# no impact--terrorism

[TERRORISM WON’T HAPPEN—GENERAL 1](#_Toc267906276)

[TERRORISM WON’T HAPPEN—AL QUEDA 3](#_Toc267906277)

[A2: 9-11 4](#_Toc267906278)

[A2: “TERORISTS ARE JUST BUSY” 6](#_Toc267906280)

[TERRORISTS DON’T WANT WMD 7](#_Toc267906281)

[A2: AL QUEDA WANTS NUKES 8](#_Toc267906282)

[A2: CAN’T DETER TERRORISM 9](#_Toc267906283)

[A2: TERRORISTS ARE CRAZY 10](#_Toc267906284)

[A2: TERRORIST ATTACK VS. ISRAEL 11](#_Toc267906285)

[A2: TERRORIST ATTACK VS. RUSSIA/ISRAEL 12](#_Toc267906286)

[TERRORISTS CAN’T GET NUKES—GENERAL 13](#_Toc267906287)

[CAN’T STEAL NUKES 14](#_Toc267906288)

[A2: WILL STEAL FROM RUSSIA 15](#_Toc267906289)

[A2: RUSSIAN TACTICALS 18](#_Toc267906292)

[A2: “LOOSE NUKES” 19](#_Toc267906293)

[RUSSIA THREAT CONSTRUCTION LINK 20](#_Toc267906294)

[A2: BLACK MARKET 21](#_Toc267906295)

[A2: SMUGGLING UNDERREPORTED 23](#_Toc267906297)

[CAN’T BUILD NUKES 24](#_Toc267906298)

[A2: WILL GET FISSILE MATERIAL 26](#_Toc267906300)

[A2: CAN STEAL PLUTONIUM 27](#_Toc267906301)

[A2: CAN STEAL REACTOR FUEL 28](#_Toc267906302)

[A2: WILL GET COMPLETE WARHEAD 29](#_Toc267906303)

[STATES WILL NOT GIVE NUKES 30](#_Toc267906304)

[A2: IRAN WILL GIVE NUKES 31](#_Toc267906305)

[STATES WILL NOT SPONSOR 32](#_Toc267906306)

[A2: IRAN/DPRK WILL SPONSOR 33](#_Toc267906307)

[A2: NUKE TERROR=EXTINCTION 34](#_Toc267906308)

[A2: U.S. RETALIATION 36](#_Toc267906309)

[A2: U.S. BOMBS MECCA 39](#_Toc267906312)

[NUCLEAR WAR OUTWEIGHS TERRORISM 40](#_Toc267906313)

[A2: TERRORISTS CAN CONCEAL NUKES 41](#_Toc267906314)

[A2: BIOWEAPONS—GENERAL 42](#_Toc267906315)

[NO IMPACT TO BIOWEAPONS 44](#_Toc267906317)

[A2: SMALLPOX 45](#_Toc267906318)

[A2: EBOLA 46](#_Toc267906319)

[A2: CHEMICAL WEAPONS 47](#_Toc267906320)

# TERRORISM WON’T HAPPEN—GENERAL

**If their terrorism arguments were correct attacks would already be happening—experts, government officials, and media outlets are all wrong—dangerous terrorist networks have been destroyed**

MUELLER 2006 (John, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct)

For the past five years, Americans have been regularly regaled with dire predictions of another major al Qaeda attack in the United States. In 2003, a group of 200 senior government officials and business executives, many of them specialists in security and terrorism, pronounced it likely that a terrorist strike more devastating than 9/11 -- possibly involving weapons of mass destruction -- would occur before the end of 2004. In May 2004, Attorney General John Ashcroft warned that al Qaeda could "hit hard" in the next few months and said that 90 percent of the arrangements for an attack on U.S. soil were complete. That fall, Newsweek reported that it was "practically an article of faith among counterterrorism officials" that al Qaeda would strike in the run-up to the November 2004 election. When that "October surprise" failed to materialize, the focus shifted: a taped encyclical from Osama bin Laden, it was said, demonstrated that he was too weak to attack before the election but was marshalling his resources to do so months after it. On the first page of its founding manifesto, the massively funded Department of Homeland Security intones, "Today's terrorists can strike at any place, at any time, and with virtually any weapon." But if it is so easy to pull off an attack and if terrorists are so demonically competent, why have they not done it? Why have they not been sniping at people in shopping centers, collapsing tunnels, poisoning the food supply, cutting electrical lines, derailing trains, blowing up oil pipelines, causing massive traffic jams, or exploiting the countless other vulnerabilities that, according to security experts, could so easily be exploited? One reasonable explanation is that almost no terrorists exist in the United States and few have the means or the inclination to strike from abroad. But this explanation is rarely offered.

**Terrorism is exaggerated—the death toll since 9-11 is extremely low**

**MUELLER 2006** (John, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct)

But while keeping such potential dangers in mind, it is worth remembering that the total number of people killed since 9/11 by al Qaeda or al Qaeda­like operatives outside of Afghanistan and Iraq is not much higher than the number who drown in bathtubs in the United States in a single year, and that the lifetime chance of an American being killed by international terrorism is about one in 80,000 -- about the same chance of being killed by a comet or a meteor. Even if there were a 9/11-scale attack every three months for the next five years, the likelihood that an individual American would number among the dead would be two hundredths of a percent (or one in 5,000). Although it remains heretical to say so, the evidence so far suggests that fears of the omnipotent terrorist -- reminiscent of those inspired by images of the 20-foot-tall Japanese after Pearl Harbor or the 20-foot-tall Communists at various points in the Cold War (particularly after Sputnik) -- may have been overblown, the threat presented within the United States by al Qaeda greatly exaggerated. The massive and expensive homeland security apparatus erected since 9/11 may be persecuting some, spying on many, inconveniencing most, and taxing all to defend the United States against an enemy that scarcely exists.

**No terrorism – hard to pull off, not many terrorists, and small attacks don’t cut it**

**Schneier** **5-5-2010** - masters degree in computer science from American University, chief technology officer and founder of BT Counterpane Internet Security (Bruce, “Why Aren't There More Terrorist Attacks?”, Schneier on Security, May 5th, <http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/05/why_arent_there.html>)

As the details of the Times Square car bomb attempt emerge in the wake of Faisal Shahzad's arrest Monday night, one thing has already been made clear: Terrorism is fairly easy. All you need is a gun or a bomb, and a crowded target. Guns are easy to buy. Bombs are easy to make. Crowded targets -- not only in New York, but all over the country -- are easy to come by. If you're willing to die in the aftermath of your attack, you could launch a pretty effective terrorist attack with a few days of planning, maybe less. But if it's so easy, why aren't there more terrorist attacks like the failed car bomb in New York's Times Square? Or the terrorist shootings in Mumbai? Or the Moscow subway bombings? After the enormous horror and tragedy of 9/11, why have the past eight years been so safe in the U.S.? There are actually several answers to this question. One, terrorist attacks are harder to pull off than popular imagination -- and the movies -- lead everyone to believe. Two, there are far fewer terrorists than the political rhetoric of the past eight years leads everyone to believe. And three, random minor terrorist attacks don't serve Islamic terrorists' interests right now. Hard to Pull Off Terrorism sounds easy, but the actual attack is the easiest part. Putting together the people, the plot and the materials is hard. It's hard to sneak terrorists into the U.S. It's hard to grow your own inside the U.S. It's hard to operate; the general population, even the Muslim population, is against you. Movies and television make terrorist plots look easier than they are. It's hard to hold conspiracies together. It's easy to make a mistake. Even 9/11, which was planned before the climate of fear that event engendered, just barely succeeded. Today, it's much harder to pull something like that off without slipping up and getting arrested. Few Terrorists But even more important than the difficulty of executing a terrorist attack, there aren't a lot of terrorists out there. Al-Qaida isn't a well-organized global organization with movie-plot-villain capabilities; it's a loose collection of people using the same name. Despite the post-9/11 rhetoric, there isn't a terrorist cell in every major city. If you think about the major terrorist plots we've foiled in the U.S. -- the JFK bombers, the Fort Dix plotters -- they were mostly amateur terrorist wannabes with no connection to any sort of al-Qaida central command, and mostly no ability to effectively carry out the attacks they planned. The successful terrorist attacks -- the Fort Hood shooter, the guy who flew his plane into the Austin IRS office, the anthrax mailer -- were largely nut cases operating alone. Even the unsuccessful shoe bomber, and the equally unsuccessful Christmas Day underwear bomber, had minimal organized help -- and that help originated outside the U.S. Terrorism doesn't occur without terrorists, and they are far rarer than popular opinion would have it. Small Attacks Aren't Enough Lastly, and perhaps most subtly, there's not a lot of value in unspectacular terrorism anymore. If you think about it, terrorism is essentially a PR stunt. The death of innocents and the destruction of property isn't the goal of terrorism; it's just the tactic used. And acts of terrorism are intended for two audiences: for the victims, who are supposed to be terrorized as a result, and for the allies and potential allies of the terrorists, who are supposed to give them more funding and generally support their efforts. An act of terrorism that doesn't instill terror in the target population is a failure, even if people die. And an act of terrorism that doesn't impress the terrorists' allies is not very effective, either. Fortunately for us and unfortunately for the terrorists, 9/11 upped the stakes. It's no longer enough to blow up something like the Oklahoma City Federal Building. Terrorists need to blow up airplanes or the Brooklyn Bridge or the Sears Tower or JFK airport -- something big to impress the folks back home. Small no-name targets just don't cut it anymore. Note that this is very different than terrorism by an occupied population: the IRA in Northern Ireland, Iraqis in Iraq, Palestinians in Israel. Setting aside the actual politics, all of these terrorists believe they are repelling foreign invaders. That's not the situation here in the U.S. So, to sum up: If you're just a loner wannabe who wants to go out with a bang, terrorism is easy. You're more likely to get caught if you take a long time to plan or involve a bunch of people, but you might succeed. If you're a representative of al-Qaida trying to make a statement in the U.S., it's much harder. You just don't have the people, and you're probably going to slip up and get caught.

# TERRORISM WON’T HAPPEN—AL QUEDA

Terrorist attacks would be easy, but they still haven’t occurred—Al Qaeda is weak, incompetent, or no longer a threat

MUELLER 2006 (John, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct)

Instead, Americans are told -- often by the same people who had once predicted imminent attacks -- that the absence of international terrorist strikes in the United States is owed to the protective measures so hastily and expensively put in place after 9/11. But there is a problem with this argument. True, there have been no terrorist incidents in the United States in the last five years. But nor were there any in the five years before the 9/11 attacks, at a time when the United States was doing much less to protect itself. It would take only one or two guys with a gun or an explosive to terrorize vast numbers of people, as the sniper attacks around Washington, D.C., demonstrated in 2002. Accordingly, the government's protective measures would have to be nearly perfect to thwart all such plans. Given the monumental imperfection of the government's response to Hurricane Katrina, and the debacle of FBI and National Security Agency programs to upgrade their computers to better coordinate intelligence information, that explanation seems far-fetched. Moreover, Israel still experiences terrorism even with a far more extensive security apparatus. It may well have become more difficult for terrorists to get into the country, but, as thousands demonstrate each day, it is far from impossible. Immigration procedures have been substantially tightened (at considerable cost), and suspicious U.S. border guards have turned away a few likely bad apples. But visitors and immigrants continue to flood the country. There are over 300 million legal entries by foreigners each year, and illegal crossings number between 1,000 and 4,000 a day -- to say nothing of the generous quantities of forbidden substances that the government has been unable to intercept or even detect despite decades of a strenuous and well-funded "war on drugs." Every year, a number of people from Muslim countries -- perhaps hundreds -- are apprehended among the illegal flow from Mexico, and many more probably make it through. Terrorism does not require a large force. And the 9/11 planners, assuming Middle Eastern males would have problems entering the United States legally after the attack, put into motion plans to rely thereafter on non-Arabs with passports from Europe and Southeast Asia. If al Qaeda operatives are as determined and inventive as assumed, they should be here by now. If they are not yet here, they must not be trying very hard or must be far less dedicated, diabolical, and competent than the common image would suggest.

**Al Qaeda is not just biding its time—it would have attacked already**

**MUELLER 2006** (John, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct)

Another common explanation is that al Qaeda is craftily biding its time. But what for? The 9/11 attacks took only about two years to prepare. The carefully coordinated, very destructive, and politically productive terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 were conceived, planned from scratch, and then executed all within six months; the bombs were set off less than two months after the conspirators purchased their first supplies of dynamite, paid for with hashish. (Similarly, Timothy McVeigh's attack in Oklahoma City in 1995 took less than a year to plan.) Given the extreme provocation of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, one would think that terrorists might be inclined to shift their timetable into higher gear. And if they are so patient, why do they continually claim that another attack is just around the corner? It was in 2003 that al Qaeda's top leaders promised attacks in Australia, Bahrain, Egypt, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Yemen. Three years later, some bombs had gone off in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, and Jordan (as well as in the unlisted Turkey) but not in any other of the explicitly threatened countries. Those attacks were tragic, but their sparseness could be taken as evidence that it is not only American alarmists who are given to extravagant huffing and puffing.

# A2: 9-11

**Al Qaeda realizes that september 11 was counterproductive—attacks have alienated allies and even hostile governments are cracking down on terrorism all over the world**

**MUELLER 2006** (John, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct)

One reason al Qaeda and "al Qaeda types" seem not to be trying very hard to repeat 9/11 may be that that dramatic act of destruction itself proved counterproductive by massively heightening concerns about terrorism around the world. No matter how much they might disagree on other issues (most notably on the war in Iraq), there is a compelling incentive for states -- even ones such as Iran, Libya, Sudan, and Syria -- to cooperate in cracking down on al Qaeda, because they know that they could easily be among its victims. The FBI may not have uncovered much of anything within the United States since 9/11, but thousands of apparent terrorists have been rounded, or rolled, up overseas with U.S. aid and encouragement. Although some Arabs and Muslims took pleasure in the suffering inflicted on 9/11 -- Schadenfreude in German, shamateh in Arabic -- the most common response among jihadists and religious nationalists was a vehement rejection of al Qaeda's strategy and methods. When Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in 1979, there were calls for jihad everywhere in Arab and Muslim lands, and tens of thousands flocked to the country to fight the invaders. In stark contrast, when the U.S. military invaded in 2001 to topple an Islamist regime, there was, as the political scientist Fawaz Gerges points out, a "deafening silence" from the Muslim world, and only a trickle of jihadists went to fight the Americans. Other jihadists publicly blamed al Qaeda for their post-9/11 problems and held the attacks to be shortsighted and hugely miscalculated. The post-9/11 willingness of governments around the world to take on international terrorists has been much reinforced and amplified by subsequent, if scattered, terrorist activity outside the United States. Thus, a terrorist bombing in Bali in 2002 galvanized the Indonesian government into action. Extensive arrests and convictions -- including of leaders who had previously enjoyed some degree of local fame and political popularity -- seem to have severely degraded the capacity of the chief jihadist group in Indonesia, Jemaah Islamiyah. After terrorists attacked Saudis in Saudi Arabia in 2003, that country, very much for self-interested reasons, became considerably more serious about dealing with domestic terrorism; it soon clamped down on radical clerics and preachers. Some rather inept terrorist bombings in Casablanca in 2003 inspired a similarly determined crackdown by Moroccan authorities. And the 2005 bombing in Jordan of a wedding at a hotel (an unbelievably stupid target for the terrorists) succeeded mainly in outraging the Jordanians: according to a Pew poll, the percentage of the population expressing a lot of confidence in bin Laden to "do the right thing" dropped from 25 percent to less than one percent after the attack.

**The threat of terrorism is exaggerated—September 11 was a last desperate strike as jihadist movements were renouncing violence**

**MUELLER 2006** (John, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct)

The results of policing activity overseas suggest that the absence of results in the United States has less to do with terrorists' cleverness or with investigative incompetence than with the possibility that few, if any, terrorists exist in the country. It also suggests that al Qaeda's ubiquity and capacity to do damage may have, as with so many perceived threats, been exaggerated. Just because some terrorists may wish to do great harm does not mean that they are able to. Gerges argues that mainstream Islamists -- who make up the vast majority of the Islamist political movement -- gave up on the use of force before 9/11, except perhaps against Israel, and that the jihadists still committed to violence constitute a tiny minority. Even this small group primarily focuses on various "infidel" Muslim regimes and considers jihadists who carry out violence against the "far enemy" -- mainly Europe and the United States -- to be irresponsible, reckless adventurers who endanger the survival of the whole movement. In this view, 9/11 was a sign of al Qaeda's desperation, isolation, fragmentation, and decline, not of its strength.

# A2: 9-11

**Their impact is political spin—catastrophic terrorism is so difficult that 9-11 is a tragic aberration, not a harbinger of worse attacks**

**MUELLER 2004** (John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center at Ohio State University, Regulation, Fall)

Obviously, this condition could change if international terrorists are able to assemble sufficient weaponry or devise new tactics to kill masses of people, and if they come to do so routinely. That, of course, is the central fear. As during the Cold War, commentators are adept at spinning out elaborate doomsday and worst-case scenarios. However, although not impossible, it would take massive efforts and even more stupendous luck for terrorists regularly to visit substantial destruction upon the United States. HISTORICAL RECORD It should be kept in mind that September 11 continues to stand out as an extreme event. Until then, and since then, no more than 329 people have ever been killed in a single terrorist attack (in a 1985 Air India explosion). And extreme events often remain exactly that — aberrations, rather than harbingers. A bomb planted in a piece of checked luggage was responsible for the explosion that caused a Pan Am jet to crash into Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, killing 270 people. Since that time, hundreds of billions of pieces of luggage have been transported on American carriers and none have exploded to down an aircraft. (And millions of passengers who checked bags at hotels and retrieved them before heading to the airport have routinely lied to airline agents when answering the obligatory question about whether their luggage had at all times been in their possession.) This does not mean that one should cease worrying about luggage on airlines, but it does suggest that extreme events do not necessarily assure repetition any more than Timothy McVeigh’s Oklahoma City bombing of 1995 has. Since its alarming release of poison gas in the Tokyo subway in 1995, the apocalyptic group Aum Shinrikyo appears to have abandoned the terrorism business and its example has not been followed. Some sort of terrorist inoculated Tylenol capsules with cyanide in 1982, killing seven people. However, that frightening and much-publicized event (it generated 125,000 stories in the print media alone and cost the manufacturer more than $1 billion) failed to inspire much in the way of imitation.

# A2: “TERORISTS ARE JUST BUSY”

**Invasion of Afghanistan is not responsible for the absence of terrorist attacks on the U.S.**

**MUELLER 2006** (John, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct)

Another popular explanation for the fact that there have been no more attacks asserts that the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, although it never managed to snag bin Laden, severely disrupted al Qaeda and its operations. But this claim is similarly unconvincing. The 2004 train bombings in Madrid were carried out by a tiny group of men who had never been to Afghanistan, much less to any of al Qaeda's training camps. They pulled off a coordinated nonsuicidal attack with 13 remote-controlled bombs, ten of which went off on schedule, killing 191 and injuring more than 1,800. The experience with that attack, as well as with the London bombings of 2005, suggests that, as the former U.S. counterterrorism officials Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon have noted, for a terrorist attack to succeed, "all that is necessary are the most portable, least detectable tools of the terrorist trade: ideas."

**Iraq does not account for the lack of terrorist attacks against the U.S.**

**MUELLER 2006** (John, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct)

It is also sometimes suggested that the terrorists are now too busy killing Americans and others in Iraq to devote the time, manpower, or energy necessary to pull off similar deeds in the United States. But terrorists with al Qaeda sympathies or sensibilities have managed to carry out attacks in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere in the past three years; not every single potential bomb thrower has joined the fray in Iraq.

# TERRORISTS DON’T WANT WMD

**Terrorists don’t want WMD**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

Psychotic terrorist killers. The overwhelming majority of terrorists are as psychologically healthy, rational and intelligent as the rest of us; indeed, mentally ill terrorists would be far less dangerous and much easier to deal with. Terrorists are typically neither psychopathic nor psychotic, nor are they driven by mere bloodlust. Furthermore, terrorists have not historically been particularly interested in WMD, and no terrorist use of WMD of any kind has resulted in mass casualties, unless the airliners used in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 (‘9/11’) count as weapons of mass destruction. States, on the other hand, have used WMD to great effect. This is not to say that terrorists are not interested in killing large numbers of people; clearly, some are. Much of the concern about nuclear terrorism derives from the reasonable fear that al-Qaeda might be planning an attack even more lethal than those of 9/11. However, neither al-Qaeda nor any of the organisations linked to it has ever used WMD, and the evidence that they have the will or technical capacity to do so is limited and unconvincing.

**Terrorists have only used low-tech weapons—this won’t change**

**MUELLER 2004** (John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon

Center at Ohio State University, Regulation, Fall)

A central issue, however, is whether such spectacularly destructive terrorist acts will become commonplace. Although there have been many deadly terrorist incidents in the world since 2001, all (thus far, at least) have relied on conventional methods and have not remotely challenged September 11 quantitatively. If, as some purported experts repeatedly claim, chemical and biological attacks are so easy and attractive to terrorists, it is impressive that none have so far been used in Israel (where four times as many people die from automobile accidents as from terrorism). Actually, it is somewhat strange that so much emphasis has been put on the dangers of high-tech weapons in the first place. Some of that anxiety may come from the post-September 11 anthrax scare, even though that event killed only a few people. The bombings of September 11, by contrast, were remarkably low-tech and could have happened long ago; both skyscrapers and airplanes have been around for a century now.

**Terrorists won’t seek nuclear weapons**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

It is important to remember that terrorists, with the possible exception of al-Qaeda, are not known for their great tactical innovation. The traditional tools of terrorism – hostage-taking, bombings, shoot-and-run sniper attacks – have only relatively recently been expanded to include the use of suicide bombers, and even suicide bombs are only a particularly unpleasant and vicious variation on an older theme. Terrorists in general probably share the same ignorance and fear of WMD prevalent in the broader population, and probably see little reason to turn to unknown, possibly unpredictable and certainly dangerous substances and techniques when the older tactics have proved themselves to be simple, reliable and cheap – or so, at least, we hope.

# A2: AL QUEDA WANTS NUKES

**Al-Qaeda does not have nuclear capabilities—past evidence shows they won’t use nuclear attacks**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

From time to time, it has been rumored that al-Qaeda had acquired nuclear or radiological weapons. However, an ‘extensive analysis of open source information and interviews with knowledgeable officials’ concluded that there is ‘no credible evidence that either bin Laden or al-Qa’ida possesses nuclear weapons or sufficient fissile material to make them’, or that the organisation had any fissile materials at all. Claims that the organisation had bought a ‘suitcase nuke’ from the Kazakh state arsenal or from Chechen militants may simply indicate that it has been defrauded of large amounts of money. There also seems to be no basis to rumours that the organisation had hired a number of ex-Soviet nuclear scientists. The idea of attacking nuclear power stations was raised in the early stages of the development of the 9/11 attacks, but was vetoed, apparently by bin Laden himself. As Tom Fingar, US Assistant Secretary of State for intelligence and research, has said: ‘We have seen no persuasive evidence that al-Qaida has obtained fissile material or ever has had a serious and sustained program to do so. At worst, the group possesses small amounts of radiological material that could be used to fabricate a radiological dispersion device.’

# A2: CAN’T DETER TERRORISM

**Even if terrorists themselves are not deterred, host and sponsor states would be**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

It has become a cliché to say that terrorists would not be directly deterred from using nuclear weapons by the threat of nuclear retaliation because their weapons have ‘no return address’. According to Admiral Richard W. Mies, commander-in-chief of US Strategic Command: ‘The post-Cold War world is a more chaotic place. Strategic deterrence, which worked well in the bipolar framework of the Cold War, may not work as well in a multipolar world of unpredictable, asymmetric threats, and in some cases, it may fail. How do you deter a threat that has no return address? How do you dissuade a threat that is faceless?’ This argument is narrowly correct in terms of modern transnational terrorist groups, which have not single host, sponsor or homeland. However, at least two important qualifications apply. First, while terrorist groups themselves might not be directly deterred by the threat of massive retaliation, host or sponsor states might be, and indeed should be, which could have an indirect or secondary deterrent effect on militant groups. Second, it may not in fact be impossible to trace a weapon to its source.

# A2: TERRORISTS ARE CRAZY

**Terrorists are rational and psychologically normal—extensive studies prove this**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

Popular and political rhetoric is full of descriptions of terrorists as ‘sick’, ‘crazy’, ‘psychopathic’, or even ‘psychotic’. This is a dangerously misleading notion that can seriously undermine our attempts to understand terrorist behaviour. Terrorist activity cannot be dismissed as ‘irrational’ and hence as pathological, unreasonable or inexplicable. The resort to terrorism need not be an aberration; it may be a reasonable and calculated response to circumstances. Most terrorists are psychologically normal and as rational as most other people: ‘Whilst many [terrorists] are violent, and most have committed horrific and sometimes barbaric crimes, few if any fit the image in any technical sense of an abnormal individual … Most active terrorists show few if any of the attributes of clinical abnormality. In a statistical sense, terrorists are not “normal”, by virtue of the lives they lead and the things they do. But there seems [sic] to be no discernible psychopathological qualities of terrorists that can identify them from others in the community from which they come.’ That terrorists do things that are abhorrent or incomprehensible to others says more about ordinary people than most of us are willing to admit, despite the overwhelming historical evidence that extreme violence, in the form of wars, genocide, murder and rape, is part of the common human heritage. Jerrold M. Post, the founder of the CIA’s Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior (CAPPB), agrees: ‘The author’s own comparative research on the psychology of terrorists does not reveal major psychopathology, and is in substantial agreement with the findings of Crenshaw that “the outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is their normality”. Her studies of the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Nigeria in the 1950s found the members to be basically normal. Nor did Heskin find members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) to be emotionally disturbed.’ In a review of the social psychology of terrorist groups, McCauley and Segal conclude that the best documented generalization is negative; terrorists do not show any striking psychopathology. Nor does a comparative study reveal a ‘particular psychological type, a particular personality constellation, a uniform terrorist mind’.

**Terrorists are not insane and they wouldn’t be effective if they were**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

Seriously disturbed people, especially those suffering from psychosis, usually have great difficulty in doing day-to-day tasks, like keeping a job, maintaining a household or staying healthy. Engaging in the demanding clandestine activities required by terrorism would simply be beyond the capabilities of a psychotic person. Moreover, people with serious mental illness could constitute a grave danger to ‘professional’ terrorist organisations, in the extremely unlikely event that they were recruited in the first place. Indeed, they are unlikely to be anything but an impediment and a security risk to any terrorist organisation. Even people with less serious disorders, such as depression or bipolar disorder, could be lethargic and unmotivated, or intermittently unpredictable and potentially uncontrollable. Personality disorders could affect the sufferer’s sense of loyalty or their reliability. In short, all of the factors that can make mental illness so disabling in the workplace and in daily life would also be at play in terrorist organisations, a situation further complicated by the need for strict discipline, secrecy and the ability to preserve a façade of normality while leading a double life.

# A2: TERRORIST ATTACK VS. ISRAEL

**Palestinian groups would not use nuclear weapons against Israel**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

More pragmatic calculations could influence whether a separatist group engages in mass-casualty or nuclear terrorism. Secessionist territories are, by definition, within the target state’s legal boundaries, and in many cases target and constituency populations are intermingled. Israeli and Palestinian or Israeli Arab populations, for example, are either intermingled or, where separated, so close to one another that a WMD attack on one would be very likely to affect the other. In the case of nuclear weapons, the fallout plume from an explosion in any of Israel’s major cities could easily reach the West Bank or Gaza. Other WMD are similarly indiscriminate. Any release of a biological agent in an Israeli city would be certain to affect Palestinians or Israeli Arabs.

# A2: TERRORIST ATTACK VS. RUSSIA/ISRAEL

**Terrorists wouldn’t use nuclear weapons against Russia or Israel—both countries have demonstrated the will to retaliate**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

In both the Palestinian and Chechen cases, would-be WMD terrorists would have to consider the threat of massive retaliation. Not only is Israel an unambiguous – albeit undeclared – nuclear-weapon state, it typically exacts disproportionate vengeance on Palestinians in response to even moderate attacks, which might deter any sane Palestinian. In the Chechen case, Moscow has repeatedly demonstrated that it is willing to use disproportionate force in dealing with domestic security threats. A nuclear attack by Chechen nationalists would provide a pretext for responding in kind and solving the Chechen problem once and for all. Even for Chechen nationalists, while there are some factors that increase the likelihood of nuclear terrorism, a sober calculation of the risks and benefits involved should show what an exceptionally dangerous move this would be.

# TERRORISTS CAN’T GET NUKES—GENERAL

**Terrorists can’t get nuclear weapons by any means**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

Nonetheless, there is considerable evidence that must inform this speculation and narrow its range. First, there are technical considerations. Assembling enough fissile material for even the crudest nuclear device – and the amounts needed vary inversely with sophistication – would be very difficult and probably extremely expensive for a terrorist organisation. The theoretical knowledge and practical skills required to design and build a nuclear weapon are of a high order, while setting up, equipping and successfully operating an undetectable clandestine weapons laboratory would be difficult and expensive, even for the best-funded terrorist organisation. Aum Shinrikyo, which operated relatively openly under Japanese laws regarding religious organisations that made it all-but-untouchable, and which had a billion-dollar war chest, gave up the attempt to develop a nuclear weapon very early on in the process, preferring to work with chemical and biological agents instead. The evidence, much of it admittedly negative, suggests that buying or stealing a functional nuclear weapon would be an even more difficult, perhaps impossible, task. Nuclear weapons are guarded like national treasures; indeed, nuclear weapons are in some sense national treasures, symbols of national strength and modernity bought at immense cost. No state that possessed them, whether established or ‘rogue’, would be likely to hand over such weapons to terrorists unless they were acting as mercenary agents of the state itself. The threat of nuclear retaliation, even if the possibility of tracing the weapon back to its source were thought to be low, should be enough to deter any rational state from using a nuclear weapon against another nuclear-weapon state, or a country under the protection of one.

# CAN’T STEAL NUKES

**Terrorists can’t steal a nuclear weapon–security is tight and the weapons are too complicated**

**ROTHSTEIN, AUER AND SIEGEL 2004** (Linda, editor, Catherine, managing editor, and Jonas, assistant editor of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, BAS, November/December, http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art\_ofn=nd04rothstein)

Of these, the first is the least likely. It would be extremely difficult for terrorists to acquire an intact weapon from one of the eight nuclear weapon states. The security of these weapons, especially those in Russia and Pakistan, is a valid concern. But to detonate an intact, stolen Russian nuke, a terrorist would have to get past security safeguards built into the weapon, such as authorization codes. And Pakistani nuclear weapons (believed to number up to 50) are reportedly stored separately from the weapons' cores. Besides the difficulties associated with obtaining a ready-made, good-to-go nuke, there would be other barriers--such as transporting and preparing to deliver it undetected. This is perhaps the lowest probability, highest consequence scenario of nuclear terrorism.

# A2: WILL STEAL FROM RUSSIA

**Russian nuclear security is strong**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

Russian nuclear weapons. Russian nuclear weapons appear to be under the generally good control of élite troops. There is no evidence in open-source material that a single nuclear warhead, from any national arsenal or another source, has ever made its way into the world's illegal arms bazaars, let alone into terrorist hands. No actual or aspiring nuclear-weapon state has ever claimed to have nuclear weapons without also having all of the technical infrastructure necessary to produce them ab initio, although they could, if the ‘loose nukes’ arguments were sound, easily have bought a few on the black market. Even the extravagant sums sometimes mentioned as the alleged asking price for stolen weapons would be tiny fractions of the amount required to develop an indigenous nuclear-weapon capability, yet circumstances seem to have compelled states to choose the more expensive course.

**Terrorists cannot steal nuclear weapons from Russia**

**KAMP 1996** (Karl-Heinz, heads the foreign and security policy section of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Sankt Agustin, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July)

Well, maybe. But it must be noted that the military organizations responsible for nuclear weapon security in the former Soviet Union have proven more reliable than feared a few years ago. There has been no illegal passing on of complete nuclear weapons or key components. And none of the reports about the marketing of ex-Soviet nuclear materials has involved critical items taken from weapon stocks. There seem to be two decisive reasons for the stability of the ex-Soviet nuclear weapons sector, particularly in Russia. First, even if Russian leaders did not take Western fears about nuclear-weapon security seriously, they would still be concerned about the risks that uncontrolled nuclear proliferation could pose to their own country. As far as possible, resources have been channeled into the nuclear armed forces sector to guarantee its workability. Soldiers in this sector are better paid and facilities have been better maintained than in other areas. Second, the military's nuclear elites have met very high standards in the past. It is hard to imagine that nuclear units trained during the Soviet era would neglect their tasks under hostile conditions and abuse the goods placed under their command. It would be extremely difficult for terrorists to steal complete nuclear weapons from depots or to obtain them with the help of security personnel. Of course, there is no guarantee that the current stability in the military nuclear sector will continue in the indefinite future.

**Russian nuclear security is good**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

The NIC’s 2004 report also addressed the security of nuclear warheads in general: ‘All nuclear weapons storage sites, except those subordinate to the strategic missile troops, fall under the 12th GUMO’s responsibility, thus facilitating a uniform policy in matters of operation and physical security. In peacetime all nuclear munitions except those on ICBMs and SLBMs on alert status are stored in nuclear weapons storage sites. The Russians employ a multi-layered approach that includes physical, procedural, and technical measures to secure their weapons.’ Globalsecurity.org describes the security around nuclear weapons under the control of the 12th GUMO in similar terms to the NIC: ‘The system for the protection of nuclear munitions is echeloned and generally extremely reliable. Access to them is multilayered, and it is virtually impossible for unauthorized individual [sic] to gain access to the warheads. The transport of nuclear munitions is also properly organized. Special security units are in a high state of readiness to thwart any attempt to seize them. To date there has not been a single loss from the nuclear arsenals.’ Clearly, nuclear weapons are not ‘strewn across Russia’, nor are they ‘scattered throughout’ the country.

# A2: WILL STEAL FROM RUSSIA

**Russian military security has improved—nuclear weapons are not vulnerable**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

The 12th GUMO referred to above is the 12the Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defence. Its direct progenitor was given charge of the Soviet Union’s nuclear efforts in 1949 and the organisation, under one name or another, has held that responsibility ever since. Like the rest of the Russian armed forces, the 12the GUMO has suffered from underfunding and a decline in morale, although both seem to have improved in recent years. The 2002 NIC report quoted a 12th GUMO officer as saying in a Russian television programme in August 2001 that ‘security was lax at 12th GUMO sites. The officer outlined a number of problems at the storage sites, including charges that there are personnel shortages and that alarms [sic] systems operate only 50 percent of the time. The officer speculated that a terrorist organization could seize a nuclear warhead.’ The report went on to discuss a number of problems affecting the 12th GUMO. These were generic to the Russian military: low, late or unpaid wages, poor housing and food shortages. While wage arrears were brought up to date by 1999 and wages have been paid regularly since then, the report quotes the ‘Chief of Staff of the 12th GUMO’ as saying that there were ‘9,500 homeless active duty and retired officers’. In 1998, the head of the directorate, General-Colonel Igor Valynkin, acknowledged some ‘serious incidents at some of his subordinate facilities’, but added that more stringent selection criteria would be used and that polygraphs and drug and alcohol tests would ‘monitor the reliability of personnel’. Despite these problems, ‘Valynkin was adamant that no Russian nuclear weapons had been stolen and described such allegations as “barking mad”’. The 2004 NIC report does not mention any of the earlier problems with the 12th GUMO. Instead, it quotes two senior Russian officials, then First Deputy Chief of the General Staff Colonel-General Yuriy Nikolayevich Baluyevskiy and Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, as saying that Russian nuclear weapons were secure from theft by terrorists.

**Terrorists can’t get nuclear weapons from Russia—it would have already happened**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

If terrorists have indeed been seeking radioactive materials or nuclear weapons during the years since the Soviet Union’s collapse, and if they are as readily available as some commentators suggest, why have terrorists – with one or two very minor exceptions – never used any radioactive materials, or shown any signs of having nuclear weapons? Similarly, why have would-be nuclear-weapons states, especially ‘rogues’, invested such enormous amounts of time and treasure in their quest for fissile materials, risking increasingly severe consequences, if these materials are easily available off the ex-Soviet shelf? Granted, aspirant nuclear states ideally want sustainable indigenous fuel cycles to support credible long-term deterrent or offensive capabilities, but if the aim were simply to achieve instant nuclear status, then purchasing a few Russian warheads or the fissile materials and expertise required to build an arsenal would seem to be an obvious choice. Yet to our knowledge none has taken that route, suggesting that it might not be available even to state actors, whose pockets are considerably deeper than the best-funded terrorist organisations.

# A2: WILL STEAL FROM RUSSIA

**Failure of Aum Shinrikyo proves terrorists cannot get nuclear weapons from Russia**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

Kiyohide Hayakawa, Aum’s ‘minister of construction’ (Aum structured itself as an alternative government of Japan), made eight trips to Russia in 1994. His personal notebook contained a ‘shopping list’ including a nuclear warhead, for which Aum was prepared to pay $15m. While he did not buy a nuclear weapon, Hayakawa may have obtained a recipe for sarin from Russia, possibly from Lobov himself. The sarin Aum used in Tokyo followed a formula unique to the Russian military, and Aum’s head of intelligence, Yoshihiro Inoue, claimed at his 1997 trial that Lobov was its source. Hayakawa’s notebook also contained detailed notes on the production of sarin. Despite its 30,000 Russian members, its $1bn war chest, its scientists, its attempts to recruit post-Soviet expertise and its high-level political contacts, Aum was never able to acquire a nuclear weapon or nuclear technology from Russia, even in the chaotic years shortly after the Soviet Union’s collapse. While this does not prove that Russian nuclear weapons are not ‘loose’, it is persuasive evidence that they have been more tightly controlled than some believe, even soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

# A2: RUSSIAN TACTICALS

**Russian tactical weapons are safe—only a total collapse of government would create a terrorist threat**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

TNW have properties that are alleged to entail ‘risks of early and/or unauthorized use, and…vulnerability to theft’. TNW are by definition more portable than strategic weapons. They are also designed for use by forward commanders at the battlefield level, and may therefore have fewer physical or regulatory restrictions on their arming and use. It is not obvious, however, that these characteristics necessarily make Russian TNW more vulnerable to theft than any others. In 2002, the NIC’s Annual Report ot Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces said that: ‘An unauthorized launch or accidental use of a Russian nuclear weapon is highly unlikely as long as current technical and procedural safeguards built into the command and control system remain in place and are effectively enforced. Our concerns about possible circumvention of the system would rise if central political authority broke down.’ In other words, the NIC judges the overall security of Russia’s nuclear forces to be adequate, and only to be threatened by a complete failure of government. However, the report went on to say that ‘the security was designed in the Soviet era to protect weapons primarily against a threat from outside the country and may not be sufficient to meet today’s challenge of a knowledgeable insider collaborating with a criminal or terrorist group.’

# A2: “LOOSE NUKES”

**All Russian nuclear weapons have been accounted for—none have been stolen**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

In fact, all the evidence is that the weapons were indeed safely withdrawn. In 2002, the INC ‘assessed’ that, by June 1992, ‘the last of the former Soviet tactical nuclear warheads were withdrawn to Russia, and…by the end of 1996, the last of the strategic nuclear warheads had been removed from Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus.’ The NIC’s 2004 report on Russian nuclear security quotes former Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeny Adamov as saying: ‘Neither Bin Ladin nor anyone else could steal a nuclear warhead from anywhere in the former Soviet Union. During my time as minister, I carried out a comprehensive stock-taking of everything we had and had had, and traced the history of all the warheads ever produced. So, everything there was on the territories of the former USSR republics was returned to Russia…Nothing was stolen from us. So, neither Bin Ladin, nor Iraq nor Iran could make use of these explosive devices.’

**Lebed’s “lost nuclear warheads” are a myth and all of the weapons would have degraded by now anyway**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

The greatest concern about ‘loose’ Russian nuclear weapons was triggered by General Alexander Lebed, a former chief of the Russian Security Council, who claimed in 1997 that he could account for only 48 of 100 (or 132; accounts differ) backpack-sized nuclear weapons (so called ‘suitcase nukes’). However, it is not certain that the weapons existed at all, or that, if they did, any went missing. In 2002, Nikolai Sokov, who worked on arms control at the Soviet and then Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1987 and 1992, wrote what is probably the most comprehensive review of open-source material on the topic. His paper reached two main conclusions: ‘First, the probability that any portable nuclear devices were lost prior to or after the breakup of the Soviet Union appears low…This does not mean that the threat does not exist, but rather that at this moment, it is probably not the most immediate threat to the home security of the United States or to US armed forces abroad. Second, even if any devices were lost, their effectiveness should be very low or maybe even non-existent, especially if the loss occurred during the period of greatest risk, in the early 1990s. without scheduled maintenance, these devices apparently can produce only minimal yield and eventually possibly no yield at all, and can only serve as a source for small amounts of weapons-grade fissile materials’. Sokov described the evidence for the weapons’ existence as ‘sketchy and incomplete’, saying they had a ‘mythological quality’ and ‘often seem a matter of fiction rather than that of fact’. Nonetheless, he concluded that ‘several broad considerations suggest that the story about portable nuclear devices should be taken seriously, with the caveat that their existence cannot be viewed as an established fact’.

# RUSSIA THREAT CONSTRUCTION LINK

**The argument that terrorists could obtain nuclear weapons in Russia relies on cold war threat construction and ethnocentric stereotypes of Russians**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

In general, at least some of the concern about loose Russian weapons may stem from an unconscious but pervasive belief that Russians cannot possibly be as responsible and effective as the Americans, the French, or the British in safeguarding their nuclear arsenal, an attitude reminiscent of the demonising mythology of the Cold War, which simultaneously exaggereated the capabilities of the Soviet military, while denigrating the professionalism and competence of its members. Granted, with the near-collapse of the Russian state there was indeed a severe rise in criminality that did not exclude the armed forces, and which persists to this day. However, it is one thing to acknowledge disorder in a society simultaneously released from decades of authoritarian rule and subjected to the severe stress of economic failure; it is another altogether to allege a general abeyance of morality. Consider this excerpt from a RAND Corporation briefing paper on nuclear terrorism, which discussed the Japanese sect Aum Shinrikyo’s failure to obtain nuclear weapons or technology from Russia: ‘even enterprising Russian officials and scientists may have feared the implications of transferring nuclear technology, knowledge, or material to a religious organization based in a foreign state…Aum’s contacts may have been good, but not good enough to secure the transfer of such sensitive capabilities’ (emphasis added). The default assumptions appear to have been that ‘enterprising Russians’ might normally have been expected to transfer nuclear weapons or technology to an apocalyptic religious cult without considering the consequences (in other words, that they would have lacked ordinary standards of morality and responsibility); that there most likely were people in positions to do so who would indeed have handed nuclear weapons over to a cult, if only its contacts had been good enough; and that evidence to the contrary was worthy of special note, to be expressed in a tone of faint but distinct surprise.

# A2: BLACK MARKET

**There is no nuclear black market**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

The nuclear black market. There is no evidence in the open-source literature of a true international black market in nuclear materials. Virtually all known cases of nuclear theft or smuggling have involved amateurs hoping for rich returns, despite the seeming absence of anyone interested in buying the material. To the extent that a market exists, it is almost entirely driven by supply; there appears to be no true demand, except where the buyers were government agents running a sting. Organised crime, with one known exception, has not been involved in nuclear trafficking. Even the notorious A.Q. Khan network concentrated on nuclear technology, especially centrifuge uranium enrichment, rather than fissile materials, although there have been suggestions that Khan, a Pakistani nuclear engineer, sold uranium hexafluoride, the feedstock for enrichment, to Libya.

**There is no nuclear black market—IAEA statistics confirm that if every ounce of fissile material ever stolen was assembled, it would still be only one-third of a bomb**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

Twenty confirmed incidents have involved highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium-239 (Pu239); these are listed in Table 1. According to the IAEA, most ‘featured very small quantities.’ As of December 2004 (the most recent year for which the agency has released complete data), no trafficking incident known to the IAEA involved more that a very small fraction of the quantity required to build a weapon, and the number of those that have involved true weapons-grade fissile materials is debatable. The total for all IAEA-confirmed trafficking cases involving HEU for the decade from 1993 to 2003 was just 8.35kg. even if it had all been weapons-grade material and all in one shipment, this would still have been about two-thirds short of the 25kg of HEU required for a basic bomb. With the notable exception of 363g of mixed plutonium-uranium oxide (MOX) reactor fuel seized at Munich airport in Germany in 1994, the quantities of plutonium known to have been trafficked have been minute. The largest single haul of pure plutonium was a tiny pellet of extremely highly-enriched ‘super-grade’ metal seized at Tengen in Germany in 1994. the source of the substance remains unknown, although there are suspicions that it came from a Soviet weapons laboratory. The total amount of IAEA-confirmed plutonium trafficked between 1993 an 2003 was 374.3g, or less than one-twelfth of the amount needed for a basic bomb.

**Organized crime does not smuggle fissile material**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

The only known incident implicating organised crime involved reactor fuel. In 1998, a 19.9%-enriched, or very nearly highly enriched, reactor fuel element was seized in Italy from mafiosi trying to sell it, apparently to unnamed Middle Eastern countries. It is widely thought that the element was one of two fuel assemblies that went missing in the 1970s from a TRIGA research reactor in Congo (which is still operating under very poor security). Speaking to a US Senate committee in 1996, then CIA director John Deutch stated that: ‘We have no evidence…that large organised crime groups with international connections are involved in the trafficking of radioactive materials’. Lee quotes ‘European police officials’, spokesmen for Russia’s internal security agencies and Russian Interpol as saying much the same thing.

#  A2: BLACK MARKET

**The nuclear black market is a myth**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

Lee’s further remark that ‘sophisticated thieves and smugglers are less likely to get caught than the amateur players and scam artists who dominate the known smuggling incidents’ is self-evidently true but, again, it has nothing to say about the actual market and activities therein. No one, Lee included, has been able to provide, at least in the open sources, concrete evidence of a single case in which a substantial portion of the fissile materials needed to make a bomb had been, or was close to being, illicitly transferred to terrorists, organised criminals or, indeed, anyone actively seeking them. It is clearly possible that the actual black market is larger than the IAEA’s database suggests – law enforcement is not perfect, after all – but it is not likely to be much larger: ‘In sum, the visible manifest market for nuclear materials appears disorganised, chaotic, dominated by bumbling amateurs, and artificial in important respects; genuine buyers with real money seldom make an appearance, even in the few cases where weapons-usable materials are offered for sale…Moreover…the nuclear materials flowing through international smuggling channels frequently are nothing more than artifacts of undercover operations.’

# A2: SMUGGLING UNDERREPORTED

**The drug trade analogy is false—nuclear smuggling is over reported**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

Comparisons are sometimes made between the drug trade and the illicit traffic in nuclear materials, the implication being that the detected traffic represents only a tiny fraction of the actual flow of goods. This argument is weak, although it cannot be completely dismissed. The huge demand for illegal drugs is obvious, but there is almost no evidence of a comparable demand for nuclear materials. To argue that a large black market exists, and that the failure to detect it is proof of the fiendish cunning of those who operate it, is sophistry of the least persuasive kind. Lee provided an excellent example in testimony to the US Congress Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack on September 2005: ‘Admittedly the visible face of the nuclear black market doesn’t seem very compelling. Lots of radioactive junk floating around. A multitude of sellers, a few bona fide buyers, and some more a minor international nuisance than a first-order strategic threat. But this picture may be misleading. As with other illegal businesses – drugs, for example – what is seized is only a small fraction of what may be circulating in international smuggling channels.’ Lee went on to say that ‘important incidents go unreported or undetected – actually go under-reported, especially in former Soviet bloc countries.’ This is simply fatuous: if these incidents were unreported or undetected, Lee could not know about them or assert their existence. In the case of ‘unreported’ incidents, Lee might conceivably have access to classified information, although he made no such claim, but in the case of ‘undetected’ incidents, no one but the parties directly involved can know anything about them. Far from under-reporting, it may well be the case, as Deutch has pointed out, that incidents of nuclear trafficking in the former Soviet Union are in fact sensationalised or over-reported. It is even possible that media coverage has to some extent created the problem of nuclear smuggling: ‘For Smirnov [Leonid Smirnov, the first known thief of weapons-grade fissile material] and many other thieves, the idea of material diversion was prompted by extensive coverage by the mass media. Newspaper reports on nuclear trafficking raised the awareness about the value of such material, often exaggerated, among the general public and thus involuntarily contributed to the increased number of thefts.’

# CAN’T BUILD NUKES

**Terrorists won’t build nuclear weapons–it’s too complex**

**KAMP 1996** (Karl-Heinz, heads the foreign and security policy section of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Sankt Agustin, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July)

Reports of nuclear smuggling appear to lend added weight to the idea that terrorists can build their own bombs, because they suggest that fissile material may now be obtained on a nuclear black market. After all, if gram quantities of uranium 235 and plutonium 239 have appeared on the market, it seems likely that larger quantities are also available. And in view of remarks made by readily quoted "experts"--that one kilogram of plutonium is enough to piece together a nuclear weapon--it would seem virtually inevitable that some terrorist group will build a bomb. But the idea that terrorists can readily build a bomb is naive. After all, a number of countries with vast resources and a wide range of scientific and technical personnel have struggled unsuccessfully to produce nuclear weapons. Iraq's nuclear program, which was exposed after the Persian Gulf War, is an example of a costly, time-consuming, and ultimately unsuccessful quest for a nuclear device. Iraq began recruiting nuclear experts in the early 1970s, and used its worldwide trade links and an elaborate secret procurement network in an effort to obtain the necessary technology. Failing at more advanced methods, Iraq eventually turned to an extremely energy-intensive technology--"calutrons"--that the United States had used to produce uranium in the 1940s. Still, after spending 20 years and more than a billion dollars, Iraq had yet to produce a functioning weapon by the time it was defeated in 1991. It is difficult to imagine that a small terrorist group or an individual--who would certainly have far fewer resources--would find bomb building easier.

**Terrorists cannot build nuclear weapons**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

Do-it-yourself’ nuclear weapons. It is most improbable that any terrorist group could become a do-it-yourself nuclear power: unlike rough conceptual outlines, the detailed plans and engineering drawings necessary to build a bomb are not easily available.2 It would also be very difficult, if not effectively impossible, to acquire sufficient quantities of suitable fissile materials. The expertise and facilities required to build a functional bomb, even a crude one, are of a higher order than those possessed by any known terrorist organisation. Developing nuclear weapons requires state-level resources, and the process takes years.

**Terrorists can’t build a nuclear bomb–you should assign this zero risk**

**ROTHSTEIN, AUER AND SIEGEL 2004** (Linda, editor, Catherine, managing editor, and Jonas, assistant editor of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, BAS, November/December, http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art\_ofn=nd04rothstein)

Could terrorists produce an entirely do-it-yourself nuclear bomb? Fabricating fissile material, highly enriched uranium (HEU) or separated plutonium, is exceedingly labor-and resource-intensive--and both activities present many opportunities for detection. Terrorist-produced fissile material is so extremely unlikely that it's safe to call it impossible.

# CAN’T BUILD NUKES

Terrorists couldn’t build a nuclear weapon—the technical requirements it requires are overwhelming

FROST 2005 (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

Others are less convinced. Another former Manhattan Project scientist, Canadian J. Carson Mark, argues that, while ‘schematic drawings’ for nuclear weapons have indeed been widely accessible from years, the ‘detailed design drawings that are essential before it is possible to plan the fabrication of actual parts are not available’. Preparing these drawings ‘requires a large number of man-hours and the direct participation of individuals thoroughly informed in several quite distinct areas: the physical, chemical and metallurgical properties of the various materials to be used, as well as the characteristics affecting their fabrication; neutronic properties; radiation effects, both nuclear and biological; technology concerning high explosives and/or chemical propellants; some hydrodynamics; electrical circuitry; and others’. In any case, ‘the necessary attributes [of the nuclear weapon construction team] would be quite distinct from the paramilitary capability most often supposed to typify terrorists’. Overall, Mark et al. support the possibility that terrorists, given enough money, time and expertise, and some very specialised equipment, not to mention sufficient quantities of fissile material, might conceivably be able to build some sort of device with a nuclear yield. Their paper is nonetheless an effective counterpoise to the notion that the procedure would be anything but difficult, time-consuming and expensive. The following discussion is based largely on their article, as it still the most authoritative technical discussion of terrorist INDs readily available.

**Even if terrorists had perfect equipment, the black market could on supply low-quality fissile material which makes building a bomb impossible**

FROST 2005 (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

To compound the difficulty, terrorists would probably not be able to obtain pure metallic fissile materials. The other more accessible forms of fissile material, such as powdered enriched uranium-oxide reactor fuel, uranium-plutonium ceramic MOX reactor fuel, or zirconium-clad reactor fuel elements filled with ceramic uranium-oxide pellets, would also pose significant problems. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the terrorists would know in advance exactly how much material, of what kind and isotopic composition, they would be receiving. If the nuclear black market were indeed as chaotic it appears, they might simply have to wait for nuclear material to be offered to them and then make the best of it. Building a workable device under those circumstances would be a real challenge even for a professional team; it would probably be impossible for a terrorist group. It is conceivable that terrorists could simply place an order for particular materials with a corrupt insider, although if this were a realistic possibility it would have to be asked why it appears never to have been done.

**The challenge of South African proliferation proves that terrorists could not build nuclear weapons**

FROST 2005 (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

Some of these considerations would not have applied to the South African programme: it was never intended to support long-term, open-ended production, and the South African army was already highly trained and battle-tested. Some of these conditions also might not apply to terrorists: in particular, they might have to be excessively careful in their use of fissile materials. Given the tiny amounts that are known to have been smuggled, they would probably struggle to assemble even the smallest critical mass. The crucial point about the South African programme is that it took at least three years, from 1974 to 1977, for a relatively wealthy state with an existing nuclear infrastructure, years of friendly international exchange of nuclear technology and knowledge and high levels of domestic expertise to build a simple gun-type device that could have produced a nuclear yield. States do indeed have higher standards than terrorists, but these would be more than offset by the very much lower levels of funding, expertise, staffing and equipment available to terrorists. And that ignores the major problem facing terrorists: obtaining a sufficient supply of fissile materials of known composition. If South Africa is indeed a model for terrorist proliferation, there is probably little need to worry.

#  A2: WILL GET FISSILE MATERIAL

**Terrorists groups cannot get fissile material—failure of Al Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo prove**

**CAMERON 2000** (Gavin, Research Associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Current History, April)

Another pathway to nuclear-yield terrorism is to acquire the material needed to construct a nuclear device. But gathering sufficient nuclear material is extremely difficult. Despite reports of nuclear “leakage” in the former Soviet Union, only a handful of cases involving weapons-significant materials are known, and date to the early 1990s. Never was the quantity involved sufficient to build a weapon. For example, after failing to acquire an intact nuclear weapon, al Qaeda sought to purchase fissile materials. Members of the group were offered what was described as highly enriched uranium (HEU), which was actually low-enriched uranium, and thus unusable in a nuclear weapon without extensive processing. It would be unwise to assume that all terrorist groups would similarly fail, or that the former Soviet Union is the only place to seek nuclear materials. Aum Shinrikyo mined natural uranium in Australia in 1993 and sought to enrich it. But because most groups likely would be deterred by the cost, difficulty, and time required for material enrichment, Aum’s example may prove unique. The need to acquire a considerable quantity of fissile material would seem to preclude all but the most affluent or state-sponsored groups from crafting their own nuclear devices.

**Terrorists couldn’t build nuclear weapons even if they got fissile material–other parts of the bomb are too complex**

**KAMP 1996** (Karl-Heinz, heads the foreign and security policy section of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Sankt Agustin, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July)

Obtaining weapon-grade fissile material is only the first step in building a bomb--nuclear weapons require a host of other "exotic" raw materials. And the amount of fissile material needed depends on the level of accessible technology. As a rule, the more basic the design of a nuclear weapon, the more fissile material required. It is true that some weapons need no more than a single kilogram of plutonium, but these are weapons produced only in the huge nuclear laboratories of the superpowers, the United States and Russia. And they require technologies like supercompression, which have not yet been mastered by other Western nuclear powers, let alone by any non-governmental nuclear aspirants. Apart from producing or obtaining fissile material, the production of a weapon requires highly qualified personnel with special know-how in the fields of physics, chemistry, metallurgy, and electronies. Special technical apparatus and complex components are needed that cgnnot be purchased off the shelf. This applies in particular to plutonium components, which must be machined to exacting technical demands. It is almost absurd to fear terrorist bombs made from smuggled plutonium. More basic nuclear weapon designs--so-called "gun-type" devices--use only uranium 235. And gun-type designs require masses of fissile material--quantities that go far beyond any amount that has reportedly been offered on a black market.

**Even if terrorists got radioactive material, most of it is useless—they couldn’t process it into material for a bomb**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

Many of the materials listed above could be used in radiation dispersal devices. However, none of them would be ideal bomb fuel, and each would require processing to make them so. Fresh reactor fuel is so poorly enriched – typically around 3-5% - that it could not be used as a nuclear explosive, and further enriching it is beyond the capacity of all but a handful of states. Used reactor fuel, unlike the fresh variety, contains some plutonium, but it is dangerously radioactive and physically hot, and extracting the plutonium ‘would have to be carried out by remote operation, a very complicated undertaking requiring months to set up and check out, as well as many days for the processing itself’. Extracting metallic uranium from either powdered fuel or metal fuel rods would involve some fairly difficult and potentially hazardous chemical procedures, though it ‘could certainly be within the reach of a dedicated technical team’.

# A2: CAN STEAL PLUTONIUM

**Terrorists could not use stolen plutonium to build a bomb—its physical properties are too complicated**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

Plutonium has bizarre physical peculiarities that can make essential steps in bomb construction – melting, casting or hot working – difficult and even potentially dangerous for the uninitiated. Metallic plutonium goes through six different crystallographic phases, more than any other element, between room temperature and its molten state, which it reaches at 640°C. As it is heated, it undergoes expansion through the alpha, beta, gamma and delta phases, but shrinks once more in the delta-prime phase, and continues to shrink, even as it heats up, until it reaches the epsilon phase, whereupon it slowly expands once more until it melts. When it does so, it abruptly shrinks once more and becomes more dense than the delta, delta-prime and epsilon phases, and only slightly less dense than the gamma phase. Each phase has its own unique properties that make it more or less suitable for use in weapons. For example, the delta phase, which occurs at about 375°C, is desirable for use in weapons because it is tough and malleable, but it is not stable at room temperature. The alpha or base phase is stable and is the most dense form, but it is very brittle and the shrinkage that takes place between the liquid stage and room temperature means that it is almost impossible to accurately cast or hot-work alpha-phase plutonium. To produce a stable delta-phase metal that is easily machined or cast, plutonium has to be alloyed with a small percentage of aluminium, gallium or indium. However, plutonium does not alloy easily, so the resulting material might have areas that were effectively pure plutonium, and therefore unstable, and others that were stable alloy. Solving this problem would almost certainly be beyond the capacity of almost any terrorist group, unless it were able to obtain some very highly specialised metallurgical expertise. Furthermore, plutonium’s liquid phase is more dense than the delta phase, which could lead to criticality problems.

**Terrorists couldn’t handle plutonium—its physical properties are too dangerous**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

While neither uranium nor plutonium is particularly radioactive when fresh and unirradiated, both are chemically and radiologically toxic and carcinogenic if they enter the body, and would have to be handled with some care, especially when being machined – unless, of course, members of the bomb team were willing to take the slight but real risk of developing cancer. Even if it were not carcinogenic, plutonium has other characteristics, including a tendency to burst spontaneously into flames (it is ‘pyrophoric’), which mean that special care must be taken in its handling. The Rocky Flats plutonium ‘pit’ or weapons core production centre near Denver, Colorado, which operated from 1952 to 1989, suffered an unknown number of plutonium fires, including at least three particularly serious incidents. The local fire brigade responded to 31 plutonium fires between 1966 and 1969 alone. However, the actual number of plutonium filings or chips ignited spontaneously, workers dropped them into machine oil to put them out. Clearly, there are hazards other than radiation or criticality awaiting the unwary or careless bomb builders, especially if they want to use plutonium.

# A2: CAN STEAL REACTOR FUEL

**Terrorists would need a huge amount of fuel to make a bomb**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

According to Mark et al., using very highly enriched uranium-oxide powder (94% U-235) or reactor-grade plutonium oxide powder as-is would probably be ‘the simplest and most rapid way to make a bomb’ because of the difficulty involved in converting it into metallic form. In this case, terrorists would need very large quantities of fuel. The bare critical mass (‘bare crit’) for powdered HEU oxide at full crystal density – which is very much denser than the form in which it would most probably be obtained – is about 110kg (242lb), and about 35kg (77lb) for plutonium oxide. Using an implosion design with neutron reflectors, such as plates of iron, natural uranium or graphite, would reduce the amount required by half, but this would also substantially increase the device’s weight and bulk. Amory Lovins claims that ‘neutron reflection and implosion can reduce critical mass by a large factor. This factor has been officially stated to be ~5, consistent with the US and IAEA requirement of strict physical security measures for quantities of Pu≥2 kg (independent of isotopic composition). Published data suggest, however, that with sophisticated design the factor may be > 5.’ The most effective neutron reflector, one that could achieve the kinds of economies suggested by Lovins, is beryllium.

**Terrorists could only use weapons-grade material—lower grade materials would be too difficult**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

Lower enrichment grades of uranium could theoretically be used in weapons, although the amounts required would be immense: the bare crit for 50%-enriched uranium is about 160kg (350lb); for 20%-enriched uranium, the lowest grade still considered highly enriched, it would be 800kg (1760lb). if sufficient amounts of powder were obtained, ‘the terrorists would [still] need accurate information in advance concerning the physical state, isotopic composition and chemical constituents’ of the material, and would also require a larger quantity of material and ‘a larger weight in the assembly mechanism to bring the material into an explosive configuration’ than would be required for metallic bomb fuels: ‘Even [if the powder were] at full crystal density, the amounts are large enough to appear troublesome: ~55kg (half bare crit) for 94 percent uranium oxide and ~17.5kg for plutonium. However, the density of powder as acquired is nowhere close to crystal density. To approach crystal density would require a large and special press, an the attempt to acquire [one]…might blow the cover of a clandestine operation…The option of using low-density powder in a gun-type assembly should probably be excluded on the basis of the large material requirements. There remains the possibility of using a rather large amount of oxide powder (tens of kilograms of possibly more) at a low density in an implosion-type assembly and simply counting on the applied pressure to increase the density sufficiently to achieve a nuclear explosion. Some sort of workable device could certainly be achieved in that way. However, obtaining a persuasive determination of the actual densities that would be realized in a porous material under shock pressure (and thence the precise amount of material required) would be a very difficult theoretical (and experimental) problem for a terrorist team.’

# A2: WILL GET COMPLETE WARHEAD

**Even if terrorists stole a complete warhead, they couldn’t use it**

**KAMP 1996** (Karl-Heinz, heads the foreign and security policy section of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Sankt Agustin, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July)

However, even if a terrorist organization managed--perhaps by working with illegal arms dealers--to obtain a complete nuclear weapon from ex-Soviet stocks, it could not necessarily detonate that weapon. Apart from the fact that most nuclear weapons would be highly unsuitable for terrorist use--due to their size and the difficulty of transporting them--nuclear weapons have a series of built-in technical and security safeguards, including self-destruct mechanisms that can be overridden only by a small and specially trained circle of technicians. Soviet strategic nuclear weapons are secured by systems similar to the sophisticated "Permissive Action Links" (PALS) used to secure U.S. weapons. PALS prevent unauthorized or accidental use by employing multi-digit code systems to lock nuclear weapons against detonation. The United States provided the Soviet Union with the relevant technical know-how for these devices in the early 1960s. To make a credible threat, terrorists would not only have to seize a nuclear weapon, they would have to number in their ranks someone with specific knowledge about a particular explosive device. That possibility cannot be ruled out, but it is highly unlikely in view of the combination of requirements.

**Terrorists could not get an assembled warhead—failure of Aum Shinrikyo and Al Qaeda prove**

**CAMERON 2000** (Gavin, Research Associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Current History, April)

Two terrorist groups—the Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda, the network of suspected Saudi-born terrorist Osama bin Laden—unsuccessfully sought nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Given the wealth and contacts each possesses, their failure suggests that such acquisitions remain far from easy—even in the former Soviet bloc.

**Even if terrorists steal a Russian weapon they can’t use it—security measures and decaying parts prevent this—our evidence cites uniquely qualified experts**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

Even if terrorists had been able to obtain any of these weapons, Sokov argues that they would have been difficult or impossible to deploy: the bombs might have been fitted with locks to prevent unauthorised deployment, or radioactive components may have decayed to the point of uselessness. Even if it were still fresh and fully functional, terrorists would only be able to ‘mine’ one for its nuclear materials, which they almost certainly could not reassemble into a functional weapon. These materials could, however, be used in one or more relatively harmless RDDs. This discussion necessarily involves a good deal of speculation – state secrets are state secrets, after all, and few are more closely held than those concerning nuclear weapons – but Sokov is unusually well qualified to address this matter.

# STATES WILL NOT GIVE NUKES

**No state would ever give nuclear weapons to terrorists**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

 State sponsors of nuclear terrorism. Nuclear-weapon states, even ‘rogues’, are most unlikely to be foolish enough to hand nuclear weapons, which are among their dearest national treasures, over to such unreliable, unpredictable and potentially dangerous characters as terrorists, especially when the chances of a suspected state sponsor suffering nuclear retaliation and annihilation are so good, and so blindingly obvious.

**States won’t give nuclear weapons to terrorists**

**KAMP 1996** (Karl-Heinz, heads the foreign and security policy section of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Sankt Agustin, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July)

Given the record so far, it seems unlikely that any sponsoring state would willingly "pass along" nuclear know-how or nuclear weapons. Every country that possesses nuclear weapons attaches overriding importance to the control of its nuclear arsenal. When it comes to nuclear weapons, the relations between nuclear and non-nuclear allies--even in NATO--involve security arrangements that imply deep distrust. The security of nuclear weapons and their protection against abuse or unauthorized use have the highest priority and are guaranteed by extensive technical and organizational measures by every current member of the "nuclear club." Would a state that achieved nuclear capability choose to put nuclear weapons into the hands of terrorists, knowing that a dangerous group could turn against its own patron? The idea that any state--"rogue nation" or not--would hand over the control of nuclear weapons to an organization of criminals or religious zealots is nearly inconceivable.

**No state would ever transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists**

**CAMERON 2000** (Gavin, Research Associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Current History, April)

The belief that Russia or any other state might be willing to sponsor a client group to use a nuclear device against its enemies seems equally implausible. Fear of retribution from the attacked state and the international community, potential loss of control over the client group, and a reluctance to surrender the nuclear weapons to another party due to the intrinsic difficulty of acquiring them mitigate against such state sponsorship.

# A2: IRAN WILL GIVE NUKES

**Iran will not give nuclear weapons to terrorists**

**POSEN 2006** (Barry, Ford International Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, AlterNet, March 30, http://www.alternet.org/audits/34219/)

Would Iran give nuclear weapons to terrorists? We know that Tehran has given other kinds of weapons to terrorists and aligned itself with terrorist organizations, like Hezbollah in Lebanon. But to threaten, much less carry out, a nuclear attack on a nuclear power is to become a nuclear target. Anyone who attacks the United States with nuclear weapons will be attacked with many, many more nuclear weapons. Israel almost certainly has the same policy. If a terrorist group used one of Iran's nuclear weapons, Iran would have to worry that the victim would discover the weapon's origin and visit a terrible revenge on Iran. No country is likely to turn over the means to its own annihilation to an uncontrolled entity.

# STATES WILL NOT SPONSOR

**No state would sponsor nuclear terrorism—even the remote chance of retaliation is enough to deter them**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

The possibility that a terrorist weapon could be traced back to the sponsor, even if relatively low, should still be too high in relation to the worst possible consequences – nuclear annihilation – for a state to sponsor or even knowingly to host nuclear terrorists. Even passive, unwitting hosts might face some level of retaliation if it could be argued that they should have known about the terrorists on their soil. All nuclear-weapon states – established, ‘rogue’ and clandestine proliferators alike – have the strongest possible interests in ensuring that terrorists do not get hold of nuclear weapons and, therefore, in maintaining control of their nuclear materials and technology. This is, of course, especially true since the enunciation of the so-called First Bush Doctrine, in which US President George W. Bush announced that the United States would ‘make no distinction between the terrorists who committed [the 9/11 attacks] and those who harbour them’.

**States will not sponsor nuclear terrorism—it is too risky for the sponsor**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

With regard to the first point, it is sometimes speculated that a state might actively or passively help a terrorist group to acquire a nuclear weapon. It is almost inconceivable, however, that any state, of any stripe, would knowingly allow a nuclear weapon on its soil in the possession of actors that were not themselves under the state’s tightest possible control and hence effectively part of it, if for no other reason than the fear that the weapon might be used against itself. Nor could it allow the expertise and physical plant required to build one to be outside of state control. Why sponsor a nuclear programme if the state were not the primary beneficiary? In the case of second-tier nuclear-weapon states, the weapons themselves are national treasures, bought at great cost, invested with immense symbolic value and therefore presumably kept under tight control. (The A.Q. Kahn episode is evidence of a state entity sharing some nuclear technology – but possibly not fissile materials and certainly not bombs – with other friendly states, not terrorists.) If state-sponsored nuclear terror were to occur, it would most probably be a case of a state using an unconventional delivery system, a potentially attractive option if the attack were thought to be deniable or if the state lacked suitable delivery vehicles, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles. That, at any rate, is how it would be seen by the victim and the international community.

# A2: IRAN/DPRK WILL SPONSOR

**Iran or North Korea would never sponsor nuclear terrorism—they would fear retaliation**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

Not all states or their leaderships are necessarily rational, of course, but it is still difficult to imagine any state actively sponsoring nuclear terrorism. Both the obvious potential candidates, Iran and North Korea, have engaged in risky nuclear brinkmanship, but it is highly unlikely that either would sponsor a terrorist nuclear attack on another state. North Korea has consistently used its nuclear programme as a way of wringing concessions from the West, and even as erratic a ruler as Kim Jong Il would not launch a nuclear attack of any sort unless he were in extremis, facing an imminent invasion by the combined forces of the US and South Korea, perhaps, or confronting the collapse of his regime for other reasons. Under those circumstances, however, he would be unlikely to deliver his weapons clandestinely. For Iran, the possible pursuit of a nuclear-weapon programme has increased international pressure and prompted hints of military intervention; sponsoring a nuclear attack would simply seal the country’s fate. The risk is compounded by the fact that the wounded party might not be over-concerned with proof of sponsorship. The most likely target, the United States, has invaded two countries and toppled their governments, inflicting thousands of casualties in the process, largely because of these states’ associations, proven in one case but merely assumed in the other, with an attack that killed 3,000 Americans. How might it respond to an attack that killed perhaps half a million citizens, devastated Manhattan or Washington and crippled the national and global economies?

# A2: NUKE TERROR=EXTINCTION

**Nuclear terrorism won’t cause extinction–the u.s. would easily recover**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

An existential threat. When applied to nuclear terrorism, the phrase ‘existential threat’ implies that a state such as the United States could be destroyed by terrorists wielding nuclear weapons. Yet to destroy the United States or any other large industrial state, in the sense of inflicting such damage to its government, economy, population and infrastructure that it could no longer function as a coherent political and economic entity, would require a large number of well-placed nuclear weapons with yields in the tens or hundreds of kilotons. It is unlikely that terrorists could successfully obtain, emplace and detonate a single nuclear weapon, while no plausible radiological device or devices could do any significant damage on a national level.

**Catastrophic terrorism may be bad, but it would have no permanent effect on the united states**

**MUELLER 2004** (John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center at Ohio State University, Regulation, Fall)

The cosmic alarmism reached a kind of official pinnacle during last winter’s Orange Alert. At the time, Homeland Security czar Tom Ridge declared that “America is a country that will not be bent by terror. America is a country that will not be broken by fear.” Meanwhile, however, Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was telling a television audience that if terrorists were able to engineer a catastrophic event that killed 10,000 people, they would successfully “do away with our way of life.” The sudden deaths of that many Americans — although representing less than four-thousandths of one percent of the population — would indeed be horrifying and tragic, but the only way it could “do away with our way of life” would be if we did that to ourselves in reaction. All societies are “vulnerable” to tiny bands of suicidal fanatics in the sense that it is impossible to prevent every terrorist act. But the United States is hardly “vulnerable” in the sense that it can be expunged by dramatic acts of terrorist destruction, even extreme ones. In fact, the country can readily, if grimly, overcome that kind of damage — as it overcomes some 40,000 deaths each year from automobile accidents. As rand’s Bruce Hoffman put it, “Unfortunately, terrorism is just another fact of modern life. It’s something we have to live with.”

**Terrorism threats are exaggerated—there are institutional and professional reasons to inflate risk**

**MUELLER 2004** (John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center at Ohio State University, Regulation, Fall)

In addition, it should be pointed out that the response to September 11 has created a vast and often well-funded terrorism industry. Its members would be nearly out of business if terrorism were to be back-burnered, and accordingly they have every competitive incentive (and they are nothing if not competitive) to conclude that it is their civic duty to keep the pot boiling. Moreover, there is more reputational danger in underplaying risks than in exaggerating them. People routinely ridicule futurist H.G. Wells’ prediction that the conflict beginning in 1914 would be “the war that will end war,” but not his equally confident declaration at the end of World War II that “the end of everything we call life is close at hand.” Disproved doomsayers can always claim that caution induced by their warnings prevented the predicted calamity from occurring. (Call this the Y2K effect.) Disproved Pollyannas have no such convenient refuge.

**Cost-benefit analysis proves terrorism not an existential threat – not worth expenditures**

**Mueller 10,** PolSci Professor at Ohio State (John Mueller and Mark Stewart- Civil Engineering Professor at Newcastle University, April 10, “Hardly Existential: Thinking Rationally About Terrorism” Foreign Affairs)

An impressively large number of politicians, opinion makers, scholars, bureaucrats, and ordinary people hold that terrorism -- and al Qaeda in particular -- poses an existential threat to the United States. This alarming characterization, which was commonly employed by members of the George W. Bush administration, has also been used [3] by some Obama advisers, including the counterterrorism specialist Bruce Riedel. Some officials, such as former U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, have parsed the concept further, declaring [4] the struggle against terrorism to be a "significant existential" one. Over the last several decades, academics, policymakers, and regulators worldwide have developed risk-assessment techniques to evaluate hazards to human life, such as pesticide use, pollution, and nuclear power plants. In the process, they have reached a substantial consensus about which risks are acceptable and which are unacceptable. When these techniques are applied to terrorism, it becomes clear that terrorism is far from an existential threat. Instead, it presents an acceptable risk, one so low that spending to further reduce its likelihood or consequences is scarcely justified. An unacceptable risk is often called de manifestis, meaning of obvious or evident concern -- a risk so high that no "reasonable person" would deem it acceptable. A widely cited de manifestis risk assessment comes from a 1980 United States Supreme Court decision [5] regarding workers' risk from inhaling gasoline vapors. It concluded that an annual fatality risk -- the chance per year that a worker would die of inhalation -- of 1 in 40,000 is unacceptable. This is in line with standard practice in the regulatory world. Typically, risks considered unacceptable are those found likely to kill more than 1 in 10,000 or 1 in 100,000 per year. At the other end of the spectrum are risks that are considered acceptable, and there is a fair degree of agreement about that area of risk as well. For example, after extensive research and public consultation, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission decided [6] in 1986 that the fatality risk posed by accidents at nuclear power plants should not exceed 1 in 2 million per year and 1 in 500,000 per year from nuclear power plant operations. The governments of Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom have come up with similar numbers for assessing hazards. So did a review [7] of 132 U.S. federal government regulatory decisions dealing with public exposure to environmental carcinogens, which found that regulatory action always occurred if the individual annual fatality risk exceeded 1 in 700,000. Impressively, the study found a great deal of consistency among a wide range of federal agencies about what is considered an acceptable level of risk. There is a general agreement about risk, then, in the established regulatory practices of several developed countries: risks are deemed unacceptable if the annual fatality risk is higher than 1 in 10,000 or perhaps higher than 1 in 100,000 and acceptable if the figure is lower than 1 in 1 million or 1 in 2 million. Between these two ranges is an area in which risk might be considered "tolerable." These established considerations are designed to provide a viable, if somewhat rough, guideline for public policy. In all cases, measures and regulations intended to reduce risk must satisfy essential cost-benefit considerations. Clearly, hazards that fall in the unacceptable range should command the most attention and resources. Those in the tolerable range may also warrant consideration -- but since they are less urgent, they should be combated with relatively inexpensive measures. Those hazards in the acceptable range are of little, or even negligible, concern, so precautions to reduce their risks even further would scarcely be worth pursuing unless they are remarkably inexpensive. If the U.S. Department of Homeland Security wants to apply a risk-based approach to decision-making, as it frequently claims it does, these risk-acceptance criteria seem to be most appropriate. To this end, the table below lists the annual fatality risks for a wide variety of these dangers, including terrorism. As can be seen, annual terrorism fatality risks, particularly for areas outside of war zones, are less than one in one million and therefore generally lie within the range regulators deem safe or acceptable, requiring no further regulations, particularly those likely to be expensive. They are similar to the risks of using home appliances (200 deaths per year in the United States) or of commercial aviation (103 deaths per year). Compared with dying at the hands of a terrorist, Americans are twice as likely to perish in a natural disaster and nearly a thousand times more likely to be killed in some type of accident. The same general conclusion holds when the full damage inflicted by terrorists -- not only the loss of life but direct and indirect economic costs -- is aggregated. As a hazard, terrorism, at least outside of war zones, does not inflict enough damage to justify substantially increasing expenditures to deal with it. Because they are so blatantly intentional, deaths resulting from terrorism do, of course, arouse special emotions. And they often have wide political ramifications, as citizens demand that politicians "do something." Many people therefore consider them more significant and more painful to endure than deaths by other causes. But quite a few dangers, particularly ones concerning pollution and nuclear power plants, also stir considerable political and emotional feelings, and these have been taken into account by regulators when devising their assessments of risk acceptability. Moreover, the table also includes another kind of hazard that arouses strong emotions and is intentional -- homicide -- and its frequency generally registers, unlike terrorism, in the unacceptable category. In order to deal with the emotional and political aspects of terrorism, a study [8] recently conducted for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security suggested that lives lost to terrorism should be considered twice as valued as those lost to other hazards. That is, $1 billion spent on saving one hundred deaths from terrorism might be considered equivalent to $1 billion spent on saving two hundred deaths from other dangers. But even with that generous (and perhaps morally questionable) bias, or even with still more generous ones, counterterrorism expenditures fail a standard cost-benefit assessment. Politicians and bureaucrats do, of course, face considerable political pressure to deal with terrorism, but that does not relieve them of their responsibility to expend public funds wisely. If they feel they cannot do so, they should resign or forthrightly admit that they are being irresponsible -- or they should have refused to take the job in the first place. Moreover, although political pressures may force unwise actions and expenditures, they usually do not dictate the precise amount of money spent. The United Kingdom, which seems to face a considerably greater internal threat from terrorism than the United States, nonetheless spends only half as much per capita on homeland security -- at no notable cost to the tenure of its politicians and bureaucrats. And certainly nothing relieves politicians and bureaucrats of their responsibility to inform the public about the risk that terrorism actually presents. But just about the only official who has ever openly tried to do so is New York's Mayor Michael Bloomberg, who, in 2007, remarked [9] that people have a greater chance of being hit by lightning than being struck by terrorism -- an observation that, as the table suggests, is a bit off the mark but roughly sound. Bloomberg, it might be noted, is still in office. To border on becoming unacceptable by established risk conventions -- that is, to reach an annual fatality risk of 1 in 100,000 -- the number of fatalities from terrorist attacks in the United States and Canada would have to increase 35-fold; in Great Britain (excluding Northern Ireland), more than 50-fold; and in Australia, more than 70-fold. For the United States, this would mean experiencing attacks on the scale of 9/11 at least once a year, or 18 Oklahoma City bombings every year. For this to come about, terrorists would probably have to acquire nuclear weapons, the likelihood of which is highly questionable [10]. If that fear is deemed viable, however, the policy implications would be to spend entirely, or almost entirely, on dealing with that limited concern. Massive expenditures to protect "critical infrastructure," for example, are unlikely to be effective against a nuclear explosion. In fact, there is little evidence that terrorists are becoming any more destructive, particularly in the West. Some analysts [11] have found that, if anything, terrorist activity is diminishing, at least outside of war zones. As a hazard to human life in the United States, or in virtually any country outside of a war zone, terrorism under present conditions presents a threat that is hardly existential. Applying widely accepted criteria established after much research by regulators and decision-makers, the risks from terrorism are low enough to be deemed acceptable. Overall, vastly more lives could have been saved if counterterrorism funds had instead been spent on combating hazards that present unacceptable risks.

# A2: U.S. RETALIATION

**Obama won’t retaliate --- he knows the costs**

**Crowley**, Senior Editor the New Republic, **10** [Michael, January, “Obama and Nuclear Deterrence”, <http://www.tnr.com/node/72263>]

The Los Angeles Times ran an [important story](http://www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-na-obama-nuclear4-2010jan04%2C0%2C2198537%2Cfull.story) yesterday about the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review, which evaluates U.S. policy towards the use of nuclear weapons. Apparently there's a debate inside the administration--one that is splitting the civilians from the generals--not just about the size of our nuclear stockpile but also how we conceive of possible first-strike and retaliatory policies. A core issue under debate, officials said, is whether the United States should shed its long-standing ambiguity about whether it would use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, in hopes that greater specificity would give foreign governments more confidence to make their own decisions on nuclear arms. Some in the U.S. argue that the administration should assure foreign governments that it won't use nuclear weapons in reaction to a biological, chemical or conventional attack, but only in a nuclear exchange. Others argue that the United States should promise that it would never use nuclear weapons first, but only in response to a nuclear attack. As the story notes, some experts don't place much weight on how our publicly-stated doctrine emerges because they don't expect foreign nations to take it literally. And the reality is that any decisions about using nukes will certainly be case-by-case. But I'd still like to see some wider discussion of the underlying questions, which are among the most consequential that policymakers can consider. The questions are particularly vexing when it comes to terrorist groups and rogue states. Would we, for instance, actually nuke Pyongyang if it sold a weapon to terrorists who used it in America? That implied threat seems to exist, but I actually doubt that a President Obama--or any president, for that matter--would go through with it.

**The U.S. will not retaliate with nuclear weapons—it makes no sense**

**SPRING 2001** (Baker, Research Fellow at Heritage Foundation, Heritage Backgrounder 1477, Sept 20, http://www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/BG1477.cfm)

Nuclear retaliation is not appropriate for every kind of attack against America. Some opponents of missile defense believe that the United States has an effective nuclear deterrent that, if necessary, could be used to respond to attacks on the homeland. But no responsible U.S. official is suggesting that the United States consider the use of nuclear weapons in response to the horrific September 11 attacks. In most cases of attack on the United States, the nuclear option would not be appropriate, but a defense response will almost always be appropriate. The United States needs to be able to resort to defensive options.

# A2: U.S. RETALIATION

**The U.S. will not retaliate—there are no strategic targets to hit and weapons are too hard to trace**

**DOWLE 2005**

(Mark, Teaches at the Graduate School of Journalism at Berkeley, California Monthly, September, http://www.alumni.berkeley.edu/Alumni/Cal\_Monthly/September\_2005/COVER\_STORY-\_Berkeleys\_Big\_Bang\_Project\_.asp)

Because terrorists tend to be stateless and well hidden, immediate retaliation in kind is almost impossible. But some nuclear explosions do leave an isotopic signature, a DNA-like fingerprint that allows forensic physicists such as Naval Postgraduate School weapons systems analyst Bob Harney to possibly determine the origin of the fissile material in the bomb. Nuclear forensics is not a precise science, Harney warns. Post-attack sites are almost certain to be contaminated with unrelated or naturally occurring radioactivity, and there are numerous, highly enriched uranium stashes in the world with unknown signatures. But there is no question, according to Peter Huessy, a member of the Committee on the Present Danger and consultant to the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., that Russian forensic experts could quickly detect Russian isotopes, and that highly enriched uranium (HEU) from, say, France could readily be differentiated from American HEU. But, Huessy warns, distinguishing post-blast residues of Pakistani uranium from North Korean uranium would be more challenging, probably impossible. Because neither country is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA inspectors have been unable to collect from their facilities reliable isotope samples that could be compared to post-attack residues. Even if the uranium were traced, the source nation could claim that the material had been stolen.

**No nuclear retaliation—even if there is overwhelming pressure to respond, the U.S. will not strike if it can’t identify targets**

**ALFORD 2007** (Roger, professor of law at Pepperdine, The Huffington Post, March 7, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/roger-alford/the-awful-new-arithmetic-\_b\_42864.html)

Just one little problem: nuclear forensics. On the morning after, just how do you do forensics on ground zero to identify the source? After a nuclear strike the will to respond will be overwhelming. But in order to retaliate in kind, we will need more than what the nuclear crime scene investigators can provide. One could, I suppose, go on hunches. If Israel is subjected to a nuclear terrorist attack, the candidates for state sponsorship are a universe of one. Is that enough for a nuclear response? And, as Perry noted, if Iran and North Korea join the nuclear club, then the non-proliferation dam will have broken. Japan and South Korea will follow suit, and a Shia nuke will lead to a Sunni nuke in the hands of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. If a half dozen more countries join the nuclear club, then tracing the source of nuclear terrorism will become ever more complex.

# A2: U.S. RETALIATION

**No impact to retaliation—strikes would be limited and no one would escalate**

**SCHUYLER 2007** (Dave, “Restating the U.S. Policy of Nuclear Deterrence,” Last Mod Nov 13, http://theglitteringeye.com/?p=459)

A recent post on nuclear deterrence on American Future drew several comments on another blog. The blogger at American Future, Marc Schulman, outlines the responses in this post. In summary the responses were that a nuclear response to a nuclear terrorist attack was itself terrorism, a nuclear retaliation would inevitably draw other state actors to escalate the exchange, a nuclear retaliation would be collective punishment, and attacking Muslim holy sites would be counterproductive. I agree with this last point but I want to deal with each of the other points in some detail. \* A nuclear response to a nuclear terrorist attack is terrorism.There’s no generally accepted definition of terrorism so before tackling this point I’ll propose one. Ignoring the issue of state actors vs. non-state actors I think that a terrorist attack is an attack on civilians or civilian assets whose purpose is to provoke terror. It has no other tactical or strategic significance. Any nuclear response by the United States would be against military or governmental facilities, sites involved in military production, or command and control. The objective would be to eliminate the possibility of future attacks or the support for those who would engage in future attacks. That such a response would inevitably result in massive civilian casualties is sad. But such a response would not, by definition, be terrorism \* A nuclear retaliation Iran in response to a terrorist nuclear attack would inevitably draw France, Russia, and China to enter the conflict.To believe this you must believe that France, Russia, and China will act irrationally. There is absolutely no reason to believe that this is the case. All three nations know that their intervention against the U. S. would result in total annihilation. There are other issues as well and let’s examine the two distinct cases: Russia on the one hand and France and China on the other. As a major non-Gulf producer of oil Russia would be in a position to benefit enormously in case of a disruption of Gulf oil production or shipment. That being the case they would publicly deplore a retaliation against Iran but privately rejoice. Both France and China are in an extremely delicate position. A nuclear response by either would result in total annihilation and, equally importantly, wouldn’t keep the oil flowing. Lack of a blue water navy means that both nations are completely at the mercy of the United States’s (or more specifically the U. S. Navy’s) willingness to keep shipments of oil moving out of the Gulf. China is particularly vulnerable since it has only about two weeks’ worth of strategic oil reserves. Neither France nor China has any real ability to project military force other than nuclear force beyond their borders. They’d be upset. But they’re in no position to do anything about it.

# A2: U.S. BOMBS MECCA

**The U.S. would not start a nuclear war—even the G.O.P. believes that nuclear strikes are insane**

**CAIR BULLETIN 8-6-2007** (Council on American-Islamic Relations, “Muslims welcome GOP rejection

of threat to attack Mecca” http://www.amperspective.com/html/muslims\_welcome.html)

The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) today welcomed remarks by several Republican presidential candidates repudiating threats made by fellow White House hopeful Rep. Tom Tancredo (R-CO) to attack Islamic holy sites. The Washington-based Islamic civil rights and advocacy group also called on Tancredo to retract and apologize for remarks he made last week advocating threats to bomb the holy cities of Mecca and Medina as part of his proposed anti-terror policy. In a statement issued today, CAIR said: "The Republican candidates and the Department of State are correct in rejecting threatened attacks on Islamic holy sites as a deterrent to terrorists. "Representative Tancredo's extreme and counterproductive proposal to threaten Mecca and Medina fails any reasonable test for strategic viability. It only serves to further damage our nation's interests and image in the Muslim world and will inevitably be used as rhetorical fodder by extremists. "America's relationship with Islam and Muslims worldwide will be a central issue for the administration of our next president, whoever that may be. "We call on Representative Tancredo to retract his inflammatory statements and to apologize for fanning the flames of international mistrust and hostility. We also urge every other presidential candidate to state how her or his leadership would win back the international support, particularly in the Islamic world, that America has lost in recent years." During a Republican presidential debate in Iowa over the weekend, former Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson said, "I sincerely believe that bombing religious artifacts and religious holy sites would do nothing but unify 1 billion Muslims against us." After the debate, former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee said the idea is "appalling." Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA) also said, "I wouldn't follow that." Earlier in the week, Tom Casey, a deputy spokesperson for the State Department, said: "It is absolutely outrageous and reprehensible for anyone to suggest attacks on holy sites, whether they are Muslim, Christian, Jewish or those of any other religion." Casey called Tancredo's proposal "absolutely crazy."

# NUCLEAR WAR OUTWEIGHS TERRORISM

**Nuclear war outweighs nuclear terrorism–it’s the only scenario for extinction**

**ROTHSTEIN, AUER AND SIEGEL 2004** (Linda, editor, Catherine, managing editor, and Jonas, assistant editor of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, BAS, November/December, http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art\_ofn=nd04rothstein)

Nuclear terrorism would be horrific, but nuclear war would be far worse. As Lynn Eden reported in "City on Fire," fire damage from nuclear explosions has been vastly and systematically underestimated--a move that allowed early U.S. war planners to demand a much larger nuclear arsenal. As Eden wrote, a single 300-kiloton nuclear weapon detonated above the Pentagon on a clear day would engulf the surrounding 65 square miles in firestorms that would "extinguish all life and destroy almost everything else." And that's a conservative estimate. Let's recap. An attack from a weapons state is highly unlikely; an accidental nuclear launch is far more worrisome. As remote as the possibility is, all-out nuclear war has the potential to end human life on the planet--still the true doomsday scenario.

# A2: TERRORISTS CAN CONCEAL NUKES

**Terrorist nuclear weapons would be huge and clumsy—they would require extremely high implosion velocities**

**FROST 2005** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

The need for fast conventional high explosives (HE) imposes an entirely different set of technical and safety considerations. All nuclear weapons, whether gun or implosion types, require high assembly velocities because of the risk of pre-initiation or ‘fizzle’ due to neutron sources in the fuel that could trigger a chain reaction before the fissile material was properly assembled into a supercritical configuration. If that happened, the weapon could simply be blown apart, with minimal nuclear yield. If assembly velocities were reasonably high, however, the ‘fizzle yield’ of a crude device could be in the 100-tonne HE equivalent range. The risk of predetonation is so high for plutonium of any grade that it cannot be used in a gun-type assembly. A military gun-type device assembles its components in approximately one millisecond; compression of the fissile core in an implosion device takes one to four microseconds. Terrorists, however, are likely to require even higher assembly velocities in their weapons because of the characteristics of the fuel they would be likely to use. In practical terms, this means that, in order to prevent fizzle caused by the neutron source, a terrorist gun-type uranium bomb would require both a longer barrel than a military weapon, to allow the projectile to accelerate before hitting the target, and more, or more powerful, explosives to drive the projectile, both of which would considerably increase the bomb’s weight and bulk over a military weapon, as would the sheer mass of the fissile powder and associated materials. Similarly, the strong neutron source in reactor-grade plutonium means that a bomb made from this material would require exceedingly high implosion velocities.

# A2: BIOWEAPONS—GENERAL

**Terrorists won’t use bioweapons and there’s no impact if they do**

**O’NEILL 2004** (Brendan, Spiked Politics, “Weapons of Minimum Destruction,” August 19, http://www.spiked-online.com/Printable/0000000CA694.htm)

Rapoport says that terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons is similar to state use - in that it is rare and, in terms of causing mass destruction, not very effective. He cites the work of journalist and author John Parachini, who says that over the past 25 years only four significant attempts by terrorists to use WMD have been recorded. The most effective WMD-attack by a non-state group, from a military perspective, was carried out by the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka in 1990. They used chlorine gas against Sri Lankan soldiers guarding a fort, injuring over 60 soldiers but killing none. The Tamil Tigers' use of chemicals angered their support base, when some of the chlorine drifted back into Tamil territory - confirming Rapoport's view that one problem with using unpredictable and unwieldy chemical and biological weapons over conventional weapons is that the cost can be as great 'to the attacker as to the attacked'. The Tigers have not used WMD since.

**No impact–history proves bioweapon use is unlikely**

**O’NEILL 2004** (Brendan, Spiked Politics, “Weapons of Minimum Destruction,” August 19, http://www.spiked-online.com/Printable/0000000CA694.htm)

Yet, as Rapoport points out, while the Aum Shinryko attack certainly had tragic consequences, it also showed up the limitations of WMD attacks in terms of causing casualties or destruction. He says that even though Aum Shinryko had 'extraordinary cover for a long time' - meaning that the Japanese authorities were nervous about monitoring the group on the grounds that it was a religious outfit - and despite the fact that it had '20 members with graduate degrees in science, significant laboratories and assets of over a billion dollars', it still did not succeed in its aim of taking hundreds or thousands of casualties, of causing mass destruction. For Rapoport this shows that such weapons are far from easy to use, especially when the groups using them must move around quickly, 'as all terrorists must do'. According to Rapoport, the most striking thing about the Aum Shinryko attack is that no one died from inhaling the sarin gas itself - in every fatal case, the individual had made contact with the liquid. He cites Parachini again, who says that the individuals killed by Aum Shinryko are the only people to have lost their lives as a result of a WMD attack by a terrorist group over the past 25 years. (There were also five deaths as a result of anthrax attacks post-9/11, but Parachini doesn't include those because the individual responsible and the motivation for those attacks remain unknown.) 'When you think that fewer than 15 people have been killed by known terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons, and contrast that to the thousands who were killed on 9/11 and in conventional bombings in Madrid or Bali or Istanbul, it's quite remarkable that we are so obsessed with WMD', says Rapoport.

# A2: BIOWEAPONS—GENERAL

**Terrorists could not use biological weapons**

**DREYFUSS 2000** (Robert, Mother Jones, Sept/Oct, http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/2000/09/phantom.html)

But even most terrorism hawks -- including experts in the U.S. intelligence community and defense contractors like the RAND Corporation -- acknowledge that assembling and using weapons of mass destruction is a daunting project. Last year, a blue-ribbon "Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction" issued its report to Congress and the president. The study maintains that nuclear, biological, or chemical terrorism "presents a genuine threat to the United States." But, it goes on, carrying out such attacks requires capabilities that virtually no terrorist group possesses, including "highly knowledgeable personnel, significant financial resources, fairly sophisticated production facilities and equipment, quality control and testing, and special handling." Even if terrorists could acquire strains of botulism, anthrax, or plague, turning such materials into a lethal device for mass casualties is a highly complex undertaking. "It's simply not easy to do," explains Milton Leitenberg, a biological warfare expert at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland. Leitenberg points to the technical hurdles involved in the event that sparked much of the alarm about terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons -- the 1995 nerve-gas attack on the Tokyo subway by the Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo. Subsequent investigations revealed that the group possessed significant quantities of chemicals, as well as ample funding to procure whatever equipment was necessary to produce biological weapons. Professional scientists in the cult spent four years attempting to produce two agents -- anthrax and botulinum toxin -- considered relatively easy to work with. Yet the group failed to produce any biological agent, and were reduced to poking bags with umbrellas to disseminate the sarin gas they were able to make. Such difficulties explain why the government has not documented a single threat from terrorists wielding toxic agents. "There is no U.S. government evidence that any group has produced or obtained biological weapons," Leitenberg says.

# NO IMPACT TO BIOWEAPONS

**Bioweapons impacts are overstated–their impact evidence is biased by economic and psychological motives**

**O’NEILL 2004** (Brendan, Spiked Politics, “Weapons of Minimum Destruction,” August 19, http://www.spiked-online.com/Printable/0000000CA694.htm)

So why are we so obsessed with WMD? Why do we continue to fret over weapons which, by all accounts, do not cause as much mass destruction as conventional weapons, which have only rarely been used by terrorists (and not very successfully at that), and which we're not even certain that today's terrorists, specifically al-Qaeda, have got access to? Rapoport says that's a good question - but a difficult one to answer. He thinks the reasons are complex; he argues that it isn't only government and media who have ratcheted up fear about WMD, but that 'economic interests' have, too - those in business, government and research institutions who stand to make financial gain from public concern about WMD and from public demands for more protective measures against such weapons. No doubt there is some truth in that. But the disparity between the facts about WMD and our fears of WMD also reveals something more about today's terror-obsession. It shows up the gap between the reality of terrorism - which over the past three years has largely consisted of scrappy bomb attacks by small nihilistic groups - and the fear of terrorism as something that might bring down civilisation as we know it, or, in the words of President Bush, inflict 'hundreds of thousands of casualties'. It suggests that our concern about terrorism is not entirely shaped by the real threat posed by terrorism, but by a broader sense of fear and insecurity at home. That might explain why so much of the terror discussion, particularly in relation to WMD, is anticipatory and speculative, always conjuring up worst-case scenarios - because it comes from within, from our own nightmares and imaginations, rather than from without. In this sense, chemical and biological weapons - the nightmare notion of silent, invisible killer poisons being released into our water systems or on to crowded public transport - are the perfect metaphor for the West's own sense of vulnerability. What we could really do with is a heavy dose of reality.

**Lessons from the SARS outbreak have already improved worldwide public health–this will limit future outbreaks of any disease**

**ENSOM 2003** (Jim, Globalcontinuity.com, June 20 http://www.globalcontinuity.com/article/articleview/94/1/30/)

In reaching these landmarks in the containment of SARS, the most severely affected countries and areas have identified and rapidly corrected long-standing weaknesses in their health systems in ways that will mean permanent improvements for the management of all diseases. In addition, systems of data collection and reporting, and new patterns of openly and frankly communicating information to the public will hold the world in good stead when the next new disease emerges and the next influenza pandemic breaks out.

# A2: SMALLPOX

**No impact to smallpox terrorism–vaccines, residual resistance, public health infrastructure and delivery problems all check**

**ROTHSTEIN, AUER AND SIEGEL 2004** (Linda, editor, Catherine, managing editor, and Jonas, assistant editor of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, BAS, November/December, http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art\_ofn=nd04rothstein)

So we escaped an attack by Iraq. But would we all be doomed if Al Qaeda terrorists (perhaps bearing some of that rumored French smallpox) decided to infect the United States? It seems unlikely. First, set aside the problems attackers would face in trying to deliver the disease other than through person-to-person contact. (Cold Warriors speculated that the Soviets would fill intercontinental ballistic missiles with the virus and send the missiles over the North Pole.) The key to preventing a major outbreak is a good public health system that can detect a handful of cases before the disease spreads. Meanwhile, helping to slow the spread are two surprising findings: A study by Oregon Health and Science University researchers, reported in the September 2003 issue of Nature Medicine, revealed that in contrast to conventional wisdom that the effects of vaccination lasted only a few years, "90 percent of those vaccinated 25 to 75 years ago maintain a substantial level of immunity." In other words, half the U.S. population (nearly everyone was vaccinated before 1972) has some degree of immunity, a considerable barrier to the rapid spread of smallpox. Simultaneously, if cases were detected, there would be time to vaccinate the unprotected population. As for the vaccine's availability, there seems to be an adequate supply. Doctors at Vanderbilt University report in the September 8 issue of the Journal of the American Medical Association that the vaccine in the emergency supply can be diluted to as much as one-tenth and still provide an overall vaccination success rate of 99.4 percent.

# A2: EBOLA

**Ebola is overrated–the worst possible outbreaks kill only a few people**

**YORK 1995** (Ian, Pathology Researcher, August 18 http://www.mcb.uct.ac.za/ebola/ebopage.htm)

No offense, Erik, but people who think that Ebola is a genuine threat to humanity are generally very poor on context. It should mean something to you that we virologists are not panicking about it. If you want a nightmare disease, how about a highly contagious disease, with a long incubation time (during which people are still infectious), which can affect anyone anywhere, rapidly become resistant to antibiotics, for which there is no effective vaccine despite much effort, which can be spread by non-intimate contact? Tuberculosis is on the way back; the WHO expects 30 million people to die of tb in the this decade. Ebola has killed less than 400 people in the past decade. By contrast, typhoid fever kills over 600,000 people per year; measles kills 1,000,000 (one million) people per year. If you think Ebola has the potential to kill anywhere near that many, you don't understand the virus. The Ebola outbreak in Kikwit \*was\* the worst-case scenario; \*everything\* went wrong. 300 deaths. Not trivial. But a tiny fraction of the real killers. Lobby and try to get measles vaccine in Africa, if you want to do some good. Son't waste your time worrying about Ebola.

**Ebola won’t become pandemic–it becomes fatal before it can spread and symptoms encourage others to avoid infection**

**VAN DER GIESSEN, ET AL 2004** (J.W.B., Microbiological Laboratory for Health Protection

Center for Infectious Diseases Epidemiology, “Zoonoses in Europe: A Risk to Public Health,” Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu Report)

In general, zoonoses that have a high case-fatality rate and/or that cause severe morbidity and have limited abilities for human-to-human transmission are less likely to emerge globally than zoonoses that emerge rather unnoticed. For example, the probability that Ebola virus will cause a pandemic is relatively small because of its transmission route and because it kills rapidly, thereby creating terror among relatives of the dead so that they avoid high-risk contacts 70. In contrast, HIV diseases can spread unnoticed for decades, since it opens the door to aspecific opportunistic diseases by immunosuppression after a long latency period in populations already suffering from decreased immune function due to other infectious diseases and malnutrition (Appendix III).

# A2: CHEMICAL WEAPONS

**There’s no impact to chemical weapons–dilution, weather, reverse contamination and historical examples prove**

**ROTHSTEIN, AUER AND SIEGEL 2004** (Linda, editor, Catherine, managing editor, and Jonas, assistant editor of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, BAS, November/December, http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art\_ofn=nd04rothstein)

In "The Dew of Death," Joel Vilensky and Pandy Sinish recounted the strange story of lewisite, an arsenic-based chemical weapon developed by the Chemical Warfare Service during World War I. By the end of the war, the United States was producing 10 tons a day of the stuff, yet it was never used in battle, where it would probably have flopped. Lewisite shares many of the problems that have prevented most chemical weapons from entering the world's armies' battlefield arsenals: Most chemicals are very hard to disseminate in sufficiently undiluted form, and might not work in weather that is too hot, too cold, too windy, or too wet. The dilution problem would also make it very difficult to carry out an attack involving the poisoning of a major city's water supply. Nearly every article about terrorist uses of chemical or biological weapons begins by recalling Aum Shinrikyo's use of sarin gas in 1995 in the Tokyo subway. Employing five separate packages of poison, cult members managed to kill 12 commuters, although another 1,000 had to seek hospital treatment. The attack was shocking, yet fell short of the cult's ambitions. (Shoko Asahara, the leader of the group, aspired either to be Japan's prime minister or to kill as many of his countrymen as possible.) Saddam Hussein's forces used poison gas at Halabja in the open air. Halabja, a Kurdish city in northern Iraq, is perhaps the best known of the several dozen towns and villages Saddam Hussein is thought to have gassed in 1987 and 1988. Some 5,000 of its population of 70,000 died as a result of being bombarded with what might have been a combination of mustard gas, nerve agent, and possibly cyanide. The attack was a monstrous crime, but the Iraqi military succeeded by having complete control over the place, the time, and the choice of a day with ideal weather--and because it faced no danger of experiencing any resistance. Saddam's men were able to spread the poisons systematically (delivery might have been by a combination of dispersal from low-flying planes and attack with chemical shells). The Halabja massacre was not a demonstration of the unique power of chemical weapons, but of the fact that the population was defenseless. Iraq, and probably Iran, also used poison gas during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). Even as thousands of young people were slaughtered in a war that ended in stalemate, the war's less-controlled, battlefield use of chemical weapons is customarily assessed as having lent neither side an advantage. Today, few of the world's militaries would even consider using chemical weapons--they can contaminate the battleground and come back on the attackers if the wind takes an unexpected turn. The major militaries--including those of the United States, Britain, Russia, and Germany--have dumped old munitions (not always carefully) or have spent, or need to spend, billions of dollars to neutralize decaying munitions that could threaten civilians who live near storage sites. Some tiny amount of worry should probably be devoted to leaking chemical munitions.

**No impact to chemical terrorism**

**MUELLER 2004** (John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center at Ohio State University, Regulation, Fall)

POOR RESULTS For their part, biological and chemical weapons have not proven to be great killers. Although the basic science about them has been well known for a century at least, both kinds of weapons are notoriously difficult to create, control, and focus (and even more so for nuclear weapons). To this point in history, biological weapons have killed almost no one. And the notion that large numbers of people would perish if a small number of chemical weapons were to be set off is highly questionable. Although they can be hugely lethal when released in gas chambers, their effectiveness as weapons has been unimpressive. In World War I, for example, chemical weapons caused less than one percent of the total combat deaths; on average, it took a ton of gas to produce one fatality. In the conclusion to the official British history of the war, chemical weapons are relegated to a footnote that asserts that gas “made war uncomfortable...to no purpose.” A 1993 analysis by the Office of Technology Assessment finds that a terrorist would have to deliver a full ton of Sarin nerve gas perfectly and under absolutely ideal conditions over a heavily populated area to cause between 3,000 and 8,000 deaths —something that would require the near-simultaneous detonation of dozens, even hundreds, of weapons. Under slightly less ideal circumstances — if there were a moderate wind or if the sun were out, for example — the death rate would be only one-tenth as great. The 1995 chemical attack launched in Tokyo by the well-funded Aum Shinrikyo (attempted only after several efforts to use biological weaponry had failed completely) managed to kill only 12 people.