**GDI Scholars – SoKo Aff Wave 1**

\_\_\_\*\*1AC 3

1AC 4

1AC 5

1AC 6

1AC 7

1AC 8

1AC 9

1AC 10

1AC 11

1AC 12

1AC 13

1AC 14

1AC 15

1AC 16

1AC 17

\_\_\*\*Plan 17

1AC 18

1AC 19

\_\_\_\*\*Japan 20

1AC Cards 21

1AC Cards 22

Collapse Inevitable – Basing 23

Internals – Dependence 24

IL – Plan 🡪 Independent Japan 25

IL – Plan 🡪 Independent Japan 26

IL – Plan 🡪 Independent Japan 27

IL – Plan 🡪 Independent Japan 28

IL – Plan 🡪 SDFs 29

Internals – Signal 30

Impacts – Independence S Asia\*\* 31

Impact – END 🡪 Nuclear War 32

Impact – North Korea 33

AT: Appeasement DA 34

AT: A9 Amendment Solves 35

AT: Iraq Deployment S 36

\_\_\_\*\*North Korea 37

1AC Cards 38

1AC Cards 39

1AC Cards 40

UQ – Conflict Inevitable 41

UQ – Conflict Inevitable 42

UQ – Punishment Inevitable 43

UQ – SoKo Wants War 44

UQ – SoKo Wants War 45

UQ – Troop Strength Up 46

UQ – War Games 47

IL – Border Skirmishes 🡪 War 48

IL – Nuclear Deterrence 49

IL – Nuclear Deterrence 50

IL – Nuclear Deterrence 51

IL – SoKo Aggressivity 52

IL – Troops 🡪 Escalation 53

Impact – PGS 54

Impact – WMD Use 55

Impact – WMD Use 56

END Fails 57

END Fails 58

END Fails 59

AT: 6 Party Solves 60

AT: Alt Cause – SoKo Conflict 61

AT: Alt Cause – SoKo Conflict 62

AT: Diplomacy Solves 63

AT: No Nuclear Response 64

AT: North Korea Cheats 65

AT: NPR Solves 66

AT: Regime Collapse 67

\_\_\_\*\*Solvency 68

1AC Cards 69

1AC Cards 70

1AC Cards 71

Plan 🡪 Re-Unification 72

S Mech – Cut Troops, Keep Bases 73

S Mech – Reduce to 15,000 74

SOFA = NM 75

AT: Plan Violates SOFA 76

AT: Transition Conflict 77

\_\_\_\*\*2ACs Against Common Generics 78

2AC – Obama Good 79

2AC – Japan Prolif DA 80

2AC – Japan Prolif DA 81

2AC – Japan Prolif DA 82

2AC – Japan Prolif DA 83

2AC – Japan Prolif DA 84

2AC – Lee Cred DA 85

2AC – QPQ CP 87

2AC – QPQ CP 88

2AC – QPQ CP 89

SoKo Wins the War – 2AC 90

SoKo Wins the War – 2AC 91

SoKo Wins the War – 2AC 92

\_\_\_\*\*2AC Add-On – Troop Shift 93

Troop Shift – Drug War 94

Troop Shift – Econ 95

Troop Shift – Iraq 96

\_\_\_\*\*2AC Add-On – US-ROK Relations 97

US-ROK – Top Shelf 98

US-ROK – Top Shelf 99

US-ROK – Econ Impact 100

US-ROK – UQ 101

US-ROK – UQ 102

\_\_\_\*\*Neg 103

Deter Good 104

Peace Treaty CP 105

\_\_\_\*\*1AC

1AC

**ADVANTAGE ONE is NORTH KOREA –**

**Korean tension at an all time high – US troops are at high alert**

**Korea Times 10** [May 28, Korea Times, Lexis]

**Inter-Korean tension has been escalating to the brink of** **military engagement. Korea and the United States are planning a military exercise off the West Coast. U.S. stealth bombers are on a standby at Japanese and Guam airbases, ready for a strike on any point in the North within one hour.** **The North threatened to destroy loudspeakers the South is installing to resume anti-**[**Kim Jong-il**](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9462601714&returnToId=20_T9462601745&csi=174045&A=0.05357799748347214&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE0009XP1%23&searchTerm=Kim%20Jong-il%20&indexType=P) **psychological warfare on the DMZ. This attack will provoke counterattacks from the South.All inter-Korean agreements have been scrapped and all hot lines suspended, even including Red Cross contacts. The situation looks more serious now than in 1994. At that time, tensions between the United States and** **North Korea reached a point of an armed conflict over Pyongyang's nuclear program.**

**These events lock in the US force commitment to South Korea**

**Pomfret 10 [John, Stanford and Nanjing University degrees, Recipient Osborne Elliot Award May 25, The Washington Post, Lexis]**

**The** [**Obama administration**](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9469551353&returnToId=20_T9469572249&csi=10962&A=0.6955848829366236&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0BO%23&searchTerm=Obama%20administration%20&indexType=P) **announced Monday that it would bolster South Korea's defenses and initiate joint military exercises with Seoul because of growing tensions** with the North over the sinking of one of South Korea's warships. In twin announcements, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and the White House said U.S. **forces in South Korea had been directed to "coordinate closely with their Korean counterparts to ensure readiness and to deter future aggression."** "**U.S. support for South Korea's defense is unequivocal," the White House statement said.** Seoul has steered clear of threatening specific military retaliation since blaming the North for the March 26 attack on its warship -- which left 46 South Korean sailors dead. Still, **moves by the South and the United States make clear that they are including a significant military component in their response.** **South Korean Defense Minister Kim Tae-young said Monday that his country would launch a joint anti-submarine military exercise with the United States** and join a U.S.-led anti-proliferation program, known as the Proliferation of Security Initiative, that South Korea had previously been reluctant to take part in to avoid provoking the North. In addition, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak vowed that his country's military would learn from the mistakes that allowed what was thought to be a North Korean mini-submarine to approach the Cheonan and split it in two with a torpedo. **"The discipline of the armed forces will be reestablished, military reform efforts will be expedited and combat capabilities will be reinforced drastically,"** Lee said in a speech to the nation Monday. He said that **the U.S.-Korean military alliance -- almost 29,000 U.S. troops are deployed in South Korea -- would be strengthened.**

**This isn’t a game – North Korea will wage all out war**

**New Zealand Herald 10 [May 20 The New Zealand Herald Lexis]**

**North Korea warns that it will wage "all-out war" if punished for the sinking of a South Korean warship. The White House is calling the sinking of the warship by North Korea in March an act of aggression that constitutes a challenge to international peace and security. The US backed South Korea and vowed to support Seoul "in its defence against further acts of aggression".** President Barack Obama's press secretary issued a statement today after South Korea released a report concluding that the warship Cheonan was sunk by a torpedo fired by the North. In the White House statement, press secretary **Robert Gibbs says the attack is one more instance of North Korea's unacceptable behaviour and defiance of international law.** Evidence overwhelmingly proves North Korea fired a torpedo that sank a South Korean warship, killing 46 sailors, investigators said earlier today.

1AC

Conflict would inevitably draw the US in

**Bandow 10** (Doug, 4/18, former assistant to Ronald Reagan and fellow at Cato Institute, Huffington Post, “Let the Koreans Take Care of the Koreas, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/let-the-koreans-take-care\_b\_542141.html)

If a torpedo was used, however, the threat of conflict rises. **The Republic of Korea could not easily ignore a North Korean submarine stalking and sinking one of its vessels. Seoul has promised "a firm response**," though, argues Han Sung-joo, a former ROK foreign minister and U.S. ambassador, "that doesn't mean a military reaction or an eye-for-eye response." In fact, the South did not retaliate after earlier provocations, such as the terrorist bombing of a South Korean airliner and assassination attempt against former president Chun Doo-hwan which killed 16 ROK officials. **A military reprisal then could have triggered a full-scale war. Responding in kind this time also could spark a dangerous escalatory spiral with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. However, Seoul has spent the last decade attempting to pacify the DPRK, providing aid, allowing investment, and hosting summits. To do nothing would seem to be abject appeasement, undermining ROK credibility and encouraging the North to act even more recklessly in the future. I**f the word "firm" has any meaning, the South Korean government would have to do more than protest. **Still, the decision, though difficult, shouldn't concern the U.S. The South has gone from an authoritarian economic wreck to a democratic economic powerhouse. With a vastly bigger and more sophisticated economy, larger population, and greater access to international markets and support than the North, Seoul long has been able to defend itself. Pyongyang retains a numerical military edge, but its weapons are old, troops are undertrained, and industrial base is shrinking. Thus, the South should be able to decide on the action that best advances its security**. However, **Seoul long chose to emphasize economic development over military preparedness. As a result, the ROK remains dependent on America**. Some 27,000 U.S. personnel are stationed in the South. **The U.S. retains formal command of all forces, American and South Korean, during a war. Seoul expects substantial U.S. air and naval support and ground reinforcement in the event of war.** **Which means that ROK retaliation against the DPRK would draw the U.S. into any conflict. So Washington cannot help but pressure South Korean decision-makers to act in accord with American as well as ROK interests**. In fact, that's what happened in 1983, when the U.S. insisted that Seoul not retaliate militarily after the bombing attack on President Chun. **The current situation also means that the destiny of America is essentially controlled by the North's Kim Jong-il. Ordering an attack on a South Korean ship could end up forcing Washington to go to war.** **Although the bilateral U.S.-South Korean defense treaty does not make American intervention automatic, it is unimaginable that an American administration would stand aside in a conflict.** This is a ludicrous position for both the U.S. and South Korea, six decades after Washington saved a far weaker ROK from a North Korean invasion in the midst of the Cold War. **Neither country is well-served by Seoul's continuing defense dependency on America**. Unfortunately, the policy incongruities only are likely to worsen. The ROK desires to wield increasing influence beyond its own shores. While relying on American military forces to defend its homeland, the South Korean government is crafting its navy for more distant contingencies and deploying ground personnel in the Middle East and Central Asia. Yet Seoul found that when the enemy struck at home, assuming the Cheonan was sunk by the North, the South Korean military was ill-prepared to defend its own personnel.

1AC

**All options are on the table, including US nuclear first use**

**Daley 10 [Tad, April 9, CASMII, http://www.campaigniran.org/casmii/index.php?q=node/9759]**

**Although Gates said the NPR did pledge that America would not attack or threaten non-nuclear weapon states with nuclear weapons, he indicated that states "not in compliance with the NPT," specifically** naming **North Korea** and Iran, **had been placed by the drafters of the NPR in an entirely different category.** For these states, he said, three times, **"all options are on the table." Such words can have only one meaning. The Obama Administration has now said to North Korea** and Iran, **"If you do not do what we tell you to do, we may launch a nuclear first strike upon you."**

North Korea would retaliate – it would be an all-out conflict

**Fagge 10 [Nick, Staff Writer, March 27, The Express News, Lexis]**

**FEARS of an all-out conflict between North and South Korea grew last night after a ship was sunk in a suspected torpedo attack**. Early reports suggested that only 58 of the South Korean naval vessel's 104-strong crew had been saved. After the ship went down, the South Korean navy fired on an unidentified ship in the Yellow Sea, close to North Korea. The incident took place on a disputed sea boundary that has been the scene of numerous incidents, most recently in January and February. Clashes took place in 2002 but these were not as serious as a border dispute in 1999 that left up to 80 North Korean sailors dead after an exchange of gunfire. There are now fears that the latest incident in worsening relations between the two countries could plunge them into war. An emergency meeting of security officials was called by South Korea's President Lee Myung-bak in the capital Seoul. However South Korea was careful not to confirm reports that the attack was by forces controlled by North Korean dictator Kim Jong-il. Kim Jong-il. A spokesman said: "It is not clear whether North Korea was involved." **The dramatic escalation of the conflict comes after North Korea warned it was bolstering its defences in response to joint military operations held by South Korea and America**. **North Korea had already threatened nuclear strikes against the US and South Korea over claims they were trying to topple Kim Jong-il's communist regime.**

This conflict escalates into maximum destruction

**Chol ‘99**, Executive Director of Center for Korean-American Peace, Kim Myong, “US-DPRK Will End Up in Shotgun Marriage,” Policy Forum Online, October 22, <http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/9907G_Kim.html>.

Kim Jong Il, often called North Korea's David, did not flinch from standing up to the military muscle of the world's super-Goliath, the United States. Kim Jong Il had already built up a lethal war machine capable of wreaking unprecedented havoc on the American mainland at a minute's notice. Kim Jong Il is sure of the huge capability of his military. It would take the Korean People's Army as few as several minutes to wipe out off the world map the whole of South Korea and the entire Japanese archipelago. Significantly absent from the Perry report is a mention of the real threat of any new war in Korea instantly expanding into nuclear war, with 12 operating nuclear reactors in the ROK, 51 reactors in Japan and 102 in the United States singled out as prime targets. However, the Perry report noted that a new war would be fought on the world's most densely populated and industrialized areas, unlike the Gulf War and the Yugoslavia war. Resumption of hostilities in Korea would spell an abrupt end to the present unprecedented economic prosperity the Americans are enjoying. It would leave South Korea and Japan smoking in Stone-Age ruins. Forward military bases, AEGIS ships, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, submarines and cruise missiles would be of little operational value in safeguarding the American mainland from nuclear holocaust. Moreover, dozens, hundreds of Chernobyls will inevitably break out in South Korea, Japan and the United States.

1AC

**Withdrawing our nuclear umbrella causes China to pressure North Korea – indigenous South Korean forces are key**

Doug **Bandow, ‘9.** Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and a former Special Assistant to President Reagan. “A Tattered Umbrella” CATO, June 16, 2009, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10293>.

Such a "dual use" capability would benefit the United States as well. The objective would not be a high-profile attempt at containment, but a low-profile capacity for deterrence, relieving Washington of any need to intervene. Most important, **America should not reflexively extend its "nuclear umbrella" in response to the future possibility of a nuclear North Korea. Doing so would inevitably deepen American involvement in regional controversies, potentially turning every local dispute into an international crisis**. Moreover, while such a policy might seem to be a convenient and cheap means of protecting friends while discouraging proliferation, **it would become problematic once another nation gained the ability to strike the United States.** If North Korea eventually marries a nuclear weapon to a long-range missile, Pyongyang still won't strike America. Kim Jong-il is evil, not stupid; he wants his virgins in this life, not the next. However**, such a weapon would give him a deterrent capability, modest though it might be, diminishing the credibility of Washington's threat to intervene. The question would become: for what are American policy makers willing to sacrifice Los Angeles**? Seoul and Tokyo? Sydney and Taipei? Jakarta and Bangkok? All of them? **Even if the risk was small, the cost would be catastrophic. And the U.S. government's principal responsibility is to protect American lives, not to guarantee the security of foreign lands. Adopting a policy inviting a nuclear attack on the American homeland violates that duty**. **Offering nuclear guarantees also diminishes the threat** — to North Korea and China — **of America's friends developing independent nuclear deterrents. Far better for Washington to indicate that it is not inclined to leave the DPRK with a nuclear monopoly among smaller powers in East Asia.** **While the United States would not encourage its allies to exercise the nuclear option, it should suggest that it would not stop them.** Pyongyang might not mind the further spread of nuclear weapons, but **Beijing certainly would not relish the prospect of** Japan, and even worse **Taiwan, exercising the nuclear option. Even if the PRC was not certain that Washington was serious, it would have an incentive to bring greater pressure on the North. And that, of course, is the ultimate goal: halt proliferation to the DPRK.** Whether America and allied states would want to go down this path if Pyongyang proceeded unimpeded could be addressed then. **But a written pledge now by Washington to defend South Korea against a nuclear North would eliminate perhaps the most powerful way of sharing the nuclear nightmare with China, and thus encouraging it to act against North Korea.** There's nothing unusual about American officials pledging to protect the South. Last month, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated: "I want to underscore the commitments the United States has and intends always to honor for the defense of South Korea and Japan." But the justification of such a policy long ago disappeared. **Washington should devolve responsibility for the ROK's defense to the ROK. Seoul can protect itself against conventional threats. South Korea could respond to nuclear weapons in the North by raising the possibility of building a countervailing nuclear capability**. That's not a good solution. But it might prove to be the best of a bunch of bad options.

1AC

**South Korea’s military policy is tied to the US—withdrawal would strip the ROK of its power**

**Bandow 5** (Doug, former assistant to Ronald Reagan and fellow at Cato Institute, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m2751/is\_81/ai\_n15753425/pg\_6/?tag=content;col1)

IT SHOULD come as no surprise that the majority of South Koreans, who most obviously benefit from their defense free-ride, oppose proposals for America to withdraw its troops and end its security guarantee. However**, there are good reasons for South Koreans to be dissatisfied with the current relationship. The price of the American guarantee is turning decisions about South Korea's defense over to Washington.** For many decades, this was not a grave concern for South Koreans, especially when it appeared that war with the North was inevitable if the United States left the peninsula. Today, however, peace on the Korean Peninsula is possible apart from the Mutual Defense Treaty. Far more important, **South Koreans are finding that they are much more risk averse than the United States**--as represented by both the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations--**in terms of engaging in military adventures in the region.** Moreover, **objections from South Korea might not sway the United States from its chosen course**. Attitudes toward the North now diverge widely. The reasons are complex, but many South Koreans, in particular younger people, view North Koreans more as long-lost brothers than long-time enemies. Hostility toward America also has risen, as the older generation, which remembers the United States fondly for having intervened to prevent North Korean conquest in 1950, passes on. In contrast, young people are more likely to think of Washington's support for assorted military dictators. Finally, **with Seoul barely 25 miles from the North Korean border, ROK leaders and citizens alike are acutely aware of their vulnerability in any conflict, even though the allies would ultimately prevai**l. South Koreans could not have been reassured when, in early 2004, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator Richard G. Lugar (R-IN) contended that the United States should "not rule out any options, including--as a last resort--the use of force" to deal with North Korea or other regional threats. Even blunter was Senator John McCain's (R-AZ) statement: "While they may risk their populations, the United States will do whatever it must to guarantee the security of the American people. And spare us the usual lectures about American unilateralism. We would prefer the company of North Korea's neighbors, but we will make do without it if we must." **So long as American forces are based in the South, Washington will seek to dominate and control the alliance. Real equality is simply impossible. Seoul cannot escape being tied to U.S. policy, even if it tries to disassociate itself from Washington. Imagine the imposition of sanctions, enforcement of a blockade or military strikes on the North--conducted by American forces located beyond South Korea's borders and acting outside of South Korea's borders over the objections of the ROK**. North Korea is unlikely to distinguish the positions of the two members of the Mutual Defense Pact and is likely to view the South as an appropriate target of retaliation. Other dangers also await the South if it continues to tie itself to American defense policy. The most important future international relationship may well be that between the United States and China. Can Beijing peacefully assert itself on the East Asian and global stage, and can the United States accommodate itself to a more influential China? Is the ROK willing to risk its survival as a prosperous and independent nation by getting in between those two powers? This is why the relationship between the United States and South Korea must change. There is much the United States and ROK can do in the coming years to cooperate to encourage South Korean and regional security. The SPI talks should focus on refashioning the relationship to fit today's dramatically new security environment. Most important, **they should begin with the presumption that Seoul will begin taking over responsibility for its own defense. Rather than maintaining a formal commitment to defend the South from North Korea** (or China, for that matter), **Washington should pursue more limited forms of defense cooperation advantageous to both sides**. Cooperation on missile defense would be one such step. Another would be joint naval training and maneuvers to prepare for future contingencies, such as seizure of illicit North Korean weapons shipments. **Arrangements also should be made for emergency base access, should American support be needed to thwart a serious hegemonic threat beyond the capacity of friendly regional states to contain**. In 1971, Prime Minister Kim Jongpil responded to the Nixon Administration's partial withdrawal by stating: "**Now is no time to survive by depending on others--U.S. troops in our country will go home sooner or later, which means that we must defend our country through our own strength."** **Surely that time is now, thereby freeing the American people from a commitment that** costs far more than it is worth, absorbs valuable military resources, and **keeps the Korean people in a dependent relationship that insults their nationhood and puts their destiny in another country's hands. Only then can South Korea and the United States decide on the contours of future military cooperation that will serve both nations**.

1AC

**ADVANTAGE TWO is JAPAN –**

**Removing troops from South Korea shifts the focus of the alliance and causes a more assertive, independent Japanese force structure**

Cronin 5 (Richard, Specialist in Asian Affairs, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs Vol. 29 No. 1, <http://www.stimson.org/southeastasia/pdf/Cronin_The_North_Korean_Nuclear_Threat_and%20the_US_Japan_Security_Alliance.pdf>)

The U.S. Defense Department’s plan for the “transformation and realignment” of U.S. forces worldwide has created some nervousness in both Japan and South Korea despite the potential domestic political benefits of reducing the burden of U.S. bases on local communities. The main concern of Japan, which is shared by some in the South Korean government, relates to rumors of American force reductions that could signal a shift of focus away from the longstanding U.S. role of deterring conflict and reinforcing security in Northeast Asia. U.S. officials and senior military officers insist that any force reductions will be more than compensated for by increasing the mobility and lethality of remaining forces. Some Japanese officials and commentators, however, are not completely persuaded by these reassurances. Analysts have noted that unlike in Europe, where the Pentagon is drawing down and realigning forces that are no longer relevant in a post-Cold War environment, potential flash points such as the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits continue to represent active threats to peace. These observers note that given the lack of any collective security framework in Asia, the U.S. bilateral alliance system remains the lynchpin of regional stability and security. In general, the Japanese government has indicated cautious support for proposed changes in the American command structure and deployments in Japan and South Korea. At the same time, however, the Koizumi government also appears to have some unresolved concerns about the larger portents of reconfiguring U.S. forces for new challenges arising out of the threat of global terrorism and proliferation. A struggle has emerged between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Japan Defense Agency over whether the new National Defense Program Outline, scheduled for adoption by the end of 2004, should include a parallel “transformation” of Japanese forces to facilitate their deployment outside the traditional boundaries of the “Far East,” as referenced in the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The same concern about the boundaries of the alliance has caused some in the Japanese government to resist a Pentagon proposal to relocate the headquarters of the 1st Army Corps, currently at Fort Lewis in Washington state, to Camp Zama, about 25 miles southwest of Tokyo. The camp currently houses the several U.S. Army headquarters elements as well as Japanese ground forces units. Reportedly, Japanese officials are concerned about the broader implications of hosting a U.S. military command that is responsible for missions beyond the area covered by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Some argue that this arrangement could transgress the limits of the prevailing constitutional interpretation banning participation in “collective defense” arrangements. The Paradox of Managing U.S.-Japan Alliance Cooperation on North Korea and Broader Security Threats The United States faces something of a paradox. On one hand, alliance cooperation has never been closer or more extensive, and Japan continues to remove legal and policy barriers to support for U.S. forces in combat situations. On the other hand, Japan also has never been more materially and psychologically prepared to become a “normal” country, since the concept was first proposed by a prominent nationalist politician, Ichiro Ozawa, in the early 1990s, to develop an independent defense and power projection capability. Japan’s concerns about a rising China have also caused nervousness about any indication that the United States might find a “strategic” partnership with Beijing in the U.S. interest. Already, a number of Japanese analysts have warned that the maintenance of the U.S.-Japan alliance for more than five decades is unprecedented. On the other hand, the October 2004 report of the Prime Minister’s Advisory Commission on Defense Capabilities and indications of the contents of the new National Defense Program Outline covering the period 2005 to 2009, continue to emphasize the absolute necessity of maintaining Japanese defense policy on the basis of the U.S.-Japan alliance. These trends and indicators suggest that alliance relations could go in two very different directions, depending on how well the United States manages its current opportunity to forge a closer and more effective alliance. In the near term, the problem of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and other WMD is likely to be the crucible in which the vitality of the alliance is determined. In the longer term, greater Japanese security activism appears to be taking on a life of its own. That is, the expanded role and operational freedom that has been given to the Japanese military in response to Japan’s concerns about keeping the United States attentive to its interests regarding North Korea has acquired momentum that is not necessarily connected with any specific threat or conflict scenario. The Japanese challenge, at the moment, is to acquire the political will and cross-ministry cooperation to forge a new national strategy that reflects not only the need to maintain a strong alliance with the United States, but that also one that is comprehensive with respect to the totality of Japan economic, diplomatic, and military interests.

1AC

Withdrawing forces in Asia sends a signal to Japan that they cannot depend on the US indefinitely, spurring military assertiveness throughout Asia

Carpenter 95 (Ted Galen, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Paternalism And Dependence: The U.S.-Japanese Security Relationship, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-244.html>)

Even worse, Washington's policy encourages a dependent mentality on the part of the Japanese and enables Tokyo to evade political and military responsibilities in East Asia even when Japan has important interests at stake. Japanese officials confirm that, in the event of war, Japanese military units would not join U.S. forces in combat operations unless Japan itself were attacked. U.S. leaders foolishly perpetuate Japan's security dependence. Washington's East Asian policy is held hostage to the exaggerated fears of Japan's neighbors, who oppose a more active military role for Tokyo. A lingering undercurrent of distrust toward Japan in U.S. policy circles has also been a major motive for Washington's "smothering" strategy. A new policy is badly needed. It would seek a mature relationship between equals and recognize that Japan, as the principal great power in East Asia, must take a more significant role in the region's security affairs. The United States should withdraw its forces from East Asia over the next five years and keep smaller forces based in Guam and other U.S. territories. The U.S.-Japanese alliance ought to be replaced by a more limited, informal security relation- ship. America should be the balancer of last resort, not the intervenor of first resort, in East Asia's security equation. Introduction Critics have long charged that Washington's military commitments to wealthy allies in Western Europe and East Asia encourage those nations to "free ride" on the U.S. security guarantee. The accuracy of such allegations was demonstrated with unusual clarity in early 1995 when Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye unveiled his department's latest East Asia strategy report, which affirmed that the United States would keep approximately 100,000 troops in East Asia indefinitely.(1) Five days later Japan's Kyodo News Service announced that the Japanese government hoped to reduce its troop levels and weapons by approximately 20 percent and cut military spending over the next five years.(2) Those two events indicate that incentives matter just as much in international affairs as they do in domestic affairs. Given the threat environment in East Asia--North Korea's attempt to acquire nuclear weapons, China's increasingly assertive behavior, and the continuing political instability in Russia--it is unlikely that Tokyo would decide to cut its already modest military forces and budgets were it not for Washington's willingness to underwrite Japan's defense. The attitude expressed in an editorial in the influential Asahi Shimbun, that Japan should "aim at being a conscientious-objector nation," would be difficult to sustain if Japan had to be responsible for its own safety.(3) Hisahiko Okazaki, Japan's former ambassador to Thailand, described a more probable reaction. If the U.S. alliance did not exist and Japan's survival were at stake, "because of a threat from the Russians, the North Koreans, or the Chinese," Okazaki stated, Japan would build a strong military force for itself.(4) Just as domestic welfare expenditures foster an unhealthy dependent mentality and discourage initiative on the part of recipients, so too do international military welfare subsidies. Nye's announcement reassured Japanese officials that it was safe for their country to continue its free-riding habits.

1AC

TWO IMPACTS – FIRST IS REGIONAL STABILITY

Independent Japanese forces are the most effective route to conflict stability in Asia

**Carpenter, ‘2** [Ted, Galen, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, “Japan Takes a Modest Step Toward Global Security” CATO, 1-8-2002, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3364>]

**The standard argument against Japan playing a more active military role is that it would upset its neighbors in East Asia.** The nations of that region, it is said, still remember the outrages committed by imperial Japan during the 1920s and 1930s and would react badly to any manifestations of "Japanese militarism." **But that argument oversimplifies reality.** True, a few countries (most notably South Korea) are still paranoid about Japan. China also opposes any military role for Japan. Indeed, if Beijing had its way, the Japanese SDF would not even exist. But **China's strident objections are self-serving;** **PRC officials realize that an** active, **assertive Japan would be a major obstacle to Beijing's own ambitions** to become the dominant power in the region. **Other East Asian countries are beginning to mute their objections to Japan playing a more active security role.** Successive Australian governments have said that the time has come to bury the fears about renewed Japanese militarism. Singapore earlier this year offered Tokyo the use of its naval facilities -- a strong signal that it accepts the reality that Japan no longer poses a threat. Similar accommodating statements have been emanating from the Philippines over the past year. **Those changes are gratifying. They show a recognition that the era of Japanese imperialism ended more than a half century ago, and that** 21st century **Japan bears no resemblance to the rapacious, expansionist Japan of that earlier era. Modern Japan is a conservative**, status quo **power that would be a stabilizing force against aggression, not a source of aggression. Japan needs to seize the opportunity afforded by the changing attitude of its neighbors. It is time for the SDF to play a realistic security role in East Asia** and beyond. **No rational person would object if Tokyo provided combat forces for the struggle against** Osama bin Laden and his **terrorists.** It is time for Japan to fully rejoin the ranks of the great powers. And **the United States needs to help with that transition. U.S. officials have** not only **allowed Japan to get away with free riding on the U.S. security guarantee**, they have openly discouraged Japan from venturing beyond the status of being Washington's logistical helpmate. **That attitude must be discarded. U.S. leaders ought to make it clear to Japan -**- and to that country's neighbors -- **that Washington no longer objects to Japan's playing a full-fledged security role. Indeed, the United States should state explicitly that it expects Japan to do so.**

**Nuclear instability in Asia outweighs – lack of certainty, presence of great powers, number of actors, entrenched nature of conflict and no conflict-depressing norms**

Paul **Dibb, ‘1**. Prof – Australian National University, Strategic Trends: Asia at a Crossroads, Naval War College Review, Winter 2001, http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review...r/art2-w01.htm

**The areas of maximum danger and instability in the world today are in Asia**, followed by the Middle East and parts of the former Soviet Union. **The strategic situation in Asia is more uncertain** and potentially threatening than anywhere in Europe. Unlike in Europe, **it is possible to envisage war in Asia involving the major powers: remnants of Cold War ideological confrontation still exist across the Taiwan Straits and on the Korean Peninsula; India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and these two countries are more confrontational than at any time since the early 1970s**; in Southeast Asia, Indonesia—which is the world’s fourth-largest country—faces a highly uncertain future that could lead to its breakup. The Asia-Pacific region spends more on defense (about $150 billion a year) than any other part of the world except the United States and Nato Europe. China and Japan are amongst the top four or five global military spenders. **Asia also has more nuclear powers than any other region of the world. Asia’s security is at a crossroads**: the region could go in the direction of peace and cooperation, or it could slide into confrontation and military conflict. There are positive tendencies, including the resurgence of economic growth and the spread of democracy, which would encourage an optimistic view. But there are a number of negative tendencies that must be of serious concern. **There are deep-seated historical, territorial, ideological, and religious differences in Asia. Also, the region has no history of successful multilateral security cooperation or arms control**. Such multilateral institutions as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the ASEAN Regional Forum have shown themselves to be ineffective when confronted with major crises.

1AC

**The only scenario for escalating Asian conflicts is in a world of US security assurances**

Joel S **Wit, ’10**. Visiting Fellow, U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS, “Four Scenarios for a Nuclear North Korea,” Februrary, <http://uskoreainstitute.org/pdf/WP-NK_Future/USKI_WP10-01_Wit.pdf>.

Overall, while this scenario would represent a serious setback to efforts to establish peace and stability in Northeast Asia, **predictions that a nuclear North Korea would trigger a downward spiral in the regional security environment appear far from certain. A strong U.S. alliance commitment to South Korea** and Japan **would reduce the risk that the worst case** “nuclear dominos” scenario **would emerge, although there would probably be an erosion of political and other barriers preventing those dominos from falling.** Nevertheless, the combination of political, economic **and security measures taken by Washing- ton and its allies in response to a nuclear North could trigger new tensions and instability. A critical factor in controlling the level of tension will be efforts taken by the U.S. and its allies to carefully manage political relationships in the region among the key players**, particularly efforts to work in close cooperation with China.

SECOND is TAIWAN CONFLICT –

An independent Japan prevents Taiwan conflict by restricting the Chinese sphere of influence

**Preble, ‘6** [Christopher, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, “Two Normal CountriesRethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” CATO Policy Analysis, April 18, 2006, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf>]

But **lingering hostility toward** and suspicion of North Korea **in the near term** pale in comparison **with Japanese concerns over the** medium to **long term with respect to** a rising **China. Beijing is exerting greater influence** in the political, economic, and diplomatic realms **and** simultaneously **threatening to use force against Taiwan** if the island proceeds on its current path toward greater independence. **Japan would look upon Chinese annexation of Taiwan as a national security threat**, but it is less clear how it would respond to more subtle Chinese challenges to Japanese economic and security interests in and around Taiwan. **The trajectory of China’s rise to regional prominence threatens to collide with both Japanese and American interests. The open question is whether all three countries will be able to establish a new strategic balance or whether competition** for influence in East Asia **will lead to a clash that could threaten the lives of hundreds of millions of people on both sides of the Pacific.** According to Eugene Matthews, a former senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and now president of the international educational firm Nintai, Japan’s growing self-reliance is indicative of resurgent nationalism. Matthews urges that U.S. policy be directed at blocking such sentiments, or at least attempting to channel them in a particular direction.3 But it is hardly unreasonable for Japan to seek some measure of independence from the United States.4 A desire that one’s country be capable of defending itself might be a sign of nationalism, but if it is, it is no different from the nationalism expressed by the United Kingdom and dozens of other countries that have maintained a robust defensive capability in spite of security assurances from the United States. Fortunately, the Bush administration has encouraged a more assertive stance on the part of the Japanese government, even at the risk of arousing regional fears of a resurgent Japan. Although such fears cannot be dismissed entirely, **both the U**nited **S**tates **and Japan should continue their efforts to establish Japan as an independent pole of power in East Asia, a “normal country” that is no longer dependent on a distant patron for its defense.**

1AC

**Taiwan is the most likely scenario for global nuclear escalation**

**Ikegami, ‘8**. Dr. Masako, Professor of Sociology and Peace & Conflict Studies and Director of the Center for Pacific Asia Studies – Stockholm University “Time for Conflict Prevention Across the Taiwan Strait”, China Brief, 8(7), 3-28, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no\_cache=1&tx\_ttnews[tt\_news]=4822](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=4822))

Indeed, a **cross-Strait conflict is potentially one of the most dangerous conflicts involving two major nuclear powers, in which the risk of escalation, in the worst case, cannot exclude strategic nuclear exchange**. Thus, it is understandable that many countries make such a statement of “neutrality” or remain bystanders. **The location of Taiwan**, however, **in the midst of** the **vital** sea lines of communications (**SLOCs), any level of armed conflict will inevitably envelop an international affair with global consequences, economically, politically and militarily. By nature, a cross-Strait conflict cannot be a limited theatre of war**. Therefore, it would greatly improve conflict prevention if NATO could at a minimum maintain its own version of “strategic ambiguity” to make Beijing’s calculation of using force more difficult, less optimistic, and thereby more prudent [9]. The recent large-scale naval exercise conducted by the United States, Japanese, Australian, Indian and Singaporean navies in September 2007 might have aimed at such a signalling effect toward China. It will also be constructive if Europe, together with other Western countries, were to make Beijing understand **that any armed attack on Taiwan would lead to worldwide criticism and boycotts of Chinese products.**

1AC

**END makes Taiwan the deadliest war imaginable**

**Johnson, ‘1.** Chalmers, President – Japan Policy Research Institute, “Time to Bring the Troops Home”, The Nation, 4-26, <http://ieas.berkeley.edu/cks/k12/girling_troops.doc>.

**In East Asia, the United States maintains massive and expensive military forces poised to engage in** everything from **nuclear war** to sabotage of governments that Washington finds inconvenient (for example, the government of former President Suharto in Indonesia, which in May 1998 the US government helped to bring down via troops its Special Forces had trained). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the United States still deploys some 100,000 military personnel and close to an equal number of civilian workers and dependents in Japan and South Korea. These forces include the Third Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa and Japan; the Second Infantry Division in South Korea; numerous Air Force squadrons in both countries (Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa is the largest US military installation outside the United States); the Seventh Fleet, with its headquarters in Yokosuka, Japan, patrolling the China coast and anywhere else that it wants to go; and innumerable submarine pens (for example, White Beach, Okinawa), support facilities, clandestine eavesdropping and intelligence-collecting units, Special Forces and staff and headquarters installations all over the Pacific. From approximately 1950 to 1990, the US government invoked the cold war to justify these so-called forward deployments--actually, in less euphemistic language, imperialist outposts. During the late 1940s, when it became apparent that the Chinese Communist Party was going to win the Chinese civil war, the United States reversed its policy of attempting to democratize occupied Japan and devoted itself to making Japan Washington's leading satellite in East Asia. The United States entered into an informal economic bargain with Japan: In return for Japan's willingness to tolerate the indefinite deployment of US weapons and troops on its soil, the United States would give it preferential access to the American market and would tolerate its protectionism and mercantilism. These were advantages the United States did not extend to its European allies or Latin American neighbors in the cold war. Oddly enough, this policy is still in effect some fifty-four years after it was first implemented. In return for hosting 40,000 US troops and an equal number of dependents in ninety-one US-controlled bases, Japan still has privileged access to the US economy and still maintains protectionist barriers against US sales and investment in the Japanese market. The overall results of this policy became apparent in the 1970s and led to acute problems for the US economy in the 1980s--namely, huge excess manufacturing capacity in Japan and the hollowing out of US manufacturing industries. The costs for the United States have been astronomical. During the year 2000 alone, it recorded its largest trade deficit ever, of which $81 billion was with Japan. During the mid-1980s, Japan became the world's largest creditor nation and the United States became the world's largest debtor nation, thereby turning upside down the original assumptions on which US economic policies toward Japan were based. But neither the United States nor Japan made any changes in its old trade-for-bases deal, despite occasional and futile protests by US business interests. Meanwhile, from the point of view of US elites committed to maintaining hegemony on a global basis, the sudden and unpredicted collapse of the Soviet Union in the period 1989 to 1991 was a disaster. They had to find some new justifications for their overseas presence, particularly in East Asia, where Japan's inherent power and the emergence of a commercially oriented China offered implicit challenges to the old American order. Among these justifications, one of the cleverest was the so-called two-war strategy, which requires the US military establishment to be able to fight two large wars on opposite sides of the globe at the same time. The beauty of this formulation is that it avoids specifying which nations might conceivably want to go to war with the United States and ignores the historical fact that in America's most recent wars--Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf and Yugoslavia--no second nation (on the other side of the globe or nearby) challenged it. More concretely, Pentagon strategists have tried to find replacement enemies for the former USSR by demonizing North Korea and muttering ominously about China's successful transition from a Leninist command economy to a state-guided market system resembling the other successful capitalist countries of East Asia. Until June 2000, North Korea was routinely described as an extremely threatening "rogue state." Then, on the initiative of the South Korean president, the two Koreas began to negotiate their own reconciliation without asking for US permission. The possibility that North and South Korea might achieve some form of peaceful coexistence totally undercuts the main US rationale for a "national missile defense" and a "theater missile defense." Regardless of which ventriloquist is in charge of him on any given day, George W. Bush shows no sign of comprehending these matters. In March, when South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, last year's winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, visited Washington to ask for help in pursuing his country's rapprochement with the North, the newly designated "leader of the free world" rudely brushed him off. Korea policy has become a plaything of Congressional Republican mastodons, and the Bush White House seems much more interested in pleasing them than in the situation in East Asia. It is easy for the United States to attempt to bully both the North and South Koreas; it has been doing so since 1945. China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious US militarists know that China's minuscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the overwhelming US power arrayed against it (twenty archaic Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US warheads). Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains the most dangerous place on earth. **Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown** prince in Sarajevo **led to a war that no one wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the United States and China into a conflict that neither wants. Such a war would** bankrupt the United States**, deeply** divide Japan **and probably** end in a Chinese victory**, given that China is the world's most populous country and would be defending itself against a foreign aggressor.** More seriously, **it could** easily escalate into a nuclear holocaust.

1AC

Independently, curbing the rise of another great power dampens great power conflict

Wohlforth, ‘9. William, professor of government at Dartmouth College. “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics v61, n1, January, Muse.

The evidence suggests that narrow and asymmetrical capabilities gaps foster status competition even among states relatively confident of their basic territorial security for the reasons identified in social identity theory and theories of status competition. Broad patterns of evidence are consistent with this expectation, suggesting that unipolarity shapes strategies of identity maintenance in ways that dampen status conflict. The implication is that unipolarity helps explain low levels of military competition and conflict among major powers after 1991 and that a return to bipolarity or multipolarity would increase the likelihood of such conflict. This has been a preliminary exercise. The evidence for the hypotheses explored here is hardly conclusive, but it is sufficiently suggestive to warrant further refinement and testing, all the more so given [End Page 56] the importance of the question at stake. If status matters in the way the theory discussed here suggests, then the widespread view that the rise of a peer competitor and the shift back to a bipolar or multipolar structure present readily surmountable policy challenges is suspect. Most scholars agree with Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke’s argument: “[S]hould a satisfied state undergo a power transition and catch up with dominant power, there is little or no expectation of war.” 81 Given that today’s rising powers have every material reason to like the status quo, many observers are optimistic that the rise of peer competitors can be readily managed by fashioning an order that accommodates their material interests. Yet it is far harder to manage competition for status than for most material things. While diplomatic efforts to manage status competition seem easy under unipolarity, theory and evidence suggest that it could present much greater challenges as the system moves back to bipolarity or multipolarity. When status is seen as a positional good, efforts to craft negotiated bargains about status contests face long odds. And this positionality problem is particularly acute concerning the very issue unipolarity solves: primacy. The route back to bipolarity or multipolarity is thus fraught with danger. With two or more plausible claimants to primacy, positional competition and the potential for major power war could once again form the backdrop of world politics. [End Page 57

1AC

**The plan toes the line – it encourages Japanese flexibility by loosening the reins while preserving a robust alliance**

**Bandow, ‘9** [Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties, “Tokyo Drift” CATO Institute, National Interest Online, 8-31-2009, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10496>]

Over the last half century Japan has changed far more than has the alliance. **It is time to adjust the U.S.-Japan relationship** accordingly. Some on the Right point out that Tokyo cannot demand equality unless it does more. Bruce Klingner of the Heritage Foundation observed: "Neither country is well served by endlessly repeated bromides of the strength of the alliance as it becomes increasingly apparent that Japan will not fulfill the security role required to address increasing global security threats." However, **the real problem is not that Tokyo does too little, but the United States does too much.** Japan's security dependence is not in America's interest. Why preserve a military relationship created in a very different world? **Klingner contended that "the alliance is critical to fulfilling current U.S. strategic objectives,"** since "The forward deployment of a large U.S. military force in Japan deters military aggression by North Korea, signals Washington's resolve in defending U.S. allies, and provides an irreplaceable staging area should military action be necessary." **Yet South Korea, with forty times the GDP, twice the population, and far greater military spending than Pyongyang, should be the one deterring threats from the North.** America should not demonstrate resolve in defending allies — Japan as well as South Korea — which should be defending themselves. And Tokyo is unlikely to allow the United States to use facilities in Japan for American purposes — especially to initiate war against China over Taiwan or to otherwise maintain U.S. primacy. In fact, **America's aggressive foreign policy and force structure, oriented to offense rather than defense, is why the United States spends so much on the military** — roughly half of the global total. Washington has eleven carrier groups in order to attack other nations, such as Iran, North Korea and China, not to prevent them from attacking America. Even more so, the role of U.S. bases and forces abroad is offensive, to intervene. Protecting war-torn allied states in the aftermath of the greatest conflict of human history made sense. Doing the same today, when allied states have prospered and the most serious hegemonic threat has disappeared, does not make sense. **Washington should return to Japan responsibility for its defense.** Even today, **Tokyo, though spending just one percent of GDP** ($47 billion last year) **on the military**, is on par with the leading European states. **Bu**t with the world's second largest economy (third based on purchasing power parity), **Japan could do much more. Doubling its defense effort** — which would still be half of America's burden — **would match Chinese military spending.** Whether Japan needs to do so is, of course, up to Japan. The more persuasive Beijing's so-called peaceful rise, the less pressure on Tokyo to act militarily. The more provocative North Korea in developing and testing both missiles and nuclear weapons, the greater the need for Japan to augment its forces. Whatever the Japanese people wish to do, they should pay the cost of and take responsibility for doing so. **Particularly important is the future of so-called extended deterrence. Analysts like** Harvard's Joseph **Nye take the policy for granted**, worrying only about whether or not it is credible**. However, as Beijing develops its own strategic nuclear deterrent** against America, **the question will arise: should the United States risk Los Angeles for Tokyo? The increasing unpredictability of North Korean behavior has led to more discussion in Japan about the possibility of developing a countervailing weapon.** **The potential for** further **proliferation in the region is worrisome, but no more so than the possibility of a confrontation between the United States and nuclear-armed China over the interests of other nations. Deterrence can fail. And protecting other nations can lead them to be dangerously irresponsible.** In any case, the United States would be less likely to have to rely on nuclear deterrence for Japan if that nation possessed an adequate conventional defense. With the rise of prosperous and/or populous allied states (Japan, South Korea, Australia, and several ASEAN nations) as well as friendly powers (India and Indonesia, most notably), **Washington is in the position to act as an off-shore balancer, prepared to act against an aggressive hegemonic power should one arise, but not entangled in daily geopolitical controversies.** America's overwhelming power and geographic isolation give Washington greater flexibility in defending its own security. **Expecting Tokyo to protect itself doesn't mean severing bilateral security relationships.** The United States and Japan should cooperate on issues ranging from intelligence sharing to emergency base access. Nye also writes of "a new set of transnational challenges to our vital interests, such as pandemics, terrorism, and human outflows from failed states. Chief among these challenges is the threat posed by global warming." None of these, however, compares to the importance of preserving the nation from attack. And none are relevant to a military alliance. **In fact, today's emphasis on military issues may inhibit bilateral cooperation elsewhere.** The DPJ intends to change Tokyo's relationship with the United States. In what direction will the new government move? **Washington should take the lead, turning defense responsibilities over to Japan, which would benefit both countries.**

1AC\_\_\*\*Plan

The United States Federal Government should substantially reduce its military presence in South Korea by immediately withdrawing a substantial number of deployed active forces.

1AC

First, our solvency advocate –

**Bandow, ‘2. (**Doug, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and a former Special Assistant to President Reagan, “A New Policy for a New Millenium: America's Relationship to South and North Korea” The ICAS Lectures, Spring Symposium, 2-14-2002, <http://www.icasinc.org/2003/2003w/2003wdxb.html>] )

**Washington needs to withdraw** its **troops and eliminate its security guarantee**. Many hawks now say that the **U.S. shouldn't stay if it isn't wanted**. Even if America is wanted, however, another nation's desire for U.S. aid is no reason to provide it. The **U.S. should do so only if doing so advances American national interests**. What vital U.S. interest supposedly is being served? America's presence undoubtedly still helps deter the DPRK from military adventurism, but it is not necessary to do so. As noted earlier, the **South can stand on its own**. A recent report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies reported simply: "Without U.S. help, **South Korea is capable today of defending itself against an invasion from the North**." As one of the world's wealthiest nations, the **ROK can well afford to replace the American tripwire**. Some argue that maybe American troops should be withdrawn, only just not now. But for some policymakers there will never be a good time to update U.S. policy. Indeed, many desire to preserve America's troop presence after reunification. Advocates of a permanent U.S. occupation talk grandly of promoting regional stability. However, it would be a miraculous coincidence if a commitment forged in the Cold War and created to deter a ground invasion from a contiguous neighbor turned out to be the perfect arrangement to meet completely different contingencies in a completely different security environment. In fact, there are **no secondary "dual use" function for America's soldiers to perform**. For instance, while U.S. and Chinese interests might eventually collide, **America's deployments in Korea would provide little value**. No administration would initiate a ground invasion against the PRC. And South Korea, like **Japan for that matter, is unlikely to allow itself to become the staging ground for such a conflic**t. To do so **would turn itself into China's permanent enemy. Containing a resurgent Tokyo is an even more fanciful role.** **The greatest threats to regional stability are internal**--insurgency and corruption in the Philippines, democratic protests and ethnic conflict in Burma, economic, ethnic, nationalistic, and religious division in Indonesia. But they **impinge no vital American interests and are not susceptible to solution by the U.S. military. In sum, without any connection to the larger Cold War and global hegemonic struggle Korea is relatively unimportant to the U.S**. So some American policymakers make an entirely different argument: the U.S. should base soldiers overseas at someone else's cost. But Washington must create the additional units, a cost that America's allies do not cover. Moreover, **friendly states are not likely to long accept a foreign occupation carried out solely to save money for Americans.**  Some supporters of the U.S. troops presence point to the North Korean nuclear threat. However, the **American presence performs no useful role in dealing with Pyongyang's putative nuclear capabilities. In fact, the current deployment leaves U.S. forces as nuclear hostages if the North marries an effective atomic bomb to a means of delivery**. Moreover, the troop tripwire makes North Korea America's problem. Removing it, argues Adam Garfinkle, editor of the National Interest, "would force China and the other parties to the problem to face reality." The best strategy for handling the DPRK is not obvious. The North may have decided to cheat all along. Or it may have pe**rceived that the Agreed Framework was unraveling, since the U.S. had failed to move forward with diplomatic and economic relations.** A not insubstantial factor in its current behavior may be the North's belief that the Bush administration has targeted Kim's regime for a preventive war. CIA Director George Tenet implicitly acknowledged the problem without noting America's role, when he suggested that if the North goes ahead and nonproliferation weakens, other states might view the acquisition of nukes as the best way to match neighbors and deter more powerful nations. Irrespective of who is to blame, what is to be done? It is not surprising that policymakers in Seoul, within easy reach of North Korean artillery and Scud missiles, have a different perspective on coercion. Beijing, Moscow, and **Tokyo also worry about radioactive fallout, missile attacks, refugee flows, economic turmoil, and regional chaos**

1AC

**Signal of the plan alone is enough to send the signal to de-militarize and look to diplomacy.**

**Bandow 96(Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute “Tripwire: Korea and U.S. foreign policy in a changed world” pg 83 JL)**

**U.S. troops have been stationed in South Korea for the past half century.** Although their withdrawal would unsettle a government and people grown used to America's presence, it really should sur­prise neither. After all, in 1984, 4 of 10 South Koreans advocated that the United States stay only until Seoul became militarily self-sufficient.1 **With the economic gap between South and North expand­ing at an embarrassing rate, that time is now**. South Korea's Ministry of National Defense has acknowledged that "considering the changes in our security environment including the emerging South-North arms control question, reduction of troops will become inevitable."2 Unfortunately, the ministry was referring to South Korean troop levels. But **surely the first cuts should come in the forces of the United States, whose support has always been justified by the exceptional military circumstances on the peninsula. Only after the American troop presence has disappeared** should **the ROK,** which obviously has both the most at stake in and the primary obligation for its own defense**, downsize its army**. In 1971 Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil responded to the Nixon administration's par­tial withdrawal: "Now is no time to survive by depending on oth­ers—U.S. troops in our country will go home sooner or later, which means that we must defend our country through our own strength."3 Again, **that time is now**. Nevertheless, disengagement would be a dramatic step. **Its most important impact would probably be symbolic.** Opines Claude Buss of the Hoover Institution, "**In the minds of many Korean and Ameri­can officials, the military role of the U.S. forces is less important than the psychological, political, and diplomatic effects of their pres­ence**. As Defense Secretary [James] Schlesinger stated in 1974, U.S. forces in Korea symbolize America's continued interest in the overall stability of that part of the world."\* It would be important, therefore, for Washington to **emphasize that placing responsibility for Korea's defense on Koreans would not mean indifference to the ROK's safety.**

**Troops could be withdrawn gradually ending in 2012 to ensure lasting peace.**

**Kim et al. 09(Kim, Indong Oh, writers from the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development Northeast Asia Peace and Security Project “A New U.S. Policy toward Korea: Korean American Recommendations for Real Change” JL)**

**As** the denuclearization process, **peace** treaty and normalization **talks move forward**, **the United States should gradually withdraw its 28,500 troops stationed in South Korea by 2012, which is the target date for relinquishing the U.S. military's wartime operational control over the ROK troops to the South Korean government.** Our troops have been in Korea for too long, and the goal of defending South Korea is no longer credible. Since it costs about $2-4 billion per year to station the U.S. troops in South Korea, and there is a great need to reduce our military spending at present, it will serve the U.S. interests to **reduce our troop strength in the ROK, which already has a powerful military to defend itself.** South Korea also has twice the population of North Korea, and its annual military spending is about eight times larger than North Korea's, while South Korea's GDP is 40 times greater than North Korea's.

\_\_\_\*\*Japan

1AC Cards

Only an end to US patronage would force Japan to develop military capabilities

Carpenter 95 (Ted Galen, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Paternalism And Dependence: The U.S.-Japanese Security Relationship, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-244.html>

Japan's reluctance to build up its military and play a more active security role is not merely a product of domestic considerations, however. That reluctance must be viewed in the context of the military relationship with the United States. The U.S. policy of providing for the bulk of Japan's security needs--combined with the policy of discouraging independent Japanese initiatives--has greatly skewed the incentives. During the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis, Washington's willingness to assume the costs and risks of defending Tokyo's interests spared the Japanese people and government difficult decisions about how to protect those interests.(24) Instead of sending military forces to protect the Persian Gulf oil supply, which Japanese officials insisted was a vital national interest, Japan hid behind the Peace Constitution and resorted to another form of checkbook diplomacy. Tokyo did provide more than $13 billion to help pay for Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, but it assiduously avoided sharing the military risks. That approach worked--at least in the sense that no breach occurred in the U.S.-Japanese relationship, despite some public anger in the United States. But one ought to wonder if the reaction of the American public to Japan's checkbook strategy would have been as restrained if the Persian Gulf War had produced the thousands of American casualties most military experts predicted instead of fewer than 200 deaths. That is an especially pertinent question since Japan would apparently adopt the same strategy of confining its role to financial and (possibly) logistical assistance in the event of a war in East Asia. It is highly unlikely that Japan would continue to spend such a meager percentage of its GDP on the military or to remain so diffident on matters that affect its own well- being, were it not for the smothering strategy of the United States. Tokyo's long-standing policy was aptly described by Kenneth Hunt, vice president of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. "Defence spending has tended to be set simply at levels which kept both Washington and domestic opinion not too restive."(25) The incentive to continue free riding, the arrogant and exploitive mentality of some Japanese leaders, and the changes in both policy and attitude that would probably occur if the United States withdrew the defense subsidy and security shield were all illustrated during a September 1995 television debate between Ryutaro Hashimoto and Junichiro Koizumi, the candidates for president of the LDP. When asked whether the current U.S.-Japanese security treaty should be maintained, Koizumi replied, Not necessarily, because lately the United States has been asking Japan to bear more of the cost of maintaining the U.S. Forces in Japan [USFJ]. Japan has been paying as much as it can. If the United States cannot bear the USFJ's stationing costs, we will have to ask them to reduce military personnel and bases in Japan to a size [the United States] can afford to maintain.(26) He added, however, that Japan would commit itself to its own defense buildup if a scaled-down USFJ could not provide adequate protection. Koizumi's comments illustrate that keeping Japan a U.S. military dependent has become increasingly unhealthy for both countries. That policy perpetuates an expensive set of security obligations for the United States, and it encourag- es the Japanese to act as though they can forever evade political and military issues. Yet, despite occasional rhetorical gestures to the contrary, Washington appears determined to maintain a policy of paternalism.

1AC Cards

A shift away from the patron-client model will cause Japan to further augment the SDF and become a regional power

Christopher **Preble, ‘6.** Director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, “Two Normal CountriesRethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” CATO Policy Analysis, April 18, 2006, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf>

As the total number of U.S. military personnel in Japan has remained relatively stable since the end of the Cold War, Japan’s defensive capabilities have expanded. Japan is already an active player in East Asia, and it possesses the resources necessary for it to contribute to global security using a wide range of political, economic, and military means. Indeed, Japan’s total economic output ranks second only to that of the United States. Japan has used a small portion of its great economic strength to upgrade its military capabilities, focusing particularly on qualitative improvements, as opposed to the number of troops, ships, or planes.28 So even as Tokyo continued to brandish its pacifist constitutional principles, and while total military spending as a share of GDP has remained at or just below 1 percent, the SDF has become a formidable, technologically advanced, and tactically diverse force whose ground, maritime, and air components boast nearly 240,000 active-duty personnel. The Maritime SDF includes 44 destroyers, 9 frigates, and 16 submarines, and the combined air power of the SDF includes 380 combat-capable aircraft plus other fixed-wing and helicopter assets.29 Japan’s defense expenditures are much smaller than those of the United States but are comparable to those of all other advanced industrial economies in real terms. In the mid- 1980s, Japan had the world’s sixth-largest defense budget behind the Soviet Union, the United States, France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom; by the end of the decade, Japan trailed only the Soviet Union and the United States. Military spending continued to rise throughout the 1990s, and expenditures have remained stable since then. According to official statistics compiled by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Japan’s defense expenditures in 2004 were exceeded only by those of the United States and the United Kingdom. It seems likely, however, that Japan’s defense budget was also less than that of China (Table 1).30 Chinese defense figures are widely disputed, and are likely 40 to 70 percent higher than the Chinese government’s official statistics. Leaving those three countries aside, however, Japan almost certainly spends more than the other two permanent members of the UN Security Council (France and Russia) but also more than Germany and almost three times as much as India, two other countries that aspire to permanent membership on the Security Council. Japanese per capita defense spending is roughly equivalent to that of Germany and South Korea. This hardly constitutes a crushing burden on Japanese taxpayers, and it could easily be expanded if changing strategic circumstances so dictated. Citizens in the United Kingdom pay more than twice as much per person to maintain their highly effective military, and the French spend almost twice as much per capita as do the Japanese. Although Japan’s defense spending is comparable to that of other advanced industrial democracies, it might still be insufficient relative to the threats Japan faces. Tokyo’s allocation of approximately 1 percent of its GDP to defense in 2004 contrasts with the 2.4 percent spent by the South Koreans, for example, and the more than 4 percent spent by the United States during the same period, and yet Japan is operating within the same strategic environment and is concerned about similar threats. It is logical to conclude, therefore, that the U.S. security guarantee has enabled the Japanese to refrain from spending more on their defense.31 On the other hand, military spending is hardly the only measure of a country’s international engagement. Japan remains a leading provider of foreign aid, contributing more than $6.7 billion in Official Development Assistance in 2003, more than any other country with the exception of the United States.32 These numbers make clear that Japan already plays an active role in world affairs, in spite of the constitutional restrictions on the use of military force. What Japan has lacked for much of its history since the end of World War II is the incentive and the will to take responsibility for its own security—and for regional security—to a degree commensurate with its economic power and interests. The U.S. security guarantee serves as a disincentive for change, and U.S. policy has therefore impeded the development of Japan’s indigenous military capabilities, capabilities that might prove useful to both countries in the future. The best way to break this cycle of dependence is to phase out the American security guarantee and replace it with a more equitable mutual defense pact. It is unlikely that Japan can assume its place among the community of great nations—despite its considerable wealth and foreign policy activism through financial aid—without a fundamental reorientation of the current patron-client security relationship with the United States.

Collapse Inevitable – Basing

**US- Japan alliance will collapse- basing disputes**

**The Economist 6/10** ( The Economist, “Bowing Out”, <http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2010/06/japans_prime_minister_resigns?page=1&source=features_box_main>)

In his **resignation speech** to his party’s lawmakers, Mr **Hatoyama admitted that his mishandling** of a row with **America over an American marine base in the island of Okinawa cost him his job**, coupled with lavish political-funding scandals that have led to indictments of former members of his and of Mr Ozawa’s staff. Though he once again denied his responsibility for the funding disaster, the two resignations would help the DPJ become “new and cleaner,” Mr Hatoyama said. The **immediate catalyst for his downfall was Mr Hatoyama’s decision last Friday to support a plan with America to relocate a United States marine base**, called Futenma, within the island of Okinawa, **rather than removing it** elsewhere. Besides **breaking a** personal **promise to Okinawans to get rid of the base**, Mr Hatoyama was also **forced to sack Mizuho Fukushima, t**he head of one of the DPJ’s two coalition parties, from his cabinet because **she opposed the Futenma plan.** This set off a damaging chain of events. On May 30th her party, the **Social Democrats, abandoned the coalition and the following day indicated it might support a censure motion in the Diet against Mr Hatoyama.** It was not clear whether his party held enough seats to block such a motion in the upper house, nor that it would enjoy the support of its own lawmakers from Okinawa. **Opinion polls taken after** the **Futenma decision** also showed a **slump in Mr Hatoyama’s support, down from 71%** nine months ago to as **low as 17%.** This lengthened the DPJ’s odds in the upper-house election. Some of the party’s lawmakers up for re-election were told by their constituents that Mr Hatoyama’s indecisiveness over Futenma and his financial scandals might cost them their re-election, which led them to **openly discuss removing him.**

**US-Japan alliance will inevitably collapse because of basing disputes. Most of Japan’s politicians and public want the U**.**S. out.**

**Yamaguchi 06/10** (Mari, Associated Press, “Japan’s Prime Minister says he will Resign”, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37458490/ns/world_news-asiapacific>)

 Embattled **Prime Minister** **Yukio Hatoyama of Japan** said today that he is **resigning over his broken campaign promise to move a US Marine base** off the southern island **of Okinawa**. The **prime minister faced growing pressure from within his own party** to resign ahead of next month’s upper house elections. His **approval ratings had plummeted over his bungled handling of the relocation of the Marine Air Station Futenma**, which **reinforced his public image as an indecisive leader.** Hatoyama is the fourth Japanese prime minister to resign in four years. Until last night, Hatoyama insisted he would stay on while intermittently holding talks with key members of his Democratic Party of Japan. But this morning, after eight months in office, **Hatoyama faced the nation to say he is stepping down**. “Since last year’s elections, I tried to change politics in which the people of Japan would be the main characters,’’ he told a news conference broadcast nationwide. But he conceded **his efforts fell short**. “That’s **mainly because of my failings**,’’ he said. Hatoyama, 63, cited two **main reasons for his resignation**: the **Futenma issue, which led to the dismissal of one of his Cabinet members who could not accept his decision,** and a political funding scandal. In that incident, two of his aides were convicted of falsifying political contribution reports and sentenced to suspended prison terms. Hatoyama did not face charges. His government came to power amid high hopes in September after his party soundly defeated the long-ruling conservatives in lower house elections. **Hatoyama had promised to forge a “more equal’’ relationship with the United States** and to **move Futenma off Okinawa, which hosts more than half the 47,000 US troops** in Japan under a security pact. But last week, he said he would go along with the **2006 agreement to move the base to a northern part of the island, infuriating residents who want it off Okinawa entirely**. Hatoyama said today that **recent tensions in the Korean peninsula surrounding the sinking of a South Korean warship reminded him of the potential instability in Northeast Asia and drove home the importance of the US-Japan security pact.** “There was no choice but to keep the base on Okinawa,’’ he said. His **three-way coalition was cut to two members over the weekend when a junior partner, the Social Democrats, withdrew after the prime minister expelled its leader Mizuho Fukushima**, who **rejected the Futenma decision**, from the Cabinet. “I need to take responsibility for forcing the Social Democrats to withdraw from the coalition,’’ Hatoyama said. Fukushima’s dismissal enhanced her public standing as a politician who stood up for her convictions

Internals – Dependence

**SouthWest Asia bases its diplomatic relations upon US extended nuclear deterrence- North Korean aggression included**

**Ito 10 [Masami, Staff Writer, May 12, Japan Times, Lexis]**

**Mitsuru Kurosawa**, a professor of international law at Osaka Jogakuin College, **blames Japan's continued reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella for this inaction.** Like the previous LDP governments, **"the DPJ also stands unchanged about depending on the U.S. for extended nuclear deterrence in the face of** **threats,"** Kurosawa said. "The dependence on the nuclear umbrella may remain unchanged, but I think we can see that the DPJ is at least trying to reduce (this deterrent's) role." Last summer, when the LDP was struggling to stay in power, it did not articulate any nuclear policy shift. **The party's 2009 campaign platform focused on strengthening ties with the U.S., including the missile defense program and protecting Japan from North Korea's missile and nuclear** **threats.** The DPJ meanwhile distinguished itself by vowing to play a leading role in efforts to rid the world of atomic weapons and to "work toward a nuclear-free Northeast Asia." Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada has also expressed strong interest in nuclear disarmament, pushing for nations to adopt a no-first-use policy and not using such weapons against nonnuclear states. "It's true the DPJ has shown more enthusiasm (toward promoting nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament), but it has not yet produced results," Kurosawa said. **Nonnuclear Japan has been relying on U.S.** **nuclear deterrence since the Cold War.** Because of this, experts believe the country cast the impression that it could never fully engage in any movement to rid the world of atomic weapons.

**The SDF has pinned its hopes on US nuclear deterrence**

**BBC 2005 [BBC Asian Monitoring, October 30, Lexis]**

**US strike capabilities and the nuclear deterrence provided by the US remain an essential complement to Japan's defence capabilities in ensuring the defence of Japan and contribute to peace and security in the region.** Both sides also confirmed several basic concepts relevant to roles, missions, and capabilities in the area of improving the international security environment, to include: Bilateral cooperation in improving the international security environment to achieve regional and global common strategic objectives has become an important element of the alliance. To this end, the US and Japan contribute as appropriate based on their respective capabilities, and take necessary measures to establish effective posture. Rapid and effective response requires f lexible capabilities and can benefit from close US-Japan bilateral cooperation and policy coordination. Regular exercises, including those with third countries, can improve these capabilities. **The US forces and the SDF will strengthen cooperation with other partners to contribute to international activities to improve the international security environment.** In addition**, both sides emphasized that the increasing importance of addressing new** **threats and diverse contingencies and improving the international security environment compels both sides to develop their respective defence capabilities, and to maximize the benefits of innovations in technology.**

IL – Plan 🡪 Independent Japan

**A shift towards diplomacy would allow Japan to be more independent—empirically proven the last time we suggested diplomacy (retag?)**

Cronin 5 (Richard, Specialist in Asian Affairs, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs Vol. 29 No. 1, <http://www.stimson.org/southeastasia/pdf/Cronin_The_North_Korean_Nuclear_Threat_and%20the_US_Japan_Security_Alliance.pdf>)

Although cooperation with the United States has been essential to Japan’s policy towards North Korea, Japanese policymakers have long had strong reasons for keeping in step with South Korea. The release of the results of the Bush administration’s North Korea policy review, on May 6, 2001, just before a visit to Washington by South Korea’s foreign minister, generated considerable frustration in both Tokyo and Seoul. Neither government believed that the Administration’s continued insistence that North Korea must unilaterally and unequivocally give up its nuclear program before the United States would engage in serious negotiations was realistic. By the summer of 2002, however, both Tokyo and Seoul began to express optimism that the United States was seriously interested in exploring the possibility of eliminating Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and other WMD activities through diplomacy. Tokyo also was encouraged in October 2002 when the Bush administration firmly rejected a bid by North Korea to exclude Japan from the then-proposed Six-Party Talks. Various signals from senior Bush officials indicated a sharp divide between “engagers” and “hawks”… it was widely assumed in Japan and elsewhere in the region that the U.S. government was taking a rhetorical hard line… Until the negative domestic political fallout from the Koizumi-Kim summit of September 2002, the Japanese government remained closer to the government of South Korea on its preferred approach, which emphasized diplomatic engagement, than to the U.S. approach. Since then, both governments have generally been in agreement on a policy of “pressure and dialogue,” with the Japanese placing more emphasis on dialogue. The South Korean government has also supported this phraseology, but has been even less supportive of pressure than Japan and continues to pursue economic engagement despite North Korean provocations. As if to underscore the gap between South Korean perspectives and those of the United States and Japan, President Roh Moo-hyun, in a nationally televised speech marking the anniversary of a 1919 Korean uprising against Japanese colonial rule, sharply criticized both American and Japanese policies. Roh called for more independence from the United States and sharply criticized Prime Minister Koizumi for his controversial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, which enshrines, in the form of names inscribed on mortuary tablets, more than 2 million fallen soldiers dating from the suppression of revolts after the Meiji Restoration (1868) through the Second World War. Those enshrined from World War II include some 14 military leaders deemed “Class A” war criminals in the Tokyo war crimes trials. These visits, which Prime Minister Koizumi defends as a legitimate and unexceptional expression of respect for all of the country’s war dead, have provoked a bitter and ongoing condemnation from China.19

IL – Plan 🡪 Independent Japan

Japan is pushing for a more independent relationship but is held back by US presence—withdrawal of forces sends a signal that unilateralism in East Asia is over

Rozman 3 (Gilbert, Prof of Sociology at Princeton, “Japan’s North Korea Initiative and U.S.-Japanese Relations”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, <http://www.fpri.org/orbis/4703/rozman.japannk.html>)

A different image can be drawn from scrutinizing the debates inside Japan: that of a country repeatedly striving to gain an independent voice on matters of East Asian security, even if it has so far been unsuccessful in that endeavor. Reviewing Japan’s quest gives us a different perspective on Japan’s relations with the United States, especially since 9/11, as the United States vaunts its unrivalled power. It can also shed light on the hopes behind Koizumi’s trip to Pyongyang and the potential for future diplomacy. To those who expect little from Japan’s diplomacy, Koizumi’s announcement that he would go to Pyongyang to meet the North’s Kim Jong Il came as a surprise. Soon, however, those who downplayed the importance of the announcement of the trip outnumbered the few observers who were either alarmed or delighted with what they saw as a rare independent move. The doubters recalled the June 2000 summit between Kim Jong Il and South Korea’s then president Kim Dae Jung, when all the hoopla proved ephemeral. It had been a long time since a Japanese leader made a bold breakthrough at a summit, and after seeing Koizumi fail to deliver on much of his domestic agenda, many doubted that he would do so in the global arena. The initiative seemed to be largely in the hands of the Bush administration, which, after labeling the North part of the “axis of evil,” seemed unlikely to approve a Tokyo-Pyongyang deal. Finally, they noted that the main agenda item was the return of abducted Japanese citizens, an issue of great emotional appeal inside Japan but tangential to significant security questions. After Koizumi’s September trip, a fifth reason arose to discount the momentary candor of mutual apologies and pledges of future cooperation. When the United States dispatched Assistant Secretary of East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly to Pyongyang two weeks later, it appeared that a coordinated approach long urged by Seoul was under way to explore just how far the North would compromise on security in order to achieve its goals for economic reform and political recognition. At the summit Kim admitted the kidnappings in the 1970s and 1980s of 13 Japanese citizens, 8 of whom were dead. As the Japanese public became absorbed in the tragic stories of the families of kidnap victims, it paid little heed to geopolitical issues. It again seemed that a Japanese leader’s initiative would bring no dramatic departure from Japan’s pattern of reliance on U.S. leadership. On October 29-30, when Japanese diplomats met with their North Korean counterparts in Kuala Lumpur, the same message emerged: the North rebuffed Japan’s interest in discussing its nuclear weapons program. But what many observers have missed is a continuing thread in the evolution of Japan’s post-Cold War foreign policy, which leads to a different conclusion about the significance of Koizumi’s trip to North Korea. Looking back, we can identify a streak of failed breakout strategies aimed at giving Japan an independent voice on the global stage. Each strategy has had implications for U.S.-Japanese relations and provides us with clues about how Japan wants to reshape the overall security of East Asia. The old Left, though fading, has long dreamed of a breakout strategy. The resurgent Right has pressed for it, although often differing on how to proceed. Mainstream as well as maverick Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leaders are tantalized by its potential impact on public opinion. The goal is shared across the political spectrum, even if no single approach has appeal. Japan’s motive for distancing itself from the United States to an important degree but not breaking the bonds of alliance lies less in any new perception of a military threat than in lingering discomfort over its absence of a strong voice in international circles. Many have a sense that, as politician Ichiro Ozawa put it, Japan is not a “normal” state.[4] So far they cannot agree on what it takes to become “normal,” but each time hopes arise for a breakthrough with one or another significant foreign partner, the nation rallies around the prospect that it will finally happen. The chances are slim that Tokyo could cut a deal with the outcast Pyongyang. They rise considerably, however, if Pyongyang really determines to bargain its WMDchips for a large economic payoff and recognizes the promise of multilateral diplomacy, in an age of unwelcome unilateralism. The North’s choice remains an enigma, leaving Tokyo restlessly awaiting the right opportunity.

IL – Plan 🡪 Independent Japan

The U.S. stepping away from the Japan alliance helps foster Japanese feeling of independence and the idea Japan can make a change in Asia.

Harris 07(Tobias, Japanese politics specialist who worked for a DPJ member of the upper house of the Diet 2006-2007. He is now a Ph.D. student in political science at MIT. “Benign neglect for the alliance?” May 20, <http://www.observingjapan.com/search/label/US-South%20Korea%20relations>. JL)

Upon further reflection, I wonder if the Asia team that the Bush administration has assembled — which I previously discussed here — for its final years in office might be a good thing for the US-Japan alliance. For too long, the alliance has been a cozy love fest. Even in rough patches, the alliance has been characterized by each ally stroking the other's ego, providing constant reassurance that the alliance is secure. When I was doing research on my master's dissertation, I spoke with Carl Ford, who was at the State Department early in the current administration and was deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asia-Pacific affairs during the administration of George HW Bush. Speaking of the differences in alliance management during the Clinton administration and the twelve years of Republican administrations that preceded it, Ford said, "The Republican Asia team pampered Japan. They regularly told Japan how important it was – the US-Japan relationship is very high maintenance. When the Clinton administration came in, things changed – not dramatically so, but noticeably so. There was less pampering of Japan." So at what point does pampering Japan and providing it with constant reassurance stop being a good thing and become an obstacle to forming a genuine alliance, in which the allies are comfortable airing grievances or questioning the direction and extent of cooperation? Maybe a couple years dealing with an Asia team whose attention is directed elsewhere will be good for Japan. Perhaps a couple years of not hearing how important and special Japan is for the US will help Japan get used to the idea of being a more independent, flexible actor in changing Asia. If the alliance is as healthy as both countries' leaders insist, this should not be so hard to manage. (Although there will be more pressure on US officers and diplomats in Japan and James Shinn's team at the Pentagon to push the 2006 realignment plan forward, which will perhaps be more difficult without an experienced Japan hand at the White House.) Besides, with a new Korean administration in the offing, maybe it is best that the US give priority to patching up the bruised relationship with South Korea?

Japan has started taking interest in providing for itself outside the realm US – Japan relationship.

Harris 07(Tobias, Japanese politics specialist who worked for a DPJ member of the upper house of the Diet 2006-2007. He is now a Ph.D. student in political science at MIT. “Japan feels the heat,” 4-4, <http://www.observingjapan.com/search/label/US-South%20Korea%20relations>. JL)

But leaving aside the question of a new division of labor in the US-Japan alliance, the US-ROK free-trade agreement, coming on the heels of the February agreement, is an important indicator of how the US position in Asia is changing. The old hub-and-spoke system, establishing in the early 1950s, meant that the US was the senior partner in a series of bilateral alliances. That system appears to be breaking down, in a haphazard way, on all fronts. That changes provides the context for Australia and Japan talking directly to each other about security, without the US acting as an intermediary, and it provides the context for the new US-ROK relationship, of which the trade agreement is an indispensable part. The US increasingly has to deal with allies on more equal terms. This is a good thing, but it requires the US to change its habits in Asia; it needs to learn to see the region and the world through the eyes of its allies and partners. Arguably Japan, however, remains stuck in a relationship largely unchanged from the hub-and-spoke era, in part due to the lingering presence of the US Military in Japan -- and the clear subordination of the JSDF to the US Military.

IL – Plan 🡪 Independent Japan

Japan is unable to operate on a regional political scale with U.S. presence.

Harris 07(Tobias, Japanese politics specialist who worked for a DPJ member of the upper house of the Diet 2006-2007. He is now a Ph.D. student in political science at MIT. “Redefining the US-ROK relationship,” 4-3, http://www.observingjapan.com/search/label/US-South%20Korea%20relations. JL)

Based on the coverage in Japan's newspapers, it seems that Japan was blindsided by the US-ROK free-trade agreement. Perhaps Japanese observers did not quite believe that negotiators would be able conclude an agreement before time ran out. Of course, the agreement's passage in both the US and South Korean legislatures is hardly a foregone conclusion, as the Japanese media has noted, but the prospect of Korean companies -- especially automakers -- having preferential access to the US market seems to have stirred the Japanese government to action. The FT reports today that Japan has announced that it is interested in ramping up talks with South Korea on a Japan-South Korea FTA, and quotes Abe has saying that even an FTA with the US should be considered. The FT also notes, however, that Korea is more interested in trade negotiations with the EU than with Japan. Perhaps another sign of the deficiencies of the Japanese government's foreign policy making; Tokyo seems utterly incapable of shaping the regional environment, and is continually being outflanked by its neighbors, allies, and rivals, whether on trade, security, or in the six-party talks.

IL – Plan 🡪 SDFs

The U.S. taking a step back from Asia allows for Japanese development of SDF’s.

**Carpenter 02** (Ted Galen, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, “Japan Takes a Modest Step Toward Global Security” CATO, 2002,<http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3364>. JL)

The Japanese Diet has taken a much-publicized step to allow Japan to play a meaningful security role in the 21st century. Over the opposition of pacifist legislators, the Diet recently passed Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's anti-terrorism bill, which allows Japan's Self Defense Forces to support the U.S.-led war against Osama bin Laden. Three Japanese naval vessels are now on their way to take up positions in the Indian Ocean. That step contrasts with Tokyo's policy during the Persian Gulf War. During that crisis, Japan confined its role to "checkbook diplomacy" -- paying some $13 billion of the war's cost but otherwise declining to assist the international coalition that forced Saddam Hussein's troops out of Kuwait. One should not overstate the importance of the anti-terrorism legislation, however. It is still a relatively timid venture into the realm of the world's security affairs. Japan must do far more if it hopes to be taken seriously as a political and military player. The most disappointing aspect of the anti-terrorism measure is that it confines Japan's role to non-combat, logistical support. That restriction reflects the same unfortunate timidity contained in the 1997 changes to the defense guidelines for the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Those guidelines were an improvement on their predecessor. For the first time, Japan agreed to have the Special Defense Forces (SDF) play a role in repelling a security threat in East Asia, even if Japan were not under attack. But as in the case of the later anti-terrorism bill, the SDF was only supposed to provide logistical support for U.S. combat operations. That limitation needs to end. Article 9, the "pacifist clause" in Japan's constitution, has outlived whatever usefulness it may have had when it was adopted at the insistence of the United States after World War II. Japan is the only major power that refuses to play a security role commensurate with its political and economic status. Even Germany, the other principal defeated power in World War II, has recently sent peacekeeping troops to the Balkans and has now agreed to send 3,000 combat personnel to participate in the war against bin Laden. Tokyo cannot forever confine its security role to one of cheerleading, financial subsidies and logistical support.

Internals – Signal

**The plan signals a transformation in U.S. strategy and empowers Japanese parties that resent U.S. basing**

**Bandow, ‘9. (**Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties, “Tokyo Drift” CATO Institute, National Interest Online, 8-31-2009, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10496>. )

Yet **South Korea**, with **forty times the GDP, twice the population, and** far greater military spending than Pyongyang, should be the one **deterring threats from the North**. **America** should **not demonstrate resolve in defending allies — Japan as well as South Korea** — which should be defending themselves. And **Tokyo is unlikely to allow the United States to use facilities in Japan for American purposes** — especially to initiate war against China over Taiwan or to otherwise **maintain U.S. primacy**. In fact, America's aggressive foreign policy and force structure, oriented to offense rather than defense, is why the United States spends so much on the military — roughly half of the global total. Washington has eleven carrier groups in order to attack other nations, such as Iran, North Korea and China, not to prevent them from attacking America. Even more so, the role of U.S. bases and forces abroad is offensive, to intervene. Protecting war-torn allied states in the aftermath of the greatest conflict of human history made sense. Doing the same today, when **allied states have prospered and the most serious hegemonic threat has disappeared, does not make sense**. **Washington** **should return to Japan responsibility for its defense**. Even today, **Tokyo,** though spending just one percent of GDP ($47 billion last year) on the military, is **on par with the leading European states**. But with the world's second largest economy (third based on purchasing power parity), **Japan could do much more**. **Doubling its defense effort — which would still be half of America's burden — would match Chinese military spending.** Whether Japan needs to do so is, of course, up to Japan. The more persuasive Beijing's so-called peaceful rise, the less pressure on Tokyo to act militarily. **The more provocative North Korea in developing and testing both missiles and nuclear weapons, the greater the need for Japan to augment its forces**. Whatever the Japanese people wish to do, they **should pay the cost of and take responsibility for doing so. Particularly important is the future of so-called extended deterrence**. Analysts like Harvard's Joseph Nye take the policy for granted, worrying only about whether or not it is credible. However, as Beijing develops its own strategic nuclear deterrent against America, the question will arise: should the United States risk Los Angeles for Tokyo? The **increasing unpredictability of North Korean behavior has led to more discussion in Japan about the possibility of developing a countervailing weapon**. The potential for further proliferation in the region is worrisome, but no more so than the possibility of a confrontation between the United States and nuclear-armed China over the interests of other nations. Deterrence can fail. And protecting other nations can lead them to be dangerously irresponsible. In any case, the **United States would be less likely to have to rely on nuclear deterrence for Japan if that nation possessed an adequate conventional defense**. With the rise of prosperous and/or populous allied states (Japan, South Korea, Australia, and several ASEAN nations) as well as friendly powers (India and Indonesia, most notably), Washington is in the position to act as an off-shore balancer, prepared to act against an aggressive hegemonic power should one arise, but not entangled in daily geopolitical controversies. America's overwhelming power and geographic isolation give Washington greater flexibility in defending its own security. **Expecting** **Tokyo to protect itself doesn't mean severing bilateral security relationships**. The **United States and Japan should cooperate on issues ranging from intelligence sharing to emergency base access.** Nye also writes of "a new set of transnational challenges to our vital interests, such as pandemics, terrorism, and human outflows from failed states. Chief among these challenges is the threat posed by global warming." None of these, however, compares to the importance of preserving the nation from attack. And none are relevant to a military alliance. In fact, today's emphasis on military issues may inhibit bilateral cooperation elsewhere.

Impacts – Independence S Asia\*\*

A less dependent Japan would use its military to tackle regional security issues instead of relying on US

Christopher **Preble, ‘6.** Director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, “Two Normal CountriesRethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” CATO Policy Analysis, April 18, 2006, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf>

A U.S.-Japan strategic relationship that more closely resembles an alliance in the traditional sense of the term, as opposed to the current patron-client relationship, is likely to be an enduring model for U.S.-Japanese security cooperation in the future, especially if it is based on popular support. Fortunately, popular sentiment within Japan offers still more clues about how the three cases discussed above might play out in a future in which Japan behaves as a normal country, that is, as a country responsible for defending its interests, and not dependent on the United States. Of the three cases discussed above, popular support for an active role by Japanese military forces is weakest with respect to Iraq. Japanese elites place great importance on retaining the favor of their security patron. It is unlikely that there would be Japanese forces operating in Iraq today were it not for U.S. pressure, and the Japanese may be reluctant to become involved in similar military missions in the future. However, lingering anti-militarism within Japan does not proscribe the SDF from serving in the more ambiguous role of security provider in postconflict settings, with or without U.S. encouragement. If the pattern of SDF peacekeeping established in the 1990s were to continue, or even expand, that should not be seen as a manifestation of resurgent Japanese militarism. On the other hand, it seems more likely that, in the absence of U.S. pressure to become more actively involved around the world, a more independent Japan would use its military forces to deal with issues more directly relevant to its own national security. That would be beneficial to both the United States and Japan. To be sure, an equitable strategic partnership could make things more difficult for U.S. policymakers in certain instances, but that is a chance worth taking in the interest of devolving security responsibilities away from the United States and lowering U.S. risk exposure. Reducing the global U.S. military presence is essential to alleviating the considerable burdens on U.S. taxpayers, who collectively spend more than 10 times as much on defense as do the Japanese. U.S. policy should seek to accelerate Japan’s emergence as a more effective military ally in the region. Within the context of a more equitable U.S.-Japan alliance, if Japanese forces were deployed to any country far outside the East Asian region, their dispatch would be dependent on Tokyo’s assessment of Japanese security interests and therefore would be far more likely to enjoy the support of the Japanese public. Under the current patron-client relationship, Japanese and American officials alike have bent over backwards to place the small number of SDF troops in a location where they are unlikely to be exposed to harm; by extension, this small number of troops is not measurably contributing to the completion of the mission in Iraq; nor are they substantially reducing the threat to other Coalition forces. In short, their presence is almost entirely symbolic and has little, if any, strategic value. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Koizumi risked some political capital, as well as time and attention, rallying a modicum of public support for an exceedingly modest, even token, military deployment. And while the Japanese agonized over the dispatch of a few hundred troops to a country thousands of miles away, China ratcheted up its threats against a democratic entity a few hundred miles away from Japan and North Korea continued to process nuclear material. At best, Japan’s conduct seems a case of misplaced priorities and confusion over Japan’s strategic interests; at worst, Japan has subordinated its own interests to those of its distant patron.

Impact – END 🡪 Nuclear War

Nuclear deterrence only escalates the risk of nuclear war—only shifting away from it in Japan can solve

Dr. **Ruff, ‘9** – Associate Professor in the Nossal Institute for Global Health, University of Melbourne, and chairs the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. “Japan would be safer without extended deterrence,” October 10, <http://mdn.mainichi.jp/perspectives/views/archive/news/2009/20091010p2g00m0in025000c.html>.

President Obama's pledge "to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons," made in his speech in Prague on April 5 this year, was greeted enthusiastically in Japan as it was throughout the world. Sadly, an obstacle to fulfilling that pledge has been the previous Japanese government's desire to cling to extended deterrence, even to the point of introducing nuclear weapons into the region; to oppose deep reductions in the massive U.S. (and therefore Russian) nuclear arsenals; and to oppose reducing the circumstances in which nuclear weapons might be used through a U.S. no-first use declaration. Make no mistake -- this obstacle is being aggressively exploited by U.S. hardliners intent upon maintaining and even modernizing the U.S. arsenal. If such policies, under pressure from Japan, were to find their way into the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review in preparation right now, the prospects for abolition of the worst weapons of terror would be substantially set back. President Obama's assessment of when nuclear abolition could become a reality -- "perhaps not in my lifetime" -- could become a virtual certainty. Nuclear deterrence, at its core, is a pledge to inflict catastrophic retaliation -- including the mass extermination of civilian populations and radioactive devastation on a scale which knows no borders -- on any state that uses these weapons first. We now know that use of even a tiny fraction of current nuclear arsenals would produce a global climatic catastrophe which would make any such use not only murderous but suicidal. A country that relies upon a proxy nuclear arsenal for its security is making a Faustian bargain. For nothing more than an unenforceable promise that its "protector state" will retaliate upon countless millions of innocent people on its behalf, a country such as Japan (or South Korea, or Australia, or the non-nuclear members of NATO) makes itself a target for nuclear weapons, turns its own fate over to someone else, and forfeits its moral stature as a non-nuclear-weapon state. It increases the ways and places in which a nuclear war might start. It makes the security of its people and land hostage to nuclear security and restraint in Russia, China, and North Korea. It adds to the risk of nuclear war through technical failure, human error, madness, malice, inadvertence, terrorist infiltration or cyberattack. This is why extended nuclear deterrence -- and nuclear deterrence in any form -- must be rejected in favor of a sustainable, non-nuclear framework for Japanese and regional security. Elements of this new framework could include creation of a North Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone, endorsement of the principle of no first use, adhering to the three non-nuclear principles, and explicit rejection of any suggestion that nuclear weapons might be used in response to chemical, biological, or conventional attack.

Impact – North Korea

**Independent Japan prompts China to solve North** **Korea**

**Mauro 10** (intelligence analyst with the Asymmetric Warfare and Intelligence Center, Ryan, June 2, FrontPageMag.com, <http://frontpagemag.com/2010/06/02/promoting-a-free-korea/> )

**The biggest reason North Korea has started and continued the crisis is to maintain a hold on its population. It provides an excuse for dramatic security measures and a reason to crack down on things like joint ventures with the South that expose the people to Western influence. This has become an increasing problem for Kim Jong-Il, as over half of the population now accesses foreign news, polls of refugees show increasing anger towards the government for their economic catastrophe, and public expressions of dissent when the government issued a new currency and banned old bank notes and foreign currency.** Suzanne Scholte, the leader of the North Korea Freedom Coalition, told FrontPage that **now is the time to aggressively “reach out to the North Korean people through all means possible**” and to focus on the human rights situation under Kim Jong-Il, which she described as a “holocaust.” She provided FrontPage with the text of a speech she gave in April, outlining the weaknesses of the regime. **Two of the most important methods the regime uses to stay in power have collapsed. The system to distribute food and goods has collapsed, and so private markets have arisen that are decreasing the population’s reliance upon the government for survival. The second major method was isolating the population from outside influence, which is also failing**. “One could argue that capitalism is alive and well and thriving in North Korea as the people cope the best they can by trading and selling the markets,” she said in her speech. “In fact, the film Titanic became so widely watched in North Korea that the regime felt compelled to inform the people that the movie was a depiction of the failure of capitalism,” she said. **The fear of the Kim Jong-Il regime became evident when it said it will destroy any loudspeakers set up by the South to broadcast into the North**. **That is a line that he cannot allow to be crossed. The North Koreans have vowed to begin “merciless counteractions” against the South’s “psychological warfare against the North.” The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has made new 300-strong police units** **in each province to stamp out opposition and to try to prevent the flow of information into the country.** The West faces a dilemma. **The North Korean government feels it needs a crisis in order to survive, and therefore, ignoring them will only result in greater provocations. At the same time, Kim Jong-Il must react to the retaliation by appearing stronger than his enemies by heating things up further. The result is an inevitable series of increasing crises with unforeseen consequences. The solution is to hasten the day when the regime falls, but the weaker the regime becomes, the more likely it is to lash out as it has this year. The unfortunate conclusion is that further clashes are unavoidable.** There are multiple ways that the West can weaken the regime’s grip. Colonel Cucullu said that the North expects to “be rewarded by Western nations once again.” **This behavior cannot be encouraged through appeasement.** He also raised the point that **Japan is also fearful and will not rely on the U.S. for its safety. The possibility of chaos on the Korean Peninsula and the potential for Japan to rapidly re-arm can be used to pressure China into reigning in its partner**. Joshua Stanton makes a wise suggestion that cell phones be smuggled into North Korea’s markets and towers erected in the South so they have reception. Scholte said that there are 17,000 North Koreans who left their country for the South that can be used to send information into their original homeland. Refugees can be mobilized for similar efforts. The U.S. should place North Korea back on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, and push for sanctions in the United Nations. International measures to freeze the assets of North Korean officials and institutions involved in criminal activity and human rights abuses should also be taken. **There will be those who oppose such measures out of a fear of provoking North Korea. The sad truth is that the current government will set out to instigate major confrontations as a matter of survival. The West has two options: Ignore the misery of the North Korean people and hope that this pattern will not spiral down into armed conflict, or actively welcome the day that Korea can be united and free**.

AT: Appeasement DA

Japanese sanctions on North Korea would induce action on the nuclear program—Japan has huge role in Korean economy

Cronin 5 (Richard, Specialist in Asian Affairs, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs Vol. 29 No. 1, <http://www.stimson.org/southeastasia/pdf/Cronin_The_North_Korean_Nuclear_Threat_and%20the_US_Japan_Security_Alliance.pdf>

A number of initiatives by the Koizumi government to strengthen Japan’s own military capabilities vis-á-vis North Korea, and its cooperation with the United States on measures aimed at putting pressure on Pyongyang to change its course, go well beyond what Japan has been prepared to do even in the recent past. In February and June 2004 Japan’s Diet passed legislation that would give the government the authority to impose economic and financial sanctions on Pyongyang, including measures against the pro-Pyongyang Chosen Soren (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan), such as cutting off financial remittances, and banning North Korean ships from Japanese ports under certain circumstances. The legislation regarding port visits appears to be aimed at the Mangyongbong-92, the North Korean ship that provides the only ferry connection between the two countries. 20 As stated earlier, several political leaders and government officials have openly described the proposed legislation as a “bargaining chip” in negotiating the nuclear and abduction issues, but others, who have low expectations of Pyongyang, also view sanctions as simply a means of punishing Pyongyang for its recalcitrance. The potential value of these measures as negative incentives and bargaining chips could be significant, as Japan is North Korea’s third largest trading partner after China and South Korea. North Korea’s exports to Japan have shrunk from $43 million in 1990 to only $23 million in 2002. Even in the best of times North Korea’s exports to Japan have been paltry compared with other East Asian countries, but sales to Japan still represent a significant source of hard currency, as do remittances from North Koreans living in Japan. Moreover, as the overall North Korean economy steadily declines, the hard currency earned by exports to Japan could be relatively more important. It also cannot be lost on Pyongyang that just as Japan has steadily squeezed both North Korean exports and remittances from ethnic Koreans in Japan in recent months, the country could also reap substantial benefits in return for abandoning its intransigence regarding its nuclear program and the abductee question.

AT: A9 Amendment Solves

Political disputes threaten the amendment process

Christopher **Preble, ‘6.** Director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, “Two Normal CountriesRethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” CATO Policy Analysis, April 18, 2006, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf>

Notably, however, while a survey from September 2004 found that nearly 85 percent of the members of the Diet support a revision of Article 9, sharp divisions exist between the political parties on the nature and extent of the revisions.36 Although the commission reports from April 2005 were adopted with support from the ruling LDP, its ally, the New Komeito, and the principal opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan, the three parties follow very different agendas.37 The LDP seeks a comprehensive modification of the constitution, including Article 9. In November the LDP issued its proposed draft constitution, which is supported by Prime Minister Koizumi. The LDP draft includes a reference to the SDF as a formal military force and recognition of its international role but also suggests changes to other parts of the constitution dealing with domestic issues such as the distribution of power between local and central governments and changes to amendment procedures.38 Although constitutional revision is a major topic in Japan, partisan divisions could seriously delay the amendment process. This is true even after the impressive gains made by reform-minded LDP candidates in the September 2005 elections. A two-thirds majority in each chamber is required before changes can be presented as a nationwide referendum for ratification; accordingly, the parties are expected to try to work together to create a revision proposal that can win broad support.39

**Amendment doesn’t place Japan as regional power (?)**

Christopher **Preble, ‘6.** Director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, “Two Normal CountriesRethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” CATO Policy Analysis, April 18, 2006, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf>

But constitutional revision would not lead inexorably to an embrace of militarism or, worse, Japanese imperialism. A careful reading of Japanese public opinion reveals that many Japanese do not want to abandon the pacifist principles enshrined in Article 9. For example, although a January 2004 poll by the Japan Times found that the Japanese increasingly believe that the constitution is “out of touch with the transformed international situation as well as the realities of Japanese society,” and more than 80 percent support reform in some fashion,43 a more recent Asahi Shimbun poll from May 2005 revealed a split over the fate of Article 9. While 58 percent of Japanese believe that a revised constitution should explicitly recognize the existence of the SDF, and 12 percent wish to see the SDF become a traditional military force, 51 percent of respondents prefer that Article 9 remain unchanged. Such apparent inconsistency shows that Japanese political leaders must facilitate a public debate, not only to rally supporters, but also to educate a public that seems both concerned and confused by the issue.44 More important, those sentiments might reflect a continued strong aversion to the aggressive use of force as proscribed by Article 9 and also a desire to maintain, and even expand, autonomous military capabilities for selfdefense.

AT: Iraq Deployment S

Japanese deployment to Iraq was a means of strengthening the alliance with the US

Christopher **Preble, ‘6.** Director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, “Two Normal CountriesRethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” CATO Policy Analysis, April 18, 2006, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf>

Twelve years later, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq posed no greater threat to Japan than it had in the earlier period. But the second time around, Japan’s leaders—particularly Prime Minister Koizumi—were anxious to prove their loyalty to the United States. Equally important, there were fewer legal prohibitions on military participation in 2003 than in 1991, given that the Japanese had passed legislation following the first Gulf War that made it somewhat easier to deploy SDF personnel abroad. “When the United States, an absolutely invaluable ally of our country, is sacrificing itself,” the prime minister explained, “it is natural for our country to back the move as much as possible.”59 In short, the deployment of Japanese forces to Iraq in 2003 was more a reflection of Japan’s continued dependence on the United States than it was an expression of independence. Indeed, this is essentially how the Bush administration framed the deployment. As a follow-on to his comment that it was essential that Japan be seen as standing side by side with the United States in the war on terrorism, former deputy secretary of state Armitage in June 2003 expressed his hopes that Japan would decide to put “boots on the ground” in Iraq.60 Tokyo’s primary interest, it could easily be interpreted, was not in bringing stability to Iraq, per se, but rather in maintaining good relations with the United States. If the Japanese public was genuinely supportive of the mission, if the deployment revealed a sense of shared strategic purpose or was seen as advancing genuine Japanese national interests, then the Japanese forces in Iraq today would be both useful and significant. As it is, they are merely symbolic. As of the end of March 2006, there were approximately 600 Japanese ground troops operating in the relatively peaceful city of Samawa in southern Iraq, with another 200 stationed in Kuwait in a supporting role. The deployment was first approved in December 2003, and Koizumi renewed this mandate in two successive years. It now seems likely that the SDF mission in Iraq will end some time in mid to late 2006, when the British and Australian troops that are providing security for the Japanese forces are scheduled to leave the country.61 Koizumi’s ability to sustain the mission for as long as he did reflects a delicate political balancing act. The SDF troops have been posted in a relatively peaceful region, and their assignment, the Japan Defense Agency explains, focuses on “humanitarian and reconstruction assistance” and is “designed solely to help the people of Iraq in their attempt to rebuild their own country.”62The Japanese safe haven essentially has been carved out by Dutch, and later British and Australian, combat forces, none of which are proscribed from operating in a combat setting.63 A majority of Japanese disapproved of the U.S. attack on Iraq, but opposition to their government’s support of postwar reconstruction has been far more muted. Most recognize Japan’s dependence on the United States for security and are therefore willing to put aside their qualms about the use of force in order to reaffirm their solidarity with their powerful patron. The Japanese public’s ambivalence has enabled the Koizumi government to circumvent pockets of strong public opposition. “Maintenance of the U.S.-Japan alliance will now be given priority,” according to the prime minister, even if America’s actions are not considered legitimate by many Japanese. Koizumi stresses: “There are times when we make mistakes following the public opinion.”64 That statement, far from being an expression of blatant disregard for public opinion, instead reflects Koizumi’s sense that satisfying the United States, even if it means risking the lives of Japanese soldiers, is a fair bargain just so long as those risks don’t materialize into actual casualties. It would be far harder for Koizumi to maintain such a stance if Japanese troops were subjected to the chaos and violence that confront American forces every day.

\_\_\_\*\*North Korea

1AC Cards

**US gets embroiled (retag** **later)**

**Shanker and Sanger 10 [Thom, Pentagon correspondent NYT, David, Chief Washington Correspondent NYT, May 30, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/31/world/asia/31koreanavy.html]**

WASHINGTON — Surprised by how easily a South Korean warship was sunk by what an international investigation concluded was a North Korean torpedo fired from a midget submarine, senior American officials say they are planning a long-term program to plug major gaps in the South’s naval defenses**. They said the sinking revealed that years of spending and training had still left the country vulnerable to surprise attacks.** The discovery of **the weaknesses in South Korea caught officials in both countries off guard.** As South Korea has rocketed into the ranks of the world’s top economies, it has invested billions of dollars to bolster its defenses and to help refine one of the oldest war plans in the Pentagon’s library: a joint strategy with the United States to repel and defeat a North Korean invasion. But the shallow waters where the attack occurred are patrolled only by South Korea’s navy, and South Korean officials confirmed in interviews that the sinking of the warship, the Cheonan, which killed 46 sailors, revealed a gap that the American military must help address. The **United States — pledged to defend its ally** but stretched thin by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq — **would be drawn into any conflict**. But it has been able to reduce its forces on the Korean Peninsula by relying on South Korea’s increased military spending. Senior Pentagon officials stress that firepower sent to the region by warplanes and warships would more than compensate for the drop in American troop levels there in the event of war. But **the attack was evidence, the officials say, of how North Korea has compensated for the fact that it is so bankrupt that it can no longer train its troops or buy the technology needed to fight a conventional war**. So it has instead invested heavily in stealthy, hard-to-detect technologies that can inflict significant damage, even if it could not win a sustained conflict. Building a small arsenal of nuclear weapons is another big element of the Northern strategy — a double-faceted deterrent allowing it to threaten a nuclear attack or to sell the technology or weapons in order to head off retaliation even befor an act of war like sinking South Korean ships. In an interview last week, **Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that the joint training exercise with South Korea planned just off the country’s coast in the next few weeks represented only the “near-term piece” of a larger strategy to prevent a recurrence of the kind of shock the South experienced as it watched one of its ships sunk without warning**. But the longer-range effort will be finding ways to detect, track and counter the miniature submarines, which he called “a very difficult technical, tactical problem.” “Longer term, it is a skill set that we are going to continue to press on,” Admiral Mullen said. **“Clearly, we don’t want that to happen again. We don’t want to give that option to North Korea in the future. Period. We want to take it away.”**

1AC Cards

**North Korean provocation will result in actualization of the US’s promises to provide extended nuclear deterrence, equipping the South with Tomahawk missles, B-2 bombers and more, giving the North implement nuclear weaponry.**

**Sung-Ki 09 [Jung, Staff Reporter for the Korean Times, August 25, http://thevelvetrocket.com/2009/08/25/the-u-s-nuclear-umbrella-a-double-edged-sword-for-south-korea/]**

**Amid growing concern about North Korea’s high-stake nuclear gamesmanship, the United State has vowed to provide an “extended” nuclear umbrella to South Korea,** where no tactical nuclear weapons are present. Debates are under way, however, on the effectiveness of this in the case of conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Proponents say the U.S. commitment to providing extended nuclear deterrence capabilities will help prevent the North from “miscalculating” that it would gain anything from missile and nuclear tests. Opponents argue **the U.S. nuclear deterrence pledge could only provoke the communist North and send the wrong message that Pyongyang is a recognized nuclear state.** “**The U.S. extended deterrence means a stronger and broader defense against the North’s chemical, biological and missile attacks as well as nuclear attacks.** So this is huge step in the joint defense of South Korea and the United States against North Korea,” a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) said. “But there is concern, at the same time, that talking **too much of the nuclear umbrella would give North Korea a good excuse to claim itself to be a nuclear power,”** the researcher said. **At the June 16 summit in Washington, U.S. President Barack Obama reaffirmed that the United States would provide an “extended nuclear umbrella” to South Korea in response to increasing nuclear threats from North Korea.** Pyongyang conducted a second nuclear test last month and test-fired several short-range missiles, defying calls by the international community to give up its nuclear ambitions. **This was the first time for a U.S. leader to clarify at a summit coverage of South Korea under its nuclear umbrella.** The U.S. government has promised since 1978 that it will provide necessary nuclear deterrence capabilities for South Korea against North Korea in the annual South Korea-U.S. defense ministers’ meetings, but the issue had not been discussed at a summit level. **Under the extended nuclear deterrence pledge, military experts say, the U.S. military would mobilize all necessary capabilities to neutralize North Korean nuclear provocations. For example, the U.S. Air Force could send B-2/52 bombers and other fighter aircraft carrying nuclear bombs, such as the B-61, to hit nuclear facilities in the North. Tomahawk cruise missiles could be launched from nuclear-powered submarines to strike targets. The B-61 bomb is known to have a “dial able” explosive power of 0.3 to 340 kilotons and believed to be capable of destroying North Korea’s key underground facilities. U.S. fighter aircraft would also be ready to conduct surgical strikes with high-end bombs, such as bunker busters.**

1AC Cards

**Status quo pressure is doomed to fail – if North Korea feels backed into a corner, they’ll lash out**

**New York Times 10** (David Sanger, May 28, “In the Koreas, Five Possible Ways to War”, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/30/weekinreview/30sanger.html?pagewanted=1)

USUALLY**, there is a familiar cycle to Korea crises**. Like a street gang showing off its power to run amok in a well-heeled neighborhood, **the North Koreans launch a missile over Japan or set off a nuclear test or stage an attack — as strong evidence indicates they did in March, when a South Korean warship was torpedoed.** Expressions of outrage follow**. So do vows that this time, the North Koreans will pay a steep price. In time, though, the United States and North Korea’s neighbors** — China, Japan, South Korea and Russia — **remind one another that they have nothing to gain from a** prolonged confrontation, much less a **war**. Gradually, sanctions get watered down. Negotiations reconvene. **Soon the North hints it can be enticed or bribed into giving up a slice of its nuclear program. Eventually, the cycle repeats**. **The White House betting is that the latest crisis**, stemming from the March attack, **will also abate** without much escalation. **But there is more than a tinge of doubt. The big risk**, as always, **is what happens if the North Koreans make a major miscalculation. (It wouldn’t be their first. Sixty years ago, Mr. Kim’s father, Kim Il-sung, thought the West wouldn’t fight when he invaded the South. The result was the Korean War.)** What’s more, the dynamic does feel different from recent crises. The South has a hardline government whose first instinct was to cut off aid to the North, not offer it new bribes. At the same time, the North is going through a murky, ill-understood succession crisis. And President **Obama has made it clear he intends to break the old cycle**. “**We’re out of the inducements game,” one senior administration official, who would not discuss internal policy discussions on the record, said last week**. “**For 15 years at least, the North Koreans have been in the extortion business, and the U.S. has largely played along. That’s over.”** **That may change the North’s behavior, but it could backfire.** “There’s an argument that **in these circumstances, the North Koreans may perceive that their best strategy is to escalate,”** says Joel Wit, a former State Department official who now runs a Web site that follows North Korean diplomacy.

UQ – Conflict Inevitable

**Crises with North Korea are inevitable in the status quo—only a withdrawal of the Western threat will solve**

**Mauro 10** (intelligence analyst with the Asymmetric Warfare and Intelligence Center, Ryan, June 2, FrontPageMag.com, <http://frontpagemag.com/2010/06/02/promoting-a-free-korea/> )

**The crisis with North Korea is escalating and will continue to escalate for as long as the regime is in power.** **Kim Jong-Il made a calculated decision that he** **needed a dramatic confrontation in order to appear strong, set the stage for his youngest son to take over, and to create a pretext with which to stop Western influence from reaching the country’s increasingly knowledgeable population. Until the regime collapses under the weight of its failures, it will need to periodically up the ante with a series of increasingly frightening provocations.** There was a much bigger **purpose behind the North’s sinking of the Cheonan** and that **was to stir up the biggest clash since the Korean War.** Shortly after the attack, **the South Korean army was accused by the North of crossing into the Demilitarized Zone and opening fire. Five properties at the jointly-operated Mt. Kumgang resort were seized, and two North Korean agents were arrested in South Korea as they plotted to assassinate the highest-level defector living there. This was a campaign to make certain that a crisis was sparked.** Since **South Korea has formally accused the Kim Jong-Il regime of sinking their ship, the U.S. and South Korea have planned joint military exercises**, the South Koreans have pledged to bring the case to the United Nations and **they have cut off almost all trade with North Korea.** **The South’s sea lanes are also being closed to North Korean ships and they are re-labeling the North as their “principal enemy.” The North Korean government believes it has to retaliate and appear strong in the face of this retaliation. They have reacted by cutting off economic and political ties, and promising to close the Kaesong factory complex where South Korean businesses were allowed to invest, and South Koreans are now beginning to be kicked out from the site. The military is on alert, and the telephone line between the two countries used to avert naval clashes has been cut off. The “puppet authorities” of the South will not be allowed to travel to the North, and none of the South’s air or naval vessels can enter their territory**. **Four of North Korea’s submarines have left their base and their location is unknown. It is possible they have been deployed for an attack**. Colonel Gordon Cucullu, author of Separated at Birth: How North Korea Became the Evil Twin, told FrontPage that **it is also possible that the submarines are hidden in caves along the coast as a security measure. This movement may be because of the North Korean military’s “war footing,”** but it is hard to know for sure given how erratic their behavior has been. Another startling development is that **the South has arrested a spy who transmitted classified information about their subway system to the Kim Jong-Il regime. This is a strong indication that North Korea is still preparing for potential sabotage operations**. **The North has the world’s largest number of special forces, which they have been training to carry out guerilla-type attacks. It is also known that the North has commandos willing to go on suicide missions. Should the North Korean government view the upcoming military exercises as something they must respond aggressively to in order to maintain credibility, the use of such saboteurs cannot be ruled out.**

UQ – Conflict Inevitable

**US response to sinking of South Korean warship pushes tensions—conflict is likely**

**Huffington Post 10** (Kelley Olson, 5/27, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/27/south-korea-begins-larges\_n\_591974.html?page=9&show\_comment\_id=48574077#comment\_48574077)

**Military tension on the Korean peninsula rose Thursday after North Korea threatened to attack any South Korean ships entering its waters and Seoul held anti-submarine drills in response to the March sinking of a navy vessel blamed on Pyongyang**. Separately, **the chief U.S. military commander** in South Korea **criticized the North over the sinking of the South Korean warship** Cheonan in which 46 sailors died, **telling the communist country to stop its aggressive actions. North Korean reaction was swift. The military declared it would scrap accords with the South designed to prevent armed clashes at their maritime border, including the cutting of a military hot line, and warned of "prompt physical strikes" if any South Korean ships enter** what the North says are its waters in **a disputed area** off the west coast of the peninsula. A multinational team of investigators said May 20 that a North Korean torpedo sank the 1,200-ton ship. **Seoul announced punitive measures, including slashing trade and resuming anti-Pyongyang propaganda over radio and loudspeakers aimed at the North. North Korea has denied attacking the ship, which sank near disputed western waters where the Koreas have fought three bloody sea battles** since 1999. "The facts and evidence laid out by the joint international investigation team are very compelling. That is why I have asked the Security Council to fulfill their responsibility to keep peace and stability ... to take the necessary measures, keeping in mind the gravity of this situation," U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said as he opened a conference in Brazil meant to help find solutions to global conflicts. **Inter-Korean political and economic ties have been steadily deteriorating since the February 2008 inauguration of South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, who vowed a tougher line on the North and its nuclear program**. **The sinking of the Cheonan has returned military tensions – and the prospect of armed conflict – to the forefront**. Off the west coast, **10 South Korean warships, including a 3,500-ton destroyer, fired artillery and other guns and dropped anti-submarine bombs during a one-day exercise to boost readiness, the navy said. South Korea also is planning two major military drills with the U.S. by July in a display of force intended to deter aggression by North Korea**, according to South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff**. Gen. Walter Sharp, chief of the 28,500 U.S. troops in South Korea, said the United States, South Korea** and other members of the U.N. Command "**call on North Korea to cease all acts of provocation and to live up with the** terms of past agreements, including the **armistice agreement**." The U.S. fought on the South Korean side during the 1950-53 Korean War, which ended in an armistice, not a peace treaty. North Korea has long demanded a permanent peace agreement. **The prospect of another eruption of serious fighting has been constant on the Korean peninsula since the war ended**. But it had been largely out of focus in the past decade as North and South Korea took steps to end enmity and distrust, such as launching joint economic projects and holding two summits. **The sinking of the warship, however, clearly caught South Korea** – which has a far more modern and advanced military than its impoverished rival – **off guard**. "I think one of the big conclusions that we can draw from this is that, in fact, military readiness in the West Sea had become very lax," said Carl Baker, an expert on Korean military relations at the Pacific Forum CSIS think tank in Honolulu, calling it nothing short of an "indictment" of Seoul's preparedness. South Korean and U.S. militaries are taking pains to warn the North that such an embarrassment will not happen again. South Korean media reported Thursday that the **U.S.-South Korean combined forces command led by Sharp raised its surveillance level**, called Watch Condition, by a step from level 3 to level 2. Level 1 is the highest. **The increased alert level means U.S. spy satellites and U-2 spy planes will intensify their reconnaissance of North Korea**, the JoongAng Ilbo newspaper said, citing an unidentified South Korean official. The South Korean and U.S. militaries would not confirm any changes to the alert level. It would be the first change since North Korea carried out a nuclear test in May 2009, a South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff officer said on condition of anonymity, citing department policy.

UQ – Punishment Inevitable

**US condemned North Korea’s attack- ready to “punish” the violation of peace**

**OI 10 [May 21, One India News Source, http://news.oneindia.in/2010/05/21/united-states-warns-north-korea.html]**

**The United States warned North Korea that it would be punished for sinking the South Korean warship, Cheonan.** US explains the ship **sinking as an 'unprovoked and unwarranted act of agression'. The White House called the attack "a challenge to international peace and security and a violation of the armistice agreement"** which ended the 1950-53 war.

UQ – SoKo Wants War

**South Korea will no longer tolerate Northern provocation—they are ready to use violence**

**Korea Herald 10** (5/24, “Lee says South will invoke right of self-defense”, <http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20100524000740>)

**President Lee** Myung-bak on Monday **vowed to “immediately exercise (Seoul’s) right of self-defense” if North Korea attempts military provocation again as he announced several countermeasures against the North**, which allegedly sank a South Korean warship in March. “From now on, **the Republic of Korea will not tolerate any provocative act by the North and will maintain the principle of proactive deterrence,**” Lee said during a televised national address, which was followed by a joint press briefing by the ministers of unification, foreign affairs and defense. “**If our territorial waters, airspace or territory are militarily violated, we will immediately exercise our right of self-defense**.” **Lee defined the Cheonan’s sinking as “a surprise North Korean torpedo attack,” saying that it “constitutes a military provocation against the ROK.**” Admitting the mistakes made by the South Korean Armed Forces, Lee said his government will “solidify national security readiness.” **“The discipline of the Armed Forces will be reestablished, military reform efforts will be expedited and combat capabilities will be reinforced drastically**,” he said during the 10-minute speech. **“ROK-U.S. joint combat readiness will be further strengthened on the basis of the strong ROK-U.S. alliance.” As its first military measure to punish Pyongyang for the deadly attack, Seoul will launch its own antiproliferation exercise and resume psychological warfare against North Korea**, Defense Minister Kim Tae-young said during a joint press briefing following the presidential address. As another retaliatory step, **North Korean vessels have been prohibited from sailing in South Korean waters**, previously allowed under an inter-Korean maritime pact signed in 2004, Kim said. **The South will also launch a joint antisubmarine military exercise with the U.S. in the West Sea that focuses on improving defense tactics against the North’s underwater attacks.**  Kim said **South Korea would aggressively participate in the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative** in and out of the Korean Peninsula as part of an international effort **to stop the shipment of weapons of mass destruction**. **South Korea, after years of hesitation so as not to provoke the North, decided to join the PSI following North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests last year. “The maritime interdiction training exercises within the region will be led by our Navy and are currently planned for the latter half of this year**,” Kim said. “**We will also participate in a maritime interdiction exercise outside the region** hosted by Australia in September this year.”

UQ – SoKo Wants War

**South Korea is escalating tensions after perceived sinking—they will start the conflict backed by the US**

**Huffington Post 10** (5/26, Matthew Lee and Hyung Jin-Kim, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/26/north-korea-border-close-threat_n_590282.html?page=2&show_comment_id=48429007#comment_48429007>)

SEOUL, South Korea — U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham **Clinton said** Wednesday **the world must respond to the "unacceptable provocation" represented by the sinking of a South Korean warship blamed on Pyongyang, as the regime unleashed more blistering rhetoric against Seoul and Washington.**  Tension on the divided Korean peninsula has risen dramatically since international investigators said last week that a torpedo fired by a North Korean submarine tore apart and sank the South Korean warship Cheonan on March 26, killing 46 sailors. Relations are at their lowest point in a decade, when South Korea began reaching out to the North with unconditional aid as part of reconciliation efforts. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak has taken a harder line against Pyongyang since taking office in 2008 amid delays in the North's promised denuclearization and has suspended aid. **South Korea, backed by the U.S.,** Japan and other allies, **began implementing** a package of **punitive measures against the North** on Tuesday – **ranging from slashing trade, resuming propaganda warfare and barring the North's cargo ships. Those were seen as among the strongest it could implement short of military action**. **"This was an unacceptable provocation by North Korea, and the international community has a responsibility and a duty to respond,"** Clinton told reporters in Seoul, the final leg of a three-nation Asian tour**. South Korea's measures "are absolutely appropriate and they have the full support of the United States."** Later Wednesday, **North Korea again called the investigation results a "fabrication" and accused** President Barack **Obama's administration of being behind a plot to pinpoint the North as the culprit to bolster its military presence in the region**. "As a matter of fact, the **Obama administration is straining the situation in a bid to beef up its forces in the region and tighten its military domination**," the official Korean Central News Agency said in a commentary. It did not mention Clinton's trip. **North Korea, which has vowed to retaliate against any punishment for the ship sinking, has declared it is cutting relations with South Korea, starting "all-out counterattacks" against the South's psychological warfare operations and barring South Korean ships and airliners from passing through its territory.** On Wednesday, **the North cut off some cross-border communication links and expelled eight South Korean government officials from a joint factory park** in the North Korean border city of Kaesong. **The North's military also issued a statement warning it would "totally ban" the passage of South Korean personnel and vehicles to Kaesong if Seoul does not stop psychological warfare operations. It also said it would "blow up" any propaganda loudspeakers South Korea installs at the border. "We will never tolerate the slightest provocations of our enemies, and will answer to that with all-out war,"** Maj. Gen. Pak Chan Su, a Korean War veteran, said in Pyongyang, according to footage from APTN. "This is the firm standpoint of our People's Army."

UQ – Troop Strength Up

**US bolstering hard power in response to North Korean aggression – naval exercises prove**

**Post and Courier 10 [May 29 Charleston News** [**http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/opinion/?id=38464**](http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/opinion/?id=38464)**]**

With the Cheonan incident North Korea may be playing a familiar game. **In the past its saber rattling, up to and including nuclear and missile tests, led to rising international tension but eventually won the rogue nation economic and political benefits without curbing its continuing menace in Northeast Asia. It is time to take a different approach. A calm and measured show of strength should take precedence** over a premature rush to dialogue. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton says the destruction of the South Korean Navy vessel Cheonan by a North Korean torpedo in March, with a loss of 46 lives, must have "consequences." **The United States has reinforced its armed strength in Northeast Asia, and new joint naval exercises are planned with South Korea. South Korea has suspended aid to North Korea,** and plans to take the Cheonan incident to the United Nations.

UQ – War Games

**Declaration of North Korea as “main enemy” and promises of 80, 000 troop scale war games prove South Korea’s in the war business**

**BBC 10 [May 26, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, Lexis]**

In his national address Monday, Lee laid down a series of countermeasures after a multinational team of investigators determined that a North Korean torpedo attack sank the warship Ch'o'nan [Cheonan] on March 26. **Lee vowed Seoul will no longer tolerate Pyongyang's provocations and will assume a stance of "proactive deterrence."** **Lee's words followed comments by government officials earlier in the day that the South's government was considering redesignating** **North Korea as its "main enemy"** in its defence policy document later this year. The South Korean Defence White Paper first referred to North Korea as the main enemy in 1995. That was in response to comments by a North Korean representative during a 1994 inter-Korean meeting that Seoul would turn into "a sea of fire" if a war broke out on the peninsula. In 2004, under the Kim Dae-jung [Kim Dae-jung] administration, the description of North Korea as an "enemy" was removed. The defence policy paper only described North Korea as presenting a "direct military threat" against the South. Kim and his successor No Mu-hyo'n [Roh Moo-hyun] adopted an engagement policy towards North Korea, pushing for reconciliation on the peninsula. But the situation has changed after the Ch'o'nan [Cheonan] incident, which Lee called "a military provocation." "Now that President Lee spoke of the concept of our main enemy, [redesignation of North Korea] will be practically considered," Blue House [ROK Office of the President] spokeswoman Kim Eun-hye said. Lee was quoted as saying, **"North Korea presents a threat, but we need to show them a definitive stance and we have the strength to do it."** S**outh Korea is also considering resuming a joint South-US field manoeuvre drill. A high-ranking military official in Seoul said that would be part of the response to North Korea** South Korean and US forces held field manoeuvre exercises known as "Team Spirit" from 1976 to 1993. A Team Spirit exercise was scheduled for 1994 but was cancelled when North Korea agree to disable its nuclear weapons programme. **The military official said yesterday the new exercise would be modelled after Team Spirit, which included up to 80,000 US troops.**

**US seeking offensive strategies to deter the North with South Korea on board**

**Solomon 10 [Jay, Staff Writer June 1, Wall Street Journal, Lexis]**

**South Korea is planning war games with US and** reviewing its defense policy following North Korea's alleged sinking of naval patrol vessel; **could seek to postpone pending South Korean assumption of operational control from US and develop more offensive weapons to deter nuclear-armed North.**

**US formally condemns “rogue” actions of North Korea and has promised response with South Korea**

**Lee 10 [Matthew, Associated Press Writer, May 19, KansasCityNews.com** <http://www.kansascity.com/2010/05/19/1956867/us-weighs-response-to-skorean.html>**]**

For a second day in a row, senior American military, intelligence and diplomatic officials huddled in Washington to prepare a response to South Korea's report formally blaming the North for the explosion March 26 that sank the Cheonan, killing 46 sailors. The report, released in Seoul, said that investigators have proof that North Korea fired a torpedo at the warship. Shortly afterward, the White House released a statement saying: **"This act of aggression is one more instance of North Korea's unacceptable behavior and defiance of international law."** It said **the attack was "a challenge to international peace and security and is a violation of the Armistice Agreement"** that ended the Korean War. State Department spokesman Gordon Duguid said the evidence ruled out any alternative explanation and that **the United States was "already working very closely with our ally**, (South Korea), and consulting with our partners regarding appropriate steps." The top U.S. diplomat for Asia, Kurt Campbell, said earlier Wednesday that the **"United States strongly supports its conclusions."** Campbell, assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific, said the release of the report meant **the U.S. and its allies will be facing "a very serious set of circumstances in the coming days."** The U.S. response will be a central issue during Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's upcoming trip to Asia, Campbell said. Clinton leaves Washington on Thursday for talks in Japan, China and South Korea. "The United States supports South Korea unequivocally and strongly," Campbell said, adding that Clinton would be consulting closely with China, Japan and South Korea on how to answer the attack.

IL – Border Skirmishes 🡪 War

**North Korea’s actions have resulted in a war state emerging along the DMZ**

**Yearn-hong 10 [Choi, Staff Writer, May 21, Korea Times, Lexis]**

The full investigation into the explosion that caused the sinking of the South Korean naval ship Cheonan has been released. Many "normal" people already guessed North Korean was responsible for the incident in the Yellow Sea that March night. North Korea has denied it. Strange to say, many South Korean opposition leaders and politicians had attempted to find alternative explanations to North Korean involvement. If not North Korea, then who could it have been? There are many "abnormal" South Korean people who are either sympathetic to North Korea or hopeful that the explosion came from a possible accident. Now, it is all over. An international investigation team has finally released the long awaited report. What can we do now? **South Korean military retaliation on the North Korean navy's sudden and surprise attack which destroyed the 1,200-ton ship is not very desirable.** **It could escalate to a massive war along the Demilitarized Zone. North Korea has the capability to start a series of local battles in the DMZ, in the Yellow Sea or in the East Sea. So it should not start a retaliatory war.**

IL – Nuclear Deterrence

**North Korean nuclear aggression prompts the US to magnify the strength of its extended nuclear deterrence**

**Korean Herald 09 [May 27, The Korean Herald, Lexis]**

[**Obama**](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9490991612&returnToId=20_T9490994462&csi=6742&A=0.3138176684318059&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0BO%23&searchTerm=Obama%20&indexType=P) **assured the two Asian leaders of Washington's "unequivocal commitment" to the defense of their nations and peace in Northeast Asia. "**[**President Obama**](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9490991612&returnToId=20_T9490994462&csi=6742&A=0.3138176684318059&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0BO%23&searchTerm=President%20Obama%20&indexType=P) **asked me to remind our citizens of the strong Korea-U.S. alliance and that the United States' nuclear deterrence and strong military will protect South Korea in the face of nuclear threats from the North,"** President Lee said during a meeting with ministers after the telephone discussion.[**Obama**](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9490991612&returnToId=20_T9490994462&csi=6742&A=0.3138176684318059&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0BO%23&searchTerm=Obama%20&indexType=P) **was quoted as saying that North Korea also should be aware of the "rock-solid" Washington-Seoul alliance and the extensive and robust U.S. nuclear umbrella for the defense of the South. The U.S. leader appreciated Seoul's decision to take part in the U.S.-led international partnership that aims to intercept transfer of weapons of mass destruction**. The Foreign Ministry made a long-delayed announcement that it will fully participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative. also extended condolence over the death of former President Roh Moo-hyun. Lee and [Obama](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9490991612&returnToId=20_T9490994462&csi=6742&A=0.3138176684318059&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0BO%23&searchTerm=Obama%20&indexType=P)  are scheduled to meet in Washington next month. President Lee also had phone talks with Japanese leader Aso on Monday and with Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd yesterday. He is willing to talk with his Russian and Chinese counterparts if necessary, Lee's aides said. In a conference with ministers on a long-term budget plan, Lee pledged to take stern action and strengthen international cooperation to force the North to abandon its nuclear ambition. "**In the face of the latest nuclear test, we will be taking stronger countermeasures than ever through close cooperation with the United States**, as well as other member nations of the six-party talks - Japan, China and Russia," Lee was quoted as saying.

**Mutual dependence and continued rogue threat ensure US extended nuclear deterrence will continue to expand**

**Tanter 10 [Richard Professor of International Relations, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, February 7, Asian Pacific Journal: Japan Focus http://www.japanfocus.org/-Richard-Tanter/3269]**

Significantly, the most recent Australian official statement on extended nuclear deterrence is also the detailed and developed in the six decades of the ANZUS alliance. In the 2009 Defence White Paper all of the previously mentioned elements of the Australian policy of reliance on the United States assurance of nuclear protection are present, and are expounded at greater length and with more coherence:21 **• the United States will continue to rely on its “nuclear deterrence capability to underpin US strategic power, deter attack or coercion by other nuclear powers, and sustain allied confidence in US security commitments by way of extended deterrence”; • “stable nuclear deterrence” will continue and extended nuclear deterrence “will continue to be viable”; • “rogue states of concern” with long-range ballistic missiles will be “the challenge”; • for the first time, specific nuclear threats –** “though remote” – **are named:  • “**Iran and **North Korea, and possibly others in the future, will continue to pursue long-range ballistic missile programs that could pose a direct, though remote, risk to our own security.**” • the alliance is “indispensable to our security” insofar as it means “that the associated capability, intelligence and technological partnership, at the core of the alliance, is available to support our strategic capability advantage in our immediate neighbourhood and beyond.” • the alliance also “**means that, for so long as nuclear weapons exist, we are able to rely on the nuclear forces of the United States to deter nuclear attack** on Australia.” • for the first time, an official document articulates a commonly held position that alliance “protection provides a stable and reliable sense of assurance and has over the years removed the need for Australia to consider more significant and expensive defence options.” • joint defence facilities, especially at the Pine Gap intelligence facility, “contribute to the intelligence collection capabilities of both countries, support monitoring of compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements, and underpin global strategic stability by providing ballistic missile early warning information to the United States”.

IL – Nuclear Deterrence

**In the face of threat the US will ally closer with South Korea and Japan under a nuclear umbrella**

**Perkovich 09 [George, May, International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, http://www.icnnd.org/research/Perkovich\_Deterrence.pdf]**

**In East Asia, the situation is no less complicated.** As discussed below, **North Korea poses nuclear threats to South Korea and Japan. As long as these threats remain, the U.S. will continue to extend nuclear deterrence to its allies. Washington, Tokyo and Seoul must devote new effort to cooperatively devise policies to contain and deter Pyongyang and to try to eliminate its nuclear weapon capabilities and their export.** In the former category should be included enhancements in theater missile defenses and combined U.S.-Japanese ground-strike capabilities to negate possible North Korean missile threats. While retaining nuclear deterrence, allies should realistically examine whether nuclear weapons are necessary or would be feasibly used to destroy the North Korean government and Army. **Potential targets of U.S. nuclear attacks on North Korea presumably would include Pyongyang and other heavily populated areas** (or areas from which fall out would affect South Korea). Would it be just and therefore credible to hold elements of the North Korean civilian population at risk of nuclear destruction for the acts of a government for which that population is not responsible? If the North Korean people are victims of their own government, wouldn’t they be doubly victimized by U.S. nuclear attacks on them? Even if U.S. lawyers, who are involved in reviewing U.S. military operations, approved nuclear attacks that would harm large numbers of North Korean civilians, would South Koreans and others whose political support the United States needs for its larger purposes agree, especially given fear of radioactive fallout?

**Nuclear** **threats necessitate the US take the role of an extended nuclear deterrent.**

**Yong-ok 09. (Park, Research Fellow Sejong Institute. December, Korea Focus, http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/design2/essays/view.asp?volume\_id=92&content\_id=102814&category=G.)**

**As long as North Korea possesses nuclear arms, South Korea`s independent defense system against North Korea has little practical significance. North Korea`s military threats against the South have now added the “nuclear factor,” which entirely requires dependence on the “nuclear umbrella” of the United States**. While the **U.S. nuclear umbrella can prevent the North from using its nuclear arms**, it will have only limited effect in deterring various forms of conventional military provocations. Moreover, the North`s nuclear capabilities could make the United States hesitate to send reinforcements to Korea if a conventional war erupts on the peninsula. **Korean and U.S. authorities have recently adopted the new concept of “extended deterrence” replacing “nuclear umbrella.” It is because they have concluded that nuclear umbrella alone cannot guarantee the practicality and trustworthiness of the U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea.**According to definitions by the South Korean defense authorities, **nuclear umbrella means a system in which a nuclear power provides security guarantee for its allies or friendly countries that do not have nuclear arms. On the other hand, extended deterrence is a policy with which the nuclear power extends both nuclear and conventional deterrence to assist allies and friends against threats of attack from third countries. The “Joint Vision for the Alliance of ROK-USA,” which was adopted** at the Korea-U.S. summit talks in Washington on June 16, 2009**, confirmed the United States` “extended deterrence which includes nuclear umbrella” for the Republic of Korea. This meant that the concept of “extended deterrence through nuclear umbrella,” which had been repeatedly reassured** in the annual Security Consultative Meetings between the defense ministers of the two allies, **was now upgraded to a commitment between their heads of state.**

IL – Nuclear Deterrence

**US committed to defending South Korea in the face of Northern aggression**

**BBC 06 [October 26, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, Lexis]**

Seoul, 23 October: **The combined forces command of South Korea and the United States has begun to study how to implement a concrete pledge by the US to provide a nuclear umbrella in case of an attack from North Korea**, military sources said Monday [23 October]. "South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Combined Forces Command started studies on follow-up measures to an assignment given to Gen Burwell B. Bell at the end of the Military Committee Meeting with regard to detailed extension of a US nuclear umbrella," a military source said on condition of anonymity. At the end of annual defence talks with his South Korean counterpart Yoon Kwang-ung on Saturday, **US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld "offered assurances of firm US commitment and immediate support" to South Korea, "including the continuation of the extended deterrence offered by the US nuclear umbrella, consistent with the Mutual Defence Treaty.**" "The studies will include finding out whether it is necessary to complement the existing operational plans drawn up by the combined forces command," the source said. Despite a denial by US officials, **South Korean officials said the phrase "extended deterrence" can be interpreted as a detailed and concrete pledge by the US to provide a nuclear umbrella for South Korea in case of an attack from North Korea.**

**Despite its aim for global disarmament, the US still extends its hhegemonic dominance over North Korea through extended nuclear deterrence.**

**Hayes 09. [Peter, Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development” Japan Focus, December 24,** [**http://www.japanfocus.org/-Peter-Hayes/3268**](http://www.japanfocus.org/-Peter-Hayes/3268)**]**

This essay examines the role that nuclear weapons have played in Northeast Asia in creating a system of inter-state relations based in part on nuclear threat and the impact of North Korea on that system. **The US-led alliances that rest on extended nuclear deterrence have been characterized as hegemonic in the forty years of Cold Wa**r in the Gramscian sense of hegemonic, that is, **allied elites accepted US leadership based on its legitimating ideology of extended nuclear deterrence, institutional integration, and unique American nuclear forces that underpinned the alliances.2 A crucial aspect of American nuclear hegemony in Asia was the guarantee that the hegemon would ensure that no adversary could break out of the system after China's** 1964 **successful nuclear test**, as expressed by the Non Proliferation Treaty and IAEA safeguard system. The failure of the United States to stop and now reverse the DPRK nuclear over the previous two decades threatens its hegemonic leadership in Northeast Asia, and is linked to the decreasing ability of American power to shape events in other proliferation-prone regions such as South and West Asia. On April 4, 2009, President **Obama proposed global "Nuclear Abolition" as a new strategic goal for US foreign policy**, thereby projecting it as an organizing principle under American leadership for all states. His Global Abolition policy promises to fulfill the pledge that is the foundation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, namely, **that non-nuclear states will forego nuclear weapons provided that the nuclear weapons states eliminate them**. However, **Global Abolition has not supplanted extended nuclear deterrence in managing regional challengers to the status quo distribution of power**. In relation to the DPRK, a classic upstart threat to the existing regional order, the United States appears to be headed towards a reassertion of strategic deterrence in the form of restated general commitments to extend nuclear deterrence to its regional allies against the DPRK. **The goal is to deter the DPRK from attacking—not currently a realistic prospect given both the low level of the DPRK nuclear program, and the overwhelming nuclear power of the United States**. More important, it seeks to compel the DPRK to cooperate in non-proliferation and in negotiations to end its weapons program—a strategy that has thus far failed to curtail North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, and ironically, may even hasten, not slow, DPRK proclivity to export its capabilities.

IL – SoKo Aggressivity

**With allies forming North and South Korea militarize against each other and have dropped all diplomatic pretenses**

**Sisk 10 [Richard, Staff Writer, May 26, Daily News, Lexis]**

WASHINGTON - Cold War rhetoric escalated tensions on the Korean peninsula yesterday ahead of Secretary of State Clinton's mission to restore calm while backing up South Korea. South Korean President [**Lee Myung-bak**](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9462715650&returnToId=20_T9462716505&csi=151550&A=0.1445502963642178&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0VY%23&searchTerm=Lee%20Myung-bak%20&indexType=P) **redesignated North Korea as his nation's "principal enemy" and the Stalinist regime in Pyongyang severed all ties with the South, including a Red Cross contact on the heavily fortified demilitarized zone. By dropping the term "enemy" and pursuing a failed policy of engagement in recent years, Lee said, "We have ignored the very danger under our feet."** The North's Korean Central News Agency mocked the charge by Seoul and the U.S. that a North Korean minisub sank the South Korean Navy corvette Cheonan on March 26, killing 46 sailors in possibly the worst violation of the 1953 armistice. The charge was a "clear fabrication" from a government in the South riddled with "confrontation maniacs, sycophants, traitors and wicked warmongers," KCNA said. In response, **all South Korean government officials working at a joint industrial park in the border town of Kaesong are being expelled,** KCNA said. In Beijing, Clinton urged China to rein in its North Korean ally before her arrival in Seoul to show support for the South. "No one is more concerned about peace and stability in this region as the Chinese," Clinton said. "We know this is a shared responsibility, and in the days ahead we will work with the international community and our Chinese colleagues to fashion an effective, appropriate response." Seoul banned North Korean ships from passing through South Korean waters, pushed for tougher United Nations sanctions, and resumed propaganda broadcasts across the DMZ separating the two hostile states. **North Korea, which has threatened "all-out war" against the South, then banned South Korean ships and airplanes from passing through its waters and airspace. The North also vowed "all-out counterattacks" against the South's propaganda.**

**Korean peninsula faces nuclear war due to escalating tension**

**BBC 10 [June 1, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, Lexis]**

**The regime, which is seeking confrontation with the North and a nuclear war on the peninsula with the backing of outside forces, deserves a vehement condemnation from the entire Korean nation.** Yu Pok Sun, 42, a peasant of the Migok Coop Farm in Sariwon City, North Hwanghae Province, told KCNA that the South Korean regime has persistently pursued the policy of confrontation with the North, wrecking the historic June 15 joint declaration and the programme for its implementation, that is October 4 declaration, and **leading the North-South relations to the state of war. The South Korean regime will know how dearly it has to pay for their crimes,** she added.

IL – Troops 🡪 Escalation

**Troop** **exercises ensure conflict** **escalation**

**Coonan 10 [Clifford, Writer- The Independent and The Irish Times, May 25, The Irish Times, Lexis]**

**Pyongyang s response when threatened by the South is to promise all-out** **war. True to form, it responded with defiance, saying that accusing it of blowing up the Cheonan was tantamount to declaring** **war.** The North Koreans have also said they will open fire on speakers if the South resumes blaring anti-North Korean propaganda back over the border, which was abandoned in 2004 as relations thawed. There have been numerous attacks on South Korea over the years. North Korea is suspected of involvement in a 1983 attack on a presidential delegation that killed 21 people and the bombing of an aircraft in 1987 that claimed 115 lives. **Pyongyang** **disputes the maritime** **border unilaterally drawn by UN forces at the close of the** **war, and the Koreas have fought three bloody skirmishes there,** most recently in November. In Seoul, **defence minister Kim Tae-young said the US and South** **Korea would hold joint anti-submarine exercises in the waters soon. Joint military exercises are guaranteed to anger the North Koreans.**

Impact – PGS

**North Korean ambitions cause the US to implement a new brand of weaponry to defend its allies, crossing onto the threshold of nuclear warfare**

**Sanger and Shanker 10 [David E, Thom, April 24 The International Herald Tribune, Lexis]**

In coming years, President [**Barack Obama**](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9487911806&returnToId=20_T9487912688&csi=8355&A=0.4801550620472812&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0BO%23&searchTerm=Barack%20Obama%20&indexType=P)  **will decide whether to deploy a new class of weapons capable of reaching any corner of the Earth from the United States in under an hour** and with such accuracy and force that they would greatly diminish America's reliance on its nuclear arsenal. Yet even now, concerns about the technology are so strong that the Obama administration has acceded to a demand by Russia that the United States decommission one nuclear missile for every one of these conventional weapons fielded by the Pentagon. That provision, the White House said, is buried deep inside the New Start treaty that Mr. Obama and President Dmitri A. Medvedev signed in Prague two weeks ago. Called Prompt Global Strike, the new weapon is designed to carry out tasks like picking off Osama bin Laden in a cave, if the right one could be found**; taking out a North Korean missile while it is being rolled to the launch pad;** or destroying an Iranian nuclear site - all without crossing the nuclear threshold. In theory, the weapon will hurl a conventional warhead of enormous weight at high speed and with pinpoint accuracy, generating the localized destructive power of a nuclear warhead. The idea is not new: President George W. Bush and his staff promoted the technology, imagining that this new generation of conventional weapons would replace nuclear warheads on submarines. In face-to-face meetings with Mr. Bush, **Russian leaders complained that the technology could increase the risk of a nuclear war,** because Russia would not know whether the missiles carried nuclear warheads or conventional ones. **Mr. Bush and his aides concluded that the Russians were right.**

Impact – WMD Use

**The conflict will escalate to chemical and nuclear WMD use**

**MacLeod 10 [Calum, Reporter, June 1, USA Today, Lexis]**

T**he report and demands for sanctions have prompted threats of war from the North, which denies sinking the Cheonan and maintains a massive army along most of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)** between the North and South. On Sunday, North Korea mobilized 100,000 people in Pyongyang for a rally with signs that read, "Beat up the reactionary traitor Lee Myung Bak" and **"Stop and destroy provocations by the bellicose South Koreans and the U.S. mavericks,"** according to The Chosun Ilbo newspaper. North Korea might not be done. Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, says **a provocative act might come soon if tensions do not ease**. **Koreans have long lived with the nightmarish possibility of a devastating war, but the likelihood of conflict increases when all communications are cut off as they are now,** says Daniel Pinkston, a regional analyst based in Seoul for the International Crisis Group, a think tank. **If war does break out, "there could be casualties like we've never seen,"** Pinkston says, as **the North will "get off a lot of artillery" before being stopped, and there is the potential that chemical and even nuclear weapons could be used.**

**North Korea sees US presence as a threat and is prepared to use nuclear weapons in response**

**Associated Press 10** (“N. Korea Threatens Attack If U.S., S. Korea Hold Drills”, 2/25, http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/AS-Koreas-Nuclear/2010/02/25/id/350860)

**North Korea threatened a "powerful" attack if the United States and South Korea proceed with joint military drills** next month, **warning** Thursday **that it could even resort to nuclear means**. **The threat, routinely issued before South Korea and the United States embark on regularly scheduled military exercises**, was made just hours after President Barack Obama's special envoy to North Korea arrived in Seoul for discussions about the North. Communist **North Korea, believed to have enough weaponized plutonium to make at least a half-dozen atomic bombs, quit six-nation disarmament-for-aid negotiations last year. It also conducted a nuclear test**, earning stricter U.N. sanctions. China, the United States and other nations involved in the disarmament talks have been trying to draw North Korea back to the negotiating table. U.S. envoy Stephen Bosworth met Thursday with South Korea's Wi Sung-lac after a stop in Beijing for talks with Chinese nuclear envoy Wu Dawei the previous day. During his Beijing visit, Bosworth called for the quick resumption of the nuclear negotiations with North Korea. He heads to Tokyo on Friday. The North has demanded a lifting of the sanctions and peace talks with the United States on formally ending the 1950-53 Korean War before it returns to the negotiations. "We believe the six-party talks are presented with a good opportunity to work out of the dilemma," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang told reporters, without elaborating. South Korea and **the United States, which maintains 28,500 troops in South Korea, plan to start annual military exercises** March 8. **The North sees the exercises as preparation for an invasion, but the United States and South Korea say the maneuvers are purely defensive. "If the U.S. imperialists and South Korean warmongers launch the joint military exercises ... we will react to them with our powerful military counteraction, and if necessary, mercilessly destroy the bulwark of aggression by mobilizing all the offensive and defensive means including nuclear deterrent," a Korean People's Army spokesman said** in a statement from the North's official Korean Central News Agency. South Korea's Defense Ministry said it had no immediate comment on North Korea's threat. The two Koreas technically remain in a state of war because their three-year conflict ended in a truce, not a peace treaty.

Impact – WMD Use

**North Korea is ready and willing to use nuclear war to stamp out current American presence in the Koreas**

**Asia Times 9** (Kim Myong Chol, 6/12, “Nuclear war is Kim Jong-il’s game plan” <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/KF12Dg01.html>)

TOKYO - A little-noted fact about **the second nuclear test conducted** on May 25 **by the Kim Jong-il administration** of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is that it **was a highly successful fission trigger test for multi-megaton warhead**s. These types of warheads can be detonated in outer space, far above the United States, evaporating its key targets. **This is a significant indication of the supreme leader's game plan for nuclear war with the crippled superpower** and its allies, Japan and South Korea. The North Korean Foreign Ministry on April 29 announced its plan to test-fire what it termed a long-awaited "intercontinental ballistic missile" (ICBM), the first public ICBM test after numerous missile tests, short-range, medium-range, and long-range, were conducted without notice. **On March 9, the General Staff of the nuclear-armed Korean People's Army had begun preparing to launch simultaneous retaliatory strikes on the US**, Japan and South Korea **in response to their act of war**. Although no appropriate test site for a thermonuclear bomb is available on the Korean Peninsula, North Korean scientists and engineers are confident, as a series of computer simulations have proved that their hydrogen bombs will be operational. **The North Korean message is that any soft spots of the US, Japan and South Korea's defense lines will be used as the testing grounds for their thermonuclear weapons**. The Korean Central News Agency said on May 25 that the underground nuclear test was carried out at the request of nuclear scientists and engineers and reported: The current nuclear test was safely conducted on a new higher level in terms of its explosive power and technology of its control and the results of the test helped satisfactorily settle the scientific and technological problems arising in further increasing the power of nuclear weapons and steadily developing nuclear technology. John Pike, the founder and director of globalsecurity.org, told the Weekly Standard on October 19, 2006, that the North Korean nuclear test that year may have been a test of a "trigger device" for a much larger hydrogen bomb. Writing in the New York Times on April 7, 2009, he revealed that "North Korea's low-yield nuclear test in October 2006 did "coincide with the sub-kiloton tests of the fission trigger for a hydrogen bomb". He added, "possibly North Korea's hydrogen bombs can be easily fitted on missiles". **The Kim Jong-il administration has developed its global nuclear strike capability primarily as a deterrent to US invasion to keep the Korean Peninsula out of war. Secondly, it needs operational nuclear missiles targeted at US and Japanese targets in the event of a DPRK-US war**. **The North Korean state-run newspaper, Minjo Joson, vowed on June 9 to use nuclear weapons in war as "merciless means of offense to deal retaliatory strikes" against anyone who "dares infringe upon the dignity and sovereignty of the DPRK even a bit".** Scenario for nuclear war After shifting to a plan B, Supreme Leader **Kim Jong-il has put in place a nuclear game plan as a part of the plan's military first policy to deal with nuclear rogue state America and its allies South Korea** and Japan. (See Kim Jong-il shifts to plan B, Asia Times Online, May 21) The **nuclear game plan is designed firstly to militarily prevent the US from throwing a monkey wrench into the plans of the Kim Jong-il administration for economic prosperity** by 2012 - the centenary of the birth of founding father Kim Il-sung **- in a bid to complete its membership of the three elite clubs of nuclear, space and economic powers. Its second aim is to win the hearts and minds of the 70 million Korean people, North, South and abroad, and leave little doubt in their eyes that Kim Jong-il has what it takes to neutralize and phase out the American presence in Korea**. This will hasten the divided parts of ancestral Korean land - bequeathed by Dankun 5,000 years ago and Jumon 2,000 years ago - coming together under a confederal umbrella as a reunified state. **It is designed to impress upon the Korean population that Kim Jong-il is a Korean David heroically standing up to the American Goliath, that he can lead the epic effort to settle long-smoldering moral scores with the US over a more than 100-year-old grudge match** that dates as far as the 1905 Taft-Katsura Agreement and the 1866 invasion of Korea by the USS General Sherman. Third, **Kim Jong-il has described the shift** to plan B as a stern notice **for the governments of the US and its junior allies that they cannot get away with their hostile behavior any longer, unless they are prepared to leave their booming economies consumed in a great conflagration of retaliatory thermonuclear attacks.** **The game plan assumes that the US is unlikely to shake off its aggressive behavior until it is wiped off this planet**. The Barack Obama administration has not taken much time to reveal its true colors, which are no different from the George W Bush administration. **There have been four compelling signs: First**, the March 9-20 Key Resolve (Team Spirit) **joint war games between the US and South Korea.** Second, **the US-led** United Nation Security Council's **(UNSC) condemnation of an innocuous April 5 satellite launch**. Third, the rehashing of counterfeit money charges that the US has failed to produce compelling evidence to support. As Newsweek wrote in its June 8 issue, "The Treasury Department couldn't find a single shred of hard evidence pointing to North Korean production of counterfeit money." Fourth, the presence of Bush holdovers in the Obama administration, such as Stuart Levy, the architect of Bush-era financial sanctions intended to criminalize the DPRK.

END Fails

**END** **to ROK is at the heart of the conflict with North Korea**

**Hayes 09. [Peter, Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development” Japan Focus, December 24,** [**http://www.japanfocus.org/-Peter-Hayes/3268**](http://www.japanfocus.org/-Peter-Hayes/3268)**]**

**For nearly six decades, nuclear weapons have been a central element of international affairs in East Asia. Starting with the coercive use of nuclear weapons in 1945 to force Japan to surrender and signal American preponderance in the postwar order, nuclear weapons became a cornerstone of a rigid bipolar threat system based on strategic deterrence and organized around the global balance of terror** between the former Soviet Union and the United States. Early usage of American nuclear threat projection against China in the Korean War (compellence) and in the 1958 Quemoy-Matsu crisis (deterrence) and other high risk efforts to deter and compel adversaries led to a set of bilateral alliances created by John Foster Dulles, based in part on the concept of *extended nuclear deterrence* (END), which generated a third approach that shaped the way conflict was manifested in the region. **This was strategic reassurance of allied leaders and publics. Later, reassurance was used to stabilize the “central balance” by dampening escalation instability or the propensity of nuclear weapons states to strike first, in the form of arms control and disarmament treaties and agreements to curtail destabilizing nuclear forces and activities by nuclear weapons states. These cooperative measures among nuclear adversaries also deeply affected the region—for example, how naval forces interacted on the high seas**.3 Korea played a special role in this system of nuclear threat projection.4 Nuclear threats were found to be difficult to exploit against China and DPRK forces during the war; and Soviet nuclear forces affected US naval deployments in Korea, revealing the first wartime “virtual” effect, prefiguring the emergence of the idea of Mutual Assured Destruction. American weapons were deployed first in Korea in 1958 as part of a global forward deployment of tactical and theater nuclear weapons under the rubric of Massive Retaliation. The deployments in Korea were also linked to the withdrawal of ground-based nuclear forces from Japan forced by the popular revulsion against the Japanese government in 1958, as a proxy for and litmus test of the credibility of END to Japan after 1960. For most of the Cold War, nuclear deployments in Korea were primarily aimed at the Soviet-Chinese bloc, initially treated as a single set of targets in the sixties; and later, with the deepening Soviet-Chinese antagonism clear by the early 1960s, were aimed primarily at the former Soviet Union, and only secondarily against North Korea itself. Thus**, countering threats to the ROK was not separable from sustaining the central balance wherein Chinese and Soviet forces targeted US forces in Korea**; and there was therefore no question of separate provision of END for the ROK until Park Chung Hee began to develop his own nuclear forces and ended the presumption that the United States would choose who led the ROK and dictated its military strategy.5 By 1968, the United States and the Soviet Union had created the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty framework in order to contain proliferation by small and medium states, and the United States firmly quashed Park’s attempt to gain an independent nuclear force. It was no coincidence that that the DPRK began at about the same time to acquire elements of the nuclear fuel cycle needed to develop nuclear weapons, suggesting that the ROK proliferation attempt and the near-war in August 1976 over the poplar tree cutting incident at Panmunjon that month had convinced Kim Il Sung to counter the US nuclear threat in kind. In 1978, the nearly complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Korea that began in 1976 under President Carter was reversed due to a conservative backlash, and Korea remained implicated in the provision of END to Japan by the United States. As part of a global reversal of the 1958 deployment in 1991, President Bush Sr. withdrew US nuclear weapons from the ROK, and US withdrawal became part of the drama that unfolded around the DPRK nuclear breakout that surfaced publicly in 1992 when the IAEA discovered that the DPRK’s nuclear declaration.was inconsistent with environmental data collected from the Yongbyon facility. Henceforth, the credibility of US END with allies in this region was tied up directly with the United States’ ability to stop and reverse (not merely contain by deterrence) the DPRK’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and use of nuclear threat to compel the United States and others to negotiate with it—what I term the DPRK’s “stalker strategy.”6 **As a result of nearly two decades of slow motion nuclear wrestling with the DPRK culminating in 2009 in the latter’s second, this time successful, nuclear test, the credibility of US END has fallen to an all-time low**. Since 2008, US nuclear hegemony based on END in East Asia has begun to unravel due to the havoc wrought by the North Korean nuclear breakout on the NPT-IAEA system as a whole, by its rejection of the authority of the UNSC as enforcer of the NPT-IAEA system, as a spoiler state for cooperative security institution building in the region, and by its direct challenge to US hegemony in its alliance relationships. Of course, all the nuclear weapons states are responsible for the parlous state of the NPT-IAEA system. **But in the case of the DPRK, the United States as a direct antagonist and primary player in the Peninsula is by far the state held most accountable for these dismal outcomes.**

END Fails

**Continuing the alliance and END threatens North Korea and accelerates their nuclear programme**

Kang **Hyun-kyung, ‘9**. 6-19. “Doves Say S.Korea, US Corner NK,” <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/06/113_47126.html>.

**Liberals and some North Korea experts have cast doubt on the effectiveness of the comprehensive strategic alliance** that President Lee Myung-bak and his U.S. counterpart Barack Obama agreed at their summit this week over the Stalinist regime's nuclear ambitions. A local North Korea watcher told The Korea Times on condition of anonymity that **South Korea and the United States would have been better off if they had not included the phrase ``peaceful reunification on the principles of free democracy and market economy'' in the joint vision. He said the description would only agitate the North because it sent a clear message that reunification will only be achieved through the South's absorption of the North.** His remark reflects the worry that ``a cornered dog sometimes bites.'' **In the joint statement, Lee and Obama agreed reunification based on democracy and a market economy and the U.S. government's provision of extended deterrence, including its nuclear umbrella, to South Korea**. Doves in Seoul expressed worries about the ramifications of the two leaders' commitments on North Korea. Yonsei University Professor Moon Chung-in, a former special attache to the inter-Korean summit in 2000, said Friday that **hardening its stance toward the North and sending a signal of a South-led absorption reunification would be no help to the two Koreas' building confidence**. In a speech at a seminar, Moon said that **deterrence would not necessarily lead to peace**, noting it is part of an approach designed to manage peace. Rep. Lee Kang-rae, floor leader of the largest opposition Democratic Party (DP), said **South Korea's absorption-based reunification is the worst case scenario that the North has in mind. ``The window of opportunity for South-North dialogue will be closed as long as Lee sticks to the approach**,'' said Lee. Former Unification Minister Lim Dong-won, meanwhile, speculated that **U.S. commitment to the provision of a nuclear umbrella to South Korea would help the North justify its nuclear program for self-defense.** ``The North has set 2012 as the year to achieve the goal of becoming a great power state in terms of ideology, military and economy. **For South Korea, buying time would only help the North make more nuclear bombs,**'' claimed Lim. Seoul National University Professor Ha Young-sun said in a column that **Seoul and Washington failed to catch the core message on the North's motive of building nuclear weapons and this led to the wrong policy remedy to the North Korean nuclear program**. ``**North Korea made it clear repeatedly that its intention to make nuclear bombs is neither to normalize relations with the United States nor to gain economic assistance from other countries. The North said it developed the nuclear programs for self-defense,''** said Ha.

END Fails

**Precedent and size of military forces mean America would never use nukes in Korea anyway**

Patrick **Morgan, ‘9.** Thomas and Elizabeth Tierney Chair in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Considerations Bearing on a Possible Retraction of the American Nuclear Umbrella Over the ROK” June, 21, 2009, <http://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/Morgan%20Considerations%20Bearing_on_a_Possible_Retraction_of_the_American_Nuclear_Umbrella.pdf>]

However, **US extended nuclear deterrence is still deemed somewhat or strongly useful for offsetting the North Korean nuclear weapons program**, discouraging development of nuclear weapons by Japan (and potential imitators), deterring potential threats to Japan from China and Russia, easing Japan’s domestic defense debate, and sustaining the US power projection capability and related hegemony in East Asia. This can be annoying because **the extended nuclear deterrent is not without problems**. For instance, **nuclear weapons are very limited military assets due to the potency of what has been termed the nuclear taboo or the tradition of nuclear nonuse. This is particularly true for the US because its massive conventional military superiority makes resorting to nuclear weapons even more difficult to justify.** Currently in East Asia, this is reinforced by the weakness of Russia and the limitations of China as a great power – they pose no major immediate threats that would plausibly require using nuclear weapons in response. In addition, **South Koreans are now very reluctant to see grave harm done to the North – the North Korean threat is downplayed, with many South Koreans seeing North Koreans as poor relations who will not attack the South. All these factors make US use of nuclear weapons against North Korea very unlikely, even if Pyongyang used a nuclear weapon against the ROK or American forces in the area.** Then there is the complaint that **American nuclear weapons and the nuclear umbrella provide a rationale for the North Korean nuclear weapons program, for China’s continuing modernization of its nuclear weapons, and for China’s opposition to the US alliances in East Asia. Thus nuclear weapons are not an ideal way to sustain American influence in East Asia**.

AT: 6 Party Solves

**Six party fails – US/Japan backout**

**Reuters 10 [May 21, http://www.cnbc.com/id/37268106/North\_Korea\_Says\_South\_Pushing\_Towards\_War]**

**"Clearly this was a serious provocation by North Korea and there will definitely be consequences because of what North Korea has done," said State Department spokesman P.J. Crowle**y. Gates said **the United States was consulting with South Korea, which would decide what action to take.** U.S. President Barack Obama's administration was talking to South Korea's neighbors and the U.N. Security Council on what to do next, White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said. Japan said it would be difficult to resume nuclear disarmament talks between five regional powers and the North, and said **Washington shared its view that such negotiations, aimed at aiding Pyongyang in return for a promise to drop its nuclear arms, were unthinkable.**

AT: Alt Cause – SoKo Conflict

**South Korea views North Korea as misguided and lost while the US sees it as a threat—absent US action, South Korea would act peacefully**

**Hwang 6** (Balbina Y, 10/16, Northeast Asia Policy analyst, http://gees.org/documentos/Documen-01717.pdf)

What has profoundly changed, however, is that **the two allies are no longer unified in their strategic perceptions of the primary threat to South Korea: the North**. This divergence in threat perception has led to serious political and public developments that question and even threaten the very existence of the alliance. **Most Americans tend to attribute the strategic dissonance in the alliance to the dissipation of the “North Korean threat” altogether in South Korea. They cite the Sunshine Policy**, the emergence of a younger generation with no first-hand experience of the Korean War, **and a government in Seoul seemingly limitless in its willingness to accommodate the Pyongyang regime, including the omission of the official label “enemy”** from its national Defense White Paper and even the refusal to discuss human rights abuses. But as many **South Koreans** (both young and old) are quick to point out, they **do feel threatened by the North, only the threat has metamorphosed into a completely different kind of peril than that perceived by Americans. Today, the majority of South Koreans no longer view North Korea as an invincible, evil enemy intent on conquering the South. Rather, the greatest threat posed by the North is the instability of the regime which could lead to a collapse** (whether through implosion or explosion), **thereby devastating the South’s economic, political, and social systems**. **What explains South Korea’s sudden shift** to fearing the North’s weakness rather than that regime’s strengths? The Sunshine Policy and the ensuing historic summit between the two Korean leaders in June 2000 marks the proximate symbol of a profound shift on the Korean peninsula, but the true causes are more complex and lie in the previous decade. **They include the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of China in the early 1990s, as well as the devastating floods and famines of 1994–1995 that produced shocking pictures of starving, skeletal North Korean children.[3] These images “humanized” a traditional enemy and caused South Koreans to feel a connection to what they see as poor, starving, and weak brethren, who at best are victims of a bad regime and at worst are misguided, but certainly have neither the capability nor intent to truly harm their Southern relatives. Most importantly, they were viewed as fellow Koreans.** The significance of this psychological mind-shift cannot and should not be underestimated. After all, who can blame South Koreans both young and old? They are tired of being the last remaining victims of the Cold War, and they too want to reap the “peace dividend” that the rest of the world enjoyed. South Koreans now want the freedom to not fear that their very way of life is in constant danger, a life that is built on prosperity, material well-being, physical comfort, and freedom. **The problem is that for the United States** and many others in the region (including Japan and Australia), **North Korea largely remains an unchanged Cold War threat based on its continued pursuit of a military-first policy despite mass starvation and a failed economy; its pursuit of nuclear weapons, missile proliferation, and illicit activities including counterfeiting; its record of state-sponsored terrorism; its continued hostile stance toward the South** and other countries in the region; and even its continued brutality toward its own people through widespread human rights violations. **For the United States, the source of the threat lies in the strength of the North Korean regime, while for South Korea, the threat now lies in the regime’s fundamental weakness and its potential for collapse**. Given this vastly different assessment, the divergence in policy prescriptions is predictable. **Seoul wants to mitigate the potential for greater instability by engaging the Pyongyang regime in the hope of coaxing it gradually toward positive regime transformation. Washington, in contrast, views engagement efforts as part of the problem if it contributes to augmenting the regime’s existing strengths rather than seeking ways to further weaken it. This chasm between the American and South Korean perceptions of the North Korean threat and how to address it is at the heart of rising tensions between the two allies**. It is also an important contributing factor to anti-American sentiment in South Korea because the uncompromising U.S. stance toward North Korea is seen as the cause of instability on the peninsula and a primary barrier to inter-Korean reconciliation.

AT: Alt Cause – SoKo Conflict

**While US sees North Korea as a threat, South Korea sees them in need and would not act hostile**

**Dujarric 5** (Robert, Senior Associate of National Institute of Public Policy, Korea Observer, Vol. 36 No. 3, pg 445)

In the past decade, however, the three pillars of the alliance, dealing with the DPRK, playing a role in Korean politics, and enhancing regional security have been dramatically challenged. First, **there used to be a shared threat perception. South Koreans and Americans agreed that the DPRK was the enemy**. They may have had different ideas about how to deal with it, but **almost no one in a position of authority doubted that the North was a menace, particularly the South Korean government.** President Jimmy Carter floated the idea of removing most of the American army from Korea. But the entire U.S. political establishment, including his top advisors and cabinet officials, were so adamantly opposed that even “the most powerful man in the world” had to abandon his plan. However, in the past decade, American and South Korean views have diverged dramatically. During the Cold War, North Korea was clearly a foe but it was not on top of the U.S. threat agenda. Compared to the USSR, North Korea was a minor adversary, which is why the USFK were far smaller than the American component of NATO in Europe. **With the demise of the Soviet Union, however, the DPRK threat has become more salient for Americans. The missile/WMD program has extended the perimeter of the North Korean peril for Americans, perhaps even to American territory itself if the longer-range missiles are effective.** The possibility of North Korea selling fissile materials, or even a working nuclear bomb, to Al-Qaeda, adds another element to the danger emanating from Kim Jong-il. **It is critical for Koreans to realize that it is not only “hardliners” in the U.S. that are convinced that the DPRK is a hostile power**. Many American analysts and policy makers disagree with the antics of the likes of John Bolton or the ineffective use of intemperate language of the President, but **few think that North Korea is not one of the top threats to American security. On the other hand, South Korean views of the North have mutated.** In the Cold War years, it was the South that feared that America would forget its commitment to what was for Koreans an existential threat but to Americans only one of the many possible theaters of operations. **Since the beginning of the Sunshine Policy era, however, South Korean perceptions have become very different. Some South Koreans still see the North as a mortal enemy. But even they are often willing to provide economic aid to the North to prevent a** 450 Robert Dujarric possible **collapse of the DPRK which could force the South to bear the enormous burden of a sudden unification. Other South Koreans**, especially those represented in the more militant supporters of the current Roh Moo-hyun administration, **simply do not believe that the DPRK is a menace. They think of the Kim regime as an unfortunate relative in need of help. They explain its enormous investment in military resources as a legitimate quest for security in the face of American intransigence.** Many of them are proud that a Korean state is standing up to the most powerful nation on earth. Their views may not be representative of the majority of South Koreans, but they do reflect those of individuals who are now influential in the country.

AT: Diplomacy Solves

**The US isn’t pursuing diplomacy, it’s pursuing a muscular response**

**Lorinc 10 [John, Anchor and Editor of CNNRadio, Globe and Mail(Canada), Lexis]**

As **tensions over North Korea's lethal torpedoing of a South Korean ship escalated this week from simmer to boil,** [**Hillary Rodham Clinton**](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9469616023&returnToId=20_T9469628825&csi=161300&A=0.6422701324976168&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0BO%23&searchTerm=Hillary%20Rodham%20Clinton%20&indexType=P) **stomped into the middle of the conflict with a round of shuttle diplomacy intended to push China to rein in** [**Kim Jong-Il,**](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9469616023&returnToId=20_T9469628825&csi=161300&A=0.6422701324976168&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE0009XP1%23&searchTerm=Kim%20Jong-Il,%20&indexType=P) a long-time customer**. The conflict** - which she **characterized as "an unacceptable provocation**" - is Ms. Clinton's first major test as U.S. Secretary of State. She is walking the highest of wires, looking to triangulate the competing demands of Seoul and Beijing while demonstrating to restive American voters that U.S. President Barack **Obama's administration can deliver a muscular response in a combustible situation**. The Story So Far After the nastiness over the Democratic nomination, Mr. Obama and Ms. Clinton have settled into a good-cop, bad-cop partnership on the international stage. In principle. In practice, Ms. Clinton has shared the portfolio with Vice-President Joe Biden, with little to show for her efforts. After alienating the Israelis during peace negotiations earlier this spring, neither looked especially adroit. Ms. Clinton now has an **opportunity** to redeem herself **using a deft combination of veiled threats and back-room pressure. She** has had plenty of experience seeing people close to her deal with China and North Korea, during her first stint in the White House. When hubby Bill ran the show, secretary of state Madeleine Albright became the first senior Western official to meet Mr. Kim. Mr. Clinton's administration also extended "most favoured nation" status for North Korea's trade with China.

**Diplomacy** **is out the window**

**Reuters 10 [May 21, http://www.cnbc.com/id/37268106/North\_Korea\_Says\_South\_Pushing\_Towards\_War]**

**"Clearly this was a serious provocation by North Korea and there will definitely be consequences because of what North Korea has done," said State Department spokesman P.J. Crowle**y. Gates said **the United States was consulting with South Korea, which would decide what action to take.** U.S. President Barack Obama's administration was talking to South Korea's neighbors and the U.N. Security Council on what to do next, White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said. Japan said it would be difficult to resume nuclear disarmament talks between five regional powers and the North, and said **Washington shared its view that such negotiations, aimed at aiding Pyongyang in return for a promise to drop its nuclear arms, were unthinkable.**

AT: No Nuclear Response

**All options on the table- Gates declaration**

**Maler 10 [Sandra, Editor Reuters, April 6, Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0622770720100406]**

**New U.S. nuclear doctrine is designed to make clear to states like** [Iran](http://www.reuters.com/places/iran) and North **Korea that all options are on the table for dealing with them,** U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said on Tuesday. "The NPR has a very strong message for both Iran and North Korea," Gates told a news conference on the release of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. "**We essentially carve out states like** Iran and **North Korea, that are not in compliance with** (the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), **and basically all options are on the table when it comes to countries in that category along with non-state actors who might acquire nuclear weapons," Gates told reporters.**

AT: North Korea Cheats

**That’s a stereotype – the North wants to bargain to reduce its proximate weakness relative to the South**

Peter **Hayes, ‘6.** Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, a member of the Pacific Council on International Policy, the Western partner of the Council on Foreign Relations; and the US Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, “The Stalker State: North Korean Proliferation and the End of American Nuclear Hegemony” Policy Forum Online, 10-4-2006, <http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0682Hayes.html>.

In my view, **the DPRK used nuclear threat as a form of compellence of its own, to force the very much larger nuclear power, the United States, to engage it on critical security and regime survival issues**. Such threats have been left deliberately ambiguous and its capacities to act on these implicit and explicit threats remain very opaque and uncertain. However, **it is clear that the DPRK could threaten vital US interests with a nuclear weapon at the brink of a war in Korea, either directly in Korea or in Japan, or even against the United States itself. It also plays on the fear, linked for many to the post-9/11 mentality, that the DPRK might sell nuclear materials or even whole weapons to other states or to non-state terrorist organization**s. In the case of the DPRK, **the nuclear weapon is a weapon of the weak and the desperate, but one with a very unusual levelling capacity due to its exceptional power**. **Given the rigid and tenacious US stereotypes about the DPRK’s inability to change from a nightmarish child of the Cold War into something more compatible with post-Cold War international norms of state behaviour, Pyongyang used the nuclear threat to batter away at the American door.** **This challenge to nuclear inequality goes to the** heart of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and therefore, to the **fundamental foundation of American nuclear hegemony**. As Kim Yong Sun, then in charge of nuclear strategy in the Korean Workers’ Party, explained to me in Pyongyang in 1991: "I’d like to compare the need for discussion between ourselves and the United States on the nuclear issue with two people sitting at a table, one wearing a big visible knife and the other unarmed. Is it acceptable for the armed one to demand inspection of the pockets of the unarmed one? We see that this is a superpower demand on a non-nuclear small country to be imposed unilaterally. (…) There might be big and small nations, but there can’t be superior and inferior nations. There might be developed and developing countries, but there can’t be dominating and dominated countries." **The DPRK has sought to use nuclear weapons not only to counter the US nuclear threat and other interrelated insecurities derived from the Korean division and war, a typical negative use of nuclear weapons. Pyongyang has also tried to gain a security relationship with Washington, due to its perception that it needs distant great-power allies to offset the proximate power of Japan, China, and Russia; and because it wants to avoid being crushed by South Korea, which is twice as large in population and fifty times bigger in terms of economy** – and which has already been recognized by both China and Russia. **This positive use of nuclear weapons by an adversary rather than an ally is incomprehensible to Americans – that the North Koreans could imagine that they could be security partners with the United States. Yet this is what senior North Koreans have consistently said, and there is no reason to disbelieve them. There is no place in US nuclear ideology for an adversary who uses nuclear weapons to try to assert its right to achieve a security relationship with Washington. For this reason, US nuclear strategists failed to perceive what the North Koreans were doing, over and over again. Their stereotypes simply precluded this possibility**. In my view, they were mistaken in shunning the various overtures from Pyongyang, such as that made by the now deceased party leader Kim Yong Sun, who said to me in 1993, referring to the need to put aside the profound conflicts dividing North Korea and the United States, ‘It is possible and probable to solve the nuclear issue by this direct dialogue. Koreans have a saying: “Sword to sword: ricecake to ricecake”. It is time to throw away the sword and hold up the ricecake.”

AT: NPR Solves

**Despite Obama’s hopes of disarmament, North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons necessitates an extended nuclear deterrent to South Korea on behalf of the US.**

**Yong-ok 09. (Park, Research Fellow Sejong Institute. December, Korea Focus, http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/design2/essays/view.asp?volume\_id=92&content\_id=102814&category=G.)**

North Korea is now a nuclear state that declares that it won`t give up its arsenal as long as nuclear weapons exist in other countries. **As long as North Korea keeps nuclear weapons South Korea must remain under the U.S. nuclear umbrella**. Although the umbrella deters a North Korean nuclear threat, it has limited effect against nonnuclear military provocations**. Hence, the Korean and U.S. governments recently adopted a new concept, “extended deterrence,” to supplement the protection provided under the nuclear umbrella.** Depending on the result of the Obama administration's ongoing "2009 Nuclear Posture Review" (NPR), the concept and operational doctrine of the nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence may be rewritten. Unlike previous administrations, it is anticipated that the Obama administration would favor deterrence by conventional weapons rather than by nuclear weapons, and it would expect an increased allied role rather than unilateral U.S. commitment in any future international military actions. **In the fast-changing international situation, Korea should comprehend its role and share and build up commensurate capabilities. So far, the United States has proclaimed its strategic commitment to Korea by providing the nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence. The Korean national defense authorities must maintain close coordination with the United States to keep abreast of the modus operandi.**

AT: Regime Collapse

**Regime collapse inevitable - Southern actions, North Korean refugees, and decreasing power of ideology**

**Park and Kim 10** (Myoung-Kyu and Philo, Profs of sociology and North Korea studies, Asian Perspective, Vol 34, No. 1, 125-8)

The policy that allowed for market activities in North Korea was introduced in July 2002 but was repealed in 2005. In October 2006, North Korea conducted its first official nuclear test, which was followed by the second nuclear test in May 2009. These were probably expressions by the North of their worries about the the Kaesong Industrial Complex and other human contacts. **The strong provocation toward the South may not just have been a reaction to the international situation; it may also have reflected growing sociopolitical unrest within North Korean society**. For example, **the distribution of leaflets in North Korea by South Korean NGOs became a contentious issue in South Korea because of the tension it was creating between the two governments. The leaflets were sent to the North using balloons. For the ordinary citizen in the South, it was perhaps perplexing to see the North Korean government launch such bitter criticism of small-scale actions by South Korean NGOs. However, the reaction of the North is evidence that the leaflets, containing new information and very critical commentary on the “Great Leader,” Kim Il Sung, were having some impact on North Korea society. To the North’s administration, such actions represented the beginning of a potentially destabilizing trend through which social unity would be eroded and the position of the North’s political royalty endangered**. It is said that there are **frequent and diverse informal human contacts across the North Korean-Chinese border.** These **continue to grow as a result of such things as the proliferation of illegal mobile phones. There is a continuous flow of North Koreans who cross the Chinese border** in both directions. **Others make the journey from the North to South Korea, necessarily via third countries. This continual movement of people provides a ready supply of information about life outside North Korea, including for example routes of escape and opportunities that might await them in final destination countries. Increasingly, North Korean refugees who have successfully made it to South Korea are active in a range of activities that aim to “help North Korean brothers” or “democratize North Korea.” This growing movement of North Koreans in the South working to destabilize the North deeply concerns the Northern regime, and this can explain its deep sensitivity regarding South Korea’s policies on human rights and political and economic “opening**.” It is also worth mentioning here that that **the power of the North’s juche ideology seems to have decreased in recent years**. In 1994, around 80 percent of North Korean citizens stated a belief in the official ideology.9 However, this figure fell to around 64 percent in 2008 and to 54.9 percent in 2009, of whom 26 percent expressed “strong pride” and 29 percent “some pride.” **42.7 percent expressed “no pride for juche ideology,” constituting 32 percent of respondents who had “not much pride” and 11 percent who had “no pride at all.”10 Kim Jong Il has been losing popularity** throughout the past ten years. According to a 1998 survey of 1,694 North Korean refugees in China, only 8 percent expressed criticism of the Kim Jong Il leadership. However, **negative sentiment toward his leadership had increased to 26.1 percent in 2008 and then to 28.1 percent in 2009.11 It seems likely that Kim Jong Il can currently command the support of around or slightly less than 50 percent of the North Korean population**.

\_\_\_\*\*Solvency

1AC Cards

**Bandow, ‘2. (**Doug, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and a former Special Assistant to President Reagan, “A New Policy for a New Millenium: America's Relationship to South and North Korea” The ICAS Lectures, Spring Symposium, 2-14-2002, <http://www.icasinc.org/2003/2003w/2003wdxb.html>] )

**Washington needs to withdraw** its **troops and eliminate its security guarantee**. Many hawks now say that the **U.S. shouldn't stay if it isn't wanted**. Even if America is wanted, however, another nation's desire for U.S. aid is no reason to provide it. The **U.S. should do so only if doing so advances American national interests**. What vital U.S. interest supposedly is being served? America's presence undoubtedly still helps deter the DPRK from military adventurism, but it is not necessary to do so. As noted earlier, the **South can stand on its own**. A recent report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies reported simply: "Without U.S. help, **South Korea is capable today of defending itself against an invasion from the North**." As one of the world's wealthiest nations, the **ROK can well afford to replace the American tripwire**. Some argue that maybe American troops should be withdrawn, only just not now. But for some policymakers there will never be a good time to update U.S. policy. Indeed, many desire to preserve America's troop presence after reunification. Advocates of a permanent U.S. occupation talk grandly of promoting regional stability. However, it would be a miraculous coincidence if a commitment forged in the Cold War and created to deter a ground invasion from a contiguous neighbor turned out to be the perfect arrangement to meet completely different contingencies in a completely different security environment. In fact, there are **no secondary "dual use" function for America's soldiers to perform**. For instance, while U.S. and Chinese interests might eventually collide, **America's deployments in Korea would provide little value**. No administration would initiate a ground invasion against the PRC. And South Korea, like **Japan for that matter, is unlikely to allow itself to become the staging ground for such a conflic**t. To do so **would turn itself into China's permanent enemy. Containing a resurgent Tokyo is an even more fanciful role.** **The greatest threats to regional stability are internal**--insurgency and corruption in the Philippines, democratic protests and ethnic conflict in Burma, economic, ethnic, nationalistic, and religious division in Indonesia. But they **impinge no vital American interests and are not susceptible to solution by the U.S. military. In sum, without any connection to the larger Cold War and global hegemonic struggle Korea is relatively unimportant to the U.S**. So some American policymakers make an entirely different argument: the U.S. should base soldiers overseas at someone else's cost. But Washington must create the additional units, a cost that America's allies do not cover. Moreover, **friendly states are not likely to long accept a foreign occupation carried out solely to save money for Americans.**  Some supporters of the U.S. troops presence point to the North Korean nuclear threat. However, the **American presence performs no useful role in dealing with Pyongyang's putative nuclear capabilities. In fact, the current deployment leaves U.S. forces as nuclear hostages if the North marries an effective atomic bomb to a means of delivery**. Moreover, the troop tripwire makes North Korea America's problem. Removing it, argues Adam Garfinkle, editor of the National Interest, "would force China and the other parties to the problem to face reality." The best strategy for handling the DPRK is not obvious. The North may have decided to cheat all along. Or it may have pe**rceived that the Agreed Framework was unraveling, since the U.S. had failed to move forward with diplomatic and economic relations.** A not insubstantial factor in its current behavior may be the North's belief that the Bush administration has targeted Kim's regime for a preventive war. CIA Director George Tenet implicitly acknowledged the problem without noting America's role, when he suggested that if the North goes ahead and nonproliferation weakens, other states might view the acquisition of nukes as the best way to match neighbors and deter more powerful nations. Irrespective of who is to blame, what is to be done? It is not surprising that policymakers in Seoul, within easy reach of North Korean artillery and Scud missiles, have a different perspective on coercion. Beijing, Moscow, and **Tokyo also worry about radioactive fallout, missile attacks, refugee flows, economic turmoil, and regional chaos**

1AC Cards

**\*\*Signal alone s**

**Removing U.S. forces send the signal to de-militarize and look to diplomacy.**

**Bandow 96(Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute “Tripwire: Korea and U.S. foreign policy in a changed world” pg 83 JL)**

**U.S. troops have been stationed in South Korea for the past half century.** Although their withdrawal would unsettle a government and people grown used to America's presence, it really should sur­prise neither. After all, in 1984, 4 of 10 South Koreans advocated that the United States stay only until Seoul became militarily self-sufficient.1 **With the economic gap between South and North expand­ing at an embarrassing rate, that time is now**. South Korea's Ministry of National Defense has acknowledged that "considering the changes in our security environment including the emerging South-North arms control question, reduction of troops will become inevitable."2 Unfortunately, the ministry was referring to South Korean troop levels. But **surely the first cuts should come in the forces of the United States, whose support has always been justified by the exceptional military circumstances on the peninsula. Only after the American troop presence has disappeared** should **the ROK,** which obviously has both the most at stake in and the primary obligation for its own defense**, downsize its army**. In 1971 Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil responded to the Nixon administration's par­tial withdrawal: "Now is no time to survive by depending on oth­ers—U.S. troops in our country will go home sooner or later, which means that we must defend our country through our own strength."3 Again, **that time is now**. Nevertheless, disengagement would be a dramatic step. **Its most important impact would probably be symbolic.** Opines Claude Buss of the Hoover Institution, "**In the minds of many Korean and Ameri­can officials, the military role of the U.S. forces is less important than the psychological, political, and diplomatic effects of their pres­ence**. As Defense Secretary [James] Schlesinger stated in 1974, U.S. forces in Korea symbolize America's continued interest in the overall stability of that part of the world."\* It would be important, therefore, for Washington to **emphasize that placing responsibility for Korea's defense on Koreans would not mean indifference to the ROK's safety.**

**Troops could be withdrawn gradually ending in 2012 to ensure lasting peace.**

**Kim et al. 09(Kim, Indong Oh, writers from the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development Northeast Asia Peace and Security Project “A New U.S. Policy toward Korea: Korean American Recommendations for Real Change” JL)**

**As** the denuclearization process, **peace** treaty and normalization **talks move forward**, **the United States should gradually withdraw its 28,500 troops stationed in South Korea by 2012, which is the target date for relinquishing the U.S. military's wartime operational control over the ROK troops to the South Korean government.** Our troops have been in Korea for too long, and the goal of defending South Korea is no longer credible. Since it costs about $2-4 billion per year to station the U.S. troops in South Korea, and there is a great need to reduce our military spending at present, it will serve the U.S. interests to **reduce our troop strength in the ROK, which already has a powerful military to defend itself.** South Korea also has twice the population of North Korea, and its annual military spending is about eight times larger than North Korea's, while South Korea's GDP is 40 times greater than North Korea's.

1AC Cards

**Badass theoretical card (re-tag)**

**Arms race in South Korea is solely linked to clear aggressive threats from the North.**

**Suh 10(J.J, researcher for IR policy think tank FPIF, “Allied to Race? The U.S.-Korea Alliance and Arms Race” 5/17/10 JL)**

According to realist conventional wisdom, **a state allocates resources to the military as a means to provide for survival. Since the minimal goal of a state is its survival against potential threats, the amount of its military spending is proportional to the level of threat it faces**. A state in a benign strategic environment may keep its security expenditure to a minimum so it may allocate more resources to internal welfare, even if it may not be able to completely eliminate the military for fear that today’s friends should become tomorrow’s enemies. But **a state facing a clear and present danger is forced to spend whatever is necessary to defend against an external threat even at a great cost to internal welfare.** While scholars note a dilemma a state faces in striking an optimal balance between guns and butter, they tend to agree that the higher the level of threat,*ceteris paribus*, the higher the defense spending. Richardson’s classic arms-race model uses external threat as a driver of arms race because one’s increase in military capability increases the threat perceived by a potential adversary, who then increases its own military strength. **This in fact has been the primary explanation of South Korea’s military spending:** that **Seoul must defend against the North Korean threat.** The Republic of Korea Army (ROKA), for example, acquired tanks, M48s, mainly because it feared another blitzkrieg spearheaded by the North’s tank forces, as in the early stage of the Korean War. **Traumatized by the experience of the war, the ROKA has continued to upgrade its tanks and has acquired new ones even while building all manner of defenses against the North’s tanks. The earlier history of Seoul’s spending growth can be readily explained in terms of its strategic need to catch up with North Korea, its main threat,** which was enjoying an edge until the early 1970s. Seoul still identifies the North as a “direct and serious threat” and justifies its military spending in the same terms: “**a country in conflict**, such as ours **that constantly faces North Korean threat, must analyze ‘security threats’ first to determine the military requirement and use the requirement to calculate the size of the defense expenditure.”**

Plan 🡪 Re-Unification

**Removing U.S. forces fosters Korean unity and self determination which is key to lasting regional security.**

**Kim et al. 09(Kim, Indong Oh, writers from the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development Northeast Asia Peace and Security Project “A New U.S. Policy toward Korea: Korean American Recommendations for Real Change” JL)**

**The withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea** **will** also **help** in facilitating **the self-determination of the Korean people as for the future destiny of their country-free from outside interferences. The U.S. owes a heavy responsibility for the artificial division of Korea at the end of the WW II.** That decision went against the long history and interest of the Korean people as a united country. **To achieve a permanent peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, it is essential that the division of Korea be ended and the country be allowed to reunite in a peaceful manner. In other words, from now on, Uncle Sam should stop trying to dictate the future of Korean people's destiny, as it had done in the past.**

S Mech – Cut Troops, Keep Bases

**Removing ground forces while simultaneously retaining naval and air bases removes unnecessary reason for North Korean aggression while maintaining sufficient back-up forces.**

**Stanton 10(Joshua, former U.S. Army Judge Advocate “Why the U.S. Army Should Leave Korea” The New Ledger online April 11th, 2010 JL)**

Thus, while I don’t go so far as to accept the Princess Bride Doctrine (”never get involved in a land war in Asia”), I do not believe **it is wise for us to have our forces within easy artillery range of Kim Jong Il, such that he may freely choose the time, place, and manner of our involvement. I offer two qualifications here. First, this is not to suggest that we unilaterally abrogate the alliance with South Korea. Our air and naval installations in Korea provide useful power-projection capability and are far more secure**, ironically, than our many scattered and isolated Army posts. I can imagine any number of contingencies for which we’d want to **have the ability to move people and supplies into South Korea in a hurry**.

S Mech – Reduce to 15,000

**Reducing troop levels to around 15,000 removes the U.S. military “footprint” - removes U.S.’s role of protector.**

**GI Korea 10(ROK Drop leading military news from Korea, “**[**Debating the Future of the US Military Presence In South Korea**](http://rokdrop.com/2010/04/14/debating-the-future-of-the-us-military-presence-in-south-korea/)**” April 14th, 2010 JL)**

I think the **US Army should take the approach of the US Marines and rotate soldiers to the peninsula for training exercises to maintain training cohesion with the ROK Army without having to leave a big force footprint**. They could be housed at a small camp set up near the Korea Training Center for example. I think at some point it should also be explored closing Kunsan AFB once the ROK Air Force has reached a capability to off set what the US Air Force currently provides from Kunsan. **There should be other capabilities looked at as well that the ROK military could take over in the future. That would leave the future KORCOM with military hubs around Camp Humphreys and Osan AFB with a force structure probably under 15,000. It just seems to me the cost savings would be huge not to mention the freeing up of thousands of soldiers to support other US military mission**

SOFA = NM

**The plan acts like any other U.S. peacetime troop movement – SOFA allows US free power to maneuver troops anywhere in South Korea.**

**Mason 09(Chuck, Legislative Attorney for the Congressional Research Service “Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Has It Been Utilized?” pg. 12 JL)**

In 1954 the United States and the Republic of Korea entered into a mutual defense treaty.81 **As part of the treaty the countries agree to attempt to settle international disputes peacefully, consult whenever the political independence or security of either party is threatened by external armed attack, and that either party would act to meet the common danger in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.**82 Article IV of **the treaty grants the United States “the right to dispose.... land, air and sea forces in and about the territory” of South Korea.**83 Pursuant to the treaty, specifically Article IV, the countries entered into a SOFA with agreed minutes and an exchange of notes in 1966;84 it was subsequently amended January 18, 2001.

AT: Plan Violates SOFA

**Plan eliminates South Korean SOFA – SOFA’s doesn’t solely dictate our alliance only the privileges of the stationed soldiers.**

**Mason 09(Chuck, Legislative Attorney for the Congressional Research Service “Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Has It Been Utilized?” pg. 1 JL)**

The United States has been party to multilateral and bilateral agreements addressing the status of U.S. armed forces while present in a foreign country. These agreements, commonly referred to as **Status of Forces Agreements** (SOFAs), generally **establish the framework under which U.S. military personnel operate in a foreign country, addressing how the domestic laws of the foreign jurisdiction shall be applied toward U.S. personnel while in that country.** **Formal requirements concerning form, content, length, or title of a SOFA do not exist.** A SOFA may be written for a specific purpose or activity, or it may anticipate a longer-term relationship and provide for maximum flexibility and applicability. It is generally a stand-alone document concluded as an executive agreement. A SOFA may include many provisions, but the most common issue addressed is which country may exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel. Other provisions that may be found in a SOFA include, but are not limited to, the wearing of uniforms, taxes and fees, carrying of weapons, use of radio frequencies, licenses, and customs regulations. **SOFAs are often included, along with other types of military agreements, as part of a comprehensive security arrangement with a particular country. A SOFA itself does not constitute a security arrangement**; rather, **it establishes the rights and privileges of U.S. personnel present in a country** in support of the larger security arrangement. SOFAs may be entered based on authority found in previous treaties and congressional actions or as sole executive agreements. The United States is currently party to more than 100 agreements that may be considered SOFAs. A list of current agreements included at the end of this report is categorized in tables according to the underlying source of authority, if any, for each of the SOFAs.

AT: Transition Conflict

**The time is ripe to remove troops from South Korea – Solves anti-American feelings while remaining joint staff would solve a peaceful transformation.**

**Cummings 04(Colonel J.P. U.S. Army, “SHOULD THE U.S. CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA?” pg 12-13 JL)**

Considering the capability of the ROK Military and the recent disparate demands on the United States military, the **time is ripe to withdraw ground forces from South Korea. This course of action will enable the military to apply more resources toward the global war on terrorism. Furthermore, there will be inherent cost savings by withdrawing ground forces from South Korea.** The American force structure currently in Korea could be deployed elsewhere (Afghanistan, Iraq, or Bosnia). **Withdrawal of forces would eliminate the infrastructure cost of maintaining hundreds of individual camps required to forward base U.S. ground forces. Furthermore, the removal of U.S. ground forces would halt the progress of anti-American sentiment among the** South **Korean population.** To assure our South Korean allies of our commitment to the alliance and to the defense of South Korea, **we must continue to maintain a strong Combined Joint Staff presence on the Peninsula. The purpose of the United States contribution on the staff would be to insure there is no degradation of readiness during the transfer of the ten agreed upon military missions from USFK to ROK**. Moreover, to insure quality of effort, U.S. staff officers on Combined Joint Staff should be credible professionals with continued career potential.24 Likewise, we must continue to forward base air force and intelligence assets to augment ROK security efforts. Finally, the 12 Combined Joint Staff in Korea should continuously update South Korea on United States armed forces transformation issues that may impact future deployment of forces to South Korea. One concrete policy the United States must adopt is to insure that we maintain a one to one ratio of staff officers in the Combined Joint Headquarters. If the primary staff officer is Korean, the U.S. should assign him a deputy of equal rank if practical; a Korean should be the deputy when a U.S. officer is the primary staff officer. **Should share with the ROK military training and assets required to execute counterbattery and JSA missions**.

\_\_\_\*\*2ACs Against Common Generics

2AC – Obama Good

**Obama \*clearly\* prefers the Aff**

Todd **Crowell, ‘9**. “No, No and Maybe,” Asia Cable, 7-19, <http://asiacable.blogspot.com/2009/07/no-no-and-maybe.html>.

One way to head that off would be to **reintroduce some nuclear weapons back in** the region either in **South Korea** or aboard US naval warships, such as Japan-based submarines equipped with nuclear-armed Tomahawk cruise missiles. Hatoyama seemed to be signaling to Washington that such a step would be okay with his government. Such a move **would** obviously **go against the craw of** President Barack **Obama**, **who would** prefer to be seen **as reducing nuclear stockpiles around the world**, **not re-introducing them were they have long been removed**, but it may be necessary to maintain a semblance of deterrence in Northeast Asia.

**He’s pushed for it in the NPR**

Park **Yong-ok, ‘9**. – Research Fellow Sejong Institute. “Nuclear Armed North Korea and Extended Deterrence ― Issues, Prospects and Suggestions,” December, Korea Focus, <http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/design2/essays/view.asp?volume_id=92&content_id=102814&category=G>.

North Korea is now a nuclear state that declares that it won`t give up its arsenal as long as nuclear weapons exist in other countries. As long as North Korea keeps nuclear weapons South Korea must remain under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. **Although the umbrella deters a North Korean nuclear threat, it has limited effect against nonnuclear military provocations. Hence, the Korean and U.S. governments recently adopted a new concept, “extended deterrence**,” to supplement the protection provided under the nuclear umbrella. **Depending on the result of the** Obama administration's ongoing "2009 Nuclear Posture Review" (**NPR), the** concept and operational doctrine **of the nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence may be** rewritten**.** Unlike previous administrations, it is anticipated that the **Obama** administration **would favor deterrence by conventional weapons rather than by nuclear weapons, and it would expect an increased allied role rather than unilateral U.S. commitment** in any future international military actions.

2AC – Japan Prolif DA

**Try or die – basing issues, Japanese domestic sentiment and TLAM retirement disrupt the foundation of the alliance**

Todd **Crowell, 3-12**-10. “Tokyo's Long-Held Secrets Coming Out,” Real Clear World, <http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2010/03/12/tokyos_long-held_secrets_coming_out_98852.html>.

TOKYO - **Details of secret agreements between Japan and the U.S. concerning** deployment of **nuclear** **weapons in Japanese territorial waters or** over its **air space have been tumbling out almost daily**, embarrassing the former rulers and adding an additional strain to an alliance already weakened by disputes over basing issues. The previous administration led by the Liberal Democratic Party, which governed Japan virtually without interruption for more than 50 years up to and including the last LDP premier Taro Aso, steadfastly denied that any such agreement existed, even as former administrative vice ministers (the top civil servants) came forth from retirement to assert that they did exist. The new government headed by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which won an overwhelming election last summer and formed a government in September, early on promised to shed light on this issue. This week, a special panel of government officials and historians issued its findings. The Foreign Ministry panel disclosed the existence of three secret pacts. One permitted the U.S. to introduce nuclear weapons aboard naval vessels without prior consultation with Tokyo. Another permitted unrestricted use of American bases in Japan should a conflict arise in Korea. A third permitted re-introduction of nuclear weapons to Okinawa in the event of an emergency. **These secret agreements were related to** the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (**the foundation of the U.S. Japan defense alliance**), which was signed 50 years ago this year. The terms of the agreement call on the U.S. to defend Japan, using nuclear weapons if necessary, if attacked. Tokyo in return provides Americans with bases. Fifty years after the signing, The U.S. still maintains 86 facilities on Japanese soil housing 44,850 uniformed personnel. About 75 percent of these troops are based on the southern island of Okinawa, which has long been a bone of contention with local residents. During the Cold War, U.S. naval vessels, including those permanently based at two main ports, Sasebo and Yokosuka, routinely carried nuclear weapons on board. Tactical nuclear weapons delivered by fighter-bombers were stored at American bases in South Korea. Additionally, nuclear weapons were deployed on Okinawa, then administered by the U.S. In a recent article in Foreign Affairs, John Packard, the President of the U.S.-Japan Foundation and a former aide to Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer in the 1960s, wrote: "Until it reverted to Japan in 1972, the U.S. military treated the place [Okinawa] with a free hand often defying the wishes of both the Japanese government and the U.S. State Department." He went on to mention an incident in 1966 when, he says, the U.S. transported nuclear weapons from Okinawa to mainland Japan in flagrant violation of the 1960 agreement. He did not elaborate. In 1991 former President George H.W. Bush ordered the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from U.S. naval ships (not counting ballistic missile submarines, which do not call on Japanese ports), and from South Korea. These weapons had been removed earlier from Okinawa after its return to Japanese sovereignty in 1972. That American warships, especially aircraft carriers, routinely carried nuclear weapons into Japanese waters was, in fact, never a real secret. It was common for anti-nuclear activists to protest the arrival of these ships. Washington neither confirmed nor denied the presence of such weapons; Tokyo said nothing. Former Prime Minister Eisaku Sato first enunciated what are known as the "Three No's" regarding nuclear weapons in 1967. The No's are 1. never to possess, 2. never manufacture and 3. never allow nuclear weapons to be admitted into Japan. For this he received the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1974. Some argue that it should be considered the two and a half No's. The panel said that the prime ministers who followed Sato in this period, including Kakuei Tanaka, Yasuhiro Nakasone and right through Toshiki Kaifu in 1989 were briefed by civil servants on the contents of thee pacts. It is unclear if later PMs were also briefed considering that the weapons were removed, but they clearly did not delve deeply into the matter. If these secret pacts had been revealed earlier, especially during the Cold War, it would probably have sent demonstrators out into the streets. Now they cause barely a ripple. For one thing, the public had been primed by revelations of former civil servants. Indeed, Washington declassified and published the documents from its side years ago. Some conservative may see the revelations as further evidence that the new DPJ government is anti-American. Washington already believes that **Hatoyama's commitment to the alliance is only lukewarm**, despite protestations of its importance. Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada said it had nothing to do with the alliance and everything to do with the commitment to open government. More secrets have been tumbling out, especially regarding the return of Okinawa. Last week Finance Minister Naoto Kan said, "I have confirmed the existence of [secret] an interest-free bank account in the U.S." It presumably held some funds connected with the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty in 1970. Many critics of the former government have long believed that Tokyo vastly under-reported the amount of money that Japan contributed to help turn some former American bases and installations on Okinawa to return the lands to their original state. The secret account merely reaffirms that the public was never given the whole story. Okinawa of course, is at the focus of the dispute between Tokyo and Washington over basing issues, and any new revelations concerning the terms of the island's return to Japanese sovereignty merely add fuel to the **public sentiment**s among islanders that **is hardening against** the **continued U.S. military presence** on that island. Washington negotiated a deal with the former government to lighten the burden by moving 8,000 Marines to Guam (partly paid for by Japan) and closing the obsolete Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma, now virtually surrounded by the city of Ginowan and building a new base (also at Japanese expense) in the Okinawan city of Nago. The new administration under Prime Minister Yukio **Hatoyama**, citing election pledges, **balked at immediately implementing the agreement**. To Washington's dismay, it seemed to want to reopen the whole question and move the Marine Air Station out of Okinawa. Hatoyama has promised to resolve this issue by the end of May. Meanwhile, the administration of President Barack Obama is in the middle of reviewing its basic policy on nuclear weapons and "extended deterrence," the euphemism for defending Japan against attack with nuclear weapons. **Recently, a review panel recommended** that the **nuclear warheads for the Tomahawk** cruise missile **be retired. The previous Japanese government** had **argued strenuously against such a move as weakening** the "**extended nuclear deterrence**." Washington counters that strategic nuclear war heads carried aboard Trident submarines plus nuclear weapons from B-52 or B-2 bombers based on Guam can provide sufficient fire power to maintain the "nuclear umbrella."The new government's position on the Tomahawk retirement is not known.

2AC – Japan Prolif DA

**Non-UQ – TLAM-Ns were part of END agreements**

Jung **Sung-Ki, ‘9**. 6-29-09, “USFK Chief Pledges Shield Against NK Missiles,”

http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/06/113\_47644.html

The United States will use its missile defense network to defend South Korea against incoming missiles from North Korea under an extended deterrence pledge in case of an emergency, the chief of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) said. The remarks came amid growing concern about **Pyongyang**'s missile programs. The communist state **test-fired a long-range rocket that is convertible to an** intercontinental ballistic missile (**ICBM**), earlier this year. Gen. Walter Sharp, who concurrently serves as commander of the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) and the United Nations Command (UNC), made the remarks in a forum at the Korea Military Academy in northern Seoul last Friday, according to CFC officials. Sharp said the extended deterrence recently reaffirmed by U.S. President Barack Obama during a summit with South Korean President Lee Myung-bak in Washington, D.C. would include the provision of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea against North Korea, reinforcement of troops on the Korean Peninsula and the missile defense scheme, the officials said. Analysts here believe that U.S. Aegis warships would be deployed near the peninsula to shoot down North Korean short- and medium-range missiles or high-altitude missile defense systems based in Hawaii would be activated to intercept an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) by the North. The U.S. government has promised since 1978 that it would provide necessary nuclear deterrence capabilities for South Korea against North Korea. **Under the extended nuclear deterrence pledge**, military experts say, **the U.S. military would mobilize all necessary capabilities** to neutralize North Korean nuclear provocations. For example, the U.S. Air Force could send B-2/52 bombers and other fighter aircraft carrying nuclear bombs, such as the B-61, to hit nuclear facilities in the North. **Tomahawk cruise missiles could be launched from nuclear-powered submarines to strike targets**. The B-61 bomb is known to have a ``dial able'' explosive power of 0.3 to 340 kilotons and believed to be capable of destroying North Korea's key underground facilities. U.S. fighter aircraft would also be ready to conduct surgical strikes with high-end bombs, such as bunker busters.

No risk of re-arm

Joshua **Pollack, 3-12**-10. regular contributor at the prominent blog Arms Control Wonk. “Extended deterrence and the tactical nuclear mirage,” <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/joshua-pollack/extended-deterrence-and-the-tactical-nuclear-mirage>.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the need to reassure allies has become, perhaps by default, one of the more important rationales for continuity in U.S. nuclear posture. In fact, a view frequently expressed by current and former U.S. officials holds that Washington still maintains the largest strategic nuclear arsenal in the world precisely to provide these assurances. Most recently, a report from the Strategic Posture Commission took this idea in a somewhat different direction. It maintained that "extended deterrence," i.e., nuclear deterrence on behalf of allies, is needed to inhibit the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. For at least some allies, including Japan, the report connected this outcome to the continued presence of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. **Does the assurance of allies** and the prevention of nuclear proliferation **really depend on** specific and identifiable numbers or locations of **nuclear weapons?** There is little reason to think so." But are these claims reasonable and well-supported? As if on cue, **events have conspired to undermine this** portion of the report. **In January, a letter from** Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya **Okada** to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was made public that **disavowed** any specific stance on U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. According to a translation PDF by the Citizens' Nuclear Information Center, **Okada stated** that **Japan was "not in a position to judge** whether it is necessary or desirable" for the United States to retain particular weapons systems, including the nuclear Tomahawk cruise missile, or TLAM-N, which the commission's report had deemed to be of special importance to Tokyo. **Shortly thereafter, Japan**'s new government **went a step further by breaking** with **the opacity that long surrounded U.S. nuclear weapons in** and around **Japan. The government openly acknowledged once-secret understandings** that allowed Washington to bring nuclear-armed vessels into Japanese ports without notice. Although U.S. Navy boats haven't carried nuclear weapons for almost two decades, this disclosure symbolically closes the books on tactical nuclear weapons in Japan. **There is** certainly **no indication** that **Tokyo will** now **seek its own nuclear arsenal; if anything,** its commitment to abstention has been reaffirmed.

2AC – Japan Prolif DA

Fears are misplaced—Japan is already armed and militaristic views are a tiny faction of Japanese society

Christopher **Preble, ‘6.** Director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, “Two Normal CountriesRethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” CATO Policy Analysis, April 18, 2006, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf>

As the Japanese debate their interests and obligations with respect to both their own defense and security in East Asia, other countries are doing the same. Throughout the course of the U.S.-Japanese strategic relationship, some Americans have been reluctant to allow the Japanese to assume a more significant role in world affairs. Unfortunately, fundamental change is impossible so long as America’s policy toward Japan is based on anachronistic assessments of Japanese intentions and abilities. A Japan capable of defending itself, and also capable of contributing to security in East Asia, would reduce the need for U.S. forces in the region. The very concept of the United States shedding some of its Cold War–era obligations is anathema to those who celebrate the supposed benefits of American unipolarity. For example, in 2000 the Project for a New American Century worried that “a retreat” from Cold War–era obligations in East Asia, including in South Korea and Japan, “would call America’s status as the world’s leading power into question.”45 Not all opposition, however, stems from a desire to perpetuate American global dominance; some people fear the supposed innately militaristic nature of Japanese society. Eugene Matthews, formerly with the Council on Foreign Relations, warned in 2003 that “Japan’s new nationalism” could lead to “the rise of a militarized, assertive, and nuclear-armed Japan, which would be a nightmare for the country’s neighbors.”46 Matthews’s comments do not appear to reflect widespread sentiment within the United States, judging from some of the responses that the article elicited,47 but it is clear that many people in Asian nations that were occupied by the Japanese Imperial Army in the 1930s and 1940s remain deeply concerned about the possible resurgence of Japanese nationalism. Those fears contribute to objections to any alteration of the current U.S.-Japanese relationship, especially if such a change would make it easier for the Japanese to deploy their forces abroad. The Chinese, in particular, worry that any revision, either to the Japanese constitution or to the U.S.-Japan alliance, would automatically constitute a renunciation of the peaceful foreign policy currently enshrined within Article 9 and would inevitably lead to Japanese rearmament. 48 That argument essentially ignores that Japanese rearmament has been going on for many years. Indeed, the very term “rearmament” is inappropriate, given that Japan is already well armed. Japanese armies terrorized East Asia in the first half of the 20th century, and it would be unwise to ignore the psychological impact that their actions had on the occupied nations. Of particular concern have been Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine where 2.5 million Japanese war dead—including 14 leaders convicted of war crimes—are memorialized. Those visits seem to fit a pattern in which Japanese tend to play down the gravity of the Imperial Army’s wartime abuses. Some demagogic politicians have gone so far as to suggest that the war crimes charges were trumped up by the victors. 49 In another well-publicized instance, a controversy over several Japanese textbooks that overlook Japan’s wartime abuses has contributed to a sense in Asia, particularly Korea and China, that some Japanese have not fully accepted guilt for the war. When the Ministry of Education approved several new textbooks for use in Japanese schools in April 2005, the decision prompted angry protests in China and South Korea. Wang Yi, the Chinese ambassador to Japan, claimed that one book “has distorted history and hurt the feelings of people in Asia, including China.”50 A South Korean paper declared that the approval of the texts revealed that “those who are leading Japan are lacking in historical and philosophy understanding and are stuck in their own closed obstinacy.”51 But criticism of the controversial texts has not been limited to Koreans or Chinese; many Japanese also had problems with the language and tone of the books. Editors at the Asahi Shimbun criticized the Japanese government for approving a history text that “is still not of a standard to be used in schools.” In a spirited critique, the editorial concluded: “It is only natural for adults to wish their children to be proud of their own country. If they have a high regard for their own country, however, they should respect the feelings of people overseas who hold a high regard for their own homelands, too.”52 By at least one measure, many Japanese appear to share those sentiments: a Kyodo News study found that only 16,300 students at 77 junior high schools, 0.44 percent of the total student population, will be using the textbooks beginning this April.53 The textbook controversy should not be taken as evidence of a widespread resurgence of Japanese nationalism. Although there may be a nationalist fringe within Japan pining for a return to martial glory, such individuals remain on the margins of Japanese society. It would be unwise to allow the ghosts of World War II to forever dictate the conduct of U.S. policy toward Japan. The United States can continue to move forward with its new strategic relationship in which Japan emerges from its subordinate role while at the same time quietly urging the Japanese to show an appreciation for the special concerns voiced by some of their neighbors.

2AC – Japan Prolif DA

Japan’s economic ties prevent militaristic action

Christopher **Preble, ‘6.** Director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, “Two Normal CountriesRethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” CATO Policy Analysis, April 18, 2006, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf>

The Japanese, for their part, are already mindful of the continuing anxiety of the nations of the Pacific Rim. Perhaps that is one reason why such a large portion of Japan’s foreign aid budget has been given to the countries occupied by Japanese forces during World War II—Thailand, Korea, the Philippines, and China. Japanese aid in 2003 constituted approximately 50 percent of the total foreign aid received by Indonesia, Vietnam, and Laos; about 60 percent of the aid received by the Philippines, Malaysia, and Myanmar; and about 70 percent of aid to China.54 Japanese businesses have also developed extensive economic ties in those nations. These spending and investment patterns suggest that the Japanese government, and Japanese citizens and businesses, place great value on friendly, peaceful relations with their Asian neighbors. At the same time, a series of urgent security challenges has prompted a reassessment throughout Japanese society of the utility of military power. While it is conceivable that a few Japanese might wish to remain dependent on America for their security, either out of a desire to avoid paying more for defense or for fear of the risks associated with a change from the status quo, many more are now willing to embrace a new strategic relationship with the United States in which the Japanese take full responsibility for their own security and also accept additional responsibilities in East Asia and the western Pacific. The Bush administration is encouraging such new thinking on the part of the Japanese. The president and his senior advisers appear to appreciate that fears of a new Japanese empire are both irrational and anachronistic. “There is no fear of Japan,” an unnamed administration official told National Review’s Richard Lowry. “The old cork-in-the-bottle theory is dead.”55 The Bush administration should combine this recognition of Japan’s legitimate security interests with a willingness to devolve security responsibilities to Japan, thereby easing the military and economic burden on American taxpayers. In other words, the Bush administration should view Japanese military capabilities not only as additive to, but also as a partial replacement for, U.S. military forces in the region. The agreements announced in late October 2005 suggest that the process of strategic devolution may already be taking place. As discussed above, Japanese military forces are already extremely capable of both defending the territory of Japan and confronting would-be regional threats. Japan possesses advanced anti-submarine warfare capabilities, which are particularly important in the East Asian theater, and it also is capable of conducting mine-clearing activities. 56 Those assets are geared primarily to regional contingencies, but the vessels in Japan’s Maritime SDF constitute the second or third most capable fleet in the world. A shift in Japanese defense posture would not necessarily require a substantial expansion of current military spending.57 Given Japan’s tight integration into the global economy, and its continued reliance on raw materials and energy resources from outside the Asia-Pacific region, the Japanese want to be in a position to safeguard the flow of such strategic resources, as well as finished goods, to and from their country, and this might require a new approach to the deployment and disposition of their existing military, especially naval, assets. Ultimately, however, Washington must prompt such a shift by continuing to stress its new vision for U.S.-Japan strategic cooperation. The Japanese government must decide the size and composition of Japan’s military, consistent with the wishes of the Japanese people. Americans must be willing to allow the Japanese to assert a measure of independence from their former patron; it serves neither U.S. nor Japanese long-term interests to expect Tokyo to merely toe Washington’s line.

2AC – Japan Prolif DA

Peaceful democratic values and trends in Japanese society check increasing military power and prevent resurgence of militarism

Christopher **Preble, ‘6.** Director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, “Two Normal CountriesRethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship” CATO Policy Analysis, April 18, 2006, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa566.pdf>

Meanwhile, latent American and East Asian fears of a resurgent Japan should be calmed by the commitment of the Japanese to the principles enshrined in their constitution—even a constitution modified to reflect Japan’s emergence as a full-fledged sovereign state. Although there is a remote possibility that Japan’s transition to “normal” country status could eventually lead to resurgent nationalism, or even revanchism, Japan’s underlying democratic values and a tradition of anti-militarism cultivated since the end of World War II point strongly in the opposite direction. There is little reason to believe that the domestic political forces that have constrained Japanese national security policy for decades would collapse and be superseded by rampant imperialism of the kind that was practiced in the 1930s. To the contrary, domestic sentiments in Japan suggest that the use of Japanese military power will be restricted to the resolution of specific crises that threaten vital Japanese interests. The Japanese inclination to play a global role commensurate with Japan’s political and economic power may grow, irrespective of a formal and coordinated effort to reshape the alliance. In the near term, however, Japan will be focused on regional security threats, where its power and influence are likely to be decisive. Therefore, the creation of a new strategic partnership between the United States and Japan that is far less burdensome and risky for Americans could provide an effective framework for addressing regional security challenges in East Asia well into the future.

2AC – Lee Cred DA

**Lee’s credibility is sapped because of the economy – he can only win on NoKo**

Scott A. **Snyder, ‘9** – Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korea Studies, Council on Foreign Relations. “Strengthening South Korean Ties,” 6-17, CFR, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/19655/strengthening_south_korean_ties.html>.

**You talked of low popularity ratings for** President **Lee. Are there concerns how effectively he can manage domestic issues such as** the economy with **a more belligerent North Korea**? I would say **the South Korean public has been disappointed by economic performance under Lee** Myung-bak. There have also been criticisms from the progressive segment in South Korea that Lee has mishandled the inter-Korean relationship, although **public opinion polls suggest that his policies toward North Korea still retain strong support even though his personal popularity has dropped.**

**We control UQ and there isn’t a definitive link direction**

Scott A. **Snyder, ‘9** – Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korea Studies, Council on Foreign Relations. “Strengthening South Korean Ties,” 6-17, CFR, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/19655/strengthening_south_korean_ties.html>.

South Korea recently decided to join the Proliferation Security Initiative, though it had refused to do so in 2006 after North Korea's first nuclear test. There also seems to be broader consensus now on stricter sanctions against Pyongyang. However, **there are those in South Korea who are concerned about Seoul's stance.** Has the ground shifted in South Korea's posture or are there internal fissures that Washington should be worried about? " [**I]t is possible that there could emerge issues between the United States and South Korea that could become divisive in South Korean domestic politics**." The government under Lee Myung-bak has decided to join the Proliferation Security Initiative and this represents a significant shift from the previous administration, which opted not to join that initiative following the first North Korean nuclear test. So, one aspect of this decision is that it shows that the United States and South Korea are very closely coordinated with each other. A second aspect of this is that many of the steps that have existed under the Proliferation Security Initiative have now been given a kind of indirect authorization under the new UN Security Council resolution [1874]. So the Proliferation Security Initiative activities are now blessed by an international authorization. **The other aspect of this is [that] aspects of the Lee administration's policy toward North Korea** and toward the United States remain politically contested in South Korea. **The administration does suffer from low public support ratings at this time. So, it is possible that there could emerge issues between the United States and South Korea that could become divisive in South Korean domestic politics.**

**2AC – US-ROK Relations DA**

**Alliance is resilient – 15 other areas shore it up**

5-party talks Sanctions KORUS OPCON Afghanistan

Terror Prolif Piracy Organized crime

Jung **Sung-ki, ‘9**. “Obama Pledges Nuclear Umbrella for S. Korea,” Korea Times, 6-17, <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/06/113_46976.html>.

U.S. President Barack Obama reaffirmed Tuesday that Washington would provide an extended nuclear umbrella to South Korea in response to increasing nuclear threats from North Korea. In a summit at the White House, President Lee Myung-bak and Obama adopted ``the joint vision for the ROK-US alliance,'' which calls for building a broader, ``21st century strategic'' partnership in the realms of politics, the economy, culture and other areas beyond the security arena. President **Obama agreed to Lee's offer to hold five-way denuclearization talks**, excluding the North which has boycotted a return to negotiations. The agreement came as skepticism has grown over the effectiveness of the six-party disarmament forum involving the United States, the two Koreas, China, Japan and Russia. **The two leaders** warned Pyongyang against further provocative moves and **shared the need for tougher financial sanctions** on the poverty-stricken North. On economic issues, **they pledged efforts to ratify** the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (**KORUS**-FTA) at an early date. The landmark trade deal has yet to be approved by legislators in both Seoul and Washington after being signed two years ago. **Saying that their alliance was adapting to changes** in the 21st century security environment, **the presidents agreed** that **the** two **allies will maintain** a robust defense posture, backed by allied **capabilities that support both nations' security interests**.'' The continuing commitment of extended deterrence, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella, reinforces this assurance, they said. The U.S. government has promised since 1978 that it will provide necessary nuclear deterrence capabilities to South Korea against the Stalinist North in the annual South Korea-U.S. defense ministers' meetings, but this is the first time that the issue has been discussed at a summit. Under the extended nuclear deterrence pledge, the U.S. military would use some of its tactical nuclear weapons, such as B-61 nuclear bombs carried by B-2/52 bombers and F-15E, F-16 and F/A-18 fighters, as well as Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from nuclear-powered submarines, to strike North Korea's nuclear facilities in retaliation for any such attack on the South, military sources here said Both leaders mainly discussed ways of deterring and countering North Korea's lingering missile and nuclear threats, as Pyongyang has ratcheted up tensions on the Korean Peninsula through a second nuclear test and a series of short-range missile launches last month. Despite years of efforts within the six-party framework, the North admitted recently that it had continued with a secret uranium enrichment program. After the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution calling for tougher sanctions on North Korea last week, Pyongyang vowed to build more nuclear bombs and proceed with uranium enrichment. The North had previously vehemently denied the existence of such a program. **Other major topics** discussed during the summit **included a review of the planned transition of wartime operational control** of South Korean troops from Washington to Seoul **and the South's possible redeployment of troops to Afghanistan**. Toward developing a ``21st century strategic partnership,'' Lee and Obama also conferred on joint measures to deal with global issues, such as climate change, cooperation on energy resources, poverty and the international financial crisis. ``**Our governments** and our citizens **will work closely to address the global challenges of terrorism, prolif**eration of weapons of mass destruction, **piracy, organized crime** and narcotics, **climate change, poverty, infringement on human rights, energy security, and epidemic disease,**'' the joint vision said. ``The alliance will enhance coordination on peacekeeping, post-conflict stabilization and development assistance, as is being undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan.'' **Seoul and Washington will also strengthen coordination in multilateral mechanisms aimed at global economic recovery** such as the G20, it added.

**New areas of cooperation shore up the alliance**

FTA NoKo Clean Development Counter-terror Peacekeeping

Scott A. **Snyder, ‘9** – Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korea Studies, Council on Foreign Relations. “Strengthening South Korean Ties,” 6-17, CFR, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/19655/strengthening_south_korean_ties.html>.

Ahead of the meetings with President Obama, President Lee had called for a ratification of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement that was signed in 2007. There has been resistance from the U.S. auto industry, which is facing its own troubles, on this. President **Obama today did not commit on a timeline** when this pact would be presented to Congress for consideration. Do you think we will see this agreement ratified any time soon? **What I think was important was the expression of qualified support** that the president gave **to** the idea of a Korea-U.S. **Free Trade** Agreement, pending the resolution of outstanding obstacles especially in the areas of beef and autos. So that suggests that it is still possible for the free trade agreement to go forward but there are a number of other issues that are clearly higher on the priority list for the administration. How would you sum up these meetings today and what was their significance? **The main message from the meeting was an expression of solidarity between the two countries in the face of North Korea**'s challenge to regional and global stability. In addition, **the [joint] statement** also **emphasizes the potential for expanded U.S.-South Korea cooperation to address** many new areas **including clean development, counterterrorism, and peacekeeping. These** are areas that **expand the scope and application of the alliance in ways that enhance** the **mutual interests** of the two countries.

2AC – QPQ CP

**Sequencing element in their QPQ collapses the bargain – making a concession \*this month\* is better and encourages better, binding QPQs in institutional settings**

Jae-**Jung Suh, 2-9-**10. Associate professor and director of Korean Studies at the School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. “Invite North Korea to the Global Nuclear Security Summit,” <http://www.fpif.org/articles/invite_north_korea_to_the_global_nuclear_security_summit>,

**Thus the stage is set for quid pro quo.** Peace is a good thing for both Washington and Pyongyang, so is denuclearization. **So why not trade** one for the other? **It is** one of the rare **win-win** situations for both parties, **except that Washington and Pyongyang might not see it that way. There is** so much bad blood, figuratively and literally, **between them that the** sequencing of peace and denuclearization remains a potential deal-breaker**. Concerned that Pyongyang is trying to buy time** with potentially lengthy negotiations for a peace treaty, **Washington wants** the resumption of the Six Party Talks and **denuclearization first. Pyongyang**, on the other hand, **demands a peace treaty before denuclearization** because it fears an attack once it gets rid of what it considers "nuclear deterrent." Hence the quid pro quo becomes a deadlock. A possible way to breach the deadlock seems a 6+4+2 or 4+6+2 formula: holding a six-party denuclearization, a four-party peace, and a bilateral meeting back-to-back at the summit level. The United States and North Korea could hold a four-party peace meeting with China (a de jure party to the Korean War) and South Korea (a de facto party) to declare the end of the war and sign a peace treaty. The four-party meeting can be held immediately before or after a six-party meeting, where the six parties' leaders sign an agreement on the peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. **If the leaders commit themselves to the** principles contained in the important September 19 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks — **peaceful denuclearization of Korea**, normalization of diplomatic relations, economic cooperation, and "lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia" — **they would be taking a critical step toward institutionalizing the talks in a more formal body**. In addition, Washington and Pyongyang could hold a bilateral meeting to discuss issues relevant only to them, such as diplomatic normalization. **The Global Nuclear Security Summit will provide a fortuitous venue** where the leaders of the six countries can hold the these meetings sequentially on a global stage. Not only would the multilateral setting render the order of the meetings meaningless so long as the three meetings are held during **the world summit**, but it **would** also **increase international pressure on the participants to live up to the series of agreements signed before the world**. Such a possibility will be facilitated by an exchange of declarations. **Washington can find a creative way to allay Pyongyang's concerns** about its dignity and independence, mindful that they are central to the latter's complaints about the UN sanctions. **Pyongyang can reciprocate, or take the initiative by declaring that it understands** the international community's **concerns** about proliferation **and is willing to cooperate** with the world **to address them. Such an exchange** of declarations, public or private, **would help all the parties move to the next level of "action for action." But it has to be done soon, not to miss the historic opportunity offered by the** Global **Nuclear Security Summit.** And much care needs to be given to each other's concerns lest a wrong word derail the initiative. Washington and Pyongyang have taken a long detour, through a nuclear test and sanctions, to get to where they are now. The convoluted history of the past several months should serve as a reminder to everyone, in the United States as well as North Korea, of the fundamental difference between the two positions. American top priority is nonproliferation whereas North Korea is primarily concerned about its dignity and survival. This fundamental difference led ultimately to the nuclear test and the sanctions. The clash of mindsets also brings into relief **the one thing that the two have in common: their utter failure to understand each other.** Ambassador Stephen Bosworth and his North Korean counterpart will do well by starting to address that rare commonality. To forestall future misunderstandings or manage them in a controlled manner should they occur, Washington and Pyongyang should establish a liaison office as soon as logistically feasible.

2AC – QPQ CP

**Current policy misunderstands NoKo’s motives – moving beyond carrot/stick military approach is key – NoKo won’t bargain otherwise**

Kang **Hyun-kyung, ‘9**. 6-19. “Doves Say S.Korea, US Corner NK,” <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/06/113_47126.html>.

**In the joint statement, Lee and Obama agreed reunification based on democracy and a market economy** and the U.S. government's provision of extended deterrence, including its nuclear umbrella, to South Korea. Doves in Seoul expressed worries about the ramifications of the two leaders' commitments on North Korea. Yonsei University **Professor** Moon **Chung-in**, a former special attache to the inter-Korean summit in 2000, **said** Friday **that hardening its stance toward the North and sending a signal of a South-led absorption reunification would be no help to the two Koreas' building confidence**. In a speech at a seminar, Moon said that **deterrence would not necessarily lead to peace**, noting **it is part of an approach designed to manage peace**. Rep. Lee Kang-rae, floor leader of the largest opposition Democratic Party (DP), said South Korea's absorption-based reunification is the worst case scenario that the North has in mind. `**`The window of opportunity for South-North dialogue will be closed as long as Lee sticks to the approach**,'' said Lee. Former Unification Minister Lim Dong-won, meanwhile, speculated that U.S. commitment to the provision of a nuclear umbrella to South Korea would help the North justify its nuclear program for self-defense. ``**The North has set 2012 as the year to achieve the goal of becoming a great power state in terms of ideology, military and economy. For South Korea, buying time would only help the North make more nuclear bombs**,'' claimed Lim. Seoul National University **Professor** Ha **Young-sun** **said** in a column that **Seoul and Washington failed to catch the core message on the North's motive of building nuclear weapons and this led to the wrong policy remedy** to the North Korean nuclear program. ``**North Korea made it clear repeatedly that its intention** to make nuclear bombs **is** neither to normalize relations with the United States nor to gain economic assistance from other countries. The North said it developed the nuclear programs for **self-defense**,'' said Ha. **He proposed Seoul and Washington scrap the traditional carrot and stick approach and find an alternative option that can convince the North to give up its military-first principle and to look to the benefits it could receive if it takes an economy-first stance**.

**In the context of QPQs on the plan, NoKo makes the offers – they will \*certainly\* denuclearize IF we do the plan first but won’t if we don’t**

Leon v **Segal, ‘9**. “What Obama should offer North Korea,” 1-28, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/what-obama-should-offer-north-korea>.

As president, however, Obama will be preoccupied with the economic crisis and will have to depend on appointees with the courage of his convictions. Thus, **the question remains, will he be willing to expend the political capital to deal with North Korea**, challenging the reigning orthodoxy in Washington and the irreconcilables in Congress? **Similarly, he could be constrained** by the leaders of regional allies such as **Japan and South Korea**. For instance, **Tokyo and Seoul are divided between conservative realists** who, though skeptical, are willing to give negotiations a try **and right-wingers** who prefer to live with the North Korean threat than to improve relations with Pyongyang. Recent Japanese governments have wavered between pressing the United States to negotiate and doing their utmost to impede the Six-Party Talks. Current Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso has taken the latter course, but he may not survive the upcoming election. A coalition government under his opponent, Ichiro Ozawa, may be more forthcoming because Ozawa will want to improve relations with all of Japan's near neighbors. In South Korea, President Lee Myung-bak came to power determined to show he was tougher than his predecessors, which has only led North Korea to dig in its heels and stall North-South reconciliation. Still, Lee may come around to pursuing diplomacy with North Korea. To do otherwise would run the risk of lagging behind while the United States makes rapid progress in its relations with North Korea. **Pyongyang's basic stance is that as long as Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul remain adversaries, it feels threatened and will acquire nuclear weapons** and missiles to counter that threat. **But, it says,** if Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo move toward reconciliation, it will get rid of these weapons**. Whether North Korea means what it says isn't certain, but the** only way to test it **is to try to build mutual trust over time** by faithfully carrying out a series of reciprocal steps that starts now.

2AC – QPQ CP

**The CP causes a huge conflict with South Korea**

**Asia Times 9-19** [by Donald Kirk, Journalist Donald Kirk has been covering Korea - and the confrontation of forces in Northeast Asia - for more than 30 years. "And then there were two ..." September 19, 2009, [**http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/KI19Dg01.html**](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/KI19Dg01.html) download date: 9-19-09]

**South Korea appears on a collision course with the** **U**nited **S**tates **over** growing sentiment among American officials in favor of **talks with North Korea** in the hope of somehow dragging the North back to six-nation talks on its nuclear weapons. The White House and State Department have already reached a consensus that there's no harm in beginning the bilateral dialogue that North Korea has long wanted - but only if the US nuclear envoy, Stephen Bosworth, can use such talks to persuade the North to return to multilateral talks that the North has vowed to spurn. The US consent to bilateral talks as an opening gambit represents a triumph for the diplomatic strategy of North Korea's ailing but still active leader Kim Jong-il. He conveyed his own message of reconciliation through former US president Bill Clinton when Clinton visited in early August on an "unofficial mission" to pick up the two women from Al Gore's Current TV network who'd been held for 140 days after North Korean soldiers captured them filming along the Tumen River border with China. Presumably, US President Barack Obama assented to the bilateral dialogue after Clinton briefed him on the three hours and 17 minutes that he spent with Kim Jong-il. Bill, mingling his public and personal lives, no doubt also thoroughly briefed his wife, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who had been saying, in effect, six-party talks or no talks at all. Now, however, the US is clearly wary of upsetting South Korean leaders after Bosworth briefed them in Seoul on his notion of chatting with the North Koreans. The **South's President** **Lee** Myung-bak and his Unification Minister, Hyun In-taek, **have been saying, warily**, that, sure, **they don't mind if the US does whatever it can to speed up the process, but North Korea had better give up its nukes first - and forget about bypassing South Korea on the way. South Korea's suspicion that the whole idea of bilateral dialogue is North Korea's way of simply attempting to gain recognition** of its status as a nuclear power worries US diplomats. They don't want to appear to be cold-shouldering their South Korean ally while kowtowing to Kim Jong-il for a bilateral process that's likely to nowhere fast.

SoKo Wins the War – 2AC

**South Korea is developing indigenous conventional and nuclear forces now that ensure security**

Jung **Sung-ki, ‘9**. “The U.S. Nuclear Umbrella: A Double-Edged Sword for South Korea,” The Velvet Rocket, 8-25, <http://thevelvetrocket.com/2009/08/25/the-u-s-nuclear-umbrella-a-double-edged-sword-for-south-korea/>.

**South Korea’s military is** also **planning** to acquire **weapons systems to help deter North Korea’s lingering nuclear and missile threats on its own. The military plans to increase** the procurement numbers of precision-guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions (**JDAM) and** air-launched **cruise missiles**. It aims to buy 1,400 JDAMs by 2013 to bring its total number to 4,551. The JDAM is a guidance tail kit that converts existing unguided free-fall bombs into accurate, adverse weather munitions. Carried by advanced fighter jets, including F-15Ks, the bomb has a glide range of 24 kilometers and can strike within 13 meters of its target. It can penetrate up to 2.4 meters of concrete. The South Korean Air Force is also seeking to equip some of its KF-16 fleet with JDAMs. In addition, the South plans to acquire about 270 joint air-to-surface, standoff (cruise) missiles (JASSM) by 2011. The JASSM, developed by U.S. Lockheed Martin, is an autonomous, long-range, air-to-ground, precision missile designed to destroy high-value, fixed and mobile targets. Nuclear Submarines? **Beginning in 2018, South Korea plans to build indigenous 3,000-ton** KSS-III **submarines fitted with domestically built submarine combat systems aimed at automating target detection**, tracking, threat assessment and weapons control. The heavy sub will be armed with indigenous ship-to-ground cruise missiles and be capable of underwater operations for up to 50 days with an advanced AIP system, Navy officials said. According to informed government sources, the Navy wants to deploy about six KSS-III submarines and then may push to develop a nuclear-powered submarine as a hedge against future uncertainties in Northeast Asia. **Many observes admitted the Navy needs nuclear-powered submarines in the long term but are skeptical** **about** the plan, citing the potential political and diplomatic **backlash**, particularly **from the United States**. South Korea initially pushed for developing a nuclear-powered sub in 2004 but canceled the initiative later for these reasons. “A nuclear-powered submarine plan involves both military and political aspects,” a defense analyst said. “Nuclear subs will, of course, offer benefits to the Navy in terms of much longer operational range and fuel efficiency. But the thing is, unless legal and political problems are resolved first, we can’t go forward with the plan.” The analyst apparently referred to a 1991 inter-Korean non-nuclear declaration and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in which non-nuclear weapon states such as South Korea are required to place all of their nuclear materials under inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure they are not used to develop atomic weapons. Some proponents say that because nuclear-powered submarines use low-grade nuclear fuel, they do not violate the denuclearization pledge. Opponents say that since a nuclear-powered sub would require enriched uranium fuel, the ability to enrich uranium also could be used to produce material for building nuclear weapons. **Nuclear submarines can remain underwater much longer than conventional submarines, propelled by diesel generators**, and are considered a strategic weapon second only to aircraft carriers. **To thwart North Korea’s asymmetrical capabilities and other regional hostile forces, the Navy has emphasized strengthening its submarine fleet**. The Navy has nine German-made Type-209 1,200-ton submarines and three Type-214 1,800-ton submarines, first built locally under technical cooperation with HDW of Germany. They are all diesel- and electric-powered. “Submarine fleets are seen as one of the most powerful features of any military force,” said the analyst. “For South Korea, the requirements and roles of advanced attack submarines are essential to help neutralize the North’s increasing asymmetrical capabilities.” Six more Type-214 subs are scheduled to be commissioned by 2018, when the Navy will inaugurate a submarine command. The Type-214 submarine, a core part of the future strategic mobile squadrons, is armed with modern torpedoes and submarine-to-surface missiles. The 65.3-meter-long sub can submerge to depths of up to 400 meters, with a maximum submerged speed of 20 knots. **With the help of** Air Independent Propulsion (**AIP**), which improves its underwater performance and gives it stealth capability, **the submarine can carry out underwater operations for as long as two weeks**, putting Guam in its operational range, according to the Navy. The sub’s ISUS-90 integrated sensor enables operators to detect about 240 targets simultaneously and track 32 targets.

**South Korea has an enormous quantitative advantage – they’re capable of self-defense**

Robert J. **Koehler, ‘9** – a magazine editor living in Seoul and a 10-year-resident of Korea. “South Korea Would Win War with North,” 6-21. <http://www.rjkoehler.com/2009/06/21/south-korea-would-win-war-with-north/>.

**Then there’s the air force. You can really feel the difference when you compare the two sides’ top fighters, the South’s F-15K and the North’s MiG-29. In an air battle, the F-15K — with its longer radar — would be firing missiles at the MiG even before the MiG knew it was there. And it terms of ground-attack capabilities, the MiG-29 has only short-range guided munitions**, while the F-15K can launch precision strikes against major facilities in Pyongyang from 280km out with the SLAM-ER. The ROK Air Force believes **one F-15K can take on 10 North Korean MiG-29s**. Then there’s the rest of the crap North Korea flies — the country’s 840 warplanes include about 362 MiG-15s and 362 MiG-21s introduced around the Korean War and in the 1960s. South Korea’s 490 warplanes include 130 KF-16s it introduced in the 1990s and 39 F-15Ks. Marmot’s Note: North Korea has 1.02 million troops. South Korea has 650,000 troops. My favorite stat, though, is the defense budget — **South Korea’s defense budget in 2008 was 26.64 trillion won, nearly 390 times North Korea’s 2008 defense budget of 68.47 billion won**. Anyway, the moral of this story — and its one I really wish US pundits would pay attention to — is that South Korea is more that capable of defending itself. This is not 1950.

SoKo Wins the War – 2AC

**SoKo has an enormous naval edge**

Robert J. **Koehler, ‘9** – a magazine editor living in Seoul and a 10-year-resident of Korea. “South Korea Would Win War with North,” 6-21. <http://www.rjkoehler.com/2009/06/21/south-korea-would-win-war-with-north/>.

**The North Korean navy has** its **issues**, too. **North Korean warships aren’t good on the high seas and their conventional weaponry gives them limited night-time operational capabilities**. The only capably warships North Korea has are the 1,500t Najin class and 1,640t Soho class. Most of its ships are small craft of 402t that are deployed along the front line. **South Korea, on the other hand, has** the 4,500t KDX and 7,600t Sejong the Great class, **an Aegis warship capable of independent operations. Including the P-3C, South Korea also has better naval aviation and long-range attack capabilities**. For example, the North Korea’s largest warship, the Najin-class, would get sunk by South Korea’s Haeseong ship-to-ship missile (with a range of 150km) even before it got near a Sejong the Great-class warship. In the submarine department, North Korea has 22 Romeo-class (1,830t) subs and about 60 semi-submersibles. The Rome-class compares with South Korea’s Type 214 Son Won-il-class (1,800t) in tonnage, but not in capabilities. **The Son Won-il class can cruise underwater at 7.4km an hour for 13 days, while the Romeo class is an older type that must raise an air intake mast above water to recharge its diesel engines.**

**SoKo has a huge edge in tanks**

Robert J. **Koehler, ‘9** – a magazine editor living in Seoul and a 10-year-resident of Korea. “South Korea Would Win War with North,” 6-21. <http://www.rjkoehler.com/2009/06/21/south-korea-would-win-war-with-north/>.

**According to** material submitted to the National Assembly late last year by **the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the North and South Korean militaries do not compare**. The Joint Chiefs noted that **North Korean tanks have weak night fighting capabilities, their armored vehicles cannot cross rivers and their field guns are inaccurate**. North Korea, for instance, has T-34 and T-54/55 tanks with 88mm and 100mm guns, as well as Chonma-ho tanks with 115mm guns. These tanks, however, are not equipped with infra-red detection equipment and are not watertight, giving them limited night-fighting and river-crossing capabilities. North Korea’s 3,000 or so T-54/55s and PT-76s are outdated tanks introduced in 1964. In fact, of the 3,900 or so tanks possessed by North Korea, over 90% are reportedly of older designs. **South Korea, on the other hand, has K-2 tanks, which come decked out with all sorts of** nifty **tracking and fire control equipment and Cobra gunships with stuff that can penetrate 9cm of armor. The South also has armored vehicles with outstanding river-crossing capabilities** and K-9 self-propelled guns with automatic firing control. Moreover, of South Korea’s 2,300 tanks, only about half are outdated models like its 400 or so M47s introduced in 1959 and 800 or so M48A5s introduced in 1977. On the other hand, the South has about 1,200 new model K1A1 1,200 tanks and 80 T-80Us, and is pushing the introduction of the much more advanced XK-2 tank.

**Koreans are fully prepared for any event without U.S. military equipment and aid.**

**Suh 10(J.J, researcher for IR policy think tank FPIF, “Allied to Race? The U.S.-Korea Alliance and Arms Race” 5/17/10 JL)**

**While there is no dispute about the contributions that the United States has made to Korea’s defense, it is analytically difficult to show that its contributions have produced a replacement effect,** not only because its contributions serve U.S. strategic needs but also because **Korea’s military spending grew even when Washington’s security commitment remained constant** or grew. In the 1950s and 1960s, Washington provided economic and military assistance—especially so-called counterpart funding—not just as a supplement but also as an inducement for Seoul to raise the size of the military and defense budget. Even as President Richard Nixon withdrew one division from South Korea, he increased other types of defense assistance to compensate for the decrease in Korea’s defense readiness that might result from the force reduction. President Jimmy Carter threatened to cut U.S. aid if Seoul did not go along with his policy, but he ended up giving aid without any troop withdrawal. **Through the 1970s, President Park Chung-he**e, fearing American withdrawal, **launched an ambitious program to build Korea’s independent military capability.** But in the 1980s, when President Ronald Reagan made unqualified commitment to South Korea’s defense, **President Chun Doo-hwan** still **went ahead with the military modernization program.** In other words, **South Korea kept beefing up its military regardless of the level of American support.**

SoKo Wins the War – 2AC

**American ground forces in South Korea are unnecessary and their “tripwire” has faded. South Korea can survive solely with aid form the navy and air force.**

**Cucullu 05(Gordon, Lt. Colonel “Korean Troop Withdrawal” accessed on Military.com JL)**

**North Korea is an acknowledged dangerous foe**. It has massed artillery poised to rain steel down on Seoul and forward-deployed American units. It fields a 1.2 million man army with massive reserves. Aircraft, logistical support, armor units, and special operations infantry units have been deployed into protected attack positions for years. We know about the missiles, the nucs-bugs-and-gas WMD that Kim Jong Il possesses and seems willing to use on military and civilian targets. **But** we also know that the **hedonistic Kim regime has one foot in the economic grave and the other on a banana peel.** Without massive infusion of foreign assistance and revenue gained from illegal operations such as counterfeiting, narcotics, slave labor, and sale of weapons systems to other rogue states, it is likely that an economic implosion would have flushed his regime away. **Thirty years ago analysts calculated that North Korea had upwards of 90 days supplies for a full-scale war. Given the economic disintegration of North Korea since 1994, it would be surprising if the North could mount an all-out war for more than 14-21 days.** Nevertheless, in any conflict the North Korean wild card is the horrific damage it could inflict on the civilian population of Seoul even without using WMD. That said, it is critical to recognize that the power balance has shifted on the peninsula, dramatically enough to require a reevaluation of America's roles and responsibilities. Furthermore, **the South Korean military is as strong as it has ever been in manpower, equipment, and training. With its booming economy South Korean outspends the North in actual dollars while committing a significantly smaller percentage of its GNP to defense.** It has approximately 600,000 regulars backed by large reserves and modern equipment. In a fight the **South Korean military ought to be able to defend the country with air and naval augmentation from America and allies.** At some point ground forces might need to be committed to the fight too, but the **decades-long tripwire rationale for continued forward deployed American units seems to have faded.** In fact, without undue provocative response from North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il, America has already extricated a brigade from the 2nd Infantry Division, relocating it in Fort Carson, CO after a combat tour in Iraq. Other units are slated to follow over time, bringing the level of US troops to fewer than 30,000, the lowest since wartime. Concomitantly a major redeployment in theater is underway as facilities and units move southward, out of range of the most immediate North Korean artillery and missile threat.

**The Republic of Korea has the ability to maintain heavy deterrence against the North Koreans even without the U.S.**

**Suh 10(J.J, researcher for IR policy think tank FPIF, “Allied to Race? The U.S.-Korea Alliance and Arms Race” 5/17/10 JL)**

**While there is no dispute about the contributions that the United States has made to Korea’s defense, it is analytically difficult to show that its contributions have produced a replacement effect**, not only because its contributions serve U.S. strategic needs but also because Korea’s military spending grew even when Washington’s security commitment remained constant or grew. In the 1950s and 1960s, Washington provided economic and military assistance—especially so-called counterpart funding—not just as a supplement but also as an inducement for Seoul to raise the size of the military and defense budget. Even as President Richard Nixon withdrew one division from South Korea, he increased other types of defense assistance to compensate for the decrease in Korea’s defense readiness that might result from the force reduction. President Jimmy Carter threatened to cut U.S. aid if Seoul did not go along with his policy, but he ended up giving aid without any troop withdrawal. Through the 1970s, President Park Chung-hee, fearing American withdrawal, launched an ambitious program to build Korea’s independent military capability. But in the 1980s, when President Ronald Reagan made unqualified commitment to South Korea’s defense, **President Chun Doo-hwan** still **went ahead with the military modernization program**. In other words, **South Korea kept beefing up its military regardless of the level of American support. This**, in turn, **raises the question about the degree to which** U.S. Forces in Korea (**USFK**) **needs to be replaced in order to maintain a strategic balance against the North Korean military.** The Roh Moo-hyun government justified some of its new weapons development programs in terms of the need to substitute for the U.S. capabilities that would be withdrawn by 2012 when wartime operational control will be transferred to the ROKA, but it is at least questionable whether all of those capabilities need to be acquired by South Korea. For example, the Kumgang and Paektu Projects would, upon their completion, give the ROKA the ability to monitor North Korea’s military activities almost anywhere in the country. **Given that the North Korean military has only rudimentary reconnaissance and surveillance capability, any additional high-tech surveillance systems to replace what the United States currently provides could potentially be overkill**. The ROKA maintains such a high force-to-space ratio that even without the benefits of the high-tech systems, it could block any blitzkrieg attempt by the North. Thus, **while the U.S. military adds to the South’s capability, some of its contribution may be superfluous, especially given that Seoul is already enjoying military advantages over Pyongyang. The alliance’s supplementary effect, therefore, will be smaller than it seems at first.**

\_\_\_\*\*2AC Add-On – Troop Shift

Troop Shift – Drug War

Troops would be relocated to the U.S. benefits drug war

**Horween 09(Matt,** **former commissioned U.S. Foreign Service Officer for the U.S. Agency for International Development, “Time to Remove U.S. Troops From South Korea” JL)**

It is obvious to anyone who thinks about it, that what the **U.S. government is doing now and proposing to do in the future in South Korea is not a good plan.** So what would be a good plan? **We** could **withdraw all** of our **troops**, close all our bases, **and bring** all our **assets back to the USA. The troops would be with their families and we would benefit from their economic impact here. More importantly, our military could train them to be an instant deployment force.** They could train in the southwest desert area of our country, where **they would be on the spot in case Mexico implodes or their drug war spills over into U.S. territory.** We would tell South Korea that it is time for them to take over their own defense and to go to the United Nations if North Korea invades their territory.

Troop Shift – Econ

Troops in Korea cost the US two to four billion dollars a year.

**Kim et al. 09(Kim, Indong Oh, writers from the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development Northeast Asia Peace and Security Project “A New U.S. Policy toward Korea: Korean American Recommendations for Real Change” JL)**

**Since it costs about $2-4 billion per year to station the U.S. troops in South Korea, and there is a great need to reduce our military spending at present, it will serve the U.S. interests to reduce our troop strength in the ROK, which already has a powerful military to defend itself.** South Korea also has twice the population of North Korea, and its annual military spending is about eight times larger than North Korea's, while South Korea's GDP is 40 times greater than North Korea's.

Troops would be relocated to the U.S. benefits econ

**Horween 09(Matt,** **former commissioned U.S. Foreign Service Officer for the U.S. Agency for International Development, “Time to Remove U.S. Troops From South Korea” JL)**

It is obvious to anyone who thinks about it, that what the **U.S. government is doing now and proposing to do in the future in South Korea is not a good plan.** So what would be a good plan? **We** could **withdraw all** of our **troops**, close all our bases, **and bring** all our **assets back to the USA. The troops would be with their families and we would benefit from their economic impact here. More importantly, our military could train them to be an instant deployment force.** They could train in the southwest desert area of our country, where **they would be on the spot in case Mexico implodes or their drug war spills over into U.S. territory.** We would tell South Korea that it is time for them to take over their own defense and to go to the United Nations if North Korea invades their territory.

Troop Shift – Iraq

**Troops will be moved to locations around the globe such as Iraq to improve security and stability in regions - recent transfers prove.**

**White 04(Josh, Staff Writer for the Washington Post, “U.S. Troops Moving From S. Korea to Iraq” JL)**

**Defense Department officials announced** yesterday their plan **to send the 2nd Brigade of the Army's 2nd Infantry Division to Iraq** within the next few months **to help deal with festering security problems there**. The move will deplete U.S. forces in South Korea by nearly 10 percent, the first major shift of resources out of the country in decades. **Pentagon officials stressed** yesterday **that the move** should **not be viewed as a sign of waning commitment to protecting Seoul from a North Korean attack,** but some members of Congress expressed concern and some experts said it showed the U.S. Army is stretched dangerously thin. The Pentagon is dipping into forces protecting a volatile region dominated by concern over North Korea's nuclear ambitions, and members of Congress yesterday predicted U.S. troops would be diverted to Iraq from other parts of the globe over the next year. Defense officials had estimated earlier they would drop U.S. forces in Iraq to about 115,000 by summer, but U.S. generals have asked to keep about 138,000 troops there at least through next year. **The 2nd brigade will take with it to Iraq a number of heavy armored vehicles, such as Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles, part of the U.S. military's effort to beef up force protection as it fights the insurgency. The deployment from Korea will help spell 20,000 U.S. troops whose tours in Iraq were extended earlier this year.**

\_\_\_\*\*2AC Add-On – US-ROK Relations

US-ROK – Top Shelf

**Controversies over SOFA have sparked large anti-American protests and long-lasting anti-American sentiment.**

**Shorrock 06(Tim, Writer for ISP, “SOUTH KOREA: Protests Show Rising Hostility toward U.S. Policies” JL)**

**Hundreds of people demonstrated** at Yongsan, the huge U.S. military base in Seoul, with smaller actions taking place in Kwangju and other cities on Nov 23-24. **Civic groups hope to collect two million signatures on a petition demanding legal changes in the U.S.-Korean alliance that would allow U.S. soldiers to be tried in Korean courts.** They are also sending a delegation to Washington to ask President George W Bush to overturn the acquittal. **Many of the demonstrations had a strong anti-American flavour**. At one protest at the U.S. embassy in downtown Seoul, **protesters burned American flags and chanted slogans demanding that U.S. troops leave the country.** On Nov 25, **student radicals threw petrol bombs at Camp Gray**, a U.S. military support base in Seoul. Most of the protests, however, were more sorrowful than angry. "We **strongly protest the U.S. military court's acquittal of the U.S. soldier and condemn its shamelessness**," the Korean National Council of Churches said in a statement. It called **on the Korean government to revise th**e Status of Forces Agreement (**SOFA)**, **which governs the legal status of U.S. troops in Korea**. The deaths of the girls "have galvanised and incited lots of emotion and activism towards the U.S. military as violent and predatory towards Korea rather than protecting Koreans," said Katherine Moon, a professor at Wellesley College who specialises in U.S.-Korea relations and has written a book about prostitution at U.S. military bases in South Korea.

US-ROK – Top Shelf

**Both parties in the ROK favor peace – US war push collapses the alliance**

**Bae 10** (Jong-Yun, Prof of Political Science, Asian Survey, Vol. 50, No. 2, pg. 335)

The names of the policies have changed, but **the basic theme of engagement has been kept by both conservative and progressive regimes in South Korea**. Despite efforts by then President-elect Lee’s transition team to integrate the Ministry of Unification with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 2008, the former, in charge of all matters related to Korean unification and inter-Korean relations, is still operating in the Lee administration. Moreover, **in December 2005, new legislation was passed known as the Inter- Korean Relations Development Act, which obligates Seoul to pursue the development of inter-Korean relations and unification**. A divided nation conscious of more than 1,200 years of continuous unity remains committed to the dream of reunification. **The United States traditionally has prioritized democratization over nationalist aspirations for reestablishing a single state after a period of division, particularly when Washington sees a communist regime on one side insistent on imposing its totalitarian ways.** The U.S. government interfered in the Vietnam War, arguing that the nationalist appeal of reunification was secondary to the pull of freedom in South Vietnam. **With North Korea, the embodiment of the worst excesses of totalitarianism in American eyes, and South Korea an ally credited with establishing a full-fledged democracy and an “economic miracle” based on a market economy, the U.S. finds little basis for reunification unless the North collapses or its regime changes fundamentally**. Regarding these approaches, most of **Washington**, including George W. Bush, **had little sympathy** with the Sunshine Policy, especially **for peacefully solving North Korean nuclear issues**.13 Even policy makers of the U.S. Congress have negative attitudes. The report “Congressional Attitudes on the Future of the U.S.-South Korea Relationship” states, “On a bipartisan basis, **those interviewed were very skeptical of South Korean policy toward North Korea, including the Sunshine Policy and subsequent ROK efforts to engage North Korea**.”14 **Some of the U.S. policy makers understand South Korea’s engagement policy as too generous, naïve, and dangerous**. Critical for understanding the differences with the U.S. is the realization that **despite the sharp political differences between conservatives and progressives in South Korea,15 there is a degree of consensus on handling North Korea**. To be sure, the past 10 years of progressive regimes had tilted the balance toward sustaining the North Korean regime rather than conditioning rewards on its transformation. This no doubt also created a degree of sympathy for the North and suspicion of the alliance with the U.S. that a conservative regime would have worked much harder to avoid.16 “Self-reliance in National Defense” or “Balancer in Northeast Asia,” which were chosen by Roh Moo-hyun as role concepts in security issues including the North Korean nuclear crisis, were also criticized by conservatives as weakening the alliance between the U.S. and South Korea.17 Yet, the fact is that divisions over North Korean policy between the U.S. and South Korea also existed in the Kim Young Sam period during the first North Korean nuclear crisis. In the Kim Dae-jung period, there was meaningful policy cooperation with the Clinton administration (as when then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited North Korea and signed the U.S.-North Korea Joint Communiqué in October 2000). Still, early in the period Kim’s Sunshine Policy raised doubts in the U.S. that were only overcome with the final report of the Perry Process in 1999 that put Clinton behind testing whether engagement would work. And the Roh Moo-hyun government joined the agreement in the Six-Party Talks on February 13, 2007, after cooperating with the U.S. to make it possible, although many South Korean conservatives were skeptical that the North would meet its promises and wondered if Bush might be backing down because of his troubles elsewhere. **The two camps in South Korea do not agree on policies toward North Korea or the U.S., but they are not far apart on the need to stick to the path of engagement. At the core of this overall consensus is strategic thinking that opens the door to North Korea while visualizing reunification as a gradual process in a regional context**. **One key element of this strategic consensus is maintaining the alliance with the U.S.** Even Roh Moo-hyun, who was elected amid anti- American sentiment in 2002, recognized this reality when he dispatched the Korean army to Iraq at Bush’s request.18 Roh also agreed to the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in April 2007 and acceded after the U.S. Congress insisted on changes at the end of June. **Whatever the differences on how to deal with Pyongyang, Seoul remains committed to an alliance relationship with Washington. The alliance is virtually unassailable because the foremost objective in strategic thinking is stability**. **This is seen as essential for the South Korean economy**, sandwiched between technologically more-advanced producers in Japan and the U.S. and the rising, low-cost producers of China. **The alliance with the U.S. may be primarily a means to keep North Korea from invading or otherwise destabilizing the South, but it also is a bulwark of dependability for the South and the region. Thus, its significance is much broader than many have suggested**. Although both Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun propelled several quietly progressive policies toward North Korea, they never denied the importance of the American alliance, even at times of policy discord on the North Korean nuclear issue. Nonetheless**, the value of the alliance could be called into question if the U.S. gets trigger-happy toward the North**—or if force realignment aimed at a possible war over Taiwan were to lead many in Korea to perceive the American troops as a source of instability.

US-ROK – Econ Impact

**Without action, Anti-Americanism in Korea risk the alliances stability and the Korean economy.**

**Risse 06(Nicole, M.A. in Korean Studies and Director of The Europe-Korea Foundation, “The Evolution in anti-Americanism in South Korea: From Ideologically Embedded to Socially Constructed” pg 88 JL)**

"**Strong anti-Americanism could trigger a negative reaction in the United States, in particular with members of Congress**." The U.S. ambassador to Korea, H.E. Stephen W. Bosworth, (Stephen W. Bosworth at the 23rd IEWS (Institute for East and West Studies) Diplomatic Round Table Series at Yonsei University in November 2000) expressed this concern as well when he **pointed out how important the United States are for Korea’s security but these days even more for Korea’s economy.** He mentioned that **Korea has to realize** and is realizing that it is a global player and that "**the World is watching them**." However**, if they continue to express a strong anti-American sentiment, they will have to face a change of perception by the American population and that could have consequences for Korea.** The financial crisis was a dark era throughout Asia. For many nations it meant a loss of pride. The bailout by the IMF was therefore not perceived as the helping hand but as the hand that was slapping them in the face. Some people warned that **this perception "maybe promoting a new round of anti-Americanism in the region"** (Bello 1998: Internet Source). The Clinton administration has used the IMF to enforce reforms and due to these reforms a lot of people where laid-off and put in a miserable situation. Some people foresaw that: When Korea begins to experience the real consequences of the austerity measures, for example, potential unemployment of as many as 1.5 million people, Korean politicians will deflect the people's anger by placing blame on the IMF, sowing the seeds for a renewed round of resentment (APCSS 1998: Internet Source).

US-ROK – UQ

**US-ROK security alliance weakening – 4 reasons**

Robert E **Kelly, ‘9** – Assistant Professor Department of Political Science & Diplomacy Pusan National University. “Start Admitting that the US Commitment to SK is Weakening,” http://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2009/04/24/start-admitting-that-the-us-commitment-to-sk-is-weakening.

The Korean press has been filled for months with the coverage of the US military’s redeployment from north to south of Seoul. Usually these reports include protestations from both sides that the military commitment of the US to the South has not diminished. I just can’t see how that can be the case. **I want the US commitment to remain strong, but** I think **this is wishful thinking. 1. The US has slowly reduced its ground forces in Korea over the last few decades. US force totals are now around 28k and may sink below 25k by 2015. By contrast, the US has about twice that number in Japan and Germany**, neither of whom are as directly threatened as SK. The common response is that the US can provide the same level of protection with fewer people because of today’s greater lethality per US warfighter, as well as the continuing cover provided by the US air force and navy. Essentially this is a Rumsfeldian transformation argument. The ‘transformation’ of the US military has made each US solider more individually effective, so you need fewer of them for the same job. This is achieved through better training, and use of IT to coordinate firepower better. Smart soldiers and combined arms have multiplier effects we didn’t enjoy during the Cold War. So instead of blowing up a whole valley to kill the enemy, you only need the firepower to blow up a part of it, because IT (‘the networked battlefield’) will tell you exactly which part the enemy is in. I find this moderately compelling, but the verdict is not really in yet on transformation. (See Thomas Ricks at Foreign Policy and Fred Kaplan at Slate, who have long chronicled the ups and downs of this notion.) While it seemed to work well in Afghanistan, it was an abysmal failure in Iraq, where low force totals were the single biggest US problem until the surge. **Transformation and smaller forces** also seem to **run against a basic military lesson – more is better**. Ceteris paribus, a larger force should improve options and create a greater cushion to absorb casualties and defeats. I think we all assume that NK’s military is clapped out, but it is over 1 million strong, and US totals seem awfully low. Also, should the US be involved in another war – as we are now – at the time of a conflict with the DPRK, more is again better. It just seems awfully risky. **2. US forces are being moved south of Seoul. To me, this is the most obvious sign of decreased willingness. During the Cold War, US troops were purposefully strewn along the DMZ, so that if there was a conflict, US lives would be lost almost immediately. Dead Americans would then rouse US public opinion to commit to the war**. NATO followed the same logic in central Europe. The more flags on the initial coffins, the more likely collective security would be honored. **It seems willful blindness to say that the US is not looking to avoid casualties and therefore the public opinion chain-gang effect by this southward move**. This may be good for the US. It lowers the likelihood of an immediate public outcry, and so gives DoD and the White House some time in a crisis. But if I were South Koreans, I would be nervous. Similarly, **US forces will no longer be located between Seoul, the capital, and the DMZ**. 20m people live in greater Seoul – 40% of the national population. It is extremely exposed. It is only 30 miles from the DMZ; it is extremely dense, and it is filled with skyscrapers and high apartment tower blocks that would fall easily if it hit by NK artillery. (Picture the horrifying WTC collapse happening dozens of times.) I imagine the ROK army will be put in the US place, but still if I were a Korean, I would be pretty spooked that the US is no longer protecting what would obviously be the primary target if the DPRK drove south. **3. In 2012, the US will relinquish wartime authority to control SK forces. This abolition of** Combined Forces Command (**CFC) is marketed as restoring sovereignty and control to the South, but an obvious extra for the US is that it is no longer obligated to command in the case of a war**. Again, this gives the US more wiggle room. 4. **Finally**, I think **US public opinion is hardly deeply committed the defense of SK anymore**. The Cold War is over. If SK were to go communist now, it would not matter to US security as much as before. And Americans are exhausted from Iraq, Afghanistan, and the general stress of the GWoT. To the extent Americans even know where SK is, most of their political images will be of a wealthy country (Samsung TVs, etc, etc) that should be able to defend itself. **The American attitude, and** probably **that of DoD, is burden-sharing**. Allies should carry more of their own defense. NK is SK’s problem, let them fix it; it’s their war, let them fight it. In sum, the bulk of smaller US forces will be 100 miles from the DMZ, south of Seoul, and **we don’t have the authority to command the SK military in a fight most Americans won’t see as critical for national security**. In other words, we are reserving options for ourselves, including just how much we want to commit.

US-ROK – UQ

**The NPR will decrease nuclear aid and call for SoKo to put up**

Park **Yong-ok, ‘9**. – Research Fellow Sejong Institute. “Nuclear Armed North Korea and Extended Deterrence ― Issues, Prospects and Suggestions,” December, Korea Focus, <http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/design2/essays/view.asp?volume_id=92&content_id=102814&category=G>.

The **Obama** administration **is** currently **conducting another** round of Nuclear Posture Review (**NPR**). It is possible that **the 2009 NPR will produce a dramatically different outcome** from those of two previous NPRs, considering that President Obama is a strong advocate of a nuclear-free world. The 1993 NPR under the Clinton administration virtually followed the Cold War concept despite the changes in world situation since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It maintained the offensive strategy based on the “nuclear triad” consisting of the land-based ICBM, submarine-based SLBM and strategic bombers all capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The 2001 NPR under the Bush administration reflecting the post-Cold War situation established a “new triad,” which consisted of the three types of offensive arms of the old triad (both nuclear- and conventionally-armed), defensive systems, including missile defense, and a responsive infrastructure for addressing unexpected developments. It combined both offensive and defensive strategies presupposing the preemptive use of nuclear weapons. The ongoing 2009 NPR of the Obama administration is inclined toward considerably reducing dependence on nuclear arms in accordance with the objective of a nuclear-free world. It is generally recognized that the previous nuclear posture of the United States has caused a burden to its nuclear nonproliferation and anti-terror efforts and that Washington needs to exercise strong leadership in realizing a nuclear-free world although the maintenance of nuclear capabilities is still necessary as a means of strategic deterrence. **Yet, it needs further observation to determine whether Obama`s NPR can completely depart from Bush`s** NPR. The Obama administration should accept the role and functions of nuclear arms in restraining foes and protecting friends, and it therefore faces the question of maintaining balance and harmony between nuclear deterrence and denuclearization. No consensus seems to have been reached in the United States and little change may be expected in its general nuclear posture for the time being. **What is clear, however, is that the concepts of nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence and their operational principles can be altered in accordance with the outcome of the current review** of the U.S. nuclear posture. **One possible area of changes is whether emphasis will be placed on unilateral U.S. assistance or increased role of allies** in the future mode of security cooperation. **In the event** that **Washington reduces the strategic importance of nuclear arms,** a drastic increase in the role of allies will be called for**. Changes will be unavoidable and South Korea will be required to equip itself with enough capabilities necessary for playing its role in any restructured security situation in the future.**

\_\_\_\*\*Neg

Deter Good

**Basing basing is the most effective cost-benefit deterrent**

George **Perkovich, ‘9**. “EXTENDED DETERRENCE ON THE WAY TO A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD,” <https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http://www.icnnd.org/research/Perkovich_Deterrence.pdf>.

**The most credible and** perhaps **least dangerous way to assure allies of U.S. commitments to defend them is to station U.S. conventional forces** on allied territories, as is already the case in original NATO states and in Japan and South Korea. **With U.S. conventional forces in harm’s way, an adversary attacking a U.S. ally would draw the U.S. into the conflict** with greater certainty than if nuclear weapons were directly and immediately implicated. Indeed, the greater credibility that U.S. conventional forces bring to extended deterrence is one reason why Poland has been keen to have U.S. missile defense personnel based on Polish soil. Were U.S. personnel attacked, the U.S. would respond forcefully. Arguably **the best way to strengthen the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence would be to stress that conventional capabilities of the U.S. and its allies alone are sufficient to defeat all foreseeable adversaries** in any scenario other than nuclear war. And as long as adversaries can threaten nuclear war, the U.S. will deploy nuclear weapons to deter that threat. Of course, **basing U.S. conventional forces** on allied territory **also invites controversy** in many places, including Japan. **Such controversies are much less intense than would flow from proposals to base nuclear weapons**, but they point to the fundamental underlying political-psychological challenge of extended deterrence. Allies want the protection that the U.S. can provide, and worry about abandonment, but they also don’t want to be implicated in U.S. policies that could entrap them in conflicts not entirely of their making. This tension is the heart of the extended deterrence challenge. To repeat, **rather than focusing on nuclear weapons, the U.S. and its allies should concentrate on building cooperation and confidence in overall political-security strategies in each region**. Indeed, it is worthwhile to honestly consider whether in Northeast Asia and Central Europe and Turkey the recently expressed concerns over the future credibility of extended U.S. nuclear deterrence is a proxy for deeper concerns that are more difficult to express.

**US security commitments deter conflict escalation**

**Bandow, 07 (Doug, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and a former Special Assistant to President Reagan. National Interest Online, February 1,** [**http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=13538**](http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=13538)**.)**

**The principle behind extending Washington’s nuclear umbrella is deterrence. That is, smaller nations, even if evil or aggressive, will not risk American retaliation by threatening friendly states.  Moreover, friendly states, sheltered behind a U.S. guarantee, will avoid taking steps opposed by Washington—most particularly, constructing their own nuclear weapons.** Undoubtedly, **security commitments help deter. The possibility of U.S. intervention raises the cost of war, and thereby discourages aggression. If aggression is less likely, then so is the likelihood that countries will adopt extreme defensive measures. Advocates of extended security commitments, and particularly nuclear guarantees, emphasize these effects**.

Peace Treaty CP

**Conditional permanent peace treaty solves nuclearization**

Anthony **DiFilippo, ‘9** – Professor of sociology @ Lincoln University (PA), “Solution to Nuclear Brinkmanship,” The Korea Times, 6-26, <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2010/02/198_47507.html>

What is clear from all of this is that **the Obama administration's North Korea policy is a hodgepodge of disparate interests** belonging to Washington, Tokyo and Seoul, **all of which are touting the rhetoric that they ``will never accept'' a North Korea with nuclear weapons. But** they need to look again: **the DPRK already has nuclear weapons.** The issue now is not the public consumption rhetoric coming from Washington, Tokyo and Seoul that relies on the inanity of refusing to accept something that now exists. Rather**, the issue at hand is how to get the DPRK to get rid of its nuclear weapons and the program to manufacture them.** **The current strategy of demanding that the North unilaterally get rid of its nuclear weapons, a position zealously articulated most especially by the United States, but by others as well, simply will not work. The DPRK views its possession of nuclear weapons and the testing of them as imperative for self-defense.** This is what the DPRK ``juche"-based military-first policy dictates. **Demands, threats, sanctions and interdiction activities will only lead to more missile and nuclear tests and perhaps war, or, in the worse case, nuclear conflagration. What's most important to Pyongyang is not its small cache of nuclear weapons, but the maintenance of DPRK sovereignty. Right now, Pyongyang is convinced that it must protect DPRK sovereignty with nuclear weapons**. In Pyongyang this past January, I was told unequivocally ― and on more than one occasion ― that **the DPRK would not have any use for nuclear weapons if it was confident that the United States had no hostile intent. Presently, Pyongyang is certain that the United States, supported by Japan and South Korea, presents a serious threat to the DPRK. Making this matter worse is President Obama'**s April **speech** in Prague, **where he talked about the U.S. objective of eliminating all nuclear weapons**, a goal, he said, that ``will not be reached quickly ― perhaps not in my lifetime." When spoken, t**hese words** produced much skepticism in Pyongyang; however, they **instantly became completely useless there when Washington**, as it did just recently, **formally provided South Korea with ``the continuing commitment of extended deterrence, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella**,'' something that it has also given Japan in the past. **Pyongyang believes that the nuclear umbrella officially given to South Korea is part of Washington's plan for a ``preemptive nuclear attack,'' and so in the North's eyes helps justify its possession of a nuclear deterrent.** While the six-party talks have yielded some success, presently, bilateral dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang is necessary. Indeed, **offering a permanent peace treaty, which could easily be drafted to contain a safeguard clause that stipulates the abrogation of the accord if the DPRK re-commences its nuclear weapons activities, is a very small price to pay for denuclearization**. Along with bilateral dialogue, **a permanent peace treaty to replace the armistice would immediately eliminate Pyongyang's justification for possessing nuclear weapons and create the requisite conditions for normalized U.S.-DPRK relations.**