Terror Talk

Terror Talk 1

1NC 2

1NC 3

1NC 4

Link – Apocalyptic Rhetoric 5

Link – Rule of Law 6

Link – Democracy/Freedom 7

Link – Security 8

Link – War on Terror 9

Link – War on Terror 10

Link – War on Terror 12

Link – Discourse 13

Link – Threat Con 14

Link – Threat Con 15

Link – “Terrorist” 16

Link – “Terrorist” 17

Link – “Terrorist” 18

Link – “Terrorist” => Fear 19

Link – “Hunting Terrorists” 20

Link – Terrorism Reps 21

Link/Impact – Rhetoric 🡪 Dehum 22

Impact – Violence 24

Impact – Violence 25

Impact – Violence 26

Impact – Violence 27

Impact – Biopolitics 28

Impact – Holocaust 29

Impact – Racism 30

Impact – Cult to Kill 31

Impact – US Domination 32

Impact – Turns the Case 33

Impact – Turn the Case 34

Impact – Violence 35

Impact – Dehum 🡪 Genocide 36

Impact – Dehum – Maiese 37

Impact – Dehum – Maiese 38

Impact – Dehum/Violence 39

A2 – Perm 40

A2 – Perm 41

A2 – Perm 42

Alt – Mockery 43

Alt – Mockery – A2 Perm 44

Alt - Discourse Matters 45

Alt – Reject 46

Alt - Reject 47

Alt - Reject 48

Alt – Reject 49

Alt – Reps 1st 50

Alt – Reps 1st 51

AT: Fear Good 52

AT: Threats Real 53

\*\*Aff Answers\*\* 54

AFF – AT: Reps Bad 55

AFF – AT: Reps Bad 56

AFF – Threats Real 57

AFF – Link - “Terrorist” Good 58

AFF – Link – “Terrorist” Good 59

AFF – AT: Reps Matter 61

AFF – AT: Reps Matter 62

AFF – AT: Discourse 1st 63

AFF – AT: Discourse 1st 64

AFF - Perm 65

AFF – Alt No Solve 66

AFF – Alt No Solve 67

AFF – Hardline Response Good 68

AFF – Hardline Response Good 69

AFF – Hardlined Response Good 70

AFF – AT: Turns the Case 71

1NC

Terrorist rhetoric reinforces a binary that pits the good in an endless war against the other

Kellner 7 (Douglas, Chair of Philosophy @ UCLA, Presidential Studies Quarterly. Vol. 37 (4), 2007, pg. 622+) JPG

On the day of the strikes on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the U.S. corporate television networks brought out an array of national security state intellectuals, usually ranging from the right to the far right, to explain the horrific events of September 11. Fox News presented former UN Ambassador and Reagan administration apologist Jeane Kirkpatrick, who rolled out a simplified version of Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations (1996), arguing that we were at war with Islam and should defend the West. (4) Kirkpatrick was the most discredited intellectual of her generation, legitimating Reagan administration alliances with unsavory fascists and terrorists as necessary to beat Soviet totalitarianism. Her propaganda line was premised on a distinction between fascism and Communist totalitarianism which argued that alliances with authoritarian or right-wing terrorist organizations or states were defensible because these regimes were open to reform efforts or historically undermined themselves and disappeared. (5) Soviet totalitarianism, by contrast, should be resolutely opposed, as a Communist regime had never collapsed or been overthrown and communism was an intractable and dangerous foe, which must be fought to the death with any means necessary. Of course, the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, along with its empire, and although Kirkpatrick was totally discredited she was awarded a professorship at Georgetown and continued to circulate her extremist views through Fox TV and other right-wing venues. On the afternoon of September 11, Ariel Sharon, leader of Israel, himself implicated in war crimes in Sabra and Shatila in Lebanon in 1982, came on global television to convey his regret, condolences, and assurance of Israel's support in the war on terrorism. Sharon called for a coalition against terrorist networks, which would mobilize the civilized world against terrorism, posing the Good versus Evil, "humanity" versus "the blood-thirsty," "the free world" against "the forces of darkness," which are trying to destroy "freedom" and our "way of life." (6) The Bush-Cheney administration would take up precisely the same tropes, with President Bush constantly evoking the "evil" of the terrorists, using the word five times in his first statement on the September 11 terror assaults. Bush also declared that the attacks were an "act of war" against the United States, presaging the era of war that was to come. (7) The Fox News network had its anchor Brit Hume ask former Reagan Secretary of State George Schultz whether military action by the United States was justified, and Schultz answered: "Absolutely.... We need to put people on notice that if they harbor terrorists, they are going to get it from us. No place to hide." He then recounted a story from boot camp when a sergeant handed him his rifle and said: "Here. This is your best friend.... And remember, never point this rifle at anybody unless you're willing to pull the trigger." (8) Newt Gingrich, former speaker of the House, noted that President Bush just described the attack as an act of war and urged Congress to move immediately toward declaring war against militant Islam. (9) Commenting later in the day, pundit Bill O'Reilly exclaimed, "I think we have to let the chains fall down and let the dogs of war," and his guest Colonel David Hunt enthused: "Bill, you've got to unleash the dogs of war." (10) Such all-out war hysteria, militarism, and extremist rhetoric was the order of the day, and throughout September 11 and its aftermath, ideological warhorses such as William Bennett came out and urged that the United States declare war on "militant Islam," asserting: "We have a moment of moral clarity right now in America.... There is good and evil in the world.... We issued a statement today at Empower America, Jack Kemp and Jeane Kirkpatrick and I, saying that Congress should declare war against militant Islam and that the United States should proceed as if in war, because it is war." (11) While Bennett and his group urged war on Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and other alleged sites of militant Islam, on the Canadian Broadcasting Network, former Reagan administration Deputy Secretary of Defense and military commentator Frank Gaffney suggested that the United States needed to go after the sponsors of these states as well, such as China and Russia, to the astonishment and derision of Canadian commentators. (12) And right-wing talk radio and the Internet buzzed with talk of dropping nuclear bombs on Afghanistan, exterminating all Moslems, and whatever other fantasy popped into their overheated rhetoric. Hence, corporate television and radio in the United States allowed right-wing militarist zealots to vent and circulate the most aggressive, fanatic, and extremist views, creating a consensus around the need for immediate military action and all-out war. The television networks themselves featured logos such as "War on America," "Attack on America," "America under Attack," and circulated discourses that assumed that the United States was at war and that only a military response was appropriate. Few cooler heads appeared on any of the major television networks that repeatedly beat the war drums day after day, without even the relief of commercials for three days straight, driving the country into hysteria and making it certain that there would be a military response and war.

1NC

Terrorist rhetoric shuts off solutions to terrorism, necessitates eradication of those who its applied to, and incites racist violence

Kapitan and Schulte 2 (Tomis and Erich, Thomas – Prof of Philosophy @ N Illionois U, and Erich – , Journal of Political and Military Sociology Vol. 30 Iss. 1, 2002, pp. 172+, Questia) JPG

Given that a population has deeply rooted grievances it is determined to rectify, and given that, continually, its members have been willing to resort to terrorist actions in pursuing its goals, then what is the intelligent response? One might try to beat them into submission, but short of outright genocide, retaliation against a population from whose ranks terrorists emerge will not solve anything so long as that population feels it has a legitimate grievance worth dying for and decides that terrorism is the only viable response. Such "counter-terrorist" retaliation, combined with a failure to address their grievances, only intensifies their hatred and resolve, their willingness to engage in more terrorism, and soon the parties will find themselves wrapped in an ever-increasing spiral of violence. Whether individual terrorists are driven by strategy, psychology, or a combination of both, the rational approach to persistent terrorism stemming from a given group requires examining the situation wherein terrorism is seen as the only route of resistance or outlet for outrage. Only then can intelligent moral responses be crafted. This brings us closer to our main contentions. The prevalent rhetoric of 'terrorism' has not provided an intelligent response to the problem of terrorism. To the contrary, it has shut off any meaningful examination of causes or debate on policies and has left only the path of violence to solve differences. Rather than promoting a free and open examination of the grievances of the group from which terrorists emerge, the 'terrorist' label nips all questioning and debate in the bud. Terrorists are "evil"-as the U.S. Administration has repeated on numerous occasions since September 11, 2001-and are therefore to be eradicated. This sort of response to terrorist violence is nothing new; the 'terrorist' rhetoric has been steadily escalating since the early 1970s, and under the Reagan Administration it became a principal foil for foreign policy. None of this has been lost upon those who employ the rhetoric of 'terrorism' as a propaganda device, to obfuscate and to deflect attention away from controversial policies. A prime example in the 1980s was a book edited by Benjamin Netanyahu entitled, Terrorism: How the West Can Win. While it offers a standard definition of 'terrorism,' both the editor and the contributors applied it selectively and argued that the only way to combat terrorism is to respond with force, "to weaken and destroy the terrorist's ability to consistently launch attacks," even though it might involve the "risk of civilian casualties" (pp. 202-205). Throughout this book, very little is said about the possible causes of terrorist violence beyond vague assertions about Islam's confrontation with modernity (p. 82), or passages of this calibre: The root cause of terrorism lies not in grievances but in a disposition toward unbridled violence. This can be traced to a worldview that asserts that certain ideological and religious goals justify, indeed demand, the shedding of all moral inhibitions. In this context, the observation that the root cause of terrorism is terrorists is more than a tautology. (p. 204) One is tempted to pass off comments like this as pure rant, save for the fact that this book reached a large audience, especially since its contributors included not only academics and journalists but also important policy makers. Netanyahu himself went on to become the Israeli Prime Minister, and among the American contributors were U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz, U.N. Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, and Senators Daniel Moynihan and Alan Cranston, all of who voiced sentiments similar to those of Netanyahu. This upshot of the book is that a terrorist is portrayed as a carrier of "oppression and enslavement," lacking moral sense, and "a perfect nihilist" (pp. 29-30). Given that the overwhelming number of examples of terrorism are identified as coming from the Arab and Islamic worlds, and that "retaliation" against terrorists is repeatedly urged even at the expense of civilian casualties, then one begins to see the point of Edward Said's assessment of the book as nothing short of "an incitement to anti-Arab and anti-Moslem violence" (Said 1988:157).17

1NC

Reject the affirmatives construction of terrorism – recognizing that terrorism is not an objective reality sheds its violent representations

Whitbeck 2 (John V., int’l lawyer dealing w/ Israeli-Palestinian conflict, The Washignton Report on Midde East affairs Vol. 21 Iss. 2, March 2002, pp. 52+, questia) JPG

A Devalued Word However, the word has been so devalued that even violence is no longer an essential prerequisite for its use. In recently announcing a multibillion-dollar lawsuit against 10 international tobacco companies, a Saudi Arabian lawyer told the press: "We will demand that tobacco firms be included on the lists of terrorists and those financing and sponsoring terrorism because of the large number of victims that smoking has claimed the world over." If everyone recognized that the word "terrorism" is fundamentally an epithet and a term of abuse, with no intrinsic meaning, there would be no more reason to worry about the word now than prior to Sept. 11. However, with the United States relying on the word to assert, apparently, an absolute right to attack any country it dislikes (for the most part, countries Israel dislikes) and with President George W. Bush repeatedly menacing that "either you're with us or you're with the terrorists" (which effectively means, "either you make our enemies your enemies or you'll be our enemy--and you know what we do to our enemies"), many people around the world must feel a genuine sense of terror (dictionary definition: "a state of intense fear") as to where the United States is taking the rest of the world. Meanwhile, in America itself, the Bush administration appears to be feeding the U.S. Constitution and America's traditions of civil liberties, due process and the rule of law (the finest aspects of American life, and the principal reasons why the country used to be admired abroad) into a shredder--mostly to domestic applause or acquiescence. Who would have imagined that 19 angry men armed only with knives could accomplish so much, provoking a response, beyond their wildest dreams, which threatens to be vastly more damaging to their enemies even than their own appalling acts? If the world is to avoid a descent into anarchy, in which the only rule is "might makes right," every "retaliation" provokes a "counter-retaliation" and a genuine "war of civilizations" is ignited, the world--and particularly the United States--must recognize that "terrorism" is simply a word, a subjective epithet, not an objective reality, and certainly not an excuse to suspend all the rules of international law and domestic civil liberties which have, until now, made at least some parts of our planet decent places to live.

Link – Apocalyptic Rhetoric

Apocalyptic rhetoric regarding terror creates an image of war which is used to justify militaristic actions

Kellner 7 (Douglas, Chair of Philosophy @ UCLA, Presidential Studies Quarterly. Vol. 37 (4), 2007, pg. 622+) JPG

From September 11 to the beginning of the U.S. bombing acts on Afghanistan in October, the U.S. corporate media intensified war fever and circulated highly militarist rhetoric that legitimated the Bush-Cheney administration's largely unilateralist military action. Media frames shifted from "America under Attack" to "America Strikes Back" and "America's New War"--even before any military action was undertaken, as though the media frames were to conjure the military response that eventually followed. From September 11 and through the Afghan Terror War, the networks generated escalating fear and hysteria demanding military response, while the mouthpieces of the military-industrial complex demanded military action with little serious reflection on its consequences visible on the television networks. There was, by contrast, much intelligent discussion on the Internet and print media sources showing the dangers of the takeover of broadcasting by corporations which would profit by war and upheaval. (23) The brief war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan from early October through December 2001 appeared to be a military victory for the United States. After a month of stalemate following ruthless U.S. bombing, the Taliban collapsed in the north of the country, abandoned the capital Kabul, and surrendered in its southern strongholds (Kellner 2003b). Yet the Afghanistan Terror War was ambiguous in its outcome. Although the Taliban regime that hosted Osama bin Laden and A1 Qaeda collapsed under U.S. military pressure, the top leaders and many militants of Al Qaeda and the Taliban escaped and the country remains perilous and chaotic to this day (the fall of 2007). (24) Violent warlords that the United States used to fight A1 Qaeda still exert oppressive power and keep the country in a state of disarray, while sympathizers for Al Qaeda and the Taliban continue to wield power and destabilize the country. Because the United States did not use ground troops or multilateral military forces, the top leaders of the Taliban and Al Qaeda escaped, Pakistan was allowed to send in planes to take out hundreds of Pakistanis and numerous top A1 Qaeda militants, and Afghanistan remains a dangerous and unruly territory (Kellner 2003b; Hersh 2004). (25) Whereas the 1991 Gulf War produced spectacles of precision bombs and missiles destroying Iraqi targets and the brief spectacle of the flight of the Iraqis from Kuwait and the liberation of Kuwait City (Kellner 1992), the Afghanistan War was more hidden in its unfolding and effects. Many of the images of Afghanistan that circulated through the global media were of civilian casualties caused by U.S. bombing. Daily pictures of thousands of refugees from war and the suffering of the Afghan people raised questions concerning the U.S. strategy and intervention. Moreover, just as the survival of Saddam Hussein ultimately coded Gulf War I as problematic, so did the continued existence of Osama bin Laden and his top Al Qaeda leadership point to limitations of the younger Bush's leadership and policies.

Link – Rule of Law

The rule of law creates those outside the law as terrorists and justifies indiscriminate violence

Baxi 9 (Upendra, Prof. of Law in Development @ U of Warwick, Theory & Event, Vol. 12 No. 3, 2009, Muse) JPG

9. Terror has its own analytic. Contemporary 'terror' talk often ignores Marx's insight in *Capital* – that the rule of law remains inconceivable outside the reign of terror. Tabloid cultural industry and theory far from inviting any structural grasp of 'terror' rather invite us to a sort of epistemological break in the name of 9/11, and its variously iterated aftermaths. The analytic of terror thus foregrounds a particular type: indiscriminate violence caused by nomadic suicide bombers, within and across nations. The analytic thus formed remains ahistorical and fragmented. Ahistorical because it ignores monumental forms of 'terror' historically articulated by the series of radical evils of colonization, imperialism, and the 'Cold War,' and because it elides the everyday forms of lived experience of terror made visible by critical feminist, race, and LBGT theoretical discourses[8](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v012/12.3.baxi.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f8). And fragmented because it cannot attend to the structural violence always fully instanced by Marxian and post-Marxian discourses.

Link – Democracy/Freedom

Discourse creates images of the world that legitimizes violence as a tool of freedom and democracy

Graham et. al. 4 (Phillip W., Sen. Public Health Researcher @ RTI International, Discourse and Society, 2004, 15(2-3). pp. 199-221., Muse) JPG

Of course it is one thing to identify and critically analyse the features and importance of the genre we present here, to situate Bush’s “call to arms” within a genre that extends into history for far more than a single millennium, and to identify the epoch-making and epoch- marking potential of such texts. It is entirely another matter to intervene in any positive way or with any great effect. However, in the context of a world that is unravelling into an ever more violent, oppressive, and chaotic “global village” of misery and murder; in which weapons and wars proliferate while the institutions of mass media provide a smooth, homogeneous sheen to proceedings, however gruesome and murderous; in which “democracy”, “peace”, and “freedom” are trumpeted as rationales for mass murder carried out against the will of citizenries, and without the legal sanction of “the international community”; in which language, images, and media are a significant part of the weaponry of mass destruction—the question for discourse analysts, applied linguists, and the like is this: what do we do? Halliday (1993: 63) has long since drawn the connection between ‘discourse, dollars, and death’, yet we find ourselves confronted once again involved in a campaign of organised killings, backed and instigated by discourse and dollars. We would like to think, though, that knowledge of how successful exhortations for people to kill and die have been structured over the last millennium might translate at some level into knowledge of how to successfully exhort people to live, understand, and progress socially in increasingly humane ways.

Link – Security

Terrorism is grounded in a policy of security and promotes American exceptionalism resulting in a need to eradicate those who are deemed lesser

Ivie 7 (Robert, Prof of Comm and Culture @ Indiana U, Rhetoric & Public Affairs. V. 10. Is. 2., 2007, 221+, Questia) JPG

The stubborn question of security, which always confounds and often preempts or subsumes and subordinates any immediate aspiration of peace, is itself provoked by a rhetoric of evil, which envelops all considerations of safety and well-being in a swirl of fear and hatred. The ubiquitous sign of evil converts the secular quest for security into a prayer for redemption and a sacrament of atonement through the sacrifice of "a scapegoat in whom we have invested all the evil in the world."3 Safety becomes a matter of salvation in the rhetorical universe that is war culture. No other equation casts such a deadly spell on an embattled people confronted by a deeply troubled world than the "myth of redemptive violence."4 An unambiguous, Manichean distinction between good and evil, which Elisabeth Anker identifies as a "pervasive cultural code" expressed in melodramatic narrations of villainous victimization and heroic redemption, structures American political discourse and news coverage alike, diminishing public debate and conflating the exercise of state power with national identity.5 America's lethal preoccupation with evil precedes the tragedy of 9/11 and George W. Bush as presidential spokesman-in-chief. Certainly Ronald Reagan was eager to proclaim the Soviet Union an evil empire, and the dark memory of Adolf Hitler is forever fixed in the national imaginary as the personification of archetypal evil. The image of evildoers evoked by President Bush after the fall of Manhattan's twin towers resonated not only with right-wing Christian fundamentalism but also with mainstream political culture rooted in the secular religion of national mission and American exceptionalism. The living legacy of exceptionalism, as Seymour Martin Lipset observes, is a moralistic creed that insists Americans are opposed to evil in their foreign relations and "on God's side against Satan" in matters of warfare.6 The United States is the one essential nation above all others, the beacon and exemplar of standards that no other country can match. Exceptionalism is a founding myth and, Michael Hirsh notes, the "wellspring" of the current war against terrorism insofar as such a war stands for remaking the world in America's image.7 A deep and wide channel of patriotic piety has been cut over centuries of spilling blood in the name of the Almighty and the Redeemer. As a matter of history and of living custom, a Manichean divide between good and evil has come to separate righteous patriots from enemies of the state. Thus Bush's belabored and hardly deft, but certainly compelling, rhetoric of evildoers merely channeled already strong cultural predispositions to render any enemy essentially diabolical.8 As a medium of American war culture, Bush spoke to a Christian America in the language of a Christian man crusading for a righteous cause by declaring an unrestricted war on evil. Much like the Puritan rhetoric of covenant renewal, as Denise M. Bostdorff explains, Bush's rhetoric of evil depicted Americans as a special people watched over by God, represented 9/11 as a test of national character, and advanced a righteous call to arms with a renewed sense of mission, making "clear that the evil character of an external enemy was to blame, [and] thereby absolving U.S. citizens and the U.S. government of any guilt."9 Bush's post-9/11 rhetorical world was "governed by theistic essence," John M. Murphy observes. It was filled with heroes and villains, divided by good and evil, and given purpose by God's will, which was to be fulfilled by people of faith and character opposed to evil.10 "Bush's providential certainty" and "prophetic dualism," David Hoogland Noon concludes, supplanted critical thought with the righteous pursuit of "moral security" against evildoers.11 There was nothing secret or sophisticated about Bush's basic rhetorical strategy. In "The Gospel According to George," Newsweek reporters Howard Fineman and Tamara Lipper observed that the president believed his faith would "guide" him in Iraq. In biblical cadences, he preached time and again a simple secular sermon to the receptive public that he would lead by faith and vision into holy battle in order to bestow freedom on an otherwise evil world.12 Billy Graham's son, the Reverend Franklin Graham, affirmed the president by declaring Islam an "evil and wicked religion," while the administration's deputy undersecretary of defense for intelligence and war-fighting support, Lieutenant General William Boykin, professed that America was fighting Satan in Islamic Iraq on behalf of the real, Christian God.13 Indeed, the integrating theme of Bush's post-9/11 presidency was that any and all means were justified by holy ends in what amounted to a redemptive war on Islamic terrorism. One must wonder, along with Wes Avram, if the president's early reference to fighting a "crusade" was "an accidental gaffe at all."14 Despite his later differentiation between terrorism and Islam as a faith based on peace, love, compassion, and tolerance, the president and his supporters persisted in the use of "coded Christian language," as Stephen B. Chapman argues, to invest the nation and its war with "messianic meaning."15 America was endowed by the Creator with moral ideals, Bush proclaimed, and, "as the greatest force for good in history," was now fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq "to the glory of God."16 America had entered a "Third Awakening" of religious devotion in its war on global terrorism, the president suggested on the day after the fifth anniversary of 9/11, a spiritual awakening to this stark "confrontation between good and evil."17 Carol K. Winkler observes that, as a "linguistic marker of American culture," terrorism functions dangerously in contemporary presidential rhetoric more and more like an ideograph strongly influencing how the nation defines itself. It "demarcates the unacceptable" in the embodiment of a barbaric and unholy evil, an ambiguous but palpable malevolence that must be destroyed for the nation to cleanse itself. It reinforces a regime of executive authority that erodes civil liberties, undercuts the separation of governing powers, and increasingly eschews diplomacy, all in the name of responding rapidly and forcefully to ubiquitous terrorist threats. It deflects attention from economic targets and the ruling elite's special interest in protecting profit margins of global enterprises. It oversimplifies, mischaracterizes, and ultimately exacerbates threats issued by the likes of Osama bin Laden, reducing them to the diabolical ambition of attacking all democratic countries in order to destroy freedom itself.18

Link – War on Terror

The war on terror is purely rhetorical and is used to justify war and indiscriminate violence

The Independent 1 (Staff, 9/17,

http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/leading-articles/it-is-meaningless-and-dangerous-to-declare-war-against-terrorism-669538.html) JPG

What is a declaration of war against terrorism, apart from a rhetorical device? "Whatever the technical and legal issues about a declaration of war," the Prime Minister said yesterday, "the fact is that we are at war with terrorism." Never mind the technical and legal issues, there is the plain meaning of words. It is only meaningful to declare war on a state or a military power; anything else is metaphor.

You cannot declare war on a tactic; it is as if President Roosevelt responded to the attack on Pearl Harbor by declaring war on bombing. It does not even make much sense to declare war on terrorists. When President Bush solemnly announces that the United States is on a war footing and calls up the reservists, he does not seriously intend to mobilise resources against Eta, the Tamil Tigers or the Real IRA. Irish terrorism is an illuminating case: when it comes to harbouring terrorists, the pre-Clinton US record of tolerating IRA fundraising and refusing to extradite IRA suspects does not bear close scrutiny.

We cannot even be sure that Osama bin Laden was behind the 11 September attacks. The US – and Britain – is thus at war with only a "prime suspect".

This is a war which, like the war against drugs, debases the language. There may yet be a real war, of course. If the US and its allies commit forces to fighting in Afghanistan there will, of course, be casualties on the Nato side, unlike the war in Kosovo or, in significant numbers, the Gulf war. That could lead the West into a war like Vietnam, but we are, we hope, a long way from that yet.

We are being purist, possibly even pedantic. President Bush needs to respond rhetorically to the grief, anger and frustration of American opinion. Thus the geniuses of the presentational arts give us Operation Noble Eagle, while the intelligence agencies get on with the essentially rather passive job of working out who was behind the atrocities and the military planners with that of working out how to reach them. It is possible that by talking tough and acting cautiously George Bush is pursuing a sensible, pragmatic strategy. Meanwhile, Tony Blair is pursuing a similar approach: he has attracted attention in the US for his "shoulder to shoulder" stance of unqualified support, thus ensuring that, when in private he advises restraint, he will be taken seriously.

There are dangers in the over-use of the language of war, however. It raises the expectation of an early, overwhelming and probably indiscriminate military response. If that does not happen, public opinion in America may prove harder to mobilise when it comes to the resolve and expense needed to follow through on what President Bush has accepted will be a long and difficult process.

A secondary danger is that the rhetoric of war will be used to justify intolerance. Although the lives of US or British service personnel are not yet at stake, there is already an assumption, which would be wrong even if they were at risk, that questioning the policy of national leaders is collaborating with terrorists. This is particularly strong in the US, which has a long tradition of non-partisan support for the presidency at times of crisis. But it is happening here too, as it did in the Falklands and Gulf wars. Any suggestion that aggressive military action against suspects in Afghanistan might be counter-productive (because it could recruit a new generation of suicide terrorists), is treated in some quarters as "left-wing bias".

Link – War on Terror

Politicians have created and exaggerated terrorism to justify and push a violent political agenda

Beckett 4 (Andy, writer @ the Guardian, 10/15/4, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2004/oct/15/broadcasting.bbc) JPG

Since the attacks on the United States in September 2001, there have been more than a thousand references in British national newspapers, working out at almost one every single day, to the phrase "dirty bomb". There have been articles about how such a device can use ordinary explosives to spread lethal radiation; about how London would be evacuated in the event of such a detonation; about the Home Secretary David Blunkett's statement on terrorism in November 2002 that specifically raised the possibility of a dirty bomb being planted in Britain; and about the arrests of several groups of people, the latest only last month, for allegedly plotting exactly that.

Starting next Wednesday, BBC2 is to broadcast a three-part documentary series that will add further to what could be called the dirty bomb genre. But, as its title suggests, The Power of Nightmares: The Rise of the Politics of Fear takes a different view of the weapon's potential. "I don't think it would kill anybody," says Dr Theodore Rockwell, an authority on radiation, in an interview for the series. "You'll have trouble finding a serious report that would claim otherwise." The American department of energy, Rockwell continues, has simulated a dirty bomb explosion, "and they calculated that the most exposed individual would get a fairly high dose [of radiation], not life-threatening." And even this minor threat is open to question. The test assumed that no one fled the explosion for one year. During the three years in which the "war on terror" has been waged, high-profile challenges to its assumptions have been rare. The sheer number of incidents and warnings connected or attributed to the war has left little room, it seems, for heretical thoughts. In this context, the central theme of The Power of Nightmares is riskily counter-intuitive and provocative. Much of the currently perceived threat from international terrorism, the series argues, "is a fantasy that has been exaggerated and distorted by politicians. It is a dark illusion that has spread unquestioned through governments around the world, the security services, and the international media." The series' explanation for this is even bolder: "In an age when all the grand ideas have lost credibility, fear of a phantom enemy is all the politicians have left to maintain their power." Adam Curtis, who wrote and produced the series, acknowledges the difficulty of saying such things now. "If a bomb goes off, the fear I have is that everyone will say, 'You're completely wrong,' even if the incident doesn't touch my argument. This shows the way we have all become trapped, the way even I have become trapped by a fear that is completely irrational." So controversial is the tone of his series, that trailers for it were not broadcast last weekend because of the killing of Kenneth Bigley. At the BBC, Curtis freely admits, there are "anxieties". But there is also enthusiasm for the programmes, in part thanks to his reputation. Over the past dozen years, via similarly ambitious documentary series such as Pandora's Box, The Mayfair Set and The Century of the Self, Curtis has established himself as perhaps the most acclaimed maker of serious television programmes in Britain. His trademarks are long research, the revelatory use of archive footage, telling interviews, and smooth, insistent voiceovers concerned with the unnoticed deeper currents of recent history, narrated by Curtis himself in tones that combine traditional BBC authority with something more modern and sceptical: "I want to try to make people look at things they think they know about in a new way." The Power of Nightmares seeks to overturn much of what is widely believed about Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida. The latter, it argues, is not an organised international network. It does not have members or a leader. It does not have "sleeper cells". It does not have an overall strategy. In fact, it barely exists at all, except as an idea about cleansing a corrupt world through religious violence. Curtis' evidence for these assertions is not easily dismissed. He tells the story of Islamism, or the desire to establish Islam as an unbreakable political framework, as half a century of mostly failed, short-lived revolutions and spectacular but politically ineffective terrorism. Curtis points out that al-Qaida did not even have a name until early 2001, when the American government decided to prosecute Bin Laden in his absence and had to use anti-Mafia laws that required the existence of a named criminal organisation. Curtis also cites the Home Office's own statistics for arrests and convictions of suspected terrorists since September 11 2001. Of the 664 people detained up to the end of last month, only 17 have been found guilty. Of these, the majority were Irish Republicans, Sikh militants or members of other groups with no connection to Islamist terrorism. Nobody has been convicted who is a proven member of al-Qaida. In fact, Curtis is not alone in wondering about all this. Quietly but increasingly, other observers of the war on terror have been having similar doubts. "The grand concept of the war has not succeeded," says Jonathan Eyal, director of the British military thinktank the Royal United Services Institute. "In purely military terms, it has been an inconclusive war ... a rather haphazard operation. Al-Qaida managed the most spectacular attack, but clearly it is also being sustained by the way that we rather cavalierly stick the name al-Qaida on Iraq, Indonesia, the Philippines. There is a long tradition that if you divert all your resources to a threat, then you exaggerate it." Bill Durodie, director of the international centre for security analysis at King's College London, says: "The reality [of the al-Qaida threat to the west] has been essentially a one-off. There has been one incident in the developed world since 9/11 [the Madrid bombings]. There's no real evidence that all these groups are connected." Crispin Black, a senior government intelligence analyst until 2002, is more cautious but admits the terrorist threat presented by politicians and the media is "out of date and too one-dimensional. We think there is a bit of a gulf between the terrorists' ambition and their ability to pull it off." Terrorism, by definition, depends on an element of bluff. Yet ever since terrorists in the modern sense of the term (the word terrorism was actually coined to describe the strategy of a government, the authoritarian French revolutionary regime of the 1790s) began to assassinate politicians and then members of the public during the 19th century, states have habitually overreacted. Adam Roberts, professor of international relations at Oxford, says that governments often believe struggles with terrorists "to be of absolute cosmic significance", and that therefore "anything goes" when it comes to winning. The historian Linda Colley adds: "States and their rulers expect to monopolise violence, and that is why they react so virulently to terrorism." Britain may also be particularly sensitive to foreign infiltrators, fifth columnists and related menaces. In spite, or perhaps because of, the absence of an actual invasion for many centuries, British history is marked by frequent panics about the arrival of Spanish raiding parties, French revolutionary agitators, anarchists, bolsheviks and Irish terrorists. "These kind of panics rarely happen without some sort of cause," says Colley. "But politicians make the most of them." They are not the only ones who find opportunities. "Almost no one questions this myth about al-Qaida because so many people have got an interest in keeping it alive," says Curtis. He cites the suspiciously circular relationship between the security services and much of the media since September 2001: the way in which official briefings about terrorism, often unverified or unverifiable by journalists, have become dramatic press stories which - in a jittery media-driven democracy - have prompted further briefings and further stories. Few of these ominous announcements are retracted if they turn out to be baseless: "There is no fact-checking about al-Qaida." In one sense, of course, Curtis himself is part of the al-Qaida industry. The Power of Nightmares began as an investigation of something else, the rise of modern American conservatism. Curtis was interested in Leo Strauss, a political philosopher at the university of Chicago in the 50s who rejected the liberalism of postwar America as amoral and who thought that the country could be rescued by a revived belief in America's unique role to battle evil in the world. Strauss's certainty and his emphasis on the use of grand myths as a higher form of political propaganda created a group of influential disciples such as Paul Wolfowitz, now the US deputy defence secretary. They came to prominence by talking up the Russian threat during the cold war and have applied a similar strategy in the war on terror. As Curtis traced the rise of the "Straussians", he came to a conclusion that would form the basis for The Power of Nightmares. Straussian conservatism had a previously unsuspected amount in common with Islamism: from origins in the 50s, to a formative belief that liberalism was the enemy, to an actual period of Islamist-Straussian collaboration against the Soviet Union during the war in Afghanistan in the 80s (both movements have proved adept at finding new foes to keep them going). Although the Islamists and the Straussians have fallen out since then, as the attacks on America in 2001 graphically demonstrated, they are in another way, Curtis concludes, collaborating still: in sustaining the "fantasy" of the war on terror. Some may find all this difficult to swallow. But Curtis insists,"There is no way that I'm trying to be controversial just for the sake of it." Neither is he trying to be an anti-conservative polemicist like Michael Moore: "[Moore's] purpose is avowedly political. My hope is that you won't be able to tell what my politics are." For all the dizzying ideas and visual jolts and black jokes in his programmes, Curtis describes his intentions in sober, civic-minded terms. "If you go back into history and plod through it, the myth falls away. You see that these aren't terrifying new monsters. It's drawing the poison of the fear." But whatever the reception of the series, this fear could be around for a while. It took the British government decades to dismantle the draconian laws it passed against French revolutionary infiltrators; the cold war was sustained for almost half a century without Russia invading the west, or even conclusive evidence that it ever intended to. "The archives have been opened," says the cold war historian David Caute, "but they don't bring evidence to bear on this." And the danger from Islamist terrorists, whatever its scale, is concrete. A sceptical observer of the war on terror in the British security services says: "All they need is a big bomb every 18 months to keep this going." The war on terror already has a hold on western political culture. "After a 300-year debate between freedom of the individual and protection of society, the protection of society seems to be the only priority," says Eyal. Black agrees: "We are probably moving to a point in the UK where national security becomes the electoral question." Some critics of this situation see our striking susceptibility during the 90s to other anxieties - the millennium bug, MMR, genetically modified food - as a sort of dress rehearsal for the war on terror. The press became accustomed to publishing scare stories and not retracting them; politicians became accustomed to responding to supposed threats rather than questioning them; the public became accustomed to the idea that some sort of apocalypse might be just around the corner. "Insecurity is the key driving concept of our times," says Durodie. "Politicians have packaged themselves as risk managers. There is also a demand from below for protection." The real reason for this insecurity, he argues, is the decay of the 20th century's political belief systems and social structures: people have been left "disconnected" and "fearful". Yet the notion that "security politics" is the perfect instrument for every ambitious politician from Blunkett to Wolfowitz also has its weaknesses. The fears of the public, in Britain at least, are actually quite erratic: when the opinion pollsters Mori asked people what they felt was the most important political issue, the figure for "defence and foreign affairs" leapt from 2% to 60% after the attacks of September 2001, yet by January 2002 had fallen back almost to its earlier level. And then there are the twin risks that the terrors politicians warn of will either not materialise or will materialise all too brutally, and in both cases the politicians will be blamed. "This is a very rickety platform from which to build up a political career," says Eyal. He sees the war on terror as a hurried improvisation rather than some grand Straussian strategy: "In democracies, in order to galvanize the public for war, you have to make the enemy bigger, uglier and more menacing." Afterwards, I look at a website for a well-connected American foreign policy lobbying group called the Committee on the Present Danger. The committee features in The Power of Nightmares as a vehicle for alarmist Straussian propaganda during the cold war. After the Soviet collapse, as the website puts it, "The mission of the committee was considered complete." But then the website goes on: "Today radical Islamists threaten the safety of the American people. Like the cold war, securing our freedom is a long-term struggle. The road to victory begins ... "

Link – War on Terror

Acting against terrorism in the name of humanism and democracy entrenches a double standard which justifies more violent and dangerous actions

Kellner 7 (Douglas, Chair of Philosophy @ UCLA, Presidential Studies Quarterly. Vol. 37 (4), 2007, pg. 622+) JPG

Bush's rhetoric, like that of fascism, deploys a mistrust of language, reducing it to manipulative speechifying, speaking in codes, repeating the same phrases over and over. This is grounded in anti-intellectualism and contempt for democracy and rational argument. It is clearly evident in Bush's press conferences and brusque responses to questions and general contempt for the whole procedure. It plays to anti-intellectual proclivities and tendencies in the extreme conservative and fundamentalist Christian constituencies who support him. It appears that Bush's press conference was orchestrated to shore up his base and prepare his supporters for a major political struggle rather than to marshal arguments to convince those opposed to going to war with Iraq that it was a good idea. He displayed, against his will, the complete poverty of his case to go to war against Iraq: he had no convincing arguments, nothing new to communicate, and just repeated the same tired cliches over and over. Bush's discourse displayed Orwellian features of Doublespeak, where war against Iraq is for peace, the occupation of Iraq is its liberation, destroying its food and water supplies enables "humanitarian" action, and the killing of countless Iraqis and destruction of the country will produce "freedom" and "democracy." In a prewar summit with Tony Blair in the Azores and in his first talk after the bombing began, Bush went on and on about the "coalition of the willing" and how many countries were supporting and participating in the "allied" effort. In fact, however, it was a Coalition of Two, with the United States and United Kingdom doing most of the fighting and with many of the countries that Bush claimed supported his war quickly backtracking and expressing reservations about the highly unpopular assault that was strongly opposed by most people and countries in the world and, when things started to go bad, pulling out their troops and material support as quickly as possible. On the whole, U.S. broadcasting networks tended to present a sanitized view of the Iraq War while Canadian, British and other European, and Arab broadcasting networks presented copious images of civilian casualties and the horrors of war. U.S. television coverage tended toward pro-military patriotism, propaganda, and technological fetishism, celebrating the weapons of war and military humanism, highlighting the achievements and heroism of the U.S. military. Other global broadcasting networks, however, were highly critical of the U.S. and UK military and often presented highly negative spectacles of the assault on Iraq and the shock and awe of high-tech massacre (Kellner 2005). In a sense, the U.S. and UK war on Iraq found itself in a double bind. The more thoroughly they annihilated Iraqi troops and conquered the country, the more aggressive, bullying, and imperialist they would appear to the rest of the world. Yet the dramatic pictures of civilian casualties and harrowing images of U.S. bombing and destruction of Iraq made it imperative to end the war as soon as possible. An apparently failed attempt to kill Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi leadership on April 7 destroyed a civilian area and killed a number of people, followed by the killing of journalists in two separate episodes by the U.S. military on April 8, both of which produced an extremely negative media spectacle of the war on Iraq. But the apparent collapse of the Iraqi regime on April 9, where for the first time there were significant images of Iraqis celebrating the demise of Hussein, provided the material for a spectacle of victory.

Link – Discourse

Terrorism is not an objective reality – their discourse is ideological violence

Collins 2 (John, Asst. Prof of Globabl Studies @ St. Lawrence U, Collateral Language, pp. 57-58)

Equally important for the purposes of this essay, the same am­nesia has the effect of hiding the history of “terrorism” as a con­cept, specifically the ways in which the meaning of the term was shaped in recent decades by individuals with close links to American power. **What we think we “know” about “terrorism” is not an objective reality**; on the contrary, the very idea of “**terror­ism” is the product of specific efforts** by specific people **to define certain** examples of **political violence** (**typically** violence com­mitted by **those** who are **opposed to U.S. policies** in the world) **as illegitimate**. In other words, when someone uses the word “terrorism,” they are describing the world in a way that works to the advantage of the powerful. In cultural studies, the academic field in which I was trained, **words** and ideas that **masquerade as neutral** or objective “**reality,” while actually expressing** the **nar­row interests** of a dominant group, are called *ideology.* We can say that **ideology is** most **successful when it is able to erase its own footprints**, that is, when people are not aware of the work that had to be done in order to fix the meaning of the word or idea in question. The concept of **“**terrorism,” in this sense, appears to be a very effective example of ideology because **the public at large has come to accept the definition promoted by the U.S. political elite**, without knowing how this definition was created in the first place. Yet even this explanation is unsatisfactory be­cause, for reasons I will discuss below, U.S. officials actually have rarely provided explicit definitions of “terrorism,” relying in­stead on a vague, even tautological set of descriptions and as­sumptions that mask the government’s own historical role in carrying out, supporting, and provoking political violence. Thus we have a situation in which Americans are being asked to support an open-ended war not against a clearly defined “enemy,” but rather against an ideological concept whose defi­nition is assumed rather than offered.

Link – Threat Con

The threat of terror has expanded beyond proportion of the actual threat via fear and negative discussion

Martin 85 (L. John, Prof of Journaism @ U of Maryland, [Studies in Conflict & Terrorism](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db%3Dall~content%3Dt713742821), Volume Issue [2](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db%3Dall~content%3Dg789420852) 1985 , pages 127 – 146, http://pegasus.cc.ucf.edu/~surette/mediasrole.html) JPG

In general, one would suspect that terrorists prefer publicity to casualties. Schmid and de Graaf quote a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization as saying, "we would throw roses, if it would work" instead of bombs. "Publicity," say Amos and Stole, "can be seen generally to rank above the goal of forcing a target government to carry out some immediate action, for example, the release of prisoners, distribution of food, or payment of tribute." In fact, terrorist groups are often known to claim responsibility for bombings they did not commit. Terrorism, in effect, is a form of nonverbal communication that the terrorist resorts to when verbal communication fails. The terrorist feels a strong need to discredit a government in power, to right or to avenge a wrong. Since trying to do this singlehandedly would brand him or her as a criminal, the terrorist organizes a group of likeminded individuals and declares a "cause.'' Once the group has been formed, it needs to be maintained, and it turns to tactical terrorism to keep itself in arms, money, and fresh recruits. The visibility thus achieved also has longrange or strategic value. The PLO, for example, soon became a group to be reckoned with after a few terrorist incidents. Saudi Arabia and other Arab, as well as non-Arab, countries began to provide the group with lavish support so that it was able to use more traditional, less violent methods of propaganda, such as advertising, participation in international discussion, and attendance at world forums, as well as broadcasting, newspapers, magazines, motion pictures, and a wire service. Tactical terrorism does not have to succeed to have strategic value. And even negative publicity is better than no publicity at all. PLO intelligence chief, Abu Ayyad, gave three goals for the 1972 Munich Olympic games incident: "Strengthening of the existence of the Palestinian people; echo with the international press assembled there; and liberation of fedayeen imprisoned in Israel." Schmid and de Graaf comment that the placement of the military objective as the last item implicitly admits the propagandistic nature of the action." The 200 detained Palestinians were not released by Israel, nor did the PLO ever expect them to be. In fact, had their demands been met, it is highly probable that they would have been escalated. "The demands that terrorists present are usually so outrageous," according to Devine and Rafalko, "that they are rarely met. When officials can and do meet the demands of a terrorist group, they usually respond with demands that are even more unlikely to be accommodated. All that terrorists want is a large audience, and they have learned to exploit the media's own modus operandi to maximize their reach. The Red Brigades, according to Schmid and de Graaf, pick Wednesdays and Saturdays as "their preferred communication days" to get into the thicker Thursday and Sunday newspapers. "We recognize," said a PLO member, "that sport is the modern religion of the Western World. We knew that the people of England and America would switch their television sets from any program about the plight of the Palestinians if there Was a sporting event on another channel. So we decided to use their Olympics . . . to make the world pay attention to us. We offered up human sacrifices to your gods of sport and television." Terrorists prefer to operate in Western Europe because the publicity they can receive there is greater than anywhere else except in the United States.

Link – Threat Con

The rhetoric of fear around terror recreates and expands itself in the representations of western media and discourse – the threat of terrorism is a social construction

Martin 85 (L. John, Prof of Journaism @ U of Maryland, [Studies in Conflict & Terrorism](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db%3Dall~content%3Dt713742821), Volume Issue [2](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db%3Dall~content%3Dg789420852) 1985 , pages 127 – 146, http://pegasus.cc.ucf.edu/~surette/mediasrole.html) JPG

While terrorist incidents are fairly frequent-the reported ones averaging at least nine a day-they are not always covered by the world's press, in spite of their "made for the news media" production. If, therefore, it is true, as Devine and Rafalko say, that "it would be utterly pointless to commit an act of terrorism in a society having rigid control over its press." because without publicity, terrorism is meaningless; if, as Schmid and de Graaf state, "the main sense, if not the only one ... a massacre has is that sense it gains from being reported and explained by the media"; and if "the terror event enjoys an unparalleled power simply because of its media value," as Kupperman puts it, then terrorism is not being too successful, unless it is a truly spectacular event. Very few terrorist incidents were reported crossnationally-at least in the leading newspapers in this admittedly limited study. Kupperman is right, in that case, when he says that "to maintain the media spotlight, terrorist organizations must heighten the threshold for the spectacular assault."

Also under press control, terrorists may have to escalate their activities in order to get into the media, John Grace fears, since there must presumably be a critical mass of terrorism that would force itself through the barrier of media secrecy. However, Brian Jenkins does not believe terrorists want a lot of casualties. They want publicity and are not, therefore, likely to go nuclear., for example. This is a reasonable assumption, since there also is a critical mass of public tolerance of violence. "Acts of extraordinary violence would be counterproductive," says Kupperman. "Were they to occur. nations would unite to rout out the terrorists." A possible consequence of the muzzling of the press, as has been true in Latin America and also in several African countries, is that terrorists are forced to seize broadcasting stations to get their message across. "Radio stations in many African states," according to Martin, "are as closely guarded as the presidential residence because they are among the first targets of insurgents."

How effective, then, can terrorism be? "There is no known case in modern history," says Gross, "of a terrorist movement seizing political power." On the other hand, Gross also cites a 1965-1975 study that says: "The record shows that transnational terrorists have generally been rather successful in avoiding capture (or, if caught, in escaping punishment). " And, "while it is extremely doubtful that [terrorist] attacks could force the Yugoslav government to give Croatia its independence," to cite one example in Europe, Jenkins has pointed out that "insurgents fought in Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea for over 14 years using the, standard tactics of rural guerrilla warfare. The world hardly noticed their struggle, while an approximately equal number of Palestinian commandos employing terrorist tactics have in a few years become a primary concern to the world."

Of course, others have suggested that the last thing terrorists want is to achieve their goals. One of the hostages in the Hanafi incident in Washington recalls, according to Schmid and de Graaf, "Khaalis coming in and telling us: 'The whole world is watching me; the whole world is calling me.' It was his moment of glory. " Martin says terrorists seldom demand the full realization of their cause, possibly because they don't expect it, but equally probably, as Watson suggests, because achieving their goals would force them to relinquish their accumulated power. If terrorists want political power above everything else, they will not trade it away by negotiating to achieve their ultimate goal Frequently, therefore, when a cause is realized or becomes moot terrorists continue student terrorists, to operate but change their causes. German for example, began as an anti-Vietnam War movement. After the war, they took up other causes."

What should be the role of the media'? There is no doubt that people have the right to know not only about the "crazies" in their midst and the threats to life, limb, and property, but also about the causes people espouse and are willing to lay down their lives for. For all one knows, people may wish to support such causes, if not physically then with money and through moral suasion. "It is possible to imagine governmental officials doing more to destroy democracy in the name of counter-terrorism than is presently likely to be achieved by terrorists themselves," Wardlaw warns.

On the other hand, one must distinguish between the need to know and the desire to be entertained. Entertainment should not be at the expense of law and order, life, limb, and property Yet terrorism has become a form of mass entertainment, according to psychiatrist Frederick J. Hacker. Richard Salant, president of CBS News, argues that, "We present facts from which people draw their own conclusions . . . , whether it's politics or terrorists or anything else . . . . If we start playing God and say that fact or this viewpoint ... might give people ideas, we would have to stop covering politics." But is he being completely objective? Isn't there a conflict of interest in his argument? Does CBS present all the news, or does it play God, selecting what it thinks will keep its ratings above those of other networks? And is such selection made on the basis of the need to know or in terms of the maximum entertainment value-the drawing power of the story?

Link – “Terrorist”

The use of the word terrorism is a racist distortion of the Middle East– spills over to infringement of human rights

Bizri 7 (Siwar, Policy Analyst @ SAIC, 11/16/7, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University,

 http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-12042007-153628/unrestricted/finalthesis.pdf) JPG

Within minutes of the massive blast that ripped through the Oklahoma City Federal Building on April 19, 1995, hundreds of media outlets around the country leapt to pen down their assumptions of the potential bombers. Those first crucial hours after the tragedy would help to reinforce the initial assumptions brimming in the minds of public and press alike. Media accounts immediately selected a vocabulary scattered with words and phrases alluding to Islamic and Arab fundamentalists (Nacos and Torres-Reyna 2003, 133; Shaheen 2003, 175). Middle Eastern terrorists were the first and only of those accused of the heinous act (Kuzma 2000, 95) fueling the forthcoming mental and verbal associations based merely on speculation linking a specific background to an atrocious incident (Moore 2007, 124). As time went on, news agencies and terrorism “experts” alleged that Middle Eastern fanatics seemed to be the most logical to implicate due to the similarity in their “terrorism” tactics and those used at the bomb site (Bender and Revah, 11). Many scholars thereafter believe that these immediate presumptions helped trigger a racial backlash, which some believe led to the abrupt arrest of a Jordanian-American man, as well as various other implications (Johnston 1995, 24). Why were those of Middle Eastern origin the first implicated in the minds of the American public? The obvious answer typically evokes a simple word: terrorism. More specifically terrorism and conflict within the past few decades ravaging the majority of the Middle East, it seems, and various parts of the globe. Why, then, should one not point fingers at a group who seems to attract tension and controversy, let alone full-out war? Because the various outlets of the media have tended to resort to a negative image of the Arab when trying to grasp the supposed reality of current world affairs (Mousa 1987, 102). The unlucky associations of Arabs and Muslims due to Orientalism, historical events, current international relations, and fringe members of the Arab community have led to an image the majority of Arabs would gladly cast aside (Said 1994, 334). Moreover, the general media is most likely gathering their information from the endless array of news and government reports describing the unending conflict of the Middle East. However, the reality of the situation, no matter how unintended or coincidental, places this ethnic group at the unlikable end of the ethnic stick.

Link – “Terrorist”

Terrorism is a fabricated threat used to instill fear in the population – the discourse surrounding terror are the root cause of the impacts

Said 1 (Edward, university professor of English and Comparative Literature at Columbia University, International Socialist Review, Aug/Sep 2001

http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Terrorism/Resistance\_Terrorism\_Said.html) JPG

FIRST OF all, this relentless pursuit of terrorism is, in my opinion, almost criminal. It allows the United States to do what it wishes anywhere in the world. Take, for example, the 1998 bombing of Sudan. That was done because Bill Clinton was having trouble with Monica Lewinsky. There was a paper-thin excuse that they were bombing a terrorist factory, which turned out to be a pharmaceutical factory producing half the pharmaceutical supply for the country, which a few weeks later was in the grip of a plague. Hundreds of people died as a result of the plague because there were no pharmaceuticals to treat them because of the willful bombing by the United States. Terrorism has become a sort of screen created since the end of the Cold War by policymakers in Washington, as well as a whole group of people, like Samuel Huntington and Steven Emerson, who have their meal ticket in that pursuit. It is fabricated to keep the population afraid and insecure, and to justify what the United States wishes to do globally. Any threat to its interests, whether it's oil in the Middle East or its geostrategic interests elsewhere, is labeled as terrorism, which is exactly what the Israelis have been doing since the mid-1970s in response to Palestinian resistance to their policies. It's very interesting that the whole history of terrorism has a pedigree in the policies of imperialists. The French used the word "terrorism" for everything that the Algerians did to resist their occupation, which began in 1830 and didn't end until 1962. The British used it in Burma and in Malaysia. Terrorism is anything that stands in the face of what we want to do. Since the United States is the global superpower and has or pretends to have interests everywhere-from China to Europe to southern Africa to Latin America and all of the Americas-terrorism becomes a handy instrument to perpetuate this practice. Terrorism is also now viewed as a resistance to globalization. That connection has to be made. I notice, by the way, Arundhati Roy made that connection, as well, that people's movements of resistance against deprivation, against unemployment, against the loss of natural resources, all of that is termed "terrorism. " Into this vicious cycle feed a few groups like bin Laden's and the people he commands, whether they are in Saudi Arabia or Yemen or anywhere else. They're magnified and blown up to insensate proportions that have nothing to do with their real power and the real threat they represent. This focus obscures the enormous damage done by the United States, whether militarily, environmentally, or economically, on a world scale, which far dwarfs anything that terrorism might do. Lastly, very little is said about homegrown terrorism, the militias and armed groups in this country, or Timothy McVeigh. I remember very clearly after the blowing up of the federal building in Oklahoma City, my office was deluged with phone calls because I think Steven Emerson, who was instantly called an expert on terrorism, said this has all the marks of Middle Eastern terrorism. That cycle of connections is deeply damaging to individuals of Arab and Muslim origin in this country. During the 2000 election campaign, anything having to do with Islam or Muslims was used as a way of discrediting your opponent. Hillary Clinton returned a $50,000 contribution from the Muslim Alliance, which is a very conventional, quite politically neutral group, because they smacked of terrorism, she said. Those kinds of labels can be like racial profiling that involves not only African Americans and Latin Americans but also Arab Americans. Interestingly, the State Department report you cited shows conclusively that the Islamic world is number 10 on the list. The greatest source of terrorism is the U.S. itself and some of the Latin American countries, not at all the Muslim ones. But they're used, partly manipulated by the Israeli lobby, partly by Defense and State Department interests, to keep America in its policies and to intimidate people.

Link – “Terrorist”

Terrorist rhetoric has become a justification for violence against dissenters of the state justifiying control by the elites and extreme violence

Whitbeck 2 (John V., int’l lawyer dealing w/ Israeli-Palestinian conflict, The Washignton Report on Midde East affairs Vol. 21 Iss. 2, March 2002, pp. 52+, questia) JPG

The greatest threat to world peace today is clearly "terrorism"--not the behavior to which the word is applied, but the word itself. For years, people have recited the truisms that "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" and that "Terrorism, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder." With the world's sole superpower declaring an open-ended, worldwide "war on terrorism," however, the notorious subjectivity of this word is no longer a joke. It is no accident that there is no agreed definition of "terrorism," since the word is so subjective as to be devoid of any inherent meaning. At the same time, the word is extremely dangerous, because people tend to believe that it does have meaning and to use and abuse the word by applying it to whatever they hate as a way of avoiding rational thought and discussion and, frequently, excusing their own illegal and immoral behavior. There is no shortage of precise verbal formulations for the diverse acts to which the word "terrorism" often is applied. "Mass murder," "assassination," "arson" and "sabotage" are available (to all of which the phrase "politically motivated" can be added if appropriate). Such crimes, moreover, are already on the statute books, rendering specific criminal legislation for "terrorism" unnecessary. Such precise formulations, however, do not carry the overwhelming, demonizing and thought-deadening impact of the word "terrorism," which is, of course, precisely the charm of the word for its more cynical and unprincipled users and abusers. If someone commits "politically motivated mass murder," people might be curious as to the cause or grievances which inspired such a crime, but no cause or grievance can justify (or even explain) "terrorism," which, all right-thinking people agree, is the ultimate evil. Most acts to which the word "terrorism" is applied (at least in the West) are tactics of the weak, usually (although not always) against the strong. Such acts are not a tactic of choice but of last resort. To cite one example, the Palestinians certainly would prefer to be able to fight for their freedom by "respectable" means, using F-16s, Apache attack helicopters and laser-guided missiles such as those the United States provides to Israel. If the U.S. provided such weapons to Palestine as well, the problem of suicide bombers would be solved. Until it does, and for so long as the Palestinians can see no hope for a decent future, no one should be surprised or shocked that Palestinians use the "delivery systems" available to them--their own bodies. Genuine hope for something better than a life worse than death is the only cure for the despair which inspires such gruesome violence. In this regard, it is worth noting that the poor, the weak and the oppressed rarely complain about "terrorism." The rich, the strong and the oppressors constantly do. While most of mankind has more reason to fear the high-technology violence of the strong than the low-technology violence of the weak, the fundamental mind-trick employed by the abusers of the epithet "terrorism" (no doubt, in some cases, unconsciously) is essentially this: The low-technology violence of the weak is such an abomination that there are no limits on the high-technology violence of the strong which can be deployed against it. Not surprisingly, since Sept. 11, virtually every recognized state confronting an insurgency or separatist movement has eagerly jumped on the "war on terrorism" bandwagon, branding its domestic opponents (if it had not already done so) "terrorists" and, at least implicitly, taking the position that, since no one dares to criticize the United States for doing whatever it deems necessary in its "war on terrorism," no one should criticize whatever they now do to suppress their own "terrorists." Even while accepting that many people labeled "terrorists" are genuinely reprehensible, it should be recognized that neither respect for human rights nor the human condition are likely to be enhanced by this apparent carte blanche seized by the strong to crush the weak as they see fit. Writing in The Washington Post on Oct. 15, deputy editor Jackson Diehl cited two prominent examples of the abuse of the epithet "terrorism": "With their handshake in the Kremlin, Sharon and Putin exchanged a common falsehood about the wars their armies are fighting against rebels in Chechnya and the West Bank and Gaza. In both cases, the underlying conflict is about national self-determination: statehood for the Palestinians, self-rule for Chechnya. The world is inclined to believe that both causes are just.... Sharon and Putin both have tried to convince the world that all their opponents are terrorists, which implies that the solution need not involve political concessions but merely a vigorous counterterrorism campaign." Perhaps the only honest and globally workable definition of "terrorism" is an explicitly subjective one--"violence which I don't support." Anyone who reads both the Western and Arab press cannot help noticing that the Western press routinely characterizes as "terrorism" virtually all Palestinian violence against Israelis (even against Israeli occupation forces within Palestine), while the Arab press routinely characterizes as "terrorism" virtually all Israeli violence against Palestinians. Only this formulation would accommodate both characterizations, as well as most others.

Link – “Terrorist” => Fear

A politics of fear is used to replicate the terrorist other – justifies military expansionism

Kellner 7 (Douglas, Chair of Philosophy @ UCLA, Presidential Studies Quarterly. Vol. 37 (4), 2007, pg. 622+) JPG

And while Bush ascribed "fear" to his symbolic Other and enemy, as Michael Moore's 2002 film Bowling for Columbine demonstrates, the U.S. corporate media have been exploiting fear for decades in their excessive presentation of murder and violence and dramatization of a wide range of threats from foreign enemies and within everyday life. Clearly, the media and the Bush administration whipped up fear and panic in their post-9/11 proliferation of reports of terrorist threats, obsessive focus on terrorism, and demands for retaliation. The media became weapons of mass hysteria that created tremendous fear in the population, which made the public look anxiously to the government for protection, rendering the population malleable to manipulation. Since the September 11 strikes, the Bush administration used fear tactics to advance its political agenda, including tax breaks for the rich, curtailment of social programs, military buildup, the most draconian assaults on U.S. rights and freedoms in the contemporary era in the so-called USA Patriot Act, and a highly controversial and divisive March 2003 war on Iraq. (16) The Bush-Cheney administration used a fearful population and Congress to push through its extremist agenda, and the media were their weapons to help continually generate fear and ready the public to accept curtailment of their freedoms to protect them and make them secure. In his September 20 talk to Congress, Bush drew a line between those who supported terrorism and those who were ready to fight it. Stating "You're either with us, or against us," Bush declared war on any states supporting terrorism and laid down a series of nonnegotiable demands to the Taliban who ruled Afghanistan, while Congress wildly applauded. Bush's popularity soared with a country craving blood-revenge and the head of Osama bin Laden. Moreover, Bush also asserted that his administration held accountable those nations that supported terrorism--a position that could nurture and legitimate military interventions for years to come. Bush administration discourses, like those of bin Laden and radical Islamists, are fundamentally Manichean, positing a binary opposition between Good and Evil, Us and Them, civilization and barbarism. Bush's Manichean dualism replicates as well the Friend/Enemy opposition of Carl Schmidt upon which Nazi politics were based. Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and "the Terrorist" provided the face of an enemy to replace the "evil Empire" of Soviet communism, which was the face of the Other in the Cold War. (17) The terrorist Other, however, does not reside in a specific country with particular military targets and forces, but is part of an invisible network supported by a multiplicity of groups and states. This amorphous terrorist enemy, then, allows the crusader for good to attack any country or group that is supporting terrorism, thus promoting a foundation for the Bush Doctrine of preemptive and perennial war. The discourse of good and evil can be appropriated by disparate and opposing groups and generates a highly dichotomous opposition, undermining democratic communication and consensus and provoking violent militaristic responses. It is assumed by both sides that "we" are the good, and the "Other" is wicked, an assertion that Bush made in his incessant assurance that the "evil-doers" of the "evil deeds" will be punished. Projecting evil onto the Other constructs the opponent of evil as "good" and elevates the struggle to a cosmic battle between good and evil. All traits of aggression and wickedness are thus projected onto the Other while constituting oneself as good and pure.

Link – “Hunting Terrorists”

Describing actions in terms of animal behavior dehumanizes terrorists

Steuter and Wills 9 (Erin and Deborah, both prof of sociology @ Mt. Allison U, Canada,

2009, Global Media Journal -- Canadian Edition, Volume 2, Issue 2, pp. 7-24,

www.gmj.uottawa.ca/0902/v2i2\_steuter%20and%20wills.pdf) JPG

The symbolic lexicon used by the news media since 9/11 demonstrates a clear pattern. Suspected terrorists, enemy military and political leaders and, ultimately, entire populations are metaphorically linked to animals, particularly to prey. This holds true both nationally and internationally: headlines from newspapers of many political affiliations across the U.S., Europe and Australia generate, with remarkable consistency, this journalistic framing of the enemy as hunted animal. Canadian newspaper headlines echo this framing, particularly in two of its most persistent strains: the enemy as repugnant animal and the enemy as pestilential. Most frequently, enemies are identified with the lower-order animals conventionally regarded as especially noxious by society, as exemplified in headlines such as: “Raid Zaps Iraqi Rat” (Toronto Sun, Apr. 18, 2003); “Canadian soldiers mop up Taliban rat’s nest in Afghanistan” (Calgary Herald, Sep. 14, 2006); and “Iraq war breeding terrorists of future” (Windsor Star, Jun 22, 2005). Media reports on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are punctuated by language expressing notions of pursuit, capture and entrapment via a particular vocabulary that relies on animal-related metaphors such as “hunt”, “trap”, “snare”, “net” and “corral”. Terrorists, thus, are “caught in a trap” while the enemy “scurries” for cover or “slithers” out of reach. Neutral terms such as “search” or “look for” have been almost entirely replaced by the dominant hunting model, as in repeated references to the “hunt for terrorists”.

Link – Terrorism Reps

The representation of terror was founded upon a dichotomy between good and evil – this discourse is the precondition for endless violence against the other

Kellner 7 (Douglas, Chair of Philosophy @ UCLA, Presidential Studies Quarterly. Vol. 37 (4), 2007, pg. 622+) JPG

Such hyperbolic rhetoric is a salient example of Bushspeak that communicates through codes to specific audiences, in this case domestic Christian right-wing groups that are Bush's preferred recipients of his discourse. (18) But demonizing terms for bin Laden both elevate his status in the Arab world as a mythical superhero who stands up to the West and help marshal support among those who feel anger toward the West and intense hatred of the West. Bush and the global media helped produce a mythology of bin Laden, elevating him to almost superhuman status, while generating fear and hysteria that legitimated Bush administration militarism geared toward the "Evil One," as Bush has called bin Laden, equating him with Satan. The discourse of "evil" is totalizing and absolutistic, allowing no ambiguities or contradictions. It assumes a binary logic where "we" are the forces of goodness and "they" are the forces of darkness. Such discourse legitimates any action undertaken in the name of good, no matter how destructive, on the grounds that it is attacking "evil." The discourse of evil is cosmological and apocalyptic, evoking a cataclysmic war with mythical stakes. In this perspective, evil cannot be just attacked one piece at a time, through incremental steps, but must be totally defeated, eradicated from the earth if good is to reign. This discourse of evil raises the stakes and violence of conflict and nurtures more apocalyptic and catastrophic politics, fueling future cycles of hatred, violence, retribution, and wars.

It is, of course, theocratic Islamic fundamentalists who themselves engage in similar simplistic binary discourse and projection of evil onto the Other which they use to legitimate acts of terrorism. For certain Manichean Islamic fundamentalists, the United States is "evil," the source of all the world's problems, and deserves to be destroyed. Such one-dimensional thought does not distinguish between U.S. policies, leaders, institutions, or people, while advocating a Jihad, or holy war, against the American monolithic evil. The terrorist crimes of September 11 appeared to be part of this Jihad and the monstrousness of the actions of killing innocent civilians shows the horrific consequences of totally dehumanizing an "enemy" deemed so evil that even innocent members of the group in question deserve to be exterminated.

Underlying the Bush-Cheney administration rhetoric were fundamental American political mythologies. The civilization discourse built on Ronald Reagan's favorite rhetoric of "the city on the hill," whereby the destiny of the United States was to establish a site of freedom and civilization in the wilderness (see Rogin 1987). Bush's discourse in particular evoked the frontier mentality whereby the sheriff defends the good citizens against evil outlaws and savages. (19) As Ivie and Giner (2007) put it, "After 9/11 terrorism became the threatening face of savagery in democracy's troubled empire." Bush's "savages" were the "evil doers" associated with Islamic terrorism, against whom he declared war.

The legitimation of violence against evildoers is also grounded in the political mythology of what Jewett and Lawrence (1988) describe as the "American monomyth," a dominant trope of the genres of popular culture in the United States from Indian captivity narratives through the Hollywood western and superhero films. On this model, a community is threatened by barbaric forces, and redemptive violence is used to protect the community. In the post-9/11 context, the barbaric forces threatening the community were global terrorism and Bush's Terror War policies were redemptive violence.

Link/Impact – Rhetoric 🡪 Dehum

Terrorist rhetoric is used to dehumanize the enemy and justify atrocities

Macleod 10 (Ryannon, IR major @ Memorial U of Newfoundland, e-IR, publisher of IR lit., 5/3/10, http://www.e-ir.info/?p=4017) JPG

While little to no persuasion is required to garner support for defensive acts of war upon a nation’s invasion by foreign militant groups or armies, those governments seeking to engage in aggressive acts of war against other states face the ideological encumbrance of rallying public support for their cause. In these cases government leaders must rhetorically construct their enemies with dehumanizing language so as to exploit the ways in which the general masses perceive others. Such rhetorical construction of one’s enemies is “fundamental to a nation’s public support for war… Dehumanizing others renders the requisite horrors of war tolerable,” (Elliot 2004, 99) and ensures that “no moral relationship with the (enemy) inhibits the victimizer’s violent behaviour” (Haslam 2006, 254). Through carefully crafted narratives, government leaders are able to sculpt and shape socially constructed realities in such a way so as to “allow or even demand (its) citizens to undertake acts that would be universally rejected if they were directed towards ‘true’ human beings” (Anderson 2006, 739). How, then, does one go about orchestrating such a sophisticated fabrication of reality? Successful dehumanization rests first within defining those which a government wishes to antagonize as “others,” distinctly lacking a capacity for those characteristics associated with being innate to human nature; ultimately, the goal is to construct this definition in such a way so as to “emphasize that the ‘other’ is morally culpable of great crimes, thus less than human and deserving of punishment” (Boudreau and Polkinghorn 2008, 176). This is usually established in relation to ethnicity and race, with the “enemy” cast as being savages or barbarians lacking in culture, cognitive and rational capacities, morality, and self-restraint; the ideal portrayal is of a “savage [that] has brutish appetites for violence and sex, is impulsive, and prone to criminality” (Haslam 2006, 252). One effective means of denying a group inclusion to the human race through rhetoric is to explicitly liken the group’s members to animals, insects, or parasites. Equally effective is the construction of a likeness to children, implicating a lack of development and autonomy. Put simply, if rhetoric is crafted in such a way so as to cast one’s enemies as “lacking what distinguishes humans from animals, they should be seen [either] implicitly or explicitly as animal-like” (Haslam 2006, 258); the definitive goal is to define the reality of the intended enemy so that public perception associates the group, as well as the groups individual members, as anything but human (Elliot 2004). No intense scrutiny or analysis is needed to find these basic founding elements of dehumanization entangled in even the most superficial components of Bush’s “War on Terror” – the conflict itself is named in such a way so as to avoid explicitly naming any human opposition to American forces. Instead, the U.S military forces seek to conquer an abstract notion of evil, an “inhuman construct that no bullet can kill” (Elliot 2004, 100). However, such a fixation upon evil is far from a modern development for the Americans, and long precedes both the War on Terror and the tragedy of 9/11; whether it be government leaders of the Cold War era associating the Soviet Union with the idea of an empire of evil, or Adolf Hitler’s immortalization as the personification of evil (Ivie 2007), George Bush’s immediate invocation of evil imagery is hardly unprecedented. Though not an inherently unique approach, the president’s rhetoric of evil was highly effective in that it immediately eradicated any space within the public perception for critical thought regarding terrorism, and those proposed “enemies” of the United States. From the very beginning of the War on Terror, absolutely every consideration “became a matter of national security as viewed through the lens of an evil threat” (Ivie 2007, 226). By resorting to a means of rhetorical definition of enemies founded in  previous American conflicts, Bush’s invocation of evil allowed for him to associate his wartime narratives with oppressive regimes of past, casting terrorists as “the heirs of fascism, totalitarianism and Nazism” (Maggio 2007, 822). Bush explicitly highlighted this very association within his address to a joint session of congress on September 20th, 2001, stating: “[those responsible for the attacks on 9/11] are the heirs of all murderous ideologies of the 20th Century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions – by abandoning every value except the will to power – they follow in the path of fascism, Nazism, and totalitarianism.” Though this does not explicitly dehumanize those whom he opposes, the reliance upon past constructions of enemies of the United States allowed Bush to strongly associate those enemies to other groups who have long been accepted as lacking in human characteristics. This idea, along with the association to evil, is frequently re-emphasized in subsequent public addresses regarding the War on Terror that Bush gave over the next five years. Despite the strength of these ideological associations, Bush reinforces the dehumanized image they construct by including rhetoric of murder when speaking of his enemies. Though not as inherently diabolical a concept as evil, the rhetoric of murder is perhaps more effective as it draws a direct link between those Bush wishes to dehumanize, and an understanding of the moral capacity to commit heinous criminal acts upon innocent individuals. Whether it be his continual reference to the attacks on 9/11 as “acts of murder” (for example, Bush 2001a, Bush 2001b, Bush 2002), or the statement that “The United States of America is an enemy of those who aid terrorists and of the barbaric criminals who profane a great religion by committing murder in its name,” (Bush 2001c) Bush is able to further deny membership to the human species to those enemies of the U.S by constructing for them a reality in which there is absolutely no capacity for innate human characteristics. Though the rhetoric of evil and murder form the foundations for the dehumanization of the enemies of the United States, George W. Bush elaborates upon this by detailing explicit examples of the evil demonstrated by those enemies. Within his 2002 State of the Union Address Bush tells of the enemy’s use of “poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens – leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children.” This imagery is taken further within the 2003 State of the Union Address, within which Bush details the forced confessions obtained by the enemy by “torturing children while their parents are made to watch.” As if this were not enough to seal the dehumanized fate of those enemies of the U.S, Bush details the torture methodologies preferred by his enemies to be “electric shock, burning with hot irons, dripping of acid on the skin, mutilation with electric drills, cutting out tongues and rape.” Barbaric? Savage, brutish appetites for violence and sex? Morally culpable of great crimes? All of these key elements of dehumanization are evident within this one statement. By presenting the American people with such a graphic list outlining gruesome crimes, Bush not only suggests that his enemies are less than human, he demands that their identity be acknowledged as innately evil, monstrous, and horrific. Though conventional means of dehumanization are not evident within the president’s rhetoric regarding his enemies within the War on Terror, George W. Bush is able to skilfully use ideas of evil and murder to fulfil the theoretical requirements of dehumanizing an enemy. By relying upon past constructions of evil, as well as graphic narratives of his enemy’s behaviour, Bush is able to present the American people with a portrait of an enemy who is completely devoid of human characteristics, who is without culture or morality, and who has a voracious appetite for gruesome crimes against humanity. One need only skim Bush’s rhetoric of evil to see his desired picture of an enemy who opposes freedom and democracy in all of its forms; of ruthless barbaric criminals who profane religion in order to justify their sacrificing of human life. The evil, deluded men of whom he spins tales are heartless, thrive in chaos and have absolutely no regard for human dignity. In this, Bush takes the practice of dehumanization to a whole new level – not only does he succeed as depicting those with whom he aims to engage in aggressive acts of war as less than human, he manages to craft a narrative in which those whom he wishes to conquer are the embodiment of evil, and everything which threatens the American way of life.

Impact – Violence

Hate for the other creates a fundamental clash of civilizations which imposes violence on everyone outside the body politic

Kellner 7 (Douglas, Chair of Philosophy @ UCLA, Presidential Studies Quarterly. Vol. 37 (4), 2007, pg. 622+) JPG

As Tariq Ali (2002) notes, the Terror War became a "clash of fundamentalisms" in which both sides deployed Manichean discourses used to whip up hatred of the Other and to incite violence and war. The media were the instruments of both, creating hysteria while circulating militarist and Manichean discourses. Media commentators on U.S. television, for example, offered one-sided and ideological accounts of the cause of the September 11 events, blaming their favorite opponents in the current U.S. political spectrum as the source of the terror assaults. For fundamentalist Christian ideologue Jerry Falwell, and with the verbal agreement of Christian Broadcast Network President Pat Robertson, the culpability for this "horror beyond words" fell on liberals, feminists, gays, and the ACLU. Falwell said and Robertson agreed: The abortionists have got to bear some burden for this because God will not be mocked. And when we destroy 40 million little innocent babies, we make God mad. I really believe that the pagans, and the abortionists, and the feminists, and the gays and the lesbians who are actively trying to make that an alternative lifestyle, the ACLU, People for the American Way--all of them who have tried to secularize America--I point the finger in their face and say, "You helped this happen." (20) In fact, this argument is similar to a right-wing Islamic claim that the United States is fundamentally corrupt and evil and thus deserves God's wrath, an argument made by Falwell critics that forced the fundamentalist fanatic to apologize. On the issue of "what to do," right-wing columnist Ann Coulter (2001) declaimed: "We know who the homicidal maniacs are. They are the ones cheering and dancing right now. We should invade their countries, kill their leaders and convert them to Christianity." (21) While Bush was declaring a "crusade" against terrorism and the Pentagon was organizing Operation Infinite Justice, Bush administration Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz (U.S. Department of State 2001) said the administration's retaliation would be "sustained and broad and effective" and that the United States "will use all our resources. It's not just simply a matter of capturing people and holding them accountable, but removing the sanctuaries, removing the support systems, ending states who sponsor terrorism."

Impact – Violence

The representations surrounding terrorist tactics blurs the line between civilian and soldier justifiying endless violence against those outside the body politic

Birchall 5 (Ian, British Marxist historian and translator, Sartre Studies Intl Vol. 11 No. 1-2, 2005, pp. 251- Questia)JPG

Many have claimed that the events of 11 September 2001 opened up a new period in which everything is changed. The 96-year-old Sartre--presumably now a non-smoker--who had lived through and commented on the great atrocities of the twentieth century, might have been a little sceptical. While 11 September was an atrocity in which nearly three thousand civilians died, it pales in scale when compared to Hiroshima, Dresden (40) or the bombing of North Vietman in the 1960s (when a greater tonnage of bombs was dropped than in the whole of the Second World War). In all these cases, civilians were the main victims. The involvement of civilians in war is nothing new; it has been a growing phenomenon since the nineteenth century. In the Second World War, when the East End of London was subjected to daily German bombing, there is a story of a woman who, when asked what had become of her husband, responded: 'The bloody coward's gone and joined the army.' The rhetoric of 'innocent civilians' plays a major part in the mythology of 'terrorism'. It needs to be exposed for the rhetoric that it is. In 1956, Albert Camus launched a well-meaning campaign for a 'civilian truce' in Algeria. It was doomed to failure from the first day, for it was based on a fundamental misunderstanding. Guerrilla warfare, by its very nature, transgresses the boundaries between civilian and military. (Guerrilla warfare is the natural form of struggle of oppressed colonial peoples, who are at a disadvantage technologically but have the advantage of operating in their own territory. As early as the 1840s, a British officer, John Jacob, complained of 'cruel bloodthirsty cowards' who hid and ran, rather than give the British 'a little honest fighting'. Clearly these 'savages' weren't playing by the rules. (41)) It is scarcely possible to argue that European settlers in Algeria, or Jewish settlers in Palestine, were 'innocent' just because they didn't wear uniforms. Indeed, the main novelty of 11 September is that the victims were Americans. I do not say this facetiously--11 September was a great atrocity. Those who died were for the most part ordinary working people who had no control over their nation's foreign policy. But for the first time since the crushing of the Native Americans (the basis of a whole industry of books and films which has demonized the 'Indians'), the United States was subjected to guerrilla struggle on its own territory. That this involved a huge psychological shock for the American population is undoubted. However, in terms of the underlying moral and political arguments, nothing has changed. More significant was the change that took place in 1989. With the collapse of the Russian empire--the self-styled 'Soviet Union'--the label socialism was no longer popular among those opposing Western imperialism. In the period 1945-1989, the leaders of national liberation struggles--impressed by Stalin's rapid industrialization, and hoping for economic assistance, if not political guidance, from Moscow--tended to adopt the language of socialism. It provided a comfortable excuse for Western intellectuals, who could imagine that anti-imperialist violence was part of a struggle for worldwide socialism. Sartre, at least until the 1970s, when he discovered the existence of something called 'Soviet imperialism', (42) was frequently gullible in this respect. (Only a handful of individuals navigated their way through the Cold War epoch with the firm conviction that there was nothing 'socialist' about the Stalinist bloc, while still giving total opposition to Western capitalism. Castoriadis, CLR James, Tony Cliff, Alfred Rosmer and Raya Dunayevskaya are still marginalized from the history of socialism, though the course of events has confirmed their perspicacity. (43) As early as 1947, the young Claude Lefort, in Les Temps modernes, challenged the claim of the Vietnamese Communists to be pursuing a socialist strategy, though he unconditionally supported their right to national self-determination. (44)) Modern 'terrorism' offers no such comfortable evasions. Yet though the rhetoric of socialism is absent, terrorism is still deeply rooted in the gross disparities of wealth that characterize the modern world, even if individual exponents--such as Osama bin Laden--come from wealthy backgrounds. For Bush and Blair, the enemy seems difficult to define; one day it is Al-Qaida and the Palestinian suicide bombers, the next, the states of the 'Axis of Evil'. Those who still seek to oppose imperialism must do so without any illusions about the nature of the forces aligned against it.

Impact – Violence

The fear-based politics of terror justifies violence in the name of rhetorical constructions

Ivie 7 (Robert, Prof of Comm and Culture @ Indiana U, Rhetoric & Public Affairs. V. 10. Is. 2., 2007, 221+, Questia) JPG

Similarly, eight months later on September 20, 2002, Bush justified a doctrine of preemptive war against the enemies of civilization and "the evil designs of tyrants," a doctrine that opened its third section with a quotation from the president speaking at the National Cathedral in Washington, D.C., three days after 9/11 and vowing to "rid the world of evil." On October 7, just over two weeks after announcing his strategy of preemption, Bush applied the new doctrine directly to Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, saying that the United States must presume the worst and must acknowledge "an urgent duty to prevent the worst from occurring."29 Then, in his January 28, 2003, State of the Union address, the president insisted that America could not afford to trust in the "sanity and restraint" of, nor could it wait any longer to disarm, a "dictator" with access to "the world's most dangerous weapons" and a history of using them to kill and disfigure thousands of his own people. This was an "evil" man who tortured children and adults alike with electric shocks, hot irons, acid drips, power drills, amputations, and rape. "If this is not evil," Bush proclaimed, "then evil has no meaning."30

The image of Satan was Bush's rhetorical trump card in a case for preemptive war that lacked strong evidence of a substantial or imminent threat to the United States or to world security.31 Fear and the perception of peril were themselves entailments of the sign of evil. The very soul of the nation was at risk of damnation and in need of redemption. A war to bring down the demonic Saddam Hussein was a war of atonement and salvation-a war, Christian Spielvogel argues, that Bush represented throughout his 2004 reelection campaign "as a test of national moral resolve in the face of evil."32 Bush's born-again articulation of Christian moral orthodoxy and its daunting expectation of strict fidelity to God's law required the nation to go it alone in Iraq as an affirmation of faith. Thus the moral logic of this pivotal symbolic form perpetuated war, as Spielvogel explains, because "fear of evildoers provides the impetus to sustain one's moral fortitude."33 America's public faith ultimately was justified by a special covenant with God, and it was to Him that the nation ultimately was accountable in what the president called, deep into the bloody occupation of Iraq, this "time of testing."34 "Fellow citizens," he cautioned in the State of the Union address on January 31, 2006,"we've been called to leadership in a period of consequence."35

The discourse surrounding terror produces a violent representation that necessitates mass killings in the name of good

Mitchell 5 (WJ Thomas, Prof of English & Art Hist. @ U of Chicago, ELH, Vol. 72, No. 2, Summer 2005, pp. 291-308, Muse) JPG

I hope it is becoming clear what all this has to do with terror, which fuses the divine and the demonic in a single unspeakable and unimaginable compound. The terrorist is a holy warrior or a devil, depending upon your point of view, or your historical positioning (yesterday’s terrorist is today’s hero of the glorious revolution). Terror is also the deliberate combining of the semiotics and aesthetics of the unimaginable with those of the unspeakable. You can’t imagine anyone doing this, going this far? You think the unnameable horror, the indescribable, unspeakable act cannot be named, described, and reenacted? Terrorists speak the language of the unspeakable. They perform and stage the unimaginable. Their acts as producers of words and images, symbolic forms of violence, are much more important than their acts of actual physical violence. Strategic forms of violence such as war or police action are not essential to their repertoire. The main weapon of terror is the violent spectacle, the image of destruction, or the destruction of an image, or both, as in the mightiest spectacle of them all, the destruction of the World Trade Center, in which the de- struction of a globally recognizable icon was staged, quite deliberately, as an icon in its own right. The people consumed with the image are collateral damage, “enemies of God” who are of no interest. Or they are holy sacrifices, whose innocence is precisely the point. From the standpoint of the terrorist, their innocence makes them appropriate sac- rificial victims. From the standpoint of counter-terror, their innocence confirms the absolute, unspeakable evil and injustice of the terrorist cause. (There is, of course, the intermediate, compromise position known as “collateral damage,” which expresses regret for the loss of innocent life, but claims nevertheless a statistical kind of justice in unverifiable claims about the number of guilty terrorists killed.) Either way, the point of terrorist violence is not the killing of the enemy as such, but the terrorizing of the enemy with a traumatizing spectacle. “Shock and awe” are the tactics that unite non-state with state terror- ism, and in both cases the traumatic spectacle can be rationalized as a humane act of restraint. Instead of killing large masses of people, it is sufficient to “send them a message” by subjecting them to shocking displays of destruction.15

Impact – Violence

The war on terror is no longer one of conventional military means – the representations of terror fuels violence against the other

Mitchell 5 (WJ Thomas, Prof of English & Art Hist. @ U of Chicago, ELH, Vol. 72, No. 2, Summer 2005, pp. 291-308, Muse) JPG

Terrorism, then, is a war of words and images carried by the mass media, a form of psychological warfare whose aim is the demoralization of the enemy, and not the direct destruction of military personnel or equipment. I don’t mean by this that it is not a real war, but that it is an updated version of a very old kind of war, one that is conducted mainly by symbolic gestures of violence, ones that attempt to conquer Word and Image in a Time of Terror the enemy through psychological intimidation rather than physical coercion. Terrorists do not occupy territory. They deterritorialize vio- lence, making it possible for it to strike anywhere. The randomness and unpredictability of terror, coupled with its sense of overdetermined symbolic significance, produce a different kind of battlefield, one that has no front or back. Of course all this means that conventional military means, most especially prolonged conquest and occupation of territory, are absolutely useless against terrorism (just as the talking cure of psychoanalysis is worse than useless against psychosis). The whole notion of a conventional, military “war on terror,” in this light, is quite incoherent, confusing one kind of war with another. It is the sort of asymmetrical warfare that is doomed, not just to failure but to actually strengthening the enemy against which it is waged.

The futility and incoherence of the war on terror have become spectacularly evident in the unspeakable and unimaginable spectacles emerging from the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq. But it was already anticipated by an image that eloquently predicted the outcome of the invasion. This was a parody of the Uncle Sam poster circulated in American newspapers by Common Cause, showing the figure of “Uncle Osama” bin Laden, pointing his finger at potential recruits, and declaring “I want you—to invade Iraq.” This image condensed in a single potent figure the intentions of al Qaeda, explicitly articulated, as the chief coordinator of U.S. counterterrorism efforts, Richard Clarke noted, in the writings of Osama bin Laden: “The ingredients al Qaeda dreamed of for propagating its movement were a Christian government attacking a weaker Muslim region, allowing the new terrorist group to rally jihadists from many countries to come to the aid of the religious brethren.”16 This dream has now come true in Iraq. Uncle Osama has propagated his movement by impersonating Uncle Sam calling Ameri- can youth to a holy war for democracy and freedom, a crusade against Evil. The national icon of American military mobilization is mirrored by its uncanny double or Evil Twin, the arch demon of terror. One can hardly imagine a more perfect updating of Walt Kelly’s famous line in the Pogo comic strip: “We have met the enemy, and he is us”—which in this case, perhaps should be rewritten, “U.S.”

Impact – Biopolitics

Terror rhetoric creates a biopolitics of humanity which justifies violence against those outside the body politic

Baxi 9 (Upendra, Prof. of Law in Development @ U of Warwick, Theory & Event, Vol. 12 No. 3, 2009, Muse) JPG

25. François Debrix does offer singular insights from the discursive platform of 'tabloid' meta-ethics, in which WOT stands presented as an 'absolute war, starting with Iraq' and a 'final and fatal- combat by the forces of 'good' against those of 'evil'(112.) In such a war, 'sovereignty of one state, any state, no longer matters' and indeed 'in fact becomes trivial.' The new paradigm-warriors now hold the 'keys to the survival of not just of nation state anymore, but also of humanity in general.' More precisely, Debrix suggests, a 'humanity defined restrictively of those who are willing to join the absolute war and partake of the ultimate moral crusade' (112.) Tabloid meta-ethics, consequently, marks a shift from Foucault's notion of 'biopolitics of administering populations towards the articulation of 'biopolitics of humanity'(107.) In establishing new conception of life contrasting bodies of 'those who must be defended' with the' new class of bodies' that endanger others, tabloid meta- ethics reconstitutes the meaning of 'bare life.' Any war, but especially WOT, crystallizes the 'basic expression' of 'bare life' in that 'docile bodies are sent outside the life of body politic to preserve a way of life by destroying other lives…'(107.) Yet, by the same token, the WOT violence presents itself as self-justifying tabloid theory/culture narratives of 'just 'war' affirming ways of recycling the Euroamerican collective ways of the resurrection of the post-Enlightenment conceptions of good life everywhere. Tabloid theory and cultures reconstruct the 'biopolitics of humanity' as constituted by conceptions of an absolute war that insists that 'one cannot win such a war,' or, rather, 'it has to be won again every day' (97) wherein the 'war machine becomes the promoter and enforcer of bare life under the regimes of biopolitical sovereignty (107.) Biopolitics of humanity, ably assisted by tabloid terror cultures, close post-Westphalian orders of normative aspirations that dared (once upon a time) to prescribe minimalist thresholds, these manifold narratives drawing some bright lines amongst jus ad bello (just reasons for war or warlike activities), jus in bello (considerations solicitous of the means of reasonable and proportionate infliction of violence within acts of war/warlike hostilities) and jus post bellum (setting normative thresholds for belligerent occupation.) All that matters now is the WOT talk concerning the 'demise of evil regimes,' lands and peoples (111-113), no matter how decisively and also expediently constructed. Are these tabloid terror type formations of agonal sovereignty fundamentally unrelated to emancipatory, human rights talk? Even as the contemporary WOT enactments, fostered by an amoral 'war machine', fail to deliver terminal security for humankind, they do succeed in the obscene 'suspension of the ethical' bemoaned by Levinas.

Impact – Holocaust

Attempting to explain and label violence with negative discourse recreates the conditions for the holocaust

Mitchell 5 (WJ Thomas, Prof of English & Art Hist. @ U of Chicago, ELH, Vol. 72, No. 2, Summer 2005, pp. 291-308, Muse) JPG

These figures of the unspeakable or unsayable are condensed into a single axiom in Wittgenstein’s famous declaration in the Tractatus: “Concerning that about which one cannot speak, one must remain silent.”6 Although some commentators claim to know exactly what Wittgenstein meant by this, I have always found his predicates to be radically ambiguous. Is the “cannot” based in what he elsewhere calls a “metaphysical” can? Is the point that one literally is unable to speak about something because one knows nothing about it, has nothing to say? Is this, in short, something like a grammatical prohibition which says, in effect, “You can speak about this, but your speech will be meaningless, nonsensical, hollow. In that sense, it will not be speech, but merely a noisy form of silence.” Or is it, on the other hand, a moral prohibition: I cannot speak of that which I am forbidden to mention; I cannot violate my inner sense of what I should and must say, or refrain from saying. In this latter case, the “cannot” of the introductory clause really becomes synonymous with and anticipates the “must” [not] of the main clause. We might invoke here the first law of Jewish ethics, as articulated by the late Sidney Morgenbesser: “Can implies don’t.”The difference here is between the inability to speak and the refusal to speak, a distinction that might be illustrated by the famous torture scene in the film Marathon Man. Laurence Olivier, the Nazi torturer, is interrogating Dustin Hoffman with the aid of a dentist’s drill, and he persists in asking him, “Is it safe?” (safe, that is, to retrieve his contraband diamonds from a Manhattan safe deposit box). Hoffman has no idea what the question even means, much less what the answer is, and says so, but this does not satisfy his torturer, who interprets his refusal to answer the question as a sign that Hoffman is concealing something. Soon Hoffman decides that he had better tell his torturer what he wants to hear, and reassures him that yes, it is safe—very, very safe. But of course Olivier is skeptical about this and continues to torture him, whereupon Hoffman switches tactics and tells him that in fact it is not safe, it is very, very dangerous. By this point Olivier doesn’t know what to believe any more, and so he carries on the tor- ture (mercifully in an unseen—but not unheard—scene beyond the view of the camera) until Hoffman’s will is broken and he is reduced to howling animal cries of pain, unable to say anything at all. At this point, Olivier is satisfied that Hoffman “knew nothing—if he had, he would have talked” and orders his men to dispose of him.The significance of this horrific scene is not just the unspeakability of torture—what John Conroy has called “unspeakable acts” in his book by that title.7 The real horror, as Conroy shows, is its staging of the unspeakable as conducted by “ordinary means” in order to force a subject to speak. Olivier plays Szell, the “Weiss Engel,” as a concerned, sympathetic dentist, who makes small talk with Hoffman about his interests as a student while preparing his instruments. He never raises his voice, but remains cool and clinical throughout the process, as if he is probing the inside of Hoffman’s head to extract its contents, at the same time that the cinematography is carrying the spectator vicariously through Hoffman’s experience of the unspeak- able, and into the unimaginable (conveyed, of course, by a dissolve into audio-visual oblivion at the moment Olivier drives his drill into a nice fresh nerve). We have been forcefully reminded by recent events at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq that torture rarely produces any useful information, that it has instead a kind of mirroring or doubling effect in which the victim simply tells the torturer what he wants to hear. “We have ways of making you talk,” is the mantra of the torturer, but those ways tend finally to produce nothing but an echo of the interrogator’s question and, finally, the silence of the body reduced to inarticulate animal cries of pain.Trauma, like God, is supposed to be the unrepresentable in word and image. But we incorrigibly insist on talking about it, depicting it, and trying to render it in increasingly vivid and literal ways.8 Certain works of contemporary art are designed to transmit trauma as directly as possible, to rub the spectator’s face in the unspeakable and unimagi- nable. The Holocaust industry now combines trauma theory’s cult of the unrepresentable with a negative theology discourse to produce a virtual liturgy of the unspeakable and unimaginable, all rendered in an outpouring of words and images, objects, installations, architectural and monumental constructions. The very term “Holocaust,” as Giorgio Agamben has argued, signifies this elevation of the Final Solution from its grisly reality into a divine sacrifice, an apotheosis that produces very mixed results.9

Impact – Racism

Representations of terror turn into racist forms of discrmination

Bizri 7 (Siwar, Policy Analyst @ SAIC, 11/16/7, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University,

http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-12042007-153628/unrestricted/finalthesis.pdf) JPG

Research shows that the repetitive association of certain words and images with an accompanying idea may result in cognitively associating two otherwise separate ideas due to constant exposure to this repetition (Abreu et al. 2003, 692; Graber 2007, 28; Lasorsa and Dia 2007, 282; Ramasubramanian 2005, 9; Shaheen 2003, 172; Van Dijk 1995, 261). For example, when violent regions or violence in general is shown continually accompanying a certain race or ethnic group in the media, the public may begin to cognitively associate the idea of violence with this group (Downings and Husband 2005, 87; Mousa 1987, 101). This is similar to the way stereotyping takes place when an idea forms of a particular group that is continually referred to or discussed in a way conducive to the stereotype (Abraham and Appiah 2006, 190). Stereotypes themselves refer to the wholesale attribution of characteristics towards all members of a given group, which may be positive or negative, but are typically the latter towards groups other than one’s own (Amodio and Devine 2006, 652. Furthermore, a detrimental element of negative stereotyping is its persistence over time (Garcia-Marques, Santos and Mackie 2006, 814; Shaheen 1985, 161). Existing research has shown that the cognitive processing of news media may occur at a subconscious level (Abreu et al. 2003, 702; Berkowitz 1984, 411; Devine 2001, 757; Ramasubramanian 2007, 250) including the absorption of stereotypes, otherwise known as automaticity (Lasorsa and Dia 2007, 281). Therefore, any underlying bias within the media may actually be unnoticeable to the American public, as well as to the journalists themselves, whom otherwise might eschew any apparent prejudices or stereotypes with which they are confronted (Larson 2006, 2; Ottosen 1995, 100; Van Dijk 1992, 89). The above point makes it necessary to also make clear the level at which the effects of the media occur, whether individual, group, or societal. This research study, then, attempts to decipher the individual level effects of the media on cognition, which manifests itself in individual opinion and belief but may become an expression of the larger society (Domke 1997, 5; Graber 2007, 20). Previous studies have supported the idea of associations forming from exposure to certain racial/ethnic triggers such as particular photographs, images or ideas (Abraham and Appiah 2006, 189; Ram Subramanian 2007, 250). In regards to the current study, by continually referring to a negatively-connotated event, word, idea, or group, the media may influence the formation of mental associations that link these negative expressions with Arabs and Arab Americans (Abouchedid and Nasser 2006, 204; Entman 2007, 313; Shaheen 1985, 166). In a case study done by Robert M. Entman, it was found that exactly this was happening in news media regarding the nuclear freeze movement of the 1980’s (2007, 313). The media maintained an unfavorable frame of the movement, which indicated that ordinary citizens were not in favor of the nuclear freeze policy when in actuality the majority was. Entman found public opinion and the mental associations that formed to be contingent upon the unfavorable media framing that was occurring at the time. Moreover, acting elites found themselves less pressured to act upon the favors of the nuclear freeze movement with the unfavorable media framing helping to reduce the priority of this particular policy on the public agenda (Entman 2007, 314). Regarding Arab-Americans, then, unfavorable media framing may also decrease any pressure on elites to reduce the negative images of Arabs and Arab-Americans, which in turn could also delegitimize the importance of this issue in the eyes of the public. In addition to the current maintenance of stereotypical imagery, the combination of negative media framing and common ethnic schemas of Arabs and Muslims have resulted in a long history of socialization and activation in the American and perhaps, wider world culture (Cainkar 2006, 259). This is similar to the activation of racial schemas in regards to African Americans which has placed them in an unfavorable light in reference to particular social issues (Abraham and Appiah 2006, 199; Ramasubramanian 2005, 6). Negative perceptions of most ethnic groups, however, has tended to digress from overt forms of racism, such as institutional practices or claims of inferiority, instead replaced by implicit verbal and visual associations in the media which activate particular stereotypes maintained within the culture (Van Dijk 1995, 276; 1992, 95). Explicit forms of racism, usually in the form of negative perceptions towards an entire group, have increasingly become replaced by a more subtle form of racism towards specific characteristics of an ethnic group (Ramasubramanian 2005, 6; Van Dijk 1992, 90). A negative judgment towards specific actions or characteristics of a group may be more warranted than blatant forms of racism, therefore are more difficult to label as racist (Van Dijk 1992, 93). In reference to Arabs and Muslims, the action of terrorism has become synonymous with this religious/ethnic group, therefore justifying subtle forms of discrimination and stereotyping (Ottosen 1995, 109). This study, then, will mainly focus on assumed semantic implications of word associations in the media based on shared ideological and socially shared knowledge (Van Dijk 1995, 270), rather than measure any explicit statements of racial and ethnic schemas.

Impact – Cult to Kill

Terror discourse creates a cult to kill resulting in endless violence against the enemy

Ivie 7 (Robert, Prof of Comm and Culture @ Indiana U, Rhetoric & Public Affairs. V. 10. Is. 2., 2007, 221+, Questia) JPG

Indeed, in Terry Eagleton's critical view, "holy terror" is a rhetorical malfunction that prods the nation to displace "its own deformities on to a vilified other" so that it might "rid itself magically of its defects" without recognizing in the scapegoat a "horrific double" and thus acknowledging America's own "collective disfigurement."21When terrorists are rendered this way into dehumanized scapegoats-that is, as "inanimate bombs, psychologically damaged, diseased, and subhuman-in all cases portraying them as acting without forethought, provocation, or reason," in the words of Stephen John Hartnett and Laura Ann Stengrim, such rhetoric "clouds our abilities to think about the historical, political, economic, and cultural causes of violence."22 Rhetorical practices that invoke the sign of evil cannot be banished entirely if for no other reason than, as John Angus Campbell attests, evil is a trope deeply embedded in political culture.23 Yet James Arnt Aune rightly insists that the incantation of radical evil "is inherently corrosive of democratic politics" and, we might add, overly conducive to war.24

The rhetoric of religion informs political culture in just this corrosive way, as we have learned so well from Kenneth Burke. The ritual of "victimage" in secular affairs, he explains, is the "logological" equivalent of a theology of redemption through sacrifice and thus an "insight into the nature of language itself as a motive": Order leads to Guilt that involves Redemption through Victimage. Thus the Cult of the Kill pervades the language of sociopolitical relations, especially in the secular religion of a chosen people whose Covenant with God implies the possibility of a Fall from grace and entails, as a condition of redemption, some punishment or payment for wrongdoing. This logic of atonement allows redemption through vicarious sacrifice, which is the principle of mortification by transference or scapegoat that "is particularly crucial to conditions of empire," Burke insists, when purification is achieved by venting conflict through a sacrificial vessel. In this sense, "the role of the sacrificial principle . . . [is] 'logologically inseparable' from the idea of dominion," and thus the scapegoat principle "is basic to the pattern of governance."25

As a basic principle of symbolic action, then, the idea of "redemptive sacrifice" follows from the repression of conscience-laden guilt and in response to the condition of sociopolitical order. Victimage, or "redemption by vicarious atonement," is "intrinsic in the idea of guilt" just as "guilt is intrinsic to the idea of a Covenant." Moreover, terms for order, fall, and redemption imply one another in a cyclical logic that can be reversed so that, for example, "the terms in which we conceive of redemption can help shape the terms in which we conceive of the guilt that is to be redeemed." Accordingly, the name by which we designate a "curative victim" to cleanse our guilt not only reflects but also reflects back upon our sense of order and a concomitant fear of damnation.26 The more fearful and sinister the image we paint of our enemy, the greater our corresponding sensation of endangerment and the stronger our need for redemption through vicarious sacrifice. It may well be that simply naming the enemy is, per se, sufficient cause for war, or as James Hillman writes, "Once the enemy is imagined, one is already in a state of war."27

Impact – US Domination

Their methodology is based around a hegemonic discourse – this preserves the US international order

Ismael 9 (Amani, Asst. Prof of journalism @ Americsn U in Cairo, PhD in mass comm. @ U of Iowa, Mediterranean Edition 4(2) Fall 2009, globalmedia.emu.edu.tr/fall2009/.../1\_Amani\_Ismail\_pp1\_12.pdf) JPG

Although the meaning of “terrorism” remains an unsettled controversy (e.g. Tuman, 2003), the term acquires particular prominence when employed by news media because of multiple functions media serve in society. Such functions include agenda-setting (McCombs, 1997), influencing public opinion (Mutz & Soss, 1997), and participating in foreign policy-making (Dauber, 2001). Indeed, the communication order is a critical foundation for constituting social and political change (Altheide, 2006). Political violence, sometimes used interchangeably with “terrorism” (a tendency that several scholars, e.g. Laqueur (1987), have problematized), is typically classified along two basic lines: grievance/bottom-up and institutional/top-down violence (Tuman, 2003; Wittebols, 1991). Grievance violence is typically performed by marginalized – or at least self-perceived as such – groups that seek to expose an issue, attain power, or alert attention to a cause. Conversely, institutional violence is characteristic of ruling apparatuses that seek to repress potential or actual resistance by less powerful entities in a given society (Wittebols, 1991). These violence genres are constructed in drastically different ways from each other in mainstream news media. So, where grievance violence is portrayed as terrorist and is amplified, sensationalized, and often stripped of its historical and social context (Steuter, 1990; Wittebols, 1991), its institutional counterpart is not depicted as terrorism in the first place or is euphemized as, say, government efforts to protect national security and interests (Nacos, 2002;2GMJ: Mediterranean Edition 4(2) Fall 2009 Wittebols, 1991). For instance, Chechen rebellion against Russian repression as well as Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupation are commonly conveyed as illegitimate acts of attacking civilians and threatening social order and stability. Contrarily, oppressive Russian and Israeli policies against the respective peoples are portrayed as justified and warranted (Tuman, 2003). While scholars generally agree that terrorism is a form of political violence – violence performed with political goals or within a political context (e.g. Nacos, 2002; Nossek, 2004) – there is no consensus on what “terrorism” encompasses (e.g. Schlesinger, Murdock, & Elliot, 1983; Tuman, 2003). The term’s resistance to definition is perhaps best captured in “the hackneyed expression, ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’” (Carruthers, 2000, p. 165). In 1988, Edward Said even suggested eliminating the term, explaining: The use of the word terrorism . . . usually has all kinds of implicit validations of one’s own brand of violence, it’s highly selective. If you accept it as a norm, then it becomes so universally applicable that it loses any force whatsoever. I think it is better to drop it (p. 44). A common theme running across attempts to define “terrorism” is the essential reliance on inducing psychological intimidation within the target audience for the sake of a politically oriented goal (Weimann & Winn, 1994). There is also scholarly consensus that the label “terrorist/terrorism” attaches a pronounced connotation of guilt and illegitimacy to the designated party, thereby permanently tainting its image (Crenshaw, 1995; Tuman, 2003). Such connotation also helps justify government policy toward other nations, including refusal to foster diplomatic relations and imposition of economic sanctions (Crenshaw, 1995). At this juncture, the role of mass media as the cultural arms of any given modern day society (Gerbner, 1992) is pivotal. Most of the information we acquire is through media outlets; they serve as primary means of constructing our everyday reality (Gerbner, 1992). Furthermore, mass media are the first and foremost publicity forums for acts of political violence serving as a practical theater for perpetrators to convey their messages to the intended audience(s) (Carruthers, 2000; Weimann & Winn, 1994). Laqueur (1987) has even gone as far as calling “terrorists” the “super entertainers of our time” (p. 305). Whether acts are designated as terrorism, revolt, resistance or otherwise, can be highly consequential. Once assigned, the power of a name is such that the process by which the name was selected generally disappears and a series of normative associations, motives, and characteristics are attached to the named subject (Bhatia, 2005). Given that the agendas of those participating in the political violence discourse are varied, an expected consequence is tailoring such definitions to suit those agendas (Tuman, 2003). Using “terrorism” as a catch-all phrase to selectively label certain acts of political violence does not help to further our understand of motives behind the violence (Laqueur, 1987). The terrorist label is often complemented with such condemning terms as “thug” and “assassin,” which helps further narrow discourse on the subject (Steuter, 1990). And although assigning labels may sometimes simplify a complex world, the need for simplicity can be rapidly appropriated and taken advantage of by those with their own political agenda (Bhatia, 2005). As Karim (2002) argues; “Dominant discourses support the actions of hegemonic powers to preserve themselves from threats that they themselves name as violent and terroristic” (p. 102). In the post-9/11 era, the U.S.-led “war on terrorism” has tended to dominate foreign news around the world. Further, “[a] myth is being created that in the post-cold war era, a radicalized Islam has replaced communism as the pre-eminent transnational threat to Western interests, exemplified by shadowy networks such as al-Qaida, with their alleged links to ‘rogue’ states” (Thussu, 2006, p. 231). Islamic militancy emerges undifferentiated in the news: Lebanon’s Hizbullah, Palestinian Hamas, Indonesia’s Jemaa Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines, Hizbul-Mojaheddin in Kashmir, Abu Mousab al-Zarqawi’s supporters in Iraq and Chechen rebels are all presented as part of a seamless, transnational terror network. (Thussu, 2006, p. 231)

Impact – Turns the Case

Terrorist rhetoric generates more terrorism – 4 reasons

Kapitan and Schulte 2 (Tomis and Erich, Thomas – Prof of Philosophy @ N Illionois U, and Erich – , Journal of Political and Military Sociology Vol. 30 Iss. 1, 2002, pp. 172+, Questia) JPG

The 'terrorist' rhetoric typified in Netanyahu's book actually increases terrorism in four distinct ways. First, it magnifies the effect of terrorist actions by heightening the fear among the target population. If we demonize the terrorists, if we portray them as arbitrary irrational beings with a "disposition toward unbridled violence," then we are amplifying the fear and alarm generated by terrorist incidents. Second, those who succumb to this rhetoric contribute to the cycle of revenge and retaliation by endorsing terrorist actions of their own government, not only against those who commit terrorist actions, but also against those populations from whose ranks the terrorists emerge. The consequence has been an increase in terrorist violence under the rubric of 'retaliation' or 'counter-terrorism.'18 Third, short of genocide, a violent response is likely to stiffen the resolve of those from whose ranks terrorists have emerged, leading them to regard their foes as people who cannot be reasoned with, as people who because they avail themselves so readily of the 'terrorist' rhetoric know only the language of force. As long as they perceive themselves to be victims of intolerable injustices and view their oppressors as unwilling to arrive at an acceptable compromise, then they will reply with more violence against their oppressors. Fourth, and most insidiously, those who employ the rhetoric of 'terrorism' for their own political ends, for instance, to solidify American support for Israeli policies, are encouraging actions that they understand will generate or sustain further violence directed against civilians. Inasmuch as their verbal behavior is itself intended to secure political objectives through violence directed against a civilian populus, then it qualifies as an instance of terrorism just as much as any direct order to carry out a bombing of civilian targets. In both cases, there is purposeful verbal action aimed at bringing about a particular result through violence against civilians.19 Let us now examine evidence for these points.

Impact – Turn the Case

The representations of terror create a self-destructive fantasy – this image clones itself in our discussions of law and public policy

Mitchell 5 (WJ Thomas, Prof of English & Art Hist. @ U of Chicago, ELH, Vol. 72, No. 2, Summer 2005, pp. 291-308, Muse) JPG

This brings me to the issue of cloning, which might at first glance seem to be quite remote from the problem of the unspeakable and the unimaginable, much less the question of terror. And yet the clone is, I will argue, the key figure that circulates between words and images in our time of terror. Cloning is, as my colleague Leon Kass, the chair of the Presidential Commission on Bioethics, has noted, an object of “horror,” “repugnance,” and “revulsion”—a figure for the unspeakable and unimaginable.17 The clone updates all the ancient phobias about image-making, mimesis, doubling, mirroring, and copying. The origi- nal prohibition on the making of “graven images,” given to Moses on Mount Sinai, is really a law that aims at heading off the production of living images, artificial life forms, the most potent and virulent of which is the idol, the image that condenses the collective desire for a representation of the unrepresentable God.18 In our time, the artificial production of living images has become a technical reality. Cloning continues to be the stuff of myth, fantasy, and science fiction, but at the same time it is the object of debates in law and public policy, not to mention capital investment.19 It is a potent wedge issue in American politics, merging seamlessly with debates about homosexual rights and abortion. The clone as biological simulacrum literalizes homophobia while raising the specter of reproduction without sexual difference. As a reproductive and even therapeutic technology it involves tampering with fetal tissue, and raises the specter of assembly-line production of identical human beings who might be used for “spare parts” or sent on suicide missions without second thoughts. Clones are anonymous, interchangeable cannon fodder like the storm troopers of Attack of the Clones, the most recent film in the Star Wars saga. The clone is, in short, the living image of the unimaginable in our time, and it is very difficult to speak of it without lapsing into the same tones of meta- physical and moral certainty that inform discussions of terrorism.20 The clone and the terrorist personify twin anxieties about the production and destruction of living images respectively: the clone incarnates the horror of the biological simulacrum, the uncontrolled proliferation of organisms associated with cancer, viruses, and plagues. The terrorist is the figure of iconoclasm and suicidal self-sacrifice, the destruction of living images. We should not be totally surprised to find cartoonist Aaron McGruder bringing cloning and terrorism together in a series of cartoons that depict Osama bin Laden calling all jihadists to engage in stem-cell research.

The synthetic figure of “cloning terror” is, then, both a metaphor for the horror of cloning in itself, and an image of terrorism as a virulent, destructive life-form that is being “propagated” (as Richard Clarke puts it) by the very means that are supposed to destroy it. This biological model of terror is everywhere in ordinary language today, from the invocation of “sleeper cells” to the comparison of terrorism to a virus, cancer, or plague, to the phrase “war on terror” itself, which, as linguist Geoffrey Nunberg points out, “dates from the turn of the twentieth century, when people adapted epidemiological metaphors like ‘the war on typhus’ to describe campaigns against social evils. . . . ‘The war on terror,’ too, suggests a campaign aimed not at human adversaries but at a pervasive social plague.”21

Derrida has described contemporary terrorism as a political and social form of an autoimmune disorder, in which the social body is tricked into attacking itself, turning its own strengths against itself in symbolic and real forms of suicide.22 As a technology of the unimagi- nable, terrorism turns the protective function of the imagination—its ability to foresee what is to come—against itself by provoking anxiety and self-destructive fantasy. Just as torture works by turning the in- dividual imagination against itself with the dread of unspeakable tor- ments to come (showing the instruments of torture is often enough in itself to extract a “confession”), so terror works on the collective imagination to clone images of horror, many of which were of course already anticipated in Hollywood disaster movies. Insofar as the clone is portrayed as the uncanny double or “Evil Twin” who is faceless, anonymous, or, even worse, a distorted mirror image of the self (Uncle Osama mirroring Uncle Sam), it serves as the all-purpose figure of the Other, a perfect projection screen for dark, all-too-imaginable paranoid fantasies. The racial Other is an especially apt candidate for figurative cloning since, as the saying goes, “they all look alike.”

Impact – Violence

The discourse surrounding terror produces a violent representation that necessitates mass killings in the name of good

Mitchell 5 (WJ Thomas, Prof of English & Art Hist. @ U of Chicago, ELH, Vol. 72, No. 2, Summer 2005, pp. 291-308, Muse) JPG

I hope it is becoming clear what all this has to do with terror, which fuses the divine and the demonic in a single unspeakable and unimaginable compound. The terrorist is a holy warrior or a devil, depending upon your point of view, or your historical positioning (yesterday’s terrorist is today’s hero of the glorious revolution). Terror is also the deliberate combining of the semiotics and aesthetics of the unimaginable with those of the unspeakable. You can’t imagine anyone doing this, going this far? You think the unnameable horror, the indescribable, unspeakable act cannot be named, described, and reenacted? Terrorists speak the language of the unspeakable. They perform and stage the unimaginable. Their acts as producers of words and images, symbolic forms of violence, are much more important than their acts of actual physical violence. Strategic forms of violence such as war or police action are not essential to their repertoire. The main weapon of terror is the violent spectacle, the image of destruction, or the destruction of an image, or both, as in the mightiest spectacle of them all, the destruction of the World Trade Center, in which the de- struction of a globally recognizable icon was staged, quite deliberately, as an icon in its own right. The people consumed with the image are collateral damage, “enemies of God” who are of no interest. Or they are holy sacrifices, whose innocence is precisely the point. From the standpoint of the terrorist, their innocence makes them appropriate sac- rificial victims. From the standpoint of counter-terror, their innocence confirms the absolute, unspeakable evil and injustice of the terrorist cause. (There is, of course, the intermediate, compromise position known as “collateral damage,” which expresses regret for the loss of innocent life, but claims nevertheless a statistical kind of justice in unverifiable claims about the number of guilty terrorists killed.) Either way, the point of terrorist violence is not the killing of the enemy as such, but the terrorizing of the enemy with a traumatizing spectacle. “Shock and awe” are the tactics that unite non-state with state terror- ism, and in both cases the traumatic spectacle can be rationalized as a humane act of restraint. Instead of killing large masses of people, it is sufficient to “send them a message” by subjecting them to shocking displays of destruction.15

Impact – Dehum 🡪 Genocide

Terrorist representations and dehumanization pave the way for genocide

Steuter and Wills 9 (Erin and Deborah, both prof of sociology @ Mt. Allison U, Canada,

2009, Global Media Journal -- Canadian Edition, Volume 2, Issue 2, pp. 7-24,

www.gmj.uottawa.ca/0902/v2i2\_steuter%20and%20wills.pdf) JPG

The metaphors that collectively construct the enemy in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars require attention because of their potential consequences. The saturation of these metaphors in media reporting has resulted in the dominance of the complementary enemy-as-animal, enemy-as-prey and enemy-as-disease patterns, a dominance that works to obscure public awareness that, first, representational strategies are in play and, second, that these strategies are more than merely rhetorical in their effects. The link between the widespread dissemination of dehumanizing images of the enemy and racism, oppression and even genocide has been well established. Gregory Stanton (1996) observed that the first three stages leading to genocide are classification, symbolization and dehumanization. Animal, prey and disease-related metaphors accomplish in a single rhetorical gesture all three of these steps, powerfully conflating them into a process that simultaneously identifies, marks, symbolizes and profoundly devalues the Other. For Stanton, genocide is not a product, but a process. It may appear sudden, but it is actually linked to a series of distinct but progressive stages, each integral to the “genocidal process” (1996). Classification, symbolization, and dehumanization are followed by organization, polarization, identification, extermination and finally denial of the genocidal act. The language and imagery through which the enemy-Other is represented in the news media play a key role in these stages; once the enemy is consistently represented as less than human, it becomes psychologically acceptable to engage in genocide or other atrocities (Frank & Melville, 1988: 15). Historical precedents include Nazi propaganda films that interspersed scenes of Jewish immigration with shots of teeming rats. Jews were also compared to cross-bred mongrel dogs, insects and parasites requiring elimination; Nazi propaganda insisted that “in the case of Jews and lice, only a radical cure helps” (Mieder, 1982). The more recent Rwandan genocide was also fueled by widely-disseminated media voices in print and radio repeatedly calling the Tutsi ethnic community serpents and cockroaches (Kagwi-Ndungu, 2007).

Impact – Dehum – Maiese

Dehumanization makes violence socially acceptable

Maiese 3 (Michelle, Asst. Prof of Philosophy @ Emanuel college, July 2003,

http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/dehumanization/) JPG

Dehumanization is a psychological process whereby opponents view each other as less than human and thus not deserving of moral consideration. Jews in the eyes of Nazis and Tutsis in the eyes of Hutus (in the Rwandan genocide) are but two examples. Protracted conflict strains relationships and makes it difficult for parties to recognize that they are part of a shared human community. Such conditions often lead to feelings of intense hatred and alienation among conflicting parties. The more severe the conflict, the more the psychological distance between groups will widen. Eventually, this can result in [moral exclusion](http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/intolerable_moral_differences/). Those excluded are typically viewed as inferior, evil, or criminal.[1] We typically think that all people have some basic human rights that should not be violated. Innocent people should not be murdered, raped, or tortured. Rather, [international law](http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/international_law/) suggests that they should be treated [justly and fairly](http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/principles_of_justice/), with dignity and respect. They deserve to have their basic needs met, and to have some freedom to make autonomous decisions. In times of war, parties must take care to protect the lives of innocent civilians on the opposing side. Even those guilty of breaking the law should receive a fair trial, and should not be subject to any sort of cruel or unusual punishment. However, for individuals viewed as outside the scope of morality and justice, "the concepts of deserving basic needs and fair treatment do not apply and can seem irrelevant."[2] Any harm that befalls such individuals seems warranted, and perhaps even morally justified. Those excluded from the scope of morality are typically perceived as psychologically distant, expendable, and deserving of treatment that would not be acceptable for those included in one's moral community. Common criteria for exclusion include ideology, skin color, and cognitive capacity. We typically dehumanize those whom we perceive as a threat to our well-being or values.[3] Psychologically, it is necessary to categorize one's enemy as sub-human in order to legitimize increased violence or justify the violation of basic human rights. [Moral exclusion](http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/intolerable_moral_differences/) reduces restraints against harming or exploiting certain groups of people. In severe cases, dehumanization makes the violation of generally accepted norms of behavior regarding one's fellow man seem reasonable, or even necessary.

Impact – Dehum – Maiese

Dehumanization paves the way for genocide and human rights violations

Maiese 3 (Michelle, Asst. Prof of Philosophy @ Emanuel college, July 2003,

http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/dehumanization/) JPG

While deindividuation and the formation of enemy images are very common, they form a dangerous process that becomes especially damaging when it reaches the level of dehumanization. Once certain groups are stigmatized as evil, morally inferior, and not fully human, the persecution of those groups becomes more psychologically acceptable. Restraints against aggression and violence begin to disappear. Not surprisingly, dehumanization increases the likelihood of violence and may cause a conflict to escalate out of control. Once a [violence](http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/violence/) break over has occurred, it may seem even more acceptable for people to do things that they would have regarded as morally unthinkable before. Parties may come to believe that destruction of the other side is necessary, and pursue an overwhelming victory that will cause one's opponent to simply disappear. This sort of [into-the-sea framing](http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/into-the-sea_framing/) can cause lasting [damage to relationships](http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/damaged_relationships/) between the conflicting parties, making it more difficult to solve their underlying problems and leading to the loss of more innocent lives. Indeed, dehumanization often paves the way for [human rights violations](http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/human_rights_violations/), [war crimes](http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/war_crimes_genocide/), and [genocide](http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/war_crimes_genocide/). For example, in WWII, the dehumanization of the Jews ultimately led to the destruction of millions of people.[9] Similar atrocities have occurred in Rwanda, Cambodia, and the former Yugoslavia. It is thought that the psychological process of dehumanization might be mitigated or reversed through [humanization efforts](http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/humanization/), the development of [empathy](http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/empathic_listening/), the establishment of personal relationships between conflicting parties, and the pursuit of common goals.

Impact – Dehum/Violence

Terrorist rhetoric dehumanizes those who it is applied to and paves the way for endless violence with no opposition

Kapitan and Schulte 2 (Tomis and Erich, Thomas – Prof of Philosophy @ N Illionois U, and Erich – , Journal of Political and Military Sociology Vol. 30 Iss. 1, 2002, pp. 172+, Questia) JPG

The discriminatory applications of the terms 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' by the U. S. Government and mainstream American media reveal that neither uses these terms with any real concern for consistency, completeness, and accuracy. If they did, and if the U.S. Government really meant what it says it means when it proclaims a "war on terrorism," then the United States would be declaring war on itself, or, at the very least, upon its allies that have practiced or supported violence against civilians for political ends. Instead, these terms are selectively used by governments and media to describe those who resort to force in opposing governmental policies. This development is not entirely surprising. For example, we might expect that the U.S. State Department will be selective in its catalog of terrorist incidents since it is an arm of a government pursuing its own political agenda. It is a bit more difficult to understand why a free press should follow the Government's lead, but some have tried to explain this phenomenon by pointing out that the American media "support the existing social, political, and economic order in which they operate because they are part of and benefit from that order, and the views they convey rarely stray far from the norm" (Picard 1993:121).12 The American situation is not unique in this regard; other countries, including Israel, Great Britain, Russia, India and Egypt routinely do the same, and so might any state in describing militant insurgents opposed to its policies, like the Nazis in describing resistance fights in the Warsaw ghetto (Herman and O'Sullivan 1989:261). There is a definite political purpose in so doing. Because of its negative connotation, the 'terrorist' label automatically discredits any individuals or groups to which it is affixed; it dehumanizes them, places them outside the norms of acceptable social and political behavior, and portrays them as people who cannot be reasoned with.13 As a consequence, the rhetoric effectively,

\* erases any incentive that an audience might have to understand the point of view of those individuals and groups so that it can ignore the history behind their grievances;

\* deflects attention away from one's own policies that might have contributed to these grievances;

\* repudiates any calls to negotiate with them;

\* paves the way for the use of force and violence in dealing with them, and in particular, gives a government "freedom of action" by exploiting the fears of its own citizens and stifling any objections to the manner in which it deals with them.14 The general strategy is nothing new; it is part and parcel of the war of ideas and language that accompanies overt hostilities. The term 'terrorism' is simply the current vogue for discrediting one's opponents. The net effect is that the 'terrorist' rhetoric effectively shuts down all meaningful debate on policy or tactics, and leaves only the path of violence to solve differences. The theoretical roots of this line of thinking are probably Hobbesian. In his book War and Justice, Robert Phillips writes, Every political community has understood that random and indiscriminate violence is the ultimate threat to social cohesion, and thus every political society has some form of prohibition against it. Terrorism allowed to take full sway would reduce civil society to the [Hobbesian] state of nature ... No political society can sanction terrorism, for that would be a self-contradiction, as the very reasons for entering civil society were to escape precisely those conditions imposed by the terrorist. (Phillips 1984:28) Under a truly Hobbesian view, one need not object to one's own terrorism against foreign peoples or countries. I enter a political society so that I may escape precisely those conditions imposed by the terrorist, not in hopes that all people, least of all the foreign enemies of my society, can escape those conditions. So a terrorist strike against my society may well be intolerable, but a terrorist strike on behalf of my society and/or against another society may be acceptable or even desirable. This may help to explain a second critical feature in the semantics of the word 'terrorism.' As typically employed, the word effectively takes on an indexical character, that is, there is an implicit reference to the speaker's point of view, so that in general usage, 'terrorism' is actually coextensive with the phrase 'terrorism against us' (O'Brien 1977:91).15 Just as successive Israeli Governments routinely refer to Palestinian militants as 'terrorists,' Palestinians have responded similarly in describing Israeli settlers and Israeli military personnel. If we read each of the occurrences of 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' in Phillips' passage and in popular discourse as indexical, then there is greater consistency with the Hobbesian view as well as common sense. Thus, to paraphrase Phillips, "no political society can sanction terrorism against itself, for that would be a self-contradiction." Accordingly, it becomes easy to demonize terrorists because they are violating the canons of our social organization and would draw us into a brutal state of nature. They are "beasts" that can only be dealt with on their own terms, according to the laws of the Jungle under which disagreements are settled through violence or the threat of such. Yet, despite its popularity, this sort of talk is difficult to justify. Terrorism does not present any more of an assault on the foundations of political society than do more ordinary sorts of crimes, like murder, robbery, or rape. Most societies have found more effective ways of dealing with crime than matching the brutality of the criminals and there is no obvious reason to think that similar methods, e.g. addressing the root causes of the crime, would fail in dealing with terrorism

A2 – Perm

War discourse breaks down diplomacy

Hodges and Nilep 7 (Adam and Chad, Adam – PhD linguistics @ U Boulder @ Col & prof of philosophy @ U Boulder, Chad – prof of linguistics @ U Boulder, “Discourse, War and Terrorism”, pp. 12) JPG

In order to understand the relationship between discourse and war (including the strategy of terrorism), let us consider Carl von Clausewitz’s (1976) maxim that war is simply politics by other means. One may imagine a continuum of political strategy, with war and diplomacy occupying opposite ends. Diplomacy represents the art of communication employed in the service of peaceful cohabitation. As diplomacy’s opposite war represents the breakdown of communication, resulting in physical violence. It is important to note, however, that both ends of this continuum rely crucially on uses of language. The practice of diplomacy relies on dialogue and tireless negotiation in an effort to reach shared understandings among rical groups. War, too, relies on discourse – communication within the group to divide interests and dehumanize the Other as a prelude to violence.

A2 – Perm

Representations overwhelm the permutation – only confronting the images of terror can create solutions

Mitchell 5 (WJ Thomas, Prof of English & Art Hist. @ U of Chicago, ELH, Vol. 72, No. 2, Summer 2005, pp. 291-308, Muse) JPG

This image has become iconic for the American war on terror be- cause it condenses all these unspeakable scenarios into an eloquent form whose simplicity and directness makes it ideal for duplication and repetition. And its very simplicity helps it condense multiple nar- ratives into a single gestalt. This is the magic of the traditional devo- tional image in Christian iconography, which encouraged prolonged contemplation of an image, not just the quick “reading” that gives the figure a proper name and places it in a narrative. The devotional image requires acts of sympathetic imagination that encourage identi- fication with the depicted figure. This image stands out from the Abu Ghraib archive because it resonates with these devotional overtones. One effect of the still photograph is to freeze what must have been a very short interval of equilibrium for this prisoner, and to prolong it indefinitely. As with the images of the tortured Christ in Passion cycles, the abjection and humiliation tend to drop away as we ponder a moment of poise, balance, and even dignity. This man (who was probably guilty of car theft) has been told that if he steps off the box he will be electrocuted. He is enduring a moment of terror under that stifling hood, but just for a moment is keeping his balance. As image, he will keep his balance forever, serving no doubt as an emblematic recruiting poster for al Qaeda, but also perhaps serving as an occa- sion for devoted contemplation, an inquiry into what is expressed by these images beyond their readability. In saying this, it may seem that I am fetishizing these images, endowing them with a life of their own, beyond their historical, documentary function, detaching them from the strict rule of narrative, and releasing them into a world of verbal and visual associations. But if this is fetishism, it is of a sort that has already been established in the mass reception of these photographs, and the discourse that circulates around them. We have no choice but to face these images for whatever shocks of recognition they may provide. That which we could not have imagined has become all too imaginable, and the unspeakable has become that of which we are compelled to speak.

A2 – Perm

Security representations overwhelm the perm

Ivie 7 (Robert, Prof of Comm and Culture @ Indiana U, Rhetoric & Public Affairs. V. 10. Is. 2., 2007, 221+, Questia) JPG

The cycle of interconnected and symbolically charged terms makes it impossible to sort out a simple linear progression from empirical threat or actual necessity to measured or just response and thus unrealistic to assert that issues of national security can be calculated and assessed strictly objectively. At least in the case of U.S. war culture, and certainly we know that contemporary America is not entirely unique in this matter, the articulation of good and evil suffuses and distorts every reason, every calculation, every perception, and every dimension of motivation for choosing armed hostility over diplomacy or peace. The face of evil colonizes judgment, neutralizes arguments for pragmatic alternatives, and diminishes deference to ethical constraints.

No space for critical thinking about the challenge of terrorism or the invasion of Iraq was provided by the president's rhetoric of evil. From the beginning of Bush's war on terrorism, every consideration domestic and foreign became a matter of national security as viewed through the lens of an evil threat. In his first State of the Union address after 9/11, the president established a totalizing focus on evil that not only aimed to eliminate "terrorist parasites" who endangered civilization worldwide and to prevent an "axis of evil" in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea from threatening the world with weapons of mass destruction; it also endeavored to provide for comprehensive "homeland security," extending to increased research on bioterrorism, enhanced airport and border surveillance, better intelligence gathering by federal agents (and by "the eyes and ears of alert citizens"), and augmented police and firefighter training-all of which would improve public health, combat illegal drugs, and provide safer neighborhoods. Additionally, the president spoke of "health security," "retirement security," and a plan for "economic security" that would promote jobs, education, energy production, trade, and tax relief for the beleaguered nation. All of this added security would demonstrate to America's enemies that they "were as wrong as they are evil."28

Alt – Mockery

Their representations of terror create a universal hate creating an appetite for war – only comedy can cure this terrible love of war

Ivie 7 (Robert, Prof of Comm and Culture @ Indiana U, Rhetoric & Public Affairs. V. 10. Is. 2., 2007, 221+, Questia) JPG

Any tragic appetite for war, Burke concludes, that is concocted by means of symbolic action-especially a longing for redemption by substitution, proxy, projection, sacrifice, or just plain passing the buck-can never be fully cured; it can only be processed and diverted, and then only by virtue of the comic corrective, that is, "in the spirit of solemn comedy."36 Merton shares not only Burke's sense of the scapegoat but also his commitment to humility as the sole plausible answer to "universal self-hate." Humility, along with compassion and identification, Merton allows, are required to understand and face with equanimity the inevitability of failure and error. The "one truth that would help us begin to solve our ethical and political problems" is "that we are all more or less wrong, that we are all at fault, all limited and obstructed by our mixed motives, our self-deception, our greed, our self-righteousness and our tendency to aggressivity and hypocrisy."We must somehow come to accept, then, that everyone is a "mixture of good and evil." Only by such humility can humanity hope to "exorcise the fear which is at the root of all war."37 Such an abiding fear of damnation (that is, of a chosen people falling from grace) and incessant desire for redemption (that is, for reassurance of their exceptional status) is both a product of and motive for a tragic rhetoric of evil (in the logological sense of symbols cross-pollinating and mutually implicating one another). This potent mixture of fear and desire may very well evoke that elevated, menacing, and awesome aesthetic of the sublime, which Hillman refers to as a "terrible love of war."38 War brings the Christian God to life, Hillman argues, in a conjunction of beauty and savagery, love and rage, life and death, desire, horror, attraction, and fear that is especially compelling in contemporary America.39 Yet Hillman also maintains that the sublimity of this war sickness contains the key to its cure. The clues he draws from a "Hymn to Ares" include the power of imagination, the requirement of courage and contestation, a regard for justice, a capacity for tolerance and restraint, and, perhaps most perceptive of all, a recognition that wars begin "in the shrill voice" of political leaders, the press, and members of the public "who perceive 'enemies' and push for a fight." Perceiving an enemy produces a threat. The constructive equivalent and fitting answer to war's sublimity-the rhetorical response to war from within the symbolic universe of war itself-is a regimen of "aesthetic passion," a "passionate intensity" that overcomes "peacetime monotony" and turns war inside out by countering inhuman with humane relations of identification and difference, thus providing a reason to pause and reflect, a way of taming haste, of motivating restraint, of cultivating prudence.40 If enemy making is the sublime expression of a chosen people's tragic fear of damnation and their collective desire for redemption by vicarious sacrifice, then humble peace making might properly begin by reflecting courageously and intensely on the image of their terrifying antagonist so that they might discover therein the sins for which they seek atonement. What guilty transgressions are sublimated in the depiction of an abominable adversary? What does a menacing caricature reveal to those in whose own image it is formed? And how might such a revelation help to deter deadly, fear-inducing rituals of vilification? Is war a heroic nation's only path to salvation? These questions cast a somewhat different light on Burke's notion of the comic corrective as it operates within tragic frames of acceptance, a notion typically understood as his antidote to the perverse enmity and factional strife that is an "almost tyrannous ubiquity in human relations."41 The tragic line of development, which is endemic to the drama of political relations, readily leads to victimization unless a comic corrective is introduced strategically to complicate the matters at hand.42 Caricature is the rhetorical instrument for converting necessarily mistaken adversaries whose wrongs (even terrible wrongs) are a function of foolishness and stupidity into diabolical and thus menacing enemies who perpetrate vicious crimes against humanity. The more charitable, reasonable, and realistic attitude is realized, Burke argues, in a "comic" widening of the operative frame of reference, a widening of perspective that broadens and matures "sectarian thought" in secular relations.43 Thus, as William H. Rueckert notes, Burke's terms for the comic corrective stress the need for a broader, well-rounded frame-a terminology that amplifies rather than diminishes or reduces, that acknowledges irony, respects ambiguity and ambivalence, and deploys metaphor to peek around conceptual corners and to cross rigid boundaries.44 This way of understanding Burke's comic corrective focuses attention primarily on rounding out narrow, inordinately threatening caricatures of adversaries. Perhaps there is something also to be gained by contemplating the caricature itself, that is, by examining it closely for the traits and transgressions it discloses about those who seek absolution indirectly through vicarious sacrifice. What unwanted qualities and guilty lapses of their own would they cast off symbolically in the image of a wicked foe? From this perspective, we might be able to penetrate more deeply into the dark recesses of a nation's guilty conscience and gauge more realistically the intensity of its impetus for redemption. We may even discover additional correctives and alternatives to rituals of vilification and victimization by confronting sublimated motives from this reverse angle. In this regard and for this purpose, George Bush's unmitigated rhetoric of good versus evil is a perfect specimen on which to experiment. He spoke extensively, explicitly, and consistently about evildoers to justify total war on terrorism, and he did so in a polarizing manner of speaking that completely vindicated the United States, cleansing it of any and all guilt by equating the enemy with utter depravity. A rhetorical discharge this uninhibited-characterized by Joshua Gunn as a generic exorcism that dehumanizes and demonizes the Other-would seem to function as a welcome purge and great relief to the body politic.45What it suggests about the state of the nation's soul, however, may be somewhat less satisfying.

Alt – Mockery – A2 Perm

The only way to deflate the test of terrorism is to mock the representations – the permutation creates guilt which is at the root of the impact

Ivie 7 (Robert, Prof of Comm and Culture @ Indiana U, Rhetoric & Public Affairs. V. 10. Is. 2., 2007, 221+, Questia) JPG

Most notably, this rhetorical cycling between the extremes of good and evil alienates the nation from an aesthetic of humility and thus from identifying with a common humanity. It produces what Merton reckons is hell: a condition in which Americans bond with one another only out of hate for others from whom they cannot escape, hate for others that is an expression of self-hate.77 Americans can neither isolate themselves from the world nor fully master and tame it. Perhaps, then, the only choice that is both pragmatic and moral is to make enemies less evil and thereby reduce the blinding drive for redemption-the desperate fear of damnation-to a lower level of intensity so that the nation's collective capacity for tolerance, restraint, and genuine problem solving might improve. The troublesome terms in the deadly cycle of guilt and redemption always implicate each other (logologically, as Burke would say) so that modifying one alters the rest more or less, directly or indirectly. Theoretically, that is, a comic corrective to an overly heroic and dangerously inflated national self-image would diminish any symbolic need for an equally overdrawn image of terrorist enemies. However, from a more linear perspective (or what Burke calls a "rectilinear" or narrative unfolding compared to a cyclical ordering of terms), critiquing arrogance would not appear to be the most likely place to start because, as David Campbell has argued so convincingly, national security (and insecurity) is not strictly an objective condition but instead is written in the language of an alien, dirty, sick, subversive, or similarly threatening representation of the enemy.78 By this logic, one is more likely to begin productively by rewriting with aesthetic intensity the overdrawn and fear-inducing image of an utterly evil enemy than by moving directly to an appeal for humility. Even the most determined and aesthetically intense efforts at rewriting the image of the enemy, one suspects, are unlikely to transform all evil into simple error, that is, to meet the Burkean standard of charitably attributing even the worst wrongs of an adversary to sheer stupidity and mistakenness rather than to viciousness and wickedness. The maximum opportunity for critically reworking political relations is more a matter of reforming, discounting, and modifying motives than of debunking them, Burke would likely agree, since he "considers human life as a project in 'composition'" and ongoing revision, an exercise in enhancing consciousness in order to cope better and more peacefully with the tragic "heroics of war."79 We must do the best we can by advancing at an oblique angle instead of attempting a full about-face. Toward this end, rhetoric persuades to peacemaking over warfare-assuages fear and self-loathing rather than overstating danger and projecting hate-most immediately by rehumanizing the hellish caricature of the enemy and thereby addressing by indirection the haunting question of redemption. The scapegoat is more than a barometer of angst; it is also a cultural device or ritual for articulating the nation's identity and defining its relation to the world. As C. Allen Carter notes, language that is ethically surcharged and that tends toward moral perfectionism creates, by Burke's account, languageinduced guilt that motivates a corresponding quest for self-justification through a surrogate victim.80 There is a kind of symbolic cathexis and conflation of the scapegoat with the motivating source of fear, loathing, and guilt, much like the hated and feared Jew was confused with "the plague as a divine punishment" and became the first cause of the epidemic of Black Death. Thus, "to avert the plague," the guilt must be identified with and punished through the scapegoat. Mere mention of plague could therefore be cause for massacring Jews, who were thought, according to Guillaume de Machaut, to be "false, treacherous and contemptible swine," the "wicked and disloyal who hated good and loved everything evil," and thus who "poisoned" the rivers and caused the "mortal calamity" of Christians. Because of such "treachery," then, "every Jew was destroyed, some hanged, others burned; some were drowned, others beheaded with an ax or sword."81 They were, in short, the evil terrorists of their medieval times, just as the present war on terror is a kind of legalized witch-hunt "stimulated by the extremes of public opinion."82

Alt - Discourse Matters

Discourse matters in the way we shape terrorism – the word terror has become a power play by the sovereign

Isen 4 (Galip, prof of education @ Istanbul Bilgi U, 7/28/4, http://reconstruction.eserver.org/033/isen.htm) JPG

<3> In that case, ignoring the sheer abominability of the act for a moment, it is perplexing why the tragedy of September 11 caught America and the rest of the world by such surprise [[5](http://reconstruction.eserver.org/033/isen.htm#5)]. Opinion polls point to the sociological drift and spread of the shock in the wake of 9-11 and the aura of mediated communication surrounding it: Terrorism figures to have become a "buzzword" [[6](http://reconstruction.eserver.org/033/isen.htm#6)] in the life course of the ordinary citizen, too, a force that exerts itself into known conceptions and practices of life. A conceptual presence exerts its influence primarily on minds and therefore, the phenomenon of terrorism needs to be probed deeper, if possible, in areas and aspects reflecting its effect on collective mental frames of reference. The quintessential question may be how aware an important sector of humanity is as to what it is so frightened of. Then, it might be more enlightening to begin reviewing the entire problem in another fashion: When speaking of terrorism, are we reitirating a tired jargon of matters of prophylactic techniques and technology, intelligence, detection and punishment, policies and reprisals etc.? Or are we facing a weakness of modern society against a genre of violence that may be caused by the very same reasoning applied to understanding and formulating the evil of terrorism and the already exhausted usual answers?<4> Polls reveal that Americans who before September 11 tended to assess their government in relation to issues of social policy, are now more focused on national security [[7](http://reconstruction.eserver.org/033/isen.htm#7)]. Terrorism was seen as the most important problem facing the country right after 9-11 and despite a drop in rating, continued to vie with economic concerns for the top spot since [[8](http://reconstruction.eserver.org/033/isen.htm#8)]. There were responses with a deeper reaching potential of new socio-political demands: the public voiced support for deterring terrorism at the expense of "limited" infringements to individual and personal rights [[9](http://reconstruction.eserver.org/033/isen.htm#9)]. A majority of Americans said they approved the reinstitution of the military draft if more soldiers were needed in the war on terrorism [[10](http://reconstruction.eserver.org/033/isen.htm#10)]. Seventy percent of the people interviewed six months later reported that they had shed tears in the aftermath of the attacks and about 20 percent still occasionally did [[11](http://reconstruction.eserver.org/033/isen.htm#11)].<5> In the light of such indicators, it makes sense that the official and public reaction to 9-11 has accorded terrorism, which used to be but the "warfare of losers" the status of a successful modus operandi. The eponymy of the military intervention to Afghanistan as "War against Terror," too, has elevated it to a par with "war" [[12](http://reconstruction.eserver.org/033/isen.htm#12)], to which aeons of historical conditioning, myths of valor, heroism and victory have accorded a measure of legitimacy. It can further be commented that terrorism has almost come to be accepted as some kind of inevitability. The mere utterance of terror now constitutes a message, and worse, is perceived as a symbol, another semiological instrument of power with the potency of a totem [[13](http://reconstruction.eserver.org/033/isen.htm#13)], no less fear rousing than the evil it represents [[14](http://reconstruction.eserver.org/033/isen.htm#14)].<6> The flood of rhetoric encompassing the policy moves pioneered by U.S. President George W. Bush and his complement of "communication elites" had a considerable effect in the management of the discourse spurred by 9-11 and progressed to the belligerency in Afghanistan and Iraq. Discourse management is a term fairly widely used in studies of human-computer interaction and face-to-face communication situations. It usually refers to the strategies and the control of the flow and direction of messages, choice of topics, techniques of guiding discussions for influencing outcomes. As such, in general lexicons the concept has the attributes of a power-play, oriented to the accomplishment of willed ends, albeit in the limited bounds of conversational interaction and behavior [[15](http://reconstruction.eserver.org/033/isen.htm#15)]. Here, rather in the Foucauldian manner, the usage is relatively comprehensive, comprising more than the techniques, mechanisms and strategies of controlling small group -- limited issue communication frames. Discourse management in this broader and rather sociological sense too, is again in part, a process of setting public agendas, determining the limits and flow of messages, monitoring their sources, impacts and limiting or remedying their damage. Then, it also incorporates the selection of particular arrays of means, modes and media of debate conducive for creating favored mindsets, ways of seeing, thinking, doing and being-in-the-world. "Discourse," by definition, constrains communication processes and hence thought and social praxis. It accomplishes this by delimiting the choices and extent of intellectual foci, the parameters of knowledge and its production. Thus, prevailing discourse is elemental in construing whatever is adhered to in the community as "truth." Even when arguments run counter to the tenets of a favored content and use of language as "truth," they are still largely determined by it and possibly contribute to the power it commands, constituting more a complementary para-discourse than anti-discourse [[16](http://reconstruction.eserver.org/033/isen.htm#16)]. <7> Discourse is not a sum total of semantics or rhetoric. It comprises above and beyond the use of language and symbols, messages never uttered but still communicated implicitly, concealed in utterances [[17](http://reconstruction.eserver.org/033/isen.htm#17)]. All propositions of discourse need not be expressed in order to be "understood." This hermeneutic process takes place by means of what Tuen van Dijk calls "macro-structures." Macro-structures organize complex semantic information enabling the interpretation of such latent cognitive information, accord a cognitive ability to summarize discourse and resort to it for comprehending and rendering relevant other information. The constraints of discourse operate globally on macro-structures and their quite specific contents, providing a global meaning for discourse [[18](http://reconstruction.eserver.org/033/isen.htm#18)]. <8> Michel Foucault concentrated on the power-related aspects of discourse. He noted that the "production of discourse is controlled, selected, organized and redistributed to avert its powers, avoid its dangers, to cope with hazard and to evade its ponderous, awesome materiality" [[19](http://reconstruction.eserver.org/033/isen.htm#19)]. According to Foucault, it is the type of discourse which constantly "is reiterated, discussed, spoken and remains spoken indefinitely" that lends itself to power [[20](http://reconstruction.eserver.org/033/isen.htm#20)]. Weltanschaaungen [[21](http://reconstruction.eserver.org/033/isen.htm#21)] are directly or implicitly woven into "ouvres"; texts, statements or utterances as discourse by way of what Foucault calls the "author function" [[22](http://reconstruction.eserver.org/033/isen.htm#22)]. The genealogical aspect of discourse constitutes a domain of objects in relation to which true or false propositions can be denied or affirmed [[23](http://reconstruction.eserver.org/033/isen.htm#23)]. It is via this process of controlling contents that engage the mind, and hence, the mind that knowledge becomes objectified through discourse into both power itself and an instrument of power [[24](http://reconstruction.eserver.org/033/isen.htm#24)].

Alt – Reject

Flawed epistemology – all of your evidence is based on false perceptions of terror– the view that terrorism is an occurrence is what recreates the impact

Jackson 2 (Richard, Senior Fellow in Poli Sci @ U of Canterbury, New Zealand Int’l Review, Vol 27 Issue 2, 2002, pp. 2-, Questia) JPG

The first step in dealing with any problem is to make sure that we understand it properly. The problem of terrorism in particular requires clear and realistic thinking, and all assertions about who the terrorists are, or how we should respond to them, need careful scrutiny before being embraced. The job is not made any easier by the persistence of a number of myths, constantly re-cycled by academics, the media, and government officials, that can then become the basis of misguided counter-terrorism policies. Terrorism is an extremely complex phenomenon, requiring a great deal of careful thought and reflection. De-mystifying the subject is a critical first step in developing credible anti-terrorism strategies. Unfortunately, in times of crisis, the temptation is to rush our judgments and to rely on accepted -- but often mythical -- wisdom. A key set of myths revolve around the question of what `terrorism' actually is, and whether it is so easily defined, categorised, or quantified. There is no accepted definition of what terrorism is -- it is a highly contested concept. Although the US State Department's annual list of terrorist groups and state supporters of terrorism is the most widely accepted formulation, it is criticised for its lack of consistency. That is, the groups on this list change regularly according to prevailing US policies. When Osama bin Laden was fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan with CIA support, he was nowhere to be seen on that list. Now, of course, he is number one. At one time or another, both the IRA and the ANC were on the list. Iraq was on it as a terror-supporting state, then off during the war against Iran, and then back on after the 1991 Gulf War. If the stickiness of assigning terrorist labels can be seen anywhere, it is most telling in the list of Nobel Peace Prize winners -- Sean McBride, Menachem Begin, Yassir Arafat, and Nelson Mandela were all formerly designated as `terrorists' before they won the world's greatest diplomatic prize. Another error is the present insistence on designating the collective enemy as `international terrorism', as if such a phenomenon actually exists. While there are terrorist organisations that operate across borders (giving them an `international' dimension), they are all unique groups that have to be understood in terms of their own history, ideology, and social and political contexts. It is, in fact, a misnomer to assume that Palestinian `terrorism', Irish `terrorism', Basque `terrorism', Tamil `terrorism', Islamic `terrorism', `narco-terrorism' or anti-abortion `terrorism' in the United States have anything more than superficial similarities. Similarly, it is mistaken to assume that there is no difference between revolutionary terrorism and nationalist terrorism, or between ideological terrorism and religious terrorism. Part of the problem is that we only consider terrorism when it happens, and thus we tend to perceive it as a one-off event. This is partly due to the tendency of the media quickly to abandon the story once it has lost its drama. It is not surprising then that we fail to appreciate its context, or see it as one part of a long-running historical struggle.

Alt - Reject

All your evidence is based on myths about terrorism

Jackson 2 (Richard, Senior Fellow in Poli Sci @ U of Canterbury, New Zealand Int’l Review, Vol 27 Issue 2, 2002, pp. 2-, Questia) JPG

In fact, how are we to distinguish between insurgent or revolutionary violence, and terrorist violence -- particularly when insurgent groups use terror on occasion, but not as a matter of general principle? The ANC and the PLO, despite being recognised as legitimate liberation movements, historically have resorted to what we would presently call terror strategies. This is the problem of trying to define terrorism according to methods it employs. A common definition is `indiscriminate attacks on innocent populations designed to create fear for political ends', but the issue is obviously further complicated when governments employ the same tactics, such as Stalin's purges, Mao's Cultural Revolution, or Latin American death squads. Some try to define terrorism according to the kinds of groups that practice it, and suggest that it is only used by non-state actors trying to overthrow or influence legitimate governments. This is another myth. Not only do states support terrorism in a wide variety of forms, but some even practice it -- against their internal opponents, or against foreign enemies. Spain's `dirty war' against ETA in the 1980s, and Israel's car-bombing of terrorist suspects in Lebanon (which killed innocent bystanders) are pertinent examples. There is another myth at work here -- that even if some authoritarian-type states give support to terror groups, democratic states never would. There are enough examples to completely belie this myth: Israel's support for Christian militias in South Lebanon, US support for the Contras in Nicaragua, Renamo in Mozambique, and death squads in numerous South American dictatorships, Britain's tacit support for Protestant vigilantes in Northern Ireland. A final myth about the nature of terrorism lies in the extent of terrorism's reach and its power to threaten us. It is common parlance to imply that the world is brimming with terrorist cells, some of whom may get access to weapons of mass destruction and bring about an apocalypse. There is a sense in which we need to put the threat in perspective. In global terms, the vast bulk of terrorist activities occurs in unstable developing countries, such as Algeria, where 80,000 people have been indiscriminately murdered since 1992. Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Colombia, to name a few, also experience extreme levels of terrorist violence. In America, homicide -- estimated at 25,000 per year -- is by far the greatest killer, even including the 11 September death toll (and also involves 240,000 injuries). Logically, a much more vigorous public debate in the United States about this issue and how to deal with it would seem warranted. In other words, we cannot begin to deal with the problem without a sense of proportion -- otherwise we may feel that draconian and disproportionate measures are called for, when they clearly are not.

Their evidence is based on flawed interpretations of terrorism

Spencer and Hulsse 8 (Alexander and Rainer, both IR professors @ Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Security Dialogue, Vol. 39, No. 6 pp. 571-592, 2008) JPG

In any case, most of what has been written on Al-Qaeda is based neither on interviews nor on field research conducted inside the organization. Rather, it builds on less-direct information – it is ‘veranda terrorism research’. Among the sources used are already existing studies of Al-Qaeda, media information and intelligence reports. Obviously, this leads to a rather incestuous field of knowledge, where one scholar reproduces the unverified views of another and thus contributes to the circulation of the ever-same ‘facts’ (Reid, 1993). This is hardly a new insight about terrorism research, however. Back in 1988, one review found that ‘there are probably few areas in the social science literature in which so much is written on the basis of so little research’ (Schmid & Jongman, 1988: 177). Another remarked that ‘with a few clusters of exception there is, in fact, a disturbing lack of good empirically-grounded research on terrorism’ (Gurr, 1988: 2). These findings have been subsequently confirmed – and deplored – on numerous occasions (e.g. Merari, 1991; Silke, 2001, 2004; Horgan, 2004; Schulze, 2004; Ranstorp, 2007). Obviously, this lack of primary research further aggravates the problem identified above, as it adds another layer of interpretation. Studies of this kind which predominantly use secondary information are interpretations of how others (e.g. intelligence staff or field-researching terrorism scholars) have interpreted Al- Qaeda members’ self-interpretation. And yet, despite these various filters, information in such studies is presented as though it provided objective accounts of the reality about Al-Qaeda. This is particularly true for work that draws on intelligence reports and treats them as though they were primary sources (e.g. Burke, 2003; Gunaratna, 2002; Jacquard, 2001; Koch, 2005; Reeve, 1999). Yet, even if an intelligence report is based on successful infiltration, it provides not a description but an interpretation of Al-Qaeda.

Alt - Reject

The methodology used for solving terrorism is flawed – inevitably otherizes and breeds more resistance

Jackson 2 (Richard, Senior Fellow in Poli Sci @ U of Canterbury, New Zealand Int’l Review, Vol 27 Issue 2, 2002, pp. 2-, Questia) JPG

`Know your enemy' is one of the first precepts of military strategy. In the present struggle against terrorism, it is an absolute necessity. Without a clear sense of who it is we are fighting -- their aims, their motivations, their character -- devising strategies to counter their activities will fall far short of their objectives. And yet notions about `who the terrorists are' are the part of the terrorism discourse most prone to myth-making. For understandable reasons (how do we make sense of the horror committed by terrorists?), myths about the terrorists themselves are the most powerful and persistent part of our collective imagination in regards to terrorism. One of the major myths about `terrorists' is that they are mad or deranged individuals. At best, they must be mentally unstable, with personal histories of abuse, low serf-esteem, and social alienation. In fact, there is no evidence from any studies to show that this is necessarily true, and `terrorists' are no more pathological than other individuals who choose violent professions, such as the military or police. The danger of reducing structural and political problems to ones of individual pathologies and personal problems, furthermore, is that we fail to see the connections between the `terrorists' and their on-going political struggle, their goals, and their tactics -- all of which may be reasonable or even meaningful within their particular social context. If the `terrorists' have such severe psychological hang-ups, why do we need to look for any particular political source for their acts? Part of the problem, of course, is that we argue (in a circular fashion) that only madmen would resort to these strategies. After all, we all know that terrorism is a strategy of futility -- a strategy of the irrationally hopeless -- and governments never give in to terrorists. Actually, this is a long-standing myth that officials would like to believe, but for which there is plenty of contrary evidence. The examples of Menachem Begin in Israel, Archbishop Makarios in Cyprus, Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya, Ahmed Ben Bella in Algeria, Gerry Adams in Northern Ireland, Yasir Arafat in the autonomous Palestinian National Authority, and Nelson Mandela in South Africa all show how tactical successes and political victories can be achieved using terror tactics. Many other groups -- Kashmiri separatists, Kurdish nationalists, Basque separatists, the Tamil Tigers -- have clearly demonstrated how causes or grievances can be resurrected and thrust onto the world stage through a series of well-orchestrated and attention-riveting acts. In other words, it is not helpful simply to dismiss terrorists as lunatics when often there is a clear logic to their methods, which may be chosen only after considerable thought and debate within the organisation. Criminalising labels Often, when governments want to deny any legitimacy to so-called `terrorists', they are quick to label them as criminals, thereby trivialising their motives and objectives. This serves the purpose of alienating the `terrorists' from the population they are trying to influence. In fact, in most liberal democracies, political crimes were not recognised as a separate category of criminal behaviour until very recently. Instead, state officials suggest that the motives of the `terrorists' lie in purely criminal realms, such as the so-called `narco-terrorists' in Latin America. While this terminological slight of hand may provide a convenient solution to the problem of political terrorism (there is no terrorism, only criminal behaviour), it does little to advance our understanding of it. Re-moulding terrorists into psychotic criminals -- as the FBI did to the Unabomber after he was caught -- is less taxing than trying to understand their roots in our own societies or foreign policies. Designating terrorists as madmen and criminals is part of the process of denigrating their motives. An aspect of this policy lies in the common assertion that the primary purpose of terrorism is to produce chaos. In fact, terrorism has many motives. When it is practiced by states, it may actually be aimed at the greater control of society (as in the use of death squads by Latin American dictators), or revenge for perceived offences (for example, Libya-sponsored attacks on the United States following the bombing of Tripoli in 1986). When non-state actors use it, they may be trying to draw attention to a grievance or demonstrate how the state is ineffective in providing security, making a statement, attempting to win political concessions, reacting to the government's use of overwhelming force, or simply raising money for the organisation (as in kidnappings). To ignore or misconstrue the real purposes of terrorism is surely to mistake its true character, which is a recipe for counter-terrorist failure. A final myth currently in vogue in official circles is that the terrorists who committed the attacks on America are nothing but cowards. This is clearly absurd -- cowards do not commit suicide to destroy their enemies, and there is no real difference between soldiers who embark on `suicide missions' against opposing forces and terrorists willing to sacrifice their lives for their cause. Labeling them as cowardly ignores the fact that they are extremely formidable enemies with great determination, courage, skill, and organisation. Without a clear appreciation of their abilities, we will obviously fall short in devising sufficient counter-terrorist strategies.

Alt – Reject

Metaphors used in the war on terror dehumanize the other – these metaphors must be rejected

Steuter and Wills 8 (Erin and Deborah, both prof of sociology @ Mt. Allison U, Canada, 2008, “At War With Metaphor: Media, Propaganda, and Racism in the War on Terror”, pp. xvii-xviii) JPG

The Massacres and genocides that comprise our most painful historical moments are characterized by a persistent dehumanization of the enemy. The language that has emerged in the twenty-first century as part of the public face of the war on terror has helped to fundamentally define that enemy, just as the metaphors we use reflect and reflexively shape our thinking. When we repeatedly represent our enemies as essentially different in substance from us, as less than human, we extend ourselves permission to behave in ways that often echo the very violence we condemn. If metaphors affect the way we think and act we must take extraordinary care, individually and collectively, with the metaphors we choose to adopt. We cannot break the cycle of violence by responding to physical violence with violence of speech or image. We may, however, begin to change that cycle by breaking down and examining the metaphors we employ, by working to understand the reverberations of race and propaganda that come to us from earlier historical conflicts, and by resisting those metaphors that urge us towards actions we would otherwise condemn. This resistance is profoundly important, not only for the sake of the enemy, but for our own. If we ally ourselves to a rhetoric that strips others of their humanity it is inevitable that in the process our own will suffer. The multiple costs of the war on terror mask a broader expense of spirit and community: when we systematically reduce others, we are ourselves reduced. When we diminish others, we are diminished. It is important to analyze the metaphors that move us dangerously closer to solutions of eradication and extermination; in doing so, we can choose to change the direction of this movement through heightened critical awareness of metaphor’s processes and power.

Alt – Reps 1st

The problem-solution mindset of counter-terrorism necessitates endless violence – initial representations outweigh the permutation

Jarvis 9 (Lee, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations @ Swansea University, Security Dialogue vol. 40, no. 1, February) JPG

Although there may exist strategic, even normative, grounds for conceptu- alizing terrorism as a coherent object of knowledge, this essentialist ortho- doxy is unfortunate for two reasons. First, by attributing terrorism an objective existence, mainstream terrorism studies offers very limited space for reflecting on the historical and social processes through which this identity, behaviour or threat has been constituted. With the interpretive, symbolic and discursive contexts of its creation – to say nothing of the power relations traversing these contexts – presumed largely irrelevant for under- standing this phenomenon, terrorism remains consistently and artificially detached from the processes of its construction. In this sense, we could do far worse than remember Foucault’s (1981: 67) famous cautionary note when encountering claims to speak the truth about terrorism: ‘We must not imagine that the world turns towards us a legible face which we would have only to decipher’. Foucault’s meta-theoretical caution will not, of course, convince everyone that further critical reflection in this field is needed. By turning to the very specific, and narrow, essence attributed to terrorism within the mainstream debates, however, it may be possible to garner further support for such a programme. As the above discussion suggests, existing studies remain overwhelmingly structured by a conception of their object as an unconventional form of illegitimate violence. With relatively few exceptions, the majority of scholars working here are content to tie their understanding of terrorism both to activities of particular non-state actors and to the targeting of par- ticular victims: non-combatants or (more emotively) ‘innocent civilians’. With reflections on the nature and causes of terrorism already framed around this double condemnation, then, discussions relating to the legitimacy of terrorism, or, indeed, the possibility of state terrorism, become systematically excluded from this field of enquiry before they emerge. As outlined below, it is an attempt to contest these exclusionary practices that largely motivates the first, broadening, face of critical terrorism studies. Given the above preference for a specific and narrow essentialist frame- work, it is perhaps unsurprising that terrorism studies has oriented towards policy-relevant research. In seeking not only to define and explain, but also to prevent or resolve, its object of knowledge, this structuring of the discipline necessarily mobilizes a very limited conception of academic responsibility. In Cox’s (1996: 88) famous terminology, as noted by Gunning (2007), terrorism studies has overwhelmingly functioned as a problem-solving pursuit that: takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action. The general aim of problem solving is to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble. As Cox’s remarks suggest, the problem-solving approach to the study of terrorism is normatively problematic in reducing academic responsibility to a technical exercise of risk governance or management. At best, such a reduc- tion militates against any notion of critical enquiry aimed at contesting or destabilizing the status quo: of ‘saying the unsayable’ in Booth’s (2008: 68) terminology. At worst, it simply reifies a tired and unstable inside/outside dichotomy that legitimizes the state’s continued monopoly on violence. Either way, the continued structuring of the mainstream literature around the above debates fails to offer any meaningful participatory role for engaged, active scholarship. In sum, although characterized by considerable diversity, the terrorism studies literature suffers from key analytical and normative limitations. Analytically, the preference for a narrow essentialist framework not only neglects the processes of terrorism’s construction, it also reduces the space available for discussing the (il)legitimacy of particular violences. Norma- tively, the preference for producing policy-relevant, problem-solving research works to detach academic responsibility from any notion of critical enquiry. These limitations, I argue, open considerable space for the emergence of a critical terrorism studies agenda.

Alt – Reps 1st

The way in which we frame our actions matters – terrorist rhetoric creates an exclusion of those not aligned with the good which justifies endless violence

Kellner 7 (Douglas, Chair of Philosophy @ UCLA, Presidential Studies Quarterly. Vol. 37 (4), 2007, pg. 622+) JPG

From September 11 to the beginning of the U.S. bombing acts on Afghanistan in October, the U.S. corporate media intensified war fever and circulated highly militarist rhetoric that legitimated the Bush-Cheney administration's largely unilateralist military action. Media frames shifted from "America under Attack" to "America Strikes Back" and "America's New War"--even before any military action was undertaken, as though the media frames were to conjure the military response that eventually followed. From September 11 and through the Afghan Terror War, the networks generated escalating fear and hysteria demanding military response, while the mouthpieces of the military-industrial complex demanded military action with little serious reflection on its consequences visible on the television networks. There was, by contrast, much intelligent discussion on the Internet and print media sources showing the dangers of the takeover of broadcasting by corporations which would profit by war and upheaval. (23) The brief war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan from early October through December 2001 appeared to be a military victory for the United States. After a month of stalemate following ruthless U.S. bombing, the Taliban collapsed in the north of the country, abandoned the capital Kabul, and surrendered in its southern strongholds (Kellner 2003b). Yet the Afghanistan Terror War was ambiguous in its outcome. Although the Taliban regime that hosted Osama bin Laden and A1 Qaeda collapsed under U.S. military pressure, the top leaders and many militants of Al Qaeda and the Taliban escaped and the country remains perilous and chaotic to this day (the fall of 2007). (24) Violent warlords that the United States used to fight A1 Qaeda still exert oppressive power and keep the country in a state of disarray, while sympathizers for Al Qaeda and the Taliban continue to wield power and destabilize the country. Because the United States did not use ground troops or multilateral military forces, the top leaders of the Taliban and Al Qaeda escaped, Pakistan was allowed to send in planes to take out hundreds of Pakistanis and numerous top A1 Qaeda militants, and Afghanistan remains a dangerous and unruly territory (Kellner 2003b; Hersh 2004). (25) Whereas the 1991 Gulf War produced spectacles of precision bombs and missiles destroying Iraqi targets and the brief spectacle of the flight of the Iraqis from Kuwait and the liberation of Kuwait City (Kellner 1992), the Afghanistan War was more hidden in its unfolding and effects. Many of the images of Afghanistan that circulated through the global media were of civilian casualties caused by U.S. bombing. Daily pictures of thousands of refugees from war and the suffering of the Afghan people raised questions concerning the U.S. strategy and intervention. Moreover, just as the survival of Saddam Hussein ultimately coded Gulf War I as problematic, so did the continued existence of Osama bin Laden and his top Al Qaeda leadership point to limitations of the younger Bush's leadership and policies. By early 2002, George W. Bush faced a situation similar to that of his father after the Gulf War. Despite victory against the Taliban, the limited success of the war and a failing economy provided a situation that threatened the junior Bush's reelection. Thus, the Bush-Cheney regime needed a dramatic media spectacle that would guarantee its reelection, and once again Saddam Hussein provided a viable candidate, enabling "the war on terrorism" to morph into an era of perpetual war against terrorism and the countries that support terror, a situation in which media spectacle was used to promote policies of unilateral aggression. In his televised State of the Union address on January 29, 2002, George W. Bush promised an epoch of Terror War, expanding the Bush Doctrine to not only go after terrorists and those who harbor terrorist groups but to include those countries making "weapons of mass destruction." (26) State of the Union speeches are typically rituals of unity in which the parties pull together to celebrate the country, and although presidents often use the occasion to promote their agendas, Bush's speech signaled a major rupture with previous policy, providing the basis for what would emerge as the Bush Doctrine of preemptive war. Claiming that Iraq, Iran, and North Korea constituted "an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world," Bush put the "world's most dangerous regimes" on notice that he was planning to escalate the war on terror. Rattling the saber, Bush put "rogue states" and terrorists everywhere on notice that he was prepared to go to war indefinitely against an array of targets in an epoch of enduring Terror War. Likewise, Bush's rhetoric of "evil" was going over the top. He used the term "evil" at least five times in his State of the Union address and included countries such as Iran in this litany, which was itself undergoing complex domestic changes. Looked at more closely, Bush's State of the Union address could be read as a cunning use of Terror War to push through his indefensible domestic programs such as the Star Wars missile program, a $48 billion increase for the U.S. military, a tax break and give-away for the rich, and a Social Security program that would advance a right-wing agenda (i.e., investment firms and charities would solve social problems and not government). The evil axis countries could be used to justify producing the Star Wars missile defense system that critics had claimed had not been proven workable, legitimating a missile defense system that would allegedly protect the United States against nuclear missile attack. In the "axis of evil" speech, Bush would evoke the fear of nuclear missile attack on the United States to justify preemptive strikes, a strategy that would soon be deployed on Iraq. Exploiting fear thus was a major tactic to push through his radical shift in foreign policy, as well as his right-wing domestic agenda. The emphasis on care, compassion, sacrifice, national service, and community voluntarism in the State of the Union gave Bush credence as a compassionate conservative, as opposed to a hard-right ideologue and selfish manipulator of crisis and tragedy for extreme right-wing and militarist political ends. However, the emphasis on patriotism, national unity, and moral community functioned to identify both his party and policies with patriotism, but also to identify anyone who criticized his foreign or domestic policies as "unpatriotic." Lynne Cheney, wife of U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney and a long-time cultural warrior against the left, had been circulating texts documenting unpatriotic statements by university professors. Since September 11, Ms. Cheney had been leading an assault against dissidents to Bush administration policy on the grounds that they are not patriotic and not supporting the president in a time of war and danger. (27) Stressing national unity and patriotism provided rhetorical cover for suppressing dissent, and thus threatened U.S. democracy, revealing the dangerous anti-democracy sentiments of the Bush-Cheney regime.

AT: Fear Good

Terrorists fears are irrational

Myers 1( David G., Professor of Psych @ Hope U, American Psychological Society Observer, December 2001, http://www.davidmyers.org/Brix?pageID=65) JPG

"Freedom and fear are at war," President Bush has told us. The terrorists' goal, he says, is "not only to kill and maim and destroy" but to frighten us into inaction.1 Alas, the terrorists have made progress in their fear war, by diverting our anxieties from big risks toward smaller risks. Flying is a case in point. Even before the horrors of September 11th and the ensuing crash at Rockaway Beach, 44 percent of those willing to risk flying told Gallup they felt fearful.2   "Every time I get off a plane, I view it as a failed suicide attempt," movie director Barry Sonnenfeld has said.3   After the five crashed airliners, and with threats of more terror to come, cancellations understandably left airlines, travel agencies, and holiday hotels flying into the red. Indeed, the terrorists may still be killing us, in ways unnoticed. If we now fly 20 percent less and instead drive half those unflown miles, we will spend 2 percent more time in motor vehicles.4   This translates into 800 more people dying as passengers and pedestrians.5   So, in just the next year the terrorists may indirectly kill three times more people on our highways than died on those four fated planes. Ah, but won't we have spared some of those folks fiery plane crashes? Likely not many, especially now with heightened security, hardened cockpit doors, more reactive passengers, and the likelihood that future terrorists will hit us where we're not looking. National Safety Council data reveal that in the last half of the 1990s Americans were, mile for mile, 37 times more likely to die in a vehicle crash than on a commercial flight.6   When I fly to New York, the most dangerous part of my journey is the drive to the Grand Rapids airport. (My highway risk may be muted by my not drinking and driving, but I'm still vulnerable to others who do.) Or consider this: From 1990 through 2000 there were 1.4 deaths per 10 million passengers on U.S. scheduled airlines.7   Flying understandably feels dangerous. But we have actually been less likely to crash and die on any flight than, when coin tossing, to flip 22 heads in a row.8 Will yesterday's safety statistics predict the future? Even if not, terrorists could take down 50 more planes with 60 passengers each and-if we kept flying-we'd still have been safer this year in planes than on the road.9   Flying may be scary, but driving the same distance should be many times scarier.

AT: Threats Real

All of your threats are exaggerated – your representations are counterproductive

Jackson 2 (Richard, Senior Fellow in Poli Sci @ U of Canterbury, New Zealand Int’l Review, Vol 27 Issue 2, 2002, pp. 2-, Questia) JPG

The importance of de-mystifying or exorcising the terrorism discourse lies foremost in the need to have a clear evaluation of its threat and real nature before we rush headlong into any old `war on terrorism'. In military parlance, we are talking about a realistic `threat assessment', lest we end up in a worse position than we started from. For this we need clear-headed, informed and rigorous debate, a characteristic mostly missing in the present rush to pass anti-terrorist legislation, send troops, believe all official pronouncements, and endlessly re-count our dominant myths. In addition, it is important to clarify our language to avoid moral ambiguity and charges of hypocrisy. We will never be able effectively to counter the propaganda of the terrorists if we are seen to be saying one thing (`we must fight terror in all its forms') while actually doing something else (supporting Israel's policy of disproportionate retaliation against Palestinians). Terrorist attacks are deeply disturbing and socially de-stabilising events, and whenever they occur there is tremendous pressure on policy-makers to find a `quick fix' that will restore our sense of safety. Unfortunately, the rush to find instant solutions can cloud long-term issues and ultimately prove counter-productive. The only real strategies for countering terrorism lie in a combination of short-, medium- and long-term measures designed to deal with the conditions that give rise to terrorism in the first place and undermine the social spaces where terrorists gain their support. The present `war on terrorism' is ultimately going to be counter-productive because it is based on the myth that a military response of sufficient magnitude will undermine support for the terrorists and deter future acts, and that curbing personal freedoms is a justified necessity. In the end, the campaign in Afghanistan will only provide more recruits for anti-Western terrorists, while counter-terrorism legislation at home will undermine the very values we are trying to protect. The discourses of terrorism -- particularly those surrounding the events of 11 September 2001 -- have revealed the extent to which our collective understanding of the phenomena of terrorism is infused with a number of persistent myths and misconceptions. The official, media, and academic discourses in particular continue to perpetuate myths about the nature of international terrorism, the identities of terrorists, and the necessity of certain kinds of counter-terrorism measures. This kind of unrealistic thinking will ultimately prove counter-productive. Effectively dealing with the problem of terrorism, in the first instance, requires clear-headed, informed, and rigorous analysis. There is, therefore, an urgent need to exorcise and de-mystify current discourses on terrorism.

\*\*Aff Answers\*\*

AFF – AT: Reps Bad

The substantial impact of terrorist measures needs to be countered – terrorism spreads like a disease not because US response

Finklestein, 6 (Daniel, Exec Editor @ The Times, 8/23/6, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/daniel\_finkelstein/article616813.ece) JPG

But while I think he makes an open and shut case against panic, when it comes to the need for a vigorous policy to combat terrorism Professor Mueller’s maths is less convincing. First, the probability of an event is not really the thing you should be worrying about. In his excellent book Fooled by Randomness, the mathematician and Wall Street trader Nassim Nicholas Taleb discusses what he calls the issue of asymmetry. He explains (rather impatiently since he regards the issue as obvious) that you may believe, say, that financial markets will probably go up, while you behave, sensibly, as if they will go down. The reason? Because you think it very likely that they will go up a little, but, in the unlikely event that they go down, you think they will go down a great deal. “How could people miss such a point?” he complains. “Why do they confuse probability and expectation, that is probability and probability times the payoff?” The probability of, say, a nuclear terrorist attack might be tiny but the consequences, the “payoff” as it were, would be huge. It is expectation, not probability, that should determine policy towards terrorism. The second problem with Mueller’s paper is simple: the low incidence of terrorist outrages occurred when there was already a firm policy in place to prevent it. His argument, the “bloody nuisance” argument, depends on the idea that, without additional measures domestically and internationally, the number of terrorist incidents is unlikely to rise greatly. There is, however, lots of evidence that crime doesn’t work like that. Instead of falling gently or rising gently in response to policy measures, crime behaves like a contagious disease. Potential offenders catch the idea of offending from each other. And just like a disease that starts with only a few people and becomes an epidemic, once it reaches a tipping point the amount of criminal behaviour explodes. If successful suicide bombings became even slightly more common, can we really be confident that other fundamentalists would not copy that behaviour? We already know that ordinary suicides increase when there are front-page stories about people killing themselves. And if there were such an increase, might it escalate as one group copies another? So Matthew Parris is right but also wrong. Without minimising the horrendous suffering of individuals, terrorism might well be little more than a “big bloody nuisance”. But should we treat it as if that was all it was? Absolutely not.

AFF – AT: Reps Bad

Terrorism has to be defined in order to establish an effective response

TTSRL 8 (Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law, policy Brif no. 2, 10/1/8, www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/WP3%20Del%204.pdf) JPG

Where natural sciences use numbers to communicate an idea, social sciences use words. Unlike numbers, however, words mean different things to different people. Where anyone with a basic education is able to add “4” to “5” and come to the same result, if we ask a group of people to discribe “freedom”, we may end up with many different results depending on the particular persons’ origin, culture, and experience. Words such as “freedom” do not have the same meaning for everybody and such differences obviously hamper communication. Therefore, when studying terrorism, it is necessary to have a look at what different people, states, and international organizations mean when they use the word “terrorism” in their everyday speeches or documents. Without understanding the exact meaning of the term, it is hardly possible to analyze what consequences there are to intranational and international relations. Without a common agreement on the notion, there can hardly be any common steps to counter terrorism, whether at the domestic or the international level. This study should serve as an overview of how people, states and international organizations define terrorism. In chapters two and three, we shall analyze the academic discourse and have a look at what the common attributes that scholars ascribe to terrorism are. Whereas the second chapter uses a positive way of defining the notion – that is, it asks what terrorism is -, chapter three approaches the task from the other direction and asks what terrorism is not. Namely it searches for differences between terrorism and two related terms, organized crime and political violence. In order to articulate general statements, theories and recommendations, scholars try to group similar phenomena together according to common qualities. As we shall see, terrorism has got many facets that may serve as a basis for such classification. Chapter four focuses on several important typologies that have been reflected in academic literature. The academic discourse is important for our understanding of terrorism and for imbedding it in the theory. But although academia reflects reality, academia does not constitute reality. In order to analyze the current situation and obstacles in international cooperation on counter-terrorism, it is thus also necessary to ask how the term “terrorism” is understood in different legal frameworks. Chapter five deals with the international level, paying special attention to the European Union’s efforts to reach a common definition of terrorism. Chapter six, then, focuses on the level of member states and draws conclusions from similarities and differences found in the nation states’ legal orders.

AFF – Threats Real

Terrorist threats are real – only by honing our fear of terror can we reduce the violence

Seymour 8 (JJ, writer @ Self Help Recordings, 10/10/8,

http://ezinearticles.com/?Fear-of-Terrorism---How-to-Overcome-Terrorism-Fear-For-Good&id=1574000) JPG

Fear of terrorism is a serious matter in the post-9/11 world. As more and more political powers develop powerful nuclear weapons, and as large-scale war becomes more and more impracticable, military conflict--more and more often--takes the form of brief, violent attacks on civilians and infrastructure. Indeed, panic and fear are implied by the very word, "terrorism." The aim of a terrorist attack is to overwhelm a country's population with terror, and thus achieve one's organization's political aims. Thus, it is unsurprising that many people who live in countries that have suffered from recent terrorist attacks have developed a real phobia of being unexpectedly shot at, bombed, or taken hostage by various rogue military groups. Even people who live far from the major centers of terrorist activity have become paranoid, to the extent that their phobia interferes with their ability to lead normal lives.A Complex TerrorWhether you live near or far from previous terrorist activity, the fear of terrorist political acts entails many complicated emotions. That feeling of dread we experience when we hear the news of yet another attack is a potent cocktail of guilt, anger, confusion, and helplessness. When we listen to news of tragedy, we often regret how ignorant we are of what is going on elsewhere in the world. No matter how frequently we read the news, and from how many different sources (on the Internet and elsewhere), it's never frequently enough; our sources are never reliable enough.So Many QuestionsWe wonder, isn't there anything we can do? Would these attacks have been prevented if only we got involved in politics, if we knew more? Should we enter the world of politics or high finance, become major political players? Should we hide out in the desert, and live off canned food? Are we just so much sheep for the slaughter? Is it better to just bury our heads in the sand, to tune out these dire reports? The closer we live to the attacks, the more intense these feelings become.Take Control Of Your Fear Of Terrorism To be sure, terrorism poses a major world problem. The problem is at once political, economic, philosophical, and practical. So far, it's a problem without any obvious answers. However, perhaps the first step to grappling with this complex problem is to take control of your fear. Does the stuff you hear on the news put you into a state of unthinking panic? Well, how do you think those German citizens felt, when they voted a man named Adolf Hitler into power? To be an empowered citizen, you need to take control of your fear--and the best way to do this is with hypnotherapy and NLP.

Terrorist threats are real – only by identifying terrorists can we respond to threats

Jenkins 98 (Brian Michael, analyst @ RAND, “Countering the New Terrorism,” pp. vi-vii, 1998,

www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\_reports/MR989/index.html) JPG

Defining “international terrorism” was a necessary prerequisite for mobilizing international support against terrorism and could be viewed as a noble effort against piracy provided an historical precedent – and the conventions governing war. It also served U.S. national interests in that the principal terrorist threat to the United States came not from terrorist attacks inside the United States but rather from terrorist attacks on American citizens and facilities abroad. The chronology of international terrorism reinforced this concern by showing that U.S. citizens and facilities were the number one target in international incidents of terrorism. The United States had no mandate to intervene in the internal conflicts of other nations, but when that violence spilled over into the international community, it became a legitimate international concern

AFF – Link - “Terrorist” Good

Defining terrorism is critical in solving it – this outweighs your root cause arguments

TTSRL 8 (Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law, policy Brif no. 2, 10/1/8, www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/WP3%20Del%204.pdf) JPG

Yet the real business can be spoiled, some authors claim, by the lack of a universally agreed definition of terrorism. ‘An objective definition of terrorism is not only possible: it is also indispensable to any serious attempt to combat terrorism,’ holds Ganor (quoted in Schmid, 2004a: 375). He thus reiterated his earlier statement on the importance of this issue, in which he had declared that a common understanding of what constitutes terrorism is important, among other purposes, for 1) a development of common international strategies, 2) effective results of the international mobilization against terrorism, 3) enforcement of international agreements against terrorism, and 4) effective extradiction procedures (Ganor, 1998). Similarly, Schmid also points to a positive role of a universal definition in coordinating the states’ anti-terrorist strategies, quoting Dean and Alexander, who consider the absence of a universal definition of terrorism as the main factor likely to encourage future terrorism – more eminent than, e.g., disagreement as to the root causes, religionization of politics or exploitation of the media (Schmid, 2004a: 378). However, the focus is here shifted from the academia to the fields of strategic and legal discourse, and Ganor and Schmid’s statements therefore cannot be considered as proper arguments in favour of the universal academic definition of terrorism. Nonetheless, they pave the way to the conclusion that in fact, there is a search going on not for one universal definition of terrorism, but for manifold definitions of terrorism, which, in each of the fields listed above (academic, strategic and legal), are required to play a peculiar role and therefore focus on various issue areas in their quest. Whereas the strategic discourse may be assumed to be primarily concerned with terrorism as a method of combat, in the legal discourse, the focus rests rather with those who can be punished for commiting terrorist acts, the perpetrators. In the absence of a universal legal definition, capabilities of prosecuting those who commit terrorist crimes are limited – nullum crimen sine lege – and the extradition channels are obstructed.

Terror discourse is key to an effective response to terrorism

Albrechtsen 9 (Janet, writer @ The Australian, 7/9/9, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/07/29/language\_police\_terrorize\_common\_sense.html) JPG

Would someone kindly lock up these language police for crimes against the English language? An attack is what happened in Jakarta when innocent hotel guests were murdered at the J.W. Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels. And it is, quite literally, the bleeding obvious to point out that the perpetrators of the carnage are a group of Islamist militants who twist the tenets of Islam to suit their ideological purposes. They seek to bring down democracy in Indonesia and punish Western nations for fighting the Taliban and al-Qa'ida, with the ultimate aim of creating an Islamic caliphate. Yet while these terrorists go to great lengths to promote their Muslim identity and their militant Islamist ideology, it seems we are not allowed to mention that now. There is nothing wrong with crafting careful language when dealing with terrorism. For years political leaders have used terms such as Islamist terrorist or Islamo-fascist to carefully distinguish militants from the vast majority of peace-loving Muslims. But there is a difference between being careful and being cowardly. The kind of zealous language policing endorsed by the Victoria Police and the Multicultural Foundation encourages us to hide from the truth. Their new whitewash language is not just daft, it's dangerous. Clarity of language is a critical tool if we are serious about uncovering and understanding militant Islam. After so many attacks and the murder of so many innocent people, why would we cower from identifying the drivers of their Islamist extremism? Yet there was too much cowering and not enough clarity from Attorney-General Robert McClelland when he addressed the Australian Strategic Policy Institute last week. Endorsing the language police's Lexicon of Terrorism project, the A-G's speech was littered with references to "violent extremism", "violent extremists", "violent extremist messages", "extremist beliefs" and "extremist ideology". McClelland was too frightened to construct a sentence that included the word Islamism. Instead he quoted from Ed Husain, in his book The Islamist, who has no problem referring to "Islamist extremists". Apparently the A-G believes it is acceptable for a Muslim to speak with factual accuracy but the rest of us must resort to meaningless generalities for fear of radicalising Muslim youth.

AFF – Link – “Terrorist” Good

No link and turn – their evidence assumes a totalizing image of terrorism – not responding to terrorism risks destructive violence

Black 4 (Donald, Professor of the Social Sciences at the University of Virginia, Sociological Theory, Vol. 22, No. 1, Mar. 2004, pp. 14-25, Jstor) JPG

Social space has various dimensions-horizontal (such as degrees of intimacy and integration); vertical (inequality); corporate (involvement of groups); cultural (such as language and religion); and normative (social control). The multidimensional location and direction of social life predicts and explains its behavior. Conflicts with more distant adversaries (such as strangers) attract more law and punishment (Black 1976:4048), for example, and ideas with more distant subjects (such as nonhumans) are more scientific and successful (Black 2000a:349-61).' The social geometry of conflicts thus explains litigiousness and punitiveness, and the social geometry of ideas explains their scienticity and success. Now consider violence. Violence is the use of force, and most violence is social control: It defines and responds to deviant behavior. Much is self-help-the handling of a grievance with aggression, such as the beating of a child who misbehaves, the killing of a spouse who is unfaithful, or the rioting of prisoners against their guards (see Black 1983, 1990:74-79). Violent self-help includes everything from pushing or slapping an individual to bombing a city or exterminating an ethnic group (see generally Black 2002d). Such violence partly resembles law. For example, both are forms of justice; their distribution is highly precise; and they sometimes obey similiar geometrical principles. Just as distant conflicts attract more law and punishment than close conflicts, for instance, so they attract more violence. Consider the use of weapons: Hold constant the conflict (such as an insult or theft), and the lethality of weapons is a direct function of social distance, both relational and cultural (Black 2002d:4-10). Other dimensions of social geometry are relevant to the occurrence and nature of violence as well, such as whether a grievance is downward (against an inferior); upward (against a superior): lateral (against an equal); collective (by or against a group); outward (against a marginal); or inward (against someone more integrated). Violence might appear to be an unpredictable outburst or unexplainable explosion, but it arises with geometrical precision. It is unpredictable and unexplainable only if we seek its origins in the characteristics of individuals (such as their beliefs or frustrations) or in the characteristics of societies, communities, or other collectivities (such as their cultural values or level of inequality). But violent individuals and violent collectivities do not exist: No individual or collectivity is violent in all settings at all times, and neither individualistic nor collectivistic theories predict and explain precisely when and how violence occurs (see Black 1995:852-58; 2002d:l-3). Violence occurs when the social geometry of a conflict--the conflict structure-is violent. Every form of violence has its own structure, whether a beating structure, dueling structure. lynching structure, feuding structure, genocide structure-or terrorism structure (see, e.g., Black 1990:7&79; Baumgartner 1992; Senechal de la Roche 1996, 1997; Cooney 1998; Black 2002d). Structures kill and maim, not individuals or collectivities. The relationship between law and relational distance is curvilinear. with the least law across the shortest and longest distances (such as bctween members of the same household and between nations). The same applies to the relationship between law and cultural distance (Black 1976:4046.73-78). Pure terrorism is self-help by organized civilians ~vhocovert1.y injlict mass violence on other civilians (see Senechal de la Roche 1996:101-05; Ganor 1998, 2001). This definition is what Max Weber calls an "ideal typex-a specification of something in its purest sense (see Weber [I9041 1949:89-112; [I9221 1964:89, 110). Pure terrorism also includes foiled plans, attempts, and threats to inflict mass violence on civilians, such as a 1995 plan by Arab Muslims to blow up simultaneously 11 airplanes bound for the United States from Asia; a 1993 attempt by Arab Muslims to blow up the World Trade Center in New York City; and a 2002 threat by Chechen Muslims to blow up a theater in Moscow. Although pure terrorism has all the elements above, terrorism occurs in lesser degrees as well, such as by unorganized civilians or against government officials. But here I address pure terrorism alone. Like much other violence, pure terrorism is social control. It belongs to the same family as law, gossip, ostracism, ridicule, and other processes that define and respond to deviant behavior. It is self-help, the handling of a grievance with aggression. Although it partly resembles other self-help, including many homicides and assaults in everyday life (Black 1983, 1998:xiv-xvi; see also Cooney 1998), terrorism is collec- tive violence-a group project-and in this respect resembles rioting, lynching, and vigilantism (see Senechal de la Roche 1996). Like rioting and feuding, it entails a logic of collective liability: Vulnerability attaches to a social location (such as a particular nationality, religion, or ethnicity) rather than to wrongful conduct by those attacked (see Black 1987:49-50, 55-57; Senechal de la Roche 1996:10345). Like feuding, too, pure terrorism is recurrent, a series of episodes over time. But unlike most feuding, terrorism kills or maims not merely a person or two but a large number, possibly hundreds or thousands. It is mass violence. And it is normally unilateral-one-sided rather than reciprocal (see Black 1984:5-6; 1995:855, n. 130; Senechal de la Roche 1996:101-02). Pure terrorism is not only collective but well organized-more organized than the crowds in riots or lynchings (Senechal de la Roche 1996:103-05). Although vigilantism is similarly unilateral, recurrent, and organized, it targets only those deemed guilty of a particular offense rather than any member of a social location (Senechal de la Roche 1996:103-05; see also 118-21). The covert nature of terrorism likewise distinguishes it from most vigilantism, rioting, and lynching. Terrorists operate underground, possibly alone, though as agents of an organization. Pure terrorism is more war-like than most collective violence, including individual killings by organized groups (such as assassinations of Spanish government officials by Basque nationalists in the 20th century) or mass killings by unorganized individuals (such as a 1995 bombing of a U.S. government building in Oklahoma. Its typically interethnic and sometimes international character is war-like as well. Yet pure terrorism is not true warfare. It is a form of quasi-warfare (compare Huntington 1996:216-17). Because terrorists may wield highly destructive weapons (conceivably biological, chemical, or nuclear) capable of killing numerous civilians of both sexes and all ages, terrorism may resemble episodes of conventional warfare. But unlike conventional warfare, terrorism is unilateral and covert rather than bilateral and overt, and its targets are civilian rather than military. It also lacks the game-like elements of some cause the Basque assassinations and the Oklahoma City bombing had governmental targets, neither qualifies as pure terrorism (which has only civilian targets). In addition, the former was not mass violence, and the latter was not an organizational action warfare (known as rules of war), such as the wearing of uniforms, nonviolence by and toward those who surrender, and the exclusion of weapons regarded as inhumane or unfair (see, e.g., Loy and Hesketh 1995; Walzer 2000:4&47). Conventional warfare commonly has a well-defined beginning (such as a declaration of war) and conclusion (such as the surrender of one side), and former enemies may resume normal relations when it ends. But terrorists seldom take prisoners (except for ransom) and often kill those they take. And imprisoned terrorists may wait only for another chance for more attacks, possibly ignoring peace treaties by their representatives. Terrorism is effect- ively interminable-unless it succeeds. Pure terrorism operates on a small scale with hit-and-run tactics akin to guerrilla warfare, though guerrillas mainly launch attacks from relatively inaccessible rural hideouts while terrorists camouflage themselves as ordinary civilians in urban and other active settings to strike in the midst of their enemy.3More importantly, in its pure form guerrilla warfare has military targets, while pure terrorism has civilian targets (see Ganor 1998). Even so, those popularly known as guerrillas may some- times engage in terrorism (when they attack civilians), and those popularly known as terrorists may sometimes engage in guerrilla warfare (when they attack military facilities or personnel).

Defining terror is critical to defeating terrorism and limits extremeties of violence

Johns 4 (John H., Ret. Brig. Gen., 10/17/4, www.nsijjohns.com/images/Terrorism.pdf) JPG

If a belligerent wishes to brand acts of terrorism against it as immoral, it must find a definition that distinguishes the type of terrorism used by it and its allies from that of its adversaries. In the case of the current "war against terrorism," declared by President Bush, this presents problems. It is useful to rally the American people by stating the effort in moralistic terms of good versus evil and rejecting any suggestion that terrorism is any way morally justified. Another way to isolate the Islamic terrorists is to define terrorism to exclude actions of nations or their military. Recent definitions by U.S. Government Agencies in fact offer such definitions, restricting the label to non-nation activity. This has the convenience of putting our use of military force outside the bounds of terrorism. This restricted definition, of course, denies legitimacy to the only means of violence available to the weak and takes away the reciprocal advantage. Terrorism is the force of choice for domestic dissidents and the militarily weak in international affairs because it gives them an asymmetrical advantage, especially if they cannot be readily identified. Non-nation groups conduct much of international terrorism such as the 9-11 acts. While they may have the support of governments, these connections are difficult to prove. This limits the counter-terrorist efforts because over reaction against broad targets can generate more hostility and lose moral legitimacy for the counter terrorism effort. More will be said on this regarding the Iraq war.

Word-smithing to exclude one side's use of terrorism may appeal to the militarily powerful and their followers, but non-nation terrorist groups may argue that the ends justify the means if their terrorist acts result in a change in policies that they label as unjust. Moreover, the current enemies of the United States may argue that U.S. policies themselves involve a form of economic and military terrorism - economic sanctions against Iraq from 1991 to the recent invasion, sanctions against Cuba, etc. and militarily against the Palestinians (through Israel as a proxy), Nicaragua, etc. It all depends on whose ox is being gored; one person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter. Surveys consistently show that much of the Islamic world views terrorists against Israel as "freedom fighters." President Reagan labeled the Islamic terrorists fighting the Russians in Afghanistan in the 80s (including the Taliban, a member of which was Osama bin Laden) as "freedom fighters." They are now "terrorists." Again, it depends on whose ox is being gored.

In all conflicts, each side is convinced of its moral high ground. It then becomes a contest for convincing target audiences that you have the moral high ground. In the current war, the audiences include the American public, the populations in which the enemy operates, and the world community. Thus, the task in the current "war on terrorism" is to convince these target audiences that ours is the moral and just cause. In order to keep support among the populations in which they operate and draw their recruits, the terrorists will have to win the moral argument. The evidence so far is that the terrorists are winning except in the United States and Israel.

It should be clear to the reader that the central theme of this essay is that victory in the "war on terrorism" will be achieved only if we win the hearts and minds of several target audiences. To date, we appear to be losing that battle among some audiences. A crucial question is: are we losing the battle because of our failure to communicate effectively, or must we reexamine some of our policies? This question is best answered by looking at specific target audiences. In doing this, we must keep in mind that borders between these audiences are porous. Unlike wars of the past, where nations could more or less separate these audiences, what is said to one audience is likely to be available to the others. The message that appeals to one may alienate another. Truly, this is the age of global communications.

AFF – AT: Reps Matter

Language doesn’t generate more terrorism – not using appropriate terms limits responses to terrorism

Albrechtsen 9 (Janet, writer @ The Australian, 7/9/9, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/07/29/language\_police\_terrorize\_common\_sense.html) JPG

The suggestion from McClelland and senior police that using terms such as Islamo-fascists may drive young Muslims into the arms of jihadists is dubious. I'm willing to wager that those drawn to violence have other matters on their minds and other forces pulling them towards violence than the language employed by Westerners. If we submit a questionnaire to young would-be jihadists asking them to list, on a scale of one to 100, the reasons they might choose jihad over, say, becoming a pastry chef or a train driver, I'm guessing none are going to suggest they are fed-up with the way Westerners used the term Islamo-fascist. Instead, they may list matters such as hating democracy, achieving glory for Islam and Muslims, destroying the infidel enemies around them, wanting to bring to account those countries that sent infidel troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and so on. That's what the present generation of Islamist terrorists tells us and it may be useful to take them at their word. In the A-G's woolly world, how exactly does a newspaper report on Islamic militancy if the only acceptable phrase is "violent extremism"? The Australian's Sally Neighbour has done a stellar job reporting on the role played by Islamic boarding schools such as al-Mukmin at Ngruki in Solo, Central Java, in the violent campaign to set up an Indonesian Islamic state. Described by its co-founder and Jemaah Islamiah leader Abu Bakar Bashir as "a crucible for the formation of cadres of mujaheddin" with a mission "to nurture zeal for jihad so that love for jihad and martyrdom grow in the soul of the mujaheddin", it becomes clear that Islam is used to fuel violence among young Muslim men. As Neighbour reported last week, "The Ngruki school and others linked to JI -- chiefly the Darul Syahadah ('house of martyrs') and Al Muttaqin schools, both in Central Java -- have produced no less than dozens of young recruits linked to a string of terrorist attacks, starting with the first Bali bombings in 2002." Would the A-G have us refrain from reporting the truth, that a handful of radical Islamic schools is a breeding ground for Islamist terrorists? There are no such sensibilities about calling a spade a bloody shovel when Christian extremists firebomb abortion clinics. No concerns about wholesale branding of Christianity by using the Christian word. Nor is there a fear that using the word will radicalise young Christians. In other areas, too, we don't shy away from using descriptors to explain extremism. The US Department of Homeland Security had no misgivings about producing an intelligence assessment in April headed Right-wing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalisation and Recruitment. The nine-page report, which predicts a surge in violence given the present economic and political climate of the US, is littered with references to "right-wing terrorist and extremist groups". Yet when it comes to militant Islam, we are asked to whitewash our language, tiptoeing around the truth for fear of offending and radicalising Muslims. One might have been forgiven for thinking we had long ago rejected this nonsense of letting the Islamist tail wag the Western dog. Since September 11, politicians of all hues have been falling over themselves to make it clear that the perpetrators of violence are fringe-group Islamist extremists who exploit Islam for their own ideological, anti-Western purposes. Politicians have made it clear specifically to praise, and seek the support of, moderate Muslims. Wait on. Dellal told The Age that we should also avoid using the term "moderate Muslim" because it suggested to Muslims that they were not true to their faith. When the word moderate is labelled as a menacing, you know the thin blue line of the language police has become a perilously thick one.

AFF – AT: Reps Matter

Focus on representation fails

Collins 98 (Patricia Hill, Prof of Sociology @ U of Maryland, College Park, Fighting Words: Black Women and the Search for Justice, p. 136)

Social **theories that reduce** hierarchical **power relations to the level of representation**, performance, or constructed phenomena not only **emphasize the likelihood that** resistance will fail **in the face of a pervasive hegemonic presence, they** also **reinforce perceptions** that local, **individualized micropolitics constitutes the most effective terrain of struggle. This** emphasis on the local **dovetails** nicely **with increasing emphasis on the “personal” as a source of power and** with **parallel attention to subjectivity. If politics becomes reduce to the “personal,” decentering relations of ruling in** academia and other **bureaucratic structures seem** increasingly unlikely. As Rey Chow opines, “What **these intellectuals are** doing is **robbing the terms of oppression of their critical and oppositional import, and thus** depriving the oppressed **of** even **the vocabulary of protest and rightful demand**” (1993, 13). Viewing decentering as a strategy situated within a larger process of resistance to oppression is dramatically different from perceiving decentering as an academic theory of how scholars should view all truth. When weapons of resistance are theorized away in this fashion, one might ask, who really benefits?

Post-modern insistence on discourse precludes understanding issues like war and peace

Walt 91 (Stephen M., prof of IR @ Harvard, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Jun., 1991), pp. 211-239)

On the whole, security studies have profited from its connection to real-world issues**;** the main advances of the past four decades have emerged from efforts to solve important practical questions. If security studies succumbs to the tendency for academic disciplines to pursue “the trivial, the formal, the methodological, the purely theoretical**,** the remotely historical—in short, the politically irrelevant” (Morgenthau, 1966:73**),** its theoretical progress and its practical value will inevitably decline. Among other things, it means that security studies should remain wary of **the** counterproductive tangents that have seduced other areas of international studies, most notably the “post-modern” approach to international affairs (Ashley, 1984; Der Derian and Shapiro, 1989; Lapid, 1989). Contrary to their proponents’ claims, post-modern approaches have yet to demonstrate much value for comprehending world politics**;** to date, these works are mostly criticism and not much theory**.** 26 As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers “have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field**”** (Keohane, 1988:392). In particular, issues of war and peace are too important for the field to be diverted into a prolix and self-indulgent discourse that is divorced from the real world.

AFF – AT: Discourse 1st

Policy analysis should trump discourse – most effective way to challenge power

Taft-Kaufman 95 (Jill, Speech prof @ CMU, Southern Comm. Journal, Spring, v. 60, Iss. 3, “Other Ways”)

The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported by substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects, creates a solipsistic quagmire. The political sympathies of the new cultural critics, with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people, aligns them with the political left. Yet, despite their adversarial posture and talk of opposition, their discourses on intertextuality and inter-referentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist politics--conflict, racism, poverty, and injustice. In short, as Clarke (1991) asserts, postmodern emphasis on new subjects conceals the old subjects, those who have limited access to good jobs, food, housing, health care, and transportation, as well as to the media that depict them. Merod (1987) decries this situation as one which leaves no vision, will, or commitment to activism. He notes that academic lip service to the oppositional is underscored by the absence of focused collective or politically active intellectual communities. Provoked by the academic manifestations of this problem Di Leonardo (1990) echoes Merod and laments: Has there ever been a historical era characterized by as little radical analysis or activism and as much radical-chic writing as ours? Maundering on about Otherness: phallocentrism or Eurocentric tropes has become a lazy academic substitute for actual engagement with the detailed histories and contemporary realities of Western racial minorities, white women, or any Third World population. (p. 530) Clarke's assessment of the postmodern elevation of language to the "sine qua non" of critical discussion is an even stronger indictment against the trend**.** Clarke examines Lyotard's (1984) The Postmodern Condition in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all social relations are linguistic, and, therefore, it is through the coercion that threatens speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society falls apart. To this assertion, Clarke replies**:**  I can think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of society that can only recognize the discursive. If the worst terror we can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak, we are appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms. It may be the intellectual's conception of terror (what else do we do but speak?), but its projection onto the rest of the world would be calamitous..**..(**pp. 2-27) The realm of the discursive is derived from the requisites for human life, which are in the physical world, rather than in a world of ideas or symbols.(4) Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for their fulfillment. Postmodern emphasis on the discursive without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete social goals (Merod, 1987). Although the material conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example, argues that "the justice that working people deserve is economic, not just textual" (p. 571). Lopez (1992) states that "the starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be the present existential, concrete situation" (p. 299). West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 170). Unlike postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy about power and the realities of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances that create lived experience. People whose lives form the material for postmodern counter-hegemonic discourse do not share the optimism over the new recognition of their discursive subjectivities, because such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and current struggles against racism, sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice. They do not appreciate being told they are living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. Ideas have consequences. Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a cultural and humane failure. The need to look beyond texts to the perception and attainment of concrete social goals keeps writers from marginalized groups ever-mindful of the specifics of how power works through political agendas, institutions, agencies, and the budgets that fuel them.

AFF – AT: Discourse 1st

The claim that language merely influences reality is not enough to reject us

Roskoski & Peabody 91 (Matthew, Joe, Florida State University, “Critique of Language Argument,”)

Before we begin to discuss the validity of the hypothesis, we ought first to note that there are two varieties of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. The strong version claims that language actually creates reality, while the weak version merely claims that language influences reality in some way (Grace). As Bloom has conceded, the strong version - "the claim that language or languages we learn determine the ways we think" is "clearly untenable" (Bloom 275). Further, the weak form of the hypothesis will likely fail the direct causal nexus test required to censor speech. The courts require a "close causal nexus between speech and harm before penalizing speech" (Smolla 205**)** and we believe debate critics should do the same. We dismiss the weak form of the hypothesis as inadequate to justify language "arguments" and will focus on the strong form.

AFF - Perm

Discourse must be combined with interventions at the policy level to change the knowledge economy of terrorism

Graham et. al. 4 (Phillip W., Sen. Public Health Researcher @ RTI International, Discourse and Society, 2004, 15(2-3). pp. 199-221., Muse) JPG

Martin and Rose (2003) suggest that the challenge for discourse analysis is to show how emancipation, as well as domination, is achieved through discourse; that an analytical focus on ‘hegemony’ must be balanced with a focus on discourses of empowerment—discourses designed to ‘make peace, not war’, that successfully ‘redistribute power without necessarily struggling against it’ (2003: 264; cf Martin, 1999); and that analysis needs to move away from ‘demonology’ and ‘deconstruction’ towards the design of ‘constructive’ discourse (Martin, in press). These are certainly important considerations for the theory and practice of discourse analysis. At least as important to our mind are clear understandings of macro-social, -cultural, and -economic changes, all of which can be seen quite clearly from a discourse-historical perspective—in a process of historical *reconstruction*—to grasp human history as a seamless, unbroken whole. It has become clear that in what is called “a global knowledge economy”, meanings and their mediations perform increasingly important and overt political-economic functions (cf. Graham, 2002; Fairclough and Graham, 2002). The sole social function of academics is, and always has been, ‘to influence discourse’ (David Rooney, personal correspondence)—that is all we can do as academics, whether through teaching, writing, or through the manifold arts of activism. Feudalism was tied to land and militarism; mercantilism was tied to gold and mercenary armies; capitalism was tied to ownership of productive apparatus and imperialism; corporatism is tied to the ownership of legal fictions—money, corporations, and intellectual property—and ‘information warfare’, all of which are products of discourse (Graham, 2002). Each of these developments—each stage in the ‘phylogenesis’ of western economic systems (Martin, 2003: 266)—has tended towards an increasing reliance on abstract- discursive rather than brute-physical coercion in the maintenance of inequalities.The current political economic system, as transitional as it may be, is undoubtedly the most discourse- and media-reliant system in history, precisely because of its size and the high levels of abstraction that both support it and constitute the bulk of its commodities (Graham, 2000). Understanding this means understanding the importance and potential of discursive interventions. The Pentagon’s ‘Total Information Awareness’ program fully recognises this (DARPA, 2003). Similarly, whichever group perpetrated the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon also fully recognised it: the attacks were directed at symbolic centres of a globally hegemonic system and were designed specifically for their mass media impact. Merely exposing facts and breaking silences (as per Chomsky and Pilger) is not enough either; the current malaise is primarily axiological (values-based). Discursive interventions at the axiological level are necessary in the policy field, in the multiple fields of mass media, and in every local field. Ours is a discourse-based global society, a discourse-based global economy, and a discourse-based global culture. Consequently, humanity has never been so close to realising our ‘species-being’ (Marx, 1844/1975: ch 4)—our universal humanity—whilst simultaneously being so close to achieving self-annihilation. Discursive interventions will necessarily be decisive in the outcome between these two paths.

AFF – Alt No Solve

The alternative fails – it doesn’t engage problems and justifies the oppression of the status quo

Hanson 4 (Victor Davis, historian @ Stanford, City Journal Spring 2004, http://www.city-journal.org/html/14\_2\_the\_fruits.html) JPG

Rather than springing from realpolitik, sloth, or fear of oil cutoffs, much of our appeasement of Middle Eastern terrorists derived from a new sort of anti-Americanism that thrived in the growing therapeutic society of the 1980s and 1990s. Though the abrupt collapse of communism was a dilemma for the Left, it opened as many doors as it shut. To be sure, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, few Marxists could argue for a state-controlled economy or mouth the old romance about a workers’ paradise—not with scenes of East German families crammed into smoking clunkers lumbering over potholed roads, like American pioneers of old on their way west. But if the creed of the socialist republics was impossible to take seriously in either economic or political terms, such a collapse of doctrinaire statism did not discredit the gospel of forced egalitarianism and resentment against prosperous capitalists. Far from it. If Marx receded from economics departments, his spirit reemerged among our intelligentsia in the novel guises of post-structuralism, new historicism, multiculturalism, and all the other dogmas whose fundamental tenet was that white male capitalists had systematically oppressed women, minorities, and Third World people in countless insidious ways. The font of that collective oppression, both at home and abroad, was the rich, corporate, Republican, and white United States. The fall of the Soviet Union enhanced these newer post-colonial and liberation fields of study by immunizing their promulgators from charges of fellow-traveling or being dupes of Russian expansionism. Communism’s demise likewise freed these trendy ideologies from having to offer some wooden, unworkable Marxist alternative to the West; thus they could happily remain entirely critical, sarcastic, and cynical without any obligation to suggest something better, as witness the nihilist signs at recent protest marches proclaiming: “I Love Iraq, Bomb Texas.” From writers like Arundhati Roy and Michel Foucault (who anointed Khomeini “a kind of mystic saint” who would usher in a new “political spirituality” that would “transfigure” the world) and from old standbys like Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre (“to shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time”), there filtered down a vague notion that the United States and the West in general were responsible for Third World misery in ways that transcended the dull old class struggle. Endemic racism and the legacy of colonialism, the oppressive multinational corporation and the humiliation and erosion of indigenous culture brought on by globalization and a smug, self-important cultural condescension—all this and more explained poverty and despair, whether in Damascus, Teheran, or Beirut. There was victim status for everybody, from gender, race, and class at home to colonialism, imperialism, and hegemony abroad. Anyone could play in these “area studies” that cobbled together the barrio, the West Bank, and the “freedom fighter” into some sloppy global union of the oppressed—a far hipper enterprise than rehashing Das Kapital or listening to a six-hour harangue from Fidel. Of course, pampered Western intellectuals since Diderot have always dreamed up a “noble savage,” who lived in harmony with nature precisely because of his distance from the corruption of Western civilization. But now this fuzzy romanticism had an updated, political edge: the bearded killer and wild-eyed savage were not merely better than we because they lived apart in a pre-modern landscape. No: they had a right to strike back and kill modernizing Westerners who had intruded into and disrupted their better world—whether Jews on Temple Mount, women in Westernized dress in Teheran, Christian missionaries in Kabul, capitalist profiteers in Islamabad, whiskey-drinking oilmen in Riyadh, or miniskirted tourists in Cairo. An Ayatollah Khomeini who turned back the clock on female emancipation in Iran, who murdered non-Muslims, and who refashioned Iranian state policy to hunt down, torture, and kill liberals nevertheless seemed to liberal Western eyes as preferable to the Shah—a Western-supported anti-communist, after all, who was engaged in the messy, often corrupt task of bringing Iran from the tenth to the twentieth century, down the arduous, dangerous path that, as in Taiwan or South Korea, might eventually lead to a consensual, capitalist society like our own.

AFF – Alt No Solve

Defining terrorism is key to prevent abuses of it – the alternative allows cooption

TTSRL 8 (Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law, policy Brif no. 2, 10/1/8, www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/WP3%20Del%204.pdf) JPG

The first reason is that the absence of a commonly accepted definition invites abuse. In view of the delegitimization, stigmatization and securitization issues discussed in the next section, this seems to be a serious case for expanding a common understanding of terrorism. Double standards and the might makes right principle applied both in the international and domestic scene – styling resistance movements, guerillas or mere political opposition as “terrorists” - have in recent times become a favourite instrument of authoritarian governments to legitimize crushing those actors abroad – in which the label “terrorism” is used as a powerful instrument in the hands of the stronger. This should be, it can be argued, prevented on normative grounds. The academia, which ought to be critical towards the realm of politics – even if it cannot be detached from it – should then play a crucial role in the deconstruction of similar processes. Yet, to meet such expectations, it should possess useful instruments of analysis. In line with the “strategic” argument outlined above, Jessica Stern of Harvard University also concedes that ‘how we define terrorism profoundly influences how we respond to it’. Yet she adds another reason in favour of the definition – its relevance for theory and research: ‘The definition inevitably determines the kind of data we collect and analyze, which in turn influences our understanding of trends and our predictions about the future’ (1999: 12). The same argument is presented by Schmid, who speaks of the universalist definition as a prerequisite of a ‘responsible theory’ (2006: 3). Such arguments may be radicalized: arbitrariness in definitions as points of departure for research perhaps not only influences academics’ results and hinders their comparability, but it also generates a sense of uncertainty that the participants in the discourse talk about, indeed, the same phenomenon at any given point of time, which limits their potential for cooperation. Uniformly defining terrorism in the academia thus seems relevant both in theoretical and practical terms. From the theoretical point of view, such clarification would provide a paradigmatic stable point of departure for the research on terrorism – instead of the current state of confusion where results of individual researchers and teams can be compared or complement each other only to a limited extent. From the practical point of view, it would contribute to mitigating the ambiguities associated with the term that invite abuse.

AFF – Hardline Response Good

Letting radical Islam fester is what created terrorist problems – setting a violent precedent undermines terrorism

Hanson 4 (Victor Davis, historian @ Stanford, City Journal Spring 2004, http://www.city-journal.org/html/14\_2\_the\_fruits.html) JPG

What went wrong with the West—and with the United States in particular—when not just the classical but especially the recent antecedents to September 11, from the Iranian hostage-taking to the attack on the USS Cole, were so clear? Though Americans in an election year, legitimately concerned about our war dead, may now be divided over the Iraqi occupation, polls nevertheless show a surprising consensus that the many precursors to the World Trade Center and Pentagon bombings were acts of war, not police matters. Roll the tape backward from the USS Cole in 2000, through the bombing of the Khobar Towers and the U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998, the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the destruction of the American embassy and annex in Beirut in 1983, the mass murder of 241 U.S. Marine peacekeepers asleep in their Lebanese barracks that same year, and assorted kidnappings and gruesome murders of American citizens and diplomats (including TWA Flight 800, Pan Am 103, William R. Higgins, Leon Klinghoffer, Robert Dean Stethem, and CIA operative William Francis Buckley), until we arrive at the Iranian hostage-taking of November 1979: that debacle is where we first saw the strange brew of Islamic fascism, autocracy, and Middle East state terrorism—and failed to grasp its menace, condemn it, and go to war against it. That lapse, worth meditating upon in this 25th anniversary year of Khomeinism, then set the precedent that such aggression against the United States was better adjudicated as a matter of law than settled by war. Criminals were to be understood, not punished; and we, not our enemies, were at fault for our past behavior. Whether Carter’s impotence sprang from his deep-seated moral distrust of using American power unilaterally or from real remorse over past American actions in the cold war or even from his innate pessimism about the military capability of the United States mattered little to the hostage takers in Teheran, who for some 444 days humiliated the United States through a variety of public demands for changes in U.S. foreign policy, the return of the exiled Shah, and reparations. But if we know how we failed to respond in the last three decades, do we yet grasp why we were so afraid to act decisively at these earlier junctures, which might have stopped the chain of events that would lead to the al-Qaida terrorist acts of September 11? Our failure was never due to a lack of the necessary wealth or military resources, but rather to a deeply ingrained assumption that we should not retaliate—a hesitancy al-Qaida perceives and plays upon.

AFF – Hardline Response Good

Military responses solve terrorism by ending their operational capacity

Byman 5 (Daniel L., Sen. Fellow in Foreign Policy @ Saban Center, 4/15/5,

http://www.brookings.edu/events/2005/0415terrorism.aspx) JPG

Nevertheless, Dr. Ganor suggested that it was worth pondering whether the Boomerang Effect really exists. The "pro" side points to such incidents as the wave of Hamas bombings that occurred in Israel after the 1996 assassination of Hamas' chief bomb maker, Yehia Ayash (known as "the Engineer"), which was widely attributed to Israel. For these analysts, the determining factor of terrorism is motivation. Specifically, a terrorist group will launch an attack in response to a specific event. However, other analysts argue that terrorist groups do not base their attacks on motivational factors but conduct attacks when they have the opportunity to do so—thus for them, only capability really matters. Although the terrorist groups may claim their attacks are in response to specific counterterrorism measures, they likely would have occurred regardless. These analysts point to the absence of any increase in terrorist attacks following Israel's targeted killing of Hamas leader, Sheik Ahmed Yassin in 2004. If motivation was the source of terrorism, one would think the killing of Yassin would generate high levels of attacks. Therefore, the fact that attacks did not occur seems to suggest that the operational capability of the terrorist group was severely damaged. Dr. Ganor argued that effective counterterrorism policies are those that, on a case by case basis, account for the determining factor of terrorism—whether it be motivation or operational capacity. If the key factor is operational capability, then counterterrorism policies should heavily favor military strikes. If the key factor is motivation, then counterterrorism policies should refrain from aggressive military strikes. Dr. Ganor then indicated his belief that Hezbollah's activity is dependent on motivation whereas Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Islamic Jihad are driven by their respective operational capabilities.

Harsh rhetoric solves the impact of the kritik

Riley 1 (Denise, Professor of English & American Studies @ U of East Anglia, Diacritics, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Winter, 2001), pp. 41-53, JStor) JPG

This sonorousness of vindictive words might help to characterize how, say, racist speech works on and in its targets. But doesn't such speculation also risk becoming an advocacy for the cultivation of insensitivity on the part of those liable to get hurt-or worse, a criticism of their linguistic vulnerability: "They just shouldn't be so linguistically sensitive"? There's much to be said for studiously practicing indifference. But the old playground chant of "sticks and stones may break my bones, but words can never hurt me" was always notoriously untrue. The success of the tactics of indifference will also depend on the vicissitudes of the words' fate in the world, which is beyond my control. I change, too. As the terrain upon which malevolent accusation falls, I am malleable, while the harsh words themselves under go their own alterations across time, and so their import for me weakens or intensifies accordingly. At times the impact of violent speech may even be recuperable through its own incantation; the repetition of abusive language may be occasionally "redemptive" through the irony of iteration, which may drain the venom out of the original insult and neutralize it by displaying its idiocy. Yet angry interpellation's very failure to always work as intended (since at particular historical moments, I may be able to parody, to weaken by adopting, to corrode its aim), is alsoexactlywhat,atothertimes,worksforit.Inanyevent,interpellationoperateswith a deep indifference as to where the side of the good may lie, and we can't realistically build an optimistic theory of the eventual recuperability of harm. Here there's no guaranteed rationality, nor any inescapable irrationality Repetition breeds its own confident mishearing, but its volatile alterations lean towards neither automatic amelioration nor inevitable worsening.

AFF – Hardlined Response Good

Not challenging terrorism is seen as appeasement – signals tolerance to violent action

Hanson 4 (Victor Davis, historian @ Stanford, City Journal Spring 2004, http://www.city-journal.org/html/14\_2\_the\_fruits.html) JPG

Even when Middle Easterners regularly blew us up, the Clinton administration, unwilling to challenge the new myth of Muslim victimhood, transformed Middle Eastern terrorists bent on destroying America into wayward individual criminals who did not spring from a pathological culture. Thus, Clinton treated the first World Trade Center bombing as only a criminal justice matter—which of course allowed the United States to avoid confronting the issue and taking on the messy and increasingly unpopular business the Bush administration has been engaged in since September 11. Clinton dispatched FBI agents, not soldiers, to Yemen and Saudi Arabia after the attacks on the USS Cole and the Khobar Towers. Yasser Arafat, responsible in the 1970s for the murder of a U.S. diplomat in the Sudan, turned out to be the most frequent foreign visitor to the Clinton Oval Office. If the Clintonian brand of appeasement reflected both a deep-seated tolerance for Middle Eastern extremism and a reluctance to wake comfortable Americans up to the danger of a looming war, he was not the only one naive about the threat of Islamic fascism. Especially culpable was the Democratic Party at large, whose post-Vietnam foreign policy could not sanction the use of American armed force to protect national interests but only to accomplish purely humanitarian ends as in the interventions in Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia. Indeed, the recent Democratic primaries reveal just how far this disturbing trend has evolved: the foreign-policy positions of John Kerry and Howard Dean on Iraq and the Middle East were far closer to those of extremists like Al Sharpton and Dennis Kucinich than to current American policy under George W. Bush. Indeed, buffoons or conspiracy theorists like Noam Chomsky, Michael Moore, and Al Franken often turned up on the same stage as would-be presidents. When Moore, while endorsing Wesley Clark, called an American president at a time of war a “deserter,” when the mendacious Sharpton lectured his smiling fellow candidates on the Bush administration’s “lies” about Iraq, and when Al Gore labeled the president’s action in Iraq a “betrayal” of America, the surrender of the mainstream Democrats to the sirens of extremism was complete. Again, past decorum and moderation go out the window when the pretext is saving indigenous peoples from American oppression. The consensus for appeasement that led to September 11, albeit suppressed for nearly two years by outrage over the murder of 3,000, has reemerged in criticism over the ongoing reconstruction of Iraq and George Bush’s prosecution of the War on Terror.

AFF – AT: Turns the Case

Without a hardline response, terrorism will breed more terrorism

Dershowitz 6 (Alan, prof of Law @ Harvard, 1/16/6, http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial\_opinion/oped/articles/2006/01/16/terrorism\_confusing\_cause\_effect/) JPG

WHATEVER ANYONE might think of the artistic merits of Steven Spielberg's new film ''Munich," no one should expect an accurate portrayal of historical events. ''Munich" portrays a squad of Mossad agents, led by a fictional character named Avner Kauffman, tracking down and killing the Black September terrorists who had perpetrated the massacre of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics. As the movie progresses, Avner becomes increasingly disillusioned with his mission. His chief concern is that counterterrorism only incites more terrorism, which in turn provokes reprisals. The last shot in the movie rests on the World Trade Center, suggesting a connection between the Middle East's ''cycle of violence" and the Sept. 11 attacks. Deepak Chopra wrote that the movie ''draws a trail that leads directly to the attacks of 9/11." The trouble with this ''cycle of violence" perspective is that it confuses cause and effect. The period immediately preceding Munich was plagued by airline terrorism, including the blowing up of a Swiss airliner that killed all 47 passengers and crew, and dozens of deadly hijackings. Palestinian hijackings were successful because even when the hijackers were captured, they were quickly released as soon as Palestinian terrorists hijacked another airplane. This long pattern of high-publicity, low-risk hijackings is what encouraged Black September to up the ante by infiltrating the Olympic Village in Munich. As I wrote in my book ''Why Terrorism Works," ''Based on the reaction to international terrorism over the previous four years, the terrorists planning the Munich operation could expect to succeed in attracting the world's attention and be relatively certain that if any of the terrorists were captured, they would not be held for long." In short: Terrorism works because it is successful, and success begets repetition.