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**Saudi-U.S. Relations are stabilizing—Obama has generated hopes for Middle East peace**

**Michelson 9**(Heike, April 30, Einaudi Center for World Affair Studies@Cornell University, “HRH Prince Turki Al-Faisal sees new hope in Saudi-American relations”, http://www.einaudi.cornell.edu/news/headlines.asp?id=2088)

HRH Prince Turki **Al-Faisal**, the **former Saudi Arabian ambassador to the** **U**nited **S**tates, **gave a talk on** "What We Expect From America: A Saudi Perspective.” His talk focused on **the** over 80 **years of Saudi-U.S. relations**, which have been characterized by tension and friendship. President Roosevelt befriended the founder of the Kingdom and supported the development of oil within the Kingdom. Prince Al-Faisal noted that “Your country helped us, in our developing days, in establishing not only educational institutions and accepting Saudi students to come to your country, but also in the technical support, military and otherwise." Tensions between the two reached high points during major events in the battle for and formation of an Israeli state in the 1950s and again in the 1970s. Relations between the two normalized during the Persian Gulf War as they came together over a common enemy in Iraq.  **September 11th** once more **increased hostility** between the countries **when** President George W. **Bush,** who made **much of the fact that 15 of the 19 terrorists were of Saudi nationality**, "turned his back to peacemaking in the Middle East and almost abandoned everything President Clinton had almost succeeded in bringing about." **This prompted** Crown Prince **Abdullah to write Bush** a letter explaining **that the two nations had reached a crossroads**, and a decision had to be made whether or not they would follow the same path or go their separate ways. **Since then**, however, **relations** between Saudi Arabia and the United States **have improved**. In spite of the myriad obstacles and problems stemming from the September 11th attacks, “**the two governments remained cool headed ... and managed to overcome the effects of that situation**.” **President Obama’s recent election has brought hope to the entire Middle East for peaceful resolutions** **to the turmoil that has embroiled the region for decades.** Prince Al-Faisal’s advice for U.S. foreign policy: “We don’t want any more plans…we don’t want Obama to say...‘come and tell me what you want.’ No. We want Obama to tell us what he wants. We want an end vision to all this.” **He ended on an optimistic note for the future of U.S.-Saudi relations, saying that they are willing to listen to Obama**, but that he should make sure his words are followed by actions. “We’re holding our breath and waiting.”

Sunni Alliance – 1NC

**Withdrawing from Iraq kills US-Saudi relations and causes Shiite-Sunni conflict**

**Byman 7**(Daniel, Director of Security Studies Program@Georgetown U, February 8, “Saudi Arabia's own Iraq nightmare”. http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/feature/2007/02/08/saudis)

**Saudi Arabia is watching with fear** **as the U**nited **S**tates **debates whether to stay in** [**Iraq**](http://dir.salon.com/topics/iraq) **or leave**. For while Washington may walk away from Iraq if President Bush's so-called [surge](http://dir.salon.com/topics/surge) plan fails, Saudi Arabia, which shares a more than 500-mile border with Iraq, cannot. **A predominantly Sunni** Muslim **nation** that prides itself on an ultra-puritanical Wahhabi interpretation of Islam, **Saudi Arabia has growing reason to be alarmed** **about** **the** rising **influence of** **Iran's hard-line Shiite regime in** war-torn **Iraq**. As **sectarian violence continues to deepen** there -- and with the balance of power across the [Middle East](http://dir.salon.com/topics/middle_east) possibly at stake -- **there is a growing danger that the Saudi leadership will try to protect its interests by supporting Sunni radicals** in their fight **against Iranian**-backed **Shiites, even though these** same **fighters are** also rabidly **anti-American**. That could have ominous consequences for the long-standing, though always complicated, alliance between Riyadh and Washington. Publicly, Saudis talk of the Iranian threat, both because they see it as growing and because they know that they will find sympathetic ears in Washington, especially now that the Bush administration is blaming Tehran for the deepening chaos in Iraq. Nawaf **Obaid**, a **longtime** **advisor to the Saudi government**, **issued a** [broadside editorial](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/28/AR2006112801277.html) in the Washington Post in November, **warning that a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would lead to "massive Saudi intervention to stop Iranian-backed Shiite militias** from butchering Iraqi Sunnis." **Although the tenuous state of the Saudi military makes a decisive military intervention almost unthinkable**, **Riyadh could provide military aid, and** certainly can provide considerable **funding**, to an array of Iraqi groups. From Riyadh's perspective, a stable and strong Iraq was a threat to the kingdom's security but at least had long balanced Tehran's influence -- a balance that ended after the United States toppled Saddam from power. Saudis have looked on with dismay as groups linked to Tehran gained power through the electoral system the United States established. Today, as the United States considers its options in the face of a bloody insurgency and growing sectarian strife, **the Saudis see Iran's clerical leaders as vultures circling around the corpse of Saddam Hussein's Sunni-dominated Iraq**. **Compounding** the **Saudis'** **fears** about the region **is the threat of unrest at home**. As **sectarian war increasingly dominates Iraq**, religious tensions inside the kingdom are growing. **Saudi Sunnis**, many of **whom see the Shiites as apostates**, **hear horror stories of atrocities committed by Shiite militias** **in Iraq and are agitating** **for Saudi intervention** to protect Iraqi Sunnis. **Saudi Arabia's** long-suffering **minority Shiite population**, in turn, **sees the carnage that Sunni suicide bombers are wreaking** in Iraq against Shiites, **and fears that hard-won reforms in its favor over the last 15 years may be reversed**. As Obaid's shrill warning suggests, the Saudis have many reasons to fear [Iran.](http://dir.salon.com/topics/iran/) The opposing countries' struggle for dominance in the region goes back decades and draws on a deep well of sectarian hatred. Even before the mullahs seized power in Tehran in 1979, Riyadh and Tehran competed for geopolitical influence in the Persian (or, as the Saudis would say, the "Arabian") Gulf. With the ascent of Ayatollah Khomeini's clerical regime, however, the competition became far nastier. Both countries portrayed themselves as defenders of the faith and based their political legitimacy on their religious bona fides. The difference was more than just Sunni vs. Shiite, or Arab vs. Persian: Iran purported to represent revolutionary Islam. Like many leftist movements, the new regime proclaimed it would aid the "dispossessed" against wealthy and supposedly exploitative Western powers. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, was a status quo state that had a cozy relationship with Washington and other Western powers. Khomeini regularly ridiculed the Saudi regime, and other Iranian leaders called for its downfall. Its leaders were corrupt and profligate. Khomeini leveled the ultimate insult: Saudi Islam was "American Islam." The result was a cold war within Islam. Both countries funded charities and religious schools that promulgated their version of the religion. Iran also established ties to a range of extremist groups in the Persian Gulf, which attempted a coup in neighboring Bahrain in 1981, committed terrorist acts against Kuwait, and stirred up unrest among Saudi Shiites, who represent perhaps a fifth of the total population in the kingdom and are concentrated in the oil-rich Eastern Province. Iran even demonstrated its contempt for the Saudis by inciting unrest for several years at the hajj, the annual holy pilgrimage to Mecca for the world's Muslims. The Saudis, in turn, poured money into Saddam's Iraq, helping it stay afloat and eventually overwhelm Iran in the two neighbors' bloody struggle.

Sunni Alliance – 1NC

**U.S.-Saudi relations key to solve multiple scenarios Middle East instability**

**Brzezinski 9**(Zbigniew, Professor of American Policy@John Hopkins University, May 8, “U.S.-Saudi Relations in a World Without Equilibrium Conference Transcripts -- Session 1 The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski”, http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/articles/2009/ioi/090508-ussa-brzezinski.html)

I think we need to work together and we have to draw some fundamental lessons from the experience of the previous century. **In the previous century** - the twentieth century - **Europe twice committed suicide. And it took a lot of** effort, including **American effort, to help bring Europe to its feet**. It committed suicide **because it couldn't handle nationalist, ethnic, territorial, and** yes, even also **religious conflicts, on its own**. **It succumbed** to **the easy temptation** of trying to resolve conflicts by **force**. **But force tends to produce unpredictable consequences**. **It tends to escalate**. It tends to get out of hand.  And **this is why it is so urgent to recognize** in regards to **the Israeli-Palestinian** conflict; or the problem with **Iran**; or the issues involving **Afghanistan and Pakistan**; **or the growing tensions within** various countries in **the Middle East** -- political, social, and religious; external threats. As for example, Saudi Arabia recently expressed concerns about threats emanating from South Yemen. **Religious differences**, not only **between Jews** and **Christians**, or Jews **and Muslims**, or Muslims and Christians, but **also among** Muslims, **the Sunni and the Shiite** -- that none of these issues in the present context in the Middle East can be constructively resolved by conflict.  But if there is not to be conflict, **peace has to be institutionalized. It has to be reinforced**, and it has to be built with deliberate effort. And as Professor Hagel said, "With a real sense of urgency." Because in fact **a number of problems in the Middle East** -- Middle East proper and Middle East at large -- **are getting out of hand**.  The opportunities for a solution to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict are beginning to fade away. If we don't move soon, there will be no peace. But if there is no peace, what will there be?  There will be a resumption of conflict and we had a little preview of it last December in Gaza, and we know what the consequences are. That will require a major American commitment stemming from the very practical realization that the two parties in the conflict cannot resolve it on their own. We know that.  If 30 years of experience is not evidence of that, then I don't know what evidence is. **The U**nited **S**tates **has to be actively engaged as a peace maker, and that means that the U**nited **S**tates **has to be willing to spell out at least the minimum parameters** of peace so that the parties are then propelled toward serious negotiations.  We need to do that. **Saudi Arabia needs to help**. We can do it from the outside. Saudi Arabia is in the region. **Saudi Arabia can influence the Arabians,** the Arab countries, and the Arab political movements. **Saudi Arabia can mitigate some of the tendencies towards extremism within the population,** and particularly within some of its more fundamentalist religious manifestations.  We need this initiative to be comprehensive, large scale, and mutually reinforcing. And if we don't do it together, we and the Arabs around Israel and Palestine, it is not going to happen. And if it doesn't happen, it will become worse.  War is not a solution for the problem posed in the region by Iran. **If there is a conflict with Iran** either provoked by someone or initiated by us **the consequences** for the region **will be devastating**. They will be devastating for us as well. Let's have no illusion about that. There is no solution to the problem of Iran -- in a narrow sense, the nuclear program; in a larger sense, the role of Iran in the region -- that can be achieved by war. Let's not be tempted by it. Let's not have anyone urge us privately to do it, even if not publicly. And let us not have anyone else provoke it.  I think we are conscious about this imperative. **We can avoid a conflict which will be self destructive for the region**, **not to mention** the fact that it will probably undermine America's role in the world. And whether one likes it or not, a constructive American role in the world is the only alternative to global chaos from which everyone suffers.  So the stakes are enormous. I could go on and on and talk about Afghanistan, Pakistan, but Senator Hagel has mentioned that and very aptly.  My central message is very simple. If we want to deal with these problems, we have to work in concert. **We have to take** certain **initiatives** that we have long delayed in taking. **And Saudi Arabia has to provide affirmative, assertive, outspoken leadership and not wait for others to act, but to be a partner**.  **We need** in brief: **an American, Saudi Arabian, genuine alliance for peace in the Middle East**.

Sunni Alliance – 1NC

Middle East instability causes nuclear war

**Steinbach 2**(John, DC Iraq Coalition, March, “Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction: a Threat to Peace”, http://globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html)

Meanwhile, **the existence of** **an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region** in turn **has serious implications for** future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even **the threat of nuclear war**. Seymour Hersh warns, **"Should war break out in the Middle East again**,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, **a nuclear escalation,** once unthinkable except as a last resort**, would now be a strong probability**."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "**The nuclear issue is gaining momentum**(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42**) Russia** and before it the Soviet Union **has long been a major**(if not the major) **target of Israeli nukes.** It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) **Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations** and, at the very least, **the** unilateral **possession of nuclear weapons** by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and **dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war**. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- **the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration**." (44)

\_\_\_\*\*Sunni Alliance – UQ

Brink

Sunni-Shia tension is rising in Iraq – danger awaits following withdrawal

**Siasat News, 6-17**-10. “Top cleric seen tipping Iraq's political balance ,” <http://www.siasat.com/english/news/top-cleric-seen-tipping-iraqs-political-balance?page=0,1>.

Najaf, June 17: **Iraqis hoping for a secular, nonsectarian government are worried about signs that the country's most revered Shiite cleric has stepped into the post election fray** with moves that appear aligned with Iran's own ambitions in Iraq. The March 7 election gave a narrow victory to a bloc led by Ayad Allawi, a secular Shiite with Sunni backing. But Allawi's chances of heading the next government were dampened when two major Shiite blocs, one of them overtly religious, struck an alliance after the votes were in. Now Allawi faces a fresh challenge in the shape of Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, the 83-year-old sage who was revered by Sunnis and Shiites alike as a uniter standing above politics, but who is now seen by many as the man who shut out Allawi and brokered the alliance that put the Shiites on top. **The apparent shift brings into sharper focus the conflicting visions of Iraq's future as the US prepares to withdraw its forces** from the country next year — **whether it will drift into the orbit of Iran, or take the middle ground by improving relations with Saudi Arabia and other Sunni-led Arab states**. Shiites are the majority in both Iraq and Iran, and the new alliance has positioned religious Shiite parties to maintain their hold on power for four more years and deepen the intertwining of politics and religion in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. The formalization of the merger was announced just hours after Ammar al-Hakim, one of its leaders, met with al-Sistani in Najaf, the Shiite holy city and base of the so-called marjaiyah, or religious Shiite leadership. **Sunnis** backed Allawi's Iraqiya bloc because they wanted a secular, Iraq-focused party to shield them against some Iranian-style form of Shiite clerical rule. They **are taking the new Shiite alliance as a slap in the face**, and fear Al-Sistani has gone from uniter of Iraq to uniter of its Shiites. "We don't view the recent moves of the marjaiyah to have been made in the national interest," complained Mohammed Tamim, an Iraqiya lawmaker. "They were made for the benefit of just one particular sect." The Shiites, for their part, see Iraqiya as a vehicle for sympathizers of Saddam's Baathist regime to regain their ascendancy or at least win more power than their minority status entitles them to. Both Allawi and al-Sistani carry personal baggage that isn't lost on Iraqis. Al-Sistani was born in Iran and holds Iranian citizenship. Allawi is a former member of the Baath Party and was handpicked by the Americans in 2004 to serve as Iraq's first post-Saddam prime minister. Iraq's next two prime ministers — Ibrahim al-Jaafari and the current Nouri al-Maliki — belong to the religious Shiite Dawa Party which is in the new alliance. With al-Maliki leading the alliance and seeking another term as prime minister, and Allawi claiming the title on the strength of his election showing, al-Sistani's role may be critical.

Uniqueness—US-Saudi Relations Stable

**US Saudi Relations are high now but are on the brink**

**Handley 10**(Paul, Jun 27, a foreign correspondent in Asia for more than twenty yearshttp://business.maktoob.com/20090000484542/U\_S\_Saudi\_talks\_to\_focus\_on\_Iran\_sanctions/Article.htm accessed June 27) CM

RIYADH - Saudi doubts over US-driven sanctions on Iran, the flaggin Middle East peace process and Afghanistan will be the focus of King Abdullah's talks at the White House this week, analysts say.Tuesday's meeting between President BarackObama and the 86-year-old sovereign of the Middle East oil giant, their third, comes after the sacking of the US commander in Afghanistan and with Iran still defiant over its controversial nuclear programme. Obama is expected to urge Saudi patience on Israeli-Palestinian peace talks and seek its help in shoring up support in Afghanistan and Pakistan for the fight against the Taliban. **The two sides** could also **agree arms deals to build Riyadh's defensive capabilities against Iran's threat, including a long-pending request for as many as 72 F-15 Eagle tactical fighters, according to defence industry sources. There are no gaping strategic differences between the close allies, said Saudi expert Thomas Lippman** at the US Council on Foreign Relations. **Abdullah and Obama's initial meeting in Riyadh on June 3, 2009, and Obama's landmark address to the Arab world in Cairo the next day did much to bridge the chasm dug by previous** president George W. Bush's **administration.The two coordinate closely on fighting Al-Qaeda and other threats**, Lippman said. "There's no breach to be repaired like before." **But even as they endorse Washington's lead on key regional problems, the Saudis have doubts about its approach**, especially in Iran and Afghanistan.

**U.S. Saudi relations are stable—Riyadh anticipate Obama to change foreign policy**

**Murphy 9**(Caryle, Foreign Correspondent@The National, “Bridging the Great Divide”, http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090121/FOREIGN/848419949/1103/ART)

RIYADH // **The** new **Obama administration will find Saudi Arabia** and its Arab Gulf neighbours in a sour mood, **distressed that** yet again **the U**nited **S**tates **did nothing to restrain Israel** from demonstrating its military might at huge cost to Arab civilians in the Gaza Strip. **Hard work will be needed in Washington to restore trust in the wisdom and execution of US foreign policies**. After eight years of being treated by the United States more like employees than partners, Gulf officials said, they hope to see more consultation and less “instruction”. Mr Obama’s election came as a surprise to many **Saudis** and other Gulf Arabs because of the United States’ history of slavery and racial tension. But they **greeted his victory with cheers**. Especially among young people, **expectations soared for a change in US foreign policies**. **The president’s Kenyan heritage, his brown skin and his Muslim father made Saudis feel he would be more sympathetic** to Arab views, said Ahmad al Farraj, a Riyadh-based political analyst. “**Obama** really **captured the imagination of Saudi Arabia**,” said Adel al Toraifi, a political columnist. **“Even Islamists have a good impression of him.”** But expectations of a major US policy change are on hold because of Israel’s siege on Gaza. And some are warning that disappointment is just around the corner. Although Mr Obama will “be better than Bush”, Mr al Farraj said, “I’ve been telling my friends to be prepared because Obama will shock you. He’ll be looking for a second term. And he will want to prove to white people and to Christians, ‘See? You thought I might like Arabs, but I don’t’.” **Riyadh has been trying to hold the incoming administration’s feet to the fire**. The cabinet of ministers said last week it “looks forward to an incoming American administration that is more serious, objective and independent in dealing with the Palestinian issue”. At the official level, US-Saudi relations will remain as they are because the basics have not changed: oil for the United States, security for Saudi Arabia.

Uniqueness—US-Saudi Relations Stable

**U.S.-Saudi relations high because of regional stability assurance, but the Saudi’s are still affected by past U.S. action**

**Long 4**(David, Professor of Middle East and Gulf Affairs, Summer, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 3, Pg. 33-4)

**The Saudi wake-up call for their own terrorist threat came** on 12 May **2004 when a terrorist attack rocked Riyadh**, killing twenty-nine, including nine Americans. That and **subsequent terrorist attacks have driven home to the Saudi public the need for an all-out counterterrorist campaign and hasbrought closer Saudi government cooperation** with US law enforcement and intelligence sharing between US and Saudi agencies. Thus, while both countries have found it in their interests to avoid publicizing that fact, **US-Saudi relations have greatly improved in the past year,** and **Saudi bashing has** somewhat **diminished**. On 24 March 2004, senior officials from the State and Treasury Departments and the Federal Bureau of Investigation testified before the House International Relations Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia at a hearing on “Saudi Arabia and the Fight against Terrorism Financing.” All three commended the kingdom for its progress in the war against terrorism. Cofer Black, the State Department’s coordinator for counterterrorism, stated, “The Saudis are a strong ally and are taking unprecedented steps to address an al Qaeda menace that threatens us both.”16 Recognition of Saudi cooperation was a positive step in improving relations, but it is extremely doubtful that the emphasis placed by the Treasury Department and the FBI on stopping the money flow will contribute significantly to the war against terrorism. In the words of Columbia University professor David Hisson, “Terrorism is not a revenue-intensive activity.” It does not take large infusions of capital to maintain operations. In the age of electronic transfers, it is impossible to cut off the money flow completely, anyway, whether it is terrorism money or laundered drug money. And even if it were possible to cut off all funding, it is impossible to eradicate terrorism. It is too cheap, too available, and too tempting. The best we can do in the war on terrorism is reduce it to manageable proportions in order that all peoples can live their lives free of constant fear. The question then remains, **Will the spate of animosity engendered by 11 September continue to undermine US-Saudi relations**, or will it gradually subside with the passage of time and in the face of strong, existing mutual interests? **Looking at the improvement of the relationship since 11 September**, there is some reason for hope. At the very least, **it seems highly unlikely that US-Saudi relations will break down completely in the foreseeable future**. **Their mutual interests in** oil, **regional security**, and in combating global terrorism **are** too **strong**. The relationship is like a marriage from which there is no divorce. The question is whether the marriage will remain stormy or again calm down over time. Considerable **psychological damage has been done**, particularly **on the Saudi side, that might take a long time to heal**. As a result, **the Saudis**, while pursuing mutual interests with the United States, **will likely be less inclined to make concessions than in the past**. **There is also the personal dimension**. Not only has **the ethnic and religious invective taken its toll**, but difficulties imposed in the name of security upon Saudis traveling to the United States may well have the long-term effect of directing them elsewhere to study and to conduct business, thus undermining interpersonal ties that have given the United States an advantage in government and commercial activities alike. The political, economic, and commercial impact of lessening personal ties could be enormous.

Uniqueness—US-Saudi Relations Stable

**U.S.-Saudi relations strong despite decreased oil trade**

**Dourian 10**(Kate, Head of Middle East coverage@Platts, February 23, *Platts Oilgram Price Report,* Vol. 88 No. 35, pg. 17)

**Saudi Arabia**, with current production of just over 8 million b/d, has production capacity of 12.5 million b/d and **holds the biggest percentage of the world's spare production capacity**. **Saudi Aramco also has significant downstream assets in the US** through joint ventures with Shell and ExxonMobil. **But Saudi exports to the US market**, previously the kingdom's biggest oil export market, **have been declining steadily** while sales to the faster-growing Asian market have risen and in 2008 accounted for 52.7% of total Saudi crude oil exports. The Department of Energy under Chu has focused on energy efficiency and conservation, as well as renewable energy, with the aim of reducing US dependence on foreign sources of oil, such as Saudi Arabia. However, in recent weeks, **Washington has been pressing Riyadh to provide assurances to China**, a key buyer of Middle Eastern crude oil, **that it would make up for any shortfall should the international community approve further sanctions against Iran**, including a possible ban on Iranian oil exports. While **diplomatic** **relations between Riyadh and Washington have remained strong despite strains following** the **September 11** attacks in which Saudi nationals were involved, there has been an erosion in oil exports to the US, partly as a result of an increased focus by the kingdom on the faster-growing markets in Asia and partly because of the recession that hit energy demand in the world's largest economy.

**U.S. Saudi Relations Stable—multiple reasons**

**BBC 9**(May 29, “Saudi paper hails ties with USA, urges new approach on Mideast”, BBC Worldwide Monitoring)

**Saudi-US** **relations have remained strong** and firm **despite** the **challenges** they faced **because of differences of views over the Palestinian issue** **and the conflict in the Middle East**. **Both** countries **faced** further **challenges in the wake of** the **9/11** attacks. However, **the** **Saudi and US leaderships saw** eye to eye **that those** terrorist **attacks would not threaten their** bilateral**relations**. And **even though** the administration of former US President George **Bush adopted a pre-emptive, offensive attitude in its foreign policy**, **it remained faithful to the historical ties** between Riyadh and Washington, and despite the strict procedures that the US Consulate followed in granting visas, political ties between Riyadh and Washington continued to be characterized by integration and coordination. President Barak **Obama's visit to Riyadh** on 3 June **reflects Washington's respect for** the status that **the Kingdom** of Saudi Arabia enjoys within the international community. **This visit** expresses a tradition of continued appreciation by successive US administrations of the pioneering status Riyadh represents and the constructive role it has played in promoting stability and security in the Middle East, indeed the stability of international economies. Saudi Arabia has never hidden its desire for balanced oil prices that serve both exporters and importers. It has never hesitated to exert assiduous efforts to establish peace in the Middle East and confront the dangers that threatened regional stability. **Riyadh has always insisted on equal and effective partnership with Washingto**n, **avoiding** the **disputes** that other parties tried to raise to maintain crises and wars. **The relationship with Washington has been an object of appreciation by the** **Saudi leadership**, which paid special attention to it because the United State is a major power that shoulders great responsibilities towards world peace and security.

Uniqueness—US-Saudi Relations Stable – A2: Israel

**Relations high—Obama’s Saudi Arabia trip, and he has criticized Israel**

**BBC 9**(June 3, BBC Worldwide Monitoring, “Saudi editorial calls for Obama to turn new page in relations”, Lexis)

Saudi newspapers commented editorially today on a number of topics, affirming that **Saudi-American relations are strong** and durable. The Makkah-based Al-Nadwa said the Saudi-American relations are deep-rooted and their foundation was laid by the Kingdom's Founder -the late King Abd-al-Aziz during his historical meeting with the then US President Franklin Roosevelt more than six decades ago. The sons of King Abdulaziz followed the footsteps of their great father as regards cementing relations with the US, the daily said. The paper noted that the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdallah Bin-Abd-al-Aziz during his visits to Washington has given an additional impetus to these relations. **King Abdullah has succeeded in surpassing** the era which followed the events of **September 11 when certain quarters,** exploiting the events**, tried to undermine the Saudi-American relations**, said the daily, **adding that the wisdom of the two leaderships has defeated the anti-media campaigns** through partnership strategy embodied by the visits exchanged at all levels. "Undoubtedly, **the** current **visit of** US President Barack **Obama** to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia **will contribute to further cementing the bilateral relations**, and it **will constitute an important development for further enhancing** cultural and scientific **cooperation** taking into account the fact that the US is an important place for Saudi students who are on scholarships, and the Kingdom has been positively contributing to enabling others get acquainted with Islam and its tolerant teachings," Al-Nadwa commented. It believed that **the Palestinian problem constitutes the core of the Kingdom's foreign policy**, and that **Saudi Arabia has been urging Washington to tackle this problem fairly so as to enable the Palestinians' practice their legitimate rights** including their right to establish an independent state on their homeland. In an editorial entitled 'What the Muslims expect from Obama', the Riyadh-based Al-Jazirah said the visit of Obama to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia starting later today, is the first visit for the US president to an Arab country, and the visit can be viewed as a renewal for the Arab-American relations which were undermined during the era of US former president George W.Bush and the neo-conservatives. **The visit in itself is not enough to restore** the Arab-American **relations** to its proper lane because **mistakes committed by former US administration** under the pretext of fighting terrorism and its involvement in two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in line with the policy of 'Either with us or against us'. **The policy of the former US administration has made the region explosive** and has given the green light to Israel to continue its aggressions against Palestine and Lebanon, the paper said. "So, it is an essential matter for Obama to open a new page in Washington's international relations because the relations should be based on the principle of dialogue and mutual respect," said the daily, noting that the Arab and Muslim countries are keen on reciprocal relations based on cooperation and mutual interests. "Moreover, the Arab and Muslim countries are keen on enabling the Palestinian people restore their usurped rights," said Al-Jazeerah newspaper. "Obama during the presidential elections campaign pledged to improve Washington's relations with the countries of the world notably the Muslim countries, and in the light of this pledge the American Muslims voted for him." "It is premature to say that Obama has fulfilled his promises in this respect," said the daily, adding that the Palestinian problem is the most important topic through which we can evaluate Obama's policy towards the Arabs and Muslims. **Obama has firmly criticized Israel's settlement policy and its endeavours to escape paying prices for peace**, the paper noted.

Uniqueness – US-Saudi Relations Stable – A2: Withdrawal Inevitable

**No withdrawal—instability, 50,000 troops will stay**

**Chulov 10**(Martin, Iraq Correspondent for the Guardian, May 12, “Iraq violence set to delay US troop withdrawal” http://readersupportednews.org/off-site-news-section/45-45/1949-iraq-violence-set-to-delay-us-troop-withdrawal)

**The White House is likely to delay the withdrawal of** the first large phase of **combat troops from** [**Iraq**](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/iraq) **for at least a month after escalating bloodshed** **and political instability** in the country. General Ray Odierno, the US commander, had been due to give the order within 60 days of the general election held in Iraq on 7 March, when the cross-sectarian candidate Ayad Allawi edged out the incumbent leader, Nouri al-Maliki. **American officials had been prepared for delays in negotiations to form a government**, but now appear to have balked after Maliki's coalition aligned itself with the theocratic Shia bloc to the exclusion of Allawi, who attracted the bulk of the minority Sunni vote. **There is also concern over interference from Iraq's neighbours,** Iran, Turkey and Syria. Late tonight **seven people were killed and 22 wounded when a car bomb planted outside a cafe exploded in Baghdad's Sadr City**, a Shia area, police and a source at the Iraqi interior ministry said. **The latest bomb highlights how sectarian tensions are rising**, as al-Qaida fighters in Iraq and affiliated Sunni extremists have mounted bombing campaigns and assassinations around the country. **The violence is seen as an attempt to intimidate all sides of the political spectrum and press home the message to the departing US forces that militancy remains a formidable foe**. Odierno has kept a low profile since announcing the deaths of al-Qaida's two leaders in Iraq, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayub al-Masri, who were killed in a combined Iraqi-US raid on 18 April. The operation was hailed then as a near fatal blow against al-Qaida, but violence has intensified ever since. All US combat forces are due to leave Iraq by 31 August, a date the Obama administration is keen to observe as the president sends greater reinforcements to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan – a campaign he has set apart from the Iraq war, by describing it as "just". Iraqi leaders remain adamant that combat troops should leave by the deadline. But they face the problem of not having enough troops to secure the country if the rejuvenated insurgency succeeds in sparking another lethal round of sectarian conflict. "The presence of foreign forces sent shock waves through Iraqis," said Hoshyar Zebari, the foreign minister. "And at the beginning it was a terrifying message that they didn't dare challenge. But then they got emboldened through terrorism and acts of resistance. And as the Americans are leaving, we are seeing more of it." Zebari said Iraq's neighbours were taking full advantage of the political stalemate. He also hinted that they may be directly backing the violence. "They too have been emboldened, because we haven't been able to establish a viable unified government that others can respect," he said. "In one way or another, Iran, Turkey and Syria are interfering in the formation of this government. "There is a lingering fear [among some neighbouring states] that Iraq should not reach a level of stability. The competition over the future of Iraq is being played out mostly between Turkey and Iran. They both believe they have a vested interest here." **The withdrawal order is** eagerly **awaited** by the 92,000 US troops still in Iraq – they mostly remain confined to their bases. This month Odierno was supposed to have ordered the pullout of 12,500, a figure that was meant to escalate every week between now and 31 August, when only **50,000 US troops are set to remain – all of them non-combat forces**.

**Withdrawal will be delayed due to violence—50,000 will still be left indefinitely anyway**

**Ditz 10**(Jason, Managing News Editor, May 11, “Iraq Drawdown ‘Reconsidered,’ US Admits”, http://news.antiwar.com/2010/05/11/iraq-drawdown-reconsidered-us-admits/)

With Iraqis [still reeling from yesterday’s attacks which left 154 dead and over 600 wounded](http://news.antiwar.com/2010/05/11/2010/05/10/at-least-84-killed-in-attacks-across-iraq/), the deadliest day in quite some time in the nation, **US officials are finally admitting that the August “drawdown” is being reconsidered**. Initially **Obama Administration officials had promised to have all combat troops out of Iraq by August** of this year, [**leaving some 50,000 troops in the nation indefinitely afterwards**](http://news.antiwar.com/2010/05/11/2009/02/26/obama-to-leave-50000-troops-in-iraq-indefinitely/)**. Even this pledge**, a far cry from his campaign promise to have all the troops out by May, **is looking increasingly unlikely.** With the March 7 election predictably ending in indecision and rising tensions, **the US hasn’t even started removing its nearly 100,000 troops** in earnest yet, and with [just months left to meet that deadline they are admitting that it might not begin until “June at the earliest.](http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2010/05/11/international/i102158D49.DTL)” When **US officials were selling Iraq’s election as a “stabilizing” influence** **the hope was that the drawdown would** seriously **begin just** weeks **after the vote**. Now that **the election seems to have made matters dramatically worse,** not only the August deadline but **the 2011 deadline must be considered in question.**

Uniqueness – Sunni Alliance Strong

**Sunni states will tentatively keep their relationship to the US – critical internal link to avoiding sectarian war**

Mohamad **Bazzi, 6-17**-10. Senior Fellow for Middle East studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and Journalism Prof @ NYU. “Opinion: Appeasing a tougher Tehran,” Global Post, Lexis.

The clerical hierarchy and military apparatus realized that they needed to shore up their Islamic and populist credentials after the election protests and crackdown. Their strategy was to focus outward: an imperial Iran trying to extend its dominance over the Persian Gulf and the region as a whole. As it sought to maintain its grip on power, the Iranian regime engaged in more, not less, adventurism abroad. By surviving its internal challenge, the Iranian regime has emerged stronger. The Sunni Arab states still view Shiite Iran as a significant threat, but they are now largely resigned to negotiation with Tehran instead of confrontation. Arab leaders are no longer convinced that their best hope for countering Iran is to stick with the United States. Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, **the Middle East has been polarized between the** so-called œ**axis of resistance** (anti-imperialist, anti-Western, led by Iran and its allies Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas) **and** the œaxis of accommodation (**Sunni Arab states allied with the United States**). The leaders of Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah rarely miss an opportunity to portray themselves as defenders of the Palestinian cause, who reflect the popular will of millions of Muslims chafing under regimes that œsold out to the United States. The Islamic Republic spent decades nurturing its allies in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and, more recently, in the Palestinian territories. Tehran would not allow these alliances to wither because of internal or external pressures. The Iranian regime lost some of its populist legitimacy in the Arab world after the disputed election. In a region ruled by kings and despots, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad worked hard to cultivate his image as a Third World leader who is not afraid to stand up to the West. He had become more popular among Arabs than his own people, who were frustrated by his inability to deliver on promises to improve a stagnant economy, root out corruption and redistribute oil wealth. When Ahmadinejad denies the Holocaust or threatens Israel, his rhetoric resonates more with Arabs than Iranians, who have far less at stake in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Still, the traditional centers of power in the Arab world ” **Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other Sunni states** in the Persian Gulf ” **are extremely nervous about the growing influence of Iran:** its nuclear ambitions, its sway over the Iraqi government and Shiite militias, its support for Hezbollah and Hamas, and its alliance with Syria (which some Arab regimes accuse of being a traitor to the Arab cause). **Arab leaders are not worried that Iran will export the cultural aspects of Shiism; rather, they are afraid of political Shiism spreading to the Arab world through militant groups like Hezbollah**. The groups strong performance against a far superior Israeli military during the July 2006 war electrified the Arab world, and it offers a stark contrast to Arab rulers appeasing the United States. Arab regimes fear that their Sunni populations will be seduced by Iran and Hezbollahs message of empowering the dispossessed ” creating a new and potent admixture of Arabism and Shiite identity. There is some precedent for this. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini inspired revolutionary zeal among nationalists throughout the Arab world. The revolutions aftershocks were felt for a long time in the Middle East, helping, indirectly, to give rise to some militant Sunni movements and inspiring Shiites in Lebanon and Iraq. As the Iranian regime suppressed internal dissent over the past year, it worked to maintain its influence over neighboring Iraq and all the major Shiite factions there. Since Iraqs provincial elections in January 2009, Iran tried to revive the defunct United Iraqi Alliance, a sectarian coalition of Shiite parties that dominated the first parliamentary elections in 2005 and largely collapsed two years later. Before the latest parliamentary vote in March, Iran helped bring together two major Shiite parties: the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, led by Iranian-backed cleric Ammar al-Hakim, and the Sadrist movement led by anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. The final reunification took place last month in Baghdad, when the State of Law coalition headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki joined the other Shiite factions to form a single parliamentary bloc that is just four seats shy of a majority. With Irans backing, this new alliance will likely claim the right to form a government despite the fact that it was created after the elections and is therefore disregarding the wishes of the Iraqi electorate. By joining this Shiite alliance, Maliki is trying to exclude his rival Ayad Allawi, whose secular coalition attracted strong Sunni support. **This threatens to once again unleash** the **sectarian warfare** that shattered Iraq from 2005 to 2007. When Sunni Arab regimes like Saudi Arabia attempt to exert their influence in Iraq, they are often outmaneuvered by Iran. Saudi King Abdullah tried to publicly break from the Bush administration in March 2007, when he denounced, for the first time, the U.S. military presence in Iraq as an œillegitimate foreign occupation. The king was reflecting the view of many Arabs who blame the U.S. overthrow of Saddam Husseins minority Sunni regime in Iraq for emboldening Iran. Arab leaders also blamed the breakdown of Israeli-Palestinian talks on former President George W. Bushs refusal for seven years to actively engage in Middle East peacemaking. Even limited progress on peace efforts could have provided diplomatic cover for the Sunni Arab states to cooperate more closely with the United States ” and work to isolate Iran. Today, Arab leaders have little hope that President Barack Obama will be able to compel Israelis and Palestinians into substantial negotiations. **The Saudis and other Arab regimes are most concerned with their own surviva**l. Of course, **they will remain staunch U.S. allies and wary of Irans ascendance. But they will continue hedging their bets** by appeasing a more confident Tehran. **Its the only way to survive in a tough part of the world.**

Uniqueness – Sunni Alliance Strong

Sunni states are united behind the US against Iran

**NYT 09,** (no author, March 30, “Bahrain” [http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/bahrain/index.html Accessed June 27](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/bahrain/index.html%20Accessed%20June%2027)) CM

**Although a diplomatic outreach by Iran has succeeded in calming tempers, officials, political analysts and diplomats in Bahrain and around the region said that the reaction exposed simmering, unresolved tensions**. **The conflict also underscored the tension between those officials in Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia who are aligned with Washington** and support the peace process with Israel, and those in Qatar and Syria who have developed close political and economic ties with Iran.  A predominantly Persian nation, **Iran is seen** by some leaders **in** Egypt, **Saudi Arabia and other Western-aligned countries as the greatest threat to their regional influence**. The United Arab Emirates has a longstanding dispute with Tehran over three islands in the gulf occupied by Iran. The largest of the three, **Abu Musa, is strategically located in the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow chokepoint through which all vessels from Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the Emirates must pass to reach the open ocean. It has been occupied by Iran since 1992. The conflict also aggravated hostility between several Arab leaders who are Sunni Muslims and their Shiite citizens. In Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, Sunni Muslim** leaders accuse Iran, a Shiite country, of inciting their Shiite communities to rebel; meanwhile, the Shiites in those places say their Sunni leaders use Iran's rising influence as an excuse to step up their oppression. Some Arab leaders, including in Morocco and Bahrain, **have accused Iran and its proxies of trying to convert their Sunni citizens to Shiism, a charge Iran has denied.** In Bahrain, there have been riots nearly every night in the poor Shiite villages along the coast. The rioters, who burn tires in the street and hurl rocks and metal spikes at the police, insist that they are protesting an apartheid system that denies them opportunities equal to those of their Sunni neighbors, and they say that their government has cracked down in response to the perceived threats.

**U.S. developing Sunni alliance**

**Tamimi 7**(Azzam, Director of the Institute of Islamic Political Thought, March 7, “Sunnis will not be persuaded that Iran is their real enemy” http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/mar/07/comment.comment)

**Now the Americans and their Arab allies in the region seem convinced that** their **Iran**ian adversary **is the real winner from** the occupation of **Iraq**. **The threat to US interests has been compounded by the refusal of the Iranians to abandon their nuclear programme**. **The US-Shia alliance in Iraq has backfired** on America. Now, as the fourth anniversary of the invasion approaches, **a US-Sunni alliance seems to be in the making to pave the way** for an attack against Iran. It is widely believed in the region that **the meeting** in Jordan on 20 February **between** Condoleezza **Rice**, the US secretary of state, **and the intelligence chiefs of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and the U**nited **A**rab **E**mirates **was aimed at preparing the ground**. The idea appears to be for the Sunni world, which until recently would have been opposed to any attack on Iran, to see the merits of a US strike. The role of Washington's friends in the region would be to portray Iran as the real threat to both Arabs and Sunnis. The best climate for achieving such an objective is sectarianism not only inside Iraq but across the region. But the new US-Sunni alliance is likely to backfire, as the US-Shia alliance did. If one of the latter's repercussions was a Sunni backlash, wait and see what an Iranian-backed Shia explosion of anger will do to our world. And the anger will not be confined to Shias. **The US-Sunni alliance is** in fact **a coalition with** the corrupt regimes of **Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan** - which falsely claim to represent Sunni Islam and are loathed by their populations - along with their backers in the west. If Iran is attacked, it is highly unlikely that the Sunnis will be indifferent; just as they stood by Hizbullah last summer, they will stand by Iran. The attempt to create a US-Sunni alliance has already failed to convince most Sunnis that Iran - rather than the US - is the real enemy.

Uniqueness – US-Kuwait Relations Stable

US Kuwait relations are high- new nuclear agreement proves

**BERNAMA  10,** (no author, June 24, <http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v5/newsworld.php?id=508336> accessed June 27) CM

**The United States and Kuwait here signed a Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) on nuclear safeguards and other nonproliferation topics**, according to Qatar News Agency.  The MoC was signed for Kuwait by Secretary General of the Kuwait National Nuclear Energy Committee (KNNEC) Dr. Ahmad Bishara and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Thomas D''Agostino.  **The MoC includes cooperation in nuclear legislation and regulations,** human resource planning and modeling, nuclear safeguards and security, radiation protection and environmental.  Among others are on the safety and health issues, low-and intermediate-level radioactive waste management, reactor operations, safety and best practices.  **During the ceremony, D'Agostino said it is clear that both countries recognise the importance of preventing nuclear proliferation**, and keeping dangerous nuclear materials out of the hands of terrorists and proliferators.  **"This agreement is an important milestone further underscoring the commitment of the United States and Kuwait to address the global challenges of nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards and security,"** he added.  "Understanding, developing and implementing proper nuclear safeguards is an important part of any successful nuclear energy program, and this agreement helps strengthen nonproliferation efforts around the world," **D'Agostino noted.  Kuwait Ambassador to the US Sheikh Salem Abdullah Al-Jaber Al-Sabah said Kuwait and the US already enjoy a very strong relationship and this cooperation will add another aspect to the relationship.  "As Kuwait looks forward to its energy needs in the future, of course nuclear power is one of the options we are looking at very seriously and I see no better partner to work with other than the US on this venture that we are about to embark on,"** he pointed out.  "Kuwait is an oil-producing country but that does not put aside our willingness and ability to look into other sources of energy as our population increases and as our demand for electric generation increases," he affirmed.  -- BERNAMA

Uniqueness – US-Kuwait Relations Stable

US and Kuwait relations high

**al-Sabah 08**, (Shaykh Muhammad , August 8,Kuwaiti deputy prime minister and foreign minister, BBC NEWS, From Al-Arabiya Through LEXISNEXIS, Accessed 6/28) CM

He says: 'Of course, **we are the allies of the United States and it is largely to be credited for liberating Kuwait from the Iraqi occupation**. But while we are allies of the United States, we are also frank with the United States. We announced publicly that we are against any military action against Iran from Kuwait." He adds: "We also have the courage to speak with our main allies on what we see is in the interest of my country first and the region. Therefore, we are against the use of force and military action against Iran." Continuing, he says: "We were not pleased with the way Iraq was dealt with after the fall of Saddam Husayn. We used to speak to our US allies continuously about some of the mistakes they made after the fall of Saddam. **We also did not establish diplomatic relations with Israel and we did not normalize our ties with it. Yet we are the biggest allies of the United States in the region**. But, we tell the United States that we cannot normalize with Israel while it continues to violate international legitimacy. We have this courage to speak to our main ally, the United States, by what is dictated by our national and pan-Arab interests." Asked about Kuwait's position if a decision was made to attack Iran, Shaykh Al-Sabah says this is a hypothetical question and adds: "We are now speaking about peaceful solutions. The talk about military action is not compatible with the current atmosphere. The talk now is about diplomatic action through the world organization, international legitimacy, and diplomatic and political action. Therefore, permit me not to answer this hypothetical question." Shaykh Al-Sabah says that Kuwait pursues positive neutrality, which means giving advice to Iran. He says: "Iran is our friend and we are in a continuous dialogue with our brothers in Iran. I was in Iran last week and I spoke with our brothers there including Foreign Minister Mottaki. They know Kuwait's precise stand. I announced from Tehran that Iran must reassure the world about the peacefulness of its nuclear programme by abiding by the protocols defined by the IAEA. I always told them that Muhammad al-Baradi'i is a friend and not a foe." Anchorman Nakuzi says**:"** But your Iranian friend says, if I am attacked I will not only close the Strait of Hormuz., but also attack the US bases in the Gulf, which essentially means Iraq and Kuwait. Despite your positive neutrality, this friend says that if I am attacked I will attack Kuwait; not the Kuwaiti people, but the US allies in the region**.**" Shaykh Al-Sabah says: "I did not hear this talk or understand this way at least. Iran said that if there is a military action against it, it will reply by attacking all the areas from which the military operations took off, and this is a legitimate right. This is the right of self-defence." "Therefore, I understand that there will be no military attack from Kuwait," anchorman Nakuzi says. "This is correct," Shaykh Al-Sabah says, adding: "**The US forces in Kuwait have a specific duty under an agreement with the United States**. Therefore, we are reassured. But **if the United States wanted to take military action, it would not have any need for bases in the region**. Operations might take off from the United States, as happened in the case with Iraq. Therefore, I do not want to talk about hypotheses. **Our brothers in Iran are aware about the nature of US presence in Kuwait**. We explained to them fully that this presence has nothing to do with Iran. This US, British, and French presence and our treaties with Federal Russia and China are for the protection of Kuwait." Following a short break, anchorman Nakuzi asks Shaykh Al-Sabah if he believes that the region is witnessing Sunni-Shi'i sedition, Shaykh Al-Sabah says: "No doubt there are those who rekindle this sedition. There are those who want to rouse or revive this sedition." There are also those who want to classify states and societies on sectarian basis. He says: "I will speak about my country, Kuwait, and the Sunni-Shi'i merger in it. Perhaps, many do not know that many Shi'is were martyred in defence of Kuwait." Turning to Iraq, he says that Iraq was able to prevent Sunni-Shi'i sedition. "Praised be God, we now see the signs of Iraqi national unity," he says. Asked how he views Hezbollah's domination and use of arms in Beirut, Shaykh Al-Sabah says: "I do not like to speak about our brothers in Lebanon, because Lebanon has a special dynamism. Lebanon is a special case. It cannot be a yardstick for any other Arab country." He refers to the numerous crises experienced by Lebanon and how accord was reached in the end. Shaykh Al-Sabah also refers to the $300 million, which Kuwait allocated for the reconstruction of Lebanon, including Shi'i areas. "We never dealt with the Lebanese political forces on the basis of their sectarian identity," he says. We are colour blind when dealing with Iraq and pay no attention to sectarian identities.

\_\_\_\*\*Sunni Alliance – Links

Link—Iraq Withdrawal

**Plan critically tanks relations—Riyadh will see withdrawal as Obama’s unwillingness to support relations**

**Tiron 8**(Roxana, Defense Expert@The Hill, September 11, “Relationship with Saudi Arabia poses a host of challenges for next president”, http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/1763-relationship-with-saudi-arabia-poses-a-host-of-challenges-for-next-president)

**Saudi Arabia is watching the American presidential election** carefully, **because its relationship with the new president will be crucial** to secure America’s standing in the Middle East. **Saudi Arabia** does not publicly favor one presidential candidate, but experts on the kingdom say it **is afraid of the unknown, particularly after a mostly favorable relationship with** President **Bush** and his father. After Sept. 11, 2001, the American relationship with the kingdom became much more politically challenging because 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi. Sens. John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Barack **Obama** (D-Ill.) **have been harsh critics of human rights violations in Saudi Arabia**. McCain earlier this year went as far as accusing the kingdom of sponsoring terrorist attacks in Iraq. While courting the women’s vote, McCain and Obama have Saudi Arabia in their crosshairs when it comes to gender discrimination. Women in Saudi Arabia are not allowed to vote, drive or participate in the Olympics. In the August issue of Marie Claire, Obama vowed to be a strong advocate of women’s rights around the world. “When it comes to countries like Saudi Arabia or Pakistan or others in the Middle East where women are still in second-class positions, it is important for us to recognize that the culture is not going to transform overnight,” he said. “But we won’t be bashful about speaking out on these issues and affirming a core belief in the equality of women.” In 2002, McCain said on the John Williams radio show: “I’m just saying we insist that you allow people some fundamental rights. Let’s start out in Saudi Arabia by allowing women to ride in the front seat of a car? How about that, just for starters?” But some say that campaign rhetoric will remain just that, claiming Saudi Arabia officials are confident the criticism will ease significantly when the presidential race is over. “**The Saudis are resigned to** a certain amount of Saudi-**bashing during American presidential elections**. They don’t like it, but **they take it without whining,” said** Wyche **Fowler** Jr., **the U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia** from 1996 to 2001. Another Middle East expert, Hady Amr, said that the new president would have a “more pragmatic” approach. **At the heart of future U.S.-Saudi relations is how a new White House will assuage regional concerns about** **Iran’s growing power and** **Iraq’s instability**, analysts say. **The Saudi elites are** nervous both **about** **Obama’s** Iraq withdrawal policy and about McCain’s “neoconservatism,” pro-Israel stance and “bellicose” statements towards Iran, said F. Gregory Gause III, an expert on Saudi Arabia at the University of Vermont. **Saudi Arabia finds itself in a delicate position.** King Abdullah has called America’s invasion of Iraq an “illegal occupation,” but now **Riyadh fears that a quick withdrawal of U.S. troops would bolster Iran’s regional influence**.

**Pre-mature withdrawal kills relations**

**Leverett 9**(Flynt, director of the Geopolitics of Energy Initiative@the New America Foundation, “Interview: US-Saudi Relations, http://www.energyintel.com/DocumentDetail.asp?document\_id=251328)

**The Saudis are** also **concerned** that the **Obama** administration **will withdraw US forces from Iraq too quickly**, in a way **that reignites ethnic and sectarian conflict there and creates serious challenges to Saudi security.** At this point, I think that Saudi expectations about how much Shia dominance of Iraqi politics can be rolled back are not realistic, but **the way** in which **Iraq has evolved** since Saddam Hussein was overthrown genuinely **concerns the Saudis**. **As** the **Obama** administration **works to reconfigure** the **American presence in Iraq, it would be** well **advised to talk with the Saudis** much more than the Bush administration ever did about what the United States is doing.

Link—Iraq Withdrawal

**Perception of Iraqi instability freaks out Saudi Arabia**

**McMillan 6**(Joseph, United States Institute of Peace, “Saudi Arabia and Iraq: Oil, Religion, and an Enduring Rivalry” http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/articles/2006/ioi/060131-usip-saudi-iraq-2.html)

**The Saudi foreign policy agenda toward Iraq**, now and for the foreseeable future, **can be summed up in a single word: stability.** As early as November 2003, Adel al-Jubeir, **the foreign affairs adviser** to then-Crown Prince Abdullah, **told** a press conference in **Washington, "We are concerned that the situation in Iraq, unless we deal with it in a positive way, could erode and unravel**."[1] Within less than a year, Saudi officials were privately describing the situation in Iraq as nothing short of chaotic, and the Saudi media had become openly critical of the optimistic assessments of progress in Iraq coming out of the White House. **This emphasis on stability is,** in part, **characteristic of the Saudi worldview** in general. Saudi Arabia shares a 475 mile border with Iraq. (Map: CIA Factbook) On both a governmental and an individual basis, **Saudis are temperamentally uncomfortable with disorder and unpredictability,** which is why the Saudi government has traditionally moved slowly and with extreme caution on issues both foreign and domestic. **In the case of Iraq**, however**, Riyadh's fear of instability is** firmlygrounded in concrete **threats to Saudi national and dynastic interests.** As Saudi officials regularly point out, **the kingdom's longest** international **border is with Iraq**. It is, for most of its length, remote, undemarcated, and undefended, and, for reasons that have shifted over time, has always been a matter of security concern to the Saudi regime. In recent decades, the concerns about the security of the border were primarily military. During and after the first Gulf War, the size and perceived capabilities of Iraqi military forces, combined with the evident hostility the Saddam Hussein regime harbored toward its conservative monarchical neighbor, forced Saudi decision makers to treat the border as a possible avenue of attack. But conventional military attack was far from the only threat Saudi leaders feared from Iraq. The difficulty of patrolling in remote desert areas, combined with the ingrained tribal traditions of easy movement across borders, made northern Saudi Arabia, western Iraq, and eastern Jordan a beehive of smuggling activity. In happier times, what Riyadh was most concerned about was liquor and narcotics, and to a lesser degree firearms. With what the Saudis see as the collapse of government in Iraq, the uncontrolled flow of terrorist operatives in both directions, bringing with them heavy arms pilfered from the former regime, has become the overriding issue. **The Saudi government's biggest fear is that disorder will spill over its own borders** **in the form of** experienced, battle-trained **fighters who can easily infiltrate** into the kingdom, **bringing** with them newly honed skills in **bomb-making and other aspects of insurgent warfare** and joining with al Qaeda elements already active in Saudi Arabia.

**Relations with Saudi Arabia are stable now—withdrawal would de-rail relations**

**McMillan 6**(Joseph, United States Institute of Peace, “Saudi Arabia and Iraq: Oil, Religion, and an Enduring Rivalry” http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/articles/2006/ioi/060131-usip-saudi-iraq-7.html)

Although **Saudi Arabia** argued strenuously against the invasion of Iraq before it took place, since the overthrow of Saddam it **has made clear that it hopes for and supports the success of U.S. efforts to restore order**. This position clearly does not mean that the Saudis have agreed with everything the United States has done **in Iraq**. For example, Saudi leaders opposed the dismantlement of the Iraqi Army and the Baath Party, both of which they argue were key institutions that should have been purged and then utilized for the reconstruction of the country. The Saudis contend that both decisions had the effect of unnecessarily making enemies of many who might otherwise have been neutral toward the occupation. **Despite** these **differences over the past**, **and Saudi anxieties over the empowerment of Iraqi Shia, U.S. and Saudi objectives toward Iraq are now** largely **in harmony** -- **for the time being.** **This** harmony **was reflected in** **Saud al-Faisal's statement** to the Saudi-British Forum shortly after the Iraqi elections, which could as easily have been given by a U.S. official: "**We must also work for a stable and unified Iraq**, at peace with itself and in harmony with its neighbors. We are heartened by the electoral process and results in that country. And we must work together to achieve what the Iraqi people deserve." [26] **Adel al-Jubeir**, adviser to then–Crown Prince Abdullah, had **previously emphasized the importance of U.S. success in Iraq** in a speech to the Los Angeles Committee on Foreign Affairs on October 4, 2004, **urging that the** **U**nited **S**tates **not give up on restoring order to Iraq** and **saying, "You must succeed**. The challenge is, how do you do it, but you must persevere **if you want stability in the region**." The Saudis' desire for stability in Iraq and for cooperation with the United States was also visible in then -- Crown Prince Abdullah's initiative proposing the establishment of an Arab-Islamic force to help secure Iraq, a proposal that the White House rejected publicly on October 18, 2004. Nevertheless, **the fact that Saudi officials** continued to **cling** to the idea well **beyond** **the point** that **Washington considered it** dead **should** **be** interpreted as **clear evidence of Riyadh's interest in helping the** **U**nited **S**tates cope with the Iraqi situation.[27]

Link—Iraq Withdrawal

**Saudi Arabia is attempting to prevent Iranian influence in Iraq—U.S. pullout kills relations and wrecks Iran containment**

**Kaye and Wehrey 9** (Dali, Associate Director for ME foreign Police@RAND, and Frederic, Senior Policy associate@Rand, *The Washington Quarterly,* Volume 32, Issue 3, July, pg. 41-2)

**Due to** this **inter-Arab disarray and the Iranian threat being** at times **more symbolic than real** **in the minds of** many **Arab leaders, Washington has not** always **been able to strengthen** Arab **containment policies against Iran**. **The failure to forge a unified consensus against Tehran has only been exacerbated by what** Arab states, particularly **Saudi Arabia, perceive as conflicting signals and uncertainty in U.S. policies toward Iran**.[26](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/99146287-5749201/section%7Edb=all%7Econtent=a912817522%7Efulltext=713240928%7Edontcount=true#NOTE0026) With the release of the Iraq Study Group report in 2006 and the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran, Riyadh detected a subtle shift in Washington's approach toward Tehran.[27](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/99146287-5749201/section%7Edb=all%7Econtent=a912817522%7Efulltext=713240928%7Edontcount=true#NOTE0027) Efforts to shore up the confidence of the Gulf states, such as the Gulf Security Dialogue of 2006 that enhanced security cooperation between the United States and the GCC as well as the accompanying weapons sales to Gulf states,[28](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/99146287-5749201/section%7Edb=all%7Econtent=a912817522%7Efulltext=713240928%7Edontcount=true#NOTE0028) were effectively overtaken by the perception of an imminent U.S.-Iranian detente on Iraq and the need for the Gulf states to secure a “seat at the table” before any U.S.-Iranian deal marginalized them. **Deliberations about a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq** and the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) **have** only **accelerated this trend**, as have expectations that the Obama administration is likely to expand engagement with Iran. **“With the American withdrawal from Iraq,** and the absence of any Arab activism, **the region will find itself at the stage of a second defeat, at the hands of** Syria and **Iran**,” warned Tariq al-Humayd, editor of Asharq Al-Awsat, an Arabic international newspaper.[29](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/99146287-5749201/section%7Edb=all%7Econtent=a912817522%7Efulltext=713240928%7Edontcount=true#NOTE0029) **Saudi officials have long accused the United States of “handing” Iraq to Iran** but have been surprisingly passive in countering Iranian influence. Saudi interlocutors in early 2007 spoke of having already “written off” Iraq as a sphere of Iranian control since 2006 and have been pursuing a policy of “damage control” ever since. Lebanon and Palestine are seen as more hopeful areas to “roll back” Iranian influence and establish a measure of regional parity with the Islamic republic.[30](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/99146287-5749201/section%7Edb=all%7Econtent=a912817522%7Efulltext=713240928%7Edontcount=true#NOTE0030) **Recent events**, however, may **have convinced Saudi Arabia that Iranian influence is not as broad as previously assumed** **and that the Maliki government is worthy of Saudi efforts to bring it “back to the Arab fold**.”[31](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/99146287-5749201/section%7Edb=all%7Econtent=a912817522%7Efulltext=713240928%7Edontcount=true#NOTE0031) In the context of the drawdown, **Riyadh can be expected to pursue a wary engagement with the Maliki government** while hedging its bets by supporting a broad range of other actors. The next major litmus test for Baghdad from Riyadh's perspective will be whether the Awakening Councils and Sons of Iraq are integrated into Iraqi political life and that the Iraq's Sunni population is protected.[32](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/99146287-5749201/section%7Edb=all%7Econtent=a912817522%7Efulltext=713240928%7Edontcount=true#NOTE0032)

Link – Kuwait Withdrawal

**Kuwait commitment maintains strong relations – if we retreat it collapses Saudi threat perceptions**

David E. **Long, ‘4** – Former executive director of the Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies and a former deputy director of the State Department's Office of Counterterrorism. “US-Saudi Relations: Evolution, Current Conditions, and Future Prospects.” Mediterranean Quarterly 15.3 (2004) 24-37, Lexis.

These **stresses and repeated US retreats from its assurances** of even-handedness over the Arab-Israeli issue **contributed to continued Saudi anxiety over the strength of the US commitment to the kingdom's external security.** These anxieties were exacerbated by the collapse of the shah's regime in Iran in early 1979. With the United States unwilling in Saudi eyes to save its close friend the shah, the Saudis feared that it would act the same way if the Saudi regime faced similar circumstances.9 When then Crown Prince Fahd canceled a trip to Washington in March of that year, not wishing to appear to support the Egypt-Israel treaty that was signed at the same time, the US-Saudi special relationship fell into disarray.10 **Despite the stresses and strains on the bilateral relations of basically ambivalent partners, the United States maintained a close and cordial working relationship.** Indeed, **the US response** in 1991, **in which it led a coalition** of Western and Arab states in Operation Desert Storm **to drive Saddam's occupation forces out of Kuwait, could be considered a high point of cordiality in the relationship.** The Saudis, on their side and with no publicity, footed the lion's share of the bill, amounting to over $50 billion. **Not only was the relationship vastly beneficial to the interests of both countries, but a solid body of mutual goodwill had built up**, begun in the 1930s by the honest, straightforward business practices of American oil men, strengthened by the skilled diplomacy of a succession of American embassy and consulate personnel over the years, and expanded by the thousands of Saudi students who studied in the United States, particularly in the late 1970s and 1980s.

**The US need Kuwait as an ally and failure to consult could lead to Backlash**

**Terrill 07** (W. Andrew,Middle East nonproliferation analyst for the International Assessments Division of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Strategic Studies Report, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf Page 82accessed 6/28) CM

1. The U.S. leadership must continue to bear in mind that Kuwait is a more important ally than its small territory and population would imply. Moreover, **Kuwait may be especially important during the current time frame as the United States and the region** **attempt to cope with continuing problems with Iraq, Iran, democratization, and counterterrorism**. Kuwait, as has been noted throughout this monograph, 81 can contribute significantly to managing all of these problems. **Kuwait’s possession of one of the region’s best harbors, as well as its continued willingness to host U.S. troops, stands as an invitation for U.S. military personnel to be the best possible guests**. 2. **The U.S. Government must avoid making statements that appear to take the Kuwaitis for granted**. U.S. politicians that speak of redeploying from Iraq to Kuwait, for example, might do well to note that such a move would only be done after a careful exchange of views with the Kuwaitis and with Kuwaiti permission. **Proclaiming a policy that intensely involves Kuwait while assuming that the Kuwaitis will do just about anything that U.S. leaders say is inappropriate and portrays Kuwait as an unequal ally**. **Such an image will ultimately be resented and could product a backlash that harms smooth U.S.-Kuwaiti coordination**. 3. **The United States needs to speak out in favor of Kuwaiti democracy and note the positive lessons of Kuwaiti democratization**. With all of the setbacks that have taken place in the Middle Eastern drive for democracy, it is important to note that Kuwaiti progress in democratization and possible lessons of the Kuwaiti model are too often virtually ignored. This process of speaking out will not only be of interest to the Kuwaitis, but it may also help to educate the American public about the value of U.S.-Kuwaiti national security ties. In the West, Kuwait is widely known to have a parliament but it is not clear if the strength of this parliament is fully understood or appreciated. The United States must also accept that democracy is still democracy when politicians we do not like are elected—so long as these people also respect democratic institutions. We cannot fairly support democracy only in cases where the United States approves of the candidates 82 who are elected. Parliaments support evolutionary change in most instances and the Kuwaiti model may prepare citizens for an ever expanding and deepening democratic outlook

Link – Kuwait Withdrawal

Kuwait supports US military efforts in Iraq

**Blanford 02** (Nicholas, Sept23, Author and correspondent for news sources in the middle east since 94, Christen Science Monitor <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/> pg 7 accessed 6/28) CM

The United States may be unpopular throughout the Arab world, but **in** **Kuwait, with the trauma of Iraq's 1990 invasion still fresh in people's minds, even Islamists are not opposed to an American** **presence here**. **Kuwaitis openly back the removal of Iraq's President Saddam Hussein**. And while the presence of US troops in neighboring Saudi Arabia has helped spawn the extremism of Osama bin Laden, Islamists - advocates of Islamic political rule - have kept Kuwait's military relationship with the US off their political agenda. "**Islamists understand the requirement of** **Kuwait's security and the needs of the United States,"** says Shafeeq Ghabra, head of the Center of Strategic and Future Studies at Kuwait University. "**They** **support ousting Saddam Hussein, yet at the same time they are critical of the American policy in Palestine and Afghanistan**." Islamists fill about one-third of Kuwait's 50-seat Parliament, reflecting a gradual trend toward Islamic values, particularly among young Kuwaitis. The well-organized Islamists have proved an effective opposition force, calling for less spending on defense and opposing cuts in Kuwait's welfare programs. Mohammed Mulaifi, a student of sharia, or Islamic law and a member of the extremist Salafist sect, says he sympathizes with Mr. bin Laden's efforts to oust the US from the Gulf. But he also admits that Kuwait is a different case. "Kuwait is an American base and I oppose this," Mr. Mulaifi says. "But **most Kuwaitis support the US military presence here**." In the wake of the **1991 Gulf War, several Gulf countries, including Kuwait, made a strategic long-term commitment to develop close** **military ties with Washington as a form of insurance against regional instability. The US benefits commercially through lucrative arms contracts with Arab states and ensuring the continued flow of oil and gas from the Gulf**. Still, **the government of** **Kuwait**, **like that of its Gulf neighbors, has remained circumspect on whether it would permit US troops to mount a unilateral operation** to depose Saddam, **conditioning its** **support for the** **military option** on a forceful United Nations Security Council resolution. "As a member of the United Nations, Kuwait is obliged to implement any security Council resolution [against Iraq]," Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah, Kuwait's foreign minister, said last week

Iraqi instability highlights the need for US- Kuwaiti Bilateral relations

**Terrill 07** (W. Andrew,Middle East nonproliferation analyst for the International Assessments Division of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Strategic Studies Report, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf Page 82accessed Page xi) CM

Since its independence in 1961, **Kuwait has struggled to manage a number of difficult challenges related to protecting its citizens and its territory from the predatory designs of large and dangerous neighbors. The most menacing neighbors have been Iraq and Iran.** While Iran has proven a threatening and subversive enemy on key occasions, Iraq is even more problematic. **Kuwait has maintained a long and often extremely difficult relationship with Iraq**, and a series of Iraqi governments have either pressured Kuwait for territorial concessions or suggested that Kuwait is a lost province of Iraq. Additionally, within Kuwait a widely held belief is that large, if not overwhelming, portions of the Iraqi public share this viewpoint. Iraq-Kuwait tensions are therefore unlikely to disappear in the aftermath of Saddam’s trial and execution. Iraq, even without Saddam, is often viewed as a danger to Kuwait xii given this history, and ongoing **Kuwaiti concerns about Iraq underscore the need for continuing U.S.-Kuwait security ties.** Furthermore, **both Kuwait and the United States fear a rise in region-wide terrorism and sectarian violence resulting from the current civil strife in Iraq**, as well as other factors. Should Iraqi’s sectarian strife reach new levels of intensity, it is important that it does not spread to other nations such as Kuwait. Kuwaiti diplomacy and security planning must seek ways to minimize the impact of the Iraq civil war in ways that do not cause the vast majority of loyal Kuwaiti Shi’ites to become alienated from their government

Link – Presence k2 Allies\*\*

**US military presence is vital to relations**

**IDA, ‘2**. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

In the mid-1990s, **Zakheim** et al. [1996] **conducted an extensive assessment**. Based upon a variety of interviews with foreign representatives, they concluded that **US presence**, especially naval presence, **provides** strong assurance value to friends and allies **in** many parts **of the world**. The study team found that interviewees shared the view that **US military presence is crucial to preserving stability, which in turn is crucial to regional economic growth**, itself a US economic and national security interest. Many respondents were even more explicit about the linkage between military presence and the preservation, indeed enhancement, of their own and US economic interests. **This feeling was** said to be widespread throughout each of the regions. In 1995, **Thomason** et al. **found** two principal things: first, **US allies and friends indicated very clearly that they were more assured by greater, rather than less, US military presence**. Second, in some parts of the world (Western Europe and Korea) land-based presence was considered much more helpful, all things considered, than sea-based presence in providing assurance, whereas in other parts of the world (e.g., much of the Persian Gulf), just the opposite appeared to be true. Overall, friends and allies want help, presence, but on their own terms, which means, increasingly, as unobtrusively as possible in most instances; and they want to be recognized as political equals. [p. 8] As a part of the same study, Thomason et al. also conducted off-the-record interviews with approximately three dozen US security experts in the mid-1990s to assess the “assurance” and other values these experts assigned to various levels and types of US presence, power projection capability, and other factors (for a synopsis, see Thomason, 2001). Current and former Service chiefs, commanders in chief of Unified Commands, and other senior policy makers and diplomats were interviewed as to the effectiveness of various kinds of presence and other instruments of national power in promoting the principal objectives of presence. Overall, these **US decision-makers saw reassurance of friends and allies as a vital part of our foreign policy** and national security strategy. **They viewed reassurance as a complex, ongoing process**, calling for high-quality and, frequently, high-level attention. **They cited** continuous, face-to-face involvement and **relationships**—both military and civilian—**as necessary in establishing the trust and understanding that underpins strong** friendships, **partnerships, and coalitions**. Many of the interviewees noted that the establishment of an ongoing dialogue helps both parties to avoid misinterpreting one another’s intentions and contributes to an understanding of the way in which both parties think.

Link – Presence k2 Allies – AT: Turns\*\*

**Multiple reasons they can’t access a link turn –**

**Won’t work without compensation and consultation**

**IDA, ‘2**. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

**In discussions with over 50 representatives of 22 countries**1 **we found that US friends and allies were generally comfortable with current levels and forms of US military presence in their countries and reg**ions. In this chapter we summarize and assess— • These representatives’ attitudes regarding continuous US military presence levels in their countries and regions • Relations between these representatives’ views of security threats facing their countries and their attitudes regarding US military presence • Relation between their views of the need to deter a conventional military threat to their countries and their perspectives on the value of US military presence • The types of US military presence forces that they most valued, by country and region • The purposes for which they valued US military presence • US military presence (and related) activities that these representatives valued The chapter concludes, **with respect to potential changes in US military presence posture**, that latitude can be found to substitute less personnel-intensive forms of presence for the current ones. However, **to avoid undercutting the assurance objectives of US national security policy**, it cautions that **changes** in US presence numbers need to involve consultations with our allies and very likely will require compensatory changes in activities, capabilities, and non-military diplomacy.

**It paints a snapshot of uniqueness, while the link is an enduring trend**

**IDA, ‘2**. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

Looking at SEA/Australia, South Asia, and even some of SWA in Figure V-1, **we are not saying that all countries** in this great sweep **would unequivocally oppose a continuous in-country US military presence** of any kind. We do say that under the circumstances they foresee, almost all their **governments would** very much **prefer not to receive a** proposal from the US for a **continuous visible military presence** in their countries, and **if one is received, the shorter the proposed duration**, the better. Again, that does not mean opposition to all US military-related presence. For example, Australia clearly is willing to consider US use of its facilities, including training ranges and repair facilities; Singapore welcomes port visits and aircraft transits; and so on.

**Post-op tradeoffs fail**

**IDA, ‘2**. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

Second, **if there is no capability assessment, US earnests of mutual suffering and risk sharing may become salient for assurance** of the foreign expert. The **Korean affinity for boots on the ground clearly relates to this**. The European preference for boots on the ground may be colored by the intra-NATO debates on peacekeeping forces in the Balkans. **In our discussions with representatives of countries in which US military presence is valued, we also encountered an** unwillingness to consider **increased military technical or reinforcement capabilities as substitutes for numbers of US military personnel present**. This was rarely an explicit rejection of specific tradeoffs; rather, **it was either an early statement to the effect that nothing could substitute for physical presence or a dismissive comment or gesture when the idea of a tradeoff was raised.**

Link – Presence k2 Allies – AT: Turns\*\*

**Most experienced observers concur with the link**

**IDA, ‘2**. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

**Most experienced observers believe that US overseas military presence is effective** (to some degree) **in** strengthening deterrence, **assuring friends and allies, positioning the US to be able to protect key interests in crisis situations, stabilizing the security environment**, preserving an open international economic environment, **and retarding the spread of nuclear weapons**. The arguments and hypotheses of Colin Powell, Joseph Nye, Robert Art, Bradford Dismukes, and Richard Haass over the last decade are illustrative.

**Colin Powell concurs**

**IDA, ‘2**. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

**Colin Powell Writing in 1991** in Foreign Affairs, General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, offered an eloquent statement of the importance of a continuing overseas military presence. **Our forward presence is a given—to signal our commitment to our allies and to give second thoughts to any disturber of the peace**…. Economic power is essential; political and diplomatic skills are needed; the power of our beliefs and values is fundamental to any success we might achieve; but **the presence of our arms to buttres**s these **other elements is as critical to us as the freedom we so adore.** [p. 36]

**The Joint Chiefs concur**

**IDA, ‘2**. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of

Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

QDR 2001 is a recent official manifestation of a long-standing general hypothesis regarding US military presence activities: that they can and regularly do help promote fundamental security objectives of the nation. Another illustration of this kind of belief and hypothesis appears in a recent doctrinal publication of the Joint Staff: “**In peacetime, the Armed Forces of the United States help to deter potential aggressors from using violence to achieve their aims. Forward presence activities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances**, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US influence and access.”

Link – Presence k2 Allies – XT

**Military presence is crucial to allied assurances – the 1NC IDA evidence cites two wide-reaching, long-term studies that show near-universal backing for US presence**

**Presence is vital to relationship building – without it, trust collapses**

**IDA, ‘2**. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

Our **interlocutors valued relationships with Americans at all levels**. Thus, in addition to high-level visits, **presence activities** of many kinds **were valued in large measure for their role in relationship building**. In particular, building personal relationships was seen by foreign experts as a co-equal goal for many activities that are seen from the US side as focused mainly on substantive training. **One of our interlocutors characterized the goal of relationship building as developing a capability so that when problems arise one can move quickly with people who are already known quantities to solve the problems**. Most interlocutors, however, were not precise, seeing relationship building in terms of a more diffuse comfort level. International military education and training (IMET), Partnership for Peace (PfP), and similar programs were seen as valuable as much for their relationship building aspects as for substantive learning. Exchange programs and combined exercises also were seen as important relationship building activities.

**The opposition to the plan is uniform and unforgiving**

**IDA, ‘2**. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

Overall, **the kinds of activities described here were clearly highly valued by essentially all our friends and allies**. However, **among allies where US military forces are present, no one volunteered that there is a tradeoff between activities and numbers in US military presence**. **In** nearly all **cases our interlocutors were** clearly opposed to any reductions **and** had no interest in discussing **what might compensate for reduced numbers**. It seems clear, however, that if numbers are to be reduced, in the vast majority of cases these findings on activities can point the way to a less painful process if they are taken into account. At a minimum, consultation should be a part of the process. In general, the US should consider significant tailored increases in the areas of relationship building and institutional interoperability to compensate, at least in part, for any reductions in numbers.

**Military presence is key to the most important and enduring foreign relationships**

**IDA, ‘2**. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

There was broad agreement that **one of the highest payoffs of** past **US military presence** activities **has been the establishment of favorable long-term relationships with key foreign officials. In many cases these relationships were initially established years before the foreign officials rose to high positions. The value of such relationships has repeatly been proven when the US has needed to quickly establish military and diplomatic coalitions and to gain access to operating bases and sources of supply**. The web of such relationships was also cited as an effective vehicle for assuring friends and allies of continuing US interest in their security situations. As one official said, “We need US Army generals to visit countries that are being run by generals.”

Link – Presence k2 Allies – XT

**Troops are a key expression of commitment and will – senior US decision-makers agree**

**IDA, ‘2**. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

**Among** these **senior US decision-makers, a firm, widely shared belief was evident**: strong, continuous, **high-quality personal level** interactions and **relationships are necessary** to promote the reassurance objective. **But they are not sufficient. They need to be combined with some regular, credible evidence of** US will and ability **to be there to help when needed**. On this latter point, however, **no real consensus was evident regarding the** essentiality of any one particular **level** (or type) **of presence forces for effective reassurance.** This finding may be explained in part by the possibility that what respondents viewed as “credible” may have been—at least broadly—a function of what they viewed as either the current or latent threat level in a particular region at the time. It may also have been due to genuine uncertainty as to what “works” to offset various perceived threat levels.

**Link – Presence k2 Middle East**

**Withdrawing presence causes severe political backlash**

**IDA, ‘2**. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

**As for the Middle East, the NDU** study **emphasized** a likely increasing threat to maritime forces there, **a need for better** TMD, **force protection**, more WMD detectors, an increase in naval presence (especially TMD-capable surface ships), and a possible shift to more amphibious forces in lieu of some ground forces in the region. Flournoy’s group considered the value of increasing long-range strike capabilities (from Diego Garcia) as well, but warned that **a “reduction in visible presence” in the region could have “a** severe and deleterious political effect, **eroding both deterrence and regional support.” The threat environment in the Middle East was said to be increasingly likely to feature WMD;** the study team expressed serious concerns regarding WMD attacks on US forces, host nation citizens and others, including Host Nation Support (HNS) personnel. Overall, the study concluded that the long-term US ground presence prospects in the region are quite uncertain.

\_\_\_\*\*Sunni Alliance – Internals

Internals – Withdrawal 🡪 Regional Power Vacuum

**Saudi Arabia will create a proxy war in Iraq**

**Wehrey et al 09**, (Fredrich, Senior policy Analyst for the Rand Institute, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND\_MG840.pdf accessed June 26) CM

Despite these signs of accommodation in the Gulf, it is worth noting that the political marginalization and economic deprivation of Shi’a communities in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, **Bahrain**, **and,** to a lesser extent, **Kuwait are potential flashpoints in the future**. **The Gulf Shi’as can hardly be considered “proxies” of Tehran;** most regard the Islamic Republic with a degree of spiritual and emotional affinity but not as an object of political emulation. Yet more hard-line and radi- cal elements may become empowered, particularly among the younger generation, if these communities continue to perceive a lack of progress on political inclusion, civil rights, and economic improvement.**Saudi Arabia and Iran Compete, Coordinate, and Engage in Different Arenas of the Middle EastThe relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran as it is evolving today appears to incorporate elements of both sectarian confrontation and pragmatic rapprochement.** As in earlier periods (e.g., before the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and during the warming of relations in the mid- 1990s), the two countries are showing their ability to reach an accom- modation on regional order while minimizing deeper ideological and structural tensions. **This hybrid approach plays out in different ways throughout the regions where the two countries come into contact—in Iraq, the Gulf, and the Levant.Riyadh and Tehran Perceive Iraq as a Zero-Sum GameMuch focus has been directed at Iraq as an arena for “proxy” compe- tition between Saudi Arabia and Iran, particularly in the event of a U.S. withdrawal**. **Saudi Arabia’s** previous **warnings that it will increase its involvement in Iraq following a U.S. departure should not be dis- missed**. But its ability to support and influence Sunni factions should not be inflated, and its role in containing Iranian influence in Iraq may be more limited than is realized.A key theme is Saudi Arabia’s desire to keep the United States involved in Iraq as a balancer and, absent this, to play a role in shap- ing the outcome of any trilateral Iranian-U.S.-Iraqi talks. Sensing that this strategy may be eroding, made overtures Riyadh has recently taken steps to diver- sify and strengthen its contacts with a range of Iraqi political actors. Meanwhile, Iran has to Saudi Arabia about a sort of cooperative power-sharing relationship over Iraq that may mirror past coordination on Lebanon but that explicitly calls for the departure of U.S. forces. Riyadh likely sees this overture for what it is: an attempt to deprive Saudi Arabia of its external patron and relegate it to the status of junior partner in the new regional order. Instead of true cooperation, the Saudi-Iranian relationship over Iraq is likely to be defined as “man- aged rivalry,” with a modicum of coordination and contact to prevent an escalation of sectarian conflict, which would benefit neither side.

**A withdraw from a Iraq creates a political vacuum that allows for neighboring countries to invade**

**Barkey 8**, ([Henri J, Oct. 3,](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/experts/index.cfm?fa=expert_view&expert_id=400) Prof @ Lehigh University, Washington Times <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22198> Accessed June 26) CM

**The United States and Iraq are close to concluding a deal on the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from major population centers by the end of June** and from the rest of Iraq by 2011.  By most accounts this pact is the result of the Maliki government's increasing confidence in Iraq's armed forces and U.S. domestic pressure for withdrawal.  **There is, however, a gaping hole in this deal: It has no strategy to contend with Iraq's neighbors - some of whom are capable and willing to undermine Iraqi stability.**Without a political strategy that counteracts their influence or engages them in the process, a withdrawal agreement is not worth the paper on which it is printed.  **Iraq's neighbors are not just bystanders: almost all have specific interests and, through surrogates, have been actively involved in Iraq**. These activities have often been at odds with U.S. and Iraqi government wishes. **A withdrawal plan, which creates a political vacuum, invites intervention by Iraq's neighbors to shape the nation's internal evolution in accordance with their own security considerations.**  This, of course, is not as easy as it seems. Two of Iraq's neighbors, Iran and Syria, have been at loggerheads with Washington. Lines of communication are all but closed and replaced by complete mistrust.  **Tehran and Damascus firmly suspected that regime change in Baghdad would extend to them as well**. Washington consistently has accused both countries of supporting Iraq's insurgency; and in the case of Iran, accusations include the transfer of arms and training for insurgents.  By contrast, the other four neighbors - **Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Kuwait - are long-standing allies of the U.S.  Iran and the Saudis are eyeing each other nervously in Iraq. Riyadh, already unnerved by Iran's nuclear program, sees Iran attempting to use a Shia-dominated Baghdad as an ally in its quest for regional dominance**. **Tehran**, in turn, **fears Saudi-supported Sunni jihadist movements and the emergence of a pro-U.S. Iraq aligning itself against Iran.**Turks, Iranians and Syrians would like to see the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) subjugated to Baghdad's control, if not disappear altogether. In their minds, a Kurdish province in an Iraqi federal state could inspire secessionist impulses among their own much-maligned Kurdish populations.  Saudis and other Arabs are unsympathetic to federalism, believing that Kurdish aspirations will one day lead them to secede and carve out another non-Arab country in the region or the Shia will create a superfederal region of their own.

Internals – Withdrawal 🡪 Regional Power Vacuum

**Saudi Arabia has influence over the Sunni’s and could join the flight in Iraq**

**Barkey 8**, ([Henri J, Oct. 3,](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/experts/index.cfm?fa=expert_view&expert_id=400) Prof @ Lehigh University, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22198> Washington Times Accessed June 26) CM

The U.S. and **Iraq's neighbors**, however**, do share one common goal: Iraq's territorial integrity.** Where they disagree is on the internal arrangements. This provides a foundation on which Washington can begin a diplomatic initiative to construct a regionwideunderstanding.  **The most important first step is to work with the allies individually to unscramble conflicting U.S. and Iraqi concerns on one side and Turkish, Saudi, Jordanian and Kuwaiti ones on the other**.  Once progress is made, Washington can bring Iraq and the four neighbors together to constitute an informal front. Such a strategy would strengthen United States' weak hand and make it easier to engage the Iranians and Syrians.  **Washington should urge the Saudis to stop their nationals from joining the fight in Iraq** and also halt the transfer of Saudi petrodollars to jihadist networks all over the world.  The Saudis, in exchange, may require new security understandings from the United States, confirmation of **Iraq's place in the Arab fold and agreement between Iraq and the Persian Gulf countries on security arrangements against Iran.  Iraq will want the Saudis to use their considerable influence over Sunni tribes to get them to commit to working with the central government after a U.S. withdrawal**.  Similarly, among Turkey, the Iraqi Kurds and Baghdad, there is a deal to be made.  Iraqi Kurds want assurances from Turkey that it will not intervene in Iraqi domestic matters against them and that Ankara will ensure their access to European markets for their oil and other products.  Turks want the Turkish Kurdish insurgent group, the PKK, to be forced out of northern Iraq and for the KRG not to take the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. These are hard but not impossible problems to resolve.  However, it would require a diplomatic game plan that puts together the elements of a win-win strategy for all involved. The United States should want the KRG to become an institutionalized part of Iraq and not an independent state.  For this to happen, the Turks must recognize the KRG, while Iraqi Kurds must work with the United States if the PKK is to be forced out of northern Iraq. Turkey must act as a reliable conduit for Iraq Kurds to sell their products to international markets.  Finally, a peaceful and legitimate resolution of the multiple claims to the oil-rich city of Kirkuk has to emerge without the intervention of outside powers.

Internals – Withdrawal 🡪 Regional Power Vacuum

**Troop Withdrawal from Iraq causes Saudi Arabia to join the fray to protect Sunni’s causing regional war**

**Olbaid 6,** (Nawaf, Nov 26, Adjunct Fellow for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “<http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/articles/2006/ioi/061129-obaid-iraq.html> Accessed June 26) CM

In February 2003, a month before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, warned President Bush that he would be "solving one problem and creating five more" if he removed Saddam Hussein by force. Had Bush heeded his advice, Iraq would not now be on the brink of full-blown civil war and disintegration. One hopes he won't make the same mistake again by ignoring the counsel of Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the United States, Prince Turki al-Faisal, who said in a speech last month that "since America came into Iraq uninvited, it should not leave Iraq uninvited**." If it does, one of the first consequences will be massive Saudi intervention to stop Iranian-backed Shiite militias from butchering Iraqi Sunnis.**  **Over the past year, a chorus of voices has called for Saudi Arabia to protect the Sunni community in Iraq and thwart Iranian influence there**. Senior Iraqi tribal and religious figures, along with the leaders of Egypt, Jordan and other Arab and Muslim countries, have petitioned the Saudi leadership to provide Iraqi Sunnis with weapons and financial support. Moreover, domestic pressure to intervene is intense. Major Saudi tribal confederations, which have extremely close historical and communal ties with their counterparts in Iraq, are demanding action. They are supported by a new generation of Saudi royals in strategic government positions who are eager to see the kingdom play a more muscular role in the region. Because **King Abdullah has been working to minimize sectarian tensions in Iraq and reconcile Sunni and Shiite communities, because he gave President Bush his word that he wouldn't meddle in Iraq (and because it would be impossible to ensure that Saudi-funded militias wouldn't attack U.S. troops), these requests have all been refused. They will, however, be heeded if American troops begin a phased withdrawal from Iraq. As the economic powerhouse of the Middle East, the birthplace of Islam and the de facto leader of the world's Sunni community** (which comprises 85 percent of all Muslims), Saudi Arabia has both the means and the religious responsibility to intervene. Just a few months ago it was unthinkable that President Bush would prematurely withdraw a significant number of American troops from Iraq. But it seems possible today, and therefore the Saudi leadership is preparing to substantially revise its Iraq policy. Options now include providing Sunni military leaders (primarily ex-Baathist members of the former Iraqi officer corps, who make up the backbone of the insurgency) with the same types of assistance -- funding, arms and logistical support -- that Iran has been giving to Shiite armed groups for years. Another possibility includes the establishment of new Sunni brigades to combat the Iranian-backed militias. Finally, Abdullah may decide to strangle Iranian funding of the militias through oil policy. If Saudi Arabia boosted production and cut the price of oil in half, the kingdom could still finance its current spending. But it would be devastating to Iran, which is facing economic difficulties even with today's high prices. The result would be to limit Tehran's ability to continue funneling hundreds of millions each year to Shiite militias in Iraq and elsewhere. Both the Sunni insurgents and the Shiite death squads are to blame for the current bloodshed in Iraq. But while both sides share responsibility, Iraqi Shiites don't run the risk of being exterminated in a civil war, which the Sunnis clearly do. Since approximately 65 percent of Iraq's population is Shiite, the Sunni Arabs, who make up a mere 15 to 20 percent, would have a hard time surviving any full-blown ethnic cleansing campaign. What's clear is that the Iraqi government won't be able to protect the Sunnis from Iranian-backed militias if American troops leave. Its army and police cannot be relied on to do so, as tens of thousands of Shiite militiamen have infiltrated their ranks. Worse, Iraq's prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, cannot do anything about this, because he depends on the backing of two major leaders of Shiite forces. There is reason to believe that the Bush administration, despite domestic pressure, will heed Saudi Arabia's advice. Vice President Cheney's visit to Riyadh last week to discuss the situation (there were no other stops on his marathon journey) underlines the preeminence of Saudi Arabia in the region and its importance to U.S. strategy in Iraq. But if a phased troop withdrawal does begin, the violence will escalate dramatically. **In this case, remaining on the sidelines would be unacceptable to Saudi Arabia. To turn a blind eye to the massacre of Iraqi Sunnis would be to abandon the principles upon which the kingdom was founded. It would undermine Saudi Arabia's credibility in the Sunni world and would be a capitulation to Iran's militarist actions in the region. To be sure, Saudi engagement in Iraq carries carries great risks -- it could spark a regional war. So be it: The consequences of inaction are far worse.**

Internals – Withdrawal 🡪 Regional Power Vacuum

US troop withdraw would mean that the Saudi Arabia would invade

**Chartier 06** (Tom , Dec. 6, writer for the Atlantic Free Press, [http://www.lewrockwell.com/chartier/chartier50.html accessed june 26](http://www.lewrockwell.com/chartier/chartier50.html%20accessed%20june%2026)) CM

International wheelings and dealings are like a complex game of poker where the nations playing don’t know how many cards are in the deck. Everybody hides aces up their sleeves. Everybody bluffs. Double-dealing is rife. Some sit quietly with their poker faces and wait for the best time to call. Others posture and strut. Some players excel and some can’t tell their ace from a hole in the ground. The U.S. adventure in the Middle East has been a mind-boggling display of inept gamesmanship. Indeed, to our Great Decider it has seemed to be little more than a game all along. With the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, President Bush laid his cards on the table expecting to rake in all the chips of oil and laurels of victory to transform the frat-boy into the Great Liberator thus securing a glorious chapter in the history books. As we have seen, frat-boy’s hand contained garbage. So Bush the Elder stepped in to save Bush the Lesser with some better players, James Baker, Lee Hamilton and Robert Gates. The Iraq Study Group thinks they know how to play the game and they have handed the dealer a new, stacked deck of cards with which Bush the Lesser can, theoretically, play to win. Arrogance, greed, and ignorance have described Bush’s method of play in the Middle East. He and his neocon string-pullers have been playing as if they had magic X-ray glasses to see through everyone’s cards. The game has not been friendly. It has gone on too long at too high a cost. Now there is a possible royal flush on the table… a Saudi Arabian Royal Flush. **The House of Saud has run out of patience. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia has made it clear that were Iraq to be vacated by the doomed U.S. Army, Saudi Arabia and Jordan would come to the aid of the Iraqi Sunnis.** It has been hinted that [private Saudi money](http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1208/dailyUpdate.html) has been supporting the Sunni insurgents. Former Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., and member of the Saudi Royal family, [Prince Turki al-Faisal](http://www.thefirstpost.co.uk/index.php?menuID=1&subID=971) stated: "Since America came to Iraq uninvited, it should not leave Iraq uninvited." A player in this game can’t walk away from the table whenever he pleases. However, Prince Turki has [suddenly](http://blogs.abcnews.com/theblotter/2006/12/money_behind_sa.html) packed up and walked out of Washington. What conclusions can be drawn from that recent 'diplomatic mystery'? Did Prince Turki’s family obligations require his immediate presence in Saudi Arabia or was his [abrupt departure](http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=18745) a warning to the US? Prince Turki’s departure could signal a serious split between the Saudi Royal family. Could the Saudi Royal family be [another fatality](http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/ap/world/4400058.html) of Bush’s failed Middle East policy? That would be certain disaster for U.S. as well. **The Saudis may be united and they may not be bluffing. Stability in the Middle East is crucial to all of the Gulf States.** Thanks to the idiocy of the United States, that **fragile stability balances on the edge of a knife**. Bush has unleashed a war that he is unable to contain let alone win. Even if Bush were to accept the ISG Report’s 79 recommendations, his legacy would be endless war in the Middle East. The U.S. think tanks, corporations and above all the Bush Administration have no concept of Arab culture. They have played the game as if everyone in the world "thinks" just like them. Today there are just [six people fluent](http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N06193252.htm) in Arabic stationed in the U.S. Embassy in Iraq. This is preposterous arrogance. U.S. government policy in the Middle East has ignored the tribal, family-like loyalties of Arab society. No decision Bush might make will work until this basic fact is understood. Does Saudi Arabia hold the final ace? I wouldn’t want to bet against it. What do you think? Whether they do or not, they are no longer willing to sit by while the chaos spreads. Saudi Arabia and Jordan have stepped in to take control of the game. Bush’s cowboy policy of corporation-run Middle East is no longer being tolerated. In fact, it seems Bush has reached a point where he [does not know what to do](http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/13/world/middleeast/13prexy.html?th&emc=th) or which cards to play. Is **Sunni Saudi Arabia tired of Shiite Iran’s provocations**? Playing a game of irritating bluff, Iran has been needling the White House. Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s unyielding nuclear stance is calling America and Israel’s bluff. Are the US and Israel stupid enough to invade Iran? Was Iran’s recent Holocaust Conference a none-too-subtle test designed to force Bush and Israel’s Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to show their hands? Has Iran been playing a fool’s game as well? Israel has reacted with a [veiled threat](http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,251-2501000,00.html) to use the very nuclear weapons that they have claimed not to have. Last summer, Olmert launched an insane attack on the Lebanon only to suffer Israel’s second military defeat by Hezbollah. Olmert is unable to stop Palestinian reprisals for greedy and brutal [Israeli policy](http://www.icahd.org/eng/articles.asp?menu=6&submenu=3). Consequently, hard line, right wing Israeli leaders are more paranoid and defensive than ever. This does nothing but put the lives of millions of innocent Israelis in greater peril. Have **Saudi Arabia and Jordan decided that enough is enough**? Are they fed up with an ignorant and inept White House that attempts to bully the Middle East into an impossible scenario? Have they decided to tell the U.S. what to do**? Certainly the Saudi announcement of support for Iraqi Sunnis states a simple fact of war. Wars cannot be won without loyalty.** To win you *must* pick a side. Have the most powerful Sunni families decided to take care of their brother Sunnis while forcing the hand of the U.S? It would seem so. It is unwise to [ignore the culture](http://business.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,9067-2487315,00.html) of the Arabs dominated by tribal loyalties. The British government has just learned this hard lesson the hard way. When the British Serious Fraud Office uncovered a BAE Systems slush fund "which it allegedly used to bribe senior Saudi officials to secure contracts," the Saudis reacted with anger. A prominent Saudi businessman told the Times: "Saudi Arabia does not make commercial or defense decisions based on what shareholders or voters think. It is run like a family business. If you upset members of the family, they will simply choose another supplier." The Serious Fraud Office investigation has done nothing but enrage the Saudi Royal family. Insulted, they threatened to take their business elsewhere which would lose British industry many thousands of jobs and millions of pounds. According to the Times, BAE Systems is  "the UK’s prime defense contractor and Britain’s biggest manufacturer." Needless to say [the Times now reports](http://business.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,8209-2505789,00.html): "Downing Street yesterday bowed to pressure from Saudi Arabia and forced the Serious Fraud Office to abandon its investigation."  Why? The Times quotes Lord Goldsmith, the Attorney General speaking to the House of Lords: "They [the PM and others] have expressed the clear view that continuation of the investigation would cause serious damage to UK/Saudi security, intelligence and diplomatic co-operation, which is likely to have seriously negative consequences for the UK public interest in terms of both national security and our highest priority foreign policy objectives in the Middle East."  Sweet are the uses of the War on Terror. **Loyalty is an important factor in Arab culture. Woe to those who betray it. And the Arabs do not take betrayals lightly**. That little detail has been overlooked by the West since the 1916 [Sykes-Picot Agreement](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/middle_east/2001/israel_and_the_palestinians/key_documents/1681362.stm). W<CONTINUED>

Internals – Withdrawal 🡪 Regional Power Vacuum

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What the Saudi declaration of support for the Iraqi Sunnis tells the world is that Saudi Arabia will no longer tolerate U.S. [pussy-footing around](http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/13/opinion/13wed1.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin). Bush must choose sides. Does he support the [Sunnis or the Shiites](http://archive.gulfnews.com/opinion/columns/region/10089406.html)? Does he support Israel or the rest of the Middle East? If the U.S. continues to allow Israel to dictate its policy, the Saudi - U.S. special relationship, and the oil that flows from it, will dry up. So there it is: the U.S. has been given a choice. Will it remain friends with the Sunni-governed, oil-producing, Gulf States? Or will Bush forsake the Sunnis, the Saudis and the GOP’s SUV-driving constituency and bow to the Shia majority in Iraq? Either choice will further destabilize the Middle East. If Bush decides to support the Iraqi Sunnis that could justify his desire to attack Shia Iran. The neoconservative game of endless war may continue with a Saudi-sanctioned strike against Tehran. White House spokesman Tony Snow [recently stated](http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/ap/world/4400058.html) that the Saudis are "**rightly concerned about the adventurism of Iranians in Iraq, and we share that concern."** America’s [days as a two-timer](http://www.zmag.org/zmag/articles/ShalomIranIraq.html) are over. During the high-stakes tensions at the poker table, one quiet player with a [very strong hand](http://business.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,13130-2499998,00.html) goes unnoticed. [Russia](http://news.independent.co.uk/business/analysis_and_features/article2067660.ece). [China](http://www.tompaine.com/articles/2006/12/12/china_has_us_by_the_purse.php) owns the bank. The U.S. sits at poker table with an empty hand and [bad credit](http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/102906Z.shtml). Right **now, it seems that Saudi Arabia holds the real cards**. So, does the U.S. take the hint and play along? **Can it continue its game of suicide poker? Or is it really more a game of Arabian Roulette?**

Internals—Withdrawal 🡪 Sunni-Shiite Conflict

**Withdrawal creates middle-east instability—increases Sunni-Shiite conflict, kills U.S.-Saudi Relations**

**Obaid 6**(Nawaf, Managing director of the Saudi National Security Assessment Project, November 29, “Stepping Into Iraq: Saudi Arabia Will Protect Sunnis if the U.S. Leaves”, http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/articles/2006/ioi/061129-obaid-iraq.html)

In February 2003, **a month before the** U.S.-led **invasion of Iraq, the Saudi foreign minister,** Prince **Saud al-Faisal, warned** President **Bush** that he **would be** "**solving one problem and creating five more**" **if he removed Saddam** Hussein **by force**. Had Bush heeded his advice, Iraq would not now be on the brink of full-blown civil war and disintegration. **One hopes he won't make the same mistake** again **by ignoring the counsel of Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the U**nited **S**tates, Prince Turki al-Faisal, **who said** in a speech last month that **"since America came into Iraq uninvited, it should not leave Iraq uninvited." If it does, one of the first consequences will be massive Saudi intervention to stop** Iranian-backed **Shiite militias from butchering** Iraqi **Sunnis**. Over the past year, a chorus of voices has called for Saudi Arabia to protect the Sunni community in Iraq and thwart Iranian influence there. Senior Iraqi tribal and religious figures, along with the **leaders** of Egypt, Jordan and other Arab and Muslim countries, **have petitioned the Saudi leadership** to **provide** Iraqi **Sunnis** **with** weapons and financial **support**. Moreover, **domestic pressure to intervene is intense.** Major Saudi tribal confederations, which have extremely close historical and communal ties with their counterparts in Iraq, are demanding action. They are supported by a new generation of Saudi royals in strategic government positions who are eager to see the kingdom play a more muscular role in the region. **Because** King **Abdullah** **has been working to minimize sectarian tensions** in Iraq and reconcile Sunni and Shiite communities, **because he gave President Bush his word that he wouldn't meddle in Iraq** (and because it would be impossible to ensure that Saudi-funded militias wouldn't attack U.S. troops), **these requests have** all **been refused**. **They will**, however, **be heeded if American troops begin a phased withdrawal from Iraq**. As the economic powerhouse of the Middle East, the birthplace of Islam and the de facto leader of the world's Sunni community (which comprises 85 percent of all Muslims), **Saudi Arabia has both the means and the religious responsibility to intervene**. Just **a few months ago it was unthinkable that** President **Bush would** prematurely **withdraw a significant number of American troops from Iraq. But it seems possible today, and therefore the Saudi leadership is preparing to substantially revise its Iraq policy**. **Options** now **include** **providing** **Sunni military leaders** (primarily ex-Baathist members of the former Iraqi officer corps, who make up the backbone of the insurgency) **with** the same types of assistance -- **funding, arms and logistical support** -- that Iran has been giving to Shiite armed groups for years. **Another possibility includes the establishment of new Sunni brigades to combat the Iranian-backed militias**. Finally, **Abdullah may decide to strangle Iranian funding** of the militias through oil policy. If Saudi Arabia boosted production and cut the price of oil in half, the kingdom could still finance its current spending. But it would be devastating to Iran, which is facing economic difficulties even with today's high prices. The result would be to limit Tehran's ability to continue funneling hundreds of millions each year to Shiite militias in Iraq and elsewhere. Both the Sunni insurgents and the Shiite death squads are to blame for the current bloodshed in Iraq. But while both sides share responsibility, Iraqi Shiites don't run the risk of being exterminated in a civil war, which the Sunnis clearly do. Since approximately 65 percent of Iraq's population is Shiite, the Sunni Arabs, who make up a mere 15 to 20 percent, would have a hard time surviving any full-blown ethnic cleansing campaign. What's clear is that the Iraqi government won't be able to protect the Sunnis from Iranian-backed militias if American troops leave. Its army and police cannot be relied on to do so, as tens of thousands of Shiite militiamen have infiltrated their ranks. Worse, Iraq's prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, cannot do anything about this, because he depends on the backing of two major leaders of Shiite forces.

Internals—Withdrawal 🡪 Sunni-Shiite Conflict

Withdrawing troops from Iraq will allow for indigenous militancy to cripple the state and destabilize the region

**Pollack & Sargsyan 10**, (Kenneth M, Irena L, April, is the director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy @ the Brookings Inst., is a research analyst @ the Saban Center and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government @ Georgetown University The Washington Quarterly 32(2) pg 8-9, accessed 6/28) CM

**Iraq,** **and** potentially **Afghanistan** at some later date, **are not the first times that the United States has had to confront this politically vicious cycle of an indigenous military pushed into COIN operations that then poses a threat to its own civilian governmen**t, in turn **prompting that government to try to prevent a military takeover by politicizing and crippling its military**. **The good news is that there is evidence that e ternal military forces can prevent either or both**. **The bad news** is that the history seems to demonstrate that such **a foreign military presence needs** **to consist** of large numbers **of combat troops**, not just military advisors. **This is particularly salient for Iraq, both because of its importance to U.S. interests and the fact that current plans envision the withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces so soon**. There, **the United States needs to leave behind** not merely an Iraqi military capable of defeating the remnants of the insurgency, but **a functional state that will remain stable and will not slide back into the kind of civil war that would threaten the stability of the wider Persian Gulf region**. **In 1925, the U.S. Marines** finally **pulled out of Nicaragua**.10 They had arrived in 1912 to quell the domestic conflict between Nicaraguan liberals and conservatives, and largely succeeded in stamping out the violence itself. **Unfortunately, neither the Americans nor the Nicaraguans had fully resolved the underlying problems that had led to the conflict in the first place**. **As a result only months after the Marines departed, the civil war resumed, fiercer than ever, in a struggle referred to as the Constitutionalist War**. Immediately, the United States intervened again, forcing both sides to agree to a negotiated settlement that included provisions for new elections supervised by U.S. troops and the creation of a new national army, the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua

Internals—Withdrawal 🡪 Sunni-Shiite Conflict

A immediate withdraw would result in civil war and the rise of an Iraqi dictator

**Pollack & Sargsyan 10**, (Kenneth M, Irena L, April, is the director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy @ the Brookings Inst., is a research analyst @ the Saban Center and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government @ Georgetown University The Washington Quarterly 32(2) pg 13-14, accessed 6/28) CM

Thus, the real threat conjured by these historical patterns is not so much that **a hasty U.S. withdrawal could result in a new Iraqi dictatorship**. As bad as that would be, it would be preferable to the most likely outcome, **which would be a resumption of all out civil war when the would-be dictator’s bid for power succeeded only in fracturing the Iraqi security forces, crippling the government, and prompting all of Iraq’s previously warring factions to resume their unfinished battles**. **Having made the political decision to withdraw the vast majority of U.S. troops, Washington is, to a certain e tent, simply stuck with this risk**. But **it is a risk that can be mitigated**, particularly by modulating the drawdown in accord with Iraq’s political circumstances, and being willing to show the fle ibility and adaptability that Obama insisted on in his February 2009 speech on Iraq.18 Perhaps of greater importance still will be the president’s plan to leave behind 35,000—50,000 U.S. troops\_many of them combat troops rebadged as advisors in ‘‘Advisory Assistance Brigades’’ (AABs)\_until at least the end of 2011 to guard against future instability. **Maintaining the AAB force in Iraq will likely be necessary**, **if the United States is to avoid the mistakes it made in Latin America and Southeast Asia in the twentieth century**. **These brigades retain virtually all of the personnel and much of the equipment of full combat brigades**. Indeed, in an emergency, several of the AABs will be able to rapidly reequip as full-spectrum combat units. Thus, these brigades will perform a dual role: they will serve as advisors in peacetime but could quickly become combat brigades in a crisis. In many ways, the formation of the AABs is a clever way to square the circle between the president’s commitments to transition U.S. troops away from combat missions while still retaining combat capacity in Iraq to guard against crucial problems such as the propensity of COIN-trained developing armies to overthrow civilian governments.

Long term Presence of US Military presence is needed for the political stability of Iraq

**Pollack & Sargsyan 10**, (Kenneth M, Irena L, April, is the director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy @ the Brookings Inst., is a research analyst @ the Saban Center and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government @ Georgetown University The Washington Quarterly 32(2) pg 14-15, accessed 6/28) CM

In turn, this arrangement highlights another critical political-diplomatic hurdle that the United States faces in Iraq: securing a new agreement with the Iraqi government that would allow U.S. military forces to remain in the country beyond 2011**.** At present, the security agreement governing the presence of U.S. military personnel in Iraq e pires on December 31, 2011. This means that every last U.S. soldier, sailor, airman, and marine must be out by that date. Because this subject is politically sensitive in both the United States and Iraq, no one is willing to discuss it. **But Iraqi and U.S. military and civilian leaders alike recognize that a follow-on agreement to e tend the U.S. military presence beyond 2011 would be** desirable and probably **necessary. It is highly unlikely that Iraq will have sorted out its political and security problems by the end of 2011, including finding a solution to the propensity of COIN-trained militaries to move against the civilian leadership.** **Consequently, it will be critical for the United States to retain at least the AABs for at least 3—5 years after the e piration of the current security agreement to allow Iraqi civil-military relations to mature**, **Iraqi political institutions to strengthen**, and a culture of apolitical professionalism to take root within the Iraqi military before the last U.S. combat troops (even if they are masquerading as advisors) depart. **Finally, it is worth also considering the potential implications of this phenomenon for Afghanistan**. The U.S.-led NATO forces are far from achieving in Afghanistan what the United States has accomplished in Iraq. If the United States, however, succeeds in achieving in Afghanistan what it did in Iraq, Kabul will most likely evince the same problematic civil-military relations that Baghdad is now confronting\_and which has destroyed so many other nascent governments in the past. If so, the president’s notional timetable to begin withdrawal in June 2011 will have to be implemented as a reduction in U.S. troops, but by no means a complete withdrawal. Like Iraq, Afghanistan will require roughly 50,000 U.S. combat troops, probably rebadged as advisors, for many more years before it is able to stand on its feet. In the end, if Washington gets its fondest wishes, and Iraq continues to go well while Afghanistan succeeds at least as well as Iraq, then **the United States will have to e pect to maintain large troop commitments in both of those countries for a long time** to come\_similar to those U.S. deployments in Europe, East Asia, and elsewhere around the globe. Although this recommendation may

Internals—Withdrawal 🡪 Sunni-Shiite Conflict

Withdraw will lead to civil war and regional instability

**Oliker, Grant, Kaye, 10** (Olga, Audra K. Dalia Dassa, Jan, is a senior international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, A former intelligence analyst at the U.S. State Department, is associate director of the RAND Center for Middle East Public Policy, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP272.pdf> ix-x accessed 6/28) CM

As **the United States draws down its forces in Iraq**, it behooves decisionmakers to recognize that this drawdown, which started in June 2009 and continues at the time of this writing, **will affect vulnerable and at-risk populations.** The ways in which **it** **does so have significant implications for the evolution of Iraq and U.S. policy interests in that country and the Middle East** more broadly. Regardless of how the security situation evolves in the years to come, **these issues will continue to create humanitarian challenges, and it is in U.S. interests to take steps to address them**. **A number of groups are at risk because of the U.S. drawdown and withdrawal, because they have depended on U.S. forces and force presence for their security over the last six years**. In addition, **the drawdown may e acerbate the already precarious circumstances of displaced Iraqis, both within the country and in neighboring states**. That said, appropriate policies and actions can mitigate destabilizing regional scenarios and reduce the dangers faced by these populations in the years to come. Groups at particular risk as U.S. forces depart Iraq include tens of thousands of Iraqis and their families who are affiliated w ith the United States in any of a variety of ways smaller minorities among Iraq’s permanent citizens who have relied on U.S. forces for protection1 Palestinians who took refuge in Iraq under the Saddam Hussein government other refugee groups from outside Iraq who have taken shelter in that country over the years2 the Mujeheddin e-Khalq (MEK), a cult-like dissident group from Iran that received sanctuary in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1991 and whose members have since lived in their own enclave, from 2003 to early 2009 under the protection of U.S. forces3 1 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) lists the following minority religious and ethnic groups as at particular risk: Shabak, Christians generally, Sabaean-Mandaeans, Yazidis, Baha’i, Kaka’i, Ahl i-Haq, Yarsan, Jews (of whom very few remain in Iraq), Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Armenians, and Roma (Kawliyah) (UNHCR, 2007). 2 These include ethnic Kurds from Turkey, Iran and Syria, ethnic Arabs from Syria, and Ahwazi Arabs from Iran. A number of Sudanese refugees have recently been resettled.

Withdraw underlines stability of nearby regional states

**Oliker, Grant, Kaye, 10** (Olga, Audra K. Dalia Dassa, Jan, is a senior international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, A former intelligence analyst at the U.S. State Department, is associate director of the RAND Center for Middle East Public Policy, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP272.pdf> ix-x accessed 6/28) CM

**If violence in Iraq worsens as** and after **U.S. forces draw down**, as it may well do in at least some disputed and multiethnic areas, **displacement will increase yet again**. Whether or not violence increases in the near term, however, **this displacement crisis may well breed instability** in its own right. Unless these problems are addressed as part of a broad development and integration agenda, displacement will not only be long term, but **it may also lead to increased risk of violence in the future**, as grievances over lost land combine with perceptions of social and economic inequities between the populations hosting the displaced and the newcomers, both in Iraq and in neighboring countries. **This has the potential to undermine the stability of key regional states, such as Jordan, and a range of broader U.S. regional goals.** Although the displacement crisis will be long term, and vulnerable populations will face increased risk as U.S. forces draw down, the dangers emanating from both of these situations can be mitigated. Indeed, the drawdown of U.S. forces can potentially create opportunities for the United States to more effectively address this crisis and gain regional and international assistance to do so. A number of specific actions and general approaches can help ensure the protection of particularly endangered populations, mitigate the destabilizing effects of mass displacement, and prevent the chronic underdevelopment that may otherwise be its result. Lower Risk of Violence Where practicable and useful, adapt troop withdrawals t 􀁴􀀁 o ensure the longest presence where violence is most likely, specifically in the regions of Baghdad, Diyala, and along the KRG border. 􀁴􀀁 Improve security for the vulnerable and those at risk of deportation in Iraq by working with Iraq, regional governments, and other key international actors.

Internals – Withdrawal 🡪 Kills Relations

**Plan kills U.S.-Saudi Relations—Saudi perceptions of Iraqi Stability**

**Blanchard 9**(Christopher, Analyst in Middle East affairs@The Congressional Research Service, December 16, “Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations”, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf

**Saudi Arabia** publicly **opposed the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003**, **but provided logistical support** to U.S. forces, 88 and **Saudi officials have called on U.S. forces not to leave Iraq on an “uninvited” basis**. 89 **Saudi Arabia’s principal interests with regard to Iraq are**— first, **to prevent instability and conflict** in Iraq **from threatening Saudi Arabia’s internal security** and stability; **second, to prevent the repression of Iraq’s Sunnis by newly dominant Shiites**; and, third, to limit the regional influence of a potentially hostile Iran. 90 **Saudi Arabia’s** longer term **interests include ensuring that the revival of Iraq’s oil industry does not threaten Saudi preeminence** and preferences in global energy markets and that Iraq does not re-emerge as a strategic military threat to the Arab Gulf states. **Reconciliation and long-term stability in Iraq could ease Saudi fears of creeping insecurity**, but could also create new challenges. Saudi Arabia’s immediate concern is the reintegration or elimination of Saudi militants who may be seeking to return from Iraq. The success of Iraqi reconciliation efforts and the choices made by Iraq’s government will determine whether Saudi fears about the empowerment of Shiite Arabs and the growth of Iranian influence persist or diminish. Future Iraqi choices in key areas such as energy and military policy will have important implications for Iraqi-Saudi relations. 91 Saudi Policy Priorities in Iraq **The Saudi Arabian government has refrained from** overt political**-military intervention in Iraq** since 2003**, in spite of the threat that instability in Iraq has posed to Saudi Arabia’s national security**. To date, Saudi policy initiatives have sought to meet the humanitarian needs of Iraqis displaced by violence; to promote political and religious reconciliation among Iraqis by hosting and participating in various regional conferences; and, to take preventive security measures to limit the spread of violence into Saudi Arabia. Some analysts believe that Saudi Arabia has not fulfilled pledges of aid to Iraq because it does not want to support an Iraqi government that many Saudis believe has a Shiite sectarian agenda. Other observers also speculate that the Saudi government may be offering financial support to Sunni Arab individuals and groups in Iraq, including tribal leaders and others associated with the so called “awakening” movement. However, Prince Saud al Faisal publicly has dismissed calls for direct Saudi involvement in supporting Iraqi Sunnis and has stated, that “since the start of the crisis in Iraq ... the Kingdom has said it will stand at an equal distance from all Iraqi groups and does not describe itself as the guardian of any group or sect.” 92

**Military presence is k2 Saudi Arabia-US relations**

**Blanchard 9,** (Christopher M., December 16, a analyst in middle eastern affairs for CRS, “Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations” <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf> Page 25 Accessed June 27 ) CM

**Long-standing military** training programs **remain an important pillar of U.S.-Saudi relations**. **The United States has played an integral role in the development, training, and arming of the Saudi Arabian military** since the 1940s, when U.S. military advisors first carried out a comprehensive assessment of the kingdom’s defense requirements.53 Since the 1940s, **a number of subsequent U.S. defense assessments, joint planning activities, and training programs have established close and cooperative relationships between the U.S. military services and their Saudi counterparts.** **The Saudi Arabian government has continually sought U.S. military technology and training as a guarantee of its national security, and Saudi authorities have pursued military procurement and modernization initiatives based on the recommendations of U.S. defense surveys**.54 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the United States Army Corps of Engineers completed a series of massive military infrastructure construction projects across the kingdom; many U.S.-built facilities remain critical to the operations of Saudi security forces. As noted above, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and subsequent coalition efforts to evict Iraqi forces and enforce United Nations Security Council Resolutions provided the basis for the expanded U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia that lasted from 1990 until 2003. Following the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, the U.S. military withdrew almost all of the 5,000 troops that had been stationed in Saudi Arabia and moved its Combat Air Operations Center from Saudi Arabia to neighboring Qatar. **Now, as before, between 200 and 300 U.S. military personnel remain in Saudi Arabia at any given time to administer long-standing U.S. training programs in conjunction with U.S. civilians and local hires**. Almost all U.S. training for the Saudi armed forces is funded via Saudi government purchases through the Foreign Military Sales program. The existence of parallel U.S. training programs for different Saudi security forces reflects the relatively stove-piped nature of Saudi Arabia’s security and defense establishment; anecdotal evidence suggests that different Saudi ministries and security forces do not operate **jointly and may serve as sources of influence and patronage for members of the royal family.**

Internals – Withdrawal 🡪 Kills Relations

**Saudis favor regional US military occupation- key to maintain their hegemony and deter attack**

**IISS 8** [International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 20, Chapter 2, Page 45, www.iiss.org/EasySiteWeb/GatewayLink.aspx?alId=23352] KLS

However, the **Saudis are unwilling to depend too heavily on the US for their security**. Even before 2003, Saudi Arabia was unsure whether the United States was a reliable ally, especially after the strong criticism the kingdom received in the US following the 11 September 2001 attacks. American military difficulties in Iraq since 2003 have made Saudi Arabia fear that the US is not only fickle, but also less powerful than was once believed. The legitimacy of the Saudi royal family and national claims to leadership of the Arab and Muslim world (the king’s official title is ‘Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques’) are undermined by a reliance on the United States for the kingdom’s protection. This problem is compounded by the vehement anti- Americanism found throughout the Arab world. **For reasons both of internal stability and regional prestige therefore, Saudi Arabia is eager to avoid appearing as an American proxy.** This explains occasional undiplomatic demonstrations of displeasure or independence, such as King Abdullah’s meeting with Ahmadinejad before reportedly cancelling a state dinner with US President George W. Bush the following month, or his description of the US presence in Iraq as an ‘illegal foreign occupation’.40 **At the same time, the Saudis are aware that they ultimately rely on the American military presence to protect them from Iranian regional hegemony.**

**Saudis approve of the bases- they have empirically cooperated with the US military to drive out al Qaeda**

**Dobbs 3 [Michael, Washington Post Staff Writer, March 14, The Washington Post, Lexis]**

The issue became particularly acute after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. **Hundreds of thousands of U.S. and other foreign forces were allowed to stage in Saudi Arabia before driving Iraqi forces from Kuwait**. But Saudi fundamentalists had been promised the foreign troops would leave immediately after the conflict. When **U.S. forces remained, bin Laden and others rang an alarm that helped give impetus to al Qaeda.**

Internals – Presence k2 Regional Stability

**Maintaining presence post-elections is key – withdrawing too quickly collapses regional security and rocks the global economy**

Thomas E. **Ricks, 2-25**-10 – Senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. “Extending America's stay in Iraq,” The International Herald Tribune, Lexis.

Whether or not the elections bring the long-awaited political breakthrough that genuinely ends the fighting there, **2010 is likely to be a turning-point year in the war**, akin to the summer of 2003 (when the United States realized that it faced an insurgency) and 2006 (when that insurgency morphed into a small but vicious civil war and American policy came to a dead end). For good or ill, **this is** likely **the year we will begin to see the broad outlines of post-occupation Iraq.** The early signs are not good, with the latest being the decision over the weekend of the leading Sunni party, the National Dialogue Front, to withdraw from the elections. **The political situation is far less certain, and** I think **less stable, than most Americans believe**. A retired Marine colonel I know, Gary Anderson, just returned from Iraq and predicts a civil war or military coup by September. Another friend, the journalist Nir Rosen, avers that Iraq is on a long-term peaceful course. Both men know Iraq well. I have not seen such a wide discrepancy in expert views since late 2005. The period surrounding the surge of 2007 has been misremembered. It was not about simply sending 30,000 more troops to Iraq; it was about using force differently, moving the troops off big bases to work with Iraqi units and live among the people. Perhaps even more significantly, the surge signaled a change in American attitudes, with more humility about what could be done, more willingness to listen to Iraqis, and with quietly but sharply reduced ambitions. The Bush administration's grandiose original vision of transforming Iraq into a beacon of democracy that would alter the Middle East and drain the swamps of terrorism was scuttled and replaced by the more realistic goal of getting American forces out and leaving behind a country that was somewhat stable and, with luck, perhaps democratic and respectful of human rights. As part of the shift, the U.S. commander, Gen. David Petraeus, also effectively put the Sunni insurgency on the American payroll. Looking back now, I think the surge was the right thing to do. In rejecting the view of the majority of his military advisers and embracing the course proposed by a handful of dissidents, President Bush found his finest moment. That said, the larger goal of the surge was to facilitate a political breakthrough, which has not happened. **All the existential questions that plagued Iraq** before the surge **remain unanswered**. How will oil revenue be shared among the country's major groups? **What is to be the fundamental relationship between Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds?** Will Iraq have a strong central government or be a loose confederation? And what will be the role of Iran (for my money, the biggest winner in the Iraq war thus far)? Unfortunately, all of **these questions have led to violence in the past, and could again just as the Obama administration's timeline calls for troops to leave** areas that are far from quiet. The plan this year is to pull out about 10,000 troops a month for five months, beginning in late spring. That will halve the American military presence, with the remainder (other than a "residual force" of unspecified size) scheduled to be withdrawn in 2011. The withdrawal plan was written on the assumption that the elections would be held late in 2009 or early in 2010. **Under the plan, troop numbers would be kept level to ensure stability in a vulnerable period,** especially if the Sunnis were to feel that the electoral process was **unfair**, or if they were not given a role in the new government commensurate with their success at the polls. But given the changed timetable, just as Iraqi political leaders are struggling to form a new government, American military leaders will be distracted by the myriad tasks of supervising major troop movements. On top of that, the deeper the troop withdrawals go, the more potentially destabilizing they will be - **because the first withdrawals will be made in areas that are considered more secure,** or where Iraqi forces are deemed more reliable or evenhanded. By June, American troops may be leaving areas that are far from quiet, and where new tensions may be brewing as a result of the elections. Once again, the United States would be rushing toward failure in Iraq, as it did so often under the Bush administration, trying to pass responsibility to Iraqi officials and institutions before they are ready for the task. By late summer, the Obama administration could find itself in the uncomfortable position of reconsidering its vows to get out of combat in Iraq by August and to remove all troops by the end of next year. This will be politically difficult for the president, but he has shown admirable flexibility in his handling of Iraq. My impression is that the American people now wish they had never heard of Iraq, but understand just what a mess it is and are willing to give the president a surprising amount of leeway. Extending the American military presence will be even more politically controversial in Iraq, and for that reason, it would be best to let Iraqi leaders make the first public move to re-open the status of forces agreement of 2008, which calls for American troops to be out of the country by the end of next year. But I think leaders in both countries may come to recognize that the best way to deter a return to civil war is to find a way to keep 30,000 to 50,000 United States service members in Iraq for many years to come. These troops' missions would be far narrower than during the surge era; their primary goal would be to train and advise Iraqi security forces and to carry out counterterrorism missions. (It is actually hard to get below 30,000 and still have an effective force; many troops are needed for logistics, maintenance, medical, intelligence, communications and headquarters jobs, and additional infantry units are then needed to protect the people performing those tasks.) Such a relatively small, tailored force would not be big enough to wage a war, but it might be enough to deter a new one from breaking out. An Iraqi civil war would likely be a three- or four-sided affair, with the Shiites breaking into pro- and anti-Iranian factions. It could also easily metastasize into a regional war. Neighboring powers like Turkey and Iran are already involved in Iraqi affairs, and the Sunni Arab states would be unlikely to stand by **and watch a Shiite-dominated regime in Baghdad slaughter the Sunni minority. A regional war in the middle of the world's oil patch could** shake the global economy to its foundations and make the current recession look mild**. In addition, a continued American military presence could help Iraq move forward politically. No one there particularly likes having the Americans around, but many groups seem to trust the Americans as honest brokers**.

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Internals – Presence k2 Regional Stability

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And there would be a moral, humanitarian and political benefit: Having American soldiers accompany Iraqi units may improve the behavior of Iraqi forces, discouraging relapses to Saddam Hussein-era abuses, or the use of force for private ends and feuds. Advisers not only instruct Iraqi commanders, they also monitor them. **As a longtime critic of the American invasion of Iraq, I am not happy about advocating a continued military presence there. Yet**, to echo the counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen, **just because you invade a country stupidly doesn't mean you should leave it stupidly**. The best argument against keeping troops in Iraq is the one some American military officers make, which is that a civil war is inevitable, and that by staying all we are doing is postponing it. That may be so, but I don't think it is worth gambling to find out.

**US military presence is k2 maintaining stability in the region**

**Hajjar 02**, (Sami G., March, U.S. Army War College as Prof. and Director of Middle East Studies in the Department of National Security and Strategy, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=185> accessed June 27) CM

I conclude this study with a final comment speculating on the long-term role of the Army in the Gulf. For as long as Gulf oil remains vital to the interests of the United States and its allies, **the presence of an Army** heavy combat capability based in the region is to be expected. This capability **is to prevent a cross-border invasion into Kuwait and Saudi Arabia by Iraq**. The possibility of an Iraqi incursion will remain for some time, even after the regime of Saddam has been replaced. As already noted, this is because of the Iraqi argument that historically Kuwait belongs to Iraq, and because future Iraqi governments are likely toblame Kuwait for the impact the sanctions have had on Iraqi society. Hence, even if Baghdad is ruled by a moderate regime that is friendly to the West, this should not mean that Iraqi national aspirations would necessarily be abandoned. In addition to Iraq, **the Gulf region is likely to remain fundamentally unstable** for several decades to come. **Iran can be a source of instability** insofar as it regards itself as the dominant Gulf power that is entitled to a commensurate role in the region. Sharing major maritime oil and gas fields with the littoral Gulf states means that Iran and the Arab sheikdoms have potential friction points. U**.S. military presence, especially naval and air force capabilities, in several of the Gulf countries is a critical check to Iranian ambitions and possible adventurism.**161 The uncertain prospect for the long-term stability of the traditional Gulf regimes is another issue of concern. These regimes, as this study has demonstrated, welcome American military presence. Several scenarios could be discussed as to what would happen if these regimes were to fall. I believe that, in the unlikely event this is to occur, it would not simultaneously happen in all of the Gulf states. If there were a regime change in Saudi Arabia, for example, the pressure would be more and not less on the United States to enhance its military presence, and specifically the presence of heavy combat capabilities in the other Gulf states. In other words**, there is no realistic end in the foreseeable future to U.S. military engagement in the Gulf. The vital interests the United States has in the region, the desire of local governments to retain U.S. military presence, and the inability of Japan and European powers that depend on Middle East oil to project power for a long period of time, mean that U.S. engagement is there for the long haul**.The Army should plan accordingly, for an over-the-horizon presence strategy is no longer valid. Air and naval power are highly effective in defeating aggression by hostile forces; land power is, in the final analysis, what will secure the worlds most precious and coveted real estate.

Internals—A2: Saudi-Iraq Coop

**No Cooperation—perceived instability creates Saudi apprehension**

**Blanchard 9**(Christopher, Analyst in Middle East affairs@The Congressional Research Service, December 16, “Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations”, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf

**Sectarian** and strategic **anxieties complicate Saudi efforts to engage the Shiite-led Iraqi government,** to establish strong trade links, and to discourage and prevent Saudi clerics and individuals from supporting Sunni Arab combatants in Iraq. Saudi leaders maintain regular contact with prominent Iraqi government officials, clerics, and political figures. A Saudi Foreign Ministry delegation visited Iraq in August 2007 to explore the possibility of reopening an embassy in Baghdad, and in January 2008, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal announced that an ambassador had been chosen and that Saudi Arabia hoped to open an embassy in Baghdad “in the next few months.” 93 However, **in October 2008 he appeared to place an indefinite delay on plans to send an ambassador to Baghdad because, in the Saudi government’s view, security concerns would limit the ability of any Saudi representative to operate effectively**. 94 **A regional press report** in April 2009 **appeared to confirm that advanced preparations for an eventual Saudi diplomatic presence in Baghdad have been made, but quoted Saudi officials as indicating that security concerns continue to limit their willingness to send high level diplomatic personnel to Iraq** on a permanent basis. **The bombings of Iraqi government ministries** in August and October 2009 likely **confirmed Saudi views of insecurity in Baghdad following the withdrawal of U.S. forces** from Iraq’s cities. As of November 2009, a Saudi Embassy had not been opened in Baghdad and no ambassador had been publicly identified

\_\_\_\*\*Sunni Alliance – Impacts

Impact Quantifier – Middle East War Outweighs\*\*

**Middle east instability allows for multiple scenarios for escalation, causing nuclear Armageddon**

**Russell 9**(James, Managing Editor@Strategic Insights, “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East”, http://www.analyst-network.com/articles/141/StrategicStabilityReconsideredProspectsforEscalationandNuclearWarintheMiddleEast.pdf)

In describing near-term regional scenarios that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons, three parties present themselves as principal candidates to cross the nuclear threshold: Israel, Iran and the United States. While another regional state or non-state actor may possess nuclear weapons, publicly available information suggests that Israel is the only nuclear weapons state in the region. It is also possible that Iran has already crossed the nuclear threshold and is already a nuclear weapons state. A massive intelligence failure allowing Iran to quietly become a nuclear power must be factored into potential near-term scenarios for nuclear use. Various Israeli officials have openly stated that Israel will attack Iran before it achieves a nuclear capability. In June 2008, then Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz stated: “If Iran continues its program to develop nuclear weapons, we will attack it. The window of opportunity has closed. The sanctions are not effective. There will be no alternative but to attack Iran in order to stop the Iranian nuclear program.” 71 For its part, **the U**nited **S**tates **has explicitly extended its nuclear umbrella over Israel and a variety of Gulf States that host American military forces. In extending a nuclear umbrella over Israel**, 72 senior **American officials have repeatedly made veiled references of their commitment to use all means at their disposal to defend Israel up to and including nuclear weapons**. Vice President Dick Cheney offered the following representative formulation of the American commitment to Israeli security in 2008 when he stated: “**America’s commitment to Israel’s security is enduring and unshakable**,” he said, “as is our commitment to Israel’s right to defend itself always against terrorism, rocket attacks and other threats from forces dedicated to Israel’s destruction.” 73 President Bush specifically stated in February 2006 that **the United States would defend Israel militarily in the event of an attack by Iran**. 74 In October 2007, President Bush stated that a nuclear-armed Iran might lead to World War III. 75 In remarks that received no disavowals from government sources, then Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton stated in April 2008 that **the United States would “obliterate” Iran if it ever attacked Israel** with nuclear weapons. 76 While these commitments don’t contradict the American policy of not supporting an Israeli preemptive strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructures, borne out in former President Bush’s refusal to greenlight an Israeli request for overflight rights to cross Iraqi airspace, they do strongly suggest that the United States would retaliate forcefully in the event the Iranians attacked Israel with nuclear weapons, since it would be Iran committing nuclear first use and breaking the long taboo in place since 1945. America’s disapproval of Israeli pre-emption may reflect a reduced national appetite for military action in general, and for unilateral strategic action. However, the intensity of U.S.-Israeli bilateral relations places the United States in an extremely awkward position: on the one hand, a cherished ally could openly be calling for the fulfillment of security commitments 77 for its protection and security in response to an external threat; on the other hand, U.S. security commitment to its allies include deterrence and defense, but are widely regarded as excluding preventative actions. To summarize, **systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework induce the prospect of strategic instability in which escalation could unfold in a number of scenarios leading to the use of nuclear weapons** **by** either **the U**nited **S**tates, Israel, or Iran. For purposes of this paper, escalation means an expansion of the intensity and scope of the conflict. 78 **The common denominator for the proposed scenarios is that nuclear use occurs in the context of conflict escalation – a conflict that could be initiated by a variety of different parties and in a variety of different circumstances**. 79 It is extremely unlikely that either the United States or Israel would initiate the use of nuclear weapons as part of a pre-emptive attack on Iran’s nuclear sites. 80 However, **there are escalation scenarios involving state and non-state actors in the coercive bargaining framework that could conceivably lead to nuclear weapons use by** Israel and/or **the U**nited **S**tates. Iran’s response to what would initially start as a sustained stand-off bombardment (Desert Fox Heavy) could take a number of different forms that might lead to escalation by the United States and Israel, surrounding states, and non-state actors. Once the strikes commenced, it is difficult to imagine Iran remaining in a Saddam-like quiescent mode and hunkering down to wait out the attacks. **Iranian leaders have unequivocally stated that any attack on its nuclear sites will result in a wider war** 81 – a war that could involve regional states on both sides as well as non-state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah. While a wider regional war need not lead to escalation and nuclear use by either Israel or the United States, **wartime circumstances and domestic political pressures could combine to shape decision-making in ways that present nuclear use as an option to achieve military and political objectives**. For both the United States and Israel, **Iranian** or proxy **use of chemical**, biological or radiological **weapons represent the most serious potential escalation triggers. For Israel, a sustained conventional bombardment of its urban centers by** Hezbollah rockets in Southern Lebanon **could also trigger** an **escalation** spiral. Assessing relative probability of these scenarios is very difficult and beyond the scope of this article. **Some scenarios** for Iranian responses **that could lead to escalation by the U**nited **S**tates and Israel **are: • Terrorist**-type **asymmetric attacks** on either the U.S. or Israeli homelands by Iran or its proxies using either conventional or unconventional (chemical, biological, or radiological) weapons. Escalation is more likely in response to the use of unconventional weapons in populated urban centers. <CONTINUED>

Impact Quantifier – Middle East War Outweighs\*\*

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The potential for use of nuclear retaliation against terrorist type attacks is problematic, unless of course the sponsoring country takes official responsibility for them, which seems highly unlikely. • **Asymmetric attacks by Iran or its proxies using unconventional weapons against U.S. military facilities** in Iraq and the Gulf States (Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, Qatar); • Long-range missile strikes by Iran attacking Israel and/or U.S. facilities in Iraq and the Gulf States: • Conventional missile strikes in and around the Israeli reactor at Dimona • Airbursts of chemical or radiological agents in Israeli urban areas; • Missile strikes using non-conventional weapons against US Gulf facilities such as Al Udeid in Qatar, Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE, and the 5 th Fleet Headquarters in Manama, Bahrain. Under all scenarios involving chemical/biological attacks on its forces, the United States has historically retained the right to respond with all means at its disposal even if the attacks come from a non-nuclear weapons state. 82 • **The involvement of non-state actors as part of ongoing hostilities between Iran, the U**nited **S**tates, **and Israel** in which Hezbollah and/or Hamas became engaged presents an added dimension for conflict escalation. While tactically allied with Iran and each other, these groups have divergent interests and objectives that could affect their involvement (or non-involvement in a wider regional war) – particularly in ways that might prompt escalation by Israel and the United States. Hezbollah is widely believed to have stored thousands of short range Iranian-supplied rockets in southern Lebanon. Attacking Israel in successive fusillades of missiles over time could lead to domestic political demands on the Israeli military to immediately stop these external attacks – a mission that might require a wide area-denial capability provided by nuclear weapons and their associated PSI overpressures, particularly if its conventional ground operations in Gaza prove in the mid- to longterms as indecisive or strategic ambiguous as its 2006 operations in Lebanon. • **Another source of uncertainty is the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps** (IRGC) – referred to here as “quasi-state” actor. **The IRGC manages the regime’s nuclear, chemical and missile programs** and is responsible for “extraterritorial” operations outside Iran. The IRGC is considered as instrument of the state and reports directly to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. So far, the IRGC has apparently refrained from providing unconventional weapons to its surrogates. The IRGC also, however arms and funds various Shiite paramilitary groups in Iraq and Lebanon that have interests and objectives that may or may not directly reflect those of the Iranian supreme leader. Actions of these groups in a wartime environment are another source of strategic uncertainty that could shape crisis decision-making in unhelpful ways. • **The most likely regional state to be drawn into a conflict on Iran’s side in a wider regional war is Syria, which is widely reported to have well developed missile and chemical warfare programs**. Direct Syrian military involvement in an Israeli-U.S./Iranian war taking the form of missile strikes or chemical attacks on Israel could serve as another escalation trigger in a nuclear-use scenario, in particular if chemical or bio-chem weapons are used by the Syrians, technically crossing the WMD-chasm and triggering a retaliatory strike using any category of WMD including nuclear weapons. • The last – and perhaps most disturbing – of these near-term scenarios is the possible use by Iran of nuclear weapons in the event of conventional strikes by the United States and Israel. This scenario is built on the assumption of a U.S. and/or Israeli intelligence failure to detect Iranian possession of a nuclear device that had either been covertly built or acquired from another source. **It is possible to foresee an Iranian “demonstration” use of a nuclear weapon in such a scenario** in an attempt to stop an Israeli/U.S. conventional bombardment. **A darker scenario would be a direct nuclear attack by Iran on Israel**, also precipitated by conventional strikes, inducing a “use them or lose them” response. In turn, **such a nuclear strike would almost certainly prompt** an Israeli and U.S**. massive response – a potential “Armageddon” scenario.**

Impact Module—Terrorism

**U.S.-Saudi relations key to win the war on terror**

**Blanchard 9**(Christopher, Analyst in Middle East affairs@The Congressional Research Service, December 16, “Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations”, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf

**The** Bush Administration’s January 2008 **Strategy Toward Saudi Arabia asserted that, “Victory** for the United States **in the** global **war on terrorism will be impossible without a partnership to dry up funds for terrorists and to combat Islamic extremism** in the kingdom.” 64 Terrorism has long been an issue in U.S.-Saudi relations, and the strategy document constitutes the latest acknowledgment by U.S. officials of the roles that Saudi nationals play in both supporting and combating terrorism. **U.S. policy makers sought the support of Saudi authorities throughout the 1970s and 1980s in combating various terrorist groups.** However, **after terrorist attacks on U.S. military facilities in Saudi Arabia** in 1995 and 1996, **the need for additional U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism cooperation grew more urgent**. **Current counterterrorism issues include joint U.S.-Saudi efforts to eliminate threats posed by violent extremists** in the kingdom as well as internationally. **U.S. officials acknowledge significant Saudi domestic counterterrorism efforts** and encourage the Saudi government to build upon the positive steps it has already taken to combat international terrorism. Both U.S. and Saudi officials have said the impetus for closer counterterrorism cooperation in recent years came from a series of terrorist attacks against Saudi, U.S., and other facilities in Saudi Arabia beginning in May 2003. **One knowledgeable observer described the May 2003 attacks as “the inevitable wake up call” for Saudi leaders increasingly concerned over attempts by terrorists to target the Saudi regime**. 65 According to the 9/11 Commission’s final report, “[a]s in Pakistan, Yemen, and other countries, [Saudi] attitudes changed when the terrorism came home.”

**Terrorism causes extinction**

**Alexander 3**(Yonah, August 28, Professor of Inter-University for Terrorism Studies, “Terrorism Myths and Realities”, Washington Times, pg. A20)

Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that **the international community failed**, thus far at least, **to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization** itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, **contemporary terrorists** **have introduced a new scale of violence** in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. **The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism** **[e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber**] **with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns.**

Impact—Causes Terrorism

**U.S. Saudi relations key to prevent massive increase in terrorism**

**Telhami and Hill 2**(Shibley, Senior Fellow at the Saban Center, and Fiona, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, "Does Saudi Arabia Still Matter? Differing Perspectives on the Kingdom and Its Oil” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58444/shibley-telhami-fiona-hill-et-al/does-saudi-arabia-still-matter-differing-perspectives-on-the-kin?page=show)

**Given America's** ongoing security **interest in the Persian Gulf, it is highly likely that the U.S. military will retain a large presence in the region**. **Washington must** therefore continue to **place high priority on sustaining favorable relations with Riyadh**, since **Saudi approval and cooperation will remain essential to any continued American military presence**. It is certainly possible that the United States will reduce the number of troops it keeps in Saudi Arabia, or will at least have them assume a lower profile, but it is hard to imagine that, with the exception of Kuwait, any of the smaller members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (which comprises Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) could afford to host large American bases without Saudi acquiescence. In addition, U.S. options would be significantly handicapped if Saudi Arabia were to deny overflight rights to U.S. military aircraft, or prohibit ground troops from launching operations from Saudi soil in the case of a war with Iraq. And finally, the key role that Saudi Arabia plays psychologically and symbolically in the lives of Muslims worldwide cannot be underestimated. **It is one thing to have radical nonstate groups that** advocate and **employ violence against the** **U**nited **S**tates; **it would be a very different matter to have a radical government** **employ the pulpit of Mecca**, **where millions** **come every year** on pilgrimage**, to set a hostile tone in the name of Islam**. This prospect alone -- which seems quite realistic in Rouleau's portrait of "the most rigorous theocracy in the Islamic world," where Islamic radicals "have called into question the very legitimacy of the al Saud dynasty" -- should be enough to convince Americans that a close U.S.-Saudi relationship is in their best interest.

Impact Module—Saudi Prolif

**Collapse of U.S.-Saudi relations causes Saudi Proliferation**

**Lippman 8**(Thomas, Diplomatic and National Security Reporter@The Washington Post, “Nuclear Weapons and Saudi Strategy”, http://www.mei.edu/Portals/0/Publications/nuclear-weapons-saudi-strategy.pdf)

So let us **suppose** that **Saudi Arabia’s currently testy relationship with the U**nited **S**tates **deteriorated** to the point where the Saudis no longer felt they could rely on Washington’s protection. **If the Saudis could no longer assume** that the armed forces of **the U**nited **S**tates **are their ultimate weapon against external threats, might they not wish to acquire a different ultimate weapon?** With that in mind, **could not a reasonable case be made in the Saudis’ minds for the development of** an alternative security relationship, and perhaps **a nuclear agreement**, with another major power should relations with the United States deteriorate? A possible candidate for such a role would of course be China, a nuclear power that has a close relationship with Saudi Arabia’s ally Pakistan and a growing need for imported oil. Sufficiently remote from the Persian Gulf not to pose a direct threat to Saudi Arabia, and no longer part of any international communist movement, **China could theoretically be an attractive partner**. This is not to say that Saudi Arabia is actually seeking such a relationship with any country other the United States, but to be unaware of any such outreach is not to exclude it from the realm of possibility. **The Saudi Arabian armed forces have never developed a** coherent **national security doctrine** that could provide a serious basis for acquisition and deployment planning, **let alone for a decision to acquire nuclear weapons**. **But** to summarize the reasons why Saudi Arabia might pursue such a course: **it is a rich but weak country with armed forces of suspect competence; outmanned by** combat**-hardened**, **truculent and potentially nuclear-armed neighbors**; and **no longer confident that it can count on its American protector**. Even before the Iraq War, Richard L. Russell observed in a 2001 essay arguing the case for Saudi acquisition of nuclear capability that “It would be imprudent, to say the least, for Riyadh to make the cornerstone of [its] national-security posture out of an assumption that the United States would come to the kingdom’s defense under any and all circumstances.” It might be even more imprudent now. “**From Riyadh’s perspective**,” continued Russell, “**the acquisition of nuclear weapons** and secure delivery systems **would appear logical and even necessary**.” Those “secure delivery systems,” Russell argued, would not be aircraft, which are vulnerable to ground defenses, but “ballistic-missile delivery systems that would stand a near-invulnerable chance of penetrating enemy airspace”— namely, the CSS-2s. Military **experts say it is theoretically possible that the missiles could be made operational**, modernized, **and retrofitted with nuclear warheads acquired from China, Pakistan** or perhaps, within a few years, North Korea. **Any attempt to do so**, however, **would present immense** technical and **political difficulties** — **so** much so **that Saudi Arabia might emerge less secure**, rather than more.

**Causes nuclear terrorism**

**Blank 3**(Stephen, November 7, Analyst of National Security Affairs, “Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Gambit” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/EK07Ak01.html)

Obviously, **that kind of transformation of the proliferation** situation **raises the possibility of several more crises** in different regions of the world, all of **which could occur in relatively simultaneous fashion** **and** which **would** all **involve the** linked **threats of** either **terrorists** **with access to nuclear weapons** or states possessing those weapons which extend their protection and deterrence to those terrorists. Furthermore, there are still more considerations. If one looks at the history of Pakistan's nuclear program there immediately arises the issue of Pakistan's widely-reported assistance to North Korea, which at the same time is apparently proliferating missiles all over the Middle East. **Adding Saudi Arabia to this chain of proliferators** only **extends the process of secondary or tertiary proliferation by which new nuclear powers assist other nuclear "wannabes" to reach that state**. Thus, the threat expressed by the US of being at the crossroads of radicalism and technology becomes that much more real.

Impact Module—Saudi Prolif

Nuclear terrorism causes extinction

**Sid Ahmed 4**(Mohamed, Political Analyst, Sept.4 “Extinction!”, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm)

We have reached a point in human history where the phenomenon of terrorism has to be completely uprooted, not through persecution and oppression, but by removing the reasons that make particular sections of the world population resort to terrorism. This means that fundamental changes must be brought to the world system itself. The phenomenon of **terrorism is even more dangerous than is generally believed**. We are in for surprises no less serious than 9/11 and with far more devastating consequences. **A nuclear attack by terrorists will be much more critical than Hiroshima and Nagazaki**, even if -- and this is far from certain -- the weapons used are less harmful than those used then, Japan, at the time, with no knowledge of nuclear technology, had no choice but to capitulate. Today, the technology is a secret for nobody. So far, except for the two bombs dropped on Japan, nuclear weapons have been used only to threaten. Now **we are at a stage where they can be detonated.** This completely changes the rules of the game. We have reached a point where anticipatory measures can determine the course of events. **Allegations of a terrorist connection can be used to justify anticipatory measures, including the invasion of a sovereign state like Iraq**. As it turned out, these allegations, as well as the allegation that Saddam was harbouring WMD, proved to be unfounded. **What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living**. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, **tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race** and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is **if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war**, from **which no one will emerge victorious**. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. **When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.**

Impact—Causes Saudi Prolif

**Loss of relations causes Saudi prolif and de-stabilizes the Middle East**

**McDowell 3**(Steven, LT in the U.S. Navy, September, “Is Saudi Arabia a Nuclear Threat?”, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/mcdowell.pdf)

**The decision to replace the missiles will profoundly impact** Saudi security as well as **the security of neighboring states. The Persian Gulf historically has been an unstable region characterized by** regional **arms races**, **the use of chemical** and biological **weaponry, a pre-emptive attack on a nuclear power reactor**, numerous **revolts** and uprisings, **and the destruction of oil** fields during the 1990-91 Gulf War and during the recent U.S. led war in Iraq. Instability in the Gulf region has the potential to negatively impact the global economy and the supply of oil. A stable Middle East is in the interest of all states most importantly the United States that relies on oil. **Given the current** conventional and unconventional **inventories of Gulf states** that have been **hostile to the Saudi regime** in the past, I argue that **the U.S.-Saudi relationship will play a key role in whether Saudi Arabia will seek a nuclear capability** by replacing its aging CSS-2 ballistic missile system. **Without the U.S.-Saudi alliance, in particular U.S. military support, the Saudi regime could be compelled to acquire nuclear weapons** in order to counter potential threats in the Gulf.

**Relations key to prevent Saudi Proliferation**

**McDowell 3**(Steven, LT in the U.S. Navy, September, “Is Saudi Arabia a Nuclear Threat?”, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/mcdowell.pdf)

In general, **arms purchases in the Middle East have created a “domino effect**” **that has** ultimately **led to an arms race**. Gulf **states have been motivated to proliferate in order to narrow their perceived security gap** between their own forces and those of their potential enemy. 76 U.N. **inspections of Iraqi facilities following the 1991 Persian Gulf War revealed an extensive WMD program** that included nuclear weapons programs. **Iran has** since **accelerated its nuclear**, chemical weapons, and ballistic missile **programs** while **Israel is suspected of having a** chemical weapons program and a **nuclear inventory** consisting of one hundred warheads. 77 **With threats of WMD adjacent in every direction of Saudi Arabia, the likelihood of the Saudis pursuing a nuclear capability through their ballistic missile program is a serious probability**. **A** likely **constraint to this would be the regime’s relationship with the U**nited **S**tates. **The Saudis have relied on U.S. security** for many years, but is the U.S. relationship strong enough to suppress Saudi insecurity?

**Relations prevent prolif**

**McDowell 3**(Steven, LT in the U.S. Navy, September, “Is Saudi Arabia a Nuclear Threat?”, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/mcdowell.pdf)

**States tend to acquire nuclear weapons** for reasons ranging from the quest for power and prestige to the need **to deter other states** who present a considerable external threat. As discussed in the second chapter, **Saudi Arabia** is a realist state that **faces a security dilemma**. **Its alliance with the U**nited **S**tates **reassured the Saudis that their security needs are covered**, thus **reducing the Saudi desire for nuclear weapons**. However, in the wake of the planned U.S. military withdrawal from the Kingdom, the Saudi regime will likely re-examine its security needs with respect to the removal of U.S. troops. The shift from a bipolar international structure consisting of the United States and the former Soviet Union had a dramatic impact on the security alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia. One of the initial consequences of this change was the propensity among states to proliferate weapons of mass destruction, thereby establishing a causal relationship between the structure of the international system and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 86 Benjamin Frankel argues the unipolar world that exists today and the diminished technological difficulties of acquiring nuclear weapons that facilitates the spread of nuclear weapons as their acquisition “becomes a matter of political decisions.” **The Saudi incentives to acquire a nuclear weapon are directly related to the credibility of the security guarantees provided by the U**nited **S**tates, which will be discussed in further detail in Chapter four. In short, **the perception of the U.S. security guarantee has been considerably weakened, causing the Saudi regime to explore the need to provide its own security** interests, **especially in the event that U.S.- Saudi relations deteriorate further**. **U.S. actions taken such as the military withdrawals from Lebanon** in 1984 and Somalia in 1993 **demonstrate a dynamic strategic environment that may have prompted Saudi Arabia to question the resolve of the U.S. security umbrella.** Furthermore, the Saudi regime must address: What is the level of threats in the Gulf region and are they acceptable to the regime?

Impact—Causes Saudi Prolif

**Instability means lack of U.S. Saudi relations goes nuclear**

**McDowell 3**(Steven, LT in the U.S. Navy, September, “Is Saudi Arabia a Nuclear Threat?”, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/mcdowell.pdf)

**In the Middle East, the acquisition of** ballistic missiles and **WMD by one state has often been perceived as a reduction in security of other Gulf states**. Due to its location, historical disputes, and the conventional and unconventional capabilities of its regional adversaries, **Saudi Arabia** still **faces adversaries who compel it to replace its** CSS-2 **missiles**, possibly **with a nuclear capability.** As a result, **the Saudis must monitor the capabilities of its Gulf neighbors** despite the status of their relations. **The Middle East is all too familiar with revolutions and military coups**, which have on several occasions successfully facilitated changes in leadership. Consequentially, **instability in any Gulf state causes apprehensions in Saudi Arabia**. **Saudi potential adversaries possess strong military forces**, larger populations, and in some cases advanced WMD programs. **The** perceived **value of WMD along** with the concerted efforts to conceal them in the Gulf states **will continue to distress the Saudi regime** until such missiles are totally removed from all parts of the region. Further complicating the Saudi security dilemma is the continuation of various regional disputes. Saudi border disputes with Yemen show no signs of disappearing and Saudi relations with Iran, while cordial on the surface, could face diverging interests over the price of oil in the future. This may lead to hostilities between the two states. The future of Iraq still remains unclear; however, its previous efforts to acquire WMD coupled with a yet ‘unassembled’ Iraqi government will remain under the watchful eye of the Saudis. Until the Israeli-Palestinian crisis is resolved, Israel with its advanced WMD programs will continue to unease the Saudis. **Despite the large U.S. military presence** in the Gulf region, shifting **U.S. strategic priorities will continue to weaken its security commitments and cause the Saudi regime to re-evaluate its relationship** with the United States. Due to periodic instabilities in the Gulf region, Saudi Arabia may feel that a nuclear capability is warranted in order to deter potential threats. However, **the United States will continue to push for diplomatic resolutions** in the region, **which may satisfy Saudi security concerns. A deterioration in U.S.-Saudi relations would ultimately increase the value of a Saudi nuclear capability**.

**Deteriorating relations with the U.S. causes Saudi prolif**

**Feldmen 4**(Yana, First Watch International, July, “Saudi Arabia”, http://www.sipri.org/research/disarmament/nuclear/researchissues/past\_projects/issues\_of\_concern/saudi\_arabia/saudi\_arabia\_default)

The strategic situation of Saudi Arabia is such that the Kingdom might consider a nuclear alliance with a friendly nuclear power or its own nuclear deterrent an attractive option. **The Kingdom is situated between two powerful regional rivals – Israel and Iran.** Israel is believed to possess nuclear weapons while it is strongly suspected that the Iranian nuclear programme has been developed to create the option to develop nuclear weapons. As recently as 1991, **Saudi Arabia may have depended on the nuclear umbrella of the United States to deter the possible use of chemical or biological weapons** against targets in Saudi Arabia by Saddam Hussein. The continued **deterioration of security ties with the** **U**nited **S**tates **might** well **provide an incentive to secure a viable nuclear alternative**. Although **Saudi Arabia appears to be a low proliferation threat at this stage**, given their considerable level of wealth, links to nations that have known nuclear programmes, **the possibility that Saudi Arabia would consider a nuclear weapons option for the future remains a concern** for some analysts.

Impact—Saudi Prolif—A2:Inevitable

**Saudi Arabia won’t proliferate now—only chance is loss of U.S. relations**

**Brooks 9**(Webster, Foreign Policy review, September 22, “Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy Gamble”, http://www.foreignpolicyreview.org/)

**The prospects of Saudi Arabia attempting to develop a nuclear weapons program are remote. The Kingdom has no nuclear** power **facilities. Its scientists have no experience in enriching uranium** for reactor fuel or operating nuclear reactors. Further, **no evidence exists that Riyadh has tried to procure nuclear weapons from foreign suppliers**. Saudi Arabia has joined the Gulf Cooperation Council initiative to develop a joint nuclear energy program. In May 2008, **they also signed a memorandum of understanding with the U.S. on nuclear energy cooperation**. Were the Saudi’s to move in the direction of a nuclear weapons program, they would undoubtedly face heavy international criticism, risk isolation and stiff economic sanctions. Nevertheless, **the possibility of Riyadh going nuclear cannot be ruled out.** **If** Iran brings a nuclear weapons program on-line, or **Saudi confidence in America’s ability to protect the Kingdom collapses,** or a new leader succeeds King Abdullah with a pro-nuclear weapons agenda, **Riyadh could reverse course**.

Impact—Sunni-Shiite Conflict Goes Nuclear

**Shia-Sunni conflict goes nuclear**

**CNN 7**(“Opposing the 'Surge'; Energy Challenge; Second Air Strike Against Suspected al Qaeda Targets in Somalia”, Aneesh Raman, CNN Correspondent, January 24, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0701/24/cnr.05.html)

RAMAN: For years, **Sunnis**, given their reach, **have dominated Middle Eastern affairs**. **Shia, based mainly in Iran, claimed little clout.** But **when Saddam Hussein's regime fell** amid the instability that followed, **an opportunity emerged for Iran to change the landscape**. And that **it did, ramping up influence in Baghdad through Shia militias**, in Lebanon through Shia Hezbollah, and in the Palestinian areas through Hamas. All **while pursuing a nuclear program** in open defiance of the world. It's a strategy that, in short, has worked. In the course of a year, **Iran has become the dominant player in the Middle East, forcing Sunni states, especially** **U.S. allies like** Egypt, Jordan, and **Saudi Arabia, to confront a whole new level of regional uncertainty**, one that could drag them all into the fight. KASSEM: It could end up as like the big confrontation, the big Sunni- Shia confrontation. RAMAN: The signs are there. One example, **responding to Iran's** several **Sunni states are now planning nuclear programs of their own**. (on camera): It is a dauntsing question. What comes next for the Middle East? On the Arab street there are as many opinions as there are people willing to voice them. (voice over): For decades, those that sat here witnessed change of all kinds. But those that sit today seem more concerned than ever before. "I am afraid," says Mohammed, "the fight between Shia and Sunnis in Iraq will spread, perhaps to Lebanon and Syria. And it could then have a bad effect on all Arab countries." UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Iran, in case of having (INAUDIBLE) will try to take control. RAMAN: **It is a doomsday scenario**, a centuries-old Shia-Sunni divide spreading to all Arab streets. **But unthinkable as it may seem, people here are bracing for anything**.

\_\_\_\*\*Sunni Alliance DA – Aff Answers

AFF: US-Saudi Relations Cyclical

**No impact—relations with Saudi Arabia are cyclical, and are in decline**

**Bronson 6**(Rachel, senior fellow and director of Middle East studies@the Council on Foreign Relations May 6, “5 Myths About U.S. Saudi Relations” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp dyn/content/article/2006/05/19/AR2006051901758.html)

There's more to it than that. **Oil is**, of course, **critical to U.S.-Saudi ties** -- it can hardly be otherwise for the world's largest consumer and largest producer. **But Washington's relationship with Riyadh more closely resembles its friendly ties to oil-poor Middle Eastern states** such as Jordan, Egypt and Israel than its **traditionally hostile relations with oil-rich states** such as Libya and Iran. Deep oil reserves have never translated into easy relations with the United States. A major reason for the close ties between the two nations was their common Cold War fight against communism. Both countries worried about the Soviet Union, and that solidified their oil and defense interests, and minimized differences. In hindsight, by supporting religious zealots in the battle against communism, the two countries contributed to the rise of radical Islamic movements. 2 The 9/11 hijackers undermined otherwise strong U.S.- Saudi ties. Actually, **things were never that smooth. Historians refer to the "special relationship" established when Saudi Arabia's** King Abdel **Aziz and** President Franklin D. **Roosevelt met in 1945**. But **since then the relationship has endured oil embargoes, U.S. restrictions on arms sales** to Saudi Arabia, **and tensions around Israel and Palestine**. Dissension permeates the entire history of U.S.-Saudi relations. **Since the end of the Cold War, relations have become particularly fraught**, with the 9/11 attacks being the most recent issue. Oil, defense and some regional interests keep the countries together, but both sides have made clear that the relationship is less special today. In 2005, Rice stated that "for 60 years . . . the United States pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region here in the Middle East -- and we achieved neither." Meanwhile, members of the Saudi royal family are debating the utility of close ties with the Americans.

AFF: US-Saudi Relations Low

**Saudi Arabia views the war with Afghanistan as a threat to their security**

**Green 10** (R., March 3**,**a research fellow at MEMRI.The Middle East Media Research Institute http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/4065.htm accessed June 27) CM

**Saudi Arabia views the ongoing war in Afghanistan as a threat to Pakistan**, **which, for many decades, has served as Saudi Arabia's strategic depth in the Muslim world, and whose stability is therefore of the utmost importance to the Saudis.** This was related in an article by Al-Watan's editor, Jamal Khashoggi: **"Saudi Arabia has a genuine interest to bring peace to Afghanistan because it will help stabilize Pakistan, a strategic ally of the kingdom**. [The Saudis] can use [their] connections with Afghan religious leaders to achieve [this aim]."[1] The daily Al-Jazirah likewise expressed Saudi Arabia's concerns about Pakistan, in an editorial published following a series of terrorist attacks in Pakistan cities: "**The growth of Taliban terrorist organizations and their spread throughout [strategically] important regions in interior Pakistan is a negative development, not just for Pakistan and Afghanistan, but for the [entire] Indian subcontinen**t... **The security crisis Afghanistan is experiencing**, and which Pakistan is currently struggling with, **represents a serious challenge to** both these **countrie**s, **as well as to the U.S. and to NATO as a whole**."[2] B) Saudi Arabia's Rivalry with Iran Saudi Arabia's interest in Afghanistan also stems from its ongoing rivalry with Iran, whose ties to Afghanistan go back centuries. The Safavid and Qajar dynasties (which ruled Iran from the early 16th to the early 20th centuries) both dominated the Herat region in Western Afghanistan and claimed it as part of their empires. **Afghanistan also has a large Shi'ite minority** (estimated at 20% of the population) **and** a number of ethnic minorities that speak Iranian languages. Today, **Iran views Afghanistan as part of its sphere of influence and as an arena for advancing its political, strategic, economic, and cultural interests**. **Saudi Arabia strongly opposes Iran's use of Afghanistan to boost its regional status and set up an additional front of confrontation with the U.S.**, and the Saudi dailies Al-Sharq Al-Awsat and Al-Watan have pointed to the heavy involvement of Iran in Afghanistan.[3] As a matter of fact, the current conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran is just another phase in the long-standing rivalry between them. This rivalry intensified especially after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which generated immense solidarity with Iran in the Muslim world. Saudi Arabia sought to counter this development and restore its supremacy in the Muslim world through two main courses of action, the first of which was a decade-long involvement in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union. This war culminated in victory over the Soviets and in the demise of their empire, which greatly enhanced Saudi Arabia's prestige at the expense of Iran's. Second, the Saudis engaged in a global effort to spread Wahhabi Islam throughout the world by financing educational facilities and providing personnel to run them. This too was a Saudi victory, for the Saudi efforts were far more successful than Iran's attempts to export its revolution.

AFF: US-Saudi Relations Low

**U.S. Saudi Relations low—Palestine-Israel**

**Pipes 9**(Daniel, January 26, Front Page magazine, “A Saudi Prince's Threat to the Obama Administration”, http://www.danielpipes.org/6151/a-saudi-princes-threat-to-the-obama-administration)

These credentials help gauge the import of the remarkable op-ed **Turki published** on Jan. 23 in London's Financial Times, "[Saudi Arabia's patience is running out](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a11a77b0-e8ef-11dd-a4d0-0000779fd2ac.html)." He begins it by recalling his own efforts over the decades to promote Arab-Israeli peace and especially the Abdullah Plan of 2002. "But after Israel launched its bloody attack on Gaza," he writes, "these pleas for optimism and co-operation now seem a distant memory." Then comes **a threat: "Unless the new US administration takes forceful steps to prevent** any **further** suffering and **slaughter of Palestinians**, the peace process, **the US-Saudi relationship and the stability of the region are at risk**." **He goes on to whack** George W. **Bush in a way not** exactly **usual for a former Saudi ambassador**: "**Not only has the Bush administration left a sickening legacy** in the region, but **it has** also, through an arrogant attitude about the butchery in Gaza, **contributed to the slaughter of innocents."** Then comes the threat again, restated more directly: "**If the US wants to continue playing a leadership role in the Middle East and** **keep** its strategic **alliances intact** - especially its ‘special relationship' with Saudi Arabia - **it will have to revise drastically its policies** **vis-à-vis Israel and Palestine**." Turki goes on to instruct in detail the new administration what to do: condemn Israel's atrocities against the Palestinians and support a UN resolution to that effect; condemn the Israeli actions that led to this conflict, from settlement building in the West Bank to the blockade of Gaza and the targeted killings and arbitrary arrests of Palestinians; declare America's intention to work for a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, with a security umbrella for countries that sign up and sanctions for those that do not; call for an immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from Shab‘ah Farms in Lebanon; encourage Israeli-Syrian negotiations for peace; and support a UN resolution guaranteeing Iraq's territorial integrity. Mr Obama should strongly promote the Abdullah peace initiative. Finally **Turki notes that** **Iran's** Mahmoud **Ahmadinejad has called on** "**Saudi Arabia to lead a jihad against Israel** [that] would, if pursued, create unprecedented chaos and bloodshed." **He** soothingly **notes that**, "So far**, the kingdom has resisted** these calls," **but then reiterates his threat a third time: "every day this restraint becomes more difficult to maintain**. … Eventually, the kingdom will not be able to prevent its citizens from joining the worldwide revolt against Israel."

**US Afghan surge undermined Saudi Arabian negations with the Taliban souring relations**

**Green 10** (R., March 3**,**a research fellow at MEMRI. **“**The Middle East Media Research Institute http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/4065.htm accessed June 27) CM

**The announcement of Obama's decision to reinforce U.S. troops in Afghanistan** [[14]](http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/4065.htm" \l "_edn14" \o ") and ratchet up their military activities there **was greeted in the Saudi press with a wave of criticism over U.S. disregard of the Saudi recommendations for negotiations with the Taliban**. [[15]](http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/4065.htm" \l "_edn15" \o ") Operation Moshtarak, an offensive carried out by combined NATO and Afghan army troops against **Taliban strongholds in the south of the country, was likewise met with criticism over the war's continuation.** *Al-***Watan claimed that the NATO offensive would deteriorate the situation in the Afghanistan-Pakistan arena, disrupting the Saudi mediation initiative before it had a chance to gather momentum**. The daily reiterated **Saudi disappointment at the U.S. rejection of the recommendations made by Turki Al-Faisal**, asserting that Saudi Arabia would intervene only on its own terms: "The deteriorating situation in the Pakistan-Afghanistan arena does not bode well. Most analyses [of the situation] suggest that matters will continue to decline... Military intervention and the solution [it offers] represent one alternative, diametrically opposed to the alternative of negotiations. This analysis is relevant to the situation in Afghanistan, where, ten years after the first coalition forces arrived, Al-Qaeda remains active... The most obvious proof of the failure of international policy in dealing with the overall situation is the Afghan president's recent appeal to Saudi Arabia to intervene and mediate in resolving this crisis. **"The tribal areas in southern Afghanistan and northern Pakistan have become an independent emirate,** or a sort of autonomy, **and this must be recognized,** albeit tacitly**. That is the reality on the ground... which is the reason for Saudi Arabia's demands to reassess the policy being followed, especially the [push for] military resolution**, **which has exacerbated the mutual violence...** Reviewing some of the ideas published by Prince Turki Al-Faisal on this matter, [one will find] the most feasible plan of action for dealing with the ever-deteriorating Pakistan-Afghanistan region. "[In previous situations] **Saudi Arabia has served as mediator in the service of Islam, without any ulterior motives of its own, and is capable of doing the same again, as long as it is in accordance with its own positions and perspective.** **The latest offensive by NATO forces** in Helmand, which was the largest military operation since the arrival of coalition [forces] in Afghanistan, **does not very well serve efforts to initiate a Saudi mediation."****[[16]](http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/4065.htm" \l "_edn16" \o ")**

AFF: US-Saudi Relations Low

**Civilian deaths in Afghan war has breed Saudi Discontent**

**Green 10** (R., March 3**,**a research fellow at MEMRI.The Middle East Media Research Institute http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/4065.htm accessed June 27) CM

**Saudi columnists leveled even harsher criticism at the U.S., condemning its military operations in Afghanistan.** **Al-Madina**columnist Sa'id Muhammad Habib **accused the U.S. of war crimes in Afghanistan**, while lauding the Afghan combatants who, according to his statement, have a history of routing all occupying forces: **"[There are] early signs of an immense, resonating defeat that will be dealt to the U.S. and to its NATO-member allies in Afghanistan by that same great Muslim nation**... which has stood [throughout history] in arms against every imperialist... "**The difference between the past and the present [situation] lies in military technology: [today] the 'smart' bombs and deadly rockets dropped by the American planes take the lives of dozens and even hundreds of Afghans and Pakistanis** in an instant... most of them **defenseless civilians...** Despite all this, **the outcome of the Afghanistan war will reveal,** if Allah should will it, **the outright failure** and defeat [of the U.S. and NATO]... The London Conference revealed the extent of distress felt by the international community regarding America's war on Afghanistan. Notwithstanding all the resources being spent on Obama's 'good' war there, this war is lost, [even] according to the commanders of the U.S. military... The U.S. will not be able to continue its war crimes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other countries, and to operate according to hypocritical policies and despicable double standards, and still maintain the support of the people. Its corrupt policies ensure its defeat. The great nation of Afghanistan will prove its allegiance to Islam, not to the dollar... The prestige of America and NATO will crumble into the dust of Afghanistan, until the U.S. withdraws, receding back into itself. Today the historic role [of the U.S.] has passed to other [nations]. The world recognizes China's status, as it continues defy the U.S., which is arming Taiwan"

**Animosities because of 9/11 sour US- Saudi relations**

**Long 04,** (David E, Summer, Diplomat, Prof. and Author Consultant on Middle East and Gulf Affairs and Counter-terrorism, Mediterranean Quarterly,page 25)

**Since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, US-Saudi relations have plummeted** from being one of the closest and most durable bilateral relationships between a major oil-producing state and a major oil-consuming state **to an all time low.** **A common perception of Saudi Arabia heard in the United States is that it is a corrupt, absolute monarchy that supports terrorism and provides financial aid to terrorist organizations, denies its people basic democratic freedoms and human rights, keeps its women in virtual bondage, is antisemitic, and uses its vast oil reserves as an instrument of political power against Israel and the United States.** At the same time, **Saudi feelings toward the United States have turned from admiration, emulation, and trust to feelings of betrayal.** **A new**, harsher **perception sees the United States as an arrogant, hypocritical country preaching racial and ethnic toleration but intolerant itself.** How could a relationship of three-quarterscentury duration deteriorate so quickly? And what is the future of the relationship likely to be? To explore those questions, let us look at the evolution of the relationship and the factors that have kept it together for so many years.

AFF: US-Saudi Relations Low

**Saudi Arabia perceives the US military as weak**

**Blanchard 9,** (Christopher M., December 16, a analyst in middle eastern affairs for CRS, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf> Page 25 Accessed June 27) CM

Saudi-U.S. relations have grown increasingly complex as the number of policy challenges facing both countries has multiplied and as both countries’ security and economic interests have become more intertwined. **The United States remains the principal external actor in the Middle East region, but** by most accounts, many regional policy makers, including those in **Saudi Arabia, perceive potential U.S. influence to be limited by current U.S. military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Saudi confidence in U.S. influence and guarantees reportedly has diminished, and the ability of the United States to simultaneously pursue a political and social reform agenda and a close strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia remains in question. Saudi Arabia has weathered economic strains and a dangerous domestic terrorism campaign and arguably has emerged as the most economically and politically powerful Arab state.**51 Over the long term, growing demand for oil in developing countries, declining oil reserves outside of the Persian Gulf region, and expanding Saudi oil revenues are likely to further raise Saudi Arabia’s international profile and influence. **U.S. national security interests with regard to Saudi Arabia are likely to persist, while U.S. efforts to achieve policy goals may be complicated by these trends.** At present, formal U.S.- Saudi security and political relationships appear strong, in spite of differences in some areas. As noted above, the Obama Administration appears poised to promote U.S.-Saudi cooperation in education, trade, and investment while continuing to seek Saudi cooperation on global counterterrorism and regional security issues.

AFF: Iraq Link Turn

**The Saudis want the US to withdraw from Iraq**

**Korb, Wadhams 10**, (Lawrence J., Caroline, May 19, is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress. is the Director for South Asia Security Studies at American Progress http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/05/arab\_gulf\_trip.html Accessed June 27) CM

**The Saudis**, like the Emirates**, focus on Iran as their number one security concern**. They are worried about what one official called the Iranian neoconservatives**, and** many **believe that the answer to a potential nuclear Iran is a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East**—including Israel. **They believe** that the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—**the United States**, United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, France, and China—should take up this offer, which was originally made by Iran under the Shah, and enforce it through the United Nations. **Saudi officials overall do not advocate for a continued U.S. presence in Iraq**. **They believe that the United States should live up to the Strategic Framework Agreement with Iraq and withdraw on schedule. They lament our invasion of Iraq, believe we handed Iraq to the Iranians on a platter, and worry about growing Iranian influence in Iraq following our withdrawal. And they argue that the world community needs to step in to help maintain unity in Iraq after the United States withdraws**. They do not support a particular individual for prime minister—in fact, they do not support any of the potential candidates, especially Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. And some are troubled that the Iraqis appear to be adopting the Iranian model for governance by relying on Shia Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani to choose the next prime minister. The Saudis have aggressively undertaken counterterrorism efforts, especially in the past five years. They realized they had a real problem with extremism in their country following the 9/11 attacks and a number of terrorist activities in the kingdom in 2003 to 2005. And they have fired thousands of teachers and imams who they believe possess and promote extremist views. They have also promoted moderate Islamic messages in their media and established an elaborate rehabilitation program for convicted terrorists, including some who were interned at Guantánamo. Using both hard and soft power including art classes and counseling, they believe that they have attained a very low recidivism rate of 10 to 15 percent among the terrorists. These figures are higher among those who were imprisoned in Guantánamo. But their definition of moderate Islam may have a different version than our own; it seems to entail increased tolerance of the Saudi state and not necessarily non-Muslims.

AFF: Kuwait Link Turn

A. Saudis don’t support US interests if they are associated with the War on Terror

**Dobbs 3 [Michael, Washington Post Staff Writer, March 14, The Washington Post, Lexis]**

Historically, Freeman said, **Saudis saw the United States as "a wonderful partner" because it was a distant power without colonial designs in the Persian Gulf region.** But developments since the Gulf War, and particularly **since the onset of the war on terrorism, have changed that perception.**

**B. Kuwait bases service the function of “waging the War on Terror” and pursuing oil interests**

**Conteris et al 4** [Andres Conteris, Ben Moxham, Herbert Docena, and Wilbert van der Zeijden, January 17 & 20, World Social Forum http://www.yonip.com/main/APA/WSF%20USBases%20Report.pdf] KLS

As the pre-inaugural reports prepared under the direction of (now) Assistant Secretary of State

Armitage and (now) Ambassador Khalilzad recommended, in the Asia Pacific this meant

reaffirming the commitment to U.S. military bases and forward deployed troops across the region.

Yes, some bases will be close in Rumsfeld’s re-configuration, and some will be merged. But, this

will be done in the context of augmenting U.S. military power through “diversification”– moving

their center of gravity of **U.S. forward deployed troops and bases** from Northeast Asia further south. The **goals are to better encircl**e China, to **fight** the so-called “**War on Terrorism**” across Southeast Asia, and to more completely control the sea lanes over which Persian Gulf oil – the life blood of East Asia’s economies – must travel. Guam will again become a hub for U.S. Asia- Pacific forces. So much for its people and natural resources! U.S. bases in Australia will be augmented. The agenda is to build on the “Visiting Forces” and access agreements with the Philippines , and Singapore , and to open the way for U.S. forces in Thailand . In fact, as the Philippine press reports, U.S. military officials are privately exploring the possibility of reestablishing its bases in the former colony. With the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the way was opened to expand and to redesign the U.S. network of bases. Using the Bush Administration’s intimidating tactic of insisting that “for us or against us” (in the latter case being targeted for possible invasion,) dictatorships in Pakistan , Uzbekistan , Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan were forced to surrender sovereignty and to invite the Pentagon to establish what will likely become permanent U.S. military bases. A year later, with Germany balking at joining in the invasion of Iraq and limiting the roles that U.S. bases there could play, Washington began “diversifying” its European military infrastructure . Threats to punish Germany by withdrawing all U.S. bases from Germany were made, although Germany will continue to “host” the most U.S. bases and troops in Europe for years to come. New bases were established in those bastions of democracy and human rights Romania and Bulgaria. To the south, under cover of **preparations for the war,** Bush and company removed one of the precipitating causes of the 9-11 attacks: **the majority of U.S. troops and bases in Saudi Arabia .** Many Moslems experienced those bases as sullying Islam’s holiest land. **These troops, bases and functions were transferred to Qatar and Kuwait**. Bases in Djibouti and Bahrain were expanded. And now, **in addition to plans for Iraq to serve the U.S. as a source of oil that can be used to leverage Saudi Arabia and OPEC, U.S. military planners look forward to Iraq serving as a bastion of U.S. military power in the Middle East for decades to come.**

AFF: Presence Link Turn

**US presence in middle east prevent cohesive middle eastern alliances**

**Conry 96,** (Barbra, September 29,Policy analyst for the CATO Institute, CATO institute http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-258.html accessed june 27) CM

Because Washington has made it clear that the United States is prepared to take ultimate responsibility for the security of the region, however, that incentive has been nullified. **The southern gulf states have not had to make serious efforts to build the cohesion that would be necessary for an effective alliance or even to form a functioning rapid-reaction corps.** At a December 1995 GCC conference, for example, **the question of strengthening the GCC rapid-reaction force, Peninsula Shield, "was sidelined before the summit began, when Saudi Arabia,** which dominates the alliance, **and Kuwait convinced their partners that only a limited expansion of Peninsula Shield is necessary as Western powers are committed to defending them under defence agreements."**[9](http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-258.html#9) As Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) has commented, "**As long as the USA acts as if it's going to do it all for them, it's going to do it all for them."**[**10**](http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-258.html#10) **Removing the incentive for the gulf monarchies to work out some of their differences not only hinders regional defense cooperation; it also contributes to a more dangerous environment in the region generally**. Genuine defense cooperation among the GCC states would do a great deal to defuse tensions in the region. **Because U.S. involvement in gulf security has removed the incentive to defuse those tensions,** they not only remain, **they threaten to embroil the United States in messy disputes among U.S. allies.** The United States will generally have little interest in those disputes, but its allies can be expected to attempt to draw Washington into them. Perry has conceded as much: A paradoxical risk posed by the United States' position as premier arbiter of Middle Eastern security is the high value Middle Eastern states now place on getting us involved in local conflicts.