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# 1AC

## Plan text

### The US Federal Government should deploy a constellation of kinetic energy ballistic missile interceptors in space above the mesosphere.

## Contention 1: Inherency

### The Outer Space Treaty has yet kept the US from militarizing space.

CIAO Focus May 2004 (CIAO Focus, May 2004: Space Weapons, <http://www.ciaonet.org/focus/focus_0405.html>)

Given recent public statements and military assessments, such as the Air Force's Vision 2020 report, the deployment of space weapons has the air of inevitability. The weaponization of outer space is controlled through norms and treaties, most notably the 1967 Outer Space Treaty which prohibited the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in space and was signed by 97 countries, including the United States. The treaty bans weapons of mass destruction from space, defined as "nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction." Space weapons fall into three general categories: those that would defend against ballistic missile attacks, those that attack or defend satellites, and those that would strike terrestrial targets. Proponents of space weaponization argue that since the United States spends 65% of the world expenditure on commercial satellites and approximately 95% of the world expenditure on military space uses, the government must provide for defensive measures to protect such assets. Space weapons could also be used to make preemptive strikes against enemy targets and, possibly, to defend against missile attack. The stakes are high. In addition to the great expense and difficulty involved in developing space weapons, a race with China to weaponize space might be in the offing. Critics suggest that inexpensive technologies could thwart costly space weapons and that the U.S. should take the lead in updating the Outer Space Treaty to ensure that space is kept weapons free.

### No Plan for Space Missile Interception

Mackenzie Eaglen 2010(Research Fellow for National Security Studies at the Allison Centery for Foreign Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation. “Why Missile Defense is Still Needed” <http://www.riponsociety.org/forum310g.htm>)

The administration’s plan for missile defense has four stages that continue through 2020. The program includes both land and sea-based interceptors. Ultimately, the fourth phase would move the system beyond regional defense and protect the entire U.S. homeland against an ICBM attack. Unfortunately, the administration has cut back on other integral parts of the comprehensive program. The number of ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California has been cut from 44 to 30, the planned “third site” for missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic was cancelled, and funding has been eliminated for space.

## Contention 2: Chinese ASAT 1/8

### Chinese expansion into space challenges US national security

Marter 2003

William C. Martel (Professor of National Security Affairs at Naval War College, RI) and Toshi Yoshihara (Research Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Massachusetts) 2003, Avoiding a Sino-American Space Race, Washington Quarterly: Autumn 2003 issue, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/440173\_915549761\_918386378.pdf

This prevailing indifference, however, risks overlooking the longer-term consequences of China's growing space power and, more dangerously, the potential collision of U.S. and Chinese interests in space. From China's perspective, the United States' self-appointed guardianship of space is presumptuous and represents a genuine challenge to China's national security concerns. For the United States, China's extension into space symbolizes its ambitions to challenge U.S. national security. Deeply seated, mutual suspicions are evident in both countries' strategic assessments as the contours of potential strategic competition between Washington and Beijing emerge. In essence, both sides agree that the other represents a challenge. Although this potential clash of interests is not yet sufficiently severe to be visible to casual observers, the United States and China are on the threshold of a space race that could radically influence international security.

### China can destroy US satellites

MacDonald 2008

Bruce W. MacDonald (Senior Director at the United States Institute of Peace) 2008, China, Space Weapons, and US Security, Council Special Report No.38, September 2008, published by the Council on Foreign Relations,

http://books.google.com/bookshl=en&lr=&id=o0GkabrNftIC&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=Bruce+W.+MacDonald+(Senior+Director+at+the+United+States+Institute+of+Peace)+2008,+China,+Space+Weapons,+and+US+Security,+Council+Special+Report+No.38,+September+2008,+published+by+the+Council+on+Foreign+Relations&ots=OTkmlF7uGY&sig=ncw52NFQTbv6Zh5k4EefU7dtgqw#v=onepage&q&f=false

On January 11, 2007, China launched a missile into space, releasing a homing vehicle that destroyed an old Chinese weather satellite. The strategic reverberations of that collision have shaken up security thinking in the 1 Inked States and around the world. This test demonstrated that, it it so chose, China could build a substantial number ot these anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) and thus might soon be able to destroy substantial numbers of U.S. satellites in low earth orbit (LEO), upon which the U.S. military heavily depends. On lebruary 21, 2008, the United States launched a modified missile-defense interceptor, destroying a U.S. satellite carrying one thousand pounds ot toxic fuel about to make an uncontrolled atmospheric reentry. Thus, within fourteen months, China and the I inked States both demonstrated the capability to destroy \MO satellites, heralding the arrival of an era where space is a potentially tar more contested domain than in the past, with few rules.1

Contention 2: Chinese ASAT 2/8

### Realism and historical evidence indicate rising powers like China are likely to challenge established powers like the US.

Friedberg 2005

Aaron L. Friedberg (Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University), The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Confict Inevitable?, Fall 2005, Vol. 30, No. 2, Pages 7-45

Realist pessimists note that, throughout history, rising powers have tended to be troublemakers, at least insofar as their more established counterparts in the international system are concerned. This is the case, in the realists’ view, regardless of regime type; it was as true of a rising, democratic United States as it was of a rising, autocratic Germany. As Samuel Huntington has pointed out, International Security 30:2 18 Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, “Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050,” Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper No. 99 (New York: Goldman Sachs Group, 2003). 28. For estimates of China’s defense spending, see U.S.-China Security Review Commission, The National Security Implications of the Economic Relationship between the United States and China, pp. 167–177. 29. For an analysis of Chinese military imports, see Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China’s Arms Acquisitions from Abroad: A Quest for “Superb and Secret Weapons” (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). Regarding China’s protracted and painful efforts to develop its own ballistic missile submarines, see John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994). 30. Regarding the progress of China’s military modernization efforts, see Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, May 28, 2004, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ d20040528PRC.pdf. See also Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1999); James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds., China’s Military Faces the Future (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1999); Col. Susan M. Puska, ed., People’s Liberation Army after Next (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000); and David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).“The external expansion of the UK and France, Germany and Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States coincided with phases of intense industrialization and economic development.” 31 There appear to be a number of reasons for this pattern. As a state’s capabilities grow, its leaders tend to define their interests more expansively and to seek a greater degree of inºuence over what is going on around them. Rising powers seek not only to secure their frontiers but to reach out beyond them, taking steps to ensure access to markets, materials, and transportation routes; to protect their citizens far from home, defend their foreign friends and allies, and promulgate their values; and, in general, to have what they consider to be their legitimate say in the affairs of their region and of the wider world. This correlation between growing power and expanding interests has been succinctly summarized by Robert Gilpin: “A more wealthy and more powerful state . . . will select a larger bundle of security and welfare goals than a less wealthy and less powerful state.” 32 As they seek to assert themselves, rising powers are often drawn to challenge territorial boundaries, international institutional arrangements, and hierarchies of prestige that were put in place when they were relatively weak. Their leaders and people often feel that they were unfairly left out when the pie was divided up, and may even believe that, because of their prior weakness, they were robbed of what was rightfully theirs. Like Germany at the turn of the twentieth century, rising powers tend to want their “place in the sun,” and this often brings them into conflict with more established great powers, which are typically the architects and principal beneciaries of the existing international system. 33

Contention 2: Chinese ASAT 3/8

### Loss of US satellites would cause global economic and communication failure

Martel 2003

William C. Martel (Professor of National Security Affairs at Naval War College, RI) and Toshi Yoshihara (Research Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Massachusetts) 2003, Avoiding a Sino-American Space Race, Washington Quarterly: Autumn 2003 issue, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/440173\_915549761\_918386378.pdf

Conventional wisdom holds that space is so vital to national security and economic prosperity that the United States will do whatever it takes to protect its ability to use space. This rationale was enshrined in an influential report issued in January 2001 by a blue-ribbon commission on space,1 headed by Donald Rumsfeld before he became secretary of defense, which strongly advocated greater protection for U.S. space assets. The Rumsfeld Commission asserted that "[t]he security and economic well being of the United States and its allies and friends depend on the nation's ability to operate successfully in space. To be able to contribute to peace and stability in a distinctly different but still dangerous and complex global environment, the [United States] needs to remain at the forefront in space, technologically and operationally, as we have in the air, on land and at sea."2 Furthermore, the report argued that "the present extent of U.S. dependence on space, the rapid pace at which this dependence is increasing, and the vulnerabilities it creates, all demand that U.S. national security space interests be recognized as a top national security priority."3 In economic terms, the United States relies on space technologies and capabilities to support a wide range of commercial activities. Among the most important commercial assets in space is the constellation of Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation satellites. The precise timing signals emitted from the GPS allow automobiles, aircraft, and ships to locate their positions and establish the chronological order for virtually all financial transactions. Indeed, the global financial network would collapse without GPS. Equally important, commercial satellites carry most global communications. Despite the phenomenal growth rate of fiber optics networks, commercial satellites still dominate long-haul global communications.

Contention 2: Chinese ASAT 4/8

### US dependent on GPS satellites for national security

Martel 2003

William C. Martel (Professor of National Security Affairs at Naval War College, RI) and Toshi Yoshihara (Research Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Massachusetts) 2003, Avoiding a Sino-American Space Race, Washington Quarterly: Autumn 2003 issue, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/440173\_915549761\_918386378.pdf

The United States is extraordinarily dependent on space for its national security.4 The U.S. military has integrated space technologies into virtually all aspects of military operations, dramatically improving U.S. military power. Since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, which is widely considered the first "space war," the Pentagon has relied on electro-optical, hyperspectral, infrared, and radar satellites to see what is happening on the battlefield.5 Communication satellites allow military commanders to be connected to their forces, while the navigation signal from GPS satellites is essential for precision attacks. The air campaigns over Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq also demonstrated the value of space assets in modern warfare. Similarly, U.S. military commanders increasingly rely on imagery from commercially owned satellites; in fact, commercial satellites handled 80 percent of U.S. military communications during the Kosovo operation in 1999.6 20 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY • AUTUMN 2003 Downloaded By: [Optimised: University of California, Berkeley] At: 02:35 22 June 2011 Averting a Sino-U.S. Space Race I Government agencies often pay private firms to collect and process vital satellite imagery. For the first five months of the Afghan campaign, the Department of Defense paid the Space Imaging Corporation $1.9 million per month for images of Afghanistan collected by its Ilconos imaging satellite. This new commercial satellite market also creates vulnerabilities because of the ability of hostile governments or terrorist organizations to gain access to readily available satellite imagery. Such information could be used to harm U.S. interests in various ways, including attacking military bases and disrupting military operations.

Contention 2: Chinese ASAT 5/8

### If the US loses satellites to Chinese ASAT, Taiwan conflict will explode into US-China war.

Ian Easton 2009

Ian Easton, Research Fellow at the 2049 Project Institute, 2009. “The Great Game in Space,” http://www.project2049.net/documents/china\_asat\_weapons\_the\_great\_game\_in\_space.pdf

Any possible U.S. military contingency around the Taiwan Strait would require secure satellites as the U.S. becomes ever more reliant upon its space systems. Moreover, reconnaissance satellites are thought to limit the risk inherent in the build-up of forces that both the PRC and the U.S. could be expected to deploy to the region in the event of a crisis. However, if the U.S. was blinded as the result of a preemptive Chinese ASAT attack, the conflict could quickly escalate to a dangerous level. According to two experts on the subject, “if there is a great-power war in the twenty-first century, our crystal ball says that it will be between the United States and China over Taiwan, with a very serious potential for a horrible escalatory process.” 38 This underscores the gravity of the topic as well as the negative impact the Chinese shift towards fielding ASAT weapons could have.

### US and China likely to go to war over hegemony and security competition

Brzezinski, Mearsheimer 2005

 Zbigniew Brzezinski, John J. Mearsheimer, Foreign Policy, January/February 2005, Clash of the Titans

China cannot rise peacefully, and if it continues its dramatic economic growth over the next few decades, the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war. Most of China’s neighbors, including India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, and Vietnam, will likely join with the United States to contain China’s power. To predict the future in Asia, one needs a theory that explains how rising powers are likely to act and how other states will react to them. My theory of international politics says that the mightiest states attempt to establish hegemony in their own region while making sure that no rival great power dominates another region. The ultimate goal of every great power is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system.

Contention 2: Chinese ASAT 6/8

### Losing satellites would devastate our economy and cripple our military allowing competitors to get the edge, undermining our hegemony.

Charles H. Cynamon (USAF Major) 1999, Protecting Commercial Space Systems: A Critical National Security Issue, USAF study thesis, published by the USAF in April 1999, psu.edu

Qualitative assessment convinces us the economic implications of losing commercial space capability are real and too painful to bear. The May 1998 failure of the Galaxy IV satellite should stand as testament of the havoc an adversary might create. The more our economy becomes dependent on the information and services provided by these systems, the more significant the impacts are sure to be. The loss of a single Iridium satellite will not be catastrophic, not even significant. Many of these big low earth orbit (LEO) systems will provide on-orbit spares to enable near real-time switchover to the spare. However, we must be concerned with the potential for an “Informational Pearl Harbor” whether perpetrated by another 25 state or a terrorist intending to cripple our economy in the furtherance of their own interests. In this scenario, a peer competitor could attack our commercial space systems (a decisive point) to damage our economy (a center of gravity) via our financial markets. By devastating the US economy, an adversary might employ this diversionary tactic to turn our national focus inward. If US intervention can be prevented, our adversary’s goals are more likely to be achieved. A secondary benefit would be the negation of US military effectiveness in countering our adversary’s aggression. One might argue, an “Informational Pearl Harbor” is a worst case scenario we cannot afford to defend against. Unfortunately, the threat of an asymmetrical attack on the US is growing. The drug trafficking war on our southwestern border is analogous to the threats against our commercial systems. We know we can never completely negate the flow of drugs with surveillance and response alone. However, like the drug threat, we must take the necessary steps to reduce the threat to an acceptable level by using all of the tools at our disposal to identify, classify and, if possible, negate the sources before they manifest themselves.

Contention 2: Chinese ASAT 7/8

### Continued economic decline will result in global war.

Mead, 9 (Walter Russell Mead, [Henry A. Kissinger](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_A._Kissinger) senior fellow for [U.S. foreign policy](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._foreign_policy) at the Council on Foreign Relations. The New Republic, “Only Makes You Stronger,” February 4 2009.  http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2 AD 6/30/09) JM

Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well.If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.

Contention 2: Chinese ASAT 8/8

### Economic collapse causes nuclear war

Lewis 98, (Chris H., environmental historian, University of Colorado-Boulder), THE COMING AGE OF SCARCITY, 1998, p. 56 AD: 7-7-09 CS

Most critics would argue, probably correctly, that instead of allowing underdeveloped countries to withdraw from the global economy and undermine the economies of the developed world, the United States, Europe, Japan, and others will fight neocolonial wars to force these countries to remain within this collapsing global economy. These neocolonial wars will result in mass death, suffering, and even regional nuclear wars. If First World countries choose military confrontation and political repression to maintain the global economy, then we may see mass death and genocide on a global scale that will make the deaths of World War II pale in comparison. However, these neocolonial wars, fought to maintain the developed nations' economic and political hegemony, will cause the final collapse of our global industrial civilization. These wars will so damage the complex economic and trading networks and squander material, biological, and energy resources that they will undermine the global economy and its ability to support the earth's 6 to 8 billion people.

This would be the worst-case scenario for the collapse of global civilization.

## Contention 3: Hegemony 1/5

### US Heg is threatened by recent technologies developed by other nations

Schendzielos, Kurt M. 2008

 (ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES) [http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metad ataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA485553](http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA485553))

America is critically reliant upon space exploitation for a wide variety of activities. These range from strictly military capabilities such as intelligence gathering and secure communications to civilian financial transaction timing and remote Earth sensing for environmental analysis. Recent developments in anti-satellite technologies signal a dangerous threat to U.S. space dominance. Specifically, zero-warning threats such as ground-based lasers or direct-ascent kinetic-kill vehicles present the biggest challenge for which there is little or no defense. Until recently, the U.S. had been reasonably secure that its satellites were free from disablement. Unfortunately, many adversary nations acquired anti-satellite technologies and proliferated them; threatening permanent disablement of almost any American satellite. This monograph surveys available unclassified literature to assess current and emerging threats to U.S. satellites and evaluates open source defenses available, ranging from policy mechanisms to physical defenses. The level of protection is wanting and the monograph reviews various promising technologies in development currently that could be obtained to defend U.S. satellites in the timeframe commensurate with the proliferation and risk of anti-satellite threats. An advocacy suggesting that increased national resources and efforts be devoted to protecting Low-Earth Orbiting satellites from zero-warning attacks is proposed.

Contention 3: Hegemony 2/5

### US Space Weapons prevents hegemonic struggle and arms race

Everett C. Dolman, ’06 (Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the U.S. Air Force's School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS)”US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space” Sais Review http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais\_review/v026/26.1dolman.html#authbio )

Seizing the initiative and securing low-Earth orbit now, while the US is unchallenged in space, would do much to stabilize the international system and prevent an arms race is space. From low-Earth orbit (LEO), the enhanced ability to deny any attempt by another nation to place military assets in space, or to readily engage and destroy terrestrial ASAT capacity, makes the possibility of large scale space war and or military space races less likely, not more. Why would a state expend the effort to compete in space with a superpower that has the extraordinary advantage of holding securely the highest ground at the top of the gravity well? So long as the controlling state demonstrates a capacity and a will to use force to defend its position, in effect expending a small amount of violence as needed to prevent a greater conflagration in the future, the likelihood of a future war in space is remote. Moreover, if the US were willing to deploy and use a military space force that maintained effective control of space, and did so in a way that was perceived as tough, non-arbitrary, and efficient, such an action would serve to discourage competing states from fielding opposing systems. Should the US use its advantage to police the heavens (assuming the entire cost on its own), and allow unhindered peaceful use of space by any and all nations for economic and scientific development, over time its control of LEO could be viewed as a global asset and a public good. Much in the manner that the British maintained control of the high seas, enforcing international norms of innocent passage and property rights , the US could prepare outer space for a long-overdue burst of economic expansion.

Contention 3: Hegemony 3/5

### Missile Defense is key to US hegemony because it dissuades other countries from asserting greater regional and global roles

Marko Beljac ’03 (writer for Dissident Voice, PhD from Monash University, and is a professor at the University of Melbourne, studies the interface between science and global security October 21, 2003 “The Political Economy of Hegemony, Survival and Self Deterrence” http://dissidentvoice.org/Articles9/Beljac\_Military-Economy.htm)

Ballistic Missile Defense is also meant to shore up US hegemony in another important respect. The Bush administration's National Security Strategy of the United States as well as its Nuclear Posture Review state that US military dominance, including strategic nuclear dominance, is necessary in order to "dissuade" any major centre of world power from even thinking about asserting greater regional and global roles. The ultimate expression of this would be the attainment of a global first strike nuclear capability, most especially over China and Russia but also keeping a weary eye over a possible Euro deterrent. Such a capability would ensure that the US would not have a comparative advantage in the use of force but an absolute advantage. Supercomputer simulations of the likely major attack options of the US nuclear war plan (Single Integrated Operational Plan or SIOP), the ones focused on Russia, indicate that after Russian capabilities have been degraded by about 90% diminishing returns rapidly set in. Hence the achievement of a first strike capability requires more than just an offence. A defense is needed in order to deal with any remaining weapons left after a first strike. Ballistic Missile Defense, we may surmise, is an important part of providing a shield or shadow behind which the US may continue to use military force to uphold the system of world order, a necessary task given the fact that this system does not enjoy the support of the world's population. One of the most important aspects of BMD is that it acts as a Trojan horse for the militarization of space. The logic on this is quite obvious. Any space based missile defense system will be highly vulnerable to counter-measures such as attack satellites. The Bush administrations National Security Presidential Directive 23 accordingly states, "the Defense Department plans to employ an evolutionary approach to the development and deployment of missile defenses to improve our defenses over time. The United States will not have a final, fixed missile defense architecture. Rather, we will deploy an initial set of capabilities that will evolve to meet the changing threat and to take advantage of technological developments." This is a clear indication that the architecture for the militarization of space will be built around missile defense, using the defense of the defense as a rationale for placing offensive weapons in space.

Contention 3: Hegemony 4/5

### Space Weapons allow US to display dominance while being able to limit spending of imperial ambitions

Everett C. Dolman, ’10 (Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the U.S. Air Force's School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS)”The Case for Weapons in Space: A Geopolitical Assessment )

There is little reason to believe the United States will forego the capacity to influence decisions and events beyond its borders, with military force if necessary. Whether that capacity comes from space as well as the other military domains is undetermined. But, the operational deployment of space weapons would increase that capacity by providing for nearly instantaneous force projection worldwide. This force would be precise, unstoppable, and deadly. At the same time, the United States would forgo some of its ability to intervene directly in other states because the necessary budget tradeoffs would diminish its capacity to do so. A space-heavy American military would structurally limit potential American imperial ambitions while simultaneously extending its global leadership role. The need to limit collateral damage, the requirement for precision to allay the low volume of fire, and the tremendous cost of space weapons will ensure they are used for high-value, time-sensitive targets. An opposing state’s calculation of survival no longer would depend on interpreting whether or not the United States desires to be a good neighbor; whether it will invade and occupy its territory. Without sovereignty at risk, fear of a space-dominant American military will subside. The United States will maintain its position of hegemony as well as its security, and the world will not be threatened by the specter of a future American empire. Geopolitics is in ascendance because it provides practical guidance to those who perceive the world in realist terms. The primary tenet of geostrategy is simple. In order to dominate the battlespace, it is necessary to control the most vital positions. If the most vital positions cannot be controlled, then they must be contested. The opponent cannot have uninhibited access to them. This simple dictum, known by every strategist and tactician but articulated so clearly by Mackinder, is the essence of the geostrategist’s logic. Control is desirable, contestation is imperative. This dictum applies to every medium and theater of war.

Contention 3: Hegemony 5/5

### Heg good. US decline would be historically unprecedented and result in major conflict and global war

Robert A. Pape, ’09 ( Professor of political science at the University of Chicago. “Empire Falls,” The National Interest, January 2009 - February 2009)

THE UNITED States has always prided itself on exceptionalism, and the U.S. downfall is indeed extraordinary. Something fundamental has changed. America’s relative decline since 2000 of some 30 percent represents a far greater loss of relative power in a shorter time than any power shift among European great powers from roughly the end of the Napoleonic Wars to World War II. It is one of the largest relative declines in modern history. Indeed, in size, it is clearly surpassed by only one other great-power decline, the unexpected internal collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Most disturbing, whenever there are major changes in the balance of power, conflict routinely ensues. Examining the historical record reveals an important pattern: the states facing the largest declines in power compared to other major powers were apt to be the target of opportunistic aggression. And this is surely not the only possible danger from relative decline; states on the power wane also have a history of launching preventive wars to strengthen their positions. All of this suggests that major relative declines are often accompanied by highly dangerous international environments. So, these declines matter not just in terms of economics, but also because of their destabilizing consequences.

## Contention 4: Solvency 1/2

### Developing offensive counterspace capabilities, such as BMD, dissuade China from attacking US satellites.

Ashley Tellis 07, Senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007. 'China's Military Space Strategy', Survival, 49:3, 41 – 72, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/tellis_china_space1.pdf>

This has led some observers, such as US Senator Jon Kyl, to conclude that the solution to redressing emerging American space vulnerabilities in the context of competition with China lies in developing, among other things, US offensive counterspace capabilities. 90 These will almost certainly be required, if for no other reason than to deter Beijing’s use of anti-space weaponry and to hold at risk its own emerging assets in space, which are likely to become even more important for both economic and military purposes as China evolves into a great power. 91 Offensive American counterspace instruments serve the limited but critical purpose of raising the costs of China’s evolving space-denial strategy, increasing the probability that Beijing will desist from asymmetric attacks on US space assets.

### U.S. Space Weaponization key to leadership, security and intelligence.

Rozoff ‘09 Rick Rozoff is an analyst with Liberty News Radio. June 18, 2009. “Militarization Of Space: “Threat Of Nuclear War On Earth”. <http://www.opednews.com/articles/Militarization-Of-Space-T-by-Rick-Rozoff-090619-728.html>.

“Russian military experts see in this doctrine a disguised bid by the US for the weaponization of outer space. Anti-satellite weapons makes an integral part of the U.S. missile defence system.” The U.S. National Space Policy of 2006 states that “In this new century, those who effectively utilize space will enjoy added prosperity and security and will hold a substantial advantage over those who do not. Freedom of action in space is as important to the United States as air power and sea power. In order to increase knowledge, discovery, economic prosperity, and to enhance the national security, the United States must have robust, effective, and efficient space capabilities.” It further identifies goals of the policy to include the intention to: Strengthen the nation’s space leadership and ensure that space capabilities are available in time to further U.S. national security, homeland security, and foreign policy objectives Enable unhindered U.S. operations in and through space to defend our interests there Develop and deploy space capabilities that sustain U.S. advantage and support defense and intelligence transformation and provide, as launch agent for both the defense and intelligence sectors, reliable, affordable, and timely space access for national security purposes Support military planning and satisfy operational requirements as a major intelligence mission The same Russian general quoted above cited as an example of Washington’s space war plans the Pentagon’s downing of an American spy satellite in February of 2008, allegedly because it had become disabled.

Contention 4: Solvency 2/2

### The solution is to build a powerful BMD system.

Howard Kleinberg 2011, member of the graduate faculty of the Department of Public & International Affairs at University of North Carolina Wilmington, April 2011. US Army Field Artillery Association, “A Global Missile Defense 'networK': Terrestrial High-Energy Lasers and Aerospace Mirrors,” p. Lexis

Fortunately, this recently -revealed, real-world ASAT threat also brings a silver lining in it. As is the case with ballistic missiles, SBBMD weapons can also defend against ASATs. All ASATs, at least, whether direct-ascent or co-orbiting, must first be launched from the Earth's surface, regardless of the launch platform, and must first go through a boost phase. And since SB-BMD provides the single best way to stop any such missile attack from taking place, Robert Butterworth, suggests inhis article, "Assuring Space Support Despite ASATs," it would also provide the single best way to defend against ASAT attacks; same mission, different payload inside the threat missile. SB-BMDs could also intercept ASATs in other phases of their flight, at least within lower Earth orbit. For instance, the Missile Defense Agency's GMD can intercept ICBM warheads at the peak of their trajectories, some 1, 100 km (500 miles) or so. Similarly, an ASAT (direct-ascent or co-orbiting) on terminal approach towards a satellite in LEO would present a target of comparable size, density and velocity as a "mid-course" ICBM warhead (if not even larger), at a similar altitude, and possibly similar speed and trajectory. As a result, the AS AT could also be targeted and interceptedby a midcoursedefense-capable SB-BMD weapon, in addition to its primary role of boost-phase defense, giving a "second-chance" round of shots with which to try to stop any ASAT.

# Inherency

## No Space Weapons Now

### U.S. Lacks the space weapons to Back Up its Space Deterrence Policy

US State Department April 27th, 2007 (Study on Space Policy: Report of the International Security Advisory Board, [**http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/85263.pdf**](http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/85263.pdf))

The ideal way, if possible, to protect our space assets is to dissuade others from developing and deploying ways to threaten them, but given the many ways available and the difficulty of identifying potential threats, this does not provide sufficient confidence. Besides, the United States has not been successful in dissuading at least a small number of countries from developing and acquiring means to attack its space systems. These capabilities exist, and are growing and spreading. Next, we need to be able to deter attacks on our systems, but what attacks and how? To rely on deterrence requires that we clearly define our interests and what we will regard as threats to them. It requires that all states and non-state actors be convinced that the United States will not tolerate attacks on or deliberate interference with our vital space systems, and that the United States has effective means to deal with such threats. This requires that the United States possess highly credible and potentially highly damaging responses, such that we can place confidence in reliance on deterrence. The ISAB is worried that deterrence against attacks confined to U.S. space assets, even though vital, lacks the high confidence necessary. At this time, the United States relies on dissuasion and deterrence, because it lacks the means to defend our space assets and to deny successful attacks on them. This is so despite the requirement in the 1996 and 2006 space policy directives that the United States be able to "deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests."

# Solvency

## Solvency General 1/2

### The US Must defend its assets in space through Militarization

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis ’09 [Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Independent Working Group, 2009, “Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, & The 21st century” http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf]

Access to a secure space environment is indispensable if the United States is to deploy a robust, layered missile defense. It is essential not only to assure that the United States will be able to use space for missile defense, but also to develop the means to protect other space-based assets and infrastructure. Space has become an arena of crucial importance to the United States both for commercial purposes and for national security. Just as it must maintain capabilities to defend its interests in the air, at sea, and on land, the United States needs to defend its space-based assets. At the same time we must deny the hostile use of space by our enemies. Just as land, the seas, and the air have been conflict arenas, space is changing how wars are fought and where they will be fought.

### Space Militarization will greatly help the US

Lambakis ’07 [Steven Lambakis, Writer for Hoover Institution, 2007, “Leveraging Space to Improve Missile Defense”

There are three combat mission areas in particular that could beneﬁt signiﬁcantly from a more thoroughgoing exploitation of space—space control, offensive strike, and missile defense. I will focus on the latter. Adding a space-based layer of hit-tokill interceptors to enhance the performance of the newly deployed United States ballistic missile defense system could offer numerous military and diplomatic advantages. Highly effective defenses against ballistic missiles carrying nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction would offer a great pay-off over the long-term when one takes into account threat and national vulnerability to catastrophic attack.

### The US heavily relies on space and must militarize before anyone else does

Wilson ’01 [Tom Wilson, Space Commission Staff Member, 2001, “Threats to United States Space Capabilities” http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/report/2001/nssmo/article05.html]

The employment of space systems increases the effectiveness of terrestrial warfighters by performing as a force multiplier. In peace, space systems are a key element of deterrence. In crisis, they provide a wide spectrum of options to the National Command Authorities and Commanders in Chief while providing confidence to our allies. In war, space systems enhance combat effectiveness, reduce casualties and minimize equipment loss. At the same time, the United States' (U.S.) increasing economic and military dependence on space creates a vulnerability that is an attractive target for our foreign adversaries. If adversaries are able to employ offensive counterspace operations--operations which are intended to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy U.S. space systems--the force multiplication effect they provide would be reduced or eliminated. This could lead to more expensive victories or even to defeat.

Solvency General 2/2

### U.S. should Develop and Test Space Weapons to Avoid Strategic Surprise

John E. Hyten April 2000 (A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War: Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict in Space, Urbana-Champaign, IL, Program in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security, [**http://acdis.illinois.edu/Research/OPs/Hyten/html/cover.html**](http://acdis.illinois.edu/Research/OPs/Hyten/html/cover.html))

Failure to fully develop and test such capabilities and such weapons could make the United States vulnerable to surprises from other nations in the future. Gen. John L. Piotrowski, former commander of the U.S. Space Command said, on many occasions, that when it came to space weapons the one thing the United States couldn’t afford to be was second. A robust program developing capabilities for space control should be laid out to explore new technologies, integrate them into new weapons systems, and fully test them both in laboratory and field demonstrations. Since the goal would be not to deploy such weapons until absolutely required (and when that time would come is unknown), an urgent "crash" program is not needed. However, unless aggressive programs (in terms of funding and schedules) are developed, little progress will be made. In this time of strategic pause, programs can be implemented that are aggressive, but take the necessary time to time to fully explore different technologies and thoroughly test and check out systems when developed. If the systems actually reach maturity, and there is still no pressing need for deployment, they can be set aside until such a situation arises.

### Military Commanders and Policymakers need a range of options, including Space Weapons, to Respond to Attacks on U.S. Space Assets

Marc J. Berkowitz, March 2007 (Protecting America's Freedom of Action in Space." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2, [**http://www.spacedebate.org/hf/v3n2.pdf**](http://www.spacedebate.org/hf/v3n2.pdf))

Given that doing nothing in the face of enemy aggression in space is not an attractive option, and diplomatic demarches and economic sanctions may not achieve the desired results, national security planners must be prepared in advance with a range of options for the impending contingency of responding to hostile interference with US interests in space. The tailoring of responses involving military activities must take into account the possibility that the adversary may not own or operate spacecraft or find a tat-for-tat response sufficiently compelling to change its behavior. Deterring additional strikes and disarming the enemy's ability to inflict further damage on critical US space assets should take priority. Countering the enemy's space control weapons, C2, and targeting, as noted above, will be important approaches to achieving such a counterforce mission objective.

## ASAT Solvency 1/2

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## Hegemony Solvency 1/3

### America must act now, before its too late and the national and global community would be affected for the worse

Dolman ’05 [Everett C. Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies, “US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space” 9-14-05, http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20&%20Space.pdf]

Space weaponization is a critical and necessary component in the process of transformation well under way, a process that cannot be reversed. Once America demonstrated the capacity to strike precisely, it could only go back to the kind of indiscriminant targeting and heavy collateral damage that characterized pre-space warfare if it were engaged in a war of national survival. And if there are future technological, economic, and perhaps social benefits to be derived from developing and deploying weapons, they will certainly not come from increasing the stock of current systems. They will only come, if at all, from the development of new, highly complex and scientifically heuristic space, stealth, precision, and information systems. As leader of the international community, the United States finds itself in the unenviable position that it must make decisions for the good of all. On the issue of space weaponization, there appears no one best option. No matter the choice selected, there are those who will benefit and those who will suffer. The tragedy of American power is that it must make a choice, and the worst choice is to do nothing. And yet, in the process of choosing, it has a great advantage—the moral ambiguity of its people regarding the use of power. There is no question that corrupted power is a dangerous thing, but perhaps only Americans are so concerned with the possibility that they themselves will be corrupted. They fear what they could become. No other state has such potential for self-restraint. It is this introspection, this self-angst that makes America the best choice to lead the world today and tomorrow. It is not perfect, but perhaps it is perfectible.

### US dominance allows it to police the globe and keep other states under surveillance.

Bruce Sterling, April 2002 (“Peace is War”, Wired Magazine Volume 10, No.4, [**http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/10.04/sdi.html**](http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/10.04/sdi.html))

The US military improves every time it does this. Its skill today boggles the mind. Satellites detect objects on the ground and relay their coordinates to commanders in hardened bunkers thousands of miles away, who radio the data to Green Berets and Delta Force soldiers carrying laser pointers in the field. The pointers point. The bombers bomb. The enemy evaporates. The world's fourth-largest army: smashed. Battle-hardened Balkan fighters: smashed. The most feared and respected mountain bandits on earth: smashed. It's a new strategic reality. The Pentagon's role in world affairs has gone through an epochal transformation: from the Fulda Gap to the Highway of Death, from Agent Orange to GPS, from arsenal of democracy to global cop. When you're a cop, sometimes you kick doors in. Most of the time you stay on patrol. Outer space is where a global cop patrols. America's eyes, ears, and nerves are up there, all day, everyday, circling the blue yonder. Space vehicles are the ultimate asymmetrical asset. They can't be reached with a hijacked jet. They laugh at anthrax. The point of having cops is to manage robbers. The trick is to keep the robbers earthbound.

Hegemony Solvency 2/3

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### Historically, Dominance of a Regime (Air, Sea) by a Liberal Hegemonic State has been Beneficial for Commerce and Peace

Everett C. Dolman 2006 (U.S. Military Transformation and Weapons in Space. SAIS Review. XXVI, No. 1, [**http://spacedebate.org/argument/1466**](http://spacedebate.org/argument/1466))

There is reasonable historic support for the notion that the most peaceful and prosperous periods in modern history coincide with the appearance of a strong, liberal hegemon. America has been essentially unchallenged in its naval dominance over the last 60 years, and in global air supremacy for the last 15 or more. Today, there is more international commerce on the oceans and in the air than ever. Ships and aircraft of all nations worry more about running into bad weather than about being commandeered by a military vessel or set upon by pirates. Search and rescue is a far more common task than forced embargo, and the transfer of humanitarian aid is a regular mission. Lest one think this era of cooperation is predicated on intentions rather than military stability, recall that the policy of open skies advocated by every president since Eisenhower did not take effect until after the fall of the Soviet Union and the singular rise of American power to the fore of international politics. The legacy of American military domination of the sea and air has been positive, and the same should be expected for space.

Hegemony Solvency 3/3

### U.S. Command of the Global Commons Gives Other Nations Incentive to Accept U.S. Hegemony

Barry R. Posen, Summer 2003 (Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony, International Security. Vol. 28, No. 1, [**http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=6&tid=11093**](http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=6&tid=11093))

Command of the commons creates additional collective goods for U.S. allies. These collective goods help connect U.S. military power to seemingly prosaic welfare concerns. U.S. military power underwrites world trade, travel, global telecommunications, and commercial remote sensing, which all depend on peace and order in the commons. Those nations most involved in these activities, those who profit most from globalization, seem to understand that they benefit from the U.S. military position, which may help explain why the world’s consequential powers have grudgingly supported U.S. hegemony.

## Solvency-Military Defense key for GPS Satellites

### Space weapons are key to keeping military defense-GPS satellites help guide missiles more accurately than any other guiding system

Dolman ’05 [Everett C. Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies, “US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space” 9-14-05, http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20&%20Space.pdf]

The tremendous growth in space reliance from OSD to OIF is evident in the raw numbers. Despite engaging with a 60 percent smaller force (fewer than 200,000 personnel v. over 500,000), satellite communications usage increased four-fold, from 200 to 800 Mbps (Megabits per second) capacity. Newly possible operational concepts such as reach back (intelligence analysts in the United States sending information directly to frontline units) and reach forward (rear-deployed commanders able to direct battlefield operations in real time) reconfigured the tactical concept of war. The value of Predator and Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), completely reliant on satellite communications and navigation for their operation, was confirmed. Special Forces units, paradoxically tethered to satellite support and yet practically unfettered in their silent movements because of them, ranged throughout Iraq in independent operations that were extremely disruptive. But the paramount effect of space-enabled warfare was in the area of combat efficiency. Space assets allowed all weather, day-night precision munitions to provide the bulk of America’s striking power. Strikes from standoff platforms, including Vietnam-Era B-52s, allowed maximum target devastation with extraordinarily low death and collateral devastation. In ODS, 90 percent of munitions used were unguided. Of the ten percent that were guided, none was GPS capable. By OIF, 70 percent were precision guided, more than half of those from GPS satellites. In ODS, fewer than five percent of aircraft were GPS-equipped. By OIF, all were. During ODS, GPS proved so valuable to the army that it procured and rushed into theater over 4,500 commercial receivers to augment the meager 800 military-band ones it could deploy from stockpiles, an average of one per company (about 200 personnel). By OIF, each army squad (6-10 soldiers) had at least one military GPS receiver.

## Solvency-NMD Popular

### US Public in Favor of Missile Defense

Mackenzie Eaglen 2010(Research Fellow for National Security Studies at the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation. “Why Missile Defense is Still Needed” http://www.riponsociety.org/forum310g.htm)

A poll conducted by Opinion Research Corporation this past May reveals that 88 percent of the respondents believe that the federal government should field a system for countering ballistic missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction. However, many also mistakenly believe we already have what is needed to defeat a range of threats.

## Solvency-Enhanced Missile Defence 1/3

### Space Militarization will allow for enhanced missile defense

Lambakis ’07 [Steven Lambakis, Writer for Hoover Institution, 2/1/2007, “Missile Defense from Space” http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6124]

Yet given the efficiencies space offers, and given the unpredictable, catastrophic, and global nature of threats we expect to face, it makes sense to explore the possible benefits of taking other combat missions to space. Once the benefits of active space defense programs and operations are made plain, the support of the American people will be forthcoming. There are several space combat mission areas of interest to the future defense of the United States, including space control, offensive strike, and ballistic missile defense. Each combat mission offers very different operational and strategic possibilities, and each should be evaluated separately and judged independently. Recognizing that weapons that leverage Earth orbits can make different contributions to national defense strategy, lumping them together in order to draw a general conclusion about the prudence of deploying “weapons in space” makes little sense. Our progress in this area will depend greatly on our ability to mature our rhetoric so that we can make meaningful distinctions. So I will focus here on the possible advantages of adding a space-based layer leveraging hit-to-kill interceptors to the newly deployed U.S. missile defense system. Highly effective missile defenses would appear to offer a very significant payoff over the long term when one takes threat and national vulnerability to catastrophic attack into consideration

### Space Weapons give Military Commanders more Options, Enhancing Deterrence and Diplomacy

Steven Lambakis, 2002 (Putting Military Uses of Space in Context, Future Security in Space: Commercial, Military, and Arms Control Trade-Offs., Center For Nonproliferation Studies, [**http://cns.miis.edu./pubs/opapers/op10/op10.pdf**](http://cns.miis.edu./pubs/opapers/op10/op10.pdf))

There are sound political and strategic justifications for looking to space. First, a weapon that exploits Earth's orbit may increase the number of foreign policy and military options available to our leaders and commanders. More options mean that a leader may not be forced to take a more destructive or weaker course of action, that he has choices on how his country should act in a dynamic, complex, and often dangerous world. Effective military options, in other words, can work to improve deterrence and stability and help leaders deal more intelligently, even more diplomatically, with surprises.

Solvency-Enhanced Missile Defence 2/3

### Building a powerful BMD System will greatly increase defense

Howard Kleinberg, member of the graduate faculty of the Department of Public & International Affairs at University of North Carolina Wilmington, April 2011. US Army Field Artillery Association, “A Global Missile Defense 'networK': Terrestrial High-Energy Lasers and Aerospace Mirrors,” p. Lexis

Fortunately, this recently -revealed, real-world ASAT threat also brings a silver lining in it. As is the case with ballistic missiles, SBBMD weapons can also defend against ASATs. All ASATs, at least, whether direct-ascent or co-orbiting, must first be launched from the Earth's surface, regardless of the launch platform, and must first go through a boost phase. And since SB-BMD provides the single best way to stop any such missile attack from taking place, Robert Butterworth, suggests inhis article, "Assuring Space Support Despite ASATs," it would also provide the single best way to defend against ASAT attacks; same mission, different payload inside the threat missile. SB-BMDs could also intercept ASATs in other phases of their flight, at least within lower Earth orbit. For instance, the Missile Defense Agency's GMD can intercept ICBM warheads at the peak of their trajectories, some 1, 100 km (500 miles) or so. Similarly, an ASAT (direct-ascent or co-orbiting) on terminal approach towards a satellite in LEO would present a target of comparable size, density and velocity as a "mid-course" ICBM warhead (if not even larger), at a similar altitude, and possibly similar speed and trajectory. As a result, the AS AT could also be targeted and interceptedby a midcoursedefense-capable SB-BMD weapon, in addition to its primary role of boost-phase defense, giving a "second-chance" round of shots with which to try to stop any ASAT.

### Outer space is a new battlefield open to each country in the world. The United States needs to use this opportunity to get one step further than their potential enemies.

Steve Lambakis, March 2007 (Professor at the Hoover Institute, Missile Defense from Space, [**http://www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-02177.pdf**](http://www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-02177.pdf))

National economic and commercial interrelationships thrive on the flow of invisible ones and zeros through space channels, so that timely, agile intercontinental trade is now taken for granted. U.S. and coalition forces routinely leverage earth-circling platforms to enhance military capabilities: the Global Positioning System for improved navigation and precision timing, reconnaissance and early warning sensors, and highbandwidth communications. Space, moreover, is an open arena, a global commons increasingly used by many countries for military purposes. The proliferation of space technologies offers foreign governments and nonstate entities unparalleled opportunities to enhance diplomatic and military influence over the U.S. and strike with strategic effect. Potential enemies of the United States today have improved “vision” over the U.S. homeland and battlefield activities, a better sense of direction and geographic position, and an improved ability to mobilize forces and coordinate activities. With battle space now reaching up to at least 22,000 miles above the Earth — the orbital altitudes for early warning and communications satellites — protecting ourselves from future attacks will depend mightily on space power.

Solvency-Enhanced Missile Defence 3/3

### Space Weapons work and are key to locating threats that are posed to the US and its allies

-Lambakis ’07 [Steven Lambakis, Writer for Hoover Institution, 2/1/2007, “Missile Defense from Space” http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6124]

While space assets generally follow predictable orbital paths, they do provide a unique form of mobility — they can be present and persistent over many places on the globe. Indeed, in 2007, the Missile Defense Agency will begin demonstrations with two satellites hosting sensors designed to provide very fine surveillance and tracking data on in-flight ballistic missiles and payloads. A constellation of these satellites would become the sensor backbone of a global missile defense capability and would make possible the global mission endorsed by the Bush administration: the protection of the United States, its deployed forces, and allies and friends. Similarly, a space-based interceptor layer would enable a global on-call missile defense capability and a timely response to rapidly evolving threats, even threats emanating from unpredicted locations with very different azimuths from those we plan to be able to defeat today. A space-defense capability also would allow the country to engage longer-range threats originating from deep within the interior of a threat country.

### Space Weapons are the only viable option for defense against the various threats that other countries pose

Gruselle ’07 [Bruno Gruselle, Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, 2007, “The Final Frontier: Missile Defense in Space?”

http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-art2600.pdf]

Defending against large numbers of missiles or long-range systems poses a number of challenges that cannot be ignored. And the 2006 hostilities in Lebanon and Isreal have shown the limit of classical kinetic means to defeat large salvos of incoming missiles. Only two possible responses to these threats remain. • Direct action against launch capabilities. The number of launch platforms is usually very limited compared to the volume of missiles, the usual ratio being 1:30. Destroying launch platforms would certainly curb the ability of an adversary to make full use of its complete arsenal. Yet to accomplish such a deed a state would need a very rapid detection–action loop so that it could strike and destroy launch capabilities as they are used. 21 • An almost endless number of interceptions. For a defence system to rely on shooting down incoming missiles, it will need a large supply of interceptors at its disposal. 22 This implies energy weapons such as lasers, which expend only power in their operation. Space-based assets could clearly play a role in both responses. Space-based sensors could give the necessary alert and tracking data to the interception network that land-based sensors would not be able to obtain. More important, space-based interceptors could be the most appropriate means to target long-range missiles fired from deep within a country’s territory or to rapidly destroy the launch capabilities of a rogue state set on defeating limited land-based interception system inventories

## Solvency-Missile Interception

### If the US does not deploy space weapons, an enemy can successfully launch a missile at the US with no way of stopping it

Lambakis ’07 [Steven Lambakis, Writer for Hoover Institution, 2/1/2007, “Missile Defense from Space” http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6124]

It is also known that enemies of the United States can put a nuclear weapon over U.S. territory using a ballistic missile. The detonation of this weapon at a high altitude could unleash an electromagnetic pulse that would wipe out satellite and airborne navigation, intelligence, and communications systems and impede any U.S. military response to the aggression. Such a pulse of energy would disable or destroy the unprotected technological infrastructure of a region or the nation. According to the emp Commission, “a regional or national recovery would be long and difficult and would seriously degrade the safety and overall viability of our nation. . . . [A]t some point the degradation of infrastructure could have irreversible effects on the country’s ability to support its population.” Space-based interceptors may be the only effective way to counter this threat and mitigate the effects of an electromagnetic pulse resulting from the intercept. Engaging the missile close to its launch point would release the resulting explosion of gamma rays closer to the attacker’s territory. Relying on an intercept in space, in the midcourse of a missile’s flight, risks damaging unprotected satellites (i.e., just about all commercial and civilian satellites), regardless of who owns them.

### If the US adapts to Space Weapons they will be able to deflect missiles with relative ease

Dinerman ’08 [Taylor Dinerman, The Space Review, 9/1/2008 “Space Based Missile Defense and the Psychology of Warfare” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1205/1]

In future wars, those who are fighting against the West—today Iran or North Korea, tomorrow, who knows?—will use ballistic missiles not only to terrorize enemy civilian populations but to build morale among their own forces and people. Missile defense is the key to winning this critical psychological battle. As long as their missiles are being shot out of the sky, claims that they are hurting the enemy and thus filling people’s need for revenge can be shown to be utterly empty. This, however, cannot be done with terminal phase defense weapons. To hit a missile or a warhead that is descending towards its target may be a feat of technological skill, but it does nothing to decrease the emotional satisfaction that comes from striking a hated enemy. Midcourse interceptors such as the US GBI or the Israeli Arrow are better, but the best way to publicly humiliate those who are launching Scud-type missiles is to shoot them down as soon after they leave the launch pad as possible. The only weapon now in development that will—in theory—be able to do this is the Airborne Laser (ABL), which the Missile Defense Agency plans to test next year.

## Solvency-Prevents Asteroid Impacts

### Space weapons prevents asteroid/comet impacts

[**Kunich, John C.**](http://www.spacedebate.org/author/2083) "[**Planetary Defense: The Legality of Global Survival**](http://afls14.jag.af.mil/dscgi/ds.py/Get/File-71020/part4.DOC)." [**Air Force Law Review**](http://www.spacedebate.org/source/Air%20Force%20Law%20Review). Vol. 41 (1997): 119-160.

Mitigation, or response, could take several forms, depending in part on the nature and magnitude of a given threat, once it has been detected and evaluated. One possible response would be evacuation of the impact zone, to minimize loss of life. A closely related response is preparation to minimize the resultant damage due to fires, tidal waves, earthquakes, acid rain, and other after-effects, and to provide medical care to the victims. These forms of response, though important, would be grossly inadequate when dealing with a truly massive threat such as those discussed previously. In the event of a massive strike from space, the resultant apocalyptic disasters would render such efforts as fruitless as rearranging the deck chairs while the Titanic sinks. The only meaningful response to a massive strike is some form of direct intervention. Direct intervention may entail deflection or destruction of the approaching space object to prevent or mitigate any impact with Earth. The means for achieving this fall partially within the realm of existing military capabilities, and partially within the ambit of technologies superficially similar to some proposed/experimental aspects of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Depending on the physical size and other attributes of the threatening object, a variety of countermeasures might be effective in diverting or destroying it. Earth-based nuclear devices such as Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) or their submarine-launched counterparts might suffice. Non-nuclear options conceivably would work, including kinetic energy or laser systems such as were explored under SDI. Some of these may require space-basing to be effective, while others may work in an Earth-based mode.

### Deterrence prevents rogue state nuclear launches

LeFevre, Alexi A. "A Strategic Conversation about National Missile Defense." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 2, No. 4 (Winter 2008): 108-118

There is no reason to think that strategic deterrence would fail against current national actors. Deterrence as a strategy requires that the players involved hold their own continued survival as the highest national interest. Given the self-interested actions of the current regimes in Iran, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Pakistan, and others, it is logical to assume that these countries would be more willing to accept a status quo or move towards some form of reconciliation rather than initiate a hostile nuclear attack that would undoubtedly result in a devastating response. Today, the path of conciliation can be seen when we look at Libya’s decision to give up its nuclear weapons, North Korea’s destruction of part of its Yongbyon nuclear plant, Pakistan’s arrest of A. Q. Khan, and so forth. While all of these actions certainly are not final products, they are steps in the right direction. Furthermore, critics of deterrence argue that it becomes a nonplayer when one considers irrational or suicidal actors, most often seen in terrorist organizations. As I previously discussed, it is highly unlikely that these groups would use nuclear missiles as their method of attack, and an NMD would provide no defense against this.

## Nuclear Conflict Impact Turn

### Greater accuracy and speed of conventional weapons prevents nuclear conflict

Sugden, Bruce M. "Speed Kills: Analyzing the Deployment of Conventional Ballistic Missiles." International Security. Vol. 34, No. 1 (Summer 2009): Vol. 34, No. 1, Pages 113-146.

The second rationale for CBMs in an expanded mission is that a wider array of conventional strike options will allow the United States to avoid crossing the nuclear threshold; they will provide usable tools for escalation that are proportionate to the threat that needs to be deterred or defeated. In contrast, the use of nuclear weapons against most anticipated non-WMD threats is deemed disproportionate. Using nuclear weapons, even against WMD targets, will engender a host of undesired political consequences. Therefore, the threat to launch a conventional strike would be more credible, which is conducive to managing the escalation of the use of force below the nuclear threshold and to ensuring the success of deterrence. This line of thinking echoes the Cold War doctrine of flexible response, wherein the United States and its allies were prepared to fight at all levels of war to deter the Soviet Union from all forms of military aggression. A U.S. Department of Defense official, for example, declared in a 2002 briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review that "the non-nuclear strike forces, we believe, have the potential, if fully exploited, fully developed, to reduce our dependency on nuclear forces for the offensive-strike leg.

(This is circumstantial and not in direct reference to space platform weapons. Use with proper judgment.)

### China will weaponize

Meteyer, David O. August 2005(The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. INSS Occasional Paper 60. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies)

The military only system criterion represents one portion of the overall military, economic, and diplomatic conditions necessary for the successful dissuasion of China’s space weapons. Other conditions and their respective criteria, summarized in Table 6, are necessary. Conditions include the unassailability of US systems, the overwhelming US economy, and the strong interdependence of US– PRC relations. Unfortunately, it is neither possible nor highly likely that many of the conditions necessary for successful dissuasion exist now or will in the future. For example, it is nearly impossible for the Pentagon to make its systems unassailable, whether it is through advanced defensive mechanisms, replenishment, or alternative source capabilities. The economic condition looks similarly unattainable since the China–US economic gap is rapidly closing. In the future, China may surpass the United States as the biggest economy in the world and would place itself in a position to develop more and better space systems.

## Solvency-Only Space BMD Solves 1/2

### Space assets critical

Meteyer, David O. The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. INSS Occasional Paper 60. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005.

A number of data points underscore US dependency on space as well as its integration into operations across the entire spectrum of US forces. The GPS precision-guided munitions (PGM) used in both Desert Strom and Iraqi Freedom demonstrates this point. In Desert Strom 8% of munitions were PGM, as compared to 68% in Iraqi freedom. In addition to supporting PGM, GPS also aides in the prevention of fratricide, enhances close air support (CAS) employment, and fosters economy of force through successful blue force tracking (BFT) capabilities, among other benefits. Satellite communications (SATCOM) usage levels also emphasizes the significant US dependence on space operations. US reliance on satellite communications during Desert Strom was paltry: one Mbps per every 5,000 troops deployed. For Iraqi Freedom that number swelled to 51.1 Mbps. The massive SATCOM bandwidth requirement supported such activities as Iraqi target imagery dissemination, Combined and Joint C2, Predator UAV data feeds, and Combatant Commander video-teleconferences.

### Alternative solutions fail to defend satellites

Lewis, Jeffrey. "Rumsfeld Aims for the Stars: An Arms Control Alternative to the Pentagon's Plans in Space." Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. (Winter/Spring 2002)

The lopsided exchange ratios are magnified by another disadvantage to defense. Since the attacker selects the mode of attack, satellites must be defended against all choices available to the attacker. Many satellite defenses, however, compete with one another. For example, defeating a co-orbital interceptor requires hardening a satellite and adding fuel. This will add size, making the satellite a larger target for direct ascent weapons that are too fast and destructive to be defeated by hardening or maneuverability. Miniaturizing satellites and distributing functions across a network requires that the constrellation fly in formation, compromising maneuverability.

### Satellites easily destroyed

Sterner, Eric. Beyond the Stalemate in the Space Commons. . Washington, D.C.: Center for New American Security, January 2010.

Space systems are extraordinarily fragile. Satellites are vulnerable to kinetic and directed energy attacks. Even modest damage to subsystems, such as optics or solar arrays, may be functionally catastrophic to an entire satellite. In general, physical damage to space elements cannot be repaired and usually proves fatal, while even software failures can quickly become terminal because the margins for error aboard a spacecraft are so small. Communications links and ground- based command and control elements are also vulnerable and may be easier targets for a potential adversary. While it is possible to attack each space system, or its elements, individually, their location in orbit may also make them vulnerable as a class to a single strike that degrades or destroys multiple platforms. The Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack noted that satellites in Low- Earth Orbit might be particularly susceptible to a nuclear-weapons-generated EMP attack that significantly increases radiation levels in the Earth’s natural radiation belts.

Solvency-Only Space BMD Solves 2/2

### Space BMD proven and developed

Unknown author July 26, 2006 “Coyle takes aim at Brilliant Pebbles”. The Claremont Institute: Claremont, CA

Would Brilliant Pebbles work? Coyle does not mention that Brilliant Pebbles had successfully completed its simulation stage and was ready to move to the proof-of-concept, prototype, and performance testing stages when it was effectively starved of funding as the Clinton administration came to power. Nor does he mention that in 1994 NASA launched a deep-space probe mission known as “Clementine,” constructed with first-generation Brilliant Pebbles hardware. The mission, which cost $80 million, effectively “space-qualified” Brilliant Pebbles technology, even though the missile defense program had already been eliminated.
        Would Brilliant Pebbles be too expensive? The newly released report by the Independent Working Group entitled Missile Defense, the Space Relationship and the Twenty-First Century—the report cited by the UPI piece—puts the total cost of a 1,000-satellite constellation of Brilliant Pebbles at $16 billion, based on the fully approved Defense Acquisition Board plan from 1991. The figure includes the costs of developing, testing, deploying, and operating Brilliant Pebbles over a 20-year period using a low-to-moderate risk, event-driven acquisition schedule. Many would agree that $16 billion dollars is a small price to pay for the protection of the U.S. and its allies from ballistic missile attack and nuclear devastation.

## Solvency-Space BMD Proven and Ready (Brilliant Pebbles)

### Space BMD proven and developed

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### Brilliant Pebbles technology space-tested

Hoffman, Ian September 10, 2002. (“Physicists' war games led to brilliant space defense plan” Oakland Tribune.

Teller and Wood sold the idea in Washington and translated it into hardware, with Wood towing a sample pebble on a cart through the corridors of power. At the time, wags joked that after smart rocks and Brilliant Pebbles could only come "genius dust." Critics rolled their eyes and denounced the weaponization of the heavens. But of all SDI's beams and schemes, the pebbles came closest to the reality. Its major components were tested next to exploding nuclear bombs in the Nevada desert. They flew to the moon and mapped it in the Clementine mission

### The Soviets couldn’t counter Brilliant Pebbles

Hoffman, Ian September 10, 2002. (“Physicists' war games led to brilliant space defense plan” Oakland Tribune.

In 1991, former Soviet weaponeers told Canavan that they labored hard but couldn't theorize a cost-effective assault against Brilliant Pebbles. "They said they realized at their level of technology they could not beat the Brilliant Pebble and it would bankrupt them to even try. So they didn't try."

### Brilliant Pebbles technology space-tested

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## Solvency – First Mover Key 1/2

### Other countries would not try to counter the American nuclear weapons, as long as America is the first to deploy

Dolman ’05 [Everett C. Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies, “US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space” 9-14-05, http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20&%20Space.pdf]

Indeed, it is concern for the unanticipated arrival of technology X that initially motivates my own preference for a policy advocating immediate deployment of space weapons. So long as America is the state most likely to acquire a breakthrough technology in this area, my concern is limited to the problem of letting technology take us where it will. But what if an enemy of democratic liberalism should suddenly acquire the means to place quickly and cheaply multiple weapons into orbit? The advantages gained from controlling the high ground of space would accrue to it as surely as to any liberal state, and the concomitant loss of military power from the denial of space to our already-dependent military force could cause the immediate demise of the extant international system. The longer the US dithers on its responsibilities, the more likely a potential opponent could seize low-earth orbit before America could respond. And America would respond … finally. But would another state? If America were to weaponize space today, it is unlikely that any other state or group of states would find it rational to counter in kind. The entry cost to provide the infrastructure necessary is too high; hundreds of billions of dollars, at minimum. The years of investment it would take to achieve a minimal counter-force capability—essentially from scratch—would provide more than ample time for the US to entrench itself in space, and readily counter preliminary efforts to displace it. The tremendous effort in time and resources would be worse than wasted. Most states, if not all, would opt not to counter US deployments in kind. They might oppose US interests with asymmetric balancing, depending on how aggressively America uses its new power, but the likelihood of a hemorrhaging arms race in space should the US deploy weapons there—at least for the next few years—is extremely remote.

### Various Countries including China and India already have technology that could be used to attack US Satellites

Major Adkins ’05 [Major Larry Adkins, High Frontier Journal, 9-15-2005, “ Space Superiority: Does the US Really Have It? http://www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-070622-057.pdf]

Technologically, our adversaries have the capability to blind imagery satellites or jam satellite signals. 4 According to Leonard David’s article in Space.com, laser technology is rapidly becoming available to blind imagery satellites. 5 Countries and individuals have also shown they are willing and able to deliberately disrupt communication satellites. In 1997, India jammed Tongasat because of a disagreement over possession of a geosynchronous orbit slot. 6 In 1998, MED-TV accused Turkey of jamming its Kurdish broadcast channel that is beamed to 70 countries. 7 In early 2003, the FBI charged six people for selling software and decryption devices that allowed consumers to “steal” satellite television signals (e.g., DirectTV) which they had not paid for. 8 As late as the summer of 2003, the Iranian Embassy in Cuba reportedly jammed Voice of America satellite broadcasts being sent to Iran

Solvency – First Mover Key 2/2

### US space militarization key to counter threats from China and Russia.

Bill Gertz, 1/17/2007 (editor of Washington Times, Moscow, Beijing eye space weapons; Senate alerted to Pentagon fears, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/>)

China and Russia are developing space weapons and are among several nations working on systems to threaten U.S. satellites with lasers or missiles, says the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. In Senate testimony last week, Army Lt. Gen. Michael Maples for the first time raised Pentagon concerns about secret Chinese and Russian space weapons programs. "Russia and China continue to be the primary states of concern regarding military space and counterspace programs," Gen. Maples said at the annual threat briefing of the Senate intelligence committee. Gen. Maples said that "several countries continue to develop capabilities that have the potential to threaten U.S. space assets, and some have already deployed systems with inherent anti-satellite capabilities, such as satellite-tracking laser range-finding devices and nuclear-armed ballistic missiles." Other countries are working on improving space-object tracking and "kinetic or directed energy weapons capabilities." Gen. Maples did not discuss the reported testing of a Chinese anti-satellite laser against a U.S. satellite, which triggered high-level Bush administration worries about Beijing's growing space-weapons program. U.S. officials said details about the Chinese anti-satellite laser shot remain classified so as not to alert China about U.S. knowledge of what intelligence officials say may have been a test shot of an anti-satellite weapon. China has developed several types of ground-based lasers with Russian and Israeli technology, U.S. officials have said. Russia developed anti-satellite weapons during the Cold War, and U.S. officials think the Russian military is continuing work on the weapons, which include both anti-satellite missiles and ground-based lasers. Both Russia and China deny that they are building space weapons and have sought to curb U.S. space defenses through a proposed international ban on weapons in space. The Air Force in 2004 deployed the 76th Space Control Squadron, which can disrupt or knock out foreign satellites using electronic jammers from the ground. Nations other than Russia and China that have space capabilities in key areas also "will acquire military and commercial space-based assets," Gen. Maples said. "Increasing levels of international cooperation, along with the growing number of commercial space consortia, is allowing the proliferation of advanced satellite technologies and knowledge of space systems operations to become available to nations lacking a domestic space capability," he said. Gen. Maples said that building space weapons is "financially taxing" and that "most countries assessed to be pursuing these capabilities are not expected to acquire them within the next few years." He warned, however, that less-developed states and "nonstate entities" also "are pursuing more limited and asymmetric approaches that do not require excessive financial resources or a high-tech industrial base."

## Solvency – Militarization 🡺 Deterrence

### If the US militarizes space, the impact of that presence will deter other countries from doing something similar

Whiting ’02 [Stephen N. Whiting, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, June 2002, “Policy, Influence, and Diplomacy: Space as a Natural Element” http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/saas/whiting.pdf]

The sixth component of space assets’ diplomatic power is the ability to shape behavior and exert influence through presence. As defined in the Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia, ìForward presence activities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting United States influence and access. Put another way, presence is the proximity of space assets to a location, such that international actors change their behavior or are deterred based solely on the location of space assets. The ability to influence other states due to the presence of space assets, or any military force, is based on the impact of those forces on other states’ decision making, not on the distance of our forces to a given geographic location, nor on the ability of other states to physically see our forces. Although the joint definition does not include space assets, it is clear that space assets can achieve some of the same effects as forward deployed terrestrial forces although the fact that space assets cannot physically punish another state, a capability possessed by terrestrial forces, is an important distinction. To be sure, the ability to punish with terrestrial forces may have a stronger impact on an adversary’s decision calculus, but this does not preclude the ability of space assets to also affect that decision calculus through their presence. Space assets do provide some advantages over terrestrial forces, however, such as their tremendous field of view which allows them to exert presence over a wider area than terrestrial forces

# Chinese ASAT 2AC Extensions

## Uniqueness 1/3

### China is prepared for war with the US

Capaccio 9 (Tony, Staff Writer, Bloomberg, “China’s New Weapons May Threaten U.S. Bases, Ships, Gates Says”, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=am6ExRzB1cjo) MAT

China is developing new weapons that could threaten the U.S. military presence in the Pacific, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said today. “We should be concerned less with their potential ability to challenge the U.S. -- fighter-to-fighter or ship-to-ship -- and more with their ability to disrupt our freedom of movement and narrow our strategic options,” Gates told an audience of airpower advocates during a speech in suburban Maryland. His comments reflect a growing concern within the U.S. intelligence and military community over the range and sophistication of China’s weaponry. Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair told the Senate Intelligence Committee in April that China has “dramatically expanded” its ability to hack into U.S. government computers. “Information warfare has become the pillar of China’s military modernization program and war planning,” Blair said

### China will weaponize

Meteyer, David O. August 2005(The Art of Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons. INSS Occasional Paper 60. USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies)

The military only system criterion represents one portion of the overall military, economic, and diplomatic conditions necessary for the successful dissuasion of China’s space weapons. Other conditions and their respective criteria, summarized in Table 6, are necessary. Conditions include the unassailability of US systems, the overwhelming US economy, and the strong interdependence of US– PRC relations. Unfortunately, it is neither possible nor highly likely that many of the conditions necessary for successful dissuasion exist now or will in the future. For example, it is nearly impossible for the Pentagon to make its systems unassailable, whether it is through advanced defensive mechanisms, replenishment, or alternative source capabilities. The economic condition looks similarly unattainable since the China–US economic gap is rapidly closing. In the future, China may surpass the United States as the biggest economy in the world and would place itself in a position to develop more and better space systems.

Uniqueness 2/3

### China has rapidly modernized in order to compete with the US

Zhang 4 (Baohui, Ph.D and Prof of Political Science at Univ of Texas, Asian Perspective, “American Hegemony and China’s U.S. Policy”, 28 (3), p. 86-89) MAT

China’s rapid modernization has increased its global influence at an impressive pace. However, this rising China faces the question of how to manage its relations with the world’s greatest power, the United States. China’s national interests will be profoundly affected by that relationship. In recent years, the bilateral relationship has seen much uncertainty and in fact, in both countries there have been hot debates over policy choices toward each other. In the United States, the debate centers on whether a rising China will be a revisionist state that seeks to change the world order, or a status-quo state that will respect and play by international rules. Some observers argue that China is a revisionist state and thus the United States must contain China to suppress its power. Most, however, believe that through engagement the United States can influence China to play by the accepted rules of the world community.1 Chinese policymakers are concerned with a similar question, which is how China should best pursuer its interests in a world dominated by American hegemony. Chinese policy choices, they believe, should be based on both an interpretation of American intentions toward China and a projected balance of power between the two countries in the future. In theory, benign or hostile U.S. intentions, and a favorable balance of power, would result in rational choices of different policies toward the United States. Unfortunately, it is widely known that discerning one country’s intention toward another is difficult at best. It is hampered by prejudice, lack of intention, and insufficient communication. Chinese policymakers and experts are inevitably divided with regard to their interpretation of American intentions toward China.2 National capabilities or power, on the other hand, are substantially easier to measure. This article argues that China’s policy toward the United States must incorporate the power factor. In fact, this is the classic perspective of the realist tradition in world politics. It emphasizes the central role of power in the choices of foreign policies. The articles raises the question, given the projected balance of power between China and the United States, what is China’s most realistic policy to maximize its national interests and global influence? One policy pursues rivalry and competition with the United States. The other policy recognizes American global dominance and promotes China’s interests through cooperation with the United States. This article argues that the only realistic policy choice for China is the cooperation strategy. This view is based on the projected balance of power between the two countries. In essence, it recognizes that China will be unlikely to match the power of the United States. The following sections will examine the Chinese view of the future balance of power versus the United States and the appropriate responses from China.

Uniqueness 3/3

### China competes with and challenges the US with its space programs

Ian Easton, Research Fellow at the 2049 Project Institute, 2009. “The Great Game in Space,” http://www.project2049.net/documents/china\_asat\_weapons\_the\_great\_game\_in\_space.pdf

China has been devoting significant resources to directed-energy weapons systems, particularly ground-based lasers, and have used them to target U.S. reconnaissance satellites. In August and September of 2006, China used high-powered, ground-based lasers to blind or “paint” U.S. reconnaissance satellites on several occasions as they passed over China. Reports stated that these were either ASAT tests or relatively “low-power” laser ranging devices intended to precisely determine satellite orbits for ASAT targeting purposes. 22 According to one account, the “Chinese routinely turn powerful lasers skywards, demonstrating their potential to dazzle or permanently blind spy satellites.” This report went on to quote Gary Payton, a senior Pentagon official who said “They let us see their lasers. It is as if they are trying to intimidate us.” 23 According to a Hong Kong news website, China has at least one very large “ASAT laser artillery” weapon deployed | The Great Game in Space | China’s evolving ASAT Weapons Programs and Their Implications for Future U.S. Strategy| 5 somewhere in its North Western territory, possibly somewhere high in Xinjiang’s Tianshan Mountains where there would be far less atmospheric interference to deal with. 24 China has also been developing (and in some cases fielding) cyber warfare units to hack into space control systems; co-orbital ASAT systems to covertly disable enemy satellites; radiofrequency weapons to jam satellite signals; and high-powered microwave weapons to destroy satellites from Earth. Some of these systems have been in development for over a decade, and the cyber warfare and laser programs are particularly mature. 25 In terms of co-orbital ASAT development, China’s recent BX-1 micro-satellite test, which was carried out as a part of the manned Shenzhou-7 mission, demonstrated technology that can be used as a base for future covert satellite inspection missions, as well as co-orbital ASAT attacks. The BX-1 test was particularly notable for the fact that it pasted within 25 km of the International Space Station (ISS) in what may have been a simulated attack run. 26 In the near future, it is possible that China could use this technology to launch co-orbital, micro-satellite ASAT weapons from its Xichang Satellite Launch Center (or Base 27) to attack U.S. national security satellites in GEO. Looking longer term, such weapons could potentially be launched using road-mobile launchers as well. The summation of this broad and assertive Chinese ASAT weapons program is a clear challenge to U.S. space operations, and by way thereof, nearly all modern U.S. war fighting capabilities. This fact has not gone unnoticed, especially in the Pacific theater of operations, where the U.S. is especially reliant upon its space assets.

## Links 1/8

### The US satellite space system, economy, and national security are at risk.

Charles H. Cynamon (USAF Major) 1999, Protecting Commercial Space Systems: A Critical National Security Issue, USAF study thesis, published by the USAF in April 1999, psu.edu

As set forth in the first chapter, the case to be made for the protection of commercial space systems hinged on the ability to prove commercial space systems are critical to national security. The three elements required to prove this point do exist. First, commercial space reliance is rapidly increasing, economically and militarily. Second, although industry is primarily concerned with hazards facing their systems, viable and serious threats to these systems exist and cannot be ignored. Third, the consequences associated with the loss of commercial space systems poses a severe blow not only to the commercial space industry but to various other sectors of the US economy. Additionally, commercial space systems are force-enhancers for today’s armed forces. The loss of these systems would seriously jeopardize our ability to effectively wage wars with minimal loss of life. These factors force us to conclude this is a critical national security issue just as many in high-level government positions are now realizing.

### China is increasingly dominating global economics and could soon start to dominate space as well

Dolman ’10 [Everett Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies, 8-30-2010, “The Case for Weapons in Space: A geopolitical assessment”

China's current space program is readily imagined as a New Age Great Wall. Competing with the West in the highest technological endeavors, and doing so despite significant capital disparities, enhances the legitimacy of the communist party. China's domestic population rationalizes lower per capita income as the state completes its rise among nations to superpower status. International audiences are awed by the accomplishments, conveying further legitimacy to the state. They acknowledge China's domestic right to self-determination, but more importantly give credence to the capacity of Chinese manufacturing to produce quality high technology goods. This perception helps to increase the sale of advanced Chinese-made products abroad. While its comprehensive space program enhances foreign and domestic perceptions of legitimacy, and raises awareness of Chinese industrial and manufacturing acumen, its military space efforts directly threaten the relatively stable international system. It is this latter issue that presents a wicked problem for strategists.

Links 2/8

### Chinese expansion into space challenges US national security

William C. Martel (Professor of National Security Affairs at Naval War College, RI) and Toshi Yoshihara (Research Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Massachusetts) 2003, Avoiding a Sino-American Space Race, Washington Quarterly: Autumn 2003 issue, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/440173\_915549761\_918386378.pdf

This prevailing indifference, however, risks overlooking the longer-term consequences of China's growing space power and, more dangerously, the potential collision of U.S. and Chinese interests in space. From China's perspective, the United States' self-appointed guardianship of space is presumptuous and represents a genuine challenge to China's national security concerns. For the United States, China's extension into space symbolizes its ambitions to challenge U.S. national security. Deeply seated, mutual suspicions are evident in both countries' strategic assessments as the contours of potential strategic competition between Washington and Beijing emerge. In essence, both sides agree that the other represents a challenge. Although this potential clash of interests is not yet sufficiently severe to be visible to casual observers, the United States and China are on the threshold of a space race that could radically influence international security.

Links 3/8

### US satellites vulnerable to attack from China

William C. Martel (Professor of National Security Affairs at Naval War College, RI) and Toshi Yoshihara (Research Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Massachusetts) 2003, Avoiding a Sino-American Space Race, Washington Quarterly: Autumn 2003 issue, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/440173\_915549761\_918386378.pdf

In sum, because U.S. military effectiveness and commercial competitiveness depend so overwhelmingly on space, the country is increasingly vulnerable to an adversary's malicious use of space or attacks against space systems. As the Rumsfeld Commission report warned The United States and China are on the threshold of a space race. ominously, "If the [United States] is to avoid a 'space Pearl Harbor,' it needs to take seriously the possibility of an attack on U.S. space systems. The nation's leaders must assure that the vulnerability of the United States is reduced and that the consequences of a surprise attack on U.S. space assets are limited in their effects."7 At present, most nations cannot challenge the United States directly, but there are fears that states might someday attack U.S. satellites to cripple its military capabilities. Policymakers in the United States are increasingly concerned that this is precisely China's strategy.

### China can destroy US satellites

Bruce W. MacDonald (Senior Director at the United States Institute of Peace) 2008, China, Space Weapons, and US Security, Council Special Report No.38, September 2008, published by the Council on Foreign Relations,

http://books.google.com/bookshl=en&lr=&id=o0GkabrNftIC&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=Bruce+W.+MacDonald+(Senior+Director+at+the+United+States+Institute+of+Peace)+2008,+China,+Space+Weapons,+and+US+Security,+Council+Special+Report+No.38,+September+2008,+published+by+the+Council+on+Foreign+Relations&ots=OTkmlF7uGY&sig=ncw52NFQTbv6Zh5k4EefU7dtgqw#v=onepage&q&f=false

On January 11, 2007, China launched a missile into space, releasing a homing vehicle that destroyed an old Chinese weather satellite. The strategic reverberations of that collision have shaken up security thinking in the 1 Inked States and around the world. This test demonstrated that, it it so chose, China could build a substantial number ot these anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) and thus might soon be able to destroy substantial numbers of U.S. satellites in low earth orbit (LEO), upon which the U.S. military heavily depends. On lebruary 21, 2008, the United States launched a modified missile-defense interceptor, destroying a U.S. satellite carrying one thousand pounds ot toxic fuel about to make an uncontrolled atmospheric reentry. Thus, within fourteen months, China and the I inked States both demonstrated the capability to destroy \MO satellites, heralding the arrival of an era where space is a potentially tar more contested domain than in the past, with few rules.1

Links 4/8

### Chinese analysts have already planned strategies to cripple the US

Ashley Tellis, Senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007. 'China's Military Space Strategy', Survival, 49:3, 41 – 72, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/tellis_china_space1.pdf>

Among many complex and diverse lessons, Chinese analyses of US military operations in the Persian Gulf wars, Kosovo and Afghanistan have yielded one critical insight: the United States is inordinately dependent on its complex but exposed network of sophisticated command, control, communications and computer-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems operating synergistically in and through space. 34 In other words, while American military power derives its disproportionate efficacy from its ability to leverage critical space assets, these very resources are simultaneously a font of deep and abiding vulnerability. Chinese strategists concluded, therefore, that any effort to defeat the United States would require a riposte against its Achilles heel: its space-based capabilities and their organic ground installations. 35 The ability to neutralise American space systems quickly would permit a weaker Chinese military to deter, delay, degrade or defeat the superior warfighting capabilities of the United States and ’level the playing field’ in a shooting war. As one Chinese military scholar described his country’s calculus,Downloaded By: [Carnegie Endowment for International Peace] At: 15:35 30 August 2007 China’s Military Space Strategy | 49 An effective active defense against a formidable power in space may require China to have an asymmetric capability against the powerful United States. Some have wondered whether a defensive policy applied to space suggests that China’s possession of a robust reconnaissance, tracking, and monitoring space system would be sufficient for China to prevent an attack in space and would be in line with China’s ‘doctrinal’ position of ‘defensive’ capabilities. An effective active defense strategy would include the development of these systems but would also include anti-satellite capabilities and space attack weapon systems if necessary. In essence, China will follow the same principles for space militarization and space weapons as it did with nuclear weapons. That is, it will develop anti-satellite and space weapons capable of effectively taking out an enemy’s space system, in order to constitute a reliable and credible defense strategy. 36

### Satellites are necessary for weather readings and communication- our society could not survive without them

Charles H. Cynamon (USAF Major) 1999, Protecting Commercial Space Systems: A Critical National Security Issue, USAF study thesis, published by the USAF in April 1999, psu.edu

Finally, sensing of our environment from space is crucial for predicting natural disasters and everyday weather, and for studying the earth’s environment.11 It’s no exaggeration, the average person hardly realizes the extent they rely on commercial space systems. For most, the realization comes when the capability is lost, such as the failure of the Galaxy IV satellite in May 1998. The failure of that one satellite left about 80-90% of the 45 million pager customers in the US without service for 2-4 days and 5400 of 7700 Chevron gas stations without pay-at the-pump capability.12 This failure left employees processing credit payments with the manual system they had long since forgotten.

Links 5/8

### Without satellites, our lifestyle would be impossible- all facets of our military, economy, and everyday life are linked to satellites

Ian Easton, Research Fellow at the 2049 Project Institute, 2009. “The Great Game in Space,” http://www.project2049.net/documents/china\_asat\_weapons\_the\_great\_game\_in\_space.pdf

One senior Air Force officer said that thanks to satellite technology the U.S. no longer fights in the fog of war, but in a “huge cloud of electrons.” However, because four-fifths of America’s military data is transmitted through unhardened commercial satellites, and a single Global Hawk unmanned surveillance drone flying over the Middle East can consume several times more bandwidth than was used in the whole of the 1991 war against Iraq, Air Force officers commonly describe space as being America’s “Achilles Heel.” 34 Referring to China’s January 11, 2007 direct-ascent ASAT test, General Hamel of the Air Force’s Space and Missile Systems Center said “if they take our asymmetric advantage in space, we go from an information age war machine to an industrial age war machine…shifting the balance; the edge will go to the adversary.” 35 Many specialists also argue that, the aside from the U.S. military dependency on orbital space U.S. economy, and in turn, much of the world economy, is also rapidly becoming dependent on space-based systems. They posit that, in effect, the U.S. is now a “space faring” nation whose very way of life is tied to the myriad capabilities provided by the orbital space medium

Links 6/8

### Loss of US satellites would cause global economic and communication failure

William C. Martel (Professor of National Security Affairs at Naval War College, RI) and Toshi Yoshihara (Research Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Massachusetts) 2003, Avoiding a Sino-American Space Race, Washington Quarterly: Autumn 2003 issue, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/440173\_915549761\_918386378.pdf

Conventional wisdom holds that space is so vital to national security and economic prosperity that the United States will do whatever it takes to protect its ability to use space. This rationale was enshrined in an influential report issued in January 2001 by a blue-ribbon commission on space,1 headed by Donald Rumsfeld before he became secretary of defense, which strongly advocated greater protection for U.S. space assets. The Rumsfeld Commission asserted that "[t]he security and economic well being of the United States and its allies and friends depend on the nation's ability to operate successfully in space. To be able to contribute to peace and stability in a distinctly different but still dangerous and complex global environment, the [United States] needs to remain at the forefront in space, technologically and operationally, as we have in the air, on land and at sea."2 Furthermore, the report argued that "the present extent of U.S. dependence on space, the rapid pace at which this dependence is increasing, and the vulnerabilities it creates, all demand that U.S. national security space interests be recognized as a top national security priority."3 In economic terms, the United States relies on space technologies and capabilities to support a wide range of commercial activities. Among the most important commercial assets in space is the constellation of Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation satellites. The precise timing signals emitted from the GPS allow automobiles, aircraft, and ships to locate their positions and establish the chronological order for virtually all financial transactions. Indeed, the global financial network would collapse without GPS. Equally important, commercial satellites carry most global communications. Despite the phenomenal growth rate of fiber optics networks, commercial satellites still dominate long-haul global communications.

Links 7/8

### US dependent on GPS satellites for national security

William C. Martel (Professor of National Security Affairs at Naval War College, RI) and Toshi Yoshihara (Research Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Massachusetts) 2003, Avoiding a Sino-American Space Race, Washington Quarterly: Autumn 2003 issue, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/440173\_915549761\_918386378.pdf

The United States is extraordinarily dependent on space for its national security.4 The U.S. military has integrated space technologies into virtually all aspects of military operations, dramatically improving U.S. military power. Since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, which is widely considered the first "space war," the Pentagon has relied on electro-optical, hyperspectral, infrared, and radar satellites to see what is happening on the battlefield.5 Communication satellites allow military commanders to be connected to their forces, while the navigation signal from GPS satellites is essential for precision attacks. The air campaigns over Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq also demonstrated the value of space assets in modern warfare. Similarly, U.S. military commanders increasingly rely on imagery from commercially owned satellites; in fact, commercial satellites handled 80 percent of U.S. military communications during the Kosovo operation in 1999.6 20 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY • AUTUMN 2003 Downloaded By: [Optimised: University of California, Berkeley] At: 02:35 22 June 2011 Averting a Sino-U.S. Space Race I Government agencies often pay private firms to collect and process vital satellite imagery. For the first five months of the Afghan campaign, the Department of Defense paid the Space Imaging Corporation $1.9 million per month for images of Afghanistan collected by its Ilconos imaging satellite. This new commercial satellite market also creates vulnerabilities because of the ability of hostile governments or terrorist organizations to gain access to readily available satellite imagery. Such information could be used to harm U.S. interests in various ways, including attacking military bases and disrupting military operations.

Links 8/8

### Satellites are needed to measure ocean surface temperatures and track global warming, precipitation, and climate change. Impact is warming

Frank J. Wentz (Remote Sensing Systems), Chelle Gentemann (Remote Sensing Systems), Deborah Smith (Remote Sensing Systems) and Dudley Chelton (College of Oceanic and Atmospheric Sciences, Oregon State University) 2000, Satellite Measurements of Sea Surface Temperature Through Clouds, Science 5 May 2000: Vol. 288 no. 5467 pp. 847-850, http://www.sciencemag.org/content/288/5467/847.full

Satellite measurements of SST began in the 1970s, using infrared radiometers flying aboard the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's geostationary and polar orbiting platforms (6). Satellite infrared SST measurements have resulted in major advancements in oceanography, meteorology, and climatology (2, 7–10). However, the infrared SST retrievals have two significant limitations: (i) Retrievals cannot be done when clouds (which cover roughly half the Earth) are present. (ii) Atmospheric aerosols from volcanoes and large fires can cause a spurious cooling in the SST retrieval (11, 12). The aerosol problem has been particularly troublesome when trying to construct multiyear time series to infer climate change (11). Furthermore, the cloud detection algorithms are not totally reliable, with some clouds going undetected. It has long been recognized that microwave radiometry offers a solution to the cloud and aerosol problem. At frequencies below about 12 GHz, the surface radiance is proportional to SST and microwaves penetrate clouds with little attenuation, giving a clear view of the sea surface under all weather conditions except rain. Furthermore, at these frequencies, atmospheric aerosols have no effect, making it possible to produce a very reliable SST time series for climate studies. The first satellite microwave radiometers operating at these low frequencies were flown on SeaSat and Nimbus-7, launched in 1978. These early missions demonstrated the feasibility of measuring SST with microwaves (13, 14) and led to some notable scientific results (15). However, the usefulness of these early radiometers was significantly limited by a poor calibration system. Subsequent microwave radiometers launched in the 1980s and 1990s, such as the Special Sensor Microwave Imager (SSM/I), used improved calibration systems but lacked the low-frequency channels needed to retrieve SST. In November 1997, the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM) spacecraft was launched (16). The TRMM microwave imager (TMI) has a full suite of channels ranging from 10.7 to 85 GHz and represents the first satellite sensor that is capable of accurately measuring SST through clouds.

## Impacts 1/4

### Loss of satellites cripples the military- causes greater losses.

Charles H. Cynamon (USAF Major) 1999, Protecting Commercial Space Systems: A Critical National Security Issue, USAF study thesis, published by the USAF in April 1999, psu.edu

For the military, it’s a forgone conclusion commercial space will be key to providing fully mission-capable operational forces. Because our operational forces are now predominantly stationed in the continental United States (CONUS), we must be expeditionary in our ability to meet America’s global commitments. We must be ready to operate in an environment with little or no existing communications infrastructure, areas where little mapping has occurred, and vast expanses where continuous overhead intelligence collection will be key to real-time situational awareness. Among other burdens this reality incurs, it places a premium on such commercial capability as satellite communications to connect our forces with their logistics pipelines in the 26 US or to connect our combatant commanders with their CONUS-based staffs and in-theater component commanders. Even in today’s peacetime environment, the military relies on commercial products and services, such as imagery and communications.7 As important as these commercial capabilities are for training and exercises, they are vital for conducting operational planning and implementing military operational as directed by the National Command Authority. The military implications should these commercial capabilities not be available is rather simple. The military mantra is “train like we fight.” The sudden loss of critical information to support war planning and execution will significantly diminish our military effectiveness. One should not and could not say this alone would spell defeat. However, there is no doubt a diminishing of military effectiveness directly equates to the number of body bags for US forces.

### If the US loses satellites to Chinese ASAT, Taiwan conflict will explode into US-China war.

Ian Easton, Research Fellow at the 2049 Project Institute, 2009. “The Great Game in Space,” http://www.project2049.net/documents/china\_asat\_weapons\_the\_great\_game\_in\_space.pdf

Any possible U.S. military contingency around the Taiwan Strait would require secure satellites as the U.S. becomes ever more reliant upon its space systems. Moreover, reconnaissance satellites are thought to limit the risk inherent in the build-up of forces that both the PRC and the U.S. could be expected to deploy to the region in the event of a crisis. However, if the U.S. was blinded as the result of a preemptive Chinese ASAT attack, the conflict could quickly escalate to a dangerous level. According to two experts on the subject, “if there is a great-power war in the twenty-first century, our crystal ball says that it will be between the United States and China over Taiwan, with a very serious potential for a horrible escalatory process.” 38 This underscores the gravity of the topic as well as the negative impact the Chinese shift towards fielding ASAT weapons could have.

Impacts 2/4

### Losing satellites would devastate our economy and cripple our military allowing competitors to get the edge, undermining our hegemony.

Charles H. Cynamon (USAF Major) 1999, Protecting Commercial Space Systems: A Critical National Security Issue, USAF study thesis, published by the USAF in April 1999, psu.edu

Qualitative assessment convinces us the economic implications of losing commercial space capability are real and too painful to bear. The May 1998 failure of the Galaxy IV satellite should stand as testament of the havoc an adversary might create. The more our economy becomes dependent on the information and services provided by these systems, the more significant the impacts are sure to be. The loss of a single Iridium satellite will not be catastrophic, not even significant. Many of these big low earth orbit (LEO) systems will provide on-orbit spares to enable near real-time switchover to the spare. However, we must be concerned with the potential for an “Informational Pearl Harbor” whether perpetrated by another 25 state or a terrorist intending to cripple our economy in the furtherance of their own interests. In this scenario, a peer competitor could attack our commercial space systems (a decisive point) to damage our economy (a center of gravity) via our financial markets. By devastating the US economy, an adversary might employ this diversionary tactic to turn our national focus inward. If US intervention can be prevented, our adversary’s goals are more likely to be achieved. A secondary benefit would be the negation of US military effectiveness in countering our adversary’s aggression. One might argue, an “Informational Pearl Harbor” is a worst case scenario we cannot afford to defend against. Unfortunately, the threat of an asymmetrical attack on the US is growing. The drug trafficking war on our southwestern border is analogous to the threats against our commercial systems. We know we can never completely negate the flow of drugs with surveillance and response alone. However, like the drug threat, we must take the necessary steps to reduce the threat to an acceptable level by using all of the tools at our disposal to identify, classify and, if possible, negate the sources before they manifest themselves.

Impacts 3/4

### Continued economic decline will result in global war.

Mead, 9 (Walter Russell Mead, [Henry A. Kissinger](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_A._Kissinger) senior fellow for [U.S. foreign policy](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._foreign_policy) at the Council on Foreign Relations. The New Republic, “Only Makes You Stronger,” February 4 2009.  http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2 AD 6/30/09) JM

Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well.If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.

Impacts 4/4

### Economic collapse causes nuclear war

Lewis 98, (Chris H., environmental historian, University of Colorado-Boulder), THE COMING AGE OF SCARCITY, 1998, p. 56 AD: 7-7-09 CS

Most critics would argue, probably correctly, that instead of allowing underdeveloped countries to withdraw from the global economy and undermine the economies of the developed world, the United States, Europe, Japan, and others will fight neocolonial wars to force these countries to remain within this collapsing global economy. These neocolonial wars will result in mass death, suffering, and even regional nuclear wars. If First World countries choose military confrontation and political repression to maintain the global economy, then we may see mass death and genocide on a global scale that will make the deaths of World War II pale in comparison. However, these neocolonial wars, fought to maintain the developed nations' economic and political hegemony, will cause the final collapse of our global industrial civilization. These wars will so damage the complex economic and trading networks and squander material, biological, and energy resources that they will undermine the global economy and its ability to support the earth's 6 to 8 billion people. This would be the worst-case scenario for the collapse of global civilization.

## Chinese Realism- War Inevitable 1/4

### China is a rising power

Aaron L. Friedberg (Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University), The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Confict Inevitable?, Fall 2005, Vol. 30, No. 2, Pages 7-45

For realist pessimists, the single most important feature of the PRC today is its rising power. Everything else, including the likely character of the U.S.-China relationship, follows from this fact. Taking aggregate economic capacity as a rough surrogate for overall national power, it is apparent that China’s growth has been extraordinarily rapid. Since the start of economic reforms in 1978, the PRC’s gross national product (GNP) is thought to have increased by a factor of four and, according to some estimates, it could double again by the middle of the second decade of the twenty-first century. 26 What is especially impressive about the Chinese economy is not only the speed with which it appears to be expanding but its growing mass and enormous potential. Given the sheer size of its population and the rising productivity of its workers, China may one day regain its historic position as the world’s largest economy. Although such projections are fraught with difªculties and uncertainties, some experts have calculated that China’s economy could overtake that of the United States as early as 2015. 27 The combination of the speed and the magnitude of China’s growth in recent decades appears to be unprecedented. The closest analogy is probably the emergence of the United States as the world’s preponderant economy over the course of the nineteenth century

Chinese Realism- War Inevitable 2/4

### Realism and historical evidence indicate rising powers like China are likely to challenge established powers like the US.

Aaron L. Friedberg (Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University), The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Confict Inevitable?, Fall 2005, Vol. 30, No. 2, Pages 7-45

Realist pessimists note that, throughout history, rising powers have tended to be troublemakers, at least insofar as their more established counterparts in the international system are concerned. This is the case, in the realists’ view, regardless of regime type; it was as true of a rising, democratic United States as it was of a rising, autocratic Germany. As Samuel Huntington has pointed out, International Security 30:2 18 Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, “Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050,” Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper No. 99 (New York: Goldman Sachs Group, 2003). 28. For estimates of China’s defense spending, see U.S.-China Security Review Commission, The National Security Implications of the Economic Relationship between the United States and China, pp. 167–177. 29. For an analysis of Chinese military imports, see Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China’s Arms Acquisitions from Abroad: A Quest for “Superb and Secret Weapons” (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). Regarding China’s protracted and painful efforts to develop its own ballistic missile submarines, see John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994). 30. Regarding the progress of China’s military modernization efforts, see Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, May 28, 2004, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ d20040528PRC.pdf. See also Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1999); James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds., China’s Military Faces the Future (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1999); Col. Susan M. Puska, ed., People’s Liberation Army after Next (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000); and David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).“The external expansion of the UK and France, Germany and Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States coincided with phases of intense industrialization and economic development.” 31 There appear to be a number of reasons for this pattern. As a state’s capabilities grow, its leaders tend to define their interests more expansively and to seek a greater degree of inºuence over what is going on around them. Rising powers seek not only to secure their frontiers but to reach out beyond them, taking steps to ensure access to markets, materials, and transportation routes; to protect their citizens far from home, defend their foreign friends and allies, and promulgate their values; and, in general, to have what they consider to be their legitimate say in the affairs of their region and of the wider world. This correlation between growing power and expanding interests has been succinctly summarized by Robert Gilpin: “A more wealthy and more powerful state . . . will select a larger bundle of security and welfare goals than a less wealthy and less powerful state.” 32 As they seek to assert themselves, rising powers are often drawn to challenge territorial boundaries, international institutional arrangements, and hierarchies of prestige that were put in place when they were relatively weak. Their leaders and people often feel that they were unfairly left out when the pie was divided up, and may even believe that, because of their prior weakness, they were robbed of what was rightfully theirs. Like Germany at the turn of the twentieth century, rising powers tend to want their “place in the sun,” and this often brings them into conflict with more established great powers, which are typically the architects and principal beneciaries of the existing international system. 33

Chinese Realism- War Inevitable 3/4

### The resulting collision of interests results in inevitable US-China conflict

Aaron L. Friedberg (Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University), The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Confict Inevitable?, Fall 2005, Vol. 30, No. 2, Pages 7-45

The collision between the expanding interests of a rising power and those of its more established counterparts can be dealt with in a number of ways, but the resulting disputes are seldom resolved peacefully. Recognizing the growing threat to its position, a dominant power (or coalition of status quo powers) may attempt to use force preventively to destroy a rising state before it can achieve its full potential. Less bellicose, established powers have also at times sought to appease emerging states, looking for ways to satisfy their demands and ambitions without conflict and to engage them and incorporate them peacefully into an existing international order. However sincere and well intentioned these efforts may be, they have usually failed. Sometimes the reason is clearly the character of the demands of the rising state. As was true of Adolf Hitler’s Germany, for example, a rising power may have ambitions that are so extensive as to be impossible for the status quo powers to satisfy without effectively committing suicide. Even when the demands being made of them are less extensive, the status quo powers may be too reluctant to make reasonable concessions, thereby fueling the frustrations and resentments of the rising power, or too eager to do so, feeding its ambitions and leading to escalating demands. Successful policies of engagement/appeasement are certainly possible in theory, but in practice they have proven to be difficult to implement. 34 Looking at the raw facts of its expanding economy and growing military capabilities, most realist pessimists would be content to conclude that China is a rising power and that, as such, it is unlikely to behave differently than have others of its type throughout history. Thus Huntington, after describing the correlation in past cases between rapid internal growth and external expansion, predicts that China too will “undoubtedly be moving into such a phase in the coming decades.” 35 Similarly, according to John Mearsheimer, so long as China’s power continues to grow, “China, like all previous potential hegemons, [will] be strongly inclined to become a real hegemon.” 36 Some analysts go a step further, arguing that China is especially likely to behave assertively, even at the risk of coming into conflict with others. Recent Chinese history, the “century of humiliation” that began with the Opium Wars of the 1840s and ended only with the ªnal expulsion of foreign powers from the mainland after World War II, appears to have left China’s leaders and its people acutely sensitive to perceived slights to national honor and prestige International Security 30:2 20 34. 37 As a result of the painful experiences of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, contemporary Chinese strategists may be even more eager than they might otherwise be to establish a sphere of influence or zone of control that would prevent such threats from reemerging in the future. 38

Chinese Realism- War Inevitable 4/4

### US and China likely to go to war over hegemony and security competition

 Zbigniew Brzezinski, John J. Mearsheimer, Foreign Policy, January/February 2005, Clash of the Titans

China cannot rise peacefully, and if it continues its dramatic economic growth over the next few decades, the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war. Most of China’s neighbors, including India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, and Vietnam, will likely join with the United States to contain China’s power. To predict the future in Asia, one needs a theory that explains how rising powers are likely to act and how other states will react to them. My theory of international politics says that the mightiest states attempt to establish hegemony in their own region while making sure that no rival great power dominates another region. The ultimate goal of every great power is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system.

## Solvency-Military Defense key for GPS Satellites

### Space weapons are key to keeping military defense-GPS satellites help guide missiles more accurately than any other guiding system

Dolman ’05 [Everett C. Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies, “US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space” 9-14-05, http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20&%20Space.pdf]

The tremendous growth in space reliance from OSD to OIF is evident in the raw numbers. Despite engaging with a 60 percent smaller force (fewer than 200,000 personnel v. over 500,000), satellite communications usage increased four-fold, from 200 to 800 Mbps (Megabits per second) capacity. Newly possible operational concepts such as reach back (intelligence analysts in the United States sending information directly to frontline units) and reach forward (rear-deployed commanders able to direct battlefield operations in real time) reconfigured the tactical concept of war. The value of Predator and Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), completely reliant on satellite communications and navigation for their operation, was confirmed. Special Forces units, paradoxically tethered to satellite support and yet practically unfettered in their silent movements because of them, ranged throughout Iraq in independent operations that were extremely disruptive. But the paramount effect of space-enabled warfare was in the area of combat efficiency. Space assets allowed all weather, day-night precision munitions to provide the bulk of America’s striking power. Strikes from standoff platforms, including Vietnam-Era B-52s, allowed maximum target devastation with extraordinarily low death and collateral devastation. In ODS, 90 percent of munitions used were unguided. Of the ten percent that were guided, none was GPS capable. By OIF, 70 percent were precision guided, more than half of those from GPS satellites. In ODS, fewer than five percent of aircraft were GPS-equipped. By OIF, all were. During ODS, GPS proved so valuable to the army that it procured and rushed into theater over 4,500 commercial receivers to augment the meager 800 military-band ones it could deploy from stockpiles, an average of one per company (about 200 personnel). By OIF, each army squad (6-10 soldiers) had at least one military GPS receiver.

# Hegemony 2AC Extensions

## US Hegemony Keeps Peace 1/2

### US Heg good, will not threaten peace

Karl P. Mueller, ‘03(Senior Political Scientist with the RAND corporation, “Totem and Taboo: Depolarizing the Space Weaponization Debate” http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/ass ets/docs/Security\_Space\_Volume.Final.pdf)

Where the space hegemonists stand out most fundamentally from other weaponization advocates is on the political dimension, where controlling space becomes controlling the world. One explanation for how this is to occur, as Smith has suggested, is that overwhelming U.S. space power will be unassailable, so that the rest of the world will not challenge American hegemony. Either they will perceive it to be benign, or they will be so intimidated by it that defiance of the United States will appear pointless. The weakness of this scenario lies in the tension between believing that there are rival states strong enough to become the space hegemony if the United States fails to do so, and believing that these rivals are too weak or too meek to develop dangerous space capabilities in the face of U.S.

### US Space Weapons lead to global peace

Steven Lambakis, 02 (National security and international affairs analyst specializing in space power “Putting Military Uses of Space in Context)

Second, enhanced military power in the hands of states that uphold the rule of international law can work to improve peace and stability in the world. Treaties dealing with the space environment are written to establish stability and order on the space frontier. And this is good. Washington has never considered space to be a domain of anarchy. Indeed, it is in the U.S. interest to develop proper laws and exercise force in a restrained and responsible manner to prevent space from devolving into a lawless, disorderly realm.

### High US Heg Keeps Peace, its only a defensive system

Everett C. Dolman, ’06 (Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the U.S. Air Force's School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS)”US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space” Sais Review http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais\_review/v026/26.1dolman.html#authbio )

Moreover, if the United States were willing to deploy and use a military space force that maintained effective control of space, and did so in a way that was perceived as tough, non-arbitrary, and efficient, such an action [End Page 171] would serve to discourage competing states from fielding opposing systems. Should the United States use its advantage to police the heavens and allow unhindered peaceful use of space by any and all nations for economic and scientific development, over time its control of low-Earth orbit could be viewed as a global asset and a public good. In much the same way the British maintained control of the high seas, enforcing international norms of innocent passage and property rights, the United States could prepare outer space for a long-overdue burst of economic expansion. There is reasonable historic support for the notion that the most peaceful and prosperous periods in modern history coincide with the appearance of a strong, liberal hegemon. America has been essentially unchallenged in its naval dominance over the last 60 years, and in global air supremacy for the last 15 or more. Today, there is more international commerce on the oceans and in the air than ever. Ships and aircraft of all nations worry more about running into bad weather than about being commandeered by a military vessel or set upon by pirates. Search and rescue is a far more common task than forced embargo, and the transfer of humanitarian aid is a regular mission. Lest one think this era of cooperation is predicated on intentions rather than military stability, recall that the policy of open skies advocated by every president since Eisenhower did not take effect until after the fall of the Soviet Union and the singular rise of American power to the fore of international politics. The legacy of American military domination of the sea and air has been positive, and the same should be expected for space.

US Hegemony Keeps Peace 2/2

### US will be pursuing their hegemonic power with space weapons which will not cause conflict

Everett C. Dolman, ’06 (Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the U.S. Air Force's School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS)”US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space” Sais Review http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais\_review/v026/26.1dolman.html#authbio )

Placement of weapons in space by the United States would be perceived correctly as an attempt at continuing American hegemony. Although [End Page 169] there is obvious opposition to the current international balance of power, the majority of states seem to regard it as at least tolerable. A continuation of the status quo is thus minimally acceptable, even to states working toward its demise. As long as the United States does not employ its power arbitrarily, the situation would be bearable initially and grudgingly accepted over time. On the other hand, an attempt by any other state to dominate space would be part of an effort to break the land-sea-air dominance of the United States in preparation for a new international order, with the weaponizing state at the top. Such an action would challenge the status quo, rather than seek to perpetuate it. This would be disconcerting to nations that accept the current international order—including the venerable institutions of trade, finance and law that operate within it—and intolerable to the United States. As leader of the current system, the United States could do no less than engage in a perhaps ruinous space arms race, save graciously decide to step aside.

## Space Weapons Key to Hegemony 1/2

### Weapons in Space key to US Heg

Everett C. Dolman, ’06 (Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the U.S. Air Force's School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS)”US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space” Sais Review http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais\_review/v026/26.1dolman.html#authbio )

This reasoning does not dispute the fact that U.S. deployment of weapons in outer space would represent the addition of a potent new military capacity, one that would assist in extending the current period of American hegemony well into the future. Clearly this would be threatening, and America must expect severe condemnation and increased competition in peripheral areas. But such an outcome is less threatening than any other state doing so. Placement of weapons in space by the United States would be perceived correctly as an attempt at continuing American hegemony. Although [End Page 169] there is obvious opposition to the current international balance of power, the majority of states seem to regard it as at least tolerable. A continuation of the status quo is thus minimally acceptable, even to states working toward its demise. As long as the United States does not employ its power arbitrarily, the situation would be bearable initially and grudgingly accepted over time.

### US Seeks to Increase Heg Power through Space Weapons

Anup Shah ‘07(Founder and Research follow for globalissues.org “Militarization and Weaponization of Outer Space” [http://www.globalissues.org/article/69/milit arization-and-weaponization-of-outer-space January ‘07](http://www.globalissues.org/article/69/milit%20arization-and-weaponization-of-outer-space%20January%20%2707))

While various militaries around the world have used Space for years, it has largely been for surveillance satellites etc. However, the Bush Administration in the United States has long made it clear that the [US wishes to expand its military capabilities and have weapons in space](http://www.transnational.org/forum/power/2001/05.02_Rumsfeld.html) and therefore also be dominant in this fourth military arena (the other three being sea, land and air). This new “ultimate high ground” would provide further superior military capabilities. While it would provide additional important defense mechanisms, many worry about the other benefit it would bring—capabilities for offensive purposes to push America’s “national interests” even if they are not in the interests of the international community. Furthermore, together with its pursuit of missile defense, (which goes against the Anti Ballistic Missile treaty, an important part of global arms control mechanisms), the USA risks starting a wasteful expenditure of an arms race in space. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, and the resulting “War on Terror” military-based policies and spending has increased. So too have the policies looking into space-based weapons. The Washington D.C.-based Center for Defense Information (CDI) provides a detailed report suggesting that this should not be a rushed decision

### US Seeks Space Weapons to Increase Heg Power

Sourav Roy ’07 (Research Fellow for Afro-Middle East centre February 7, 2010 Mission Absolute: “American Hegemony in Space” http://www.amec.org.za/index.php?option=co mcontent&view=article&id=98:mission-absolute-american-hegemony-in-space&catid=66:war-on-terror&Itemid=83

Totalitarian control of military warfare and defense systems from space is not the only prize the U.S. seeks. The Americans are also finding ways to create wealth out of space. Mining The Sky: Untold riches from the asteroids, comets and planets, a book by former NASA scientist John Lewis, addresses this issue. Lewis argues that there are precious metals and elements in many celestial bodies, waiting to be tapped and exploited. His theory is that anybody who controls access to these planetary bodies will realize unimaginable fortunes. In fact, the various NASA missions to Mars over the past decades could indeed have been treasure-finding missions for identifying the composition of the Martian red soil. Such missions could open the door for commercial exploitation and innumerable profits. Not surprisingly, there is a bill pending in the U.S. Congress to exempt from taxes all profits derived from space.

Space Weapons Key to Hegemony 2/2

### The US needs increased defense against missile attacks from places such as Iran and the DPRK

Gruselle ’07 [Bruno Gruselle, Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, 2007, “The Final Frontier: Missile Defense in Space?” http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-art2600.pdf]

By funding programmes to research weapon systems that could be used in space, the United States government is leaving open options to develop and deploy such systems. This may appear to some as “facts in orbit”; that is, a drive to create and deploy space weapons without public debate. But if one looks at the existing security situation, the development of every possible means of defence should perhaps not be rejected without further examination. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a fact, illustrated by the present crises with Iran and with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), which could lead to a dramatic increase in security threats to the world in general and to the United States and its allies in particular. In the realm of missiles, the development of more efficient, longer-range weapons is gaining pace, as illustrated by the launch on 4 July 2006 of a Taepodong-2 from the DPRK. Pyongyang possesses a large ballistic missile arsenal, comprising mainly Scud-type missiles in addition to longerrange systems. 12 According to some assessments, the DPRK today possesses between 300 and 400 Scud-B and Scud-C missiles as well as 60 mobile launchers deployed north of the Demilitarized Zone and capable of reaching most of the Republic of Korea and in particular Seoul. With its Nodong missile arsenal, the DPRK can strike most of Japan in a matter of minutes, including US assets deployed there. Today, worst-case assessments give the DPRK a total capability of about 200 Nodong missiles and 10–15 mobile launchers. More disturbing is the willingness of Pyongyang to sell such weapons to literally any state willing to pay for them. Its cooperation with Syria and its assistance to Iran’s Shahab programme must today be considered as one of the most worrying trends in missile proliferation. Indeed, Iran’s missile programme has reached an unprecedented level of sophistication and size for a proliferant country. Tehran is reported to possess a tactical arsenal comprising several hundred Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 missiles 14—equivalent to Scud-B and Scud-C. The quest for longer-range systems reportedly started at the beginning of the 1990s with support from the DPRK. The first flight test of the 1,300km-range Shahab-3 in 1998 started a long series of tests and the official deployment of the missile in 2003. 16 With such a missile Tehran gains the ability to threaten Israel as well as part of Europe. Iran has also conducted the development of modern anti-ship cruise missiles, culminating with the announcement from Tehran of the deployment of a Raad anti-ship cruise missile in 2004.

## Other Countries Waiting for US to Make the First Move

### Because of US Heg, other countries are depending on US to make the first move

Everett C. Dolman, ’06 (Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the U.S. Air Force's School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS)”US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space” Sais Review http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais\_review/v026/26.1dolman.html#authbio )

As leader of the international community, the United States finds itself in the unenviable position of having to make decisions for the good of all. On the issue of space weaponization, a single best option is elusive. No matter the choice, some parties will benefit and others will suffer. The tragedy of American power is that it must make a choice, and the worst choice is to do nothing. Fortunately, the United States has a great advantage — its people's moral ambiguity about the use of power. There is no question that corrupted power is dangerous, but perhaps only Americans are so concerned with the possibility that they themselves will be corrupted. They fear what they could become. No other state has such potential for self-restraint. It is this introspection, this self-angst that makes America the best choice to lead the world today and tomorrow. America is not perfect, but perhaps it is perfectible.

## Missile Defense and Relations

### Missile Defense Good for U.S.-Russia relations.

Spring ‘11

Baker Spring is the F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy at The Heritage Foundation. He specializes in examining the threat of ballistic missiles from Third World countries and U.S. national security issues. The Heritage Foundation. “Russian Control of U.S. Missile Defenses? Just Say No. April 11, 2011. http://blog.heritage.org/2011/04/11/russian-control-of-u-s-missile-defenses-just-say-no/

While the U.S. is right to be seeking Russian cooperation in the area of missile defense—more defensive strategic postures would benefit both the U.S. and Russia in addressing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the missiles used to deliver them—the U.S. should reject this Russian demand. The Russian demand defies rational explanation. The missile defense system will serve only one purpose: to intercept and destroy ballistic missiles already launched at a target. In this context, the Russians cannot believe that U.S. and allied operation of a missile defense system will pose a threat to them unless they think they need to threaten both with a nuclear-armed missile attack. If this is the basis of Russian thinking, then this negotiation is about anything but cooperation. Genuine cooperation in the realm of missile defense is not about the possession of capabilities by the U.S., U.S. allies, or Russia; it is about all three parties standing together in the intention to oppose aggression through the use of ballistic missiles by rogue states. The Russians can be motivated only by either of two desires in demanding direct operational control. The first is to deny the U.S. and its allies the ability to operate a missile defense system for their own protection. The second is for the Russians to operate the system only for their own benefit, effectively expecting the U.S. and its allies to build a missile defense system and turn it over to Russia. Either way, the demand will leave the U.S. and its allies vulnerable to missile attack. Interestingly, there is no evidence that the Russians have made an offer to the U.S. and its allies in these negotiations to allow them operational control over the Russian missile defense system deployed around Moscow. Fortunately, there is another option for genuine cooperation in the field of missile defense between the U.S. and its allies on the one side and the Russians on the other: to pursue coordinated deployments of missile defense systems to address shared threats. This approach permits each to control the missile defenses in their possession to meet their security needs while also providing all the opportunity for cooperation even where there may be differences of opinion of what constitutes a genuine threat. The coordinated deployment option would also deny Russia the ability to assert that missile defenses are inherently destabilizing no matter which country possesses a missile defense capability. Russia made just such an assertion by insisting on the inclusion of anti-missile defense language in the preamble to the New START arms control treaty with the U.S., which has just entered into force. Russia, by acknowledging that it has a missile defense capability of its own in the contribution to coordinated deployments for countering shared threats, will no longer be able to assert that missile defenses are destabilizing under all circumstances. In the course of negotiations on missile defense cooperation, the U.S. and its allies should not buckle to the Russian demand for operational control. If they do, the agreement will only serve to perpetuate U.S. and allied vulnerability to missile attack. In this case, what was supposed to be a negotiation about cooperating in the field of missile defense will become a negotiation over cooperation in restricting missile defense. It will be an agreement that will not serve U.S. or allied interests.

## Space Assets Vulnerable 1/2

### The US is dependent on our space assets for defense and military operations

Meteyer ’05 [David O. Meteyer, USAF Institute for Natural Security Studies, August 2005 “The Art of War: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space Weapons” http://www.usafa.edu/df/inss/OCP/ocp60.pdf]

A number of data points underscore US dependency on space as well as its integration into operations across the entire spectrum of US forces. The GPS precision-guided munitions (PGM) used in both Desert Strom and Iraqi Freedom demonstrates this point. In Desert Strom 8% of munitions were PGM 5 , as compared to 68% in Iraqi freedom. 6 In addition to supporting PGM, GPS also aides in the prevention of fratricide, enhances close air support (CAS) employment, and fosters economy of force through successful blue force tracking (BFT) capabilities, among other benefits. 7 Satellite communications (SATCOM) usage levels also emphasizes the significant US dependence on space operations. US reliance on satellite communications during Desert Strom was paltry: one Mbps per every 5,000 troops deployed. For Iraqi Freedom that number swelled to 51.1 Mbps. 8 The massive SATCOM bandwidth requirement supported such activities as Iraqi target imagery dissemination, Combined and Joint C2, Predator UAV data feeds, and Combatant Commander video-teleconferences.

### The US is dependent on their space technology, and so they need to protect it by militarizing

Dolman ’10 [Everett Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies, 8-30-2010, “The Case for Weapons in Space: A geopolitical assessment”

No state relies on space power and space support more than the US. Since at least the mid-1980s, its armed forces have undergone a radical transformation. Space intelligence and observations, high bandwidth communications, and navigation support have created the most deadly combat force in history. America can engage targets anywhere in the world, in all weather, day or night, with extraordinary precision and lethality, and with a minimum of collateral damage. The progress of this transformation has been stymied with the continuing emphasis on ground forces occupation duties in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the American military is operating more effectively and efficiently today with the smallest percentage of its population actively engaged in military service since the post-WWII demobilization.

Space Assets Vulnerable 2/2

### Losing US Space technology would deal a severe blow to the US economy

Dolman ’05 [Everett C. Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies, “US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space” 9-14-05, http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20&%20Space.pdf]

No nation relies on space more than the United States—none is even close—and its reliance grows daily. For both its civilian welfare and military security, a widespread loss of space capabilities would prove disastrous. America’s economy, and along with it the world’s, would collapse. Its military would be obliged to hunker down in defensive crouch while it prepared to withdraw from dozens of then-untenable foreign deployments. For the good of its civilian population, and for itself, the United States military—in particular the United States Air Force—is charged with protecting space capabilities from harm and ensuring reliable space operations for the foreseeable future. As a martial organization, the Air Force naturally looks to military means in achievement of its assigned ends. And so it should.

# Uniqueness

## Foreign Countries already have power 1/3

### Various Countries including China and India already have technology that could be used to attack US Satellites

Major Adkins ’05 [Major Larry Adkins, High Frontier Journal, 9-15-2005, “ Space Superiority: Does the US Really Have It? http://www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-070622-057.pdf]

Technologically, our adversaries have the capability to blind imagery satellites or jam satellite signals. 4 According to Leonard David’s article in Space.com, laser technology is rapidly becoming available to blind imagery satellites. 5 Countries and individuals have also shown they are willing and able to deliberately disrupt communication satellites. In 1997, India jammed Tongasat because of a disagreement over possession of a geosynchronous orbit slot. 6 In 1998, MED-TV accused Turkey of jamming its Kurdish broadcast channel that is beamed to 70 countries. 7 In early 2003, the FBI charged six people for selling software and decryption devices that allowed consumers to “steal” satellite television signals (e.g., DirectTV) which they had not paid for. 8 As late as the summer of 2003, the Iranian Embassy in Cuba reportedly jammed Voice of America satellite broadcasts being sent to Iran

### Other Countries already have strong space power

Space Security ’04 [Space Security, 2004, “Space Security” http://www.spacesecurity.org/SSI2004.pdf]

The ASAT potential of high-energy lasers has been extensively explored by the US and to a lesser degree by the USSR. As many as 30 states may already have the capability to use low-power lasers to degrade unhardened sensors on satellites. 42 In 1997, the US Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL) was test-fired against a satellite in a 420kilometer orbit, damaging the satellite’s sensors. Reportedly, it was not the mega-watt MIRACL laser, but a 30-watt laser used for alignment that actually damaged the target satellite’s sensors. 43 This suggests that even a commercially available low-watt laser could be used to ‘dazzle,’ or temporarily disrupt, a satellite functioning from the ground.

Foreign Countries already have Power 2/3

### US space militarization key to counter threats from China and Russia.

Bill Gertz, 1/17/2007 (editor of Washington Times, Moscow, Beijing eye space weapons; Senate alerted to Pentagon fears, [**http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/**](http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/))

China and Russia are developing space weapons and are among several nations working on systems to threaten U.S. satellites with lasers or missiles, says the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. In Senate testimony last week, Army Lt. Gen. Michael Maples for the first time raised Pentagon concerns about secret Chinese and Russian space weapons programs. "Russia and China continue to be the primary states of concern regarding military space and counterspace programs," Gen. Maples said at the annual threat briefing of the Senate intelligence committee. Gen. Maples said that "several countries continue to develop capabilities that have the potential to threaten U.S. space assets, and some have already deployed systems with inherent anti-satellite capabilities, such as satellite-tracking laser range-finding devices and nuclear-armed ballistic missiles." Other countries are working on improving space-object tracking and "kinetic or directed energy weapons capabilities." Gen. Maples did not discuss the reported testing of a Chinese anti-satellite laser against a U.S. satellite, which triggered high-level Bush administration worries about Beijing's growing space-weapons program. U.S. officials said details about the Chinese anti-satellite laser shot remain classified so as not to alert China about U.S. knowledge of what intelligence officials say may have been a test shot of an anti-satellite weapon. China has developed several types of ground-based lasers with Russian and Israeli technology, U.S. officials have said. Russia developed anti-satellite weapons during the Cold War, and U.S. officials think the Russian military is continuing work on the weapons, which include both anti-satellite missiles and ground-based lasers. Both Russia and China deny that they are building space weapons and have sought to curb U.S. space defenses through a proposed international ban on weapons in space. The Air Force in 2004 deployed the 76th Space Control Squadron, which can disrupt or knock out foreign satellites using electronic jammers from the ground. Nations other than Russia and China that have space capabilities in key areas also "will acquire military and commercial space-based assets," Gen. Maples said. "Increasing levels of international cooperation, along with the growing number of commercial space consortia, is allowing the proliferation of advanced satellite technologies and knowledge of space systems operations to become available to nations lacking a domestic space capability," he said. Gen. Maples said that building space weapons is "financially taxing" and that "most countries assessed to be pursuing these capabilities are not expected to acquire them within the next few years." He warned, however, that less-developed states and "nonstate entities" also "are pursuing more limited and asymmetric approaches that do not require excessive financial resources or a high-tech industrial base."

### Other Countries will be able to attack US Space Assets

Wilson ’01 [Tom Wilson, Space Commission Staff Member, 2001, “Threats to United States Space Capabilities” http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/report/2001/nssmo/article05.html]

The ability to restrict or deny freedom of access to and operations in space is no longer limited to global military powers. The reality is that there are many extant capabilities to deny, disrupt or physically destroy space systems and the ground facilities that command and control them. Knowledge of U.S. space systems functions, locations and physical characteristics, as well as the means to conduct counterspace operations, is increasingly available on the international market. Nations or groups hostile to the U.S. possess or can acquire the means to disrupt or destroy U.S. space systems by attacking the satellites in space, their communications nodes on the ground and in space, or ground nodes that command the satellites.

Foreign Countries already have Power 3/3

### Easy for other countries to attack Space Assets; space assets vulnerable to ASAT attacks.

Wilson ’01 [Tom Wilson, Space Commission Staff Member, 2001, “Threats to United States Space Capabilities” http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/report/2001/nssmo/article05.html]

The U.S. space assets themselves are also very vulnerable. While some national security space systems have built-in security and countermeasures, most of our government and all of our commercial space assets are vulnerable to a variety of ASAT attacks. The reason for this vulnerability is that the additional cost and weight of the security and countermeasures is regarded as unnecessary when compared to what is incorrectly characterized as a lack of threats to our space assets. The proliferation of ballistic missile and space technology has made it easier to develop direct ascent antisatellite weapons and to obtain the capability to deliver nuclear warheads into space. Studies have shown that the detonation of a low-yield nuclear weapon in LEO will not only fatally damage nearby satellites but will also increase the naturally occurring radiation around the earth, reducing most LEO satellites lifetimes from years to months. Many countries such as China, India, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia have this capability.

## Militarization Inevitable

### Pressure from the Military and Economic Front makes Militarization inevitable.

Hyten ’02 [John E. Hyten, USAF, Air and Space Power Journal, 8-20-02, “A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War?” http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/fal02/hyten.html]

The pressures on space are enormous—from both an economic and a military perspective. Even one of these pressures is severe enough to create conflict. Combined, they create the risk of war—either on Earth, in space, or both. On the economic front, conflict has already occurred due to crowding in geostationary orbits. In the year 2000, the commercial space industry alone generated over $80 billion in worldwide revenue.12 Conflicts in this arena are beginning to grow as crowding increases due to the finite number of unoccupied geostationary slots and the limited amount of unallocated spectrum. Militarily, one cannot imagine the United States allowing an enemy either to threaten US space capabilities or use space systems to put Americans at risk. Space systems could become a significant part of any future military conflict involving the United States. The military leadership is fully convinced that the United States will need weapons to deal with space-related conflict.

### Militarization of space is inevitable.

The Heritage Foundation 2011 (China and the Battlefield in Space, [**http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2003/10/china-and-the-battlefield-in-space**](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2003/10/china-and-the-battlefield-in-space))

Military thinkers in China are probably correct--the weaponization of space is inevitable. The communications and reconnaissance satellites in orbit have already militarized space. Probably the most effective global ballistic missile defense system that could be deployed will be dependent on space-based interceptors and lasers. The outlines of Beijing's draft treaty prohibiting the deployment of weapons in space and attacks on space bodies is merely a delaying action to limit the effectiveness of United States ballistic missile defense programs. And China is actively engaged in theoretical and practical research to develop its own offensive anti-satellite systems, including means to jam or ram enemy satellites.

# Alternative Advantage: Russia

## Russia Advantage 1AC 1/3

### Thousands of weapons on standby, need for defense system great.

Helfand and Pastore 09

Ira Helfand, M.D., and John O. Pastore, M.D., are past presidents of Physicians for Social Responsibility. U.S.-Russia nuclear war still a threat. March 31, 2009.http://www.projo.com/opinion/contributors/content/CT\_pastoreline\_03-31-09\_EODSCAO\_v15.bbdf23.html

President Obama and Russian President Dimitri Medvedev are scheduled to Wednesday in London during the G-20 summit. They must not let the current economic crisis keep them from focusing on one of the greatest threats confronting humanity: the danger of nuclear war. Since the end of the Cold War, many have acted as though the danger of nuclear war has ended. It has not. There remain in the world more than 20,000 nuclear weapons. Alarmingly, more than 2,000 of these weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals remain on ready-alert status, commonly known as hair-trigger alert. They can be fired within five minutes and reach targets in the other country 30 minutes later. Just one of these weapons can destroy a city. A war involving a substantial number would cause devastation on a scale unprecedented in human history. A study conducted by Physicians for Social Responsibility in 2002 showed that if only 500 of the Russian weapons on high alert exploded over our cities, 100 million Americans would die in the first 30 minutes. An attack of this magnitude also would destroy the entire economic, communications and transportation infrastructure on which we all depend. Those who survived the initial attack would inhabit a nightmare landscape with huge swaths of the country blanketed with radioactive fallout and epidemic diseases rampant. They would have no food, no fuel, no electricity, no medicine, and certainly no organized health care. In the following months it is likely the vast majority of the U.S. population would die. Recent studies by the eminent climatologists Toon and Robock have shown that such a war would have a huge and immediate impact on climate world wide. If all of the warheads in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals were drawn into the conflict, the firestorms they caused would loft 180 million tons of soot and debris into the upper atmosphere — blotting out the sun. Temperatures across the globe would fall an average of 18 degrees Fahrenheit to levels not seen on earth since the depth of the last ice age, 18,000 years ago. Agriculture would stop, eco-systems would collapse, and many species, including perhaps our own, would become extinct. It is common to discuss nuclear war as a low-probabillity event. But is this true? We know of five occcasions during the last 30 years when either the U.S. or Russia believed it was under attack and prepared a counter-attack. The most recent of these near misses occurred after the end of the Cold War on Jan. 25, 1995, when the Russians mistook a U.S. weather rocket launched from Norway for a possible attack. Jan. 25, 1995, was an ordinary day with no major crisis involving the U.S. and Russia. But, unknown to almost every inhabitant on the planet, a misunderstanding led to the potential for a nuclear war. The ready alert status of nuclear weapons that existed in 1995 remains in place today. The nuclear danger will not pass until the U.S. and Russia lead the other nuclear states to a Nuclear Weapons Convention that seeks to abolish these weapons forever. As a critical first step the U.S. and Russia must take their weapons off ready-alert status. Presidents Obama and Medvedev can do this on their own by executive order. Ira Helfand, M.D., and John O. Pastore, M.D., are past presidents of Physicians for Social Responsibility.

Russia Advantage 1AC 2/3

### Nuclear Weapons on high alert, serious risk of miscalculation .

Giacomo ‘03

Carol Giacomo is a national security reporter in the Washington bureau of the Reuters News Agency. May 22, 2003. “Experts Fear U.S.-Russia Nuclear 'Miscalculation”. http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0522-03.htm

More than a decade after the Cold War ended, the world faces a possible "perfect storm" of security factors that has increased the risk of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear exchange between the United States and Russia, experts said yesterday. A study by the RAND think-tank, strongly endorsed by former U.S. senator Sam Nunn and his non-profit group, paints a devastating picture of Russia's strategic capabilities and challenges assumptions about the degree to which better U.S.-Russian relations have improved security. In the report and at a news conference, they called for world leaders to address the problem. The chilling assessment came as the Republican-dominated U.S. Senate cleared the way for research and development of a new generation of low-yield nuclear weapons, up to about a third as large as the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in World War II. A day after senators voted to lift a 10-year-old ban on such weapons research, Democrats sought a compromise that would allow the research, but prohibit the development. Senators instead approved lifting the ban on both research and development, but would require the American president to seek congressional authorization before producing any of the new weapons. "This issue is as clear as any issue ever gets: You're either for nuclear war or you're not," said Democratic Senator Ted Kennedy. "Either you want to make it easier to start using nuclear weapons or you don't." New Scientist magazine, meanwhile, reports that the British government is recruiting scientists for its nuclear weapons program, raising fears among anti-nuclear campaigners that London may join Washington in developing new-generation nuclear weapons. Britain's Atomic Weapons Establishment has confirmed it hopes to hire 80 physicists, material scientists and systems engineers this year and to increase its work force by 300 or more by 2008, the magazine says. The scientists may be involved in research with the United States under a mutual defense agreement. Nunn said the post-Cold War era has seen lessened chances of a premeditated nuclear strike by Washington or Moscow, but "on balance my belief is that the risk has increased ... for a perfect storm in terms of a nuclear miscalculation or an accident." The RAND study cites three reasons for this: First, the United States and Russia retain large nuclear forces on "hair-trigger" alert, meaning they could be launched in minutes and destroy both societies in an hour. Second, economic and social problems have led Russia to rely increasingly on nuclear arms. The number of Russian weapons that could survive a U.S. first strike attack has declined dramatically, its submarine fleet has been "decimated," its early warning systems has deteriorated to the point of "serious disrepair," and many of its intercontinental ballistic missiles are "well beyond their planned service lives," the report says. Moreover, "the breakdown of order in Russia, economic difficulties, and low morale of its military personnel and the rise of organized crime and separatist violence have increased concern" about nuclear force security, it said. Third, the vulnerability of Russian forces is enhanced by the increasing capability of U.S. forces to deliver accurate and devastating strikes, the report concluded. All this means "the incentive for Moscow is to launch quickly use it or lose it," said David Mosher, one author of the study. The report foresaw three scenarios: an intentional unauthorized nuclear weapon launch by a terrorist or rogue commander; a missile launched by mistake; or an intentional launch of nuclear weapons based on incorrect or incomplete information.

Russia Advantage 1AC 3/3

### Space Missile Defense key to intercepting accidental launches

### Fox and Orman ’11.

Eugene Fox is vice president and Stanley Orman is CEO of Orman Associates, Rockville, Md., a defense consulting firm. May 9, 2011. “BMD Needs Space Component”. http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=6442464&c=FEA&s=COM

Chilton is right to bring this subject to the forefront once again. We need this space-based capability for our missile defense, and just as important, to protect our space-based sensors from attack. We are heavily dependent on our space assets for communications, for observation, for location and guidance using GPS, and for any BMD activity. The loss of these capabilities would drastically reduce our ability to defend ourselves or to respond in any effective manner if hostilities were to break out. Let us hope that some active serving officers will have to courage to speak out and admit that space is merely another domain in which we have to operate effectively if we are to remain secure. Aegis ships are now being deployed to the Mediterranean to provide interception capability for missiles aimed at Europe, and agreement has been reached to deploy ground-based interceptors in Romania in 2015, for the same purpose. These limited capability missiles may provide some defense for Europe against intermediate-range missiles fired from Iran, but will not enhance American defenses against long-range missiles directed at the U.S. mainland. We seem to be insistent on avoiding the real issue. If we are to have effective missile defenses, we have to consider space-based interceptors.

### And. Nuclear miscalculation causes EXTINCTION

Bostrom 02 (Professor of Philosophy, Yale University Nick, “Existential Risks,” http://www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html)

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization. Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

## Russia Solvency

### U.S. Space Weaponization key to leadership, security and intelligence.

Rozoff ‘09

Rick Rozoff is an analyst with Liberty News Radio. June 18, 2009. “Militarization Of Space: “Threat Of Nuclear War On Earth”. <http://www.opednews.com/articles/Militarization-Of-Space-T-by-Rick-Rozoff-090619-728.html>.

“Russian military experts see in this doctrine a disguised bid by the US for the weaponization of outer space. Anti-satellite weapons makes an integral part of the U.S. missile defence system.” The U.S. National Space Policy of 2006 states that “In this new century, those who effectively utilize space will enjoy added prosperity and security and will hold a substantial advantage over those who do not. Freedom of action in space is as important to the United States as air power and sea power. In order to increase knowledge, discovery, economic prosperity, and to enhance the national security, the United States must have robust, effective, and efficient space capabilities.” It further identifies goals of the policy to include the intention to: Strengthen the nation’s space leadership and ensure that space capabilities are available in time to further U.S. national security, homeland security, and foreign policy objectives Enable unhindered U.S. operations in and through space to defend our interests there Develop and deploy space capabilities that sustain U.S. advantage and support defense and intelligence transformation and provide, as launch agent for both the defense and intelligence sectors, reliable, affordable, and timely space access for national security purposes Support military planning and satisfy operational requirements as a major intelligence mission The same Russian general quoted above cited as an example of Washington’s space war plans the Pentagon’s downing of an American spy satellite in February of 2008, allegedly because it had become disabled. General Buzhinsky said, “Despite the statements of some U.S. officials that the satellite’s destruction had to be performed once only to minimize risks for life and the health of people, many analysts are of another opinion. They believe that the U.S. tested a new type of weapons capable of destroying spacecraft.” A year later, February of 2009, an American and Russian satellite were reported to have collided over northeastern Russia.

## Russia 2AC Extensions

### Russia wont engage in an arms race.

### Krepon and Katz-Hyman ‘05

Michael Krepon is co-founder of Stimson, and director of the South Asia and Space Security programs. Michael Katz-Hyman is a research Assistant at the Henry L. Stimson Center. “Space Weapons and Proliferation.” July 2005. http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Space\_Weapons\_and\_Proliferation.pdf.

For space warfare initiatives to generate an arms race, both contestants need to be able to compete, and see value or necessity in the competition. Moscow’s ability to engage in an arms race with the United States is now very much in doubt. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates Russian military expenditures to be approximately $20 billion a year, or less than five percent of the US defense budget. Russia’s deployed nuclear forces continue to decline in numbers, the result of block obsolescence of Cold War-era investments, funding constraints, defense production impediments, and national decisions to apply limited resources to other priorities. From a high point in 1986 of over 40,000 stockpiled warheads, the Russian nuclear arsenal is estimated to consist of 16,000 warheads, about half of which may now be operational. By contrast, during virulent phases of the Cold War, the Soviet Union increased its stockpile size by 1,000 warheads per year.

# A2 Case

## A2: Insufficient Defense

### A good plan will provide sufficient defense and be able to defend the US from various threats

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis ’09 [Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Independent Working Group, 2009, “Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, & The 21st century” http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf]

A global layered defense capability is necessary to counter these threats. Near-term options exist for augmenting seabased defenses and deploying space-based defenses within the next decade, resulting in a comprehensive, global layered missile defense system. Layered defenses provide multiple opportunities to destroy attacking missiles in all thrree phases of flight from any direction regardless of their geographic starting point. Furthermore, a layered defense makes the countermeasures available to the offensive systems much less effective than would be the case if interdiction was only possible in one (or two) phase(s) of the missile’s flight. Boostphase intercepts, most efficiently conducted by components deployed in space, are particularly desirable because a missile is most vulnerable during this segment since it is relatively slow moving, presents a readily identifiable target (bright rocket plume), and has not released any of its warheads or countermeasures that would complicate interception in subsequent phases. Boost-phase interception has the added advantage that the missile’s payload may, depending on how early interdiction occurs, fall back on the attacking nation. This situation could deter the launching state if it is confronted with the likelihood of serious damage to its own territory. In addition, depending on the number of assets deployed, a space-based boost-phase defense could always be on station on a world-wide basis, unfettered by sovereignty issues of overflight and operations on another nation’s territory.

### Anti-missile defense needed

Mackenzie Eaglen 2010(Research Fellow for National Security Studies at the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation. “Why Missile Defense is Still Needed” http://www.riponsociety.org/forum310g.htm)
Iran will likely achieve nuclear status in the near future, and the world has limited visibility into their program and even less into their leaders’ intentions. The International Atomic Energy Agency is having difficulty developing a comprehensive picture of Iran’s nuclear program, but officials believe Iran may be working on affixing a nuclear warhead to one of its growing classes of ballistic missiles. Even the U.S. military estimates that Iran will be capable of fielding an intercontinental ballistic missile by 2015.

Numbers tell the rest of the story. In just the past decade, the number of nuclear states around the globe has grown from six to nine. Meanwhile a total of 28 countries have ballistic missile capabilities. Some are rapidly improving their arsenals with help from other states. China, for example, has shown it is capable of targeting U.S. satellites with ballistic missiles and electromagnetic pulse warheads. In January 2007, China launched an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) at one of its own satellites. The Chinese referred to the test as an experiment and not a deliberate anti-satellite test. Nevertheless, the action proved Chinese capabilities and demonstrates their potential for growth In just the past decade, the number of nuclear states around the globe has grown from six to nine. Meanwhile a total of 28 countries have ballistic missile capabilities. North Korea has some 1,000 missiles and is selling them to other countries. It has tested at least 25 missiles with ranges of up to 1,200 miles. This means North Korean missiles are capable of reaching South Korea and Japan. Its leaders are also developing a new ICBM with a minimum range of 3,700 miles that could hit Alaska and some parts of Hawaii if it functioned at its full capacity. Judging by capabilities (missile arsenals) as well as intentions (official statements from world leaders), the need for a U.S. missile defense system is clear.

## A2: Arms Race 1/3

### US space dominance prevents arms race

[**Dolman, Everett C.**](http://www.spacedebate.org/author/1064) Winter 2005 "[**Strategy Lost: Taking the Middle Road to Nowhere**](http://www.peterson.af.mil/hqafspc/news/images/JournalWinter05Web.pdf)." [**High Frontier Journal**](http://www.spacedebate.org/source/High%20Frontier%20Journal). Vol. 3, No. 1 31-33.

Common to all hedging strategy proponents is the fear that placing weapons in space will spur a new arms race. Unfortunately, such a strategy increases the likelihood of a space arms race if and when space weapons are ultimately deployed, as the only plausible response by the US would be to at least match the opposing capabilities. This dithering approach blatantly ignores the current real world situation. At present, the US has no peer competitors in space. For the US to refrain from weaponizing until another state proves the capacity to challenge it allows for potential enemies to catch up to American capabilities. At a minimum, there is no risk for potential peer competitors to try. On the other hand, should the US reject the hedging strategy and unilaterally deploy weapons in space, other states may rationally decide not to compete. The cost of entry will simply be too great; the probability of failure palpable. In other words, the fear of an arms race in space, the most powerful argument in favor of the hedging plan, is most likely if the US follows its counsel

### Other countries would not try to counter the American nuclear weapons, as long as America is the first to deploy

Dolman ’05 [Everett C. Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies, “US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space” 9-14-05, http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20&%20Space.pdf]

Indeed, it is concern for the unanticipated arrival of technology X that initially motivates my own preference for a policy advocating immediate deployment of space weapons. So long as America is the state most likely to acquire a breakthrough technology in this area, my concern is limited to the problem of letting technology take us where it will. But what if an enemy of democratic liberalism should suddenly acquire the means to place quickly and cheaply multiple weapons into orbit? The advantages gained from controlling the high ground of space would accrue to it as surely as to any liberal state, and the concomitant loss of military power from the denial of space to our already-dependent military force could cause the immediate demise of the extant international system. The longer the US dithers on its responsibilities, the more likely a potential opponent could seize low-earth orbit before America could respond. And America would respond … finally. But would another state? If America were to weaponize space today, it is unlikely that any other state or group of states would find it rational to counter in kind. The entry cost to provide the infrastructure necessary is too high; hundreds of billions of dollars, at minimum. The years of investment it would take to achieve a minimal counter-force capability—essentially from scratch—would provide more than ample time for the US to entrench itself in space, and readily counter preliminary efforts to displace it. The tremendous effort in time and resources would be worse than wasted. Most states, if not all, would opt not to counter US deployments in kind. They might oppose US interests with asymmetric balancing, depending on how aggressively America uses its new power, but the likelihood of a hemorrhaging arms race in space should the US deploy weapons there—at least for the next few years—is extremely remote

A2: Arms Race 2/3

### War is improbable to occur as long as the US acts correctly

Dolman ’05 [Everett C. Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies, “US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space” 9-14-05, http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20&%20Space.pdf]

Seizing the initiative and securing low-Earth orbit now, while the US is unchallenged in space, would do much to stabilize the international system and prevent an arms race in space. From low-Earth orbit (LEO), the enhanced ability to deny any attempt by another nation to place military assets in space, or to readily engage and destroy terrestrial ASAT capacity, makes the possibility of large scale space war and or military space races less likely, not more. Why would a state expend the effort to compete in space with a superpower that has the extraordinary advantage of holding securely the highest ground at the top of the gravity well? So long as the controlling state demonstrates a capacity and a will to use force to defend its position, in effect expending a small amount of violence as needed to prevent a greater conflagration in the future, the likelihood of a future war in space is remote

### Deployment of Space Weapons Won't Cause Arms Races

CIAO Focus 2002 (CIAO Focus, 2002: Deployment of Space Weapons Won't Cause Arms Races, http://spacedebate.org/argument/1153)

Historical examples refute the technological determinism argument. Nation-states will choose to develop or not to develop space weapons based on their own strategic and economic calculations.

### U.S. Deployment of Space Weapons won't Initiate an Arms Race because Other Countries will Realize U.S. is not a Threat to Them

Everett C. Dolman September 14th, 2005 (US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space, E-parliament conference on space security, Washington DC, <http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space_hearing_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20%26%20Space.pdf>)

Hence, the argument that the unilateral deployment of space weapons will precipitate a disastrous arms race is misplaced. To be sure, space weapons are offensive by their very nature. They deter violence by the omnipresent threat of precise, measured, and unstoppable retaliation. They offer no advantage if the target set considered is not global. But they also offer no advantage in the mission of territorial occupation. As such, they are far less threatening to the international environment than any combination of weapons employed in their stead. A state employing offensive deterrence through space-weapons can punish a transgressor state, but is in a poor position to challenge its sovereignty. The transgressor state is less likely to succumb to the security dilemma if it perceives its national survival is not at risk. Moreover, the tremendous expense of space weapons inhibits their indiscriminate use. Over time, the world of sovereign states will recognize that the US does not threaten self-determination internally, though it challenges any attempts to intervene militarily in the politics of others, and has severely restricted its own capacity to do so.

A2: Arms Race 3/3

### Developing offensive counterspace capabilities, such as BMD, dissuade China from attacking US satellites.

Ashley Tellis, Senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007. 'China's Military Space Strategy', Survival, 49:3, 41 – 72, [**http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/tellis\_china\_space1.pdf**](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/tellis_china_space1.pdf)

This has led some observers, such as US Senator Jon Kyl, to conclude that the solution to redressing emerging American space vulnerabilities in the context of competition with China lies in developing, among other things, US offensive counterspace capabilities. 90 These will almost certainly be required, if for no other reason than to deter Beijing’s use of anti-space weaponry and to hold at risk its own emerging assets in space, which are likely to become even more important for both economic and military purposes as China evolves into a great power. 91 Offensive American counterspace instruments serve the limited but critical purpose of raising the costs of China’s evolving space-denial strategy, increasing the probability that Beijing will desist from asymmetric attacks on US space assets.

## A2: Space Militarization Impossible 1/2

### Space Militarization is feasible, and is already occurring with much success

Orr ’04 [Jackie Orr, Department of Sociology Syracuse University, 2004, The Militarization of Outer Space, http://crs.sagepub.com/content/30/2/451.full.pdf+html]

The battles for which the U.S. Space Command is prepared are not futuristic science ﬁction scenarios. As the command center responsible for the protection and proliferation of military and commercial satellites, and for the rejuvenated National Missile Defense program, the Space Command is already a key player in the conduct of U.S. war. Satellitemediated infotech warfare has arrived. The militarized use of space-based satellites to provide real-time ﬂows of information and imagery debuted in the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989, developed in the 1990s during the U.S.-led war against Iraq and in the killing ﬁelds of Kosovo, and is today an integral component of U.S. military activity in Afghanistan and Iraq (Gray 1997; Grossman 2001). “Space support to NATO’s operations in Kosovo was a perfect example of how the United States will ﬁght its wars in the future,” the Space Command reported in 2002, “Satelliteguided munitions, communications, navigation, and weather all combined to achieve military objectives in a relatively short amount of time and without the loss of a single U.S. troop.” (From the website of the U.S. Space Command at www.spacecom.mil/Fact%20SheetMilitarySpaceForces.htm, April 22, 2002.) As home to an increasingly sophisticated and expensive infrastructure of satellites, and to a proposed network of (possibly nuclear-powered) space stations equipped with laser weaponry, ‘outer space’ is now the ﬁnal, fantastic frontier for the U.S. military’s imaginary and material battleﬁelds.

### Missile Defense Works

Mackenzie Eaglen 2010(Research Fellow for National Security Studies at the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation. “Why Missile Defense is Still Needed” http://www.riponsociety.org/forum310g.htm)

Our investment in missile defense is what prevents others from building up their own arsenals and reduces their perceived need to acquire additional weapons. The United States today provides security for more than 30 countries around the world and thus prevents these nations from pursuing large missile programs of their own. As a result, the number of weapons throughout the world has decreased, which is a desirable outcome.
The bottom line is that missile defense decreases the importance and utility of ballistic missiles. This dramatically limits their attractiveness to potential enemies, given that such an attack would more than likely fail.

### There have been tests of space weapons with high success

Lambakis ’07 [Steven Lambakis, Writer for Hoover Institution, 2007, “Leveraging Space to Improve Missile Defense”

With several successful hit-to-kill intercept tests in the bag and the proven combat performance of short-range land-based defenses, we have shown that we can “hit-a-bullet-with-a-bullet.” We also have made great strides in component miniaturization and advances in materials, and over the past twenty years have improved performance in interceptors, sensors, and battle management. This technological progress is key to considering whether the operation of space-based interceptors is feasible, effective (as part of the overall US missile defense system), and affordable.

A2: Space Militarization Impossible 2/2

### The US already has successful anti-satellite technology, as shown in 1985

Miller ’02 [John J. Miller, National Review, July 15, 2002, “Our Next Manifest Destiny” http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/714383/posts]

On the morning of September 13, 1985, Air Force Major Doug Pearson smashed through the sound barrier in his F-15. Pointed almost directly upward more than seven miles above the Pacific Ocean, he tapped a little red button on the side of his control stick, and released a missile strapped to the belly of his plane. The missile blazed out of sight, leaving the earth's atmosphere quickly and reaching a speed of 13,000 miles per second. Pearson wondered if it would hit anything. The mission was classified, so Pearson had developed a code with the folks back at Edwards Air Force Base: The radioman would tell him to level off at a certain altitude if his missile struck its target, an obsolete scientific probe orbiting 345 miles over Hawaii. As it happened, the code wasn't necessary. When Pearson checked in a few minutes after firing, he could hear cheering in the background from the control room. It was the one time an American pilot had ever destroyed an object in outer space. People still talk about Pearson as the country's first "space ace." He remains its only space ace. A few weeks after the satellite was destroyed, Congress banned further tests. "We had hoped to conduct more," recalls Pearson, now a general. "But politics were what they were, and the nation decided to go another way."

## A2: Space Debris

### Space debris is inevitable and is not a big risk. It is not a Reason to Reject Anti-Satellite Weapons

CIAO Focus 2007 (CIAO Focus, 2007: Space Debris is not a Reason to Reject Anti-Satellite Weapons, [**http://spacedebate.org/argument/2597/**](http://spacedebate.org/argument/2597/))

Space debris is an inevitable fact of all space activity and will have to be dealt with in some way. The U.S. can develop methods to mitigate the risks from space debris when disabling target satellites but this should not be an overriding concern.

Space Debris is an Inevitable Consequence of Space Activity.

Taylor Dinerman, January 22nd, 2007 (Sticky airbags and grapples: kinetic ASATs without the debris, The Space Review, [**http://www.thespacereview.com/article/789/1**](http://www.thespacereview.com/article/789/1))

Dangerous space debris is both man-made and natural, in the latter case in the form of micrometeoroids. Confusing the two is a great way to make the issue into more of a problem than it already is. The environment around Earth is certainly filled with space junk, but if this was as dangerous as has been claimed, spacecraft would be breaking up on an almost weekly basis. Space junk is a problem and always will be. The international agreements designed to mitigate the dangers have been useful, but cannot halt the creation of more debris any more than recycling laws halt the production of garbage. The trend has been moving in the right direction, at least until our Chinese friends decided to make a statement.

### Anti-Satellite Weapons could be Developed that Would not Create Space Debris

Taylor Dinerman, January 22nd, 2007 (Sticky airbags and grapples: kinetic ASATs without the debris, The Space Review, [**http://www.thespacereview.com/article/789/1**](http://www.thespacereview.com/article/789/1))

Fortunately, a few years ago a proposal was floated for as class of weapons that would destroy target spacecraft without directly creating any debris. This type of "co-orbital" ASAT would approach its target and envelop it with an airbag covered in a type of sticky substance. It would then fire a thruster so that the conjoined satellites would burn up in the atmosphere. If it worked as designed, no debris would be created. In practice it would be no easy task to design, test, and operate such a weapon, but it is not beyond the state of the art and would not create any debris. Figuring out what kind of sticky material is right for such a system would, by itself, be a fascinating project. The substance might have applications in other military and perhaps civil space systems. If the sticky airbag solution proves too difficult, the same goals might be reached using an ASAT equipped with grappling arms that would grasp the target before pushing down towards the atmosphere. The challenges of such a system are evident, not the least of which would be the need for some sort of decision-making software that would choose the best places to seize the enemy satellite during the final moments before contact.

## A2: Militarization Destabilizing 1/2

### History shows that character and motivations of states is more important than technology for determining what is 'destabilizing'.

Steven Lambakis February 2011 (Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics Policy Review, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/feb01/lambakis.html)

When we look at what incites war, history instructs us that what matter most are the character and motivation of the states involved, along with the general balance of power (i.e., are we in the world of 1914, 1945, or 2001?). Fluctuations in national arsenals, be they based on earth or in space, do not determine, but rather more accurately are a reflection of, the course of politics among nations. In other words, it matters not so much that there are nuclear weapons, but rather whether Saddam Hussein or Tony Blair controls them and in what security context. The same may be said for space weapons.

### Loss of a communications satellite won’t necessarily cause crisis escalation.

Steven Lambakis February 2011 (Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics Policy Review, [**http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/feb01/lambakis.html**](http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/feb01/lambakis.html))

In other words, it is not at all self-evident that a sudden loss of a communications satellite, for example, would precipitate a wider-scale war or make warfare termination impossible. In the context of U.S.-Russian relations, communications systems to command authorities and forces are redundant. Urgent communications may be routed through land lines or the airwaves. Other means are also available to perform special reconnaissance missions for monitoring a crisis or compliance with an armistice. While improvements are needed, our ability to know what transpires in space is growing -- so we are not always in the dark.

A2: Militarization Destabilizing 2/2

### Space Weapons will not pose offensive threat to other countries’ sovereignty

Everett C. Dolman 2006 (US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space, SAIS Review. XXVI, No. 1, [**http://spacedebate.org/evidence/2322/**](http://spacedebate.org/evidence/2322/))

Hence, the argument that the unilateral deployment of space weapons will precipitate a disastrous arms race is further eroded. To be sure, space weapons are offensive by their very nature. They deter violence by the omnipresent threat of precise, measured, and unstoppable retaliation. But they offer no advantage in the mission of territorial occupation. As such, they are far less threatening to the international environment than any combination of conventional weapons employed in their stead. What would be more threatening to a state in opposition to American hegemony: a dozen lasers in space with pinpoint accuracy, or (for about the same price) 15 infantry divisions massed on the border? A state employing offensive deterrence through space weapons can punish a transgressor state, but it is in a poor position to challenge that state’s sovereignty. A transgressor state is less likely to succumb to the security dilemma if it perceives that its national survival is not at risk. Moreover, the tremendous expense of space weapons would inhibit their indiscriminate use. Over time, the world of sovereign states would recognize that the United States could not and would not use space weapons to threaten another country’s internal self-determination. The United States still would challenge any attempts to intervene militarily in the politics of others, and it would have severely restricted its own capacity to do the latter. Judicious and non-arbitrary use of a weaponized space eventually could be seen as a net positive, an effective global police force that punishes criminal acts but does not threaten to engage in aggressive behavior.

### Past 65 years of escalating military space activity have not been destabilizing, no reason to expect weaponization would be either

Andrew T. Park, 2006 (Incremental Stepps for Achieving Space Security: The Need for a New Way of Thinking to Enhance the Legal Regime for Space, Houston Journal of International Law, [**http://www.hjil.org/ArticleFiles/28\_3\_871.pdf**](http://www.hjil.org/ArticleFiles/28_3_871.pdf))

The fact of the matter is that the world has not fallen apart after sixty years of increasing military activity in space. The evolution of the militarization of space has been particularly shaped by pressing national security requirements of the United States, and as many space hawks firmly believe, “this is how it will continue to be.” The U.S. quest for space dominance may arguably serve to further selfish military desires, but it can also provide a degree of stability that the current legal regime has been unable to provide.

## A2: Nuclear Weapons Good

### A single nuclear detonation is devastating

Lambakis, Steven. February and March 2007. ("Missile Defense From Space." Policy Review. No. 141)

And the stakes couldn't be higher. A ballistic missile delivering a nuclear payload to an American city would be truly devastating. For comparison, the Insurance Information Institute estimates total economic loss so far from Hurricane Katrina at more than $100 billion. By some calculations, it is going to take New Orleans 25 years to recover fully, and the cost of rebuilding the city is predicted to be as high as $200 billion. The direct cost to the New York City economy following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks was between $80 billion and $100 billion. These figures do not include indirect costs or the incalculable human losses.

Now just imagine the costs imposed by a ballistic missile nuclear strike against a U.S. city. The economic toll from a single nuclear attack against a major city, which would involve extensive decontamination activities and impact the national economy, could rise above $4 trillion. The economy could also be devastated by the electromagnetic pulse generated by a high-altitude nuclear explosion. The resulting electromagnetic shock would fry transformers within regional electrical power grids. The interdependent telecommunications (including computers), transportation, and banking and financial infrastructures that people and businesses rely on would be significantly damaged. Such an event would leave us, in some cases, with nineteenth-century technologies. This situation S Moreover, the paralysis leaders would experience would leave the country and its allies exposed to highly lethal twenty-first century threats. The blackmail possibilities of these weapons are as mind-numbing as they are terrifying.

## A2: Other tech solves 1/2

### Missile Defense is the most recent, necessary, and best space weapon

David C. Gompert and Jeffrey A. Isaacson ‘99(David C gompert is a senior fellow at the RAND corporation and is the former Senior Advisor for National Security and Defense for the Coalition and is a part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; Jeffrey A. Isaacson is the Vice President, Army Research Division; Director, RAND Arroyo Center “Planning a Ballistic Missile Defense System of Systems” http://www.rand.org/pubs/issue\_papers/IP181/index2.html)

The United States is edging toward deployment of a national missile defense (NMD) system to protect itself from limited ballistic missile attacks by rogue nations. [1] Although a definitive decision to deploy NMD has not been made, the Clinton administration is taking steps in that direction: (1) affirming that a rogue nation ballistic missile threat could exist in the near future, (2) budgeting funds for NMD deployment in the Future Years Defense Program, and (3) declaring that NMD deployment might require modifications to the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The administration has promised a deployment decision as early as July 2000, assuming the technology is ready and the threat looms. Congress appears even more committed, with both the House and Senate recently voting to deploy a system as soon as technologically possible. This growing interest in at least limited NMD has been fueled by concerns about the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), ballistic missiles, and technologies to produce both. Three particular developments in 1998 catalyzed the push to deploy: (1) the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, which validated fears of further nuclear proliferation; (2) the Rumsfeld Commission report, which found that the ballistic missile threat to the United States is broader, more mature, and evolving more rapidly than originally surmised and that it may emerge with little or no warning (Rumsfeld, 1998); and (3) the Taepo Dong-1 missile test by North Korea, which reinforced the Rumsfeld Commission findings by illustrating that key technological hurdles to intercontinental ballistic missile development (in this case, multiple staging) may be overcome without warning. Yet, with both widening support and a heightened sense of urgency for at least limited NMD, there is a danger that the United States will take a path of least technical, bureaucratic, and diplomatic resistance, instead of making a considered judgment of what missile defense capabilities and treaty rights it needs. Current plans for a near-term NMD--the so-called "C1 capability"--are essentially a point solution to a point problem, with limited long-term value. At worst, the current plans point to a fragile initial capability that may be inadequate even to meet the immediate threat, much less other threats. It follows that negotiating only those changes to the ABM Treaty needed to permit the planned point solution will either prevent the United States from having adequate missile defense or require more wholesale treaty changes down the road. A different point solution is not the answer. What is needed, instead, is a long-term strategy that addresses the evolving ballistic missile defense problem broadly and flexibly, while also neutralizing the near-term threat. This strategy would call for an integrated and adaptable "system of systems" to defend U.S. territory, forces, allies, and other interests worth protecting. Such an approach is essential for coherent investment, technological, and negotiating strategies and should therefore be crafted in parallel with--indeed, as the framework for--a response to the immediate threat. In this paper, we present the case for and the components of such a general solution. We offer a durable strategic rationale for a ballistic missile defense, suggest how to assess the adequacy of any solution, illustrate a general solution, and identify potential steps to align the near-term program with the general solution. We also examine strategies for managing the ABM Treaty, Russia, China, and strategic offensive forces that are consistent with the general solution. To set the stage, we begin with a brief description of current U.S. ballistic missile defense programs and the ABM Treaty.

A2: Other tech solves 2/2

### National Missile Defense technology already in progress

Wade Boese (Editorial Advisor to Arms Control Association “News Analysis: Missile Defense: Deploying a Work in Progress” September 04 http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004\_09/Missile\_Defense)

Sometime over the next several weeks, most likely around Oct. 1, President George W. Bush or Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld will stride to a podium and announce that the initial elements of a missile defense system are now in place and ready for action. They will proclaim that the deployment fulfills the president’s promise four years ago to guard America against a rogue state or terrorist group armed with a ballistic missile. The hyperbole has already begun. As the system’s first missile interceptor booster was placed into its silo in Alaska July 22, Major General John W. Holly, charged with developing the system, said it “marks the end of an era where we have not been able to defend our country against long-range ballistic missile attacks.” On a campaign stop in August, Bush proclaimed, “It’s the beginning of a missile defense system that was envisioned by Ronald Reagan.” He added, “We want to continue to perfect this system, so we say to those tyrants who believe they can blackmail America and the free world: You fire, we’re going to shoot it down.”

## A2: Missiles bad for US Russia Relations

### Missile Defense Good for U.S.-Russia relations.

Spring ‘11

Baker Spring is the F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy at The Heritage Foundation. He specializes in examining the threat of ballistic missiles from Third World countries and U.S. national security issues. The Heritage Foundation. “Russian Control of U.S. Missile Defenses? Just Say No. April 11, 2011. http://blog.heritage.org/2011/04/11/russian-control-of-u-s-missile-defenses-just-say-no/

While the U.S. is right to be seeking Russian cooperation in the area of missile defense—more defensive strategic postures would benefit both the U.S. and Russia in addressing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the missiles used to deliver them—the U.S. should reject this Russian demand. The Russian demand defies rational explanation. The missile defense system will serve only one purpose: to intercept and destroy ballistic missiles already launched at a target. In this context, the Russians cannot believe that U.S. and allied operation of a missile defense system will pose a threat to them unless they think they need to threaten both with a nuclear-armed missile attack. If this is the basis of Russian thinking, then this negotiation is about anything but cooperation. Genuine cooperation in the realm of missile defense is not about the possession of capabilities by the U.S., U.S. allies, or Russia; it is about all three parties standing together in the intention to oppose aggression through the use of ballistic missiles by rogue states. The Russians can be motivated only by either of two desires in demanding direct operational control. The first is to deny the U.S. and its allies the ability to operate a missile defense system for their own protection. The second is for the Russians to operate the system only for their own benefit, effectively expecting the U.S. and its allies to build a missile defense system and turn it over to Russia. Either way, the demand will leave the U.S. and its allies vulnerable to missile attack. Interestingly, there is no evidence that the Russians have made an offer to the U.S. and its allies in these negotiations to allow them operational control over the Russian missile defense system deployed around Moscow. Fortunately, there is another option for genuine cooperation in the field of missile defense between the U.S. and its allies on the one side and the Russians on the other: to pursue coordinated deployments of missile defense systems to address shared threats. This approach permits each to control the missile defenses in their possession to meet their security needs while also providing all the opportunity for cooperation even where there may be differences of opinion of what constitutes a genuine threat. The coordinated deployment option would also deny Russia the ability to assert that missile defenses are inherently destabilizing no matter which country possesses a missile defense capability. Russia made just such an assertion by insisting on the inclusion of anti-missile defense language in the preamble to the New START arms control treaty with the U.S., which has just entered into force. Russia, by acknowledging that it has a missile defense capability of its own in the contribution to coordinated deployments for countering shared threats, will no longer be able to assert that missile defenses are destabilizing under all circumstances. In the course of negotiations on missile defense cooperation, the U.S. and its allies should not buckle to the Russian demand for operational control. If they do, the agreement will only serve to perpetuate U.S. and allied vulnerability to missile attack. In this case, what was supposed to be a negotiation about cooperating in the field of missile defense will become a negotiation over cooperation in restricting missile defense. It will be an agreement that will not serve U.S. or allied interests.

## A2: Space Weapons Bad 1/2

### Rival countries will expand now

Trevor Brown, MSc, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2009. Air & Space Power Journal, “Soft Power and Space Weaponization,” <http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/spr09/brown.html>

Without a doubt, we must guard at all costs the celestial lines of communications that link society and the military. Consider the consequences if satellites that we use every day for military operations, financial transactions, communications, weather forecasting, and air navigation failed without warning. Devastating strikes on critical nodes in space not only could place the lives of millions at serious risk, but also could result in incalculable economic losses to the nation.

Throughout the Cold War, the United States struggled to obtain a position of military superiority over the Soviet Union in order to protect American values and interests. A legacy of that struggle is the United States’ current space capability. Should the United States permit security for its values and interests to lapse by discontinuing attempts to retain the military superiority that it has achieved? Are we to believe that US security could somehow increase by forgoing military supremacy?

Some people speak as if they believe that a country can choose whether to pursue national security through arms or through arms control.10 But Russia’s interest in banning space weapons is motivated by a desire to stunt the growth of US military space programs in order to buy time for covertly advancing its own space-weapons program and achieving technological parity.11 Russia bases its opposition to space weaponization not on a scrupulous set of principles but on strategic objectives. Two scholars contend that “to understand whether Russia could indeed change its position on the weaponization of space, we need to go beyond official statements and discussion among Russian military experts. The course of the military space program in Russia will be determined primarily by the availability of the resources required to support the program and by the ability of the industry and the military to manage development projects for the military use of space.”12

Despite China’s repeated calls for a ban on all space weapons, historical evidence suggests that little separates Chinese and Russian motivations for such bans. “Because a broad interpretation of space weapons would rule out almost all U.S. missile defense systems, Chinese officials who want to limit U.S. missile defense deployments would advocate a ban that used this interpretation.”13 Interestingly, after the Clinton administration scrapped the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1993, China redoubled its efforts in military space and gained ground on the United States.14 By 1999 “China’s test of a spacecraft intended for manned flight demonstrated a low-thrust rocket propulsion system that could be used to make warheads maneuver to defeat a BMD [ballistic missile defense] system.”15

Perhaps there remains a belief in the US strategic community that “the deployment of U.S. space weapons is likely to make space assets—including commercial communications and broadcast satellites—even more vulnerable, since no other country is pursuing, let alone deploying, space attack weapons.”16 Such notions were shattered when China conducted its first successful ASAT test in January 2007, suggesting that it had spent many years developing ASAT capabilities. The United States—as well as the rest of the world, for that matter—should not allow itself to be duped. The record shows that although officials in the Chinese Communist Party rail against military space as a threat to peace and stability, the People’s Liberation Army busies itself with the acquisition of space weapons.

The notion that the United States can keep space from becoming a “shooting gallery” by agreeing to a comprehensive ban on space weapons is naïve.17 The hard truth is that as long as US economic and military power depends on massive, complex, and expensive sets of vulnerable space assets, the incentive for any potential foe to develop ways of attacking them remains too great to be overcome by any international agreement.18 If, however, such an agreement can constrain the United States from developing and deploying effective countermeasures, foes would have every reason to pressure Washington into limiting its own actions.19 As space technology spreads, the incentives for small and medium states to seek space-warfare capabilities increase, and the destruction of a major US satellite would represent both a substantive and symbolic victory over the United States.20 There is, therefore, no question of whether to proceed with space weapons—only a question of how to do so with the requisite political skill in order to retain soft power while expanding hard power

A2: Space Weapons bad 2/2

### U.S. must deploy to stay ahead

Brian Berger and Lon Rains, “Northrop to Buy SpaceShipOne Builder: Scaled Composites Already Crafting ‘SpaceShipTwo’ for Tourists,” MSNBC, 20 July 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19877344 (accessed 9 March 2008).

A glance at the global strategic situation reveals many nations rushing to develop space capabilities. Ostensibly civilian, the capabilities in development around the world are largely dual use and will have profound effects on the balance of power. The United States, therefore, would be foolish to slow the pace of its own space development. The issue at hand is whether to proceed with space weapons and how to proceed with these capabilities and effectively manage the security dilemmas that will inevitably arise.

By assuming a posture which suggests that its intentions in space are competitive scientific and commercial pursuits—and which does not suggest the desire to barricade the medium in times of peace for the purpose of geopolitical leverage—the United States can proceed without causing undue angst in the international community. Once we have laid the foundation for commercial activities (i.e., “merchant shipping”), military capabilities—or “military shipping”—will follow in due course and with far less controversy. If US policy makers can showcase scientific and commercial space endeavors while avoiding the perception of orbital despotism, they can steadily build dominant military space capabilities and retain soft power.

# A2 Politics DA

## A2: Politics Link – International Backlash

### International Community will support the US rather than try to militarize themselves

Lambakis ’01 [Steven Lambakis, a writer for Hoover Digest, 2-1-2001, “Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics”

Similar international support may be expected in the future, even if the United States were to deploy space-based interceptors to slap down ballistic missiles aimed at New York or Los Angeles or antisatellite weapons to blind prying eyes in times of crisis or conflict. When the stakes are high and the United States must act militarily in self-defense or to protect its interests, allies and friends are likely to judge U.S. activities in space to affect politico-strategic conditions on Earth appropriately and in context.

## A2: Politics DA-No Link

### Doing the plan doesn’t cause Obama to lose political capital; neg doesn’t have link

Hoppin ’08 [Andrew Hoppin, Former Chief Information Officer to US Senate, co-founder of NASA co-lab, 2-29-2008, “Space Policy under an Obama Administration” http://globehoppin.com/2008/02/29/space-policy-under-an-obama-administration/]

Many space constituents are publicly critical of the Obama campaign for campaign rhetoric that is less overtly supportive of the status quo of the US space program than that of the Clinton or McCain campaigns. However, to this constituent of space, Obama’s ambivalence makes him THE MOST ATTRACTIVE Presidential candidate in this campaign. Why? Because I believe that the WORST CASE scenario for the US space program under a new Administration is the status quo, and that we’re quite unlikely– even under an Obama administration– to experience major cutbacks in public space spending, due to the political capital that the status quo of space policy enjoys in key large States.

## A2: Plan Unpopular 1/2

### The Republicans strongly support missile defense and always have

Korb ’08 [Lawrence Korb, Senior Fellow at center for American Progress, Senior Advisor to the Center of Defense Information, 4-25-08, “Republicans, Missile Defense, and the Reagan Legacy” http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/republicans-missile-defense-and-the-reagan-legacy]

In addition, a foolproof national missile defense would enable Republicans to go it alone in the world and not have to rely on other nations or international treaties to provide security. This philosophy can be summed up as "unilateral if we can, multilateral if we must." Thus, if national missile defense can protect the United States against North Korean, Iranian, or Chinese missiles, why negotiate or make concessions? Or if the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with Russia prevents Washington from forging ahead with national missile defense, why not just scrap the treaty regardless of how it affects U.S.-Russian relations? Or why ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty? Instead, move ahead with the development of the bunker-buster or the reliable replacement warhead. Consequently, when the Republicans are in power, they push missile defense relentlessly. After the Republicans won both the Senate and House of Representatives in 1995, they passed a law, the National Missile Defense Act, which said that it was U.S. policy to deploy national missile defense as soon as possible. Never mind that the Soviet Union had collapsed, that the Clinton administration had just concluded an agreement with North Korea to freeze its development of plutonium at Yongbyon, or that there was no evidence then that Iran was violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

### Democrats also want to develop stronger Missile Defense systems

Democratic National Platform 2k [Democratic National Platform, quoted/compiled on the site OnTheIssues.com, 8-15-2000, “Develop limited Military Defense Systems” http://www.ontheissues.org/celeb/Democratic\_Party\_Defense.htm]

Our first priority is to continue to cut stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, halting testing, and ensuring that weapons and weapons-grade material do not fall into the wrong hands. In light of the possibility that U.S. forces will have to contend with hostile tactical range ballistic missiles, we have been working rapidly to develop anti-tactical ballistic missile systems. We reject Republican plans to endanger our security with massive unilateral cuts in our arsenal and to construct an unproven, expensive, and ill-conceived missile defense system that would plunge us into a new arms race. Democrats support the development of the technology for a limited national missile defense system.

A2: Plan Unpopular 2/2

### Missile defense has bipartisan support

Hodge 2/11 – staff writer for the Wall Street Journal (Nathan, 2/11/11, “Pentagon Loses War to Zap Airborne Laser From Budget,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704570104576124173372065568.html)

In March 1999, the General Accounting Office recommended the Air Force reconsider plans to order a second aircraft. That fall, the Pentagon began considering a plan to cut $258 million from the Airborne Laser to make up other budget shortfalls.  In response, a group of 19 Republican senators and one Democrat, led by Sen. Thad Cochran (R., Miss.), sent a letter to then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen urging him to keep funding intact. The Clinton administration pressed ahead with the proposed cuts, only for the Republican-controlled Congress in 2000 to restore funding. Mr. Cohen, like Mr. Gates, was a Republican defense secretary in a Democratic administration.  Missile defense was transformed under President George W. Bush. The Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency took over management of the Airborne Laser. In addition to developing "boost phase" defenses like Airborne Laser, the agency focused efforts on fielding "hit-to-kill" systems—rocket-launched interceptors that would steer into the path of an incoming missile and destroy warheads by sheer impact.  Riki Ellison, head of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, said bipartisan support continued to grow with each successful test of interceptor systems.

### Missile Defense is popular, poll proves

Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance ’05 (non-profit that seeks support for testing, development & deployment of missile defense systems, “Views of American Public on Missile Defense” http://www.missiledefenseadvocacy.org/data/files/polls/viewsofthe americanpubliconmissiledefense.pdf)

There is broad support for a missile defense system: 79% of Americans support a missile defense system to protect the United States. (70% Independents, 70% Democrats, and 91% Republicans)Americans perceive missile defense as a public safety issue: 70% of Americans state that Missile Defense is a public safety issue and part of the nation’s homeland security program. Americans will feel safer with a missile defense system: 71% of Americans stated they will feel safer with a Missile Defense System in place to protect the United States. The majority of Americans believe the building of a missile defense system is affordable. 53% of Americans believe Missile Defense is affordable and is money well spent

## Winners Win

### Political Capital is not finite-the more Obama pushes plans through congress, the more polcap he gains

Singer ‘09 (Jonathan Singer-senior writer and editor for MyDD. Singer is perhaps best known for his various interviews with prominent politicians. His interviews have included John Kerry, Walter Mondale, Bob Dole, and George McGovern, Barack Obama, John Edwards, and Tom Vilsack. He has been cited by sources including Newsweek, NY Times, and USA today. 3-3-2009, “By Expanding Capital, Obama Grows his Capital” http://mydd.com/2009/3/3/by-expending-capital-obama-grows-his-capital]

Some believe that political capital is finite, that it can be used up. To an extent that's true. But it's important to note, too, that political capital can be regenerated -- and, specifically, that when a President expends a great deal of capital on a measure that was difficult to enact and then succeeds, he can build up more capital. Indeed, that appears to be what is happening with Barack Obama, who went to the mat to pass the stimulus package out of the gate, got it passed despite near-unanimous opposition of the Republicans on Capitol Hill, and is being rewarded by the

# A2 Spending DA

## Spending Good – Jobs

### U.S. Millitiary Spending key to jobs.

Pollin and Garrett-Peltier ‘07

Robert Pollin and Heidi Garrett-Peltier Department of Economics and Political Economy Research Institute University of Massachusetts, Amherst. October 2007. University of Massachusetts. <http://www.ips-dc.org/reports/071001-jobcreation.pdf>.

The U.S. government spent an estimated $572 billion on the military in 2007. This amounts to about $1,800 for every resident of the country. The level of military spending has risen dramatically since 2001, with the increases beginning even before September 11, 2001. In total dollar terms (after controlling for inflation), military spending has risen at an average rate of 10 percent per year from 2000 – 2006, the full years of the Bush presidency to date. By contrast, the overall U.S. economy grew at an average annual rate of 2.7 percent. As a share of GDP, the military budget rose from 3.0 to 4.4 percent of GDP during the Bush Presidency. At the current size of the economy, a difference between a military budget at 4.4 rather than 3.0 percent of GDP amounts to $134 billion. The largest increases in the military budget during the Bush presidency have been associated with the Afghanistan and especially the Iraq wars. The Iraq war alone now costs an average of $360 million a day (according to the Congressional Research Service), or $138 billion over the 2007 fiscal year. Thus, the $138 billion spent on Iraq in 2007 was basically equal to the total increase in military spending resulting from moving the military budget from 3.0 to 4.4 percent of GDP. Amid the debates on the political and strategic merits of the Iraq war, one aspect of the current level of military spending by the U.S. government that has been largely neglected is its effects on the U.S. economy. $600 billion is a vast sum of money—greater than the combined GDP of Sweden and Thailand, and eight times the amount of U.S. federal spending on education. It is therefore reasonable to ask what the benefits might be to U.S. taxpayers if some significant share of the $600 billion now going to the military were instead devoted to alternative domestic purposes, such as health care, education, or the environment. A view is often expressed that the military budget is a cornerstone of the U.S. economy. The Pentagon is often said to be a major underwriter of, and stimulus to, important technical innovations. It is also often cited as a major employer, providing good jobs—jobs that are stable and at least decently paid—to millions of Americans.

### Studies prove Military Spending key to Economy and Jobs.

UAB 10.

University of Alabama Birmingham study led by Assistant Professor of Sociology Casey Borch, Ph.D. June 17, 2010. “UAB Study Confirms Military Spending Helps States Survive Poor Economy” http://main.uab.edu/Sites/MediaRelations/articles/78097/.

States in which defense spending is high are better equipped to withstand the effects of an economic downturn than others, according to a new study led by The University of Alabama at Birmingham Assistant Professor of Sociology Casey Borch, Ph.D. The study, published this week in the June issue of the journal Social Forces, confirms that states with high levels of defense spending have lower poverty rates, less income inequality, lower unemployment and higher median family income. It also demonstrates that the U.S. economy is increasingly dependent on military spending. "Politicians always have assumed that military spending helps the economy, but there have been very few studies to prove that it's true. No studies have examined the effects of military spending on as many measures of economic well-being at the state level as our study," said Borch, who teaches in the UAB Department of Sociology and Social Work. For this study, Borch and his team examined data taken from 49 states during the post-Vietnam War era, from 1977 to 2004, to determine the role of military spending in a peacetime economy. The time span coincided with a 30-year decline in and dependence on manufacturing in the United States, Borch said. The researchers reviewed spending on defense contracts and military personnel and compared it to changes in economic indicators over time - poverty and unemployment rates, median family income and income disparities. The researchers also adjusted for variables such as the dominant political party in a state, strength of labor unions, number of Fortune 500 companies, gross state product (GSP) from manufacturing and proportion of military and non-military federal spending. The researchers found, for example, that an increase in a state's dependence on military spending, from 5 to 10 percent of its total GSP, increased employment about 1 percent - despite nationwide declines in manufacturing - and a $14,000 per household increase in median family income. In addition, the Gini Index, a measure of income distribution across a population, fell about 6 percent. Poverty rates fell about 2 percent. Data in the study showed that decreased military spending coincided with times of economic hardship in the states. For example, the 1990s were marked by slowdowns in military spending, and many state economies dependent on military spending suffered higher unemployment, slow economic growth and widening income inequality, Borch said. "For some cities and states, military spending is an incredibly important part of the local economy," said Borch. "For example, in places like Virginia, which has military bases and a shipbuilding center, there is an enormous amount of military spending, and Huntsville, Ala., is the third most dependent metropolitan statistical area in the country. Other states like Montana and Idaho enjoy less. Therefore, you have politicians and community leaders who work to get military spending funneled into their states because it helps the state economy." The United States ranks No. 1 in the world for military spending, said Borch. Russia ranks second, with a military budget about seven times smaller than the United States.

## 2AC Spending – No Link

### Spending on Space Militarization doesn’t add to spending, just refocuses it.

### Dolman 05

Everett Dolman is an Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. 14 September 2005. http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20&%20Space.pdf.

The immediate budget impact of significant funding increases for space weapons would be to decrease funding for combat aircraft, the surface battle fleet, and ground forces. This may well set the proponents of space weaponization at odds with both proponents and opponents of increased defense spending. Space advocates must sell their ideas to fellow pro-weapons groups by making the case that the advantages they provide outweigh the capabilities forgone. This is a mighty task. The tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars needed to develop, test and deploy a minimal space weapons system with the capacity to engage a few targets around the world could displace a half-dozen or more aircraft carrier battle groups, entire aircraft procurement programs such as the F-22, and several heavy armored divisions. This is a tough sell for supporters of a strong military.

### America spends billions on war in Afghanistan refocusing spending on space saves money.

### Cooper 10

Helen Cooper is a White House correspondent with The New York Times. “Cost of Wars a Rising Issue as Obama Weighs Troop Levels”. “Cost of War a rising issue as Obama Weighs Troop Levels”. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/22/us/politics/22costs.html>.

As Mr. Obama begins trying to untangle the country from its military and civilian promises in Afghanistan, his critics and allies alike are drawing a direct line between what is not being spent to bolster the sagging economy in America to what it is spending — $120 billion in Afghanistan this year alone. On Monday, the United States Conference of Mayors made that connection explicitly, saying that American taxes should be paying for bridges in Baltimore and Kansas City, not in Baghdad and Kandahar. The mayors’ group approved a resolution calling for an early end to the American military role in Afghanistan and Iraq, asking Congress to redirect the billions now being spent on war and reconstruction costs toward urgent domestic needs. The resolution, which noted that local governments cut 28,000 jobs in May alone, was the group’s first anti-war vote since it passed a resolution four decades ago calling for an end to the Vietnam War. And in a speech on the Senate floor on Tuesday, Senator Joe Manchin III, Democrat of West Virginia, said: “We can no longer, in good conscience, cut services and programs at home, raise taxes or — and this is very important — lift the debt ceiling in order to fund nation-building in Afghanistan. The question the president faces — we all face — is quite simple: Will we choose to rebuild America or Afghanistan? In light of our nation’s fiscal peril, we cannot do both.” Demonstrators describing themselves as “angry jobless citizens” said they would picket the Capitol on Wednesday to urge members of Congress to use any savings from Mr. Obama’s troop reductions to create more jobs. The group sponsoring the demonstration, the Prayer Without Ceasing Party, said in a statement on Tuesday that it was “urging the masses to call their congressmen and the president to ensure that jobs receive a top priority when the troops start returning to America.” Spending on the war in Afghanistan has skyrocketed since Mr. Obama took office, to $118.6 billion in 2011. It was $14.7 billion in 2003, when President George W. Bush turned his attention and American resources to the war in Iraq. The increase is easy to explain. When Mr. Obama took office, he vowed to aggressively pursue what he termed America’s “war of necessity” (Afghanistan) and to withdraw from America’s “war of choice” (Iraq). He has done so; the lines on Iraq and Afghanistan war spending crossed in 2010, when the United States spent $93.8 billion in Afghanistan versus $71.3 billion in Iraq, according to the Congressional Research Service. But the White House is keenly aware that the president is heading into a re-election campaign; with the country’s jobless rate remaining high, topping 9 percent, his poll numbers on his handling of the domestic economy have plummeted. “Do we really need to be spending $120 billion in a country with a G.D.P. that’s one-sixth that size?” asked Brian Katulis, a national security expert at the Center for American Progress, a policy group with close ties to the Obama administration. “Most Americans would be shocked to know that we’re spending that kind of money for jobs programs for former Taliban, and would wonder where are our jobs programs for Detroit and Cleveland?” In 2010, Congress — at the Obama administration’s request — set aside $100 million to support programs in Afghanistan aimed at moving former insurgents off the battlefields and into the country’s mainstream economy. Those efforts — similar to what the Bush administration did in Iraq — have yet to bear much fruit; the 1,700 fighters who have enrolled in the reintegration program represent only a fraction of the estimated 20,000 to 40,000 Taliban insurgents, The New York Times reported Monday.

## A2: Spending Hurts Growth

### Military Spending Key to economic growth

Feldstein ’08 [Martin Feldstein, professor at Harvard and member of WSJ board of contributors, 12-24-2008, “Defense Spending Would Be Great Stimulus” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123008280526532053.html]

The Department of Defense is preparing budget cuts in response to the decline in national income. The DOD budgeteers and their counterparts in the White House Office of Management and Budget apparently reason that a smaller GDP requires belt-tightening by everyone. That logic is exactly backwards. As President-elect Barack Obama and his economic advisers recognize, countering a deep economic recession requires an increase in government spending to offset the sharp decline in consumer outlays and business investment that is now under way. Without that rise in government spending, the economic downturn would be deeper and longer. Although tax cuts for individuals and businesses can help, government spending will have to do the heavy lifting. That's why the Obama team will propose a package of about $300 billion a year in additional federal government outlays and grants to states and local governments. A temporary rise in DOD spending on supplies, equipment and manpower should be a significant part of that increase in overall government outlays. The same applies to the Department of Homeland Security, to the FBI, and to other parts of the national intelligence community. The increase in government spending needs to be a short-term surge with greater outlays in 2009 and 2010 but then tailing off sharply in 2011 when the economy should be almost back to its prerecession level of activity. Buying military supplies and equipment, including a variety of off-the-shelf dual use items, can easily fit this surge pattern. For the military, the increased spending will require an expanded supplemental budget for 2009 and an increased budget for 2010. A 10% increase in defense outlays for procurement and for research would contribute about $20 billion a year to the overall stimulus budget. A 5% rise in spending on operations and maintenance would add an additional $10 billion. That spending could create about 300,000 additional jobs. And raising the military's annual recruitment goal by 15% would provide jobs for an additional 30,000 young men and women in the first year.

## Turn

### Lack of Spending means no BMD which is key to protecting space assests.

Howard Kleinberg, member of the graduate faculty of the Department of Public & International Affairs at University of North Carolina Wilmington, April 2011. US Army Field Artillery Association, “A Global Missile Defense 'networK': Terrestrial High-Energy Lasers and Aerospace Mirrors,” p. Lexis

Fortunately, this recently -revealed, real-world ASAT threat also brings a silver lining in it. As is the case with ballistic missiles, SBBMD weapons can also defend against ASATs. All ASATs, at least, whether direct-ascent or co-orbiting, must first be launched from the Earth's surface, regardless of the launch platform, and must first go through a boost phase. And since SB-BMD provides the single best way to stop any such missile attack from taking place, Robert Butterworth, suggests inhis article, "Assuring Space Support Despite ASATs," it would also provide the single best way to defend against ASAT attacks; same mission, different payload inside the threat missile. SB-BMDs could also intercept ASATs in other phases of their flight, at least within lower Earth orbit. For instance, the Missile Defense Agency's GMD can intercept ICBM warheads at the peak of their trajectories, some 1, 100 km (500 miles) or so. Similarly, an ASAT (direct-ascent or co-orbiting) on terminal approach towards a satellite in LEO would present a target of comparable size, density and velocity as a "mid-course" ICBM warhead (if not even larger), at a similar altitude, and possibly similar speed and trajectory. As a result, the AS AT could also be targeted and interceptedby a midcoursedefense-capable SB-BMD weapon, in addition to its primary role of boost-phase defense, giving a "second-chance" round of shots with which to try to stop any ASAT.

## Loss of Space Assets kills Economy 1/2

### Losing Space Assets as a result of not militarizing would cost much more than the plan currently does

Lambeth ’03 [Benjamin Lambeth, Writer for RAND, 2003, “Mastering the Ultimate High Ground: Next steps in the Military Use of Space” http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph\_reports/2005/MR1649.pdf]

The most compelling reason for moving forward with dispatch toward acquiring at least the essential elements of a serious space control capability is that the United States is now unprecedentedly invested in and dependent on on-orbit capabilities, both military and commercial. Since these equities can only be expected to grow in sunk cost and importance over time, it is fair to presume that they will eventually be challenged by potential opponents. In 1997, thenCINCSPACE General Howell M. Estes III pointed out that with more than 525 satellites then on orbit (including more than 200 U.S. satellites) and with more than $250 billion likely to be invested by 46 nations in space assets by 2000, space had indisputably become an economic center of gravity and, hence, a major vulnerability of the United States and its allies.

### Military Spending is Helping Hawaii’s economy

### Rand 11.

Rand Study lead by James Hosek a lead author of the study and a senior economist at RAND, a nonprofit research organization. June 1, 2011. “Military Spending Linked to 18 Percent of Hawaii’s Economy”. http://www.rand.org/news/press/2011/06/01.html.

Up to 18 percent of Hawaii's economy can be linked to spending by the U.S. Department of Defense, according to a new study from the RAND Corporation. "It's common knowledge that defense activity in Hawaii plays a significant role in Hawaii's economy, but the size of that role has not been previously studied and quantified," said James Hosek, lead author of the study and a senior economist at RAND, a nonprofit research organization. "For example, 20 percent of defense procurement goes to the professional, scientific and technical services industry, and generates further economic activity." Defense department spending in Hawaii averaged $6.5 billion per year during fiscal years 2007-2009. Of that, $4.1 billion was for personnel and $2.4 billion for the purchase of goods and services in Hawaii. These expenditures were associated with 101,000 jobs and $12.2 billion worth of the total value of goods produced and services provided in Hawaii — or 18 percent of Hawaii's economic activity in 2009. The study was done in cooperation with the Hawaii Institute of Public Affairs and the Military Affairs Council of the Chamber of Commerce of Hawaii. These two public interest groups asked RAND to make an assessment of the relationship between defense department spending and Hawaii's levels of output, employment and earnings. The RAND study collected information about defense spending on personnel and procurement, and estimated the relationship between these expenditures and the levels of output, employment and earnings in Hawaii's economy. The study also considered the sensitivity of the estimates to a number of factors such as undercounting or overcounting defense procurement and state paid by defense personnel. Most factors made little difference, but different estimates of the savings rate of personnel and where the earnings of afloat and deployed personnel are spent could decrease the estimated economic impact by approximately 10 percent. Hosek cautioned that the study should not be used as a basis for estimating how much a given increase or decrease in defense spending would affect the Hawaii economy, because there are other variables that must be considered. The study also notes that defense department spending in Hawaii has increased by $1 billion since the mid-1990s. Future studies may want to examine what effect this increase has had on the dynamics of Hawaii's economy, including whether it has led to investments in Hawaii's private sector, infrastructure and people.

Loss of Space Assets kills Economy 2/2

### Military Spending will help Economy and create Jobs

Lubold ‘9

Gordon Lubold is a senior Staff Writer for the Christian Science Monitor. January 6, 2009. “Defense spending as 'stimulus'? http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2009/0108/p01s03-usmi.html

The Defense Department has enjoyed a long budgetary heyday, but the golden times may be nearing an end as the Iraq war, which has been eating up $10 billion a month, starts winding down and recession pressures force federal budgeteers to rein in spending. That's the conventional wisdom, at least. But defense spending won't drop anytime soon, experts predict. Even as the nation gasped over a $1.2 trillion federal budget for this fiscal year, estimated Tuesday by the Congressional Budget Office, President-elect Obama this week signaled his resolve to spend the country out of recession. In the short term, that probably means more money for defense. It may be impractical, for several reasons, to cut defense spending for the first year or two of the Obama administration, experts say. One is that a de-escalating war in Iraq won't immediately curtail expenditures needed to keep troops and equipment whole. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, in a New Year's Eve request to Congress, asked for an additional $70 billion to pay for war costs. At the same time, ramped-up military operations in Afghanistan under Mr. Obama will cost the US government more. Perhaps the biggest reason defense spending won't fall anytime soon is that it would be too hard for congressional lawmakers to justify cuts to defense during a recession, and lawmakers will instead seek to retain and renew defense contracts – and keep thousands of people in their jobs. "I would be very doubtful that Congress will cut any major procurement programs, because the Democrats would not want to be accused of putting anyone out of work as they put together an economic stimulus package," says Dov Zakheim, who served as the Pentagon's chief financial officer until 2004. Federal spending on defense could rise as much as 2 percent over the next couple years, says Mr. Zakheim, now a consultant in Washington. Still, Obama made a point Wednesday of saying his administration would dedicate itself to rooting out inefficiencies in government and finding ways to streamline operations. The Pentagon budget, which accounts for almost 47 percent of all federal discretionary spending, would seem to be a prime place to start. This week, the Government Accountability Office reported that every year the military stashes $7.5 billion in unneeded parts in Navy warehouses. The Pentagon's baseline budget for the current fiscal year is $514 billion, but with Secretary Gates's $70 billion request, war funding will top $136 billion in additional defense costs for 2009. Other factors are also at play. To pay for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Pentagon has used a controversial budgetary maneuver called "supplemental funding," in which costs for war operations are counted separately from the normal baseline budget. As equipment such as trucks, planes, and other gear failed, these supplementals have been used to bankroll new weapons systems to replace the dilapidated gear. Supplemental funding has been like candy to a child, and lawmakers and the Pentagon itself would like to see the Pentagon be weaned off it. Senior Pentagon officials say the Defense Department's fiscal year 2010 budget, to be unveiled two weeks after Obama takes office, will reflect an increase of about $57 billion in money that is "migrated" from supplemental funding to the baseline budget – which will represent an annual increase of about 13 percent. Boosting defense spending is the way to go in a recession anyway, argue many economists. The US government under Obama should go on a major spending spree to spur job growth and keep the economy from derailing, says Martin Feldstein, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Reagan. He argues that Obama should increase the defense budget by 10 percent for procurement and research, a move that could potentially create about 300,000 additional jobs. "A substantial short-term rise in spending on defense and intelligence would both stimulate our economy and strengthen our nation's security," Mr. Feldstein wrote in a recent op-ed in The Wall Street Journal. Senior military officials, including Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argue for maintaining a "floor" of defense spending commensurate with about 4 percent of US gross domestic product. The US now spends 4.2 percent of GDP on defense – about $700 billion (of which roughly $187 billion is supplemental funding for the two wars). Admiral Mullen and others would like to see defense spending stay at that level for several years. It's a target that seems unlikely to many analysts. "That is a proxy argument," says Robert Work, vice president for strategic studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a think tank here. The Pentagon simply wants to maintain the current level of funding – including war funding – even after the wars wind down. The baseline defense budget will rise somewhat as it absorbs supplemental war costs, he says, but competing interests will force the Pentagon to decrease its overall spending in the longer term.

## Spending 2AC 1/3

### Deficit spending is high and inevitable – Democrats refuse any cuts

WNR 11 (Wheeling News Register, “Liberals Blocking Any Fiscal Control,” 6-1, http://www.news-register.net/page/content.detail/id/555717/Liberals-Blocking-Any-Fiscal-Control.html?nav=511)

Liberals in the U.S. Senate have made it clear they will not under any circumstances consider even baby steps toward reining in the federal spending spree. Various proposals to reduce deficit spending - not eliminate it - have been made during the past year. The most recent one, approved by the House of Representatives, was put forth by U.S. Rep. Paul Ryan, R-Wis. But that proposal was rejected in the Senate, which remains under the tight-fisted control of liberal Democrats. Still, the Ryan plan remains in play, to the point liberals have made it their primary target. During the weekend, Sen. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y., stressed the Ryan plan is unacceptable to liberals. "We will oppose (Republicans) in the budget negotiations if they don't abandon Ryan," he vowed. Consider just what it is Schumer and company are rejecting: Under current policies, the government would engage in $9.5 trillion in deficit spending during the next 10 years. That is on top of the current $14.3 trillion national debt. Ryan's plan would curb just $4 trillion of that 10-year deficit - less than half. The liberals won't even agree to that. Clearly, they have chosen to draw a line in the sand - in red ink.

### Impact empirically denied – tech bubble burst in 2001 and financial crisis of 2008 prove that economic decline does not cause war

### Plan solves growth

Hubbard 8 (Scott, professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics at Stanford University and former director of the NASA Ames Research Center, “Is Space Exploration Worth the Cost? A Freakonomics Quorum,” 1-11, http://www.freakonomics.com/2008/01/11/is-space-exploration-worth-the-cost-a-freakonomics-quorum/)

There are five arguments that are advanced in any discussion about the utility of space exploration and the roles of humans and robots. Those arguments, in roughly ascending order of advocate support, are the following: 1. Space exploration will eventually allow us to establish a human civilization on another world (e.g., Mars) as a hedge against the type of catastrophe that wiped out the dinosaurs. 2. We explore space and create important new technologies to advance our economy. It is true that, for every dollar we spend on the space program, the U.S. economy receives about $8 of economic benefit. Space exploration can also serve as a stimulus for children to enter the fields of science and engineering. 3. Space exploration in an international context offers a peaceful cooperative venue that is a valuable alternative to nation state hostilities. One can look at the International Space Station and marvel that the former Soviet Union and the U.S. are now active partners. International cooperation is also a way to reduce costs. 4. National prestige requires that the U.S. continue to be a leader in space, and that includes human exploration. History tells us that great civilizations dare not abandon exploration. 5. Exploration of space will provide humanity with an answer to the most fundamental questions: Are we alone? Are there other forms of life beside those on Earth?

Spending 2AC 2/3

### Space BMD solves Iranian EMP attacks that collapse the economy

Brian Kennedy, president of the Claremont Institute and a member of the Independent Working Group on Missile Defense, 2008. “What a single nuclear warhead could do,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122748923919852015.html

Third, America will remain in a condition of strategic vulnerability as long as it fails to build defenses against the most powerful political and military weapons arrayed against us: ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. Such missiles can be used to destroy our country, blackmail or paralyze us. Any consideration of how best to provide for the common defense must begin by acknowledging these facts. Consider Iran. For the past decade, Iran -- with the assistance of Russia, China and North Korea -- has been developing missile technology. Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani announced in 2004 their ability to mass produce the Shahab-3 missile capable of carrying a lethal payload to Israel or -- if launched from a ship -- to an American city. The current controversy over Iran's nuclear production is really about whether it is capable of producing nuclear warheads. This possibility is made more urgent by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's statement in 2005: "Is it possible for us to witness a world without America and Zionism? But you had best know that this slogan and this goal are attainable, and surely can be achieved." Mr. Ahmadinejad takes seriously, even if the average Iranian does not, radical Islam's goal of converting, subjugating or destroying the infidel peoples -- first and foremost the citizens of the U.S. and Israel. Even after 9/11, we appear not to take that threat seriously. We should. Think about this scenario: An ordinary-looking freighter ship heading toward New York or Los Angeles launches a missile from its hull or from a canister lowered into the sea. It hits a densely populated area. A million people are incinerated. The ship is then sunk. No one claims responsibility. There is no firm evidence as to who sponsored the attack, and thus no one against whom to launch a counterstrike. But as terrible as that scenario sounds, there is one that is worse. Let us say the freighter ship launches a nuclear-armed Shahab-3 missile off the coast of the U.S. and the missile explodes 300 miles over Chicago. The nuclear detonation in space creates an electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Gamma rays from the explosion, through the Compton Effect, generate three classes of disruptive electromagnetic pulses, which permanently destroy consumer electronics, the electronics in some automobiles and, most importantly, the hundreds of large transformers that distribute power throughout the U.S. All of our lights, refrigerators, water-pumping stations, TVs and radios stop running. We have no communication and no ability to provide food and water to 300 million Americans. This is what is referred to as an EMP attack, and such an attack would effectively throw America back technologically into the early 19th century. It would require the Iranians to be able to produce a warhead as sophisticated as we expect the Russians or the Chinese to possess. But that is certainly attainable. Common sense would suggest that, absent food and water, the number of people who could die of deprivation and as a result of social breakdown might run well into the millions. Let us be clear. A successful EMP attack on the U.S. would have a dramatic effect on the country, to say the least. Even one that only affected part of the country would cripple the economy for years. Dropping nuclear weapons on or retaliating against whoever caused the attack would not help. And an EMP attack is not far-fetched. Twice in the last eight years, in the Caspian Sea, the Iranians have tested their ability to launch ballistic missiles in a way to set off an EMP. The congressionally mandated EMP Commission, with some of America's finest scientists, has released its findings and issued two separate reports, the most recent in April, describing the devastating effects of such an attack on the U.S. The only solution to this problem is a robust, multilayered missile-defense system. The most effective layer in this system is in space, using space-based interceptors that destroy an enemy warhead in its ascent phase when it is easily identifiable, slower, and has not yet deployed decoys. We know it can work from tests conducted in the early 1990s. We have the technology. What we lack is the political will to make it a reality. An EMP attack is not one from which America could recover as we did after Pearl Harbor. Such an attack might mean the end of the United States and most likely the Free World. It is of the highest priority to have a president and policy makers not merely acknowledge the problem, but also make comprehensive missile defense a reality as soon as possible.

Spending 2AC 3/3

### BMD solves ASATs

Howard Kleinberg, member of the graduate faculty of the Department of Public & International Affairs at University of North Carolina Wilmington, April 2011. US Army Field Artillery Association, “A Global Missile Defense 'networK': Terrestrial High-Energy Lasers and Aerospace Mirrors,” p. Lexis

Fortunately, this recently -revealed, real-world ASAT threat also brings a silver lining in it. As is the case with ballistic missiles, SBBMD weapons can also defend against ASATs. All ASATs, at least, whether direct-ascent or co-orbiting, must first be launched from the Earth's surface, regardless of the launch platform, and must first go through a boost phase. And since SB-BMD provides the single best way to stop any such missile attack from taking place, Robert Butterworth, suggests in his article, "Assuring Space Support Despite ASATs," it would also provide the single best way to defend against ASAT attacks; same mission, different payload inside the threat missile. SB-BMDs could also intercept ASATs in other phases of their flight, at least within lower Earth orbit. For instance, the Missile Defense Agency's GMD can intercept ICBM warheads at the peak of their trajectories, some 1, 100 km (500 miles) or so. Similarly, an ASAT (direct-ascent or co-orbiting) on terminal approach towards a satellite in LEO would present a target of comparable size, density and velocity as a "mid-course" ICBM warhead (if not even larger), at a similar altitude, and possibly similar speed and trajectory. As a result, the AS AT could also be targeted and intercepted by a midcourse defense-capable SB-BMD weapon, in addition to its primary role of boost-phase defense, giving a "second-chance" round of shots with which to try to stop any ASAT.

### Collapses the economy

Ian Easton, Research Fellow at the 2049 Project Institute, 2009. “The Great Game in Space,” http://www.project2049.net/documents/china\_asat\_weapons\_the\_great\_game\_in\_space.pdf

Many specialists also argue that aside from the U.S. military dependency on orbital space, the U.S. economy, and in turn, much of the world economy, is also rapidly becoming dependent on space-based systems. They posit that, in effect, the U.S. is now a “spacefaring” nation whose very way of life is tied to the myriad capabilities provided by the orbital space medium. War games conducted as part of U.S. national security protocols, such as the Army-After-Next, Navy Global and Air Force Global Engagement series, Space Game 2 and Schriever 1 & 2, as well as the privately conducted “DEADSATS” war games, conducted from the late 1990s and the early 2000s, confirm this view. According to some space experts who were intimately involved with the war games, the exercises exposed “a critical national Achilles heel that politicians, economists and corporate CEOs have largely ignored…losses in space can quickly affect the economic, social, and national security fabric not only of the United States, but of the entire world.” These experts further speculate that “large military powers,” such as the United States, could “be held hostage by the unknowns inherent in a new kind of war.” 36 These concerns are directly linked with China’s ASAT weapons and their potential applicability in any future U.S.-Sino conflict. A more recent war game, “Pacific Vision,” conducted by Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) underscored the vulnerability of the unprotected commercial communication satellite channels on which the Air Force relies, as well as its cyber and radar vulnerabilities to Chinese attack.

## Ext – Economy

### Space based BMD key to combat EMP attacks that collapse the economy

Dr. Steven Lambakis, Senior Defense Analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy, 2007. High Frontier, 3:2, “Leveraging Space to Improve Missile Defense,” p. 28-29

Will there ever be a time when we will need the powerful capabilities discussed above? Robust missile defenses, at a minimum, could further the defensive goals of dissuading our allies from investing in ballistic missile programs and deterring aggressive missile behavior. Yet there are instances imaginable too when we would want to have the strongest, most reliable, most effective defenses possible. What if, for example, a hostile country decided that the best military option it had available, an option that would inflict maximum damage on the US, would be to launch and then detonate a nuclear weapon several hundred kilometers above the US? Although nobody would die, not immediately at least, and no buildings would be destroyed, the resulting explosion would send out an invisible electro-magnetic pulse that would disable or destroy the electrical, financial, communications, and transportation infrastructures of part or all of the country. The impact on the economy and the health and safety of citizens would be felt worldwide. According to a recent report by a congressionally chartered commission to look at the electromagnetic pulse threat, “a regional or national recovery would be long and difficult and would seriously degrade the safety and overall viability of our Nation.” Indeed, our vulnerability might invite such an attack. The stakes, in fact, are that high, and the possible threat posed by a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile is that chilling. A robust missile defense system may be the only recourse we have to defend ourselves against such a threat. Now who is in favor of having the most efficient, most effective missile defenses in place? And if most of us favor strengthening defenses to improve our ability to kill long-range missiles early enough in their trajectory (that is, from boost phase to early midcourse phase), why would we not be in favor of a vigorous program to develop and deploy interceptors that provide on-call, worldwide reach, and a boost phase layer within the currently deployed ballistic missile defense system? Why, in other words, would we not want to investigate more fully the performance possibilities of space-based interceptors?