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# South Korea 1ac (1/7)

## Plan: The United States federal government should remove its troops from South Korea. Questions, ask.

## Advantage 1: Accidental War

## The Korean peninsula is extremely dangerous and the potential for incidents along the border is ever-present—the recent warship explosion in the Yellow Sea recent events on the peninsula prove this argument to be true:

Doug **Bandow**, March 30, 20**10** (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “South Korea Needs Better Defense.” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11628>

A South Korean warship sank in the Yellow Sea following an explosion Friday. North Korean involvement is widely suspected, but Seoul says no conclusions have yet been reached. The incident, irrespective of the details, should remind officials in Seoul that the Korean peninsula remains **extraordinarily unstable**. Pyongyang has long used brinkmanship as a negotiating technique. The North employed its usual array of rhetorical bombs in response to recently concluded joint maneuvers between U.S. and South Korean forces. And ships of both nations exchanged fire last November around the ill-defined sea boundary between the two countries.

## This incident is different than past crises with North Korea—there is a credible threat of miscalculation to war from North Korea:

David **Sanger**, May 28, 20**10** (staff writer, New York Times), “In the Koreas, Five Possible Ways to War.” New York Times. Online. Internet. Accessed June 11, 2010 at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/30/weekinreview/30sanger.html>

USUALLY, there is a familiar cycle to Korea crises. Like a street gang showing off its power to run amok in a well-heeled neighborhood, the North Koreans launch a missile over Japan or set off a nuclear test or stage an attack — as strong evidence indicates they did in March, when a South Korean warship was torpedoed. Expressions of outrage follow. So do vows that this time, the North Koreans will pay a steep price. In time, though, the United States and North Korea’s neighbors — China, Japan, South Korea and Russia — remind one another that they have nothing to gain from a prolonged confrontation, much less a war. Gradually, sanctions get watered down. Negotiations reconvene. Soon the North hints it can be enticed or bribed into giving up a slice of its nuclear program. Eventually, the cycle repeats. The White House betting is that the latest crisis, stemming from the March attack, will also abate without much escalation. But there is more than a tinge of doubt. The big risk, as always, is what happens if the North Koreans make a major miscalculation. (It wouldn’t be their first. Sixty years ago, Mr. Kim’s father, Kim Il-sung, thought the West wouldn’t fight when he invaded the South. The result was the Korean War.) What’s more, the dynamic does feel different from recent crises. The South has a hardline government whose first instinct was to cut off aid to the North, not offer it new bribes. At the same time, the North is going through a murky, ill-understood succession crisis. And President Obama has made it clear he intends to break the old cycle. “We’re out of the inducements game,” one senior administration official, who would not discuss internal policy discussions on the record, said last week. “For 15 years at least, the North Koreans have been in the extortion business, and the U.S. has largely played along. That’s over.” That may change the North’s behavior, but it could backfire. “There’s an argument that in these circumstances, the North Koreans may perceive that their best strategy is to escalate,” says Joel Wit, a former State Department official who now runs a Web site that follows North Korean diplomacy.

## Additionally, the possibility of Kim Jong-Il dying within the next three years heightens the risk of destabilization and unpredictability on the peninsula:

Kwang-Tae Kim, March 25, 2010, “NKorea vows ‘nuclear strikes’ in latest threat” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iURO8fOyWVOA0ytFlaAGuC9F7R9wD9EM4I600>

The fate of the North's nuclear weapons has taken on added urgency since late 2008 as concerns over the health of leader Kim Jong Il have intensified. Kim, who suffered an apparent stroke in 2008, may die within three years, South Korean media have reported. His death is thought to have the potential to trigger instability and a power struggle in the North. Gen. Walter Sharp, the top U.S. commander in South Korea, says the possibility of turmoil in the North is of real concern, citing the country's economic weakness, malnourishment in both the military and general population, and its nuclear weapons. "The possibility of a sudden leadership change in the North could be destabilizing and unpredictable," he said in testimony before the House Appropriations Committee hearing earlier this week.

# South Korea 1ac (2/7)

## This constant instability creates an ever-present danger to US troops—they are constantly vulnerable to paranoid North Korean provocations:

Doug Bandow, February 26, 2009 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “Starting the Second Korean War?” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://reason.com/archives/2009/02/26/starting-the-second-korean-war>

The arguments were similar as those made today regarding North Korea: An unpredictable regime, the uncertainty of deterrence, and the relative ease of attack. It's impossible to know what the world would have looked like had Washington struck, but China likely would have moved closer to the Soviet Union and become more resolutely hostile to the U.S. Restraint almost certainly was the better part of valor. So, too, with North Korea today. Of course, Washington still should work with the DPRK's neighbors in an attempt to persuade Pyongyang to abandon both its missile and nuclear ambitions. Even more important, though, would be to turn the problem of North Korea over to the surrounding states. To the extent that the North threatens anyone, it is South Korea and Japan. China and Russia are unlikely direct targets, but still have good reason to prefer a stable and peaceful Korean peninsula. Thus, the U.S. should withdraw its 29,000 troops from the ROK, where they are vulnerable to military action by Pyongyang. Then North Korea would be primarily a problem for the ROK, China, Japan, and Russia. And the U.S. need not worry about the latest North Korean gambit.

## Such saber-rattling combined with the US troop presence on the peninsula risks a war by miscalculation:

John **Park, 2008** (Dir., Korea Working Group, U.S. Institute of Peace), THE LONG SHADOW: NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SECURITY IN 21ST CENTURY ASIA, 2008, 282.

In an acute crisis, such fears and temptations on both sides could possibly interact to trigger an armed conflict that neither side wants. As noted earlier, Pyongyang's nuclear arsenal poses a considerable potential threat to Washington and its allies. In a crisis situation, **the U.S. military would likely raise its operational preparedness** for a possible preemptive attack as it did in 1994. The United States might strengthen surveillance efforts to locate and track North Korea's nuclear forces or reinforce U.S. offensive strike capabilities. Pyongyang, in turn, **might mistake such precautionary measures for actual first-strike preparation**. Such misperception is a real possibility, given North Korea's limited intelligence gathering capability.

## Korea is a military tinderbox—one accident could trigger a full scale war:

Doug **Bandow, 2010** (senior fellow, CATO Institute), “An Unstable Rogue.” April 6, 2010. Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23144>

We must hope that the Yellow Sea sinking was a tragedy rather than a provocation. But even if the former, the incident should remind everyone that the Korean peninsula remains a military tinderbox. It would **only take one accident or mistake to trigger full-scale war.**

## Deterrence will fail against North Korea:

Doug **Bandow**, February 26, 20**09** (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “Starting the Second Korean War?” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://reason.com/archives/2009/02/26/starting-the-second-korean-war>

Zelikow goes even further. He says: "whatever the merits of Harrison's suggestion when it comes to North Korea's nuclear weapons, the United States should not accept Pyongyang's development of long-range missiles systems, which can be paired with an admitted nuclear weapons arsenal, as still another fait accompli." In his view, Washington should warn the North to stand down; if the DPRK failed to comply, the U.S. should take out the missile on its launch pad. Why? Zelikow contends that "the North Korean perfection of a long-range missile capability against the United States, Japan, or the Republic of Korea would pose an imminent threat to the vital interests of our country." To rely on deterrence, he adds, would be a "gamble."

## The US troop presence on the peninsula means the US will get sucked into any conflict:

Doug **Bandow**, May 25, 20**10** (senior fellow @ CATO Institute) “Engaging China to maintain peace in East Asia” Online. Internet. Accessed June 15, 2010 at <http://dailycaller.com/2010/05/25/engaging-china-to-maintain-peace-in-east-asia/>

While the U.S. remains involved in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, East Asia contains the seeds of potentially bigger conflicts. China holds the key to maintaining regional peace. For instance, the Republic of Korea is imposing economic sanctions on North Korea after the latter sank a South Korean naval vessel. A military response could set off a retaliatory spiral leading to war. With 27,000 troops stationed on the Korean peninsula, Washington could not easily stay out of any conflict.

# South Korea 1ac (3/7)

## Any threat to our troops is an automatic tripwire to US escalation of a conflict: if our soldiers are in danger we will intervene to protect them:

Doug **Bandow, 1996** (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World, pg. 8-9.

More important is the military risk of U.S. security ties. Although the American commitment probably helps deter North Korean aggression, it ensures that the United States will be involved if hostilities recur. Indeed, the 37,000 U.S. soldiers are a tripwire that **makes intervention automatic**. Although the risk of war seems slight at the moment—in late 1995 famine in the North and political scandal in the South did raise tensions—the consequences would be horrific. And the possible acquisition by North Korea of atomic weapons increases the potential costs exponentially. If a conflict erupted, perhaps over the nuclear issue should the current agreement with Pyongyang break down, the American troops would become nuclear hostages.

## **North Korea will escalate a conflict to the nuclear level:**

Hyung-Jin **Kim,** March 28, 20**10** (staff writer, Associated Press), Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2011468304_sokor29.html>

North Korea warned the United States and South Korea of possible deadly consequences Monday in retaliation for what it called psychological warfare involving journalist tours to the South's portion of the buffer zone between the rivals. Monday's warning came after a South Korean military ship sank Saturday due to an unexplained explosion onboard. The ship was near the disputed sea border with North Korea, though South Korean and U.S. officials say they have seen nothing that suggests any North Korean involvement. The statement by the North's military accused South Korea of staging anti-North Korea "psychological warfare" in the demilitarized zone with visits there by journalists this year. The North said that allowing the reporters to tour the zone and nearby areas was aimed at preparing "materials for anti-North smear campaigns." The statement said those actions violate the armistice that ended hostilities in the 1950-53 conflict and that the U.S., a truce signatory, is also responsible. The military Friday **threatened "unprecedented nuclear strikes"** in anger over a report that South Korea and the U.S. plan to prepare for possible instability in the totalitarian country.

## A new Korean war risks escalation to a nuclear Third World War:

Pat **Fungamwango**, October 25, 19**99** (staff writer, Africa News, accessed via Lexis/Nexis, April 1, 2010)

If there is one place today where the much-dreaded Third World War could easily erupt and probably reduce earth to a huge smouldering cinder it is the Korean Peninsula in Far East Asia. Ever since the end of the savage three-year Korean war in the early 1950s, military tension between the hard-line communist north and the American backed South Korea has remained dangerously high. In fact the Koreas are technically still at war.

# South Korea 1ac (4/7)

## North Korean war causes superpower conflict:

Paul **Stares, 2009** (senior fellow at CFR, and Joel Wit, senior fellow at Weatherhead East Asia) January 2009, “Preparing for Sudden Chance in North Korea,” CFR, ttp://www.cfr.org/publication/18019/preparing\_for\_sudden\_change\_in\_north\_korea.html

North Korea is hardly a normal country located in a strategic backwater of the world. As a nuclear weapons state and exporter of ballistic missile systems, it has long been a serious proliferation concern to Washington. With one of the world’s largest armies in possession of huge numbers of long-range artillery and missiles, it can also wreak havoc on America’s most important Asian allies––South Korea and Japan––both of which are home to large numbers of American citizens and host to major U.S. garrisons committed to their defense. Moreover, North Korea abuts two great powers—China and Russia––that have important interests at stake in the future of the peninsula. That they would become actively engaged in any future crisis involving North Korea is virtually guaranteed. Although all the interested powers share a basic interest in maintaining peace and stability in northeast Asia, a major crisis from within North Korea could lead to significant tensions and––as in the past–– **even conflict between them**. A contested or prolonged leadership struggle in Pyongyang would inevitably raise questions in Washington about whether the United States should try to sway the outcome. Some will almost certainly argue that only by promoting regime change will the threat now posed by North Korea as a global proliferator, as a regional menace to America’s allies, and as a massive human rights violator, finally disappear. Such views could gain some currency in Seoul and even Tokyo, though it seems unlikely. Beijing, however, would certainly look on any attempt to promote a pro-American regime in Pyongyang as interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state and a challenge to China’s national interests. This and other potential sources of friction could intensify should the situation in North Korea deteriorate. The impact of a severe power struggle in Pyongyang on the availability of food and other basic services could cause tens and possibly hundreds of thousands of refugees to flee North Korea. The pressure on neighboring countries to intervene with humanitarian assistance and use their military to stem the flow of refugees would likely grow in these circumstances. Suspicions that the situation could be exploited by others for political advantage would add to the pressure to act sooner rather than later in a crisis. China would be the most likely destination for refugees because of its relatively open and porous border; its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has reportedly developed contingency plans to intervene in North Korea for possible humanitarian, peacekeeping, and “environmental control” missions. Besides increasing the risk of dangerous military interactions and unintended escalation in sensitive borders areas, China’s actions would likely cause considerable consternation in South Korea about its ultimate intentions toward the peninsula. China no doubt harbors similar fears about potential South Korean and American intervention in the North.

## Fortunately, removing the troops reduces the likelihood of war with North Korea:

Doug **Bandow**, March 10, 20**07** (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “Why are We Still in Korea?.” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://original.antiwar.com/doug-bandow/2007/03/09/why-are-we-still-in-korea/>

Indeed, U.S. officials have begun talks with Pyongyang intended to lead towards diplomatic recognition. After six years of refusing to negotiate with the North, the Bush administration’s new Korean policy appears to be detente with its former enemy. War is still possible, but seems ever less likely. America **should reduce the chance still further by removing the only forces positioned to come into contact with Pyongyang.**

## Disengaging the US troops in South Korea is necessary to protect American lives while reducing the North Korean threat to America:

Doug **Bandow**, June 4, 20**09** (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “North Korea: Paper Tiger.” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.campaignforliberty.com/article.php?view=100>

The only Americans currently within range of the DPRK are the 28,000 troops stationed in the South. Their deployment, while unnecessary to protect the ROK, actually endangers the U.S. Disengagement would be the most effective means of reducing the threat to America.

# South Korea 1ac (5/7)

## Advantage 2: North Korean Nuclearization

## North Korea has abandoned anti-nuclear talks in the status quo—they are rapidly modernizing their nuclear arsenal

**Joongang Daily**, March 18, 20**10** (staff writer). Online. Internet. April 10, 2010. (http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2917980)

North Korea’s nuclear ambitions have nearly stalemated the United States, with no viable alternatives to the stalled six-party talks in sight, a scholar said Tuesday. “There is an increasing pessimism about the prospect of diplomacy as a viable vehicle for denuclearization,” Scott Snyder, director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at the Asia Foundation, said on the Web site of the Council on Foreign Relations. “But there’s also ... not much support for alternatives. That’s the core dilemma. Alternatives to diplomacy are hard to muster, and yet hope for diplomacy to be successful is quite limited.” North Korea detonated its second nuclear device last year and has been boycotting the six-party talks for nearly a year to protest UN sanctions imposed after its nuclear and missile tests.

## North Korean nuclearization will trigger escalation and war

Paul **Dibb, 2006** (Emeritus Prof of International Relations at Australian National University), *Sydney Morning Herald (Australia)*, August 15, 2006. “As one nuclear flashpoint reaches a lull, another simmers away.” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at http://www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/as-one-nuclear-flashpoint-reaches-a-lull-another-simmers-away/2006/08/14/1155407736794.html

In North Korea a similar situation applies. Having seen the destruction of Saddam's regime, North Korea's Kim Jong-il is intent on acquiring nuclear weapons to preserve his regime. But the end of the Cold War has eroded the influence of North Korea's allies over its military ambitions and sense of security. China has been embarrassed by its inability to restrain North Korea from testing nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and Russia no longer wields any influence over the rogue state.In many ways, the situation in North-East Asia is potentially even more dire than in the Middle East. North Korea's recalcitrance in dismantling its nuclear weapons program comes at a time of unprecedented tensions between China and Japan and South Korea and Japan where one false move could spell disaster.North Korea is playing a dangerous game of bellicose brinkmanship; it continues to keep more than a million troops on high-alert status, including heavy artillery concentrations only 50 kilometres from Seoul, a city of more than 10 million people.North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons threatens to seriously destabilise North-East Asia and result in a nuclear arms race developing there. As it is, the North's belligerence is encouraging Japan to build up its military capabilities. This at a time when China's poor relations with Japan are worrying. The Chinese communist leadership drums up anti-Japanese nationalism whenever it suits, while China's military build-up greatly concerns Japan. The pace of Beijing's defence spending is puzzling, particularly as China faces no military threat for the first time in many decades.Similarly, Japan's relations with South Korea are at a low point, partly over Japan's view of the history of World War II but also because of territorial disputes, which Seoul has elevated to the level of national pride, threatening the use of military force. This is occurring when, from Tokyo's perspective, South Korea is drifting from the orbit of the US alliance and getting uncomfortably close to China, as well as appeasing North Korea.All this is an unhealthy mix of great power tensions and deep-seated historical distrust and growing military capabilities. The bigger worry is that Pyongyang's adventurism will incinerate any efforts to stabilise a region full of dangerous rivalries, as will the inevitable collision between Iran and Israel in the Middle East.

# South Korea 1ac (6/7)

## North Korean nuclear weapons use leads to a full scale nuclear war

Kim Myong **Chol, 2002** (North Korea expert and research fellow, Nautilus Institute). October 24, 2002. “Agreed Framework is Brain Dead; Shotgun Wedding is the only option to defuse crisis,” Online. Internet. Accessed, April 10, 2010 at <http://nautilus.org/fora/security/0212A_Chol.html>.

Set free from from the heavy fetters of the nuclear accord, the North Koreans now feel completely free to fabricate a full range of nuclear bombs, including uranium bombs and hydrogen bombs. The North Korean regime of Kim Jong Il is ready to join the elite nuclear club as a full-fledged member. They are well confident that the North Korean scientists are resourceful enough to produce miniaturized nuclear weapons. All the North Korean ICBMs, a joke to the American counterparts, can still wreak disastrous havoc on prime targets on the Metropolitan U.S.A. From now on, not a single day will pass without North Korean rolling out a nuclear bomb. To be candid, there is every good reason to suspect that as early as the mid-80s the North Koreans managed to produce not less than fifty atomic bombs with more than 300 kg of plutonium imported from abroad. However, they will never admit this fact under any circumstances. In other words, when they succeeded in test-firing intermediate-range Scud missiles, a result of reverse-engineering, it is logical to believe that they must have already had scores of nuclear weapons in their arsenal. It is ridiculous to think that the North Koreans ought to have developed missile technology without simultaneously working on nuclear devices. One estimate indicates that North Korea has now not less than one hundred nuclear warheads. Successful test firing of multistage rockets in 1993 and spectacular blastoff of a multistage rocket to put a tiny satellite into orbit can be better explained in this context only. In short, North Korea is in an Israeli -like status. One critical difference is that North Korea is capable of striking any strategic target on the U.S. mainland with a tiny fleet of ICBMs. Three facts may suggest the extent of the North Korean readiness for nuclear exchange. A North Korean official said, "One top-class nuclear scientist and one missile expert are on the Central Committee of the ruling Workers Party of Korea. They are always among the suite accompanying Kim Jong Il on his criss-crossing on-the-spot guidance tour. Most of the population of the nation can be evacuated into deep hardened underground shelters in less than twenty minutes with little panic or confusion. The whole nation can live safely in underground facilities for many months. Fortress North Korea has been designed to withstand a nuclear saturation strike and retaliate in kind. However, it is not the case either with South Korea or Japan or the U.S. The three countries are most vulnerable to North Korean missile attacks. Any military strike initiated against North Korea will promptly explode into a thermonuclear exchange between a tiny nuclear-armed North Korea and the world's superpower, America. The most densely populated Metropolitan U.S.A., Japan and South Korea will **certainly evaporate in The Day After scenario-type nightmare**. The New York Times warned in its August 27, 2002 comment: "North Korea runs a more advanced biological, chemical and nuclear weapons program, targets American military bases and is developing missiles that could reach the lower 48 states. Yet there's good reason President Bush is not talking about taking out Dear Leader Kim Jong Il. If we tried, the Dear Leader would bombard South Korea and Japan with never gas or even nuclear warheads, and (according to one Pentagon study) kill up to a million people."

## North Korean proliferation risks proliferation exports—increasing the likelihood of war in the Middle East or Asia:

David **Sanger**, May 28, 20**10** (staff writer, New York Times), “In the Koreas, Five Possible Ways to War.” New York Times. Online. Internet. Accessed June 11, 2010 at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/30/weekinreview/30sanger.html>

A Nuclear Provocation With tensions high, American spy satellites are looking for evidence that the North Koreans are getting ready to test another nuclear weapon — just as they did in 2006 and 2009 — or shoot off some more long-range missiles. It is a sure way to grab headlines and rattle the neighborhood. In the past, such tests have ratcheted up tension, and could do so again. But they are not the Obama administration’s biggest worry. As one of Mr. Obama’s top aides said months ago, there is reason to hope that the North will shoot off “a nuclear test every week,” since they are thought to have enough fuel for only eight to twelve. Far more worrisome would be a decision by Pyongyang to export its nuclear technology and a failure by Americans to notice. For years, American intelligence agencies missed evidence that the North was building a reactor in the Syrian desert, near the Iraq border. The Israelis found it, and wiped it out in an air attack in 2007. Now, the search is on to find out if other countries are buying up North Korean technology or, worse yet, bomb fuel. (There are worries about Myanmar.) In short, the biggest worry is that North Korea could decide that teaching others how to build nuclear weapons would be the fastest, stealthiest way to defy a new American president who has declared that stopping proliferation is Job No. 1.

It is unclear whether the American intelligence community would pick up the signals that it missed in Syria. And if it did, a crisis might not be contained in the Korean Peninsula; it could spread to the Middle East or Southeast Asia, or wherever else North Korea found its customers.

# South Korea 1ac (7/7)

## A Middle East conflict will escalate – causing worldwide nuclear war

**Steinbach, 2002** “Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction: A threat to peace,” March 2002

 HYPERLINK "http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/02.03/0331steinbachisraeli.htm" www.wagingpeace.org/articles/02.03/0331steinbachisraeli.htm

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever reason - the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)

## Asian wars go nuclear:

Jon **Landay**, March 10, 20**00** (staff writer, Knight Ridder, Washington Bureau, lexis)

The 3,700-mile arc that begins at the heavily fortified border between North and South Korea and ends on the glacier where Indian and Pakistani troops skirmish almost every day has earned the dubious title of most dangerous part of the world.Few, if any, experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. And Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe.``Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile,'' said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. ``We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster.'' In an effort to cool the region's tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel Berger all will hopscotch Asia's capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. And while Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime.

## Troop removal is critical to facilitating a solution to North Korea’s nuclear program:

Doug **Bandow, 2003** (senior fellow, CATO Institute), “Cutting the Tripwire: It’s time to get out of Korea.” July 1, 2003. Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5993>

Although North Korea's nuclear program has understandably attracted Washington's eyes, America's relationship with the South requires equal attention. T**he nuclear controversy grows out of the unnatural U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula**, and **no solution is likely until that presence is removed**. Well before the present contretemps, it was evident that the 37,000 troops in the South were a Cold War artifact that had lost its raison d'être. Washington's commitment was a result of the post–World War II division of the peninsula, the North's subsequent invasion of the South, and China's intervention on the Northern side. After the war ended, South Korea had an unpopular, authoritarian government and a primitive economy. But for Washington's promise to go to war, backed by an occupying garrison, Seoul likely would not have survived another attack.

A carrot from the United States can bring North Korea back to the nuclear negotiating table:

Choe **Sang-Hun, 2010** (staff writer, New York Times.) “North Korea Calls for Better U.S. Ties,” January 2, 2010. Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/02/world/asia/02korea.html>

North Korea called on Friday for an end to “the hostile relationship” with the United States, issuing a New Year’s message that highlighted the reclusive country’s attempt to readjust the focus of six-party nuclear disarmament talks.In an editorial carried by its major state media outlets, North Korea said that its consistent stand was “to establish a lasting peace system on the Korean Peninsula and make it nuclear-free through dialogue and negotiations.” The editorial added that “the fundamental task for ensuring peace and stability” was “to put an end to the hostile relationship” with the United States.The sequence of easing tension with Washington, establishing a peace regime and then denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula has been shaping up as the North’s policy approach before it re-engages in talks about giving up its nuclear weapons, according to officials and analysts in Seoul.The North’s new emphasis on that policy sequence proved to be a stumbling block when President Obama’s special envoy on North Korea policy, Stephen W. Bosworth, visited the North’s capital, Pyongyang, last month to try to persuade North Korea to return to the six-nation talks about its nuclear program.

# \*\*\*\*\*2ac extensions\*\*\*\*\*

# Inherency: US still has a substantial troop presence in South Korea

## The US still maintains 28,500 troops in South Korea to this day

Hwang **Doo-hyong**, March 26, 20**10** (staff writer, Yonhap News), Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2010/03/26/13/0301000000AEN20100326000100315F.HTML>

The U.S. currently maintains 28,500 troops in South Korea, a legacy of the Korean War, when the U.S. fought alongside South Korea against invading North Korean troops aided by China.

## Simple inertia and outdated commitments causes the united states to maintain thousands of troops in South Korea

**Stratfor** Intelligence Foundation, 20**08**. “U.S., South Korea: The End of an Era -- The Closure of Combined Forces Command” March 17, 2008. Online. Internet. Accessed April 10, 2010 at www.stratfor.com

Yet more than 50 years later, a combination of containment and structural inertia have left some 30,000 U.S. troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula — a commitment no longer commensurate with the threat or the likelihood of the outbreak of war. The troop presence is also no longer in line with the United States’ geopolitical focus. With some 150,000 U.S. troops committed to Iraq and more than 25,000 in Afghanistan, the current disposition of U.S. forces in South Korea does not reflect the demands being placed on the U.S. military.

# Accidental War Extensions: Succession Crisis Increases Likelihood of Miscalculation

## The succession crisis in North Korea increases the likelihood of miscalculation over the Korean peninsula:

David **Sanger**, May 28, 20**10** (staff writer, New York Times), “In the Koreas, Five Possible Ways to War.” New York Times. Online. Internet. Accessed June 11, 2010 at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/30/weekinreview/30sanger.html>

A Power Struggle or Coup Ask American intelligence analysts what could escalate this or a future crisis, and they name a 27-year-old Kim Jong-un, the youngest of Kim Jong-il’s three sons, and the father’s choice to succeed him. Little is known about him, but his main qualifications for the job may be that he is considered less corrupt or despised than his two older brothers. One senior American intelligence official described the succession crisis this way: “We can’t think of a bigger nightmare than a third generation of the Kim family” running the country with an iron hand, throwing opponents into the country’s gulags, and mismanaging an economy that leaves millions starving. It is possible that on the issue of succession, many in the North Korean elite, including in the military, agree with the American intelligence official. According to some reports, they view Kim Jong-un as untested, and perhaps unworthy. “We’re seeing considerable signs of stress inside the North Korean system,” another official reported. And that raises the possibility of more provocations — and potential miscalculations — ahead. One line of analysis is that the younger Kim has to put a few notches in his belt by ordering some attacks on the South, the way his father once built up a little credibility. Another possibility is that internal fighting over the succession could bring wide-scale violence inside North Korea, tempting outside powers to intervene to stop the bloodshed. Curiously, when Kim Jong-il took the train to China a few weeks ago, his heir apparent did not travel with him. Some experts read that as a sign that the Kim dynasty might fear a coup if both were out of the country — or that it might not be wise to put father and son on the same track at the same time, because accidents do happen.

## A messy power struggle in North Korea is on the way:

Doug **Bandow**, June 11, 20**10** (senior fellow @ CATO Institute) “Confronting North Korea: Who’s in charge?” Online. Internet. Accessed June 13, 2010 at <http://dailycaller.com/2010/06/09/confronting-north-korea-whos-in-charge/>

Fourth, there’s no reason to expect a “soft landing” in the North. The existing regime has demonstrated enormous resilience, both in surviving crisis and in resisting change. However, it took Kim Il-sung, who won control with Soviet aid at the North’s founding in 1949, decades to transfer power to his son, Kim Jong-il. The latter is in ill health and probably doesn’t have nearly as much time to orchestrate a similar transfer. The result could be a messy power struggle on Kim’s death, with, in addition to Kim Jong-un, two other sons, a brother-in-law, a younger half-brother, past and present wives, various illegitimate children, and any number of officials who have been waiting years, even decades, for their chance to gain control. Finally, the key to solving the “North Korean problem” is China. Shortly after the sinking of the Cheonan Kim Jong-il scurried off to the PRC, apparently with his chosen son in tow. Today Beijing provides the DPRK with the bulk of its food and energy. Until now the Chinese leadership has believed that pushing Kim too hard risked the stability of the peninsula. But if Kim is willing to commit an act of war against the South, his regime is the real source of dangerous regional instability. The PRC would be serving its own interest if it acted to neuter Pyongyang. It’s hard to believe, but the situation in North Korea could get worse. Imagine a weak collective leadership after Kim’s death dissolving into warring factions as competing officials looked to their favorite Kim relative or army general. Imagine burgeoning civil strife, growing public hardship, and mass refugee flows. Or violence flowing across the Yalu River to the north and demilitarized zone to the south.

## The leadership struggle in North Korea risks violence spilling out of North Korea:

Doug **Bandow, 2010** (senior fellow, CATO Institute), “An Unstable Rogue.” April 6, 2010. Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23144>

Even if the DPRK was not involved in the sinking, only prudence, not principle, prevents the North from engaging in armed instances of brinkmanship. And with Pyongyang in the midst of a leadership transition of undetermined length, where the factions are unclear, different family members could reach for power, and the military might become the final arbiter, the possibility of violence occurring in the North and spilling outward seems real.

# Accidental War Extensions: Chenoan Incident Risks War In Korean Peninsula

## The Chenoan incident proves the world has changed: Kim either is ready to risk war or has lost control over the military—either scenario risks a conflict on the peninsula:

Doug **Bandow**, May 25, 20**10** (senior fellow @ CATO Institute) “Engaging China to maintain peace in East Asia” Online. Internet. Accessed June 15, 2010 at <http://dailycaller.com/2010/05/25/engaging-china-to-maintain-peace-in-east-asia/>

The regime started a war in 1950 and engaged in terrorism into the 1980s. Pyongyang has cheerfully sold weapons to all comers. Worse, today it appears to be in the midst of an uncertain leadership transition. If North Korean forces sank the South Korean vessel, then either Kim Jong-il is ready to risk war or has lost control of the military, which is ready to risk war.

## North Korea will risk war over the ship sinking incident:

Vijay **Joshi**, June 4, 20**10** (staff writer, Associated Press) “SKorea’s Lee sees no possibility of war with north.” Online. Internet. Accessed June 13, 2010 at <http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jFoJSL1TdsqcmxTABYNX3ENr1_TwD9G4U2G80>

It was the first time since the ship sinking that Lee has categorically ruled out war with North Korea. The North, however, has warned that any move to punish it over the sinking could led to war.

## Another incident at sea risks escalation on the Korean peninsula:

David **Sanger**, May 28, 20**10** (staff writer, New York Times), “In the Koreas, Five Possible Ways to War.” New York Times. Online. Internet. Accessed June 11, 2010 at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/30/weekinreview/30sanger.html>

An Incident at Sea Ever since an armistice ended the Korean War, the two sides have argued over — and from time to time skirmished over — the precise location of the “Northern Limit Line,” which divides their territorial waters. That was where the naval patrol ship Cheonan was sunk in March. So first on the Obama administration’s list of concerns is another incident at sea that might turn into a prolonged firefight. Any heavy engagement could draw in the United States, South Korea’s chief ally, which is responsible for taking command if a major conflict breaks out. What worries some officials is the chance of an intelligence failure in which the West misreads North Korea’s willingness and ability to escalate. The failure would not be unprecedented. Until a five-nation investigation concluded that the Cheonan had been torpedoed, South Korea and its allies did not think the North’s mini-submarine fleet was powerful enough to sink a fully armed South Korean warship.

## An international probe concludes that a North Korean submarine torpedoed a South Korean boat killing 46 of its sailors—this is the Cheonan incident:

Vijay **Joshi**, June 4, 20**10** (staff writer, Associated Press) “SKorea’s Lee sees no possibility of war with north.” Online. Internet. Accessed June 13, 2010 at <http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jFoJSL1TdsqcmxTABYNX3ENr1_TwD9G4U2G80>

Lee's comments were aimed at assuaging prospective investors. "Don't worry about a war, invest," he was quoted as telling the businesspeople. The two Koreas technically remain in a state of war because their three-year conflict ended in a truce, not a peace treaty, in 1953. North Korea denies it is responsible for the March sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan which killed 46 sailors. An international probe concluded that a North Korean submarine torpedoed it. On Friday, South Korea officially referred North Korea to the U.N. Security Council, taking its strongest step ever toward making the communist North face international punishment.

# Accidental War Extensions: US troops constantly in danger

## North Korea constantly places US troops in danger of military and terrorist attacks:

Doug **Bandow**, May 24, 20**10** (senior fellow @ CATO Institute) “Avoiding Pyongyang” Online. Internet. Accessed May 24, 2010 at <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23432>

The so-called Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been a malign international actor since its formation six decades ago. Kim Il-sung initiated full-scale war in 1950; over the years the regime has engaged in a variety of military and terrorist attacks on both South Korean and American targets.

## US troops are currently in range of North Korean attack:

Doug **Bandow**, May 24, 20**10** (senior fellow @ CATO Institute) “Avoiding Pyongyang” Online. Internet. Accessed May 24, 2010 at <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23432>

Washington is stuck in the center of Korean affairs today only because of the U.S.-ROK alliance, which provides a security guarantee to South Korea with no corresponding benefit to America. Without the alliance, there would be no U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula, within range of North Korean attack, and no American promise to intervene in any war that might result from a provocation by Pyongyang or retaliation by the South.

# Accidents Extensions: Military Drills Internal Link

## Annual military drills conducted by US troops on the North Korean border constantly fuel tensions along the Korean peninsula:

**NTDTV.com**, March 9, 20**10**, “Joint U.S.-South Korea Military Drills Rattle North,” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://english.ntdtv.com/ntdtv_en/ns_asia/2010-03-09/403930778313.html>

The U.S. and South Korea conducted joint military drills on Tuesday, provoking North Korea to place its army in position. More than 200 U.S. and South Korean troops participated in a guerilla warfare exercise in Pohang, south of Seoul, with the units practicing their rappelling skills in the snow. [Lt. Col. Forrest Poole, U.S. Marines]: "The purpose of the training is to build a relationship and strengthen the relationship between the ROK (Republic of Korea) marine and the United States' marines. It's already good, but whenever we can work together, we can make it better." The drills, aimed at testing the allies' defense readiness, draws fiery rhetoric from the North each year and fuel tensions on the Korean peninsula. [Ji Soo-min, South Korean Colonel]: "We developed our capacity for joint battle and mountainous battle performances through this U.S. and South Korean joint military drill. It was a good chance to improve the friendship between South Korean and U.S. marines." The drills involve about 18,000 U.S. troops, with 8,000 coming from abroad and 10,000 being already stationed in the South.

## The annual military joint exercises create tension every year that risks war:

Ju-min **Park, 2010** (staff writer, Los Angeles Times), “U.S., South Korea begin war games, angering North Korea.” Mar 9, 2010. Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/09/world/la-fg-korea-war-games9-2010mar09>

U.S. and South Korean armed forces on Monday began their annual military joint exercises, prompting North Korea to chastise the war games as "a foolish act of banging their heads on a rock." The 11-day exercises involving tens of thousands of troops are a routine training event designed to improve the ability to defend South Korea, according to U.S.-South Korea Combined Forces Command. That's not the way Pyongyang sees it. North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Monday released a statement calling the drill an "undisguised adventurous saber-rattling [that] is creating such [a] tense situation on the Korean peninsula that a war may break out any time."

# Accidental War Advantage Extensions: Accident Likely

## North Korea constantly saber-rattles—one wrong move could cause the US to go to war with Pyongyang:

Doug **Bandow,** February 26, 20**09** (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “Starting the Second Korean War?” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://reason.com/archives/2009/02/26/starting-the-second-korean-war>

What to do about North Korea was a major topic during Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent trip to South Korea and China. The North remains predictably unpredictable. If the Korean peninsula has gone a few weeks without a crisis, expect Pyongyang to create one. So it has been with the advent of the Obama administration. Angry over the Bush administration's failure to offer sufficient inducements, the North announced that it was halting plans to dismantle its nuclear program. Irritated with Seoul's new hard-line towards North Korea, Pyongyang declared all agreements with the Republic of Korea to be inoperative. Now the North apparently is preparing to stage a missile test. Secretary Clinton called the latter "unhelpful," as if Dear Leader Kim Jong Il was a valued negotiating partner. The government in Seoul responded with a yawn and Secretary Clinton indicated her desire for continued negotiations. But the latest emanations from Pyongyang have caused some policymakers to advocate confrontation. Philip Zelikow, late of the Bush State Department, suggests war. This isn't the first time that U.S. officials have proposed sending in the bombers. The Clinton administration apparently came close to ordering military strikes before former President Jimmy Carter's dramatic flight to Pyongyang. And Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) has spent years pondering the possibility of preventive war against the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It was never a good idea, but the pressure for military action may grow. Selig Harrison of the Center for International Policy recently traveled to the DPRK, where he was told that existing supplies of plutonium had been "weaponized." He argues that the U.S. "can tolerate a nuclear-armed North Korea that may or may not actually have the weapons arsenal it claims," but others would put the military option back on the table.

## North Korea exhibits paranoid over-reactions to even minor instability—heightening the risk of accidental conflict:

Kwang-Tae **Kim,** March 25, 20**10**, “NKorea vows ‘nuclear strikes’ in latest threat” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iURO8fOyWVOA0ytFlaAGuC9F7R9wD9EM4I600>

North Korea's military warned South Korea and the United States on Friday of "unprecedented nuclear strikes" as it expressed anger over a report the two countries plan to prepare for possible instability in the totalitarian country, a scenario it dismissed as a "pipe dream." The North routinely issues such warnings. Diplomats in South Korea and the U.S. have repeatedly called on Pyongyang to return to international negotiations aimed at ending its nuclear programs. "Those who seek to bring down the system in the (North), whether they play a main role or a passive role, will fall victim to the unprecedented nuclear strikes of the invincible army," North Korea's military said in comments carried by the official Korean Central News Agency. The North, believed have enough weaponized plutonium for at least half a dozen atomic bombs, conducted its second atomic test last year, drawing tighter U.N. sanctions.

## Potential for conflict still exists on the Korean peninsula:

Doug Bandow, 2010 March 30, 2010 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “South Korea Needs Better Defense.” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11628>

The Korean War ended in 1953, but the potential for conflict never fully disappeared, as evident from the latest events in the Yellow Sea. Before the government in Seoul attempts to save the world, it needs to protect the people of South Korea.

# Accidental War Advantage Extensions: Accident Likely

## North Korean brinksmanship risks a full scale war on the peninsula:

Doug **Bandow, 2010** (senior fellow, CATO Institute), “An Unstable Rogue.” April 6, 2010. Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23144>

And the Yellow Sea incident highlights other dangers: it may have been an act of brinkmanship too violent by half or an act of military disobedience designed to sink any prospect of negotiations. Either of these could lead the worst of all outcomes on the peninsula—full-scale war. Then the PRC would face the worst case in virtually every dimension: the end of North Korea, a united ROK allied with Washington on China’s border, mass refugee flows over the Yalu, and conflict, including possibly radiation, spilling over Chinese territory.

## Tension is endemic to the US-North Korean relationship:

Eric **Schwartz, 2008** (Attorney, Office of the General Counsel-Sempra Energy), Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review, Winter 2008. “U.S. Security Strategy: Empowering Kim Jong-il?” Lexis/Nexis. Accessed April 1, 2010.

The Korean War is considered a Cold War proxy battle between China and the United States. n180 In 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea in an attempt to reunify the Korean Peninsula. n181 In response, the United States convinced the UN Security Council to vote in favor of sending military aid to South Korea. n182 The Security Council recommended that all UN members assist the U.S.-led force to restore peace to the Korean Peninsula. n183 The war eventually ended in a stalemate, and the Korean Peninsula remained divided into two separate nations. n184 In 1953, the two sides signed an armistice agreement but did not sign an official peace treaty. n185 As a result, North Korea and South Korea are still technically at war today. n186 Since the armistice, the relationship between the United States and North Korea has been plagued with virulent rhetoric and tension. n187 Moreover, North Korea has often referred to the South Korean government as a U.S. "puppet." n188

## US military commitment to South Korea endangers American troops:

Doug **Bandow, 2003** (senior fellow, CATO Institute), “Cutting the Tripwire: It’s time to get out of Korea.” July 1, 2003. Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5993>

The alliance with the Republic of Korea -- actually a one-sided security guarantee -- has been America's most consistently dangerous commitment since World War II. The nearly 34,000 deaths in the Korean War have been supplemented by further flare-ups, such as the North's 1968 seizure of the USS Pueblo and its 1976 murder of two U.S. soldiers cutting down a tree in the demilitarized zone. Reports of other, unpublicized incidents abound, including full-fledged firefights between American forces and North Korean soldiers entering the South. The Korea Defense Veterans of America estimate that 1,500 Americans have been killed by Northern forces since the Korean War ended.

## North Korean recklessness could lead to war on the peninsula at any time:

Doug **Bandow, 2010** (senior fellow, CATO Institute), “An Unstable Rogue.” April 6, 2010. Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23144>

In late March an explosion sunk a South Korean warship in the Yellow Sea. After his government downplayed the likelihood of North Korean involvement, the South’s defense minister now says a mine or torpedo might have been involved. A torpedo would mean a North Korean submarine actively targeted Seoul’s aging corvette. The Republic of Korea’s president, Lee Myung-bak, has attempted to dampen speculation by announcing his intention to “look into the case in a calm manner.” But the possibility that Pyongyang committed a flagrant and bloody act of war has sent tremors through the ROK. Seoul could ill afford not to react strongly, both to protect its international reputation and prevent a domestic political upheaval. All economic aid to and investment in the North would end. Diplomatic talks would be halted. Prospects for reconvening the Six-Party Talks would disappear. Moreover, Seoul might feel the need to respond with force. Even if justified, such action would risk a retaliatory spiral. Where it would end no one could say. No one wants to play out that scenario to its ugly conclusion. The Yellow Sea incident reemphasizes the fact that North Korean irresponsibility could lead to war. Tensions on the Korean peninsula have risen after President Lee ended the ROK’s “Sunshine Policy”—which essentially provided bountiful subsidies irrespective of Pyongyang’s behavior.

# Accidental War Extensions: US Troops Not Needed to Deter North Korea

## Turn: US troop presence prevents South Korea from building an adequate defense:

Doug Bandow, 2010 March 30, 2010 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “South Korea Needs Better Defense.” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11628>

Washington has promoted this perspective, enlisting the ROK military in Afghanistan and Iraq, for instance. A new study from the Center for a New American Security argues that "the value of the alliance goes far beyond security in the Korean peninsula." Participants urged the South to create a capability "to provide assistance in more global contingencies." It obviously is up to Seoul to decide what it wants to do in the world. But its first responsibility is to defend itself. As long as 27,000 American personnel remain on station in the ROK, the South is not doing enough militarily. Moreover the U.S. maintains the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa, Japan, as back-up for Korean contingencies, and would be expected to intervene with other large-scale forces in the event of war.

## South Korea is dependent on the US for its defenses:

Doug Bandow, 2010 March 30, 2010 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “South Korea Needs Better Defense.” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11628>

However, lack of reciprocity from the DPRK led President Lee Myung-bak, elected in 2007, to stop providing unconditional aid and investment. The North responded angrily, but little changed in terms of the military situation. North Korea's armed forces are large but decrepit. Pyongyang could wreak enormous havoc while losing any war. The South has a more modern, better-trained force, including navy. Even so, the ROK remains heavily dependent on the U.S. for its defense.

## Cutting troops will cause South Korea to care for its own defenses:

Doug Bandow, 2010 September 8, 2009 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “Why Are ‘We” Defending South Korea?” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.campaignforliberty.com/article.php?view=201>

There is no immutable aspect of geography which requires the country to the south to have a smaller military than the country to the north. Rather, South Korea has chosen to rely on America in order to invest its money on economic development. A perfectly rational decision for Seoul. But perfectly ridiculous for America today, when the South has upwards of 40 times the GDP and twice the population of the DPRK. South Korea is capable of building a much larger military, adding rather than cutting military personnel. It has decided to build one significantly smaller than that of the North because it can count on Americans rushing to its defense.

## The US should withdraw its troops and allow South Korea to handle its own defenses:

Doug Bandow, 2010 September 8, 2009 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “Why Are ‘We” Defending South Korea?” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.campaignforliberty.com/article.php?view=201>

The ROK is an independent nation fully entitled to implement its own foreign policy and create its own military force. But the core duty of an independent nation is to defend itself. Having joined the ranks of leading countries -- South Korea's economy ranks in the top 15 -- Seoul should take over responsibility for ensuring its own defense as well as promoting regional stability. The U.S. can and should be a good friend of the South, as Americans expand cultural, economic, and political ties with South Koreans. But it's time to plan for a phase-out of America's troop presence, punctuated by ending America's security guarantee. The two governments should continue to cooperate on security issues of shared interest, of which there are many. However, they should work together as equals, not as guardian and dependent. Put bluntly, Americans should no longer be expected to subsidize their friends across the Pacific.

## US military presence encourages South Korea to not build up its military forces:

Doug Bandow, 2003 (senior fellow, CATO Institute), “Cutting the Tripwire: It’s time to get out of Korea.” July 1, 2003. Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5993>

To the extent that the South's military lags behind its antagonist's, that is a matter of choice, not necessity. Nothing prevents Seoul from building a larger force. Rather, the American tripwire discourages it from doing so. As the South acknowledges in its own defense reports, it chose to focus on economic development at the expense of military strength -- a plan it can follow securely as long as America protects it.

# Accidental War Extensions: US Troops Not Needed to Deter North Korea

## South Korea is fully capable of defending itself—economic situation proves:

Doug Bandow, 2010 March 30, 2010 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “South Korea Needs Better Defense.” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11628>

Yet the South is capable of defending itself. Over the last 60 years it has been transformed from an authoritarian wreck into a prosperous democratic leader internationally. The ROK's economy ranks 13th in the world. South Korea's GDP is roughly 40 times that of the North. Should it desire to do so, Seoul could spend more than the entire North Korean GDP on defense alone.

## South Korea can effectively deter the North:

Doug Bandow, 2010 March 25, 2010 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “Okinawa and the Problem of Empire.” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/okinawa-and-the-problems_b_512610.html>

If the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force located on Okinawa is not needed to defend Japan, then what is it for? South Korea vastly outranges the North on virtually every measure of power and can do whatever is necessary to deter North Korean adventurism. There also is much talk, offered unceasingly and uncritically, about maintaining regional stability. But what invasions, border fights, naval clashes, missile threats, and full-scale wars are the Marines preventing?

## South Korea can adequately defend itself against North Korea:

Doug Bandow, 2010 February 1, 2008 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “GOP lost in defense budget black hole.” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/columns/doug_bandow_gop_lost_in_defense_budget_black_hole2008-02-01T08_00_00.html>

Finally, the U.S. is allied with every major industrialized state and is friendly with most regional powers that aren’t formal allies. Europe possesses a larger population and economy than America, let alone Russia. South Korea has 40 times the GDP and twice the population of the North. Japan, Australia, Singapore and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations are capable of matching China. Why can’t America’s allies and friends defend themselves and their regions?

# Accidental War Extensions: US Troops Not Needed to Deter North Korea

## The US should remove all its troops from South Korea—the South can take care of its own defense needs:

Doug Bandow, 2007 March 10, 2007 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “Why are We Still in Korea?.” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://original.antiwar.com/doug-bandow/2007/03/09/why-are-we-still-in-korea/>

These steps are welcome, but remain inadequate half-measures. America should initiate a much more rapid drawdown of its forces. Five years from now there shouldn’t be a single U.S. soldier based in South Korea to turn over command responsibility to the ROK. Alliances are created in specific geopolitical circumstances for specific geopolitical purposes. For instance, there was good reason for Washington to intervene in 1950 to prevent the South from being absorbed by Kim Il-sung’s North Korea. South Korea was an economic and political mess. Pyongyang possessed a stronger military than the ROK (which had been denied American heavy weapons because of its threat to attack the North). The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was backed by China and the Soviet Union. With the Cold War raging globally, a geopolitical loss in Korea might destabilize other nations (such as Japan) and regions (such as Europe). The world looks very different today. The Cold War is over, the Soviet Union has disbanded, and the People’s Republic of China has discarded Maoism. Japan sports the world’s second biggest economy; most other East Asian states are allied to or friendly with the U.S. Moreover, South Korea has surpassed the North on virtually every measure of national power. The ROK possesses roughly 40 times the GDP and twice the population of North Korea. The South has a vast technological edge, is engaged internationally, and even trades more with China than does Pyongyang.

## The Republic of Korea can defend itself against North Korea:

Doug Bandow, 2007 March 10, 2007 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “Why are We Still in Korea?.” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://original.antiwar.com/doug-bandow/2007/03/09/why-are-we-still-in-korea/>

Finally, though Seoul’s military is numerically smaller, it is qualitatively superior to that possessed by the North. South Korea spends between three and four times as much as the DPRK on the military. The ROK’s reserve capacity and potential support is even greater.

## South Korea can defend against the North on its own:

Doug **Bandow**, May 24, 20**10** (senior fellow @ CATO Institute) “Avoiding Pyongyang” Online. Internet. Accessed June 15, 2010 at <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23432>

Were the ROK still a helpless economic wreck, one could concoct an argument for American aid. But the South vastly outranges the DPRK on every measure of national power. The ongoing debate about whether Seoul is ready to take over operational control (“OPCON”) of its own forces along with any U.S. troops during a war is symptomatic of the extreme dependency in which South Korea finds itself. For the ROK to cower fearfully before Pyongyang is roughly the equivalent of the U.S. running to Brussels to request European troops to deter a Mexican attack.

# Accidental War Advantage Extensions: Get Tough Approach Risks War

## Obama’s current get tough approach to North Korea risks a war—a soft-line approach is superior:

John **Feffer, 2009** (co-director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies), “Escalating with North Korea” Jun 25, 2009. Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://sites.google.com/site/nzdprksociety/commentary/escalating-with-north-korea>

In his eagerness to show that he has the strength of will to confront a nuclear bully, President Barack Obama hopes to dispel any illusions--among conservatives here, among the leadership in North Korea--that he's a "cut-and-run" kind of guy. He can multitask. He can talk and prepare for war at the same time. This guy can take care of pesky flies like North Korea. I'm not sure who's giving the president his advice on North Korea. But it's all wrong. His show of "resolve" has only made matters worse. Myth 1: North Korea is about to attack Hawaii: North Korea has two long-range missiles, the Taepodong-1 and the Taepodong-2. The first, likely used only for satellite launches, can maybe go 2,500 miles. But it's never been successfully tested. The Taepondong-2 maybe could go about 3,700 miles.[1] But it too has failed in its two tests: a quick fizzle in 2006 and a failure in the third stage this last April.[2] Even if Pyongyang gets everything right for a possible July 4 test, it's 4,500 miles between Pyongyang and Honolulu. As for putting a nuclear warhead on the top of it, North Korea has shown no evidence that it has the necessary miniaturization technology. Myth #2: North Korea is a military threat: North Korea has a lot of people in uniform, and its artillery can cause horrific damage to Seoul. But North Korea spends about half a billion dollars a year on its military. South Korea alone spends 40 times that amount. And theUnited States spends 1,000 times more. Neither China nor Russia would support any North Korean military action. Militarily speaking, North Korea is a kamikaze country. It can inflict damage, but only in a suicide attack and only close to home. Myth 3: We really showed them at the UN: The Security Council statement in April and the resolution in June certainly communicated international anger at North Korea's rocket and nuclear tests. But we overreacted to the April launch. We should have treated it as a satellite launch and pressed forward with negotiations. Instead, North Korea responded to our fierce words by upping the ante and conducting a second nuclear test. The UN statement was as satisfying as hitting a problem with a baseball bat--except that the problem in this case was a hornet's nest. The more recent resolution, meanwhile, represents a dangerous escalation: a confrontation at sea might trigger a much larger conflict. Myth 4: Kim Jong Il is crazy and North Korea is an unpredictable rogue state: Actually, North Korean reactions have been quite predictable and, at least within the North Korean context, rational. Pyongyang was unhappy with the course of negotiations and its relative lack of priority on Obama's to-do list. Rocket launches and nuclear tests have yielded both attention and concessions in the past, so they went with what works. And they telegraphed their moves well in advance. The leader of North Korea runs a brutal state and a mind-numbing personality cult. And North Korea's official statements often sound like the scripts from bad horror movies. But Kim Jong Il worked out shrewd deals in the past--with theClinton and Bush administrations, with the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh-Moo Hyun governments in South Korea, and even with Junichiro Koizumi in Japan back in 2002. If he's mad, there's a method in his madness. It's definitely frustrating to negotiate with North Korea. And many respected analysts have serious doubts as to whether Pyongyang will ever give up its nuclear weapons. But when we were talking seriously with North Korea, it kept its plutonium program frozen (Clinton) or began dismantling it (Bush), and its long-range missile program was still rudimentary. That beats war every time. We seem to be back in 1994, when a Democratic president played tough with the North Koreans to demonstrate that he had hawkish credentials when necessary. **The tit-for-tat escalation of that period nearly led to war**. Fortunately, former President Jimmy Carter helped avert confrontation by **visiting Pyongyang and working out a compromise**. Maybe the Man from Plains can get on the plane again. The escalation must stop: It's time to talk.

# Solvency: US should disengage from South Korea

## The US should step away from the Korean peninsula—it isn’t in our national interest:

Doug **Bandow**, June 11, 20**10** (senior fellow @ CATO Institute) “Confronting North Korea: Who’s in charge?” Online. Internet. Accessed June 13, 2010 at <http://dailycaller.com/2010/06/09/confronting-north-korea-whos-in-charge/>

Fourth, there’s no reason to expect a “soft landing” in the North. The existing regime has demonstrated enormous resilience, both in surviving crisis and in resisting change. However, it took Kim Il-sung, who won control with Soviet aid at the North’s founding in 1949, decades to transfer power to his son, Kim Jong-il. The latter is in ill health and probably doesn’t have nearly as much time to orchestrate a similar transfer. The result could be a messy power struggle on Kim’s death, with, in addition to Kim Jong-un, two other sons, a brother-in-law, a younger half-brother, past and present wives, various illegitimate children, and any number of officials who have been waiting years, even decades, for their chance to gain control. Finally, the key to solving the “North Korean problem” is China. Shortly after the sinking of the Cheonan Kim Jong-il scurried off to the PRC, apparently with his chosen son in tow. Today Beijing provides the DPRK with the bulk of its food and energy. Until now the Chinese leadership has believed that pushing Kim too hard risked the stability of the peninsula. But if Kim is willing to commit an act of war against the South, his regime is the real source of dangerous regional instability. The PRC would be serving its own interest if it acted to neuter Pyongyang. It’s hard to believe, but the situation in North Korea could get worse. Imagine a weak collective leadership after Kim’s death dissolving into warring factions as competing officials looked to their favorite Kim relative or army general. Imagine burgeoning civil strife, growing public hardship, and mass refugee flows. Or violence flowing across the Yalu River to the north and demilitarized zone to the south. Washington’s best policy would be to step back from this geopolitical miasma. Any map demonstrates which countries have the most at stake in a stable Korean peninsula: South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. It is time for them to take the lead. America could help as they search for a solution. But North Korea truly is their problem far more than Washington’s problem.

# \*\*\*\*North Korean Proliferation Advantage\*\*\*\*

# North Korea Rapidly Prolifing Now

## North Korea is rapidly proliferating nuclear weapons while threatening the United States and Japan:

Eric **Schwartz, 2008** (Attorney, Office of the General Counsel-Sempra Energy), Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review, Winter 2008. “U.S. Security Strategy: Empowering Kim Jong-il?” Lexis/Nexis. Accessed April 1, 2010.

Within the past decade, the DPRK has threatened preemptive attack against the United States, n9 test-fired missiles towards Japan, n10 and tested a nuclear weapon in the face of international protest. n11 In 2003, after North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), John Bolton, then Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, declared, "[it is] hard to see how we can have conversations with a government that has blatantly violated its [\*3] agreements." n12 Despite this history, the United States agreed to terms in the February 2007 agreement that were almost identical to the terms of the failed 1994 Agreed Framework. n13 North Korea later violated its February 2007 agreement with the United States by delaying the closure of its nuclear facility by two months. n14

# Fears of pre-emption encourage prolif

## North Korea is infuriated by recent reports the US is planning a pre-emptive strike:

Donald **Kirk, 2010** (staff writer, Reuters), “Rand: 400,000 troops needed to secure N.Korea and its loose nukes.” Jan 25, 2010. Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010at http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2010/ea\_nkorea0051\_01\_25.asp

If there's one sure way to infuriate the North Koreans, it's to talk of "regime collapse" and "contingency planning". As far as Pyongyang is concerned, such speculation is proof positive of United States-led plotting of a "pre-emptive strike". Against this background, one should not be surprised if the North Koreans see a study conducted by Rand Corporation analyst Bruce Bennett and Dartmouth College scholar Jennifer Lind as the most conclusive evidence to date that the planning is in an advanced stage. Considering Rand's contracts with the U.S. defense establishment, one has to perceive the study as a scenario for an invasion of the North that would plunge the Korean Peninsula into a second Korean War.

## Threats of a preemptive US attack are at the root of North Korea’s nuclearization drive:

Eric **Schwartz, 2008** (Attorney, Office of the General Counsel-Sempra Energy), Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review, Winter 2008. “U.S. Security Strategy: Empowering Kim Jong-il?” Lexis/Nexis. Accessed April 1, 2010.

North Korea has plainly stated that, because of the U.S. threat of preemptive attack, it seeks to acquire nuclear weapons as its only method of deterrence. n237 The DPRK even went so far as to test a nuclear bomb. n238 Despite this revelation, the United States has declined to attack North Korea for the following reasons. First, the Bush Doctrine has kept the U.S. military fully engaged in the Middle East. n239 It is questionable whether the United States has the military strength to concurrently conduct a large-scale operation in North Korea. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the U.S. invasion in Iraq, which was based on faulty intelligence and ran [\*30] contrary to both international norms and consensus, has weakened the U.S. government's credibility both domestically and abroad. n240

## Troop presence in South Korea is the only reason North Korea is hostile to the US:

Doug **Bandow, 2003** (senior fellow, CATO Institute), “Cutting the Tripwire: It’s time to get out of Korea.” July 1, 2003. Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5993>

Why is America still in Korea? The security commitment is the only reason the North breathes fire against Washington. If the U.S. withdrew, Pyongyang would pose no serious threat to us. Today it wields only an untested missile with the theoretical possibility of hitting Alaska or the West Coast, and it knows that attacking America would ensure obliteration. In contrast, leaving forces on the peninsula creates 37,000 nearby nuclear hostages if Pyongyang develops a nuclear arsenal. The troop presence also further strains a military that intends to garrison a defeated Iraq along with the Balkans, all while searching for Al Qaeda worldwide. Alliances are created at particular times to meet particular threats. They are not ends in themselves, to be preserved no matter how much the world changes. Instead of augmenting its forces in the Pacific and threatening Pyongyang with war, the U.S. should bring home its troops and turn the problem of Pyongyang over to its neighbors, where it belongs.

## The doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense encourages North Korean proliferation:

Eric Schwartz, 2008 (Attorney, Office of the General Counsel-Sempra Energy), Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review, Winter 2008. “U.S. Security Strategy: Empowering Kim Jong-il?” Lexis/Nexis. Accessed April 1, 2010.

As the world's foremost superpower, the United States has the unique ability to influence the behavior of other states. Since the end of World War II, the United States has been the central architect in creating and maintaining a global system of international law and human rights. Generally, America has used this global system to protect its own interests, but current U.S. policies concerning preemptive self-defense and nuclear weapon use are contrary to the international norms which the United States itself helped to establish. These policies may have unintentionally encouraged nuclear proliferation and inspired North Korean Kim Jong-il to obtain nuclear weapons.

## Fears of pre-emptive attack by the United States facilitate North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons:

Eric Schwartz, 2008 (Attorney, Office of the General Counsel-Sempra Energy), Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review, Winter 2008. “U.S. Security Strategy: Empowering Kim Jong-il?” Lexis/Nexis. Accessed April 1, 2010.

The Bush administration employed the doctrine of preemptive self-defense in the war against Iraq without UN approval. n19 Yet, the United States has declined to recognize [\*4] any other country's right to preemptive attack. n20 Finally, the United States has adopted policies for treating detainees that violate the Third Geneva Convention. n21 U.S. disregard for international norms has not gone unnoticed in North Korea. In 2003, following President Bush's "axis of evil" comments, North Korea withdrew from the NPT, citing its right to launch a preemptive strike against the United States in self-defense. n22 North Korea has stated its belief that the only adequate deterrence against a U.S. attack is nuclear development. n23

# Fears of pre-emption encourage prolif

## The fear of US pre-emptive attack motivates North Korean nuclear acquisition:

Eric Schwartz, 2008 (Attorney, Office of the General Counsel-Sempra Energy), Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review, Winter 2008. “U.S. Security Strategy: Empowering Kim Jong-il?” Lexis/Nexis. Accessed April 1, 2010.

North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons exemplifies the unintended consequences of U.S. legitimization of nuclear weapons and preemptive self-defense. The dual threats of nuclear weapons and preemptive attack may deter those parties whose vital interests include maintaining the international status quo, protecting their citizens, and retaining power. A policy of deterrence, however, may only serve to motivate rivals, such as Kim Jong-il, in their pursuit of nuclear weapons. Already on the offensive against the United States, Kim Jong-il has little to lose by pursuing a nuclear agenda. Thus, he may view nuclear weapons as [\*22] North Korea's best chance to avoid American attack and to reinforce his self-proclaimed position as the "Great Leader" of his country.

## Bush doctrine promotes nuclear proliferation:

Eric Schwartz, 2008 (Attorney, Office of the General Counsel-Sempra Energy), Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review, Winter 2008. “U.S. Security Strategy: Empowering Kim Jong-il?” Lexis/Nexis. Accessed April 1, 2010.

Arguably, the Bush Doctrine could inspire other nuclear states to take their own preemptive military action. In turn, non-nuclear states are provoked to acquire nuclear weapons secretly, hoping to discourage preemptive military actions against them. This counter-effect is exemplified by the North Korean Foreign Ministry's response to the escalation of rhetoric following Bush's "axis of evil" speech: "The United States says that after Iraq, we are next . . . but we have our own counter-measures. Preemptive attacks are not the exclusive right of the U.S." n234

## Aggressive US rhetoric against North Korea only fuels Pyongyang’s nuclearization drive:

Eric Schwartz, 2008 (Attorney, Office of the General Counsel-Sempra Energy), Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review, Winter 2008. “U.S. Security Strategy: Empowering Kim Jong-il?” Lexis/Nexis. Accessed April 1, 2010.

Recent aggressive U.S. rhetoric has led North Korea to believe that the stage is being set for a future attack. As evidence, North Korea cites President Bush's repeated accusations that North Korea is a rogue nation developing WMDs. n227 The United States took preemptive action against Iraq under a similar rationale: repeated violations of UN sanctions, human rights violations, possession of WMDs, the irrationality of Saddam Hussein, and a long-standing rhetoric of hostility towards the United States. n228 It follows that the United States could apply the same rationale to North Korea based on the actions of the North Korean government, even without exaggerated evidence. North Korea's fears of the United States exaggerating or distorting evidence to suit its "axis of evil" rhetoric may be well founded. Recent evidence suggests the United States may have exaggerated its claims that North Korea violated the 1994 Agreed Framework. n229 Never a popular agreement with U.S. conservatives, [\*28] it is now widely believed that the United States distorted the DPRK diplomat's claim that North Korea had the right to develop nuclear weapons. n230 At the time, the United States presented a flimsy, worst-case scenario of the DPRK's nuclear program as incontrovertible proof to exaggerate the dangers of North Korea's government (just as it did when presenting the dangers posed by Iraq). n231 After publicizing North Korea's alleged assertion of its nuclearization rights, the United States characterized North Korea as an international menace. During this time, the Agreed Framework unraveled, with both countries blaming the other for the failure. n232 Considering the exaggerated evidence used to support preemptive war against Iraq, another fellow "axis of evil" state, it is not unreasonable to believe that the United States could make the same decision to depose an anti-American regime in North Korea. Thus far, the U.S. policy of preemptive self-defense as a deterrent seems to have backfired in the case of North Korea. If anything, this U.S. policy has encouraged North Korea to pursue nuclear capability. For example, in withdrawing from the NPT in 2003, a North Korean official stated, "The bloody lesson of the war in Iraq for the world is that only when a country has physical deterrent forces and massive military deterrent forces that are capable of overwhelmingly defeating any attack by state-of-the-art weapons, can it prevent war and defend its independence and national security." n233

# Prolif Advantage Extensions: Even Optimists Think NK Prolif is Unstable

## Even prolif optimists agree that North Korean prolif is unstable

Dong Sun Lee, 2007 Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University. Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 61, No. 4

North Korea's nuclear armaments can generate continual crises, posing a persistent threat to peace on the Korean peninsula. Even proliferation optimists—who believe the spread of nuclear weapons tends to promote peace—recognise that political relations can be unstable until all parties deploy reliable nuclear deterrents (Sagan and Waltz 2003). For instance, acute crises occurred between the nuclear-armed superpowers during the early Cold War (most notably over Berlin and Cuba) when mutual assured destruction had yet to be established. Furthermore, India and Pakistan—both nascent nuclear powers—fought a limited war over Kashmir in 1999 (Kapur 2005). These events indicate that, despite their potential for promoting caution, nuclear arsenals do not prevent dangerous crises altogether, especially when such arsenals are insecure. And the DPRK nuclear forces will remain so for the foreseeable future. Pyongyang's opponents are making far larger investments on conventional and/or nuclear armaments. The 2006 defence budget of North Korea amounted to an estimated US$2.3 billion, only a tiny faction of the military budgets of the United States (US$535), Japan (US$41.1), and the ROK (US$23.7) (Military Balance 2007). Therefore, resource-strapped North Korea will be unable to build a secure second-strike force anytime soon against the United States and its regional allies.6 To make things worse, behavioural tendencies shown by Americans and North Koreans do not bode particularly well for crisis prevention. Americans frequently forget that their actions could appear threatening to their adversaries, instead believing that their benign intentions are too obvious to misperceive. North Koreans are not known for their empathy and sensitivity to other states' security needs, either. Therefore, the chances of managing the security dilemma effectively and avoiding crises between the two countries do not look too good (Jervis 1989). And North Korean armament means that a crisis on the Korean peninsula can lead to a far more destructive war.

# North Korean Prolif Impacts: US Attack

## North Korean proliferation risks a military attack by the United States:

Doug Bandow, 2010 (senior fellow, CATO Institute), “An Unstable Rogue.” April 6, 2010. Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23144>

Although the DPRK’s governing structures so far have proven surprisingly resilient, it’s impossible to ignore the possibility of an implosion, military coup or messy succession fight. If North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons, its actions could trigger two equally explosive responses: a military attack by the United States or decisions by South Korea and Japan to build nuclear weapons in response.

# North Korean Prolif Impacts—Attack Japan/South Korea

## North Korea possesses enough plutonium to make nuclear missiles to attack Japan or South Korea:

Eric Schwartz, 2008 (Attorney, Office of the General Counsel-Sempra Energy), Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review, Winter 2008. “U.S. Security Strategy: Empowering Kim Jong-il?” Lexis/Nexis. Accessed April 1, 2010.

North Korea is a communist totalitarian government, and is accused of being one of the most notorious human rights violators. n175 All North Korean media is state-controlled, and it is reported that over 200,000 people are being held as political prisoners. n176 The UN has condemned North Korea for its human [\*23] rights abuses, which include torture, political imprisonment, and slave labor. n177 North Korea has a reported available military manpower of about 12 million, and an annual average available military manpower of about 400,000. n178 Furthermore, it is estimated North Korea has acquired enough plutonium to make nuclear missiles that could reach Japan or South Korea. n179

# North Korean Prolif Solvency

## Offers to remove US troops from South Korea triggers the de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula:

Donald Kirk, 2010 (staff writer, Reuters), “North Korea reaches out to US with talk of peace treaty.” Jan 11, 2010. Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/0111/North-Korea-reaches-out-to-US-with-talk-of-peace-treaty>

North Korea called again for a Korean War peace treaty on Monday, in an apparent bid to deal more directly with the United States while putting off multilateral talks on its nuclear weapons program. Pyongyang's Korean Central News Agency quoted a foreign ministry spokesman as saying a peace treaty would "help terminate the hostile relations" between North Korea and the US and “positively promote the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula at a rapid tempo." The North Korean foreign ministry spokesman said the signatories of the Korean War armistice should negotiate a Korean War treaty to replace the armistice either in separate talks or during six-party talks. The latter, last held in Beijing in December 2008, include Japan, China, and Russia as well as the US and North and South Korea. The reference to “signatories” in Monday’s statement left open the question of whether North Korea’s call for a peace treaty is an effort to bypass South Korea. The US, China, and North Korea signed the Korean War armistice in July 1953, but South Korea’s Korean War president Rhee Syngman refused. He believed the armistice would mean permanent division of the Korean peninsula between North and South. For years North Korea has been calling for a peace treaty that would also likely include a call for US troops to leave South Korea.

## Withdrawal of US troops bolsters dialogue on North Korea’s nuclear program:

Donald Kirk, 2010 (staff writer, Reuters), “Rand: 400,000 troops needed to secure N.Korea and its loose nukes.” Jan 25, 2010. Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2010/ea_nkorea0051_01_25.asp>

That demand alone appears to rule out serious dialogue on the North's nuclear program, but the North's demands do not stop there. North Korea also is demanding a peace treaty to replace the Korean War armistice — and setting withdrawal of the 28,500 U.S. troops from the South as a condition.

## A peace treaty with North Korea would revive nuclear disarmament talks with North Korea:

Jon Herskovitz, 2010 (staff writer, Reuters), “North Korea calls for peace treaty to replace armistice.” Jan. 11, 2010. Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60A0QV20100111>

North Korea said on Monday it wants to reach a peace treaty quickly to replace the ceasefire that ended the 1950-53 Korean War in order to build trust with the United States and revive dormant nuclear disarmament talks.

## Peace treaty critical to solving the root cause of hostile relations between the US and North Korea:

Jon Herskovitz, 2010 (staff writer, Reuters), “North Korea calls for peace treaty to replace armistice.” Jan. 11, 2010. Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60A0QV20100111>

North Korea said a few weeks ago it was ready to end its year-long boycott of six-country nuclear talks, but analysts said the North may try to attach conditions to its return to the discussions among the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the United States. "If confidence is to be built between the DPRK (North Korea) and the U.S., it is essential to conclude a peace treaty for terminating the state of war, a root cause of the hostile relations, to begin with," the North's KCNA news agency quoted a Foreign Ministry spokesman as saying.

# \*\*\*\*\*War Will Escalate\*\*\*\*\*

# North Will Escalate

## Any US action against North Korea risks a full scale war on the peninsula:

Doug Bandow, 2009 February 26, 2009 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “Starting the Second Korean War?” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://reason.com/archives/2009/02/26/starting-the-second-korean-war>

Of course, it would be better not to have to rely on deterrence. But a preventive strike would be no cakewalk. If there is insanity at work on the Korean peninsula, it is the assumption that Kim would do nothing if his nation was attacked by the U.S. He might choose inaction, but more likely would see such a strike as the prelude to regime change. In that case the results of the Iraq war would impel him to act first rather than await invasion. America and South Korea would win any war, but the costs would be horrendous.

## North Korea will retaliate against South Korea in response to any US military action:

Doug Bandow, 2009 February 26, 2009 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “Starting the Second Korean War?” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://reason.com/archives/2009/02/26/starting-the-second-korean-war>

Moreover, the DPRK could easily initiate a more limited tit-for-tat retaliation. The South's capital of Seoul lies within easy range of Scud missiles and massed artillery. Even the "optimists" who believe that Seoul could be protected by massive military strikes along the Demilitarized Zone talk about holding casualties to under 100,000. Imagine Pyongyang announcing a limited bombardment in response to the U.S. action, combined with the promise of a ceasefire if the ROK blocked any further American response. Washington's Asian policy would be wrecked along with Seoul.

# \*\*\*\*\*Disad Answers\*\*\*\*\*

# South Korea AFF: No Disads

## All the disads are non-unique: the US has already cut back and moved its troops away from North Korea:

Doug Bandow, March 10, 2007 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “Why are We Still in Korea?.” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://original.antiwar.com/doug-bandow/2007/03/09/why-are-we-still-in-korea/>

Very true. It’s time for Washington to help by ending its defense guarantee to the South. The U.S. has begun reducing troop levels, as well as moving the bulk of its soldiers out of Seoul. Moreover, Washington recently agreed to turn over wartime command responsibility to South Korea in 2012. Indeed, the U.S. was prepared to do so in 2009, but ROK officials, who long had demanded the transfer, feared doing so would leave them vulnerable to a North Korean attack.

# Terrorism DA Answers

## The risk of a full scale nuclear exchange trumps the risk of terrorism:

Doug Bandow, 2008 February 1, 2008 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “GOP lost in defense budget black hole.” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/columns/doug_bandow_gop_lost_in_defense_budget_black_hole2008-02-01T08_00_00.html>

Terrorism, a la 9/11, is horrid, but the potential consequences are nothing like that of even a small nuclear strike. Such terrorism is best met by sophisticated intelligence, international cooperation, law enforcement and special forces rather than huge militaries and preventive wars. The threat of nuclear terrorism or a rogue state missile attack is real — though very unlikely — and must be guarded against. But, again, there is no comparison with the possibility of a full-scale nuclear exchange.

# South Korea Affirmative: AT: Troops Deter China

## US troops in Korea can’t contain China:

Doug Bandow, March 10, 2007 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “Why are We Still in Korea?.” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://original.antiwar.com/doug-bandow/2007/03/09/why-are-we-still-in-korea/>

For some alliance advocates the defense of Korea long ago ceased to be an argument for defending Korea. Instead, they argue that U.S. forces serve a “dual use” function. That is, a garrison that protects the ROK also serves other military purposes in the region. But Japan isn’t going to attack either Korea. It’s hard to imagine Washington sending its Korea-based Army division to hold fractious Indonesia together, restore democracy in Thailand, or battle Burma’s brutal military junta. No one threatens Australia and New Zealand. Rather, the only plausible alternative mission is “containing” China. It’s a dubious goal. There isn’t much that a small American ground contingent could achieve against such a populous and geographically expansive power. Whatever the future course of U.S.-China relations, American participation in a ground war against the PRC seems inconceivable.

## South Korea won’t allow its bases to be used in a strategy to contain China:

Doug Bandow, March 10, 2007 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “Why are We Still in Korea?.” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://original.antiwar.com/doug-bandow/2007/03/09/why-are-we-still-in-korea/>

Nor does the ROK have any interest in becoming a base for U.S. operations against Beijing. Two years ago President Roh stated that Washington would require his government’s permission to use its Korean-based forces elsewhere in the region, and that South Korea would not be drawn into a needless war. Although the conservative opposition might triumph in Korea’s presidential election at the end of the year, the Grand National Party seems no more likely to allow America to turn the ROK’s next door neighbor, a potential regional or global superpower, into a permanent enemy.

# \*\*\*\*\*Counterplan Answers\*\*\*\*\*

# Hardline Counterplan Answers

## Engagement is superior to coercion in efforts to create North Korean disarmament:

Doug **Bandow, 2009** September 15, 2009 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “Engagement with North Korea: A Viable Alternative” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/sep/15/books-us-engagement-with-n-korea-viable/>

North Korea says it wants to deal, but even the Chinese are no longer confident that the nuclear crisis can be resolved diplomatically. Does any basis remain for engagement? Yes, reply the contributors to "Engagement With North Korea." Editors Sung Chull Kim of the Hiroshima Peace Institute and David C. Kang of the University of Southern California note that despite intense debate over policy toward Pyongyang, "there has been little sustained effort either to explore the theoretical logic of engagement or to assess whether or not — and if so in what ways — engagement has worked on the Korean Peninsula." They conclude that "engagement in general is a viable alternative to coercive strategies for inducing North Korean cooperation."

## Coercion and pressure are ineffective against North Korea:

Doug **Bandow, 2009** September 15, 2009 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “Engagement with North Korea: A Viable Alternative” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/sep/15/books-us-engagement-with-n-korea-viable/>

Success of this approach has been limited. Concludes Charles K. Armstrong of Columbia University: "If engagement and 'Sunshine policy' were intended to fundamentally change North Korea in the near term, the policy is clearly overly ambitious. This does not mean, however, that the alternative would have been any better. Coercion and pressure historically have done little to change North Korean behavior."

## Engagement is the only viable strategy with North Korea:

Doug Bandow, 2009 September 15, 2009 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “Engagement with North Korea: A Viable Alternative” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/sep/15/books-us-engagement-with-n-korea-viable/>

Russia's role in peninsula affairs has been modest in recent years and is unlikely to change. Japan's position is more significant, but, as Jung Ho Bae of the Korea Institute for National Unification and Sung Chull Kim point out, Tokyo has been essentially AWOL, focused, for domestic political reasons, on forcing North Korea to account for Japanese citizens kidnapped over the years. Japan's new government should rethink Tokyo's stance. Mr. Kang's concluding essay presents the most fundamental argument for engagement: the lack of a viable alternative. "In large part, engagement was eventually arrived at when it became clear that coercive strategies were unlikely to succeed, and were unlikely to gain the support of critical actors," he writes. That remains the case today.

# Hardline Counterplan Answers

## China won’t come on board to any sanctions regime against North Korea:

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The role of the People's Republic of China, too, is critical. Stephan M. Haggard of the University of California at San Diego and Marcus Noland of the Institute for International Economics review Pyongyang's economic relationships and find that capital inflows have been rising since 2005, largely from South Korean aid and Chinese trade. Mr. Haggard and Mr. Noland emphasize that "sanctions are not likely to be effective in the absence of coordination." However, such coordination is unlikely because China's objectives are not the same as those in Washington or Seoul. Argues Fei-Ling Wang of the Georgia Institute of Technology: "Beijing prefers the continued survival of [North Korea] for its political and strategic needs." Although "Nominally supporting Korean unification, [China] seeks to maintain the political status quo and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula," he adds.

## China is unwilling to squeeze North Korea:

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It still might be possible to recruit Beijing in a more coordinated campaign against North Korea, but the United States and its allies would have to persuade China that it is in the latter's interest to squeeze Pyongyang — no easy task.