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1NC 1/3

The affirmative’s use of he/man language creates cycles of otherization of women

Griffith 98 (Nicola, six-time winner, Lambda Award for LGBT fiction, *Altair* #2, http://nicolagriffith.com/tongue.html JM)

Language shapes our thoughts and therefore our imagination. When we read science fiction, or watch it, or listen to it, we are absorbing one person's vision of the future (or present, or past). Whether we like it or not, television now provides visions of the future for more people than all the SF novels put together. Of all the women who grew up on the original Star Trek, I doubt there is a single one who did not get a thrill, a frisson, the urge to shout Yes! when she saw the premiere of Star Trek: The Next Generation and heard Captain Picard saying they were all going to boldly go where no one had gone before. The future opened like a flower: women could think that maybe in the twenty-fourth century we were a bit more important than we are now. That is a very powerful imaginative tool for a young girl. She will watch that series (and Xena, Warrior Princess; and Buffy The Vampire Slayter) and know deep in her bones that women can. She will probably stay loyal to the series, the spin-offs, the novelizations. She will make the bottom line a lot more healthy for the producers. I suspect that Babylon Five's audience would increase significantly if they changed "The Third Age of Mankind" to words that included us. To me it doesn't matter if the second in command of B5 is a woman, we are still slapped in the face every time we hear those opening credits. Such a slip with the old he-man language, even once, indicates a certain lack of thought on the subject. It means the writers have not sat down and properly examined their attitudes to gender. It makes me wonder: Where else will they slip up with women's roles? Is this series worth my time and effort? It is such a little thing, the "Third Age of Mankind," but it sits like a rock in the road. People like me will be tempted to point the car in a different direction. [Two months after writing this, I discover that the opening sequence has changed. It will be interesting to see what happens with the ratings.] Science fiction novelists and short story writers don't do much better. It seems that many SF writers can see men fairly clearly in their crystal ball, but women are obscured by a veil. When the spaceship is manned by cadets with IQs matched only by their height in centimeters we think: oh, did the women all die? When we read of the extinction of mankind, we think: oh, well maybe it was only the men who died...but in that case, where are the women? When we hear of man being in a death struggle with some alien species, we wonder: which side are the women on? Always: where are the women? What are we doing? How do we fare in this imagined world? It matters. Women need to be see their reflections shining back at them from the future. After all, our six year old as she grows up will not see many images of herself in her science text books. A while ago I was invited to go talk to a class at the Georgia Institute of Technology who were studying Ammonite and Russ's The Female Man. Students do not go to Georgia Tech to study the classics. They generally do not care much for gender studies, or literature, or the humanities. They go to learn about nuclear engineering, mechanical engineering, computers and other hardware-related subjects. But here they were, brows furrowed, trying to make sense of what I was trying to do in my fiction. The marvelous thing was: they got it. One man who was studying digital video something-or-other said to me, "I was a third of the way through Ammonite and it was making me more and more uncomfortable and I didn't know why and then I realized: all the characters are female. It's all 'she' and 'her.' There were no pronouns for me. It made me feel weird, as though I didn't really matter. And I realized that this is what it must be like for girls growing up, reading their physics books or whatever." Exactly. Women and girls feel like that a great deal, and not just while we're growing up. I can't blame men for feeling uncomfortable when they get a taste of it. It's not very pleasant. It would be nice, though, if men could take a lesson from the feeling. I was at a party recently and a man I had never met before buttonholed me. "When I got half-way through Ammonite I got really pissed off!" he said. I sighed and asked why he thought that was. "Because I was lied to!" By whom, I wanted to know. "The publishers! The back cover copy never said a word about the book being about women!" He was pretty het up. I asked him if he had finished the book. "Yes, I liked it. It's just that, well," he looked vaguely puzzled, "I was misled..." I pointed out patiently that the only person doing the misleading had been himself: the back cover copy did not lie. It talked about security forces, and natives, and deadly viruses. The only pronouns used were "they" and "them." If he went ahead and assumed that meant men, he had no one to blame but himself, had he? After all, women are human. We are people, too. That man wandered off, not terribly convinced. Deep inside he knows—though he may not know that this is what he knows--that people are really men. Women are just, well, women: the also-ran, the other, the alien. This is what he-man language does, this is how it survives today when it is demonstrably unfair, inefficient and unnecessary. It forms part of a feedback loop: men (and women) condemn women as Other every time they say mankind. They may not mean to, but motivation doesn't matter. The result is the same. What we hear is: less than human. The very words we all use build a hierarchy in our heads and women always come in second. As a result of that internal hierarchy, we find it harder to point to the naked ridiculousness of he-man language. Which reinforces the hierarchy. Woman as Other becomes embedded in our very language. We become alien in our own tongue.

1NC 2/3

The term "manned" excludes women from space policy, causing perverse policy failure & weak science

Niebur 2-24 (Susan, former Discover Program Scientist, PhD; *Women In Planetary Science* ;2011 http://womeninplanetaryscience.wordpress.com/2011/02/24/gender-neutral-language-matters/ JM)

I was disappointed to see the phrasing of tonight’s press release, “NASA Releases Images Of Man-Made Crater On Comet.” This was an amazing opportunity for scientists and schoolchildren alike to see the results of a planetary science experiment on a truly cosmic scale, and yet the very title of the release does not encourage students thinking about a future career in science, math or engineering. Indeed, it dissuades them. Well, half of them, anyway. You see, language matters. And when girls read about manned missions to the moon, manned spacecraft, or a man-made crater on a comet, they are far less likely to read on, to read further, and to imagine themselves in the role of one of those lucky scientists and engineers. Which means that as time goes on, fewer push themselves to take and excel in higher math and more sophisticated science classes. Fewer perservere through hard times, tough professors, and touchy teaching assistants. Fewer graduate with STEM degrees, and fewer still compete for the competitive NASA fellowships and the JPL postdocs and the elusive GSFC civil servant positions. Fewer are available at every level, in fact, and then the field is simply unbalanced, with women only ten percent of the population in planetary science at the senior professor level. Which means that almost half our field is missing. Now I know that some see will this as ”only” a question of language, but it really does have implications for the field of planetary science today and the field as it will be forty years from now, when today’s schoolchildren are proposing to lead the flight missions of tomorrow. On the day that proposals for the 2068 mission to Mars are received, will there be an equal distribution of proposals led by men and women? Or will almost half the proposals be missing? Please consider using gender-neutral language in NASA press releases. It matters, and it has long-reaching impact.

Sexism is the cause of all proliferation, environmental destruction, domestic violence, and war

Warren & Cady 94 (Karen J, Duane L, feminists &authors, Hypatia, “Feminism and Peace: Seeing connections,” pg 16-17, JL)

Much of the current "unmanageability" of contemporary life in patriarchal societies, (d), is then viewed as a consequence of a patriarchal preoccupation with activities, events, and experiences that reflect historically male-gender identified beliefs, values, attitudes, and assumptions. Included among these real-life consequences are precisely those concerns with nuclear proliferation, war, environmental destruction, and violence toward women, which many feminists see as the logical outgrowth of patriarchal thinking. In fact, it is often only through observing these dysfunctional behaviors -- the symptoms of dysfunctionality -- that one can truly see that and how patriarchy serves to maintain and perpetuate them. When patriarchy is understood as a dysfunctional system, this "unmanageability" can be seen for what it is -- as a predictable and thus logical consequence of patriarchy. 11The theme that global environmental crises, war, and violence generally are predictable and logical consequences of sexism and patriarchal culture is pervasive in ecofeminist literature (see Russell 1989 , 2). Ecofeminist Charlene Spretnak, for instance, argues that "a militarism and warfare are continual features of a patriarchal society because they reflect and instill patriarchal values and fulfill needs of such a system. Acknowledging the context of patriarchal conceptualizations that feed militarism is a first step toward reducing their impact and preserving life on Earth" ( Spretnak 1989 , 54). Stated in terms of the foregoing model of patriarchy as a dysfunctional social system, the claims by Spretnak and other feminists take on a clearer meaning: Patriarchal conceptual frameworks legitimate impaired thinking (about women, national and regional conflict, the environment) which is manifested in behaviors which, if continued, will make life on earth difficult, if not impossible. It is a stark message, but it is plausible. Its plausibility ties in understanding the conceptual roots of various woman-nature-peace connections in regional, national, and global contexts.

1NC 3/3

The alternative is to interrogate and reject the gendered discourse of the 1AC. Failure to look to language dooms all other feminist projects.

Cameron 98 (Deborah, , Professor of Language & Communication at Worcester College, University of Oxford , *Signs* Volume 23: 4, Summer , http://people.pwf.cam.ac.uk/bv230/lang-var/cameron%201998%20gender%20language%20and%20discourse.pdf, JM)

The "turn to language" in the humanities and social sciences has affected many feminists' approach to the question framed by Kramer, Thorne, and Henley (1978, 638) as how "language —in structure, content, and daily usage —reflects] and help[s] constitute sexual inequality." It is more likely to be assumed, now, that the role of language is a strongly constitutive one, and some may even take this to mean that there is no social reality outside language and discourse. A consequence of the "linguistic turn" for feminist language studies has been to change the way the field itself *is* implicitly divided up. In the past, studying the speech behavior of women and men (sex or gender "differ­ence," a topic for sociolinguists) was often sharply distinguished from studying their representation in linguistic texts ("sexist language," a topic for stylisticians, grammarians, lexicologists, or language historians). Now these may be regarded as aspects of one process, the linguistic and discur­sive construction of gender across a range of cultural fields and practices. When a researcher studies women and men speaking she is looking, as it were, at the linguistic construction of gender in its first- and second-person forms (the construction of "I" and "you"); when she turns to the represen­tation of gender in, say, advertisements or literary texts she is looking at the same thing in the third person ("she" and "he") In many cases it is neither possible nor useful to keep these aspects apart, since the triangle "I-you-she/he" is relevant to the analysis of every linguistic act or text. This redrawing of old boundaries has also had consequences for the way feminists address Kramer. Thorne, and Henley's third question, "How can sexist language be changed'" (IV78, 638). While "sexist language," con­ceived as a finite, context-free set of objectionable items (like generic *he* and *man),* undoubtedly remains a salient issue in the politics of everyday life (indeed, the recent furor over "political correctness" has provoked a new wave of public arguments about it), it has become far less central in recent feminist theoretical discussions. This change is largely attributable to the fact that "discourse" rather than language per se is seen as the main locus for the construction (and contestation) of gendered and sexist meanings. As discourse has attracted more attention, sexist language has at­tracted less. One notable exception to this trend, however, is Anne Pauwels's *Women ChangingLanguage* (1998), which shows, among other things, that there is still theoretical life in traditional concerns about sexist language and the reform thereof. Pauwels treats feminist linguistic reform as a case of lan­guage planning and surveys the forms it has taken in a number of countries and languages (Dutch, German, and English are particularly well covered, and there is also material on French, Spanish, Italian, the Nordic lan­guages, Russian, Lithuanian, Japanese, and written Chinese.) A valuable feature is the author's

assessment of the technical as well as the political problems involved in reform; she remarks for instance on failures to assess the linguistic viability of specific reforms within particular language sys­tems. (A simple example is that many people avoid saving *Ms.*

because [Ms.] is not a permissible freestanding consonant duster in English. While the same problem in principle arises with *Mrs.* and *Mr.,* these are well-established items; whereas in the case of *Ms.* there is no tradition of pro­nouncing it, no indication of what item [if any] it abbreviates, and thus no clue as to what vowel should be inserted. This, Pauwels suggests, can only exacerbate the problem of ideological resistance.) Pauwels is by no means unaware of current arguments emphasizing the role of discourse in the reproduction of sexism. The concentration of femi­nist reform efforts at the level of words, which for many nonlinguists are synonymous with language itself, is another of the limitations she dis­cusses, noting that few guidelines concern themselves with sexism at the level of the sentence of text. Partly this results from the limited institutional concerns most reformers address (most obviously, the need for nonsexist occupational terms to comply with anti-discrimination legislation). Even here, however, there is evidence of reformers’ intentions being frustrated in practice e.g.. women become "chairpersons" and "salespersons" while men remain "chairmen" and "salesmen”). It is in relation to the sort of observation that the topic of "sexist lan­guage" is illuminated by, and starts to overlap with, work from a "dis­course" perspective. The criticism discourse analysts would make of many institutional reform efforts is that the latter underestimate, or even run counter to, the insight that meaning is not fixed or handed down by fiat. Rather, it is socially constructed, which means it is continually negotiated and modified in everyday interaction. It is therefore unsurprising that dis­cursive processes often frustrate feminists' attempts to cleanse sexist lan­guage from what remains a sexist society (a succinct and well-illustrated version of this argument is Ehrlich and King |1994)). What people do in discourse overrides changes initiated at other levels, because discourse is the key site for the social construction of meaning. Understanding the complexity of that process is the central goal of many varieties of discourse analysis, including feminist varieties, which concern themselves in par­ticular with the construction and reproduction of gendered (and sexist) meanings.

\*Links\*

Link- “Manned”

“Manned” is a sexist term

Robinson 1 (Jackie, Teaching & Learning Committee, University of Queensland, http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/student-info-files/guid\_for\_assign\_pres.pdf, JM )

Great care must be taken not to use discriminatory language in academic writing. Depending on the context, disparaging terms can occur in relation to race, age, culture, religion, background, and disabilities. The most common, and yet normally unintentional, form of discriminatory language is sexist language. It includes terms such as his, him, her or she when referring to a position which could be held by either a male or female; mankind instead of humankind; or manned instead of staffed; air hostess instead of flight attendant, and so on. Further details about non-discriminatory language can be found in the Style Manual for Authors, Editors and Printers (AGPS, 1994). In addition, The University of Queensland’s Office of Equal Opportunity has produced a number of leaflets which are available, free of charge, to students and staff. One is called ‘A Guide for the Use of Non-sexist Language’ (OEO, 1998), the other ‘A Guide to Avoiding Racism through Language’ (Vice-Chancellor’s Committee Against Racism, 1995).

"Manned" is a sexist term

Nelson 3 (Todd D, PhD, Michigan State U; Tips; March 4, http://www.mail-archive.com/tips@acsun.frostburg.edu/msg06298.html JM)

I agree that the term "manned" has a sexist connotation. I am personally not offended by it. However, language plays a role in development and, therefore, when referring to the workforce terms that do not have any gender relationship should be encouraged.

"Manned” differentiates between women and humans

Poe 3 (Retta, PhD, UMissouri; Tips; March 4, http://www.mail-archive.com/tips@acsun.frostburg.edu/msg06298.html JM)

It seems to me that your correspondent's reply is a perfect illustration of WHY the use of "manned" instead of a gender-neutral term such as "staffed" is sexist: it assumes that man=human. As for her assertion that "many (most?) people stopped thinking of sexual connotations for words ...years ago" - I'd like to see the evidence that supports this. Maybe SHE stopped thinking of sexist language years ago, but I don't know of evidence to back up her belief that many or most others did this. Hmm...sounds a little like the false consensus effect to me.

Gendered discourse is given subconscious meaning independent of intentions

Gross 3 (Alan E, former chair, Department of Psychology, UMaryland; Tips; March 4, http://www.mail-archive.com/tips@acsun.frostburg.edu/msg06298.html JM)

A better term is probably "staffed" and yes the term "manned" could easily be perceived as sexist. Research some years ago asked kids and others to draw a picture of the person in several stories using masculine pronouns as plurals. Many more than chance drew pictures of males. This process is probably not conscious and directly refutes the assertion of the webmaster. It certainly couldn't hurt to cite this research in your response. If you can't find it, I may be able to dig some up. In any event, it definitely won't harm anyone if they change the terminology to neutral.

Link- NASA

Nasa is sexist and puts runs their programs towards men

Bell & Parker 9 (David & Martin, *Space Travel and Culture: From Apollo to Space Tourism*, Times Higher Education, 5/29 , 6/21/11, JL)

Gender and space is also looked at, both in terms of Nasa's poor attitude to women (from sexually harassed secretaries and administrators through to a female astronaut programme brutally cancelled by Nasa after it showed that women, in many ways, made better astronauts than men) and the homosocial bonding of the all-male crews. In the first instance, the argument is perhaps a little unfair, making Nasa seem almost uniquely misogynist at a time when society as a whole limited the professional possibilities open to women.

Link- General

Using he, him, his and man as generic forms is sexist

Lei 6 (Xiaolan, Prof or Language at NW Poly Univ Xi’an China, Journal of Language & Linguistics Vol 5, #1 pg 87-88, 6/22/11, JL)

In society, men are considered the norm for the human species: their characteristics, thoughts, beliefs and actions are viewed as fully representing those of all humans, male and female. This practice can make women invisible in language or altogether excludes them. It can also lead to their portrayal as deviations from this 'male = human' norm. Women's linguistic status is often dependent on or derives from that of 88 men, which is represented as autonomous. By relegating women to a dependent, subordinate position, sexist language prevents the portrayal of women and men as different but equal human beings. **1.1.** Common forms of sexism in English include the use of 'man' and 'he / him / his' as generics—that is, nouns and pronouns referring to both men and women—the use of suffixes -man, *-ette*, *-ess*, -*trix* in occupational nouns and job titles, asymmetrical naming practices, and stereotyped images of women and men as well as descriptions of (mainly) women which trivialise or denigrate them and their status.

Using generic male words is sexist

Grammar.about.com 11 (Grammar Site, <http://grammar.about.com/od/rs/g/sexistlanguageterm.htm>, 6/1, 6/22/11, JL)

"Questions and criticisms of sexist language have emerged because of a concern that language is a powerful medium through which the world is both reflected and constructed. . . . Some have claimed that the use of generics (such as 'mankind' to refer to both men and women) reinforces a binary that sees the male and masculine as the norm and the female and feminine as the 'not norm.' . .

Gendered pronouns exclude women from entering policy

Todd-Mancillas 81 (William R., Faculty, California State University, *Communication Quarterly* 29, 2, p. 112, http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=692bbddd-f8d9-4fd9-8160-cf5e04dba6cb%40sessionmgr14&vid=2&hid=21, JM)

Bem and Bem conducted two studies investigating the effects of "man"-linked words in job advertisements.^ In the first study, 120 high-school seniors (60 men, 60 women) were divided into three groups, with each group reading 12 job advertisements: appliance sales, telephone operator, photographer, travel agent, telephone frameman, dental assistant, taxicab driver, telephone service representative, assistant buyer, keypunch operator, telephone lineman, and public relations advertising. In the sex-biased ("man"-linked) condition, telephone framemen and linemen were described as "men" who have the opportunity to work with other "craftsmen" and enjoy the outdoors. Telephone operators and service representatives were described as "women" who place complex long-distance phone calls, and the "girl to talk to" when special telephone services are needed. In the sex-unbiased condition, advertisements were written to appeal to both men and women. The third condition was sex-reversed, in that job advertisements were written to appeal to the sex least frequently employed in those positions. Analysis ofthe data indicated that in the sex-biased condition, only 5% of the women and 30% of the men were interested in applyitig for "opposite- sex" jobs. However, these percentages increased to 25% and 75% in the sex-unbiased and 45% and 65% in the sex-reversed conditions. Similar results were obtained for male respondents. Accordingly, Bem and Bem concluded that "sex bias in the content of a job advertisement does serve to aid and abet discrimination by discouraging both men and women from applying for 'opposite- sex' jobs."

Masculine words discourage women from affiliation

Todd-Mancillas 81 (William R., Faculty, California State University, *Communication Quarterly* 29, 2, p. 110, http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=692bbddd-f8d9-4fd9-8160-cf5e04dba6cb%40sessionmgr14&vid=2&hid=21, JM)

The results of the above studies support the propositions that "man"-linked words are not perceived as referring with equal likelihood to men and women and that usage of "man"-linked words may cause women to perceive their behavioral options as more limited than they actually are. Two additional studies have obtained behavioral data further supporting these propositions.^ Schneider and Hacker had 306 sociology students submit newspaper and magazine photographs appropriate for illustrating chapters in an introductory sociology text. Half of the subjects received a list of non- "man"-linked chapter titles: "Culture," "Population," "Race and Minority Groups," "Family," "Crime and Delinquency," "Violence and Social Unrest," "Ecology," and "Social Theory." The remaining subjects received "man"-linked chapter titles: "Social Man," "Urban Man," "Political Man," "Industrial Man," and "Economic Man." Sixty-four percent of the subjects receiving "man"-linked titles submitted photographs depicting men only, while only about 50% of the subjects receiving non-"man"-iinked titles submitted photographs depicting males only. In Linda Harrison's study, 503 junior high students were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, each of which required the subject to draw figures of persons discussed in seven sentences (e.g., "Draw three examples of early man and the tools you think he used in daily life"). In the first condition, "man"-linked words were used; in the second, "human," "people," and "they;" in the third, "men and women" and "they." For both male and female subjects, significantly more figures were drawn of males than females in condition one than in either of the other conditions.

Link- General

Male language as generics is sexist

Ollscoille 94 (Colaiste, Member of Comm on Equality of Oppurt., A guide pg. 4-5, 6/22/11, JL)

It is often claimed that 'man' is a generic term, i.e. that it refers to all humans, male and female.  'Man' was once used as a true generic.  At that time the word for an adult male was 'waepman', while 'wifman' referred to an adult female.  Over time, 'wifman' developed into'woman', the term 'waepman' was dropped and 'man' became associated specifically wih adult males. Today 'man' is used sometimes to refer solely to male humans, while at other times it is intended to include all human beings.  Which meaning is intended is often unclear.  Wheher the intention, the use of 'man' obscures the presence and contribution of women. When we use 'man' it conjures up images of male persons only, not females or males and females together. The 'generic' use of male pronouns, 'he, his, him', is misleading and exclusive.  Simply stating that male pronouns should be understood to include females does not suffice.  Male pronouns should be used only in relation to males.  When referring to humans in general, or to a group which includes both females and males, 'she and he', 'he and she', 'she/he' or 's/he' can be used.  Or the following methods can be used to avoid the exclusive use of 'he'.

Male language excludes women

Gastil 90 (John, *Sex Roles, Vol. 23,*11/12, pg 630, 6/22/11, JL)

Its contemporary perniciousness (see Strunk & White, 1979, p. 60). Feminist scholars, however, maintain that the generic he and similar words "not only reflect a history of male domination" but also "actively encourage its perpetuation" (Sniezek & Jazwinski, 1986, p. 643). For example, the ostensibly generic use of *he* has permitted varying legal interpretations that often exclude women but always include men (Ritchie, 1975; Collins, 1977; Hill, 1986).

Masculine generic pronouns deny women equality

UNC Writing Center, 10 (“Gender-Sensitive Language,” October 1, http://www.unc.edu/depts/wcweb/handouts/gender.html, JM)

English speakers and writers have traditionally been taught to use masculine nouns and pronouns in situations where the gender of their subject(s) is unclear or variable, or when a group to which they are referring contains members of both sexes. For example, the U.S. Declaration of Independence states that " . . . all men are created equal . . ." and most of us were taught in elementary school to understand the word "men" in that context includes both male and female Americans. In recent decades, however, as women have become increasingly involved in the public sphere of American life, writers have reconsidered the way they express gender identities and relationships. Because most English language readers no longer understand the word "man" to be synonymous with "people," writers today must think more carefully about the ways they express gender in order to convey their ideas clearly and accurately to their readers. Moreover, these issues are important for people concerned about issues of social inequality. There is a relationship between our language use and our social reality. If we "erase" women from language, that makes it easier to maintain gender inequality. As Professor Sherryl Kleinman (2000:6) has argued, [M]ale-based generics are another indicator—and, more importantly, a reinforcer—of a system in which "man" in the abstract and men in the flesh are privileged over women. Words matter, and our language choices have consequences. If we believe that women and men deserve social equality, then we should think seriously about how to reflect that belief in our language use.

Link- Generic

Masculine generics diminish the worth of women

Prosenjak et al 7 (Nancy, Women in Literacy & Life Assembly, NCTE, July, http://www.ncte.org/positions/statements/genderfairuseoflang, JM)

Like the pseudo-generic form he, the use of the word man to represent both women and men excludes women, and it minimalizes their contributions and their worth as human beings. To make language more inclusive: Avoid exclusionary forms such as mankind man’s achievements the best man for the job man the controls man the ticket booth   Choose inclusionary alternatives   humanity, human beings, people human achievements the best person for the job take charge of staff the ticket booth (a) Some forms pose greater problems than those listed above: man-made (as in man-made materials). Artificial materials or even synthetic materials has less positive connotations when substituted here. freshman (as in certain official names such as freshman orientation). First-year student is an alternative which may work. alumni which is the masculine plural form; alumnae is the feminine plural. (b) When describing a job or career both men and women might perform, avoid using a combined term that specifies gender. Avoid exclusionary words and phrases such as   chairman/chairwomen businessman/businesswoman congressman/congresswoman policeman/policewoman salesman/saleswoman fireman mailman   Choose inclusionary alternatives   chair, coordinator, moderator, presiding officer, head, chairperson business executive, manager, businessperson congressional representative police officer salesperson, sales clerk, sales representative firefighter postal worker, letter carrier.

All-encompassing male language is no longer even proper grammar

UCL Human Resources 99 (Univ. College London, “Guide to Non-Discriminatory Language,” http://www.ucl.ac.uk/hr/docs/non\_discrim\_language.php, JM)

The English language has traditionally tended to assume the world to be male unless specified otherwise and therefore it is important to be sensitive to ways in which the use of sex neutral words can actively promote equality. Using 'he' to refer to an unspecified person is now generally considered unacceptable and it is preferable to use '(s)he', 'she/he' or 'he or she' and vice versa. A disclaimer that 'he should be taken to include she' looks like the token gesture that it is. Avoid using the terms 'ladies' or 'girls' for women, as this is patronising. Sex has traditionally been associated with the words for particular roles for example 'foreman', 'housewife' and 'chairman'. The test is always to ask yourself whether you would describe someone of the other sex in the same way. Women are also often referred to in terms of the title conferred by their marital status - Miss or Mrs. As you will often not know a woman's marital status, it is safer to use the title Ms, which may not always be their preferred title, but will not be inaccurate. Roughly half of the people in paid work in Britain are now women and a minority of households now take the form of a traditional nuclear family. It is important to reflect this in case studies and teaching materials and you should consider showing women in jobs, hobbies and roles traditionally ascribed to men and vice versa. Use 'partner' instead of spouse routinely, to avoid assuming that everyone is a heterosexual couple or part of a 'traditional' family.

\*Impacts\*

Impact – Extinction

Privileging the masculine causes extinction

Jill Steans, Senior Lecturer in International Relations Theory , Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham, Gender and International Relations: An Introduction*,* 1998 p. 102-103

If liberal feminists are correct in their view of the state as a ‘neutral arbiter’, rather than a patriarchal power, and if women’s inequality is largely a consequence of bias, it is possible that attitudes towards women in the military would change over time as women proved themselves, just as they have in other spheres from which they were once excluded. However, for many femi­nists the proper question to ask is not how women’s status can be furthered by participation in the military, but how women and other ‘outsiders’ might focus their opposition to military institu­tions and strengthen institutions to build peace-orientated com­munities. As Stiehm acknowledges, even if women were to participate in combat roles, and were accepted, it would not solve the problem of their relation to other states’ ‘protectors’ and ‘protected’, a relationship which feminists should be concerned to problematize. It seems that, while recognition of the close linkages between citizenship and participation in combat is an obvious starting point for feminists in their quest for gender equality, it may be that ‘NOW’s brand of equal opportunity or integrationist feminism’ could merely function to ‘reinforce the military as an institution and militarism as an ideology by perpetu­ating the notion that the military is central to the entire social order’ and thereby perpetuate a gendered order which damages both women and men. Human survival may depend upon breaking the linkage between masculinity, military capacity and death. It is for feminists and others committed to peace to provide new thinking about the nature of politics, to redefine ‘political community’ and our ideas of ‘citizenship’ and, in so doing, con­front the ‘barracks community’ directly with its ‘fear of the femi­nine . Feminist challenges to dominant conceptions of citizenship, political community and security and feminist ‘re­visions’ are the subject of chapter 5.

Impact - Oppression

Once sexism devalues the feminine it can’t be brought back, it is vulnerable and otherized

Cohn & Ruddick 3 (Carol Director of the Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, & Sara, taught philosophy, peace studies, and feminist theory at the New School University, [www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/director.htm](http://www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/director.htm), JL)

Once the gender-coding takes place – once certain ways of thinking are marked as masculine and feminine,

entwining metaphors of masculinity with judgements of legitimacy and power – then any system of thought or action comes to have gendered positions within it. For example, we see the devaluation and exclusion of “the feminine” as shaping and distorting basic national security paradigms and policies. And once the devaluation-by-association-with-the- feminine takes place, it becomes extremely difficult for anyone, female or male, to take the devalued position, to express concerns or ideas marked as “feminine.” What then gets left out is the emotional, the concrete, the particular, human bodies and their vulnerability, human lives and their subjectivity.

Impact- War

Subordination of women to men makes global nuclear war inevitable.

Betty Reardon, Director, Peace Education Program, Columbia. Women and Peace. Pg. 30-31 1993

A clearly visible element in the escalating tensions among militarized nations is the macho posturing and the patriarchal ideal of domination, not parity, which motivates defense ministers and government leaders to “strut their stuff” as we watch with increasing horror. Most men in our patriarchal culture are still acting out old patterns that are radically inappropriate for the nuclear age. To prove dominance and control, to distance one’s character from that of women, to survive the toughest violent initiation, to shed the sacred blood of the hero, to collaborate with death in order to hold it at bay all of these patriarchal pressures on men have traditionally reached resolution in ritual fashion on the battlefield. But there is no longer any battlefield. Does anyone seriously believe that if a nuclear power were losing a crucial large-scale conventional war it would refrain from using its nuclear war missiles because of some diplomatic agreement? The military theater of a nuclear exchange today would extend instantly or eventually to all living things, all the air, all the soil, all the water. If we believe that war is a “necessary evil,” that patriarchal assumptions are simply “human nature,” then we are locked into a lie, paralyzed. The ultimate result of unchecked terminal patriarchy will be nuclear holocaust.

The masculine mode of politics engendered in the 1AC’s discourse promotes violent displays of strength in the name of a country’s “male” identity

Christensen & Ferree 7 (Wendy & Myra, Professor of Sociology @ University of Wisconsin-Madison & Director of the Center for German & European Studies, *Springer Science*, Special Issue, October 10, p. 5 http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/gender/Publications/ChristensenFerree.pdf, JM)

Another influential analyst of gender in the language of war and peace, Carol Cohn (1987), argues that US government defense and security discourse during the Cold War was organized around masculinity as an unemotional display of strength, justifying callousness toward what was termed “collateral damage,” i.e., killing civilians by the millions. She suggests that for the first Iraq War as well the value placed on callousness as masculinity was expressed by contrasting it with masculinity that was framed as “not masculine enough” to be “tough.” In this debate, the use of diplomacy became a sign of lacking masculinity, the debate became binary and the association of femininity with weakness was used discursively to devalue national security stances that were not “strong enough.” (Cohn 1993). Other researchers have noted the prevalence of masculinity discourses in the wake of 9/11. Drew (2004) points to how fear and vulnerability in the aftermath of the attack were associated with weakness and femininity, while the media constructed an assertively masculine alternative by playing up “narratives of heroism” from New York City firefighters and rescue crews. The Bush Administration then adopted this rhetoric of “being tough,” and “not wimping out.” Clark (2004) and Young (2003) argue that after 9/11 Bush was constructed as a “father figure” for the nation with the responsibility to discipline those who invaded the safe space of the national family. These are illustrations of how, using what Iris Marion Young (2003) calls “the logic of masculinist protection,” gender is a powerful tool for mobilizing support for national security measures. Young argues that the logic of masculinist protection evokes fear to set up binaries of “good men/bad men” and “good women/bad women” that are mapped on to policy positions. A “good man” risks himself to protect his dependents (women and children) from “bad men” who are constructed as “uncivilized” and “barbaric.” “Good women” accept this protection, and honor their protectors, while “bad women” challenge and reject protection. Dissent becomes associated with “bad women” and is devalued. In our case, the “bad woman” role was assigned by pro-war speakers to Europeans, who were actively demasculinized as wimps and sissies, and framed as “ungrateful” for US protection. The language of “wimp” and “sissy” simultaneously challenges men’s heterosexuality and thus their honor as protectors, and casts countries as women, therefore as dependents in need of protection.

Impact- Policy Failure

Representations of discourse and emotions go hand in hand, if sexist language is used then IR goes array

Bleiker & Hutchinson 8 (Roland, Emma, Review of International Studies, British International Studies Association, 133-134, Fear no more: Emotions and world politics, 6/20/11, JL)

To understand the complex and seemingly elusive relationship between emotions and world politics we need to use all of our perceptive and cognitive tools. Rather than relying on social scientific methods alone, as scholars of IR have tended to do, we need the type of ‘common discourse’ that Edward Said and other more interdisciplinary authors advocate: a broad understanding of society and politics that replaces the current specialisation of knowledge, where only a few fellow experts are still able to communicate with each other.82 We may well even need to heed Hayden White’s encouragement and look beyond the currently fashionable dichotomy of fact and fiction. New ways of recognising the politics of emotion could emerge if we returned to earlier intellectual traditions that provided space for a range of different truth claims, including those ‘that could be presented to the reader only by means of fictional techniques of representation’?83 The prime task of this essay was to take a step in the direction of such inquiries into the relationship between emotions and politics. We fully recognise that by doing so we have taken on a topic that is far too large to cover comprehensively in the context of a short essay. Our objective was thus limited to identifying the type of attitude to knowledge and evidence that can facilitate inquiries into emotions. We have, however, refrained from discussing particular methods or ways of operationalising research. The latter would entail focusing on a specific political problem and then identifying the emotions attached to them, whether they are, for instance, fear, anger, shame, pity, compassion, empathy or sympathy. To be politically meaningful a study would then need to demonstrate, empirically or conceptually, what exact role emotions play in the issues at stake. Doing so would also entail investigating the extent to which prevailing modes of inquiry into international relations, such as those shaped by social science, may already be able to account for the issues and factors that are to be explained. The features that remain elusive, such as those linked to the more intangible aspects of the politics emotions, call for a willingness to explore alternatives modes of inquiry. Particularly important here are methods developed in the humanities, such as those designed to understand the nature and impact of visual and other aesthetic sources. A more active exploration of these sources can increase our understanding of the relationship between emotions and world politics, even through the so-produced knowledge may at times appear uncertain or even dubious when evaluated by standards of measurement applied in the social sciences.

Impact- Space Policy Failure

Sexism leads to exclusion of women from scientific institutions – their participation is key to maintain a robust and competitive space program

Lempinam 10 (Contributor, Science Magazine, October 29, http://www.sciencemag.org/content/330/6004/607.full, JM)

Women scientists and students are still confronted by a “chilly” climate at many U.S. universities, and unless conditions improve, their departure from science and technology fields could hinder the nation’s strength in a competitive global economy, said AAAS President Alice S. Huang. Speaking at the AAAS Caribbean Division’s 25th annual conference, the accomplished virologist and educator said it is imperative that the United States identify and support science talent wherever it is found. And she urged universities and colleges to lead those efforts. “We’ve actually had marvelous changes in society in the past 20 years or so,” Huang told the audience at the 25 September talk. “There has been much more acceptance of women.... But there is still a great deal that needs to be done. We’re not there yet—and we’re losing out on a lot of individuals who could contribute.” Huang’s talk was one of several recent AAAS reports and events—including one on Capitol Hill—to explore the challenges faced by women in science, engineering, and technology fields. While women still report problems ranging from overt bias to a lack of social support, there is an increasing recognition that they must be crucial players in the global drive for innovation. A new survey of more than 1000 researchers, commissioned by AAAS/Science for L’Oreal USA (see www.aaas.org/go/loreal found that more than half of the women who responded said they had experienced gender bias. More than half cited difficulties with child care as a major career barrier. “We need to be more imaginative about how one can have a successful career in science as well as a life,” said Shirley Malcom, director of Education and Human Resources at AAAS. “It will be necessary to reorient the expectations so that women scientists face fewer hurdles and can play on a level field with their male counterparts.” Support for women scientists has taken on new prominence as policy-makers promote innovation and technology development as economic necessities. Unless the United States can tap into the skill and experience of women and underrepresented minorities, Huang said, the nation may become less competitive. Huang advised women to seek out mentors, join professional associations, and promote their own work. The AAAS survey found that women are lacking such support: Nearly one-third lacked career role models, and a quarter of the women said teachers and advisors could have helped them overcome career obstacles, compared to 14% of the men surveyed. To remedy these deficits, policy-makers and employers are searching for new ways to support women scientists and engineers, speakers said at a 23 September Capitol Hill panel discussion of the survey. U.S. Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson (D—TX), who delivered opening remarks, has introduced legislation to promote gender parity among university faculty in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics fields. “We need to keep the attention on getting rid of those barriers as much as we can,” Johnson said. Programs to remove career barriers for women scientists and engineers globally are the focus of renewed attention and funding by the U.S. State Department, the World Bank, and an array of other development agencies, speakers said at a regional meeting of the International Network of Women Engineers and Scientists (INWES). The meeting, held 25 to 26 August and hosted by Education and Human Resources and the AAAS International Office, featured scientists, educators, and policy experts from 11 nations. Many of Joshua Mandell’s clients at the World Bank “have expressed a demand” for science and technology programs that include a significant role for women, the program officer noted at the meeting, because the programs “can have strong impacts on economic growth.”

Impact- Environment

The destruction of the environment is a rooted in gendered systems of hatred – only a greater feminist role can solve

Jaggar 89 (Allison M., PhD, Buffalo, *Gender/body/knowledge: Feminist reconstructions of being and knowing*, pp. 115-116, June 1, JM)

No part of living nature can ignore the extreme threat to life on earth. We are faced with worldwide deforestation, the disappearance of hundreds of species of life, and the increasing pollution of the gene pool by poisons and low-level radiation. We are also faced with biological atrocities unique to modem life—the existence of the aids vims and the possibility of even more dreadful and pernicious diseases caused by genetic mutation as well as the unforeseen ecological consequences of disasters such as the industrial accident in India and nuclear meltdown in the Soviet Union. Worldwide food short­ages, including episodes of mass starvation, continue to mount as prime agri­cultural land is used to grow cash crops to pay national debts instead of food to feed people.' Animals are mistreated and mutilated in horrible ways to test cosmetics, drugs, and surgical procedures.-' The stockpiling of ever greater weapons of annihilation and the horrible imagining of new ones con­tinues. The piece of the pie that women have only begun to sample as a result of the feminist movement is rotten and carcinogenic, and surely our feminist theory and politics must take account of this however much we yearn for the opportunities within this society that have been denied to us. What is the point of partaking equally in a system that is killing us all?' The contemporary ecological crisis alone creates an imperative that femi­nists take ecology seriously, but there are other reasons ecology is central to feminist philosophy and politics. The ecological crisis is related to the systems of hatred of all that is natural and female by the white, male western formulators of philosophy, technology, and death inventions. I contend that the sys­tematic denigration of working-class people and people of color, women, and animals arc all connected to the basic dualism that lies at the root of western civilization. But this mindset of hierarchy originates within human society, its material roots in the domination of human by human, particularly women by men. Although I cannot speak for the liberation struggles of people of color, 1 believe that the goals of feminism, ecology, and movements against racism and for the survival of indigenous peoples are internally related; they must be understood and pursued together in a worldwide, genuinely prolife, movement.

Sexism destroys the environment

**Tickner 92**, J. Ann, Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security , CIAO,

If, as these anthropologists and social constructionist ecofeminists believe, Western civilization has reinforced the subjugation of women through its assertion that they are closer to nature than men, then the nature/culture dualism must be challenged rather than ignored. If, as these authors claim, the woman/nature connection is historically contingent, then there are possibilities for transcending this hierarchical dualism in ways that offer the promise of liberation for both women and nature. Since the liberation of nature is also the goal of ecology, ecofeminist Ynestra King suggests that feminism and ecology can usefully form an alliance. According to King, ecology is not necessarily feminist, but its beliefs are quite compatible with those of these social constructionist ecofeminists since both make their chief goal the radical undermining of hierarchical dualisms. King argues that, since ecofeminists believe that misogyny is at the root of the dualism between nature and culture that ecologists deplore, ecology is incomplete without feminism.

\*Language Core\*

AT: Policy-Making Key

Discourse shapes policymaking – empirics prove

Schmidt & Radaelli 5 (Vivien A. & Claudio M., , Professor of International Relations @ Boston University, PhD in Political Science, *Policy Change and Discourse in Europe*, p. 188-189, JM)

These four mediating factors tend to be the main ones considered by social scientists in both first and second generation studies of policy change in Europe. As such, they miss out on the final, fifth factor, which we believe essential to understanding the dynamics of policy change: discourse. Discourse helps create an opening to policy change by altering actors’ perceptions of the policy problems, policy legacies and ‘fit’, influencing their preferences, and, thereby, enhancing their political institutional capacity to change. Most notable among the cases in this volume are Prime Minister Blair’s discourse, which unblocked a policy area that had seen little movement throughout the post-war period, when Blair argued that a new European security and defence initiative was necessary in light of changing US defence priorities with regard to NATO, (Howorth, in this volume). Also significant was Commission officials’ discourse that produced a major shift in trade policy priorities from trade liberalisation to development (Van den Hoven, in this volume) and in agricultural policy from production support schemes to sustainable development (Fouilleux, in this volume). EU policy, moreover, has itself also often been used in the discourse to promote policy change. For example, German and French capacity to reform in telecommunications policy was enhanced by discourses that directly referred to EU institutional requirements and competitive pressures (Thatcher, in this volume). By contrast, French capacity to transform national immigration policy was enhanced by a discourse that described the changes in purely French terms, without reference to the EU (Geddes and Guiraudon, in this volume). By the same token, however, French leaders’ inability to come up with a purely French discourse that would serve to alter views of the obligations of the Republican state in the ‘service publique’ (general interest utilities and infrastructural) services stymied reform in areas other than telecoms, such as electricity, as noted above. Discourse, in sum, is one among several factors involved in policy change. When considered in the context of the process of Europeanisation, it can be seen as contributing to ‘policy learning’, to use the concept most often employed by social scientists concerned with explaining policy adjustment in the face of crisis-inducing problems and the failure of past policy solutions (see Hemerijck and Schludi 2000).

The discursive context of politics determines policy implementation and the policies passed

Sheperd 10 (Laura J., ., Lecturer in International Relations at the University ofBirmingham,UK, *International Review of the Red Cross*, Volume 92: 877, March, p. 148-149, http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-877-shepherd.pdf, JM)

Third, and finally, this approach draws attention to the process of implementing policy. It is not the overall aim of this approach to juxtapose different readings of various policies with a view to dismissing one or another of the readings as ‘untrue’, nor to suggest that one set or another of the meanings read in the documents is somehow ‘better’. All words carry meaning and have value; the process of writing value into policy documents is therefore inescapable, but it has profound implications for the interpretation and therefore implementation of that document. Meaning cannot be fixed; the sense we make of a policy document or strategic plan is conditioned by our own discursive context and the productive context of the document or plan in question. The challenges in implementing UNSCR 1325 – or, more recently, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820 that seeks to eliminate all forms of sexual violence as weapons of war – will vary from place to place, and over time. This variation does not inhere in the inaccurate representation of specific cultural and historical contexts; rather, it is a function of language itself, according to poststructural philosophy. Therefore, looking for the origin or root of meaning, the reality to which a representation purports to relate, is an irrelevance. ‘Truth is a thing of this world. […] Each society has its regime of truth […], the type of discourses which it accepts and makes function as true’.19 This has profound implications for political research, in that a search for the ‘truth’ of the matter/‘reality’ becomes in this mode of investigation a search for the ‘systems of power which produce and sustain it [truth], and the effects of power which it induces and which extend it’.20 It is hoped that this article will encourage critical interpretations of and reflections on the policy documents that order the lives of individuals everywhere, employing as they do concepts that, like all concepts, are inherently value-laden. As Dvora Yanow points out, ‘[i]nterpretations […] are more powerful than “facts”. That makes the policy process, in all its phases, a struggle for the determination of meanings’.21

AT: Policy-Making Key

Discourse shapes social reality – it is relied on for change

Fairclough 92 (Norman, Professor of Linguistics at Lancaster University, PhD,  *Discourse and Social Change,* p. 6-7, JM)

What is open to question is whether such theory and research recognizes an importance that language has always had in social life but which has previously not been sufficiently acknowledged, or actually reflects an increase in the social importance of lan­guage. Although both may be true, I believe that there has been a significant shift in the social functioning of language, a shift reflected in the salience of language in the major social changes which have been taking place over the last few decades. Many of these social changes do not just involve language, but are con­stituted to a significant extent by changes in language practices; and it is perhaps one indication of the growing importance of language in social and cultural change that attempts to engineer the direction of change increasingly include attempts to change language practices. Let me give some examples. Firstly, in many countries there has recently been an upsurge in the extension of the market to new areas of social life: sectors such as education, health care and the arts have been required to restructure and reconceptualize their activities as the production and marketing of commodities for consumers (Urry 1987). These changes have profoundly affected the activities, social relations, and social and professional identities of people working in such sectors. A major part of their impact comprises changes in dis­course practices, that is, changes in language. In education, for example, people find themselves under pressure to engage in new activities which are largely defined by new discourse practices (such as marketing), and to adopt new discourse practices within existing activities (such as teaching). This includes 'rewordings' of activities and relationships, for example rewording learners as 'consumers' or 'clients', courses as 'packages' or 'products'. It also includes a more subtle restructuring of the discourse prac­tices of education - the types of discourse (genres, styles, etc.) which are used in it - and a 'colonization' of education by types of discourse from outside, including those of advertising, manage­ment, and counselling. Again, industry is moving towards what is being called post-Fordist' production (Bagguley and Lash 1988; Bagguley 1990), in which workers no longer function as individuals performing re­petitive routines within an invariant production process, but as teams in a flexible relation to a fast-changing process. Moreover, traditional employee-firm relations have been seen by manage­ments as dysfunctional in this context; they have therefore attempted to transform workplace culture, for example by setting up institutions which place employees in a more participatory relation with management, such as 'quality circles'. To describe these changes as 'cultural' is not just rhetoric: the aim is new cultural values, workers who are 'enterprising', self-motivating and, as Rose (MS) has put it, 'self-steering'. These changes in organization and culture are to a significant extent changes in discourse practices. Language use is assuming greater importance as a means of production and social control in the workplace. More specifically, workers are now being expected to engage in face-to-face and group interaction as speakers and listeners. Almost all job descriptions in white-collar work, even at the lowest levels, now stress communication skills. One result is that people's social identities as workers arc coming to be defined in terms that have traditionally been seen not as occupational, but as teams in a flexible relation to a fast-changing process. One striking feature of changes of this sort is that they are transnational. New styles of management and devices such as 'quality circles' are imported from more economically successful countries like Japan, so that changes in the discourse practices of workplaces come to have a partly international character. The new global order of discourse is thus characterized by widespread tensions between increasingly international imported practices and local traditions.

AT: Policy-Making Key

Failure to interrogate discourse engenders policy failure

Sheperd 10 (Laura J., Lecturer in International Relations at the University ofBirmingham,UK*, International Review of the Red Cross*, Volume 92: 877, March, p. 144-145, http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-877-shepherd.pdf, JM)

In our personal lives, we know that language matters, that words are constitutive of reality. There are words that have been excised from our vocabularies, deemed too damaging to use. There are forbidden words that children whisper with guilty glee. There are words we use daily that would be meaningless to our grandparents. Moreover, the cadence and content of our communications vary by context; words that are suitable for the boardroom may not be appropriate for the bedroom or the bar. In our personal lives, we admit that words have power, and in formal politics we do the same. It is not such a stretch to admit the same in our professional lives. I am not claiming that all analysis must be discourse-theoretical – must take language seriously – to be policy-relevant, for that would clearly be nonsense. I am, however, claiming that poststructural theories of language have much to offer policy makers and practitioners, and arguing that in order to understand how best to implement policy we first need to understand ‘how’ a policy means, not just what it means. That is, we must understand a policy before we can implement it. This article argues that we need to engage critically with how that understanding is mediated through and facilitated by our ideas about the world we live in. If we are to avoid unconsciously reproducing the different forms of oppression and exclusion that different forms of policy seek to overcome, we need to take seriously Jacques Derrida’s suggestion that ‘il n’y a pas de hors-texte’.5 [T]here is nothing ‘beyond the text.’ […] That’s why deconstructive readings and writings are concerned not only with library books, with discourses, with conceptual and semantic contents. They are not simply analyses of discourse […]. They are also effective or active […] interventions that transform contexts.6 Writing from a discipline (International Relations) that has a very clear idea of what constitutes an ‘effective or active’ intervention (and writing about language is not it), I have a strong desire to have the politics I espouse recognized as a legitimate and useful form of intervention. It ‘is not politics as a means to truth but as the activity of contesting truths’.7 Discursive practices maintain, construct and constitute, legitimize, resist and suspend truth as they (re)produce meaning, and it is these practices that we can interrogate. The simple formulation of an essay title is a discursive practice: there is a difference between writing on ‘women, armed conflict and language’ and ‘gender, violence and discourse’. The former fits comfortably within an empiricist framework – we can see, and therefore know, language, women and armed conflict – whereas the latter does not. The latter demands conceptual, rather than experiential, engagement. I include both in the title of this essay not only to draw attention to the ways in which two sets of three words purport to mean the same thing while having very different connotations, but also to suggest that we should (that tricky exhortation) include both in our studies and practices of politics and policy.

Their gendered discourse fraught with inequity precludes rational policy discussion

Christensen & Ferree 7 (Wendy & Myra**,** Professor of Sociology @ University of Wisconsin-Madison & Director of the Center for German & European Studies, *Springer Science*, Special Issue, October 10, p. 6-7, http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/gender/Publications/ChristensenFerree.pdf, JM)

Moreover, negative gender images can trivialize and demean opponents without offering a rebuttal to their substantive claims. Gendering nations and policy positions can make them appealing or ridiculous by bringing the meaning of the gender symbols into the argument. Thus, if the US has to fear “emasculation” and “defend its honor” by a show of “manly strength,” a positive value is placed on shows of force without needing to explicitly consider the merits of alternative, non-military policies. To present European countries as “women” is also to discredit their claims. To attempt to argue that a policy could simultaneously be both “more feminine” and “better” creates a symbolic conflict that is difficult to process, like trying to read the word “purple” when it is written in green letters or recognize a red ace of spades (Banaji and Dasgupta 1998). We thus anticipate anti-war speakers to use positive images of more modern styles of masculinity rather than of femininity, and that anti-war positions and speakers will be trivialized as feminine by pro-invasion speakers.

AT: Discourse Shift Impossible

Language shift is feasible – linguistic mechanisms are already in place

Martyna 80 (Wendy, Lecturer at UC Santa Cruz, *Signs,* Vol. 5: 3, Spring 1980, p. 490-492, jstor, JM)

Language change may be difficult, but it is not impossible. Some prominent individuals, for example, have made striking changes in their language use. Millions were listening when Harry Reasoner apologized for referring, on a previous broadcast, to the "men" of the judiciary Committee. In response to the many objections he had received, he not only apologized but also asked indulgence for future language offenses he might inadvertently commit. A variety of government agencies, feminist groups, professional associations, religious organizations, edu­cational institutions, publishing firms, and media institutions have also endorsed language change, issuing guidelines or passing regulations concerning sexist language.\*5 Initial empirical studies suggest consider­able language changes among university faculty and politicians.\*4 The strongest argument for the possibility of language change is that substantial numbers of language users have already managed to construct detours around generic "he" and "man." Ann Bodine sur­veys instances of socially motivated language change in England, Swe­den, and Russia; Paul Friedrich investigates the Russian example in detail, exploring how pronominal change resulted from a growing con­cern for social equality. Many guidelines for nonsexist language encourage either the re­placement of the generic masculine with sex-inclusive or sex-neutral forms or rewriting to avoid the need for a single pronoun or noun." "They" has long been in use as an alternative to "he": Bodinc claims that "despite almost two centuries of vigorous attempts to analyze and reg­ulate it out of existence, singular 'they' is alive and well."\*0 Research on pronoun use confirms Bodine's observation.51 Maija Blaubergs and Bar­bara Bate have both categorized the many proposed alternatives to sexist language forms." The two main ones are sex-inclusive forms (such as "he or she" and "women and men") and sex-neutral terms (such as "chairperson" and "humanity"). Since 1970. several new pronouns, in­cluding "tey," "co," "na." and "E," have been suggested." The difficulty of changing the language must also be contrasted with the difficulty of not changing. The awkwardness that may result from the "he or she" construction may be less troublesome than the ambiguity and sex exclusiveness of the he/man approach, and even that awkwardness will eventuallv decline.

AT: Discourse Shift Impossible

Alt Solves sexist language

Glassman & Lindeman 98 (Grotta & Devora, Lawyers at their own practice, Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, Sep , pg. 18, 6/22/11, JL)

The advent of the Internet and electronic mail have made it possible for the information you write to be read by millions of people worldwide. With no harm intended, writers of Web pages, employment policies, internal memos, letters, and handbooks often inadvertently include sexist language in their writing. Sexist language is that which tends to evoke a male image. For example, picture a mailman; a policeman; a fireman; a chairman; a salesman; a workman; a businessman. What is the gender of the person in the picture which first comes to mind? The same effect occurs with the use of the male pronoun. "An employee must swipe his timecard daily upon arrival." "Everyone must straighten his work area before leaving." "No one is permitted to eat his lunch in the large conference room." What is the gender of the employees you pictured in these situations? Our society now recognizes that employment decisions should be based on merit, and not on gender. Old concepts die hard, however. Picture a doctor treating a patient; a judge on the bench; an airline pilot. Although these words, themselves, are not gender based, many of us still picture a man, first. Therefore, the concept behind avoiding sexist writing is to write in an inclusive manner where women populate your literature, as they do your workplace. Avoiding sexist writing is not difficult, if you follow a few simple guidelines: 1. Include "her": An easy fix to a stand-alone male pronoun is to simply include the female by inserting "she" or "her." This can be cumbersome in complex sentences, but sometimes it is all you need. Consider this example: "When an employee reaches retirement age, he or she will be entitled to certain benefits." Avoid using "he/she," however, or "s/he" as they are awkward and detract from the flow of your writing. 2. Use plurals: Since the plural pronouns (they, them) are non-gender related, using plurals often eliminates the problem. For example, instead of "an employee must swipe his timecard daily upon arrival," the sentence becomes "employees must swipe their time cards daily upon arrival." 3. Use second-person (you): In some instances, where appropriate, use of the second person (you) instead of the third-person (he, she, they) also eliminates problematic language. For example, an employee procedure handbook could read "you must swipe your timecard daily upon arrival." 4. Use the passive voice: Most writing guide-books frown upon using what is called the "passive voice." The "passive voice" is merely a situation where the focus of the sentence becomes the object receiving the action, instead of the person performing the action. For example, instead of saying "Jack caught the bus," the user of the passive voice would say "the bus was caught by Jack." This construction can be wordy, at times, yet, if cautiously use, it can also help you out of a sexist-language situation. For example, you might say "lunch is not permitted to be eaten in the large conference room." 5. Avoid use of the word "man" by itself or as a prefix or suffix: We now understand that the phrases "Peace on earth, good will towards men" and "All men are created equal" are meant to apply to all people, not just those of the male gender. At the time those phrases were coined, the status of women was something less than desirable and women were not, in fact, treated equally under the law or otherwise. This article is not intended as a history lesson in the status of women; however, such information underlies the reasoning for eliminating the use of the word "man," by itself or as a prefix or suffix, when the reference is to both men and women. I do not recommend simply always inserting "people" or "person" in the place of "men" or "man," however, as some of those results are just plain silly. For example, a "people-hole" instead of a "manhole." In that case, "work hole" will suit the purpose. Other suggested substitutions are as follows: 6. Use "Ms." correctly: "Ms." was created as a form of address to provide for women, as "Mr." does for men, a polite title which does not indicate their marital status. Whether or not a woman is married is totally irrelevant in the workplace. Using "Ms." only in the place of "Miss," however, totally defeats this purpose. For example: "We welcome our new sales associates: Mr. James Joseph, Ms. Regina Parks, Ms. Janet Harris and Mrs. Sophie Buckman." Who is married and who isn't? Whose marital status is unknown? Eliminating sexist language from your writing may not be easy at first. You may need to look at your writing through different eyes. Nevertheless, it is an important goal to strive for and is a simple, cost-free way to generate good will for your company. Sexist language offends female executives, buyers, employees and representatives -- people who may be making decisions about your company, your products, and you. Therefore, it is worth the effort. Follow these steps, develop an inclusive writing style that reflects the makeup of your workforce, and the world.

AT: Taft-Kauffman

We need to question human agency in order to move on in our discourse, questioning sexism here is key

Bleiker 3(Roland, Professor of International Relations Harvard & Cambridge, *Discourse and Human Agency*, School of Political Science University of Queensland, pg. 25-26, 6/21/11, JL)

The concept of human agency has occupied a central position in the history of political and social thought. From Aristotle onwards, countless leading minds have philosophized how people may or may not be able to influence their environment. Do our actions, intentional or not, bear upon our destiny? Or are we simply creatures of habit, blind followers of cultural and linguistic orders too large and too powerful to be swayed? Today these questions remain as important as ever. Who or what shapes the course of social dynamics in the late modern world, an epoque of rapid change and blurring boundaries between nations, cultures, knowledges, realities? Can shifting social designs and their designers be discerned at all? Questions of agency, this essay argues, can best be understood if approached through the concept of discourse. However, embarking on such a journey breaks theoretical taboos and evokes various forms of anxieties. There are possible objections from those who employ the concept of discourse in their work, poststrucutalists and postmodernists in particular. Very few of the respective authors, from Heidegger to Foucault lo their contemporary interpreters, have dealt with questions of agency in an explicit and systematic way. White (2000, 76) speaks of a 'tendency to keep ontological affirmations austerely thin or minimal.' This minimalism has often been equated with an image of the world in which human beings are engulfed by discursive webs to the point that action becomes no more than a reflection of externally imposed circumstances. Towards such interpretations, my challenge consists of demonstrating that it is feasible as well as worthwhile to conceptualize the notion of human agency. In fact, my analysis seeks to show how this alleged inability to speak of agency is largely a reflection of anti-postmodern polemic, rather than a position that is inherent to or advocated by most authors who have sought to apply a discursive approach to the study of social and political phenomena.

This Round Key

This round is the key rejection - the aff’s use of “man” causes more sexist discourse and prevents long-term change

Chew 7 (Huibin, June 16 , Left Turn: Notes from the Global Intifada, <http://www.leftturn.org/?q=node/699>, JL)

This shallow vision of gender justice has so permeated even progressive circles, that our very definition of sexism is circumscribed. Too often, sexism is merely seen as a set of cultural behaviors or personal biases; challenging sexism is simply seen as breaking these gender expectations. But sexism is an institutionalized system, with historical, political, and economic dimensions. Just as it was built on white supremacy and capitalism, this country was built on patriarchy—on the sexual subjugation of women whether in war or “peace”, slavery or conquest; on the abuse of our reproductive capacity; the exploitation of both our paid and unpaid labor. Truly taking on an anti-sexist agenda means uprooting institutional patriarchy. To do so we must first, as a society, overcome our fears of addressing feminist issues and views. A deep analysis of how patriarchy operates is typically absent across progressive organizing in the US—whether for affordable housing, demilitarization, immigrant rights, or worker rights. In all of these struggles, women are heavily affected, and moreover, affected disproportionately in gendered ways, as women. Yet too often, organizers working on these issues do not recognize how they are gendered. In the process, they prioritize men’s experiences, and perpetuate sexism. Gender is ghettoized, rather than fully integrated into radical struggles. Appended to the main concerns of other movements, it is at best engaged on a single-issue, not systemic basis.

It is the very discourse of this debate round that functions to map out logics of domination and solve oppression and enable resistance

Cuomo 2 (Chris, Associate Professor of Philosophy & Women's Studies at the University of Cincinnati, "On Ecofeminist Philosophy", Ethics & the Environment, Vol #7, #2, Project MUSE, JL)

Talk of a logic of domination is a way of identifying the values embedded in culture's unjust hierarchies, and mapping the effects of such hierarchies, and such logics, is a crucial project for moral philosophv. Ecofeminists have shown that this is true because different forms of exploitation and domination are connected conceptually, but also because gender, race, class, and "nature" comingle in reality-in identities, economies, social institutions, and practices. Analyses of complex and interwoven systems of domination are therefore key to understanding social truths, and nearly any interface of nature and culture. Warren's Ecofeminist Philosophy shows that the clear and persuasive presentation of such analyses was one of the primary projects of twentieth-century ecofeminist philosophy . This project was political as well as philosophical, for to identify the hidden lines of influence and power that shape patterns of injustice and impairment is to point toward strategies for ethical engagement and improvement.

Sexism in language happens all of the time, only by standing now and refusing to use it can we move on

West & Turner 9 (Richard & Lynn, *Understanding Interpersonal Communication*, pg. 139-140, JL)

Another example of language that some people think is sexist is man-linked words. These words—such as chairman, salesman, repairman, mailman, and mankind— include man but are supposed to operate generically to include women as well. Man-linked expressions such as *manning the phones* and manned space flight are also problematic. In addition, the practice of referring to a group of people as guys, as in 'hey, you guys, let's go to the movies,' reinforces sexism in language. Relatively easy alternatives to these exclusion­ary verbal symbols are becoming more commonplace (see Table 4.2). Test your skills at replacing man-linked words with gender-neutral terms by taking the Gender-Free Language Quiz. Go to your online Resource Center for *Understanding Interpersonal Communication* to access *Interactive Activity 4.3: Gender-Free Language.*

AT: Intent

Even unintentionally sexist language reflects gender bias

Yourdictionary.com, 11 (“Sexist Language,” June 21, http://www.yourdictionary.com/grammar/style-and-usage/sexist-language.html, JM)

[Sexist language](http://www.yourdictionary.com/examples/sexism) is language that excludes either men or women when discussing a topic that is applicable to both sexes. This includes using the word man to refer to humanity, and using titles like Congressman and fireman. Another common error that shows gender bias is assuming that the subject of all sentences is male. For instance, the statement "Each student chose his own topic for his term paper," leads the reader to assume that all the students in the class were male, despite the probability that half of them were female. Underlying [sexist](http://www.yourdictionary.com/library/reference/word-definitions/define-babe.html) language is gender bias, which can occur consciously or unconsciously. When unconscious, the gender bias in language can be considered to be the product of society: other people use sexist language, and repetition normalizes it until the speaker unconsciously produces his or her own sexist language where men are the norm and women the "other".

Masculine generics inherently devalue women – intention is irrelevant

Klein 93 (Jennifer, Faculty @ Hamilton College, “Avoiding Sexist Language,” http://www.hamilton.edu/writing/writing-resources/avoiding-sexist-language, JM)

Some terms are inherently sexist, such as "mankind" and "policeman." These terms ignore the female gender in categories that should include both men and women. Often, these terms are the hardest to avoid without making the writing sound stilted. However, there are alternatives.   Mykol Hamilton, Nancy Henley and Barrie Thorne, among others, insist that we must find alternate terms for those that are inherently sexist. For instance, rather than using "man" or "mankind," why not use "people," "human beings," "humankind," or "humanity" (Hamilton et. al. 172)? The NCTE "Guidelines" offer many alternatives for sexist terms, such as "letter carrier" instead of "mailman" and "police officer" instead of "policeman."

Even unintentional “he/man” language establishes men as standard and women as objects unworthy of that status

Kleinman 7 (Sherryl, Teacher, Department of Sociology @ U North Carolina, March 12, http://www.alternet.org/story/48856/?page=entire, JM)

I'm not saying that people who use "you guys" have bad intentions, but think of the consequences. All those "man" words -- said many times a day by millions of people every day -- cumulatively reinforce the message that men are the standard and that women should be subsumed by the male category. We know from history that making a group invisible makes it easier for the powerful to do what they want with members of that group. And we know, from too many past and current studies, that far too many men are doing "what they want" with women. Most of us can see a link between calling women "sluts" and "whores" and men's sexual violence against women. We need to recognize that making women linguistically a subset of man/men through terms like "mankind" and "guys" also makes women into objects. If we, as women, aren't worthy of such true generics as "first-year," "chair" or "you all," then how can we expect to be paid a "man's wage," be respected as people rather than objects (sexual or otherwise) on the job and at home, be treated as equals rather than servers or caretakers of others, be considered responsible enough to make our own decisions about reproduction, define who and what we want as sexual beings? If we aren't even deserving of our place in humanity in language, why should we expect to be treated as decent human beings otherwise? Now and then someone tells me that I should work on more important issues -- like men's violence against women -- rather than on "trivial" issues like language. Well, I work on lots of issues. But that's not the point. What I want to say (and do say, if I think they'll give me the time to explain) is that working against sexist language is working against men's violence against women.

AT: Strategic Essentialism

No turns - Essentialism is less effective in the long term, reinforces beliefs like sexism, and is harnessed for violent projects.

Kobayashi 94 (Audrey, Direct. Institute of Women’s Studies @ Queen’s, *Gender, Place, & Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography* 1, 2, p. 225, JM)

It is important to resist the temptation of strategic essentialism, nonetheless, for a number of reasons. First, our theories really are not just stories; interwoven with the world, their outcomes, like the dusty ideas of the Enlightenment, have real and durable effects. We need to find ways of merging theory and action in explicit as well as implicit ways. Theories can nonetheless constitute a radical form of discourse (Cohen, 1992). Secondly, the urge to essentialize, like the urge to universalize (Harvey, 1992) can be a cover for the fact that we don't have an answer. Giving in to essentialism, however promising the short-term goals, may retard the process of finding more effective solutions (bearing in mind that, in opposition to instrumental rationalism that sees solutions as progress, solutions are never more than moments of particular coalescence). Thirdly, essentialism tends to dissolve differences in broad generic categories. In political terms, such generalization is tempting, for the perpetration of images of genetic suffering can mobilize considerable political force in a world where the generic and the natural are often closely intertwined. It becomes too easy, however, to mask the differences that exist among non-existent generics or, in order to serve a political purpose, to erect the same kinds of social constructions that have served the political purposes of racism and sexism. There are indeed no short cuts, and to take them is to risk setting amongst us the 'Trojan Horse' of feminist/anti-racist ethnocentrism (Spelman, 1990). Finally, the notion of strategic essentialism falls too readily into the hands of those nationalists throughout the world who, in the name of cultural freedom, democracy and identity, are killing and maiming and destroying all possibility for freedom, democracy and identity. Part of the alternative to strategic essentialism lies in a form of politics that focuses on specific conditions as temporary historical moments, and attempts to establish effective remedies to the results of sexism or racism (or other forms of oppression) according to situational terms, "built around issues, not biogenetic categories" (Knowles & Mercer, 1992, p. 111). In other words, rather than succumbing to essentialism, essentials can be upended through "a mode of politics which engages with the details of the oppression and which is capable of ending it" (p. 110). Such strategies are important. They will make a difference to people's lives if they can be effectively mounted, and if they can avoid the risk of isolating the specific while ignoring the fact that specific conditions are often expressions of larger and less readily identified or organized processes, thus masking complexity as well as the ambiguity of 'effects' interpreted from a variety of points of view (Brah, 1992). It is a difficult irony of such strategies that they, too, must rely upon a generalized consensus of both the problem and the solution while at the same time they deny the power of generalizations to control their lives.

Essentialist understandings of gender relations guarantee marginalization

Kobayashi 94 (Audrey, Direct. Institute of Women’s Studies @ Queen’s, *Gender, Place, & Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography* 1, 2, p. 225, JM)

Essentialism is an impediment to understanding those relations of power in two remaining ways. The first is that essentialist arguments often take the position that social constructions are only social constructions, "revealing [a] belief that only biologically determined phenomena could have any significance in social life" (Vance, 1992, p. 133). Such a position minimizes the power of social construction, rendering opaque not only the social processes by which marginalization and power relations are constructed but also the possibility that such processes might subsequently be deconstructed. Secondly, a rationale often put forward for essentialism (and discussed below in political terms) is that if a trait is not unchanging it should be. Not only is such a position difficult to sustain against a transformative model, but it fails to address the problem that one essentialism is always formulated against other people's essentialism; such situations lead to moral arrogance and narrowed vision but seldom to effective social or theoretical outcomes. As Vance (1992,p. 136) goes on to point out, the starting point to avoid such problems is to be "clear about what each theorist or author imagines to be constructed" (emphasis added). Only by achieving such clarity shall we be able to develop a contingency of analytical categories sufficient to match the contingency of social life.

AT: Speech Codes Bad

Our discursive action is not punishing or exclusionary – discourse is a fluid body that is constantly adjusted through acts such as our interrogation of their policy

Sheperd 10 (Laura J., Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Birmingham,UK*, International Review of the Red Cross*, Volume 92: 877, March, p. 156-157, http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-877-shepherd.pdf, JM)

As Roxanne Doty explains, discourse is more than just language. ‘A discourse delineates the terms of intelligibility whereby a particular reality can be “known” and acted upon.’63 Discourses are systems of meaning-production rather than simply statements or language, systems that ‘fix’ meaning, however temporarily, and enable us to make sense of the world. In suggesting that discourses ‘fix’ meaning I do not wish to imply that there is any trans-historical continuity or universality to meaning. This is a politics of iterated practices, these processes are always ongoing and never complete. Rather, the ‘terms of intelligibility’ are multiple, open and fluid and must be continually re-articulated and re-ordered if what was once ‘common sense’ is to remain so. It is the partial and limited nature of fixity that allows critical space for engagement. Above, I have outlined the ways in which the realities of gender and violence are ‘known’ in Chapter 5.10 of the IDDRS, for how these realities are known has direct and material implications for how they are acted upon. In this section, I offer some concluding remarks and suggest some potentially fruitful avenues for future research. What are the implications of the issues discussed here? The theoretical musings may be interesting (to some, at least) but how can the study of women and war be enriched by the arguments presented, by the type of analysis espoused? The first point of critical engagement must be with the language used to write policy. Every policy document at the international level, no matter how short or seemingly insignificant, already goes through a process of drafting and revising in consultation with various advocates, stakeholders and interested parties. Academic interest is rarely focused on these negotiations (a notable exception being the analysis of the ‘holy brackets’ deployed during the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, 1995),64 but I would suggest that more attention should be paid to how these crucial documents come to be written in the ways that they are. This is not because it is somehow possible to write the perfect policy, one that will neither privilege nor marginalize any group or individual, nor because those who are involved in the policy-making process require the expertise of interested academics in order to say what they really mean. Instead, learning more about which groups are organized – both conceptually and strategically – around which ideas, and how tensions are resolved when two or more groups experience conflict, can only give us a better idea about how commonsense notions are being circulated and (re)produced through the writing of policy itself. I have referred to this kind of analysis as an exercise in mapping, where the terrain in question is discursive.65 Again, I emphasize that the aim of such an analysis is not to criticize or exclude from the negotiating table any organization on the basis of its discursive terrain. Rather, given that ideas matter, it simply behoves us to know more about the ideas these key actors hold.

AT: Speech Codes Bad

Our challenge to their discourse does not exclude or punish prior ones – it shifts their prioritization

Wodak & Chilton 5 (Ruth & Paul A., Chair in Discourse Studies @ Lancaster University & Professor of Linguistics @ Lancaster, *A New Agenda in (Critical) Discourse Analysis: Theory, Methodology, and Interdisciplinarity (Discourse Approaches to Politics, Society and Culture)*, p. 16, JM)

Interdiscursive analysis of texts is analysis of the specific articulations' of different discourses, genres and styles (assuming that texts are normally com­plex - or hybrid, or mixed - with respect to each of these categories) that char­acterizes a particular text. Interdiscursive analysis contributes to social analysis a mediating level between various forms of social analysis on the one hand, and detailed linguistic analysis of text on the other - mixtures of discourses, genres and styles in a text can for instance on the one hand be mapped onto bound­ary shifts between different social fields (and so impinge on social issues such as the commodification of arts or education), and on the other hand be seen as realized in lexical, semantic and grammatical heterogeneities. It also takes a profoundly relational view of change - changes in discourses for instance are characteristically not simply the substitution of one discourse for another, but changes in relations between discourses, a new articulation of discourses which includes prior discourses (as we showed in Chiapello & Fairclough 2002). Ex­tracts from one of the texts which Robertson analyses (the Summit Declaration from the EU Lisbon Council) will serve as a brief example:

AT: Butler Answers

Language doesn’t construct the subject – rather it is our prior conceptions of language

Veronica Vasterling 99, Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy and the Center of Women Studies of the University of Nijmegen, the Netherlands, (HYPATIA, Volume 14.3, pgs 17-38]

The claim that language constructs the body does not mean that language originates, causes, or composes exhaustively that which it constructs. Rather, it means that there can be "no reference to a pure body which is not at the same time a further formation of that body" (Butler 1993, 10). In more general terms, instead of merely describing or referring to a body that is simply there, the constative or referential use of language is "always to some degree performative" (Butler 1993, 11). This argument can be interpreted in the following [End Page 19] way. Though referential or constative language seems to offer a direct connection to extra-linguistic reality, it depends on the prior semantic definition of the words used. The statement "this body is female" for instance, can be uttered only by a speaker who has acquired some knowledge of what these words mean. Referential or constative language is not only dependent on the prior semantic definition of the words used; precisely on the basis of that semantic definition, it also effects a certain delimitation of what is taken as extra-linguistic reality. Apart from referring to extra-linguistic reality, the statement "this body is female" at the same time delimits the body it refers to as female, with all the connotations this term carries. If the words "this body is female" appear to represent or mirror an extra-linguistic reality, then it is only because, in everyday usage, we systematically forget that the possibility of referential or constative language depends on prior semantic definitions of the words used, delimiting or highlighting the reality that is referred to in certain ways. In other words, we are so accustomed to the referential use of terms such as body and female that often we are not aware of the ways in which the connotations of these terms delimit and inform our view of extra-linguistic reality.

**Language only enables interpretation of what appears – it does not enable things such as the subject to appear**

Veronica Vasterling 99, Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy and the Center of Women Studies of the University of Nijmegen, the Netherlands, (HYPATIA, Volume 14.3, pgs 17-38]

The import of the claim that language conditions the appearance of materiality differs from the one discussed above because of the introduction of the notion of "appearance," an ambiguous notion with strong ontological and epistemological connotations. Depending on one's interpretation of "appearance," the claim either implies linguistic monism or a very strict epistemological assumption. In the phenomenological-ontological tradition, the notion "appearance" is one of the key terms. For Martin Heidegger, being is synonymous with appearing; only in so far as it appears, something can be said to exist, to be there. [3](http://muse.uq.edu.au.ts.isil.westga.edu/journals/hypatia/v014/14.3vasterling.html#FOOT3) In this sense reality is all that appears. According to Heidegger, language enables the interpretation of what appears, it does not enable that things appear. Hence, reality is epistemologically dependent but ontologically independent of language. The ontological independence of reality is reversed into dependence if, according to the above claim, language conditions the possibility of appearance. In so far as it enables that things appear, language determines the limits of reality. As language is contingent and variable over time, so are the limits of what we call, and perceive as, reality. Though much more sophisticated and defensible than the absurd conclusion that reality consists of some sort of linguistic stuff substance, this position still amounts to linguistic monism for it precludes the possibility of an ontologically independent, extra-linguistic reality. What appears or is perceived as extra-linguistic reality is still a hidden effect of language or, in terms of Butler, the dissimulated effect of discursive power.

AT: Butler Answers

Butler is wrong - Language does not construct reality but rather exposes its limits

Veronica Vasterling 99 Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy and the Center of Women Studies of the University of Nijmegen, the Netherlands, HYPATIA, Volume 14.3, pgs 17-38]

May we conclude from the Kantian interpretation of Butler's claim that [End Page 21] reality, in so far as it is not reducible to language, is ontologically independent of language, in other words, that language does not determine the ontological limits of reality? And, hence, that the charge of linguistic monism is refuted? I think so. Butler, in a recent Dutch interview, dispels the ambiguity that clings to many passages on this topic in her Bodies That Matter (1993) by explicating her position as a post linguistic turn Kantian position: "the ontological claim can never fully capture its object, and this view makes me somewhat different from Foucault and aligns me temporarily with the Kantian tradition as it has been taken up by Derrida. The 'there is' gestures toward a referent it cannot capture, because the referent is not fully built up in language, is not the same as the linguistic effect. There is no access to it outside of the linguistic effect, but the linguistic effect is not the same as the referent that it fails to capture" (Butler 1997, 26). [4](http://muse.uq.edu.au.ts.isil.westga.edu/journals/hypatia/v014/14.3vasterling.html#FOOT4) In whatever way language constructs reality, no construction nor all constructions together can ever fully capture it. With a linguistic turn of Kant, Butler says that the reach of language and, hence, the reach of knowledge is limited: the signifying processes of language always leave, as it were, an ontological remainder. But if language does not determine the ontological limits of reality, it does determine the epistemological limits of access to reality. According to Butler, there is no access to reality without language. This epistemological assumption is more strict than the one that follows from the claim I discussed in the previous section for it implies that language conditions not only the intelligibility of reality but also its accessibility. I have my doubts about this assumption. To posit language in both cases as condition implicitly equates intelligibility and accessibility. Yet isn't the reach of the latter wider than the reach of the former? Can't we have access to phenomena we do not understand?

**Butler is wrong – the “constructed” body that she speaks of is unintelligible – it exceeds understanding**

Veronica Vasterling, Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy and the Center of Women Studies of the University of Nijmegen, the Netherlands, 1999 (HYPATIA, Volume 14.3, pgs 17-38]

Thus, the body that makes itself felt as a demand in and for language is, in my explanation, the--as yet--unintelligible body. The body is unintelligible insofar as it exceeds not only, in general, the limits of the linguistically constructed body but, more specifically, the limits of the sexed, gendered, and sexualized body. This specification is important, for sex, gender, and sexuality are anything but neutral categories. The construction of the sexed, gendered, and sexualized body is, at least partly, regulated by oppressive norms among them, as Butler rightly stresses, the norm of heterosexuality. If the intelligible body is a body that is sexed, gendered, and sexualized according to (oppressive) norms, then these norms will permeate not only our understanding but [End Page 24] also our lived experience of the body. What such norms prescribe often will be understood and lived as natural and hence inevitable facts of human life. But lived experience is not restricted to the intelligible body. If it were, it would be hard to explain why and how, for instance, a teenager who has grown up in a community that considers heterosexuality as a natural fact feels desires that don't fit this fact. If accessibility were restricted to the intelligible body, it would be hard indeed to explain such phenomena. Because we have access to the unintelligible body with its sometimes unintelligible desires we not only may come to feel ill at ease with the intelligible body but also may come to conceive of, for instance, heterosexuality as an oppressive norm.

\*Alternative\*

Alt Solvency

The aff’s conception of separating man and woman in language leads to the problems in policy. We need to see women and men together, we need to not see them as separate genders or policy leads to conflict.

Moghadam 1 (Valentine, feminist scholar & author, “Violence and Terrorism: Feminist Observations on Islamist Movements, State, and the International System” Muse**,** JL)

Our world desperately needs new economic and political frameworks in order to end the vicious cycle of violence and bring about people-oriented development, human security, and socio-economic justice, including justice for women. Such frameworks are being proposed in international circles, whether by some UN circles, the antiglobalization movement, or the global feminist movement. Women's peace movements in particular constitute an important countermovement to terrorism, and they should be encouraged and funded. Feminists and women's groups have long been involved in peace work, and their analyses and activities have contributed much to our understanding of the roots of conflict and the conditions for conflict resolution, human security, and human development. There is now a prodigious feminist scholarship that describes this activism while also critically analyzing international relations from various disciplinary vantage points, including political science.° The activities of antimilitarist groups such as the Women's international League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), Women Strike for Peace, and the Women of Greenham Common are legendary, and their legacy lies in ongoing efforts to "feminize" peace, human rights, and development. At the third UN conference on women, in Nairobi in 1985, women decided that not only equality and development, but also peace and war were their affairs.° The Nairobi conference took place in the midst of the crisis of Third World indebtedness and the implementation of austerity policies recommended by the World Bank and the IME Feminists were quick to see the links between economic distress, political instability, and violence against women. As Lucille Mair noted after the Nairobi conference: This [economic] distress exists in a climate of mounting violence and militarism... violence follows an ideological continuum, starting from the domestic sphere where it is tolerated, if not positively accepted. It then moves to the public political arena where it is glamorized and even celebrated.... Women and children are the prime victims of this cult of aggression.14 Since the 1980s, when women activists formed networks to work more effectively on local and global issues, transnational feminist networks have engaged in dialogues and alliances with other organizations in order to make an impact on peace, security, conflict resolution, and social justice.. The expansion of the population of educated, employed, mobile, and politi­cally-aware women has led to increased activism by women in the areas of peace, conflict resolution, and human rights. Around the world, women have been insisting that their voices be heard, on the streets, in civil society organizations, and in the meeting halls of the multilateral organizations. Demographic changes and the rise of a "critical mass" of politically engaged women are reflected in the formation of many women's groups that are highly critical of existing po­litical structures; that question masculinist values and behav­iors in domestic politics, international relations, and conflict; and that seek to make strategic interventions, formulating solutions that are informed by feminine values. An important proposal is the institutionalization of peace education.

Alt Solvency

The ballot in voting neg grows the movement to end sexism which is the only way to do it without recreating patriarchy

Klocke 8(Brian, writer for NOMAS, Roles of Men with Feminism & Feminist Theory, 6/21/11, JL)

Unfortunately, some segments of the men's movement, such as men's rights groups and followers of Robert Bly's mythopoetic movement, seem less focused on dismantling patriarchy and more focused on, in bell hook's (1992) words, "the production of a kind of masculinity that can be safely expressed within patriarchal boundaries. She further explains that the most frightening aspect of the contemporary men's movement, particularly as it is expressed in popular culture, is the depoliticization of the struggle to end sexism and sexist oppression and the replacing of that struggle with a focus on personal self-actualization. She suggests that the men's movement should not be separate from the women's movement but instead become a segment under the larger feminist movement. In this way men would not be taking center stage in yet another part of women's lives allowing a slightly more subtle form of domination to continue.

Alt Solvency

Alt solves – discursive analysis is the only way to deconstruct conceptions of gender

Kobayashi 94 (Audrey, Direct. Institute of Women’s Studies @ Queen’s, *Gender, Place, & Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography* 1, 2, p. 225, JM)

What we can hope, for the moment, is to become more adept at the practice of unnatural discourse, as a means of exposing the conditions under which naturalizing tendencies have worked, so that we not only come to terms with the unsettling implications of post-modernism, but also disrupt the discourses set in motion by Enlightenment thought. This disruption involves two general goals: ( [1](http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/%09%09%09%09%09%09" \l "bib1" \o "1)) A continuing analysis and critique of the processes of social construction, as (almost universally) processes of naturalization, in order to understand the concepts, meanings, representations, practices and political forms through which 'race' and gender are constructed as normal, that is, viewed as part of a fundamental and unchanging (or slowly changing) order that is 'second nature.' Such understanding comes about not especially through sophisticated theorizing, but through patient and determined empirical work that investigates the details of people's lives, their taken-for-granted worlds, and that asks questions that no one had previously thought to ask. ([2](http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/%09%09%09%09%09%09#bib2)) The development of ways of initiating 'unnatural discourse', using both language (as concept) and political practice in such a way that natural categories are challenged. A method of deconstruction, or disassembly, is needed to allow us to understand not just the explicit statements of belief about what is 'natural', but also those values that are so naturalized that they have not previously come under question. This project requires, in part, a recovery of the significant past, and of the mnemonic qualities that are invoked in every use of language to give it its naturalizing power. As geographers, we need to invoke ideology to uncover the terrain that is uncontested because it is deemed to be ruled by common sense. These challenges are huge, and no pretence will be made to outline here all that is involved. Perhaps imagination is our greatest asset, since most of what is involved is not even on the academic agenda. We can begin to speculate, however, about some of the elements of the unnatural, and upon how the political strategies might be conceptualized if not put in place. The appeal of unnatural discourses lies in their use of practices that would in the past have been designated as (if you will) witchcraft or voodoo, practices associated with the unnatural, and therefore evil because threatening, powers of women or people of colour. The unnatural, in other words, is anything that falls outside the parameters of the naturalized, safe and known world of rational man. Included within those parameters are all practices that involve the imposition of social order based on a notion of a 'natural state of man.' Such a position could exclude, for example, violence (viewed by some as a natural tendency of man) as a means of bringing about social change. More radical are possibilities that instead project social actions that are beyond the realm of current imagination, so far, perhaps, that they may even be construed as 'supernatural'. 'The unnaturalization of everyday language is an important aspect of this project. In language is codified the normative categories through which human relations are constructed, and communication provides the only means through which the conditions of change are expressed. The creation of 'race' is one such example of an effective means of unnaturalizing deeply held convictions; if that particular linguistic tool is now losing its efficacy so much the better, for it is an indication not that the term was inadequate, but that it provoked some of the changes that were sought. Linguistic strategies rely upon the imposition of conceptual disorder and ideological confounding against the power of naming as one of the most important means of imposing order and dominion. Using language as a force of the unnatural to deconstruct the power of words to create oppression is not to destroy the power of words to have meaning, and so create lives that are truly meaningless in a nihilistic void. Rather, we need to gain control of language in order to understand the ways in which discourses are constructed as ideological traditions that gain efficacy through repetition, inscription, and representation (Goodrich, 1990, Ch. 4). Such processes will go on, but hopefully at a higher level of competence.

AT: Perm

1. Perm severs the representations of the 1AC which is a voting issue because it denies us stable link ground and makes the aff conditional allowing them to sever out of any negative arguments – voter for fairness
2. Their Reps still link – The 1AC still was spoken in a violent matter, saying I’m sorry just forget it doesn’t make it all better. Our 1NC link is all about the usage even if they drop it, it was still used.
3. Critique turns case – there is no net benefit to the perm, they aren’t solving the “otherness” all they are doing is pushing it deeper.
4. No Solvency – Language sustains our perception of the world and this semantic construction ties things we do not understand to representations we can understand

Vasterling 99 (Veronica, Associate Professor in Philosophy at U of Nijimegen, Butler's Sophisticated Constructivism: A Critical Assessment, Hypatia 14.3, , pg. 17-38, 6/21/11, JL)

Whereas everything that is intelligible to us is also accessible to us, the reverse is not true. Phenomena that are intelligible to us are phenomena we do understand in some way or other. At the most basic level, to understand something means to be able to name or refer to it. As understanding involves the capacity to name, to refer, or to articulate that which is understood, it is always mediated by language**.** To equate intelligibility and accessibility would mean that we cannot have access to phenomena we do not understand, that is, phenomena we cannot articulate. That does not seem plausible. By following the hermeneutic model of understanding, I try to show that we can have access to phenomena we do not understand, that is, cannot articulate, though this access is not completely independent of linguistically mediated understanding. In daily life, our behavior and actions are guided by a mostly implicit understanding of the world we inhabit, an understanding that is based upon the ways in which this world is semantically constructed**.** Even so, our daily routines areon occasion slightly, and sometimes profoundly, disrupted because we are confronted with people, situations, actions, images, texts, things, bodily sensations etcetera that defy our understanding. The context of habitual understanding enables these confrontations or encounters. 5 To become aware of something we do not understand, we need a context of what we do understand. 6 By giving us access to what we do not understand, the context of habitual understanding does, as it were, indicate its own limits**.** We register these limits not simply as a lack of understanding but, more precisely, as a lack of our capacity to articulate. The nagging feeling or awareness of something we cannot put in words is nothing unusual. This fact of everyday life implies that the range of accessibility is wider than, though not independent of, the range of intelligibility. Whereas the latter more or less coincides with our linguistic capacities, the former indicates that these capacities do not (fully) determine our awareness of and contact with reality.

AT: Perm

1. No Solvency – Representations and the discourse of them create the basis for how policies are evaluated. These evaluations are ideologically biased and perpetuate a certain type of politics, which links back into the critique.

Kleinman 96 (Arthur, Professor of Medical Anthropology & Professor of Anthropology at Harvard, <http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3671/is_199601/ai_n8747499/print>, 6/21/11, JL)

One metric of suffering recently developed by the World Bank has gained wide attention and considerable support.(27) Image II describes what the World Bank's health economists mean by the term Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs). Table 1 shows the result of the application of DALYs to measure the cost of suffering from illnesses globally. It emphasizes the significant percentage of loss in DALYs due to mental health problems. This finding, one would suppose, should help make the case for giving mental health problems--suicide, mental illnesses, trauma due to violence, substance abuse--higher priority so that greater resources can be applied to them. In fact, the cost of mental health problems are placed by the World Bank in the discretionary category so that the state is not held responsible for that burden. This is a serious problem that requires fundamental change in the way suffering from mental health problems is prioritized by the World Bank. But here we ask a different question: What kind of cultural representationand professional appropriation of suffering is this? This metric of suffering was constructed by assigning degrees of sufferingto years of life and types of disability. The assumption is that values will be universal**.** They will not vary across worlds as greatly different as China, India, sub-Saharan Africa, and North America. They will also be reducible to measures of economic cost. That expert panels rate blindness with a severity of 0.6, while female reproductive system disorders are evaluated at one third the severity is surely a cause for questioning whether gender bias is present, but more generally it should make one uneasy with the means by which evaluations of severity and its cost can be validly standardized across different societies, social classes, age cohorts, genders, ethnicities, and occupational groups. The effort to develop an objective indicator may be important for rational choice concerning allocation of scarce resources among different policies and programs. (It certainly should support the importance of funding mental health programs, even though as it is presently used in the World Bank's World Development Report it does not lead to this conclusion.) But it is equally important to question what are the limits and the potential dangers of configuring social suffering as an economic indicator. The moral and political issues we have raised in this essay cannot be made to fit into this econometric index. Likewise, the index is unable to map cultural, ethnic, and gender differences. Indeed, it assumes homogeneity in the evaluation and response to illness experiences, which belies an enormous amount of anthropological, historical, and clinical evidence of substantial differences in each of these domains.(28) Professional categories are privileged over lay categories, yet the experience of illness is expressed in lay terms. Furthermore, the index focuses on the individual sufferer, denying that suffering is a social experience. This terribly thin representation ofa thickly human conditionmay in time also thin out the social experience of suffering. It can do this by becoming part of the apparatus of cultural representation that creates societal norms, which in turn shapes the social role and social behavior of the ill, and what should be the practices of families and health-care providers**.** The American cultural rhetoric, for example, is changing from the language of caring to the language of efficiency and cost; it is not surprising to hear patients themselves use this rhetoric to describe their problems. Thereby, the illness experience, for some, may be transformed from a consequential moral experience into a merely technical inexpediency.

1. They don’t solve the “otherness”. All the aff does with the perm is pushes the “otherness” further away. They don’t take a stand of doing anything just saying it’s there. The neg doesn’t push people into the “otherness”. We don’t strip their identity. We just get rid of sexist language. If the neg links into it so does the perm. Any attempt by the aff to solve it is intrinsic.

\*Aff\*

Policy Making Good

As long as policy is rational policy will succeed

Bleiker & Hutchinson 8. (Roland, Emma, Review of International Studies, British International Studies Association, 119-120, Fear no more: Emotions and world politics, 6/20/11, JL)

Both Crawford and Mercer identify prevailing understandings of reason as a key explanation for the scholarly neglect of emotion. They stress that realism and liberalism rest on the fundamental assumption that the behaviour of states is based on rational, or at least intelligible factors. Crawford strongly laments that this rational-actor paradigm has become so dominant that ‘emotions virtually dropped from the radar screen of international relations theorists’.15 Mercer too critiques the prevailing scholarly eagerness to ‘purge’ emotions from explanations.16 Lebow has recently affirmed the adequacy of these complaints, stressing, as Mercer did, that reason and emotion are not nearly as mutually exclusive as was assumed by prevailing approaches to international relations.17 The attempt to separate emotion and rationality is, of course, part of a long modern tradition. Historically perceived to encapsulate women’s ‘dangerous desires’, emotions were thought to be feelings or bodily sensations that overtook us, distorting thought and the ability to make rational and ethical judgement.18 Justice must be free of passion, it was believed, because emotion impels people to perform irrational acts of violence and harm.19 The ensuing assumptions go far beyond the realm of philosophy and political theory. They permeate much of decision-making and public debate a well. Consider how nuclear strategy during the Cold War was based on highly rationalised assumptions, even when these assumptions bordered on the absurd, as when the very notion of credible deterrence depended on the rather questionable idea that a ‘thermonuclear war’ between the superpowers was winnable and, in the words of Herman Kahn, ‘would not preclude normal and happy lives for the majority of survivors and their descendants’.20 Or look at a recent media release by the Australian Law Reform Commission, which aims at generating public debate on the effectiveness and need for sedition laws in the fight against global terrorism. Its main objective is to come up with useful – read rational – policy advice by taking ‘some of the emotion out of the debate’.21 These are precisely the attitudes to reason and emotion that many feminists have for long held responsible for gendered and highly problematic practices of statehood, sovereignty and conflict.22

Policy-Making trades-off with discourse, we often do policy making before discourse

Bleiker 3(Roland, Professor of International Relations Harvard and Cambridge, Discourse and Human Agency, School of Political Science University of Queensland, pg. 43, 6/21/11, JL)

I have used everyday forms of resistance to illustrate how discourses not only frame and subjugate our thoughts and behaviour, but also offer possibilities for human agency. Needless to say, discursive dissent is not the only practice of resistance that can exert human agency. There are many political actions that seek immediate changes in policy or institutional structures, rather than ’mere’ shifts in societal consciousness. Although some of these actions undoubtedly achieve results, they are often not as potent as they seem. Or, rather, their enduring effect may well be primarily discursive, rather than institutional. Nietzsche (1982b, 243) already knew that the greatest events ‘are not our loudest but our stillest hours.’ This is why he stressed that the world revolves ‘not around the inventors of new noise, but around the inventors of new values.’ And this is why, for Foucault too, the crucial site for political investigations are not institutions, even though they are often the place where power is inscribed and crystallized. The fundamental point of anchorage of power relations, Foucault claims, is always located outside institutions, deeply entrenched within the social nexus. Hence, instead of looking at power from the vantage point of institutions, one must analyse institutions from the standpoint of power relations (Foucault, 1982, 219–222).

Policy Making Good

Discursive focus detracts from focus on reality

Taft-Kaufman 95 (Jill, Professor Department of Speech Communication @ Central Michigan U, *The Southern Communication Journal*, 90, 3, Spring, JM)

If the lack of consistency between postmodernism's self-styled allegiance to the oppositional and its collaboration with the existing state of academic practice were its only shortcoming, it should be enough to prevent us from unquestioningly embracing it as a theory. More disquieting still, however, is its postulation of the way the world around us works. Theory that presumes to talk about culture must stand the test of reality. Or, as Andrew King states, "culture is where we live and are sustained. Any doctrine that strikes at its root ought to be carefully scrutinized" (personal communication, February 11, 1994). If one subjects the premise of postmodernism to scrutiny, the consequences are both untenable and disturbing. In its elevation of language to the primary analysis of social life and its relegation of the de-centered subject to a set of language positions, postmodernism ignores the way real people make their way in the world. While the notion of decentering does much to remedy the idea of an essential, unchanging self, it also presents problems. According to Clarke (1991): Having established the material quality of ideology, everything else we had hitherto thought of as material has disappeared. There is nothing outside of ideology (or discourse). Where Althusser was concerned with ideology as the imaginary relations of subjects to the real relations of their existence, the connective quality of this view of ideology has been dissolved because it lays claim to an outside, a real, an extra-discursive for which there exists no epistemological warrant without lapsing back into the bad old ways of empiricism or metaphysics. (pp. 25-26) Clarke explains how the same disconnection between the discursive and the extra-discursive has been performed in semiological analysis: Where it used to contain a relation between the signifier (the representation) and the signified (the referent), antiempiricism has taken the formal arbitrariness of the connection between the signifier and signified and replaced it with the abolition of the signified (there can be no real objects out there, because there is no out there for real objects to be). (p. 26) To the postmodernist, then, real objects have vanished. So, too, have real people. Smith (1988) suggests that postmodernism has canonized doubt about the availability of the referent to the point that "the real often disappears from consideration" (p. 159). Real individuals become abstractions. Subject positions rather than subjects are the focus. The emphasis on subject positions or construction of the discursive self engenders an accompanying critical sense of irony which recognizes that "all conceptualizations are limited" (Fischer, 1986, p. 224). This postmodern position evokes what Connor (1989) calls "an absolute weightlessness in which anything is imaginatively possible because nothing really matters" (p. 227). Clarke (1991) dubs it a "playfulness that produces emotional and/or political disinvestment: a refusal to be engaged" (p. 103). The luxury of being able to muse about what constitutes the self is a posture in keeping with a critical venue that divorces language from material objects and bodily subjects. The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported by substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects, creates a solipsistic quagmire. The political sympathies of the new cultural critics, with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people, aligns them with the political left. Yet, despite their adversarial posture and talk of opposition, their discourses on intertextuality and inter-referentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist politics--conflict, racism, poverty, and injustice. In short, as Clarke (1991) asserts, postmodern emphasis on new subjects conceals the old subjects, those who have limited access to good jobs, food, housing, health care, and transportation, as well as to the media that depict them.

Discourse Doesn’t Solve

The neg isn’t finding how the discourse emerges, without finding that they can’t ever solve their critique

Taft Kaufman 95 (Jill, Professor Department of Speech Communication @ Central Michigan University, [The Southern Communication Journal](http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink?RQT=318&pmid=17630&TS=1184952735&clientId=17822&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD), Vol.60, Iss. 3, 6/21/11, JL)

The realm of the discursive is derived from the requisites for human life, which are in the physical world, rather than in a world of ideas or symbols.(4) Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for their fulfillment. Postmodern emphasis on the discursive without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete social goals (Merod, 1987). Although the material conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example, argues that "the justice that working people deserve is economic, not just textual" (p. 571). Lopez (1992) states that "the starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be the present existential, concrete situation" (p. 299). West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 170). Unlike postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy about power and the realities of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances that create lived experience. People whose lives form the material for postmodern counter-hegemonic discourse do not share the optimism over the new recognition of their discursive subjectivities, because such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and current struggles against racism, sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice. They do not appreciate being told they are living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. Ideas have consequences. Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a cultural and humane failure. The need to look beyond texts to the perception and attainment of concrete social goals keeps writers from marginalized groups ever-mindful of the specifics of how power works through political agendas, institutions, agencies, and the budgets that fuel them.

Discourse Doesn’t Solve

Discourse does not affect reality – alternative narratives prove

Roskoski & Peabody 94 (Matthew & Joe, Faculty @ Florida State University, “A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language ‘Arguments,’” October 26, http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques, JM)

Before we begin to discuss the validity of the hypothesis, we ought first to note that there are two varieties of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. The strong version claims that language actually creates reality, while the weak version merely claims that language influences reality in some way (Grace). As Bloom has conceded, the strong version - "the claim that language or languages we learn determine the ways we think" is "clearly untenable" (Bloom 275). Further, the weak form of the hypothesis will likely fail the direct causal nexus test required to censor speech. The courts require a "close causal nexus between speech and harm before penalizing speech" (Smolla 205) and we believe debate critics should do the same. We dismiss the weak form of the hypothesis as inadequate to justify language "arguments" and will focus on the strong form. Initially, it is important to note that the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis does not intrinsically deserve presumption, although many authors assume its validity without empirical support. The reason it does not deserve presumption is that "on a priori grounds one can contest it by asking how, if we are unable to organize our thinking beyond the limits set by our native language, we could ever become aware of those limits" (Robins 101). Au explains that "because it has received so little convincing support, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has stimulated little research" (Au 1984 156). However, many critical scholars take the hypothesis for granted because it is a necessary but uninteresting precondition for the claims they really want to defend.

Reality drives discourse

Roskoski & Peabody 94 (Matthew & Joe, Faculty @ Florida State University, “A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language ‘Arguments,’” October 26, http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques, JM)

The first reason is that it is impossible to generate empirical validation for the hypothesis. Because the hypothesis is so metaphysical and because it relies so heavily on intuition it is difficult if not impossible to operationalize. Rosch asserts that "profound and ineffable truths are not, in that form, subject to scientific investigation" (Rosch 259). We concur for two reasons. The first is that the hypothesis is phrased as a philosophical first principle and hence would not have an objective referent. The second is there would be intrinsic problems in any such test. The independent variable would be the language used by the subject. The dependent variable would be the subject's subjective reality. The problem is that the dependent variable can only be measured through self- reporting, which - naturally - entails the use of language. Hence, it is impossible to separate the dependent and independent variables. In other words, we have no way of knowing if the effects on "reality" are actual or merely artifacts of the language being used as a measuring tool. The second reason that the hypothesis is flawed is that there are problems with the causal relationship it describes. Simply put, it is just as plausible (in fact infinitely more so) that reality shapes language. Again we echo the words of Dr. Rosch, who says: {C}ovariation does not determine the direction of causality. On the simplest level, cultures are very likely to have names for physical objects which exist in their culture and not to have names for objects outside of their experience. Where television sets exists, there are words to refer to them. However, it would be difficult to argue that the objects are caused by the words. The same reasoning probably holds in the case of institutions and other, more abstract, entities and their names. (Rosch 264). The color studies reported by Cole & Means tend to support this claim (Cole & Means 75). Even in the best case scenario for the Whorfians, one could only claim that there are causal operations working both ways - i.e. reality shapes language and language shapes reality. If that was found to be true, which at this point it still has not, the hypothesis would still be scientifically problematic because "we would have difficulty calculating the extent to which the language we use determines our thought" (Schultz 134). The third objection is that the hypothesis self- implodes. If language creates reality, then different cultures with different languages would have different realities. Were that the case, then meaningful cross- cultural communication would be difficult if not impossible. In Au's words: "it is never the case that something expressed in Zuni or Hopi or Latin cannot be expressed at all in English. Were it the case, Whorf could not have written his articles as he did entirely in English" (Au 156). The fourth and final objection is that the hypothesis cannot account for single words with multiple meanings. For example, as Takano notes, the word "bank" has multiple meanings (Takano 149). If language truly created reality then this would not be possible. Further, most if not all language "arguments" in debate are accompanied by the claim that intent is irrelevant because the actual rhetoric exists apart from the rhetor's intent. If this is so, then the Whorfian advocate cannot claim that the intent of the speaker distinguishes what reality the rhetoric creates. The prevalence of such multiple meanings in a debate context is demonstrated with every new topicality debate, where debaters spend entire rounds quibbling over multiple interpretations of a few words.1

No Link – Manned

No link – “manned” has nothing to do with gender

Coleman 3 (Herb, Contributor, Tips; March 04, http://www.mail-archive.com/tips@acsun.frostburg.edu/msg06298.html, JM)

Although, I could see how the connotation would seem sexists, from my early education I recall the "manned", "manual", and "manage" all come from the same latin root for the word "hand" and were not originally gendered terms. Many people, especially on TV, make the same mistake with the Spanish phrase "mano y mano". The way it is often used makes it seem that the people think it means "man to man" but instead it actually means "hand and hand".

Man is the root, it is not sexist but classic English

English for Students.com 11 (Dictionary website ,4/23, <http://www.english-for-students.com/manu.html>, 6/21/11, JL)

These ROOT-WORDS are MAN & MANU which mean BY HAND. The words Nos. 6, 7 and 8 are really misnomers. MANUfactured goods are no longer made by handin a MANUfactory by a MANUfacturer with his own hands. In the march of automation we shall soon be obliged to find another name for machine-made goods. Someday, a person who knows the ROOT-WORD well will invent a new word to take the place of the old.

Even if masculine generics are sexist, using them for lack of alternatives without malice is justified

Krigline 5 (Michael, English Instructor @ Northwestern Polytechnical University, May http://www.krigline.com/Sexist.htm)

As English and Chinese speakers embrace the value of sexual equality many of these outdated terms will change, but since languages evolve slowly it is equally unreasonable to expect all “sexist” language to disappear quickly. Where the alteration is easy, changes are much more apparent in modern English. For example, we can easily change policeman to police officer and chairman to chairperson. It is almost as easy to change sentences from singular to plural so that you can use the sexually neutral “they” instead of “he/she.” For decades, American writing teachers have encouraged students to stay away from sexist language. In a popular 1989 writing guidebook, DeWitt Scott says to avoid stereotypes that “put women down” and to remember that lawyers, officials and business people are less and less exclusively male. He also points out that “sexism isn’t primarily a question of language, but of assumptions underlying language.”[[2]](http://www.krigline.com/Sexist.htm" \l "_ftn2" \o ") In other words, calling someone a “girl” can simply refer to her gender (especially if she is young), but to refer to your associate by saying “My girl will fix you a cup of coffee” reflects an immature or backward assumption about the modern role of women. Certainly, sexist terminology exists in the English language (and probably in every other language in the world), and we should rejoice as a lot of it passes out of our newspapers and books. Native English speakers can also rejoice that our forefathers—oops, make that ancestors—gave us a language without gender (like "le" and "la" to modify French nouns) and without little pictures (like the Chinese female pictograph 女); words with gender particles and "female" pictographs would be much more difficult to make neither masculine nor feminine than "sexist" endings like "-men."[[3]](http://www.krigline.com/Sexist.htm" \l "_ftn3" \o ") Contemporary writers should indeed be vigilant to reduce or remove the use of sexist terminology. But as we wait for the English language to change, there is no need to expunge gender-related language from historical records or to impugn the people who wrote that way as being sexist or chauvinistic. They were simply using the words available to them, and their writing can reveal a lot about the values of their time. Similarly, we should not automatically assume that current writers or speakers are being derogatory simply because they leave “-men” on the end of a word or refer to an unknown person as “he.”[[4]](http://www.krigline.com/Sexist.htm" \l "_ftn4" \o ") We are all the children of our time and the product of our educational opportunities, trying to use words to convey our thoughts to others—which is never an easy task. In the long run, rash assumptions and name-calling will always contaminate the communication process, while tolerance and patient listening should yield a clearer understanding.

Turn- Can’t Solve “Otherness”

Categorization doesn’t promote otherization – Their vague alternative allows subjective, under-the-table distinctions that are worse

Taft Kaufman 95 (Jill, Professor Department of Speech Communication @ Central Michigan University, [The Southern Communication Journal](http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink?RQT=318&pmid=17630&TS=1184952735&clientId=17822&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD), Vol.60, Iss. 3, 6/21/11, JL)

Lumping people together in categories of "Other" can have the same effect. Groups are conferred with clusters of common attributes based primarily upon their relative lack of power within the social hierarchy. Imposition of the "Other" label masks distinctions within a group, such as race, class, sex, age, sexual preference, values, religion, politics, and geographic genealogy. Individuals from marginalized groups object to the double standard by which individuals from the dominant culture can see themselves as unique but thrust upon "Others" the burden of being a spokesperson for the entire group of which their perceived "Otherness" makes them a member (Moore, 1992; White, 1992). In discourses of subjectivity, details about a person matter. As Minh-ha (1989) reasons, details about a person help to rewrite them as subject (42). One of the appeals of the undifferentiated "Other" is the quick fix that the concept offers to those who would like to recognize difference but do not want to spend the time necessary getting to know people who are different. Stereotypes and "Otherness" require distance in order to flourish. Particulars make a person and an experience real. Frank (1991) stresses the difference between categorizing people and experiences by a common name and the specifics that lead to involvement, shared experience, and commitment. Once a healthy young academic, a sudden heart attack followed by testicular cancer quickly forced Frank out of a realm where he was perceived as a distinct person and into the category of "cancer patient." After having crossed over this threshold, Frank learned that among caregivers and people who were not ill, generalities save time. Placing people in categories, the fewer the better, is efficient; each category indicates a common treatment: one size fits all. But...treatment is not care. Treatment gets away with making a compromise between efficiency and care by creating an illusion of involvement. (p. 45)

Turn and Perm Solvency

The permutation to retain but discuss sex/gender distinctions solves best

Taft Kaufman 95 (Jill, Department of Speech Communication @ Central Michigan University, [The Southern Communication Journal](http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink?RQT=318&pmid=17630&TS=1184952735&clientId=17822&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD), Vol.60, Iss. 3, 6/21/11, JL)

If the dialogue on "Otherness" becomes a genuine dialogue by emphasizing these articulate and impassioned voices, we will want to consider the social and political implications and consequences of white elites performing the personal narratives of marginalized people for audiences composed primarily of other white elites. Appropriation and commodification of these voices perhaps assuage our sense of guilt but hide the need for collective action to change conditions causing "Otherness." In addition, such performances transmit the idea that oppressed people still need voices from the dominant culture to rescue them from obscurity and to validate their importance. As Yamada (1990) laments, "I hope that we do not have to wait until some accepted American writer with perfect English adopts the immigrants as interesting subjects before their experiences can be considered 'universal' and therefore a bona fide part of American culture" (p. 126). Mudimbe (1988) rejects the need for such validation when he asserts that Western ideology is irrelevant for African authenticity. In light of this position, we can question the usefulness and wisdom of performing the personal narratives of the sociological or anthropological "Other" when that concept of "Other" is seen by the people to whom the term refers as a "mask hiding that space where our words would be if we were speaking...if we were there" (hooks, p. 151). If "the Other" is to be performed, let us consider the effects of changing the audience for that performance. At performance festivals, conventions, and in numerous colleges and universities with homogeneous student populations, white elites are currently performing representations of "Others" primarily for other white elites. One way to turn our present monologue into dialogue would be to perform "the Other" for the people who own these narratives. The process might initiate and develop dialogue about representation, images, and stereotypes of how we see each other. Challenges to and questions about valid representation, while they may not provide as much comfort as our past practice, could foster significant discussions about racism, sexism, homophobia, ageism, and classism. Such an alteration of our practice would also help to align our performance work more with the new Oral History Evaluation Guidelines, which encourage oral historians to make their interviews accessible to the individuals from whom they were taken and the community from which they emerged (Ritchie, 1992).

Perm Solvency

We can work to solve the “other”. The perm does this by co-opting not only rejection of gender language but acknowledges that rejection alone can’t solve and pushes back against the other.

Taft Kaufman 95(Jill, Department of Speech Communication @ Central Michigan University, [The Southern Communication Journal](http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink?RQT=318&pmid=17630&TS=1184952735&clientId=17822&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD), Vol.60, Iss. 3, 6/21/11, JL)

As a corollary to performance of whiteness, we might perform the fragmented process by which we build perceptions of someone who is different from us. This performance of our sense of difference might focus upon the political, economic, sexual, and ethnic shards that construct "Otherness." Such a process would help us respond to hook's (1992) proposal to "interrogate the way assuming the position of an outsider looking in, as well as interpreter, can, and often does, pervert and distort one's perspective" (pp. 152-53). As Kozol (1992) recommends: "More people have to concentrate on how we perpetrate the distortions" involved in perceptions of people as "Others." If one does choose to perform narratives of "the Other," the voices of those others should prompt us to go to the field to gain personal, interactional, in-depth knowledge of the people we are studying over time. Studies based upon depth and breadth help to reduce the risk of appropriating, commodifying, and stereotyping groups of people. "The Other" is not a fixed reality, but a dynamic, multifaceted relationship that takes experience to uncover and may be glimpsed only partially within roles that are often multiple and contradictory. Anthropology, according to Rosaldo (1989), requires time and patience. Those of us who are not trained as anthropologists and will not be training our students as such must work cautiously so that narrowly circumscribed interviews, which lead to soundbite assumptions, do not serve as foundation for performance of "the Other." Questioning the methods for data collection is crucial. Fieldwork must be tied to complex interpretations of historical, political, and socioeconomic research. Research on gender needs to be integrated with that of race, ethnicity, class, and nationality. There are, according to Rosaldo, "no shortcuts" (p. 25).

The critique’s totalizing nature co-opts political projects by destroying coalitions – the perm is key

Krishna 93 (Sankaran , Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii; *Alternatives*18, 3, p. 385-417, JM)

While this point is, perhaps, debatable, Der Derian’s further assertion, that a postmodern critique of the Gulf War mobilization would be somehow more effective, sounds less convincing. An alternative, late-modern tactic against total war was to war on totality itself, to delegitimize all  sovereign truths based on class, nationalist, or internationalist metanarratives … better strategically to play with apt critiques of the powerful new forces unleashed by cyber war than to hold positions with antiquated tactics and nostalgic unities. (AD: 177-178; emphasis in original)   The dichotomous choice presented in this excerpt is straightforward: one either indulges in total critique, delegitimizing all sovereign truths, or one is committed to “nostalgic” essentialist unities that have become obsolete and have been the grounds for all our oppressions   .   In offering this dichotomous choice, Der Derian replicates a move made by Chaloupka in his equally dismissive critique of the more mainstream nuclear opposition, the Nuclear Freeze movement of the early 1980s, that, according to him, was operating along obsolete lines, emphasizing “facts” and “realities” while a “postmodern” President Reagan easily outflanked them through an illusory Star Wars program. (See KN: chapter 4) Chaloupka centers this difference between his own supposedly total critique of all sovereign truths (which he describes as nuclear criticism in an echo of literary criticism) and the more partial (and issue-based) criticism of what he calls “nuclear opposition” or “anti nuclearists” at the very outset of his book. (KN: xvi) Once again, the unhappy choice forced upon the reader is to join Chaloupka   in   his   total critique of all sovereign truths or be trapped in obsolete essentialisms. This leads to a disastrous politics, pitting groups that have the most in common (and need to unite on some basis to be effective) against each other. Both Chaloupka and Der Derian thus reserve their most trenchant critique for political groups that should, in any analysis, be regarded as the closest to them in terms of an oppositional politics and their desired futures. Instead of finding ways to live with these differences and to (if fleetingly) coalesce against the New Right, this fratricidal critique is politically suicidal. It obliterates the space for apolitical activism based on provisional and contingent coalitions, for uniting behind a common cause even as one recognizes that the coalition is comprised of groups that have very differing (and possibly unresolvable) views of reality . Moreover, it fails to consider the possibility that there may have been other, more compelling reasons for the “failure” of the Nuclear Freeze movement or anti-Gulf War movement. Like many a worthwhile cause in our times, they failed to garner sufficient support to influence state policy. The response to that need not be a totalizing critique that delegitimizes all narratives.   The blackmail inherent in the choice   offered by Der Derian and Chaloupka, between total critique and “ineffective” partial critique ought to be transparent. Among other things, it   effectively militates against the construction of provisional or strategic essentialisms in our attempts to create space for an activist politics . In the next section, I focus more widely on the genre of critical international theory and its impact on such an activist politics.

Perm Solvency

Policy can be used to change discourse and language, NY proves

Grynbaum 2007 (Michael, Staff writer NYT, August 7, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/07/nyregion/07bword.html?pagewanted=print>, 6/20/2011, JL)

The New York City Council, which drew national headlines when it passed a symbolic citywide ban earlier this year on the use of the so-called n-word, has turned its linguistic (and legislative) lance toward a different slur: bitch. The term is hateful and deeply sexist, said Councilwoman Darlene Mealy of Brooklyn, who has introduced a measure against the word, saying it creates “a paradigm of shame and indignity” for all women. But conversations over the last week indicate that the “b-word” (as it is referred to in the legislation) enjoys a surprisingly strong currency — and even some defenders — among many New Yorkers. And Ms. Mealy admitted that the city’s political ruling class can be guilty of its use. As she circulated her proposal, she said, “even council members are saying that they use it to their wives.” The measure, which 19 of the 51 council members have signed onto, was prompted in part by the frequent use of the word in hip-hop music. Ten rappers were cited in the legislation, along with an excerpt from an 1811 dictionary that defined the word as “A she dog, or doggess; the most offensive appellation that can be given to an English woman.” While the bill also bans the slang word “ho,” the b-word appears to have acquired more shades of meaning among various groups, ranging from a term of camaraderie to, in a gerund form, an expression of emphatic approval.

Ms. Mealy acknowledged that the measure was unenforceable, but she argued that it would carry symbolic power against the pejorative uses of the word. Even so, a number of New Yorkers said they were taken aback by the idea of prohibiting a term that they not only use, but do so with relish and affection. “Half my conversation would be gone,” said Michael Musto, the Village Voice columnist, whom a reporter encountered on his bicycle on Sunday night on the corner of Seventh Avenue South and Christopher Street. Mr. Musto, widely known for his coverage of celebrity gossip, dismissed the idea as absurd. “On the downtown club scene,” he said, munching on an apple, the two terms are often used as terms of endearment. “We divest any negative implication from the word and toss it around with love.” Darris James, 31, an architect from Brooklyn who was outside the Duplex, a piano bar in the West Village, on Sunday night was similarly opposed. “Hell, if I can’t say bitch, I wouldn’t be able to call half my friends.” They may not have been the kinds of reaction that Ms. Mealy, a Detroit-born former transit worker serving her first term, was expecting. “They buried the n-word, but what about the other words that really affect women, such as ‘b,’ and ‘ho’? That’s a vile attack on our womanhood,” Ms. Mealy said in a telephone interview. “In listening to my other colleagues, that they say that to their wives or their friends, we have gotten really complacent with it.” The resolution, introduced on July 25, was first reported by The Daily News. It is being considered by the Council’s Civil Rights Committee and is expected to be discussed next month. Many of those interviewed for this article acknowledged that the b-word could be quite vicious — but insisted that context was everything. “I think it’s a description that is used insouciantly in the fashion industry,” said Hamish Bowles, the European editor at large of Vogue, as he ordered a sushi special at the Condé Nast cafeteria last week. “It would only be used in the fashion world with a sense of high irony and camp.” Mr. Bowles, in salmon seersucker and a purple polo, appeared amused by the Council measure. “It’s very ‘Paris Is Burning,’ isn’t it?” he asked, referring to the film that captured the 1980s drag queen scene in New York. The b-word has been used to refer to female dogs since around 1000 A.D., according to the Oxford English Dictionary, which traces the term’s derogatory application to women to the 15th century; the entry notes that the term is “not now in decent use.” But there is much evidence that the word — for better or worse — is part of the accepted vernacular of the city. The cover of this week’s New York magazine features the word, and syndicated episodes of “Sex and the City,” the chronicle of high-heeled Manhattan singledom, include it, though some obscenities were bleeped for its run on family-friendly TBS. A feminist journal with the word as its title is widely available in bookstores here, displayed in the front rung at Borders at the Time Warner Center. Robin Lakoff, a Brooklyn-born linguist who teaches at the [University of California](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/u/university_of_california/index.html?inline=nyt-org), Berkeley, said that she despised the word, but that enforcing linguistic change through authority “almost never works,” echoing comments from some New Yorkers who believed a ban would only serve to heighten the word’s power. “If what the City Council wants to do is increase civility, it would have to be able to contextualize it,” said Ms. Lakoff, who studies language and gender. “You forbid the uses that drive people apart, but encourage the ones that drive people together. Which is not easy.” Councilman Leroy G. Comrie Jr., the Queens Democrat who successfully sponsored a symbolic moratorium on the n-word that was adopted Feb. 28, said he supported Ms. Mealy’s measure, but acknowledged that the term had many uses. “We want to make sure the context that it’s used is not a negative one,” Mr. Comrie said yesterday. Back at the West Village piano bar on Sunday evening, Poppi Kramer had just finished up her cabaret set. She scoffed at the proposal. “I’m a stand-up comic. You may as well just say to me, don’t even use the word ‘the.’ ” But at least one person with a legitimate reason to use the word saw some merit in cutting down on its use. “We’d be grandfathered in, I would think,” said David Frei, who has been a host of the Westminster Kennel Club dog show in New York since 1990. The word is a formal canine label that appears on the competition’s official materials. But Mr. Frei said he worried about the word’s impact on some viewers, especially younger ones. “I think we have to take responsibility for that word on the air. The reality is it’s in the realm of responsible conduct to not use that word anymore.

Perm Solvency

Discursive analysis is most effective when combined with concrete political actions

Wodak & Chilton 5 (Ruth & Paul A., Chair in Discourse Studies @ Lancaster University & Professor of Linguistics @ Lancaster, *A New Agenda in (Critical) Discourse Analysis: Theory, Methodology, and Interdisciplinarity (Discourse Approaches to Politics, Society and Culture),* p. 16, JM)

Finally, integrated research can involve relevant practitioners. It is true that in many fields practitioners have not much need for analytical research of their own practices as they are secure in their traditional ways of doing things. But where innovation is needed, and where traditional practices are in crisis, re­searchers can make positive contributions, and open up options that may not have been evident to practitioners. If the relation is equal, and the practitioners are not used as "subjects" of research, but as partners, and the researchers not as hired hands doing the bidding of their paymasters, but as consultants whose critiques and suggestions it might be prudent to listen to, collaborations between academic researchers and practitioners would give practitioners a chance to benefit from the critical and imaginative stance independent academic researchers can still afford, and academic researchers a chance to make a difference to the world "out there".

Perm solves best – reproach and not rejection is the key

Isaacs 97 (Tracy, Chair, Department of Women's Studies & Feminist Research, *Ethics* 107, 4, July , jstor, JM)

Given her analysis, Calhoun maintains that it may not be appro­priate to blame, to hold responsible, for example, "the ordinary man" for using "he" gender neutrally or calling women "girls." These prac­tices take on a moral dimension when they are viewed through the eyes of feminist social critics, and that creates an abnormal context with respect to these practices because the critical framework is not recognized by the dominant culture. These "ordinary men" aren't party to information that they would need in order to recognize this behavior as contributing to oppression. (Nor, indeed, are many "ordi­nary women.") To the extent that this is true, it would be inappropriate to hold the men who do it responsible. It is arguable that in cases that resemble this one in the relevant respects, the new moral ideas will be thoroughly different in emphasis from the old ones and will require significant revisions in the way things arc conceptualized. As an exam­ple, Calhoun cites the ethics of care introduced by Carol Gilligan.15 It "is neither clearly consequentialist nor rights-based, and ... empha­sizes the moral importance of personal, noncontractual relationships, compassion and sympathy, sustaining connection, and highly contex-tualized reasoning."16 Where recognition of morally wrong practice requires a shift in perspective, the acquisition of new information will not come easily.17 Though agents who behave wrongly based on ignorance in an abnormal context are not morally responsible, Calhoun maintains that it is still appropriate to reproach them. For if no one points out that the behavior is problematic, then we cannot expect changes. Why change when there is no recognition of a problem? Silence has the effect of sanctioning the behavior.18 The merit of this type of analysis over one focusing on inability is that, given that we do not attribute the problematic behavior to a cognitive incapacity but, rather, to the state of moral knowledge supported by the prevalent culture, there is still some hope for change in the individuals who perpetuate the prac­tice. Calhoun suggests reproach as a good mechanism for accomplish­ing this change. Reproach comes largely in the form of labeling. If someone, even if unknowingly, exploits, then that person is an "ex­ploiter." Those who violate rights are "rights violators"; those who oppress are "oppressors."19 Using language that identifies them as such, rather than language that excuses the behavior, draws "attention both to self-legislative capacities and to the moral obligatoriness of not participating in oppressive social behavior," and is appropriate even when social conditions are sufficient to mitigate responsibility.20 Thus, where the behavior takes place in an abnormal moral context, "our entitlement to use reproach is independent of the blameworthiness of individuals."21

No Alt Solvency

Their censoring approach dooms the artistic movements that align with the critique – the

alt turns itself

Adler 96 (Amy, Associate Professor @ New York School of Law, *California Law Review* 84, 6, p. 1500-1502, December, JSTOR, JM)

Recently, in a startling reversal of tradition, the American political left has let out a cry for the censorship of speech. With a symmetry so perfect it approaches artifice—and therefore is ironically suited to the problem of artistic expression—this new leftist movement mirrors the censorship of the right, leaving a large sector of speech doubly threat­ened from opposing camps. Two separate leftist schools of thought have entered the fray: the feminist anti-pornography movement, led by Catharine MacKinnon,3 and the anti-"hate speech" school, led by a group of legal scholars who wish to prohibit speech that harms histori­cally victimized classes of society. Like a rebel band besieging an entrenched fortress, these new scholars—mostly women and people of color—are waging nothing less than a war on traditional First Amendment jurisprudence. Reigning First Amendment standards allow for limitations on of­fensive or hurtful language only in certain extreme (and somewhat pe­culiar) circumstances, such as when hateful speech amounts to "fighting words"5 or incitement to "imminent lawless action,"6 or when sexual speech meets the tortured constitutional definition of "obscenity."7 Both schools of leftist censors, however, seek to redefine the categories of what speech may be restricted constitutionally. In pursuit of this end. to varying degrees, they deliberately disregard the measures of value— such as "public debate"8 or "artistic expression"9—that traditionally have been the foundation of First Amendment law. They argue instead that the harm hate speech and pornography causes to the equal rights of women, blacks, and other victimized or "outsider"10 groups must out­weigh free speech considerations." But a major problem looms: leftist censorship is on a collision course with a new kind of political speech that is developing in outsider communities. As the legal academy struggles with the question of how to control disturbing or possibly harmful representations of marginal­ized groups, a similar debate has been raging in the art world, yet it has yielded strikingly different results. While the new censors want to ban speech to achieve their goals, the new artists want to use and exploit the very speech that censors would ban.12 Race, gender, and sexual orientation have become the subjects of art, and art has become a central medium to activists concerned with achieving equality in these realms.13 This turn toward the political in art has been intricately bound up with the "culture wars" of the past seven years, both responding to and provoking an escalating series of right-wing attacks on artistic expression. Ironically, however, many of the latest assaults on artistic expres­sion have come not just from right-wing sources, but from outsider groups themselves.16 This conflict is odd given that the new censorship and the new political art tend to be motivated by the same goal: the pursuit of equality for outsider groups. And yet, the left has increas­ingly attacked art, denouncing it as racist or sexist even when the artists responsible for the work claim that they intended to criticize racism and sexism.17 How could this have happened? How could leftist censors have generated theories that now threaten activist speech arising in their own communities? The answer stems from a dangerous combination of two fac­tors: (1) the surprising nature of the new political art, and (2) the naive interpretive theories that underlie the new censorship proposals. Leftist censors have overlooked a dramatic shift in contemporary political and artistic speech that directly defies their theories—the move toward a subversive use of hate speech and pornography. Thus, while leftist cen­sors propose banning certain harmful words and images, a remarkable thing is occurring: activists and artists are increasingly using these very same words and images as part of their political discourse.

Controlling language won’t alter the spheres where it is pervasive

Forsyth 3 (PhD, University of Florida, Tips; March 04, http://www.mail-archive.com/tips@acsun.frostburg.edu/msg06298.html, JM)

I don't think using the word 'manned' in this context is sexist, and agree with the NIH webmaster's statement that it is pointless, and probably counterproductive to try to control or manage language in this way. There is considerable evidence suggesting that attempts to control language use almost always fail to produce the intended attitude change. Even totalitarian states with complete control of all public language use failed to influence underlying attitudes by regulating communication. For example, in countries like Yugoslavia nothing at all was allowed to be printed or said about ethic differences for decades, yet those attitudes endured and as soon as the external repression disappeared with the collapse of the state, ethnic hatred returned with even greater ferocity. In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe using the kind of absolute control language manipulators can only dream of, nothing but the most negative information about capitalism was printed or broadcast for some 70 years, with minimal impact on people's actual thoughts and attitudes.

No Alt Solvency

Their censoring critique obscures and worsens the problem

Roskoski & Peabody 94 (Matthew & Joe, Faculty @ Florida State University, “A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language ‘Arguments,’” October 26, http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques, JM)

There are several levels upon which language "arguments" are actually counterproductive. We will discuss the quiescence effect, deacademization, and publicization. The quiescence effect is explained by Strossen when she writes "the censorship approach is diversionary. It makes it easier for communities to avoid coming to grips with less convenient and more expensive, but ultimately more meaningful approaches" (Strossen 561). Essentially, the argument is that allowing the restriction of language we find offensive to substitute for taking actions to check the real problems that generated the language. Previously, we have argued that the language advocates have erroneously reversed the causal relationship between language and reality. We have defended the thesis that reality shapes language, rather than the obverse. Now we will also contend that to attempt to solve a problem by editing the language which is symptomatic of that problem will generally trade off with solving the reality which is the source of the problem. There are several reasons why this is true. The first, and most obvious, is that we may often be fooled into thinking that language "arguments" have generated real change. As Graddol and Swan observe, "when compared with larger social and ideological struggles, linguistic reform may seem quite a trivial concern," further noting "there is also the danger that effective change at this level is mistaken for real social change" (Graddol & Swan 195). The second reason is that the language we find objectionable can serve as a signal or an indicator of the corresponding objectionable reality. The third reason is that restricting language only limits the overt expressions of any objectionable reality, while leaving subtle and hence more dangerous expressions unregulated. Once we drive the objectionable idea underground it will be more difficult to identify, more difficult to root out, more difficult to counteract, and more likely to have its undesirable effect. The fourth reason is that objectionable speech can create a "backlash" effect that raises the consciousness of people exposed to the speech. Strossen observes that "ugly and abominable as these expressions are, they undoubtably have had the beneficial result of raising social consciousness about the underlying societal problem..." (560).

Our essentialism is key to building functional political strategies – the alternative is confused politics

Kobayashi 94 (Audrey, Direct. Institute of Women’s Studies @ Queen’s, *Gender, Place, & Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography* 1, 2, p. 225, JM)

The social construction approach has been criticized from another angle, for moving too quickly along theoretical paths that leave political problems unresolved. According to Jackson: In challenging the naturalness of categories like 'race' and gender, we run the political danger of evacuating the very concepts around which people's struggles against oppression are being organized ... We are searching for non-essentialist conceptions of race and gender around which it is possible to mobilize politically, but we may have to face a dilemma in which we support one argument politically while rejecting its basis intellectually. (1991,p. 193) This problem has led some writers (Stasiulis, 1990) to adopt positions of 'strategic essentialism' (see Spivak, 1989; Fuss, 1989) in order to retain political efficacy utilising what Stuart Hall terms 'arbitrary closure', or representation as a kind of formative political strategy (Hall, 1992). The dilemma is genuine, and it emphasizes the painful fact that despite our attempts to merge theory with practice, it is not so easily accomplished. Nor does theory in itself, however correct, provide a reliable basis for changing the world.

No Alt Solvency

We are constituted in discourse – it is impossible to truly control language, making the K’s censorship useless

Butler 97 (Judith, Co-director of the Program of Critical Theory @ UC Berkeley, *Excitable Speech,* p. 1, March 9, JM)

When we claim to have been injured by language, what kind of claim do we make? We ascribe an agency to language, a power to injure, and position ourselves as the objects of its injurious trajectory. We claim that language acts, and acts against us, and the claim we make is a further instance of language, one which seeks to arrest the force of the prior instance. Thus, we exercise the force of language even as we seek to counter its force, caught up in a bind that no act of censorship can undo. Could language injure us, if we were not, in some sense, linguistic beings? Beings which require language in order to be? Is our vulnerability to language a consequence of our being constituted within its terms? If we are formed in language, then that formative power precedes and conditions any decision we might make about it, insulting us from the start, as it were by its prior power. The insult, however, assumes its specific proportion in time. To be called a name is one of the first forms of linguistic injury that one learns. But not all name calling is injurious. Being called a name is also one of the conditions by which a subject is constituted in language; (…) The problem of injurious speech raises the question of which words wound, which representations offend, suggesting that we focus on those parts of language that are uttered, utterable, and explicit. And yet, linguistic injury appears to be the effect not only of the words by which one is addressed but the mode of address itself, a mode – a disposition or conventional bearing – that interpellates and constitutes a subject. One is not simply fixed by the name that one is called. In being called an injurious name, one is derogated and demeaned. But the name holds out another possibility as well: by being called a name, one is also, paradoxically, given a certain possibility for social existence, initiated into a temporal life of language that exceeds the prior purposes that animate that call. Thus, the injurious address may appear to fix or paralyze the one it hails, but it may also produce an unexpected and enabling response. J. L. Austin proposed that to know what makes the force of an utterance effective what establishes its performative character, one must first locate the utterance within a “total speech situation”. There is, however, no easy way to decide on how best to delimit that totality. (…)

Turn- Speech Codes Kill Language 1/2

Speech Codes are destructive to language

Volokh 2002 (Eugene, Law Professor at UCLA, Coding Campus, 11/21, 6/21/11, JL)

"Fighting bad speech with good speech," the civil libertarian's classic remedy, is highly effective in this sort of closed environment, much more so than in society at large. Students pay close attention to what the instructor, the administration, and other students say. If the professor or the dean condemns genuinely offensive speech, this will powerfully deter such speech in the future. And such a public response (which, incidentally, can be used as to gross rudeness outside class, too) should also help make the victim feel vindicated. When we're insulted, what we usually want is for others to speak up to support us, and to condemn the wrongdoer. Speech codes can do little to improve on this system; and they can do much to worsen it. To begin with, speech codes risk deterring even reasoned, polite argument. Especially when faced with a vague standard such as "harassing" or "offensive," wise students tend to avoid anything that might get them suspended or expelled, or might lead to a notation on their records. Even the accusation of "harass[ment]," with its echoes of tortious or criminal conduct, may itself be a serious threat. This will interfere with in-class discussion — and with student spontaneity — much more than instructor control alone would.

Punishing harmful language, especially in the sphere of debate, threatens our status as intellectuals and our survival

Roskoski & Peabody 94 (Matthew & Joe, Faculty @ Florida State University, “A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language ‘Arguments,’” October 26, http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques, JM)

When language wounds, the natural and immediate impulse is to take steps to shut up those who utter the wounding words. When, as here, that impulse is likely to be felt by those who are normally the first amendment's staunchest defenders, free expression faces its greatest threat. At such times, it is important for those committed to principles of free expressions to remind each other of what they have always known regarding the long term costs of short term victories bought through compromising first amendment principles. (Strossen 487). Certainly debaters and debate coaches, whose entire activity is premised upon the freedom of expression, ought to be among the staunchest defenders of that freedom. When we are asked to censor the rhetoric of a debater, as the C.L.U. warns, we ought to think long and hard about the risks associated with playing fast and loose with free speech. As Brennan notes, the mandate "to inculcate moral and political values is not a general warrant to act as 'thought police' stifling discussion of all but state-approved topics and advocacy of all but the official position." (Brennan 577). Not only does the first amendment create a moral or deontological barrier to language "arguments", the principles it defends also create a pragmatic barrier. The free and sometimes irreverent discourse protected by the first amendment is essential to the health and future success of our society. History has borne out the belief that the freedom to challenge convictions is essential to our ability to adapt to change. As Hyde and Fishman observe, university scholars must be allowed to "think the unthinkable, discuss the unmentionable, and challenge the unchallengeable" because "major discoveries and advances in knowledge are often highly unsettling and distasteful to the existing order." This leads them to conclude that "we cannot afford" to impose "orthodoxies, censorship, and other artificial barriers to creative thought" (Hyde & Fishman 1485). Given the rapid pace of political and technological change that our society faces, and given that debates often focus around the cutting edge of such changes, the imposition of linguistic straitjackets upon the creative thought and critical thinking of debaters would seem to uniquely jeopardize these interests. This is not just exaggerated rhetoric, nor is it merely our old debate disadvantages in new clothes. Hyde & Fishman's claims have been repeatedly validated by historical events. Had Elie Wiesel debated in Germany, a "Zionist language" argument would not have been unlikely. As Bennett Katz has argued, The essentiality of freedom in the community of American Universities is almost self-evident... To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation... Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die. (Katz 156).

Turn- Speech Codes Kill Language 2/2

None of their ethical claims apply – restriction of speech outweighs

Roskoski & Peabody 94 (Matthew & Joe, Faculty @ Florida State University, “A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language ‘Arguments,’” October 26, http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques, JM)

The first ramification is that the advocate of language "arguments" is faced with a dilemma. Assume that the debater making the above argument has sufficient skill and evidence to win the argument on the flow. In such a situation, one must decide whether or not to vote for the repugnant position. If one does, then language "arguments" forfeit their claim to moral legitimacy. One who will vote to censor pro-African American speech has no ground to claim an intent to improve the ethical persona of the debate activity. If one does not, then language "arguments" are revealed to be simply vehicles for the moral agendas of the advocates or critics in question. We would contend, in that circumstance, that a ballot is not the correct method of promoting one's personal moral agenda. Principles of non-intervention and impartiality would tend to support this assertion, as would Brennan's observation that educators are not in the business of mind-control.

They can’t solve the case--Censoring certain words transforms politics into a fight over language rather than the institutions that generate true violence. Only the perm solves.

Brown 1 [Wendy Brown, professor at UC-Berkeley, 2001 Politics Out of History, p. 35-36]JFS

“Speech codes kill critique,” Henry Louis Gates remarked in a 1993 essay on hate speech. Although Gates was referring to what happens when hate speech regulations, and the debates about them, usurp the discursive space in which one might have offered a substantive *political* response to bigoted epithets, his point also applies to prohibitions against questioning from within selected political practices or institutions. But turning political questions into moralistic ones—as speech codes of any sort do—not only prohibits certain questions and mandates certain genuflections, it also expresses a profound hostility toward political life insofar as it seeks to preempt argument with a legislative and enforced truth. And the realization of that patently undemocratic desire can only and always convert emancipatory aspirations into reactionary ones. Indeed, it insulates those aspirations from questioning at the very moment that Weberian forces of rationality and bureaucratization are quite likely to be domesticating them from another direction. Here we greet a persistent political paradox: the moralistic defense of critical practices, or of any besieged identity, weakens what it strives to fortify precisely by sequestering those practices from the kind of critical inquiry out of which they were born. Thus Gates might have said, “Speech codes, born of social critique, kill critique.” And, we might add, contemporary identity-based institutions, born of social critique, invariably become conservative as they are forced to essentialize the identity and naturalize the boundaries of what they once grasped as a contingent effect of historically specific social powers. But moralistic reproaches to certain kinds of speech or argument kill critique not only by displacing it with arguments about abstract rights versus identity-bound injuries, but also by configuring political injustice and political righteousness as a problem of remarks, attitude, and speech rather than as a matter of historical, political-economic, and cultural formations of power. Rather than offering analytically substantive accounts of the forces of injustice or injury, they condemn the manifestation of these forces in particular remarks or events. There is, in the inclination to ban (formally or informally) certain utterances and to mandate others, a politics of rhetoric and gesture that itself symptomizes despair over effecting change at more significant levels. As vast quantities of left and liberal attention go to determining what socially marked individuals say, how they are represented, and how many of each kind appear in certain institutions or are appointed to various commissions, the sources that generate racism, poverty, violence against women, and other elements of social injustice remain relatively unarticulated and unaddressed. We are lost as how to address those sources; but rather than examine this loss or disorientation, rather than bear the humiliation of our impotence, we posture as if we were still fighting the big and good fight in our clamor over words and names. Don’t mourn, moralize

Sexism Inevitable

Sexism inevit – Media

Wilson & Gutierrez & Chao 03(Clint, Felix, Lena, *Racism Sexism and Media*, pg. 215, 6/21/11, JL)

Editors need to consider whether sexism is a factor in the decisions that are made about such stories. This is unlikely to happen until more women—and women of color—are in decision-making posi­tions and can exert greater influence on how sex crimes are reported (Flanders, 1997). The absence of women in prominent roles in news media is perhaps no more blatant than in the network evening news anchor positions—still an all-male bastion into 2003. When Tom Brokaw, 62-year-old NBC evening news anchor announced in 2002 that he would be retiring in 2004, Brian Williams was named as his replacement. As this is being written, appar­ently no women or people of color are being considered to succeed soon-to-be retiring CBS news anchor Dan Rather, 70, or ABC news anchor Peter Jennings, 63. Bonnie J. Dow, associate professor of communication at the University of Georgia and author of *Prime Time Feminism: Television, Media Culture ami the Women's Movement Since 1970,* has said that the three network anchor chairs are the last all-male preserve in and of televi­sion—notwithstanding Monday Night Football.

Sexism inevitable – Underground

Mills 3 (Sara, School of Cultural Studies, Sheffield Hallam University, January, http://extra.shu.ac.uk/daol/articles/open/2003/001/mills2003001.html, JM)

Because of this move away from the top-down model of Second Wave feminism, Third Wave feminism finds it difficult to discuss sexism, since sexism as a concept is based on the idea that discrimination against women is systematic and that sexism is imposed on women by those in positions of power, is ingrained in social structures and works to the benefit of all men. Sexism as a topic of analysis is distinctly unfashionable at the moment and has a slightly anachronistic feel to it. Sexist language was broadly defined within 2nd wave feminism as the use of statements which 'create, constitute, promote or exploit an unfair or irrelevant distinction between the sexes', (Vetterling-Braggin, 1981: 3). Thus, studies of sexism concerned themselves with the use of the so-called generic pronoun `he' to refer to both males and females, and the use of the form `lady' or `female' with generic nouns such as `doctor' when they are used to refer to females. This type of analysis showed that there was a systematic tendency within English and other languages to assume that males were the norm and to associate women with trivial, sexualised or non-serious topics (Cameron, 1998; Pauwels, 1998). [13] Many Feminist analysts of sexist language argued that this type of language use should be reformed to reflect the changes in women's position in society. However, some feminists questioned this determinist position and suggested that perhaps sexist language did not itself determine women's oppression; reform of the language alone would not alter the way that women were treated. [14] Feminists drawing on social constructionism argued that changes in women's position would lead to a change in the way language was used. Neither of these views is accurate, as it is clear there is a complex dialectic process going on in language, whereby language items both affirm and contest the status quo, and changes in social structures necessitate the development of new vocabulary and forms of expression at the local level may lead to changes in the overall meanings of words and also wider changes at a societal level. I would like now to discuss the ways in which analysing sexism within Third Wave feminism has been made more complex, and to analyse the reasons that sexism has become difficult to discuss. One of the major factors in the current difficulty in discussing sexism is the result of very effective feminist campaigns over language: in the public sphere, sexism is often viewed by employers and employees to be incompatible with equal opportunities in the workplace. Publishing houses, trades unions, public corporations, public service providers, universities and so on, have issued guidelines on appropriate language. [15] Feminists have developed alternative terms, so that instead of `chairman; 'chair', can be used. Instead of referring to `air hostess' which some find demeaning, one can use 'flight attendant', and so on. Cameron has argued that in fact by challenging the use of sexist words, 'the radicals have effectively politicised all the terms, so that, in any interaction, the choice of certain words will announce your political stance in relation to women' (Cameron, 1994b: 31). [16] It is important that these feminist campaigns have led to language policies being adopted by institutions. Whilst many of the policies on sexism and racism seem to have largely fallen into disuse, the fact that there is institutional support changes the status of an individual's complaint about language use (Pauwels, 1998). But the very success of the campaigns to change the language used at work has meant that certain forms of sexism rather than being seen as neutral forms have become marked and associated with conservatism- sexism thus seems to have been driven underground. Therefore, rather than sexism being overt as in the past, sexism has become much more indirect.

Sexism Inevitable

Sexism is hardwired into society, no matter what changes happen it will never be far enough

Torres 2009 (Annaliza, Columnist for Freedom Socialist, Feb, <http://www.socialism.com/drupal-6.8/?q=node/326>, 6/22/11, JL)

The right's multi-issue agenda. Connerly's backers have included beer king Joseph Coors, Rupert Murdoch of Fox News, Focus on the Family, the Bradley Foundation, and the white supremacist Council of Conservative Citizens. In short, his funders are anti-labor, anti-gay, anti-immigrant, racist, and sexist. But it's not just wealthy bigots who are the problem. The CRI drive is part of a larger offensive against the entire working class. It's no coincidence that Connerly targeted states with large Latino populations. This dovetails perfectly with the war on immigrant labor.  Big business bankrolls initiatives such as CRI to better divide workers. After all, an integrated workforce breaks down race and sex barriers and clarifies class lines. To prevail, the working class must take the same multi-issue approach that big business does. We need a united front. Eyes on the prize. Connerly and his allies pretend to want a color-blind society; they conveniently ignore that people of color are still underrepresented in good-paying jobs and employment generally. And with the economy's downturn, it's getting worse. The Black civil rights movement demanded full equality in all areas of life. But 50 years later, discrimination is very much alive. This is because racism, along with sexism, is hardwired into capitalism. As long as this system exists, we will always be defending reforms won earlier.

A2: Language PICs – Butler

Language is reversible – The introduction of injurious language simultaneously introduces the prospect of contestation – Their erasure avoids the prospect of contestation

Butler 97 (Judith, Excitable Speech, UC-Berkeley, p. 2)

One is not simply fixed by the name that one is called. In being called an injurious name, one is derogated and demeaned. But the name holds out another possibility as well: by being called a name, one is also, paradaoxically, given a certain possibility for social existence, initiated into a temporal life of language that exceeds the prior purposes that animate that call. Thus the injurious address may appear to fix or paralyze the one it hails, but it may also produce an unexpected and enabling response. If to be addressed is to be interpellated, then the offensive call runs the risk of inaugurating a subject in speech who comes to use language to counter the offensive call. When the address is injurious, it works its force upon the one in injures.

Their certainty about the effects of language belies the nature of human agency and the importance of context, making us powerless in the face of language – Extricating the language from the plan doesn’t make the words “go away” – Confrontation via the permutation solves best

Butler 97 (Judith, Excitable Speech, UC-Berkeley, p. 13)

Indeed, recent effort to establish the incontrovertibly wounding power of certain words seem to founder on the question of who does the interpreting of what such words mean and what they perform. The recent regulations governing lesbian and gay self-definition in the military of, indeed, the recent controversies over rap music suggest that no clear consensus is possible on the question of whether there is a clear link between the words that are uttered and their putative power to injure. To argue, on the one hand, that the offensive effects of such words is fully contextual, and that a shift of context can exacerbate or minimize that offensiveness, is still not to give an account of the power that such words are said to exercise. To claim, on the other hand, that some utterances are always offensive, regardless of context, that they carry their contexts with them in ways that are too difficult to shed, is still not to offer a way to understand how context is invoked and restaged at the moment of utterance.

This theory of agency is critical to true liberation – Their conception of liberty is in service to the state and systemic power – “Only policy formulations *truly* matter” is their arg

Butler 97 (Judith, Excitable Speech, UC-Berkeley, p. 15)

Those who seek to fix with certainty the link between certain speech acts and their injurious effects will surely lament the open temporality of the speech act. That no speech act has to perform injury as its effect means that no simple elaboration of speech acts will provide a standard by which the injuries of speech might be effectively adjudicated. Such a loosening of the link between act and injury, however, opens up the possibility for a counter-speech, a kind of talking back, that would be foreclosed by the tightening of that link. Thus, the gap that separates the speech act from its future effects has its auspicious implications: it begins a theory of linguistic agency that provides an alternative to the relenetless search for legal remedy. Te interval between instances of utterance not only makes the repetition and resignifcation of the utterance possible, but shows how words might, through time, become disjoined from their power to injure and recontextualized in more affirmative modes. I hope to make clear that by affirmative, I mean “opening up the possibility of agency” where agency is not the restoration of a sovereign autonomy in speech, a replication of conventional notions of mastery.

A2: Language PICs – Butler

Only we have a legitimate theory of human agency

Butler 97 (Judith, Excitable Speech, UC-Berkeley, p. 16)

Whereas some critics mistake the critique of sovereignty for the demolition of agency, I propose that agency begins where sovereignty wanes. The one who acts (who is not the same as the sovereign subject) acts precisely to the extent that he or she is constituted as an actor and, hence, operating within a linguistic field of enabling constraints from the outset.