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\*1AC\*

1AC (1/6)

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan mirror the American exceptionalist logic that fueled our invasion of Vietnam – this ontology functions to try and alleviate the wounds of our defeat in Vietnam by waging wars to protect our identity and pacify others – if unchecked this will result in extinction

Spanos 8 (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam, p. ix-x) PJ

In this book I contend that the consequence of America's intervention and conduct of the war in Vietnam was the self-destruction of the ontological, cultural, and political foundations on which America had perennially justi­fied its "benign" self-image and global practice from the time of the Puritan "errand in the wilderness." In the aftermath of the defeat of the American Goliath by a small insurgent army, the "specter- of Vietnam—by which I mean, among other things, the violence, bordering on genocide, America perpetrated against an -Other" that refused to accommodate itself to its mission in the wilderness of Vietnam—came to haunt America as a contra­diction that menaced the legitimacy of its perennial self-representation as the exceptionalist and -redeemer nation.- In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the dominant culture in America (including the government, the media. Hollywood. and even educational institutions) mounted a massive campaign to "forget Vietnam." This relentless recuperative momentum to lay the ghost of that particular war culminated in the metamorphosis of an ear­lier general will to "heal the wound" inflicted on the American national psy­che, into the "Vietnam syndrome"; that is, it transformed a healthy debate over the idea of America into a rational neurosis. This monumentalist initiative was aided by a series of historical events between 1989 and 1991 that deflected the American people's attention away from the divisive memory of the Vietnam War and were represented by the dominant culture as manifestations of the global triumph of "America's: Tiananmen Square, the implosion of the Soviet Union, and the first Gulf War. This “forgetting” of the actual history of the Vietnam War, represented in this book by Graham Greene's The Quiet American, Philip Caputo's A Rumor of War, and Tim O'Brien's Going After Cacciato hand many other novels, memoirs, and films to which I refer paren­thetically, contributed to the rise of neoconservatism and the religious right to power in the United States. And it provided the context for the re­newal of America's exceptionalist errand in the global wilderness, now un­derstood, as the conservative think tank the Project (or the New American Century put it long before the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, as the preserving and perpetuation of the Pax Americana. Whatever vestigial memory of the Vietnam War remained after this turn seemed to be decisively interred with Al Qaeda's attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. Com­pletely immune to dissent, the confident American government, under President George W. Bush and his neoconservative intellectual deputies—and with the virtually total support of the America media—resumed its errand in the global wilderness that had been interrupted by the specter of Vietnam. Armed with a resurgence of self-righteous indignation and exceptionalist pride, the American government, indifferent to the reser­vations of the "Old World," unilaterally invaded Afghanistan and, then, after falsifying intelligence reports about Saddam Hussein's nuclear ca­pability, Iraq, with the intention, so reminiscent of its (failed) attempts in Vietnam, of imposing American-style democracy on these alien cultures. The early representation by the media of the immediately successful "shock and awe" acts of arrogant violence in the name of "civilization" was euphoric. They were, it was said, compelling evidence not only of the recuperation of American consensus, but also of the rejuvenation of America's national identity. But as immediate "victory" turned into an occupation of a world un­willing to be occupied, and the American peace into an insurgency that now verges on becoming a civil war, the specter of Vietnam, like the Hydra in the story of Hercules, began to reassert itself: the unidentifiabil­ity or invisibility of the enemy, their refusal to be answerable to the American narrative, quagmire, military victories that accomplished noth­ing, search and destroy missions, body counts, the alienation of allies, moral irresolution, and so on. It is the memory of this "Vietnam"—this specter that refuses to be accommodated to the imperial exceptionalist discourse of post-Vietnam America—that my book is intended to bring back to presence. By retriev­ing a number of representative works that bore acute witness, even against themselves, to the singularity of a war America waged against a people seeking liberation from colonial rule and by reconstellating them into the post-9111 occasion, such a project can contribute a new dimen­sion not only to that shameful decade of American history, but also, and more important, to our understanding of the deeply backgrounded ori­gins of America's "war on terror" in the aftermath of the Al Qaeda at­tacks. Indeed, it is my ultimate purpose in this book to provide directives for resisting an American momentum that threatens to destabilize the en­tire planet, if not to annihilate the human species itself, and also for rethinking the very idea of America.

1AC (2/6)

And, the military evokes a problem/solution mentality that reduces beings to Standing Reserves

Spanos 90 (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, Heidegger, Nazism, and the Repressive Hypothesis, p. 222) PJ

The counter-strategy of the NLF and the NVA could be said to con- stitute a deliberate refusal to accommodate the imperative of presence informing the cultural, political, and military practices of the United States. American military practice was determined by an end-oriented (and ethno- centric) mindset that perceived the differential complexities-the otherness -of Vietnamese life and the actual conditions of the war (the Problem) in the spatial or panoptic terms of a microcosmic "world picture" or (tac- tical) map in which every resistant (differential) thing/event could, in the term Heidegger employs to characterize the essence of technology, be "En- framed" (Gestell) or "disciplined" (Foucault), i.e., compelled into its proper place in the gridded whole and pacified-reduced to "Standing Reserve" (Bestand) (the Solution). In opposition, the NLF and NVA simply obscured this re-presentational map, blurred the categorical distinctions necessary to the restrictive narrative economy of the panoptic gaze. In the metaphorics precipitated by the American soldier's existential experience in Vietnam- his experience of uncanniness-this counter-strategy transformed the map into a maze:

1AC (3/6)

And, we don’t claim the elimination of the State – we argue a decentering of the imperial ontology through rejection and a nomadic thought that forecloses hegemonic thinking

Spanos 2k (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, America’s Shadow, p.204-206) PJ

Given this utterly reduced condition of thinking, the "ends of man" thus points to the (self)dis-closure of that spectral force field of differences that the "truth" of the age of the world picture cannot finally contain within its imperial circumference. The moment that the structuralist logic of the discourse of modern anthropology reaches its limits — achieves closure — means, finally, the delegitimation of the ("disinterested" or "objective") truth discourse of Occidental humanism. This, it must be remembered, is the post-Enlightenment "anthropology" that, under the allotropic names of "the free world" or "liberal [American] democracy," has come to be represented in the aftermath of the Cold War and the "kicking of the Vietnam syndrome" as "the end of history" by the spokespersons of "America." In the face of this triumphalist ontological representation of the contemporary occasion — which is to say, this astonishingly amnesiac historical memory — would not a "postcolonial" opposition be better served by discarding the worn-out, ontologically empty word "postmodernism"? Would it not, further, be preferable to undertake the postcolonial project by thinking the dangerous political occasion called "the New World Order" in the resonant spectral terms recalled by Derrida's early effort to think the "ends of man" in the context of the Vietnam War? This, at any rate, is the suggestive oppositional project Derrida proposes in *Specters of Marx,* his most recent and most political repetition of the "Heideggerian" effort of ontological retrieval, in the wake of the dominant liberal/capitalist culture's proclamation at the end of the Cold War of the death and burial of Marx and its euphoric announcement of the "gospel," "the good news" that has been brought into being by the dialectical labor of History in the "fullness of time."22 And, as I have suggested by pointing to its affiliation with Said's invocation of the political emigre, it is a proposal that demands urgent attention. Indeed, it is the imperative of thinking in the interregnum, given the apparent indifference of postmodern/postcolonial criticism, which restricts its understanding of the new globalism to the untethered flow of transnational capital, to this other, equally pervasive, nationalist globalism, which represents the present post-Cold War moment not simply as the end of History, but as the triumph of "America" as well. If, as I have suggested, this alleged "good news" is understood, as I think it should be, as the triumphant annunciation of a fully realized imperial and banalizing project of thinking, of an "advent," as it were (the *Pax Metaphysica),* as well as the completed imperial and banalizing project of sociopolitics (the *Pax Americana),* then it becomes the task of a "postcolonial" opposition not simply to retrieve the differential event that the announcement of "good news" has had to obliterate in order to legitimize the planetary truth of liberal capitalist democracy. (It should not be overlooked that this end-of-history discourse repeats in *thought* the violence in *practice* to which the American officer in Vietnam synecdochically referred when he declared that "[w]e had to destroy Ben Tre in order to save it.")23 It also becomes a postcolonial opposition's task to think that repressed event in terms of the implications of its persistent and anxiety-provoking spectral afterlife for a way of thinking capable of disarticulating or molecularizing the inordinate positive power of the triumphant imperial discourse. It has not been my purpose in this book to undertake this rethinking of thinking, though I want to emphasize that what I have said in the preceding chapters makes it clear that this initiative would benefit by attuning itself to the de-structive (or decentering) project Heidegger inaugurated in *Being and Time* in the wake of the forgetting of the *Seinsfrage* (which is to say, of the closure of philosophy) and that Derrida and Foucault, in different ways, extended and modified. Finally, however, it is not so much to theory as such that the project to rethink thinking in the interregnum must look as it is to the violence of the history of the Occidental thought and practice I have retrieved. This history, bathed in innocent blood, emphatically suggests that such a thinking must take its point of departure from the self-de-struction of the discourse of Man in the Vietnam War — the event that synecdochically and decisively disclosed not only the *essential* complicity of Occidental thought with imperial practice, but also the essential affiliation between the dissemination inhering in its Word and the diasporic consequences of the fulfillment of its Word's logic. To "repeat" my beginning after a long detour, it must take its positive point of departure from the negative force — the "decentered" or, in the allotropes of Edward Said and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, the "unhoused" or "deterritorialized" or "diasporic" or "nomadic" energies — released into history as haunting specters by the fulfillment of this European Word's reifying or spatial, which is to say, imperial, logic. This task reflects the poverty — the "damaged life" — of the exiled intellectual in the interregnum. Having learned from its fate at the hands of the colonial regime of truth, however, such a differential/exilic thinking of the *Abgeschiedene,* unlike the modes of opposition that sanguinely continue to think in the ontological terms prescribed by the master discourse, is not only enabled to refuse to play by the rules of its imperial logic. It is also enabled to transform this negative condition into a positive force of resistance. As I hope these chapters have shown, such a strategic "nomadic" thinking, more than any other that is currently available, will be adequate to the task of writing the history of the present and, though it may in the end be the same thing, of deterring liberal capitalist democracy and the *Pax* *Americana.*<CONTINUED>

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But, it needs to be underscored, the self-de-struction of the imperial truth discourse of the post-Enlightenment incumbent on the fulfillment of its ontologic should not merely be thought in terms of resisting an oppressive and banalizing tradition. For this dis-closure of its plenary circle also and simultaneously releases *pro-jective* possibilities. To think positively the spectral Other that haunts Occidental thought—"the shadow that the light of Being has not been able to illumine," in Enrique Dussel's resonant formulation24 — is, therefore, to open up the possibility of a different idea of the *polis* from that envisioned by the metaphysical (and Roman) West. It is, finally, to bring into being (to liberate) the thought of a differential polity, a polity in which the dialogue that is the essential condition of our mortal being-with takes place not in the seductive paradisal realm to which it has, in fact, been strategically confined by liberal democracy, but in *this* unequal world, where imbalance of power — and injustice — always rules.

1AC (4/6)

And, America’s hegemonic ontology is at the heart of our ‘problems’ in the Middle East

Spanos 3 (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, A Rumor of War: 9/11 and the Forgetting of the Vietnam War, p. 60-61) PJ

Let me, now, after this long detour, return to my beginning, September 11. There, it will be recalled, I suggested that, however horrific, the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, was, as the symbolic significance of American power of these chosen sites clearly suggests, the consequence in large part of a very long history of what Edward Said has called Western ‘‘Orientalism,’’ a history of representation/domination of the Orient culminating in the United States’ ubiquitous indirect and overt economic, cultural, political, and military depredations over the last half century in the oil-rich Middle East in the duplicitous name of ‘‘national interests’’: its clandestine orchestration of the overthrow of Muhammad Mossadegh in Iran, its support of unpopular despotic Middle Eastern regimes such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the Taliban, its massive financing of Israel’s militaristic colonialist policies in the face of the obvious valid claims of the Palestinians, to name only a few of these. I also suggested that the logic informing the United States’ reductive binarist representation and the swift and unequivocal response to the terrorists’ attack on American soil was deeply backgrounded in American history, that it was, indeed, simultaneous with its Puritan origins. This is the exceptionalist logic that, in assuming Americans to be God’s and, later, History’s chosen people, has perennially justified America’s unilateral, ‘‘benign’’ ‘‘errand’’ in the world’s ‘‘wilderness.’’ It is, therefore, as American writers as distanced in time from one another as Melville and Caputo bear witness, a ‘‘concentering’’ metaphysical logic, which, in beginning inquiry from the end, enables not only the demonization of the anxiety-provoking multiplicity (thus precluding the open-ended and productive strife of authentic dialogue) but also the reduction of this differential multiplicity (which is to say, the differential dynamics of being) to a reified, comprehendible, and ‘‘practically assailable’’ One. As such a concentering mono-logic, this divinely or historically ordained American exceptionalism has predictably manifested itself over and over again in some degree or other in a relentlessly deadly way—as a monomania (Melville) or paranoia (Thomas Pynchon)—whenever any differential constituency of the human community has refused its spontaneous consent to the ‘‘truth’’ of the American way of life: from the Puritans’ annihilation of the Pequots in the name of their ‘‘errand’’ in the New England wilderness and the post-Revolutionary Americans’ virtual extermination of the Native American population and their cultures in the name of Manifest Destiny, through the Spanish-American War, to the Vietnam War, when the United States unleashed a technological fire power unprecedented in the history of warfare against a Southeast Asian people seeking its independence from colonial rule emanating from a distant continent.

1AC (5/6)

And, Western hegemony is a way of thinking rooted in the drive to know, master and exploit – recognition of this ontology is critical to solve

Spanos 2k (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, America’s Shadow, p. 191-193) PJ

What I have argued in this book about the relationship between philos­ophy and imperialism is that the euphoric annunciation of the end of history and the advent of the New World Order by the deputies of the dominant American culture at the end of the Cold War is symptomatic of the achievement of the global hegemony of "America" understood not simply as a political order, but as a way of thinking. I have claimed that this triumphant "American" way of thinking is not exceptional­ist, as it has always been claimed by Americans, especially since de Tocqueville's announcement of the advent of democracy in America, but European, which means metaphysical: an imperial thinking, whose provenance resides in Roman antiquity, that sees the being into which it inquires as a totalized spatial image, a "field" or "region" or "domain" to be comprehended, mastered, and exploited. But this way of putting this imperial metanarrative, though necessary in the context of the amnesiac imperatives of thinking the Enlightenment as an epochal emancipatory moment in world history, is too general. It does not account for the historically specific transformation of this European mode of knowledge production accomplished in the wake of America's emergence as a global power: the fulfillment of the Enlighten­ment's "developmental model" in the effacement of the visible imperial logos informing traditional metaphysics by way of the apotheosis of the "objectivity" of empirical science and the advent of the classificatory table. Under the aegis of a triumphant America, the narrative economy of European metaphysics has come to its end in the form of a uni­versal instrumentalism, a Man-centered thinking for which everything in time and space is seen as a "problem" that the larger compara­tive "picture" renders susceptible to a final and determinate solution. In Heidegger's proleptic terms, European metaphysical thinking in the technological age dominated by America has become "Americanized," a "re-presentational"/"calculative" thinking or "planning" that has trans­formed the uncalculability of being at large into a planetary "world picture": "We get the picture" concerning something does not mean only that what is, is set before us, is represented to us, in general, but that what is stands before us—in all that belongs to it and all that stands together in it as a system. "To get the picture" throbs with being acquainted with something, with being equipped and prepared for it. Where the world becomes picture, what is, in its entirely, is juxtaposed as that for which man is prepared and which, correspondingly, he therefore intends to bring before him­self and have before himself, and consequently intends in a decisive sense to set in place before himself. Hence world picture, when understood essentially, does not mean a picture of the world but the world conceived and grasped as picture. What is, in its en­tirety, is now taken in such a way that it first is in being and only is in being to the extent that it is set up by man, who represents and sets forth. Wherever we have the world picture, an essential decision takes place regarding what is, in its entirety. The Being of whatever is, is sought and found in the representedness of the latter.' Reconstellated into the context of this Heideggerian diagnosis of mo­dernity, the American end-of-history discourse undergoes a resonant estrangement. What is euphorically represented as "good news" — the global fulfillment ("end") of the emancipatory promise of History —comes to be seen as the Pax Metaphysica: the colonization of the errant mind of humanity at large by a banal and banalizing thinking that has reduced everything, including human beings, to "standing [or dispos­able] reserve."2 This "end of philosophy" in the form of a "triumphant" instrumentalist thinking that has reduced being to disposable commod­ity is everywhere manifest in the post–Cold War era. And, I suggest, its most telling symptom is the globalization of (American) English as the lingua franca of the "free market," which has as one of its most dev­astating consequences the "Americanization" not simply of the Western nation-states but of entire Third World cultures. What for the purpose of my argument this global triumph of "Amer­ican" thinking means is that even those who would oppose American global hegemony are, insofar as they remain indifferent to the onto­logical grounds of its sociopolitical practices, condemned to think their opposition according to the imperatives of the discursive practices they would oppose. They thus fulfill the expectation of the deputies of Amer­ican culture who predict that "even nondemocrats will have to speak the language of democracy in order to justify their deviation from the sin­gle universal standard."3 That is to say, the fulfillment of the European metanarrative in the globalization of American technological thinking, that is, the Americanization of the planet, has tacitly reduced opposition to a resonant silence. It is in this sense that, with Heidegger, the intellectual who is attuned to the complicity between Western philosophy and imperialism is com­pelled to call this "age of the world picture" presided over by America a "destitute time" or, more suggestively, "a realm of in-between" — "the No-more of the gods that have fled and the Not-yet of the god that is coming."4 In the context of the impasse of oppositional thinking, in other words, he/she is compelled to acknowledge the time of the post—Cold War occasion as an interregnum. This, for an opposition that limits resistance to the political, means a time of defeat. But for the opposi­tional thinker who is attuned to the ontological exile to which he/she has been condemned by the global triumph of technological thinking it also means the recognition that this exilic condition of silence constitutes an irresolvable contradiction in the "Truth" of instrumental thinking—the "shadow" that haunts its light — that demands to be thought. In the interregnum, the primary task of the marginalized intellectual is the re­thinking of thinking itself. And, as I have suggested, it is the event of the Vietnam War—and the dominant American culture's inordinate will to forget it — that provides the directives for this most difficult of tasks not impossible.

1AC (6/6)

And, we must use debate as a sphere of challenging hegemonic conceptions of power

Spanos 93 (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, The End of Education: Towards Posthumanism, p. 196) PJ

In insisting that the theoretical practice of the oppositional intellectuals ought to be a local and regional struggle aimed at revealing and undermining power, Foucault, like the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School before him (Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse) locates this struggle at the site of culture in general, where by means of the discursive practices that constitute it, power is “most invisible and insidious.” I want to suggest, by way of a specifying qualification based on a curious but telling historical oversight on the part of critical theorists of the post-Vietnam decade (who shifted the focus of critique from the economy of material production to the hegemonic economy of culture), that this struggle should be waged at the site of the educational institution in general and the university in particular. As I have suggested in focusing on the student revolt in the United States, in France, in Germany, and elsewhere in the West (and Japan) in the late 1960s, it is in the operations of education more than any other cultural apparatus elaborated by modern liberal bourgeois capitalist Western societies – more than in family, church, political system, information and entertainment media – that power is “most invisible and insidious.” It is the school, in other words, that employs what I have been calling “hegemonic discourse of deliverance” most effectively in disciplining the youth and reproducing the dominant sociopolitical order. While other ideological cultural apparatuses are situated in the material world and, as in the case of the media’s coverage of the revolutions in Eastern Europe or the American response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, partake more or less visibly in its productive operations, the school is represented fundamentally as a separate and value-free space in which the pursuit of knowledge is undertaken for the benefit of all “mankind,” if not for knowledge’s own sake.

\*1NC\*

1NC (1/3)

Link - Withdrawal represents a façade of a benign gesture – failure to question the ontology of the West ensures future hegemonic expansion

Spanos 8 (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, Global American:

The Devastation of Language Under the Dictatorship of the Public Realm, p. 200-202, Muse) PJ

What is astonishing in the typical discourse of the Rand Corporation report—so reminiscent of the discourse of *The Pentagon Papers* forty years earlier—positing the benefits to the U.S. Defense Department of “shaping” “indigenous attitudes” is its unquestioned reduction of living human beings, especially a diverse cultural population of Arab civilians who are being killed, mutilated, unhoused, imprisoned, tortured, by a foreign invading and occupational force (a horror it calls “collateral damage”) to “targeted” “consumers” of “branded” products—the entire value system, including the consumerism, of American capitalist democracy—in the very process of claiming to care for the lives of its “targets.” As in the case of *The Pentagon Papers* during the early phase of the U.S.’s intervention in Vietnam, nowhere in this extended genial and mind-numbing repetitive instrumentalist report is there the slightest hint as to the question of the legitimacy of the American invasion and occupation of Iraqi land. It simply—and optimistically—assumes that the U.S.’s military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan has been decreed by Providence or History and that the end of this intervention is benign. Nor, as a necessary consequence, is there any reference to alternative emotions that its marketing strategies might be instigating in its “indigenous targets”: revulsion or outrage, for example, at their dislocated lives being represented as nothing more than mindless consumers of products—a reduction exacerbated by the traditional animosity these Islamic peoples bear against the imperial West—at the very moment that the American war machine is destroying them and their singular ways of life. The authors’ absolute confidence in the “American way”—their unquestioning assumption of the benign utility of their relentlessly instrumentalist marketing discourse betrays their absolute submersion in a regime of truth, which is to say their unawareness of the innocent human blood that the American army of occupation is spilling—to say nothing of the endless anguish its destabilizing occupation is precipitating—in the name of “regime change” in Iraq and elsewhere. In this, they recall Alden Pyle, the representative “quiet American,” whose murderous blind and thoughtless optimism Graham Greene indicted half a century ago, at the very moment that the U.S. began to calculate the benefits of “winning the hearts and minds” of Third World peoples in it pursuit of world hegemony. Though this time, to invoke Marx’s *Eighteenth Brumaire—*and Voltaire’s *Candide—*as farce: Candide had been wounded [during the Lisbon earthquake] by splinters of flying masonry and lay helpless in the road, covered with rubble. “For heaven’s sake,” he cried to Pangloss, “fetch me some wine and oil! I’m dying.” “This earthquake is nothing new,” replied Pangloss, “the town of Lima in America experienced the same shocks last year. The same cause produced the same effects. There is certainly a vein of sulphur running under the earth from Lima to Lisbon.” “Nothing is more likely,” cried Candide, “but the oil and wine, for pity’s sake!” “Likely!” exclaimed the philosopher, “I maintained it’s proved!” Candide lost consciousness, and Pangloss brought him a little water from a fountain close by. (Voltaire 1947, 334)

Impacts –

1. The imperial practices of the US are rooted in an ontology geared towards “Americanizing” the “underdeveloped” and invaluable rest of the world

Spanos 2k (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, America’s Shadow, p. 180) PJ

Its acutely differentiated description of this complex new global ter­rain is indispensable to any effort that would resist late capitalism's culturally and sociopolitically disabling seductions. But this account of the postmodernism of postmodernity is blind to the essentially ac­commodational dynamics of this accelerating planetary process. It fails to see, that is, that this process has been one of strategically in­corporating the contradictory and delegitimating differences (Others) precipitated by the "fulfillment" of the "benign" logic that justified the United States's intervention in Vietnam into (an instrumentalized ver­sion of) the American *logos.* Since the Vietnam War, the United States, understood as a nation-state, has indeed been eclipsed by the rise of transnational capitalism, but this does not mean that America is no longer an imperial center. It means, rather, that transnational capital­ism has become "American" —an ontologically grounded comportment toward other "underdeveloped" worlds, from their way of perceiving reality to their political institutions, that assumes the latter's radical in­feriority — and that its post–Cold War project is the "Americanization" of the planet.

1NC (2/3)

1. Their ontology turns the case – integrating the imperial logic perpetuates cycle of violence in which we constantly try to forget past failures through new wars – this inevitably culminates in extinction

Spanos 8 (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam, p. ix-x) PJ

In this book I contend that the consequence of America's intervention and conduct of the war in Vietnam was the self-destruction of the ontological, cultural, and political foundations on which America had perennially justi­fied its "benign" self-image and global practice from the time of the Puritan "errand in the wilderness." In the aftermath of the defeat of the American Goliath by a small insurgent army, the "specter- of Vietnam—by which I mean, among other things, the violence, bordering on genocide, America perpetrated against an -Other" that refused to accommodate itself to its mission in the wilderness of Vietnam—came to haunt America as a contra­diction that menaced the legitimacy of its perennial self-representation as the exceptionalist and -redeemer nation.- In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the dominant culture in America (including the government, the media. Hollywood. and even educational institutions) mounted a massive campaign to "forget Vietnam." This relentless recuperative momentum to lay the ghost of that particular war culminated in the metamorphosis of an ear­lier general will to "heal the wound" inflicted on the American national psy­che, into the "Vietnam syndrome"; that is, it transformed a healthy debate over the idea of America into a rational neurosis. This monumentalist initiative was aided by a series of historical events between 1989 and 1991 that deflected the American people's attention away from the divisive memory of the Vietnam War and were represented by the dominant culture as manifestations of the global triumph of "America's: Tiananmen Square, the implosion of the Soviet Union, and the first Gulf War. This “forgetting” of the actual history of the Vietnam War, represented in this book by Graham Greene's The Quiet American, Philip Caputo's A Rumor of War, and Tim O'Brien's Going After Cacciato hand many other novels, memoirs, and films to which I refer paren­thetically, contributed to the rise of neoconservatism and the religious right to power in the United States. And it provided the context for the re­newal of America's exceptionalist errand in the global wilderness, now un­derstood, as the conservative think tank the Project (or the New American Century put it long before the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, as the preserving and perpetuation of the Pax Americana. Whatever vestigial memory of the Vietnam War remained after this turn seemed to be decisively interred with Al Qaeda's attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. Com­pletely immune to dissent, the confident American government, under President George W. Bush and his neoconservative intellectual deputies—and with the virtually total support of the America media—resumed its errand in the global wilderness that had been interrupted by the specter of Vietnam. Armed with a resurgence of self-righteous indignation and exceptionalist pride, the American government, indifferent to the reser­vations of the "Old World," unilaterally invaded Afghanistan and, then, after falsifying intelligence reports about Saddam Hussein's nuclear ca­pability, Iraq, with the intention, so reminiscent of its (failed) attempts in Vietnam, of imposing American-style democracy on these alien cultures. The early representation by the media of the immediately successful "shock and awe" acts of arrogant violence in the name of "civilization" was euphoric. They were, it was said, compelling evidence not only of the recuperation of American consensus, but also of the rejuvenation of America's national identity. But as immediate "victory" turned into an occupation of a world un­willing to be occupied, and the American peace into an insurgency that now verges on becoming a civil war, the specter of Vietnam, like the Hydra in the story of Hercules, began to reassert itself: the unidentifiabil­ity or invisibility of the enemy, their refusal to be answerable to the American narrative, quagmire, military victories that accomplished noth­ing, search and destroy missions, body counts, the alienation of allies, moral irresolution, and so on. It is the memory of this "Vietnam"—this specter that refuses to be accommodated to the imperial exceptionalist discourse of post-Vietnam America—that my book is intended to bring back to presence. By retriev­ing a number of representative works that bore acute witness, even against themselves, to the singularity of a war America waged against a people seeking liberation from colonial rule and by reconstellating them into the post-9111 occasion, such a project can contribute a new dimen­sion not only to that shameful decade of American history, but also, and more important, to our understanding of the deeply backgrounded ori­gins of America's "war on terror" in the aftermath of the Al Qaeda at­tacks. Indeed, it is my ultimate purpose in this book to provide directives for resisting an American momentum that threatens to destabilize the en­tire planet, if not to annihilate the human species itself, and also for rethinking the very idea of America.

1NC (3/3)

The alternative is to vote negative. Only by rejecting a hegemonic ontology can we affirm ourselves as intellectuals seeking to create change

Spanos 2k (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, America’s Shadow, p. 61-62) PJ

If the genealogy of the triumphalist imperial thinking I have undertaken in this chapter teaches us anything at all, it is to take this telling "qualification" of the end-of-history discourse seriously. Doing so puts one in a position to perceive not only the inordinately persuasive power of this kind of contradiction-defying "technological" thinking, but also its weakness, a weakness that up to now has been obscured by oppositional discourses that contradictorily think resistance in the logic prescribed by the dominant thought of the Enlightenment, the very thought they would oppose. If, indeed, the highly prized Western consciousness as such is a technological optical machine of conquest, if the Western will to know is simultaneously a will to total power, if the Western subject in fact defines itself as "I think; therefore I conquer," and if it is this imperial ocularcentric Western mode of thinking that has gained complete discursive dominion over the planet, then surely in this interregnum the time has come for those who would effectively resist the practical fulfillment of the *Pax Metaphysica* as the *Pax Americana* to return to the site of ontology *as point of departure.* I mean the site of Heidegger's de-struction and of the deconstruction of those like Derrida, Levinas, Lyotard, Lacoue-Labarthe, Nancy, and others whose thought — even their critique of Heidegger's — Heidegger's catalyzed. In thus calling for such a "step back," I am not positing the ontological in *opposition* to the other more "political" sites that, admittedly, these thinkers originally neglected or rarefied. I am suggesting, rather, that the "triumphant" liberal/capitalist democratic culture's overdetermination of the "truth" (the correspondence of mind and thing) in justifying its "triumph" has rendered a rigorous analysis of the ontological ground of this imperial truth an imperative of political resistance against the New World Order, the *Pax Americana,* that would follow this *Pax* *Metaphysica.* I mean an analysis such as that inaugurated in the post- Vietnam decade by these "postmetaphysical" thinkers, but this time reconstellated into the context of the global imperial politics enabled by metaphysical thinking in its fulfilled technological/instrumental phase. Far from being identifiable as totalitarian in tendency or simply obsolete, as so many New Historicist, neo-Marxist, cultural, and postcolonial critics have all-too-hastily concluded, these postmetaphysical or postlogocentric or postocularcentric discourses imply recognition not only of the global triumph of the imperialist thought they would oppose. Equally important, they constitute inaugural efforts, precipitated by the very planetary technologization — that is, colonization — of thought, to think thinking differentlyor, rather, differentially*.*They are, that is, *symptomatic* manifestations of the contradictions — the subverting or decolonizing Other — that the "fulfillment" and global "triumph" of metaphysical thought, like the end of philosophy, according to Heidegger's quite different reading of modernity, necessarily precipitate at its limits. They are, to put it in Heidegger's terms, symptomatic gestures of the *Abgeschiedene,* the "ghostly" wandering stranger, who, aware of the global colonization of originative thinking by the total instrumentalization and banalization of "enlightening" thought, has parted from the solar "at-homeland," but whose very spectral nonbeing haunts the "victorious" culture of the "age of the world picture."102

\*Links\*

Link – Afghanistan/Iraq

Withdrawal means nothing if we don’t rethink the ontological foundations of humanism because harms can be replicated – post-9/11 invasions prove

Spanos 3 (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, Humanism and the Studia Humanitatis after 9/11/01: Rethinking Anthropologos, p. 249-252, Muse) PJ

This urgent need to rethink the boundaries of the disciplines is especially crucial for humanities departments, that collective part of the university whose "domain" is culture. During the decade of the Viet-nam War, the emancipatory momentum inaugurated by the civil rights, feminist, and student protest movements (and the influx of a vast number of immigrants who, unlike those in the past, refuse the disabling seductions of assimilation) destabilized the traditional idea of the humanities, the end of which, in keeping with the ideals of the founding Enlightenment humanists (Kant, Schiller, Humboldt, etc.) has been the reproduction of a (hierarchized) national identity. What began to emerge symptomatically in the wake of the interrogation of the disciplinary Enlightenment model was an idea of the humanities that was no longer bound to the nation state, but one whose end was emancipatory and cosmopolitan: the education of a culturally diverse body of students to live critically in a various globalized world. This destabilizing momentum has been exacerbated—and complicated—by the massive intervention of transnational capitalism into the arena of higher education, an intervention that, as Bill Readings, Masao Myoshi, Arjun Appadurai, and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri,44 among others, have shown, is intended to harness the institutions of higher education, including the new emancipatory and multicultural thrust of the humanities, to the imperatives of the anti-national global free market: hitherto marginalized constituencies of the human community are "emancipated"—enabled to participate in the global community—to enlarge the market for its commodities. Though this transnational corporate initiative is visible everywhere in the American university, the claim that it's corporatization of higher education at the expense of its former role as cultural reproducer of the nation state is a *fait* *accompli* is premature, as the nationalist surge in the United States in the aftermath of 9/11 makes manifestly clear. This initiative must, of course, be taken into account by the new, secular humanist, but as a complication of the problem of higher education, not as its defining character. In the immediate wake of this dual and seemingly contradictory destabilization of the traditional idea of higher education and the institutional structure that had been developed to fulfill its nationalizing imperatives—what the intellectual custodians of the cultural memory have called the "deconstruction of America"45 —the dominant culture in [End Page 250] the United States, as I noted at the beginning, mounted a massive campaign to recuperate the traditional function of the humanities and the institutional means of achieving it: the reproduction of the nation state and the "core curriculum." This early nationalist project, which was intended to subsume a multiplicity of ("subnational") voices into a self-identical one—"we" opposed to a menacing "them"—was epitomized by political conservatives such as William Bennett, the chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities and later Secretary of Education under the Reagan Administration; Alan Bloom, the Straussian classicist and author of the highly mediatized *Closing of the American Mind;* and Lynn Cheney, the director of the National Endowment of the Humanities under the first Bush Administration. As Bennett put this reactionary post-Vietnam initiative "to reclaim a legacy" that was abandoned as a consequence of a "collective loss of nerve and faith on the part of both faculty and administrators in the late 1960s and early 1970s": "[W]hat we have on many campuses is an unclaimed legacy, a course of studies in which the humanities have been siphoned off, diluted, or so adulterated that students graduate knowing little of their heritage. . . . Great works, important bodies of knowledge and powerful methods of inquiry constitute the core of the humanities and sustain the intellectual, moral and political traditions of *our* [American] civilization. If *we* neglect, as *we* have been neglecting, this core and rationale of the humanities, if *we* permit the fragmentation of the humanities to continue, then *we* will jeopardize everything *we* care for." Bennett's subsumption of ethnic, racial, gender, and cultural variety to his commanding center or core "we" epitomizes the reductive violence of his and other conservatives' chauvinist discourse.46 What was at stake for them was the nation defined by the elite minority culture they represented, not the variety of peoples who comprise it. Aided by Al Qaeda's attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 9/11/01, this sustained minority initiative to "reclaim a legacy" by way of recuperating the core curriculum has culminated in the kind of ultra-nationalist agenda espoused by Samuel Huntington in *Who Are We?* It is an agenda that would reduce the goal of the humanities to the recuperation of the "core Anglo-Protestant culture" in the face of the threat to American national identity—and to the global power of the United Sates—posed by the emergence of strong "subcultures" (most notably Hispanic) in the United States *and* the commodifying effects of transnational capitalism—in behalf of assuring [End Page 251] an American victory in the "clash of civilizations."47 This ultra-nationalist agenda, which, as Edward Said pointed out in his early critique of Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations*, can only understand relationality in terms of warfare,48 is the appalling answer of the neoconservatives who now determine cultural policy in the United States to the urgent question concerning the end of the *studia* *humanitatis* precipitated by the postmodern occasion.

Link – Japan

American exceptionalism has taken a turn – withdrawal from Japan doesn’t mean the end of American influence, simply a turn to defensive exceptionalism

Hodgson 3 (Godfrey, Associate Fellow Rothermere American Institute University of Oxford, Anti-Americanism and American Exceptionalism, p. 9-11)

Of course the French are by no means the only people in the world who do not wish to see their own cultural distinctiveness erased by American influence. The same is true of every people in Europe. The fact that some buy American fast food or soda drinks does not mean that Italians or Danes want to become Americans. Obviously many people in the Islamic world feel the same. So do the Hindu masses in India. So do many in Latin America, “so far from God”, ran the bitter old Mexican joke, “and so near to the United States”. The Japanese ackowledge that they owe their democracy and their prosperity to Aamerican forberance, but they do not want to become Americans. As for China, much as many Chinese envy and want to emulate American technology and economic success, it is hard even to imagine them wanting to abandon Chinese culture. I do not need to labour the point, but it does bring me the second main theme of my talk: the consequences of American exceptionalism. Large claims have always been made for the superior virtue of American society. A seventeenth century Puritan, John Winthrop, could speak of America as “a city built upon a hill” at a time when American cities were few, scattered and built mainly of wood among the marshes and tidal flats of the eastern estuaries. Henry James meticulously explored the myth of American innocence, as compared with the supposedly fallen corruption of Europe. (I have always been amused by the notion that the children of the Robber Barons, and the grandchildren of those who evicted the Mexicans and the native Americans by force of arms from half a continent, were innocent.) Woodrow Wilson thought the governments of Europe, even those elected by mass democracy, were irredeemably corrupt, so much so that he refused to allow Britain and France to be called “allies” when their armies were fighting side by side with Americans, insisting on the chilly term “associated powers”. Wilson and his friends were convinced that America was the only true democracy, and that European leaders like Clemenceau or Lloyd George, in spite of massive electoral majorities, were seen by their people as members of an undemocratic ruling class. I Forty years ago, American intellectuals took up the cudgels in what was called the “end of ideology debate”, and one of the leading contributions was a book called *The End of American Exceptionalism*, by Daniel Bell. ( I always suspected that what these intellectual gladiators had in mind was the end of all ideologies except their own.) Bell regretted the end of exceptionalism, but his regrets were premature. In the past two decades American exceptionalism did not end. It has returned, and with a vengeance. This is not simply the idea that the United States is richer or more powerful than other countries. American exceptionalism is the claim that American society, and the United States as a political power, are inherently more virtuous than other nations, and especially more so than the corrupt societies of the Old World. A corollary that is increasingly dominant in conservative or neo-conservative circles, but could also be detected in the “neo-Wilsonian” rhetoric of the Clinton Administration, is that, as a consequence of the exceptional virtue of American political ideas and constitutional arrangements, it is the high duty of the United States to spread its virtues to as much of the rest of the world as possible. In recent years, too, a new dimension has been added to this theory by the increasingly frequent identification of American democracy with free market capitalism as the twin pillars of what makes America exceptional, or, to speak in a more high-flown way, as the double headed eagle of America’s manifest destiny. Moreover the two most significant international developments of the past two decades have reinforced and intensified the sense of American exceptionalism. The fall of the Communist empire in Eastern Europe, the discrediting of communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union have left the United States as incomparably the most powerful nation state in military terms. (They also removed a powerful, if corrupt, ideological rival.) The easy victories over Iraq in 1991 and again in 2003 have rubbed that superiority home. Perhaps even more, the failure of the European nations to prevent the tragic consequences of the break-up of Yugoslavia, and the Europeans’ need to call in the United States to defeat Serbia militarily so that the Serbian people could overthrow Slobodan Milosevic, left the United States in the position of the “lone superpower”. It is true that, in calling themselves that, Americans may not fully appreciate the burdens they may be laying on themselves. If the United States has the power, even so confident an American nationalist as Henry Kissinger had questioned whether its people have the will to take responsibilities for all the evils of a naughty world. In some respects, the United States is now virtually an imperial power, albeit still one that is reluctant to see itself as such. It has hundreds of bases in dozens of countries. Its satellites can photograph and listen in to everything. Its carrier task forces and long-range aircraft can project its military power virtually everywhere. For half a century it has been able to incinerate much of the globe, and now some of its leaders believe they may in the future be in a position to make their own territory invulnerable through missile defense, able to incinerate, but not prone to obliteration. It asserts the right to intervene wherever it can, and expects to be the arbiter of any of the world’s quarrels that it chooses to enter. Its government interprets international law to allow it a new right of “pre-emptive self-defense”. There is a robustness, verging on hubris, in all of this. “We need to err on the side of being strong”, the influential William Kristol told Fox News television defiantly in April 2003. “And if people want to say we’re an imperial power, fine.”i

Link – Kuwait/Turkey

The affirmative represents the world or realist notions – this requires ‘saving’ and ‘maintaining stability’ – withdrawal is irrelevant with this mentality making redeployment inevitable

Nuruzzaman 6 (Mohammad, professor at the University of Alberta, Beyond the Realist Theories: ‘‘Neo-Conservative Realism’’ and the American Invasion of Iraq, p. 246-247)

The charge against Iraq’s alleged WMD programs was more serious. In President Bush’s opinion, actions were necessary not only to save the allies in the Middle East, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Turkey, but also to maintain stability in the whole region. The president clearly said: Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction are controlled by a murderous tyrant who has already used chemical weapons to kill thousands of people. This same tyrant has tried to dominate the Middle East, has invaded and brutally occupied a small neighbor, has struck other nations without warning, and holds an unrelenting hostility toward the United States. By its past and present actions, by its technological capabilities, by the merciless nature of its regime, Iraq is unique. (Bush 2002b) The Bush administration cohorts successfully followed the lead of the president to convince American people and the international community that Saddam Hussein was really a grave danger to world peace and security. Condoleezza Rice, for example, in an attempt to justify the invasion, told the CNN on September 8, 2002, ‘‘We don’t want the smoking gun to become a mushroom cloud’’ (quoted in Scott Peterson 2002). Unfortunately, neither the ‘‘war president’’ nor his war team came out successful in establishing any linkage between Al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein or in finding out any trace of chemical or biological weapons in Iraq. The invasion and occupation of Iraq by the Bush administration poses some challenges to all varieties of realist theories. The invasion took place at a time when the United States was the undisputed leader of the post–Cold War unipolar world, with Europe, Japan, the Russian Federation, and China falling far behind. Despite a relative decline compared with Japan and the European Union, America still tops the list of nations of the world in terms of economic, political, military, and cultural powers. The vast possession of both hard and soft powers, the choice of America as the hub of international investment, the acceptability of the American dollar as international currency, and high-quality diplomacy put America as the number one nation in the world. The Americans still command the globe’s most resources, produce 30% of world product, and their economy is still 40% larger than the nearest rival (see Cox 2001:21). The American supremacy was not definitely challenged by Saddam Hussein provoking hostile military acts by the current American leadership. Iraq, judged by any yardstick of power, was not a great or major power posing any serious challenges to American security or national interests. The UN sanctions imposed in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War already crippled Iraq and its military muscle, effectively blocking any possibility of WMD development by the Saddam Hussein regime. All variants of realist theories predict war between major and Great Powers, provided they perceive real challenges from each other and if wars are seen as necessary to improve relative power positions. The defensive realists support the status quo by arguing that defensive military postures strengthen national security of a state while posing no threats to its rivals. Expansions by powerful states, according to them, do not produce major benefits. The offensive camp of structural realism, in contrast, predicts that Great Powers may undertake opportunistic aggressions if conquests are deemed to produce benefits for the conquerors. The classical realists clearly state that human aggressiveness and anarchy might precipitate devastating warfare between nations. It can be argued that none of the realist positions clearly explains the catastrophic American invasion and occupation of Iraq. The Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq clearly defies the position of the defensive realists that status quo–promoting policies help strengthen national security and promote peace. Opportunistic aggressions to accrue major benefits, as argued by the offensive realists, do not apply to the Iraq invasion in any major way. The argument that the invasion of Iraq was largely influenced by American motivation to take direct control of the huge oil resources of Iraq and West Asia, which closely validates the offensive realist position, rather appears feeble (for such arguments, see Research Unit for Political Economy 2003). The United States was already controlling the vast oil resources of Saudi Arabia and other tiny kingdoms in the Gulf region. It was also extending its control over the Caspian Sea oil resources by cultivating good relations with and promoting friendly regimes in Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is true that America was much concerned about the oil agreements that the Saddam Hussein regime concluded with Russian and French oil companies, but those agreements were not posing any serious dangers to American oil interests and security. Additionally, America was not faced with any fuel shortage or a long-term threat to its oil interest that might create such shortage in the future. Aggressive human nature did play a small role in the invasion, at least viewed from the side of the victim of invasion. Saddam Hussein, in the wake of UN sanctions, did not behave irresponsibly; he rather proved to be a rational actor and could be deterred by means other than the invasion (see Kriesler 2003)

Link – South Korea

Withdrawal from South Korea is a fantasy to hide the underlying American exceptionalism – this must be challenged to truly solve

Pease 9 (Donald, Chair of the Dartmouth Liberal Studies Program, The new American exceptionalism, p. 20-21)

I have elaborated this theoretical scenario to explain the complex psy­chosocial processes that constituted the preconditions for the symbolic efficacy of the fantasy of American exceptionalism. I have solicited the insights of Slavoj Zizek and Renata Soled to articulate this explanation because they arrived at an understanding of the workings of state fan.- tasy from within the precincts of the Soviet imperial formation onto whom the cold war state had projected the agency responsible for the construction of the U.S. State of Exception. As the subjects within a nation-state that had actually been subjected to the imperial formation that the U.S. state had described as its dialectical contrary, Zizek and Salecl are perhaps the theorists best suited by historical circumstances to explain the perverse logics of the U.S. State of Exception. But the paradoxical logic at work in the primal scene of American exceptionalism discerned by two of its ego-ideals need not impede a more forthright description of the reality effects of this pervasive state of fantasy. After World War II, the U.S. government propagated the belief that America was the fulfillment of the world's aspiration for the "Nation of Nations" by constructing the threat to the attainment of that ideal in the image of the Soviet Empire. The construction of this national enemy in the image of an Evil Empire enabled the U.S. state to represent its imperial practices as preemptive measures that it was obliged to take to prevent the Soviet Empire from incorporating U.S. citizens within its imperial domain. American exceptionalism produced the desire within U.S. citizens to construe U.S. imperialism as a nation-preserving measure that would prevent Soviet imperialism from destroying America's national ideals. American exceptionalism also enabled U.S. citizens to turn this nation-preserving measure into an exception to U.S. national identity that proved its rule. Rather than construing the occupation of South Korea and West Berlin as violations of the belief in American nationalism, the fantasy of American exceptionalism allowed U.S. citizens to derive enjoyment from these exceptions as necessary means to achieve the state's destruction of imperialism as a Russian way of life. Exceptionalism became a state fantasy when it caused U.S. citizens to want to participate in the state's imperial will by changing the objec­tive cause of their desire. The imperialism that the state in fact practiced intensified the need within U.S. citizens to disavow those practices. This need in in turn produced a counterloop of desire for the recovery of the ideal nation. But the latter desire could only be acted upon by renewing the practice of disavowal through which the U.S. national identity was produced. What was important in the practice of this de­sire was not whether or not the fantasy of American exceptionalism was "true." What mattered was the way that the fantasy of exceptionalism overwhelmed this question of the truth. Americans could not be de­ceived about American exceptionalism because, to paraphrase Renata Salecl, they articulated the truth of their nationalizing desire in and through this deception.

Link – South Korea

American influence over South Korean economics makes imperialist ethics inevitable - withdrawal is a band aid solution that will fail

Moon 7 (William J, undergraduate at the University of Michigan’s Stephen M. Ross School of Business, http://www.lurj.org/article.php/vol2n1/coldwar.xml)

There was, of course, more at stake in the Cold War for America than simple ideological and political struggle. The involvement in Korea also incorporated, to a large extent, shrewd economic calculations. Communist expansion was a great threat to American political economy, precisely because it hindered upon American economic dominance. Americans understood the Soviet bloc as an “iron curtain” which was a threat to the American economy that relied heavily on free trade with foreign economies (Small 193). The Soviet aspiration to become an economic hegemony via closing off its economy was an especially frightening concept under the overproduction and under-consumption thesis, which installed a belief that, “the nation's economy, in order to remain healthy, had continually to expand and integrate new markets and sources of raw material” (Kramer, “New”). This ideology especially gained momentum when conservatives succeeded in linking the Great Depression with a lack of free trade. This was not entirely a false alarm especially in the post-war period, since the share of trade in the U.S. economy rose to an unprecedented level in the 1950s. Many critics point to the lack of “anything” in Korea to deny any claims of American economic benefits involved with intervention in Korea. Specifically, they refer to the massive U.S. economic and military aid poured into South Korea, which peaked at a tune of about $1 billion a year, when the total U.S. federal budget was under $70 billion (Woo-Cumings 66). There were, nevertheless, economic benefits involved with the generosity. Similar to the political economy imperialism, U.S. involvement aimed at not only securing raw materials, but also securing cheap labor and markets to sell finished goods (Guevara). The American support for pro-capitalist regimes in South Korea effectively stifled labor movements for four decades. Korean workers, as Hegan Koo puts it, were infamously known for suffering the world's longest work hours – up to eighteen hours a day – in some of the most inhumane working conditions the world had ever seen (Koo 78). In addition to the strong discursive environment that denounced labor movements as “communists,” blacklisting labor movement leaders effectively obliterated the collective identity of workers. Unsurprisingly, American leverage over the right-wing regimes granted the United States exclusive rights to take advantage of such labor practices. Namely, South Korea became one of the first nations that the United States established a Free Trade Zone, where American businessmen could import Koreans good unhindered by domestic rules and regulations (Kramer, “Whose”). Free Trade Zones in South Korea emerged in early 1960s as part of the First Economic Development Plan, which strikingly correlated with the rise of labor-intensive industries in Korea (“Recent”). According to classic economic models set forth by trade economists, such increase in trade, at an aggregate level, should have benefited both countries involved. From a purely economic standpoint, the American involvement in Korea, thus invariably benefited Korea. Yet, such premise hardly signifies American altruism, because benefiting Korea was the means through which Americans benefited. As President Eisenhower articulates, the “flow of U.S. dollars abroad would be matched by a corresponding flow of [other goods] into the nation” (Klein 42). Many Marxist scholars criticize such unbalanced relationship between states, because the capitalist system of world order induces the economy of smaller states to inevitably depend on larger economies, which is the very logic of imperialism. More importantly, Korea served as a primary exemplar that glorified America's reassurance in providing a military umbrella for post-colonial nations (Williams et al. 52). The “symbolic” model that established America as a reliable bulwark against communism was an important American economic strategy that deterred other nations from joining the communist movement.

Link – Withdrawal

Even if withdrawal assumes some alleviation of imperial tendencies opposition gets nowhere without a reorientation of ontological foundations

Spanos 2k (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, America’s Shadow, p. 191-193) PJ

What I have argued in this book about the relationship between philos­ophy and imperialism is that the euphoric annunciation of the end of history and the advent of the New World Order by the deputies of the dominant American culture at the end of the Cold War is symptomatic of the achievement of the global hegemony of "America" understood not simply as a political order, but as a way of thinking. I have claimed that this triumphant "American" way of thinking is not exceptional­ist, as it has always been claimed by Americans, especially since de Tocqueville's announcement of the advent of democracy in America, but European, which means metaphysical: an imperial thinking, whose provenance resides in Roman antiquity, that sees the being into which it inquires as a totalized spatial image, a "field" or "region" or "domain" to be comprehended, mastered, and exploited. But this way of putting this imperial metanarrative, though necessary in the context of the amnesiac imperatives of thinking the Enlightenment as an epochal emancipatory moment in world history, is too general. It does not account for the historically specific transformation of this European mode of knowledge production accomplished in the wake of America's emergence as a global power: the fulfillment of the Enlighten­ment's "developmental model" in the effacement of the visible imperial logos informing traditional metaphysics by way of the apotheosis of the "objectivity" of empirical science and the advent of the classificatory table. Under the aegis of a triumphant America, the narrative economy of European metaphysics has come to its end in the form of a uni­versal instrumentalism, a Man-centered thinking for which everything in time and space is seen as a "problem" that the larger compara­tive "picture" renders susceptible to a final and determinate solution. In Heidegger's proleptic terms, European metaphysical thinking in the technological age dominated by America has become "Americanized," a "re-presentational"/"calculative" thinking or "planning" that has trans­formed the uncalculability of being at large into a planetary "world picture": "We get the picture" concerning something does not mean only that what is, is set before us, is represented to us, in general, but that what is stands before us—in all that belongs to it and all that stands together in it as a system. "To get the picture" throbs with being acquainted with something, with being equipped and prepared for it. Where the world becomes picture, what is, in its entirely, is juxtaposed as that for which man is prepared and which, correspondingly, he therefore intends to bring before him­self and have before himself, and consequently intends in a decisive sense to set in place before himself. Hence world picture, when understood essentially, does not mean a picture of the world but the world conceived and grasped as picture. What is, in its en­tirety, is now taken in such a way that it first is in being and only is in being to the extent that it is set up by man, who represents and sets forth. Wherever we have the world picture, an essential decision takes place regarding what is, in its entirety. The Being of whatever is, is sought and found in the representedness of the latter.' Reconstellated into the context of this Heideggerian diagnosis of mo­dernity, the American end-of-history discourse undergoes a resonant estrangement. What is euphorically represented as "good news" — the global fulfillment ("end") of the emancipatory promise of History —comes to be seen as the Pax Metaphysica: the colonization of the errant mind of humanity at large by a banal and banalizing thinking that has reduced everything, including human beings, to "standing [or dispos­able] reserve."2 This "end of philosophy" in the form of a "triumphant" instrumentalist thinking that has reduced being to disposable commod­ity is everywhere manifest in the post–Cold War era. And, I suggest, its most telling symptom is the globalization of (American) English as the lingua franca of the "free market," which has as one of its most dev­astating consequences the "Americanization" not simply of the Western nation-states but of entire Third World cultures. What for the purpose of my argument this global triumph of "Amer­ican" thinking means is that even those who would oppose American global hegemony are, insofar as they remain indifferent to the onto­logical grounds of its sociopolitical practices, condemned to think their opposition according to the imperatives of the discursive practices they would oppose. They thus fulfill the expectation of the deputies of Amer­ican culture who predict that "even nondemocrats will have to speak the language of democracy in order to justify their deviation from the sin­gle universal standard."3 That is to say, the fulfillment of the European metanarrative in the globalization of American technological thinking, that is, the Americanization of the planet, has tacitly reduced opposition to a resonant silence. It is in this sense that, with Heidegger, the intellectual who is attuned to the complicity between Western philosophy and imperialism is com­pelled to call this "age of the world picture" presided over by America a "destitute time" or, more suggestively, "a realm of in-between" — "the No-more of the gods that have fled and the Not-yet of the god that is coming."4 In the context of the impasse of oppositional thinking, in other words, he/she is compelled to acknowledge the time of the post—Cold War occasion as an interregnum. This, for an opposition that limits resistance to the political, means a time of defeat. But for the opposi­tional thinker who is attuned to the ontological exile to which he/she has been condemned by the global triumph of technological thinking it also means the recognition that this exilic condition of silence constitutes an irresolvable contradiction in the "Truth" of instrumental thinking—the "shadow" that haunts its light — that demands to be thought. In the interregnum, the primary task of the marginalized intellectual is the re­thinking of thinking itself. And, as I have suggested, it is the event of the Vietnam War—and the dominant American culture's inordinate will to forget it — that provides the directives for this most difficult of tasks not impossible.

Link – Withdrawal

Their call for withdrawal is stuck in the American problem solving ontology

Spanos 8 (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, Global American:

The Devastation of Language Under the Dictatorship of the Public Realm, p. 194-196, Muse) PJ

In his speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Kansas City, President Bush traced the present “argument” against “staying the course” in Iraq back to the Vietnam War, when “people argued the real problem was America’s presence and that if we would just withdraw, the killing would end.” More specifically—and not incidentally—he attributed the origin of this argument to the anti-American Old World Englishman, Graham Greene’s *The Quiet American*: “The argument that America’s presence in Indochina was dangerous had a long pedigree. In 1955, long before the United States had entered the war, Graham Greene wrote a novel called *The Quiet American*. It was set in Saigon, and the main character was a young government agent named Alden Pyle. He was a symbol of American purpose and patriotism— and dangerous naivete. Another character [the English expatriate reporter and narrator, Fowler] describes Alden this way: “I never knew a man who had better motives for all the trouble he caused.” After America entered the Vietnam War, the Graham Green argument gathered some steam. As a matter of fact, many argued that if we pulled out there would be no consequences for the Vietnamese people. In fact, “this symbol of American purpose and patriotism” was an American CIA agent, who, in the face of the imminent defeat of the French colonial army at the hands of the insurgent Vietminh and armed with the domino theory—the “truth” he acquired from the Cold War— and Orientalist books of the “area expert” York Harding and his American exceptionalist ethos, was clandestinely attempting to establish a “Third Force.” Following the unerring missionary logic of the myth of American exceptionalism, Pyle envisages this “Third Force” as one, under the aegis of the U.S., that would oppose both the decadent (Old World) French colonial regime and the Chinese and/or Soviet Communists, who were alleged (falsely) to be in control of the Vietminh. Directed by his “textual attitude”—the “fallacy” of “assuming that the swarming, unpredictable, and problematic mess in which humans beings live can be understood on the basis of what books—texts—say (Said 1979, 92-93)—and in the name of his American exceptionalism, he arranged with the “leader” of this “Third Force” to detonate some bombs in the heart of Saigon during a parade that would be interpreted by the world press as the terrorist work of the communists. Unbeknown to Pyle, the parade had been called off, but this had not deterred the leader of the “Third Force.” The result of Pyle’s “American purpose and patriotism”—what President Bush’s satirical invocation of Greene’s novel leaves resonantly unsaid—is a terrorist massacre of innocents. I quote at some length to retrieve the chilling point, obliterated by the President in his speech, that Greene is making about the terrible banality of the American language and thinking epitomized by of the “quietAmerican”: “There mustn’t be any American casualties, must there? [Pyle had warned a couple of American secretaries (and Phuong, his Vietnamese girlfriend) to stay away from the milk bar they frequented that day]” An ambulance forced it way up the rue Catinat into the square and the policeman who had stopped me moved to one side to let it through . . . . I pushed Pyle forward and ahead of me into the square before we could be stopped. We were among a congregation of mourners. The police could prevent others entering the square; they were powerless to clear the square of the survivors and the first–comers. The doctors were too busy to attend to the dead, and so the dead were left to their owners, for one can own the dead as one owns a chair. A woman sat on the ground with what was left of her baby in her lap; with a kind of modesty, she had covered it with her straw peasant hat. She was still and silent, and what struck me most in the square was the silence . . . . The legless torso at the edge of the garden still twitched, like a chicken which had lost its head. From the man’s shirt, he had probably been a trishaw driver. Pyle said, “It’s awful.” He looked at the wet on his shoes and said in a sick voice, “What’s that ?” “Blood,” I said, “Haven’t you ever seen it before?” He said, “I must get them cleaned before I see the ministers.” I don’t think he knew what he was saying. He was seeing a real war for the first time: he had punted down into Phat Diem in a kind of school boy dream, and anyway in his eyes soldiers didn’t count. I forced him, with my hand on his shoulder, to look around. I said, “This is the hour when the place is always full of women and children—it’s the shopping hour. Why choose that of all hours?” He said weakly, “There was to have been a parade.” “And you hoped to catch a few colonels. But the parade was cancelled yesterday, Pyle. “I didn’t know.” “Didn’t know!” I pushed him into a patch of blood where a stretcher had lain. “You ought to be better informed.” “I was out of town,” he said, looking down at his shoes. “They should have called it off.” “And miss the fun?” I asked him. “Do you expect general The to lose his demonstration? This is better than a parade. Women and children are news, and soldiers aren’t, in a war. This will hit the world Press. You’ve put General The on the map all right, Pyle. You’ve got the Third Force and National Democracy all over your right shoe. Go home to Phuong and tell her about your heroic dead—there are a few dozen less of her people to worry about . . . .” Unlike them [the people who were already flocking into the nearby cathedral] I had reason for thankfulness, for wasn’t Phuong alive? Hadn’t she been “warned”? But what I remembered was the torso in the square, the baby on its mother’s lap. They had not been warned: they had not been sufficiently important . . . . A two-hundred pound bomb does not discriminate. How many dead colonels justify a child’s or a trishaw driver’s death when you are building a national democratic front? (Greene 1977, 161-63)19

Link – Withdrawal

The withdrawal is an illusion to show a success after a hardship – it ignores the ontological foundations of the intervention

Spanos 2k (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, The Question of Philosophy and *Poiesis* in the Posthistorical Age: Thinking/Imagining the Shadow of Metaphysics, p. 156-158) PJ

This accommodational strategy of representation, for example, is epitomized by Richard Haass, a former official in the Bush administration and now director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institute, in his recent book, The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States after the ColdWar.5 Eschewing Fukuyama’s vulnerable Hegelian eschatological structure in favor of theorizing the actual practices of the United States in the international sphere, Haass frames the post–cold war occasion in the totalizing liberal capitalist image of a ‘‘deregulated world’’ (in contrast to the world ‘‘regulated’’ by the cold war scenario) and the role of the United States as that of a sheriff leading posses (the appropriate members of the United Nations or the NATO alliance) to quell the threats to global stability and peace posed by this international deregulation. Despite the acknowledgment that conflict is inevitable in the world ‘‘after the cold war’’ (an acknowledgment that, in fact, echoes Fukuyama), the triumphant (ontological) idea of liberal capitalist democracy—its ontologically grounded commitment to the ‘‘laissez-faire’’ polity (deregulation), which is to say, to the fictional concept of the sovereign subject—remains intact. Indeed, Haass gives this representational framework far more historical power than Fukuyama’s disciplinary discourse of political science is able to muster. For, unlike the Fukuyamans, he informs his representation of the historically determined and determining exceptionalist mission of the United States in the globalized post–cold war era with the teleological metaphorics that have been, from the beginning, fundamental to the constitution and power of the American cultural identity. The metaphor of the sheriff/posse derives from the history of the American West and constitutes a variation of the pacification processes of westward expansion. As such, it brings with it the entire ideological baggage of the teleological myth of the American frontier, from the Puritans’ ‘‘errand in the [‘New World’] wilderness’’ to the myth of Manifest Destiny. As the New Americanist countermemory has persuasively shown, this is the myth that has saturated the cultural discourse of America, both high and low, since its origins: whether in the form of the American jeremiad, which, from the Puritans through DanielWebster to Ronald Reagan, has functioned perennially to maintain the national consensus vis-à-vis its providentially ordained mission to domesticate (and dominate) what is beyond the frontier, or of the Hollywood western (including its military allotrope), which has functioned to naturalize what one New Americanist has called the American ‘‘victory culture.’’ 6 The virtually unchallenged official and mediatic representation of the self-righteous militaristic solution of the crisis in Kosovo—a representation that reiteratively justifies the devastation of Serbia and the terrible ‘‘collateral damage’’ this violence necessarily entails—as a ‘‘just, humanitarian’’ war undertaken by the United States under the alias of NATO bears witness to the historical reality of this myth, to its irresistible durability (despite its self-destruction in the 1960s), and to its inordinate power. What the presently privileged oppositional discourses are blinded to by their binarist and exclusionary turn from theory to praxis is, to put it bluntly, the relationship of this recuperative representation of the post– cold war period to the Vietnam War, a war, not incidentally, that, as President John F. Kennedy’s equation of Southeast Asia as ‘‘the new frontier’’ suggests, was, from the beginning of the United States’ intervention, represented in the exceptionalist terms of the founding American myth of the frontier: the providentially ordained ‘‘errand in the wilderness.’’ 7 Or, rather, it is the thisness—the historical specificity—of the Vietnam War that needs to be put back into play by a discourse that would effectively resist the polyvalent reactionary political implications of this global representation (and here I am referring specifically to the event of Kosovo). The triumphalist end-of-history discourse is the precipitate of a massive mnemonic project of the custodians of the American cultural memory, not least the media, to obliterate the memory of the decades-long event we call ‘‘Vietnam.’’ This project of forgetting, undertaken by what Althusser calls the ideological state apparatuses, or, alternatively, the liberal capitalist problematic, was a systematic one that began with the reduction of the thisness of the Vietnam War to war-in-general and culminated in the obliteration of reference to it in post–cold war representations of American history. This eventuation is symptomatically suggested by the (enforced) visible absence of significant reference to the Vietnam War in Fukuyama’s and other triumphalists’ accounts of Universal History’s dialectical fulfillment of its destined end in the demise of Soviet communism and the global triumph of liberal capitalist democracy, its establishment, as it were, of its imperium sine fine. But it is made resonantly clear by President George Bush’s announcement, following what his administration and the media that aped its representation of that global occasion took to be the decisive American victory in the Persian Gulf, that ‘‘we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome at last.’’ 8

Link – Crisis Politics – Middle East

Development of crisis scenarios is consistent with the ontologies that justified exceptionalist and hegemonic expansion into the Middle East and other totalitarian practices

Spanos 8 (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, Global American:

The Devastation of Language Under the Dictatorship of the Public Realm, p. 172, Muse) PJ

As oppositional intellectuals have claimed from the days of the beginning of the George W. Bush presidency—and, with the deepening of the quagmire in Iraq, the general American public has increasingly come to agree—this Republican administration, more than any other administration in the history of the U.S. is one that has played havoc with the constitutional checks and balances in its arrogant and selfrighteous effort to wrest the power to govern from the U.S. Congress in behalf of conducting a global war against the Islamic world which it strategically has called a “global war on terror.” Long before its invasion of Iraq, this Republican president and his neoconservative intellectual deputies, aided and abetted by the fervor of the Evangelical Christian racist right, had produced an imperial scenario the end of which was, from the beginning, the “Pax Americana,” the imposition of “peace” by violence—and American style democracies—in those areas of the world, most notably, the Middle East—that constitute obstacles to America’s global hegemony. In the process—and taking strategic advantage of the “terrorist” attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 9/11 by al-Qaeda—this regime, armed by policy experts who represent the complex dynamics of globalization in terms of the capitalist “deregulation” of the national economy (the free market)1 and supported by the obsequious media, announced its policy of preemptive wars on “rogues states” and then invaded Afghanistan and, on the false pretext that Saddam Hussein was producing weapons of mass destruction, Iraq: a “global war on terror,” that is, which has no borders and no foreseeable end. It thus established a global geopolitical crisis situation that has rendered “homeland security” a major—and abiding—ideological priority. As a result of this strategic representation of the global occasion, the Bush presidency has tacitly established a permanent state of exception that has justified a unilateral policing of the world of nations, the torture of suspected terrorists in defiance of international law, and produced the “Patriot Act,” a climate of governmental secrecy, a national judicial system that is intent on annulling dissent, a timidity on the part of the Democratic Party in the face of the administration’s imperial foreign policies: a political system, that is to say, the logic of which, if not (yet) the actual practice, is unambiguously totalitarian.

Link – Problem Solving

The problem/solution mindset sees problems as things to be mastered – this calculative mentality culminates in genocidal ends

Spanos 3 (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, A Rumor of War: 9/11 and the Forgetting of the Vietnam War, p. 37-38) PJ

When the Vietnamese insurgents refused to accommodate themselves to this metaphysical/Western concept of warfare, the frustrated American military command was forced to revise its forwarding mid-intensity strategy. But this revision did not take account of the cultural implications of this systematic refusal on the part of the ‘‘Other’’ to be answerable to the American narrative. As in the individual case of Caputo, the collective unconsciousness of the American military command was so deeply inscribed by the ‘‘truth’’ of the American exceptionalist narrative that privileged and, in turn, demanded accomplishment—getting something done— that it precluded the possibility of seeing the conditions of this war with the eyes of the Southeast Asian ‘‘Other.’’ Instead, it sought the same decisive narrative end by other means: the ‘‘war of attrition,’’ which rendered the invisible and intangible ‘‘enemy’’—ultimately Vietnam—visible to the gaze, tangible, and thus assailable. This was the strategy of high technological mass destruction that at first (in the period of Caputo’s service) took the form of the relentless search-and-destroy mission in ‘‘free-fire zones’’ (spaces ostensibly, but not really, emptied of civilians), preceded and often accompanied by napalm bombings and artillery barrages, but which, when this type of operation accomplished nothing, eventually escalated into the massive B-52 bombings, the systematic defoliation of the Vietnamese wilderness (which also contaminated it with the deadly Agent Orange), and the spraying of herbicides into the Vietnamese rice paddies, all undertaken on the assumption that these tactics of mass technological destruction would kill or enable the killing of enough of the enemy to ‘‘bring him to his knees.’’ This official strategy of indiscriminate mass destruction is precisely that which increasingly preoccupies Caputo’s narrative until it comes to culmination shortly before his fatal order: Having lost about thirty percent of his command the past month, Neal [Caputo’s company commander] had become intolerable. . . . C Company’s kill ratio was below standard. Bodies. Bodies. Bodies. Battalion wanted bodies. Neal wanted bodies. He lectured his officers on the importance of aggressiveness and made implied threats when he thought we lacked that attribute. . . . So we went along with the captain’s policy [of offering extra beer rations for every confirmed VC killed], without reflecting on its moral implications. (ARW, 294) The inscribed will to ‘‘perform’’—to accomplish, to bring crisis to a productive closure—of the American chain of command, extending outward from Caputo’s company commander to battalion headquarters and beyond to MACV and the Pentagon, was utterly frustrated by the strategic refusal of the Vietnamese guerrillas to expose themselves to the vastly superior American military machine. And in its arrogant assumption of the righteousness of its cause, which, I am suggesting, had its ultimate source in the ‘‘exceptionalist’’ origins of America, it tacitly authorized the indiscriminate killing of Vietnamese in the name of the ‘‘body count.’’ As author of his narrative, Caputo is unwilling to acknowledge the continuity between his individual actions and those of his military superiors, to say nothing about his country’s national identity. Here, for example, he both disassociates his postwar (educated) self from the command’s perspective and implies that his and his men’s going along with the chain of command’s banalizing of human life and death was a betrayal of the ‘‘lofty ideals’’ of America. If, however, we reconstellate this ‘‘confession’’ into the context of Caputo’s characterization of his psychological condition prior to his order to ‘‘get those goddamned VC,’’ we are compelled, despite, indeed, because of, the visibility of his reluctance, to perceive the ineluctable relay between his personal act of violence and the collective act of violence perpetrated against the Vietnamese people and their land by the American military machine, the American government, and ultimately—and most tellingly—by America itself.

Link – Problem Solving

The affirmative’s ‘can do’ approach to the resolution replicates America’s exceptionalist mentality and the harms

Spanos 8 (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, Global American:

The Devastation of Language Under the Dictatorship of the Public Realm, p. 184-186, Muse) PJ

No more damning analysis of the “style”—the “problem-solving” or “can do” rhetoric and structure—of these routine, indiscriminate deathdealing documents exists than that of Richard Ohmann in *English in* *America*, except for the fact that he does not quite draw the conclusion I am suggesting. I am referring to his tremendously important, though now virtually forgotten revolutionary exposure of the (inadvertent) complicity of university literature departments—their cultural production, especially their teaching of freshman composition—with the “commonsensical” and routinized violence perpetrated by the American government in Vietnam. Responding to the style and matter of the first of these excerpts, Ohmann writes, Of course it is the job of generals to win, and political impact be damned. The more surprising and dismaying revelation of *The Pentagon Papers* is how much the *civilians* running America came to share this perspective. Perhaps the neatly symmetrical form . . . and the mechanical quality of the whole paradigm, helped dull their senses and made the unspeakable a daily routine. An all-pervasive metaphor accompanies the argumentative strategy [of the author’s problem-solving model], that of cost and benefit . . . . They must solve the problem, even if it means subtracting cabbages from kings. Thus, McGeorge Bundy in February, 1965, advocating a course of “sustained reprisal” against North Vietnam for “offenses” in the south: “While we believed that the risks of such a policy are acceptable, we emphasize that its costs are real.” These costs include “significant losses,” “an extensive and costly effort against the whole air defense system of North Vietnam,” high U.S. casualties, and arousal of American “feelings.” “Yet measured against the costs of defeat in Vietnam, this program seems cheap. And even if it fails to turn the tide—as it may— the value of the effort seems to us to exceed its cost.” What arguments like these have in common is a lunatic incommensurability. Even now, reading these documents, I want to shout, “You destroyed the South Vietnamese people, and talked of piaster spending. You held off from still greater killing only because open debate in America about doing so might encourage the North Vietnamese.” The main point to make, in this context, is that since the suffering of the Vietnamese did not impinge on the consciousness of the policy-makers as a cost, it had virtually no existence for them—at least in these memoranda. (1976, 199-202)6 One could supplement Ohmann’s damning critical analysis of the “can do” language and the deeply inscribed panoptic structure of this enormous archive of memoranda by pointing to their unerring and mind-numbing sameness: their systematic reliance on the quantitative measure, the abstracting and reductive cliché, the euphemisms, the short-hand structure of the sentences—what Eichmann called the “appropriate telegraphic style” in speaking of the “monthly reports” on the progress of the “Final Solution” he sent to the Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler7—and, subsuming these, the “problem-solving” model. This model, like the “over-sight” or “super-vision” of the capitalist “problematic” brilliantly analyzed by Louis Althusser in “From Capital to Marx’s Philosophy,” blinds the willful inquirer to any differential reality that would contradict and thus remain an obstacle to the end he/she desires from the beginning: in this case, “the suffering of the Vietnamese,” which “did not impinge on the consciousness of the policy makers,” that is, “*had virtually no existence for them*” (my emphasis). One could also mark the obliteration of conscience, which Arendt over-determines in her devastating analysis of Eichmann’s language, achieved in these Pentagon memoranda by the insistent identification of the realities instigating it as a neurosis—the “‘French defeat’ and ‘Korean syndromes,’” as well as pointing to the genealogy of what, in the aftermath of the war under the massive campaign of the American government and the culture industry to “forget Vietnam” in the name of resuming its mission in the world’s wilderness (specifically the Middle East), came to be called “the Vietnam syndrome.” But, for the purpose on my argument, I want to underscore what Ohmann long ago noted at the outset of his criticism, but did not adequately amplify about the “agents” of these memoranda. This deadly cliché-ridden and euphemistic “telegraphic” language, whose superficiality—is it inappropriate to call this symptom of these documents “banality”?—lent itself to the pervasive routinization of a murderous indiscriminate violence against America’s demonized “Others,” is not, as it is in a totalitarian society, that of a militarist mentality. It is, rather, the language of civilians, precisely those “ordinary” Americans who exist in democracies to protect society from the juggernaut mentality of the militaristic mind.

Link – Problem Solving - Forgetting Vietnam (1/2)

The call to end a specific problem evokes a sense of American problem solving that gives us the opportunity to forget our proof of calculative failure in Vietnam

Spanos 2k (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, America’s Shadow, p. 140-142) PJ

This revisionist ideological initiative was not restricted to the simulacral productions of Hollywood. It was, in fact, the essential project of the culture industry at large. This is emphatically suggested by such immensely popular "documentaries" as Al Santoli's *To Bear Any* *Burden* (1985), which, in collecting the personal "testimony" about the "Vietnam War and its aftermath" of "Americans and Southeast Asians" "who remember,"25 duplicates this melodramatically imagined transformation of a recuperative ideology of reconciliation (i.e., accommodation) to a more aggressive attack against the countermemory. "After the publication of *Everything We Had,"* Santoli writes in his preface, "I realized that the recognition given to it and to Vietnam veterans in general is only one step in our coming to terms with the Vietnam trauma. The larger story is more than one of combat by American soldiers in Vietnam, or one that ends with America's direct involvement there. It seemed necessary to take a look at the revolution that preceded America's involvement, as well as the effects of the Communist victory in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos" *(BAB,* xvi-xvii). The "truth" to which this "objective" (retrospective) look bears witness is suggested in a paragraph preceding this one: "I did not want to see the Communists succeed or the lives of my friends wasted. But with no mandate for victory, and a senseless obsession with body-counts, I felt that our lives and ideals meant nothing. We were just cold statistics in Washington's political computers. Everything I ever believed in was turned upside down" *(BAB,* xvi). Hidden behind Santoli's appeal to a cross-section of eyewitness accounts is a self-confirming future-anterior selective process ("the effects of the Communist victory in Vietnam") as recounted by "a larger community of veterans" *(BAB,* xvii) — not only Americans (soldiers, journalists, diplomats, relief workers), but Cambodian refugees and former Vietnamese insurgents themselves. It is, in other words, a process that, like the *Rambo* trilogy, articulates a narrative that would bring a war that refused to end to decisive closure by demonstrating the "negative" consequences for the Vietnamese and for adjacent Southeast Asian peoples of the United States's withdrawal from Vietnam. Santoli's book attributes this withdrawal, of course, to a neurotic protest movement that did not allow the American military to win the war. With this symbolic denouement, the "wound" suffered by "America" has been utterly, if not explicitly, healed. To invoke an analogous metaphor, the ghost that has haunted the collective American psyche is exorcised. The internal divisions within the American body politic have not only been reconciled; the reconciliation has rendered the *res publica* stronger and more dedicated to the principles of American democracy in its struggle against radicals and communist imperialism. But what, in the context of the emergence of the end-of-the-Cold War discourse, needs to be thematized is that the metaphor of *trauma* has undergone a telling metamorphosis: the metaphor of the wound, which implies healing, that is, ideological reconciliation, has become — or is at the threshold of being represented as — a collective psychological illness, a national "syndrome," which implies the imperative to blame a negative ideological cause. The fourth and "final" phase of the American culture industry's renarrativization of the Vietnam War was inaugurated on the concurrent occasion of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the United States's surgically executed "victory" against Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War. What is especially telling about the official representation of this historical conjuncture, especially by the television networks, is that, from beginning to end, it was this contrasting negative measure of Vietnam that utterly determined its narrative shape: the linear/circular structure of decisive victory. From the inaugural debates about the question of the legitimacy of America's intervention in the face of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait through the brief period of the war itself to its immediate aftermath, it was the specter of the Vietnam War — the "divisive" and "self-defeating" national anxiety precipitated by its radical indeterminacy— that the narrative structure of closure, enabled by a "victory" by the United States in the Cold War, was intended to decisively efface. This transformation of a national anxiety into a productive negative image was symptomatically reflected by President Bush's virtually unchallenged guarantee to the American public on the eve of the war that it would not be "another Vietnam"26 and, more strategically, by the exclusive mediation of the events of the Gulf War by the American military information agencies in a way that the events of the Vietnam War had made unthinkable. And it was the long process of cultural forgetting, which had ostensibly (re)constituted the actual defeat of the United States into a drastically mistaken withdrawal from Vietnam, that had prepared the ground for this cultural transformation. In short, the representational forgetting of the actualities of the war systematically undertaken by the ideological state apparatuses had gradually arrived at a form of remem Bering it that attributed the defeat of America to the infectious impact of the multisituated protest movement in the United States on the American public and its intellectual deputies. In this "final" phase, that is, the earlier public need to "heal the wound" — a recuperative and conciliatory gesture of forgetting — became, in the words of President George Bush and official Washington, a matter of "kicking the Vietnam syndrome."27 Aided and abetted by the culture industry, this early gesture of forgetting metamorphosed at the time of the Gulf "crisis" into a virulently assured assumption that the resistance to America's intervention and conduct of the war in Vietnam in the 1960s was a symptom of a national neurosis. (This interpretation of the active resistance to the Vietnam War was not a sudden reactionary political initiative enabled by the circumstances of the Gulf War. Its origins can be traced back to the period of the Vietnam War itself, to the reaction against the protest movement by such influential conservative and liberal humanist intellectuals as George Kennan, Walter Jackson Bate, and Allan Bloom, among many others. The disruptions of the traditional white Anglo-American and male-dominated cultural value system in American colleges and universities — whether in the form of the common body of shared knowledge informing the general education program [the *litterae humaniores]* or the canon of great books — were undertaken in the name of relevance. In the name of high seriousness, these anxious traditionalists reduced this emancipatory initiative to an unhealthy or neurotic obsession with novelty and/or vulgarity and represented it — as Arnold had represented the rise of working-class consciousness in late Victorian Britain — as a symptom not simply of a "centrifugal" process

Link – Problem Solving - Forgetting Vietnam (2/2)

<CONTINUED>

precipitating a dangerous cultural "heterogeneity," but as a collective "death wish" [Bate] on the part of the American academy.)28 Whatever its limitations, the protest movement in the Vietnam decade was, in fact, a symptomatic manifestation of a long-overdue and promising national self-doubt about the alleged legitimacy of America's representation of its internal constituencies (blacks, women, gays, ethnic minorities, the poor, the young, and so on) and about the alleged benignity of its historically ordained exceptionalist mission to transform the world (the barbarous Others) in its own image. In this last phase of the amnesiac process, this healthy and potentially productive self-examination of the American cultural identity came to be represented as a collective psychological sickness that, in its disintegrative momentum, threatened to undermine "America's" promised end.29 By this I mean the end providentially promised to the original Puritans and later, after the secularization of the body politic, by History: the building of "the city on the hill" in the "New World," which is to say, the advent of the New World Order and the end of history.

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Impact – Problem/Solution Mindset

Western thought sees the world as a set of problems to be mastered or destroyed

Spanos 3 (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, A Rumor of War: 9/11 and the Forgetting of the Vietnam War, p. 37-38) PJ

This is why I have italicized the words ‘‘clear and resolute’’ in the above quotation referring to the marine in the poster. Clarity, the essential value of Western epistemology (as it is reflected, for example, in the privileged concept of the Enlightenment), implies a charted field of (super-)vision that is not impeded by diversionary obstacles but, rather, sees contradictions as obstacles to the decisive achievement of the end and thus to be accommodated or, if that is impossible, to be obliterated. Resoluteness implies not simply the decisive certainty of purpose but also the decisive certainty of the end to be accomplished. Together, they assume a disciplinary epistemology that spatializes temporal events before they occur—reduces their differential, errant, obscure, and menacing living force to a strategic map on which no detail is superfluous or unaccounted for to the calculative mind—and, crucial to Caputo’s text, they enable getting something done. In identifying with the marine in the poster, in other words, the young Caputo is also identifying himself with a caricatured version of the empirical pragmatic American character, the ‘‘leader of men,’’ who has his origins in the image of the pathbreaking and civilization-rejuvenating frontiersman and his ‘‘maturity’’ in the problem solving of a Benjamin Franklin, but who comes down to Caputo (and to virtually all the young Americans who fought in Vietnam) mediated by the melodramatic Hollywood western and itsWorld War II allotrope, and symbolized by the ubiquitous mythicized icon of the actor JohnWayne. The simulacrum he identifies with, that is, constitutes the fulfillment of the logical economy of the original, but in such a caricatured way that it discloses its absurdity and its contradictory essence. Caputo begins to sense the dislocating difference between his inscribed expectations about war and the actualities of this particular war as soon as he arrives in Vietnam, when, instead of Western-style armies, he encounters evanescent ‘‘phantoms.’’ But it is only when, as the leader of a platoon of marines, he undertakes his first ‘‘search and destroy’’ mission in the bush that his illusions about war (if not this particular war) and the sense of control they enabled begin to self-destruct decisively. Caputo anticipates this process at the outset of the action when, airborne, on his way into the designated landing zone, he encounters the tremendous difference between that part of Vietnam seen from the panoptic distance enabled by a microcosmic map—and the ‘‘hammer and anvil’’ tactics based on this spatializing vision—and the actualities of entering this nightmarish and menacing jungle landscape: We were flying parallel to the mountains; the Cordillera spread out before us, and it was the most forbidding thing I had ever seen. . . . There it was the Annamese Cordillera, hostile and utterly alien. The Vietnamese themselves regarded it with dread. ‘‘Out there’’; they called that humid wilderness where the Bengal tiger stalked and the cobra coiled beneath its rock and the Viet Cong lurked in ambush. Looking down, I wondered for a moment if the operation was somebody’s idea of a joke. Our mission was to find an enemy battalion. A battalion—a few hundred men. The whole North Vietnamese Army could have concealed itself in that jungle-sea, and we were going to look for a battalion. Crush it in a hammer and anvil movement. We were going to find a battalion and destroy it. Search and destroy. I half expected those mountains to shake with contemptuous laughter at our pretense. (ARW, 77–78)

Impact – Problem/Solution Mindset

Engaging in western problem/solution mindsets result in genocidal ends

Spanos 93 (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, Heidegger and Criticism: Retrieving the Cultural Politics of Destruction, p. 205) PJ

Mystified and utterly frustrated by the enemy's decentered "invisibility," the agencies conducting the war eventually reacted to the uncanny impasse in the same, if deviously rationalized, way that Lieutenant Galley did: they unleashed overtly and massively the latent (racist) violence inhering in the liberal democratic ("can do")32 representation of the American intervention in Vietnam. It was, to be specific, the subversion of their inscribed assumption of presence and desire for and expectation of closure—the resolution of the narrative that promised decisive victory— that, after 1965, provoked the full fury of American technology against allthe Vietnamese: the saturation B-52 bombings that decimated the Vietnamese landscape and contributed to making the agrarian people of Vietnam a population of urban refugees;33 the indiscriminate use of herbicides like Agent Orange that defoliated and contaminated vast areas of the earth of Vietnam; the mechanized "search and destroy" (later recoded as "search and clear") missions and the bracketing of "free-fire zones" that resulted in the undifferentiated destruction of entire villages and untold numbers of villagers; the systematic, concealed brutalization and torture of prisoners of war, and of those villagers suspected of being "Viet Cong," that spread terror throughout the Vietnamese populace; and the various "pacification" projects: the relocation of the peasantry in what were euphemistically called "New Life Hamlets," but which, like their predecessors, the "Strategic Hamlets" of the Diem regime, were in fact more like concentration camps.34 One catches a glimpse of the awful violence of the American command's policy of "attrition"—the concentrated American impulse to force a rational/technological solution on the recalcitrantly de-centered context generated by the anticlimactic strategy of the NLF. and NVA—in the following grotesquely self-parodic instance (one of many) recorded by Michael Herr in his brilliant deconstruction of the official history of the war in Vietnam:

Impact – Problem/Solution Mindset

The attempt to picture the world as a manageable theater justifies imperial practices

Spanos 2k (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, America’s Shadow, p. 56-58) PJ

The end of the pursuit of knowledge, according to this developed —postcolonial — form of imperial practice, is to produce *peace,* but this peace will be achieved only by the total colonization and pacification of the Other. Theory (understood as a mode of inquiry that privileges seeing, *theoria)* and practice are coterminous. The *Pax Metaphysica is* the *Pax Romana.* My intention in invoking Heidegger's ontological genealogy of imperialism has not been to offer an alternative to that of Foucault, Said, and most postcolonial critics who would interrogate imperialism as an economic and/or political practice or as economico-political practice to which cultural texts contribute in a fundamental way. As Heidegger's entanglement with the German National Socialist project testifies, his restricted ontological focus is hardly adequate to the complex actualities of modern imperial practice. My purpose, rather, has been to demonstrate that the contemporary — postcolonial — critique of imperialism is disabled by a significant lack or, perhaps more accurately, by a resonant unthought in its discourse. What I have tried to make explicit by reconstellating Heidegger's de-struction of the metaphysical thinking of the ontotheological tradition (and by thematizing the affiliative system of sedimented tropes inscribed in it) into the context of more "practical" postcolonial critiques of imperialism is that these oppositional discourses, whether Foucauldian or New Historicist or Marxist or nationalist, tend to be blind to (or refuse to take seriously) the enabling degree to which Western imperialism is not simply a practice as such, but a deeply inscribed ideological state of mind produced by a "truth" endemic to a metaphysical ontology. More specifically, they overlook the fact that the modern imperial project is informed by a re-presentational or a "visual" problematic that has its constructed origins in the origin of the very idea of the West. These oppositional discourses, in short, are blinded by their overdetermination of "practice" to the reality that the idea of the West and imperialism are synonymous. To wring a turn on Enrique Dussel's resonant insight into Descartes's "I think; therefore I am," the identity of the collective Western subject is epitomized by the statement: "I think; therefore I conquer." In other words, my invocation of Heidegger's meditation on the genealogy of the Occidental concept of the true and the false suggests that the contemporary genealogies of imperialism, which have turned to history against the prior hegemony of "theory" in order to undertake their critique, *have not been historical enough.* The disabling consequences of this failure are manifold, but the most serious has to do with the relationship between the West as a state of mind that sees/grasps the truth of being and as a relay of imperial practices this state of mind compels. The preceding interrogation of the ontotheological tradition has shown that the metaphysical orientation it privileges at the outset involves the re-presentation of being. That is to say, it metaphorizes (i.e., reifies) the mutable be-ing of being. More specifically, it reduces being to the microcosmic *figure* of the centered circle supervised by the panoptic (solar) eye, a figure that becomes increasingly complex, especially in the period of the so-called Enlightenment, in its internal structure and its relation to the exterior Other (the periphery). This means that the Western consciousness at large comports itself before "reality," no matter what its site, in such a way that it transforms "it" into a region or territory or domain that it can survey at a glance. As such an optical technology, it perceives and orders — renders intelligible, brings "peace" to — every differential thing and every differential event it encounters according to the taxonomic imperatives of its measuring center. The West represents the end of this ocularcentric operation as the truth that brings the peace of fulfillment, of a completed development. But the destruction of the ontology of the ontotheological tradition discloses that this intelligibility and this peace of the Western dispensation — this *Pax Metaphysica* — are the consequences of a blindness to or a coercion or accommodation of any thing or event that is external to its circumference: is the result, that is, of its colonization of the "false." As such a transcendental diagramming or structuring machine that renders being intelligible by accommodating "it" to its luminous measuring center, then, the Western consciousness is an imperial consciousness not simply in relation to ontological alterity. It is also an imperial consciousness in relation to what the dominant culture represents as all the "more practical" differential sites that constitute the continuum of a territorialized being: from the individual subject (and the educational institutions that reproduce it) through gender and race relations all the way across to the collective "Third World" subject. To reconstellate Foucault's commentary on Bentham's Panopticon quoted earlier into this more deeply backgrounded historical context, the imperial Western consciousness itself, from its beginning, is "the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form; its functioning, abstracted from any obstacle, resistance or friction, must be represented as a pure architectural and optical system: it is in fact a figure of political technology that may and must be detached from any specific use." As I have shown, this figure is the (gridded) centered circle that is the symbol of Beauty and/or Perfection — and of Domination. In the modern (post-Enlightenment) era, the *actio* of this polyvalent diagram of knowledge/power takes the form of indirection. Its *actio* is strategically intended not simply to hide the totalizing imperial will to power operative in it, but to encode that power in the semblance of a benign project in behalf of the "improvement" (cultivation, development, maturation) of the "unimproved" (uncultivated, underdeveloped, adolescent) Other. It represents the act of violence as a mediating and disinterested project intended to bring peace to warring factions. The circumference's "center elsewhere," which was always visible and thus vulnerable in its prior historical allotropes, becomes naturalized and invisible in its latest guise. In so doing, it also becomes a far more efficient and irresistible instrument of imperial power, since power in this "enlightened" dispensation is internalized as knowledge in the Other on which it is practiced.

Impact – Problem/Solution Mindset (1/2)

US action presents a benign façade that masks the imperial logic justifying America’s hegemonic violence that seeks to reduce everything to a knowable, assimilative being.

Spanos 2k (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, America’s Shadow, p. 8-13) PJ

Metaphysics, therefore, in its post-Greek, that is, Roman, form, is a way of thinking that perceives "beings" or "things-as-they-are" from a privileged vantage point "beyond" or "above" them, that is, from a dis­tance — an "Archimedian point," to appropriate Hannah Arendt's apt phrase' — that enables the finite perceiver to "overcome" the ontolog­ically prescribed limits of immediate vision or, to put it positively, to comprehend them in their totality. But incorporated implicitly in Hei­degger's translation of the Greek prefix meta as "from above" is the idea of "from the end." For another meaning of the word meta is "after." These two meanings, it should be underscored, activate our aware­ness that the naturalization of the word "metaphysics" has congealed two metaphorical systems that are, nevertheless, absolutely integral with and necessary to each other: that which emanates from sight and that which emanates from the object it sees. But to disclose the indissolu­ble relationship of these metaphorical systems will require separating them out. Holding in temporary abeyance the resonant specificity of the visual metaphorics of the "first" meaning in favor of thinking the second, we can say that the metaphysical interpretation of being involves the per­ception of "beings" or "things-as-they-are" (physis) from the end, not only in the sense of termination but also in the sense of the purpose or goal of a directional and totalizing temporal process, a process in which this end is present from the beginning. If we attend to the word meta as a category of time, we can be more specific about what "be­ings" actually refer to: it compels us to understand "them" as the radical temporality of being or, more precisely, the differences that temporality always already disseminates. To think meta-physically is thus to think backward. This means retro-spectively or circularly, for the purpose of accommodating difference to a preconceived end or of reducing the dif­ferential force of time to a self-identical, objectified, timeless presence, while preserving the appearance of the temporality of time. To put this reduction in the terms precipitated by the implicit distinc­tion between two kinds of time (one that is derivative and one that is original), to think metaphysically is to transform the spectral nothing­ness of being (das Nichts) into a comforting and/or productive totalized Something, a Summum Ens. Behind and enabling Heidegger's statement is his monumental de-struction of the "hardened" Being of modernity in the appropriately titled Being and Time: his pro-ject to enable the claims of temporal difference, which the metaphysical tradition has perennially repressed by reifying them, to be heard." Putting the circular struc­ture of metaphysical perception in terms of the reification of a temporal force that is identifiable with the Nothing thus suggests the raison d'être of this destructive hermeneutics. In so doing, it points acutely to the foundations and structure of the logic of imperialism. Let me recall a fundamental moment in Heidegger's destruction of the truth discourse of the ontotheological tradition: his retrieval of the Nothing from "nega­tion," which is to say, from the oblivion to which the reifying logic of modern science would relegate it. In this project of retrieval, Heidegger distinguishes between fear (Furcht), which is the response of one inhab­iting a derivative (technologized) world, and the "fundamental mood of anxiety" (Angst): Anxiety [unlike fear, which has an object], is indeed anxiety in the face of ... , but not in the face of this or that thing. Anxiety in the face of ... is always anxiety for ... , but not for this or that. The indeterminateness of that in the face of which and for which we become anxious is no mere lack of determination but rather the essential impossibility of determining it. In a familiar phrase this indeterminateness comes to the fore. In anxiety, we say, "one feels ill at ease [es ist einen unheim­lich]." What is "it" that makes "one" feel ill at ease? We cannot say what it is before which one feels ill at ease. As a whole it is so for him. All things and we ourselves sink into indifference. This, however, not in the sense of mere disappearance. Rather in the very receding things turn towards us. The receding of beings as a whole that close in on us in anxiety oppresses us. We can get no hold on things. In the slipping away of beings only this "no hold on things" comes over us and remains. Anxiety reveals the nothing. Metaphysics is thus a circular mode of inquiry that, in beginning from the end, has as its end the (finally futile) total reification and determination of the essential anxiety-activating indeterminacy of the nothing, of temporality, of the differences that temporality disseminates: of a phantasmic alterity, as it were. To use the rhetoric in Heidegger's discourse that points to the essential imperialism of metaphysical ontol­ogy, it is an end-oriented mode of inquiry intended to level or at-home or domesticate or pacify — that is, to "civilize" — the "threatening" not-at-home (die Unheimliche) that being as such "is" for Dasein. The function of metaphysical thinking is not simply to annul the anxi­ety — the dislocating uncanniness (die Unheimlichkeit) — precipitated by being-in-the-not-at-home. By an easy extension inhering in Heideg­ger's ironic invocation of the metaphor of "grasping" — one of the essential and determining white metaphors of the truth discourse of the Occident, to which I will return when I take up the spatial meta­phorics informing the word "metaphysics" — it can be said that the function of this "after" in the logical economy of metaphysics is also to transform the indeterminate realm of the uncanny to a condition that enables its management. The function of metaphysical thinking, in short, is "ideological." It serves to reduce the ineffable be-ing of being to what Heidegger will later call exploitable "standing reserve" (Bestand) and Foucault, "docile and useful body." It is not, however, simply the Other of metaphysics — the nothing, the temporal, the accidental, the contradictory, the differential, or, to evoke the connotation of the ontological Other I want to underscore, the spectral — that metaphysical objectification and naming would do­mesticate and pacify. As the metaphorics released by the solicitation of the sedimented and innocuous (indeed, benign) names referring to the domestication (at-homing) of being suggest, it is also — and in a deter­mined way— the "unknown," the "primitive," the "wild" or "savage," the an-archic, the dis-orderly, in their ecological and human (subjective, sexual, racial, ethnic, and sociopolitical) manifestations. It is, in short, <CONTINUED>

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the entire relay of being that haunts or threatens the authority of the received (hegemonic) discourse of the dominant, that is, Western, order. This systematic metaphorization of being constitutes the origin of (and is obscured by) the naturalized and enabling principle of the logic — the truth discourse — of Occidental metaphysics: that Identity is the condition for the possibility of difference. And it is to the speci­ficity of this constructed polyvalent metaphorical ("white") system that we must, above all, turn if we are to plumb the historical past of modern Western imperialism and, more important, the depth of its inscription as ideology in the modern Western subject and its language. But before undertaking that task of denaturalization directly, we need to elabo­rate the economy of the logic enabled by this principle of metaphysical principles. As its binarism suggests, the foundational privileging of Identity over difference in metaphysical thinking means operationally that it enables the inquirer to read the temporal process as a system of evanescent or always changing signatures, fragments, enigmas, shadows, phantasms, and so on. It enables him/her to address the differential dynamics of time as a spectral subaltern surface (an adulterated or "fallen," and thus worthless, but always threatening Other) that obscures — or, rather, reveals as in a glass darkly — a prior informing luminous presence (an abiding or universal or permanent meaning) that a willed penetra­tion will reveal. Plato, for example, in the Phaedrus, called the partial temporal body into which the soul had fallen a "polluted ... walking sepulchre" that only the recollection (anamnesis) of a prior "pure" and "whole" state vaguely shadowed in this corrupt and partial body could redeem.12 However that "otherly" surface is represented, whether as shadow (as in Plato) or as signature (as in St. Augustine and the Church Fathers) or as negation (as in Hegel) or as fragment (as in modern empirical science), the metaphysical mode of inquiry assumes that the difference the inquirer encounters is not an irresolvable contradiction or contingency, but a problem that can and must be solved in the name of the truth. It assumes the Other to be a mere appearance: a recalcitrant agency of concealment and instability that must yield what it conceals to the stabilizing truth of Identity, of the One, of the End, of Presence. In short, metaphysical inquiry represents that which is Other than its truth not simply as a negative term (specter or spirit), but, as such, as that which corroborates its Identity (Spirit) and endows its Truth with power. Thus perceiving meta-ta-physika produces and validates the essential logic of the ontotheological tradition. This is, of course, the hi­erarchized binary logic that enables the first, "major" term — the term representing a self-present and plenary object —to demonize the second, "minor" or "subaltern," term: the term representing an entity that is not present to itself. This binary logic, in other words, empowers the privi­leged term to represent the Other as nonbeing (spectral), as some kind of arbitrary threat to Being—the benign total order to which the first term is committed — and thus to subdue and appropriate this Other to the latter's essential truth. It is in this sense that one can say that West­ern metaphysical thinking is essentially a colonialism. By this, I do not simply mean, as does much postcolonial discourse that acknowledges in some degree the polyvalency of the imperial project, a metaphor ap­propriated to the thought of being (or of any site on the continuum of being other than the economic or political) from another "more practi­cal and fundamental" — "real" — domain of reference." In identifying Western metaphysical thought with colonialism, I am positing a literal and precise definition of the process of metaphysical inquiry. The binary logic endemic to the very idea of the West had its origins, according to Heidegger, in late antiquity with the Romans' coloniza­tion of Greek (the vestiges of pre-Socratic) thinking, with, that is, their reduction of the originative thinking of the latter to a derivative (con-structed) understanding of truth. More specifically, the provenance of this logic lies in the imperial Romans' politically strategic translation of a-letheia to veritas, truth as always already un-concealment to truth as adaequatio intellectus et rei, the correspondence of mind and thing." This epochal reduction of an originative to a re-presentational mode of thinking— a thinking that places the force of being before one as a thing to be looked at — was calculatively determined by a relatively concep­tualized understanding of the operations of metaphysical perception. In decisively establishing the binary opposition between the true and the false as the ground of thinking, this reduction also decisively established the ground for the eventual assimilation of an infinite relay of different but analogous oppositions into the totalized epistemic binary logic of the Western tradition. Under the aegis of the doctrine of the adaequatio, it was not only the binary opposition between Truth and falsehood that empowered the correction or appropriation or reformation or disciplin­ing or accommodation or civilizing, which is to say, the colonization, of the "errant" or "deformed" or "wasteful" or "excessive" or "im­mature" (uncultivated) or "barbarous" or "feminine" force named in the second, demonized term. As the very metaphors used to character­ize the "false" suggest, that opposition was simply one — no doubt the most fundamental — of a whole series of binary oppositions inhering, however asymmetrically developed, in History, in, that is, the founding Occidental representation of temporal being-as-a-whole by way of per­ceiving "it" meta-ta-physika: Being and time, Identity and difference, the Word and words, Being and nonbeing, Subject and object, Sanity and madness, Culture and anarchy, Civilization and barbarism, Man and woman, the White race and the colored races, the West and the east, the North and the south, and so on. What this emphatically suggests is that an oppositional criticism that would be adequate to the task of resisting imperialism must cease to think the imperial project in the disciplinary terms endemic to and mandated by the Occident's compartmentalization of being and knowledge.

Impact – Problem/Solution Mindset

The US attempts to regulate the world and plays the sheriff in the wilderness

Spanos 2k (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, America’s Shadow, p. 140-142) PJ

This accommodational strategy of representation, for example, is epitomized by Richard Haass, a former official in the Bush administration and now director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, in his book *The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States after* *the Cold War* (1997).*4* Eschewing Fukuyama's Hegelian eschatological structure in favor of theorizing the actual practices of the United States in the international sphere — Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Iraq, and so forth — Haass frames the post-Cold War conjuncture in the totalizing image of a "deregulated world" (in contrast to the world "regulated" by the Cold War scenario) and the role of the United States in the trope of a sheriff leading posses (the appropriate members of the United Nations) to quell threats to global stability and peace posed by this international deregulation. Despite Haass's acknowledgment that conflict is inevitable (which, in fact, echoes Fukuyama), the triumphant idea of liberal capitalist democracy remains intact in his discourse. That is, his commitment to the "laissez-faire" polity (deregulation) — to the fictional concept of the sovereign subject — continues to be grounded in the metaphysics that informed America's global errand in the "wilderness" of Southeast Asia. Indeed, Haass gives this representational framework far more historical power than Fukuyama's disciplinary discourse of political science is able to muster. For, unlike the Fukuyamans, Haass informs his representation of the United States's historically determined and determining exceptionalist mission in the post-Cold War era with the teleological metaphorics that have been from the beginning fundamental to the constitution and power of the American globally oriented national identity. The metaphor of the sheriff/posse derives from the history of the American West and constitutes a variation of the pacification processes of westward expansion. As such it brings with it the entire baggage of the teleological metanarrative of the American frontier from the Puritans' "errand in the ['New World'] wilderness" to the myth of Manifest Destiny. As the "New Americanist" countermemory has persuasively shown, this is the myth that has saturated the cultural discourse of America, both high and low, since its origins: whether in the form of the American jeremiad, which, from the Puritans through Daniel Webster to Ronald Reagan, has always functioned to maintain the national consensus vis-a-vis its providentially ordained mission to domesticate (and dominate) what is beyond the frontier5 or in the form of the Hollywood western, which has functioned to naturalize what one New Americanist has called the American "victory culture."6 Reconstellated into this context, Haass's more "realistic" analysis of the post-Cold War occasion comes to be seen not simply as continuous with Fukuyama's, but as a more effective imperial global strategy. The utter immunity to criticism of the Clinton administration's "humanitarian" war against Serbia in the spring of 1999 — which perfectly enacted the Haassian scenario — bears witness to this. In the following chapters of this book I will, by and large, refer to Fukuyama's version of the post-Cold War American end-of-history discourse. But I wish to make it clear at the beginning that, in doing so, I am referring not to a particular theory, but to a fundamental American tradition whose theorization extends from de Tocqueville through Frederick Jackson Turner to Fukuyama and Haass.

Impact – Imperialism/Genocide

This imperial logic leads to war and genocide

Spanos 2k (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, America’s Shadow, p. 194) PJ

The incommensurability between the United States's justification for its intervention in Vietnam and its totally instrumentalist planning and conduct of the war exposed the irreconcilable contradiction inhering in the liberal democratic/humanist discourse of "the free world." In Nietzsche's and Foucault's ironic terms, the Vietnam War revealed its "benignity" — the "sweetness and light" ostensibly deriving from clas­sical Greece — to be an "Egyptianism," a comportment toward being that has as its fundamental purpose the pacification of any resistance to its truth discourse. It revealed that the real project of the anthropolog­ical discourse inherited by America from the European Enlightenment is the reification of the nothing that belongs to being for the purpose not simply of "comprehending" its ineffable and elusive errancy, but of rendering its various manifestations "practically assailable." This first postmodern war, in short, showed decisively that the benign discourse of Enlightenment Man must end in violence against the recalcitrant Other that does not answer to the dictates of its plenary anthropo-logic —sometimes, as in the case of America's intervention in Vietnam, taken to a genocidal extreme.

Impact – Error Replication

Application of Occidental ontology ensures error replication

Spanos 93 (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, Heidegger and Criticism: Retrieving the Cultural Politics of Destruction, p. 46-47) PJ

The Heideggerian phenomenological reduction, that is, dereifies the interpreter in the sense of retrieving his/her ec-static or ec-sistential temporality, his/her *openness* to being. In so doing, it also retrieves the primordial ontological difference from the structure of identity into which the metaphysical eye has coerced it. In thus abandoning the will to power over being, or, to put it positively, in letting being be as it shows itself from itself,38 the interpreter, in other words, *allows* the "object" of interpretation to undergo a liberating or, better, an e-man-cipating metamorphosis. The reified text, the text that the Medusan eye of the metaphysical interpreter "looks at" and petrifies39—turns into something presentat- hand, or, to invoke a related metaphor, reduces to "graspable" icon (or Euclidean map)—undergoes a sea change. It now emerges explicitly as transitive verbal text—a text to be heard—from its context in the realm of deposited or "monumentalized" knowledge. It becomes an *event* in the interpreter's temporal horizon of circumspective care, an event he/ she experiences hermeneutically, *as* event, in the sense, as the crucial privitive prefix of *a-letheia* makes clear, of dis-covering the temporal being that spatialization covers over or conceals. According to a phenomenological hermeneutics, then, it is not, as it has been "from ancient times," the static, presentational, uprooted—and coercive—language of assertion that constitutes the " 'locus' of truth" (BT, 196; SZ, 154). It is, rather, the kinetic, explorative—and generous— language of human speech: not the mystified orality of the (selfpresent) Word of mythic or Platonic Man with which Derrida identifies Heidegger's understanding of *Rede,* but the always potential dialogic process, which, in being temporal, precludes a definitive revelation of a being.40 This process "locates" the truth of being in the interpreter's continuous ecstatic awareness of the ontologically alternating rhythm of concealment and disclosure, appearing and disappearing, inscription and de-scription, truth and error, continuity and change, or, to appropriate Paul de Man's antinomy for my purposes, blindness and insight. To return to the spatial metaphor, in modeling itself on the *logos* as *legein,* in assigning ontological priority to temporality over form in understanding, phenomenological hermeneutics becomes a process of discovery in the sense of *dis-dosing*—opening out, liberating—the hermeneutic possibilities that the inauthentic spatial impulse of the Western literary consciousness closes off, conceals, and eventually forgets in coercing the temporality of the text into a totalized circle. It is hardly accidental that, in contrast to the spatializing "awaiting which makes present and forgets," Heidegger's term for *Dasein's* authentic (i.e., temporal and projective) hermeneutic comportment before being is *"vorldufende Entschlossenheit,"* which means simultaneously "anticipatory resoluteness" and, as its etymology suggests, a "running forward which dis-closes" (BT, 343 ff.; SZ, 297 ff.)41 It is in this sense of a resolute opening out that remembers (repeats or retrieves) that phenomenological hermeneutics, unlike the amnesiac spatial memory, renders encounters with a literary text "fateful," that is, historically significant—and for "its time," that is, timely (BT, 434-39; SZ, 382-87).42 In putting into question the old, the habitual, metaphysical frame of reference, the phenomenological interpreter (as Heidegger understands this being) loses privileged status as "objective" observer of the sealedoff and familiar or "domesticated" (at-homed) world of modernity: the world as blueprint or formalized icon or, as Heidegger puts it, "useful chart by which we may find our way amid the various possible things and realms of things."43 He or she becomes, rather, a care-ful *Dasein* "inquiring into the extra-ordinary";44 becomes, that is, *Homo viator,* a human being always already on the way. The imperative to de-construct the metaphysical circle of the Western tradi ion, to retrieve the temporal/ explorative comportment toward being from representation, is not restricted to poststructuralist philosophy. It is also a felt need of the postmodern poet and novelist. I will explore this relationship at some length in the next chapter. It will suffice here to briefly invoke the testimony of the American poet Charles Olson, who voiced this destructive/ projective imperative in both his poetry and prose perhaps more insistently and succinctly than any other "postmodern" writer. Like Heidegger, who calls for the interpretive practice of a *Homo viator,* Olson calls for a poetics that reflects the horizontal vision of a "Figure Outward," a "Juan de la Cosa," who encounters the world as such, including the world of the literary text—even the most metaphysical or autotelic—as a being there, in the midst, and thus with "the old measure of care."45

Impact – Forgetting Vietnam

This western ontology of exceptionalism is at the heart of all mass, military atrocities and justifies killing in the name of saving – must remember Vietnam as an example of this

Spanos 3 (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, A Rumor of War: 9/11 and the Forgetting of the Vietnam War, p. 33-34) PJ

This extraordinarily reductive representation and self-righteous, inexorable, and unilateral practical response to the violence committed against Americans, which in large part is the consequence of the West’s and, in recent times, of the United States’ depredations in the East, is not, as I have suggested, unprecedented. On the contrary, it is the predictable manifestation of a deeply inscribed and naturalized cultural belief in America’s divinely or historically—that is to say, ontologically—ordained exceptionalist mission in the world’s ‘‘wilderness,’’ one that, in fact, has informed the entire violent history of American expansionism. It informed the American Puritans’ identification of the Native Americans, who resisted their plantation of God’sWord in the forests of New England, with the expendable agents of Satan; it informed the period of westward expansionism, which, in the name of Manifest Destiny, justified, first, the wholesale removal, and then the extermination, of the Native American population; and, most tellingly, it informed the American representation and conduct of the Vietnam War, which, to repeat, bore witness to the destruction of a Southeast Asian country and the indiscriminate slaughter of untold numbers of its population by the all but full force of the American military machine, which, we should not forget, included terror: the use of psychological and chemical weapons (what, in referring to Middle Eastern states, American officialdom calls weapons of indiscriminate mass destruction) in the insanely rational name of saving Vietnam for the free world. This, among other good reasons I cannot go into here, is why, it seems to me, it is worth retrieving the by now strategically buried history of the Vietnam War by way of the highly representative example of A Rumor ofWar 5 at this profoundly perilous moment of world history when the dominant culture in the United States is once again concentering an extremely complex and volatile global condition, which it, and the West over which it has unilaterally claimed leadership, has gone far to produce, in the figure of a single but symbolic person (and the Taliban government that harbored him) for the purpose of decisive retaliation. For Caputo’s memoir, perhaps more than any other book about the Vietnam War, bears powerful witness, if only in a symptomatic way, to the dark underside of the American exceptionalism that justified not only the United States’ intervention in Vietnam and its unerringly cold-blooded and massively destructive conduct of the war but also, because its rhetoric betrays a deep historical sense, the violent American history of which the Vietnam War was only one example.

Impact – Capitalism

Imperial ontology sustains capitalism

Spanos 2k (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, America’s Shadow, p. 192) PJ

Reconstellated into the context of this Heideggerian diagnosis of modernity, the American end-of-history discourse undergoes a resonant estrangement. What is euphorically represented as "good news" —the global fulfillment ("end") of the emancipatory promise of History — comes to be seen as the *Pax Metaphysica:* the colonization of the errant mind of humanity at large by a banal and banalizing thinking that has reduced everything, including human beings, to "standing [or disposable] reserve."2 This "end of philosophy" in the form of a "triumphant" instrumentalist thinking that has reduced being to disposable commodity is everywhere manifest in the post-Cold War era. And, I suggest, its most telling symptom is the globalization of (American) English as the *lingua franca* of the "free market," which has as one of its most devastating consequences the "Americanization" not simply of the Western nation-states but of entire Third World cultures.

Impact/Root Cause – Extremism

America’s hegemonic ontology is at the heart of extremism in the Middle East

Spanos 3 (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, A Rumor of War: 9/11 and the Forgetting of the Vietnam War, p. 60-61) PJ

Let me, now, after this long detour, return to my beginning, September 11. There, it will be recalled, I suggested that, however horrific, the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, was, as the symbolic significance of American power of these chosen sites clearly suggests, the consequence in large part of a very long history of what Edward Said has called Western ‘‘Orientalism,’’ a history of representation/domination of the Orient culminating in the United States’ ubiquitous indirect and overt economic, cultural, political, and military depredations over the last half century in the oil-rich Middle East in the duplicitous name of ‘‘national interests’’: its clandestine orchestration of the overthrow of Muhammad Mossadegh in Iran, its support of unpopular despotic Middle Eastern regimes such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the Taliban, its massive financing of Israel’s militaristic colonialist policies in the face of the obvious valid claims of the Palestinians, to name only a few of these. I also suggested that the logic informing the United States’ reductive binarist representation and the swift and unequivocal response to the terrorists’ attack on American soil was deeply backgrounded in American history, that it was, indeed, simultaneous with its Puritan origins. This is the exceptionalist logic that, in assuming Americans to be God’s and, later, History’s chosen people, has perennially justified America’s unilateral, ‘‘benign’’ ‘‘errand’’ in the world’s ‘‘wilderness.’’ It is, therefore, as American writers as distanced in time from one another as Melville and Caputo bear witness, a ‘‘concentering’’ metaphysical logic, which, in beginning inquiry from the end, enables not only the demonization of the anxiety-provoking multiplicity (thus precluding the open-ended and productive strife of authentic dialogue) but also the reduction of this differential multiplicity (which is to say, the differential dynamics of being) to a reified, comprehendible, and ‘‘practically assailable’’ One. As such a concentering mono-logic, this divinely or historically ordained American exceptionalism has predictably manifested itself over and over again in some degree or other in a relentlessly deadly way—as a monomania (Melville) or paranoia (Thomas Pynchon)—whenever any differential constituency of the human community has refused its spontaneous consent to the ‘‘truth’’ of the American way of life: from the Puritans’ annihilation of the Pequots in the name of their ‘‘errand’’ in the New England wilderness and the post-Revolutionary Americans’ virtual extermination of the Native American population and their cultures in the name of Manifest Destiny, through the Spanish-American War, to the Vietnam War, when the United States unleashed a technological fire power unprecedented in the history of warfare against a Southeast Asian people seeking its independence from colonial rule emanating from a distant continent.

\*Alternative\*

Alternative – Rethinking Thinking

The alternative is to vote negative. Only through rejection of the imperial order can we rethink thinking – a reorientation of our ontology is the only way to overcome our metaphysical tendencies

Spanos 2k (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, America’s Shadow, p. 143-144) PJ

It is this radical contradiction that the American Cultural Memory's remembrance of the war has obsessively tried to forget. As I have shown, this inordinate amnesiac will to obliterate the disclosures of Vietnam has been the hidden ideological agenda not simply of the American media's representation of the war in its long aftermath, but of the intellectual deputies of the dominant post-Cold War culture, who have been compelled by their recuperative exceptionalist "Hegelian" metanarrative to negate — or sublate — the history of the Vietnam War in order to celebrate the advent of the end of history and the *Pax Americana.* What needs to be remarked about this victorious post-Cold War discourse is that in affirming its universal truth, its spokespersons are compelled to speak something different. What matters to them is not the historically specific event of the Vietnam War, but the globally triumphant idea of liberal capitalist democracy. Is it an accident that they insistently speak of the post-Cold War occasion in this way? What about this "not Vietnam"? This is the first directive toward rethinking thinking in the interregnum. An oppositional discourse that would be adequate to the task of resisting the Pax Americana must first think this sublated negation of the contradiction positively. This is not to say that the disclosure of this directive to think the *nonbeing of* — that belongs to — the imperial discourse of instrumentalism is restricted to the event of the Vietnam War. It is, as Heidegger's earlier call to rethink the nothing that modern science "wishes to know nothing about"5 suggests, the unthought directive precipitated by the devastations at the sites of language, the earth, and its peoples incumbent on the "planetary imperialism of technologically organized man."6 In a formulation of this resonant disclosure that implicates "Americanism" with the advent of the "age of the world picture," Heidegger writes: As soon as the gigantic in planning and calculating and adjusting and making secure [one of the most revealing symptomatic manifestations of which is the annihilation of space and time by means of the electronic revolution] shifts over out of the quantitative and becomes a special quality, then what is gigantic, and what can seemingly always be calculated completely, becomes, precisely through this, incalculable. This *becoming incalculable remains the* *invisible shadow that is cast around things everywhere when man* *has been transformed into subjectum* and the world into picture.7 But, I am suggesting, it was the decisiveness of the Vietnam War's disclosure of this ontological contradiction — the shadow — that has rendered the retrieval of Heidegger's call to rethink the *not* that haunts the discourse and practice of "Americanism" an urgent imperative of the post-Vietnam occasion.

Alternative Solvency – Rethinking Thinking

Rethinking thinking assumes a reorientation of our ontology that rejects our drive for hegemony

Spanos 2k (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, America’s Shadow, p. 143-144) PJ

What needs to be foregrounded is that these global post-Cold War "reformist" initiatives are not discontinuous practices, a matter of historical accident. Largely enabled by the "forgetting" of Vietnam — and of the repression or accommodation or self-immolation of the emer gent decentered modes of thinking the Vietnam War precipitated — they are, rather, indissolubly, however unevenly, related. Indeed, they are the multisituated practical consequences of the planetary triumph (the "end") of the logical economy of the imperial ontological discourse that has its origins in the founding of the idea of the Occident and its fulfilled end in the banal instrumental/technological reasoning in the discourse of "America." In thus totally colonizing thinking, that is, this imperial "Americanism" has come to determine the comportment toward being of human beings, in all their individual and collective differences, at large — even of those postcolonials who would resist its imperial order. This state of thinking, which has come to be called the New World Order (though to render its rise to ascendancy visible requires reconstellating the Vietnam War into this history), subsumes the representative, but by no means complete, list of post-Cold War practices to which I have referred above. And it is synecdochically represented by the massive mediatization of the amnesiac end-of-history discourse and the affiliated polyvalent rhetoric of the *Pax Americana.* Understood in terms of this massive effort to endow hegemonic status to the transformation of the metaphorics of the "wound" to (neurotic) "syndrome," the *forgotten* of the systematic process of forgetting apparently accomplished by the renarrativization of history since the humiliatingly visible fall of Saigon in 1975 takes on a spectral resonance of epochal and planetary significance. As such, it calls on the differential community of oppositional intellectuals to undertake a genealogy of this end-of-history discourse that would retrieve *(wiederholen]* as precisely as possible the essence of that which the United States's intervention in Vietnam and its conduct of the war disclosed, that which the American Cultural Memory, in the form of a "new Holy Alliance," has feverishly attempted to bury in oblivion by way of its multisituated and long-term labor to hegemonize a demonic representation of this (self-)disclosure.

Alternative – Rethinking (Forgetting Vietnam)

The alternative is to vote negative. Rejection of hegemonic ontologies allows us to rethink foreign policy and remember Vietnam’s example of America’s imperialist violence

Spanos 3 (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, A Rumor of War: 9/11 and the Forgetting of the Vietnam War, p.64-65) PJ

As Caputo and virtually every American soldier who fought in Vietnam reiteratively testify, the insurgents of the National Liberation Front in Vietnam, like the many-headed hydra of European antiquity (and of the Revolutionary Atlantic economy), were constantly defeated by the ‘‘Herculean’’ American military juggernaut, but they nevertheless kept rising up in unpredictable places and times to eventually bring their would-be monster-slayer to a dead end. Given the incommensurability of America’s predictable invocation of the (mythical) logic of exceptionalism and the postcolonial condition, there is little reason to believe that the hatred precipitated by the United States’ perennial unilateral ‘‘defense’’ of its ‘‘interests’’ in the Islamic world—a defense expedited by its reduction of the diversity of this world to an abstract and predictable stereotype—will not also manifest itself as a ‘‘many-headed hydra’’ that will resurface in unexpected places at unexpected times to constantly molecularize, and neutralize the power of, the concentering Ahabian American narrative, its self-present will, and its forwarding military machine. The lesson the VietnamWar should have taught America, but apparently has not, is that in this globalized postcolonial age, only a rethinking of America’s perennial exceptionalist mission in the world’s ‘‘wilderness’’— a rethinking that must be genealogical, that must, in other words, understand America’s modern (instrumentalist) foreign policy in the light of the very formation of the American national identity—will resolve the complex global conditions that are the dark legacy ofWestern imperialism. Only such a radical genealogical rethinking of America’s role in the world will be able to negate the present historical context, which promises not the Pax Americana but, as even the Bush administration acknowledges when its deputies remind the American public that the war against terror does not have a foreseeable end, an ongoing, undecidable war against an undecidable enemy— not to say the establishment of a perpetual national state of emergency that will play havoc on the civil rights of the American people.

\*Framework\*

Framework – Ontology First

Ontological focus is able to unveil the violence of the hegemony and reveal epistemic ruptures

Spanos 93 (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, Heidegger and Criticism: Retrieving the Cultural Politics of Destruction, p. 132-133) PJ

In the preceding essays, I situated my destructive inquiry into the operations of humanist discursive practices at the site of ontology. My purpose in doing so was to suggest the underlying continuity between the various historically specific representations of reality in the onto-theological tradition, the tradition that has come to be called "the West" or "the Occident": that these representations constitute, in Derrida's terms, "a series of substitutions of center for center, . . . a linked chain of determinations of the center."1 My limitation of inquiry to the site of ontology was intended to thematize the metaphysics informing the dominant order in the present historical conjunction, and the metaphorics of the centered circle it enables: the metaphorics all too invariably discounted, overlooked, or minimized by both neo-Marxists and other "worldly critics" in their interrogation of the hegemony of what has been variously called "humanism," "bourgeois capitalism," "the consumer society," *"la societe de la spectacle,"* "late capitalism," "the age of the world picture," or "the disciplinary society." I do not want to suggest that a destructive hermeneutics renders the historically specific conjuncture irrelevant or minimally significant, as Heidegger unfortunately did with dire consequences. On the contrary, this relative indifference to the historical occasion constitutes the essential limitation of Heidegger's version of the destruction and, in a different way, of Derrida's (and de Man's) deconstruction. Heidegger's tendency to limit his interrogation of the ontotheological tradition to the question of being *(die Seinsjrage)* overlooks the affiliation between philosophy and sociopolitical formations. And, as I have suggested in chapter 4, Derrida's tendency to limit inquiry to the site of textuality—as a transhistorical "base" to epiphenomenal superstructural phenomena (especially the sociopolitical)—paradoxically reduces the text's historically specific difference, and the difference for good or ill it makes in the world, to an indifferent *difference.* In this essay I want to suggest that, whatever the political limitations of Heidegger's hermeneutics—and they are substantial—it nevertheless lends itself to appropriation in behalf of an emancipatory discursive practice that overcomes the limitations of deconstructive textuality, classical Marxist essentialism, and the genealogical criticism that tends to understand history as a discontinuous series of epistemic ruptures.2

Framework – Ontology First

Ontology precedes policy – policy without recognition of ontological flaws have been empirically bad

Spanos 8 (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, Global American:

The Devastation of Language Under the Dictatorship of the Public Realm, p. 172-173, Muse) PJ

This argument against the Bush administration and its intellectual deputies by oppositional intellectuals is manifest. There is no question that this presidential administration has gone farther than any other in the history of the U.S. to relocate the power to govern, constitutionally allocated jointly to the Congress, the judiciary, and the executive branches, in the presidency. And this revolutionary reactionary turn behooves oppositional intellectuals to resist this ominous political momentum, that is, to participate in politics, in a far more active way than heretofore. But this oppositional representation of the U.S.’s relation to the world, though true in part, is not finally commensurate with the sociopolitical realities of what the neoconservative deputies of the dominant culture have called the “American Century”—the global realities, that is, produced under the aegis of a commodity-driven techno-capitalist, and republican “America,” the America, in the phrase coined by Theodore Roosevelt, as “Leader of the Free World.” Nor, therefore, is the consequent tendency of recent American oppositional intellectuals to over-determine politics as the privileged site of resistance adequate to the imperatives of these global realities. In the following, all too brief remarks, I want to suggest, not an alternative to this kind of disciplinary oppositional politics, but a comportment towards political resistance that perceives the act of thinking as ontologically prior to, yet indissolubly related with politics. I have inferred this comportment from the decisive disintegration of the base/superstructure and/or disciplinary models of the representation of being enabled by the poststructuralist revolution, but, contrary to the poststructuralists’ tendency to restrict the implications of this revolution to the site of language (textuality) as such, I have, like Edward W. Said, understood this revolution as a historical and “worldly” one.2 More specifically, I read the “postmodern” revolution in thinking, misnamed “theory” (from the Greek, *theoria*, to see) as the precipitate of the fulfillment in post- Enlightenment, capitalist/democratic America of the binary logic of the languages of Western civilization that had their origin in a metaphysical interpretation of being that reduces the many into the One, difference to Identity, be-ing to Being, or, in the binary that has not been emphasized enough, temporality into Spatial (or Territorialized) Object. In other words, I read this revolution as the coming to its end of a gradual but necessary and relentless process of *reification—*which is to say, of *hardening* and *decay—*that has rendered the originative language of thinking depthless: an abstract, quantitative, calculative, and instrumental—utterly thoughtless—sociopolitical agent of brutal violence, torture, mutilation, dispossession, death on those constituencies of the human community (and the land that sustains them) that this *system* of language and thought deem expendable, those who, in Michel Foucault’s phrase, do not prove “useful and docile” to the dominant culture.

Framework – Ontology First (1/2)

Focus on Ontology is key to resistance to dominant discourse

Bleiker 3 (Roland Discourse and Human Agency School of Poli Sci U of Queensland http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/eserv/UQ:10672/rb\_cpt\_2\_03.pdf) pj

The above-mentioned refusal to buy milk bottled in non-reusable glass may help to clarify the suggestion that tactical manifestations of human agency are not bound by spatial dynamics. The consumer who changes his/her shopping habits engages in a tactical action that escapes the spatial controlling mechanisms of established political and economic boundaries. The effect of such a tactical action is not limited to the localized target, say, the supermarket. Over an extended period of time, and in conjunction with similar actions, such tactical dissent may affect practices of production, trade, investment, advertisement and the like. The manifestations that issue from such actions operate along an indeterminate trajectory insofar as they promote a slow transformation of values whose effects transgress places and become visible and effective only by maturation over time. In the case of tactical protest actions of environmentally sensitive consumers, it may still be too early to ascertain a definitive manifestation of human agency. However, various indicators render such an assertion highly likely. Changing attitudes and consumption patters, including an increasing concern for environmental issues, have produced easily recognizable marketing shifts in most parts of the industrial world. For instance, health food sections are now a common feature in most supermarkets. And there is empirical evidence that suggests that consumer preferences for costly 'ethical' production technologies can lead to increased competition between producers, which, in turn, may gradually increase the level of adoption of such ethical technology (Noe and Rebello, 1995, 69-85). Conclusion The task of articulating a discursive notion of human agency towered at the entrance of this essay and has never ceased to be its main puzzle, a cyclically reoccurring dilemma. How can we understand and conceptualize the processes through which people shape social and political life. Where is this fine line between essentialism and relativism, between suffocating in the narrow grip of totalizing knowledge claims and blindly roaming in a nihilistic world of absences? How to make a clear break with positivist forms of representing the political without either abandoning the concept of human agency or falling back into a new form of essentialism? Confronting the difficulties that arise with this dualistic dilemma, I have sought to advance a positive concept of human agency that is neither grounded in a stable essence nor dependent upon a presupposed notion of the subject. The ensuing journey has taken me, painted in very broad strokes, along the following circular trajectory of revealing and concealing: discourses are powerful forms of domination. They frame the parameters of thinking processes. They shape political and social interactions. Yet, discourses are not invincible. They may be thin. They may contain cracks. By moving the gaze from epistemological to ontological spheres, one can explore ways in which individuals use these cracks to escape aspects of the discursive order. To recognize the potential for human agency that opens up as a result of this process, one needs to shift foci again, this time from concerns with Being to an inquiry into tactical behaviours. Moving between various hyphenated identities, individuals use ensuing mobile subjectivities to engage in daily acts of dissent, which gradually transform societal values. Over an extended period of time, such tactical expressions of human agency gradually transform societal values. By returning to epistemological levels, one can then conceptualize how these transformed discursive practices engender processes of social change. I have used everyday forms of resistance to illustrate how discourses not only frame and subjugate our thoughts and behaviour, but also offer possibilities for human agency. Needless to say, discursive dissent is not the only practice of resistance that can exert human agency. There are many political actions that seek immediate changes in policy or institutional structures, rather than 'mere' shifts in societal consciousness. Although some of these actions undoubtedly achieve results, they are often not as potent as they seem. Or, rather, their enduring effect may well be primarily discursive, rather than institutional. Nietzsche (1982b, 243) already knew that the greatest events 'are not our loudest but our stillest hours.' This is why he stressed that the world revolves 'not around the inventors of new noise, but around the inventors of new values.' And this is why, for Foucault too, the crucial site for political investigations are not institutions, even though they are often the place where power is inscribed and crystallized. The fundamental point of anchorage of power relations, Foucault claims, is always located outside institutions, deeply entrenched within the social nexus. Hence, instead of looking at power from the vantage point of institutions, one must analyse institutions from the standpoint of power relations (Foucault, 1982, 219-222). A defence of human agency through a Nietzschean approach does inevitably leave some observers unsatisfied -- desiring a more robust account of what constitutes human actions and their influence on political and social life. However, a more firm and detailed theory of agency is unlikely to achieve more than essentialize a particular and necessarily subjective viewpoint on the political. Needed, instead, is what William Connolly has termed an ethos of critical responsiveness -- that is, an openness towards the unknown, unseen, unthought and a resulting effort to accept and theorize our limits to cognition (see Connolly, 1995, 154, and for a discussion White, 2000, 106-150). The key, then is to turn this inevitable ambiguity into a positive and enabling force, rather than a threat that needs to be warded off or suppressed at all cost. The present essay has sought to demonstrate how such an attitude towards human agency is possible, and indeed necessary, in both theory and practice. In the domain of political practice, everyday forms of resistance demonstrate that transformative potential is hidden in the very acceptance of ambiguity. Consider the countless and continuously spreading new social movements, pressure groups and other loose organizations that challenge various aspects of local, national or global governance. <CONTINUED>

Framework – Ontology First (2/2)

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These movements operate in a rather chaotic way. They come and go. They are neither centrally controlled nor do they all seek the same objective. Some operate on the right end of the political spectrum. Others on the left. Some oppose globalization. Others hail it. Some seek more environmental regulations. Others defend neo-liberal free trade. And, it is precisely through this lack of coherence, control and certainty that the respective resistance movements offer a positive contribution to the political. They are in some sense the quintessential aspect of postmodern politics, of local resistance to metanarrative impositions (see White, 1991, 10-12; Walker, 1988). They embody what Connolly (1995, 154-155) believes is the key to cultural democratization: a certain level of 'productive ambiguity,' that is, the commitment always to resist 'attempts to allow one side or the other to achieve final victory.' Ensuing forms of human agency, anarchical as they may be, thus generate regular and important public scrutiny and discussion of how norms, values and institutions function.

\*Answers To\*

A2: Humanism

Humanism seeks to dominate in the name of security

Spanos 2k (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, America’s Shadow, p. 140-142) PJ

The parallel with the humanist cultural project of Matthew Arnold (and of the German classicists who precede him, above all, Hegel, and the Anglo-American humanists who follow him) should now be quite obvious. The names — authors, artistic perspectives, texts, origins — are different, but the beginning, agency, and end are fundamentally the same: the *Logos* (or "Center Elsewhere" or "Seed"), Culture, and the Hegemony of Occidental Civilization (Colonization). To put this relay of tropes in terms of the discourse of the post-Enlightenment, they are the Comprehensive (Panoptic) Eye, the Disciplinary Circumscription of the Other, and the Containment, Pacification, and Utilization of its erratic force. The Occidental *paideia* — its representation of the truth of being, of culture, of human being's comportment toward the world — has been essentially and deeply complicitous with the imperial project ever since Rome colonized the Greeks' originative and errant way of thinking being. The European ideal of the *Pax Romana*, in short, is identical with the domination and pacification of the Other.

Human rights are used as justification for military intervention and imperial tendencies

Treanor 4 (Paul, studied Political Science at the Universiteit van Amserdam, http://web.inter.nl.net/users/Paul.Treanor/human-rights.html) PJ

Increasingly, the doctrine of human rights is itself a cause of suffering, oppression and injustice. Increasingly, the argument that superpowers have a 'moral duty' to enforce human rights, is used in the same way as the doctrine of the 'civilising mission' once was used to justify colonialism. Since this was first written, it appears that the civilising mission - or at least crusades in defence of western civilisation - are not quite dead yet. American reactions to the attacks of 11 September 2001 have re-emphasised the so-called "Clash of Civilizations". In that vision of history and geopolitics, democracy, freedom, and human rights are seen as universally valid, and yet historically specific to western civilisation. They are seen as a gift, which the West must bring to the rest of the world, or at least defend against the rest of the world. The position presented below is a rejection of human rights, without any appeal to cultural relativism or ethical relativism. Human rights, sovereignty and military intervention Universal human rights and sovereignty are two separate issues. It is possible to believe in universal human rights, but also in national sovereignty. In fact, until recently, this was the standard view among foreign policy elites. A justification of intervention does not logically follow from human rights, even if those rights are violated. Interventionists try to suggest that it does, but they never explain the logic on this assertion. The assertion that military intervention is necessary in the face of clear human rights violations, is emotional propaganda. It is often successful, but it is not ethics. If, for instance, children are being tortured to death in Eritrea, then this is wrong. It is not necessary to read the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to know it is wrong. But whatever grounds you have for finding it wrong, it does not follow that the US Marines can legitimately invade Eritrea. The tactic of interventionists is usually to massively publicise the violations, and to imply that opponents of the intervention are accomplices. The torture does not automatically produce a moral entitlement to intervention (breach of sovereignty). Even if the torture did create such an entitlement, it does not automatically follow that it must be a military intervention. And even if the torture creates an entitlement to military intervention, it does not automatically follow that the United States 'owns' that entitlement. All of these are separate steps, separate events, which need separate moral justification. With or without human rights, universal or not. Human-right interventionism is in any case historically recent. For centuries great powers justified their wars, with speaking of human rights. The atrocity story is a traditional part of wartime propaganda, but it is only since the 1950's that it is called a 'human rights violation' - And not every legitimation of intervention is formulated in human-rights terms - the Genocide Convention, for instance, simply prohibits genocide. But in the media and political rhetoric, these formal distinctions are often ignored. (Genocide is referred to as a 'human rights violation', although it is more accurate to call it a crime in international law). Since the emergence of the mass media in 19th-century western states, it is the emotional impact of the atrocity story which counts.

A2: Humanism

Humanism evokes a benign logic that is used to justify mass atrocities and the kill to save mentality

Spanos 93 (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, Heidegger and Criticism: Retrieving the Cultural Politics of Destruction, p. 216-217) PJ

"We had to destroy Ben Tre in order to save it." This synecdochical justification by an American major, who was successful in his "attempt at attaining history," synecdochically betrays the terrible contradictions informing the American command's "benign" mission in Vietnam. But it does much more than that. As suggested by the chillingly resonant parallel with *Moby-Dick,* Herman Melville's uncannily genealogical and proleptic representation of the Puritan/frontier psyche, it also betrays the "end" of America's cultural self-representation: the will to planetary domination. The furious and single-minded American obsession to "save" this Third World country from a Communism which was also a "yellow peril," in the face of the uncanny enemy—an enemy who would not be *contained within* the expanding (neo)imperial perimeter and objectified or reduced to "standing reserve"—exposed its rational, humane, and liberal discourse and practice to be a monomaniacal obsession to bring its American version of the centered Occidental narrative of presence— its "errand in the wilderness"—to a "final (re-)solution." To "build its City on the Hill" in a recalcitrant Southeast Asia, the United States had to destroy (all of) Vietnam: No turbaned Turk, no hired Venetian or Malay, could have smote him with more seeming malice. Small reason was there to doubt, then, that ever since that almost fatal encounter, Ahab had cherished a wild vindictiveness against the whale, all the more fell for that in his frantic morbidness he at last came to identify with him, not only *all* his bodily woes, but *all* his intellectual and spiritual exasperations. The White Whale swam before him as the monomaniac incarnation of *all* those malicious agencies which some deep men feel eating in them; till they are left living on with half a heart and half a lung. The intangible malignity which has been from the beginning; to whose dominion even the modern Christians ascribe one-half of the worlds; which the ancient Ophites of the east reverenced in their statue devil;—Ahab did not fall down and worship it like them; but deliriously transferring its idea to the abhorred white whale, he pitted himself, all mutilated, against it; *all* that cracks the sinews and cakes the brain; *all* the subtle demonisms of life and thought; *all* evil, to crazy Ahab, *were visibly personified,* *and made practically assailable in Moby Dick.* He piled upon the Whale's white hump the *sum of all* the general rage and hate felt by his whole race from Adam down; and then, as if his chest had been a mortar, he burst his hot heart's shell upon it.53

A2: Humanism/Perm

Humanism is deeply entrenched in violent hegemony and is unsalvageable

Spanos 3 (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, Humanism and the Studia Humanitatis after 9/11/01: Rethinking Anthropologos, p. 234-237, Muse) PJ

I could go on to retrieve other poststructuralist indictments of humanism, but the examples I have cited, coupled by the corrosive history of modernity I invoked earlier—a history, to reiterate, that has borne witness to the self-destruction of the very ontological, cultural, and political identity of the West, especially as it has been embodied by the United States, which is to say, this unexceptional exceptionalist nation—should suffice to make clear the highly contested nature of the word "humanism."31 Indeed, the actual history of modernity and the post-structuralist critique have precipitated a change of terrain in the geography of knowledge production that has rendered the term "humanism" so problematic that one wonders whether or not it and its correlatives—"authorship," "creation," "genius," "imagination," 'work of art," and others—is any longer relevant and usable. As Edward Said puts this de-sedimenting momentum in his last, posthumously published book, *Humanism and Democratic Criticism:* Even the idea of the imagination, a central tenet in all literary humanism at least since the middle of the eighteenth century, has undergone an almost Copernican transformation. The original explanatory power of the term has been modified by such alien and transpersonal concepts as ideology, the unconscious, structures of feeling, anxiety, and many others. In addition, acts of imagination, which used to stand alone and do all the work of what we still call creation, have become reformulated in terms that include performatives, construct-ions, and discursive statements; in some cases these seem to have entirely dissolved the possibility of agency, whereas in others, agency, or the will, no longer has the sovereign authority or plays the role it once did. Even to speak of a work [End Page 235] of literature as a creation is, for some critics, to presume too much, since "creation" carries too many connotations of miraculous conception and complete autonomous activity to be allowed the explanatory sway it once had. This is not to say, of course, that any of these challenged words and ideas have simply disappeared—they have not—but they often seem to provoke so many doubts and suspicions as to render them all but unusable.32 Fully aware of its now deeply problematic status, Said nevertheless claims that the word "humanism" is salvageable, indeed, urgently needed after 9/11, when America has arrogantly assumed unilateral responsibility for keeping order in the world, and he goes on to undertake an eloquent and passionate defense of his claim. In this book, Said attempts to re-appropriate the term from the "classic" humanists' long abuse of it: "But it is worth insisting in this as well [the emergence of widespread anti-humanist "revulsion with the Vietnam War," racism, imperialism, "and the dry-as-dust academic humanities that had for years represented an unpolitical, unworldly, and oblivious (sometimes even manipulative) attitude to the present"] that attacking the abuses of something is not the same thing as dismissing or entirely destroying that thing. So, in my opinion, it has been the abuses of humanism that discredited some of humanism's practitioners without discrediting humanism itself" (*HDC* 13). In the process, Said shows quite rightly that traditional humanists (and the *studia* *humanitatis* they sponsored and institutionalized) were committed to a humanism "that is often associated with very selective elites, be they religious, aristocratic, or educational, on the one hand, and, on the other, with an attitude of stern opposition, sometimes stated, sometimes not, to the idea that humanism might or could be a democratic process producing a critical and progressively freer mind" (*HDC* 16). He argues, second, that this humanism assumed a "supposed opposition between what is designated as traditional and canonical" against "the unwelcome interventions of the new and the intellectually representative of the age we live in" (*HDC* 23) and thus depended on "the notion of a unified, coherent, homogenous national identity (*HDC* 24). Third, he shows that it "interpreted the past as an essentially complete history" against a perspective that "sees history, even the past, itself, as still open to the presence and the challenges of the emergent, the insurgent, the unrequited, and the unexplored" (*HDC* 26). In short, Said persuasively demonstrates that this classical humanism is ontologically essentialist (metaphysical), epistemologically identitarian, and politically [End Page 236] nationalist, racist, elitist, patriarchal, undemocratic, Eurocentric, and imperial. What, therefore, he posits as an alternative to this *distanced* oppressive or accommodational and dehumanizing humanism is one that is "worldly," by which he means anti-essentialist, anti-identitarian, anti-nationalist, anti-patriarchal, anti-racist, anti-elitist, anti-Eurocentric, and anti-imperial. It is, I want to emphasize, a way of perceiving being in all its *indissolubly* *related* worldly manifestations (i.e., the linguistic representations of being's polyvalent reality) that privileges the *question* over the *answer* and, thus, in opposition to classical humanism, a *careful* way of comporting oneself to and acting in the finite world of representation that is simultaneously in- and outside it—*a-part*, as it were—receptive to and critical of the texts one encounters, or, as Said puts it elsewhere, "contrapuntal." This careful "exilic" comportment towards the represented world (which is a world characterized by inordinate imbalances of power) is what Said calls "philology," "the abiding basis for all humanistic practice." Following Vico's revo-lutionary secular humanist assertion in *New Science* that "the historical world is made by men and women, and not by God, and that it can be understood rationally according to the principle . . . that we can really know only what we make" (*HDC* 11), Said writes:

A2: Perm

Combination of our alternative and the plan recreates harms

Spanos 2k (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, America’s Shadow, p. 6-7) PJ

Further, it has not been adequately remarked by his commentators that Heidegger, in the process of disclosing the genealogy of humanist modernity (what he identified as the "age of the world picture"), called this tradition "onto-theo-logical" to differentiate between three epochal historical phases of the history of Western philosophy. These are the inaugural onto-logical era (Greco-Roman, in which the *logos* as e-mergent *physis* becomes *ratio,* simultaneously imminent in and external to nature); the theo-logical (the medieval/Protestant, in which the *logos* as *ratio becomes the visible and transcendental Logos or Word of God);* and the anthropo-logical (the Enlightenment, in which the visible Word of God becomes the invisible *Logos* of Man). These epochal revolutions in the history of philosophy were epistemic in scope and depth. But the revolutionary character of these transformations should not obscure the recuperative representational impulse informing each phase of representation — not least the anthropological, the phase that is alleged by Foucauldians, and all-too-casually assumed by many cultural and postcolonial critics, to have constituted an epistemic break in the thought of the Occident. I mean the mimetological impulse that kept the *idea* of Europe intact even as it underwent massively historically specific transformations. What all three epochs have fundamentally in common, what "Europe" did not allow to pass away into historical oblivion, what it, in a virtually unthought way, carried over from the disintegration of the *episteme* of each phase, was the *logos.* Let me retrieve an inaugural postmodern theoretical insight into this stable differential/identical — logocentric — history that has by now become ineffectually sedimented in the posttheory occasion: [O]n the basis of what we call the center (and which, because it can be either inside or outside, can also indifferently be called the origin or end, *arche* or *telos*), repetitions, substitutions, transformations, and permutations are always taken from a history of meaning *[sens]*—that is, in a word, a history — whose origin may always be reawakened or whose end may always be anticipated in the form of presence.... If this is so, the entire history of the concept of structure, before the rupture of which we are speaking, must be thought of as a series of substitutions of center for center, as a linked chain of determinations of the center. Successively, and in a regulated fashion, the center receives different forms or names. The history of metaphysics, like the history of the West, is the history of these metaphors and metonymies. Its matrix... is the determination of Being as presence in all senses of this word.5

The perm represents a co-option - by acknowledging our criticism as useful, the metaphysical ontology seeks to assimilate us into the Occident

Spanos 2k (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, America’s Shadow, p. 50) PJ

Unlike its predecessor in the *ancien regime*, metaphysical inquiry at this advanced Enlightenment stage does not obliterate the contradictory, amorphous, unimproved, and "ahistorical" Other from the vantage point of a visible "center elsewhere." It "acknowledges" this Other's claims as contributive to (the knowledge of) the larger self-identical Whole. In other words, it "classifies" the amorphous Others from the vantage point of an invisible "center elsewhere." It differentiates these Others into discrete phenomena — attributes distinguishing identities to them — within and in behalf of a prior encompassing self-present total Identity. This individuation of the amorphous Other conveys a sense of the sovereign integrity of the differentiated entities, but it obscures the fact that their uniqueness is entirely *dependent* on a dominant synchronic Totality, the always present and determining center of which is always out of sight. To acquire validity the differentiated entity must *accommodate* its differential partiality to the prior Totality, must, that is, objectify and subordinate itself to — take its proper place within — the gridded structure of the dominant Identity. To become a subject it must heed the call — the hailing — of the Subject. As his invocation of the ontological metaphorics of the center and the circle should suggest, what the Lacanian Marxist Louis Althusser says about "the interpellation of the individual as subject" — the (subjected) subject invented by the bourgeois capitalist Enlightenment — applies by extension to the spatial economy of the (neo)imperial project as such:

A2: Perm

The perm leads to co-option and dooms the alternative to failure

Spanos 2k (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, America’s Shadow, p. 128-130) PJ

What, after the revelatory event of Vietnam, should be astonishing to anyone living in the present historical conjuncture is the enormous power of the end-of-the-Cold War discourse. This, as I have reiterated, is the discourse, common to both cultural conservatives and liberals, that represents the successful "revolutions" against Stalinist communism first in the Eastern Bloc and then in the Soviet Union itself, the brutal suppression of the uprising in Tiananmen Square by the Old Guard communist regime, and the surgically executed military victory against Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War as the "fall of communism," that is, as the irreversible manifestation of the universal illegitimacy of the founding principles of socialism. Conversely, and more tellingly, it is the discourse that represents the global events of the late 1980s and early 1990s as a decisive manifestation of the universal legitimacy of the idea of American democracy. I am referring to the theory, most starkly exemplified by Francis Fukuyama's Hegelian interpretation of these events, that interprets the end of the Cold War as the culmination and fulfillment of a dialectical historical process that has precipitated liberal capitalist democracy as the "absolute" or planetary form of government and, in so doing, has brought the "developmental" dialectical economy of historical differentiation to its noncontradictory fulfillment and end in a totalized and identical self-present world order.3 Despite a certain toning down of the triumphalist rhetoric compelled by the ongoing civil/racial strife in Bosnia, Kosovo, and other parts of the world and the reassessment of the "decisive" defeat of Saddam Hussein, this triumphalist American representation of the contemporary post-Cold War occasion continues to determine the content and parameters of cultural and sociopolitical discourse and practice not simply in the West but everywhere in the world. (It is a mistake to conclude, as too many on the Left have, that the continuing strife these post-Gulf War events reflect has effectively delegitimated the end-of-history discourse. The dominant culture's representation of America's global role has not abandoned this triumphalist vision. Rather, as in the case of Richard Haass's *The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States after the Cold War,* it has accommodated these events to America's perennial, historically ordained, exceptionalist mission.)4 As such, this triumphalist representation has effectively obliterated or accommodated any differential event the contradictory force of which might legitimate a resistant impulse, not least the history of the Vietnam War. In so doing, it has also empowered itself to demonize any such resistant impulse as "political correctness." Symptomatic of the inordinate power of this global post-Cold War discourse (and of the inadequacy, if not obsolescence, of the traditional and even postmodern Left-oriented problematics) is the dearth of significant challenges to this representation of the end of the Cold War as the end of history. The principal spokespersons of the various oppositional discourses that have emerged in the academic marketplace as "victors" over deconstruction and other discourses focusing on the ontological question have not only largely ignored this epochal end-ofhistory thesis. They have also paid little attention to the practices it has enabled: the American invasion of Panama, the Gulf War, the "relief" of Somalia (Operation Hope), the intervention in Haiti, and, more recently, the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo (though not, for example, in Rwanda) and, in the name of securing the world from the threat of "weapons of mass destruction," once again in Iraq. Most of these discourses (they include not only the New Historicism, critical genealogy, and the various neo-Marxisms that derive from the "critical theory" of the Frankfurt School and from the interpretation of postmodernism as the cultural logic of late capitalism, but also much of black criticism, feminist criticism, and even postcolonial criticism) practice their adversarial criticism as if this triumphalist end-of-history discourse did not exist or is too trivial to warrant serious attention. They seem to have forgotten their provenance *in* the Vietnam War, in the spectacle of an Occidental state practicing something like genocide (by means, in part, of an army largely conscripted from its oppressed minorities) in the name of *the fundamental principles* of liberal democracy (the "free world"). How, then, is one to account for the present cultural power of this triumphalist discourse of the New World Order? Why is it that an adversarial postmodernist discourse instigated in large part by the unequivocal exposure during the Vietnam War of the contradictory imperial violence inhering in the "benign" political discourse of Occidental "freedom" —what Foucault has called "the regime of truth" — has been reduced to virtual silence in the face of the reaffirmation of America's global errand in the aftermath of the Cold War? The Vietnam War bore witness to the decisive self-destruction of the logical economy propelling the American intervention in Vietnam, a self-destruction synecdochically enacted in the mad rationality of the American military officer who made history by declaring to his interlocutor that "we had to destroy Ben Tre in order to save it."5 Why, then, do the adversarial discourses that emerged from the rubble of this self-destruction seem now without recourse to confront the dominant liberal capitalist culture's representation of the end of the Cold War as the advent of the New World Order, which is to say, as the *Pax Americana!* Why, on the twentieth anniversary of the fall of Saigon, does this oppositional discourse tacitly acknowledge the culture industry's decisive pronouncement that Robert McNamara's strategically timed memoirs as secretary of defense in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations constitute the definitive and final resolving act of the Vietnam War?

A2: Perm – State of Exception

**The permutation represents an exception to the ‘American exceptionalism bad’ rule – this state of exception kills solvency**

Spanos 2k (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, The Question of Philosophy and *Poiesis* in the Posthistorical Age: Thinking/Imagining the Shadow of Metaphysics, p. 169-170) PJ

To return to Heidegger, then, the Abgeschiedene, the thinker/poet who has been estranged from his or her discursive homeland by the totalization of instrumental thought, is not obliterated from being. On the contrary, it is precisely at the point of the ‘‘triumph’’ of instrumental thought that this alienated exile, like the nothing, returns, as an absent presence to haunt the centered thought of the metropolitan homeland from which he/she has been driven into exile: as, that is, the non-being which belongs to the truth of metaphysical Being but which this truth will have ‘‘nothing to do with.’’ For if saying belongs as an absolute prerogative to the imperial language of technological thinking, the Abgeschiedene, as the other of this kind of thought, speaks the unsayable, a language of silence. This silent language is an ‘‘other’’ language, a language that will not be answerable to the saying of the They (das Man), that is, to ‘‘the dictatorship of the public realm,’’ of the ‘‘way things have been publicly interpreted,’’ 24 in the totally colonized homeland. Here, in his invocation of the thinker as wandering stranger and his or her silent language as the spectral contradiction that returns to menace the routinized logical economy of the discourse of the triumphant dominant culture, Heidegger anticipates at the site of thought not only Derrida’s ‘‘trace,’’ ‘‘différance’’ and ‘‘specter’’; Levinas’s ‘‘absolutely other’’; Lacan’s ‘‘real’’; Lyotard’s ‘‘unpresentable’’ and ‘‘differend’’; Althusser’s ‘‘absent cause’’: all those intuitions of an other ‘‘reality’’ than that arrogantly asserted by the ontotheological tradition insistently, if only symptomatically, articulated by early postmodern theorists. What is more important, because it suggests an indissoluble relationship between theory and praxis that cannot help but call for thinking, he also anticipates the global antitechnocapitalist politics of Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘‘nomadology,’’ 25 the global antifascist politics of Agamben’s Arendt-inspired thought of the global ‘‘state of exception’’ (the ‘‘refugee’’),26 and the global postcolonial politics of Homi Bhabha’s concept of ‘‘hybridity,’’ Spivak’s ‘‘catachrestic’’ subaltern, and Dussel’s ‘‘non-being.’’ 27 Even more suggestively, Heidegger’s Abgeschiedene is, if one makes explicit the implicit relationship between the thinking of this ontological exile and the errant thinking that, according to the Parmenides lectures, was decisively transformed by Rome’s reduction of the Greek understanding of truth as a-letheia (un-concealment) to veritas (the correspondence of mind and thing) in the name of its imperial project, proleptic of the postimperial politics that Said tentatively articulates in Culture and Imperialism against the global language of the ‘‘administered’’ imperial society.

This legal circumvention is a state of exception in line with the same logic used by the State to justify all forms of insidious biopolitical control

Agamben 5(Giorgio, professor of aesthetics at the University Iuav of Venice, “State of Exception”, 8-9)

In Rossiter's book these aporias explode into open contradictions. Unlike Tingsten and Friedrich, Rossiter explicitly seeks to justify con­stitutional dictatorship through a broad historical examination. His hypothesis here is that because the democratic regime, with its com­plex balance of powers, is conceived to function under normal circum­stances, "in time of crisis a democratic, constitutional government must temporarily be altered to whatever degree is necessary to overcome the peril and restore normal conditions. This alteration invariably involves gov­ernment of a stronger character; that is, the government will have more power and the people fewer rights" (Rossiter 1948, 5). Rossiter is aware that constitutional dictatorship (that is, the state of exception) has, in fact, become a paradigm of government ("a well-established principle of constitutional government" 141) and that as such it i**s** fraught with dangers; nevertheless, it is precisely the immanent necessity of consti­tutional dictatorship that he intends to demonstrate. But as he makes this attempt, he entangles himself in irresolvable contradictions. Indeed, Schmitt's model (which he judges to be "trail-blazing, if somewhat oc­casional," and which he seeks to correct [14]), in which the distinction between commissarial dictatorship and sovereign dictatorship is not one of nature but of degree (with the decisive figure undoubtedly being the latter), is not so easily overcome. Although Rossiter provides no fewer than eleven criteria for distinguishing constitutional dictatorship from unconstitutional dictatorship, none of them is capable either of defining a substantial difference between the two or of ruling out the passage from one to the other. The fact is that the two essential crite­ria of absolute necessity and temporariness (which all the others come down to in the last analysis) contradict what Rossiter knows perfectly well, that is, that the state of exception has by now become the rule: "In the Atomic Age upon which the world is now entering, the use of constitutional emergency powers may well become the rule and not the exception" (297); or as he says even more clearly at the end of the book, "In describing the emergency powers of the western democracies, this book may have given the impression that such techniques of govern­ment as executive dictatorship, the delegation of legislative power, and lawmaking by administrative degree were purely transitory and tempo­rary in nature. Such an impression would be distinctly misleading... . The instruments of government depicted here as temporary 'crisis' ar­rangements have in some countries, and may eventually in all countries, become lasting peacetime institutions" (313). This prediction, which came eight years after Benjamin's first formulation in the eighth the­sis on the concept of history, was undoubtedly accurate; but the words that conclude the book sound even more grotesque: "No sacrifice is too great for our democracy, least of all the temporary sacrifice of democ­racy itself" (314).

A2: State Good/Dogmatism

Spanos doesn’t completely denounce the State, merely the ontology of American exceptionalism and hegemony

Spanos 8 (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam, p.xviii) PJ

It is not the main intention of this book to argue against the global theory that posits the demise of the nation-state and the rise of transnational capital to global sovereignty. Its purpose, rather, is to retrieve and underscore the perennial mobilizing force of the myth of American exceptionalism and the American nation-state it defines in the context of a traditional and postmodern representation of the United States that accepts the myth of exceptionalism as a reality. I mean a representation that, in acknowledging the radical difference between its nontraditional multicultural (and contractual) essence and the traditional monocultural essence of the European nation states, has, on the one hand, enabled its defenders to distinguish America as essentially democratic and anti-imperialist from the nations of Europe, and, therefore, on the other, as a nation susceptible to the kind of decentering endemic to transnational capital in a way that the European nations are not.To put my primary purpose in this way in the wake of the coming to prominence of the globalization theory that posits the demise of the nation-state, is, however, to indicate that what follows in the book does constitute a tacit challenge to it.

A2: Identity/Groups

Identity politics and “categories” of thought are co-opted by a drive for hegemony and hierarchies of thought

Spanos 93 (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, Heidegger and Criticism: Retrieving the Cultural Politics of Destruction, p. 133-135) PJ

At present, several theoretical discourses are competing for authority in the interrogation of the dominant culture and the (discreetly) repressive sociopolitical formations it legitimates: the discourses of textuality, of psychoanalysis, of ontology, of feminism, of black criticism, of Marxism, and so on. Each of these interpretive strategies *tends* to assume a base/superstructure model in which the particular base determines in the last instance the superstructural sites and thus represents the latter as more or less epiphenomenal. Understood in terms of the questions they have raised in their common demystification of the problematic of the dominant culture—questions about consciousness, language, culture, gender, race, the ecos, society, and politics, to which this "value-free" problematic is necessarily blind—a different understanding of base and superstructure suggests itself. According to my appropriation of the destruction—a reading I believe is latent in Heidegger's destructive hermeneutics—the field of inquiry is not divided according to the imperatives of the base/superstructure model. Its sites are not in essence hierarchically ordered, but *laterally* equiprimordial: they constitute an indissoluble and interpenetrating continuum or force field of lived discursive practices, although unevenly developed at any historically specific moment. The destruction understands the constituted history of "the Occident"—the onto-theo-logical tradition—as a *process ofreconstitutions,* a process characterized by periods of relative stability all along the lateral field of discursive forces that undergo destabilization when their internal contradictions surface as disruptive events or, in Foucault's phrase, "discursive explosions,"3 which in turn are *accommodated* by the substitution of another socially constituted and comprehensive center. In this process of accommodation to the "new" center, particular historical conjunctures will overdetermine one or more discursive sites at the expense of the visibility of the others. (It is in this sense that one could say that the lateral discursive field offerees is always unevenly developed at any historically specific moment in the tradition.) As a consequence of this historical overdetermination, it *appears* that the overdetermined site (or sites) is determinant in the last instance of the less visible ones: that it constitutes the base that shapes its superstructural manifestations. With the rise of capital in the Western industrial nations in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, for example, the economic site became overdetermined. It thus seemed to Marx and Engels (and to the theoreticians of capitalism) that the economic site constituted the base of the superstructural sites. However insistent their qualifications, it was finally the ownership of the means of production that determined the structural characteristics of language, culture, gender, law, politics, and so on: According to the materialist conception of history, the *ultimately* determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life. More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the *only* determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase. The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure—political forms of the class struggle and its results, to wit: constitutions established by the victorious class after a battle, etc., juridical forms, and even the reflexes of all these actual struggles in the brains of the participants, political, juristic, philosophical theories, religious views and their further development into systems of dogma—also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their form*.* There is an interaction of all these elements in which, amid all the endless host of accidents (that is, of things and events whose inner interconnection is so remote or so impossible of proof that we can regard it as non-existent, as negligible) the economic movement finally asserts itself as necessary. Otherwise the application of the theory to any period of history would be easier than the solution of a simple equation of the first degree.4

A2: Nazism

Spanos recognizes that Heidegger’s involvement with Nazism was part of a humanist ethic – Heidegger had a lapse of anti-humanism

Pease 93 (Donald, Chair of the Dartmouth Liberal Studies Program, Forward, Heidegger, Nazism, and the Repressive Hypothesis, p. xi-xii) PJ

I consider it my responsibility in this foreword to William Spanos's *Heidegger and Criticism: Retrieving the Cultural Politics of Destruction* to sketch out the significance of its occasion—the possible erasure of Heidegger's influence from American criticism—as well as the figures marking it. Those figures include such proper names as "Heidegger," "Dresden," "Auschwitz," "Vietnam," and they share as a common property only the absence of any speculative instrument capable of conceptualizing their interrelationship. As grounds for his erasure, Heidegger's critics propose that the Heidegger who persevered in undermining the "forgetting of Being" should have understood himself to be under no obligation to remember Auschwitz (which instantiated what Levinas has called the "otherwise than being")1 indicated an unpardonable lapse in his thinking; and that the key words from the Nazi propaganda machine (e.g., *Volk, Arbeit, Fuhrungprinzip)* that appeared as well in Heidegger's works entailed nothing less than the engendering, sedimentation, and support of Nazi ideology from *within* Heidegger's philosophy. Heidegger's refusal to speak about Auschwitz bears significant witness to obstacles Heidegger's involvement with Nazism poses for responsible thinking about the "Heidegger controversy." While the Heidegger controversy does not become an explicit topic until Spanos's final chapter, it nevertheless informs the book's overall rationale: the "destruction" (in the Heideggerian sense of disassembling the structure in which the forgetting of being is enabled) of liberal humanism as a discourse appropriate to adjudicate the controversy. Arnold Davidson's introduction to "Symposium on Heidegger and Nazism" in a special issue of *Critical Inquiry2* provoked Spanos to discriminate the American from the European "appropriation" of the Heidegger question in an essay that he first published in a special issue of *boundary* 2,3 entitled "Heidegger, Nazism and the Repressive Hypothesis: The American Appropriation of the Question."4 The terms in Spanos's title call renewed attention to the difficulty of addressing the topic. In taking the "American appropriation" of the Heidegger question as his central concern, Spanos first displaces the European debate over the political and philosophical implications of Heidegger's adherence to Nazism, then he replaces the Nazis' extermination of the Jews with the United States' genocidal policies against Vietnam as the pertinent historical context. The overall result of Spanos's rhetorical strategy is the substitution of the 1960s antiwar controversy for the 1990s Heidegger controversy. In focusing on the "repressive hypothesis" as the Americanist instrument of appropriation in the Heidegger controversy, Spanos is not conducting a defense of Heidegger but expressing concern over the potential loss of the question (Man's being in the world) to which Heidegger's thinking gave access. Spanos identifies Davidson's "liberal humanist" critique (free-standing, disinterested inquiry certain of its power conceptually to grasp the truth of the matter) as itself the object of Heidegger's persistent critique, and a vestigial trace of Nazi humanism. Davidson's liberal humanism, Spanos argues, depends on presuppositions from the ontotheological tradition for its power and it displays that tradition's capacity to reconstitute its central premises at the very site of the Heidegger controversy.

A2: Pragmatism

Pragmatic approaches lead to imperialist violence, a re-inscription of harms, and turns case

Spanos 2k (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, America’s Shadow, p. 186-187) PJ

This marginalization has been the consequence of a number of interrelated tendencies: the growing (American) pragmatist resistance to theory, the academic loss of nerve in the face of the existential imperatives of the decentering of the subject, the nationalist or racist resistance to "white" postmodernist writing, the nostalgic Left's representation of the decentering as a relativism that precludes practice, and, not least, the disengagement incumbent on the institutionalization of dissent. Whatever the causes, the marginalization of the postmodern demystification of the self-identical subject has been disabling. It has paralyzed — indeed, rendered irrelevant — the critical function of the New Historicism and its affiliated cultural and postcolonial discourses in the face of the horrifically paradoxical underside of the post-Cold War occasion: the occasion that has given rise to the ubiquitous and multisituated wars of Identity all-too-glibly represented as "Balkanization," as if such violence were endemic to that particular ("unimproved" or "underdeveloped") region of the world. I am not simply referring to Eastern Europe (the conditions of sociopolitical life in the former Central European communist bloc, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union), the Middle East, and Africa. I am also referring to the West, particularly, but certainly not exclusively, to the United States (the conditions of sociopolitical life subsequent to the emergence in the post-Vietnam period of multiculturalism). The first instance bears pervasive witness to the renewed spectacle of an old and virulent nationalism, ethnocentrism, and racism — a violent sociopolitics of Identity. This is the state of life in the newly decolonized cultures of Eastern and Central Europe, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union, which have ironically reinscribed with a vengeance the very metaphysically legitimated principle of self-presence that Stalinist communism, by way of its apotheosis of the Party and the Proletariat as its principle of identity, employed to justify the brutal totalitarian or imperial suppression and oppression of the different social, cultural, ethnic, and racial enclaves of these geopolitical spaces.30 Similarly, postcolonial countries in the Middle East and Africa have reinscribed the very principle of identity that the imperial powers, by way of the apotheosis of the Western idea of civilization, employed to justify their cultural, economic, and political domination and exploitation of their spaces. These, too, as the examples of Iran, Iraq, and Algeria testify, manifest their "freedom" from colonial rule in a virulent identity politics expressed in bloodletting.

A2: Science Good

Humanist notions of science have given rise to the violence of the status quo and justify mass atrocities

Spanos 8 (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam, p. 8-9) PJ

In the above synecdochical passage Fukuyama’s rhetoric strategically maneuvers the reader’s attention toward the “larger pattern”—the promised structure—that the dialectics of History will bring forth in the “fullness of time.” (I am pointing provisionally to the affiliative relationship between the metaphorics of the centered circle, of the gaze/picture, and of the patriarchal/theological seed “planted” in the womb of time, all tropes intrinsic to the Occidental—and especially American—imperial project.) Understood in terms of the de-sedimented context precipitated by this interrogation of Fukuyama’s spatial rhetoric, we are enabled to resist this enticement and to refocus our attention on “the setbacks and disappointments in the process of democratization” that Fukuyama foresees, but which he represents as seductive “distractions” from “the larger pattern” to which we should not succumb. That which distracts means an inessential or accidental or irrelevant or, more resonantly, marginal force—a differential Other— that draws our attention—our gaze—away from the “essential” direction and that “stirs up or confuses us [as subjects] with conflicting emotions or motives.”10 In Fukuyama’s discourse, this distraction refers to the histori-cally specific events of modernity that have collectively generated a pervasive pessimism, especially among advanced (poststructuralist?) intellectuals, a pessimism that, accordingly, has made it difficult to “recognize good news when it comes” (*EH*, xii). This is the history he abstractly and neutrally characterizes as “the truly terrible political events of the first half of the twentieth century—two destructive world wars, the rise of totalitarian ideologies, and the turning of science against man in the form of nuclear weapons and environmental damage” (*EH*, xiii). That is, what the “distraction” that “distracts” refers to is the actual—catastrophic—history, both past and future, that would disrupt the promissory dialectical economy of History. Derrida thematizes the eschatological provenance of Fukuyama’s annunciation of the end of history as “good news” (I would add its “pro*vid*ential” origins to foreground the visual metaphorics of this prophetics): Why a gospel? Why would the formula here be neo-testamentary? This book claims to bring a “positive response” to a question whose formation and formulation are never interrogated in themselves. It is the question of whether a “coherent and directional History of mankind” will eventually lead “the greater part of humanity” . . . toward “liberal democracy” (p. xii). Of course, while answering “yes” to this question in this form, Fukuyama admits . . . to an awareness of everything that allows one to have one’s doubts: the two world wars, the horrors of totalitarianism—Nazi, fascist, Stalinist—the massacres of Pol Pot, and so forth. . . . But according to a schema that organizes the argumentation of this strange plea from one end to the other, all these cataclysms (terror, oppression, repression, extermination, genocide, and so on), these “events” or these “facts” would belong to empiricity. . . . Their accumulation would in no way refute the *ideal* orientation of the greater part of humanity toward liberal democracy. . . . Even if one admitted the simplicity of this summary distinction between empirical reality and ideal finality, one would still not know how this . . . anhistoric *telos* of history gives rise, very precisely *in our* *day* . . . to an event which Fukuyama speaks of as “good news” and that he dates very explicitly from “The most remarkable evolution of the last quarter of the twentieth century.” (p. xiii) . . . This “move toward political freedom around the globe”. . . would have been everywhere accompanied . . . by “a liberal revolution in economic thought.” The alliance of liberal democracy and of the “free market,” there’s the “good news” of this last quarter century. This evangelistic figure is remarkably insistent.11

\*\*\*A2: SPANOS\*\*\*

Education Reform 1NC

We believe that a focus on challenging American Exceptionalism in the educational academy is preferable to the Affirmative’s focus on military posture.

Education reform is critical to allow for discourses to challenge US hegemony

Spanos 84 (William V. The Uses and Abuses of Certainty: A Caviling Overture Source: boundary 2, Vol. 12/13, Vol. 12, no. 3 - Vol. 13, no. 1, On Humanism and the University I: The Discourse of Humanism (Spring - Autumn, 1984), pp. 1-17 ) TBC 7/9/10

In 1974, at the behest of Derek Bok, the new president of Harvard University, a faculty committee chaired by the new Dean of Arts and Sciences, Henry Rosovsky, undertook "a major review of the goals and strategies of undergraduate education at Harvard."' In 1978, when it had become clear that "there was wide agreement that the 1 proliferation of courses [in the previous decade] had eroded the purpose of the existing General Education Program" ("RCC," p. 1), the Task Force submitted its "Report on the Core Curriculum" to the Harvard Faculty, a report, it believed, which was grounded in "a standard [of education] that meets the needs of the late twentieth century" ("RCC," p. 2). After a brief period of deliberation, during which the media, on the basis of its promise to renew American socio- political life, inflated the "curricular reform" at Harvard into an educational event of national significance, the Harvard Faculty adopted the "Report." As if waiting for such a sign from the pharmakos, colleges and universities throughout the country began to fellow suit. This momentum in higher education-in which the reformation of the humanities curriculum is related to the recuperation of the good health the nation apparently lost during the turbulent decade of the Vietnam War, the years, that is, of the civil rights and student protest movements-comes to culmination and clear focus in the report on the humanities in education published in November, 1984 by William J. Bennett, Chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities and, subsequently, Secretary of Education in the Reagan Administration. In this report, significantly entitled "To Reclaim a Legacy," Chairman Bennett deplores the disarray into which higher education-especially the teaching of the humanities curricu- lum-has fallen as a consequence of what he says was "a collective loss of nerve and faith on the part of both faculty and academic administrators during the late 1960's and early 1970's":2 Although more than 50 percent of America's high school graduates continue their education at American colleges and universities, few of them can be said to receive there an adequate education in the culture and civilization of which they are members. Most of our college graduates remain shortchanged in the humanities-history, literature, philosophy, and the ideals and practices of the past that have shaped the society they enter. The fault lies principally with those of us whose business it is to educate these students. We have blamed others, but the responsibility is ours. ... It is we the educators-not scientists, business people, or the general public-who too often have given up the great task of transmitting a culture to its rightful heirs. Thus, what we have on many of our campuses is an unclaimed legacy, a course of studies in which the humanities have been siphoned off, diluted, or so adulterated that students graduate knowing little of their heritage. ("RL," p. 16) As a "survivor" of what in The Wall Street Journal he has called the 2 "shattering of the humanities,"'3 Bennett predictably invokes and re- affirms the Word of the Father of modern Anglo-American Human- ism-"the best that has been said, thought, written, and otherwise ex- pressed about the human experience" ("RL," p. 17)-and, focalizing the increasing demand both within and without the academy for the restoration of the core curriculum, calls for the reclaiming of the "un- claimed" legacy of which our students are the "rightful heirs": ...the humanities can contribute to an informal sense of community by enabling us to learn about and become participants in a common culture, share- holders in our civilization. But our goal should be more than just a common culture-even television and the comics can give us that. We should instead want all students to know a common culture rooted in civilization's lasting vision, its highest shared ideals and aspirations, and its heritage. ("RL," p. 17) That higher education is in a state of crisis goes without saying. But this thematic should not divert our attention from the pharmakon that Bennett and other influential humanists are not only espousing but increasingly forcing on the academy in the name of right reason. For this recuperation of the humanistic curriculum-however self-evident as a cure it may seem to those of the humanist persuasion-is, in the view of many others equally com- mitted to preparing the young for life in the last third of the twentieth century, precisely, if generally, the cause of the "sickness" that af- flicts the cultural and socio-political life of the modern Western nation states. To say, as Bennett explicitly and the Harvard Faculty and Administration implicitly do, that the shattering of the humanities curriculum was the disastrous result of a "collective loss of nerve and faith" on the part of educators "during the late 1960's and early 1970's" is to practice a sleight of hand which not only ignores the student protest movement both here and in Europe that implicated higher education with the State's war against Vietnam. It also ignores a number of emergent oppositional discourses that have found the "disinterested" inquiry of Humanism to be a logo- ethno- and phallo- centric ideology the function of which is to legitimate and relegitimate Western hegemony in the face of knowledge explosions that also activate the dormant desires for enfranchisement of hitherto repressed others (those different from "us"). Is this the unsaid socio- political agenda that finally lies behind Bennett's insistent equation of the humanities with the Western, indeed, American, heritage and his demand, as official cultural spokesman of the Reagan Administration, that the American university reclaim a "lost" legacy?

Education Reform Key

We must focus on the Academia – it is at the root of liberal violence towards the third world

Spanos 93 (William V. Prof of English and comparative lit at Binghamton U Heidegger and Criticism: Retrieving the Cultural Politics of Destruction pg. 229-230)

What does need to be thematized, however, is the remarkable symmetry between Frankel's and Arnold Davidson's representations of the truth/power nexus. Frankel's liberal humanist discourse justifies the university in the context of the American intervention in Vietnam in precisely the Kantian terms invoked by Davidson to discredit Heidegger's project to "overcome philosophy": "Specific" practices at Columbia University may have contributed to the "evils" the students were combatting; but if these specific practices were at all culpable—and it is not certain to Frankel that this was the case—they were the consequence of the betrayal of its unworldly principle of autonomous reason, of its "Kantian" Heidegger, Nazism, and the "Repressive Hypothesis" sence, and thus correctable. For "force," according to Frankel, is in essence "alien to [the American university's] habits and . . . lethal to it." In thus defending the idea of the university as a value-free space, Frankel also assumes a view of the relationship between the pursuit of truth and the practices of power which Davidson invokes centrally in order to condemn as "unpardonable" Heidegger's "staggering" identification of a technologized agriculture and the Nazi gas chambers and death camps: the "incommensurability"—the radical difference—between knowledge production and the violent practices of power. "Force that is merely latent [i.e., the beneficial constraints of laws produced by autonomous reason]," he declares, "has a different social and psychological significance from force that is actively employed. Force that is employed subject to strict legal restrictions is not the same genre with force that does not recognize such limits." What I am suggesting in thus invoking Foucault's analysis of the repressive hypothesis in the context of the American liberal humanists' radical differentiation of knowledge production (the university) from the relay of technological instruments (weapons) that devastated Vietnam and its people's culture is the following: Davidson's typically humanist condemnation of Heidegger's project to "overcome" philosophy and his consequent equation of the technologization of agriculture and the production of corpses in the gas chambers and the death camps is a remarkably parochial (ethnocentric), if not calculatedly duplicitous, strategy. Understood in this American context, to put it alternatively, Heidegger's project and his "pronouncement," whatever its limitations vis-a-vis specificity, takes on a quite different—a far more justifiable—significance from that attributed to it by his humanist prosecutors. For the humanist representation of these leaves unsaid Heidegger's thematization of the modern Occident's reduction of truth as aletheia to truth as adequaetio intellectus et rei (an originary or dialogic thinking to derivative or monologic "philosophy"), and its reduction of being (the indissoluble lateral continuum from the subject through language and culture to the economy and the political state) to a universally technologized "standing reserve." This humanist representation also overlooks the critique of Occidental discursive practices, especially since the Enlightenment, enabled by Foucault and by poststructuralism or posthumanism at large: the critique, I want to reiterate, that Heidegger's interrogation of the discourse of humanism catalyzed.65

Education Reform Key

Education reform is critical to allow for discourses to challenge US hegemony

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It is we the educators-not scientists, business people, or the general public-who too often have given up the great task of transmitting a culture to its rightful heirs. Thus, what we have on many of our campuses is an unclaimed legacy, a course of studies in which the humanities have been siphoned off, diluted, or so adulterated that students graduate knowing little of their heritage. 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Education Reform Key

Education is at the heart of militarism – Reform is key

Giroux 6 (Henry A. The Emerging Authoritarianism in the United States: Political Culture Under the Bush/Chaney Administration Henry A. Giroux the Global TV Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster U symploke 14.1/2 (2006) 98-151) TBC 7/9/10

The growing influence of a military presence and ideology in American society is made visible, in part, by the fact that the United States has more police, prisons, spies, weapons, and soldiers than at any other time in its history. The radical shift in the size, scope, and influence of the military can also be seen in the redistribution of domestic resources and government funding away from social programs into military-oriented security measures at home and abroad. As Richard Falk has pointed out, "The US Government is devoting huge resources to the monopolistic militarization of space, the development of more usable nuclear weapons, and the strengthening of its world-girdling ring of military bases and its global navy, as the most tangible way to discourage any strategic challenges to its preeminence" (para. 22). According to journalist George Monbiot, the U.S. federal government "is now spending as much on war as it is on education, public health, housing, employment, pensions, food aid and welfare put together" (para. 12). Meanwhile, the state is being radically transformed into a national security state, increasingly put under the sway of the military-corporate-industrial-educational complex. The military logic of fear, surveillance, and control is gradually permeating our public schools, universities, streets, media, popular culture, and criminal justice system. Since the events of 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the military has assumed a privileged place in American society. President Bush not only celebrates the military presence in American culture, he cultivates it by going out of his way to give speeches at military facilities, talk to military personnel, and address veterans groups. He often wears a military uniform when speaking to "captive audiences at military bases, defense plants, and on aircraft carriers" (Mariscal para. 7). He also takes advantage of the campaign value of military culture by using military symbolism as a political prop in order to attract the widest possible media attention. One glaring instance occurred on May 1, 2003, when Bush landed in full aviator flight uniform on the USS Abraham Lincoln in the Pacific Ocean, where he officially proclaimed the end of the Iraq war. There was also his secret trip to Baghdad to spend [End Page 124] Thanksgiving Day 2003 with the troops, an event that attracted world-wide coverage in all the media. But Bush has done more than take advantage of the military as a campaign prop to sell his domestic and foreign policies. His administration and the Republican Party, which up to recently controlled all three branches of government, have developed a "dangerous and unprecedented confluence of our democratic institutions and the military" (Baker 38). Writing in Harper's Magazine, Kevin Baker claims that the military "has become the most revered institution in the country" (37). Soon after the Iraq War, a Gallup Poll reported that over 76% of Americans "expressed 'a great deal' or 'quite a lot' of confidence in their nation's military." Among a poll of 1,200 students conducted by Harvard University, 75% believed that the military most of the time would "do the right thing." In addition, the students "characterized themselves as hawks over doves by a ratio of two to one" (Baker 37). Given this pro-military attitude among university students, it should not surprise us that the Bruin Alumni Association at the University of Los Angeles, California, has targeted professors it describes as "radical" and posted their names on its Web site under the heading "The Dirty Thirty." The group is headed by former student and right-wing ideologue, Andrew Jones, whose "Open Letter from the Bruin Alumni Association" describes its mission as combating "an exploding crisis of political radicalism on campus" and defines radicalism as holding any dissenting view of the war in Iraq, supporting affirmative action, or opposing "President Bush, the Republican Party, multi-national corporations, and even our fighting men and women." The Bruin Alumni Association does more than promote "McCarthy-like smears," intolerance, and anti-intellectualism through a vapid appeal for "balance"; it also offers $100 prizes to any students willing to provide information on their teachers' political views (Fogg). Of course, this has less to do with protesting genuine demagoguery than it does with attacking any professor who might raise critical questions about the status quo or hold the narratives of power accountable. A narrowing view of politics and a growing support of the military have coincided with an attack on higher education by right-wing ideologues such as David Horowitz and Lynne Cheney (spouse of Vice President Dick Cheney), who view it as a "weak link" in the war against terror and a potential fifth column.13 Horowitz also acts as the figurehead for various well-funded and orchestrated conservative student groups such as the Young Americans and College Republicans, [End Page 125] which perform the groundwork for his "Academic Bill of Rights" policy that seeks out juicy but rare instances of "political bias"—whatever that is or however it might be defined—in college classrooms. These efforts have resulted in considerable sums of public money being devoted to hearings in multiple state legislatures, most recently in Pennsylvania, in addition to helping impose, as the Chronicle of Higher Education put it in "Forum: A Chilly Climate on Campuses," a "chilly climate" of self-policing of academic freedom and pedagogy. Popular fears about domestic safety and internal threats accentuated by endless terror alerts have created a society that increasingly accepts the notion of a "war without limits" as a normal state of affairs. But fear and insecurity do more than produce a collective anxiety among Americans, exploited largely to get them to believe that they should vote Republican because it is the only political party that can protect them. In addition to producing manufactured political loyalty, such fears can also be manipulated into a kind of "war fever." The mobilization of war fever, intensified through a politics of fear, carries with it a kind of paranoid edge, endlessly stoked by government alerts and repressive laws and used "to create the most extensive national security apparatus in our nation's history" <CONTINUED>

Education Reform Key

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(Rosen 2003b, para. 5). It is also reproduced in the Foxified media, which, in addition to constantly marketing the flag and interminably implying that critics of American foreign policy are traitors, offer up seemingly endless images of brave troops on the front line, heroic stories of released American prisoners, and utterly privatized commentaries on those wounded or killed in battle. Time Magazine embodied this representational indulgence in military culture by naming "The American Soldier" as the "Person of the Year" for 2003. Not only have such ongoing and largely uncritical depictions of war injected a constant military presence in American life, they have also helped to create a civil society that has become more aggressive in its warlike enthusiasms. But there is more at work here than either the exploitation of troops for higher ratings or an attempt by right-wing political strategists to keep the American public in a state of permanent fear so as to remove pressing domestic issues from public debate. There is also the attempt by the Bush administration to convince as many Americans as possible that under the current "state of emergency" the use of the military internally in domestic affairs is perfectly acceptable, evident in the increasing propensity to use the military establishment "to incarcerate and interrogate suspected terrorists and 'enemy combatants' and keep them beyond the reach of the civilian judicial system, even if they are American citizens" (R. Kohn 174-175). It is also evident in the federal government's attempt to try terrorists in military courts, and to detain prisoners "outside the provisions of the Geneva Convention as prisoners of war . . . at the U.S. [End Page 126] Marine Corps base at Guantanamo, Cuba because that facility is outside of the reach of the American courts" (R. Kohn 174-5). As military values, ideology, and a hyper-masculine aesthetic begin to spread out into other aspects of American culture, citizens are recruited as foot soldiers in the war on terrorism, urged to spy on their neighbors' behaviors, watch for suspicious-looking people, and supply data to government sources in the war on terrorism. Major universities intensively court the military establishment for Defense Department grants and in doing so become less open to either academic subjects or programs that encourage rigorous debate, dialogue, and critical thinking. In fact, as higher education is pressured by both the Bush administration and its jingoistic supporters to serve the needs of the military-industrial complex, universities increasingly deepen their connections to the national security state in ways that are boldly celebrated. For instance, Pennsylvania State University (in addition to Carnegie Mellon University, the University of Pennsylvania, Johns Hopkins University, and a host of other public institutions) has entered into a formal agreement with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in order to "create a link between [a] leading research university and government agencies." Graham Spanier, Penn State president and head of the new National Security Higher Education Advisory Board, stated that the collaboration "sends a positive message that leaders in higher education are willing to assist our nation during these challenging times" (Pennsylvania State University).

Schools are key cites for military indoctrination

Giroux 6 (Henry A. The Emerging Authoritarianism in the United States: Political Culture Under the Bush/Chaney Administration Henry A. Giroux the Global TV Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster U symploke 14.1/2 (2006) 98-151) TBC 7/9/10

Schools represent one of the most serious public spheres to come under the influence of military culture and values. Zero-tolerance policies turn public schools into prison-like institutions, as students' rights increasingly diminish under the onslaught of new disciplinary measures. Students in many schools, especially those in poor urban areas, are routinely searched, frisked, subjected to involuntary drug [End Page 127] tests, maced, and carted off to jail. Elissa Gootman in a 2004 report on schools in New York City claims that "In some places, schools are resorting to zero-tolerance policies that put students in handcuffs for dress code violations" (C14). As educators turn over their responsibility for school safety to the police, the new security culture in public schools has turned them into "learning prisons," most evident in the ways in which schools are being "reformed" through the addition of armed guards, barbed-wired security fences, and lock-down drills (Chaddock 15). In 2003, the police in Goose Creek, South Carolina, conducted an early morning drug-sweep at Stratford High School. When the officers arrived, they drew guns on students, handcuffed them, and made them kneel facing the wall (Lewin A16). No drugs were found in the raid. Though this incident was aired on the national news, there was barely any protest from the public. It gets worse. Some schools are actually using sting operations in which undercover agents pretend to be students in order to catch young people suspected of selling drugs or committing any one of a number of school infractions. The consequences of such actions are far reaching. As Randall Beger points out: Opponents of school-based sting operations say they not only create a climate of mistrust between students and police, but they also put innocent students at risk of wrongful arrest due to faulty tips and overzealous police work. When asked about his role in a recent undercover probe at a high school near Atlanta, a young-looking police officer who attended classes and went to parties with students replied: "I knew I had to fit in, make kids trust me and then turn around and take them to jail." (124) The militarization of public high schools has become so commonplace that even in the face of the most flagrant disregard for children's rights, such acts are justified by both administrators and the public on the grounds that they keep kids safe. In Biloxi, Mississippi, surveillance cameras have been installed in all of its 500 classrooms. The school's administrators call this "school reform," but none of them have examined the implications of what they are teaching kids who are put under constant surveillance. The not-so-hidden curriculum here is that kids can't be trusted and that their rights are not worth protecting. At the same time, students are being educated to passively accept military sanctioned practices organized around maintaining control, surveillance, and unquestioned authority, all conditions central to a police state and proto-fascism.

Education Reform Key

Focus on education is key to promoting true participation and resistance

Giroux 6 (Henry A. The Emerging Authoritarianism in the United States: Political Culture Under the Bush/Chaney Administration Henry A. Giroux the Global TV Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster U symploke 14.1/2 (2006) 98-151) TBC 7/9/10

The liberal democratic vocabulary of rights, entitlements, social provisions, community, social responsibility, living wage, job security, equality, and justice seem oddly out of place in a country where the [End Page 139] promise of democracy has been replaced by casino capitalism, a winner-take-all philosophy suited to lotto players and day traders alike. As corporate culture extends even deeper into the basic institutions of civil and political society, buttressed daily by a culture industry largely in the hands of concentrated capital, it is reinforced even further by the pervasive fear and public insecurity regarding the possibility that the future holds nothing beyond a watered-down version of the present. As the prevailing discourse of neoliberalism seizes the public imagination, there is no vocabulary for progressive social change, democratically inspired vision, or critical notions of social agency to expand the meaning and purpose of democratic public life. Against the reality of low-wage jobs, the erosion of social provisions for a growing number of people, the expanding war against young people of color at home, and empire-building wars abroad, the market-driven juggernaut of neoliberalism continues to mobilize desires in the interest of producing market identities and market relationships that ultimately sever the link between education and social change while reducing agency to the obligations of consumerism. As neoliberal ideology and corporate culture extend even deeper into the basic institutions of civil and political society, there is a simultaneous diminishing of non-commodified public spheres—those institutions such as public schools, independent bookstores, churches, noncommercial public broadcasting stations, libraries, trade unions, and various voluntary institutions engaged in dialogue, education, and learning—that can address the relationship of the individual to public life, foster social responsibility, and provide a robust vehicle for public participation and democratic citizenship. As media theorists, Edward Herman and Robert McChesney observe, non-commodified public spheres have historically played an invaluable role "as places and forums where issues of importance to a political community are discussed and debated, and where information is presented that is essential to citizen participation in community life" (3). Without these critical public spheres, corporate power often goes unchecked and politics becomes dull, cynical, and oppressive.20 Moreover, the vacuum left by diminishing democracy is filled with religious zealotry, cultural chauvinism, xenophobia, and racism—the dominant tropes of neoconservatives and other extremist groups eager to take advantage of the growing insecurity, fear, and anxiety that result from increased joblessness, the war on terror, and the unraveling of communities. In this context, neoliberalism creates the economic, social, and political instability that helps feed both the neoconservative and the religious Right movements and their proto-fascist policy initiatives. [End Page 140]

Vietnam Focus Bad

Focusing on Vietnam invokes humiliation which makes interventionist wars inevitable and forecloses the possibility for peace

Mendible 7 (Myra, Florida Gulf Coast U., Radical Pyschology, vol 7,

http://www.radicalpsychology.org/vol7-1/mendible.html) TBC 7/9/10

In a victory speech following the 1991 Persian Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush proclaimed it a proud day to be American. The president’s speech officially heralded a new structure of feeling in America, one more suited to an imperial power’s spectacular reemergence on the world stage. It pronounced an official end to the “Vietnam syndrome,” a malaise that had presumably stricken the American psyche for over 16 years. The war had been the antidote for what ailed us, Bush’s speech assured us, the means to restore the nation’s honor and reclaim its rightful status. Americans could finally trade in the sackcloth of humiliation for the mantle of pride. By God, we had “kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all” (Bush, para. 15). There are several problems, of course, with this version of history and with the ways that the “we” is constituted in its narrative. This essay is concerned with the extent to which Vietnam consistently plays out in popular memory as a psychodrama of humiliation, casting America in the role of victim and producing certain alignments and associations in the citizenry. Bush’s speech capitalized on a set of assumptions that have long dominated public discourse about the war. News pundits, filmmakers, and political leaders alike have exploited the evocative power of this humiliation tale, invoking its stock characters and compensatory themes to elicit predictable responses in target audiences. This affective logic binds subjects to cycles of compensatory violence, fueling militaristic strains in America’s political culture and setting the stage for a series of wars and interventions. I hope to show how this humiliation dynamic structures conflicts in ways that short-circuit the consideration of peaceful options.

Focus on Vietnam causes a fear of casualties that make inevitable intervention worse – They don’t solve exceptionalism, they send it underground

Weisbrot 2 (Andrew, Ctr for Econ & Pol Res, http://www.cepr.net/index.php/op-eds-&-columns/op-eds-&-columns/vietnam-syndrome-is-alive-and-thriving/) TBC 7/9/10

What our politicians fear, but nobody wants to talk about, are the political consequences of American casualties. This is not because Americans are lacking in courage; as the heroic actions of the firefighters and others at the site of the World Trade Center showed, there is no shortage of people who are willing to risk their lives for the sake of their fellow citizens. But since Vietnam, there has been a widespread mistrust of American foreign policy. During the war, we were told that we were helping the Vietnamese -- saving them and the world from communism. This turned out to be a huge lie, with terrible consequences. Millions discovered that the United States was really fighting a dirty colonial war that the French had abandoned. Recent revelations have only reinforced this mistrust, as well as the worst picture imaginable of that war: the atrocities committed by former Senator Bob Kerrey, for example, or historian Michael Beschloss's analysis of President Lyndon Johnson's tapes, showing that he knew as early as 1965 that the war in Vietnam could not be won -- yet continued to send tens of thousands of Americans to die there. In the post-Vietnam era, Washington has mainly contracted out the dirty work -- mass murder in Guatemala and El Salvador, or trying to overthrow the government of Nicaragua in the 1980s. But whether the US military was directly involved -- as it was in the invasions of Grenada and Panama, the Persian Gulf War and Kosovo -- or not, it is a sordid record. In general, US officials lied about the purpose of their interventions, and none of them had much to do with US national security. For these reasons, public support for the "War on Terrorism" is miles wide but only an inch deep. Our political leaders want to use this crusade the way they used the "War Against Communism," and more recently, the "War on Drugs" in Colombia: as an excuse for the violence and brutality that are necessary to police a worldwide empire. It remains to be seen how much of this they can get away with, or whether they will expand the current war to countries such as Iraq, Somalia, Iran or elsewhere. But they know one thing very well: they cannot allow the US casualty count to rise very high before people begin to question their motives.

Vietnam Focus Bad

Obsession with Vietnam will center American policy debates on military power, causing a right-wing backlash and continually eschewing diplomatic solutions

Kane 9 (John, U of Sydney, Australian J of Intl Affs, 63.4, informa Professor in the Department of Politics and Public Policy at Griffith University) TBC 7/9/10

Kissinger was surely correct about this. The problem with American military power after Vietnam was not that it had been significantly diminished—it had not—but that it had been somehow emasculated, creating an enduring dissensus between rightist 'hawks' and leftist 'doves'. The former, arguing that the full extent of America's military might had not even been deployed in Vietnam, were deeply resentful of what they regarded as the domestic betrayal that had produced an unnecessary defeat and wished to wipe out the humiliation of Vietnam through convincing and wholehearted assertions of American power. This required, too, the restoration of presidential authority, sapped by popular and congressional distrust after Vietnam and Watergate. Such hawkish dreams were largely frustrated by the persistence among populace and politicians of the 'Vietnam syndrome', but their influence would be increasingly felt as more radical kinds of conservative gained ascendancy over the liberal wing of the Republican Party following the fall of Nixon.6 Meanwhile, the Democrats, after the candidacy of George McGovern in 1972, moved further Left to become the party of injured American innocence, as suspicious and fearful of military power as had been America's peace activists earlier in the twentieth century. The result was not merely dissensus on foreign policy but an obsession with either the possibilities or dangers of military power that, in the long run, elevated the military dimension of international relations above the diplomatic. Discussions of foreign policy post-Vietnam tended to revolve endlessly around the question of when and how the use of military force could be justified. (It is sobering to think that the famous Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, with its insistence on strictly national interests, overwhelming force, a swift victory and a clean exit might have precluded American participation in World War II.) It was not surprising, then, that when an ultra-conservative administration came to power in 2000, its foreign policy team should be made up of figures whose predilection was for military rather than diplomatic affairs. Most had spent their government careers either in the armed forces or as Department of Defense bureaucrats striving to build America's military strength (in Donald Rumsfeld's case, to reshape it for a new era). It was strange, but telling, that those with actual army or navy experience—the State Department's Colin Powell and Richard Armitage, respectively, who had both served in Vietnam—were the cautious ones with respect to military force, while the men they contemptuously referred to as the 'chicken hawks'—Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and his aide 'Scooter' Libby, all at Defense—were conservative ideologues ready and willing to wield it when the occasion arose, as it did after September 11, 2001. None had the background of a Dean Acheson or an Averill Harriman, or the propensities of even a George Marshall who, though an indomitable old soldier, left his most considerable mark in the field of diplomacy (Mann 2004: 273-4).

Their Vietnam link emboldens opposition to Iraq and Afghanistan, making conflict worse and killing millions

Kirkpatrick 9 (Jeanne, CFR, 10-14, The incurable Vietnam syndrome

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/10/14/opinion/main5383848.shtml.) TBC 7/9/10

Barack Obama, however, hasn't been saying anything about light at the end of the tunnel. The president, who (mercifully) came of age after the Vietnam war, seemingly put the kibosh on these mindless comparisons on September 15 when he said, in response to a question, "You never step into the same river twice. And so Afghanistan is not Vietnam." Yet the evocation of Vietnam keeps cropping up among the president's aides and supporters, who warn, as E.J. Dionne did in an October 5 Washington Post column, that involvement in Afghanistan could harm the president's domestic agenda as badly as the Vietnam war harmed LBJ's Great Society. It has been widely reported that the "must read" book in the White House now is Lessons in Disaster: McGeorge Bundy and the Path to War in Vietnam by Gordon Goldstein, a study of the Kennedy-Johnson national security adviser and his role in the war. And a Times of London correspondent wrote on September 24 that "one senior official" in the White House, while speaking to him, "introduced the word 'Vietnam' into a discussion of Afghanistan." Far be it from me--a military historian--to dispute the usefulness of history in policymaking. Properly applied, the study of past wars can be essential in guiding the course of current and future conflicts. But the key is to take lessons selectively and intelligently and not become enthralled by lazy reasoning along the lines of "Vietnam was an American war; X is an American war; therefore, X will be another Vietnam." The Vietnam conflict featured a variety of factors that are absent in Afghanistan and Iraq. North Vietnam was a disciplined, one-party state with one of the world's largest and most battle-hardened armies. It had the legitimacy that came from a struggle against French colonialism and the support of two superpowers, China and Russia. Almost all of its resources from 1954 to 1975 were devoted to one goal--the annexation of South Vietnam.<CONTINUED>

Vietnam Focus Bad

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Given such a formidable foe, which was able to confront us not only with black-clad guerrillas but also with regulars riding tanks, the U.S. defeat becomes more explicable and less replicable. The Iraqi guerrillas, Sunni and Shiite, were formidable in their own right, but they were no Viet Cong. Neither are the Taliban. They are more likely to engage in sustained firefights than were Al Qaeda in Iraq or the Mahdi Army, but they are incapable of maneuvering in battalion-, brigade-, or division-sized formations as the Vietnamese Communists routinely did. Even company-sized attacks are rare in Afghanistan. The Taliban, like their Iraqi counterparts, prefer to strike with IEDs, which take little courage to plant. Although the Taliban, like the Viet Cong, enjoy cross-border havens, they do not receive anywhere close to the same degree of support from Pakistan that the Viet Cong got from North Vietnam. They don't even receive as much outside support as the mujahedeen did during their 1980s war against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan. Nor are they monolithic, as the Viet Cong were. The very term "Taliban" is a misnomer. It is used to describe loosely affiliated bands of insurgents who have no unified command structure of the kind that Hanoi imposed on its forces. Thus there is little danger of coordinated, countrywide attacks like the 1968 Tet Offensive. None of the Afghan insurgent groups enjoys anywhere close to the prestige and legitimacy, either at home or abroad, that the Viet Cong were able to garner in their fight against first France and then the United States. Mullah Omar is no Ho Chi Minh. Neither is Jalaluddin Haqqani. Are there nevertheless lessons from Vietnam that will help us fight the Taliban and other present-day foes? Undoubtedly. But the right lesson to draw is not that "we can't win." In fact, in Vietnam between 1968 and 1972 we did more or less win (a point elaborated by historian Lewis Sorley in his 1999 book A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam), but we failed to stick it out. If the United States had continued supporting Saigon with substantial aid after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1973 to counter the aid Moscow and Beijing were providing to Hanoi, the likelihood is that South Vietnam would still exist--just as South Korea still exists. The Vietnam experience demonstrates the importance of using sound counterinsurgency tactics based on protecting the population rather than the conventional "search and destroy" methods employed in the early years of that war, which resulted in massive casualties for both sides (as well as for civilians) and ultimately squandered America's commitment to continue the fight. Somewhat in the mold of General Creighton Abrams, who took command in Vietnam in 1968, General Stanley McChrystal has inherited a conventional war effort that he is determined to convert into a population-centric counterinsurgency effort. The difference is that the Afghan National Army and the International Security Assistance Force are far smaller and less capable than their Vietnam war counterparts, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and Military Assistance Command-Vietnam. Therefore implementing a counterinsurgency strategy will require more troops. If the White House agrees, it will be imperative to send a substantial number of reinforcements quickly rather than repeating one of the mistakes of the Vietnam days when Lyndon Johnson escalated gradually. That allowed the enemy to adjust to American tactics and made it impossible to wrest the initiative on the battlefield. The Vietnam experience also shows the importance of not holding Third World allies to an impossible standard. The Kennedy administration helped overthrow Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, and South Vietnam never had another ruler who was as strong or legitimate. That is a lesson worth keeping in mind as so many critics insist that progress in Afghanistan requires replacing Hamid Karzai, who is supposedly too discredited to help us win. New York Times columnist Frank Rich writes, for instance, that "Karzai, whose brother is a reputed narcotics trafficker, is a double for Ngo Dinh Diem." Let us hope he does not suffer Diem's fate. If the United States were to be seen as complicit in Karzai's removal, that would make it as difficult for his successors to gain legitimacy as it was for Diem's successors. Another crucial point to take away from Vietnam is the importance of willpower in warfare. North Vietnam was much smaller than the United States, but its desire to prevail was much greater. If it is parallels to Vietnam that you seek, look at the wavering in the White House today. In some respects it is reminiscent of the Johnson and Nixon administrations, which showed themselves more interested in ending than in winning the war. If President Obama ultimately decides not to make a serious and prolonged commitment to Afghanistan, he will be making the same mistake so many Democrats did in the early 1970s when they claimed that we could get out of Vietnam with no damage to our country or the region. We now know that America's defeat was a tragedy for the people of Southeast Asia, with millions of Cambodians slain in the "killing fields" and hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese "boat people" taking to the seas on leaky rafts. It also did incalculable damage to America's standing in the world, encouraging our enemies from Tehran to Managua to step up attacks on our allies. It took us a full decade to recover, and even now we are still dealing with some of the fallout from that period, such as the Iranian revolution. The consequences of defeat in Afghanistan would undoubtedly be just as severe, if very different.

Turn – Empathy

The alternative makes empathy for other people impossible, depriving them of reflective consideration.

Norris 94 (Christopher, Professor of the History of Ideas, University of Wales, TRUTH AND THE ETHICS OF CRITICISM, , p.87-8)

This is what distinguishes Montaigne's scepticism from the wholesale varieties currently in vogue among postmodernists, New Historicists, and others. It works on a principle directly counter to the 'radical alterity' thesis: that is to say, on the assumption that however deep such cultural differences may run, they are still (in William Empson's fine phrase) 'a small thing by comparison with our common humanity'. The trouble with the current anti-humanist doxa is that it swings so far against those bad old forms of quasi-universalist subject-centred thought that it leaves no room for treating other subjects - including the victims of colonial oppression - as in any way capable of reasoned enquiry or reflective moral awareness. At this point scepticism passes over into cynicism, or the critique of prejudice into another (just as damaging) kind of prejudice that regards all truth-claims and ethical values as relative to this or that 'discourse', or again, as mere products of the will-to-power in its protean manifestations.

Empathy is crucial to an ethical mode of being in the world – turns the K

Rulka-Hathaway 1 (Kathleen M. August AN ARGUMENT FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF MORAL DISCUSSION INTO THE FORUM OF MARRIAGE AND FAMILY THERAPY http://minds.wisconsin.edu/bitstream/handle/1793/39229/2001rulkahathk.pdf.txt;jsessionid=dcoz8y096e8y?sequence=2 ) TBC 7/9/10

When caring is fostered, empathy is born and there is a positive influence on the inherent strength of the family. Empathy is the ability to be aware and attuned to another. This empathy, as Berkowitz and Grych (1998) observe, is one of the fundamental elements of morality, along with conscience, moral reasoning, and altruism. Empathic behavior brings one outside the self, able to live in relationship with others and in community. Daniel Goleman (1995) writes that empathy builds on self-awareness, a quality that enables one to be aware of self in relation to the other. It becomes a way of being present in the world and is one of the foundational bedrocks of humans' capacity 22 for moral reasoning. Goleman (1995) posits that the emotional attunement of empathy promotes caring for the other. He writes that the roots of morality are found in empathy, that humanity’s ability to empathize allows people to connect with one another, to share the pain, and to reach out and help. He explores the root of empathy, the Greek empatheia and elucidates this term meaning ?feeling into? (98). Goleman posits this attunement as reciprocal, part of the ?rhythm of relationship? (100). Carol Bly (1996) takes the notion of empathy further in her book Changing the Bully Who Rules the World: Reading & Thinking About Ethics. She postulates that empathy can be a tool by which people in power are stopped from wanting to exploit as much as they would otherwise. She stresses the importance of teaching empathy in steps that one might practice, but asserts that people cannot grow and change, until they have felt ?heard out,? (83) by a caring and benignant mentor who supports the process. She posits this as being essential because, The purpose of any kind of empathy is to give someone a chance to have his or her story heard, because many people have never had this experience. She explicates further, ?Since they have never had the experience of being heard out themselves, they haven?t developed a taste for hearing out anyone else,? (84). Berkowitz and Grych (1998), seem to believe that parents can be taught how to foster the development of empathy and a moral nature. Furthermore, they write, early and middle childhood is "when these characteristics develop " (371). They agree with Aristotle in that moral agents need self-control, which enables one to put emotional reactiveness aside so as to be interested in and concerned for others. This social interaction is critical to psychological health. How is an empathic and moral consideration of others fostered in the development of individuals? One has to consider an intellectual development within an ethical realm encompassing consideration for others. Weinstein (1995) convincingly 23 argues that ethical consideration requires a rational approach to values and emotional concerns and is critically important to the strength and vitality of all human relationships. A strong ethical and moral foundation then serves as an internal control on the behavior of persons, and encourages a building of trust between all people. Within this realm of morality, the nature of social exchange and cooperation is defined, that which makes social existence and justice possible.

Turn – Genocide

Heidegger justifies genocide

Ross 10 (Kelley L., Ph.D., retired from the Dept of Phil at LA Valley College http://www.friesian.com/rockmore.htm) TBC 7/9/10

A recent book, Heidegger, The Introduction of Nazism Into Philosophy in Light of the Unpublished Seminars of 1933-1935, by Emmanuel Faye [translated by Michael B. Smith, foreword by Tom Rockmore, Yale University Press, 2009], features ever more disturbing revelations about Heidegger. This stuff is pretty damning. I was willing to believe that Heidegger, with his own "metaphysical" form of Nazism, did not subscribe to Nazi theoretical racism. Indeed, we find Richard Wolin (who forcefully argues the connection between Heidegger's philosophy and his politics) saying in 2001: [Heidegger] never subscribed to the racial anti-Semitism espoused by the National Socialists. To him this perspective was philosophically untenable, insofar as it sought to explain "existential" questions in reductive biological terms. For Heidegger, biology was a base exemplar of nineteenth-century materialism -- a standpoint that needed to be overcome in the name of "Existenz" or "Being." [Heidegger's Children, Princeton University Press, p.6] However, Faye convincingly demonstrates that Heidegger did subscribe to "the racial anti-Semitism espoused by the National Socialists," wishing to avoid Darwinian "biological" racism, not just because of Ninteenth century "materialism," but because it was too Anglo-Saxon and "Liberal." His own "metaphysical" racism, a "spiritual" racism, was not unique to him and was in fact legitimized by some statements from Hitler himself. This provided a Heideggerian theoretical basis for Anti-Semitism. In an epigraph to this page, we see Heidegger speaking of the need for identifying an Enemy, even creating one, with the goal of "total extermination." If we are looking for a Heideggerian justification for genocide, this looks like it. Also, the apologistic narrative for Heidegger is that he dropped out of Nazi politics after resigning the Rectorship (Wolin also seems to accept this). But it was not true. Faye shows that Heidegger first of all was appointed to a legal commission (he had taught a seminar in Nazi law) which may actually have been responsible for many of the Nuremburg Laws of 1935. Then he was appointed to the editorial committee that was overseeing the Nazi era edition of Nietzsche's complete works, which is one reason why Heidegger was giving Nietzsche seminars later in the 1930s. Both of these were significant appointments for Nazi academics, and Heidegger got them for being politically reliable, not because he was suddenly disillusioned with politics, or Nazi politics.

Heidegger is complicit in genocide

Hodge 95 (Joanna, Prof of Phil at Manchester Metro U, Heidegger and ethics, Google Books pg. 82) TBC 7/9/10

There is in this speech a shocking and resonating silence about Nazism and the genocidal destruction of Jewish communities and homes. Heidegger seems outrageously content to elaborate his own responses to homelessness and fails to think that the history of the persecution of Jews in Europe may be intertwined with a failure in the history of Europe and its philosophy to think through to this homelessness, now understood not as a social or economic condition but as an ontological feature of what it is to be human. Heidegger identifies a failure within the European tradition to address this homelessness in the loss of a relation to being. He does not consider that this failure may lead to a hostile projection not just into the world but onto peoples with specific markings in relation to conceptions of exile and homelessness: gypsies and Jews. There are two possibilities: either this failure to address the German transformation of European anti-Semitism into organized murder blocks Heidegger's capacity to think in terms of a revival of ethics, or his insensitivity to ethical issues grounds both this silence and that failure to make the transition from questioning metaphysics to questioning ethics. This resonating silence concerning the Holocaust is also evident in the "Letter on humanism\*. Heidegger starts by setting a threefold process in play: restoring thoughtfulness to thought; restoring meaning to language; and thereby cumulatively retrieving a sense of the location in which human beings find themselves, establishing a relation for human beings to themselves in a context greater than their own activity. This process of thinking leads Heidegger to reassess his own work in highly positive terms, but it does not lead him to reassess his involvement with Nazism. The theme of a transformation of philosophy into another kind of thinking is stated at the end of the 'Letter on humanism':

Turn – Genocide

Heidegger’s philosophy causes genocide

Rockmore 91 (Tom On Heidegger’s Nazism and Philosophy Dusquesne University Prof of Phil http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft6q2nb3wh;brand=ucpress) TBC 7/9/10

Heidegger's failure to denounce, or even to acknowledge, Nazi practice can be interpreted as an oblique resistance to the practical consequences of his theoretical commitment. He was obviously unwilling to acknowledge the failure of his turn to Nazism, not for mere psychological reasons, but on good philosophical grounds; for his turn to Nazism was grounded in his own theory of Being, which he never abandoned. For the same reason, he was also unwilling to abandon National Socialism, or at least an ideal form of it, because of his continued interest in certain points where his thought converged with Nazism, including the coming to be of the Germans as German and the confrontation with technology. Heidegger's insensitivity to the effects of Nazism in practice is coupled, then, with a residual theoretical enthusiasm for a form of Nazism in theory. In Heidegger's writings on technology, at least two passages indicate a striking insensitivity to human suffering. Heidegger, who understood technology as a form of disclosure, was careful to conceal and not to reveal some of his most deeply held views about the technological process. There is a passage in the original version of Heidegger's essay, "The Question concerning Technology," which originated as a lecture in 1949 under the title "Enframing" but which was altered in the version published in 1954.[126] In the version published during Heidegger's lifetime, the text, which was clearly changed to conceal an earlier formulation, retains only seven words in the translation, five in the revised text: "Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry."[127] This banal point hardly reveals the startling claim embedded in the original manuscript, which only became available some seven years after Heidegger's death. The original passage reads as follows: "Agriculture is now a mechanised food industry, in essence the same as the manufacturing of corpses in gas chambers and extermination camps, the same as the blockade and starvation of nations, the same as the production of hydrogen bombs."[128] From a strictly Heideggerian point of view, this passage is literally correct, since he maintains that all of modernity suffers from the turn away from Being which leads to the hegemony of technology. Yet this passage is disturbing, in part because of Heidegger's manifest insensitivity, in a period when he emphasizes the Ereignis , to the most catastrophic moral Ereignis of our time: the Holocaust. Heidegger, who is sensitive to Being, is startlingly insensitive to human being. There is further a manifest conceptual mistake in simply considering all forms of technology as indistinguishably alike. For Heidegger has failed to consider, and certainly failed to comprehend, the relation of technology to the event of the Holocaust: the unparalleled way in which all available technological resources were harnessed, and new ones were invented, specifically to commit genocide . No amount of liberal handwringing at this late date should be allowed to obscure Heidegger's incapacity, not only to respond to, but even to comprehend, the Holocaust through his theory of technology.[129] His theory, hence, fails the test of experience.

Turn – Nazism

Spanos doesn’t avoid Heidegger’s Nazism

Perkin 93 (Theorizing the Culture Wars Dr. J. Russell Postmodern Culture http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/postmodern\_culture/v003/3.3r\_perkin.html) TBC 7/7/10

Spanos's extensive reliance on Heidegger raises a political question that he doesn't adequately face. The humanists are lambasted for every ethnocentricity that they committed; Babbitt, perhaps not without justification, is described as having embodied "a totalitarian ideology" (84). But the book is defensive and evasive on the topic of Heidegger's political commitments. Spanos seems to think he can testily dismiss those who bring up this matter as enemies of posthumanism, and his treatment of the topic consists mainly in referring readers to an article he has published elsewhere. But the problem remains: Heidegger's ontological critique, when translated into the political sphere, led him to espouse Nazi ideology. If Heidegger is to be praised as the thinker who effected the definitive radical break with humanism, surely the question of his politics should be faced directly in this book.

Perm – Alt is totalizing

The alternatives totalizing rejection of techne is naive and dangerous. Reflective action avoids mastery but holds out the possibility of freedom.

Lovitt 77 (William, Professor of German, Cal State-Sacramento, introduction to Martin Heidegger's THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS, 1977, p.xxxiii.)

Man needs above all in our age to know himself as the one who is so claimed. The challenging summons of Enframing "sends into a way of revealing" (QT 24). So long as man does not know this, he cannot know himself; nor can he know himself in relation to his world. As a consequence he becomes trapped in one of two attitudes, both equally vain: either he fancies that he can in fact master technology and can by technological means -- by analyzing and calculating and ordering -- control all aspects of his life; or he recoils at the inexorable and dehumanizing control that technology is gaining over him, rejects it as the work of the devil, and strives to discover for himself some other way of life apart from it. What man truly needs is to know the destining to which he belongs and to know it as a destining, as the disposing power that governs all phenomena in this technological age.

The absolutist negativism of the K prevents change

Pasquale 5 (Frank L., Ph.D., a cultural anthropologist Secular Humanist Bulletin, Feb. 10 Volume 20, Number 3. Absolute Thinking in an Inabsolute World http://secularhumanism.org/index.php?section=library&page=pasquale\_20\_3&back=http://secularhumanism.org/lib/list.php%3Fpublication%3Dshb) TBC 7/7/10

For my own part, I have grown weary of extremist thinking, whether purely right/wrong, black/white, good/evil, either/or, us/them, absolute, or absolutely relative. Western history and philosophy sometimes seem to me a succession of presumptuous pretensions to certainty. Such thinking has led to great achievements, but also untold destruction. It provided an impetus for great adventure and oppressive imperialism. It envisioned shining cities on a hill, and a purified “race” of superior humans (minus those deemed “unfit”). To view ourselves as absolutely, unchangeably prejudiced, judgmental, selfish, oppressive, or evil is as dangerous and as empirically indefensible as to think ourselves perfect or capable of perfection. By doing so, we lapse back into an age-old habit of framing the world in dueling absolutes. (Remember Manichaeanism? How about Bushism?) But we are not absolutely good, nor absolutely evil; we are capable of both and generally interested in improving. We make small advances here and lapse back there. Our ethics and values are neither fixed and eternal nor absolutely relative but an approximate reflection of our nature (such as we dimly perceive it at this point in species evolution), our needs, and our shared aspiration to live lives worth living. While it is essential that we remain skeptically aware of our many failings and foibles, we should not deny our incremental advancements, our ethical aspirations, or our potential for goodness and nobility, imperfect as these may be. At the very least, to deny such advancements is to negate the contributions of those whose lives were devoted to promoting a precious self-fulfilling prophecy of human decency and justice, regardless of power, class, culture, skin color, or metaphysical stance. At the worst, it is to frame a dismal world and a self-fulfilling prophecy where power alone is the greatest “good,” where we are forever consigned to an original sin of destructive judgmentalism without hope of improvement, and where all “religious” people and phenomena constitute a uniform evil that must be obliterated without a trace. I had thought that humanism represented a repudiation of such thinking, but perhaps I was mistaken.

Perm Solves – Criticizing humanism should make available possibilities other than totalizing negation.

Lewandowski 94 (Joseph, Department of Comparative Literature at SUNY Binghamton, PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM, Vol. 20., No. 3, 1994, p. 112)

Thus Spanos's intervention into the question of 'theory' is bound up with his (and Heidegger's) much larger critical opposition to humanism. Though a thorough explication of such a critique of humanism is beyond the scope of this review, I think it salient to note that opposition to humanism—to the privileging of a sovereign subject over and against a distinct world of manipulable objects—for Spanos (or Heidegger) does not generally suggest negation (anti-humanism). The de-structuring of humanism is not a call for nihilism. Quite the contrary. To paraphrase Heidegger in the "Letter on Humanism' (a text which resides just beneath the surface of all of Spanos's thinking in Heidegger and Criticism) an opposition to humanism in no way implies a defense of the inhuman but rather opens other vistas.

Perm – Alt is totalizing

Spanos makes totalizing assumptions which he repeats – Perm is key

Perkin 93 (Theorizing the Culture Wars Dr. J. Russell Postmodern Culture http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/postmodern\_culture/v003/3.3r\_perkin.html) TBC 7/7/10

Another problem is that the book makes huge historical assertions that have the effect of lessening difference, even while it attacks the metaphysical principle "that identity is the condition for the possibility of difference and not the other way around" (4; emphasis in original). This is something Spanos has in common with some followers of Derrida who turn deconstruction into a dogma, rather than realizing that it is a strategy of reading that must take account of the particular logic of the texts being read. Spanos asserts that the classical Greeks were characterized by "originative, differential, and errant thinking" (105), which every subsequent age, beginning with the Alexandrian Greek, through the Romans, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and the Victorians, and right up to the present, misunderstood in a reifying and imperialistic appropriation. This not only implies a somewhat simplistic reception-history of ancient Greek culture; it also, significantly, perpetuates a myth--the favourite American myth that Spanos in other contexts attacks in the book--of an original period of innocence, a fall, and the possibility of redemption.

Perm Solves – Spanos’s dogmatism destroys the alt

Perkin 93 (Theorizing the Culture Wars Dr. J. Russell Postmodern Culture http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/postmodern\_culture/v003/3.3r\_perkin.html) TBC 7/7/10

My final criticism is that Spanos, by his attempt to put all humanists into the same category and to break totally with the tradition of humanism, isolates himself in a posture of ultraleftist purity that cuts him off from many potential political allies, especially when, as I will note in conclusion, his practical recommendations for the practical role of an adversarial intellectual seem similar to those of the liberal pluralists he attacks. He seems ill-informed about what goes on in the everyday work of the academy, for instance, in the field of composition studies. Spanos laments the "unwarranted neglect" (202) of the work of Paulo Freire, yet in reading composition and pedagogy journals over the last few years, I have noticed few thinkers who have been so consistently cited. Spanos refers several times to the fact that the discourse of the documents comprising The Pentagon Papers was linked to the kind of discourse that first-year composition courses produce (this was Richard Ohmann's argument); here again, however, Spanos is not up to date. For the last decade the field of composition studies has been the most vigorous site of the kind of oppositional practices The End of Education recommends. The academy, in short, is more diverse, more complex, more genuinely full of difference than Spanos allows, and it is precisely that difference that neoconservatives want to erase. By seeking to separate out only the pure (posthumanist) believers, Spanos seems to me to ensure his self-marginalization. For example, several times he includes pluralists like Wayne Booth and even Gerald Graff in lists of "humanists" that include William Bennett, Roger Kimball and Dinesh D'Souza. Of course, there is a polemical purpose to this, but it is one that is counterproductive. In fact, I would even question the validity of calling shoddy and often inaccurate journalists like Kimball and D'Souza with the title "humanist intellectuals." Henry Louis Gates's final chapter contains some cogent criticism of the kind of position which Spanos has taken. Gates argues that the "hard" left's opposition to liberalism is as mistaken as its opposition to conservatism, and refers to Cornel West's remarks about the field of critical legal studies, "If you don't build on liberalism, you build on air" (187). Building on air seems to me precisely what Spanos is recommending. Gates, on the other hand, criticizes "those massively totalizing theories that marginalize practical political action as a jejune indulgence" (192), and endorses a coalition of liberalism and the left. The irony is that in the last chapter, when he seeks to provide some suggestions for oppositional practice, Spanos can only recommend strategies which are already common in the academy, especially in women's studies and composition. He praises the pedagogical theory of Paulo Freire, which as I have noted is hardly an original move; he recommends opposition to the structures of the disciplines, and oppositional practices within the curriculum. But again, many liberal as well as left academics are already teaching "against the grain," enlarging the canon and experimenting with new methods of teaching. I have been teaching full-time for five years now, and the texts my younger colleagues and I teach, and the way we teach them, constitute something radically different from the course of studies during my own undergraduate and even graduate career. Women's studies, which is not mentioned much in The End of Education, has provided a great deal of exciting interdisciplinary work. Gates's book shows in detail how African-American studies has constituted not only an oppositional discourse, but one that has started to reconfigure the dominant discourse of American studies.

Perm Solvency

Perm Solves – Meditative thinking can correct calculation but both are sometimes necessary.

Kockelmans 85 (Joseph, Penn State philosopher, HEIDEGGER AND SCIENCE, 1985, p.254.)

This ambivalent attitude in regard to modern science and technology, which says at the same time yes and no, corresponds to the two modes of thinking we have referred to earlier. Calculative thinking will help us to use our resources effectively; meditative thinking will help us in making certain that technicity will not overpower us. Meditative thinking will thus make it possible for us to come to come to a freedom in regard to things that lets things be (Gelassenheit), by maintaining an openness to the mystery that is hidden in modern technicity.

The perm solves. It recognizes the totalizing capacity of language but holds out the possiblity of using it to criticize and change the world.

Lewandowski 94 (Joseph, Department of Comparative Literature at SUNY Binghamton, PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM, Vol. 20., No. 3, 1994, p. 119)

Spanos rightly rejects the 'textuality' route in Heidegger and Criticism precisely because of its totalizing and hypostatizing tendencies. Nevertheless, he holds on to a destructive hermeneutics as disclosure. But as I have already intimated, disclosure alone cannot support a critical theory oriented toward emancipation. I think a critical theory needs a less totalizing account of language, one that articulates both the emphatic linguistic capacity to spontaneously disclose worlds—its innovative 'worlding' possibilities—and its less emphatic, but no less important, capacity to communicate, solve problems, and criticize the world. The essential task of the social critic—and any literary theory that wants to be critical—is to couple world disclosure with problem-solving, to mediate between the extra-ordinary world of 'textuality' and the everyday world of 'texts'. In this alternative route, literary theory may become the kind of emancipatory oriented critical theory it can and should be.

The permutation is capable of embracing disclosure in such a way as to fundamentally alter our relationship with being, simultaneously pursuing emancipatory politics.

Lewandowski 94 (Joseph, Department of Comparative Literature at SUNY Binghamton, PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM, Vol. 20., No. 3, 1994, p. 120)

In his 1981 acceptance speech upon receipt of the Adorno prize, Jurgen Habermas formulates the positive and emancipatory possibilites of the coupling of world disclosure and problem-solving that I have only briefly suggested here. Habermas raises the question of the relationship between aesthetic (disclosive) experiences and life problems. When a disclosive experience is used "…to illuminate a life historical situation and is related to life problems, it enters into a language game which is no longer that of the aesthetic critic. The aesthetic experience then not only renews the interpretation of our needs in whose light we perceive the world. It permeates as well our cognitive significations and our normative expectations and changes the manner in which all these moments refer to one another." When the literary theorist (or 'aesthetic critic') can discern in texts world-disclosive possibilities and critically use them to illuminate, begin to criticize and solve life-historical problems—problems of cross-cultural representation for example—then he or she has entered into a very different language game, one that is not merely a hypostatized 'sterile game' of deconstructing or de-structuring 'texts'. Here, then, in such a 'high'-stakes language game, the constellation of disclosive experiences, cognitive significations and normative expectations is reconfigured. Such a transformative reconfiguration opens up not simply the abyss, the indeterminacy, or the destructive will to power that seems to infect every aspect of modernity, but rather the possibility of linking the insights gained in aesthetic experience to everyday practice in genuinely emancipatory ways.

Perm Solvency

Perm Solves – the alternative cant be an excuse for objectivity

Lewandowski 94 (Joseph, Department of Comparative Literature at SUNY Binghamton, PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM, Vol. 20., No. 3, 1994, p. 117-8)

But radicalized or not, Spanos's trading of any possibility of 'determinate truth' for Heideggerian disclosure as eventing of truth/untruth robs his critical theory of the necessary yardstick needed to measure 'emancipation.' Heidegger's disclosure is a cyrptonormative truth: it is an event before which any critical judgement necessarily fails. Disclosure is not a process of inquiry, but rather a revealing/concealing that befalls or overtakes us. In his eagerness to draw out the enabling features and 'post'-humanist dimension of Heidegger's disclosure, Spanos fails to see the inevitable and internal limits to truth as disclosure. Gadamer encounters similar problems, despite his keen insights, when he holds on to a Heideggerian disclosure that too often undermines the power of critical reflection. And the postmodern Italian philosopher Giannia Vattimo encounters a related problem when he attempts to take leave of modernity and proclaim a liberating postmodernity via Heidegger's disclosure. But while a purely aesthetic theory interested in 'textuality' can quite justifiably be grounded in truth as disclosure (as American deconstructionism of Vattimo's il pensiero debole is) a truly critical theory interested in emancipation simply cannot: some types of 'emancipation' are false and need to be rejected. Texts may very well 'disclose' worlds in the same way that, say, the Greek temple does for Heidegger. But a genuinely critical theory needs to be able to say what worlds are better or worse for actual agents in actual worlds—a need, I might add, that Spanos is constantly aware of and typifies in his denunciation of American imperialism in Vietnam (and elsewhere) in Heidegger and Criticism.

Perm Solves – Action must be grounded in a new version of humanism which absorbs post-structuralism

Orr 99 (Caley Michael University of Colorado, Boulder http://www.janushead.org/JHspg99/orr.cfm) TBC 7/7/10

Perhaps the gravest consequence of the structuralist paradigm is the deconstruction of volition. With no apparent absolute ground upon which to stand and make decisions, how can humans decide on any course of action, especially regarding moral and ethical issues? Derrida provides a keen observation into the ethical structure of Western metaphysics, but his deconstruction of any sort of system makes it impossible to choose a program of action based on logical grounds. The heaviest blow to any comprehensive perspective of the world comes with the deconstruction of the Self. How can we have certain objective knowledge of the world if we do not have a concrete self from which to begin our investigations? The re-establishment of some of the Humanist ideals, modified by what insights the Post-Structuralist tradition has offered, should remedy this epistemological and ethical crisis, if it can be properly formulated. The reconstruction of the concept of a concrete self, the redefinition of the meaning of meaning and an explication of the role of faith in the realization of the ideal of objective meaning are fundamental goals in what we call the Renaissance of Meaning and the formulation of a New Humanism. Upon close pragmatic inspection, the concept of a concrete self is seen to have survived the relativistic onslaught of structuralist and deconstructionalist criticism. What has risen from the ashes of these schools of thought are two basic propositions: 1. The concept of Self is an illusion of the structure of consciousness. 2. The Self is an actual concrete entity existing within a conscious being. (Essentially the binary opposite of proposition 1) Because of the pragmatic consequence of action, these two propositions can be collapsed into one, and, for all practical purposes, the existential claim about the Self (i.e. proposition 2) can be held to be true. Whether or not the Self is an illusion or not is immaterial; what matters is that the conscious being acts as if a concrete self exists by performing all of the actions that necessarily require the positing of a self (i.e. all of the acts of volition-- willing, desiring, speaking etc). Another example of this method is implicit in such systems as Euclidean geometry. The geometer posits certain abstract entities, such as points and lines, from which one derives theorems that correspond with our empirical experience of the world. It matters little whether those entities “truly” exist. For all practical purposes, they do, because of the pragmatic consequence of action. Other parallels include theoretical entities in physics such as atoms and subatomic particles, as well as more profound objects such as black holes. These entities have meaning according to the consequences which follow from their postulation.

Perm Solvency – Epistemology

Perm Solves – We can combine epistemologies

Olssen 4 (Mark Professor of Political Theory and Education University of Surrey Culture and learning: access and opportunity in the classroom Google Books pg. 244-5) TBC 7/7/10

A number of commentators have noted that in their critique of knowledge, post-modernists invariably characterize it as “positivist.” The typical version of positivism that is attacked is one that locates truth outside society and presents it as accessible through a “neutral” language that is a direct representation of the external world. The post-modernist view of the inseparability of knowledge and knowers is then used to challenge the claims of the natural sciences that they can provide access to truth that is outside society and history. The implications of this polarization between post-modernism and a positivist view of science is termed by Alexander “the epistemological dilemma,” which he summarizes as follows: Either knowledge … is unrelated to the social position and intellectual interests of the knower, in which case general theory and universal knowledge are viable, or knowledge is affected by its relation to the knower, in which case relativistic and particularistic knowledge can be the only result. This is a true dilemma because it presents a choice between two equally unpalatable alternatives, (However) The alternative to positivist theory is not resigned relativism and the alternative to relativism is not positivist theory. Theoretical knowledge can never be anything other than the socially rooted efforts of historical agents. But this social character does not negate the possibility of developing either generalized categories or increasingly disciplined, impersonal and critical modes of evaluation. (Alexander, 1995, p. 91) We endorse Alexander’s view that there is an alternative to this polarization and will explore it in some detail later. Next however, we turn to other problems of post-modernism as a critical social theory and in particular, its concept of knowledge. Post-modernism reduces knowledge to a simple monolithic form that is then held to be hegemonic. However, as Collins argues in his encyclopedic Sociology of Philosophies (Collins, 1998), it is only rarely and under exceptional conditions that the certainty of knowledge is hegemonic in any intellectual fields are typically structured by competing traditions and positions and that the dominance of one is only ever partial and transient. Indeed, for Collins, the reality of competing traditions is one of the conditions for the objectivity of knowledge. In contrast, post-modernism polarizes present and absent meanings leading to an inevitably schematic and partial view of knowledge. The manner in which post-modernists typically equate science with positivism, despite the fact, at least in its cruder forms, positivism has never been widely accepted as a theory of science, is an example of this. Philosophers such as Toulmin as well as sociologists have, since the 1970’s, shown that locating knowledge socially does not lead to the abandonment of truth and objectivity. It is in these developments that we can find a way out of Alexander’s “epistemological dilemma.”

Perm Solves – Science can be included in constructivist approaches

Cupchik 1 (Gerald Professor at the University of Toronto Scarborough FQS Vol 2, No 1 feb (2001): Qualitative and Quantitative Research: Conjunctions and Divergences http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/968/2112) TBC 7/8/10

A reconciliation of positivism and constructivism can only be accomplished by eliminating the arbitrary boundaries and assumptions that separate them. Getting rid of concerns about truth and apprehension is a good place to start. Constructivists take for granted the notion that truth is relative to individuals and communities. But what about "scientists"? While they may be in search of first principles of "nature," scientists also know that individual events are indeterminate and that theories are always being replaced over the course of time. Therefore the notion of "truth" may be a hold over of religious concerns about ultimate realities which are knowable only by deities. Social scientists need not have such pretensions and can be forgiven if they place truth to the side and get on with their business of understanding and relating to the natural and social worlds. [4]

Perm Solvency – Epistemology

Perm Solves – Positivism isn’t a contradictory epistemology

Cupchik 1 (Gerald Professor at the University of Toronto Scarborough FQS Vol 2, No 1 feb (2001): Qualitative and Quantitative Research: Conjunctions and Divergences http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/968/2112) TBC 7/8/10

Even the concept of validity need not isolate the positivist and constructionist scholarly communities. Both communities express a concern for ecological validity, the extent to which a finding meaningfully reflects an event or process in the world. Both also bear the burdens of their doctrinal commitments. In the case of positivism, precise operational definitions can so deplete a phenomenon of its richness and texture that it all but disappears in the rush to actuarial prediction. On the other hand, constructionists can so link a phenomenon with a particular interpretive context that it runs the risk of being isolated within collective solipsism. The two communities therefore have different albatrosses dangling from their epistemological necks. In the case of positivism, measurement can transform meaning into nothingness. For constructivists, the priestly use of impenetrable language can generate meaning, but only for the initiated. [6] Inquiry can be treated as a kind of action (NELSON, MEGILL, & McCLOSKEY 1987) engaged in by researchers in the process of generating knowledge. This systematic and systemic activity extends to all phases of the research project, from the noticing of a phenomenon, to framing the research problem, decisions about method, the collection and analysis of data, the interpretation of findings and their communication in oral and written forms, and reflections on the outcome of the project both by the researcher and various audiences. Reconciliation must begin with a shared notion of social phenomena in-the-world and therefore of what is "real." Just as people can share the "facts" of everyday "reality," even while differing in interpretations of their meaning, positivist and constructivist "realities" are not necessarily foundationally incompatible. [7]

Perm Solvency – Ontology

Perm solves – the ontology of positivism is complementary to the kritik

Cupchik 1 (Gerald Prof at U of Toronto Scarborough FQS Vol 2, No 1 feb (2001): Qualitative and Quantitative Research: Conjunctions and Divergences http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/968/2112) TBC 7/8/10

Constructivist Realism is therefore a position which acknowledges that social phenomena exist in communities quite independently of professional researchers. These real phenomena will be observed and named by members of the natural community, and understood by experienced or wiser people of good judgment. Scholars can approach this real world each in their own way. An empathic approach would be one in which an attempt is made to understand these phenomena holistically and from the perspective of the participants. It is here that a qualitative method can be used to exhaustively tap all perspectives. But, to the extent that the scholar comes from outside the community, there will be speculative leaps in the search for a coherent account of the phenomenon. A sympathetic approach involves an expression of interest in the community and a sincere desire to work productively with its real phenomena. The questions asked are more limited and external to the social system and the quantitative models that are brought to bear are but a pale shadow of the original phenomenon. Precision is gained but at the loss of subtlety. [30] Both types of scholars are selective of their facts and ultimately engage in acts of construction. Both begin with a concrete world and step into another world of abstraction. The same criterion of value can be applied to both kinds of constructions. If we hold the real social phenomenon in one hand with an extended arm and interpose our theoretical accounts with the other hand, as lenses focused on the phenomenon, is it brought more clearly into view? If our abstract concepts do not account for patterns in the lived-world then our theories lack in value, however they are derived. But if the in-depth examination of a phenomenon helps clarify patterns that lie within it and these patterns are formally described, then the qualitative and quantitative approaches will have done their duty; richness and precision will have complemented each other. [31] I have argued in this paper that the fundamental goal of social research should be to reveal the processes that underlie observed social phenomena. Social phenomena are multilayered events as is the inquiring mind of the social scientist. Qualitative method should not be seen as providing access to the "meaning" of individual events, texts, and so on. Rather, understood within the tradition of observation in natural history, qualitative method provides a basis for "thick" description. This rich source of data is most productive when it focuses on events or episodes in which the phenomenon in question is well represented. To the extent that the interviewer and the respondent share an ongoing reference point, it makes it easier to locate the respondent's concrete discourse in a meaningful abstract theoretical context of interest to the interviewer. This enhanced intersubjectivity provides a basis for reconciling the problematic of realism-relativism in a "grounded" fashion (RENNIE 1995; 1998; 2000). [32] Quantitative method can yield insights to the extent that evocative stimuli design are presented to relevant groups and the resulting statistical interactions help tease out the underlying processes. Statistically significant effects can draw our attention to socially meaningful events which are then re-examined in descriptive depth. This interplay between descriptive richness and experimental precision can bring accounts of social phenomena to progressively greater levels of clarity. Together, qualitative and quantitative methods provide complementary views of the phenomena and efforts at achieving their reconciliation can elucidate processes underlying them. Constructivist realism is an ontological position that accommodates the best of positivism and interpretivism.1) [33]

Alt Fails

Decontextualized criticism of policy action leads to marginalization

Lynn 98 (Laurence E., Jr. The University of Chicago A Place at the Table: Policy Analysis, Its Postpositive Critics, and the Future of Practice DRAFT January 25, http://harrisschool.uchicago.edu/about/publications/working-papers/pdf/wp\_99\_01.pdf) TBC 7/8/10

The postpositivist critique of policy analysis as hopelessly “stuck” in a narrowly positivist mode of practice strikes a false note, however. That critique tends to be based on a decontextualized caricature, virtually a parody, of policy analysis training and practice. Not surprisingly, policy analysis practitioners tend, as Durning notes, to ignore the “tools of tyranny” rant. Durning would like to sneak some new postpositivist methods by unsuspecting practitioners, but it will not work. Until postpositivists can be persuaded to tell the story of actual practice and its shortcomings truthfully, it will be too easy to dismiss them as either Maoists or “tools of anarchy,” and the good ideas embedded in their critique will be lost.

Spanos Fails – Heidegger cannot articulate a political connection

Lewandowski 94 (Joseph, Dept of Comparative Lit at SUNY Binghamton, PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM, Vol. 20., No. 3, 1994, p. 110-119) TBC 7/8/10

While the attempt to make literary theory critical in this innovative union of Heidegger and Foucault is laudable, Spanos’s ‘retrieving’ of Heidegger shares many of the problems that faced an earlier generation of critical theorists interested in Heidegger (here I am thinking of Marcuse), and many of the problems that face contemporary philo-sophical hermeneutics (here I am thinking mostly of Gadamer and Vattimo). Remember that Marcuse's dissatisfaction with Heidegger grew, in fact, not simply out of Heidegger's political engagements but more so out of his failure to link his fundamental ontology to any historically concretized praxis (a problem Spanos is aware of, as I suggested earlier, but never resolves via genealogy — a point I shall return to shortly). Heidegger never has much to say about agents and their capacity for historically realizable emancipation: for Heidegger, it is always a freedom that possesses man, a historical destiny that awaits or calls us, and not the other way around. Thomas McCarthy raises this problematic in his essay on 'Heidegger and Critical Theory': Heidegger, Marcuse wrote, 'remained content to talk of the nation's link with destiny, of the "heritage" that each individual has to take over, and of the community of the "generation", while other dimensions of facticity were treated under such categories as "they" and "idle talk" and relegated in this way to inauthentic existence. [He] did not go on to ask about the nature of this heritage, about the people's mode of being, about the real processes and forces that are history.' (p. 96) The point to be made here is that Heidegger's politics are not the only (or necessarily the largest) obstacle to coupling him with critical theory. Hence much of Spanos's energetic defense of Heidegger against his 'humanist detractors' (particularly in his defiant concluding chapter, 'Heidegger, Nazism, and the "Repressive Hypothesis": The American Appropriation of the Question') is misdirected. For as McCarthy rightly points out, 'the basic issues separating critical theory from Heideggerean ontology were not raised post hoc in reaction to Heidegger's political misdeeds but were there from the start. Marcuse formulated them in all clarity during his time in Freiburg, when he was still inspired by the idea of a materialist analytic of Dasein' (p. 96, emphasis added). In other words, Heidegger succumbs quite readily to an immanent critique. Heidegger's aporias are not simply the result of his politics but rather stem from the internal limits of his questioning of the 'being that lets beings be\*, truth as disclosure, and destruction of the metaphysical tradition, all of which divorce reflection from social practice and thus lack critical perspective.

Alt Fails

Spanos can’t articulate an emancipatory alternative

Lewandowski 94 (Joseph, Dept of Comparative Lit at SUNY Binghamton, PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM, Vol. 20., No. 3, 1994, p. 110-119) TBC 7/8/10

Spanos, however thinks Foucault can provide an alternative materialist grounding for an emancipatory crticial theory that would obviate the objections of someone such as Marcuse. But the turn to Foucault is no less problematic than the original turn to Heidegger. Genealogy is not critical in any real way. Nor can it tame or augment what Spanos calls Heidegger's 'overdetermination of the ontological site'. Foucault\*s analysis of power, despite its originality, is an ontology of power and not, as Spanos thinks, a 'concrete diagnosis' (p. 138) of power mechanisms.3 Thus it dramatizes, on a different level, the same shortcomings of Heidegger's fundamental ontology. The 'affiliative relationship' (p. 138) that Spanos tries to develop between Heidegger and Foucault in order to avoid the problem Marcuse faced simply cannot work. Where Heidegger ontologizes Being, Foucault ontolo-gizes power. The latter sees power as a strategic and intentional but subjectless mechanism that 'endows itself and punches out 'docile bodies', whereas the former sees Being as that neutered term and no-thing that calls us. Foucault (like Spanos) never works out how genealogy is emancipatory, or how emancipation could be realized collectively by actual agents in the world. The 'undefined work of freedom\* the later Foucault speaks of in 'What Is Enlightenment?' remained precisely that in his work.4 The genealogy of power is as much a hypostatization as is fundamental ontology: such hypostatizations tend to institute the impossibility of practical resistance or freedom. In short, I don't think the Heideggerian 'dialogue' with Foucault sufficiently tames or complements Heidegger, nor does it make his discourse (or Foucault's, for that matter) any more emancipatory or oppositional. Indeed, Foucault's reified theory of power seems to undermine the very notion of 'Opposition', since there is no subject (but rather a 'docile' body) to do the resisting (or, in his later work, a privatized self to be self-made within a regime of truth), nor an object to be resisted. As Said rightly points out in The World, the Text, and the Critic, 'Foucault more or less eliminates the central dialectic of opposed forces that still underlies modern society\* (p. 221, emphasis added). Foucault's theory of power is shot through with false empirical analyses, yet Spanos seems to accept them as valid diagnoses. Spanos fails to see, to paraphrase Said's criticisms of Foucault's theory of power, that power is neither a spider's web without the spider, nor a smoothly functioning diagram (p. 221).

Alt fails – general rejection of metaphysics ignores important context

Perkin 93 (Theorizing the Culture Wars Dr. J. Russell Postmodern Culture http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/postmodern\_culture/v003/3.3r\_perkin.html) TBC 7/7/10

There are further problems with the narrative built into The End of Education. Humanism is always and everywhere, for Spanos, panoptic, repressive, characterized by "the metaphysics of the centered circle," which is repeatedly attacked by reference to the same overcited passage from Derrida's "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences"--not coincidentally one of the places where Derrida allows himself to make large claims unqualified by their derivation from reading a particular text. In order to make this assertion, Spanos must show that all apparent difference is in fact contained by the same old metaphysical discourse. Thus, within the space of four pages, in the context of making absolute claims about Western education (or thought, or theory), Spanos uses the following constructions: "whatever its historically specific permutations," "despite the historically specific permutations," "Apparent historical dissimilarities," "Despite the historically specific ruptures." (12-15) Western thought, he repeats, has "always reaffirmed a nostalgic and recuperative circuitous educational journey back to the origin" (15). This over-insistence suggests to me that Spanos is a poor reader of Derrida, for he is not attentive to difference at particular moments or within particular texts. He seems to believe that one can leap bodily out of the metaphysical tradition simply by compiling enough citations from Heidegger, whereas his rather anticlimactic final chapter shows, as Derrida recognizes more explicitly, that one cannot escape logocentrism simply by wishing to.

Alt Fails

The alternative is circular – Revealing fails

Bartok 84 (Philip J. Dept of Phil U of Notre Dame FOUCAULT’S ANALYTIC OF FINITUDE AND THE “DEATH” OF PHENOMENOLOGY) TBC 7/8/10

For Foucault, it is ultimately phenomenology’s very foundation in the contents of actual experience that leads it into trouble. The phenomenological project was born out of Husserl’s rejection of psychologism, but on Foucault’s view phenomenology’s roots in psychology remain all too apparent. For him, “[t]he phenomenological project continually resolves itself, before our eyes, into a description - empirical despite itself - of actual experience, and into an ontology of the unthought that automatically short-circuits the primacy of the ‘I think.’”12 Phenomenology, holding in tension the empirical and the transcendental, the epistemological and the ontological, is ultimately a “discourse of mixed nature” which succeeds only in “fulfilling with greater care the 6 hasty demands laid down when the attempt was made to make the empirical, in man, stand for the transcendental.”13 The realm of experience studied by phenomenology is supposed to be both specific enough to serve as the subject of a precise descriptive language (i.e. of a descriptive psychology), and sufficiently removed from such specificity to be able to provide foundations for all experience. It is Foucault’s contention that the domain of experience simply cannot fulfill both of these roles simultaneously. Phenomenology either attempts to merely reduce the transcendental to the empirical or it remains caught in an “endless oscillation” between empirical and transcendental modes of discourse.14 For Foucault, this oscillation is indicative of the fundamental ambiguity of phenomenological discourse, an ambiguity configured for it by the analytic of finitude.

A2: Alt – Do Nothing

Sometimes it is preferrable to act. Doing nothing is still a choice, we shouldnt be blind to the consequences.

Padrutt 92 (Hanspeter, psychiatrist, Daseinanalytisches Institut, Zurich, HEIDEGGER AND THE EARTH, Ladelle McWhorter, ed., 1992, p.31.)

Once in a while the conceptual interplay of theory and praxis is put against this attempt. From the philosophical point of view the so-called practical or political dimension of the attempt is rejected, whereas from the ecological point of view the so-called theoretical, philosophical dimension is rejected. But deeper reflection and decisive action do not need to contradict each other. Those who shield themselves from the political consequences might one day be confronted with the fact that no decision is still a decision that can have consequences. And those who believe that they need not bother about thinking fail to recognize that no philosophy is also a philosophy e.g., a cybernetic worldview -- that also has consequences

Ontology Focus Bad – Genocide

Heidegger’s privileging of ontology is complicit in atrocities

Committee on Public Safety 96 (The writers subsume their individual names within the denomination of "Committee" in deference to the indivisibility of the work presented Levinasian Scholars "My Place in the Sun" Reflections On The Thought Of Emmanuel Levinas Diacritics 26.1 (1996) 3-10 Project Muse) TBC 7/7/10

At the heart of Levinas's critique of Heidegger is the reproof that the question of man has become submerged in the question of being, and thus that the recovery of the meaning of being entails the forgetting of the meaning of the human. Heidegger's Letter on Humanism (Brief über den Humanismus), published in 1947, in which he claims that "what is essential is not humanity, but being" [Brief 24] is offset by the title of Levinas's work, published in the same year, in which he shows how the anonymity of existence, or being, is redeemed only by the existent, or be-ing; hence, De l'existence à l'existant, from existence to the existent--denoting a sense of direction, lost needlessly in Lingis's translation of the title as Existence and Existents. Levinas depicts the anonymity of being through the il y a, in which the impersonality of the verb mirrors the subjectless horror of existence. The anonymity of the il y a is "saved" ultimately only through the face of the other for whom one is always inescapably responsible. It is not that Levinas retreats from the ontological (the domain of Sein or being) to the ontic (the domain of the Seienden or be-ings), or that he rejects being in favor of some pre-Heideggerian idealist notion of the subject. Rather, his emphasis on the passage from the bare meaning of être or existence to l'étant or existent gropes toward what finally comes to signify the ethical, whereby the anonymity of the infinitive is overcome by the priority of the participial being-for-another-existent and the subject deposed rather than posed [EI 50]. "I am wary of that debased word 'love,'" he remarks again to Nemo, "but the responsibility for the other, being-for-the-other, seemed to me, even at that time [1947], to put an end to the anonymous and senseless rumbling of being" [EI 51]. Only in the most practical and mundane of obligations to the other is ontology rendered ethical and humane. This horror invoked by the anonymous il y a is not to be confused with Heideggerian anguish before death, or care for being. Levinas describes how the original De l'existence appeared in a cover on which were inscribed the words "where it is not a question of anxiety" [EI 47]. One could scarcely ask for a more explicit derangement of fundamental ontology, in the light of a horror of the il y a which had become historically incarnated for him: "None of the generosity which the German counterpart of the 'there is,' the 'es gibt,' is said to contain was displayed between 1933 and 1945," he writes later [DL 375]. There is no mistaking his imputation of ideological implications of complicity between Heideggerian Sein and modern genocide. They are related, not by happenstance but as the fundamental possibility of each other. Invoking the Platonic concept of the good beyond being (epekeina ts ousias), Levinas contests the notion that nothingness is a privation of being and that evil is a privation of the good, insisting that evil itself is a positive mode of being. Being can be more primally terrible than simply not-being. In brief, the distance between Heideggerian ontology and Levinasian ethics can be measured by the difference between an inquiry into being qua being (ti to on) and an inquiry into humanity itself (ti bioteon)--a distance which, as Heidegger himself observes in his Letter [Brief 22], is paradoxically both farther away than any individual be-ing and yet nearer than any be-ing could ever be.

Ontology Focus Bad – Genocide

Heideggerian focus on Ontology leads to genocide

Committee on Public Safety 96 (The writers subsume their individual names within the denomination of "Committee" in deference to the indivisibility of the work presented Levinasian Scholars "My Place in the Sun" Reflections On The Thought Of Emmanuel Levinas Diacritics 26.1 (1996) 3-10 Project Muse) TBC 7/7/10

Heidegger's depiction of human being as fundamentally in relation makes of otherness a condition of Dasein's possibility. To master one's own relation to being means to master one's own relation to another: "Dasein's understanding of being already entails the understanding of others, because its being is being-with" [SZ 1.4.§26]. In this sense, then, Miteinandersein, being-with-one-other, is a being with oneself also. Levinas critiques this notion of Miteinandersein for depicting the self and the other as related side by side, mediated through a third common term--the truth of being [TA 18-19]. In contrast, Levinas posits the relation of the face to face, that is, between two, and with no third term, no external authority. Once three are involved, we enter the universe of the one and the many and, hence, of "the totalizing discourse of ontology" [Kearney 57-58]. Only in the ethical relation of two can the self encounter the other immediately without recourse to an anonymous and faceless collectivity. Describing ethics as a "meontology" [Kearney 61], Levinas argues that its openness to the other is prior to ontology's closure upon itself. It is not that Heidegger's rupture with Western metaphysics through fundamental ontology went too far, but that it did not go far enough. It ushered in a philosophy of identity based on bonds and on consanguinity without fully confronting the advent of otherness in the epiphany of the human face. How, wonders Levinas, can fundamental ontology embrace the consanguineous body yet refuse the face? By repudiating idealism's abstract human nature, fundamental ontology gave vent to what rationalism, as the self-proclaimed universal mark of "humanity," had been repressing all along: "the hatred of a man who is other than myself," the very essence, that is, of anti-Semitism [DL 361]. For Levinas, the unthought of Heidegger's ontology comes to light in the death camps. They are related as being and be-ings themselves are related, within a hermeneutic circle where it is impossible to inquire about the one without understanding it in terms of the other. As Heidegger observed in the introduction to Being and Time, such concrete inquiry, if taken as a formal concept from the perspective of analytic logic, can only beg the question [SZ Einleitung 1.§2]. But just as he seeks to think the relation between being and be-ings in a manner more rigorous than the conceptual, so Levinas relates fundamental ontology and [End Page 6] anti-Semitism as each other's condition of possibility. From as early as the essay translated here, but repeated often, Levinas prophesied that the advent of fundamental ontology was of historic moment, and that philosophy after Heidegger could never be innocent again. Alongside the Jews, Enlightenment rationalism also perished in the Holocaust. With the Holocaust, the Jew (re)entered history; after two millennia of being represented as the great refusers of the present, as atavists of the Old Law, left behind by the New, the Jew now became contemporaneous. Their testament typologized away into the shadowy prefigurement of what is to come and has already come, the Jew became the fulfillment of the present, in a literalness beyond all metaphor [DL 170-77]. Thus it is that, through genocide, Levinas saw history and philosophy mediated. Not since dialectical materialism have we encountered such an audacious literalness, such theoreticization of historical concreteness.

Ontology Focus Bad – Freedom

Their obligation to Being is a structuralism that destroys capacity for human freedom.

Wolin 90 (Richard, Professor of Modern European Intellectual History, Rice, THE POLITICS OF BEING, 1990, p.153-4.)

Heidegger's incapacity to comprehend the concept of freedom is merely a logical outgrowth of his post-Kehre radical antihumanism. The philosophical economy of Seinsgeschichte necessitates that the autonomy of human conduct be negated, for in this way alone can Heidegger reconceptualize Dasein as an abject and pliable conduit for Being's "coming to presence." In order to secure Dasein's compliance with the goals of Seinsgeschichte, it must be divested of the capacity for free action. Thus, in his 1936 Schelling lecture, Heidegger essentially proclaims the obsolescence of "freedom" as a viable philosophical category--that is, when understood from the "essential" standpoint of Seinsgeschichte: "From the originary perspective of the history of Being, 'freedom' has forfeited its role. For Being [Seyn] is more originary than the totality of beings and subjectivity."

This structural logic guarantees a life not worth living.

Wolin 90 (Richard, Professor of Modern European Intellectual History, Rice, THE POLITICS OF BEING, 1990, p.154)

The project of human freedom, incessantly belittled by "essential thinking," receives its inspiration from the conviction that "it is more honest, courageous, self-clairvoyant, hence a higher mode of life, to choose in lucidity than it is to hide one's choices behind the supposed structure of things." In this respect, the concept of freedom, as it has been handed down to us on the basis of the Greek ideal of autonomic or self-rule, represents an indispensable touchstone of the Western tradition: it has become a sine qua non for the ideal of a meaningful human existence. And thus, in a far from trivial sense, we view a life led under conditions of "unfreedom" as a life deprived of an essential prerequisite for the fulfillment of human potential. It would be a life bereft of those autonomous capacities of decision and choice on the basis of which alone we are able to identify and define our projects as our projects. We are of course simultaneously defined by a preexisting network of values, institutions, and belief-systems, which have themselves been shaped and handed-down by the members of a given community or group. Yet, it is our capacity to "choose in lucidity" as to which among these would endow our projects with direction and significance that forms the indispensable basis of a meaningful human life.

Ontology Focus Bad – Conservative

Focus on Ontology entrenches status quo thinking

Strathausen 6 (Carsten University of Missouri-Columbia Carsten, “A Critique of Neo-Left Ontology”, PMC 16.3, muse) TBC 7/9/10

Ontological argument is static, undialectical, and unhistorical. It apodictically posits a truth that, following Adorno, can only be thought in and through a continuous process of self-critical reflection. The truth about ontology, therefore, is its untruth and philosophical sterility. Ontology begets ideology, because it refuses to think through and beyond contradiction the way dialectics does. Instead, Heidegger allegedly praises the mere existence of paradox as if it were truth itself. In doing so, ontology succumbs to the apologetic "affirmation of power" (136), and Adorno spends numerous pages on Heidegger's use of the predicate "is" to substantiate this claim.5 The brute fact that the world exists and that Being "is," so Adorno, seduces Heidegger to abandon dialectical reflection in favor of mere tautologies that refuse to mediate between the constitutive poles of subject and object, Being and beings. Instead, ontology ultimately collapses the two into one. "The whole construction of [Heidegger's] ontological difference is a Potemkin Village" (122), Adorno concludes, because this alleged difference only serves to advocate the self-identity and self-righteousness of the way things always already are in the beginning and will have been in the end. In Heidegger, "mediation [succumbs] to the unmediated identity of what mediates and what is being mediated" (Adorno 493).

Focus on Ontology prevents change

Strathausen 6 (Carsten University of Missouri-Columbia Carsten, “A Critique of Neo-Left Ontology”, PMC 16.3, muse) TBC 7/9/10

Given the prominence of Althusserian Marxism in France at the time of Bourdieu's essay, his structuralist terminology ("relative autonomy"; "overdetermination"; "structure of the field of productivity") and its proclaimed difference from the critical apparatus of the Frankfurt School should not be overrated. True, Bourdieu speaks of "habitus" while Adorno speaks of "ideology"; Bourdieu regards Heidegger as a "practical operator" (64) who mediates between politics and philosophy, whereas Adorno refers to him as a "reflection" ["Widerhall"] or "sign" ("Abdrücke" (73)] of the social in the realm of philosophy. But the crucial point remains that both Adorno and Bourdieu read Heidegger's ontology as the unconscious expression of a dynamic social process whose dynamics it fails to reflect. This failure is constitutive of ontological discourse, whose preference for stasis over movement, ground over horizon, Being over becoming is but an expression of a human "desire" (69) caused by a world that, in reality, never stands still. In short: while most critics today read Heidegger's philosophy as a deconstruction of Western metaphysics and essentialist ontology avant la lettre, this is precisely not how Bourdieu, Adorno, or several leading Marxists understood his work. For them, ontology is an inherently conservative, if not reactionary concept. Marxist theory, it follows, should dispense with ontology and turn toward this changing world instead.6 "Always historicize" is its motto, and the "persistence of the dialectic" (Fredric Jameson) testifies to the reflective nature of Marxist thought. It is an attempt literally to think after ["nach-denken"] the real, material events that define human experience and collective practice. Hence, Étienne Balibar and Fredric Jameson continue to argue that "there is no Marxist philosophy and there never will be" (1). Rather, Marxism should "be thought of as a problematic" (Jameson, "Actually" 175) that continues to develop and change along with the object of its inquiry, namely capitalism. Only the dialectical method is able to keep pace with history as it mediates between the constitutive poles of subject and object, Being and becoming.7 Thus, Marxists do "philosophy in a materialist way," as Pierre Macherey puts it (8). The goal, after all, is not to interpret the world, but to change it.

A2: Ontology First

Prioritizing Ontology prevents change to current atrocities

Jarvis 0 (Darryl S. L. Natl. U of Singapore “international relations and the challenge of postmodernism p 128-129 Google Books) TBC 7/8/10

More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil. That it does and continues to do so reflects our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating theory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorists have to the real world. Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge.37 But to suppose that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggles as actors in international politics. What does Ashley's project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and destitute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the emigres of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to suppose that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary—or is in some way bad—is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. As Holsri argues, we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, "So what?" To what purpose do they deconstruct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this "debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics" be judged pertinent, relevant, helpful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholastically excited by abstract and recondite debate.

Survival comes before ontology –a true relationship with being awareness of the limits of our existence

Robbins 99 (Brent Dean, Asst. Prof. of Psychology, Point Park U, 1999 “Medard Boss,” http://mythosandlogos.com/Boss.html) TBC 7/9/10

"Death is an unsurpassable limit of human existence," writes Boss (119). Primarily, however, human beings flee from death and the awareness of our mortality. But in our confrontation with death and our morality, we discover the "relationship" which "is the basis for all feelings of reverance, fear, awe, wonder, sorrow, and deference in the face of something greater and more powerful." (120). Boss even suggests that "the most dignified human relationship to death" involves keeping it--as a possibility rather than an actuality--constantly in awareness without fleeing from it. As Boss writes: "Only such a being-unto-death can guarantee the precondition that the Dasein be able to free itself from its absorption in, its submission and surrender of itself to the things and relationships of everyday living and to return to itself." (121) Such a recognition brings the human being back to his responsibility for his existence. This is not simply a inward withdrawal from the world--far from it. Rather, this responsible awareness of death as the ultimate possibility for human existence frees the human being to be with others in a genuine way. From this foundation--based on the existentials described above--Boss is able to articulate an understanding of medicine and psychology which gives priority to the freedom of the human being to be itself. By freedom, Boss does not mean a freedom to have all the possibilites, for we are finite and limited by our factical history and death. Yet within these finite possibilities, we are free to be who we are and to take responsibility for who we are in the world with others and alongside things that matter.

A2: Ontology First

Ethics comes before Ontology – Value to Life

Cohen 1 (Richard A., the Isaac Swift Prof of Judaic Studies at UNC at Charlotte, pg. 15 “Ethics, Exegesis, and Philosophy: Interpretation after Levinas,” Google Books) TBC 7/9/10

Philosophy as ethical exegesis - discovering the ethical in the ontological, seeing the lower in the light of the higher, not anthropology but ethics - is attuned to this deeper, weightier, truer history that defies straightforward language and is refractory to the light of publicity. Its commitments are not to visible history alone, the history of historiography, but rather to a more insecure but deeper history, that of the humanity of the human. The human is not a biological or a rational category. Rather, the human emerges when and where morality is at work. Humanity is not a given but an achievement, an accomplishment, an elevation. Moral rectitude and justice are rare enough for philosophy also to miss them. Ethical exegesis is philosophy attentive to responsibilities beyond epistemology, and higher than the aesthetic celebration of the spectacle of be-ing or its language. It is thinking bound to the "difficult freedom" of moral responsibilities and obligations - for fellow humans, for sentient life, and finally for all of creation in all its diversity. And as such it is wisdom, or the quest for wisdom -philosophy. Just as the aesthetic dimension is not by itself evil (or good), one cannot say that the aesthetic life is false (or true). Like good and evil, truth and falsity are not its standard. They are standards of epistemology. Epistemology need not refrain from judging aesthetics, but neither epistemology nor aesthetics has the right to the last word. Ethics, in contrast, can and must remind us that the aesthetic life is inferior to the moral life. The aesthetic world -however spectacular, grand, or beautiful - is too small a world. When aesthetics takes itself for a world it becomes precious, as in Huysmans, or both precious and precocious, as in Heidegger and Derrida, or fascist, its true moral face. And let there be no doubt, the aesthetic life revolves around the self, is indeed its very cult. And thus it is essentially linked to death or, by dialectical rebound, linked to youth, for the self by itself is a mortal being. Regarding not die truth but the superiority of morality, of ethical commitment ("either/or") over aesthetic disengagement ("both/and"), Kierkegaard has written penetrating and moving tributes to this wisdom. The great nineteenth-century German Orthodox rabbi and scholar, Samson Raphael Hirsch, in the Jewish tradition, commenting on Proverbs (chapter two, "Wise Men and Fools"), notes that the word that text opposes to "wisdom" (Hebrew: chockmah), namely, "foolishness" (Hebrew: olai), "is related to oulaiy 'perhaps/ and ahfal-, 'darkness'."6 Again, Levinas's "temptation of temptation," the perhaps, the maybe, the possible, opposed to and by the actual, the here, the now, not the real but the moral "demands of the day." No one would oppose beauty, to be sure, but when self-regard becomes disregard for others - and surely it tends in this direction - then aesthetic desires become evils, hardening rather than softening the heart. There are worthier, nobler tasks. Ethical exegesis - penetrating through the spectacle and its display of signs to its human dimension, the dimension of suffering and moral demand - articulates the fragile but overpowering solidarity of a human community on the difficult road of redemption. It will say and say again the rupture of the masks of being demanded by morality and of justice. Beyond but through morality, ethical exegesis will also dare to suggest, obliquely, to be sure, the glimmer of another exigency -spirit, inspiration, absolution - more intense, higher, brighter, illuminating and not illuminated by the light of sun, moon and stars. Micah 6:8: "For he has told thee, oh humans, what is good, and what the Lord thy God does require of thee, but to do justice and to love mercy and to walk humbly with thy God." Not a "proof text," to be sure, but a confirmation. The difference putting ethics first makes is of no less consequence than that which, according to Husserl, separates philosophy and psychology. That difference was at once the greatest chasm and yet barely discernible, in that the findings of these two disciplines would be strictly parallel to one another, so parallel that a sentence from one could be transposed word for word into the other, yet their significance would be entirely different. Philosophy - in this case ethics, what I am calling ethical exegesis - would be the absolute source of all meaning, hence the ground of psychology and sociology and all the sciences, social or natural. While not another epistemological grounding of epistemology, ethical exe- gesis nonetheless still has the pretension to provide the reason for philosophy. But "reason" in the sense of "end," "purpose," "aim" - what is most important, most significant. Without returning to pre-modern philosophy, without imposing one arbitrary onto-theo-logy or another, without making a fetish of science or of its drifting, and most especially without the pretended "second innocence" of aesthetic celebration, ethical exegesis - in moral responsibilities and obligations, and in the call to justice built upon these - supplies a reason for philosophy, a reason for knowledge and a reason for living. No doubt this is a very large claim. And in this sense, this is an ambitious book. Very simply: nothing is more significant than serving others. All other significations, in all other registers, derive from this deepest or highest significance.

Science Good

Scientific modes of knowledge are self-correcting and true

Cohen Manion and Morrison 7 (Louis, Lawrence, Keith R. B. Research methods in education Google Books pg. 6-7) TBC 7/7/10

A further means by which we set out to discover truth is research. This has been defined by Kerlinger (1970) as the systematic, controlled, empirical and critical investigation of hypothetical proposition\* about the presumed relations among natural phenomena. Research has three characteristics in particular which distinguish it from the first means of problem-solving identified earlier, namely, experience. First, whereas experience deals with events occurring in a haphazard manner, research is systematic and controlled, having its operations on the inductive-deductive model outlined above. Second, research is empirical. The scientist turns to experience for validation. As Kerlinycr (1970) puts it, subjective, personal belief has, to have a reality check against objective, empirical facts and tests. And third, research is self-correcting. Not only does the scientific method have built-in mechanisms to protect scientists from error as far as is humanly possible, but also their procedures and results are open 10 public scrutiny by fellow professionals. Incorrect results in time will he found and either revised or discarded (Mouly Research is a combination of both experience and reasoning and must be regarded as the most successful approach to the discovery of truth, particularly as far as the natural sciences are concerned (Burg 1963).'

Science is true – the alternative ontology does not correspond to reality

Cobern 90 (William W., November,. Ph.D. Assistant Prof of Sci Ed A Critical Look at Radical Constructivism and Science Teacher Education EDUCATION RESEARCH WILL NOT PROFIT FROM RADICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM) TBC 7/8/10

The radical constructivist having grown tired of the quest to know reality declares reality unimportant. It is only the construction, in and of itself, that is important. To carry further the artistic metaphor, radically constructed knowledge is a form of modernism similar to modern art: Modernism ... denies the primacy of an outside reality, as given. It seeks either to rearrange that reality, or to retreat to the self's interior, to private experience as the source of its concerns and aesthetic preoccupations ... There is an emphasis on the self as touchstone of understanding and on the activity of the knower rather than the character of the object as the source of knowledge ... Thus one discerns the intentions of modern painting ... to break up ordered space ... to bridge the distance between object and spectator, to "thrust" itself on the viewer and establish itself immediately by impact. (Bell, 1976, p.110,112) As with a Wassily Kandinsky painting, there is no intention to represent the natural world. The value of the art is in its impact. The value of radically constructed knowledge is in its viability. One does not worry that knowledge match reality, only that knowledge allow the useful prediction of experience, its impact. But when it does so predict, what metaphysic does viability reinforce? The eminent physicist Cecil Frank Powell noted, "all our experience of the development of science suggests that there is indeed an order in nature which we can discover..." (1972, p.5). I am inclined to think that viability reinforces the estimation that knowledge is approaching reality, and in fact undermines radical constructivism. In sum, the argument here is that a knowable, objective reality is a key feature of the historical Western world view, and one that was crucial for the birth and nurture of modern science. In 1991, a radical constructivist will do science because the power of experimental science has been previously established in the years since Galileo. One has cause to doubt that in an earlier age radical constructivism would have motivated the exploration of something that had no known potential. Furthermore, even if one were now to adopt radical constructivism the viability test that it offers may actually undermine the first principles of radical constructivism, rather then support them. Perhaps one should say, the success of science undermines radical constructivism for all but those who have an a priori commitment to radical constructivism. In fact, I would go so far as to say, the real issue at hand is a priori commitments to different ontological positions. Westerners have for centuries lived with the difficulties of realism. The question is thus, why would one choose to make an a priori commitment to radical constructivism?

Science Good – Ontology

An ontology cannot grasp a Nature prior to judgment – only science recognizes this

Bachelard 90 (Suzanne A prof of phil at the Sorbonne Study of Husserl's Formal and Transcendental Logic Google Books) TBC 7/8/10

Logic, as science of science, as the theory which serves as norm for science, must be, specifically, the instrument for the criticism of principles which grounds science in its genuineness. It must consider the judgments which make up a science as requiring criticism and authentication by this criticism. From the fact of this critical focus, logic thematizes the sphere of judgments considered in themselves. Its apophantic focus results from this. Thus we return to the traditional orientation of logic conceived of as theory of judgment and. in particular, as theory of predicative judgment. "With this supposed as such, the mere correlate of the 'supposing\* or 'opining' (often spoken of as the opinion. S<iga), we have now laid hold of what is called the judgment (apophansis) in traditional logic and is the theme of apophantic logic" (126). We can say that, as science of science, logic has an ontological focus and that, as science of science, it has an apophantic focus. As science of the second degree it forms judgments about judgments. Thus the province of judgments becomes a proper thematic field. And this thematic field is the field emphasized by logic, for the fact of being a science of the second degree is for it the characteristic fact. For science the object would be the immediate theme and the judgment the intermediate theme. Logic, on the contrary, directs itself only mediately toward the object, toward the existent itself, and it directs itself immediately toward judgments "as suppositions of something existent."'1 Apophantics and ontology are hence two different thematic focuses of one and the same science. As Erfahrung und Urteil says in very condensed terms, . . . the difficult problems concerning the relationship between formal apophantics and formal ontology, i.e., their belongingness together and indeed their inner unity In the face of which their separation proves to be precursory, frests] upon differences of attitude only rather than upon differences in their fields.1 This venture into the intentionality which governs scientific judging is typical of a phenomenological examination which is not content with "positive" investigations, i.e.. investigations exclusively directed toward the objective data, as the sciences are; and Division B, where this examination is presented, rightly calls itself a phenomenological clarification of the twofold character of formal logic as formal apophantics and formal ontology. But there is no reason to believe that simply by following this subjective direction of examination we have reached the level of transcendental research. The cognizing subjectivity to which Husserl refers remains a "natural" subjectivity since it is as yet not separated from the presuppositions attaching to the natural attitude; only the transcendental reduction will reveal these presuppositions. The uncovering of them will be the task of Part II of Formal and Transcendental Logic. For the moment there is the question of explicating the genuine sense of the sciences and logic within the natural attitude. Which is the attitude of science. Division B of Part I offers us an intentional epistemology and not a transcendental phenomenology. This is why Husserl. taking the cognition of Nature as the example of scientific cognition, says that "of course one must not fall back on the Nature already given by sheer experience before all thinking" (118). Here there is no question of parenthesizing the productions of science. To be sure, we say that Nature is in itself, that it exists before our act of judgment. But we can qualify it by our act of judgment. And that we know about it we have from our activity of judging. What is more, only if we go on synthetically to make our experiencing itself and its productions a theme of judgment, can we have original knowledge of the fact that this (harmoniously flowing) experiencing already bears "implicitly" in itself, "before" our thinking . . . , the being-sense of Nature, as the same sense that thinking explicates (119). To be sure, one can say that what is implicit was already there prior to its being explicated, but one only knows that it is there when it has been explicated. The sense of the judgment cannot be determined by an experience of Nature which is not involved in the activity of judgment. Nature as form-of-scientific-judgment will have, to be sure, under it Nature as form-of-experience, but Husserl says in an astonishing formulation: "[T]he under-it is at the same time an in-it" (i 18). The notion of Nature prior to any act of judging is a meaningless notion if one does not conceive it beginning from the predicative sphere, and "by the judger, qua judger, only that Nature is accepted which is categorially formed in the judging" (i 18).

Positivism Good

Positivism is best – self correcting and it uses observable regularities to inform action – focus on epistemology causes a retreat from policy relevance

Houghton 8 (David Patrick Ass. Prof. of IR at UCF, Positivism ‘vs’ Postmodernism: Does Epistemology Make a Difference? International Politics (2008) 45) TBC 7/8/10

As long ago as 1981, Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach effectively laid the influence of the dogmatic behaviouralism of the 1960s to rest in their book The Elusive Quest, signaling the profound disillusionment of mainstream IR with the idea that a cumulative science of international relations would ever be possible (Ferguson and Mansbach, 1988). The popularity of the ‘naïve’ form of positivism, wed to a view of inexorable scientific progress and supposedly practiced by wide-eyed scholars during the 1960s, has long been a thing of the past. Postmodernists hence do the discipline something of an injustice when they continue to attack the overly optimistic and dogmatic form of positivism as if it still represented a dominant orthodoxy which must somehow be overthrown. Equally, supporters of the contemporary or 'neo-' version of positivism perform a similar disservice when they fail to articulate their epistemological assumptions clearly or at all. Indeed, the first error is greatly encouraged by the second, since by failing to state what they stand for, neo-positivists have allowed postmodernists to fashion a series of 18 straw men which burn rapidly at the slightest touch. Articulating a full list of these assumptions lies beyond the scope of this article, but contemporary neo-positivists are, I would suggest, committed to the following five assumptions, none of which are especially radical or hard to defend: (1) that explaining and/or understanding the social and political world ought to be our central objective; (2) that - subjective though our perceptions of the world may be - many features of the political world are at least potentially explainable. What remains is a conviction that there are at least some empirical propositions which can be demonstrably shown to be ‘true’ or ‘false’, some underlying regularities which clearly give shape to international relations (such as the proposition that democracies do not fight one another); (3) that careful use of appropriate methodological techniques can establish what patterns exist in the political world, even if these patterns are ultimately transitory and historically contingent; (4) that positive and normative questions, though related, are ultimately separable, though both constitute valid and interesting forms of enquiry. There is also a general conviction (5) that careful use of research design may help researchers avoid logical pitfalls in their work. Doubtless, there are some who would not wish to use the term 'positivism' as an umbrella term for these five assumptions, in which case we probably require a new term to cover them. But to the extent that there exists an 'orthodoxy' in the field of International Relations today, this is surely it. Writing in 1989, Thomas Biersteker noted that “the vast majority of scholarship in international relations (and the social sciences for that matter) proceeds without conscious reflection on its philosophical bases or premises. In professional meetings, lectures, seminars and the design of curricula, we do not often engage in serious reflection on the philosophical bases or implications of our activity. Too often, 19 consideration of these core issues is reserved for (and largely forgotten after) the introductory weeks of required concepts and methods courses, as we socialize students into the profession” (Biersteker, 1989). This observation – while accurate at the time – would surely be deemed incorrect were it to be made today. Even some scholars who profess regret at the philosophically self-regarding nature of contemporary of IR theory nevertheless feel compelled to devote huge chunks of their work to epistemological issues before getting to more substantive matters (see for instance Wendt, 1999). The recent emphasis on epistemology has helped to push IR as a discipline further and further away from the concerns of those who actually practice international relations. The consequent decline in the policy relevance of what we do, and our retreat into philosophical self-doubt, is ironic given the roots of the field in very practical political concerns (most notably, how to avoid war). What I am suggesting is not that international relations scholars should ignore philosophical questions, or that such ‘navel gazing’ is always unproductive, for questions of epistemology surely undergird every vision of international relations that ever existed. Rather, I would suggest that the existing debate is sterile and unproductive in the sense that the various schools of thought have much more in common than they suppose; stated more specifically, postpositivists have much more in common than they would like to think with the positivists they seek to condemn. Consequently, to the extent that there is a meaningful dialogue going on with regard to epistemological questions, it has no real impact on what we do as scholars when we look at the world ‘out there’. Rather than focusing on epistemology, it is inevitably going to be more fruitful to subject the substantive or ontological claims made by positivists (of all metatheoretical stripes) and postpositivists to the cold light of day. Substantive theoretical and empirical claims, 20 rather than ultimately unresolvable disputes about the foundations of knowledge, ought to be what divide the community of international relations scholars today.

Positivism Good

Explicit, clear, causal theories of international relations are better – 5 reasons

Walt 5 (Stephen prof of intl studies at U of Chicago, Annu Rev Polit Sci 8 23-48, the relationship between theory and policy in international relations) TBC 7/8/10

First and most obviously, a good theory should be logically consistent and empirically valid, because a logical explanation that is consistent with the available evidence is more likely to provide an accurate guide to the causal connections that shape events. Second, a good theory is complete; it does not leave us wondering about the causal relationships at work (Van Evera 1997). For example, a theory stating that “national leaders go to war when the expected utility of doing so outweighs the expected utility of all alternative choices” (Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman 1992) may be logically impeccable, but it does not tell us when leaders will reach this judgment. Similarly, a theory is unsatisfying when it identifies an important causal factor but not the factor(s) most responsible for determining outcomes. To say that “human nature causes war,” or even that “oxygen causes war,” is true in the sense that war as we know it cannot occur in the absence of these elements. But such information does not help us understand what we want to know, namely, when is war more or less likely? Completeness also implies that the theory has no “debilitating gaps,” such as an omitted variable that either makes its predictions unacceptably imprecise or leads to biased inferences about other factors (Nincic & Lepgold 2000, p. 28). A third desideratum is explanatory power. A theory’s explanatory power is its ability to account for phenomena that would otherwise seem mystifying. Theories are especially valuable when they illuminate a diverse array of behavior that previously seemed unrelated and perplexing, and they are most useful when they make apparently odd or surprising events seem comprehensible (Rapaport 1972). In physics, it seems contrary to common sense to think that light would be bent by gravity. Yet Einstein’s theory of relativity explains why this is so. In economics, it might seem counterintuitive to think that nations would be richer if they abolished barriers to trade and did not try to hoard specie (as mercantilist doctrines prescribed). The Smith/Ricardo theory of free trade tells us why, but it took several centuries before the argument was widely accepted (Irwin 1996). In international politics, it seems odd to believe that a country would be safer if it were unable to threaten its opponent’s nuclear forces, but deterrence theory explains why mutual vulnerability may be preferable to either side having a large capacity to threaten the other side’s forces (Wohlstetter 1957, Schelling 1960, Glaser 1990, Jervis 1990). This is what we mean by a powerful theory: Once we understand it, previously unconnected or baffling phenemona make sense. Fourth, at the risk of stating the obvious, we prefer theories that explain an important phenomenon (i.e., something that is likely to affect the fates of many people). Individual scholars may disagree about the relative importance of different issues, but a theory that deals with a problem of some magnitude is likely to garner greater attention and/or respect than a theory that successfully addresses a puzzle of little intrinsic interest. Thus, a compelling yet flawed explanation for great power war or genocide is likely to command a larger place in the field than an impeccable theory that explains the musical characteristics of national anthems. Fifth, a theory is more useful when it is prescriptively rich, i.e., when it yields useful recommendations (Van Evera 1997). For this reason, George advises scholars to “include in their research designs variables over which policymakers have some leverage” (George 2000, p. xiv; also Glaser & Strauss 1967, Stein 2000). Yet Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2005.8:23-48. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org by University of California - Santa Cruz on 11/30/07. For personal use only. a theory that does not include manipulable variables may still be useful to policy makers. For example, a theory that explained why a given policy objective was impossible might be very useful if it convinced a policy maker not to pursue such an elusive goal. Similarly, a theory that accurately forecast the risk of war might provide a useful warning to policy makers even if the variables in the theory were not subject to manipulation. Finally, theories are more valuable when they are stated clearly. Ceteris paribus, a theory that is hard to understand is less useful simply because it takes more time for potential users to master it. Although academics often like to be obscure (because incomprehensibility can both make scholarship seem more profound and make it harder to tell when a particular argument is wrong), opacity impedes scientific progress and is not a virtue in theoretical work. An obscure and impenetrable theory is also less likely to influence busy policy makers.

Positivism Good

Positivist empiricism is crucial to prevent policy failure and anti-democratic ideology

Lynn 98 (Laurence E., Jr. U of Chicago A Place at the Table: Policy Analysis, Its Postpositive Critics, and the Future of Practice DRAFT January 25, http://harrisschool.uchicago.edu/about/publications/working-papers/pdf/wp\_99\_01.pdf) TBC 7/8/10

To policy analysts, the counterfactual is the world that frustrated Charles Schultze and Alice Rivlin, a world with no one at the table to add clarity, thoughtful analysis, and an awareness of alternatives and opportunity costs to the discussion, a world dominated by the inertia of government and by “military requirements,” professional medical judgment, the sanctity of subsidies, and the superiority of sentiment. To the postpositivists, the counterfactual appears to be a politics wholly reconstituted around empowered and informed citizens. Postpositivists evidently believe that eliminating positivist practice and the institutions that sustain it will improve the prospects for unimpeded discourse and deliberation undistorted by elite bias. This difference seems to me to be captured in the following thought experiment. Suppose that conventional, “positivist” policy analysis, wherever and by whom it is currently practiced , could be surgically removed from the body politic. That is, suppose that policy analysis as practiced in the planning, program development, and budget offices of federal, state, and local agencies, in the General Accounting Office, the Congressional Research Service, and the Congressional Budget Office, in The Brookings Institution and the American Enterprise Institute, at the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, Mathematica Policy Research, the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, and the Urban Institute, at the Institute for Research on Poverty and the Joint Center for Poverty Research — together with its most prominent practitioners — Henry Aaron, Mary Jo Bane, David Ellwood, Judith Gueron, Robert Greenstein, Rebecca Maynard, Robert Reischauer, Alice Rivlin, and Isabelle Sawhill, with their positivist penchant for facts, causal models, instrumental rationality, evaluation of alternatives and evidence based practice — could be excised from government and sent to the collective farm to do honest work. Postpositivists, who cast such institutions and individuals as either ineffectual or the enemies of democracy, would, I assume, argue that the elimination of these “tools of tyranny” would contribute toward improving the climate and prospects for communicative practice based on postpositivist epistemologies. There would be grounds for greater optimism concerning policies that reflect the values and ideas of informed citizens. Bias toward the policies, constituencies, and power of the centralized state would no longer be able to distort public dialogue, reify agency views of the world, and stifle the processes of deliberation. In contrast, traditional policy analysts would view the consequences very differently. Send policy analysts to the collective farm and, in an inevitably interest-dominated, hierarchical political world, nontransparent methods would again go unchallenged and become even more pervasive. Secrecy, obscurantism, corruption, deception, distortion, unfounded assertion, dishonesty, narrow ambition, ideological excess and all the other temptations to which flesh is heir might well be even more widely and securely practiced. The postpositivist dream of “unimpeded discourse” could easily become a nightmare of discourse impeded not by policy analysts claiming expertise but by a host of other anti-democratic elements inimical to informed discussion and empowered citizens. Careful attention must be paid to the design of institutions that promote cooperation at various levels of social discourse (Ostrom 1998), but this is a positivist project that postpositivists could scarcely be expected to endorse.

A2: Positivism Bad

Positivism does not rely on constructions and isn’t exclusive

Cupchik 1 (Gerald Prof at U of Toronto Scarborough FQS Vol 2, No 1 feb (2001): Qualitative and Quantitative Research: Conjunctions and Divergences http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/968/2112) TBC 7/8/10

The central goal of this paper is to demonstrate the complementary roles played by quantitative and qualitative methods in the analysis of social phenomena. Quantitative and qualitative methods are generally practiced by scholars from radically different disciplines and it is assumed "that the claim of compatibility, let alone one of synthesis, cannot be sustained" (SMITH & HESHUSIUS 1986, p.4). LINCOLN and GUBA (2000) have similarly argued that the ontological foundations of positivist and interpretivist paradigms that underlie these methods are fundamentally incommensurable. The basis for this argument is revealed in their account of the "Basic Beliefs (Metaphysics) of Alternative Inquiry Paradigms." Positivism's ontology is termed "naive realism"—reality is deemed both "real" and "apprehendable," while postpositivism's "critical realism" maintains that "'real' reality" is "probabilistically apprehendable." LINCOLN and GUBA reject any absolutist criteria for "judging either 'reality' or validity" (p.167). Critical theory offers "historical realism," a "virtual reality shaped by social, political ..., and gender values; crystalized over time" (p.165). Finally, constructivism represents "local and specific constructed realities" (p.165) wherein social phenomena are products of "meaning-making activities of groups and individuals" (p.167). [1] To build bridges between different social ontologies, we must engage in a transcendental act of reflection and look for similarities in the midst of supposed differences. On face value, positivism holds that the observer is separate from the observed and that findings are "true," whereas constructivism is transactionally oriented with its findings subjectively tinged and "created" (LINCOLN & GUBA 2000). But if physical scientists acknowledge HEISENBERG's principle that phenomena are transformed in the act of measurement, then the positivist observer is never really independent of the phenomenon under investigation. Similarly, the principle of indeterminacy holds that events in the world are open-ended and, hence, one cannot account for all the variance in a given episode, physical or social. So positivist scientists are well aware of the fact that they are not independent of a world that cannot be fully predicted. [2] On the other hand, in discussing "orienting to the phenomenon," BEACH (1990) argued that the "social order, evident in and through the detailed and contingent activities of societal members, exists independently of social scientific inquiry (p.217). Thus, even while individuals and communities might construct interpretations of events that reflect relative values and interests, the underlying phenomena do not rely on them for existence. Both positivist and constructivist researchers are therefore engaged, though they responsibly endeavor to develop principles and accounts which are not restricted by arbitrary biases. The researcher is in-the-world at each stage of a project, shaping it and being shaped by phenomena in it, and by pressures from communities of scholars. [3]

Phenomenology Fails

Phenomenology fails – it turns into limited anthropology

Bartok 84 (Philip J. Dept of Phil U of Notre Dame FOUCAULT’S ANALYTIC OF FINITUDE AND THE “DEATH” OF PHENOMENOLOGY) TBC 7/8/10

In support of Foucault’s argument it should be noted that Husserl readily admits that in its attempt to move beyond the empirical to the transcendental, transcendental phenomenology does not leave behind the horizon of empirical contents, but merely wins for the data in this horizon a transcendental rather than an empirical significance. From its starting point in the natural attitude, the transcendental phenomenological reduction merely effects a “readjustment of viewpoint”, one which preserves a “thoroughgoing parallelism” between a phenomenological psychology and a transcendental phenomenology: “[T]o each eidetic or empirical determination on the one side there must correspond a parallel feature on the other”.15 But for Husserl, the full sense of the “transcendental” is achieved only through the application of both transcendental phenomenological and eidetic reductions, that is, in the in the discovery of the essential features of pure conscious experience.16 The eidetic reduction too departs from the empirical, taking a fact, whether in the natural attitude or in transcendentally purified consciousness, as the starting point for systematic variation in pure fantasy.17 Taken together, the transcendental phenomenological and eidetic 7 reductions lead the phenomenologist from the empirical starting point of the natural attitude to a description of the essences of pure conscious experience. Against this attempt to move from the empirical to the transcendental Foucault suggests that, [i]t is probably impossible to give empirical contents transcendental value, or to displace them in the direction of a constituent subjectivity, without giving rise, at least silently to an anthropology - that is, to a mode of thought in which the rightful limitations of acquired knowledge . . . are at the same time the concrete forms of existence, precisely as they are given in that same empirical knowledge.18

Phenomenology fails – we can’t transcend purely empirical ideas

Bartok 84 (Philip J. Dept of Phil U of Notre Dame FOUCAULT’S ANALYTIC OF FINITUDE AND THE “DEATH” OF PHENOMENOLOGY) TBC 7/8/10

Foucault’s line of argument here is most plausibly understood as an internal objection to Husserl’s approach: Transcendental phenomenology fails to achieve the (transcendental) aims set out for it by Husserl himself. The transcendental reduction fails insofar as it merely effects something like a shift of vision, attempting to assign transcendental significance to what are, by Husserl’s own admission, merely empirical contents. If Foucault’s archaeological analysis of the character of the modern episteme is adequate, this failure was inevitable given the fact that Husserl’s project was configured by an episteme characterized by the analytic of finitude. Given the problematic dual status of “man” under this episteme, Husserlian phenomenology cannot help but devolve into an anthropology.

Phenomenology fails – ontology factually doesn’t come first

Searle 5 (John, Prof Berkeley The Phenomenological Illusion SCHRIFTENREIHE- WITTGENSTEIN GESELLSCHAFT, VOL 34, pages 17-38 http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/PhenomenologicalIllusion.pdf) TBC 7/9/10

The observer independent is ontologically primary, the observer dependent is derivative. Now here is the interest of all this for the present discussion: Heidegger has the ontology exactly backwards. He says the ready-to-hand is prior, the present-at-hand is derivative. The hammers and the dollar bills are prior to the sheets of paper and the collection of metal molecules. Why does he say this? I think the answer is clear; phenomenologically the hammer and the dollar bill typically are prior. When using the hammer or the dollar bill, we don’t think much about their basic atomic structure or other observer independent features. In short, Heidegger is subject to the phenomenological illusion in a clear way: he thinks that because the ready-to-hand is phenomenologically prior it is ontologically prior. What is even worse is that he denies that the ready-to-hand is observer relative. He thinks that something is a hammer in itself, and he denies that we create a meaningful social and linguistic reality out of meaningless entities. Rather he says we are “always already” in a meaningful world. Here is what he says: The kind of Being which belongs to these entities is readiness-to-hand. But this characteristic is not to be understood as merely a way of taking them, [my italics] as if we were talking such “aspects” into the “entities” which we proximally encounter, or as if some world-stuff which is proximally present-at-hand in itself were “given subjective colouring” in this way. (Heidegger 1962, 101) This seems wrong. If you take away the rhetorical fl ourishes in his prose, the view that he says is false, is the correct view. The characteristic of being money or a hammer is precisely a “way of taking them”. Such features as being money or being a hammer are observer relative and in that sense the object is “given subjective coloring” when we treat it as a hammer. Heidegger’s views are expressions of his rejection of the basic nature of the basic facts.

Phenomenology Fails

Alt doesn’t solve – intention does not affect action the way they assume

Searle 5 (John, Prof Berkeley The Phenomenological Illusion SCHRIFTENREIHE- WITTGENSTEIN GESELLSCHAFT, VOL 34, pages 17-38 http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/PhenomenologicalIllusion.pdf) TBC 7/9/10

Another example of the phenomenological illusion comes out in Merleau- Ponty’s discussion of skillful coping, which he calls “motor intentionality”. (Merleau-Ponty 1962) The idea is that because there are all kinds of routine actions, such as walking or driving a car, that do not have the concentrated focused consciousness of intentionality, of the kind you get for example when you are giving a lecture, that therefore they have a different kind of intentionality altogether. If it feels different then it must be different. But if you look at the actual conditions of satisfaction there is no difference in the logical structure. To see this, contrast doing a type of action as skillful coping and doing it as concentrated deliberate action. For example, normally when I get up and walk to the door I do it without special concentration or deliberation. Skillful coping. But suppose I do it and concentrate my attention on doing it. Deliberate action. The cases as described, though they feel different, are logically similar. In both cases I am acting intentionally and in both there are causally self referential conditions of satisfaction. I succeeded in what I was trying to do only if my intentions in action caused the bodily movements. It is a clear case of the phenomenological illusion to suppose that different phenomenology implies a different kind of intentionality with a different logical structure.

Phenomenology relies on a perceptual illusion

Searle 5 (John, Prof Berkeley The Phenomenological Illusion SCHRIFTENREIHE- WITTGENSTEIN GESELLSCHAFT, VOL 34, pages 17-38 http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/PhenomenologicalIllusion.pdf) TBC 7/9/10

Why are these points not obvious? I think the answer is the phenomenological illusion. In general these features are not present to the phenomenology. We do not, when playing tennis have a conscious experience of having propositional representations of conditions of satisfaction and we do not consciously think of ourselves as embodied consciousnesses in interaction with the world. The phenomenological illusion can even give us the impression that the tennis racket is somehow part of our body; and indeed when we are playing tennis or skiing, the tennis racket or the skis seem more like an extension of the body than they seem like instruments. But this, of course, is a phenomenological illusion. In fact there are no nerve endings in the tennis racket, nor in the skis; but if you get good at skiing or playing tennis it will seem almost as if there are. It does not seem like you are an embodied brain engaged with a world; rather it seems like you and the world form a single unity, and of course there is no propositional content running consciously through your head. But all the same, the entire logical apparatus of intentionality applies. If you describe the phenomenology and stop there, you miss the underlying logical structures

Phenomenology fails - Phenomenologists rely on a tautological understanding of basic facts

Searle 5 (John, Prof Berkeley The Phenomenological Illusion SCHRIFTENREIHE- WITTGENSTEIN GESELLSCHAFT, VOL 34, pages 17-38 http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/PhenomenologicalIllusion.pdf) TBC 7/9/10

As far as I can tell (and I may be mistaken about this) because of their failure to recognize the primacy of the basic facts, the phenomenologists seem to be unable to give a de re reading of references to objects. They hear the references to the basic facts, about molecules, for example, as always already inside the scope of the “present-at-hand” (or some other phenomenological) operator, and they hear the references to hammers and money, etc. as always already inside the scope of the “ready-to-hand” (or some other phenomenological) operator. Look at the quote from Dreyfus above. “Heidegger holds that there is no way to account for referring and truth starting with language as occurent sounds …” But that is precisely how one has to account for meaning, reference, truth, etc. because we know before we ever start on the philosophical problems that the speech act is performed by making “occurent sounds”, marks, etc. The inadequacy of existential phenomenology could not be stated more clearly: Dreyfus is in effect saying that the Heideggerian cannot state the solution because he cannot hear the question.

Phenomenology Fails

Phenomenology – facts can be detatched from their perspectives

Searle 5 (John, Prof Berkeley The Phenomenological Illusion SCHRIFTENREIHE- WITTGENSTEIN GESELLSCHAFT, VOL 34, pages 17-38 http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/PhenomenologicalIllusion.pdf) TBC 7/9/10

On the same page, the following sentence occurs: “It seemed to me that both the external, logical, god-like claim that, for there to be a social world, the brute facts in nature must somehow acquire meaning, and the internal phenomenological description of human beings as always already in a meaningful world, were both correct but in tension.” (Dreyfus 1999, 12) The reference to “god-like” reveals that once again he thinks that the stance is part of the phenomenon, that the brute facts only exist from a certain stance or from a point of view, either godlike or “detached, logical”, as the case might be. Now, this is a very deep mistake, and it is a foundational mistake. Where brute, observer independent facts are concerned, there is no point of view built into their ontology. The basic facts exist apart from any stance or point of view.

Phenomenology is wrong – there are objective facts

Searle 5 (John, Prof Berkeley The Phenomenological Illusion SCHRIFTENREIHE- WITTGENSTEIN GESELLSCHAFT, VOL 34, pages 17-38 http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/PhenomenologicalIllusion.pdf) TBC 7/9/10

The picture that Dreyfus seems to have is that institutional facts exist from one point of view and brute facts exist from another point of view. But that is wrong. Brute facts simply exist. No point of view is necessary. Institutional facts exist from a point of view of the participants in the institution and their participation in the institution creates the facts. But where Dreyfus cites a “tension” there is no tension. There is no tension at all in supposing that the piece of paper in my hand is both a piece of paper and a ten dollar bill. There is a philosophical problem, as to how human beings create an institutional reality by imposing status functions on brute facts. I ask the question, How do we get from the brute facts to the institutional facts? How does the mind impose status functions on the phenomena? The logical form of that question is: Given that there is a brute reality of observer independent phenomena, phenomena that have an absolute existence, independent of any human attitudes, stances, etc., how do such phenomena acquire status functions? The reference to brute phenomena is de re, it has wide scope occurrence. The problem is that the phenomenologist tends not to hear the de re occurrence. Thus Dreyfus hears the question as asking: From the detached logical point of view there exist brute facts, from the active participants point of view there exist institutional facts. What is the relation between them? Now there does seem to be a “tension” because there is now a problem about reconciling the detached logical point of view with the active participant’s point of view. Nothing has wide scope or de re occurrence. That is the perspectivalism that I have tried to identify.

The fact that basic truths change does not mean that truth is relative

Searle 5 (John, Prof Berkeley The Phenomenological Illusion SCHRIFTENREIHE- WITTGENSTEIN GESELLSCHAFT, VOL 34, pages 17-38 http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/PhenomenologicalIllusion.pdf) TBC 7/9/10

There is an objection one frequently hears that goes as follows: What I call the basic facts are just what happens to be widely believed at a certain point in history, a “contemporary given” as Dreyfus calls them. But they were not always believed in the past and it is quite likely that they will be superseded in the future. So there are no timeless absolute basic facts; there are just beliefs that people think are true relative to their time and place. This mistake is prominent in Thomas Kuhn, for example. (Kuhn 1962) But the answer to it is this. It is only on the assumption of a non-relative, absolute reality that it is worthwhile to change our opinions in the first place. We are trying to get absolute non-relative truths about an absolute non-relative reality. The fact that we keep changing our opinions as we learn more only makes sense given the assumption that our aim is the description of an absolute non-relative world. The fact of opinion change is an argument against relativism, not an argument for it. It is quite likely that our conception of what I have been calling the basic facts will be improved on, and that at least some of our present conceptions will become obsolete. This does not show that there are no basic facts, nor that the basic facts only have a relative existence, but that their absolute existence does not by itself guarantee that at any point in our history we have accurately stated them. The facts don’t change, but the extent of our knowledge does

Post-Positivism Bad

Postpositivism would cause disaster – misinformation, conservatism, and essentialism

Lynn 98 (Laurence E., Jr. U of Chicago A Place at the Table: Policy Analysis, Its Postpositive Critics, and the Future of Practice DRAFT January 25, http://harrisschool.uchicago.edu/about/publications/working-papers/pdf/wp\_99\_01.pdf) TBC 7/8/10

If having convictions that are invulnerable to challenge and unavailable to verification is a virtue, then, it seems to me, postpositivists are urging us to reenter a dark, pre-enlightenment age dominated by the clash of metaphysical absolutes in which issues are settled by essentialist assertions, power and maneuver, and deliberate distortion or outright suppression of issues and opposition. It will be a politics of absolutist claims, bad numbers, and worse arguments, of emotion and unreason, of the survival of the most determined with the most to gain. Conservatives who set about dismantling the data-collection capacity of executive agencies in order to rob liberal policy analysis of its life’s blood, who are acting on what they believe to be a normative and critical analysis of social dysfunction (e.g., a retreat from God), and who advocate deliberation among citizens that is uncorrupted by the kind of social science research too readily available in The Green Book, would seem to be exempt from most postpositivist criticism. Presumably if, following rules of discourse and choice agreed to by all, a community wishes to misinvest public resources, silence politically incorrect or divisive voices, and allow selfappointed local elites to pursue their ambitions without restraint, then their wisdom should neither be criticized nor contested by postpositivists. Indeed, as far as I can tell, there are no valid grounds for doing so. Grass roots intimidation and prejudice expressed through shouting in ordinary language are, at least, authentic.

Post-positivism fails – policy making

Lynn 98 (Laurence E., Jr. The University of Chicago A Place at the Table: Policy Analysis, Its Postpositive Critics, and the Future of Practice DRAFT January 25, http://harrisschool.uchicago.edu/about/publications/working-papers/pdf/wp\_99\_01.pdf) TBC 7/8/10

By this standard, the postpositivist derogation is a failure. The postpositive caricature of policy analysis is chilling, but false, so strained, so far removed from the ethos of policy analysis as generally taught and practiced, that most practitioners are justified in paying little or no attention to what they regard as esoteric, pedantic irrelevance. Moreover, the postpositivist penchant for constructing, as Edmund Wilson might put it, “imaginary systems [that are] as antithetical to the real one as possible” and for using these imaginary systems as a normative template for practice is so obviously subservient to a political agenda as to void its claim to authority as an undistorted epistemological critique of actual practice.

Policy making is self-correcting

Lynn 98 (Laurence E., Jr. The University of Chicago A Place at the Table: Policy Analysis, Its Postpositive Critics, and the Future of Practice DRAFT January 25, http://harrisschool.uchicago.edu/about/publications/working-papers/pdf/wp\_99\_01.pdf) TBC 7/8/10

Policy analysis as a professional practice has been and must continue to be ethically committed to (1) improving public policy through “bringing to the table” an informed voice undistorted by a material interest in policy outcomes and (2) public policy discourse, both internal and external to agencies, that is conducted with intellectual integrity and a respect for democratic institutions. Policy analysts are obligated to recognize and adapt to changes in the environments and contexts of their practice, to acknowledge well-founded criticisms of their methods and professional conduct, and to being realistic concerning both the advantages and limitations of the tools at their disposal. Policy analysis is and will remain pragmatic and crafty. For this reason policy analysis practice will continue to be driven by problems as they arise in context. Admittedly, these contexts are more often than not hierarchical, often polarized, and always interest-driven rather than the kind of idealized contexts envisioned by postpositivists. But public policy making is far less “federal” and hierarchical than it used to be, and decades of right-of-center politics have shifted interest decisively from public programs to incentives, choice, and quasi-markets. The exigencies of the political world will continue to insure a reality check on practice, and practice will evolve accordingly.

Humanism Good

Frameworks of human rights allow for incremental changes to improve value to life

Pasquale 5 (Frank L., Ph.D., a cultural anthropologist Secular Humanist Bulletin, Feb. 10 Volume 20, Number 3. Absolute Thinking in an Inabsolute World http://secularhumanism.org/index.php?section=library&page=pasquale\_20\_3&back=http://secularhumanism.org/lib/list.php%3Fpublication%3Dshb) TBC 7/7/10

All value is not completely relative to power. Assuredly, it remains so in much too great a measure. But it is not so in the absolute. The notion of fundamental human rights represents an endeavor on the part of human beings to establish global consensus on the quality of life or minimum treatment that all human beings deserve. It would be foolish to deny that such rights are widely being violated or that the powerful often reserve the right to violate them most. The current power of the U.S. government enables it to waive such rights with respect to suspected “enemy combatants” or “potential terrorists,” whether in violation of its own laws, United Nations charters, or Geneva conventions. But those much less powerful are able to appeal to standards from which to criticize such behavior as excessive and unjust. Such standards rest upon the recognition of certain enduring, though not absolute or eternal, attributes and aspirations of human beings. They rest upon commitments to protect the innocent and to incrementally improve the quality of human life regardless of personal characteristics, political advantage, or disadvantage.

Humanism and scientific thought is essential to prevent extinction and retain value to life

AMA 73 (American Humanist Association Humanist Manifesto II http://www.americanhumanist.org/who\_we\_are/about\_humanism/Humanist\_Manifesto\_II) TBC 7/7/10

The next century can be and should be the humanistic century. Dramatic scientific, technological, and ever-accelerating social and political changes crowd our awareness. We have virtually conquered the planet, explored the moon, overcome the natural limits of travel and communication; we stand at the dawn of a new age, ready to move farther into space and perhaps inhabit other planets. Using technology wisely, we can control our environment, conquer poverty, markedly reduce disease, extend our life-span, significantly modify our behavior, alter the course of human evolution and cultural development, unlock vast new powers, and provide humankind with unparalleled opportunity for achieving an abundant and meaningful life. The future is, however, filled with dangers. In learning to apply the scientific method to nature and human life, we have opened the door to ecological damage, over-population, dehumanizing institutions, totalitarian repression, and nuclear and bio-chemical disaster. Faced with apocalyptic prophesies and doomsday scenarios, many flee in despair from reason and embrace irrational cults and theologies of withdrawal and retreat. Traditional moral codes and newer irrational cults both fail to meet the pressing needs of today and tomorrow. False "theologies of hope" and messianic ideologies, substituting new dogmas for old, cannot cope with existing world realities. They separate rather than unite peoples. Humanity, to survive, requires bold and daring measures. We need to extend the uses of scientific method, not renounce them, to fuse reason with compassion in order to build constructive social and moral values. Confronted by many possible futures, we must decide which to pursue. The ultimate goal should be the fulfillment of the potential for growth in each human personality - not for the favored few, but for all of humankind. Only a shared world and global measures will suffice. A humanist outlook will tap the creativity of each human being and provide the vision and courage for us to work together. This outlook emphasizes the role human beings can play in their own spheres of action. The decades ahead call for dedicated, clear-minded men and women able to marshal the will, intelligence, and cooperative skills for shaping a desirable future. Humanism can provide the purpose and inspiration that so many seek; it can give personal meaning and significance to human life.

Humanism Good

Humanism can be used to criticize imperialism

Siddiqi 5 (Edward Said, humanism, and secular criticism Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics, Annual, Yumna http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_hb6554/is\_25/ai\_n29205117/pg\_10/?tag=content;col1 TBC 7/7/10)

Humanism is disclosure; it is agency; it is immersing oneself in the element of history; it is recovering what Vico calls the topics of mind from the turbulent actualities of human life, "the uncontrollable mystery on the bestial floor," and then submitting them painstakingly to the rational process of judgment and criticism.... For what is crucial to humanistic thought, even in the very act of sympathetically trying to understand the past, is that it is a gesture of resistance and critique. (41) Said attributes to humanism a dynamic, secular, and critical quality that, he fears, is being eroded in the sphere of learning, and in the world at large. He extols the humanist scholar as a historically attuned critic who is not so much interested in preserving a European tradition, as Said's invocation of "great" European scholars might suggest on a superficial reading, but is, rather, committed to the pursuit of human freedom in a truly expansive sense that is based on an "[expanded] ... understanding of human history to include all those Others constructed as dehumanized, demonized opponents by imperial knowledge and a will to rule." (42) In singling out the figure of Freud as representative here, Said is following a logic that Mufti traces so well in relation to Auerbach: the figure of the exiled German Jew who faces world catastrophe and who--as Said notes--comments: "But the struggle is not over yet." (43) Reflecting in 2003 on Orientalism, twentry-five years after its publication, Said again identifies himself as a humanist: My idea in Orientalism is to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical thought-stopping fury that so imprison us. I have called what I try to do "humanism," a word I continue to use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated post-modern critics. By humanism I mean first of all attempting to dissolve Blake's mind-forg'd manacles so as to be able to use one's mind historically and rationally for the purpose of reflective understanding. Moreover humanism is sustained by a sense of community with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking therefore, there is no such thing as an isolated humanist. (44)

Humanism is key to solving imperialism

Siddiqi 5 (Edward Said, humanism, and secular criticism Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics, Annual, Yumna http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_hb6554/is\_25/ai\_n29205117/pg\_10/?tag=content;col1 TBC 7/7/10)

Said speaks with a sense of tremendous urgency of the need to revivify humanism as a rational, secular, historically-minded communitarian enterprise that may stand as a shield against the "fragmented knowledge available on the internet and in the mass media" which nationalist and religious orthodoxies often disseminated by the mass media as they focus ahistorically and sensationally on the distant electronic wars that give viewers the sense of surgical precision, but in fact obscure the terrible suffering and destruction produced by modern warfare. (45) Said directly connects the decline of humanistic studies with the depredations of Western and especially US foreign policy. In the same essay, Said writes: "... [H]umanism is the only and I would go so far as saying the final resistance we have against the inhuman practices and injustices that disfigure human history" (n. pag.).

Humanism Good

Deconstruction of humanist values causes atrocities

Ketels 96 (Violet B., Associate Professor of English at Temple University, “‘Havel to the Castle!’ The Power of the Word,” 548 Annals 45, November, JSTOR) TBC 7/9/10

T HE political bestiality of our age is abetted by our willingness to tolerate the deconstructing of hu- manist values. The process begins with the cynical manipulation of lan- guage. It often ends in stupefying murderousness before which the world stands silent, frozen in impotent "attentism"-a wait-and-see stance as unsuited to the human plight as a paci- fier is to stopping up the hunger of a starving child. We have let lapse our pledge to the 6 million Jewish victims of the Holo- caust that their deaths might some- how be transfiguring for humankind. We allow "slaughterhouse men" tac- tical status at U.N. tables and "cast down our eyes when the depraved roar past."' Peacemakers, delegated by us and circumscribed by our fears, temporize with thugs who have re- vived lebensraum claims more boldly than Hitler did. In the Germany of the 1930s, a demonic idea was born in a demented brain; the word went forth; orders were given, repeated, widely broad- cast; and men, women, and children were herded into death camps. Their offshore signals, cries for help, did not summon us to rescue. We had become inured to the reality of hu- man suffering. We could no longer hear what the words meant or did not credit them or not enough of us joined the chorus. Shrieking victims per- ished in the cold blankness of inhu- mane silence. We were deaf to the apocalyptic urgency in Solzhenitsyn's declara- tion from the Gulag that we must check the disastrous course of his- tory. We were heedless of the lesson of his experience that only the unbending strength of the human spirit, fully taking its stand on the shifting frontier of encroaching violence and declaring "not one step further," though death may be the end of it--only this unwavering firmness offers any genuine defense of peace for the individ- ual, of genuine peace for mankind at large.2 In past human crises, writers and thinkers strained language to the breaking point to keep alive the memory of the unimaginable, to keep the human conscience from forget- ting. In the current context, however, intellectuals seem more devoted to abstract assaults on values than to thoughtful probing of the moral di- mensions of human experience. "Heirs of the ancient possessions of higher knowledge and literacy skills,"3 we seem to have lost our nerve, and not only because of Holocaust history and its tragic aftermath. We feel insecure before the empirical absolutes of hard science. We are intimidated by the "high modernist rage against mi- mesis and content,"4 monstrous prog- eny of the union between Nietzsche and philosophical formalism, the grim proposal we have bought into that there is no truth, no objectivity, and no disinterested knowledge.5 Less certain about the power of language, that "oldest flame of the humanist soul,"6 to frame a credo to live by or criteria to judge by, we are vulnerable even to the discredited Paul de Man's indecent hint that "wars and revolutions are not empiri- cal events... but 'texts' masquerad- ing as facts."7 Truth and reality seem more elusive than they ever were in the past; values are pronounced to be mere fictions of ruling elites to retain power. We are embarrassed by virtue. Words collide and crack under these new skeptical strains, dissolv- ing into banalities the colossal enor- mity of what must be expressed lest we forget. Remembering for the fu- ture has become doubly dispiriting by our having to remember for the pres- ent, too, our having to register and confront what is wrong here and now. The reality to be fixed in memory shifts as we seek words for it; the memory we set down is flawed by our subjectivities. It is selective, decep- tive, partial, unreliable, and amoral. It plays tricks and can be invented. It stops up its ears to shut out what it does not dare to face.s Lodged in our brains, such axioms, certified by science and statistics, tempt us to concede the final irrele- vance of words and memory. We have to get on with our lives. Besides, memo- ries reconstructed in words, even when they are documented by evidence, have not often changed the world or fended off the powerful seductions to silence, forgetting, or denying. Especially denying, which, in the case of the Holocaust, has become an obscene industry competing in the open market of ideas for control of our sense of the past. It is said that the Holocaust never happened. Revision- ist history with a vengeance is pur- veyed in words; something in words must be set against it. Yet what? How do we nerve to the task when we are increasingly disposed to cast both words and memory in a condition of cryogenic dubiety? Not only before but also since 1945, the criminality of govern- ments, paraded as politics and fat- tening on linguistic manipulation and deliberately reimplanted mem- ory of past real or imagined griev- ance, has spread calamity across the planet. "The cancer that has eaten at the entrails of Yugoslavia since Tito's death [has] Kosovo for its locus," but not merely as a piece of land. The country's rogue adventurers use the word "Kosovo" to reinvoke as sacred the land where Serbs were defeated by Turks in Memory of bloody massacres in 1389, sloganized and distorted in 1989, demands the bloody revenge of new massacres and returns civilization not to its past glory but to its gory tribal wars. As Matija Beckovic, the bard of Serb na- tionalism, writes, "It is as if the Ser- bian people waged only one battle-by widening the Kosovo charnel-house, by adding wailing upon wailing, by counting new martyrs to the martyrs of Kosovo. .. . Kosovo is the Serbian-ized history of the Flood-the Ser- bian New Testament."10 A cover of Siiddeutsche Zeitung in 1994 was printed with blood donated by refugee women from Bosnia in an eerily perverse afterbirth of violence revisited."11 We stand benumbed before multi- plying horrors. As VAclav Havel warned more than a decade ago, re- gimes that generate them "are the avant garde of a global crisis in civi- lization." The depersonalization of power in "system, ideology and appa- rat," pathological suspicions about human motives and meanings, the loosening of individual responsibility, the swiftness by which disastrous events follow one upon another "have deprived us of our conscience, of our common sense and natural speech and thereby, of our actual human- ity."12 Nothing less than the transfor- mation of human consciousness is likely to rescue us.

Anti-Humanism Bad

Anti-humanism causes Nazism

Hicks 9 (Stephen, Dr of Phil Heidegger, Anti-Humanism, and the Left, http://www.stephenhicks.org/2009/11/30/heidegger-anti-humanism-and-the-left/) TBC 7/9/10

And of Heidegger’s more abstract philosophical commitments, i.e., his stance against reason and modernity, Black says: “what remained consistent throughout, from the Letter on Humanism to the Question Concerning Technology, was that veiled, abstracted, but nonetheless, resonant critique of modernity, and the human-centred rationality he discerned at its fallen heart … . His thought resonates not because he was a Nazi, but because his criticism of modernity echoes many of today’s anti-modern trends.” Exactly right. Heidegger’s Nazism is a particular application of his broader anti-humanism, and his philosophical influence has to be understood from that level of abstraction and generality. Heideggerian anti-humanism can be applied particularly in a number of ways, so that is why we find his continued resonance with today’s postmodernists, left environmentalists, neo-Luddites, and man-hating animal activists, and the rest.

US Good

The US is the end-all be-all of values. Without us, everyone is dead. Opposing the US is sado-masochism.

NOORANI, 5 (Yaseen U OF AZ, TUCSON, The Rhetoric of Security, *CR: The New Centennial Review* 5.1 (2005) 13-41 Project Muse) TBC 7/7/10

Without the United States everyone is dead. Why should this be? The reason is that the United States fully embodies the values underlying world peace—"freedom, democracy, and free enterprise" (*National Security* 2002, i)—and is the key to their realization in the global domain. These values are [End Page 30] universal, desired by all and the standard for all. "[T]he United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere" (*National Security* 2002, 3). The fact that the United States "possesses unprecedented—and unequaled—strength and influence in the world" (1) cannot therefore be fortuitous. It cannot but derive from the very founding of the United States in universal principles of peace and its absolute instantiation of these principles. This results in "unparalleled responsibilities, obligations, and opportunity" (1). In other words, the United States as a nation stands, by virtue of its internal constitution, at the forefront of world history in advancing human freedom. It is the subject of history. Its own principle of organization is the ultimate desire of humanity, and the development of this principle is always at its highest stage in and through the United States. For this reason, the values of the United States and its interests always coincide, and these in turn coincide with the interests of world peace and progress. The requirements of American security reflect "the union of our values and our national interests," and their effect is to "make the world not just safer but better" (1). The United States therefore is uniquely charged by history to maintain and advance world peace and universal freedom. America is a nation with a mission, and that mission comes from our most basic beliefs. We have no desire to dominate, no ambitions of empire. Our aim is a democratic peace—a peace founded upon the dignity and rights of every man and woman. America acts in this cause with friends and allies at our side, yet we understand our special calling: This great republic will lead the cause of freedom. (Bush 2004a) America can lead the cause of freedom because it *is* the cause of freedom. "American values and American interests lead in the same direction: We stand for human liberty" (Bush 2003b). For this reason, it has no "ambitions," no private national interests or aspirations that would run contrary to the interests of the world as a whole. It undertakes actions, like the invasion of Iraq, that further no motive but the cause of humanity as a whole. "We have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of [End Page 31] that country to its own people" (Bush 2003a). In this way, the United States is distinct from all other nations, even though all of humanity espouses the same values. Only the United States can be depended upon for ensuring the endurance of these values because they are the sole basis of its existence. "Others might flag in the face of the inevitable ebb and flow of the campaign against terrorism. But the American people will not" (*NSCT* 2003, 29). Any threat to the existence of the United States is therefore a threat to the existence of the world order, which is to say, the values that make this order possible. It is not merely that the United States, as the most powerful nation of the free world, is the most capable of defending it. It is rather that the United States is the supreme agency advancing the underlying principle of the free order. The United States is the world order's fulcrum, and therefore the key to its existence and perpetuation. Without the United States, freedom, peace, civil relations among nations, and the possibility of civil society are all under threat of extinction. This is why the most abominable terrorists and tyrants single out the United States for their schemes and attacks. They know that the United States is the guardian of liberal values. In the rhetoric of security, therefore, the survival of the United States, its sheer existence, becomes the *content* of liberal values. In other words, what does it mean to espouse liberal values in the context of the present state of world affairs? It means to desire fervently and promote energetically the survival of the United States of America. When the world order struggles to preserve its "self," the self that it seeks to preserve, the primary location of its being, is the United States. Conferring this status upon the United States allows the rhetoric of security to insist upon a threat to the existence of the world order as a whole while confining the non-normative status that arises from this threat to the United States alone. The United States—as the self under threat—remains external to the normative relations by which the rest of the world continues to be bound. The United States is both a specific national existence struggling for its life and normativity itself, which makes it coextensive with the world order as a whole. For this reason, any challenge to U.S. world dominance would be a challenge to world peace and is thus impermissible. We read in *The National Security Strategy* that the United States [End Page 32] will "promote a balance of power that favors freedom" (*National Security* 2002, 1). And later, we find out what is meant by such a balance of power. The relationship between the United States and the world order, then, is similar to the relationship in Hobbes between the Leviathan and the civil society that it embodies and represents. The individual members of this civil society are collectively the author of all of the acts of the Leviathan. Yet they have no authority to influence or oppose the actions of the Leviathan, because they have contracted with each other to give over all of their powers to it.

US Good

The only risk of international violence is a world in which the U.S. succumbs to internal criticism of hegemony

Sowell 6 (Thomas Sowell, Senior fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Inst., “Where is the West?” 11-19-2006, http://jewishworldreview.com/cols/sowell110906.php3) TBC 7/7/10

European nations protesting Saddam Hussein's death sentence, as they protested against forcing secrets out of captured terrorists, should tell us all we need to know about the internal degeneration of western society, where so many confuse squeamishness with morality. Two generations of being insulated from the reality of the international jungle, of not having to defend their own survival because they have been living under the protection of the American nuclear umbrella, have allowed too many Europeans to grow soft and indulge themselves in illusions about brutal realities and dangers. The very means of their salvation have been demonized for decades in anti-nuclear movements and protesters calling themselves "anti-war." But there is a huge difference between being anti-war in words and being anti-war in deeds. How many times, in its thousands of years of history, has Europe gone 60 years without a major war, as it has since World War II? That peace has been due to American nuclear weapons, which was all that could deter the Soviet Union's armies from marching right across Europe to the Atlantic Ocean. Having overwhelming military force on your side, and letting your enemies know that you have the guts to use it, is being genuinely anti-war. Chamberlain's appeasement brought on World War II and Reagan's military buildup ended the Cold War. The famous Roman peace of ancient times did not come from negotiations, cease-fires, or pretty talk. It came from the Roman Empire's crushing defeat and annihilation of Carthage, which served as a warning to anyone else who might have had any bright ideas about messing with Rome. Only after the Roman Empire began to lose its own internal cohesion, patriotism and fighting spirit over the centuries did it begin to succumb to its external enemies and finally collapse. That seems to be where western civilization is heading today. Internal cohesion? Not only does much of today's generation in western societies have a "do your own thing" attitude, defying rules and flouting authority are glorified and Balkanization through "multiculturalism" has become dogma. Patriotism? Not only is patriotism disdained, the very basis for pride in one's country and culture is systematically undermined in our educational institutions at all levels. The achievements of western civilization are buried in histories that portray every human sin found here as if they were peculiarities of the west. The classic example is slavery, which existed all over the world for thousands of years and yet is incessantly depicted as if it was a peculiarity of Europeans enslaving Africans. Barbary pirates alone brought twice as many enslaved Europeans to North Africa as there were Africans brought in bondage to the United States and the American colonies from which it was formed. How many schools and colleges are going to teach that, going against political correctness and undermining white guilt? How many people have any inkling that it was precisely western civilization which eventually turned against slavery and began stamping it out when non-western societies still saw nothing wrong with it? How can a generation be expected to fight for the survival of a culture or a civilization that has been trashed in its own institutions, taught to tolerate even the intolerance of other cultures brought into its own midst, and conditioned to regard any instinct to fight for its own survival as being a "cowboy"? Western nations that show any signs of standing up for self-preservation are rare exceptions. The United States and Israel are the only western nations which have no choice but to rely on self-defense — and both are demonized, not only by our enemies but also by many in other western nations. Australia recently told its Muslim population that, if they want to live under Islamic law, then they should leave Australia. That makes three western nations that have not yet completely succumbed to the corrosive and suicidal trends of our times. If and when we all succumb, will the epitaph of western civilization say that we had the power to annihilate our enemies but were so paralyzed by confusion that we ended up being annihilated ourselves?

Interventionism Good

Interventionism is key to solve genocide

McMaster 3 (Brigadier General H. R. Hoover Institution 3 Feb 17 http://www.hoover.org/pubaffairs/dailyreport/archive/2848556.html.) TBC 7/9/10

Although the dangers of careless military activism are easy to imagine, the cost of passivity is more difficult to discern. In the 1990s, the Vietnam syndrome helped delay and limit U.S. military intervention in the Balkans. Those delays and limits extended murderous Serbian repression and actually accelerated ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Failure to intervene militarily often permits humanitarian crises to continue and leads to more dangerous conflicts.

Cartesian Subject Good

No Link – Heidegger mischaracterizes Descartes’ autonomous subject

Beavers 90 (Anthony F. Descartes beyond Transcendental Phenomenology Preliminary Comments on Heidegger’s Critique of the Cartesian Project Ph.D. Prof of Phil U of Evansville http://faculty.evansville.edu/tb2/PDFs/TransPhen.pdf ) TBC 7/8/10

It is true that Descartes does not question the meaning of the Being of the sum; it is not on these grounds that I disagree with Heidegger. Part of the project of Being and Time requires Heidegger to undertake an analysis of that Being which he himself is. This being, we are told, is the Being of the cogito sum. But as Being and Time progresses, the reader discovers that the mode of thinking is but one mode of human being. Thus, Dasein (Heidegger's "human being") is not merely the sum of cogitationes. It is equiprimordially that being who experiences moods and who engages in discourse. What I hope to show is that the same is true for Descartes, who never made the mistake of equating himself in the concreteness of his lived experience with the ego cogito, and that if Descartes were to "question the meaning of the Being of the sum," his investigation would come closer to Heidegger's existential phenomenology than to Husserl's transcendental variety. Nevertheless, Heidegger continually criticizes Descartes for limiting the scope of the human being to the cogito sum, an object of thought that shows up as a necessary condition for representation. For Heidegger, the danger of this equation is that the human being is understood along the lines of an object, like any other object, and not as the privileged being who has its being as an issue for it. In the language of Being and Time, Descartes' understanding of the self is of an object present-at-hand, or so Heidegger claims. In what follows, I hope to show that this characterization of Descartes' understanding of the self is mistaken. Descartes simply did not hold the view that Heidegger assigns to him. To critics of Heidegger, such a charge might not seem at all surprising or worthy of our attention. It is commonly held that Heidegger made similar mistakes respecting many philosophers, including not only the early Greek ones, Anaximander, Parmenides and Heraclitus, but also the German ones, especially Kant and Nietzsche. What should it matter if we add Descartes to this long and distinguished list? But the error made here in this case is different. This is because, first of all, Heidegger rarely criticizes another philosopher with the force he wages against Descartes; generally he tries to show how right a philosopher is, promoting him to the level of a spokesman for his particular historical epoch, even if this philosopher does not understand the depth of his own philosophy with regard to the question of Being or the true implications of his own thinking. Secondly, and more importantly, the popular view of Descartes suggests that, at least in this one case, Heidegger was right.

No Link – Descartes’ subject doesn’t preclude Heideggerian embodiment

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I hope to show that if Descartes were to question that Being which he himself is, he would not start with the ego cogito; he would begin instead with an examination of the mind/body composite, something which, in essence, cannot be questioned in the context of the Meditations. What is surprising, as we shall see, is that, for Descartes, the mind/body composite is "understood" by us in everyday life, in our passions, and in conversation or discourse. The means to "understanding" this self of daily life is remarkably close to those suggested by Heidegger, though, to be sure, Descartes is far from developing a precise vocabulary to talk about such things. What is at stake in this examination? If I am correct, then Heidegger's critique of Descartes is reduced to the charge that he did not take up the right (that is, Heidegger's) project. We may as well charge Kant for not working in systematic theology or Plato for not writing poetry instead of philosophy, though I suspect that, in a manner of speaking, Heidegger does make this charge against Plato. More to the point, however, if I am correct, then Heidegger's critique is misplaced; it should have been directed to other aspects of Descartes' thinking and, if it had been so, Descartes, like Kant and Hegel, might have been shown in a more positive light.

A2: Knowledge Flawed

The imperfections in human knowledge prove the necessity of science

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Though we take a strict position on what constitutes knowledge, we aren’t critical of the sources of ideas. Often intuitive feelings, hunches, speculation, and flashes of inspiration prove to be excellent sources of novel approaches, new ways of looking at things, new discoveries, and new concepts. We don’t disparage those ideas derived from religious experience, altered states of consciousness, or the emotions; we merely declare that testing these ideas against reality is the only way to determine their validity as knowledge. 5. Human knowledge isn’t perfect. We recognize that the tools for testing knowledge—the human senses and human reason—are fallible, thus rendering tentative all our knowledge and scientific conclusions about the nature of the world. What’s true for our scientific conclusions is even more so for our moral choices and social policies; these latter are subject to continual revision in the light of both the fallible and tentative nature of our knowledge and constant shifts in social conditions.