South Korea Aff – 2.0

South Korea Aff – 2.0 1

\*\*\*Solvency – 1AC 3

\*\*\*Solvency – 1AC 4

\_\_\_\*\*2AC – AT: Regime Collapse DA 5

2AC Regime Collapse DA (1/) 6

2AC Regime Collapse DA (2/) 7

2AC Regime Collapse DA (3/) 8

2AC Regime Collapse DA (4/) 9

Ext- No Smooth Transition 10

Ext- No Smooth Transition 11

Ext-Troops Cause Collapse 12

\_\_\_\*\*Add-Ons 13

Deficits Add-On – 2AC 14

CBW’s Add-On – 2AC 15

Regime Collapse – 2AC Add-On 16

Regime Collapse – 2AC Add-On 17

CBW’s – Will Use CBW’s 18

CBW’s – Will Use CBW’s 19

CBW’s NoKo – Will Use CBW’s 20

CBW’s Impact – Chemical Weapons 21

CBW’s Impact – Bioweapons Bad 22

CBW’s – US-China Relations Module 23

CBW’s – US-China Relations Module 24

\_\_\_\*\*2AC – AT: Base PICs 25

2AC – PIC Out of Base (1/2) 26

2AC – PIC Out of Base (2/2) 27

Theory – Shell 28

\_\_\_\*\*2AC – AT: Lee Credibility 29

2AC – Internal Politics (1/3) 30

2AC – Internal Politics (2/3) 31

2AC – Internal Politics (3/3) 32

Internal Politics – Asian Econ Resilient 33

Internal Politics – South Korean Econ Resilient 34

\_\_\_\_\*\*2AC – AT: Politics 35

Agenda Politics – Plan = Obama win 36

Agenda Politics – Plan Popular – Blue Dogs 37

Agenda Politics – Plan Popular – Collins 38

Agenda Politics – Ext – Collins Key 39

Agenda Politics – No Push 2AC 40

Midterms Politics – Plan Popular – Public 41

Agenda Politics – Plan = Obama Loss 42

Midterms Politics – Plan Unpopular – Public 43

\_\_\_\*\*2AC – AT: QPQ NPT CP 44

NPT FAILS 45

NPT Fails 46

NPT Fails 47

NPT Fails 48

NPT Fails 49

A2 Amend NPT 50

NPT fails 51

North Korea Won’t Give Up Nukes 52

North Korea Won’t Give Up Nukes 53

Bargain Fails 54

Bargain Fails 55

\_\_\_\*\*2AC – AT: DAs 56

Hegemony Good DA – 2AC 57

Hegemony Good DA – 2AC 59

Hegemony Good DA – 2AC 60

\*\*\*Solvency – 1AC

Immediately withdrawing troops is crucial to solving the largest risk of global war – the perception of troop removal is the only way to reverse the risk

KIM JOHNG **SOHN, ‘9** – Tongil Korea Net, “US Should Terminate Military Presence in S Korea As Early As Possible,” 9-8, <http://tongilkorea.net/2009/09/08/us-should-terminate-military-presence-in-s-korea-as-early-as-possible/>.

Pyongyang — It has passed 64 years since the U.S. imperialists’ occupation of south Korea. **If the United** States persistently **enforces its** policy of **military presence in south Korea, lending a deaf ear to** the **voices** of the peoples of Korea and other countries of the world **demanding the** earliest withdrawal of the U.S. forces from south Korea, **it will face bitterer rebuff and denunciation at home and abroad**. The U.S. forces’ landing in south Korea was aimed at keeping it under its occupation and turning it into its colony, dividing Korea into two parts and using its southern half as a military appendage for executing its policy of aggression. **The U.S. moves to seek its forces’ permanent presence in south Korea** and bolster up its combat capability are a challenge to the demand of the times for the withdrawal of foreign troops and their trend. The U.S. should pull its forces out of south Korea as early as possible as demanded by international law and the times. **The termination of the U.S. forces’ presence in south Korea would remove the basic factor of threatening the peace in Korea and the biggest hurdle lying in the way of national reunification. The** pullback of the U.S. forces from south Korea would result in eliminating the most dangerous hotbed of war in the world and thus help create environment favorable for ensuring peace and security on the Korean peninsula and the rest of Asia and the world. **How to approach the issue of the U.S. forces’ withdrawal from south Korea serves as a barometer judging whether the U.S. has a will to rectify its hostile policy towards the DPRK** or not and whether it wishes to see Korea’s reunification and peace or not. The world is waiting for the U.S. to make a switchover in its attitude.

US troop withdrawal solves and all their DAs – literally, all of them – are zero-risk

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The vortex of Korean politics can make even Donald Rumsfeld sound like the most radical Korean peace activist. "After the cold war," he declared on June 3, "U.S. forces have been stationed in South Korea for too long." The occasion was the announcement of the largest U.S. troop reductions from the Korean peninsula since the Korean War armistice, which took place 51 years ago this month. The Pentagon is withdrawing one-third of its forces from South Korea and sending a portion of them to Iraq. Since this announcement comes at a time not of relative tranquility but rather of heightened tensions between the United States and North Korea, some critics have charged the Bush administration with sacrificing security in East Asia on the altar of its Iraq policy. "Scavenging troops from South Korea," writes Jon Wolfstahl in the International Herald Tribune, "sends exactly the wrong signal at the wrong time to U.S. allies and adversaries alike." These critics are missing the point. American troops are no longer needed on the Korean peninsula. The Bush administration's only mistake is in not going far enough. An even more dramatic withdrawal of U.S. troops would not compromise security and could even help unknot the ongoing negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang. The Pentagon announcement comes just before a third round of Six-Party Talks that bring together the United States, North and South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia. The previous two rounds went nowhere and expectations for this third round are low. The United States is insisting on CVID or the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of North Korea's nuclear programs – before any substantive compromise can be hammered out. Having declared North Korea beyond the pale, the Bush administration is stuck in a theological hole: any form of negotiations looks suspiciously like "supping with the Devil." North Korea, meanwhile, has broached various scenarios whereby they freeze and then dismantle their programs in exchange for energy, economic incentives, security guarantees, or a mixture of the three. It might seem strange that the United States is reducing its military footprint on the Korean peninsula at this juncture. The Pentagon points out that the current plan has been on the drawing board since the end of the Cold War. Troops in fixed positions with slow-moving tanks, according to the Pentagon, fight yesterday's wars. Today's conflicts require rapid response units that can move quickly and over long distances. U.S. military presence in Korea – as well as in Japan – is being refashioned for the instantaneous demands of the virtual age and to intervene in areas further south as part of the "war on terrorism." This restructuring was first delayed in the early 1990s during the first nuclear crisis between the United States and North Korea. Why, during a second and potentially more serious crisis, is the restructuring moving forward? Certainly the immediate need for troops in the Iraq occupation is one reason. <CONTINUED>

\*\*\*Solvency – 1AC

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The deeper issue, however, is the declining utility of American troops on the Korean peninsula. North Korea's conventional forces have deteriorated in strength over the last twenty years, even as Pyongyang has directed large portions of its stagnant government budget toward the military. South Korea's armed forces, which include 690,000 troops, have meanwhile steadily improved its capability. Because of the high cost of fuel and the lack of critical spare parts, North Korean military pilots train 13 hours a year, which is what an American pilot easily clocks in a month. Or to give another example of the growing disparity of forces, South Korea has the luxury to spend between ten and one hundred times more per soldier for their equipment and other needs. Given the dramatic reversal of comparative strength between North and South, the tiny U.S. contingent – around 5 percent of South Korean troop strength – does not bring much to the table. The U.S. decision in 2003 to redeploy U.S. forces away from the DMZ has eliminated their function as a tripwire, the first line of defense against a North Korean invasion. Military boosters emphasize the symbolic value of U.S. troops in demonstrating the unwavering commitment of the United States to its alliance with South Korea and to deter any North Korean attack on the South. But even this symbolism has become drained of meaning. South Korea under Roh Moo-Hyun wants more equality in its relations with the United States, which translates into greater control over military affairs. Younger South Koreans now see the United States – or, to be more precise, the trigger-happy unilateralism of the Bush administration – as more dangerous than North Korea. U.S. deterrent capacity, meanwhile, now resides in firepower based largely outside the peninsula, such as the Fifth Air Force and the Seventh Fleet, both based in Japan. As it did fifty years ago, U.S. airpower can reduce North Korea to rubble. North Korean leaders recognize that any attack they might launch across the DMZ would thus be suicidal. The presence of the remaining 25,000 U.S. troops does not alter this calculus. Although they have only a minor military function and declining symbolic value, the remaining U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula can play a vital new role: bargaining chip. North Korea has argued that it is under threat of U.S. attack and considers U.S. troops in South Korea a longstanding provocation. So let's try something new by putting U.S. troop presence on the negotiating table. With the advice and consent of our South Korean allies, the Bush administration should offer a timetable for the removal of all U.S. troops from the peninsula. A Democrat would be hard pressed to offer such a deal. When Jimmy Carter tried to withdraw U.S. troops from the peninsula, he hit major resistance from Washington insiders. Only the hawks in Washington have the political capital to push through a complete withdrawal. The complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea would certainly have its drawbacks. South Korea is spending more now on its defense than ever before and the Defense Ministry has called for an additional 13 percent increase in the military budget to compensate for the disappearing U.S. troops. The peace movement in Japan and Okinawa also want to bid farewell to U.S. troops, so the shifting of U.S. forces eastward, while a boon for the Korean peace movement, would not necessarily be a plus for the region as a whole. Still, U.S. troop withdrawal from the Korean peninsula would be such an enormous step toward resolving inter-Korean tensions that the benefits outweigh the costs. Beset on all sides for its Iraq policy, the Bush administration needs a foreign policy victory. It needs to demonstrate that it isn't ignoring the Korean peninsula. And it needs to show the world that the United States, if only after 51 years, does eventually bring home its troops.

\_\_\_\*\*2AC – AT: Regime Collapse DA

2AC Regime Collapse DA (1/)

1. **Case outweighs-** 
   1. **we control both link and impact timeframe: Both Koreas are on the edge of war--removing troops sends an immediate signal**
   2. We control escalation- regional actors such as China would get involved to protect its interests in North Korea as a buffer zone
   3. Case solves the impact- independent Japan would check regional instability in North Korea

**2. Korean regime is stable- totalitarian nature, military repression and China prop it up**

Karlin 10 (Anatoly, independent writer, political analyst and media critic, 3/28, <http://www.sublimeoblivion.com/2010/03/28/korean-war-2/>) my

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Nonetheless, this does not mean that the DPRK is weak or unstable. Though its system of personal rule is brittle, a combination of coercion and legitimizing propaganda suppresses popular uprisings from below and open struggles amongst the elites. Consumer poverty has not preempted the sustenance of a 1.1mn-strong military, with some NBC capabilities, that is nearly twice the size of its southern adversary (not only in manpower, but also tanks, artillery pieces, warships, and fighters). This military buildup serves two complementing imperatives of the regime – 1) preserve the political dominance of the ruling elites centered around the Kim dynasty and upper echelons of the Party and military-industrial complex, and 2) pursue Kim Il-sung’s policy of “reunification through military force under DPRK conditions” that consitutes the legitimizing basis of the regime’s permanent war economy. Contrary to popular opinion, the North Korean regime is essentially stable. It survived its baptism of fire in 1950-53, the collapse of the Soviet Union (and of its subsidies) in the early 1990′s, and a devastating famine in 1995-98. It is merely authoritarian regimes, like Iran or China, which tend to be the most unstable. On the other hand, North Korea is a throughly totalitarian society, in which all information about the outside world is limited and dissenting voices are sent off to vast political prisons. Though hardship, dearth, and black markets may undermine the DPRK, there is always China to provide a last bulwark against disintegration. China has no interest in seeing the DPRK collapse, since doing so 1) may unleash a destabilizing flood of refugees and 2) much more importantly, its successor state will probably align with, or be absorbed by, South Korea, which is a regional rival and a firm ally of the US. The Chinese will do everything in their power to avoid a scenario in which a united Korean peninsula points like a dagger into their heartlands. Hence, as long as the DPRK’s rulers are united in their will to perpetuate the system, it will not collapse of its own accord.

**3. Current US response plans aren’t coordinated and won’t solve**

Pei 10 (Minxin, Prof of government at Claremont McKenna College, 5/12, The Diplomat, <http://the-diplomat.com/2010/05/12/get-ready-for-dprk-collapse/>) my

Of course, the Kim dynasty may set a precedent. But given the worsening economy, the inexperience of the putative successor and the unknown reliability of the Korean military and security forces in the event of Kim Jong-il’s death, the rest of East Asia should be prepared for a scenario of rapid collapse in North Korea. What is most worrying about a possible North Korean collapse is that the key players in the region are not talking to each other, even informally, about such an eventuality. It’s almost certain that these powers—China, the United States, Japan, South Korea and, possibly, Russia—have all drawn up their own contingency plans for Pyongyang’s quick collapse. However, they’ve done nothing to explore a collective response to what is without doubt a geopolitical game-changer. As a result, many crucial questions remain unanswered. For instance, how should the United States and South Korea react if China sends combat troops into North Korea to conduct ‘humanitarian assistance’ missions? In all likelihood, Beijing will be tempted to do so if millions of refugees start fleeing into China. Which country will take the lead in securing nuclear materials? How will China respond to the crossing of the 38th parallel by South Korean and US forces? Who will take the lead in reaching out to Pyongyang’s post-Kim regime? What will be the collective security architecture after the Korean peninsula is reunified? These critical issues are deemed too sensitive for US, Chinese, Japanese and South Korean government officials to discuss. As a result, few are thinking about these difficult issues, let alone exploring workable solutions that could help avoid a possible conflict between China and the United States over a collapsing North Korea and construct an enduring peace after the departure of the Kim dynasty.

2AC Regime Collapse DA (2/)

**4.** **a) US-led response to North Korean collapse threatens China**

Glaser and Snyder 10 (Bonnie, CSIS associate and governmental advisor on East Asia, Scott, director of the Center for US-Korea Policy, May, <http://csis.org/files/publication/100506_Glaser_RespondingtoChange_Web.pdf>) my

Discussing instability in North Korea also brings to the forefront Chinese concerns about U.S. intentions that, in many ways, eclipse their concerns about South Korea. As noted above, North Korea is still viewed by some scholars, officials, and military officers as a buffer zone between Chinese territory and U.S. troops stationed in the ROK. Shen Dingli of Fudan University calls the DPRK "a guard post for China, keeping at bay the tens of thousands of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea." Another Chinese scholar recently framed it this way: "The 38th parallel is necessary to preserve stability until relations among the major powers are changed." This "buffer zone" argument is part of a larger Chinese concern over U.S. military presence near China. Chinese thinkers have frequently expressed anxiety that a unified peninsula would pose the danger of U.S. troops being stationed close to China's border. Fudan University's Wu Xinbo has written that continuation of U.S. military presence on the peninsula after unification would be "of grave concern to China." When asked in December 2009 whether the United States would deploy forces north of the 38th parallel in a reunified Korea, USFK commander General Sharp said only that he would not take any options off the table. The deployment of U.S. forces so close to China, most Chinese scholars believe, would "fundamentally alter China's strategic security environment." In a recent discussion, one leading PLA researcher argued, "The Korean peninsula cannot be made into a sphere of influence for the United States and the ROK...The Chinese government won't accept the U.S.-ROK alliance breaching the 38th parallel." The officer continued, "We won't allow U.S. troops deployed along the Yalu River." Beyond concerns about U.S. military presence, any discussion of post-DPRK security arrangements brings out Chinese anxieties that the United States is trying to diminish Chinese influence in the region and tighten its encirclement of China. For example, after the release of the inter-Korean Joint Declaration in 2007, the Chinese Communist Party newspaper People's Daily carried a signed commentary by senior editor Wen Xian arguing that "China's role in the Korea issue cannot be neglected," and some Chinese scholars publicly fretted that "if the United States is an indispensible power, China is an equally important player that can by no means be bypassed." Dai Xu, a PLA Air Force colonel and frequent media commentator who is known for his harsh criticism of U.S. policy, sees U.S. calls for cooperation on instability response through this same lens: "The United States seeks more control over the North by coaxing China into its initiative of a contingency plan to eventually form a pro-U.S. Korean peninsula." In a private discussion, one Chinese scholar charged that "the U.S. intention is to weaken China's relationship with the ROK and support domination of the Peninsula by the ROK," while another insisted that "the United States wants to be the sole power dominating the Peninsula." Gong Keyu, vice director of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies' Center for Asian-Pacific Research, argues that China's role in North Korea should be to "contain U.S. expansionism."

2AC Regime Collapse DA (3/)

b) Rebuilding the US-Sino relationship is critical to a peaceful Sino rise

Schriver 7, (Armitage International Partner, January, Randall, http://www.aspeninstitute.org/atf/cf/%7BDEB6F227-659B-4EC8-8F848DF23CA704F5%7D/CMTCFINAL052307.PDF)

While the current administration understandably devotes enormous amounts of time to Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and the Middle East conflict, the defining strategic challenge of our age is unfolding in a different region. The emergence of China in the context of a rapidly changing Asia is arguably the most important strategic development on our agenda. This view is endorsed by authoritative sources. For example, a report by the U.S. National Intelligence Council 2020 project suggested that the emergence of China resembles the advent of a united Germany in the 19th century and a powerful United States in the early 20th century, with the potential to dramatically transform the geopolitical landscape. However, the U.S.-China bilateral relationship and U.S. relations with Asia more generally, may not be receiving the kind of senior-level attention that their strategic importance requires. It is critical that senior leaders in the U.S. government find the time to provide thoughtful stewardship of the U.S.-China bilateral relationship. Although the United States may have more important bilateral relationships in the world (Japan and the United Kingdom come to mind), there is no other bilateral relationship that, if managed poorly, could carry as many regional and global costs. In other words, because the stakes are so high and the consequences of failure so global, the U.S.-China relationship is perhaps the most significant bilateral relationship in the world. There is strong cause for concern that the relationship will falter and burden us with the afore- mentioned consequences. Considering the degree of uncertainty in the present U.S.-China relationship, the current trend seems to be moving toward greater strategic distrust. Perhaps most notably, the problems that will emerge over the near- to medium-term are likely to be exception- ally challenging. All country-to-country relationships experience problems, but as this paper seeks to convey, the future of the U.S.-China relationship will almost certainly be turbulent. Although the frequency and magnitude of the expected perturbations would be difficult to manage in any <<compiled card cut off like this>>

c) US-China relations key to solve multiple nuclear wars

Adhariri, 99 Armed Forces Staff College national security professor, 1999 [Eschan, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, August 1]

Looking ahead, a continued deterioration of Sino-US ties does not bode well for the regional stability of the very large and equally important Asia Pacific. Yet this regional stability might be negatively affected for a long time if Washington and Beijing fail to bounce back from this fiasco and assiduously work to improve their strategic relations. In the meantime, the issue of immediate concern for the USA is nuclear non-proliferation. Immediate work has to be done by both sides to minimize damages on this issue. The PRC, armed with the knowledge of America's premier nuclear programs, is likely to be a much more sought after sources for nuclear proliferation than it has ever been in the past by those countries keenly interested in enhancing the sophistication of their extant nuclear programs and by those who have not yet developed indigenous nuclear know-how but desire to purchase it. China, along with Russia, has an established record proliferating nuclear technology. This reality is not likely to change in the foreseeable future, much to the continued consternation of now-nuclear India. The increased nuclear sophistication on the troubled subcontinent carries with it the risk of a potential nuclear holocaust. The Kashmir issue still remains unresolved and very explosive given the continued intransigence of both India and Pakistan to amicably resolve it.

5. Eventual regime collapse is good—more likely to achieve disarmament and reunification

Blumenthal and Forgach 9 (Daniel and Leslie, fellow and research assistant at American Enterprise Institute, Wall Street Journal Opinion, 12/27, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704680804574621193918197418.html>) my

With protests that forced a policy change, a sanctions regime that has so far deprived Kim of at least $18 million, and uncertainty about the Dear Leader's succession plan, it may well be that this time around Kim is truly running out of money and possibly control. Rather than bail him out, Washington should let Kim fall. It's the best chance the U.S. has of achieving its twofold objectives: denuclearization in North Korea and the eventual unification of the peninsula. After all, the Kim clique has made it clear after decades of negotiations that no amount of aid will suffice to induce them to end their nuclear program. The relatively conciliatory response to Special Envoy Stephen Bosworth's mission earlier this month—the North Koreans declared that "differences" have been "narrowed"—was a classic North Korean negotiating ploy, not an eleventh-hour acceptance of a nuclear-free world. Some might argue that a desperate Kim may really make a deal this time—and Pyongyang certainly needs the bailout it is sure to receive during a new round of talks. But history suggests a dying regime is far less likely to make lasting concessions. Successful disarmament has occurred in places like the Ukraine and South Africa only after a new regime one looking for assistance and legitimacy, came to power. The question is which course is riskier: Letting Kim fall while planning for Korean unification, or attempting to prop up a dangerous regime with a growing arsenal of nuclear weapons? If Washington and its allies plan well, the former has the better chance of succeeding.

2AC Regime Collapse DA (4/)

6. US m**ilitary withdrawal stabilizes the region and prevents collapse**

Feffer 00 (John, works in the East Asia Quaker International Affairs Program, Vol. 5 No. 18, <http://www.lightparty.com/Politics/ForeignPolicy/FPIP-5-18.html>) my

As it makes good on its commitments in the economic realm, the U.S. must also begin to address the security issues in the region. Both sides talk of "keeping their powder dry.” It is the responsibility of the stronger party to make the first move. Washington’s offensive posture bases, military presence in South Korea, TMD, joint maneuvers does nothing to allay Pyongyang’s fears of invasion. The U.S. must consider the following steps: Cancel joint exercises with South Korea, and put the issue of U.S. troop withdrawal on the negotiating table. The North Korean military threat has been inflated, and the South Korean military can already counter any North Korean "threat” without U.S. troop support. North Korea’s entire government budget of $9.4 billion is smaller than South Korea’s military budget of $13 billion. Cancel TMD. This system is wildly expensive ($60 billion over the next fifteen years), technically flawed, and disruptive to U.S. relations with numerous countries. An East Asian "space race” is already pushing countries to develop satellites. Rather than encouraging this race, the U.S. must lead the way in restraining the militarization of space. Encourage regional security dialogue. U.S. military withdrawal from the region should avoid creating a vacuum in its wake that might encourage major arms programs in South Korea or a remilitarized Japan. Only an effective multilateral security framework that oversees confidence building measures and regional force reductions can ensure a nonhegemonic peace in the region. As part of this approach, the U.S. must reduce arms sales to the region and abandon the costly Pentagon doctrine of maintaining the capacity to fight two wars simultaneously. The U.S. must also consider a deeper change in negotiating style. The Kim Dae Jung government is no longer pursuing zero-sum tactics in its relations with North Korea. Rather, South Korea is making conciliatory moves to create an improved atmosphere more likely to encourage North Korean reciprocity. As the 1994 Agreed Framework negotiations demonstrated, North Korea responds positively when its negotiating partner acts first and in good faith. Moreover, as North Korea becomes increasingly engaged in world politics, it will put greater value on compliance with international agreements on proliferation and nuclear weapons production. Instead of extracting bilateral concessions, the U.S. should begin to think in terms of achieving its goals through a multilateral framework. By reducing tension in the region, the U.S. can also help support the innovative South Korean policies, particularly from civil society. Prior to the summit, civil movements were out in front of the South Korean government establishing 250 sister-farm relationships; donating shipments of clothes, milk, and eggs; and helping to reforest hills stripped bare for firewood. These efforts are concrete examples of unification from below. The U.S. must accept that it is not the boldest actor in its relations with North Korea. Italy has led the way by establishing diplomatic relations; Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit Pyongyang in July; South Korea is pushing ahead with concrete economic projects. The two Koreas will have to work out unification largely by themselves. But the U.S. can still make an important contribution by removing barriers that discourage economic cooperation with North Korea and retiring some of the huge and costly U.S. arsenal in Asia, before disengaging from the peninsula and allowing "slow motion” unification to gather momentum.

7. US military is stretched too thin to effectively stabilize the region in a collapse

Erickson 10 (Stephen, Executive Director and Founder of CenterMovement.org, CenterMovement.org, May 6, <http://www.centermovement.org/topics-issues/end-the-cold-war-in-korea-bring-american-troops-home-before-its-too-late/>) my

The permanent US military deployment in South Korea is a Cold War anachronism. There is absolutely no reason that a nation as advanced and prosperous as South Korea cannot defend itself from its pathetically backward northern brothers and sisters. A well-known night-time satellite image taken from space shows a brilliant South and a North languishing in the Dark Ages. The US presence creates political dysfunction while it minimally protects South Korea. US soldiers on South Korean soil breed resentment. Thousands of nationalist South Korean students regularly take to the streets to protest the Americans soldiers in their country and to call for unification between North and South. South Korean and US government policies are often awkwardly out of step with each other, with America often having the far more hawkish posture, as it did during the W. Bush years. American security guarantees have perhaps sometimes led the government of the South to engage in policies of inappropriate appeasement toward the North. The threat of South Korea investing in nuclear weapons to counter the North might, for example, finally persuade China to put sufficient pressure of North Korea. A South Korea determined to match North Korean nuclear weapons development might paradoxically further the goal of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. Most crucially, from an American point of view, the US Army is stretched too thin to play much of a role in protecting South Korea. As things stand, American soldiers are little more than targets for North Korean artillery and missiles. A defense of Seoul, its re-conquest, and forcible regime change in the North are all beyond US military capabilities at this time, given its commitments elsewhere. US participation on the ground in a new Korean War would also stress the US federal budget beyond the breaking point.

Ext- No Smooth Transition

**Status quo forces can’t solve regime collapse—diplomatic ties with China and South Korea need to be strengthened**

Glaser and Snyder 10 (Bonnie, CSIS associate and governmental advisor on East Asia, Scott, director of the Center for US-Korea Policy, May, <http://csis.org/files/publication/100506_Glaser_RespondingtoChange_Web.pdf>) my

Despite signs of DPRK instability, the parties most directly concerned, namely China, South Korea, and the United States, as the guarantor of South Korean security, remain constrained in their ability to prepare for the worst in North Korea. Coordination is hobbled by impulses towards economic, strategic, and political competition over North Korea, and lack of mutual trust inhibits more active cooperation to address these issues. Beijing recognizes the inherent dangers in the prevailing situation, but its leaders still prefer the status quo, two-state peninsula. The Chinese worry that the process of change would be destabilizing; they are uncertain about whether Chinese interests would be protected under alternative arrangements and thus want to avoid any change in the balance of power in the region that would be detrimental to China. South Korea is hesitant to discuss how to manage the consequences of instability in North Korea with major power neighbors out of fear that such discussions would invite unwanted intervention or other limitations that might thwart Korean hopes for eventual reunification. As for the United States, it is tied to the future of the peninsula through its treaty commitment to the defense of the ROK, its interest in nonproliferation, and its increasingly important relationship with China. Whether these three countries cooperate or face conflict with one another in managing potential North Korean instability will likely influence the prospects for long-term stability in Northeast Asia. Discussing interests and concerns regarding the effects of North Korean instability would certainly help the United States, China, and South Korea to better coordinate their actions in the event of contingency response. Moreover, enhanced cooperation and understanding will help to promote greater mutual trust among the three nations and improve their ability to effectively engage North Korea in diplomatic negotiations over denuclearization.

**US forces can’t facilitate transition absent communication with South Korea and China—and they won’t talk**

Glaser 10 (Bonnie, CSIS associate and governmental advisor on East Asia, 5/26, <http://oilprice.com/Geo-Politics/Asia/Is-North-Korea-on-the-Verge-of-Collapse.html>) my

It is premature to predict near-term regime collapse in North Korea, but it is not too early for major regional parties to plan for the effects of instability, potentially including massive refugee flows and unsecure nuclear weapons, materials, facilities, and knowhow that could be smuggled out of the North and into the hands of the highest bidder. Responses to instability could include decisions by China, South Korea and the US to dispatch troops into North Korea to restore order and to locate and secure weapons of mass destruction facilities. Absent advance coordination, these forces could come into conflict with each other. Despite the obvious risks, the US has been unable to establish multilateral cooperation on a coordinated contingency response plan. Bilateral planning has been stepped up with South Korea under the Lee Myung-bak administration, but China remains unwilling to discuss instability response with the US or the ROK. Why is Beijing loath to reveal its likely plans in the event of North Korean instability? First, China harbors deep suspicions about US and ROK intentions, fearing that the allies may use instability in the North as a pretext to carry out South Korea-led reunification and to station US troops close to China’s border. Second, Beijing worries that instability response coordination with the US and South Korea would sour relations with Pyongyang. Finally, China may be seeking to preserve the “strategic ambiguity” of its response in order to deter all sides, including Pyongyang, from taking actions that would destabilize regional security. Beijing is not alone in its hesitancy. Seoul has long been reluctant to coordinate contingency plans with any nation besides the US, worrying that increased transparency may open the door to great-power meddling. The ROK is particularly anxious about China, which it believes might obstruct efforts to reunify the Korean Peninsula under democratic and free market principles. The US cannot afford to let great power politics stand in the way of planning an effective response to North Korean instability; the risks are simply too great. Instead, it should seek to create favorable conditions for the primary parties, namely itself, South Korea, and China, to discuss likely responses to North Korean instability, while keeping its ally Japan informed.

Ext- No Smooth Transition

**(do they claim that US troops would facilitate a ‘soft landing’ or just take care of the situation if it really did crash?)**

The collapse will inevitably be hard—images of the South foster a violent revolution

Lankov 4 (Andrei, Professor at Kookmin University in Seoul, 12/9, Nautilus Institute, <http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0454A_Lankov.html>)

In spite of the heavy use of nationalist, even racist, rhetoric, the regime cannot rely on nationalism alone as a source of its legitimacy. The inhabitants of the South, after all, belong to the same nation, as North Korean media itself has never tired of repeating. Nor can it cite the sacral sources of its legitimacy: in spite of the numerous quasi-religious features of chuch'e, the regime still exhibits strong vestiges of the rationalist Marxist tradition and has construed its propaganda discourse around its supposed ability to deliver a "happy and prosperous life" to its subjects. The present government which includes a large number of Kim's clansmen and their confidants simply cannot recognize that the country's economy has been following an erroneous path for decades. It will be suicidal for the people who hold power, first and foremost, as heirs to the late Great Leader, Eternal President. If the populace learned how dreadful their position was compared to that of the South Koreans, and if the still-functioning system of police surveillance and repression ceased to work with its usual efficiency, then the chance of violent revolution or at very least, mass unrest would be highly likely. The proponents of a "soft landing" believe that the collapse of the regime (be it violent or otherwise) would not mean an end to a separate North Korean state. However, it is difficult to see how the North Koreans could possibly be persuaded to remain quiet if they knew the truth and were not afraid of immediate and swift retribution for their dissent. The proponents of the "soft landing", obviously influenced by the Chinese experience, imply that rising living standards will be seen by the populace as an adequate trade-off for their political docility--either under Kim Jong Il or under some force which eventually replaced him. Indeed such has been the case in China or Vietnam, but then the populace of these two countries were not exposed to the effect of democratic freedoms and capitalist prosperity enjoyed just across the border by people who speak the same language and belong to a similar culture. In a North Korea with freer information flows, the existence of the South is bound to create the illusion that the North Korean economic problems would find a simple and fast solution by immediate unification with the South. Such an option is not conceivable at the moment, when the masses are kept under control and information about South Korea is scarce. However, the easing of political restrictions and access to relevant information is bound to lead to a development not much different from that of Germany in 1989-1990. In other words, the attempts to promote reform and liberalization are likely to lead to the exact opposite--to political instability, regime collapse and a subsequent "hard landing."

Ext-Troops Cause Collapse

**American troop presence aggravates both Koreas and bars peaceful collapse**

CSIS 2 (August, working group report, <http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/uspolicy/CSIS-blueprint.pdf>) my

Second, what is left unclear in this family of unification scenarios is the status of the U.S. military presence on the peninsula. Few authors have addressed this question in their models.1 Implicit in this family of scenarios, however, is the assumption that either the Northern entity acquiesces to maintenance of the U.S. military presence on the peninsula as part of the coexistence and integration process (thus dropping a long-held precondition), or the Southern entity requests American withdrawal in order to achieve peaceful coexistence and integration with the North (elaborated below). Third, the triggers and end state of this family of scenarios are not clearly defined. Some authors argue that once formal recognition of the status quo and a peace settlement are achieved, then peaceful coexistence leading to economic integration will follow. And ultimately, unification will be the end product of a gradual, almost evolutionary conjoining of the two systems by mutual agreement and in harmonious fashion. This is, however, highly idealistic and unlikely. A more plausible outcome is that some nonlinear event forces unification somewhere along the peaceful coexistence timeline, but the negative externalities are minimized as a result of pre-existing levels of integration. At any rate, the most distinctive and critical component common to all scenarios under this type is the protracted time period. The peaceful integration scenarios are unfeasible without a long period (i.e., at least one decade or more) of coexistence and integration.2 U.S. Role The United States can play important and useful roles if unification proceeds along the lines described above. These divide into tasks performed on the peninsula and those between the new Korean entity and the region. Between Seoul and Pyongyang, the United States could play the role of an honest broker, largely regulating as a third party the coexistence process between the two Koreas. Specific tasks under this mandate could include facilitating dialogue on difficult security-related issues; managing confidence-building measures; and monitoring mutual force reductions that might emerge from a peace treaty. Off the peninsula, the United States role would be largely to dampen any insecurity spirals that might emerge among powers in the region as a result of the new status quo on the peninsula. Tasks would include ensuring the non-nuclear potential of the peninsula; offering external security guarantees to the two Koreas to encourage the focus of the peninsula’s indigenous resources on integration rather than on force projection in the region; and preventing other powers from trying to exercise undue influence or exploit a fluid situation on the peninsula. To propose these tasks for the United States does not assume that the Koreans will welcome a continued American presence. As some experts have argued, in fact, Koreans most may not welcome an intruding American presence in this scenario. For example, some argue that the overwhelming desire on the peninsula for a soft landing outcome and the preemption of great power competition over the unification process will incline Koreans to push the United States out and declare neutrality. This outcome is especially likely, experts maintain, if North Korea holds out the U.S. presence as the primary impediment to true peaceful unification. The burden of proof will be on those willing parties in the United States and South Korea that value a post-unification role by the United States to shape the conventional wisdom. These roles and tasks are not superficial, but are critical and indeed requisite to the peaceful integration process. Moreover, they minimize the negative externalities that might flow from unification’s impact on regional power relations.

\_\_\_\*\*Add-Ons

Deficits Add-On – 2AC

**Troops in Korea cost the US two to four billion dollars a year.**

Kim et al. 09(Kim, Indong Oh, writers from the **Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development Northeast Asia Peace and Security Project “A New U.S. Policy toward Korea: Korean American Recommendations for Real Change” JL)**

Since it costs about $2-4 billion per year to station the U.S. troops in South Korea, and there is a great need to reduce our military spending at present, it will serve the U.S. interests to reduce our troop strength in the ROK, which already has a powerful military to defend itself. South Korea also has twice the population of North Korea, and its annual military spending is about eight times larger than North Korea's, while South Korea's GDP is 40 times greater than North Korea's.

B) Deficit spending destroys the economy

**Fraser 06** (“The real worry about U.S. budget policy? Spending” Alison Acosta Fraser Director of the Thomas A.Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies. August 19, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed081906a.cfm>)

But what about spending? This is where the single-minded focus on the deficit becomes a problem. The good news is unexpected revenue growth overshadowed the bad news of persistent spending growth. Federal spending has grown 45 percent since 2001, 8 percent this year alone. Not just for defense, but for things like the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, an indoor tropical rain forest in Iowa, and huge subsidies to farmers to not grow crops.WhenGeorge W. Bush took office, spending was 18.4 percent of GDP. By the end of this year it willreach 20.3 percent. While his strong tax policy has helped the economy, his spending policies have not.If policymakers had reined in spending to grow at the same rate as the economy, they would havevirtually eliminated the deficit by now.The real worry about Washington's budget policy is spending. As baby boomers start to retire, the budget will spiral out of sight, fueled by Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid. That comes on top of recent spending growth. By reasonable accounts, the budget could reach 50 percent of GDP by 2050 - and continue to grow after that. The deficits and spending levels of today don't foretell the harm this will bring. However, the stagnant economies of Europe, complete with high tax-and-spend welfare policies and soaring unemployment, do. To be sure, pro-growth tax policiesare working. As a pleasant distraction, they arealso driving down the deficit, masking the effect of high spending. But don't be fooled by all this crowing about reducing the deficit**.** Washington shouldn't rest on its deficit-reduction laurels.

CBW’s Add-On – 2AC

**North Korea will use CBW’s early in any conflict – the threshold is low**

**Crisis** **Group** **9** (Crisis Group Asia Report N°168, North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs, 18 June 2009, North Korea: Getting Back to Talks, 18 June 2009 http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/09051CICG.pdf)KM

A. WEAPONS USE **There are several possible scenarios for the use of DPRK chemical or biological weapons** in Korea or elsewhere. While **mutual deterrence** on the Korean peninsula is robust, it **could fail;** in the case of transfers to other states or non-state actors, the likelihood of CBW use increases. **South Korea’s population density and Seoul’s proximity to the DMZ make millions of civilians vulnerable** to a North Korean attack. As the conventional balance of forces continues to deteriorate for Pyongyang, **its leaders might feel they would have to use CW early in a conflict to avoid defeat**. 1. Attack: deliberate, accidental, unauthorised **While it is difficult to imagine North Korea using its nuclear weapons in an unprovoked first strike**, the literature stresses **the** generally **offensive nature of DPRK military doctrine**, and, as **has** been noted, **the threshold for CW use** is **much lower**. The Supreme Commander of the KPA must authorise it, but the KPA has custody of the munitions, **which also increases the likelihood of accidental or unauthorised use. The regime might use chemical weapons either while conducting preventive war or as a “doomsday weapon” in the face of imminent defeat in war.** Either **BW research or efforts to weaponise biological agents could lead to accidental exposure** or release in North Korea. Although unlikely, **the North might use biological weapons in the first phase of a preventive war.** 2. Retaliation, escalation **The Korean peninsula is one of the world’s most dangerous flash points.** The DPRK has the fourth largest military in the world, with one million active duty personnel, but most of its hardware is obsolete.108 Escalation and all-out war were avoided during a period of high tension and serious North Korean provocations in the 1960s, but there have been several close calls in the now more than half-century since the end of the Korean War.109 108

**CBW war causes global extinction**

**Steinbrauner97** (Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, December 22, Foreign Policy)

That deceptively simple observation has immense implications. The use of a manufactured weapon is a singular event. Most of the damage occurs immediately. The aftereffects, whatever they may be. decay rapidly over time and distance in a reasonably predictable manner. Even before a nuclear warhead is detonated, for instance, it is possible to estimate the extent of the subsequent damage and the likely level of radioactive fallout. Such predictability is an essential component for tactical military planning. **The use of a pathogen**, by contrast, **is an extended process whose scope and timing cannot be** precisely **controlled**. For most potential biological agents, the predominant drawback is that they would not act swiftly or decisively enough to be an effective weapon. But for a few **pathogens** - ones **most likely to have a decisive effect and therefore** the ones most likely to **be contemplated for** deliberately **hostile use** -the risk runs in the other direction. **A** lethal **pathogen that could efficiently spread from one victim to another would be capable of initiating an intensifying cascade of disease that might** ultimately **threaten the entire world population**. The 1918 influenza epidemic demonstrated the potential for a global contagion of this sort but not necessarily its outer limit.

Regime Collapse – 2AC Add-On

US presence in the Koreas pushes North Korea to collapse—the regime will create crises to prop itself up

Mauro 10 (intelligence analyst with the Asymmetric Warfare and Intelligence Center, Ryan, June 2, FrontPageMag.com, <http://frontpagemag.com/2010/06/02/promoting-a-free-korea/> )

The crisis with North Korea is escalating and will continue to escalate for as long as the regime is in power. Kim Jong-Il made a calculated decision that he needed a dramatic confrontation in order to appear strong, set the stage for his youngest son to take over, and to create a pretext with which to stop Western influence from reaching the country’s increasingly knowledgeable population. Until the regime collapses under the weight of its failures, it will need to periodically up the ante with a series of increasingly frightening provocations. There was a much bigger purpose behind the North’s sinking of the Cheonan and that was to stir up the biggest clash since the Korean War. Shortly after the attack, the South Korean army was accused by the North of crossing into the Demilitarized Zone and opening fire. Five properties at the jointly-operated Mt. Kumgang resort were seized, and two North Korean agents were arrested in South Korea as they plotted to assassinate the highest-level defector living there. This was a campaign to make certain that a crisis was sparked. Since South Korea has formally accused the Kim Jong-Il regime of sinking their ship, the U.S. and South Korea have planned joint military exercises, the South Koreans have pledged to bring the case to the United Nations and they have cut off almost all trade with North Korea. The South’s sea lanes are also being closed to North Korean ships and they are re-labeling the North as their “principal enemy.” The North Korean government believes it has to retaliate and appear strong in the face of this retaliation. They have reacted by cutting off economic and political ties, and promising to close the Kaesong factory complex where South Korean businesses were allowed to invest, and South Koreans are now beginning to be kicked out from the site. The military is on alert, and the telephone line between the two countries used to avert naval clashes has been cut off. The “puppet authorities” of the South will not be allowed to travel to the North, and none of the South’s air or naval vessels can enter their territory. Four of North Korea’s submarines have left their base and their location is unknown. It is possible they have been deployed for an attack. Colonel Gordon Cucullu, author of Separated at Birth: How North Korea Became the Evil Twin, told FrontPage that it is also possible that the submarines are hidden in caves along the coast as a security measure. This movement may be because of the North Korean military’s “war footing,” but it is hard to know for sure given how erratic their behavior has been. Another startling development is that the South has arrested a spy who transmitted classified information about their subway system to the Kim Jong-Il regime. This is a strong indication that North Korea is still preparing for potential sabotage operations. The North has the world’s largest number of special forces, which they have been training to carry out guerilla-type attacks. It is also known that the North has commandos willing to go on suicide missions. Should the North Korean government view the upcoming military exercises as something they must respond aggressively to in order to maintain credibility, the use of such saboteurs cannot be ruled out. The biggest reason North Korea has started and continued the crisis is to maintain a hold on its population. It provides an excuse for dramatic security measures and a reason to crack down on things like joint ventures with the South that expose the people to Western influence. This has become an increasing problem for Kim Jong-Il, as over half of the population now accesses foreign news, polls of refugees show increasing anger towards the government for their economic catastrophe, and public expressions of dissent when the government issued a new currency and banned old bank notes and foreign currency. Suzanne Scholte, the leader of the North Korea Freedom Coalition, told FrontPage that now is the time to aggressively “reach out to the North Korean people through all means possible” and to focus on the human rights situation under Kim Jong-Il, which she described as a “holocaust.” She provided FrontPage with the text of a speech she gave in April, outlining the weaknesses of the regime. Two of the most important methods the regime uses to stay in power have collapsed. The system to distribute food and goods has collapsed, and so private markets have arisen that are decreasing the population’s reliance upon the government for survival. The second major method was isolating the population from outside influence, which is also failing. “One could argue that capitalism is alive and well and thriving in North Korea as the people cope the best they can by trading and selling the markets,” she said in her speech. “In fact, the film Titanic became so widely watched in North Korea that the regime felt compelled to inform the people that the movie was a depiction of the failure of capitalism,” she said. The fear of the Kim Jong-Il regime became evident when it said it will destroy any loudspeakers set up by the South to broadcast into the North. That is a line that he cannot allow to be crossed. The North Koreans have vowed to begin “merciless counteractions” against the South’s “psychological warfare against the North.” The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has made new 300-strong police units in each province to stamp out opposition and to try to prevent the flow of information into the country. The West faces a dilemma. The North Korean government feels it needs a crisis in order to survive, and therefore, ignoring them will only result in greater provocations. At the same time, Kim Jong-Il must react to the retaliation by appearing stronger than his enemies by heating things up further. The result is an inevitable series of increasing crises with unforeseen consequences. The solution is to hasten the day when the regime falls, but the weaker the <CONTINUED>

Regime Collapse – 2AC Add-On

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regime becomes, the more likely it is to lash out as it has this year. The unfortunate conclusion is that further clashes are unavoidable. There are multiple ways that the West can weaken the regime’s grip. Colonel Cucullu said that the North expects to “be rewarded by Western nations once again.” This behavior cannot be encouraged through appeasement. He also raised the point that Japan is also fearful and will not rely on the U.S. for its safety. The possibility of chaos on the Korean Peninsula and the potential for Japan to rapidly re-arm can be used to pressure China into reigning in its partner. Joshua Stanton makes a wise suggestion that cell phones be smuggled into North Korea’s markets and towers erected in the South so they have reception. Scholte said that there are 17,000 North Koreans who left their country for the South that can be used to send information into their original homeland. Refugees can be mobilized for similar efforts. The U.S. should place North Korea back on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, and push for sanctions in the United Nations. International measures to freeze the assets of North Korean officials and institutions involved in criminal activity and human rights abuses should also be taken. There will be those who oppose such measures out of a fear of provoking North Korea. The sad truth is that the current government will set out to instigate major confrontations as a matter of survival. The West has two options: Ignore the misery of the North Korean people and hope that this pattern will not spiral down into armed conflict, or actively welcome the day that Korea can be united and free.

<insert regime collapse bad>

**Military withdrawal fosters peaceful reunification and stabilizes the region**

Feffer 00 (John, works in the East Asia Quaker International Affairs Program, Vol. 5 No. 18, <http://www.lightparty.com/Politics/ForeignPolicy/FPIP-5-18.html>) my

As it makes good on its commitments in the economic realm, the U.S. must also begin to address the security issues in the region. Both sides talk of "keeping their powder dry.” It is the responsibility of the stronger party to make the first move. Washington’s offensive posture bases, military presence in South Korea, TMD, joint maneuvers does nothing to allay Pyongyang’s fears of invasion. The U.S. must consider the following steps: Cancel joint exercises with South Korea, and put the issue of U.S. troop withdrawal on the negotiating table. The North Korean military threat has been inflated, and the South Korean military can already counter any North Korean "threat” without U.S. troop support. North Korea’s entire government budget of $9.4 billion is smaller than South Korea’s military budget of $13 billion. Cancel TMD. This system is wildly expensive ($60 billion over the next fifteen years), technically flawed, and disruptive to U.S. relations with numerous countries. An East Asian "space race” is already pushing countries to develop satellites. Rather than encouraging this race, the U.S. must lead the way in restraining the militarization of space. Encourage regional security dialogue. U.S. military withdrawal from the region should avoid creating a vacuum in its wake that might encourage major arms programs in South Korea or a remilitarized Japan. Only an effective multilateral security framework that oversees confidence building measures and regional force reductions can ensure a nonhegemonic peace in the region. As part of this approach, the U.S. must reduce arms sales to the region and abandon the costly Pentagon doctrine of maintaining the capacity to fight two wars simultaneously. The U.S. must also consider a deeper change in negotiating style. The Kim Dae Jung government is no longer pursuing zero-sum tactics in its relations with North Korea. Rather, South Korea is making conciliatory moves to create an improved atmosphere more likely to encourage North Korean reciprocity. As the 1994 Agreed Framework negotiations demonstrated, North Korea responds positively when its negotiating partner acts first and in good faith. Moreover, as North Korea becomes increasingly engaged in world politics, it will put greater value on compliance with international agreements on proliferation and nuclear weapons production. Instead of extracting bilateral concessions, the U.S. should begin to think in terms of achieving its goals through a multilateral framework. By reducing tension in the region, the U.S. can also help support the innovative South Korean policies, particularly from civil society. Prior to the summit, civil movements were out in front of the South Korean government establishing 250 sister-farm relationships; donating shipments of clothes, milk, and eggs; and helping to reforest hills stripped bare for firewood. These efforts are concrete examples of unification from below. The U.S. must accept that it is not the boldest actor in its relations with North Korea. Italy has led the way by establishing diplomatic relations; Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit Pyongyang in July; South Korea is pushing ahead with concrete economic projects. The two Koreas will have to work out unification largely by themselves. But the U.S. can still make an important contribution by removing barriers that discourage economic cooperation with North Korea and retiring some of the huge and costly U.S. arsenal in Asia, before disengaging from the peninsula and allowing "slow motion” unification to gather momentum.

CBW’s – Will Use CBW’s

**North Korea would use chemical weapons immediately in war, every third artillery shot fired would be a chemical round.**

**Crisis** **Group** **9** (Crisis Group Asia Report N°168, North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs, 18 June 2009, North Korea: Getting Back to Talks, 18 June 2009 http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/09051CICG.pdf)KM

Most of the literature on **the North’s CW doctrine** contains broad assumptions, including that the DPRK **would employ chemical weapons in an effort to defeat ROK forces very rapidly and achieve national unification by force before the U.S. could make its strength felt**. Given the relative decline in the DPRK’s conven- tional capabilities, **chemical weapons are considered critical for the KPA to prosecute its war plans successfully**. 65 **The DPRK has deployed a large portion of its military forces in forward areas near the demilitarised zone (DMZ), so many analysts believe it would use CW immediately** **in a war**.66 U.S. Army General Leon LaPorte, former Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, asserted in August 2005 that North Korean leaders do not consider CW to be WMD, and “**current North Korean doctrine states that every third [artillery] round fired would be a chemical round”**.67

**North Korea values chemical weapons and refuses to remove them, they are key military capabilities.**

**Crisis** **Group** **9** (Crisis Group Asia Report N°168, North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs, 18 June 2009, North Korea: Getting Back to Talks, 18 June 2009 http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/09051CICG.pdf)KM

**As the balance of conventional forces continues to go against it,** asymmetric capabilities, including **CW, will remain an important pillar of DPRK military strategy.** **North Korea does not appear to be prepared to sign the CWC any time soon, since that** convention **requires the verifiable destruction of CW stocks**. **Military leaders are also very unlikely to accept** **a CW disarmament** process, both because they would consider it a sign of weakness and **because it would reveal information about the country’s military capabilities** and posture.

CBW’s – Will Use CBW’s

**North Korea has CBW’s – conflicts will inevitably contain their use.**

**IISS** **4**(The International Institute For Strategic Studies, 21 January 2004, http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/north-korean-dossier/north-koreas-weapons-programmes-a-net-asses/north-koreas-chemical-and-weapons-cbw-prog/#measures)KM

The available evidence suggests that **North Korea probably possesses both a chemical and biological weapons programme**, although they may differ in terms of scope and state of advancement. The chemical weapons programme probably involves some chemical weapons production and stockpiling, although the amount and types of agents that have been produced, the number and types of munitions that have been stockpiled, and the location of key research, production, and storage facilities cannot be assessed with high confidence**. North Korea is thought to be capable of producing a variety of traditional blister, blood, choking and nerve agents**, although there may be limits on what it can produce in its ageing chemical industry. Meanwhile, given its munitions industry, **North Korea is thought capable of producing a variety of delivery systems for chemical weapons, including artillery, multiple rocket launchers, mortars, aerial bombs, and missiles.** The extent to which Pyongyang has chosen to deploy these capabilities is unknown, but US and South Korean forces prudently assume that North Korea possesses chemical weapons and is prepared to use them against military and civilian targets in offensive operations or in retaliation for an attack on North Korea. By comparison, less is known about North Korea’s presumed biological weapons programme. While there is general agreement that North Korea has conducted research and development on biological agents, there is not enough information to conclude whether it has progressed to the level of agent production and weaponisation, although North Korea is most likely technically capable of both**. Whatever the actual status of North Korea’s chemical and biological capabilities, the perception that it has,** or likely has, **chemical and biological weapons contributes to Pyongyang’s interest in creating uncertainties** in Washington, Seoul and Tokyo and raises the stakes to deter or intimidate potential enemies. **From Pyongyang’s perspective, chemical and biological weapons could have utility** both **on the battlefield and at the strategic level**. US and South Korean **military commands have to operate on the assumption that North Korea maintains a large stockpile of chemical and** possibly **biological munitions** integrated with its conventional forces and deployed for use on the battlefield. This complicates allied military planning for defence against any North Korean attack or for conducting offensive operations against the North. Some measures have been taken to strengthen allied troops’ CBW defences, but it is difficult to accurately assess their effectiveness without knowing the size, composition, or delivery means of North Korea’s presumed chemical weapons arsenal. At the strategic level, the potential delivery of large quantities of chemical or biological agents to nearby targets (such as Seoul) and smaller quantities to more distant targets (such as Tokyo) could cause significant civilian casualties, depending on the amount and type of agent, the delivery means, the extent of civilian defence measures, and many other factors. In any event, the plausible threat that North Korea might use chemical or biological weapons, if the survival of the regime was at stake, contributes to deterrence and discourages Seoul and Tokyo from pursuing policies that could increase the risk of conflict and drive Pyongyang to take desperate measures.

**North Korea will use chemical weapons stockpiles in a war.**

**Global** **Security** **Newswire** **9** (Thursday, June 18, 2009 http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw\_20090618\_7626.php)KM

A report released today said that **military conflict** **with North Korea might lead the isolated regime to use its sizable chemical arsenal** against South Korea, Reuters reported (see GSN, April 23). **Pyongyang is believed to hold** between 2,500 and 5,000 tons of **nerve and blister agents and would be able to deploy them via missile strikes** on Seoul and other South Korean locations, according to a report by the nongovernmental International Crisis Group. "If there is an escalation of conflict and **if military hostilities break out, there is a risk that they could be used,"** said Daniel Pinkston, a Seoul-based representative of the group. "In conventional terms, North Korea is weak and they feel they might have to resort to using those." The report comes amid increasing tensions over North Korea's nuclear and missile activities (see related GSN story, today). The U.N. Security Council last week approved another sanctions resolution in response to the Stalinist state's May 25 nuclear test. **The North's chemical-weapon stockpile, several decades in the making**, "does not appear to be increasing, but **is already sufficient to inflict massive civilian casualties on South Korea,**" the report says.

CBW’s NoKo – Will Use CBW’s

**North Korea can produce and use CBW’s for warfare.**

**NTI** **9** (November 2009, http://www.nti.org/e\_research/profiles/NK/Biological/index.html)KM

Open-sources provide varying assessments of DPRK's purported capabilities in biological weapons. These estimates range from its possession of a rudimentary biological warfare (BW) program to having deployed biological weapons. However, **most official estimates appear to conclude that the DPRK possesses a range of pathogens that can be weaponized and the technical capabilities to do so** rather than ready-to-use weapons. The United States government believes that **the DPRK possesses a substantial biological weapons capability.** General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK), stated in a testimony before the U.S. Senate in March 2002 that "...**North Korea has the capability to develop, produce and weaponize biological warfare agents.**"[1] In May 2002, John R. **Bolton**, then U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, **described DPRK's biological weapons program as "a dedicated, national-level effort to achieve a BW capability**" and claimed that it "has developed and produced, and may have weaponized, BW agents in violation of the [Biological and Toxin Weapons] Convention." Bolton further noted that **the "leadership in Pyongyang has spent large sums of money to acquire the resources, including a biotechnology infrastructure, capable of producing infectious agents**, toxins, and other crude biological weapons. **It likely has the capability to produce sufficient quantities of biological agents for military purposes** **within weeks of deciding to do so**, and has a variety of means at its disposal for delivering these deadly weapons."[2] Further, in 2006, the MND stated that "It is assessed that Pyongyang has been producing poison gas and biological weapons since the 1980s. It is believed that... **North Korea is able to produce biological weapons such as the bacteria of anthrax, smallpox, and cholera**."

CBW’s Impact – Chemical Weapons

**Chemical weapons would cause immense civilian casualties in a war.**

**Crisis** **Group** **9** (Crisis Group Asia Report N°168, North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs, 18 June 2009, North Korea: Getting Back to Talks, 18 June 2009 http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/09051CICG.pdf)KM

**North Korea’s chemical and biological weapons programs pose serious security threats** that require immediate and sustained international efforts to eliminate them. The Six-Party Talks have focused on the nuclear weapons program, and although the participants are committed to establishing a peace mechanism in North East Asia, they are not addressing either the chemical or the biological programs. While the North projects a menacing image, it faces challenges of food, energy and economic insecurity and a deteriorating conventional arms balance. These present opportunities for issue linkages, even a grand security bargain, but the negotiations will be daunting. **Pyongyang’s chemical weapons arsenal is sufficient to cause huge civilian casualties in South Korea. The evidence of the arsenal seems irrefutable, but Pyongyang denies the existence of any** chemical or biological **weapons** programs. North Korean media proclaim the DPRK is threatened by non-existent South Korean and U.S. chemical and biological weapons. This indoctrination extends to KPA soldiers in the form of CW defence training, even though Seoul signed the CWC and has destroyed its CW stocks.

CBW’s Impact – Bioweapons Bad

**Uncontained bioattack leads to extinction – this outweighs nuclear war**

**Ochs 2**(Richard Ochs, ANALYST FOR THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS WORKING GROUP, July 9 2002 -- “BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS MUST BE ABOLISHED IMMEDIATELY” -- http://www.freefromterror.net/other\_articles/abolish.html)

**Of all the weapons of mass destruction**, the genetically engineered **biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth**. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of **nuclear weapons**, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they **are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily**, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. **Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents** by the hundreds with no known cure **could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE.**

CBW’s – US-China Relations Module

**Conflict over North Korea kills any stability in relations between China and the US.**

**Friedberg** **5** (Friedberg, Aaron L., Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, International Security, Volume 30, Number 2, Fall 2005, pp. 44-45)

**The physical image of roughly balanced opposing forces suggests** a degree of **tension** and potential instability. In such circumstances **a change on one side or the other can yield dramatic**, discontinuous **shifts**. Such possibilities exist in the political world as well. With reference once again to the end of the U.S.- Soviet Cold War, **it is possible to imagine that a sudden breakthrough toward domestic political reform in China could open the way for radically improved relations with the United States**. At the same time, however, it is conceivable that **an unanticipated or mismanaged crisis (over** Taiwan, for example, or **North Korea**, or in South Asia) **could lead to the opposite result**. If the United States and China were somehow to lurch from constrained competition to direct confrontation, **their relationship would be transformed overnight. Trade and diplomacy would be disrupted; hostile images would harden; domestic political reform in China might be derailed; and the prospect of a genuine entente between the two** Pacific powers **could be put off** for a generation or even more.

**Second Korean War would drag in China as an enemy of the US.**

**Karlin** **10** (Anatoly Karlin, March 28, 2010 http://www.sublimeoblivion.com/2010/03/28/korean-war-2/)KM

**Crossing the DMZ** with the intention of toppling the DPRK and replacing it with a government allied with or integrated into South **Korea will put a whole set of new dynamics into play**. Though **China** has no intention of aiding North Korea in aggression, it **views the establishment of an American bridgehead on its Manchurian border with trepidation and may intervene** under extreme circumstances, such as an all-out American and South Korean drive for “regime change” in Pyongyang. **If this were to happen, all bets are off. China will probably be able to roll back the invasion forces** to the DMZ. After all, it managed to do this in the 1950′s, when it was much more militarily backwards relative to the US. Now, it will have a big preponderance over land, while its new “carrier-killing” ballistic missiles, submarines, cruise missiles, and Flanker fighters are now, at some level, able to deny the seas off China to the US Navy, while its anti-satellite tests and cyberwar prowess means that the American dominance in space and information ought not be taken for granted either. Now **I am not saying that the Chinese Army** (it ceased by the People’s Liberation Army recently) **comes anywhere close to matching the American military**; **however**, **it might** well already **have the ability to defeat it in a local war** on China’s borders. **If China is successful, it will re-establish North Korea** as its own protectorate, although under someone more rational and reliable than Kim Jong-il (though needless to say **this will also completely sever its economic relationship with the US** and cause a severe, but temporary, economic contraction due to the collapse of its export sector).

CBW’s – US-China Relations Module

**Empirically proven – war over Korea pits the US against China and creates hatred between the two countries.**

**Hanley** **10** (CHARLES J. HANLEY THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 20, 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5j7dD6NMKF5mQ3XJ68fo1EUIutP2wD9GEP4T82)KM

**It wasn't only America's place on the world stage that changed. "The Korean War thrust China onto the Cold War's front line**," said Shen Zhihua, a leading Chinese scholar of the war. "It encouraged Mao Tse-tung to lead Asia's and even the world's revolutions," and **it "entrenched the enmity and hatred between China and the U.S."** The two Koreas, meanwhile, rebuilt industrial economies from the war's devastation -- the north as an authoritarian one-party state obsessed with self-reliance, the south as a capitalist powerhouse under repressive military rule and, for the past two decades, a civilian democracy. Across the heavily mined armistice line, a 2.5-mile-wide demilitarized strip stretching 135 miles across the peninsula, almost 2 million troops face each other on ready alert for resumed war, some 27,000 of them U.S. military. **War scares have flared regularly**, from the 1968 North Korean seizure of the U.S. Navy spy ship Pueblo, to the long-running duel over North Korea's nuclear-weapons program, to this year's sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan, allegedly by North Korea. **Why has this state of no war, no peace dragged on for 60 years?** South Korean scholar Hong Il-sik believes that **four great powers** -- the U.S. and Japan on one side, China and Russia on the other -- **like it this way. A unified Korea would align with one power or the other, upsetting the regional balance**, said the former Korea University president, a prominent conservative commentator. "By keeping Korea divided, they're in fact maintaining their own security," Hong said. . . . Korea as Cold War victim is a given of history: After the impromptu 1945 division, done for the convenience of the dual military occupation, the U.S.-Soviet superpower rivalry repeatedly foiled all efforts at reunification. But that Cold War ended a generation ago, and Korea's cold war goes on. Historian Park Myung-lim, a prolific chronicler of the war and author of a recent book on its consequences, said the North Korean leadership of the late Kim Il Sung and his son, Kim Jong Il, bears much of the blame because of its stark black-and-white worldview and bellicose "military first" policies. But it has been a U.S. failure, too, Park said. Despite normalizing relations with Moscow, Beijing and Vietnam, the U.S. "has chosen containment over engagement and peaceful coexistence with North Korea," he said. It's because "we've never known our enemy," said the University of Chicago's Bruce Cumings, author of the new book "The Korean War." American policymakers down the generations wrongly viewed Pyongyang as a puppet of the Kremlin and Beijing, he said. "When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, these deep suppositions about the nature of the regime led them to predict North Korea would collapse any day soon. Here we are 20 years later and North Korea is still standing," Cumings said. He added that **in light of the intense bombing of the north during the war, "you can understand how North Korea looks at us**." Some say the best opportunity for peace was a half-century ago -- that when China withdrew its troops from the north in 1958, U.S. troops should have withdrawn from the peninsula. Others say the abrupt change in tone between the presidencies of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush dashed hopes for progress. Still others say South Korea's decadelong "sunshine policy" of peaceful coexistence, economic relations and humanitarian aid for North Korea bolstered a regime that otherwise would have collapsed. And retired Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub, a former U.S. chief of staff in Korea, sees blown opportunities in the war years themselves. "The armistice, in essence, rewarded North Korea for invading South Korea. We had the opportunity from a military standpoint. We should have pushed north" -- that is, pressed the offensive, he said. . . . Decades of crisis invite such an array of post-mortems and prescriptions for peace, just as the immediate consequences of the war itself remain uncertain in many ways. Did 2.5 million people die, or as many as 4 million? The United Nations concluded that Chinese military deaths alone reached almost 1 million. The official U.S. death toll stands at 36,516, and hundreds more died from 15 European and other allied nations that came to South Korea's defense. Tens of thousands were massacred in political executions on both sides. T**he physical devastation, both north and south, was almost complete**: factories and schools, railroads and ports, bridges and dams, and hundreds of thousands of homes destroyed. Some 10 million **South Koreans today are separated from family in the north**. For the 49 million South Koreans and 24 million North Koreans, **that psychic legacy of the unending war, another kind of damage, remains powerful**. "The Korean people never imagined they could be separated. That was the beginning of the tragedy," said Park, the historian. "**For North Koreans and South Koreans both, the thing now is to avoid a second Korean War at all costs. It would mean the death of all of us."**

\_\_\_\*\*2AC – AT: Base PICs

2AC – PIC Out of Base (1/2)

1. American deterrence is out of the spotlight as the South has made a name for itself.

Bandow 2K(Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute “Leave Korea to the Koreans” May 27) JL

Moreover, the Republic of Korea need no longer play the role of helpless victim. The South has won the competition between the two Koreas. It has 30 times the GDP, twice the population, and a vast technological lead. South Korea, in contrast to the North, is a major international player. Indeed, Russia is shipping weapons to South Korea to pay off its debts. China, too, is unlikely to back Pyongyang in any war. Obviously, North Korea remains a dangerous actor. But its threats are largely empty - desperate attempts to gain international attention. Bankrupt, starving, and friendless, the North is struggling to survive, not to dominate South Korea, let alone the region. Even its most worrisome activities, such as missile and nuclear weapons research, look more like strategies to defend itself in an increasingly hostile world than to prepare itself for an aggressive war. When your neighboring enemy spends as much on defense as your entire GDP, and is allied with the world's greatest military power, you don't have many defense options. The summit announcement is one of the most dramatic developments on a peninsula long noted for surprises. Six years ago, Kim Jong-il's father, Kim Il-sung, was set to meet Kim Dae-jung's predecessor, Kim Young-sam. Kim Il-sung dropped dead shortly before the meeting, however, and relations between the two nations quickly deteriorated. Since that time, North Korea has suffered famine, near economic collapse and, if reports are accurate, political infighting. The only card Pyongyang has had to play to gain international attention and assistance is the threat to misbehave. Kim Jong-il's apparent willingness to meet with Kim Dae-jung is another sign of desperation. Even if the meeting falls through, Pyongyang has conceded the legitimacy of its southern counterpart.

**2. PIC doesn’t solve all the case, any remaining “tripwire” forces won’t send the proper signal to Japan and discourages military assertiveness.**

Bandow 03(Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute Reason vol. 35 iss. 3 July) JL

To the extent that the South's military lags behind its antagonist's, that is a matter of choice, not necessity. Nothing prevents Seoul from building a larger force. Rather, the American tripwire discourages it from doing so. As the South acknowledges in its own defense reports, it chose to focus on economic development at the expense of military strength--a plan it can follow securely as long as America protects it. Unfortunately, while the South needs no help to defend itself against its shell of a neighbor, American soldiers are everywhere: arriving at Seoul's international airport, based at the 630-acre Yongsan Army Garrison in downtown Seoul, and on maneuvers around the country. Some number of fights, traffic accidents, and crimes are inevitable. Last fall, when a military court acquitted two soldiers who ran over two children, demonstrations broke out across the nation. Koreans jeered, ostracized, barred from stores, and in a few cases physically attacked their supposed protectors. One American soldier was even kidnapped by a mob after a serviceman refused to accept a leaflet attacking the U.S. over the deaths of the two girls. Some Koreans are boycotting American goods. Before taking office, President Roh promised not to "kowtow" to the U.S. and called for a more "equal" relationship. All of the presidential candidates--including the one favored by Washington, conservative Lee Hoi-chang--demanded a change in the Status of Forces Agreement, which covers a variety of issues involving the investigation and custody of U.S. soldiers accused of a crime. But the nation will never be America's equal as long as America is defending it. Protecting oneself is among the most important attributes of sovereignty. If Seoul instead puts its security in Washington's hands, it is giving Washington authority to make the decisions.

2AC – PIC Out of Base (2/2)

3. Leaving one base in South Korea would not add to an already lacking North Korean deterrent.

Crowell 05(Todd, writer for Asia Times “Seoul's warning to the US on Pyongyang” July 15)

In their view, the 32,000 American servicemen and supporting troops no longer serve as a defensive "trip-wire" against a North Korean invasion. They are just in the way. "The presence of these brigades allows the North to hold us hostage because the North would likely respond to any US air strikes by firing thousands [sic] of missiles at our bases in the South," writes Kennelly. "Simply put, our troop presence in South Korea no longer deters the North. It deters us [emphasis in the original]," he writes. "Repositioning and trimming our troops in South Korea is a signal that we are preparing seriously to deal with the danger posed by the North Korean tyrant Kim Jong-il." The authors argue that South Korea is capable of defending itself against a conventional attack without America's help. "The South Koreans are now grown ups fully capable of taking care of themselves." South Korea, Kennelly writes, has the resources to field a military capable of ripping North Korea's million-man "paper tiger" to shreds. "It's time to let the South Koreans defend themselves."

4. Plan solves the net benefit – the action of withdrawal sends North Korea the signal that we mean business. Remnant bases would moot the effect.

Kennelly 05(Daniel, Senior Editor at The American Enterprise, The American Enterprise in Jul 01 2005)

Last October, the Pentagon announced plans to withdraw about a third of our troops from South Korea, and reposition the rest far away from the border that divides communist North from democratic South. In the heat of eleventh-hour Presidential politics, John Kerry lambasted George W. Bush for sending a message of weakness to North Korea. In fact, it was exactly the opposite. Repositioning and trimming our troops in South Korea is a signal that we are preparing seriously to deal with the danger posed by North Korean tyrant Kim Jong Il. Though Mr. Kerry misunderstood the signal, both Pyongyang and Seoul received it loud and clear. The Korean Central News Agency (the ministry in charge of government doublespeak in Kim Jong Il's regime) released a statement about the American move that, for once, was mostly true: The U.S. claims that this action is aimed to fill up a vacuum caused by the cutdown of U.S. troops. But this is, in fact, nothing but a reckless measure for putting into practice its scenario for another war. The massive redeployment of the U.S. troops in and around South Korea is in pursuance of the U.S. war strategy to wage a blitz warfare in Korea through a preemptive attack.

5. PIC doesn’t solve net benefit – The South Koreans refuse any offensive measures by the US military, meaning deterrence is not hinged on the number of troops or bases.

Kennelly 05(Daniel, Senior Editor at The American Enterprise, The American Enterprise in Jul 01 2005)

The U.S. is in a straitjacket in Korea. Two straightjackets, actually, one strategic, and the other diplomatic. The strategic straitjacket comes from Washington's difficulty in choosing between two mutually incompatible goals: 1) denuclearization of North Korea, and 2) peace in the Far East. Given its irresponsible leadership, a nuclear North poses grave dangers, risks proliferation to terrorists, and presents a likelihood of long-running threats and instability. Yet there is no way to eliminate North Korea's nuclear program without some risk of war. Both alternatives present terrifying aspects, and the U.S. government is deeply divided over what to do. For the moment, the choice has been made for us. Our current alliance with South Korea--the diplomatic straitjacket--prevents us from acting. South Korea will never let us use our sticks. And our carrots have proven worthless in modifying the North's behavior. Thus, we are currently stuck with a nuclear-armed North Korea. The Clinton administration tried the carrot approach in 1994 when it negotiated the "Agreed Framework," a sweetheart deal for the North in which the U.S. promised to deliver hundreds of thousands of tons of fuel oil annually, and to build two 1,000 megawatt light-water nuclear reactors, in exchange for the DPRK freezing its weapons program. In November 2002, we learned that the North had secretly continued work on its nuclear weapons program, so the fuel shipments were halted. The lesson learned from this debacle was that the North Koreans refuse to trade away their nuclear program at any price. Nor do we have any effective stick with which to modify their behavior. The South Koreans refuse to give their consent to any military move. They fight tooth and nail against even the mildest attempts to confront Kim Jong Il. It is their country that would most reap the whirlwind if hostilities broke out. Unfortunately, that has resulted in a pattern of appeasement, which, over the long run, raises the levels of danger progressively higher.

Theory – Shell

1. The neg’s action of PIC’ing is unfair.

a. Unfairly forces the affirmative to debate itself.

b. The neg doesn’t get to shape the way the aff functions

c. Fairness sets precedents for the debate community so is inherently linked to and the root of education.

2. PIC infinitely increases aff research burden, by forcing us to research every possible way or combination the neg could withdraw troops. Also opens the floodgates to PIC’ing out of a brigade, type of weapon or even race and gender of troops.

3. Aff loses all ability to weigh the debate in terms of impact calculus, the neg gains the ability to pick and choose which aff advs it wants while adding their own. Even moots 2AC strategic use of Add-Ons.

4. PIC is essentially plan plus – it only adds specifications to what happens when we withdraw troops. AND plan plus is bad because of all the reasons listed under fairness.

5. Voting issue for fairness and education.

\_\_\_\*\*2AC – AT: Lee Credibility

2AC – Internal Politics (1/3)

1. Not Unique - Lee’s administration is already on shaky ground, he won’t get anything major passed.

Kitazume 10(Takashi, Staff writer the Japan Times, “SOUTH KOREAN JOURNALIST SYMPOSIUM” April 10 http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20100410d2.html )JL

Still, Yeo said it is questionable whether Lee can maintain leadership for the rest of his term. Analysis of the media polls show Lee's approval ratings much lower among people in their 30s and 40s, and some experts say the president remains popular only because the opposition forces are weak, he noted. Since a South Korean president cannot run for re-election, Lee could go down the path of becoming a lame duck in the final two years of his term if his third year passes without major achievements, Yeo said. Compared with his predecessors, Lee lacks solid supporters due to personal charisma and most of his top political aides started working for him relatively recently — either when he became mayor of Seoul in 2002 or during his 2007 presidential election campaign, Yeo noted. Lee also does not have a strong power base within the ruling Grand National Party. Even though the GNP holds a stable majority, he lacks leadership in managing parliamentary business and has a hard time negotiating with powerful party leaders, according to Yeo. He also faces criticism from the opposition that his economic policies are too near-sighted and that, like Japan, his administration has failed to address concerns resulting from an increase in the ranks of temporary workers and others not regularly employed in South Korea, Yeo said. Critics charge that the president has not done much to deal with the rise in the rich-poor gap and rising welfare costs for the elderly, he added.

2. Not Unique - Lee’s credibility already took a major hit when he lifted a ban on American beef. Koreans feel he has forsaken public health for foreign politics.

Morozov 6/16/10(Evgeny, writer for the Boston Review “Sharing Liberally” http://bostonreview.net/BR35.4/morozov.php) JL

For more than a month between May and June 2008, the streets of Seoul brimmed with tens of thousands of angry people, unhappy that newly elected president Lee Myung-Bak had lifted a five-year ban on imports of American beef. Many South Koreans felt that the ban, originally imposed because of fears of mad cow disease, had been rescinded too hastily, giving public safety a back seat to the exigencies of foreign policy. So they took to Seoul’s parks and public squares and mounted candlelight vigils and sang “No to mad cow!” By late June, their efforts paid off: the president was forced to apologize on national television, reshuffle his cabinet, and add a few extra restrictions to the trade agreement. Shirky zeroes in on the high-school students—most of them girls—who spearheaded the protests. He is particularly impressed to report that they learned about the ban through postings on an Internet forum dedicated to their favorite boy band. “Massed together, frightened and angry that Lee’s government had agreed to what seemed a national humiliation and a threat to public health, the girls decided to do something about it,” Shirky writes, pointing out that the band’s Web site “provided a place and a reason for Korea’s youth to gather together by the hundreds of thousands.”

3. Not Unique - Lee has lost so much popularity with GNP he is considered a lame duck.

Korea Times 6/18/10(“Time to abandon ship” http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2010/06/137\_67873.html) JL

After the local election defeat, President Lee Myung-bak told the government and Grand National Party to ``carefully read voters’ thoughts.” Yet the President’s words apparently have fallen on deaf ears of some Cheong Wa Dae and GNP officials, given their handling of key pending issues. It seems as if Lee has been turned into a lame duck just halfway into his presidency and by his own men at that. A case in point is the governing camp’s reluctance to give up its revised plan to build an education-science town 110 km south of Seoul, instead of an administrative city as Lee had promised while campaigning. Faced with the election loss \_ voters’ judgment in other words \_ President Lee seems to have abandoned the ``revision bill” and returned to his election promise. Now the bill is at a parliamentary committee, which is certain to demolish it, judging by the composition of the panel’s members. But the governing party, backed by some presidential aides, is trying to take the debate and consequent vote to the full National Assembly session, saying in effect, ``a historic issue such as this deserves nothing less.” There are no legal problems with the GNP’s move, as the Assembly can move up any debate from a standing panel to a plenary meeting when 30 or more legislators request it. Nor is their argument necessarily wrong that the ayes and nays of the total 299 legislators should be ``recorded in history,” if it is helpful for responsible politics.

2AC – Internal Politics (2/3)

4. Plan popular with youth – Youth historically important to Korean leadership popularity.

Lee 4(Sook-Jong, researcher for the Brookings Institute, “The Rise of Korean Youth as a Political Force: Implications for the U.S.-Korea Alliance”)JL

One of the striking new developments in Korean politics today is the rise of a new generation of young Koreans as an independent political force. Ironically, the event that sparked their rise had nothing whatsoever to do with politics; it was the 2002 World Cup games which South Korea co-hosted with Japan. The unprecedented success of the Korean national team, which managed to reach the semifinals, drew hundreds of thousands of mostly young Koreans to downtown streets as they celebrated victory after victory. Mobilization for the massive celebrations was aided in no small measure by the Internet, of which almost all young Koreans are everyday users. The celebration went on for the duration of the World Cup, lasting nearly a month and peaking at the end of June. Though the massive celebration was anything but political, it generated much discussion on the new nationalism of Korean youth. Less than six months later, Korean young people once again gathered en masse in downtown streets, but in sharp contrast to the World Cup celebrations, the gathering was somber and, more importantly, very much political. This time, the Korean youth were mobilized for “candlelight protests” which lasted from late November 2002 to the early months of 2003. These protests were sparked by the U.S. Military Tribunal’s acquittal of two American soldiers charged with the negligent homicide of two Korean schoolgirls during an armored mine clearing vehicle exercise.1 The public outcry for “justice” brought tens of thousands of Koreans to the streets of downtown Seoul every day to both mourn the deaths of the young girls and demand a major revision to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in Korea.2 Specifically, the protesters demanded that the SOFA include a mandate for the United States Forces in Korea (USFK) 3 to concede its jurisdiction to the Korean authorities over crimes committed by U.S. troops while on duty. As with the World Cup celebrations, the majority of those in the streets were in their 20s and 30s. And as with the World Cup, the Internet played a key role in mobilizing the young masses who, in this case, were spurred by a message one young man posted on an Internet bulletin board. At the peak of the protests, anti-American sentiments were so strong that the North Korean admission of a nuclear program, which shocked the rest of the world, did little to constrain their mass rallies. Instead, Korean youth rallied around the presidential candidate, Roh Moo-hyun, who portrayed himself as independent from the U.S. and keen on domestic reform. Internet-savvy Korean youth used email and their cell phones to increase voter turnout on December 19 and ensured his victory in a close presidential race. These events in 2002 demonstrate how Korean youth can become a potent political force in a sudden and effective manner. If the World Cup street cheers revealed the mobilizing capacity of Korean youth, the “candle-light protests” demonstrated their ability to mobilize resources toward a specific political agenda. In most countries, the younger generation is portrayed as a politically apathetic group. The younger generation in Korea would be no exception in a time of political stability, but late 2002 in Korea was anything but politics as usual. Moreover, South Korea has a history of student activist movements that has its roots in the anti-authoritarian protests that began in the early 1960s. As democracy in Korea continues to evolve, this legacy seems to have transformed into a diffused form of youth movement in which university students actively participate as young citizens. Needless to say, the political views of these citizens have great potential to shape the course of South Korean politics and the U.S.-Korea alliance.

2AC – Internal Politics (3/3)

5. Alt Cause – Lee’s economic reform package won’t pass because of a widely unpopular city planning package that will be up for debate until Lee’s re-election.

Herskovitz 09(Jon, writer for Reuters, “South Korea's Lee runs risks with new city plan” http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTOE60A00820100111)JL

Jan 11 (Reuters) - South Korean President Lee Myung-bak put his rising popularity ratings and economic reform plans at risk on Monday by changing the focus of a planned new city that has angered a key power broker in his ruling party. The issue will likely dominate parliament when it convenes in the next few weeks and could delay Lee's plans to cut taxes, expand the mandate of the Bank of Korea and reform a rigid labour market by making it easier to hire and fire workers. The pro-business president wants to dump the original plan to shift large chunks of the government from the capital to a new city called Sejong about 150 km (95 miles) south of Seoul. He proposes instead to turn it into a science city and offer incentives to local and foreign firms to relocate there. His government argues it is a waste of money to build another city just to house bureaucrats and point to a large administrative centre which already exists just outside the capital. "Provincial elections are coming up in June and regardless of what policies the government comes up with, Sejong City will be the centre of clashes until the vote," said Kang Won-taek, a political science professor at Soongsil University.

6. Alt Cause – South Korea’s parliament is simply to dysfunctional to ever allow the economic reforms to be passed.

Marshall 6/1/10(Andrew, chief correspondent Reuters “Key political risks to watch in South Korea” http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSRISKKR)JL

After suffering a collapse in popularity upon taking office just over two years ago, President Lee Myung-bak has seen a surge in his support as South Korea's economy emerges from the global downturn more quickly than other major economies. Lee's plan for job creation and his business-friendly reform agenda look set for delays in a parliament where infighting in his ruling, conservative Grand National Party and spirited opposition protests have postponed almost all of his plans. A parliament described by local media as dysfunctional has stymied many of the economic reforms proposed by Lee to make Asia's fourth-largest economy more competitive and open to investment. -- Legislative delays. Parliament has achieved little this year other than debate a scheme to move parts of the capital out of Seoul and a government plan to revitalise the country's four major rivers. This pushed back Lee's proposed economic reforms that include tax cuts and a trade deal with the United States. This means fewer reforms will be passed and those that are will be approved later rather than sooner. [ID:nSEO314453]

Internal Politics – Asian Econ Resilient

Asia has recovered very well from the global economic crisis – proves it can take hits.

Roach 6/8/10(Stephen, writer for the Financial Times “The new lesson for resilient Asia”)JL

Asia has come through the global crisis of 2008-09 with flying colours. As chairman of Morgan Stanley’s Asia businesses over the past three years, I have been privileged to witness this extraordinary resilience first-hand. As I now head back to the US, three lessons stand out. First, Asia learnt the painful lessons of the 1997-98 regional crisis very well. That crisis stemmed largely from Asia’s vulnerability to the vicissitudes of international capital flows. Lacking in foreign exchange reserves, overly exposed to short-term external debt and with rigid currency pegs, the region stood little chance when the hot money started to flee. When Thailand went, Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan and most of the others in developing Asia were quick to follow. By contrast, for Asia, the latest crisis was primarily an external demand shock. The unprecedented 11.8 per cent drop in the volume of global trade in goods in 2009 hit this export-led region extremely hard. No country was spared either sharp recession (Japan, Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand) or major slowdown (China, India and South Korea). But Asia’s build-up of foreign exchange reserves in the period between the two crises – from less than US$1,000bn in 1998 to nearly $5,000bn in 2009 – insulated it from the financial upheaval that followed Lehman’s collapse. Second, there is the China factor. As I have criss-crossed the region, there has been no mistaking Asia’s new China-centric character. I remember penning a piece in the Financial Times after the Asian crisis arguing that China was bound to supplant Japan as the leader of regional growth. Most were sceptical and even I concede that the transition occurred with greater speed than I anticipated.

Conditions make Asia a resilient choice to invest in when others fail.

Kumar 6/22/10(V. Phani, writer for the Wall Street Journal, “No Single Theme Will Do When Investing In Asia”)JL

Spanning a seven-hour time difference between Wellington and Karachi, the region's 15 biggest stock markets collectively have a capitalization of about $16 trillion and are based in countries home to more than half the world's population. These nations not only have different demographics and levels of economic development, they are also governed under different political systems--ranging from China's one-party communist rule to a multi-party coalition administration in India, the world's largest democracy. The universe of stocks is just as diverse. It includes shares of cash-rich mobile operators to leveraged chipmakers and infrastructure developers to giant resource and automobile firms whose fortunes ride on global economic cycles, as well as defensive utility and consumer stocks that outperform in falling markets. And while miners led by BHP Billiton Ltd. (BHP, BHP.AU) define the strength of the resources sector in Australia--just as Seoul-based Samsung Electronics Co. (SSNHY, 005930.SE), Taipei-listed Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (TSM) and India's Infosys Technologies Ltd. (INFY) stand for the technology sector prowess of their respective countries--treating a country as a proxy for investments in a particular industry would be a mistake, some asset allocation specialists say. "Asia is very different in terms of demographics, labor productivity and profitability trends. A foreign investor has to take that into account and look country by country. You just cannot (categorize) Asia by sector," said Khiem Do, head of Asian Multi-Asset at Baring Asset Management. Demographics Do said population demographics were crucial in choosing a country for asset allocation, given that a high and rising number of working age people and fewer retirees often ensured a nation's economic growth. At the same time, the low level of corporate and household debt in Asia gave the region an advantage over the West. "Once demographics turn against you, it's tough...the peak of (a nation's) debt tends to coincide with the peak in demographics," he said. "You have labor productivity increase, (good) demographics and the ability to fund the growth in Asia. That's very important."

Asia has the most favorable conditions for future investment.

Twaronite 6/22/10(Lisa, writer for the Wall Street Journal, “Getting Back Into Asia Ahead Of The Next Wave”)JL

Foreign money poured into Asia in the first five months of the year, only to recede--and some say there is no better time than now to get back into certain Asian markets and sectors ahead of the next tide. "We should take advantage of this 'correction' while it lasts," said Taizo Ishida, lead manager of the Matthews Asia Pacific Fund (MPACX). Ishida said Asia still offers the best investment opportunity for long-term investors. Country flows--the money allocated by funds tracked by EPFR Global to different markets--through May of this year showed Japan received the biggest net flows of nearly $3 billion, followed by China, South Korea and India. Since the beginning of June, China has been the only Asian market to see significant inflows. "Why the hiatus? Investors were already on edge because of the unknowns surrounding the removal of fiscal and monetary stimulus," said Cameron Brandt, senior analyst at EPFR Global. While Asia's trade with the U.S. usually grabs headlines, trade with the 27 nations of the European Union is often just as important, Brandt said, because it absorbs a bigger share of China's and India's exports than the U.S. and is also Japan's second-biggest export market. "So the possibility of a Greece-inspired double-dip recession in Europe could spell trouble for the region's export story," Brandt said. But in the longer term, Asia has "favorable demographics, improving rate of urbanization, improving domestic consumption...especially China, India and Indonesia [have] strong economic growth," said Colin Ng, head of Asian equities at Baring Asset Management.

Internal Politics – South Korean Econ Resilient

Larger than predicted growth over the past year prove the South Korean economy is resilient during turmoil.

Yonhap 10(Yonhap News Agency, “(2nd LD) S. Korean economy grows a revised 2.1 pct in Q1” 4/6/10)JL

SEOUL, June 4 (Yonhap) -- The South Korean economy expanded at a faster pace than estimated earlier in the first quarter on strong consumer spending and exports, the central bank said Friday, underpinning optimism about the economic recovery. The economy grew 2.1 percent in the January-March period from the previous quarter, compared with an earlier estimate of 1.8 percent made in April, the Bank of Korea said. Asia's fourth-largest economy also grew 8.1 percent from a year earlier, more than the previous 7.8 percent estimate, marking the highest gain since the fourth quarter of 2002. "Outbound shipments increased sharply in April and May, and industrial output posted solid growth, which will help the economy grow in the current quarter," Jung Yung-taek, head of the central bank's national income statistics team, told reporters. Last year, the Korean economy avoided a yearly contraction by expanding 0.2 percent, thanks largely to government spending and key rate cuts. But it marked the slowest growth since a 5.7 percent contraction in 1998 when the country was in the midst of the Asian financial meltdown. In 2008, the economy here expanded a revised 2.3 percent.

Even if the economy takes a hit, foreign investment can prop up South Korea.

Park 6/18/10(Jungyoun, writer for Reuters “Seoul shares slip but foreign buying continues”)JL

SEOUL, June 18 (Reuters) - Seoul shares took a breather from recent gains and retreated on Friday, led by technology and auto issues, but still outperformed the region's benchmark index for the month on a positive outlook for listed firms, analysts said. "Shares are taking a breather as the index has steadily risen to the psychologically significant 1,700 point level. But as earnings season approaches, the index could go up further," said Kim Seung-han, a market analyst at HI Investment & Securities. The Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) was down 0.21 percent at 1,704.26 points as of 0200 GMT, but still up about 4.0 percent on the month, outperforming the MSCI Asia-Pacific ex-[Japan](http://www.reuters.com/places/japan)'s .MIAPJ0000PUS's 3.6 percent rise. The KOSPI is up about 1.5 percent on the year, versus the MSCI Asia ex-Japan's over 5 percent fall. "Like China, the South Korean economy is making a rapid V-shaped recovery on the back of strong performance by its corporate players, which are seen increasing global market share and outdoing their international peers. That's stoked appetite for local stocks," said Ham Sung-sik, a senior analyst at Daishin Securities, adding views on auto and tech firms were particularly bullish. Foreign investors were buyers of a net 67.3 billion won worth of shares, poised to buy stocks for a sixth consecutive session.

\_\_\_\_\*\*2AC – AT: Politics

Agenda Politics – Plan = Obama win

**Plan is a win – strengthens Obama holdout on 2012 OPCON transfer**

Klingner 9 (Bruce, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation, 6/22, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2009/06/Its-not-right-time-to-discuss-OPCON-transfer)

U.S. officials in the Bush administrations were strongly opposed to reversing the decision and it appears that the Obama administration will maintain U.S. resistance. U.S. officials have expressed exasperation if not hostility to South Korea's repeated attempts to undo the OPCON decision. Transferring operational command requires Seoul to implement a series of improvements to South Korean military forces. Although not totally synonymous with South Korea's defense Reform 2020 initiative, that program provides a metric for assessing progress in implementing necessary defense programs. The ambitious military modernization plan is to develop a smaller, technologically oriented defense force by upgrading technology, improving command and control systems, and procuring more capable weapons. Funding shortfalls have already delayed the program by five years. South Korean inability or unwillingness to fund its military requirements raises U.S. concerns over Seoul's resolve to fulfill its alliance obligations. Deferring the OPCON transfer decision at this time would be seen by the United States as removing a necessary catalyst for South Korea to maintain its commitment to deploying the forces necessary to assume wartime command. South Korean advocacy for reversing the decision also risks calling into question the U.S. pledge to defend its ally. U.S. officials have repeatedly affirmed Washington's unwavering commitment to defend the Republic of Korea. Washington has emphasized that U.S. troop levels will remain at 28,500 in Korea. The introduction of extended accompanied tours, in which families will move to South Korea with service members, is also highlighted as another sign of a long-term U.S. presence.

**Obama supports denuclearization and military withdrawal**

Crowell 9 (Todd, veteran East Asia news correspondent, Asia Cable, 7-19, http://asiacable.blogspot.com/2009/07/no-no-and-maybe.html)

One way to head that off would be to reintroduce some nuclear weapons back in the region either in South Korea or aboard US naval warships, such as Japan-based submarines equipped with nuclear-armed Tomahawk cruise missiles. Hatoyama seemed to be signaling to Washington that such a step would be okay with his government. Such a move would obviously go against the craw of President Barack Obama, who would prefer to be seen as reducing nuclear stockpiles around the world, not re-introducing them were they have long been removed, but it may be necessary to maintain a semblance of deterrence in Northeast Asia.

Obama supports cooperation with Korea and peaceful interaction

Connell 9 (Executive Director, U.S.-Korea Business Council, Sean, published by U.S.-Korea Business Council and American Chamber of Commerce in Korea)

Our organizations welcome President Obama’s appreciation of the importance of the U.S.-Korea relationship, which he has described as “remarkably strong and successful.” As a senator, he urged the United States to “pay attention to the interests of the South Korean people to ensure that we move forward in unity and common purpose” as it works with Korea to address the challenges presented by North Korea’s nuclear program. He understands the importance of the U.S.-Korea economic relationship, having said that “the U.S.-Korea economic relationship has also benefited both nations and deepened our ties.” President Obama has pledged to seek new partnerships in Asia that go “beyond bilateral agreements, occasional summits, and ad hoc arrangements” and to “build an infrastructure with countries in East Asia that can promote stability and prosperity.” Korea has the ability and the ambition to play an active role in international leadership, including through its strong support for multilateral peacekeeping efforts and in advocating the maintenance of open global markets as chair of the G-20 in 2010. Our organizations urge the Obama administration and Congress to consider the U.S.-Korea partnership a central component of this infrastructure and to work closely with Korean President Lee, the Korean government, and the Korean National Assembly to construct this framework.

Agenda Politics – Plan Popular – Blue Dogs

Blue Dogs would vote for the plan- either on principle or added pork

Carpenter 7 (Amanda, 4/2, political advisor and speech writer, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_qa3827/is\_20070402/ai\_n19012216/?tag=content;coll)

Last week, when the House passed its pork-stuffed Iraq spending bill that establishes a date certain for withdrawal of American troops, only seven of the 43 members of the Blue Dog Democratic caucus, which purports to fight for fiscal responsibility and strong national security, voted against the bill. So that means a large majority of 36 voted for it. Several members who were reluctant to require withdrawal of U.S. troops by a firm deadline made deals that were greased with pork fat from the Democratic leadership in exchange for their votes. The final House bill that narrowly passed, 218 to 212, contained a whopping $24 billion in earmarks that will pay for many pet projects in the home districts of several Blue Dogs.

Blue Dogs control too many key votes for their demands to be ignored—budget proves

Associated Press 09 (Associated Press is a American News service having newspapers, online, and radio news. “Conservative 'Blue Dog' Democrats Flex Muscles as Obama Stumbles” March 19th 2009. <http://www.newsmax.com/headlines/conservative_democrats/2009/03/19/194047.html>)

WASHINGTON - Conservative and moderate Democrats are flexing their muscles on Capitol Hill, demanding significantly lower spending for domestic programs as well as automatic budget cuts if tax cuts and new programs would increase the deficit A group of 51 so-called "Blue Dog" House Democrats released their roster of budget demands Thursday, calling for cutting more than $40 billion from domestic programs funded by Congress each year At the same time, they said that President Barack Obama's controversial bill to fight global warming should not be permitted to advance under rules that shut off the right of Senate Republicans to filibuster the measure. The Blue Dogs, a coalition of moderate and conservative Democrats, many of them from the South, control a critical bloc of votes needed to pass the congressional budget blueprint. It is the first legislative response to Obama's $3.6 trillion budget for next year. Of greatest importance to the group is putting in place a legally binding "pay as you go" system governing new tax cuts and benefit programs such as Obama's health reform initiative. Under such a regimen, legislation cutting taxes, establishing new benefit programs or making current programs more generous must be "paid for" with higher revenues or benefit cuts elsewhere. If the rule is broken, it would trigger across-the-board cuts in other benefit programs, with Social Security exempted. Such a statutory pay-as-you-go system, or "paygo," was in place for years in the 1990s and early this decade, though the law was simply "switched off" when Congress passed President George W. Bush's 2001 tax-cut bill. "We're trying to be constructive in a way that allows the president to get an acceptable budget," said Rep. Charlie Melancon, D-La., "but at the same time get paygo statutorily put in place." While the group hasn't drawn any lines in the sand, some of their demands are likely to be met, especially regarding global warming. Opposition from the Blue Dogs likely ensures that Obama's controversial "cap-and-trade" plan to limit greenhouse gases won't advance in a fast-track budget bill that could avoid a GOP filibuster in the Senate. Under cap-and-trade, the government would establish a market for carbon dioxide by selling credits to companies that emit greenhouse gases. The companies can then invest in technologies to reduce emissions to reach a certain target or buy credits from other companies that already have met their emission reduction goals. The cost of the credits would be passed on to consumers. The demands by moderates to curb the growth of domestic agency budgets by limiting the increase for next year to inflation will face great resistance from senior lawmakers and the administration. Obama sought a $51 billion, 9 percent increase for non-defense programs, a figure that's probably too high to pass, especially with Congressional Budget Office estimates on Friday expected to show that the worsening economy with produce significantly higher deficits than predicted by Obama's budget. "I'm going to show that we've made many adjustments in the budget in light of CBO's re-estimates," said Senate Budget Committee Chairman Kent Conrad, D-N.D. Administration allies such as House Appropriations Committee Chairman David Obey, D-Wis., are pressing for budget increases well above those sought by moderates. The looming battle over how much to devote to annual domestic agency budgets is important because unlike other elements of the congressional budget plan—they are often more symbolic than substantive—the annual caps on appropriations have real impact on programs.

Agenda Politics – Plan Popular – Collins

Collins supports peace initiatives in Korea

Struck 3 (Myron, president of Targeted News Service, States News Service, 4/16, Lexis)

Hopping off a Black Hawk helicopter just feet away from a barbed-wire fence that has divided a people into two countries for more than a half-century, Sen. Susan M. Collins, R-Maine, met with front-line troops Wednesday along the demilitarized zone separating North and South Korea. "When you're up on the front-lines, you can feel the tensions," Collins said from Seoul late Wednesday night (Korean time). As she spoke, the U.S. has arranged to have China participate in trilateral talks with the North Korean government - starting next week in Beijing, Collins said - to try to diffuse a six-month escalation of tensions concerning the possibility that North Korea has been developing fuel for nuclear weapons. Collins, who was one of four members of the Senate Armed Services Committee to accompany Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn., on his first international tour, said the goal of the delegation was to show interest and concern for a relaxation of tensions - and to reach out to troops who are putting their lives at risk on what had been the hottest front line involving U.S. troops until the Iraq crisis turned to war.

Collins is key to the agenda

Rizzo 8 [Katherine, "Inside Congress" editor for Congressional Quarterly, November 5, The Wall Street Journal, <online> http://blogs.wsj.com/capitaljournal/2008/11/05/sen-collins-finding-power-in-the-middle/]

‘The Ladies From Maine’ Ms. **Collins** and the other senator from her state, Republican Olympia J. Snowe**, go their own, moderate way so often that when GOP leaders are quizzed about being able to filibuster a bill, they tend to walk through the math by explaining how many votes** they expect from core Republicans and what **they expect from “the ladies from Maine.” With Democrats** tantalizingly **close to the 60 votes** they need to cut off filibusters, **a lot of what happens in the next two years will depend on** two things: the ability of Democrats to keep the majority together, and the willingness of Republican moderates to defect on crucial issues**.** **If** the **Democrats want to make another run** at President George W. Bush’s restrictions **on stem cell research, they’ll start by making sure the ladies from Maine haven’t changed their minds** on the subject. **Anything** to do **with habeas corpus rights?** Once again – **first stop, the ladies from Maine.** Had voters broken up the moderate Maine sisterhood, the mathematics for getting bills through the Senate would have been dramatically different. **With a genuine swing vote in play**, Republicans will know that if they frame their arguments well enough or draft their amendments just so, they have a chance to swing Ms. Collins and other moderates their way. And Democrats know that they have to tailor their versions to get the blessing of moderates**.** Declining Numbers of GOP Moderates After Tuesday’s election, **there aren’t** as **many moderate Republicans in Congress** as there used to be. **How** Sens. **Collins and Snowe** and fellow outcasts from their party’s conservative wing behave will help determine President-elect Barack Obama’s success in moving his agenda through Congress. So Ms. **Collins truly does have an outsized dose of power.** Moderate Republicans up for re-election in 2010 share that power, but for them it will be tempered by an outsized dose of anxiety because they won’t want to risk being picked off in a primary. Pennsylvania’s Sen. Arlen Specter is in that category. If he doesn’t decide to retire, Ohio Sen. George V. Voinovich will be in the same boat. Ms. Snowe isn’t up again until 2012, so look for her to be less anxious than Mr. Specter. She should be more relaxed – and powerful – like the other lady from Maine

Agenda Politics – Ext – Collins Key

Collins will determine the agenda – she is the margin of error

Rizzo 8 [Katherine, "Inside Congress" editor for Congressional Quarterly, November 5, The Wall Street Journal, <online> http://blogs.wsj.com/capitaljournal/2008/11/05/sen-collins-finding-power-in-the-middle/]

Let’s hear it – just one more time – for the margin of error. But not exactly the same one that has crept into our casual speech since the start of our political season two years ago. **This margin of error is the one by which the Senate will abide** for at least the next couple of years. **The margin has a name:** Susan **Collins**, a Republican who has just survived a well-funded election challenge from Rep. Tom Allen, her Democratic opponent. And the error rests with whichever Senate leader who fails to win her support. Among the Republicans re-elected this week, **she is the true swing vote** – **the one that means the difference between a bill that moves** well across the Senate floor **and a bill that stumbles** around **with a foot stuck in one of the spittoons** that decorate the place. The cautious, deliberative Ms. **Collins has power because of her ability to say “no” to** the people she eats lunch with every Tuesday — her own fellow **Republicans.** Last year, **they found they could count on** Ms. **Collins for only half of the “party unity” votes** – votes in which a majority of Republicans and a majority of Democrats line up against each other. Even when the Republicans set the agenda, Ms. Collins never stuck with her party more than 78% of the time – her rating on party unity votes during her most partisan years, 2003 and 2004.

Agenda Politics – No Push 2AC

Obama isn’t willing to use political capital for South Korean issues

Economist Intelligence Unit 10 (6/1, Country Report Select, Lexis)

South Korea will seek to maintain cordial relations with the US. Both nations recognise the importance of their strategic partnership in the political and economic arenas. Yet this recognition does not guarantee accord on the two main bilateral issues. The first relates to the relocation of US forces to a new base to the south of Seoul and the transfer of wartime operational command to South Korea by 2012. The second concerns the free-trade agreement (FTA) between the two nations, which has been finalised but still awaits ratification by the legislatures of both countries. Lee Myung-bak is committed to the deal, and its lack of progress in Congress (the US legislature) is therefore galling. During a visit to South Korea in late 2009 the US president, Barack Obama, acknowledged that the FTA's completion would improve bilateral relations, but it is unclear how much political capital he is willing to use up in Congress to ensure its ratification. The Cheonan incident could complicate bilateral relations further, although initial indications suggest that the sinking will improve ties between the two countries.

Midterms Politics – Plan Popular – Public

**Public supports decrease in military spending**

Greenwald 10 (Glen, constitutional lawyer, Salon.com, 1/26, http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn\_greenwald/2010/01/26/defense)

Public opinion is not a legitimate excuse for this utterly irrational conduct, as large percentages of Americans are receptive to reducing -- or at least freezing -- defense spending. A June, 2009 Pew Research poll asked Americans what they would do about defense spending, and 55% said they would either decrease it (18%) or keep it the same (37%); only 40% wanted it to increase. Even more notably, a 2007 Gallup poll found that "the public's view that the federal government is spending too much on the military has increased substantially this year, to its highest level in more than 15 years." In that poll, 58% of Democrats and 47% of Independents said that military spending "is too high" -- and the percentages who believe that increased steadily over the last decade for every group.

Agenda Politics – Plan = Obama Loss

The plan is a flip flop – Obama pledged his full support for troops in South Korea—explicitly ordered commanders to work with troops

CNN 5/26 (http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/05/26/south.korea.clinton/index.html)

"The U.S. and South Korean militaries have announced plans for joint exercises and we will explore further enhancements to our posture on the peninsula to ensure readiness and to deter future attacks," Clinton said. "The United States is also reviewing additional options ... to hold North Korea and its leaders accountable." While in China on Monday, Clinton said the United States supports the finding on the Cheonan's sinking and said the United States' "support for South Korea's defense is unequivocal." "We endorse President Lee's call on North Korea to come forward with the facts regarding this act of aggression and, above all, stop its belligerence and threatening behavior," Clinton said Monday. U.S. President Barack Obama has directed military commanders to work with South Korean troops "to ensure readiness and to deter future aggression" from North Korea.

**Obama is committed to defending South Korea**

National Post 9 (5/25, http://www.nationalpost.com/news/canada/toronto/Obama+pledges+support+South+Korea+defense/1629552/story.html)

WASHINGTON - President Barack Obama assured South Korean President Lee Myung-bak Monday of Washington’s “unequivocal commitment” to the defense of South Korea following a nuclear test by North Korea. The two presidents, in a telephone conversation, “also agreed to work closely together to seek and support a strong United Nations Security Council resolution with concrete measures to curtail North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities,” the White House said in a statement. Obama also spoke by phone with Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso and assured him of Washington’s “unequivocal commitment to the defense of Japan and maintaining peace and security in Northeast Asia,” the White House said. The U.N. Security Council Monday condemned North Korea’s nuclear test, but Pyongyang looked set to ratchet up tension further with a report it would launch more short-range missiles. “Our army and people are fully ready for battle ... against any reckless U.S. attempt for a pre-emptive attack,” the North’s KCNA news agency said. In a unanimous statement adopted after Monday’s nuclear blast, the Security Council decided to start work immediately on a new resolution, condemning the test as a “clear violation” of a previous resolution banning such tests in 2006. The White House said Obama and Aso agreed to intensify coordination with South Korea, China and Russia and to work closely in the UN Security Council to obtain a resolution with ”concrete measures” to curtail North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities.

Obama fully supports South Korean military action—he has no intention of withdrawing troops

The Guardian 5/24 (Tania Branigan, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/24/south-korea-trade-south-korea>)

Barack Obama has given his full support to South Korea's decision to act against Pyongyang for the torpedo attack on its warship, the White House said today, adding that the president has ordered the US military to "ensure readiness" to help deter future aggression by the North. Earlier Seoul suspended all trade and investment with North Korea, banned the North's ships from passing its waters, and vowed to take Pyongyang to the UN security council over the incident, in which 46 sailors died. The White House said it endorsed South Korean president Lee Myung-bak's demand that "North Korea immediately apologise and punish those responsible for the attack, and, most importantly, stop its belligerent and threatening behaviour". Seoul can continue to count on the full backing of the US, an official said, adding that military commanders were co-ordinating closely with South Korea's government and defence department on ways the US could help if North Korea continued its threatening behaviour. The official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the discussions are continuing, said that was likely to include US assistance with military training exercises. The US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, said the attack had created a "highly precarious" security situation in the region. The South Korean president, in an address delivered at the war memorial in Seoul, said Pyongyang had to pay for its brutality over the sinking of the warship. Lee accused Pyongyang of "incessant" attacks, listing incidents including a 1983 bombing that targeted a South Korean presidential delegation in Burma and the 1987 shooting down of an aircraft, in which 115 people died. "We have always tolerated North Korea's brutality, time and again," Lee said. "We did so because we have always had a genuine longing for peace on the Korean peninsula. But now things are different. North Korea will pay a price corresponding to its provocative acts."

Midterms Politics – Plan Unpopular – Public

65% of the public favor strong forces in East Asia

Vaughn 7 (Bruce, Analyst in Southeast and South Asian Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service, 1/22, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33821.pdf>)

There appears to be strong support for the retention of American military bases both at home and abroad, according to recent polls conducted by the Chicago Council of Global Affairs. Some 68% of Americans polled felt that America should have “about as many as now” (53%) or “more bases” (15%). Some 65% of Americans polled believe that U.S. military presence in East Asia should be maintained (57%) or increased (8%) as opposed to 30% that feel it should be decreased. Sixty two percent of South Koreans believe they “should have” American bases as opposed to 29% that feel they “should not have” American bases while 59% of South Koreans feel U.S. military presence in East Asia should be increased and a further 15% feel it should be maintained. In Japan, 57% believe they “should have” as opposed to 34% who thought they “should not have” American bases. This reflects a 5% increase in support in the case of Japan since the question was asked in 2004. Support in Afghanistan appears less strong though it too increased 5% since 2004. Afghanistan has 52% in favor and 39% opposed to American military bases. Some 66% of Indians feel the United States is “very or somewhat positive” in resolving key problems in Asia.

Voters are already criticizing Obama’s policy in North Korea—a peaceful stance would push them away

CQ Politics 9 (6/15, http://blogs.cqpolitics.com/eyeon2010/2009/06/voters-say-obama-not-tough-eno.html)

About two-thirds of voters believe that President Obama has not been tough enough with the two nations - North Korea and Iran - that have raised serious concerns about their nuclear ambitions, and those numbers include a majority of Democrats, according to a Fox News/Opinion Dynamics poll conducted June 9-10. Sixty-nine percent say Obama has not been tough enough on North Korea, including 65 percent of Democrats, and 66 percent say he has not been tough enough on Iran, including 57 percent of Democrats. The biggest concern among voters is that North Korea and Iran would develop and sell nuclear missiles to terrorists or another country, with 41 percent saying that about North Korea and 35 percent about Iran. Eighteen percent are worried that North Korea would use nuclear missiles to attack the U.S. while 23 percent are concerned that Iran would use them against Israel.

**Over half of voters support military action against North Korea’s nuclear program**

CQ Politics 9 (4/6, http://blogs.cqpolitics.com/eyeon2010/foreign-policy/2009/04/)

In a poll conducted before Sunday's actual test launch of a three-stage rocket, 73 percent of voters said they were very or somewhat concerned that North Korea might acquire the capability of using nuclear weapons against the U.S., according to a Rasmussen Reports poll. The survey conducted April 3-4 said 57 percent said the U.S. should take military action to prevent North Korea's ability to develop a long-range missile that could be used to hit the U.S. with nuclear weapons. But voters were unconvinced that offering incentives to North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program was worth the effort. Fifty-one percent said the U.S. should not offer to help rebuild North Korea's economy in exchange for such an agreement while 27 percent said they would make that deal.

\_\_\_\*\*2AC – AT: QPQ NPT CP

NPT FAILS

NPT fails—civilian overlap, easy withdrawal, available technology, and absence of punishments

Kittrie 7 (Orde, Prof of law, Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 28:337, <http://students.law.umich.edu/mjil/article-pdfs/v28n2-kittrie.pdf?q=averting>) my

Today, more than sixty years after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki detonations, detailed descriptions of how to construct a nuclear weapon are widely available, including over the Internet.66 It is relatively easy to create every part of a nuclear weapon except the weapons-grade fissile material—highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium—at the weapon’s core.67 From a technological perspective, then, only the acquisition of weapons-grade fissile material stands between most states (and sophisticated terrorist groups) and manufacturing a nuclear weapon.68 Civilian nuclear power technology and the nuclear technology needed to develop weapons-grade fissile material overlap considerably. Any nuclear power program that operates fully independently (with a “full fuel cycle”) includes technology readily adaptable to the production of weapons-grade fissile material. The fuel cycle stages most readily adaptable to producing such material are the enrichment and reprocessing stages.69 Yet, under NPT Article IV as currently interpreted, state parties (including NNWSs) are not prohibited from possessing enrichment or reprocessing technology, or even weapons-grade nuclear material, so long as the technology and material are “for peaceful purposes” and “in conformity with articles I and II” of the NPT. As IAEA Director General El Baradei puts it: “[u]nder the current regime . . . there is nothing illicit in a non-nuclear-weapon state having enrichment or reprocessing technology, or possessing weapon-grade nuclear material.”70 The overlap between civilian and military nuclear technologies poses perhaps the most significant challenge facing the nuclear nonproliferation regime: the ease with which a state—in the guise of conducting a peaceful nuclear weapons program—can acquire either weapons-grade fissile material or the technologies necessary for its production. Article X provides each state party the right to withdraw from the NPT at its own discretion. Therefore, once a state bent on developing nuclear weapons has acquired the requisite material or technologies, it can withdraw from the NPT and quickly proceed to construct a nuclear bomb.71 Alternatively, a state progressing towards developing nuclear weapons might decide to remain within the NPT in order to further advance its weapons program clandestinely.72 The NPT’s principal tool for detecting cheating by member states on their nonproliferation obligations is the safeguards agreement, which Article III requires each NNWS to conclude with the IAEA for the purpose of “verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons.” The IAEA’s model for this safeguards agreement is contained in an IAEA document usually referred to as INFCIRC/153.73 The safeguards agreements for individual states, commonly known as “INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreements,” have rarely deviated from the model. Under INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreements, parties must report to the IAEA on their nuclear facilities and the nuclear material that moves through them.74 The INFCIRC/153 agreements are significantly flawed, however, in that they contain no effective mechanism for the IAEA to assess whether the reports are complete.75 The agreements operate on the assumption that all states declare all relevant facilities and materials.76 The lack of IAEA verification authority under the INFCIRC/153 agreements is compounded by the fact that neither the INFCIRC/153 agreements, the NPT, nor international law in general provide specific penalties for lying to international organizations. The international community’s failure to detect the Iraqi nuclear weapons program in the 1980s demonstrated the verification weaknesses of the INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreements. According to Pierre Goldschmidt, former Deputy Director General of the IAEA, in 1991 “the world discovered that Iraq had been developing over more than a decade, a secret nuclear weapon programme completely separate from its civil nuclear programme declared to and inspected by the IAEA.”77

NPT Fails

**NPT has lost its power to control North Korea—weak response to Iranian and Korean tests prove**

Kittrie 7 (Orde, Prof of law, Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 28:337, <http://students.law.umich.edu/mjil/article-pdfs/v28n2-kittrie.pdf?q=averting>) my

The last ten years have been less successful for the nuclear nonproliferation regime, which by now has lost much of its capacity to hinder proliferation.19 The UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change recently warned of “the erosion and possible collapse of the whole [nuclear nonproliferation] Treaty regime,” explaining: “We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the nonproliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.”20 The first major step in the decline of the nuclear nonproliferation regime involved a set of Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons detonations in 1998.21 Although India and Pakistan were not parties to the NPT, their flagrant proliferation, and the world’s weak response, shook the NPT and did considerable damage to the nuclear nonproliferation regime.22 In 2003, North Korea announced both that it was withdrawing from the NPT and that it possessed nuclear weapons.23 The Security Council failed to respond to either announcement.24 In October 2006, North Korea took another step toward a nuclear arsenal by detonating a nuclear weapon.25 The Security Council responded with weaker sanctions than it had previously imposed in response to lesser threats to international peace and security.26 In June 2003, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) determined that Iran had violated its NPT safeguards agreement.27 For more than three years thereafter, the Security Council stood mute while Iran failed to redress those violations and refused to take various steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors.28 The sanctions the Security Council finally imposed on Iran in December 2006 and March 2007 were among the weakest it had ever enacted.29 Today, the risk of a nuclear 9/11 is high and rising. Graham Allison, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense during the Clinton administration and former dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, wrote in 2004 that “on the current path, a nuclear terrorist attack on America in the decade ahead is more likely than not.”30 Robert Gallucci, the Dean of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service who led U.S. negotiations with North Korea during the Clinton administration, estimated in September 2006 that “it is more likely than not that al Qaeda or one of its affiliates will detonate a nuclear weapon in a U.S. city within the next five to ten years.”31 Two regimes which are hostile to the West and exceptionally comfortable with civilian deaths—the totalitarian North Korean regime32 and the terrorist-supporting Iranian regime33—are well on their way to developing nuclear arsenals capable of use against a U.S. or other Western city. North Korea has tested a nuclear weapon and is estimated to possess sufficient plutonium for six to eight additional atomic bombs,34 and Iran continues to defy efforts to stall development of its nuclear arsenal.35

NPT Fails

NPT can’t solve—weak sanctions and loss of critical Chinese support

Kittrie 7 (Orde, Prof of law, Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 28:337, <http://students.law.umich.edu/mjil/article-pdfs/v28n2-kittrie.pdf?q=averting>) my

Korea, however, never did comply with its NPT obligations, and in 2002 it was caught violating the Agreed Framework.186 In January 2003, North Korea once again announced its withdrawal from the NPT, this time with immediate effect.187 Shortly thereafter, North Korea announced that it possessed nuclear weapons.188 A strong response by the international community during this period might well have stopped North Korea from proceeding further with its nuclear weapons program. The North Korean regime appears extremely vulnerable to strong sanctions, so long as they include Chinese and South Korean participation.189 China supplies between seventy and ninety percent of North Korea’s oil needs,190 and China’s brief closure in 2003 of its oil pipeline to North Korea for “maintenance” prompted a quick and conciliatory North Korean response.191 The North Korean regime is also highly dependent on South Korea, which has, since the mid-1990s, helped sustain it with more than six billion dollars in humanitarian aid, investment, and other economic assistance.192 China, however, remained concerned that significant pressure on North Korea might cause the North Korean regime to collapse, thereby flooding China with refugees.193 Accordingly, China took the lead in preventing the Security Council from responding to North Korea’s noncompliance with its NPT and Agreed Framework obligations, withdrawal from the NPT, and announcement of a nuclear arsenal. For example, China in spring 2003 blocked a Security Council statement criticizing North Korea for its noncompliance and withdrawal, declaring that such a statement would “complicate” diplomacy with North Korea.194 Russia backed the Chinese position, with Russia’s UN ambassador urging “dialogue” and stating, “I think it is a bad idea to condemn.”195 Two weeks later, North Korea responded to this forbearance by declaring that it “possesses a nuclear arsenal and might sell some of it to the highest bidder.”196 Again, the Security Council took no action. Indeed, for eleven years between 1995 and 2006—a period in which North Korea continually failed to comply with its NPT safeguard obligations, cheated on the Agreed Framework, withdrew from the NPT, and announced it had manufactured nuclear weapons197—the Security Council issued no resolutions referring to any of these North Korean actions. 198 Not until North Korea launched ballistic missiles on July 4, 2006, did the Security Council act.199 Resolution 1695 imposed missilerelated sanctions200 and finally condemned North Korea’s “announcement of withdrawal” from the NPT and “stated pursuit of nuclear weapons.”201 The resolution also urged North Korea “to return at an early date” to the NPT,202 a statement rendered somewhat ironic by the Security Council’s three-and-a-half years of tardiness in issuing such a call. Finally, undeterred by the international community’s previous weak responses, North Korea on October 9, 2006, took another step towards a nuclear arsenal by testing a nuclear weapon.203 Less than two days later, North Korean leaders inaugurated a potentially dangerous new era of nuclear blackmail, announcing: “We hope the situation will be resolved before an unfortunate incident of us firing a nuclear missile comes. That depends on how the U.S. will act.”204

NPT Fails

NPT credibility irreversibly damaged by dismal response to India and Pakistan

Kittrie 7 (Orde, Prof of law, Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 28:337, <http://students.law.umich.edu/mjil/article-pdfs/v28n2-kittrie.pdf?q=averting>) my

Although India and Pakistan were not NPT members, their tests did serious damage to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. George Bunn condemned the tests as having “violated a global norm against any more countries with nuclear weapons,” and asserted that “[i]f this norm is to be preserved, violators must suffer serious consequences or the norm will become a paper tiger.”345 “Just as national laws will be weakened by failure to enforce them,” said Bunn, “violation of international norms must produce serious consequences for the violators or others will choose the same path.”346 Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, the chief U.S. interlocutor with India and Pakistan following the tests, stressed that, in the wake of the detonations, sanctions would “create a disincentive for other states to exercise the nuclear option [and] keep faith with the much larger number of nations that have renounced nuclear weapons despite their capacity to develop them.”347 Despite the high stakes, and regardless of the Security Council’s broad authority and stated intention to act decisively, the international community’s response to the nuclear detonations by India and then Pakistan was extremely weak. As discussed in Part III, the Security Council had already asserted the legal authority in 1992 to sanction any proliferant activity, regardless of whether that activity violated the NPT or any other legal instrument. Yet the Security Council imposed no sanctions in response to the detonations. The Security Council responded to the detonations in two statements by the President of the Security Council348 (one after each state tested) and one Security Council resolution.349 Both statements “strongly deplore[ d]” the tests and urged “restraint” and “dialogue.”350 The resolution, issued nearly a month after the Indian tests and a week after Pakistan tested, “reiterat[ed]” that “the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security,” 351 and expressed grave concern about the tests, but imposed no sanctions.352 The closest the resolution came to imposing a substantive consequence was its nonbinding statement that it “encourages all States to prevent the export” to India and Pakistan of equipment, materials, or technology that “could in any way assist” their nuclear weapons programs. 353 In spite of the grave damage done to the nuclear nonproliferation regime by India for reasons of clearly minor import to the Indian national interest, the Security Council could not even bring itself to ban exports to India of nuclear equipment, materials, and technology.

NPT Fails

Nobody takes the NPT seriously—integrating India’s nuclear weapons peacefully sent a signal that the NPT had no power

Kittrie 7 (Orde, Prof of law, Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 28:337, <http://students.law.umich.edu/mjil/article-pdfs/v28n2-kittrie.pdf?q=averting>) my

The failure of the international community to impose significant sanctions in response to the Indian and Pakistani detonations undermined the nuclear nonproliferation regime by sending a strong message to potential proliferators that the price for proliferating is low.379 The Bush administration’s recent nuclear cooperation agreement with India380 further undermined the regime.381 In implementation of the agreement, the administration sought and received from Congress changes to the U.S. laws that prohibit transfer to non-NPT parties of a range of nuclear technologies and materials.382 The laws were changed so as to exempt from the ban U.S. exports of civilian nuclear technology to India.383 The U.S. decision to engage in civil nuclear cooperation with a nuclear- armed, non-NPT member such as India undermines the basic NPT bargain made by NNWS to forswear nuclear weapons in exchange for receiving civil nuclear cooperation. The U.S.-India agreement makes the NPT look less like a reciprocal bargain and more like a discriminatory trap for those NNWS parties prohibited by their NPT membership from following the Indian example and obtaining both nuclear weapons and civil nuclear cooperation.384 Indeed, some of the language in the U.S. government’s announcement of the U.S.-India nuclear deal seemed almost designed to erode the nuclear nonproliferation norm. For example, the State Department “fact sheet” describing the deal stated that the “agreement to reach full civil nuclear cooperation brings India into the international nonproliferation mainstream.”385 If India can be brought “into the international nonproliferation mainstream” without becoming a party to the NPT, where does that leave the NPT? Ali Larijani, Iran’s top nuclear negotiator and secretary of the Iranian National Security Council, recently noted: “India does not accept the NPT and has nuclear weapons. But America has no problem with this and is also concluding a long-term nuclear energy agreement with India.”386 As an Egyptian analyst told the New York Times in regard to a proliferation-threatening proposal that Egypt pursue a nuclear program, “Why should the U.S. assist India in its nuclear program and not Egypt?”387

A2 Amend NPT

Internal dissent and veto power block amendments to the NPT

Kittrie 7 (Orde, Prof of law, Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 28:337, <http://students.law.umich.edu/mjil/article-pdfs/v28n2-kittrie.pdf?q=averting>) my

The nuclear nonproliferation regime needs to be enhanced before it is too late. Unfortunately, the NPT is nearly impossible to amend formally. With the exception of its 1995 extension, the treaty has not been formally amended since its entry into force. Of the seven NPT Review Conferences since the treaty’s entry into force, three—those in 1980, 1990, and 2005—were so contentious they ended without even an agreed concluding statement.516 The near-impossibility of formally amending the NPT is due in part to this contentiousness, which has beset the treaty’s formal review mechanism. An even greater obstacle is NPT Article VIII.2, which requires that any amendment be approved by “the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.”517 In other words, every member of the IAEA Board of Governors has a veto over any NPT amendment. In 2007, there are thirty-five members of the IAEA Board of Governors, including several countries with questionable commitment to nonproliferation.518

NPT fails

NPT enforcement is impossible—sanctions fail without support from actors too worried about short term costs

Kittrie 7 (Orde, Prof of law, Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 28:337, <http://students.law.umich.edu/mjil/article-pdfs/v28n2-kittrie.pdf?q=averting>) my

To the extent sanctions help prevent nuclear proliferation—and experience with Iraq, Libya, and 1974–98 India shows that they do— sanctions help prevent future costs. Sanctions serve as investments in averting the costs of nuclear 9/11s—more than half a million lives and over one trillion dollars in damage per bomb detonated in a major city— as well as averting the costs of arms races that ensue as a proliferant’s neighbors feel compelled to develop their own nuclear arsenals and enhance their conventional militaries and homeland security defenses. Sanctions also help prevent the costs to the sender state, target state, and broader international community of military intervention designed to prevent nuclear proliferation before it occurs. Unfortunately, key members of the international community, including such potential sanctions-imposing bodies as the Security Council and EU, have been failing to appropriately balance present lost profits against the future costs of arms races, catastrophic nuclear attacks, and military intervention. In practice, when future dangers of a somewhat uncertain magnitude and timing compete against the present costs of sanctions, the present certain costs too often hold sway. The voice of businesspersons who stand to lose contracts now tends to outweigh the interests of unknown, perhaps even as yet unborn, persons who will lose their lives and livelihoods to nuclear proliferation later. This is particularly true in situations where sender states with the most to lose in shortterm profits are not the states that would reap the greatest long-term benefits from sanctions imposition. For example, while strong sanctions against Iran would cost Russia and China much more than they would the United States, the United States is considered to be at far greater risk from an Iranian nuclear arsenal. Thus, sanctions that would benefit the entire international community in the long term might not be imposed because of the particular countries which would have to bear their shortterm costs. This tendency to sacrifice long-term benefits in favor of short-term profits undermines the efficacy of the collective security system on which the UN Charter is based. Under the collective security system, states renounce the temptation to take unilateral, preventive forceful action against a potential aggressor in return for a guarantee that the collective will come to their rescue if they are attacked.538 This bargain is particularly tenuous with respect to nuclear weapons, where an attack could cause enormous and indeed irreparable damage before any rescue could occur.539 The rescue must therefore come before the attack, in the form of sanctions sufficient to coerce or contain the potential proliferant. If such sanctions are not forthcoming, the proliferant’s foremost potential victims will be very tempted to take preventive forceful action. Thus, the Russian and Chinese veto of serious sanctions against Iran may force the United States and Israel into a choice between a preventive strike or facing the risk of an Iranian nuclear arsenal.

North Korea Won’t Give Up Nukes

Not even a security guarantee—much less the NPT—will convince North Korea to abandon its nukes

Lee 9 (Sunny, The National Foreign Correspondent, 10/26, <http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20091026/FOREIGN/710259855/1002>) my

“I hope that if the North Koreans declare a willingness to return to the six-party talks that people won’t break out the champagne. The question is whether North Korea will denuclearise, not whether it will return to the six-party talks,” Ms Glaser said. “North Korea will never, in any circumstances, give up its nuclear weapons,” said Zhang Liangui, a Chinese expert on North Korea at the Central Party School, an elite institute in Beijing for Communist Party cadre. According to Mr Zhang, the reason that North Korea enters into a negotiation with the US is only to gain some practical benefits, not because it is considering renouncing its nuclear weapons. “Even though the US will satisfy North Korea’s various demands, the North will still never, never give up its nukes,” said Mr Zhang. Koh Yu-hwan, an expert on North Korea at Seoul’s Dongguk University, disagrees, saying North Korea’s position on nuclear weapons is fluid. “It’s not that clear cut. The Korea War [1950-53] ended with an armistice. Technically the war is not yet over. The North wants nuclear weapons as a deterrent against the US. So, if the US offers a security guarantee, pledges that it wouldn’t try a ‘regime change’ and sign a peace treaty with North Korea, the goal of denuclearisation is still possible,” Mr Koh said. “That’s a naive view,” counters Mr Zhang, pointing out that the North’s motivation to own nuclear weapons is multifarious. “Actually, Pyongyang has multiple reasons to develop nukes,” he said. “North Korea publicly says it is developing nukes because of the US threat. But actually, North Korea has multiple reasons, including domestic needs, arms-race against its rival South Korea, to take upper hand in case of unification with South Korea, and also to raise its strategic position in the region, particularly against Japan. “All these issues will not be solved by the US guaranteeing its security. Therefore, despite all kinds of security guarantees from the US, North Korea will never give up its nuclear weapons,” Mr Zhang said. Mr Klingner said the task will be arduous. “Actually, there is very little optimism among US analysts that North Korea will actually give up its nuclear weapons,” he said, adding this very rationale is pushing the Obama administration to implement a ‘two-track’ approach on North Korea, which is designed to maintain pressure on Pyongyang, but also leave a door open for negotiation.

North Korea Won’t Give Up Nukes

North Korea won’t give up its nukes—it tries to force concessions through brinkmanship

Bandow 9 (Doug, Senior Fellow at CATO, 5/6, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10183>) my

North Korea demonstrates the limits of President Obama's more accommodating diplomacy. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea engages in perpetual brinkmanship. Last winter the tortuous negotiations over North Korea's nuclear program crashed if not burned over verification procedures for Pyongyang's official nuclear declaration. The Obama administration hopes to rejuvenate the six-party talks, but the way forward is uncertain after the North's missile launch a month ago. In fact, the effort was much ado about nothing. The botched effort suggests that the DPRK poses less than a formidable military threat. Gen. James E. Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, snickered: "On the idea of proliferation, would you buy from somebody that had failed three times in a row and never been successful?" However, as a step designed to win international attention the test was far more successful, creating the usual public frenzy in Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington. The U.S. denounced the launch as illegal and went to the United Nations for redress. U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon complained that the action was "not conducive to efforts to promote dialogue, regional peace and stability," as if those were North Korea's objectives. China and Russia exhibited their usual reluctance to crack down on the North. With Beijing's call for "calm" and "restraint," the Security Council approved a resolution insisting on little more than enforcement of previously approved sanctions. What should Washington do? The Obama administration needs to realistically assess the conundrum that is North Korea. We should downplay any expectations of changing North Korea. America should step back and let others take the lead in dealing with Pyongyang. A desperately poor, isolated state with an antiquated military, the DPRK poses far greater problems for its neighbors than for America. Only South Korea is within reach of the North's army — a good reason for the U.S. to withdraw its troops, since they are not needed to safeguard the Republic of Korea. (Seoul enjoys a vast economic, technological, population and diplomatic edge over the North.

All efforts at diplomacy fail- North Korea will never give up its nuclear weapons

Lee 8 (Sunny, Korea Times correspondent, 11/20, <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/06/120_34774.html-> cache) my

Meanwhile, Shen said North Korea would never allow nuclear sampling by international inspectors. Asked how such an attitude is likely to undermine its relationship with the Obama administration, Shen said, "North Korea can offend the U.S. more to keep its nuclear weapons." According to him, the six-nation process to persuade North Korea to relinquish its nuclear weapons is a vain exercise. "The six-party talks are a lie because North Korea will never give up its nuclear weapons." "For the last five years of negotiations, North Korea has developed nuclear weapons. In five years, it will have more," he said. He predicted that the U.S. would eventually settle for a nuclear North Korea. "The U.S. accepted nuclear weapons in Israel, China, Pakistan and India. Why couldn't it accept North Korea as a nuclear country?" He said the U.S. is not ready. "Maybe not in five years. Not in 15 years. But in 50 years, it will."

Bargain Fails

Any condition fails—North Korea will inevitably back out—empirically proven in 6 party talks

Cha 9 (Victor, former Director for Asian Affairs in the White House's National Security Council, CSIS, January, <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0804qus_korea.pdf>) my

North Korea’s unwillingness to agree to a written document crafted by the Chinese became apparent almost immediately at the recent round of talks in Beijing. North Korean negotiators apparently were interested only in getting commitments from other parties about the continued supply of fuel shipments even as Pyongyang was unwilling to accept a verification protocol. This intransigence was despite a highly controversial decision by the Bush administration in October to remove North Korea from the terrorism blacklist. U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill’s last-ditch attempt to break the logjam reflects a fundamental dilemma of “relative reasonableness” the U.S. continually faces in implementing Six-Party Talks agreements with the North. What this means is that every agreement in the Six-Party Talks process is negotiated with painstaking care as parties hammer out specific quid pro quos and synchronize steps and timelines with concomitant rewards and penalties. Yet, sooner or later, Pyongyang plays brinksmanship and demands more than it was promised or does less than it should. In this instance, a “verifiable nuclear declaration” – emphasis on verifiable – by the North was the clear understanding of all parties to the talks dating back to the September 2005 Joint Statement. Nevertheless, Pyongyang eventually chose not to agree to standard verification schemes. While everyone accepts that the DPRK is being completely unreasonable, they also realize that a failure of the agreement could mean the failure of the Six-Party Talks and the precipitation of another crisis. To avoid this, the parties end up pressing the U.S., knowing full-well that the DPRK is at fault and traversing the bounds of fairness and good faith, but certain that the only chance of progress can be had from U.S. reasonableness rather than DPRK unreasonableness. The result is that any additional U.S. flexibility is widely perceived in the region as evidence of U.S. leadership (except perhaps in Tokyo), but is viewed in Washington as some combination of desperation and weakness.

Bargain Fails

Quid pro quo fails—mutual distrust deadlocks negotiations

Suh 10 (Jae-Jung, Associate professor and director of Korean Studies at the School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, 2/9, <http://www.fpif.org/articles/invite_north_korea_to_the_global_nuclear_security_summit>,) my

Thus the stage is set for quid pro quo. Peace is a good thing for both Washington and Pyongyang, so is denuclearization. So why not trade one for the other? It is one of the rare win-win situations for both parties, except that Washington and Pyongyang might not see it that way. There is so much bad blood, figuratively and literally, between them that the sequencing of peace and denuclearization remains a potential deal-breaker. Concerned that Pyongyang is trying to buy time with potentially lengthy negotiations for a peace treaty, Washington wants the resumption of the Six Party Talks and denuclearization first. Pyongyang, on the other hand, demands a peace treaty before denuclearization because it fears an attack once it gets rid of what it considers "nuclear deterrent." Hence the quid pro quo becomes a deadlock.

(best I can make of it is Lee/Obama’s agreement is a qpq)

US objectives harden North Korean resolve and push away compromise

Kang 9 (Hyun-kyung, 6-19. “Doves Say S.Korea, US Corner NK,” <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/06/113_47126.html>.) my

Liberals and some North Korea experts have cast doubt on the effectiveness of the comprehensive strategic alliance that President Lee Myung-bak and his U.S. counterpart Barack Obama agreed at their summit this week over the Stalinist regime's nuclear ambitions. A local North Korea watcher told The Korea Times on condition of anonymity that South Korea and the United States would have been better off if they had not included the phrase ``peaceful reunification on the principles of free democracy and market economy'' in the joint vision. He said the description would only agitate the North because it sent a clear message that reunification will only be achieved through the South's absorption of the North. His remark reflects the worry that ``a cornered dog sometimes bites.'' In the joint statement, Lee and Obama agreed reunification based on democracy and a market economy and the U.S. government's provision of extended deterrence, including its nuclear umbrella, to South Korea. Doves in Seoul expressed worries about the ramifications of the two leaders' commitments on North Korea. Yonsei University Professor Moon Chung-in, a former special attache to the inter-Korean summit in 2000, said Friday that hardening its stance toward the North and sending a signal of a South-led absorption reunification would be no help to the two Koreas' building confidence. In a speech at a seminar, Moon said that deterrence would not necessarily lead to peace, noting it is part of an approach designed to manage peace. Rep. Lee Kang-rae, floor leader of the largest opposition Democratic Party (DP), said South Korea's absorption-based reunification is the worst case scenario that the North has in mind. ``The window of opportunity for South-North dialogue will be closed as long as Lee sticks to the approach,'' said Lee.

\_\_\_\*\*2AC – AT: DAs

Hegemony Good DA – 2AC

**China sees our unequal alliance with Japan as an opportunity to rise to power; US withdrawal allows Japan to develop its Special Defence Force which is the lynchpin to east asian security**

**Kakuchi 2/2/10** (Suvendrini, Political Analyst, Inter Press Service (IPS), "Japan-U.S. Pact Crucial to Balance of Power in East Asia", http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=51681) JG

TOKYO, June 2, 2010 (IPS) - **A clumsy and failed attempt by Japan’s nine-month-old coalition government to change the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty**, a post World War II landmark in bilateral relations after the Japanese defeat and **often referred to as the lynchpin in Asian regional defence, has shaken domestic politics and fueled East Asian anxiety.**  Analysts predict tough times for Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, seen to culminate in his resignation on Wednesday, after he stumbled and sparked a political storm when he tried to move a controversial U.S marine base stationed in Okinawa.  Public support for Hatoyama’s democratic socialist government slid to 17 percent Monday, an ominous sign of disastrous results in the Upper House elections in July.  On the international front, **analysts see Japan’s political mess spilling into disastrous regional consequences as Japan and the United States struggle to come to a satisfactory conclusion amid domestic anger over Okinawa** and a tinderbox situation for U.S. troops facing violence in Afghanistan.  **"I would describe the situation in East Asia as dangerous and uncertain," said international relations expert Takeshi Inoguchi** of University of Niigata, a leading foreign studies institution.  **Inoguchi was referring to heightened alertness in East Asia after South Korea and Japan decided to take stern action against North Korea, which has reacted with its characteristic dogmatism by threatening war even as evidence emerged that it had carried out the sinking of a South Korean warship** in March near the maritime border with the authoritarian regime.  China, a key player in Asian security, is the lone supporter of the North and is not throwing its weight behind South Korea.  Other issues creating tense regional relations include Chinese military activities in Japanese waters that have, for the moment, been smoothed in an agreement forged on Monday to pursue further talks between Chinese premier Wen Jiabao and Hatoyama during the former’s visit to Tokyo this week.  Inoguchi said it is difficult to predict what will happen next. An unfortunate confluence of factors, namely, "Japan’s weak leadership," the anticipated victory of the opposition in South Korea’s local elections on Wednesday, and Chinese reports of local labour and rural unrest turning into a headache for Beijing, "can only mean a more explosive East Asia," he said.  Last week Hatoyama fired cabinet minister Mizuho Fukushima, leader of a small leftist party, after she refused to sign a document approving the relocation of the Futenma U.S. military air base to a less crowded part of Okinawa, citing it was against the party’s campaign pledge.  Professor Masao Okonogi, an expert on the Korean peninsula, said the ongoing political crisis has turned the spotlight once again on the future of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which has long been a thorny issue on the domestic front and a relentless quagmire for Japanese governments.  **"Any attempt to change the bilateral military alliance, which the Japanese public thinks is unfair, signals a treacherous path for governments as you can see from what is happening now,"** he said.  The Japan-U.S. military alliance allows Japan to defend itself from foreign invasion but prevents it from participating in an attack. In addition, Japan is host to the largest number of U.S. military and naval bases in Asia, where they are heavily involved in U.S.-led wars in the region.  **Japan’s defence policy views the Treaty as crucial to efforts to forestall threats posed by North Korea and China, which are seen as potential dangers to Japan’s national security.  But China and North Korea view the military pact between Japan and the United States as a throwback to Cold War diplomacy.  Analysts say any hopes the Japanese public may have had to push for a more equal military alliance with Washington have been dashed as tensions grow and the lack of leadership on the domestic front leaves little room for meaningful negotiation.** Professor Akira Kato, an international politics expert at Obirin University, said **an equal alliance with the United States would mean allowing Japan to rearm itself.  Japan has a formidable Self Defence Force (SDF) that cannot be officially named a military under its postwar pacifist Constitution.  A tortuous change enacted in the Japan-U.S. Security Pact two decades ago now permits, among other stipulations, the Japanese SDF to participate in operations with the U.S. security forces stationed in the country.**  But leftist political parties such as the Social Democratic Party, which has abandoned the ruling coalition over policy disagreements, calls for the opposite. Its policy is to "scale down the SDF and transform the bilateral Security Pact into peace and goodwill."  Analysts say such foreign policy row is one pressing reason why the Japanese platform, such as what is identified with the conservative Liberal Democratic Party, remains shaky in terms of negotiating for a better deal with the United States over U.S. base relocation.  "**With political and public opinion divided, the looming insecurity in East Asia and Japan’s shaky politics, the Japan-U.S. security treaty continues to play a fundamental role in Asian security with all its other implications," said Obirin University’s Kato.  A change of head of government in Japan no longer surprises anyone.** Two weeks ago, Yukio Hatoyama resigned as prime minister and was replaced by former finance minister Naoto Kan. Indeed, over the last four years, Japan has had several prime ministers. <CONTINUED>

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**The victory of Japan’s Democratic Party (DPJ),** which brought an end to the domination of Japanese politics by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), **failed to ensure the stability of government in Japan.**  **Protracted uncertainties in Japanese politics have further undermined the country’s efforts to regain its status as a significant player in East Asia. As the region is being transformed by the rise of China and the arrival of India as two new major powers, Japan has struggled to prove its relevance in the regional strategic equation. It is true that Japan remains an important economic power in the region and beyond. Yet, East Asia has now become a region shaped by countries with both economic and strategic significance.** Even as an economic power, **Japan is being challenged by China as the second largest economy in the world**, and **the prospect for Japan to revitalize its economy remains uncertain.**  In fact, Prime Minister Kan even warned that Japan could face a similar fate as Greece if it did not resolve its mounting national debt, which has reached 218.6 percent of its gross domestic product in 2009. Aware of the danger, as a new leader, Prime Minister Kan has promised to restore Japan’s economic vitality and aimed for more than 2 percent of annual growth by 2020. The challenge for Japan in achieving that target is enormous. In addition to economic problems, the dynamic of Japan’s internal politics often renders it difficult for any government to push for necessary reforms. For example, it is not immediately clear how long Prime Minister Kan would survive. One cannot be sure whether the DPJ would be able to maintain its grip on power in the next election. Despite all the difficulties, we hope Japan would be able to withstand the challenges. As international relations in East Asia enter its most crucial juncture, the role of Japan as a major regional power is very much needed. It is for the first time in Asia’s history that regional politics would be characterized by more than two powerful players. China will undoubtedly soon emerge as the most powerful country, second only to the US. India too will become a power that would shape the future of East Asia. As a result, **a new emerging regional order is in the making. Southeast Asian countries, having good relationships with all four major powers, expect that the ongoing power shift in East Asia will  continue to be peaceful and to the benefits of all regional nations, small and big.**  I, for one, believe that s**ome sort of multi-polar structure in East Asia would ensure that the region continues to enjoy the stability** it has experienced over the last five decades. In that context, **a strong Japan would greatly contribute to the preservation of peace, stability and prosperity in the region. A strong Japan would be beneficial for the fulfillment of the ideal of an East Asian community.**  **The role that Japan has played in Southeast Asia — an important component of East Asia’s stability and security — has helped the region flourish economically, which in turn contributes to peace and stability in the region. Southeast Asian states wish to see Japan**, under the new administration led by Prime Minister Kan, **to succeed**. Southeast Asian states, and also **East Asia as a whole, needs a strong partnership with Japan to ensure that the 21st century is indeed an Asian century.** Indonesia is no exception. Our relationship with Japan will continue to occupy an important place in our foreign policy. Japan is the largest trading partner and investor in Indonesia. **Japan** has been playing an important role in our economic development and **is a fellow democracy with whom we share many values and norms.**

Hegemony Good DA – 2AC

**Troops in Korea cost the US two to four billion dollars a year.**

Kim et al. 09(Kim, Indong Oh, writers from the **Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development Northeast Asia Peace and Security Project “A New U.S. Policy toward Korea: Korean American Recommendations for Real Change” JL)**

Since it costs about $2-4 billion per year to station the U.S. troops in South Korea, and there is a great need to reduce our military spending at present, it will serve the U.S. interests to reduce our troop strength in the ROK, which already has a powerful military to defend itself. South Korea also has twice the population of North Korea, and its annual military spending is about eight times larger than North Korea's, while South Korea's GDP is 40 times greater than North Korea's.

B) Deficit spending destroys the economy

**Fraser 06** (“The real worry about U.S. budget policy? Spending” Alison Acosta Fraser Director of the Thomas A.Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies. August 19, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed081906a.cfm>)

But what about spending? This is where the single-minded focus on the deficit becomes a problem. The good news is unexpected revenue growth overshadowed the bad news of persistent spending growth. Federal spending has grown 45 percent since 2001, 8 percent this year alone. Not just for defense, but for things like the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, an indoor tropical rain forest in Iowa, and huge subsidies to farmers to not grow crops.WhenGeorge W. Bush took office, spending was 18.4 percent of GDP. By the end of this year it willreach 20.3 percent. While his strong tax policy has helped the economy, his spending policies have not.If policymakers had reined in spending to grow at the same rate as the economy, they would havevirtually eliminated the deficit by now.The real worry about Washington's budget policy is spending. As baby boomers start to retire, the budget will spiral out of sight, fueled by Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid. That comes on top of recent spending growth. By reasonable accounts, the budget could reach 50 percent of GDP by 2050 - and continue to grow after that. The deficits and spending levels of today don't foretell the harm this will bring. However, the stagnant economies of Europe, complete with high tax-and-spend welfare policies and soaring unemployment, do. To be sure, pro-growth tax policiesare working. As a pleasant distraction, they arealso driving down the deficit, masking the effect of high spending. But don't be fooled by all this crowing about reducing the deficit**.** Washington shouldn't rest on its deficit-reduction laurels.

Hegemony Good DA – 2AC

C) Economic strength is the most important determinant in sustaining hegemony

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FROM ROME, Imperial China, Venice, Spain, France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union to the United States today, the rise and fall of great nations has been driven primarily by relative economic strength. As Paul Kennedy so ably describes in his classic The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, the more international commitments a state has, the more its power matters and hence the more relative economic strength it needs. Although scholars have long debated its nuances, the basic definition of power in international politics is simple: power is the aggregate resources a state has at its disposal to achieve its aims, the most important of which are to defend its national interests, both at home and abroad.1 But it is not only how much power a state has that matters. It is also how much power a state has relative to other states. This is true in any rough-and-tumble environment. A Ford Explorer is a powerful vehicle—unless it collides with a Mack Truck. In international politics, power does not ensure success. But, power certainly helps. At any given moment, U.S. power is heavily dependent on the size and quality of its military forces and other current power assets. A successful grand strategy, however, must work for the long haul and so depends on the power a state is able to produce in the future. Over time, America’s power is fundamentally a result of its economic strength. Productive capacity—defined by indicators such as wealth, technology and population size—is a prerequisite for building and modernizing military forces. The United States, like any state, may choose to vary the degree to which its productive capacities are used to create military assets. But it is the economy as a whole that constrains the choice. And the size of the economy relative to potential rivals ultimately determines the limits of power in international politics. Major assessments of this relative position have long turned heavily on a single statistic: America’s share of world economic product. Advocates of extending America’s unipolar dominance are well aware of the central importance of the economic foundations of American power and routinely present detailed statistics on the U.S. share of world product. The basic notion is simple: take U.S. domestic product in any year and divide it by the aggregate total of the gross domestic product of all states in the world. To measure gross domestic product, the unipolar-dominance school prefers to compare every country’s output in current-year U.S. dollars, a method that tends to show America is much further ahead of other countries than alternative measures. Indeed, the most recent call for America to exploit its hegemonic position (published in 2008) rests on the presumption of U.S. dominance based on the current-year dollar figures.2 By this metric, in 2006 the United States had 28 percent of world product while its nearest most likely competitor, China, had 6 percent. Looks pretty good for America, right? Alas, single-year “snapshots” of America’s relative power are of limited value for assessing the sustainability of its grand strategy over many years. For grand-strategic concerns—especially how well the United States can balance its resources and foreign-policy commitments—the trajectory of American power compared to other states is of seminal importance. For the sake of argument, let us start with the unipolar-dominance school’s preferred measure of American hegemony, but look at the trajectory of the data over time. According to GDP figures in current U.S. dollars from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United States increased its share of world production during the 1990s, reached its apogee in 2000, and then began to steadily lose ground during the eight years of the Bush administration, with its relative power ultimately falling by nearly a quarter in the first decade of the twenty-first century. At the same time, the relative power of China, the state many consider America’s most likely future rival, has grown consistently. If we look out as far as the IMF can see (2013), things get even worse—with the United States expected to continue declining and China to continue rising. The United States has been going through the first decade of the twenty-first century not stronger than before, but substantially weaker. How good are the numbers? Economists commonly use two other methods to calculate GDP, constant-dollar calculations and purchasing power parity.3 Although each offers advantages and disadvantages, for our purposes what matters is that they form a lower bound of America’s relative decline. And regardless of the metric, the trend is the same. Again using IMF figures, Table 2 shows the trajectory of the share of world product for the United States and China using both alternative measures. Simply put, the United States is now a declining power. This new reality has tremendous implications for the future of American grand strategy.