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# \*\*\*AFF\*\*\*

# 1AC

**Contention One: Prostitution**

**US military presence in Korea sustains prostitution and violence—Americans project Orientalist and gendered notions of culture onto Korean women to maintain a permanent underclass in Korea**

**Moon 09** - Wellesley College professor (Katharine H.S. “Military Prostitution and the U.S. Military in Asia” in The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus. Posted on January 17, 2009. <http://lists.econ.utah.edu/pipermail/margins-to-centre/2009-January/001668.html>, MT)

Where there are soldiers, there are women who exist for them. This is practically a cliché. History is filled with examples of women as war booty and “camp followers,” their bodies being used for service labor of various kinds, including sex. **Contrary to common assumptions in the West, prostitution is not “part of Asian culture**.” Just about every culture under the sun has some version of it during times of war and times of peace. In some ways, military prostitution (prostitution catering to, and sometimes organized by, the military) has been so commonplace that people rarely stop to think about how and why it is created, sustained, and incorporated into military life and warfare. Academic interest and analysis of this issue gained momentum only in the last twenty years and still remains scant and sporadic. Even as interest in women and gender as categories of analysis has increased in many academic disciplines, there is still a question of intellectual “legitimacy,” that is, whether prostitutes, prostitution, and sex work warrant “serious” scholarly attention and resources, especially for students of international politics. After all, it is a highly “personal” and therefore “subjective” matter and prone toward the proverbial “he said/she said” contestation. To boot, many have turned the feminist emphasis on women and agency on its head by glibly claiming that most military prostitutes sought out the work and life of their own free will and therefore are exercising their agency. In this view, it is primarily about women’s personal decisions and responsibility to face the consequences; governments and other institutions of society need not be held accountable. Filipino activists from the Gabriela women's organization wearing cut-outs of the four accused US Marines of rape, pose standing behind bars in Manila, 23 November 2006. For decades, key leaders of Asian women’s movements such as Takazato Suzuyo of Okinawa and Matsui Yayori, the well-known Japanese journalist and feminist activist, Aida Santos and women’s organizations like GABRIELA of the Philippines have argued to the contrary. They documented and insisted that **U.S. military prostitution in** Okinawa/Japan, **South Korea**, and the Philippines **involve a complex “system” of central and local government policies, political repression, economic inequalities and oppression of the underclass**, police **corruption**, debt bondage of women by bar owners, **in addition to pervasive sexist norms and attitudes in both the U.S. military and the respective Asian society**. In the 1970s and 1980s, when Asian feminists raised these connections, they tended to fault patriarchal and sexist values together with power inequalities emanating from them and the economic and political disparities among nations. Such individuals and organizations also emphasized the compromised sovereignty of their own governments in relationship with the more powerful U.S. government and military, resulting in the compromised rights and dignity of the Korean, Okinawan, Filipina and other women who “serviced” American military (male) personnel. Aida Santos, a long-time activist opposing U.S. military bases in the Philippines (and later the Visiting Forces Agreement) wrote in the early 1990s that in the Philippines, “[r]acism and sexism are now seen as a fulcrum in the issue of national sovereignty.”[1] Such activists made the case that the personal is indeed political and international. [2] “Olongapo Rose,” a 1988 documentary film by the British Broadcasting Corporation about U.S. military prostitution in the Philippines graphically depicts the various political, economic, cultural, and racial “systems” at work. Even under authoritarian rule in the 1970s, Filipinas did not hesitate to speak up and campaign nationally and internationally against the Philippines authorities and the U.S. military for abetting and condoning the physical, sexual, and economic exploitation and violence against women who worked in the R&R industry along Olongapo and Subic Bay, where U.S. forces had been stationed until the early 1990s. But in Korea, even progressive activists of the 1970s and 1980s, who fought against military dictatorship, labor repression, and the violation of human rights overlooked military prostitution as a political issue. For one, they had their plates full, challenging the Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan regimes. Second, as much as some activists criticized the dominant role of the United States in the alliance relationship, others were loath to attack a fundamental institution that safeguarded Korean security. Of course, the legal system was stacked against them. With the National Security Law squarely in place, critics of the U.S. military or the alliance could be thrown into prison, tortured, or killed. Third, military prostitutes were so beneath the political radar screen of most progressives because the women themselves were viewed as “dirty,” lowest of the low, and “tainted” because they slept with foreign soldiers. A highly puritanical and moralistic sense of ethnonationalism among most Koreans had exiled Korean military prostitutes from the larger Korean society and political arena. It is common knowledge among military prostitutes and their advocates that the formers’ family often disowned them upon learning of their “shameful” lives. But in 1988, Yu Boknim, a Korean democracy activist, and Faye Moon, an American missionary and social activist became mavericks even among progressive dissidents by paying attention to the plight of the Korean gijichon (camptown) women. Together with the assistance of a handful of student activists and the financial support of some Protestant churches, they established Durebang (My Sister’s Place) in 1988 as a counseling center, shelter, and later bakery (to generate income for older women who had left the sex business and younger women who wanted to get out). But despite their efforts to raise awareness of the relationship between the presence of U.S. bases and the growth of this underclass of women and their Amerasian children, most of Korean society continued to ignore the women and their needs. Rather, Yu and Moon found increasing solidarity with their activist counterparts from the Philippines, Okinawa/Japan, and the United States as women began to organize around issues of sexual violence and slavery, militarism, and human rights in the Asia-Pacific. Currently, military prostitution in Korea has been transformed in line with global economic and migration trends. Foreign nationals, primarily from the Philippines and the former Soviet Union, have become the majority of sex-providers and “entertainers” for the U.S. troops. Young Korean women, with better education and economic and social opportunities than their mothers or grandmothers, are not available for such work. And they are not as easily duped by traffickers. In a more complex, globalized and multicultural sex industry environment, however, political and legal accountability for various problems and conflicts that both the prostitutes and the servicemen encounter become even more difficult to understand and more difficult for activists to target effectively. Nevertheless, on a day-to-day basis, hardworking advocacy organizations on behalf of the women, such as Saewoomtuh, continue to offer shelter, counseling, and health and legal assistance to the best of their ability. Kids at Amerasian transit center, Ho Chi Minh City, 1992.

**Prostitution in South Korea stems from an Orientalist idea of dominance that sees Asians as weak, feminine and submissive, reliant on American military protection**

**Wu 2k4** (Nadine, James Madison University, “The Dynamics of Orientalism and Globalization in the International Sex Industry and Human Trafficking,” 2004, <http://www.jmu.edu/writeon/documents/2004/wu.pdf>) SLV

Many governments have long promoted sex tourism as a way of generating revenue. Migration for commercial sex work rose significantly in the 1960s and 1970s, with the establishment of U.S military bases in Thailand and neighboring countries (Skrobanek, Boonpakdee, & Jantaeero, 1998). As the U.S military bases extended into Asia in the 1960’s women from poor families were encouraged to prostitute themselves for a source of income to support their families. In fact, some governments such as the Philippines encouraged women to do their “patriotic duty” to help the economy by prostituting themselves to military men (Truong 1996). There is also a booming prostitution industry surrounding U.S military bases in South Korea. It is not a coincidence that prostitution rose at the height of U.S military involvement in Asia. Sex tourism continues to be extremely profitable. In 1996 nearly five million sex tourists from the United States, Western Europe, Australia, and Japan visited Thailand. These transactions brought in about $26.2 billion to the Thai economy (Bales 1999). Many government officials seem to view its women as a gold mine to be used, and depend on them for foreign exchange dollars to help boost their economy. Revenue from sex tourism can be used to pay debts from the World Bank. Social structures are important in the trafficking of women. Castells theorizes that social structures are organized around relationships of production/consumption, power and experience (1996). Power is especially important in the trafficking industry. Traffickers often target people in their local communities because it gives them more power and control (Polaris Project 2003). In a familiar community, the traffickers know who the vulnerable people are. Trust is another good reason for traffickers to use people in their own community. Women are more likely to trust men from their own community so it is easier to deceive them. Traffickers use violence and threats as a form of power against women. They can threaten to hurt the woman’s family members if she does not agree to the traffickers’ demands. Because the woman knows the trafficker(s), she recognizes that the threat can easily be carried out. The trafficker(s) would know exactly who is in her family and where they live. Men who want vulnerable women are trying to establish power in a social structure. As a result of these social structures, many individuals benefit from human trafficking. The traffickers earn money while the customers get to enjoy a sexual experience. Even law enforcement officials, such as the policeman who brought Siri back to the brothel, often receive a percentage of the brothel’s profits. Many elements of human trafficking can be theorized in relation to Orientalism. Critical scholar Edward Said defined Orientalism with several different approaches. Orientalism is a legacy of the Enlightenment, which focused on defining the world in strict dichotomies such as good versus evil. Said analyzes Orientalism as a tradition of theory and practice that has affected the way we think today. According to Said, Orientalism emerged in Europe as an academic tradition of teaching and writing about the Orient. Western scholars studied the Orient through ethnography, and the interpretation of its culture by reading and translating Oriental texts. Orientalism is an idea constructed by the “West” and is also based on the distinction between the Orient and the Occident which leads to fantasies of the exotic “other”. The West sees itself as superior by comparing itself to the “Orient.” The Orient is childlike, exotic, backwards, and incapable of defining itself, while the West is progressive, active, and masculine. Because the Orient was seen as weak and inferior, colonization was viewed as a necessary to save them from their backwardness. Said analyzes Orientalism as a “Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (1978). Orientalist scholarship provided the means for western countries to take over Oriental lands and rescue them. In essence, it justified colonialism and cultural domination.

**Military violence is neither natural nor inevitable—war is sustained by gendered systems of identity like military prostitution**

**Enloe 93** – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War” p. 245-248, MT)

Conquerors' mistresses, wartime rape victims, military prostitutes, cinematic soldier-heroes, pin-up models on patriotic calendars-these are only some of the indications, not only that nationalism is often constructed in militarized settings, but that **militarization** itself, like nationalist identity, **is** **gendered**. To put it more simply, no person, **no community**, and no national movement **can be militarized without changing the ways in which femininity and masculinity infuse daily life**. Much of our research in the 1960s and 1970s focused on civil wars some we labeled as revolutionary, and others portrayed as mere insurgencies. They seemed to offer opportunities to explore changing consciousness, national versus class versus ethnic loyalties, the processes of social mobilization and party building, state fragility, and state expansion. But as I recall, thinking about civil wars did not prompt us to think about or even conceptualize militarism. States had militaries; that's how you could tell they were states. And certain levels of alienated mobilization seemed naturally to take the form of armed insurgency. But as for militarism a distinctive set of beliefs and structures and militarization a particular societal process entrenching these beliefs and structures we looked to neither concept to generate questions, to make us stop in our intellectual tracks. So we made militarization of any society appear simpler than, in fact, it was. When I think back now to the 1960s, I wonder why I didn't pause, why I found it so easy to accept armed nationalist conflicts as, if not inevitable, at least not very surprising. At some level I did not see nationalist warfare as problematic. True, I did puzzle over state elites' use of their militaries and police forces to respond to ethnic or antiimperialist challenges. I did wonder how civilian nationalists came to their decisions to take up armed resistance and whether they would succeed in controlling the military forces they had created. And I did try to understand how relatively unpoliticized people caught in the crossfire would piece together their own strategies for coping with escalating conflict. All this hard questioning notwithstanding, I think I assumed that militarization of any nationalist conflict wasn't difficult to accomplish. It only required, I naively presumed, the state's deployment of military units and the insurgents' acquisition of weapons and recruits and policies to bring both sides into an encounter. In those days I didn't give much thought to what sorts of mental transformations had to occur in order for national identities to become militarized. Now I am more and more convinced that the **militarization** of any nationalist movement **occurs through the gendered workings of power**. It is neither natural nor automatic. Militarization occurs because some people's fears are allowed to be heard, and to inform agendas, while other people's fears are trivialized or silenced. Slovak nationalism, reemerging today; Quebecois nationalism, now in its third decade of development; Lithuanian nationalism, successful in its achievement of statehoodnone have (as yet) been militarized. Within other nationalist movements, by contrast, there has been ambivalence and even explicit conflict over militarization. Thus, within contemporary Russian nationalism, U.S. black nationalism, Canadian Indian nationalism, South African black nationalism, German nationalism, and Serb, Croatian, and Bosnian nationalism, there have been debates over social changes that would legitimize particular militaristic tendencies. In each of these processes of national formation, the struggle today remains inconclusive. It is impossible to make sense of how nationalist ideologies and organizations emerge, grow, wither, or disappear altogether unless we chart these internal debates over militarization. Who supports militarizing strategies, and who offers alternatives? Do the supporters and their critics look different in their gender, region, generation, class, or political experience? Principal among militarizing transformations are changes in ideas about manliness manliness as it supports a state, and manliness as it informs a nation. If I had given more (or any!) thought to how the meaning assigned to being a man changed as a state deployed its forces in the name of "national security" or in the name of creating a new, more authentic nation, or as a nationalist movement mobilized its force, then I might have noticed that changes in ideas about masculinity do not occur without complementary transformations in ideas about what it means to be a woman. For instance, I might have paid attention to a state's policies regarding rape: were soldiers given instructions to avoid sexual assaults on women in the contested regions? Were reported assaults treated seriously by superior officers, or glossed over? I might have given more analytical weight to evidence that insurgent male leaders deliberately excluded or included women, that they tried to prevent sexual liaisons within their units, that they encouraged most women to serve the now-militarized cause in roles compatible with concepts of femininity preexisting in the community. And by paying attention I might have caught sight of the contradictions that thread their way through most instances of militarization. For militarization is a process that is not greased with natural inclinaions and easy choices. It usually involves confusion and mixed messages. On the one hand, it requires the participation of women as well as men. On the other hand, it is a **social construction** that usually **privileges masculinity**. It is the first of these two conditions that makes many women who have become nationalists willing to support militarization: their participation as women becomes valuable, and they often gain new space in which to develop political skills. During the Intifada, Palestinian women began to run more of the West Bank community institutions as the Israeli military closed down older institutions as security risks, and as hundreds of Palestinian men were imprisoned. During the eight-month Iraqi military occupation, Kuwaiti women, having lost their Asian maids, likewise gained a new sense of their political value; actions such as obtaining food, carrying information, and caring for torture victims took on new, nationalist connotations. Similarly, Iraqi women who identify themselves as nationalists by virtue of participation in the ruling Baathist Party's Women's Federation today speak of the earlier Iran-Iraq war as a time when the state was compelled to take women's talents seriously, as it replaced conscripted men with women in hosts of official positions. Yet because it is a process riddled with gendered contradictions, the militarization of any nationalist movement is usually contested. It is often precisely where one can observe the formal and informal political struggles between women and men. In these debates over militarization, women and men are divided, not simply over priorities on the political agenda, but also over what constitutes this amorphous thing, "the nation."Peace movements that emerge within militarizing nationalist movements are typically treated as though they are hopeless and/or analytically trivial. The militarization of our own curiosity often takes the form of treating the most militarized tendencies such as the formation of mostly male militias as the most analytically interesting.

**Representations of a dangerous world solidify the gendered order of international relations. The war in Korea will never end until military masculinity is challenged**

**Enloe 93** – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War” p. 12-16, MT)

The filmmakers weren't able to follow the young man beyond basic training. But it would not be surprising if he had been sent to Afghanistan; Soviet troops were still mired in that guerrilla war when the documentary was being shot. Nor was the crew able to return to interview the mother after her son returned if he returned. Perhaps she would have told them of her new worries, maybe now mixed with anger, prompted by stories slowly filtering back from Afghanistan. These were not stories of enemy atrocities. They were stories of cruelty within the ranks of the Red Army itself: harsh hazing rituals carried out by older soldiers against younger conscripts or by men of one ethnic group against men of another ethnic group, with officers participating or standing passively by. Some mothers began to collect the stories, to add up the suicides, to challenge officials' sanguine explanations. In 1989, some of the women whose sons had been officially listed as missing in action began to form their own groups, independent of the official organizations designed to channel the anxieties of soldiers' mothers. The first objective of these groups was to extract more information about their sons' fates from the government. It was the unresponsiveness and even contempt with which officials greeted these requests that sparked more radical thinking and activist grass-roots organizing among increasing numbers of women. After a large demonstration outside the Soviet Chamber of Deputies in March 1989, the organizers founded the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers. A year later, it changed its name to Materinskoe Serdise, "Mother's Heart." Although the exact size of its membership remained unknown, the organization began to receive telephone calls and letters from parents throughout the Soviet Union anxious to know more about the whereabouts and well-being of their sons serving in the military. 3 These women were redefining motherhood. Being a good Soviet mother and being a Soviet patriot no longer seemed mutually reinforcing. The mothers began to forge a radically new portrait of the state's military. No longer did it seem the patriotic defender of Soviet society, the transformer of boys into mother-free men. It seemed more of an inhumane machine devouring the sons of mothers. The Gorbachev regime, trying to extricate itself from Afghanistan while instituting political reforms at home, was particularly vulnerable to this emergent maternal dissent. It was not only the military that had to be mollified but also the maternal organizations, which were wearing a new mantle, a new legitimacy. An official investigatory commission was created. Its 1991 report confirmed the women's claim. The authors estimated that for the past fifteen years an average of eight thousand Soviet soldiers had died annually in service: 50 percent from suicide, 20 percent from beatings or other inflicted injuries, 10 percent from accidents, and only 20% in the line of duty.4 In the wake of the abortive August coup, women organizing out of their identities as mothers of soldiers became even more assertive. In October 1991, a group of 250 women from fifty-six towns in Russia held a hunger strike outside Moscow's White House to demand that the state-sponsored All-Union Congress of Parents of Servicemen not be privileged as the sole organization representing soldiers' families. A few days later, representatives of the mothers of soldiers movement, as it was now being labeled, surrounded the defense minister and insisted that they be allowed inside the congress. When he turned his back on them and drove off, they pushed their way into the meeting hall, only to be evicted by police.5 **The ending of any war is a complicated process**. It is not an event: the signing of a peace accord, the decommissioning of a missile. It is a long series of steps, with each step shaping the steps that follow, yet no step automatically succeeding the ones that came before it. And **the war-ending process is gendered. Many of the steps require the redefining of long-held notions of femininity and masculinity** as well as the abandonment of government policies intended to sustain particular relationships between men and women and between men or women and the state. The Cold War has had distinct attributes, but in its dissolution it is no different from the Crimean War or World War II We will be able to chart more accurately the gendered processes that are at work in constructing the post Cold War world if we can describe exactly what it is that needs to be dismantled. What were the gendered relationships on which the Cold War relied for its creation and forty-five-year-long perpetuation? The regimes that were essential to perpetuating the Cold War had to convince their citizenries that the world was a dangerous place. Their citizens had to behave as if surrounded by imminent danger. Having internalized an acute sense of danger, citizens would be more likely to accept the heavy taxation and the underfunding of health, housing, and education that came with high military spending. Being persuaded that danger lurked, citizens would be more willing to leave secrecy unquestioned, to leave conscription and wiretapping unchallenged. The more convincingly danger was portrayed, the more vulnerable was any campaign for social change to accusations of subversion. Calling for a reduction of a factory's toxic emissions, working to spread literacy among poor urban women, organizing the harvesters of agricultural cropsall would be more easily imagined as threats to the state and to the social order itself if the world could be thought of as fraught with diffuse danger. But of course women and men do not experience danger in identical ways. In most of the societies that were drawn into the Cold War, men were thought to be manly insofar as they did not shy away from danger and perhaps even flirted with it as they protected the nation's children and women. Women, on the other hand, were considered those most vulnerable to danger. Only a foolish woman, a woman who ignored the dictates of femininity, behaved as though she was not endangered, as though a man's protection was irrelevant. If she went out alone at night, if she hitchhiked or traveled far from home without a masculine shield, she deserved what she got. Likewise, women could be persuaded to support their governments' efforts to organize against the Cold War threat. Any man was socialized into the gendered culture of danger in part by the women who would look to him to provide protection, to be the brave one.This gendering of danger has been dissected, and its myths exposed, chiefly by women in India, Great Britain, Mexico, the United States, Brazil, and elsewhere who have created movements against violence toward women and against government efforts to control women's sexuality. But the lessons are pertinent to making sense of the Cold War. For example, feminist researchers have uncovered a 1958 report by a presidential commission assessing the U.S. Military Assistance Program which urged national security strategists to think about Third World women's fertility. As the Cold War rivalry spiraled, the report explained that high birth rates were due to women's uncontrolled fertility. These rates were producing population growth in countries of strategic importance to the U.S.such as Egypt, Mexico, Brazil, and Indonesiathat would destabilize their regimes and make them dangerously susceptible to Communist subversion. 6 During the next two decades, women in many countries imagined to be strategically important in the U.S.Soviet rivalry would find that they were sharing their beds not only with their husbands but also with U.S. national security officials. Many Brazilian women who organized against their country's anti-Communist military government in the 1970s and 1980s came to the conclusion that militarized anti-Communism and domestic violence against women needed to be critiqued in the same breath, for the construction of the worldview that placed danger at its core relied on gendered danger as well.7 Male bonding among policymakers privy to state secrets, recruiting military ''manpower," and keeping checks on women-led social reform movements all were part of a web woven to perpetuate the Cold War, each thread of which required women to relate to danger in a markedly different way than was required of men. It was no coincidence, therefore, that the "feminine mystique" gained such political potency in the United States in the 1950s, at the very time when the government was taking steps to roll back the allegedly anomalous gender changes wrought by World War II. Pressing women especially white, middle-class womenback into the domestic sphere went hand in hand with promoting consumerist capitalism; the feminine mystique became as solid a pillar of **the U.S. version of Cold War culture** as did its **remasculinized military**. Both were part of the "American way of life" that would protect U.S. citizens from the lures of Communism. Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that scores of women voluntarily offered their services to Washington's new civil defense bureaucracy.8 Homosexuality, latchkey children, women in combatall, U.S. Cold War cultural strategists warned, could undermine the country's capacity to meet the global threat. Smuggling FBI agents into U.S. Army women's softball teams in the 1950s in order to track down alleged lesbians, therefore, was just one small policy brick laid on the American side of the rising Cold War wall.9

**Patriarchal militarism will end life on Earth**

**Warren and Cady 94** (Karen and Duane, Professors of Philosophy at Malacaster College and Hamline University, Hypatia, Spring)

The notion of patriarchy as a socially dysfunctional system enables feminist philosophers to show why conceptual connections are so important and how conceptual connections are linked to the variety of other sorts of woman-nature-peace connections. In addition, the claim that patriarchy is a dysfunctional social system locates what ecofeminists see as various "dysfunctionalities" of patriarchy-the empirical invisibility of what women do, sexist-warist-naturist language, violence toward women, other cultures, and nature-in a historical, socioeconomic, cultural, and political context.(10) To say that patriarchy is a dysfunctional system is to say that the fundamental beliefs, values, attitudes and assumptions(conceptual framework) of patriarchy give rise to impaired thinking, behaviors, and institutions which are unhealthy for humans, especially women, and the planet. The following diagram represents the features of patriarchy as a dysfunctional social system: Patriarchy, as an Up-Down system of power-over relationships of domination of women by men, is conceptually grounded in a faulty patriarchal belief and value system,(a), according to which(some) men are rational and women are not rational, or at least not rational in the more highly valued way(some) men are rational; reason and mind are more important than emotion and body; that humans are justified in using female nature simply to satisfy human consumptive needs. The discussion above of patriarchal conceptual frameworks describes the characteristics of this faulty belief system. Patriarchal conceptual frameworks sanction, maintain, and perpetuate impaired thinking,(b): For example, that men can control women's inner lives, that it is men's role to determine women's choices, that human superiority over nature justifies human exploitation of nature, that women are closer to nature than men because they are less rational, more emotional, and respond in more instinctual ways than(dominant) men. The discussions above at(4) and(5), are examples of the linguistic and psychological forms such impaired thinking can take. Operationalized, the evidence of patriarchy as a dysfunctional system is found in the behaviors to which it gives rise,(c), and the unmanageability,(d), which results. For example, in the United States, current estimates are that one out of every three or four women will be raped by someone she knows; globally, rape, sexual harassment, spouse-beating, and sado-masochistic pornography are examples of behaviors practiced, sanctioned, or tolerated within patriarchy.I n the realm of environmentally destructive behaviors, strip-mining, factory farming, and pollution of the air, water, and soil are instances of behaviors maintained and sanctioned within patriarchy. They, too, rest on the faulty beliefs that it is okay to "rape the earth," that it is "man's God-given right" to have dominion(that is, domination) over the earth, that nature has only instrumental value, that environmental destruction is the acceptable price we pay for "progress." And the presumption of warism, that war is a natural, righteous, and ordinary way to impose dominion on a people or nation, goes hand in hand with patriarchy and leads to dysfunctional behaviors of nations and ultimately to international unmanageability. Much of the current "unmanageability" of contemporary life in patriarchal societies,(d), is then viewed as a consequence of a patriarchal preoccupation with activities, events, and experiences that reflect historically male gender-identified beliefs, values, attitudes, and assumptions. Included among these are life consequences are precisely those concerns with nuclear proliferation, war, environmental destruction, and violence toward women, which many feminists see as the logical outgrowth of patriarchal thinking. In fact, it is often only through observing these dysfunctional behaviors--the symptoms of dysfunctionality--that one can truly see that and how patriarchy serves to maintain and perpetuate them. When patriarchy is understood as a dysfunctional system, this "unmanageability" can be seen for what it is--as a predictable and thus logical consequence of patriarchy.(11) The theme that global environmental crises, war, and violence generally are predictable and logical consequences of sexism and patriarchal culture is pervasive in ecofeminist literature(see Russell 1989, 2). Ecofeminist Charlene Spretnak, for instance, argues that "**a militarism and warfare are continual features of a patriarchal society because they reflect and instill patriarchal values and fulfill needs of such a system. Acknowledging the context of patriarchal conceptualizations that feed militarism is a first step toward reducing their impact and preserving life on Earth**” (Spretnak 1989, 54). Stated in terms of the foregoing model of patriarchy as a dysfunctional social system, the claims by Spretnak and other feminists take on clearer meaning: Patriarchal conceptual frameworks legitimate impaired thinking (about women, national and regional conflict, the environment) **which is manifested in behaviors which, if continued, will make life on earth difficult, if not impossible**. It is a stark message, but it is plausible. Its plausibility lies in understanding the conceptual roots of various woman-nature-peace connections in regional, national, and global.

**Specifically, the idea of military dominance makes nuclear war inevitable**

**Reardon, 93** (Betty, Women and peace: feminist visions of global security, p.31

A clearly visible element in the escalating tensions among militarized nations is the macho posturing and the patriarchal ideal of *dominance*, not parity, which motivates defense ministers and government leaders to “strut their stuff” as we watch with increasing horror. Most men in our patriarchal culture are still acting out old patterns that are radically inappropriate for the nuclear age. To prove dominance and control, to distance one’s character from that of women, to survive the toughest violent initiation, to shed the sacred blood of the hero, to collaborate with death in order to hold it at bay—all of these patriarchal pressures on men have traditionally reached resolution in ritual fashion on the battlefield. But there is no longer any battlefield. Does anyone seriously believe that if a nuclear power were losing a crucial, large-scale conventional war it would refrain from using its multiple-warhead nuclear missiles because of some diplomatic agreement? The military theater of a nuclear exchange today would extend, instantly or eventually, to all living things, all the air, all the soil, all the water. If we believe that war is a “necessary evil,” that patriarchal assumptions are simply “human nature,” then we are locked into a lie, paralyzed. The ultimate result of unchecked terminal patriarchy will be nuclear holocaust. The causes of recurrent warfare are not biological. Neither are they solely economic. They are also a result of patriarchal ways of thinking, which historically have generated considerable pressure for standing armies to be used.

**The Orientalist notion that Korea must be defended is wrong and makes war inevitable**

**Barkawi 08** (Tarak, lecturer in international security at the Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge, specializes in the study of war, “Orientalism at War in Korea,” <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p252622_index.html>) SLV

Since its publication, Said’s classic text has generated a great deal of scholarship and commentary. Relatively little of this work deals directly with violent conflict.7 Yet, war and violent conflict have always been fundamental to Orientalist discourses. Indeed, the very idea of the West, along with its History, is born in Orientalist conflict. Herodotus elaborated a vision of the Greeks through contrast with the Persian Empire they fought.8 Back then, of course, the Greeks were the weaker party, fighting for their existence on an imperial periphery. A long line of scholars and political and military commentators have made use of cultural materials already well developed in Herodotus—the Persians as a multitudinous mass who threatened to overwhelm the Greeks; their lack of individuality and ‘freedom’; their hierarchical social and political arrangements; their indolence and sensuality; their capacity for, indeed enjoyment of, unreasoning, passionate violence, and so on. Orientalism subsequently has been marked by this extremism, and by this fear, even as the poles of power shifted to favor the putative West of the day. The renaissance recoveries of Greek and Roman traditions, and their subsequent employment in Orientalisms of diverse kind, took place in a Europe poised to begin its modern rise to world dominance. The birth of Orientalist traditions in a context of Western weakness and existential crisis, but subsequently flowering in one of strength and dominance marks also the American experience. Outnumbered and threatened by Indians at the beginning, Puritan traditions of Indian hating became basic to the Frontier, the American West, and beyond to the ground wars in Asia.9 Already evident in the ancient Greek narratives is the basic principle of Orientalist war: the civilizing mission. Roman, British and contemporary American imperialists (along with British publicists who egg them on) continued to draw deeply on this originary stock of cultural resources even as they developed it. The West frames use of force in the non-European world almost always in civilizing terms. The modernization of backward peoples often requires violence, ultimately for their own good. ‘Rollback’ in the Cold War was about liberating the slave world from totalitarian grip. Narratives of peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention partake also of this world of Orientalist war. I want to develop an important aspect of Orientalist constructions that is of great relevance to Korea. This concerns numbers, the idea of an overwhelming Asian horde, which is there right from the start. In the Greek and Persian wars of the fifth and sixth centuries BC, Persian forces outnumbered the Greeks in the major engagements, and of course it was, at that time, the Persians who had invaded Greece. Chroniclers exaggerated the ratio of opposing forces in some cases by orders of magnitude according to modern scholarship. Hans Delbruck suggests Greek oral and dramatic traditions inflated Persian numbers as a way of emphasizing the impressive character of victories won by their citizen soldiers against the professional warriors and noble cavalry of the Persian army. Subsequently, whatever the actual strategic context, whatever the actual relations ofpolitical and military power, this trope of a few outnumbered whites facing off against an Oriental horde that far outnumbers them generally has informed representations of war between the West and Orientalized others. The film 300 (dir. Zack Snyder 2007) is only the most recent example, one that speaks directly to the continued popular vitality of Herodotus’ themes, but there are numerous other examples. In fact, you will have a hard time finding Hollywood war films that do not in one or another involve a few outnumbered Americans.

**Military prostitution in Korea is sustained by racist depictions of Asian women—the legacy of US occupation exacerbates racism in both Asia and the United States**

**Moon** **97** – Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, Department of Political Science and Edith Stix Wasserman Chair of Asian Studies (Katherine, “Sex among Allies” 1997, p. 33-35, MT)

In Olongapo and Angeles in the Philippines, where the U.S. Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base were respectively located (until the withdrawal of U.S. forces in 1992),"[t]here was virtually no industry except the 'entertainment' business, with approximately 55,000 registered and unregistered prostitutes and a total of registered 2,182 R&R establishments. 68By 1985 the U.S. military had become the second largest employer in the Philippines, hiring over 40,000 Filipinos. . . . The sum of their salaries amounted to almost $83 million a year." 69 **Ideologies around race and nationality** have also **contributed to the social inequalities and conflicts**, especially affecting prostitutes, in the U.S. camptown communities in Asia. Enloe writes that"[c]lass and race distinctions **inform all social relations between the U.S. military and the host community**." 70 The racism demonstrated by American soldiers toward Asians in Vietnam and Korea are well-documented. Lloyd Lewis notes that "soldiers in all branches of the armed services [in Vietnam] recount receiving the same indoctrination" **that the "enemy is Oriental and inferior."** 71 The racist terms for Vietnamese--"gook, slant, slope, dink . . . or a half a dozen local variations"—72 had all been employed previously by Americans [toward Japanese in World War II and Koreans and Chinese in the Korean War] to designate yellow-skinned peoples." 73 Max Hastings has noted in his history of the Korean War that the "Eighth Army was forced to issue a forceful order" in the summer of 1951 that soldiers cease" to take a perverse delight in frightening civilians" and attempting to "drive the Koreans off roads and into ditches." The order concluded with "We are not in this country as conquerors. We are here as friends." 74 Hastings also includes a comment by a Marine, Selwyn Handler: "Koreans were just a bunch of gooks. Who cared about the feelings of people like that? We were very smug Americans at that time." 75 Bruce Cumings recounts the racism among Americans, soldiers and diplomats alike, in the late 1960s:"Their racism led them to ask me, because I was living with Koreans and they rarely ventured out to 'the economy,' things like whether it was true that the Korean national dish, *kimch'i,* was fermented in urine." 76 **Racist stereotypes of Asians within the American society have mixed with sexist stereotypes of Asian women** to foster American participation in camptown prostitution in Asia. The main military newspaper, *Stars and Stripes,* encouraged soldiers to explore Korea's "nighttime action," especially the *kisaeng* party, the"ultimate experience": Picture having three or four of the loveliest creatures God ever created hovering around you, singing, dancing, feeding you, washing what they feed you down with rice wine or beer, all saying at once," You are the greatest." This is the Orient you heard about and came to find. 77 A U.S. Army chaplain I interviewed in April 1991 noted the following: What the soldiers have read and heard before ever arriving in a foreign country influence prostitution a lot. For example, **stories about Korean** or Thai **women being** beautiful, **subservient-- they're tall tales**, glamorized. . . . U.S. men would fall in lust with Korean women. **They were property, things, slaves. . . . Racism, sexism--it's all there. The men don't see the women as human beings-**-they're disgusting, things to be thrown away. . . . They speak of the women in the diminutive. 78 On Okinawa, U.S. servicemen from the Kadena Air Base" can be seen in town (Naha) wearing offensive T- shirts" depicting" a woman with the letters LBSM," which means" little brown sex machine." 79 The "brown" refers to the Filipino and Thai women who constitute the majority of military prostitutes on Okinawa. 80 Aida Santos reveals that Olongapo sells a variation on the theme--a popular T-shirt" bearing the message 'Little Brown Fucking Machines Powered with Rice.'" 81 She emphasizes that in the Philippines,"[r]acism and sexism are now seen as a fulcrum in the issue of national sovereignty." 82 **The presence of U.S. military servicemen** **in Asia** **generates significant social transformations** **that affect** both **the** host **Asian society and** the **American society** across the Pacific. Thanh-dam Truong has asserted that the U.S. military's use of Thailand as the major R&R base for U.S. soldiers fighting in Vietnam has spawned the now booming sex tourism industry all across the country, 83 winning Thailand the ignoble title, "Asia's brothel." Filipinos have charged that U.S. servicemen have brought AIDS and HIV into their country. Prostitutes in Olongapo, along with the umbrella feminist organization, GABRIELA, and health organizations, pushed the Philippine government to "obtain a guarantee that all U.S. service personnel coming into the Philippines be tested for HIV." 84 In 1988, the Philippines Immigration Commissioner required all U.S. servicemen entering the Philippines to present certificates verifying that they are AIDS-free. 85 In addition, sexual relations between American men and Asian prostitutes have created a living legacy of mixed-raced children who are rejected by both their mother's and father's societies. Maria Socorro"Cookie" Diokno, an active leader in the Philippines' anti-base movement, has referred to the children born of American servicemen and Asian women as "Amerasian 'souvenir' bab[ies]." 86 ABC's *Prime Time* (May 13, 1993) depicted Amerasian children in the Philippines who had been abandoned by their soldier-fathers and were living with their impoverished mothers, scavenging for food among heaps of rubble and waste. Enloe reports that"[o]f the approximately 30,000 children born each year of Filipino mothers and American fathers, some 10,000 [were] thought to become street children, many of them working as prostitutes servicing American pedophiles." 8 Enloe adds that a Filipino "insider" has noted that many others have been sold, with" Caucasian-looking children . . . allegedly sold for $50-200 (around P1,000-4,000), whereas the Negro-fathered ones fetch only $25-30 (around P500-600)." 88 Johnston's Mom in Songt'an, Korea, also tried to give up her sons to adoption, after earlier having given up a daughter. But in the end, she could not bear to do it and went back to prostitution in order to keep her boys. 89 In the film, *Camp Arirang,* one barwoman in Songt'an laments the need to give up her half African-American son one day; black Amerasian children are most shunned in Korean society, so most mothers try to send them to the United States for a chance at education and a future. She has already torn up all photographs of herself with her son because she knows she must let him go. In a voice cracking with emotion, she calmly says, "All I want him to know is that he was born in Korea, that his mother is Korean, and that she is dead. It will be easier for him that way." The withdrawal of U.S. naval bases from the Philippines in 1992 also left behind a legacy of approximately 50,000 Amerasian children in the Philippines, with an estimated 10,000 of them living in Olongapo, which had housed the U.S. Subic Naval Base. The law firm of Cotchett, Illston, and Pitre of Burlingame, California, filed a class action suit against the U.S. government on behalf of Amerasian children left behind in the Philippines in March 1993. 90 The plaintiffs would "ask the federal court to order the Navy to provide funds for the education and medical care of these children until they reach 18 years of age." 91 The prostitute- mothers of these children and several leading Philippine civic organizations, such as GABRIELA, as well as the Council of Churches, mobilized such legal action. Asian societies have borne the burden of the painful repercussions of militarized prostitution, but the American society has not gone untouched. Many of the prostitutes who end up divorced from their GI husbands (an estimated 80% of Korean-GI marriages end up in divorce) 92 go back into prostitution around military camp areas in the United States. 93 In the film *The Women Outside,* officials from the Mayor's Office of Midtown Enforcement in Manhattan state that some U.S. servicemen have been paid by flesh traffickers to marry women in Korea and bring them to the United States for work in massage parlors and brothels.

**Racism is evil and must be resisted for humanity to survive**

**Memmi 2k** (Albert, Professor Emeritus of Sociology @ U of Paris, Naiteire, Racism, Translated by Steve Martinot, p. 163-165)

The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved. Yet for this very reason, it is a struggle to be undertaken without surcease and without concessions. One cannot be indulgent toward racism. One cannot even let the monster in the house, especially not in a mask. To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people, which is to diminish what is human. To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. It is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim (and which [person] man is not [themself] himself an outsider relative to someone else?). Racism illustrates in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated; that is it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is. and always in question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animality to humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. However, it remains true that one's moral conduct only emerges from a choice: one has to want it. It is a choice among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking, that the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order for which racism is the very negation. This is almost a redundancy. One cannot found a moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism because racism signifies the exclusion of the other and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical point of view, if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is "the truly capital sin."fn22 It is not an accident that almost all of humanity's spiritual traditions counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice, because injustice engenders violence and death Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. But no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed, All unjust society contains within itself the seeds of its own death. It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. "Recall," says the Bible, "that you were once a stranger in Egypt," which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming once again someday. It is an ethical and a practical appeal -- indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality. Because, in the end. The ethical choice commands the political choice. A just society must be a society accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.

**Hence the plan:**

**The United States federal government should substantially reduce its military presence in South Korea.**

**Contention Two: Solvency**

**Intervening at the site of military prostitution allows us to challenge the masculine international order as a whole**

**Enloe 93** – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “Bananas, Beaches and Bases” p. 16-18 MT)

It's true that in international politics women historically have not had access to the resources enabling them to wield influence. Today women are at the bottom of most international hierarchies: women are routinely paid less than even the lowest-paid men in multinational companies; women are two thirds of all refugees. Women activists have a harder time influencing struggling ethnic nationalist movements than do men; women get less of the ideological and job rewards from fighting in foreign was than do men. Though a pretty dismal picture, it can tell us a lot about how the international political system has been designed and how it is maintained every day: some men at the top, most women at the bottom. But in many arenas of power feminists have been uncovering a reality that is less simple. First, they have discovered that some women's class aspirations and their racist fears lured them into the role of controlling other women for the sake of imperial rule. British, American, Dutch, French, Spanish, Portuguese women may not have been the architects of their countries' colonial policies, but many of them took on the roles of colonial administrators' wives, missionaries, travel writers and anthropologists in ways that tightened the noose of colonial rule around the necks of African, Latin American and Asian women. To describe colonization as a process that has been carried on solely by men overlooks the ways in which male colonizers' success depended on some women's complicity. Without the willingness of 'respectable' women to see that colonization offered them an opportunity for adventure, or a new chance of financial security or moral commitment, colonization would have been even more problematic. 12 Second, feminists who listen to women working for multinational corporations have heard these women articulate their own strategies for coping with their husbands' resentment, their foremen's sexual harassment and the paternalism of male union leaders. To depict these women merely as passive victims in the international politics of the banana or garment industries doesn't do them justice. It also produces an inaccurate picture of how these global systems operate. Corporate executives and development technocrats need some women to depend on cash wages; they need some women to see a factory or plantation job as a means of delaying marriage or fulfilling daughterly obligations. Without women's own needs, values and worries, the global assembly line would grind to a halt. But many of those needs, values and worries are defined by patriarchal structures and strictures. If fathers, brothers, husbands didn't gain some privilege, however small in global terms, from women's acquiescence to those confining notions of femininity, it might be much harder for the foreign executives and their local élite allies to recruit the cheap labor they desire. Consequently, women's capacity to challenge the men in their families, their communities or their political movements, will be a key to remaking the world. 'So what?' one may ask. A book about international politics ought to leave one with a sense that 'I can do something'. A lot of books about international politics don't. They leave one with the sense that 'it's all so complex, decided by people who don't know or care that I exist'. The spread of capitalist economics, even in countries whose officials call themselves socialists, can feel as inevitable as the tides. Governments' capacity to wound people, to destroy environments and dreams, is constantly expanding through their use of science and bureaucracy. International relationships fostered by these governments and their allies use our labor and our imaginations, but it seems beyond our reach to alter them. They have added up to a world that can dilute the liveliest of cultures, a world that can turn tacos and sushi into bland fast foods, globalize video pornography and socialize men from dozens of cultures into a common new culture of technocratic management. One closes most books on 'international political economy' with a sigh. They explain how it works, but that knowledge only makes one feel as though it is more rewarding to concentrate on problems closer to home. Hopefully, the chapters that follow will provoke quite a different feeling. They suggest that the world is something that has been made; therefore, it can be remade. The world has been made with blunt power, but also with sleights of hand. Perhaps international **policy-makers** find it more 'manly' to think of themselves as dealing in guns and money rather than in notions of femininity. So they and most of their critics as well have tried to hide and deny their reliance on women as feminized workers, as respectable and loyal wives, as 'civilizing influences', as sex objects, as obedient daughters, as unpaid farmers, as coffee-serving campaigners, as consumers and tourists. **If we can expose their dependence on feminizing women, we can show that this world system is also dependent on artificial notions of masculinity**: this seemingly overwhelming world system may be more fragile and **open to radical change** than we have been led to imagine. Some women have already begun the difficult process of trying to create a new international political system. Many point to the conference in Nairobi, Kenya, in 1985 to mark the end of the United Nations Decade of Women as a watershed. For eighty years Nairobi women had been trying to build new international alliances, especially to end men's exclusive right to vote in national elections and **to end the exploitation of women as** mothers and as **prostitutes by national and imperial armies**. Some of those efforts made international élites nervous. Occasionally, they wittingly or unwittingly entrenched gendered hierarchies of international power. They elevated motherhood to a political status; they made feminine respectability a criterion for political legitimacy; they proposed that white women should be the political mentors of women of color. An international feminist alliance, as we will see, doesn't automatically weaken male-run imperialist ventures. In the late 1980s there are fresh understandings, therefore, of the ways in which international feminist theorizing and organizing has to be rooted in clear explanations of how women from different, often unequal societies, are used to sustain the world patterns that feminists seek to change. Women organizing to challenge UN agencies, the International Monetary Fund or multinational corporations are developing theory and strategies simultaneously. A feminist international campaign lacking a feminist analysis of international politics is likely to subvert its own ultimate goals. Among the sectors 'subsystems' of the world political system that are being most affected by internationalized feminist organizing today are prostitution; population politics; development assistance; military alliances; textile and electronics production. It takes a lot of information-gathering, a lot of thinking, a lot of trial and error and a lot of emotionally draining work to understand how notions about **femininity and masculinity create and sustain global inequalities and oppressions** in just one of these sectors. Yet a truly effective international feminism requires us to make sense of how patriarchal ideas and practices link all of these sectors to each other and to other relationships whose gendered dynamics we have scarcely begun to fathom.

**The notion that America must protect its vulnerable allies maintains partriarchy—the reasons for the plan are significant because they cast it as a challenge to patriarchy rather than a cosmetic change in the patriarchal system**

**Enloe 93** – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “Bananas, Beaches and Bases” p. 11-15 MT)

**Making women invisible hides the workings of both femininity and masculinity in international politics**. Some women watching the Iran/Contra hearings found it useful to speculate about how the politics of masculinity shape foreign-policy debates. They considered the verbal rituals that public men use to blunt the edges of their mutual antagonism. A congressman would, for instance, preface a devastating attack on Admiral Poindexter's rationale for destroying a document by reassuring the admiral and his male colleagues that he believed the admiral was 'honorable' and 'a gentleman'. Another congressman would insist that, despite his differences with Reagan officials Robert McFarlane and Oliver North, he considered them to be 'patriots'. Would these same male members of Congress, selected for this special committee partly because they had experience of dealing with military officers and foreign-policy administrators, have used the word 'honorable' if the witness had been a woman? Would 'patriot' have been the term of respect if these men had been commending a woman? There appeared to be a platform of trust holding up these investigations of US foreign policy. It was a **platform that was supported by pillars of masculinity**, pillars that were **never subjected to political scrutiny**, but **which had to be maintained by daily personal exchanges**, memos **and** formal **policy**. A theme that surfaced repeatedly during the weeks of the Iran/Contra hearings was 'We live in a dangerous world'. Critics as well as supporters of selling arms to Iran and using the profits to fund the Contras were in agreement on this view of the world in 1987. No one chimed in with, 'Well, I don't know; it doesn't feel so dangerous to me.' **No one questioned this portrayal of the world as permeated by risk and violence**. **No one even attempted to redefine 'danger'** by suggesting that the world may indeed be dangerous, but especially so for those people who are losing access to land or being subjected to unsafe contraceptives. Instead, the vision that informed these male officials' foreign-policy choices was of a world in which two super-powers were eyeball-to-eyeball, where small risks were justified in the name of staving off bigger risks the risk of Soviet expansion, the risk of nuclear war. It was a world in which **taking risks was proof of one's manliness and therefore of one's qualification to govern**. Listening to these officials, I was struck by the similarity to the 'manliness' now said to be necessary for success in the international financial markets. With Britain's 'Big Bang', which deregulated its financial industry, and with the French and Japanese deregulators following close behind, financial observers began to warn that the era of gentlemanliness in banking was over. British, European and Japanese bankers and stockbrokers would now have to adopt the more robust, competitive form of manliness associated with American bankers. It wouldn't necessarily be easy. There might even be some resistance. Thus international finance and international diplomacy seem to be converging in their notions of the world and the kind of masculinity required to wield power in that world in the 1990s. 8 At first glance, this portrayal of danger and risk is a familiar one, rooted in capitalist and Cold War ideology. But when it's a patriarchal world that is 'dangerous', masculine men and feminine women are expected to react in opposite but complementary ways. A 'real man' will become the protector in such a world. He will suppress his own fears, brace himself and step forward to defend the weak, women and children. In the same 'dangerous world' women will turn gratefully and expectantly to their fathers and husbands, real or surrogate. If a woman is a mother, then she will think first of her children, protecting them not in a manly way, but as a self-sacrificing mother. In this fashion, **the 'dangerous world'** evoked repeatedly in the Iran/Contra hearings **is upheld by unspoken notions about masculinity. Ideas of masculinity have to be perpetuated to justify foreign-policy risk-taking**. To accept the Cold War interpretation of living in a 'dangerous' world also confirms the segregation of politics into national and international. The national political arena is dominated by men but allows women some select access; the international political arena is a sphere for men only, or for those rare women who can successfully play at being men, or at least not shake masculine presumptions. Notions of masculinity aren't necessarily identical across generations or across cultural boundaries. An Oliver North may be a peculiarly American phenomenon. He doesn't have a carbon copy in current British or Japanese politics. Even the Hollywood character 'Rambo', to whom so many likened Oliver North, may take on rather different meanings in America, Britain and Japan. 9 A Lebanese Shiite militiaman may be fulfilling an explicitly masculinist mandate, but it would be a mistake to collapse the values he represents into those of a British SAS officer or an American 'Rambo'. Introducing masculinity into a discussion of international politics, and thereby making men visible as men, should prompt us to explore differences in the politics of masculinity between countries and between ethnic groups in the same country. These differences have ignited nationalist movements which have challenged the existing international order, dismantling empires, ousting foreign bases, expropriating foreign mines and factories. But there have been nationalist movements which have engaged in such world challenges without upsetting patriarchal relationships within that nation. It is important, I think, to understand which kinds of nationalist movement rely on the perpetuation of patriarchal ideas of masculinity for their international political campaigns and which kinds see redefining masculinity as integral to re-establishing national sovereignty. **Women do not benefit automatically every time the international system is re-ordered** by a successful nationalist movement. **It has taken awareness, questioning** and organizing by women inside those nationalist movements to turn nationalism into something good for women. In conventional commentaries men who wield influence in international politics are analyzed in terms of their national identities, their class origins and their paid work. Rarely are they analyzed as men who have been taught how to be manly, how to size up the trustworthiness or competence of other men in terms of their manliness. If international commentators do find masculinity interesting, it is typically when they try to make sense of 'great men' Teddy Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Mao Tset'ung not when they seek to understand humdrum plantation workers or foreign tourists. Such men's presumptions about how to be masculine in doing their jobs, exercising influence, or seeking relief from stress are made invisible. Here are some examples: In 1806 executives of the Northwest Company decided it was no longer good international company politics for their trappers to take Native Canadian women as their wives; they calculated that it was more advantageous to encourage their Canadian white male employees to import European women. That was a self-conscious use of power to reshape the relationships between women and men for the sake of achieving specific international goals. The decisions of managers in London altered the way in which Canada was integrated into the British empire. It was an imperial strategy that relied on the currencies of gender and race. 10 When US Defense Department officials insisted that the Philippines government take responsibility for conducting physical examinations of all women working in the bars around the American military bases in the Philippines, it affected the lives of thousands of young Filipinas and sent a clear message to thousands of American sailors and Air Force pilots. The message symbolized the unequal alliance between the US and Philippines governments. Its implementation rooted that government-to-government inequality in the everyday lives of American military men and Filipino working women.11 The chapters that follow explore some accepted arenas of international politics: nationalist movements, diplomacy, military expansion, international debt. However, we will examine these familiar realms from unconventional vantage points. We will listen to male nationalist leaders worrying about their women abandoning traditional feminine roles. Those masculine worries and nationalist women's responses to them will be taken as seriously as male nationalists' strategies for ousting colonial rulers. We will look at diplomacy by listening to wives of foreign-service careerists. To understand how military alliances actually work, we will consider the experiences of women who live and work around military bases and women who have camped outside those bases in protest. We will explore bankers' international operations by paying attention to women who have to live on austerity budgets or work in factories, hotels and other people's kitchens in order for government debts to be serviced. Later chapters explore areas assumed to fall outside 'international politics'. Looking at fashions in clothing and food sheds light on the relationships between affluent and developing countries. The often difficult relationships between domestic servants and the middle-class women who hire them will be examined to make sense of new trends in international politics. We will take a close look at the foreign travel of Victorian women explorers and present-day businessmen to understand how power between countries is made and challenged. We will listen to women married to diplomats in order to see to what extent governments' foreign-policy machinery depends on notions of wifely duty.

**Reducing Military presence alone doesn’t solve—we must prioritize an understanding of masculinity and femininity to truly demilitarize and break the cycle of militarization and patriarchal attitudes.**

**Enloe 93** – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War” p. 21-31 MT)

It is a misplaced hope. For the significant work now being done on masculinity is not a repopulating of the political landscape with men in the name of postmodernism. Rather, those conducting the valuable investigations of masculinity start from the essential feminist discovery that **we can make sense of men's gendered reactions only if we take women's experiences seriously**. Indeed, the more we have learned about the deliberate efforts to circumscribe women's behavior, the more we have exposed the human decision making that undergirds much of masculinity. We don't yet have feminist-informed studies of such male-dominated institutions as the United Nations Security Council or the Central Intelligence Agency. But the day when we will may not be far off. Already we have a Canadian feminist's analysis of the International Labor Organization.17 And there are North American, European, and Japanese feminist scholars energetically at work right now charting the **masculinist assumptions** that have **guided** the distinctively **post-World War II** profession of **international relations research**.18 The 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe brought about the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and a surge of demilitarization. But although Polish, Czech, Hungarian, East German, and Romanian women played central roles in the grass-roots organizing that made the eventual upheavals possible, this demilitarization was not guided by feminist insights into the causes of militarization.19 In a mirror image of Western anti-Communist regimes' needing the symbol of the overworked, "unfeminine" Soviet or Polish woman to justify their Cold War policies, the Communist regimes had depended on feminism's being so tainted by its association with Western bourgeois individualism that no woman in their own nations would be inspired by feminist analyses or aspirations. Without the image of the self-absorbed, materialistic, man-hating Western feminist to combat, the restlessness of women in Eastern Europe might have translated into gender-conscious political action much earlier. Olga Havel might have become famous in her own right rather than as an imprisoned playwright's loyal wife. But, unlike the revolutions in Eritrea and Nicaragua, most of those in Eastern Europe were informed by only the faintest glimmers of organized feminist consciousness. Thus, men were not challenged to rethink their own masculinist presumptions about power or public life until after the Communist regimes had crumbled. East Germany initially appeared to provide a contrast. Cities such as Berlin, Dresden, and Weimar were the sites of feminist organizing in 1989. 20 It often appeared ahead of male-led organizing because the regime was preoccupied with monitoring the masculinized coffee houses and universities and thus was caught unprepared for the political activism that flowed out of the theaters and the churches, sites of women's organizing. During those turbulent autumn months, women's groups presented detailed platforms, built diverse umbrella organizations, and mobilized thousands of women in public rallies. For a while they couldn't be ignored by the male contestants for power. They wedged their way into the bargaining rooms and into the transitional regime. But even these consciously feminist women of East Germany couldn't direct the course of the next stage, the government-to-government bargaining sessions that ultimately produced German reunification. Whereas the bringing down of the old regime had been a process shaped by struggles between politicized women and men in East Germany, German reunification was a virtually all-male political process. Soon after, many East German women joined many East German men in voting for Helmut Kohl's Christian Democratic Party, with its promises of material wellbeing and free markets. Those few feminists who warned that reunification without feminist guarantees could be a disaster for women were seen as out of step. Even they might have found it hard to believe that, within two years after reunification, 12 percent of single mothers in eastern Germany would be among the ranks of the unemployed.21 Democratization and demilitarization have commonly been presumed to serve women's interests. **Demilitarization loosens the bond between men and the state; thus, it should make the state more transparent and porous**. Democratization simultaneously opens up the public spaces; thus, it should permit more voices to be heard and policy agendas to be reimagined. **But such changes will take place only if the** two **processes are not designed in such a way as to reprivilege masculinity**. The democratic elections of 1990 in Eastern Europe revealed the tenacity of patriarchy. The results of these elections made invisible women's contributions to creating the conditions that made these elections possible: ·The percentage of women in Czechoslovakia's parliament dropped from 29.3 to 8.6. ·The percentage of women in Poland's parliament dropped from 20.2 to 13.5. ··The percentage of women in Hungary's parliament plummeted from 26.6 to 7.2. ·In the pre-reunification election of March 1990, the percentage of women in East Germany's parliament slipped from 33.6 to 20.5; parliamentary elections in December for a unified German legislature managed to return the same proportion of women, 20.5 percent. ·· The percentage of women in Romania's parliament fell from 34.4 to 5.5. 22 It is not that those Cold War legislatures in which Eastern European women had held a quarter or a third of the seats had wielded effective influence. They hadn't. But that may be the point. Demilitarization and democratization together infused these once drab and impotent bodies with new vitality and new power. Legislatures became places where one could give meaningful voice to public concerns. Even in Poland, where a conservative woman has been made prime minister, the legislative agenda which assigns priority to restricting Polish women's freedom of reproductive choice is being hammered out with little organized influence by Polish women.23 If a man had never felt comfortable spending his waking hours fixing his car or building a garden shed, now he had an alternative outlet for his energies. It was precisely because the legislatures were transformed by the end of the Cold War that they became, in many men's eyes, worthy loci for re-emergent civic activism. Legislatures became thereby places too important to allow more than a handful of women. Does the democratization of parliaments equal the defeminization of parliaments? While Eastern European nations' legislatures have been masculinized, their popular cultures have been sexualized. As women have filed out of the parliaments, they have walked into proliferating beauty contests, franchised brothels, free-enterprise escort services, and joint-venture overseas marriage services. 24 Nor have they done so necessarily against their wills. Russian and Eastern European feminist social commentators who have observed the postrevolutionary traumas of the last several years explain that consumerism is being woven into the democratized fabric of civic life in ways that co-opt many women in their own objectification. "Now there are calendars full of nude women everywhere in the ministry." A Czech feminist who worked in her country's environmental affairs ministry is describing the new bureaucratic culture of post-1989 Prague. Such sexist expressions were defined as pornography and prohibited under the old regime. But with the emergence of capitalism and liberalism in the 1990s, nude women's photos on office walls have become so commonplace that most women office workers feel they have no space to object. "And imagine what it's like coming into a colleague's office to discuss a policy. You sit down and have to put your cup of coffee on a glass-topped coffee table which is displaying assorted cut-out photographs of nude women."25 Some women even seem to be taking pleasure in the widespread availability of pornography. The shriveled consumer markets of the Cold War the price paid for Cold War expenditures on bloated armies and protected weapons factories nurtured aspirations among the double-burdened women that can only now be pursued: for beauty, for pleasure, for financial security, for the marriageable man with a good income and a two-car garage. Filipina feminists allied with women working as prostitutes servicing American sailors around Subic Bay naval base learned what Eastern European feminists trying to create a nascent women's movement today are learning (and what impatient American feminists still may have to learn): any woman hoping to sow the seeds of political consciousness must take other women's desires and even fantasies seriously. Those fantasies could throw light on how political priorities constructed in one era shape women's attitudes toward themselves and the men in their lives in the following era. Writing off as merely a victim of false consciousness a Russian woman who sends her name to a new marriage service for American men risks missing a chance to gain a new understanding of how the post Cold War world is being constructed.Like militarization, demilitarization is sexualized. Men returning from wars have sexual expectations. Fathering is one form of demilitarized citizenship. A year after victory but still in desert fatigues, proud men hold up their newborn babies. No women are inside the photographer's frame. But they are more than bit players in any country's demilitarization. Other men return from war zones anxious about jobs, not just for their own well-being but with a sense of the male breadwinner's familial responsibilities. With the many-stranded winding-down of the Cold War, wars have been ending often raggedly in Angola, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Namibia, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Lebanon. Each of these wars was fueled by its own particular internal sparks its class disparities, factional rivalries, and ethnicized oppressions. But each was prolonged and made more ferocious by American and Soviet infusions of direct and indirect aid and encouragement, sometimes to the regime and sometimes to the insurgents. To end each of these Cold War proxy wars, thousands of men must be persuaded to change their ideas of what is right and natural and even pleasurable to do as men. Militarized forms of manliness may be all that some of the younger Cambodian, Lebanese, or Ethiopian men have known. The precise recipes for militarized masculinity will differ, however. Each man's willingness to hand in his grenade launcher or his combat boots and to imagine a demilitarized role for himself in his society will depend on his own experiences as a vigilante, a death squad assassin, an army conscript, a unit commander, or a nighttime civil guard. Perhaps he has been humiliated by other men and thus sees demilitarization as a chance to regain his manly dignity. Or perhaps he has felt more important in his military role than he ever did as a shopkeeper or civil servant. He may have been embarrassed in front of his buddies when he vomited every time he saw a person being wounded. Or he may have felt energized by his new license to wield violent force. Perhaps he found emotional satisfaction in a rarely felt intensity of friendship among men. Or perhaps he felt lonely, deprived of the support and comfort formerly supplied by his wife or mother. Just how a man (or adolescent boy) has experienced militarization and how willingly he sheds the habits and expectations of militarization will redound on the women he returns to. His new definition of his masculinity or his refusal to redefine his identity will be played out in his family life, in his interactions with women workmates, and in his exchanges with women who are perfect strangers. Each of these women, in turn, will be counted on, as she always has been, to coax, absorb, sacrifice, and tutor. Some women, however, may not want to give up their jobs, may not want to have another child, may have grown used to having sex only on occasional leaves, or may not think donning a veil is a proper price for peace (in the home or in the government). These women may rebel against the sorts of expectations leaders will try to impose on them in the name of post Cold War ''political stabilization." It can take years to demilitarize a society. **Masculinity and femininity will be among the political territories where the struggles for demilitarization will have to be played out**. Vietnamese women and men are still in the process of demilitarization, long after most Americans and Europeans have turned their attention elsewhere. During 1990-92 alone, 500,000 Vietnamese soldiers overwhelmingly male were demobilized. 26 Some had fought in the earlier war against the United States and its Saigon ally. Many were young boys then but were conscripted to fight the succeeding war in neighboring Cambodia. The conclusion of that conflict, due in large measure to the new cooperation between Washington and Moscow, has reunited husbands and wives after long separations. It has also thrown thousands of men onto the already strained Vietnamese labor market, causing the regime to feel nervous over the lack of jobs for men who believe they have made patriotic sacrifices. These scores of male veterans are searching for jobs at a time when Hanoi is cutting support to unprofitable state companies. Women's own waged work, as well as the continuing high birth rate, have thus become issues not simply of economic planning but also of demilitarization. It is no coincidence that prostitution has spread. Local Women's Federation activists are expressing alarm. Vietnamese journalists estimate that there are now one hundred thousand women working as prostitutes in Ho Chi Minh City and another thirty thousand in Hanoi.27 We often think that increasing numbers of women are pressed into prostitution because of militarization. But **there are forms of demilitarization** such as in Russia or Vietnam **that can bring rising prostitution**, as men look for new enterprises and as women are displaced from other forms of livelihood. In September 1991, the Hanoi newspaper Lao Dong reported that "hundreds of girls have been sold to brothels in Phnom Penh and southern China."28 An American reporter assigned to Phnom Penh in early 1992 went to the disco at Le Royal Hotel, only to see "swarms of Vietnamese prostitutes descend on unaccompanied men." He offhandedly speculated that, "with lighter skins and more experience than Cambodian women, they dominate the market, and apparently find Phnom Penh more profitable than Saigon."29 These articles did not explore what these Vietnamese women had done before working as prostitutes, who had transported them to Cambodia or southern China, or who owned the brothels in which some of them worked. Prostitutes were mentioned either as features on the landscape or as indicators of economic stress**. Women working as prostitutes requiring radical reformations of existing state defense institutions** in El Salvador, South Africa, Cambodia, and Lebanon. Every one of these new militaries will prompt government officials to make decisions about whether to recruit women, whether to inaugurate compulsory military service, how to instill discipline and enthusiasm in young men, and whether to acknowledge homosexuality in the ranks. These decisions are only the beginning. Governments creating new militaries will also make deliberate decisions about whether to manipulate masculinized ethnic stereotypes to enhance officers' authority, how to control soldiers' wives, whether to condone military prostitution with what safeguards for male soldiers and whether to turn a blind eye to wife battering within soldiers' homes. As they reach these decisions, to which existing militaries will they look to provide models? Canada? Finland? The United States? India? It is important to record which groups are invited to sit around the policymaking table when these crucial decisions are made. Whose credentials will be deemed relevant those of prostitutes? Of school teachers? Of mothers? The large industrial states are reacting to the end of the rivalry between the great powers by forecasting substantial personnel reductions "downsizing" is the American bureaucratic term. But cutting back on the number of soldiers a military needs is never a simple numerical operation. Will African-American women, who currently comprise 45 percent of all the women in the U.S. Army's rank and file, make up such a large percentage after the cuts? In the wake of the Los Angeles riots, will there be more pressures on the Pentagon to continue to serve as a major socializer of African-American men, even if this means organizing troop reductions so that more white soldiers are given early demobilization? 31 If German leaders respond to calls to end male conscription and introduce an all-volunteer force, will women be allowed to enlist in greater numbers than they are now? What about Turkish-German men? And what will happen to the peculiar relationship of Scottish men to the British army if historic Scottish regiments are merged into less regionally distinct units? If the Gurkha Brigade falls under the same British budgetary ax, will Nepali notions of masculinity undergo a profound transformation? **A substantially reduced military is rarely just a smaller military**. Cuts in any military's personnel usually alter significantly its relationships to the women and men in the country's various social classes and ethnic communities. Not all of the militaries being created, redesigned, or proposed are being tied to orthodox, sovereign nation-states. French and German officials have proposed the formation of a new European defense force under the aegis of the previously dormant WEU, the Western European Union. Such a force has the attraction to some of being separate from NATO and at arm's length from U.S. influence. Simultaneously, the United Nations peacekeeping forces, drawn from the militaries of its member states, are being looked upon by the governments of many industrialized and Third World countries as offering the best hope for a genuinely post Cold War, non imperialist military. Others worry that so much preoccupation with the UN's new military responsibilities will draw money and value away from the organization's less glamorous, somewhat less masculinized development efforts. Like any other institution, the United Nations is susceptible to masculinization and militarization. Thus we are entering a period of global history when perhaps more new militaries are being designed and launched than at any time since the multiplication of new states during the decolonialization of the 1950s. However, the point is not that militaries have been fixed institutions during the Cold War and are only now being projected into uncertain orbit. A military isn't like a Georgia O'Keeffe painting or an I. M. Pei building when it's done it's done. A military is forever in a state of becoming like a compost heap. The questions we must pose today to understand just what is happening in the Ukraine or South Africa are questions we should have been asking of any military in 1951 and 1985. They are questions that come out of an awareness that any government trying to use its military to sustain its domestic authority and its influence with other states will attempt to use ideas about femininity and masculinity as well as ideas about race and class to get the armed force it feels it can trust. At this moment, then, someone in the corridors of Estonia's fledgling defense ministry is mulling over whether gay men and lesbians should be allowed into the country's new military. That decision is not a foregone conclusion. It never has been a foregone conclusion not in any country's military since homosexuality became an object of explicit state manipulation in the twentieth century. So there will be memos, discussions, advice from psychologists, off-the-record anecdotes, and sly asides. Faxes will likely be sent to Brussels to ask NATO about the policies of its fifteen allies on homosexual soldiering. Back will come faxes saying that the Dutch and Canadians no longer see heterosexuality as a requisite for effective soldiering, while the Americans and British do, though with far less confidence than they did even five years ago. Of principal concern for designers of the Estonian military will no doubt be the question of whether permitting gay men and lesbians to soldier will enhance or jeopardize the new military in the eyes of the country's citizenry. Another matter for official debate will be whether a homosexual man lacks the sort of manly qualities presumed to be needed to wield a gun, follow orders, risk physical danger, and support fellow soldiers under stress. Lesbians will be considered quite differently. If the Estonian bureaucratic discussions sound at all like those in the United States, Canada, and elsewhere, then Baltic concern over lesbians will be voiced in terms of their being "too" compatible, not incompatible, with soldiering. In the London headquarters of the once-somnolent WEU, another official is having to figure out how to respond to the official referred to as Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman. She is formally titled the vice-chairman of the WEU's Defense Committee, so she cannot be dismissed cavalierly. Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman has submitted a formal report that surveyed the status of women in the union's member forces and found it wanting. She and her committee have looked forward to the mid-1990s, when in all probability a number of WEU forces that now rely on male conscriptionsuch as France, Germany, and Italywill have forsaken that personnel formula and moved toward volunteerism. At that point, she predicts, there will be more appreciation for the skills, educational attainments, and commitment that women can bring to soldiering. She and her colleagues urge the entire WEU not to drag its feet until that day arrives, but instead to take the initiative now to lower the barriers which are keeping the proportion of women in the military well below 10 percent throughout Western Europe. If the WEU is to play a more active role in postCold War security arrangements, it cannot afford to deprive itself of such potentially valuable "manpower." Nor can it afford to be so far out of step with changes in all other sectors of European socioeconomic life. 32 Portugal, with one of the most patriarchal of Western European militaries, is moving in the direction the report recommends. In 1992, the Portugese defense ministry cautiously opened the officer corps to women. Joana Costa Reis, a twenty-five-year-old student of modern languages, was one of the first applicants for the fifteen slots. She thought officer training would allow her to pursue her interests in camping, survival skills, and guns. She was joined by twenty-three-year-old Rosa Maria Santos, who quit her job in order to pursue a career in the army.33 At about the same time, Japan's Self-Defense Agency admitted thirty-nine women cadets into the National Defense Academy. Upon graduation, they will become the first women officers in Japan's military.34 The creation and reorganization of so many military institutions are occurring at a time when gay men and lesbians are more vocal and better organized politically in a wider array of countries than ever before. Militaries have never conducted their discussions about the sorts of sexuality they deemed best suited for soldiering under such a public gaze. Not that there is agreement among gay and lesbian activists in any country over whether military service offers a chance for homosexuals to gain first-class citizenship. What is true, however, is that discussions of such topics among gay men and lesbians have served to underscore for everyone the state-sanctioned artificiality of the heterosexualized soldier.35 Similarly, the question of how and when to use women to compensate for shortages of the kinds of men the government trusts with its weaponry can no longer be addressed within the safe confines of ministerial offices. Women officers in NATO have their own organizations. Civilian feminists, women legislators, and civil rights lawyers in the United States, Canada, and Scandinavia monitor closely their governments' responses to sexual harassment and discrimination in promotions as well as any refinements in the definition of combat. As among gay men and lesbians, however, there is no consensus among feminists about how women should regard military service. Some feminists in each of these countries see the state's military as a potential site for economic advancement and for political legitimation and never use the concept of militarism to gauge that military's impact on the social order. Other feminists start with questions about militarism. They begin their assessment of their country's military with a wary belief that a military is essentially a patriarchal institution, even if it occasionally sees fit to enlist women into its fold. 36 As each new country joins the ranks of nonconscription militaries and as governments are tempted to reach out to at least a small sector of women, these debates will grow more common. They are already going on in Italy.37 The form of military force that is inspiring perhaps the greatest hope is the United Nations peacekeeping force. It inspires optimism because it seems to perform military duties without being militaristic. And its troops at first glance appear to escape the distorting dynamics of militarism because they may not depend so heavily on patriarchal masculinity. According to one UN official, who observed UN peacekeeping soldiers in Namibia in the 1980s, local women seemed to view men soldiering under the UN's banner as less alienating, more approachable, and perhaps more trustworthy than men soldiering for any of the several rival governments. This official reported that she witnessed a higher proportion of marriages between UN soldiers and local women than she believed had occurred between, for instance, American soldiers and local women in Korea.38 To date we in fact know amazingly little about what happens to a male soldier's sense of masculine license when he dons the blue helmet or armband of the United Nations peacekeeper. The contents of formal agreements, or "codes of conduct," between the United Nations Secretary and specific host officials are kept secret. This makes it difficult, for instance, for women in a host country to find out what suppositions about male peacekeeping soldiers' sexuality are written into the code's provisions for health and policing. The crucial question may be whether soldiering for a state calls forth different notions of masculinity than soldiering for a nonstate international agency does. What exactly happens to a Canadian or Fijian male soldier's presumptions about violence, about femininity, about enemies, or about his own sexuality when he is placed in the position of maintaining peace between two warring armies? If a man can discard inclinations and presumptions with just the switch from one set of stenciled initials to another, it may mean that militarized masculinity is only shirtsleeve-deep. 39 Any United Nations peacekeeping unit whether in Bosnia, Cambodia, or Somaliais in practice a compilation of soldiers enlisted in and trained by particular states. There is no direct UN recruitment. There is no UN basic training. From the UN-sanctioned action in Korea in the 1950s through the UN-sanctioned action in the Persian Gulf in 1991, U.S. presidents refused to allow U.S. soldiers to be commanded by anyone but a U.S. officer. Only in early 1993 did President Bill Clinton permit a small group of noncombat soldiers left behind as peacekeepers in Somalia to be commanded by a non-American, a Turkish general operating under UN authority. On the other hand, there are certain governments which have quite consciously viewed UN peacekeeping as a priority mission for their soldiers, and this purpose has undoubtedly filtered down through the ranks in as yet unanalyzed ways. Ireland, Fiji, India, Ghana, Finland, and Malaysia are among the countries whose governments have routinely contributed troops to UN missions. Canada's former prime minister, Brian Mulroney, announced in early 1992 that with the end of the Cold War his country's military would see UN service as its most important function after self-defense. From the south came rumblings of displeasure. Washington officials saw the Mulroney declaration as a diversion of Canadian military resources from NATO.40 They were right. Finland's new women volunteer soldiers serve in the Finnish contingent on loan to the UN, and Australia's military has just deployed its first women soldiers to Cambodia on UN duty. Nonetheless, United Nations peacekeeping forces remain as overwhelmingly male as most state militaries. With such a composition, it must have the same sort of policies around masculinity as other, more conventional forces do. We have yet to hear how United Nations force commanders imagine male sexuality. Are the blue-helmeted men on duty in Cambodia explicitly ordered not to patronize prostitutes? What steps are taken to prevent AIDS and other forms of sexually transmitted diseases among UN peacekeepers? Each of these policies will be informed by ideas about women, about the roles women must play if a male soldier is to be able to do his job. United Nations male peacekeepers are as likely to have mothers, girlfriends, and wives as the male soldiers of any other military. Just as in those more orthodox forces, the contributions of these women are accepted as natural, even if policies are devised to ensure that they fill these roles. Nowhere was this clearer than in the New York Times 'discussion of the proposal that Britain's famed Gurkhas, the celebrated troops recruited from Nepal, should serve as the core of a genuinely nonstate United Nations peacekeeping force. 41 The advantage of this proposal was not only that the Gurkhas, being citizens of an impoverished Asian country, would cost less than Canadian or Finnish soldiers. Nor was it only that Gurkhas had established a record of battlefield competence and discipline. It was also an unstated plus that the Nepali men serving in the Gurkhas apparently didn't need the company of their wives while stationed abroad and didn't compensate for their wives' absence by engaging in alienating abuse of other countries' women. These Nepali men seemed to have learned a kind of militarized masculinity quite unlike that of their British, American, or French counterparts. While such different constructions may indeed exist and while they may make one set of men better at post Cold War international peacekeeping than another, such a proposal leaves out the women. Gurkhas have earned this reputation for celibate soldiering because of what their wives absorb, are compelled to absorb, because they live under British military policies for wives. Nepali women at home in Darjeeling, India, or in villages in the hills of Nepal construct their lives in ways that have made life easier for British defense planners. They have made it possible for the British to use their husbands in ways that have given the Gurkhas the image of the ideal post Cold War peacekeepers. 42 What is distinctive here is not the particular marriage practices of Nepali women. Rather, by making Nepali women visible we are reminded that one cannot assess which forms of masculinity are most suitable for the postCold War world unless one asks, Where are the women? The end of the superpower rivalry that has shaped the distribution of aid, the construction of fears, and the ferocity of hostilities has not made masculinity irrelevant in international relations**. To make sense of how masculinity is being demilitarized and remilitarized today, one must pay attention to women and to ideas about femininity**. The Australian woman soldier donning the UN's blue helmet to serve in Cambodia, the Vietnamese woman trying to find a client in Le Royal Hotel's disco, the international civil servant devising policies to bolster the morale of UN troops, the recently demobilized Khmer Rouge guerrillaall are partners in a postCold War dance.

**Our challenge to patriarchy can fundamentally transform the international system—all types of destruction and violence are inevitable until this is done**

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In a similar vein, Paula Smithka argues that sexism, naturism, nuclearism, and other “isms of domination” are symptoms of the disease of dissociation by which humans attempt to sever their relationships with others and with nature (Smithka 1989). In the terminology introduced here, patriarchaism constructs one’s perception of the “other” as inferior, permits the psychological and conceptual distancing (dissociation of “the other,” and justifies the interiorizing of “the other.” Suppose nuclearism is indeed an “addiction,” as Lifton and Falk claim, or unhealthy dissociation, as Smithka claims – partly psychological conditions. How does one recover from it? Addictions and dissociation ultimately involve faulty beliefs which, for recovery to occur, must be seen and rejected (Warren 1990). Nuclear awareness, then, involves seeing the insanity of nuclear confrontation. For a feminist peace politics, this involves seeing the patriarchalist biases of nuclear parlance (in addition to whatever *other* biases must be seen.) The case is the same for sexism, racism, classism, naturism, and any other “isms of domination” based on faulty belief systems – what I have called oppressive and patriarchal conceptual frameworks. They must be seen to be rejected. What is involved in seeing and breaking through the addictions, the illusions against the earth (e.g. “rape of the land”); perhaps even global, systemic, economic violence (e.g. poverty). This would involve, the dissociation? To employ the familiar language of recovery from addictions such as alcoholism, to recover from nuclearism and other “isms of domination” we can and must now, in the pre-feminist patriarchal present, choose to become recovering nuclearists, recovering naturists, recovering sexists and racists. And we can start to do that by seeing and changing the faulty patriarchalist thinking that underlies and sustains these “isms.” Seen in terms of the psychological phenomena of dissociation, addiction, or dysfunctional systems generally, then, patriarchalism might be also viewed as ecofeminist Charlene Spretnak views it: as a primary, progressive, terminal disease, the “logical” because predictable consequence of which could quite **literally be the death of the planet.** Seen from a psychological perspective, nuclear madness needs to be taken seriously *as a madness*, that is, as a craziness which has delusion, denial, and dissociation at its core. An ecofeminist peace politics would help explore and clarify the nature of the conceptual, psychological, and behavioral ties of nuclearism and other “isms of domination” to this flawed thinking – patriarchalism. Feminists can being to develop analyses of violence and nonviolence which show the interconnections among kinds of violence: violence against the self (e.g. anorexia and bulimia, suicide); violence against others (e.g. spousal and child abuse, rape); violence showing ways in which **patriarchalism underlies all** such kinds of **violence** and itself breeds violence.

# PATRIARCHY = NUKE WAR

**Patriarchalist nations mandate militarism that makes nuclear warfare and extinction inevitable**

**Spretnak 89**—MA in English from Berkeley (Charlene, Exposing the Nuclear Phallacies,1989, JB)

Women and men can live together and can relate to other societies in any number of cultural configurations, but ignorance of the configurations themselves locks a populace into blind adherence to the status quo. In the nuclear age, such unexamined acceptance may be fatal as certain cultural assumptions in our own society are pushing us closer and closer to war. Since a major war could now easily bring on massive annihilation of almost unthinkable proportions, why are discussions in our national forums addressing this madness of the nuclear arms race limited to matters of hardware and statistics? A more comprehensive analysis is needed-unless, as the doomsayers claim, we collectively harbor a death wish and no not really want to look closely at dynamics propelling us steadily toward the brink of extinction. The cause of nuclear arms proliferation is militarism. What is the cause of militarism? The traditional militarist explanation is that the “masters of war” in the military-industrial complex profit enormously from defense contracts and other war preparations. A capitalist economy periodically requires the economic boon that large-scale government spending, capitol investment, and worker sacrifice produce during a crisis of war. In addition, American armed forces, whether nuclear or conventional, are stationed worldwide to protect the status quo, which requires vast and interlocking American corporate interests. Suck an economic analysis alone in inadequate, as the recent responses to the nuclear arms race that ignore the cultural orientation of the nations involved: They are patriarchies. Militarism and warfare are continual features of patriarchal society because they reflect and instill patriarchal values and fulfill essential needs of such a system. Acknowledging the context of patriarchal conceptualizations that feed militarism is a first step toward reducing their impact and preserving life on Earth.

**Patriarchy is the root cause of war and will lead to nuclear holocaust**

**Reardon, 93** (Betty, Women and peace: feminist visions of global security, p.31

A clearly visible element in the escalating tensions among militarized nations is the macho posturing and the patriarchal ideal of *dominance*, not parity, which motivates defense ministers and government leaders to “strut their stuff” as we watch with increasing horror. Most men in our patriarchal culture are still acting out old patterns that are radically inappropriate for the nuclear age. To prove dominance and control, to distance one’s character from that of women, to survive the toughest violent initiation, to shed the sacred blood of the hero, to collaborate with death in order to hold it at bay—all of these patriarchal pressures on men have traditionally reached resolution in ritual fashion on the battlefield. But there is no longer any battlefield. Does anyone seriously believe that if a nuclear power were losing a crucial, large-scale conventional war it would refrain from using its multiple-warhead nuclear missiles because of some diplomatic agreement? The military theater of a nuclear exchange today would extend, instantly or eventually, to all living things, all the air, all the soil, all the water. If we believe that war is a “necessary evil,” that patriarchal assumptions are simply “human nature,” then we are locked into a lie, paralyzed. The ultimate result of unchecked terminal patriarchy will be nuclear holocaust. The causes of recurrent warfare are not biological. Neither are they solely economic. They are also a result of patriarchal ways of thinking, which historically have generated considerable pressure for standing armies to be used.

# HUMAN RIGHTS I/L

**Women’s rights are neglected in the status quo, this is the biggest human rights problem today**

**Bunch, 90** She founded the Center for Women's Global Leadership, recipient of the Eleanor Roosevelt Award for Human Rights, currently a member of the Advisory Committee for the Human Rights Watch Women's Rights Division, recently served on the Advisory Committee for the Secretary General’s 2006 Report to the General Assembly on Violence against Women(Charlotte, “Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Towards a Re-Vision of Human Rights”, http://www.jstor.org/stable/762496, JPW)

Significant numbers of the world's population are routinely subject to torture, starvation, terrorism, humiliation, mutilation, and even murder simply because they are female. Crimes such as these against any group other than women would be recognized as a civil and political emergency as well as a gross violation of the victims' humanity. Yet, despite a clear record of deaths and demonstrable abuse, women's rights are not commonly classified as human rights. This is problematic both theoretically and practically, because it has grave consequences for the way society views and treats the fundamental issues of women's lives. This paper questions why women's rights and human rights are viewed as distinct, looks at the policy implications of this schism, and discusses different approaches to changing it. Women's human rights are violated in a variety of ways. Of course, women sometimes suffer abuses such as political repression that are similar to abuses suffered by men. In these situations, female victims are often invisible, because the dominant image of the political actor in our world is male. However, many violations of women's human rights are distinctly connected to being female-that is, women are discriminated against and abused on the basis of gender. Women also experience sexual abuse in situations where their other human rights are being violated, as political prisoners or members of persecuted ethnic groups, for example. In this paper I address those abuses in which gender is a primary or related factor because gender-related abuse has been most neglected and offers the greatest challenge to the field of human rights today.

# RAPE ADD ON

**Militarized rape and prostitution are inevitably intertwined**

**ENLOE** **00** (Chloe, “Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives,” 2000, P112) SLV

Militarized rape and militarized prostitution are often treated by policy makers as if they were divided by a cultural Maginot Line. When they are, this division is marked less by cultural realities than by a fortified wall of ideas and practices built by nervous policy makers themselves. This imagined separation between militarized rape and militarized prostitution serves the interests of many patriarchal officials: it allows them to discuss rape and prostitution as if their perpetrators and their victims were entirely different. In actual practice, in the world of military policy making, officials think of rape and prostitution *together.* Providing organized prostitution to male soldiers is imagined to be a means of preventing those same soldiers from engaging in rape. It was this sort of thinking, connecting rape to prostitution, that informed the Japanese imperial government's 1930s and 1940s "comfort women" policy making. Strikingly similar thinking undergirds present-day British and American military sexual politics.9 Take the Okinawa rape case of 1995.

**Militarized rape is grounded in dichotomies of victory and defeat**

**ENLOE** **00** (Chloe, “Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives,” 2000, p111) SLV

There are as many different forms of militarized rape as there are subtle nuances in the relationships between militarized women and militarized men. Nonetheless, they share some important common features-features that will affect not only the rapist's sense of what he is doing and of what gives him license to do it but also the raped woman's responses to that assault. First, the male militarized rapist in some way imposes his understandings of "enemy," "soldiering," "victory," and "defeat" on both the woman to be raped and on the act of sexual assault. Second, consequently, the militarized rape is harder to privatize than non militarized rape is, since it draws so much of its rationale from an imagining of societal conflict and/or the functions of a formal institution such as the state's national security or defense apparatus or an insurgency's military arm. Third, the woman who has endured militarized rape must devise her responses in the minutes, weeks, and years after that assault not only by weighing her relationships to the rapist and to her personal friends and relatives, to the prevailing norms of feminine respectability, and perhaps to the criminal justice system, but *in addition,* she must weigh her relationships to collective memory, collective notions of national destiny, and the very institutions of organized violence.

# POSITIVE PEACE ADD ON

**Defining peace as the absence of war only gears up for the next war, by reifying militaristic structures, incorporating a feminine perspective solves.**

**Enloe 93** – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War” p. 64-66, MT)

Peace is conventionally juxtaposed with war. Before war there is peace; after war there is peace. Indeed, the dichotomy has been so widely assumed to be obvious, logical, and true that peace has been on the short end of the theoretical discussion, as if all one needed to do was to determine the causes of war, eliminate them, and voila! peace. In this formulation, peace is often discussed as if it were a static condition: the absence of overt, state-sponsored hostilities. In reality, **peace** has lacked adequate theoretical attention from patriarchal intellectuals because it **has been defined in** negative, **often feminine, terms**. When war is seen as active, heroic, and masculine, then peace becomes merely the absence of all these stirring qualities. Thus, social processes such as capital formation, building the state, and waging war have great aesthetic appeal when male scholars select topics on which to focus their energies, even in the cause of criticizing such processes. Feminist thinking about peace is not necessarily locked into this war/ peace dichotomy. Perhaps because feminists start from the conditions of women's lives, and because they see how many forms violence and oppression can take, they are more likely to define peace as women's achievement of control over their own lives. 39 We must nonetheless think about violence and oppression in ways that keep the distinctiveness of militarism sharply etched. It is not enough, I believe, to lump wife battering and wartime rape together as if they required identical uses of public power or involved identical relationships between masculinity and the state. Nor is it enough to conflate all wives' frustrations with their husbands' reluctance to take on child care with the problems of military wives coping with pressures from the military to perform all the tasks of motherhood as well as unpaid volunteer service on the base. A century and a half ago, British feminists in the Owenite socialist movement were militant in challenging the oppressiveness of marriage for women. They were addressing members of a society governed by an imperial state, speaking to women and men whose political leaders were militarizing economic, ethnic, and gender relations within Britain and its colonies. Yet the Owenite feminist women did not analyze state armies or the government's claim to need to recruit and arm such globally ambitious military forces. In these women's theoretical framework, the war zone was not India, Africa, or the Caribbean; it was the British domestic household. Lack of peace, they argued, lay in the oppressive structures of patriarchal marriage. For Owenite feminists, the opposite of peace was not militarism; it was marriage.40 Their analysis rings all too true today. This rediscovered analysis of marriage is provocative and useful insofar as it deepens our understanding of genuine peace. Yet it remains limited in its ability to help us understand the relationship between peace and militarism because it fails to trace the links between the patriarchal oppressions imposed locally and those imposed militarily overseas. This theoretical debate over the opposite of peace and the obstacles to achieving peace is reflected in the current argument among women activists over how to maximize scarce resources in order to produce effective social change. If one believes that militarization is the chief obstacle to peace, then one would encourage a woman in a violent marriage to attend not only a rally to press for more restraints on domestic batterers, but also a rally to sharply cut postCold War military spending. One would also urge speakers at each rally to describe the causal links between a husband's abusive behavior and the wider militaristic culture that legitimates all forms of violence. 41 But a feminist working in an underfunded local battered woman's shelter might see militarization as a surface symptom of more basic assumptions in the culture about marriage, property, reproduction, and heterosexuality all of which are essential to the maintenance of male privilege and the permission for interpersonal violence on which such dominance often rests. Following this line of thought, one would urge the antimilitarist activist to enlist in the struggle against wife abuse, on the grounds that stopping legitimized oppression in personal relationships is the most theoretically efficient way to end militarism. The practical and theoretical links between heterosexist domination and the military's exploitation of women need to be clearly drawn, however complex these links may be and however many other issues claim our energies and resources. Moreover, rather than imagining war and peace as opposites, we must clarify the ways in which "peacetime" conditions such as those under which American and European women currently live actually foster wartime conditions such as those faced by women in Armenia.

**Focus on war distorts how we analyze gender relations and other forms of masculinized violence.**

**Enloe 93** – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War” p. 60-61 , MT)

Of all forms of state-organized violence, war has provided the most urgent context for feminist theorizing. Better than posing war and other forms of violence as alternative objects of attention, however, is seeing them as **connected forms of state-licensed male violence**. Some wars have been more fruitful than others in providing women with the impetus and resources for thinking about the connections between state violence and gendered hierarchies. For instance, because of reporting by feminists in Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia, rape is getting more attention as a state-generated act of war, rather than merely a private, if despicable, act. While feminist researchers such as Susan Brownmiller and war correspondents such as Daniel Lang twenty years ago documented the role of central government policies about militarized masculinity in acts of wartime rape, until recently even human rights groups have averted their eyes when the abuse took the form of sexual assaults on women by soldiers of the state.35 In 1992, however, Amnesty International (perhaps pressured from the inside by its large number of women staffers) issued its first international report on rape as a widespread form of state denial of human rights. While it concentrated on the treatment of women in detention, its charges could be applied to the general conduct of war as well. The report confirmed reports by local women activists that the Indian, Peruvian, and Philippine governments, among others, either ignored assaults by men in its police and army forces or responded to those abuses with nothing more than taps on the offenders' wrists. Essentially, Amnesty International called on governments to risk weakening the power of masculinity for the sake of guaranteeing their political legitimacy in the eyes of a newly alert international community. 36 If one doesn't consider the possible connections between war and other forms of violence, **a focus on wars can distort our understanding of how state-organized violence reshapes relations** between women and men. There is a common belief that intense militarization does not only privilege men, but can also "open doors" for women. Every day there are fresh indications of how complex the experiences of World War I and II were for American, Canadian, European, and Japanese women. As feminist scholars embark on the reconstruction of the past from below, taking seriously the diaries and oral histories of ordinary women, the patterns become more intriguing, but by no means simpler.37

**We aren’t saying ignore the military, we just need to consider MORE aspects of security**

**Bleiker, 2005** (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. xxxix-xl, TH)

To problematize realist approaches to conflict on the Korean penin- sula is, of course, not to declare security policy obsolete or to question the need for military-based defense. Nor is it meant to legitimize the highly repressive political regime in Pyongyang, whose brinkman- ship tactics pose grave risks to world peace. The point, rather, is to search for new ways of understanding and dealing with the highly volatile security situation. But such approaches can emerge only if one supplements state-based security policies with more innovative political approaches to inter-Korean relations.

A major task of rethinking conflict in Korea thus consists of ad- vancing a broader understanding of security. Security should no lon- ger be viewed solely as a protection of the state apparatus, based on realist assessments of allegedly objective “military realities.” Rather, security must also be seen as a much wider political project that seeks to secure stability, subsistence, dignity, basic human rights, and free- dom from fear. This is why a willingness to forgive and overcome the pains of the past is just as essential to an adequate security regime as are conventional military strategies. A broader political approach to security could not only reduce many of the present tensions but also be of crucial importance in case of North Korea’s collapse, which remains a constant possibility and one of the most unpredictable sources of destabilization in northeast Asia. Security policy, expressed in other words, is about the political imaginary as much as it is about facing threats. Although generally presented as a pragmatic response to external circumstances, secu- rity is (and has always been) just as much about defining the values and boundaries of political communities, about separating the inside from the outside. In short, security lies at the heart of modern life. This is why questions of identity are essential for understanding the larger political dynamics that are intertwined with security policy. Once one appreciates the central link between security, identity, and society, one must also recognize that security not only delin- eates the limits of politics but also encompasses the possibilities of reaching beyond them. This is why Michael Dillon stresses that security should be seen as a political project that explores how new and more peaceful political constellations may emerge from “the unstable, unjust and violently defended sediment of modern political existence.” Security, as he puts it, becomes “a possibility rather than a fixed and determined actuality.”36 To argue that this is so is, of course, not to equate alternative security arrangements with utopia. Dangerous weapons exist on both sides of the divided Korean peninsula. They are used to project and underline political threats. Thus one must never forget that an escalation is possible at any moment and could cause an immense human tragedy. This is why political transformations must be grounded in what is realisti- cally possible, given the prevailing security dilemmas. But the very existence of serious escalatory dangers is also the main reason why one must seek to transcend them. Doing so is the major purpose of the second part of this book. It revolves around an attempt to com- bine an ethics of dialogue with an ethics of difference.

# INTERSECTIONALITY KEY

**The army is inherently patriarchal – ignores prostitution**

**ENLOE** **00** (Chloe, “Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives,” 2000, p57) SLV

The armed forces, especially as portrayed by heavy-handed enthusiasts of militarist ideals, may seem simplistically hierarchical. But in reality most military institutions resemble those of Victorian Britain insofar as male bonding cuts across and often contradicts the more formal hierarchical concepts of the chain of command and centralized control. Most armies and navies are built on a patriarchal bonding between men as men. On the other hand, most men also are stratified by rank in a way that commonly accentuates those inequities of class and ethnicity already existing in civilian society at large. Relations between men are never simple. At the heart of relations between militarized men is this persistent tension between hierarchy and male bonding. A military's prostitution policy usually is crafted by officials with an eye toward sustaining this ambivalence, not resolving it.

**The US perpetuates a sexist ideology everywhere it goes; this legitimizes class and race struggles and the subjugation of women**

**Enloe 90,** Cynthia Ph.D. from the University of California/Berkeley “Bananas, Bases, and Patriarchy” in “Women, militarism, and war: essays in history, politics, and social theory,” by Jean Bethke Elshtain and Sheila Tobias, p 187-205 WM

Most historical accounts we have of these decisions and how Caribbean and Central American people have tried to cope with, or at times resist, these decisions are written as though no one ever had considered gender. But is this true? For instance, did British and Spanish colonizers never consider whether female Africans made less valuable slave laborers than male Africans? New work being done by black women historians suggests that it is misleading to imagine that sexist assumptions didn't shape the ways in which racism was developed to rationalize and organize slave labor. They suggest that these early uses of sexist strategies have had lasting effects, helping to sustain patriarchal notions within the black communities, notions that present obstacles to effective political action even a century or more after slavery's abolition. What then ofthe presentday politics of Jamaica, Trinidad, Dominica, Guyana? It seems unwise to theorize about post-slavery "plantation societies" of the Caribbean as if women and men experienced slavery in identical ways, or as if the politics of post-slavery communities were free of the legacies of the colonists' patriarchal strategizing. Essentially we would be asking how divisions of labor have been constructed, divisions that have made the cultivation of sugar and bananas, for instance, profitable enough that they reaped profits for the overseas companies and their local allies. Furthermore, questions about how racist bases of such profitable divisions are dependent on sexism aren't relevant solely to those countries in the region with histories of slavery. In Central American societies, where colonists' use of African slaves was less prevalent, racism nonetheless was wielded in order to create domestic stratifications of color that served to coopt the Hispanicized and exploit the Indian. Were the formulation and, even more interesting for us today, the persistence of these divisions of Central American labor accomplished without any dependence on sexism? Take the banana. The banana's history is embedded in the history of European colonial expansion and, later, North American neocolonial control. It is also integrally tied to the ways that women's relations to men have been shaped by local governments and foreign companies, bolstered from time to time by U. S. military intervention. So the banana, perhaps, is a good place to start in our fashioning of a feminist analysis of American militarization of the region. The banana is not native to Central America. Its original home was Southeast Asia. By the 1400s, the banana had spread westward to become a basic food on the Guinean coast of Africa. When Spanish slavers began raiding the coast and shipping captured Africans to the West Indies and South America, they shipped bananas as well. The banana, then, entered this hemisphere as the slavers' choice of a cheap and popular African staple to feed enslaved women and men. The yellow bananas familiar to North American consumers were not developed as a distinct variety until the nineteenth century. They were first served at the homes of wealthy Bostonians in 1875. United Fruit's corporate empire, which over the next century came to behave like a surrogate state in much of Central America, grew out of the American popularization of this humble globe-trotting fruit. That market success wove an invisible but crucial political link of interdependence between the women of North America and the women of Central America. In the 1950s, United Fruit took the lead in launching a brand name fur its own bananas-"Chiquita." Standard Fruit, its chief competitor, fol- lowed quickly on its heels with its own brand name-"Cabana," Thus began a marketing war to win the allegiance of American and European housewives and their local grocers. Today, the goal remains to persuade predominantly female consumers that bananas from one company are of higher quality and possess longer shelf life and greater overall reliability than those from another company. The COnventional way of thinking about how and why it's "banana republics" that American officials want to preserve-by force, if necessaryin Central America is one that focuses on class alliances made by United Fruit and Del Monte executives with local political and economic elites on the one hand, and with Washington policy-makers on the other. They all have a common stake in keeping banana workers' wages low and their political consciousness undeveloped. But who are these workers? Pictures that I have seen of Honduran banana-worker union members always appear full of men. Do only men work on the major banana plantations, or is it only the male workers who are employed in the banana industry in ways that allow for unionization? Where are the women? One reality-that women do work-makes bananas profitable for this triple alliance of elites, but the work they do (weeding) is so marginalized that they develop a different sort of political consciousness and are excluded from the unions by their fathers and brothers who imagine their conflicts with management more "political," more "serious." Another reality is that women do not do any wage-paying work on the plantations of United Fruit or Del Monte: they are at home doing unpaid subsistence farming, child care, and cooking. Feminists in scores of industrialized and Third-World countries have revealed how even mining and agricultural operations that recruit only male workers still depend on women's work. For without women dOing the hard but unpaid work of subsistence farming and household maintenance, the companies would not be able to pay their male workers such low wages. The unpaid work that women do allows for the survival and reproduction of those paid workers. Given these realities, the "banana republics" that U. S. militarization is intended to sustain are patriarchal in at least two ways. First, **the colonially-seeded culture of *machismo* serves to legitimize local class and racial stratifications in ways that make the subjugation of all women perpetuate low wages** and attenuate union organizing. If we thought these propositions were worth investigating, we would also find how they operate *together* so as to sustain the kind of internationally dependent, militarized society we have come to call a "banana republic."

# MILITARY KEY

**U.S. military functions on genedered identities**

Moon, 1997 (Katharine H.S., Professor in the Department of [Political Science](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_science) at [Wellesley College,](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wellesley_College) “Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S./Korea Relations,” p. 54, TH)

Like transnational studies, the bureaucratic politics model also focuses on the role of elites in policy making, including, in recent years, women. As more women have joined the ranks in these institutions and helped formulate women-oriented policies, they remind us that institutional cultures are not gender-neutral and therefore not value-free in making and implementing policies. Kardam and Whitworth offer excellent examples of ways in which even "women-friendly" offices and projects within, respectively, the World Bank and the International Labor Organization suffer from gendered biases about the meaning, context and goals of development and labor for women. 32 Kardam points out that the World Bank's bias toward the economic "efficiency" and "effectiveness" of their projects overshadows the "equity" and social welfare needs of most women in developing countries. 33 Similarly, Enloe and others have observed that military institutions are severely gendered in their organizational structure and culture. 34 For example, Enloe states: "A drill sergeant is trying to devastate a resistant young man when he contemptuously shouts into his face, 'Woman!' To be prepared for combat, to soldier, a man must be stripped of all his 'feminine' attributes." 35 This illustrates the way that the U.S. military establishes its organizational hierarchy and gendered ideology by degrading the feminine and constructing an acceptable masculinity.

# PROSTITUTION KEY

**Prostitution is part of the construction of the man as a ‘protector’ of the ‘feminized nation’ which legitimizes masculinized modes of militarization in the name of ‘protection’**

**Enloe 93** – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War” p. 238-239, MT)

When they are represented as sexual partners and as bearers of national traditions, women can either acquire nationalist prestige or lose it. It is precisely because sexuality, reproduction, and child-rearing acquire such strategic importance with the rise of nationalism that many nationalist men become newly aware of their need to exert control over the women. **Controlling girls and women becomes a man's way of protecting** or reviving **the nation**. Not a few nationalist women have assisted in those efforts by policing other women. Thus, as is usually the case, relations between nationalist women and men can be understood in part by investigating relations between women themselves. Other nationalist women, however, denounce the myth of woman-as-traitor and its obverse, woman-as-patriotic-mother, as false and oppressive. They have a hard time being heard inside many nationalist movements and have often risked their nationalist credentials which many of them prize in speaking out. Rape and **prostitution have been central to many men's construction** of the nationalist cause. **They have permitted men to hear the feminized nation beckoning them to act as "her" protectors**. The external enemy is imagined to be other men, men who would defile or denigrate the nation. Too often missing in this gendered nationalist scenario are the voices of the actual women who have suffered rape or have been compelled to seek an income from prostitution. Thus, Bangladeshi women who had been raped during the war of secession from Pakistan were rarely asked to help build the identity of the new nation, though news of their rapes had the effect of mobilizing the anger of many Bangladeshi men. Likewise today, women who have been raped are more symbols than active participants in countries such as Sri Lanka and Kashmir. In the early 1990s, Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian feminists began to alert the international media to rape being wielded in Bosnia as an instrument of militarized, masculinized nationalism. "We have orders to rape the girls," a young Bosnian Muslim woman named Mirsada was told by a Serbian soldier who abducted her from her village of Brezovo Polje in June 1992. Telling her story to an American newspaper reporter two months later (a story afterward confirmed by other sources), Mirsada told of forty village women who were abducted and raped by Serbian male soldiers. A gynecologist who treated the survivors said that she believed the rapes were intended to humiliate the Muslim women: "They were raped because it was the goal of the war." 16 A European

Community investigation team estimated that twenty thousand Muslim women were raped in Bosnia between April 1992 and January 1993. 17

**Orientalism creates fertile ground for sex-trafficking and prostitution as men view the “other” women as submissive and weak; spreading colonial and racist practices**

**Wu ‘04**

[Nadine, James Madison University Social Science Essay Contest Runner Up, B.S. Sociology, Louisiana Department of Health Clinical Care Manager, "The Dynamics of Orientalism and Globalization in the International Sex Industry and Human Trafficking”, <http://www.jmu.edu/writeon/documents/2004/wu.pdf>] Gus

Orientalism and imperialism are evident in global trafficking and the international sex industry. Sex tourism is an opportunity for white men to purchase exotic cultural experiences. Most of these tourists come from the United States, Australia, Germany, other European countries, and Japan (Skrobanek, Boonpakdee, & Jantaeero, 1998). Sexuality was a significant element of European construction of the Rest as a fantasy of innocence, domination and submissiveness. Advertisements for sexual services emphasize the sexual and exotic characteristics of the “other” culture, feeding into western fantasies (Taylor 2000). Men in western societies are drawn to foreign prostitutes because they want someone who is submissive and exotic so they often idealize nonwhite women. The tourists enjoy experiences with “other” women because they resent what they see as women’s power in the West and feel threatened by their demands for equality (Taylor, 2000). In Hall’s terms, these men are constructing themselves in relation to women of the Rest culture. Because they see women of the so called Rest as more gentle and submissive, they feel more powerful and masculine when they juxtapose themselves against a woman who is not white. Western sex tourists apparently feel they have a right to commodify women of “other” cultures, nationalities, and ethnic groups. They attempt to colonize the “Orient” by prostituting sex from “Oriental” women while happily reaping the benefits of racism, colonialism, global economic inequalities, and sexism.

# STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE O/W

**Invisible conflicts create more violence than publicized militaristic violence**

**Reardon, 93** (Betty, Women and peace: feminist visions of global security, p.39-40)

War has always been the most well organized and destructive form of violence in which human beings have engaged. However, physical or direct violence, particularly military violence, in the twentieth century appears to be more varied and is certainly more potentially destructive than it has ever been. Armed conflict itself is a common condition of life throughout the world. “Low-intensity conflict,” the constant and pervasive warfare that has plagued Central America, the Philippines, and other areas where internal violent struggles characterize politics, has become the most common form of war in our time. It is waged by government, political factions, and “drug lords.” Such “civil” conflicts, and the excessive violence that currently plagues urban society, take more civilian lives than lives of combatants, and disrupt and debase the life of entire societies. For example, gunfights have occurred between rival gangs in cities; children have been shot on playgrounds and have shot each other in their schools. In the fall of 1991, the New York Times reported that many children, some as young as nine, carry guns for “protection.” While the media and policy-makers focus more on the major events of armed conflict among nations, such as that which has kept the Middle East in a constant state of hostility, these other incidents of warfare go on unabated.

# A2: FOCUSING ON WOMEN BAD

**Gender is a product of social relations – feminitiy is constructed as a binary with masculinity.**

**Enloe 93** – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War” p. 19-21 MT)

Masculinity, by contrast, is a territory only recently opened for exploration. We have acres of bookshelves of course, filled with studies of men in the Cold War. But that is quite a different topic. A biography of Konrad Adenauer or an institutional history of the KGB may be crammed with information about both famous and anonymous men, yet leave the reader intellectually starved for an analysis of masculinity. We may know the career tracks, partisan alliances, and policy justifications of politicians and bureaucrats who sustained great power rivalries, yet be in the dark when puzzling about how, exactly, those men's sometimes tenuous holds on their own masculine identities served to choreograph their interactions with other officials or their foreign policy inclinations. To explore the complexities of masculinity in the history of the Cold War calls for more than curiosity about men. It requires curiosity about women as well. For **masculinity is constructed out of ideas about femininity**, its alleged opposite. Men in real life learn about and accept or resist their culture's ideas about what is natural in male behavior by relying on (while still controlling) women, **by fantasizing about women**, and by working to separate themselves from women. Where are the women? This is a question that can reveal the major players in the creation and the perpetuation of the Cold War to be more than merely idiosyncratic heroes or villains, more than just personifications of their bureaucratic posts. It is a question that reminds us that the people on the podium or around the conference table are not women. It is a question that makes us see **men as people who have been socialized not always successfully into particular gender assumptions and who have had bestowed on them distinct privileges, authorities, and limitations**. Thus, to take an interest in masculinity is not to turn the searchlight away from women. In fact, the overlooked as well as celebrated ways in which masculinity has functioned in international politics since the 1940s are best understood if we give the women affected by the male actors' behavior a voice and if we listen to them. Thus, explorations of women's relationships to militarization should be seen as treasure troves of information about the ways in which men's ideas about their own and other men's manliness have been created. Luise White's much-praised history of colonized Kenyan women in prostitution, for instance, can inform us about African and British men's sexual expectations during both world wars. 14 Similarly, Victoria De Grazia's study of Mussolini's policies intended to control women can provide us with fresh insights into Fascist efforts to militarize men's identities.15 That masculinity is socially constructed, often with the help of self-consciously honed public policy, has been hard for many people to accept. Much political energy has been invested for many years in persuading us to believe that men "naturally" feel what they feel, do what they do, and become what they become. There are serious beginnings in exploring how and why masculinity is constructed, however: some in works of social theorizing, others in historical case studies. 16 Still, there is a danger that this new attention to masculinity could reinvigorate patriarchy. Those who have been uncomfortable with the serious attention paid to women with the advent of feminist journalism and of [Page 21] women's studies might reach out to the burgeoning literature on masculinity the way a panicked swimmer would embrace an alligator: it's not the ideal lifesaver, but it might keep you afloat until the sea calms down.

# A2: PROSTITUTION GOOD

**Our argument isn’t that prostitution is intrinsically bad – conservative forces within south korea dehumanize and exclude prostitutes**

Moon, 1997 (Katharine H.S., Professor in the Department of [Political Science](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_science) at [Wellesley College,](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wellesley_College) “Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S./Korea Relations,” p. 16, TH)

The vast majority of these women have experienced in common the pain of contempt and stigma from the mainstream Korean society. These women have been and are treated as trash, "the lowest of the low," in a Korean society characterized by classist (family/educational status-oriented) distinctions and discrimination. The fact that they have mingled flesh and blood with foreigners (*yangnom*) 4 in a society that has been racially and culturally homogeneous for thousands of years makes them pariahs, a disgrace to themselves and their people, Korean by birth but no longer Korean in body and spirit. Neo-Confucian moralism regarding women's chastity and strong racialist conscience among Koreans have branded these women as doubly "impure." The women themselves bear the stigma of their marginalization both physically and psychologically. They tend not to venture out of camptowns and into the larger society and view themselves as "abnormal," while repeatedly referring to the non-camptown world as "normal." Once they experience kijich'on life, they are irreversibly tainted: it is nearly impossible for them to reintegrate themselves into "normal" Korean society. Kim Yang Hyang, in the documentary *The Women Outside,* recalls how her family members rejected her when she returned to her village after working for a time in the kijich'on. One of her cousins told her, "Don't come around our place." 5

**We don’t victimize prostitutes**

Moon, 1997 (Katharine H.S., Professor in the Department of [Political Science](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_science) at [Wellesley College,](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wellesley_College) “Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S./Korea Relations,” p. 53, TH)

First, we need to begin viewing even the most dispossessed women as "players" in world politics; without jumping back and forth from two opposite poles of self-agency and victim-hood, a middleground must be found. 25 The kijich'on prostitutes mentioned in this book were definitely not autonomous actors because they were economically and socially dispossessed. Moreover, their physical freedom was often limited. And most had psychological dependence on their pimps, club managers, or GI customers. But neither were these women simple recipients of governmental actions. The fact is that both the USFK and the ROK government acknowledged and treated these women as significant players in the Clean-Up Campaign. The women did not choose this particular camptown project, but the Campaign's success depended on these women's participation. Participation for these women was not free of co-optation, but neither were all women beaten into submission nor silent about the effects of U.S. foreign policy changes on their lives. The women themselves helped forge kijich'on residents' sentiments against U.S. military domination in their lives and used some of the Campaign's repressive policies to pursue their self-interest (chapter 6).

# A2: SPEAKING FOR OTHERS

**We don’t speak for others**

Moon, 1997 (Katharine H.S., Professor in the Department of [Political Science](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_science) at [Wellesley College,](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wellesley_College) “Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S./Korea Relations,” p. 22, TH)

Lastly, many of the interviews took place over a series of meetings, over tea and meals, and in the company of other camptown prostitutes and staff members at various counseling centers. I also offered English lessons at My Sister's Place and got to know different women. Like many Koreans, most camptown women of the older generations do not have a concept of a research interview, where two strangers talk simply to ask and answer questions about a particular topic. Moreover, the women did not believe they had opinions worth sharing with "educated people." Even while they spoke of their experiences, they often would interrupt themselves, saying apologetically, "I know nothing; I am ignorant." To motivate them to speak, I assured them that their life stories were very important for a young Korean-American woman to hear and learn from and avoided settings and mannerisms that would seem formal, academic, and alien to them. The interviews with the former prostitutes are not intended to offer statistical evidence of any point I make in the study but rather to provide credence to the fact that these women's lives were heavily involved in U.S.- ROK relations at the camptown level and to give voice to people who most Koreans and Americans have never considered as having anything important to say or worth listening to.

# A2: IVORY TOWER

**Nope**

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. xviii, TH)

Grassroots practitioners often seemed more open to multiple perspectives than the detached specialist of high politics. I learned a great deal from the development community, which has been active in North Korea since a famine devastated the country in 1995. In this context I had the opportunity to evaluate the political dimensions of the Swiss Development Agency’s humanitarian assistance program in North Korea. Should one provide humanitarian aid in an attempt to alleviate the disastrous effects of famine? Or would such assis- tance merely obstruct badly needed change, helping to sustain an authoritarian regime and thus further perpetuating human rights abuses? The answers are not easy, of course, and I certainly do not pretend to have found them. But having to come up with a position that had immediate and very real consequences for people forced me to contemplate ethical dilemmas in a way that I could not have done had I simply judged the issues from the safe distance of an ivory tower, where relatively little is at stake.

# A2: SQUO SOLVES – CRACKDOWN

**Stringent regulations mean women are stereotyped and categorized as protistutes**

**MOON 97** [Katherine H.S., Ph. D. Princeton University, Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, served in the Office of the Senior Coordinator for Women’s Issues in the U.S. Department of State, “Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in US/Korea Relations”, Columbia Univeristy Press, 1997, P128] SLV

Third, by emphasizing the maintenance of valid VD cards, the Clean-Up gave license to U.S. MPs, the local Korean police and health workers to harass all camptown women, not just the prostitutes. For example, MPs would come into the clubs and demand to see the VD cards of the club's hostesses in what amounted to "surprise inspections." Such action on the part of U.S. personnel was not sanctioned by the Status of Forces Agreement and was therefore a breach of Korean sovereignty. In Tongduch'on, USFK officials who undertook daily unannounced inspections were not limited to MPs; they included representatives of camp commanders, the Equal Opportunity Treatment Office, the Public Affairs Office, the Provost Marshall, the Criminal Investigation Division, the Office of Preventive Medicine, and the Inspector General. 18 Angered by the arrogance of U.S. MPs and other USFK inspectors, club owners and Korea Special Tourist Association (KSTA) leaders protested to local ROK and USFK authorities.

**Despite the crackdown on prostitution, it is rampant in South Korea**

**Korea Herald ‘07**

[Editorial, “Diehard Prostitution”, March 9, Lexis] Gus

A high level of accuracy applies to the U.S. assessment of human rights conditions in South Korea. The report correctly points out that "domestic violence, rape, child abuse remained serious problems" in South Korea although its government generally respects the human rights of its citizens. No less serious is the issue of prostitution, which the report says is illegal but widespread in South Korea. Worse still, South Korea is stigmatized as a "country of origin, transit, and destination for trafficking in persons." Brothels in red-light districts were forced to close after the National Assembly passed anti-prostitution and anti-trafficking laws in September 2004. But in the absence of evidence that prostitution has actually declined, it should be safe to say, as the report does, that prostitution has moved underground and overseas. Indeed, those in the sex industry have opened secret shops, both in commercial and residential districts in Seoul, as shown by recent police crackdowns on massage parlors and other suspect facilities. Prostitution is so widespread that its "clientele includes people from all walks of life, except, maybe, the priesthood," according to a remark attributed to a police officer who participated in an operation against secret brothels. It is also a profitable business, with a figure of some 10 billion won or more in annual sales not an unattainable goal for some of the bogus massage parlors. The success of the sex industry is attributed partly, if not wholly, to lax law enforcement. According to the U.S. human rights report, only 15 percent of those booked for investigation were actually prosecuted.

# A2: SQUO SOLVES – CAMP TOWNS

**Balance of power in camp town society is gendered**

**MOON 97** [Katherine H.S., Ph. D. Princeton University, Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, served in the Office of the Senior Coordinator for Women’s Issues in the U.S. Department of State, “Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in US/Korea Relations”, Columbia Univeristy Press, 1997, P125] SLV

Although Keohane, Nye, and Huntington have mentioned that transnational processes generate "asymmetries" and changes in the "balance of power within the local society," few have paid attention to such power disparities in studies of transnationalism. 1 This chapter demonstrates that asymmetries in the balance of power within the local society did indeed result from the interactions among the ROK government, the USFK, and various camptown residents, and that the asymmetries were distinctly gendered. In general, the USFK, ROK government, and local camptown power-holders promoted their respective interests at the expense of the prostitutes. But the women were not simply passive victims of others' political and economic ambitions. Although powerless in many respects, kijich'on women did voice their own interests, when push came to shove, through private complaints and public protests. The Camptown Clean-Up Campaign, which was intended to improve channels of communication and cooperation in camptown politics, became the cork that plugged up the possibility of public protest by kijich'on prostitutes.

# A2: LEGAL RIGHTS SOLVE

Legal rights don’t solve sexism or any forms of gendered oppression

Charlesworth, et. al, ’91 Hilary Charlesworth is considered as the pioneer in feminist international law scholarship. Her groundbreaking book The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis has been awarded the Certificate of Merit by the American Society of International Law in 2001, Christine Chinkin is a Professor of International Law at the London School of Economics and Political Science and the William W. Cook Global Law Professor at the University of Michigan Law School, Shelly Wright is Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, University of Sydney (October 1991, Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, Shelley Wright, “Feminist Approaches to International Law”, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2203269 , JSTOR, JPW)

The feminist critique of rights questions whether the acquisition of legal rights advances women's equality.'33 Feminist scholars have argued that, although the search for formal legal equality through the formulation of rights may have been politically appropriate in the early stages of the feminist movement, continuing to focus on the acquisition of rights may not be beneficial to women. 34 Quite apart from problems such as the form in which rights are drafted, their interpretation by tribunals, and women's access to their enforcement, the rhetoric of rights, according to some feminist legal scholars, is exhausted.'35 Rights discourse is taxed with reducing intricate power relations in a simplistic way.'36 The formal acquisition of a right, such as the right to equal treatment, is often assumed to have solved an imbalance of power. In practice, however, the promise of rights is thwarted by the inequalities of power: the economic and social dependence of women on men may discourage the invocation of legal rights that are premised on an adversarial relationship between the rights holder and the infringer. 137 More complex still are rights designed to apply to women only such as the rights to reproductive freedom and to choose abortion.' In addition, although they respond to general societal imbalances, formulations of rights are generally cast in individual terms. The invocation of rights to sexual equality may therefore solve an occasional case of inequality for individual women but will leave the position of women generally unchanged.'39 Moreover, interna- tional law accords priority to civil and political rights, rights that may have very little to offer women generally. The major forms of oppression of women operate within the economic, social and cultural realms. Economic, social and cultural rights are traditionally regarded as a lesser form of international right and as much more difficult to implement.'4

# A2: NO SPILL OVER IN SOCIETY

**Harassment of prostitutes spills over to affect all women in camp towns**

**MOON 97** [Katherine H.S., Ph. D. Princeton University, Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, served in the Office of the Senior Coordinator for Women’s Issues in the U.S. Department of State, “Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in US/Korea Relations”, Columbia Univeristy Press, 1997, P129] SLV

Outside the clubs, the Korean police were all too eager to stop Korean women in the streets. Women who wore more make-up than others, women who walked with servicemen or were near a base, unaccompanied by U.S. personnel, even though they were not prostitutes, were all subject to random checks of VD cards by Korean police and health inspectors. In 1971, the Chief of Songt'an Police stated that "[t]he problem is that KNP, Korean health agents and women inspectors have no way of determining who is an unregistered streetwalker, Korean citizen or U.S. dependent." 21 Consequently, the tendency was to treat all women as prostitutes or potential prostitutes. Such actions date back to earlier attempts in different societies to control military prostitution; the enforcement of the British Contagious Diseases Act of the 1860s and U.S. federal legislation regarding venereal disease containment during World War I translated into the assumption that any woman found near military camps is a prostitute and therefore subject to gynecological examination. 22 The leaders of U.S. commands had to step in and negotiate with local police to refrain from stopping women for simply accompanying U.S. servicemen in town. U.S. soldiers charged that Korean police (KNP) and health inspectors were harassing them and their Korean female companions, often wives, girlfriends, or friends, without any provocation or reason. 23 Many base authorities requested that KNP and other local officials refrain from indiscriminate stopping of women accompanying GIs, claiming that such KNP actions "mean, by implication that (1) all Korean females accompanying U.S. personnel are prostitutes, or (2) that U.S. personnel go only with Korean females who are prostitutes." 24 Other commanders, however, asked their men to cooperate with the KNP, who were, after all, only doing their job to protect the health of U.S. personnel.

**Challenging the subjugation of Korean prostitutes spills over to affect Korean society as a whole**

**MOON 97** [Katherine H.S., Ph. D. Princeton University, Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, served in the Office of the Senior Coordinator for Women’s Issues in the U.S. Department of State, “Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in US/Korea Relations”, Columbia Univeristy Press, 1997, P136] SLV

The significance of the protests described above lies in the fact that many kijich'on prostitutes, though powerless in many ways, did not simply remain passive in the camptown turmoils of the early 1970s. On the contrary, they formed a local bloc with which to protest the U.S. hegemony over the economic and political life of their camptowns. Referring to the protests against the boycott, Ms. Kim stated, "[T]he shop owners and club owners joined forces with us and supported our protest because with fixed prices, the prices of their own goods fell." 88 In other words, U.S. actions, whether off-limits decrees or boycotts and prix fixe measures, had direct economic consequences on all camptown residents dependent on the bases for their survival. In this sense, although prostitutes were the most despised of the camptown residents, they represented, in stark relief, the vulnerability of local Korean residents to U.S. power and thereby succeeded to lead other villagers to challenge that power. The political protests of prostitutes also underscore the refusal of many women, though condemned by Korean society and abused by Koreans and Americans alike, to be treated like commodities. In short, they asserted their sense of human dignity, albeit fragile, when pushed too far by others in the camptown communities. It is also significant that for these women the economic value of their labor and that of their human worth were intertwined. Moreover, they merged their sense of powerlessness, vis-á-vis the bases, to the violation of the human rights, or domination, of the Korean people in general by the United States.

# A2: PROSTITUTION IS CULTURAL

**Claims that prostitution is an element of Korean culture are flawed**

**Sturdevant and Stoltzfus 93** (Saundra and Brenda, “Let the Good Times Roll: Prostitution and the U.S. Military in Asia,” 1993,p 174, SLV)

It may be possible to say that this is "their culture" (which of course fails to explain why American men take to it like fish to water). But I don't think so. It seems true that many Korean males are little despots at home and carousing nincompoops on the town, often staying out until midnight, and there will be little hope for women's equality or for democracy in the country as long as this persists. But then how can an American who has taken the night air around Itaewon talk about "carousing nincompoops" and keep a straight face?

Concubinage is a long-standing and still-widespread practice in Korea, with as many as four wives serving one husband in a careful hierarchy of status; put this abuse of women together with the *chador-like* public dress women used to wear and the ritualized confinement off male power to the inner sanctum of the home, and you have something akin to contemporary Middle Eastern social structure, even if changed much beyond that in postwar Seoul. But these practices are as old as the hills, imbedded in custom and ritual, and do not represent a perversion of Korean morality or dishonor to the women involved.

Prostitution, on the other hand, has no sanction in Korean morality. Nor is this the "culture" of North Korea, and that makes it hard to attribute the behavior to some unchanging Korean "way of life." Whatever else one may say about Kimilsungland, no such conditions exist. The regime outlawed prostitution and concubinage in I946, at the same time that it established formal legal equality for women. (Upon returning from my first visit to North Korea, I lectured at a military graduate school about my experience. The students asked about this and that but waited until we sat down for a beer to put the most important, albeit alliterative, question for the accomplished Korean hand: "What's the price of pussy in Pyongyang?")

Furthermore, there is in South Korea the stark contrast between the unfortunate multitude of girls of the night and the dignified wives and stellar mothers that are the norm, plus the general Korean shame that such conditions exist in the first place. The wise and undaunted mother of the family with whom we lived, only a few years older than I, was the only upstanding Korean woman I knew who dared be seen on the streets of Seoul alone with me, lest she be taken for a prostitute. It is probably not kosher to quote George Blake, Seoul station chief for MI-6 in I950 and infamous Russian spy, but he once said that in most countries he visited the women were far more admirable than the men, and this was particularly true of Korea.

The culture of camp towns, prostitution as a way of life, and sex tourism has nothing to do with Korean culture. It is an integral part of Korea's subordination to Japanese and American interests through most of this century; the military base in the Itaewon area, after all, was Japan's for four decades, and now it has been ours for four decades. In I945 the camp towns just switched patrons. This patent subordination is obvious to anyone with eyes to see, or ears to hear. Furthermore from the horny adolescents out of Arkansas to the leaky old American ambassadorial residence, the web of subordination is seamless.

# A2: TOURISM

**Brothels surrounding military bases create the foundation for brothels for tourists**

**ENLOE** **00** (Chloe, “Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives,” 2000, p68) SLV

Tourism, at first glance, seems far removed from militarism. Tourism's promoters glorify leisure, they urge the tourist to shed stress, discard discipline. Tourism usually is portrayed as a search for peace, not violence. And yet, in reality, tourism can push women into prostitution as surely as does militarism. In many parts of the world, in fact, the presence of brothels for male soldiers has laid the groundwork for the development of brothels for male tourists.60 That is, militarism and tourism may not be polar opposites after all. They may be kin, bound together as cause and effect.

# A2: CAN END MILITARISM WITHOUT ENDING PATRIARCHY

**Until we end the patriarchal structure we cannot end militarism, it may appear dormant but it can always revive itself at any instance.**

**Enloe 93** – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War” p. 68-71, MT)

Our own historical period may rank as the most thoroughly militarized in history; more people in more societies have been dependent on or controlled by the military and military priorities that is, have become militarized than perhaps at any previous time. Military expenditures, military authority, and militaristic values and ways of thinking have influenced the flow of foreign trade and have determined which countries receive agricultural assistance. Militarism has shaped the design and marketing of children's toys and of adult fashions and entertainments. It has influenced fathers' hopes for their sons and voters' presumptions about electable candidates. Militarized mythologies of valor and safety have influenced the self-esteem and security of millions of people. Yet the very breadth and depth of militarization in so many countries makes it difficult to develop unambiguously feminist theories of militarization. Feminist theorizing is distinctive insofar as it reveals how much of social practice depends on deliberate manipulations of gender. It takes culture seriously; it is on the lookout for even the most seemingly trivial efforts of state officials to shape ideas about what it means to be womanly or manly. Still, the very darkness of our times whether measured in megatonnage of nuclear explosives or in numbers of refugees has tempted many to dilute their distinctly feminist approach. Although the spread of military beliefs and influence cannot be sustained unless fueled by the hierarchical arrangements of gender, some may have hesitated to press the issue in a group that has come together out of quite different concerns about militarization. The composition of an antimilitarism campaign is often diverse: men and women who see a threat to democracy in the government's use of force to quell popular protest, aboriginal people who fear the escalating demand for uranium deposits under their already scarce lands, mothers alarmed over the conscription of their sons, parents desperate to locate ''disappeared" children, workers opposed to their employers' stubborn dependence on military contracts, citizens alarmed over the government's willingness to lease land for foreign bases, and men who feel that their own male honor is violated by soldiers who rape their wives and daughters. Militarization, in contrast to other forms of gender oppression, really does injure men, literally as well as figuratively on the battlefield, in jail cells, and as objects of forced conscription. Thus, despite the best efforts of a militarizing state to manipulate ever-potent notions of masculinity, men can be mobilized as allies in antimilitarist campaigns. At the same time, however, they are hard to convince of the need for a feminist analysis of what causes and perpetuates militarization. A man may feel so threatened in his masculine identity that he may refuse to admit that the meanings assigned to femininity and masculinity not just as abstractions, but as part of his everyday guide to behavior might shape his idea of what is a trivial issue as opposed to what is politically significant, demanding his public attention. To overcome these very real theory-in-action dilemmas, a feminist must demonstrate exactly what is lost, analytically and strategically, when gender considerations are left out of the explanation. At the very least, a proponent of feminist theorizing must show convincingly that if the social constructions of femininity and masculinity are ignored or trivialized, we all will fail to grasp why people's lives have become increasingly dominated by military values and agendas, and our actions will fail to reverse these trends. Most radically, a feminist analysis implicates patriarchy not just the capitalist military-industrial complex, and not just the hierarchical statein the causation of militarism. **It is the entire patriarchal structure** of privilege and control **that must be dismantled if societies are to be rid**, once and for all, **of militarism**. This message may be difficult for many women and men to hear in the wake of the collapse of the second superpower and the consequent reduction in tensions between nuclear-armed alliances. Isn't the Cold War's final curtain enough to warrant a sense of relief and accomplishment? No, unfortunately. As long as patriarchal assumptions about masculinity and femininity shape people's beliefs and identities and their relationships with one another, militarization, however temporarily stanched, lies dormant, **capable of rising again**, and yet again.

**Bases have gendered concequences that spill over and effect the entire country.**

**Enloe 93** – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War” p. 118-120, MT)

**A foreign military base** shares some striking similarities with a multinational company's overseas branch. Both camouflage their functional interests with talk of "family" and "community." Both rely on the energies of local residents but use alien cultural presumptions to organize their work lives. And both, while concentrated in compact physical spaces, **spill their gendered consequences far beyond the base** or factory gates. Feminists in the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand have described in detail just how **U.S. military bases distorted** the **sexual politics** of the countries. A military base wasn't only an installation for servicing bombers, fighters, and aircraft carriers or a launchpad for aggressive forays into surrounding territories. It was also and always had been a package of presumptions about male soldiers' sexual needs and about the local community's resources for satisfying those needs. Massage parlors had, over the years, become as integral to Subic Bay (the mammoth, recently closed U.S. naval base in the Philippines) as its dry docks. We have yet to possess comparable sexual histories of the U.S. military bases at Roosevelt Roads, in the Panama Canal Zone, at Guantanamo Bay, and at Key West. Until we have such histories, we won't have a realistic picture of just how militarization of the Caribbean and Central America has been entrenched in the twentieth century. We won't know how sexuality was used to wage the Cold War in this corner of the globe. Still, we have some clues. In the 1980s, Honduras was the newest regional site for a U.S. military base. If Honduran women had met with Thai and Filipina women, what common stories would they have had to tell? What light would those stories shed on what it takes to militarize international relations? 11 Lucy Kosimar, a freelance reporter, wrote an account of how sexual politics in Honduras were being fashioned so as to meet the alleged needs of the U.S. military there.12 In 1985, Kosimar went to visit the shanty town of brothels that had grown up near Palmerole, one of the bases used by the U.S. military in its series of "Big Pine" joint maneuvers, which were intended to preserve U.S. Cold War control over Central America. She found Honduran women serving as prostitutes to both Honduran and U.S. soldiers. Her report revealed in a microcosm what Honduran public health officials have noted more generally: that there had been a notable rise in the cases of sexually transmitted diseases in Honduras in the three years since the start of U.S. military buildup. Hondurans refer to a particularly virulent form of STD as "Vietnam Rose." While the nickname once again wrongly blamed the victim, it suggested that Hondurans saw the Vietnamization of their country in terms of sexuality as well as in terms of anti-Communist ideology, money, and weaponry. Lucy Kosimar let us hear from some of the people behind the statistics. First there were the Honduran women as young as sixteen years old who had been virtually kidnapped and brought to the brothels as captives. One woman who tried to escape was caught and returned by Honduran policemen. There were other women who, on the surface, seemed to have come to the brothels freely, although in fact they had been driven by their need for money. These women split their fees with the owners of the shabby cantinas where they conducted their business. But many of the women living on the fringes of the U.S. base fell somewhere in between these two groups. They had been drawn so deeply into debt to the men who supplied their food and minimal housing that they were never able to pay off their debts and thus regain their freedom. Kosimar found that local policemen acted as enforcers of the prostitution system. The police, in turn, were controlled by Honduran army officers. This control reflected the country's then-growing militarization, the increasing capacity of the military to intimidate other Honduran officials. The U.S. soldiers involved were from both the enlisted and officer ranks. It may have been the construction of **militarized masculinity** that was most responsible for U.S. enlisted men's belief that one of the prerogatives due an American male GI overseas was the sexual services of local women. However, whereas in Vietnam most American military women were nurses, in Honduras the U.S. field units included several dozen women soldiers. It is not clear whether their presence affected the men's assumptions of sexual prerogatives. The most common complaint from the women soldiers was that they had not been issued proper sanitary supplies. But where did these women soldiers go for their R and R when their male comrades headed for the cantinas? It would be wrong to imagine that the sexual exploitation of local women was sustained solely by Honduran military intimidation and diffuse U.S. patriarchal culture. As is true in other base towns around the world, the system of militarized sexual relations required explicit American policy-making. Kosimar reported, for example, that U.S. army doctors from the Palmerole base routinely conducted medical exams on Honduran women working in the nearby brothels. Their job was to ensure that American male soldiers would have access to sex without jeopardizing the army's operational readiness.

# A2: POSTMODERNISM/RELATIVISM BAD

Considering multiple perspectives good – increases the information we can draw from to make the best decisions. Suppressing difference is violent.

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. 111-114, TH)

While finding and developing commonalties between North and South is a major challenge, developing tolerance for the differences that remain may be even more difficult. Such tolerance requires an ethics of difference that is often dismissed, for it tends to be as- sociated with relativism. Many international relations scholars are concerned that a postmodern embrace of difference would lead to a situation where anything goes and “any narrative is as valid as an- other.”50 As a result, these scholars fear, we would no longer be able to defend certain values and political projects, such as democracy or human rights. But there are no reasons why an appreciation of difference would prevent us from judging and choosing between op- posing values or political options. To the contrary, understanding and engaging questions of difference is essential for understanding political challenges and taking informed decisions. For instance, historians who open up alternative interpretations of the past actu- ally reduce the danger of relativism, for they increase the sources available for judging whether our understanding of history is ap- propriate. In so doing, historians may oppose “the manipulation of narratives by . . . providing a space for confrontation between opposing testimonies.”51 Making choices, drawing lines, and defending them are inevita- ble, particularly in a context like Korea, where interests and perspec- tives clash. An unconditional acceptance of otherness cannot—and indeed should not—always work in practice. There are moments when the reassertion and imposition of one perspective or value system over another becomes desirable, perhaps even a political im- perative. But successful and fair solutions to political challenges are more likely to emerge if positions are not dogmatically asserted but carefully justified through a critical and self-reflective understand- ing of the tensions between identity and difference. Advancing an ethics of difference does not entail abandoning the ability to judge, particularly when it comes to questions of respon- sibility for war and conflict on the Korean peninsula. Gerrit Gong stresses that addressing such questions will be one of the main chal- lenges in a unified Korea.52 Claus Offe, writing about the task of coming to terms with Germany’s divided past, argues likewise that a general amnesty is out of the question.53 But one must recall at the same time that the institution of amnesty is not to be equated with amnesia. Paul Ricoeur, for instance, stresses that there is a duty to forget as much as there is a duty to remember, for “the duty to re- member is a duty to teach, whereas the duty to forget is a duty to go beyond anger and hatred.”54 Richard Kearney adds that “genu- ine amnesty” is a way of remembering that goes beyond a form of memory dominated by “the deterministic stranglehold of violent obsession and revenge.”55 Korea needs such a willingness to forgive in the service of healing and reconciliation: it needs a way out of the cycle of violence and hatred that has dominated interactions on the peninsula for half a century now. The role of history is illustrative, not least because it forces us to confront questions of evidence and truth. Not any version of the past can be sustained. Although the content of a historical account is in- evitably intertwined with the values espoused by the narrator, a his- torian cannot simply make up events and interpretations. Ricoeur seeks to avoid an abuse of memory by grounding it in “what really happened.”56 This is, of course, an aspiration that inevitably remains unfulfilled, for history is a form of representation, and a represen- tation is always incomplete and, at least to some extent, distorted. It cannot capture the object that it represents as it is, void of per- ception and perspective.57 Ricoeur stresses the need to supplement historical memory with documentary and archival evidence.58 Even so-called postmodern historians stress the need for rules of schol- arship and verification. Hayden White, for instance, admits that every historical narrative contains a “desire to moralize” the event that it seeks to capture. But to count as “proper history,” White emphasizes, the narrative “must manifest a proper concern for the judicious handling of evidence, and it must honor the chronological order of the original occurrence of events.”59 Chakrabarty, likewise, defends the notion of “minority histories” while rejecting relativist positions that may dismiss such accounts as purely personal or ar- bitrary. He stresses that an alternative memory of the past can only enrich, or be absorbed into, the mainstream historical discourse if the following questions can be answered in the affirmative: “Can the story be told/crafted? And does it allow for a rationally defen- sible point of view or position from which to tell the story?”60 Some of the highly ideological and hagiographical narratives that make up North Korea’s national mythology are unlikely to with- stand a confrontation with rigorous historical testing principles. But the same can be said about aspects of South Korea’s historical consciousness as well. A recent example of the need to revise the official memory of the Korean War can be found with regard to the No Gun Ri massacre. For decades citizens of the small village of No Gun Ri had insisted that on a summer day in July 1950, American soldiers had machine-gunned hundreds of civilians under a railroad bridge near the village. But U.S. military officials, as well as the South Korean government, consistently denied that such events ever occurred, arguing that they could find no basis for the allegations. No history text mentioned the event. Public discussion of the issue emerged only in the late 1990s, when a dozen former U.S. soldiers gave evidence to an investigative team from the Associated Press that largely confirmed the claims that No Gun Ri’s inhabitants had advanced for decades. After a yearlong review the U.S. Army had to admit officially that “U.S. ground forces fired toward refugees in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during this period. . . . As a result, an unknown number of refugees were killed or injured.”61 Histories are never finished. They are written and rewritten con- stantly, reflecting the emergence of new evidence as well as the evolu- tion of political doctrines and knowledge conventions. This constant reassessment of the past is both a source of tension and a chance to find pathways toward a more peaceful political environment. In few parts of the world is this process of remembering and forgetting more controversial and volatile than in divided Korea, where the memory of war and death continues to dominate virtually all aspects of poli- tics and society. I have argued in this chapter that a route from trauma to recon- ciliation can open up if an ethics of dialogue is supplemented with an ethics of difference: a willingness to recognize and deal with the different and incompatible identities that developed in the di- vided parts of Korea during the last half-century. I have sought to outline the contours of an ethics of difference by supplementing a variety of theoretical sources with an effort to identify attempts to translate these ideas into practice. The latter undoubtedly remain isolated efforts, but the democratizing South Korean society shows increasing signs of developing a more tolerant attitude. Among the examples are efforts by historians and teachers to promote tolerance for multiple narratives of the past. Although neglected by security experts, such low-key efforts are crucial for developing a culture of reconciliation. Advancing and developing an ethics of difference is important for several reasons: to avoid an escalation of military tensions on the peninsula, to lay the foundations for a sustainable policy of engage- ment, and to prepare for some of the conflicts that would emerge in the eventuality of a North Korean collapse. I have focused here on the few signs of hope that exist on the Korean peninsula at the moment: efforts within South Korea to promote aspects of an ethics of difference. These efforts remain timid and isolated, and they have so far not been reciprocated by the North. But this in itself is not discouraging. Promoting an ethics of difference as part of a reconciliation process inevitably takes time. Entrenched identities cannot be uprooted overnight nor can the an- tagonistic political attitudes and practices that are intertwined with these identities. But there are more immediate challenges too, most notably the danger that an ethics of difference may either promote more conflict or generate a form of relativism that prevents us from judging and defending particular political projects. Neither fear is justified, at least not if an ethics of difference is articulated and ap- plied in a consistent manner. Indeed, if there is a source of tension and conflict on the peninsula, it is located precisely in the attempt to erase difference and impose one memory of the past and one vision for the future. This is why the most serious cause of violence today stems not from interactions with difference, but, as William Connolly convincingly argues, from doctrines and movements that suppress difference by trying to reinstate a unified faith in one form of identification.62 Tolerating different coexisting narratives does not prevent making judgments about their content or desirability. Quite to the contrary, reasonable decisions about key political and ethical challenges can be made only after taking into account a va- riety of perspectives, interests, and arguments. Repressing the dif- ference will neither lead to better decisions nor avoid the fact that they are based on certain political and moral values.

# \*\*\*A2: CP’S\*\*\*

# A2: CPS – NB LINKS TO AFF

**Gendered understanding of oriental women is socially constructed, the counterplan’s representations corrupt solvency**

**Lewis 04** - Professor of Cultural Studies at the University of East London (Reina, “Rethinking Orientalism: Women, Travel and the Ottoman Harem” 2004, p. 142-144, MT)

Whilst the evocative and detailed description of Orientalised women was an expected trope of material about the Orient, the emphatic use of the female body as a marker of racialised difference in the writings of Ottoman women was more than mere allegiance to cultural convention. This chapter focuses on the **codification of Oriental women’s bodies as beautiful** **in** a **consideration of how the gaze is racialised and sexualised** **at** the point of both **production and** of **reception**. Different types of ‘Oriental’ women are displayed for the reader in a highly visual style of literary description characterised by references to the ‘sister arts’ of painting and poetry. These ‘word portraits’ institute a regime of representation – the presentation of ‘Oriental’ women by ‘Oriental’ women – that can be analysed in relation to the dominant modes of Orientalist spectacle with which their readers would have been more familiar. **The images** also set **up a series of racialised ethnic and national differences** that splinter the dominant Orientalist version of a generic Orient or Oriental. Localised differences have a function in the construction of alternative Ottoman femininities important to the textual self-inscription of their authors. Beauty signifies in and through a series of looks that, in a number of different ways, gender and racialise both the objects of the gaze and the owners of the look. This is seen particularly in the books of Demetra Vaka Brown whose repeated commentary on the beauty of Ottoman women is too pro- nounced to ignore, particularly in her first book *Haremlik* where she returns to the intimate friends of her youth, now become grand hanıms. Ottoman writers use descriptions of female appearance and beauty to present a series of racial and ethnic Ottoman identities that they evidently expect to be only partially comprehensible to their Occidental readership. Their efforts to explain regional Ottoman differentiations of race and ethnicity – that are unremittingly gendered and classed – to a readership of presumed outsiders is suggestive for an analysis of how the reiterative qualities that Judith Butler (1990) sees as essential to performative gender identities can be applied to identities based on race and ethnicity. Operating as mechanisms to incorporate subjects into social order, performative phrases or actions literally do, or enact, what they say as they are said: thus the doctor who says of the new-born baby ‘it’s a boy’ literally attributes a gender to the infant as s/he says it, just as a marriage comes into legal being as the official pronounces the words that name it. Butler uses theories of performativity to emphasise how **gender is constructed** and non- natural, seeing it as an identification that is **secured through the repeated performance of socially accepted signs of masculinity or femininity**. Much of the interest generated by theories of performativity has centred on questions of gender identity and of theatrical spectacle, whether it be formal or informal drag performances, theatre, film or performance art (see Jones and Stephenson 1999 and Chinn 1997). I am going to use the emphasis on the instability of identity foregrounded by theories of performativity to think about the construction of racialised and ethnic identities in literary texts. In this and the following chapter I explore if and how performative statements are able to operate across cultures, where the consensus necessary for the recognition of performative actions may not be shared. When the main claim to fame of Ottoman women’s books was that they could sell themselves as the ‘accurate’ revelation of a still largely hidden world authenticated by the ‘real’ Oriental status of their female authors, I want to ask how much manoeuvrability their authors had in relation to the types of identifications with which they aligned themselves? When they explicitly and implicitly invoke European visual art in their depiction of Oriental women, is it useful to consider their emerging representations in relation to discussions of the embodiment of performative spectacle? Do the authors’ fluctuating processes of identification with and separation from the variously racialised female subjects of their books show something new about the functioning of those contradictory and shifting processes of identification that have emerged as central to discussions about performativity (see also Brah 1996)? This chapter analyses the identificatory positions for authors and readers that are produced in and by these sources in relation to an Orientalist gaze that is conceptualised as plural rather than singular, and as polysemic in its potential to produce diverse positions of spectator pleasure and identification. I want to return for a moment to consider the Orientalist discursive conditions in which these texts emerged. As discussed in Chapter One, **the sexualised display of the Oriental female body was a central strand of Western Orientalism**, fully developed and well known by the second half of the nineteenth century. But I would not want to characterise this as a display whose only audience was male. I agree with many other scholars in the field who argue that that the dominant codes of Orientalist art prioritise a male visual pleasure and that this is bound up in the construction of imperial identities and the subjective investment in imperial power relations (Nochlin 1983, Richon 1985, Tawadros 1988). None of that is contested: pictures by male artists such as Jean-Léon Gérôme, Eugène Delacroix, John Frederick Lewis and Ludwig Deutsch were prevalent in the Salons and Academies of Europe. But women were also consumers, attending exhibitions, viewing Orientalist visual culture through the print and periodical reproduction that reached beyond the middle classes, and collecting colonial postcards (MacKenzie 1995, DeRoo 1998). Women as well as men looked at Orientalised female bodies and were well schooled in the logic of the Orientalist fantasy harem. Western women did not only consume Orientalist imagery, they also produced it. As I argued in *Gendering Orientalism* (Lewis 1996), there was a painterly female Orientalist gaze in operation in the nineteenth century, the products of which circulated in the same venues as paintings by Decamps, Ingres or Gérôme. More is now known about the variety of nineteenth-century women’s visual Orientalism (Roberts 2002, Cherry 2000). Whether they liked them or not, critics nearly always read a painting’s female point of origin as essential to its meaning. The terms of this gendering might be variable, but gender remained central to the reception of women’s art or literature. At the turn of the twentieth century, this was still the gender-specific context in which Ottoman women’s writings were received. Only now, merchandised in relation to their experience of the harem, their geographical/ethnic point of origin differently racialised the text. But if, as Melman has demonstrated, the European woman was inevitably positioned at one remove from the nascent superiority of the ethnographer’s gaze, then the woman coded as Oriental was situated even further from any space of cultural authority (Melman 1992). As Ottoman women inserted themselves into a Western representation system, one must consider the role played by their depiction of female beauty in this process of transculturation. As discussed in previous chapters, the classification ‘Oriental woman’ was not straightforward and could encompass differences of religion, region and ethnicity in keeping with the heterogeneity of the Ottoman population. Yet the terms of this heterogeneity were not fixed in either their value or their meaning, operating as variable categories that were deployed, contested and remade in Ottoman sources. As Ottoman writers tried to reframe their gendered Ottoman identities for themselves in the context of books directed at a primarily Occidental audience, they struggled with the slipperiness of language and the liabilities of a mode of writing dependant on concepts of authenticity. In a transculturating movement their terms of identification shifted from a local to an international discourse as they sought to remake identifications for themselves whilst simultaneously trying to signify Orientalness for an Occidental readership. Transculturation moves both ways, and the terms available to Ottoman women were already by this period influenced by Western definitions of the Orient. The recognition of this continued to shock or surprise a West fond of imagining the Orient in general and the harem in particular as hermetically sealed. This shifting set of identifications is important for an Orientalist discourse that sets such store by an authenticity whose guarantee rests on ethnic, Orientalist and gender allegiances. The concept of performativity is helpful for thinking through these varieties of racial and ethnic identity. In unpicking some of these complex positionings Vaka Brown, who was writing from the United States, emphasised her Oriental credentials by creating an affinity between herself and all that was best about Turkish Muslim female life. Thus, to her Occidental readership she might appear to be a reliable observer-participant (American enough to give judgements, Ottoman enough to gain privileged access). But to Ottoman Muslim readers she might appear more partisan. As was evident in Chapter Three, Halide Edib objected to Vaka Brown’s version of harem life and to her romanticisation of polygamy. Edib wrote bitterly of the misery that polygamy brought to her childhood when her father took a second wife:

# A2: ROK CP’S

State dialogue doesn’t solve

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. 64, TH)

Some form of dialogue has always taken place in Korea, from un- official Red Cross talks, ministerial meetings, and diplomatic gather- ings to the spectacular summit between the North and South Ko- rean heads of state in June 2000.4 But none of the joint declarations and agreements that emerged from these numerous encounters ever managed to solve the issues at stake and establish a lasting atmo- sphere of peace. Sooner or later each agreement broke down. State- based dialogues may be able to deal with some of the immediate and overt challenges, such as finding ways to limit nuclear proliferation on the peninsula. But diplomatic encounters rarely, if ever, remove the underlying causes and patterns of conflict. None of the various state negotiations and summits have been able to engage the fun- damental problem of Korea’s culture of insecurity: the antagonistic identity constructs that continuously fuel conflict and undermine agreements, no matter how promising they seem at first sight. The Pyongyang summit of June 2000 is the most graphic case. Although spectacular and symbolically important, it hardly constituted a dia- logical breakthrough. Each party came to it driven by interests that were specific to its own state apparatus: the North hoped to get some international recognition and badly needed funds. The South was willing to provide the latter, as it turned out later, through a secret payment of $100 million in return for securing the summit and, as some critics of the South Korean president’s engagement policy sug- gest, helping him to win a Nobel Prize.5

**Women in Korea have been pushing for rights since the 50’s**

**ENLOE** **00** (Chloe, “Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives,” 2000, p85) SLV

It was women who first insisted that the experiences of the "comfort women" be seen as a national political issue by the South Korean government. The Korean women activists wanted to make Korea's own Confucian ideology's inherently patriarchal assumption about feminine duty and feminine shame central to that issue formation. By contrast, the men at the top of the Seoul government, as well as many male nationalists in the opposition, preferred to craft the I990s issue in such a fashion that local patriarchal complicity could be kept a nonissue. These nonfeminists were far more comfortable using the elderly women's stories to exert pressure on Japanese officials, men from whom they wanted apologies and compensation. Most important, the masculinized Korean political elite of the 1990s did not want the survivors' stories to fuel popular criticism of military prostitution still established around today's American bases in South Korea.119

**Prostitution industry has been allowed to develop**

**ENLOE** **00** (Chloe, “Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives,” 2000, p92) SLV

The prostitution industry servicing American soldiers in South Kon has not been left to chance. It has been self-consciously shaped by two governments, each seeking to exert controls that would ensure that its own goals would be met. Thus, for instance, officials in Seoul in the 1960s have sponsored a Woman's Autonomous Association in each GI town. Each association in practice has been far from autonomous. Katharine Moon found that "local police and government authorities solicit the leaders of the associations and keep watch over the women's activities." 132 A principal objective is to persuade the women in prostitution to monitor each other, especially to guarantee that every woman remains free of sexually transmitted diseases. This practice has added an innovative twist on both the British government's nineteenth-century system and the U.S.-Philippine alliance's more recent system.

**Although patronage has played a role in incorporating women into the public sphere, because of South Korean culture these roles have been merely tokenistic.**

**Yoon 01** (Bang-Soon L. Department of Political Science Central Washington University “Democratization and Gender Politics in South Korea”, Gender, Globalization, and Democratization, Pg 177-78, SW)

Patronage is an important part of South Korea's political culture that has deeply permeated both the public and private sectors, government institutions, as well as political parties, and both men and women have been subject to it. However, the patterns of patronage show a gender difference. For males, their functional merit attracted the patron's attention as "task elites," whereas for women, sexuality per se appears as a crucial factor rather than their expertise. A few elite women were recruited as NA members (in the national constituency seat category) or party leaders essentially for their symbolic value, irrespective of their functional merits. For example, although women college professors have been sought-after targets of political recruitment, their "Kleenex tissue paper" role clearly indicates their value is no more than tokenistic. Informal rules are also forceful in patronage politics, as one feminist activist put it: "For women to be recruited by male patrons in the government or political party, they should somehow appeal to that male patron either due to their physical beauty or other character such as being smart without losing femininity, and so on. Anyhow, you should be liked by the male patron to be selected. Money is another important criterion. Despite the fact that male "task elites" were institutionally recognized by power elites as junior partners, women elites under the patronage politics system lack such recognition. Their identity is blurred, and they do not have their own power bases for further career development in politics. In sum, while patronage has played a crucial role in the inclusion of women in the formal political sphere, few elite women have been selectively admitted to government and political party organizations on their own initiation. Almost all have been beneficiaries of gendered patronage politics. Therefore, their space within formal institutions has been very vulnerable. When gaps arise between the government's agenda and women's agenda, these token women often sided with the government transmitting government values to the society rather than the reverse. This gendered structure facilitated very few opportunities to promote women's interests and to expand women's political space at the societal level.

**Government and management officials coopt and suppress South Korean women’s demands against an exploitative environment.**

**Yoon 01** (Bang-Soon L. Department of Political Science Central Washington University “Democratization and Gender Politics in South Korea”, Gender, Globalization, and Democratization, Pg 181, SW)

Unlike the popular image of Asian women, whose femininity, motherhood, sexuality, passivity, docility, and hard-working nature at the workplace may capture the observer's immediate attention, female factory workers were at the forefront of industrial labor activism in South Korea. Particularly in the mid-1970s until the democratization movement in the mid-1980s, the industrial labor movement was sustained by female factory workers who stood against exploitative working conditions (e.g., poor wages, hazardous work environments, and violation of human rights), repressive labor policies, and abusive government agencies such as the police (Lee, Hyo-Jae 1996,263-267). Despite their roles as *Sanop* or *Suchul Jonsa* (industrial or export soldiers) euphemistically praised by the export regime and corporate leaders, young women factory workers' wages barely allowed a subsistence living (Cumings 1997: 370). Their struggles were threefold-against repressive government, against management, and against male labor union leaders who, often coopted by government, suppressed women workers' demands (Launius 1991). Young women factory workers in the export industries were a true vanguard of industrial labor activism, and they contributed to the eventual collapse of the military-authoritarian regime of Park, Chung Hee and to the massive democratization movement in the 1980s. The Y. H. Trading Company's (manufacturing wigs and garments) women workers' labor activism in the late 1970s is a good case in point. When the company planned to close due to mismanagement, women workers seized the leading opposition political party's building (lead by Kim, Young-Sam Park). A women worker's death caused by excessive use of physical force by police ignited larger anti-government social unrest (labor and student demonstrations), particularly in Seoul, Masan, and in Pusan, where the opposition leader Kim's political home is based. Disputes among President Park's entourage over how to handle such social unrest led to Park's assassination by his own intelligence director in 1979, which ended Park, Chung-Hee's eighteen-year tenure in power and terminated the anti-democratic Yushin system. Young women's struggle for factory workers' rights was more powerful in overthrowing the Yushin regime than any other social groups or NA members.

# A2: NON FEM CP’S

**Reducing Military presence alone doesn’t solve – you must prioritize an understanding of masculinity and femininity to truly demilitarize or else it only encourages more militarization and patriarchal attitudes.**

**Enloe 93** – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War” p. 21-31 MT)

It is a misplaced hope. For the significant work now being done on masculinity is not a repopulating of the political landscape with men in the name of postmodernism. Rather, those conducting the valuable investigations of masculinity start from the essential feminist discovery that **we can make sense of men's gendered reactions only if we take women's experiences seriously**. Indeed, the more we have learned about the deliberate efforts to circumscribe women's behavior, the more we have exposed the human decision making that undergirds much of masculinity. We don't yet have feminist-informed studies of such male-dominated institutions as the United Nations Security Council or the Central Intelligence Agency. But the day when we will may not be far off. Already we have a Canadian feminist's analysis of the International Labor Organization.17 And there are North American, European, and Japanese feminist scholars energetically at work right now charting the **masculinist assumptions** that have **guided** the distinctively **post-World War II** profession of **international relations research**.18 The 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe brought about the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and a surge of demilitarization. But although Polish, Czech, Hungarian, East German, and Romanian women played central roles in the grass-roots organizing that made the eventual upheavals possible, this demilitarization was not guided by feminist insights into the causes of militarization.19 In a mirror image of Western anti-Communist regimes' needing the symbol of the overworked, "unfeminine" Soviet or Polish woman to justify their Cold War policies, the Communist regimes had depended on feminism's being so tainted by its association with Western bourgeois individualism that no woman in their own nations would be inspired by feminist analyses or aspirations. Without the image of the self-absorbed, materialistic, man-hating Western feminist to combat, the restlessness of women in Eastern Europe might have translated into gender-conscious political action much earlier. Olga Havel might have become famous in her own right rather than as an imprisoned playwright's loyal wife. But, unlike the revolutions in Eritrea and Nicaragua, most of those in Eastern Europe were informed by only the faintest glimmers of organized feminist consciousness. Thus, men were not challenged to rethink their own masculinist presumptions about power or public life until after the Communist regimes had crumbled. East Germany initially appeared to provide a contrast. Cities such as Berlin, Dresden, and Weimar were the sites of feminist organizing in 1989. 20 It often appeared ahead of male-led organizing because the regime was preoccupied with monitoring the masculinized coffee houses and universities and thus was caught unprepared for the political activism that flowed out of the theaters and the churches, sites of women's organizing. During those turbulent autumn months, women's groups presented detailed platforms, built diverse umbrella organizations, and mobilized thousands of women in public rallies. For a while they couldn't be ignored by the male contestants for power. They wedged their way into the bargaining rooms and into the transitional regime. But even these consciously feminist women of East Germany couldn't direct the course of the next stage, the government-to-government bargaining sessions that ultimately produced German reunification. Whereas the bringing down of the old regime had been a process shaped by struggles between politicized women and men in East Germany, German reunification was a virtually all-male political process. Soon after, many East German women joined many East German men in voting for Helmut Kohl's Christian Democratic Party, with its promises of material wellbeing and free markets. Those few feminists who warned that reunification without feminist guarantees could be a disaster for women were seen as out of step. Even they might have found it hard to believe that, within two years after reunification, 12 percent of single mothers in eastern Germany would be among the ranks of the unemployed.21 Democratization and demilitarization have commonly been presumed to serve women's interests. **Demilitarization loosens the bond between men and the state; thus, it should make the state more transparent and porous**. Democratization simultaneously opens up the public spaces; thus, it should permit more voices to be heard and policy agendas to be reimagined. **But such changes will take place only if the** two **processes are not designed in such a way as to reprivilege masculinity**. The democratic elections of 1990 in Eastern Europe revealed the tenacity of patriarchy. The results of these elections made invisible women's contributions to creating the conditions that made these elections possible: ·The percentage of women in Czechoslovakia's parliament dropped from 29.3 to 8.6. ·The percentage of women in Poland's parliament dropped from 20.2 to 13.5. ··The percentage of women in Hungary's parliament plummeted from 26.6 to 7.2. ·In the pre-reunification election of March 1990, the percentage of women in East Germany's parliament slipped from 33.6 to 20.5; parliamentary elections in December for a unified German legislature managed to return the same proportion of women, 20.5 percent. ·· The percentage of women in Romania's parliament fell from 34.4 to 5.5. 22 It is not that those Cold War legislatures in which Eastern European women had held a quarter or a third of the seats had wielded effective influence. They hadn't. But that may be the point. Demilitarization and democratization together infused these once drab and impotent bodies with new vitality and new power. Legislatures became places where one could give meaningful voice to public concerns. Even in Poland, where a conservative woman has been made prime minister, the legislative agenda which assigns priority to restricting Polish women's freedom of reproductive choice is being hammered out with little organized influence by Polish women.23 If a man had never felt comfortable spending his waking hours fixing his car or building a garden shed, now he had an alternative outlet for his energies. It was precisely because the legislatures were transformed by the end of the Cold War that they became, in many men's eyes, worthy loci for re-emergent civic activism. Legislatures became thereby places too important to allow more than a handful of women. Does the democratization of parliaments equal the defeminization of parliaments? While Eastern European nations' legislatures have been masculinized, their popular cultures have been sexualized. As women have filed out of the parliaments, they have walked into proliferating beauty contests, franchised brothels, free-enterprise escort services, and joint-venture overseas marriage services. 24 Nor have they done so necessarily against their wills. Russian and Eastern European feminist social commentators who have observed the postrevolutionary traumas of the last several years explain that consumerism is being woven into the democratized fabric of civic life in ways that co-opt many women in their own objectification. "Now there are calendars full of nude women everywhere in the ministry." A Czech feminist who worked in her country's environmental affairs ministry is describing the new bureaucratic culture of post-1989 Prague. Such sexist expressions were defined as pornography and prohibited under the old regime. But with the emergence of capitalism and liberalism in the 1990s, nude women's photos on office walls have become so commonplace that most women office workers feel they have no space to object. "And imagine what it's like coming into a colleague's office to discuss a policy. You sit down and have to put your cup of coffee on a glass-topped coffee table which is displaying assorted cut-out photographs of nude women."25 Some women even seem to be taking pleasure in the widespread availability of pornography. The shriveled consumer markets of the Cold War the price paid for Cold War expenditures on bloated armies and protected weapons factories nurtured aspirations among the double-burdened women that can only now be pursued: for beauty, for pleasure, for financial security, for the marriageable man with a good income and a two-car garage. Filipina feminists allied with women working as prostitutes servicing American sailors around Subic Bay naval base learned what Eastern European feminists trying to create a nascent women's movement today are learning (and what impatient American feminists still may have to learn): any woman hoping to sow the seeds of political consciousness must take other women's desires and even fantasies seriously. Those fantasies could throw light on how political priorities constructed in one era shape women's attitudes toward themselves and the men in their lives in the following era. Writing off as merely a victim of false consciousness a Russian woman who sends her name to a new marriage service for American men risks missing a chance to gain a new understanding of how the post Cold War world is being constructed.Like militarization, demilitarization is sexualized. Men returning from wars have sexual expectations. Fathering is one form of demilitarized citizenship. A year after victory but still in desert fatigues, proud men hold up their newborn babies. No women are inside the photographer's frame. But they are more than bit players in any country's demilitarization. Other men return from war zones anxious about jobs, not just for their own well-being but with a sense of the male breadwinner's familial responsibilities. With the many-stranded winding-down of the Cold War, wars have been ending often raggedly in Angola, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Namibia, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Lebanon. Each of these wars was fueled by its own particular internal sparks its class disparities, factional rivalries, and ethnicized oppressions. But each was prolonged and made more ferocious by American and Soviet infusions of direct and indirect aid and encouragement, sometimes to the regime and sometimes to the insurgents. To end each of these Cold War proxy wars, thousands of men must be persuaded to change their ideas of what is right and natural and even pleasurable to do as men. Militarized forms of manliness may be all that some of the younger Cambodian, Lebanese, or Ethiopian men have known. The precise recipes for militarized masculinity will differ, however. Each man's willingness to hand in his grenade launcher or his combat boots and to imagine a demilitarized role for himself in his society will depend on his own experiences as a vigilante, a death squad assassin, an army conscript, a unit commander, or a nighttime civil guard. Perhaps he has been humiliated by other men and thus sees demilitarization as a chance to regain his manly dignity. Or perhaps he has felt more important in his military role than he ever did as a shopkeeper or civil servant. He may have been embarrassed in front of his buddies when he vomited every time he saw a person being wounded. Or he may have felt energized by his new license to wield violent force. Perhaps he found emotional satisfaction in a rarely felt intensity of friendship among men. Or perhaps he felt lonely, deprived of the support and comfort formerly supplied by his wife or mother. Just how a man (or adolescent boy) has experienced militarization and how willingly he sheds the habits and expectations of militarization will redound on the women he returns to. His new definition of his masculinity or his refusal to redefine his identity will be played out in his family life, in his interactions with women workmates, and in his exchanges with women who are perfect strangers. Each of these women, in turn, will be counted on, as she always has been, to coax, absorb, sacrifice, and tutor. Some women, however, may not want to give up their jobs, may not want to have another child, may have grown used to having sex only on occasional leaves, or may not think donning a veil is a proper price for peace (in the home or in the government). These women may rebel against the sorts of expectations leaders will try to impose on them in the name of post Cold War ''political stabilization." It can take years to demilitarize a society. **Masculinity and femininity will be among the political territories where the struggles for demilitarization will have to be played out**. Vietnamese women and men are still in the process of demilitarization, long after most Americans and Europeans have turned their attention elsewhere. During 1990-92 alone, 500,000 Vietnamese soldiers overwhelmingly male were demobilized. 26 Some had fought in the earlier war against the United States and its Saigon ally. Many were young boys then but were conscripted to fight the succeeding war in neighboring Cambodia. The conclusion of that conflict, due in large measure to the new cooperation between Washington and Moscow, has reunited husbands and wives after long separations. It has also thrown thousands of men onto the already strained Vietnamese labor market, causing the regime to feel nervous over the lack of jobs for men who believe they have made patriotic sacrifices. These scores of male veterans are searching for jobs at a time when Hanoi is cutting support to unprofitable state companies. Women's own waged work, as well as the continuing high birth rate, have thus become issues not simply of economic planning but also of demilitarization. It is no coincidence that prostitution has spread. Local Women's Federation activists are expressing alarm. Vietnamese journalists estimate that there are now one hundred thousand women working as prostitutes in Ho Chi Minh City and another thirty thousand in Hanoi.27 We often think that increasing numbers of women are pressed into prostitution because of militarization. But **there are forms of demilitarization** such as in Russia or Vietnam **that can bring rising prostitution**, as men look for new enterprises and as women are displaced from other forms of livelihood. In September 1991, the Hanoi newspaper Lao Dong reported that "hundreds of girls have been sold to brothels in Phnom Penh and southern China."28 An American reporter assigned to Phnom Penh in early 1992 went to the disco at Le Royal Hotel, only to see "swarms of Vietnamese prostitutes descend on unaccompanied men." He offhandedly speculated that, "with lighter skins and more experience than Cambodian women, they dominate the market, and apparently find Phnom Penh more profitable than Saigon."29 These articles did not explore what these Vietnamese women had done before working as prostitutes, who had transported them to Cambodia or southern China, or who owned the brothels in which some of them worked. Prostitutes were mentioned either as features on the landscape or as indicators of economic stress**. Women working as prostitutes requiring radical reformations of existing state defense institutions** in El Salvador, South Africa, Cambodia, and Lebanon. Every one of these new militaries will prompt government officials to make decisions about whether to recruit women, whether to inaugurate compulsory military service, how to instill discipline and enthusiasm in young men, and whether to acknowledge homosexuality in the ranks. These decisions are only the beginning. Governments creating new militaries will also make deliberate decisions about whether to manipulate masculinized ethnic stereotypes to enhance officers' authority, how to control soldiers' wives, whether to condone military prostitution with what safeguards for male soldiers and whether to turn a blind eye to wife battering within soldiers' homes. As they reach these decisions, to which existing militaries will they look to provide models? Canada? Finland? The United States? India? It is important to record which groups are invited to sit around the policymaking table when these crucial decisions are made. Whose credentials will be deemed relevant those of prostitutes? Of school teachers? Of mothers? The large industrial states are reacting to the end of the rivalry between the great powers by forecasting substantial personnel reductions "downsizing" is the American bureaucratic term. But cutting back on the number of soldiers a military needs is never a simple numerical operation. Will African-American women, who currently comprise 45 percent of all the women in the U.S. Army's rank and file, make up such a large percentage after the cuts? In the wake of the Los Angeles riots, will there be more pressures on the Pentagon to continue to serve as a major socializer of African-American men, even if this means organizing troop reductions so that more white soldiers are given early demobilization? 31 If German leaders respond to calls to end male conscription and introduce an all-volunteer force, will women be allowed to enlist in greater numbers than they are now? What about Turkish-German men? And what will happen to the peculiar relationship of Scottish men to the British army if historic Scottish regiments are merged into less regionally distinct units? If the Gurkha Brigade falls under the same British budgetary ax, will Nepali notions of masculinity undergo a profound transformation? **A substantially reduced military is rarely just a smaller military**. Cuts in any military's personnel usually alter significantly its relationships to the women and men in the country's various social classes and ethnic communities. Not all of the militaries being created, redesigned, or proposed are being tied to orthodox, sovereign nation-states. French and German officials have proposed the formation of a new European defense force under the aegis of the previously dormant WEU, the Western European Union. Such a force has the attraction to some of being separate from NATO and at arm's length from U.S. influence. Simultaneously, the United Nations peacekeeping forces, drawn from the militaries of its member states, are being looked upon by the governments of many industrialized and Third World countries as offering the best hope for a genuinely post Cold War, non imperialist military. Others worry that so much preoccupation with the UN's new military responsibilities will draw money and value away from the organization's less glamorous, somewhat less masculinized development efforts. Like any other institution, the United Nations is susceptible to masculinization and militarization. Thus we are entering a period of global history when perhaps more new militaries are being designed and launched than at any time since the multiplication of new states during the decolonialization of the 1950s. However, the point is not that militaries have been fixed institutions during the Cold War and are only now being projected into uncertain orbit. A military isn't like a Georgia O'Keeffe painting or an I. M. Pei building when it's done it's done. A military is forever in a state of becoming like a compost heap. The questions we must pose today to understand just what is happening in the Ukraine or South Africa are questions we should have been asking of any military in 1951 and 1985. They are questions that come out of an awareness that any government trying to use its military to sustain its domestic authority and its influence with other states will attempt to use ideas about femininity and masculinity as well as ideas about race and class to get the armed force it feels it can trust. At this moment, then, someone in the corridors of Estonia's fledgling defense ministry is mulling over whether gay men and lesbians should be allowed into the country's new military. That decision is not a foregone conclusion. It never has been a foregone conclusion not in any country's military since homosexuality became an object of explicit state manipulation in the twentieth century. So there will be memos, discussions, advice from psychologists, off-the-record anecdotes, and sly asides. Faxes will likely be sent to Brussels to ask NATO about the policies of its fifteen allies on homosexual soldiering. Back will come faxes saying that the Dutch and Canadians no longer see heterosexuality as a requisite for effective soldiering, while the Americans and British do, though with far less confidence than they did even five years ago. Of principal concern for designers of the Estonian military will no doubt be the question of whether permitting gay men and lesbians to soldier will enhance or jeopardize the new military in the eyes of the country's citizenry. Another matter for official debate will be whether a homosexual man lacks the sort of manly qualities presumed to be needed to wield a gun, follow orders, risk physical danger, and support fellow soldiers under stress. Lesbians will be considered quite differently. If the Estonian bureaucratic discussions sound at all like those in the United States, Canada, and elsewhere, then Baltic concern over lesbians will be voiced in terms of their being "too" compatible, not incompatible, with soldiering. In the London headquarters of the once-somnolent WEU, another official is having to figure out how to respond to the official referred to as Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman. She is formally titled the vice-chairman of the WEU's Defense Committee, so she cannot be dismissed cavalierly. Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman has submitted a formal report that surveyed the status of women in the union's member forces and found it wanting. She and her committee have looked forward to the mid-1990s, when in all probability a number of WEU forces that now rely on male conscriptionsuch as France, Germany, and Italywill have forsaken that personnel formula and moved toward volunteerism. At that point, she predicts, there will be more appreciation for the skills, educational attainments, and commitment that women can bring to soldiering. She and her colleagues urge the entire WEU not to drag its feet until that day arrives, but instead to take the initiative now to lower the barriers which are keeping the proportion of women in the military well below 10 percent throughout Western Europe. If the WEU is to play a more active role in postCold War security arrangements, it cannot afford to deprive itself of such potentially valuable "manpower." Nor can it afford to be so far out of step with changes in all other sectors of European socioeconomic life. 32 Portugal, with one of the most patriarchal of Western European militaries, is moving in the direction the report recommends. In 1992, the Portugese defense ministry cautiously opened the officer corps to women. Joana Costa Reis, a twenty-five-year-old student of modern languages, was one of the first applicants for the fifteen slots. She thought officer training would allow her to pursue her interests in camping, survival skills, and guns. She was joined by twenty-three-year-old Rosa Maria Santos, who quit her job in order to pursue a career in the army.33 At about the same time, Japan's Self-Defense Agency admitted thirty-nine women cadets into the National Defense Academy. Upon graduation, they will become the first women officers in Japan's military.34 The creation and reorganization of so many military institutions are occurring at a time when gay men and lesbians are more vocal and better organized politically in a wider array of countries than ever before. Militaries have never conducted their discussions about the sorts of sexuality they deemed best suited for soldiering under such a public gaze. Not that there is agreement among gay and lesbian activists in any country over whether military service offers a chance for homosexuals to gain first-class citizenship. What is true, however, is that discussions of such topics among gay men and lesbians have served to underscore for everyone the state-sanctioned artificiality of the heterosexualized soldier.35 Similarly, the question of how and when to use women to compensate for shortages of the kinds of men the government trusts with its weaponry can no longer be addressed within the safe confines of ministerial offices. Women officers in NATO have their own organizations. Civilian feminists, women legislators, and civil rights lawyers in the United States, Canada, and Scandinavia monitor closely their governments' responses to sexual harassment and discrimination in promotions as well as any refinements in the definition of combat. As among gay men and lesbians, however, there is no consensus among feminists about how women should regard military service. Some feminists in each of these countries see the state's military as a potential site for economic advancement and for political legitimation and never use the concept of militarism to gauge that military's impact on the social order. Other feminists start with questions about militarism. They begin their assessment of their country's military with a wary belief that a military is essentially a patriarchal institution, even if it occasionally sees fit to enlist women into its fold. 36 As each new country joins the ranks of nonconscription militaries and as governments are tempted to reach out to at least a small sector of women, these debates will grow more common. They are already going on in Italy.37 The form of military force that is inspiring perhaps the greatest hope is the United Nations peacekeeping force. It inspires optimism because it seems to perform military duties without being militaristic. And its troops at first glance appear to escape the distorting dynamics of militarism because they may not depend so heavily on patriarchal masculinity. According to one UN official, who observed UN peacekeeping soldiers in Namibia in the 1980s, local women seemed to view men soldiering under the UN's banner as less alienating, more approachable, and perhaps more trustworthy than men soldiering for any of the several rival governments. This official reported that she witnessed a higher proportion of marriages between UN soldiers and local women than she believed had occurred between, for instance, American soldiers and local women in Korea.38 To date we in fact know amazingly little about what happens to a male soldier's sense of masculine license when he dons the blue helmet or armband of the United Nations peacekeeper. The contents of formal agreements, or "codes of conduct," between the United Nations Secretary and specific host officials are kept secret. This makes it difficult, for instance, for women in a host country to find out what suppositions about male peacekeeping soldiers' sexuality are written into the code's provisions for health and policing. The crucial question may be whether soldiering for a state calls forth different notions of masculinity than soldiering for a nonstate international agency does. What exactly happens to a Canadian or Fijian male soldier's presumptions about violence, about femininity, about enemies, or about his own sexuality when he is placed in the position of maintaining peace between two warring armies? If a man can discard inclinations and presumptions with just the switch from one set of stenciled initials to another, it may mean that militarized masculinity is only shirtsleeve-deep. 39 Any United Nations peacekeeping unit whether in Bosnia, Cambodia, or Somaliais in practice a compilation of soldiers enlisted in and trained by particular states. There is no direct UN recruitment. There is no UN basic training. From the UN-sanctioned action in Korea in the 1950s through the UN-sanctioned action in the Persian Gulf in 1991, U.S. presidents refused to allow U.S. soldiers to be commanded by anyone but a U.S. officer. Only in early 1993 did President Bill Clinton permit a small group of noncombat soldiers left behind as peacekeepers in Somalia to be commanded by a non-American, a Turkish general operating under UN authority. On the other hand, there are certain governments which have quite consciously viewed UN peacekeeping as a priority mission for their soldiers, and this purpose has undoubtedly filtered down through the ranks in as yet unanalyzed ways. Ireland, Fiji, India, Ghana, Finland, and Malaysia are among the countries whose governments have routinely contributed troops to UN missions. Canada's former prime minister, Brian Mulroney, announced in early 1992 that with the end of the Cold War his country's military would see UN service as its most important function after self-defense. From the south came rumblings of displeasure. Washington officials saw the Mulroney declaration as a diversion of Canadian military resources from NATO.40 They were right. Finland's new women volunteer soldiers serve in the Finnish contingent on loan to the UN, and Australia's military has just deployed its first women soldiers to Cambodia on UN duty. Nonetheless, United Nations peacekeeping forces remain as overwhelmingly male as most state militaries. With such a composition, it must have the same sort of policies around masculinity as other, more conventional forces do. We have yet to hear how United Nations force commanders imagine male sexuality. Are the blue-helmeted men on duty in Cambodia explicitly ordered not to patronize prostitutes? What steps are taken to prevent AIDS and other forms of sexually transmitted diseases among UN peacekeepers? Each of these policies will be informed by ideas about women, about the roles women must play if a male soldier is to be able to do his job. United Nations male peacekeepers are as likely to have mothers, girlfriends, and wives as the male soldiers of any other military. Just as in those more orthodox forces, the contributions of these women are accepted as natural, even if policies are devised to ensure that they fill these roles. Nowhere was this clearer than in the New York Times 'discussion of the proposal that Britain's famed Gurkhas, the celebrated troops recruited from Nepal, should serve as the core of a genuinely nonstate United Nations peacekeeping force. 41 The advantage of this proposal was not only that the Gurkhas, being citizens of an impoverished Asian country, would cost less than Canadian or Finnish soldiers. Nor was it only that Gurkhas had established a record of battlefield competence and discipline. It was also an unstated plus that the Nepali men serving in the Gurkhas apparently didn't need the company of their wives while stationed abroad and didn't compensate for their wives' absence by engaging in alienating abuse of other countries' women. These Nepali men seemed to have learned a kind of militarized masculinity quite unlike that of their British, American, or French counterparts. While such different constructions may indeed exist and while they may make one set of men better at post Cold War international peacekeeping than another, such a proposal leaves out the women. Gurkhas have earned this reputation for celibate soldiering because of what their wives absorb, are compelled to absorb, because they live under British military policies for wives. Nepali women at home in Darjeeling, India, or in villages in the hills of Nepal construct their lives in ways that have made life easier for British defense planners. They have made it possible for the British to use their husbands in ways that have given the Gurkhas the image of the ideal post Cold War peacekeepers. 42 What is distinctive here is not the particular marriage practices of Nepali women. Rather, by making Nepali women visible we are reminded that one cannot assess which forms of masculinity are most suitable for the postCold War world unless one asks, Where are the women? The end of the superpower rivalry that has shaped the distribution of aid, the construction of fears, and the ferocity of hostilities has not made masculinity irrelevant in international relations**. To make sense of how masculinity is being demilitarized and remilitarized today, one must pay attention to women and to ideas about femininity**. The Australian woman soldier donning the UN's blue helmet to serve in Cambodia, the Vietnamese woman trying to find a client in Le Royal Hotel's disco, the international civil servant devising policies to bolster the morale of UN troops, the recently demobilized Khmer Rouge guerrillaall are partners in a postCold War dance.

**Masculinity in IR ensures militarization because it privileges hyper aggressive behavior.**

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Feminist theorizing has demonstrated that both capitalist-centered and state-centered theories may have dramatically underestimated the power it requires to militarize any society. Decisions about whether men and women should be trained together, policies designed to identify homosexuals, memos about men's access to prostitutes, meetings to hammer out a policy that defines the carrying of umbrellas as "unmanly" for army officers, official debates over whether to turn a blind eye toward rape during wartime or soldiers' wife battering in peacetime all are exercises of public power **intended to construct gender** in such a way as to **ensure** that **militarization** stays firmly on the rails. One of the most striking characteristics of militaries themselves is that they are almost exclusively male. While an estimated 430,000 women were serving as uniformed personnel in the world's regular military units by the end of the 1980s, they nowhere challenged state militaries' essentially masculinized culture. 22 Of the scores of state militaries that have been designed in the past fifty years, only in the U.S., Israel, Canada, and South Africa have the active-duty forces been even slightly less than go percent male. Thus, while we are learning more and more about the typically overlooked women who have served as soldiers, generically the military remains an overwhelmingly male institution.23 This has been so in cultures and historical periods that otherwise share little in common. Something that existed in tenth-century China as well as in nineteenth-century Britain and in late twentieth-century Kenya has produced in their state institutions for organized violence that is, their militaries a profound dependency on maleness. But maleness alone has not been deemed sufficient to guarantee the formation of militaries that states could trust. In all the societies for which we have information, ideas about what it means to be male that is, **masculinity**, **not mere biological maleness** have been considered by **militarizers** to be the sine qua non of effective and trustworthy soldiering. Militaries are composed of men as a result of quite conscious political policies. State officials themselves primarily male create an explicit link between the presumed cultural and physical properties of maleness and the institutional needs of the military as an organization. The boys and men who are typically recruited or pressed into service as foot soldiers or ships' crews are drawn from the relatively powerless strata of state societies: peasants, poor urban dwellers, and members of those racial, ethnic, or religious communities held in contempt by the state elite. Yet, for a military to serve the state's interests, these boys and men must be bound to their officers men who are usually from quite different social strata. The glue is camaraderie; the base of that glue is masculinity. In fact, nervous commanders often try to use the alleged common bonds of masculinity to reduce the all-too-obvious class and ethnic tensions among their troops. 24 But **masculinity has been so intimately connected to militarism** that it is no wonder there have been questions about whether the two are analytically separable. According to one view, **masculinity** cannot be militarized, cannot be transformed, because it **is inherently militaristic in the first place**. In most cultures that we know about, to be manly means to be a potential warrior. Any man who claims that it is not and never will be in his nature to soldier is therefore taking a risk. He will more than likely be thought of by his friends, neighbors, and governors as less than masculine. We know from countless historical accounts and oral histories how widespread this risk is. Yet only if we can show that masculinity is separable from militarist values and presumptions can we imagine masculinity being demilitarized. By contrast, other feminists believe that masculinity and militarism, although tightly interwoven at certain times and in certain cultures, can be and sometimes have been pried apart. According to this approach, these two ideological constructs what it means to be a male and the values and beliefs that make military modes of thinking and behavior seem right and natural have distinct histories. For instance, despite the radical demilitarization of Costa Rican society ever since the adoption of its 1948 constitution eliminated its national army, notions of masculinity are still etched sharply enough in the culture to have sustained patriarchal privileges for men and to have provoked one of Latin America's liveliest feminist movements. By remaining alert to the dynamic relationship between masculinity and militarism in any particular country or ethnic community, we are likely to assess more accurately how much public power it takes to ensure that ideas about what it means to be "manly" serve militarism. This awareness, in turn, underscores the political quality of masculinity: it is a set of ideas deserving the attention not just of militarists but of every citizen. Those like myself who believe that militarism is separable from masculinity are especially interested in conscription. If all cultures constructed ideas about manliness such that soldiering was part and parcel of any man's proving his manliness, then governments' conscription efforts would be a lot easier. And in fact popular ideas about "becoming a man" in many societies do make it difficult for a young man to find language and imagery that will permit him to resist military call-up without jeopardizing his status as masculine, not only in the eyes of his father, mother, and male and female friends, but often in his own eyes as well. Yet, in countries as different as Turkey, Nicaragua, the United States, Guatemala, Iraq, and Israel, young men by the thousands have avoided the military draft, either by leaving the country or by resisting the law directly. Often it has been less a young man's refusal to join the military than his path of avoidance that has determined whether others considered him to have forfeited his claim to masculinity. Thus, in the 1990's in the U.S. there is still public controversy over the different paths chosen in the Vietnam War era by Muhammad Ali (conscientious objection on religious grounds), Dan Quayle (joining the National Guard), and Bill Clinton (seeking college deferment). 25 What remains constant in these American cases, as well as in less celebrated instances in many other countries, is masculinity's special salience. What varies is how masculinity can be constructed and reconstructed so as to allow for some "manly" avoidance of the state's compulsory military service for young men within the hallowed territory of manliness. If the state's military begins to lose its legitimacy, the tension between masculinity and men's compulsory military service can become acute. This was the case in both Lithuania and South Africa by the late 1980s, when Lithuanian men came to see service in the Soviet military as violating their nationalist values and when growing numbers of South African men questioned the apartheid-upholding mission of the South African military. But the emergence of such tension doesn't just happen. It is the result of conscious politicization of masculinity by those who have a stake in prying manhood away from service in a state military. In South Africa the organization of an anticonscription campaign by young white men became the occasion for confronting attitudes binding masculinity (especially as defined in the white community) to state military service. These attitudes are exemplified by the white serviceman who told researcher Jacklyn Cock, "I grew up during my National Service. I became a man, physically fit and independent. I'd heard it was tough but I never imagined how tough it would be. I handled it." Another young man described to her the interactions which socialize conscripts into a militarized understanding of their own masculinity: "Basics . . . is tough, you're in a situation you don't want to be in. It's very physical, you've got to fight for yourself and there's lots of group pressure too. If one guy lets the group down he feels like dirt 'cos they all get punished. This grueling 'Rambo Syndrome' takes its toll. The victims are usually 'weaklings' or those who refuse to become 'Rambos.' " By the end, another man recalled, "the army does 'make a man of you.' It brings out the best in people. I learned to relate to people better. My own personal belief in myself and my capabilities deepened . . . I learned to push myself forward, to be more aggressive, to get my own way." Even those men who as soldiers found the brutalizing of black South Africans unfair and distasteful discovered that widespread ideas about masculinity made it difficult for them to act: ''The SA army cultivates this macho, tough boy image. I was wary of breaking with this." 26.

**Removing bases doesn’t matter unless the intention is to undermine gender divisions and exploitation.**

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Belizean women (and, some say, imported Guatemalan women) have a lot to tell us about how the British armed forces use sexuality to conduct their foreign policy. 50 Northern Irish and West German women who date British troops have important insights to share with the women in Belize. British women married to British soldiers could help round out the picture, as could British women peace activists and those in uniform. All together, these women's seemingly different experiences add up to a gendered government bases policy. But it is the very divisions between these women that provide a military base with its security. The armed forces need women to maintain their bases, but they need those women to imagine that they belong to mutually exclusive categories. Women from different countries are separated by distance, and often race and inequalities of political influence. Prostitutes, girlfriends, wives, peace activists and women soldiers have learned to view each other as sexual or ideological rivals. An **anti-bases movement uninformed by feminist questioning leaves these divisions in place.** In this sense, **an anti-bases movement that ignores the armed forces' dependence on the complex relations between women leaves the structure of military bases in tact even if it manages to close down a particular base**. A woman living on a military base as a wife wants to feel secure. And her own advancement depends on her husband performing successfully enough to win promotion. Thus she sees women peace activists camped outside her gates as the enemy, not an ally. The woman in uniform is trying to challenge the military's masculinist conventions; she sees herself as a war-making partner, not a sexually available object for her male team-mates. So it is not surprising that she deeply resents the women who work as prostitutes outside (and sometimes inside) the base gates, eroticizing, she thinks, her workplace. Girlfriends of soldiers are never quite sure whether the soldier they are dating may have a wife back home, whether the promises of marriage will be realized when a superior warns against marrying a foreign women or when the tour of duty is over and the need for local companionship comes to an abrupt end. Thus when Kenyan and Filipino women met in Nairobi in 1985 and launched the Campaign Against Military Prostitution (CAMP) to create a network of women in all countries hosting American bases, they were **taking a step towards dismantling the global gender structure** on which each individual base depends. 51 So, too, are Filipino anti-bases activists who try to imagine what their actions might mean for the already politically conscious women in the small Pacific nation of Belau, the US military's favored back-up site for its giant Subic Bay naval base.52 When a base is successfully ousted from one place it is likely to be moved somewhere else. If women active in anti-bases movements see developing contacts with women in alternative countries as integral to their work, there is a better chance of the removal of a military base producing a fundamental reassessment of global strategy, not simply a transfer of equipment and personnel. If military wives and women soldiers begin to explore the ways that prostitution pollutes not only their on-base lives but the life of the country off which they are living, the respect they seek for themselves is likely to have deeper roots. Such an exploration might also prompt them to broaden their political horizons, to focus less exclusively on benefits and ask more questions about the consequences of militarization.

**The personal is political, trying to separate between what we do in the ‘private’ sphere and the ‘public’ sphere only sustains deeply gendered conceptions on which contemporary international politics are based.**

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One of the simplest and most disturbing feminist insights is that **'the personal is political'**. Disturbing, because it means that **relationships we once imagined were private or merely social are** in fact **infused with power, usually unequal power** backed up by public authority. Rape, therefore, is about power more than it is about sex, and not only the rapist but the state is culpable. Likewise interior design and doctors' attitudes toward patients are at least as much about publicly wielded power as they are about personal taste or professional behavior. But the assertion that 'the personal is political' is like a palindrome, one of those phrases that can be read backwards as well as forwards. Read as 'the political is personal', it suggests that politics is not shaped merely by what happens in legislative debates, voting booths or war rooms. While men, who dominate public life, have told women to stay in the kitchen, **they have used their public power to construct private relationships in ways that bolstered their masculinized political control**. Without these maneuvers, men's hold over political life might be far less secure. Thus to explain why any country has the kind of politics it does, we have to be curious about how public life is constructed out of struggles to define masculinity and femininity. Accepting that the political is personal prompts one to investigate the politics of marriage, venereal disease and homosexuality not as marginal issues, but as matters central to the state. Doing this kind of research becomes just as serious as studying military weaponry or taxation policy. In fact, insofar as the political is personal, the latter cannot be fully understood without taking into account the former to make sense of international politics we also have to read power backwards and forwards. Power relations between countries and their governments involve more than gunboat maneuvers and diplomatic telegrams. Read forward, 'the personal is international' insofar as ideas about what it means to be a 'respectable' woman or an 'honorable' man have been shaped by colonizing policies, trading strategies and military doctrines. On the eve of the 1990s, it has almost become a cliché to say that the world is shrinking, that state boundaries are porous. We persist, none the less, in discussing personal power relationships as if they were contained by sovereign states. We treat ideas about violence against women without trying to figure out how the global trade in pornographic videos operates, or how companies offering sex tours and mail-order brides conduct their businesses across national borders. Similarly, we try to explain how women learn to be 'feminine' without unravelling the legacies of colonial officials who used Victorian ideals of feminine domesticity to sustain their empires; or we trace what shapes children's ideas about femininity or masculinity without looking at governments' foreign investment policies that encourage the world-wide advertising strategies of such giants as McCann Erickson or Saatchi and Saatchi. Becoming aware that personal relationships have been internationalized, however, may make one only feel guilty for not having paid enough attention to international affairs. Start watching what is going on in Brussels. Don't turn off the TV when the conversation moves to trade deficits. Listen to politicians more carefully when they outline their foreign-policy position. While useful, this new international attentiveness by itself isn't sufficient. It leaves untouched our presumptions about just what 'international politics' is. Accepting that the personal is international multiplies the spectators, it especially adds women to the audience, but it fails to transform what is going on on stage. The implications of a feminist understanding of international politics are thrown into sharper relief when one reads 'the personal is international' the other way round: the international is personal. This calls for a radical new imagining of what it takes for governments to ally with each other, compete with and wage war against each other. 'The international is personal' implies that governments depend upon certain kinds of allegedly private relationships in order to conduct their foreign affairs. Governments need more than secrecy and intelligence agencies; they need wives who are willing to provide their diplomatic husbands with unpaid services so those men can develop trusting relationships with other diplomatic husbands. They need **not only military hardware, but a steady supply of women's sexual services to convince their soldiers that they are manly**. To operate in the international arena, governments seek other governments' recognition of their sovereignty; but **they** also **depend on ideas about masculinized dignity and feminized sacrifice to sustain that sense of autonomous nationhood**. Thus international politics of debt, investment, colonization, decolonization, national security, diplomacy and trade are far more complicated than most experts would have us believe. This may appear paradoxical. Many people, and especially women, are taught that international politics are too complex, too remote and too tough for the feminine mind to comprehend. If a Margaret Thatcher or a Jeanne Kirkpatrick slips through the cracks, it is presumably because she has learned to 'think like a man'. But investigations of how **international politics rely on manipulations of masculinity and femininity** suggest that the **conventional approaches to making sense of inter-state relations are superficial**. Conventional analyses stop short of investigating an entire area of international relations, an area that women have pioneered in exploring: how states depend on particular constructions of the domestic and private spheres. If we take seriously the politics of domestic servants or the politics of marketing fashions and global corporate logos, we discover that international politics is more complicated than non-feminist analysts would have us believe. We especially have to take culture including commercialized culture far more seriously. The consumer and the marketing executive have a relationship that is mediated through their respective understandings of national identity and masculinity and femininity. That consumermarketer relationship not only mirrors changing global power dynamics, it is helping to shape those dynamics. Women tend to be in a better position than men to conduct such a realistic investigation of international politics simply because so many women have learned to ask about gender when making sense of how public and private power operate. This approach also exposes how much power it takes to make the current international political system work. Conventional analyses of inter-state relations talk a lot about power. In fact, because they put power at the center of their understandings, they are presumed to be most naturally comprehended by men; women allegedly do not have an innate taste for either wielding or understanding power. However, **an exploration of** agribusiness **prostitution**, foreign-service sexism and attempts to tame outspoken nationalist women with homophobic taunts all **reveal that in reality it takes much more power to construct and perpetuate international political relations than we have been led to believe.** Conventional international-politics commentators have put power at the center of their analyses often to the exclusion of culture and ideas but they have under-estimated the amount and varieties of power at work. It has taken power to deprive women of land titles and leave them little choice but to sexually service soldiers and banana workers. It has taken power to keep women out of their countries' diplomatic corps and out of the upper reaches of the World Bank. It has taken power to keep questions of inequity between local men and women off the agendas of many nationalist movements in industrialized as well as agrarian societies. It has taken power to construct popular culture films, advertisements, books, fairs, fashion which reinforces, not subverts, global hierarchies. 'The international is personal' is a guide to making sense of NATO, the EEC and the IMF that insists on making women visible. If it is true that friendly as well as **hostile relations between governments presuppose constructions of women as symbols**, as **providers** of emotional support, as paid and unpaid workers, then **it doesn't make sense to continue analyzing international politics as if they were either gender-neutral** or carried on only by men. International policy-making circles may look like men's clubs, but international politics as a whole has required women to behave in certain ways. When they haven't, relations between governments have had to change. Women need to be made visible in order to understand how and why international power takes the forms it does. But **women are not just the objects of that power, not merely passive** puppets or victims. As we have seen, women of different classes and different ethnic groups have made their own calculations in order to cope with or benefit from the current struggles between states. These calculations result in whole countries becoming related to one another, often in hierarchical terms. In search of adventure, that physical and intellectual excitement typically reserved for men, some affluent women have helped turn other women into exotic landscapes. In pursuit of meaningful paid careers, some women have settled in colonies or hired women from former colonies. Out of a desire to appear fashionable and bolster their sometimes shaky self-confidence, many women have become the prime consumers of products made by women working for low wages in other countries. And in an effort to measure the progress they have made towards emancipation in their own societies, women have often helped legitimize international global pyramids of 'civilization'. All too often, the only women who are made visible on the international stage are 'Third World women', especially those who are underpaid factory workers or entertainment workers around foreign military bases. There are two dangers here. First, the multiple relationships that women in industrialized countries have to international politics are camouflaged. For instance, we do not see the British Asian woman who is organizing anti-deportation campaigns, which can reshape governments' use of marriage to control international flows of people. The American woman on holiday who is helping to 'open up' Grenada to tourism is made invisible, as is the Canadian woman who is insisting on pursuing her career rather than following her diplomat husband overseas. The Italian woman sewing for Benetton at home is hidden. In the process, the international system is made to look less complicated, less infused with power, less gendered than it really is. The second danger in this tendency to see only 'Third World women' when thinking about women on the international stage is that the important differences between women in less industrialized countries will be ignored. By portraying all women in Third World societies as sewing jeans, not buying jeans, as prostitutes, not as social workers and activists, we again under-estimate the complex relationships it takes to sustain the current international political system. Middle-class women in countries such as Mexico and Sri Lanka have different kinds of stakes in the present system than do working-class and peasant women. This is compounded by societies' ethnic and racial barriers between Hispanicized and Indian Mexican women, and between Tamil and Singhalese Sri Lankan women, for instance. International debt may affect all women in Mexico, but not to the same degree or in the same ways. National dignity may be appealing to all Sri Lankan women, but which nation one feels part of may be problematic. Sexuality may also divide women in a Third World country. Heterosexual women, for instance, may feel ashamed or contemptuous of lesbian women and thus not be able to confront nationalist men who use homophobic innuendos to delegitimize arguments for women's rights. The international establishment has needed many women in Third World countries to feel more at ease with women from Europe or North America than with women living in a shanty town a mile from their front door. Therefore, efforts to transcend internationally and locally devised barriers between women of Third World countries have had the most significant impact on foreign military bases, multinational corporations and investment bankers. While women have not been mere pawns in global politics, governments and companies with government backing have made explicit attempts to try to control and channel women's actions in order to achieve their own ends. Male officials who make foreign policy might prefer to think of themselves as dealing with high finance or military strategy, but in reality they have self-consciously designed immigration, labor, civil service, propaganda and military bases policies so as to control women. They have acted as though their government's place in world affairs has hinged on how women behaved.

**Demilitarizing alone doesn’t’ solve the aff – a dismissal or ignoring feminist motives for de-deployment will only lead to re-masculinization.**

**Enloe 93** – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War” p. 139-141, MT)

The factories most often located in these countries are precisely those that maximize profits by using foreign and local constructs of femininity to devalue women's labor. This is not a new situation. It is as old as the dilemma of a woman who must choose between an unlivable farm income, a position as a domestic servant, or a factory wage, on the one hand, and a demeaning and risky but occasionally more lucrative income from prostitution, on the other.39 What is new in the 1990s is the prospect that entire economies built on gendered as well as class and race dependent presumptions of skill and worth will be integrated through treaty arrangements into a hemispheric market. What is also new for this hemisphere is that this treaty-based continentalism is being legitimized as a formula for (a) coping with the new conditions of a world without competition between two superpowers, and (b) ending local military conflicts fueled in large part by that superpower rivalry. Suddenly, stylish Van Heusen shirts have taken on a distinctly postCold War look. Garments have become Guatemala's second leading export, after coffee. Even while the civil war continued, the government of President Vinicio Cerezo worked with agencies of the U.S. government to entice foreign investors to return to Guatemala. Foreign-owned and jointly owned factories assembling products for export maquiladoras were seen by both the nervous civilian regime and Washington's security-minded aid officials as an engine for postwar economic development that would not upset Guatemala's traditional landed elite. 40 Companies such as Levi-Strauss, Guess, Bugle Boy, Phillips-Van Heusen, Sears, K-Mart, and Montgomery Ward decided in the late 1980s and early 1990s that it served their interests to accept the invitation to invest directly in Guatemalan operations or to contract indirectly with Korean companies that now have factories in Guatemala or with locally owned manufacturers. Managers who have set up their factories in the countryside hire as many men as they do women, preferring Indian men. In the cities, 80 percent of the workers whom factory managers hired were women, mostly young, single women between the ages of 14 and 24.41Some of these women told interviewers that they were going to work as daughters, leaving school or quitting work on farms or as domestic servants, in order to support their parents and siblings. A fifteen-year-old girl working in a maquiladora explained: "I would not be working in this horrible factory for this demanding manager unless it was absolutely necessary. My father does not have a job and so wethe girlshad to find work. I went to the maquila because I knew they would hire me. I want to be in school but I am here. I do not like it but what can I do?"42 Phillips Van Heusen executives, headquartered in New York City, were not expecting Guatemalan women to be assertive, organized, or militant. Like the designers of post Cold War continentalism, these executives presumed that established notions about femininity would survive demilitarization and continue to ensure a compliant work force. They hoped to keep their factories union-free. But in 1991, workers primarily young women began to organize in PhillipsVan Heusen's two Guatemalan factories. They threatened to strike unless they gained the right to unionize and better wages; they also called for an end to unsafe working conditions and sexual abuse.43 Naming sexual harassment was unsettling to the postwar continentalist project. This organizing grew not only out of conditions experienced in the PhillipsVan Heusen plants, but also out of autonomous women's consciousness-raising and organizing begun earlier as a direct response to Guatemala's

militarization. In late 1992, the Guatemalan government recognized the union. 44 So demilitarization is a process that can take more than a single route. **It can follow a path leading to the remasculinization** of civil life. **Or** it can be nudged along a road that **leads toward the reduction** not only of organized violence but also **of masculinity's civic privileges. If the** **designers** **and** **monitors** of formal peace processes **ignore** **the** diverse **ways in which masculinity** **provided** **fodder for** earlier **militarization**, the **prospects for taking the latter route will remain dim. On the other hand, if the feminist question** "Where are the women?" **is taken seriously, men's notions about themselves will be recognized as problematic, and thus political**. Masculinity in policing, in political parties, and in trade negotiations will be charted as a necessarily contested zone. How this zone is constructed and occupied during the next decade will determine in large measure how Central America's women and men experience the postCold War world.

**Omitting the sexual relations of war or militarized peace skews the story in favor of masculinization and delivers an inaccurate story.**

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**War and militarized peace are occasions when sexual relations take on particular meanings**. A museum curatoror a journalist, novelist, or **political commentator who edits out sexuality**, who leaves it on the cutting-room floor, **delivers** to the audience a **skewed and** ultimately **unhelpful account of** just what kinds of myths, anxieties, inequalities, and state policies are required to fight a **war** **or** to sustain a **militarized** form of **peace**. A letter from a former CIA analyst, now an academic, suggests one reason why prostitution is so invisible, not only in military museums, but also in "serious" official discussions of security. He noted that in a recent book I had surmised from a Rand Corporation report that Soviet commanders had banned prostitution from their bases in Afghanistan during the counterinsurgency of the 1980s. He warned me not to jump to conclusions. While working as a CIA analyst in the 1970s, he had conducted a classified study of morale and discipline among Soviet forces. During the course of the study, he had interviewed an emigre who had been a conscript on a remote Soviet air force base in Russia's Far North. In reply to the analyst's inquiry about the presence of women on the base, the former conscript recalled that there had been approximately one hundred. What were their functions? "Prostituki!" The U.S. analyst found this pertinent and included the information in his report. But when the official CIA version came out, this was the only information excised by his superiors from the original draft. The analyst, looking back, speculated: "Since the U.S. military represses its bases' dependency on sexual access to local women, the organizational incentive is to avoid mentioning the Soviet problems for fear of drawing attention to the issue in the U.S. The tendency," he went on to explain, "to use information about the USSR as a means of discussing U.S. problems was something I commonly encountered in the CIA." 1 It is for this reason that feminist ethnographies and oral histories are so vital. They help us to make sense of militaries' dependence on yet denial of particular presumptions about masculinity to sustain soldiers' morale and discipline. Without sexualized rest and recreation, would the U.S. military command be able to send young men off on long, often tedious sea voyages and ground maneuvers? Without myths of Asian or Latina women's compliant sexuality, would many American men be able to sustain their own identities, their visions of themselves as manly enough to act as soldiers? Women who have come to work as prostitutes around U.S. bases tell us that a militarized masculinity is constructed and reconstructed in smoky bars and sparsely furnished rented rooms. If we confine our curiosity only to the boot camp and the battlefield the focus of most investigations into the formations of militarized masculinity we will be unable to explain just how masculinity is created and sustained in the peculiar ways still imagined by officials to be necessary to sustain a modern military organization. We will also miss just how much governmental authority is being expended to insure that a peculiar definition of masculinity is sustained. Military prostitution differs from other forms of industrialized prostitution in that there are explicit steps taken by state institutions to protect the male customers without undermining their perceptions of themselves as sexualized men. "Close to 200,000 men a month paid three dollars for three minutes of the only intimacy most were going to find in Honolulu."2 These figures come from records kept in Hawaii during 1941 and 1944. Historians have these precise figures because Honolulu brothel managers, most of whom were white women, had to submit reports to Hawaii's military governor. American soldiers' sexual encounters with local prostitutes were not left to chance or to the market; they were the object of official policy consideration among the military, the police, and the governor's staff. Two hundred and fifty prostitutes paid $1.00 per year to be registered merely as "entertainers" with the Honolulu Police Department because the federal government had passed the May Act in 1941, making prostitution illegal, to assuage the fears of many American civilians that mobilizing for war would corrupt the country's sexual mores. 3 Hawaii's military governor disagreed. He had police and military officers on his side. They saw a tightly regulated prostitution industry as necessary to bolster male soldiers' morale, to prevent sexually transmitted diseases, and to reassure the Hawaiian white upper class that wartime would not jeopardize their moral order. The navy and the army set up prophylaxis distribution centers along Honolulu's Hotel Street, the center of the city's burgeoning prostitution industry. The two departments collaborated with the local police to try to ensure that licensed prostitutes kept their side of the bargain: in return for the license, women servicing soldiers and sailors up and down Hotel Street had to promise to have regular medical examinations, not to buy property in Hawaii, not to own an automobile, not to go out after 10:30 at night, and not to marry members of the armed forces. The objective was to keep prostitutes quite literally in their place. The effort was only partially successful. Women working in the most successful brothels, white women, many of whom came by ship from San Francisco to work as prostitutes, made enough money to violate the official rules and buy homes outside Honolulu. They kept $2 of the $3 from each customer. Out of their earnings they paid $100 per month to the brothel manager for room and board, plus extra for laundry and $13 for each required monthly venereal disease test. Before the war, most Hotel Street brothels had two doors, one for white male customers and one for men of color, most of whom were Asian men who worked on the island's pineapple and sugar plantations. Brothel managers believed this segregation prevented violent outbursts by white men who objected to the women they were paying for servicing men of any other race. As the wartime influx of white soldiers and sailors tilted the brothels' business ever more toward a white clientele, most managers decided that any risk of offending white male customers was bad business; they did away with the second door and turned away men of color altogether. Opening time for the typical Honolulu brothel during the war years was 9 A.M. It operated on an efficient assembly-line principle. From prostitutes and soldiers recalling the arrangement, we learn that most of the brothels used what was called a 'bull-ring' setup consisting of three rooms. "In one room a man undressed, in a second the prostitute engaged her customer, in a third a man who had finished put his clothes back on." 4 Prostitutes learned to tailor their services to the sexual sophistication of their military clients. They offered oral sex to the more nervous and inexperienced men. A senior military police officer in the middle of the war speculated before an audience of local citizen reformers that those sailors who performed oral sex with the Honolulu prostitutes were those men most likely to engage in homosexual behavior once they were back on board ship. The U.S. military's policymakers tried to think of everything. Today British and Belize officials work hard together to develop a complex policy to ensure a steady but safe supply of military prostitutes for the British troops stationed in that small ex-colony perched on the edge of Latin America.5 A new nine-hundred-man batallion arrives every six months. British soldiers have special brothels designated for their patronage, although they slip out of the carefully woven policy net to meet local women in bars and discos in Belize City. Most of the women who work in the officially approved brothels are Latinas, rather than Afro-Belize women; many have traveled across the border from war-torn Guatemala to earn money as prostitutes. The government-to-government agreement requires that every brothel worker, with the cooperation of the owners, have a photo identification card and undergo weekly medical examinations by a Belizean doctor. Prostitutes are required to use condoms with their military customers, although it is not clear how many women may be paid extra by their customers to break the condom rule. If a soldier-patron does show symptoms of a sexually transmitted disease or tests positive for HIV, it is assumed that the prostitute is to blame. The infected soldier gives his British superiors the name of the prostitute who he believes infected him. On the basis of the soldier's word as well as on test results, on a first "offense" the woman is reprimanded by the brothel owner; on a second offense she is fined; on a third she is fired. British-born soldiers and their Nepali Gurkha comrades, both in Belize under a Belize-British defense pact, have rather different racial/ sexual preferences. Whereas the former are likely to frequent both Latina and Afro-Belize women, the Gurkhas reprotedly prefer Latina women, which means that the Gurkhas are more likely to stick to the government-approved prostitutes. The fact that any Gurkha troops go to prostitutes at all, however, contradicts the long-standing British portrayal of Nepali militarized masculinity: though white British men's masculinity is presumed by their officers to require a diet of local sex while overseas, Nepali men's masculinity is constructed as more disciplined, faithful when home and celibate while on assignment abroad. 6 With the end of the Cold War and the relaxation of political tensions between Belize and Guatemala, the future of the government-to-government prostitution agreement has become uncertain. But in early 1992, Britain's Chief of Defence Staff, Field Marshal Sir Richard Vincent, made it known publicly that the Conservative government of John Major was hoping that the British troop rotation in Belize could be continued. Though no longer needed to defend Belize, the British army, according to the field marshal, now finds Belize's climate and topography especially attractive for jungle warfare training.7 Do the field marshal and his superiors back in London perhaps also find the Belize government's willingness to cooperate in the control of local women's sexuality a military attraction? The United States fashioned a rather different policy to regulate soldiers' relationships with prostitutes around major U.S. bases such as Clark and Subic Bay in the Philippines. Like the British, the Americans supported compulsory medical examinations of women working as prostitutes. Similarly, women without the license issued with these examinations were prevented from working by the localin this case Filipinomunicipal authorities. U.S. soldiers who contracted sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) were not required to report the woman whom they believe gave them the disease. Nonetheless, it was the practice of the Angeles City and Olongapo health authorities to pass on to U.S. base officials the names of sex workers who had contracted STDs. The base commanders then ordered that the photographs of infected Filipinas be pinned upside down on the public notice board as a warning to the American men. 8 Apparently believing that "stable" relationships with fewer local women would reduce the chances that their personnel would become infected, base commanders allowed Filipinas hired out by bar owners to stay with their military boyfriends on the base. U.S. officials occasionally sent out a "contact" card to a club owner containing the name of a Filipina employee whom the Americans suspected of having infected a particular sailor or air force man. However, they refused to contribute to the treatment of prostitutes with sexually transmitted diseases or AIDS and turned down requests that they subsidize Pap smears for early cancer detection for the estimated one hundred thousand women working in the entertainment businesses around Clark and Subic. The closing of both Clark Air Force Base and Subic Naval Base in 1992forced many Filipinas in precarious states of health into the ranks of the country's unemployed. Their few options included migrating to Okinawa or Guam, or even to Germany, to continue working as prostitutes for U.S. military men. They may also have been vulnerable to recruiters procuring Filipina women for Japan's entertainment industry, an industry that is increasingly dependent on young women from abroad.9 Olongapo City's businessman mayor, with his own entertainment investments now in jeopardy, has been in the forefront of promoters urging that Subic Bay's enormous facilities be converted into private enterprises, although the Filipino military is also eager to take over at least part of the operations for its own purposes. Military base conversion is always an intensely gendered process. Even if women working the entertainment sector are not at the conversion negotiation table, they will be on many of the negotiators' minds. For instance, the above-mentioned mayor, among others, has urged not only that privatized ship maintenance be developed at Subic Bay, but also that tourism development be high on the new investment list. 10 In the coming years, the politics of prostitution in Olongapo City may take on a civilian look, but many of the tourists attracted may be slightly older American men trying to relive their earlier militarized sexual adventures with Filipina women. There is no evidence thus far that being compelled by the forces of nature and nationalism to shut down two of their most prized overseas bases has caused U.S. military planners to rethink their prostitution policies. Shifting some of the Philippines operations to Guam or Singapore or back home to the United States does not in itself guarantee new official presumptions about the kinds of sexual relations required to sustain U.S. military power in the postCold War world. The governments of Singapore and the United States signed a basing agreement in Tokyo in mid-I992. But, despite popular misgivings about the implications of allowing U.S. Navy personnel to use the small island nation for repairs and training, the basing agreement itself was kept secret. Thus, Singapore citizens, as well as U.S. citizens, are left with little information about what policing formulas, public health formulas, and commercial zoning formulas have been devised by the two governments to shape the sexual relations between American and Singapore men and the women of Singapore.11 The women who have been generous enough to tell their stories of prostitution have revealed that sexuality is as central to the complex web of relationships between civil and military cultures as are more talked-about security doctrines and economic quid pro quo. Korean and Filipino women interviewed by Sandra Sturdevant and Brenda Stoltzfus for their oral history collection Let the Good Times Roll also remind us of how hard it is sometimes to map the boundaries between sexual relations and economics.12 They found that the local and foreign men who own the brothels, bars, and discos catering to soldiers are motivated by profit. These men weigh the market value of a woman's virginity, her "cherry," as well as her age. They constantly reassess their male clients' demands. Thus, by the early 1990s, bar owners and procurers concluded that AIDS-conscious U.S. soldiers were competing to have sex with younger and younger Filipinas, and so the proprietors sought to supply them, driving down the value of the sexual services supplied by "older" womenwomen in their early twenties. 13 Over the decades, U.S. Navy veterans stayed in the Philippines and set up bars and discos, both because they liked living outside the United States (often with Filipina wives) and because they could make a comfortable livelihood from sexualized entertainment. Australian men immigrated to launch their own businesses in the base towns and eventually made up a large proportion of the owners of the military-dependent entertainment industry.14 Local military personnel, especially officers, also used their status and authority in the rural areas to take part in the industry. Some men in the Philippines military have been known to supplement their salaries by acting as procurers of young rural women for the tourist and military prostitution industries.15 Similarly, among the investors and managers of Thailand's large prostitution industry are Thai military officers.16 Militarized, masculinized sexual desire, by itself, isn't sufficient to sustain a full-fledged prostitution industry. It requires (depends on) rural poverty, male entrepreneurship, urban commercialized demand, police protection, and overlapping governmental economic interest to ensure its success. Yet military prostitution is not simply an economic institution. The women who told their stories to Sturdevant and Stoltzfus were less concerned with parsing analytical categorieswhat is "economic," what is "social," and what is ''political"than with giving us an authentic account of the pressures, hopes, fears, and shortages they had to juggle every day in order to ensure their physical safety, hold onto some self-respect, and make ends meet for themselves and their children. The stories that prostitutes tell also underscore something that is overlooked repeatedly in discussions of the impact of military bases on local communities: local women working in military brothels and discos mediate between two sets of men, the foreign soldiers and the local men some of whom are themselves soldiers, but many of whom are civilians. Outside observers rarely talk about these two sets of men in the same breath. But the women who confided in Stoltzfus and Sturdevant knew that they had to be considered simultaneously. The Korean and Filipina women detailed how their relationships with local male lovers and husbands had created the conditions that initially made them vulnerable to the appeals of the labor-needy disco owners. Unfaithfulness, violent tempers, misuse of already low earnings, neglectful fathering any combination of these behaviors by their local lovers and husbands might have launched these women into military prostitution. Children, too, have to be talked about. Most of the women servicing foreign soldiers sexually have children, some fathered by local men and others fathered by the foreign soldiers. Prostitution and men's ideas about fathering: the two are intimately connected in these women's lives. In deeply militarized countries such as the Philippines, South Korea, Honduras, and Afghanistan, a woman working in prostitution may have to cope with local as well as foreign soldiers who need her services **to shore up their masculinity**. Because it is politically less awkward to concentrate on foreign soldiers' exploitation of local women, local soldiers' militarized and sexualized masculinity is frequently swept under the analytical rug, as if it were nonexistent or harmless. And in fact the local soldiery may have more respect for local women, may have easier access to noncommercialized sex, or may have too little money to spend to become major customers of local prostitutes. But none of those circumstances should be accepted as fact without a close look. For instance, Anne-Marie Cass, an Australian researcher who spent many months in the late 1980s both with the Philippine government's troops and with insurgent forces, found that Filipino male soldiers were prone to sexualizing their power. Cass watched as many of them flaunted their sexualized masculinity in front of their female soldier trainees, women expected from respectable families to be virgins. She also reported that many Filipino soldiers "expect to and receive rides on civilian transport, and drinks and the services of prostitutes in discos and bars without payment." 17

# A2: CONDITION CP (ON ROK ACTION)

**Threatening to withdraw unless South Korea takes action is the orientalist logic which underlied South Korea’s support for prostitution and objectification**

**Sang-Hun 09** – Journalist for the New York Times (Choe “Ex-Prostitutes Say South Korea and U.S. Enabled Sex Trade Near Bases” in the New York Times, January 7, 2009 <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/08/world/asia/08korea.html?_r=1>, MT)

SEOUL, South Korea — South Korea has railed for years against the Japanese government’s waffling over how much responsibility it bears for one of the ugliest chapters in its wartime history: the enslavement of women from Korea and elsewhere to work in brothels serving Japan’s imperial army. Now, a group of former prostitutes in South Korea have accused some of their country’s former leaders of a different kind of abuse: **encouraging them to have sex with the American soldiers** who protected South Korea from North Korea. They also accuse past South Korean governments, and the United States military, of taking a direct hand in the sex trade from the 1960s through the 1980s, working together to build a testing and treatment system to ensure that prostitutes were disease-free for American troops. While the women have made no claims that they were coerced into prostitution by South Korean or American officials during those years, they accuse successive Korean governments of hypocrisy in calling for reparations from Japan while refusing to take a hard look at South Korea’s own history. “Our government was one big pimp for the U.S. military,” one of the women, Kim Ae-ran, 58, said in a recent interview. Scholars on the issue say that the South Korean government was motivated in part by fears that the American military would leave, and that it wanted to do whatever it could to prevent that. But the women suggest that **the government** also **viewed them as commodities to be used** to shore up the country’s struggling economy in the decades after the Korean War. They say the government not only sponsored classes for them in basic English and etiquette — meant to help them sell themselves more effectively — but also sent bureaucrats to praise them for earning dollars when South Korea was desperate for foreign currency. “They urged us to sell as much as possible to the G.I.’s, praising us as ‘dollar-earning patriots,’ ” Ms. Kim said. The United States military, the scholars say, became involved in attempts to regulate the trade in so-called camp towns surrounding the bases because of worries about sexually transmitted diseases. In one of the most incendiary claims, some women say that the American military police and South Korean officials regularly raided clubs from the 1960s through the 1980s looking for women who were thought to be spreading the diseases. They picked out the women using the number tags the women say the brothels forced them to wear so the soldiers could more easily identify their sex partners. The Korean police would then detain the prostitutes who were thought to be ill, the women said, locking them up under guard in so-called monkey houses, where the windows had bars. There, the prostitutes were forced to take medications until they were well. The women, who are seeking compensation and an apology, have compared themselves to the so-called comfort women who have won widespread public sympathy for being forced into prostitution by the Japanese during World War II. Whether prostitutes by choice, need or coercion, the women say, they were all victims of government policies. “If the question is, was there active government complicity, support of such camp town prostitution, yes, by both the Korean governments and the U.S. military,” said Katharine H. S. Moon, a scholar who wrote about the women in her 1997 book, “Sex Among Allies.” The South Korean Ministry of Gender Equality, which handles women’s issues, declined to comment on the former prostitutes’ accusations. So did the American military command in Seoul, which responded with a general statement saying that the military “does not condone or support the illegal activities of human trafficking and prostitution.” The New York Times interviewed eight women who worked in brothels near American bases, and it reviewed South Korean and American documents. The documents do provide some support for many of the women’s claims, though most are snapshots in time. The women maintain that the practices occurred over decades. In some sense, the women’s allegations are not surprising. It has been clear for decades that South Korea and the United States military tolerated prostitution near bases, even though selling sex is illegal in South Korea. Bars and brothels have long lined the streets of the neighborhoods surrounding American bases in South Korea, as is the case in the areas around military bases around the world. But the women say few of their fellow citizens know how deeply their government was involved in the trade in the camp towns. The women received some support for their claims in 2006, from a former government official. In a television interview, the official, Kim Kee-joe, who was identified as having been a high-level liaison to the United States military, said, “Although we did not actively urge them to engage in prostitution, we, especially those from the county offices, did often tell them that it was not something bad for the country either.” Transcripts of parliamentary hearings also suggest that at least some South Korean leaders viewed prostitution as something of a necessity. In one exchange in 1960, two lawmakers urged the government to train a supply of prostitutes to meet what one called the “natural needs” of allied soldiers and prevent them from spending their dollars in Japan instead of South Korea. The deputy home minister at the time, Lee Sung-woo, replied that the government had made some improvements in the “supply of prostitutes” and the “recreational system” for American troops. Both Mr. Kim and Ms. Moon back the women’s assertions that the control of venereal disease was a driving factor for the two governments. They say the governments’ coordination became especially pronounced as Korean fears about an American pullout increased after President Richard M. Nixon announced plans in 1969 to reduce the number of American troops in South Korea. “The idea was to create an environment where the guests were treated well in the camp towns to discourage them from leaving,” Mr. Kim said in the television interview. Ms. Moon, a Wellesley College professor, said that the minutes of meetings between American military officials and Korean bureaucrats in the 1970s showed the lengths the two countries went to prevent epidemics. The minutes included recommendations to “isolate” women who were sick and ensure that they received treatment, government efforts to register prostitutes and require them to carry medical certification and a 1976 report about joint raids to apprehend prostitutes who were unregistered or failed to attend medical checkups. These days, camp towns still exist, but as the Korean economy took off, women from the Philippines began replacing them. Many former prostitutes live in the camp towns, isolated from mainstream society, which shuns them. Most are poor. Some are haunted by the memories of the mixed-race children they put up for adoption overseas. Jeon, 71, who agreed to talk only if she was identified by just her surname, said she was an 18-year-old war orphan in 1956 when hunger drove her to Dongduchon, a camp town near the border with North Korea. She had a son in the 1960s, but she became convinced that he would have a better future in the United States and gave him up for adoption when he was 13. About 10 years ago, her son, now an American soldier, returned to visit. She told him to forget her. “I failed as a mother,” said Ms. Jeon, who lives on welfare checks and the little cash she earns selling items she picks from other people’s trash. “I have no right to depend on him now.” “The more I think about my life, the more I think women like me were the biggest sacrifice for my country’s alliance with the Americans,” she said. “Looking back, I think my body was not mine, but the government’s and the U.S. military’s.”

# A2: PROSTITUTION CRACK DOWN CP

**Policies in the name of ‘protecting’ notions of ‘civilized’ women motivate imperialist colonization.**

**Enloe 93** – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “Bananas, Beaches and Bases” p. 48-52, MT)

European and American women taught not only letters and numbers in their governments' colonies; they taught notions of respectability. They traveled to colonized societies as settlers, explorers, and missionaries. They served colonial administrations without pay as the wives of soldiers, planters, missionaries and administrators. European and American women volunteered to work as nurses, governesses and teachers. The colonial governments expected women in all of these roles to set standards of ladylike behavior. The Victorian code of feminine respectability would set a positive example for the colonized women. Colonial administrators hoped, too, that such a code would maintain the proper distance between the small numbers of white women and the large numbers of local men. Sexual liaisons between colonial men and local women usually were winked at; affairs between colonial women and local men were threats to imperial order. Ladylike behavior was a mainstay of imperialist civilization. Like sanitation and Christianity, feminine respectability was meant to convince both the colonizing and the colonized peoples that foreign conquest was right and necessary. 10 Ladylike behavior would also have an uplifting effect on the colonizing men: it would encourage them to act according to those Victorian standards of manliness thought crucial for colonial order**. Part of that empire-building masculinity was protection of the respectable lady**. **She stood for the civilizing mission** which, **in turn, justified the colonization** of benighted peoples. 'Among rude people the women are generally degraded, among civilized people they are exalted,' wrote James Mill, one of the most popular promoters of British colonialism in the nineteenth century.11 British colonial officers blamed the existing ideologies of masculinity in the colonized societies for women's degradation; if men's sense of manliness was such that it didn't include reverence toward women, then they couldn't expect to be allowed to govern their own societies. Thus, for instance, in India British commentators created the idea of the 'effeminate' Bengali male, only to berate him because he wasn't manly enough to recognize his obligation to protect and revere women. 12 British officials passed legislation in India improving women's inheritance rights (1874, 1929, 1937), prohibiting widow-burning (1829) and allowing widow remarriage (1856), all in the name of advancing civilization. At the same time, Victorian values allowed these British officials to enact laws which imposed prison sentences on wives who refused to fulfill their sexual obligations to their husbands and imposed a system of prostitution that provided Indian women to sexually service British soldiers stationed in India. The riddle of two such contradictory sets of colonial policies comes unravelled if one sees British masculinized imperialism not as a crusade to abolish male domination of women but as a crusade to establish European male rule over the men in Asian and African societies.13

# A2: AGENT COUNTER PLANS

**The U.S. military has an obligation to end the prostitution in South Korea**

**Stars and Stripes 6-18-10**

[Jon Rabiroff, B.S. Journalism Syracuse, “Report on Human Trafficking Cites South Korean Juicy Bars”, June 18, <http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/report-on-human-trafficking-cites-south-korean-juicy-bars-1.107610>] Gus

SEOUL — A leading advocate in the fight against human trafficking said he hopes a reference to juicy bars in the U.S. State Department’s newly released annual Trafficking in Persons Report will prompt the U.S. military and South Korean officials to step up efforts to rid the base-area establishments of prostitution and other problems. “The report has pointed out where the trafficking victims can be found — near the military base — and now presses South Korea to step up the law enforcement,” U.S. Rep. Chris Smith, R-N.J., wrote in an e-mail exchange with Stars and Stripes. “But, even more importantly, the **U.S. military has a responsibility and a role to play in enforcing the zero tolerance policy,”** he continued. “If it is our servicemen who are creating the demand, we have to ensure that they stop exploiting the women.”

# A2: DOD BAN SOLDIERS FROM PROSTITUTION CP

**The DOD doesn’t recognize Juicy Bars as no go zones perpetuating American military engagement with prostitution and human trafficking**

**Stars and Stripes ’09**

[Jon Rabiroff, B.S. Journalism Syracuse, Hwang Hae-rym journalist, “Juicy Bars said to be havens for prostitution aimed at U.S. Military”, September 9, http://www.stripes.com/news/juicy-bars-said-to-be-havens-for-prostitution-aimed-at-u-s-military-1.8019]

The U.S. Department of Defense has a strict policy against prostitution and human trafficking that requires military officials to “deter activities of DoD Service members, civilian employees, indirect hires” and others “that would facilitate or support [sex trafficking] domestically and overseas.” And in practice, U.S. military officials have long placed South Korean “glass houses,” where prostitutes sit in storefronts like meat hanging in a butcher shop window, off-limits. But no such blanket prohibition exists for juicy bars, despite their history of trouble. About 50 entertainment establishments — U.S. officials don’t identify juicy bars or use the term — have been declared no-go zones for U.S. Forces Korea personnel due to prostitution and human trafficking violations. Another 19 outside Osan Air Base were almost added to that list earlier this year for similar reasons before they collectively agreed to clean up their acts. Still, dozens — if not hundreds — of other juicy bars, like the one outside Camp Casey, have managed to evade sanctions.

**Illegal prostitution and indentured servitude is rampant in South Korea and is constantly overlooked by the American, Philippine, and Korean governments – means no enforcement**

**Stars and Stripes ’09**

[Jon Rabiroff, B.S. Journalism Syracuse, Hwang Hae-rym journalist, “Juicy Bars said to be havens for prostitution aimed at U.S. Military”, September 9, http://www.stripes.com/news/juicy-bars-said-to-be-havens-for-prostitution-aimed-at-u-s-military-1.8019]

Prostitution and indentured servitude are everyday realities at many of these popular hangouts for American soldiers, according to past and present bar girls, many of whom were enticed from the Philippines to work in the South Korean bars with false promises that they could earn legitimate incomes as singers and entertainers. “If you don’t sell a lot of drinks, [the bar owners] are going to push you to go out with a customer to make money,” said Jenny, a former bar girl who asked not to be fully identified. “I was shocked the first night I worked there.” And it’s all happening right under the noses of U.S. military officials and the South Korean and Philippine governments, women’s advocacy groups assert. “Three governments are to be blamed for their irresponsibility,” said Yu Young-nim, director of My Sister’s Place, a social service agency that helps Philippine bar girls forced into prostitution in South Korea. “The Philippine government for not working hard to create job opportunities for its poor people, the Korean government for not managing and controlling jobs [given to immigrants] and the U.S. government for neglecting its responsibility to supervise its soldiers and for not helping these victims.” Officially, none of what often transpires inside the juicy bars is supposed to be happening.

# A2: STOP/REFORM PROSTITUTION CP

**Focusing on prostitution masks the overall problem in U.S. Military posture towards the Orient, the army has already enforced regulations to end prostitution yet the abuse continues and is sanctioned because of soldiers perceptions of Asian women.**

**Moon** **97** – Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, Department of Political Science and Edith Stix Wasserman Chair of Asian Studies (Katherine, “Sex among Allies” 1997, p. 35-37, MT)

Individual moments of sexual contact have engendered large-scale socioeconomic transformations for Americans and Koreans, as well as personal traumas and challenges. But **to root these consequences of prostitution in individuals' behavior without assessing** the **policies and practices of the U.S. military is like seeing the trees but not the forest**. Policies on the prevention and control of sexually transmitted diseases, fraternization with locals, language and cultural awareness programs for soldiers stationed outside of the United States, and the length of the tour of duty are just some of the factors that influence the participation of soldiers in prostitution and the system of prostitution that evolves in a locality. For example, Korea is one of the two countries, among those where the United States has bases, categorized as a "noncommand- sponsored" tour, 94 meaning that the Department of Defense will not pay for the travel and living costs of family members who accompany soldiers to Korea. In 1991, only 10% of the 40,000 troops were accompanied by their family members. Korea is also a "hardship tour," partly because of its status as a war zone and also because the living arrangements, language, and cultural differences pose difficulties for Americans. Korea is also a"short tour," usually about one and a half years long. Moreover, enlisted men who are sent to Korea tend to be very young, in their late teens and early twenties--they are without family and get hands-on experience in (technically) a combat zone. This contrasts with U.S. military policy for troops in former West Germany, which tends to send married men with their families since the 1980s. 95nOne U.S. military official, who is familiar with troop life in Korea and Germany, found that prostitution rose concomitantly with a predominance of single men based around Nuremberg in the 1960s and 1970s; the swing toward the stationing of married soldiers in the 1980s coincided with a decline in prostitution. 96 Moreover, Germany in the 1970s and 1980s was considered A "plum" post, as opposed to a "hardship tour," because family members could experience European living. All Americans and Koreans who are familiar with U.S. military life have told me that the noncommand-sponsored status and the short duration of tours prevent a soldier from getting to know Korean culture and people and from putting down roots and establishing a stable life. The fact that the enlistees are unattached, lonely, "ghettoized" in Korea and distanced from America, and that they are moving on in a year's time makes them ready candidates for "GI johns." **Command policies say no to prostitution**. All commands hold briefings introducing soldiers to their new posts and inform them of special health hazards and precautions. Servicemen also receive sex education on STDs and AIDs. In the Asian posts, superiors discuss the local camptown environment and prostitution. But the attitudes and the conduct of local commanders and immediate superiors, rather than official policies and briefings, determine how servicemen perceive prostitution in overseas settings. Two Army chaplains I spoke with emphasized that"[t]he command spells out what's o.k. and not o.k. in terms of interactions with the locals, including women. In Saudi Arabia [Persian Gulf War], it was definitely 'Thou shalt not.'" 97 Another Army chaplain agreed,"[In] Saudi Arabia, even before the soldier could go near a local woman and get caught by Arabs, we'd get him before the Arabs could; that's how strict we were." 98 In contrast, he pointed out that in Korea, the military says," 'Aw, it's the culture' and winks at what goes on." 99 One sailor I spoke with in the spring of 1991 stated that just before his ship docked in the Philippines or Korea, the medical officer gathered the men for a briefing about health precautions and "threw the men condoms as if they were Hallmark cards." He added that some **officers would tell their men that prostitution is a way of life for Asians and that Asians like prostitution**. 100 Former servicemen who had served in the Philippines stated on ABC's *Prime Time* (May 13, 1993) that military officers had"enthusiastically promoted" prostitution in the Philippines and that some had their own clubs and owned women. Indeed, prostitution is an everyday experience, part of the routine, for the thousands of American servicemen in Korea. The authors of"Human Factors Research" (by EUSA) found that of 1% of the population surveyed in 1965,"approximately 84% of the men stated[d] that they have 'been with' or 'been out with' a prostitute at least once for one purpose or another." 101 Peer pressure was a major culprit:"[M]ost of the men state that one of the forces exerting pressure on them to 'try a prostitute' immediately after arrival is the encouragement of other Americans." 102 One U.S. Army captain who had served in Korea in the early 1980s also pointed out that there is "overwhelming cultural pressure among enlisted men" to seek out prostitutes. 103 He added that even moral crusaders who come in talking big about the sinfulness of prostitution ended up participating themselves. The U.S. military does have a sporadic history of tackling prostitution and venereal disease as a moral crusade. Social and moral reform efforts during World War I years is the most prominent and well- documented. Controlling prostitution and venereal disease was part of a"garrison state" mentality, characterized by the"subordination of all other purposes and activities to war and the preparation for war." 104 For women, this meant"the first time a"national, concerted policy sanctioned the total abrogation of civil rights for women on the streets." 105 The"prostitute was cast as the enemy on the home front. . . . War propaganda presented the prostitute as someone predatory and diseased, who 'could do more harm than any German fleet of airplanes' to the men fighting the war." 106 The military judged the women to be responsible for generating the high rates of venereal disease among soldiers. Brandt points out that"[a]t home and abroad during the war, almost seven million days of active duty were lost to venereal disease, the most common illnesses in the service next to influenza." 107 In addition,"venereal diseases during the war cost the government almost fifty million dollars." 108 In the entire army, 76.6% of the infections involved soldiers serving in the United States. 109 To remedy this crisis, **the military enlisted the help of progressive-era social reformers and together pushed for legal and social measures to prevent prostitution** and sexual freedom in general. Despite the repressive treatment of women, such as forced gynecological examinations and detention at the mere suspicion of having a VD infection, 110 a serious concern with the welfare and protection of girls and women involved in vice-related activities drove the actions of social reformers, especially the Progressive era "social feminists." 111 Moreover, reformers attempted to apply through law and education the" language of Progressivism": "*self-* discipline, *self-* denial, *self-* sacrifice, and *self-* control."( (112 (emphasis in original)

**Efforts to improve the conditions only lead to authoritarian control over the women’s lives, supporting the idea that they are passive – the CP doesn’t do enough it only enables politicians to spin it as a big win when it is actually a step backwards.**

**Moon** **97** – Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, Department of Political Science and Edith Stix Wasserman Chair of Asian Studies (Katherine, “Sex among Allies” 1997, p. 73-74, MT)

While trying to protect the interests of local businesses, the Korean government simultaneously used political patronage and **authoritarian control** to pressure local governments, police, and KSTAs to meet the interests of local U.S. commands. Because the Clean-Up order had been issued by President Pak and actively carried out by the upper ranks of the Home Affairs Ministry, low-level officials had little choice but to comply. As political appointees, each provincial governor, county (*kun*) chief and ward (*ku*) head were beholden to their superiors. 142 Moreover, the then JC Assistant Secretary for the Korean side noted that **as the** Subcommittee's **Clean-Up** efforts **began producing positive results**, "the local **officials wanted** to **get in on the action for their own political usage**. They began to run around getting involved in this work." 143 The local **officials would in turn put pressure on** local **establishments and residents to cooperate with U.S. military authorities**. 144 Regarding VD control, U.S. military and ROK government officials (former and current) commented that women were often forced to comply with regular check-ups and quarantines. 145 Although bar-owners and prostitutes generally resented the increased police and governmental control over their business activities, many camptown residents did welcome the central government's attention to "environmental beautification" because funds and other resources were made available for long-needed infrastructural improvements. From the perspective of U.S. and Korean officials responsible for overseeing camptown improvements, the Clean-Up Campaign yielded positive results. First, racial discrimination on the part of Korean camptown workers toward black U.S. servicemen significantly decreased together with racial violence. 146 Second, sanitation conditions, roads, and lighting in camptowns greatly improved. With consistent prodding from the U.S. military, the Korean government tightened its venereal disease control of women (chapters 4 and 6), while the U.S. military restructured its VD contact identification systems and assisted the ROK government with medical supplies and expertise. Despite the initial resentment of some camptown residents toward the increased surveillance and control of their villages by two governmental authorities, many camptown Koreans, in the long run, benefited economically and politically from the Clean-Up. The Purification Movement provided developmental attention and assistance to these long-neglected shantytowns. 147 Some residents caught on quickly that the Clean- Up would help improve business by facilitating U.S. patronage and attracting "more legitimate businesses." 148 Politically, the Campaign's reinforcement (in some cases, creation) of Korean administrative accountability and suppression of lawlessness in camptowns served to de-emphasize the pariah image. Moreover, the establishment of Korean-American Friendship Councils helped empower villagers who had had little recourse for addressing grievances regarding U.S. military actions and GI behavior. One official of the Korea Special Tourist Association commented that U.S. Military Police (in Tongduch'on/Camp Casey), who had acted arrogantly in policing bars/clubs before 1971-72, 149 ceased to throw their weight around after the establishment and fortification of KAFCs in 1972: "Sometimes they [MPs] accompanied U.S. and Korean health officials [into the clubs] but weren't as abusive as before. I wonder if we had had the friendship associations functioning before 1972 whether such abuses on the part of the U.S. military could have happened." 150 The KAFCs and the imposition of Korean governmental authority in camptowns also helped prevent the rampant use of the off-limits decree by U.S. commanders. 151 By the middle of 1972, Subcommittee efforts at improving community relations generated changes in the USFK off-limits policy. The new directive emphasized consultation and cooperation with Korean owners of establishments, and when necessary, the use of the USFK chain of command as mediator with the appropriate offices of the Korean government. 152 **Despite the gains, the** social **cost of these** camptown **improvements was** **increased authoritarian control and militarization of people's lives**. The number of police personnel, 153 checkpoints, vehicles, and raids<> 154 increased in most camptowns, 155 and U.S. military patrol teams increased in number and kind to monitor the behavior of both U.S. personnel and Korean residents. Although increased policing was needed to control the excesses of camptown life, the Purification Movement reduced the amount of village space, **especially that of camptown women**, not subject to the surveillance of governmental and military authorities.

**Trying to ‘save’ Asian women from prostitution without recognizing how oriental logic informs the situation only reinforces the belief the west is superior – cant solve case.**

**Wu 04** – B.A. in Sociology from James Madison University, has worked with many Civic and Social organizations (Nadine “The Dynamics of Orientalism and Globalization in the International Sex Industry and Human Trafficking” 2004, www.jmu.edu/writeon/documents/2004/wu.pdf, p. 7-12, MT)

Human trafficking has gained much publicity in the west in recent years. How does one analyze the person who was smuggled or the person who does the smuggling? What about the people who indirectly profit from it or the customers? How do Orientalist attitudes affect perceptions of women who are trafficked into prostitution? How ethical are efforts to help women in trafficking rings? Governments, activists, politicians, feminists, anti-trafficking organizations, and **policymakers look at women through varying conceptual frameworks.** Some policymakers frame the issue in terms of illegal immigration. U.S legislation passed in 1996 to combat illegal immigration increased penalties for people who enter the country illegally (Kyle and Koslowski, 2001). Some U.S members of Congress point out that illegal aliens are criminals by virtue of illegally crossing borders (Koslowski 2001). Women who are caught in the U.S are often arrested for prostitution and deported, even if they got into that line of work against their will (Polaris Project, 2003). However, restrictive immigration policies make these organizations flourish. Traffickers can make more money because migrants will be willing to pay higher smuggling fees in order to get into other countries. Criminalizing the women who take part in trafficking does not address their motives for migrating. It fails to address gender and ethnic stratification and the economic inequalities that drive women to improve their lives. These conditions help make the human trafficking market possible. The trafficking of women needs to be reframed in terms of human rights and economics instead of and annoying problem of immoral immigrants. Once again **the west is framing the “other” in racist terms**. Not all politicians want to criminalize prostitutes who are trafficked. Some sincerely want to help women who are in bad situations. In the fall of 1999, Representative Chris Smith introduced the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, which focused on protecting women and children trafficked for forced prostitution and proposed to increase punishment for traffickers. Women in these trafficking networks are often starved, locked in cellars, beaten regularly, and threatened with work in a whorehouse (Kwong, 2001) so they do need protection. Although these acts are well-intentioned, they also emphasize women in traffic networks as victims rather than people who live in conditions that often cause migration to be necessary. Like those who criminalize prostitutes, these **politicians fail to address the effects of colonization** and globalization or ask why so many people feel the need to migrate in the first place. Legislation designed to protect trafficked women is necessary but not enough. There is little evidence that tighter laws have been successful in stopping or reducing forced prostitution that many women face when they are smuggled across borders. **Ironically many anti-trafficking activists** and feminists who **claim to be progressive also subscribe to Orientalist beliefs**, although in a different, more subtle manner. **These people do not consciously desire to colonize women of color or frame them as barbaric “others”. However, they still construct themselves as being superior to women of color**. Such organizations often portray the women as helpless, naïve victims who should be pitied. Kathleen Barry, founder of Coalition Against Trafficking in Women is an example of an Orientalist feminist. When talking about Bengali women forced into trafficking she says, “Illiteracy and rural village patriarchal feudalism abnegate human identity for many of these women” (1995). Of Thai women says, “In Thailand, religious ideology and patriarchal feudalism reduce the value of women's lives to that of sexual and economic property, which in turn validate prostitution” (1995). Unfortunately some families in Asian countries do sell their daughters to brothels but western women are also not free from oppression (Bales 1999). For example, many American women and children are forced into prostitution domestically in the United States. Furthermore, **the simplistic attitude that all** non-white women or **women of color are slaves to inherently barbaric, backwards cultures symbolizes Orientalism**. Instead of recognizing forced prostitution as a result of a combination of social, political, cultural, and economic forces, Barry blames this form of oppression solely on the culture of the Orient. Barry’s remarks characterize a rescue mentality among white feminists, another element of Orientalism. **Like the Orientalist scholars who constructed themselves as being superior to the Orient, these feminists construct themselves as being more empowered than Asian women. Just as white male clients have sexual fantasies of Orientals**, **white feminists have fantasies of rescuing them from their evil, barbaric Asian men**. In condemning all Asian cultures as essentially patriarchal and oppressive, white feminists like Barry forget that many of the clients who drive the demand for international trafficking are white men from North America and Europe. It is obvious that racism exists even in so called progressive circles. This condescending rhetoric neglects to expose the Orientalist fantasies of these white men. Not only is it racist, but in the process they also ignore the real cultures of people who are different from them. They ignore women’s movements and liberation movements that have occurred and continue to occur in “other” countries. The racism of western feminists such as Kathleen Barry raises the question of how to help women without being disrespectful. It is important to respect the ambitions and strength of women who can survive such situations. Contrary to popular belief, the women are often making choices based on their economic and social circumstances. Even the women who don’t know they are going into prostitution are attempting to control their lives. Poverty has been an important motivating factor for many young women to migrate for prostitution for other forms of work (Skrobanek, Boonpakdee, and Jantaeero 1998). The decision to migrate is usually made when individuals or families see no way to improve their lives other than leaving their homes in search of work. The decision is not taken lightly and **does mean that such women are simply passive, naïve victims of white or Asian men. Rather, it shows that they are ambitious enough to improve their lives** and that they have confidence in their ability to deal with the challenges and uncertainties of migration. But like any human beings who end up in unfortunate circumstances, they would benefit from the help of other people because criminal networks and the sex industries won’t hesitate to exploit their ambitions for a better life. It is important for western feminists to realize that ability of women to survive harsh conditions can be seen as a sign of their strength and that privileged feminists never have to experience these kinds of struggles. Although it’s important to recognize that women in trafficking rings are not simply helpless idiots, one should be careful not to idealize them either. Idealizing a culture is just as harmful as viewing a culture as barbaric because it prevents meaningful dialogue and critique between different groups of people. **It also prevents** people from seeing problems in different cultures and **working together for viable solutions**.

# A2: HUMAN RIGHTS CP’S

**Categorizing women’s rights as human rights is too narrow**

**ENLOE** **00** (Chloe, “Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives,” 2000, P139) SLV

"Women's rights are human rights" was, nonetheless, a theoretical assertion (and a basis for organizing) still subjected to continuing debate even among feminists. Some feminists worried that so much preoccupation with rights would foster too individualistic a focus for feminist activism. It had been liberal feminism that had provided the most comfortable bridge connecting women's movements and international human rights politics. Liberal feminists, in turn, usually invested their energies in pursuing individual claims of equality. Those women's advocates who had come to their activism through socialist feminism, anti-racist feminism, or anti-colonial feminism were made uneasy by such classic liberal unquestioning acceptance of individualism. Then, too, other feminists keeping track of the "women's rights are human rights" efforts expressed concern that the very inclusiveness of the language of human'rights might blind its users to vital political, economic, and cultural differences among women. "Humanness" was real, but it was not adequate to express the diversity of women's conditions and aspirations-and the tough political work that was needed if women were to build alliances by confronting, not denying, this diversity and inequality. The gains that those activists employing a feminist interpretation of human rights made in a growing number of international political sites, consequently, were achieved in the midst of a lively and "vcr more broadly international feminist dialogue. How to think about what had happened to women in Bosnia became part of that lively dialogue. I04

# A2: UNIFICATION CP

Germany proves unification fails

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. 30, TH)

Leaving aside the enormous political, economic, and administra- tive challenges, one stunning feature characterizes the early days of German unification: the realization that four decades of very differ- ent socializations in East and West created rather different identity patterns. “Every day we are surprised anew that 45 years of sepa- ration had a greater impact upon us than we thought it had when the Wall came down,” says Lothar de Mazière, East Germany’s first freely elected prime minister.51 The mayor of Leipzig, likewise, stresses that “no one on either side of the Wall had any idea how far apart we had grown in forty years. Only now are we beginning to understand it.”52 Particularly revealing is that these differences be- came manifest only after unification. The realization that “till now we did not know we had an [East German] identity” was a common experience.53 Heiner Meulemann puts this seemingly paradoxical issue somewhat differently but gets at the same dynamic. In a com- pelling empirical study he revealed that East Germans did in fact not identify strongly with the old regime, for it was generally perceived to be unjust and inefficient. But as soon as it disappeared, people started to display an emotional attachment to the order that had vanished. The long process of socialization under the Communist regime showed its real power only after its demise, because for many people its worldview was the only one available to interpret and deal with the new situation.54 The “wall in the head” was far more difficult to bring down than the wall that divided Berlin and the rest of the country. In many ways the experiences of east Germans after unification mirror the fate of North Korean defectors in the South. Hans-Joachim Maaz, a prominent east German psychiatrist, whose book Behind the Wall generated a major public debate soon after unification, stresses that the demands of the market economy were virtually the opposite of the attributes that people from a Communist socialization brought to the new context. What was demanded of East Germans before was “submission, adjustment, restraint,” in short, not to be critical, creative, not to stick out and take initiative. But these were precisely the attributes demanded of people after unification. As a result many felt simply overwhelmed.55 Maaz describes how people from the east tended to experience psychological problems after German unifica- tion, such as insecurities, anxieties, panic attacks, and depression. One of the most destabilizing factors was the challenge to individu- als of ascertaining who they were and how they could prevail in the new environment.56 The identity problems that emerged with unification were thus not of an ideological nature but had mostly to do with entrenched behavior patterns that formed over a long period of socialization, with fundamental assumptions about who one is and how one re- lates to family, friends, colleagues, the state, and the public realm. Herta Müller, a prominent novelist, goes so far as to argue that although East Germans were German by language, they had in fact much more in common with East European people than with West Germans.57

Studies show psychological identity differences, societal upbringing, won’t be easy to get rid of

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. 26-28, TH)

Even more indicative of identity-related difficulties are the psychological and sociocultural obstacles that many defectors experience in their attempt to integrate into South Korean society. They range from specific challenges, such as difficulties in the realm of sexual relations, where North Koreans are used to far more conservative norms,32 to more general psychosomatic illnesses, such as inferiority complexes, depression, stress, and trauma. Particularly revealing is that defectors from the North suffer far more from such psycho- logical problems than do immigrants from other countries.33 Many defectors criticize South Korean society and its people for being “closed” and “selfish.”34 The defectors tend to feel lonely, alienated, inferior, and powerless, or, as one commentator puts it, they experi- ence a “sense of not belonging to the new society.”35 Do the psychological difficulties that defectors experience in South Korea indicate that the North Korean system of information control has worked? Have decades of socialization produced people with different identities? Some indicators suggest yes, at least at first sight. Defectors from the North “unanimously agree that the vast majority of North Koreans harbored great love and respect for Kim Il Sung as the man who freed them from the Japanese, defeated the Americans in the Korean War, and built the foundations of the national economy.”36 Equally revealing, though, is that most defec- tors have no difficulties adjusting to the political dimensions of the South Korean system. That may be the case because, as some sug- gest, they explicitly decided to defect from the North.37 But there is more to it. Consider how many participants in a survey of defectors point out that North Korean people do not tend to be particularly concerned with ideology. They stress that an “absolute obedience to ideology is more important than its content.” Professing adherence to an ideology, then, becomes more of a survival tool, something that is, in effect, quite removed from the daily lives and beliefs of people.38 Such interpretations are supported by insights from differ- ent cultural contexts. Consider how James Scott, in a study of domi- nation and resistance, draws attention to the differences between “public transcripts” and “hidden transcripts.” The latter represent what is visible in public of the interaction between subordinates and those who hold power.39 By controlling the public transcript, elites can establish an official ideological narrative that depicts how they want subordinates to see them. But this is not the whole story, Scott insists. In addition to this hegemonic public conduct there is “a backstage discourse consisting of what cannot be spoken in the face of power.”40 Scott is particularly critical of what he calls the “thick theory of hegemony.” He dismisses as untenable the argument that a dominant ideology is so powerful in concealing its logic of op- pression that it persuades subordinate groups to espouse uncritically the values that explain and justify their own subordination. Such a position gravely misjudges the ability of subordinates to learn from their daily material experiences, which allows them to penetrate and demystify the dominant ideology.41 Whether Scott’s position on hegemony applies to North Korea is open to debate, for the latter is clearly one of history’s most totali- tarian and reclusive societies. Independent of this debate, it is clear that most defectors have few difficulties adjusting to the ideological surroundings of their new life in South Korea. A 1996 survey, for instance, revealed that defectors believed that the biggest problem after a unification would not be of an ideological nature but would involve more generic value patterns and prejudices. In 2001 a survey of 528 defectors produced a similar picture. When asked if North and South Koreans would be able to live together amicably after unification, only 15 percent of the respondents evaluated this possi- bility as very high. Most answers were in the “so-so” and “not-so- high” category, while 20 percent had a very pessimistic view. The reasons most cited for this widespread pessimism were “cultural differences in norms, values and living habits.”42 The clash of values that occurs between North Korean defectors and South Korean citizens does, at least to some extent, reflect stereo- typical differences associated with Communist and capitalist societies. Or so several commentators argue. As a result of having lived in an totalitarian society, Northerners are said to lack the experience of making choices, expressing opinions, and assuming responsibility. They are used to a system that distributes privileges according to position and status rather than individual merit. Their attributes are said to include passive acceptance of authority, a strict moral code, importance placed on solidarity and equality, and a tendency to principled black-and-white logic. This contrasts with Southerners, who grew up in a competitive market economy and an increasingly democratizing society. Their attributes are said to include individu- alism, attachment to material wealth, decay of community soli- darity, looser moral codes, and a tendency toward utilitarian “gray logic,” designed to further their interests.43 As with all stereotypes, these differences are partly fiction, partly true. But the experience of defectors does suggest that Northerners are oriented toward col- lectivism and equality, while Southerners are more characterized by individualism and libertarian notions of freedom.44 These differences account for major societal difficulties, no matter how constructed and stereotypical they are.

**Even though homogeneity has existed for a long time, there are reasons to believe it won’t be so easy – shouldn’t under emphasize antagonistic identity constructions**

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. 18-19, TH)

Problems emerging from the tension between identity and differ- ence tend to be either minimized or downright ignored in Korea. Se- curity experts in particular do not consider questions of identity to be relevant. They rely instead on well-rehearsed strategic and geo- political frameworks to understand the challenges ahead. Equally widespread is the tendency that Roy Richard Grinker refers to as the “master narrative of homogeneity”: the belief that the division of the peninsula was imposed from the outside and that unification would immediately recover the lost national unity.3 Such a quest for national cohesion is understandable, both emotionally and histori- cally. Many commentators draw attention to the remarkable degree of cultural homogeneity in Korea. They argue, for instance, that “the common language, culture, and history of the two Koreas, along with growing re-acquaintance and familiarity, are likely to predominate over the 50-year interlude of separation.”4 Some even go so far as to present existing identity differences as “trivial compared to the amount and depth of the homogeneity accumulated for 1,000 years in the past.”5 The common aspects of Korean culture will undoubt- edly prevail in the long run. But major problems will persist if differences that have emerged since the 1950s continue to be downplayed or ignored.

I also draw attention to two domains that can further underline how problematic and deeply entrenched the identity differences are: the experience of North Korean defectors in the South and a com- parison with a dozen years of German unification. Entering these domains of inquiry is to embark on a brief detour from the im- mediate concerns of security policy. But doing so is important, for insights from defectors and from Germany clearly demonstrate not only that significant identity differences exist but also, and perhaps more important, that they persist far beyond the ideological and po- litical structures that set them up in the first place.

# A2: DELAY CPS

**We will win on this card alone – The very reason power relations are unequal is because Women’s calls for equality are met with ‘this is the wrong time’, this continually delays change and causes the impacts they isolate which are a product of the unequal power realtions, this is especially true in context of U.S. foreign military bases.**

**Enloe 93** – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “Bananas, Beaches and Bases” p. 61-64, MT)

Nationalism has provided millions of women with a space to be international actors. To learn that one's culture But many of the nationalisms that have rearranged the pattern of world politics over the last two centuries have been patriarchal nationalisms. They have presumed that all the forces marginalizing or oppressing women have been generated by the dynamics of colonialism or neocolonialism, and hence that the pre-colonial society was one in which women enjoyed security and autonomy. Thus simply restoring the nation's independence will ensure women's liberation. Many nationalists have assumed, too, that the significance of the community's women being raped or vulgarly photographed by foreign men is that the honor of the community's men has been assaulted. And frequently they have urged women to take active roles in nationalist movements, but confined them to the roles of ego-stroking girlfriend, stoic wife or nurturing mother. Repeatedly male nationalist organizers have elevated unity of the community to such political primacy that any questioning of relations between women and men inside the movement could be labeled as divisive, even traitorous. **Women who have called for more genuine equality between the sexes** in the movement, in the home **have been told that now is not the time**, the nation is too fragile**, the enemy is too near. Women must be patient**, they must wait until the nationalist goal is achieved; then relations between women and men can be addressed. 'Not now, later', is the advice that rings in the ears of many nationalist women. 'Not now, later', is weighted with implications. It is **advice predicated on the belief that the most dire problems** facing the nascent national community are problems which **can be explained and solved without reference to power relations between women and men. That is**, the causes and effects of foreign investments and indebtedness can be understood without taking women's experiences seriously; **foreign military bases** and agribusiness-induced landlessness **can be challenged without coming to grips with how each has relied on women's labor and silence;** the subtle allure of cultural imperialism can be dissected without reference to masculine pride and desire. Each of these presumptions seems **politically shallow**. In addition, the 'not now, later' advice implies that what happens during the nationalist campaign will not make it harder in the future to transform the conditions that marginalize women and privilege men. It also rests on the prediction that political institutions born out of a nationalist victory will be at least as open to women's analysis and demands as the institutions of a nationalist movement. Both of these assumptions are questionable. The very experiences of a nationalist campaign whether at the polls in Quebec, or in the streets of Armenia, or in the hills of Algeria frequently harden masculine political privilege. If men are allowed to take most of the policy-making roles in the movement, they are more likely to be arrested, gain the status of heroes in jail, learn public skills, all of which will enable them to claim positions of authority after the campaign is won. If women are confined to playing the nationalist wife, girlfriend or mother albeit making crucial contributions to a successful nationalist campaign they are unlikely to have either the skills or the communal prestige to gain community-wide authority at a later time. The nation of what 'the nation' was in its finest hour when it was most unified, most altruistic will be of a community in which women sacrificed their desires for the sake of the male-led collective. Risky though it might indeed be for a nationalist movement **to confront current inequities between its women and men, it is more likely to produce lasting change than waiting until the mythical 'later'**. There is a long history of nationalist women challenging masculine privilege in the midst of popular mobilization. Erasing those women's efforts from the nationalist chronicles makes it harder for contemporary women to claim that their critical attitudes are indigenous and hence legitimate. Thus nationalist feminists in countries such as Vietnam, Sri Lanka and Jamaica have invested energy in recapturing local women's nationalist history. As Honor Ford Smith of the Jamaican feminist theater group Sistren recalls, What we knew was that a spate of tongue-in-cheek newspaper and television reports had projected white feminists in Europe and North America as 'women's libbers', hysterical perverts . . . We did not know of the struggles of women for education and political rights between 1898 and 1944. We did not know the names of the early black feminists . . . 39 Challenges have been hardest to mount when women within a movement have lacked the chance to talk with each other in confidence about their own experiences and how they shape their priorities. Women in an oppressed or colonized national community are usually not from a single social class, and thus they have not experienced relations with the foreign power or the coopted ruling élite in the same ways. Nor do all women within a national community have identical sexual experiences with men or with other women. Women who haven't had the space to discuss their differences and anxieties together have been less able to withstand men's charges of being lesbians or aliens. Women's efforts to redefine the nation in the midst of a nationalist campaign have been especially difficult when potentially supportive women outside the community have failed to understand how important it is to women within the community not to be forced to choose between their nationalist and their feminist aspirations. As stressful as it is to live as a feminist nationalist, to surrender one's national identity may mean absorption into an international women's movement led by middle-class women from affluent societies. This is the caveat issued by Delia Aguilar, a Filipino nationalist feminist: when feminist solidarity networks are today proposed and extended globally, without a firm sense of identity national, racial and class we are likely to yield to feminist models designed by and for white, middle-class women in the industrial West and uncritically adopt these as our own. 40 Given the scores of nationalist movements which have managed to topple empires and create new states, it is surprising that the international political system hasn't been more radically altered than it has. But a nationalist movement informed by masculinist pride and holding a patriarchal vision of the new nation-state is likely to produce just one more actor in the international arena. A dozen new patriarchal nation-states may make the international bargaining table a bit more crowded, but it won't change the international game being played at that table. It is worth imagining, therefore, what would happen to international politics if more nationalist movements were informed by women's experiences of oppression. If more nation-states grew out of feminist nationalists' ideas and experiences, community identities within the international political system might be tempered by cross-national identities. Resolutions of inter-state conflicts would last longer because the significance of women to those conflicts would be considered directly, not dismissed as too trivial to be the topic of serious state-to-state negotiation.

**Bases become normalized through notions of masculinity and feminity.**

**Enloe 93** – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “Bananas, Beaches and Bases” p. 65-67, MT)

Most bases have managed to slip into the daily lives of the nearby community. **A military base**, even one controlled by soldiers of another country, **can become politically invisible if its ways of doing business** and seeing the world **insinuate themselves** into a community's schools, consumer tastes, housing patterns, children's games, adults' friendships, jobs and gossip. On any given day, therefore, only a handful of these scores of bases scattered around the world are the objects of dispute. Most have draped themselves with the camouflage of normalcy. Real-estate agents, town officials, charity volunteers, barmaids, local police, business owners all accept the base, its soldiers and their families as givens. They may even see them as valuable, as good for their own well-being. Rumors of a base closing can send shivers of economic alarm through a civilian community that has come to depend on base jobs and soldiers' spending. Military alliances between governments need this daily acceptance. NATO and the Warsaw Pact would be far more fragile than they already are if local women and men didn't find reasons for accepting foreign military bases in their midst. American, British, French, Soviet governments those with the most soldiers stationed outside their own borders would find it more difficult to sustain their sense of world influence if they couldn't maintain military bases in other people's backyards. Understanding how a military base acquires its local camouflage or perhaps loses it is critical to making sense of how international military alliances are perpetuated, or undone. **The normalcy that sustains a military base** in a local community **rests on ideas about masculinity and femininity**. A foreign base requires especially delicate adjustment of relations between men and women, for if the fit between local and foreign men and local and foreign women breaks down, the base may lose its protective cover. It may become the target of nationalist resentment that could subvert the very structure of a military alliance. 'A friendly, unquestioning, geographically convenient but expendable launching point for the projections of US military power' is what many British people believe their country has become. 3 They feel as though their country is less a sovereign nation than an aircraft-carrier for the American armed forces. Between 1948, when American forces returned to post-war Britain, and 1986 the US military created some 130 bases and facilities in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. They did this with the British government's often secret acquiescence.4 Some of these installations are mere offices, hardly noticeable to the casual passer-by. Others, like those at Greenham Common, Molesworth, Mildenhall and Holy Loch, are full-fledged communities with elaborate facilities and large workforces.

# A2: LIMIT PROSTITUTION CP’S

**So long as the underlying notion of the masculine occident remains intact, domination over the perceived ‘passive’ ‘sexualized’ oriental women will guarantee prostitution.**

**Jordan 2000** – Associate Professor at the School of Social Service Administration of the University of Chicago. (Ann D., “Commercial Sex Workers in Asia: A Blind Spot in Human Rights Law” in Women and International Human Rights Law, Volume 2, 2000, pp.525-585, <http://www.ageofconsent.com/comments/commercialsexworkers.htm>, MT)

Men also eroticize women based on myths about the sexuality of women of different races, castes, ethnic groups or cultures. Indian men have a fetish for the "exotic" look of young Nepalese women, thereby fueling the trafficking of Nepalese girls and women into India. Western men travel halfway around the world to buy sex with young women and girls based on myths about **"exotic,"** **compliant**, and **submissive** Asian women. These "exotic" women and girls come almost exclusively from lower classes or castes or different ethnic or racial groups. One-third of the women and children in Taiwan’s sex industry, working in cities servicing men of a higher class and different ethnicity, are from mountain areas and aboriginal tribes, which are both regarded as lower class.30 Over 60 percent of women and girls in Cambodia’s CSI are non-Khmer girls and women trafficked in from neighboring countries.31 They service Khmer men with a (comparatively) higher socioeconomic status. Asian sex tourism cannot be explained by resorting to the myth of the purported irrepressible masculine sexual urge, which, if truly irrepressible, could be sated with the services of a CSW in the tourists’ own countries. Instead, it is really about certain men’s inability to face a world in which the social construction of "masculinity" and the myth of the "natural" superiority of men are being challenged. It is about **masculine power** **and perceived ideals of feminine docility and submission**: "The attraction is power and the relationship one of master/slave. **Racist stereotypes of the exotic, sexually-licentious oriental woman fuel the sex tourist industry in South-East Asia**."32 Interestingly, the reference is to Japanese men’s fetish for Korean sex workers but the statements could just as easily apply to Western sex tourists. Sex tourism provides traveling tricks with a means to step into a past where women were girls, men were masters, and the "inferior" races knew their place. One could almost pity the men who feel so ill-equipped to live in a world of equality and mutual respect if it were not for the great harm they do to the commercialized rape victims they willingly exploit. These sexual myths are **elevated to the level of truths** throughout the world. Members of male-dominated legislatures, judiciaries, and police forces perpetuate and enforce these myths as truths through their power to transform myths about the nature of male-female relations and commercial sexual transactions into legally material facts. They then apply the law to these "facts." For example, the myth of the so-called uncontrollable male sexual urge is translated into a fact in law and used to punish women for enticing vulnerable men into buying sex. **As long as "masculineness" myths surrounding sexuality and sexual relations remain embedded** in cultures as facts and men dominate in law enforcement, **laws intended to control or limit exploitation** and abuse in the CSI **are doomed to fail** as they will run counter to the beliefs held by the law enforcers. Most of these myths are culturally sanctioned and many are sanctioned by religious dogma.

# \*\*\*A2: K’S\*\*\*

# A2: K’S

**National/ideological identity is the constitutive one of the conflict between North and South Korea**

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. 10, TH)

To start with a simplification: identities in Korea are articulated largely in negative terms. To be South Korean means, above all, not to be Communist. To be North Korean means not to be part of a capitalist and imperialist order. Each state bases its legitimacy, as Leon Sigal puts it, “on being the antithesis and antagonist of the other.”32 Or, as the South Korean president Park Chung Hee once said: “Unfortunately, the north Korean communists have chosen a path diametrically opposed to what we have been pursuing.”33 The situation is, of course, not quite as straightforward. Koreans derive their identity from a variety of sources. Depending on the situation, a person may, for instance, be identified primarily as a man or a woman, an elder or a youth, a manager or a peasant.34 These and many other forms of identification are embedded in the Korean language, which possesses verb and noun suffixes that structur- ally force a speaker to identify specific hierarchy relationships in all verbal interactions. The Cold War did not eradicate these aspects of Korean culture. Rather, it created a situation in which a very spe- cific, externally imposed, and ideological identification has come to prevail over all others. Whereas gender, age, education, or regional affiliation continue to be key factors in determining a person’s so- cial status and possibilities, his or her ideological identification has literally turned into a matter of life and death, or at least freedom and imprisonment. As Chun Chae-sung observes: “The Korean war put an end to multi-identity competition at various levels only to make the Cold War identity the most dominant one.”35

# A2: K’S – STATE ACTION KEY

**Working within the state is key – fragmentation of smaller issues makes changing policy impossible, individual components of the military deny responsibility**

**ENLOE** **00** (Chloe, “Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives,” 2000, p55) SLV

Tracing military prostitution policies is made doubly difficult by senior officials' denying that their country even has a formal policy on prostitution for soldiers. Military elites-generals, admirals-and their civilian colleagues frequently pass the messiest, the most unmilitary responsibilities further down the chain of command to the: level of field officers, to the colonels. Still, because most men who achieve the lofty ranks of general and admiral have themselves climbed the ranking ladder, they each have had the experience of being the colonel (or commander) handling the messy, unmilitary matters such as prostitution. It is because they managed to handle those matters well-kept operations running smoothly, did not allow scandal, took steps to ensure that no civilian issue arose-that these men were positively evaluated by their superiors and promoted up the ladder, away from daily worries about bar brawls and venereal disease.

Thus, military prostitution policies often are made at precisely those levels in the political system at which politicians and citizen groups have great trouble monitoring and holding the military as a whole accountable. At the same time, central government civilian authorities often find it politically safer to let local municipal officials do the negotiating with military commanders on questions involving prostitution-questions of business zoning, public health, licensing, policing, this civilian political strategy only serves to further fragment and camouflage the political decision making that regulates the daily processes that add up to military prostitution. The strategy makes it harder for citizens outside these closed policy circles to see prostitution .IS an industry and as an integral part of a distinctive national security doctrine.

Yet the absence of a written, centralized prostitution policy does not mean that a military elite has no policy. It may only suggest that the military is aware that its attitudes and practices surrounding sexuality are fraught with contradictions and political risks. Those risks can be strategically minimized by a combination of decentralized responsibility, informal decision making, and official acknowledgment only of prostitution as a "health issue," Under certain circumstances and at rare times, however, militarized prostitution does become visible and does acquire the status of a public issue.

# A2: FEM K

**Perm – incorporating an interrogation of orientalism is critical to prevent feminist analyses from recreating domination**

**Wu ‘04**

[Nadine, James Madison University Social Science Essay Contest Runner Up, B.S. Sociology, Louisiana Department of Health Clinical Care Manager, "The Dynamics of Orientalism and Globalization in the International Sex Industry and Human Trafficking”, <http://www.jmu.edu/writeon/documents/2004/wu.pdf>] Gus

Ironically many anti-trafficking activists and feminists who claim to be progressive also subscribe to Orientalist beliefs, although in a different, more subtle manner. These people do not consciously desire to colonize women of color or frame them as barbaric “others”. However, they still construct themselves as being superior to women of color. Such organizations often portray the women as helpless, naïve victims who should be pitied. Kathleen Barry, founder of Coalition Against Trafficking in Women is an example of an Orientalist feminist. When talking about Bengali women forced into trafficking she says, “Illiteracy and rural village patriarchal feudalism abnegate human identity for many of these women” (1995). Of Thai women says, “In Thailand, religious ideology and patriarchal feudalism reduce the value of women's lives to that of sexual and economic property, which in turn validate prostitution” (1995). Unfortunately some families in Asian countries do sell their daughters to brothels but western women are also not free from oppression (Bales 1999). For example, many American women and children are forced into prostitution domestically in the United States. Furthermore, the simplistic attitude that all non-white women or women of color are slaves to inherently barbaric, backwards cultures symbolizes Orientalism. Instead of recognizing forced prostitution as a result of a combination of social, political, cultural, and economic forces, Barry blames this form of oppression solely on the culture of the Orient. Barry’s remarks characterize a rescue mentality among white feminists, another element of Orientalism. Like the Orientalist scholars who constructed themselves as being superior to the Orient, these feminists construct themselves as being more empowered than Asian women. Just as white male clients have sexual fantasies of Orientals, white feminists have fantasies of rescuing them from their evil, barbaric Asian men.In condemning all Asian cultures as essentially patriarchal and oppressive, white feminists like Barry forget that many of the clients who drive the demand for international trafficking are white men from North America and Europe. It is obvious that racism exists even in so called progressive circles. This condescending rhetoric neglects to expose the Orientalist fantasies of these white men. Not only is it racist, but in the process they also ignore the real cultures of people who are different from them. They ignore women’s movements and liberation movements that have occurred and continue to occur in “other” countries.

**Looking to the state and IR is key**

Moon, 1997 (Katharine H.S., Professor in the Department of [Political Science](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_science) at [Wellesley College,](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wellesley_College) “Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S./Korea Relations,” p. 21, TH)

Although it is helpful to understand military prostitution as a function of masculinist norms and practices in militaries, the "gender lens" alone fails to address the political context in which international institutions-- alliances, military assistance programs, and overseas military bases--seek to control women and gender constructs for the sake of pursuing their "militarizing objectives." Since the institutionalizing of military prostitution involves a social, economic, and political process, overseas military prostitution must be examined in the context of interaction between foreign governments and among governments and local groups. The challenge in this book is to analyze the interstate context(s) that determine what Enloe herself admits feminists know little about: "how bargains are struck between influential civilians in a garrison town and the local military commanders." 19 .

# A2: SCHMITT

**The aff recognizes difference and solves the criticism – the alternative leads to violence**

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. 116, TH)

An inquiry into the emergence of hostile identity patterns in Korea does more than merely widen our understanding of current security dilemmas, for the key to a more peaceful future lies in recognizing the constructed nature of identities and the conflicts that issue from them. Expressed in other words, difference does not necessarily lead to violence. The source of conflict is located in the political manipu- lation of the tension between identity and difference, in attempts to isolate a few arbitrarily selected elements of the past in order to construct around them a mythological division between inside and outside. “Politicians,” one commentator points out, “have no hesita- tion in appealing to the collective memory—in a carefully selective way—in order to justify their present conduct by the past.”1 Once these artificial demarcations of identity have become internalized in language, school curricula, political institutions, moral discourses, and the like, their mythical origin appears more and more real until the ensuing worldview, and the conflicts that they generate, seem inevitable, even natural. This process has been particularly pro- nounced in Korea, where an unusually hermetic dividing line has provided each state with the opportunity to disseminate its ideo- logical worldview without being challenged by the other side.

Schmitt falsely assumes we have to fight otherness – this creates violence, the aff’s recognition of difference solves

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. 122, TH)

I have sought to show that a sustainable culture of reconciliation has the best chance of emerging if a politics of engagement not only promotes dialogue but also recognizes the inevitable existence of difference and alterity as an essential aspect of preventing violent encounters. A more peaceful future does not emerge from avoiding or even repressing difference but from articulating and realizing a more tolerant relationship between identity and difference—a rela- tionship that consists of finding nonviolent forms of identification and of viewing difference not as a threat to identity but as an inevi- table, and perhaps even enriching, aspect of life. Various commen- tators do indeed stress the central importance of this task. Emanuel Levinas sees peace as “a relation with the other in its logically indiscernible alterity,” and David Campbell defines justice as “the relationship to the other.”23 Accepting the otherness of the other is essential if reconciliation is to prevail over conflict. Otherwise, a situation emerges in which one identity practice prevails over another, thereby creating resentment, more antagonisms, and, most likely, overt forms of conflict. Reconciliation, in this sense, is a “point of encounter where concerns about both the past and the future can meet.”24 In Korea this encounter would need to deal with competing memories of national division and war. And it would need to find an appropriate mixture of remembering and forgetting, of forgiveness and of holding people accountable for what happened in the past.

A fundamental rethinking of security is more important than the question of specific policy proposals – only abandoning predetermined guidelines for how to act and accepting the inevitability of danger allows for productive, non-violent, and ethical policymaking

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. 123-4, TH)

But equally essential is the existence of a counterforce that balances the imperatives of short-term decision making, for the foun- dations of an adequate security policy can remain adequate and fair only if its norms and procedures are submitted to periodic scrutiny and adjustment. Advancing such a counterweight was the main task of this book, and it entailed suspicion of political positions that are grounded in universal norms and principles. The foundations for an alternative and nonviolent constitution of identity and difference cannot be based on a set of predetermined guidelines that are then automatically applied to all contexts. William Connolly convincingly argues that “one of the defining characteristics of an ethical ori- entation is cultivation of a critical responsiveness that can never be automatic, deducible, guaranteed, or commanded by some unquestionable authority.”25 Thus I have presented the ethical challenge that prevailing security dilemmas pose as an inherently relational issue, as “an ongoing historical practice” that must be approached and understood in its complexities and ever-changing dimensions.26 Such an approach to peace and reconciliation in Korea requires a fundamental rethinking of security. While some aspects of conventional security concerns will (and should) remain central to both academics and security practitioners, one must also recognize that political change can occur only after the underlying issue of identity has become a topic of discussion and scrutiny. This, in turn, entails searching for a mind-set that reaches beyond the parameters of cur- rent political maneuverings. Such a search is inevitably a long-term affair, for it revolves around the need to transform notions of secu- rity that are deeply entrenched in political practice and societal consciousness, not just in Korea but in international politics in general. Perhaps security may one day no longer be associated with order and certainty, for it is exactly the search for order and certainty that has generated problematic demarcations between inside and outside. “Total security,” one of J. G. Ballard’s narrators says, “is a disease of deprivation.”27 The process of drawing a rigid line across the thirty-eighth parallel perfectly illustrates how artificially cre- ated political and mental boundaries have generated a violent and highly volatile environment. An alternative understanding of securi- ty would, in Costas Constantinou’s words, “desynchronize security from safety and certitude.” He, alongside a number of other schol- ars, now seeks to validate a different notion of security, one that points not to an (impossible) escape from danger but to a situation in which one can “feel secure-in-danger . . . and dwell next to one’s enemy in security, without surrendering, or dominating, or making the foe friend.”28 Clearly, these and a range of other related security challenges cannot be solved today, nor can they be addressed at the level of the nation-state. But there is reason for optimism never- theless, and this hope is contained in the ethics of dialogue and the ethics of difference that I have articulated in this book. Some of the ensuing policy positions may be difficult to implement, or they may even be haunted by contradictions, but they constitute the best hope that we have to find a way out of the current and highly dangerous culture of insecurity. Needed, then, are ways of locating, promoting, and expanding tolerance and the cross-territorial bonds that develop between people and the human ideals that they stand for. To think ahead of security in such a broad and postnational way is a first step—necessary and long overdue as it is—toward establishing po- litical interactions in Korea that are no longer defined by the constant specter of violent encounters.

# \*\*\*A2: DA’S\*\*\*

# A2: DETERRENCE DA

**Strategies of deterrence and containment are rooted in Cold War Orientalism**

**Barkawi 08** (Tarak, lecturer in international security at the Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge, specializes in the study of war, “Orientalism at War in Korea,” <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p252622_index.html>) SLV

The generative character, the cultural and social productivity, of such wars is a consequence of the constitutive role of ‘the Orient’, broadly understood, in Western identities. Such identities are committed, in diverse ways, to notions of Western vitality, strength and dominance over the Orient. At the same time, these identities evince a fear of, and a fascination with, the Orient. As such, evidence of Oriental power and potency, such as for example the rise of Japan or China, have the capacity to disrupt Western narratives, leading not only to moments of self-doubt and critique but also fuelling energies for change or redoubled efforts at continued dominance in new circumstances. There is no more obvious sign of Western weakness and Oriental strength than defeat in battle or failure to obtain victory. Unsurprisingly then, such setbacks become sites of cultural disruption and production at all levels of Western society. This project seeks to anatomize this broad canvas through study of a hugely consequential but oft-neglected war. Among other things, the Korean War set the mold for US conduct of limited war in the Third World during the Cold War, creating the ‘stalemate machine’ and putting an end to ‘Rollback’ as anything other than a rhetorical posture until Reagan. It played a very significant role in militarizing containment strategy, rescued and re-energized McCarthyism and related activities, reshaped relations between economy and state in the US, helped put an end to the long Democratic reign over the White House, while placing a distinctive stamp on Cold War party politics in the US. In many ways, the Korean War was formative for what has been termed ‘Cold War culture’. The Korean War helped make what the Vietnam War took apart in American society and politics. The Korean War also played two other roles of consequence illuminated by my particular lens. US constructions of communism in the Cold War employed distinctively Asian and Oriental tropes. There is crossover and much traffic between the Red and Yellow Perils; Soviet totalitarianism was also Oriental despotism. This distinctive conception of the communist Other, I want to suggest, was given shape, form and energy in no small measure by the US experience in Korea, especially given the role of Communist China.

**Deterrence theory is based on patriarchal conceptions of the United States which legitimizes violence while paternalizing the rest of the world**

Cohn, 1990 (Carol, Director of the Boston Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, and a Senior Research Scholar at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, “’Clean Bombs’ and Clean Language,” in “Women, militarism, and war: essays in history, politics, and social theory,” by Jean Bethke Elshtain and Sheila Tobias, p. 37-38, TH)

This analogy is so striking because it at first seems so inappropriate. The popular understanding of nuclear deterrence is that it describes a relationship between two countries of almost equal strength, in which one is able to deter the other from a first strike by threatening to retaliate in kind. But in this case, the partners are unequal, and the stronger one uses his superior force, not to protect himself from grave injury, but to coerce. But if the analogy seems to be a Hawed expression of deterrence as we have been taught to view it, it is nonetheless extremely revealing about U.S. nuclear deterrence as an operational, rather than a rhetorical or declaratory policy. What it suggests is the speciousness of the rhetoric that surrounds deterrence-of the idea that we face an implacable enemy, and that we only stockpile nuclear weapons in an attempt to defend ourselves. Instead, what we see is the drive to superior power as a means to exercise one's will, and a readiness to threaten the disproportionate use of force in order to achieve one's own ends. There is no question of recognition of competing but legitimate needs here, no desire to negotiate, discuss, or compromise, and most important, no necessity for that recognition or desire, since the father carries the bigger stick 11 The United States frequently appears in international politics as a "father," sometimes coercive, sometimes benevolent, but always knowing best. The single time that any mention was made of countries other than the United States, our NATO allies, or the USSR was during a lecture on nuclear proliferation. The point was made that these other countries simply could not be trusted to know what was good for them, nor were they yet fully responsible, so nuclear weapons in their hands would be much more dangerous than in ours. The metaphor was that of parents setting limits for their children.

**Deterrence theory relies on abstraction, not reality. It takes the weapons as the reference point, which obscures the human costs inherent to deterrence**

Cohn, 1990 (Carol, Director of the Boston Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, and a Senior Research Scholar at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, “’Clean Bombs’ and Clean Language,” in “Women, militarism, and war: essays in history, politics, and social theory,” by Jean Bethke Elshtain and Sheila Tobias, p. 46-48, TH)

The problem, however, is not only that defense intellectuals use abstract terminology that removes them from the realities of which they speak. There is no reality of which they speak. Or, rather, the "reality" of which they speak is itself a world of abstractions. Deterrence theory, and much of strategic doctrine altogether, was invented largely by mathematicians, economists, and a few political scientists. It was invented to hold together abstractly, its validity judged by its internal logic. These abstract systems were developed as a way to make it possible to "think about the unthinkable"-not as a way to describe or codify relations on the ground. 32 The problem with the idea of "limited nuclear war," therefore, is not only that it is grotesque to refer to the death and suffering caused by any use of nuclear weapons as "limited." It is also that "limited nuclear war" is itself an abstract conceptual system, designed, embodied, and achieved by computer modeling. As such, there is no need to think about the concrete human realities behind the model; what counts is the internal logic of the system. 33 The realization that the abstraction was not just in the words, but characterized the entire conceptual system itself, helped me make sense of my difficulty in staying connected to human lives. It also helped make sense of some of the bizarre and surreal quality of what people said. But there was still a piece missing. How is it possible, for example, to make sense of the following paragraph? It is taken from a discussion of a scenario ("regime A") in which the United States and the USSR have revised their offensive weaponry, banned MIRVs, and gone to a regime of single-warhead (Midgetman) missiles, with no "defensive shield" (familiarly known as "Star Wars," or SDI): The strategic stability of regime A is based on the fact that both sides are deprived of any incentive ever to strike first. Since it takes roughly two warheads to destroy one enemy silo, an attacker must expend two of his missiles to destroy one of the enemy's. A first strike disarms the attacker. The aggressor ends up worse off than the aggressed. 34 "The aggressor ends up worse off than the aggressed"? The homeland of "the aggressed" has just been devastated by the explosions of a thousand nuclear bombs, each likely to be ten to one hundred times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, and the aggressor, whose homeland is still untouched, "ends up worse off"? What would make it possible to think such a thing? Abstract language and abstract thinking surely contribute, but they do not seem to be a sufficient explanation. To the uninitiated mind, this sentence remains insane. I was only able to "make sense of it" when I finally asked myself the question that feminists have been asking about theories in every discipline: What is the reference point? Who (or what) is the subject here? In techno-strategic discourse, the reference point is not human beings; it is the weapons themselves. The aggressor thus ends up worse off than the aggressed because he has fewer weapons left; human factors are irrelevant to the calculus of gain and loss. If human lives are not the reference point, then it is not only impossible to talk about humans in this language, it also becomes in some sense illegitimate to ask the paradigm to reflect human concerns. Hence, questions that break through the numbing language of strategic analysis and raise issues in human terms can be easily dismissed. No one will claim that the questions are unimportant; but asking is inexpert, unprofessional, irrelevant to the business at hand. The outcome is that defense intellectuals can talk about the weapons that are supposed to protect particular political entities, particular peoples and their way of life, without actually asking if they can do it, or if they are the best way to do it, or whether they may even damage the entities you are supposedly protecting. It is not that the men I spoke with would say that these are invalid questions, rather that they are separate questions, questions that are outside what they do, outside their realm of expertise. The problem is that this discourse has become virtually the only response to the question of how to achieve security that is recognized as legitimate. If the language of weaponry were one competing voice in the discussion, or one that was integrated with others, the fact that the referents of strategic paradigms are only weapons might be of less note. But when the only language and expertise is coextensive with weapons, the limits of this language and body of knowledge become staggering. And its entrapping qualities-the way in which, once you adopt it, it becomes so hard to stay connected to human concerns-become more comprehensible.

**Rhetoric of nuclear deterrence entrenches the US’s masculine domination of the nuclear control.**

**Cohn, 87** –Ph.D., Director of the Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights. (Summer 1987, Carol, Sex and Death in the of Defense Intellectuals Source: Signs, Vol. 12, No. 4, Within and Without: Women, Gender, and Theory, pp. 687-718. Press Stable URL:

 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3174209, JSTOR, SW).

The patriarchal bargain could not be laid out more clearly. Another striking metaphor of patriarchal power came early in the summer program, when one of the faculty was giving a lecture on deterrence. To give us a concrete example from outside the world of military strategy, he described having a seventeen-year-old son of whose TVwatching habits he disapproves. He deals with the situation by threatening to break his son's arm if he turns on the TV again. "That's deterrence!" he said triumphantly. What is so striking about this analogy is that at first it seems so inappropriate. After all, we have been taught to believe that nuclear deterrence is a relation between two countries of more or less equal strength, in which one is only able to deter the other from doing it great harm by threatening to do the same in return. But in this case, the partners are unequal, and the stronger one is using his superior force not to protect himself or others from grave injury but to coerce. But if the analogy seems to be a flawed expression of deterrence as we have been taught to view it, it is nonetheless extremely revealing about U.S. nuclear deterrence as an operational, rather than rhetorical or declaratory policy. What it suggests is the speciousness of the defensive rhetoric that surrounds deterrence-of the idea that we face an implacable enemy and that we stockpile nuclear weapons only in an attempt to defend ourselves. Instead, what we see is the drive to superior power as a means to exercise one's will and a readiness to threaten the disproportionate use of force in order to achieve one's own ends. There is no question here of recognizing competing but legitimate needs, no desire to negotiate, discuss, or compromise, and most important, no necessity for that recognition or desire, since the father carries the bigger stick.

Deterrence theories are paralyzed by an ever-expanding elaborative language edifice which purports distinctive qualities between weapons systems.  Deterrence sets into play hypothetical scenarios for violence rather than assessments which account for the totality of human actions.

Cohn in 2003 Director of the Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, & Ruddick, taught philosophy, peace studies, and feminist theory at the New School University, 03 (Carol & Sara, ‘A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Boston Consortium on Gender, Security, and Human Rights, www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/director.htm

Deterrence theory is an elaborate, abstract conceptual edifice, which posits a hypothetical relation between two different sets of weapons systems – or rather, between abstractions of two different sets of weapons systems, for in fact, as both common sense and military expertise tells us, human error and technological imperfection mean that one could not actually expect real weapons to function in the ways simply assumed in deterrence theory. Because deterrence theory sets in play the hypothetical representations of various weapons systems, rather than assessments of how they would actually perform or fail to perform in warfare, it can be nearly infinitely elaborated, in a never ending regression of intercontinental ballistic missile gaps and theater warfare gaps and tactical “mini- nuke” gaps, ad infinitum, thus legitimating both massive vertical proliferation and arms racing.

**Deterrence theories fails because they depend upon all actors being “rational agents” which fails to take into account distinct cultural, societal, political difference between groups of people.**

Cohn in 2003 Director of the Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, & Ruddick, taught philosophy, peace studies, and feminist theory at the New School University, 03 (Carol & Sara, ‘A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Boston Consortium on Gender, Security, and Human Rights, www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/director.htm

Deterrence theory is also a fiction in that it depends upon “rational actors,” for whom what counts as “rational” is the same, independent of culture, history, or individual difference. It depends on those “rational actors” perfectly understanding the meaning of “signals” communicated by military actions, despite dependence on technologies that sometimes malfunction; despite cultural difference and the lack of communication that is part of being political enemies; despite the difficulties of ensuring mutual understanding even when best friends make direct face-to- face statements to each other. It depends on those same “rational actors” engaging in a very specific kind of calculus that includes one set of variables (e.g., weapons size, deliverability, survivability, as well as the “credibility” of their and their opponent’s threats), and excludes other variables (such as domestic political pressures, economics, or individual subjectivity). What is striking from a feminist perspective is that even while “realists” may worry that some opponents are so “insufficiently rational” as to be undeterrable, this does not lead them to search for a more reliable form of ensuring security, or an approach that is not so weapons-dependent.

# A2: KOREAN ECONOMY DA

**Korean economy is gendered**

**Moon 5** (Seungsook Moon Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea Chair of Sociology at Vassar College, Ph. D. from Brandeis)

As we have seen, the masculinization of skilled labor in the rapidly industrializing economy facilitated by the economic use of prospective conscripts was closely related to the marginalization of women in the economy, which will he discussed in the next chapter. This gendered making of the industrial economy was central to the remaking of the modern gender hierarchy based on the division of labor between housewife and husband-provider. Modern notions of femininity and masculinity, based on this hierarchical gender division of labor, became popularized through formal schooling and the mass media, two major mechanisms of socialization that construct gendered subjects. Even after the recent curricular reform in 1995, textbooks used in social studies repre- sented sharply dichotomous images of women as consumers and housewives and men as historical heroes and productive workers (Pak My6ng-sun 1997, 126-30). In South Korea, the production of textbooks was tightly controlled by the state under the military rule. Teachers had to use state-approved text- books in primary and secondary education. This uniformity increased the in- fluence of pervasive images of women as housewives among young students. The almost uniform representation in the textbooks of women as housewives, meanwhile, contrasted the diverse images of men. Adult men appeared in all occupations except those of household manager and nurse. At the same time, all the diverse images of men that were presented shared the fundamental role of family provider as well (Pak MyOng-sun 1997). The mass media also tended to represent women primarily as housewives. Programs targeted to female viewers reflected this tendency. For example, prime-time sitcoms or soap operas, for which women made up the majority of the audience, depicted married women as housewives. A content analysis of three major women’s magazines published between 1968 and 1981 reveals that the typical heroine of fictional stories was an attractive but unhappy single women in her twenties whose main work was housekeeping or who was at times employed in a low status white-collar occupation Married women appeared as the second-largest category in the fic- I iota representation of women in these women's magazines. Both single and mai vied women portrayed in these magazine fictions faced feminized prob- Icti is of love and family (Song Yu-jae 1985). In the process of rapid industrialization, emergent urban middle-class families adopted the normative gender division of labor. Studies of urban families onducted in the 197os and early 198os illustrate the following pattern. Al- iliough they *were* occasionally involved in children's education, family con- sumption, and family outings, the primary role of husbands was nevertheless financial support of their families. In contrast, wives performed housework and child rearing and often *exercised* authority in household decision making that was delegated by their absent and bus,: husbands. Even the paid employment of some wives rarely changed the rigid division of labor by gender, since *these* women worked only as long as their employment did not interfere with their domestic responsibilities. Furthermore, these working wives' employ- ment (in the absence of an urgent need for money) tended to undermine their bargaining power with their husbands in any conjugal conflict. Professional women were inclined to feel grateful about their husbands' "permission" or "understanding" for their employment outside the home (Cho Uhn 1983). After two decades of industrialization, by the 198os, the normative gen- der division of labor between husband-provider and housewife became firmly established. Elaine Kim's study (1997), conducted in the late 198os and based on in-depth interviews of fifty-four married South Korean men between the ages of twenty-four and sixty-nine, illustrates the central role of family pro- vider in these men's perception of masculinity across class and age. While these men display varying degrees of misogyny and sympathy toward women, they converge in their perception of manhood, defined primarily in terms of financial abilities. A series of small-scale case studies based on interviews and surveys offers glimpses of the extent to which modern gender hierarchy was accepted by women as well. Even rural or urban poor women who had to work to assist family income tended to view themselves as housewives. According to a 1987 survey of rural families whose economic conditions did not support the urban middle class gender division of labor, only 15.5 percent of the women answered that they were entirely farmwordkers. The majority of the women interviewed57.8 percent, responded that they were solely or primarily housewives and 30.7 percent that they were 1q,1 It housewives and Ord! workers (Kim Chu-suk 1990, 279). Similarly, a study of urban poor families in Ch'ungju, a provincial city, shows that a majority of the women considered their husbands the primary providers, despite the fact that other family members worked in order to maximize family income, and that the wife often contributed nearly half of it. Among these married women, 55.2 percent indi- cated that their husband was the primary breadwinner, whereas 12.4 percent indicated that they were (Kim Mi-suk 199o, 169). The modernization of gender hierarchy in industrializing South Korea dur- ing the period from the 196os to the 198os hinges on the construction and maintenance of femininity and masculinity, tied to the ideology of housewife and husband-provider and the gender division of labor. Masculine identity in this structure is grounded in men's privileged access to the labor market, rigidly segregated by gender. Several mechanisms have been at work to ensure men's access to stable and full-time jobs, ranging from the state's policy and institutional arrangements to individual practices in business firms and facto- ries, as well as the inculcation of modern gender ideology through family life, schooling, and the mass media. In association with these cultural mechanisms for constructing men as family providers, the convergence of military and economic mobilizat ion of men by the modernizing state functions to reinforce the masculine subjectivity, particularly enabling a large number of working-class men to gain access to secure employment. In the large scheme of the militarized economy, the eco- nomic use of prospective conscripts as semiskilled or skilled workers served as a reward for those who complied with men's martial duty, while the evasion of military service was punished with the denial of *access* to employment, even self-employment. This rewarding of martial duty was an integral element of the militarized economy that also recognized military service as work experience and translated it into extra pay, faster promotion, and the extra points for pub- lic employment tests (see chapter I). In constructing men as dutiful nationals through economic and military mobilization, the modernizing state compen- sated men for their subjection to military service with economic advantage over women and thereby contributed to the establishment of men's subjectivity as family providers, especially among upper part working-class men who would otherwise not be able to live out the middle-class norm of the nuclear family. The coupling of military service with employment during the period of military rule remained unchallenged for two reasons. First, by exploiting the context of acute military confrontation with North Korea, repressive military regimes prohibited any public discussion of military service issues. Second, rigidly gender-segregated labor market had rendered the connection in- other words, segregated at the stage of recruitment, most working women were employed in feminized sectors of the labor market. They could 1101 see the contributing role of military service to the masculinizing of skilled labor in strategic chemical and heavy industries.'

**Measuring Korean progress or “development” in western terms is Orientalist**

**Moon 5** (Seungsook Moon Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea Chair of Sociology at Vassar College, Ph. D. from Brandeis)

A majority of studies of contemporary social change in East Asia have focused on rapid industrialization within the framework of "economic developmcnt."2 Recently, responding to the growth of civil society and the political transition to procedural democracy, some scholars of East Asia have begun to pay attention to the processes of "political development."' Emphasizing a replicable model of economic and political development, many studies of social change in East Asia within the framework of “development” studies have attempted to identify facilitators of, and constraints on, capitalist economy and procedural democracy. In doing so, these studies tend to assume that modernity is a “Western” phenomenon in the sense of being the property or heirloom, and therefore that social change in Korea (and other East Asian societies) s a late- comer in the pantheon of modern nrtion-states, is to be measured ill terms 01 the fixed trappings of modernity observed in Western societies. Some of the development studies continue to suggest that non-Western societies achieve development by transplanting modern (read implicitly as "Western") institu- tions and values to their soil. Responding to the recent wave of industrial- ization in East Asia, however, others have generated a *culturalist* account for the "East Asian model of development," stressing "Confucian" values and the role of the authoritarian developmental state.' Retreating from the earlier ver- sion of the Orientalist dichotomy between the Western self, which is mod- ern, advanced, and civilized, and the non-Western other, which is premodern (or antimodern), backward, and uncivilized,' this culturalist discourse tends to overlook historical change in (nationalized) cultures in East Asia and spe- cific power relations defining what constitutes apparently uniform national cultures.' In questioning the Eurocentric view of modernity and articulating a post- colonial view of it, I do not intend to essentialize cultural differences among societies as if they were devoid of histories, or to embrace relativism as if there were no intersubjectivc human experience, understanding, and knowl- edge, as certain strands of postmodernism imply: Nor do I deny the influence, on forging modernities in non-Western societies, of hegernonic components of historically Western modernity such as instrumental rationality, bureau- cratic institutions of capitalist economy and representative government, and the ideals of individual freedom and equality. Rather, by questioning the uni- form and fixed meaning of modernity tied to the West as its privileged origi- nator, I intend to highlight the politics of meanings that exist at the core of the dichotomous categorization of concepts and ideas—for example, West- ern/foreign versus non-Western/indigenous. I also intend to recognize the hy- brid nature of modernity in specific national contexts, including Western na- tional societies; modernity is neither purely Western nor purely indigenous to a specific local society." Since the period of colonialism and imperialism, the notion of modernity has traveled across linguistic and cultural boundaries, and its *meanings* have been appropriated and reinvented by various social groups in a host society.9 When we recognize the interpretive agency of local actors who are mobilized to transform their social works in the name of modernity, modernity becomes as local as it is “Western.” This recognition enables us to investigate active responses to the notion of modernity in efficient local contests and helps us illuminate the agency of women and men who contest hegemonic meanigs of modernity in their historical and social contexts

**Korean industrialization and modernization is a gendered product of American and Korean militarism**

**Moon 5** (Seungsook Moon Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea Chair of Sociology at Vassar College, Ph. D. from Brandeis)

In critical responses to gender-blind studies of rapid industrialization in East Asia, during the past decade some students of East Asian political economy have examined gendered processes of industrialization." Most of these studies focus on the impact of the economic transformation on various groups of women, and on gender relations in household and workplace. In particular, these studies investigate the patriarchal nature of industrial development of the "miracle" economies of East Asia, a perspective that marginalizes women in the industrializing economies!' Conceptualizing gender as an organizing principle in society, most of these studies go beyond the questions raised by women and development studies about women's experiences and the impact of industrialization on women. They also move away from the Marxist femi- nist reduction of women's subordination to the logic of capital accumulation.' They provide us with accounts of women's subordination in terms of their specific structural positions located in the interplay between the processes of production and reproduction, paying attention to the sexual division of labor rooted in the household as the core of the "social relations of gender" shaping industrialization (Filson and Pearson 1980.1 ' Yet the approach to industrialization primarily as the transformation of political economy tends to obscure the political and cultural dimension of this transformation, including the meaning of industrialization as a crucial requirement of modern nationhood and the extent to which the Cold War shaped the processes of nation building in decolonized or non-Western soci- eties. The historical significance of the Cold War for the pursuit of modernity in these societies cannot be overemphasized, because the [lotion of economic development as the dominant path to modernity in the postwar era was born from a perception that poverty was the hotbed of communism:8 Specifically, through economic development as well as military alliances, the "free world" was to "protect" its former colonies and new allies against impending threats from insidious communists. In other words, *the* idea of economic development was intimately linked to the strategic and political interests of the capitalist West in the Cold War rivalry. In this global equation, East Asia occupied a cru- cial geopolitical position because Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam (before its communization) functioned as frontlined bulwarks against the communist Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. After the collapse of the eastern bloc, the Cold War rivalry has been replaced by (economic) globalization. Yet the implications of the Cold War for nation building in East Asian societies still deserve serious attention. While social histories of the geder politics of modern nation building in relation to the Cold War in various East Asian countries are yet to be written, this book hopes to contribute to such inquiry by focusing on South Korea, which is arguably one of the countries most , affected k, the Cold War; in fact, as the eruptions of nuclear-weapons crises in 19 94 and the early years of the twenty-first century indicate, the Cold War lingers on in the Korean peninsula in the post-Cold War era: 9 Approaching industrialization as an integral part of modern nation build- ing, I use the notion of militarized modernity to capture the peculiar combi-nation of Foucauldian discipline and militarized violence that permeated the Korean society in the process of building a modern nation in the context of the Cold War. In particular, I focus on discipline and violence observed in the inteiplay between the militarized nation, constructed as the anticommunist self that is at war with communist North Korea, and its members, whose po-. litical identities were forged and contested in the process of mobilization and its aftermath. I argue that gender shaped the process of mass mobilization of Koreans, whom the modernizing state constructed as a unified people, and in turn the gendered paths of mobilization shaped the ways in which women and men obtained new political subjectivity as citizens in the process of the collective struggle to redefine the nature of their membership in the nation. This means that the asymmetry of gender relations in the economy and poli- tics of contemporary Korea needs to be explained in terms of the specific ways in which women and men are incorporated into the nation. Words of caution are necessary here to avoid possible misunderstandings about the notion of militarized modernity. I do not intend to reduce tne com- plex phenomenon of South Korean modernity to militarization. I *conceive* militarization not as a single factor but as a changing process that has per- meated various aspects of South Korean society."' Nor do I intend to over- look *the* importance of ongoing change to the nature of South Korean moder- nity, whose hcgemonic meaning is challenged by competing commitments and knowledge concerning the desired direction of contemporary social change within the state and growing civil society. Rather, I use the notion of milita- rized modernity to illuminate the peculiar combination of historical circum- stances under which modernity has been pursued in South Korea: national division, the civil war and the prolonged military confrontation between the two Koreas, postcolonial ambivalence to modernity, and the extreme sense of urgency about about catching up with advanced countries. A series of national and transnational political changes since the 197os has gen- erated growing interest in the study of citizenship.2' These changes included (procedural) democratization in third-world countries and former Eastern Bloc countries, increasing transnational migration, and the rise of the new Rights in the West that was linked to the weakening of the welfare states. While debates about these changes tend to highlight the formalistic dimension of citi- zenship rights entitling one to access resources in a national community, some scholars have been interested in the notion of active citizenship, emphasizing citizens' political mobilization and participation. In line with this democratic view of citizenship, 1 find recent feminist scholarship on citizenship fruitful in moving beyond the formalistic and unilineal evolutionary model that has been dominant in the literature on citizenship. Feminist scholars have pointed out that despite its universalistic locution, the application of the notion of citizenship and access to citizens' rights has varied from one social group to another, depending on the group's position embedded in the social structures of inequalities (Yuval•Davis 1997, 68; Lister 1997, chap. 3; Walby 1994, 384). Hence some feminists are cautious about the notion of citizenship, and others reject it as a male or masculinist concept and replace it with maternal thinking. Critically responding to this line of debate, Mary Dietz (1996) envisions a democratic view of citizenship thus: For a concept of citizenship, feminists should turn to relations and prac- tices that are expressly contextual, institutional, and political, informed by and situated within particular cultures and histories, and oriented toward action. What this requires, among other things, is a project that conceptual- izes politics . differently than the Liberal, the Marxist, or the Maternalist views. That conception I will loosely call "democratic" insofar as it takes politics to entail the collective and participatory engagement of historically situated and culturally constituted persons-as-citizens in the determination of the affairs of their polity. The polity is a public space, a locale or realm or arena: it may manifest itself at the level of the neighborhood (rural, urban, metropolitan, suburban), the town or city, the state, the region, the nation, or the globe, or even in "cyberspace." (34-35) Similarl, going beyond merely arguing that citizenship is a masculinist concept, Ruth Lister reconstrues the notion of citizenship; she redefines it not only as a formal status, characterized by a set of rights and obligations vis-à-vis the state, but also as the practice of such rights and obligations, includeing the struggle to gain new rights and give substance to formal rights that already exist. At its heart, citizenship is an expression of the human agency to transform oneself and the social world governed by the nation-state. In light of these insights, I define citizenship as a democratic membership in the body politic characterized by active struggle and negotiation to give substance to formal rights and redefine their boundaries. Rarely explored in studies of social change in South Korea, military service has been a pivotal component in the state's mobilization of gendered nationals and the emergence of citizenship in the aftermath of militarized modernity. Some scholars investigating Korean political economy from various perspec- tives have mentioned the striking resemblance between the modern military and large blue-collar and white-collar companies in their daily working and social relations (Koo 2001; Lie 1998; Janelli 1993; Choong Soon Kim 1992; Kear- ney 1991; Bae Kyuhan 1987). Yet these scholars' observations of business firms do not lead to an analysis of militarized modernity characterized by the con- struction of the militarized nation, the making of its members, and the integra- tion of military service into the organization of the industrializing economy. There are certain historical and sociopolitical factors contributing to the pecu- liar function of military *service* in South Korea. First, South Korean society has been entangled in a prolonged military confrontation with North Korea for half a century, ever since the Korean War (1950-53). This situation contributed to the development of a postcolonial state that has exploited anticommunism as national orthodoxy and imagined modernity in terms of building a strong military to protect the nation. Here I do not intend to exaggerate Korea's pecu- liarity in militarized national security, since the modern nation-state tends to rely ultimately on military means to safeguard its claim to territorial sover- eignty. Yet its quasi-religious fervor in ruthlessly persecuting dissidents and labeling them "communists," combined with the dominance of the issue of military security, particularly during the decades of repressive military rule, set South Korea apart from many other nation-states. A cornerstone of the strong military in South Korea has been the “universal male conscription system” that has mobilized the masses of young men. Second, completely overlooked by scholarship on the political economy of Korean industrialization, the use of conscripts as workers and researchers in the industrializing economy was institutionalized under the military service special cases law, enforced onward. Although this practice still exists its economic and social significance as a means t‘t build a real )11 has been un- raveled, throughout the 1990s, by economic globalization anti procedural de- mocratization in South Korea. That is, the institution of military service was an integral part of economic development pursued as a way to build a wealthy and strong nation. Third, it is important to pay attention to specific forms of military recruit- ment, because the form of recruitment shapes the relationship between the nation-state and its gendered citizens. As social theorists have argued, the process of state formation is embedded in war making and the attempt to monopolize the means of organized violence (Tilly 1992; Giddens 1987). The maintenance of the military through a specific method of recruitment is there- fore central to the nation-state's sustained claim to territorial sovereignty, and this territoriality in turn constitutes the very sociopolitical context in which gendered citizenship is constructed, maintained, and potentially contested. This emphasis on the military does not mean that the relation of the military to the state remains constant as the state evolves in a specific social and histori- cal context. The "civilizing process" (Elias 1939/1997) of "internal pacification" (Giddens 1987) and the rise of "hegemony" (Gramsci 1971) certainly reduce the relative importance of the military in domestic politics and social relations among civilians. Yet the imperative to secure military power as the ultimate recourse in both domestic and international politics makes military service a significant factor to be reckoned with in any study of the gender politics of membership in the nation."

# A2: TURNS CASE

**War is never the answer to gender inequality; their evidence is no more than wartime propaganda**

**Berkman 1990**, Joyce, Ph.D., Yale (1967), “Feminism, War, and Peace Politics: The Case of World War I” in “Women, militarism, and war: essays in history, politics, and social theory,” by Jean Bethke Elshtain and Sheila Tobias, p 141-156 WM

To be rejected as well was the view that war protects women. Wartime propaganda had made much of soldiers "rescuing" women and children. The authors of the Resolutions insisted that warfare did quite the reverse: "The moral and physical suffering of many women are beyond description.... Women raise their voices in commiseration with those women wounded in their deepest sense of womanhood [a reference to rape] and powerless to defend themselves." There are *no* benefits of war as far as women are concerned, according to the final document; only suffering, from sexual violation to widowhood and accompanying poverty, mourning the deaths of sons, and caring for the survivors wounded in body and soul. Among the most arresting new images the writers invoked, so widespread that in time it grew banal, was that of mothers breeding "cannon fodder." This image had already been adumbrated in the preamble to the founding document of the Women's Peace Party in the United States that stated: "Women are charged with creating each [new] generation; war crushes their dreams. And then women are told to bear more sons to be slaughtered." Vida Goldstein used the "cannon fodder" image to oppose compulsory conscription in Australia. 37 Kate Richards O'Hare in an article entitled "Breed, Mother, Breed," used an even more ugly image depicting women as "brood sows raising sons for the Army to convert into fertilizer. "38 But Crystal Eastman, urging the Women's Peace Party to tap maternal feelings in a series of mothers' mass meetings against conscription, talked about women's "greater regard for life, both intellectually and emotionally. "39 Pro-war feminists were arguing that maternal responsibilities extended beyond the protection of one's immediate family to that of one's nation. Hence their support for the war. Antiwar feminists countered that "genuine protection" of the nation was in conflict with wholesale butchery of that nation's young. 40 The sides were drawn over what was to be the "proper" interpretation of the mother's role. The feminists did not clearly differentiate biological and cultural factors. Most assumed both were involved, as when Vera Brittain declared that social structures "reinforce" men's aggressive and domineering impulses, just as they reinforce women's nurturing ones.41

# A2: DISAD FIRST

**The negative’s ignorance towards gender in their attempts at international diplomacy is an attempt to assert the irrelevance of gender**

**Chinkin 2003** (Christine, professor of international law at the of Economics and Political Science, Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 867, lexis.) AK

Experts in many issues are frequently brought into negotiating teams, but not those with gender expertise. This should be redressed by bringing into the international team identified persons whose role it is to facilitate the inclusion of women and consideration of gender issues throughout the process. The current reality is that gender relations and the empowerment of women are not perceived as essential to the terms of any peace settlement, even when the need to go beyond military to civilian matters is recognized. Taking account gender is not on anyone’s agenda, nor is such expertise sought alongside experts in a broad range of other fields. However to ignore these particular issues is simply to assert their irrelevance.

**The negative’s notion of “post-conflict peace” is gendered – women still have to deal with violence and oppression after the male-centered IR claims “peace”**

**Chinkin 2003** (Christine, professor of international law at the London School of Economics and Political Science, 18 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 867, lexis.) AK

The very concepts of post-conflict, reconstruction, and rehabilitation may be problematic. Just as women experience war differently so too are their experiences of post-conflict gendered. There can be no assumption that the violence stops for women with a formal ceasefire. Rather the forms and location of gendered violence change. Their relations with war-traumatized children, family members, and former fighters all place gendered demands upon them. Demographic changes flow from the conflict. The disproportionate number of women impacts upon issues such as access to land, housing and social benefits, and return after internal or international displacement. Priority in social and health services may be proposed for those (primarily males) who fought in the conflict, contributing to hardship and poverty for those with social responsibility for the care of others. Focus upon addressing the ethnic or religious difference that fuelled the conflict can obscure continued sex-based discrimination. In turn, the intersections of ethnic or religious discrimination with sex should be identified and considered. Women's experiences throughout the conflict will have been diverse and there can be no assumption that all women will share the same ideologies or priorities. For example, for some there may be very specific health care needs, such as treatment for sexually transmitted disease and other consequences of rape; for others, finding information about missing relatives, sons and husbands who have disappeared may be their foremost concern; for others, this may be attempting to restore normality for their children; for all, economic survival will be essential. Particular categories of women may have specific needs. For example, former combatants may face difficulties in reintegration, especially where preferential measures are directed towards male combatants. Not only is "post-conflict" n24 a misnomer for women, so too are the notions of reconstruction and rehabilitation. Both concepts assume an element of going back, restoring the status quo. But this is not necessarily what women seek. n25 The goal is not restored dependence and subordination but rather an enhanced social position that accords full citizenship, social justice, and empowerment based upon respect for women's human dignity and human rights standards that may never previously have existed.

**Both war and peace seen through a patriarchal conceptual framework develop into “isms of domination” that replicate structural violence**

**Warren and Cady 94**—Warren is the Chair of the Philosophy Department at Macalester College and Cady is Professor of Philosophy at Hamline University (Karen and Duane, “Feminism and Peace: Seeing Connections”, p. 7, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3810167.pdf, JB)

Conceptually, a feminist perspective suggests that patriarchal conceptual frameworks and the behavior they give rise to, are what sanction, maintain, and perpetuate "isms of domination"-sexism, racism, classism, warism,4 naturism5 and the coercive power-over institutions and practices necessary to maintain these "isms." If this is correct, **then no account of peace is adequate which does not reveal patriarchal conceptual frameworks: they underlie and sustain war and conflict resolution strategies**. (Examples of why we think this is correct are laced throughout the remainder of the paper.) One glaring example of how the dominant cultural outlook manifests this oppressive conceptual framework is seen in macho, polarized, dichotomized attitudes toward war and peace. Pacifists are dismissed as naive, soft wimps; warriors are realistic, hard heroes. War and peace are seen as opposites. In fact few individual warists or pacifists live up to these exaggerated extremes. This suggests a reconceptualization of values along a continuum which allows degrees of pacifism and degrees of justification for war (Cady 1989). Feminist philosophers regard conceptual considerations to be at the core of peace issues because many of the other women-peace connections can be explained theoretically with an analysis of patriarchal conceptual frameworks in place. The evidence for the existence of such conceptual connections comes from a wide variety of sources: empirical data and history; art, literature, and religion; politics, ethics, and epistemology; language and science. Although we cannot discuss all of these sources here, we do consider several. They are evidence of woman-peace connections that, in turn, help to establish the nature and significance of the conceptual connections.

# A2: NUKE WAR O/W

**Focusing on nuclear war instead of prostitution causes the very thing it tries to avoid by normalizing the way we militarize gender that causes war.**

**Enloe 93** – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War” p. 63-64, MT)

Those who, along with many feminists, believe that it is war that demands explanation, and not the apparently diffuse processes of militarization, are understandably impatient with analyses that tend to blur war into other seemingly less life-threatening processes. **Can the policies meant to make prostitution safe for soldiers** on leave really **be discussed in the same breath as the continuing threat of nuclear weapons**? Wars also capture our attention because they appear to have recognizable beginnings and endings, making them appealingly susceptible to systematic analysis. Yet focusing our attention on war isn't sufficient analytically. It tempts us to underestimate the kinds and amounts of political power it takes for governments to wage wars because it **ignores the decisions taken and policies implemented in the prewar period** that lay **the** cultural **groundwork for waging war** and that **make fighting another day feasible and tolerable**. **Militarizing gender** **before** **the** **first shot** is fired **is necessary for governments preparing for war**. Men have to be socialized from boyhood to see their masculine identities tied to protecting women while tolerating violence. Women have to be prepared from girlhood to admire men in uniforms and to see themselves as bandaging the wounds inflicted by violence rather than wielding it. Nor does militarization end with the peace treaty, the welcome-home parades, and the burying of the dead. When war is over, women are encouraged to restore a comforting sense of normalcy by relinquishing whatever autonomy they gained while the men were away. Women are also expected to repair the emotional and physical damage done to militarized sons, husbands, and lovers. In the defeated country, women may be drawn into prostitution to service the sexual needs of occupying soldiers. The governments of both the victors and the losers are likely to see in their women citizens the reproducers of the next generation of soldiers. None of these expectations imposed on women are likely to be fulfilled **unless ideas about femininity and masculinity can be successfully militarized** in the postwar era. The postwar era militarized thus becomes the newest prewar era. To chart the postwar militarization of women and of men, and individual and collective resistance to those gendered militarizing pressures, we might pay particular attention in the coming years to the relations between women and men and between women and the state in Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Somalia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Croatia, Cambodia, Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait. The feminist answers derived from North American and European experiences before and after World War II will become sharper and more politically reliable once they are tested in these ten countries. 38

**Nuclear discourse is constructed through masculine imagery – this both legitimates violent conflict while obscuring the destruction it entails**

Cohn, 1990 (Carol, Director of the Boston Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, and a Senior Research Scholar at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy “’Clean Bombs’ and Clean Language,” in “Women, militarism, and war: essays in history, politics, and social theory,” by Jean Bethke Elshtain and Sheila Tobias, p. 35-37, TH)

Feminists have often suggested that an important aspect of the arms race is phallic worship, that "missile envy" is a significant motivating force in the nuclear build-up.6 I have always found this an uncomfortably reductionist explanation and hoped that my research at the Center would yield a more complex analysis. But I was curious about the extent to which I might find a sexual subtext in the defense professionals' discourse. 1 was not prepared for what I found. I think I had naively imagined myself a feminist spy in the house of death-that I would need to sneak around and eavesdrop on what men said in unguarded moments, using all my subtlety and cunning to unearth the sexual imagery in how they thought and spoke. I had naively believed that these men, at least in public, would appear to be aware of feminist contexts. I thought that at some point at least, during a long talk about "penetration aids," someone would suddenly look up, slightly embarrassed to be caught in a blatant confirmation of feminist analyses of What's Really Going On Here.7 I was wrong. There was no evidence that feminist critiques had ever reached the ears, much less the minds, of these men. American military dependence on nuclear weapons was explained as "irresistible, because you get more bang for the buck." Another lecturer solemnly and scientifically announced, :'to disarm is to get rid of all your stuff." (This may, in turn, explain why they see serious talk of nuclear disarmament as perfectly resistible, not to mention foolish. If disarmament is emasculation, how could any real man even consider it?) Other lectures were filled with discussion of vertical erector launchers, thrust-to-weight ratios, soft lay-downs, deep penetration, and the comparative advantages of protracted versus spasm attacks-or what one military adviser to the National Security Council has called "releasing 70 to 80 percent of our megatonnage in one orgasmic whump."8 There was serious concern about the need to harden our missiles, and the need to "face it, the Russians are a little harder than we are. " 9 Disbelieving glances would occasionally pass between me and my one ally-another woman-but no one else seemed to notice. That defense intellectuals themselves use sexual imagery to such an extent does not seem especially surprising. Nor does it, by itself, consti­tute grounds for imputing motivation. For me, the interesting issue is not so much the imagery's psychodynamic origins as how it functions: how does it serve to make it possible for strategic planners and other defense intellectuals to do their macabre work? How does it function in their construction of a work-world that feels tenable? Several stories illustrate the complexity of the rhetoric. During the summer program, a group of us visited the New London Navy base where nuclear submarines are homeported, and the General Dynamics Electric Boat boatyards where a new Trident submarine was being constructed, At one point during the trip, we took a tour of a nuclear-powered submarine. When we reached the part of the sub where the missiles are housed, the officer accompanying us turned with a grin, and asked if we wanted to stick our hands through a hole to "pat the missile," Pat the missile? The image reappeared the next week when a lecturer scornfully declared that the only real reason for deploying cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe was "so that our allies can pat them." Some months later, another group of us went to be briefed at NORAD (the North American Aerospace Defense Command). On the way back, word leaked out that our landing would be delayed because the new B-1 bomber was in the area. The plane was charged with a tangible excite­ ment that increased as we flew in our holding pattern, people craned their necks to try to catch a glimpse of the B-1 in the skies, and the excitement climaxed as we touched down on the runway and hurtled past it. Later when I returned to the Center, I encountered a man who, unable to go on the trip, said to me enviously, "I hear you got to pat a B­ 1." What is all this "patting"? What are men doing when they "pat" these high-tech phalluses? Patting is an assertion ofintimacy, sexual possession, affectionate domination. The thrill and pleasure of "patting the missile" is an expression of that phallic power with the possibility of vicariously appropriating it as one's own. But if the predilection for patting phallic objects indicates something of the homoerotic excitement suggested by the language, it also has another aspect. Patting is not just an act of sexual intimacy. It is also what one does to babies, small children, the pet dog. The creatures one pats are small, cute, harmless--not terrifyingly destructive. Patting removes the object's lethal purpose. Much of the sexual imagery I heard was rife with the sort of ambiguity suggested by "patting the missiles." The imagery could be construed as a deadly serious display of the connections between masculine sexuality and the arms race. But at the same time, it can also be interpreted as a way of minimizing the seriousness of militarist endeavors, of denying their deadly consequences. A former Pentagon target analyst, in telling me why he thought plans for "limited nuclear war" were ridiculous, said, "Look, you gotta understand that it's a pissing contest-you gotta expect them to use everything they've got." What does this imagery say? Most obviously, that this is all about competition for manhood. But at the same time, the imagery diminishes the contest and its outcomes by representing them as acts of boyish mischief rather than the dangerous and deadly possibilities that they really are.

**The appeal to objectivity and rationality underlying nuclear discourse masks the patriarchal assumptions which legitimate it**

Cohn, 1990 (Carol, Director of the Boston Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, and a Senior Research Scholar at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, “’Clean Bombs’ and Clean Language,” in “Women, militarism, and war: essays in history, politics, and social theory,” by Jean Bethke Elshtain and Sheila Tobias, p. 49-51, TH)

Learning to speak the language reveals something about how thinking can become more abstract, more focused on parts disembedded from their context, more attentive to the survival of weapons than the survival of human beings. In this instance, it reveals something about the process of the mind's militarization-and the way in which that process may be undergone by man or woman, hawk or dove. Most often, the act of learning techno-strategic language is conceived of as an additive process: you add a new set of vocabulary words; you add the reflex ability to decode and use endless numbers of acronyms; you add some new information that the specialized language contains; you add the conceptual tools that will allow you to "think strategically." This additive view appears to be held by defense intellectuals themselves; as one said to me, "Much of the debate is in technical terms-learn it, and decide whether it's relevant later." This view also appears to be held by many in the opposition, be they critical scholars and professionals attempting to change the field from within, or public interest lobbyists and educational organizations, or some feminist anti-militarists.37 They believe that learning and using the language can be a valuable political tool: some think that our nuclear policies are so riddled with irrationality that there is room for well­ reasoned, well-informed arguments to make a difference; others, even if they don't believe that the technical information is very important, see it as necessary to master the language simply because it is too difficult to attain public legitimacy without it. In either case, the idea is that you add the expert terms and information to your linguistic repertoire, and· proceed from there. However, I have been arguing throughout this essay that learning the defense language is a transformative rather than an additive process. When you choose to learn it you are not simply adding new information and vocabulary; you are entering into a particular mode of thinking about nuclear weapons, military and political power, and about the relationship between human ends and technological means. Thus, those of us who find U.S. nuclear policy desperately misguided are in a quandary. If we refuse to learn the language, we are guaranteed that our voices will remain outside the "politically relevant" spectrum of opinion. If we do learn and speak it, we severely limit what we can say, and invite the transformation, the militarization, of our own thinking. The question for those of us who do choose to learn is what use are we going to make of that knowledge? One thing we can do is to challenge the legitimacy of the defense intellectuals' dominance of the discourse on nuclear issues. When defense intellectuals are criticized for the cold­blooded inhumanity of the scenarios they plan, their response is that they are "objective and realistic." They portray those who are radically opposed to the nuclear status quo as irrational, unrealistic, emotional. But if the smooth, shiny surface of their discourse--its abstraction and technical jargon-appears at first to support these claims, a look just below the surface does not. There we find strong currents of homoerotic excitement, heterosexual domination, the drive toward competency and mastery, the pleasures of membership in an elite and privileged group, of the ultimate importance and meaning of membership in the priest­ hood, and the thrilling power of becoming Death, shatterer of worlds. Deconstructing techno-strategic discourse's claims to a monopoly on rationality is, then, in and of itself, an important way to challenge its hegemony as the sole legitimate language for public debate about nuclear policy.

**The normative ideology behind maintaining nuclear arsenals and threatening nations with war without an understanding of the human effects of this violence beyond extinction severs morality from hypermasculine politics**

**Blanchard 3—**PhD Candidate in the School of International. Relations at USC (Eric, “Gender, International Relations, and the Development of Feminist Security Theory”, Summer 2003, JSTOR, p. 1293-4, JB)

Jean Bethke Elshtain's rich blend of political theory, personal narrative, and history, Women and War ([1987] 1995), serves as a rejoinder to the discipline's philosophical conceit and issues a key challenge to the domestic/ international divide that Grant identifies. In a sweeping survey of the discourse of war from the Greeks onward, Elshtain details women's complex relationships to the body politic, and thus to war, as they emerge from the narratives (war stories) that are constitutive of war. Elshtain focuses on the ways in which war's "productive destructiveness" inscribes and reinscribes men's and women's identities and thus the boundaries of community: "War creates the people. War produces power, individual and collective" (166-67). Reacting to what she sees as the onset of scientism and hyperrationality in academic IR, Elshtain critiques the retreat into abstraction that the quest for scientific certainty produced in "professionalized" war discourse and attempts to revive the bond between politics and morality broken by Machiavelli. By reifying state behavior, Elshtain argues, the realist narrative ignores human agency and identity: "No children are ever born, and nobody ever dies, in this constructed world. There are states, and they are what is" (91).4 Sensitive to the importance of language and narrative in matters of security, Elshtain critiques what she calls the "strategic voice," an authoritative discourse that is "cool, objective, scientific, and overwhelmingly male" ([1987] 1995, 245). According to Elshtain, this realm of expert language, with its talk of "peacekeeping" missiles and village "pacification," separates ordinary citizens from civic life. Drawing on fieldwork initiated at a summer program for nuclear strategists during the last decade of the cold war, Carol Cohn's (1987) analysis of the "technostrategic" discourse of nuclear defense intellectuals casts a feminist eye on the thinking that shapes the practices of national security. Using an ethnographic, participant-observer strategy, Cohn shows how the planners' use of gendered euphemisms, exemplified by the talk of **nuclear virginity and the association of disarmament with emasculation**, contributed to a willful, discursive denial of the strategists' accountability to "reality"-**the potential cost of strategic decisions in terms of human life** (1987, 1990). While denial of the horrors of nuclear war may be an occupational hazard of nuclear planning, to achieve success (in terms of professional standing and collegial status) participants must legitimate their positions by assuming the masculine-that is, tough, rational, logical position in the gendered security discourse. The masculine position is also available to (and must be taken by) women who want to be taken seriously, while they limit their "feminine" contributions for the sake of legitimacy (1993, 238). Cohn thus shows how both men and women are implicated in, constituted through, and positioned by gendered security discourse. Realizing that merely adding women to the profession will not eliminate the degradation of "feminine" ideas, Cohn suggests that the task ahead is a revaluation of gender discourse (1993).

**Nuclear discourse in politics is inherently gendered and renders the feminine as the victim**

**Warren and Cady 94**—Warren is the Chair of the Philosophy Department at Macalester College and Cady is Professor of Philosophy at Hamline University (Karen and Duane, “Feminism and Peace: Seeing Connections”, p. 12-13, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3810167.pdf, JB)

The adoption of sexist-naturist language in military and nuclear parlance carries the inequity to new heights (Warren N.d.). Nuclear missiles are on "farms," "in silos." That part of the submarine where twenty-four multiple warhead nuclear missiles are lined up, ready for launching, is called "the Christmas tree farm"; BAMBI is the acronym developed for an early version of an antiballistic missile system (for Ballistic Missile Boost Intercept). In her article "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals," Carol Cohn describes her one-year immersion in a university's center on defense technology and arms control. She relates a professor's explanation of why the MX missile is to be placed in the silos of the new Minuteman missiles, instead of replacing the older, less accurate ones "because they're in the nicest hole-you're not going to take the nicest missile you have and put it in a crummy hole." Cohn describes a linguistic world of vertical erector launchers, thrust-to-weight ratios, soft lay downs, deep penetration, penetration aids (also known as "penaids", devices that help bombers of missiles get past the "enemy's" defensive system)," the comparative advantages of protracted versus spasm attacks"-or what one military advisor to the National Security Council has called "releasing 70 to 80 percent of our megatonnage in one orgasmic whump"-where India's explosion of a nuclear bomb is spoken of as "losing her virginity" and New Zealand's refusal to allow nuclear-arms or nuclear-powered warships into its ports is described as "nuclear virginity" (Cohn 1989, 133-37). Such language and imagery creates, reinforces, and justifies nuclear weapons as a kind of male sexual dominance of females. There are other examples of how sexist-naturist language in military contexts is both self-deceptive and symbolic of male-gendered dominance. Ronald Reagan dubbed the MX missile "the Peacekeeper."" Clean bombs "are those which announce that "radioactivity is the only 'dirty' part of killing people" (Cohn 1989, 132). Human deaths are only "collateral damage" (since bombs are targeted at buildings, not people). While a member of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, Senator Gary Hart recalled that during military lobbying efforts under the Carter administration, the central image was that of a "size race" which became "a macho issue." The American decision to drop the first atomic bomb into the centers of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, instead of rural areas, was based on the military's designation of those cities as "virgin targets," not to be subjected to conventional bombing (Spretnak 1989, 55).

 **Masculine preoccupation with nuclear armament is caused by a phallic worship and urge for sexual domination.**

**Cohn, 87** –Ph.D., Director of the Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights. (Summer 1987, Carol, Sex and Death in the of Defense Intellectuals Source: Signs, Vol. 12, No. 4, Within and Without: Women, Gender, and Theory, pp. 687-718. Press Stable URL:

 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3174209, JSTOR, SW).

Feminists have often suggested that an important aspect of the arms race is phallic worship, that "missile envy" is a significant motivating force in the nuclear build-up.12 I have always found this an uncomfortably reductionist explanation and hoped that my research at the Center would yield a more complex analysis. But still, I was curious about the extent to which I might find a sexual subtext in the defense professionals' discourse. I was not prepared for what I found. I think I had naively imagined myself as a feminist spy in the house of death-that I would need to sneak around and eavesdrop on what men said in unguarded moments, using all my subtlety and cunning to unearth whatever sexual imagery might be underneath how they thought and spoke. I had naively believed that these men, at least in public, would appear to be aware of feminist critiques. If they had not changed their language, I thought that at least at some point in a long talk about "penetration aids," someone would suddenly look up, slightly embarrassed to be caught in such blatant confirmation of feminist analyses of What's Going On Here.'3 Of course, I was wrong. There was no evidence that any feminist critiques had ever reached the ears, much less the minds, of these men. American military dependence on nuclear weapons was explained as "irresistible, because you get more bang for the buck." Another lecturer solemnly and scientifically announced "to disarm is to get rid of all your stuff." (This may, in turn, explain why they see serious talk of nuclear disarmament as perfectly resistable, not to mention foolish. If disarmament is emasculation, how could any real man even consider it?) A professor's explanation of why the MX missile is to be placed in the silos of the newest Minuteman missiles, instead of replacing the older, less accurate ones, was "because they're in the nicest hole-you're not going to take the nicest missile you have and put it in a crummy hole." Other lectures were filled with discussion of vertical erector launchers, thrust-to-weight ratios, soft lay downs, deep penetration, and the comparative advantages of protracted versus spasm attacks-or what one military adviser to the National Security Council has called "releasing 70 to 80 percent of our megatonnage in one orgasmic whump."14 There was serious concern about the need to harden our missiles and the need to "face it, the Russians are a little harder than we are." Disbelieving glances would occasionally pass between me and my one ally in the summer program, another woman, but no one else seemed to notice. If the imagery is transparent, its significance may be less so. The temptation is to draw some conclusions about the defense intellectuals themselves-about what they are really talking about, or their motivations; but the temptation is worth resisting. Individual motivations cannot necessarily be read directly from imagery; the imagery itself does not originate in these particular individuals but in a broader cultural context. Sexual imagery has, of course, been a part of the world of warfare since long before nuclear weapons were even a gleam in a physicist's eye. The history of the atomic bomb project itself is rife with overt images of competitive male sexuality, as is the discourse of the early nuclear physicists, strategists, and SAC commanders.'5 Both the military itself and the arms manufacturers are constantly exploiting the phallic imagery and promise of sexual domination that their weapons so conveniently suggest. A quick glance at the publications that constitute some of the research sources for defense intellectuals makes the depth and pervasiveness of the imagery evident. Air Force Magazine's advertisements for new weapons, for example, rival Playboy as a catalog of men's sexual anxieties and fantasies. Consider the following, from the June 1985 issue: emblazoned in bold letters across the top of a two-page advertisement for the AV-8B Harrier II-"Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick." The copy below boasts "an exceptional thrust to weight ratio" and "vectored thrust capability that makes the . .. unique rapid response possible." Then, just in case we've failed to get the message, the last line reminds us, "Just the sort of' Big Stick' Teddy Roosevelt had in mind way back in 1901. "16 An ad for the BKEP (BLU-106/B) reads: The Only Way to Solve Some Problems is to Dig Deep. THE BOMB, KINETIC ENERGY PENETRATOR "Will provide the tactical air commander with efficient power to deny or significantly delay enemy airfield operations." "Designed to maximize runway cratering by optimizing penetration dynamics and utilizing the most efficient warhead yet designed."17 (In case the symbolism of "cratering" seems far-fetched, I must point out that I am not the first to see it. The French use the Mururoa Atoll in the South Pacific for their nuclear tests and assign a woman's name to each of the craters they gouge out of the earth.) Another, truly extraordinary, source of phallic imagery is to be found in descriptions of nuclear blasts themselves. Here, for example, is one by journalist William Laurence, who was brought to Nagasaki by the Air Force to witness the bombing. "Then, just when it appeared as though the thing had settled down in to a state of permanence, there came shooting out of the top a giant mushroom that increased the size of the pillar to a total of 45,000 feet. The mushroom top was even more alive than the pillar, seething and boiling in a white fury of creamy foam, sizzling upward and " then descending earthward, a thousand geysers rolled into one. It kept struggling in an elemental fury, like a creature in the act of breaking the bonds that held it down."'8 Given the degree to which it suffuses their world, that defense intellectuals themselves use a lot of sexual imagery does not seem especially surprising. Nor does it, by itself, constitute grounds for imputing motivation. For me, the interesting issue is not so much the imagery's psychodynamic origins, as how it functions. How does it serve to make it possible for strategic planners and other defense intellectuals to do their macabre work? How does it function in their construction of a work world that feels tenable? Several stories illustrate the complexity. During the summer program, a group of us visited the New London Navy base where nuclear submarines are homeported and the General Dynamics Electric Boat boatyards where a new Trident submarine was being constructed. At one point during the trip we took a tour of a nuclear powered submarine. When we reached the part of the sub where the missiles are housed, the officer accompanying us turned with a grin and asked if we wanted to stick our hands through a hole to "pat the missile." Pat the missile? The image reappeared the next week, when a lecturer scornfully declared that the only real reason for deploying cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe was "so that our allies can pat them." Some months later, another group of us went to be briefed at NORAD (the North American Aerospace Defense Command). On the way back, our plane went to refuel at Offut Air Force Base, the Strategic Air Command headquarters near Omaha, Nebraska. When word leaked out that our landing would be delayed because the new B-1 bomber was in the area, the plane became charged with a tangible excitement that built as we flew in our holding pattern, people craning their necks to try to catch a glimpse of the B-1 in the skies, and climaxed as we touched down on the runway and hurtled past it. Later, when I returned to the Center I encountered a man who, unable to go on the trip, said to me enviously, "I hear you got to pat a B-I." What is all this "patting"? What are men doing when they "pat" these high-tech phalluses? Patting is an assertion of intimacy, sexual possession, affectionate domination. The thrill and pleasure of "patting the missile" is the proximity of all that phallic power, the possibility of vicariously appropriating it as one's own. But if the predilection for patting phallic objects indicates something of the homoerotic excitement suggested by the language, it also has another side. For patting is not only an act of sexual intimacy. It is also what one does to babies, small children, the pet dog. One pats that which is small, cute, and harmless-not terrifyingly destructive. Pat it, and its lethality disappears. Much of the sexual imagery I heard was rife with the sort of ambiguity suggested by "patting the missiles." The imagery can be construed as a deadly serious display of the connections between masculine sexuality and the arms race. At the same time, it can also be heard as a way of minimizing the seriousness of militarist endeavors, of denying their deadly consequences. A former Pentagon target analyst, in telling me why he thought plans for "limited nuclear war" were ridiculous, said, "Look, you gotta understand that it's a pissing contest-you gotta expect them to use everything they've got." What does this image say? Most obviously, that this is all about competition for manhood, and thus there is tremendous danger. But at the same time, the image diminishes the contest and its outcomes, by representing it as an act of boyish mischief.

**The US trying to control nuclear armament is an expression of masculine control.**

**Cohn, 87** –Ph.D., Director of the Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights. (Summer 1987, Carol, Sex and Death in the of Defense Intellectuals Source: Signs, Vol. 12, No. 4, Within and Without: Women, Gender, and Theory, pp. 687-718. Press Stable URL:

 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3174209, JSTOR, SW).

Rhetoric of nuclear deterrence entrenches the US’s masculine domination of the nuclear control. "Virginity" also made frequent, arresting, appearances in nuclear discourse. In the summer program, one professor spoke of India's explosion of a nuclear bomb as "losing her virginity"; the question of how the United States should react was posed as whether or not we should "throw her away." It is a complicated use of metaphor. Initiation into the nuclear world involves being deflowered, losing one's innocence, knowing sin, all wrapped up into one. Although the manly United States is no virgin, and proud of it, the double standard raises its head in the question of whether or not a woman is still worth anything to a man once she has lost her virginity. New Zealand's refusal to allow nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered warships into its ports prompted similar reflections on virginity. A good example is provided by Retired U.S. Air Force General Ross Milton's angry column in Air Force Magazine, entitled, "Nuclear Virginity." His tone is that of a man whose advances have been spurned. He is contemptuous of the woman's protestation that she wants to remain pure, innocent of nuclear weapons; her moral reluctance is a quaint and ridiculous throwback. But beyond contempt, he also feels outraged-after all, this is a woman we have paid for, who still will not come across. He suggests that we withdraw our goods and services-and then we will see just how long she tries to hold onto her virtue. 19

**Nuclear rhetoric is romanticized to demotionalize the ramifications of atomic weapons**

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The United States frequently appeared in discussions about international politics as "father," sometimes coercive, sometimes benevolent, but always knowing best. The single time that any mention was made of countries other than the United States, our NATO allies, or the USSR was in a lecture on nuclear proliferation. The point was made that younger countries simply could not be trusted to know what was good for them, nor were they yet fully responsible, so nuclear weapons in their hands would be much more dangerous than in ours. The metaphor used was that of parents needing to set limits for their children. Domestic bliss Sanitized abstraction and sexual and patriarchal imagery, even if disturbing, seemed to fit easily into the masculinist world of nuclear war planning. What did not fit, what surprised and puzzled me most when I first heard it, was the set of metaphors that evoked images that can only be called domestic. 20 I am grateful to Margaret Cerullo, a participant in the first summer program, for reporting the use of this analogy to me and sharing her thoughts about this and other events in the program. The interpretation I give here draws strongly on hers. Nuclear missiles are based in "silos." On a Trident submarine, which carries twenty-four multiple warhead nuclear missiles, crew members call the part of the submarine where the missiles are lined up in their silos ready for launching "the Christmas tree farm." What could be more bucolic-farms, silos, Christmas trees? In the ever-friendly, even romantic world of nuclear weaponry, enemies "exchange" warheads; one missile "takes out" another; weapons systems can "marry up"; "coupling" is sometimes used to refer to the wiring between mechanisms of warning and response, or to the psychopolitical links between strategic (intercontinental) and theater (Europeanbased) weapons. The patterns in which a MIRVed missile's nuclear warheads land is known as a "footprint."21 These nuclear explosives are not dropped; a "bus" "delivers" them. In addition, nuclear bombs are not referred to as bombs or even warheads; they are referred to as "reentry vehicles," a term far more bland and benign, which is then shortened to "RVs," a term not only totally abstract and removed from the reality of a bomb but also resonant with the image of the recreational vehicles of the ideal family vacation. These domestic images must be more than simply one more form of distancing, one more way to remove oneself from the grisly reality behind the words; ordinary abstraction is adequate to that task. Something else, something very peculiar, is going on here. Calling the pattern in which bombs fall a "footprint" almost seems a willful distorting process, a playful, perverse refusal of accountability-because to be accountable to reality is to be unable to do this work. These words may also serve to domesticate, to tame the wild and uncontrollable forces of nuclear destruction. The metaphors minimize; they are a way to make phenomena that are beyond what the mind can encompass smaller and safer, and thus they are a way of gaining mastery over the unmasterable. The fire-breathing dragon under the bed, the one who threatens to incinerate your family, your town, your planet, becomes a pet you can pat. Using language evocative of everyday experiences also may simply serve to make the nuclear strategic community more comfortable with what they are doing. "PAL" (permissive action links) is the carefully constructed, friendly acronym for the electronic system designed to prevent the unauthorized firing of nuclear warheads. "BAMBI" was the acronym developed for an early version of an antiballistic missile system (for Ballistic Missile Boost Intercept). The president's Annual Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum, which outlines both short- and longrange plans for production of new nuclear weapons, is benignly referred to a1 MIRV stands for "multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles." A MIRVed missile not only carries more than one warhead; its warheads can be aimed at different targets. 698 Summer 1987 / SIGNS as "the shopping list." The National Command Authorities choose from a "menu of options" when deciding among different targeting plans. The "cookie cutter" is a phrase used to describe a particular model of nuclear attack. Apparently it is also used at the Department of Defense to refer to the neutron bomb.a2 The imagery that domesticates, that humanizes insentient weapons, may also serve, paradoxically, to make it all right to ignore sentient human bodies, human lives.2' Perhaps it is possible to spend one's time thinking about scenarios for the use of destructive technology and to have human bodies remain invisible in that technological world precisely because that world itself now includes the domestic, the human, the warm, and playfulthe Christmas trees, the RVs, the affectionate pats. It is a world that is in some sense complete unto itself; it even includes death and loss.

**Discourse around nuclear weapons attempts to manipulate man’s destruction into rebirth.**

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The neutron bomb is notable for the active political contention that has occurred over its use and naming. It is a small warhead that produces six times the prompt radiation but slightly less blast and heat than typical fission warheads of the same yield. Pentagon planners see neutron bombs as useful in killing Soviet tank crews while theoretically leaving the buildings near the tanks intact. Of course, the civilians in the nearby buildings, however, would be killed by the same "enhanced radiation" as the tank crews. It is this design for protecting property while killing civilians along with soldiers that has led people in the antinuclear movement to call the neutron bomb "the ultimate capitalist weapon." However, in official parlance the neutron bomb is not called a weapon at all; it is an "enhanced radiation device." It is worth noting, however, that the designer of the neutron bomb did not conceive of it as an anti-tank personnel weapon to be used against the Russians. Instead, he thought it would be useful in an area where the enemy did not have nuclear weapons to use. (Samuel T. Cohen, in an interview on National Public Radio, as reported in Fred Kaplan, "The Neutron Bomb: What It Is, the Way It Works," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists [October 1981], 6.) 2 For a discussion of the functions of imagery that reverses sentient and insentient matter, that "exchange[s] . .. idioms between weapons and bodies," see Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 60-157, esp. 67. 24 For further discussion of men's desire to appropriate from women the power of giving life and death, and its implications for men's war-making activities, see Dorothy Dinnerstein, 699 Cohn / DEFENSEI NTELLECTUALS telegram to the physicists at Chicago read, "Congratulations to the new parents. Can hardly wait to see the new arrival. "a At Los Alamos, the atom bomb was referred to as "Oppenheimer's baby." One of the physicists working at Los Alamos, Richard Feynman, writes that when he was temporarily on leave after his wife's death, he received a telegram saying, "The baby is expected on such and such a day. "6 At Lawrence Livermore, the hydrogen bomb was referred to as "Teller's baby," although those who wanted to disparage Edward Teller's contribution claimed he was not the bomb's father but its mother. They claimed that Stanislaw Ulam was the real father; he had the all important idea and inseminated Teller with it. Teller only "carried it" after that.27 Forty years later, this idea of male birth and its accompanying belittling of maternity-the denial of women's role in the process of creation and the reduction of "motherhood" to the provision of nurturance (apparently Teller did not need to provide an egg, only a womb)-seems thoroughly incorporated into the nuclear mentality, as I learned on a subsequent visit to U.S. Space Command in Colorado Springs. One of the briefings I attended included discussion of a new satellite system, the not yet "on line" MILSTAR system.2 The officer doing the briefing gave an excited recitation of its technical capabilities and then an explanation of the new Unified Space Command's role in the system. Self-effacingly he said, "We'll do the motherhood role-telemetry, tracking, and control-the maintenance." The Mermaid and the Minotaur (New York: Harper & Row, 1977). For further analysis of male birth imagery in the atomic bomb project, see Evelyn Fox Keller, "From Secrets of Life to Secrets of Death" (paper delivered at the Kansas Seminar, Yale University, New Haven, Conn., November 1986); and Easlea (n. 15 above), 81-116. a Lawrence is quoted by Herbert Childs in An American Genius: The Life of Ernest Orlando Lawrence (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1968), 340. ai Feynman writes about the telegram in Richard P. Feynman, "Los Alamos from Below," in Reminiscences of Los Alamos, 1943-1945, ed. Lawrence Badash, Joseph 0. Hirshfelder, and Herbert P. Broida (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1980), 130. 27 Hans Bethe is quoted as saying that "Ulam was the father of the hydrogen bomb and Edward was the mother, because he carried the baby for quite a while" (J. Bernstein, Hans Bethe: Prophet of Energy [New York: Basic Books, 1980], 95). 8 The MILSTAR system is a communications satellite system that is jam resistant, as well as having an "EMP-hardened capability." (This means that the electromagnetic pulse set off by a nuclear explosion would theoretically not destroy the satellites' electronic systems.) There are, of course, many things to say about the sanity and morality of the idea of the MILSTAR system and of spending the millions of dollars necessary to EMP-harden it. The most obvious point is that this is a system designed to enable the United States to fight a "protracted" nuclear war-the EMP-hardening is to allow it to act as a conduit for command and control of successive nuclear shots, long after the initial exchange. The practicality of the idea would also appear to merit some discussion-who and what is going to be communicating to and from after the initial exchange? And why bother to harden it against EMP when all an opponent has to do to prevent the system from functioning is to blow it up, a feat certain to become technologically feasible in a short time? But, needless to say, exploration of these questions was not part of the briefing. 700 Summer 1987 / SCGNS In light of the imagery of male birth, the extraordinary names given to the bombs that reduced Hiroshima and Nagasaki to ash and rubble"Little Boy" and "Fat Man"-at last become intelligible. These ultimate destroyers were the progeny of the atomic scientists-and emphatically not just any progeny but male progeny. In early tests, before they were certain that the bombs would work, the scientists expressed their concern by saying that they hoped the baby was a boy, not a girl-that is, not a dud.29 General Grove's triumphant cable to Secretary of War Henry Stimson at the Potsdam conference, informing him that the first atomic bomb test was successful read, after decoding: "Doctor has just returned most enthusiastic and confident that the little boy is as husky as his big brother. The light in his eyes discernible from here to Highhold and I could have heard his screams from here to my farm."30S timson, in turn, informed Churchill by writing him a note that read, "Babies satisfactorily born."31 In 1952, Teller's exultant telegram to Los Alamos announcing the successful test of the hydrogen bomb, "Mike," at Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshall Islands, read, "It's a boy."32 The nuclear scientists gave birth to male progeny with the ultimate power of violent domination over female Nature. The defense intellectuals' project is the creation of abstract formulations to control the forces the scientists created-and to participate thereby in their world-creating/destroying power. The entire history of the bomb project, in fact, seems permeated with imagery that confounds man's overwhelming technological power to destroy nature with the power to create-imagery that inverts men's destruction and asserts in its place the power to create new life and a new world. It converts men's destruction into their rebirth.

**The discourse of war is structured around nuclear weapons shifting the focus to loss of weapons and making loss of human life “collateral damage”.**

**Cohn, 87** –Ph.D., Director of the Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights. (Summer 1987, Carol, Sex and Death in the of Defense Intellectuals Source: Signs, Vol. 12, No. 4, Within and Without: Women, Gender, and Theory, pp. 687-718. Press Stable URL:

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Their justification for continuing to use these models is that "other people" (unnamed, and on asking, unnameable) believe in them and that they therefore have an important reality ("Nuclear Nonsense," Foreign Policy, no. 58 [Spring 1985], 28-52). 44 Charles Krauthammer, "Will Star Wars Kill Arms Control?" New Republic, no. 3,653 (January 21, 1985), 12-16. 710 Summer1 987/ SIGNS powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, and the aggressor, whose homeland is still untouched, "ends up worse off"? How is it possible to think this? Even abstract language and abstract thinking do not seem to be a sufficient explanation. I was only able to "make sense of it" when I finally asked myself the question that feminists have been asking about theories in every discipline: What is the reference point? Who (or what) is the subject here? In other disciplines, we have frequently found that the reference point for theories about "universal human phenomena" has actually been white men. In technostrategic discourse, the reference point is not white men, it is not human beings at all; it is the weapons themselves. The aggressor thus ends up worse off than the aggressed because he has fewer weapons left; human factors are irrelevant to the calculus of gain and loss. In "regime A" and throughout strategic discourse, the concept of "incentive" is similarly distorted by the fact that weapons are the subjects of strategic paradigms. Incentive to strike first is present or absent according to a mathematical calculus of numbers of "surviving" weapons. That is, incentive to start a nuclear war is discussed not in terms of what possible military or political ends it might serve but, instead, in terms of numbers of weapons, with the goal being to make sure that you are the guy who still has the most left at the end. Hence, it is frequently stated that MIRVed missiles create strategic instability because they "give you the incentive to strike first." Calculating that two warheads must be targeted on each enemy missile, one MIRVed missile with ten warheads would, in theory, be able to destroy five enemy missiles in their silos; you destroy more of theirs than you have expended of your own. You win the numbers game. In addition, if you do not strike first, it would theoretically take relatively few of their MIRVed missiles to destroy a larger number of your own-so you must, as they say in the business, "use 'em or lose 'em." Many strategic analysts fear that in a period of escalating political tensions, when it begins to look as though war may be inevitable, this combination makes "the incentive to strike first" well nigh irresistible. Incentive to launch a nuclear war arises from a particular configuration of weapons and their hypothetical mathematical interaction. Incentive can only be so narrowly defined because the referents of technostrategic paradigms are weapons-not human lives, not even states and state power. The fact that the subjects of strategic paradigms are weapons has several important implications. First, and perhaps most critically, there simply is no way to talk about human death or human societies when you are using a language designed to talk about weapons. Human death simply is "collateral damage"-collateral to the real subject, which is the weapons themselves. Second, if human lives are not the reference point, then it is not only impossible to talk about humans in this language, it also becomes in some 711 Cohn / DEFENSEI NTELLECTUALS sense illegitimate to ask the paradigm to reflect human concerns. Hence, questions that break through the numbing language of strategic analysis and raise issues in human terms can be dismissed easily. No one will claim that the questions are unimportant, but they are inexpert, unprofessional, irrelevant to the business at hand to ask. The discourse among the experts remains hermetically sealed. The problem, then, is not only that the language is narrow but also that it is seen by its speakers as complete or whole unto itself-as representing a body of truths that exist independently of any other truth or knowledge. The isolation of this technical knowledge from social or psychological or moral thought, or feelings, is all seen as legitimate and necessary. The outcome is that defense intellectuals can talk about the weapons that are supposed to protect particular political entities, particular peoples and their way of life, without actually asking if weapons can do it, or if they are the best way to do it, or whether they may even damage the entities you are supposedly protecting. It is not that the men I spoke with would say that these are invalid questions. They would, however, simply say that they are separate questions, questions that are outside what they do, outside their realm of expertise. So their deliberations go on quite independently, as though with a life of their own, disconnected from the functions and values they are supposedly to serve. Finally, the third problem is that this discourse has become virtually the only legitimate form of response to the question of how to achieve security. If the language of weaponry was one competing voice in the discussion, or one that was integrated with others, the fact that the referents of strategic paradigms are only weapons would be of little note. But when we realize that the only language and expertise offered to those interested in pursuing peace refers to nothing but weapons, its limits become staggering, and its entrapping qualities-the way in which, once you adopt it, it becomes so hard to stay connected to human concernsbecome more comprehensible.

# NUCLEAR WAR RHETORIC = NUKE WAR

**Rhetoric around nuclear weapons uses enormous destructive power without emotional fall-out, condoning war.**

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Entering the world of defense intellectuals was a bizarre experience-bizarre because it is a world where men spend their days calmly and matterof-factly discussing nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, and nuclear war. The discussions are carefully and intricately reasoned, occurring seemingly without any sense of horror, urgency, or moral outrage-in fact, there seems to be no graphic reality behind the words, as they speak of "first strikes," "counterforce exchanges," and "limited nuclear war," or as they debate the comparative values of a "minimum deterrent posture" versus a"nuclear war-fighting capability." Yet what is striking about the men themselves is not, as the content of their conversations might suggest, their cold-bloodedness. Rather, it is that they are a group of men unusually endowed with charm, humor, intelligence, concern, and decency. Reader, I liked them. At least, I liked many of them. The attempt to understand how such men could contribute to an endeavor that I see as so fundamentally destructive became a continuing obsession for me, a lens through which I came to examine all of my experiences in their world. In this early stage, I was gripped by the extraordinary language used to discuss nuclear war. What hit me first was the elaborate use of abstraction and euphemism, of words so bland that they never forced the speaker or enabled the listener to touch the realities of nuclear holocaust that lay behind the words. 6 I have coined the term "technostrategic" to represent the intertwined, inextricable nature of technological and nuclear strategic thinking. The first reason is that strategic thinking seems to change in direct response to technological changes, rather than political thinking, or some independent paradigms that might be isolated as "strategic." (On this point, see Lord Solly Zuckerman, Nuclear Illusions and Reality [New York: Viking Press, 1982]). Even more important, strategic theory not only depends on and changes in response to technological objects, it is also based on a kind of thinking, a way of looking at problemsformal, mathematical modeling, systems analysis, game theory, linear programming-that are part of technology itself. So I use the term "technostrategic" to indicate the degree to which nuclear strategic language and thinking are imbued with, indeed constructed out of, modes of thinking that are associated with technology. Anyone who has seen pictures of Hiroshima burn victims or tried to imagine the pain of hundreds of glass shards blasted into flesh may find it perverse beyond imagination to hear a class of nuclear devices matter-offactly referred to as "clean bombs." "Clean bombs" are nuclear devices that are largely fusion rather than fission and that therefore release a higher quantity of energy, not as radiation, but as blast, as destructive explosive power.7 "Clean bombs" may provide the perfect metaphor for the language of defense analysts and arms controllers. This language has enormous destructive power, but without emotional fallout, without the emotional fallout that would result if it were clear one was talking about plans for mass murder, mangled bodies, and unspeakable human suffering. Defense analysts talk about "countervalue attacks" rather than about incinerating cities. Human death, in nuclear parlance, is most often referred to as "collateral damage"; for, as one defense analyst said wryly, "The Air Force doesn't target people, it targets shoe factories."8 Some phrases carry this cleaning-up to the point of inverting meaning. The MX missile will carry ten warheads, each with the explosure power of 300-475 kilotons of TNT: one missile the bearer of destruction approximately 250-400 times that of the Hiroshima bombing.9 Ronald Reagan has dubbed the MX missile "the Peacekeeper." While this renaming was the object of considerable scorn in the community of defense analysts, these very same analysts refer to the MX as a "damage limitation weapon."'? These phrases, only a few of the hundreds that could be discussed, exemplify the astounding chasm between image and reality that characterizes technostrategic language. They also hint at the terrifying way in which the existence of nuclear devices has distorted our perceptions and redefined the world. "Clean bombs" tells us that radiation is the only "dirty" part of killing people. To take this one step further, such phrases can even seem healthful/ curative/corrective. So that we not only have "clean bombs" but also "surgically clean strikes" ("counterforce" attacks that can purportedly "take out"-i. e., accurately destroy-an opponent's weapons or command centers without causing significant injury to anything else). The image of excision of the offending weapon is unspeakably ludicrous when the surgical tool is not a delicately controlled scalpel but a nuclear warhead. And somehow it seems to be forgotten that even scalpels spill blood."

# A2: WAR FIRST

The discourse of war results in social conflict and the overlooking of gender

Steans 06 (Jill, Professor of Gender in international relations, Ph.D, “Gender and international relations: issues, debates and future directions,”p. 47 , MR)

This chapter provides an overview of feminist perspectives on war and peace. Wars have been and continue to be central to the struggle to carve out territorial spaces, forge collective identities and to mark out the boundaries of political communities. IR, a discipline born out of the experience of war, has understood war in social and political terms, resulting from social conflict and connected to the construction of political identities and the pursuit of 'national interests'.l Gender has rarely been seen as relevant to the analysis of war. Similarly, IR scholars have expressed no curiosity about the near male exclusivity of the military, believing this to be a consequence of 'natural' gender distinctions and differing characteristics and capabilities between men and women. Work is now appearing on gender and war. Joshua Goldstein has argued that gender can be and should be employed in IR to understand 'real world issues of war in and between states'.2 Adam Jones has also sought to make men as men visible in the study of conflicts.3 Goldstein and Jones argue that gender can be viewed as a variable that might be integrated into a social constructivist or mainstream analysis of war. Feminists eschew the integration of a 'gender variable' into the study of war in favour of elucidating the multifaceted ways in which masculinities and femininities have been constructed and reproduced in warfare.

**War/peace dichotomies legitimize structural inequalities—victims internalize the violence and it becomes depoliticized and unsolvable**

**Blanchard 3—**PhD Candidate in the School of International. Relations at USC (Eric, “Gender, International Relations, and the Development of Feminist Security Theory”, Summer 2003, JSTOR, p. 1303, JB)

The issue of rape forces feminist security theorists to ask tough questions about the war/peace dichotomy, questioning whether peacetime provides peace for women. Perpetrators of violence against women often stay close, continuing to threaten women in the post-civil-war or post-state-terror rebuilding process (Pettman 1996, 105). However, war-related violence should not obscure women's everyday insecurity under global systems of patriarchy. Examining Pakistani honor killings and the societal threats of retribution that often silence women who voice their insecurity, Lene Hansen argues that debate as to whether security "happens" at the individual or collective level is misplaced; in their national, religious, political, and cultural contexts**, practices such as honor killings and rape effectively transfer insecurity to the individual, thus privatizing and depoliticizing gender insecurity** (2000).

**The aff’s security and war rhetoric are tools to subordinate women and promote the international patriarchal order**

**Byron and Thorburn, 98** Jessica Byron is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of the West Indies, she holds a PhD from the University of Geneva. Diana Thorburn is a lecturer in international relations in the Department of Government at the University of the West Indies, she holds a doctorate in international relations and international economics from Johns Hopkins University (Jessica and Diana, "Gender and International Relations: A Global Perspective and Issues for the Carribean", 59 Feminist Review 232, JPW)

The themes of conflict and security have attracted sustained scrutiny from feminist scholars because of their centrality to IR theory and practice, and because of their particularly strong masculine bias. Many, including Rebecca Grant, have identified national security structures and the attendant ways of thinking as the sources of much of the gender bias in international relations theory as a whole (Grant 1991). She argues that the initial gendered separation of the public and private spheres in the organization of state and society produced an exclusively male concept of citizenship. Men were given the military role of defenders off the state, thereby acquiring a privileged and active status in national life. Women were invisible, did not have access to the state machinery and did not participate in national decision making. Domestic concerns played little part in shaping ‘the national interest’.

Marysia Zalewski (1995) and Cynthia Enloe (1993) point out the extent to which beliefs about gender differences have been deliberately constructed in the security sphere. The idea of the masculinity of war and the image of the macho soldier have reinforced the patriarchal order. The traditional exclusion of women from armed combat was a mechanism designed not primarily to protect them, but to protect male privileges (Zalewski, 1995). Beliefs and myths about masculinity and femininity act on their own, or are consciously manipulated by the authorities, in the process of escalating or terminating armed conflict.

# A2: TRUTH CLAIMS

**Orientalism is not a neutral or objective description of the East – but a specific way of interpreting and othering their actions**

**Seo 08** – Professor in the Dept. of Stylist at Yong-in Songdam College (Bong-Ha, “Critical Discussion on the ‘Orientalism’ in Fashion Culture” Journal of the Korean Society of Clothing and Textiles Vol. 32, No. 6 (2008) p.902~910, MT)

Orientalism presupposes the Orient that exists for the West, and is constructed in relation to the West, which is grounded in the special position of the Orient in the experience of the Europeans. The Orient is not only adjacent to Europe; it is also the place of Europe's greatest, richest, and oldest colonies, a source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural rivalry, and recurring images of ‘the other’. Furthermore, the Orient has helped to define Europe as its contrasting image, ideal, personality, and experience. Yet, none of this Orient is merely imaginative. In fact, the Orient was indispensible part of European material cultivation and culture. Orientalism expresses and represents the integral part of it with a mode of discourse in terms of culture and ideology (Said, 1995). Orientalism is compounded from the ‘Orient’ and ‘ism’, but in this term, Occident, instead of Orients, becomes the subject, representing the response and attitude of the West toward the Orient, which is the other (Jeong, 2003). Edward Said who discovered and disseminated Orientalism consistently argues in his book, Orientalism that the ‘Orient’ was designated as its name in **the discourse of Orientalism by the Western empire**, and it was **created** as **series of images** (Evil, darkness, **feminine, passive,** and so on), and whose meanings were positioned as the other, and labelled as ‘Barbarious’ (Ashcroft & Ahluwalia, 1999). Accordingly, **Orientalism is not the Orient-centered term, which is captured or fascinated by the attractive feature of the Orient. Rather it entails prejudice**, value, idea, and image of the Orient, fabricated during the invasion of the West towards the Orient (Said, 1995). That is, Europe acquired its iden- tity and power by alienating the Orient, which was ‘the concealed self’ of it (Kang, 1997). Said calls into question like “How do we represent other cultures?” “Is the concept of single culture useful?” “Is the notion of single culture a search for the justification or admiration of its culture or a sense of hostility or attack to other culture in the discussion of culture?” “Can we maintain that cultural, religious, and racial difference is more important than social-eco- nomic or political-historical category?”(Said, 1995). In addition to the questions about what is ‘the other’ or what is the ‘Ideology’, established in the interdependence of ‘the other’ are the questions about the inter- action between the images of imperialistic culture, and marginalized and decentered culture. ‘the other’ means the appointed attributes, which cannot be represented by the culture. The changes in all fields of Europe during the Renaissance, which was the starting point of modern times, were the subversion of feudal order, the discovery of an individual and freedom, the liberation of human reason from the power, and the liberation of knowledge from the intellectual oppression of the Middle Ages. However, the change caused the big trauma by cutting off the theological and political background by severing the long standing tradition. This trauma was combined with the Worldwide expansion of Europe, and offered the important clue in the emergence of modern Orientalism. It still remains that way now (Clarke, 1998). **Orientalism** is the cultural device and **the system of discourse, putting the World except for the West in the fixed frame for the dominance** by clinging to the depth of politics and wielding the obstinate and crafty power. That is, Orient was represented and created by the West, which is the transcendental subject (Kang, 1997). Accordingly, ‘Orientalism’ is the controversial term, being questioned about the neutral meaning, and according to Bernard Lewis, who is a scholar of Oriental studies, specializing in the history of Islam, “It is contaminated going beyond the possibility of rescue now (Clarke, 1998)”. Orientalism indicates the representation of ‘an Oriental’ associated with the negative factors of Western culture (Criminal, insane person, female, the poor), sharing the identity of outsider as Said clearly said in the “Orientalism” (Kang,1997). Orientalism is the geographical violence. In spite of the independence of numerous colonies, imperialistic culture is still influential. Therefore, Orientalism as an enlightened and open conversation without deflection or prejudice cannot be supposed (Halbfass, 1988). The Oriental Look of fashion reveals the features of Orientalism. Oriental Look that holds some parts of Asia Ethnic Look, is the vulgar distortion of the image of the Orient, as Orientalism, manifested through the costume. Kwon(1998) argues that ‘Oriental Look’ has been dominated by the ‘Orientalism’, which is the thinking way towards the Orient, and the positional superiority in terms of the flexibility of location, pursued by the West, has given the location of the subject to the West through the creation of Oriental Look and consumption process. The author carried on her maintenance that the West has put the Oriental Look in the part of the Western culture in an attempt to overcome the self-consciousness about being influenced by the Orient, which had been recognized to be inferior to its self-culture through the creative work and the certainty of wearing subjects. She concludes that ‘Oriental Look’ has been continually managed without the appointment of its orthodoxy as a **Western strategy to secure its identity and power**, and keep the aesthetic hegemony and such management way or volition is the Orientalism of costume. Eventually, even though Oriental Look is the concept to be included in the Asian Ethnic Look, it has the figurative features, different from the general Asian Ethnic Look, which have borrowed the Oriental image from the mysticism and naturalism of the Orient, and rooted in the interest in the Oriental thought as a result of the depravity of Western Christian ideas, and the necessity of new motive. Just as Said argues that Orientalism designates the representation of the Orientals, in association with criminals, female, the needy, Oriental Look represents costume with the images of the Orient such as eccentricity, insanity, ludicrousness, voluptuous beauty, and so on.

Political manipulation of statistics is used to construct threats

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. 57-58, TH)

Articulated from the privileged vantage point of the state, the strategic studies discourse acquires a degree of political and moral authority that goes far beyond its empirically sustainable claims. For years scholars have questioned the accuracy of the calculations and the political conclusions derived from them. In the 1980s critics were already pointing out that the official statistics compare quan- tity, not quality, and that in terms of the latter the South enjoys a clear strategic advantage over the North, even without including U.S. nuclear and other weapons stationed in or (possibly) directed toward the Korean peninsula.95 These critiques have intensified in recent years. In a detailed study of the subject Moon Chung-in argues that even without U.S. nuclear support, “South Korea is far superior to the North in military capacity” and cites major quality differences in such realms as communications, intelligence, electronic warfare, and cutting-edge offensive weapons systems.96 Sigal, likewise, points out that the much-feared million-man North Korean army is largely a fiction. About half, he estimates, are either untrained or soldier- workers engaged in civil construction. Many of North Korea’s tanks and aircraft are obsolete, leaving its “ground forces and lines of supply vulnerable to attack from the air.”97 Humanitarian workers, who have gained access to much of North Korea’s territory in the last few years, paint a similar picture. They stress, for instance, that “the few tanks seen on the road cannot get from one village to the next without breaking down or running out of fuel.”98 The political manipulation of statistics for defense expenditures perfectly illustrates how technical data are used to project threats in a particular manner. Policy makers and security experts keep draw- ing attention to North Korea’s excessive military expenditures. And excessive they are, indeed, averaging an estimated 27.5 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) over the last few years, even reaching a staggering 37.9 percent in 1998, at a time when the country was being devastated by a famine.99 Seoul’s defensive needs seem much more modest in comparison, located at a mere 3.5 percent of the GDP. But when one compares the expenditures of the two Koreas in absolute terms, which is hardly ever done in official statistics, the picture suddenly looks very different. Given its superior economy, the 3.5 percent that Seoul spends on its military amounts to more than twice as much as the North Koreans spend, no matter how ex- cessive the North’s expenditures appear to be in terms of percentage of the GDP.100 One does not need to be fluent in the technostrategic language of security analysis to realize that over the years this un- equal pattern of defense spending has created a qualitative imbal- ance of military capacities on the peninsula. And yet the myth of the strong North Korean army, of “the world’s third largest military capability,” is as prevalent and as hyped as ever.101

Its not a question of the most accurate history but the best history – history = political, we can’t remember everything, have to choose what to forget. Even if they win their specific description of events/north korea – allowing a plurality of histories is good. Perm – reason to vote aff.

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. 103-4, TH)

To move from trauma to reconciliation some aspects of the war have to be “forgotten.” Nietzsche stresses that the past suffocates the present unless we forget it. He calls upon people to have the courage to “break with the past in order to live.”21 Forgetting, in this sense, does not mean ignoring what happened. Forgetting, it must be remembered, is a natural process, an inevitable aspect of remembering. We all do it, whether we want it or not. We cannot possibly remember everything. We cannot give every event the same weight. Our memory of the past is the result of a process through which certain events and interpretations are remembered and pri- oritized, while others are relegated to secondary importance or forgotten altogether. This is particularly the case with a major event like the Korean War, which is far too complex to be remembered in its totality. The task of historians is to select the few facts, perspectives, and interpretations that ought to be remembered. The combination of forgetting and remembering is as inevitable as it is political. History is, in fact, as much about the present and the future as it is about the past. At the time an event takes place there is no memory. Historical awareness emerges later and by necessity includes values and inter- ests that have nothing to do with the original occurrence. History, in this sense, is one of the prime sites of politics. Nietzsche is par- ticularly critical of periods during which historical understandings lack critical awareness of this process—situations, say, when power- ful rulers fail to gain legitimacy on their own and thus rely on the misappropriation of historical figures and events to justify their form of dominance.22 Such is undoubtedly the case in contemporary Korea, where history has been geared far more toward supporting particular regimes than toward actually representing what happened in the past. But South Korea also displays signs of what Nietzsche calls “criti- cal histories”: attempts to challenge the notion of a single historical reality and create the political space in which diverging narratives of the past can compete with each other, perhaps even respect each other, despite the differences that divide them. A recent example of a breakthrough in this direction, timid as it may well be, can be found in revisions of history textbooks. Several generations of his- tory texts that are used in South Korea’s schools have studiously avoided even mentioning the role that Northern Communist gue- rillas played in the fight against the Japanese colonial occupiers. Textbooks released in early 2003 for the first time deal with a 1937 clash between Japanese colonial forces and resistance fight- ers allegedly led by Kim Il Sung, the future leader of North Korea. The passage reads as follows: In June, 1937, the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army crossed the Yalu river and seized Bocheonbo, south of Hamgyong province. . . . The Japanese were shocked by the attack and began to aggressively crack down on the Korean national movement. After Korea was lib- erated from Japan, Kim Il Sung was revered by North Koreans as a leader of Korean independence. . . . Some academics in South Korea have been critical of North Korea for exaggerating the battle.23 This account is undoubtedly far more balanced and less hostile than the overtly ideological representations that had prevailed for decades. A representative of the Ministry of Education called it an attempt to present “strictly the facts.”24 That is hardly possible, of course, but even so, the more balanced representation still created protest from conservative segments of South Korea’s society. Park Sung Soo, head of the Institute of Documenting Accurate History, warned of succumbing to North Korea’s propaganda. He argued that “the reference to the battle needs to be removed or it may taint the pure minds of youth.”25

Less important than finding the truth is reaching the interpretation which creates the smallest possibility of violence

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. 110, TH)

If history is to be placed in the service of reconciliation, it has to go beyond merely acknowledging that the two sides have different notions of the past. Leaving it at that would only entrench prevailing antagonisms and thus legitimize or even intensify the existing conflict. An ethics of difference must seek to create the conditions under which different identities can coexist and explore common ground. Here too the role of the Korean War is essential, for a process of reconciliation would need to seek out the lowest common denominator that could unite the diverging historical narratives on the peninsula. Susan Dwyer identifies three stages in the process of reconciliation. The first, she says, consists of an effort to find agreement on “the barest of facts.” The second stage involves identifying a range of dif- ferent interpretations of the events. And the third stage would entail narrowing things down to a limited set of interpretations that the two sides can tolerate.47 While such a goal of agreeing to disagree seems modest, the path to achieving it is littered with seemingly insurmountable obstacles. The first hurdle alone is gargantuan, for Dwyer defines agreeing on “the barest of facts” as finding a clear view of “who did what to whom and when.”48 In Korea these “bare facts” are, of course, precisely the major point of contention—and the source of trauma and hatred. And even if there were agreement on certain truth claims, promoting them may not necessarily bring more justice. Kwon Hyeok-beom, for instance, warns of searching for common roots between North and South and using them as a basis for reconciliation. The strong masculinism that still dominates both parts of the peninsula promotes identity practices that consti- tute women as “kind, gentle, and subservient.” Thus grounding rec- onciliation in common Confucian values may only strengthen the patriarchal social order and lead to further discrimination against women.49

**Threat constructed, especially in this instance. No race/geographic/historical reasons for division. All ideological.**

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. 4-5, TH)

In this chapter I examine how antagonistic identity patterns emerged historically and how they have become intertwined with the current culture of insecurity. Such an endeavor can, of course, not be exhaustive. A thorough investigation into the nature and function of identities would need to scrutinize in detail the developments of each Korean state, drawing attention to moral discourses, policy shifts, media representations, educational practices, and a wide range of other factors essential to the process of nation building. Doing so would go far beyond what is possible in the context of a brief chap- ter. The focus of my inquiry will thus be limited to identifying broad patterns that arose during key periods of Korean history, such as the Japanese colonial occupation, the Korean War, and the ongoing Cold War confrontation. It is evident that such an abbreviated intel- lectual endeavor requires glossing over some nuances that inevitably occur within these larger patterns.7 But locating underlying trends is nevertheless crucial, for it can reveal how identity patterns that formed during the last half-century of Korea’s national division are essential to understanding and dealing with the security challenges that lie ahead. To be more specific, the key security dilemmas of today are intrinsically linked to identity constructs that portray the political system at the opposite side of the divided peninsula as threatening, perhaps even inherently evil. The constructed nature of these dilemmas is all the more evident because the boundaries of identity in Korea are drawn not along “natural” lines, such as race, ethnicity, language, or religion. They are based above all on two artificially created and diametrically opposed ideological images of the world.

**Antagonistic identity construction and threat construction = the root cause of conflict**

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. 15, TH)

Antagonistic identity patterns pose one of the most difficult chal- lenges to politics and security in Korea. My intention in this chapter was to retrace their emergence and understand their influence on the current political climate. Superpower rivalry divided the peninsula at the end of the Second World War and set the stage for a sustained ideological confrontation. The devastating Korean War then created wounds that still influence politics on the peninsula half a century later. On each side an unusually strong state emerged and was able to promote a particular ideological vision of politics and society, a vision that constructs the other side of the dividing line as an enemy and a source of fear and instability. A virulent anti-Communist discourse has acquired a quasi-hegemonic status in the South, while an equally pronounced anticapitalist and anti-imperialist attitude prevails in the reclusive North.

The construction of antagonistic identities, and the threat per- ceptions that are associated with them, have decisively shaped the domestic political atmosphere in both North and South Korea. The same can also be said in regard to foreign policy, as I will demonstrate in subsequent chapters. In an extensive study Moon Chung-in has shown how existing threat perceptions, which are based on antagonistic identity constructs, are among the most dif- ficult obstacles to the successful negotiation of arms control. “Both parties,” he stresses, “are entrenched in their perceptual vortex of mutual denial, mistrust, and tunnel vision.”63 Over the years these antagonistic forms of identity have become so deeply entrenched in societal consciousness that the current politics of insecurity appears virtually inevitable. Indeed, the prevailing identity constructs have helped to legitimatize the very militarized approaches to security that have contributed to the emergence of tension in the first place.

# A2: YOU WOULD APPEASE hITLER

**Feminist theory could’ve prevented WWII**

**Berkman 1990**, Joyce, Ph.D., Yale (1967), “Feminism, War, and Peace Politics: The Case of World War I” in “Women, militarism, and war: essays in history, politics, and social theory,” by Jean Bethke Elshtain and Sheila Tobias, p 141-156 WM

Socialist women also had an international meeting in 1915 at Berne, Switzerland, a meeting initiated by Germany's Clara Zetkin who argued in her call that since women had no political rights, they bore no responsibility for the war. "If men kill, women must fight for peace."44 'lhe socialist women departed from their sisters in The Hague by creating a mixed-gender peace initiative. Meanwhile, at a follow-up conference of Hague women held in Zurich, an all-female Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (still in existence) was born. The war was then over and an armistice had been signed. Accordingly, **the** immediate impetus for the founding of the WILPF was the eagerness of women to resume ties of friendship and support and to find a way to heal the wounds of war. 43 In contrast to that impulse, in their view, the statesmen meeting at Versailles to forge a final peace draft were thinking only in terms of payment and revenge. WILPF demanded an immediate end to the blockade of Germany and relief for Germany's victims. They assailed the peace accord, pointing out that it would cause economic disaster (for the Germans), exacerbate national hatred, and (with prescience) probably cause another war.46 Ethel Snowden put it well: "I want neither a German peace, nor a French peace, nor an English peace. I want a people's peace. "41\

# A2: READINESS

**Notions of military readiness rely on a masculinized construction of security, adding women alone can’t solve.**

**Enloe 93** – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War” p. 214-217, MT)

Policymakers for the U.S. Air Force, which has a relatively high proportion of support roles (e.g., many mechanics and flight controllers for each fighter pilot), found that they could recruit large numbers of women **without jeopardizing the masculinized construction** of their combat elite. By contrast, officers of the U.S. Marines feared that even a small proportion of women in their combat-heavy service would threaten its deeply masculinized image. The Army, of course, is also combat-heavy, as it includes the combat units of infantry and armored divisions. But it also stands out because of its need for "manpower." Thus, the U.S. Army, like armies in most countries, tends to be the most ethnically and economically diverse service, though that diversity may be carefully arranged hierarchically. It has to recruit such large numbers of people that it cannot be as selective as the other services can, and its male recruits in particular tend to be immature.18 The male officers in the field who were commanding troops in the 1970s and 1980s often were far more ambivalent than their civilian Defense Department superiors about the wisdom of or need for deploying women in traditionally masculinized jobs. Many though not all of these officers were mainly concerned about the morale of their men, men who had been recruited partly with the promise that joining the military would confirm their manliness. Some of these male officers had access to the press, particularly publications aimed at veterans, and to congressional committees. They, too, wielded **the** potent **national security concept of "readiness**," but they **used** it to argue that women had no place at the front and that those women who wanted to be there were raising questions about their own **femininity** and patriotism.19 And finally there were the women soldiers themselves though "soldiers" is a somewhat misleading term here. For many **women who joined the uniformed forces**, like many of their male counterparts, deliberately sought out jobs as administrators, computer technicians, nurses, and nutritionists, jobs that were militarized but which **did not jar the masculinization of American soldiering or their own internalized feminine identities**. A 1992 survey of 868 army women, which was one of the largest of its kind and was solicited by the presidentially appointed Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Military, revealed that while 60 percent of women officers and 54 percent of women enlisted personnel wanted the ban on women in combat lifted, they were not necessarily imagining themselves as combat volunteers. They themselves, like many men, wanted the training, education, independence from families, and steady income that the military provided, not the opportunity to wield instruments of direct violence. Only 15 percent of the army women surveyed in the aftermath of the Gulf War expressed a desire to serve in combat roles. What they wanted most, they said, were institutional reforms that would remove the barriers currently barring women from promotions. The combat ban, they reported, was the spikiest barrier. 20 Women in uniform themselves did not have a monolithic image of their own femininity or of the military's impact on it. Women career officers, for instance, tended to be those most outspoken about existing bans on women in combat. These were the women who saw themselves as staying in the service for twenty years and so tagged combat exclusion as a principal barrier to their promotion. Enlisted women often were more frustrated by day-to-day harassment and by the military's inadequate medical services for women. These were the women with perhaps the biggest stake in ensuring that veterans' health and educational benefits were designed to fit women veterans' needs and were sustained by a budget-conscious Congress. One gets the impression that it was the women careerists the officers who were more likely to have the confidence and the contacts to speak out when they felt they were being harassed or being denied a hearing by their immediate superiors. The women officers are the ones who have been most apt to be in contact with the liberal women advocates in Washington and most likely to be interviewed by congressional subcommittees and television talk-show hosts, thus privileging their concerns and their experiences in the complex cultural political process that was creating the image of the American woman soldier. And because only 19 percent of all women officers in the early 1990s are African-American women, 21 white women careerists' ideas have tended to receive the most visibility. These distinct American image-making arenas do overlap. But looking at each of them separately reminds us that the ideology of militarized femininity has not been constructed through some simple or obvious process in either the Cold War or the post-Cold War era. Such an examination also prompts us to ask hard questions about how the image of the woman soldier is constructed and reconstructed in other countries as well ·Do journalists from the mainstream national media in Japan or Norway call on field officers to voice their opinions on their women soldiers? ·Is there an equivalent of the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Subcommittee on Personnel in France or Turkey? ·Do women's groups with equal opportunity agendas have access to the "manpower" bureaucrats in the defense ministries in Britain or Italy? ·Have gay liberation activists turned their attention to homophobia inside the military in Israel or India? ·Do racial minority rights organizations monitor discrimination inside the military with the help of state-established agencies in Canada or Germany? ·Do Australian or Dutch base commanders agree with most American base commanders' decision to carry pornographic magazines on their base newsstands?22 For all the outpouring of recent feminist scholarship on World War II, we still today have only an incomplete picture of the interactive processes that redefined and/or entrenched American femininity and masculinity to suit U.S. wartime needs in the 1940s. But what we have earned from this burgeoning work is that those earlier ideological processes involved very particular actors with their own anxieties, resources, and limitations. It is with this awareness that we need to turn our attention to the construction of images of American or any other country's women soldiers in the Gulf War.

# A2: ECONOMY IMPACT SCENARIOS

**The negative’s attempts to use peacemaking as economic policy reinforce traditional engendered economics.**

**Pankhurst 2K** (Masculinity is key in creating violence and the negative peace rhetoric of the status quo. By changing masculinity we create positive peace. (Donna, “Women, Gender, and Peacebuilding”, August 2000, http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/assets/CCR5.pdf) AK

It is very difficult to distinguish between economic policies which are to be promoted as part of peacebuilding and general economic policies, as unfortunately it is normal for little account to be taken of the particular difficulties and needs of post-conflict economies when policies are developed (by governments and international agencies). It is also normal for a gender analysis and perspective to be completely absent in economic policies, even though it is clearly necessary57. A few governments and international organisations have recently begun to `engender' budgets to ensure that at least there are no unforeseen consequences of tax and expenditure plans which penalise women more than men58, but there is considerable potential for further development in this area.The relevance of different kinds of economic policy for peacebuilding varies a lot with context, but there are some areas of policy which often have obvious implications for gender issues. For instance, it is very common for some kind of land reform to be considered necessary for peacebuilding. Nowhere in the world has a land reform been implemented where gender was not an issue, in spite of the fact that many studies on land reform have shown that there are economic advantages for society as a whole to granting women rights59. At worst, women's rights are non-existent, with land titles being granted to men. More commonly, women have some access in their own right but this is less secure and dependent on their marital status. International donors have often been very influential in deciding the type of land reform which should be adopted and so there is a great deal of potential for gender to be taken up as an issue where land reform is considered as part of peacebuilding (as it ` will be in Rwanda for instance).

**Free Trade excludes women and supports and spreads patriarchal systems**

**Ruiz 04** (Tricia Ruiz, BS Geography and International Studies, California State University-Hayward 2004 Feminist Theory and International Relations: The Feminist Challenge to Realism and Liberalism) AK

Feminist critiques of liberalism address the economic inequalities inherent to free trade, which disproportionately affect women. Jacqui True argues that male-centered macroeconomic indicators, such as the Gross National Product undervalue the work of women. True also reports that on a world scale, women are a disadvantaged group: they own one per cent of the world’s property and resources, perform sixty per cent of the labour, [and] are the majority of refugees, illiterate and poor persons. *(Ibid)* This suggests that the capitalist structure is a patriarchal one, effectively marginalizing the participation and contributions of women in the economy, since much of their work is reflected in unpaid illegal or domestic settings that are not included in economic assessments. Indeed, liberalist institutions such as the WTO and multinational corporations have tended to create free trade agreements that weaken state protections on labor rights19 and public social funds, which has served to negatively affect the large proportion of women in the labor force. This in turn camouflages issues of female exploitation, such as the gendered division of labor and the increase in sex trafficking worldwide. Feminists also challenge liberalism’s claim that international institutions provide for ways in which women can be become more politically and socially acknowledged and empowered. Since the leaders and the processes of formal international organizations come from patriarchal systems, their work can keep women at a disadvantage. Hilary Charlesworth critiques some of the recent formal international conferences, such as the Beijing Declaration and Agenda 21 in Rio. She notes that the wording in the documents shows that while some consensus was achieved in progressing issues critical to women, not enough was achieved to arrive at the real changes proposed by feminists.

# A2: HEG IMPACT SCENARIOS

**Perpetuating American hegemony locks in existing gender hierarchies**

**Enloe 90,** Cynthia Ph.D. from the University of California/Berkeley “Bananas, Bases, and Patriarchy” in “Women, militarism, and war: essays in history, politics, and social theory,” by Jean Bethke Elshtain and Sheila Tobias, p 187-205 WM

It seems like such a simple question, why is it so rarely asked? What, in fact, would we see if we looked at women's lives in Central America and the Caribbean, for example? One possibility is that we would understand how the policies of the American government and its local allies intensify the hardships of women's lives. If we take women's lives seriously, we cannot assume that local or international politics affect women and men in identical ways. For example, some of the issues named and contested by feminism become visible as integral parts of U. S. intervention policy. The denigration of women intensifies with the u.s. militarization of Central America. There is a higher incidence of rape and battering during war time. The male role as protector and sexual exploiter is affirmed and extended; prostitution is a mainstay of preserving military organization. More difficult, but equally important, we need to understand the full costs of Nicaraguan militarization to the future of the revolution. While U. S. policy has forced such a mobilization, the way in which the Nicaraguan government views its defense and appeals to its people to join the effort may deepen the power of men over women, as well as endangering democratic goals. There is a second possibility. If we keep asking, "Where are the women?" we may find that we will have to modify our understanding of the requirements for U. S. politics to succeed in the Third World. In other words, it might be that women's lives are worth considering not only for the sake of detailing the *impact* of militarism and imperialism, but also for the sake of clarifying their basic underpinnings-how U. S. power locks into existing power relations within the countries it seeks to control. At this stage we don't have a fully articulated feminist theory to explain how imperialism and militarism have structured our relations with Central America and the Caribbean. But we do have the makings of such a theory. We do know enough about how power operates *inside* societies to urge that men-as-men and women-as-women be made visible in any investigation of how power operates *between* societies.

**Military interventions are the perfect way to disrupt gender equality movements**

**Enloe 90,** Cynthia Ph.D. from the University of California/Berkeley “Bananas, Bases, and Patriarchy” in “Women, militarism, and war: essays in history, politics, and social theory,” by Jean Bethke Elshtain and Sheila Tobias, p 187-205 WM

Similarly, before the U.S. military invasion, Grenadian women were organizing to make their work in the cocoa industry (a principal export sector) more visible. Grenadian women in the revolutionary movement began to insist that the men take their work seriously. Beyond that, they began developing government policies that would dismantle the sexual divisions of labor on which the island's cocoa business has relied. These important sexual politics were cut short by the landing of the U. S. Marines. It is likely that the postinvasion Grenadian society is being "developed" on a rigid sexual division of labor by the expansion of the tourist industry and by the (not terribly successful) attempts by Washington officials to "secure" Grenada by inviting American light industries to establish cost-cutting assembly-line production.

**US military bases are a parasite feeding on whatever country they are in; they foster prostitution and distort sexual politics**

**Enloe 90,** Cynthia Ph.D. from the University of California/Berkeley “Bananas, Bases, and Patriarchy” in “Women, militarism, and war: essays in history, politics, and social theory,” by Jean Bethke Elshtain and Sheila Tobias, p 187-205 WM

Feminists in the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand have described in alarming detail just how U. S. military bases have distorted the sexual politics of the countries. A military base isn't simply an installation for servicing bombers, fighters, and aircraft carriers, or a launch-pad for aggressive forays into surrounding territories. A military base is also a package of presumptions about the male soldier's sexual needs, the local society's sexual needs, and about the local society's resources for satisfying those needs. Massage parlors are as integral to Subic Bay, the mammoth U. S. naval base in the Philippines, as its dry docks. 7 Lucy Komisar, a freelance reporter, has written an account of how sexual politics in Honduras are being fashioned to meet the alleged needs of the American military there. 8 Komisar went to visit the shanty town of brothels that has grown up near the Palmerole military base, one of the bases used by the U. S. military in its series of "Big Pine" joint maneuvers. She found Honduran women serving as prostitutes to both Honduran and American soldiers. Her report revealed in microcosm what Honduran public health officials have noted more generally: that there has been a notable rise in the number of cases of venereal disease in Honduras in the three years since the start of the U. S. military build-up. Hondurans refer to the particularly virulent strain ofV.D. as "Vietnam Rose," While the nickname wrongly blames the victim, it suggests that Hondurans see the Vietnamization of their country in terms of sexuality as well as money and hardware.

**Combined with militarization gender binaries foster military rape and a gendered view of national security this is not impossible to deconstruct however, in fact it is certainly possible to separate militarism and masculinity, but we must concentrate on gender and patriarchy**

**Enloe 90,** Cynthia Ph.D. from the University of California/Berkeley “Bananas, Bases, and Patriarchy” in “Women, militarism, and war: essays in history, politics, and social theory,” by Jean Bethke Elshtain and Sheila Tobias, p 187-205 WM

In our attempt to discover just how much militarization is a gendered process, that is, a process that won't "work" unless men will accept certain norms of masculinity and women will abide by certain strictures of femininity, we might consider three other dynamics in addition to military prostitution. The first is *rape.* The second is *military recruitment.* The third is the *ideology of national security.* How far is each of these necessary for the American-sponsored militarization of the Caribbean and Central America in the 1980s? How far is each of these dependent not just on notions of gender but on patriarchal relations? We can only be suggestive here, but we might at least raise the level of genuine political curiosity. For instance, it seems remarkable that there hasn't been more curiosity, more committed political questioning, about why male soldiers' rapes of civilian women have been so widespread in Central America. Typically, rape is listed among an assortment of repressive acts, as if rape were not qualitatively different both in its motivations and its repercussions. But why, in fact, do male soldiers in Guatemala or Contra soldiers in Nicaragua engage in sexual assault on women so insistently? Is it one more product of masculinity militarized? Is it part of some self-conscious officer-level policy of intimidation? Of whom? Of the women themselves or of their husbands, sons, and fathers whose sense of male honor is tied up in their capacity to protect "their" women? Guatemalan army commanders have been quoted as saying that killing Indian women and children is part of a deliberate strategy of counterinsurgency: the foundation of the Indian guerrillas' organization is seen to be the "family nuclei." Therefore, whole families have to be murdered if the insurgency is to be crushed. 9 But this still doesn't explain the reports of rapes and sexual tortures of women that soldiers engage in before they murder Indian women. Some Latin American feminists now believe that masculinity is being militarized for the sake of a wider militarization of the society.lO If this is true, then we will have to focus our political energies much more on finding out how u. S. soldiers are trained and what sexual assumptions are woven into the training we provide to soldiers and police of other countries. We will also have to listen more carefully to women and men in EI Salvadoran and Guatemalan insurgent movements. Have the experiences of rape, direct and indirect, had different effects on their political mobilization? It may well be that a woman who herself has suffered rape by a government soldier or who has seen her mother or sister raped will think about power and injustice rather differently than her male comrades who either have not been politicized by rape at all or who have, but assign different meanings to that experience. Finally, there are the gendered politics of military manpower. When I hear that Barbados is expanding its military manpower, here are some of the things I wonder about. I wonder how it is that Barbadian standards of masculinity can be transformed so that the cricket player can be overtaken by the soldier (or the militarized policeman). Not all societies, and certainly not most of those in the Caribbean and even some in Central America (e.g., Costa Rica), so merge soldiering and manhood that they become almost indistinguishable. Certainly it makes the military recruiter's task easier if to be a soldier proves a man is masculine. But the two are analytically and historically separable. If they weren't, governments would not need to waste their credibility by trying to enforce conscription laws. So when the Reagan administration set out to urge governments in the Caribbean and Central America to increase their numbers of soldiers, it was asking them to engage in some tricky cultural maneuvers. Unless those regimes can count on young men enlisting simply to escape the despair of unemployment or the threat of repression-and both of these are available to Caribbean and Central American recruiters-they will also have to convince women in their countries that men who join the newly expanding armies are more genuinely "real men" than are men able to get decent civilian jobs. What is happening to Barbadian and Costa Rican women's beliefs about masculinity? Are they changing in ways that will ease Washington's militarizing plans? If women in these countries are resisting such cultural changes, then it is likely that their alienation from their governments, and possibly from the men in their lives as well, is intensifYing. We could perhaps understand militarization better if we looked at how "national security" is defined and how it is gendered. I think it is useful to try to figure out just how much militarization of *any* society requires its citizens to rethink what they need to feel secure. Feminists who have studied European and North American societies in wartime have shown the differences between the beliefs of men and women about what they -need to feel safe. They have also revealed how governments intent upon legitimizing their expanded wartime powers have used propaganda emphasizing women's need for protection and men's duty to serve as -protectors to win that legitimation. There's strong reason to believe that some of the same efforts might be needed if Caribbean and Central American regimes are to gain their people's acceptance of the larger manpower quotas, greater security budgets, wider emergency powers, and more foreign bases on their soil that Washington is fostering. Does this mean that the U. S. -fueled militarization of these countries is dependent on an even more entrenched version of *machismo?* This may not be easy as we enter the 1990s. Today, there are more women in these countries raising children on their own, farming on their own, learning how to read and write for themselves, joining crafts cooperatives. These are not the sort of experiences that will encourage women to accept national security doctrines that portray them as the objects of male protection. The militarism of the United States and other countries needs us all to behave *as women.* Otherwise their militarizing goals won't be achieved. They need some American women to feel protected by a massive arms build-up and by their sons and husbands in uniform. They need wives of soldiers to accept the extra duties of household maintenance when their husbands are on maneuvers in Honduras and EI Salvador without worrying too much about the rumors they've heard about the Honduran brothels. They need some-not too many-American women to view the military as the place to prove their equality with men. Still, among American women, the military needs some Latinos, maybe new arrivals from war-torn Central America, to work in Silicon Valley's electronic factories making the latest electronic weaponry, and other Latinos to see their boyfriends answering the army recruiter's call as a step toward Americanization. In Central America and the Caribbean, militarization seems to require women to work for low wages for foreign companies or to support those companies' low-paid male workers by performing family work that is rewarded with no pay at all. It also requires women to do the stressinducing juggling of household budgets so that the government can cut their social service budgets in order to live up to agreements with the IMF. If local poor women can't manage this demanding task, or if they refuse to privatize their economic struggles and instead take to the streets, then the U. S. -fostered militarization will be jeopardized by faltering local governments. What this suggests is that we have just begun to understand how the relations between women and between women and men-in movements, in families, on military bases, on plantations-are the prerequisites for American-promoted military expansion. Even with the fragmentary clues we now have, we should be able to insist that gender in general and patriarchy in particular be made central topics in any movement dedicated to rolling back militarization.

# A2: NORTH KOREA IMPACT SCENARIOS

Description of korea as a rogue state ignores the U.S.’s role and makes understanding the situation impossible

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. 36-38, TH)

I will pay particular attention the role of the United States, for nothing about the past and present dilemmas on the peninsula can be addressed or even understood without recourse to the United States. This is why China repeatedly stressed that the latest nuclear crisis was primarily an issue between North Korea and the United States.4 Kim Dae-jung, in his final speech as South Korea’s presi- dent, reiterated the same theme: “more than anything, dialogue between North Korea and the United States is the important key to a solution.”5 A solution is, however, far from imminent. Both the United States and North Korea see each other as a threat. And each has good reason for doing so. But each is also implicated in the pro- duction of this threat. The problem is that these interactive dynam- ics are hard to see, for the West tends to project a very one-sided image of North Korea, one that sees it solely as a rogue and thus a source of danger and instability. Nicholas Eberstadt, for instance, stresses that “North Korean policies and practices have accounted for most of the volatility within the Northeast Asian region since the end of the Cold War.”6 The deeply entrenched image of North Korea as a rogue state is part of an identity-driven political attitude that severely hinders both an adequate understanding and potential resolution of the crisis. The rhetoric of rogue states is indicative of how U.S. foreign policy continues to be dominated by dualistic and militaristic Cold War thinking patterns. The “evil empire” may be gone but not the underlying need to define safety and security with reference to an external threat. Rogues are among the new threat perceptions that serve to demarcate the line between good and evil, identity and difference. As during the Cold War, building up a strong military arsenal is viewed as the key means through which this line is to be defended. In the absence of a global power that matches the United States, this militaristic attitude has, if anything, intensified. Look at Washington’s recent promulgation of a preemptive strike policy against rogue states. The consequences of this posture are particu- larly fateful in Korea, for it reinforces half a century of explicit and repeated nuclear threats against the government in Pyongyang. The effect of these threats has been largely obscured, in part because the highly specialized discourse of security analysis has managed to at- tribute responsibility for the crisis solely to North Korea’s actions, even if the situation is in reality far more complex and interactive. Drawing attention to the interactive dimension of security dynam- ics, and the role of the United States in it, is not to absolve North Korea of responsibility. Pyongyang bears perhaps the lion’s share for much of the culture of insecurity that still persists on the penin- sula. Over fifty years it has committed at least a dozen terrorist acts, from bombings of civilian airliners to tunnel and submarine infiltrations across the DMZ, not to speak of countless other provo- cations and verbal aggressions. The production of crises has become a hallmark of North Korean politics, designed both to fortify its authoritarian rule and to win concessions from the international community. But this does not mean developments take place in a vacuum. Indeed, in an almost mirror image of North Korea’s vili- fied brinkmanship tactic, the U.S. administration under President George W. Bush has embarked on a form of crisis diplomacy that explicitly generates threats in order to improve its negotiation posi- tion and force its opponent into submission.

Demonization of North Korea is empirically the root of the problem – North Korea is neither irrational nor aggressive, these interpretations of North Korea are deliberate fabrications blind to both history and official North Korean statements

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. 46-52, TH)

Lets us, for the sake of understanding the interactive dimensions of the crisis, contemplate for a moment how the crisis must have ap- peared from the vantage point of North Korea’s decision makers. The first and undoubtedly most striking feature to notice from Pyongyang would be the long and unbroken period of American nuclear hegemony in Asia. Equally obvious and understandable is that this hegemonic practice must have been—and indeed was—interpreted as a clear threat to North Korea’s security. The United States remains the only nation ever to have used nuclear weapons in a combat situation and this in proximity to Korea, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. During the Korean War the United States entertained the use of nuclear weapons against North Korea and China as part of its “massive retaliation” doctrine. General Douglas MacArthur specifically requested permission to use twenty-six nuclear bombs to attack specific targets. His successor, General Matthew Ridgeway, renewed the request. In the end no nu- clear weapons were used, although the newly inaugurated president, Dwight Eisenhower, hinted in 1953 that the United States would use them if the armistice negotiations failed to make progress.41 Soon after the Korean War, in January 1958, the United States introduced ground-based nuclear weapons to South Korea, a move that con- stituted a direct violation of the Armistice Agreement.42 This move did not occur in response to a specific North Korean threat but was part of a more general worldwide reorganization of American military strategy.43 The weapons were kept close to the border with the North. Don Oberdorfer reports that “nuclear warheads had been flown by helicopter almost routinely to the edge of the DMZ in training exercises.”44 The very nature of these exercises was a public threat to North Korea. Consider, for instance, how the yearly joint maneuvers between the United States and South Korea, termed “Team Spirit,” revolved around an unnecessarily aggressive north- bound scenario. They stressed, as Moon Chung-in puts it, “bold and vigorous strikes into the enemy’s rear” as part of an overall “offen- sive military strategy.”45 The deployment of American nuclear weapons in South Korea was an important element of what Peter Hayes calls “American nu- clear hegemony” in the Pacific. It was one of the central military components around which regional security alliances were formed. Hayes also stresses that this nuclear strategy remained a “completely unilateral American activity.”46 Neither South Korea nor any other U.S. ally was given a say in operational decisions, which always re- mained under the full control of Washington. Moreover, North Korea has never consented to the deployment of nuclear weapons on its soil, either by the Soviet Union or by China. It has not even ac- commodated foreign military personnel, at least not since the last Chinese troops left in 1958.47 This contrasts quite sharply to the almost forty thousand U.S. soldiers who remain stationed in South Korea (imagine, just for a moment, how the United States would have perceived forty thousand Soviet troops stationed in North Korea). The United States withdrew nuclear weapons from South Korea in the early 1990s. Analyses differ on the exact reasons for this with- drawal. Donald Gregg, then the U.S. ambassador to South Korea, suggests that it was a gesture of goodwill designed to facilitate ne- gotiations with North Korea.48 Other U.S. officials say that it was a more tactical move, linked to experiences in the first Gulf War that suggested that high-yield conventional weapons may actually be more useful than nuclear ones in the context of a controllable regional battlefield.49 Be that as it may, the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear war- heads from Korean soil hardly removed the nuclear threat from the peninsula. Long-range U.S. nuclear missiles could still easily reach North Korea, a fact that Pyongyang was frequently reminded of, in implicit and not-so-implicit manners. U.S. nuclear threats toward Pyongyang intensified again when Wash- ington’s Korea policy became more hawkish with the inauguration of President George W. Bush. In his State of the Union Address of February 2002, Bush singled out North Korea as one of three na- tions belonging to an “axis of evil,” citing as evidence Pyongyang’s export of ballistic missile technology and its lingering ambition to become a nuclear power.50 This sudden turnaround in U.S. foreign policy, which sharply reversed the more conciliatory approach pur- sued during the Clinton administration, can just as easily be seen as the origin of the present nuclear crisis in Korea. In June 2002 details of a “Nuclear Posture Review” became public, according to which the new U.S. strategic doctrine relied on the possibility of preemp- tive nuclear strikes against terrorists and rogue states. The review explicitly cited North Korea with regard to two scenarios: counter- ing an attack on the South, and halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It mentioned, for instance, “using tactical nu- clear weapons to neutralize hardened artillery positions aimed at Seoul, the South Korean capital.”51 A few months later Washington made its threats official. The new “National Security Strategy,” released in September 2002, outlined in detail when preemptive strikes are legitimate and would be used as a way to “stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States.”52 Faced with a sudden intensification of U.S. nuclear threats, it is hardly surprising that Pyongyang reacted angrily and called Washing- ton officials “nuclear lunatics.”53 Nor is it surprising that Pyongyang is reluctant to give up its nuclear option, for it could serve as a credi- ble deterrent against a U.S. attack. Indeed, the desire for such a de- terrent only mirrors the attitude and behavior of the United States. Some even go so far as to suggest that “when the U.S. insists that nu- clear weapons are vital to its own security but harmful to the secu- rity of others, it becomes hopelessly lacking in credibility.”54 Be that as it may, declassified intelligence documents, which became avail- able after the collapse of Communist regimes in eastern Europe, do indeed reveal that from the 1980s on North Korea perceived itself as increasingly weak and vulnerable to external attacks.55 While the first nuclear crisis unfolded, Kim Il Sung talked about this dilemma to Cambodia’s head of state, Norodom Sihanouk. Kim stressed that “they want to take off our shirt, our coat and now our trousers, and after that we will be nude, absolutely naked.”56 As a result of this increasing vulnerability, the prime objective of the government in Pyongyang has moved, as many commentators now recognize, from forcefully unifying the peninsula to the simple task of regime sur- vival.57 But very few Western decision makers have the sensitivity to recognize these factors and take them into account when formulat- ing their policies. Donald Gregg is one of the rare senior American diplomats who acknowledges that “the U.S. scares North Korea.”58 But even he could make such an admission in public only after he had retired from the State Department. In view of the reinterpretation of events that I have presented here, the question of responsibility for the recurring nuclear crises in Korea becomes a very blurred affair. One could point out, as several commentators have, that before October 2002 North Korea had by and large complied with the terms of the 1994 agreement. This was confirmed not only by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization but also by CIA Director George J. Tenet, who testi- fied on this matter to Congress on March 19, 2002.59 The “mother of all confessions” does, of course, put this interpretation in per- spective. But the United States also did not live up to the Agreed Framework. Construction of the two light-water reactors promised to North Korea was five years behind schedule. Long before the most recent crisis unfolded, the promised annual fuel deliveries became increasingly threatened because of high oil prices and op- position from influential conservative elements within Congress.60 Perhaps most important, the very existence of long-standing Ameri- can nuclear threats against North Korea is not only contrary to the 1994 agreement but also a direct violation of the international non- proliferation regime, which foresees that “countries without nuclear weapons must not be threatened by those who possess them.”61 The point is not to attribute responsibility for the reemergence of a nuclear crisis on the peninsula. Both the United States and North Korea have contributed a great deal to fuel each other’s fears. But decision makers in Washington have clearly not been sufficiently aware of their own role in generating fears and counterreactions. Nor have they learned much from the lesson of the first nuclear crisis. Consider, for instance, how the United States has quickly forgotten, or ignored, a number of rather striking concessions that Pyongyang made in the period leading up to the second crisis. North Korea started to open up its borders: it accommodated several hundred representatives of foreign aid organizations, increased cooperation with (capitalist) Russia, sought to normalize talks with Japan, and entered into diplomatic relations with a dozen Western countries. There were steps toward domestic reform, such as the introduction of quasi–market principles and the opening of special economic zones. There was also progress toward a rapprochement with the South, most notably in domains such as family exchanges, busi- ness contacts, and cultural exchanges. Pyongyang started to clear mines in the DMZ and worked toward establishing road and rail- way links with the South. North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Il, even publicly acknowledged the importance of a continuous deployment of U.S. troops in South Korea. He stressed that their presence is a threat only so long as the relationship between North Korea and the United States remains hostile.62 This in itself could be seen as the “mother of all concessions,” for the removal of U.S. troops had been one of North Korea’s key demands for decades.63 Instead of appreciating and building on these concessions, U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea focused on Pyongyang’s linger- ing nuclear ambition. But not everyone believed Pyongyang when it declared in October 2002 that it had never ceased its nuclear program. The Russian foreign minister, for instance, called it a North Korean tactical maneuver.64 Neither claim could at this stage be empirically verified, but that is not the main point anyway. More important is that the United States failed to pay attention to a series of rather obvious North Korean gestures long before the crisis came to be seen as a crisis in October. North Korea’s worry began to grow with Bush’s “axis of evil” speech earlier that year, in February. At that time an unofficial North Korean representa- tive, Kim Myong Chol, told a New York Times journalist, Nicholas Kristof, that he foresaw “a crisis beginning in the latter half of this year.” North Korea, Kim mentioned, “will respond to the breakdown of the nuclear deal . . . by starting its nuclear program and resuming its missiles tests.”65 That is, of course, precisely what hap- pened eight months later. It is striking how North Korea’s approach in 2002–2003 paral- leled its behavior during the crisis of 1993–1994. Pyongyang most likely assumed, as it did a decade earlier, that a hard-line U.S. ad- ministration would not engage in serious dialogue until North Korea threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Scott Snyder, in an extensive study of Pyongyang’s approach during the first crisis, speaks of a “crisis-oriented negotiation style” that is rooted in North Korea’s particular historical experience, most notably its partisan guerrilla legacy. Snyder writes of a remarkably rational and entirely consistent approach, one that relies on “threats, bluff, and forms of blackmail to extract maximal concession from a negotiating counterpart.”66 Even the dramatic language that shocked the world media in early 2003 was entirely predictable. The apoca- lyptic threat of turning Seoul into a “sea of fire,” for instance, was literally a rehearsed metaphor from the first crisis.67 It is part of an all-too-predictable emotional vocabulary that has prevailed in North Korea’s press for decades. Once translated into standard English, it is not much different from the more rationally expressed U.S. threat of preemptive nuclear strikes. One can agree or disagree with North Korea’s dramatic brink- manship tactic, but one cannot ignore its deeply entrenched exis- tence. Doing so may lead to dangerous miscalculations. At mini- mum, it prevents us from recognizing how Pyongyang may be using its last bargaining chip, its nuclear potential, as a way of entering into dialogue with the United States. In case this was not clear from North Korea’s behavior during the first crisis, Kim Myong Chol stressed the same point again in the interview with Nicholas Kristof. In February 2002, several months before the crisis esca- lated, Kim pointed out that “North Korea cannot kill the heavy- weight champion, the U.S. But it can maim one of his limbs, and so the heavyweight champion will not want to fight. That is the North Korean logic.”68 The logic may be flawed, as Kristof notes, but it is entirely consistent with Pyongyang’s attitude during the first crisis. It demonstrates that Pyongyang had no interest in a military confrontation with the United States. Indeed, North Korea’s press repeatedly stressed that the first nuclear crisis “was settled through negotiations” and that this proves that the more recent issue can be solved in this manner as well.69 Pyongyang wanted guarantees and concessions. And its demands were not even particularly out- rageous. For years Pyongyang has requested a nonaggression pact as well as one-on-one negotiations with the United States, leading to a normalization of the relationship between the two countries or at least to a recognition of each other’s sovereignty. The United States, by contrast, has always preferred multilateral negotiations and demanded North Korean disarmament before a normalization of relations. Despite numerous and obvious signs, and despite detailed and insightful studies of North Korea’s previous negotiation behavior, U.S. decision makers repeated exactly the same mistakes that they committed during the first crisis: they believed that by demonizing North Korea as an evil rogue state, they could force Pyongyang into concessions. Whether this policy resulted from ignorance or specific design remains open to debate. The bottom line is that the U.S. po- sition was firm: “America and the world will not be blackmailed,” Bush stressed in his 2003 State of the Union address.70 The result was predictable: Pyongyang became more recalcitrant. A new nu- clear crisis started to take hold of the Korean peninsula.

Demonization of Rogue States is not based in an objective assessment of their policies or the threat they pose, but simply their opposition to U.S. policy

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. 53-55, TH)

The conflict pattern had been set long before the latest crisis un- folded. Several scholars, most notably Bruce Cumings and Hazel Smith, have for years drawn attention to Washington’s inability to see North Korea as anything but a dangerous and unpredictable rogue state.71 A look at the deeply embedded nature of this policy attitude is thus in order, even if it entails a brief detour from the immedi- ate issue of Korean security. Central here is the transition from the Cold War to a new world order. While the global Cold War power structures collapsed like a house of cards, the mind-sets that these structures produced turned out to be far more resilient. Cold War thinking patterns remain deeply entrenched in U.S. foreign policy, not least because virtually all its influential architects rose to power or passed their formative political years during the Cold War. As a result security has in essence remained a dualistic affair: an effort to protect a safe inside from a threatening outside. Once the danger of communism had vanished, security had to be articulated with reference to a new Feindbild, a new threatening other that could provide a sense of identity, order, and safety at home. “I’m running out of demons. I’m running out of villains,” said U.S. General Colin Powell in 1991. “I’m down to Castro and Kim Il Sung.”72 Rogue states were among the new threat perceptions that rose to prominence when Cold War ideological schism gave way to a more blurred picture of global politics.73 And North Korea became the rogue par excellence: the totalitarian state that disrespects human rights and aspires to possess weapons of mass destruction; the one that lies outside the sphere of good and is to be watched, contained, and controlled. But there is far more to this practice of “othering” than meets the eye. For one, the construction of a rogue threat is to a large extent a post–Cold War phenomenon. During the 1970s and 1980s, for instance, American perceptions of Korea were per- haps more influenced by the television comedy M\*A\*S\*H than by Pyongyang’s political escapades, provocative as they undoubtedly were at times.74 Equally revealing are the reasons why some of the key rogue states, such as North Korea, Iraq, and Iran, have recently been constituted as rogue by the United States. It cannot be their au- thoritarian nature and their human rights violations alone, Robert Dujarric stresses, for many other states, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt, have an equally appalling record. Neither can it be that they possess or aspire to possess weapons of mass destruction. Other- wise, states like India, Pakistan, or Israel would be constituted as rogues too. Dujarric stresses that rogue states share one common characteristic above all: “they are small or medium nations that have achieved some success in thwarting American policy.”75 The tendency to demonize rogue states considerably intensified following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington of Sep- tember 11, 2001. For some policy makers and political commenta- tors the American reaction to these events signified a fundamentally new approach to foreign policy. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld heralded the arrival of “new ways of thinking and new ways of fighting.”76 Stephen Walt, likewise, spoke of “the most rapid and dramatic change in the history of U.S. foreign policy.”77 Signifi- cant changes did, indeed, take place. The inclusion of a preventive first-strike option, for instance, is a radical departure from previous approaches to deterrence, which revolved around a more defense- oriented military policy. But at a more fundamental, conceptual level the U.S. position represents far more continuity than change. Indeed, one can clearly detect a strong desire to return to the reas- suring familiarity of the dualistic and militaristic thinking patterns that dominated foreign policy during the Cold War. The new U.S. foreign policy reestablished the sense of order and certitude that had existed during the Cold War: an inside/outside world in which, in Bush’s words, “you are either with us or against us.”78 The first step in such a move back was a massive increase in U.S. military expen- ditures. Bush’s budget for 2002 included, as he said, “the largest increase in defense spending in two decades.”79 Once again, the world is divided into good and evil, and once again military means occupy a key, if not the only, role in protecting the former against the latter. What must be stressed, though, is that evil here means more than merely “doing harm or inflicting pain on innocents.”80 Rogue states are evil because they attack, as did the Soviet empire, the very foundations of Western civilization: a form of life based on the principles of liberal democracy and market- oriented capitalism. The new good-versus-evil rhetoric poses various obstacles to security policy on the Korean peninsula. “The opposition between good and evil is not negotiable,” Allan Bloom noted during Ronald Reagan’s presidency. It is a question of principles and thus “a cause of war.”81 Expressed in other words, the rhetoric of evil moves the phenomena of rogue states into the realm of irrationality. Evil is in essence a term of condemnation for a phenomenon that can neither be fully comprehended nor addressed, except through militaristic forms of dissuasion and retaliation. This is why various commenta- tors believe that the rhetoric of evil is an “analytical cul de sac” that prevents, rather than encourages, understanding. Some go so far as to argue that a rhetoric of evil entails an “evasion of accountability,” for the normative connotations of the term inevitably lead to policy positions that “deny negotiations and compromise.”82 Indeed, how is it possible to negotiate with evil without being implicated in it, without getting sucked into its problematic vortex?

**North Korea may be dangrous - but more dangerous are confrontational/militaristic attitudes. What's worst is that we don't notice how we cause it, and just blame NK. must rethink security, updates our paradigms for understanding**

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. x-xi, TH)

The dangers of North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship are evident and much discussed. Miscalculations or a sudden escalation could precipitate a human disaster at any moment. Equally dangerous, although much less evident, are the confrontational and militaristic attitudes with which some of the key regional and global players seek to contain the volatile situation. Particularly problematic is the approach of the most influential external actor on the peninsula, the United States. Washington’s inability to see North Korea as anything but a threatening “rogue state” seriously hinders both an adequate understanding and potential resolution of the conflict. Few policy makers, security analysts, and journalists ever try to imagine how North Korean decision makers perceive these threats and how these perceptions are part of an interactive security dilemma in which the West is implicated as much as is the vilified regime in Pyongyang. Par- ticularly significant is the current policy of preemptive strikes against rogue states, for it reinforces half a century of American nuclear threats toward North Korea. The problematic role of these threats has been largely obscured, not least because the highly technical discourse of security analysis has managed to present the strategic situation on the peninsula in a manner that attributes responsibility for the crisis solely to North Korea’s actions, even if the situation is in re- ality far more complex and interactive. A fundamental rethinking of security is required if the current culture of insecurity is to give way to a more stable and peaceful environment. Contributing to this task is my main objective of this book. I do so by exploring insights and options broader than those articulated by most security studies specialists. While pursuing this objective I offer neither a comprehensive take on the Korean security situation nor a detailed update on the latest events. Various excel- lent books have already done so.3 I seek not new facts and data but new perspectives. I identify broad patterns of conflict and embark on a conceptual engagement with some of the ensuing dilemmas. I aspire to what Gertrude Stein sought to capture through a poetic metaphor:4 the political and moral obligation to question the im- mutability of the status quo; the need to replace old and highly problematic Cold War thinking patterns with new and more sensi- tive attempts to address the dilemmas of Korean security. The constructed nature of these antagonistic perceptions became particularly evident if one had the opportunity to visit and talk to people on both sides of the barbed-wire fence. It was clear that the prevalent images of the “evil other” were based far more on stereo- typical and manipulated images than on what the vilified people on the other side of the DMZ actually were, did, and believed. But in the context of a hermetically divided peninsula, where virtually no communication and information passed from one side to the other, each state could easily promote propagandistic regime-legitimization processes without running the risk of having its claims questioned by the population. Look at what happened in mid-November 1986, when rumors spread in South Korea that North Korea’s leader, Kim Il Sung, had died. The origin of these rumors was South Korean gov- ernment reports of North Korean broadcasts intercepted along the DMZ, as well as photographs of a North Korean flag flying at half- mast in Panmunjom. Over the next few days my NNSC colleagues and I observed the flag in question, but at no point was it located at half-mast. Except, of course, for a few seconds twice a day, when it was hoisted in the morning and lowered again in the evening. It was thus easy to take photographs of the flag flying at half-mast, but only the power and legitimacy of the state could imbue these highly partial visual interpretations with a power strong enough to generate a sus- tained political crisis that fixated politics in the South for days—most likely to detract attention from problematic domestic issues.

**We agree your authors are korea experts, that's why you're wrong**

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. xvi, TH)

Gathering the courage to start a large research project on Korean security was not easy, for few topics have produced as much litera- ture. Taking on this massive body of knowledge as a mere “hobby Koreanist” was a rather daunting idea, no matter how passionately I felt about it all. This was all the more the case because increasing attention was now given to work by more critically inclined authors, such as Moon Chung-in, Paik Nak-chung, Bruce Cumings, Leon Sigal, Katherine Moon, Scott Snyder, and Hazel Smith, to name just a few. Add to this the insufficiency of my Korean-language competence, despite sustained and rather laborious attempts to acquire and then update my rudimentary linguistic skills. In the end I simply decided to take the plunge, dilettantish as my dive (and subsequent landing) may well be. I jumped into the void mostly because I had a long and strong passion for Korea and because I had an equally strong and passionate conviction that the puzzles of Korean security need to be scrutinized in a novel and radically different manner. Perhaps there is even an advantage in not being a specialist, for one’s mind is not yet molded by well-rehearsed disciplinary conventions, nor does one have a professional reputation and career at stake, at least not in that particular discipline. An outsider may thus pronounce what an insider cannot, which is why some commentators argue that a rethinking process actually requires a “stranger’s account.”6

# \*\*\*F/W BIZ\*\*\*

# A2: FRAMEWORK

**Orientalism corrupts rational decisionmaking – an examination of identity constructs is key**

**Barkawi 08** (Tarak, lecturer in international security at the Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge, specializes in the study of war, “Orientalism at War in Korea,” <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p252622_index.html>) SLV

A large literature exists on misperception, decision-making, and conflict in International Relations. Scholars have looked at the misuse of historical analogies, a variety of cognitive psychological processes, and other ways in which decision makers misperceive the significance of events and the intentions of potential or actual enemies. In one sense, the idea that Orientalist ‘prejudices’ lead Western decision makers to misunderstand the character of non-European opponents would seem to fit in this tradition. However, there is a crucial difference. The misperception literature asks the question of how do potentially rational decision makers misperceive or misunderstand? A psychological process or misuse of historical analogy intervenes, compromising an objective reading of the evidence. Orientalism, however, involves relational identities. The identity of the Westerner is intimately bound up with constructions of Orientalized others. In order for Americans to ‘liberate’ Iraq, and hence conceive themselves as liberators, Iraqis must desire liberation. This is not misperception but a form of identity politics. To conceive the Iraqis differently, say as a people who regard the US as a violent and unpredictable imperial overlord allied with Zionist interests, requires abandoning the notion that Americans are liberators. Such a reversal marked the crises generated in American society by the Vietnam War. Many Americans did indeed come to see the US as a murderous imperial aggressor in Vietnam in different ways, in part in and through media representations of the war. Events at the front entangled narratives of self and other at home, for elites and publics.

**The question of how we relate to other cultures is the most important question - our discourse about people and cultures underlies all interaction, we must reject Western pre-conceived notions of the Orient.**

**Turner 94** - Professor of Sociology and Head of the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at Cambridge University. (Bryan S., “Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism” 1994, p. 36-39, MT)

**The way we talk about other people is a central problem of all human interaction** and one of the **constitutive debates within the social sciences**. Although as a matter of fact we do talk about other people and other cultures apparently without too much difficulty, there are major philosophical problems which throw doubt on whether we can really understand people who belong to alien groups and foreign cultures. The philosophical issues are ones of translation and relativism. Achieving a reliable, intersubjectively intelligible translation of meaning is the core issue of all hermeneutics. Sociologists and philosophers have come to see the meaning of words as dependent on their usage within a particular language and their function within a particular grammar, which in turn depends upon its setting within the way of life of a particular society. The philosophical task of understanding the meaning of an expression in another culture cannot, according to this view of language, be separated from the sociological problem of providing an exposition of the social structure within which that language is embedded. Taken as a strong doctrine about the dependence of meaning on social structure, such a philosophical position would render translation, if not impossible, at least uncertain and problematic. Unless there is extensive comparability of social structures, one language cannot be intelligibly translated into another. The paradox is that translation is a routine practice and becoming proficient in another language may be difficult but is clearly not impossible. The question of translation can be treated as a specific instance of the more general problem of cultural relativism. The problem of relativism is as old as Western philosophy itself since it was Herodotus and Aristotle who confronted the fact that ‘Fire burns both in Hellas and in Persia; but ~~men’s~~ ideas of right and wrong vary from place to place’. If all beliefs and knowledge are culturally specific, then there are no universal criteria of truth, rationality and goodness by which social practices could be neatly compared or evaluated. There are, however, a number of familiar difficulties with relativism, because, taken to its logical conclusion, it demonstrates that our knowledge of the world is merely ethnocentric, subjective preference. It would mean that no objective, valid comparisons between societies could be made and yet it would be difficult to conceive of knowledge which was not comparative or at least contained comparisons. To know something is, in principle, to be able to speak about it, and language necessarily involves contrasts and comparisons between sameness and difference. As with translation, we constantly compare, despite the apparently insoluble philosophical difficulties of doing so. The questions of translation and relativism inevitably confront the sociologist who attempts a comparative study of two religions, such as Christianity and Islam. In fact, the question of adequate comparisons is so fundamental that it may appear to rule out such an enterprise from inception since the implication of much sociological analysis of Islam is that it is not a ‘religion’ at all but a ‘socio-political system’. The trouble with this implication is that it takes Christianity as a privileged model of what is to count as a ‘religion’ in the first place; perhaps in this respect it is Christianity, not Islam, which is the deviant case. One way into these conceptual puzzles may be to recognize that our contemporary views of other religions, such as Islam, are part of an established tradition of talking about alien cultures. **We understand other cultures by slotting them into a pre-existing code or discourse which renders their oddity intelligible**. We are, in practice, able to overcome the philosophical difficulties of translation by drawing upon various forms of accounting which highlight differences in characteristics between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The culture from which comparisons are to be made can be treated as possessing a number of essential characteristics—rationality, democracy, industrial progress—in terms of which other cultures are seen to be deficient. A table of positive and negative attributes is thus established by which alien cultures can be read off and summations arrived at. Any comparative study of religions will, therefore, tend to draw upon pre-existing assumptions and scholarly traditions which provide an interpretational matrix of contrasts and comparisons. The principal balance sheet by which Islam has been understood in Western culture may be referred to as ‘orientalism’. Orientalism as a system of scholarship first emerged in the early fourteenth century with the establishment by the Church Council of Vienna of a number of university chairs to promote an understanding of oriental languages and culture. The main driving force for orientalism came from trade, inter-religious rivalries and military conflict. **Knowledge of the Orient cannot**, therefore, **be separated from the history of European expansion** into the Middle East and Asia. The discovery of the Cape route to Asia by Vasco da Gama in 1498 greatly extended the province of orientalism, but it was not until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that detailed studies of oriental societies were published in Europe. In Britain, the establishment of the Asiatic Society (of Bengal) in 1784 and the Royal Asiatic Society in 1823 were important landmarks in the development of Western attitudes. Similar developments took place in France with Napoleon’s Institut d’Egypte and the Société Asiatique in 1821; while in Germany an Oriental Society was formed in 1845. It was through these and similar institutions that knowledge of oriental societies, studies of philology and competence in oriental languages were **developed and institutionalized**. While in common sense terms the ‘Orient’ embraces an ill-defined geographical zone extending from the eastern shores of the Mediterranean to South- east Asia, Islam and the Islamic heartlands played a peculiarly significant part in the formation of Western attitudes to the East. Within the category of ‘other religions’, Islam has at least two major distinguishing features. First, Islam as a prophetic, monotheistic religion has very close ties historically and theologically with Christianity. It can be regarded, along with Christianity and Judaism, as a basic variant of the Abrahamic faith. Second, unlike other religions of the Orient, Islam was a major colonizing force inside Europe and from the eighth century onwards provided the dominant culture of southern Mediterranean societies. These two features of Islam raise the question: in what sense is Islam an ‘oriental religion’? This deceptively simple question in fact goes to the heart of the orientalist problematic. If orientalism addresses itself to the issue of what constitutes the Orient, then it is also forced ultimately to define the essence of occidentalism. We might, for example, take a number of Christian cultural attributes—scriptural intellectualism, antimagical rationality or the separation of the religious and the secular—as constitutive of occidentalism in order to mark off the Orient. As we have seen in Chapter 2 this strategy does immediately raise the difficulty that Christianity, as a Semitic, Abrahamic faith by origin, could be counted as ‘oriental’, while Islam, by expansion part of the culture of Spain, Sicily and eastern Europe, could be regarded as ‘occidental’. The problematic religious and geographical status of Islam was recognized by traditional Christian theology which either treated Islam as parasitic upon Judaeo-Christian culture or as a schism within Christianity. In Dante’s Divine Comedy, the Prophet Muhammad is constantly split in two as an eternal punishment for religious schism. The problematic nature of Islam is not, however, merely a difficulty within Christian theology. If the motivating issue behind Christian orientalism was the uniqueness of the Christian revelation with respect to Islamic heresy, then **the crucial question for comparative sociology has been the dynamism of Western, industrial civilisation versus the alleged stagnation of the Orient**. Within Weberian sociology, the fact that Islam is monotheistic, prophetic and ascetic raises important difficulties for the view that Protestant asceticism uniquely performed a critical role in the rise of Western rationality. In The Sociology of Religion (1966), Weber provided two answers to remove this difficulty for the Protestant ethic thesis. First, while recognizing that Muhammad’s initial message was one of ascetic self-control, Weber argued that the social carriers of Islam were Arab warriors who transformed the original salvation doctrine into a quest for land. Hence, the inner angst of Calvinism was never fully present in Islam. Second, the prebendal form of land-ownership in Islam resulted in a centralized state so that Islam became the ideology of a patrimonial structure and precluded the growth of urban asceticism. This argument about social carriers and patrimonial power in Islam permitted Weber to treat Islam as a religion of world acceptance with a formal and legalistic orientation to questions of personal salvation. Since Islam presented no radical challenge to the secular world of power, it failed to develop a rational theodicy which would, in principle, have driven believers to a significant position of world mastery. Islam, by legitimating the status quo, never challenged the political structure in such a way to promote fundamental processes of social change. Weber’s treatment of Islam provides us with the accounting system that constitutes the basis of his comparative sociology of oriental society, of which the central issue is a contrast between dynamic and stationary social systems. The task of Weber’s sociology was to provide an historical account of the emergence of what he took to be the characteristic uniqueness of the West, namely the defining ingredients of rational capitalist production. These ingredients included rational (Roman) law, the modern state, the application of science to all areas of social life, especially to the technology of industrial production, the separation of the family from the business enterprise, autonomous urban institutions, an ascetic lifestyle which initially converted entrepreneurship into a ‘calling’ and finally the bureaucratization of social procedures. These features of capitalist society were the institutional locations of a general process of rationalization in which social relationships were increasingly subject to norms of calculation and prediction. The rationalization of social life involved a continuous alienation of social actors, not only from the means of production, but from the means of mental production and from the military apparatus. The ownership of the means of economic, intellectual and military production are concentrated in bureaucratic, anonymous institutions so that, in Weber’s view, capitalism became an ‘iron cage’ in which the individual is merely a ‘cog’. While the individual is subjected to detailed social regulation, rational law, bureaucratic management and applied science provide the social conditions for economic stability by which capitalist accumulation can proceed unhindered by moral conventions or by capricious political intervention.

**Reps first, construction of threats key to evaluate crises, we’re not saying they aren’t real**

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. xxxvii-xxxviii, TH)

One must recognize both the values that are entailed in prevailing approaches to security and the interactive role that these values play in the production of political crises. The latter do not occur naturally. They are a product of human interaction. The existence of weap- ons alone is not enough for a political disagreement to escalate. For a crisis to become a crisis, as in Korea in 1994 and 2003, “military realities” must intersect with certain projections and perceptions of threats. When that is not the case, even a potentially volatile situa- tion does not turn into a crisis or at least is not seen as such. This was the case, for instance, with the introduction of U.S. missiles into Turkey during the Cold War. Such an act could easily have triggered a Soviet reaction along the lines of the U.S. response to the stationing of Moscow’s missiles in Cuba, which precipitated a highly precari- ous military standoff that almost ended in nuclear war.27 A crisis is an inherently political event, with rather arbitrary be- ginnings and ends that mark shifts in political perception. Consider the latest crisis on the Korean peninsula. According to press reports and policy statements in the Western world, it “broke out” sometime in late 2002, when North Korea started to make public its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The conven- tional interpretation holds that Pyongyang sought to use “nuclear brinkmanship” to put pressure on the international community, most notably the United States. In a last ditch effort to avoid eco- nomic collapse, Kim Jong Il is thus said to have “manufactured a crisis to win concessions.”28 But one could just as easily advance a fundamentally different understanding of the crisis. One could, for instance, locate its beginning earlier in the year, at the moment when the United States declared North Korea to be an evil “rogue state,” when it identified the country as a potential target for a pre- emptive nuclear strike, or when it suspended the promised shipment of much-needed fuel oil to the North.29 Or one could simply note that a crisis is always already contained in the militaristic culture of insecurity that prevails in Korea. The question is simply when the crisis becomes manifest and recognized as such. Drawing attention to the socially constructed dimensions of crises is, of course, not to argue that they are not real or dangerous. Rather, the point is to avoid making the mistake of seeing crises as factually given, thereby missing the key political processes that led to their emergence. Central attention must thus be paid to what David Campbell called the “representation of danger.”30 If one accepts that dangers do not occur naturally but result from a clash of different representations, then an inquiry into the values of these representations becomes central. That such a task must above all scrutinize the role of realism is equally obvious, for realism is, as exemplified by the Perry report, by far the most influential ideology in the domain of foreign and security policy.31 To be more precise, it is probably a combination of liberal and realist values. But some key underlying features of these two ideologies are rather similar anyway. They revolve around an image of international politics as dominated by nation-states and one key structural feature, anarchy: the absence of a central regulatory authority. The international is thus portrayed as a realm of threats and dangers.32 While liberals be- lieve that some of these perils can be mediated through international cooperation, the standard realist response is to protect state sover- eignty, order, and civility at the domestic level by promoting policies that maximize the state’s military capacity and, so it is assumed, its security.33

# PREFER OUR AUTHORS

**Prefer our authors – the media reinforces orientalist stereotypes**

**Park and Wilkins 2k5** (Jane and Karen, University of Oklahoma and University of Texas, “Re-Orienting the Orientalist Gaze,” The Global Media Journal, Spring 2005, <http://lass.calumet.purdue.edu/cca/gmj/sp05/gmj-sp05-park-wilkins.htm>) SLV

It is the job of media to construct images of people, events, and settings; it is the industry of media to do so in ways that reflect the political interests and economic parameters of the governing class. The result? Consistently narrow and misleading portrayals of social and cultural "others." These characterizations become particularly problematic in relation to international and intercultural communities when the groups being constructed are not culturally proximate with those administering the media industries.

With regard to US media representations of the "Orient" – a category that encompasses the geography, peoples, and cultures of the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia – these representational strategies can have devastating consequences. For the majority of those within the US, ignorance of important cultural histories, as well as of global situations with direct domestic implications, may result. For others within the US who exhibit characteristics of cultural otherness associated with the "Orient," discrimination, abuse, and misunderstandings may result. And for those within countries associated with the "Orient" outside of the US, military conflict, political intervention, and economic dominance may result. Media participate at each of these levels, whether in terms of civil harmony or international conflict, perpetuating problematic stereotypes that serve as justification for humiliating interpersonal dynamics as well as misguided superpower intervention.

**The U.S. defines its relationship to other nations through an orientalist lense**

**Park and Wilkins 2k5** (Jane and Karen, University of Oklahoma and University of Texas, “Re-Orienting the Orientalist Gaze,” The Global Media Journal, Spring 2005, <http://lass.calumet.purdue.edu/cca/gmj/sp05/gmj-sp05-park-wilkins.htm>) SLV

Said’s notion of "Orientalism" offers a particularly useful framework for understanding how western media engage in constructing eastern cultures. Orientalism can be thought of on two levels: first, as a theoretical structure that helps us understand the mediated production of cultural texts; and second, as an explanation for a specific set of power dynamics in particular historical contexts.

As a theory, Orientalism suggests that media, along with other central societal institutions, are able to dominate, reshape and have "authority over the Orient" (Said, 1978, p. 3). Key here is the understanding that the relationship between the Occident, in its capacity of media production, and the Orient, as a subject of that production, is one of power. Moreover, while manifest Orientalism, referring to explicitly stated views, may be subject to shifts over time, the more enduring latent Orientalism is much more consistent, and much less subject to change. The latent Orientalism is the more problematic of the two, being accepted and unquestioned as conventional wisdom.

Although many modern institutions participate in this structuring of knowledge over the Orient, media are particularly critical in this process, not just as central institutions in the distribution of knowledge, but as integrally linked to military, political and economic agencies that benefit from a limited view of the Orient as a problem in need of a western, technological fix. As Said explains, "Orientals were rarely seen or looked at; they were seen through, analyzed not as citizens, or even people, but as problems to be solved or confined" (1978, p. 207). Through this process of Orientalism, large groups of people with diverse histories become oversimplified into one monolithic, subordinate and ahistorical category. These problematic constructions are perpetuated through visual images, verbal descriptors, and the selection of experts within the media. While Orientalism describes how western media, and other institutions, dominate through the cultural production of the eastern other, this reflexive process also means that the West defines its own culture, and sense of dominance, in relation to this constructed, subordinate "Orient."

**Prefer our authors – theirs view the world through an orientalist lense**

**Barkawi 08** (Tarak, lecturer in international security at the Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge, specializes in the study of war, “Orientalism at War in Korea,” <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p252622_index.html>) SLV

Military and political leadership, as well as news reporters, are not in the position of scholars in their study. They work within Orientalist frames, seeking to understand, describe and react to events as they develop. Leadership initiates action based on such understandings, actions that can have unexpected outcomes, which then must be accounted for by all involved in terms striving to maintain the identities at stake. In this kind of way, the course of events in a campaign comes to shape and inform Orientalist representations of that campaign, as well as their social consequences. It was simply not possible, as communist forces drove the US and UN out of North Korea, to blandly assert that Americans and ‘Britishers’ cannot be pushed around at will, and expect such arepresentation to ‘stick’ or be accepted without generating comment and criticism, as it did at Willoughby’s press conference quoted above, which became quite testy. In previous press releases as well as official estimates, he had often downplayed the possibility of Chinese intervention, underestimated their numbers, and suggested they would not ‘openly’ take on the US. He was caught out by the Chinese offensive, and had to fall back on other Orientalist resources in efforts to contain the untoward course of events.

# EPISTEMOLOGY

**The way their authors view history is distinctly masculine, it leaves out women, furthers gender hierarchies in IR, and must be questioned**

**Enloe 90,** Cynthia Ph.D. from the University of California/Berkeley “Bananas, Bases, and Patriarchy” in “Women, militarism, and war: essays in history, politics, and social theory,” by Jean Bethke Elshtain and Sheila Tobias, p 187-205 WM

I first began thinking about the piece that eventually became "Bananas, Bases, and Patriarchy" during an afternoon spent at a "Remember Vietnam" symposium. As one male speaker after another told of his experiences during the late 1960s and early 1970s, I realized that women's experiences were being completely left out. It was as if Vietnamese, American, and Cambodian women's lives and thoughts added nothing to our understanding of the causes and consequences of that destructive and controversial war. That afternoon, both the history of the war and the "lessons" we're still trying to extract from it were being masculinized. In the 1980s, two of the regions of the world being most rapidly militarized are the Caribbean and Central America. What will we lose-in our capacity to understand and to act-if we leave women out of our analyses of that militarizing process? The well-known commentators who occupy the stage of almost any critical discussion of imperialism or interventionism apparently believe that there is almost nothing to be gained by looking at women's lives. Emmanuel Wallerstein, Walter Rodney, Samir Amin, Perry Anderson, Noam Chomsky-some of these men are from the "First World," others from the Third. Together, they have helped fashion the intellectual tools many of us use to explain how EXXON, NATO, the IMF (International Monetary Fund), and Hollywood have come to distort relations between the world's rich and poor. But they have developed this critical world view without much consciousness about gender. They almost never ask whether it matters that the Third-World's investment-attracting "cheap labor" is *made* cheap by being feminized. They scarcely ever wonder whether the IMF's standard package of austerity measures imposed on Third-World governments changes the relations between women and men in those countries. They also seem to believe that the expansion of Third-World militaries due to foreign arms sales and the influx of military aid does not depend at all on changing notions of what constitutes "masculine" behavior in those countries or in the donor country. When reading these commentators, we are almost never prompted to try to figure out what the connections might be between international debt, foreign investment, and militarism on the one hand, and violence against women, and domestic work, on the other. The message one comes away with is that the former are inherently "serious" and "political," whereas the latter are "trivial" and "private." Surely everything we have revealed in the last twenty years of the women's movement suggests that we should be very wary of any theory that presumes the economic and emotional relations between women and men to be outside the pale of serious politics. What would be helpful in moving beyond those unexamined presumptions about the peripheral role of gender, at least in the anti-intervention movement, is posing some questions about women's lives. Perhaps by asking where women are and what they are doing, we can start to imagine what a distinctly feminist analysis of international politics would look like.

Viewing Korean conflict from the standpoint of sex workers is key to productive change in the security environment

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. 69-70, TH)

States do, of course, play a central role in East Asian security af- fairs. In that sense the strong statist language is not surprising. It is, perhaps, inevitable. We all slip into it, whether we want it or not. It is often the only way to address the key security dilemmas. But states are not monolithic entities. The policy formations within them are often hotly disputed and under constant transformation. Neither are states the only actors driving events. But statecentric metaphors of security relations make it very difficult to appreciate, or even recognize, the multitude of additional factors that shape security environments. Seen through a strategic studies lens, actors other than states—from international organizations to nongovernmental organi- zations (NGOs), business representatives, or average citizens—simply have no bearing on the political realm or at least not on its security dimensions. And yet these nonstate interactions offer perhaps one of the best opportunities to overcome the antagonistic identity practices that sustain the Korean conflict. An excellent model for bringing people into the realm of the po- litical can be found in feminist critiques of international relations scholarship, which, much like its subdiscipline of security studies, remains wedded to a strong statecentric paradigm. In its prevail- ing neorealist and neoliberal form, international relations schol- arship revolves around understanding the influence of structures and norms of state behavior. The only individuals who matter are those imbued with the power of a “decision maker”: presidents, diplomats, generals, and the occasional CEO of a multinational com- pany. Cynthia Enloe is among a group of innovative scholars who have challenged this narrow vision of the international. She interprets the dynamics of world politics from the vantage point of the margins, by heeding, for instance, the voices of women migrant workers in Mexico or sex workers in brothels outside U.S. military bases in Asia. By theorizing the international from the margins, Enloe reveals what otherwise would remain unnoticed: that “relations between govern- ments depend not only on capital and weaponry, but also on the control of women as symbols, consumers, workers and emotional comforters.”21 A similar visualization of nonstate transformations of security environments is needed in Korea. In this sense I now want to ex- amine how a variety of factors, from the gradual opening of North Korea to the introduction of an engagement policy in the South, have engendered cross-border contacts that contain far more transforma- tive potential than security experts acknowledge.

# A2: REALISM INEVITABLE

The idea that Realism is inevitable reifies patriarchy and is the root of violence

Steans 06 (Jill, Professor of Gender in international relations, Ph.D, “Gender and international relations: issues, debates and future directions,” p. 38, MR)

To recap briefly, feminists have pointed to the gender bias in realism but also criticized realist discourse because of its tendency to present historically contingent features of world order, such as the sovereign state, as 'given'. In the realist construction of the 'state as purposive actor', the state is given a concrete identity through the fusion of the sovereign state with a nationalist construction of political identity. In realism the 'imagined community'I7 of the nation-state is privileged as the single irreducible component of identity and human attachment and thus reduces questions of identity in International Relations to identification on the part of individual citizens with the nation-state. The assumption that the state in some senses embodies the collective identity and will of 'the people' reduces all aspects of social relations which play a role in shaping identities, including violence and conflict for example, to relations between sovereign states. The concept of the 'national interest' as a central organizing concept in International Relations relies upon the assumption that our identification with the nation overrides all other dimensions of social and political identification.

Turn – their ideas of realism are products of masculine perspectives, a feminist perspective offers a more realist approach, while also redefining the way we view the “inevitability of violence.”

Tickner 92**.** (J. Ann, professor at the School of International Relations, Gender in International Relations, pg. 30, MR)

Having examined the connection between realism and masculinity, I shall examine some feminist perspectives on national security. Using feminist theories, which draw on the experiences of women, I shall ask how it would affect the way in which we think about national security if we were to develop an alternative set of assumptions about the indi­vidual, the state, and the international system not based exdusively on the behavior of men. Realist assumptions about states as unitary actors render unproblematic the boundaries between anarchy and order and legitimate and illegitimate violence. If we were to include the experiences of women, how would it affect the way in which we understand the meaning of violence? While women have been less directly involved in international violence as soldiers, their lives have been affected by domestic violence in households, another unprotected space, and by the consequences of war and the policy priorities of militarized societies. Certain feminists have suggested that, because of what they see as a connection between sexism and militarism, violence at all levels of soci­ety is interrelated, a claim that calls into question the realist assumption of the anarchy/order distinction. Most impor­tant, these feminists claim that all types of violence are embedded in the gender hierarchies of dominance and sub­ordination that I described in chapter i. Hence they would argue that until these and other hierarchies associated with class and race are dismantled and until women have control over their own security a truly comprehensive system of security cannot be devised.

Their conception of realism is based on flawed masculine assumptions, forcing constant pursuit of security because violence is “inevitable.”

Tickner 92. (J. Ann, professor at the School of International Relations, Gender in International Relations, pg. 28-30, MR)

I shall begin this chapter by examining the contemporary realist analysis of national security, concentrating on the work of Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, two scholars of international relations whom I define in chapter i as a classi­cal realist and a neorealist, respectively.3 I shall also discuss some of the ideas of Thomas Hobbes and Niccolò Machia­velli, Western political theorists whose writings have had an important influence on contemporary realism. Of all the academic approaches to international relations, political realism is most closely associated with the worldview of foreign policy practitioners, particularly national security specialists. Realists have concentrated their investigations on the activi­ties of the great powers: therefore my discussion in this section will be drawn mainly from the experiences of the great powers, particularly the contemporary United States with whose activities realists are centrally concerned. For realists, security is tied to the military security of the state. Given their pessimistic assumptions about the likely behavior of states in an "anarchic" international environ­ment, most realists are skeptical about the possibility of states ever achieving perfect security. In an imperfect world, where many states have national security interests that go beyond self-preservation and where there is no international govern­ment to curb their ambitions, realists tell us that war could break out at any time because nothing can prevent it. Con­sequently, they advise, states must rely on their own power capabilities to achieve security. The best contribution the discipline of international relations can make to national se‑ curity is to investigate the causes of war and thereby help to design "realistic" policies that can prolong intervals of peace. Realists counsel that morality is usually ineffective in a dan­gerous world: a "realistic" understanding of amoral and in­strumental behavior, characteristic of international politics, is necessary if states are not to fall prey to others' ambitions.In looking for explanations for the causes of war, realists, as well as scholars in other approaches to international rela­tions, have distinguished among three levels of analysis: the individual, the state, and the international system. While realists claim that their theories are "objective" and of uni­versal validity, the assumptions they use when analyzing states and explaining their behavior in the international sys­tem are heavily dependent on characteristics that we, in the West, have come to associate with masculinity. The way in which realists describe the individual, the state, and the international system are profoundly gendered; each is con‑ structed in terms of the idealized or hegemonic masculinity described in chapter i. In the name of universality, realists have constructed a worldview based on the experiences of certain men: it is therefore a worldview that offers us only a partial view of reality.

Realists disregard the patriarchal nature of politics while feminists identify the gendered tendencies, making realism obsolete

Steans 06 (Jill, Professor of Gender in international relations, Ph.D, “Gender and international relations: issues, debates and future directions,” p. 35, MR)

Realists have not reflected on how this (inherited) conceptual baggage, specifically how the conceptions of power, autonomy, sovereignty and world order, are gendered. Most have been content to take the masculinized nature of world politics as yet another natural and immutable 'fact'. In contrast, feminists have called for reflexivity on just such matters, pointing out that the use of gendered imagery in realist texts is highly significant. Thus, feminists have focused not on the 'objective facts' of an anarchic, dangerous world, but rather on how dominant discourses in IR have worked systematically to create a conception of international politics as a realm characterized by ever-present 'threats' and 'dangers' and, in this way, present the world as disorderly and hostile.5 In realist texts, the political community (nation-state) has been constructed as a community of men whose power and autonomy is predicated upon the ability to control and/or dominate those 'outside'. The realist conception of the autonomous state has been juxtapositioned against images of anarchy or a disorderly international 'state of nature'. The use of such imagery has to be seen in terms of a deeply rooted fear of the 'feminine'. Thus, Ann Runyan has argued that: Whether the state has been viewed as continuous with nature, or juxtaposed to nature, its metaphysics has read order, unity, and an intolerance of difference, into both nature and the body politic. This has lead to a suppression and exploitation of all those things defined as 'natural' (including women) and that do not fit into the designs of the white, Western man and his state.6

Realism not inevitable- incorporation of feminist ideals reconceptualizes the state

Steans 06 (Jill, Professor of Gender in international relations, Ph.D, “Gender and international relations: issues, debates and future directions,” p. 33, MR)

In the first part of this chapter, realism serves as the point of departure in under­ standing the place of gender in the theorization of the state in IR. To a great extent, the invisibility or marginalization of gender in the study of IR is a consequence of the methodological individualism in realism. Ann Tickner argues that an 'ontology based on unitary states operating in the asocial, anarchical world has provided few entry points for feminist theories, since these were grounded in an epistemology that took social relations as its central category of analysis.'! Realism has been a particular target of feminist critique because it has been an influential-indeed for a long time dominant- approach within IR and has provided a 'common-sense' view of the world for practitioners as well as theorists in IR. As Ann Tickner argued in her critique of realist discourse, 'the most dangerous threat to both a man and a state is to be like a woman because women are weak, fearful, indecisive, and dependent - stereotypes that still surface when assessing women's suitability for the military and the conduct of foreign policy today.'2 Feminist work has contributed to a reconceptualization of the state as a dynamic entity that is made and remade through discourses and practices that embed and reproduce both gendered understandings of the world and particular kinds of gender relations in the world of international politics. Accordingly, the second part of the chapter moves beyond critique to set out the various ways that gender is at work in the practice of 'state-making', specifically in the construction of identities and in the boundaries of political community. The third section of this chapter focuses on gendered conceptions of citizenship.

# A2: REALISM

**Realism has been failing in korea for 50 years**

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. xxvii-xxviii, TH)

One of the key features of politics in Korea is a persistently recurring state of military tension. The roots of this conflict are historical: as a result of the emerging Soviet-American rivalry at the end of World War II, the Korean peninsula was tentatively divided along the thirty- eighth parallel. With the creation of two politically and ideologically separate Korean states in 1948, and their subsequent confrontation during the Korean War, the patterns for conflict in northeast Asia were set. In 1953 the Armistice Agreement ended three years of in- tense fighting that killed more than a million people. But the memory of violence and death continues to dominate politics on the penin- sula. More than half a century later, and more than a decade after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Korea remains hermetically divided between a Communist North and a capitalist South, caught in a tense and highly anachronistic Cold War stalemate. The presence of weapons of mass destruction, combined with a hostile rhetoric and the intersection of great power interests, has created an ever-present danger of military confrontation. Nearly two million troops face each other across the dividing line at the thirty-eighth parallel. Conventional security approaches, based on deterrence and realist ideology, have failed to bring lasting security to the region.

**Ignoring critical theory is not neutral – accepts realism as objective when it’s not. Means you aren’t actually getting rid of theory, but just making assumptions about what is given.**

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. xlviii-xlix, TH)

Can a book that favors a critical and conceptual rethinking over a problem-solving approach still be relevant to policy makers? The an- swer is yes, but I need to elaborate. The lack of communication be- tween academics and practitioners is, of course, notorious. Andrew Mack stresses that the institutional and disciplinary structures of academia award scholars not for making policy recommendations but for advancing theoretical contributions.57 When urged to com- ment on the key political challenges of his day, Martin Heidegger, for instance, responded that he could not help, that it is not the task of thinking to make public statements on moral and practical is- sues.58 Obstacles from the other side are equally high because, as Mack points out, policy makers rarely have the time for extensive reading. And if they do read, they often feel alienated by the ab- stract theoretical language that permeates many academic analyses. William Tow, an experienced analyst of East Asian security policy, stresses that many policy makers in the region view theoretical debates emanating from the West as “intellectually elegant but distant from their own immediate interests and agendas.” Rather than participating in academic debates, Asian policy makers base their strategic decisions mostly on intelligence assessments, cables dispatched from foreign missions, and discussions within their own policy community.59 The problem is, of course, that all these discus- sions, briefs, and dispatches are framed, as Tow acknowledges, by the prevailing statecentric and realist approach that I have identified as the main obstacle to a more peaceful security arrangement in Korea. This tendency is even more problematic because realist per- spectives are not presented as the ideological positions that they are but as detached and factual assessments of strategic reality. Realist approaches to foreign policy have been around for so long and have become so influential that their political origin appears more and more real until the ensuing worldviews, and the conflicts that they generate, seem inevitable, even natural. We begin to “lie herd-like in a style obligatory for all,” Nietzsche would say.60 A more adequate security policy must, as I argued earlier, chal- lenge the equation of realist ideology with objectivity and common sense. A major purpose of rethinking security policies is thus to ques- tion their taken-for-granted nature. This cannot be done without a certain distancing from the way in which security issues have con- ventionally been portrayed. Some speak of a need to “defamiliarize commonsense understandings” of security to make their constructed nature apparent.61 My own attempt at doing so is based primarily on two strategies.

**Realism fails in south korea and north korea**

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. xxxviii-xxxix, TH)

Although some analysts see a gradual weakening of realist doctrines in East Asian politics in favor of more cooperative liberal approaches,34 many of the most fundamental realist values continue to guide foreign policy decisions, even when they reflect seemingly liberal principles. That realist defense postures only increase every- one else’s insecurity is evident, not least through extensive realist at- tempts to theorize the respective dilemmas. Far less certain, though, and what I dispute here, is whether realist theories and policies remain adequate, and ethical, to deal with the increasingly complex and interactive security situation on the Korean peninsula. Few experts on Korean security have sought to address these normative challenges. Moon Chung-in and Judy E. Chung are among the rare exceptions. They stress that neither realist nor liberal approaches can offer a comprehensive explanation of war and peace in East Asia. Missing from these analyses is “the formation of national identity and the nature of mutual perception among contesting parties.” Understanding the realm of identity formation is central, Moon and Chung insist, because “at a very deep level, state behav- ior is shaped by what states are—and what they are is socially con- structed.”35 While basing my inquiry on similar assumptions, I try to take the issue one step further by demonstrating that the inside- outside (il)logic that lies at the heart of realist defense postures generates and entrenches the very antagonistic identity constructs that have been identified as the key source of tension on the Korean peninsula.

**Violence on the peninsula = structural problem, not mini-tactical instances. Staying within current realist thought and not engaging the question of reconciliation causes error replication.**

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. xxix-xxx, TH)

One can argue about who is to blame for the renewed tensions in Korea. To engage these debates is not the purpose of this book, at least not in the conventional sense. Instead I seek to understand and deal with the more fundamental question of why such standoffs keep emerging and reemerging in the first place. The persistently recurring pattern of conflict suggests a more deeply entrenched structural problem, one that goes far beyond short-term tactical maneuverings of policy makers. The key actors, issues, and policy perspectives change constantly, but the nature of the problem remains the same. This is why fundamentally new forms of thinking and acting are required, for it is hardly possible to find a way out of the current security dilemmas through the political mind-sets that have created them in the first place. Without dealing with questions of reconciliation and forgiveness, the present culture of insecurity is unlikely to give way to a more peaceful order. But the task of constructing a nonviolent future out of a violent past is, of course, not easy. How is one to facilitate non- violent coexistence among people divided by the memory of pain and death? What are they to remember? And how? What are they to forget? And why? These difficult but fundamental questions are hardly ever posed in Korea, where antagonistic Cold War rhetoric and a general climate of fear and distrust continue to drive interac- tions between the key actors. A sustained diplomatic breakthrough cannot occur without first promoting a culture of reconciliation. To argue this is, of course, not necessarily new or radical. Many security experts would readily agree. Jang Si Young and Ahn Pyong-Seong, for instance, stress that genuine peace is unlikely in the immediate future because “it will require considerable time for the two Koreas to promote exchanges and confidence building” before any progress can be made.3 But in the logic of prevailing realist security thinking, the absence of a culture of reconciliation calls for a reinforcement of conventional defense postures. This is why Jang and Ahn argue that a “sustained build-up of its military strength is essential [to South Korea’s] se- curity.” A similar logic underlies the U.S. position toward North Korea. It is based on the assumption that the only “genuine alterna- tive to war with North Korea is now, and always has been, credible deterrence.”4 But militaristic and statecentric approaches to security (which continue to guide policy making, media coverage, and many influential academic analyses) reproduce the very dangers that they wish to ward off. A detailed study by Moon Chung-in, for instance, has shown how various attempts to manage the Korean conflict through the conventional logic of military deterrence have turned out disastrously. They have “driven North and South Korea into the trapping structure of a vicious cycle of actions and reactions.”5

**Western sources use the myth of “the unknown” to avoid countervailing data and maintain objectivity of their false conclusions. Boo realism. No objective reality.**

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. xxxv-xxxvii, TH)

Journalists, academics, and policy makers tend to stress that the so-called hermit kingdom of North Korea is so secretive that it is virtually impossible to obtain objective information about how it makes policy. “We are completely ignorant of what is happening in that part of Korea,” summarizes one observer.16 Economists emphasize similar themes, stressing, for instance, that the North is a “statistical wasteland.”17 The refrain of an unknowable hermit kingdom is equally central to newspaper representations of North Korea, which tend to emphasize, or at least imply, how rare it is for a journalist to be allowed to report from this reclusive country.18 North Korea is, indeed, one of the world’s most secluded states. Much about the decision making that occurs is impossible to re- trace. But more details about North Korea are becoming known to the outside world. There are increasingly numerous and detailed studies on society and politics, including Pyongyang’s foreign policy and negotiating behavior.19 Moreover, as a result of the famines that followed the floods of 1995, various representatives of foreign humanitarian organizations took up residence in North Korea. They were given more and more access to the country, something that had hitherto been inconceivable. Some say they have access to 75 percent of the country or 80 percent of the population.20 Clearly, the hermit kingdom is no longer quite as reclusive as its reputation has it. Hazel Smith goes so far as to speak of a “de facto opening up of the country to the outside world.” She stresses that many of the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) active in the North have been able to get access to significant information about the country, often with the assistance of government authorities. But the reports that document these experiences and insights seem to have little influence in the West.21 Cumings, likewise, argues that a wealth of information is now available about many crucial aspects of North Korea’s history, but Western policy analysts hardly ever consult this data.22 Even as they perpetuate the image of an unknowable hermit kingdom, many influential academic and policy approaches toward North Korea advance strong claims to objectivity. This practice is as widespread as it is paradoxical. Consider a South Korean report on human rights in North Korea. The authors readily admit that there is a “lack of verifiable or corroborating evidence.” But that does not prevent them from stressing that their study is “based on facts.”23 This tendency is particularly fateful in the domain of foreign and security policy. Look at how the otherwise nuanced Perry report, commissioned by President Bill Clinton, insisted that the United States should deal with North Korea “as it is, not as we might wish it to be.” It advocated a “realist view, a hard-headed understanding of military realities.”24 There is no such thing as an “objective reality,” especially not in the domain of security policy, which revolves not only around fac- tual occurrences but also, and above all, around the projection and evaluation of threats. The latter are inevitably matters of perception and judgment. This is particularly the case in Korea, where there has been far too much destruction and antagonistic rhetoric to allow for observations that are even remotely objective. Several prominent authors have indeed acknowledged that it is impossible to advance value-free judgments on Korean politics and history.25 An extensive empirical survey of newspaper articles in South Korea confirms this impression. It demonstrated that explicit “value-oriented” report- ing is much more frequent in coverage of North Korea than any other topic. Basing their analyses on a survey of two “conservative” (Donga Ilbo and Seoul Sinmun) and one “progressive” (Hankyorae Sinmun) newspaper, the researchers categorized stories as being “fac- tual,” “value-oriented,” or “normative.” They considered the vast majority of reports to be factual, but value-oriented and normative attitudes were most common in stories relating to North Korean politics. The authors also stress how much this form of reporting, which is mostly negative, has influenced public perceptions over the past decades.26 Strategic “reality” in Korea is the reality seen through the lenses of the strategic studies paradigm. This paradigm filters or selects information in a way that sets limits on what can and cannot be rec-ognized as “real” and “realistic.” The policy perspectives that are based on realist ideology can thus be presented as “hard-headed” understandings of “military realities,” even though (or, precisely because) next to nothing is known (or being acknowledged) about the actual realities of North Korea. But because the realist ideology is articulated from the privileged position of the state, any oppos- ing perspective can relatively easily be dismissed as unreasonable or unrealistic. A more adequate understanding of the nature and function of se- curity policy in Korea must thus problematize approaches that seek to legitimize themselves through an uncritical reference to “reality.” One must ask: whose reality? For what purpose? In whose inter- est? With what consequences? Needed, then, are not only policy approaches based on an understanding of North Korea “as it is” but also, and above all, attempts to understand how the current security dilemmas “have become what they are.”

**Realism only focuses on what happens TO politics – our focus is key to seeing what prostitutes do WITH politics**

Moon, 1997 (Katharine H.S., Professor in the Department of [Political Science](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_science) at [Wellesley College,](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wellesley_College) “Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S./Korea Relations,” p. 54, TH)

About twenty-five years later, current conceptions of nongovernmental actor have not expanded significantly upon Keohane and Nye's original formulation; the definition of "actor" as applied to the poorest and most dispossessed of women still goes wanting. In 1996, Weiss and Gordenker emphasize organization and "internationally-endorsed objectives" 28 as the defining characteristics of nonstate actors. They argue that no matter what one calls nonstate actors, "[t]here seems no quarrel, however, with the notion that these organizations consist of durable, bounded, voluntary relationships among individuals to produce a particular product, using specific techniques." 29 Again, these parameters leave most of the world's women outside the domain of recognized political processes and in the role of victim or bystander. Most poor women's political interests are matters of day-to-day survival, not of bounded durability, and most assert their interests through whatever apertures in the system they can take advantage of, rather than through organized techniques aimed at a "particular product." It is more useful to view disempowered women as players in world politics from the perspective of what they do with politics across borders--survive, adapt, facilitate, criticize, and resist--than what they do to it. Such women may not mitigate the sovereignty of states, as transnational organizations do, and they may not forge interests and coalitions across borders, as NGOs do, but they do share in the process of "politici[zing] the previously unpolicitized and connect[ing] the local and the global." 30

**Realism is insufficient – IR is not just a question of power relations**

Moon, 1997 (Katharine H.S., Professor in the Department of [Political Science](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_science) at [Wellesley College,](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wellesley_College) “Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S./Korea Relations,” p. 53, TH)

The Korean case points out that foreign control and domination of women is variable and that Marxist-influenced correlations between interstate relations and women's oppression do not account for the variability. The basic problem is that such correlations assume a zero-sum relationship between a stronger state and a weaker state's interactions. But studies on organizational/institutional behavior, big power/small power relations, 23 and dependent development 24 point to the fact that actual bargaining activities of states are not fixed by discernible disparities in power. They illustrate ways in which a weaker power can gain leverage over the stronger power, given a particular context of interests and commitments. Viewing strong- weak state relations as an interactive process, then, offers us a more open-ended array of consequences and roles in interstate relations for women. In addition, perpetuating a static dichotomy of power relations between nations, so that the women of the weaker nation are always oppressed and exploited by the men of the stronger nation (with the help of local operators, of course), does not help us "disaggregrate" the content and degree of exploitation and abuse. With respect to the U.S.-ROK power relations and military prostitution, what exactly are we trying to explain? Causes and characteristics of the sex trade? Variations in prostitution practices among the different military camps? Changes in the system over time? Or do we focus on the kind and degree of poverty, social degradation, and "choice" confronting the individual women in the prostitution systems?

**Prostitution founds U.S.-Korean relations**

Moon, 1997 (Katharine H.S., Professor in the Department of [Political Science](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_science) at [Wellesley College,](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wellesley_College) “Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S./Korea Relations,” p. 21, TH)

The specific intergovernmental context in focus here is the disparities in power (unequal military, economic, and diplomatic capabilities) between the Republic of Korea and the United States during the first half of the 1970s, which marked the beginning of U.S. distance from Asian military conflict, with the application of the Nixon Doctrine. This study of U.S.-Korea kijich'on prostitution seeks to strengthen and refine feminist analysis of foreign policy by asking when, how, and why governments use women, not just gendered ideology, as instruments of foreign policy, how specific uses affect women's lives, and if participation in the process politicizes the women's self-identities. In the process, we may find that women are more directly involved in international politics than through their part in gendered schemes of power, that their relationship with foreign soldiers personify and define, not only underlie, relations between governments. Although we rarely, if ever, think of women and prostitution as actors and issues in foreign policy, the following pages show that the sexual health and work conduct of Korean kijich'on prostitutes became an urgent and regular focus of joint U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) actions in the first half of the 1970s through the "Camptown Clean-Up Campaign" (also called "Purification Movement"). The 1971-76 Minutes of the U.S.-ROK Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 20 Joint Committee and its Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Civil- Military Relations, which provide much of the historical documentation for this study, offer detailed descriptions of such actions. The five-year Clean-Up effort coincided with the Seoul government's desperate attempts to prevent further withdrawal of U.S. troops, begun under the Nixon Doctrine, and to gain the reaffirmation, through U.S. policy statements and increased military assistance, of Washington's commitment to South Korean security. Korean kijich'on prostitutes, through the Clean-Up Campaign, became integral to the efforts of the U.S. Forces in Korea and the Seoul government to secure firm U.S. military commitment to the Republic.

**A focus on solely the inter-state nature of U.S.-Korean relations obscures the crucial role that prostitution played in cementing it**

Moon, 1997 (Katharine H.S., Professor in the Department of [Political Science](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_science) at [Wellesley College,](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wellesley_College) “Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S./Korea Relations,” p. 15-16, TH)

The selling and buying of sex by Koreans and Americans have been a staple of U.S.-Korean relations since the Korean War (1950-53) and the permanent stationing of U.S. troops in Korea since 1955. It would not be far-fetched to say that more American men have become familiar with camptown prostitution in Korea since the 1950s than with military strategy and Korea's GNP figures. Since the war, over one million Korean women have served as sex providers for the U.S. military. And millions of Koreans and Americans have shared a sense of special bonding, for they have together shed blood in battle and mixed blood through sex and Amerasian offspring. U.S. military-oriented prostitution in Korea is not simply a matter of women walking the streets and picking up U.S. soldiers for a few bucks. It is a system that is sponsored and regulated by two governments, Korean and American (through the U.S. military). The U.S. military and the Korean government have referred to such women as "bar girls," "hostesses," "special entertainers," "businesswomen," and "comfort women." Koreans have also called these women the highly derogatory names, yanggalbo (Western whore) and yanggongju (Western princess). As this study reveals, both governments have viewed such prostitution as a means to advance the "friendly relations" of both countries and to keep U.S. soldiers, "who fight so hard for the freedom of the South Korean people," happy. 2 The lives of Korean women working as prostitutes in military camptowns have been inseparably tied to the activities and welfare of the U.S. military installations since the early 1950s. To varying degrees, USFK (U.S. Forces, Korea) and ROK authorities have controlled where, when, and how these "special entertainers" work and live. The first half of the 1970s witnessed the consolidation of such joint U.S.-ROK control. This book attempts to bring two strands of U.S.-Korea relations together, the first being a story about people-to-people relations in the camptowns and the second about state-to-state relations between Seoul and Washington. We have a tendency to understand foreign relations as sets of policies that are formulated and executed by an elite group of men in dark suits, as abstracted from individual lives, especially in the lowest reaches of society. Kijich'on women, who occupy those reaches, would then be destined to invisibility and silence, though in fact, evidence shows that they were very much an integral part of the tensions and negotiations between U.S. and ROK officials in the 1970s. By following both strands and knitting them together, the hope is to reveal how private relations among people and foreign relations between governments inform and are informed by each other. Specifically, we shall explore how and why these women became a symbol of the Korean government's desire for and the USFK's assurance and commitment to a continued, large U.S. military presence in Korea in the context of the Nixon Doctrine; this change in foreign policy mandated a 20,000 reduction of U.S. troops from Korea (chapter 3). In short, the focus is on the role of the women as instruments in the promotion of two governments' bilateral security interests. There is another hope contained in the writing of this book: to help lift the curtains of invisibility that have shrouded the kijich'on women's existence and to offer these pages as passageway for their own voices. Many of the women I met and learned about while conducting field research in Korea (1991-92) were far from silent when engaged. They often offered biting criticisms of the Korean government, the U.S. military, of American life, and of one another's child-rearing habits, relationships with GI customers, and make-up style. They ranged widely in personality, age, reasons for selling sex, adaptation to kijich'on life, and future aspirations. But they also shared some commonalities: The vast majority of the prostitutes in the 1950s to the 1970s had barely completed elementary school; junior high graduates were considered highly educated among such women. 3 Most, especially among the earlier generations of prostitutes (1950s-70s), came from poor families in Korea's countryside, with one parent or both parents missing or unable to provide for numerous family members. The earliest prostitutes were camp followers of troops during the Korean War; they did laundry, cooked, and tended to the soldiers' sexual demands. Some had been widowed by the war, others orphaned or lost during a family's flight from bombs and grenades. Many of the kijich'on prostitutes considered themselves "fallen women" even before entering prostitution because they had lost social status and self-respect from divorce, rape, sex, and/or pregnancy out of wedlock. For these women, camptowns served as a place of self-exile as well as a last resort for earning a livelihood.

**Status quo understandings of IR function through the silent exclusion of women’s perspectives – an examination of gender binaries is crucial to an accurate understanding of history and power**

**Enloe 93** – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “Bananas, Beaches and Bases” p. 1-6 MT)

Ambassadors cabling their home ministries, legislators passing laws to restrict foreign imports, bank executives negotiating overseas loans, soldiers landing on foreign hillsides these are some of the sites from which one can watch the international political system being made. But if we employ only the conventional, ungendered compass to chart international politics, we are likely to end up mapping a landscape peopled only by men, mostly élite men. The real landscape of international politics is less exclusively male. A European woman decides to take her holiday in Jamaica because the weather is warm, it is cheap and safe for tourists. In choosing this form of pleasure, she is playing her part in creating the current international political system. She is helping the Jamaican government earn badly needed foreign currency to repay overseas debts. She is transforming 'chambermaid' into a major job category. And, unwittingly, if she travels on holiday with a white man, she may make some Jamaican men, seeing every day the privileges economic and sexual garnered by white men, feel humiliated and so nourish nationalist identities rooted in injured masculinity. A school teacher plans a lesson around the life of Pocahontas, the brave Powhantan 'princess' who saved Captain John Smith from execution at Jamestown and so cleared the way for English colonization of America. The students come away from the lesson believing the convenient myth that local women are likely to be charmed by their own people's conquerors. In the 1930s Hollywood moguls turned Brazilian singer Carmen Miranda into an American movie star. They were trying to aid President Franklin Roosevelt's efforts to promote friendlier relations between the US and Latin America. When United Fruit executives then drew on Carmen Miranda's popular Latinized female image to create a logo for their imported bananas, they were trying to construct a new, intimate relationship between American housewives and a multinational plantation company. With her famous fruited hats and vivacious screen presence, Carmen Miranda was used by American men to reshape international relations. Carmen Miranda alerts us to the fact that it would be a mistake to confine an investigation of regional politics or international agribusiness to male foreign-policy officials, male company executives and male plantation workers. Omitting sexualized images, women as consumers and women as agribusiness workers, leaves us with a political analysis that is incomplete, even naïve. When a British soldier on leave from duties in Belize or West Germany decides that he can't tolerate his friends' continuous razzing about being 'queer' and so finally joins them in a visit to a local brothel in order to be 'one of the boys', he is shaping power relations between the British military and the society it is supposed to be protecting. He is also reinforcing one of the crucial bulwarks masculinity which permits the British government to use a military force to carry out its foreign policy among its former colonies and within NATO. Military politics, which occupy such a large part of international politics today, require military bases. **Bases are artificial societies created out of unequal relations** between men and women of different races and classes. The women tourist, the Jamaican chambermaid, Carmen Miranda, the American housewife, the British soldier and Belize prostitute are all dancing an intricate international minuet. But they aren't all in a position to call the tune. Each has been used by the makers of the international political system, but some are more complicit and better rewarded than others. A poor woman who has been deprived of literacy (especially in the language of the ruling group), bank credit or arable land is likely to find that the intrusions of foreign governments and companies in her daily life exacerbate, not relieve, those burdens. The woman tourist may not be Henry Kissinger, but she is far removed from the daily realities confronting the Jamaican woman who is changing her sheets. The American housewife who buys United Fruit bananas because the 'Chiquita' logo gives her a sense of confidence in the product may not be Margaret Thatcher, but the problems she confronts as a woman are less acute than those facing the Latin American fruit vendor making a living on the streets. **Power infuses all international relationships**. Most of us, understandably, would prefer to think That our attraction to a certain food company's marketing logo is a cultural, not a political act. We would like to imagine that going on holiday to Bermuda rather than Grenada is merely a social, even aesthetic matter, not a question of politics. But in these last decades of the twentieth century, that unfortunately isn't so. Company logos are designed to nourish certain presumptions we have about different cultures; usually they reinforce global hierarchies between countries. Similarly, tourism has become a business that is maintaining dozens of governments. Power, not simply taste, is at work here. **Ignoring women on the landscape of international politics perpetuates the notion that certain power relations are merely a matter of** taste and **culture**. Paying serious attention to women can expose how much power it takes to maintain the international political system in its present form. American popular culture today demands that any political idea worth its salt should fit on a bumper sticker. A feminist theory bumper sticker might say, 'Nothing is natural well, almost nothing'. As one learns to look at this world through feminist eyes, one learns to ask whether anything that passes for inevitable, inherent, 'traditional' or biological has in fact been made. One begins to ask how all sorts of things have been made a treeless landscape, a rifle-wielding police force, the 'Irishman joke', an all-women typing pool. Asking how something has been made implies that it has been made by someone. Suddenly there are clues to trace; there is also blame, credit and responsibility to apportion, not just at the start but at each point along the way. The presumption that something that gives shape to how we live with one another is inevitable, a 'given', is hard to dislodge. It seems easier to imagine that something oozes up from an indeterminate past, that it has never been deliberately concocted, does not need to be maintained, that it's just there. But if the treeless landscape or all-women typing pool can be shown to be the result of someone's decision and has to be perpetuated, then it is possible to imagine alternatives. 'What if . . .?' can be a radical question. Conventionally both masculinity and femininity have been treated as 'natural', not created. Today, however, there is mounting evidence that they are packages of expectations that have been created through specific decisions by specific people. We are also coming to realize that the traditional concepts of masculinity and femininity have been surprisingly hard to perpetuate: it has required the daily exercise of power domestic power, national power, and, as we will see, international power So far feminist analysis has had little impact on international politics. Foreign-policy commentators and decision-makers seem particularly confident in dismissing feminist ideas. Rare is the professional commentator on international politics who takes women's experiences seriously. Women's experiences of war, marriage, trade, travel, factory work are relegated to the 'human interest' column. Women's roles in creating and sustaining international politics have been treated as if they were 'natural' and thus not worthy of investigation. Consequently, how the conduct of international politics has depended on men's control of women has been left unexamined. This has meant that those wielding influence over foreign policy have escaped responsibility for how women have been affected by international politics. Perhaps international politics has been impervious to feminist ideas precisely because for so many centuries in so many cultures it has been thought of as a typically 'masculine' sphere of life. Only men, not women or children, have been imagined capable of the sort of public decisiveness international politics is presumed to require. **Foreign affairs are written about with a total disregard for feminist revelations about how power depends on sustaining notions about masculinity and femininity**. Local housing officials, the assumption goes, may have to take women's experiences into account now and then. Social workers may have to pay some attention to feminist theorizing about poverty. Trade-union leaders and economists have to give at least a nod in the direction of feminist explanations of wage inequalities. Yet officials making international policy and their professional critics are freed from even a token consideration of women's experiences and feminist understandings of those experiences. This book aims to cast doubt on those comfortable assumptions. By taking women's experiences of international politics seriously, I think **we can acquire a more realistic understanding of how international politics actually 'works'**. We may also increase women's confidence in using their own experiences and knowledge as the basis for making sense of the sprawling, abstract structure known as 'the international political economy'. Women should no longer have to disguise their feminist curiosity when they speak up on issues of international significance. Even women who have learned how crucial it is to always ask feminist questions about welfare, science, bus routes, police procedures have found it hard to ask feminist questions in the midst of a discussion about the international implications of Soviet perestroika or Britain's trade policies in the European Economic Community. We are made to feel silly. Many women find it tempting to build up credibility in this still-masculinized area of political discussion by lowering their voices an octave, adjusting their body postures and demonstrating that they can talk 'boy's talk' as well as their male colleagues. One result of women not being able to speak out is that we may have an inaccurate understanding of how power relations between countries are created and perpetuated. Silence has made us dumb. Relations between governments involve the workings of at least two societies sometimes twenty. Thinking about international politics is most meaningful when it derives from contact with the diverse values, anxieties and memories of people in those societies. Yet such access is itself gendered. As a British woman explained at the first meeting of the European Forum of Socialist Feminists, 'In this world it is men who do the travelling. They are so much more mobile, have so many more forums than women do military, financial, they even have spy rings! Whereas it's rare for women to have any kind of international forum, organized by and for us.' 1 So when women do manage to get together at their own meetings not just in caucuses of other people's meetings they usually become absorbed in making comparisons. In international forums women today are comparing how racism and class barriers divide women in their respective societies. We are comparing different explanations for the persistence of sexism and strategies for ending that sexism, but it is difficult to get the chance to work together to create a feminist description of the larger international frameworks that link women. For instance, when groups of women from several countries in Europe meet, do they try to hammer out a feminist analysis of 'Europe', or use their international comparisons as the basis for a fresh explanation of the political workings of NATO and the European Community? Usually they don't have an opportunity to do so. As a result, international politics remains relatively untouched by feminist thought.2 It's difficult to imagine just what feminist questioning would sound like in the area of international politics. Some women have come to believe that there is a fundamental difference between men and women. 'Virtually everyone at the top of the foreign-policy bureaucracies is male,' they argue, 'so how could the outcome be other than violent international conflict?' That is, men are men, and men seem almost inherently prone to violence; so violence is bound to come about if men are allowed to dominate international politics. At times this sweeping assertion has the unsettling ring of truth. There's scarcely a woman who on a dark day hasn't had a suspicion this just might be so. Yet most of the women from various cultures who have created the theories and practices which add up to feminism have not found this 'essentialist' argument convincing. Digging into the past and present has made them reluctant to accept explanations that rest on an assertion that men and women are inherently different. Men trying to invalidate any discussion of gender in international politics tend to quote a litany of militaristic women leaders: 'Well, if you think it's men who are causing all the international violence, what about Margaret Thatcher, Indira Gandhi and Jeanne Kirkpatrick?' Most women or men who have been treating feminist analyses seriously have little trouble in responding to this now ritualistic jibe. It's quite clear to them that a woman isn't inherently or irreversibly anti-militaristic or anti-authoritarian. It's not a matter of her chromosomes or her menstrual cycle. It's a matter of social processes and structures that have been created and sustained over the generations sometimes coercively to keep most women out of any political position with influence over state force. On occasion, élite men may let in a woman here or a woman there, but these women aren't randomly selected. Most of the time **we scarcely notice that governments look like men's clubs.** We see a photo of members of the Soviet Union's Politburo, or the US Cabinet's sub-committee on national security, of negotiators at a Geneva textile bargaining session, and it's easy to miss the fact that all the people in these photographs are men. One of the most useful functions that Margaret Thatcher has served is to break through our numbness. When Margaret Thatcher stood in Venice with Mitterand, Nakasone, Reagan and the other heads of state, we suddenly noticed that everyone else was male. One woman in a photo makes it harder to ignore that the men are men.

**Realist discourse renders women invisible in the political sphere and legitimizes a gender dichotomy**

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Feminists in IR argue that realism, dominated by elite, white, male practitioners, is a patriarchal discourse that renders women invisible from the high politics of IR even as it depends on women's subjugation as a "'domesticated' figure whose 'feminine' sensibilities are both at odds with and inconsequential to the harsh 'realities' of the public world of men and states" (Runyan and Peterson 1991, 68-69). Feminists in IR explain the exclusion of women from foreign policy decision making by pointing to the "extent to which international politics is such a thoroughly masculinized sphere of activity that women's voices are considered inauthentic" (Tickner 1992, 4). Women's traditional exclusion from the military and continuing lack of access to political power at times presents women with a "catch-22" situation. For example, the importance of a candidate's military service as a qualification for government office in U.S. political campaigns puts women, who cannot appeal to this experience, at a disadvantage in obtaining the elite status of national office and thus the ability to affect defense and security policies (Tobias 1990; cf. Elshtain 2000, 445).

**Rejection of realism challenges idea of traditional IR**

**Shepherd 8** [Laura J. Shepherd, Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham, “Gender, Violence and Global Politics: Contemporary Debates in Feminist Security Studies,” EBSCO]

All of the texts under discussion in this essay argue that it is imperative to explore and expose gendered power relations and, further, that doing so not only enables a rigorous critique of realism in IR but also reminds us as scholars of the need for such a critique. The critiques of IR offered by feminist scholars are grounded in a rejection of neo-realism/realism as a dominant intellectual framework for academics in the discipline and policy makers alike. As Enloe reminds us, ‘the government-centred, militarized version of national security [derived from a realist framework] remains the dominant mode of policy thinking’ (Enloe, 2007, p. 43). Situating gender as a central category of analysis encourages us to ‘think outside the “state security box”’ (p. 47) and to remember that ‘the “individuals” of global politics do not work alone, live alone or politic alone – they do so in interdependent relationships with others’ (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, p. 200) that are inherently gendered. One of the key analytical contributions of all three texts is the way in which they all challenge what it means to be ‘doing’ IR, by recognising various forms of violence, interrogating the public/private divide and demanding that attention is paid to the temporal and physical spaces in-between war and peace.

**Realism and state-centric decision making fails to address transnational crises**

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As images and were adjusted, different issues, actors, and processes gained visibility. Domestic bureaucratic politics were revealed as significant factors in foreign policy decision making. The role of misperceptions in decision-making by national leaders became a focus of inquiry. Increased Third World voices in the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) focused attention on the relationships between prosperity of the North and underdevelopment of the South. Regimes analysis explored how states in fact cooperate even without reference to governmental structures. The world at the turn of the century confirms the need to rethink categories and frameworks as we pursue new understandings that "match" new world politics. For example, both decentralization (marked by sub nationalist movements) and centralization processes (exemplified by the European Union) challenge conventional accounts of sovereign states, The demise of the former Soviet Union disrupts decades of East-West analysis**. Crises of nuclear proliferation, economic maldevelopment, transborder and environmental degradation cannot be ad dressed by state-centric decision-making**. And in response to global crises, social movements around the world demand more than the absence of war: People are deeper questions about the nature of power, the abuse of human the human costs of global inequities, and the meaning of a just world order.

Realism marginalizes social groups and leads to patriarchy

Steans 06 (Jill, Professor of Gender in international relations, Ph.D, “Gender and international relations: issues, debates and future directions,” p. 24, MR)

Neorealism not only privileged positivist knowledge claims but also reified what were historically contingent structures of the social and political world.20 Thus the notionof structural anarchy was presented as an enduring feature of IR, generating a pro- pensity on the part of states to pursue power and strategic and/or instrumental inter- ests. However, 'structural anarchy' was, at best, a historically contingent phenomenon and not an objective 'fact' or 'enduring condition' of international relations. Neoreal- ism constructed social practice and representations of social practice and, in the process, presupposed that the social world was self-evident. In perpetuating a belief in the natural rather than historical character of real social and political arrangements, neorealism was ideological and, moreover, could potentially be put to the service of conservative political ends. Both realism and neorealism reduced complex interna- tional phenomena to relations between reified sovereign states. This not only disguised the degree to which international processes could have an impact on specific social groups (for better or worse) but also marginalized or rendered invisible unequal social relations and many contemporary problems that had an international dimension.23 What emerged from the fourth debate was a more reflexive environment in which debate and criticism were encouraged and spaces opened up for scholars to rethink and rewrite IR.24 Critical theorists of all persuasions acknowledged the socially mutable and historically contingent nature of knowledge claims and defended, and to some degree embraced, methodological pluralism in IR. A growing group of, in many ways diverse, critical theorists began to ask questions concerning the nature of knowledgeclaims and how meaning and 'truth' were constructed. One of the central themes ofthe fourth debate was that the production of knowledge must be studied in relation to the dominant social forces and practices of the age.25 To some extent, the common aim of the various critics of neorealism was to undermine its hegemonic position in IR and open up a space for those voices marginalized or excluded from the mainstream in IR.26

**Their positivism rejects the idea of gender shaping social constructs and entrenches structural dichotomies**

**Peterson and Runyan 99—**Peterson is a Professor in the School of Government and Public Policy at the University of Arizona with courtesy appointments in the Department of Gender and Women’s Studies and Runyan is a Professor and former Head, Department of Women's, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, University of Cincinnati (V. Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan, Global Gender Issues, p. 27, JB)

For the most part, however, feminists employ postpositivism to show how the marginalized and subordinated position of women is inextricably tied to the power of gender as a value and valuing system that permeates our concepts and meaning systems, and hence our actions. Claims to being value-free merely mask the power of gender (along with other en trenched systems of oppression) to shape the production of knowledge. Because inquiry is a social practice and so is always value-laden, it is incumbent on inquirers to critically examine their social locations and values that arise from them. In this way, normative commitments that underlie inquiry are made visible and can become the subject of political debate about what values inquiry should advance. In sum, positivists may recognize the empirical role of gender and accept the need to examine sex as a variable, but **their dichotomizing assumptions obscure and even deny the relevance of gender to concepts and thought**. In contrast, postpositivists are critical of rigid dichotomies and recognize the centrality of meaning systems; they variously explore how agents and structures, subjects and objects, are mutually constituted. At the same time, postpositivists vary tremendously in how and to what extent they prioritize meaning systems, with postmodernists paying the most attention to the power of concepts and language.

Realism has perennially excluded women from the realm of IR

Steans 06 (Jill, Professor of Gender in international relations, Ph.D, “Gender and international relations: issues, debates and future directions,” p. 25-26, MR)

One of the major aims of feminist critique has been to expose the masculinist bias in neorealist/realist concepts and categories and to show how, consequently, 'claims to know' in IR have been partial and particular. In the following chapter, the feminist critique of realism is set out in some detail. At this juncture, it is appropriate to focus on how dominant ideas in IR construct the core subject matter of IR and also determine what counts as 'knowledge'. The idea that the study of gender is not part of IR because the subject is about the study of the state and its power is premised on certain ideas that privilege a realistlneorealist understanding of what the world is really like, what is enduring and what is ephemeral, what is central and what is marginal. The major source of gender bias in international relations theory generally is, ulti­ mately, rooted in concepts derived from political theory.32 Indeed, as Rebecca Grant has argued, 'the whole theoretical approach to IR rests on a foundation of political concepts which it would be difficult to hold together coherently were it not for the trick of eliminating women from the prevailing definitions of [man as] the political actor',33 These political concepts are drawn from a wide range of theorists, but owe a great deal to Thomas Hobbes and Niccolo Machiavelli particularly. These key thinkers will be revisited in the following chapter. At this point it is enough to note that the 'problem' with realism is that it is constructed around a series of concepts that privilege masculine identified traits and experiences. As Christine Di Stefano claimed, Hobbes’s(a major intellectual influence in realism) thought was shaped by a distinctly masculinist outlook, characterized by dualistic thinking, a need for a singular identity, a denial of relatedness and a radical individualism. In Hobbes's seminal text *Leviathan* (from which realists draw the analogy of IR as a 'state of nature'}, one was presented with a picture of atomized individuals who related to each other in entirely impersonal ways and where self/other distinctions were strongly enforced.-34 Hobbes's take on nature was a world in which the solitary subject (state) confronted a dangerous and threatening environment (anarchy).

Realism has formed patriarchal institutions that dominates women, ignoring the issue of gender

Steans 06 (Jill, Professor of Gender in international relations, Ph.D, “Gender and international relations: issues, debates and future directions,” p. 27, MR)

Nancy Hirschmann has argued that men have historically dominated women and so have exercised control over how they have constructed both themselves and women. This has not only resulted in institutions that socially and politically privileged men over women, but it has also affected the very structure of meaning and reality by pervading our categories of knowledge. Thus, Hirschmann has argued that modern epistemologies affect the kinds of questions asked and the particular modes of inquiry that are considered legitimate. The perspective of a socially constructed 'masculine' experience has been epistemologically validated and imposed on women, preserving male privilege and the social practices and structures that enabled men to consider their own experiences the human experience.J8 In this way, 'by explicitly ignoring gender while implicitly exploiting a distinctly masculine means of knowledge seeking, modern epistemologies have been able to mask their own bias'J9

Realism reifies the state, creating displaced ‘others,’ a uniquely patriarchal characteristic

Steans 06 (Jill, Professor of Gender in international relations, Ph.D, “Gender and international relations: issues, debates and future directions,” p. 34, MR)

The 'state as actor' approach works to reify the state by casting the state as a 'thing', an entity that has a concrete materiality or existence. For the purpose of theorizing, realism invests the state with purpose. The state is conceived as a 'purposive individual' with particular characteristics. Sovereign man is a rational choice-making individual able to legitimize violence. The idea of sovereign man is placed firmly at the centre of the conceptual universe in realism and the subject of knowledge. IR is understood as the study of relations between the state (as actor and knowing subject) and a series of marginalized and displaced 'Others'. The concepts and categories employed by realism exclude women and distinctly feminine experiences since these are deemed to be nonpolitical and 'outside' of the proper realm of study in IR.

**Only postpositivism through gender analyses can solve global security—the age of security is outdated**

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The “what" of IR is changing. The end of the Cold War and its East versus West tensions, the expansion of global capitalism, the revival of nationalisms and development of regionalism, and the growth of new social movements have altered the practical and theoretical terrain of IR. More specifically, **peace studies and development studies have challenged conventional definitions of security and economic growth**. Proponents of these studies argue that militarized national security, particularly in this nuclear age, and economic development strategies, which put profits before the needs of people and a sustainable ecology, compromise both individual and global security. **By focusing on the security needs of people and the planet, these approaches open the field to gender issues**. They permit the articulation of demands for peace, economic justice, and global equality, and they permit work in defense of the environment, upon which women and all other living things ultimately depend. In addition to rethinking the meaning of security, IR analysts are rethinking the meaning of states and sovereignty. The growth of transnational power has not eliminated but has certainly altered the power of states. In the context of unregulated global financial markets (therefore not under state control) and expansion of transnational institutions, organizations, and social movements, states confront a transformed political, economic, and socio-cultural environment. All of these are variously gendered and have varying implications for the positions of women and men.

**Realism is part of the masculinist, exclusionary system of international politics that prevents lasting peace.**

**Enloe** 20**05** (Cynthia, Feministand Women Studies“Of Arms and the Women” http://feminism.eserver.org/of-arms-and-the-woman.txt, EB)

Now--if you are still with me--the great intellectual challenge to the conventional realist understanding of international relations comes from the standpoint feminists and the postmodernist feminists, who agree on the broad outlines of the critique. (In what follows I will use "feminist" to mean standpoint and postmodernist scholars.) According to feminist critics, international relations theory as it has evolved incorporates "masculinist" prejudices at each of its three levels of analysis: man, the state and war. Realists are "androcentric" in arguing that the propensity for conflict is universal in human nature ("man"); that the logic and the morality of sovereign states are not identical to those of individuals ("the state"); and that the world is an anarchy in which sovereign states must be prepared to rely on self-help, including organized violence ("war"). Feminist theorists would stress the nurturing and cooperative aspects--the conventionally feminine aspects--of human nature; they would expose the artificiality of notions of sovereignty, and their connection with patriarchy and militarism; and they would replace the narrow realist emphasis on security, especially military security, with a redefinition of security as universal social justice. The first thing that must be said about the feminist critique of realism is that it is by no means incompatible with realism, properly understood. In fact, realist theory can hardly be recognized in the feminist caricature of it. Take the idea of the innate human propensity for conflict. Although some realist thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau have confused the matter (often under the influence of Reinhold Niebuhr) with misleading talk of "original sin," the controlling idea of realism is that there is an ineradicable potential for conflict between human beings--"men" in the inclusive, gender-neutral sense-- when they are organized in groups. Realism is not about conflict between individual men, that is, males; if it were, it would be a theory of barroom brawls or adolescent male crime. It is about conflict between rival communities, and those communities include women and men alike.

**Realist and neorealist IR fail to predict or understand multilateral institutions like the EU**

**Sylvester, 04** PhD International Relations, Professor of International Relations at Lancaster University (Christine, “Feminist International Relations: An Unfinished Journey”, Cambridge University Press, JPW) John Ruggie (1993:12) maintains that “there is a widespread assumption in the literature that all regimes are, ipso facto, multilateral in character [and yet] this assumption is egregiously erroneous.” Regimes can encompass only two states and they can lack the generalized principles of conduct that would make a multilateral security regime, say, incorporate a “norm of nonaggression, uniform rules for use of sanctions to deter or punish aggression, and . . . collectively sanctioned procedures for implementing them” (p. 13).

 Multilateralism is a generic form of modern institutional international relations that manifests diffuse reciprocity (such that the good of the group is valued), draws on generalized principles of conduct, and results in a group that is indivisible. In the post-World War II world, multilateralism has figured prominently in the organization of the western economic order, thanks initially to the US effort “to project the experience of the New Deal regulatory state into the international arena” (p. 30). Yet “much of the institutional inventiveness within multilateral arrangements today is coming from the institutions themselves, from platforms that arguably represent or at least speak for the collectivities at hand” (p. 34). The European Union illustrates this trend in a most visible manner; but so also do groups of multilateral players who, for example, keep the issues of global warming alive internationally (cf., Benedict et al., 1991). This phenomenon of institutionally directed agenda setting is difficult for neorealism to see, let alone accommodate. By contrast, it seems to be the neoliberal institutionalist vision come to life, only not in a causal sequence that school would recognize (i.e., with specific reciprocity between states leading to diffuse reciprocity that encourages states – the leaders of the band – to demand more regimes and to extend diffuse reciprocity). For multilateralism, cooperation is not simply instrumental, such that states adjust their policies to account for others when it is cost-effective to do so. Cooperation “depends on a prior set of unacknowledged claims about the embeddedness of cooperative habits, shared values, and taken-for-granted rules” (Caporaso, 1993:82). These claims draw attention to the conventions that neoliberal institutionalism acknowledges, and reach beyond them. “Sovereignty is not a concept that is sensibly applied to a single state or to numerous states in isolation from one another [so much as it] is inherently a relational concept.” In other words, the anarchic system of sovereign states is “a forum as well as a chessboard” (p. 78). Because mainstream IR favors the study of state rationalities and interests, it has neglected multilateralism, with its reflectivist and relational bent (p. 78). Also, one might add, it has neglected some postneoliberal institutionalist possibilities for exploring relational versus reactive forms of autonomy in international relations. Relational autonomy presupposes sociality and involuntary ties, such that we can imagine eviscerating our notions of separate and wary states disconnected in international realms of politics from domestic socialities. Yet when the emphasis is on “preconscious, taken-for-granted understandings” (p. 83) we also become aware of the many ways that even relational forms of cooperation may be narrow and exclusive, such that some groups are indivisible vis-`a-vis others. That is, some groups have encrusted certain “natural” principles of conduct and these create and deepen diffuse reciprocities, but only between themselves. Reginas have been frozen out by understandings that endow the worlds of Eugenes with taken-for-granted relevance to international relations.

# A2: BIOLOGICAL DETERMINISM

**Turn--The conservative insistence on biological determinism is only a way to maintain dominance in the political sphere**

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 Ideologies are often couched in terms of biological determinism, positing narrow genetic or biological causes for complex social behaviors. In the real world, human behavior is always mediated by culture--by systems of meaning and the values they incorporate. The role that biology actually plays varies dramatically and can never be determined without reference to-cultural context. Ideological beliefs may exaggerate the role of biological factors (the argument that men's testosterone explains male homicide rates) or posit biological factors where none need be involved (the argument that because some women during part of their life bear children, all women should care for children and are unfit for politics. Reliance on biological determinism means that ideologies tend to flourish in periods of disruption or transition, when political conservatism serves to buttress traditional power-wielders. And when traditional power-wielders are threatened by change, it is easy and often effective for them to repeat ideological claims that **emphasize how natural and therefore unchanging inequality is.**

**Gender is not biological or inflexible—depends on societal norms**

**Peterson and Runyan 99—**Peterson is a Professor in the School of Government and Public Policy at the University of Arizona with courtesy appointments in the Department of Gender and Women’s Studies and Runyan is a Professor and former Head, Department of Women's, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, University of Cincinnati (V. Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan, Global Gender Issues, p. 6, JB)

 We *learn,* through culturally specific socialization, what characteristics are associated with masculinity and femininity and how to assume the identities of men and women. In this sense, **"gender refers to characteristics linked to a particular sex by one's culture**."5 The specific meanings of and values given to masculinity and femininity vary dramatically over time and across cultures. For example, Western ideals of "manliness" have undergone historical shifts: From the early Greeks through the feudal period, the emphasis was on military heroism and political prowess through male bonding and risk-taking, whereas more modern meanings masculinity stress "competitive individualism, reason, self-control or self-denial, combining respectability as breadwinner and head of household with calculative rationality in public life.6 Moreover, not all cultures have associated either of these conceptions of masculinity with leadership qualities: "Queen mother’s" in Ghana and "clan mothers" in many Native American societies have been accorded power and leadership roles in these matrilineal contexts on the basis of the feminine quality of regeneration of the people and the land.7 It is also the case that there is some play in gender roles even within patrilineal or patriarchal cultures given that men are not exclusively leaders and warriors, and women are not exclusively in charge of maintaining the home and caring for children in these contexts. Due to the variation in meanings attached to femininity and masculinity, we know that **expressions of gender are not "fixed" or predetermined: The particulars of gender are always shaped by context**. However, these variations still rest on concepts of gender differences and do not necessarily disrupt gender as a relation of inequality.

# NARRATIVE GOOD

**We can’t remain silent – making the problem known is crucial to solvency**

**Sturdevant and Stoltzfus 93** (Saundra and Brenda, “Let the Good Times Roll: Prostitution and the U.S. Military in Asia,” 1993,p 169) SLV

Although I have barely written about this aspect of Korean-American exchange before-partly because it is embarrassing to Korean pride, partly because I thought few were interested in a phenomenon simultaneously ubiquitous and unremarked upon, partly because of a male code that I will discuss shortly-it is the aspect that most struck me when I first lived in Korea, creating indelible impressions of a relationship that, because of the use made of Korean women, *could not be* what it was said to be: a free compact between two independent nations dedicated to democracy and anticommunism.

Why should sexual exploitation be so obvious and so soundless, making barely a cat's-paw imprint on the literature and lore of Asian-American relations? Among the reasons is surely a tacit male code to maintain silence, thus to keep wives, mothers, girlfriends, female reporters, and inquiring feminists in the dark. To remain silent because morally all this is unremarkable: boys will be boys, the oldest profession, war is hell, or-to use Spike Lee's metaphor-"It's a dick thing." If someone dares call attention to the ceaseless orgy, all the usual bromides pour forth to drown out the faint cries of peasant girls yanked off a train in Seoul and thrown into a brothel, a thousand little justifications for the abasement of a thousand little girls at American hands. Boys will be boys. To remain silent, that is, except among one's own kind, whereupon this becomes *the* subject of discourse, mulled over endlessly and needing no legitimation (it *is* a "dick thing"), the social construction of every Korean female as a potential object of pleasure for Americans. It is the most important aspect of the whole relationship and the primary memory of Korea for generations of young American men who have served there.

# NARRATIVE

**Prostitution is prevalent in South Korea**

**Sturdevant and Stoltzfus 93** (Saundra and Brenda, “Let the Good Times Roll: Prostitution and the U.S. Military in Asia,” 1993,p 173, SLV)

As the evening ended the house madam brought in a girl of about eighteen in silk traditional garments who threw coquettish looks my way. She was mine for the night if I wanted her, so I was told. I politely declined, and we were offered the beer hall. By this time the rich man had decided I was okay, so he sat next to me and poured out a few more gallons of beer. The hostesses here were less pleasant. In fact, they struck me as desperate. My newfound rich friend stuck his hand down the blouse of the woman sitting between us and pulled out a breast to fondle. Then he put it back in and grabbed my hand, plunging it into her blouse. I let it stay there in its clammy repose for a minute, 'just to be polite," then withdrew it with a wan smile. I danced a couple of times, had some more beer, and the evening mercifully came to an end. As I walked out with the teachers, I was surrounded by several hostesses with cheerless faces, pawing pathetically at me and imploring me for "money," in a kind of literal low moan-*"mmmooaannny, mmmooaannny, mmmooaannny.* ..."

In Seoul women were available on almost every block-in a bathhouse, massage room, restaurant, or in the ubiquitous tea houses all over the city. You could get them very young, probably around twelve; kids were shanghaied into a kind of slavery as they got off the train from the countryside, looking for work to support their peasant families. Kidnapped, gang-raped and beaten by pimps while learning their few necessary words of English, they were ready for the street in a week. And you could them very old, according to American soldiers who frequented a place they called "turkey alley." I think I walked through it one hot, dusty afternoon, when a friend and I were trying to find a shortcut from the railroad station to a nearby hotel. We turned a corner in a maze of back alleys and all of a sudden from every door came a toothless old hag, a pockmarked middle-aged woman, a haggard and spiritless woman of thirty, to grab at our elbows, yank us toward a door, importune us for money. It was a gruesome, nightmarish specter in broad daylight.

**Ms. Pak’s Story**

**Sturdevant and Stoltzfus 93** (Saundra and Brenda, “Let the Good Times Roll: Prostitution and the U.S. Military in Asia,” 1993,p 202, SLV)

At this stage, since we don't know what Kim II Sung is thinking, I think it's okay for U.S. troops to be here.' But if our country could have lived depending on and trusting each other, it would have been great.

As far as I know, our country exists because the Americans helped us. However, if there were no U.S. or Soviet Union, or if Kim II Sung had not gone to study in the Soviet Union, or if President Syngman Rhee had not studied in the U.S., our country wouldn't be divided along the Thirty-eighth Parallel. 2 And when we had the war, if Kim II Sung had been stronger and there had been victory, we'd probably be a communist country, but we'd still be one. If President Syngman Rhee had been the stronger of the two and had provided real leadership, then it would have become the Republic of Korea-still one nation.

Isn't it true that the Americans and Russians are playing with us by placing us in the middle? So there is no need to say that you are helping us. You help us because you need something, too. I once had an argument with an American GI about these things. Then I read that the

U.S. and Russia had made a deal. So there is no one who is right or wrong. You are in Korea to make money, not to help us. ~one of you who are in Korea are here to help us.

Since I've dealt with Americans, I've noticed that we Koreans are still poor and many go hungry. But Americans come here and they can eat whatever they want; they can do whatever they want to; they can buy whatever they want. Our country's people are still living three to four people in one room. Very few kids get to have their own rooms in their teens. Our country has developed a lot during the past eight to ten years, right? But even then, when Americans ask you to their houses and show you around, it's so different from our country's houses.

When you go to Itaewon, the commissioned officers have their own homes.3 Poor people like us feel like we've walked into a castle. They have all kinds of liquor. When they come outside, the make fun of us with their $10 and $20. I can accept the fact that they have the ability to live like that. But in places like Itaewon, a single family uses the whole house. One man uses three rooms. Those with low ranks have a single room, but it still has a bathtub and the facilities all work.

When you go to the U.S. Army base, everything is automatic. They can use as much electricity or water as they need. Meanwhile, the government tells us to save electricity and water. It's a world apart. Our men in the army have no hot running water in the showers. They don't have enough to eat; they sleep side by side with a light blanket. When I see the Americans living so well in such nice homes and comfort, I feel sorry for our soldiers. They have it so hard. If it weren't for Kim Ii Sung's viciousness, I think it would be a hundred times more profitable for our country if the Americans left.

The reason is that the Americans don't pay any taxes. They live comfortably because of us, too. They can rent a house [outside the base] cheaply. For most people [U.S. military personnel], the base pays for their rent. But the way they act with us shows that they despise our country. They think: "Koreans will lose their land if we aren't here. We are needed here because of Kim II Sung. So we must be treated well. They can't live without us." I feel such thinking is really bad.

Many Korean women want to work with Americans in this line of work. I don't know about other countries, but our Korean men are a bit violent. I don't know how I should express this. For example, even a good person begins to show another part of himself when he starts drinking. Their true nature comes through. When they drink, they release the tension and stress from society. They act crazy and do as they wish. Americans aren't like that. Although they end up lying to you and deceiving you, Americans usually don't bother you and are friendly.

The women use contraceptives. The large majority are on the pill. There are some who use the loop, but it's not so effective. Americans have larger penises than Koreans. It's true that there are problems because their penises are larger. Things like the loop don't do the job. Something can go wrong inside. About 70 percent don't use condoms. Even those who use them stop using them once they start coming regularly since the women usually take the pill.

There are many women who can't take the pill. They throw up. So whenever they get pregnant, they have an abortion. Most people who have worked here for a long time have had ten or more abortions.

We heard that the first AIDS patient was a sailor.4 There was one case of AIDS in Songsan this time. The woman was young. She caught it from this life-style. Koreans don't have it. We got it from Americans. In all cases, it's related to Americans.6

While we're here, we don't receive Korean customers. So AIDS and syphilis and things like that come from Americans. In the old days, we didn't wash our underwear too often because there weren't such diseases among the Koreans. I have also lived with Koreans and had various relationships with them, but I haven't seen much disease.

Koreans don't know how to kiss and caress too well. If I were to compare their bed practices, Koreans usually go for the sex act, while Americans tend to kiss a lot and get messy. When I used to live with Korean men, they weren't that messy. So I don't think the diseases started in Korea. In the Korean halls, they don't have to check for syphilis. But here, we have to have a checkup every week. It's very strict.

Gonorrhea occurs when you have stress or are tired after having sex. So if you don't have good feelings about having sex, you have to check it out and treat it. It goes away when the weather gets cold. But we don't have too many cases of syphilis or gonorrhea.

When I entered this work ten years ago, I had to get a weekly checkup. Ifwe didn't and were caught by a worker from the Health Department, there was a penalty. For the checkups, you have to pay a membership fee every six months and now, for the first time, you have to have your picture taken. In the past, we paid W 500 or W 1000. Now we pay W 2,000. With the picture, it will cost W 3,500.

The [Korean] government provides the checkups. The U.S. government is not involved. What the Americans do is this: a GI goes out and sleeps with a woman. Any disease quickly appears on a man. At the hospital, they ask the man whom he slept with and from which club. After they find out the information, they go and find the woman and tell her to go to a clinic.

I think it's good that we get a weekly checkup of our bodies. It's just that we can't make money during that time we're in the clinic. If we have anything, we have to stay there for three days and receive treatment. On the fourth day, we get another examination. If we are okay, we can leave. If not, we stay another three days and get another examination. They let us out only after we're cured. They're strict about these things in every base area.

When we go to a hall, there is a debt system with the owner. You incur a debt by buying things. You also have to pay rent, food, and heat. Some owners settle the account once a month. Many places don't pay any salary. You have to sleep in order to make money. But it's the same yesterday or today. The smart person never gets tricked.

Every place I went, I never let them abuse me. When I listen to other women, I tell them, "Why did you let them do that to you. You should have done this and that." You can tell what people are like by looking at them. There are women who are into flashy things. They waste a lot of money. The owners usually take advantage of them. But if you look as if you have your wits about you, the owners won't try to trick you. You have to keep an account of your work, your debt, how much you've paid back, and how much you have coming to you the next month.

When I first entered this world, I thought that the Americans were well educated and great people. At first, I really treated them well. Even though they couldn't understand Korean, I called them "Mister" in Korean. I always used terms of respect when talking with them. Then I was tricked by them once or twice, and I saw many bad things happening-in fact, I saw people being killed.

Like once, an Amore cosmetics saleswoman was walking to her job one day. On the way, she saw an American GI burning trash; but it had a strange odor. She smelled hair burning, so she got suspicious. She called the police. They found him burning the body of a woman. He had killed her during a fight.

I try not to injure other people. No matter how bad men are to me, I give them three chances. If we try to understand and accept them, even those men won't mistreat us. The bad guys call us "bad bitches." They enter a hall and begin cussing out the people. I talk to them nicely: "You came her to drink OB [Korean beer]? You drink it when I give it to you." Then I tell them, "Don't talk bad to me. You're here in Korea to earn money. I'm here to earn money. So don't talk nasty to me." Then some kids say, "I'm sorry." But I think some Americans try to trick us and use us.

American GIs treat us this way because we're poor, uneducated, and have to make money through this kind of life. They say they don't hit women while they're drinking in their own country, but they can do as they please since they are in Korea, a poor country. I think they overdo it at times. The American GIs make fun of us by saying, "Why are you so poor? Do you eat only *kimchi?"* and other things. Any human being, no matter if they live this kind of life or not, can be good and not be used by others. We may be poor, but we will live on our own power.

I have three brothers and one sister. I'm the oldest. My parents grew ginseng. All the people in the village lived off it. At that time, we were rich. Then our elder uncle went away and didn't come back for a week. He had gone to a gambling place and lost almos t all the money. Because of my uncle, we went bankrupt. We sold our home and moved to Taejon City.

My mom worked so hard. My father had become discouraged by the farm failure and didn't work anymore. My mother worked as a bread vendor, dog-meat seller, and had a noodle shop. She also sold rice. She borrowed money from her family. By herself, she couldn't make a go of it.

My father was a ladies' man. He was good-looking and had many affairs. When I was in the fifth grade, the villagers chased away the woman who was having an affair with my father. She worked in the local pub. Whenever my father came back from there, he would beat mother up. The villagers said that my mother was such a nice woman and chased the other woman away.

The woman came back to the village again. When I woke up after sleeping, mother was crying. Father wasn't there. He had gone to her again. I knew that much. I had heard she had come back. I went to my father's friend's house and said, "Please take me to where my father is." I meant to do something about it. I was thirteen.

We went to the inn. I began to shout, "You witch. My mother is working so hard to earn money. Why do you have to come back and make trouble for us." I shouted at her a little more and came home. Father came back the next day, but he continued to be a ladies' man, a butterfly.

During my second year in junior high, I dropped out of school. I had an uncle living in Seoul. I went to work at his dress shop. My brother kept writing me letters about things at home. Whenever I got a letter from him, I was so happy. I would burst into tears. I was so young then. The dress shop closed for the summer. I went home. I couldn't go back to Seoul again. I didn't want to leave my brothers and my mother. I stayed home.

[When I was about sixteen], I had a friend who always bugged me to go to the movies with her. She liked a man who worked in the theater. One day, that man asked me out. He was very nice to me. *We* had fried wontons and Chinese cake. He picked up the food with the fork and gave it to me to eat. I was very embarrassed. I barely ate anything.

After that, he sent free movie tickets for us.

One Christmas Eve, there was a party in the village. We were having a good time. I had a glass of wine and fell asleep. It was a bit chilly, so I woke up. No one was there except that man. Suddenly, I was very frightened. I got up and ran out. He began running after me. Later he told me that if I had not run out, nothing would have happened. He said he didn't know why he had run after me. He didn't want to go all the way then. He had gone out with many girls and raped them. But my father was very strict with me, so he knew he'd better not touch me. He had just wanted to be good friends. He said that when he caught me, he decided to rape me.

I had on blue sneakers with white Jaces-I still haven't forgotten that-and red corduroy pants with a corduroy jacket and a hat. There was a zipper in the front. I had to pass by the dikes before I got home. There was a lot of snow. The dikes went up, then came down to a ditch. We had gone down to the bottom. The water was frozen. I was caught. With ice as a bed, he went wild. He began right there. He was trying so hard to get my clothes off, and I tried my hardest to keep them on. I thought he was trying to kill me. I didn't know anything-I was so naive-I didn't know why. I fought with all my might. The zipper came apart and things tore. I got very tired and he was, too, so he didn't treat me badly.

It was past the curfew.7 We went to an inn nearby. He asked the owner not to tell anyone that we were there. I was very embarrassed to be there. He raped me. I was beginning to have my period but the man kept coming. It hadn't been long since I had started having my period. It was a mess, because I

continued to resist. It was horrible. Blood everywhere. In the morning I went home. I had no strength left. I stayed home in bed for over a month. I thought I had a disease and was going to die soon. Mom thought I was sick and suggested we go to the hospital. I thought they would find out I had been with a man. What a horrible scene that would create. So I stayed home in bed. Mother was worried.

Soon after that, we moved. Mother and father had a new store in the market. They wanted to have a business. I thought we were moving because they knew about me.

The man followed us there. My father was angry. He beat me and gave the guy a few smacks, too. He said, "You're not my son, so I'm not going to beat you, but leave." My father kept beating me, saying "Why did you fall for a guy like that?" My father really loved me. I was young, so he was really angry and worried.

The guy came back. I met him while I was going to the bathroom [outside]. He dragged me away to an inn. We stayed for a few days. He wanted us to go to Chunjoo. He said, "We can make a go of things even if we have to work really hard. We can come back after we make some money." He was really making a case for himsel( I didn't know what to do. I felt sorry for him then. It wasn't that I loved or liked him. I just felt sorry for him. He was talking about killing himsel( Since I knew that I would get in trouble if I went home now, after several days, I agreed to go with him. We went to Chunjoo. We had a very hard life. The man worked very hard in the cabbage fields. He drank before, but in Chunjoo, he only had an occasional beer that I bought. When he got paid, he brought the money home. It was a good life. Then I got pregnant.

Then I was almost ready to have the baby, I was homesick. I wanted to know what was happening, so I wrote to my aunt. My aunt and uncle visited me. They told me that my mother had passed away. I felt that my mother had died of heartache because of me. I didn't even know that she had died.

I couldn't visit home because I was about to give birth. I went to my in-laws' home and had the baby. My mother-in-law knew my mother from way back. She knew that my mother was a good woman, so she was very good to me.

When my baby had grown up a little, I told the man I'd like to visit my home. I said it would be good for him, too. When I said that, he began to drink heavily again, so we had a fight. My mother-in-law packed red beans, sesame oil, and many things. She sent a man to take me to the station. She told me to come back quickly.

When I got to Seoul, the kids were starving. After my mother died, my father had moved to Seoul. He took the children with him. He was really messed up. I cleaned the children up and took care of them.

All of a sudden, one month had passed. I kept thinking I had to go back. But how could I leave them like that? I stayed one more month and another month. I couldn't leave. I just couldn't leave the kids.

My youngest brother was a couple of months older than my baby. When I was nursing my daughter, my brother would begin crying. What could I do? I had to nurse him too. My father was working in a real estate office in Hwagok-dong. I was working in my uncle's dress shop. It was hard to work even if I left the baby with others. It was far to the shop from where we lived.

A stepmother came to live with us to take care of my brothers. When she first came, she matched me up with another guy and we got married. I had a daughter [to this husband], who died soon after she was born. This daughter died, and my father sent my first daughter to the orphanage. I returned home one day and found that my baby was gone. She was two. I asked where she was. My father told me to forget about it. I said I couldn't live without her. He said he took her to an orphanage. I asked which one, but he wouldn't tell me. I nearly went crazy.

The man [husband] was suspicious of my fidelity. He wouldn't let me go to the market or the beauty shop to cut my long hair. He thought other men would take me away because I was so beautiful. At that time, to dry your hair, you had to brush it in the sunlight. We didn't have dryers. As I was brushing my hair, he would ask, "What are you doing brushing your hair outside? Whom is it for?" He thought I was trying to show off to another man. When he was in his right mind, he would say that I was beautiful when I was brushing my hair like that.

One day he said to bring a cup of water. He divided the water into two cups and began stirring it wildly. He said to drink this and die. He said if I didn't drink it, he would kill me with a bat. He said he would then drink and die. I was naive and stupid. I started to drink it.

Right after I took a sip, my mother-in-law knocked on the door. I guess she saved my life. I didn't have the courage to swallow it. I spit it out and opened the door. My mouth started to get swollen as I was going to the door. She asked what was wrong. She opened my mouth and shouted, "You've gone crazy again. If you want to die, kill yourself but don't kill other people's children." She went out and washed some rice. She gave me the wash water and told me to gargle with it and spit it out. It neutralizes the poison. He was too much. I couldn't stand it. My mouth was really swollen. Mother-in-law had gone out to get some medicine. I was so afraid of living there, I left. I went to my uncle's house. [This husband] is dead now, so the marriage is over. There was a *dabang8* that I had seen. It was called Doshin Dabang. I made a phone call. They hired me. I wasn't a hostess then with her fingernails painted and ordering people around. I was just a helper, so I didn't get good pay. I cleaned the place. I was still very young. I saw that the hostesses did nothing in particular. They just had their hair up. My brain began ticking: we were out of rice-there was nothing to feed the kids-so I went to an employment agency in Young deungpo and said I wanted to be a madam [hostess]. They told me to go to Kimpo.9 They said I would be a madam and lady [waitress].

The place they sent me had been a quiet *dabang* before. 1be business wasn't very good there. But when I got new customers, they never left. The business boomed. I got to know men only for money. When I had a free day, guys would ask me out. I promised to meet them one hour apart. I had moved the family to Shungpyung where the rent was cheap. We didn't have a telephone. My father stopped going to the office because I sent money home. He was also sick.

Once, while I was working, everyone came-the whole family-like a band of refugees. They had all kinds of bags with books, kitchen utensils, and clothes. I took them to a restaurant and fed them. I sat thinking hard. It was a big problem. I had already taken advances to send home. My debt was high. There was a Mr. Park, who had a fish farm on his land. At that time, people were into raising eels. He had a small cottage on the fish farm. I asked him to let my family live there until I earned some money or at least until the next month. He agreed. I took them there right away. I took eggs, rice, and other things to them.

Then, a man loaned me the money to get my own place. I would pay him back with interest. It was a tavern, tearoom, *dabang* and ginseng teahouse all rolled into one. There were only four tables. We had to bring the water from a mountain well. I got up at 4:00 A.M. to carry water down with my stepmother. The business started out well. I must have paid the loan back within a month.

I realized that while the customers were drinking, they would ask for girls. Then they would go to a brothel. I didn't like losing customers. I hired a woman. The woman I hired couldn't have been better. It was such a good business, we decided to move to a larger place. We leased a house, and I hired two women. They were good, too. We made a lot of money. I moved to a house with ten rooms and hired ten more women.

I was twenty-one or twenty-two, but I had brains. If I saw one thing, I knew ten things. I must have been meant to be something. I was good with the customers. I had a cook, but I got rid of him and cooked myself. I was doing a great business.

We were in competition with the larger brothels. The name of our place was Oknyu Place [House of Jade Women]. The women kept the money [they earned from men] for themselves. If they didn't want to go out, they didn't have to. I paid them a good salary since I have been through it.

My father was ashamed of us, so he didn't come. My stepmother came and helped out. Then she said she wanted me to get her a roadside tent-bar.1O She said she would like to support herself. I agreed to buy her one.

Then Father said he wanted to spend 200,000 won for *Chusok.* If someone spent 100,000 won for a party, people thought they were filthy rich. It would be as if we were showing off our wealth. At that time, I was short of money. I was skimping on my meals in order to save money. How could a parent ask such a thing? Did he know how I had earned it? That's what made me hate him. I was really sad and angry. I left home. I took only a small bag with some clothing.

Wherever I went, I left word with my eldest brother. I was gone for a few days when he came looking for me with the news that Father was in the hospital unconscious. I had left home because he had asked for some money, and now this had happened.

I didn't think he would die, I thought he was just sick. Since we didn't have any medical insurance, we just gave the hospital the money it demanded. I wanted him to recover, so I spent the money. I thought the money would heal him. But he just didn't get better.

After fifteen or twenty days, the chief doctor asked for a guardian. The immediate guardian was my stepmother. She went in to see him. She came out sobbing and kept saying, "It's all over." She said that we didn't have enough money to keep him in the hospital. He couldn't live long and would die quickly. So for everybody's sake, they told the family to take him home. That's what I heard later.

If they had told me that then, I might have tried other ways to cure him. I'm angry about that even today. Since he wasn't her first husband and since life was so difficult and he couldn't work because of his illness, she just let him die. That's the only way I can explain her action. She remarried soon afterwards. She wanted him to die so she could get on with her life.

Strangely, everyone came the day he passed away. I thought it was okay and took a nap. They woke me up. Father was beginning to move around. He had gotten a little better. He began to ask for things, like fruit. They say that when people ask for something, it's like their preparation for the afterlife. He was struggling. He kept saying he wanted to go the bathroom. He had tubes running out of his body. How could he move? How could he go to the bathroom? He raised hell for about an hour.

My aunt and uncle told me to bring the doctor. The doctor kept looking at him and pinching him here and there. Mother cried and cried. I asked the doctor, "What's happening? How is he?" He said my father was dead and told me to start mourning. I couldn't talk then. It was as if the sky had fallen and the earth had quaked. I must have aged ten years. I felt that it was my fault that my mother had passed away, and I had tried to be a good daughter to my father. I really couldn't believe he had died. I kept touching his face and his arms and legs. They were cold.

I was really sad. I went crazy. I had no desire to live. Our neighbor encouraged me. If he hadn't helped me, I don't know what I would have done. My sister wasn't with me then. She hadn't even come home. She had fought with stepmother and left. I was exhausted for a month or two. We had lost all the money. I had lost my father. But what is there left to do but live, since we are human beings?

After father died, I had a dream.

In the dream, father kept saying that he would take mother and the baby with him. I would shout "no" and begin crying. Then I would wake up. Some people say that means the family will break up. I asked stepmother about it. She said we should have GUT. II I told her to have one, but I really didn't like it.

The spirits exist. I personally experienced it. In the GUT, there is a part when the spirit wants to have a "lion dance." The family would be seated and the "lion" would enter the room. The spirit would descend on the shaman. Unless the spirit was punished and became afraid, it would not leave the place. The shaman was tied together with a rope and we were trying to untie her,

but it wouldn't loosen. No matter how hard the strong men pulled the rope. it wouldn't come untied for about thirty minutes. When they finally got the rope undone, the man living across from our house began to foam at the mouth. He was old and weak. Usually spirits attack weak people.

We made preparations for the hundredth-day memorial service. Stepmother took care of the housework and cooking. Our neighbor had a big mill. He brought a sack of rice for us. All the rice was gone in less than a month. I remarked that it was strange: even though we didn't eat too much rice, almost all of it disappeared before the month was out.

At the hundredth-day memorial service, all the relatives, including uncle and aunt, gathered. In front of them I told my stepmother: "I have tried to accept and treat you as my parent, but nothing is as important to me as my brothers and sister. You are selling the rice these kids need. I can no longer consider you my parent." Since she had lived with our father and we had lived together, I gave my stepmother the house we had leased.

We left with only our clothing and nothing else. \Ve went toward Kimpo airport. vVe rented a room. I had to get a job in order to live. I went to a *dahang.* I kept Myung Sook at home so she could cook for us. She was young but good. I worked, but we couldn't survive on the *dabang* wages. I brought knitting work at night. I'd finish and take it in early in the morning on the way to work.

'When my father passed away, the youngest was five. He wrote in his diary: "On the way from school, I had this strange thought. Why don't I have a mother? Other kids all have their mothers. My friends go to school holding hands with their mothers. I wish I had a mother. Where did my mother go?"

I didn't ask him about it, but I always talked about the fact that we had to make a greater effort because we didn't have a mother and a father. "Mother and father are up in heaven and living well there. They are looking down on us. Ifwe are bad and hang out with the wrong crowd, mother and father would be very sad. We should always live the right way. It may be wrong for me to say it, but our father was not a father like other fathers. When you grow up and become mothers and fathers yourselves, you should try to become the best mother and father."

"Our mother was a really good woman. She couldn't pass by a poor person without helping. I'm sure she is in heaven. But father lived on what mother earned when she was alive. He was an intelligent man. He was discharged after the war as a sergeant. Many people called him a great guy. So he became very proud and expected everything to be given to him. He didn't do anything."

"Don't live like him. It doesn't matter how smart you are if you don't try. In any good work, to make it good, you have to give your best effort." I always told them that they shouldn't become objects of other people's scorn or do bad things. They're all healthy and good kids.

When I came home, the kids would all be asleep in a row. \Vhen I saw them like that, I felt tired but also responsible. My eyes would droop but I tried my best to finish more knitting. We barely got by with the food and school tuition. I was always getting two months' advance pay and in deeper debt.

Our situation was very difficult. At the *dabang,* I earned the highest wage. I worked conscientiously. The owners liked me. But *dabang* income wasn't enough. There wasn't one day when I didn't worry about money. Honestly, you have to get around with men and do things if you want to earn money. I was very careful to do it without the kids knowing. As they got older, I didn't want them to know how their sister had lived.

In *dabangs,* a lot of men try to pick you up. I had two days off every month. One day, I was in a bad financial crunch, so I made an appointment with I don't know how many guys-one per hour at this and that hotel. As I talked, they would give me money to eat and so on. I couldn't count the money while I was with them. I just put it into a bag. It was W6oo,ooo-a lot of money. But I don't know who gave how much. I was so busy that day.

On the next rest day, I would do the same thing. I had a lot of fun-the money-my body. So the money situation improved a little. After father passed away, I was a loser. I didn't care about my body anymore.

Because my father had been such a butterfly, I've never wanted to have an affair with a married man. I still don't. I think about what pains it can bring. I had no male friends. I just made money. But there was this man. He was married. He kept telling me to eat good food and take Korean medicine. He seduced me. He must have been fifty. It was a long relationship.

I always went home every night for the kids' sake. Although Myung Sook could cook, she didn't know how to make the side dishes. So I cooked at night. I had to do the wash and iron their uniforms. I don't know if they'll realize it when they grow up, but with all my strength, I tried my best to raise them.

Once, a person I'd known from an agencyl2 called and said I should try something different. They said it paid well. We'd make up the women and put beautiful Korean dresses on them and have them sit inside the windows. If they sat there, the customers would come in. I'd match them with a woman and send them to a room. Ifthere were many people, I'd let them know when twenty minutes had passed. Then they would have to go into another room and have sex again. I t went on for twenty-four hours with no time to rest. The women would grab a nap here and there.

I thought I should know what the women were doing. I did it myself for two days. If there were ten guys, I'd have to take in ten. If a hundred men, then a hundred times. In general, you can do about twenty men. I'd take a drinking table and drink with them. Then we'd go into another room and make love. After we finished, we'd leave quickly so another couple could go in. Then I'd come out and try to direct the traffic.

They also had a show. As they went up to the table, there would be cucumbers, eggs, paintbrushes and so on. The women would do a show and then make love right after that. The owners wanted me to hurry the women along-make up their faces again to sit down in the window and receive the next customers. Ifthey didn't sit in the window, the customers wouldn't come in. But so many customers-it just isn't something human beings should do. It was like they were just lying there with their legs apart. The women were getting tired. So I'd tell them to rest a little. It was driving me crazy. Some of the customers would mistreat the women.

What surprised me was the fact that these women had to endure this for money. I felt as though I hadn't suffered anything in comparison to them. Yet they stayed because the money was good. I guess there are worse places.

One day, I just gave up. Only a few people with the stomach for it could work there. I couldn't stand it any longer. These were my sisters living like this! I'm willing to work hard, but I just couldn't bring myself to force these women who were so tired to receive another customer. I slept in bed all day.

The owner came and asked me,

"You really can't do it?" I said, "I can't. These women aren't animals. They're human beings." He said he would bring me the money I'd earned. They didn't want me to let the secret out. I said thanks and left. I couldn't believe there were places like that. No matter how good the money is, I felt I couldn't work like that.

Then someone from an agency in Seoul told me about the Commissioned Officers' Club. That grabbed me. After all, I'd given up on my body. I've given up on marriage. I was twenty-six, so I still looked young. If I wanted a job, I usually got it. I called and went in.

I'd heard that Americans have large penises. I didn't think about doing it with them. I thought I would work as a waitress and earn a lot of money. But those people were honest-they told me everything. They said I would earn a lot. 1 thought about it: *"Dabang* isn't enough. If I work here with the Americans, people would look down on me. If I lived away from my kids and sent them money, it would be okay." I thought I would work for a few years until the children finished school.

They said I would be going to Tong Du Chun. The man, a woman, and I went together. It looked like a nasty neighborhood. The surrounding rooms were small, and they only had a bed in them. But the owner's room was well furnished. The place they called a hall was like a shack with a few tables. I'd been to many *dabangs* but this was the worst. I mean, you know when you've crossed the line.

I told them I didn't want to work in such an inferior place. If the place was low-class, it would draw that kind of client. I said this was going too far. They said we should go to another place. They realized I was twenty-six with a lot of experience.

They brought me to Osan. It was a small place, but it had a dance floor. There were a lot of American GIs. I'd never seen an American. Some were huge. They were dancing up a frenzy. At that time, I thought that Americans were number-one citizens-that they had a big country and were better educated. They probably spend a lot of money. So I thought I would earn money there. I was also afraid.

As they danced, the lights flashed and they took their clothes off. It was the first time I'd seen a nude dancing place. They said I should go to work tomorrow. I asked for a W 600,000 in advance. The interest rate was 10 percent. They said the room rent was W 30,000. And [I had to buy] a lot of other things, including the heating coal. With the remainder of the W 600,000 advance, I paid for the kids' living expenses and took care of some loans.

I began working. I was like a spectator. I just sat around. I didn't even smoke. Blacks would approach me and say things. Whites, too. Then the owners came and said they'd been wrong about me. I wasn't the right material. They said, "That guy has the hots for you. Do something about it." I saw that it was a black man. He was a bit old, too. Whew. I asked what I should do. The owner said I should drink with him. He gave me juice in a large OB beer mug. Then the man said he would like to sleep with me.

If there was man who liked you, you just had to drink juice out of that huge beer mug. Your money went up the more you drank. After sleeping with a man, we would write it down and leave the money at the club. The money from sleeping was to your credit, but they could subtract it from your debt.

The owner said I would be lucky if I slept with a black man the first time. I told him I couldn't do it. He said I had to do it. I told him I would think more about it. I finished work for the day and returned home. I lay there all by myself quietly and thought. There was no salary.

I thought: "If I do this with Korean men, someday it might get in the way of my brothers' advancement. What if my brothers get married and somehow a member of the bride's family, an uncle or cousin, recognizes me from this kind of work? It's a small world. I don't want to mess up my brother's lives that way. IfI'm going to earn money by having sex with men, I might as well do it with Americans."

I realized I had to use my body to make money. I accepted the black man, and we went home. I didn't know his first name or last name. I was shaking. He came in and sat down. We could do it in bed or in the living room. He kept calling me to come. I said I had to go to the bathroom. I thought about it in the bathroom. "If I do it with him, will my skin turn black?" All kinds of things. I wondered how big his thing was. I'd seen other people doing it with them, and they looked dark, too. But I had already been paid. I resigned myself to doing it.

I came in. He was on the bed naked. The light in the room had a red bulb. Because of the red light, his black skin shone, and his large eyes flashed in the light. I just couldn't go in. I sat by the door and began crying. It was too cold outside. He still told me to come. I shook my head and cried. But he was very nice. He told me to come and just sleep. I said no. I couldn't go. I just sat there. Then he put on his clothes and left. I gestured to him, "Where are you going?" He said he was leaving and wanted me to sleep, to get on the bed. I was so thankful. I followed him out and said good-bye.

I thought about it: "That man was really nice. A Korean man would have said that because he had paid, he wanted something out of it. He would have been angry." I thought a white man would be okay. I went to work again. The man was there. I told the owner that I couldn't do it with him if it killed me.

Then a large white man came and began talking to me. He had huge shoulders. He asked my name, and the girls around me told him. I didn't know anything in English. Injunior high they never taught you anything. They taught you the alphabet, but I couldn't carryon a conversation.

He gave the owner some money and told me to do it with him. The owner warned that I had to do it. When we went home, the Americans always took their clothes off. We got ready to sleep. He was gentle. I worried about how I could handle his body, but he helped me. He was good. I was good.

He continued to come. He was good to me. He bought me things when the merchants dropped by. Whenever he came [to the club], he'd come home and sleep with me. He gave me money. He taught me English in a fun way. He was really nice. He was good to the other women. He had six stripes. He was the golf and volleyball coach. He was around twenty-six, like me. One month passed and another, but the owners didn't like my getting a regular customer. They were afraid I would start a family. 'Whenever he came, they shut the door in his face. They made him angry.

I was taking the pill during those two months. He told me not to take it. He threw it in the garbage. But I took it secretly. I bought a new pill almost every day. I couldn't talk [in English]. I couldn't fight with him. He told women who spoke good English to tell me to stop taking the pilL Then he bought two word picture books, one in Korean and the other in English. Through the books he told me not to take the pilL He wanted to have a baby. Since I was getting on in years, he thought I should have a baby, too. But at that time, I had no thoughts of getting married. I only wanted money. I was always thinking that I had to earn so much to send it home. I always counted my money. I always knew how much I had coming to me. Twice a month, I paid the interest and brought money home.

Then one day, he couldn't make love so I fell asleep. After a while I awoke to find him still sitting around. I put on a dress and went outside to change the coal. When I came back in, he wouldn't help me undress. So I told him that he couldn't even make love. I slept in my clothes. I may have been a little cruel. He woke me up, saying that he was leaving. Usually, he left without telling me. I said fine.

He had two uniforms in the closet. He took those, boots, and four hundred dollars he had left there in an envelope. I thought nothing of it. We Koreans don't end relationships that quickly even if we are angry-especially since we had been together for several months. He didn't come back that evening. He didn't come to the hall. I thought maybe he was busy at work or something had come up.

I waited a week. He still didn't show up. I decided I couldn't wait any longer. I told the husbands of the other women living in the house to look for him. They said they couldn't find him. I went to where he worked. They didn't know, either. I went to the gate of the base and waited for him. I'd go there at the time work started and when work ended. It was cold standing there in the early morning. I did that for many days. He still didn't come. He was my only customer then. I cried. His name was Douglas. He was my first love. No one had been kinder than he, particularly after you've known Korean men. He had treated me well, like a baby. I depended on him a lot. He used to come and give me $20 every day. He bought me clothes and other things I needed. He even bought me things for my brothers and sisters. I was deeply in love with him. I cried every night-going from this room to that room. I wrote a letter. I said I wanted to see him. There were men who went from *dabang* to *dabang* and sold jewelry, necklaces, and other accessories. They knew Douglas well. They'd always seen us together. I gave the letters to those vendors, asking them to give the letters to him if they saw him. One day the owners talked to me, saying that Americans were liars. I shouldn't trust them because they'd say they love you and the next thing you know they're saying the same thing to another person. They were saying I should meet another guy. But I kept waiting for Douglas for over a month. I cried every day. I'd go to the hall, but I would stand outside looking for him. I didn't feel like working there anymore, and I couldn't go on like that. I had been late in sending the last living expenses home.· I decided to make money.

I decided I wanted to change halls. But the owners said I couldn't leave. They said I had to pay back the agency fee of W 300,000. I had a W 600,000 debt remaining. They were demanding that I pay ". 900,000. I argued with them. I said, "I'm not a three-year-old baby. In Korean law, there is no agency fee of W 300,000." Agency fees are around W 50,000. I said W 300,000 was out of the question.

I said I can go anywhere I want to. I moved to a new place with a woman I knew. When I changed halls, I found out that the rent had been too high and that other places paid a salary. I told the other women, "Never pay for agency fees." I told them to come to me if anyone demanded agency fees. I'd fight for them. Several women came.

Other people would say that they'd seen Douglas. I thought maybe I'd see him, too, and went out once in a while. Once, I was coming back from somewhere and wondered why I couldn't see him when others could. In the hall, there is a picture of a woman on a motorcycle. A guy is chasing after her. I told the woman with me, "Wouldn't it be great if I were like the woman on the motorcycle and men were chasing after me?" Then the women said, "Hey look, there's Douglas." I told her, "You're crazy. You're trying to make fun of me."

But it was true. There he was with his big shoulders. There were three women with him. He kept looking at me and talking with them. I couldn't hear anything because of the music. He came to our table nonchalantly. He asked what I wanted to drink. I said I'd like a juice. My friend and I drank the juice while he drank liquor.

My heart was beating wildly. I didn't know the language. I couldn't say anything. He asked how I'd been. I said okay but my eyes began to get bleary with tears. He was acting normal. He patted my back and said, "Let's go home." I thought I would go home and talk with him with the picture book. \Ve came home. So, with the dictionary I asked him, "Why are you angry? Why didn't you come?" He said, "Don't say anything." We slept. **In** the morning he said he was going. I asked him if he would return. He said, "I don't know." He left.

I kept waiting for him. My debts piled up. Then, I decided again that it wasn't going to work. I calmed down. I had to earn money. I knew not all Americans were like that. I slept with them. Since our club dosed early, we went to other clubs with GIs. Then someone said, "Hey, Douglas is in the bathroom dead drunk." I was there dancing. I went and shook him to wake him up. I think he must have been on some kind of drugs. He was smashed. He seemed glad to see me. I told him to sit down at the table because I wanted to talk with him.

I asked him why he had taken my heart but never returned. I said he was a liar. I had barely learned how to speak like that. He said he loved me, but he wanted to have a baby and marry me. He said that I didn't like to have sex with him because he ~-as so big. For him that was the most important thing. But he said he didn't dislike me. At that time, I didn't know anything about sex-I just did it for the money. He said I didn't love him. I said I had to earn money. He said we two couldn't make it together. He said, "Let's remain friends." He wouldn't come back after that. I lost a lot because of him. All Americans are like that. They are.

I got another friend. He had come from Japan for a three-month vacation. When I meet men, I meet great men. He was very kind. He bought me things to eat and gave me money. We had a great time. He really made me believe in him. I was still very naive, so I really believed people. He was over thirty years old. He said he had to go but would be back the next year. After he left, he didn't write.

I accepted reality. I've met many Americans in this business. All of them are good liars. At the time, if we make them feel good, they'll say anything. They're paying money to sleep around, so they'll tell lies to feel good. In reality, we're the fools. But why do they have to tell lies like that and fool people? It's because we have these lowly jobs. That's the only reason.

I was good to these Americans. I cooked for them. One man said that he was divorced and had a child. He told me that I would make a great mother to the baby. But he never brought any money. I told him that I couldn't go on like this. I told him that he had to pay me for the time we'd spent together until now. But on the day he said he would bring the money, he had another excuse.

I told a sister who spoke good English to talk to him. I told her the story. The sister talked to him. She told him to take his wallet out. There was money in there. "So, you were trying to get a free ride?" I said. "There's nothing free here. You have to pay for living expenses."

He said I was so good to him, he thought he could get by on nothing.

If I did so much, he should have paid up. He had played around with me.

Because I was far from them, the kids were in bad shape. Sangjin was in junior high. The youngest was in elementary school. I visited them once. The walls had become black. I asked why. A matchbox had caught on fire, and the fire spread. They were in a basement then. Everything burned up. That's when I decided I couldn't leave them alone. Anything could happen. So I moved them close to me. Since I could see them every day, I gave them good food. I always gave them something, even if it was candy.

Then I sent all of them back up to Seoul and transferred them to another school. I moved to Kunsan with the woman I had worked with at the first hall. It got better after that, little by little. The kids would come to get money, or at times I would go up with the money. But the trip from Kunsan to Seoul was tiring.

I always tried to send some money. I worked all night. I earned pretty good money, but growing kids eat so much. I had fed them so well from early childhood that they ate a lot. Their mouths had become high class, so it took a lot of money. They had to have meat at every meal. They didn't eat leftovers. I just wanted them to be healthy, normal, and happy.

When I visited again, it was a mess. I found that my oldest brother was wasting the money. He was renting another room for himself and his girlfriend. He didn't have a good job. He just couldn't hold down a job. He was young and had no experience. He wanted W 300,000 to start a business. I had given him the money, but he spent it all on other things. He asked for W 500,000 again. 1 told him to go to college, but he said that would be too much of a burden for me. He wanted to make money. 1 got an advance and gave him some money. But now, he's all messed up. Like father, like son? That's the only reason 1 can think o[

1 didn't think about meeting a good person to marry. I didn't want to get married anyway. But there was a really good man. Because he was so good, I thought about marrying him. He was divorced. He had one kid. He said that his mother was president of a large company. Her income was high, and he was the only child.

He wrote to me. He came back after a year, but I couldn't marry him. There was no one around to take care of the kids. 1 could have gone to the US. and sent money, but the kids couldn't live by themselves. I couldn't face the fact that something might happen if I wasn't around. I told myself that 1 would get married after Sangjin finished schooL I'd educate them more before 1 went. I thought: "I have entered this kind of work. My brothers don't have any responsibilities so they can get married easily. I'll take care of them until then."

# SECURITY BIZ

**The drive to secure creates identity with the state and its possession of the Bomb. We worship technology, value the GDP over human survival and the environment, and we become so desensitized that we provoke wars to make us feel safe**

**Chernus 86**, Ira, professor of religious studies university of Colorado at Boulder, “Dr. Strangegod: on the symbolic meaning of nuclear weapons” 1986 WM, TH

Machines must inevitably see all the world as a machine: "The more a man acts on the basis of a self-image that assumes he is powerless, an impotent cog in a huge machine, the more likely he is to drift into a pattern of dehumanized thinking and action toward others."5 "We have become masters of the impersonal and the inanimate. Our energy and even our emotions have gone into things; the things serve us but come between us, changing the relationship of man to man. And the things take on an authority that men accept without protest. The impersonality is epidemic. It is almost as though we feared direct contact, almost as though the soul of man had become septic."6 Thus we find our identity not by relating to other individuals as individuals, but by seeing ourselves merely as a part of "the crowd" or "the nation," whose emblem and savior is the Bomb, the ultimate machine. We lose the subtleties and nuances of human complexity and see the world in absolutes, "us versus them." We view human relationships in terms of the mythic, apocalyptic vision, a vision whose ultimate promise is the annihilation of "their" machine and unlimited license for "our" machine to do whatever it wants. In fact, the ultimate goal of machine people is always to have total dominance, unlimited autonomy to manipulate the environ-ment—both human and natural—in endless technological ways. Thus the machine God also shapes our relationship with our physical and material environment, leading us to the environmental crisis that we now face. Again, the fouling of the air, water, and land was hardly begun in the nuclear age, but the symbolism of the Bomb makes it much more difficult to escape from this predicament too. Behind our callousness toward the natural realm there is not only a desire for quick and easy profit, but a more fundamental view of ourselves as radically separated from nature. In the battle of the machines to dominate the elements, we are clearly on the side of the machines—we are the machines—and this battle is seen in radically dualistic, even apocalyptic, terms. Thus, having no meaningful relationship with nature, we are free, perhaps even compelled, to manipulate it endlessly. The transformation of raw materials into manufactured goods thus becomes our primary goal and value; if the Bomb is God, then the GNP is chief of the angels. Yet our commitment to material goods as highest good may have a more complex significance. It is fostered not only by the symbol of the Bomb as divine controller, manipulator, and dominator, but also by the psychic numbing that the Bomb creates. If we dare not think about the true reality of our lives—the sword of Damocles that constantly threatens total extinction at a moment's notice—then we must divert ourselves, making the other, numbed level so complex and interesting that we shall not have time to think about the truth. And we must make ourselves so comfortable that we shall not care to deal with the danger. Thus the Bomb and the economy are interlocked not only from a strictly economic point of view (though most people do believe that more bombs are good for the economy, despite the doubts raised by economists), but also from the psychological and symbolic standpoints. The Bomb, the economy, and our lives all form parts of one interlocking machine, offering us enough satisfactions that we refuse to ask about the deeper meaning of the machine's life. When this question threatens to arise, the diversions of life as theater of the absurd and global Russian roulette are there to entertain us and soothe our doubts. Thus we desperately desire the security that we hope to gain from total domination and manipulation of our world, but we simultaneously demand the insecurity that will make life interesting and entertaining. And we certainly get this insecurity, for we have based our hopes of security on a God that, as we have seen, cannot provide it. We hope to dominate the Enemy with a weapon that by its very nature cannot offer the freedom that we seek through domination. We are caught in a vicious circle in which the quest for security can only breed the anxiety of insecurity. But machines can't feel anxiety, so it may be easier, for this reason too, to live as a machine. Finally, then, we come to treat not only the natural world and our fellow human beings as machines, but ourselves as well. We offer ourselves, our thoughts and feelings, to the machine and the nation that embodies it, and we perceive those feelings and thoughts as parts of the unreality that surrounds us: "Faced with the prospect of the destruction of mankind, we feel neither violent nor guilty, as though we were all involved in a gigantic delusion of negation of the external as well as of our internal reality." 7 We allow ourselves to be numbed, finding it the easiest way to cope with an impossible situation, and thus we commit "partial suicide," which in turn allows us to continue preparing for total suicide on a global scale. We commit ourselves to a machine that is infinitely violent and must wreak its violence on us if it is to be used on others. Therefore, as much as we fear the Enemy, we must fear ourselves in equal measure, and this fear of ourselves reinforces the numbing. So we find powerlessness attractive, even as we chase the delusion of ultimate power, for we know that this dream of ultimate power is ultimately suicidal and thus we want to perceive ourselves as weak—incapable of, or at least not responsible for, pushing the button. Caught in this contradiction, along with so many others, we escape by immersing ourselves in the air of unreality, of craziness, surrounding it all, and thus the circle is completed: at every turn, the symbolism of the Bomb as God, which makes nuclear weapons so attractive to us, reinforces the tendency toward numbing, and numbing reinforces our commitment to the Bomb as God.

**The drive to achieve complete security requires continuous exploitation of Korean women**

Moon, 1997 (Katharine H.S., Professor in the Department of [Political Science](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_science) at [Wellesley College,](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wellesley_College) “Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S./Korea Relations,” p. 18-9, TH)

I think there is yet another, unspoken, reason why these women have been forced out of Korean consciousness for nearly half a decade: Koreans have not wanted reminders of the war lurking around them and the insecurity that their newfound wealth and international power have been built on. That is, kijich'on women are living symbols of the destruction, poverty, bloodshed, and separation from family of Korea's civil war. They are living testaments of Korea's geographical and political division into North and South and of the South's military insecurity and consequent dependence on the United States. The sexual domination of tens of thousands of Korean women by "Yangk'i foreigners" is a social disgrace and a "necessary evil" that South Koreans believe they have had to endure to keep U.S. soldiers on Korean soil, a compromise in national pride, all for the goal of national security. Such humiliation is a price paid by the "little brother" in the alliance for protection by the "big brother."

**The attempt to make peace through security results in more nuclear insecurities –turns the disad**

Sandy & Perkins 01 (Leo R., co-founder of Peace Studies at Plymouth State College and Ray, teacher of philosophy at Plymouth State College, The Nature of Peace and Its Implications for Peace Education Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolutions, 4.2)

In its most myopic and limited definition, peace is the mere absence of war. O'Kane (1992) sees this definition as a "vacuous, passive, simplistic, and unresponsive escape mechanism too often resorted to in the past - without success." This definition also commits a serious oversight: it ignores the residual feelings of mistrust and suspicion that the winners and losers of a war harbor toward each other. The subsequent suppression of mutual hostile feelings is not taken into account by those who define peace so simply. Their stance is that as long as people are not actively engaged in overt, mutual, violent, physical, and destructive activity, then peace exists. This, of course, is just another way of defining cold war. In other words, this simplistic definition is too broad because it allows us to attribute the term "peace" to states of affairs that are not truly peaceful (Copi and Cohen, p. 194). Unfortunately, this definition of peace appears to be the prevailing one in the world. It is the kind of peace maintained by a "peace through strength" posture that has led to the arms race, stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and the ultimate threat of mutually assured destruction. This version of peace was defended by the "peacekeeper" - a name that actually adorns some U.S. nuclear weapons deployed since 1986. Also, versions of this name appear on entrances to some military bases. Keeping "peace" in this manner evokes the theme in Peggy Lee's old song, "Is That All There is?" What this really comes down to is the idea of massive and indiscriminate killing for peace, which represents a morally dubious notion if not a fault of logic. The point here is that a "peace" that depends upon the threat and intention to kill vast numbers of human beings is hardly a stable or justifiable peace worthy of the name. Those in charge of waging war know that killing is a questionable activity. Otherwise, they would not use such euphemisms as "collateral damage" and "smart bombs" to obfuscate it.

Statecentrism furthers antagonistic identity constructs and skews available information

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. 21-22, TH)

Various consequences emerge from the strong statecentric pat- terns and the absence of communication between the two sides. The state is always in a privileged position. It has access to information that other actors or individuals do not have. Its viewpoints, even if subjective or simply wrong, can be made to appear credible because they come from an established authority and can be backed up by force.12 In addition, the practice of imprisoning those who think differently, which is automatic in the North and still practiced in the South, perfectly illustrates what Michel Foucault also identified as a key feature of Western modernity: a penal system that is part of a larger state-directed set of technologies designed to observe, con- trol, and discipline individuals: to make them “obedient and useful at the same time.”13 Both Korean states have used their power to promote and legitimize their particular worldviews. Through a variety of mecha- nisms, from ideology-based education to a tightly controlled media environment, both states were highly successful in disseminating a very peculiar form of nationalism that portrays the political system on the opposite side of the divided peninsula as threatening, perhaps even inherently evil. What Bruce Cumings wrote of the immediate postwar period has remained valid for the decades that followed: not one good thing could be said about the leader on the other side of the dividing line. “To do so was to get a jail sentence.”14 Little does it matter, of course, that in the almost total absence of interactions between North and South, the construction of hostile perceptions is based far more on fiction than on fact. Indeed, the practice of constructing a threatening other is greatly facilitated by the unusu- ally hermetic Demilitarized Zone that separates the two Koreas, for average citizens cannot verify what everyday life looks like in the vilified other half.15 It is not unusual for states to use their privileged position to advance particular political objectives. For centuries states all over the world have promoted, legitimized, and protected identity constructs, particularly those essential for the process of nation building. The state provides mythological and institutional frameworks that sepa- rate self from other, inside from outside, safe from threatening.16 But these constructions are particularly fateful in Korea, where the state is unusually dominant, where identities are unusually antagonistic, and where the presence of a large arsenal of weapons on both sides creates a constant danger of a military escalation.

Actualizing a respect for difference is critical to eliminating antagonistic identity constructs and conflict

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. 99-100, TH)

The success of future efforts toward Korean rapprochement hinges largely on how successful the leaders and their respective societies are in dealing with the legacy of half a century of division, hostility, and grief. Dialogue alone cannot pave the way to reconciliation. No matter how successful dialogical interactions between the opposing sides are, they will always have to deal with the remainder, with positions that cannot be subsumed into compromise or perhaps cannot even be apprehended from the vantage point of those who do not live and represent them. If current efforts at engagement with the North are not followed up by a more tolerant approach to the fundamental values espoused by the other side, progress will either stall or be accompanied by the constant specter of a relapse into violence. Another form of ethics is necessary to deal with this problematic remainder—not an ethics of dialogue but an ethics of accepting the other as other, of not subsuming her/him/it into one’s own view- point. The task ahead thus consists of articulating identity in less antagonistic ways and in rendering these articulations politically acceptable. The work of Emmanuel Levinas offers some guidelines here, for it revolves around an attempt to develop an ethics of re- sponsibility that refuses to hammer difference into sameness. Ethics then becomes a question of developing a relationship to alterity that displays understanding of and respect for the other’s different identity performances.9 In an ideal scenario such respect would go beyond tolerance, for tolerance assumes a basic standard against which anything else is to be judged. Accepting alterity, by contrast, requires abandoning this privileged standpoint, perhaps even at those moments when one is deeply convinced of the superiority of one’s own moral position. Some even argue that an engagement with al- terity is most crucial precisely at those moments when the other’s position poses a fundamental danger to one’s own values.10 The antagonistic identity constructs that have emerged and evolved during the five decades of Korea’s division cannot simply be erased by a redrawing of political boundaries. Differences between the two Koreas are too deeply rooted to be merged into one common form of identity, at least in the near future. In the context of such a well- entrenched and well-protected separation of diametrically opposed identity performances, it is imperative that tan ethical position on national division and unification be based on an approach that does not subsume the other into the self. As a result the security situation on the Korean peninsula will remain volatile as long as current iden- tity constructs continue to guide policy formation. A soft landing approach may well be the most reasonable and desirable scenario, but it can unfold and develop to its fullest potential only once it in- corporates, in a central manner, issues of identity and difference. The key is not to deny difference but to make it part of a new, more pluralistically defined vision of identity and unity that may one day replace the present, violence-prone demarcation of self and other. A few isolated Korean scholars occasionally draw attention to the need for such an approach. Kwon Hyeok-beom, for instance, argues for a “politics of difference” or a “discourse of difference.” Although this would require both Korean states to renounce “the assumption that they have the superior system,” he stresses that it would not require that the South accept everything about the North and its current governing style.11 Perhaps the most sustained, book- length defense of an ethics of difference, at least in English, has been advanced by the anthropologist Roy Richard Grinker. He calls upon Koreans to abandon the myth of homogeneity and embark on a process of mourning—that is, accept that Korea has been divided for half a century and that different identity practices have emerged during this period. Grinker therefore argues for a vision of hetero- geneity and a “plural society in which north and south Koreans can one day live.”12

Geopolitical/military/strategic maneuvers are intricately bound up in identity/ideological motivations

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. 40, TH)

American efforts to build up and defend a strong South Korea had more than mere strategic reasons. Just as important as geopolitical factors were questions of identity. Or, to be precise, geopolitical and identity factors were intrinsically linked. Economic prosperity, elevat- ed living standards, and high growth rates were important indicators for measuring the “success” of the rival regimes in Korea. The pres- tige that the leading power of each alliance could gain as a result of successful socioeconomic performances within its hegemonic realm of influence accounted for each superpower’s motivation to pro- vide substantial economic aid and trade privileges to its respective Korean ally. The resulting benefits were seen as key measurements for judging the success of the rival alliance camps and their value systems. The objective was, in short, to demonstrate the “superiori- ty” of each superpower’s ideological and social regime.14 This was as clear before as after the Korean War. On June 7, 1949, President Harry Truman declared to Congress: “The Korean Republic, by dem- onstrating the success and tenacity of democracy in resisting commu- nism, will stand as a beacon to the people of northern Asia in resist- ing the control of the communist forces which have overrun them.”15 Four years later, and after a war had devastated the peninsula, the American commitment to South Korea intensified. Symptomatic here is President Dwight Eisenhower’s request for legislation concerning the political and economic restructuring of South Korea. In a mes- sage to Congress on July 27, 1953, he stressed, “The need for this action can quickly and accurately be measured in two ways. One is the critical need of Korea at the end of three years of tragic and dev- astating warfare. The second is the opportunity which this occasion presents the free world to prove its will and capacity to do construc- tive good in the cause of freedom and peace.”16 The statements by presidents Truman and Eisenhower reveal that the Cold War was far more than a geopolitical confrontation: it was a clash over different identities, over what it means to be an individual or a nation; over the role of the state in the economy; and mostly over the values that should be central to social and political life. Expressed in other words, the U.S. engagement in East Asia had as much to do with American identity politics as with the objective strategic constellation in the region.

The end of the Cold War didn’t end identity conflict

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. 42, TH)

The tools of U.S. foreign policy in East Asia changed but not the underlying U.S. political motivations or the dualistic and identity- oriented mind-set that sustains those motivations. The persistence of these identity patterns becomes evident when one observes how the dissolution of global Cold War power struggles influenced poli- tics on the Korean peninsula. With the collapse of the Soviet-led alliance system, the external reasons for Korea’s conflict—the ex- istence of global ideological cleavages embedded in a bipolar power structure—vanished too. As a result the clear separation of spheres of influence, which characterized Korea until the 1970s, gradually evolved into a situation in which each great power maintained cer- tain contacts with the opponent of its traditional Korean ally. This is particularly true with China and Russia, which established growing political and economic ties with South Korea. But in its most basic dynamic the security situation in Korea remains as tense as ever and so do the ideological battles that are responsible for the conflict in the first place. Not even the principle of cross-recognition, which was first introduced by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1975, has been achieved. The concept held that the United States and Japan would recognize North Korea, while the Soviet Union and China would enter into diplomatic relations with Seoul.26 The latter has happened, but the former has not.

Cooperative/non-aggressive foreign policy decreases North Korean aggression

Bleiker, 2005 (Roland, Professor of International Relations, pHD from the Australian National University, “Divided Korea: Toward A Culture of Reconciliation,” p. 43-44, TH)

One of the most revealing interpretations of the dynamics that led to the crisis and its resolution was made by Leon Sigal. In a counter- reading of U.S. nuclear diplomacy toward North Korea in the years leading up to the crisis, Sigal documents how coercive diplomacy brought Korea to the brink of war. He writes of a U.S. foreign policy pattern that discouraged cooperation and instead promoted a “crime- and-punishment approach” that constituted North Korea as, above all, a threatening rogue state. While acknowledging the numerous instances that would, indeed, give rise to such an image, Sigal also deals with the interactive nature of the conflict. In a crucial pas- sage he asks why, if North Korea was so keen on developing nuclear weapons and had numerous opportunities to do so, did it not simply go ahead and build bombs? Sigal’s answers highlight Washington’s inability to recognize that North Korea was playing “tit-for-tat in nuclear diplomacy.”28 Some of Sigal’s arguments have become controversial. He has, for instance, been accused of downplaying North Korea’s failure to uphold its obligations. That may well be the case, but at a more fundamental level Sigal is nevertheless able to reveal a striking empirical pattern: each time the United States used an aggressive policy to pressure North Korea into concessions, the latter became more recalcitrant. By contrast, when Washington adopted a more cooperative attitude, Pyongyang usually responded with concessions. Thus tension on the Korean peninsula decreased only when the United States adopted a “give-and-take” diplomacy that recognized how Pyongyang’s recalcitrance can, and should, be read as a bargaining tactic to get something in return for giving up the nuclear option.29

# ENLOE PRODICT

**Cynthia Enloe’s studies are backed by other feminist scholars and her epistemology takes into account the lives of women omitted by your authors**

**Elshtain and Tobias 90,** “Women, militarism, and war: essays in history, politics, and social theory,” by Jean Bethke Elshtain and Sheila Tobias, p 187-205 WM

For most Americans, the possibility of nuclear war is a preeminent concern. We contend less with the question, or problem, of militarism. By this we mean the regimentation of society on a model of military discipline, the militarization of civilian society, the policing of that society, and the bankrupting of societies through military escapades and excesses. Women in Latin America have confronted this problem more directly. Historically, their lives have been profoundly molded and controlled by military juntas and dictatorships. Cynthia Enloe, a political scientist and feminist scholar, draws a connection between the politics of "capitalist imperialism" and the denigration ofwomen in Third World countries. She insists that the machismo within Central America, in particular, is intensified by U. S. militarization of that region. Drawing upon Marxist theory, Enloe puts gender politics into the picture as a central consideration. She points out that many leading male theorists and critics of imperalism have omitted any discussion of women's lives. Enloe's thesis is shared by other feminist scholars. In her book, *Male Dominance, Female Power,* Peggy Reeves Sanday, a cultural anthropologist, demonstrates the ways in which male dominance evolves as resources diminish and group survival depends increasingly on aggressive acts of males. I Sanday takes note of the fact that in some precolonial African societies there was rough sexual equality, and that an imbalance in favor of male dominance was generated with the corning of Western colonial force. Enloe deploys the category "militarism" to cover a range of phenomena that involve not just actual war-fighting, but also a cluster of forms of domination that preparation for war and war by other means trails in its wake. What she omits from her analysis, given its focus, is this question: what kind of military *should* prevail in a democratic sOciety? In other words, if we defeat militarism as she understands it, would we still have a *military?* Can we envisage an acceptable form of defense and what part would women play in it? Because Enloe is not a pacifist, she accepts the fact that collective violence at times may be necessary. Can she, or we, envisage any violence on the part of American men and women that would be acceptable as we enter the last decades of the twentieth century?