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\*\*\*US-ROK Alliance Good\*\*\*

US-ROK Alliance Good – Troops Key

Pullout signals abandonment – functionally ends the US-ROK alliance.

Kelley 09 (“Should the US Pull Out of South Korea (2): No” Robert E Kelly, Political Science & Diplomacy Pusan National University, December 18, 2009)

2. It also means that the US will lose SK as an ally, because without the troops, they’ll feel, rightfully, that the US abandoned them. It would be nice to assure SK security without the ground forces, but US infantry on the ground (the USFK logo above) sends a much greater signal of commitment than air and sea power. SK will slide into China’s orbit if the US leaves. It’s already edging that way now. If America bails, it loses them. It is correct that SK no longer needs us to win a second Korean war though. So after unification, US retrenchment from Asia would be more possible and likely. But if America sticks with the Koreans through these difficult times, it will have them as good allies long into the future. Consider how loyal Kuwait and Germany are to the US because of historical goodwill. When Korea finally does unify – and it will happen as the post-Cold War North is in a permanent economic and legitimacy crisis – the Koreans will be deeply grateful if the US is here, or deeply resentful, and likely very pro-Chinese, if the US is not.

Military presence is key – it’s the defining aspect of the US-ROK alliance.

Sneider 06 (Daniel Sneider Associate Director for Research@Stanford, “RE-IMAGINING THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE” 11-12, 2006)

The two militaries have a vital legacy of decades of combined command, training and war planning. American military forces in significant numbers have remained in place to help defend South Korea from potential aggression from the North. South Korean troops have deployed abroad numerous times in support of American foreign policy goals, including currently in Iraq and Afghanistan. 2 This foundation of security is not only essential to this alliance but is the very definition of the nature of alliances in general, as distinct from other forms of cooperation and partnership in international relations. “Alliances are binding, durable security commitments between two or more nations,” Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, a Stanford scholar and former Clinton administration senior defense official, wrote recently. “The critical ingredients of a meaningful alliance are the shared recognition of common threats and a pledge to take action to counter them. To forge agreement, an alliance requires ongoing policy consultations that continually set expectations for allied behavior.” Alliances can survive a redefinition of the common threat that faces them but not the absence of a threat. Nor can alliances endure if there is not a clear sense of the mutual obligations the partners have to each other, from mutual defense to joint actions against a perceived danger. “At a minimum,” Sherwood-Randall says, “allies are expected to take into consideration the perspectives and interests of their partners as they make foreign and defense policy choices.”

US-ROK Alliance Good – Stability

US – Korea alliance good – it eases burdens on Japan to manage instability and mitigates tensions between Korea and Japan.

Hwang 06 (Balbina Y. Hwang The Heritage Foundation October 16, 2006 “The U.S.-Korea Alliance on the Rocks: Shaken, Not Stirred”)

At the heart of our discussion about the state of the U.S. alliance with the ROK today must be a broader consideration of future U.S. grand strategy in Asia. Beyond the immediacy of the seemingly intrac table North Korean "problem" of today lie more pro found challenges for the United States, including the eventual unification of the Korean peninsula, the rise of China, and the resurgence of Japan. It is clear that the U.S. goal for the mid- to long-term future is to play an active and positive role in maintaining stability in East Asia. The promotion of prosperity, freedom, and cooperation in the region are beyond a doubt integral to the American national interest. The best and perhaps only way for the United States to maintain its influence in the region is through its alliances with key partners. While the primary goal of the U.S.-ROK alliance was and is to deter North Korea through the Amer ican commitment to the Armistice, its broader objective has always been to maintain regional sta bility. It has done so by contributing to the strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance, not only by dispersing the U.S. force presence beyond Japan, but also by alleviating the Japanese burden of managing insta bility on the Korean peninsula. The alliance has also mitigated hostilities between the ROK and Japan and served to counter China's growing regional influence and dissuade any precipitous action on the peninsula. But perhaps most important, maintenance of a U.S.-ROK alliance will continue to serve as a bed rock for America's commitment in the region. An end to the alliance would undoubtedly jeopardize our credibility with all our allies and partners in the region, from Mongolia to Australia. And it will send the wrong message to China, whose ambitions are to create a regional multilateral structure of nomi nal equality but underlying Chinese dominance; the strength of America's alliances with the ROK and Japan is the single greatest factor thwarting Chinese regional hegemony. But sole U.S. reliance on Japan will be problematic given the level of mis trust for that country in the region. Maintenance of a strong U.S.-ROK alliance will not be an easy task given the immense challenges that will inevitably confront the relationship. Strong domestic support in both countries will be critical in order to sustain any type of formal relationship but especially one involving U.S. military forces, which requires sacrifices of those at home and in the host country. This is not an impossible task if the leader ship of both countries rise to the occasion.

US-ROK Alliance Good – Stability

US – Korea alliance good – deters North Korea, maintains stability in East Asia, and prevents Chinese regional hegemony.

Hwang 06 (Balbina Y. Hwang The Heritage Foundation October 16, 2006 “The U.S.-Korea Alliance on the Rocks: Shaken, Not Stirred”)km

At the heart of our discussion about the state of the U.S. alliance with the ROK today must be a broader consideration of future U.S. grand strategy in Asia. Beyond the immediacy of the seemingly intrac table North Korean "problem" of today lie more pro found challenges for the United States, including the eventual unification of the Korean peninsula, the rise of China, and the resurgence of Japan. It is clear that the U.S. goal for the mid- to long-term future is to play an active and positive role in maintaining stability in East Asia. The promotion of prosperity, freedom, and cooperation in the region are beyond a doubt integral to the American national interest. The best and perhaps only way for the United States to maintain its influence in the region is through its alliances with key partners. While the primary goal of the U.S.-ROK alliance was and is to deter North Korea through the Amer ican commitment to the Armistice, its broader objective has always been to maintain regional sta bility. It has done so by contributing to the strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance, not only by dispersing the U.S. force presence beyond Japan, but also by alleviating the Japanese burden of managing insta bility on the Korean peninsula. The alliance has also mitigated hostilities between the ROK and Japan and served to counter China's growing regional influence and dissuade any precipitous action on the peninsula. But perhaps most important, maintenance of a U.S.-ROK alliance will continue to serve as a bed rock for America's commitment in the region. An end to the alliance would undoubtedly jeopardize our credibility with all our allies and partners in the region, from Mongolia to Australia. And it will send the wrong message to China, whose ambitions are to create a regional multilateral structure of nomi nal equality but underlying Chinese dominance; the strength of America's alliances with the ROK and Japan is the single greatest factor thwarting Chinese regional hegemony. But sole U.S. reliance on Japan will be problematic given the level of mis trust for that country in the region. Maintenance of a strong U.S.-ROK alliance will not be an easy task given the immense challenges that will inevitably confront the relationship. Strong domestic support in both countries will be critical in order to sustain any type of formal relationship but especially one involving U.S. military forces, which requires sacrifices of those at home and in the host country. This is not an impossible task if the leader ship of both countries rise to the occasion.

US-ROK Alliance Good – Stability/Alliances

Pulling out of Korea on the brink of a second Korean war would signal weakness to US enemies and end all alliances we have.

Green 10 (“North vs. South Korea: How Bad Could a War Get?” May 27, 2010 Stephen Green, Writer-Pajamasmedia)

As we enter the summer of 2010,” writes Austin Bay, “the risk of all-out war on the Korean peninsula is quite high, and possibly the highest it has been since the armistice was signed in 1953.” The good news: It’s unlikely that North Korea has enough gasoline to fight for more than a few days. The bad news: they could really mess up the South in less time than that. The worse news: nobody knows what would happen after the inevitable North Korean collapse, but everybody knows that nobody could afford it. The downright scary news: even a wildly unspectacular North Korean invasion would serve as a test of our CINC’s mettle — a test we can’t be certain he’d pass. Let’s go through these points one at a time. The Good News An army, Napoleon said, travels on its stomach. But a modern army travels on POL: petroleum, oil, lubricants. It’s doubtful Pyongyang has enough POL to grease their tanks much further south than midtown Seoul. Also, an army needs lots of ammo and tons of spares. How many new tank tracks do you think the North has been able to beg, borrow, buy, or steal in the last 20 years? Answer: not many. And ammo needs to be replaced every couple of decades — even bullets have a shelf life. The situation for aircraft is even more critical, so it’s a good guess that the North’s air force is in even worse shape than the army. The DPRK navy can still pack some punch, as we learned last month, but sneak attacks don’t guarantee victory — just ask Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. Another bit of good news is that China is giving North Korea some small diplomatic cover over the sinking of the Cheonan. That might not seem like a good thing at first blush, but as long as China maintains influence over the DPRK, the odds of war are reduced.The Bad News North Korea has special forces up the Pyongyang. This tiny, starving, impoverished nation has tens of thousands of special forces — and they have a reputation for being tough, skilled, and deadly. They’re also expected to swarm the South’s airports and seaports and do a pretty savage job of knocking them out of service. They also might have a pretty easy time of blending into the civilian population (or even disguise themselves as ROK soldiers) and continuing to wreak havoc until found and killed, one by one. Another bit you should know. Seoul is in range of thousands of DPRK artillery tubes and missiles — many of which are in hard-to-bomb mountain hideaways. It would take hundreds of aircraft sorties, and an untold amount of counter-battery fire, before Seoul would be safe again — and the damage could take years to repair. An unprovoked attack at pre-dawn could serve up death and destruction unseen in any major city since World War II. And I’m not even factoring in the possibility of the North kicking off the festivities with a nuke, because I like to sleep at night. The Worse News Yes, there’s worse news. Now, I’ve written about a North Korean collapse pretty extensively, and going back seven years. If you don’t want to go through the archives, just know this: it would be the biggest humanitarian crisis since The Flood, only with loose nuclear materials. The Downright Scary News So, yes, North Korea could seriously mess up the South, after which the North would cease to exist as an independent nation. And I believe that China would move to intervene in the DPRK long before ROK or U.S. troops (technically, UN troops) could get through the DMZ. Then what’s so downright scary? It’s almost certain that the South could handle the North without much in the way of American help — and a Chinese coup de grace would certainly bring hostilities to a quick end. (Let’s assume that China would find it much more beneficial this time around to stop a Korean War than to enlist in one.) But: if President Obama did anything less than to order a full and immediate reinforcement of South Korea — on land, sea, and air — our other enemies and rivals would read much into such inaction. They might read too much into it, but they would read it just the same. More importantly — most especially — is the message our allies would receive: that America is no longer a reliable ally. Turkey has already de facto left NATO, in favor of rising Persian power. Obama has personally handed Israel its hat and coat, and shoved it towards the door. Britain has been insulted, India snubbed, and the French ignored. It wouldn’t take much more to see what remains of our alliances blown apart. In fact, it wouldn’t take anything more than the slightest wobble in dealing with a Second Korean War. And as this administration continues to do little or nothing as “the risk of all-out war” reaches historical highs, the signal being sent is most un-American. “Tread on Me.”

US-ROK Alliance Good – Japanese Rearm

US pullout causes Japan to rearm in fear of North Korea which sparks regional tensions.

Henderson 09 (Bruce Henderson, writer-And Still I Persist, “Assessing the North Korean Threat” July 10th, 2009)

The most important threat that North Korea represents is its ability to destabilize east Asia, particularly in the effect their militant displays have on the true regional power (and sleeping giant), Japan. Since the end of World War II, the United States has spent billions of dollars to maintain a presence in the region, in part to convince Japan that as long as Uncle Sam is guarding the door, they can maintain the pacifist veneer that has kept the most successful martial culture of the region in check for over 60 years. In a move that is dangerous for everyone, Japan is beginning to re-examine the benefits and risks or outsourcing their national defense, in part driven by our tepid response to Korea and Chinese expansion. The United States cannot afford to have Japan re-arm itself or worse yet become a regional nuclear power. Neither China and Korea have forgotten that tiny Japan has successfully conquered and occupied both countries multiple times over the last 1,000 years. The time for action is at hand; something must be done to contain and dismantle the North Korean regime before it can further degrade the future of the region. Sadly this would take a much more aggressive foreign policy stance than is likely from the inwardly focused Obama administration, and it would require a joint effort with China, which we are in no position to request and they are in no mood to grant. Expect this situation to continue to fester, with this region of the world slowly becoming a much more dangerous place.

That causes arms races and prolif that sparks regional conflicts.

Robinson 10 (“Why the West should Discourage Japanese Military Expansion” Dr. David Robinson, Edith Cowan University (Australia), Journal of Asia Pacific Studies 2010)

Japan’s Self-Defense Force is already considered a powerful regional force, and Japan’s previous decisions not to acquire nuclear weapons have been, “on purely strategic grounds, unrelated to antimilitarism or pacifism” [Bukh, 2010, pp7-8]. As Japan has a stockpile of plutonium and extremely sophisticated rocket technology, the possibility remains that Japan could become a major nuclear power within a decade if sufficiently provoked by regional competitors like North Korea [Matthews, 2003, p78], and neo-realist Kenneth Waltz has argued that Asia’s security environment will eventually compel Japan to nuclearise [Mirashita, 2001, p5]. China and Japan are each dominant in the others’ strategic thinking regarding economic, political and military issues, and the enhancement of Japanese military power must influence China’s own strategic vision [Pyle, 2007, p312-315]. China and Korea also remain “convinced that Japanese militarism, supported by an invigorated nationalist right wing, lurks just beneath the surface” [Samuels, 2007, p2]. At the very least Japan’s new foreign policy could escalate into a regional arms race, with the potential for both Japan and South Korea to nuclearise. Issues like control of the Senkaku Islands, the division of Korea, and Chinese claims on Taiwan provide continuing fault-lines around which conflict might develop [Matthews, 2003, p81].

Extinction

Ratner 3

(Ellen. White House correspondent and bureau chief for the Talk Radio News service. 1/17/3. <http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?article_id=30541>, AD: 6/20/10) jl

That is now threatened by North Korea's brazen stupidity. By rattling the nuclear saber, withdrawing from non-proliferation treaties and tossing out U.N. inspectors, the North Koreans are on the verge of making one of the colossal blunders of world history. If North Korea is not reined in, then it is likely that Tokyo will rearm – and experts predict that with Japan's high-tech, industrial economy, they could assemble a full nuclear arsenal and bomb delivery systems within three years.

This would be a disaster. Not only would it trigger a new, intra-Asian arms race – for who could doubt that if Japan goes nuclear, China and North Korea would be joined by South Korea and even Taiwan in building new and more weapons? Likewise, given the memories, who could doubt that such a scenario increases the risks of a nuclear war somewhere in the region? By comparison, the old Cold War world, where there were only two armed camps, would look like kid stuff.

US-ROK Alliance Good – Deters NK

US presence is key to checking an aggressive North Korea.

Boot 10 (Max Boot, Council on Foreign Relations, May 31, “America is still the best guarantor of freedom and prosperity”)km

In justifying his reversal, Hatoyama said that "we cannot afford to reduce the U.S. military deterrence" because of "political uncertainties remaining in East Asia." There is no shortage of such uncertainties with the Chinese navy becoming increasingly assertive in moving into Japanese waters and with North Korea, which has missiles that can easily hit Japan, sinking a South Korean naval ship with the loss of 46 sailors. The latter incident naturally has focused attention in Seoul and served to accelerate the reaffirmation of close American-Korean ties that had already begun with the election of the more conservative President Lee Myung-bak in 2008. The anti-Americanism that had been prevalent in South Korea only a few years ago has all but disappeared, and it is not only (or even mainly) because of President Obama's vaunted charm. It is largely because South Korea has tried detente and found that it did nothing to moderate the aggressive behavior of the North Korean regime. China is South Korea's largest trade partner by far, but Beijing shows scant interest in reining in Kim Jong Il. The greatest fear of Chinese leaders is that North Korea will collapse, leading to a horde of refugees moving north and, eventually, the creation an American-allied regime on the Yalu River. Rather than risk this strategic calamity, China continues to prop up the crazy North Korean communists — to the growing consternation of South Koreans, who can never forget that Seoul, a city of 15 million people, is within range of what the top U.S. commander in South Korea describes as the world's largest concentration of artillery. South Korea knows that only the U.S. offers the deterrence needed to keep a nuclear-armed North Korea in check. That is why the South Koreans, who have one of the world's largest militaries (655,000 activity-duty personnel), are eager to host 28,000 American troops in perpetuity and even to hand over their military forces in wartime to the command of an American four-star general. Under an agreement negotiated during the Bush administration, operational control is due to revert to the South Koreans in 2012, but senior members of the government and military told us they want to push that date back by a number of years. South Korea's eagerness to continue subordinating its armed forces to American control is the ultimate vote of confidence in American leadership. What other country would the South Koreans possibly entrust with the very core of their national existence? Not China, that's for sure.

Appeasing North Korea is bad – makes the US look weak and gives Korea freedom to expand nuclear weapons.

Phillips 9 (Melanie Phillips 27TH MAY 2009, Spectator contributor, “The fruits of appeasement”)km

So now we can see once again the fruits of appeasement. North Korea has tested a second set of nuclear bombs and the west throws up its hands in horror. What did it expect? Once the Bush administration cravenly decided to give up on North Korea (following the similarly short-sighted approach taken by Bill Clinton), Kim Jong-il duly took the opportunity to press full steam ahead with his nuclear programme. Now the same ‘new realists’ who came to power at the tail-end of the Bush presidency and decided to ‘live with’ a North Korean bomb – just as they have apparently decided the US could ‘live with’ an Iranian bomb – are serving in the Obama administration, which of course has taken such imbecility to unprecedented depths. Obama has been abasing himself to every despot on the planet, proclaiming America’s weakness through his ‘hand of friendship’ and infantile belief that talking to tyrants is the route to peace. The result of such epic cringing is two fingers from North Korea, with yet further threats today. Iran in particular will now be watching intently to see whether America will once again display weakness and impotence; if the US won’t even act to stop North Korea from going nuclear, Iran will be reinforced in its belief that it can develop its own nuclear weapons with impunity. So far, Obama has ‘rushed out a special statement’ in which he said ‘I strongly condemn [North Korea’s] reckless action’ and promised to ‘redouble’ America’s efforts to stop Pyongyang from acquiring nuclear weapons. Well, that will have them quaking in their boots, for sure. Redoubling weakness simply results in twice as much weakness. As John Bolton commented a week ago -- correctly predicting the second North Korean test – following remarks by Stephen Bosworth, the US special envoy to the region: Despite Pyongyang’s aggression, Mr. Bosworth has reiterated that the U.S. is ‘committed to dialogue’ and is ‘obviously interested in returning to a negotiating table as soon as we can.’ This is precisely what the North wants: America in a conciliatory mode, eager to bargain, just as Mr. Bush was after the 2006 test. If the next nuclear explosion doesn't derail the six-party talks, Kim will rightly conclude that he faces no real danger of ever having to dismantle his weapons program. North Korea is a mysterious place, but there is no mystery about its foreign-policy tactics: They work.

US-ROK Alliance Good – Deters NK

US-Korea alliance good – it’s key to stopping prolif of North Korean nuclear weapons and regional stability.

Pritchard et. al. 09 (“A New Chapter for U.S.-South Korea Alliance” Charles Pritchard, Korea Economic Institute, John H. Tilelli Jr., Cypress International, Scott A. Snyder, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korea Studies June 16, 2009)

 By conducting a second nuclear test in May, followed by a number of missile launches, North Korea has forced its way onto the Obama administration's agenda. First and foremost, effective U.S.-South Korea alliance coordination is critical to managing both the global effects of North Korea's nuclear threat on the nonproliferation regime and the regional security challenges posed by potential regime actions that lead to further crisis in the region. North Korea's internal focus on its leadership succession, and the apparent naming of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's little-known and inexperienced youngest son as his successor, make the task of responding to North Korea's aggressive and destabilizing actions all the more challenging. Both deterrence and negotiation must be pursued on the basis of close consultations. Presidents Obama and Lee must also develop coordinated contingency plans in the event of internal instability in North Korea. Through effective U.S.-South Korea alliance coordination, it should be possible to forge a combined strategy capable of managing the nuclear, proliferation, and regional security dimensions of North Korea's threat. A coordinated position would also strengthen the administration's hand in its efforts to persuade China to put pressure on North Korea.

\*\*\*North Korea Advantage\*\*\*

Conflict Uniqueness Frontline

Conflict won’t escalate – It’s all hype, China deters, and economic sanctions all prevent war

Mottram 5/25 (Linda, Austrailian Broadcasting Corporation Reporter, "North is bluffing says South Korea's ambassador to Australia," http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/asiapac/stories/201005/s2909210.htm, 6/5/10) jl

South Korea's ambassador to Australia Woosang Kim says North Korea is bluffing and that current tensions on the peninsula won't escalate to military action.
The Ambassador also says he's confident North Korea's main international backer, China, will play it's part to calm the crisis. As he spoke in Canberra, Beijing's special representative for Korean affairs was meeting South Korea's foreign minister as part of Seoul's diplomatic push to secure international support. The push comes after the South announced it was cutting trade and other contacts and barring the North's merchant ships from using it's sea lanes over the finding that a North Korean submarine torpedoed and sank a South Korean ship in March, killing 46. Seoul is also referring the issue to the United Nations Security Council -- and that's where China's veto could either make or break a push for new sanctions against the North.

It’s a bluff – Recent military actions are non-threatening

Doms 6/2 (Nick, Huliq News, "North Korea's all-out-war is bluff says US Intel." http://www.huliq.com/9990/north-korea-all-out-war-bluff-says-us-intel, AD: 6/4/10) jl

US Intel calls North Korea’s “all out war” a bluff even though Pyongyang ordered 50,000 Special Forces to the demilitarized zone earlier this month. Such movements are usual and not viewed as an imminent threat, according to Declassified Intel sources.

North Korea threatened to meet confrontation with confrontation yesterday and has since scrapped its 2004 pact with South Korea, aimed to avoid accidental naval clashes over a much disputed maritime border between the two countries.

Their brinks are lies – recent attacks are negligible compared to conflict during the last five decades.

The Daily Reckoning 6/2 (People Powered News, "Never Mind the North Koreans," http://beforeitsnews.com/news/71/449/Never\_Mind\_the\_North\_Koreans.html, AD: 5/4/10) jl

There has been a lot of hype surrounding the little peninsula of Korea lately. As you’re no doubt aware, an international commission recently determined that a North Korean torpedo destroyed a South Korean Cheonan battleship.

Markets are a bit spooked and the press is eating up daily comments from Asian leaders and US representatives – as well as denials by North Korea and calls for calm from China’s officials. President Myung Bak Lee has denounced the North’s actions with hostility, demanding an immediate and sincere apology. But UN officials aren’t holding their breath. The confrontation has a lot of investors and traders second-guessing whether or not war is imminent, hurting an economy that is on the rise.

But contrary to popular belief, there isn’t much to be concerned about.

First and foremost, the recent events are not the worst that we have seen between the two nations in the last five decades. That’s not to downplay the tragedy, but it is just the continuation of a civil feud between these two nations. Remember, the Korean War itself isn’t fully resolved – North Korea simply signed an armistice in July 1953, but there was no formal surrender. And it seems like every few years North Korea finds a way to rattle its neighbors. About four years ago North Korea got their hands on long-range missiles. Test firing them over the Sea of Japan, the North Korean government received warnings from leaders of both Japan and South Korea as well as glares from the United States and other nations. Ultimately, the incident was resolved and things went back to the way they were. A whole lot of nothing.

Conflict Uniqueness Frontline

No war – North Korea is all talk

The Daily Reckoning 6/2 (People Powered News, "Never Mind the North Koreans," http://beforeitsnews.com/news/71/449/Never\_Mind\_the\_North\_Koreans.html, AD: 5/4/10) jl

So, yes, North Korea can expel South Korean workers from the shared Gaesong factory complex and vow tactical retaliation for the loudspeakers at the border playing South Korean propaganda. Additionally, the United States can condemn the actions of the North, calling for unequivocal support for the South and UN sanctions against North Korea.

We have been here before, and will likely be here again as long as the Peninsula remains divided.

In other words, speculators shouldn’t be hesitant. South Korea still offers great underlying fundamentals. When things die down, markets will revert back to demanding currencies with riskier profiles and realize that the news of North Korea didn’t matter.

It’s all empty threats – current economic sanctions deter

Markham 5/21 (Jason, B.A. In religious Studies, "Attack by North Korea Raises Regional Tensions," http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/5406958/attack\_by\_north\_korea\_raises\_regional.html?cat=9, AD: 6/4/10) jl

The international investigation of a sunken South Korean warship confirmed the country's accusations that it was destroyed by a torpedo fired from a North Korean submarine. This startling revelation disproved previous suggestions that she ship might have simply run into a mine left over from the war. The attack killed 46 sailors and heightened tensions between the two countries, which the [BBC](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/asia_pacific/10131683.stm) says are still officially at war¹. The U.S., Australia, Britain, and Japan condemned North Korea. China, the North's primary ally, expressed reservations about the validity of the investigation's results and refrained from chastising [North Korea](http://www.associatedcontent.com/topic/9441/north_korea.html) which maintains that it did nothing, according to the BBC¹.
For the most part, South Korean allies such as the United States have expressed in characteristically vague terms the type of retaliation they would be willing to make, which leaves the future uncertain. Only straightforward responses have been given by allies. As Reuters reports, The United States said it would defend [South Korea](http://www.associatedcontent.com/theme/643/south_korea.html) against any military assaults by North Korea². Japan declared it would support a UN resolution against North Korea¹. Should more sanctions be suggested it is unlikely that they would result in further military strikes by North Korea, as sanctions have already been levied against them time after time. And even though they threatened war, according to Reuters, if sanctions were incurred², they have a history of making threats and then making diplomatic negotiations at the last moment, which suggests that this is also an empty threat. However, it is unlikely that sanctions will occur at all because, as the New York Times reports, China's approval is going to be necessary and they were very hesitant to impose fresh sanctions just last year³.

South Korea’s president has ruled out war as an option

Joshi 6/5 (Vijay, AP Staff Writer, "SKorea's Lee sees no possibility of war with North," http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jFoJSL1TdsqcmxTABYNX3ENr1\_TwD9G4U2G80, AD: 6/5/10) jl

SINGAPORE — South Korea's leader on Saturday ruled out going to war with North Korea, hours after his government asked the United Nations to punish the communist nation over the sinking of a warship.

"There is absolutely no possibility of a full-scale war on the Korean peninsula," President Lee Myung-bak told a group of businesspeople in Singapore. The meeting was closed to the media, and the comments were posted by Lee's spokesman, Park Sun-kyu, on the presidential website.

"But occasionally, there has been locally peace-threatening behavior" from North Korea, Lee said, adding that "we will strongly suppress it." He did not elaborate.

Conflict Uniqueness Frontline

No conflict – no will, and South Korea will deter

Park 6/5 (Sungwoo, Business Week Writer, "South Korean President Lee Says No Possibility of War (Update2)," http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-05/south-korean-president-lee-says-no-possibility-of-war-update2-.html, AD: 6/5/10) jl

June 5 (Bloomberg) -- South Korean President Lee Myung Bak discounted the possibility of war on the Korean peninsula today, amid tension escalated by the sinking of a South Korean warship.

Lee sought to ease concern that developments since the March sinking might threaten peace on the Korean Peninsula, as he urged further investment in his nation’s economy during a meeting with businessmen in Singapore, according to a statement posted on the presidential website today.

An international panel last month blamed North Korea for sinking the ship, prompting Kim Jong Il’s regime to cut all ties with the South and threaten “all-out war.” South Korea’s UN ambassador, Park In-Kook, asked the United Nations Security Council yesterday to “consider” the attack and respond in a “appropriate” manner to deter further North Korean assaults.

“Issues between South and North Korea must be resolved, but it is clearly not an easy task,” Lee was quoted as saying in the statement. “There is no possibility of a full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula. Occasionally, there has been locally peace-threatening behavior, and we’ll strongly suppress that.”

A planned naval exercise between the U.S. and South Korea in the Yellow Sea next week will be delayed, the Korea Times newspaper reported today, citing a spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense. The U.S. commitment to South Korea’s security is “rock solid,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in Seoul last month.

No Conflict – Deterrence

No war – Nuclear Deterrence

Wahab 10 (Zakaria Abdul, Writer for Bernama, "South Korea, Us, To Act Further Over North Korea's Sinking Of Warship," 6/5, http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v5/newsgeneral.php?id=503722, AD: 6/5/10) jl

"North Korea must cease its belligerent behaviour and demonstrate clearly and decisively that it wants to pursue a different path," he said.
The US defence secretary said the nations of this region shared the task of addressing these dangerous provocations as any inaction would amount to an abdication of their collective responsibility to protect the peace and reinforce stability in Asia.

Gates said that though it was a Pacific nation, the US believed that its security interests and economic well-being were integrally tied to Asia's, and it was increasing its deterrent capabilities in a number of ways to protect the region.
Gates said the US would enhance its missile defences with the intent to develop capabilities in Asia that were flexible and deployable, tailored to the unique needs of its allies and partners and able to counter the clear and growing ballistic missile threats in the region.
He said the US was also renewing its commitment to a strong and effective extended deterrence that would guarantee the safety of the American people and the defence of its allies and partners.
He said the US was committed to reducing the role of nuclear weapons as it worked toward a world without such armaments, but, as long as these weapons existed, it would maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.
Gates also said that the US would continue to maintain its substantial forces in the region as a show of strength of US commitment and as a deterrent power.

No Conflict – Economic Sanctions

Economic sanctions have killed the chances for conflict – North Korea is too instable

Pei 10 (Minxin, Professor of Government at Claremont McKenna College and adjunct senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment., 5/12, "Get ready for DPRK collapse," http://the-diplomat.com/2010/05/12/get-ready-for-dprk-collapse/, AD: 6/4/10) jl

Judging by recent developments inside North Korea, however, clinging on to its nukes may not actually help prolong Kim Jong-il’s regime. The country’s unfolding economic catastrophe has clearly taken a toll on the regime’s legitimacy and durability—only the most desperate governments in history have resorted to outright confiscation of its people’s money. Seasoned analysts have also reported rising popular resentment against Pyongyang. Thanks to the sanctions imposed by the United Nations and other efforts to weaken Kim Jong-il’s regime, North Korea has failed to blackmail the international community into supplying more economic assistance.

More importantly, the Kim Jong-il regime, which has become a classic family dictatorship, is about to face its most difficult test of survival: succession. Stricken by a stroke not too long ago, Kim Jong-il is in frail health and his hold on power is certain to weaken. He appears desperate to install his 27-year old son, Kim Jong-un, as his successor. Unfortunately for the Kim dynasty, this process is likely to end in failure. A review of transfers of power in modern family dictatorships (excluding traditional monarchies) shows that the chances of a successful succession from the first-generation dictator to his son are roughly one in four, and no grandson of a first-generation dictator has ever succeeded in taking over a regime and consolidating his power.

Of course, the Kim dynasty may set a precedent. But given the worsening economy, the inexperience of the putative successor and the unknown reliability of the Korean military and security forces in the event of Kim Jong-il’s death, the rest of East Asia should be prepared for a scenario of rapid collapse in North Korea.

No Conflict – NK Economy

North Korea’s economy is terrible – it poses no threat, even though people fear it.

Paal 09 (Douglas H., vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “North Korea Poses No Real Threat to the World”)

Q: Do you think North Korea poses a real threat or is it just a political game that they are playing? A: I am a little different from some observers, because I think the threat is very small. North Korea lacks the industrial capacity to build large numbers of long-ranged missiles. They will not be able to build so many weapons as to become a strategic factor in the region. But I have to acknowledge that they do pose a threat to South Korea both through short-range missiles, and the possibility of using the nuclear weapons in the South, even though there are just a few, or artillery from the North to the South. That would be the end of the North regime if they were to attack the South, but they still have that capacity. Moreover, they may force the Japanese to reconsider their very modest defense program. The Japanese have the capacity to move to a nuclear weapon, I do not think they will, but they certainly can. Certainly, politically Japan will debate whether or not move to a nuclear weapon in the short term because of this development in North Korea. And they do feel threatened by the North Korean short-ranged missiles and nuclear weapon. But as I said, North Korea is an industrial midget and not really in a position to pose a large-scale threat to the neighborhood.

The North Korean threat is a myth - they haven’t the resources to do anything considered a threat.

**Paul 09 (Ron, Texas Republican Congressman, http://www.ronpaul.com/2009-04-06/ron-paul-north-korea-is-not-a-threat-to-the-us/)**

Here it is: The North Koreans, they have a rocket, not an intercontinental ballistic missile. We don’t even know for sure if they have a bomb that they could launch, and we are now wondering, what are we going to do with this country? I mean, they can’t even feed themselves. They do not have a Navy, what kind of an Air Force do they have, and yet it just seems like this is an excuse for the West, and in particular our military-industrial complex to have another excuse to have a massive build up. It just seems so unnecessary. Ironically, it seems like the Chinese had the most measured response as they, “why don’t you just sit back a minute and think about this?” And I think that is what we ought to do. The Koreans are not going to attack us. If they even did have a bomb, even if they made an attempt to do it, I mean, they would be wiped off on the face of the Earth within minutes. It is just preposterous to think that the North Koreans are a threat. I think they are playing cat and mouse. I think they are laughing. I think they love to see us go nuts over this, but what they don’t understand is, they might not realize how much we might overreact, and this whole thing that some of our politicians are saying, “Well, we should have gone in there and bombed that site before the rocket even took off.” But the technology there is so primitive and yet we are at this point of thinking that it is like Pearl Harbor again. Just think, we are concentrating on weapons and weapons are really important.

No Conflict – NK Economy

North Korea’s is impoverished and their weapons are no threat. Multiple warrants prove.

Cirincione 09 (Joseph, president of Ploughshares Fund, “North Korean not a cause for panic”)

(CNN) -- North Korea's thinly disguised missile test violates U.N. resolutions and should be condemned. But it is not a serious threat to the United States, nor does it justify a crash program to deploy an expensive, unproven anti-missile system. North Korea's missile and nuclear capabilities do not add up to a nuclear Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, or ICBM. This third failure to create such a missile in as many attempts since 1998 likely represents the upper limits of what the country can do by stretching and adapting the Scud technology it acquired from the former Soviet Union. This small, impoverished nation would need to make three key additional breakthroughs to turn this launch vehicle into a real nuclear-armed missile capable of reaching the continental United States. First, North Korea has to develop a bigger, longer-range missile. MIT scientist Ted Postol calculates that the failed satellite appeared to weigh 150 to 200 kilograms (330 to 440 pounds) and was intended for a low-Earth orbit about 550 kilometers (340 miles) high. It is puny by world standards By comparison, this Friday a U.S. Air Force Atlas 5 rocket on a routine launch sent a 5,800-kilogram(12,790-pound) satellite into a geostationary orbit roughly 36,000 kilometers (22,370 miles) above the Earth. Size matters. A typical first-generation nuclear warhead weighs about 1,000 kilograms. To threaten California or New York, North Korea needs a much bigger missile that can carry more weight over a longer distance. According to a pre-launch analysis by David Wright of the Union of Concerned Scientists, this kind of rocket might carry a small warhead to parts of Alaska, 6,000 kilometers (3,730 miles) from Pyongyang, but it could not hit Los Angeles, 9,570 kilometers (5,945 miles) away. Building that larger missile would require major advances in metallurgy, rocket engines, guidance and propulsion, and probably foreign assistance. Second, North Korea would have to miniaturize its warhead. The primitive nuclear device tested by North Korea in 2006 is estimated to weigh more than 1,500 kilograms (3,307 pounds). That means North Korea's current nuclear weapons are simply too heavy to be launched by a vehicle similar to the one tested Sunday. Retired Gen. Eugene Habiger, former head of U.S. Strategic Command, has said, "The miniaturization of a nuclear warhead is probably the most significant challenge that any proliferant would have to face." Habiger reminds us that it took the U.S. six to eight years of intensive engineering and testing to get our warheads down to 1000 kilograms (2,205). Third, North Korea would have to develop a re-entry vehicle for its warheads. A warhead returning through the atmosphere to its target must survive extreme conditions. Developing the technology required for this survivability is no small task. It is one thing to test a nuclear weapon in carefully controlled conditions. It is another to build one that can survive the fierce vibrations, G-forces and high temperatures of launch and re-entry into the atmosphere. These are three huge engineering feats and help explain why, as Congressional Research Service expert Steven Hildreth told Congress in 2008, "only five countries [the United States, Soviet Union, China, Britain and France] have demonstrated the ability to develop, test and field ICBMs armed with nuclear warheads." North Korea simply does not have the technical background or institutional capacity to achieve these three breakthroughs anytime soon. Attempting to do so will require years of highly observable flight and explosive tests. It is time to put aside the hype and bring this launch into perspective. North Korea has significant ballistic short-range missile capabilities, perhaps a few crude nuclear weapons, but no demonstrated ability yet to combine the two. The threat from North Korea remains essentially the same as it has been for the last three years. So what to do? Korean expert Leon Sigal said, "The only way to get Pyongyang to stop is to resume negotiations." This is exactly what happened after the failed North Korean missile test in 1998 and the failed test in 2006. In both cases, Presidents Clinton and Bush let the bravado and bluster from the North Koreans die down, and within weeks coaxed them back to negotiations that suspended the programs for years. Recall that North Korea's biggest nuclear advances came from 2001 to 2006 after the Bush administration scuttled the 1994 Agreed Framework and attempted to coerce North Korea into surrender or collapse. Instead, Kim Jong Il restarted his programs, tested more missiles and their first nuclear explosion. North Korea's bluster also failed to overshadow President Obama's breakthrough declaration in Prague, Czech Republic, for global nuclear disarmament. Obama's speech provides the direction needed now. The U.S should rally the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council to condemn this test, then move forward through direct talks and the six-party process to the irreversible dismantlement of the Korean nuclear program as part of the global effort Obama detailed in his Sunday speech. Pulling North Korea from the nuclear brink will be a difficult diplomatic process, but panic does not have a place at the table.

No Conflict – Tech

North Korea’s rockets aren’t worth the clay they’re made of – also Japan’s got them on lock.

Koshoji 09 (Hiroyuki, UPI writer, 5/16, http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Analysis\_North\_Korean\_threat\_to\_Japan\_999.html)

International tensions are mounting as North Korea is suspected of preparing to launch a long-range ballistic missile, believed to be an upgraded version of its Taepodong-2. Experts believe Pyongyang will launch the missile in early April. However, they also say it will not pose a military threat to Japan.

North Korea claims it is preparing to launch not a missile but a communications satellite.

In August 1998 the isolated country fired a three-stage rocket, the Taepodong-1, over Japan and into the Pacific Ocean without warning. U.S. analysts later concluded that the rocket was equipped with a satellite, but it apparently disintegrated in midair when the third stage failed to fire.

North Korea is not an imminent threat – they haven’t the technology to develop significant nukes.

Joyner 09 (James, Managing editor of the Atlantic Council, 5/28, http://www.acus.org/users/james-joyner)

National Security Advisor Jim Jones declared in a speech to the Atlantic Council that the recent testing of a nuclear device and firing of Taepodong missiles by North Korea "are not an imminent threat" to the United States or the regions because "they have a long way to go" in perfecting the technology to weaponize their nukes.  He added, however that "The imminent threat is the proliferation of that type of technology to other countries and potentially terrorist organizations and non-state actors."

North Korea would get smacked down if it were to launch missiles.

Coonan 09 (Irish Times correspondent, 4/6, Lexis)

NORTH KOREA cranked up regional tensions in north Asia yesterday when it carried out its promise to launch a controversial long-range rocket, sending a Taepodong 2 missile over Japan and provoking international condemnation. Washington and its allies in South Korea and Japan said the satellite launch was a cover for a weapons test. The launch will be a major propaganda boost for North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, who is believed to have had a stroke in August. As a publicity stunt, the launch has succeeded in grabbing the world s attention, with the UN Security Council holding an emergency meeting and President Barack Obama describing the launch as provocative . Scientists and technicians of the DPRK [North Korea] have succeeded in putting satellite Kwangmyongsong-2, an experimental communications satellite, into orbit by means of carrier rocket Unha-2 under the state s long-term plan for the development of outer space, ran a report by the North Korean news agency KCNA. Pyongyang said that by launching a satellite it was merely trying to stake its claim in the space race, although there are issues about what a country which cannot feed its own people is doing developing a space programme. The projectile was serenaded into space with a burst of the North s extravagant propaganda on state TV, which said the satellite had immediately begun broadcasting immortal revolutionary paeans to leader Kim Jong Il and his father Kim Il Sung. But Pyongyang s claims that it had successfully sent a satellite into orbit were disputed last night by Washington, which said the rocket s cargo had splashed harmlessly into the Pacific Ocean. No object entered orbit and no debris fell on Japan, reported the US Northern Command, adding that it had assessed the missile as not a threat to North America or Hawaii, and took no action in response . The commander of the US Pacific Command had earlier warned he would shoot down the missile if ordered to do so , a threat that Pyongyang said would be an act of war .

\*\*\*Japan Advantage\*\*\*

Status Quo Solves – Power Projection

The Japanese SDF has greater power projection than ever before and is even on par with China.

Hughes 9 (Christopher W., Senior Research Fellow and Deputy Director at the CSGR with PhD from Sheffield, “Japan’s Military Modernisation: A Quiet Japan–China Arms Race and Global Power Projection”, Asia Pacific Review, Vol. 16, No.1, 2009, accessed on EBSCO, AD: 6/4/10, jm)

Japan’s strategic environment has dictated that it continues to pursue the long-term modernisation of its military forces. Japan has had to make tough decisions about new procurements in the context of a constrained defence budget, in some cases delaying or rolling over procurements. Nevertheless, Japan has succeeded in significantly pushing forward its defensive and potentially even offensive power projection capabilities since the 2004 NDPG. Japan is remodelling a more mobile GSDF, an ASDF with greater regional and global reach, and an MSDF with amphibious and carrier technologies. Japan is moving steadily forward with the deployment of BMD and new space technologies, and the JCG is expanding its capabilities and the range of its missions. Japan is in many cases engaged in something of a quiet arms race with China: matching Chinese growing air power with its own enhanced air defensive power, countering Chinese growing blue-water naval ambitions with its own more capable anti-submarine and carrier assets, and attempting to nullify Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles. Japan’s procurement programmes are simultaneously designed to provide the types of capabilities that slot well into the necessary inventories for participation in US-led coalitions.

Status Quo Solves – Power Projection

Japan is in the process of gearing up their SDF with the best in military technology – that’s key to power projection.

Hughes 9 (Christopher W., Senior Research Fellow and Deputy Director at the CSGR with PhD from Sheffield, “Japan’s Military Modernisation: A Quiet Japan–China Arms Race and Global Power Projection”, Asia Pacific Review, Vol. 16, No.1, 2009, accessed on EBSCO, AD: 6/4/10, jm)

The GSDF, in line with Japan’s intent to build up qualitative capabilities, is seeking to convert itself into a mobile force for overseas operations. The GSDF has continued to introduce the 50-tonne M-90 main battle tank (MBT), and is developing a lighter weight 44-tonne TK-X MBT, more easily transportable within and outside Japan, and designed for anti-guerrilla operations and with armour particularly effective against rocket propelled grenades and improvised explosive devices (IED). The GSDF maintains an interest in acquiring 300- kilometre range shore-to-shore missiles for the defence of off-shore islands, having originally been denied these in the 2004 NDPG. The GSDF was dealt a setback in 2009 with the decision to halt procurement of the AH64D Apache Longbow attack helicopter at just 10 units, having originally planned to acquire 52 of the aircraft through licensed production. However, the JMOD was forced to curtail orders due to the rising unit costs associated with licensed production, and instead may opt for upgrading its existing AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters or to develop an attack version of its OH-1. However, the GSDF’s power projection ambitions continue to be demonstrated by its procurement of CH-47JA transport helicopters, and the provision within the 2009 defence budget of additional ballistic protection for these helicopters. Japan appears to be following the example of states such as the UK which have added armour to their Chinook helicopters to cope with conditions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and thus is preparing the option of despatch to such theatres if necessary. The GSDF established a Central Readiness Group (CRG) in 2007, combining the elite 1st Airborne Brigade; 1st Helicopter Brigade; 101st NBC Unit; and Special Operations Group (SOG). The CRG represents a new innovation for Japan, aiming to function as a rapid reaction force for coordinating nationwide mobile operations, responding to domestic terrorism, guerrilla incursions, nuclear, biological and chemical warfare, and for training personnel for overseas despatch. Japan’s establishment of SOG in 2004 also represents a new interest in special forces with the SOG’s balaclava-clad personnel parading publicly during the ceremony for the establishment of the CRG in 2007. ASDF power projection capabilities have been strengthened in recent years through the procurement of the F-2 fighter-bomber (although in smaller numbers than originally hoped for), and through gaining for the first time an inflight refuelling capability with the procurement of four KC767 tanker aircraft (the first delivered in February 2008). The ASDF is also upgrading its E-767 AWACS radar to improve capabilities to counter cruise missiles.

Status Quo Solves – Power Projection

The SDF is prepared for regional and international operations.

Hughes 9 (Christopher W., Senior Research Fellow and Deputy Director at the CSGR with PhD from Sheffield, “Japan’s Military Modernisation: A Quiet Japan–China Arms Race and Global Power Projection”, Asia Pacific Review, Vol. 16, No.1, 2009, accessed on EBSCO, AD: 6/4/10, jm)

The ASDF is further seeking to augment its power projection capabilities with an indigenously produced C-X replacement for its C-1 transports, providing an increased 6,000 kilometre range and broadened fuselage for a 26 ton payload which will serve as the principal means of air transport for a GSDF rapid reaction force to regional contingencies and beyond. However, the JMOD chose not to request the immediate procurement of the C-X in the 2009 defence budget, choosing instead to divert funds to the immediate upgrades of the F-15s. MSDF power projection capabilities have been boosted by the procurement of three O¯ sumi-class transport ships, with flat decks for the landing of transport helicopters and an integral rear dock for the operation of hovercraft capable of landing tanks. The MSDF justifies these ships as necessary for GSDF UNPKO and other “international operations in support of peace,” and two of the class have already been deployed to East Timor, Iraq, and to Sumatra during the 2003–2004 Asian tsunami humanitarian operations.

Status Quo Solves – U.S/Japan Alliance

The U.S/Japan alliance in the status quo is sufficient to solve.

Hughes 9 (Christopher W., Senior Research Fellow and Deputy Director at the CSGR with PhD from Sheffield, “Japan’s Military Modernisation: A Quiet Japan–China Arms Race and Global Power Projection”, Asia Pacific Review, Vol. 16, No.1, 2009, accessed on EBSCO, AD: 6/4/10, jm)

Japan’s ongoing process of military modernisation and power projection has thus not been halted by budget constraints nor by political machinations in recent years, and demonstrates that Japan’s proactivism in security has certainly not ground to a halt post-Koizumi. Japan has not retreated into its security shell, but is actually engaged in a long term programme to acquire the types of capabilities that will allow it an expanded role in international security. In this sense, Japan’s security policy, viewed in conjunction with other key developments such as civilian control, defence production, the US–Japan alliance, and shifts in anti-militaristic norms, has not hit the buffers in recent years, and, even if less spectacular after Koizumi, continues on its gradual trajectory of “normalisation” under his successors.22

Status Quo Solves – Independent SDF

Japan has an independent SDF now.

KNS 9 (Korea News Service, state news agency, “Minju Joson Assails Dangerous Military Exercise of Japan SDF”, Feb 4, 2009, [<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/japan/2009/japan-090204-kcna01.htm>] AD: 6/4/10, jm)

Pyongyang, February 4 (KCNA) -- The "first airborne unit" of the Ground "Self-Defence Force" of [Japan](http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/japan/2009/japan-090204-kcna01.htm##) recently staged a parachuting exercise within the framework of a [military](http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/japan/2009/japan-090204-kcna01.htm##) operation aimed at harassing the rear, supported by helicopter gun ships in a military drill ground in Narashino, Chiba Prefecture, Japan. Minju Joson Wednesday observes in a signed commentary in this regard: The fact that the SDF which claims self-"defence" is its basic mission staged a madcap mobile exercise of its "airborne unit" for the purpose of striking the rear of its "enemy" from the outset of the new year proves that the SDF's basic mission is not defence but a preemptive attack. The moves for "coping with contingency" touted by the Japanese reactionaries are nothing but sophism intended to justify their moves to convert Japan into a military giant and launch overseas aggression, the commentary notes, and goes on: The moves stepped up by the Japanese reactionaries to revise "defense program guidelines" and militarize space, etc. in real earnest from the outset of the year clearly prove the danger of their moves to turn Japan into a military power in order to launch reinvasion. It is the invariable wild ambition and strategic goal of the Japanese reactionaries to perpetrate overseas aggression. They have become evermore undisguised in their moves to realize overseas expansion and turn Japan into a military giant in order to launch reinvasion. These developments are seriously jeopardizing the peace and security in Northeast Asia, rendering the situation there tense and creating the danger of sparking a new arms race in this region. The above-said hysteria of the Japanese reactionaries reminds one of a tiger-moth flying into flames. They would be well advised to bear in mind that their reckless moves to convert Japan into a military power and start reinvasion would only lead them to destruction and stop at once their moves for overseas expansion.

Impact is non-unique – Japan already has the capabilities to defend itself.

Tisdall 10 (“Japan is ready for North Korea” Simon Tisdall, 1 March 2010, Guardian Contributor)

Japanese politicians and their US military allies tend to soft-pedal problems with Pyongyang, stressing the need to resume the diplomatic process broken off last year. But no one at Iruma has forgotten the moment last April when North Korea lofted a TaepoDong-2 long range ballistic missile over Japan, sending it crashing into the Pacific – or the North's second nuclear test explosion the following month. "If an enemy dares to attack us, that's lucky for us," an unsmiling Taniguchi said. "Once they are within range, it is our opportunity, not theirs." Taniguchi's confidence in Japan's ability to defend itself rests on the weapons under his command – an American designed, Japanese built Patriot PAC-3 missile battery, attached to one of the six ballistic missile defence (BMD) groups girdling the country since 2007. The innocuous-looking, green-painted oblong canisters contain four Patriot missiles each. Mounted on trucks, pointing skywards, and electronically linked to six naval destroyers equipped with Aegis phased array radar, they mark the Japan Self-Defence Force's first foray into BMD. The full deployment will be completed this year. This is the type of defensive missile system the Obama administration plans to introduce in eastern Europe. It is also similar to the missiles the US has controversially agreed to sell to Taiwan, to help counter the growing threat from China. Under Article 9 of its postwar constitution, Japan renounced "forever" the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. But the 1960 US-Japan security treaty made clear that Tokyo has a right to self-defence.

Solvency – Alliance Impossible

Alt. cause and turn – failure in the Japanese government makes a more equal alliance with Japan is impossible and even if it did work would force Japan to rearm.

Kakuchi 10 (“Japan-U.S. Pact Crucial to Balance of Power in East Asia” Suvendrini Kakuchi Inter Press Service June 2, 2010)

Professor Masao Okonogi, an expert on the Korean peninsula, said the ongoing political crisis has turned the spotlight once again on the future of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which has long been a thorny issue on the domestic front and a relentless quagmire for Japanese governments. “Any attempt to change the bilateral military alliance, which the Japanese public thinks is unfair, signals a treacherous path for governments as you can see from what is happening now,” he said. The Japan-U.S. military alliance allows Japan to defend itself from foreign invasion but prevents it from participating in an attack. In addition, Japan is host to the largest number of U.S. military and naval bases in Asia, where they are heavily involved in U.S.-led wars in the region. Japan’s defence policy views the Treaty as crucial to efforts to forestall threats posed by North Korea and China, which are seen as potential dangers to Japan’s national security. But China and North Korea view the military pact between Japan and the United States as a throwback to Cold War diplomacy. Analysts say any hopes the Japanese public may have had to push for a more equal military alliance with Washington have been dashed as tensions grow and the lack of leadership on the domestic front leaves little room for meaningful negotiation. Professor Akira Kato, an international politics expert at Obirin University, said an equal alliance with the United States would mean allowing Japan to rearm itself. Japan has a formidable Self Defence Force (SDF) that cannot be officially named a military under its postwar pacifist Constitution.

Japan Rearmament DA - Links

Japan fears U.S. abandonment – it’s its primary security threat.

Hughes 9 (Christopher W., Senior Research Fellow and Deputy Director at the CSGR with PhD from Sheffield, “SUPER-SIZING” THE DPRK THREAT: Japan’s Evolving Military Posture and North Korea”, 2009, [<http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1015/1/WRAP_Hughes_9871481-080709-super-sizing_the_dprk_threat_wrap.pdf>] AD: 6/4/10, jm)

Firstly, Japan certainly faces a growing degree of existential military threats and legitimate security concerns from the North’s missile and nuclear capabilities. But, secondly, for Japan this threat is unduly accentuated by the fact that the North has repeatedly exerted an alliance political-military threat to the solidarity of the US-Japan alliance, thus threatening to undermine the very foundation of Japan’s post-war security policy. As explained in later sections, North Korea has shown itself adept at generating for Japan alliance dilemmas of entrapment and particularly abandonment by generating and exploiting differences of threat 3 perception between the bilateral allies.4 In instances of feared entrapment, Japan has moved to to strengthen its autonomous defense options. Japan’s principal concerns of abandonment, however, have necessitated moves on its part to shore up political confidence in US-Japan bilateral security ties by indicating that it is prepared to undertake additional alliance commitments. In certain cases these alliance commitments are designed to directly counter the threat from North Korea. But in others they are designed to demonstrate a willingness to support the US in dealing with other regional and global contingencies that are of greater importance to the US than Japan, in the hope that this will ensure US reciprocation to support Japan against North Korea. Japan’s motivations to support the US-led “war on terror” through the dispatch of the JSDF to Iraq between 2004-2006, and to thus take on a greater global security role, as will be argued below, can in large part be interpreted in the light of the need to strengthen alliance solidarity to respond to North Korea.5

Japan Rearmament DA - Links

The U.S deters North Korea in the ROK and contributes to a Japanese feeling of security.

Dujarric 4 (Robert, Director of the Institute of Contemporary Japanese Studies (ICJS) @ Temple University, “Japan's Security Needs U.S. Troops in S. Korea”, July 12, 2004 [<http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/papers/contribution/dujarric/02.html>] AD: 6/4/10, jm)

All of these developments will have negative consequences for Japan. Although Tokyo contributes to South Korean stability through non-military means by maintaining the Self-Defense Forces and hosting U.S. troops in Japan, it relies to a considerable extent on the United States to maintain military stability in South Korea.

Japan's interests go beyond just preventing North Korea from attacking. They include keeping South Korea within the U.S.-Japan orbit-as a partner, not satellite-and insuring that when unification takes place, the entire peninsula remains aligned with Japan and the United States.

How can Japan deal with this possible threat to Japanese interests?

American policy-makers should realize how important the U.S. ground presence in South Korea is to Japan. The current administration has not been responsive to the needs of its allies, but this may change as the failure of the invasion of Iraq becomes more obvious. Convince policymakers

Moreover, the deployment of U.S. forces in South Korea is not an immediate issue. It is one that will develop over years, probably into the next administration, and Japan's government and politicians can start a discussion on this issue not only with the highest levels of the U.S. government but also with senators, congressmen, congressional staffers, and military analysts, who play a role in formulating policy.

In doing so, they should aim to convince American policy-makers that it is essential for security in Asia-a region that generates over $7 trillion a year in combined GDPs and whose trade and investment enriches the United States-that the United States maintain a large presence on the Korean Peninsula.

Japan Rearmament DA –Internal Links

With the U.S out of the picture, the threat from North Korea will cause rearmament.

Hughes 7 (Llewelyn, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs @ The Elliot School of International Affairs with a PhD from MIT, “Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet),” [International Security](http://www.belfercenter.org/is/), Volume 31, Issue 4, pages 67-96, Spring 2007, accessed on EBSCO, AD: 6/4/10, jm)

Recent changes in the East Asian and international security environment have renewed speculation, primarily outside Japan, that Japan may choose to guarantee its security by developing an independent nuclear deterrent.16 First, the spinning away of North Korea from the orbit of the former Soviet Union has caused it to emerge as a threat to Japanese security. North Korea is in the process of developing a deliverable nuclear device. It tested a ballistic missile over Japanese airspace in 1998 and carried out further missile tests in the Japan Sea in July 2006. In addition, North Korea has withdrawn from the NPT, and on October 9, 2006, it carried out a low-yield nuclear test. Further, North Korea appears to harbor aggressive intentions toward Japan, issuing bellicose statements threatening to turn it into a “nuclear sea of ªre.”17 A major diplomatic initiative designed to halt North Korea’s nuclear weapons program—the sixparty talks involving North and South Korea, the United States, Japan, Russia, and China—has thus far failed to achieve its goal.

Without the U.S, Japan rearms.

DeFilippo 2 (Anthony, professor of Sociology @ Lincoln University, “The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement: Competing Security Transitions in A Changing International Environment,” 2002, jm)

Reminiscent of the Cold War, the most commonly used justification for the continuation of the bilateral security alliance is that instability still exists in the Asia-Pacific region. Today, Washington and Tokyo identify North Korea and China as the principal sources of potential instability in the region." The justification for the existence of the alliance is that it provides some assurance to Japan that it will not have to contend alone with foreign threats that jeopardize its national security. More- over, it is often said that Japan’s neighbors would be enormously uneasy if the bilateral security alliance did not exist, for, sans the U.S. restraint, they would fear impending Japanese rearmament. After weaving together these diverse threads, observers typically draw the specious conclusion that the U.S.-Japan security alliance is necessary to stabilize the Asia- Pacific region.

Japan Rearmament DA –Internal Links

Even waning support from the U.S would trigger nuclear rearmament.

Schell 7 (Jonathan, visiting fellow @ Yale University, “The Seventh Decade: The New Shape of Nuclear Danger,” 2007, accessed on Google Books, AD: 6/4/10, jm)

After China’s test, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato informed President Lyndon Johnson that he thought Japan, too, should have nuclear weapons. In 1968, he subordinated the Three Non-Nuclear Principles to a Four Pillars Nuclear Policy. The third of the pillars was reliance on American nuclear deterrence against nuclear attack, thus conditioning the Three Principles on a continuation of America’s extended deterrence. It followed that if the American assurance were ever withdrawn or seemed shaky, Japan might have no choice but to go nuclear. In other words, Japan’s leaders left their nuclear option open. Like Germany, Japan had signed the NPT only after it had received assurances from the United States that its right to nuclear power technology, including the full fuel cycle, would be respected. Today, Japan possesses more than two hundred tons of plutonium, enough for more than five thousand weapons. If it chooses to make nuclear weapons, it surely can do so in a matter of months at most.

Japan Rearmament DA – Impact (Arms Race)

Japanese rearmament leads to a destabilizing arms race.

Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin 9 (Emma, specialist in Asian affairs, and Mary Beth, analyst in non-proliferation, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S Interests,” CRS Report for Congress, February 19, 2009, [<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf>] AD: 6/4/10, jm)

To many security experts, the most alarming possible consequence of a Japanese decision to develop nuclear weapons would be the development of a regional arms race.33 The fear is based on the belief that a nuclear-armed Japan could compel South Korea to develop its own program; encourage China to increase and/or improve its relatively small arsenal; and possibly inspire Taiwan to pursue nuclear weapons. This in turn might have spill-over effects on the already nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. The prospect—or even reality—of several nuclear states rising in a region that is already rife with historical grievances and contemporary tension could be deeply destabilizing. The counter-argument, made by some security experts, is that nuclear deterrence was stabilizing during the Cold War, and a similar nuclear balance could be achieved in Asia. However, most observers maintain that the risks outweigh potential stabilizing factors.

A nuclear arms race would ensue.

Matsumura 6 (Masahiro, visiting fellow @ the Brookings Institute, “Prudence and Realism in Japan's Nuclear Options,” November 10, 2006 [<http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2006/1110japan_matsumura.aspx>] AD: 6/4/10, jm)

Second, a nuclear Japan would most likely accelerate a regional nuclear arms race which could destabilize the status quo in which Japan prospers. A domino effect would spark arms races between China and India and between India and Pakistan.

Japan Rearmament DA – Impact (NPT Collapse)

Collapses the NPT.

Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin 9 (Emma, specialist in Asian affairs, and Mary Beth, analyst in non-proliferation, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S Interests,” CRS Report for Congress, February 19, 2009, [<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf>] AD: 6/4/10, jm)

Japan’s development of its own nuclear arsenal could also have damaging impact on U.S. nonproliferation policy. It would be more difficult for the United States to convince non-nuclear weapon states to keep their non-nuclear status or to persuade countries such as North Korea to give up their weapons programs. The damage to the NPT as a guarantor of nuclear power for peaceful use and the IAEA as an inspection regime could be irreparable if Japan were to leave or violate the treaty. If a close ally under its nuclear umbrella chose to acquire the bomb, perhaps other countries enjoying a strong bilateral relationship with the United States would be less inhibited in pursuing their own option. It could also undermine confidence in U.S. security guarantees more generally.

Japan is key to the NPT. Violating it collapses the treaty.

Matsumura 6 (Masahiro, visiting fellow @ the Brookings Institute, “Prudence and Realism in Japan's Nuclear Options,” November 10, 2006 [<http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2006/1110japan_matsumura.aspx>] AD: 6/4/10, jm)

Third, Japan's prestige as a champion of nuclear disarmament would be irreversibly tarnished. Encouraged by the U.S. in 1993, then Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa declared that he favored an indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). A nuclear Japan might accelerate the disintegration of the NPT regime, which serves Japan's long-term enlightened interests as a major trading nation that is dependent on global security and stability.

Japan Rearmament DA – NPT Impact – 40 Countries 1/3

Strong NPT prevents runaway proliferation – Over 40 countries could break out

Rublee 8

(Maria, Professor of Government and World Affairs @ University of Tampa, Rost Rublee, “Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness,” International Studies Review, 22 Aug 2008, Volume 10, Issue 3, Pages 420-450WileyInterScience, AD: 2/12/10) jl

However, I would argue that before the United States (or any other country) gives up on the NPT and associated nuclear nonproliferation regime, we should take full account of not only the regime’s failures, but also its successes. Indeed, the success of the NPT is in many ways more surprising than its recent failures: for almost four decades, almost all states in the international system chose to forgo nuclear weapons, and in some cases, even gave them up. Numerous reports in the 1960s warned that the number of new nuclear states could reach as high as 20 in a few decades (The Bomb 1965:53). Instead, the count by 2008 is only four: India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea.2 The fact that so many states abstained from nuclear weapons tells us to look closely at the nuclear nonproliferation regime. What role has it played in encouraging nuclear forbearance? With the risk of nuclear theft or accidents increasing with each new nuclear weapons state, the international community needs all the help it can get in discouraging nuclear proliferation. This is especially important given the growing numbers of ‘‘latent nuclear states,’’ those with the ‘‘necessary industrial infrastructure and scientific expertise to build nuclear weapons on a crash basis if they chose to do so’’ (Sagan 1996:56). In 2004, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimated that over 40 countries were ‘‘nuclear latent states’’. Given the high stakes, we need to better understand how and in what ways the NPT has actually helped discouraged nuclear proliferation. In doing so, we can also understand the mechanisms through which international regimes work to influence policymakers. So what about the NPT—if anything—has led to such a stunning record of nonproliferation? Certainly, a number of authors have tackled the topic of how the NPT contributes to halting nonproliferation. What tends to be missing, however, is a systematic and theoretically grounded way to assess the NPT’s utility. In this article, I propose such a framework, drawing from social psychology. Within the social psychology literature, scholars agree that persuasion and influence happen through distinct, recognizable mechanisms. I argue that the influence of the nuclear nonproliferation regime of state elites could be understood through the lens of social psychology.3 In other words, I propose taking social psychology’s framework for how attitudes and behavior change, and applying it to the NPT. I do so through a three-step process. I first break apart ‘‘nuclear forbearance’’ (or compliance with the NPT) into three different outcomes identified by the social psychology literature: persuasion (behavior resulting from genuine transformation of preferences), social conformity (behavior resulting from the desire to maximize social benefits and ⁄ or minimize social costs, without a change in underlying preferences), and identification (behavior resulting from the desire or habit of following the actions of an important other). Next, I investigate the different mechanisms through which the international social environment exerts influence on policymakers: creating a ‘‘list’’ effect in which those in noncompliance are obviously in a small minority, linking nuclear nonproliferation to other strongly held values, establishing a public record of state commitment which makes it hard for a state to withdraw, and more. Finally, I assess the utility of the framework by examining the case of Japan: to what extent does it help us understand Japanese nuclear decision-making? I conclude with some thoughts on how this framework could be applied in a number of different issue areas in international relations. Because the framework is drawn from social psychology, it should be applicable to more than just nuclear proliferation. To what extent is it useful to understand compliance with international regimes as three different outcomes (persuasion, identification, and conformity)? Do the mechanisms work in other issues areas? Are some mechanisms more potent in specific issue areas, or perhaps in different types of regimes (for example, regimes formalized through treaties, informal regimes, track-two diplomacy, etc.)? While my immediate focus is how this framework helps us to understand nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation, it could provide fertile ground for research across a number of different fields. What is Nuclear Forbearance? Almost all states have both ratified and adhered to the NPT, giving up nuclear weapons and exercising ‘‘nuclear forbearance.’’ One may think that this nuclear forbearance means these states have permanently given up the nuclear option, and if the NPT is weakened, these states’ nuclear decision-making would not change. That would be the case if these states were ‘‘persuaded’’—that is, they have internalized the message of the NPT and no longer need the treaty to exist for them to adhere to its precepts. However, this outcome of ‘‘persuasion’’ is not the only type of nuclear forbearance possible. It could be that the elite are forgoing nuclear weapons due to ‘‘conformity’’—to gain social prestige and ⁄ or avoid social costs. In this case, if the NPT collapsed, the social costs and benefits associated with it may no longer exist, potentially leading to a reassessment of a state’s nuclear posture. Or, leadership could be following the lead of an important ‘‘other’’—the outcome of identification. If the important ‘‘other’’ helped to weaken the NPT, then leadership may no longer be as concerned about adhering to the treaty. While the behavioral outcome is currently the same—nuclear forbearance—the attitude and motivation behind the behavior is not. This unpacking of nuclear forbearance is based on social psychology. Alastair Iain Johnston (2001) has taken the field considerably forward by his identification from the social psychology literature of two methods of behavior change: persuasion and social influence. Johnston argues that in addition to transformation of state interests (persuasion), multilateral institutions can also exert,

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Japan Rearmament DA – NPT Impact – 40 Countries 2/3

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or provide a forum through which members exert, ‘‘social influence’’—essentially, a social version of material carrot-stick factors that states include in cost-benefit calculations. Roughly, ‘‘persuasion’’ can be characterized as ‘‘I now see that X is better than Y’’ and ‘‘social influence’’ can be characterized as ‘‘I think Y is correct (or I like Y better), but since everyone else says X, I will do X so I don’t rock the boat’’ (Johnston 2001). Social rewards for conformance with institutional norms include backpatting; for nonconformance, shaming. Social influence, then, is a cost-benefit calculation made with social factors, whereas persuasion is true preference change (Kelman 1958). This is an important point: constructivists often construe the effect of multilateral institutions as that of changing a state’s conception of its national interest. While that is an important effect to investigate, it is also crucial to recognize that this is not the only ‘‘nonmaterial’’ way through which states’ behavior may change. In other words, it does not have to be all-or-nothing: either states transform their attitudes and behavior (validating constructivism) or they don’t (validating realism). Constructivism allows us to explore ways in which the social milieu created by regimes can influence state behavior without ‘‘converting’’ them. Social conformity is one conceptualization of this influence short of conversion. Another example is the cooperative process documented by Dalia Dassa Kaye (2001) in her study of the Middle East peace process, which she shows to help states gain common understandings without necessarily wholesale transformation of state preferences. Distinguishing between full-fledged persuasion and social conformity is critical to nuclear policymaking. As Ariel Levite (2002) argues, some states that have adhered to the NPT may actually be engaged in ‘‘nuclear hedging’’—that is, not actively engaging in nuclear weapons development but maintaining capacity to develop them quickly if desired. On the surface, what looks like NPT compliance and what seems to indicate persuasion may better be described as social conformity. This paper argues, however, that our model of persuasion and influence needs to be more detailed to provide a robust guide in our exploration. First, instead of the term ‘‘social influence,’’ I propose the use of ‘‘social conformity’’ to signal outward acceptance with private rejection, because in social psychology literature, this is the terminology most often used. Beyond this terminology issue, I argue that, in addition to persuasion and social conformity, we must also include ‘‘identification’’ as a method of behavioral change. Identification takes place when an actor wants to be like another, and so changes his or her actions to mimic those they admire. It can take place when a friend agrees with another friend, not because he has really changed his mind, but because it is important to a significant other. Herbert Kelman (1958:51) defines identification in this way: Identification can be said to occur when an individual accepts influence because he wants to establish or maintain a satisfying self-defining relationship to another person or group. This relationship may take the form of classical identification, in which the individual takes over the role of the other, or it may take the form of a reciprocal role relationship. The individual actually believes in the responses which he adopts through identification, but their specific content is more or less irrelevant. He adopts the induced behavior because it is associated with the desired relationship. Identification falls between outright persuasion (where preferences have changed) and social conformity (where preferences have not changed). In fact, while identification can be an influence outcome between individuals, it is a common result from group membership. Called ‘‘ingroup identification,’’ Marilynn Brewer and R. J. Brown (1998:561) note that ‘‘when a collection of individuals believe that they share a common in-group membership, they are more likely to act in the interest of collective welfare than are individuals in the same situation who do not have a sense of group identity.’’ In contrast to social conformity (which is strategic and motivated by straightforward utility maximization), identification is based on an affective desire to create, maintain, or strengthen a relationship. Why is it important to include identification as a third method of behavioral change? After all, models are theoretical constructs that help us understand reality, not chart it out in full detail. However, mechanisms that produce original policy results should be included in models. That is, if the behavior change mechanism of identification leads to different policy results than persuasion and social influence, then it should be included. A current example from the nonproliferation arena will illustrate. Over the past decade, the United States has backed away from some of its obligations in the nonproliferation regime: a continued push for new nuclear weapons, public declaration of the decision to continue designing and computer-testing new nuclear weapons, and a decision to employ a limited ballistic missile defense system. Some also argue that the Bush administration’s proposed nuclear agreement with India undermines the basis of the NPT by encouraging nuclear trade with a state that refuses to sign the NPT. If an ally of the United States’ (call this state Ally X) had initially followed the United States lead on nuclear nonproliferation due to persuasion, Ally X would remain persuaded, and thus would likely express disappointment, as well as encourage the United States to get back on course. If, however, another ally’s behavior was based on identification with the United States (call this state Ally Y), then which United States would it identify with: the United States of action or rhetoric? Identification is also important because even if the United States works to uphold the nonproliferation regime, the fact that Washington maintains nearly 10,000 nuclear weapons—and almost 60% of them are operational— may send the message that to be powerful, a country needs nuclear armaments (United States Profile 2007). In addition, because in reality states are not unitary actors, the distinctions between persuasion, conformity and identification likely play out in domestic politics. In fact, each of the influence outcomes could be represented by some segment of society interested in nuclear policy. One example would be nongovernmental organization (NGOs) and activists are ‘‘persuaded’’ that nuclear weapons are detrimental to state prestige and identity, policy wonks in the diplomatic core ‘‘identify’’ with their Western allies, and members of the military bow to ‘‘social conformity.’’ In each case, the behavior is the same: nuclear forbearance. The reasons behind the actions are different, however, and material or social changes could lead to behavioral changes. A short narrative of how different domestic factions might play out in Ally X and Ally Y will illustrate. This description is not meant to describe any two countries, but rather simply highlight what differently influenced groups might look like with regard to nuclear policy, and how they might react to US behavior. In the case of Ally X and Ally Y (both confronted by the US’s changing behavior with regard to the nuclear nonproliferation regime), Ally X’s nuclear policy could be supported by a coalition of civil servants in a bureaucracy that has supported the NPT for many years, political appointees who believe in nonproliferation, and

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Japan Rearmament DA – NPT Impact – 40 Countries 2/2

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antinuclear activists with embedded ties to the policymaking apparatus—all of whom are ‘‘persuaded.’’ The United States’ current actions probably would inspire disappointment, resentment, disgust—but a change of heart is not likely because these actors are genuinely persuaded of the merits of nonproliferation. However, other elements in that government and state—those who support nonproliferation because of identification or social conformity—will likely have a different reaction. Those who believe their state should forgo nuclear weapons due to the negative diplomatic effects any other position would have, might rethink their position in light of the US’s stance, as well as the ineffectual response to North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006. In the short run, it is not likely that the state’s behavior would change, but in the long run, those persuaded may change their minds or may lose ground to growing ranks of those who disagree. In the case of Ally Y, where nuclear policy is guided by identification with the United States, confusion is likely to result, based on gap between US rhetoric and actions. How do you behave when the one you have patterned yourself after starts to do something different from what they have said all along? Depending on the strength of the persuaded and conforming segments, and the result of any internal struggle between them, the state could move more definitively against nuclear acquisition or could move toward exploring the nuclear option. In short, understanding that nuclear forbearance is actually the result of three separate attitudes—and that undermining the NPT could undermine commitment to nuclear nonproliferation with two of the three attitudes—leads to the conclusion that undermining the NPT could lead to a wave of nuclear proliferation among states we assumed would never think about the nuclear option again. In other words, the value of the NPT cannot be evaluated without assessing the extent to which it has helped to prevent proliferation. How specifically does the NPT do this? I posit that it has created an international social environment that influences elite decision-making through a number of specific and distinct mechanisms. Without the NPT, those mechanisms fall apart. It is to this social environment and the ‘‘influence’’ mechanisms fostered by it that the papers turns to next.

\*\*\*External Disads\*\*\*

Hegemony DA

Destroys US hegemony

Sung-Jun 8 (Chung, Stratfor Global Intelligence, " South Korea: Imperatives of a U.S. Presence," http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/120083/analysis/south\_korea\_imperatives\_u\_s\_presence, AD: 5/30/10) jl

Ultimately, the peninsula’s artificial divide may become a thing of the past. North-South integration is already [well under way](http://www.stratfor.com/koreas_shifting_stances_and_merging_interests?fn=5012008354). Though the exact nature and timing of reunification remain difficult to envision, a unified Korean Peninsula is unmistakably on the long-range 10-to-25-year horizon. And although a politically unified peninsula would be far more geographically coherent and defensible, Korea will remain overshadowed by the military and economic might of China and Japan. It will continue to try to retain a meaningful U.S. military presence on its territory to discourage adventurism by Beijing and Tokyo, and it will continue to leverage the most advanced U.S. military technology it can get its hands on.

Meanwhile, Washington will continue to face its own geopolitical imperative in the region, which — with the Korean Peninsula in the middle — remains without a coherent center. Under no circumstances can the United States allow China or Japan to absorb Korea. Such an event could radically reshape not just regional dynamics but global dynamics, and it would shift the balance of power in a way that would be difficult to undo. Even a skeleton crew of U.S. military personnel would continue to serve the purposes of Washington and even a unified Korean government — a small price indeed, considering the stakes.

Japan would negatively perceive more troop reductions – gives up leadership to China and ends dependence on US forces.

Sakai 10 (May 24, 2010, Tanaka Sakai “Who Sank the South Korean Warship Cheonan?” writer and editor of Tanaka News)

Following the sinking of the Cheonan, if the US and ROK had announced that the Cheonan was attacked by the North and they would counterattack, the result would have been full-scale war. However, the US military in South Korea is moving toward withdrawal. The command in case of emergencies is scheduled to be transferred from the US to the ROK military in 2012. Moreover, leadership of international politics in the Korean peninsula is in process of transfer from the US to China with the approval of US administrations from Bush to Obama. Within the military-industrial complex centered in the Pentagon, there must be opponents of multipolarization who wish to reverse this. They do not wish to sit back and watch East Asia fall under Chinese hegemony in this manner, with US military withdrawal. They naturally seek to take advantage of the Cheonan incident to induce war between South Korea and North Korea, and, as at the time of the Korean war, develop it into war between the US and China so as to reverse multipolarization in East Asia. Although I may be projecting too far, one may even suspect that they provoked the friendly attack by concealing from the ROK military the underwater navigation of the US submarine around Byaengnyeong Island. If a great war again erupts on the Korean peninsula triggered by the Cheonan Incident, even if Japan does not bribe the US with the “sympathy budget”, the stationing of US forces in Japan would continue, and the US would again view Japan as an unsinkable aircraft carrier. The Japanese economy would thus again benefit from Korean special procurements after sixty years. This would be a desirable outcome for Japanese who favor dependency on the US. However, amidst the strife centered, US multipolarists appear to be stronger than the military-industrial complex (and US-Britain centrists). The result is that the Cheonan Incident has not led to a second US- Korean War. Further, what is regrettable for those in Japan and the ROK who wish to continue dependence on the US, the US has transferred to China the role of mitigating the aggravated North-South relationship.

Hegemony DA

Hegemony is key to preventing great power wars and solves all your terminal impacts

Thayer 6 [Bradley A., Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, Duluth, The National Interest, November -December, "In Defense of Primacy", lexis]

A remarkable fact about international politics today--in a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display--is that countries want to align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes--their own protection, or to gain greater influence. Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America--their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements--and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies. U.S. primacy --and the bandwagoning effect--has also given us extensive influence in international politics , allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States . They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates.The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba--it is an anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations. THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists , most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned --between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with he United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.3 So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third,

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along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy.4 As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides. Fourth and finally, the United States, in seeking primacy, has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War--and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, the U.S. military is the earth's "911 force"--it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra, killing some 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington followed up with a large contribution of aid and deployed the U.S. military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with the aftermath of the disaster. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort. No other force possesses the communications capabilities or global logistical reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces. American generosity has done more to help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg. THERE IS no other state, group of states or international organization that can provide these global benefits. None even comes close. The United Nations cannot because it is riven with conflicts and major cleavages that divide the international body time and again on matters great and trivial. Thus it lacks the ability to speak with one voice on salient issues and to act as a unified force once a decision is reached. The EU has similar problems. Does anyone expect Russia or China to take up these responsibilities? They may have the desire, but they do not have the capabilities. Let's face it: for the time being, American primacy remains humanity's only practical hope of solving the world's ills.

Arms Race DA

US military pullout from Korea creates an arms race in Asia.

Kim 99 (Sung-Han Kim, University of California@San Diego 1999 “U.S. Military Presence in a Unified Korea”)

One common view that seems to be shared by all states in the region is that the security commitment of the United States is the indispensable anchor for East Asian security, insofar as it is conducive to peace and stability as well as to preventing an arms race in the region. There is virtually no country that would not like to see a continued U.S. presence in this region. An abrupt and large-scale American withdrawal would leave a power vacuum that would likely produce intense and destabilizing competition among the regional powers. Japan, which would have no US. security umbrella, inevitably would expand its military forces, which would escalate into an arms race between China and Japan, and also Korea.

\*\*\*North Korea Politics\*\*\*

1NC (1/2)

Regime collapse is evitable – multiple warrants prove.

Ramstad 10 (Evan, Wall Street Journal reporter, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052702304434404575149520133311894.html)

SEOUL—North Korea's authoritarian regime appears to be weakening and the prospect of its collapse is being discussed anew by longtime observers, though there is still a broad debate about when that could happen. The 16-year-old government of dictator Kim Jong Il for years defied outsiders' predictions of collapse, surviving amid debilitating poverty, hunger and external hostility. It has kept North Korea's 24 million citizens isolated and docile by instilling in them fear of extreme punishment, and by controlling information, travel and trade. But new pressures are bringing fresh doubts about the regime's ability to keep going. Those include signs that Mr. Kim is in poor health, and indications that the population is increasingly hungry and restive following the government's failure to deliver basic necessities after it tried to shut down market activities four months ago. Even the information blockade is crumbling. A nascent cellphone industry is making it possible for more North Koreans to talk—and to report on difficulties and unrest—to outsiders, and more DVDs of TV shows and CDs of music from free and prosperous South Korea are smuggled into the country. The rising prospect of collapse is chiefly expressed by a range of professors, military experts and think-tank analysts who scrutinize Pyongyang's power elite. Those observers have pointed to weaknesses in the regime in the past, particularly after the death of Mr. Kim's father, Kim Il Sung, in 1994, but they seemed to have settled into a belief in the regime's stability. Last month, however, the chatter began to change. "It's like a taboo that's been broken," said Daniel Pinkston, an analyst at the Seoul office of International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based group that reports on conflict areas. These voices were joined last week by that of Gen. Walter Sharp, commander of the combined U.S., South Korea and United Nations forces that defend South Korea, who told a congressional panel in Washington of the military's concerns about instability in North Korea. "The possibility of a sudden leadership change in the North could be destabilizing and unpredictable," Gen. Sharp told the panel, pointing to what he called "the country's disastrous centralized economy, dilapidated industrial sector, insufficient agricultural base, malnourished military and populace and developing nuclear programs." Kim Young-soo, professor of North Korea politics at Sogang University in Seoul, garnered headlines in South Korea last month by calling on the South's government to prepare for sudden change in the North. "North Korea is on the verge of collapse," Mr. Kim said in an interview. "It is a crisis not only because of Kim's illness, the food shortage and failed currency reform, but also because of a failed government."

1NC (2/2)

Link/Internal Link – US presence is key to check back the proliferation of nuclear weapons post-collapse.

O’Hanlon 4/30 (Michael E., Director of Research and Senior Fellow of Foreign Policy, “OpCon Transfer or OpCon Confusion: Making the Best of a Dubious Idea,” The Brookings Institution, April 30, 2010, [<http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0430_korea_ohanlon.aspx>] AD: 6/4/10, jm)

Well, my response to that hypothetical argument is: don’t forget, even if that’s true, even if a collapse scenario becomes our number one concern, this would be collapse in a country with 8 or 10 nuclear weapons. And any resulting mission is going to have to make the securing of those 8 or 10 nuclear weapons its top priority, along with the protection of Seoul from any kind of renegade or partial or occasional firing of North Korean artillery and missiles from any individual North

Korean commanders who may decide to use this period of chaos to settle scores or to carry out actions that they have planned for in a different kind of scenario.

And so those would be the main military concerns, which means that trying to deploy special forces very quickly around North Korea, trying to target and eliminate artillery and ballistic missile launchers through a complex air and ground operation. Trying to secure North Korea’s border, not just in some general, generic sense, but with specific tactical intelligence obtained within North Korea to give us a sense of where the nuclear weapons may be headed if they are on the move.

These things are all going to be top priorities, even in a collapse scenario. And in fact they are not just top priorities, in some generic sterile sense, I’m understating the significance here. We are talking about nuclear weapons potentially on the loose. With who knows, what buyers, what destination in mind. There would not have been a more serious threat to American or Korean national security in a long time. In fact, arguably this would be a greater direct threat to the United States than the Korean War itself had been in 1950 to 1953. Because the possibility of nuclear weapons getting out there on the black market is a great threat to American cities, and obviously to Korean cities as well.

So, this is going to be a lot more than a Balkans-style peacekeeping mission or even something resembling the stabilization mission in Afghanistan’s. It’s going to be a fight for national survival for the ROK and the United States with the potential for these 8 or 10 nuclear weapons to be the most dire direct threat to our security since World War II. And, I don’t think I’m being melodramatic, I think this is factual and an accurate assessment of the kind of risks that we would be facing if indeed North Korea began to collapse. And therefore, integrated operations that involve special forces, air power, tactical intelligence and many other assets would be of crucial significance. This is not going to be just a bigger version of a peacekeeping mission, if it happens. 50/29 scenarios may seem more benign to some people than 50/27 scenarios. They don’t seem more benign to me, in terms of what is at stake.  And I think for those missions, we still have to integrate a lot of different kinds of capabilities and there is not a clear distinction between ground and air and naval operations, or between conventional and special forces, or between ROK roles and U.S. roles.

Impact – North Korean proliferation leads to nuclear war and nuclear materials being passed around to dangerous people.

Campbell and O’Hanlon 06 (Kurt, CSIS and Michael, Brookings, “Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security, p. 230)

There are several reasons why such an arsenal poses a grave risk, each of which reflects more generic concerns described earlier. First, North Korea might sell some nuclear technology or even materials to terrorists or other states. Second, if North Korea someday collapses, its nuclear materials could fall into the hands of those who would sell them to the highest bidder. Third, US/ROK deterrence could be weakened if North Korea thought it had a nuclear trump card. Should war then result, the more bombs North Korea possessed, the greater its odds of successfully delivering a nuclear warhead against Seoul or another population center (even in the United States, probably by means other than missile attack). Finally, North Korean nuclear weapons could start a nuclear domino effect in Northeast Asia, possibly provoking Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, which would in turn weaken global nonproliferation more broadly.

Uniqueness/Link

The North Korean regime is under pressure to justify its existence. Militarism and an enemy to fight are necessary to prevent collapse.

Manasan 10 (Althea, National Post writer, http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=3085070)

While some experts believe tensions on the Korean Peninsula will blow over, at least one analyst who has spent years studying the secretive and reclusive North Korean society predicts conflict before the end of the year. It will be a war resulting from the North Korean need to bolster the “father figure” image of leader Kim Jong-il and a desire to preserve a nationalist ideology, said B.R. Myers, a professor of international studies at Dongseo University in Busan, South Korea. “The North Korean regime is under constant pressure not to lose face. That puts the regime under enormous pressure to fight back,” said Mr. Myers adding that a “show of defiance” from the regime was inevitable. The West has for years misunderstood North Korean ideology and politics, seeing it simply as a hardline communist state, said Mr. Myers, who was born in America and educated in Germany. But in his book, The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why it Matters, Mr. Myers argues that the dominant ideology is an extreme and radical ethno-nationalism, one in which Koreans see themselves as uniquely pureblooded and morally superior to all other races. “It’s actually a racist worldview that should be seen on the far right of the ideological spectrum and which is actually completely incompatible with the basic ideas of Marx and Lenin,” said Mr. Meyers in a telephone interview from Busan. According to the ideology, said Mr. Meyers, the Korean people are so kind and pure-hearted that they cannot survive in this evil world without the protective leadership of Kim Jong-il — who is referred to as “the mother of all mothers” and “our great mother” among North Koreans — and his father Kim Il-sung. This worldview permeates daily life in radio shows, workers education meetings, and fantasy biographies starring Kim Jong-il and other regime officials. “The West tends to mistakenly believe that propaganda is primarily just a sideline with which Kim Jong-il tries to stroke his own ego, and it’s really not that. It really is the lifeblood of this country,” said Mr. Myers. He also pointed out that propaganda is not merely a case of passively brainwashing the people. Rather, the messages satisfy the human desire to give life significance. “Nationalism, especially race-based nationalism, is an easy sell,” he said. “It’s something people want to believe. People are naturally inclined to think that they are part of a good in-group and everyone in the out-group is bad.” He said this brand of nationalism was more impervious to outside influences. Mr. Myers said the regime had also produced Juche Thought, a fake doctrine with no bearing on policymaking, but which had confused the West. “Juche Thought is a jumble of humanist cliches like, ‘Man is the master of all things.’” he told radio interviewer Colin Marshall recently. “While people are wasting their time trying to make sense of Juche Thought, the regime is propagating this race-based nationalism. Another problem we have in the United States, a little bit, is political correctness, inasmuch as we are uncomfortable attributing racist views to non-white people.” He said some Korean scholars had concluded that Juche Thought was incomprehensible to a foreigner. “In fact, it’s incomprehensible to the North Koreans too, but it serves its function very well. The main function of Juche is to enable the claim that Kim Il-sung is a great thinker, that he’s just as great a thinker as Mao Tse-tung was. In that sense, it has been a success.” But increasing access to outside information is beginning to create an enormous ideological problem for the regime. The spreading awareness that South Koreans — who are considered part of the pure race — do not want to live under Kim Jong-il’s rule is subversive and dangerous to the nationalist ideology as well as threatening to a Military First policy that justifies the regime’s existence. “This means that the North Korean regime is under unprecedented pressure to justify its very existence,” said Mr. Myers. “How do you keep propagating a Military First policy? How do you keep telling the North Korean people that they have to make sacrifices for the ultimate racial mission of liberating the peninsula when the South Koreans do not want to be liberated?” According to Mr. Myers, North Korea’s bold provocations not only divert the masses’ attention away from this ideological crisis, but also create the necessary in-group/out-group tensions needed to justify Kim Jong-il’s military rule. Mr. Myers doubts that the condemnations and sanctions from the international community will tame North Korea. The problem, he said, is that Kim Jong-il put himself on a military pedestal, and he cannot come down without losing credibility among his people. “That would really be the unravelling of the whole system,” he said. If an all-out war erupts in the peninsula, Mr. Myers believes it will not be a deliberate move by North Korea, but rather a consequence of the nation’s need to “up the ante.” “It’s going to be because the North Koreans underestimate the will to fight of the enemy.... “They overreach themselves and cross a line and do something which South Korea and the United States are simply not able to tolerate and ... have to retaliate.” He said a military conflict in the peninsula was a “very strong possibility” and predicted that North Korea would make its move by the end of the year. Mr. Myers said the key was whether South Korea had the stomach for a confrontation, which would lead to an enormous loss of life. If South Korea chose not to fight, Mr. Myers envisioned a scenario where North Korea fired rockets into the South, killing a few thousand people, and then bullied them into a power-sharing agreement. “But if it comes to an all-out war, I have no doubt that North Korea would lose it.”

Uniqueness – US Increasing Presence

The US is increasing its military presence due to the Cheonan incident.

Kuhn 10 (Anthony, NPR foreign correspondent, 5/24, http://www.wbur.org/npr/127095902)

Tensions between the two Koreas are being felt throughout East Asia since an international investigation blamed North Korea for sinking a South Korean warship. In the first direct military response from the United States, the Pentagon announced Monday joint anti-submarine exercises with South Korea. Japan has cited the tensions as a reason for closer military cooperation with the U.S. South Korea's President Lee Myung-bak gave a stern speech Monday at a war memorial in central Seoul. He said that his country would exercise its right to self-defense if its territory were violated by military force. He also pledged to bring North Korea before the U.N. Security Council and he suspended most trade between the two countries. In Beijing, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton praised Lee's actions and agreed with South Korea's conclusion that the North had torpedoed the South Korean warship Cheonan, killing 46 sailors in March. "The United States fully supports President Lee's responsible handling of the Cheonan incident, and the objective investigation that followed, which we and other international observers joined. The measures that President Lee announced in his speech are both prudent and entirely appropriate," Clinton said. Pyongyang has denied involvement in the Cheonan incident. The tensions come as U.S. forces are consolidating their bases and preparing to give wartime operational control of combined forces to South Korea in 2012. The debate on the wisdom of this move is now likely to heat up. The Cheonan incident could lead to a more robust U.S. military posture in the region, said John Park, director of the Korea Working Group at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C. "I think the portrayal of North Korea has been more of [weakness] and the concern of collapse being the greater threat. But with the Cheonan, it could be something of a game changer, where it's viewed as a potent conventional threat," Park said. But other than reassurances and military drills, the U.S. has not said how it would beef up its military presence. Thomas Fingar, a former deputy director of national intelligence and now a scholar at Stanford University, said he doesn't see any defensive holes that need plugging. "I don't see a capacity deficit on the part of the U.S. in the region, the South Koreans, the Japanese. There's plenty of force capability out there now to deal with North Korea," Fingar said. Meanwhile in Japan, residents of the island of Okinawa angrily protested Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's decision to move a U.S. Marine air base to another location on the island, despite his campaign pledge not to. Clinton said Hatoyama made the right choice. "As a former politician, I know how hard Prime Minister Hatoyama's decision was, and I thank him for his courage and determination to fulfill his commitments," Clinton said. China has responded coolly to the Cheonan investigation. Park, of the United States Institute of Peace, said Beijing sees security in being the only country with close ties to both Koreas. "Picking one Korea over the other, to the Chinese, has always invited instability. And so right now, this notion that we need to get China onboard to support the South Korean-led efforts, I think it's very important to re-evaluate this in the broader context of what the Chinese are trying to pull off," Park said. Fingar said that the U.S. force posture in Asia may eventually be scaled back, as it can project military force over greater distances. "[In the] long run, we're probably going to draw down, because we've got long legs, we can get there in a hurry," Fingar said. That will make U.S. forces less of a hostage to any potential adversaries nearby, he added.

Links/Internal Links – Generic

Military conflicts distract North Koreans from their governmental problems and puts them in a nationalist fervor – Cheonan sinking proves.

Arirang 10 (Korea Global TV, “Cheonan Disaster Distracting N. Koreans”, http://www.arirang.co.kr/News/News\_View.asp?nseq=103751&code=Ne2&category=2)

A number of North Korea experts say the March sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan has diverted the attention of North Koreans away from hunger, the ailing economy and uncertainties over the future leadership. Citing various sources, the Los Angeles Times reports the Kim Jong-il regime is using the recent naval incident to spur a nationalistic sentiment among its people, encouraging mass protests as part of what the daily calls a "wag the dog" strategy. While a group of war veterans staged rallies denouncing North Korea's aggression in Seoul, some 100-thousand people reportedly took to the streets of Pyeongyang last weekend, accusing South Korea and the United States of warmongering. Meanwhile, some analysts say it is unlikely the alleged North Korean torpedo attack was a direct orchestration by the North Korean leader, but more likely carried out by either his successor and youngest son Jong-un or the North Korean military.

Kim Jong-Il uses the threat of US military power to gain political support.

Sang-Hun 09 (“U.S. and S. Korea Start Military Maneuvers, Angering North” By CHOE SANG-HUN March 9, 2009, New York Times)

North Korea says it plans to send a satellite into orbit, but neighboring governments believe it will be testing its Taepodong-2 missile, which theoretically can reach as far as Hawaii and Alaska. The North put its 1.1-million-member armed forces on standby and cut off a military hot line, the only remaining channel of direct communications between the Koreas, the South Korean government said. “Shooting our satellite for peaceful purposes will precisely mean a war,” the North Korean military said in a statement. It vowed “a just retaliatory strike operation, not only against all the interceptor means involved, but against the strongholds” of the United States, South Korea and Japan. South Korea’s Defense Ministry played down the threats as “political rhetoric.” But the North Korean statement reinforced fears that it might resort to military provocations to vent anger at South Korea, which has stopped sending the North free food, as well as to drag the United States into negotiating. North Korea’s missile and nuclear threats are the impoverished country’s main tool of extracting foreign aid. Decades of indoctrination have led North Koreans to live under a constant fear of American invasion, and some experts said the leader Kim Jong-il was playing on that anxiety to strengthen his standing domestically. Questions have been raised about his grip on power since August, when, South Korean and American intelligence agencies believe, he suffered a stroke. “The latest joint U.S.-South Korean military exercise gives the North Korean regime a chance to fan those fears anew and rally its hungry populace around leader Kim Jong-il,” said Yang Moo-jin, a senior analyst at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul, South Korea.

Links/Internal Links – Generic

Kim Jong-Il uses threats and political posturing against US forces in South Korea to gain support.

Sang-Hun 09 (“As war games begin, North Korea issues threat” By Choe Sang-hun March 9, 2009, New York Times)

Amid the belligerent rhetoric, fears were growing in South Korea that the Communist regime in Pyongyang wouldresort to military provocations like a missile launch or a border attackin order to vent anger at the conservative Seoul government - which has stopped free food shipments to the North - and to force Washington to bargain over its missile and nuclear programs. North Korea has employed such tactics in the past. With North Korea expected to launch a satellite soon for what it called peaceful forces, its leaders vowed "a just retaliatory strike operation" against any efforts to stop the launch and said it would "mean a war" against the United States, South Korea and Japan. Neighboring governments believe the launch will be a cover for testing its Taepodong-2 missile, which theoretically can reach as far as Hawaii and Alaska. North Koreans live under a constant fear of American invasion, the result of decades of indoctrination. "The latest joint U.S.-South Korean military exercise gives the North Korean regime a chance to fan those fears anew and rally its hungry populace around leader Kim Jong Il," said Yang Moo Jin, a senior analyst at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul. Questions have been raised about Kim's grip on power since he reportedly suffered a stroke in August. A successful launching of the Taepodong-2 could help enhance Kim's image among his people, just as the launching of the Taepodong-1 missile in 1998 helped Kim consolidate power four years after his father, President Kim Il Sung, died.

Links/Internal Links – US Enemy = Nationalism

The only thing propping up the North Korean regime is its nationalist pride via militarism. Without an enemy to deceptively condemn, the government can’t maintain power.

Gerson 10 (columnist for the Post, 6/16, “Kingdom of Lies”, http://townhall.com/columnists/MichaelGerson/2010/06/16/kingdom\_of\_lies)

SEOUL -- In past elections for North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly, authorities have reported 100 percent voter participation and a 100 percent approval rate for all the candidates. During the last election, however, the government admitted a 99.98 percent voter turnout -- though public approval held steady at 100 percent. Such are the increments of North Korean concessions to reality.

The regime's constitution is deception. Everything, starting with the birthplace of its leader, is a lie. In more than 60 years, North Korea has never published an honest or complete set of economic indicators. Its history books simply make up events -- Americans who harvest organs of Koreans in hospital basements, or missionaries who crucify Korean children. So it is not easy to part the curtain on the internal dynamics of the regime itself. But South Korean academics and government officials report recent glimpses. After much delay, Kim Jong Il's third son, Kim Jong Eun -- reputed to be a carbon copy of his father -- has been chosen as successor. The crown prince is young (27) and inexperienced, which seems to be the point. Kim Jong Il's brother-in-law has been appointed a kind of guardian or prince regent. In the event of Kim Jong Il's death, North Korea's old guard -- a few dozen faceless bureaucrats and generals in their 70s and 80s -- would remain in control. The North Korean regime is part Stalinist political organization, part dynasty and part mafia family. The capos depend on the authority of the don for their survival and Rolexes, but they also seek to control him, especially during a transition of power. The North Korean criminal enterprise has one main goal -- the accumulation of hard currency, used to support its lifestyle and to purchase military hardware. It gains currency through narcotics trafficking, counterfeiting, the sale of arms and nuclear technology, and a successful extortion racket. The mafia muscle, in this case, is 1.5 million soldiers, chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and some 13,000 artillery tubes aimed at downtown Seoul. From 1998 to 2008, South Korea attempted to buy protection with $2.2 billion in cash. This ATM policy was remarkably transparent on both sides. The Two Koreas Summit in 2000 was delayed for a day because $500 million in cash had not yet been wired to a North Korean account. For a decade, this strategy was effective -- for North Korea. Periodic missile and nuclear tests and military provocations served as reminders to keep the checks coming. South Korean governments cooperated fully, hoping to avoid instability at nearly any cost. It was the perfect test of a policy of eager engagement and pre-emptive bribery. In practice, it rewarded and encouraged extortion, proliferation and destabilizing North Korean tantrums.

The election of South Korean President Lee Myung-bak in 2007 marked a shift. The ATM policy ended. The south has promised large-scale payments only if North Korea abandons its nuclear program. While China still supplies most of North Korea's oil and food, hard currency is getting harder to come by. Arms shipments are watched. Funds from North Koreans living in Japan have dried up. South Korean officials estimate that Kim Jong Il is now getting perhaps $700 million a year in hard currency -- not a particularly good haul.

But there are limits to the policy of isolation as well. Given that North Koreans did not revolt when millions were dying of starvation in the mid-1990s, it is difficult to imagine that economic pressure alone will bring down a committed, completely ruthless regime that cares nothing for the opinion of the world or the lives of its own people. The most fragile thing about the North Korean regime is the structure of deception that supports it. Its main vulnerability is internal and ideological. Its propaganda appeals to nationalism and racial pride. But the regime has made North Korea a laughingstock while another Korea is the envy of the world. It pretends to socialism. But North Korea is ruled by a privileged class of unimaginable excess.

Impact – Laundry List

Collapse of the North Korean regime would lead to chaos: warfare on a nuclear, biological and chemical level, refugees, and more.

Kaplan 06 (Robert D, author and correspondent for the Atlantic, “When North Korea Falls”, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/10/when-north-korea-falls/5228/)

The threat from north of the DMZ is formidable. North Korea boasts 100,000 well-trained special-operations forces and one of the world’s largest biological and chemical arsenals. It has stockpiles of anthrax, cholera, and plague, as well as eight industrial facilities for producing chemical agents—any of which could be launched at Seoul by the army’s conventional artillery. If the governing infrastructure in Pyongyang were to unravel, the result could be widespread lawlessness (compounded by the guerrilla mentality of the Kim Family Regime’s armed forces), as well as mass migration out of and within North Korea. In short, North Korea’s potential for anarchy is equal to that of Iraq, and the potential for the deployment of weapons of mass destruction—either during or after pre-collapse fighting—is far greater. For a harbinger of the kind of chaos that looms on the peninsula consider Albania, which was for some years the most anarchic country in post-Communist Eastern Europe, save for war-torn Yugoslavia. On a visit to Albania before the Stalinist regime there finally collapsed, I saw vicious gangs of boys as young as eight harassing people. North Korea is reportedly plagued by the same phenomenon outside of its showcase capital. That may be an indication of what lies ahead. In fact, what terrifies South Koreans more than North Korean missiles is North Korean refugees pouring south. The Chinese, for their part, have nightmare visions of millions of North Korean refugees heading north over the Yalu River into Manchuria. Obviously, it would be reckless not to worry about North Korea’s missile and WMD technologies. In August, there were reports yet again that Kim Jong Il was preparing an underground nuclear test. And the North test fired seven missiles in July. According to U.S. data, three of the missiles were Scud-Cs, and three were No-dong-As with ranges of 300 to 1,000 miles; all were capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. (Whether North Korea has such warheads is not definitively known, but it is widely believed to have in the neighborhood of ten—and the KFR certainly has the materials and technological know-how to build them.) The third type of missile, a Taep’o-dong-2, has a range of 2,300 to 9,300 miles, which means it could conceivably hit the continental United States. Though the Taep’o-dong-2 failed after takeoff during the recent testing, it did so at the point of maximum dynamic pressure—the same point where the space shuttle *Challenger* exploded, and the moment when things are most likely to go wrong. So this is likely not an insoluble problem for the KFR.

Impact – Nuclear War

War with North Korea goes nuclear and would be super catastrophic.

Ho Suk 10 (Han, Director for the Center for Korean Affairs, 5/27, http://www.sikharchives.com/?p=6133)

North Korea has not only the military power but also the political will to wage total war against the United States. 1. North Korea Can Engage the US in Total War North Korea is one of the few nations that can engage in a total war with the United States. The US war planners recognize this fact. For example, on March 7, 2000, Gen. Thomas A Schwartz, the US commander in Korea at the time, testified at a US congressional hearing that “North Korea is the country most likely to involve the United States in a large-scale war.” North Korea, which can and is willing to face up to the sole military superpower of the world, cannot be called a weak nation. Nevertheless, Western press and analysts distort the truth and depict North Korea as an “impoverished” nation, starving and on the brink of imminent collapse. An impoverished, starving nation cannot face down a military superpower. Today few nations have military assets strong enough to challenge the US military. Russia, though weakened by the collapse of the Soviet Union, has enough assets to face up to the US. China, somewhat weaker than Russia, too, has strong military that can challenge the US. However, both Russia and China lack the political will to face down the US. In contrast, North Korea has not only the military power but also the political will to wage total war against the United States. North Korea has made it clear that it will strike all US targets with all means, if the US mounted military attacks on North Korea. That North Korea’s threat is no bluff can be seen from the aggressive actions taken by North Korea since the Korean War armistice, most recent of which is North Korea’s attempt to capture an American spy plane. In the morning of March 1, 2003, an American RC-132S spy plane, Cobra Ball, took off from a US airbase in Okinawa, and cruised along the East coast of North Korea collecting electronic signals. The US intelligence suspected that North Korea was about to test a long-range missile and the plane was there to monitor the suspected missile launch. When the US plane reached a point about 193 km from the coast of North Korea, two MiG-29 and two MiG-21 fighter planes showed up unexpectedly. The North Korean planes approached within 16 m and signaled the US plane to follow them. The US pilot refused to follow the command and left the scene posthaste. The US plane was tailed by the hostiles for about 22 min but let the US spy plane go. There are two key points to be observed here. First, the hostile planes waited for the US plane at the Uhrang airbase, located about 200 km from the point of air encounter. They knew that the US plane was coming. The North Korean planes flew 200 km to intercept the US plane. Did the US plane see them coming? If it did, why no evasive action? After intercepting the US plane, the hostile planes dogged it for 22 min. Why no American planes for the rescue? The US crew must have informed the base of the danger they were in, but no action was taken by the base. If Kim Jong Il had given the command, the MiGs would have shot down the US plane and returned to their base before the US could have scrambled war planes. Second, North Korea intercepted an American spy plane flying 200 km from its coast. According to the international norm, a nation’s territorial air space extends 19 km from its coast line. The US is the exception and claims air space of 370 km from its coast line; any foreign airplane violating this extended air space is challenged or shot down by the US military. 2. North Korea’s Massive Retaliation Strategy North Korea’s war plan in case of an US attack is total war, not the ‘low-intensity limited warfare’ or ‘regional conflict’ talked about among the Western analysts. North Korea will mount a total war if attacked by the US. There are three aspects to this war plan. First, total war is North Korea’s avowed strategy in case of US preemptive attacks. The US war on Iraq shows that the US can and will mount preemptive strikes in clear violation of international laws, and the United Nations is powerless to stop the US. Any nation that is weak militarily may be attacked by the US at will. It is reasonable for North Korea to deter US attacks with threats of total war. Second, North Korea expects no help from China, Russia, or other nations in case of war with the US. It knows that it will be fighting the superpower alone. Nominally, China and Russia are North Korea’s allies but neither ally is expected to provide any assistance to North Korea in case of war. Neither nation can or is willing to protect North Korea from attacks by the US, and North Korea alone can and will protect itself from US attacks. This principle of self-defense applies to all nations. Third, North Korea’s total war plan has two components: massive conventional warfare and weapons of mass destruction. If the US mounts a preemptive strike on North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear plants, North Korea will retaliate with weapons of mass destruction: North Korea will mount strategic nuclear attacks on the US targets. The US war planners know this and have drawn up their own nuclear war plan. In a nuclear exchange, there is no front or rear areas, no defensive positions or attack formations as in conventional warfare. Nuclear weapons are offensive weapons and there is no defense against nuclear attacks except retaliatory nuclear attacks. For this reason, North Korea’s war plan is offensive in nature: North Korea’s war plan goes beyond repulsing US attackers and calls for destruction of the United States. The US war plan ‘5027′ calls for military occupation of North Korea; it goes beyond the elimination of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction. The US military regards North Korea its main enemy and likewise North Korea regards the US its main enemy. South Korea, too, regards North Korea its main enemy but North Korea does not regard South Korea its main enemy because South Korea is a client state of the United States and has no ability or power to act independent of the US. North Korea’s war plan is not for invading South Korea but for destroying the US.

Impact – War = Extinction

War on the Korean peninsula would end all life on Earth.

Africa News 99 (December 25, p. online)

Lusaka - If there is one place today where the much-dreaded Third World War could easily erupt and probably reduce earth to a huge smouldering cinder it is the Korean Peninsula in Far East Asia. Ever since the end of the savage three-year Korean war in the early 1950s, military tension between the hard-line communist north and the American backed South Korea has remained dangerously high. In fact the Koreas are technically still at war. A foreign visitor to either Pyongyong in the North or Seoul in South Korea will quickly notice that the divided country is always on maximum alert for any eventuality. North Korea or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has never forgiven the US for coming to the aid of South Korea during the Korean war. She still regards the US as an occupation force in South Korea and wholly to blame for the non-reunification of the country. North Korean media constantly churns out a tirade of attacks on "imperialist" America and its "running dog" South Korea. The DPRK is one of the most secretive countries in the world where a visitor is given the impression that the people's hatred for the US is absolute while the love for their government is total. Whether this is really so, it is extremely difficult to conclude. In the DPRK, a visitor is never given a chance to speak to ordinary Koreans about the politics of their country. No visitor moves around alone without government escort. The American government argues that its presence in South Korea was because of the constant danger of an invasion from the north. America has vast economic interests in South Korea. She points out that the north has dug numerous tunnels along the demilitarised zone as part of the invasion plans. She also accuses the north of violating South Korean territorial waters. Early this year, a small North Korean submarine was caught in South Korean waters after getting entangled in fishing nets. Both the Americans and South Koreans claim the submarine was on a military spying mission. However, the intension of the alleged intrusion will probably never be known because the craft's crew were all found with fatal gunshot wounds to their heads in what has been described as suicide pact to hide the truth of the mission. The US mistrust of the north's intentions is so deep that it is no secret that today Washington has the largest concentration of soldiers and weaponry of all descriptions in south Korea than anywhere else in the World, apart from America itself. Some of the armada that was deployed in the recent bombing of Iraq and in Operation Desert Storm against the same country following its invasion of Kuwait was from the fleet permanently stationed on the Korean Peninsula. It is true too that at the moment the North/South Korean border is the most fortified in the world. The border line is littered with anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles and is constantly patrolled by warplanes from both sides. It is common knowledge that America also keeps an eye on any military movement or build-up in the north through spy satellites. The DPRK is said to have an estimated one million soldiers and a huge arsenal of various weapons. Although the DPRK regards herself as a developing country, she can however be classified as a super-power in terms of military might. The DPRK is capable of producing medium and long-range missiles. Last year, for example, she test-fired a medium range missile over Japan, an action that greatly shook and alarmed the US, Japan and South Korea. The DPRK says the projectile was a satellite. There have also been fears that she was planning to test another ballistic missile capable of reaching North America. Naturally, the world is anxious that military tension on the Korean Peninsula must be defused to avoid an apocalypse on earth. It is therefore significant that the American government announced a few days ago that it was moving towards normalising relations with North Korea.

Impact – China War Module

1. Collapse of Korea results in a US-China military confrontation.

Shirk 07 (Susan, for deputy director for China-US State Department, China: Fragile Superpower)

China's neighbor and former ally, North Korea, has tested long-range missiles and nuclear weapons. So far negotiations have failed to solve the problem, and international economic sanctions are squeezing the regime. If North Korea collapses violently and sends thousands of refugees fleeing into Northeast China, Beijing might send troops into the country to re­store order over the objections of South Korea and the United States. In a situation like one of these, China's leaders may not be able to manage the domestic pressures that could drive them into an eyeball-to ­eyeball confrontation with the United States.

1. War with China would go nuclear.

Lind 05 (William, Director of the Center for Cultural Conservativism, “War With China?”, http://www.lewrockwell.com/lind/lind65.html)

I regard a war with China – hot or cold – as perhaps the greatest strategic blunder the United States could make, beyond those it has already made. The end result would be the same as that from the 20th century wars between Britain and Germany: it reduced both to second-rate powers. In the 21st century, the real victors would be the non-state forces of the Fourth Generation, who would fill the gap created by the reduction of both Chinese and American power. Given my foreboding – in George W. Bush’s Washington, it seems the rule is that any blunder we can make, we will make – I was struck by the title of Robert D. Kaplan’s article in the June *Atlantic Monthly*, "How We Would Fight China." Kaplan has written some excellent material on the breakdown of the state and the rise of non-state elements. Here, however, I think he gets it wrong. Kaplan sees the 21st century being defined by a new Cold War between China and the United States, rather than the clash between states and non-state forces. I believe this phenomenon will be far more century-shaping than any conflict between states. While Kaplan writes about how the U.S. could use naval power – subtly – to contain a rising China, within the framework of a Bismarckian *Realpolitik* that accommodates everyone’s interests, he recognizes the danger to all of a Cold War turning hot. He writes, "Only a similarly pragmatic approach (similar to Bismarck’s) will allow us to accommodate China’s inevitable re-emergence as a great power. The alternative will be to turn the earth of the twenty-first century into a battleground." Regrettably, there are influential voices in Washington that want a war with China, the sooner the better. The most likely cause is Taiwan. Few in Washington understand why China is so adamant about Taiwan remaining officially part of China. The reason is China’s history, throughout which her greatest threat has not been foreign invasion but internal division. China has often fractured, sometimes into many parts. Today, Beijing fears that if one province, Taiwan, achieves independence, others will follow. China will go to war, including with the United States, to prevent that from happening. Correctly, Kaplan observes that China is not able to successfully fight a sea and air war with America: China has committed itself to significant military spending, but its navy and air force will not be able to match ours for some decades. The Chinese are therefore not going to do us the favor of engaging in conventional air and naval battles, like those fought in the Pacific during World War II. So how would China fight us? If we send some carrier battle groups to intervene in a war between China and Taiwan, I think China will do something Kaplan does not mention. She will go nuclear at sea from the outset. When the Cold War ended, we found out that the Soviet Union planned to do exactly that (so much for Reagan Administration plans to send our carriers charging up to the Kola Peninsula). The Chinese might employ nuclear-armed anti-ship missiles and torpedoes, fired from submarines or surface ships, but I think her little surprise for us may be nastier. Kaplan briefly mentions that China "may eventually be able to lob missiles accurately at moving ships in the Pacific" from deep in Chinese territory. I think those missiles, ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, may be ready now – perhaps with a bit of clandestine targeting assistance from a Russia whose sphere of influence the United States is aggressively invading. The Chinese way of war is indirect. In most cases, that means China will engage us with "soft power," as she is already doing on multiple fronts. But in the case of American intervention in a Taiwan crisis, what if a Chinese ballistic missile popped a nuke say, 100 miles from an advancing American carrier battle group? No one gets hurt, but the message would be loud and clear: keep coming and you’re toast. If we kept coming anyway and the Chinese did nuke a carrier, we would immediately face an asymmetrical situation. How would we respond? By nuking a Chinese carrier? China doesn’t have any. If we drop a nuke on Chinese territory, we have initiated a strategic nuclear exchange. Is Taiwan worth Seattle or L.A.?

Impact – Economy Module

1. Collapse of Korea collapse all Asian economies.

Glosserman 03 (Brad, director of research at Pacific Forum CSIS, South China Morning Post, p. 17)

Failure to reach a negotiated solution could trigger a war in Northeast Asia, bringing untold devastation to both North and South Korea, and possibly Japan. War, or even the fear of war, could unleash waves of refugees. The economies of South Korea and Japan would be hard hit, and the ripples would spread through China as well, destroying the stability that is the prerequisite for economic development

1. Asian economic collapse leads to World War 3.

Plate 03 (Tom, professor at UCLA, “Neo Cons a Bigger Risk to Bush than China”)

But imagine a China disintegrating- on its own, without neo-conservative or Central Intelligence Agency prompting, much less outright military invasion because the economy (against all predictions) suddenly collapses. That would knock Asia into chaos. A massive flood of refugees would head for Indonesia and other places with poor border controls, which don’t’ want them and cant handle them; some in Japan might lick their lips at the prospect of World War II revisited and look to annex a slice of China. That would send Singapore and Malaysia- once occupied by Japan- into nervous breakdowns. Meanwhile, India might make a grab for Tibet, and Pakistan for Kashmir. Then you can say hello to World War III, Asia style. That’s why wise policy encourages Chinese stability, security and economic growth – the very direction the White House now seems to prefer.

\*\*\*South Korea Politics\*\*\*

1NC – Economic Reform Good

The GNP is just barely clinging on to power – the DEP is on the rise

Jae-eun 6/17 (Cho, Staff Writer from Jooongang Daily, "How the polls got the local elections all wrong," http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2921960, AD: 6/16/10) jl

By midafternoon on June 2, the Seoul mayoral election had started to resemble an intense sports match, as minute-by-minute exit poll results zeroed in on a less-than-1 percentage point difference between incumbent Oh Se-hoon and challenger Han Myeong-sook of the Democratic Party.
In a nail-biter, the ruling Grand National Party’s Oh was re-elected for a second term as Seoul mayor that day with 47.4 percent of the votes, beating Han with 46.8 percent.
Despite the dramatic triumph, which occurred amid spreading public distrust of the current administration’s handling of North Korea and the Cheonan incident, the reaction of the GNP and Oh to the win was far from joyous.
At the beginning of his inauguration speech on June 3, Oh said, “Although I’ve won in this election, I couldn’t help but reflect deeply on myself [after the results]. I will accept today’s victory with a humble heart as if I had in reality been defeated.”
Oh’s speech consistently alluded to his disappointment with the GNP’s nationwide results as well as the minuscule margin between him and Han. Looking back at opinion poll results from a month earlier, Oh’s reaction is more than understandable.

Military expansion wrecks political support for the GNP – South Korea is tired of militarism

Zumwalt 6/16 (James, Straff Writer, " North Korea's Influence on South Korea's Elections," http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=37501, AD: 6/16/10) jl

One of the GNP’s major election losses is most telling about the pulse of the South Korean populace.  It came in Gangwon-do, an eastern province the GNP had held for sixteen years.  Obviously a factor in how votes were cast was the province’s location—situated right along the border with North Korea.  Residents had no desire to see their province become a forward battlefield.
The head of the DEP, Chung Se-kyun, sees the election results as the people’s message for Lee now to “abandon his confrontational policy on North Korea and ease tensions on the Korean peninsula.”  In fact, DEP leaders are demanding Lee apologize to the nation for having turned Cheonan’s loss into an unnecessary national security crisis.
To add insult to injury, as embarassed GNP party bosses resigned, an audacious Pyongyang announced it was satisfied with the South’s election results.  Feeling its oats and seeking further intimidation of Seoul, Pyongyang warned on Sunday it would retaliate against South Korea for its “intolerable” campaign to punish North Korea through the UN.
According to exit polls, it appears the deciding factor in the elections was the high percentage of young voters supporting the DEP over the GNP.  Rather than believing North Korea was responsible, they chose instead to blame the Lee administration for falsifying investigation results.  They wanted to believe this rather than feel any sense of moral obligation to punish the North for killing 46 of their fellow countrymen.  Apparently for South Korea’s young voters, taking the moral high road involved too much personal risk and potential sacrifice on their part.
The election results have already had a measured impact on President Lee.  At a speech given days later at a Singapore defense conference, while blaming North Korea for Cheonan’s loss, he later added—for the first time—there was absolutely no possibility of war with the North.  In Memorial Day remarks at home afterwards, he even toned down his anti-North Korea rhetoric by not even mentioning Pyongyang was responsible for the ship’s loss.

1NC – Economic Reform Good

Lack of Support and unity within the GNP collapse the agenda

Young-bin 6/10 (Kwon, Staff Writer for Joongangdaily, "[Viewpoint] The GNP needs to reform and unite," http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2921640, AD: 6/17/10) jl

Modesty and open-mindedness are crucial for the conservatives. Conservatives who display these attitudes will be able to stay in control for a longer period. They will unite the society. Although the Presidential Committee on Social Cohesion made a grand opening, what is urgent is not such a committee, but a real, grand unity of the conservatives.
It was foolish for the GNP to remain divided between the pro-Lee Myung-bak and pro-Park Geun-hye factions during the local election campaign. Furthermore, the GNP will have difficulties to fight against the liberal opposition if it lacks unity within the party.
Not only the Park faction, but all conservatives should unite. If they take a single wrong step, the administration will become a lame duck one immediately. After the Roh administration suffered its defeat in the local elections, it took two months before a cabinet reshuffle took place. As Roh then appointed his confidants to key posts, the administration quickly became a lame duck government. To prevent such a situation from recurring, the conservatives must become open-minded and find social unity.

And Economic regulations are coming now to save the South Korean economy – failure to pass such reforms will crush growth

SteelGuru 6/16 ("South Korea to push for balanced economic policies in H2," http://www.steelguru.com/news/index/MTUwOTE1/South\_Korea\_to\_push\_for\_balanced\_economic\_policies\_in\_H2.html, AD: 6/19/10) jl

Yonhap reported that South Korea will seek balanced economic policies during the second half of 2010 in order to attain a stable recovery and consider normalizing temporarily introduced stimulus measures to keep inflation in check.
Mr Yoon Jeung hyun finance minister of South Korea said that "We will have to push for balanced policy stance in the second half. Keeping in mind that there are uncertainties in global financial markets, we have to step up efforts to stabilize our currency markets. We also need to attain a stable economic recovery, while normalizing temporarily introduced stimulus measures not to see inflationary pressure materialize."
His comments on inflationary pressure appear to be in line with some claims that the government needs to consider rolling back stimulus measures it employed to tide over a global economic downturn over the past years to stave off inflation.

1NC – Economic Reform Good

South Korean Economy is key to Chinese Economic Growth

Yang 5/29 (Fang, Staff Writer, http://www.gov.cn/english/2010-05/29/content\_1616391.htm, AD: 6/20/10) jl

The economies of China and South Korea are increasingly interdependent and closer to each other, and have a great potential for cooperation, Wen said.

The Chinese premier suggested that the two countries speed up the work on establishing a China-South Korea free trade area in a gradual manner by seeking common ground while reserving differences.

The two countries should also explore new cooperative fields like energy conservation, [environmental protection](http://www.gov.cn/english/special/envir_index.htm), high-tech and low-carbon economy, oppose trade and investment protectionism of all forms and properly handle trade frictions, said Wen.

The two countries should enhance coordination and communication within the framework of the Group of 20 and the ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea (10+3) so as to maintain financial stability and promote balanced and sustainable development of the world economy, said Wen.

"As the world is undergoing major changes and adjustments, China and South Korea, being neighbors and two countries of significant influence in the region, should deepen political trust and cooperation to benefit the two peoples and make bigger contribution to regional peace, stability and prosperity," said the Chinese premier.

Chung spoke highly of China's effective macroeconomic regulation amid the global [financial crisis](http://www.chinaview.cn/fc), saying that China's stable and rapid economic growth is conducive to South Korea, Asia and the world at large.

Chung said South Korea values strategic cooperative partnership with China, and is willing to work with China to increase contacts, push for establishment of a free trade area and facilitate trade and personnel exchanges.

Nuclear War

Plate 3 (Tom, Prof Communications and Public – UCLA, Straights Times, 6-28)

But imagine a China disintegrating -- on its own, without neo-con or CIA prompting, much less outright military invasion -- because the economy (against all predictions) suddenly collapses. That would knock Asia into chaos. Refugees by the gazillions would head for Indonesia and other poorly border-patrolled places, which don't want them and can't handle them; some in Japan might lick their chops for World War II Redux and look to annex a slice of China. That would send small but successful Singapore and Malaysia -- once Japanese colonies -- into absolute nervous breakdowns. India might make a grab for Tibet, and while it does, Pakistan for Kashmir.

Say hello to World War III Asia-style!

That's why wise policy encourages Chinese stability, security and economic growth -- the very direction the White House now seems to prefer.

2NC – Impact Calc

Outweighs on probability and magnitude – Internal instability explodes into international conflict

Lewis 8 (Dan, Research Director of the Economic Research Council, http://www.worldfinance.com/news/home/finalbell/article117.html, AD: 6/20/10) jl

That is alarming. It has been calculated that to keep China’s society stable – ie to manage the transition from a rural to an urban society without devastating unemployment - the minimum growth rate is 7.2 percent. Anything less than that and unemployment will rise and the massive shift in population from the country to the cities becomes unsustainable. This is when real discontent with communist party rule becomes vocal and hard to ignore.
It doesn’t end there. That will at best bring a global recession. The crucial point is that communist authoritarian states have at least had some success in keeping a lid on ethnic tensions – so far. But when multi-ethnic communist countries fall apart from economic stress and the implosion of central power, history suggests that they don’t become successful democracies overnight. Far from it. There’s a very real chance that China might go the way of Yugoloslavia or the Soviet Union – chaos, civil unrest and internecine war. In the very worst case scenario, a Chinese government might seek to maintain national cohesion by going to war with Taiwan – whom America is pledged to defend.

China collapse turns North Korean stability

Bajoria 9 (Jayshree, Staff Writer for Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/11097/chinanorth\_korea\_relationship.html, AD: 6/20/10) jl

Pyongyang is economically dependent on China, which provides most of its food and energy supplies. Nicholas Eberstadt, a consultant at the World Bank, says that since the early 1990s, China has served as North Korea's chief food supplier and has accounted for nearly [90 percent](http://www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/marapr98/pgs21-23.htm) of its energy imports. By some estimates, China provides 80 percent of North Korea's consumer goods and 45 percent of its food. North Korea's economic dependence on China is rapidly increasing, as indicated by a significant trade imbalance. Snyder notes that in 2008, Chinese imports amounted to $2.03 billion, while exports to China including coal and iron ore totaled $750 million. Some experts see the $1.25 billion trade deficit as an indirect Chinese subsidy given that North Korea cannot finance its trade deficit through borrowing.

China also provides aid directly to Pyongyang. "It is widely believed that Chinese food aid is [channeled to the military," (PDF)](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32493.pdf) reports the Congressional Research Service. That allows the World Food Program's food aid to be targeted at the general population "without risk that the military-first policy or regime stability would be undermined by foreign aid policies of other countries."

Chinese collapse turns the Japan advantage

Hasegawa 9 (Toshiro, Bloomberg Staff Writer, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aL89puelxM3M&refer=economy, AD: 6/20/10) jl

March 17 (Bloomberg) -- China’s government holds the key to recovery in Japan’s economy and stock market, said [Nobuyuki Saji](http://search.bloomberg.com/search?q=Nobuyuki+Saji&site=wnews&client=wnews&proxystylesheet=wnews&output=xml_no_dtd&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&filter=p&getfields=wnnis&sort=date:D:S:d1), chief economist and strategist at Mitsubishi UFJ Securities Co.

Japan’s gross national product shrank last quarter at the fastest pace since 1974 and may contract at a similar rate in the current period, if China’s stimulus measures don’t spur demand for the nation’s goods, said Saji, who was named Japan’s best economist in 2008 by Institutional Investor magazine and Nihon Keizai Shimbun Inc. The Nikkei 225 Average dropped to 7,054.98 on March 10, its lowest level since October 1982.

China’s Shanghai Composite Index is the world’s best performer with an 18 percent gain and the country’s economy grew 6.8 percent last quarter, according to Bloomberg data. While the expansion was the slowest in seven years, it is the only growth story among Japan’s three largest trading partners. The other two, the U.S. and Europe, are in recession.

“If China’s economy worsens and its domestic demand remains low, support for Japanese stocks will evaporate,” Saji said.

Uniqueness – GNP barely ahead

Power is shifting now – the GNP is diminishing

Hae-In 6/13 (Shin, Staff WRiter for Korean Herald, "Parties brace for selecting new leadership," http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20100613000234, AD: 6/14/10) jl

With people’s desire for political change vividly expressed in the recent local elections, rival parties are hastening preparations for their respective leadership races that will largely reshape the power balance ahead of the 2012 presidential vote.
Having faced an embarrassing defeat at the hands of its liberal rival in the June 2 local poll, the conservative ruling Grand National Party is tasked with heavier reform needs to win back voter support ahead of the critical presidential and parliamentary elections in two years’ time.
The main opposition Democratic Party may face fewer changes, with its incumbent chief running for reelection on the back of the stable leadership he exercised during the elections. The liberal DP won some of the key district chief positions during the local vote, including one in a GNP stronghold and politically-neutral areas.
President Lee Myung-bak’s party announced over the weekend it will be choosing its new leader and supreme council members some time from July 10-14.
The decision came amid heated disputes among the party’s younger, more progressive-minded members, who called for an immediate vote while senior legislators said the party needed more time to recover from the election loss.
Blaming the senior and staunch conservative members of the party for failing to attract the liberal younger voters, junior members of the GNP have been working to strengthen their position ahead of an in-house leadership race. Such reshaping of the power balance would push aside several close confidants of Lee, weakening his influence in the party.

**GNP rule is delicate – DEP is on the rise**

Harden 2010 (Blaine, “President’s party takes hits in South Korean midterm elections”, June 3, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/02/AR2010060201249.html, date accessed: 6/16/2010, AJK)

SEOUL -- [North Korea's apparent torpedoing of a South Korean warship](http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2F%2Ft&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNHWY1hT_Fspi4ZVhBtf3TUpEWfOsg) has weakened the political coattails of the South's pro-American president, according to the results of Wednesday's midterm elections. Candidates supporting [President Lee Myung-bak](http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2F%2Ft&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNHWY1hT_Fspi4ZVhBtf3TUpEWfOsg), who has worked closely with the Obama administration in responding to the ship's sinking, won six out of 16 races for metropolitan mayor and provincial governor, according to the National Election Commission. The main opposition Democratic Party -- which accuses Lee of using the ship's sinking for political gain, and whose leaders have stridently criticized an investigation that blames the incident on[North Korea](http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2F%2Ft&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNHWY1hT_Fspi4ZVhBtf3TUpEWfOsg) -- won seven major races, returns showed. About 48 percent of voters supported candidates from the Democratic Party and two other opposition parties, while 40 percent voted for candidates from Lee's ruling Grand National Party (GNP), according to the election commission. In midterm elections four years ago, GNP candidates won more than 50 percent of the vote. In Seoul, the capital and largest city, Mayor Oh Se-hoon of the GNP won a narrow reelection victory, while independent candidates and small parties won the other major races. Still, the Democratic Party claimed a victory. "The people handed a solemn judgment to the Lee Myung-bak administration," spokesman Woo Sang-ho said, calling the results a "public verdict against the Lee government's arrogance and self-righteousness."

Uniqueness – GNP barely ahead

The tides are turning for the GNP – Recent local elections prove power is beginning to shift to the DEP.

Zumwalt 6/16 (James, Straff Writer, " North Korea's Influence on South Korea's Elections," http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=37501, AD: 6/16/10) jl

In the aftermath of the unprovoked and cowardly torpedo attack by North Korea on March 26 resulting in the loss of the South Korean warship Cheonan and 46 of its crewmembers, the South Korean people have now spoken.  Voting in local and regional elections held June 2nd, they have issued a mandate to their government on how to deal with their neighbor to the north.
While close to 4000 offices were up for grabs, sixteen races served as a critical indicator—i.e., involving big city mayor and provincial governor offices—of support for the ruling Grand National Party (GNP).  The campaign for these offices began May 20th, the same day Seoul released the results of an investigation into the sinking of the Cheonan, conducted by an international team of experts.  That report left no doubt North Korea was responsible for yet another in a long line of unprovoked terrorist attacks against the South that date back to end of the Korean war in 1953.  Against the backdrop of the Korean War Museum in Seoul, President Lee Myung-bak launched the GNP’s campaign along with a condemnation of Pyongyang over the incident.  Of the sixteen critical races, Lee’s party was expected to win at least nine.

With elections looming, Lee took a firm stand against North Korea, telling his people he would no longer tolerate such brutality.  While the South seems, over the years, to have become detached by such outrageous acts of aggression by the North, the Cheonan loss has clearly been the most egregious.  Lee severed many trade links with the North and sought assistance from the UN Security Council to take measures against Pyongyang.  He vowed, “North Korea will pay a price” for its most recent aggression.
As Lee went on the attack against North Korea, the GNP’s main opposition—the Democratic Party (DEP)—went on the attack against Lee.  Despite the international make-up of the Cheonan investigation team, DEP party leaders questioned findings about North Korea’s involvement—even accusing Lee of having rigged the investigation.  And, even if North Korea was involved, the DEP incredulously argued, the Cheonan incident may have been “provoked” by Lee’s abandonment of the “Sunshine Policy”—a policy seeking peace with Pyongyang through appeasement—that had been followed by two previous DEP administrations.  Instead of embracing the Cheonan incident as a “Pearl Harbor moment” to unify the country against North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il, the DEP sought to use it for political gain by undermining Lee’s credibility.
The good news about the local elections is voter turnout was the highest (54.5%) in 15 years;  the bad news for the GNP is it lost big.  Of the sixteen races, it won only six to DEP’s seven—the remaining three claimed by a small opposition and two independent party candidates.  The DEP also won a majority of all the smaller races.

Uniqueness – GNP barely ahead

**The GNP is just barely ahead – Political setbacks have weakened Lee
Manthorpe 2010** (Jonathan, June 3, “South Korean voters reprimand president Lee on dealings with the North”, [http://www.vancouversun.com/news/World+Today+June+South+Korean+voters+reprimand+president+dealings+with+North/3107885/story.html](http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.vancouversun.com%2Fnews%2FWorld%2BToday%2BJune%2BSouth%2BKorean%2Bvoters%2Breprimand%2Bpresident%2Bdealings%2Bwith%2BNorth%2F3107885%2Fstory.html&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNFI22utJ7_4NR1YaqRchUArq8vuRg), date accessed: 6/16/2010, AJK)
**Contrary to all predictions, South Korean president Lee Myung-bak has been handed a significant political setback in local elections.** Lee's conservative Grand National Party was widely expected to do well in the elections for mayors and provincial governments as a reward for his firm and steady handling of the aftermath of the sinking of a South Korean warship by a North Korean submarine in March.But **South Korean voters defied the pundits and halved the number of these key regional positions the Grand National Party held after the last elections four years ago. The GNP won only six out of 16 contests for governors and big-city mayors. The results have weakened Lee's domestic authority** and his hand in seeking international backing for sanctions against North Korea for the attack on the corvette Cheonan in which 46 South Korean sailors died

Links – Military Expansion

Hard-line policies toward North Korea are massively unpopular

Yun Suk 6/3 (Lim, Staff Writer Pacific News, "Election result a surprise to many South Koreans," http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/eastasia/view/1060877/1/.html, AD: 6/19/10) jl

SEOUL : South Korean President Lee Myung Bak has suffered a major setback to his policies, as voters gave their support to the opposition party in the local polls.
The ruling Grand National Party secured only six out of the 16 posts for provincial governors and city mayors, while the opposition garnered a total of seven seats.
Independent candidates took two seats, and the minor opposition Liberal Forward Party grabbed one.
The ruling party had won 12 of the 16 seats four years ago.
The head of the ruling party announced his resignation following the results.
Chung Mong Joon, head of the Grand National Party, said: "I humbly accept the voice of the people. As chairman of the election campaigning committee, I feel a great responsibility, so I want to take this opportunity to express my wish to resign."
The result of the election - seen as a mid-term referendum on President Lee Myung Bak - was a big surprise to many South Koreans, as most of them had believed the tension with North Korea would benefit the ruling conservative party.
Some said the unexpected strong turnout by young and liberal voters worked in favour of the opposition party. The voter turnout was nearly 55 per cent, the highest for local elections in 15 years.
Voter turnout was about 46 per cent in the local elections three years ago, and 52 per cent in the general elections in 2006.
Many Koreans were expecting the recent sinking of the Cheonan frigate by North Korea to favour the ruling party and eclipse other domestic issues.
Yang Seung Ham, professor of Political Science at Yonsei University, said: "We have had quite an unexpected and shocking outcome in the elections. We expected a landslide victory of the ruling party, but the results are quite contrary to our expectations."
President Lee's focus on the sunken ship and his hardline policy towards North Korea seem to have backfired - especially among the young voters.
Yoon Da Hee, a Korean voter, said: "No matter what, North Korea is still one of our 'brothers' and so I would not like a war to break out. Instead of fighting, I would like both sides to try and resolve this well - through lots of dialogue and cooperation."

Concerns about war make hard-line stances unpopular

Myo-Ja 6/4 (Ser, Staff Writer for JoongAng Daily, "More of a loss for GNP than a win for opposition," http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2921388, AD: 6/19/10) jl

“This outcome was an expression of the public seeking a return to balance,” said Kim Ho-ki, sociology professor at Yonsei University. The liberals have fared badly in local, presidential and legislative elections since 2006, and people have gotten weary of GNP dominance, Kim said.
The outcome also indicates a change in voting behavior when tension with North Korea is high, which in the past boosted support for the conservative GNP.
“Younger voters began to harbor ill feeling toward the government as tensions rose after Lee’s hard-line response to the ship’s sinking,” said Chung Jin-young, political science professor at Kyung Hee University.
“Concerns grew about a war, and although North Korea was the culprit, Lee’s stern response actually backfired,” Chung said.
According to the National Election Commission, the turnout was 54.5 percent, the highest ever in the history of local elections. Young voters, increasingly irritated by the GNP’s campaign, which emphasized the security crisis, largely cast ballots against it, analysts say.

Links – Military Expansion

Public distrust of military expansion makes any hard-line policies unpopular

Abrahamian 6/5 (andray, Staff Writer for Asia times, "Lee rapidly falls out of favor," http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/LF05Dg01.html, AD: 6/19/10) jl

All the polls said they did. Lee, in terms of the domestic polity, handled the crisis brilliantly. In the days immediately following the sinking of the Cheonan, Internet [chat rooms](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/LF05Dg01.html), coffee shops and news pages exploded with all manner of debate, theories and criticisms. Everything was on the table, from US friendly fire to hitting a rock to encountering an old mine.
The Lee administration was being reserved with information, cagey even, and officials contradicted one another. This caused a degree of suspicion and mistrust among the public, reflected in an eight-point dip in the polls for Lee.
In early April, Lee began communicating more clearly. He got his defense minister on the same page (he had been claiming North Korea almost right away) expressing that it was too early to draw any kind of conclusions. The investigation team assembled was international and included non-military personnel. The government, little by little, began publicizing the suspicion that the sinking was North Korea's doing. They leaked information as the investigation went along, allowing public opinion to gradually adjust to the conclusion, rather than fueling anger with harsh rhetoric early on.
Meanwhile, as the investigation continued, some candidates questioned in advance what the findings would be. This came to an abrupt end when results of the investigation were released on May 20. The displayed propeller and shaft of a torpedo, with Korean writing on it, was evidence too strong to deny outright.
Most of the opposition candidates, unable to criticize the evidence without implicitly accusing the Lee administration of some sort of fraud, returned to other election issues. (Though they did vocally complain about the timing of the report - less than two weeks before the election - and Lee's supposed inability to guard the country.) The poll numbers for the Grand National Party (GNP) incumbent for mayor of Seoul, Oh Se Hoon, continued to rise, becoming an 18-point lead. The GNP also had large leads in all the contestable races.
In the following days, Lee's strong response to the findings was made clear: a cessation of all trade except the Kaesong Industrial Complex, no North Korean vessels allowed in South Korea's waters, a more aggressive military posture combined with a diplomatic push for more sanctions.
Polls said 71% of people trusted the results and only 26% thought the incident was being misused for political gain. The GNP was aware of the danger of this, too, as an internally circulated [document](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/LF05Dg01.html) warned of overusing the issue. Lee's executive handling of the incident was well supported. The GNP's strategic use of the timing to rally conservative voters without overdoing it was going well.
Then on election day, the opposition won 10 out of 16 races. The GNP won Seoul by less than 1%.

Links – Military Expansion

Constituents are uneasy about military policies – expansion is unpopular

The Korea Times 6/14 ("Post-Election Revamp," http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2010/06/137\_67629.html, AD: 6/19/10) jl

Most regrettable of all in the address was the government's North Korea policy ― or lack thereof. Calling for a tighter defensive stance, President Lee said, ``There can be no political fight in matters of national security." No one can deny the importance of the security issue, but it defies our understanding why the chief executive should think different policies between different parties as ``political strife," trying to give the people the impression that any opposition to his hard-line, confrontational policy would be harmful for the nation.
One of the unmistakable lessons from the June 2 elections was people's uneasiness ― nearly fear ― of the Lee administration's pressuring of North Korea, unaccompanied by corresponding defense preparedness, as the sinking of the warship Cheonan demonstrated. Little wonder Lee stopped short of making even a fleeting comment on the 10th anniversary of the first inter-Korean summit today.

Internals – Withdrawal 🡪 SK Expansion

US withdrawal forces South Korean military expansion

Bandow 8 (Doug, the Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance, 6/9, "Ending the U.S.-Korea Alliance," http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=17812, AD: 6/19/10) jl

Yet the alliance remains essentially unchanged. Various administrations have drawn down U.S. forces, but American troops remain on station, guaranteeing the ROK’s security. Indeed, Secretary Gates has decided to lengthen army tours in South Korea and allow families to join service personnel. General Walter L. Sharp, the new commander of U.S. forces in Korea, says “We must be prepared to fight and win.” He adds: “Our purpose is to continue to deter aggression on the Korean peninsula and, should deterrence fail, with immediate and overwhelming firepower and the U.S. will defeat that threat.” Insists Secretary Gates, “We will maintain at least the same capabilities we have here, or perhaps be able to enhance them.” Whatever for?

The North retains a nominal military superiority, but its antiquated weapons are no match for South Korea’s arsenal, backed by much-better-trained personnel. Moreover, the South could spend far more on its defense. There is no artifact of geography that keeps the ROK’s military smaller than North Korea’s. That results from a choice made by the government in Seoul. But it chooses not to, perhaps because the South Koreans aren’t convinced that the DPRK poses much of a threat. The South has cheerfully sent generous aid and investment northward. Polls of younger South Koreans find more hostility toward America than Pyongyang. If the ROK’s population doesn’t believe the threat from the North warrants greater military effort, why should America underwrite South Korea’s defense?

Internals – political fracture

Unity is key – political fracture at this key time could mean doom for the GNP

Hae-In 6/13 (Shin, Staff WRiter for Korean Herald, "Parties brace for selecting new leadership," http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20100613000234, AD: 6/14/10) jl

The ruling party whip also spurned talks of disputes within his party, saying “there cannot be different factions and groups” when it comes to the future of the party.
“The Grand National Party does not have the liberty of looking sideways. We must only look forward at the people and together achieve the reforms the people have requested us,” he said.
Internal disputes are expected to continue threatening the harmony of Lee’s party, however, as dozens of first-term GNP legislators plan to make official their requests regarding the overhaul of the government and the party Tuesday.

Controversy creates political dead-lock – hinders the GNPs agenda

Myo-Ja 6/15 (Ser, Staff Writer for Joongangdaily, "Lee shifts Sejong decision to National Assembly," http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2921855, AD: 6/17/10) jl

Lee’s change of heart appears to be a political compromise to escape from the current deadlock, and prevent the Sejong controversy from hindering the rest of his agenda items for the remainder of his term.
“GNP lawmakers will be able to vote their conscience, without being restricted by the party’s official line,” Blue House spokesman Lee Dong-kwan said. “We can no longer delay this issue.”
The spokesman insisted that the president has not given up on the Sejong City revision, but the Blue House is well aware that pro-Lee lawmakers alone cannot unilaterally push forward the changes.
The next step to moving forward - or rejecting - the revision bills will be a vote at the legislature’s Land and Maritime Affairs Committee.
Of the 31 lawmakers on the committee, 21, including eight pro-Park Grand Nationals, have said they support the initial administrative hub plan.
Even if the committee approves the bills, the revision plans are unlikely to win a majority vote at a legislative session because pro-Lee Grand Nationals who support the revision are largely outnumbered by the pro-Park Grand Nationals and opposition lawmakers.

Internals – key to world econ

South Korean economy is key to the global economy.

Hunter 9 (Bridget, Staff Writer for America.gov, "Asia-Pacific Region Seen as “Key Driver” of Global Economy," http://www.america.gov/st/business-english/2009/November/20091106160229abretnuh0.8477442.html, AD: 6/19/10) jl

Washington — “The Asia-Pacific region has become a worldwide center of economic activity and innovation,” U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Ron Kirk said November 5. “And it is a key driver of global economic growth and recovery.”

Kirk, addressing the U.S.-Korea Business Council in Washington, underscored the importance the United States attaches to its partnerships in Asia and the Obama administration’s commitment to opening markets and forging closer trade relationships in the region, which currently receives about 60 percent of U.S. exports.

“President Obama and I recognize that successful engagement with the Asia-Pacific is a critical part of U.S. trade policy,” Kirk said.

The USTR will be joining President Obama in Singapore for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Leaders Meeting scheduled to begin November 13. (See “[Economic Recovery, Resisting Trade Protectionism Top APEC Agenda](http://www.america.gov/st/business-english/2009/November/20091104135511dmslahrellek0.9469721.html).”)

“As the region continues to grow, Asia-Pacific economies will only become more important to the United States,” Kirk said.

KOREA-U.S. TRADE PACT

Kirk also assured his audience that the Obama administration remains committed to implementing the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, which was signed by the United States and the Republic of Korea June 30, 2007.

The agreement would be the United States’ most commercially significant free-trade agreement in more than 16 years, according to the Office of the Trade Representative. The pact requires congressional approval to come into force, and some members of Congress have expressed concerns about the effect some of its provisions, particularly those governing automotive trade, would have on U.S. industry.

“As all of you know, the American auto industry is working through a period of difficult transition,” Kirk said. “Our market is open to Korean autos. All we are asking for is for our own auto companies to be able compete on a level playing field in the Korean market.”

Under the FTA, nearly 95 percent of bilateral trade in consumer and industrial products would become duty-free within three years of the date the FTA enters into force, and most remaining tariffs would be eliminated within 10 years.

“Korea is America’s seventh-largest trading partner. Last year, two-way trade in goods alone totaled $83 billion, and that’s on top of $20 billion more in services trade,” Kirk said. “And if that’s not enough, we have also invested $40 billion more in each others’ economies.”

Internals – SK Econ K 🡪 China

Collapse of South Korea makes Chinese growth impossible

Reuters 5/30 (http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/TOE64T002.htm, AD: 6/20/10) jl

"Without peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, development in east Asia is impossible," said Wen.

China and Japan are the world's number two and three economies and, with South Korea, account for close to 20 percent of global economic output.

Wen offered his condolences for the dead sailors, but did not mention North Korea by name.

The leaders of the three big northeast Asian powers met in Seogwipo, a honeymoon resort on the South Korean island of Jeju, for a weekend summit that was meant to boost plans for greater regional cooperation and economic integration.

Instead, the quarrel between North and South Korea has stolen the limelight.

South Korea's Lee made clear he expected China to come round eventually and back a U.N. Security Council response to the sinking.

"China and Japan have very important roles to play in the international community and I fully expect them to have wisdom on this issue," he said, in reference to the sinking of the Cheonan.

"I believe we need to take concrete measures on this matter in order to accomplish peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula."

As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, China has the power to veto any proposed resolution or statement.

The mounting antagonism between the two Koreas is worrying investors who, though they do not expect war, wanted to be sure that the furious rhetoric does not get out of hand.

Impacts – Global Economy Module

South Koreas economy is key to the global economy

Schuman 5/24 (Michael, Staff Writer on Asia and global economic issues as a correspondent for TIME based in Hong Kong, "Why South Korea Matters," http://curiouscapitalist.blogs.time.com/2010/03/24/why-south-korea-matters/?xid=rss-topstories, AD: 6/19/10) jl

Lesson Three: Don't forget the BRICs. Korea shows the growing importance of links between emerging markets in today's global economy. Hyundai, Samsung and LG have been aggressive, and in most cases, early investors in India and China and are now top brands in local car and electronics markets. To a great degree, they've outmaneuvered the slower-moving Japanese in these key economies. That puts them in a position to switch from followers in the global economy, who latch onto market trends set by American or Japanese firms, to leaders, able to direct where these industries are headed.

In this way, Korea is again pointing the way forward for the world's remaining poor countries. When Korea was on its drive to wealth, the U.S. was the primary source of customers. However, today's developing nations, can increasingly rely on each other to both drive growth and offer opportunities for their up-and-coming corporations to gain international prominence.

Extinction

Friedberg and Schoenfield 8 (Friedberg, professor of politics and international relations at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School, Schoenfeld, senior editor of Commentary, is a visiting scholar at the Witherspoon Institute in Princeton, N.J., “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, WSJ, <http://online.wsj.vom/articles/SB122455074012352571.html>, AD: 6/19/10) jl

Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum**.** The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability.