1NC Security

The affirmative’s obsession with ranking and managing risk is the essence of security logic

Hagmann & Cavelty, 2012 (National risk registers: Security scientism and the propagation of permanent insecurity, John Hagmann and Myriam Dunn Cavelty, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Sage Journals Feb 15 2012)

With the demise of communism as an overarching organizing principle and crystallization point, Western security doctrines have seen the inclusion of a growing range of different security issues from political, societal, economic and environmental sectors. By the same token, Western security politics has also been prominently infused with risk narratives and logics since the 1990s (Petersen, 2011; Hameiri and Kühn, 2011). Particular to risk-centric conceptualizations of public danger is the understanding that national and international security should take into account a varied set of natural or man-made disaster p2otentials, as well as other probable disruptions with potentially grave consequences for society. Also, specific to these dangers is the profound uncertainty regarding their exact form and likely impact, and the substantial room for conflicting interpretations surrounding them. However, **precise and ‘actionable’ knowledge of looming danger is quintessential to security politics**, the shift to new security narratives notwithstanding. Without conceptions of existing or upcoming collective dangers, security schemes are neither intelligible nor implementable. Whether the matter at hand concerns the installation of hi-tech body scanners at airports, the construction of avalanche barriers in the Alps or diplomatic initiatives for a global anti-terror alliance, any security agenda is rhetorically and politically grounded in a representation of national or international danger. In recent years, the epistemological foundations of security politics have been addressed by reflexive and critical approaches, a literature that enquires into the formation, contestation and appropriation of (in)security discourses. Situating itself in this broader literature, this article focuses on national risk registers as a particular means for authoritative knowledge definition in the field of national security. National risk registers are fairly recent, comprehensive inventories of public dangers ranging from natural hazards to industrial risks and political perils. Often produced by civil protection agencies, they seek to provide secure foundations for public policymaking, security-related resource allocation and policy planning. Evaluating and ranking all kinds of potential insecurities, from toxic accidents and political unrest to plant diseases, thunderstorms, energy shortages, terrorist strikes, wars and the instability of global financial markets, risk registers stand at the intersection of the broadening of security politics and the adoption of risk logics.

In particular, infrastructure development is the essence of modern securitization – it translates the normal function of life into the discourse of security

Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams, 10 (Tom Lundborg, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Nick Vaughan-Williams, University of Warwick, “There’s More to Life than Biopolitics: Critical Infrastructure, Resilience Planning, and Molecular Security,” Paper prepared for the SGIR Conference, Stockholm, 7-10 September, 2010)

While the terrain of security studies is of course fiercely contested, what is common among a range of otherwise often diverse perspectives is the core premise that ‘security’ relates to a realm of activity in some sense beyond the ‘norm’ of political life. Thus, in the language of the Copenhagen School, a securitizing move occurs when an issue not previously thought of as a security threat comes to be produced as such via a speech act that declares an existential threat to a referent object (Buzan et al 1998). A similar logic can be identified in approaches to security that focus on exceptionalism: the idea, following the paradigmatic thought of Carl Schmitt, that sovereign practices rely upon the decision to suspend the normal state of affairs in order to produce emergency conditions in which extraordinary measures—such as martial law, for example—are legitimised. For this reason, a tendency in security studies—even among self-styled ‘critical’ approaches – is to privilege analysis of high-profile ‘speech acts’ of elites, ‘exceptional’ responses to ‘exceptional’ circumstances, and events that are deemed to be ‘extraordinary’. Arguably this leads to an emphasis on what we might call the ‘spectacle of security’, rather than more mundane, prosaic, and ‘everyday’ aspects of security policy and practice. By contrast, the world of CIs necessitates a shift in the referent object of security away from the ‘spectacular’ to the ‘banal’. Instead of high-profile speech-based acts of securitization, we are here dealing with telecommunications and transportation networks, water treatment and sewage works, and so on: ‘semi-invisible’ phenomena that are often taken-for-granted fixtures and fittings of society, yet **vital for the maintenance of** what is considered to be ‘**normal daily life’**. For this reason our subject matter calls for a re-thinking of the very ‘stuff’ considered to be apposite for the study of international security. Indeed, analysing the role of CIs and resilience planning in global security relations adds particular resonance to existing calls within the literature to broaden and deepen the way in which acts of securitization are conceptualised (Bigo 2002; Balzacq 2005; McDonald 2008; Williams 2003). Those adopting more sociologically-oriented perspectives, for example, have sought to emphasise the way in which securitizing moves can be made by institutions (as well as individuals), through repeated activity (as well as one-off ‘acts’), and involve various media (not only ‘speech’, but visual culture, for example). From this reconfigured point of view it is possible to then see how the design, planning, management, and execution of CIs also constitute an arena in which processes of securitization—of physical and cyber networks—takes place.

The dream of security produces apocalypse– *constructions* of existential risk produce the annihilation they are meant to escape

Pever Coviello, Prof. of English @ Bowdoin, 2k [*Queer Frontiers*, p. 39-40]

Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the world we inhabit is in any way postapocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed-it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques Derrida’s suitably menacing phrase) "remainderless and a-symbolic destruction," then in the postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, **always to an "other"** people whose very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous **contagion, threatening the safety** and prosperity **of a cherished "general population**." This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontag's incisive observation, from 1989, that, 'Apocalypse is now a long-running serial: **not 'Apocalypse Now' but 'Apocalypse from Now On.""** The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on, at length, to miss) is that apocalypse is ever present because, as an element in a vast economy of power, it is ever useful. That is, through the perpetual threat of **destruction-through the constant reproduction of the figure of apocalypse**-agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his first volume of The History of Sexuality addresses himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than productive, less life-threatening than, in his words, "life-administering." Power, he contends, "exerts a positive influence on life land, endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations?' In his brief comments on what he calls "the atomic situation;' however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern power must not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means. For as "managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race," agencies of modern power presume to act 'on the behalf of the existence of everyone." Whatsoever might be construed as a threat to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive or, indeed, **potentially annihilating**. "If genocide is indeed the dream of modem power," Foucault writes, "this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population." For a state that would arm itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patterns and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, **seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.**

Alternative – Reject the affirmative’s security logic – only resistance to the discourse of security can generate genuine political thought

Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008 [*Critique of Security*, 185-6]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps **to eschew the logic of security altogether** - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it **marginalises all else, most notably** the constructive conflicts, **debates** and discussions **that animate political life**. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: **maybe there is no hole**."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an **alternative political language** which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to **blind ourselves** to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a **different conception of the good.** We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but **bracketing it out** and handing it to the state; **it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift**."'

Icebreakers overview (:30)

Naval power- The plan creates shipping lanes which necessitate defending. Once the US establishes an economic foothold we will be invested in its defense. The scenario that Russia will attack assumes US involvement. This is ONLY possible in the world of the plan.

Shipping lanes- This scenario is true hyperbole- a SINGLE shipping lane is the CRUX of ALL global shipping. The logical extend of this is the willingness to sacrifice anything in the name of preserving the shipping lane. Lundborg concludes that the shipping lane will be closed to preserve it and secure it for later.

Artic Science- This is an excellent example of this critique- the idea that we need to prepare and securitize in the face of insecurity of warming is an attempt to prevent coming suffering. This fundamentally ignores the problems of the status quo for the problems of the future

Oil Spills- The affirmatives fundamental fear of oil spills is illogical and without limit. By refusing to take action in the face of insecurity they will always put off action. Despite current destruction of arctic ecosystems due to global warming the aff assumes that ONE oil spill could IREVERSABLY destroy all arctic life

AT perm (:45)

1. The aff’s obsession with managing risk entrenches us in security logic only totalizing rejecting solves that neocleus and Hagmann & Cavelty, 2012
2. The perm severs out of the representations of the 1ac- makes aff a moving target voter for education thats
3. The link proves that the plan would always be an undesirable element
4. The plan cannot be detached from its discursive underpinnings. The noble effort to restrict violence is enframed by a larger structure of security logic that writes the effort into a broader system of hegemonic power and economic domination.

Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, ‘7 [*Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence*, p. 3-4]

These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on terror', where their meaning and impact take on gre`ater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1

It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis **relate not only to the** most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, **but also to their available** (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, **but also their mainstream critique**s - whether they take the form **of liberal policy approaches** in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement **about major concepts**, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity. As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically **wards off critique.**

Link (:25)

The affs over emphasis on the preservation of life before everything else is a product of the security logic. By prioritizing security discourse over all else- everyday discourse is marginalized in the name of security. Their way of framing security through the necessity for infrastructure does two things- first it expands the power of the state over the individual and second it creates protectable and vulnerable zones that necessitate protection and securitization. Their framing of impact scenarios creates threats that never existed to make people feel a false sense of security. Lundborg and Vaung Williams

AT security good (:40)

1. They don’t aren’t the good type of securitization that their evidence refers to- they construct infrastructure in order to prevent conflict not improve conditions
2. The logic of security prioritizes conflict and state based threats and as an act of exemption justifies the elimination of the human security that their evidence talks about- That’s Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams, 10
3. The security framing is structurally divisive – positive articulations are impossible because of the logic of exclusion

Roe, 12 (Paul Roe, Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations and European Studies at Central European University, Budapest, “Is securitization a ‘negative’ concept? Revisiting the normative debate over normal versus extraordinary politics,” Security Dialogue vol. 43 no. 3, June 2012)

Concentrating instead on the societal sector of security, Aradau maintains that since security utterances are constitutive of who belongs to the (political) community and who does not, non-divisive referents are (at least for societal security) **rendered unattainable** – that is, **the inherent boundary-making function of security necessarily hinders the inclusionary intent of other, positive approaches**. For example, referring to some feminist approaches to security, Aradau (2008: 73) contends that J. Anne Tickner’s attempt to move beyond enemy Others to ‘the preservation of life’ itself as an ultimate value fails to acknowledge the practices brought by existing hegemonies of power:

The life of refugees and asylum seekers can be valued as they are provided with food, shelter, and even medical assistance, but are in principle excluded from the political community. They are to be saved from sinking boats only to be deported to their country of origin. By bringing the condition of politics upon the precondition for acting as a political subject, the discourse of life preservation closes down struggles about the kind of life that people can live.

In other words, ‘we can help you, but you are not one of us and so you are not welcome here’. In this sense, Aradau (2008: 162) refers to security as ‘barred universality’, inasmuch as exclusion and subordination are ‘intrinsic to its practices’. And this leads her to the rather provocative conclusion that ‘the horizon of security is, ultimately, fascism, the community that draws impermeable boundaries’ (Aradau, 2008: 162–3).

AT Our threats real ( :10)

The creation of threats by the state is just a ploy to justify the expansion of state power a supposed resolution of risk Hagmann & Cavelty 12

Risk is created as a part of the larger system of political security- while these may seem real they are actually created as a means of preservation of the state that’s lundborg and Vaughan-Williams

The claim to knowledge of existing threats is the most dangerous form of securization. It invokes the logic of the discourse without even the benefit of clearly defending the practice

Roe, 12 (Paul Roe, Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations and European Studies at Central European University, Budapest, “Is securitization a ‘negative’ concept? Revisiting the normative debate over normal versus extraordinary politics,” Security Dialogue vol. 43 no. 3, June 2012)

The view that securitization is bad for democracy is also given salience by the so-called Paris School. Inspired predominantly by the work of Pierre Bourdieu, the Paris School has sought to illuminate how the practices of various agencies – the police, border guards, etc. – serve to reveal certain processes that do not necessarily derive from identifiable security speech acts. Often focusing on the securitization of migration, the work of perhaps the most prominent of the Paris School’s members, Didier Bigo, shows how ‘security professionals’ – those officials and bureaucrats who, empowered with privileged information, purport to authoritatively define threats, rather than responding to such threats ‘out there’ – exaggerate or provoke existing fears for the purpose of promoting their own institutional interests (Bigo, 2002: 64). Rather than the ‘politics of exception’ that is characteristic of the Copenhagen School’s formulation, Bigo’s security professionals are enabled by a ‘politics of unease’ (Huysmans and Buonfino, 2008). The politics of unease is not concerned with existential threats to political autonomy and territorial integrity, but with other dangers that are nonetheless to be policed, linking together various policy fields (e.g. counter-terrorism, trafficking and illegal immigration) in order to warrant the introduction of governmental technologies such as racial profiling and ID cards. The important point here is that through more ordinary – that is to say, more discreet and surreptitious – mechanisms, the politics of unease can create contexts for securitization within which there is no clear discursive framing of threat.4 As Huysmans (2011: 376) has written more recently, if instead of the moment of securitization ‘we have a myriad of decisions in a process that is continuously made and remade, then what is left of the … political critique of securitizing that is invested in the notion of speech act?’ In other words, if you cannot locate a securitization, if you cannot identify who is responsible, how can you scrutinize the policy? This presents a particular kind of challenge for open and accountable government.

Policies that claim to know the truth of a situation fall into the trap of misplaced certainty and take overly-bold steps against imaginary threats – think WMD’s in Iraq

Mitzen and Schweller, 11 (Jennifer Mitzen and Randall Schweller, Mitzen and Schweller are professors of Political Science at Ohio State University, “ Knowing the Unknown Unknowns: Misplaced Certainty and the Onset of War”, 3/15/2011, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2011.549023, RM)

It is not surprising that decision makers dealing with enormous complexity and uncertainty sometimes mistake spiral situations for deterrent ones and vice versa. What is puzzling is that we frequently observe these problems decisively resolved in the minds of leaders. Faced with actions of great consequence and uncertainty, leaders might be expected to be indecisive or to adopt a classic hedging strategy, making incremental judgments and letting experience accumulate with an open mind. In security dilemma and spiral model cases, however, things go terribly wrong because leaders form very strong opinions and take bold and decidedly non-incremental actions. Why does this seem to happen so often? IR scholarship pays more attention to uncertainty as a cause of war than it does to misplaced certainty. In this paper we have challenged this “uncertainty bias” in two ways. First, we show that misplaced certainty matters. We argued that certainty rather than uncertainty triggers security dilemmas and arms spirals. Indeed, we see it as a necessary condition for these logics to produce war in most cases. The centrality of misplaced certainty is apparent in the three key elements that define security dilemmas and spiral dynamics: (1) there cannot be any real underlying conflicts of interest that explain the conflict; (2) leaders, nevertheless, become convinced that the state confronts a real threat that requires mobilization and risks of war to counter the “certain” danger; and (3) their threat perceptions and assessments of the other's hostile intentions must be incorrect. Like paranoia, then, conflict spirals and their associated dynamics are driven by firmly held but delusional beliefs of persecution and harm, that is, by misplaced certainties of external danger. Second, we distinguished three different types of uncertainty and argued that the risk approach in IR cannot accommodate fundamental uncertainty, which makes it an unrealistic premise for at least some important situations in world politics. Our confidence model of certainty, which assumes fundamental uncertainty, thus better accounts for both the phenomenology and prevalence of misplaced certainty. This model is not intended to replace the risk approach—the “as if” assumptions of the risk model have been theoretically productive, and exposing its empirical boundaries does not diminish that usefulness. But because the boundaries of risk are such that some important decision environments of world politics slip through the cracks, it also leaves room for theories with more realistic assumptions to give insight; and so we offer the confidence model as a way of beginning that conversation.

AT Extinction outweighs (:25)

They miss the boat here.

1. Our argument is that the use of extinction scenarios as a way of justifying action in the name of security fundamentally ignores all other concerns such as human rights. This endless pursuit of security is all sacrificing and ultimately self defeating as in the end we sacrifice all things that give life value in the name of extinction.
2. The idea that survival aka security is a prerequisite to value is what we criticize. We will never be secure enough so we will endlessly degrade human values
3. Even if they are right that extinction prevents value. They should have to prove a phenomenally high risk of TOTAL extinction to justify sacrificing human values
4. If they say try or die vote neg

Alt solves (:10)

Our argument is that discursively within political life (which we are all involved in) we should resist the urge to securitize. This resistance makes room for other versions of political thought. Our alternative is not a utopian dream that changes the fundamental nature of the state but rather a way of changing the focus from security in political thought

AT cede the political (:30)

1. Our argument is that their understanding of the political is too narrow- by only understanding political concerns as state level politics and policy pros they exclude the politics of the individual and human security that we say are important- that’s Neocleous in 8
2. Our poststructuralist stance is the only effective political strategy – the political has already been ceded to the right – broadening the scope of politics is key to effective engagement.

Grondin 4 [David, master of pol sci and PHD of political studies @ U of Ottowa “(Re)Writing the “National Security State”: How and Why Realists (Re)Built the(ir) Cold War,” http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/ieim/IMG/pdf/rewriting\_national\_security\_state.pdf]

A poststructuralist approach to international relations reassesses the nature of the political. Indeed, it calls for the **repoliticization of** practices of world **politics** that have been treated as if they were not political. For instance, limiting the ontological elements in one’s inquiry to states or great powers is a political choice. As Jenny Edkins puts it, we need to “bring the political back in” (Edkins, 1998: xii). For most analysts of International Relations, the conception of the “political” is **narrowly restricted to politics as practiced by politicians**. However, from a poststructuralist viewpoint, the “political” acquires a **broader meaning,** especially since practice is not what most theorists are describing as practice. Poststructuralism sees theoretical discourse not only as discourse, but also as political practice. Theory therefore becomes practice. The political space of poststructuralism is not that of exclusion; it is the political space of postmodernity, a dichotomous one, where one thing always signifies at least one thing and another (Finlayson and Valentine, 2002: 14). **Poststructuralism** thus **gives primacy to the political**, sinceit acts on us, while we act in its name, and leads us to identify and differentiate ourselves from others. This political act is never complete and celebrates undecidability, whereas decisions, when taken, express the political moment. It is a critical attitude which encourages dissidence from traditional approaches (Ashley and Walker, 1990a and 1990b). It does not represent one single philosophical approach or perspective, nor is it an alternative paradigm (Tvathail, 1996: 172). It is a nonplace, a border line falling between international and domestic politics (Ashley, 1989). The poststructuralist analyst questions the borderlines and dichotomies of modernist discourses, such as inside/outside, the constitution of the Self/Other, and so on. In the act of definition, difference – thereby the discourse of otherness – is highlighted, since one always defines an object with regard to what it is not (Knafo, 2004). As Simon Dalby asserts, “It involves the social construction of some other person, group, culture, race, nationality or political system as different from ‘our’ person, group, etc. Specifying difference is a linguistic, epistemological and, most importantly, a political act; it constructs a space for the other distanced and inferior from the vantage point of the person specifying the difference” (Dalby, cited in Tvathail, 1996: 179). Indeed, poststructuralism offers no definitive answers, but leads to new questions and new unexplored grounds. This makes the commitment to the incomplete nature of the political and of political analysis so central to poststructuralism (Finlayson and Valentine, 2002: 15). As Jim George writes, “It is postmodern resistance in the sense that while it is directly (and sometimes violently) engaged with modernity, it seeks to go beyond the repressive, closed aspects of modernist global existence. It is, therefore, not a resistance of traditional grand-scale emancipation or conventional radicalism imbued with authority of one or another sovereign presence. Rather, in opposing the large-scale brutality and inequity in human society, it is a resistance active also at the everyday, community, neighbourhood, and interpersonal levels, where it confronts those processes that **systematically exclude people from making decisions about who they are and what they can be**” (George, 1994: 215, emphasis in original). In this light, poststructural practices are used critically to investigate how the subject of international relations is constituted in and through the discourses and texts of global politics. Treating theory as discourse opens up the possibility of historicizing it. It is a myth that theory can be abstracted from its socio-historical context, from reality, so to speak, as neorealists and neoclassical realists believe. It is a political practice which needs to be contextualized and stripped of its purportedly neutral status. It must be understood with respect to its role in **preserving and reproducing the structures and power relations present in all language forms.** Dominant theories are, in this view, dominant discourses that shape our view of the world (the “subject”) and our ways of understanding it.

AT realism (:40)

The description of the world as an anarchic system creates a self-fulfilling prophecy in which the state continues to securitize against an every growing quantity of threats that can never truly be prevented

The LITANY of Departures From Realism and Failure of “Systemic Punishment” Disproves Their Theory.

Ronald R. Krebs, Faculty Fellow - Government @ University of Texas at Austin, Donald D. Harrington, Prof. of Political Science Univ. of Minnesota, ‘6 [Rhetoric, Strategy, and War: Language, Power, and the Making of US Security Policy, http://www.polisci.umn.edu/~mirc/paper2006-07/fall2006/Krebs.pdf]

Structural realists, focusing on the imperatives to security- or power-maximization that states must obey if they are to survive in the anarchic international system, are simply uninterested in domestic debate of any sort. They have long argued that these systemic imperatives, derived from the distribution of material power and perhaps geography, constitute an objective “national interest” that must be the chief driver of foreign policy.23 When states, for whatever reason, behave in contrary ways, they will eventually suffer punishment for their foolishness.24 But are there really such objective systemic dictates? The very fact that American structural realists frequently rail against US foreign policy suggests that departures from realist expectations are **hardly exceptional**. The typical realist response is that in these cases actors with more parochial or moralistic perspectives have hijacked policy, but realists, with their inattention to domestic politics, are then hard pressed to explain when such views hold sway.25 Moreover, the fact that such “hijackings” are so common suggests either that the system does **not often punish states for disobeying its rules**, in which case the **structural logic collapses**, or that **there are no such rules in the first place**. Structural realism imagines foreign policy as an exceptional realm above the political fray. Yet, even when the house is on fire, foreign policy lies in the realm of choice, not compulsion, and **thus very much in the realm of the political.**

Realism creates a death drive.

Der Derian 98 [JAMES, ON SECURITY, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html]

In epistemic realism, the search for security through sovereignty is not a political choice but the necessary reaction to an anarchical condition: Order is man-made and good; chaos is natural and evil. Out of self-interest, men must pursue this good and constrain the evil of excessive will through an alienation of individual powers to a superior, indeed supreme, collective power. In short, the security of epistemic realism is ontological, theological and teleological: that is, metaphysical. We shall see, from Marx's and Nietzsche's critiques, the extent to which Hobbesian security and epistemic realism rely on social constructions posing as apodictic truths for their power effects. There is not and never was a "state of nature" or a purely "self-interested man"; there is, however, clearly an abiding fear of violent and premature death that compels men to seek the security found in solidarity.

Nextgen overview

Econ- This advantage represents the fundamental obsession with the security logic- The AFF is concerned with the resolution of accidents the aff over hypes the importance and probability of these accidents and pretends that the aff will be able to magically fix all accidents despite the fact that some are caused by human error. This obsession with accidents created by their political discourse creates an logic of fear for the individual that colonizes their lives. They also misconstrue evidence to hype their scenario- They confuse the aviation industry(which they help) with the aerospace industry(which they no effect on as most of the aerospace industry is military or space). The plan only creates 150 thousand jobs as compared to the 21.4 million unemployed in the status quo. They then say that if we don’t have those small number of jobs global nuclear war will occur despite 11 recessions since nuclear weapons without any nuclear use.

Terror talk

Their construction of terrorism as a threat of an “other” that’s coming to kill us is bad for a few reasons- it infinitely drives us to securitize every vulnerability eliminating the possibility human values to exist. It also constructs terrorists as a threat that justifies racist and unethical policies that in turn produce “terrorism”. That’s Reid 10 Finally the drive to securitize against domestic threats culminates in the systematic oppression and subjugation of minorities within the US This securitization against domestic threats leads to the denial of access to infrastructure and turns the case- That’s Lundborg and van Williams

**Our policies regarding terror are the root cause of it—it’s a self-fulfilling prophecy**

RT 11 [English news channel, 11/9/2011, “Washington’s Enemy ‘Doesn’t Exist’ <http://www.rt.com/news/us-muslim-policy-sheuer-895/>]

**Americans are in the crosshairs of terrorists worldwide** purely due to Washington’s policy **in the Muslim world, not because there is an Islamic enemy** whose only aim is to kill Americans for their freedoms and lifestyle, **insists a former CIA officer.**¶ **Historian Michael Scheuer**, an author of "Through our enemies’ eyes", **who worked for the agency for over 20 years** till 2004 **and at one time was the chief of the CIA’s ‘Bin Laden unit’, says America’s greatest enemy – radical Islam – never existed: neither when Bin Laden was alive, nor now.**¶ Israeli lobby drag America into wars¶ **Actually, “it is America’s relationship with Israel that is causing this war** [on Islam]”, and until Americans accept this, “we are not going to defeat this enemy,” the author says.¶ Michael Scheuer believes it is the Israeli lobby in America that is dragging the US into wars.¶ “In Israel itself as a country, it is not a problem. The real problem is the leaders of the Jewish American community in the US, who influence and corrupt our Congress to support Israel when we have no interest there,” he states.¶ “The American political establishment is caught between two things. They are extremely pro-Israel and they are almost Marxist in their belief that the spread of democracy is inevitable in all places, in all peoples, in all time,” evaluates the former CIA officer, adding that in their desire to protect Israel, the US establishment cannot tell what’s real.¶ Radical Islamists will benefit¶ Michael Scheuer predicts that in countries caught up in the Arab Spring like Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, “there is not going to be a democracy that in any way resembles democracy in the west.”¶ At the same time, the anarchy being created in the Muslim world will make radical Islamists the only beneficiaries of the chaos engulfing the Arab countries.¶ According to Michael Scheuer, further radicalization of Islamist groups, particularly in Africa, is inevitable – thanks to guns becoming more affordable.¶ The endless flow of uncounted weapons and the opened prisons in the above countries have reinforced Islamist groups around the world, believes Scheuer.¶ “Their [American political establishment’s] mindless pursuit of secular democracy at the end of the day endangers the stability of the region and probably the whole world,” he says.¶ If Syria falls to Islamists – Israel will go down¶ As for the situation in Syria – it has been interfered in by the US unconscionably.¶ “Until they [the Syrians] removed the US ambassador, he was running around their country trying to encourage groups to overthrow the Syrian government. That is not the role of any diplomat, US, Russian, Chinese or British,” the author points out, saying that “Syrians were urged onto the streets cold-bloodedly,” without mention of the possibility of being shot dead by the government.¶ The author recalls that Syria, with its traditional support of Hezbollah, is naturally an Israeli zone of interest, not an American one.¶ “Syria is a country with no US interest. Since I was a little boy, we’ve been afraid of the Syrians,” the author says, laughing at the fact that “if you look at the map – it’s hard to imagine that this little blat of country called Syria could be a threat to the US.”¶ Clarifying a possible result of any American success in Syria, Scheuer says that “this is another good example of dichotomy in the thinking of the American leaders. Because as we call for democracy in Syria, if Assad goes – Israel’s security goes straight down.”¶ Israel sets US plans on Iran¶ Michael Scheuer reveals that America’s ‘plan on Iran’ depends on that of Israel.¶ “Both Republicans and Democrats are deathly afraid that Israelis will attack Iran off their own work. If Israel attacks Iran, the Americans will get blamed for condoning it, whether we did or not,” he explains.¶ “What we are seeing is a slow, almost non-accelerable advance toward some kind of a conflict with Tehran.”¶ He labels the alleged plot of eliminating a Saudi Arabian ambassador in the US with the help of a Mexican drug cartel “a comic uproar”, saying he can hardly believe Iran would risk a war with the US, Israel and much of NATO, just to kill somebody who is not even a member of the ruling family of Saudi Arabia.¶ “They’ve come down under belief that democracy is better for everybody. The truth is, American and western foreign policy interests in the Middle East have depended for 50 years on the maintenance of tyranny that gave us access to oil, that protected Israel and persecuted Islamists to protect us. All of that going by the wayside,” acknowledges the author, recalling the Israelis, who were first to realize that democracy might not be good for their security.¶ ‘Libya will be anti-American’¶ Answering a question about war-torn Libya, the author pointed out that this country is notorious for having its Islamists fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and then the same men encountering the Americans in Iraq and also in Afghanistan. Michael Scheuer is uncertain whether Libya will become a hotbed for terrorists, but “it will decidedly be anti-American and anti-NATO”.¶ ‘We are fighting a religious war’¶ Despite being largely well-educated and technologically advanced,¶ “America lacks common sense”¶ , claims the former CIA officer, maintaining that for the last 20 years, the US has been very efficient in creating enemies and endangering security. The last four American presidents have been telling the population that the wars the US wages abroad are against a bunch of madmen, and in no way religious wars.¶ “We are definitely fighting a religious war. And until we come to realize that – we are never going to be able to defeat it,” Scheuer concludes.¶ “Let the Chinese deal with these [Islamist] people for the next 50 years, we’ve had enough of it, but the point is – the Americans cannot get out.”

Our criticism proceeds the affirmative- the racialized logic of securitization upon which the plan relies is the root of their harms claims -- You have an ethical obligation to oppose this frame. This is an independent reason to vote negative

Roxanne Doty, Prof. of Political Science @ ASU [Woot], 1996 [Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Reprsentations in North-South Relations, p. 166-71]

One of the deadly traces that has been deposited in our current "reality" and that figures prominently in this study is "race." The inventory of this trace has been systematically ignored by international relations scholarship. It seems fair to suggest that most international relations scholars as well as makers of foreign policy would suggest that "race" is not even a relevant issue in global politics. Some might concede that while "race" may have been a significant factor internationally during particular historical periods-as a justification for colonialism, for example - "we" are past that now. The racial hierarchy that once prevailed internationally simply no longer exists. To dwell upon "race" as an international issue is an unproductive, needless rehash of history. Adlai Stevenson rather crudely summed up this position when he complained that he was impatiently waiting for the time "when the last black-faced comedian has quit preaching about colonialism so the United Nations could move on to the more crucial issues like disarmament" (quoted in Noer 1985: 84). This view is unfortunately, although subtly, reflected in the very definition of the field of international relations, whose central problems and categories have been framed in such a way as to preclude investigation into categories such as "race" that do not fit neatly within the bounds of prevailing conceptions of theory and explanation and the legitimate methods with which to pursue them. As Walker (1989) points out, current international relations research agendas are framed within an understanding that presumes certain ontological issues have been resolved. Having already resolved the questions of the "real" and relevant entities, international relations scholars generally proceed to analyze the world with an eye toward becoming a "real science." What has been defined as "real" and relevant has not included race. As this study suggests, however, racialized identities historically have been inextricably linked with power, agency, reason, morality, and understandings of "self" and "other."' When we invoke these terms in certain contexts, we also silently invoke traces of previous racial distinctions. For example, Goldberg (1993: 164) suggests that the conceptual division of the world whereby the "third world" is the world of tradition, irrationality, overpopulation, disorder, and chaos assumes a racial character that perpetuates, both conceptually and actually, relations of domination, subjugation, and exclusion. Excluding the issue of representation enables the continuation of this and obscures the important relationship between representation, power, and agency. The issue of agency in international affairs appears in the literature in various ways, ranging from classical realism's subjectivist privileging of human agents to neorealism's behavioralist privileging of the state as agent to the more recent focus on the "agent-structure problem" by proponents of structuration theory (e.g., Wendt [19871, Dessler 119891). What these accounts have in common is their exclusion of the issue of representation. The presumption is made that agency ultimately refers back to some prediscursive subject, even if that subject is socially constructed within the context of political, social, and economic structures. In contrast, the cases examined in this study suggest that the question of agency is one of how practices of representation create meaning and identities and thereby create the very possibility for agency. As Judith Butler (1990: 142-49) makes clear and as the empirical cases examined here suggest, identity and agency are both effects, not preexisting conditions of being. Such an antiessentialist understanding does not depend upon foundational categories -an inner psychological self, for example. Rather, identity is reconceptualized as simultaneously a practice and an effect that is always in the process of being constructed through signifying practices that expel the surplus meanings that would expose the failure of identity as such. For example, through a process of repetition, U.S. and British discourses constructed as natural and given the oppositional dichotomy between the uncivilized, barbaric "other" and the civilized, democratic "self" even while they both engaged in the oppression and brutalization of "others." The Spector of the "other" was always within the "self." The proliferation of discourse in times of crisis illustrates an attempt to expel the "other," to make natural and unproblematic the boundaries between the inside and the outside. This in turn suggests that identity and therefore the agency that is connected with identity are inextricably linked to representational practices. It follows that any meaningful discussion of agency must perforce be a discussion of representation. The representational practices that construct particular identities have serious ramifications for agency. While this study suggests that "race" historically has been a central marker of identity, it also suggests that identity construction takes place along several dimensions. Racial categories often have worked together with gendered categories as well as with analogies to parent/child oppositions and animal metaphors. Each of these dimensions has varying significance at different times and enables a wide variety of practices. In examining the construction of racialized identities, it is not enough to suggest that social identities are constructed on the basis of shared understandings within a community: shared understandings regarding institutional rules, social norms, and selfexpectations of individuals in that community. It is not enough to examine the shared social criteria by which one identity is distinguished from another. Two additional elements must be considered: power and truth. "Race" has not just been about certain rules and resources facilitating the agency of some social groups and denying or placing severe limitations on the agency of other social groups. Though it has been about these things, this is only one aspect of what "race" has historically been about. "Race" has most fundamentally been about being human. Racist discourses historically have constructed different kinds and degrees of humanness through representational practices that have claimed to be and have been accepted as "true" and accurate representations of "reality." Racist discourses highlight, perhaps more than any other, the inextricable link between power and truth or power and knowledge. A theory of agency in international relations, if it is to incorporate issues such as "race," must address the relationship between power and truth. This realization in turn implies a reconceptualization of power and how it works that transcends those present in existing theories of international relations. The cases examined in this study attest to the importance of representational practices and the power that inheres in them. The infinity of traces that leave no inventory continue to play a significant part in contemporary constructions of "reality." This is not to suggest that representations have been static. Static implies the possibility of fixedness, when what I mean to suggest is an inherent fragility and instability to the meanings and identities that have been constructed in the various discourses I examined. For example, to characterize the South as "uncivilized" or "unfit for self-government" is no longer an acceptable representation. This is not, however, because the meanings of these terms were at one time fixed and stable. As I illustrated, what these signifiers signified was always deferred. Partial fixation was the result of their being anchored by some exemplary mode of being that was itself constructed at the power/ knowledge nexus: the white male at the turn of the century, the United States after World War II. Bhabha stresses "the wide range of the stereotype, from the loyal servant to Satan, from the loved to the hated; a shifting of subject positions in the circulation of colonial power" (1983: 31). The shifting subject positions-from uncivilized native to quasi state to traditional "man" and society, for example -are all partial fixations that have enabled the exercise of various and multiple forms of power. Nor do previous oppositions entirely disappear. What remains is an infinity of traces from prior representations that themselves have been founded not on pure presences but on differance. "The present becomes the sign of the sign, the trace of the trace," Derrida writes (1982: 24). Differance makes possible the chain of differing and deferring (the continuity) as well as the endless substitution (the discontinuity) of names that are inscribed and reinscribed as pure presence, the center of the structure that itself escapes structurality. North-South relations have been constituted as a structure of deferral. The center of the structure (alternatively white man, modern man, the United States, the West, real states) has never been absolutely present outside a system of differences. It has itself been constituted as trace-the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates itself, displaces itself, refers itself (ibid.). Because the center is not a fixed locus but a function in which an infinite number of sign substitutions come into play, the domain and play of signification is extended indefinitely (Derrida 1978: z8o). This both opens up and limits possibilities, generates alternative sites of meanings and political resistances that give rise to practices of reinscription that seek to reaffirm identities and relationships. The inherently incomplete and open nature of discourse makes this reaffirmation an ongoing and never finally completed project. In this study I have sought, through an engagement with various discourses in which claims to truth have been staked, to challenge the validity of the structures of meaning and to make visible their complicity with practices of power and domination. By examining the ways in which structures of meaning have been associated with imperial practices, I have suggested that the construction of meaning and the construction of social**,** political, and economic power are inextricably linked. This suggests an ethical dimension to making meaning and an ethical imperative that is incumbent upon those who toil in the construction of structures of meaning. This is especially urgent in North-South relations today: one does not have to search very far to find a continuing complicity with colonial representations that ranges from a politics of silence and neglect to constructions of terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, international drug trafficking, and Southern immigration to the North as new threats to global stability and peace. The political stakes raised by this analysis revolve around the question of being able to "get beyond" the representations or speak outside of the discourses that historically have constructed the North and the South. I do not believe that there are any pure alternatives by which we can escape the infinity of traces to which Gramsci refers. Nor do I wish to suggest that we are always hopelessly imprisoned in a dominant and all-pervasive discourse. Before this question can be answered-indeed, before we can even proceed to attempt an answer-attention must be given to the politics of representation. The price that international relations scholarship pays for its inattention to the issue of representation is perpetuation of the dominant modes of making meaning and deferral of its responsibility and complicity in dominant representations.

Airports are a representation of the securitized state

Salter 07

Mark Salter, Governmentalities of an Airport:Heterotopia and Confession, International Political Sociology(2007)1, 49–66

The modern international airport represents and reflects the intersecting forces that organize contemporary politics, facilitating transit while simultaneously securitizing identity. I take this site seriously and ask: how is the airport governed? I make use of two neglected notions from Foucault’s considerable body of work: the confessionary complex and the heterotopia. Modern subjects, according to Foucault, are conditioned by a Christian notion of continual, exhaustive confes- sion in the face of state apparatus, securing not only a docile body but also an anxious, self-disclosing citizen. The airport, while emancipatory and open for some, represents a locus of anxiety and interrogation for many others. In his lecture ‘‘Of Other Spaces,’’ Foucault proposes an examination of heterotopias, locations that are ‘‘in relation with all other sites, but in such a way to suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations that they happen to designate, mirror, or reflect’’ (1986:24). The airport connects the national and the international (also the national to itself), the domestic and the foreign, in a way that problematizes those connections. In particular, I argue that within this multifaceted environment dominated by doctrines of risk management and customer service, the confessionary complex facilitates the self-policing of transiting individuals and that the overlapping and obscured lines of authority subtly restrict the possibilities of resistance. International political sociology balances theoretical analysis and empirical material, with an overtly political but not prescriptive frame. By focusing on the system of policies, practices, and discourses that govern particular intersections of the local, national, and global, international political sociology explores the intersections of power and authority that shape the governance of these specific institutions. By eschewing a strict linguistic turn, international political sociology examines not simply the language of politics but also a wider notion of discourse including prac- tices, institutions, and authorities. Bigo’s attention to the rise of international risk consultancies and Walters’ examination of the deportation and decitizenship re- gimes provide new ways of looking at policing and security. International political sociology is well situated to reflect critically on the airport, taking as its subject matter not the grand structure of a universal politics, but more modest examin- ations of specific sites and institutions where politics are enacted, or as Foucault terms it ‘‘humble modalities, minor procedures, as compared with the majestic rituals of sovereignty or the great apparatuses of state’’

Serial policy failure

Their reliance on security suffers from serial policy failure – and the attendant endless production of new threats to be countered creates an endless politics of war

Dillon and Reed 09 (IR professor @ Lancaster University; Lecturer @ King’s College London, “The Liberal Way of Killing: Killing to Make Live”)

There is, third, the additional critical attribute of contingency. It is this feature which does not merely add governing through contingency to the political rationalities and governmental technologies of contemporary liberal rule. It lends its own distinctive infection to them; one which has had a profound impact on the nature of liberal rule and war in relation, especially, to its current hyperbolicization of security and its newly problematized and proliferating accounts of dangers, threats and enemies. For if the biopolitical imperative is that of making life live, the martial expression of that imperative, the drive to liberal war, is preparedness to make war on the enemies of life. The biopoltiical imperative to make life live finds its expression today, however in making life live the emergency of its emergence; for that is what species life is now said to be. The liberal way of rule and war has thus become the preparedness to make war on whatever threatens life’s capacity to live the emergency of its emergence. For allied to the radical contingency of species existence is an account of species existence as a life of continuous complex adaptation and emergence. From the perspective of security and war, in particular, such a pluripotent life, characterized by its continuously unfolding potential, is a life that is continuously becoming-dangerous to itself, and to other life forms. Such danger is not merely actual; because life itself, here has become not merely actual. The emphasis in the problematization of danger which accompanies such a politics of life itself therefore also shifts dramatically from the actual to the virtual. Only this explains the astonishing degree to which the historically secure lives of the Atlantic basin have come to construe themselves, politically, as radically endangered by as many unknown as there are unknowable dangers; a point regularly and frankly admitted, officially, from terror to health mandarins, nationally and internationally. Many have observed that the societies of the Atlantic basin are now increasingly ruled by fear; that there is a politics of fear. But they interpret this politics of fear in political naïve ways, as the outcome of deliberate machination by political and economic elites. They may well be correct to some degree. But what is perfectly evident, also, is that the elites themselves are governed by the very grid of intelligibility furnished by the account of life as an emergency of emergence. It is not simply a matter, therefore, of leaders playing on fears. The leadership itself is in the grip of a conjugation of government and rule whose very generative principle of formation is permanent emergency. In other words, fear is no longer simply an affect open to regular manipulation by leadership cadres. It is, but it is not only that, and not even most importantly that. More importantly (because this is not a condition that can be resolved simply by ‘throwing the rascals out’) in the permanent emergency of emergence, fear becomes a generative principle of formation for rule. The emergency of emergence therefore poses a found crisis in western understandings of the political, and in the hopes and expectations invested in political as opposed to other forms of life. Given the wealth and given the vast military preponderance in weapons of mass destruction and other forms of global deployed military capabilities of the societies of the Atlantic basin, notably, of course, the United States, this poses a world crisis as well. In short, then, this complex adaptive emergent life exists in the permanent state of emergence. Its politics of security and war, which is to say its very foundational politics of rule as well, now revolve around this state of emergency. Here, that in virtue of which a ‘we’ comes to belong together, its very generative principle of formation (our shorthand definition of politics), has become this emergency. What happens, we also therefore ask of the biopoliticization of rule, when emergency becomes the generative principle of formation of community and rule? Our answer has already been given. Politics becomes subject to the urgent and compelling political economy, the logistical and technical dynamics, of war. No longer a ‘we’ in virtue of abiding by commonly agreed rules of government, it becomes a ‘we’ formed by abiding by commonly agreed rules of government, it becomes a ‘we’ formed by the rule of the emergency itself; and that is where the political crisis, the crisis of the political itself is that a ‘we’ can belong together not only in terms of agreeing to abide by the rule of its generative principles of formation but also by the willingness to keep the nature of operation of those generative principles of formation under common deliberative scrutiny. **You cannot, however, debate emergency. You can only interrogate the futile demand it makes on you**, and all the episteme challenges it poses, acceding to those demands according both to how well you can come to know them, and how well you have also adapted you affects to suffering them, or perish. The very exigencies of emergency thus militate profoundly against the promise of ‘politics’ as it has been commonly understood in the western tradition; not simply as a matter of rule, but as a matter of self-rule in which it was possible to debate the nature of the self in terms of the good for and of the self. Note, also, how much the very idea of the self has disappeared from view in this conflation of life with species life. The only intelligence, the only self-knowledge, the only culture which qualifies in the permanence of this emergency is the utilitarian and instrumental technologies said to be necessary to endure it. We have been here before in the western tradition and we have experienced the challenges of this condition as tyranny (Arendt 1968). The emergency of emergence, the generative principle of formation, the referential matrix of contemporary biopolitics globally, is a newly formed, pervasive and insidiously complex, soft totalitarian regime of power relations made all the more difficult to contest precisely because, governing through the contingent emergency of emergence, it is a governing through the transactional freedoms of contingency.

Epistemology first

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Partial fixation was the result of their being anchored by some exemplary mode of being that was itself constructed at the power/ knowledge nexus: the white male at the turn of the century, the United States after World War II. Bhabha stresses "the wide range of the stereotype, from the loyal servant to Satan, from the loved to the hated; a shifting of subject positions in the circulation of colonial power" (1983: 31). The shifting subject positions-from uncivilized native to quasi state to traditional "man" and society, for example -are all partial fixations that have enabled the exercise of various and multiple forms of power. Nor do previous oppositions entirely disappear. What remains is an infinity of traces from prior representations that themselves have been founded not on pure presences but on differance. "The present becomes the sign of the sign, the trace of the trace," Derrida writes (1982: 24). Differance makes possible the chain of differing and deferring (the continuity) as well as the endless substitution (the discontinuity) of names that are inscribed and reinscribed as pure presence, the center of the structure that itself escapes structurality. North-South relations have been constituted as a structure of deferral. The center of the structure (alternatively white man, modern man, the United States, the West, real states) has never been absolutely present outside a system of differences. It has itself been constituted as trace-the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates itself, displaces itself, refers itself (ibid.). Because the center is not a fixed locus but a function in which an infinite number of sign substitutions come into play, the domain and play of signification is extended indefinitely (Derrida 1978: z8o). This both opens up and limits possibilities, generates alternative sites of meanings and political resistances that give rise to practices of reinscription that seek to reaffirm identities and relationships. The inherently incomplete and open nature of discourse makes this reaffirmation an ongoing and never finally completed project. In this study I have sought, through an engagement with various discourses in which claims to truth have been staked, to challenge the validity of the structures of meaning and to make visible their complicity with practices of power and domination. By examining the ways in which structures of meaning have been associated with imperial practices, I have suggested that the construction of meaning and the construction of social**,** political, and economic power are inextricably linked. This suggests an ethical dimension to making meaning and an ethical imperative that is incumbent upon those who toil in the construction of structures of meaning. This is especially urgent in North-South relations today: one does not have to search very far to find a continuing complicity with colonial representations that ranges from a politics of silence and neglect to constructions of terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, international drug trafficking, and Southern immigration to the North as new threats to global stability and peace. The political stakes raised by this analysis revolve around the question of being able to "get beyond" the representations or speak outside of the discourses that historically have constructed the North and the South. I do not believe that there are any pure alternatives by which we can escape the infinity of traces to which Gramsci refers. Nor do I wish to suggest that we are always hopelessly imprisoned in a dominant and all-pervasive discourse. Before this question can be answered-indeed, before we can even proceed to attempt an answer-attention must be given to the politics of representation. The price that international relations scholarship pays for its inattention to the issue of representation is perpetuation of the dominant modes of making meaning and deferral of its responsibility and complicity in dominant representations.

Overview

The arguments in the 2AC suffer from one unifying omission: they defend the practice of political imagination and ‘realistic’ thinking without doing the work necessary to prove that security provides a stable framing mechanism to *accomplish* this.

Our argument is that logic of security imposes a structural limit on the capacity for policy-making to be rescued from itself. Their attempt to demand clear foundations from which to build political action demonstrates their inability to disentangle a vision of world politics that seeks to build security from the one that seeks to wage endless wars of extermination against an ever-expanding field of threats.

A2: Reps focus bad (Valbjorn)

1. Misses the point of the criticism.

Valbjorn says that we need to be skeptical of representational strategies that limit the possibility of encountering difference on its own terms.

But our arg is not that we must find the perfectly pure means of representing the other, it’s that ALL representations are necessarily imbued with the violence of incommensurable perception.

2. This links more to the aff. Only they contain the other within a logic of security that makes it impossible to conceptualize difference as a genuine component of human existence. In the search for a perfectly secure world we can never accept the possibility that people might reasonably disagree and be incapable of reaching a stable compromise. Only the alternative is capable of grasping otherness as an invitation to disjunction and explicitly refuse the fear that comes with the aff’s embrace of otherness exclusively through the lens of security.

3. Prefer the specificity of our link. Even if some critiques of representations are flawed, the specific way they deploy hunger as a device to secure the further reach of neoliberal ag modernization.

A2: Case outweighs

1. The aff can’t solve. They misidentify the cause of the problem. Famine and economic decline are not the result of mere happenstance – they are a product of our discursive commitment to a broader commitment to security. Their insistence that conflicts exist for explicit and single causes is a product of a system of knowledge that insists on locating security as the essential task of political imagination.

2. This failure to interrogate the deep problem of security dooms the aff

There are systemic problems that make their impacts inevitable.

- Overproduction of food has driven local farmers out of the market, which makes them more susceptible to later price hikes.

- Droughts are raging around the world – and this is not a coincidence – it’s part of a social order that has produced global warming. Which the affirmative only helps to prop up.

- Economic uncertainty is a basic feature of the modern economic order. The plan can’t resolve deep underlying questions about social spending, regulations, etc.

- China and Egypt face instability from environmental problems, lack of political freedoms, and a terrible work environment.

- deforestation is a product of overconsumption and the insatiable desire to consume, which the affirmative only expands

Each one of these is enough to disprove the easy connection between their internal link and impact

3. This is not just defense. Their reliance on security suffers from serial policy failure – and the attendant endless production of new threats to be countered creates an endless politics of war

Dillon and Reed 09 (IR professor @ Lancaster University; Lecturer @ King’s College London, “The Liberal Way of Killing: Killing to Make Live”)

There is, third, the additional critical attribute of contingency. It is this feature which does not merely add governing through contingency to the political rationalities and governmental technologies of contemporary liberal rule. It lends its own distinctive infection to them; one which has had a profound impact on the nature of liberal rule and war in relation, especially, to its current hyperbolicization of security and its newly problematized and proliferating accounts of dangers, threats and enemies. For if the biopolitical imperative is that of making life live, the martial expression of that imperative, the drive to liberal war, is preparedness to make war on the enemies of life. The biopoltiical imperative to make life live finds its expression today, however in making life live the emergency of its emergence; for that is what species life is now said to be. The liberal way of rule and war has thus become the preparedness to make war on whatever threatens life’s capacity to live the emergency of its emergence. For allied to the radical contingency of species existence is an account of species existence as a life of continuous complex adaptation and emergence. From the perspective of security and war, in particular, such a pluripotent life, characterized by its continuously unfolding potential, is a life that is continuously becoming-dangerous to itself, and to other life forms. Such danger is not merely actual; because life itself, here has become not merely actual. The emphasis in the problematization of danger which accompanies such a politics of life itself therefore also shifts dramatically from the actual to the virtual. Only this explains the astonishing degree to which the historically secure lives of the Atlantic basin have come to construe themselves, politically, as radically endangered by as many unknown as there are unknowable dangers; a point regularly and frankly admitted, officially, from terror to health mandarins, nationally and internationally. Many have observed that the societies of the Atlantic basin are now increasingly ruled by fear; that there is a politics of fear. But they interpret this politics of fear in political naïve ways, as the outcome of deliberate machination by political and economic elites. They may well be correct to some degree. But what is perfectly evident, also, is that the elites themselves are governed by the very grid of intelligibility furnished by the account of life as an emergency of emergence. It is not simply a matter, therefore, of leaders playing on fears. The leadership itself is in the grip of a conjugation of government and rule whose very generative principle of formation is permanent emergency. In other words, fear is no longer simply an affect open to regular manipulation by leadership cadres. It is, but it is not only that, and not even most importantly that. More importantly (because this is not a condition that can be resolved simply by ‘throwing the rascals out’) in the permanent emergency of emergence, fear becomes a generative principle of formation for rule. The emergency of emergence therefore poses a found crisis in western understandings of the political, and in the hopes and expectations invested in political as opposed to other forms of life. Given the wealth and given the vast military preponderance in weapons of mass destruction and other forms of global deployed military capabilities of the societies of the Atlantic basin, notably, of course, the United States, this poses a world crisis as well. In short, then, this complex adaptive emergent life exists in the permanent state of emergence. Its politics of security and war, which is to say its very foundational politics of rule as well, now revolve around this state of emergency. Here, that in virtue of which a ‘we’ comes to belong together, its very generative principle of formation (our shorthand definition of politics), has become this emergency. What happens, we also therefore ask of the biopoliticization of rule, when emergency becomes the generative principle of formation of community and rule? Our answer has already been given. Politics becomes subject to the urgent and compelling political economy, the logistical and technical dynamics, of war. No longer a ‘we’ in virtue of abiding by commonly agreed rules of government, it becomes a ‘we’ formed by abiding by commonly agreed rules of government, it becomes a ‘we’ formed by the rule of the emergency itself; and that is where the political crisis, the crisis of the political itself is that a ‘we’ can belong together not only in terms of agreeing to abide by the rule of its generative principles of formation but also by the willingness to keep the nature of operation of those generative principles of formation under common deliberative scrutiny. **You cannot, however, debate emergency. You can only interrogate the futile demand it makes on you,** and all the episteme challenges it poses, acceding to those demands according both to how well you can come to know them, and how well you have also adapted you affects to suffering them, or perish. The very exigencies of emergency thus militate profoundly against the promise of ‘politics’ as it has been commonly understood in the western tradition; not simply as a matter of rule, but as a matter of self-rule in which it was possible to debate the nature of the self in terms of the good for and of the self. Note, also, how much the very idea of the self has disappeared from view in this conflation of life with species life. The only intelligence, the only self-knowledge, the only culture which qualifies in the permanence of this emergency is the utilitarian and instrumental technologies said to be necessary to endure it. We have been here before in the western tradition and we have experienced the challenges of this condition as tyranny (Arendt 1968). The emergency of emergence, the generative principle of formation, the referential matrix of contemporary biopolitics globally, is a newly formed, pervasive and insidiously complex, soft totalitarian regime of power relations made all the more difficult to contest precisely because, governing through the contingent emergency of emergence, it is a governing through the transactional freedoms of contingency

4. If we win any of these arguments, we win the debate. All their offense presumes that the plan is a positive intervention that reduces the capacity for security to be leveraged in the name of further violence.

A2: K cedes security to the right (Knudsen)

1. Begs the question. There is a fundamental break between the theoretical possibility of emancipation and the structural logic of violence. The aff’s approach demands that we accept militarized security as real and engage it, but forecloses the possibility of exploring what it means to face ‘real’ insecurity in the first place.

2. This is theoretical and abstract evidence that problem-solving theory can be useful. It does not do the work necessary to prove that this is possible given the security dynamic laid out in the 1AC.

They don’t challenge security in a useful way – they only deploy it to serve the worst purposes.

In this moment, to affirm US commitment to riverlocks is to prop up a system of famine-management which supports a world of perpetual famine and insecurity. This would never take on the transformative and disruptive flavor implied by Gunning.

Cross-apply the Neocleous evidence about the alternative. This attempt to de-link the strategic deployment from the underlying logic of security fails because it fails to grasp that security is an entrenched discursive structure.

3. Security is an unbroken system of meaning. Their argument fails to grasp this problem. They presume the possibility that deployment of security in this instance can be detached from its broader discursive meaning. But this is impossible. The choice to engage in the logic of security infuses their entire approach.

The aff amounts to a get out of jail free card – a continuation of the logic that justified the production of famine in the first place, rather than an admission of fault and denial of justification

A2: Apocalypse planning good (Tonn)

1. The aff is a BAD use of apocalypse planning. Our argument is not a generic rejection of all terminal impacts – it’s a specific critique of the way the aff uses this framing.

Coviello says that the depictions of apocalypse tend to generate a political impulse toward further and further expanding the reach of the biopolitical machine.

2. Only the alt solves. Tonn is talking about literary representations of apocalypse, which help us see who and what we are. That’s what the neg does – we more critically engage with the possibility of danger by accepting it as genuinely possible, rather than fleeing from it instinctively.

A2: Alt can’t fiat mindset shift

That’s not our argument. The alternative is a different way of conceptualizing the value of politics. We make no claim to ‘solve’ the aff. We think the aff is a bad idea!

The Alternative is to reject the Affirmative’s logic of security – the act of situating ourselves against security is a necessary intervention that makes possible thinking beyond the rigid dichotomies that enframe traditional approaches to problem-solving in international relations

A2: Perm (Lott)

1. No net benefit to the perm. The only reason the aff framing is valuable is because it resolves some specific security dilemma, but our argument short-circuits this at the base. The entire concept of security does violence to our capacity to find value in the world – which is only experienced through the possibility of risk.

If life is lived through insecurity, the value structure provided by the aff (seeking security) is a bankrupt value system

2. They say that threats are real, but even if they’re real as experienced in context, that doesn’t mean that an approach which simply accepts the framing of them as such is valuable.

In the instance of the aff, the threat of global starvation might be real but the context of that reality is a larger project of neoliberal economic organization that generates the very problem they try to solve

3. Their affirmation of realism obliterates the possibility for ethics. The framework of security erases human beings and leaves only objects of administration. It’s the crucial step down the path to mass atrocity

Mark Neocleous, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University, 08 (“Critique of Security”, McGill-Queen’s University, pp. 4-6 Published 2008)

But what if at the heart of the logic of security lies not a vision of freedom or emancipation, but a means of modelling the whole of human society around a particular vision of order? What if security is little more than a semantic and semiotic black hole allowing authority to inscribe itself deeply into human experience? What if the magic word 'security' serves merely to neutralise political action, encouraging us to surrender ourselves to the state in a thoroughly conservative fashion?2° And what if this surrender facilitates an ongoing concession to authority and the institutional violence which underpins the authority in question, and thus constitutes the first key step in learning how to treat people not as human beings, but as objects to be administered? In other words, what if the major requirement of our time is less an expanded, refined, or redefined vision of security, and nothing less than a critique of security? Corey Robin points out that when a particular idea routinely accompanies atrocities then some real critical engagement with the idea would seem to be in order." And since there is a clear and not particularly long line linking the idea of security and the atrocities being carried out in Guantánarno, Abu Ghraib and the other 'security centres' at which people are currently being held, never mind the long history of states slaughtering millions in the name of security, then the time must be right for a critique of security.

4. The security framing infects all noble goals. For every person made secure, many others are dragged into the system

Roe, 12 (Paul Roe, Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations and European Studies at Central European University, Budapest, “Is securitization a ‘negative’ concept? Revisiting the normative debate over normal versus extraordinary politics,” Security Dialogue vol. 43 no. 3, June 2012)

Many writers acknowledge that the panic politics of securitization is analogous to traditional national-security behaviour. Although this does not mean that successfully securitized issues will necessarily be ‘militarized’, it does mean that they will reflect a national security ‘mode’ or, as Wæver (1995: 54) puts it, a ‘logic of war’ – that is, a logic of ‘challenge–resistance(defense)–escalation–recognition/defeat’. Given Wæver’s formulation, again, it is difficult to get away from the equation of securitization with Schmitt’s concept of the political: the logic of war is the very product of the fear of the extinction of the referent, and exactly the kind of politics that, to repeat Huysmans (1998: 576), defines the self ‘on the basis of the expectation of hostility’. And it is this understanding of Schmittian political realism that fundamentally informs Aradau’s critique of the Aberystwyth’s School’s notion of security as emancipation.17 For Aradau, the potential for emancipation to transform social relations is necessarily hindered by virtue of its security framing. Reflecting on Booth’s (and also Richard Wyn Jones’s)18 normative commitment to tackle insecurities such as human and minority rights abuses, poverty, and violence against women, Aradau (2008: 72) argues that security as emancipation forgets that ‘**security itself institutes a particular kind of ordering** [of] political communities’. ‘Rather than the “other” of power’, she goes on, ‘**security practices buttress institutional arrangements and legitimize forms of domination and exclusion’**. Aradau contends that **someone made secure inevitably entails someone else made dangerous.** ‘On which grounds’, she asks, ‘can one privilege such a construction of security, the security of migrants over the security of racists, the security of HIV-positive people over those at risk of being infected?’ (Aradau, 2004: 399).

5. The plan cannot be detached from its discursive underpinnings. The noble effort to restrict violence is enframed by a larger structure of security logic that writes the effort into a broader system of hegemonic power and economic domination.

Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, ‘7 [*Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence*, p. 3-4]

These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on terror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1

It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis **relate not only to the** most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, **but also to their available** (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, **but also their mainstream critique**s - whether they take the form **of liberal policy approaches** in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement **about major concepts**, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity. As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically **wards off critique.**

The LITANY of Departures From Realism and Failure of “Systemic Punishment” Disproves Their Theory.

Ronald R. Krebs, Faculty Fellow - Government @ University of Texas at Austin, Donald D. Harrington, Prof. of Political Science Univ. of Minnesota, ‘6 [Rhetoric, Strategy, and War: Language, Power, and the Making of US Security Policy, http://www.polisci.umn.edu/~mirc/paper2006-07/fall2006/Krebs.pdf]

Structural realists, focusing on the imperatives to security- or power-maximization that states must obey if they are to survive in the anarchic international system, are simply uninterested in domestic debate of any sort. They have long argued that these systemic imperatives, derived from the distribution of material power and perhaps geography, constitute an objective “national interest” that must be the chief driver of foreign policy.23 When states, for whatever reason, behave in contrary ways, they will eventually suffer punishment for their foolishness.24 But are there really such objective systemic dictates? The very fact that American structural realists frequently rail against US foreign policy suggests that departures from realist expectations are **hardly exceptional**. The typical realist response is that in these cases actors with more parochial or moralistic perspectives have hijacked policy, but realists, with their inattention to domestic politics, are then hard pressed to explain when such views hold sway.25 Moreover, the fact that such “hijackings” are so common suggests either that the system does **not often punish states for disobeying its rules**, in which case the **structural logic collapses**, or that **there are no such rules in the first place**. Structural realism imagines foreign policy as an exceptional realm above the political fray. Yet, even when the house is on fire, foreign policy lies in the realm of choice, not compulsion, and **thus very much in the realm of the political.**

A2: No root cause

We’re not making a root cause claim. We’re identifying complexities within security that undermine the aff’s ability to solve any impacts

A2: Globalization good (Seita)

Their evidence is speculative about what globalization COULD accomplish. This is the worst form of cheerleading by those who benefit from western privilege.

Not an aff advantage. If globalization has advantages, they need to prove that linking those TO security VIA the mechanism of the aff is good. Generic evidence is meaningless

For the vast majority of the world, globalization achieves none of these supposed gains

Wise et al. (Director of Doctoral Program in Migration Studies & Prof of Development Studies; Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas, Mexico) 10

(Raúl Delgado Wise, Humberto Márquez Covarrubias, Rubén Puentes, Reframing the debate on migration, development and human rights: fundamental elements, October, 2010, www.migracionydesarrollo.org)

At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, a general crisis centered in the United States affected the global capitalist system on several levels (Márquez, 2009 and 2010). The consequences have been varied:

Financial. The overflowing of financial capital leads to speculative bubbles that affect the socioeconomic framework and result in global economic depressions. Speculative bubbles involve the bidding up of market prices of such commodities as real estate or electronic innovations far beyond their real value, leading inevitable to a subsequent slump (Foster and Magdof, 2009; Bello, 2006). Overproduction. Overproduction crises emerge when the surplus capital in the global economy is not channeled into production processes due to a fall in profit margins and a slump in effective demand, the latter mainly a consequence of wage containment across all sectors of the population (Bello, 2006). Environmental. Environmental degradation, climate change and a predatory approach to natural resources contribute to the destruction of the latter, along with a fundamental undermining of the material bases for production and human reproduction (Fola- dori and Pierri, 2005; Hinkelammert and Mora, 2008). Social. Growing social inequalities, the dismantling of the welfare state and dwindling means of subsistence accentuate problems such as poverty, unemployment, violence, insecurity and labor precariousness, increasing the pressure to emigrate (Harvey, 2007; Schierup, Hansen and Castles, 2006).

The crisis raises questions about the prevailing model of globalization and, in a deeper sense, the systemic global order, which currently undermines our main sources of wealth—labor and nature—and overexploits them to the extent that **civilization itself** is at risk. The responses to the crisis by the governments of developed countries and international agencies promoting globalization have been short-sighted and exclusivist. Instead of addressing the root causes of the crisis, they have implemented limited strategies that seek to rescue financial and manufacturing corporations facing bankruptcy. In addition, government policies of labor flexibilization and fiscal adjustment have affected the living and working conditions of most of the population. These measures are desperate attempts to **prolong the privileges of ruling elites at the risk of imminent and increasingly severe crises**. In these conditions, migrants have been made into scapegoats, leading to repressive anti- immigrant legislation and policies (Massey and Sánchez, 2006). A significant number of jobs have been lost while the conditions of remaining jobs deteriorate and deportations increase. Migrants’ living standards have drastically deteriorated but, contrary to expectations, there have been neither massive return flows nor a collapse in remittances, though there is evidence that migrant worker flows have indeed diminished.

Globalization is premised on the disposability of those that it claims to save

Bourassa (University of Utah Salt Lake City) 11

(GREGORY N. , Rethinking the Curricular Imagination: Curriculum and Biopolitics in the Age of Neoliberalism, 25 JAN 2011, Curriculum Inquiry, Volume 41, Issue 1, pages 5–16, January 2011)

Youth in a Suspect Society marks a continuation of Giroux's recent interests in the resurgence of authoritarianism, market-based logics of disposability, and a biopolitics of neoliberalism. The convergence of these concepts, for Giroux, is accompanied by a fundamental shift from an imperfect social state to a ruthless market state. This shift, from “state sovereignty” to “market sovereignty” is characterized by a disinvestment in the public sphere. In this configuration, anything pertaining to the public is not only neglected but also met with great disdain. As an economic logic, neoliberalism invades the public sphere, invalidating and enclosing that which cannot be filtered through a market rationality. Here, neoliberalism meets biopolitics in that politics distances itself from social governance—withdrawing from a commitment to protect its citizens—and increasingly resorts to governing populations through the economic reign of the market. In this cruel landscape that Giroux calls the biopolitics of neoliberalism, the social state ceases to exist only to be replaced by a corporate state that is intent on warding off democratic sensibilities and enclosing the few spheres of the public that remain. Giroux's conceptual mapping of a biopolitics of neoliberalism contains yet another important element. Excluded from social and political life, those populations marginalized by class and race are reduced from the status of citizens to waste, or in Agamben's (1998) terms, from bios (social and political life) to zoē (life without quality). Rendered disposable under a biopolitics of neoliberalism, marginalized populations are vulnerable to Agamben's formulation of biopolitics as thanatopolitics. Giroux, rightfully taking Agamben's biopolitics seriously in this instance, draws here from Achille Mbembe (2003), who argues that “vast populations are subject to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of living dead” (p. 40). In short, a neoliberal biopolitics of disposability ushers in forms of social death, rendering populations expendable, without support, protection, or compassion. In Giroux's account, such a biopolitical order abandons populations under the guise that they represent the refuse of a neoliberal economic regime. This epitomizes, for Giroux, a complete violation of ethical responsibility and obligation to youth and the democratic future to come.

A2: Must include state action (McCormack)

They treat the framing of arguments in terms of what the USFG should do as grounded and meaningful, while failing to attach that imaginative process to the genuine experience of politics as the engagement of the daily form of politics.

This understanding of politics obfuscates our individual relationship to the development of discursive meaning and defers all agency, and mobilizes politics around the idea of liberal statehood.

A2: Perm – all non-competitive parts

This is incoherent. We have a specific critique of the aff. There is no non-competitive part

Famine link 2NC MUST READ

Framing hunger in terms of crisis is a tool of security used to maintain the status quo. Technological solutions prevent us from addressing the political root causes that brings about dependency, making starvation inevitable.

(Calkivik 10, Emine Asli Calkivik, PhD in Philsophy, “Dismantling Security”, 10/2010, http://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/99479/1/Calkivik\_umn\_0130E\_11576.pdf)

An important insight into these inquiries pertains to the way in which politics of security is tantamount to the technologization of political life and hence depoliticization of politics. Jenny Edkins’s discussion of practices of aid and famine relief provide a striking account of how such a technologization and de-politicization is evidenced in international politics and the discipline that studies it. At the center of Edkins’s analysis is the way in which food crises and the problem of hunger is discursively constructed as called “famine” by relief organizations, NGOs, and state representatives and how this discursive representation seals off the power structures that produce this crisis in the first place. Constituted as an object of knowledge and a subject of scientific inquiry, famine becomes a thing whose underlying causes must be sought. The desire to define famine and the concomitant hunt to capture its essence leads to an analysis of the situation in terms of the amount of crop production, availability of food, nutritional status of the population—what could perhaps be called a mathematization of the problem.Such forms of enumeration and definition, Edkins argues, come at the expense of other forms of enumeration, such as instances of hunger being remembered through the oral tradition, which could provide guidance in understanding the political context and **power relations that give rise to the crisis**. Rather than attending to its historical conditions of possibility and the forms of social and political arrangements that lead to famines, modernist **representations of such crises divest it from politics** and power relations. Edkins concludes that the framing of famine in discourses of modernity has double consequence. On the one hand, such a framing de-politicizes hunger and how it should be combated, and prioritizes technical solutions through abstract analysis and the formulation of general principles. Such an approach **merely reinstates and reproduces the form of politics that has produced the famine in the first place**. On the other hand, framing famine within discourses of modernity renders humanitarian relief industry impervious to critique because any debate—critical or supportive of humanitarianism—reproduces the very discourse of humanitarianism and its objects. Technologization of political life under the reign of instrumental andcalculative thought is depicted as symptomatic of modern political reason. Being less an antidote to violence as it is generally supposed, modern political reason, it is suggested, is itself implicated in the violence it is expected to cure. This relationship occurs because, as Campbell and Dillon suggest, modernity’s political subject is a violent subject by constitution. On the one hand, taking violence as the ultimo ratio of politics, the basic subject of modern political thought (subject in the sense of what politics is ultimately understood to be about) is posited as the subject of violence. On the other hand, the subject of modern politics—the autonomous reasoning subject—is a violent political subject by its composition. It is a subject whose features, according to modern political thought, bring him into conflict with other men. At issues is, in White’s depiction, the “teflon subject… the assertive, disengaged self who generates distance from its background (tradition and embodiment) and foreground (external nature, other subjects) in the name of an accelerating mastery over them.” Politics in modernity, according to these scholars, derives from an underlying ontology of violence occasioned by a certain understanding of political subjectivity—the autonomous reasoning subject that is to be both “capable of disclosing the character of politics rationally (an epistemological claim) and of constituting politics in reality (an ontological claim).” Given that the political subject of violence is a reasoning subject, Campbell and Dillon suggest, the complicity of reason in the violence of the political subject cannot be elided. What this diagnosis implies is that modern political reason not only cannot provide adequate tools to understand and address political violence, but that reason itself, with its universalist aspirations, is not immune to it. It is this problematization of modern political reason and modern political subjectivity that constitutes the basis of the calls for a politics beyond politics of security. As these accounts point out, increased political violence with the globalization of the project of modern politics **is less a deviation from modern reason, but the symptom of its very success.** In other words, it is expressive of the claim to sovereign identity, mastery, and transparency as the guarantee and the guiding ideal of modern life.

Consequently, forms of political violence as entailed in ethnic or nationalist conflicts—far from being expressions of the pre-modern, of deviations from or failures to live up to the standards of modernity—are instances that are symptomatic of the success of modern reason itself.

Famine turns – sprinkle these throughout the debate

The expansion of “free market ideals” justified the Western debt policies and agricultural dumping that prompted famine in the first place

Rania Khalek, associate writer for Alternet, independent journalist based out of Washington, “Food Emergency: How the World Bank and IMF Have Made African Famine Inevitable”, 9/8/11, http://www.alternet.org/story/152335/food\_emergency%3A\_how\_the\_world\_bank\_and\_imf\_have\_made\_african\_famine\_inevitable?page=3&paging=off //bss

The erosion of African agriculture is due in large part to policies imposed on debt-ridden African countries by the World Bank and the IMF—financial institutions set up in the aftermath of World War II with the stated aim of deterring financial crises like the ones that pushed Weimer Germany toward fascism. The donor nations of the IMF and World Bank divvy up power within each institution based on the size of a country’s economy, allowing a handful of privileged nations, led by the U.S., to dominate decision making. As a result, Klein explains that the pro-corporatist administrations of Reagan and Thatcher in the '70s and '80s were “able to harness the two institutions for their own ends, rapidly increasing their power and turning them into primary vehicles for the advancement of the corporatist crusade.” Driven by the ideology of the so-called free market, the IMF and World Bank attached conditions to desperately needed debt relief that required developing nations to implement Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), what Naomi Klein calls “the dictatorship of debt.” SAPs forced governments to impose a neoliberal package of austerity, privatization and massive deregulation. For Africa, this meant cutting government subsidies to small farmers, eliminating tariffs and price controls, selling off food and grain reserves (which kept countries from starving in cases of drought or crop failure), increasing cash crop exports of raw materials to the west, and allowing foreign imports from the US and Europe to flood their markets. Although the IMF and World Bank argued that restructuring was necessary to reduce Africa’s debt and foster economic growth, their policies produced the opposite effects: soaring debt and economic stagnation. In a 2004 study commissioned by the Halifax Initiative, writer Asad Ismi meticulously documents the consequences of SAPs on the African continent. Between 1980 and 1993, he found a total of 566 structural adjustment programs were forced onto 70 developing countries, including 36 of Africa’s 47 Sub-Saharan nations. Since the implementation of SAPs in the 1980s, Africa’s debt soared more than 500 percent, with an estimated $229 billion worth of debt payments transferred from Sub-Saharan Africa to the west, four times the original debt owed. According to the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database, African debt still stands at $324.7 billion, with the overwhelming majority, $278.5 billion, owed by Sub-Saharan Africa, demonstrating that SAPs have pushed Africa into perpetual debt, with no end in sight. What does this have to do with famine? Well, perpetual debt forces governments to divert spending to debt repayment, rather than investing in basic infrastructure like healthcare and education, which is relatively non-existent in Sub-Saharan Africa. With only 10 percent of the world’s population, the Sub-Saharan region comprises 68 percent of all people living with HIV. Yet, according to Ismi, “Africa spends four times more on debt interest payments than on health care.” The same holds true for the agricultural sector. SAPs initiated the collapse of African food security, diverting land, water and labor away from small-scale farming toward the production of cash crops, whose earnings were used to pay off debt. Ironically, as they demanded that African states eliminate subsidies for small-scale farmers, the United States and Europe continued to provide their agricultural sectors with billions of dollars in subsidies, forcing peasant farmers to compete with an influx of cheap, subsidized commercial staples from the west—clearly a losing battle. In 2004, Project Censored described this U.S. practice as “underselling starving nations,” a process that ensures U.S. commodities cost less than their small-scale counterparts, essentially pricing local farmers out of the market. Walden Bello points out that the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Agriculture cemented these lopsided policies, making developing countries the permanent dumping grounds for cheap surplus production from the global north. Thus, between 1995 and 2004, agriculture subsidies in developed countries went from $367 billion to $388 per year. The few subsidies the IMF did permit were strictly reserved for African commercial agriculture goods for export to Europe and America. For Kenya, where a quarter of the population lives on less than a dollar a day, this meant ditching government support for subsistence farmers and diverting resources to the production of raw exports (cash crops) for the west, like tea, coffee, tobacco and cut flowers. Earnings from exports were then used to service the country’s massive debt. After investigating the impacts of SAPs on Kenya’s struggle with malnutrition, Catherine Mezzacappa concludes, “Through their role in agricultural policy and social spending, structural adjustment policies imposed by the IMF and World Bank have contributed to the deepening of poverty and perpetuation of malnutrition in Kenya,” a country where “the leading causes of death among children are preventable and can be linked to malnutrition.” As environmental activist Vandana Shiva put it in her book Stolen Harvest, “The hungry starve as scarce land and water are diverted to provide luxuries for rich consumers in Northern countries.”

Their use of famine as a d-rule obscures the West’s role in creating poverty – ensures the reproduction of new famines to save people from

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Recognizing Economic Violence As tragic images of starving Africans in underdeveloped countries riddled with seemingly neverending violence and conflict fill the airwaves, a narrative emerges depicting Africa as a bottomless pit of charity and aid—one that ignores the historical context essential to understanding Africa’s impoverishment. Writing for Al Jazeera English, David Nally, the author of Human Encumbrances: Political Violence and the Great Irish Famine, concludes, “The portrayal of the passive victim enables NGOs and Western governments to assume the role of rescuer without having to ask uncomfortable questions about their own complicity in the suffering that is unfolding.” It’s time the West faced up to the reality that this famine is the inevitable consequence of a broken food system that prioritizes the hefty pockets of the privileged above the empty stomachs of the vulnerable, draining Africa of its resources and essentially stripping Africans of their right to food and life. David Nally quotes Susan Sontag, reminding us that, "The more it's shown that 'the sort of thing which happens in that place' is partly an outcome of policies designed in this place, the more responsibility we have to do something about it. When viewing images of starving children or reading about deaths from malnutrition in the daily newspapers, we ought to consider critically the architecture of violence behind the picture or story, not merely the sad abjection of the victim."