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## Weaponization Now --- China Perception

### **China already perceives and is responding to US weaponization – ASAT test proves**

Hagt 7 – Eric Hagt is the director of the China Program at the World Security Institute in Washington, DC, and also the editor of China Security. Winter 2007, "China's ASAT test: strategic response," Space &U Nuclear Challenges, Volume 3, No. 1, Winter 2007, page 31 to 51

Coupled with a number of key U.S. policy and military documents that call for control in space and the development of space weapons as well as the U.S. refusal to enter into any restrictive space arms control treaty, China has concluded that America is determined to dominate and control space.3 This perceived U.S. intent leads Beijing to assume the inevitable weaponization of space.4 Even more worrisome for China is the direct impact of these developments on China’s core national interests. The accelerated development of the U.S. ballistic missile system, especially as it is being developed in close cooperation with Japan, has been cited as threatening China’s homeland and nuclear deterrent.5 The ‘Shriever’ space war games conducted by the U.S. Air Force in 2001, 2003 and 20056 strongly reinforced the conclusion that U.S. space control sets China as a target.7 Most central to China’s concerns, however, is the direct affect U.S. space dominance will have on China’s ability to prevail in a conflict in the Taiwan Straits.8

As U.S. military space developments have evolved, China’s observations and subsequent conclusions have engendered a fundamental response: we cannot accept this state of affairs. For reasons of defense of national sovereignty as well as China’s broader interests in space – civilian, commercial and military – America’s pursuit of space control and dominance and its pursuit to develop ASATs and space weapons pose an intolerable risk to China’s national security.9 China’s own ASAT test embodied this message. Attempting to redress what China perceives as a critically imbalanced strategic environment that increasingly endangers its interests, China demonstrated a deterrent to defend against that threat. Its willingness to risk international opprobrium through such a test conveys China’s grim resolve to send that message.

## Weaponization Now --- Inevitable

### **Space weaponization is inevitable – US-Russia reactions and US military posture**

Hagt 7 – Eric Hagt is the director of the China Program at the World Security Institute in Washington, DC, and also the editor of China Security. Winter 2007, "China's ASAT test: strategic response," Space &U Nuclear Challenges, Volume 3, No. 1, Winter 2007, page 31 to 51

First, the article concludes from U.S. and Russian actions and reactions that the weaponization of space is inevitable. Second, the U.S. military has decided to develop war-fighting capabilities from air to space and that space will be the new battlefield for future wars. Third, what both the United States and Russia want from space is to seize the advantage in space information and prevent enemies from using this advantage. The U.S. military believes that future warfare is an all-dimension, integrated warfare that combines ground, sea, air, space and special forces, in which information warfare is the thread that connects all dots. pp 25-29.

Ji Rongren, deputy director of the Division of Military Branch Studies of the National Defense University, stated “The United States has accelerated its pace towards space control. There is no longer the question of whether or not to conduct space warfare, it is already a reality before our eyes.” This comment was made following the U.S. space warfare military exercise on Jan. 5, 2001 in “Space Warfare: Challenge, Focus and Countermeasures,” World Outlook Magazine, Issue No. 9, May 1, 2001;

## Safe From Attack --- Weather Satellites

### **Weather satellites will be safe from attack**

Morgan 10 – Forrest E. Morgan, RAND Project, Air Force, 2010, "Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space: A Preliminary Assessment," http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA522541

Weather satellites, surprisingly, might be the space assets that are safest from attack. Attacking assets supporting the highly globalized international meteorological system would result in considerable political costs, and the robust infrastructure supporting that system would limit the benefits of individual attacks against it. (See pp. 16–21.)

## SMIL Good --- Arms Race

### **US weaponization is inevitable, but weaponizing first deters other countries from weaponizing**

Duvall & Havercroft 8 – Raymond Duvall, Ph.D. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, professor of political science, Jonathan Havercroft, Ph.D., professor in political science at the University of Oklahoma, Security and Defence Forum Post-Doctoral Fellow, Centre of International Relations, 2008, "Taking sovereignty out of this world: space weapons and the empire of the future," Review of International Studies, 34: 755-775

As a final theoretic premise, we assume that, *if* a project of placing weapons in orbital space is achieved, it is apt to be accomplished firstly, and quite possibly solely, by the United States. We emphasise the word, if, because the feasibility of space weapons is far from decided. But we also recognise that there *are* military strategists who are already designing missions for such space-based weaponry. And, by all publicly available indications, the US is far ahead in their development. Consequently, if the US military can overcome the obstacles of cost and launch technology, as many in the security community now believe possible, then it seems likely that within the next twenty years the US will deploy weapons in space. If it is successful in doing so, the fact that part of its stated project is to deny access to orbital space assets to potential enemies implies that the US might well establish itself as the sole, or pre-eminent, actor in respect to space weapons. Accordingly, we focus our analysis in this article on that situation. While we concede that either a competitively balanced multi-actor arms race or a multinational collaborative process in space weapons is possible and worthy of analysis, we limit our focus to the plausible scenario of US singularity.

## SMIL Good --- Asia Leadership

### **Weaponization is key to US leadership in Asia**

Tellis 7 – Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, professor of policy analysis, U.S. Department of State senoir advisor, June 2007, "Punching the U.S. Military's "Soft Ribs": China's Antisatellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective,"http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb\_51\_tellis\_final.pdf

All in all, the emergence of potent Chinese counterspace capabilities makes U.S. military operations in Asia more perilous. These threats have arisen because China’s requirement that it be able to defeat the United States in a future regional conflict—despite its inferiority in conventional military power—compels it to exploit every asymmetric battle-space denial technology prospectively available. In such a situation, the United States has no choice but to run and win this offense/defense space race if it is to both uphold its security obligations in East Asia and elsewhere and deter increased Chinese investments in counterspace operations. n

## SMIL Good --- China

### **Chinese weaponization is inevitable – the US must weaponize to check China back**

Tellis 7 – Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, professor of policy analysis, U.S. Department of State senoir advisor, June 2007, "Punching the U.S. Military's "Soft Ribs": China's Antisatellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective,"http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb\_51\_tellis\_final.pdf

Although it is often argued that China’s recent antisatellite weapon test was a protest against U.S. space policies, Beijing’s counterspace programs are actually part of a considered strategy designed to counter the overall military capability of the United States. In preparing to cope with America’s overwhelming conventional might, China has taken aim at its Achilles heel: its space-based capabilities and their related ground installations. Thus, China will continue to invest in space-denial technology rather than be a party to any space-control agreement that eliminates its best chance of asymmetrically defeating U.S. military power. With its dominance of space now at risk, the United States must run and win this offense/ defense space race if it is to uphold its security obligations and deter increased Chinese counterspace efforts.

### **US weaponization stops Chinese weaponization**

Tellis 7 – Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, professor of policy analysis, U.S. Department of State senoir advisor, June 2007, "Punching the U.S. Military's "Soft Ribs": China's Antisatellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective,"http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb\_51\_tellis\_final.pdf

Beijing’s attitude toward space arms control will change only when one or more of the following conditions are met: n China acquires the capacity to defeat the United States despite America’s privileged access to space. n The investments in Chinese counterspace programs begin to yield diminishing returns because the United States consistently nullifies these capabilities through superior technology and operational practices. n China’s own strategic and economic dependence on space intensifies to the point where the threats posed by any American offensive counterspace programs exceed the benefits accruing to Beijing’s own comparable efforts. Because these conditions will not be realized any time soon, Washington should certainly discuss space security with Beijing but should not expect that its negotiating investments will yield any effective space-control agreements in the near-term.

## A2 China Arms Control

### **Arms control fails – China will inevitably weaponize despite publicly calling for peace**

Tellis 7 – Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, professor of policy analysis, U.S. Department of State senoir advisor, June 2007, "Punching the U.S. Military's "Soft Ribs": China's Antisatellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective,"http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb\_51\_tellis\_final.pdf

Concerns about arms races in space should be taken seriously, but there is no arms-control solution. China is pursuing counterspace programs not in protest against the George W. Bush administration’s space policies but as part of a considered strategy designed to counter the overall military capability of the United States. The weapons that China seeks to blunt are not space based; they are instead U.S. naval and air forces that operate in China’s vicinity. What is in space are the sensory organs, which find and fix targets for these forces, and the nervous system, which connects all the combatant elements and permits them to operate cohesively. There is simply no feasible way to ban or control the use of space for such purposes. Beijing’s diplomats, who repeatedly call for negotiations to assure the peaceful use of space, clearly understand this. And the Chinese military appreciates better than most that its best chance of countering the massive conventional superiority of the United States lies in being able to attack the relatively vulnerable eyes, ears, and voice of American power. Consequently, Beijing will continue to systematically pursue a variety of space-denial programs, even as it persists in issuing clarion calls for the demilitarization of space.

## A2 China Arms Race

### **Space weaponization does not cause an arms race with China – multiple alt causes**

Tellis 7 – Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, professor of policy analysis, U.S. Department of State senoir advisor, June 2007, "Punching the U.S. Military's "Soft Ribs": China's Antisatellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective,"http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb\_51\_tellis\_final.pdf

Many arms-control specialists believe that China’s counterspace programs are driven primarily by its desire to accumulate bargaining chips that could be traded for an eventual ban on space weapons. In reality, however, Beijing’s investments in space denial technology are driven by strategic concerns that have little to do with arms-limitation agreements of any kind. In the near term, China is heavily focused on developing all possible means of defeating the superior U.S. conventional forces it expects to encounter in any war over Taiwan. And over the longer term, China is seeking to prepare for a prospective geopolitical rivalry with the United States. To achieve these goals, China must be able to exercise sufficient control over its land and sea borders to prevent U.S. forces from mounting attacks on the Chinese heartland from them. It must also be able to protect its nuclear deterrent from being neutralized by U.S. theater and national missile defenses. And it must be able to construct a sufficiently secure regional system within which it can shape the political choices of its major neighbors and prevent any local adversaries from challenging it under the cover of American protection.

## SMIL Good --- Genocide

### **Space weaponization solves genocide**

Duvall & Havercroft 8 – Raymond Duvall, Ph.D. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, professor of political science, Jonathan Havercroft, Ph.D., professor in political science at the University of Oklahoma, Security and Defence Forum Post-Doctoral Fellow, Centre of International Relations, 2008, "Taking sovereignty out of this world: space weapons and the empire of the future," Review of International Studies, 34: 755-775

Furthermore, these weapons would be most useful against small targets, such as groups and individuals. While the justification for the use of space-based weapons in the quoted scenario was to prevent genocide, the hypothetical attack constitutes their possessor as global police, punishing without trial those specific actors it deems responsible for genocide. Even if the specific act provoking space-based attack is not a violation of international law, the political society with the capacity to intervene – and with it the capacity to decide when to intervene – constitutes itself as sovereign police of the international system.54 Space-based weapons for force application, then, are most useful at targeting individuals and groups at short notice in order to achieve the policing objective of ‘order’ and control under a rule of law, even as that sovereign policing decision is made outside of the very law in whose name it is made.

## SMIL Good --- Military

### **Space weaponization is key to protecting American forces**

Dalby 9 – Simon Dalby, Department of Geography & Environmental Studies, Carleton University, 2009, "Geopolitics, the revolution in military affairs and the Bush doctrine," International Politics (2009), 46, page 234-252, <http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ip/journal/v46/n2/full/ip200840a.html>

Navigation and coordination of forces, especially in deserts and on oceans is tremendously facilitated by reliable global positioning systems and the growing use of space-based surveillance and communications. Targeting ‘smart bombs’ likewise. Satellite photography allows for frequent monitoring of targets and the potential to switch surveillance rapidly without moving land-based forces. The ability of American commanders to control drones and unmanned vehicles operating in Afghanistan and Iraq from bases in the United States both allows for ease of control and safety for operators distant from combat zones. All this is made possible by space-based communication satellites. But this in turn makes American forces, dependent on their superior coordination and their ability to react faster than opponents on the battlefield because they can see what's going on better, vulnerable to the disruption of this infrastructure, in particular in space where so many communications satellites and monitoring systems are now situated.

## SMIL Good --- Overstretch

### **Space weaponization solves overstretch – there would be no need to hold territory**

Duvall & Havercroft 8 – Raymond Duvall, Ph.D. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, professor of political science, Jonathan Havercroft, Ph.D., professor in political science at the University of Oklahoma, Security and Defence Forum Post-Doctoral Fellow, Centre of International Relations, 2008, "Taking sovereignty out of this world: space weapons and the empire of the future," Review of International Studies, 34: 755-775

Thus, application of force from orbital space would have at least three crucially important constitutive effects. First, it would constitute the US, as possessor of these weapons, as the centre of a globally extensive, late-modern empire,55 a sovereign of the globe. But this sovereign would exercise its power in a new way. Rather than needing to have occupying forces in place to control the Earth’s lands and seas, it could rely heavily on space weapons to exercise social-political control. While these weapons are not particularly useful in fighting large-scale wars, or in the conquest of territory, there would no longer be a need to hold territory. All the global sovereign would have to do is to kill, or perhaps even threaten to kill, potential adversaries around the world in order to ‘police’ social and political activities throughout its global empire.56

## SMIL Good --- Proliferation

### **Space weaponization solves Iranian and North Korean nuclearization, and prevents further proliferation**

Duvall & Havercroft 8 – Raymond Duvall, Ph.D. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, professor of political science, Jonathan Havercroft, Ph.D., professor in political science at the University of Oklahoma, Security and Defence Forum Post-Doctoral Fellow, Centre of International Relations, 2008, "Taking sovereignty out of this world: space weapons and the empire of the future," Review of International Studies, 34: 755-775

Imagine what impact these weapons would have on US foreign policy with respect to two of its currently most pressing objectives. Consider, for one, how useful such weapons might be with respect to preventing a rival state, such as Iran or North Korea, from acquiring nuclear weapons. While there has been speculation that the US or Israel may launch air strikes against potential nuclear weapons manufacturing facilities in these countries, the logistics – getting access to airspace from neighbouring countries, and the possibility of retaliation against military forces in the area – make such operations difficult. Using weapons in space would avoid these logistical difficulties, thereby making the missions easier (and presumably more likely). Threatening spaced-based attack on either manufacturing sites of weapons or on the political leadership of an adversary might be sufficient in many cases to alter the behaviour of targeted governments. In short, if the US were to deploy such weapons in space, they would likely be used to similar effect as the gunboat diplomacy of the 19th century.

## A2 Russia Arms Race

### **Russia anxiety is only media hype**

Oberg 7 – James Oberg, NASA mission control, March 12, 2007, "The dozen space weapons myths," <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/826/1>

Western news dispatches from Moscow, reporting on Russian official complaints about the policy, stated that it asserted the right “to deny adversaries access to space for hostile purposes,” and that it claimed the right (some say “tacitly”) for the US to deploy weapons in space. Vitaly Davidov, deputy head of the Russian Space Agency, complained: “They [the US] want to dictate to others who is allowed to go there.”

But the actual policy document makes no such claim and displays no such intent to “deny” access. The Russian anxiety, echoed on the editorial pages and in news stories around the world, is apparently based on some over-wrought page 1 stories in US newspapers, written by people too careless to actually read the original US document and subsequent official US government clarifications, or too eager to misinterpret it in the most alarmingly stark terms.

## SMIL Good --- Satellites

### **Space weaponization is key to protecting satellites and preventing asymmetrical vulnerability**

Duvall & Havercroft 8 – Raymond Duvall, Ph.D. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, professor of political science, Jonathan Havercroft, Ph.D., professor in political science at the University of Oklahoma, Security and Defence Forum Post-Doctoral Fellow, Centre of International Relations, 2008, "Taking sovereignty out of this world: space weapons and the empire of the future," Review of International Studies, 34: 755-775

The doctrine of space control has emerged out of the belief that assets in space represent a potential target for enemies of the US.38 There are two kinds of vulnerable US assets: private-commercial; and military. One concern is that rivals may attack commercial satellites, thereby disrupting the flow of information and inflicting significant harm on global markets.39 Militarily, the concern is that, through increasing reliance on satellites for Earth-based military operations, the US has created an ‘asymmetrical vulnerability’. An adversary (including a non-state, ‘terrorist’ organisation) could effectively immobilise US forces by disabling the satellites that provide communication, command, and control capabilities. Consequently, the project of space control is designed to protect commercial and military satellites from potential attacks. Its broader purpose, however, is to prevent rivals from having any access to space for activities antithetical to US interests; this is the imperative for ‘denial of the use of space to adversaries’. Thus space control has dual functions – it is both a privatising of the commons of orbital space and a military exclusion – in a form of ‘inclusive exclusion’.40

## SMIL Good --- Space Debris

### **Space lasers can clean up all space debris in 2 years**

Phipps 10 – Claude Phipps, Photonic Associates, October 2010, “Catcher’s Mitt” as an Alternative to laserSpace Debris Mitigation," AIP Conference Proceedings, Volume. 1278, Issue 1, page 509, <http://idisk.mac.com/crphipps-Public/Catcher's_Mitt.pdf>

The concept of removing the debris with a high-power, pulsed, ground-based laser system was first presented in 1993 [1]. Laser space debris removal uses a high intensity pulsed laser beam to ablate (not pulverize) a fraction of the debris itself in an orientation such that the debris is slowed sufficiently to re-enter the atmosphere and burn up. Pulsed lasers are much more effective for this purpose than CW lasers, because the latter tend to melt the target and create more debris.

The concept was later named ORION by NASA headquarters staff, who authorized a concept validation study in 1995 [2, 3] . The study concluded that the capability to remove essentially all dangerous orbital debris in the 1 – 10-cm range between 400 and 1100 km altitude was feasible within two years, and that its cost would be modest relative to the likely costs to shield, repair, or replace high-value spacecraft that could otherwise be lost to debris impacts.

## SMIL Good --- Terrorism

### **Space weaponization is key to targeting and killing terrorists**

Duvall & Havercroft 8 – Raymond Duvall, Ph.D. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, professor of political science, Jonathan Havercroft, Ph.D., professor in political science at the University of Oklahoma, Security and Defence Forum Post-Doctoral Fellow, Centre of International Relations, 2008, "Taking sovereignty out of this world: space weapons and the empire of the future," Review of International Studies, 34: 755-775

We have already seen glimpses of this type of warfare in recent years. Consider, for example, that the Iraq War began with a so called ‘decapitation strike’ aimed at assassinating Saddam Hussein in the hope of ending the war before it began. Similar tactics have been used by the Israeli Defence Forces to kill specific leaders of the Palestinians. Also, the US has used Unmanned Aerial Vehicles equipped with missiles to target members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Placing weapons in space aimed at terrestrial targets would markedly accelerate the ability to carry out these types of ‘targeted killings’ (assassinations).

## Solvency --- Lasers

### **Space-based lasers are extremely effective**

Duvall & Havercroft 8 – Raymond Duvall, Ph.D. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, professor of political science, Jonathan Havercroft, Ph.D., professor in political science at the University of Oklahoma, Security and Defence Forum Post-Doctoral Fellow, Centre of International Relations, 2008, "Taking sovereignty out of this world: space weapons and the empire of the future," Review of International Studies, 34: 755-775

Kinetic-energy weapons, such as hypervelocity tungsten rod bundles, use the force of a collision to destroy a target either in space/entering space or on Earth. Alternative and complementary to kinetic-energy weapons are space-based high energy laser systems. While laser technology has existed since the 1960s, only recent advances have made it possible to produce sufficiently powerful lasers to be used as weapons. The US Army has successfully demonstrated the ability of a ground-based laser to destroy rocket shells in flight, and the United States Air Force has mounted an airborne laser on a modified Boeing 747 capable of destroying ballistic missiles in the boost phase.26 Furthermore, the Air Force and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization are collaborating on the Integrated Flight Experiment, which plans to launch a space-based laser to destroy a ballistic missile between 2010 and 2012.27 While the initial purpose of developing space-based lasers is missile defence, it will be possible to modify the technology, once in place, so that lasers can destroy ground-based targets as well. A system of relay mirrors in space could work from a laser based on the land, sea, air, or in space to attack any point able to be targeted by mirror reflection. This laser system would be capable of nearly instantaneously attacking any place on the Earth.

## A2 Condition China Counterplan

### **Multiple alt causes to Chinese weaponization – weapons are not a bargaining chip**

Tellis 7 – Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, professor of policy analysis, U.S. Department of State senoir advisor, June 2007, "Punching the U.S. Military's "Soft Ribs": China's Antisatellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective,"http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb\_51\_tellis\_final.pdf

Many arms-control specialists believe that China’s counterspace programs are driven primarily by its desire to accumulate bargaining chips that could be traded for an eventual ban on space weapons. In reality, however, Beijing’s investments in space denial technology are driven by strategic concerns that have little to do with arms-limitation agreements of any kind. In the near term, China is heavily focused on developing all possible means of defeating the superior U.S. conventional forces it expects to encounter in any war over Taiwan. And over the longer term, China is seeking to prepare for a prospective geopolitical rivalry with the United States. To achieve these goals, China must be able to exercise sufficient control over its land and sea borders to prevent U.S. forces from mounting attacks on the Chinese heartland from them. It must also be able to protect its nuclear deterrent from being neutralized by U.S. theater and national missile defenses. And it must be able to construct a sufficiently secure regional system within which it can shape the political choices of its major neighbors and prevent any local adversaries from challenging it under the cover of American protection.

calls for the demilitarization of space.

### **China will say no – it wants weapons to balance US terrestrial hegemony**

Tellis 7 – Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, professor of policy analysis, U.S. Department of State senoir advisor, June 2007, "Punching the U.S. Military's "Soft Ribs": China's Antisatellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective,"http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb\_51\_tellis\_final.pdf

China will, therefore, continue to develop the technology necessary to attack U.S. space systems comprehensively. As one PLA analyst, Wang Hucheng, succinctly articulated this rationale, the enduring American dependence on space constitutes “the U.S. military’s ‘soft ribs’ and strategic weaknesses”; consequently, “for countries that can never win a war with the United States by using the method of tanks and planes, attacking the U.S. space system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice. Part of the reason is that the Pentagon is greatly dependent on space for [the success of ] its military action.”

The implications of this logic devastate the hopes of arms-control theorists who believe that Chinese counterspace investments are primarily bargaining chips aimed at creating a peaceful space regime. In fact, they are just the opposite; they represent China’s best hope for prevailing against the superior conventional military power deployed by the United States. For China to give up its emerging counterspace capabilities—whether through unilateral abnegation or a negotiated arrangement— would be to condemn its armed forces to inevitable defeat in any encounter with American power. This would mean, among other things, to risk the “loss” of Taiwan with all its attendant consequences for the unity of China and the survival of its Communist leadership. It would be equally unthinkable for Chinese leaders to abandon their efforts to stave off American forward-operating forces in the western Pacific or to allow the Chinese nuclear deterrent to be neutralized by emerging U.S. strategic defenses. Because these goals—which are relatively conservative from Beijing’s point of view—are so critical to China as a rising power, it cannot be expected to trade away its counterspace capabilities for any arms-control regime that would have the effect of further accentuating the military advantages enjoyed by its competitors.

### **China will say no**

Tellis 7 – Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, professor of policy analysis, U.S. Department of State senoir advisor, June 2007, "Punching the U.S. Military's "Soft Ribs": China's Antisatellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective,"http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb\_51\_tellis\_final.pdf

Beijing’s attitude toward space arms control will change only when one or more of the following conditions are met: n China acquires the capacity to defeat the United States despite America’s privileged access to space. n The investments in Chinese counterspace programs begin to yield diminishing returns because the United States consistently nullifies these capabilities through superior technology and operational practices. n China’s own strategic and economic dependence on space intensifies to the point where the threats posed by any American offensive counterspace programs exceed the benefits accruing to Beijing’s own comparable efforts. Because these conditions will not be realized any time soon, Washington should certainly discuss space security with Beijing but should not expect that its negotiating investments will yield any effective space-control agreements in the near-term.