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 \*\*\*Generic Terrorism\*\*\*

Terrorism 1NC

No Impact to terrorism ---

Empirical evidence

Mueller ’05

(John, “Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?” FOREIGN AFFAIRS v. 85 n. 5, September/October)

But while keeping such potential dangers in mind, it is worth remembering that the total number of people killed since 9/11 by al Qaeda or al Qaeda\_like operatives outside of Afghanistan and Iraq is not much higher than the number who drown in bathtubs in the United States in a single year, and that the lifetime chance of an American being killed by international terrorism is about one in 80,000 -- about the same chance of being killed by a comet or a meteor. Even if there were a 9/11-scale attack every three months for the next five years, the likelihood that an individual American would number among the dead would be two hundredths of a percent (or one in 5,000). Although it remains heretical to say so, the evidence so far suggests that fears of the omnipotent terrorist -- reminiscent of those inspired by images of the 20-foot-tall Japanese after Pearl Harbor or the 20-foot-tall Communists at various points in the Cold War (particularly after Sputnik) -- may have been overblown, the threat presented within the United States by al Qaeda greatly exaggerated. The massive and expensive homeland security apparatus erected since 9/11 may be persecuting some, spying on many, inconveniencing most, and taxing all to defend the United States against an enemy that scarcely exists.

No incentive to inflict mass death and it’s easy getting caught

Sprinzak ‘98

(Ehud, “The Great Superterrorism Scare”, Foreign Policy, September 28, http://radiobergen.org/terrorism/super-1.html)

There is, however, a problem with this two-part logic. Although the capabilities proposition is largely valid--albeit for the limited number of terrorists who can overcome production and handling risks and develop an efficient means of dispersal--the chaos proposition is utterly false. Despite the lurid rhetoric, a massive terrorist attack with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons is hardly inevitable. It is not even likely. Thirty years of field research have taught observers of terrorism a most important lesson: Terrorists wish to convince us that they are capable of striking from anywhere at anytime, but there really is no chaos. In fact, terrorism involves predictable behavior, and the vast majority of terrorist organizations can be identified well in advance. Most terrorists possess political objectives, whether Basque independence, Kashmiri separatism, or Palestinian Marxism. Neither crazy nor stupid, they strive to gain sympathy from a large audience and wish to live after carrying out any terrorist act to benefit from it politically. As terrorism expert Brian Jenkins has remarked, terrorists want lots of people watching, not lots of people dead. Furthermore, no terrorist becomes a terrorist overnight. A lengthy trajectory of radicalization and low-level violence precedes the killing of civilians. A terrorist becomes mentally ready to use lethal weapons against civilians only over time and only after he or she has managed to dehumanize the enemy. From the Baader - Meinhoff group in Germany and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka to Hamas and Hizballah in the Middle East, these features are universal. Finally, with rare exceptions--such as the Unabomber--terrorism is a group phenomenon. Radical organizations are vulnerable to early detection through their disseminated ideologies, lesser illegal activities, and public statements of intent. Some even publish their own World Wide Web sites. Since the 1960s, the vast majority of terrorist groups have made clear their aggressive intentions long before following through with violence. We can draw three broad conclusions from these findings. First, terrorists who threaten to kill thousands of civilians are aware that their chances for political and physical survival are exceedingly slim. Their prospects for winning public sympathy are even slimmer. Second, terrorists take time to become dangerous, particularly to harden themselves sufficiently to use weapons of mass destruction. Third, the number of potential suspects is significantly less than doomsayers would have us believe. Ample early warning signs should make effective interdiction of potential superterrorists easier than today's overheated rhetoric suggests.

Terrorism 1NC

Prefer our evidence – avoids institutional bias

Rapoport ‘01

(David,- Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of California-LA, Twenty-First Century Weapons Proliferation, p. 14-16)

The major problem in dealing with biological and chemical attacks is that so many different toxins and pathogens can be used, and, since a vaccine for one is not useful for another, it is economically impossible to stockpile for all potential agents. The story noted also that, since there is money to be made, problems were exacerbated by those with conflicting interests. No wonder a well-known analyst of terrorist activity, Larry Johnson, noted in US News and World Report,8 that this particular anti-terrorism anxiety is the ‘latest gravy train’: one which academics, government bodies and business corporations are all eager to board. It is one thing to buy insurance with your own money; it is another to urge insurance with someone else’s money, especially if the insurance salesman will make a personal profit on what he sells and that fact is not obvious to the purchaser who thinks the advice is impartial. A second psychological disadvantage associated with this issue stems from the conflict between serious students of terrorist experiences and those from the physical sciences. Physical scientists are more impressed with the dangers because they are more clearly aware of the potential of chemical and biological agents and the ability of science to increase the powers of those agents. In addition, the authority of physical scientists is intimidating, especially to the untrained. Nonetheless, those of us who have been in terrorist studies for a long time are likely to be skeptical for the simple reason that we know there have always been enormous gaps between the potentiality of a weapon and the abilities and/or will to employ it. Terrorists, in particular, operate in contexts of enormous uncertainty and anxiety; accidents fatal to the terrorists are plentiful, and to avoid them terrorists seek simple weapons that are easy to transport and assemble.

No Threat 2NC

Lack of prosecutions prove no genuine threat

Mueller ’05

(John, “Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?” FOREIGN AFFAIRS v. 85 n. 5, September/October)

A fully credible explanation for the fact that the United States has suffered no terrorist attacks since 9/11 is that the threat posed by homegrown or imported terrorists -- like that presented by Japanese Americans during World War II or by American Communists after it -- has been massively exaggerated. Is it possible that the haystack is essentially free of needles? The fbi embraces a spooky I-think-therefore-they-are line of reasoning when assessing the purported terrorist menace. In 2003, its director, Robert Mueller, proclaimed, "The greatest threat is from al Qaeda cells in the U.S. that we have not yet identified." He rather mysteriously deemed the threat from those unidentified entities to be "increasing in part because of the heightened publicity" surrounding such episodes as the 2002 Washington sniper shootings and the 2001 anthrax attacks (which had nothing to do with al Qaeda). But in 2001, the 9/11 hijackers received no aid from U.S.-based al Qaeda operatives for the simple reason that no such operatives appear to have existed. It is not at all clear that that condition has changed. Mueller also claimed to know that "al Qaeda maintains the ability and the intent to inflict significant casualties in the U.S. with little warning." If this was true -- if the terrorists had both the ability and the intent in 2003, and if the threat they presented was somehow increasing -- they had remained remarkably quiet by the time the unflappable Mueller repeated his alarmist mantra in 2005: "I remain very concerned about what we are not seeing." Intelligence estimates in 2002 held that there were as many as 5,000 al Qaeda terrorists and supporters in the United States. However, a secret fbi report in 2005 wistfully noted that although the bureau had managed to arrest a few bad guys here and there after more than three years of intense and well-funded hunting, it had been unable to identify a single true al Qaeda sleeper cell anywhere in the country. Thousands of people in the United States have had their overseas communications monitored under a controversial warrantless surveillance program. Of these, fewer than ten U.S. citizens or residents per year have aroused enough suspicion to impel the agencies spying on them to seek warrants authorizing surveillance of their domestic communications as well; none of this activity, it appears, has led to an indictment on any charge whatever. In addition to massive eavesdropping and detention programs, every year some 30,000 "national security letters" are issued without judicial review, forcing businesses and other institutions to disclose confidential information about their customers without telling anyone they have done so. That process has generated thousands of leads that, when pursued, have led nowhere. Some 80,000 Arab and Muslim immigrants have been subjected to fingerprinting and registration, another 8,000 have been called in for interviews with the fbi, and over 5,000 foreign nationals have been imprisoned in initiatives designed to prevent terrorism. This activity, notes the Georgetown University law professor David Cole, has not resulted in a single conviction for a terrorist crime. In fact, only a small number of people picked up on terrorism charges -- always to great official fanfare -- have been convicted at all, and almost all of these convictions have been for other infractions, particularly immigration violations. Some of those convicted have clearly been mental cases or simply flaunting jihadist bravado -- rattling on about taking down the Brooklyn Bridge with a blowtorch, blowing up the Sears Tower if only they could get to Chicago, beheading the prime minister of Canada, or flooding lower Manhattan by somehow doing something terrible to one of those tunnels.

All reliable data supports our argument

Robinson ’05

(Paul,- assistant director of the Centre for Security Studies at the University of Hull “The good news about terrorism”)

Alas for the experts, but luckily for us, the facts do not back this up. Far from being more dangerous, the world is safer now than ever before; and far from being an ever-growing problem, terrorism has been in sharp decline for over a decade. This is not a matter of opinion. It is provable. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sipri) and Canada’s Project Ploughshares both annually track the number of armed conflicts taking place worldwide. Sipri counts only those which result in 1,000 deaths or more in a given year, so its figures are slightly lower. Even so, it agrees with Project Ploughshares that the amount of fighting on the planet is declining. According to Sipri, there were only 19 conflicts in 2003, down from 33 in 1991. With its broader definition, Project Ploughshares reports a decline to 36 in 2003 from a peak of 44 in 1995. More good news follows, I’m afraid. Battle-related deaths rose slightly from 15,000 in 2002 to 20,000 in 2003 because of the Iraq war, but even these figures are substantially down from the annual tolls of 40,000 to 100,000 during the Cold War. Global military expenditure also fell by 11 per cent in real terms between 1992 and 2000, and the Congressional Research Service in Washington notes that international arms sales fell from £22.8 billion in 2000 to £14.3 billion in 2003. In short, there are fewer wars, fewer arms sales and fewer people dying, each year, than at any time since the second world war So much for the idea that the world is becoming more unstable. What of the second thesis — that global terrorism poses a new and unprecedented threat to our security? Again, the concept turns out to be unsound. I recommend that the fearful visit the excellent website of the Rand Corporation’s MIPT (Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism) database and try out its ‘Incident Analysis Wizard’ (www.tkb.org/ChartModule.jsp). However you fiddle MIPT’s figures, the chart always ends up looking roughly the same — a big peak in terrorism in the late 1970s and early ’80s, followed by a steady reduction ever since. During the 1980s, the number of international terrorist incidents worldwide averaged about 360 a year. By the year 2000, it was down to just 100. In Western Europe, the number has declined from about 200 in the mid-1980s to under 30 in 2004. Even more strikingly, in North America the number of attacks has fallen from over 40 a year in the mid-1970s to under five every year for the past ten years, with the sole exception of 2001. Doubters can also turn to the US State Department’s yearly analyses of international terrorism. These display exactly the same picture. It is sometimes argued that terrorist attacks nowadays cause more deaths than in the past, but even that does not add up — except in the case of 2001. The statistics for worldwide fatalities from terrorism show the same decline as the number of attacks. For every Bali or Madrid bombing now, there was a Beirut, an Air India or a Lockerbie in the past. We seem to have very short memories. Remember the FLQ, the Red Brigades, the Red Army Faction, the Baader-Meinhof group, and all the rest of them? All defunct. Even Eta haven’t killed anybody for a couple of years. Bluntly, terrorism is a declining problem, despite our best efforts to provoke it.

No Will 2NC

Response to 9-11 proves

Mueller ’05

(John, “Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?” FOREIGN AFFAIRS v. 85 n. 5, September/October)

The results of policing activity overseas suggest that the absence of results in the United States has less to do with terrorists' cleverness or with investigative incompetence than with the possibility that few, if any, terrorists exist in the country. It also suggests that al Qaeda's ubiquity and capacity to do damage may have, as with so many perceived threats, been exaggerated. Just because some terrorists may wish to do great harm does not mean that they are able to. Gerges argues that mainstream Islamists -- who make up the vast majority of the Islamist political movement -- gave up on the use of force before 9/11, except perhaps against Israel, and that the jihadists still committed to violence constitute a tiny minority. Even this small group primarily focuses on various "infidel" Muslim regimes and considers jihadists who carry out violence against the "far enemy" -- mainly Europe and the United States -- to be irresponsible, reckless adventurers who endanger the survival of the whole movement. In this view, 9/11 was a sign of al Qaeda's desperation, isolation, fragmentation, and decline, not of its strength.

Even if they haven’t rejected all violence – terrorists avoid mass destruction

Mueller ’05

(John, “Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?” FOREIGN AFFAIRS v. 85 n. 5, September/October)

One reason al Qaeda and "al Qaeda types" seem not to be trying very hard to repeat 9/11 may be that that dramatic act of destruction itself proved counterproductive by massively heightening concerns about terrorism around the world. No matter how much they might disagree on other issues (most notably on the war in Iraq), there is a compelling incentive for states -- even ones such as Iran, Libya, Sudan, and Syria -- to cooperate in cracking down on al Qaeda, because they know that they could easily be among its victims. The fbi may not have uncovered much of anything within the United States since 9/11, but thousands of apparent terrorists have been rounded, or rolled, up overseas with U.S. aid and encouragement. Although some Arabs and Muslims took pleasure in the suffering inflicted on 9/11 -- Schadenfreude in German, shamateh in Arabic -- the most common response among jihadists and religious nationalists was a vehement rejection of al Qaeda's strategy and methods. When Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in 1979, there were calls for jihad everywhere in Arab and Muslim lands, and tens of thousands flocked to the country to fight the invaders. In stark contrast, when the U.S. military invaded in 2001 to topple an Islamist regime, there was, as the political scientist Fawaz Gerges points out, a "deafening silence" from the Muslim world, and only a trickle of jihadists went to fight the Americans. Other jihadists publicly blamed al Qaeda for their post-9/11 problems and held the attacks to be shortsighted and hugely miscalculated. The post-9/11 willingness of governments around the world to take on international terrorists has been much reinforced and amplified by subsequent, if scattered, terrorist activity outside the United States. Thus, a terrorist bombing in Bali in 2002 galvanized the Indonesian government into action. Extensive arrests and convictions -- including of leaders who had previously enjoyed some degree of local fame and political popularity -- seem to have severely degraded the capacity of the chief jihadist group in Indonesia, Jemaah Islamiyah. After terrorists attacked Saudis in Saudi Arabia in 2003, that country, very much for self-interested reasons, became considerably more serious about dealing with domestic terrorism; it soon clamped down on radical clerics and preachers. Some rather inept terrorist bombings in Casablanca in 2003 inspired a similarly determined crackdown by Moroccan authorities. And the 2005 bombing in Jordan of a wedding at a hotel (an unbelievably stupid target for the terrorists) succeeded mainly in outraging the Jordanians: according to a Pew poll, the percentage of the population expressing a lot of confidence in bin Laden to "do the right thing" dropped from 25 percent to less than one percent after the attack.

More evidence

Sprinzak ‘98

(Ehud, “The Great Superterrorism Scare”, Foreign Policy, September 28, http://radiobergen.org/terrorism/super-1.html)

Groups such as Hamas, Hizballah, and Islamic Jihad, which so many Americans love to revile--and fear--do not make the list of potential superterrorists. These organizations and their state sponsors may loathe the Great Satan, but they also wish to survive and prosper politically. Their leaders, most of whom are smarter than the Western media implies, understand that a Hiroshima-like disaster would effectively mean the end of their movements.

Will Get Caught 2NC

Empirically proven

Sprinzak ‘98

(Ehud, “The Great Superterrorism Scare”, Foreign Policy, September 28, http://radiobergen.org/terrorism/super-1.html)

Only two groups have come close to producing a superterrorism catastrophe: Aum Shinrikyo and the white supremacist and millenarian American Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord, whose chemical-weapons stockpile was seized by the FBI in 1985 as they prepared to hasten the coming of the Messiah by poisoning the water supplies of several U.S. cities. Only Aum Shinrikyo fully developed both the capabilities and the intent to take tens of thousands of lives. However, this case is significant not only because the group epitomizes the kind of organizations that may resort to superterrorism in the future, but also because Aum's fate illustrates how groups of this nature can be identified and their efforts preempted. Although it comes as no comfort to the 12 people who died in Aum Shinrikyo's attack, the cult's act of notoriety represents first and foremost a colossal Japanese security blunder. Until Japanese police arrested its leaders in May 1995, Aum Shinrikyo had neither gone underground nor concealed its intentions. Cult leader Shoko Asahara had written since the mid-1980s of an impending cosmic cataclysm. By 1995, when Russian authorities curtailed the cult's activities in that country, Aum Shinrikyo had established a significant presence in the former Soviet Union, accessed the vibrant Russian black market to obtain various materials, and procured the formulae for chemical agents. In Japan, Asahara methodically recruited chemical engineers, physicists, and biologists who conducted extensive chemical and biological experiments in their lab and on the Japanese public. Between 1990 and 1994, the cult tried six times--unsuccessfully--to execute biological-weapons attacks, first with botulism and then with anthrax. In June 1994, still a year before the subway gas attack that brought them world recognition, two sect members released sarin gas near the judicial building in the city of Matsumoto, killing seven people and injuring 150, including three judges. In the years preceding the Tokyo attack, at least one major news source provided indications of Aum Shinrikyo's proclivity toward violence. In October 1989, the Sunday Mainichi magazine began a seven-part series on the cult that showed it regularly practiced a severe form of coercion on members and recruits. Following the November 1989 disappearance of a lawyer, along with his family, who was pursuing criminal action against the cult on behalf of former members, the magazine published a follow-up article. Because of Japan's hypersensitivity to religious freedom, lack of chemical- and biological-terrorism precedents, and low-quality domestic intelligence, the authorities failed to prevent the Tokyo attack despite these ample warning signs. ANATOMY OF AN OBSESSION lf a close examination reveals that the chances of a successful superterrorist attack are minimal, why are so many people so worried? There are three major explanations:

\*\*\*Nuclear Terrorism\*\*\*

Nuclear Terrorism 1NC

Terrorists don’t want nukes

Heinz Kamp ‘96

(Karl- Head of the Foreign and Security Policy Section of the Konrad-Adenhauer Foundation,

Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, p.30)

As plausible as it may seem that terrorists would consider the threat of nuclear destruction as the ultimate means of enforcing their demands, there has never been a genuine nuclear threat. Not a single instance has occurred in which a non-governmental group or individual has come anywhere close to obtaining a nuclear weapon-whether by theft or by the construction of a "homemade" device. Every past attempt at nuclear blackmail--most of which have occurred in the United States--has been a deception or a bluff, as have been the few nuclear threats that have occurred in Europe. How can we reconcile the frequent expressions of fear of nuclear terrorism with a history in which not a single incident has occurred? One explanation may lie in the fact that fears regarding nuclear terrorism are based on several assumptions that are accepted at face value. On closer examination, the truth of these assumptions seems less obvious. For instance, it is tacitly assumed that terrorists regard nuclear devices as desirable instruments in their political struggles--in other words, we assume that they want nuclear weapons. And we further assume that, if terrorist groups want nuclear weapons, they are in a position to get them, either by producing the weapons themselves or by obtaining them illegally from others. In other words, we assume that they both want and can possess nuclear weapons. Another assumption taken at face value is that radical or extreme states (certain states in the Near and Middle East in particular) would willingly help terrorist groups to attain nuclear weapons. Add to this the assumption that the destabilization of the former Soviet Union, which has led to increased smuggling activities including the sale or smuggling of assorted nuclear materials, means that weapon-grade fissile materials are available on the, black market. If all these assumptions were true, we would have to ask why terrorists do not possess nuclear explosive devices today. What terrorists want. The historical record shows that most nuclear threats have been made by mentally disturbed people, with an occasional bluff by a criminal. Up to now, terrorists have apparently not seriously attempted to seize nuclear weapons. This seems somewhat surprising because the nuclear threat--idle or not--still makes its appearance in international politics. Recent threats include those by Russian nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadzie, both of whom have threatened to use nuclear weapons against "the West." Terrorists are willing to use violence--and are indifferent to the possibility that their acts can make victims of innocent bystanders. In fact, the more victims of a terrorist's action, the more likely it is that it will capture the world's headlines. Yet a review of the world's terrorist incidents shows that those with a high death toll--like the detonation of a bomb on a Pan Am jumbo jet over Lockerbie, Sscotland, in 1988, and the explosio.ns. at the World Trade Center in New York and the federal office building in Oklahoma City--are relatively rare. The majority of the world's terrorist incidents result in few or no casualties. And grisly as the worst incidents have been, no terrorist acts have been committed on a scale of truly indiscriminate mass murder--which, given the vulnerability of modern industrial societies, terrorists could achieve or try to achieve without nuclear weapons. (The poisoning of a big-city water supply with chemical agents is often cited as a potential terrorist act of such magnitude.Why hasn't such an incident occurred? One explanation is that the terrorists' main objective is to attract as much attention as possible, not to create as many victims as possible. As Brian Jenkins noted in the Autumn 1985 issue of Orbis, "Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead." In addition, any mass murder that claimed the lives of those in whose interests the terrorists claim to act, or with whom solidarity is allegedly sought, would inevitably lead to an estrangement between the terrorists and their sympathizers. (This factor is most likely to restrain organizations like the German Red Anny Faction or Italy's Red Brigades, who fight against alleged grievances at home and rely on active or passive support from sympathizers in the domestic population.

Can’t steal or build ‘em

Sterngold ’04

(James,- “Assessing the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism,” San Francisco Chronicle)

Michael May, a former director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, where U.S. nuclear weapons are designed, and now a professor emeritus at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford, said the technological hurdles to a terrorist bomb remain, realistically, quite high. He discounted the possibility terrorists could make use of a stolen warhead because of all the sophisticated security devices built into them. He also said it would be all but impossible for a non-state terrorist group to develop the capability of making its own weapons-grade uranium, because of the industrial infrastructure required.

No Will 2NC

Even if they like the idea, they think it’s too difficult

Maerli ‘02

(Morten Bremer- Norwegian Atlantic Committee, “Nuclear Terrorism: Threats, Challenges and Responses” Spring, http://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/publikasjoner/sp/2002/8.htm)

No terrorist group have publicly known ever deployed or fielded a nuclear device. Nuclear terrorism remains a fiction and scholars argue about the real threat of nuclear terrorism. According to some, "the possibility that terrorists could acquire a nuclear weapon and explode it in a U.S. city is real", and the absence of flickering TV-screens worldwide with gruesome pictures in the wash of nuclear terrorist activities, is merely due to a "lack of means, rather than a lack of motivations".1 Such views are of course funded upon a belief that the scenes from lower Manhattan September 11th, 2001, is only the beginning. This day, the spectacular attacks were all performed with conventional terrorist means. However, the magnitude, crudeness, and the efficacy with which these actions were carried out could point in the direction of future large-scale terrorist uses of weapons of mass effect (WMEs).2 More people died in one day on September 11th than in 35 years of sub-state terrorism in Western Europe.3 According to other scholars, however, nuclear terrorism is "an overrated nightmare",4 and while "chemical, biological, or radiological is likely to occur, nuclear terrorism is unlikely to do so, as it is too difficult".5 Others dismiss the risk of large-scale nuclear terrorist violence in their country on the grounds of internal factors such as geography, politics and security policy.6 And indeed, conventional means are likely to remain the weaponry of choice for most terrorists.7 Conventional weaponry, as painfully evidenced September 11th could still more than effectively serve their goals. There will be practical, strategic, and perhaps even moral constraints against uses of WMEs. Unconventional means and methods of violence with new technical requirements and unknown outcomes – and thus an increased risk of failure – could be less appealing to sub-national groups. Any unsuccessful, failed, or uncontrolled action may waste resources, kill members of the terrorist groups, increase the risk of revelation and retaliation, embarrass the terrorist organization and reduce support amongst followers – all putting the very existence of the group at stake. The use of weapons of mass destruction could stigmatize the terrorist group and render any political aspirations harder to accomplish. The constraints against the use of weapons of mass destruction are particularly severe for terrorists who are concerned with their constituents (like social revolutionary and national separatist terrorists). 8 Therefore, there has always been a huge gap between the potential of a weapon and the abilities and/or the will to employ it by terrorists.9

A2: Russia

Terrorists would not be able to secure plutonium form Russia

Milhollin ’02

(Gary,- director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control “Can Terrorists Get the Bomb?” http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/articles/2002/terror-bomb.htm)

IF MAKING nuclear-bomb fuel is a no-go, why not just steal it, or buy it on the black market? Consider plutonium. There are hundreds of reactors in the world, and they crank out tons of the stuff every year. Surely a dedicated band of terrorists could get their hands on some. This too is not so simple. Plutonium is only created inside reactor fuel rods, and the rods, after being irradiated, become so hot that they melt unless kept under water. They are also radioactive, which is why they have to travel submerged from the reactor to storage ponds, with the water acting as both coolant and radiation shield. And in most power reactors, the rods are welded together into long assemblies that can be lifted only by crane. True, after the rods cool down th1ey can be stored dry, but their radioactivity is still lethal. To prevent spent fuel rods from killing the people who come near them, they are transported in giant radiation-shielding casks that are not supposed to break open even in head-on collisions. The casks are also guarded. If terrorists managed to hijack one from a country that had reactors they would still have to take it to a plant in another country that could extract the plutonium from the rods. They would be hunted at every step of the way. Instead of fuel rods, they would be better advised to go after pure plutonium, already removed from the reactor fuel and infinitely easier to handle. This kind of plutonium is a threat only if you ingest or inhale it. Human skin blocks its radiation: a terrorist could walk around with a lump of it in his front trouser pocket and still have children. But where to get hold of it? Russia is the best bet: it has tons of plutonium in weapon-ready form, and the Russian nuclear-accounting system is weak. Russia also has underpaid scientists, and there is unquestionably some truth behind all the stories one hears about the smuggling that goes on in that country. But very little Russian plutonium has been in circulation, with not a single reported case of anything more than gram quantities showing up on the black market. This makes sense. Pure plutonium is used primarily for making nuclear warheads, it is in military hands, and military forces are not exactly keen to see it come back at them in somebody else's bombs. One source of pure plutonium that is not military is a new kind of reactor fuel called "mixed oxide." It is very different from the present generation of fuel because it contains weapon-ready material. But precisely because it is weapon-ready, it is guarded and accounted for, and a terrorist group would have to win a gun battle to get close to it. Then they would probably need a crane to move it, and would have to elude or fight off their pursuers.

A2: Pakistan

Can’t steal or buy from Pakistan

Milhollin ’02

(Gary,- director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control “Can Terrorists Get the Bomb?” http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/articles/2002/terror-bomb.htm)

What about getting material from Pakistan? Its centrifuges have been turning out bomb-grade uranium since 1986, and by now there is enough for 30 to 50 nuclear weapons. As is well known, at least some of its nuclear scientists have fundamentalist leanings. Could they spirit out enough for a bomb or two? The chances are virtually nil. Pakistan's nuclear weapons are its proudest achievement. Every gram of bomb-grade uranium has been produced at the expense of the country's suffering population, and every gram is also part of a continuous manufacturing flow. When uranium leaves the centrifuges, it goes to other plants where it is refined and then to still other plants where it is made into bombs. Pakistan produces enough for about three bombs per year, which means that one bomb's worth is the result of several months' output. If any uranium went missing, it would be as if the assembly workers for Ford Explorers suddenly stopped receiving engines. Someone down the production line would be bound to ask questions, and very quickly. There is also the fact that Pakistan's nuclear program is controlled by the army, still headed by the country's president, Pervez Musharraf. In response to the September 11 terrorist attack on America, Musharraf created a new military command with direct control over the nuclear-weapons program. In the process, he sidelined officers sympathetic to the Taliban. After all these precautions, Musharraf is unlikely to let any bomb fuel slip through his fingers. The only possibility for terrorists to lay their hands on Pakistan's uranium would be if its government fell under the control of sympathizers; given that Pakistan's army is far and away the most effective and stable organization in the country, there is not much chance of that.

A2: Retaliation

Retaliation won’t escalate

Schuler ’04

(David,- political commentator, writer and author of the award winning “Glittering Eye” “Restating the U. S. policy of nuclear deterrence” <http://theglitteringeye.com/wp-trackback.php?p=459>)

 A nuclear response to a nuclear terrorist attack is terrorism. There’s no generally accepted definition of terrorism so before tackling this point I’ll propose one. Ignoring the issue of state actors vs. non-state actors I think that a terrorist attack is an attack on civilians or civilian assets whose purpose is to provoke terror. It has no other tactical or strategic significance. Any nuclear response by the United States would be against military or governmental facilities, sites involved in military production, or command and control. The objective would be to eliminate the possibility of future attacks or the support for those who would engage in future attacks. That such a response would inevitably result in massive civilian casualties is sad. But such a response would not, by definition, be terrorism A nuclear retaliation Iran in response to a terrorist nuclear attack would inevitably draw France, Russia, and China to enter the conflict. To believe this you must believe that France, Russia, and China will act irrationally. There is absolutely no reason to believe that this is the case. All three nations know that their intervention against the U. S. would result in total annihilation. There are other issues as well and let’s examine the two distinct cases: Russia on the one hand and France and China on the other. As a major non-Gulf producer of oil Russia would be in a position to benefit enormously in case of a disruption of Gulf oil production or shipment. That being the case they would publicly deplore a retaliation against Iran but privately rejoice.\_ Both France and China are in an extremely delicate position. A nuclear response by either would result in total annihilation and, equally importantly, wouldn’t keep the oil flowing. Lack of a blue water navy means that both nations are completely at the mercy of the United States’s (or more specifically the U. S. Navy’s) willingness to keep shipments of oil moving out of the Gulf. China is particularly vulnerable since it has only about two weeks’ worth of strategic oil reserves. Neither France nor China has any real ability to project military force other than nuclear force beyond their borders. They’d be upset. But they’re in no position to do anything about it.

No retaliation --- Political opposition

Bremmer ’04

(Ian, 9-13-2004, New Statesman, “Suppose a new 9/11 hit America”)

What would happen if there were a new terrorist attack inside the United States on 11 September 2004? How would it affect the presidential election campaign? The conventional wisdom is that Americans - their patriotic defiance aroused - would rally to President George W Bush and make him an all but certain winner in November. But consider the differences between the context of the original 9/11 and that of any attack which might occur this autumn. In 2001, the public reaction was one of disbelief and incomprehension. Many Americans realised for the first time that large-scale terrorist attacks on US soil were not only conceivable; they were, perhaps, inevitable. A majority focused for the first time on the threat from al-Qaeda, on the Taliban and on the extent to which Saudis were involved in terrorism. This time, the public response would move much more quickly from shock to anger; debate over how America should respond would begin immediately. Yet it is difficult to imagine how the Bush administration could focus its response on an external enemy. Should the US send 50,000 troops to the Afghan-Pakistani border to intensify the hunt for Osama Bin Laden and 'step up' efforts to attack the heart of al-Qaeda? Many would wonder if that wasn't what the administration pledged to do after the attacks three years ago. The president would face intensified criticism from those who have argued all along that Iraq was a distraction from 'the real war on terror'. And what if a significant number of the terrorists responsible for the pre-election attack were again Saudis? The Bush administration could hardly take military action against the Saudi government at a time when crude-oil prices are already more than $45 a barrel and global supply is stretched to the limit. While the Saudi royal family might support a co-ordinated attack against terrorist camps, real or imagined, near the Yemeni border - where recent searches for al-Qaeda have concentrated - that would seem like a trivial, insufficient retaliation for an attack on the US mainland. Remember how the Republicans criticised Bill Clinton's administration for ineffectually 'bouncing the rubble' in Afghanistan after the al-Qaeda attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in the 1990s. So what kind of response might be credible? Washington's concerns about Iran are rising. The 9/11 commission report noted evidence of co-operation between Iran and al-Qaeda operatives, if not direct Iranian advance knowledge of the 9/11 hijacking plot. Over the past few weeks, US officials have been more explicit, too, in declaring Iran's nuclear programme 'unacceptable'. However, in the absence of an official Iranian claim of responsibility for this hypothetical terrorist attack, the domestic opposition to such a war and the international outcry it would provoke would make quick action against Iran unthinkable. In short, a decisive response from Bush could not be external. It would have to be domestic. Instead of Donald Rumsfeld, the defence secretary, leading a war effort abroad, Tom Ridge, the homeland security secretary, and John Ashcroft, the attorney general, would pursue an anti-terror campaign at home. Forced to use legal tools more controversial than those provided by the Patriot Act, Americans would experience stepped-up domestic surveillance and border controls, much tighter security in public places and the detention of a large number of suspects. Many Americans would undoubtedly support such moves. But concern for civil liberties and personal freedom would ensure that the government would have nowhere near the public support it enjoyed for the invasion of Afghanistan.

\*\*\*Bioterrorism\*\*\*

Bioterrorism 1NC

No impact to Bio-terrorism --- Public health checks epidemics

Easterbrook ’02

(Gregg,- “'Weapons of Mass Destruction' Meaningless” <http://www.why-> war.com/news/2002/10/07/weaponso.html)

Note that bioweapons have done steadily less harm in recent times, as public health infrastructure has improved. When the Aralsk smallpox outbreak happened, for example, Soviet officials moved rapidly to vaccinate the 50,000 people closest to the area; this stopped the disease, giving it no vulnerable hosts to jump to. Ebola had no impact in the United States in 1989, and anthrax had relatively little impact in 2001, because the releases occurred in areas of high public health and excellent health care services; the pathogens were rapidly isolated and antibiotics were given. In a world of ever-better public health (in the West, at least), using a bioweapon is like shooting a gun at someone wearing a bulletproof vest--the bullet is still dangerous, but there is a reasonable chance it will bounce off.

Terrorists don’t want bio-weapons

Paranchi ’01

(John, Analyst, RAND Corporation, “Anthrax Attacks, Biological Terrorism, and Preventive

Responses,” RAND TESTIMONY, November, p. 11-12 Available from the World Wide Web at: www.rand.org/publications/CT/CT186/CT186.pdf)

The use of disease and biological material as a weapon is not a new method of warfare. What is surprising is how infrequently it is has been used. Biological agents may appeal to the new terrorist groups because they affect people indiscriminately and unnoticed, thereby sowing panic. A pattern is emerging that terrorists who perpetrate mass and indiscriminate attacks do not claim responsibility.5 In contrast to the turgid manifestos issued by terrorists in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, recent mass casualty terrorists have not claimed responsibility until they were imprisoned. Biological agents enable terrorists to preserve their anonymity because of their delayed impact and can be confused with natural disease outbreaks. Instead of the immediate gratification of seeing an explosion or the glory of claiming credit for disrupting society, the biological weapons terrorist may derive satisfaction from seeing society’s panicked response to their actions. If this is the case, this is a new motive for the mass casualty terrorist. There are a number of countervailing disincentives for states and terrorists to use biological weapons, which help explain why their use is so infrequent. The technical and operational challenges biological weapons pose are considerable. Acquiring the material, skills of production, knowledge of weaponization, and successfully delivering the weapon, to the target is difficult. In cases where the populations of the terrorist supporters and adversaries are mixed, biological weapons risk inadvertently hitting the same people for whom terrorists claim to fight. Terrorists may also hesitate in using biological weapons specifically because breaking the taboo on their use may evoke considerable retaliation. The use of disease as a weapon is widely recognized in most cultures as a means of killing that is beyond the bounds of a civilized society. From a psychological perspective, terrorists may be drawn to explosives as arsonists are drawn to fire. The immediate gratification of explosives and the thrill of the blast may meet a psychological need of terrorists that the delayed effects of biological weapons do not. Causing slow death of others may not offer the same psychic thrill achieved by killing with firearms or explosives. Perhaps the greatest alternative to using biological weapons is that terrorists can inflict (and have inflicted) many more fatalities and casualties with conventional explosives than with unconventional weapons. Biological weapons present technical and operational challenges that determined killers may not have the patience to overcome or they may simply concentrate their efforts on more readily available alternatives.

Bioterrorism 1NC

Technical challenges

National Journal ’05

(April 23, lexis)

On the other hand, critics argue that some experts have oversimplified the significant technical challenges to building catastrophic biological weapons and have overestimated the abilities of terrorist groups to overcome them. "How do you kill a lot of people? There, you've got to get involved with airborne, deadly pathogens such as Bacillus anthracis spores, and that's fairly technically demanding to do," Zilinskas said. Potential difficulties, experts say, include obtaining proper equipment and an appropriate strain of pathogen; storing and handling the pathogen properly; growing it to produce a greater quantity; processing it to develop the desirable characteristics; testing it; and dispersing it. A terrorist group would need to have suitably educated and knowledgeable people, and sufficient time and freedom from government scrutiny, to do the work, they say. Potentially the toughest challenge, experts say, is "weaponization" -- processing an agent to the point that it can resist environmental stresses, survive dissemination, and increase its ability to infect (pathogenicity) and to harm (toxicity). This is particularly true if the terrorists want to spray the agent, which is a more effective approach for a mass attack than spreading an agent through human-to-human contact. "While collection and purification knowledge is widespread among ordinary scientists, weaponization is obviously a military subject, and much of the knowledge that surrounds it is classified," wrote Danzig, who believes that terrorists nevertheless might be able to develop catastrophic biological weapons. The key difficulty for producing an aerosolized weapon, Danzig said, "would be to produce a pathogen formulation in sizes that would be within the human respiratory range and that could be reliably stored, handled, and spread as a stable aerosol rather than clump and fall to the ground. Mastering these somewhat contradictory requirements is tricky... The challenge becomes greater as attackers seek higher concentrations of agent and higher efficiency in dissemination." Stanford's Chyba agrees on the difficulties of weaponization. "Aerosolization is clearly [a] serious hurdle. I just find it hard, currently, to imagine a Qaeda offshoot -- or, for that matter, any of the current non-state groups that I have read about -- being technically proficient in that."

Public Health Checks 2NC

Prefer empirical evidence

Easterbrook ’02

(Gregg,- “'Weapons of Mass Destruction' Meaningless” <http://www.why-> war.com/news/2002/10/07/weaponso.html)

That is the public perception of biological weapons. Here is what has happened in actual use: In 1971 smallpox from the old Soviet bioweapons program got loose in Aralsk, Kazakhstan, a place with terribly low public health standards--life expectancy for men at birth was just 40 years. Despite these seemingly ideal conditions for a runaway plague, the smallpox killed a total of three people. In 1979 an explosion at a Soviet bioweapons plant near Sverdlovsk (now called Ekaterinburg), also a place with poor public health, released a large quantity of weapons-grade anthrax spores into the air. The anthrax killed 68 people. In 1989, monkeys carrying the Ebola virus were accidentally shipped to a government facility in Reston, Virginia, just outside Washington. Workers at the facility were exposed to the virus and then moved freely among friends and family for several days before the situation was discovered. This event--the subject of Preston's book The Hot Zone--has since been discussed as if it showed how vulnerable the United States is to bioterrorism. Usually skipped over in such discussions, however, is that the Ebola loosed near the nation's capital in 1989 did not cause a single death.

Technical Barriers 2NC

**Multiple technical barriers to effective bioterrorism**

Mueller ’06

(John, terrorism expert “Overblown”)

Properly developed and deployed, biological weapons could indeed, if thus far only in theory, kill hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions of people. The discussion remains theoretical because biological weapons have scarcely ever been used. Belligerents have eschewed such weapons with good reason: they are extremely difficult to deploy and to control. Terrorist groups or rogie states may be able to solve such problems in the future with advances in technology and knowledge, but, notes scientist Russell Seitz, while bioterrorism may look easy on paper, “the learning curve is lethally steep in practice.” The record so far is unlikely to be very encouraging. For example, Japan reportedly infected wells in Manchuria and bombed several Chinese cities with plague-infested fleas before and during World War II. These ventures (by a state, not a terrorist group) may have killed thousands of Chinese, but they apparently also caused considerable unintended casualties among Japanese troops and seem to have had little military impact.

For the most destructive results, biological weapons need to be dispersed in very low-altitude aerosol clouds. Because aerosols do not appreciably settle, pathogens like anthrax (which is not easy to spread or catch and is not contagious) would probably have to be sprayed near nose level. Moreover, 90 percent of the microorganisms are likely to die during the process of aerosolization, and their effectiveness could be reduced still further by sunlight, smog, humidity, and the temperature changes. Explosive methods of dispersion may destroy the organisms and, except for anthrax spores, long-term storage of lethal organisms in bombs or warheads is difficult: even if refrigerated, most of the organisms have a limited lifetime. The effects of such weapons can take days or weeks to have full effect, during which time they can be countered with medical and civil defense measures. And their impact is very difficult to predict; in combat situations they may spread back onto the attacker. In the judgment of two careful analysis, delivering microbes and toxins over a wide area in the form most suitable for inflicting mass casualties--- as an aerosol that can be inhaled---requires a delivery syste whose development “would outstrip the technical capabilities of all but the most sophisticated terrorist.” Even then effective dispersal could easily be disrupted by unfavorable environmental and meteorological conditions.