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1NC Shell

Plan: The United States federal government will [plan] on the condition that the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea signs the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

First, the US can condition its withdrawal on North Korea signing the NPT.

Kristensen 6 (Hans, Federation of American Scientists, “The United States Nuclear Umbrella Over South Korea” <http://www.nukestrat.com/korea/umbrella.htm>

Finally, there is the issue of extended deterrence in the region in general. Japan is covered by part of the same umbrella as South Korea. Some may have been concerned that any weakening of the U.S. nuclear umbrella in the region could increase Japanese doubts about its own security arrangement with the United States and spawn Japan's own nuclear weapons ambitions.

Despite such considerations, the decision of the 37th Security Consultative Meeting to reaffirm the nuclear umbrella over South Korea appears to have missed an important opportunity to use the status of the umbrella as an additional incentive to move the nuclear agenda on the Korean Peninsula forward. Rather than simply reaffirming the umbrella as is, the United States and South Korea could have made it conditional on North Korea carrying through on its pledges to give up nuclear weapons and rejoin the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

An unmodified umbrella makes the U.S. look disingenuous when it says it has no intention to attack North Korea with nuclear weapons, and it gives North Korea an easy excuse to question the credibility of the [Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks](http://www.nukestrat.com/korea/JointStatement091905.pdf).

Second, **North Korea will say yes - pressured by 47 countries unanimously through South Korean nuclear summit.**

Doo-Hyong 4/13 (Hwang, Contributor to Yonhap News Agency, 4/13/10, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2010/04/14/39/0301000000AEN20100414000300315F.HTML) GAT

South Korea's hosting of the second nuclear security summit in 2012 will put pressure on North Korea, which has been defying international efforts to dismantle its nuclear weapons program through multilateral talks, experts said Tuesday.  "It also puts more international pressure on North Korea to change course on the nuclear issue," David Straub, associate director at the Korean Studies Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, said. In an apparent warning to North Korea, 47 world leaders at the inaugural nuclear summit here unanimously approved South Korea's plan Tuesday to host the second summit in the first half of 2012.  South Korean President Lee Myung-bak said he would welcome North Korea to the summit if progress is made in six-party talks on the North's denuclearization, which have been deadlocked over U.N. sanctions for its nuclear and missile tests early last year. The summit will focus on keeping loose nuclear materials from terrorist groups. "Choosing South Korea as the next host allows President Lee to refocus world attention back onto the North Korean nuclear threat," Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, said. "By reminding the summit participants of the threat Seoul faces from the North, Lee hopes to energize international efforts to resolve the issue, either through negotiations or stronger sanctions." Scott Snyder, director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at the Asia Foundation, agreed.  "A summit in South Korea may also place the spotlight on North Korea's position outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and on the fact that North Korea's nuclear efforts have isolated it from opportunities to gain respect from the international community," Snyder said.

1NC Shell

Third, **North Korea is critical for the credibility of the NPT – now is key**

UNIS 5 (United Nations Information Service, http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2005/dc2969.html)JFS

YOSHIKI MINE (Japan) said it was extremely regrettable that the Conference had been unable to adopt a final consensus document. States Parties to the Treaty should take the undesirable result seriously and renew their determination to explore ways to maintain and strengthen the credibility and authority of the NPT regime. He was not implying, however, that the Conference had not brought about anything fruitful. High-level delegates from many States parties had gathered in New York, seriously exchanging views to address the challenges that the NPT regime was facing today. Many States Parties had taken the view that the Democratic Republic of Korea’s nuclear issue was a serious threat to international community as a whole. The validity of the NPT regime, therefore, had not decreased. The NPT regime, now more than ever, was of immense importance to international peace and security. In light of the serious challenges facing the international community, further universalizing and reinforcing the Treaty was imperative and a benefit to all States.

Each State Party should redouble its efforts to strengthen the NPT regimes, so that the lack of an agreed document would not erode the Treaty’s authority and credibility, he said. The period leading up to the next Review Conference was crucial. All States Parties should fulfil their obligations under the Treaty in good faith, thereby reinforcing the NPT regime. For its part, Japan would intensify its efforts towards that end and would take, among other things, several measures leading up the next Regime Conference. The Democratic Republic of Korea’s nuclear issue posed a serious threat to the Treaty regime’s authority and credibility. Japan called on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to completely dismantle all of its nuclear programmes including its uranium enrichment programmes, in a permanent, thorough and transparent manner subject to credible international verification. Japan would continue to work with other partners to peacefully resolve the issue through the six-party talks.

NPT key to regional stability

**Glaser 9** (Bonnie, China Security, Aug. 2 2009, http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=287)IM

A nuclear-armed North Korea could also have profoundly destabilizing repercussions for the international non-proliferation regime.  The failure to halt and reverse North Korea’s nuclear program could provide precedent for other states to pursue nuclear weapons options or, as in the case of Iran, to decide to not give them up. The failure of North Korea to sign onto the NPT will weaken it significantly.  The further weakening and even ultimate collapse of the NPT would have destabilizing consequences both regionally and globally, and would likely be of grave concern to Beijing. Another danger posed by a nuclear North Korea is the possible sale or transfer of nuclear materials, technology or knowhow by Pyongyang to a third country or non-state actor.  Such proliferation would affect China’s interests in several ways. For one, the United States and other countries would undoubtedly adopt a much harsher policy toward North Korea, which could even include the possible use of force to stop further proliferation. Also, members of the United Nations, including China, would be expected to strengthen efforts to inspect, interdict or otherwise prevent such transfers.  Heretofore, Beijing has been reluctant to join collective efforts to counter proliferation activities.  Finally, if instability should occur while North Korea remains in possession of nuclear weapons material and weapons, there would be a high likelihood that the United States would intervene to seize control over WMD assets. The possibility of US intervention in a denuclearized North Korea would be much lower. The risk also exists that the North’s nuclear weapons could be inherited by Seoul as the result of a reunified Korean Peninsula.

1NC Shell

And, East Asian instability leads to nuclear war

Landy 2k (Jonathon, National Security and International Correspondent, Knight Ridder, March 10, L/N)

**Few if any experts think China and Taiwan**, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan **are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy, and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan, and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations, and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. “Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile**,” said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. “We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. **There are elements for potential disaster.** In an effort to cool the region’s tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia’s capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime.

Solvency – Security Guarantees

**Koreans primary concern in negotiations are security guarantees**

**Vatutin 9** (Alexander, The Voice of Russia, http://english.ruvr.ru/2009/09/14/1801055.html)JFS

Pyongyang’s negotiating partners have fallen short of implementing their side of the deal, making additional demands and continuously falling behind schedule in fuel oil and other supplies made available to the North as part of the international package of economic incentives… What Pyongyang is really concerned about, however, are security guarantees, primarily by the United States, and this is something the North Korean leaders have been saying loud and clear because the conflicts between Pyongyang and Washington remains the fulcrum of the very complex nuclear situation on the Korean peninsula, Vorontsov says.

Solvency – Troops

Disarmament talks were only successful after withdrawal of troops

**Lantier 8** (Alex, World Socialist Web Site, June 28 2008, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2008/jun2008/nkor-j28.shtml)IM

Shortly after taking office in March 2001, the Bush administration broke off the talks with North Korea held by the Clinton administration. This effectively ended then-South Korean President Kim Dae Jung’s “Sunshine Policy” of building economic and political links to North Korea, which threatened to bring about greater regional integration between Japan, China, Korea, and the broader Eurasian continent. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Bush named North Korea as part of the “axis of evil” and maintained diplomatic and military pressure on it throughout the initial stages of the Iraq occupation. The Iraq war soon began to limit US influence in Northeast Asia, however. In May 2004 the US began to pull out some troops from South Korea, which has hosted US forces since the 1950-1953 Korean War, to send them to the Middle East. In February 2005 North Korea announced that it had nuclear weapons. It carried out a nuclear test blast with unclear results in October 2006, and Rice’s subsequent tour of the region to isolate North Korea failed to garner support. The February 2007 six-party accord to begin disarmament came on the heels of the Bush administration’s defeat in the November 2006 US mid-term elections, and concessions given to North Korea due to the change in power – including increased removal of troops from South Korea. The rudderlessness of Bush administration Northeast Asia policy is a matter of serious concern inside the US bourgeoisie. In testimony last month to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dr. Kurt Campbell of the Center for a New American Security said: “Some of the President’s closest advisers have told him to spend all his waking hours on selling an increasingly skeptical American populace on the necessity of continuing with the [Iraq] war. ... Another set of advisers argue that the United States must begin to put Iraq in context and focus on other issues of importance, such as the drama playing out in Asia and in particular China’s dramatic ascent.” Though Northeast Asia is still economically dependent on exports to the US, intraregional trade is growing rapidly. China has emerged particularly as an exporter of consumer goods to wealthier markets in Japan and Korea, and Japan and Korea export capital goods to China. China overtook the US as South Korea’s largest trading partner in 2003, and in 2005 China-South Korea trade was $100 billion, versus $70 billion for Japan-South Korea and US-South Korea trade. In 2007 Japan-China trade was ¥ 29.36 trillion, versus ¥ 24.84 for Japan-US trade.

North Korea will dismantle its weapons program on the condition that the US pull out of South Korea

**Fellman and Kim 4** (Joshua and Seyoon, Bloomberg, March 8 2004, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aCCoLOfsEQdc&refer=top\_world\_news-redirectoldpage)IM

March 8 (Bloomberg) -- North Korea's government said it will make the pullout of U.S. forces from South Korea a condition of a nuclear agreement, unless the U.S. stops insisting that an accord require the North to dismantle its weapons program first. North Korea also will demand a ``complete, verifiable, irreversible security assurance'' from the U.S. in exchange for American insistence the nuclear program be dismantled on those terms, the official Korea Central News Agency said in a release. The U.S. aims to ``round off preparations for a second Korean War by rummaging through (North Korea) under the pretext of `inspection,''' the agency said. ``If the U.S. gives up its demand for `scrapping nuclear program first' and makes a switchover in its Korea policy, dramatic progress will be made in settling the nuclear issue.'' South Korea, the U.S., China, Japan and Russia are seeking to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear program in return for security guarantees and energy aid. The six nations held talks in Beijing last month and will meet again by June 30 in an effort to settle the dispute. As diplomacy goes on, the Pentagon warned in a new intelligence assessment that North Korea's nuclear ambitions were linked to the survival of Kim Jong Il's regime, and the U.S. insisted its defense of the Korean Peninsula would remain strong. North Korea today again blamed the U.S. for slow progress at the talks, saying the Bush administration must change its policy toward the regime and stop insisting on discussing the country's enriched uranium program, which it called ``fictitious.''

Solvency – Troops

The US should gradually withdraw from South Korea if they agree to inspections of nuclear facilities.

Carpenter 4 (Ted G., VP for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at CATO Instit., <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=2502>) GAT

 Every reasonable person in the United States and East Asia hopes that the ongoing nuclear crisis can be ended by diplomacy. But any diplomatic solution needs to have certain characteristics to be worthwhile. As North Korea's latest proposal suggests, the United States could probably get a rehash of the 1994 agreement for the asking -- if the concessions to Pyongyang were sufficiently generous. But such an accord would not really resolve the crisis; it would merely pave the way for a new round of cheating a few years down the road. It is not enough to get North Korea to promise to abide by the Agreed Framework and the Nonproliferation Treaty. North Korea has demonstrated repeatedly that its word means nothing. This time, there must be intrusive "on demand" inspections of all known and suspected North Korean nuclear facilities. If North Korea truly abandons its nuclear weapons program and agrees to such inspections, the United States should take a number of conciliatory steps. Those would include resuming the fuel oil shipments and construction on the light water reactors, agreeing to North Korea's earlier demand for a nonaggression pact (even though historically such agreements have rarely been worth the paper they're written on), normalizing diplomatic and economic relations with Pyongyang, concluding a peace treaty officially ending the Korean War, and gradually withdrawing all U.S. forces from South Korea. That should be the substance of Washington's counterproposal to North Korea's latest initiative. The odds are not good, however, that North Korea will agree to a new accord that includes rigorous inspections -- as opposed to a toothless, updated version of the Agreed Framework. In any case, the United States should not succumb to Pyongyang's latest phony blandishments. The old admonition applies: Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me.

North Korea will only abandon its nuclear weapons program if the US removes troops from South Korea

**Sang-Hoon 9** (Yang, The Chosen Ilbo, Oct. 21 2009, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html\_dir/2009/10/21/2009102100838.html)IM

No breakthrough seems likely in the North Korean nuclear issue now that China has made it clear that it will not risk endangering the North Korean system for the sake of denuclearization, making it improbable that the international community will be able to pressure Pyongyang into giving up its nuclear weapons program. President Lee Myung-bak's idea of a "grand bargain" and U.S. President Barack Obama's "comprehensive package" will make little difference. But the North must be persuaded to denuclearize, not as a surrender but as a big compromise that will fundamentally change the situation on the Korean Peninsula. It is naive to expect the North to give up its nuclear arms, which it considers a matter of life and death, in return for economic aid. In the course reaching a compromise, Seoul has to confront very difficult but unavoidable political and military problems. North Korean leader Kim Jong-il told Chinese premier Wen Jiabao that one condition for his return to six-party talks is an end to "hostile" policies from the U.S. The official Rodong Shinmun daily said that includes converting the armistice agreement into a peace treaty. That would be "one of the most rational and practical means" of achieving a denuclearized peninsula, it added. But this also calls for an end to the U.S.-South Korea alliance and withdrawal of the U.S. Forces Korea. The North reportedly proposed a "bold deal" to former American officials and North Korea specialists who visited Pyongyang in January and February. The North would abandon its nuclear weapons program if the U.S. removes the nuclear umbrella it provides for South Korea and puts an end to the U.S.-South Korea alliance.

Solvency – Deterrence

If the US reduces deterrence in South Korea, North Korea would return to talks

**Jong-Heon 9** (Lee, United Press International, Nov. 2 2009, http://www.upi.com/Top\_News/Special/2009/11/02/North-Korea-pushes-for-direct-US-talks/UPI-71101257172857/)IM

SEOUL, Nov. 2 (UPI) -- North Korea again urged the United States to accept its demand for direct talks on Pyongyang's nuclear programs, warning that the country will "go our own way" if Washington refuses dialogue. In early October, North Korea said it could return to the stalled six-nation talks on its nuclear weapons drive, on condition that it first has one-on-one talks with Washington and the talks make progress. The Obama administration has said it could have direct talks with the North but ruled out substantial negotiations on the nuclear issue, stressing that face-to-face contacts would be used as a tool to persuade Pyongyang to return to the six-party talks. In its response to Washington's unresponsiveness, North Korea's foreign ministry said Monday that it is time for the United States to make a decision on dialogue, as Pyongyang has already expressed its position on the preconditions for the resumption of the six-party talks. "As the DPRK (North Korea) was magnanimous enough to clarify the stand that it is possible to hold multilateral talks including the six-party talks depending on the talks with the United States, now is the U.S. turn," the ministry told Pyongyang's official news agency. The statement came after behind-the-scenes contacts between the North and the United States failed to produce tangible progress. Ri Gun, North Korea's deputy nuclear envoy, traveled to New York and San Diego last week for academic forums during which he met Sung Kim, the U.S. special envoy on the North's nuclear disarmament. The meeting raised media speculation that the two sides were fine-tuning conditions for a visit to Pyongyang by Stephen Bosworth, the U.S. special representative for North Korea policy, for direct talks. But the North's foreign ministry said Ri's encounter with the U.S. nuclear envoy was "not a preliminary one for the DPRK-U.S. talks." "No discussion has been made there on any substantial issue concerning the bilateral dialogue," it said, hinting that Pyongyang failed to gain what it wanted through the contacts. Neither North Korea nor the United States released details of the meeting. The ministry also warned the North would "go our own way" if the United States isn't ready to sit at the negotiating table with Pyongyang, suggesting it would take further steps toward nuclear armament and long-range missile tests. Seoul's Yonhap News Agency reported that the North has apparently restored the facility it used to produce weapons-grade plutonium at its main nuclear complex, which had been mothballed under a six-nation accord. "The reprocessing factory appears to have been restored to its earlier condition," a senior defense official was quoted as saying, citing satellite photos that showed a continuous stream of workers in and out of the site at the North's main nuclear complex in Yongbyon. North Korea has long called for direct talks with the United States to discuss the nuclear crisis, claiming the current standoff was caused by Washington's "hostile" policy against Pyongyang. South Korean officials say the North wants to use one-on-one negotiations with Washington to call for a non-aggression or peace treaty between them, which could lead to a withdrawal of 28,500 U.S. troops from South Korea. The North has also demanded that the United States scrap its nuclear umbrella over South Korea, calling it a strategy to invade the North with atomic bombs and evidence that Washington is "hostile" toward it.

Solvency – Concessions

Pyongyang will not do something for nothing – US concessions will push North Korea towards signing the NPT.

Sigal 9 (Leon V., Director of the NE Asia Cooperative Security Project, <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/what-obama-should-offer-north-korea>) GAT

As if President Barack Obama hasn't inherited enough trouble from his predecessor, nuclear negotiations with North Korea are once again headed for trouble. In return for energy aid, North Korea agreed at the latest round of Six-Party Talks in December 2008 to complete the disabling of its plutonium program. The Bush administration, however, insisted that the disablement be verified--moving the goalposts beyond what the six parties had previously agreed to do. A couple of months earlier, North Korea had made an oral pledge to Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill to allow sampling and other verification measures. But without a quid pro quo, which the Bush administration wouldn't provide, Pyongyang refused to put it in writing. In response, Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo threatened to suspend the scheduled shipments of energy aid they had pledged to Pyongyang, reneging on the October 2007 Six-Party agreement. This is nothing new. Whenever the United States fails to keep its side of the bargain, North Korea is quick to retaliate--in 1998 Pyongyang sought the means to enrich uranium and test a long-range Taepodong missile; in 2003 it reignited its plutonium program; in 2006 it test-launched a Taepodong and conducted a nuclear test; and last August it suspended disablement of its Yongbyon facilities and threatened to resume plutonium production. History shows that trying to get something for nothing from North Korea doesn't work. In fact, pressuring Pyongyang yields nothing but trouble. As if Washington moving the goalposts wasn't trouble enough, North Korea has been stepping up its demands, insisting that it won't give up its nuclear weapons unless the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" over South Korea is removed. Pyongyang has also hinted that it wants "all other nuclear weapons states" to disarm when it disarms. To change the dynamic, the Obama administration needs to propose a comprehensive menu of sequenced reciprocal actions to end enmity and reconcile with North Korea, easing its isolation and insecurity. In return for a new political, economic, and strategic relationship with Washington, Pyongyang needs to agree to satisfy international norms of behavior, starting with steps to halt exports of nuclear and missile technology--along with nuclear and missile tests--and then move to eliminate its nuclear and missile programs.

Other countries are pressuring North Korea too, but US concessions are key

Sindh Today News 10 (March 6 2010, http://www.sindhtoday.net/news/2/113099.htm)IM

Seoul, March 6 (DPA) The US government has joined China in calling on North Korea to restart the stalled six-nation denuclearisation talks, media reports said. “We would like to see the six-party process begin again as soon as possible. But as I’ve said many, many times, that right now it’s up to North Korea to agree to come back to the talks and to take affirmative steps towards denuclearisation,” Yonhap news agency quoted State Department spokesman Philip Crowley as saying. The comment from Crowley followed remarks by the Chinese chief nuclear envoy, Wu Dawei, who said earlier Friday in Beijing that North Korea will return to the talks before July. “China’s goal is to start the six-party talks in the first half of this year, although I am unsure whether the target would be met,” Wu told the China Daily. International pressure has mounted in recent weeks to induce North Korea back to the nuclear talks which have been stalled since Pyongyang walked out 11 months ago. North Korea’s chief nuclear envoy, Kim Kye-gwan, plans to meet US officials to prompt a restart of the talks during a programmed New York this month to attend an academic seminar, Yonhap reported. But the US has not yet approved the visa request, and analysts said Washington may press for concessions before giving Kim permission to enter the country. Pyongyang has demanded the lifting of UN sanctions and a commitment from the US to discuss a peace treaty on the Korean peninsula as conditions to return to the negotiation table.

Solvency – Concessions

North Korea demands concessions to return to talks

**China Daily 9** (Dec. 11 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2009-12/11/content\_9162516.htm)IM

SEOUL, South Korea: The Democratic People's Republic of Korea(DPRK)said Friday that it understands the need to resume the stalled international talks on ending its nuclear programs, and that it agrees to work with the United States to narrow unspecified "remaining differences." The statement from DPRK's Foreign Ministry was the first reaction from the nation to three days of high-level talks with President Barack Obama's special envoy. Upon returning from DPRK on Thursday, envoy Stephen Bosworth made similar remarks in Seoul that the two sides reached common understandings on the need to restart the nuclear talks. The North said in the statement that this week's meetings with the US "deepened mutual understandings, narrowed differences in their respective views and identified not a small number of things in common." "A series of mutual understandings were also reached on the need to resume" the nuclear talks and to implement a 2005 disarmament pact, the DPRK said in a statement, carried by the official Korean Central News Agency. The two sides "agreed to continue to cooperate to narrow remaining differences," it said. It did not elaborate what those remaining differences are. In Washington, US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton told reporters that for a "preliminary meeting, it was quite positive." State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley urged the DPRK to make a firm commitment to return to the negotiating table. "They have to make the fundamental decision, and we did not leave the meeting today believing that they had crossed the threshold that we want to see them cross," he told reporters. "We want to see them come back to the six-party process." DPRK believed capable of building at least a half-dozen atomic bombs -- had been negotiating since 2003 with the US, China, Japan, Russia and South Korea on dismantling its nuclear program in exchange for much-needed aid and other concessions.

The US needs to send a signal of commitment to North Korea for them to resume talks

**Daily Times 9** (Dec 10 2009, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story\_10-12-2003\_pg4\_1)IM

SEOUL: North Korea poured cold water on a US proposal for a step-by-step resolution to a crisis over Pyongyang’s nuclear arms programmes, saying on Tuesday that only a simultaneous package deal could solve the impasse. In a statement issued as the United States was working to coax Pyongyang to join nuclear talks, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman said the communist state would only come to the table if there was some initial aid-for-disarmament deal. “What is clear is that in no case the DPRK would freeze its nuclear activities unless it is rewarded,” said a statement issued by the North’s KCNA news agency. The English-language statement said North Korea insisted on a package deal to solve the row, and that reports of a US plans for a phased resolution process were “greatly disappointing”. North Korea would turn out for talks if the United States accepted a “first-phase” deal under which the communist state would freeze its nuclear activities in exchange for energy aid and other concessions from Washington and regional powers. “The resumption of the six-way talks in the future entirely depends on whether an agreement will be reached on the DPRK-proposed first-phase step or not,” it said. DPRK are the initials for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. “Measures such as the US de-listing the DPRK as a terrorism sponsor, lift of the political, economic and military sanctions and blockade and energy aid including the supply of heavy fuel oil and electricity by the US and neighbouring countries should be taken in exchange for the DPRK’s freeze of nuclear activities,” it said. “This would lay a foundation for furthering the six-way talks,” it said. The United States, South Korea, Japan, China and Russia are trying to convene a second round of six-way nuclear talks with North Korea to follow an inconclusive first round held in August. A new proposal worked out by the United States, South Korea and Japan last week calls for dismantling the North Korean programme in an “effective, verifiable and irreversible way”. It rejects Pyongyang’s demand for simultaneous actions to solve the crisis in favour of “coordinated steps” over time. “According to what is now afloat and what we hear, the US (stand) is greatly disappointing us,” said the North Korean spokesman. He did not state explicitly whether China had presented the proposal to North Korea. “It is unthinkable for us to allow ourselves to be disarmed believing in the lukewarm commitment of the US, the hostile partner,” it said. No talks this year: South Korea’s top envoy to talks over North Korea’s nuclear ambitions indicated on Tuesday that a new round of negotiations was unlikely this year after Washington threw out Pyongyang’s draft proposals to end the crisis. Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Soo-Hyuck said South Korea, Japan and the United States had agreed that if talks were to be held by the end of the year, they would have to be convened next week.

Solvency – Concessions

One on one talks with the US are key to North Korean cooperation

**USA Today 9** (Nov. 2 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-11-02-north-korea-talks\_N.htm)IM

SEOUL (AP) — North Korea pressed the United States to accept its demand for direct talks on the communist regime's nuclear program, warning Monday that Pyongyang "will go our own way" unless Washington agrees. North Korea's Foreign Ministry did not elaborate in the statement carried by state media, which appeared to be a threat to enlarge its nuclear arsenal. The statement came as North Korea's No. 2 nuclear negotiator, Ri Gun, wrapped up a rare trip to the U.S., where he met with the chief American nuclear negotiator, Sung Kim, amid media speculation the two discussed bilateral negotiations. North Korea has demanded direct talks with Washington since conducting a series of nuclear and missile tests and quitting six-party nuclear negotiations involving China, Japan, the two Koreas, Russia and the U.S. earlier this year. "As the (North) was magnanimous enough to clarify the stand that it is possible to hold multilateral talks including the six-party talks depending on the talks with the U.S., now is the U.S. turn," North Korea's Foreign Ministry said, according to Pyongyang's official Korean Central News Agency. "If the U.S. is not ready to sit at a negotiating table with the (North), it will go its own way," the ministry said. North Korea agreed in 2007 to disable its nuclear facilities — as a step toward its ultimate dismantlement — in exchange for energy aid and political concessions. Pyongyang halted the process and later abandoned the pact after receiving most of the promised energy aid and concessions. The standoff led to Pyongyang conducting its second nuclear test and banned missile tests earlier this year. However, North Korea said Monday that "meaningful progress" on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula is possible "if the hostile relations between the (North) and the U.S. are settled and confidence is built between them." The North has warned in recent months it is enlarging its nuclear stockpile, saying it is "weaponizing" plutonium and has succeeded in enriching uranium, a second way of building atomic bombs, in an apparent attempt to pressure Washington to agree to one-on-one talks. North Korea has long called for direct talks with the U.S. to resolve the nuclear standoff, and maintains it is compelled to develop atomic bombs to cope with what it calls "U.S. nuclear threats."

Solvency – Conditional Withdrawal

Withdrawal should be conditional

Halloran 8 (Richard, Adjunct Senior Fellow in the Asia Program of the Center for War Peace and the New Media, “US Reconsiders Ground Forces in Korea, Japan” <http://www.bu.edu/globalbeat/pubs/ib62.html>

Even so, this changes the U.S. negotiating position with North Korea, suggesting that U.S. ground forces in South Korea could become a bargaining chip. They would be reduced or withdrawn from South Korea in return for visible, verifiable reductions in the North Korean threat to South Korea and Japan.

Says Yes – Concessions

North Korea will say yes – they’ll agree to provisions if they get acts of good faith from the US.

Feffer 2k (John, American Friends Service Committee in the East Asia Quaker International Affairs Program “In Focus: A New Era for the Korean Peninsula” 5(18), June 2000)

Cancel joint exercises with South Korea, and put the issue of U.S. troop withdrawal on the negotiating table. The North Korean military threat has been inflated, and the South Korean military can already counter any North Korean "threatî without U.S. troop support. North Koreaís entire government budget of $9.4 billion is smaller than South Koreaís military budget of $13 billion. Cancel TMD. This system is wildly expensive ($60 billion over the next fifteen years), technically flawed, and disruptive to U.S. relations with numerous countries. An East Asian "space raceî is already pushing countries to develop satellites. Rather than encouraging this race, the U.S. must lead the way in restraining the militarization of space. Encourage regional security dialogue. U.S. military withdrawal from the region should avoid creating a vacuum in its wake that might encourage major arms programs in South Korea or a remilitarized Japan. Only an effective multilateral security framework that oversees confidence building measures and regional force reductions can ensure a nonhegemonic peace in the region. As part of this approach, the U.S. must reduce arms sales to the region and abandon the costly Pentagon doctrine of maintaining the capacity to fight two wars simultaneously. The U.S. must also consider a deeper change in negotiating style. The Kim Dae Jung government is no longer pursuing zero-sum tactics in its relations with North Korea. Rather, South Korea is making conciliatory moves to create an improved atmosphere more likely to encourage North Korean reciprocity. As the 1994 Agreed Framework negotiations demonstrated, North Korea responds positively when its negotiating partner acts first and in good faith. Moreover, as North Korea becomes increasingly engaged in world politics, it will put greater value on compliance with international agreements on proliferation and nuclear weapons production. Instead of extracting bilateral concessions, the U.S. should begin to think in terms of achieving its goals through a multilateral framework.

North Korea will say yes – they really want troop reductions

Lee 10 (Sung-Yoon, Adjunct Assistant Prof of International Politics @ the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy @ Tufts, “Engaging North Korea: The Clouded Legacy of South Korea’s Sunshine Policy”, April 2010 )

Remarkably, upon returning home from his Pyong yang summit in June 2000, Kim Dae Jung announced that he had persuaded Kim Jong Il to agree to the continued long-term stationing of U.S. troops in South Korea.[11] Had Kim Dae Jung truly persuaded Kim Jong Il to accept the continued deployment of U.S. troops in the South, it would have marked a breakthrough of near biblical proportions. Yet, immediately thereafter, official statements from North Korea, including statements by Kim Jong Il, repeatedly and explicitly called for the withdrawal of U.S. troops. On June 16, 2000, the day after Kim Dae Jung's return home from the highly touted Pyongyang summit, theRodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Workers' Party of Korea, called for the "withdrawal of U.S. troops" as the "first step" in "Korea's reunification."[12] The next day, June 17, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the official North Korean government news agency, stated that "the peaceful reunification of Korea requires the U.S. troops' pullback from South Korea."[13]

If we remove our threat to North Korea, they will de-nuclearize – their foreign minister said so

XNA 5 (Xinhua News Agency, http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/talks/137089.htm)JFS [Note: Paek = North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun]

"We will have neither reason nor necessity to possess even a single nuke if the US agrees to completely remove its nuclear threat to North Korea and opens the relations of peaceful coexistence with the North," Paek said.

Says Yes – Brink

North Korea is close to rejoining the NPT now

XNA 5 (Xinhua News Agency, http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/talks/137089.htm)JFS [Note: Paek = North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun]

North Korea will rejoin the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and accept the IAEA inspection if the nuclear issue can be resolved satisfactorily, the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported on Sunday.

"If the nuclear issue finds a satisfactory solution, we will return to the NPT and accept the IAEA inspection," North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun said July 29 in the ministerial meeting of the 12th ASEAN Regional Forum held in Laos.

Kim Jong-il is open to rejoining the NPT

**INA 5** (Interfax News Agency, Lexis/Nexis)JFS

In his words, Kim Jong-il "does not exclude the DPRK's return to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the absence of threats from the US side".

**Says Yes – Russian Pressure**

Russia sees the issue of North Korean Proliferation as a large problem, and will apply pressure until we see results.

Tong 5/26 (Xiong, Editor at Xinhua News, 5/26/10, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-05/26/c\_13317565.htm) GAT

Russian lawmakers on Wednesday told media measures needed to be taken to calm tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Mikhail Margelov, chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the Federation Council (Russia's upper house of parliament), told the Itar-Tass news agency this was the primary task of the international community and the United Nations shall play an important part in this process. "The world needs neither a war on the Korean Peninsula, nor a nuclear-powered Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)," said Margelov, adding it was possible for the international community to eliminate tensions on the peninsula via peaceful ways. Despite the fact that both South Korea and DPRK had made tough statements, the senator did not recognize the probability of a war between the two countries. "Be it militarily or economically speaking, forces on the Korean Peninsula are not balanced," he said. Meanwhile, Margelov's lower house counterpart Konstantin Kosachev said the same day that, as a neighboring country, Russia particularly desired a peaceful solution to the currently strained situations. "It is of vital significance for global security and stability to retain the peace of the Korean Peninsula," Kosachev said. He also said Russia should apply political rather than military pressure. He also did not rule out the possibility of Russia joining the actions of the UN Security Council against DPRK, should it be proved it was responsible for sinking the South Korean warship Cheonan. On May 20, South Korea accused the DPRK of sinking its Cheonan warship in a torpedo attack in March. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak on Monday said his country would resort to measures of self-defense in case of further military provocation by the DPRK and demanded an apology from Pyongyang. The DPRK denied the accusation and offered to send inspectors to verify the evidence. The Cheonan, a 1,200-ton South Korean warship with 104 crew members on board, sank on March 26 near the maritime border with the DPRK after an explosion. Only 58 sailors were saved.

Says Yes – International Pressure

**North Korea will rejoin the NPT – South Korean pressure**

**YNA 8** (Yonhap News Agency, Lexis/Nexis)JFS

Vienna, Sept. 30 (Yonhap) - North Korea must take steps to comply with the 2005 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty to ensure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, a senior South Korean official said Tuesday.

In a keynote speech made at the 52nd General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Vice Science Minister Park Jong-koo said keeping a check on North Korea's nuclear ambition is vital for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

He said that Seoul is waiting for Pyongyang to comply with the September 19 declaration that calls on North Korea to give up all of its nuclear weapons and development programmes in exchange for economic assistance and other incentives.

Park then said that Seoul wants the IAEA to play a greater role in convincing the North to give up its nuclear ambitions.

The official also urged the North to comply with safety regimes set by the IAEA and return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

**North Korea will rejoin the NPT – IAEA pressure**

Yon-Se 7 (Kim, The Korea Times, “IAEA Expects North Korea to Rejoin the NPT”, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2007/07/116\_6353.html)JFS

IAEA Director General ElBaradei made the remark in a meeting with President Roh Moo-hyun at Cheong Wa Dae.
ElBaradei also said he hopes that North Korea will get rid of its nuclear arms after rejoining the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). He said he hoped the current hopeful situation on the Korean Peninsula to be linked to Pyongyang applying to rejoin the NPT.
He pointed out that ``patience'' is important, forecasting that the procedures will be very complicated and difficult. He also said a communication and engagement policy is the key to resolve the issue.

Internals – NoKo K/ NPT

North Korea is the biggest internal link to the NPT – UN and IAEA agree

**YNA 5** (Yonhap News Agency, Lexis/Nexis)JFS

London, 16 March: United Nations nuclear chief Muhammad al-Baradi'i on Wednesday 16 March called North Korea the "No 1 challenge" to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty NPT , asking for greater international efforts to help resolve the dispute over the North's nuclear weapons.

In a keynote speech to the opening of an international conference on nuclear security here, Al-Baradi'i, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said various dialogue channels are needed to put North Korea's nuclear programme under "global ownership".
"We need to do everything we can, including multilateral and bilateral talks, to engage North Korea," he said, stressing the communist country has become a "black box" since it quit the NPT in 2002.

Al-Baradi'i also said he supported the six-way talks between the two Koreas, China, Japan, the United States and Russia to overcome the "urgent, major problem" posed by the Pyongyang regime's nuclear weapons programme.

Only coordinated international efforts could offer the world protection from the "horrifying" prospect of a nuclear terrorist attack, he said.

Internals – NoKo K/ NPT

North Korean prolif is a deciding factor for the global non-proliferation regime – it should be our first priority

Krieger 8 (David, president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, published in the same, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2005/03/00\_krieger\_saving-nuclear-agreement.htm)JFS

North Korea’s recent announcement that it has manufactured nuclear weapons highlights the precarious nature of the global nonproliferation regime and particularly the failure of the Bush administration’s approach to the problem. In an official statement, North Korea indicated that the impetus for its actions was “the Bush administration’s increasingly hostile policy.” In fact, the Bush administration has dragged its feet for more than four years and made inadequate efforts to provide either security assurances or development aid to North Korea in exchange for halting its nuclear program.

Yet it is widely agreed on all sides of the political spectrum that preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons is the most important item on the U.S. national security agenda. This was the one point that President Bush and Sen. John Kerry could agree upon in their presidential debate on foreign policy.

At the center of the nonproliferation regime is the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). What most Americans don’t know is that this treaty is based upon an important tradeoff. The nonnuclear weapons states agree not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, and the nuclear weapons states agree to engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament.

Internals – NoKo K/ NPT

**The NPT is losing credibility because people are afraid of the legitimacy of commitments to the treaty because North Korea is not a part of it.**

Sethi 9 (Manpreet, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 31st, International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament)JFS

The nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT)—the key multilateral pact meant to sustain nuclear non-proliferation and whose universality was touted as a panacea against nuclear proliferation—appears weak and less than effective today. Ironically, it is near universal, with only four states (India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea) out of it, and all of these are known to be nuclear weapons capable. Thus, all states without nuclear weapons are members of the treaty and committed to remaining so. Why then are we at the nuclear tipping point? One reason, of course, is the fear that the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) may cheat (as allegedly Iran has) or renege upon their commitment (as North Korea did by withdrawing from its membership of the NPT) to remain non-nuclear. Why should countries want to do so? The primary motivation for nuclear proliferation is always a need to respond to a security threat perception. Once a state feels endangered by the nuclear capability or an overwhelming conventional superiority of another, there is seldom another way in which it can better address the security deficit than by developing nuclear weapons of its own to impose deterrence. Nuclear weapons are increasingly seen as providing insurance against regime change imposed from outside the state. China in the 1960s and 1970s and Iran and the DPRK today, view nuclear weapons as guarantors against forcible change of regime/rulers.

**North Korea is the key internal link to NPT credibility**

Dunn 6 (Lewis, Nonproliferation Review, 13(3), The Monterey Institute of International Studies Center for Nonproliferation Studies)JFS

Future prospects for nuclear proliferation will be shaped partly by how this ongoing tension between the pluses and minuses of institution building works out. Failure to confront successfully Iran’s and North Korea’s noncompliance would further erode the NPT’s credibility and place a greater burden on U.S. security relationships to check proliferation incentives in the Persian Gulf region and in Asia. Over time, unless the differences between the two cultures in the NPT can be bridged, the treaty also may lose its normative and legitimizing value.

North Korea is currently destabilizing the NPT – it’s the internal link to complete disarmament

Pugwash Group 10 (Conference Report: Practical Steps to Zero Nuclear Weapons)JFS

In his remarks, conference speaker Dr. C. S. Eliot Kang, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, opened with this comment: “The time is right to make real progress in the area of nonproliferation and disarmament, if all states work together to take advantage of this opportunity.” He said that the challenges facing the NPT—such as noncompliance by some states, the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran, and North Korea's unilateral withdrawal from the Treaty—have resulted in the perception by some that the NPT is close to collapsing. Although Kang acknowledged that the US and other nuclear-weapon states parties to the Treaty bear a special responsibility, he made it clear that the US will maintain a ‘safe’ nuclear arsenal for as long as these weapons exist anywhere in the world. He further stated that non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) “bear no less responsibility… to prevent further proliferation and help create the conditions for nuclear disarmament efforts to succeed” and added that NNWS must undertake “rigorous, collective efforts to prevent other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons." Furthermore, Kang asserted that complete nuclear disarmament is contingent upon a strong non-proliferation regime and added that there was no point in NWS giving up their nuclear arsenals only to have other nations eventually acquire these weapons. He also said that NPT violations cannot be tolerated and thus the international community must make it sufficiently clear to would-be violators that the cost of non-compliance will outweigh the benefits.

Internals – NoKo K/ Prolif

**North Korea is key – it stops backsliding proliferation**

Craig 8 (Ken, Canadian Military Journal, staff officer to the Canadian National Military Representative, http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo8/no1/craig-eng.asp)JFS

North Korea signed the NPT in 1985 only at the insistence of the Soviet Union when it was made clear that North Korean membership was necessary for the provision of Soviet nuclear assistance. Nevertheless, in April 2003, North Korea became the first, and, to date, only country to withdraw from the NPT. North Korea’s withdrawal followed the failure of the Agreed Framework, a 1994 agreement between the United States and North Korea that sought to normalize relations between the two states, to limit North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, and to provide nuclear and oil energy needs to the impoverished Asian state. After months of speculation, on 9 October 2006, North Korea conducted a successful underground nuclear test, becoming the ninth state to join the list of nuclear-weapons nations. Of course, North Korea’s actions have created concern that other nations in the region may withdraw from the NPT and develop their own nuclear-weapons capabilities, thus inviting greater instability in the region. In response to the North Korean test, China chaired a series of meetings in February 2007, the Six-Party Talks (China, North Korea, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and the United States), where a tentative agreement was reached on de-escalating tensions. Under the agreement, North Korea will shut down, for the purpose of eventual abandonment, its Yongbyon nuclear facility, invite back IAEA inspectors, commence bilateral negotiations with the United States aimed at restoring full diplomatic relations between the two nations, and all parties will cooperate in providing emergency heavy fuel oil energy assistance to North Korea. There is no mention in the agreement on the future status of North Korea’s nuclear weapons arsenal, generally agreed to consist of a half-dozen devices, although the Joint Statement does make clear that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is a key objective.

The United States, Russia, and, most significantly, China, play a crucial role when discussing North Korea’s nuclear-weapons ambitions. The Six-Party Talks are an important first step, but much work remains to be done to lay the groundwork for a North Korean renunciation of its nuclear-weapons capability. The United States and Russia have the means to address North Korean energy concerns, and, along with China, all three nations can offer the requisite security guarantees. Only through open dialogue and cooperation will North Korea’s desire to possess nuclear weapons be eliminated. Some analysts suggest that North Korea is playing a game of nuclear blackmail. Nevertheless, if the international community, led by the United States, Russia and China, can convince North Korea to renounce nuclear weapons and return to the provisions of the NPT, then surely this must be viewed as a positive step to ensuring stability in the region and enhancing the strength of the non-proliferation regime.

Internals – NoKo K/ Set Precedent

North Korea’s non-compliance with the NPT, sets a precedent for other states to defect

Huntley 5 (Wade, Foreign Policy in Focus, http://www.fpif.org/reports/north\_korea\_the\_npt)JFS

Hence, the significance of North Koreas NPT withdrawal is more political and symbolic. Perhaps the greatest concern is that, if North Koreas withdrawal is not reversed and the country suffers no significant detrimental consequences, Pyongyangs action will set a precedent eroding current NPT compliance norms. Other NPT non-nuclear states in similar situations may calculate that the political costs of their own potential withdrawal have been reduced by North Koreas precedent. And unless some multilateral body challenges the viewpoint that North Koreas NPT withdrawal has rendered its prior NPT noncompliance moot (*de facto* if not *de jure*), NPT compliance norms will be even further compromised.

A2: NPT Bad

NPT is ineffective now, but full compliance will change that

**Williams 5** (Joshua, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 10 2005, https://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16744)IM

With the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference less than four weeks away, 23 top non-proliferation experts and former government officials have endorsed an agenda to strengthen the NPT. The group of former cabinet members, ambassadors and experts agrees that the NPT's future success depends on "universal compliance with tighter rules to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, more effective regional security strategies, and renewed progress toward fulfillment of... disarmament obligations." We provide the text of the joint statement signed by former Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, former Secretary of Defense Robert D. McNamara, former Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Lee Hamilton, President of the Carnegie Endowment Jessica T. Mathews, and others. Rep. John Spratt (D-SC) and Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-MA) will introduce a resolution modeled on the joint statement: Thirty-five years ago, the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) set into place one of the most important international security bargains of all time: states without nuclear weapons pledged not to acquire them, while nuclear-armed states committed to eventually give them up. At the same time, the NPT allowed for the peaceful use of nuclear technology by non-nuclear-weapon states under strict and verifiable control. Over the years, the NPT security framework has led several states to abandon their nuclear weapons ambitions and has made it far more difficult for other non-nuclear-weapon states to acquire the material and technology needed to build such weapons or to avoid detection of a covert nuclear weapons program. The NPT process also has encouraged action on several nuclear arms control initiatives and led the nuclear-weapon states to pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon NPT members, thereby reducing incentives for others to seek nuclear arms for prestige or defense. Today’s security environment requires an even more comprehensive and robust global nonproliferation strategy. The NPT’s future success depends on universal compliance with tighter rules to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, more effective regional security strategies, and renewed progress toward fulfillment of the nuclear-weapon states’ NPT disarmament obligations. We call upon all states-parties to recommit themselves to the legal and political obligations established by the treaty and successive NPT Review Conferences, as well as agree on a specific and balanced program of action to strengthen treaty

implementation and compliance.

A2: NPT Bad

The NPT will solve your turns and the alternative is worse

Kimball, 2003 (Daryl G. President of Arms Control Association, <http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1422>)JFS

Even as the nonproliferation system has become more sophisticated, the challenges it confronts have become more complex. Over the last decade, the NPT has endured successive crises involving Iraqi and North Korean nuclear weapons programs. Iran now appears to be on the verge of a nuclear weapons capability. Non-NPT member states India, Pakistan, and Israel have advanced their nuclear weapons programs with relative impunity. The possibility of terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons has added a new layer of risk.
In the face of these problems, it has become fashionable for many U.S. policymakers to dismiss arms control and nonproliferation as ineffective. Instead, they emphasize the role of pre-emptive military action and the pursuit of new nuclear-weapon capabilities to dissuade and destroy adversaries seeking weapons of mass destruction. Such an approach would forfeit essential nonproliferation tools and provide a false sense of security.
In practical terms, military pre-emption is no substitute for a comprehensive and consistent preventive approach. As the recent U.S. experience in Iraq shows, wars cost lives and money and lead to unintended consequences; nonmilitary solutions should not be undervalued. Iraq’s nuclear program was actually dismantled through special international weapons inspections, which likely could have contained the Iraqi weapons threat if they had been allowed to continue.
Proliferation problems in North Korea and Iran defy easy military solutions. In both cases, multilateral diplomacy aimed at the verifiable halt of dangerous nuclear activities is the preferred course. Nuclear proliferation must be met with firm resolve but not in a way that creates an even more uncertain and dangerous future. Rather, the United States must strengthen and adapt—not abandon—preventive diplomacy and arms control. Nonproliferation efforts have succeeded when U.S. leadership has been consistent and steadfast.
The NPT security framework has led several states to abandon their nuclear weapons programs. The NPT is so broadly supported that, in addition to the original five nuclear-weapon states, only three clearly have nuclear arsenals and they are outside the NPT. Cooperation with international inspections and safeguards against proliferation are now a standard expectation of all states. U.S.-Soviet agreements corralled their nuclear arms competition and increased transparency, thereby reducing instability and the risk of nuclear war.

Impact Helper – Brink

**The NPT system is on the brink because of North Korean nuclearization**

Chan 5/30 (Hoishan, Asahi, http://watchingamerica.com/News/57500/keeping-the-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-alive/)JFS

Resistance to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty persists, even while Iran and North Korea continue to develop nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear terrorism grows. However, if there is another mistake, the entire Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty system will collapse. The unanimous adoption of the final document is likely the result of compromise arising from a common awareness of danger.

Impact – NPT Good – Middle East Prolif

First, If North Korea doesn’t sign then Iran won’t sign, which leads to an arms race in the Middle East, fueled by nuclear materials out of NK

**Shulte 10** (Gregory, YaleGlobal , 28 April 2010,

http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/north-korea-and-syria-warning-desert)IM

North Korea is an active trafficker in conventional weapons, missiles and associated technologies. The Syrian reactor provides a stark warning that Pyongyang is ready to extend its illicit marketing to nuclear technology. Much of a joint Syrian-North Korean venture – from source or reactor fuel to funding – remains shrouded in mystery as do the motives. In October 2006, after North Korea’s first nuclear test, President George W. Bush warned that North Korea’s transfer of nuclear weapons or material to states or non-state entities would be considered “a grave threat to the United States” and that the nation “would hold North Korea fully accountable for the consequences of such action.” Yet when the US became aware of North Korea’s nuclear cooperation with Syria, there were no consequences other than Israel’s destruction of the North Korean reactor in Syria.  In the context of the Six-Party Talks, Syria’s illicit venture was seen more as an unwelcome distraction than as a dangerous development. The US chief negotiator at the time was satisfied with North Korea not denying its involvement and promising not to proliferate again. And while the IAEA launched an investigation of the covert reactor – an investigation now stymied by Syria’s refusal to cooperate – little was said in Vienna about the role of North Korea. The IAEA director general even removed North Korea from the agency’s agenda. The world’s nonproliferation regime has been shaken by North Korea’s flagrant violations and by Iran’s determined pursuit of nuclear weapons capabilities.[1] Such a rogue North Korea easily gives rise to a nuclear-armed Iran, which risks sparking a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Middle East countries that might consider acquiring their own atomic arsenals generally lack the necessary bombmaking technologies, would look abroad for equipment, material, and technical assistance. North Korea has shown its availability. To prevent further proliferation, North Korea’s activities need to be exposed, penalized, and disrupted. Three approaches should be pursued with those goals in mind: To prevent further proliferation, North Korea’s activities need to be exposed, penalized, and disrupted. First, proliferation should be moved to the top of the agenda of renewed Six-Party Talks rather than being relegated to the bottom. To ensure effectiveness of talks, North Korea should once again sign the NPT. Effective verification – two words detested by the North Koreans – must be a priority. Promises are not enough, particularly from a regime that has regularly dissembled about the scope of its nuclear activities. A better understanding of North Korea’s nuclear activities will not only thwart proliferation but also better position efforts to limit and ultimately roll back the nation’s nuclear program.

Second, Middle east war leads to global nuclear war, causing extinction.

**Steinbach ‘02** (John, DC Iraq Coalition – Centre for Research on Globalisation, March 2002, Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction: a Threat to Peace <http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html>)

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, **Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41)** and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "**The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(**42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... **if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration."** (44)

Impact – NPT Good – Nuclear Terrorism

A. Without the NPT North Korea will sponsor nuclear terrorism

**Allison 10** (Graham, Director of Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs @ Harvard University, January/February 2010, Foreign Affairs, 89 (1), p. 74-85)

The current global nuclear order is extremely fragile, and the three most urgent challenges to it are North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan. If North Korea and Iran become established nuclear weapons states over the next several years, the nonproliferation regime will have been hollowed out. If Pakistan were to lose control of even one nuclear weapon that was ultimately used by terrorists, that would change the world. It would transform life in cities, shrink what are now regarded as essential civil liberties, and alter conceptions of a viable nuclear order. Henry Kissinger has noted that the defining challenge for statesmen is to recognize "a change in the international environment so likely to undermine a nation's security that it must be resisted no matter what form the threat takes or how ostensibly legitimate it appears. " The collapse of the existing nuclear order would constitute just such a change -- and the consequences would make nuclear terrorism and nuclear war so imminent that prudent statesmen must do everything feasible to prevent it. Seven storylines are advancing along crooked paths, each undermining the existing nuclear order. These comprise North Korea's expanding nuclear weapons program, Iran's continuing nuclear ambitions, Pakistan's increasing instability, al Qaeda's enduring remnant, growing cynicism about the nonproliferation regime, nuclear energy's renaissance, and the recent learning of lessons about the utility of nuclear weapons in international affairs. Most of the foreign policy community has still not absorbed the facts about North Korean developments over the past eight years. One of the poorest and most isolated states on earth, North Korea had at most two bombs' worth of plutonium in 2001. Today, it has an arsenal of ten bombs and has conducted two nuclear weapons tests. It is currently harvesting the plutonium for an 11th bomb and restoring its reactor in Yongbyon, which has the capacity to produce a further two bombs' worth of plutonium a year. In addition, Pyongyang has repeatedly tested long-range missiles that are increasingly reliable, has proliferated nuclear technologies (including the sale of a Yongbyon-style reactor to Syria), and may be developing a second path to nuclear weapons by building a facility to enrich uranium. Without a commitment to the NPT North Korea is free to do what it will with its nuclear capabilities.

B. And, we outweigh the case – terrorism escalates to global nuclear exchange

Speice, 06 (Patrick F. Jr., JD Candidate at College of William and Mary, “Negligence and Nuclear Nonproliferation,” William & Mary Law Review, 47 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1427, February)

Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that terrorists could acquire a nuclear device or fissile material from Russia as a result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and the end of stringent Soviet-era nuclear security measures. 39 Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods, including "steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given one by [\*1438] such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways." 40 Equally threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device on their own. Very little material is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon. 41 Although nuclear devices are extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon are not significant. 42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a nuclear device into the United States makes it **incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon** once it was built. 43 Accordingly, supply-side controls that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material in the first place are the most effective means of countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. 44 Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. 45 This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. 46 Although the economy has stabilized somewhat, there [\*1439] are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and who are too young to retire, 47 raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. 48 The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. 49 Moreover, there would be **immense political pressure** in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially **triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict**. 50 In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. 51 **This** proliferation **will** increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States [\*1440] or its allies by hostile states, 52 as well as **increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the U**nited **St**ates **and** **escalate to the use of nuclear weapons**

Impact – NPT Good – Regional Stability

Without North Korea’s return to the NPT the region will collapse

**Huntley 5** (Wade, Oct. 2, 2005, Foreign Policy In Focus, Institute for Policy Studies, http://www.fpif.org/reports/north\_korea\_the\_npt)IM

Only through a comprehensive negotiated settlement can the Korean Peninsula be kept non-nuclear peacefully. However, if a negotiated settlement provides unique inducements to North Koreatoreturn(s) to compliance with NPT obligations as a non-nuclear state**,** other states might be tempted to resist compliance in hopes of wresting similar concessions for themselves. Should treating North Korea as an exceptional case be resisted in the interest of protecting the overall credibility of the NPT, even if this constrains the scope of a potential ?grand bargain? in Korea? North Korea?s nuclear ambitions already fuel palpable regional dangers and uncertainties. A steadily (if slowly) growing arsenal of nuclear weapons in North Korea would aggravate these tensions, in some cases potentially past breaking points. If North Korea?s actions trigger a nuclear proliferation domino effect in East Asia, the viability of the NPT would be shaken at its foundation. The weightiest concern is that North Korea?s ambitions would spur Japan to produce nuclear weapons. Japan has a peaceful nuclear power program that generates enriched plutonium, a space launch capacity sustaining advanced ballistic missile capabilities, and the technical expertise to reorient these activities into a sophisticated nuclear weapons development effort, if it chose to do so.

Impact – NPT Good - Other Countries Prolif

The perception of a failed NPT leads to other countries backing out and proliferating

Walsh 5 (Jim, Prof. of Security Studies at MIT,  http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/no41.pdf ) GAT

A third risk involves systems whose effectiveness depends, at least in part, on the confidence of its members. The NPT is just such a system. The treaty is stronger when member states believe that the treaty is working and that nations can be counted on to abide by the rules. It is weaker when governments believe that the treaty is not working or failing. A perception of failure encourages states to consider alternatives such as hedging and gives pro-bomb advocates an opening to make their case. This is not to suggest that discussions of the NPT should ignore failures and engage in boosterism. Focusing *only* on failure is misleading, however, and runs the risk of generating a spiralling crisis of confidence. In such a spiral, a government begins to pull back from its commitments because of doubts about the treaty, which in turn is taken as evidence that the treaty is weak and encourages other governments to follow suit.

The perception of compliance to NPT obligations is crucial to stopping runaway proliferation

Dunn 9 (Senior vice president of Science Applications International Corp, Nonproliferation Review, Summer 09, 2(12), pp. 150-151) GAT

In the early 1960s, there was a growing fear that widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons was possibly unavoidable. President John F. Kennedy warned in 1963 that a world with many dozens of nuclear weapon states might emerge. This fear of runaway proliferation gave urgency to the negotiation of a nonproliferation treaty, not least because of the belief that growing worldwide use of nuclear power would place access to nuclear weapons material in the hands of many countries.21 Such warnings of runaway proliferation, however, could well have become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Fearful of a world of nuclear powers, many countries might have sought nuclear weapons lest they be left behind. Responding to such fears, the United States took actions to enhance the nuclear security of its European non-nuclear allies. In parallel, the United States, the Soviet Union, and many other countries joined together to create what became the nonproliferation regime. The NPT was and remains a key part of that regime. Steadily growing membership in the NPT after its opening for signature in 1968\*including critical countries in Europe and Asia\*provided a valuable symbol that demonstrated to many countries that runaway proliferation was not the wave of the future. So did the prospect of an international system of nuclear safeguards\*run by a then-new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)\*to prevent diversion of nuclear weapon materials from peaceful nuclear uses. In effect, partly because of more traditional security mechanisms and partly due to the growing NPT membership, early fears of a world of runaway global proliferation became a self-denying prophecy. Today, fears have again emerged that runaway proliferation could develop. It is often argued that the spread of nuclear weapons is at a ‘‘tipping point,’’ that there is a danger of ‘‘cascading’’ proliferation, and that we could be entering a ‘‘new nuclear age.’’22 In this context, however, widespread adherence to the NPT alone will not suffice to counter fears of nuclear weapon proliferation. Rather, the NPT’s contribution to countering fears of runaway proliferation will depend heavily on whether there is a widespread perception that countries are complying fully with their NPT obligations.

Impact – NPT Good - Other Countries Prolif

Over 40 countries could break out and proliferate – a strong NPT is the only way to prevent this.

Rublee 8 (Maria R., Professor of Govt. and World Affairs at Univ. of Tampa, International Studies Review, 10(3), pp. 420-424) GAT
However, I would argue that before the United States (or any other country) gives up on the NPT and associated nuclear nonproliferation regime, we should take full account of not only the regime’s failures, but also its successes. Indeed, the success of the NPT is in many ways more surprising than its recent failures: for almost four decades, almost all states in the international system chose to forgo nuclear weapons, and in some cases, even gave them up. Numerous reports in the 1960s warned that the number of new nuclear states could reach as high as 20 in a few decades (The Bomb 1965:53). Instead, the count by 2008 is only four: India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea.2 The fact that so many states abstained from nuclear weapons tells us to look closely at the nuclear nonproliferation regime. What role has it played in encouraging nuclear forbearance? With the risk of nuclear theft or accidents increasing with each new nuclear weapons state, the international community needs all the help it can get in discouraging nuclear proliferation. This is especially important given the growing numbers of ‘‘latent nuclear states,’’ those with the ‘‘necessary industrial infrastructure and scientific expertise to build nuclear weapons on a crash basis if they chose to do so’’ (Sagan 1996:56). In 2004, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimated that over 40 countries were ‘‘nuclear latent states’’. Given the high stakes, we need to better understand how and in what ways the NPT has actually helped discouraged nuclear proliferation. In doing so, we can also understand the mechanisms through which international regimes work to influence policymakers. So what about the NPT—if anything—has led to such a stunning record of nonproliferation? Certainly, a number of authors have tackled the topic of how the NPT contributes to halting nonproliferation. What tends to be missing, however, is a systematic and theoretically grounded way to assess the NPT’s utility. In this article, I propose such a framework, drawing from social psychology. Within the social psychology literature, scholars agree that persuasion and influence happen through distinct, recognizable mechanisms. I argue that the influence of the nuclear nonproliferation regime of state elites could be understood through the lens of social psychology.3 In other words, I propose taking social psychology’s framework for how attitudes and behavior change, and applying it to the NPT. I do so through a three-step process. I first break apart ‘‘nuclear forbearance’’ (or compliance with the NPT) into three different outcomes identified by the social psychology literature: persuasion (behavior resulting from genuine transformation of preferences), social conformity (behavior resulting from the desire to maximize social benefits and ⁄ or minimize social costs, without a change in underlying preferences), and identification (behavior resulting from the desire or habit of following the actions of an important other). Next, I investigate the different mechanisms through which the international social environment exerts influence on policymakers: creating a ‘‘list’’ effect in which those in noncompliance are obviously in a small minority, linking nuclear nonproliferation to other strongly held values, establishing a public record of state commitment which makes it hard for a state to withdraw, and more. Finally, I assess the utility of the framework by examining the case of Japan: to what extent does it help us understand Japanese nuclear decision-making? I conclude with some thoughts on how this framework could be applied in a number of different issue areas in international relations. Because the framework is drawn from social psychology, it should be applicable to more than just nuclear proliferation. To what extent is it useful to understand compliance with international regimes as three different outcomes (persuasion, identification, and conformity)? Do the mechanisms work in other issues areas? Are some mechanisms more potent in specific issue areas, or perhaps in different types of regimes (for example, regimes formalized through treaties, informal regimes, track-two diplomacy, etc.)? While my immediate focus is how this framework helps us to understand nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation, it could provide fertile ground for research across a number of different fields. What is Nuclear Forbearance? Almost all states have both ratified and adhered to the NPT, giving up nuclear weapons and exercising ‘‘nuclear forbearance.’’ One may think that this nuclear forbearance means these states have permanently given up the nuclear option, and if the NPT is weakened, these states’ nuclear decision-making would not change. That would be the case if these states were ‘‘persuaded’’—that is, they have internalized the message of the NPT and no longer need the treaty to exist for them to adhere to its precepts. However, this outcome of ‘‘persuasion’’ is not the only type of nuclear forbearance possible. It could be that the elite are forgoing nuclear weapons due to ‘‘conformity’’—to gain social prestige and ⁄ or avoid social costs. In this case, if the NPT collapsed, the social costs and benefits associated with it may no longer exist, potentially leading to a reassessment of a state’s nuclear posture. Or, leadership could be following the lead of an important ‘‘other’’—the outcome of identification. If the important ‘‘other’’ helped to weaken the NPT, then leadership may no longer be as concerned about adhering to the treaty. While the behavioral outcome is currently the same—nuclear forbearance—the attitude and motivation behind the behavior is not. This unpacking of nuclear forbearance is based on social psychology. Alastair Iain Johnston (2001) has taken the field considerably forward by his identification from the social psychology literature of two methods of behavior change: persuasion and social influence. Johnston argues that in addition to transformation of state interests (persuasion), multilateral institutions can also exert, or provide a forum through which members exert, ‘‘social influence’’—essentially, a social version of material carrot-stick factors that states include in cost-benefit calculations. Roughly, ‘‘persuasion’’ can be characterized as ‘‘I now see that X is better than Y’’ and ‘‘social influence’’ can be characterized as ‘‘I think Y is correct (or I like Y better), but since everyone else says X, I will do X so I don’t rock the boat’’ (Johnston 2001). Social rewards for conformance with institutional norms include backpatting; for nonconformance, shaming. Social influence, then, is a cost-benefit calculation made with social factors, whereas persuasion is true preference change (Kelman 1958). This is an important point: constructivists often construe the effect of multilateral

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Impact – NPT Good - Other Countries Prolif

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institutions as that of changing a state’s conception of its national interest. While that is an important effect to investigate, it is also crucial to

recognize that this is not the only ‘‘nonmaterial’’ way through which states’ behavior may change. In other words, it does not have to be all-or-nothing: either states transform their attitudes and behavior (validating constructivism) or they don’t (validating realism). Constructivism allows us to explore ways in which the social milieu created by regimes can influence state behavior without ‘‘converting’’ them. Social conformity is one conceptualization of this influence short of conversion. Another example is the cooperative process documented by Dalia Dassa Kaye (2001) in her study of the Middle East peace process, which she shows to help states gain common understandings without necessarily wholesale transformation of state preferences. Distinguishing between full-fledged persuasion and social conformity is critical to nuclear policymaking. As Ariel Levite (2002) argues, some states that have adhered to the NPT may actually be engaged in ‘‘nuclear hedging’’—that is, not actively engaging in nuclear weapons development but maintaining capacity to develop them quickly if desired. On the surface, what looks like NPT compliance and what seems to indicate persuasion may better be described as social conformity. This paper argues, however, that our model of persuasion and influence needs to be more detailed to provide a robust guide in our exploration. First, instead of the term ‘‘social influence,’’ I propose the use of ‘‘social conformity’’ to signal outward acceptance with private rejection, because in social psychology literature, this is the terminology most often used. Beyond this terminology issue, I argue that, in addition to persuasion and social conformity, we must also include ‘‘identification’’ as a method of behavioral change. Identification takes place when an actor wants to be like another, and so changes his or her actions to mimic those they admire. It can take place when a friend agrees with another friend, not because he has really changed his mind, but because it is important to a significant other. Herbert Kelman (1958:51) defines identification in this way: Identification can be said to occur when an individual accepts influence because he wants to establish or maintain a satisfying self-defining relationship to another person or group. This relationship may take the form of classical identification, in which the individual takes over the role of the other, or it may take the form of a reciprocal role relationship. The individual actually believes in the responses which he adopts through identification, but their specific content is more or less irrelevant. He adopts the induced behavior because it is associated with the desired relationship. Identification falls between outright persuasion (where preferences have changed) and social conformity (where preferences have not changed). In fact, while identification can be an influence outcome between individuals, it is a common result from group membership. Called ‘‘ingroup identification,’’ Marilynn Brewer and R. J. Brown (1998:561) note that ‘‘when a collection of individuals believe that they share a common in-group membership, they are more likely to act in the interest of collective welfare than are individuals in the same situation who do not have a sense of group identity.’’ In contrast to social conformity (which is strategic and motivated by straightforward utility maximization), identification is based on an affective desire to create, maintain, or strengthen a relationship. Why is it important to include identification as a third method of behavioral change? After all, models are theoretical constructs that help us understand reality, not chart it out in full detail. However, mechanisms that produce original policy results should be included in models. That is, if the behavior change mechanism of identification leads to different policy results than persuasion and social influence, then it should be included. A current example from the nonproliferation arena will illustrate. Over the past decade, the United States has backed away from some of its obligations in the nonproliferation regime: a continued push for new nuclear weapons, public declaration of the decision to continue designing and computer-testing new nuclear weapons, and a decision to employ a limited ballistic missile defense system. Some also argue that the Bush administration’s proposed nuclear agreement with India undermines the basis of the NPT by encouraging nuclear trade with a state that refuses to sign the NPT. If an ally of the United States’ (call this state Ally X) had initially followed the United States lead on nuclear nonproliferation due to persuasion, Ally X would remain persuaded, and thus would likely express disappointment, as well as encourage the United States to get back on course. If, however, another ally’s behavior was based on identification with the United States (call this state Ally Y), then which United States would it identify with: the United States of action or rhetoric? Identification is also important because even if the United States works to uphold the nonproliferation regime, the fact that Washington maintains nearly 10,000 nuclear weapons—and almost 60% of them are operational— may send the message that to be powerful, a country needs nuclear armaments (United States Profile 2007). In addition, because in reality states are not unitary actors, the distinctions between persuasion, conformity and identification likely play out in domestic politics. In fact, each of the influence outcomes could be represented by some segment of society interested in nuclear policy. One example would be nongovernmental organization (NGOs) and activists are ‘‘persuaded’’ that nuclear weapons are detrimental to state prestige and identity, policy wonks in the diplomatic core ‘‘identify’’ with their Western allies, and members of the military bow to ‘‘social conformity.’’ In each case, the behavior is the same: nuclear forbearance. The reasons behind the actions are different, however, and material or social changes could lead to behavioral changes. A short narrative of how different domestic factions might play out in Ally X and Ally Y will illustrate. This description is not meant to describe any two countries, but rather simply highlight what differently influenced groups might look like with regard to nuclear policy, and how they might react to US behavior. In the case of Ally X and Ally Y (both confronted by the US’s changing behavior with regard to the nuclear nonproliferation regime), Ally X’s nuclear policy could be supported by a coalition of civil servants in a bureaucracy that has supported the NPT for many years, political appointees who believe in nonproliferation, and antinuclear activists with embedded ties to the policymaking apparatus—all of whom are ‘‘persuaded.’’ The United States’ current actions probably would inspire disappointment, resentment, disgust—but a change of heart is not likely because these actors are genuinely persuaded of the merits of nonproliferation. However, other elements in that government and state—those who support nonproliferation because of identification or social conformity—will likely have a different reaction. Those who believe their state should forgo nuclear weapons due to the negative diplomatic effects any other position would have, might rethink their position in light of the US’s stance, as well as the ineffectual response to North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006. In the short run, it is not likely that the state’s behavior would change, but in the long run, those persuaded may change their minds or may lose ground to growing ranks of those who disagree. In the case of Ally Y, where nuclear policy is guided by identification with the United States, confusion is likely to result, based on gap between US rhetoric and actions. How do you behave when the one you have patterned yourself after starts to do something different from what they have said all along? Depending on the strength of the persuaded and conforming segments, and the result of any internal struggle between them, the state could move more definitively against nuclear acquisition or could move toward exploring the nuclear option. In short, understanding that nuclear forbearance is actually the result of three separate attitudes—and that undermining the NPT could undermine commitment to nuclear nonproliferation with two of the three attitudes—leads to the conclusion that undermining the NPT could lead to a wave of nuclear proliferation among states we assumed would never think about the nuclear option again. In other words, the value of the NPT cannot be evaluated without assessing the extent to which it has helped to prevent proliferation. How specifically does the NPT do this? I posit that it has created an international social environment that influences elite decision-making through a number of specific and distinct mechanisms. Without the NPT, those mechanisms fall apart. It is to this social environment and the ‘‘influence’’ mechanisms fostered by it that the papers turns to next.

Impact - NPT Good - Prolif

History has proven the NPT solves proliferation, but universality is key to continued success

UN Britain 10 (P5 statement to the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review, http://www.isria.com/free/5\_May\_2010\_295.php)IM

The People’s Republic of China , France , the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm their strong and unswerving support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on the occasion of the Eighth Review Conference of the Treaty. 2. The NPT is fundamental to protecting global peace and security from the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It has served the international community well for the past four decades. It remains the bedrock of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the collective pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We stress the importance that all States Party fully implement and comply with the Treaty, and we reaffirm our unequivocal commitment to the Treaty and to strengthening the NPT at the Review Conference so that it can effectively address the current and pressing challenges that we face. 3. We also reaffirm our commitment to carry on the results of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. We welcome the constructive discussions and positive atmospherics at the Preparatory Committees of the Eighth Review Cycle and the agreement in New York in May 2009 of an agenda and rules of procedure for this Review Conference. We believe this, together with the success of the UN Security Council Summit on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament, and the unanimous adoption of Resolution 1887 , demonstrate the international community’s shared commitment to seeking a safer world for all and to creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the NPT, in a way that promotes international stability , and based on the principle of undiminished security for all. 4. We attach great importance to achieving the universali ty of the NPT. We urge those States that are not Parties to the Treaty to accede as non-nuclear-weapon States and pending accession to the NPT, to adhere to its terms. We stand ready to work with Parties to engage the non-Parties with a view to achieving this goal.

The NPT is key to stop the spread of nuclear weapons

Sanger 10 (David, NYT, May 31 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/31/world/06armstext.html)IM

The United States welcomes the agreements reached at the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime. Obama said, “The NPT must be at the center of our global efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons around the world, while pursuing the ultimate goal of a world without them.  This agreement includes balanced and practical steps that will advance non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which are critical pillars of the global non-proliferation regime.  It reaffirms many aspects of the agenda that I laid out in Prague, and which we have pursued together with other nations over the last year, and underscores that those nations that refuse to abide by their international obligations must be held accountable.” The document includes an agreement to hold a regional conference in 2012 to discuss issues relevant to a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems.  He added, “The United States has long supported such a zone, although our view is that a comprehensive and durable peace in the region and full compliance by all regional states with their arms control and nonproliferation obligations are essential precursors for its establishment.  We strongly oppose efforts to single out Israel, and will oppose actions that jeopardize Israel’s national security.”

Impact - NPT Good – Prolif

Adherence to the NPT will successfully reduce the prevalence of nuclear weapons

**Beijing Review 9** (Statement to the UN Security Council Summit by Chinese President, Hu Jintao, Nov. 5 2009, http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/2010-01/21/content\_241154.htm)IM

To realize a safer world for all, we must first and foremost remove the threat of nuclear war. I wish to propose, in this connection, that we make efforts in the following five areas: First, maintain global strategic balance and stability and vigorously advance nuclear disarmament. All nuclear-weapon states should fulfill in good faith obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and publicly undertake not to seek permanent possession of nuclear weapons. Countries with the largest nuclear arsenals should continue to take the lead in making drastic and substantive reductions in their nuclear weapons. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty should be brought into force at an early date, and negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty should start as soon as possible. When conditions are ripe, other nuclear-weapon states should also join the multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. To attain the ultimate goal of complete and thorough nuclear disarmament, the international community should develop, at an appropriate time, a viable, long-term plan composed of phased actions, including the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. Second, abandon the nuclear deterrence policy based on first use of nuclear weapons and take credible steps to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. All nuclear-weapon states should make an unequivocal commitment of unconditionally not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and conclude a legally-binding international instrument in this regard. In the meantime, nuclear-weapon states should negotiate and conclude a treaty on no-first-use of nuclear weapons against one another. Third, consolidate the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. All countries should join the NPT and real efforts should be made to uphold and enhance its authority and effectiveness. The function of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in safeguards should be strengthened. All countries should strictly comply with non-proliferation obligations, refrain from double standards, and tighten and improve export control to prevent proliferation.

Legal constraints make the NPT the only effective basis for containment

**Gumbi 10** (Lm, South African ambassador to the UN NPT Committee, April 5 2010, http://www.keepandshare.com/doc/1820924/leslie-gumbi-dirco-pdf-march-24-2010-12-00-pm-58k?da=y)IM

In order to discuss the importance of the NPT, one is inclined to attempt to focus on all the Articles of the Treaty and to elaborate on each Article in relation to its significance to international peace and security and the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. However, as my time is rather limited, I would beg your understanding and indulgence if I rather focus on the general importance of the Treaty, whilst also saying a few words about issues that I deem to be of particular relevance to African countries and concluding with a few remarks about the forthcoming Review Conference. I will therefore start by stating unequivocally that the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the foundation of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. It remains the only international instrument that strives to not only prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but that also contains the legal commitment for their elimination. In this context it should always be recalled that the Treaty represents a historical bargain between the nuclear weapon States and the non-nuclear weapon States in terms of which the non-nuclear weapon States have undertaken not to aspire to nuclear weapons based upon the reciprocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon States to eliminate their nuclear weapons. The issues of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are therefore inextricably linked and intertwined and in this sense represent two sides of the same coin. It is therefore important to recognise that progress on both fronts is required if we seriously wish to attain our often-repeated goal of a world free from the scourge of nuclear weapons.

Impact – Prolif - Nuclear War

Widespread proliferation leads to nuclear war

Utgoff, PhD from Purdue University, ’02 (Victo, Deputy Director for the Strategy, Forces, & Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis Survival, 44(2), pp. 87-90) GAT

First, the dynamics of getting to a highly proliferated world could be very dangerous. Proliferating states will feel great pressures to obtain nuclear weapons and delivery systems before any potential opponent does. Those who succeed in outracing an opponent may consider preemptive nuclear war before the opponent becomes capable of nuclear retaliation. Those who lag behind might try to preempt their opponent's nuclear programme or defeat the opponent using conventional forces. And those who feel threatened but are incapable of building nuclear weapons may still be able to join in this arms race by building other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons. Second, as the world approaches complete proliferation, the hazards posed by nuclear weapons today will be magnified many times over. Fifty or more nations capable of launching nuclear weapons means that the risk of nuclear accidents that could cause serious damage not only to their own populations and environments, but those of others, is hugely increased. The chances of such weapons falling into the hands of renegade military units or terrorists is far greater, as is the number of nations carrying out hazardous manufacturing and storage activities. Increased prospects for the occasional nuclear shootout Worse still, in a highly proliferated world there would be more frequent opportunities for the use of nuclear weapons. And more frequent opportunities means shorter expected times between conflicts in which nuclear weapons get used, unless the probability of use at any opportunity is actually zero. To be sure, some theorists on nuclear deterrence appear to think that in any confrontation between two states known to have reliable nuclear capabilities, the probability of nuclear weapons being used is zero.' These theorists think that such states will be so fearful of escalation to nuclear war that they would always avoid or terminate confrontations between them, short of even conventional war. They believe this to be true even if the two states have different cultures or leaders with very eccentric personalities. History and human nature, however, suggest that they are almost surely wrong. History includes instances in which states known to possess nuclear weapons did engage in direct conventional conflict. China and Russia fought battles along their common border even after both had nuclear weapons. Moreover, logic suggests that if states with nuclear weapons always avoided conflict with one another, surely states without nuclear weapons would avoid conflict with states that had them. Again, history provides counter-examples. Egypt attacked Israel in 1973 even though it saw Israel as a nuclear power at the time. Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands and fought Britain's efforts to take them back, even though Britain had nuclear weapons. Those who claim that two states with reliable nuclear capabilities to devastate each other will not engage in conventional conflict risking nuclear war also assume that any leader from any culture would not choose suicide for his nation. But history provides unhappy examples of states whose leaders were ready to choose suicide for themselves and their fellow citizens. Hitler tried to impose a 'victory or destruction' policy on his people as Nazi Germany was going down to defeat.' And Japan's war minister, during debates on how to respond to the American atomic bombing, suggested 'Would it not be wondrous for the whole nation to be destroyed like a beautiful flower?" If leaders are willing to engage in conflict with nuclear- armed nations, use of nuclear weapons in any particular instance may not be likely, but its probability would still be dangerously significant. In particular, human nature suggests that the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons is not a reliable guarantee against a disastrous first use of these weapons. While national leaders and their advisors everywhere are usually talented and experienced people, even their most important decisions cannot be counted on to be the product of well-informed and thorough assessments of all options from all relevant points of view. This is especially so when the stakes are so large as to defy assessment and there are substantial pressures to act quickly, as could be expected in intense and fast-moving crises between nuclear-armed states. Instead, like other human beings, national leaders can be seduced by wishful thinking. They can misinterpret the words or actions of opposing leaders. Their advisors may produce answers that they think the leader wants to hear, or coalesce around what they know is an inferior decision because the group urgently needs the confidence or the sharing of responsibility that results from settling on something. Moreover, leaders may not recognise clearly where their personal or party interests diverge from those of their citizens. Under great stress, human beings can lose their ability to think carefully. They can refuse to believe that the worst could really happen, oversimplify the problem at hand, think in terms of simplistic analogies and play hunches. The intuitive rules for how individuals should respond to insults or signs of weakness in an opponent may too readily suggest a rash course of action. Anger, fear, greed, ambition and pride can all lead to bad decisions. The desire for a decisive solution to the problem at hand may lead to an unnecessarily extreme course of action. We can almost hear the kinds of words that could flow from discussions in nuclear crises or war. 'These people are not willing to die for this interest'. 'No sane person would actually use such weapons'. 'Perhaps the opponent will back down if we show him we mean business by demonstrating a willingness to use nuclear weapons'. 'If I don't hit them back really hard, I am going to be driven from office, if not killed'. Whether right or wrong, in the stressful atmosphere of a nuclear crisis or war, such words from others, or silently from within, might resonate too readily with a harried leader. Thus, both history and human nature suggest that nuclear deterrence can be expected to fail from time to time, and we are fortunate it has not happened yet. But the threat of nuclear war is not just a matter of a few weapons being used. It could get much worse. Once a conflict reaches the point where nuclear weapons are employed, the stresses felt by the leaderships would rise enormously. These stresses can be expected to further degrade their decision-

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Impact – Prolif 🡪 Nuclear War

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making. The pressures to force the enemy to stop fighting or to surrender could argue for more forceful and decisive military action, which might be the right thing to do in the circumstances, but maybe not. And the horrors of the carnage already suffered may be seen as justification for visiting the most devastating punishment possible on the enemy.'Again, history demonstrates how intense conflict can lead the combatants to escalate violence to the maximum possible levels. In the Second World War, early promises not to bomb cities soon gave way to essentially indiscriminate bombing of civilians. The war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s led to the use of chemical weapons on both sides and exchanges of missiles against each other's cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East escalated in a few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and from police actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on the other. Escalation of violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants beforehand.' Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible. In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s.With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations. This kind of world is in no nation's interest. The means for preventing it must be pursued vigorously. And, as argued above, a most powerful way to prevent it or slow its emergence is to encourage the more capable states to provide reliable protection to others against aggression, even when that aggression could be backed with nuclear weapons. In other words, the world needs at least one state, preferably several, willing and able to play the role of sheriff, or to be members of a sheriff's posse, even in the face of nuclear threats. A world of proliferation eliminates all current checks on nuclear warfare (popular dissent, logic, alliances etc) ensuring innumerable nuclear conflict to magnitudes unimaginable in the status quo.

Impact – NPT Good - Egypt Scenario (1/2)

Egypt is on the brink of pulling out of the NPT - They’ve protested before, and they want universality for the signings

NTI 10 (Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library, http://www.nti.org/e\_research/profiles/Egypt/Nuclear/) GAT

Meanwhile, as noted, Egypt's position vis-à-vis the nonproliferation regime has been two-fold since NPT ratification. While consistently leading efforts to establish a Middle East Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (and since 1990 a WMD-Free Zone), Egypt has also protested key components of the nonproliferation regime for their lack of universality (i.e. because Israel remains outside the NPT and other treaties restricting weapons of mass destruction). Egypt has therefore refused to join the IAEA Additional Protocol and the Chemical Weapons Convention, and to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (the Pelindaba Treaty), and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.[25] At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, Egypt used the threat of blocking consensus on the indefinite extension of the treaty.[26

**Egyptian proliferation creates a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and creates instability**

Cristiani 6, (Dario, contributor to the Power and Interest News Report, http://www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-01740.pdf) GAT

Egypt, which has been damaged politically by the Israel-Lebanon crisis, has been the first country that has claimed officially that it is resuming nuclear research. The Egyptian announcement is also probably a hint for the Arab world as a whole, since Arabs criticized Cairo's position during the crisis in Lebanon strongly. This could be an Egyptian attempt to recover its central historical position in the Muslim world, which is rooted in its cultural power, its demographic hold and its strategic geographical position. Furthermore, during the last few weeks, Turkey has also announced its will to build three nuclear reactors. This scenario could lead other regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia and Syria, to revive their own nuclear programs. The development of an Iranian nuclear capability may have started a nuclear proliferation race in the region, which could pose a major challenge to overall stability in the Middle East At present, in the broader Middle East region, the right to develop nuclear energy is turning into a symbol of national independence because of the perception in the Islamic world that the West uses double standards against Muslim countries that want to gain nuclear energy technology; these detractors argue that Western attitudes toward the Israeli nuclear program have been a clear example of this hypocrisy. In these countries, the quest for nuclear energy is not tied only to the enlargement of their deterrence capabilities; it is also seen as a policy option to guarantee their national economic growth. It is clear, however, that at the same time that these states declare the will to pursue a civilian nuclear program, their research work also involves the ability to obtain at a later date the potential to create nuclear weapons. During the past few years, Egypt has been the prime example of this approach. While Egypt has called for a Middle East free of nuclear weapons, it has pursued a nuclear capability suspected of being both for civil and military purposes. In 2004, several international newspapers argued that Libya traded nuclear and missile technology and information with Egypt and that Libya has acted as an intermediary for Egypt with North Korea. Moreover, in early 2005, a dossier from the International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.) said that it suspected that Egyptian nuclear experiments in 2001 could have been used in attempts to develop a nuclear weapon. According to the report, I.A.E.A. inspectors discovered elements of actinides and fission products near an Egyptian nuclear facility, which may be symptomatic of work on plutonium separation.

Impact – NPT Good - Egypt Scenario (2/2)

Instability in the Middle East could easily escalate to global thermonuclear war.

Steinbach 2 (John, DC Iraq Coalition, Centre for Research on Globalization, 3/3/02, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html>) GAT

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)

Impact – NPT Good – Try or Die

NPT is the best and only option we have – it’s try or die

**Krieger 9** (David, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, May 2 2009, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2009/05/02\_krieger\_npt\_boldness.php?krieger)IM

Today, nearly four decades since the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force, there are nine nuclear weapons states in the world and five of these are parties to the NPT.  There are not as many nuclear weapons states today as was feared in the 1960s, but there are still nine too many.  These nine states appear proud of their nuclear arsenals, when they should be shamed by the nearly unlimited indiscriminate destructive power that these weapons represent.  Nuclear weapons of these states put at risk the future of the human species and most life on the planet. The NPT has a basic bargain.  The non-nuclear weapons states agree not to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons and, in return, the nuclear weapons states agree to pursue “good faith” negotiations for nuclear disarmament.  All parties to the treaty agree that there is an “inalienable right” to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.  President Obama has referred to this “basic bargain” of the NPT as “sound.”  He has called for establishing a structure capable of ensuring consequences for any country party to the treaty that breaks its rules.  Up to now, however, the rules have only been brought to bear against the non-nuclear weapons states, those without nuclear weapons.  It has not been possible, within the structure of the treaty, to enforce its rules against the countries that never signed it (Israel, India and Pakistan) or those that have withdrawn from the treaty (North Korea).  There has also been a lack of enforcement of the treaty against the five nuclear weapons states that are parties to the treaty (US, UK, France, Russia and China). The NPT is the only treaty in which there is a legally binding commitment to nuclear disarmament.  It provided the International Court of Justice with the legal basis to conclude: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”  President Obama argued in Prague, “Rules must be binding.  Violations must be punished.  Words must mean something.  The world must stand together to prevent the spread of these weapons.”  But it is not only the spread of nuclear weapons that must be prevented.  It is also the research, development, manufacture, possession, threat and use of the weapons that must be prohibited.  The attention of the world has largely focused on the proliferators or potential proliferators, such as North Korea or Iran.  It is desirable to try to prevent proliferation by new states, but this is no more important than eliminating the arsenals of the existing nuclear weapons states.  President Obama has, in fact, provided hope that the US is ready to lead in moving toward a nuclear weapons-free world.  The United States was established because a colonial power sought to impose taxation without representation.  How much worse is what is imposed on all humanity by the nuclear weapons states?  It is the threat of destruction of cities, countries, civilization and the human species without representation.  No one votes on our nuclear future.  The best structure we have at the moment for controlling and eliminating nuclear weapons is the NPT, a treaty in which the people of the world deserve a voice.

Politics NB – Obama Good

NK ratification would be a win for Obama – he’s been pushing it; shields the link to politics

**Matishak 9** (Martin, Global Security Newswire, July 21 2009, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw\_20090721\_8009.php)IM

WASHINGTON -- U.S. President Barack Obama's ambitious nuclear nonproliferation agenda will be tested next year at a major summit, according to experts (see GSN, July 15). (Jul. 21) - U.S. President Barack Obama, shown yesterday. The feasibility of Obama's arms-control goals might be put to the test at next year's Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review conference, experts said (Saul Loeb/Getty Images). If the May 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review conference at the United Nations is a "debacle," there is a "real danger in the American political psyche that people will say 'It's not worth it,'" analyst Lewis Dunn said Thursday during a panel discussion. Review conferences are held every five years to assess the operation of the treaty and strengthen its execution. The 2005 summit ended badly as member nations failed to reach consensus on substantive issues (see GSN, May 21, 2005). Obama has been a vocal proponent of nuclear disarmament, in April laying out an expansive arms control plan that called for U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and securing all loose nuclear materials worldwide within the next four years. He and his Russian counterpart, Dmitry Medvedev, have also pledged to seek further reductions to their nations' nuclear arsenals. Dunn, referencing his recent article on the treaty, said next year's conference is an opportunity for all parties, not just the United States, to "reinvigorate" the agreement. "Everyone has some water that they better carry," he said. Delegates should seek agreement on "action plans" to promote the treaty's three core tenets of nonproliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy, Dunn said. The plans "ought to be short and to the point" and contain a brief description that details a long-term vision for the next several decades, he added. Diplomats might call for strengthened compliance with the nonproliferation treaty, according to Dunn. They might also affirm their support for U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, which is intended to prevent nonstate actors from obtaining weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials, Dunn said. The government's instinct is to move "incrementally," but Obama's engagement can help eliminate "interagency squabbles," she said. Obama's engagement also serves as a "tremendous asset" in persuading other nations to press nonproliferation, according to Dunn. Pomper said that while he is surprised that Obama has put nuclear nonproliferation at the top of his administration's agenda, that does not ensure success.

Obama pushing NK participation – if he wins he’ll look like a badass with a magic wand

**Yonhap News Agency 10** (June 21 2010, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2010/04/14/49/0401000000AEN20100414007300325F.HT)IM

Meanwhile, Obama called on North Korea on April 13 to return to the six-party talks on ending its nuclear ambitions, warning the U.S. will continue imposing sanctions on Pyongyang "Sanctions are not a magic wand," Obama told reporters in a news conference to wrap up the summit. "Unfortunately, nothing in international relations is. But I do think that the approach that we've taken, with respect to North Korea, makes it more likely for them to alter their behavior than had there been no consequences whatsoever to them testing a nuclear weapon."    Obama was confident that the sanctions are taking effect on the impoverished communist state, citing cooperation with Russia and China. China is the North's staunchest communist ally, serving as a lifeline with the provision of most energy, food and other necessities.    He noted "a serious sanctions regime that was passed when North Korea flouted its obligations towards the NPT -- it's a sign of the degree to which international diplomacy is making it more possible for us to isolate those countries that are breaking their international obligations."    "It is our hope that as pressure builds for North Korea -- to improve its economic performance, for example, to break out of that isolation -- that we'll see a return to the six-party talks and that we will see a change in behavior," he said, lamenting "North Korea has chosen a path of severe isolation that has been extraordinarily damaging to its people."

Politics NB – Obama Good

Obama is committed to strengthening the NPT

**Robillard 10** (Kevin, Jan 6 2010, http://www.politifact.com/415/strengthen-the-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty/)IM

During the campaign, President Barack Obama promised to "crack down on nuclear proliferation by strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty so that countries like North Korea and Iran that break the rules will automatically face strong international sanctions." When Obama came into office, if a country violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency would investigate, and could then refer a case to the the United Nations Security Council for punishment. But the security council isn't required to do anything, and with five nations holding veto power, it can be difficult to create a consensus package of sanctions. For example, the Obama administration has been struggling to convince fellow council members Russia and China the Iranian regime's apparent violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty warrant stiff economic sanctions. Obama hopes to fix this by making sanctions mandatory. But he faces a stubborn and skeptical international community. In September, Obama was chairing the security council -- the first American president to do so -- when the body unanimously voted to adopt a resolution addressing a wide array of issues surrounding nuclear weapons. Most of Obama's arms control goals were mentioned; the resolution called for a treaty banning the production of fissile materials, the universal adoption of Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and urged more nations to permit tougher International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. But the idea of adding automatic sanctions to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is nowhere to be found. In fact, the resolution explicitly takes a different route by bringing violators directly to the security council, eliminating the IAEA as a middleman, but still leaving punishment in the hands of the council: "a situation of non-compliance with non-proliferation obligations shall be brought to the attention of the Security Council, which will determine if that situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security." In a speech before the Security Council, Obama said that was progress. That may be true, but to us, it's also an indication other nations aren't on board with Obama's more ambitious goal. "Countries don't want to give up their sovereignty in advance, they want to handle (the decisions) on a case-by-case basis," said Charles Ferguson, the president of the Federation of American Scientists and a nuclear policy expert. While the United Kingdom and France are both on record supporting automatic sanctions if a nation withdraws from the treaty, China and Russia's actions on Iran indicate the security council is still divided. And smaller, developing nations without nuclear weapons are unlikely to strengthen the treaty's non-proliferation measures when they continue to believe the nuclear powers aren't doing enough to disarm themselves.

Obama is pushing North Korea to rejoin the NPT

**RTTNews 10** (Global Financial Newswires, May 3 2010, http://www.rttnews.com/ArticleView.aspx?Id=1290261)IM

(RTTNews) - President Barack Obama Monday urged participants in a United Nations conference on nuclear nonproliferation to continue the spirit of the 40-year-old Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Obama, in a written communiqué to the gathering, said the NPT's regime, which calls for nuclear-armed countries to reduce their stocks of weapons while allowing other nations to develop nuclear programs for peaceful purposes, is coming under increasing pressure. "Over the coming weeks, we will see whether nations with nuclear weapons will fulfill their NPT obligations to move toward nuclear disarmament," he said. "Building on our new START Treaty with Russia and our Nuclear Posture Review, which reaffirms the central importance of the NPT, the United States is meeting its responsibilities and setting the stage for further cuts." He added, "We will see whether nations without nuclear weapons will fulfill their obligation to forsake them." Obama said that history has shown that nations that seek nuclear weapons generally do not ultimately find themselves with greater security than those who choose to join the treaty and develop peaceful nuclear programs. Nations that ignore their obligations find themselves less secure, less prosperous and more isolated," he said. "That is the choice nations must make." The U.S., Obama said, will work to ensure that nation's in compliance with the treaty obligations would continue to have access to peaceful nuclear energy. The President also continued to urge North Korea to rejoin the NPT. "The United States is committed to this goal and will pursue a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation that permits nations that uphold their responsibilities to enjoy the peaceful uses of the atom," he said. Obama also urged the participants in the conference, which includes Iran, to come together in partnership to pursue peace and the security of a world without nuclear weapons. "Today, the eyes of the world are upon us. Over the coming weeks, each of our nations will have the opportunity to show where we stand," he said. "Will we meet our responsibilities or shirk them? Will we ensure the rights of nations or undermine them? In short, do we seek a 21st century of more nuclear weapons or a world without them?" He added, "These are the questions we must answer, the challenges we must meet."

Politics NB – Obama Good

The US is committed to getting North Korea back on board with the NPT

**In The News 9** (June 14 2009, http://www.inthenews.co.uk/news/world/asia-pacific/washington-regrets-north-korea-proliferation-$1303762.htm)IM

The United States has said it will do "all we can" to prevent continued proliferation by North Korea after it threatened to "weaponise" its plutonium stocks. US secretary of state Hillary Clinton said the reclusive Communist state's actions were "deeply regrettable" and further entrenched its position as an international pariah. "They have become further isolated. And it is not in the interests of the people of North Korea for that kind of isolation to continue," she said while on an official visit to Canada. Pyongyang threatened to resume uranium enrichment after the United Nations security council adopted a new round of sanctions which banned weapons exports from North Korea and authorised all member states to inspect sea, air and land cargo and to confiscate and destroy goods that violated previous sanctions. North Korea, which drew international condemnation for an underground nuclear test in May, has previously said any attempt to search its ships would be an act of war.

Nuclear Terrorism NB (1/2)

A. North Korean nuclearization risks nuclear terrorism

Sawak 7 (Camille, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Nuclear Scholars Initiative)JFS

North Korea also remains a concern in the nuclear terrorism scenario. Again, nuclear security analysts Matthew Bunn and Anthony Weir assert that the transfer of nuclear material to terrorists cannot be ruled out though “such a decision appears quite unlikely given the importance Pyongyang appears to attach to regime survival.”320 But, Bunn and Weir note that North Korean involvement in nuclear terrorism may be probable in a situation where the regime concludes that their overthrow by the U.S. is inevitable, or it becomes so desperate and sees the revenue from a nuclear sale as crucial to regime survival.321 Though, recent diplomatic negotiations on the nuclear issue can potentially address concerns about a deliberate or unauthorized nuclear transfer to terrorists.

B. That comparatively outweighs the aff – and, we can’t stop nuclear terrorism after they acquire nukes, we need to stop it now

Viglino 7 (Dante, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Nuclear Scholars Initiative)JFS

More frightening to many than a nuclear-armed North Korea or Iran is a sub-state group of terrorists. Not only would such a group likely have little regard for norms or taboos, but deterrence would likely hold little sway as well. Though Thomas Schelling argues that terrorists would do better to use nuclear weapons for their blackmail or deterrent value, one must wonder if a nuclear explosion would not make more of a statement.376 Even most optimists should have difficulty trusting that terrorists will decide that they can use a nuclear weapon as a bargaining chip for a significant amount of time. To take an obvious example, Al Qaeda has demonstrated a willingness to cause mass-casualty attacks in the past. It neither remains within state boundaries nor recognizes international law. Under what circumstances could U.S. nuclear weapons play a role if Al Qaeda or a similar organization gained a nuclear device? A strike may prove to have benefits not deeply offset by collateral damage, and could increase the value of deterrence; this vulnerability could be eliminated by perpetrators hiding in urban areas, however. The unlikely circumstances of such an event render deterrence of low utility, especially to those who would be willing to die and might consider the retaliation by the U.S. to be useful to their propagandist goals. Attacking the source of nuclear materials from which the terrorists gained the capability is another option, but such an action seems unlikely given the taboo against these weapons that is strong in the United States, to say nothing of the political and military ramifications of such an action. Even assuming terrorists in question may otherwise be deterred via nuclear weapons, self-deterrence in the U.S. may further undermine efforts to dissuade them from using WMDs if a retaliatory strike would cause significant collateral damage. It is possible nuclear weapons could be used preemptively against a terrorist WMD threat. The circumstances under which this would be carried out are almost impossible to imagine, however. A conventional strike would almost invariably be the more appropriate choice. Even in response to an attack by a terrorist group, there are few scenarios where nuclear weapons would be particularly advantageous. In a mountainous or desolate terrain a nuclear strike may prove to have benefits not deeply offset by collateral damage, and could increase the value of deterrence; this vulnerability could be eliminated by perpetrators hiding in urban areas, however. The unlikely circumstances of such an event render deterrence of low utility, especially to those who would be willing to die and might consider the retaliation by the U.S. to be useful to their propagandist goals. Attacking the source of nuclear materials from which the terrorists gained the capability is another option, but such an action seems unlikely given the taboo against these weapons that is strong in the United States, to say nothing of the political and military ramifications of such an action. Even assuming terrorists in question may otherwise be deterred via nuclear weapons, self-deterrence in the U.S. may further undermine efforts to dissuade them from using WMDs if a retaliatory strike cause significant collateral damage.

Nuclear Terrorism NB (2/2)

C. And, we outweigh the case – terrorism escalates to global nuclear exchange

Speice, 06 (Patrick F. Jr., JD Candidate at College of William and Mary, “Negligence and Nuclear Nonproliferation,” William & Mary Law Review, 47 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1427, February)

Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that terrorists could acquire a nuclear device or fissile material from Russia as a result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and the end of stringent Soviet-era nuclear security measures. 39 Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods, including "steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given one by [\*1438] such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways." 40 Equally threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device on their own. Very little material is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon. 41 Although nuclear devices are extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon are not significant. 42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a nuclear device into the United States makes it **incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon** once it was built. 43 Accordingly, supply-side controls that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material in the first place are the most effective means of countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. 44 Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. 45 This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. 46 Although the economy has stabilized somewhat, there [\*1439] are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and who are too young to retire, 47 raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. 48 The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. 49 Moreover, there would be **immense political pressure** in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially **triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict**. 50 In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. 51 **This** proliferation **will** increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States [\*1440] or its allies by hostile states, 52 as well as **increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the U**nited **St**ates **and** **escalate to the use of nuclear weapons**

A2: Terrorist Can’t Make A Bomb

Making a nuclear bomb would be easy for terrorists

Bunn 4 (Matthew Harvard Senior Research Associate, Managing the Atom Project[Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action, w/ Anthony Wier, May, <http://www.nti.org/e_research/analysis_cnwmupdate_052404.pdf>]JFS

Unfortunately, repeated examinations of the question, “could resourceful terrorists design and build a crude nuclear bomb if they had the needed nuclear material?” by nuclear weapons experts in the United States and elsewhere have concluded that the answer is “yes”—for either type of nuclear bomb. These conclusions were drawn before the 9/11 attacks demonstrated the sophistication and careful planning and intelligence gathering of which al Qaeda is capable.37 A detailed examination by the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, drawing on all the relevant classified information, summed up the situation in a conclusory statement intended to apply to both gun-type and implosion-type devices: A small group of people, none of whom have ever had access to the classified literature, could possibly design and build a crude nuclear explosive device. They would not necessarily require a great deal of technological equipment or have to undertake any experiments. Only modest machine-shop facilities that could be contracted for without arousing suspicion would be required. The financial resources for the acquisition of necessary equipment on open markets need not exceed a fraction of a million dollars. The group would have to include, at a minimum, a person capable of researching and under- standing the literature in several fields and a jack-of-all trades technician.38

A2: No Motivation For Terrorists To Use Nukes

Terrorists have religious motivation to acquire and use nukes

Bunn 8 (Matthew Associate Professor of Public Policy at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, November (Securing the Bomb 2008, p. 4-5)JFS

Do terrorists want nuclear weapons? For most terrorists, focused on small-scale violence to attain local objectives, the answer is “no.” But for a small set of terrorists, the answer is clearly “yes.” Osama bin Laden has called the acquisition of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction a “religious duty.”6 Al-Qaeda operatives have made repeated attempts to buy nuclear material for a nuclear bomb, or to recruit nuclear expertise— including the two extremist Pakistani nuclear weapon scientists who met with bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri to discuss nuclear weapons. For years, al-Qaeda operatives have repeatedly ex- pressed the desire to inflict a “Hiroshima” on the United States.7 Before al-Qaeda, the Japanese terror cult Aum Shinrikyo also made a concerted effort to get nuclear weapons.8 With at least two groups going down this path in the last 15 years, there is no reason to expect that others will not do so in the future.

Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, head of intelligence for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), testified to the U.S. Senate in the spring of 2008 that “al-Qaida’s nuclear intent remains clear,” citing, among other things, bin Laden’s successful effort, in 2003, to get a radical Saudi cleric to issue a religious ruling, or fatwa, authorizing the use of nuclear weapons on American civilians.9Mowatt-Larssen warned that the world’s efforts to prevent terrorists from gaining the ability “to develop and detonate a nuclear weapon” are likely to be “tested” in “the early years of the 21st century.”10

2NC A2: Conditions CP Bad [Theory] (1/2)

1. We’re predictable - we’ve conditioned before

Han 2K (Yong-Sup, “North Korean Behavior in Nuclear Negotiations”, Prof@Korea National Defense University, The Non-Proliferation Review)JFS

In the US-DPRK talks, the negotiation atmosphere was not as hostile as in the South-North talks. North Korea came to the negotiation table with pride and satisfaction because meeting high-level US negotiators meant success to the North. The United States also designed the negotiation to prove some quid pro quo for North Korea’s return to the NPT. The second and third rounds of talks were run as an exercise in solving a common problem: producing a reactor replacement deal to the two sides’ mutual satisfaction. The negotiations did not take on the attributes of a zero-sum game because North Korea’s return to the NPT did not seem like a major loss to North Korea. At the same time, the United States did not feel it was losing ground by offering political and economic benefits.

2. Key to solve unpredictable advantages and squirrelly affs- no conditions CP encourages aff of the week

3. Literature solves infinite regression—finite number of mechanisms for conditional action—specificity of our evidence outweighs their hypotheticals

4. Tests resolved and the unconditional nature of the plan— conditions counterplans ensure aff upholds every word in the resolution

Resolved indicates a fixed, unchanging thing

American Heritage Dictionary 2k of the English Language 4th edition, 2000 (“resolve”, http://www.bartleby.com/61/87/R0178700.html)

**A determination or decision; a fixed purpose.**

6. They can generate offense against net benefit—they can impact turn the condition

7. Not a voting issue—at best reject the CP not the team

Functional Competition Good

1. Real world- members of congress evaluate the implications of policies in practice far more than whether “texts are compatible.”

2. Only a functional evaluation allows the judge to determine competition based on the actual arguments made in the round.

3. Promotes good judging- text comparison is removed from all substance within the round, which leads to arbitrary decisions and skews fairness.

AT: Textual Competition Good

1. Kills policymaking- debating semantics turns the contest into a race to see who can write the best plans, not the best policy options for the real world.

2. Comparing texts removes all actual substance of the debate, leading to arbitrary decisions and unfair debates

3. Only functional evaluation of how they would interact can prove real competition.

4. Leads to bad advocacies because adding “reject plan” to the bottom of the CP text makes a CP competitive in their interpretation.

5. Justifies aff abuse- any “do both” perm would win because they don’t weigh whether or not the perm is net beneficial, killing neg CP ground and skewing fairness.

AT: Perm do the CP

The 1AC fiat indicates immediate unconditional implementation of the plan. This perm severs out of the immediate and unconditional passage of the plan. Severence is an independent voting issue.

1. Makes the aff a moving target- the affirmative can change any part of their plan to avoid any negative argument. This skews fairness.

2. Infinitely regressive- allowing the aff to sever out of one part of their plan justifies them severing out of all but one word.

3. Education- When the affirmative constantly changes advocacies, it becomes impossible to learn from the round.

4. Not real world- legislators and lawyers aren’t allowed to eliminate parts of their cases or bills because someone objects to them. This lack of real world policymaking kills education.

AT: Perm do both

This perm is functionally the same as perm do the CP. The 1AC fiat indicates immediate unconditional implementation of the plan. This perm severs out of the immediate and unconditional passage of the plan. And severance is a reason to reject this perm because:

1. Makes the aff a moving target- the affirmative can change any part of their plan to avoid any negative argument. This skews fairness in that they could change their plan in the 2AR and we’d never be able to argue with them.

2. Infinitely regressive- allowing the aff to sever out of one part of their plan justifies them severing out of all but one word of their plan text and claiming solvency from it. The neg would never win in such a world, which kills competitive equity.

3. Strategy Skew- The affirmative speaks first, last, and has infinite prep time, while the negative has mere minutes before the 1NC. With time already limited, allowing the aff to change their advocacy after the 1AC completely kills neg strategy and makes for a wholly unfair debate.

4. Education- When the affirmative constantly changes advocacies, it becomes impossible to learn from a debate round because we debate over running away from arguments.

5. Not real world- legislators and lawyers aren’t allowed to eliminate parts of their cases or bills because someone objects to them. This lack of real world policymaking kills education.

\*\*Aff Answers\*\*

AFF – Conditions Bad

Conditioning CP’s are voting issues-

Infinitely Regressive- the negative can put thousands of conditions on the plan- impossible to predict and kills ground and ruins fairness.

Artificially competitive –No literature on whether or not to do the plan vs plan conditioned with \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_. Wrecks impact assessment and creates artificial education

Limits- Destroys Plan Focus by shifting the debate on the condition instead of the actual plan

Education- CP creates bad model for policy making, which wrecks real world Education

AFF - Politics NB – CP Unpopular

CP Links to Politics

Negotiations with North Korea would spend political capital

Sigal 9 (Leon, Director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council, “What Obama Should Offer North Korea”, January 28th 2009)

As president, however, Obama will be preoccupied with the economic crisis and will have to depend on appointees with the courage of his convictions. Thus, the question remains, will he be willing to expend the political capital to deal with North Korea, challenging the reigning orthodoxy in Washington and the irreconcilables in Congress?

DPRK Says No

North Korea doesn’t want to give up its nuclear program – it needs a bargaining chip and no other options are being presented.

Foster 10 (Peter, Daily Telegraph’s Beijing Correspondent, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/7306075/North-Korea-talks-gain-momentum.html> ) GAT

Pressure is building on North Korea to return to the negotiating table as its already bankrupt economy wilts further under UN sanctions imposed on Pyongyang last year as punishment for its decision to conduct a second nuclear test. The US special envoy for North Korea, Stephen Bosworth, was expected to meet with Chinese nuclear envoy Wu Dawei after arriving in Beijing on Wednesday en route to Tokyo and Seoul for further meetings.   At the same time, a North Korean delegation has travelled to Beijing to engage in high-level dialogue, with China effectively acting as middleman between the parties. On Tuesday the head of the North Korean delegation, Kim Yong-Il, met his Chinese counterpart Wang Jiarui and China's President Hu Jintao, delivering a message from leader Kim Jong-il to Hu, according to the state-controlled China Daily newspaper. The frenetic diplomatic activity comes after months of negotiations with Pyongyang aimed at getting the North to return to the Chinese-hosted six party talks which include Japan, Russia, China, the US and North and South Korea. However despite the multilateral engagement, analysts remain cautious about the long-term prospects of the talks which broke down last April after disputes on verifying whether North Korea was abiding by earlier disarmament pledges. Many analysts doubt that North Korea militarist leadership is serious about giving up the nuclear program which is its principle bargaining chip in a perpetual game of strategic brinkmanship with the outside world. Pyongyang has set out its preconditions for a return to talks, including a formal peace treaty with the US and a lifting of UN sanctions, both of which have already been rejected by Washington. Both the US and South Korea have made clear that they will not repeat the 'mistakes' of previous rounds of negotiations by handing out political and economic concessions to Pyongyang before it demonstrates it is willing to take meaningful steps towards disarmament. For its part, China has said that the future of the talks depends on the willingness of Pyongyang and Washington to work together. The US State Department, which is said to be playing a game of "strategic patience" on the issue, has said it strongly supports efforts to restart the talks, but gave no indication of possible US concessions or how the current deadlock might be broken. "The key to getting to that point is for North Korea to come back to the six-party process, which they're struggling to do," J P Crowley, a State Department spokesman said on Tuesday.

**No matter how many quid pro quos or negotiations we enter, North Korea will not make concessions on its nuclear problems.**

Kirk 9 (Donald, Asia Times Online, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/KJ07Dg01.html)JFS

It was "not right", he said, for North Korea to "discuss the nuclear issue only with the US and economic cooperation alone with South Korea". His government, he promised, would press China for details on the commercial agreements that clearly were the quid pro quo for North Korea seeming to go along with China on multilateral talks.
Whatever happens in negotiations, bilateral or multilateral, separate from the six-party talks or on the sidelines, nobody seriously expects North Korea to give up its nuclear program, much less to jettison the six to 12 nuclear devices that it's already believed to have fabricated.

If we pull out, North Korea will be emboldened in negotiations over the nuclear program.

**AP 4** (Associated Press, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5155285/)JFS

North Korea was silent Monday on news of the U.S. plan to withdraw troops, but some South Koreans are concerned that their communist neighbor will view the development as a sign of weakness on the part of Washington, its longtime adversary. If that is the case, North Korea could feel emboldened to push harder for concessions in the dispute over its nuclear program.

**AFF – No Solvency – Conditions Bad**

**Quid pro quo negotiations fail to address the North Korea nuclearization issue.**

Niksch 3 (Larry, YaleGlobalOnline, Specialist in Asian Affairs at the U.S. Congressional Research Service, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/washington-needs-roadmap-peace-north-korea)JFS

Other governments will have to recognize their responsibilities if a formula like "five plus five" is to succeed. Even while advocating US-North Korean negotiations and US reciprocity, other governments will have to recognize the credibility of the Bush Administration position that nuclear negotiations should not be a quid pro quo proposition and that North Korea must agree and act first to roll back its provocative acts since mid-December 2002, end its uranium enrichment program, and place its entire nuclear program under IAEA safeguards. Other nations also will have to recognize the credibility of economic sanctions if North Korea refuses to negotiate on this basis or crosses "red lines" with new provocations.

Negotiating the NPT with North Korea fails and increases provocations

Bajoria 9 (Jayshree, Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/13593/sixparty_talks_on_north_koreas_nuclear_program.html>)JFS

According to the September 2005 pact, Pyongyang would eventually abandon its nuclear program, rejoin the NPT, and allow IAEA monitors to return. In exchange, North Korea would receive food and energy assistance from the other members. The statement also paved the way for Pyongyang to normalize relations with both the United States and Japan, and for the negotiation of a peace agreement for the Korean peninsula.

However, negotiations hit a roadblock in November 2005 after the U.S. Treasury Department placed restrictions on Macao-based Banco Delta Asia, which Washington accused of laundering $25 million in North Korean funds. The Macanese government subsequently froze Pyongyang's roughly fifty accounts held in the bank. As the talks fell apart, North Korea stepped up its provocative behavior, conducting missile tests in July 2006 and a nuclear test in October 2006.

AFF – No Solvency – Can’t Solve Nukes

We cannot solve North Korean nuclearization – empirically proven – 5 examples

Dunn 6 (Lewis, Nonproliferation Review, 13(3), The Monterey Institute of International Studies Center for Nonproliferation Studies)JFS

U.S. proliferation policy first confronted the threat of a North Korean nuclear weapons program in the early 1980s. In 1985, the Soviet Union, encouraged by the United States, pressured Pyongyang to join the NPT. The North Korean nuclear threat had been ‘‘solved’’ - for the first of five times. (The next four solutions involved: North Korean receipt of an IAEA full-scope safeguards agreement but for technical reasons implementation of full-scope safeguards was delayed for several years; North Korean implementation of full-scope safeguards; the 1991 South Korea ÁNorth Korea agreement to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula; and the 1994 Agreed Framework.) Repeatedly, the conclusion that the North Korean nuclear threat had finally been dealt with has been proved wrong by North Korea’s defiant actions.

AFF - NPT Fails

**The NPT fails – lack of enforcement**

**Choe 6** (Julia, Harvard International Review, June 22 2006, http://www.allbusiness.com/sector-92-public-administration/national/1187444-1.html)IM

At first glance, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) seems to offer a concrete solution to the problem posed by nuclear weaponry. As the most widely accepted arms-control agreement, the NPT attempts to codify the prevention of arms proliferation among states. However, a major weakness of the NPT lies in the enforcement of its policies. This weakness has been highlighted by the current defiance of two states and has brought into question the overall effectiveness of the treaty. Iran's continuing non-cooperation emphasizes the problems of measuring compliance and of determining the course of action to take toward uncooperative states. North Korea's past actions and withdrawal from the NPT question the treaty's usefulness as a means of coping with states that no longer find abiding by the agreement worthwhile. Both cases represent the NPT's ineffectiveness in establishing a consistent and forceful system for preventing nuclear proliferation. Surely future efforts should promote stronger consensus among participating states and uniform mechanisms for addressing illegitimate state action, but it is still uncertain how these goals should be incorporated into a working treaty. Difficulties in NPT enforcement are not necessarily the fault of the treaty itself. Rather, they are intrinsic to the nature of arms control. The NPT would be best served by clearer mechanisms of enforcement that are less dependent on the vicissitudes of current global politics. Mechanisms that might include a clearer agenda of how to address noncompliant states or more concrete punishments for misbehavior could prevent the escalation of potentially dangerous situations.

The NPT fails to hold signatories to their obligations

**Council on Foreign Relations 9** (Nov. 20 2009, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9663/usindia\_nuclear\_deal.html)IM

What effect will the U.S.-India deal have on the NPT? It could gut the agreement, some experts say. Article I of the treaty says nations that possess nuclear weapons agree not to help states that do not possess weapons to acquire them. David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, says without additional measures to ensure a real barrier exists between India's military and civilian nuclear programs, the agreement "could pose serious risks to the security of the United States" by potentially allowing Indian companies to proliferate banned nuclear technology around the world. In addition, it could lead other suppliers-including Russia and China-to bend the international rules so they can sell their own nuclear technology to other countries, some of them hostile to the United States. On the other hand, experts like Gahlaut argue the NPT was already failing in its mission to prevent proliferation. She says many countries-including North Korea, Libya, Iran, and Iraq-have cheated while being signatories of the NPT.

AFF – Say No - Korea Won’t Sign the NPT

North Korea isn’t interested in rejoining the NPT and won’t give up its nuclear capabilities

**Squassoni 10** (Sharon, Senior Associate @ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Jan 10 2010, www.nautilus.org/DPRKPolicy/SquassoniMcGoldrick.pdf)IM

With North Korea’s second nuclear test in May 2009, the prospects for achieving U.S. nonproliferation goals for that country seem to fade further into the background. A long- standing goal has been to bring North Korea into compliance with its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations – in effect, nuclear disarmament. The elements include, roughly, a freeze on production capabilities (plutonium production and separation and uranium enrichment), securing (and removing or eliminating) weapons- usable fissile material and/or nuclear weapons, and full-scope safeguards on all nuclear material to ensure peaceful use. Since 2002, an additional goal has been to ensure that North Korea does not engage in onward proliferation – the transfer to other states or non- state actors of WMD-related materials, technology, equipment, or actual weapons. With North Korea’s declaration in 2003 of withdrawal from NPT, its compliance is now no longer a “simple” question of verifying disarmament and the absence of undeclared activities, facilities and materials. Instead, it begins to look much more like U.S. policies toward India, Pakistan and Israel. The ultimate goal must remain a recommitment to the NPT. North Korea is not about to rejoin the NPT any time soon. However, it may be possible to persuade North Korea to adopt a declaration akin to the obligation of nuclear weapon states under Article I of the NPT: not to transfer nuclear weapons or encourage, assist or induce any non-nuclear weapon state in the manufacture, transfer, or acquisition of nuclear weapons. This is an obligation that India, Pakistan and Israel have yet to make. On the negative side, some critics could argue that it would have little meaning as a simple declaration and could help legitimize North Korea’s nuclear weapons.

NPT Bad – Opaque Prolif

Proliferation is inevitable – the NPT makes it opaque and therefore more destabilizing

Wesley 5 ( Austrailian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 59 No.3, p. 283-284)IM

My central argument is that the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons will probably continue at the rate of one or two additional nuclear weapons states per decade, whether or not the NPT is retained. Persisting with the NPT will make this proliferation much more dangerous than if the NPT is replaced with a more practical regime. I argue that the NPT is a major cause of opaque proliferation, which is both highly destabilising and makes use of transnational smuggling networks which are much more likely than states to pass nuclear components to terrorists. On the other hand, scrapping the NPT in favour of a more realistic regime governing the possession of nuclear weapons would help put transnational nuclear smuggling networks out of business and stabilise the inevitable spread of nuclear weapons. The NPT was always a flawed regime, based on an unequal distribution of status and security. Its apparent effectiveness in containing nuclear proliferation was largely due to other factors. The events of the past 15 years have only magnified the NPT’s flaws. The end of the Cold War decoupled the possession of nuclear weapons from the global power structure. While many commenta- tors were applauding the expansion of the number of NPT signatories, and South Africa, South Korea, Brazil and Argentina renounced plans to acquire nuclear weapons, deeper and more insistent proliferation pressures were building among the emerging great powers of Asia. The succession of Persian Gulf wars demonstrated to many insecure states that only nuclear\*/not chemical or biological\*/weapons deter conventional military attack. The international community was repeatedly surprised by the extent and sophistica- tion of Iraq’s, Pakistan’s, North Korea’s and Libya’s progress in acquiring nuclear materials and know-how, each time underlining the inadequacies of the non-proliferation regime. After the 1998 South Asian nuclear tests, India’s highly effective rhetorical defence of its policy and the world’s half-hearted and short-lived sanctions against India and Pakistan damaged the moral authority of the NPT regime, perhaps terminally. Even worse than being ineffective, the NPT is dangerous, because it increases the pressures for opaque proliferation and heightens nuclear instability. Equally flawed, I argue, is the current counter-proliferation doctrine of the United States. I advocate scrapping the NPT (and the doctrine of counter-proliferation) and starting again, because the NPT is a failing regime that is consuming diplomatic resources that could be more effectively used to build an alternative arms control regime that is responsive to current circumstances. We need to confront the practicalities of scrapping the NPT\*/the positives and the negatives\*and think clearly about the requirements of a replacement regime.

NPT Bad – Mini-Arsenal Turn

Non-proliferation creates mini-arsenals, upsetting power balances

Schofield 2k (Canadian journal of political science, vol 33 p. 769)IM

Nonproliferation regimes, epitomized by the 196811995 Non-Pro- liferation Treaty, seek to contain the spread of weapons through a combination of supplier controls, technology access incentives and multilateral co-ordination. Critics of arms control have argued that contagion can actually enhance security because it brings into play the balance of power. According to balance of power theory the international system is self- regulating, so that if any one state becomes too powerful, the remain- ing key states will balance against it to minimize its possible gains. Blainey has argued that the single most important reason rivalries do not erupt into war is that would-be aggressors are deterred by the pres- ence of unpredictable third-party states; he calls this the "waterbird dilemma."87 States therefore rely on the contagion effect of conflicts to third parties to deter attacks on themselves. By containing a conflict geographically, arms control may remove this disincentive for aggres- sion. Balance of power can both increase and decrease the spread of rivalries and war. As long as there are third-party states (typical of a multipolar environment), states will restrain competition with their primary rivals to avoid exploitation. But as a system tends toward bipolarity, the balance of power may actually increase the possibility of war as states become locked into alliances that can be triggered by their small-power members. Offers of extended deterrence may halt weapons proliferation, decrease incentives for pre-emptive and pre- ventive wars, and limit further search for external allies. But similar behaviour by a competitor can force smaller states to balance or band- wagon, as appropriate, thereby denuding the international system of significant third-party states and their restraining influence. Arms control agreements that attempt to limit the spread of rivalries may also increase the probabil- ity of war by denying the entry of a stabilizing extended deterrence. In a bipolar environment, arms control and balance of power measures against the lateral contagion of rivalry or war are, by definition, irrele- vant. In a multipolar environment, the tendency of arms control to limit the entry of stabilizing third parties must be weighed against the tendency of the balance of power mechanism to transform the system into a bipolar one. This arms control function is therefore both circum- stantially complementary and contradictory with the balance of power mechanism.

Mini-arsenals lead to higher levels of proliferation – that turns the CP

James 2k (Canadian journal of political science vol. 33 pg. 733)IM

Automatically equating nuclear risk taking with irrational decision-making is not feasible at all levels of nuclear capability. It is highly rele- vant that policies for preventing nuclear use could omit potential solu- tions. The likelihood of horizontal and vertical proliferation based on a balance of terror can even increase. Scholars who support this view are in the minority, yet alternatives have yet to be based upon a solid foundation of deterrence theory. The fact that nuclear deterrence the- ory was developed in one scenario does not mean that it cannot be instructive in others, if properly applied. By considering a state's level of nuclear capability as an independent variable with multiple varia- tions, the causal effects on crisis behaviour can be more accurately assessed and tested. In this manner, other policies, such as those that promote confidence-building measures or other lunds of security assurances, can be identified and put forward with increased confi- dence. In illustration, the next section offers a brief description of a dyad with a capability furthest removed from the Cold War superpow- ers-the mini-arsenal states of Iran and Iraq. This is followed by a potential, and more discerning, coding of nuclear capability with a sample application. The history of the Cold War is exemplified in the US policy of nuclear deterrence. The lessons from the period of super-arsenal contest con- tinue to influence policy toward other states. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, potential targets include states below super-arsenal capability, including the quasi-nuclear states of Iran and Iraq. Therefore there may be misdirected efforts that not only fail to meet the objective of removing nuclear use as a crisis option, but actu- ally increase the likelihood of it, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

NPT Impact Takeout – Regional Non-Prolif Solves

There’s a move to regional non-proliferation now, which solves better than the NPT

Kuppuswamy 6 ( journal of conflict and security law, 11(1))IM

At the Wilton Park Conference, regional approaches to nuclear non-prolifera- tion were favoured as perhaps being the way forward, because the global approach is not delivering. Stasis in the global scene means that we have to find new ways of moving forward. This was in keeping with the change in the atmosphere observed at the 2005 review conference where doubts were expressed about the underlying culture of the treaty. The NPT has put up a divide that is not working. Forums where participants would have an equal sta- tus were recommended.28 This will be essential to take Resolution 1540 forward and invigorate international efforts towards non-proliferation. As one speaker put it: ‘this is the only way you will take out some of the venom and anger that is there in nations’. A true regional approach should come from within the region rather than from the outside as it is the case at present. In the Middle East, a track-2 approach involving the people, NGOs and the Arab League was recommended where small undramatic steps should be taken. This, it was felt, would eventually help the move towards a grand bargain on non-proliferation. The Euro Mediter- ranean dialogue was seen as a forum to advance regional dialogue on nuclear issues. India’s growing role in the region as a responsible nuclear power, although de facto was recognised. In the light of the failed six-party talks on North Korea, a role for India in the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) issue was identified as also a role in the wider context of South East Asia.

North Korean Appeasement DA – Iran Module

**Appeasement of North Korea causes Iranian proliferation – we will be seen as weak**

Phillips 9 (Melanie, The Spectator, http://www.spectator.co.uk/melaniephillips/3647756/the-fruits-of-appeasement.thtml)JFS

So now **we can see** once again **the fruits of appeasement. North Korea has tested a second set of nuclear bombs and the west throws up its hands in horror. What did it expect? Once the** Bush **administration** cravenly **decided to give up on North Korea** (following the similarly short-sighted approach taken by Bill Clinton), **Kim Jong-il** duly **took the opportunity to press** full steam **ahead with his nuclear program**. Now the same ‘new realists’ who came to power at the tail-end of the Bush presidency and decided to ‘live with’ a North Korean bomb – just as they have apparently decided the US could ‘live with’ an Iranian bomb – are serving in the Obama administration, which of course has taken such imbecility to unprecedented depths. **Obama has been abasing himself to every despot on the planet, proclaiming America’s weakness through his ‘hand of friendship’ and infantile belief that talking to tyrants is the route to peace.**

The result of such epic cringing is two fingers from North Korea, with yet further threats today. **Iran in particular will now be watching intently to see whether America will once again display weakness** and impotence; **if the US won’t even act to stop North Korea from going nuclear, Iran will be reinforced in its belief that it can develop its own nuclear weapons** with impunity. So far, Obama has ‘rushed out a special statement’ in which he said ‘I strongly condemn [North Korea’s] reckless action’ and promised to ‘redouble’ America’s efforts to stop Pyongyang from acquiring nuclear weapons. Well, that will have them quaking in their boots, for sure. Redoubling weakness simply results in twice as much weakness.

Iranian proliferation spurs regional proliferation while causing a conventional and nuclear war in the Middle East.

Takeyh et al 10(Ray Takeyh senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and James M. Lindsay Senior Vice President, Director of Studies, and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair at the Council on Foreign Relations, “After Iran Gets the Bomb” <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66032/james-m-lindsay-and-ray-takeyh/after-iran-gets-the-bomb>) JL

The Islamic Republic of Iran is determined to become the world's tenth nuclear power. It is defying its international obligations and resisting concerted diplomatic pressure to stop it from enriching uranium. It has flouted several UN Security Council resolutions directing it to suspend enrichment and has refused to fully explain its nuclear activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Even a successful military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities would delay Iran's program by only a few years, and it would almost certainly harden Tehran's determination to go nuclear. The ongoing political unrest in Iran could topple the regime, leading to fundamental changes in Tehran's foreign policy and ending its pursuit of nuclear weapons. But that is an outcome that cannot be assumed. If Iran's nuclear program continues to progress at its current rate, Tehran could have the nuclear material needed to build a bomb before U.S. President Barack Obama's current term in office expires. The dangers of Iran's entry into the nuclear club are well known: emboldened by this development, Tehran might multiply its attempts at subverting its neighbors and encouraging terrorism against the United States and Israel; the risk of both conventional and nuclear war in the Middle East would escalate; more states in the region might also want to become nuclear powers; the geopolitical balance in the Middle East would be reordered; and broader efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons would be undermined. The advent of a nuclear Iran -- even one that is satisfied with having only the materials and infrastructure necessary to assemble a bomb on short notice rather than a nuclear arsenal -- would be seen as a major diplomatic defeat for the United States. Friends and foes would openly question the U.S. government's power and resolve to shape events in the Middle East. Friends would respond by distancing themselves from Washington; foes would challenge U.S. policies more aggressively.

North Korean Appeasement DA – Turns Net Benefit

Making concessions undermines non-proliferation – turns the net benefit

Hwang 4 (Balbina, February 25th, The Heritage Foundation, Policy Analyst for the Asian Studies Center of the Heritage Foundation)JFS

Thus, a North Korean "freeze" of the Yongbyon facility will be inadequate, and the United States should not accept it even as a temporary measure, let alone make concessions. To do so would seriously undermine the principled U.S. stand on global non-proliferation, and would allow North Korea to revert to its old pattern of extorting concessions from the international community. Any freeze by Pyongyang is a necessary but insufficient condition for the permanent goal of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula.

North Korean Appeasement DA – Laundry List

Diplomacy cannot produce change and only serves to worsen every problem in the Koreas

Journo 6 (Elan, Capitalism Magazine, writer at the Ayn Rand Institute, http://tinyurl.com/2davfgt)JFS

The pattern of America's suicidal diplomacy is clear: the North threatens us, we respond with negotiations, gifts and concessions, and it emerges with even greater belligerence.

Without economic aid, technical assistance and protracted negotiations affording it time, it is unlikely that the North--continually on the brink of economic collapse--could have survived. It is also unlikely that it could have built the fourth-largest army in the world. The North is believed to have sold long-range ballistic missiles to Iran, Yemen, Pakistan and Syria. By some estimates, North Korea already has the material to create eight nuclear bombs. As it doubtless will continue engaging in clandestine nuclear development, the North may soon be wielding--and selling--nuclear weapons.

What made this cycle of appeasement possible--and why do our political and intellectual leaders insist that further "diplomacy" will work? Because they cling to the amoral fiction that North Korea shares the basic goal of prosperity and peace. This fantasy underlies the notion that the right mix of economic aid and military concessions can dissuade North Korea from its nuclear ambition. It evades the fact that the North is a militant dictatorship that acquires and maintains its power by force, looting the wealth of its enslaved citizens and threatening to do the same to its neighbors. This abstract fact, the advocates of diplomacy believe, is dispensable; if we ignore it, then it ceases to exist.

Notice how, in preparing the way for renewed talks, the Bush administration ceased describing North Korea as part of an "axis of evil"--as if this could alter its moral stature.

What the advocates of diplomacy believe, in effect, is that pouring gasoline onto an inferno will extinguish the fire--so long as we all agree that it will. Thus: if we agree that North Korea is not a hostile parasite, then it isn't; if we pretend that this dictatorship would rather feed its people than amass weapons, then it would; if we shower it with loot, it will stop threatening us. But the facts of North Korea's character and long-range goals, like all facts, are impervious to anyone's wishful thinking. Years of rewarding a petty dictatorship for its belligerent actions did not disarm it, but helped it become a significant threat to America.

There is only one solution to the "North Korea problem": the United States and its allies must abandon the suicidal policy of appeasement.

Israel Relations DA 2AC

**The US has to make a choice between having good relations with Israel and pursuing nonproliferation efforts – the NPT specifically breaks relations**

Borger 9 (Julian, diplomatic editor for the Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/may/06/israel-us-nuclear-non-proliferation) GAT

A diplomatic row broke out today between the US and Israel after Washington's chief nuclear arms negotiator called on Israel to sign the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), breaking a US tradition of discretion over Israel's nuclear arsenal. Israeli officials said they were puzzled by a speech to an international conference in New York by Rose Gottemoeller, an assistant secretary of state, who said: "Universal adherence to the NPT itself - including by India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea - also remains a fundamental objective of the [United States](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/usa)." By including Israel on a list of countries known to have [nuclear weapons](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/nuclear-weapons). Gottemoeller broke with normal US diplomatic practice. Since 1968 when the CIA reported Israel had developed a nuclear weapon , Washington has pursued a policy of not demanding transparency from its close ally, and in return Israel agreed not to test a bomb or declare its nuclear capability - a policy of "strategic ambiguity". "As far as we are concerned, there is no change to the close dialogue we have with Washington," Yossi Levy, Israeli foreign ministry spokesman, told Reuters. Privately, Israeli officials played down the importance of the NPT as a means of controlling proliferation. Attempts to stop spread of nuclear weapons face a critical moment over the next year before the NPT comes up for review in 2010, at a time when North Korea has declared the resumption of its nuclear weapons programme, and fears over Iran's intentions threaten to trigger a Middle East arms race. Gottemoeller's speech was made at a meeting to prepare the way for next year's critical NPT review conference. Daryl Kimball, the executive director of the Arms Control Association in Washington, said that Gottemoeller had not changed the long-held US position - that all states should join the NPT. However, she spelt that position out more explicitly in relation to Israel.

US support for Israel is key to democracy and peace.

ADL, 6 (Anti Defamation League

http://www.adl.org/israel/advocacy/how\_to\_respond/us\_israel\_relations.asp?xflag=1

The United States is a longstanding strong ally of Israel based on shared democratic values and strategic interests including the rejection of terrorism and violence. The United States has a great interest in the stability of the Middle East, a region that is afflicted by extremists who violently oppose the U.S., Israel and democracy, rogue states with large military arsenals which include non-conventional weaponry, and other authoritarian regimes. Bolstering and supporting peace, stability and democracy in the region through relations with Israel is in America’s strategic interest. Indeed, public opinion polls have consistently demonstrated that Americans of all backgrounds support strong U.S.-Israeli relations and view Israel as a key ally of the United States.

Democracy key to preventing inevitable extinction

Diamond, 95 (Larry, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives, senior research fellow at Hoover Institution, A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, December 1995, p. 6)

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness.

Israel Relations DA - Link Extension

Efforts to strengthen nonproliferation regime put pressure on Israel

Cobban 9 (Helena, Exec. Director for the Council for the National Interest, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=46773) GAT

Israel is judged to have between 100 and 200 advanced nuclear weapons either ready to deploy, or only a few minutes away from being so.  Gottemoeller’s words sparked speculation that this arsenal might re-emerge as an issue in Israel’s relations with Washington. That would end a 40-year period in which Washington colluded with Israel in maintaining the fiction that Israel’s nuclear weapons capabilities were unknown, and anyway should never be openly discussed.  Throughout those years, Washington was also vigorously combating the acquisition by any other Middle Eastern state of "weapons of mass destruction" (WMD), including chemical or biological weapons, as well as the far more lethal nuclear weapons. Many around the world accused Washington of maintaining a damaging "double standard" on nuclear weapons and all other WMD.  Israel has always fended off calls that it join the NPT. Beyond that, most Israeli leaders have gone actively on the offensive against the NPT, arguing that it has not been effective in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons worldwide. (The NPTs many supporters strongly contest that assertion. One hundred and eighty-nine states are members of the treaty.)  When George W. Bush was U.S. president, he seemed largely persuaded by the Israelis’ view of NPT ineffectiveness. His administration downgraded the support Washington previously gave the NPT. The NPT’s approach stresses the ultimate goal of a nuclear weapons-free world, the need for negotiations among nations as a way to get there, and the universality of this effort.  In place of an active commitment to the NPT approach, Bush pursued the very different policy of "counter-proliferation." That policy stressed U.S. domination of efforts to directly counter the nuclear programmes of countries Washington disapproved of, using a variety of means, including direct military destruction of suspected installations.  Obama’s Prague speech marked a sharp shift back to the NPT approach. And Gottemoeller’s speech then showed that the Obama administration intends to apply it in the Middle East, as well as elsewhere. This will have a strong effect on the administration’s diplomacy regarding both Iran and Israeli-Arab peacemaking.

Isreal Relations DA – WoT Impact Module

(A.) U.S.-ISRAELI TIES ARE CRITICAL TO WINNING THE WAR ON TERRORISM.

THOMPSON 2K1, Former Governor of Wisconsin and Presidential Candidate,

Tommy, “Thompson affirms US ties with Israel”, former governor of Wisconsin, http://www.ujc.org/page.html?ArticleID=24725 JFS

Tommy G. Thompson today called close U.S.-Israeli ties "essential" for the victory over terrorists and the vitality of democratic values in both countries and around the world. "Supporting Israel is absolutely essential to the security of the United States and to the advancement of freedom and democracy in our time," Thompson said at the closing session of the 2001 United Jewish Communities (UJC) General Assembly (GA) in Washington, DC. "It's not an overstatement to say that we are fighting the same spirit of tyranny today that we fought in the Second World War," the former Wisconsin governor continued. "And so much of that tyranny is committed under the pretext of religion. Many of you in this room understand and empathize with the suffering of those persecuted for their religious beliefs. And should Bin Ladin have his way, the Jewish people would be persecuted yet again. "While he might strike the Jewish state, he will not defeat it. On behalf of President Bush, I can tell you that America will stand with Israel - period. We cannot, and will not, let those who would hurt us, hurt our friends and allies, and hurt their own people, succeed." Thompson's remarks were delivered just hours after the UJC Delegates Assembly meeting at the GA adopted a resolution that, among other steps, condemns international terrorism, supports U.S. government efforts to defeat it, and condemns stereotyping and scapegoating of Muslim-Americans and Arab-Americans and calls on leaders of those groups to denounce anti-Semitic pronouncements.

(B.) LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR CAUSES THE UNITED STATES TO TURN THE MIDDLE EAST INTO A PARKING LOT.

EASTERBROOK, 2K1, (The New Republic, Greg, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0111/01/gal.00.html)JFS

Terrorists may not be held by this, especially suicidal terrorists, of the kind that al Qaeda is attempting to cultivate. But I think, if I could leave you with one message, it would be this: that the search for terrorist atomic weapons would be of great benefit to the Muslim peoples of the world in addition to members, to people of the United States and Western Europe, because if an atomic warhead goes off in Washington, say, in the current environment or anything like it, in the 24 hours that followed, a hundred million Muslims would die as U.S. nuclear bombs rained down on every conceivable military target in a dozen Muslim countries