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# \*\*\*NEG\*\*\*

# PROSTITUTION LOW NOW

**Prostitution is virtually none after the USFK and South Korean police crackdown.**

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SEOUL — As South Korea continues a nationwide prostitution crackdown, a U.S. Forces Korea official said this week that **the number of American troops visiting brothels in South Korea has dropped** in recent years **and is now "very low."** Chuck Johnson, action officer for USFK’s Prostitution and Human Trafficking Working Group, said U.S. troops’ participation in prostitution was "a major issue" when the group formed five years ago. Now, about five service emembers a year get into trouble for prostitution-related crimes, and the lack of business has forced some brothels outside U.S. military installations to close, he said. Johnson said educating troops about human trafficking is working. Service members are required to complete computer-based training on prostitution before or when they arrive in South Korea, and additional training is required twice a year while they’re on the peninsula. "It’s a sustained, continuous operation," he said. South Korean police began a nationwide, three-month crackdown on prostitution in July. Police said earlier this month they planned to begin raiding brothels in the "glass house" area near Yongsan Station and on Itaewon’s infamous Hooker Hill in mid-September. Both locations are within walking distance of Yongsan Garrison, home to the headquarters for the U.S. military in South Korea. A South Korean police officer said no U.S. troops were arrested during the recent sting, although a massage parlor in Hannam-dong, the neighborhood next to military’s Hannam Village housing area, that caters to South Korean businessmen was shut down. And through the end of October, police will focus on shutting down illegal "hyugaetels," or rest hotels, where customers can call ahead to hire a prostitute and rent small rooms by the hour. Former USFK commander Gen. Leon LaPorte started the command’s quarterly PHT group meeting in 2003 after a Fox News report that said American servicem embers were involved in trafficking prostitutes and a subsequent congressional investigation. After that incident, **USFK instituted a zero-tolerance policy toward prostitution**, toughening some of its regulations and setting up a hotline for people to report human-trafficking violations. In an interview with Stripes in the fall of 2004, LaPorte said nearly 400 service members had been punished that year for offenses related to prostitution. Those offenses included soliciting prostitutes, curfew violations and visiting off-limits establishments. Most were punished through Article 15s, nonjudicial punishments handed down by unit commanders. Of the 11 calls made to USFK and Department of Defense hot lines in the past year, nine were deemed "unfounded." Two businesses outside Osan Air Base were put off limits based on the other reports. Johnson said South Korean attitudes toward prostitution are rapidly changing. The country toughened its prostitution laws in 2004 to treat sex workers more as victims and increase penalties for their customers, he said. "It used to be the johns would get a slap on the wrist, and the workers would get the stiffer punishment," he said. Johnson said some brothels in the Dongducheon area that catered primarily to U.S. troops have closed in recent years because of a lack of business. But he said it’s frustrating to see that brothels in Itaewon, which have a larger pool of customers, remain open." There’s nothing else we as a hosted nation can do to shut them down," he said.

# CASE F/L – DEFENSE

**1. Fem IR can’t explain US basing policies-- emperics**

**Moon 98** (Katharine H.S. Moon Prostitute Bodies and Gendered States in U.S. -Korea Relations Moon is a Professor in the Department of Political Science at Wellesley College. Moon received her B.A. from Smith College, *magna cum laude*, and her Ph.D. from Princeton University, written in Dangerous Gender and Korean Nationalism)

**Since the early 1980s,** academics and activists have defined and analyzed military prostitution as an international system of political and economic domination, both of women and weaker nations.' The power disparities between nations, or governments, have been transferred onto women's bodies, namely that the women of the weaker state represent, through their prostituted bodies, the dominated and controlled position of the weaker state. Such views, however compelling as a political metaphor, portray power relationships between governments and between men and women as static and universal. The simple fact is that the mere existence of power disparities between and among nations does not automatically translate into subordinated positions for women in a weaker country to the men of a stronger country. The U.S. is more powerful in the con- ventional terms of military capability, economic capacity, and political influence than Italy; but American men, whether civilian or military, are in the habit of buying Italian leather, not Italian women. Even the fact of military conquest *does* nor automatically mean the sexual conquest— through rape, prostitution or concubinage—of the women in the defeated country. For example, the U.S. occupation force in Japan, despite its development of local military prostitution, initially enforced strict rules regarding fraternization with local Japanese women.' And even weaker nations have been able to manipulate existing resources and interests of the stronger state to their benefit. Saudi Arabia, during the Gulf War, is a case in point. Saudi Arabia possessed weaker military and political capability than the United States to thwart Iraqi aggression. However, because of its primary role as gatekeeper of Middle East oil supplies and strategic location in the war with Iraq, the weaker power was clearly able to prevent the U.S. military from allowing sexual frater- nization with local Saudi women. Moreover, not all women of a weaker nation experience or suffer the same plight at the hands of the stronger nation's men; class, region, race, *religion,* and ethnicity largely deter- mine who is abused or exploited and how. To understand how power relationships between nations or govern- ments are shaped, we must pay close attention to individual actors and groups who may have varying interests, norms, and goals regarding gen- der. That is, the "state" or the "military" or "capitalist interests" are not monolithic entities. The U.S. military, for example, does not exhibit one universal norm or practice regarding sexual interaction with local women in *overseas* settings.' Nor does it hold the same, constant view on strategic and organizational interests in different parts of the world. To continue to view different actors as conglomerates serves to politicize sexual and international affairs but takes *the political* process out of such *interactions.* Moreover, the perpetuation of a static dichotomy, in which the women of weaker nations are always oppressed and exploited by men of stronger nations, blurs our foci of analysis and activism. What exactly are we trying to explain or understand when we look at the rela- tionship between governments and, consequently, the governments' policies toward women? With respect to U.S.-R.O.K. (Republic of Korea) power relations and military prostitution, do we mean to explain the causes and characteristics of prostitution? Or are we aiming to assess the variations in prostitution practices among various military installa- tions and in different time periods? Or do we focus on the kind and degree of poverty, social degradation, and "choice" confronting the indi- vidual women in the prostitution system? The examination and understanding of military prostitution must be context-specific, grounded in an understanding of power as a dynamic and not a static zero-sum game. The challenge is to analyze the interstate context(s) that determine what Cynthia Enloe admits feminists know little about: "how bargains are struck between influential civilians in a garrison town and the local military commanders."' This essay seeks to strengthen and refine feminist critiques of military prostitution as a mat- ter of international politics. The questions I am asking are how and why governments use women and gendered ideology as instruments of for- eign policy; how specific uses of women's sexual labor and gendered ide- ology affect women's lives; and whether participation as instruments of foreign policy politicize the women involved.

**2. The plan’s description of prostitution is anti-historical, can’t explain specific policies**

**Moon 98** (Katharine H.S. Moon Prostitute Bodies and Gendered States in U.S. -Korea Relations Moon is a Professor in the Department of Political Science at Wellesley College. Moon received her B.A. from Smith College, *magna cum laude*, and her Ph.D. from Princeton University, written in Dangerous Gender and Korean Nationalism)

Social disorder, racial conflicts, violence, and crime were common prob- lems experienced by generations of U.S. soldiers and local Korean resi- dents. Why, then, did the U.S. military and the R.O.K. government exert so much effort to improve camptown relations in the 1970s? Some critics of U.S. military bases in Korea have tended to view *kijiaon* prostitution primarily as a result of U.S. militarism and imperi- alism:5 Without necessarily defining the meanings of these terms, such analysts have equated the superior economic, military, and political capa- bilities of the U.S. with domination, and domination with militarism and imperialism. Such views cannot explain why the Korean govern- ment's active role in controlling prostitution in the early 1970s contrast- ed so starkly with its negligence and intransigence toward any U.S. requests to address camptown problems *prior* to 1971. USFK documents from the early 1960s reveal that VD was a serious problem and concern for the military commanders and that they tried, to no avail, to push the Korean government into cracking down on VD among *kijickon* prosti- tutes. Lieutenant General T.W. Dunn, Commander of I Corps (Group), complained to the then Commanding General, Hamilton Howze, "I am convinced that we receive mostly words and bows and little practical help" regarding the "deplorable problems" related to prostitution.' 6 Even three years before the Clean-Up Campaign, U.S. officials involved with camptown relations lamented the Korean authorities' lack of cooperation in controlling prostitution and prostitutes: "[T]here was a natural impa- tience . . . [on the American side] with a strong Korean reluctance to do anything constructive about the problems of most concern to the Americans, prostitution and *venereal* disease."' The fact of U.S. superiority and "dominance" in economic, military, and political capabilities vis-a-vis Korea did not change from the 1950s and 1960s to the 1970s; the U.S. was still the "dominant" partner and Korea the "junior" partner in the alliance. U.S. troop presence in the 1960s, for example, stood at about 60,000 (compared to approximately 40,000 by September 1971), and the U.S. effectively had command over the Korean military through its role as head of the United Nations forces in Korea. But such power did not enable the Americans to force the Korean government to focus on problems related to prostitution or the Korean prostitutes who densely populated the areas around U.S. bases. In 1963, a USFK official admitted to the EUSA *Deputy Chief* of Staff that the USFK was powerless to control prostitution and venereal disease: "Our negotiating position appears to be weak, for we have no lever to force the R.O.K. to improve their efforts."'s Not only was the USFK leadership in the early 1960s unable to use its large and potent military presence as leverage to pressure the Koreans, it even exhibited awareness and concern for the political implications, i.e., sensitivity toward issues of Korean sovereignty, of official meddling by the U.S. in local camptown issues, primarily prostitution. A Major Saalberg, an Eighth Army official in 1963, stated with regard to prostitution control that "[t]he United Nations Command has followed a policy of non- interference in the internal affairs of the host nation."'9 According to some of the women who worked as camptown prosti- tutes during the 1950s and 1960s, prostitutes of that time period were much "freer," "wilder," "bolder," and less controllable by U.S. or Korean authorities than the women of the 1970s and 1980s. They claimed that each woman's survival depended on her own tough han- dling of any problems she encountered because no part of the larger society could be counted on to protect her. Moreover, these women had not yet been "tamed" by strict regulations enforced by the U.S. military or Korean authorities. And in general, the "wild" behavior of the earli- er generation of prostitutes reflected the unruliness and lawlessness of camptowns themselves, resulting from the Korean government's laissez- faire attitude toward *kijich'on* life. Some of the women went so far as to say that the police not only left them alone but feared them. Why did the overwhelming power disparity between the R.O.K.G. and the U.S. in the 1950s and 1960s not translate into overwhelming physical and sexual control and domination of Korean camptown prostitutes by U.S. soldiers? We can begin to understand the changes in the attitudes and actions of both the USFK and the R.O.K. government if we view their interac- tions as part of a dynamic in which domination is relative rather than absolute. The exploitation and oppression of women are functions of the particular power dynamic between two countries. This dynamic may enable the patron to dominate the relationship, but it may also enable the client state to steer the relationship in its favor. In the 1950s and 1960s, at least two significant factors swung the power pendulum in South Korea's favor and served as a source of resistance to U.S. demands regarding camptown life: clear U.S. geostrategic interests and alliance commitments that compromised U.S. leverage. From the Korean government's perspective, clear-cut Cold War rivalries of the 1950s and 1960s, with Asia serving as the major bat- tlefield, meant firm U.S. commitments to non-Communist Asian allies and a large U.S. troop presence to back up those commitments. The strength of these commitments assured the R.O.K. that the U.S. had as much to gain from a free and prosperous Korea as the Koreans themselves. This meant that the R.O.K., though a junior alliance part- ner, had considerable freedom and leeway in its relations with the U.S." With respect to camptown prostitution, the Korean government used the certainty of U.S. commitments to non-Communist Asia as reason to largely ignore USFK pleas for control of the health and behavior of the prostitutes. The Korean government considered camp- town prostitution primarily a U.S. problem and a matter between GI and prostitute, not, as in the 1970s, a matter of state-to-state relations and security affairs. Moreover, the general attitude of the Korean government and public toward these women during *these* two immediate postwar decades was "They're poor, like most of us who have survived the war. Let them make a living whatever way they can."21 In other words, although most Koreans morally condemned these women for selling their flesh to for- eigners, they pitied and sympathized with the women's poverty and their struggle to keep themselves and their families alive. In a way, these women's material needs were recognized more during the early postwar years than in the 1970s and 1980s, when Korea became economically and militarily much stronger. Second, the unrelenting demand in the 1970s by the USFK for the cooperation of the Seoul government in controlling camptown prosti- tutes was a result of the *loss* of Korean *leverage.* This *leverage* had *been* provided by Korea's troop contribution of 50,000 to aid the U.S. war effort in Vietnam in the mid- to late 1960s. As long as Washington needed Korean troops to supplement U.S. forces in Vietnam, as well as the moral support of its ally, the power of the U.S. to dominate the alliance with Korea was significantly compromised. The U.S. had to accommodate some of Seoul's demands regarding the conditions for troop contribution to Vietnam and the terms of the U.S.-R.O.K. secu- rity relationship." The Korean troop contribution to Vietnam strength- ened the Korean government's ability to resist or downplay the demands and complaints of the USFK authorities regarding camptown *issues.* U.S. officials involved in the Camptown Clean-Up during the early 1970s admitted that as long as Korean troops were needed in Vietnam, the U.S. could not push its interests in cleaning up the camp- towns." It was with the reduction and withdrawal of R.O.K. troops from Vietnam in the early 1970s that the U.S. officials in Korea were able to gain the upper hand on camptown issues. The Nixon Doctrine, which signaled the United States' disengage- ment from Vietnam and Asian land wars in general, and the consequent reduction of U.S. troops from Asia provided the opportune moment for the USFK to demand camptown improvements and for the Seoul gov- ernment to oblige. A specific disruption in the secure U.S.-R.O.K. alliance, then, drove the USFK leadership and the R.O.K. government, through the Purification Campaign, to tighten joint control over the bodies and conduct of camptown prostitutes. For the USFK, the Clean-Up efforts were a means to defend its organizational interests vis-a-vis the policy- makers in Washington and a symbol of its commitment to remain in Korea, regardless of Washington's policy statements. For the Korean government, the clean-up was an integral part of "private diplomacy," a desperate resort to the use of local people and resources, in the absence of conventional carrots and sticks, to secure U.S. commit- ments to Korea. The application of the Nixon Doctrine to South Korea amounted to the reduction of 20,000 U.S. troops (approximately 60,000 troops had been stationed in Korea throughout the 1960s) from Korea and high- lighted the uncertain future of the U.S. forces stationed there. During the early 1970s, the USFK leadership had good reason to feel insecure. Members of Congress were unabashedly expressing their skepticism about a continued U.S. military presence in Korea. Congressman Ronald Dellums, a newly elected African-American, severely criticized the Korean government and people's treatment of black servicemen in Korea and questioned the need to aid militarily countries where Americans, i.e., black soldiers, were not welcome.' Given this context, the Clean-Up Campaign was a way for U.S. military authorities in Korea to demonstrate the strength and congeniality of its relationship with Koreans as well as a means to maintain U.S. congressional support of its continued presence in Korea and continued military assistance for the R.O.K. government. It was, in short, an intense and comprehensive public relations effort.

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**3. Gendered theories of international relations can’t explain prostitution—there are hundreds of alt causes**

**Moon 98** (Katharine H.S. Moon Prostitute Bodies and Gendered States in U.S. -Korea Relations Moon is a Professor in the Department of Political Science at Wellesley College. Moon received her B.A. from Smith College, *magna cum laude*, and her Ph.D. from Princeton University, written in Dangerous Gender and Korean Nationalism)

When we consider the gendered nature of power disparities and domination in international politics, we often cite the masculine and femi- nine gender stereotypes attributed, respectively, to colonizers and colonized on the basis of racial hierarchy, especially the West in relation to the East.'' What we often do not probe are the ways in which actual power disparities generate government policies that have gendered conse- quences. My point here is that between legally sovereign states, the weak- er is not merely a passive recipient of the actions of the stronger. Consequently, exploitation of the women of a weaker state is not auto- matic or constant. Strong and weak states alike make calculated choices regarding women's roles and values in society at a given time. To attribute the exploitation and abuse of women to the weakness and passivity, or feminization, of a client state is to exempt that state from taking respon- sibility for its actions toward and regarding women. It strips the weaker state of agency and over-emphasizes the role of the stronger state. The Korean government's use of private individuals, particularly women, and sexual relationships as instruments of foreign policy was made possible by a culture that expected and legitimated women's self- sacrifice for family and country. Confucianist values of self-sacrifice for the good of the family and country fit handily into the Park govern- ment's scheme of women's roles in national economic development and security enhancement. Korean history, folklore, and literature are replete with variations on this basic scheme: girls and women who sacrifice their labor, lives, bodies and personal aspirations for the sake of their family and country are heroines, martyrs, and patriots.42 In the 1960s and 1970s, women formed the backbone of the low-skilled, low-wage, light- manufacturing export industry that launched South Korea's economic "miracle."" On the security front, thousands of poor girls and women from the countryside put their bodies to work selling sex to U.S. soldiers, increasing Korea's foreign exchange earnings from the dollars spent by the men and contributing to security by "providing comfort" to them. In the early to mid-1970s, such women were "lauded" by the R.O.K. as "patriots."44 Additionally, South Korea's authoritarian practices, justified as national security requirements by the Park regime, contributed to the use and abuse of private citizens for the "national good." Park and his cohorts' draconian grip over the ideas and activities of private Korean citizens through the propagation of anti-Red ideology and the coercive activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (particularly in the late 1960s through the 1970s) reflected the government's view that pri- vate thoughts and actions were closely linked to public safety and national security. The history of suffering and deprivation from the Korean War and the people's desire for prosperity and stability also lent Park Chung Hee the license to demand hard work and personal sacrifice, including the sacrifice of political liberties and participation, for the economic development of the country.

**4. The plan prevents the recognition of Korean women’s struggle**

**KIM 98** *(Yanggongju as* an Allegory of the Nation: The representation of working class women in popular and radical texts, Professor of Sociology at Wheaton University HYUN SOOK KIM written in Dangerous Gender and Korean Nationalism)

Korean government and police play in punishing women and regulating prostitution is no less problematic. She challenges the Korean govern- ment's support of militarized prostitution for U.S. soldiers and speaks personally about her own experience of sexual violence, exploitation, and oppression stemming also from Korean military-capitalist-patriar- chal culture. She is part of a protest wave building in a nation where cri- tiques of military prostitution in general and Korean patriarchy in par- ticular are not widely embraced or supported. 27 Furthermore, in her testimonies, Kim also articulates another dimension of oppression connected to sexual labor—namely, discrimi-nation. For example, in the booklet *Great Army, Great Father (Widaehan gun-* *dae, widaehan abz)* (1995), we find nationalist-feminist activists speak- ing with patronizing kindness about military prostitution: "The most victimized persons by the U.S. troops are `Kijichon women' and 'women who are interracially married to American soldiers.' We must protect the rights of Korean women" (83). Challenging this construction of prosti- tutes as passive victims, a short article in the same booklet on Kim Yon- ja shows evidence of Kim's anger, protest, and resistance against the ways women of Kijich'on are treated in Korean society. In *Great Army, Great* *Father,* Kim states that she cannot control her rage when the women of Kijich'on are judged from the perspective of anti-Americanism and labeled as "pitiful" or "wretched." In her view, when we inscribe the American military as "evil" and "Yanggongju" as objects of pity, we only cover up the roots of the problem. She insists that we also examine the psychological and emotional crises that sex workers face stemming from their experiences of sexual abuse, rape, and assault perpetrated by Korean men. These men, she points out, include Korean soldiers, Korean pimps, and Korean police and government officials. Furthermore, debt, drug addiction, alcoholism, and psychological, emotional, and sexual abuse trap the women in sexual labor and eliminate any hope of alternatives. Kijich'on is a "quicksand," Kim states, because once a woman falls in, she usually cannot get out. While political protests have been organized by sex workers, they have received scant public attention. However, a few significant exam- ples of collective action are worth mentioning. In May 1971, Kim and other sex workers organized a protest in Songt'an. The American sol- diers had distributed leaflets that read, "Shoes $5, Short-time $5, Long- time $10." Equating women's bodies with merchandise, the soldiers were demanding that the price of sexual service be reduced. Kim played a key role in mobilizing over one thousand sex workers to demonstrate in front of the army base. "We are not shoes! We are human beings!" The women demanded that the soldiers who distributed the flyers be forced to resign. The women's demands were not only ignored, but they were forced to disperse by the Korean and military police. In June 1977, in "America Town" in Kunsan, a sex worker named Yi Pok-hi was strangled to death and her body scorched. A month later, another sex worker named Yi Yong-sun was killed. An American soldier, Steven Warren Towerman, admitted to killing both women, but at the time of the incident, neither the Korean police nor the U.S. military police investigated the murders.;' Instead, the Korean police covered up the incident, declaring that there was "insufficient evidence." Then, apparently, no activists stepped forward to hold up these sex workers as national symbols, but Kim YOn-ja mobilized sex workers to demonstrate against the indifference and apathy of Korean and U.S. military police. As Kim Yon-ja and her fellow organizers have demonstrated, the sex workers of Kijich'on are not simply victims; they are social actors who interpret and shape their own lives. With their brave acts of protest, they have called for critical engagement and moral agency, challenging the material and social circumstances that bind them. They have also fought against the further degradation of their commodified bodies and demanded that their rights be protected. However, women's collective resistance has always been suppressed by both Korean and the U.S. mil- itary authorities, and sex workers have not received material or emo- tional support from Korean authorities or from the public at large. In Kim Yan-ja's personal struggle, for example, she turns to the Christian faith, which she says has been her single source of hope and strength. She says she has also found spiritual healing by mobilizing other sex workers together in Christian fellowship. Kim founded the True Love Shelter *(Ch'amsarang Simtö)* and continues to work as a missionary to promote hope in other sex workers and their children. It is in this per- sonal-political context of everyday struggle against class, gender, nation- state, and imperialist subordination that we may find Kim Yon-ja's actions and words as being strategic and historically specific. *Conclusion* This essay has examined representations of working-class sex workers for U.S. military in popular and radical texts, both of which fix the identi- ties of the women as "bad"/"good" and treat the female body as a metaphorical map of the Korean nation. Their contradictory represen- tations indicate that women engaged in militarized prostitution for for- eign soldiers have become a battleground for nationalist-feminist poli- tics in the 1990s. Specifically, both popular and radical texts portray women engaged in sex work for foreign men as victims: the women are widowed, abused, raped, prostituted, and murdered. And within this construction of the female subject as passive victim, there is no space to view the woman engaged in sexual labor as a speaking and resisting subject; instead, her speech is muted, censored, and silenced. If what she says contradicts and challenges dominant representations of her subjectivity, she is further marginalized as an outcast—as were Ollye, Mi-ra, Yun Kum-i, and Kim Yon-ja. Popular and radical discourses create and sustain the subject position of women in militarized prostitution with foreigners as “Yanggongju”and as an allegory for the Korean nation. Using the victim trope, these texts also treat the sexual-class subject postion of military sex workers as secondary and subodinate to national identity. No space is allowed for discussing military sex workers in terms of their gender, sexual, and class positions simultaneously. Instead, the construction of this allegory for the Korean nation is premised on “masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation and masculinized hope.” In sum, we must recognize that military sex workers have not been completely colonized by patriarchy, militarism, and imperialism or neocolonialism; the women do assert agency and subjectivity as Korean women. In what ways do the outcast military sex workers resist, reject, and try to invert the power hierarchy that relegates them to the lowest social standing? Do we retain the metaphor of nation as the representative discourse for collective understand female identity, or can we develop an alternative discourse on/ for military sex workers that will not re-colonize or subordinate their bodies and identities? This essay raises these unresolved questions and emphasizes the need to further investigate the ways in which the subject positions of working class women in sexual labor are constructed in defense of the nation. The first step towards “pivoting the center” may be to chart the multiple, fragmented subjectivies of working class Korean women, such as military sex workers who have historically been exculede from scholarship and represented as passive objects in popular and radical representations. Answering these unresolved questions would thus require a critical feminist analysis of the power relations inscrived in the reading, writing and public presentations of women as the victims, the oppressed, and the exploited. Instead of essentializing the experiences of the women of Kijich'on as categorically “Yanggongju,” we must begin acknowledging the agency, subjectivity, and resistance of working class women.

# GENDER TURNS

**1. The plan is elistist and universalist—disempowers women**

**KIM 98** *(Yanggongju as* an Allegory of the Nation: The representation of working class women in popular and radical texts, Professor of Sociology at Wheaton University HYUN SOOK KIM written in Dangerous Gender and Korean Nationalism)

Kim Yon-ja's testimony was relegated to the margins of this forum because the writer and videomaker analyzed the problem of military prostitution simply in terms of U.S. militarism and imperialism, thus locating the blame on Americans for the exploitation of Korean women working in Kijich'on. Their emphasis on the United States' culpability left little room to discuss the intricate relations of economic, cultural, and ideological hierarchies that reinforce women's subordination, including militarized prostitution among Koreans, in which Korean women provide sexual service to Korean soldiers near Korean military installations, and the role that the Korean dictatorships and patriarchy have played in encouraging Korean women into prostitution. Unlike Kim Yon-ja's story, which puts forward an alternative, "bottom-up" view of poor and working-class sex workers,' the activists' elitist, "top-down" perspective privileges their own subject positions as nationalist, middle- class experts with "critical knowledge." Their perspective can be char- acterized as a nationalist-feminist view. Throughout this essay, the term "nationalist-feminist" will be used to refer to what I call "the conscious- ness of decolonization." This phrase effectively captures the sentiments of contemporary Korean feminist groups who share the nationalist views of social movement groups opposing neo-colonialism, militarism, and imperialism. The nationalist and feminist groups point to the problem of class and gender oppression as stemming solely from the structural domination of imperialism. Within this framework, Koreans are catego- rized as a unified subject occupying the victim position vis-a-vis the American oppressor. The conflict between elite and working-class positions presents a fundamental challenge to middle-class Korean women, both feminist and non-feminist, when we speak of and about the poor and working- class women engaged in sexual labor, especially with foreigners. We must, however, ask the following theoretical and political questions: which ideological framework(s) should inform our discussions with American audiences about the problem of Korean prostitutes and for- eign soldiers? Who gets to speak of, for, and about the working-class Korean women working in Kijich'on? Which boundary markers—i.e., the nation, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, and/or class—help shed light on the complex problem of militarized prostitution? Historically, the term "Yanggongju" has referred to Korean women who engage in sexual labor for foreign soldiers. We need to problema- tize the social construction of this term, which does not refer to women working with or for Korean men. Used derogatorily, it means "Yankee whore," "Yankee wife," "UN lady," and/or "Western princess." This epi- thet, "Yanggongju," relegates Korean women working in militarized prostitution with foreign men to the lowest status within the hierarchy of prostitution. Since the end of the Korean War, this category has been extended to include Korean women who marry American servicemen (perjoratively called "GI Brides"). In postwar Korea, the epithet "Yanggongju" has become synonymous with "GI Brides," so that Korean women in interracial marriages are also viewed as "Yanggongju." In the 1990s, a growing number of both popular and radical politi- cal texts that incorporate representations of "Yanggongju" have been produced and circulated. These include popular novels, films, and TV programs for the mass market, as well as radical political texts such as pamphlets, newsletters, journals, and books produced by leftist nation- alist groups fighting for national sovereignty—specifically, the national unification and independence of, and democracy in, Korea. Like the Korean activists who spoke at the Boston forum, the popular and radi- cal texts focus only on militarized prostitution with foreigners and do not acknowledge or problematize militarized prostitution in Korea, which includes Korean women providing sexual service ro Korean sol- diers. The texts also use the term "Yanggongju" unquestioningly and uncritically, in its pejorative connotation. I will interrogate this categorization of Korean working-class sex workers by examining how specific texts construct and sustain the notion of "Yanggongju." Curiously, critical studies of sexual labor with foreigners in Kijich'on remained few and far between until the 1990s, and negative images of working-class Korean women as "Yanggongju" have left a deep imprint in the minds of Koreans. My essay emphasizes two main arguments: one, that although the term "Yanggongju" is used by middle-class nationalists and feminists to symbolize the nation, this use simultaneously erases or vilifies the lives and experiences of working- class women; and two, that despite being essentialized as "Yanggongju," working-class Korean women engaged in sexual labor with foreigners have agency, subjectivity, experience, and an autonomous point of view. Their self-representations contest and challenge the dominant represen- tations of them as mere victims, as the oppressed. To develop these arguments, this essay's first two sections will analyze Ahn Jung-hyo's novel *Silver Stallion* (1990) and Kang Sok-kyong's short story "Days and Dreams" (1989), respectively. Translated into English 5 and introduced to the American mass market, these two texts present stereotypical, unidimensional representations of "Yanggongju" as "vic- tims" of militarism and imperialism. The women are portrayed in terms of their object-position as poor, working-class, raped, abused "whores" for American GIs. The third section analyzes texts produced by radical movement groups, discussing specifically how these texts utilize the fig- ure of Yun Kum-i, a young Kijich'on sex worker murdered in 1992 by an American soldier. Flow do the images of Korean military prostitutes in radical texts differ from those put forward in popular texts? (Throughout the essay, the word "radical" refers to the leftist nationalist consciousness that opposes [neo-]colonialism and U.S. militarism and seeks national independence and unification of two Koreas.) I will argue that while radical social movement groups with nationalist and/or fem- inist consciousness have won some mainstream support to discuss mili- tarized prostitution, largely because of the Yun murder incident, they nevertheless *discuss* militarized prostitution only in relation to for- eigners, particularly American soldiers. Not only is the issue of Korean women providing sexual services to Korean men thus ignored, but these radical groups are reinscribing and reconstituting elitist and patriarchal views of working-class Korean women of Kijich'on as "Yanggongju"- vulgar, low, dirty, and shameful social objects. Finally, the paper's fourth section returns to a discussion of the speaking tour. I will contend that although they have not been well received by nationalists and feminists, Kim Yon-ja's speeches about her religious spirituality as a source of self- empowerment cannot be dismissed as politically incorrect. Neither can we appropriate her experience to assert a false unity of heterogeneous Korean women while relegating the working-class, female sex worker(s) to marginality. In fact, the elite-versus-working-class conflict described above cautions *us* about the privileging of *class* and "expert" knowledge that occurs when middle-class academic-activists and working-class women join together. In the late twentieth century, in the age of global or transnational cap- italist culture, it becomes particularly urgent for us diasporic Korean women to recognize the differences among us in terms of class, ethnici- ty, nationality, and power relations. Korean women do not compose a monolithic group as "Koreans," "women," or "Korean women"; we do not share a unity of "Korean womanhood"; and the traditional under- standing of our locations in terms of the oppressed and the oppressor or the periphery and the metropole is inadequate. Thus, in re-thinking the politics of representation, elitist (feminist or nationalist) academics and activists must not assert a single, unitary identity constructed in terms of Korean nation, ethnicity, or womanhood and should not contribute to the silencing of the working-class women engaged in sexual labor with foreign soldiers. Instead of reproducing totalizing, unidimensional images of working-class Korean women who work in sexual labor for for- eigners as victims of militarism and neo-colonialism, this essay empha- sizes the importance of recognizing the self-representations of working- class women and their everyday resistance to the patriarchal and military- capitalist systems of power hierarchy. When considering the position of working-class Korean women, we need to deconstruct the essentialized category of "Yanggongju" and "speak to" the working-class Korean women who have been culturally and historically muted in the dominant narratives of the middle class, both nationalist and feminist. Imperial vio- lence and male violence need to be theorized, but not in terms of mid- dle-class cultural and political norms. Theoretically and politically, we need to understand Korean women, especially and working-class women as heterogeneous, material subjects making their own histories.

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**2. The plan subverts actual feminist struggle**

**KIM 98** *(Yanggongju as* an Allegory of the Nation: The representation of working class women in popular and radical texts, Professor of Sociology at Wheaton University HYUN SOOK KIM written in Dangerous Gender and Korean Nationalism)

Again, in these nationalist views, both feminist and non-feminist, the crime is U.S. imperialism. There is no mention of how Korean patri- archy, class inequality, and the state's economic policies have contributed to the re-colonization and marginalization of sex workers.22 Instead, masculinized nationalism is recuperated by activists, including national- ist-feminists. And in this recuperation, no space is opened to view sex workers in their class, gender, and sexual positions; the contestation, resistance, and challenge by sex workers to both the international and local capitalist-military patriarchy are also occluded. In short, discus- sions of working-class sex workers in radical texts do not counter or con- test their representations in popular texts. The radical narrative about working-class women in militarized prostitution with foreigners is the same as the popular narrative in that the speaking subject at the center is the privileged activist and the local patriarchal power remains unques- tioned. In both radical and popular texts, working-class sex workers are recognized only after gruesome death and violence, and when they do become visible, they are categorized as victims oppressed by U.S. impe- rialism/militarism. In short, any historical specificity of women's loca- tions in particular social and cultural power relations as subordinate, marginal, or powerful, is effectively erased.

**3. The gender domination theory to explain prostitution simply essentializes and stigmatizes women and prostitutes – turns case**

**Scoular 2k4** [Jane, Strathclyde University, “The Subject of Prostitution,” 2004, <http://myweb.dal.ca/mgoodyea/Documents/Feminism/The%20subject%20of%20prostitution%20in%20feminist%20theory%20Scoular%20Fem%20Theor%205(3)%202004%20343.pdf>] SLV

The importance of gender in structuring the sale of sex informs a radical perspective on prostitution. Rather than representing freedom or diversity, the practice of women selling sex is considered the epitome of the oppressive sexual relations, ‘the public recognition of men’s mastery’ (MacKinnon, 1993: 13). Sexuality is considered as the primary dynamic in the ordering of society, represented in MacKinnon’s maxim: ‘Sexuality is to feminism, what work is to Marxism; that which is most one’s own and yet that which is most taken away’ (MacKinnon, 1982: 515). Carole Pateman, in *The Sexual Contract*, engenders the political fiction of the social contact to demonstrate the centrality of sexual possession to male–female relations in European societies and the role of prostitution in maintaining this dynamic: ‘womanhood . . . is confirmed in sexual activity, and when a prostitute contracts out the use of her body she is thus selling *herself* in a very real way’ (Pateman, 1988: 207, emphasis in original). **There are, however, a number of problems with such accounts. By overdetermining gendered power-dynamics critics have noted that domination theory simply essentializes and fails to move outside the phallocentric imaginary** (Cornell, 1995; Brown, 1995; Scoular, 1996).3 This is evident in the quotation above where, in one rhetorical swoop, all women are reduced to prostitutes and prostitutes to their sex acts. Not only does this reify an image of the prostitute as sexual subordinate, it also sustains the myths and norms of the sex industry, of potent men and submissive women, rather than transforming them (Shrage, 1994: 134). Gender and sexuality clearly play important structuring roles in prostitution but it is a phenomenon that cannot be reduced to either gender or sexuality (Zatz, 1997: 279).4 In doing so radical feminist theories reduce women’s identity to a single trait, regardless of the structuring roles of money, culture or race. In identifying sex more than other bodily mediated activities, such as childcare, nursing or domestic activities, radical feminists ascribe a particular value to sex, which is then used to argue against its commodification (Oerton and Phoenix, 2001: 387). Pateman, for example, defines the difference between paid sex and loving sex as: ‘[the] difference between the reciprocal expression of desire and unilateral subjection to sexual acts with the consolation of payment: it is the difference for women between freedom and subjection’ (Pateman, 1988: 204). Barry echoes this when she notes that ‘when sex is not explicitly treated as genuine human interaction, it dehumanises the experience and thereby dominates women’ (Barry, 1995: 28). Not only does this confirm current normative understandings of ‘genuine’ sex as in some way outside power, it also, as Zatz observes, accepts the culturally specific processes that separate work from relationships of intimacy. The economic dimension is important in this context. Although seen by radical feminists as just an exacerbating variable, in an always-dominant sexual hierarchy, the presence of money has important structural consequences.5 Feminists have highlighted the public/private norms of instrumental rationality and love that operate to obscure the role of desire in the market and to place burdens on groups, especially women, whose labour in an affective private world goes unrecognized (Zatz, 1997: 303; Olsen, 1983: 1497). Prostitution, however, challenges this dualism. Zatz (1997: 303) describes it as a ‘bifurcated event’ – an act that cannot be identified as singularly a market transaction or the realization of private desire. The confusion this creates fuels the whore stigma, which as McClintock (1992: 73) observes, reflects deeply felt anxieties about women trespassing the dangerous boundaries between private and public. It is also met with criminalization which attempts to force back public elements of prostitution into the realm of private sexuality, thus keeping the economy and sexuality symbolically separated: ‘By denying prostitution the status of work criminalization helps patrol the boundary between the sex/affective labour routinely assigned to and expected of women and practices deserving of the financial and status rewards of “work” ’ (Zatz, 1997: 287). Failure to recognize the role of stigma and law in structuring the marginal status of sex work means, as Zatz perceptively notes, that radical feminists often underestimate how much of what they identify as harmful in prostitution is a product, not of the inherent character of sex work or sexuality but rather of the specific regimes of criminalization and denigration that serve to marginalize and oppress sex workers while constraining and distorting sex work’s radical potential. (Zatz, 1997: 289)

**4. Modern discourse creates dichotomies that label prostitutes as the “other” allowing them to be controlled and manipulated; they are no longer humans**

**Law ‘00**

[Lisa, Ph. D. Human Geography from Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at Australian National University, member of Steering Committee of University Forum for Gender and Sexuality, Lecturer at St. Andrews, “Sex work in Southeast Asia: The place of desire in a time of AIDS”, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, p.19-20]

In an extensive scholarly work, Bell (1994) considers the subject of ‘the body’ in Western conceptualizations of prostitution at different historical junctures. Moving through the discursive construction of the prostitute in Plato, modernism, feminism and by international prostitute organizations and performance artists themselves, Bell argues that a process of ‘othering’ is evident in modern and feminist constructions of the prostitute body—dichotomizing women into good/bad, healthy/diseased and agent/victim. **Prostitute organizations that seek to break such dichotomies are often prone to reproducing them,** and Bell (1994:2) argues that it is only in prostitute performance art ‘that the overarching dichotomies of “whore” and “madonna”…are dissolved and unified’. Following Foucault, Bell claims that it was in the modern period that ‘the prostitute body was produced as an identity and prostitution as a deviant sexuality’ (1994:12). She analyses the medical-moral-legal discourses of modernity in the popular texts of Parent-Duchatelet, William Acton, Havelock Ellis and Freud, and argues that throughout the modern era: **the prostitute body was produced as a negative identity** by the bourgeois subject, an empty symbol filled from the outside with the debris of the modern body/body politic, a sign to women to sublimate their libidinal body in their reproductive body. (1994:72) Her careful re-reading of these texts reveals more ambiguity than has been previously offered, but this does not detract from her argument that the systematic surveillance and control of prostitutes in the modern era (by doctors, members of the police and clergy, reformatory matrons, sexologists and psychoanalysts) were an assertion of power over the ‘other’ that resulted in much knowledge production about prostitutes and prostitution.

**5. Prostitutes are sites of power that is translated by the state into a single stigmatizing identity**

**Law ‘00**

[Lisa, Ph. D. Human Geography from Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at Australian National University, member of Steering Committee of University Forum for Gender and Sexuality, Lecturer at St. Andrews, “Sex work in Southeast Asia: The place of desire in a time of AIDS”, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, p.24-25]

The intersection of current debates on power/knowledge, sexuality, identity and space is relevant to prostitution in Southeast Asia. Drawing from the theorizing of Foucault and contemporary feminists, I maintain that prostitute bodies are irreducible: they are the objects of power and sites of resistance, and the sites at which these struggles are worked out. Prostitute bodies are the objects of a disciplinary power that polices morals and public health, and become marked by the practices they engage in (e.g. when and where they engage in business, who their customers are, whether or not they use condoms, etc.). These practices are surveyed, regulated and controlled—usually but not exclusively through the machinery and technologies of the ‘state’—and this exertion of power creates much knowledge about a pathologized subject (‘prostitution’). The discourse of prostitution therefore produces a singular and unambiguous prostitute identity that is reflective of the (sexual) practices in which they engage. Yet if identity formation is interpreted as a complex, dialectically constructed relationship between particular forms of power/knowledge and experience, an understanding of this process has the potential of subverting specific kinds of knowledge formation about prostitutes and prostitution (e.g. through AIDS education projects). It is for this reason that I move from discussions initiated by feminists of difference to the literature in geography, where an emphasis on the relationship between identity and space is considered pivotal. Geographers highlight how bodies make particular movements through space; bodies therefore have different experiences and subjectivities. The spaces through which bodies move, however, are considered far from innocent; they are landscapes of power that also mould and police subjectivity. These spaces welcome some and reject others, affirm norms of behaviour and appearance and are inscribed with the dominant cultural norms (of morality, sexuality, and so on). If identity is experienced as movement, and space is reflective of cultural norms, then actual movements through space, and the places created and experienced in this process, work in a dialectical fashion that mediates the experience of identity. The bodies of Southeast Asian sex workers make movements through space: through red light districts, health clinics, through local communities and the spaces their customers also inhabit (e.g. clubs, hotels and beach resorts). Sometimes these movements correlate directly with the exertion of power. In the Philippines, for example, sex workers are required to attend the City Health Department on a weekly basis, and this space equates identity with sexual practices thereby evoking specific experiences of identity. Other spaces, such as the bar or neighbourhood, evoke different experiences; they can simultaneously reinforce or evade the identity of sex work, depending on the context. It is because these spaces are also situated within other spaces of political, moral and religious significance, however, that they affect experiences of identity. Red light districts are mapped by global AIDS prevention agencies, for example, and the behaviour of sex workers is policed by dominant codes of morality. Sex work is variously considered immoral, sordid, dirty, and so on, and while sex workers themselves might reject these labels, they are nonetheless encountered on a regular basis. Indeed, they constitute the landscapes of power and identity that are interrogated in this book. It is this notion of the construction of identity and its relation to different spaces that helps refuse the presumed (and universal) prostitute identity articulated in debates on prostitution and HIV/AIDS.

**6. Political discourse and action re-create the stigma of prostitution; silencing the voices of the women and using them as scapegoats**

**Law ‘00**

[Lisa, Ph. D. Human Geography from Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at Australian National University, member of Steering Committee of University Forum for Gender and Sexuality, Lecturer at St. Andrews, “Sex work in Southeast Asia: The place of desire in a time of AIDS”, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, p.82]

Conaco’s observation regarding the need for ‘strict government intervention’ in the lives of ‘hospitality girls’ highlights two inter-related themes: (1) the increasing role of public health authorities in official discussions of prostitution; and (2) and how anti-colonial sensibilities have inscribed the public health agenda. **Because public health perspectives are authorized**—and by this I mean the Department of Health professes a privileged access to reality—**they shape public perceptions about HIV/AIDS**. In the Philippines this has meant an emphasis on particular geographic areas, and the designation of sex workers as a ‘high risk group’. **This has not only reproduced stereo-types of sex workers as diseased, but has increased the stigma of working in the sex industry.** In 1993, there were debates about mandatory HIV antibody testing for women in Cebu City’s sex industry. These debates were inspired by the Department of Health’s national policy to eliminate mandatory blood screening on the grounds that it was expensive and ineffectual in slowing the spread of HIV (Chapter 2). While the rhetoric of the debate was influenced by the emerging ‘global discourse’ on HIV/AIDS and human rights, the debate itself was always about local perceptions of women in the sex industry and Cebu’s administrative autonomy. Here I highlight the role of city politics in debates about mandatory testing (cf. Brown 1995), while at the same time reproducing an exclusionary discourse which silenced the voices of women in Cebu’s sex industry. The voices which were represented in these debates—government and non-government organizations as well as the media—considered sex workers particularly vulnerable, but the debate itself exceeded discussions about preventing AIDS. Mandatory testing was simultaneously about the autonomy of Cebu’s politicians, a history of regulating prostitution, and the global links that were perceived as bringing HIV to Cebu. In the process of creating meaning, however, women in the sex industry were scapegoated for the spread of HIV.

**7. Prostitutes have been used as scapegoats to the spread of AIDS resulting in blame and stigma**

**Law ‘00**

[Lisa, Ph. D. Human Geography from Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at Australian National University, member of Steering Committee of University Forum for Gender and Sexuality, Lecturer at St. Andrews, “Sex work in Southeast Asia: The place of desire in a time of AIDS”, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, p.26-27]

There is an important cultural critique of AIDS prevention policies that are aimed at particular groups and individuals within societies. 1 These critiques have been instrumental in highlighting how marginalized groups are conceptualized as ‘objects’ and not ‘subjects’ of AIDS prevention, and how this regularly leads to blame and stigma. There were many debates about whether sex workers in Southeast Asian tourist sites were culpable, for example, but their designation as a ‘high risk group’ had more to do with existing anxieties about sex tourism than the sexual health of sex workers. While activists and bureaucrats considered what kinds of education were necessary, the debates themselves exceeded discussions about the sex industry or AIDS. Evaluating the status of the sex industry in the 1990s was simultaneously about the negative consequences of the global links in the region, and the stigma associated with women who engage in sexual relations with men. While cultural critiques of AIDS have done much to highlight how the designation of ‘high risk’ groups has been enmeshed in the politics of class, race, gender and sexuality, there has been less attention paid to how cultural politics shape interventions in places outside the West. Furthermore, critiques that do focus on the cultural politics of AIDS in Asia tend to emphasize how the epidemic has been represented in Western texts (Nguyet Erni 1997; although see Buckley 1997 on Japan). Yet the cultural politics of AIDS in Southeast Asia shares the ‘othering’ evident in Western HIV prevention policies, and is enmeshed with the cultural normativities of global imperatives to slow the spread of HIV Here I extend these critiques to examine the dynamics through which one group of **women in Southeast Asia have been scapegoated for the spread of HIV.**

# ORIENTALISM TURNS

**1. Feminist condemnation of prostitution legitimizes conservative values while ensuring their implementation in federal policy – this casts prostitutes as helpless and without agency – turns the case**

Weitzer, 06 (Ronald, Professor of Sociology at George Washington University, “Moral Crusade Against Prostitution,” *Society* 43 (3), March-April, metapress, TH)

The crusade against prostitution has been waged by an alliance of the Christian right and radical feminists. The former include Focus on the Family, the Traditional Values Coalition, the National Association of Evangelicals, the Catholic Bishops Conference, the Religious Freedom Coalition, and numerous others. For religious conservatives, prostitution symbolizes sexual liberalism, moral decay, and family breakdown. As the founder of Evangelicals for Social Action, Ron Sider, told the Seattle Weekly (8/25/04), the campaign against prostitution and sex trafficking “certainly fits with an evangelical concern for sexual integrity. Sex is to be reserved for a marriage relationship where there is a lifelong covenant between a man and a woman.” A government crackdown on prostitution thus ratifies the Christian right’s views on sex and the family. For radical feminism (which is just one kind of feminism) prostitution is defined as male domination, exploitation, and violence against women—whether entered into voluntarily or not, whether legal or illegal. As the most prominent radical feminist organization, the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women, proclaims on its website, “All prostitution exploits women, regardless of women’s consent. Prostitution affects all women, justifies the sale of any woman, and reduces all women to sex.” Although these religious and feminist activists are fierce opponents on other social issues, like abortion and same-sex marriage, they have entered into a marriage of convenience in their campaign against the sex industry. Two decades ago, these strange bedfellows forged the same coalition in opposition to pornography, playing a predominant role in the 1985 national commission chaired by Attorney General Edwin Meese. The commission’s recommendations relied heavily on the testimony of leading antipornography activists, incorporated their claims (and dismissed counterevidence) regarding the various harms of pornography (e.g., causing violence against women, moral decline), and led to a national crackdown on porn distributors, driving several out of business. History is repeating itself today. The Meese commission’s allegations about the harms of pornography are recapitulated in the Bush administration’s claims about prostitution and trafficking, and are just as strongly influenced by converging rightwing and feminist forces. As the director of the State Department’s trafficking office, John R. Miller, admitted in an op-ed in the New York Post (5/22/05), the federal government has been “working closely with faith-based, community, and feminist organizations” to combat all forms of prostitution. In fact, a coalition of these groups aggressively pushed for legislation that resulted in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA) and creation of the State Department’s new Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. Miller told the New York Times (10/26/03) that he credits these groups with keeping trafficking on the front burner: “They’re consumed by this issue. I think it’s great. It helped get the legislation passed, it helped spur me. I think it keeps the whole government focused.” The Meese commission sparked a backlash from scholars (e.g., Larry Baron, > Society, July-August 1987; Carole Vance, The Nation, August 2, 1986) and resistance from the pornography industry, but recent developments in prostitution/trafficking policy have encountered much less opposition—perhaps because prostitution is illegal here and no one is lobbying in favor of trafficking. The crusade against prostitution is yet another example of how ideology has triumphed over science in the Bush administration, but in this case, the scientific community has been largely silent. Dubious Claims Moral crusades typically make universalistic and often unverifiable claims about the nature and extent of a particular social evil. My review of the publications and testimony of leading organizations in this campaign, as well as relevant government documents, identified the following core claims: Prostitution always involves, and is an extreme example of, male domination and exploitation of women, regardless of historical time period, societal context, or legal status. Prostitution has never been and can never be organized in a way that maximizes workers’ interests and empowers women. Violence is omnipresent in prostitution. It is not simply that prostitutes experience violent incidents; instead, violence is depicted as utterly fundamental and “intrinsic” to prostitution—categorically and universally . The mantra, constantly repeated by antiprostitution organizations, is that prostitution is violence by definition. By equating prostitution with victimization, these activists hope to win broad support for their crusade. Who can endorse prostitution if it is all about violence against women? Female prostitutes are victims who lack agency. They do not actively make choices to enter or remain in prostitution, and the distinction between voluntary and forced prostitution is fallacious. Activists use the terms “prostituted women” and “sexual slavery” to drive home the idea that prostitution is something done to women, not something that can be chosen. It is simply impossible that anyone would decide to be “used” in this way. As Melissa Farley, a prominent radical feminist activist, declares, “To the extent that any woman is assumed to have freely chosen prostitution, then it follows that enjoyment of domination and rape are in her nature” (Melissa Farley and Vanessa Kelly, Women and Criminal Justice, 2000). The only time women make their own choices is when they decide to leave prostitution.

**2. Even if you don’t demonize prostitution, the federal government will adopt this rhetoric when implementing your policy - conservative values are entrenched and challenging dominant discourses of orientalism is impossible**

Weitzer, 06 (Ronald, Professor of Sociology at George Washington University, “Moral Crusade Against Prostitution,” *Society* 43 (3), March-April, metapress, TH)

Apart from these material benefits, successful moral crusades are victorious insofar as their ideology is incorporated in official government policy. The antiprostitution crusade’s views have been institutionalized remarkably quickly, judging from developments in U.S. law and government policy. In terms of foreign policy, the crusade’s claims are abundantly evident in the TVPA, the State Department’s annual Trafficking in Persons Reports, and the Department’s infamous website, The Link Between Prostitution and Sex Trafficking. Domestically, the policy shift is embodied in the End Demand for Sex Trafficking Act of 2005 (HR 2012 and S 937), a bill now before the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. Despite its title, the bill covers much more than sex trafficking; its objective is to “combat commercial sexual activities” in general. HR 2012, the TVPA, and the Justice Department’s Model State Anti-Trafficking Criminal Statute all define commercial sex as “any sex act on account of which anything of value is given to, or received by, any person.” Incredibly elastic in scope, the targets would seem to include legal pornography, whose actors get paid for sex acts, as well as legal brothel prostitution in Nevada and perhaps lap dancing in strip clubs if that qualifies as type of a “sex act.”

**3. This trades-off with status quo socio-economic analyses of prostitution and makes orientalist policies towards South Korea inevitable**

Weitzer, 06 (Ronald, Professor of Sociology at George Washington University, “Moral Crusade Against Prostitution,” *Society* 43 (3), March-April, metapress, TH)

What is largely missing here is attention to poverty and barriers to women’s employment in the Third World and Eastern Europe. Such a socioeconomic analysis of the problem has been overshadowed by the moral discourse of the dominant forces in the antitrafficking movement. The Bush administration employs both the carrot and stick to change international opinion and practice. The stick is used to pressure complacent governments to change their policies on trafficking and prostitution. The annual Trafficking in Persons Report ranks countries into three tiers according to their records on trafficking, and under the TVPA, the U.S. government can impose economic sanctions on nations that are not making good faith efforts to crack down on the problem. The U.S. government also tries to shame other countries into compliance. Japan is one case in point, and South Korea is another. After the State Department included South Korea in 2001 on its “watch list” of countries with a poor record in fighting trafficking, the embarrassed South Korean Government passed a new law (in 2004) that increased penalties for non- trafficked sex workers. Subsequently, the State Department’s 2005 Trafficking in Persons Report declared that the Korean government “showed leadership” by passing the antiprostitution law, and Korea was then rewarded by being removed from the watch list. At the same time, a carrot is used to entice organizations to accept the Bush administration’s position. To be eligible for U.S. funding, any foreign NGO working on the trafficking front must now declare its opposition to legal prostitution. The State Department’s website is unequivocal: “no U.S. grant funds should be awarded to foreign non- governmental organizations that support legal state-regulated prostitution.” Similarly, the AIDS funding law of 2003 requires that any international organization working to fight AIDS must “have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking” if it wishes to receive such funding. Both the State Department and now HR 2012 claim that legal prostitution “fuels” trafficking: where prostitution is tolerated, according to the bill, there is “nearly always an increase in the number of women and children trafficked into commercial sexual activities.” In May 2005, 171 American and foreign organizations signed a letter to President Bush opposing the antiprostitution pledge because they believe this policy interferes with promising interventions. Because of the restriction, several NGOs have rejected American funding. It has been argued that the pledge violates the First Amendment right to free speech, but this right apparently does not apply to non-American organizations. There is absolutely no evidence that legal prostitution causes or even contributes significantly to sex trafficking. If legal prostitution fuels trafficking, Nevada should be a Mecca for traffickers. Yet here has been no documented increase in trafficking in areas of the state where brothels are legal. Moreover, the State Department itself provides some evidence contradicting the alleged deleterious effect of legalization: In the 2005 Trafficking in Persons Report, Australia, New Zealand, and the Netherlands, where prostitution is legal, were found to “fully comply with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking.” Regarding the Netherlands, the Report reveals something striking: the Dutch police report a “decrease in trafficking in the legal sector.” Apparently, legal prostitution may help reduce trafficking due to greater government oversight of the legal sector, rather than being a magnet for sex traffickers.

**4. Anti-prostitution discourse reinforces dominant images of oriental women**

Weitzer, 06 (Ronald, Professor of Sociology at George Washington University, “Moral Crusade Against Prostitution,” *Society* 43 (3), March-April, metapress, TH)

The U.S. Government’s position on prostitution contrasts sharply not only with nations that have legalized some form of prostitution but also with those that are currently investigating alternatives to blanket prohibition. In Britain, the Home Office circulated a major consultation paper, Paying the Price, on prostitution in 2004, inviting comments from all interested parties, as a prelude to possible changes in government policy. Meanwhile in Canada the House of Commons Subcommittee on Solicitation Laws recently held hearings across the country that examined ways to improve conditions for sex workers, including liberalization of the law. In short, several governments around the world appear to reject the notion that prostitution is inherently evil and instead have instituted or explored ways to regulate it, guided by the principle of harm reduction. This approach has also been embraced in Nevada, where legal brothels have existed for the past 35 years. It is also worth noting that a sizeable number of Americans favor a more liberal approach to prostitution. A 1991 Gallup poll reported that 40% of > the public believed that “prostitution should be made legal and regulated by the government,” and in 1996 the General Social Survey reported that 45% of Americans agreed that, “There is nothing inherently wrong with prostitution, so long as the health risks can be minimized. If consenting adults agree to exchange money for sex, that is their business.” There is no doubt that coercive sex trafficking occurs. No one should be forced or deceived into selling sex, and unambiguous cases of this kind of trafficking need to be punished severely. But the issue has become thoroughly politicized. Activists and government officials have trumpeted phantom statistics and exploited anecdotal horror stories as evidence of a worldwide epidemic of coerced prostitution and to justify a campaign against all forms of commercial sex. As William McDonald points out in his excellent analysis of the issue, the antitrafficking campaign has capitalized on “one of the most powerful symbols in the pantheon of Western imagery, the innocent, young girl ragged off against her will to distant lands to satisfy the insatiable sexual cravings of wanton men.” Contemporary claims about sex trafficking are reminiscent of the frenzy over “white slavery” early in the 20th century (a problem that was largely mythical), except that now the typical victim is a poor, young woman from the Third World or Eastern Europe. During both time periods, a litany of wild claims contributed to a moral panic, and those who were skeptical of the claims remained largely silent. Today, there is a great deal of research contradicting this crusade’s caricature of prostitution and many good reasons to oppose the shift in American policy on sex trafficking.

# A2: GENDER FIRST

**Empirically nations must secure peace before investigating gender; otherwise real change will be suppressed**

**Berkman 1990**, Joyce, Ph.D., Yale (1967), “Feminism, War, and Peace Politics: The Case of World War I” in “Women, militarism, and war: essays in history, politics, and social theory,” by Jean Bethke Elshtain and Sheila Tobias, p 141-156 WM

On October 30, 1914, well before America entered the war and only five days after the Pankhursts had addressed an audience in Carnegie Hall, Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence spoke on the same platform, urging women to "overstep the miserable bounds of nationality and race" and to campaign for peace. 26 Rosika Schwimmer, Pethick-Lawrence's sometime traveling companion and an acclaimed feminist leader in her own right (from Hungary), exhorted audiences similarly throughout the midwest,21 Together they called upon American feminists to stop at nothing less than the formation of a Peace Party. Local women's peace committees did form and before long, assisted by Jane Addams, a Women's Peace Party in America was formally in place (1915). Until 1917, when America entered the war, peace activism enjoyed some popular support among males and females. Once America joined the Allies, however, that support crumbled and, crumbling, sundered the American women's movement just as the issue had divided British and European feminists three years before. The dilemmas were not merely theoretical. Once America was engaged in warfare, feminists and other peace politicians could be prosecuted, certainly harassed. It was far easier for the feminist to row *with* the patriotic tide than to set her oars against it.

# SOLVENCY F/L

**1. A large population of U.S. troops has always been key to Korean development and stability**

**Moon ‘97**

[Katherine H.S., Ph. D. Princeton University, Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, served in the Office of the Senior Coordinator for Women’s Issues in the U.S. Department of State, “Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in US/Korea Relations”, Columbia Univeristy Press, 1997] Gus

The USFK leadership and the U.S. Embassy staff in Korea also tended to view U.S.-ROK relations in the broader context of the Korean government's and society's needs, aspirations, and fears, whereas policy makers in Washington, especially Congress, tended to regard Korean matters more exclusively in terms of U.S. interests and capabilities. For example, at a House subcommittee hearing, General Michaelis spoke of the possibility that troop cuts will "endanger the present, outwardly healthy climate for foreign investment [in ROK], a prerequisite of the survival of the Republic as a free nation." 14 Ambassador William Porter also emphasized the importance of a large U.S. troop presence, not only for security reasons, but also psychological ones. He insisted that the **troops were important "in maintaining the sense of confidence which is responsible for so much of Korea's development."** 15 Most of the American officials I interviewed noted how much the U.S. military leadership in Korea liked and respected the Koreans for being hard-working, hard-fighting people and wished Koreans well in their quest for economic and political development.8

**2. Crack down on prostitution sites is too difficult because they are backed by the U.S. military and Korean government – risks diplomatic backlash**

**Stars and Stripes ’09**

[Jon Rabiroff, B.S. Journalism Syracuse, Hwang Hae-rym journalist, “Juicy Bars said to be havens for prostitution aimed at U.S. Military”, September 9, http://www.stripes.com/news/juicy-bars-said-to-be-havens-for-prostitution-aimed-at-u-s-military-1.8019]

“We expect something suspicious is going on there. However, there is no way for us to confirm these offenses,” said a spokesman for the police in Dongducheon, home to Camp Casey and the 70 juicy bars nearby in The Ville entertainment district. “We see this problem very seriously, although this one is a very sensitive issue,” another Dongducheon police official said, suggesting **any crackdown on the juicy bars would likely cause problems with the bar owners and the U.S. military.** Korean police customarily speak without name attribution. “We are worried about [it becoming a] diplomatic issue,” the official said.

**3. Alt cause - Prostitution is entrenched into South Korean culture because of the sexual drive of men and the lack of jobs**

**Baker ‘00**

[Michael, Foreign Correspondent BBC, Journalism Fellowship at the University of Michigan, “Policewoman on Brave Crusade”, Courier Mail, March 7, lexis]

At a press conference with South Korea's new national police commissioner, reporters turned to Kim, seated in the audience. She looked into the TV cameras and said "Under-age prostitution is too serious!" Of Korea's 1.2 million prostitutes, 500,000 were minors, she said. At the end of her rousing appeal to "save the youth", the journalists applauded. Her campaign is brave -- women rank low in Korean society and the prostitution culture is deeply entrenched. Kim's city ward contains "Texas Miari", a collection of 260 brothels named for the American soldiers who popularised the place. About 40 have been shut down by Kim, who targets everyone from landlords to security guards instead of just the pimps as previous crackdowns have done. Of 1500 prostitutes in Texas Miari, 80 percent were under 18. Prostitution at any age is illegal in South Korea. But the problem is so widespread that just tackling prostitution by minors is a major job. Most of Korea's 1.2 million prostitutes are part-time, also working at minor hotels, cafes, barber shops, steam baths and salons for businessmen. Young girls sometimes date middle-aged men for pocket money, and dates can be arranged on-line. What Kim is tackling is the tip of the iceberg, says Dr Byun Wha-soon, a researcher at the Korea Women's Development Institute in Seoul. The sexual appetite of men is a natural source of the problem. But the dearth of job opportunities for women in Korea is also a factor. Few can find jobs in their field of study. A secretary or shop assistant might earn $600 a month; women working in tea-rooms or steam baths can earn up to $4000 a month. "It's hard to buy a brand-name handbag with (the first) wage," says Dr Byun.

**4. Corruption and lack of rehabilitation make it hard to stop prostitution despite previous efforts**

**Baker ‘00**

[Michael, Foreign Correspondent BBC, Journalism Fellowship at the University of Michigan, “Policewoman on Brave Crusade”, Courier Mail, March 7, lexis]

Cracking down is complicated by rampant corruption because brothels frequently pay police. A new law allows police to name people who have sex with teenagers. The law triples jail terms and fines for pimps and no longer treats the girls as criminals. Police are also stationing more women officers in red-light districts. "This is a woman's issue and is best handled by a woman," says commissioner Lee Mu Yong. Next, Kim hopes to improve rehabilitation facilities for the girls. The halfway houses that teach hairdressing and computer skills are under-funded and former prostitutes consider them oppressive. The effort attests to Kim's character. A former police commissioner discovered her at a provincial police station where she kept a punching bag with her face on it. "If you're really strong, hit the chief," a sign read. At his press conference, the commissioner said: "Her name is Kang-ja! Kang-ja!" -- meaning "strong one".

**5. Closing a few bases does nothing to overall prostitution policy.**

**Enloe 93** – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War” p. 150, MT)

There is **no evidence** thus far **that being compelled** by the forces of nature and nationalism **to shut down** two of their most prized overseas **bases has caused U.S. military planners to rethink their prostitution pol**icies. Shifting some of the Philippines operations to Guam or Singapore or back home to the United States **does not** in itself **guarantee new official presumptions** **about** the kinds of **sexual relations** required to sustain U.S. military power in the post Cold War world. The governments of Singapore and the United States signed a basing agreement in Tokyo in mid-I992. But, despite popular misgivings about the implications of allowing U.S. Navy personnel to use the small island nation for repairs and training, the basing agreement itself was kept secret. Thus, Singapore citizens, as well as U.S. citizens, are left with little information about what policing formulas, public health formulas, and commercial zoning formulas have been devised by the two governments to shape the sexual relations between American and Singapore men and the women of Singapore.11 The women who have been generous enough to tell their stories of prostitution have revealed that sexuality is as central to the complex web of relationships between civil and military cultures as are more talked-about security doctrines and economic quid pro quo. Korean and Filipino women interviewed by Sandra Sturdevant and Brenda Stoltzfus for their oral history collection Let the Good Times Roll also remind us of how hard it is sometimes to map the boundaries between sexual relations and economics.12 They found that the local and foreign men who own the brothels, bars, and discos catering to soldiers are motivated by profit.

**6. Bases encourage prostitution viewing women as commodities even post 2003.**

**Sang-Hun 09** – Journalist for the New York Times (Choe “Ex-Prostitutes Say South Korea and U.S. Enabled Sex Trade Near Bases” in the New York Times, January 7, 2009 <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/08/world/asia/08korea.html?_r=1>, MT)

SEOUL, South Korea — South Korea has railed for years against the Japanese government’s waffling over how much responsibility it bears for one of the ugliest chapters in its wartime history: the enslavement of women from Korea and elsewhere to work in brothels serving Japan’s imperial army. Now, a group of former prostitutes in South Korea have accused some of their country’s former leaders of a different kind of abuse: **encouraging them to have sex with the American soldiers** who protected South Korea from North Korea. They also accuse past South Korean governments, and the United States military, of taking a direct hand in the sex trade from the 1960s through the 1980s, working together to build a testing and treatment system to ensure that prostitutes were disease-free for American troops. While the women have made no claims that they were coerced into prostitution by South Korean or American officials during those years, they accuse successive Korean governments of hypocrisy in calling for reparations from Japan while refusing to take a hard look at South Korea’s own history. “Our government was one big pimp for the U.S. military,” one of the women, Kim Ae-ran, 58, said in a recent interview. Scholars on the issue say that the South Korean government was motivated in part by fears that the American military would leave, and that it wanted to do whatever it could to prevent that. But the women suggest that **the government** also **viewed them as commodities to be used** to shore up the country’s struggling economy in the decades after the Korean War. They say the government not only sponsored classes for them in basic English and etiquette — meant to help them sell themselves more effectively — but also sent bureaucrats to praise them for earning dollars when South Korea was desperate for foreign currency. “They urged us to sell as much as possible to the G.I.’s, praising us as ‘dollar-earning patriots,’ ” Ms. Kim said. The United States military, the scholars say, became involved in attempts to regulate the trade in so-called camp towns surrounding the bases because of worries about sexually transmitted diseases. In one of the most incendiary claims, some women say that the American military police and South Korean officials regularly raided clubs from the 1960s through the 1980s looking for women who were thought to be spreading the diseases. They picked out the women using the number tags the women say the brothels forced them to wear so the soldiers could more easily identify their sex partners. The Korean police would then detain the prostitutes who were thought to be ill, the women said, locking them up under guard in so-called monkey houses, where the windows had bars. There, the prostitutes were forced to take medications until they were well. The women, who are seeking compensation and an apology, have compared themselves to the so-called comfort women who have won widespread public sympathy for being forced into prostitution by the Japanese during World War II. Whether prostitutes by choice, need or coercion, the women say, they were all victims of government policies. “If the question is, was there active government complicity, support of such camp town prostitution, yes, by both the Korean governments and the U.S. military,” said Katharine H. S. Moon, a scholar who wrote about the women in her 1997 book, “Sex Among Allies.” The South Korean Ministry of Gender Equality, which handles women’s issues, declined to comment on the former prostitutes’ accusations. So did the American military command in Seoul, which responded with a general statement saying that the military “does not condone or support the illegal activities of human trafficking and prostitution.” The New York Times interviewed eight women who worked in brothels near American bases, and it reviewed South Korean and American documents. The documents do provide some support for many of the women’s claims, though most are snapshots in time. The women maintain that the practices occurred over decades. In some sense, the women’s allegations are not surprising. It has been clear for decades that South Korea and the United States military tolerated prostitution near bases, even though selling sex is illegal in South Korea. Bars and brothels have long lined the streets of the neighborhoods surrounding American bases in South Korea, as is the case in the areas around military bases around the world. But the women say few of their fellow citizens know how deeply their government was involved in the trade in the camp towns. The women received some support for their claims in 2006, from a former government official. In a television interview, the official, Kim Kee-joe, who was identified as having been a high-level liaison to the United States military, said, “Although we did not actively urge them to engage in prostitution, we, especially those from the county offices, did often tell them that it was not something bad for the country either.” Transcripts of parliamentary hearings also suggest that at least some South Korean leaders viewed prostitution as something of a necessity. In one exchange in 1960, two lawmakers urged the government to train a supply of prostitutes to meet what one called the “natural needs” of allied soldiers and prevent them from spending their dollars in Japan instead of South Korea. The deputy home minister at the time, Lee Sung-woo, replied that the government had made some improvements in the “supply of prostitutes” and the “recreational system” for American troops. Both Mr. Kim and Ms. Moon back the women’s assertions that the control of venereal disease was a driving factor for the two governments. They say the governments’ coordination became especially pronounced as Korean fears about an American pullout increased after President Richard M. Nixon announced plans in 1969 to reduce the number of American troops in South Korea. “The idea was to create an environment where the guests were treated well in the camp towns to discourage them from leaving,” Mr. Kim said in the television interview. Ms. Moon, a Wellesley College professor, said that the minutes of meetings between American military officials and Korean bureaucrats in the 1970s showed the lengths the two countries went to prevent epidemics. The minutes included recommendations to “isolate” women who were sick and ensure that they received treatment, government efforts to register prostitutes and require them to carry medical certification and a 1976 report about joint raids to apprehend prostitutes who were unregistered or failed to attend medical checkups. These days, **camp towns still exist**, but as the Korean economy took off, women from the Philippines began replacing them. Many former prostitutes live in the camp towns, isolated from mainstream society, which shuns them. Most are poor. Some are haunted by the memories of the mixed-race children they put up for adoption overseas. Jeon, 71, who agreed to talk only if she was identified by just her surname, said she was an 18-year-old war orphan in 1956 when hunger drove her to Dongduchon, a camp town near the border with North Korea. She had a son in the 1960s, but she became convinced that he would have a better future in the United States and gave him up for adoption when he was 13. About 10 years ago, her son, now an American soldier, returned to visit. She told him to forget her. “I failed as a mother,” said Ms. Jeon, who lives on welfare checks and the little cash she earns selling items she picks from other people’s trash. “I have no right to depend on him now.” “The more I think about my life, the more I think women like me were the biggest sacrifice for my country’s alliance with the Americans,” she said. “Looking back, I think my body was not mine, but the government’s and the U.S. military’s.”

**7. Implementing a policy that changes the way women in the orient are treated involves either a massive mindset shift or a massive overall change in security strategy in the pacific rim – the aff does neither.**

**Enloe 93** – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “Bananas, Beaches and Bases” p. 85-91, MT)

The social problem that has attracted most Filipino attention is prostitution. Filipinos, like South Koreans, Okinawans, Guameans, Thais and Belauans, have held foreign military bases responsible for creating or exacerbating conditions which promote prostitution. Consequently, as the American bases have become the objects of nationalist ideas and campaigns, so prostitution has to become an issue defined in terms of nationalist anger and nationalist hopes. The arrival of AIDS in the Philippines in 1987 only served to escalate nationalists' sense that the current American-Philippines bases agreement violates not just Filipino women's rights but ('more fundamentally' some might say) the sovereignty and integrity of the Filipino nation as a whole. Filipino feminists took up militarization as a women's issue. During the 1970s and early 1980s they began analyzing how the Marcos regime's growing reliance on coercion undermined women's already fragile support systems. Since the fall of Marcos in 1986, Filipino women activists have charted with dismay the Aquino regime's continuation of militarization as a strategy for resolving the country's deepening social crises. Integrating anti-militarism into their analysis and practice has made it easier for women active in Gabriela and other feminist organizations to find common cause with other nationalist, anti-militarist political groups, even if those groups did not accord women's concerns top priority in their own work. Subic Bay Naval Base overshadows the town of Olongapo. The Navy base is home for many of the 15,000 American military personnel and their families stationed in the Philippines. When an aircraft-carrier docks, another 18,000 men pour into town. The Subic Bay base relies on civilian Filipino labor to keep it running. Workers are paid at lower rates than workers on American bases in South Korea or Japan, but for many Filipino men and women these base jobs provide a livelihood. By 1985 the US military had become the second largest employer in the Philippines, hiring over 40,000 Filipinos: 20,581 full-time workers, 14,249 contract workers, 5,064 domestics and 1,746 concessionaries. The sum of their salaries amounted to almost $83 million a year. By 1987 the American bases were employing over 68,000 Filipinos, who enjoyed medical insurance as well as other benefits not commonly offered by most Filipino employers. Many were women. Many more women were married to or mothers of male workers. On the other hand, some Filipino analysts warned against letting this figure weigh too heavily, for those employees amounted to a mere 5 per cent of the 1.18 million people employed by the Philippines government itself. 41 As the price of sugar has declined on the international market and as large landowners have pushed more and more Filipinos into landless poverty, more young women have come to make a living by servicing the social and sexual needs of American military men. In 1987 the Aquino government estimated that there were between 6,000 and 9,000 women entertainment workers registered and licensed in Olongapo City. Independent researchers, taking account of unlicensed as well as licensed women, put the figure as high as 20,000. Another 5,000 women often come to Olongapo City from Pampanga province and Manila when one of the American aircraft-carriers comes into port. 42 In addition, in recent years rising numbers of children have been recruited into the prostitution trade. Of the approximately 30,000 children born each year of Filipino mothers and American fathers, some 10,000 are thought to become street children, many of them working as prostitutes servicing American pedophiles. Some of the Amer-Asian children who avoid the streets have been sold. An insider described the racialized market to Filipino researchers: 'Those Caucasian-looking children are each allegedly sold for $50200 (around Pl,0004,000), whereas the Negro-fathered ones fetch only $2530 (around P500600).'43 There are more Filipino women working as prostitutes in the tourist industry than around US bases. Filipino feminists have drawn the links between the two, revealing how distorted investment, patriarchal conventions and short-sighted government priorities have together forced thousands of poor women off the land and out of exploitative jobs to service civilian as well as military men. It has been militarized prostitution, however, that has been made the most prominent symbol of compromised sovereignty by the male-led nationalist movement. Without feminist prompting, these anti-bases organizations rarely delve into the patriarchal causes for women coming to Olongapo.44 Two quite disparate worries have made American officials somewhat less complacent about prostitution around their Philippines bases in the late 1980s: Defense Department women's advocates' claim that prostitution is lowering American women's morale; and the spread of AIDS. The US Defense Advisory Committee on the Status of Women in the Services (DACOWITS) is a group of civilian men and women appointed by the Secretary of Defense to monitor the conditions under which women in the US military serve. It has become an in-house advocate for equal promotions, for attacking sexual harassment, for redefining 'combat'. DACOWITS members traveled to Asia in 1987 to inspect the conditions under which American women soldiers and sailors were serving overseas. For the first time in its history, DACOWITS members began to make a connection between the treatment of local women around the American bases and the treatment of American women on the bases. They blamed American Navy women's low morale on the sexist environment created by the 'availability of inexpensive female companionship from the local population and its adverse consequences for legitimate social opportunities of Service women'.45 Still, the American DACOWITS members fell far short of allying with Filipino women. They confined their brief to the well-being of American servicewomen. They were concerned with the impact housing was having on Navy women's heterosexual relationships. Women serving on Okinawa and at Subic Bay told them that the command's policy of placing women personnel in barracks separated from the male sailors' barracks, when combined with the condoning of local prostitution, was fostering a base-wide impression that American servicewomen were merely 'second team' members. 'More serious', according to DACOWITS members, such policies were contributing to 'conditions in which extremist behavior [lesbianism] is fostered . . . For example, one barracks at Camp Butler is widely referred to as Lessy Land.' 46 But it has been AIDS that has sparked alarm and confusion among the military and local policy-makers responsible for managing a system of sexual relations that supports the American Pacific Rim security strategy. By January 1987 doctors had recorded twenty-five HIV-positive cases in the Philippines. All twenty-five carriers were women. Twenty-two of them worked as entertainers in bars around Clark, Subic and Wallace US military bases. Six of the twenty-five showed signs of AIDS. Women in Gabriela, the umbrella feminist organization active in the anti-bases campaign, helped open Olongapo's first Women's Center and started to make the information known. Women criticized the Manila government for not giving HIV-positive women any counseling or medical care and for blaming the women themselves for AIDS, pointing to them as threat not only to American men but to other Filipinos. Who are the producers of AIDS in the Philippines? Why does prostitution exist and proliferate in the military bases and our tourist spots? The danger and damage of AIDS to women and the existence of prostitution are, in fact, crimes against women. We are the products, the commodities in the transaction . . . Who, then, we ask, are the real criminals of AIDS and prostitution? Indict them, not us.47 Filipino women activists called for a reversal of the century-old formula for safeguarding the morale and physical health of soldiers serving on overseas bases. Specifically, Gabriela members called on the Philippines government to insist that the American government institute a policy that all servicemen or base employees showing any signs of AIDS not be allowed 'no Philippine soil': In the same way that American servicemen demand VD cleara from the women, the Filipinos have the right to demand AL and V D clearance from the servicemen. 48 A year later the Philippines Immigration Commissioner declared that henceforth US military personnel and all foreign sailors arriving in the Philippines would be required to present certificates showing that they are free of AIDS.49 **If this policy is actually implemented**, it will make it far harder for American military planners to maintain their Pacific Rim strategy. **Either they will have to fundamentally alter servicemen's assumptions** about what rewards they deserve in return for months away from home and weeks cooped up on board ship. **Or they will have to modify their global security doctrine in order to rely on fewer and more modest bases abroad**.

# A2: WITHDRAWAL SOLVES

**Withdrawing troops will only cause further competition between prostitutes and the bar owners who abuse them.**

**Moon** **97** – Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, Department of Political Science and Edith Stix Wasserman Chair of Asian Studies (Katherine, “Sex among Allies” 1997, p. 63-65, MT)

**Washington's systematic calculations of troop reduction** **in Korea generated** into social, economic, and political disarray and **tensions** for Koreans and Americans in the kijich'on areas. With the reduction of U.S. forces by 20,000 (7th ID), military units were disbanded and reorganized, and the remaining troops were redeployed. The 2d Infantry Division (2d ID), whose home had been in the Munsan/Yongjugol region, moved to Tongduch'on to occupy the camps left behind by the 7th Division, while camptowns in that region were virtually shut down. Together with the flux of U.S. soldiers, Koreans helped reshape kijich'on commerce and social life. Club owners, prostitutes, and others moved away from areas being deserted by the troops to those where the troops were concentrated. Officials from both the U.S. military authorities and the ROK government agreed that

[**t]he drawdown of U.S. forces introduced new elements of tension into traditionally friendly relationships**. Accompanying base closures and restationing of U.S. Forces **resulted in widespread dislocations among Koreans living in villages adjacent to U.S. bases** . . . **and** resulted in **increased competition among** bar owners, "**business girls**," and merchants. 54 (The above appears in capital letters in the original document.) The withdrawal of U.S. troops caused economic havoc for the thousands of Korean nationals dependent on U.S. bases for jobs and income. The *Korea Herald* reported that by June 1971, 6,000 Koreans (out of a total of 32,000) employed at various U.S. installations were to be laid off. 55 Real estate prices in most camptown regions sank with the rise in the Korean residents' insecurity about the future of the U.S. military presence in their towns. 56 The camptown businesses, in particular, were severely hit. According to one official of the Korea Special Tourist Association, 57 "[t]he withdrawal put over 100 clubs out of business. Many of these people just threw away [abandoned] their establishments and left the area because there was no one to sell them to." 58 Newspapers reported that "[b]ar owners who used to clear $200 to $300 a night now [following the withdrawal] eke out a living on $4 to $5." 59 **Prostitutes also suffered economic losses and geographical dislocation**. The village of Yongjugol, which in the summer of 1970 had "boasted a total of over 2,200 'entertainers' who catered to the needs and wants of about 18,000 soldiers from the 2nd Inf. Div. and other units in the area," marked a mere 200 women remaining in July 1971. 60 Hundreds moved to camptowns in Seoul (It'aewon), Osan, and Tongduch'on. "Others . . . quietly slipped back into their families and [went] to work as taxi drivers, beauty shop operators, or secretaries." 61 The Korean press reported that "[t]he business slump has hit the Korean girls catering to the GI's. They number about 5,000. Up until last September, their earnings averaged about W100,000 a month per person. In recent months, the figure dropped to W5,000 to W7,000." 62 During my interviews, U.S. military and ROK government officials who had been familiar with the withdrawal effects on camptowns emphasized the anger, frustration, and loss of trust that Korean residents felt toward U.S. servicemen. A Korean national who had worked in Community Relations for the USFK since the 1960s noted: With the withdrawal, camptown residents came to question the reliability of the U.S. Camptown and national public opinion was,"It's too soon to withdraw. . . ." [People] lost their livelihood, and there was no financial compensation from the U.S. side. . . . With the withdrawal, people felt loss and despair. 63 Local Koreans, who had long felt abused and mistreated by American economic superiority and arrogance, vented their fears and frustrations more violently than in the past. The Korean government official serving as an Assistant Secretary to the Joint Committee during this period had spoken with camptown residents to investigate racial problems. He summed up the Korean sentiment as follows: Simply put, the local Koreans felt like this: "Since you [U.S.] say you're leaving, we don't like you anymore." Until the late 1960s/early 1970s, the locals had trusted and depended on the U.S. So, even when the GI behaved badly and fought with Koreans, the locals put up with it because they knew they'd see the soldiers the next day [in their stores or bars]. But once the men who were to leave acted nasty in town, the locals became more resentful.,/font> 64 Aware of the connection between troop reduction/redeployment and camptown problems, the same official had requested that the U.S. military provide information in advance on future troop deployments in Korea, especially in those areas that were being expanded, such as P'yongt'aek (especially Camp Humphreys and Osan Air Base areas). 65 U.S. military officials in both Washington and Korea were aware that the withdrawal of 20,000 troops might have negative effects on community relations in general and discipline and morale of U.S. troops in particular. Senior U.S. officials in Washington noted that since nearly all of the front line duties were turned over to the Korean military for the first time, the "American troops no longer feel 'an immediate exposure' to the Communist fire, less 'motivation' for being in Korea which requires a greater amount of effort to provide servicemen with constructive programs so that they would not feel they are 'wasting 13 months of their life' in Korea for no 'visible and immediate' purpose." 66 The USFK noted similarly that "[t]he withdrawal of the U.S. troops from the DMZ probably has been a contributing factor toward a lessening of morale and esprit de corps among American troops in Korea, which in turn has tended to stimulate incidents in rear areas." 67

# FOCUS ON THIRD WORLD PROSTITUTION BAD

**Focusing on prostitutes on bases in foreign countries obscures the real challenge by not putting pressure on the people who are complicient in the gendered constructions outside of the specific instance of the aff, it marginalizes women’s movements.**

**Enloe 93** – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “Bananas, Beaches and Bases” p. 198-199, MT)

Women need to be made visible in order to understand how and why international power takes the forms it does. But women are not just the objects of that power, not merely passive puppets or victims. As we have seen, women of different classes and different ethnic groups have made their own calculations in order to cope with or benefit from the current struggles between states. These calculations result in whole countries becoming related to one another, often in hierarchical terms. In search of adventure, that physical and intellectual excitement typically reserved for men, some affluent women have helped turn other women into exotic landscapes. In pursuit of meaningful paid careers, some women have settled in colonies or hired women from former colonies. Out of a desire to appear fashionable and bolster their sometimes shaky self-confidence, many women have become the prime consumers of products made by women working for low wages in other countries. And in an effort to measure the progress they have made towards emancipation in their own societies, women have often helped legitimize international global pyramids of 'civilization'. **All too often, the only women who are made visible on the international stage are** 'Third World women', **especially those who are** underpaid factory workers or **entertainment workers around foreign military bases.** There are two dangers here. First, **the multiple relationships that women in industrialized countries have to international politics are camouflaged**. For instance, we do not see the British Asian woman who is organizing anti-deportation campaigns, which can reshape governments' use of marriage to control international flows of people. The American woman on holiday who is helping to 'open up' Grenada to tourism is made invisible, as is the Canadian woman who is insisting on pursuing her career rather than following her diplomat husband overseas. The Italian woman sewing for Benetton at home is hidden. In the process, the international system is made to look less complicated, less infused with power, less gendered than it really is. The second danger in this tendency to see only 'Third World women' when thinking about women on the international stage is that the important differences between **women in less industrialized countries will be ignored**. **By portraying all women** in Third World societies **as** sewing jeans, not buying jeans, as **prostitutes**, not as social workers and activists, **we** again **under-estimate the complex relationships it takes to sustain the current international political system**. Middle-class women in countries such as Mexico and Sri Lanka have different kinds of stakes in the present system than do working-class and peasant women. This is compounded by societies' ethnic and racial barriers between Hispanicized and Indian Mexican women, and between Tamil and Singhalese Sri Lankan women, for instance. International debt may affect all women in Mexico, but not to the same degree or in the same ways. National dignity may be appealing to all Sri Lankan women, but which nation one feels part of may be problematic. Sexuality may also divide women in a Third World country. Heterosexual women, for instance, may feel ashamed or contemptuous of lesbian women and thus not be able to confront nationalist men who use homophobic innuendos to delegitimize arguments for women's rights. The international establishment has needed many women in Third World countries to feel more at ease with women from Europe or North America than with women living in a shanty town a mile from their front door. Therefore, efforts to transcend internationally and locally devised barriers between women of Third World countries have had the most significant impact on foreign military bases, multinational corporations and investment bankers. While women have not been mere pawns in global politics, governments and companies with government backing have made explicit attempts to try to control and channel women's actions in order to achieve their own ends. Male officials who make foreign policy might prefer to think of themselves as dealing with high finance or military strategy, but in reality they have self-consciously designed immigration, labor, civil service, propaganda and military bases policies so as to control women. They have acted as though their government's place in world affairs has hinged on how women behaved. Uncovering these efforts has exposed men as men.

# CONDITION CP – ROK CLEAN UP

**ROK would take Clean-Up seriously if the U.S. threatened a withdrawal**

**Moon ‘97**

[Katherine H.S., Ph. D. Princeton University, Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, served in the Office of the Senior Coordinator for Women’s Issues in the U.S. Department of State, “Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in US/Korea Relations”, Columbia Univeristy Press, 1997] Gus

Interviews with both **U.S. and ROK officials who had been involved in the Clean-Up Campaign repeatedly point to Korea's insecurity** in its security relationship with the United States during the early 1970s as the main stimulus for the ROK government's speed and alacrity in addressing camptown problems. One former ROK Subcommittee chairperson summed up the situation: At the time, the threat of invasion [from the North] was very serious. The need for U.S. military presence in Korea was very keen around the late 1960s and early 1970s. This threat and the reduction of U.S. troops and the US's demands for camptown improvements all came together and reached a critical mass. **Until the Nixon Doctrine, we never thought the United States would go.** The ROK government cooperated because the United States wanted cooperation. **The Clean-Up activities weren't something the ROK government felt it needed to do anyway.** But the United States put pressure on the Blue House. 44 The Blue House, in the person of President Pak, interpreted the camptown problems as a direct reflection of the rift and conflict between it and Washington. One ROK Subcommittee member who was active in initiating the joint efforts described Pak's thought process thus: " 'Why are the U.S. troops leaving? Because they're fighting with Koreans and not getting along. Therefore, we must get along with the U.S. soldiers so that they don't leave Korea.' . . . Addressing the needs of the U.S. military through Clean-Up was one way to win points with the U.S. government." 45 Pak's Political Secretary in charge of overseeing the actual daytoday workings of the Base-Community Clean-Up Committee emphasized that the president showed constant interest in the progress of camptown Clean-Up, sending out orders and demanding reports. 46 The speed, provision, and coordination of funds and material and human resources, as well as cooperation with U.S. military authorities at all levels of the ROK government, attested to the urgency felt by the ROK government to improve civil-military relations. The Campaign became a Blue House priority in its defense of national security. For the ROK government, cooperation with camptown Clean-Up was intended not only to keep U.S. servicemen in Korea but also to promote U.S. military assistance to Korea's force modernization efforts. Within a year of the Purification Movement, the Korean government became less fearful of further U.S. troop cuts as imminent and found assurance in the belief that the loss of the 7th Division was not indispensable as long as modernization of its own forces took place. 47 However, Seoul's doubts increased about the U.S. government's ability to deliver on its promise of the $1.5 billion military aid package. First, congressional criticism about Korean-American race relations, which had put the USFK on the defensive, threatened to block Korea's new path to security independence. Representative Ron Dellums, who had been vocal in calling for reduced U.S. military intervention abroad, 48 took credit for the rejection of a $50 million increase in military aid for Korea for the years 1971 and 1972 (proposed by Rep. William Broomfield) and stated publicly that "the United States should not give assistance to any country in which American men stationed there are subject to harsh and vile treatment by host nationals because of the color of their skin." 49 One ROK Subcommittee member, who had been active in initiating the Clean-Up, recalled that Dellums, during a visit to Korea in 1972 to support a black serviceman who had been charged with murdering a Korean woman, a prostitute, harshly criticized Korea through the media and called for a reduction of troops and aid. 50 According to one USFK member of the Subcommittee on Civil-Military Affairs, Dellums' threat to reduce or discontinue military aid "got the ROK government to do something about camptown problems." He continued, "After that threat, conditions greatly improved: lighting, access ways, general beautification, etc. It was evident in the work of the BCCUC that Dellums' threat stimulated the Korean government to act. There's no question in my mind." 51 If Dellums had been a congressional maverick in criticizing U.S. military commitments to Korea, the Korean government may have been less responsive to the threats. However, as discussed above, the fact that many members of Congress had been publicly questioning U.S. military involvement in Asia, in general, and Korea, in particular, 52 helps explain the ROK government's immediate and serious attention to camptown problems, especially racial violence. One report highlighted the urgency of resolving camptown problems as a way to prevent further congressional criticism of the ROK government and threats to discontinue aid: The Pyongtaek riots of July 9, 1971, were reported in the foreign press as caused by Korean racial discrimination and has become a controversial issue in the U.S. Congressman Dellums and other congressmen accused Koreans of racial discrimination and strongly demanded that the United States cease its foreign aid to the ROK. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs ordered the Korean embassy in Washington to contact and explain to the concerned congressmen and major news organizations the details of the causes of the incident. . . . In view of the fact that the incident could cause serious repercussions in the U.S.-ROK relationship, the Foreign Ministry realized that U.S.-Korean cooperation not only at the local level but also at the national level are necessary. 53

# LINKS: SECURITY

**Concepts of ‘risk’ and security legitimize masculine values and behavior over femininity, understanding the way politics is gendered is essential to a proper understanding of the international sphere.**

**Enloe 93** – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “Bananas, Beaches and Bases” p. 199-202, MT)

Uncovering these efforts has exposed men as men. International politics has relied not only on the manipulation of femininity's meanings but on the manipulation of masculinity. Ideas about 'adventure', **'civilization'**, 'progress', **'risk',** 'trust' and **'security'** are all **legitimized by certain kinds of masculine values and behavior**, which makes them so potent in relations between governments. Frequently the reason behind government officials usually men trying to control women has been their need to optimize the control of men: men as migrant workers, soldiers, diplomats, intelligence operatives, overseas plantation and factory managers, men as bankers. Thus **understanding the international workings of masculinity is important to making feminist sense of international politics**. Men's sense of their own manhood has derived from their perceptions both of other men's masculinity and of the femininity of women of different races and social classes. Much of what we have uncovered about the problematic character of masculinity in the armed forces can be applied to other spheres of international politics. There is much discussion today about fundamental changes occurring in international politics. Japan has become the world's largest aid donor and its largest creditor. **The United States no longer has the resources or the status to play global policeman, even if its leaders still try**. The twelve countries of the European Community are moving steadily toward not only economic, but also social and political integration. If Mikhail Gorbachev survives, the Soviet Union's international priorities are likely to undergo radical change, with military demands being subordinated to economic needs. At the same time, the 'Third World' is becoming more internally unequal each year, as countries such as South Korea, Brazil, Taiwan and Chile start to produce not only steel and automobiles, but also weapons, while countries such as Vietnam and Ethiopia struggle simply to feed their peoples. All the while, capital, drugs and AIDS are becoming globalized; debt stubbornly spirals; and governments persist in sharing coercive formulas for **suppressing dissidents in the name of national security**. It is all too easy to plunge into the discussion of any or all of these contemporary trends without asking, 'Where are the women?' What these chapters suggest is that these seemingly new trends are likely to be gendered, just as past international patterns were. The international trends of the 1990s are as likely to depend on particular relations between women and men, relations fostered by the deliberate use of political power. One of the best ways to start making sense of those gendered politics is to take seriously the analyses of women already engaged in international campaigns to influence these trends. Some of the most cogent international analysis is being generated by women meeting in Japan to discuss migrant workers and proxy brides, women meeting in New York to trace the patterns of the global prostitution industry, women meeting in Finland to discuss militarization, women meeting in Mexico City to discuss labor unions, women meeting in Brussels to discuss 1992. Making feminist sense of international politics, therefore, may compel us to **dismantle the wall that often separates theory from practice**. We don't need to wait for a 'feminist Henry Kissinger' before we can start articulating a fresh, more realistic approach to international politics. Every time a woman explains how her government is trying to control her fears, her hopes and her labor such a theory is being made.

# LINKS: ECONOMY DA

**Prostitution key to South Korean economy**

**SF Gate ‘03**

[Bobby McGill, SF Gate Newspaper, “Changing attitude toward sex threatens South Korea / Growing promiscuity, lack of education may lead to increase in AIDS, experts say”, 3/14, <http://articles.sfgate.com/2003-03-14/news/17482189_1_south-koreans-united-nations-hiv-prostitution>]

According to a recent study by the Korean Institute of Criminology, 358,000 men visit prostitutes daily at one of Korea's 5,000 illegal barber shops, steam baths, hotels, tea rooms and salons for businessmen. The study found that nearly 20 percent in the 20-to-64 age bracket purchase sex more than four times a month. As in neighboring Japan, the sex industry in South Korea is big business, accounting for $20 billion, or 4.1 percent of the nation's total gross domestic product in 2002, just behind agriculture at 4.4 percent, according to the same report by the Korean Institute of Criminology.

**The Korean economy is built on gender oppression**

**Moon 5** (Seungsook Moon Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea Chair of Sociology at Vassar College, Ph. D. from Brandeis)

This book is a postcolonial feminist study of the politics of membership in the modern Korean nation. In this study, I adopt the notion of modernity to engage in a critical reflection on the dramatic social transfor- mation in South Korea for the past three decades or so. Drawing on insights from cultural studies, I conceive of modernity as a "keyword," in Raymond Williams's sense,' used by different social groups to describe a desirable (or undesirable) direction of contemporary social change. While modernity can be defined specifically as a set of normative values and social conditions drawn from the theoretical and empirical discourse of modernity in the West, I prefer to approach it as an array *of* global and local claims, commitments, and knowl- edge whose *specific* meanings are determined in the context of asymmetrical power relations among (national) societies and (intranational) social groups. This cultural approach to modernity allows us to open space for the study of social change in "other" societies in their own terms. The cultural politics of modernity do not reduce modernity to merely an empty sign, as semiotics may suggest, that can be filled with any arbitrary permutations of meanings. His- tories of colonialism and neocolonialism, as well as current power inequalities among nation-states and among internal social groups in a given (national) society, circumscribe the ways in which modernity is imagined and such meaning is contested. Therefore, the interpretive and cultural approach to modernity highlights the global and local politics of meaning of modernity and concerns itself with the following questions: Who imagines what constitutes modernity and under what sociopolitical conditions is it imagined? How has the hegemonic meaning of (Western) modernity interpreted and invented by diverse local actors? To what extent is the meaning of modernity appropriated by the developmental state accepted, contested, or subverted by those who are mobilized by it in the name of rational modernization? During the military rule in postcolonial South Korea, the elites who con- trolled the state adopted the notion of modernity associated with a strong military and high productivity based on advanced technology that conservative nationalist leaders of the ChosOn Dynasty had imagined at the end of the nineteenth century. In the context of the Cold War rivalry and military confronta- tion with North Korea, Park Chung Hec's regime pursued this interpretation of modernity as a nation-building project. I have conceived the notion of mili- tarized modernity to illuminate the three related processes of sociopolitical and economic formation: the construction of the modern nation as an anti- communist polity, the making of its members as duty-bound "nationals," and the integration of the institution of male conscription into the organization of the industrializing economy. These processes were characterized by the amal- gamation of violent coercion and Foucauldian discipline during the period of militarized modernity (1963-1967). To build a wealthy and (militarily) strong nation as the embodiment of modernity required the state to mobilize its populace on a mass scale. We need to consider two points regarding mass mobilization. First, the path of mass mobilization was structured not only by the instrumental notion of moder- nity but also by a hegemonic understanding of the proper places of women and men in the modern nation. Underlying this understanding was the gender ideology that constructed man as a protector and family provider and woman as a reproducer of children and daily life. Accordingly, men were called on to perform mandatory military service and encouraged to *become* the primary labor force in the industrializing economy. In contrast, marginalized as a secondary workforce in the economy despite their economic contribution, women were exhorted to carry out birth control and the 'rational manage- ment of the household." Second, the peculiar nature of the nation-state that generated the powerful perception (dominion destiny *between* rulers and the ruled turned such gendered processes or mass mobilization into moments of willing participation to varying degrees; iimonp, a different social groups. In the context of the political transition from military rule to procedural democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s, grassroots social movements began to replace the established practices of mass mobilization originated with willing participation. Combined with the end of the Cold War elsewhere and globalization, procedural democratization led to the uneven decline of militarized modernity and became an enabling condition for the emergence of a new type of political membership, characterized by the struggle to monitor the powerful and demand rights vis-a-vis the state. Highlighting the willing- ness to it to give substance to formal rights, I call this new type of political membership (substantive) citizenship. I argue that the emergence of citizen- ship is the unintended and dialectical consequence of gendered mass mobilization because women and men who were called to contribute to the process of nation building were commonly exposed to repressive discipline and vio- lent punishment, and the specific paths of gendered mobilization shaped the ways in which women and men forged their new political subjectivity as citizens. My research indicates significant differences between men and women in terms of their citizenship trajectories. Women came to acquire citizenship through the autonomous women's movement to achieve equal employment, a movement that supported the concerns and interests of working-class and middle-class women. In comparison, men's emergence as citizens took two class-specific routes: college-educated middle-class men used new "citizens' organizations" that grew after 1987, and the upper segment of working-class men used "democratic labor unions." I argue that the gender distinction in class alliance is linked to women's marginalization, regardless of class, in the industrializing economy in almost all sectors of employment. Yet I do not in- tend to exaggerate this cross-class alliance in the women's movement; rather, such an alliance becomes meaningful in comparison with the visibility of class division in the trajectory of men's citizenship.

# WAR TURNS CASE

**War can be a tool for deconstructing gender hierarchies**

**Berkman 1990**, Joyce, Ph.D., Yale (1967), “Feminism, War, and Peace Politics: The Case of World War I” in “Women, militarism, and war: essays in history, politics, and social theory,” by Jean Bethke Elshtain and Sheila Tobias, p 141-156 WM

Fawcett, Rachel Strachey, and others saw a pro-war stance as helping overthrow the rigidities of role stereotyping: men as protectors, women as protected. As mere protected beings, women were (and would remain in the eyes of society) passive, inferior, "irrelevant creatures to be fought *for,* whose only personal function [in war] was to sit home and weep."lIl! It was on that premise that women had suffered second-class citizenship. If women now shared the tasks and risks of wartime, they might demonstrate their courage, loyalty, and moral conviction to be as vigorous as that of men. And then. . . of course the vote. One of the claims made for suffrage before the war was that there was a "depth of female bravery" and "moral stamina" to be added to the nation, once women were able to vote. Wartime was the time to make this claim come real.lI3 Now the very logic that had fed paCifist thinking befure the war was refashioned to arouse patriotism.

# PROSTITUTION PIC

**The word ‘prostitute’ has a precise meaning that the aff ignores – using it in context of military sexual relations stigmatizes and vilifies the women into a category of ‘evil’ women used to sustain patriarchal norms.**

**Jordan 2000** – Associate Professor at the School of Social Service Administration of the University of Chicago. (Ann D., “Commercial Sex Workers in Asia: A Blind Spot in Human Rights Law” in Women and International Human Rights Law, Volume 2, 2000, pp.525-585, <http://www.ageofconsent.com/comments/commercialsexworkers.htm>, MT)

The term "prostitute" is too broad to be useful and should, perhaps, be abandoned. The standard definition of prostitution is the promiscuous, indiscriminate, non-affective sale of sexual services for money or other thing of value. As pointed out by many scholars, this definition could include a one-night stand and would exclude the exchange of sex for money between a prostitute and a regular trick. Furthermore, "sale" connotes a voluntary, non-coercive transaction between two willing adults but the term "prostitute" is often used to include children, trafficking victims, and **women forced to sexually service invading armies.** "Child prostitute" is an especially disturbing term as it wrongly implies social acceptance of a child’s "consent" to being a prostitute and does not reveal the violence and adult coercion underlying the child’s consent, if any. **The term "military prostitute" suffers from the same inaccuracy**, as the **women** and girls **forced to "service" soldiers are**, in fact, **usually rape victims; they did not consent, and they are rarely paid**. Even if the word "prostitute" is limited to adult women who voluntarily, without force or non-economic coercion, sell sexual services, **the word is stigmatizing and misleading** as it cannot convey the complexity of the relationships between the women and the tricks, which varies from country to country and from trick to trick. Sex work is not equally stigmatized in every Asian country and not all sex workers accept any man with money as a client. Furthermore, the definition of prostitution as a cold, economic transaction does not always fit the situation of women in the Asian sex industry. Some Asian women have long-term affectual relationships with their clients and some relationships even result in marriage. The word "prostitute" does not allow for such multiple, complex meanings. It collapses all women in the CSI into one **stigmatized, vilified and marginalized category**, thereby encouraging and promoting the abrogation of some women’s human rights by governments and the silent complicity of a public that often speaks out and marches against other forms of human rights abuses. It **reinforces negative sexual stereotypes and pits the "bad" women inside and the "good" women** outside the CSI against each other. The use of **more precise terminology**, at a minimum, **can reveal** whether the woman is a subject or an object of the CSI, thereby exposing **power relations, patriarchal interests** in maintaining the status quo, and the class and racial/ethnic components of the CSI.

**The term ‘Commercial Sex Worker’ is more appropriate, and avoids the moralization inherent in the word ‘prostitute’ which turns case because of its reliance on women as ‘passive’**

**Jordan 2000** – Associate Professor at the School of Social Service Administration of the University of Chicago. (Ann D., “Commercial Sex Workers in Asia: A Blind Spot in Human Rights Law” in Women and International Human Rights Law, Volume 2, 2000, pp.525-585, <http://www.ageofconsent.com/comments/commercialsexworkers.htm>, MT)

For all these reasons, **the terms "commercial sex workers" and "commercialized rape victims,"** which **more accurately reflect the experiences of women** and girls in the CSI, are adopted in this chapter. At the same time, the decision by some women inside the CSI to claim the word "prostitute" as their own is also acknowledged and respected. Some sex workers prefer to call themselves workers in prostitution or workers in the sex industry in order to place themselves into the broader general category of workers. However, for purposes of this chapter, the term commercial sex workers (CSWs) is employed as the phrase quickly reorients the frame of reference away from the world of morality embedded in the term "prostitute" and towards the commercial nature of the work. Sex work is not simply individual women selling services; it is a highly sophisticated, highly profitable commercial enterprise. CSWs are women who enter the CSI as adults or who, having been forced or non-economically coerced into the CSI as children or adults, remain CSWs even when force or non-economic coercion no longer exists. In this chapter, the term "CSWs" is limited to include only adult women who sell (broadly defined) their sexual services to men who are not their husbands or boyfriends and to exclude other workers, such as strippers and erotic dancers.5 The element linking all CSWs is the women’s view that they are **actors rather than** **passive** victims. CSWs consider themselves to be in charge of their relationships with johns and to be voluntarily participants, notwithstanding the possible existence of economic coercion. It is true that many women who work voluntarily are still involuntarily subjected to abuse and exploitation by the police, pimps, and brothel owners. However, this abuse does not necessarily transform the women into commercialized rape victims. As long as the women consider themselves to be active participants in the industry, they are CSWs. The abuse and exploitation are separate issues that must be dealt with by legal reform and enforcement of existing criminal laws and human rights standards. As **the term CSW is devoid of the moral condemnation embedded in the word "prostitute,"** it can be applied to any type of discriminate or indiscriminate, affectual or non-affectual commercial sexual transaction short of marriage or other long-term monogamous (or polygamous) relationships. Most importantly, it forces listeners and speakers using the term to examine the women and their work. It disorients; therefore, it prevents the type of easy analyses that flow from the use of culturally-embedded language and forces us to provide reality-based meaning and content to a new concept.