## 1nc shell

**Counterplan text: The United States federal government should do the following:**

**- Provide the Hague Code of Conduct with pre-launch notifications,**

**- Consolidate Joint Data Exchange Center operations with the Hague Code of Conduct by establishing a data exchange center in Vienna, Austria,**

**- Incorporate the Spirale early warning system into the new center’s operations.**

### The cp solves transparency, crisis stability and proliferation

Larrimore 7 – Scott C. Larrimore, SBIRS Space Division Chief, Air Force Space and Missile Center, Los Angeles Air Force Base, August 2007, “International space launch notification and data exchange,” Space Policy vol. 23 issue 3, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964607000525#implicit0>]

As technology advances, missile and launch capability will continue to proliferate around the world, in some cases spawning new industries and markets. Nations will increasingly require transparency and coordination from spacefaring states first and foremost because of the potential strategic consequences of missile attacks and, second, out of a pragmatic need for launch and orbital support services. In order to increase transparency and enhance stability, the following recommendations are offered:

1. The USA and Russia should continue to work on resolving issues with JDEC

The JDEC issue has been lingering in limbo for nine years with little headway. Lack of progress demonstrates the low priority both nations have placed on this endeavor, despite rhetoric to the contrary. The USA and Russia should re-evaluate their desire to implement this program and, if validated, quickly establish plans to stand up the center. Impediments towards progress, particularly the liability issue, have been resolved. Nations around the world will follow these nuclear powers’ lead. The path could be either toward cooperation and transparency or toward opposition and obfuscation.

An operable JDEC may help diffuse some of the tension between Washington and Moscow over the USA’s plans to build a component of its missile defense system in central Europe. Recently President Bush offered to give a detailed explanation of the country’s plans to Russia and opened the door to further missile defense cooperation. The head of the USA’s Missile Defense Agency, Lieutenant General Henry Obering, said his organization is ‘‘very open to cooperation with Russia to strengthen missile defenses, including possible technology and data transfer’’ [38]. Placing priority on implementing a previously agreed-upon collaborative missile warning center would be a good step.

2. The USA should provide the HcoC with pre-launch notifications regardless of JDEC status The USA should decouple its HCoC responsibilities from an implementation tied to the JDEC. The JDEC may never materialize. Other HCoC members are honoring their agreed-upon requirements, and so should the USA. As a leader in both space and in nonproliferation, it has greater responsibility to set the example than a country just emerging with launch capabilities. By ignoring its voluntary responsibilities, the USA undermines the credibility of a major counterproliferation agreement.

3. JDEC operations should be consolidated with HCoC

There is significant overlap between the missions and intent of the bilateral JDEC and the multilateral HCoC. Both regimes call for nations to exchange pre-launch notification information. Indeed, when Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton agreed to create the JDEC, they hoped the center might evolve to include other interested states [39]. By consolidating the JDEC with the HCoC, the presidents’ vision is attained while simultaneously enhancing HCoC’s stabilizing influence with the inclusion of voluntary early warning information. If the USA and Russia cannot come to terms over implementation plans establishing the JDEC in Russia, then the nations should consider placing the center in another, neutral country. **Taxes and liabilities would become moot issues**. Considering Austria’s long history of neutrality, Vienna would be an ideal alternate location. Integration with HCoC operations should be technically simple.

4. France and its Spirale early warning system should be included in JDEC/HCoC

France has been interested in early warning satellite systems since the early 1990s. After many years of study, France will field an experimental pair of early warning satellites called Spirale in 2008. These small, 130-kg spacecraft will be placed in a geosynchronous transfer orbit as secondary payloads aboard an Ariane V rocket. Spirale’s space-based optical sensors will allow France to conduct antiballistic missile defense and proliferation monitoring tests. The demonstration satellite pair will be a pathfinder for potentially larger, operational geosynchronous satellites launched in the next decade [40].

By adding an ancillary reporting source, Spirale’s inclusion in JDEC operations would **greatly increase the credibility of data reported.** It would be harder for one country to misrepresent or modify its data as long as there is at least one alternate source of verification. Broadening JDEC’s sources would mitigate the most serious complaint of the center’s critics.

## Solves data sharing

### JDEC model solves international SSA data sharing

**Cox 7** – Col. Lee-Volker Cox, Director of Operations and Exercises, 14th Air Force, responsible for the readiness and policy direction for five global wings with 15,000 personnel providing space situational awareness, satellite operations, missile warning, space superiority, space launch and range operations; 30 March 2007, “Avoiding Collisions in Space: Is It Time for an International Space Integration Center?” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA469676, p. 8-9

The I-SPIC must be able to provide the same services and work with all organizations equally, and must demonstrate that no one is receiving different information that provides a competitive or security advantage. For international SSA, transparency is stabilizing and encourages data sharing. As a result, the organization must be under international jurisdiction, such as the UNOOSA, not a single state.

However, having responsibility does not translate to directive authority over space operations. On the contrary, countries fiercely protect their spacecraft sovereignty and may not support an international initiative increasing restrictions already in place.70 Jurisdiction would only cover associated I-SPIC operations (e.g. acceptable data, configuration control, internal/external relationships) and guide an organizational structure.

The U.S.-Russian Joint Data Exchange Center (**JDEC**) for missile warning **could serve as a model** of cooperation. Established to reduce the likelihood of launching a retaliatory missile attack due to false warnings, the center rapidly evaluates indications and provides an analysis. A direct parallel can be made to the I-SPIC’s SSA mission. **Both nations manage, and operate the JDEC** with trained experts, provide near real time processed data from their warning networks and integrate the information into a “unified database for a multilateral regime for the exchange of notifications.”71 For the I-SPIC, an international organization of spacefaring nations should manage the capability and draw on SSA representatives to operate the center. Similar to missile warning data, the center would provide SSA information integrated from all five systems into a standardized and actionable database. However, there are two major 10 differences between both centers. First, unlike JDEC data, I-SPIC information would be available to anyone or nation at no cost. Second, due to the global utility of space services and the benefit to all of mankind, funding should not be limited to spacefaring states, which already bear the burden of operating in space.

### JDEC solves data sharing

Billick 1 - Thomas W. Billick, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, May 2001, “ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SPACE,” https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q\_mod\_be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153/q\_act\_downloadpaper/q\_obj\_3d793de5-3916-40bf-a6f3-c23277362c03/display.aspx?rs=publishedsearch

In addition to the notifications required by the START Treaties and the Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement, the U.S. and Russia have recently completed two new agreements expanding launch notifications to include all space launch vehicles. On June 4, 2000 at the Moscow Summit, President Clinton and Russian President Putin signed a memorandum of agreement to establish a joint data exchange center (JDEC) in Moscow to share early warning information on missile and space launches.62 Once the JDEC is completed and commences operations, the two countries will exchange information obtained from their respective ground and space-based early warning systems on U.S. and Russian space launches (with rare exceptions) including time of launch, generic missile class, geographic area of the launch, and launch azimuth. Eventually this exchange of data will also include data sharing on detected space launches of other states. On December 16, 2000 U.S. Secretary of State Albright and Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov signed a memorandum of understanding establishing a Pre- and Post-Launch Notification System (PLNS) for launches of ballistic missiles and, with rare exceptions, space launch vehicles, identifying launch window, time of launch, generic missile class, geographic area of the launch, and launch azimuth.63 The PLNS Information Center will be an Internet-based system operated as part of the JDEC. Both agreements provide for the voluntary notification of satellites forced from orbit and certain space experiments that could adversely affect the operation of early warning radars, and both agreements leave open the possibility of negotiations on future data sharing on missiles that intercept objects not located on the Earth’s surface. This provision could have implications for anti-satellite systems.

### Compliance with Hague Code of Conduct promotes international data sharing

Gallagher and Steinbruner 8 – Nancy Gallagher, Associate Director for Research at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, Senior Research Scholar at the University of Maryland's School of Public Policy; John D. Steinbruner, Professor of Public Policy at the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland and Director of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland; “Reconsidering the Rules for Space Security,” American Academy of Arts and Sciences, http://www.amacad.org/publications/space\_security.pdf, 80-81

The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, signed in 1975, already provides part of the legal foundation for an advanced verification arrangement. The convention makes states responsible for space objects that they launch, that they commission others to launch for them, or that are launched from their territory or facility, and it requires that states maintain a national registry of all such objects. The convention further requires that all states report to the UN Secretary General specific information from their national registry; notably, the time and location of launch as well as the orbital parameters and the general function of the object launched. Other agreements include more detailed launch notification and dateexchange obligations; most notably, a U.S.-Russian agreement to establish a Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) and the multilateral Hague Code of Conduct (CoC).214With an ambiguous definition of launching states and no compliance management provisions, the Registration Convention’s central registry is far from complete. The United States has not been reporting the launch of intelligence-gathering satellites even though they are usually identified by amateur observers. The United States is not the only country that fails to take seriously its launch registry obligations, but it is the only major spacefaring member of the Hague CoC that currently does not submit the recommended prelaunch notifications to other member states.215 The United States should improve its own compliance and encourage others to do so by making access to U.S. space surveillance information contingent on compliance.

## Solves crisis stability/accidents

### The counterplan solves crisis stability

Forden 1 – Geoffrey Forden, senior research fellow with the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, May 3, 2001, “Reducing a Common Danger: Improving Russia’s Early-Warning System,” <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa399.pdf>

Of course, either India or Pakistan, and certainly China, might object that its own nuclear weapons were safe. But each country cannot be sure that all the nuclear weapons in the other countries in the region are safely deployed. For instance, if a nuclear explosion occurs in Pakistan, India’s vital security interest requires that Pakistan realize that an accidental detonation has occurred on its soil and was not the result of an Indian nuclear attack. Otherwise, Pakistan might mistakenly launch a “retaliatory” strike on India. China’s interests are also served by India’s knowing that a nuclear explosion on Indian territory was not the result of an attack. Similarly, Pakistan is well served if India knows that it was not attacked.

Russia and the United States could mitigate this danger on the Asian subcontinent by jointly providing missile surveillance information to joint centers in all three countries. The joint centers would not have to routinely provide raw data, which might reveal sensitive information about earlywarning technology. Instead they could normally provide the type of analyzed information the JDEC plans to exchange between Russia and the United States. Only after an accidental nuclear explosion, as explained below, would a limited amount of raw data have to be provided.

Establishing confidence in the information provided is still key to the success of this measure, and that is harder than it might appear. For instance, any of those countries might argue that, in the case of an actual nuclear attack, both Russia and the United States have an interest in not providing confirmation. Instead, they would argue, it would be in the U.S. and Russian interests to try to slow down the escalation by not showing a missile attack in the hopes that the countries could reach an agreement before an all-out nuclear war.

However, if the United States judges that the dangers of an inadvertent nuclear war in the region are greater than those of confirming an unprovoked attack, it must accept the responsibility of providing valid data even in the advent of a real nuclear war. Fortunately, there are technical means that could provide the countries with the reassurances they need. One possible approach would involve granting India, China, and Pakistan access to raw data in the event of an actual nuclear explosion. The data coming down from the satellite could be encrypted with codes that the three countries created to validate the data’s authenticity. Because of the need to show raw data to the countries in the region, the JDEC will not be enough. Hence the dedicated satellite.