# 1AC

## 1AC Hegemony Advantage

### Observation One: Space Control –

### First, Militarization of Space is Inevitable – It’s Only a question of who gets there first

STRATFOR 2k8

(Stratfor is a global intelligence company and has been cited by media such as CNN, Bloomberg, the Associated Press, Reuters, The New York Times and the BBC as an authority on strategic and tactical intelligence issues.[6] Barron's once referred to it as "The Shadow CIA".[7] “United States: The Weaponization of Space” April 10, 2008, http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/united\_states\_ weaponization\_space)

In the 1950s, the United States began pushing for an international treaty on outer space — even before the 1957 launch of Sputnik atop a modified version of the world’s first intercontinental ballistic missile. Fortunes have changed somewhat in the last 50 years, and the Pentagon has little interest in taking on further legally binding constraints these days. This is especially true in space, **where “weaponization” is not only inevitable**, but already well under way. In 1967, Washington became party to the “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies” (better known as the Outer Space Treaty). This treaty was quickly and readily accepted, in part because of its utter lack of definitions. Aside from some fairly unequivocal language about prohibiting the deployment of nuclear weapons in outer space and more broad military activities on the moon and other celestial bodies, the treaty is much more a loose collection of very large holes than it is a constraint on sovereign national action in space. **Since then, the military utility of space has begun to be realized**. Today, it is a cornerstone of global military communications and navigation. In Iraq today, for example, the U.S. military uses the Global Positioning System (GPS) for everything from squad level maneuvers to joint direct attack munition (JDAM) delivery. Largely from facilities inside the continental United States, the Pentagon controls some unmanned aerial systems half a world away. GPS has given rise to a new degree of precision in guided weapons. Imagery from space-based surveillance platforms has become commonplace and the Defense Support Program constellation continually monitors the surface of the earth for the launch plume of a ballistic missile. It is an incredibly valuable military domain. And just as it has become more valuable, the United States has become increasingly dependent on it. **Thus, space-based assets are susceptible targets for U.S. adversaries**. Were the United States to lose these assets, its **military capability on the ground would be severely affected**. Any symmetric enemy knows that and will act to neutralize U.S. space capability. The United States **knows that this attack will take place and must therefore defend the assets**. In **this sense, space is already a domain of military competition and conflict**. ***There is no escaping it.*** In other words, space has already been weaponized, except that the actual projectiles are not yet located in space. Beijing’s 2007 and Washington’s recent anti-satellite weapons tests only emphasize this point.

### Unfortunately, the U.S. is being left behind – we continue to explain why we ARENT developing Weapons – while countries like Russia and China Develop Weapons Behind Closed Doors

Stone 2k9

(space strategy planner for the USAF, a former staff member for two US Senators, and Executive Director of a growing Chamber of Commerce, “How should we secure our space-based assets as a nation?,” pg online @ http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1345/1 //ef)

At the same, US satellites, military as well as commercial, have been dropping offline in space. There is also the case an Iridium satellite and a defunct Russian satellite colliding in orbit, creating yet another band of space debris in orbit around our planet. All throughout these situations, the United States has been the one nation that has been blamed for developing space weapons and planning to create a sort of “space hegemony” according to one author in Air and Space Power Journal. At the UN, the US has been lambasted by Chinese and Russian officials stating that their security is being threatened by the US because of our discussions about space weapons threats to our satellites and the need for increased space situational awareness of our national security and commercial space infrastructure. They also point to the National Space Policy created in 2006 by the Bush Administration as creating the framework to create such a “space hegemony” whereby other nations would cease to have access to space. **This is simply not the case**. **US government officials have stated numerous times, categorically, that there are no space weapons programs being funded by Congress**. Yet, the Russians and Chinese both have stated that the only reason they are developing their space weapons is to defend themselves against the US deployment of weapons, weapons that according to many government officials, past and present, are not even being planned, much less deployed. Despite reassurances of quite the opposite, General Popovkin, the Russian Deputy Defense Minister gives the impression that the Russians, while developing their own space weapons systems are just defending their interests. “Russia has always been for non-deployment of weapons in space, but when others are doing this, we cannot be just onlookers, and such work is underway in Russia. This is all I can tell you.” By reading reports in the press such as these, as well as decades of Russian and Chinese open source planning and doctrine papers from their government diplomatic and war colleges, it appears the Russians and Chinese are moving (and have been for many years) **towards weaponizing space, but they are blaming the US falsely for doing it first as their excuse**. This tactic is called “projection”. Moreover, they are very effectively luring the arms control community into blaming the victim. The United States is dependent on satellites for our security, economy, and our ability to project power around the globe, and they know it. They are no where near as dependent on space as we are and they are knowledgeable of that, too. The Obama Administration **must seriously question the wisdom of entering into space arms control agreements of any kind with Russia and China when they may be engaging in a campaign of deception designed to trick the US into signing treaties that leave our space systems and their users completely vulnerable**. In other words, they seek only to constrain US power and are exploiting the good intentions of the arms control community and the American people to help achieve their ends. This approach is not new, and the Russians and Chinese are counting on the naiveté of the new administration to fall for it. If space arms control measures are adopted, the only option US strategists will have to protect the nation from “illegal” attacks on its space systems will be a transfer of capability from space to terrestrial alternatives and abandoning most of the current security and commercial space sectors. This will result in a significant contraction of the overall national space program and the space industrial base that supports it. That means job losses and a reduction in America's aerospace industry—our most successful economic sector—at a time when job security is scarce as it is. So, with all of this background information in mind, it comes as no surprise to this author that arms control advocates as well as members of the Russian and Chinese space forces are elated to see that the Obama Administration is working toward a worldwide ban on space weapons. If this agreement can just be made among the spacefaring countries of the world, peace will return to the heavens and the theory of space as a sanctuary free from conflict will be restored. Or will it?

### \*\*And, that Makes Conflict INEVITABLE – Adversaries will Seek Out Our Strengths and Eliminate them – Ensures Confrontation Over Space 2.5 thousand years of history prove\*\*

Smith 2k11

(M.V., Colonel, PhD in Politics and IR @ University of Reading, Citing Colin Gray, “Chapter 17: Security and Spacepower, Part of “Toward a Theory of Spacepower,” Edited by Charles Lutes and Peter Hays, National Defense University Press, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf> )

It is a rule in strategy, one derived empirically from the evidence of two and a half millennia, that anything of great strategic importance to one belligerent, for that reason has to be worth attacking by others. And the greater the importance, the greater has to be the incentive to damage, disable, capture, or destroy it. In the bluntest of statements: space warfare is a certainty in the future because the use of space in war has become vital. . . . Regardless of public sentimental or environmentally shaped attitudes towards space as the pristine final frontier, space warfare is coming.20 The strategic value of space to states is not in question. Advanced spacefaring states are already reliant—and moving toward dependence—on space-derived services for activities across every sector of their societies. Spacepower is becoming critical to their styles of warfighting. Likewise, the injury that can be caused to such states by menacing their space systems can be considerable. Given these incentives, the beast of war will either break its chains all at once or stretch them slowly over time.21

### The only option is for the US to weaponize space - this is critical to locking Hegemony and Preventing Violent Challenges to the International System – If the U.S. Gets there First, there is zero risk of an arms race or violent transition

Dolman 10

(Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award “The Case for Weapons in Space: A Geopolitical Assessment,” September, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf\_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per\_id=1532576)

This is the context in which the world now exists. The relatively stable global hegemony of US dominance since 1945, punctuated by limited wars and shifting balances of opposition, has relied on technology-dominant global power projection. Today, that technology is wholly integrated and inextricable from space support, and no state relies more on space power for its economic and security well-being than the US. Any effort to deny space capabilities would be a direct challenge to its hegemonic power, and the United States must confront the usurper or abdicate its leadership position. To be sure, China’s increasing space emphasis and its cultural antipathy to military transparency suggests that a serious attempt at seizing control of space is in the works. A lingering fear is the sudden introduction of an unknown capability (call it Technology X) that would allow a hostile state to place multiple weapons into orbit quickly and cheaply. The advantages gained from controlling the high ground of space would accrue to it as surely as to any other state, and the concomitant loss of military power from the denial of space to America’s already-dependent military forces could cause the **immediate demise of the extant international system.** The longer the United States dithers on its military responsibilities, the more likely a potential opponent could seize low-earth orbit before America is able to respond. And in such circumstances, the US certainly would respond. Conversely, if America were to weaponize space, **it is not at all sure that any other state or group of states would find it rational to counter in kind.** The entry cost to provide the necessary infrastructure is still too high—hundreds of billions of dollars, at minimum. The years of investment needed to achieve a comparable counter-force capability—essentially from scratch—would provide more than ample time for the United States to **entrench itself in space** and readily counter preliminary efforts to displace it. The tremendous effort in time and resources would be worse than wasted. Most states, if not all, would opt not to counter US deployments directly. They might oppose American interests with asymmetric balancing, depending on how aggressively it uses its new power, but **the likelihood of a hemorrhaging arms race** in space should the United States deploy weapons first—at least for the next few years—**is remote.** This reasoning does not dispute the fact that US deployment of weapons in outer space would represent the addition of a potent new military capacity, one that would assist in **extending the current period of American hegemony well into the future.** Clearly this would be intimidating, and America must expect severe condemnation and increased competition in peripheral areas. But such an outcome is less threatening than another, particularly non-liberal authoritarian state doing so, as the necessity of a response in kind is compelling. Placement of weapons in space by the United States would be perceived correctly as an attempt at continuing American hegemony. Although there is obvious opposition to the current international balance of power, the majority of states seem to regard it as at least tolerable. A continuation of the status quo is thus minimally acceptable, even to states working toward its demise. As long as the United States does not employ its power arbitrarily, the situation would be bearable initially and grudgingly accepted over time. Mirror-imaging does not apply here. An attempt by China to dominate space would be part of an effort to break the land-sea-air dominance of the United States in preparation for a new international order. Such an action would challenge the status quo, rather than seek to perpetuate it. This would be disconcerting to nations that accept, no matter how grudgingly, the current international order—including the venerable institutions of trade, finance, and law that operate within it—and intolerable to the United States. As leader of the current system, the United States could do no less than engage in a perhaps ruinous space arms race, save graciously decide to step aside and accept a diminished world status. Seizing the initiative and securing low-Earth orbit now, while the United States is dominant in space infrastructure, would do much to stabilize the international system and prevent an arms race in space. The enhanced ability to deny any attempt by another nation to place military assets in space and to readily engage and destroy terrestrial anti-satellite capacity would make the possibility of large-scale space war or military space races less likely, not more. Why would a state expend the effort to compete in space with a superpower that has the extraordinary advantage of holding securely the highest ground at the top of the gravity well? So long as the controlling state demonstrates a capacity and a will to use force to defend its position, in effect expending a small amount of violence as needed to prevent a greater conflagration in the future, the likelihood of a future war in space is remote.

### And, Failure to Lock-in American Hegemony Guarantees Nuclear Conflict

Gray 2k4

(Colin, Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, and founded of the National Institute for Public Policy, 2K4 “The Sheriff: America’s Defense of the New World Order, pg. 6-10)

World order is neither self-enforcing nor is it comprehensively enforceable. Nonetheless, every such “order” requires a sheriff, or some other agent of discipline. In the modern European, then world, system, which is to say since the late eighteenth century, the ordering mechanism was the balance of power, with occasional corrections imposed by war. Order is the prime virtue; it is the essential prerequisite for security, peace, and possibly justice. Disorder is the worst condition. Because this study is not deterministic, it is possible that the necessary rule-keeping job might be abandoned and not resumed for a while. Even in that unhappy event, my argument does not sink. Rather does the world cope as best it can in the absence of superior, and by and large legitimate, force, until such force reappears. Periods of anarchy, or at best of only very weak international governance, are far from unknown historically. Invariably they invite ambitious opportunists to try their luck. That development may, or may not, suffice to awake the sleeping benign giant, should such be conveniently available to be stirred from slumber. Every condition of international order works for the particular benefit of some countries and the interests more that others, and needs defending. The alternatives to an American-led international order are just possibly eventual leadership by some other polity or coalition (probably Chinese, though possibly European, led), or, more likely, a lengthy period with no one wearing the sheriff’s badge. In that unwelcome event, every predatory regional and local power, many a dissatisfied ethnic or religious minority, most probably would chance its arm and seek its own destiny, by violence if need be. Violent struggle is all but essential to the success of the process of nation building. No doubt there are many ways in which order for security, hopefully promoting peace and justice, might be established and maintained. In the life of the modern state’s system, which is to say from the Treaty of Westphalia in 1684 to the present day (though many now proclaim the demise of this system), in practice only one ordering mechanism has been available: the balance of power. The dying embers of that hoary approach limed on even until 1991, when many of its American aficionados could still be found muttering about “the strategic balance,” while through the 1990s many a serious reference still was made to that abominable consequence of Cold War military competition, a condition of stability keyed to the mutuality of assured destruction (MAD). But, today there is no strategic balance, central or otherwise, and there is no political context of hostility to provide meaning to military rivalry between the United States and the new Russian Federation. There is no balance of power serving as the mainstay, the organizing architecture, of the current world order. What we have instead was flagged in the 1995 as a strong desideratum by the classical historian, Donald Kagan. What seems to work best, even though imperfectly, is the possession by those states who wish to preserve the peace of the preponderant power and of the will to accept the burdens and responsibilities required to achieve that purpose. As written, Kagan’s words could just about fit the folly of the theory of collective security. Of Course, he has no such noble nonsense in mind. What he is saying is that peace has to be kept, actively, and that it is best kept by a preponderance, not by an ever contestable balance, of power. Kagan’s historical judgment will serve as the test for this sermon on security. In principle there is both good and bad news in Kagan’s claim. It is good news that his lifetime’s ruminations on peace and war have yielded definite advice. Many academics would be uncomfortable writing as boldly as does Kagan. The bad news is that to the best of our knowledge, there is no hidden hand of history commanded to ensure that only commercially minded popular democracies shall inherit the mantle of preponderant power. It was never probable, but that power at century’s close might have been Nazi Germany or the USSR. Fortunately, chance favored civilizational merit for once, and the only candidate for sheriff today is the United States, a fact which is our second theme. The United States is the, indeed is the only, essential protecting power for the current world order. Again, this is not to be deterministic. Although there are no other bidders for this crown at present, it does not follow that the United States is condemned to play this role. After all, American world leadership in Paris 1919 was succeeded post haste by a scuttle from many potential international obligations. Americans today could elect to withdraw from the outside world, insofar as they could in political-military ways. They would hope that the civilizational offense given by soft power of their now globally beamed culture would not be found unduly provocative abroad. Whether The Great Satan, as Iranian spokespeople have delighted in calling the United States, would be allowed to hunker down in peaceful sanctuary in North America, we should doubt. Still, it could be tried. After September 11, 2001, isolationist sentiment temporarily has lost much of its appeal. We may not be much interested in terrorism, but it would appear that terrorism is interested in us. For good or ill, we are what we are. Exactly what this is has been explained in no uncertain terms by Henry Kissinger in the opening lines of his book, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? No prizes are awarded for guessing that his question is strictly rhetorical. Kissinger proclaims that: At the dawn of the new millennium, the United States is enjoying a preeminence unrivalled by even the greatest empires of the past. From weaponry to entrepreneurship, from science to technology, from higher education to popular culture, America exercises an unparalleled ascendancy around the globe. During the last decade of the twentieth century, America’s preponderant position rendered it the indispensable component of international stability. The condition of unchallenged, indeed unchallengeable, primacy will not endure-it is not strategic history’s “last move”-but while it does the United States is the only candidate for sheriff. If Americans should decline the honor, they are at least uniquely well equipped to ensure that no one else could possibly succeed in that informal office. As Donald Kagan provided our basic text, quoted under the first point above, so it is only fitting that he should also be allowed to sound the warning bell. Kagan advises that: Unexpected changes and shifts in power are the warp and woof of international history. The current condition of the world, therefore, were war among major powers is hard to conceive because one of them has overwhelming military superiority and no wish to expand, will not last. Quite so. However, historians, perhaps especially ancient historians, should be expected to take the long view. And in the long view everything crumbles. But a suitable vision for the inspiration of policy, judicious choice of policy goals, and competence in strategy, should allow Americans to prolong their current strategic moment, as a later point makes explicit to be the sheriff of the current world order is a thankless role. American power may be necessary to restore such order as may be restorable, but Americans will not be loved, or even much appreciated, as a consequence. The rest of the world will be envious, fearful, and resentful, all the while seeking to use the leverage of American power for local purposes. There is no term extant that precisely captures the emerging U.S. role as sheriff of world order. For the first time since the mid-1960s, it has begun to be fashionable to refer to American policy and tasks as imperial. Andrew Bacevich, for one thoughtful example, suggest that “the preeminent challenge facing the United States in the twenty-first century is not eradicating terror but managing the informal American empire acquired during the course of the past century.” Empire, imperium even better, and hegemony, for all their popularity and at least partial suitability, carry baggage that can be distracting. Unless we are careful, such concepts themselves become part of the problem in the effort to conduct focused debate on U.S. policy and strategy. Despite the grounds for unease, we cannot deny the reality of common usage. For example, a review essay in Foreign Affairs opens with this claim: “The fact of America’s empire is hardly debated these days.” Allowing for the hyperbole and certain imprecision of meaning, still it is noteworthy that the author, Thomas Donnelly, feels able to make such a bold statement. I prefer to think of the United States as the sheriff of the current world order, for reasons both of cultural fit concept and of tolerable accuracy. Naturally, this American role is largely self-appointed, though it can enjoy added dignity when it is blessed formally by majority votes in multinational institutions. For example, the Security Council of the United Nations licensed the United States to lead military action against Iraq in 1990-91, while the war against Yugoslavia over its “ethnic cleansing” of Kosovo in 1999 was a collective NATO, though not a UN undertaking. Because world politics comprises a distinctly immature political system, we have to be somewhat relaxed about some of the legal niceties. To call the United States the sheriff of the current world order is both description and prescription. This lawman role derives most essentially from the contemporary distribution of power, which so markedly favors the American superstate. Beyond that derivation, however, the role of sheriff is made easier to sustain by the more or less willing, though variably grudging, acquiescence of most countries. Sheriff is of course a metaphor. By its use I mean to argue that the United States will act on behalf of others, as well as itself, undertaking some of the tough jobs of international security that no other agent or agency is competent to perform. The American sheriff serves itself by serving the world selectively. This role requires the clearest of foreign policy explanations, lest it descend into strategic opportunism, or at least appears to do so. U.S. material and spiritual resources are great, but not inexhaustible. They should not be expended casually in the pursuit of goals of only marginal national interest. Notwithstanding September 11 and its aftermath, the jury is out, and is likely to stay out awhile longer, on whether American society will tolerate the sheriff’s role as specified here, expect in contexts highly specific to obvious American interest. Those contexts may not include some which the world order will need a prudent sheriff to influence coercively (if not necessarily with force). The United States is not, and should not and cannot be, the world’s policeman vis a vis any and every disturbance. The actions of this American sheriff of order are guided frankly by a national interest discriminator. The U.S. President needs to know: what has happened (or plausibly might happen); whether it matters to the United States, and if so, how much; what, if anything, he can do about it; and what cost, of all kinds, are likely to attach to action, or inaction. If the United States does not serve itself through its peacemaking behavior, its career as sheriff will be brief indeed. Altruism has a thin record in strategic history and, we must assume, an unpromising future. That is just the way it is in world politics. However, if the United States seeks to serve only itself, and rides roughshod over the interests of others, again its career as functional sheriff will be brief. The world at large will discern scant reason to cooperate with the United States, if American statecraft is crassly applied strictly on behalf of narrowly American interests. At the level of principle, if not always in attempted application, some of the critics of American so called unilateralism are correct. The United States often is more powerful when it can act with others. This is not an invariable rule. By extension, when the sheriff departs the town he has cleansed, he wants to leave it in the hands of right-minded and hopefully capable citizens. One of the indispensable keys to success in this emerging era of American guardianship is for the maximum number of countries, and extra-national interests, to believe that the United States is protecting a world order in which they all have a vital, if sometimes differential, stake. People may resent the American sheriff, and naturally be residually suspicious of American motives. But they should be prepared to welcome American ordering activity which benefits all potential victims of disorder. Americans do not need to be loved. It is sufficient to be respected and, perhaps, appreciated for the self-assumed lawman role. The United States has an imperial history, of a sort, but has never acquired much of an imperial mindset. Commentators may discover new forms of imperialism to cover current American attitudes and behavior, and perhaps, but only perhaps, there is some small merit in the exercise. Americans are apt to view the world though missionary lenses. American is an idea, a civilization even (to stretch conceptual domain), rather than just another state. Globalization, beneath the hyperbole, is seen in America and elsewhere as equating approximately with Americanization. Whether or not, or to what extent, that is true is not a prime concern here. Instead, our gaze is fixed upon America’s role as chief protector, guardian, or sheriff of this new world with its globalizing flows of information, people, and goods. First and foremost, the United States is the agent of its own national interest, an interest that Washington, on a prudent day, judges vitally bound up with a particular idea of world order. The national interest discriminator to which reference has been made, allows a fairly reliable four-way categorization of issues. Issues can be of survival character: they can be vital: they can be major: or they can be “other.” Survival issues must be fought for. Vital interests should be defended forcefully. Major interests might possibly be protected militarily. “Other” interests should not attract the U.S. cavalry – unless, that is, the cost is believed to be extraordinarily low (but beware of the surprise that friction and chance in war may throw your way.) The political context, or perhaps the timing, may multiply the significance of matters that otherwise would be of little concern to Washington (e.g. almost anything in the Balkans). A useful approach to understanding the U.S. role as sheriff is by means of another four-way split. Given the contemporary, and at least short-term predictable, distribution of power (which admittedly is different in its political-military, economic, and cultural dimensions), the objectively desirable U.S. role typically is as plain as it is not yet acceptable politically to proclaim out loud. With respect to protecting the world order, my seconf four-way split, tied inalienably to the four-way national interest discriminator, is the following: There are problems that only the United States can address in hopes of achieving decisive success; there are problems that the United States should stand a reasonable prospect of meeting and at least alleviating; there are problems concerning which the United States should be expected to fare poorly; and finally, there are problems that the United States has absolutely no plausible prospect whatsoever of alleviating, let alone of resolving (e.g., resucuing and restoring certain failed states). It may be needless to add that in most cases the active support of some friends and allies will, on balance, be a significant, though rarely essential, benefit. The United States could pick up its military ball and go home. It could choose to rely for world order on the hidden hand of universal commercial self-interest somewhat guided by such regional and local balances and imbalances of power as may be extant or might emerge. In effect, frequently this would translate as a green light for regional bullies to mark out their territories (and sea space and air space). Thus far, the contemporary United States is showing no persuasive evidence of an inclination to bring itself home as a political military influence. The issue is not whether America’s skills in statescraft are fully adequate for the sheriff role (whose would be?). Rather, it is whether there is to be a sheriff at all. If the United States declines the honor, or takes early retirement, there is no deputy sheriff, waiting, trained and ready for promotion. Furthermore, there is no world-ordering mechanism worthy of the name which could substitute for the authority and strength of the American Superpower. At present there is no central axis of a balance of power to keep order, while the regional balances in the Middle East and South and East Asia are as likely to provoke as to cool conflict – and conflict with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) at that.

### And, History Can Only Prove Our Argument – Failure to Weaponize makes war inevitable – China will build weapons regardless of U.S. Actions – Don’t Believe the Hype Behind Benevolent Development of Space

Stakelbeck 2k7

(Fred Stakelbeck is a Senior Asia Fellow with Washington-based Center for Security Policy. He is an expert on the economic and national security implications for the U.S. of China's emerging regional and global strategic influence, pg online @ http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=38 //sdi-ef)

Reports last month that China had successfully tested an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon against one of its own antiquated weather satellites using a kinetic kill vehicle launched on board a ballistic missile raised the stakes in the ongoing battle between the U.S. and China **over space supremacy**. Indeed, the test proves China has taken another step in its quest to become a military power in space. Testing space weapons is nothing new. Both the U.S. and Soviet Union tested anti-satellite technology in the 1980’s, and the U.S. even shot down one of its orbiting satellites in 1985. But since that time, both countries have stopped testing altogether, believing that such actions jeopardize the commercial and scientific uses of space. In the recent Chinese test, experts noted that thousands of multiple-sized fragments were created from the satellite’s destruction, placing billions of dollars worth of sophisticated equipment at serious risk. As expected, international condemnation of the ASAT weapons test was both firm and swift, as India, Russia and Great Britain voiced their immediate disproval. Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) spokesman G. Madhavan Nair called the test “unethical.” Russian defense minister Sergei Ivanov said his country was against the “weaponization of space,” while the British raised the issue with Chinese officials almost immediately. In the U.S. Senate, the reaction was equally critical. Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ), the ranking Republican on the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, told a gathering at Washington’s Heritage Foundation that China’s destruction of an aging satellite with a ground-based ballistic missile was a “wake-up call” that should make the U.S. get serious about threats in space. **“China’s military doctrine and numerous writings make it clear the country does not believe space can or should be free of military capabilities,”** Kyl said. Making China’s anti-satellite test even more surprising was the fact that it **directly contradicts previous statements** made by the country’s leaders concerning the weaponization of space. In September 2005, Beijing warned that urgent attention was needed to protect against the weaponization of space, saying, “The international community should take effective preventive measures to negotiate and conclude relevant international legal instruments to prohibit deployment of weapons in outer space.” In May 2005, China’s foreign ministry spokesman Kong Quan told an audience, “Space is our shared treasure which should be used for the benefit of all mankind.” **But even as Beijing has called for the de-militarization of space, its defense community has continually included national security as one of the purposes served by its expanding space program**. The country’s latest defense paper sets ambitious goals for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and focuses on the need for “technological modernization.” The U.S. Department of Defense’s annual report on the “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China” released in 2005 recognized China’s militaristic space policy, noting, “China will eventually deploy advanced imagery, reconnaissance, and Earth resource systems with military applications.” The report went on to say, “China is working on, and plans to field, anti-satellite systems, including conducting research to develop ground-based laser anti-satellite weapons.” As recently as November, an independent panel, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, encouraged the Bush administration to initiate discussions with Beijing designed to curtail space militarization. This, only two months after reports surfaced in September of laser attacks by China against U.S. intelligence gathering satellites. Other intelligence reports claimed that the U.S. had detected “mini-Chinese satellites” placed in orbit near U.S. military communications and imaging satellites. In response to China’s latest ASAT weapons test, the Bush administration announced this month that it had suspended plans to develop space ventures with China. NASA spokesman Jason Sharp, said, “We believe China’s development and testing of such [ASAT] weapons is inconsistent with the constructive relationship that our presidents [Bush and Hu] have outlined, including civil space cooperation.” In the past, Washington has avoided sharing certain technical knowledge with Beijing and has objected to China’s growing role in the International Space Station (ISS), due to concerns that the communist regime would use the information to bolster its long-range ballistic missile forces. Prior to China’s laser and ASAT weapons tests, the Bush administration was preparing to introduce revisions to the existing National Space Policy to address increasing threats to the country’s critical satellite system. According to Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at the U.S. State Department, the new policy which was released in the fall, will, “Ensure that our space capabilities are protected in a time of increasing challenges and threats, due to the vital part they play in our national security and to our economic well-being.” Some experts have speculated that Chinese President Hu Jintao and his advisors did not fully understand the repercussions of their ASAT weapons test. “The decision process is still so opaque that maybe they didn’t know who to talk to. Maybe there was a disconnect between the engineers and policy makers,” noted Geoffrey Forden, an arms expert at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. But others disagree, noting Beijing was well aware of the dangers, but decided to ignore them instead. “The Chinese are telling the Pentagon that they don’t own space. We can play this game too, and we can play it dirtier than you,” noted Michael Krepon, president emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center. Beijing plans to make the game even “dirtier” in the future. The country’s leadership has announced that approximately 30 satellites will be launched in the coming years – 10 in 2007 alone - to create a Chinese Global Positioning System (GPS) called the Compass Navigation System. Since its inception, the system has been shrouded in secrecy. The new system, which will become fully operational next year for much of China, is expected to use the same radio frequency as Europe’s Galileo system and the U.S. GPS, making Western attempts to jam communications much more difficult. Ultimately, the Compass Navigation System could be used worldwide to provide precise positioning data for the Chinese military similar to information already produced by the U.S. GPS for military field commanders. China’s recent provocative activities will likely spur debate about putting U.S. interceptor missiles in space, the head of the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency, Air Force Lt. Gen. Henry Obering, said earlier this month. “We think it’s prudent, especially in light of the Chinese anti-satellite activities, to start that debate right now,” he said. Obering went on to say that the U.S. would be investing in a “good experimental foundation” that would add to the country’s existing sea and ground-based missile defenses. President Bush’s fiscal 2008 budget seeks an additional $10 million, slashed from an original $45 million, for studies on what could be the first space-based interceptor missiles, taking an important step toward making former President Ronald Reagan’s “Strategic Defense Initiative” or “Star Wars” a reality. Overall, President Bush has asked Congress for $8.9 billion in fiscal 2008 for the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, down $500 million from last year, the likely result of budgetary constraints associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the cost of its own military modernization program. Evaluating America’s recent conflict in Iraq, China’s communist leadership believes that a weaker military can defeat a superior force by attacking its space-based communications and surveillance systems, using powerful “lightning strikes” as a prerequisite for victory. A January 22, 2007 New York Times article noted that China has “extensively studied how the U.S. has used satellite imagery in the Persian Gulf War, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in tracking North Korea’s nuclear program.” Not since the October 4, 1957 launch of Russia’s Sputnik has the U.S. felt as threatened by another country’s space activities. At that time, America answered the challenge, developing the greatest space program on Earth. Now, China has thrown down the gauntlet. With advances in other areas such as submarine, aircraft and warship design, China has improved its extra-regional capabilities allowing it to extend its influence beyond the Taiwan Strait. Adding a space-based military capability will only make the country more dangerous to potential future adversaries such as the U.S. There is a storm gathering on the horizon. Russia admitted last year it had developed a revolutionary new missile that could evade any existing U.S. missile defense system. This month, Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has threatened to strike the U.S. and its global interests with ballistic missiles. North Korea continues to sell sophisticated missile technology to the highest bidder and has its own domestic ballistic missile program. This week, India announced it will soon fire a new missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads across much of Asia and the Middle East. **America’s enemies, as well as some of its perceived allies, are positioning themselves to attack the country’s Achilles heel – its reliance on space-based systems**. Successful asymmetrical warfare, not necessarily a frontal confrontation on the battlefield, will be the immediate goal of America’s growing list of enemies. However, as the U.S. becomes weakened by well-coordinated, intense and frequent attacks on its satellite and computer infrastructure, **the likelihood of a direct military confrontation with one or more of our enemies will grow.**

### And, China will go after our space weakness – a ‘Pearl Harbor in Space’ is Inevitable

Choong 2k9

(William, Senior Writer @ The Strait Times, articles appear in The International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Strait Times, “Reading too much into the stars?,” May 12, 2009, LexisNexis )

LAST month, China lofted a navigational satellite into the heavens. The Compass satellite will be part of the Beidou Navigation System of up to 30 'birds' that China will put into orbit by 2015. The launch highlights the massive strides that China has made since the early 1990s, when it witnessed how United States-led forces leveraged on space- based C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities during the first Gulf War. But it was only in recent years that China's space-based programme has really taken off. China's first manned space flight in 2003 carried just one astronaut; the second in 2005 bore two. Last year, it staged its first space walk. The most worrying aspect of China's space programme, however, is the anti-satellite (Asat) exercise it conducted in 2007, when it destroyed a defunct weather satellite with a missile. Analysts noted that China used the 'hit to kill' method - a technology that involves 'stopping a bullet with a bullet'. This meant that China's Asat capability had surpassed that of the former Soviet Union. Since then, there has been much talk - most of it American - of how China could raise the costs of American intervention in a conflict, say, over the Taiwan Strait. Earlier this year, for example, the Pentagon wrote in its annual report on the Chinese military that Beijing was developing capabilities to attack space assets of potential adversaries in a bid to 'blind and deafen the enemy'. According to Richard Fisher, the author of China's Military Modernization: Building For Regional And Global Reach, China has more than 1,500 ballistic and cruise missiles aimed at Taiwan. The newer missiles are more precise than the older ones, thanks to navigation satellite ('navsat') guidance. Dr Ashley Tellis, a China expert, goes further. China's pursuit of counter- space capabilities is part of a 'considered strategy designed to counter the overall military capability of the US'. China's space programme is an asymmetric strategy aimed at America's 'soft ribs' in space. In other words, China could carry out a 'space Pearl Harbour'. Many of these 'China threat' arguments can be supported empirically. Mao Zedong used asymmetrical warfare to overwhelm stronger opponents. And China's much-vaunted strategy of 'active defence', argue some, is actually an insidious strategy of using offence in the name of defence. Think of China's wars with India and the former Soviet Union in 1962 and 1969 respectively.

### U.S. China War Esacalates and Causes Extinction

**Cheong 2k**

(Ching, , Senior Writer @ the Strait Times, Senior Writer at the Strait Times, “No one gains in a war over Taiwan,” 6/25, pg Lexis)

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China, 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilization.

## 1AC Terrorism Advantage

### Observation Two: Terrorism

### First, New attempts at Terrorist Acquisition of Nuclear and Biological Weapons are inevitable

Mowatt-Larssen 2k10

(Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, former Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, U.S. Department of Energy, former Chief of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Department, Counter-terrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency, recipient of the CIA Director’s Award, graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, “Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?” January 2010, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/al-qaeda-wmd-threat.pdf)

Osama bin Ladin’s assertion in 1998 that it was his Islamic duty to acquire weapons of mass destruction **ensured that the fulfillment of this intent would become a top priority for his lieutenants** in the ensuing years. In an effort to explain his thinking to his followers, and to help guide their efforts, the al Qaeda leader has offered a number of statements that provide a need and rationale for using weapons of mass destruction as a means of achieving the group’s concrete and ambitious goals. Most recently, he promised in a 2007 video release to “escalate the killing and fighting against you (Americans)”–on grounds of destroying an international conspiracy to control the world–adding, “The capitalist system seeks to turn the entire world into a fiefdom of the major corporations under the label of globalization in order to protect democracy.” These statements should not be interpreted as empty rhetoric and idle threats: Osama bin Ladin has signaled a specific purpose for using WMD in al Qaeda’s quest to destroy the global status quo, and to create conditions more conducive to the overthrow of apostate regimes throughout the Islamic world. His argument is essentially that even weapons of mass destruction—which are outlawed under Islam—are a justifiable means of countering US hegemony. Osama bin Ladin’s morality-based argument on the nature of the struggle between militant Islamists and the US-led coalition of secular forces focuses the group’s planning on the acquisition of strategic weapons that can be used in mass casualty attacks, rather than on the production of tactical, more readily available weapons such as “dirty bombs,” chemical agents, crude toxins and poisons. In this light, **it is not surprising that the group’s top WMD priority has been to acquire nuclear and strategic biological weapons**. Considering the potential that such weapons hold in fulfilling al Qaeda’s aspirations, their WMD procurement efforts have been managed at the most senior levels, under rules of strict compartmentalization from lower levels of the organization, and with central control over possible targets and timing of prospective attacks. In this sense, their approach has been “Muhammed Atta-like”—similar to the modus operandi Khaled Sheikh Mohammed employed in making preparations for the 9/11 attacks—as opposed to resembling the signature characterizing most terrorist attacks to which the world has become accustomed. Al Qaeda’s patient, decade-long effort to steal or construct an improvised nuclear device (IND) flows from their perception of the benefits of producing the image of a mushroom cloud rising over a US city, just as the 9/11 attacks have altered the course of history. This lofty aim helps explains why al Qaeda has consistently sought a bomb capable of producing a nuclear yield, as opposed to settling for the more expedient and realistic course of devising a “dirty bomb,” or a radiological dispersal device. Another 9/11-scale operational plot managed by the al Qaeda core leadership was the development of anthrax for use in a mass casualty attack in the United States. The sophisticated anthrax project was run personally by al Qaeda deputy chief Ayman Zawahiri, in parallel to the group’s efforts to acquire a nuclear capability; anthrax was probably meant to serve as another means to achieve the same effect as using a nuclear bomb, given doubts that a nuclear option could be successfully procured. Notably, al Qaeda’s efforts to acquire a nuclear and biological weapons capability were concentrated in the years preceding September 11, 2001. Based on the timing and nature of their WMD-related activity in the 1990’s, al Qaeda probably anticipated using these means of mass destruction against targets in the US homeland in the intensified campaign they knew would follow the 9/11 attack. There is no indication that the fundamental objectives that lie behind their WMD intent have changed over time. On the other hand, the pursuit of crude toxins and poisons appears to have been of little interest to the al Qaeda leadership, even though the production of such weapons is easier and thus might seem more attractive for potential use in attacks. Although experimentation and training in crude chemical agents and pathogens was standard fare in al Qaeda’s camps in Afghanistan before 9/11, their use in attacks appears to have been left to the initiative of individual cells and planners outside the direct supervision of the al Qaeda core leadership. Prominent examples of small-scale chemical- and biological- related activity include Midhat al-Mursi’s (aka Abu Khabab) basic training for operatives in the al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan before 9/11; the Abu Musab al Zarqawi network’s plotting to use ricin and cyanide in multiple attacks planned in Europe in late 2002-early 2003; and a Bahraini terrorist cell’s plot to use a crude cyanide gas device called the “mobtaker” (an Arabic word roughly meaning “invention”) in an attack on the New York City subway in the same time frame. In each of these cases, the evidence suggests that the al Qaeda senior leadership was not directly involved or apparently even aware of attack preparations until late stages of planning. Moreover, there is no evidence that the al Qaeda leadership regarded the use of crude toxins and poisons as being suitable for conducting what would amount to pin prick attacks on the United States; on the contrary, Zawahiri canceled the planned attack on the New York City subway for “something better,” suggesting that a relatively easy attack utilizing tactical weapons would not achieve the goals the al Qaeda leadership had set for themselves. So, why hasn’t a terrorist WMD attack happened since 9/11? There are many plausible explanations for why the world has not experienced an al Qaeda attack using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons, **but it would be foolish to discount the possibility that such an event will occur in the future.** To date, al Qaeda’s WMD programs may have been disrupted. This is in fact one likely explanation, given a sustained and ferocious counterterrorist response to 9/11 that largely destroyed al Qaeda as the organization that existed before the fateful attack on the US. If so, **terrorists must continue to be disrupted and denied a safe haven to reestablish the ability to launch a major strike on the US homeland, or elsewhere in the world.** Or perhaps, al Qaeda operational planners have failed to acquire the kind of weapons they seek, because they are unwilling to settle for anything other than a large scale attack in the US. It would surely be hard for al Qaeda to lower the bar they set on 9/11: what would constitute a worthy follow-up to 9/11, on their terms? What would they achieve through another attack? There are few weapons that would meet their expectations in this regard. It is extremely difficult to acquire a functioning nuclear bomb, or to steal enough weapons usable material to build a bomb. And as al Qaeda probably learned in trying to weaponize anthrax, biological pathogens may seem simple enough to produce, but such weapons are not easy to bottle up and control. To complicate matters further, an attack on the scale of 9/11 is more difficult to accomplish in an environment of heightened security and vigilance in the US. But if Osama bin Ladin and his lieutenants had been interested in employing crude chemical, biological and radiological materials in small scale attacks, there is little doubt they could have done so by now. However, events have shown that the al Qaeda leadership does not choose weapons based on how easy they are to acquire and use, be they conventional or unconventional weapons. They choose them based on the best means of destroying the specific targets that they have in mind. Al Qaeda’s reasoning thus runs counter to analytic convention that equates the ease of acquisition of chemical, biological or radiological weapons with an increasing likelihood of terrorist use—i.e., a terrorist attack employing crude weapons is therefore more likely than an attack using a nuclear or large scale biological weapon. **In fact, it is the opposite**: If perpetrating a large-scale attack serves as al Qaeda’s motivation for possessing WMD, not deterrence value, then the greatest threat is posed by the most effective and simple means of mass destruction, whether these means consist of nuclear, biological, or other forms of asymmetric weapons. An examination of the 9/11 attack sheds light on al Qaeda’s reasoning behind the selection of specific weapons, and how that may apply to the role WMD plays in their thinking. Al Qaeda opted to pursue a highly complex and artfully choreographed plot to strike multiple targets requiring the simultaneous hijacking of several 747 jumbo passenger aircraft, because using airplanes as weapons offered the best means of attacking the targets they intended to destroy. If conventional wisdom on assessing WMD terrorism threats had been applied to considering the likelihood of the 9/11 plot, analysts may well have concluded it never would have happened; at the time, it was simply hard to believe any terrorist group could pull off such an elaborate plot utilizing novel, unpredictable weapons that were so difficult to acquire. Yet, WMD terrorism skeptics abound, and for understandable reasons. There is widespread suspicion in America and abroad that WMD terrorism is another phony threat being hyped for political purposes, and to stoke fears among the public. It is difficult to debunk this allegation, given the US government’s lack of credibility in the case of Iraqi WMD. That said, WMD terrorism is not Iraqi WMD. The case that the WMD terrorism threat is real bears no association with the Iraqi intelligence failure whatsoever, in terms of the reliability of the sources of intelligence, the quality of the information that has been collected, and the weight of the evidence that lies at the heart of our understanding of the threat. If anything, the biases in WMD terrorism analysis tilt towards treating the absence of information as an absence of threat; this could become a vulnerability in the defenses, considering the very real possibility that there may be a terrorist plot in motion that has not been found.

### And, Top Experts Agree – a Nuclear terror attack is inevitable by 2013

Allison 1/25/2K10

(Graham,Professor of Government and Director of the Belfer Center for Science and Int’l Affairs @ Harvard, “A Failure to Imagine the Worst,” Foreign Policy, <http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/node/5591> )

In his first speech to the U.N. Security Council, U.S. President Barack Obama challenged members to think about the impact of a single nuclear bomb. He said: "Just one nuclear weapon exploded in a city -- be it New York or Moscow, Tokyo or Beijing, London or Paris -- could kill hundreds of thousands of people." The consequences, he noted, would "destabilize our security, our economies, and our very way of life." Before the Sept. 11, 2001, assault on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, who could have imagined that terrorists would mount an attack on the American homeland that would kill more citizens than Japan did at Pearl Harbor? As then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice testified to the 9/11 Commission: "No one could have imagined them taking a plane, slamming it into the Pentagon ... into the World Trade Center, using planes as missiles." For most Americans, the idea of international terrorists conducting a successful attack on their homeland, killing thousands of citizens, was not just unlikely. It was inconceivable. As is now evident, assertions about what is "imaginable" or "conceivable," however, are propositions about our minds, not about what is objectively possible. Prior to 9/11, how unlikely was a megaterrorist attack on the American homeland? In the previous decade, al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993, U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and the USS Cole in 2000 had together killed almost 250 and injured nearly 6,000. Moreover, the organization was actively training thousands of recruits in camps in Afghanistan for future terrorist operations. Thinking about risks we face today, we should reflect on the major conclusion of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission established to investigate that catastrophe. The U.S. national security establishment's principal failure prior to Sept. 11, 2001, was, the commission found, a "failure of imagination." Summarized in a single sentence, the question now is: Are we at risk of an equivalent failure to imagine a nuclear 9/11? After the recent attempted terrorist attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253, this question is more urgent than ever. The thought that terrorists could successfully explode a nuclear bomb in an American city killing hundreds of thousands of people seems incomprehensible. This essential incredulity is rooted in three deeply ingrained presumptions. First, no one could seriously intend to kill hundreds of thousands of people in a single attack. Second, only states are capable of mass destruction; nonstate actors would be unable to build or use nuclear weapons. Third, terrorists would not be able to deliver a nuclear bomb to an American city. In a nutshell, these presumptions lead to the conclusion: inconceivable. Why then does Obama call nuclear terrorism "the single most important national security threat that we face" and "a threat that rises above all others in urgency?" Why the unanimity among those who have shouldered responsibility for U.S. national security in recent years that this is a grave and present danger? In former CIA Director George Tenet's assessment, "the main threat is the nuclear one. I am convinced that this is where [Osama bin Laden] and his operatives desperately want to go." When asked recently what keeps him awake at night, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates answered: "It's the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear." Leaders who have reached this conclusion about the genuine urgency of the nuclear terrorist threat are not unaware of their skeptics' presumptions. Rather, they have examined the evidence, much of which has been painstakingly compiled here by Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, former head of the CIA's terrorism and weapons-of-mass-destruction efforts, and much of which remains classified. Specifically, who is seriously motivated to kill hundreds of thousands of Americans? Osama bin Laden, who has declared his intention to kill "4 million Americans -- including 2 million children." The deeply held belief that even if they wanted to, "men in caves can't do this" was then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's view when Tenet flew to Islamabad to see him after 9/11. As Tenet (assisted by Mowatt-Larssen) took him step by step through the evidence, he discovered that indeed they could. Terrorists' opportunities to bring a bomb into the United States follow the same trails along which 275 tons of drugs and 3 million people crossed U.S. borders illegally last year. In 2007, Congress established a successor to the 9/11 Commission to focus on terrorism using weapons of mass destruction. This bipartisan Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism issued its report to Congress and the Obama administration in December 2008. In the commission's unanimous judgment: "it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013." Faced with the possibility of an American Hiroshima, many Americans are paralyzed by a combination of denial and fatalism. Either it hasn't happened, so it's not going to happen; or, if it is going to happen, there's nothing we can do to stop it. Both propositions are wrong. The countdown to a nuclear 9/11 can be stopped, but only by realistic recognition of the threat, a clear agenda for action, and relentless determination to pursue it.

### And, Bin Laden’s Death Didn’t Matter – al-Zawahri took over and new attacks are STILL inevitable

Army Times 5/2

### (“Egypt’s al-Zawahri likely to succeed bin Laden,” pg online @ <http://www.armytimes.com/news/2011/05/ap-zawahri-likely-to-succeed-bin-laden-050211/> //ef)

CAIRO — For years, Osama bin Laden’s charisma kept al-Qaida’s ranks filled with zealous recruits. But it was the strategic thinking and the organizational skills of his Egyptian right hand man that kept the terror network together after the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and pushed al-Qaida out. With Bin Laden killed, Ayman al-Zawahri becomes the top candidate for the world’s top terror job. It’s too early to tell how exactly al-Qaida would change with its founder and supreme mentor gone, but **the group under al-Zawahri would likely be further radicalized, unleashing a new wave of attacks to avenge bin Laden’s killing by U.S. troops in Pakistan** on Sunday to send a message that it’s business as usual. Al-Zawahri’s extremist views and his readiness to use deadly violence are beyond doubt. In a 2001 treatise, “Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner,” he set down the long-term strategy for the jihadi movement — to inflict “as many casualties as possible” on the Americans, while trying to establish control in a nation as a base “to launch the battle to restore the holy caliphate” of Islamic rule across the Muslim world. Unlike bin Laden, who found his jihadist calling as an adult, al-Zawahri’s activism began when he was in his mid-teens, establishing his first secret cell of high school students to oppose the Egyptian government of then-President Anwar Sadat. The doors of jihad opened for him when, as a young doctor, a visitor came to him with an offer to travel to Afghanistan to treat Islamic fighters battling Soviet forces. His 1980 trip to the Afghan war zone — only a few months long but the first of many — opened his eyes to a whole new world of possibilities. What he saw there, he was to write 20 years later, was “the training course preparing Muslim mujahideen youth to launch their upcoming battle with the great power that would rule the world: America.” The bond between al-Zawahri and bin Laden began in the late 1980s, when al-Zawahri reportedly treated the Saudi millionaire-turned-jihadist in the caves of Afghanistan as Soviet bombardment shook the mountains around them. The friendship laid the foundation for the al-Qaida terror network, which carried out the Sept. 11, 2001 suicide airplane hijackings that sparked the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan later that year. The attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon made bin Laden Enemy No. 1 to the United States. But he likely could never have carried it out without al-Zawahri. Bin Laden provided al-Qaida with the charisma and money, but al-Zawahri brought the ideological fire, tactics and organizational skills needed to forge disparate militants into a network of cells in countries around the world. “Al-Zawahri was always bin Laden’s mentor, bin Laden always looked up to him,” says terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman of Georgetown University. While bin Laden came from a privileged background in a prominent Saudi family of Yemeni decent, al-Zawahri had the experience of a revolutionary in the trenches. “He spent time in an Egyptian prison, he was tortured. He was a jihadi from the time he was a teenager, he has been fighting his whole life and that has shaped his world view,” Hoffman says. Perhaps even more significant than al-Zawahri’s role before the Sept. 11 attacks was his task afterward, when the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan demolished al-Qaida’s safe haven and scattered, killed and captured its fighters and leaders. The blow was personal as well — al-Zawahri’s wife and at least two of their six children were killed in a U.S. airstrike in the southern Afghan city of Kandahar. Al-Zawahri ensured al-Qaida’s survival, rebuilding al-Qaida’s leadership in the Afghan-Pakistan border region and installing his allies as new lieutenants in key positions. Since then, the network inspired or had a direct hand in attacks in North Africa, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Pakistan, the 2004 train bombings in Madrid and the 2005 transit bombings in London. Meanwhile, al-Zawahri — with his thick beard, heavy-rimmed glasses and the prominent mark on his forehead from prostration in prayer — became the new face of al-Qaida, churning out Web videos and audiotapes while bin Laden faded from public view for long stretches

### And, Even unsuccessful terrorism causes extinction

Sid-Ahmed '04

[Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, a political analyst for the 'Al-Ahram' newspaper, 9/1/2004, "Extinction", pg. online @ http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm// ]

The advent of the nuclear age, which began when America dropped two atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagazaki just before the end of World War II, introducedan altogether new dimension to the arms race worldwide. In fact, it changed the very notion of warfare as the realisation set in that humankind now had the means to turn the planet into a wasteland **incapable of sustaining life**. **For the first time in its long history, the human race was at risk of extinction** not through an act of nature but by its own hand.At the same time, however, the emergence of a new world order in the aftermath of the war served to prevent the risk from materialising even as it lent impetus to a deadly arms-race of the summit of the global community. The post-war world had become sharply polarised along ideological lines between a capitalist pole led by the United States and a communist pole led by the Soviet Union. As each sought to assert its supremacy over the other, the world was held hostage by an arms race between two camps capable of exterminating the inhabitants of the planet not once but several times over.Although one of the two poles developed a greater overkill capability than the other, this hardly mattered. After all, you can only die once. Thus despite this discrepancy the two poles enjoyed a kind of parity which prevented the Cold War between them from hotting up into an armed conflict. Mutual deterrence or, more precisely, mutual neutralisation, proved to be the most effective way of preventing the outbreak of what would have been the third, and probably final, world war.With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the bipolar world order that had prevailed since the end of World War II came to an end. America, with its military and economic pre-eminence over all other nations combined, was now the sole remaining superpower, without any constraints on its freedom of manouevre. This created an imbalance in the world system and tempted the US administration to pursue its own agenda without regard to considerations of international law, state sovereignty or international public opinion. To give its exercise of brute force a semblance of legality, it came up with its doctrine of pre-emptive wars, like the one it launched against Iraq. It is becoming increasingly clear that the onset of a unipolar world system has made the world more dangerous place, not the opposite.The most critical moment was the one when the Soviet Union collapsed and fragmented into a number of independent republics. The lack of a central authority in a vast nation with massive arsenals of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction raised the nightmare prospect of those weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible parties who would not hesitate to use them.Despite the acute contradiction on which it was based, the bipolar world order was an international system in which nations could be in a state of conflict but where they were also members of the United Nations, related to each other via agreements, accords, treaties, etc.. that is, through a system of mutual obligations, which restricted, to one extent or another, their freedom of action. The disappearance of the Soviet Union left the field clear not only to the United States at the summit of the global community but to the forces of international terrorism at its base. **These forces are waging a war on the international system unbound by any constraints.** It is a war waged by "irresponsible" groups who do not expose themselves to the accountability of the world system, nor to transparency in any form. That is why terrorism is so difficult to cast light on **and can represent a greater danger than wars waged by regular armies**.During the Cold War, the overkill capabilities developed by the superpowers allowed them to use deterrence as a device to prevent nuclear conflagration; there was a tacit agreement between them that while they could, and did, engage in brinkmanship by threatening to use their weapons of mass destruction, they would desist from actually doing so. In the absence of any kind of parity between the protagonists in today's shadowy war on terror, mutual deterrence has been replaced by a process of pre-emption that incites the enemy to take anticipatory measures.The devastating attack of 11 September 2001, which claimed nearly 3,000 victims, is a case in point. What provoked the attack? Why that particular type of anticipatory blow? Is there an explanation for the sequence of events that began with raids against two US embassies in Africa, followed by the attack on an American destroyer close to Aden and climaxed with 9/11? It was a practice run for an even more devastating attack involving nuclear weapons. But if Osama Bin Laden was in possession of nuclear weapons at the time, why did he choose to go for an intricate plan entailing the hijacking of four passenger planes, tight synchronisation and split-second timing? Surely triggering a nuclear device would have been easier. Settling for the low-tech alternative of turning planes into missiles indicates that Bin Laden was not then in possession of nuclear weapons. Actually, the idea of linking terrorism to prohibited weapons of mass destruction came from Bush, not from the terrorists themselves, and was aimed at establishing some sort of link between Iraq and terrorism to legitimise his war against Saddam Hussein.**We have reached a point in human history where the phenomenon of terrorism has to be completely uprooted**, not through persecution and oppression, but by removing the reasons that make particular sections of the world population resort to terrorism. This means that fundamental changes must be brought to the world system itself. The phenomenon of terrorism is even more dangerous than is generally believed. We are in for surprises no less serious than 9/11 and with far more devastating consequences.A nuclear attack by terrorists will be much more critical than Hiroshima and Nagazaki,even if -- and this is far from certain -- the weapons used are less harmful than those used then, Japan, at the time, with no knowledge of nuclear technology, had no choice but to capitulate.Today, the technology is a secret for nobody.So far, except for the two bombs dropped on Japan, nuclear weapons have been used only to threaten. Now we are at a stage where they can be detonated. This completely changes the rules of the game. We have reached a point where anticipatory measures can determine the course of events. Allegations of a terrorist connection can be used to justify anticipatory measures, including the invasion of a sovereign state like Iraq. As it turned out, these allegations, as well as the allegation that Saddam was harbouring WMD, proved to be unfounded.What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive.But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. **This could lead to a third world war**, **from which no one will emerge victorious**. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, **this war will be without winners and losers**. **When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers**.

### And, Bioweapons cause extinction

Ochs 2k2

(Richard Ochs, , former president of the Aberdeen Proving Ground Superfund Citizens Coalition, member of the Depleted Uranium Task force of the Military Toxics Project, member of the Chemical Weapons Working Group June 9, 2002, “Biological Weapons Must Be Abolished Immediately,” http://www.freefromterror.net/other\_articles/abolish.html)

Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger **to the continued survival of life on earth**. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a “nuclear winter,” resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE. Ironically, the Bush administration has just changed the U.S. nuclear doctrine to allow nuclear retaliation against threats upon allies by conventional weapons. The past doctrine allowed such use only as a last resort when our nation’s survival was at stake. Will the new policy also allow easier use of US bioweapons? How slippery is this slope?

### Fortunately, Space weapons are key to prevent nuclear and bioterrorism and accidental launch – they allow precise and immediate retaliation

Dolman and Cooper 2k11

(Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, and Henry, PhD and Former Deputy for the Strategic and Space Systems, “Chapter 19: Increasing the Military Uses of Space,” <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf> )

Weapons in space could provide the global security needed to disrupt and counter small groups of terrorists wherever they operate, **at the very moment they are identified**. Currently, UAVs, dependent on space support for operations, fly persistent missions above areas of suspected terrorist activity in Iraq, providing real-time intelligence and, in some cases, onboard weapons to support ground forces in a specific area. Tactical units are informed of approaching hostiles, and due to all-weather and multi-spectral imaging systems, both friendly (Blue Force) and enemy tracking can occur throughout engagement operations. When ground troops are unable to respond to threatening situations beyond their line of sight or are unable to catch fleeing hostiles, armed UAVs can engage those threats. The other option in a large-scale counterterror operation is to bring **in an overwhelming number of troops**, enough to create a line across the entire country that can move forward, rousting and checking every shack and hovel, every tree and ditch, with enough Soldiers in reserve to prevent enemy combatants from re-infiltrating the previously checked zones. America could in this manner combat low-tech terrorism with low-tech mass military maneuvers, perhaps at a cost savings over an effective space-based surveillance and engagement capability (if one does not count the value of a Soldier's life), but we do not think dollar value is the overriding consideration in this situation. Terrorism in the form of limited, low-technology attacks is the most likely direct threat against America and its allies today, and space support is enabling the most sophisticated response ever seen. All-source intelligence has foiled dozens of attacks by al Qaeda and its associates. But what of the most dangerous threats today? Weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear but also chemical and biological ones, could be delivered in a variety of means vulnerable to interception if knowledge of their location is achieved in time for counteroperations to be effective**. In situations where there is no defense available**, or the need for one has not been anticipated, then time is the most precious commodity. **A limited strike capability from space would allow for the engagement of the highest threat and the most fleeting targets wherever they presented themselves on the globe, regardless of the intention of the perpetrator**. The case of a ballistic missile carrying nuclear warheads is exemplary. Two decades ago, the most dangerous threat facing America (and the world) was a massive exchange of nuclear warheads that could destroy all life on the planet. Since a perfect defense was not achievable, negotiators agreed to no defense at all, on the assumption that reasonable leaders would restrain themselves from global catastrophe. Today, a massive exchange is less likely than at any period of the Cold War, in part because of significant reductions in the primary nations' nuclear arsenals. The most likely and most dangerous threat comes from a single or limited missile launch, and from sources that are unlikely to be either rational or predictable. The first is an accidental launch, a threat we avoided making protections against due to the potentially destabilizing effect on the precarious Cold War balance. That an accidental launch, by definition undeterrable, would today hit its target is almost incomprehensible. More likely than an accidental launch is the intentional launch of one or a few missiles, either by a nonstate actor (a terrorist or "rogue boat captain" as the scenario was described in the early 1980s) or a rogue state attempting to maximize damage as a prelude to broader conflict. This is especially likely in the underdeveloped theories pertaining to deterring third-party states. The United States can do nothing today to prevent India from launching a nuclear attack against Pakistan (or vice versa) except threaten retaliation. If Iran should launch a nuclear missile at Israel, or in a preemptory strike Israel should attempt the reverse, America and the world could only sit back and watch, hoping that a potentially world-destroying conflict did not spin out of control. When President Reagan announced his desire for a missile shield in 1983, critics pointed out that even if a 99-percent-reliable defense from space could be achieved, a 10,000warhead salvo by the Soviet Union still allowed for the detonation of 100 nuclear bombs in American cities—and both we and the Soviets had enough missiles to make such an attack plausible. But if a single missile were launched out of the blue from deep within the Asian landmass today, for whatever reason, a space-based missile defense system with 99-percent reliability would be a godsend. And if a U.S. space defense could intercept a single Scud missile launched by terrorists from a ship near America's coasts before it detonated a nuclear warhead 100 miles up—creating an electromagnetic pulse that shuts down America's powergrid, halts America's banking and commerce, and reduces the battlefield for America's military to third world status8—**it might provide for the very survival of our way of life.**

## 1AC Solvency

### Observation Three Solvency –

### The Plan Locks-in U.S. Hegemony and ENDS all war and Terrorism – We Solve Every Impact to your Disad

Dolman 2k3

(Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award“SPACE WEAPONS Are They Needed?” pg online @ <http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/assets/docs/Security_Space_Volume.Final.pdf> //sdi-ef)

A Simple Space Weaponization Policy By using its current and near-term capacities, the United States should endeavor at once to seize military control of low-earth orbit. From that high ground vantage, near the top of the Earth’s gravity well, space-based laser or kinetic energy weapons **could prevent any other state from deploying assets there**, and could most effectively engage and destroy terrestrial enemy ASAT facilities. Other states should still be able to enter space relatively freely for the purpose of engaging in commerce, in keeping with the capitalist principles of the new regime. Just as in the sea dominance eras of the Athenians and British before them, the military space forces of the United States would have to create and maintain a safe operating environment (from pirates and other interlopers, perhaps from debris) to enhance trade and exploration. Only those spacecraft that provide advance notice of their mission and flight plan would be permitted in space, however. The military control of lowEarth orbit would be for all practical purposes a police blockade of all current spaceports, monitoring and controlling all traffic both in and out. The United States would concurrently have to announce the policy that it will tolerate no launch of a missile (cruise or ballistic), no cross-border incursion of aircraft, no hostile and illegal position of unwanted naval forces within the twelve-mile limit of national territory. Any transgressions anywhere in the world would be stopped, **immediately by force from space.** States will complain that their sovereignty has been infringed, but the United States will be on the highest moral ground. Under no condition can a state initiate cross-border violence, and therefore no state can credibly claim that it is defending itself. Thus the complaints of the state whose forces have been dispatched by space weapons **will ring hollow**. Yes, perhaps the United States had no international right to shoot down the nuclear or chemically tipped missile launched at a traditional adversary, but the launching state will have a hard time justifying its prior right to start such a war. Over time, and this is the key factor to make such a policy work for international stability and peace (which are at least intervening factors in the rise of global prosperity), the United States must rigidly enforce this policy without discrimination. It must not make any terrestrial military incursions of its own. It must act decisively and openly, and completely without bias. There will be cries of dismay that the United States is acting as an empire, but since the only limitations made on another state’s rights are on those to make war, eventually the loudest outbursts will ebb. People will get used to having American weapons flying overhead. They won’t like it, to be sure, but it will seem a waste of time to protest something that has brought so much good to the world. States will begin to cut back on traditional military forces, as they are less useful in a world where they cannot be used offensively, and unnecessary so long as the United States can guarantee state borders. And so it would. **Complete domination of space would give the U**nited **S**tates **such an advantage on the terrestrial battlefield that no state could openly challenge it**. ***Traditional war would be effectively over.*** An idealist vision would be secured by realist means. Strategic dominance of space would further force the United States to maintain the industrial and technical capacity to keep it at the forefront of hegemony for the foreseeable future. Nontraditional war, especially terrorism, would not be over, but it could very well be mitigated.42 The current dominant use of space for military matters is in the areas of observation and monitoring. These are the tools of effective police organizations, and have already been adapted in counter-terrorism plans. The details would be worked out in time, but the strategy clearly has benefits for the United States and the world.

### And, ONLY Space weapons can solve – they allow lightening strikes that destroy enemy WMDs and terrorist bases

Lambakis 2001

(Steven, Ph.D in Int’l Politics, National security and international analyst specializing in space power and policy studies, Specialist at National Insitute for Public Policy, On the Edge of the Earth, Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2001, 98)

Space weapons might facilitate lightening strikes against WMD storage and production facilities and associated launch platforms **and wreak havoc against the bases of terrorism**. Indeed, most military targets-fIxed or mobile, land-based, sea-based, or even airborne and orbiting-would be held at risk by space weapons. Space-based weapons may be one means available to future defense planners to defeat "hard and deeply buried targets," a mission directed in the 1999 Defense ~ Planning Guidance.83 In light of these advantages, the Defense Science Board has recommended initiation of a demonstration program to show the feasibility of highly precise, hypervelocity reentry of long slender and short rods made of heavy material into the atmosphere from space.84 These guided or unguided weapons may be launched from space planes or satellites.85 To be sure, questions surrounding the utility and advantages of space strike weapons to U.S. national security deserve extensive analysis to determine the full range of political, diplomatic, military, and economic implications associated with their deployment.

### And, Weaponization ends war and terrorism forever- You cant beat what you cant see

Yoshida 2k3

(Adam, Director of the British Colombia Freedom Institute, Author of The Nothern Abyss, Noted Political Commentator, Columnist for the Greenwich Village Gazette, 2003, Oct 10th, “Red China Shooting for the Moon”, Freedom Institute Magazine, http://www.adamyoshida.com/2003\_10\_01\_archive.html //ef)

**Ceding military control of space to China would end Americas status as a Superpower and create an entirely new world order.** **An American seizure of space would make permanent American hegemony**. The development of an advanced system of space-based weapons, along with a powerful support structure, would elevate America from being, by far, the most militarily powerful nation in the history of the world to being, to put it simply, ***militarily invincible.*** How do you fight an enemy who can, moments after you attack, zero in on your home and pulverize it with a rock dropped from orbit? How do you fight an enemy whose forces have sophisticated equipment which allows them to track their own position, uncover yours, and call in precise fire upon you? How do you fight an enemy whose bombers can be over your capital minutes after the decision to go to war is taken, who can drop precision weapons on all of your high value targets, and who possesses weapons which will destroy every modern electronic within a radius of miles? The answer is simple: you can’t. Certainly, people would still be capable of launching terrorist attacks on the Earth- but retaliation would be swifter and more brutal. Moreover, under the threat of orbital bombardment, many earth-based polities would have a strong incentive to cease playing games with terrorists. **The era of conventional military conflicts on the Earth would, more or less, be over**. Once one power has space and is resolved to keep it, no other power will be able to easily break through the bottleneck. Assuming that America’s leadership retains its resolve, American domination of space would become a permanent feature of world affairs.

# NOTE:

## When I posted the Last Verison of this file last night, the underlining was stripped. I am re-underlining now, and will post a fixed copy, but I wanted those who wanted to see the file to be ready to prep for their debates.

Forslund

# 1AC

## 1AC Hegemony Advantage

### Observation One: Space Control –

### First, Militarization of Space is Inevitable – It’s Only a question of who gets there first

STRATFOR 2k8

(Stratfor is a global intelligence company and has been cited by media such as CNN, Bloomberg, the Associated Press, Reuters, The New York Times and the BBC as an authority on strategic and tactical intelligence issues.[6] Barron's once referred to it as "The Shadow CIA".[7] “United States: The Weaponization of Space” April 10, 2008, http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/united\_states\_ weaponization\_space)

In the 1950s, the United States began pushing for an international treaty on outer space — even before the 1957 launch of Sputnik atop a modified version of the world’s first intercontinental ballistic missile. Fortunes have changed somewhat in the last 50 years, and the Pentagon has little interest in taking on further legally binding constraints these days. This is especially true in space, **where “weaponization” is not only inevitable**, but already well under way. In 1967, Washington became party to the “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies” (better known as the Outer Space Treaty). This treaty was quickly and readily accepted, in part because of its utter lack of definitions. Aside from some fairly unequivocal language about prohibiting the deployment of nuclear weapons in outer space and more broad military activities on the moon and other celestial bodies, the treaty is much more a loose collection of very large holes than it is a constraint on sovereign national action in space. **Since then, the military utility of space has begun to be realized**. Today, it is a cornerstone of global military communications and navigation. In Iraq today, for example, the U.S. military uses the Global Positioning System (GPS) for everything from squad level maneuvers to joint direct attack munition (JDAM) delivery. Largely from facilities inside the continental United States, the Pentagon controls some unmanned aerial systems half a world away. GPS has given rise to a new degree of precision in guided weapons. Imagery from space-based surveillance platforms has become commonplace and the Defense Support Program constellation continually monitors the surface of the earth for the launch plume of a ballistic missile. It is an incredibly valuable military domain. And just as it has become more valuable, the United States has become increasingly dependent on it. **Thus, space-based assets are susceptible targets for U.S. adversaries**. Were the United States to lose these assets, its **military capability on the ground would be severely affected**. Any symmetric enemy knows that and will act to neutralize U.S. space capability. The United States **knows that this attack will take place and must therefore defend the assets**. In **this sense, space is already a domain of military competition and conflict**. ***There is no escaping it.*** In other words, space has already been weaponized, except that the actual projectiles are not yet located in space. Beijing’s 2007 and Washington’s recent anti-satellite weapons tests only emphasize this point.

### Unfortunately, the U.S. is being left behind – we continue to explain why we ARENT developing Weapons – while countries like Russia and China Develop Weapons Behind Closed Doors

Stone 2k9

(space strategy planner for the USAF, a former staff member for two US Senators, and Executive Director of a growing Chamber of Commerce, “How should we secure our space-based assets as a nation?,” pg online @ http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1345/1 //ef)

At the same, US satellites, military as well as commercial, have been dropping offline in space. There is also the case an Iridium satellite and a defunct Russian satellite colliding in orbit, creating yet another band of space debris in orbit around our planet. All throughout these situations, the United States has been the one nation that has been blamed for developing space weapons and planning to create a sort of “space hegemony” according to one author in Air and Space Power Journal. At the UN, the US has been lambasted by Chinese and Russian officials stating that their security is being threatened by the US because of our discussions about space weapons threats to our satellites and the need for increased space situational awareness of our national security and commercial space infrastructure. They also point to the National Space Policy created in 2006 by the Bush Administration as creating the framework to create such a “space hegemony” whereby other nations would cease to have access to space. **This is simply not the case**. **US government officials have stated numerous times, categorically, that there are no space weapons programs being funded by Congress**. Yet, the Russians and Chinese both have stated that the only reason they are developing their space weapons is to defend themselves against the US deployment of weapons, weapons that according to many government officials, past and present, are not even being planned, much less deployed. Despite reassurances of quite the opposite, General Popovkin, the Russian Deputy Defense Minister gives the impression that the Russians, while developing their own space weapons systems are just defending their interests. “Russia has always been for non-deployment of weapons in space, but when others are doing this, we cannot be just onlookers, and such work is underway in Russia. This is all I can tell you.” By reading reports in the press such as these, as well as decades of Russian and Chinese open source planning and doctrine papers from their government diplomatic and war colleges, it appears the Russians and Chinese are moving (and have been for many years) **towards weaponizing space, but they are blaming the US falsely for doing it first as their excuse**. This tactic is called “projection”. Moreover, they are very effectively luring the arms control community into blaming the victim. The United States is dependent on satellites for our security, economy, and our ability to project power around the globe, and they know it. They are no where near as dependent on space as we are and they are knowledgeable of that, too. The Obama Administration **must seriously question the wisdom of entering into space arms control agreements of any kind with Russia and China when they may be engaging in a campaign of deception designed to trick the US into signing treaties that leave our space systems and their users completely vulnerable**. In other words, they seek only to constrain US power and are exploiting the good intentions of the arms control community and the American people to help achieve their ends. This approach is not new, and the Russians and Chinese are counting on the naiveté of the new administration to fall for it. If space arms control measures are adopted, the only option US strategists will have to protect the nation from “illegal” attacks on its space systems will be a transfer of capability from space to terrestrial alternatives and abandoning most of the current security and commercial space sectors. This will result in a significant contraction of the overall national space program and the space industrial base that supports it. That means job losses and a reduction in America's aerospace industry—our most successful economic sector—at a time when job security is scarce as it is. So, with all of this background information in mind, it comes as no surprise to this author that arms control advocates as well as members of the Russian and Chinese space forces are elated to see that the Obama Administration is working toward a worldwide ban on space weapons. If this agreement can just be made among the spacefaring countries of the world, peace will return to the heavens and the theory of space as a sanctuary free from conflict will be restored. Or will it?

### \*\*And, that Makes Conflict INEVITABLE – Adversaries will Seek Out Our Strengths and Eliminate them – Ensures Confrontation Over Space 2.5 thousand years of history prove\*\*

Smith 2k11

(M.V., Colonel, PhD in Politics and IR @ University of Reading, Citing Colin Gray, “Chapter 17: Security and Spacepower, Part of “Toward a Theory of Spacepower,” Edited by Charles Lutes and Peter Hays, National Defense University Press, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf> )

It is a rule in strategy, one derived empirically from the evidence of two and a half millennia, that anything of great strategic importance to one belligerent, for that reason has to be worth attacking by others. And the greater the importance, the greater has to be the incentive to damage, disable, capture, or destroy it. In the bluntest of statements: space warfare is a certainty in the future because the use of space in war has become vital. . . . Regardless of public sentimental or environmentally shaped attitudes towards space as the pristine final frontier, space warfare is coming.20 The strategic value of space to states is not in question. Advanced spacefaring states are already reliant—and moving toward dependence—on space-derived services for activities across every sector of their societies. Spacepower is becoming critical to their styles of warfighting. Likewise, the injury that can be caused to such states by menacing their space systems can be considerable. Given these incentives, the beast of war will either break its chains all at once or stretch them slowly over time.21

### The only option is for the US to weaponize space - this is critical to locking Hegemony and Preventing Violent Challenges to the International System – If the U.S. Gets there First, there is zero risk of an arms race or violent transition

Dolman 2k10

(Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award “The Case for Weapons in Space: A Geopolitical Assessment,” September, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf\_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per\_id=1532576)

This is the context in which the world now exists. The relatively stable global hegemony of US dominance since 1945, punctuated by limited wars and shifting balances of opposition, has relied on technology-dominant global power projection. Today, that technology is wholly integrated and inextricable from space support, and no state relies more on space power for its economic and security well-being than the US. Any effort to deny space capabilities would be a direct challenge to its hegemonic power, and the United States must confront the usurper or abdicate its leadership position. To be sure, China’s increasing space emphasis and its cultural antipathy to military transparency suggests that a serious attempt at seizing control of space is in the works. A lingering fear is the sudden introduction of an unknown capability (call it Technology X) that would allow a hostile state to place multiple weapons into orbit quickly and cheaply. The advantages gained from controlling the high ground of space would accrue to it as surely as to any other state, and the concomitant loss of military power from the denial of space to America’s already-dependent military forces could cause the **immediate demise of the extant international system.** The longer the United States dithers on its military responsibilities, the more likely a potential opponent could seize low-earth orbit before America is able to respond. And in such circumstances, the US certainly would respond. Conversely, if America were to weaponize space, **it is not at all sure that any other state or group of states would find it rational to counter in kind.** The entry cost to provide the necessary infrastructure is still too high—hundreds of billions of dollars, at minimum. The years of investment needed to achieve a comparable counter-force capability—essentially from scratch—would provide more than ample time for the United States to **entrench itself in space** and readily counter preliminary efforts to displace it. The tremendous effort in time and resources would be worse than wasted. Most states, if not all, would opt not to counter US deployments directly. They might oppose American interests with asymmetric balancing, depending on how aggressively it uses its new power, but **the likelihood of a hemorrhaging arms race** in space should the United States deploy weapons first—at least for the next few years—**is remote.** This reasoning does not dispute the fact that US deployment of weapons in outer space would represent the addition of a potent new military capacity, one that would assist in **extending the current period of American hegemony well into the future.** Clearly this would be intimidating, and America must expect severe condemnation and increased competition in peripheral areas. But such an outcome is less threatening than another, particularly non-liberal authoritarian state doing so, as the necessity of a response in kind is compelling. Placement of weapons in space by the United States would be perceived correctly as an attempt at continuing American hegemony. Although there is obvious opposition to the current international balance of power, the majority of states seem to regard it as at least tolerable. A continuation of the status quo is thus minimally acceptable, even to states working toward its demise. As long as the United States does not employ its power arbitrarily, the situation would be bearable initially and grudgingly accepted over time. Mirror-imaging does not apply here. An attempt by China to dominate space would be part of an effort to break the land-sea-air dominance of the United States in preparation for a new international order. Such an action would challenge the status quo, rather than seek to perpetuate it. This would be disconcerting to nations that accept, no matter how grudgingly, the current international order—including the venerable institutions of trade, finance, and law that operate within it—and intolerable to the United States. As leader of the current system, the United States could do no less than engage in a perhaps ruinous space arms race, save graciously decide to step aside and accept a diminished world status. Seizing the initiative and securing low-Earth orbit now, while the United States is dominant in space infrastructure, would do much to stabilize the international system and prevent an arms race in space. The enhanced ability to deny any attempt by another nation to place military assets in space and to readily engage and destroy terrestrial anti-satellite capacity would make the possibility of large-scale space war or military space races less likely, not more. Why would a state expend the effort to compete in space with a superpower that has the extraordinary advantage of holding securely the highest ground at the top of the gravity well? So long as the controlling state demonstrates a capacity and a will to use force to defend its position, in effect expending a small amount of violence as needed to prevent a greater conflagration in the future, the likelihood of a future war in space is remote.

### And, Failure to Lock-in American Hegemony Guarantees Nuclear Conflict

Gray 2k4

(Colin, Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, and founded of the National Institute for Public Policy, 2K4 “The Sheriff: America’s Defense of the New World Order, pg. 6-10)

World order is neither self-enforcing nor is it comprehensively enforceable. Nonetheless, every such “order” requires a sheriff, or some other agent of discipline. In the modern European, then world, system, which is to say since the late eighteenth century, the ordering mechanism was the balance of power, with occasional corrections imposed by war. Order is the prime virtue; it is the essential prerequisite for security, peace, and possibly justice. Disorder is the worst condition. Because this study is not deterministic, it is possible that the necessary rule-keeping job might be abandoned and not resumed for a while. Even in that unhappy event, my argument does not sink. Rather does the world cope as best it can in the absence of superior, and by and large legitimate, force, until such force reappears. Periods of anarchy, or at best of only very weak international governance, are far from unknown historically. Invariably they invite ambitious opportunists to try their luck. That development may, or may not, suffice to awake the sleeping benign giant, should such be conveniently available to be stirred from slumber. Every condition of international order works for the particular benefit of some countries and the interests more that others, and needs defending. The alternatives to an American-led international order are just possibly eventual leadership by some other polity or coalition (probably Chinese, though possibly European, led), or, more likely, a lengthy period with no one wearing the sheriff’s badge. In that unwelcome event, every predatory regional and local power, many a dissatisfied ethnic or religious minority, most probably would chance its arm and seek its own destiny, by violence if need be. Violent struggle is all but essential to the success of the process of nation building. No doubt there are many ways in which order for security, hopefully promoting peace and justice, might be established and maintained. In the life of the modern state’s system, which is to say from the Treaty of Westphalia in 1684 to the present day (though many now proclaim the demise of this system), in practice only one ordering mechanism has been available: the balance of power. The dying embers of that hoary approach limed on even until 1991, when many of its American aficionados could still be found muttering about “the strategic balance,” while through the 1990s many a serious reference still was made to that abominable consequence of Cold War military competition, a condition of stability keyed to the mutuality of assured destruction (MAD). But, today there is no strategic balance, central or otherwise, and there is no political context of hostility to provide meaning to military rivalry between the United States and the new Russian Federation. There is no balance of power serving as the mainstay, the organizing architecture, of the current world order. What we have instead was flagged in the 1995 as a strong desideratum by the classical historian, Donald Kagan. What seems to work best, even though imperfectly, is the possession by those states who wish to preserve the peace of the preponderant power and of the will to accept the burdens and responsibilities required to achieve that purpose. As written, Kagan’s words could just about fit the folly of the theory of collective security. Of Course, he has no such noble nonsense in mind. What he is saying is that peace has to be kept, actively, and that it is best kept by a preponderance, not by an ever contestable balance, of power. Kagan’s historical judgment will serve as the test for this sermon on security. In principle there is both good and bad news in Kagan’s claim. It is good news that his lifetime’s ruminations on peace and war have yielded definite advice. Many academics would be uncomfortable writing as boldly as does Kagan. The bad news is that to the best of our knowledge, there is no hidden hand of history commanded to ensure that only commercially minded popular democracies shall inherit the mantle of preponderant power. It was never probable, but that power at century’s close might have been Nazi Germany or the USSR. Fortunately, chance favored civilizational merit for once, and the only candidate for sheriff today is the United States, a fact which is our second theme. The United States is the, indeed is the only, essential protecting power for the current world order. Again, this is not to be deterministic. Although there are no other bidders for this crown at present, it does not follow that the United States is condemned to play this role. After all, American world leadership in Paris 1919 was succeeded post haste by a scuttle from many potential international obligations. Americans today could elect to withdraw from the outside world, insofar as they could in political-military ways. They would hope that the civilizational offense given by soft power of their now globally beamed culture would not be found unduly provocative abroad. Whether The Great Satan, as Iranian spokespeople have delighted in calling the United States, would be allowed to hunker down in peaceful sanctuary in North America, we should doubt. Still, it could be tried. After September 11, 2001, isolationist sentiment temporarily has lost much of its appeal. We may not be much interested in terrorism, but it would appear that terrorism is interested in us. For good or ill, we are what we are. Exactly what this is has been explained in no uncertain terms by Henry Kissinger in the opening lines of his book, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? No prizes are awarded for guessing that his question is strictly rhetorical. Kissinger proclaims that: At the dawn of the new millennium, the United States is enjoying a preeminence unrivalled by even the greatest empires of the past. From weaponry to entrepreneurship, from science to technology, from higher education to popular culture, America exercises an unparalleled ascendancy around the globe. During the last decade of the twentieth century, America’s preponderant position rendered it the indispensable component of international stability. The condition of unchallenged, indeed unchallengeable, primacy will not endure-it is not strategic history’s “last move”-but while it does the United States is the only candidate for sheriff. If Americans should decline the honor, they are at least uniquely well equipped to ensure that no one else could possibly succeed in that informal office. As Donald Kagan provided our basic text, quoted under the first point above, so it is only fitting that he should also be allowed to sound the warning bell. Kagan advises that: Unexpected changes and shifts in power are the warp and woof of international history. The current condition of the world, therefore, were war among major powers is hard to conceive because one of them has overwhelming military superiority and no wish to expand, will not last. Quite so. However, historians, perhaps especially ancient historians, should be expected to take the long view. And in the long view everything crumbles. But a suitable vision for the inspiration of policy, judicious choice of policy goals, and competence in strategy, should allow Americans to prolong their current strategic moment, as a later point makes explicit to be the sheriff of the current world order is a thankless role. American power may be necessary to restore such order as may be restorable, but Americans will not be loved, or even much appreciated, as a consequence. The rest of the world will be envious, fearful, and resentful, all the while seeking to use the leverage of American power for local purposes. There is no term extant that precisely captures the emerging U.S. role as sheriff of world order. For the first time since the mid-1960s, it has begun to be fashionable to refer to American policy and tasks as imperial. Andrew Bacevich, for one thoughtful example, suggest that “the preeminent challenge facing the United States in the twenty-first century is not eradicating terror but managing the informal American empire acquired during the course of the past century.” Empire, imperium even better, and hegemony, for all their popularity and at least partial suitability, carry baggage that can be distracting. Unless we are careful, such concepts themselves become part of the problem in the effort to conduct focused debate on U.S. policy and strategy. Despite the grounds for unease, we cannot deny the reality of common usage. For example, a review essay in Foreign Affairs opens with this claim: “The fact of America’s empire is hardly debated these days.” Allowing for the hyperbole and certain imprecision of meaning, still it is noteworthy that the author, Thomas Donnelly, feels able to make such a bold statement. I prefer to think of the United States as the sheriff of the current world order, for reasons both of cultural fit concept and of tolerable accuracy. Naturally, this American role is largely self-appointed, though it can enjoy added dignity when it is blessed formally by majority votes in multinational institutions. For example, the Security Council of the United Nations licensed the United States to lead military action against Iraq in 1990-91, while the war against Yugoslavia over its “ethnic cleansing” of Kosovo in 1999 was a collective NATO, though not a UN undertaking. Because world politics comprises a distinctly immature political system, we have to be somewhat relaxed about some of the legal niceties. To call the United States the sheriff of the current world order is both description and prescription. This lawman role derives most essentially from the contemporary distribution of power, which so markedly favors the American superstate. Beyond that derivation, however, the role of sheriff is made easier to sustain by the more or less willing, though variably grudging, acquiescence of most countries. Sheriff is of course a metaphor. By its use I mean to argue that the United States will act on behalf of others, as well as itself, undertaking some of the tough jobs of international security that no other agent or agency is competent to perform. The American sheriff serves itself by serving the world selectively. This role requires the clearest of foreign policy explanations, lest it descend into strategic opportunism, or at least appears to do so. U.S. material and spiritual resources are great, but not inexhaustible. They should not be expended casually in the pursuit of goals of only marginal national interest. Notwithstanding September 11 and its aftermath, the jury is out, and is likely to stay out awhile longer, on whether American society will tolerate the sheriff’s role as specified here, expect in contexts highly specific to obvious American interest. Those contexts may not include some which the world order will need a prudent sheriff to influence coercively (if not necessarily with force). The United States is not, and should not and cannot be, the world’s policeman vis a vis any and every disturbance. The actions of this American sheriff of order are guided frankly by a national interest discriminator. The U.S. President needs to know: what has happened (or plausibly might happen); whether it matters to the United States, and if so, how much; what, if anything, he can do about it; and what cost, of all kinds, are likely to attach to action, or inaction. If the United States does not serve itself through its peacemaking behavior, its career as sheriff will be brief indeed. Altruism has a thin record in strategic history and, we must assume, an unpromising future. That is just the way it is in world politics. However, if the United States seeks to serve only itself, and rides roughshod over the interests of others, again its career as functional sheriff will be brief. The world at large will discern scant reason to cooperate with the United States, if American statecraft is crassly applied strictly on behalf of narrowly American interests. At the level of principle, if not always in attempted application, some of the critics of American so called unilateralism are correct. The United States often is more powerful when it can act with others. This is not an invariable rule. By extension, when the sheriff departs the town he has cleansed, he wants to leave it in the hands of right-minded and hopefully capable citizens. One of the indispensable keys to success in this emerging era of American guardianship is for the maximum number of countries, and extra-national interests, to believe that the United States is protecting a world order in which they all have a vital, if sometimes differential, stake. People may resent the American sheriff, and naturally be residually suspicious of American motives. But they should be prepared to welcome American ordering activity which benefits all potential victims of disorder. Americans do not need to be loved. It is sufficient to be respected and, perhaps, appreciated for the self-assumed lawman role. The United States has an imperial history, of a sort, but has never acquired much of an imperial mindset. Commentators may discover new forms of imperialism to cover current American attitudes and behavior, and perhaps, but only perhaps, there is some small merit in the exercise. Americans are apt to view the world though missionary lenses. American is an idea, a civilization even (to stretch conceptual domain), rather than just another state. Globalization, beneath the hyperbole, is seen in America and elsewhere as equating approximately with Americanization. Whether or not, or to what extent, that is true is not a prime concern here. Instead, our gaze is fixed upon America’s role as chief protector, guardian, or sheriff of this new world with its globalizing flows of information, people, and goods. First and foremost, the United States is the agent of its own national interest, an interest that Washington, on a prudent day, judges vitally bound up with a particular idea of world order. The national interest discriminator to which reference has been made, allows a fairly reliable four-way categorization of issues. Issues can be of survival character: they can be vital: they can be major: or they can be “other.” Survival issues must be fought for. Vital interests should be defended forcefully. Major interests might possibly be protected militarily. “Other” interests should not attract the U.S. cavalry – unless, that is, the cost is believed to be extraordinarily low (but beware of the surprise that friction and chance in war may throw your way.) The political context, or perhaps the timing, may multiply the significance of matters that otherwise would be of little concern to Washington (e.g. almost anything in the Balkans). A useful approach to understanding the U.S. role as sheriff is by means of another four-way split. Given the contemporary, and at least short-term predictable, distribution of power (which admittedly is different in its political-military, economic, and cultural dimensions), the objectively desirable U.S. role typically is as plain as it is not yet acceptable politically to proclaim out loud. With respect to protecting the world order, my seconf four-way split, tied inalienably to the four-way national interest discriminator, is the following: There are problems that only the United States can address in hopes of achieving decisive success; there are problems that the United States should stand a reasonable prospect of meeting and at least alleviating; there are problems concerning which the United States should be expected to fare poorly; and finally, there are problems that the United States has absolutely no plausible prospect whatsoever of alleviating, let alone of resolving (e.g., resucuing and restoring certain failed states). It may be needless to add that in most cases the active support of some friends and allies will, on balance, be a significant, though rarely essential, benefit. The United States could pick up its military ball and go home. It could choose to rely for world order on the hidden hand of universal commercial self-interest somewhat guided by such regional and local balances and imbalances of power as may be extant or might emerge. In effect, frequently this would translate as a green light for regional bullies to mark out their territories (and sea space and air space). Thus far, the contemporary United States is showing no persuasive evidence of an inclination to bring itself home as a political military influence. The issue is not whether America’s skills in statescraft are fully adequate for the sheriff role (whose would be?). Rather, it is whether there is to be a sheriff at all. If the United States declines the honor, or takes early retirement, there is no deputy sheriff, waiting, trained and ready for promotion. Furthermore, there is no world-ordering mechanism worthy of the name which could substitute for the authority and strength of the American Superpower. At present there is no central axis of a balance of power to keep order, while the regional balances in the Middle East and South and East Asia are as likely to provoke as to cool conflict – and conflict with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) at that.

### And, History Can Only Prove Our Argument – Failure to Weaponize makes war inevitable – China will build weapons regardless of U.S. Actions – Don’t Believe the Hype Behind Benevolent Development of Space

Stakelbeck 2k7

(Fred Stakelbeck is a Senior Asia Fellow with Washington-based Center for Security Policy. He is an expert on the economic and national security implications for the U.S. of China's emerging regional and global strategic influence, pg online @ http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=38 //sdi-ef)

Reports last month that China had successfully tested an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon against one of its own antiquated weather satellites using a kinetic kill vehicle launched on board a ballistic missile raised the stakes in the ongoing battle between the U.S. and China **over space supremacy**. Indeed, the test proves China has taken another step in its quest to become a military power in space. Testing space weapons is nothing new. Both the U.S. and Soviet Union tested anti-satellite technology in the 1980’s, and the U.S. even shot down one of its orbiting satellites in 1985. But since that time, both countries have stopped testing altogether, believing that such actions jeopardize the commercial and scientific uses of space. In the recent Chinese test, experts noted that thousands of multiple-sized fragments were created from the satellite’s destruction, placing billions of dollars worth of sophisticated equipment at serious risk. As expected, international condemnation of the ASAT weapons test was both firm and swift, as India, Russia and Great Britain voiced their immediate disproval. Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) spokesman G. Madhavan Nair called the test “unethical.” Russian defense minister Sergei Ivanov said his country was against the “weaponization of space,” while the British raised the issue with Chinese officials almost immediately. In the U.S. Senate, the reaction was equally critical. Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ), the ranking Republican on the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, told a gathering at Washington’s Heritage Foundation that China’s destruction of an aging satellite with a ground-based ballistic missile was a “wake-up call” that should make the U.S. get serious about threats in space. **“China’s military doctrine and numerous writings make it clear the country does not believe space can or should be free of military capabilities,”** Kyl said. Making China’s anti-satellite test even more surprising was the fact that it **directly contradicts previous statements** made by the country’s leaders concerning the weaponization of space. In September 2005, Beijing warned that urgent attention was needed to protect against the weaponization of space, saying, “The international community should take effective preventive measures to negotiate and conclude relevant international legal instruments to prohibit deployment of weapons in outer space.” In May 2005, China’s foreign ministry spokesman Kong Quan told an audience, “Space is our shared treasure which should be used for the benefit of all mankind.” **But even as Beijing has called for the de-militarization of space, its defense community has continually included national security as one of the purposes served by its expanding space program**. The country’s latest defense paper sets ambitious goals for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and focuses on the need for “technological modernization.” The U.S. Department of Defense’s annual report on the “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China” released in 2005 recognized China’s militaristic space policy, noting, “China will eventually deploy advanced imagery, reconnaissance, and Earth resource systems with military applications.” The report went on to say, “China is working on, and plans to field, anti-satellite systems, including conducting research to develop ground-based laser anti-satellite weapons.” As recently as November, an independent panel, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, encouraged the Bush administration to initiate discussions with Beijing designed to curtail space militarization. This, only two months after reports surfaced in September of laser attacks by China against U.S. intelligence gathering satellites. Other intelligence reports claimed that the U.S. had detected “mini-Chinese satellites” placed in orbit near U.S. military communications and imaging satellites. In response to China’s latest ASAT weapons test, the Bush administration announced this month that it had suspended plans to develop space ventures with China. NASA spokesman Jason Sharp, said, “We believe China’s development and testing of such [ASAT] weapons is inconsistent with the constructive relationship that our presidents [Bush and Hu] have outlined, including civil space cooperation.” In the past, Washington has avoided sharing certain technical knowledge with Beijing and has objected to China’s growing role in the International Space Station (ISS), due to concerns that the communist regime would use the information to bolster its long-range ballistic missile forces. Prior to China’s laser and ASAT weapons tests, the Bush administration was preparing to introduce revisions to the existing National Space Policy to address increasing threats to the country’s critical satellite system. According to Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at the U.S. State Department, the new policy which was released in the fall, will, “Ensure that our space capabilities are protected in a time of increasing challenges and threats, due to the vital part they play in our national security and to our economic well-being.” Some experts have speculated that Chinese President Hu Jintao and his advisors did not fully understand the repercussions of their ASAT weapons test. “The decision process is still so opaque that maybe they didn’t know who to talk to. Maybe there was a disconnect between the engineers and policy makers,” noted Geoffrey Forden, an arms expert at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. But others disagree, noting Beijing was well aware of the dangers, but decided to ignore them instead. “The Chinese are telling the Pentagon that they don’t own space. We can play this game too, and we can play it dirtier than you,” noted Michael Krepon, president emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center. Beijing plans to make the game even “dirtier” in the future. The country’s leadership has announced that approximately 30 satellites will be launched in the coming years – 10 in 2007 alone - to create a Chinese Global Positioning System (GPS) called the Compass Navigation System. Since its inception, the system has been shrouded in secrecy. The new system, which will become fully operational next year for much of China, is expected to use the same radio frequency as Europe’s Galileo system and the U.S. GPS, making Western attempts to jam communications much more difficult. Ultimately, the Compass Navigation System could be used worldwide to provide precise positioning data for the Chinese military similar to information already produced by the U.S. GPS for military field commanders. China’s recent provocative activities will likely spur debate about putting U.S. interceptor missiles in space, the head of the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency, Air Force Lt. Gen. Henry Obering, said earlier this month. “We think it’s prudent, especially in light of the Chinese anti-satellite activities, to start that debate right now,” he said. Obering went on to say that the U.S. would be investing in a “good experimental foundation” that would add to the country’s existing sea and ground-based missile defenses. President Bush’s fiscal 2008 budget seeks an additional $10 million, slashed from an original $45 million, for studies on what could be the first space-based interceptor missiles, taking an important step toward making former President Ronald Reagan’s “Strategic Defense Initiative” or “Star Wars” a reality. Overall, President Bush has asked Congress for $8.9 billion in fiscal 2008 for the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, down $500 million from last year, the likely result of budgetary constraints associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the cost of its own military modernization program. Evaluating America’s recent conflict in Iraq, China’s communist leadership believes that a weaker military can defeat a superior force by attacking its space-based communications and surveillance systems, using powerful “lightning strikes” as a prerequisite for victory. A January 22, 2007 New York Times article noted that China has “extensively studied how the U.S. has used satellite imagery in the Persian Gulf War, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in tracking North Korea’s nuclear program.” Not since the October 4, 1957 launch of Russia’s Sputnik has the U.S. felt as threatened by another country’s space activities. At that time, America answered the challenge, developing the greatest space program on Earth. Now, China has thrown down the gauntlet. With advances in other areas such as submarine, aircraft and warship design, China has improved its extra-regional capabilities allowing it to extend its influence beyond the Taiwan Strait. Adding a space-based military capability will only make the country more dangerous to potential future adversaries such as the U.S. There is a storm gathering on the horizon. Russia admitted last year it had developed a revolutionary new missile that could evade any existing U.S. missile defense system. This month, Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has threatened to strike the U.S. and its global interests with ballistic missiles. North Korea continues to sell sophisticated missile technology to the highest bidder and has its own domestic ballistic missile program. This week, India announced it will soon fire a new missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads across much of Asia and the Middle East. **America’s enemies, as well as some of its perceived allies, are positioning themselves to attack the country’s Achilles heel – its reliance on space-based systems**. Successful asymmetrical warfare, not necessarily a frontal confrontation on the battlefield, will be the immediate goal of America’s growing list of enemies. However, as the U.S. becomes weakened by well-coordinated, intense and frequent attacks on its satellite and computer infrastructure, **the likelihood of a direct military confrontation with one or more of our enemies will grow.**

### And, China will go after our space weakness – a ‘Pearl Harbor in Space’ is Inevitable

Choong 2k9

(William, Senior Writer @ The Strait Times, articles appear in The International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Strait Times, “Reading too much into the stars?,” May 12, 2009, LexisNexis )

LAST month, China lofted a navigational satellite into the heavens. The Compass satellite will be part of the Beidou Navigation System of up to 30 'birds' that China will put into orbit by 2015. The launch highlights the massive strides that China has made since the early 1990s, when it witnessed how United States-led forces leveraged on space- based C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities during the first Gulf War. But it was only in recent years that China's space-based programme has really taken off. China's first manned space flight in 2003 carried just one astronaut; the second in 2005 bore two. Last year, it staged its first space walk. The most worrying aspect of China's space programme, however, is the anti-satellite (Asat) exercise it conducted in 2007, when it destroyed a defunct weather satellite with a missile. Analysts noted that China used the 'hit to kill' method - a technology that involves 'stopping a bullet with a bullet'. This meant that China's Asat capability had surpassed that of the former Soviet Union. Since then, there has been much talk - most of it American - of how China could raise the costs of American intervention in a conflict, say, over the Taiwan Strait. Earlier this year, for example, the Pentagon wrote in its annual report on the Chinese military that Beijing was developing capabilities to attack space assets of potential adversaries in a bid to 'blind and deafen the enemy'. According to Richard Fisher, the author of China's Military Modernization: Building For Regional And Global Reach, China has more than 1,500 ballistic and cruise missiles aimed at Taiwan. The newer missiles are more precise than the older ones, thanks to navigation satellite ('navsat') guidance. Dr Ashley Tellis, a China expert, goes further. China's pursuit of counter- space capabilities is part of a 'considered strategy designed to counter the overall military capability of the US'. China's space programme is an asymmetric strategy aimed at America's 'soft ribs' in space. In other words, China could carry out a 'space Pearl Harbour'. Many of these 'China threat' arguments can be supported empirically. Mao Zedong used asymmetrical warfare to overwhelm stronger opponents. And China's much-vaunted strategy of 'active defence', argue some, is actually an insidious strategy of using offence in the name of defence. Think of China's wars with India and the former Soviet Union in 1962 and 1969 respectively.

### U.S. China War Esacalates and Causes Extinction

**Cheong 2k**

(Ching, , Senior Writer @ the Strait Times, Senior Writer at the Strait Times, “No one gains in a war over Taiwan,” 6/25, pg Lexis)

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China, 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilization.

## 1AC Terrorism Advantage

### Observation Two: Terrorism

### First, New attempts at Terrorist Acquisition of Nuclear and Biological Weapons are inevitable

Mowatt-Larssen 2k10

(Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, former Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, U.S. Department of Energy, former Chief of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Department, Counter-terrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency, recipient of the CIA Director’s Award, graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, “Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?” January 2010, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/al-qaeda-wmd-threat.pdf)

Osama bin Ladin’s assertion in 1998 that it was his Islamic duty to acquire weapons of mass destruction **ensured that the fulfillment of this intent would become a top priority for his lieutenants** in the ensuing years. In an effort to explain his thinking to his followers, and to help guide their efforts, the al Qaeda leader has offered a number of statements that provide a need and rationale for using weapons of mass destruction as a means of achieving the group’s concrete and ambitious goals. Most recently, he promised in a 2007 video release to “escalate the killing and fighting against you (Americans)”–on grounds of destroying an international conspiracy to control the world–adding, “The capitalist system seeks to turn the entire world into a fiefdom of the major corporations under the label of globalization in order to protect democracy.” These statements should not be interpreted as empty rhetoric and idle threats: Osama bin Ladin has signaled a specific purpose for using WMD in al Qaeda’s quest to destroy the global status quo, and to create conditions more conducive to the overthrow of apostate regimes throughout the Islamic world. His argument is essentially that even weapons of mass destruction—which are outlawed under Islam—are a justifiable means of countering US hegemony. Osama bin Ladin’s morality-based argument on the nature of the struggle between militant Islamists and the US-led coalition of secular forces focuses the group’s planning on the acquisition of strategic weapons that can be used in mass casualty attacks, rather than on the production of tactical, more readily available weapons such as “dirty bombs,” chemical agents, crude toxins and poisons. In this light, **it is not surprising that the group’s top WMD priority has been to acquire nuclear and strategic biological weapons**. Considering the potential that such weapons hold in fulfilling al Qaeda’s aspirations, their WMD procurement efforts have been managed at the most senior levels, under rules of strict compartmentalization from lower levels of the organization, and with central control over possible targets and timing of prospective attacks. In this sense, their approach has been “Muhammed Atta-like”—similar to the modus operandi Khaled Sheikh Mohammed employed in making preparations for the 9/11 attacks—as opposed to resembling the signature characterizing most terrorist attacks to which the world has become accustomed. Al Qaeda’s patient, decade-long effort to steal or construct an improvised nuclear device (IND) flows from their perception of the benefits of producing the image of a mushroom cloud rising over a US city, just as the 9/11 attacks have altered the course of history. This lofty aim helps explains why al Qaeda has consistently sought a bomb capable of producing a nuclear yield, as opposed to settling for the more expedient and realistic course of devising a “dirty bomb,” or a radiological dispersal device. Another 9/11-scale operational plot managed by the al Qaeda core leadership was the development of anthrax for use in a mass casualty attack in the United States. The sophisticated anthrax project was run personally by al Qaeda deputy chief Ayman Zawahiri, in parallel to the group’s efforts to acquire a nuclear capability; anthrax was probably meant to serve as another means to achieve the same effect as using a nuclear bomb, given doubts that a nuclear option could be successfully procured. Notably, al Qaeda’s efforts to acquire a nuclear and biological weapons capability were concentrated in the years preceding September 11, 2001. Based on the timing and nature of their WMD-related activity in the 1990’s, al Qaeda probably anticipated using these means of mass destruction against targets in the US homeland in the intensified campaign they knew would follow the 9/11 attack. There is no indication that the fundamental objectives that lie behind their WMD intent have changed over time. On the other hand, the pursuit of crude toxins and poisons appears to have been of little interest to the al Qaeda leadership, even though the production of such weapons is easier and thus might seem more attractive for potential use in attacks. Although experimentation and training in crude chemical agents and pathogens was standard fare in al Qaeda’s camps in Afghanistan before 9/11, their use in attacks appears to have been left to the initiative of individual cells and planners outside the direct supervision of the al Qaeda core leadership. Prominent examples of small-scale chemical- and biological- related activity include Midhat al-Mursi’s (aka Abu Khabab) basic training for operatives in the al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan before 9/11; the Abu Musab al Zarqawi network’s plotting to use ricin and cyanide in multiple attacks planned in Europe in late 2002-early 2003; and a Bahraini terrorist cell’s plot to use a crude cyanide gas device called the “mobtaker” (an Arabic word roughly meaning “invention”) in an attack on the New York City subway in the same time frame. In each of these cases, the evidence suggests that the al Qaeda senior leadership was not directly involved or apparently even aware of attack preparations until late stages of planning. Moreover, there is no evidence that the al Qaeda leadership regarded the use of crude toxins and poisons as being suitable for conducting what would amount to pin prick attacks on the United States; on the contrary, Zawahiri canceled the planned attack on the New York City subway for “something better,” suggesting that a relatively easy attack utilizing tactical weapons would not achieve the goals the al Qaeda leadership had set for themselves. So, why hasn’t a terrorist WMD attack happened since 9/11? There are many plausible explanations for why the world has not experienced an al Qaeda attack using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons, **but it would be foolish to discount the possibility that such an event will occur in the future.** To date, al Qaeda’s WMD programs may have been disrupted. This is in fact one likely explanation, given a sustained and ferocious counterterrorist response to 9/11 that largely destroyed al Qaeda as the organization that existed before the fateful attack on the US. If so, **terrorists must continue to be disrupted and denied a safe haven to reestablish the ability to launch a major strike on the US homeland, or elsewhere in the world.** Or perhaps, al Qaeda operational planners have failed to acquire the kind of weapons they seek, because they are unwilling to settle for anything other than a large scale attack in the US. It would surely be hard for al Qaeda to lower the bar they set on 9/11: what would constitute a worthy follow-up to 9/11, on their terms? What would they achieve through another attack? There are few weapons that would meet their expectations in this regard. It is extremely difficult to acquire a functioning nuclear bomb, or to steal enough weapons usable material to build a bomb. And as al Qaeda probably learned in trying to weaponize anthrax, biological pathogens may seem simple enough to produce, but such weapons are not easy to bottle up and control. To complicate matters further, an attack on the scale of 9/11 is more difficult to accomplish in an environment of heightened security and vigilance in the US. But if Osama bin Ladin and his lieutenants had been interested in employing crude chemical, biological and radiological materials in small scale attacks, there is little doubt they could have done so by now. However, events have shown that the al Qaeda leadership does not choose weapons based on how easy they are to acquire and use, be they conventional or unconventional weapons. They choose them based on the best means of destroying the specific targets that they have in mind. Al Qaeda’s reasoning thus runs counter to analytic convention that equates the ease of acquisition of chemical, biological or radiological weapons with an increasing likelihood of terrorist use—i.e., a terrorist attack employing crude weapons is therefore more likely than an attack using a nuclear or large scale biological weapon. **In fact, it is the opposite**: If perpetrating a large-scale attack serves as al Qaeda’s motivation for possessing WMD, not deterrence value, then the greatest threat is posed by the most effective and simple means of mass destruction, whether these means consist of nuclear, biological, or other forms of asymmetric weapons. An examination of the 9/11 attack sheds light on al Qaeda’s reasoning behind the selection of specific weapons, and how that may apply to the role WMD plays in their thinking. Al Qaeda opted to pursue a highly complex and artfully choreographed plot to strike multiple targets requiring the simultaneous hijacking of several 747 jumbo passenger aircraft, because using airplanes as weapons offered the best means of attacking the targets they intended to destroy. If conventional wisdom on assessing WMD terrorism threats had been applied to considering the likelihood of the 9/11 plot, analysts may well have concluded it never would have happened; at the time, it was simply hard to believe any terrorist group could pull off such an elaborate plot utilizing novel, unpredictable weapons that were so difficult to acquire. Yet, WMD terrorism skeptics abound, and for understandable reasons. There is widespread suspicion in America and abroad that WMD terrorism is another phony threat being hyped for political purposes, and to stoke fears among the public. It is difficult to debunk this allegation, given the US government’s lack of credibility in the case of Iraqi WMD. That said, WMD terrorism is not Iraqi WMD. The case that the WMD terrorism threat is real bears no association with the Iraqi intelligence failure whatsoever, in terms of the reliability of the sources of intelligence, the quality of the information that has been collected, and the weight of the evidence that lies at the heart of our understanding of the threat. If anything, the biases in WMD terrorism analysis tilt towards treating the absence of information as an absence of threat; this could become a vulnerability in the defenses, considering the very real possibility that there may be a terrorist plot in motion that has not been found.

### And, Top Experts Agree – a Nuclear terror attack is inevitable by 2013

Allison 1/25/2K10

(Graham,Professor of Government and Director of the Belfer Center for Science and Int’l Affairs @ Harvard, “A Failure to Imagine the Worst,” Foreign Policy, <http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/node/5591> )

In his first speech to the U.N. Security Council, U.S. President Barack Obama challenged members to think about the impact of a single nuclear bomb. He said: "Just one nuclear weapon exploded in a city -- be it New York or Moscow, Tokyo or Beijing, London or Paris -- could kill hundreds of thousands of people." The consequences, he noted, would "destabilize our security, our economies, and our very way of life." Before the Sept. 11, 2001, assault on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, who could have imagined that terrorists would mount an attack on the American homeland that would kill more citizens than Japan did at Pearl Harbor? As then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice testified to the 9/11 Commission: "No one could have imagined them taking a plane, slamming it into the Pentagon ... into the World Trade Center, using planes as missiles." For most Americans, the idea of international terrorists conducting a successful attack on their homeland, killing thousands of citizens, was not just unlikely. It was inconceivable. As is now evident, assertions about what is "imaginable" or "conceivable," however, are propositions about our minds, not about what is objectively possible. Prior to 9/11, how unlikely was a megaterrorist attack on the American homeland? In the previous decade, al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993, U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and the USS Cole in 2000 had together killed almost 250 and injured nearly 6,000. Moreover, the organization was actively training thousands of recruits in camps in Afghanistan for future terrorist operations. Thinking about risks we face today, we should reflect on the major conclusion of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission established to investigate that catastrophe. The U.S. national security establishment's principal failure prior to Sept. 11, 2001, was, the commission found, a "failure of imagination." Summarized in a single sentence, the question now is: Are we at risk of an equivalent failure to imagine a nuclear 9/11? After the recent attempted terrorist attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253, this question is more urgent than ever. The thought that terrorists could successfully explode a nuclear bomb in an American city killing hundreds of thousands of people seems incomprehensible. This essential incredulity is rooted in three deeply ingrained presumptions. First, no one could seriously intend to kill hundreds of thousands of people in a single attack. Second, only states are capable of mass destruction; nonstate actors would be unable to build or use nuclear weapons. Third, terrorists would not be able to deliver a nuclear bomb to an American city. In a nutshell, these presumptions lead to the conclusion: inconceivable. Why then does Obama call nuclear terrorism "the single most important national security threat that we face" and "a threat that rises above all others in urgency?" Why the unanimity among those who have shouldered responsibility for U.S. national security in recent years that this is a grave and present danger? In former CIA Director George Tenet's assessment, "the main threat is the nuclear one. I am convinced that this is where [Osama bin Laden] and his operatives desperately want to go." When asked recently what keeps him awake at night, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates answered: "It's the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear." Leaders who have reached this conclusion about the genuine urgency of the nuclear terrorist threat are not unaware of their skeptics' presumptions. Rather, they have examined the evidence, much of which has been painstakingly compiled here by Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, former head of the CIA's terrorism and weapons-of-mass-destruction efforts, and much of which remains classified. Specifically, who is seriously motivated to kill hundreds of thousands of Americans? Osama bin Laden, who has declared his intention to kill "4 million Americans -- including 2 million children." The deeply held belief that even if they wanted to, "men in caves can't do this" was then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's view when Tenet flew to Islamabad to see him after 9/11. As Tenet (assisted by Mowatt-Larssen) took him step by step through the evidence, he discovered that indeed they could. Terrorists' opportunities to bring a bomb into the United States follow the same trails along which 275 tons of drugs and 3 million people crossed U.S. borders illegally last year. In 2007, Congress established a successor to the 9/11 Commission to focus on terrorism using weapons of mass destruction. This bipartisan Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism issued its report to Congress and the Obama administration in December 2008. In the commission's unanimous judgment: "it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013." Faced with the possibility of an American Hiroshima, many Americans are paralyzed by a combination of denial and fatalism. Either it hasn't happened, so it's not going to happen; or, if it is going to happen, there's nothing we can do to stop it. Both propositions are wrong. The countdown to a nuclear 9/11 can be stopped, but only by realistic recognition of the threat, a clear agenda for action, and relentless determination to pursue it.

### And, Bin Laden’s Death Didn’t Matter – al-Zawahri took over and new attacks are STILL inevitable

Army Times 5/2

### (“Egypt’s al-Zawahri likely to succeed bin Laden,” pg online @ <http://www.armytimes.com/news/2011/05/ap-zawahri-likely-to-succeed-bin-laden-050211/> //ef)

CAIRO — For years, Osama bin Laden’s charisma kept al-Qaida’s ranks filled with zealous recruits. But it was the strategic thinking and the organizational skills of his Egyptian right hand man that kept the terror network together after the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and pushed al-Qaida out. With Bin Laden killed, Ayman al-Zawahri becomes the top candidate for the world’s top terror job. It’s too early to tell how exactly al-Qaida would change with its founder and supreme mentor gone, but **the group under al-Zawahri would likely be further radicalized, unleashing a new wave of attacks to avenge bin Laden’s killing by U.S. troops in Pakistan** on Sunday to send a message that it’s business as usual. Al-Zawahri’s extremist views and his readiness to use deadly violence are beyond doubt. In a 2001 treatise, “Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner,” he set down the long-term strategy for the jihadi movement — to inflict “as many casualties as possible” on the Americans, while trying to establish control in a nation as a base “to launch the battle to restore the holy caliphate” of Islamic rule across the Muslim world. Unlike bin Laden, who found his jihadist calling as an adult, al-Zawahri’s activism began when he was in his mid-teens, establishing his first secret cell of high school students to oppose the Egyptian government of then-President Anwar Sadat. The doors of jihad opened for him when, as a young doctor, a visitor came to him with an offer to travel to Afghanistan to treat Islamic fighters battling Soviet forces. His 1980 trip to the Afghan war zone — only a few months long but the first of many — opened his eyes to a whole new world of possibilities. What he saw there, he was to write 20 years later, was “the training course preparing Muslim mujahideen youth to launch their upcoming battle with the great power that would rule the world: America.” The bond between al-Zawahri and bin Laden began in the late 1980s, when al-Zawahri reportedly treated the Saudi millionaire-turned-jihadist in the caves of Afghanistan as Soviet bombardment shook the mountains around them. The friendship laid the foundation for the al-Qaida terror network, which carried out the Sept. 11, 2001 suicide airplane hijackings that sparked the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan later that year. The attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon made bin Laden Enemy No. 1 to the United States. But he likely could never have carried it out without al-Zawahri. Bin Laden provided al-Qaida with the charisma and money, but al-Zawahri brought the ideological fire, tactics and organizational skills needed to forge disparate militants into a network of cells in countries around the world. “Al-Zawahri was always bin Laden’s mentor, bin Laden always looked up to him,” says terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman of Georgetown University. While bin Laden came from a privileged background in a prominent Saudi family of Yemeni decent, al-Zawahri had the experience of a revolutionary in the trenches. “He spent time in an Egyptian prison, he was tortured. He was a jihadi from the time he was a teenager, he has been fighting his whole life and that has shaped his world view,” Hoffman says. Perhaps even more significant than al-Zawahri’s role before the Sept. 11 attacks was his task afterward, when the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan demolished al-Qaida’s safe haven and scattered, killed and captured its fighters and leaders. The blow was personal as well — al-Zawahri’s wife and at least two of their six children were killed in a U.S. airstrike in the southern Afghan city of Kandahar. Al-Zawahri ensured al-Qaida’s survival, rebuilding al-Qaida’s leadership in the Afghan-Pakistan border region and installing his allies as new lieutenants in key positions. Since then, the network inspired or had a direct hand in attacks in North Africa, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Pakistan, the 2004 train bombings in Madrid and the 2005 transit bombings in London. Meanwhile, al-Zawahri — with his thick beard, heavy-rimmed glasses and the prominent mark on his forehead from prostration in prayer — became the new face of al-Qaida, churning out Web videos and audiotapes while bin Laden faded from public view for long stretches

### And, Even unsuccessful terrorism causes extinction

Sid-Ahmed '04

[Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, a political analyst for the 'Al-Ahram' newspaper, 9/1/2004, "Extinction", pg. online @ http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm// ]

The advent of the nuclear age, which began when America dropped two atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagazaki just before the end of World War II, introducedan altogether new dimension to the arms race worldwide. In fact, it changed the very notion of warfare as the realisation set in that humankind now had the means to turn the planet into a wasteland **incapable of sustaining life**. **For the first time in its long history, the human race was at risk of extinction** not through an act of nature but by its own hand.At the same time, however, the emergence of a new world order in the aftermath of the war served to prevent the risk from materialising even as it lent impetus to a deadly arms-race of the summit of the global community. The post-war world had become sharply polarised along ideological lines between a capitalist pole led by the United States and a communist pole led by the Soviet Union. As each sought to assert its supremacy over the other, the world was held hostage by an arms race between two camps capable of exterminating the inhabitants of the planet not once but several times over.Although one of the two poles developed a greater overkill capability than the other, this hardly mattered. After all, you can only die once. Thus despite this discrepancy the two poles enjoyed a kind of parity which prevented the Cold War between them from hotting up into an armed conflict. Mutual deterrence or, more precisely, mutual neutralisation, proved to be the most effective way of preventing the outbreak of what would have been the third, and probably final, world war.With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the bipolar world order that had prevailed since the end of World War II came to an end. America, with its military and economic pre-eminence over all other nations combined, was now the sole remaining superpower, without any constraints on its freedom of manouevre. This created an imbalance in the world system and tempted the US administration to pursue its own agenda without regard to considerations of international law, state sovereignty or international public opinion. To give its exercise of brute force a semblance of legality, it came up with its doctrine of pre-emptive wars, like the one it launched against Iraq. It is becoming increasingly clear that the onset of a unipolar world system has made the world more dangerous place, not the opposite.The most critical moment was the one when the Soviet Union collapsed and fragmented into a number of independent republics. The lack of a central authority in a vast nation with massive arsenals of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction raised the nightmare prospect of those weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible parties who would not hesitate to use them.Despite the acute contradiction on which it was based, the bipolar world order was an international system in which nations could be in a state of conflict but where they were also members of the United Nations, related to each other via agreements, accords, treaties, etc.. that is, through a system of mutual obligations, which restricted, to one extent or another, their freedom of action. The disappearance of the Soviet Union left the field clear not only to the United States at the summit of the global community but to the forces of international terrorism at its base. **These forces are waging a war on the international system unbound by any constraints.** It is a war waged by "irresponsible" groups who do not expose themselves to the accountability of the world system, nor to transparency in any form. That is why terrorism is so difficult to cast light on **and can represent a greater danger than wars waged by regular armies**.During the Cold War, the overkill capabilities developed by the superpowers allowed them to use deterrence as a device to prevent nuclear conflagration; there was a tacit agreement between them that while they could, and did, engage in brinkmanship by threatening to use their weapons of mass destruction, they would desist from actually doing so. In the absence of any kind of parity between the protagonists in today's shadowy war on terror, mutual deterrence has been replaced by a process of pre-emption that incites the enemy to take anticipatory measures.The devastating attack of 11 September 2001, which claimed nearly 3,000 victims, is a case in point. What provoked the attack? Why that particular type of anticipatory blow? Is there an explanation for the sequence of events that began with raids against two US embassies in Africa, followed by the attack on an American destroyer close to Aden and climaxed with 9/11? It was a practice run for an even more devastating attack involving nuclear weapons. But if Osama Bin Laden was in possession of nuclear weapons at the time, why did he choose to go for an intricate plan entailing the hijacking of four passenger planes, tight synchronisation and split-second timing? Surely triggering a nuclear device would have been easier. Settling for the low-tech alternative of turning planes into missiles indicates that Bin Laden was not then in possession of nuclear weapons. Actually, the idea of linking terrorism to prohibited weapons of mass destruction came from Bush, not from the terrorists themselves, and was aimed at establishing some sort of link between Iraq and terrorism to legitimise his war against Saddam Hussein.**We have reached a point in human history where the phenomenon of terrorism has to be completely uprooted**, not through persecution and oppression, but by removing the reasons that make particular sections of the world population resort to terrorism. This means that fundamental changes must be brought to the world system itself. The phenomenon of terrorism is even more dangerous than is generally believed. We are in for surprises no less serious than 9/11 and with far more devastating consequences.A nuclear attack by terrorists will be much more critical than Hiroshima and Nagazaki,even if -- and this is far from certain -- the weapons used are less harmful than those used then, Japan, at the time, with no knowledge of nuclear technology, had no choice but to capitulate.Today, the technology is a secret for nobody.So far, except for the two bombs dropped on Japan, nuclear weapons have been used only to threaten. Now we are at a stage where they can be detonated. This completely changes the rules of the game. We have reached a point where anticipatory measures can determine the course of events. Allegations of a terrorist connection can be used to justify anticipatory measures, including the invasion of a sovereign state like Iraq. As it turned out, these allegations, as well as the allegation that Saddam was harbouring WMD, proved to be unfounded.What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive.But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. **This could lead to a third world war**, **from which no one will emerge victorious**. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, **this war will be without winners and losers**. **When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers**.

### And, Bioweapons cause extinction

Ochs 2k2

(Richard Ochs, , former president of the Aberdeen Proving Ground Superfund Citizens Coalition, member of the Depleted Uranium Task force of the Military Toxics Project, member of the Chemical Weapons Working Group June 9, 2002, “Biological Weapons Must Be Abolished Immediately,” http://www.freefromterror.net/other\_articles/abolish.html)

Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger **to the continued survival of life on earth**. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a “nuclear winter,” resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE. Ironically, the Bush administration has just changed the U.S. nuclear doctrine to allow nuclear retaliation against threats upon allies by conventional weapons. The past doctrine allowed such use only as a last resort when our nation’s survival was at stake. Will the new policy also allow easier use of US bioweapons? How slippery is this slope?

### Fortunately, Space weapons are key to prevent nuclear and bioterrorism and accidental launch – they allow precise and immediate retaliation

Dolman and Cooper 2k11

(Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, and Henry, PhD and Former Deputy for the Strategic and Space Systems, “Chapter 19: Increasing the Military Uses of Space,” <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf> )

Weapons in space could provide the global security needed to disrupt and counter small groups of terrorists wherever they operate, **at the very moment they are identified**. Currently, UAVs, dependent on space support for operations, fly persistent missions above areas of suspected terrorist activity in Iraq, providing real-time intelligence and, in some cases, onboard weapons to support ground forces in a specific area. Tactical units are informed of approaching hostiles, and due to all-weather and multi-spectral imaging systems, both friendly (Blue Force) and enemy tracking can occur throughout engagement operations. When ground troops are unable to respond to threatening situations beyond their line of sight or are unable to catch fleeing hostiles, armed UAVs can engage those threats. The other option in a large-scale counterterror operation is to bring **in an overwhelming number of troops**, enough to create a line across the entire country that can move forward, rousting and checking every shack and hovel, every tree and ditch, with enough Soldiers in reserve to prevent enemy combatants from re-infiltrating the previously checked zones. America could in this manner combat low-tech terrorism with low-tech mass military maneuvers, perhaps at a cost savings over an effective space-based surveillance and engagement capability (if one does not count the value of a Soldier's life), but we do not think dollar value is the overriding consideration in this situation. Terrorism in the form of limited, low-technology attacks is the most likely direct threat against America and its allies today, and space support is enabling the most sophisticated response ever seen. All-source intelligence has foiled dozens of attacks by al Qaeda and its associates. But what of the most dangerous threats today? Weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear but also chemical and biological ones, could be delivered in a variety of means vulnerable to interception if knowledge of their location is achieved in time for counteroperations to be effective**. In situations where there is no defense available**, or the need for one has not been anticipated, then time is the most precious commodity. **A limited strike capability from space would allow for the engagement of the highest threat and the most fleeting targets wherever they presented themselves on the globe, regardless of the intention of the perpetrator**. The case of a ballistic missile carrying nuclear warheads is exemplary. Two decades ago, the most dangerous threat facing America (and the world) was a massive exchange of nuclear warheads that could destroy all life on the planet. Since a perfect defense was not achievable, negotiators agreed to no defense at all, on the assumption that reasonable leaders would restrain themselves from global catastrophe. Today, a massive exchange is less likely than at any period of the Cold War, in part because of significant reductions in the primary nations' nuclear arsenals. The most likely and most dangerous threat comes from a single or limited missile launch, and from sources that are unlikely to be either rational or predictable. The first is an accidental launch, a threat we avoided making protections against due to the potentially destabilizing effect on the precarious Cold War balance. That an accidental launch, by definition undeterrable, would today hit its target is almost incomprehensible. More likely than an accidental launch is the intentional launch of one or a few missiles, either by a nonstate actor (a terrorist or "rogue boat captain" as the scenario was described in the early 1980s) or a rogue state attempting to maximize damage as a prelude to broader conflict. This is especially likely in the underdeveloped theories pertaining to deterring third-party states. The United States can do nothing today to prevent India from launching a nuclear attack against Pakistan (or vice versa) except threaten retaliation. If Iran should launch a nuclear missile at Israel, or in a preemptory strike Israel should attempt the reverse, America and the world could only sit back and watch, hoping that a potentially world-destroying conflict did not spin out of control. When President Reagan announced his desire for a missile shield in 1983, critics pointed out that even if a 99-percent-reliable defense from space could be achieved, a 10,000warhead salvo by the Soviet Union still allowed for the detonation of 100 nuclear bombs in American cities—and both we and the Soviets had enough missiles to make such an attack plausible. But if a single missile were launched out of the blue from deep within the Asian landmass today, for whatever reason, a space-based missile defense system with 99-percent reliability would be a godsend. And if a U.S. space defense could intercept a single Scud missile launched by terrorists from a ship near America's coasts before it detonated a nuclear warhead 100 miles up—creating an electromagnetic pulse that shuts down America's powergrid, halts America's banking and commerce, and reduces the battlefield for America's military to third world status8—**it might provide for the very survival of our way of life.**

## 1AC Solvency

### Observation Three Solvency –

### The Plan Locks-in U.S. Hegemony and ENDS all war and Terrorism – We Solve Every Impact to your Disad

Dolman 2k3

(Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award“SPACE WEAPONS Are They Needed?” pg online @ <http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/assets/docs/Security_Space_Volume.Final.pdf> //sdi-ef)

A Simple Space Weaponization Policy By using its current and near-term capacities, the United States should endeavor at once to seize military control of low-earth orbit. From that high ground vantage, near the top of the Earth’s gravity well, space-based laser or kinetic energy weapons **could prevent any other state from deploying assets there**, and could most effectively engage and destroy terrestrial enemy ASAT facilities. Other states should still be able to enter space relatively freely for the purpose of engaging in commerce, in keeping with the capitalist principles of the new regime. Just as in the sea dominance eras of the Athenians and British before them, the military space forces of the United States would have to create and maintain a safe operating environment (from pirates and other interlopers, perhaps from debris) to enhance trade and exploration. Only those spacecraft that provide advance notice of their mission and flight plan would be permitted in space, however. The military control of lowEarth orbit would be for all practical purposes a police blockade of all current spaceports, monitoring and controlling all traffic both in and out. The United States would concurrently have to announce the policy that it will tolerate no launch of a missile (cruise or ballistic), no cross-border incursion of aircraft, no hostile and illegal position of unwanted naval forces within the twelve-mile limit of national territory. Any transgressions anywhere in the world would be stopped, **immediately by force from space.** States will complain that their sovereignty has been infringed, but the United States will be on the highest moral ground. Under no condition can a state initiate cross-border violence, and therefore no state can credibly claim that it is defending itself. Thus the complaints of the state whose forces have been dispatched by space weapons **will ring hollow**. Yes, perhaps the United States had no international right to shoot down the nuclear or chemically tipped missile launched at a traditional adversary, but the launching state will have a hard time justifying its prior right to start such a war. Over time, and this is the key factor to make such a policy work for international stability and peace (which are at least intervening factors in the rise of global prosperity), the United States must rigidly enforce this policy without discrimination. It must not make any terrestrial military incursions of its own. It must act decisively and openly, and completely without bias. There will be cries of dismay that the United States is acting as an empire, but since the only limitations made on another state’s rights are on those to make war, eventually the loudest outbursts will ebb. People will get used to having American weapons flying overhead. They won’t like it, to be sure, but it will seem a waste of time to protest something that has brought so much good to the world. States will begin to cut back on traditional military forces, as they are less useful in a world where they cannot be used offensively, and unnecessary so long as the United States can guarantee state borders. And so it would. **Complete domination of space would give the U**nited **S**tates **such an advantage on the terrestrial battlefield that no state could openly challenge it**. ***Traditional war would be effectively over.*** An idealist vision would be secured by realist means. Strategic dominance of space would further force the United States to maintain the industrial and technical capacity to keep it at the forefront of hegemony for the foreseeable future. Nontraditional war, especially terrorism, would not be over, but it could very well be mitigated.42 The current dominant use of space for military matters is in the areas of observation and monitoring. These are the tools of effective police organizations, and have already been adapted in counter-terrorism plans. The details would be worked out in time, but the strategy clearly has benefits for the United States and the world.

### And, ONLY Space weapons can solve – they allow lightening strikes that destroy enemy WMDs and terrorist bases

Lambakis 2001

(Steven, Ph.D in Int’l Politics, National security and international analyst specializing in space power and policy studies, Specialist at National Insitute for Public Policy, On the Edge of the Earth, Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2001, 98)

Space weapons might facilitate lightening strikes against WMD storage and production facilities and associated launch platforms **and wreak havoc against the bases of terrorism**. Indeed, most military targets-fIxed or mobile, land-based, sea-based, or even airborne and orbiting-would be held at risk by space weapons. Space-based weapons may be one means available to future defense planners to defeat "hard and deeply buried targets," a mission directed in the 1999 Defense ~ Planning Guidance.83 In light of these advantages, the Defense Science Board has recommended initiation of a demonstration program to show the feasibility of highly precise, hypervelocity reentry of long slender and short rods made of heavy material into the atmosphere from space.84 These guided or unguided weapons may be launched from space planes or satellites.85 To be sure, questions surrounding the utility and advantages of space strike weapons to U.S. national security deserve extensive analysis to determine the full range of political, diplomatic, military, and economic implications associated with their deployment.

### And, Weaponization ends war and terrorism forever- You cant beat what you cant see

Yoshida 2k3

(Adam, Director of the British Colombia Freedom Institute, Author of The Nothern Abyss, Noted Political Commentator, Columnist for the Greenwich Village Gazette, 2003, Oct 10th, “Red China Shooting for the Moon”, Freedom Institute Magazine, http://www.adamyoshida.com/2003\_10\_01\_archive.html //ef)

**Ceding military control of space to China would end Americas status as a Superpower and create an entirely new world order.** **An American seizure of space would make permanent American hegemony**. The development of an advanced system of space-based weapons, along with a powerful support structure, would elevate America from being, by far, the most militarily powerful nation in the history of the world to being, to put it simply, ***militarily invincible.*** How do you fight an enemy who can, moments after you attack, zero in on your home and pulverize it with a rock dropped from orbit? How do you fight an enemy whose forces have sophisticated equipment which allows them to track their own position, uncover yours, and call in precise fire upon you? How do you fight an enemy whose bombers can be over your capital minutes after the decision to go to war is taken, who can drop precision weapons on all of your high value targets, and who possesses weapons which will destroy every modern electronic within a radius of miles? The answer is simple: you can’t. Certainly, people would still be capable of launching terrorist attacks on the Earth- but retaliation would be swifter and more brutal. Moreover, under the threat of orbital bombardment, many earth-based polities would have a strong incentive to cease playing games with terrorists. **The era of conventional military conflicts on the Earth would, more or less, be over**. Once one power has space and is resolved to keep it, no other power will be able to easily break through the bottleneck. Assuming that America’s leadership retains its resolve, American domination of space would become a permanent feature of world affairs.

# Terrorism Extensions

## CBW Risk High

### And, New Al-Qaeda CBW Programs are underway – risk is high

Ulda 2k11

(Bob Uda, PhD (ABD), UPI, “WMD Threat al-Qaeda Poses to the U.S. - Part 3 of 3,” pg online @ <http://beforeitsnews.com/story/442/893/WMD_Threat_al-Qaeda_Poses_to_the_U.S._-_Part_3_of_3.html> //ef)

Threat Potential. According to Dr. Ganor, his C&R vs. B&N reasoning stems from a terrorism formula relating motivation (M) and operational capability (C). To Dr. Ganor, determining a terrorist group’s threat potential (TP) is the combined effect of their motivation and their operational capability. To this formula, one can add that a terrorist group’s threat potential is the product of its motivation and its ability to acquire the elements necessary in order to reach operational capability, or TP = M x C. This formula focuses on lowering motivation or lowering capability. Lowering one option is sufficient for success. The ultimate solution is to lower both options (i.e., M and C) simultaneously and continuously. The emphasis should be on lowering a terrorist group’s offensive capability despite the chance that this may raise their motivation to retaliate. Dr. Ganor refers to this phenomenon as the boomerang effect of terrorism, i.e., when one parameter decreases, the other parameter increases and vice versa (Sinai, 2007). Al-Qaeda Bomb Maker. A dangerous al-Qaeda bomb-maker, whom the Pakistan military reported was killed two years ago, is in fact alive and well and working to develop chemical, biological, and radiological weapons—and perhaps nuclear weapons as well. That’s the chilling word from Beirut-based Ed Blanche, who writes in The Middle East magazine that Egyptian-born chemical engineer Midhat Mursi al Sayyid Umar—known as Osama bin Laden’s “sorcerer”—is working in secret laboratories in Pakistan’s northwestern tribal area (Anonymous, 2008). The Pakistani military claimed that in January 2006, Mursi was one of several senior al-Qaeda figures killed by missiles fired from a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Predator. At the time, he was at a clandestine gathering in a village near the Afghan border. United States intelligence officials were skeptical. Now, even the Pakistani intelligence chiefs admit that he’s still alive—with a $5 million U.S. bounty on his head (Anonymous, 2008). United States officials have also learned that Mursi is working to manufacture cyanide, chlorine, and other lethal poisons. He has helped revive the al-Qaeda chemical and biological weapons (CBW) program that was disrupted by the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Former CIA analyst Chris Quillen stated earlier in 2008 that Mursi and his associates may have made progress in their hideouts in Pakistan’s tribal region. American officials have warned that al-Qaeda is seeking to produce botulism toxin, smallpox, plague, or Ebola (Anonymous, 2008).

## Risk of Terrorism High

### Retaliation increases the odds of terrorism now more than ever

Reuters, 5-2-2011

(<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/02/us-binladen-reaction-idUSTRE7413DA20110502> )

Euphoria over the killing of September 11 mastermind Osama bin Laden was tempered in the West Monday by fears of retaliation, and world leaders and security experts urged renewed vigilance against attacks. Americans celebrated on the streets and U.S. markets rallied on hopes bin Laden's death could ease the threats hanging over much of the developed world -- but even President Barack Obama said that terrorist attacks would continue to be a concern. France's President Nicolas Sarkozy hailed the killing as a coup in the fight against terrorism, but both he and Foreign Minister Alain Juppe warned it did not spell al Qaeda's demise. British Prime Minster David Cameron also said the West would have to be "particularly vigilant" in the weeks ahead. As he announced bin Laden's death, Obama said: "There's no doubt that al Qaeda will continue to pursue attacks against us. We must and we will remain vigilant at home and abroad." Some security experts fear the 10th anniversary of the September 11 attacks could further incite al Qaeda supporters. "Whilst we in the West might have the satisfaction of justice having been dealt to a terrorist, many will still see Osama bin Laden as a martyr. Make no mistake: violent jihadists will react to this," Julian Lindley-French of London's Chatham House think-tank told Reuters Insider television. Roland Jacquard, head of the International Terrorism Observatory in Paris, said the United States would be targeted. "The way in which he was killed, by a military commando, shows this will have important consequences for the future. It will be a call for Jihad, he will remain a very real-life martyr for the rest of the organization," Jacquard told RTL radio. Already Monday, Islamic militants hinted at revenge. "Oh God, please make this news not true... God curse you Obama," said one message on an Arabic language forum. "Oh Americans... it is still legal for us to cut your necks." "Osama may be killed but his message of Jihad will never die. Brothers and sisters, wait and see, his death will be a blessing in disguise," said a poster on another Islamist forum. CONSTANT ALERT In Washington, a crowd gathered outside the White House as Obama announced the conclusion of a decade-long manhunt, singing patriotic songs and chanting slogans. The killing was hailed by George W. Bush, who was president when al Qaeda hijackers slammed airliners into the Pentagon and New York's World Trade Center. "The fight against terror goes on, but tonight America has sent an unmistakable message: No matter how long it takes, justice will be done," Bush said. New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg said he hoped the news would bring closure to those who lost loved ones on September 11. The dollar and stocks strengthened and oil, gold and silver prices all fell as markets received an immediate boost from the news. The United States and much of Europe is on constant alert for an attack by al Qaeda or affiliated extremist organization. France has been on red alert, the third-highest level in a four-step scale, since suicide bomb attacks in London in 2005 and has been especially vigilant since bin Laden criticised criticizedthe country's attitude toward Muslims last October. The United States warned its citizens worldwide of "enhanced potential for anti-American violence," advising them to avoid mass gatherings and travel, and Australia issued a similar warning. Iraq's army and police went on high alert. Japan said it would step up patrols around its military bases to guard against revenge attacks, and in countries with big Muslim populations, some foreign schools, embassies and other potential targets put extra security measures in place. India, whose ties with neighboring Pakistan are strained, voiced concern that bin Laden was found at a luxury compound just 60 km (35 miles) from the Pakistani capital Islamabad, saying this suggested terrorists could find sanctuary there. "Osama bin Laden's death doesn't mean we can relax now and assume the danger is past," Wolfgang Ischinger, head of the Munich Security Conference, told German radio. "I expect al Qaeda will try to get revenge against the Americans and the Pakistan government... Even if a 'battle' has been won, the 'war' is far from over."

### Magnifies the risk- retribution

Reuters, 5-2-2011

http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/05/02/uk-obama-statement-idUKTRE7410AE20110502

Bin Laden's death triggered a travel alert for Americans worldwide, the U.S. State Department said, warning of the potential for anti-American violence. Britain's Prime Minister David Cameron urged Britons to remain vigilant. "Of course, it does not mark the end of the threat we face from extremist terror. Indeed, we will have to be particularly vigilant in the weeks ahead. But it is, I believe, a massive step forward," Cameron said.

### He was just a figurehead

John Payne 2k11

(The American Conservative, 5/1/2011, “Let’s Declare Victory,” http://www.amconmag.com/blog/2011/05/01/let’s-declare-victory/)

Osama bin Laden has been killed by an American military assault. The effect on al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups’ capabilities to attack Americans will be marginal. Bin Laden has long been more of a symbol for Islamic terrorists than a strategic leader, and he will live on as a martyr to those bent on killing Americans. The biggest blow for terrorist groups will be the loss of bin Laden’s substantial funding, but terrorism is a very cheap tactic–al-Qaeda spent about half a million dollars on the 9/11 attacks, for instance–so it’s not a huge setback.

### Other leadership will come to the fore – Osama wasn’t doing anything

Ladha 5/1, Rizwan Ladha, MA Candidate in Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 5/1/2011, “Osama bin Laden Is Dead, But Nothing Really Changes,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rizwan-ladha/osama-bin-laden-is-dead-b\_b\_856111.html

This leads into the third question -- how this will impact al-Qaeda. The President said the organization, headed by Osama bin Laden, has been disrupted by our intelligence operatives and military personnel. The reality, however, is that the organization has nevertheless been running strong for the past ten years since 9/11, and of course longer before that. It is as much a matter of discussion in academic and policymaking circles today as it was then -- indeed, my class on terrorism this semester at the Fletcher School dedicated entire class periods to the study of al-Qaeda's ideology, activities and structure. In particular, the death of bin Laden will have little effect on the organizational hierarchy of al-Qaeda, which is sufficiently hydra-headed to ensure continuity of leadership. As it stands, bin Laden was hiding out in Pakistan for the past half-decade or so, and al-Qaeda has continued on. His death will not change anything.

### Haven’t won the war yet- lots of insurgents

International Business Times, 5-2-2011

http://hken.ibtimes.com/articles/140174/20110502/osama-bin-laden-obama-2611-september-11-attacks.htm

Analysts and officials warned the United States was unlikely to see a swift end to its troubles in a region where American policy has, for the last decade, been driven by its fears of another such attack. "It's important for U.S. and European allies to remember that there's still a lot of work to do," a senior Western official in Kabul said on condition of anonymity. "This doesn't change the fact that there's an insurgency that is an existential threat to the government of Afghanistan, and that Pakistan is a basket-case that is a threat to regional security," the official said.

### Nuclear attack

Gard 2k8

Robert Gard, Sr. Military Fellow, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, 5-10-08. “Nuclear Terrorism is a Likely Event” Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearterrorism/articles/nuclear\_terrorism\_likely\_event/

It seems unlikely that terrorists could obtain a usable nuclear weapon from any of the nine countries that currently possess them, although there is some concern that a possible source could be the Pakistani stockpile, should that unstable country implode.It is more likely that terrorists could obtain the key ingredient for making a nuclear bomb, plutonium (Pu) or highly enriched uranium (HEU).While producing a weapon with Puis a relatively complex task, there is consensus in the scientific community that it would not be difficult for a terrorist group to produce an explosive device similar to the one used on Hiroshima, with as little as 50 pounds of HEU. The International Panel on Fissile Materials estimated in its 2007 report that there are 1,400-2,000 tons of HEU, enough for some 56,000-80,000 nuclear weapons, spread around the world. Much of the HEU is in Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union, known to have weak security regulations and widespread corruption. In April 2006, Russian police arrested the foreman of a nuclear plant for attempting to sell about 50 pounds of HEU, enough for a weapon. Of at least equal if not greater concern is what Princeton professor Frank von Hippel calls significant quantities of HEU in some 140 locations around the world in research and medical isotope production reactors and in associated fuel development and fabrication facilities, many with only minimum security. Dr. Matthew Bunn of Harvard University has warned that these materials are in hundreds of buildings in dozens of countries; some sites have reliable safety measures, but many are secured only by a chain-link fence. Some 20 developing countries, including Belarus, Ghana and Uganda, have more than a weapon's worth of HEU. Should a terrorist obtain HEU, detection of it would be extremely difficult, as this material can be easily shielded and transported. It would be a relatively simple matter to smuggle the material into the United States, where it could be fashioned into a crude but deadly nuclear weaponin a garage with tools purchased in a hardware store.

## US Retaliates

### Extinction

Jerome Corsi, 4-20-05

(Columnist for WorldNetDaily and Ph.D. from Harvard University, “Atomic Iran: How the Terrorist Regime Bought the Bomb and American Politicians” http://911review.org/Wget/worldnetdaily.com/NYC\_hit\_by\_terrorist\_nuke.html)

The combination of horror and outrage that will surge upon the nation will demand that the president retaliate for the incomprehensible damage done by the attack. The problem will be that the president will not immediately know how to respond or against whom. The perpetrators will have been incinerated by the explosion that destroyed New York City. Unlike 9-11, there will have been no interval during the attack when those hijacked could make phone calls to loved ones telling them before they died that the hijackers were radical Islamic extremists. There will be no such phone calls when the attack will not have been anticipated until the instant the terrorists detonate their improvised nuclear device inside the truck parked on a curb at the Empire State Building. Nor will there be any possibility of finding any clues, which either were vaporized instantly or are now lying physically inaccessible under tons of radioactive rubble. Still, the president, members of Congress, the military, and the public at large will suspect another attack by our known enemy – Islamic terrorists. The first impulse will be to launch a nuclear strike on Mecca, to destroy the whole religion of Islam. Medina could possibly be added to the target list just to make the point with crystal clarity. Yet what would we gain? The moment Mecca and Medina were wiped off the map, the Islamic world – more than 1 billion human beings in countless different nations – would feel attacked. Nothing would emerge intact after a war between the United States and Islam. The apocalypse would be upon us. Then, too, we would face an immediate threat from our long-term enemy, the former Soviet Union. Manyin the Kremlin would see this as an opportunity to grasp the victory that had been snatched from them by Ronald Reagan when the Berlin Wall came down. A missile strike by the Russians on a score of American cities could possibly be pre-emptive. Would the U.S. strategic defense system be so in shock that immediate retaliation would not be possible? Hardliners in Moscow might argue that there was never a better opportunity to destroy America

## Nuclear Terror O/W War

### Nuclear terror outweighs nuclear war

### Koring 4/12/2K10

### (Paul, G and Mail, "Obama’s new nuclear strategy maintains first-strike option ", http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/obamas-new-nuclear-strategy-maintains-first-strike-option/article1525600//)

In the administration’s view, terrorists with a stolen warhead in the back of a truck or a shipping container poses the biggest danger. “The greatest threat to U.S. and global security is no longer a nuclear exchange between nations, but nuclear terrorism by violent extremists and nuclear proliferation to an increasing number of states,” Mr. Obama said.

## Nuclear Terror Probability High

### The likelihood of a nuclear terror attack is extremely high

Matthew Bunn, senior research director @ Harvard, 2007

(Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/24/AR2007092401154.html//)

Yes. Unfortunately, terrorist use of a nuclear bomb is a very real danger. During the 2004 presidential campaign, President George W. Bush and Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.) agreed that nuclear terrorism was the single greatest threat to U.S. national security. Published estimates of the chance that terrorists will detonate a nuclear bomb in a U.S. city over the next ten years range from 1 percent to 50 percent. In a 2005 poll of international security experts taken by Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), the median estimate of the chance of a nuclear attack in the next ten years was 29 percent -- and a strong majority believed that it was more likely that terrorists would launch a nuclear attack than that a state would. Given the horrifying consequences of such an attack, even a 1 percent chance would be enough to call for rapid action to reduce the risk. What materials could terrorists use to make a nuclear bomb? To make a nuclear bomb requires either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium. Neither of these materials occurs in nature, and producing either of them requires expensive facilities using complex technologies, almost certainly beyond the capability of terrorist groups. Hence, if all of the world's stockpiles of nuclear weapons, HEU and plutonium can be effectively protected and kept out of terrorist hands, nuclear terrorism can be prevented: no nuclear material, no bomb, no nuclear terrorism. How difficult would it be for terrorists to get the materials needed to make a nuclear bomb? Highly enriched uranium and plutonium are hard to make, but may not be so hard to steal. These raw materials of nuclear terrorism are housed in hundreds of facilities in dozens of countries -- some with excellent security, and some secured by nothing more than an underpaid guard and a chain link fence. There are no binding global standards setting out how well nuclear weapons and the materials needed to make them should be secured. Theft of the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons is not just a hypothetical worry, it is an ongoing reality. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has documented 15 cases of theft of HEU or plutonium confirmed by the countries concerned (and there are additional well-documented cases that the countries involved have not yet been willing to confirm). In many of these cases, the thieves and smugglers were attempting to sell the material to anyone who would buy it -- and terrorist groups have been seeking to buy it. How much expertise is needed to make a nuclear bomb? Would a large operation be required? Unfortunately, government studies have concluded that once a terrorist organization had the needed nuclear material, a handful of skilled individuals might be able to make a crude nuclear bomb using commercially available tools and equipment, without any large fixed facilities that might draw attention, and without access to classified nuclear weapons information. Getting nuclear material and making a crude nuclear bomb would be the most complex operation terrorists have ever carried out but the risk that a sophisticated group could pull it off is very real. Roughly 90 percent of the effort in the Manhattan Project was focused on making nuclear bomb material; getting stolen nuclear material would allow terrorists to skip the hardest part of making a nuclear bomb. The simplest type of nuclear bomb, known as a "gun-type" bomb, slams two pieces of nuclear material together at high speed. The bomb that destroyed Hiroshima, for example, was a cannon that fired a shell of HEU into rings of HEU. Plutonium cannot be used to make a gun-type bomb with a substantial explosive yield, because the neutrons that all plutonium emits cause the bomb to blow itself apart before the nuclear reactions proceeds very far. To make a bomb from plutonium would require a more complex "implosion-type" bomb, which would be more difficult for terrorists to build -- but government studies have repeatedly concluded that this possibility also cannot be ruled out. How much nuclear material would terrorists need to make a bomb? The amount of nuclear material needed to make a bomb depends on the material and the skill of the bomb-maker. A simple gun-type nuclear bomb would require approximately 50 kilograms of HEU -- an amount that would fit in a suitcase. Implosion-type bombs are more efficient, requiring less nuclear material. Unclassified estimates suggest that basic first-generation implosion-type bombs like the Nagasaki bomb can be made with 6 kilograms of plutonium or 15 kilograms of HEU. With these relatively small amounts, a terrorist group could potentially build a bomb with the power of thousands of tons of high explosive. Sophisticated nuclear weapon states can potentially make nuclear bombs with smaller amounts of nuclear material. Rather than stealing nuclear material and making a bomb, could terrorists steal and use an already assembled nuclear weapon? Possibly. Nuclear weapons are generally better secured than some stocks of HEU and plutonium are. Nevertheless, the United States is spending hundreds of millions of dollars beefing up security for its own nuclear weapons complex sites, and hundreds of millions more helping Russia improve security for its warhead sites. A stolen nuclear weapon might be very difficult for a terrorist group to detonate. Many nuclear weapons are equipped with electronic locks making it impossible to set off the weapon without putting in the appropriate code or figuring out a way to bypass the lock. Unfortunately, on older Russian tactical nuclear weapons, such locks are thought to be absent in some cases and relatively easily bypassed in others. U.S. strategic nuclear weapons also do not incorporate such locks, and some other countries' weapons may also lack them. In addition, modern nuclear weapons are typically equipped with devices that prevent the weapon from going off until it has passed through its expected flight sequence Â¿ such as a period of rocket-powered flight followed by coasting through space and reentering the atmosphere, in the case of a long-range ballistic missile. While designed more for safety than security, these devices would also make it more difficult to detonate most stolen weapons. If terrorists could not figure out how to detonate a stolen weapon, they might choose to cut it open and use the nuclear material inside to try to make a bomb of their own. Are there "suitcase nukes" on the loose? Probably not. In the 1990s, Gen. Alexander Lebed, then the national security advisor to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, said that more than 100 nuclear weapons designed to be carried by one person Â¿ so-called "suitcase nukes" Â¿ could not be accounted for and might be missing. The Russian Ministry of Defense firmly denied that any weapons were missing, and Lebed ultimately backed off from his initial statements. Ultimately enough information was released to make a reasonably convincing case that none of these man-portable nuclear weapons were missing. It is clear, however, that both the United States and the Soviet Union did in fact manufacture nuclear weapons designed to be carried and used by one or two people. In the United States, all such weapons have been dismantled, and some Russian statements indicate that the same is now true in Russia. Once a nuclear bomb or nuclear material has been stolen, could we stop it from being smuggled? The chances would not be very good, unfortunately. The amounts of HEU or plutonium needed for a bomb are small and easy to smuggle. These materials are not radioactive enough to require any special equipment to carry them, or to make them easy to detect. After they have left the site where they are supposed to be, they could be anywhere, and all the later lines of defense are variations on searching for needles in haystacks. With hundreds of millions of people and vehicles crossing U.S. borders every year, making sure no one gets in with a suitcase of potential bomb material is an immense challenge. Even if governments screened every container coming across their borders with a radiation detector, terrorists would not be likely to send their nuclear bomb material through one of the readily-observable radiation detectors, but would use one of the many other possible routes to avoid inspection. Moreover, if HEU was shielded with lead, detectors now being deployed would not be able to detect the weak radiation it emits (unless it was contaminated with the isotope U-232, and the detector was designed to look for the gamma rays from that decay chain). If the United States cannot stop the flow of illegal drugs and illegal immigrants across its borders, it is unlikely that it will succeed in stopping nuclear material. Even an assembled nuclear bomb might fit in the hold of a yacht, in a truck, or in a small plane. What would happen if terrorists set off a nuclear bomb in a major city? Terrorist use of a nuclear bomb would be an historic catastrophe.

## Nuclear Terror Probability High

### Now is a key time for nuclear terror threats

Bokhari 2K6

(Susan, Journal on Science and World Affairs, Vol. 2, pgs. 29-41//ef)

William C. Potter of the Center for Non proliferation Studies and Charles D. Ferguson argue that a nuclear terrorist attack is more likely to happen now than in any other time in the past. The rationale behind this statement lies in two basic premises [4]: 1. Non-state actors have emerged in the form of terrorist networks/organisations, which have the urge to use nuclear weapons for furthering their agendas. 2. Crude but real nuclear weapons, as distinct from radiological dispersal devices, are well within the technical reach of some terrorist organisations. It is due to these realistic and almost tangible threats that nuclear non-proliferation has become ‘the pre-eminent national security issue for the US ’. The most prominent policy goal of the US is therefore to keep nuclear weapons, the know-how required for their construction, and the fissile materials that make them dangerous, out of the hands of those who could inflict harm on the country or one of its allies [5]. Thus, the current US strategy of non-proliferation with regards to the terrorist threat could be categorised along the following dimensions: 1. Securing nuclear materials and warheads at the sites where they are stored, a matter that could be termed the ‘first line of defence’. [6] 2. Reducing the risk of proliferation or even of nuclear confrontations in South and Central Asia. [7] 3. Securing vulnerable Russian nuclear weapons. [8] 4. Improving protection of nuclear facilities within the US . [9] 5. Improving border and cargo monitoring at the frontier crossings and embarkation points most likely to be used by smugglers. [10] 6. Containing the spread of nuclear intelligence, defined as the know-how and material elements required to build a nuclear explosive device or even more cursory (yet sensitive) information that could give some group access to ready-made nuclear weapons. [11] 7. Preventing more states from acquiring nuclear weapons. [12] Graham T. Allison has shown, in this sense, the inevitability of nuclear terrorism, arguing that this activity could pick up pace during the next decade. In order to prevent such inevitability, Allison has suggested that the ‘thousands of unsecured weapons (soft ball size lumps of highly enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium) in Russia should be guarded from being stolen by criminals who could then sell them to terrorists deriving great economic gains’ [13]. The US has forged a network of alliances with many countries as a measure to ward off terrorism after the attacks of 9/11. In this respect, the basic strategic goal of the US is to deploy a policy which makes ‘prevention the highest priority’ in ‘countries of concern’ [14]. North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Russia could be labeled as ‘countries of concern’ because of their undemocratic governments, the anti-Americanism that exists in some subgroups of their societies, and the existence of unsecured nuclear weapons or fissile materials which are vulnerable to thefts and may be diverted for their use in nuclear terrorist attacks. The focus of this paper will be limited to the case of Pakistan, a strong partner of the US in its ‘war against terrorism’, that nevertheless poses, due to its unstable situation and precarious socioeconomic structure, a high risk of being the source of black-marketed nuclear weapons and/or fissile materials. This paper will delve into the current US strategic cooperative efforts towards Pakistan in order to assess and fill any gaps that might exist in a foreign policy approach based on the US’s ‘first line of defence’ rationale. The United States dealings with nuclear terrorism: cooperation from prevention Defining nuclear terrorism Nuclear terrorism is a term that is not restricted solely to the use by a terrorist organisation of an explosive nuclear device. According to Ferguson, nuclear terrorism in its broad definition includes actions such as [15] • The seizure and detonation of an intact nuclear weapon. • The theft or purchase of highly enriched uranium ( HEU ) or plutonium, leading to the fabrication and detonation of a crude nuclear weapon, or an improvised nuclear device (IND). Attacks against, and sabotage of, nuclear facilities, such as nuclear power plants, to try to cause the release of large amounts of radioactivity. • The unauthorised acquisition of radioactive materials contributing to the construction and detonation of a radiological dispersion device, popularly known as a ‘dirty bomb,’ or a radiation emission device. Nuclear terrorism involving the detonation of an (albeit primitive) nuclear device is not to be deemed a technically unachievable scenario. The simplicity of a gun-type weapon design makes it easier for a terrorist, given access to HEU, to engage in nuclear terrorism. A terrorist group could use, for instance, a commercial explosive to shoot two sub-critical masses of HEU into one another to ‘form [the] supercritical mass needed to sustain an explosive chain reaction’ [16]. Plutonium could likewise be used as a fissile element, though it implies a greater deal of technical challenges. Plutonium would have to be employed in the more technically sophisticated implosion-assembly method, which uses military-grade explosives and precision detonation electronics to squeeze the plutonium into a supercritical mass.

## Terrorists Not Deterred

### Deterrence doesn’t apply to terrorism – different motivation

Bowen 2k2

(Wyn Q. Bowen, senior lecturer @ Joint Services Command and Staff College @ Shrivenham, 2K2 http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq\_pubs/0731.pdf//)

Since deterrence is about preventing an enemy from acting in a particular way, success will depend on a target believing, or being made to believe, that the current state of affairs is preferable to the cost associated with a particular course of action, at least in the short term, if the purpose is buying time for other approaches. It follows that if an enemy is determined to act, deterrence could prove unworkable. At first glance, this infeasibility appears to be the case in mass-casualty terrorism since the motives of nonstate actors to perpetrate such attacks are likely to be extreme and their level of resolve so high that deterrence is inapplicable. Indeed, groups that contemplate such activity have radical views derived from religious (al Qaeda) or apocalyptic beliefs (Aum Shinrikyo). Moreover, fanaticism is expressed in unrealizable goals, operates outside of commonly accepted political and moral norms, and remains impervious to negotiation and inducement. For example, Osama bin Laden and members of al Qaeda claim to be acting in the name of Islam in pursuing objectives such as eliminating Israel and destroying America. Moreover, it is clear that many members of the al Qaeda network think in suicidal terms and are willing to endure significant costs and destruction in pursuit of their objectives.

## 2AC Accidental Launch Scenario

### Accidental Armageddon – The current deterrence structure can not protect against accidental or unauthorized launches

Institute for ForeignPolicy Analysis, 2000

(July 5th, “National Missile Defense: Policy Issues and Technological Capabilities”)

Assuredly, no country wants to provoke the United States into conducting a retaliatory nuclear strike against its territory. Fools they are not. However, the possibility that a nuclear state might lose control over one or more of its strategic missile systems and launch a limited unauthorized or accidental strike against U.S. targets seems more probable today than it was during the Cold War. The crumbling nuclear command-and-control system in Russia, the increased danger of internal loss of control, the level of discontent among nuclear crews, and the increasing number of nuclear states that have questionable safeguards against unauthorized use indicate some increase in the level of risk that these missile systems pose. Although the de-targeting agreement between the United States and Russia provides some limited safeguards against unauthorized launch scenarios, it is not a foolproof measure, nor is it verifiable. Missile systems can be retargeted quickly, as undoubtedly they would be in a crisis. The laws of probability suggest that if an unauthorized or accidental launch of an ICBM should occur, the missile’s reentry vehicles would most likely be aimed at targets located within the contiguous forty-eight states (since a vast majority of Russian and Chinese strategic missiles are programmed to hit strategic targets in the heartland of the United States). Thus, most accidentally launched missiles would likely be bolts out of the blue, approaching the forty eight contiguous states from the northeast, north, or northwest, and without the advance warning that a crisis would provide.

### And, that leads to Armageddon

Accidental NuclearWar Studies Program 2k2

(“Preventing an Accidental Armageddon”, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/babst-armageddon.html)

Although international relations have changed drastically since the end of the Cold War, both Russia and the U.S. continue to keep the bulk of their nuclear missiles on high-level alert. The U.S. and Russia remain ready to fire a total of more than 5,000 nuclear weapons at each other within half an hour. These warheads, if used, could destroy humanity including those firing the missiles. A defense that destroys the defender makes no sense. Why then do Russia, the U.S., and other countries spend vast sums each year to maintain such defenses? Since 400 average size strategic nuclear weapons could destroy humanity, most of the 5,000 nuclear weapons that Russia and the U.S. have set for hair-trigger release, present the world with its greatest danger -- an enormous overkill, the potential for an accidental Armageddon.

# China Advantage

## War Coming Now

### War with China is Inevitable and coming soon – space is the final battleground

Dolman 2k10

(Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award “The Case for Weapons in Space: A Geopolitical Assessment,” September, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf\_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per\_id=1532576)

The coming war with China will be fought for control of outer space. The stakes are high. The side that prevails will have a clear path to domination of the international system. Although its effects will be far-reaching, the conflict itself will not be visible to those looking up into the night sky. It will not be televised. Most will not even be aware that it is occurring. It may already have begun. And yet, this new kind of remotely-controlled proxy war will not be so different that it is unrecognizable. The principles of war and the logic of competition remain as they always have. Only the context has changed. When perceived through this mind-set, via the tenets of traditional realist and geopolitical theories that have survived millennia in their basic forms, the unavoidable conclusion is that the United States and the People’s Republic of China are on a collision course for war. Such determinist theory is quickly countered by those who find its implications abhorrent. Inevitability is a crass and unsubtle divination. Because a thing has always happened does not mean that it always will. Nor does the reverse hold—because a thing has never happened does not mean that it cannot be so. The realist paradigm of power politics does not have to hold sway. The cruelly consistent narrative of history need not be eternally retold. Nothing is inevitable, counter the idealists. The world can be made different, the world today is different.

### China is a threat now – building new tech

Dowd 2k9

(Alan Dowd, Senior Fellow, Fraser Institute, “Surrendering Outer Space,” POLICY REVIEW n. 156, 8—3—09,[www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/5421](http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/5421) )

I am concerned that America’s real and perceived leadership in the standing of the world’s space-faring nations is slipping away,” Griffin warns. He worries that “we will face growing competition from the advancing Chinese space program.” The concerns are real. China conducted its first spacewalk in 2008. According to Griffin, Beijing plans to “launch about 100 satellites over the next 5 to 8 years.” There is nothing untoward about this in and of itself. It is only natural for a state with a growing economy and global interests to gain a toehold in space. What is worrisome is how the Chinese are going about this and the prospect that the U.S. will be less able to keep a close eye on China’s celestial activities. The Pentagon estimated China’s military-related spending last year at $105 billion to $150 billion and has noted that “China has accorded space a high priority for investment.” For example: In 2007, China deployed its first lunar orbiter. That same year, Beijing also tested a direct-ascent anti-satellite (asat) missile against one of its own satellites, demonstrating its ability to attack satellites in low-earth orbit. In addition to the direct-ascent asat program, the Pentagon reported in its annual report to Congress on China’s military power, that Beijing is “developing other technologies and concepts for kinetic (hit-to-kill) weapons and directed-energy (e.g., lasers and radio frequency) weapons for asat missions.” China is building up its capacity to jam satellite communications and gps receivers, which are crucial to U.S. commerce and security. A 2008 Pentagon report quotes Chinese military planners as openly envisioning a “space shock and awe strike . . . [to] shake the structure of the opponent’s operational system of organization and . . . create huge psychological impact on the opponent’s policymakers.” The Pentagon noted in 2009 that Chinese military “writings emphasize the necessity of ‘destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy’s reconnaissance/observation and communications satellites,’ suggesting that such systems, as well as navigation and early warning satellites, could be among initial targets of attack to ‘blind and deafen the enemy.’” “China is developing a multi-dimensional program to limit or prevent the use of space-based assets by its potential adversaries during times of crisis or conflict,” according to the Defense Department. China is developing microsatellites, which cost a fraction of what a normal satellite costs and can be used for a range of passive, benign operations or to attack, disable, and kill other satellites. “With a microsat you can go close enough to other spacecrafts in order to repair them, but also to sabotage them,” physicist Laura Grego told the bbc in 2007. Microsatellites can shadow their prey for months or years before attacking. With plans to begin deploying elements of a manned space station next year, China’s goal is to conduct a lunar landing by 2020. Equally worrisome is the opaque manner in which China conducts military operations, as evidenced by the unannounced asat test in 2007. Cartwright said that test had produced dangerous debris that could potentially harm astronauts and billion-dollar equipment. “The lack of transparency in China’s military and security affairs poses risks to stability by increasing the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation,” the Pentagon noted last year. It ominously added, “This situation will naturally and understandably lead to hedging against the unknown.”

### China is making strategic, long-term, moves towards space militarization. The U.S. must act or be left behind

Adams 2k10

(Adams, Jonathan. "China is on path to 'militarization of space'." Christian Science Monitor 28 Oct. 2010 pg lexis)

China looks set to pull ahead in the Asian space race to the moon, putting a spacecraft into lunar orbit Oct. 6 in a preparatory mission for an unmanned moon landing in two or three years. Chinese engineers will maneuver the craft into an extremely low orbit, 9.5 miles above the moon's surface, so it can take high-resolution photos of a possible landing site. Basically, China is looking for a good "parking space" for a moon lander, in a less-known area of the moon known as the Bay of Rainbows. The mission, called Chang'e 2 after a heroine from Chinese folklore who goes to the moon with a rabbit, highlights China's rapidly growing technological prowess, as well as its keen desire for prestige on the world stage. If successful, it will put China a nose ahead of its Asian rivals with similar lunar ambitions – India and Japan – and signal a challenge to the American post-cold-war domination in space. The Asian space race Compared with the American and Soviet mad dashes into space in the late 1950s and '60s, Asia is taking its time – running a marathon, not a sprint. "All of these countries witnessed the cold war, and what led to the destruction of the USSR," says Ajey Lele, an expert on Asian space programs at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis in New Delhi, referring to the military and space spending that helped hasten the decline of the Soviet regime. "They understand the value of money and investment, and they are going as per the pace which they can go." But he acknowledged China's edge over India. "They started earlier, and they're ahead of us at this time," he says. India put the Chandrayaan 1 spacecraft into lunar orbit in 2008, a mission with a NASA payload that helped confirm the presence of water on the moon. It plans a moon landing in a few years' time, and a manned mission as early as 2020 – roughly the same timetable as China. Japan is also mulling a moonshot, and has branched out into other space exploration, such as the recent Hayabusa mission to an asteroid. Its last lunar orbiter shared the moon with China's first in 2007. Both Japan's and India's recent missions have been plagued by glitches and technical problems, however, while China's have gone relatively smoothly. Mr. Lele said the most significant aspect of the Chang'e 2 mission was the attempt at a 9.5-mile-high orbit, a difficult feat. India's own lunar orbiter descended to about 60 miles in 2008, he said, but was forced to return to a more stable, 125-mile-high orbit. A low orbit will allow for better scouting of future landing sites, said Lele. "They [the Chinese] will require huge amounts of data on landing grounds," said Lele. "A moon landing hasn't been attempted since the cold war." During the famed 1969 Apollo 11 manned mission to the moon, astronaut Neil Armstrong had to take control of the lander in the last moments of descent to avoid large moon boulders strewn around the landing site. China hopes to avoid any such last-minute surprises with better reconnaissance photos, which would allow them to see moon features such as rocks as small as one-meter across, according to Chinese media. Is China's space exploration a military strategy? Meanwhile, some have pointed out that China's moonshot, like all space programs, has valuable potential military offshoots. China's space program is controlled by the People's Liberation Army (PLA), which is steadily gaining experience in remote communication and measurement, missile technology, and antisatellite warfare through missions like Chang'e 2. The security implications of China's space program are not lost on India, Japan, or the United States. The Pentagon notes that China, through its space program, is exploring ways to exploit the US military's dependence on space in a conflict scenario – for example, knocking out US satellites in the opening hours of a crisis over Taiwan. "China is developing the ability to attack an adversary's space assets, accelerating the militarization of space," the Pentagon said in its latest annual report to Congress on China's military power. "PLA writings emphasize the necessity of 'destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy's reconnaissance … and communications satellites.' " More broadly, some in the US see China's moon program as evidence that it has a long-range strategic view that's lacking in Washington. The US has a reconnaissance satellite in lunar orbit now, but President Obama appears to have put off the notion of a manned return to the moon. With China slowly but surely laying the groundwork for a long-term lunar presence, some fear the US may one day find itself lapped –"like the tale of the tortoise and the hare," says Dean Cheng, an expert on China's space program at the Heritage Foundation in Washington. "I have to wonder whether the United States, concerned with far more terrestrial issues, and with its budget constraints, is going to decide to make similarly persistent investments to sustain its lead in space."

## AT: Economic Interdependence solves

### And, Claims of Peaceful Coexistence Between the U.S. and China are wrong – History proves conflict is inevitable despite Economic Interdependence

Dolman 2k10

(Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award “The Case for Weapons in Space: A Geopolitical Assessment,” September, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf\_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per\_id=1532576)

The power of possibility is tantalizing, but the brusque strength of probability, for a decision maker, usually holds sway. The past foreshadows the future—and it is the calculation of probability over time combined with risk that is more persuasive than platitudes. If an event is likely, its outcome perceptible, and its influence measurable, the prudent state must make preparations to mitigate its effects. If an event is unlikely, even if its impact is serious, actions necessary to mitigate it are often deferred to the future—though this form of political gambling tends to magnify the deleterious effects of the event when it eventually comes to pass. If the state’s sovereignty is at risk, however, no matter how unlikely the event, it must be dealt with directly. On the surface, it may seem as though geopolitical forces are currently in dynamic balance. The US is the overwhelming sea and air power, offensively oriented and favoring maneuver and precision strike for advantage in war. The PRC is potentially the greatest land power the world has ever known, defensively established and reliant on masses of infantry as its core strength. Neither has a globally significant advantage vis-à-vis the other. There is no plausible near-term scenario in which the US could invade and sustain an occupation of the Chinese mainland. Likewise, the US is currently impervious to any invasion and occupation by Chinese forces. Neither state’s sovereignty appears in doubt due to actions by the other. At the level of grand strategy neither mass or maneuver, offense or defense, has a transformational advantage. From this perspective, war, inevitable though it may be, is not imminent. Less venerable theories of conflict and cooperation are more favorable toward long-term peace. Economically, the US and PRC are tightly bound. Chinese markets are opening and the productivity of PRC manufacturing has allowed the US to move into a post-industrial economy. Trade is increasing substantially, and much of America’s foreign debt is held by China, to the point that it is not to either state’s fiscal advantage to engage in a conflict that will sever or (even just weaken) these ties. Culturally and historically, the Chinese and American people are inclined toward mutual admiration and respect. Despite the political differences between Chinese Communism and Western Liberal Democratic Capitalism, human connections and government rapprochement are valued by both sides. An appreciation of American technological innovation and Chinese work and spiritual ethics imbues the still-developing relationship. Both sides seem willing to work together and sustain a world system in which each nation-state has its place and its independence. In every sphere but one, it seems, the two great powers are building toward peace. In every sphere of competition, with one exception, there is room for negotiation and mutually beneficial outcomes. That one incompatible, uncompromising realm is outer space. A Twenty-First Century Great Wall in Space: No state relies on space power and space support more than the US. Since at least the mid-1980s, its armed forces have undergone a radical transformation. Space intelligence and observations, high bandwidth communications, and navigation support have created the most deadly combat force in history. America can engage targets anywhere in the world, in all weather, day or night, with extraordinary precision and lethality, and with a minimum of collateral damage. The progress of this transformation has been stymied with the continuing emphasis on ground forces occupation duties in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the American military is operating more effectively and efficiently today with the smallest percentage of its population actively engaged in military service since the post-WWII demobilization. Just over two years ago—and perhaps again earlier this year as part of a ballistic missile defense system test—China successfully engaged one of its own derelict satellites in space. This was an extraordinarily provocative action. The United States simply has no defense against such a capability, and China’s anti-satellite (ASAT) test was intended to remind the world of this weakness. Moreover, its use of an MRBM (which the PRC produces in mass) to propel the kill vehicle indicates a potential ASAT weapons capability sufficient to target the entire US low-earth orbit inventory. The US responded in kind, engaging and destroying one of its own de-orbiting satellites with a modified surface-to-air missile interceptor launched from an Aegis cruiser. While this response demonstrated an enhanced American capability to engage low-earth orbiting (LEO) satellites from a mobile platform, the message sent was straight-forward. There is no current defense against a satellite attack, and the only option available to US or PRC strategists is retaliation. If deterrence fails, LEO will become a global no-fly zone. Both sides will engage and destroy any and all satellites within range, cheaply and effectively. China’s ultimate goal appears to be to assert its regional supremacy and achieve co-equal (if not dominant) status as a global power. Control of space is a critical step in that direction. Without its eyes and ears in space to provide warning and real-time intelligence, the United States would be in a painfully awkward situation should the PRC put direct military pressure on Taiwan. A robust space program, aimed at achieving dominance in LEO, prompts a comparison to traditional large-scale government projects in China. Its monumental Great Wall was intended to keep the barbarians out, and while never impermeable, when fully manned it stymied the mobile bands of steppe cavalry that had pillaged northern regions for centuries. But defense was only one of its purposes. Such works were needed to enhance security and also to bolster trade and spur economic growth. In turn, these massive public works gave legitimacy to the ruling power. Awe-inspiring achievements were a source of pride, and clear evidence of the superiority of the state. Moreover, they were a way to slough off excess economic capacity, keeping the population industriously engaged while limiting the amount of capital that could be accumulated by private interests. China’s current space program is readily imagined as a New Age Great Wall. Competing with the West in the highest technological endeavors, and doing so despite significant capital disparities, enhances the legitimacy of the communist party. China’s domestic population rationalizes lower per capita income as the state completes its rise among nations to superpower status. International audiences are awed by the accomplishments, conveying further legitimacy to the state. They acknowledge China’s domestic right to self-determination, but more importantly give credence to the capacity of Chinese manufacturing to produce quality high technology goods. This perception helps to increase the sale of advanced Chinese-made products abroad. While its comprehensive space program enhances foreign and domestic perceptions of legitimacy, and raises awareness of Chinese industrial and manufacturing acumen, its military space efforts directly threaten the relatively stable international system. It is this latter issue that presents a wicked problem for strategists.

### Losing Space Control Collapses the Economy and Causes Military Withdrawal

Dolman and Cooper 2k11

(Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, and Henry, PhD and Former Deputy for the Strategic and Space Systems, “Increasing the Military Uses of Space,” pg online @ http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf //ef)

America's reliance on space is so extensive that a widespread loss of space capabilities would prove disastrous for both its military security and its civilian welfare. The Armed Forces would be obliged to hunker down in a defensive crouch awaiting withdrawal from dozens of no-longer-tenable foreign deployments. America's economy, and along with it the rest of the world's, would collapse.

# Heg Advantage Extensions

## 2AC Weapons k Heg

### Space weaponization is critical to U.S. hegemony- we must seize space before others

National Review 7-15-2K2

(“Our **'**Next Manifest Destiny': America should move to control space -- now, and decisively,” Volume LIV, Number 13)

These are all examples of "force enhancement," to use Pentagon parlance. By generating and channeling information, space-based assets help earthbound soldiers, sailors, and pilots improve their performance. Yet the United States will also need tools of "force application" -- weapons that act against adversaries directly in and from space, for both offensive and defensive purposes. What our country requires, in short, is the weaponization of outer space. This already would have occurred in at least limited form, but for the mulish opposition of arms-control liberals. Reagan's SDI routinely struggled for funding in the 1980s and early 1990s, and then went on life support during the Clinton administration. The budget for ground-based ABMs was slashed by nearly 80 percent in Clinton's first year -- defense contractors even had their system-development bids returned to them unopened. The Brilliant Pebbles program, an outgrowth of SDI that would have placed a swarm of maneuverable interceptors in orbit, was eliminated completely. "These actions effectively destroyed the nation's space-based missile-defense options for the following decade," says Henry Cooper, who ran the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization at the Pentagon during the first Bush administration. The budgets of other programs, such as the ASAT technology tested by Pearson in 1985, were essentially trimmed to death. In 1990, Democrats in Congress forbade ASAT laser testing (the Republican majority let the ban lapse in 1995). The Army worked on ground-based ASAT missiles through the 1990s, and by 1997 its tests were starting to show real promise. The next year, however, Clinton had a test of his own to run -- the line-item veto, since ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court -- and he used it against the Army program. "We could have had something online," says Steven Lambakis of the National Institute for Public Policy. "Now we'd be forced to cobble together an emergency response if we really needed to knock out a satellite." The United States soon will have at least a residual ASAT capability -- any national missile-defense system that can shoot down ICBMs also can obliterate satellites. What we don't have, however, is a growing architecture of space-based weapons along the lines of what Reagan began to describe in his visionary SDI speech in 1983. This May, Senate Democrats passed big cuts to ground-based missile defense, which is humdrum compared with space-based lasers and the like -- and the White House has not yet beaten back even this challenge. The wrangling over weapons and budgets stems from a fundamental confusion over what space is and how we should use it. From the standpoint of physics, space begins about 60 miles above sea level, which is roughly the minimum height a satellite must attain to achieve orbit. In this sense, space is just another medium, much like land, water, and air, with its own special rules of operation. For military purposes, however, space is more: It's the ultimate high ground, a flank from above whose importance, for those able to gain access to it, may represent the critical difference in future conflicts. For arms-control fanatics, however, space is a kind of sanctuary, and putting weapons in it poses an unconscionable threat. U.N. secretary general Kofi Annan has called for ensuring "that outer space remains weapons-free." Theresa Hitchens of the Center for Defense Information warns of threats to "global stability" and "the potential for starting a damaging and destabilizing space race." With space, there's always the sense that weapons violate some pristine nature. This is clearly one of the sentiments behind the Kucinich bill. Yet it is exactly wrong -- there should be weapons way up there because then there will be fewer of them right down here. Space power is now in its infancy, just as air power was when the First World War erupted in 1914. Back then, military planes initially were used to observe enemy positions. There was an informal camaraderie among pilots; Germans and French would even wave when they flew by each other. Yet it wasn't long before the reality of war took hold and they began shooting. The skies were not to be a safe haven. The lesson for space is that some country inevitably will move to seize control of it, no matter how much money the United States sinks into feel-good projects like the International Space Station. Americans have been caught napping before, as when the Soviet Union shocked the world with Sputnik in 1957. In truth, the United States could have beaten the Soviets to space but for a deliberate slow-down strategy that was meant to foster sunny relations with the world's other superpower. The United States is the world's frontrunner in space, with about 110 military satellites in operation, compared with about 40 for Russia and 20 for the rest of the world. Yet a leadership role in space is not the same as dominance, and the United States today lacks the ability to defend its assets against rudimentary ASAT technology or to deny other countries their own weapons in space. No country appears to be particularly close to putting weapons in orbit, though the Chinese are expected to launch their first astronaut in the next year or two and they're working hard to upgrade their military space capabilities. "It would be a mistake to underestimate the rapidity with which other states are beginning to use space-based systems to enhance their security," says the just-released annual report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. At a U.N. disarmament conference two years ago, Chinese officials called for a treaty to keep weapons out of space -- a possible sign that what they really want is some time to play catch-up. The private sector also requires a secure space environment. When the Galaxy IV satellite failed in 1998, paging services shut down, affecting an estimated 44 million customers. Banks and credit-card companies also were affected, along with a few television and radio stations. Saddam Hussein may lack the rocket power to lob a nuclear warhead halfway around the world, but he could mount one on top of a Scud and fire it straight upward. A nuclear explosion in low orbit could disable scores of satellites and wreak havoc on modern economies everywhere -- an example of space-age terrorism. Plenty of people inside the government already recognize how much the United States relies on space. There's a U.S. Space Command headquartered in Colorado Springs, and each branch of the military is to some extent involved in space power. In 1999, secretary of defense William Cohen called space power "as important to the nation as land, sea, and air power." His successor, Donald Rumsfeld, chaired a commission on space and national security right before joining the Bush administration. The panel's report, issued last year, warned of a "Space Pearl Harbor" if the country doesn't develop "new military capabilities." While Cohen's rhetoric was fine, his boss, Bill Clinton, didn't seem to agree with it. Rumsfeld is friendly to the notion of space power, but President Bush so far hasn't talked much about it. When Bush gave his missile-defense speech at the National Defense University a year ago, he spoke of land-, sea-, and air-based defenses -- but made no mention of space. "A lot of us noticed that," says one Air Force officer. The Rumsfeld commission also emphasized defense: how to protect American satellites from foreign enemies. It had almost nothing to say about offense: how to use space for projecting American power around the globe. The commission was a creature of consensus, so this does not necessarily represent Rumsfeld's own thinking. And defense certainly is important. Military satellites are tempting targets because they're so crucial to the United States in so many ways. They are protected by their remoteness, but not much else. Their frail bodies and predictable flight paths are a skeet shoot compared with hitting speedy ICBMs, an ability that the United States is just starting to master. They're also vulnerable to jamming and hacking. Hardening their exteriors, providing them with some maneuverability, and having launch-on-demand replacements available are all key ingredients to national security. Yet defense doesn't win wars. In the future, the mere act of protecting these assets won't be enough to preserve American military superiority in space. In addition to an assortment of high-tech hardware, the United States could use an Alfred Thayer Mahan for the 21st century. In 1890, Mahan was a captain in the Navy when the first edition of his book, The Influence of Sea Power on World History, was published. Today it ranks among the classic texts of military theory. Mahan argued that nations achieve greatness only if they dominate the seas and their various geographic "pressure points," holding up the example of the British Royal Navy. One of Mahan's early readers was a young man named Theodore Roosevelt, who began to apply these ideas while working in the Department of the Navy during the 1890s, and later as president. Mahanian principles shook the country loose from its traditional strategy of coastal defense and underwrote a period of national dynamism, which included the annexation of Hawaii, victory in the Spanish-American War, and the construction of the Panama Canal. No writer has clearly become the Mahan of space, though one candidate is Everett C. Dolman, a professor at the Air Force's School of Advanced Airpower Studies, in Alabama. Dolman's new book Astropolitik offers a grand strategy that would have the United States "endeavor at once to seize military control of low-Earth orbit" and impose "a police blockade of all current spaceports, monitoring and controlling all traffic both in and out." Dolman identifies low-Earth orbit as a chokepoint in the sense of Mahan -- anybody who wants access to space must pass through it. "The United States should grab this vital territory now, when there's no real competition for it," Dolman tells me. "Once we're there, we can make sure the entry cost for anybody else wanting to achieve space control is too high. Whoever takes space will dominate Earth."

### Weaponization ends war and terrorism forever- failure cedes global dominance to China

Yoshida 2k3

(Adam, Director of the British Colombia Freedom Institute, Author of The Nothern Abyss, Noted Political Commentator, Columnist for the Greenwich Village Gazette, 2003 ( Oct 10th, “Red China Shooting for the Moon”, Freedom Institute Magazine, <http://www.adamyoshida.com/2003_10_01_archive.html> )

Ceding military control of space to China would end Americas status as a Superpower and create an entirely new world order. An American seizure of space would make permanent American hegemony. The development of an advanced system of space-based weapons, along with a powerful support structure, would elevate America from being, by far, the most militarily powerful nation in the history of the world to being, to put it simply, militarily invincible. How do you fight an enemy who can, moments after you attack, zero in on your home and pulverize it with a rock dropped from orbit? How do you fight an enemy whose forces have sophisticated equipment which allows them to track their own position, uncover yours, and call in precise fire upon you? How do you fight an enemy whose bombers can be over your capital minutes after the decision to go to war is taken, who can drop precision weapons on all of your high value targets, and who possesses weapons which will destroy every modern electronic within a radius of miles? The answer is simple: you can’t. Certainly, people would still be capable of launching terrorist attacks on the Earth- but retaliation would be swifter and more brutal. Moreover, under the threat of orbital bombardment, many earth-based polities would have a strong incentive to cease playing games with terrorists. The era of conventional military conflicts on the Earth would, more or less, be over. Once one power has space and is resolved to keep it, no other power will be able to easily break through the bottleneck. Assuming that Americaâ€™s leadership retains its resolve, American domination of space would become a permanent feature of world affairs.

### Military transformations will fail without space weapons- this collapses US leadership and the global economy

Dolman 2k6

(Everett, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2006, Space News**,** Op Ed- Dominance In Space)

No nation relies on space for its security more than the United States — none is even close. Both economically and militarily, loss of space capabilities would prove disastrous. America’s economy, and along with it the world’s, would collapse. Its military would hunker down in defensive crouch while it prepared to withdraw from dozens of then-untenable foreign deployments. For these reasons, the United States Air Force is charged with ensuring reliable space access and capabilities in peace, and in defending space assets and operations in conflict. As a martial organization, it looks to military means for achievement of its assigned ends. And so it should. To date the Air Force has been hamstrung in its pursuit of weapons in space by a combination of policy angst over the possible impact on foreign relations, Cold War legal entanglements, and the misapplied logic of nuclear deterrence. Moreover, a sense that the realm of space should somehow be kept pure, free of atavistic human contamination, pervades the opposition. All of these arguments are easily countered and have been refuted at numerous forums. But the core arguments for weapons in space are — or ought to be — centered on two themes. First, the United States is the world’s hegemon, like it or not, and as such it is expected to provide leadership in the world community, provide a globally more-beneficial economy along with reduced incidences and intensity of conflict and war, and to maintain its relative power. Second, the old American way of war, in which problems overseas are ignored until they spill over into direct conflict with its interests, requiring a massive and overwhelming intervention, is gone. The 21st century American military instead relies on high-tech intelligence, global presence, stealth, and precise and deadly engagements that limit collateral damage and casualties. Such is the new reality. Transformation of the armed services has crossed a threshold of no return. Without guaranteed access to space, and the capacity in war for space dominance, the new American way of war is not viable. Consider this analogy. Imagine assigning the U.S. Navy the mission of protecting the nation’s interests at sea — indeed, to ensure that access to the high seas is unhindered, and that those who might contest American access to traditionally and legally open waters are denied the ability to do so — but to accomplish this mission without any capacity to apply violence to, in, or from the sea. The notion is ludicrous, despite the fact that no state today has the capacity to challenge the American Navy at sea, and no nation is developing such a capacity. While there are numerous diplomatic, economic and informational means to accomplish such a task -- and all should be pursued -- these are not within the Navy’s area of expertise, and so it should not receive the mission. The point is simple. The arguments against space weapons should not be centered on the correctness of the Air Force’s desire to pursue technologies that lead to weaponization, but on the propriety of the assignment. It should also be recognized that during the modern era’s most auspicious periods of peace and prosperity, the international community was led by a liberal hegemon, whose military power was globally dominant on the oceans and locally dominant on the ground where it chose to fight. Air and space power — heavily used by today’s Navy — are the prevailing globally dominating military capabilities, enabling local ground power superiority at the time and place of America’s choosing. In preparation for an eventual transformation to a space-heavy military force structure, it is prudent to ask what would such a force look like, and what would be the political ramifications of its deployment? Broadly imagined, any transition to a military that included significant space-based weapons, capable of engaging assets in space and a limited number of high-value, fleeting or heavily protected targets would come at a stiff price. Any envisioned space weapons system would be very, very expensive. The cost would come not from social or educational budgets, but from existing defense allocations. In other words: fewer performance aircraft, fewer naval surface combatants, and fewer troops and armored vehicles — a lot fewer. These conventional systems would still carry the bulk of violence projected abroad for the foreseeable future, but should space weapons be properly designed and judiciously employed to pre-emptively and preventively constrain violent opposition to U.S. security concerns, the need for conventional forces around the globe will be considerably reduced. As such, a space-heavy force structure, while adding to the deadly concentration of power that is implicit in the transformation model, will not be a threat to the security interests of other states in the same manner that an increased conventional force might. The United States will retain the capacity to intervene with violence anywhere in the world, at a moment’s notice, but it will have atrophied its capacity to invade and hold territory. A direct threat to the sovereignty of foreign states will have abated, but not the capacity to retaliate against or punish those states that oppose U.S. interests. For example, the second war in Iraq was won quickly, brilliantly in fact, by a transformed American military with far fewer personnel than could have been imagined just a few years ago. The occupation and democratization of Iraq has not gone well, or at least not as well as anticipated. The smaller, deadlier force that swept through Iraq and toppled a government is poorly constructed to pacify territory, and so clarion calls for more troops are heard daily. But what is more threatening to the many states of this world: a U.S. military force designed to push violence forward quickly, but that cannot sustain long-term, broad-area application of violence, or one that is slower, less-accurate, more broadly devastating, and designed to take and hold territory? If space weapons are used capriciously or arbitrarily, then certainly they will be part of an expensive military build-up that hastens the demise of the United States. But if they are the military foundation of an effort to ensure commercial and peaceful access to space for all nations, as is the current U.S. military dominance on the seas and in the air, then space weaponization may come to be seen as a global public good. Once again, strategy matters. The vision that America has for itself and the world cannot be achieved without dominance in space. Without the capacity to research, develop, test and then, if necessary and efficient, deploy weapons that operate to, in and from space, the lynchpin of military transformation may be lost.

## Space Wpns Make Heg Sustainable

### US hegemony is only sustainable through the deployment of space weapons

Lambakis 2k1

(Steven, Ph.D inInt’l Politics, National security and international analyst specializing in space power and policy studies, Specialist at National Insitute for Public Policy, On the Edge of the Earth, Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2001,75-6)

Since the United States bears the burden of defending global interests, it must maintain global military capabilities. As an environment for hosting global defense utilities, and possibly one day global forces for active defense, space is a logical, necessary, and unavoidable medium for the United States to exploit. Space would still have an important role for an isolationist or hemispheric-bound United States, but it would not be as important as it is to the United States that represents itself as a world power. The United States, simply put, is a natural space power.If the trends of recent decades hold, the information-dependent U.S. armed forces will demand in coming years even greater access to more efficient spacebased information-acquisition and -handling systems. Although today only a few dare to think along these lines, requirements for increasing the strategic efficiency of U.S. forces and achieving high levels of protection of U.S. and allied troops during military operations may, in the long run, mean putting more missions into space. These missions may include offensive and defensive orbital attack against targets in space or on Earth (reducing, but by no means replacing, U.S. reliance on long- and short-range air- and seaborne weapons platforms). The medium of space can offer timely access to all points in the world, an irresistible attraction to a great power having vital and major national interests in many regions. Indeed, the growth of space power in the United States may be viewed as one of the most important military developments in this new century.

## AT: Heg Bad/Heg Unsustainable

### And, Space Weapons Solve the Problem of Heg Sustainability – Weapons Ensure U.S. Heg for DECADES to come

Dolman and Cooper 2k11

(Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, and Henry, PhD and Former Deputy for the Strategic and Space Systems, “Increasing the Military Uses of Space,” pg online @ http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf //ef)

Space weapons are expensive; alternatives are cheaper and just as effective.This is the first argument against space weaponization, although **it is an easy one to set aside**. Of course space weapons are expensive—very expensive, though not necessarily more expensive than terrestrially based systems that may accomplish the same objectives, not to mention objectives that cannot be met otherwise—but so are all revolutionary technologies, **particularly those that pioneer a new medium**. Furthermore, the state that achieves cutting-edge military technology first **has historically been the recipient of tremendous battlefield advantage**, and so pursuit of cut-ting-edge technology continues— despite the enormous cost. Moreover, the cultural and economic infrastructure that allows for and promotes innovation in the highest technologies tends to remain **at the forefront of international influence.** All empires decline and eventually are subsumed, but it has not been their search for the newest technologies or desire to stay at the forefront of innovation that causes their declines. Rather, it has been the policies of those states, generally an overexpansion of imperial control or an economic decision to freeze technologies, that result in their stagnation and demise. **Space and space technology represent both the resources and the innovation that can keep a liberal and responsible American hegemony in place for decades, if not centuries, to come; furthermore, unless America maintains this technological edge, it will likely lose its preeminence**.

## Threats Real: Rogues

### Rogue ASAT use is simple and on the horizon

Lambakis 2k1

(Steven, Ph.D in Int’l Politics,National security and international analyst specializing in space power and policy studies, Specialist at National Insitute for Public Policy, On the Edge of the Earth, Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2001, 109-10)

States with access to ballistic missile technologies have a potential ASAT capability. While foreign assistance is a major factor in nearly every case, countries may be grouped into four tiers: (1) those having an indigenous ballistic missile fabrication, assembly, and deployment capability (the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, India, Israel, and North Korea); (2) those needing foreign assistance to develop ballistic missiles (Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, IndoneSIa, Iran, Iraq, South Korea, South Africa, and Taiwan); (3) those that, having no development capability, are entirely dependent on foreign-supplied ballistic missiles (Afghanistan, Algeria, Chile, Cuba, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen); and (4) those that may acquire a capability in the future following a polItIcal decision to do so (Australia, Belgium, Japan, Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Ukraine),23 Several countries are likely to be able to manufacture missiles in relatively large numbers, and some are willing to export them.24 Conceivably, transfer of these technologies and systems could be achieved without detection by U.S. intelligence, although some might argue that complete surprise is not possible.25 Even staunch advocates of arms control in space acknowledge that relatively unsophisticated "weapons capable of threatening a handful of low-altitude reconnaissance satellites might eventually prove to be within reach of any space-faring nation."26 In relative terms, LEO is so close to the earth that it offers very little security to spacecraft and space facilities. The farther out one can place a satellite in high Earth orbit, which extends from LEO to GEO at thirty-six thousand kilometers, the harder it will be to reach a moving target from Earth. Earth's midlatitudes, or locations not too far distant from the equator, provide excellent opportunities for engagement of LEO payloads. Analyses have shown that a launch site near Tehran would have had launch opportunities within a one-week period in 1992 against four of the satellites identified and tracked by amateurs-two KH11 and two Lacrosse intelligence satellites.27 A ground-launched ASAT need not be complex to reach targets in low Earth orbit.28 Simple, kinetic-kill space weapons can be very effective against space targets. Kinetic-kill weapons, as opposed to beam weapons, use some solid mass to strike a target. Explosive warheads are not necessary. A rocket could be launched from anywhere on the globe off of any platform, including the deck of a ship directly under the orbital path of the target, making these ASAT systems much more operationally flexible and potentially more survivable than co-orbital interceptors. Assuming an adversary could locate and track satellites and other systems, and could fire a significant payload into their vicinity, it is then left to the attacker to maneuver the payload close enough to the target to damage it. The crucial part of direct -ascent ASAT systems is the terminal tracking, guidance, engagement, and fusing mechanism. Given the technical challenges this poses, multiple launches of inexpensive, direct-ascent weapons may be expected against high-value targets.

### Non-state terrorist groups can threaten U.S. Space assets

Preston et al 2002

(Bob, Dana J. Johnson,Sean Edwards, Michael Miller, & Calvin Shipbaugh, Analysts at Rand, Space Weapons Earth Wars, Santa Monica: RAND, 2002, www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1209/)

The final class of actor that might be able to put weapons in space for terrestrial use at some point is not a country, but a coalition of actors (perhaps including states or failed states). One example is the transnational terrorist activity associated with Osama bin Laden. It is not obvious that space weapons would be more attractive than truck bombs to such an entity. But it was also not obvious that Aum Shinri Kyo would be able to develop chemical weapons. Another group might pay more attention to effective means of delivery than Aum Shinri Kyo did in its relatively ineffective release of sarin in the Tokyo subway system. If incidental development via commercial, reusable space systems is taken into account, the difference between a truck bomb and a space cargo recovery module bomb might be only a question of time and selection of suitable ordnance. The obvious circumstance for such a coalition actor to consider space weapons is to defeat its perceived threat. The other circumstances seem relevant only to nation-states. However, this case implicitly exploits capabilities, such as space launch, resulting from the endeavors of nation-states or their commercial industries. Such a group is, by definition, criminal because it uses violence and is not a state. The U.S. concern is not with precedent or competition but the criminal act. So, as with the rogue states, the alternatives are intrusive international intervention, preemptive unilateral action,8 and preparation for conflict. To the degree that this activity is criminal and is embedded in ordinary commerce, the United states would prefer to use police and intelligence services, rather than the military, to deal with such entities. However, for some time to come, it is likely that only the military would have the means for surveillance, inspection, and interdiction in space—and only if it recognizes the threat.

# Aerospace Advantage

## Space Weapons k Aerospace

And, Space Weapons Development Could Give the Aerospace Industry a Much-Needed Jolt

Aviation Week 2k7

(“ASAT Test Could Lift Small Sat, Space Spending,” pg online @ http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story\_generic.jsp?channel=space&id=news/ASAT01237.xml&headline=ASAT%20Test%20Could%20Lift%20Small%20Sat,%20Space%20Spending //ef)

The United States should harden defenses around its space-based assets, experts say, and a recent Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) attack test could lift the space segment of the defense industry and finally force a widespread debate over U.S. national security space policy, analysts suggest. "You'll need a balance of defensive and offensive capabilities," Heritage Foundation analyst Baker Spring said Jan. 22 at a Capitol Hill forum hosted by the Marshall Institute's ongoing National Security Space project. "Ironically, the Chinese ASAT test should 'boost' the prospects for space-based missile defense," said Jeff Kueter, the institute's president. "If the international community is truly worried about the debris-generating effects of ASAT weapons, then it ought to embrace, indeed demand, development and deployment of boost-phase missile defenses capable of intercepting ASAT missiles long before they reach their satellite targets. "Combined with a new emphasis on satellite protection, ground-based replenishment capabilities and space-based missile defenses could frustrate any attempts to block the peaceful use of space by America and her allies," Kueter continued. Spring said that vital U.S. interests at stake include protecting U.S. and allied territories against weapons that are based in space or transit space, projecting U.S. military power around the world, countering space systems controlled by hostile powers, monitoring weapons programs and eavesdropping on communications. Peter Hays, a Science Applications International Corp. employee and senior policy analyst supporting the plans and programs division at the Defense Department's National Space Security Office, said that small, distributive space-based systems could particularly benefit compared with larger satellites - speeding up a shift that already started. **The new attention could even re-energize the U.S. aerospace industry**, he said. "It could be a fire under people that was lacking," Hays said. "I wouldn't be surprised if other things get energized."

# Space-Based BMD Advantage

## 1AC BMD Advantage

### First. NMD is inevitable, the only thing that matters now is the type of system the US deploys

The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 2k6

(The Independent Working Group - made up of over 25 Professors, Generals, Ambassadors and Analysts,“Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century: 2007 Report”, http://www.claremont.org/static/IWGreport.pdf)

Missile defense has entered a new era. The decades-long debate over whether to protect the American people from the threat of ballistic missile attack has been settled – and settled unequivocally in favor of missile defense. The rigid constraints of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which made the construction of effective anti-missile capabilities impossible during the decades of the Cold War, are now a thing of the past. What remains an open question is what shape the American missile defense system will take in the years ahead.

### And, even if politics change independently an effective Space Based Missile Defense will be impossible without space control

Kagan 2k

(Donald, Gary, and Thomas, senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for international Peace and Schmitt, Senior Fellow @ the Project for a New American Century, 2000 September, “Building America’s Defenses”, http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf )

**No system of missile defenses can be fully effective without placing sensors** and **weapons in space**. Although this would appear to be creating a potential new theater of warfare, in fact space has been militarized for the better part of four decades. Weather, communications, navigation and reconnaissance satellites are increasingly essential elements in American military power. Indeed, U.S. armed forces are uniquely dependent upon space. As the 1996 Joint Strategy Review, a precursor to the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, concluded, “Space is already inextricably linked to military operations on land, on the sea, and in the air.” The report of the National Defense Panel agreed: “Unrestricted use of space has become a major strategic interest of the United States.” Given the advantages U.S. armed forces enjoy as a result of this unrestricted use of space, it is shortsighted to expect potential adversaries to refrain from attempting to offset to disable or offset U.S. space capabilities. And with the proliferation of space know-how and related technology around the world, our adversaries will inevitably seek to enjoy many of the same space advantages in the future. Moreover, “space commerce” is a growing part of the global economy. In 1996, commercial launches exceeded military launches in the United States, and commercial revenues exceeded government expenditures on space. Today, more than 1,100 commercial companies across more than 50 countries are developing, building, and operating space systems. Many of these commercial space systems have direct military applications, including information from global positioning system constellations and better than- one-meter resolution imaging satellites. Indeed, 95 percent of current U.S. military communications are carried over commercial circuits, including commercial communications satellites. The U.S. Space Command foresees that in the coming decades, an adversary will have sophisticated regional situational awareness. Enemies may very well know, in near-real time, the disposition of all forces….In fact, national military forces, paramilitary units, terrorists, and any other potential adversaries will share the high ground of space with the United States and its allies. Adversaries may also share the same commercial satellite services for communications, imagery, and navigation….The space “playing field” is leveling rapidly, so U.S. forces will be increasingly vulnerable. Though adversaries will benefit greatly from space, losing the use of space may be more devastating to the United States. It would be intolerable for U.S. forces...to be deprived of capabilities in space. In short, the unequivocal supremacy in space enjoyed by the United States today will be increasingly at risk. As Colin Gray and John Sheldon have written, “Space control is not an avoidable issue. It is not an optional extra.” For U.S. armed forces to continue to assert military preeminence, control of space – defined by Space Command as “the ability to assure access to space, freedom of operations within the space medium, and an ability to deny others the use of space” – must be an essential element of our military strategy. If America cannot maintain that control, its ability to conduct global military operations will be severely complicated, far more costly, and potentially fatally compromised. The complexity of space control will only grow as commercial activity increases. American and other allied investments in space systems will create a requirement to secure and protect these space assets; they are already an important measure of American power. Yet it will not merely be enough to protect friendly commercial uses of space. As Space Command also recognizes, the United States must also have the capability to deny America's adversaries the use of commercial space platforms for military purposes in times of crises and conflicts. Indeed, space is likely to become the new “international commons,” where commercial and security interests are intertwined and related. Just as Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote about “sea-power” at the beginning of the 20th century in this sense, American strategists will be forced to regard “space-power” in the 21st. To ensure America's control of space in the near term, the minimum requirements are to develop a robust capability to transport systems to space, carry on operations once there, and service and recover space systems as needed. As outlined by Space Command, carrying out this program would include a mix of reuseable and expendable launch vehicles and vehicles that can operate within space, including “space tugs to deploy, reconstitute, replenish, refurbish, augment, and sustain" space systems. But, over the longer term, maintaining control of space will inevitably require the application of force both in space and from space, including but not limited to antimissile defenses and defensive systems capable of protecting U.S. and allied satellites; space control cannot be sustained in any other fashion, with conventional land, sea, or airforce, or by electronic warfare. This eventuality is already recognized by official U.S. national space policy, which states that the “Department of Defense shall maintain a capability to execute the mission areas of space support, force enhancement, space control and force application.” (Emphasis added.) In sum, the ability to preserve American military preeminence in the future will rest in increasing measure on the ability to operate in space militarily; both the requirements for effective global missile defenses and projecting global conventional military power demand it. Unfortunately, neither the Clinton Administration nor past U.S. defense reviews have established a coherent policy and program for achieving this goal.

### Its try or die - a terrestrial based NMD system alone would be perceived as an offensive maneuver, only a Spaced based missile defense system will allow the US to act as an independent arbiter, creating a new era of world peace

Dolman 2k2

(Everett C., Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2002 Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age)

Without question, from military applications and strategic perspectives, space-based BMD systems are superior to terrestrial (ground, sea, or air) based ones. They also have exceptional political advantages. Any BMD system will receive criticism from potential adversaries, as is evident with the routine vocal opposition that comes from Russia and China to any proposed US TMD system. Because of criticism and retaliatory threats made by the opposing states, domestic and allied support has been hesitant and unsure. If the state is willing to deploy BMD anyway, by using a space-based system instead of a ground-based one it should be able to gradually regain widespread popular support. One of the advantages of the mobile TMD system, say its advocates, is that it could be dispatched to threatened areas as needed. True enough, but imagine the problems associated with some possible deployments – to Israel, say, or to Taiwan. As much as the US would insist that the deployment was for defensive purposes only, it would be a clear and possibly inflammatory sign of preference for one side over the other. A space-based system would forever be on alert, and would avoid the political problems of terrestrial basing altogether. The US would not have to physically deploy to the threatened territory to be able to intercept and destroy hostile missile activity – regardless of the side that launches first. US impartiality could be asserted and maintained. Retaliations, too, could be controlled. While a US TMD battery in Israel could conceivably shoot down an incoming ballistic missile from Iraq, what would prevent the Israeli’s from shooting back in anger? The US would need to deploy the system in both states. Eventually, they would have to be deployed in all states, and any hope of countering the space-based system with a fiscal restraint argument would be lost. Moreover, the human operators of the TMD battery would be at risk. Their capture or casualties in their ranks could force the US to get directly involved in the conflict. Knowing this, they could be particularly desirable targets for either side. In other instances, the US might not have the time to deploy a TMD battery to a hostile theater, or may be politically unable to do so. The case of an Indian-Pakistan or an Iraq-Iran exchange comes readily to mind. In all these described circumstances, with a space-based BMD system the US could effectively uphold the principle that aggression is wrong in international politics, first stated In George Bush’s post-war declaration of a New World Order. The US could stop the launching of missiles at any state from any state or sub-state actor, without taking sides or further inflaming the issue. If the US were willing to do so, and would act decisively and non-arbitrarily to prevent any hostile aggression from crossing national borders, the US owned and operated space-based BMD system could be seen as a global asset. The world would be free of the fear of missile-based nuclear war. As a critical element of an overall astropolitik strategy, it has tremendous political advantage and virtually no political liability.

### Space Control and a Space Based Missile Defense System are essential to protect America from a crippling WMD and EMP ballistic missile attack

The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2k6

(The Independent Working Group -made up of over 25 Professors, Generals, Ambassadors and Analysts, in “Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century: 2007 Report”, http://www.claremont.org/static/IWGreport.pdf)

Yet there is ample reason for concern. The threat environment confronting the United States in the twenty-first century differs fundamentally from that of the Cold War. An unprecedented number of international actors have now acquired – or are seeking to acquire – ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Rogue states, chief among them North Korea and Iran, have placed a premium on the acquisition of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the means to deliver them, and are moving rapidly toward that goal. Russia and China, traditional competitors of the United States, continue to expand the range and sophistication of their strategic arsenals. And a number of asymmetric threats – including the possibility of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) acquisition by terrorist groups or the decimation of American critical infrastructure as a result of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) – now pose a direct threat to the safety and security of the United States. Moreover, the number and sophistication of these threats are evolving at a pace that no longer allows the luxury of long lead times for the development and deployment of defenses. In order to address these increasingly complex and multifaceted dangers, **the U**nited **S**tates **must deploy a system that is capable of comprehensive protection of** the **American** homeland as well as its overseas forces and its allies from the threat of ballistic missile attack. Over the long term, U.S. defenses also must be able to dissuade would-be missile possessors from costly investments in missile technologies, and to deter future adversaries from confronting the United States with WMD or ballistic missiles. Our strategic objective should be to make it impossible for any adversary to influence U.S. decision-making in times of conflict through the use of ballistic missiles or WMD blackmail. These priorities necessitate the deployment of a system capable of constant defense against a wide range of threats in all phases of flight: boost, midcourse, and terminal. A layered system – encompassing ground-based (area and theater anti-missile assets) and sea-based capabilities – would provide multiple opportunities to destroy incoming missiles in various phases of flight. A truly global capability, however, cannot be achieved without a missile defense architecture incorporating interdiction capabilities in space as one of its key operational elements. In the twenty-first century, space has replaced the seas as the ultimate frontier for commerce, technology and national security. The benefits of space-based defense are manifold. The deployment of a robust global missile defense that includes space-based interdiction capabilities will make more expensive, and therefore less attractive, the foreign development of technologies needed to overcome it, particularly with regard to ballistic missiles. Indeed, the enduring lesson of the ABM Treaty era is that the absence of defenses, rather than their presence, empowers the development of offensive technologies that can threaten American security and the lives of American citizens. And access to space, as well as space control, is key to future U.S. efforts to provide disincentives to an array of actors seeking such power.

## BMD = Weaponization

### Deploying BMD spurs space weaponization

Gilbert 10

(Jo-Anne, PhD candidate and research assistant at the Griffith Asia Institute, “A Spoon Full Of Sugar Makes The Medicine Go Down? An Analysis Of The Obama Administration’s ‘New’ National Space Policy,” September, http://sustainablesecurity.org/article/spoon-full-sugar-makes-medicine-go-down-analysis-obama-administration%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98new%E2%80%99-national-space)

BMD, nuclear issues, and space weaponisation are intrinsically linked. The paradox of the push towards BMD capacity is that it deepens the US military’s already acute dependence on space systems for their operational requirements, subsequently increasing their sense of vulnerability. And, while the nuclear taboo has resulted in the ever-increasing lethality of conventional weapons, it is also spurring the development of near-space and space-enabled programs. An example is the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon, an integral component of the ‘Prompt Global Strike’ capacity - which envisages the US being able to strike a target anywhere on Earth within sixty minutes. Additionally, although he has not explicitly linked his disarmament agenda to BMD, Obama’s push for a nuclear-free world has the same motivation and justification as Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. On the other hand, US BMD systems potentially neutralise the nuclear deterrence of states such as China, thereby providing an incentive for them to pursue weaponisation. Tied to these developments is the fact that Obama is the first Democrat to take up a Presidency where the narrative of BMD is well entrenched; that is, the discourse about BMD is no longer about whether or not to support the program, but rather, what form of BMD to support.(8) The change in the base level of narrative becomes more important considering the linkage between space weapons and BMD; progression in BMD technology, and its acceptability in political and public discourse increases the chance that space weapons may become a solution.

# Solvency

### And, Space weapons are technically feasible – NO credible scientific mind thinks we cant build them

Dolman and Cooper 2k11

(Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, and Henry, PhD and Former Deputy for the Strategic and Space Systems, “Increasing the Military Uses of Space,” pg online @ http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf //ef)

Space Weapons Are Possible Arguments in the first category spill the most ink in opposition, but they are relatively easy to dispatch. Consider first that history is littered with prophesies of technical and scientific inadequacy, such as Lord Kelvin's famous retort, "Heavier-than-air flying machines are impossible." Kelvin, a leading physicist and president of the Royal Society, made this boast in 1895, and no less an inventor than Thomas Edison agreed. The possibility of spaceflight prompted even more gloomy pessimism. A New York Times editorial in 1921 excoriated Robert Goddard for his silly notions of rocket-propelled space exploration (an opinion it has since retracted): "Goddard does not know the relation between action and reaction and the need to have something better than a vacuum against which to react. He seems to lack the basic knowledge ladled out daily in high schools." Compounding its error in judgment, opining in 1936, the Times stated flatly, "A rocket will never be able to leave the Earth's atmosphere."3 Bluntly negative scientific opinion on the possibility of space weapons writ large has been weeded out over time. No credible scientist today makes the claim of impossibility, and so less encompassing arguments are now the rule. The debate has moved to more subtle and scientifically sustainable arguments that a particular space weapon is not feasible. Mountains of mathematical formulae have been piled high in an effort, one by one, simply to bury the concept. But these limitations on specific systems are less due to theoretical analysis than to assumptions about future funding and available technology.4 The real objection, too often hidden from view, is that a particular weapons system or capability cannot be developed and deployed within the planned budget or within narrowly specified means. When one relaxes those assumptions, opposition on technical grounds generally falls away. Furthermore, counterexamples exist—for example, the Brilliant Pebbles space-based interceptor system was the most advanced defense concept to emerge from the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). After a comprehensive series of technical reviews by even the strongest critics in 1989, it achieved major defense acquisition program status in 1990, was curtailed by congressional cuts in 1991 and 1992, and then was canceled by the Clinton administration in 1993. But the cancellation of the most advanced, least expensive, and most cost-effective missile defense system produced by the SDI program was for political, not technical, reasons.5 The devil may very well be in the details. But when critics oppose an entire class of weapons based upon analyses that show particular weapons will not work, their arguments fail to consider the inevitable arrival of fresh concepts or new technologies that change all notions of current capabilities. Have we thought out the details enough to say categorically that no technology will allow for a viable space weapons capability? If so, then the argument is pat; no counter is possible. But if there are technologies or conditions that could allow for the successful weaponization of space, then ought we not argue the policy details first, lest we be swept away by a course of action that merely chases the technology wherever it may go?

### And, U.S. Leadership is necessary – leading on Space Weapons Prevents Space Arms Race and Ensures Long-term Sustainable Peace and Prosperity

Dolman and Cooper 2k11

(Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, and Henry, PhD and Former Deputy for the Strategic and Space Systems, “Increasing the Military Uses of Space,” pg online @ http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf //ef)

With great power comes great responsibility. If the United States deploys and uses its military space force in concert with allies and friends to maintain effective control of space in a way that is perceived as tough, nonarbitrary, and efficient, adversaries would be discouraged from fielding opposing systems. Should the United States and its allies and friends use their advantage to police the heavens and allow unhindered peaceful use of space by any and all nations for economic and scientific development, control of low Earth orbit over time would be viewed as a global asset and a collective good. In much the same way it has maintained control of the high seas, enforcing international norms of innocent passage and property rights, the United States could prepare outer space for a long-overdue burst of economic expansion. There is reasonable historic support for the notion that the most peaceful and prosperous periods in modern history coincide with the appearance of a strong, liberal hegemon. America has been essentially unchallenged in its naval dominance over the last 60 years and in global air supremacy for the last 15 or more. Today, there is more international commerce on the oceans and in the air than ever. Ships and aircraft of all nations worry more about running into bad weather than about being commandeered by a military vessel or set upon by pirates. Search and rescue is a far more common task than forced embargo, and the transfer of humanitarian aid is a regular mission. Lest one think this era of cooperation is predicated on intentions rather than military stability, recall that the policy of open skies advocated by every President since Eisenhower did not take effect until after the fall of the Soviet Union and the singular rise of American power to the fore of international politics. The legacy of American military domination of the sea and air has been positive, and the same should be expected for space. As leader of the international community, the United States finds itself in the unenviable position of having to make decisions for the good of all. No matter the choice, some parties will benefit and others will suffer. The tragedy of American power is that it must make a choice, and the worst choice is to do nothing. Fortunately, the United States has a great advantage: its people's moral ambiguity about the use of power. There is no question that corrupted power is dangerous, but perhaps only Americans are so concerned with the possibility that they themselves will be corrupted. They fear what they could become. No other state has such potential for self-restraint. It is this introspection, this angst, that makes America the best choice to lead the world today and tomorrow. America is not perfect, but perhaps it is perfectible, and it is preferable to other alternatives that will lead if America falters at the current crossroad. Space weapons, along with the parallel development of information, precision, and stealth capabilities, represent a true revolution in military affairs. These technologies and capabilities will propel the world into an uncertain new age. Only a spasm of nuclear nihilism could curtail this future. By moving forward against the fears of the many, and harnessing these new technologies to a forward-looking strategy of cooperative advantage for all, the United States has the potential to initiate mankind's first global golden age. The nature of international relations and the lessons of history dictate that such a course begin with the vision and will of a few acting in the benefit of all. America must lead, for the benefit of all.

# Weaponization Inevitable

## Weaponization Inevitable

### Weaponization of space is inevitable – technological advancement and rivalry

Huntley 2k10

(Senior Lecturer at Naval Postgraduate School Director, Simons Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research at Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, Associate Professor at Hiroshima Peace Research Institute, Hiroshima City University; Director, Global Peace and Security Program at Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, (Wade L. Huntley, Joseph G. Bock, and Miranda Weingartner “Planning the Unplannable: Scenarios on the future of space,” February 2010, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026596460900126X)

Behind these concerns, however, has been a consistent presumption that the increasing militarization of space and the ever-present potential for space-related combat are an inevitable result of natural historical progression. For example, the US Space Command's widely-circulated 1998 “Vision for 2020” anticipated that space would eventually “evolve into a separate and equal medium of warfare” and outlined requisite US preparations for that inevitability.9 The subsequent and more notorious report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, chaired by soon-to-be US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, viewed the eventual extension of warfare into space a “virtual certainty”, famously warning of an impending “Space Pearl Harbor”, and recommended that the USA “vigorously pursue” full-scale capabilities for space weapons deployment. The Obama administration seems set to take US space policy in different directions, but reflecting convergent concerns. As a candidate, the future president explicitly opposed “the stationing of weapons in space and the development of anti-satellite weapons” but simultaneously recognized the need “to protect [US] assets in space” and supported programs “to make US systems more robust and less vulnerable.”11 Shortly after his inauguration, President Obama reaffirmed this position by declaring his intention to seek a ban on space weapons; but White House policy emphasized barring weapons that could interfere with US satellites, thereby linking the policy directly to securing US space-based capabilities.12 The new directions of the present administration encourage long-standing advocates of more multilateral approaches to space security challenges. However, these directions are ambivalent on the deeper presumption of the inevitability of space-based conflict, if not weaponization. Recent interest among US military strategists in the prerequisites for establishing and maintaining “space deterrence”13 reflect continuity in this vein of thinking. Notably, many supporters of establishing treaty-based control of future military-related space activities share the judgment that technological advancement is creating genuine security implications rendering existing space regulation increasingly insufficient, and encouraging the expectation that, absent stronger controls, weaponization may indeed be inevitable. Here also, China's ASAT-testing satellite shoot-down has been taken as a demonstration of these conclusions.16 Whereas space nationalists and space globalists differ markedly on prescriptions, the underlying diagnoses of contemporary forces and prospects are more convergent. The “realism” of the appeal among lesser-powered states of treaty-based regime solutions to space weaponization concerns underscores the observation, noted above, that “great” and “lesser” powers share a similar diagnosis of the underlying space security condition: namely, that inevitable technological advancement combined with the anarchic rivalry of states will, in the absence of restraint, lead ineluctably to the weaponization of space. These outlooks vary less on the nature of the political forces driving current circumstances than on the possibility and desirability of containing those forces. Hence, the alternative to weaponization is sometimes presented as the preservation of space as a peaceful “sanctuary”, holding at bay the terrestrial pressures that would otherwise invade the pristine space environment.19 Among other things, such visions can explore how alternative futures in space are intimately linked to terrestrial conditions. As the human presence in space develops into an integral aspect of global life, it will increasingly reflect the prevailing conditions of global life. Anticipation of space weaponization premises continued earthly insecurity and conflict, while ambitions for growing commercial and exploratory development of space presume increasing international integration and collaboration. A future in which space becomes a domain of conflict and arms race competition may be irreconcilable with visions for increasing peaceful human presence embodied in today's growing commercial and exploratory activities. Choices among alternative futures for the human presence in space may depend upon choices among alternative futures for life on Earth as well.

### Weaponization is inevitable – it’s just a question of who gets there first

Dolman and Cooper 2k11

(Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, and Henry, PhD and Former Deputy for the Strategic and Space Systems, “Increasing the Military Uses of Space,” pg online @ http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf //ef)

All states will oppose an American military occupation of space, and their combined power will accelerate the demise of the United States. There is no doubt that the United States will be opposed in its efforts to dominate space militarily. **There will always be fear that any state attempting to enhance its power may use it to act capriciously, but to suggest that the inevitable result is a space arms competition is the worst kind of mirrorimaging**. If the United States, in the very near future, were to seize space, it would do so in an attempt to extend its current hegemonic power. Other states may feel threatened by this and will certainly begrudge it, but would any be willing to bankrupt their economies to develop the multi-trillion-dollar infrastructure necessary to defeat the United States in space, all the way up the daunting gravity well of Earth? Especially after the first billions were spent and a weapons system was launched, if the United States showed the will to destroy that rocket in flight (or the laser on the ground), how long would another state be willing to sustain its commitment to replacing America as controller of space? **On the other hand, any attempt by another power to seize and control space must be viewed as an attempt to overturn the extant international order, to replace America as the global hegemo**n. The United States**, with investment already made in the necessary space infrastructure, would be forced to compete or cede world leadership**—the **latter an unlikely decision, one never historically taken by the reigning hegemon.** **The lesson is unambiguous; if you want an arms race in space, wait for it.** But here is where the paradox of opposing weapons in space is most apparent. On the one hand, we are told that if the United States weaponizes space, it will accelerate its own demise. The expense is too great, the ill will it fosters too encumbering, and the security too fleeting. Space cannot be controlled and therefore combat will occur, because to allow the United States to control space is tantamount to serving forever under its imperial thumb. Oddly, space weaponization is said to be both empowering and crippling—whichever argument appears most persuasive at the time.

## Weaponization Inevitable

### 1. The militarization of space is inevitable – globalization, aerospace competition, and dual-use technologies. Unchecked militarization results in miscalculations and global nuclear war

Ross 2009

(Sherwood Ross is a reporter for the Chicago Daily News and Rueters, “Space Race Hikes Risk of Nuclear War” accessed 7/4/10 http://www.opednews.com/articles/Space-Race-Hikes-Risk-of-N-by-Sherwood-Ross-090330-417.html)

An unchecked race to militarize space is underway that is “increasing the risk of an accidental nuclear war while shortening the time for sanity and diplomacy to come into play to halt crises,” an authority on space warfare says. By 2025, the space capabilities of the leading space powers---the U.S., Russia, India and China---will be roughly equal “due to information sharing in a globalized economy,” says noted space researcher Matt Hoey in an exclusive interview. Hoey is international military space technology forecaster who provides analysis on issues related to technology proliferation and arms control. He is also a former senior research associate at the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies and has contributed to publications such as the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and the Space Review. Through their military and commercial research facilities, the world’s military powers are pursuing development of a reusable, unmanned, hypersonic, space-strike delivery platform that “would permit rapid precision strikes worldwide in 120 minutes or less,” Hoey said. The strike platform could loiter in near-space or in low earth orbit and assault terrestrial targets at incredible speed “with a nuclear or conventional payload and then return to any base in the world on demand,” he explained. While “there will not be a dedicated ‘space war’ in our lifetimes or our children’s,” Hoey said, “we are likely to witness acts of space warfare being committed…in concert with other theatres of combat” on land, sea, and air and cyber space.” Hoey said his research analysis suggests, “Back and forth escalation regarding military space capabilities would fuel each nation’s respective space industries as would commercial space races driven by national pride.” “If these systems are deployed in space we will be tipping the nuclear balance between nations that has ensured the peace for decades,” Hoey continued. “The military space race will serve the defense industry much like the cold war and this is already being witnessed in relation to missile defense systems.” Hoey pointed out the arms control community “is still trying to put the nuclear genie from decades ago back in the bottle” and adds “once this new genie(space war) is out it is not going back in anytime soon, either.” The five treaties governing space “are highly outdated,” Hoey said, notably the milestone “Outer Space Treaty” of 1967. Theoretically, the U.S. is also bound by The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 that declares our “activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind.” (Rep. Dennis Kucinich(D-Ohio), in introducing a bill to ban the weaponization of space, charged the Bush administration with breaking with that policy by “putting weapons in outer space to give the U.S. the power to control the world.” Kucinich charged “the Air Force is seeking permission to put both offensive and defensive weapons in space.”) Hoey said the research community is expecting space warfare systems to come from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency(DARPA) and the Air Force Research Laboratories (AFRL). But instead of doing straight military R&D in-house, the Pentagon is funding civilian research that has dual-purpose use capabilities---civilian applications as well as military. Because military space race technologies are the same as those needed to explore the heavens, service the international space station and defend against threats from near earth objects, the civilian-military partnerships “present the most challenging dilemma for the arms control community,” Hoey said. That’s because arms control proponents cannot object to their military applications without also opposing “technologies that benefit [hu]mankind.” And he warned this will continue to be the case as long as existing treaties fail to differentiate between commercial and military space technology.

### We solve and no risk of offense: the U.S. militarizing space would be benevolent, reassuring nations and deterring arms races - our evidence is comparative

Dolman 2005

(Everrett C. Dolman is an Associate of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force School of advanced and space studies, September 14, 2005, “US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space,” accessed 7/4/10 http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20&%20Space.pdf)

Indeed, it is concern for the unanticipated arrival of technology X that initially motivates my own preference for a policy advocating immediate deployment of space weapons. So long as America is the state most likely to acquire a breakthrough technology in this area, my concern is limited to the problem of letting technology take us where it will. But what if an enemy of democratic liberalism should suddenly acquire the means to place quickly and cheaply multiple weapons into orbit? The advantages gained from controlling the high ground of space would accrue to it as surely as to any liberal state, and the concomitant loss of military power from the denial of space to our already-dependent military force could cause the immediate demise of the extant international system. The longer the US dithers on its responsibilities, the more likely a potential opponent could seize low-earth orbit before America could respond. And America would respond … finally. But would another state? If America were to weaponize space today, it is unlikely that any other state or group of states would find it rational to counter in kind. The entry cost to provide the infrastructure necessary is too high; hundreds of billions of dollars, at minimum. The years of investment it would take to achieve a minimal counter-force capability—essentially from scratch—would provide more than ample time for the US to entrench itself in space, and readily counter preliminary efforts to displace it. The tremendous effort in time and resources would be worse than wasted. Most states, if not all, would opt not to counter US deployments in kind. They might oppose US interests with asymmetric balancing, depending on how aggressively America uses its new power, but the likelihood of a hemorrhaging arms race in space should the US deploy weapons there—at least for the next few years—is extremely remote. This rationality does not dispute the fact that US deployment of weapons in outer space would represent the addition of a potent new military capacity, one that would assist in extending the current period of American hegemony well into the future. This would clearly be threatening, and America must expect severe condemnation and increased competition in peripheral areas. But such an outcome is less threatening than any other state doing so. Placement of weapons in space by the United States would be perceived correctly as an attempt at continuing American hegemony. Although there is obvious opposition to the current international balance of power, the status quo, there is also a sense that it is at least tolerable to the majority of states. A continuation of it is thus minimally acceptable, even to states working towards its demise. So long as the US does not employ its power arbitrarily, the situation would be bearable initially and grudgingly accepted over time. On the other hand, an attempt by any other state to dominate space would be part of an effort to break the land-sea-air dominance of the United States in preparation for a new international order, with the weaponizing state at the top. The action would be a challenge to the status quo, not a perpetuation of it. Such an event would be disconcerting to nations that accept the current international order (including the venerable institutions of trade, finance, and law that operate within it) and intolerable to the US. As leader of the current system, the US could do no less than engage in a perhaps ruinous space arms race, save graciously decide to step aside. There is another, perhaps far more compelling reason that space weaponization will in time be less threatening to the international system than without it. One of the more cacophonous refrains against weapons procurement of any kind is that the money needed to purchase them is better spent elsewhere. It is a simple cliché but a powerful one. Space weapons in particular will be very, very expensive. Are there not a thousand uses that are more beneficial for the money? But funding for weapons does not come directly from education, or housing, or transportation budgets. It comes from military budgets. And so the question should not be directed at particular weapons, but at all weapons. Immediately we see that the impact on the budget of significant increases in space weapons will be decreases in funding for combat aircraft, the surface battle fleet, and ground forces. This creates a dilemma for both pro and anti-space weaponization camps. Space advocates must sell their ideas to fellow pro-weapons groups by making the case that the advantages they provide outweigh the capabilities foregone. This is a mighty task. The tens (likely hundreds) of billions of dollars needed to develop, test, and deploy a minimal space weapons system with the capacity to engage a few targets around the world could displace a half a dozen or more aircraft carrier battle groups, entire aircraft procurement programs (such as the F-22), and several heavy armored divisions. This is a tough sell for supporters of a strong military. It is an even more difficult dilemma for those who oppose weapons in general, and space weapons in particular. Ramifications for the most critical current function of the army, navy, and marines are profound—pacification, occupation, and control of foreign territory. With the downsizing of traditional weapons to accommodate heightened space expenditures, the ability of the US to do all three will wane significantly. At a time when many are calling for increased capability to pacify and police foreign lands, in light of the no-end-in-sight occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, space weapons proponents must advocate reduction of these capabilities in favor of a system that will have no direct potential to do so Hence, the argument that the unilateral deployment of space weapons will precipitate a disastrous arms race is misplaced. To be sure, space weapons are offensive by their very nature. They deter violence by the omnipresent threat of precise, measured, and unstoppable retaliation. They offer no advantage if the target set considered is not global. But they also offer no advantage in the mission of territorial occupation. As such, they are far less threatening to the international environment than any combination of weapons employed in their stead. A state employing offensive deterrence through space-weapons can punish a transgressor state, but is in a poor position to challenge its sovereignty. The transgressor state is less likely to succumb to the security dilemma if it perceives its national survival is not at risk. Moreover, the tremendous expense of space weapons inhibits their indiscriminate use. Over time, the world of sovereign states will recognize that the US does not threaten self-determination internally, though it challenges any attempts to intervene militarily in the politics of others, and has severely restricted its own capacity to do so. America will maintain the capacity to influence decisions and events beyond its borders, with military force if necessary. The operational deployment of space weapons would increase that capacity by providing for nearly instantaneous force projection worldwide. This force would be precise, unstoppable, and deadly. At the same time, the US must forego some of its ability to intervene directly in other states because its capacity to do so will have been diminished in the budgetary trade-offs required. Transformation of the American military assures that the intentions of current and future leaders will have but a minor role to play in international affairs. The limited requirement for collateral damage, need for precision to allay the low volume of fire, and tremendous cost of space weapons will guarantee they are used only for high value, time sensitive targets. Whether or not the United States desires to be a good neighbor is not necessary to an opposing state’s calculation of survival. Without sovereignty at risk, fear of a spacedominant American military will subside. The US will maintain its position of hegemony as well as its security, and the world will not be threatened by the specter of a future American empire. Seizing the initiative and securing low-Earth orbit now, while the US is unchallenged in space, would do much to stabilize the international system and prevent an arms race is space. From low-Earth orbit (LEO), the enhanced ability to deny any attempt by another nation to place military assets in space, or to readily engage and destroy terrestrial ASAT capacity, makes the possibility of large scale space war and or military space races less likely, not more. Why would a state expend the effort to compete in space with a superpower that has the extraordinary advantage of holding securely the highest ground at the top of the gravity well? So long as the controlling state demonstrates a capacity and a will to use force to defend its position, in effect expending a small amount of violence as needed to prevent a greater conflagration in the future, the likelihood of a future war in space is remote. Moreover, if the US were willing to deploy and use a military space force that maintained effective control of space, and did so in a way that was perceived as tough, non-arbitrary, and efficient, such an action would serve to discourage competing states from fielding opposing systems. Should the US use its advantage to police the heavens (assuming the entire cost on its own), and allow unhindered peaceful use of space by any and all nations for economic and scientific development, over time its control of LEO could be viewed as a global asset and a public good. Much in the manner that the British maintained control of the high seas, enforcing international norms of innocent passage and property rights , the US could prepare outer space for a long-overdue burst of economic expansion. Conclusions: Space weaponization is a critical and necessary component in the process of transformation well under way, a process that cannot be reversed. Once America demonstrated the capacity to strike precisely, it could only go back to the kind of indiscriminant targeting and heavy collateral damage that characterized pre-space warfare if it were engaged in a war of national survival. And if there are future technological, economic, and perhaps social benefits to be derived from developing and deploying weapons, they will certainly not come from increasing the stock of current systems. They will only come, if at all, from the development of new, highly complex and scientifically heuristic space, stealth, precision, and information systems. As leader of the international community, the United States finds itself in the unenviable position that it must make decisions for the good of all. On the issue of space weaponization, there appears no one best option. No matter the choice selected, there are those who will benefit and those who will suffer. The tragedy of American power is that it must make a choice, and the worst choice is to do nothing. And yet, in the process of choosing, it has a great advantage—the moral ambiguity of its people regarding the use of power. There is no question that corrupted power is a dangerous thing, but perhaps only Americans are so concerned with the possibility that they themselves will be corrupted. They fear what they could become. No other state has such potential for selfrestraint. It is this introspection, this self-angst that makes America the best choice to lead the world today and tomorrow. It is not perfect, but perhaps it is perfectible.

### And, at-best your impact turns are inevitable – we’ll win a risk of ours because space mil. Is inevitable it’s only a question of who can control it to secure their hegemony.

MILLER 2k2

(John J., “Our ‘Next Manifest Destiny’: America should move to control space – now, and decisively”, 7/15, National Review, l/n)

Space power is now in its infancy, just as air power was when the First World War erupted in 1914. Back then, military planes initially were used to observe enemy positions. There was an informal camaraderie among pilots; Germans and French would even wave when they flew by each other. Yet it wasn't long before the reality of war took hold and they began shooting. The skies were not to be a safe haven. The lesson for space is that some country inevitably will move to seize control of it, no matter how much money the United States sinks into feel-good projects like the International Space Station. Americans have been caught napping before, as when the Soviet Union shocked the world with Sputnik in 1957. In truth, the United States could have beaten the Soviets to space but for a deliberate slow-down strategy that was meant to foster sunny relations with the world's other superpower. The United States is the world's frontrunner in space, with about 110 military satellites in operation, compared with about 40 for Russia and 20 for the rest of the world. Yet a leadership role in space is not the same as dominance, and the United States today lacks the ability to defend its assets against rudimentary ASAT technology or to deny other countries their own weapons in space. No country appears to be particularly close to putting weapons in orbit, though the Chinese are expected to launch their first astronaut in the next year or two and they're working hard to upgrade their military space capabilities. "It would be a mistake to underestimate the rapidity with which other states are beginning to use space-based systems to enhance their security," says the just-released annual report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. At a U.N. disarmament conference two years ago, Chinese officials called for a treaty to keep weapons out of space -- a possible sign that what they really want is some time to play catch-up.

# Off-Case Answers

## At: K’s

### We need to bring realist assumptions to the space weapons debate

Dolman and Cooper 2k11

(Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, and Henry, PhD and Former Deputy for the Strategic and Space Systems, “Increasing the Military Uses of Space,” pg online @ http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf //ef)

Current international relations political theory generally divides the panoply of world views into three broad outlooks: Wilsonian idealism or liberalism, Marxist collectivism or socialism, and Hobbesian realism (see figure 19–1). Arguably the most prevalent of these—certainly among practitioners if not academics—is the last, yet it has been conspicuously absent in the academic and theoretical debates concerning space exploration. Wilsonian idealism is based on the tenets of a peaceful and democratic world order as espoused by Woodrow Wilson. It includes the notions that law and institutions are important factors leading to peace and that weapons are a basic cause of war. Hence, prevention of space weaponization through treaties and existing international organizations, completely eschewing any positive role for armed force, is its key pillar of space exploration. Equally prominent in the history of space development—due to the bipolar power structure of world politics through most of its developmental stage—has been the position of Marxist-inspired collectivists, who insist that space should not be appropriated by the nations or corporations of the Earth, and that whatever bounty is realized there must be shared by all peoples. Collectivist efforts are generally focused on legal and moral arguments binding states in a system of global wealth-sharing. Hobbesian realists, inspired in part by the political teachings of Thomas Hobbes, generally perceive the condition known as anarchy—that awful time when no higher power constrains the base impulses of men and states, and both survive by strength and wit alone—to be the underlying condition of international relations. Might indeed makes We advocate a position far less harsh than that of Hobbes, an outlook increasingly known as soft realism, as we believe that proper use of military power within a framework of laws and rules can lead to greater security and welfare for all peoples, not just the wielders of that power. We do assert, however, that the state retains its position as the primary actor in international affairs and that violence has an indisputable and continuing influence on relations between states and nonstate actors. Still, in most academic and policy debates, the realist view has been set aside (at least rhetorically) as states jockey for international space leadership. Those who even question the blanket prohibitions on weapons or market forces in space exploration are ostracized. To actually advocate weaponization in space brings full condemnation. Accordingly, the debate has not been whether space should be weaponized, but how best to prevent the weaponization of space; not whether space should be developed commercially, but how to ensure the spoils of space are nonappropriable and distributed fairly to all. There has been little room for the view that state interest persists as the prime motivator in international relations, or that state-based capitalist exploitation of outer space would more efficiently reap and distribute any riches found there. It is for these reasons, we insist here and in several other venues, that space exploration and exploitation have been artificially stunted from what might have been.2 Hence, a timely injection of realist thought may be precisely what is needed to jolt space exploration from its post-Apollo sluggishness. Our intent here, then, is to add the third point of a theoretical triangle in an arena where it had been missing, so as to center the debate on a true midpoint of beliefs, and not along the radical axis of two of the three world-views.

### And, the realist description of space is the only one that fits – states are the central actors and will compete to ensure they are safe from violence

Dolman and Cooper 2k11

(Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, and Henry, PhD and Former Deputy for the Strategic and Space Systems, “Increasing the Military Uses of Space,” pg online @ http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf //ef)

We aver that the application of space technology to military operations is simply the latest in a logical line of techno-innovations in the continuing process of developing military theory and strategy. In its narrowest construct, astropolitical realism comprises an extension of existing theories of global geopolitics into the vast context of the human conquest of outer space. In its more general and encompassing interpretation, it is the application of the prominent and refined realist visions of state political and military competition into outer space policy, particularly the development and evolution of a new legal and political regime that maximizes both global security and prosperity. Though historians have done an adequate job of describing the realist—even a harsh realpolitik— view of humanity's tendency toward confrontational diplomatic exchange in the chronology of space exploration, no similar effort has been made to place a stringent conceptual framework around and among the many vectors of space policies and chronicles.19 Thus, we propose fitting realist elements of space politics into their proper places in space strategy. While it may seem barbaric in this modern era to continue to assert the primacy of war and violence—"high politics" in the realist vernacular—in formulations of state strategy, it would be disingenuous and even reckless to try to deny the continued dominance of the terrestrial state and the place of military action in the short history and near future of space operations. In the process, we advocate an open, honest debate about the future of American space intentions and the application of classical and emerging strategic theory to all realms of space exploration and exploitation— including: • its protection as a domain for private investment and commercialization • recognition of the emerging role of space as the critical, even quintessential, capacity for continuing American military preeminence in the international system • a thorough understanding of the astromechanical and physical properties of outer space essential for an optimum deployment of military space assets • a long-overdue development of a revamped legal and political regime based on current international realities and not Cold War fantasies.

## AT: Politics

### Support for space weapons derives support from both sides, not partisan

**Cox 2k7**

([Stan Cox](mailto:t.stan@cox.net) writer in Salina, Kansas, "Losing Our Cool: Uncomfortable Truths about Our Air-Conditioned,” Novemeber 15, 2007, World http://www.alternet.org/authors/5649/)

Congressional support for space weapons is bipartisan, led by a Space Power Caucus established in 2003. The top 15 House and top 15 Senate recipients of campaign funds from missile defense contractors are split almost evenly between the two major parties. Three of the top four House recipients are Democrats, the champion being John Murtha of Pennsylvania with $319,000 in contributions between 2001 and 2006. Rep. Murtha famously turned against the Iraq war in 2005, but he continues working hard to bring missile-defense pork projects to his state.

**And, the Plan is Bipartisan**

**Gilbert 2k10**

(Jo-Anne, Griffith Asia Institute @ Griffith University, “ A Spoon Full Of Sugar Makes The Medicine Go Down? An Analysis Of The Obama Administration’s ‘New’ National Space Policy,” 8/9, <http://sustainablesecurity.org/article/spoon-full-sugar-makes-medicine-go-down-analysis-obama-administration%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98new%E2%80%99-national-space>)

The change in language may contribute to calming the nerves of international audiences, who reacted with alarm at the unilateral tone in the Bush administration’s 2006 document. But the international audience is only part of this story. As the political backlash currently playing out regarding changes to the civil space program shows, there is considerable domestic political concern regarding space issues. And, although many of the policy entrepreneurs that pushed for the weaponisation of space during the Bush administration have moved out of policy circles, many of the ideological drivers for space weaponisation remain. **The desire to remain the world’s pre-eminent space power is bipartisan,** and the NSP reinforces the ‘leadership’ directive across all areas. Yet, while the Democrats have historically shown restraint in their commitment to BMD, the Republican Party remains committed to developing multilayered BMD systems that include space-based weapons.

**Plan is Popular and the CP is Unpopular**

**Lake 2k11**-

[Eli, national security correspondent @ The Washington Times, contributing editor @ The New Republic The Washington Times, “Republicans wary of EU code of space activity; Administration to outline defense, intelligence policy,” February 4, pg lexis)

Republican opposition in the Senate could scuttle the [Obama administration's](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T12235730489&returnToId=20_T12235793203&csi=8176&A=0.32955875646228594&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0BO%23&searchTerm=Obama%20administration's%20&indexType=P" \t "_parent) plans to sign on to the European Union's Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, an agreement that critics say could limit U.S. development and deployment of anti-satellite weapons. Key Senate Republicans are urging Secretary of State [Hillary Rodham Clinton](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T12235730489&returnToId=20_T12235793203&csi=8176&A=0.32955875646228594&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0BO%23&searchTerm=Hillary%20Rodham%20Clinton%20&indexType=P" \t "_parent) to consult with the relevant Senate panels before signing the agreement. The [Obama administration](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T12235730489&returnToId=20_T12235793203&csi=8176&A=0.32955875646228594&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0BO%23&searchTerm=Obama%20administration%20&indexType=P" \t "_parent) is expected to unveil Friday the U.S. National Security Space Strategy, a classified document outlining how the Defense Department and the intelligence community will implement the administration's space policy. An unclassified summary of that strategy obtained by The Washington Times says the United States will pursue more confidence-building mechanisms and transparency measures with regard to its activities in space. "We will consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the national security of the United States and its allies," the summary states. "We believe setting pragmatic guidelines for safe activity in space can help avoid collisions and other debris-producing events, reduce radiofrequency interference, and promote security and stability in the space domain - all of which are in the interests of all nations." However, the strategy also reserves the right to respond to aggression in space. "The United States will retain the right and capabilities to respond in self-defense, should deterrence fail. We will use force in a manner that is consistent with longstanding principles of international law, treaties to which the United States is a party, and the inherent right of self defense," it says. In recent months, the United States has reached out to the Russian and Chinese governments to discuss rules of the road for satellites, said U.S. officials familiar with the diplomacy. The Chinese so far have spurned offers to discuss space issues with the United States; the Russians have started technical talks. In 2007, the Chinese military successfully tested a ground-based missile that destroyed one of its own satellites. In 2009, a communications satellite owned by satellite-phone maker Iridium crashed into a Russian satellite over northern Siberia. Last month, an interagency group of U.S. experts concluded that the United States should sign the EU code of conduct with minimal changes to the document. Their recommendation is awaiting approval at the National Security Council. This has Republican senators [are] worried. "We are deeply concerned that the Administration may sign the United States on to a multilateral commitment with a multitude of potential highly damaging implications for sensitive military and intelligence programs (current, planned or otherwise), as well as a tremendous amount of commercial activity," the senators said in a letter to Mrs. Clinton. The letter was signed by 37 Republican senators, including Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky and Senate Minority Whip Jon Kyl of Arizona.

### And, the President doesn’t want Space Weapons – he wont push the plan or get the blame

Space Review 2k9

(Christopher Stone, pace strategy planner for the USAF, a former staff member for two US Senators, “How should we secure our space-based assets as a nation?,” pg online @ pg online @ http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1345/1 //ef)

A recent issue of Aviation Week, citing a policy document on the White House web site, reported that President Barack Obama favors a “worldwide ban on weapons that interfere with military and commercial satellites.” The report continues to say that the President’s overall goal is to keep his campaign promises of not putting weapons in space, seek rules for responsible space behavior, and “reduce U.S. vulnerabilities in space”. Will signing on to a worldwide ban on space weapons really protect America and reduce US vulnerabilities in space? This essay seeks to address this issue and provide another point of view regarding our space security and ultimately our national security as a whole.

## AT: Ozone Turn

### 1) empirically denied. We’ve been launching rockets into space and flying thousands of planes in the atmosphere for decades

### 2) ozone loss minimal and green rocketry solves

Sietzen 2005

(Frank, “The greening of rocket propulsion,” Aerospace America, July, LN)

However, initial studies indicated that potential damage from repeated launches of solid-booster-driven vehicles would not be excessive and, depending on the direction of the wind, could be mitigated. But now a new space age has dawned. This time, environmental issues are taken much more seriously in the production and maintenance of rocket propulsion systems. For satellite propulsion and new upper stages, designers are considering alternatives to hydrazine-driven thrusters. Emerging candidates include ion engines and electric systems. It is now possible that future generations of U.S. and foreign space launch vehicles, as well as engine, motor, and spacecraft on-board propulsion systems, will be driven by environmentally friendly rockets. This not only could reduce their cost and ease their handling and assembly, but also might increase the number of potential launch sites or spaceports. With little fanfare, the greening of rocketry is under way. In recent years, advances in computational and other tools have added to our understanding of atmospheric changes caused by the byproducts of space vehicle launches. These tools have yielded new data on just what happens to the Earth's atmosphere over time in areas near launch sites for large satellite-carrying vehicles.

## AT: ILaw Turn

### International law doesn’t prohibit space weapons

Rumsfeld commission 2k1

(“Chapter 3,” Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, January 11, [www.fas.org/spp/military/commission/report.htm](http://www.fas.org/spp/military/commission/report.htm) )

There is no blanket prohibition in international law on placing or using weapons in space, applying force from space to earth or conducting military operations in and through space. There are a number of specific prohibitions on activity to which the U.S. has agreed: • The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty prohibits “any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion” in outer space. • The 1967 Outer Space Treaty proscribes placing weapons of mass destruction in space or on the moon or other celestial bodies, and using the moon or other celestial bodies for any military purposes. • The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty prohibits the development, testing, or deployment of space-based components of an anti-ballistic missile system. • A number of arms control treaties are intended to prohibit the U.S and Russia from interfering with the other’s use of satellites for monitoring treaty compliance. • The 1980 Environmental Modification Convention prohibits all hostile actions that might cause long-lasting, severe or widespread environmental effects in space. It is important to note, however, that by specifically extending the principles of the U.N. Charter to space, the Outer Space Treaty (Article III) provides for the right of individual and collective self-defense, including “anticipatory self-defense.” In addition, the non-interference principle established by space law treaties would be suspended among belligerents during a state of hostilities.

## AT: Code of Conduct CP

### \*\*\*2AC\*\*\*

### 1. Perm: Do Both

### 2. Counterplan Doesn’t Solve

### a. China Will Cheat – that’s Stakelbeck and Stone

### b. Russia Will Cheat – that’s Stone

### 3. Turn: Code of Conduct is unverifiable and contrains the U.S.

Kueter 2k11

(Jeff, President of the Marshall Institute, “ Rules of the Road in Space: Does a Code of Conduct Improve U.S. Security?,” April 1, <http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=939> //ef)

Advocates of the Code believe it will spur the emergence of best practices and encourage good behavior in space. Evidence supporting that proposition is scarce. **The Code itself is little more than a statement of general principles.** Much more work is required to develop best practices and socialize good behavior in space, even if such an outcome is achievable. Without those details, subscribing to the Code is premature. **The United States would be agreeing to a process whose end is unknown and whose impact on its military and commercial interests can not be weighed**. The U.S. has other viable options to marshal the international community to grapple with the practical issues identified in the Code. The Code purports to facilitate the emergence of responsible behavior in space with the belief that a shared definition will discourage irresponsible actions. “If the Code seeks nothing more than to secure commitment to a set of vague statements, then it offers little contribution to the security of space,” Kueter argues. **“Countries that seek to deny the U.S. use of space do so to advance their own security and there is nothing in the Code that precludes them from doing so.”** **But, depending on how the Code is implemented in the U.S., it may impose important unilateral constraints on the U.S. that are not shared internationally**. And, if the Code evolves into binding commitments, it becomes an arms control agreement and, as such, deserves a much fuller vetting by the public and the Congress than it has received to date

### 4. Turn – Code is either a Treaty and Links to Politics, or An Executive Order and FAILS completely

Kueter 2k11

(Jeff, President of the Marshall Institute, “ Rules of the Road in Space: Does a Code of Conduct Improve U.S. Security?,” April 1, <http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=939> //ef)

The United States Constitution reserves for the U.S. Senate the right to provide advice and consent on all treaties entered into by the United States. Proponents of the Code are quick to point out **that it is not a treaty**, and therefore, would not require the advice and consent of the Senate. Once signed, a treaty is “implemented” domestically through legislation passed by the Congress adjusting U.S. law, budgets, and programs to comply with the treaty’s requirements. For an international agreement, like the Code, how it is implemented is less clear. **The most probable** and efficient **tool is the executive order**. The President simply will sign an order detailing general or specific steps departments and agencies must take to comply with the Code. Such an order **is not formerly reviewed**, certainly is not subject to Senate approval, and may even be classified so as to escape public scrutiny and notice altogether. Presidential executive agreement authority is important and arguments favoring wide latitude for allowing executive discretion can be made persuasively. But ***the tool can be misused and its use to advance poorly constructed policy ideas is particularly problematic.*** That is likely the case with the EU Code. The open-ended nature of the Code as presented**, lacking enforcement provisions, lacking implementation details, and lacking linguistic precision, leaves open to question how and what the President will order federal department and agencies to do**. If the implementation order is written in such a way as to compel adherence with the Code’s requirements no matter how they evolve, then the other signatories have carte blanche, knowing that whatever they can get the diplomats to agree to will be implemented with little or no congressional or public oversight. In theory, an implementation order can be written more precisely to protect U.S. interests, **but that may prove impossible given the incomplete nature of the Code.**

### 5. Turn: Space Industry –

### A. The Counterplan Collapses It

Stone 2k9

(space strategy planner for the USAF, a former staff member for two US Senators, and Executive Director of a growing Chamber of Commerce, “How should we secure our space-based assets as a nation?,” pg online @ http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1345/1 //ef)

What about space situational awareness programs, satellite systems that would be launched to monitor the surrounding areas near critical space systems? Could these be considered a threat to other nation’s satellites? Could satellites already in orbit be considered space weapons? The answer is **yes**. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union worked on what they called co-orbital ASATs where they would launch a satellite into space in order to rendezvous with another and crash into it, thereby destroying its functionality. Another aspect is the concept of using satellites as space mines. An old satellite that is no longer serving its purpose can be turned off, only to be turned back on later in order to strike other satellites. So while treaties, agreements, and codes of conduct to prevent space from becoming a battlefield sound great**, they aren’t practical or verifiable without shutting down the commercial and military space programs of the United States and all other nations in the process**. Any satellite can become a weapon if desired. They don’t have to be equipped with lasers or tungsten rods. This is one reason why this author believes the Bush Administration did not sign onto any agreement banning space weapons or increasing the reach of the Outer Space Treaty. They wanted to preserve the ability of the US to defend itself, per its authority in the US Constitution and the inherent right of self-defense established in the UN Charter. This allows the US to deploy missile defenses, keep their deterrent forces up, and launch space systems to allow American space forces to monitor the condition of our satellites.

### B. Collapses the Economy

[insert]

### 6. Arms control or codes of conduct will fail - they only allow challengers to outpace us and put our satellites in jeopardy

Kueter 2k7

(president of the George C. Marshall Institute, a nonprofit think tank dediicated to science and technology in public policy (Jeff, New Atlantis, “China's Space Ambitions -- And Ours,” Spring, lexis)

Setting aside such semantic quibbling, the real challenge now facing the United States is how best to deter, deny, and dissuade the Chinese, and other emerging space powers, from hostile actions in space. One approach would involve diplomacy and international discussions. For some time, arms-control advocates have been pushing for agreements to ban weapons in space. More recently, in light of the changed circumstances brought on by China's tests, the focus has shifted to securing "codes of conduct" and devising "rules of the road" to regulate how nation-states behave in space. Sympathetically interpreting China's recent tests as an understandable reaction to U.S. policies, arms-control advocates have characterized American actions in space as dangerous and provocative, and have condemned the United States for refusing to enter into international negotiations. Only a treaty, they argue, can restrain the Americans' aggressive tendencies. As one arms-control advocate told the Washington Post, the Chinese were responding to U.S. space policies and sending a signal to the Pentagon: "We can play this game, too, and we can play it dirtier than you." Representative Edward Markey, a Democrat from Massachusetts, told the Post that the United States must initiate "an international agreement to ban the development, testing, and deployment of space weapons and anti-satellite systems." This attitude--blaming America for other countries' actions and demanding that the United States preemptively disarm itself--is reminiscent of the old Cold War debates over nuclear weapons. Also strikingly familiar to students of the Cold War is Beijing's hypocritical hand-wringing over the specter of an arms race in, and the weaponization of, outer space. As Michael Pillsbury has pointed out, "While China has publicly assumed a leadership position in international activities to ban space weapons, there is an active group within China not only advocating the weaponization of space but also putting forth specific proposals for implementation of a Chinese space-based weapons program." Even while the PLA was successfully executing at least two anti-satellite tests, the Chinese diplomatic corps was raging against the supposed weaponization of space by the United States. At a U.N. conference on space in 2006, a Chinese Foreign Ministry official, Tang Guoqiang, complained about actions in space that could "cause serious consequences": "The policy of a certain country [i.e., the United States] to test, deploy and use weapons and weapon systems in outer space [is] disconcerting. Outer space is the common heritage of mankind and [the] weaponization of outer space is bound to trigger off [an] arms race in outer space, thus rendering outer space a new arena for military confrontation." Even after the January 2007 ASAT test, a Chinese Foreign Ministry official insisted that countries "opposed to the weaponization of space" should "join hands to realize this goal." Existing treaties allow actions to protect and defend national interests in space. Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty forbids signatories (including the United States and China) from placing nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on the Moon, and prohibits the testing of weapons, conduct of maneuvers, or construction of fortifications on the Moon and other celestial bodies. Since October 1967, when the treaty went into force, nearly every U.S. president has interpreted its requirements in such a way as to explicitly allow the development, operation, and maintenance of the space-control capabilities needed to ensure freedom of action in space and to deny such freedom of action to adversaries. During successive administrations of both political parties, the National Security Council has interpreted the treaty as not barring the deployment of space-based missile defenses or other systems to perform space-control missions. Work to draft new treaties continues apace. China and Russia have been spearheading international efforts to construct a framework to govern space. The Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) process at the U.N. Conference on Disarmament calls for formal negotiations to prohibit the placement of weapons in orbit or on celestial bodies. But whatever shreds of credibility this international process had were destroyed by the recent Chinese tests. Another diplomatic tack contemplated by those opposed to "weaponizing space" is the adoption of multilateral codes of conduct. To a certain extent, such norms will develop organically on their own, as the growing interdependence between economic and security interests forces government and commercial satellite operators to cooperate, and as Washington increasingly coordinates its space activities with military and civil space authorities in allied and friendly nations. Over time, new norms for shared space situational awareness, debris mitigation, and orbital traffic management may emerge among responsible space-faring nations. But such norms make no sense if the parties have not first built up trust. And if such norms are externally imposed, they will be nothing more than unverifiable arms control agreements in camouflage. Absent the ability to ascertain or enforce compliance, a code-of-conduct rule regime will be weak and, more likely than not, ineffectual. A rules system for space between potential adversaries that relies on voluntary compliance and lacks viable punitive measures will be a hollow one. (Nor, for that matter, would an international treaty "banning" anti-satellite testing be enforceable or verifiable; the ignominious record of enforcing and verifying treaties prohibiting activities on Earth should be proof enough of that.) The chief failing of the diplomatic approach to dealing with the new reality of space weapons is that it is blind to the reason a potential adversary like China would seek access to space in the first place--namely, the desire to be able to inflict a crippling blow against U.S. military and economic might by decapitating its surveillance and communications abilities. Those pushing for a new treaty or a code of conduct have yet to explain why China would abandon capabilities that threaten the "soft underbelly" of American military power. The Chinese regime clearly aspires to develop such capabilities; there is little reason to believe it would negotiate them away. The United States should resist calls for such futile diplomatic efforts.

## Extra 2AC/1AR Cards

### Code of Conduct is on-par worse for the U.S.

Kueter 2k11

(Jeff, President of the Marshall Institute, “ Rules of the Road in Space: Does a Code of Conduct Improve U.S. Security?,” April 1, <http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=939> //ef)

While the objectives of the Code are consistent with U.S. interests, consistency is not a justification for action when other options are available to achieve the same ends. In such a circumstance, policy makers ought to thoroughly and cautiously examine the consequences, intended and unintended, of the proffered course of action. Arguments favoring the adoption of the Code **are weak and** the practical outcomes sought are achievable through other means. The U.S. should participate as a leader in any and all international discussions about the governance and management of space, but the Code itself offers little to advance those discussions outside of what could be done and is largely happening without it. The risks the Code presents are understated, at a minimum, and in all probability entail negative consequences far in excess of the likely benefits.

### And, Code of Conduct doesn’t solve space war – space assets are too valuable

Kueter 2k11

(Jeff, President of the Marshall Institute, “ Rules of the Road in Space: Does a Code of Conduct Improve U.S. Security?,” April 1, <http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=939> //ef)

For years, national security analysts have engaged a largely esoteric debate about the militarization and weaponization of space. During the 1980s, some critics saw deployment of anti-satellite weapons and missile defenses in space as destabilizing and predicted it would incite a destructive arms race in space. Formal arms control efforts were started to “ban” space weapons. Those initiatives ultimately faltered, as did efforts to build and deploy anti-satellites (ASATs) and space-based missile defenses. The military use of space continued unabated, however, as did space’s weaponization, albeit not in the manner anticipated by national security scholars. The integration of reconnaissance, surveillance, communications, weather monitoring and other space services in real-time warfighting has steadily intensified the militarization of space. And as the military uses of space intensified, so too did interest in space weaponry. Space weapons shifted from explicit ASAT programs to electronic systems designed to jam or spoof information transmissions from space and lasers to blind satellites. China maintains an active kinetic-kill ASAT program. China’s 2007 ground-to-space test likely served twin purposes. First, it demonstrated a nascent ASAT capability in a highly visible way and second, because the target satellite was at an altitude roughly equivalent to where a U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile would deploy its penetration aids, the test is judged by some as confirmation of China’s development of ballistic missile defenses. The U.S. missile defense program was converted to perform an anti-satellite mission, but has not maintained that capability. Prior U.S. ASAT programs from the Cold War have long since been discontinued. The status of the Soviet Union’s ASAT programs perhaps is less certain, but there is no public evidence suggesting that Russia has an active program. That may not matter because space systems inherently present dual-use characteristics. Investments in on-orbit maneuverability and situational awareness can provide important contributions to space-based weapons along with their other contributions to peaceful uses of space. The kinetic destruction of satellites on-orbit envisioned by Cold War era ASAT systems can be accomplished today by maneuvering a satellite into another satellite. The recent Iridium-Cosmos collision offers ample illustration of the destructive effectiveness of such satellite-to-satellite encounters. **For years, Russia and China, along many others, have pushed an arms control proposal designed to “ban” weapons in space**. The U.S. has long opposed such a measure for a variety of reasons.9 The inability to move that proposal forward gave rise to demands for ‘rules of the road.’ An international consensus defining appropriate behavior in space, proponents claim, would diffuse pressures to weaponize space while offering impetus to address the practical concerns of many nations operating in space. Neither approach, of course, addresses the core reason why war would come to space. War will find its way to space because there are things of military value in space and their denial or destruction would net a military advantage during a conflict.

### And, the Code is Too Vague and Encroaches on Space Activities – Makes it useless

Kueter 2k11

(Jeff, President of the Marshall Institute, “ Rules of the Road in Space: Does a Code of Conduct Improve U.S. Security?,” April 1, <http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=939> //ef)

Unfortunately, the details will matter and it is in the details that the effort to grow a set of shared beliefs through diplomatic discussions falters. For example, the Code requires subscribing states to “promote the development of guidelines for space operations within the appropriate fora for the purpose of protecting the safety of space operations and the long-term sustainability of outer space activities.”11 Without additional details on what comes out of the “appropriate fora,” a state signing onto the Code risks agreeing on the basic idea – safe operations are better than unsafe operations – without any idea of what the guidelines it will be required to follow are. The guidelines may prove unacceptable because they impose restrictions on space activities that the state believes are vital to its interests. Or the guidelines may prove to be so vague as to only loosely limit operations, resulting in little improvement in safe space operations. Nevertheless, subscribing states are obligated to abide by the results. Code proponents reply to such charges with the reminder that the Code is voluntary and its requirements are

non-binding. If that is the case, the norms it strives to create are not really shared in any meaningful sense.

### The Code conflicts with U.S. priorities and risks circumvention

Kueter 2k11

(Jeff, President of the Marshall Institute, “ Rules of the Road in Space: Does a Code of Conduct Improve U.S. Security?,” April 1, <http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=939> //ef)

The Code would exert de facto influence on U.S. space programs. Take, for example, the commitment to “refrain from the intentional destruction of any on-orbit space object or other activities which may generate long-lived space debris.”12 If the Code is approved by the United States, it is difficult to foresee the United States initiating a kinetic kill or other ASAT program and avoiding being criticized sharply for failing to live up to the spirit of the Code, even though those actions are allowed. Indeed, early proponents of the Code argued for a “hedging strategy” wherein the U.S. would agree to rules of the road while pursuing research and development programs to enable deployment of space weapons should the need arise.13 If the Code is interpreted as a shared international custom or practice, the risk becomes that the non-binding and voluntary provisions will become less and less meaningful.14

### The Code is unnecessary for dialogue

Kueter 2k11

(Jeff, President of the Marshall Institute, “ Rules of the Road in Space: Does a Code of Conduct Improve U.S. Security?,” April 1, <http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=939> //ef)

Few will argue that addressing debris, avoiding accidents, and managing space traffic are unimportant concerns. Indeed, managing each is important for the continued exploitation of space. When evaluating the Code of Conduct, however, these issues need to be separated from the Code. The only judgments that matter are whether the Code is the most effective way to address those topics. Because the Code is simply a set of high-level, vague commitments, considerable work is required to operationalize its meanings. In many cases, those discussions already are ongoing and the Code does not necessarily contribute positively to them. In those cases where additional discussion is required, other models to spur international discussion exist and have a proven record of success. The Code is neither essential nor necessarily the most effective way to achieve the desired ends.

### No Enforcement or Verification Makes the Code Useless

Kueter 2k11

(Jeff, President of the Marshall Institute, “ Rules of the Road in Space: Does a Code of Conduct Improve U.S. Security?,” April 1, <http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=939> //ef)

Without punishment, do rules matter? Some proponents of the Code claim the creation of rules is sufficient because their mere existence allows the identification of rule breakers. That is true, but for what purpose? If there is no way to punish a rule-breaker, the regime of rules lacks credibility. Similarly, rule breakers have to be identified or, put another way, compliance with the Code has to be verifiable. Neither verification nor enforcement is a priority for the EU Code.

Employing a rules-based construction to govern international behavior is not unique. The Code’s proponents point to a host of other international agreements that fit the same genre, namely the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Hague Code of Conduct on Ballistic Missile Proliferation, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. Without exploring the motives and context behind the genesis of each of these agreements or their subsequent successes, failures, or sustainability, they represent a mixed bag. Each is criticized for the absence of an enforcement mechanism and none is considered successful at “stopping” the activities they were designed to address.

The EU Code constructs a “consultation mechanism” to investigate incidents and subscribing states are to agree to participate in consultations in pursuit of “mutually acceptable solutions.”18 This language is, of course, limited by other language in the document that reserves the right for states to act in their self-defense as well as the voluntary, non-binding nature of the agreement. What one state envisions as necessary for its self-defense may not been seen in the same light by the impacted party. Jamming or otherwise inhibiting satellite transmissions in unstable regions (to disorient and perhaps quell opposition groups) clearly would be in the interest of certain regimes, but also not looked upon favorably by those satellite operators whose systems are impacted.

Not all norm-building advocates dismiss the need for enforcement. The Union of Concerned Scientists, for example, place emphasis on the issue. They argue: “Because negotiated agreements can reduce the likelihood and effectiveness of a potential attack, a particularly important role for diplomacy is setting clear international norms of behavior and specified consequences for violations. Strong norms and penalties increase the political costs of aggression.”19

As presented, the Code presents a quandary. Without penalties, there is no cost for breaking the rules (aside from international condemnation, which can be done today regardless of the Code) and thus offers little prospect of advancing U.S. security interests. The U.S. will need to prepare to operate in recognition of the lack of constraint on the actions of others in space. With penalties, the Code becomes arms control.

### Code would be implemented via an executive order

Kueter 2k11

(Jeff, President of the Marshall Institute, “ Rules of the Road in Space: Does a Code of Conduct Improve U.S. Security?,” April 1, <http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=939> //ef)

The United States Constitution reserves for the U.S. Senate the right to provide advice and consent on all treaties entered into by the United States. Proponents of the Code are quick to point out that it is not a treaty, and therefore, would not require the advice and consent of the Senate. Once signed, a treaty is “implemented” domestically through legislation passed by the Congress adjusting U.S. law, budgets, and programs to comply with the treaty’s requirements. For an international agreement, like the Code, how it is implemented is less clear.

The most probable and efficient tool is the executive order. The President simply will sign an order detailing general or specific steps departments and agencies must take to comply with the Code. Such an order is not formerly reviewed, certainly is not subject to Senate approval, and may even be classified so as to escape public scrutiny and notice altogether. Presidential executive agreement authority is important and arguments favoring wide latitude for allowing executive discretion can be made persuasively. But the tool can be misused and its use to advance poorly constructed policy ideas is particularly problematic.

### Perm Ev

Dolman and Cooper 2k11

(Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, and Henry, PhD and Former Deputy for the Strategic and Space Systems, “Increasing the Military Uses of Space,” pg online @ http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf //ef)

Space weapons advocates oppose treaties and obligations and want outer space ruled at the whim of whoever holds military power. This is a false argument, completely unsupportable. There is no dichotomy demanding law or order. Solutions lie in the most effective combination of law and order. There is no desire for a legal free-for-all or an arbitrary and capricious wielding of power by one state over all others. What we advocate is a new international legal regime that recognizes the lawful use of space by all nations, to include its commercial exploitation under appropriate rules of property and responsible free market values, to be enforced where necessary by the United States and its allies.

### And, Treaties to Limit Weaponization Illegalize Missile Defense and ICBMs

Stone 2k9

(space strategy planner for the USAF, a former staff member for two US Senators, and Executive Director of a growing Chamber of Commerce, “How should we secure our space-based assets as a nation?,” pg online @ http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1345/1 //ef)

There are many other reasons to steer clear of arms control agreements regarding space. One reason is the fact that there is no clear definition of what a “space weapon” is. The term space weapon could possibly be applied to terrestrial-based systems, both defensive and offensive, that are necessary parts of our national defense strategy and architecture. A few examples of this are missile defense interceptors and ICBMs. Last year, the United States made an agreement with Poland and the Czech Republic to base ground-based missile defense interceptors and a radar to increase the reach of our layered, ground-based missile defense system against nations such as Iran in addition to systems already in place to defend against such an attack by North Korea. These missiles reach into space to intercept missiles during their mid-course phase of flight and as such could be considered a space weapon by some countries. Our Navy Standard Missile 3-equipped ships could also be considered a space weapon by some because these missiles have shown to be adaptable (once) to intercept satellites in low Earth orbit. ICBMs, a key piece of our nuclear deterrent force for over fifty years, flies through space on a ballistic flight path toward its target on Earth. This capability could also be outlawed by such a ban on space weapons. While the language on the White House website states that the ban will be on weapons that “interfere with civil and military satellites” some could interpret these systems (ICBMs and missile defense systems) as capable of “interference” because of the ability to adapt them to hit satellites in orbit, regardless if they were designed for this purpose or not.

## AT: Arms Race

### All-Purpose Answer – 1AC?

### \*\*\*Weaponization Inevitable – If the U.S. Gets there first it CONTROLS future Weaponization and SHUTS DOWN Arms Racing

Dolman and Cooper 2k11

(Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, and Henry, PhD and Former Deputy for the Strategic and Space Systems, “Increasing the Military Uses of Space,” pg online @ http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf //ef)

Space is too vast to be controlled. If one state weaponizes, then all other states will follow suit, and a crippling arms race in space will ensue. Space is indeed vast, but a quick analysis of the fundamentals of space terrain and geography shows that **control of just LEO would be tantamount to a global gate or checkpoint for entrance into space, a position that could not be flanked and would require an incredible exertion of military power to dislodge**. Thus**, the real question quickly becomes not whether the United States should weaponize space first, but whether it can afford to be the second to weaponize space**. Space has been dubbed the ultimate high ground (see figure 19–2). As with the high ground throughout history, whosoever sits ensconced upon it accrues incredible benefit on the terrestrial battlefield. This comes from the dual advantages of enhanced span of command acuity (visibility and control) and kinetic power. It is simply easier and more powerful to shoot down the hill than up it. The pace of technological development, particularly in microsatellites and networked operations, could allow a major spacefaring state to quickly establish enough independent kinetic kill vehicles in LEO (through multiple payload launches) to effectively deny entry or transit to any other state. Currently, the United States has the infrastructure and capacity to do so; China may in the very near future. Russia is also a potential candidate for a space coup. ***Should any one of these states put enough weapons in orbit, they could engage and shoot down attempts to place counterspace assets in orbit, effectively taking control of outer space***. Indeed, the potential to be gained from ensuring spacepower projection while denying that capability in others is so great that some state, some day, will make the attempt. In order to ensure that no one tries, space weapons opponents argue that the best defense is a good example. So long as the United States does not make any effort to weaponize space, why would any competing state be tempted to do so? And even if another state does attempt it, the United States has the infrastructure to quickly follow suit and commence a campaign of retrieval in space. Not only does the logic escape us, but also it seems that by waiting, the United States is guaranteeing what space weapons opponents fear most: a space arms race.

## 2AC Space Arms Race F/L

### 1. No arms race -- Weaponizing space now prevents other countries from doing it – It costs too much

**Dolman 2k5**

(Everett, Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the U.S. Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 9-14-2K5, “ U.S. Military Transformation and Weapons in Space,” For e-parliament conference on Space Security, www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20

Transform%20&%20Space.pdf //ef)

And America would respond … finally. But would another state? If America were to weaponize space today, it is unlikely that any other state or group of states would find it rational to counter in kind. The entry cost to provide the infrastructure necessary is too high; hundreds of billions of dollars, at minimum. The years of investment it would take to achieve a minimal counter-force capability—essentially from scratch—would provide more than ample time for the US to entrench itself in space, and readily counter preliminary efforts to displace it. The tremendous effort in time and resources would be worse than wasted. Most states, if not all, would opt not to counter US deployments in kind. They might oppose US interests with asymmetric balancing, depending on how aggressively America uses its new power, but the likelihood of a hemorrhaging arms race in space should the US deploy weapons there—at least for the next few years—is extremely remote.

### 2. US weaponization now doesn’t cause conflict, it’s just an extension of hegemony- if any other state acts, it’s globally destabilizing

Dolman 2k5

(Everett, Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the U.S. Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 9-14-2K5, “ U.S. Military Transformation and Weapons in Space,” For e-parliament conference on Space Security, www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20

Transform%20&%20Space.pdf //ef)

This rationality does not dispute the fact that US deployment of weapons in outer space would represent the addition of a potent new military capacity, one that would assist in extending the current period of American hegemony well into the future. This would clearly be threatening, and America must expect severe condemnation and increased competition in peripheral areas. But such an outcome is less threatening than any other state doing so. Placement of weapons in space by the United States would be perceived correctly as an attempt at continuing American hegemony. Although there is obvious opposition to the current international balance of power, the status quo, there is also a sense that it is at least tolerable to the majority of states. A continuation of it is thus minimally acceptable, even to states working towards its demise. So long as the US does not employ its power arbitrarily, the situation would be bearable initially and grudgingly accepted over time. On the other hand, an attempt by any other state to dominate space would be part of an effort to break the land-sea-air dominance of the United States in preparation for a new international order, with the weaponizing state at the top. The action would be a challenge to the status quo, not a perpetuation of it. Such an event would be disconcerting to nations that accept the current international order (including the venerable institutions of trade, finance, and law that operate within it) and intolerable to the US. As leader of the current system, the US could do no less than engage in a perhaps ruinous space arms race, save graciously decide to step aside.

### 3. Space weapons are less threatening than the weapons they replace- this prevents an arms race and counterbalancing

Dolman 2k5

(Everett, Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the U.S. Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 9-14-2K5, “ U.S. Military Transformation and Weapons in Space,” For e-parliament conference on Space Security, www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20

Transform%20&%20Space.pdf //ef)

There is another, perhaps far more compelling reason that space weaponization will in time be less threatening to the international system than without it. One of the more cacophonous refrains against weapons procurement of any kind is that the money needed to purchase them is better spent elsewhere. It is a simple cliché but a powerful one. Space weapons in particular will be very, very expensive. Are there not a thousand uses that are more beneficial for the money? But funding for weapons does not come directly from education, or housing, or transportation budgets. It comes from military budgets. And so the question should not be directed at particular weapons, but at all weapons. Immediately we see that the impact on the budget of significant increases in space weapons will be decreases in funding for combat aircraft, the surface battle fleet, and ground forces. This creates a dilemma for both pro and anti-space weaponization camps. Space advocates must sell their ideas to fellow pro-weapons groups by making the case that the advantages they provide outweigh the capabilities foregone. This is a mighty task. The tens (likely hundreds) of billions of dollars needed to develop, test, and deploy a minimal space weapons system with the capacity to engage a few targets around the world could displace a half a dozen or more aircraft carrier battle groups, entire aircraft procurement programs (such as the F-22), and several heavy armored divisions. This is a tough sell for supporters of a strong military. It is an even more difficult dilemma for those who oppose weapons in general, and space weapons in particular. Ramifications for the most critical current function of the army, navy, and marines are profound—pacification, occupation, and control of foreign territory. With the downsizing of traditional weapons to accommodate heightened space expenditures, the ability of the US to do all three will wane significantly. At a time when many are calling for increased capability to pacify and police foreign lands, in light of the no-end-in-sight occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, space weapons proponents must advocate reduction of these capabilities in favor of a system that will have no direct potential to do so Hence, the argument that the unilateral deployment of space weapons will precipitate a disastrous arms race is misplaced. To be sure, space weapons are offensive by their very nature. They deter violence by the omnipresent threat of precise, measured, and unstoppable retaliation. They offer no advantage if the target set considered is not global. But they also offer no advantage in the mission of territorial occupation. As such, they are far less threatening to the international environment than any combination of weapons employed in their stead. A state employing offensive deterrence through space-weapons can punish a transgressor state, but is in a poor position to challenge its sovereignty. The transgressor state is less likely to succumb to the security dilemma if it perceives its national survival is not at risk. Moreover, the tremendous expense of space weapons inhibits their indiscriminate use. Over time, the world of sovereign states will recognize that the US does not threaten self-determination internally, though it challenges any attempts to intervene militarily in the politics of others, and has severely restricted its own capacity to do so. America will maintain the capacity to influence decisions and events beyond its borders, with military force if necessary. The operational deployment of space weapons would increase that capacity by providing for nearly instantaneous force projection worldwide. This force would be precise, unstoppable, and deadly. At the same time, the US must forego some of its ability to intervene directly in other states because its capacity to do so will have been diminished in the budgetary trade-offs required. Transformation of the American military assures that the intentions of current and future leaders will have but a minor role to play in international affairs. The limited requirement for collateral damage, need for precision to allay the low volume of fire, and tremendous cost of space weapons will guarantee they are used only for high value, time sensitive targets. Whether or not the United States desires to be a good neighbor is not necessary to an opposing state’s calculation of survival. Without sovereignty at risk, fear of a spacedominant American military will subside. The US will maintain its position of hegemony as well as its security, and the world will not be threatened by the specter of a future American empire.

### 4. No risk of crisis instability from space weapons- nations won’t act brashly

**Lambakis 2k1**

**(Steven, Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy, 2K1 “Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics,” Policy Review, February 1, p. 41)**

One such assumption is that military developments over the past 50 years have created a security environment in which certain tactical events or localized crises run an unacceptably high risk of triggering a general, possibly even nuclear, war. We are therefore more secure when we do nothing to upset the global military balance, especially in space -- where we station key stabilizing assets. Yet we have little experience in reality to ground this freely wielded and rather academic assumption. By definition, anything that causes instability in armed relationships is to be avoided. But would "shots" in space, any more than shots on the ground, be that cause? When we look at what incites war, history instructs us that what matter most are the character and motivation of the states involved, along with the general balance of power (i.e., are we in the world of 1914, 1945, or 2001?). Fluctuations in national arsenals, be they based on earth or in space, do not determine, but rather more accurately are a reflection of, the course of politics among nations. In other words, it matters not so much that there are nuclear weapons, but rather whether Saddam Hussein or Tony Blair controls them and in what security context. The same may be said for space weapons. The sway of major powers historically has regulated world stability. It follows that influential countries that support the rule of law and the right of all states to use orbits for nonaggressive purposes would help ensure stability in the age of satellites. The world is not more stable, in other words, if countries like the United States, a standard-bearer for such ideas, "do nothing." Washington's deterrence and engagement strategies would assume new dimensions with the added influence of space weapons, the presence of which could help bolster peacemaking diplomacy and prevent aggression on earth or in space. Insofar as we have no experience in space warfare, no cases exist to justify what is in essence a theoretically derived conclusion -- that space combat must be destabilizing. We do know, however, that the causes of war are rarely so uncomplicated. Small events, by themselves, seldom ever explain large-scale events. When ardent Israeli nationalist Ariel Sharon visited this past fall the holy site around the Al Aksa Mosque at Jerusalem's Temple Mount, his arrival fired up a series of riots among impassioned Palestinians and so widened the scale of violence that it kicked up the embers of regional war yet again. Yet the visit itself would have been inconsequential were it not for the inveterate hostility underlying Israeli-Palestinian relations. Likewise, World War I may have symbolically begun with the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo. Yet a serious student of history would note that the alliances, the national goals and military plans, and the political, diplomatic, and military decisions of the major European powers during the preceding years and months were the true causes of the erosion in global strategic stability. By extension, if decisions to go to war are set on a hair-trigger, the reasons for the precarious circumstances extend far beyond whether a communications or imaging platform is destroyed in space rather than on earth. Those who believe we run extraordinary risks stemming from clouded perceptions and misunderstandings in an age of computerized space warfare might want to take a look at some real-world situations of high volatility in which potentially provocative actions took place. Take, for example, the tragedies involving the USS Stark and USS Vincennes. In May 1987, an Iraqi F-1 Mirage jet fighter attacked the Stark on patrol to protect neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf, killing 37 sailors. Iraq, a "near-ally" of the United States at the time, had never before attacked a U.S. ship. Analysts concluded that misperception and faulty assumptions led to Iraq's errant attack. The memory of the USS Stark no doubt preoccupied the crew of the USS Vincennes, which little over a year later, in July 1988, was also on patrol in hostile Persian Gulf waters. The Vincennes crew was involved in a "half war" against Iran, and at the time was fending off surface attacks from small Iranian gunboats. Operating sophisticated technical systems under high stress and rules of engagement that allowed for anticipatory self-defense, the advanced Aegis cruiser fired anti-aircraft missiles at what it believed to be an Iranian military aircraft set on an attack course. The aircraft turned out to be a commercial Iran Air flight, and 290 people perished owing to mistakes in identification and communications. To these examples we may add a long list of tactical blunders growing Out of ambiguous circumstances and faulty intelligence, including the U.S. bombing in 1999 of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during Kosovo operations. Yet though these tragic actions occurred in near-war or tinderbox situations, they did not escalate or exacerbate local instability. The world also survived U.S.-Soviet "near encounters" during the 1948 Berlin crisis, the 1961 Cuban missile crisis, and the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. Guarded diplomacy won the day in all cases. Why would disputes affecting space be any different? In other words, it is not at all self-evident that a sudden loss of a communications satellite, for example, would precipitate a wider-scale war or make warfare termination impossible. In the context of U.S.-Russian relations, communications systems to command authorities and forces are redundant. Urgent communications may be routed through land lines or the airwaves. Other means are also available to perform special reconnaissance missions for monitoring a crisis or compliance with an armistice. While improvements are needed, our ability to know what transpires in space is growing -- so we are not always in the dark. The burden is on the critics, therefore, to present convincing analogical evidence to support the notion that, in wartime or peacetime, attempts by the United States to control space or exploit orbits for defensive or offensive purposes would increase significantly the chances for crisis instability or nuclear war. In Washington and other capitals, the historical pattern is to use every available means to clarify perceptions and to consider decisions that might lead to war or escalation with care, not dispatch.

## Additional 2AC/1AR Answers

### Waiting to deploy space weapons ensures an space arms race we can’t win

Dolman 2k5

(Everett, Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the U.S. Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 9-14-2K5, “ U.S. Military Transformation and Weapons in Space,” For e-parliament conference on Space Security, www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20

Transform%20&%20Space.pdf //ef)

The strategy is thus the greatest hope for advantage of two sides with diametrically opposed aims, but it is not true compromise, the situation where both sides forego some of their aims so that others can be met. It is instead the forwarding of a competition that appears unwinnable to a later time, when the odds will have changed to favor one side or the other. It is a postponement of competition, not a resolution of it. It is therefore fatally flawed in its employ as either anchor for or bulwark against the possibility of an arms race. As has been argued, should the US attempt to weaponize space today, no other state could counter it. No space arms race would unfold. To wait until another state is capable of deploying space weapons—and one would have to assume such a state would postpone its attempt until it could launch a considerable force into orbit—a space race is all but guaranteed! And not only is the hedging strategy particularly susceptible to the technology X argument above, it argues for a reactive posture from the United States. Hoping that either weapons will or will not come is a poor substitute for strategy. In a previous work, I outlined an argument for seizure of low-earth orbit as the geopolitically determined dominant ground in the near future of warfare. The advantage of occupying the top of the gravity well is such that once ensconced, a state willing to defend its position cannot be outflanked. Attempts to dislodge it would be extremely expensive and would require enormous will on the part of an opponent. The US would have the will in such a situation, but perhaps not the funds or the capability.

### Weaponizing space now decreases the likelihood of an arms race and war – Other countries won’t expend the resources to compete with us

Dolman 2k5

(Everett, Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the U.S. Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 9-14-2K5, “ U.S. Military Transformation and Weapons in Space,” For e-parliament conference on Space Security, www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20

Transform%20&%20Space.pdf //ef)

Seizing the initiative and securing low-Earth orbit now, while the US is unchallenged in space, would do much to stabilize the international system and prevent an arms race is space. From low-Earth orbit (LEO), the enhanced ability to deny any attempt by another nation to place military assets in space, or to readily engage and destroy terrestrial ASAT capacity, makes the possibility of large scale space war and or military space races less likely, not more. Why would a state expend the effort to compete in space with a superpower that has the extraordinary advantage of holding securely the highest ground at the top of the gravity well? So long as the controlling state demonstrates a capacity and a will to use force to defend its position, in effect expending a small amount of violence as needed to prevent a greater conflagration in the future, the likelihood of a future war in space is remote. Moreover, if the U.S. were willing to deploy and use a military space force that maintained effective control of space, and did so in a way that was perceived as tough, non-arbitrary, and efficient, such an action would serve to discourage competing states from fielding opposing systems. Should the US use its advantage to police the heavens (assuming the entire cost on its own), and allow unhindered peaceful use of space by any and all nations for economic and scientific development, over time its control of LEO could be viewed as a global asset and a public good. Much in the manner that the British maintained control of the high seas, enforcing international norms of innocent passage and property rights , the US could prepare outer space for a long-overdue burst of economic expansion.

## AT: Debris Turn

### No risk of Orbital Debris –

Dolman and Cooper 2k11

(Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, and Henry, PhD and Former Deputy for the Strategic and Space Systems, “Increasing the Military Uses of Space,” pg online @ http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf //ef)

Weaponization of space will create conditions that will make space travel risky if not impossible.Having extended the illogic of opposing space weapons to the limit, opponents then take on the mechanics of war and the evils of the military. As for the first argument, orbital debris is the challenge, which the recent Chinese antisatellite (ASAT) test confirms. The destruction of its own dying satellite in 2007 created thousands of bits of debris that are now floating at orbital velocity, an expanding cloud that poses a lasting navigational hazard to legitimate space flight. True, the Chinese test was criminal, especially since it could have engaged with almost no debris remnants if it had altered its engagement path. In over a dozen antisatellite tests that the Soviet Union held in the 1970s and 1980s, only the first left appreciable debris. After that, the massive co-orbital ASAT engaged in a kinetic direction toward the Earth, down the gravity well, causing all of the detritus of the ASAT and target to burn up in the atmosphere. Indeed, in a scenario where the United States is controlling space, most engagements would occur in launch phase, before the weapons even reach orbit. Any debris that is not burned up or destroyed will fall onto the launching state. Because tested weapons systems have maximized destruction to validate capabilities does not mean that future engagements must create long-lasting debris fields. Satellites are very fragile, and a bump or a push in the wrong direction is all that is necessary to send them spinning off into a useless or uncontrollable orbit—if you get to space first. Space war does not have to be dirty war, and in fact spacefaring nations will go out of their way to ensure that it is not (an argument that nonspacefaring powers may wish to fight dirty, and the only reliable defense against them would be in space, occurs below).

## AT: Kills Tourism

### No Chance Weapons Kill Tourism

Dolman and Cooper 2k11

(Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, and Henry, PhD and Former Deputy for the Strategic and Space Systems, “Increasing the Military Uses of Space,” pg online @ http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf //ef)

The second argument concerns commerce and tourism. Opponents say that space weapons would make individuals afraid to do business in space or travel there for pleasure, for fear of being blown to smithereens. This is an emotional appeal that **has no basis in fact.** Currently, for example, weapons are pervasive on the seas, in the air, and on land, but wherever there is a dominating power, commerce and travel are secure. America's Navy has dominated the open oceans for the last half-century, ensuring that commerce is fair and free for all nations, as has its Air Force in nonterritorial airspace. A ship leaving port today is more likely than ever to make it to its destination, safer from pirates, rogue states, navigational hazards, and even weather—all due to the enforcement of the rule of law on the seas and the assistance of sea- and space-based navigational assistance. Why would American dominance in space be different

## AT: Miscalc Turn

### Multiple factors prevent miscalc, even with space to ground weapons

Preston et al 2002

(Bob, Dana J.Johnson, Sean Edwards, Michael Miller, & Calvin Shipbaugh, Analysts at Rand, Space Weapons Earth Wars, Santa Monica: RAND, 2002, [www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1209/](http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1209/) )

The responsiveness of space-based weapons may also be seen as a disadvantage. When the objective of owning weapons of mass destruction is to deter others who have weapons of mass destruction, shorter times make stable deterrence more difficult if they threaten the survivability of the opponent’s deterrent. Some have suggested that the timeliness of ground attack weapons from space would threaten the stability of nuclear deterrence. But this is not necessarily so. Because the deorbit times for practical space-based weapons are at best comparable with and generally longer than those of existing ballistic missiles, short warning times would degrade deterrence only if surveillance systems were unable to see space weapons deorbit and if the terrestrial nuclear deterrent forces were vulnerable to the space weapons. Surveillance of space for reliable attack warning is more difficult than surveillance of the earth for missile warning, but it is possible from space. However, warning of an attack is not absolutely necessary for preserving stable deterrence if enough of the opponent’s deterrent forces are survivable. Among terrestrial nuclear deterrent forces, only stationary or slow-moving surface platforms, such as silo-based missiles, would be vulnerable to a first strike from space. But thanks to accurate ballistic missiles, silobased missiles have been vulnerable for a long time, so most nuclear deterrent forces are at least partially based on mobile launchers or submarines to improve survivability. These measures are just as effective against space-based threats.

## AT: Relations/Diplomacy Turns

### Turn- Isolationism

### Little A: The benefits of weaponization outweigh any diplomatic repercussions- relations are already shot over multiple other space issues- And bowing to other nations gives them an “unreciprocated veto” of US foreign policy, undermining sovereignty

Dinerman 2k5

(Taylor, Editor and Publisher of spaceequity.Com, 2005 Sep 19th, “The Bush Administration and Space Weapons”, The Space Review, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/368/1 )

In January 2001, the Rumsfeld Commission concluded that, “An attack on elements of US space systems during a crisis or conflict should not be considered an improbable act.” Since then, in Afghanistan and Iraq, the powerful military advantage which comprehensive space power gives to the American military has been clearly demonstrated. Potential foes have taken notes and are looking at ways to hit vulnerable targets in order to create maximum damage for the minimum investment. Asymmetric space warfare will be the method of choice against America, at least for the foreseeable future. Many foes of “space weaponization” act as if they believed that the active measures to defend American satellites are a destabilizing form of space weaponization. To some extent they are right. A weapon designed to kill a kinetic energy a-sat could also be used against an enemy comsat or other spacecraft. To allow the opponents to cut up the debate into little bits and have to argue about each piece would be to repeat the mistakes of the 1970s and 1980s, when those who argued against America’s military build up forced the Reganite hawks to argue the case for each new weapon on an individual and isolated basis. Instead, the Dubya-era hawks should boldly tell their foes that the US will deploy a variety of weapons in space, and will do so on an American schedule based on a unilateral American estimate of what is needed. Neither the Canadians through NORAD nor the Europeans through NATO should be allowed a serious say in US space weapons policy. Their demands for what Walter Russell Mead called an “unreciprocated veto” over US military activity may be shrill, but since their own refusal to take US security interests into account over things like the Galileo satellite navigation system or arms sales to China there is no reason to listen to their advice on what we put into space on our own rockets. If Americans do not believe that US military supremacy is a good thing in and of itself then they will not believe that space supremacy is important either. However, if they do think that US national security has something to do with military strength, space supremacy becomes automatically a primary goal. In the end, the ability to use the ultimate high ground and to deny it to our enemies is the key to winning future conflicts. Nothing the liberals say, nor any objections from the French, should be allowed to get in the way.

### Little B: This spurs isolationism

Weekly Standard 98

(August 10 / August 17)

Among its many charming habits, the Clinton administration has repeatedly condemned all criticism of its foreign adventuring as "isolationism." But if there is anything likely to stir up the old spirit of American isolationism, it is the arrogant attempt by a world body to displace American sovereignty and American law with unaccountable, unelected quasi-governmental world institutions. Real internationalism is, now and always, internationalism that defends and vindicates American interests and American constitutional values. It's no paradox at all: Those who most want America to play a constructive role in the world must most vehemently insist that the International Criminal Court be junked.

### That causes escalatory wars and genocide

Diamond ‘96

(Larry, Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, 96 “Why the United States must remain engaged,” Orbis, Summer, Volume 40, Number 3)

Much in Nordlinger's book is wise, prudent, and morally responsible. Let us hope that we never again so demonize a global challenger that our officials are tempted to vitiate our constitution and values, or make the mistake, so tragically common in the cold war, of embracing any ethically repugnant regime that happens to be on "our side." Let us have a serious debate on our national interests and the military means we need to defend them. If we can pare our defense spending further by eliminating expensive weapons programs that are not needed or not likely to work (or even in some cases not wanted by the armed forces themselves), by all means let us do so. But let us not make the mistake - the core mistake of isolationists then and now - of assuming that a world without effective rules and the power to enforce them would be any more benign than Hobbes imagined it would be, or that a world full of escalating rivalries, arms buildups, aggression, repression, genocide, and war would not ultimately threaten our values, our security, and our way of life. Especially now, in a turbulent era of power instabilities and rapidly resurgent nationalisms, world order will depend heavily on preeminent American military power, selectively but strategically engaged around the world in the service of liberal principles. In the necessary task of reconfiguring U.S. foreign policy for a new century, liberal internationalism offers the best, wisest, most secure, and most humane foundation on which to build.

# Add-ons

## 2AC Indo-Pak War

### A. Space Militarization deters Indo-Pak war and aggression against the U.S.

Miller 2002

(John J. Miller is a national political reporter for the National Review and a Bradley fellow at the Heritage Foundation, “Our 'Next Manifest Destiny': America should move to control space -- now, and decisively” pg online @ http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/714383/posts)

That may sound like 21st-century imperialism, which, in essence, it would be. But is that so bad? Imagine that the United States currently maintained a battery of space-based lasers. India and Pakistan could inch toward nuclear war over Kashmir, only to be told that any attempt by either side to launch a missile would result in a boost-phase blast from outer space. **Without taking sides, the United States would immediately defuse a tense situation and keep the skies above Bombay and Karachi free of mushroom clouds**. Moreover, Israel would receive protection from Iran and Iraq, Taiwan from China, and Japan and South Korea **from the mad dictator north of the DMZ.** The United States would be covered as well, able not merely to deter aggression, but also to defend against it.

National security always has been an expensive proposition, and there is no getting around the enormous costs posed by a robust system of space-based weaponry. It would take a supreme act of national will to make it a reality. We've done it before: Winning the Cold War required laying out trillions of dollars, much of it on machines, missiles, and warheads that never saw live combat. Seizing control of space also would cost trillions, but it would lead to a world made immeasurably safer for America and what it values.

### B. India Pakistan war escalates to extinction.

**Fai 2k1**

(Ghulam Nabi, Executive Director, Kashmiri American Council, Washington Times, 7-8)

The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and distant (with India crowned with a unilateral veto power) to aggressive involvement at the vortex. The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary.

## 2AC Space Colonization

### A. international military competition in space creates the advanced technologies and incentives needed for Colonization

Yoshida 2k3

(Adam, Director of the British Colombia Freedom Institute, Author of The Nothern Abyss, Noted Political Commentator, Columnist for the Greenwich Village Gazette, Oct 10th, “Red China Shooting for the Moon”, Freedom Institute Magazine, http://www.adamyoshida.com/2003\_10\_01\_archive.html )

Over time the mission of the Space Force would evolve. Initially its tasks would be confined to the Earth’s orbit: attacking enemy satellites, shooting down ballistic missiles, and protecting vital orbital installations. However, in a relatively short amount of time, that role would evolve to include more offensive missions. Weapons would be built to attack targets upon the Earth. Orbital weapons would be required to intercept enemy hypersonic bombers and, perhaps, protect American ones. Advanced military spacecraft might be launched from orbit to attack Earth-based targets. The advent of the first military spacecraft would lead to the creation of more advanced platforms from which to launch them and ships from which to attack those platforms. In other words, merely beginning to move down this road will set off a revolution in military technology. The development of advanced weapons will, inevitably, lead to the development of other, even more advanced weapons and the further spread of technology. As ship drives and weapons speed improve, the area of militarized space would increase, thereby giving humanity further reason to expand outwards from the Earth.

## 2AC Carrier Trade-off

### Next, Carrier trade-off:

### Little A: Space weapons will force the Navy to cut funding for carrier battlegroups

Dolman 2k5

(Everett, Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the U.S. Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 9-14-2K5 “ U.S. Military Transformation and Weapons in Space,” For e-parliament conference on Space Security, www.eparl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20

Transform%20&%20Space.pdf)

There is another, perhaps far more compelling reason that space weaponization will in time be less threatening to the international system than without it. One of the more cacophonous refrains against weapons procurement of any kind is that the money needed to purchase them is better spent elsewhere. It is a simple cliché but a powerful one. Space weapons in particular will be very, very expensive. Are there not a thousand uses that are more beneficial for the money? But funding for weapons does not come directly from education, or housing, or transportation budgets. It comes from military budgets. And so the question should not be directed at particular weapons, but at all weapons. Immediately we see that the impact on the budget of significant increases in space weapons will be decreases in funding for combat aircraft, the surface battle fleet, and ground forces. This creates a dilemma for both pro and anti-space weaponization camps. Space advocates must sell their ideas to fellow pro-weapons groups by making the case that the advantages they provide outweigh the capabilities foregone. This is a mighty task. The tens (likely hundreds) of billions of dollars needed to develop, test, and deploy a minimal space weapons system with the capacity to engage a few targets around the world could displace a half a dozen or more aircraft carrier battle groups, entire aircraft procurement programs (such as the F-22), and several heavy armored divisions

### Little B: This forces a transition to “distributed capital ships”, preventing a catastrophic decline in US power projection

Krepinevich ‘96

(Andrew, May, Executive director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1996, “A New Navy for a New Era”, CSBA Report, http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/R.19960500.ANew\_Navy

\_For\_A\_N/R.19960500.A\_New\_Navy\_For\_A\_N.htm#ch1)

Recent experience and a number of key trends suggest two important conclusions with respect to the Navy’s carrier fleet. First, carriers are becoming increasingly vulnerable, a trend that cannot be easily (or cheaply) reversed. Second, there are a significant and likely growing number of alternatives to the carrier for providing prompt strike capabilities and conducting forward-presence operations. These trends do not indicate that the Navy should consider abandoning the carrier. They do, however, suggest that the Navy should begin in earnest a transition process designed to reduce its reliance on the carrier to carry the overwhelming burden for strike and forward presence operations. The United States Navy needs to accelerate its restructuring efforts toward developing a “distributed” capital ship. The “distributed” capital ship comprises a network of Navy long-range strike platforms, to include carriers, surface combatants and submarines armed with vertical launch systems capable of firing long-range precision-guided munitions (PGMs), such as the Tomahawk land-attack missile (TLAM). But it also would include new combatants, such as the arsenal ship and converted Trident submarines (so-called “stealth battleships”). This architecture of strike platforms would be integrated by an expanded version of the Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability. There are several key trends that inform this observation: \* • Carriers are likely to become increasingly vulnerable over the next decade or two, a trend that will not likely be easily (or cheaply) reversed. This growing vulnerability has both strategic and technological roots. The Navy’s growing emphasis on littoral warfare will see carriers operating less in the broad expanses of the world’s oceans and more along the shores of would-be hostile states. This will make carriers increasingly easy to find, while also reducing their warning time of an attack. Moreover, the diffusion of advanced targeting technologies (e.g., communications, positioning, and imaging satellites) and weapon technologies (e.g., submarines, anti-ship missiles, long-range strike systems such as ballistic missiles and high-performance aircraft, and even anti-ship mines), may increase substantially the carriers’ vulnerability. \* • Since their spectacular performance in the Pacific Theater of Operations during World War II, carriers have, over time, seen many of their unique features eroded by technology. For example, the carriers displaced the battleship as the capital ship in large part because of its strike range advantage. But now that advantage has been eclipsed by other ships carrying long-range PGMs, and by long-range bombers. Whether it is the strikes on Baghdad during the Gulf War, or retaliatory strikes against Iraq after the war, or punitive strikes in Bosnia, increasingly the weapon of choice is the long-range PGM, not carrier-based aircraft. In short, there are a growing number of alternatives to the carrier for providing prompt strike capabilities.\* • With the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missile technology, the long era of sanctuary for U.S. forward bases will probably come to an end. Third World nations armed with improved “Scuds” and low-observable cruise missiles will likely make the forward deployment of land-based aircraft and large ground forces in future regional conflicts a far more hazardous enterprise than it was during the wars in Korea, Vietnam, or the Persian Gulf. This will place a premium on the U.S. military’s ability to conduct long-range precision strikes against enemy weapons threatening in-theater, high-value, fixed-point targets. The primary means for conducting these strikes will be Air Force long-range bombers and Navy precision-strike platforms, linked into a distributed network. The “distributed” capital ship offers the following advantages over current fleet strike capabilities: \* • Military Effectiveness. The Navy’s strike capabilities are not likely to be sustained at even today’s level of effectiveness unless the Navy can meet the challenge of increasingly capable Third World military systems. Much as the carriers of an earlier era held a range advantage in strike operations over the battleship, so today these latter-day “battleships” – the arsenal ship and converted Trident submarine – can “outrange” the carriers. They do so by virtue of their missiles and their reduced vulnerability, which will allow them to operate more closely to shore than do carriers at a comparable level of risk. The “stealth battleships” also can undertake offensive mining and countermine operations, and still operate with less detection – and less protection – in the littoral areas than can the carriers. \* • A Hedge Against Uncertainty. An emphasis on a more balanced, more distributed fleet that exploits those technologies that are advancing most rapidly will provide future fleet commanders with a variety of options for conducting strike and presence operations. It also will present would-be adversaries with more operational “problems” to solve before they can feel comfortable taking on the U.S. Navy.\* • Reduced Cost. The distributed capital ship offers the Navy a way out of its long-term budget dilemma. Maintaining a twelve-carrier force has “crowded out” investment in long-range precision munitions, countermine warfare, and the recapitalization of surface combatants, among other things. Carriers cost over $4 billion to construct and nearly $2 billion per year to operate. Projected costs for the arsenal ship run at about $700 million, and the conversion of Trident boats to stealth battleships is estimated at $450-700 million each. Due to dramatically reduced crewing, and the use of missiles in lieu of aircraft, among other factors, operating costs of a fleet employing a distributed capital ship approach is likely to be substantially lower than a fleet based principally on carriers. Finally, both the arsenal ship and (especially) the converted Tridents would require considerably less in the way of combat escorts, producing additional savings. \* • Advantages Over Surface Combatants. Both the arsenal ship and Trident “stealth battleship” have three principal advantages over surface combatants. They are less vulnerable. With far smaller crews, their operating cost would likely be considerably less than those of surface combatants with comparable strike capabilities. Finally, the arsenal ship carries several times as many vertical launch systems (VLS) as any other surface combatant. • Casualties (Strategic Culture). If the Navy is to make good on its avowed mission to be first on the scene in the event of crisis, and to provide a prompt global strike capability when the nation requires it, then it will have to find some way of doing it without putting so many of its sailors in harm’s way, especially for those contingencies where the stakes are relatively low. As recent crises have shown, the carriers have long since lost their monopoly in both crisis and strike operations to a variety of other platforms, from Marine amphibious ships, to Navy surface combatants, to long-range Air Force tactical and strategic aircraft. Over time, both the arsenal ship and the “stealth battleship” will likely offer an increasing capability to conduct substantial strike operations, while risking less damage to themselves and their crew, than the carriers. In summary, it seems prudent for the U.S. Navy to begin the transition toward a distributed capital ship comprising perhaps eight to ten carriers (the number that can be sustained within projected Navy budgets), and between two and four arsenal ships and a comparable number of Trident “stealth battleships.” This should permit a vigorous level of experimentation and innovation to determine the optimal force that will comprise the “distributed capital ship.” If the Navy fails to invest in a distributed capital ship strike architecture, and carriers do become progressively more vulnerable, the worst case scenario could be catastrophic. Under these circumstances, having bet everything that the future conflict environment at sea will be very similar to what it was during the Cold War, or the Gulf War, the Navy would be left with relatively little operational flexibility. Fortunately, the Navy leadership has wisely given itself the opportunity to create a fleet that will meet the very different geopolitical and military-technical challenges of a new era. But now it must seize upon that opportunity, for as Francis Bacon once observed, “He who will not apply new remedies must expect new evils.”

## Carrier Trade-Off Add-On- Casualty Aversion Module

### Carriers undermine US credibility - they are deployed to foreign waters but never used

Isenberg 1990

(David, Senior analyst at Intellibridge, Editor of the Homeland Security Monitor, adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute, June 8th, “The Illusion of Power: Aircraft Carriers and U.S. Military Strategy”, Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 134, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=994&full=1)

Ironically, using carriers to assert power can undermine the credibility that the United States seeks to foster by doing so. As Luttwak noted in 1985, The diminishing value of carrier air power has been masked in recent years by political malpractice. Presidents unwilling to actually use force, but equally unwilling to admit impotence, have developed the habit of sending aircraft-carrier task forces to regions in crisis where American interests are in danger. The carriers go off, and the mighty armada is duly filmed in distant waters for the benefit of the nightly television news. The President, it seems, has acted. But the crisis continues to unfold just as before, and the natives do as they want with our interests in need of protection, quite unafraid of those 34 attack aircraft. Nothing of value is therefore achieved; but the aircraft carriers and all their escorts are kept on station day after day, for weeks or months. Actually, there is one significant result from this parody of gunboat diplomacy; next time, upon the occasion of the next crisis, the sending of the aircraft carriers will intimidate even less. Of course, the maneuver could work--but only if the rule of gunboat diplomacy were strictly followed: if the natives refuse to behave themselves, the gunboats must open fire, if only to preserve their value for the next occasion. But that is not a rule likely to be obeyed when the whole point of sending out the carriers in the first place is not to act, but rather to avoid having to act. Nevertheless, in February of the year following each such maneuver, when the Secretary of the Navy presents his statement to Congress, he will stress how much the carriers were "used" during the previous year and note their great utility for "crisis management."(15)

### This uniquely creates a perception of US casualty aversion

Dueck 2004

(Colin, Assistant professor of political science at the University of Colorado, Winter, “Hegemony on the Cheap”, WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Volume XX, No 4, http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj03-4/dueck.html)

Nevertheless, even as President Clinton laid out his extremely ambitious foreign policy goals, he proved unwilling to support them with the necessary means. In particular, he proved reluctant to support these initiatives with the requisite amount of military force. In one case after another of humanitarian intervention, a pattern emerged: the Clinton administration would stake out an assertive and idealistic public position, then refuse to act on its rhetoric in a meaningful way. Yet in every such case, whether in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, or Kosovo, the president was ultimately forced to act, if only to protect the credibility of the United States.19 The result was a series of remarkably halfhearted, initially low-risk interventions, which only reinforced the impression that the United States was unwilling to suffer costs or casualties on behalf of its stated interests overseas.20

### That causes Chinese miscalculation that escalates to Sino-US war

Plage, Professor of Political Science at UCLA – 1998

(Tom, Los Angeles Times, “China’s Dangerous Perception Error; If the People's Liberation Army misjudges U.S. behavior on Iraq, it may be less hesitant to act in Korea or Taiwan,” February 24, Lexis)

If that's the actual Chinese belief, then the gap between the reality of U.S. military capabilities and China's percep-tion of them is wide. Worse yet, Mulvenon's informed melancholy is shared in Washington. A recent Pentagon study, "Dangerous Chinese Misperceptions," agrees that, despite all the recent military-to-military contacts between Chinese officers and their U.S. counterparts, the true picture of America apparently is still fuzzy. Says the Pentagon report: "China's leadership holds a number of dangerous misconceptions that may well cause serious political friction or even military conflict with the United States. The consequences of China consistently underestimating the military power of potential opponents complicates any effort to deter China." A widespread Chinese belief about U.S. weakness could trigger miscalculation by Beijing. One such error would be a wholly unilateral Chinese decision to intervene suddenly in North Korea, should that failing state disintegrate and refugees pour over the border into China. Or a decision to attack Taiwan, a nation of 21 million people which Beijing claims as its historic own. Of the latter, Mulvenon agrees: "Many Chinese officers think, 'You would not risk the lives of American boys and girls over Taiwan.'J"

## 2AC Asteroids

### A. Space Weapons Shoot Down Asteroids

Britt 2k2

Robert Roy Britt, journalist, “Space-Based Missile Defense Needed to Thwart Asteroid Attacks,” NEW SCIENTIST, 2—14—02, [www.space.com/scienceastronomy/solarsystem/deflection\_asteroids\_020214.html](http://www.space.com/scienceastronomy/solarsystem/deflection_asteroids_020214.html)

Earth is little more than a sitting duck in a cosmic shooting gallery, the scientists tell us. But that doesn't mean we can't shoot back. If an asteroid is ever found to have our planet in its sights, a carefully aimed missile can simply knock the rock off course. There's one little problem. It's hard to deflect something that's coming right at you. Any boxer understands this. A slight bit of energy applied to a punch in the right way can turn a roundhouse into a harmless glancing blow. But if you try and stop an upper cut by driving your chin directly into it, you'll go down for the count. Claudio Maccone at the Center for Astrodynamics in Turin, Italy, has a boxer's eye for asteroids, and he's developed what he claims is the best plan for protecting Earth. Put missiles in space, Maccone says, and hit the asteroids at an angle.

### B. Solves Extinction

Barbee 2k5

Brent William Barbee, MSE, “Mission Planning for the Mitigation of Hazardous Near Earth Objects,” Master’s Thesis, University of Texas at Austin, 12—05, p. 1-2.

Human beings have survived and, by some estimations, thrived on our homeworld by learning to adapt to our environment and, in some cases, shield ourselves from aspects of our environment that might harm or kill us. It is generally accepted that humans have a will to live, usually choosing to fight when faced with mortal danger. The impending collision of a NEO with Earth constitutes a mortal danger of the gravest sort. The collision of a sufficiently massive NEO with Earth would release tremendous amounts of energy, owing to the extreme mass of the NEO and the large magnitude of the relative velocity between the NEO and the Earth at the time of impact. If a massive enough NEO, of mean diameter 1 km or greater, were to strike Earth, the amount of energy released would be unprecedented in known human history, sending enough debris into the atmosphere to block out all sunlight for weeks or months, sending enormous tsunamis to batter coastlines all along whichever ocean is struck if the NEO impacts an ocean, and creating an enormous crater if the NEO impacts land, sending forth a huge shockwave that would wipe out everything in its path for many kilometers from the impact point. The massive shock to our ecology and climate would dramatically shift the weather, creating a long series of devastating storms and perhaps even ushering in a premature ice age. The mechanical shock delivered beneath the Earth’s surface could spark a horribly destructive spell of volcanic activity and/or earthquakes. Millions, if not billions of people would be killed and human civilization might not survive in its present form or at all. Even a relatively small NEO could lay waste to an entire metropolis or continental region were it to strike land in a densely populated area.