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# \*\*\*No North Korea-South Korea War (1nc Front-Line)\*\*\*

## Zero possibility of war on the Korean peninsula:

Vijay **Joshi**, June 4, 20**10** (staff writer, Associated Press) “SKorea’s Lee sees no possibility of war with north.” Online. Internet. Accessed June 13, 2010 at <http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jFoJSL1TdsqcmxTABYNX3ENr1_TwD9G4U2G80>

South Korea's leader on Saturday ruled out going to war with North Korea, hours after his government asked the United Nations to punish the communist nation over the sinking of a warship. "**There is absolutely no possibility of a full-scale war on the Korean peninsula,**" President Lee Myung-bak told a group of businesspeople in Singapore. The meeting was closed to the media, and the comments were posted by Lee's spokesman, Park Sun-kyu, on the presidential website. "But occasionally, there has been locally peace-threatening behavior" from North Korea, Lee said, adding that "we will strongly suppress it." He did not elaborate.

## Turn: Weakening the US deterrent versus North Korea risks war:

Robert Dujarric, 2009. 5/29/2009 (Institute of Contemporary Japanese Studies at Temple University). May 29, 2009. Online. Internet. Accessed April 10, 2010 at http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/commentary/data/000130

The best reaction to the DPRK's WMD program is to maintain a high level of deterrence by making sure that the United States has the visible ability to crush North Korea should Pyongyang choose the path of war. Deterrence worked against far more dangerous enemies—first and foremost the Soviet Union—and it has worked with North Korea for decades. Nukes and missiles do not radically alter the equation. The second task for Japan, the United States, and South Korea, along with China, is to think about how to manage unification if the regime in Pyongyang collapses, which could be tomorrow or many decades from now.

## Despite hostile rhetoric—no war risk—Kim Jong Il is effectively deterred:

Doug **Bandow**, June 11, 20**10** (senior fellow @ CATO Institute) “Confronting North Korea: Who’s in charge?” Online. Internet. Accessed June 13, 2010 at <http://dailycaller.com/2010/06/09/confronting-north-korea-whos-in-charge/>

There never would be a good time for instability in North Korea. The heavily armed regime continues with its nuclear program. It has been pulling back in its modest economic liberalization of recent years. In April the DPRK apparently sank the Cheonan, a South Korean warship, the North’s first deadly act of war in more than two decades. Since then the Republic of Korea has cut economic ties and barred Pyongyang’s ships from South Korean waters. The North reciprocated by closing, or at least saying that it intended to close, the Kaesong industrial park, in which ROK companies employ North Korean workers. Hostile rhetoric has filled the air, but no one really wants war. Although the DPRK has made brinkmanship its principal negotiating strategy, Pyongyang knows that it would lose any conflict. Even when it comes to whatever nuclear capability Kim Jong-il has developed—miniaturizing weapons and developing delivery systems are not easy—**deterrence works**. He and his cohorts want their virgins (and liquor) in this life, not the next.

## Turn: Concessions to North Korea only encourage belligerent behavior from North Korea:

Michael **Horowitz, 2004** (PHD from Harvard school of government, former NDT champion, Washington Quarterly, Who’s Behind That Curtain? Unveiling Potential Leverage over Pyongyang; 25)

U.S. military leverage theoretically functions both in a negative fash- ion, as U.S. deployments and commitments deter North Korean military adventurism, and in a positive fashion, because incentives to ratchet down military tension might elicit cooperative behavior from Pyongyang. This is not to say that Washington should make direct military conces - sions to Pyongyang in response to threats; doing so would serve to **rein- force the North Korean belief that their foreign policy goals can be best achieved through brinkmanship.** Yet, U. S. military power remains a potential source of lever- age and will inevitably be employed as a piece of a negotiated agreement to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program or if a new nuclear bargain is not achieved.

## US nuclear deterrence completely deters North Korea—Pyongyang will never be a threat to the United States.

Doug **Bandow, 2009** June 4, 2009 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “North Korea: Paper Tiger.” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.campaignforliberty.com/article.php?view=100>

That could eventually change, of course, but the DPRK obviously poses no present danger. There is no cause for precipitous action. In fact, Pyongyang is never likely to pose a genuine threat to America. The U.S. has the world's most sophisticated nuclear arsenal: any North Korean attack would be suicidal. Just one American missile with multiple warheads could destroy everything worth destroying in the North. If Washington could deter Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, two of the greatest mass murderers in human history, it can deter Kim Jong-il.

# No North Korea-South Korea War (1nc Front-Line)

## The United States will not escalate a minor incident to a full scale war: policymakers understand the cost and danger in such a move.

John Park, 2008 (Dir., Korea Working Group, U.S. Institute of Peace), THE LONG SHADOW: NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SECURITY IN 21ST CENTURY ASIA, 2008, 280.

While North Korea's nuclear arsenal has captured the headlines, the North Korean military does not need it to inflict unacceptable damage to the United States and its allies in the event of a U.S. invasion. When Pyongyang was believed to possess a meager arsenal--comprising only one or possibly two untested nuclear devices and no effective long-range missiles--military experts still calculated that a major war on the Korean peninsula would cost the United States approximately 80,000 to 100,000 casualties and US$100 billion. When damage to other countries was also considered, the estimated cost of such a war increased to as high as "one million casualties and one trillion dollars in estimated industrial damage and lost business." Another estimate calculated that a second Korean War would entail destruction costing "more than $60 billion and result in 3 million casualties, including 52,000 U.S. military casualties." The prospect of such a costly conventional war clearly suffices to deter the United States. The U.S. government could not persuade its public to approve such a war.

## Any war would be rapid and wouldn’t escalate: US air and naval power would wipe the mat with North Korea:

Doug Bandow, 2009 June 4, 2009 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “North Korea: Paper Tiger.” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.campaignforliberty.com/article.php?view=100>

It is even more obvious that Pyongyang poses no meaningful danger to America. The North has no ability to project military power. If it attempted to do so, U.S. air and naval power would make quick work of North Korea's forces.

## The war won’t escalate: China and Russia will back up South, not North Korea:

Doug Bandow, 2010 March 30, 2010 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “South Korea Needs Better Defense.” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11628>

The international environment also has changed. Both China and Russia recognize South Korea; neither would back aggression by Pyongyang. The ROK could count on support from throughout East Asia and around the world.

## North Korea won’t invade South Korea—the South Korean deterrent ensures:

Doug Bandow, 2009 June 4, 2009 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “North Korea: Paper Tiger.” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.campaignforliberty.com/article.php?view=100>

Pyongyang retains a quantitative military edge, but its equipment is antiquated; North Korean troops are malnourished and get little training. The North is effectively bankrupt and without allies. With about 40 times the GDP and twice the population of the North, Seoul could outmatch the Kim regime in any way it chose. With large military reserves, a strong industrial base, abundant allies, and generous access to international credit markets, South Korea is well-positioned to triumph in any conflict. It is obvious, then, that the DPRK doesn't pose much of a conventional threat to the South. The Kim regime could invade the ROK, but doing so would be far more likely to end in the destruction of the North than the South. And nothing suggests that Kim Jong-il is seeking martyrdom: he wants his virgins in this life, not the next.

## South Korea isn’t scared of a North Korean attack—it proves North Korea is all talk:

Doug Bandow, 2009 September 8, 2009 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “Why Are ‘We” Defending South Korea?” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.campaignforliberty.com/article.php?view=201>

Not only that, but Seoul has spent much of the last decade subsidizing North Korea with cash, food, and investment as part of its "sunshine policy." Despite Pyongyang's ever-belligerent rhetoric, most South Koreans do not fear attack. Even now, under the conservative government of President Lee Myung-bak, the ROK is reducing the size of its armed forces rather than bolstering the military in preparation for whatever might come during North Korea's looming leadership transition.

# No War Extensions: Extensions: Zero Chance of War

## North Korea will engage in brinksmanship, but not war:

Doug **Bandow**, May 24, 20**10** (senior fellow @ CATO Institute) “Avoiding Pyongyang” Online. Internet. Accessed May 24, 2010 at <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23432>

However, since the downing of a ROK airliner in 1987, Pyongyang has been on better behavior. Brinkmanship has remained the North’s chief negotiating tactic, but the DPRK has **avoided committing any blatant acts of war**.

## Tensions on the Korean peninsula have receded: North Korea is eschewing violence now.

Doug Bandow, 2010 March 30, 2010 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “South Korea Needs Better Defense.” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11628>

Nevertheless Pyongyang has generally eschewed violence in recent years. Tensions on the peninsula thankfully have receded substantially. Two South Korean presidents have ventured north for summits with Kim Jong Il. The Republic of Korea spent roughly 10 years subsidizing the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea as part of the "Sunshine Policy."

# No War—Extensions: US nuclear deterrence solves war with North Korea

## So called crazy leaders are deterrable—they look out for their own best interests:

Jonathan **Tepperman,** 8/29/20**09** (staff writer, <http://www.newsweek.com/id/214248>)

Nuclear pessimists—and there are many—insist that even if this pattern has held in the past, it's crazy to rely on it in the future, for several reasons. The first is that today's nuclear wannabes are so completely unhinged, you'd be mad to trust them with a bomb. Take the sybaritic Kim Jong Il, who's never missed a chance to demonstrate his battiness, or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has denied the Holocaust and promised the destruction of Israel, and who, according to some respected Middle East scholars, runs a messianic martyrdom cult that would welcome nuclear obliteration. These regimes are the ultimate rogues, the thinking goes—and there's no deterring rogues. But are Kim and Ahmadinejad really scarier and crazier than were Stalin and Mao? It might look that way from Seoul or Tel Aviv, but history says otherwise. Khrushchev, remember, threatened to "bury" the United States, and in 1957, Mao blithely declared that a nuclear war with America wouldn't be so bad because even "if half of mankind died … the whole world would become socialist." Pyongyang and Tehran support terrorism—but so did Moscow and Beijing. And as for seeming suicidal, Michael Desch of the University of Notre Dame points out that Stalin and Mao are the real record holders here: both were responsible for the deaths of some 20 million of their own citizens. Yet when push came to shove, their regimes balked at nuclear suicide, and so would today's international bogeymen. For all of Ahmadinejad's antics, his power is limited, and the clerical regime has always proved rational and pragmatic when its life is on the line. Revolutionary Iran has never started a war, has done deals with both Washington and Jerusalem, and sued for peace in its war with Iraq (which Saddam started) once it realized it couldn't win. North Korea, meanwhile, is a tiny, impoverished, family-run country with a history of being invaded; its overwhelming preoccupation is survival, and every time it becomes more belligerent it reverses itself a few months later (witness last week, when Pyongyang told Seoul and Washington it was ready to return to the bargaining table). These countries may be brutally oppressive, but nothing in their behavior suggests they have a death wish.

# No War—Extensions: War Won’t Escalate

## North Korea can’t attack the US: it’s missiles can’t reach us and can’t be nuclearized:

John **Feffer, 2009** (co-director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies), “Escalating with North Korea” Jun 25, 2009. Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://sites.google.com/site/nzdprksociety/commentary/escalating-with-north-korea>

Myth 1: North Korea is about to attack Hawaii: North Korea has two long-range missiles, the Taepodong-1 and the Taepodong-2. The first, likely used only for satellite launches, can maybe go 2,500 miles. But it's never been successfully tested. The Taepondong-2 maybe could go about 3,700 miles.[1] But it too has failed in its two tests: a quick fizzle in 2006 and a failure in the third stage this last April.[2] Even if Pyongyang gets everything right for a possible July 4 test, it's 4,500 miles between Pyongyang and Honolulu. As for putting a nuclear warhead on the top of it, North Korea has shown no evidence that it has the necessary miniaturization technology.

## Conflict with North Korea won’t escalate—it has a small army and other countries won’t back them up:

John **Feffer, 2009** (co-director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies), “Escalating with North Korea” Jun 25, 2009. Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://sites.google.com/site/nzdprksociety/commentary/escalating-with-north-korea>

Myth #2: North Korea is a military threat: North Korea has a lot of people in uniform, and its artillery can cause horrific damage to Seoul. But North Korea spends about half a billion dollars a year on its military. South Korea alone spends 40 times that amount. And theUnited States spends 1,000 times more. Neither China nor Russia would support any North Korean military action. Militarily speaking, North Korea is a kamikaze country. It can inflict damage, but only in a suicide attack and only close to home.

## Despite large forces, North Korea is not a threat to South Korea:

Doug Bandow, 2009 September 8, 2009 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “Why Are ‘We” Defending South Korea?” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.campaignforliberty.com/article.php?view=201>

North Korea possesses a lot of military personnel and hardware: 1.1 million personnel, over 4000 tanks, 2500 armored personnel carriers, and 18,000 pieces of artillery. But its forces are ill-trained and its weapons are antiquated. The terrain favors defense and neither China nor Russia would back the North in an invasion. The ROK lags behind in quantity, but that is a matter choice.

## North Korea is not a threat to the United States:

Doug Bandow, 2009 June 4, 2009 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “North Korea: Paper Tiger.” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.campaignforliberty.com/article.php?view=100>

Another day, it must be another weapons test for North Korea. And that means wailing and gnashing of teeth from Seoul to Washington. And presidential statements denouncing the grave threat posed to world peace. Yet the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea is an impoverished wreck. One American carrier group has more firepower than the entire North Korean military. It is the U.S. which threatens Pyongyang, not the other way around.

## North Korea can’t threaten any nation in the region:

Doug Bandow, 2009 June 4, 2009 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “North Korea: Paper Tiger.” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.campaignforliberty.com/article.php?view=100>

The DPRK has neither the interest nor the ability to challenge other nations in the region -- Indonesia, Australia, Philippines, et al. The North possesses an antiquated army and little else, not a globe-spanning military like that of the U.S.

# No War: Military Drills Won’t Trigger War

## North Korean bluster about military drills is all talk—there was no reaction from North Korea from the latest wave of drills:

Kwang-Tae Kim, 2010 March 25, 2010, “NKorea vows ‘nuclear strikes’ in latest threat” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iURO8fOyWVOA0ytFlaAGuC9F7R9wD9EM4I600>

South Korean media have reported that Seoul has drawn up a military operations plan with the United States to cope with possible emergencies in the North. The North says the U.S. plots to topple its regime, a claim Washington has consistently denied. Last month, the North also threatened a "powerful — even nuclear — attack," if the U.S. and South Korea went ahead with annual military drills. There was no military provocation from North Korea during the exercises.

## *North Korean threats against US troop drills are all absurd bluffs:*

Joshua Stanton, 2010 (staff writer), “North Korea Re-Re-Declares War, Threatens ‘Merciless Physical Force,’ Demands Peace Treaty” Mar. 8, 2010. Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.freekorea.us/2010/03/08/north-korea-re-re-declares-war-threatens-mercilless-physical-force-and-wants-a-peace-treaty/>

So Operations Key Resolve and Foal Eagle have started again. I boldly predict that this year, as has been the case for each year for the many decades we’ve had troops stationed in South Korea, the exercise will not end with an American invasion of North Korea. Just as predictably, North Korea is threatening the United States and/or South Korea. The challenge for North Korean propagandists is always how to make each year’s threat stand out from such previous-year classics as “sea of fire.” After all, you can only say “brigandish,” “imperialist,” and “merciless” so many times before people start to suspect you’re writing your missives with pre-printed refrigerator magnets.

# No War--Extensions: Won’t Attack Japan

## Japan can deter any threat from North Korea:

Doug Bandow, 2009 June 4, 2009 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “North Korea: Paper Tiger.” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.campaignforliberty.com/article.php?view=100>

Japan worries about threats from Pyongyang, but the former is more than capable of defending itself. Japan possesses the world's second largest economy, noted for its technological sophistication. There is little that Tokyo could not build or buy. More than 60 years after the end of World War II, it is time for Japan to take over responsibility for its own defense.

# \*\*\*Proliferation Advantage Answers (1nc Front-Line)\*\*\*

## The six party talks are solving now—new Chinese investments have invigorated the process.

The Australian, 2010. February 16, 2010. Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/china-to-tempt-n-korea-to-talks/story-e6frg6so-1225830664414>

CHINA plans to invest billions of dollars in North Korea in an apparent effort to prod the impoverished country into rejoining international nuclear disarmament talks, reports said yesterday. Beijing hoped to break the deadlock over North Korea's status as a dangerous, isolated new nuclear power by investing $11.3 billion there. This would be a vast sum for the impoverished "Hermit Kingdom" -- worth about 40 per cent of the country's annual gross domestic product in 2008. This news emerged following mutual visits by senior Chinese and North Korean officials last week. Yonhap news agency quoted a source familiar with North Korean issues as saying: "A couple of Chinese banks and several international companies have practically clinched investment deals with Daepung International Investment Group," a company that seeks to attract foreign investors to North Korea. This points to the best potential breakthrough in relations between North Korea and its neighbours since last April when it quit the Six-Party Talks process about denuclearisation, also involving South Korea, Japan, Russia, the US and China, and in May conducted a second nuclear test.

## Turn: Unilateral concessions to North Korea only embolden its proliferation efforts—it takes the stick out of the US hands.

Michael Horowitz, 2004. (PHD from Harvard school of government), Washington Quarterly, “Who’s Behind That Curtain? Unveiling Potential Leverage over Pyongyang”; p. 21.

Essentially, giving North Korea a security assurance without verifiable nuclear dismantlement is unlikely to create diplomatic momentum and risks delaying an ultimate solution by prematurely taking the stick out of U.S. hands. By consistently raising issues such as the negative security assurance, Pyongyang could also be trying to set a trap for the United States, seeking to drive a wedge between the United States and Japan as well as South Korea no matter how Washington responds. If Washington grants a negative secu- rity assurance to Pyongyang, absent receiving verifiable concessions, it could create the perception in South Korea and especially Japan that the United States is insufficiently committed to resolving the nuclear dispute. Because of concern about military overextension due to deployments in the war on terrorism, U.S. actions could be perceived as a resource-based compromise, creating concern that the United States is willing to look the other way and accept de facto North Korean nuclear weapons. Conversely, a U.S. refusal to grant a negative security assurance to North Korea in the face of more coop- erative behavior from North Korea could damage U.S. relations with Japan and especially South Korea by making the United States appear belligerent. These complications confront policymakers attempting to utilize U.S. mili-tary might to leverage North Korea.

## Engagement strategies will fail with North Korea—coalition members will disagree on strategies:

Doug Bandow, 2009 September 15, 2009 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “Engagement with North Korea: A Viable Alternative” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/sep/15/books-us-engagement-with-n-korea-viable/>

But nothing is simple with the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea. U.S. engagement has been controversial since the Clinton administration negotiated the Agreed Framework in 1994. Youngshik D. Bong of American University doubts that Washington's "staged engagement strategy," that is, "the tit-for-tat or action-for-action pattern," will succeed. He contends that "nuclear weapons may have become too valuable for Kim Jong Il's regime to trade away under the principle of simultaneous reciprocity." While the overall deal might be worth making, the specific rewards for individual denuclearization steps might not be sufficient. Moreover, the system makes it hard to unite surrounding states behind U.S. objectives. Mr. Bong notes: "Any failure of a staged engagement will not be enough to convince all the members of the engagement coalition that every opportunity to resolve the nuclear issue through engagement has been exhausted. They might still disagree whether the time has come to turn to coercive methods." Mr. Bong instead argues "that the United States must adopt a full-engagement strategy and make a grand bargain with North Korea if it is to achieve complete denuclearization peacefully."

# Proliferation Advantage Answers (1nc Front-Line)

## Even if North Korea develops nuclear weapons—they wouldn’t use them—they know it is suicide.

Zhiqun Zhu, 2009 (associate professor of political science and international relations at Bucknell University). Online. Internet. Accessed, April 1, 2010 at <http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0728/p09s02-coop.html>.

The cold war has not ended on the Korean Peninsula. Regime survival is a top priority for Pyongyang. Depicted as being belligerent and menacing to its neighbors and the US, North Korea retorts that it is the US that has been hostile and provocative. The impoverished North needs the nuclear program as a bargaining chip. It is also in dire need of energy, which nuclear technology can provide. It is highly unlikely that Pyongyang will actually use nuclear weapons against its neighbors or the US – the Communist leaders are fully aware that it would be suicidal.

## Turn: Nuclear terrorism:

## A) US hardline versus North Korea key to stopping transfer of nuclear tech to terrorists:

**The Advertiser** (Australia), September 28, **2007** LN nsa

The first question is whether North Korea can be deterred from exporting nuclear material to other countries willing to pay a high price in the international market. When North Korea tested its first nuclear device in October, the U.S. warned Pyongyang that if it exported nuclear material Washington would hold North Korea ''fully accountable of the consequences of such action''. In other words, if Pyongyang was caught transferring nuclear material, the U.S. reserved the right to respond with direct military action against North Korea. Most analysts (including myself) have tended to assume North Korean elites would never be foolish enough to export nuclear proliferation by transferring fissile material - mainly because of the vehemence of Washington's deterrent warnings after the 2006 test, but also because its stocks of nuclear material are generally estimated to be modest.

## B) Nuclear terrorism causes nuclear war.

Greg **Easterbrook**, senior editor with THE NEW REPUBLIC, November **2001**, p. www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0111/01/gal.00.html

Terrorists may not be held by this, especially suicidal terrorists, of the kind that al Qaeda is attempting to cultivate. But I think, if I could leave you with one message, it would be this: that the search for terrorist atomic weapons would be of great benefit to the Muslim peoples of the world in addition to members, to people of the United States and Western Europe, because if an atomic warhead goes off in Washington, say, in the current environment or anything like it, in the 24 hours that followed, a hundred million Muslims would die as U.S. nuclear bombs rained down on every conceivable military target in a dozen Muslim countries.

## No impact: proliferation won’t cause war—new proliferators will be cautious:

Jonathan **Tepperman,** 8/29/20**09** (staff writer, <http://www.newsweek.com/id/214248>)

A **growing and compelling body of research** suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it.

# Proliferation Advantage Answers—Extensions: North Korea Won’t Use Nukes

## No risk of nuclear war from North Korea:

Doug **Bandow**, May 24, 20**10** (senior fellow @ CATO Institute) “Avoiding Pyongyang” Online. Internet. Accessed May 24, 2010 at <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23432>

Even the North’s nuclear program poses no direct threat to the United States. Nothing suggests that Kim is suicidal: he wants his virgins today, not in the afterlife. So he would never strike at America, risking retaliatory annihilation. The prospect of proliferation is worrisome, but again, Kim likely understands the enormous risks he would take selling materials to non-state actors that might target the United States.

## Even so called crazy leaders behave rationally with nuclear weapons:

Jonathan **Tepperman,** 8/29/20**09** (staff writer, <http://www.newsweek.com/id/214248>)

To understand why—and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way—you need to start by recognizing that all states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side—and millions of innocents pay the price. Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button—and everybody knows it—the basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, "Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything?"

## North Korea’s proliferation capabilities don’t match its rhetoric:

Doug Bandow, 2009 June 4, 2009 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “North Korea: Paper Tiger.” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.campaignforliberty.com/article.php?view=100>

What of the DPRK's nuclear and missile programs? They are primarily a problem for the North's neighbors and thus give other countries a good reason to consider augmenting both defensive and deterrence capabilities. However, North Korea apparently has neither weaponized nor miniaturized actual nuclear warheads. Pyongyang possesses no long-range missiles capable of accurately hitting American territory. The North's capabilities do not match its bluster.

# Proliferation Advantage Answers: Talks Will Succeed Now

## (--)North Korea is running out of cash: it will be back at the negotiating table soon:

Jack **Kim, 2/19/2010** (<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6170RG20100208>)

WILL NORTH KOREA RETURN TO NUCLEAR TALKS? North Korea's moves are often linked to the precarious state of its finances and the economic pressure it is facing now indicates it **will likely return to the talks in the hopes of winning aid**. North Korea has attached two conditions to its return and a face-saving compromise would need to be found to resume the talks among the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the United States. North Korea has called for an end to U.N. sanctions imposed to punish it for detonating a nuclear device in May 2009 and for direct talks with Washington to replace the armistice that ended the 1950-53 Korean War with a peace treaty.

## (--) And…because it is in North Korea’s best interest…the talks will soon resume:

**Korea Herald, 2/17/2010** (<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/NEWKHSITE/data/html_dir/2010/02/18/201002180057.asp>)

Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan yesterday said he believes the multilateral talks aimed at ending North Korea's nuclear weapons programs will soon resume, although he was not certain of a time frame. "We can not be sure of an exact date, but the six-party talks are likely to happen soon," Yu told lawmakers at a meeting with an Assembly committee on foreign affairs. The foreign minister has reiterated several times that he hopes for, and believes the denuclearization talks would occur soon. As evidence, Yu said the latest visit by Wang Jiarui, the head of international relations of the Chinese Communist Party to the North, and the ensuing visit to Beijing by North Korea's chief nuclear negotiator Kim Gye-gwan were "signs" that there is **movement indicating a resumption of the six-nation dialogue.**  "The six-party talks **will most certainly be resumed because it is also in North Korea's interest,"** Yu said.

## (--) And…Poverty in North Korea will force it back to the table:

**Korea Herald, 2/17/2010** (<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/NEWKHSITE/data/html_dir/2010/02/18/201002180057.asp>)

North Korea has been boycotting the six-party talks since the United Nations condemned its rocket launch in April last year. In May, the North conducted its second nuclear test. Pyongyang, devastated by nationwide poverty, has lately appeared to be in a reconciliatory mode, indicating it may return to the table.

## (--) Current sanctions regime is effective against North Korea:

Martina **Stewart, 2/7/2010 (**<http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/02/07/clinton-defends-obamas-engagement-strategy-on-iran-n-korea/?fbid=tS08NAClfuo>)

With regard to North Korea, Clinton said it also has spurned the Obama administration's efforts at engagement over its nuclear ambitions. "But because we were willing to engage, we ended up getting a very strong sanctions regime against North Korea that China signed onto and Russia signed onto," Clinton said. "And right now is being enforced around the world."

# Proliferation Advantage Answers: Extensions: Concessions Cause Prolif

## (--)North Korea will pocket unilateral concessions: they’ll merely forestall the nuclear issue with infinite demands:

Michael **Horowitz, 2004** (PHD from Harvard school of government, former NDT champion, Washington Quarterly, Who’s Behind That Curtain? Unveiling Potential Leverage over Pyongyang; 24-25)

One goal clearly articulated by the North Korean regime over the last de- cade that may explain its recent behavior has been to obtain a “complete, verifiable, and irreversible security assurance,”3 a promise that the United States will not launch a preemptive or preventive military attack on North Korea. Another possibility, however, is that the negative security assurance demand is just a bargaining chip. U.S. negotiators have held out the possi- bility of a negative security assurance or other limited military concessions if North Korea made substantive concessions in its nuclear program, which the North Koreans have refused to make so far. For example, in the June 2004 six-party talks, the U.S. proposal for resolving the nuclear issue in- cluded an offer of a negative security assurance in response to North Korean nuclear dismantlement.4 Yet, granting a negative security assurance to Pyongyang without receiving at least a verifiable freeze leading to the dis-mantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program carries some risks. Pyongyang might simply pocket the negative security assurance and use the diplo - matic momentum to shift negotiations to other issues, such as the de - ployment of U.S. troops on the peninsula, a peace treaty, or the formal treaty relationship between the United States and South Korea. The point is not the specific demand, but rather the idea that unreciprocated concessions may convince Pyongyang that it has the ability to **forestall resolution of the nuclear issue with indefinite demands.**

## (--) Next link is shifting the goal-posts: Empirical evidence supports the idea that North Korea will simply shift its demands to something else after we give into them:

Michael **Horowitz, 2004** (PHD from Harvard school of government, former NDT champion, Washington Quarterly, Who’s Behind That Curtain? Unveiling Potential Leverage over Pyongyang; 26)

Some empirical evidence supports this fear. In 1991, North Korea claimed that U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea were the critical factor motivating its nuclear program. When the United S t a t e s w i t h - drew its nuclear weapons from South Ko - rea as part of a reconfiguration of U. S. forces following the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea shifted its demands, asking for an unprecedented level of ac-cess to South Korean and U.S. military facilities to “confirm” that the nuclear weapons had been withdrawn. This method of partial compli- ance, at best, **while simultaneously shifting the goalposts or ratcheting up demands** is well documented in North Korean negotiating tactics.5

## (--) Unreciprocated concessions only exacerbates the crisis on the Korean peninsula:

Michael **Horowitz, 2004** (PHD from Harvard school of government, former NDT champion, Washington Quarterly, Who’s Behind That Curtain? Unveiling Potential Leverage over Pyongyang; 21)

After more than a decade and a half of crises, negotiations, and agreements, North Korea is now believed to have produced enough nuclear material for several nuclear weapons. What now? As long as the North Ko - rean regime believes that the status quo is sustainable, they will have little incentive to dismantle their nuclear program completely. Regardless of one’s preferred endgame for the Korean peninsula, establishing effective levers of influence over North Korea is a vital first step in moving toward sustainable resolution of the nuclear issue. It is currently unclear whether Pyongyang would agree to verifiable nuclear dismantlement in exchange for serious economic and political incentives from the United States. If such an agreement can be reached, it will pave the way for a nuclear-free peninsula. If it fails, the United States will have overwhelm- ing international support to move toward a more coercive solution. Currently, Pyongyang simply responds to U.S. diplomatic overtures with threats and brinksmanship, a cycle that intensifies crises and the possibility of armed con- flict on the peninsula. In return, the United States and other regional actors seem to have little ability to threaten or otherwise influence Pyongyang. Re- sponding to the current situation by granting **unreciprocated concessions to the North Koreans would likely exacerbate the problem;** allowing North Ko- rea to reap the economic benefits of broken promises will not lead to a sus- tainable solution.

# Proliferation Advantage Answers—Extensions: Kim Won’t Sell Nukes

## North Korea won’t sell nukes abroad—the risk is exaggerated:

Doug **Bandow**, May 24, 20**10** (senior fellow @ CATO Institute) “Avoiding Pyongyang” Online. Internet. Accessed May 24, 2010 at <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23432>

Even the North’s nuclear program poses no direct threat to the United States. Nothing suggests that Kim is suicidal: he wants his virgins today, not in the afterlife. So he would never strike at America, risking retaliatory annihilation. The prospect of proliferation is worrisome, but again, Kim likely understands the enormous risks he would take selling materials to non-state actors that might target the United States.

# Proliferation Advantage Answers: Extensions: Prolif is Slow

## Any nuclear proliferation will be slow and controllable—taking out their impacts:

William C. **Potter, 2008** (International Security, Summer, Professor of Nonproliferation Studies @ Monterey Institute, EBSCO)

The more extreme position of the two authors is staked out by Hymans, for whom the real proliferation puzzle is not why there are so few nuclear weapons possessors, but why there are any at all (p. 8). Hymans finds the major international relations paradigms—realism, institutionalism, and constructivism—of limited utility in explaining the slow pace of proliferation and those rare instances of its occurrence. The answer to the puzzle, he believes, has to do primarily with the lack of motivation on the part of nearly all state leaders. Put simply, he argues, nonproliferation restraint stems less from external efforts to stop states from going nuclear, and more from “the hearts of state leaders themselves” (p. 7). Contrary to conventional wisdom, he maintains, few national political figures have either the desire or certitude to go nuclear (p. 8). According to Hymans, although the nonproliferation regime may have many virtues, the appearance of its success in containing proliferation results mainly from the fact “that few state leaders have desired the things it prohibits” (ibid.).

## Prolif is historically slow:

Jonathan **Tepperman,** 8/29/20**09** (staff writer, <http://www.newsweek.com/id/214248>)

The risk of an arms race—with, say, other Persian Gulf states rushing to build a bomb after Iran got one—is a bit harder to dispel. Once again, however, history is instructive. "In 64 years, the most nuclear-weapons states we've ever had is 12," says Waltz. "Now with North Korea we're at nine. That's not proliferation; **that's spread at glacial pace**." Nuclear weapons are so controversial and expensive that only countries that deem them absolutely critical to their survival go through the extreme trouble of acquiring them. That's why South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan voluntarily gave theirs up in the early '90s, and why other countries like Brazil and Argentina dropped nascent programs.

# Proliferation Advantage Answers: No Snowball

## Studies prove: No prolif snowball--

William C. **Potter, 2008** (International Security, Summer, Professor of Nonproliferation Studies @ Monterey Institute, EBSCO)

Solingen, like Hymans, is wary of predicting rampant weapons spread and finds **little evidence in her case studies** to suggest the existence of a proliferation dynamic that resembles nuclear chains. Her guarded optimism about the near-term nuclear future follows logically from her decisionmaking paradigm, which emphasizes the manner in which the external environment is filtered through the lens of domestic political coalitions. These political groupings, it is assumed, typically will make rational choices based on their calculation of regime (rather than state) benefits. These decisions, moreover, are apt to vary significantly from state to state and regime to regime. As a consequence, one state’s decision to withdraw from the NPT, launch a nuclear weapons program, and even test a nuclear device need not lead to a similar response in other states.

## Prolif doesn’t snowball—their argument is the modern day version of the domino theory:

William C. **Potter, 2008** (International Security, Summer, Professor of Nonproliferation Studies @ Monterey Institute, EBSCO)

Hymans is keenly aware of the **deficiency of past proliferation projections**, which he attributes in large part to the “tendency to use the growth of nuclear capabilities, stances toward the non-proliferation regime, and a general ‘roguishness’ of the state as proxies for nuclear weapons intentions” (p. 217). Such intentions, he believes, cannot be discerned without reference to leadership national identity conceptions, a focus that appears to have been absent to date in intelligence analyses devoted to forecasting proliferation.49 Hymans is equally critical of the popular notion that “the ‘domino theory’ of the twenty-first century may well be nuclear.”50 As he points out, the new domino theory, like its discredited Cold War predecessor, **assumes an oversimplified view about why and how decisions to acquire nuclear weapons are taken**.51 Leaders’ nuclear preferences, he maintains, “are not highly contingent on what other states decide,” and, therefore, “proliferation tomorrow will probably remain as rare as proliferation today, with **no single instance of proliferation causing a cascade of nuclear weapons states**” (p. 225). In addition, he argues, the domino thesis embraces “an exceedingly dark picture of world trends by lumping the truly dangerous leaders together with the merely self-assertive ones,” and equating interest in nuclear technology with weapons intent (pp. 208–209). Dire proliferation forecasts, both past and present, Hymans believes, flow from four myths regarding nuclear decisonmaking: (1) states want the bomb as a deterrent; (2) states seek the bomb as a “ticket to international status”; (3) states go for the bomb because of the interests of domestic groups; and (4) the international regime protects the world from a flood of new nuclear weapons states (pp. 208–216). Each of these assumptions is faulty, Hymans contends, because of its fundamental neglect of the decisive role played by individual leaders in nuclear matters.

# \*\*Anti-Americanism Advantage Answers\*\*

## US-South Korean relations are strong now:

AFP, 2010 March 25, 2010, “US to finish base move in S.Korea done by 2016.” Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gzJWQ7_sjeY0Vz0qnWC2H4bgUO0g>

The move will allow US forces to leave their huge Yongsan base in Seoul, which was set up for the 1950-53 Korean War but now lies in the heart of the developed and densely populated city, leading to frictions with residents. Relations between the allies have grown smoother since conservative President Lee Myung-Bak took over in 2008. His predecessor, Roh Moo-Hyun, had campaigned in part on promises to take a tougher line on US troops.

# \*\*\*Disad Links: Troop Shift Links\*\*\*

## US troops removed from South Korea will likely be redeployed to existing US geopolitical demands:

**Stratfor** Intelligence Foundation, 20**08**. “U.S., South Korea: The End of an Era -- The Closure of Combined Forces Command” March 17, 2008. Online. Internet. Accessed April 10, 2010 at www.stratfor.com

Yet more than 50 years later, a combination of containment and structural inertia have left some 30,000 U.S. troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula — a commitment no longer commensurate with the threat or the likelihood of the outbreak of war. The troop presence is also no longer in line with the United States’ geopolitical focus. With some 150,000 U.S. troops committed to Iraq and more than 25,000 in Afghanistan, the current disposition of U.S. forces in South Korea does not reflect the demands being placed on the U.S. military.

## US troops in South Korea prevent larger deployments in Iraq

Doug **Bandow, 2003** (senior fellow, CATO Institute), “Cutting the Tripwire: It’s time to get out of Korea.” July 1, 2003. Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5993>

Why is America still in Korea? The security commitment is the only reason the North breathes fire against Washington. If the U.S. withdrew, Pyongyang would pose no serious threat to us. Today it wields only an untested missile with the theoretical possibility of hitting Alaska or the West Coast, and it knows that attacking America would ensure obliteration. In contrast, leaving forces on the peninsula creates 37,000 nearby nuclear hostages if Pyongyang develops a nuclear arsenal. The troop presence also further strains a military that intends to garrison a defeated Iraq along with the Balkans, all while searching for Al Qaeda worldwide. Alliances are created at particular times to meet particular threats. They are not ends in themselves, to be preserved no matter how much the world changes. Instead of augmenting its forces in the Pacific and threatening Pyongyang with war, the U.S. should bring home its troops and turn the problem of Pyongyang over to its neighbors, where it belongs.

# Disad Links: Reverse Spending Links

## Removing troops from South Korea would save the US money:

Doug **Bandow**, June 11, 20**10** (senior fellow @ CATO Institute) “Confronting North Korea: Who’s in charge?” Online. Internet. Accessed June 13, 2010 at <http://dailycaller.com/2010/06/09/confronting-north-korea-whos-in-charge/>

Third, the U.S.-ROK alliance has outlived its usefulness. The South is well-able to defend itself, with some 40 times the DPRK’s GDP and twice the DPRK’s population. There’s no reason for Washington, which faces a deficit of $1.6 trillion this year, to borrow money for the privilege of defending South Korea, which is well able to spend much more on its military if circumstances require.