# \*\*AFF UPDATES\*\*

# \*Title XI\*

# -Navy Inherency

#### Naval readiness is rapidly declining now with no funding for modernization— investment is key

**Eaglen ’12** [3 April 2012, MacKenzie Eaglen, Research Fellow for National Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, Lanterloon,“U.S. military faces a readiness crisis,” http://lanterloon.com/u-s-military-faces-a-readiness-crisis/, AZhang]

None of America’s armed forces can meet all of the demands placed on them by commanders today. Just last week, the Navy said that for the second time in seven months, equipment failure prevented an amphibious assault ship — the USS Essex — from meeting a commitment at sea. Unfortunately, this is not surprising. The U.S. military faces a readiness crisis — one confronting not just its people and end-strength cuts — but pushing equipment to the breaking point. Across all services, long-standing readiness problems are worsening and breakdowns are happening more frequently. Adm. Jonathan W. Greenert testifying to Congress last July shortly before his promotion to Chief of Naval Operations, said: “The stress on the force is real. And it has been relentless.” The overall picture is dismal: While the Navy’s fleet has shrunk by about 15 percent since 1998, the number of ships deployed overseas has remained constant. Each ship goes to sea longer and more often, resulting in debilitating maintenance problems. Simple wear and tear is weakening defense capabilities across the board as the military’s major platforms age after high wartime usage rates and a lack of major recapitalization since the Reagan buildup. An Air Force F-15C literally broke in half during flight some years ago. Today, every single Navy cruiser hull has cracks; A-10C Warthogs have fuselage fractures, and the UH-1N Twin Huey helicopter fleet is regularly grounded. Over half the Navy’s deployed aircraft are not ready for combat. Last April, the engine of a F/A-18C Hornet caught fire aboard the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson. Last March, the engine of a Marine Hornet about to take off from the aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis exploded. As these aging aircraft were bursting into flames, senior officials were warning Washington politicians that keeping the older fighter planes in safe flying condition was “one of their most serious challenges.” Built in the 1980s and 1990s, the jets were designed to fly for 6,000 hours. Delayed delivery of the replacement F-35, however, has forced the services to squeeze an additional 4,000 flight hours out of the Hornets. This is just a sample of the readiness problems plaguing those who serve in uniform. Yet, the almost-$1 trillion “stimulus” bill didn’t contain a nickel for military modernization. Instead, the president and Congress have been cutting defense dollars and capabilities for the past three years. Today, Washington wants to divert even more defense dollars to debt reduction — even in the face of the rapidly declining readiness of the U.S. military. This will only exacerbate the problem of how to meet the urgent need to conduct overdue maintenance on older ships, planes and vehicles. The latest defense budget takes a half trillion dollars out of military spending over the next decade even though Pentagon leaders expect no let up in demand for U.S. forces worldwide. Should an unforeseen crisis arise, the consequences could be deadly. While there is no quick or easy fix, admitting there is a problem and doing something about it should be everyone’s priority. In 2010, a bipartisan blue-ribbon panel set up by Congress and led by Bill Clinton’s Secretary of Defense and George W. Bush’s National Security Adviser issued a stark warning about the worrisome state of America’s military and advised Congress to act quickly to rebuild and modernize the U.S. military: “The aging of the inventories and equipment used by the services, the decline in the size of the Navy, escalating personnel entitlements, overhead and procurement costs, and the growing stress on the force means that a train wreck is coming in the areas of personnel, acquisition, and force structure.” Meeting the military’s full modernization requirements will “require a substantial and immediate additional investment that is sustained through the long term.” However, the price of U.S. weakness will be greater in the long run.

#### Existing naval decline arguments are irrelevant- the Navy is now being asked to do more with less— investment is key

**Eaglen ’12** [3 February 2012, MacKenzie Eaglen, Research Fellow for National Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, American Enterprise Institute, “U.S. Navy readiness continues its decline amid the ‘pivot’ to Asia,” http://www.aei-ideas.org/2012/02/u-s-navy-readiness-continues-its-decline-amidst-the-pivot-to-asia/, AZhang]

At the same time as the Obama administration is heralding a strategic “pivot” towards Asia and the growing threat of Chinese military modernization, the U.S. Navy continues to put on a brave face in the middle of a growing readiness crisis. While not new, this alarming trend was highlighted again this week when Navy officials announced that, for the second time in seven months, the USS Essex, a Marine Corps amphibious assault ship, has failed to meet a commitment at sea due to equipment failure or maintenance issues. The Navy’s No. 2 wasn’t understating the problem when he told Congress last year: “The stress on the force is real. And it has been relentless.” This is not an isolated occurrence. A high operational tempo over the past decade has put an incredible strain upon all of America’s military. As fewer ships spend less time at home making repairs, regular wear and tear takes a heavy toll. In fact, in 2011, nearly one-quarter of the entire surface fleet failed inspection. The Navy has 22 cruisers in service and every one of them has cracks in the aluminum superstructure. Meanwhile, half of the Navy’s deployable aircraft are not combat ready and engines aboard two F/A-18s have caught fire aboard ships underway. While the Navy has shrunk by 15 percent since 1998, it has deployed a relatively constant number of ships at sea at any given time. Between two major wars in the Middle East, a third in Libya, anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa, disaster relief in Asia, and maritime deterrence in the Western Pacific, the U.S. military has increasingly been asked to do more with less. The USS Essex was supposed to take part in Cobra Gold—a joint exercise with Thailand—before it had to back out due to mechanical problems. In many ways, this incident can be seen as a metaphor for the entire shift to Asia. On paper, it sounds like a smart and forward-thinking policy—it even involves allies and burden-sharing. What’s not to love? But without the proper resources, Cobra Gold, as well as the larger “pivot” and its supposed emphasis on air and naval power, is just a paper tiger. If the administration is serious about properly resourcing an American military emphasis in the Pacific while not taking our eye off the ball everywhere else, the president must send over a budget that proposes to reverse the decline of the Navy’s size, fleet, and readiness**.** Anything less should be called out for what it really is: a strategy that says one thing and a budget that does another.

# -Navy Good

#### Failure to effectively build a fleet undermines Navy capacity, power projection, and peaceful competition with China

**Cropsey ’10** [Seth Cropsey, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, Washington, DC. He served as Naval Officer from 1985 to 2004 and as deputy senior under secretary of the Navy in the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H. Bush, “The US Navy in Distress,” Strategic Analysis Vol. 34 No. 1, January 2010, pp. 43-44, http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/Cropsey\_US\_Navy\_In\_Distress.pdf, AZhang]

The United States faces several alternative naval futures. Failure to build a fleet that answers the nation’s enduring need for flexible maritime forces or reverse the effects of serious and sustained naval decline will produce a navy-lite, one that looks more and more like a coast guard. Forgetting the bond between effective maritime strategy and discouraging likely future challenges is certain to embolden and generate increasingly formidable naval competition: With continued effort China can shed its ‘near peer competitor’ status and become the real thing. The inability to re-consider fundamental assumptions about the shape of naval forces erodes one of the United States’ traditional strengths, a flexible concept of mari- time strategy as an essential element of national defense strategy. Failure to disci- pline the costs of building and maintaining naval forces, or to reduce a multiplying and largely unaccountable defense bureaucracy sentences the US combat fleet to either reduced size or capability – or both. The incapacity to identify affordable technologies foreshadows the end of the innovation and ingenuity that has charac- terized the American fleet since the post-Revolutionary War Navy built its first six over-size frigates that served effectively as capital ships from the western Atlantic to the central Mediterranean. All these pathologies result in a much diminished US Navy. All are grave. None is as debilitating as the Navy’s self-induced drift towards conceiving of itself as a coalition-organizing and land-oriented deterrent to local conflict. This essentially con- tinentalist idea possesses strong attraction for the Defense Department’s flavour du jour: multi-lateralist approaches to land-based asymmetrical challenges. But it is a death knell for a globe-spanning, trans-oceanic, strategic maritime force as well as the idea of such a force upon which both supreme naval competence and public support depends. The late Samuel P. Huntington wrote in his famous article for the May 1954 issue of Proceedings, ‘If a service does not possess a well defined strategic concept, the public and the political leaders will be confused as to the role of the service, uncertain as to the necessity of its existence and apathetic or hostile to the claims made by the service upon the resources of society.’ A maritime strategy of deterrence through ‘thinking locally and acting globally’, as the oft-seen bumper sticker advocates, matches the sensibilities of most Western European populations today. It will never command the same respect and support as a strategy based on the nation’s need to protect against multiplying ballistic missile threats and seaborne WMD. Its silence about the dangers of China’s rising naval power is a strategic blunder as well as a lost opportunity to educate and gather public support. Maritime strategy that seeks lesser goals threatens irreparable damage to our alliances, prestige, and the international sys- tem that American policy has labored to create for the past century. The notion of using the Navy as a ‘global force for good’ – as the recruiting ad promises – isn’t bad and isn’t new. It could also be relatively inexpensive since building, renting, or buying small vessels linked to a mother ship and configured to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief is cheap compared to the cost of combatants. But the humanitarian mission is subordinate to the United States’ greater strategic objectives. The global-force-for-good idea turns on its head the influence that maritime force – in the absence of traditional navy-to-navy struggles for sea con- trol – was supposed to exert over a strategic littoral area and transforms it into a kind of public diplomacy that seeks to shape public attitudes in potentially hostile regions by demonstrating American good will. In failing to marshal the domestic political support necessary to maintain a large, capable, robust maritime force, this approach will reduce the Navy to an instrument of coastal or perhaps hemispheric defense. This puts at risk the nation’s capacity to meet with confidence an increasingly fragmented strategic future. It shatters the perception of the United States as a great power. It calls into question our future ability to clear the seas of a potential enemy’s naval and merchant shipping at precisely the moment when a would-be great power, China, is constructing maritime forces that could resur- rect a naval contest of wills such as the one that withered when an essentially contin- ental power, the Soviet Union opposed an essentially maritime power, the United States. Identifying China as a potential naval competitor threatens neither the truth nor peace. There is no better assurance of continued peaceful competition with China than a maritime strategy that retains a powerful US combat fleet in the western Pacific.

#### **Shipbuilding is specifically key to counter China naval rise**

Lyons 4/17 [17 April 2012, Admiral James A. Lyons, commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and senior U.S. military representative to the United Nations, “LYONS: Navy’s shipbuilding deficiencies,” http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/apr/17/navys-shipbuilding-deficiencies/, AZhang]

The Navy’s force projection and assured nuclear strategic capability are keys to our retaining U.S. pre-eminence as a world leader. Our Navy, however, will face increasing threats, especially from China, which has deployed anti-ship ballistic missiles, sophisticated nuclear attack and ballistic missile submarines, and fifth-generation stealthy aircraft, which are clearly targeted against our naval forces. Our ships will require a broad spectrum of defensive and offensive capabilities in order to carry out their mission. The Department of Defense Joint Requirements Oversight Council identified simultaneous defense, ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles as a “capability gap.” In 2006, the council validated that Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) was an operation requirement not sufficiently addressed. Developing an effective IAMD capability for the Navy’s surface combatant ships is essential in order to preserve the Navy’s most important role in the Joint Force - that of guaranteeing “forcible entry” capability anywhere in the world. To provide the necessary capability to counter the changing threat environment, the Navy is in the early stages of a shipbuilding program that will determine the character and future capabilities as well as the size of the Navy for the next 50 to 60 years. It is critical that the Navy’s future shipbuilding plans provide the most capable force given current fiscal constraints.

#### **Decline of US Naval power leads to multiple scenarios for great power war**

**Eaglen and McGrath ’11** [Mackenzie Eaglen is Research Fellow for National Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. Bryan McGrath is a retired naval officer and the Director of Delex Consulting, Studies and Analysis in Vienna, Virginia. On active duty, he commanded the destroyer USS Bulkeley (DDG 84) and served as the primary author of the current maritime strategy. (5/16/11, Mackenzie, Bryan, “Thinking about A Day Without US Sea Power: Implications for US defense Policies” http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/05/Thinking-About-a-Day-Without-Sea-Power-Implications-for-US-Defense-Policy, AZhang]

Global Implications. Under a scenario of dramatically reduced naval power, the United States would cease to be active in any international alliances. While it is reasonable to assume that land and air forces would be similarly reduced in this scenario, the lack of credible maritime capability to move their bulk and establish forward bases would render these forces irrelevant, even if the Army and Air Force were retained at today’s levels. In Iraq and Afghanistan today, 90 percent of material arrives by sea, although material bound for Afghanistan must then make a laborious journey by land into theater. China’s claims on the South China Sea, previously disputed by virtually all nations in the region and routinely contested by U.S. and partner naval forces, are accepted as a fait accompli, effectively turning the region into a “Chinese lake.” China establishes expansive oil and gas exploration with new deepwater drilling technology and secures its local sea lanes from intervention. Korea, unified in 2017 after the implosion of the North, signs a mutual defense treaty with China and solidifies their relationship. Japan is increasingly isolated and in 2020–2025 executes long-rumored plans to create an indigenous nuclear weapons capability.[11] By 2025, Japan has 25 mobile nuclear-armed missiles ostensibly targeting China, toward which Japan’s historical animus remains strong. China’s entente with Russia leaves the Eurasian landmass dominated by Russia looking west and China looking east and south. Each cedes a sphere of dominance to the other and remains largely unconcerned with the events in the other’s sphere. Worldwide, trade in foodstuffs collapses. Expanding populations in the Middle East increase pressure on their governments, which are already stressed as the breakdown in world trade disproportionately affects food importers. Piracy increases worldwide, driving food transportation costs even higher. In the Arctic, Russia aggressively asserts its dominance and effectively shoulders out other nations with legitimate claims to seabed resources. No naval power exists to counter Russia’s claims. India, recognizing that its previous role as a balancer to China has lost relevance with the retrenchment of the Americans, agrees to supplement Chinese naval power in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf to protect the flow of oil to Southeast Asia. In exchange, China agrees to exercise increased influence on its client state Pakistan. The great typhoon of 2023 strikes Bangladesh, killing 23,000 people initially, and 200,000 more die in the subsequent weeks and months as the international community provides little humanitarian relief. Cholera and malaria are epidemic. Iran dominates the Persian Gulf and is a nuclear power. Its navy aggressively patrols the Gulf while the Revolutionary Guard Navy harasses shipping and oil infrastructure to force Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries into Tehran’s orbit. Russia supplies Iran with a steady flow of military technology and nuclear industry expertise. Lacking a regional threat, the Iranians happily control the flow of oil from the Gulf and benefit economically from the “protection” provided to other GCC nations. In Egypt, the decade-long experiment in participatory democracy ends with the ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood in a violent seizure of power. The United States is identified closely with the previous coalition government, and riots break out at the U.S. embassy. Americans in Egypt are left to their own devices because the U.S. has no forces in the Mediterranean capable of performing a noncombatant evacuation when the government closes major airports. Led by Iran, a coalition of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq attacks Israel. Over 300,000 die in six months of fighting that includes a limited nuclear exchange between Iran and Israel. Israel is defeated, and the State of Palestine is declared in its place. Massive “refugee” camps are created to house the internally displaced Israelis, but a humanitarian nightmare ensues from the inability of conquering forces to support them. The NATO alliance is shattered. The security of European nations depends increasingly on the lack of external threats and the nuclear capability of France, Britain, and Germany, which overcame its reticence to military capability in light of America’s retrenchment. Europe depends for its energy security on Russia and Iran, which control the main supply lines and sources of oil and gas to Europe. Major European nations stand down their militaries and instead make limited contributions to a new EU military constabulary force. No European nation maintains the ability to conduct significant out-of-area operations, and Europe as a whole maintains little airlift capacity.

# -AT: Can’t Solve (Alt Causes)

#### Stabilizing the shipbuilding industry would reduce costs and solve institutional problems

**Cropsey ’12** [18 April 2012, “The U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plan: Assumptions and Associated Risks to National Security” Dr. Seth Cropsey, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, Washington, DC. He served as Naval Officer from 1985 to 2004 and as deputy senior under secretary of the Navy in the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H. Bush, http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/SethCropsey--USNavyShipbuildingPlan--Testimony041812.pdf, AZhang]

Knowledge of shipbuilding remains part of American manufacturing. But accelerating cost, an ageing workforce, reduced orders for warships, and an uncertain future risk the nation’s ability to turn out sufficient numbers of vessels at affordable prices and profitably enough to keep shipbuilding companies alive. The destabilization of the American shipbuilding industrial base is one reason that the cost of warships is outpacing the rate of inflation. The Navy’s reduced procurement of ships over the past twenty years has caused the industry to contract, lay off workers, and in general to become less reliable. This has driven up the cost of labor and the cost of construction materials. The fewer ships the Navy buys, the less lucrative the industry is for skilled workers. As the cost of labor rises shipbuilders are increasingly pressed to attract and train qualified personnel. The negative trends reinforce each other. As younger workers are dissuaded from seeking employment or remaining in the industry by the prospects of sporadic employment those who remain—the existing workers—age. The cycle is self-defeating. Paying older workers increases overhead costs and makes it increasingly expensive to invest in the training and education of a younger workforce. The destabilization of the industrial base also causes costs to rise since many of the materials and products that go into building Navy ships are not useful for other purposes. Since the Navy is buying far fewer ships now than it did in the 1980s, many shipyards rely on a single source for necessary materials. With a virtual monopoly on these products, the suppliers have in large part the ability to name their price. The inefficient manner in which the shipyards acquire these materials drives up labor and overhead costs. The solution lies in stabilizing the American shipbuilding industry. This means that the Navy must either increase its orders of ships and/or improve its business practices, for example disciplining the changes it requires of shipbuilders once orders have been placed and vessels are under construction. Buying and stockpiling spare parts for ships that are already in service and whose need for regular maintenance and repair is well known would also help provide stability for the American shipbuilding industry. In a study conducted on the subject in 2006, the RAND Corporation concluded that the rising costs of building ships is the result of a combination of unsteady U.S. Government procurement rates and a “monopsony relationship” between the government and the shipbuilders. In a monopsony a single purchaser is faced with a host of sellers. Because there is so little American shipbuilding outside of what the Navy purchases, U.S. firms are at the commercial mercy of the 9 percent of the Navy budget devoted to buying ships. A 2005 Government Accountability Office report attributed cost increases in shipbuilding to instability in the entire industry, the difficulty in recruiting and training qualified personnel, high rates of skilled personnel turnover and the shipbuilders’ dependence on a rapidly shrinking supplier base.

# -Fed Key

#### Steady federal Title XI funding key to revitalize the shipbuilding industrial base, generate jobs and maintain defense capabilities

**AMO ’12** [American Maritime Officer “Title XI loan guarantees generate U.S. shipbuilding jobs,” May 2012, http://www.amo-union.org/News/2012/201205/201205.pdf, AZhang]

As the subcommittee on Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies devel- ops appropriations legislation for FY 2013, we ask that it provide funding for the Maritime Administration’s loan guarantee program, known as the “Title XI Program.” This program warrants continued support even as Congress understandably reviews all accounts carefully. This is not a large, top down government program but a small program based on private sector initiative and applications. The program guarantees commercial loans for privately financed commercial ship construction and shipyard modernization – all in the United States. Demand for program guarantees has consistently exceeded available resources. Funding and implementation of the Title XI program will help grow the U.S. economy and create and maintain American jobs in the domestic shipbuilding and related service and supply industries, as well as aboard United States-flag commercial vessels. It will help maintain the nation’s defense shipbuilding industrial base and an active U.S.-flag merchant marine, which is essential to U.S. defense sealift requirements. The program has created and maintained tens of thousands of well-paying seagoing and shoreside jobs, and helped to ensure that an adequate pool of vessels and mariners and a shipyard industrial base, including associated supply industries, is available to meet U.S. economic, homeland and national sealift needs. Maintaining commercial vessel construction in U.S. shipyards can also help reduce overhead charges assessed to DOD on military ship- building contracts, as some overhead could be assessed to commercial work. The program also provides a strong return for the government, as each Title XI dollar leverages 15-20 dollars of private investment. Moreover, the resulting overall economic activity has been estimated to be several times the shipyard output. For vessel operators and shipyards seeking to utilize the program, it is critically important that the program be funded on a regular basis. Sporadic funding for Title XI makes it difficult to develop even short term plans, much less multi-year strategies, and inhibits critical economic activity in the maritime sector. On the other hand, a consistently funded program will help grow the maritime industry and the economy as ship owners and shipyards invest in their enterprises. Moreover, the risk premiums collect- ed in the course of administration of the program help ensure that the program is paid for. For all these reasons, we urge you to include funding for new commitments for the Title XI program in appropriations leg- islation for Fiscal Year 2013.

# -BMD Impact

#### BMD solves Russian and Chinese conflict and is critical to deterrence

**NDU ’10** [The Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Defense University, “Industry Study Final Report Shipbuilding Industry,” Spring 2010, p. 1, http://www.ndu.edu/icaf/programs/academic/industry/reports/2010/pdf/icaf-is-report-shipbuilding-2010.pdf, AZhang]

Countering Near-Peer and Technologically Enabled Competitors “Preventing war is preferable to fighting wars. Deterring aggression must be viewed in global, regional, and transnational terms via conventional, unconventional, and nuclear means.”17 Although the Cold War is over, the US must continue to counter threats posed by near-peer and technologically-enabled competitors. Deterrence in regards to the maritime strategy basically refers to ballistic missile defense and forward offensive missile capability. The requirement for maritime security to secure freedom of movement and secured access remains unchanged, but a different solution may be required to affect it. Ballistic missile defense is an important piece of the nation’s strategy to protect forward deployed forces, allied nations, and the homeland, and Navy ships play a crucial role in this task. It is a capability important for today and will continue to grow in importance as missiles continue to proliferate in the world both in the hands of nation states and possibly in the hands of nontraditional and non-state actors. The ability to deliver missiles forward from the sea is also an important piece of the nation’s strategic deterrence. The ability to launch conventional or nuclear missiles from anywhere in the ocean gives pause to any nation that would attempt to do us harm. The submarine is the most effective delivery system of choice since they are virtually 5 ￼ undetectable in location. Power projection should also focus on strategic sealift while ceding some power projection missions from carrier battle groups to other services. Resurgent Russia and China do not challenge US dominance at sea; however, they do pose a threat to access and freedom of action at sea. Russia understands the current deterrence calculus associated with the strategic stockpile of nuclear weapons that the US possesses. Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM) places Strike Groups at risk should China decide to engage militarily.18 A carrier can be defended organically, but at a very high operational cost. Defense of the Strike Group would likely expend prohibitively large portions of the strike capability thereby limiting accomplishment of the carrier’s primary power projection mission. If that mission is sacrificed, it changes the cost-benefit analysis that currently favors the Strike Group.

# -AT: 313 Ships CP

#### Disregard the counterplan solvency evidence— Hugh Hewitt is ultra-right-wing and has a partisan political agenda in mind

**Stowell 5/31** [31 May 2012, Rich Stowell, Washington Times, “Hugh Hewitt preaches conservative politics best,” http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/general-factotum/2012/jun/1/hugh\_hewitt\_preaches/, AZhang]

Anyone with only a passing familiarity of American conservatism will immediately recognize the name Hugh Hewitt and, more than likely, his signature phrase. Familiarity is a must for anyone who wants to know politics, for Hugh is the smartest man on radio. He is in the pantheon of influential talking heads on the Right, along with Rush, Hannity, Mark Levin, Ann Coulter, and Dennis Prager. Among that elite, he most deftly of all combines wit, insight, humility, and a strategic optimism for his brand of politics. Listeners to his three-hour daily, syndicated talk show will know what the most important political topics of the day are. Usually, they revolve around how bad President Obama is for the country. "Epic," "massive," and "utter" are just a few of the adjectives Hugh regularly employs to describe Barack Obama's failure as chief executive. He is also unimpressed with the president's supposed intellect and cool demeanor: "The president is petulant, arrogant, dismissive of his critics, needlessly combative and usually and almost casually condescending," Hugh wrote a few months ago. A common critique is that Obama has little idea what he is talking about when it comes to foreign affairs and the economy, a belief that Hugh reiterates when commenting on the president's interminable answers to reporters' questions.

#### Counterplan fails— can’t maintain a steady growth in number ships

**Eaglen and McGrath ’11** [Mackenzie Eaglen is Research Fellow for National Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. Bryan McGrath is a retired naval officer and the Director of Delex Consulting, Studies and Analysis in Vienna, Virginia. On active duty, he commanded the destroyer USS Bulkeley (DDG 84) and served as the primary author of the current maritime strategy. (5/16/11, Mackenzie, Bryan, “Thinking about A Day Without US Sea Power: Implications for US defense Policies” http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/05/Thinking-About-a-Day-Without-Sea-Power-Implications-for-US-Defense-Policy, AZhang]

Financing the future Navy fleet is simply common sense for a maritime power. A strong Navy is in America’s long-term interest and essential to the nation’s prosperity. Failure to invest in the fleet, reverse its decline, and maintain steady growth in the number of ships in the Navy’s inventory will only embolden U.S. adversaries. History has seen more than one great naval power (e.g., Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) become a shadow of its former self when it failed to maintain its maritime preeminence.It is difficult to imagine that the nation desires such a decline—and even more difficult to accept that Congress and the Administration are letting it happen.

#### Counterplan fails—lacks necessary surge capacity and maintenance capability, ensuring ship and naval power degradation

**Eaglen and McGrath ’11** [Mackenzie Eaglen is Research Fellow for National Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. Bryan McGrath is a retired naval officer and the Director of Delex Consulting, Studies and Analysis in Vienna, Virginia. On active duty, he commanded the destroyer USS Bulkeley (DDG 84) and served as the primary author of the current maritime strategy. (5/16/11, Mackenzie, Bryan, “Thinking about A Day Without US Sea Power: Implications for US defense Policies” http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/05/Thinking-About-a-Day-Without-Sea-Power-Implications-for-US-Defense-Policy, AZhang]

Today’s Navy is experiencing extreme levels of stress. [6] While the fleet has shrunk by about 15 percent since 1998,[7] the number of ships deployed overseas has remained constant at about 100. Each ship goes to sea longer and more often, resulting in problems such as the well-publicized shortfalls in surface ship condition.[8] With no surge capacity left in the fleet, each new casualty ripples through the schedules of dozens of ships. With the end of supplemental funding, Navy maintenance funding will be cut by almost 20 percent this year. In this context, a relatively small additional reduction in maintenance funding could render a Navy with 250–280 ships capable of keeping only 50 to 60 ships at sea. Even if the Navy can sustain today’s number of ships or even grow slightly over the next decade as predicted by current Navy shipbuilding plans, the fleet will increasingly be composed of smaller and less capable littoral combat ships and logistics ships, such as Joint High Speed Vessels. This trend toward a fleet for engagement and maritime security could be enabled by the country’s increasingly modest vision of itself and the erosion of its sense of destiny and centrality. With ship design times of 20 years or longer and service lives of up to 50 years, the fleet could degrade to a point at which the country will be economically and strategically unable to reverse course. The nation and the most versatile element of its military power would then continue to decline to second-rate status.

#### **313 ships ain’t enuff— a strong shipbuilding industry is the most critical aspect of naval power**

**NLUS ’09** [Navy League of the United States, “Navy League's Maritime Policy Statement,” http://www.corpusnavyleague.org/Maritime\_Policy\_09\_10.pdf, pp. 1-2, AZhang]

To maintain global maritime presence, we must have sufficient sea-going assets to provide forward presence, react to contingencies wherever they may occur and, when required, provide forceful control of the seas and the littorals. Only strong American maritime forces can ensure control the seas — above, on and below. Maritime superiority requires “hulls in the water,” just as victory on land is won by “boots on the ground.” The con- tributions of all of America’s maritime forces — the Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and U.S.-flag Merchant Marines — plus those of our partners worldwide, are welcome and important, but it is the U.S. Navy that blesses us with maritime superiority. The 313 ships that the service has set as a fleet goal should be viewed as the bare minimum, since the attrition that would occur in major combat is not considered. While there has been a focus in recent years on hull forms, stealth and other advanced technologies, it is the capability to find and put ordnance on the target that defines the true worth of a combatant ship. Only strong American maritime forces can ensure control of the seas — above, on and below. Equally important is the capability for our Sailors and Marines to train realistically with those ships. The continuing emotion-based attacks on the Navy’s active sonar training are the most glaring, but not the only, example of how training capability is being dramatically eroded. The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision to support active sonar training is a great help, but more is needed. The Navy League has argued repeatedly for legislation ensuring our forces have the ability to train as they will fight. We desper- ately need that legislation as special interest groups continue to impede essential training. The Navy League believes that shipbuilding is the most critical of all the programs in the Department of Defense (DoD) budget. The funds are not there to build and maintain a Navy of 313 ships including the amphibious ships mandated by our commitments to littoral warfare, or replace the aging Coast Guard fleet. The final Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2008, which is currently in working draft form, may call for a number greater than 313 and the Navy League wholeheartedly supports any escalation of that number. The Navy League applauds the decision to build more DDG 51-type ships versus the expensive DDG 1000s. Simply put, we need numbers of ships and we can get more hulls in the water with the less expensive but still very capable DDG 51s. Inflation is a fact in shipbuilding, and the increasing cost of commodities, weakness of the dollar and lack of long-term funding stability create cost growth. In recognition of these factors, the Navy needs $20 billion per year for shipbuilding and modernization, the Coast Guard needs $2.6 billion per year to effectively execute its Deepwater modernization program and the Marine Corps needs the 10th LPD amphibious transport dock ship and a total force of 34 amphibious ships. Though the Navy states that its aircraft shortfall is several years out, the fact is that there is currently a shortage of Hornets and, as a result, some of our active-duty Carrier Air Wings do not have a full complement of aircraft today. Our warfighting capability is being degraded. The question of affordability needs to be balanced against the impact of our loss of mari- time superiority. To say we cannot afford these dollar amounts equates to saying we can afford to become a second-rate maritime nation.

#### **Shipbuilding capability is the critical factor of naval power— current ship inactivation pushes us to the brink**

**Cropsey ’12** [Seth Cropsey, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, he served as a naval officer from 1985 to 2004, and as Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy during the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, “Defeat at Sea: The U.S. Naval Implosion of 2050,” April 2012, http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/SethCropsey--DefeatAtSea040312.pdf, AZhang]

In the popular imagination a naval fleet is diminished by the loss of its ships in combat. Over the past quarter century valiant efforts of the crews of three U.S. Navy ships that suffered grievous damage in the Persian Gulf as a result, respectively, of a missile attack, a mine, and a suicide bomber prevented the loss of a U.S. naval combatant at the hands of an enemy—an event that has not occurred since World War II. However, there are two other more silent and insidious ways to shrink a navy: decommissioning ships, and failing to build them. The U.S. is engaged in both as the recent naval communication (excerpted below) and figures about naval shipbuilding noted immediately beneath demonstrate. The scenario that follows offers one possible consequence of the United States’ prolonged naval disarmament. There are many others. All lead to the same place, a self-inflicted loss of America’s great power status as a direct consequence of its navy’s inability to shape events, project power, and defend American and allied interests at a distance from our borders. 1. “Unclassified Mar. 12, 2012 From: Chief of Naval Operations To: All Hands Subj: Projected Ship Inactivation Schedule Fiscal Year 2013 The Projected FY13 Ship Inactivation Schedule...is promulgated as follows: USS Crommelin (frigate, or FFG) USS Underwood FFG USS Curts FFG USS Carr FFG USS Enterprise (aircraft carrier) USS Klakring FFG USS Reuben James FFG USS Cowpens (cruiser, or CG) USS Anzio CG USS Vicksburg CG USS Port Royal CG” 2

# **--- Links to PTX**

#### **Counterplan links to politics— toxic partisan environment**

**NDIA ’12** [12 January 2012, National Defense Industrial Association, “Sen. Collins Sounds Alarms About Weakening U.S. Shipbuilding Industry,” http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/posts/post.aspx?ID=636, AZhang]

Navy officials years ago set a goal of having a 313-ship fleet. The numbers of ships in each class have been shuffled since then. One revised benchmark of having 94 large surface combatants recognizes the growing need for ships able to perform a variety of missions such as ballistic missile defense, open ocean anti-submarine warfare and strike warfare, Collins said. “The longer Congress has to wait for a plan to address the gap, the more questions will be asked about validity of the 94 ship requirement,” she said. “If 94 ships is the minimum, how many ships do we have to be short of that goal before someone in the Navy or at the Pentagon sounds the alarm that the risk for our country’s security has reached a red line?” She added: “Building a large number of ships is necessary, but building a large number of ships with limited combat capability at the expense of increasing the number of ships with higher capability could well be a Pyrrhic victory.” During a keynote address Jan. 10 at the symposium Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert said that the service this spring will begin a force structure assessment that takes into account the defense strategy unveiled by President Obama last week. The study will take stock of the Navy's ship inventory, now and into the future. “In the near term, I'm very comfortable,” Greenert said. “But what do we need in the future? What does our shipbuilding plan say?” The admiral acknowledged that the service needed to do a better job working with industry to deliver ships to the fleet. About 15 percent of the ships are late, he said. Delays in shipbuilding and other areas of procurement are confounded by what Collins described a s a toxic partisan environment in Congress that is only getting worse. Lawmakers continue to bicker over every issue, holding hard lines on the left and right when it comes to budgetary matters. “When we don't do our work on time, it delays new starts, it makes contracts more expensive and it throws a monkey-wrench into the entire procurement process,” Collins said.

# ---Elections Turn (OG)

#### They read Obama Good Elections DA as a net benefit to shipbuilding counterplan—

#### Turn— Romney win key to long- term naval power expansion— guts counterplan solvency

**Cushman ’12** [27 January 2012, John H. Cushman Jr, Staff writer for the New York Times, “Defense Budget Limits Reach of a Campaign Promise for the Navy,” http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/28/us/politics/defense-budget-limits-reach-of-romneys-plan-for-navy.html, AZhang]

WASHINGTON — One of the most specific campaign promises Mitt Romney has made in the realm of defense policy is to increase the Navy’s shipbuilding program to 15 vessels each year from 9 or 10, enough to significantly increase the size of a fleet that has been straining to meet its global missions. That simple, rule-the-waves articulation of Mr. Romney’s military stance as he auditions for the role of commander in chief now stands in even sharper contrast with the Obama administration’s posture. The Pentagon’s new budget request, issued on Thursday, would not increase but cut the number of ships, retiring some early and delaying the purchase of others. To hit its budget target, the Navy would retire seven cruisers and two smaller amphibious ships, and delay work on three amphibious ships and an attack submarine. Two smaller combat ships, customized for shallower seas and shorelines, would be eliminated, as would eight fast cargo ferries. Mr. Romney’s alternative, which offers no details but surely would cost many billions of dollars, could play especially well in states with significant shipbuilding industries and naval installations — including Florida, with its hard-fought primary looming. It may show the influence of one of Mr. Romney’s top defense advisers, John Lehman, who as Ronald Reagan’s Navy Secretary talked of building a 600-ship Navy. (There were more than 500 ships in the Navy then; now there are fewer than 300.)

# -AT: LOST CP

# ---Turn

#### Turn- LOST ratification destroys our naval capability— laundry list

**Inhofe et. al. 5/22** [22 May 2012, Sen. Jim Inhofe, second ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, Sen. Roger Wicker, ranking member of the SASC Subcommittee on Seapower, And Sen. Jeff Sessions, ranking member of the Budget Committee, “Law of the Sea would usurp U.S. Navy’s authority,” http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0512/76627.html, AZhang]

A steady stream of admirals and service chiefs over many years have advocated for the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, or the Law of the Sea Treaty — an accord rejected by President Ronald Reagan in 1982. Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example, said this treaty “codifies navigational rights and freedoms essential for our global mobility.” It is true that the treaty’s navigational articles codify noncontroversial traditional maritime rules of the road. But the Navy has successfully preserved and protected its navigational rights and freedoms for 200 years without it. For the treaty to be “essential for our global mobility,” the Navy would have to suffer a devastating decline — either from drastic budget cuts or a major reduction in its mission and capabilities. Ceding any authority to an international body is not only a threat to our sovereignty, it also creates another avenue for other nations to stop U.S. unilateral activity. Some fear the Navy is at a tipping point. Increased global threats, combined with fewer resources, have created growing concern for its future. Devastating budget cuts under the Obama administration mean doing even more with much less. If the proposed defense cuts through sequestration go into effect, potential cuts include the littoral combat ship, amphibious ships, a reduction in aircraft carriers and far fewer sailors. After sequestration, our fleet could be smaller than 230 ships — the smallest since 1915. Could it be that some have decided to put their hope in a piece of paper rather than provide the resources necessary to maintain our Navy’s traditional strength? Does this U.N. treaty provide real justification for such devastating cuts? If not, we need detailed explanations from our top military officials. The Navy already operates within the bounds of international and customary laws. Shortly after World War II, the U.S. joined the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, now called the International Maritime Organization. The purpose of the group is to set maritime laws that are now broadly enforced by national and local maritime authorities to improve safety at sea, facilitate trade among seafaring states and protect the marine environment. These laws allow the U.S. to execute commerce and military operations around the globe — as an independent and sovereign nation. Thus, LOST is unneeded and redundant. Most of the opposition to the Law of the Sea pact stems from the treaty’s non-navigational portions that deal with the international taxation from natural resources revenue, issues related to U.S. sovereignty and the redistribution of wealth from the U.S. to the Third World. But even worse, this agreement would be an albatross that takes our nation’s military down with it. Proponents say the treaty exempts military activity from international litigation. But those of us opposing it are deeply concerned because this terribly flawed document fails to define what is included in that exemption. In addition, it opens the U.S. military to the jurisdiction of international courts and governing bodies. Military training exercises that do not have the approval of other nations could be prevented because of potentially negative environmental impacts. U.S. military vessels could be stopped on the grounds that they are too heavy a polluter. All the while, billions — if not trillions — in limited U.S. funds would be transferred from the U.S. Treasury to international coffers through the tax and redistribution provisions of the treaty. As we have seen, when funds are limited, the first place to get squeezed is our military. At the same time, nations like China and Iran, both signers of the treaty, have been flexing their muscles. Iran threatened to shut down the Strait of Hormuz and attack U.S. vessels. China’s navy has engaged in acts of harassment meant to intimidate its neighbors in the South China Sea. In both cases, it is the might of the U.S. Navy — not the treaty — that maintains order. The Senate should reject this dangerous hand over of U.S. sovereignty. Instead, it should provide the Navy with the resources necessary to keep it the best force on the high seas

# ---Links to PTX

#### Counterplan links to politics— Republican opposition is as heavy as a Snorlax

**Pecquet 5/25** [Julian Pecquet, The Hill, “Opposition to Law of the Sea Treaty heats up,” http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/un-treaties/229637-opposition-to-law-of-the-sea-treaty-heats-up, AZhang]

Sen. Dean Heller (R-Nev.) on Friday became the 27th senator to sign on to a letter opposing passage of the Law of the Sea Treaty, leaving opponents just seven votes shy of the 34 votes opponents need to doom passage of the UN maritime convention. “We are writing to let you know that we believe this Convention reflects political, economic, and ideological assumptions which are inconsistent with American values and sovereignty,” reads the letter to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.). U.S. accession to the 30-year-old treaty is championed by the U.S. Navy and oil and gas industries, who say it's in the United States' interest to be able to craft international maritime law. Critics say it could force the U.S. to abide by international restrictions on carbon emissions and force American companies to pay royalties to a United Nations body. The full text of the letter is below: The Honorable Harry Reid Majority Leader United States Senate Washington, DC 20510 Dear Mr. Leader, We understand that Chairman Kerry has renewed his efforts to pursue Senate ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. We are writing to let you know that we believe this Convention reflects political, economic, and ideological assumptions which are inconsistent with American values and sovereignty. By its current terms, the Law of the Sea Convention encompasses economic and technology interests in the deep sea, redistribution of wealth from developed to undeveloped nations, freedom of navigation in the deep sea and exclusive economic zones which may impact maritime security, and environmental regulation over virtually all sources of pollution. To effect the treaty’s broad regime of governance, we are particularly concerned that United States sovereignty could be subjugated in many areas to a supranational government that is chartered by the United Nations under the 1982 Convention. Further, we are troubled that compulsory dispute resolution could pertain to public and private activities including law enforcement, maritime security, business operations, and nonmilitary activities performed aboard military vessels. If this treaty comes to the floor, we will oppose its ratification. Sincerely yours, Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) Jim Inhofe (R-Okla.) Roy Blunt (R-Mo.) Pat Roberts (R-Kansas) David Vitter (R-La.) Ron Johnson (R-Wis.) John Cornyn (R-Texas) Jim DeMint (R-S.C.) Tom Coburn (R-Okla.) John Boozman (R-Ark.) Rand Paul (R-Ky.) Jim Risch (R-Idaho) Mike Lee (R-Utah) Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.) Mike Crapo (R-Idaho) Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) John Barrasso (R-Wyo.) Richard Shelby (R-Ala.) John Thune (R-S.D.) Richard Burr (R-N.C.) Saxby Chambliss (R-Ga.) Dan Coats (R-Ind.) John Hoeven (R-N.D.) Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) Jerry Moran (R-Kansas) Dean Heller (R-Nev.)

# ---Econ DA

#### Ratifying LOST tanks our economy

**Hatch and Cornyn 5/23** [23 May 2012, Senators Orrin Hatch and John Cornyn, “The Law of the Sea treaty will sink America's economy,” http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/05/23/law-sea-treaty-will-sink-america-economy/, AZhang]

Americans despise taxes. After all, one of the key issues that paved the way for the American Revolution was the unfair taxation that King George III levied against the Colonies. Now some in the US Senate want to say yes to an international tax. It would be the first time in history that an international organization would possess taxing authority, and it would amount to billions of American dollars being transferred out of the US Treasury. The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, or the Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST) is the vehicle through which such taxes would be imposed on U.S.-based commercial enterprises. The treaty that Reagan refused to sign in 1982 is reappearing once again in the Senate. The truth is, LOST contains numerous provisions that hurt the U.S. economy at a time when we need more jobs – not fewer. Under the guise of being for “the good of mankind, ” LOST would obligate the United States to share information and technology in what amounts to global taxes and technology transfer requirements that are really nothing more than an attempt to redistribute U.S. wealth to the Third World. At the center of these taxes and transfers is the International Seabed Authority (ISA), a Kingston, Jamaica based supra-national governing body established by the treaty for the purpose of redistributing cash and technology from the “developed world” to the “developing world.” Ceding authority to the ISA would mean that the sovereignty currently held by the U.S. over the natural resources located on large parts of the continental shelf would be lost. That loss would mean lost revenue for the US government in the form of lost royalties that the U.S. government collects from the production of those resources. According to the U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Task Force, which is currently mapping the continental shelf, the resources there “may be worth billions if not trillions” of dollars. In case proponents of LOST have not noticed, the US is over $15 trillion in debt, and we still have more than 20 million Americans who can’t find a job. The last thing we need to do redistribute funds from our country to our economic and strategic competitors. To make matters worse, the US would have no control over how or to whom the taxes and technology would be redistributed. Undoubtedly funds that rightfully belong to the American taxpayer would be sent to corrupt governmental regimes, make dictators wealthier, and could even be used for activities directed against the United States and our interests. Under the treaty, the transfer of these funds does not end with nation states. These royalty revenues would even be extended to “peoples who have not attained full independence or other self-governing status.” That means groups like the Palestinian Authority and potentially other groups with terrorist ties. Proponents of the treaty will claim that the technology transfer portion of the treaty has been significantly changed. In truth, nations with mining and resource recovery technologies like the United States will be obligated to share those technologies with Third World competitors, and that is one of the many issues, which trouble those of us opposed to the treaty. In other words, US companies would be forced to give away the very types of innovation that historically have made our nation a world leader while fueling our economic engine. Under the best of US economic circumstances, the Senate should say no to such an egregious breach of the trust Americans have placed in us. Our current economic struggles are all the more reason to say no to a treaty that is all cost and no benefit.

Economic decline triggers worldwide conflict  
Royal 10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, (Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult  to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg. Hess. & Weerapana. 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. 'Diversionary theory' suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1990, DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention. This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

# ---Kyoto DA

#### LOST is bad and leads to Kyoto Protocol ratification, which is also bad :P (cripples economic growth)

**Borowski 5/31** [31 May 2012, Julie Borowski, Policy Analyst at FreedomWorks, Board of Advisors for the Coalition to Reduce Spending

graduated Magna Cum Laude from Frostburg State University in May 2010 where she studied political science, economics and international studies, TownHall, “The U.N.’s Law of the Sea Treaty Threatens Our National Sovereignty,” http://townhall.com/columnists/julieborowski/2012/05/31/the\_uns\_law\_of\_the\_sea\_treaty\_threatens\_our\_national\_sovereignty/page/full/, AZhang]

The latest threat to U.S. sovereignty is the United Nations’ Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST) that is being pushed by the Obama administration. LOST rises from the dead every few years. For more than thirty years, the United States has refused to become a party to LOST for good reasons. But this could be the year that the United States surrenders its sovereignty over the seas to an international body if Obama gets his way. Under this treaty, the U.N. would have control over 71 percent of the Earth’s surface. This would be a huge step towards global governance. The Senate may vote to ratify the sea treaty as early as next week. President Ronald Reagan rejected LOST back in 1982, stating it would grant the U.N. the power to tax U.S. companies and redistribute wealth from developed to undeveloped nations. For the first time in history, the U.N. would have the authority to collect taxes from U.S. citizens. The thought of global taxation should send goose bumps down the spine of every American. Any form of global taxation would be a direct violation of the U.S. Constitution. American citizens are already overtaxed and overregulated. The last thing we need is an unelected, unconstitutional international body imposing even more harmful taxes and regulations on us. LOST could end up costing trillions of dollars and the American people would have no say on how the money is spent. If the U.S. ratifies LOST, U.S. energy companies would be forced to pay a part of their royalties to the International Seabed Authority in Kingston, Jamaica. This supra-national governing body would be tasked with the mission of distributing revenue to “developing states” such as Somalia, Zimbabwe, and Burma. Like all forms of foreign “aid”, it’s likely that a big chunk of this money will end up in the hands of corrupt dictators thus propping up authoritarian regimes. The U.N. would be granted the power to regulate deep-sea exploration in U.S. waters. LOST would do irreparable harm to U.S. companies by forcing them to comply with global environmental rules. The treaty would create a new international tribunal known as the International Tribunal of LOST (ITLOS) to adjudicate a number of different issues. It wouldn’t just be used to resolve maritime issues like boats accidently wrecking into each other. Radical environmentalists would likely use the ITLOS to file costly international climate change lawsuits against the United States. Signing LOST is certainly not in the best economic interest of the United States. The text of the U.N. treaty states that, “states shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from or through the atmosphere.” The autonomy of the United States is threatened if we allow our domestic laws to be crafted by an international body that is not accountable to the American people. LOST could even lead to a back door implementation of another U.N. treaty that the United States has never ratified: the Kyoto Protocol on global warming. This U.N. treaty would require the United States to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 7 percent below 1990 levels. Patrick J. Michael of the Cato Institute finds that it would likely reduce the gross domestic product of the United States by 2.3 percent per year while not having a noticeable effect on the global climate. According to the U.S. Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration, the Kyoto Protocol would increase the price of electricity by 86 percent, add $1,740 to the average household’s energy bill, and permanently raise the price of gasoline by 66 cents per gallon. It would inevitably raise the price for basic goods and cause millions of Americans to lose their jobs. The scientific debate on anthroprogenic global warming continues to rage. We shouldn’t sacrifice our standard of living based on this unsettled issue. Remember that some scientists were warning us about man-made global cooling in the 1970’s. TIME Magazine even ran a cover story on “How to Survive the Coming Ice Age” in April 1977. Climate change fear-mongering has been going on for decades—let’s not fall for the propaganda so easily. The U.N. is openly hostile to our national sovereignty and republican form of government. The ratification of LOST would open up a Pandora’s Box of problems. It would impose global taxes and regulations that cripple economic growth while exposing ourselves to high-stakes environmental lawsuits. We need to sink LOST once and for all.

# -AT: Jones Act CP

#### Jones Act is essential to a strong shipbuilding industry— strong workforce and Title XI solves

**NASSCO ’09** [30 July 2009, General Dynamics NASSCO, Aimee Heim, General Dynamics NASSCO Matt Tedesco, Tedesco Consulting “A Shipbuilder’s Assessment of America’s Marine Highways,” p. 31, http://www.nassco.com/pdfs/Shipbuilder-Assessment-American-Marine-Highway-NASSCO.pdf, AZhang]

The Jones Act is vital to of the health of the U.S. shipbuilding industry. Requiring Jones Act qualified vessels to be built in the U.S. indicates that, in addition to support for a healthy merchant marine, it is also the policy of the United States to support a healthy shipbuilding industrial base. In this respect, the Jones Act protects jobs of American employees and the business investment in Jones Act vessels made by U.S. companies, while simultaneously ensuring that the U.S. workforce has an adequate skill set to meet the needs of both industry and military surge capability in time of national emergency. While the cost of a Jones Act qualified ship as compared to a U.S. operated vessel available on the global market varies significantly, it is still much less of a factor in the overall cost of moving freight as compared to other expenses, as shown previously in Figure 8. The cost of the landside transportation requirements make up the largest portion of overall expense, specifically: terminal operating costs, terminal leasing costs, terminal infrastructure costs and trucking transportation costs. Vessel operating costs (fuel) are also a significant contributor to the cost per trailer for Marine Highways seeking to compete in time sensitive markets. The high cost of constructing vessels in the United States serves as a roadblock to investment and financing, emphasizing the importance of Title XI loan guarantees. However, the construction cost of vessels is not the only roadblock to the overall economic viability of a Marine Highways operation. For example, if the cost of a Jones Act Vessel is approximately 14% of the cost per trailer, then the Jones Act “penalty” is approximately 7% to 9% assuming a vessel built overseas is half to one-third the cost of one built in the U.S. Series production may substantially reduce this Jones Act differential. The cost of labor in the U.S. is also not a prohibitive factor in the overall cost of a U.S. built vessel. The U.S. ranks third or fourth in the cost of labor compared to other key shipbuilding nations, as illustrated in Figure 7. When compared to world-class shipyards, the key differential in shipbuilding cost is volume. Korean, Japanese and Chinese shipyards are delivering between 50 and 80 large ships per year, on average. By contrast, U.S. yards are only delivering an average of three to five large ships, in total, per year.

# -AT: HMT Removal CP

#### **Expansion of Marine Highways is a prerequisite to the counterplan**

**NASSCO ’09** [30 July 2009, General Dynamics NASSCO, Aimee Heim, General Dynamics NASSCO Matt Tedesco, Tedesco Consulting “A Shipbuilder’s Assessment of America’s Marine Highways,” pp. 23-24, http://www.nassco.com/pdfs/Shipbuilder-Assessment-American-Marine-Highway-NASSCO.pdf, AZhang]

The U.S. Coast Guard plays a critical role in maintaining maritime mobility, which the Coast Guard defines as the facilitation of maritime commerce and elimination of interruptions and impediments to the efficient and economical movement of goods and people, while maximizing recreational access to and enjoyment of the water. The traditional mission of the Coast Guard is to implement the policies created in other parts of the federal government, not to influence policy directly. However, by aligning with other agencies in the protection of working waterfronts and maritime security, the Coast Guard can be a valuable partner in the creation of an AMH network. The Department of Homeland Security (which also has oversight of the U.S. Coast Guard) has the potential to gain much from a successful AMH service. A robust coastal shipping network would add capacity to the national highway system. That capacity could move necessary humanitarian aid, evacuees, and military goods if an interruption were to occur on the land-side transportation system. When land capacity was inoperable or insufficient during the evacuation of lower Manhattan on September 11, 2001, maritime capacity filled this need. AMH capacity could have also been of assistance during the evacuation of New Orleans in the days and hours that preceded and followed Hurricane Katrina. Having the additional waterborne capacity would have eased the congestion that left thousands stranded for hours while trying to escape the path of the storm. Many roads and bridges were damaged by debris and storm surge in the aftermath of the hurricane. Those that had stayed in New Orleans became trapped there. On September 5, 2005, the President temporarily waived the Jones Act to allow sufficient numbers of small vessels to facilitate an evacuation. A viable AMH network could have filled some of that capacity. The Department of Homeland Security also has authority over the Customs and Border Protection Agency, which is responsible for the collection of the HMT, a key inhibitor in establishing an AMH service. The Secretary of Homeland Security can review how the HMT is being applied, the projects that are being funded by the revenues generated from the HMT and what the effects would be of removing one or both applications for strictly domestic water-borne cargo. The Department of Homeland Security could also play a policy role in assisting TRANSCOM with providing subsidy to ports that have a “Strategic Port” designation. Strategic Ports clearly have a homeland security component, in that these facilities are specified based on their ability to efficiently move military cargo to and from the waterways and with security sufficient that the public and commercial cargo has restricted entry. That level of security and shield from public view is required to keep sensitive information related to the cargo from potential adversaries.

# -AT: NEPA CP

#### Laundry list of factors that cause delays and potential rejection of permits

**USACE ’11** [4 April 2011, Joint Public Notice US Army Corps of Engineers and State of Alabama Deparment of Environmental Management, “Proposed Filling of Wetlands to Expand Austal USA’s Mobile River Shipyard Mobile, Mobile County, Alabama,” http://www.sam.usace.army.mil/rd/reg/PN/currentPNs/SAM-2011-00354-TMZ.pdf, AZhang]

This public notice is being distributed to all known interested persons in order to assist in developing facts on which a decision by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers can be based. For accuracy and completeness of the record, all data in support of or in opposition to the proposed work should be submitted in writing setting forth sufficient detail to furnish a clear understanding of the reasons for support or opposition. The decision whether to issue a permit will be based on an evaluation of the probably impact, including cumulative impacts, of the proposed activity on the public interest. That decision will reflect the national concern for both protection and use of important resources. The benefit which reasonably may be expected to accrue from the proposal must be balanced against its reasonably foreseeable detriments. All factors which may be relevant to the proposal will be considered, including the cumulative effects thereof; among those are conservation, economics, aesthetics, general environmental concerns, wetlands, cultural values, fish and wildlife values, flood hazards, flood plain values, land us, navigation, shoreline erosion and accretion, recreation, water supply and conservation, water quality, energy needs, safety, food production, and in general, the needs and welfare of the people. The Corps is soliciting comments from the public; Federal, State, and local agencies and officials; Indian Tribes; and other interested parties in order to consider and evaluate the impacts of this proposed activity. Any comments received will be considered by the Corps to determine whether to issue, modify, condition or deny a permit for this proposal. To make this decision, comments are used to assess impacts on endangered species, historic properties, water quality, general environmental effects, and the other public interest factors litsted above. Comments are used in the preparation of an Environmental Assessment and/or an Environmental Impact Statement pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act. Comments are also used to determine the need for a public hearing and to determine the overall public interest of the proposed activity.

# -AT: China Fund CP

#### China against shipbuilding

**Shortsea.nl, no date** [“Drag on progress shortsea in China,” Sector News, Volume 7, no. 1, http://www.shortsea.nl/main/attachements/Def-SSJ-SN-ENG-0307.pdf, AZhang]

It seems unbelievable, but it is true: the Chinese government wants to slow down growth of newbuilding tankers serving the chemical sector via sea-river transport. In 2006 the ministry involved issued measures to stop newbuilding. “Apparently measures taken are prompted by exaggerated market expectations and a kind of mechanism of the authorities to control market developments”, associate professor Albert Veenstra of the Rotterdam School of Management (RSM) of the Erasmus University told ShortSea Journal. Currently, he lives and works in Beijng, in the framework of a scheme for an academic exchange program. “Coastal shipping in Europe goes along various borders, while in this area there is one coastline belonging to one country. That is why the structure of organisation of shortsea shipping differs. According the Port Strategy Document of the Chinese government there are three port areas with hinterland connections: the first is the Pearl Region surrounding Shanghai, the second region Shenzhen and the third opposite Hainan and Hong Kong.” n the Development Plan 2006 – 2007 for Chinese ports, the government defines Dalian, Tianjin, Qindao, Xiamen, Shenzhen and Guangzhou as being container hub ports. The ports of Qunhuangdao, Tangshan and Tanjin should have good working facilities for throughput of coal, petrol, ore and containers. These developments have to be an impulse for newbuilding of terminals for handling of crude oil in Dalian, Qingdao and Ningbo, and for ore terminals in coastal ports and in the Yangtze Delta area. Monopoly According Veenstra only the shipping lines Cosco, Asia Pacific and China Shipping benefit from this government concept. They are allowed to call all port areas in one string. The result is that the major part of shortsea shipping is covered by Chinese shipping lines. The Yangtze river, 6,380 kilometres in length, will be dredged to be fit for inland navigation, sea-river shipping and for ro/ro vessels at the upper river of the Yangtze. This part is called the Chuan river, which is more or less blocked up by construction works at the Three Gorges Dam. For that reason the river has been navigated less and less, from which road haulage has benefited. Road transport was even better than waterway transport. This being the case, and through economic growth lead to congestion on motorways, which are very bad at some stretches. The difference between transport times – 24 hours for 535 kilometres on the motorway, as opposed to 12 to 14 hours for 321 kilometres waterway between Wanzhou and Yichang – caused a boost of waterway transport and that of ro/ro transport in particular. Today, there are 21 ro/ro shipping lines, which jointly deploy 119 vessels on the Chuan river.

# -Aerosols Add-On

#### Shipping solves warming – aerosol emissions

**Cattermole 10** (Tannith Cattermole Brighter, whiter clouds could fight global warming By 14:55 February 22, 2010 <http://www.gizmag.com/brighter-whiter-clouds-fight-global-warming/14282/-BRW>)

The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) modeled the reflectivity of clouds in a detailed simulation that aimed to determine the net effect of increased aerosols on cloud reflectivity. Chief climate scientist Phil Rasch and his team at the US Department of Energy Office of Science's PNNL in Richland, Washington, simulated three ships chugging along in a 93-mile by 37-mile area of the Pacific Ocean, several hundred miles southwest of Los Angeles. Their findings suggest that introducing aerosols near the surface would, in fact, result in cloud brightening and reflectivity and therefore form an effective tool against global warming, except in clouds already drizzling which would be largely unaffected. While the aerosols currently affecting clouds in shipping lanes are expelled from ships as polluting steam, the artificially-brightening aerosol could be seawater sprayed from ocean vessels. But there are still unanswered questions as to how safe, efficient or predictable such methods might be. Rasch and his team are also using the simulation to explore when might be the best time of day to spray, given further information as to how the aerosols are affected by climate and prevailing weather; what effect brighter clouds have on rain, whether aerosols are burned off by the rising sun and how long they maintain a brighter cloud. This is one of a few circulating ideas to fight global warming with geoengineering and is not the first of these to suggest modification of Earth's atmospheric particles.

#### Unlike other methods of solving warming, aerosols can be removed from the atmosphere solves all offense

**Zickfield 12** (“Once that aerosol-based blanket is removed the temperature will rise” Kirsten Zickfeld – climate researches march 5, 2012-BRW)

The duo used an earth system climate model developed by the University of Victoria to study the impact of greenhouse gas and aerosol emissions on the world’s climate. The study was based on emission levels that are consistent with data from the 2007 report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The removal of aerosols from the atmosphere would cause additional global warmingin the short term, if all of those emissions were removed now. “The widespread presence of aerosols in the Earth’s atmosphere is effectively acting like a solar radiation blocking blanket right now,” explains Zickfeld. “It’s preventing the Earth’s temperature from responding to the real effects of global warming. But once that aerosol-based blanket is removed the temperature will rise.” Due to the emission of greenhouse gases, the world’s temperature has warmed by almost 1 ° C since the beginning of the industrial era. The study finds that elimination of all emissions would lead to an additional short-term warming by 0.25 to 0.5 degrees. “One to 1.5 degrees of global warming may not seem like a great deal,” says Zickfeld. “But we need to realize that the warming would not be distributed equally over the globe, with mid to high latitude regions such as Canada, Alaska, northeastern Europe, Russia and northern China being most strongly affected.

# \*Topicality\*

# Investment = Maintenance

**Investment includes maintenance**

**Senate Report 112-99 ’11** [Senate Report 112-99, From the U.S. Government Printing Office, “MARITIME ADMINISTRATION AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 R E P O R T OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION on S. 1430,” December 7, 2011, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-112srpt99/html/CRPT-112srpt99.htm, AZhang]

(d) Intercoastal and Inland Water Transportation.--The Secretary shall investigate, determine, and keep current records of intercoastal and inland water transportation, including their relation to transportation by land and air.] (d) Marine Transportation System.- (1) Report on waterways.--Not later than October 1, 2012, the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the commanding officer of the Army Corps of Engineers, and with the concurrence of the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating, shall submit a report to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives on the status of the Nation's coastal and inland waterways that- (A) describes the state of the United States' marine transportation infrastructure, including intercoastal infrastructure, intracoastal infrastructure, inland waterway infrastructure, ports, and marine facilities; (B) provides estimates of the investment levels required- (i) to maintain the infrastructure; and (ii) to improve the infrastructure; and (C) describes the overall environmental management of the maritime transportation system and the integration of environmental stewardship into the overall system. (2) Marine transportation.--The Secretary may investigate, make determinations concerning, and develop a repository of statistical information relating to marine transportation, including its relationship to transportation by land and air, to facilitate research, assessment, and maintenance of the maritime transportation system. As used in this paragraph, the term ``marine transportation'' includes intercoastal transportation, intracoastal transportation, inland waterway transportation, ports, and marine facilities.

**Investment includes maintenance**

**Senate Report 112-99 ’11** [Senate Report 112-99, From the U.S. Government Printing Office, “MARITIME ADMINISTRATION AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 R E P O R T OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION on S. 1430,” December 7, 2011, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-112srpt99/html/CRPT-112srpt99.htm, AZhang]

Section 2. Marine Transportation System. Section 2 would require the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the commanding officer of the Army Corps of Engineers, and in concurrence with the U.S. Coast Guard, to submit a report on the status of the Nation's coastal and inland waterways. The report would describe the state of marine transportation infrastructure; provide estimates of the investment levels require to maintain and improve the infrastructure; and describe the overall environmental management of the maritime transportation system. This section would also allow the Secretary to investigate, make determinations concerning, and develop a repository of statistical information relating to intercoastal and intracoastal water transportation.

# Investment = Title XI

**Title XI is transportation infrastructure investment**

**MARAD ’10** [7 December, 2010, Maritime Administration, “Title XI Loan Guarantee Program: Actions Are Needed To Fully Address Oig Recommendations,” p. 12, http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/Title%20XI%20508%20Loan%20Gurantee%20Program.pdf, AZhang]

The Maritime Administration (MARAD) recognizes the importance of effective business processes and careful oversight to ensure that investments in American shipyards and merchant fleets through the Title XI program offer the maximum achievable benefit. While the majority of the risk of guaranteeing a loan that later results in default occurs in the initial analysis period and loan guarantee approval process - not the loan repayment period -MARAD takes very seriously its record-keeping and post-approval monitoring duties in order to ensure transparency of the program and rapid action when necessary to protect the federal government’s financial interests. We believe that none of the Title XI defaults over the past decade could have been avoided by any action taken post-approval of the loan guarantee.

**Title XI is infrastructure investment and direct spending**

**Matsuda ’10** [14 July 2010, David Matsuda, Maritime Administrator, “Statement Of David T. Matsuda Maritime Administrator Maritime Administration Before The House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee On Seapower And Expeditionary Forces,” p. 5, http://democrats.armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File\_id=665f6770-dab5-458d-84ce-85f52f895ee4, AZhang]

Title XI offers loan guarantees for shipyard modernization projects and for building vessels in U.S. shipyards. This funding supports infrastructure investment and economic growth. The program provides approved applicants with long-term financing at stable interest rates, sustains efficient facilities for shipbuilding and ship repair within the U.S., improves system capacity, and sustains U.S. jobs. The Title XI Loan Guarantee Program sustains jobs because it has the effect of leveraging a relatively small commitment of Federal budget authority ($17.5 million in FY 2009) to generate a much larger amount of direct spending from loans ($310 million in FY 2009). When added to additional private spending ($44 million in FY 2009) associated with the loan guarantee projects, the FY 2009 Title XI program helped to support a total of $354 million in business for U.S. shipyards – including 2,400 job-years associated with the shipbuilding industry and its suppliers and almost 1,400 job-years occurring within the broader economy.1

**Title XI Loan Guarantees are transportation infrastructure investment**

**Oberstar ’08** [29 October 2008, James Oberstar, Chairman on the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, “Investing in Infrastructure: The Road to Recovery,” Hearing before the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress Second Session, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg45362/html/CHRG-110hhrg45362.htm, AZhang]

Previous 12 years to this Congress, the Title XI loan guarantee program was allowed to deteriorate. The Title XI construction differential subsidy program was allowed to deteriorate to a point of zero availability of funds. And, to be sure, these two initiatives, the Title XI loan guaranty, construction differential subsidy, and operating differential subsidies, were for another era of maritime shipping in America when we had 5,500 U.S. flag vessels at the end of World War II. By the time I came to Congress in 1975, we were down to 800 such vessels. Today we have 37. Because other countries have subsidized their shipbuilding, the operation, the maintenance of their maritime fleet, and this country abandoned it, the U.S. flag fleet. The short sea shipping initiative is an opportunity for us to regain an American flag presence in our territorial waters, in the Great Lakes international waters, and in the Gulf of Mexico. And, certainly, the port of Baltimore would be a great beneficiary from this initiative, not only for RORO, for truck, trailer roll-on/roll-off, but also vessel. A vessel has already been built to accommodate 110 rail cars, freight rail cars. They have three levels in the vessel of track where the train just pushes the rolling stock on to the vessel in three layers, in three decks. And then the ship leaves from the Yucatan Peninsula and goes to Mobile, Alabama. Now, we can do that in the Great Lakes. We can do that port to port in the United States, in the coast waters trade, and avoid the congestion on land that rail and truck traffic encounters. That is the great promise. But we need to invest money through the Title XI Loan Guarantee Program. What will that do? You remember very well, Mr. Chairman, the great Baltimore shipyard construction that had 25,000 workers at its peak, along with the Bethlehem Steel Plant. There isn't a single ship construction worker operating now. But that industry could come back if we reinvest through the Title XI Loan Guarantee Program. And so you have steel for shipbuilding, shipyard workers, a service to transportation in this country, reducing air pollution, reducing energy inputs, and creating enormous economic productivity. That is how our infrastructure intermodally works. So we are going to move ahead about this.

Title XI Loan guarantees are investment

**ASA ’03** [American Shipbuilders Association in January of 2003. Volume 9, Issue 1. “Naval Force Structure Legislation Introduced” http://www.usships.org/content/view/151/67/]

Threats of foreign industrial dependence and terrorism launched from foreign ships calling at U.S. ports and those engaged in re-supplying our forward deployed men and women in the military dictate that the U.S. rebuild her merchant marine fleet. ASA urges Congress and the Administration to support a 50 ship construction program to provide militarily useful ships owned and operated by American citizens to serve as a defense auxiliary in these times of war and national emergency. This construction program would entail a public/private investment under the Title XI Ship Loan Guarantee Program. U.S. citizen ship companies would finance the comparable foreign construction cost of each ship with the federal government financing the higher cost associated with U.S. ship construction. In return for an annual cost of $6 million per ship, the Department of Defense would have access to a fleet of 50 ships for 20 years to meet defense sealift requirements. Construction of commercial ships is critical to sustaining and strengthening the shipbuilding industrial base that builds naval ships. Increased commercial ship production reduces the unit cost of each naval ship and accelerates insertion of commercial technologies and building processes in the manufacture of naval ships. An American Merchant Marine would also significantly enhance national security by reducing America’s growing reliance on China.

# TI = Military

**Transportation includes the military**

**Kim** ‘09 [Brian Kim, Wyle Laboratories, Inc., et al., “Guidebook on Preparing Airport Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventories”, Airport Cooperative Research Program – Report 11, http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/acrp/acrp\_rpt\_011.pdf]

Transportation Sector: Consists of private and public passenger and freight transportation, as well as government transportation, including military operations.

**Transportation Infrastructure includes military**

**DSCA** **4/20** [20 April 2012, Defense Security Cooperation Agency “C7.6. - Defense Transportation System (DTS),” http://www.dsca.osd.mil/samm/ESAMM/C07/7.06.htm, AZhang]

C7.6. - Defense Transportation System (DTS) C7.6.1. Definition. DTS is the portion of the worldwide transportation infrastructure that supports Department of Defense (DoD) transportation needs in peace and war DoD Directive 4500.9E. DTS consists of two major elements: military (organic) and commercial resources. These resources include assets, services, and systems organic to, contracted for, or controlled by DoD. The DTS infrastructure, including ports, airlift, sealift, railway, highway, in-transit visibility systems, information management systems, Customs, and traffic management that DoD maintains is a vital element of DoD’s capability to project power worldwide. DTS shipments must comply with the Defense Transportation Regulation (DTR) 4500.9-R. C7.6.2. Methods of DTS use in Security Cooperation. C7.6.2.1. Military (Organic). DoD-owned or operated assets, such as trucks, rail cars, ships, aircraft, or other modes of transportation. These assets are under the control of the Service Components of TRANSCOM: Air Mobility Command (AMC), Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), or Military Sealift Command (MSC). C7.6.2.1.1. AMC Channel. AMC Channel airlift provides regularly scheduled movement of cargo over validated routes depending on volume of materiel. Shipping activities must clear air shipments with Service's Airlift Clearance Authority prior to movement in accordance with the DTR. Unless the channel is supporting a location with little or no commercial business options, 25 short tons is the minimum monthly volume required. C7.6.2.1.2. Special Assigned Airlift Mission (SAAM) Flights. A SAAM is an assigned airlift requirement for special pickup or delivery by AMC. Costs are billed by the hour from the time the aircraft leaves its home station until it returns to its home station. It is billed as a line item on the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA). If a SAAM is not routed back to its home station on the return leg, charges will be incurred only up to the point the mission was changed. SAAMs may be used for cargo that requires special considerations because of its weight or size, the urgency or sensitivity of movement, or other special factors, see DTR Chapter 202 for procedures. C7.6.2.1.3. U.S. Navy vessels and charter vessels. Use of U.S. Navy or vessels chartered by SDDC are considered part of DTS. C7.6.2.2. DoD-contracted commercial. DTS is not limited to organic assets and includes commercial carriers under contract to DoD that move materiel via trucks, rail cars, ships, aircraft or other modes of transportation. C7.6.2.3. Ocean liner service. Liner service is regularly scheduled ocean transportation service where DoD pays on a piece-by-piece basis. Containerized and non-containerized cargo (break bulk cargo) are charged different rates. Ocean liner service is provided through two contracts administered by TRANSCOM: 1) Universal Services Contract, and 2) Regional Domestic Contract. It also includes the use of trucks, railroads, barges, convoys, and/or pipelines for overland movement. C7.6.2.4. Small Parcel Shipments. Small parcel releases use commercial small parcel carriers, U.S. Postal Service, or methods that allow for shipments to be traced and tracked. Overseas movement via the Military Postal Service (Army or Air Force Post Office (APO) or Fleet Post Office (FPO)) is used if certain conditions are met. First, use of an APO or FPO must be specifically authorized in an LOA. Second, the APO or FPO addressees must give written approval that they accept responsibility for receiving SC shipments. An APO or FPO might be recommended if a shipment is classified and the purchaser does not have approved facilities to receive classified items in the United States, though not all Military Postal Service addresses handle classified materiel. An APO or FPO may not have the capacity or manpower to handle a large volume of SC shipments and may require above-the-line charges for the increased volume over an extended period of time. The purchaser must bear the cost of such shipments. For transmission outside of the United States. and its territorial areas, SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL materiel may only be transmitted by cleared U.S. contractors in accordance with National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual, paragraph 5-405b, or by DoD entities in accordance with DoD 5200.1, Volume 3, enclosure 4. TOP SECRET material may only be transmitted by Defense Courier Service, Department of State Courier System, or the written authorization of the Government Contracting Authority. C7.6.2.5. Shipments by the U.S. Government (USG) to a Freight Forwarder or Embassy (DTC 5). USG Shipments to U.S.-located Foreign Military Sales (FMS) freight forwarders or country representatives located at embassies in the United States are DTS shipments until the consignee unloads the materiel from the carrier. C7.6.2.6. Delivery on Board a Purchaser-Controlled Ship or Aircraft at a DoD Port of Embarkation (POE) (DTC 8). Shipments to a DoD-controlled POE in the United States are DTS shipments until the materiel is loaded into a purchaser's ship or aircraft. The purchaser is responsible for all onward movement and documentation.

**Transportation Infrastructure includes sealift**

**TRANSCOM ’12** [1 February 2012, TRANSCOM, Defense Transportation Regulation – Part III “CHAPTER 302 MOBILIZATION AND PRE-DEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES,” pp. 3-4, http://www.transcom.mil/dtr/part-iii/dtr\_part\_iii\_302.pdf, AZhang]

1. General. Strategic mobility is the capability to deploy and sustain military forces worldwide in support of national strategy. The DTS is that portion of the Nation’s transportation infrastructure that supports the movement of DOD transportation needs in peace and war across the range of military operations including the movement of personnel, cargo, and equipment during the deployment and redeployment process. It is an integral part of the total US transportation system and involves procedures, resources, and interrelationships between the DOD, federal, commercial, and non-US activities to include agreements the US Government has with non-US activities to enter cargo into the DTS, (e.g., Canada). (See Joint Publication [JP] 4-09, Distribution Operations and Field Manual [FM] 3-0, Operations.) DODD 4510.11, DOD Transportation Engineering, outlines the policies and responsibilities associated with the execution of programs for highways, ports, and railroads for national defense, and administration of other modal national defense programs as directed by the SecDef. These services include installation transportation studies, evaluations of marine ports, terminals, and other modal facilities identification and ensurance of important public highways and commercial rail lines, and engineering guidance related to force mobilization and deployment. The information displayed in Figure 302-1 and Figure 302-2, may apply to all phases of mobility. When USTRANSCOM declares the transportation environment is constrained, Figure 302-1, due to its inability to accommodate taskings levied from multiple locations within the same region, the TO will submit transportation requirements to USTRANSCOM for consolidation, sourcing, and prioritization IAW the supported CDR’s Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD). When USTRANSCOM cancels the consolidation requirement for sourcing of transportation assets, the TO will resume authorized procurement and routing authority in the unconstrained circumstance, Figure 302-2. a. Transportation Assets for Mobility. (1) Airlift. The two sources for air transport assets are military and civil aircraft. Each has various transport restrictions based on the dimensions, weight, and shapes of the cargo to be moved. In order to mitigate lift constraints, USTRANSCOM will analyze all transportation resources to efficiently transport the shipper’s requirement. (a) AMC. As a component command of USTRANSCOM, AMC provides common- user airlift across the range of military operations. The military cargo aircraft includes C-130, C-5, C-17, KC-135, and KC-10. The majority of these aircraft use the 463L air cargo pallet system to reduce the time required to load and unload bulk air cargo. See Appendix V for aircraft characteristics. (b) The CRAF augments unique airlift capability with civil aircraft, aircrews, and support structure during times of national emergency. The legal basis for CRAF is the Defense Production Act of 1950, which empowers the President, during a national defense emergency, to allocate industrial production and services to the DOD. Airlift planners and shippers using CRAF assets must be aware of their unique characteristics. Civil aircraft transporting DOD cargo, passengers, and patients may require increased loading/unloading time and specialized MHE. Many CRAF assets are not configured to support 463L pallets. Unique MHE requirements for loading and unloading civil aircraft may constrain or restrict cargo loading at ports. Units will refer to load planners for specific restrictions. The Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) and installations must coordinate aircraft requests to ensure the planned aircraft can be handled. (2) Sealift Resources. Shipping resources can be classified as belonging to three separate pools of resources: US Government, US flag, and foreign flag assets. (a) US Government assets can be found in both the DOD and DOT. In the DOD, MSC is the primary provider and operator of sealift resources. In the DOT, MARAD is the primary provider of sealift resources. 1 MSC. As a component command of USTRANSCOM, MSC provides common- user sealift across the range of military operations. MSC adjusts and controls the total number of ships under its operational control to meet demand. Under normal peacetime conditions, the MSC force consists of government-owned ships as well as privately owned ships under charter to MSC. When demand increases, MSC can expand its fleet by acquiring additional sealift from a variety of resources and through a number of different acquisition programs. MSC resources available to the DTS beyond the MSC active peacetime fleet are Fast Sealift Ships (FSS), and Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSRs) ships. Pre-positioning ships may be available for common-user sealift missions once released by the CDR. a. FSS. Government-owned Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) ships that are berthed on the US East and Gulf Coast. These ships are capable of carrying 150,000 square feet of combat, combat support, or combat service support equipment at a speed of 27 knots. b. LMSRs. Ships stationed OCONUS that carry Army heavy brigade equipment and others berthed in the CONUS to transport deploying unit equipment and cargo. These ships can maintain a speed of 24 knots. One LMSR operates in the Maritime Prepositioning Program (MPS). LMSRs operate primarily in support of Army and Marine Corps global prepositioning strategies. c. Prepositioned (PREPO) Ships. MSC has a large fleet of PREPO ships that can be used for common-user sealift once they discharge their cargo and have been released by the Supported CDR. PREPO ships are used by the Army and Marine Corps to place immediate use assets near anticipated AORs. 2 DOT/MARAD. DOT/MARAD is the DOT agency responsible for administering federal laws and programs designed to support and maintain a US merchant marine capable of meeting the nation’s needs. It is responsible for the management of the NDRF. A key component of the NDRF is the RRF, which is maintained by DOT/MARAD. DOT/MARAD is also a key organization in the processes for acquiring shipping once the voluntary charter market is no longer responsive. The RRF consists of commercial or former military vessels of high military utility including RO/RO, sea barge, Lighter Aboard Ship (LASH), container, tanker, crane, and breakbulk ships. Some of these vessels have had their military capabilities enhanced with the addition of systems such as the Modular Cargo Delivery System and the Offshore Petroleum Discharge System. DOT/MARAD maintains these vessels in four, five, 10, or 20 day readiness status.

# Military = “Public”

**We Meet- Navy and Coast Guard Shipyards are Public**

**US Commission on Ocean Policy ’04** [US Commission on Ocean Policy,“Inventory of U.S. Ocean and Coastal Facilities Appendix 5 to An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century Final Report of the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy,” 2004, pp. 32-33, http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/full\_color\_rpt/append\_5.pdf, AZhang]

2.1.9.3 Public Shipyards In addition to the private, commercial shipyards discussed above, the federal government, specifically the U.S. Navy and USCG, maintains public shipyards. Combined, the U.S. Navy and USCG maintain five shipyards. These shipyards service the existing fleet, as well as assist with the design and construction of new ships. 2.1.9.3.1 U.S. Coast Guard Shipyards USCG maintains the Coast Guard Yard in Baltimore, Maryland, to support its fleet. As a full-service shipyard, the yard’s capabilities include the facilities to construct, repair, retrofit, and renovate cutters, boats, and various aids to navigation, as well as manufacture unique Coast Guard items. Other support activities, such as casualty response support and design and production engineering, are also conducted at the yard.36 2.1.9.3.2 U.S. Navy Shipyards The U.S. Navy maintains four public shipyards: Norfolk, Virginia; Portsmouth, New Hampshire; Puget Sound, Washington; and Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The overall mission of the naval shipyards is to provide maintenance, modernization, inactivation, disposal and emergency repair services to Navy ships and submarines.37 Norfolk Naval Shipyard, located near Richmond, Virginia, provides logistic support for assigned ships and service craft, including constructing, overhauling, repairing and outfitting ships and other marine vessels. The Navy maintains seven dry docks on the Norfolk waterfront. Norfolk also operates the Shipyard Instructional Design Center, a training development and media production facility; the Naval Shipyard Development and Integration Test Site, which tests and implements business process improvements in maintenance depots; and several other laboratories and repair facilities.38 Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, near Boston, Massachusetts, overhauls, repairs, modernizes, and refuels Los Angeles Class submarines. The facility maintains three dry docks capable of docking all active classes of submarines. It is also operates the Ship Availability Planning and Engineering Center for the Los Angeles Class and the planning yard for the Navy's deep-diving submarine and submersible vessels, as well as other scientific research, defense prototype testing, and submerged rescue platforms. As of October 2002, approximately 4,200 civilian personnel and 104 military personnel worked at Portsmouth. Combined, Portsmouth contributed over $300 million to the local economy in 2001 through wages, local purchases, and contracted services.39 Pearl Harbor Navel Shipyard in Hawaii performs periodic vessel inspection and repairs; repairs reported deficiencies; completes modernizations using innovative designs tested on prototypes; performs required maintenance; and serves as a calibration center for the entire Pacific Fleet.40 ￼32 Inventory of U.S. Coastal and Ocean Facilities Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, in Bremerton, Washington, maintains naval ships, systems, and ordnance throughout their lifecycle. In 1990 the U.S. Navy authorized a program to recycle nuclear-powered ships at Puget Sound. Approximately 16 percent of the shipyard's workload involves inactivation, reactor compartment disposal, and recycling of ships. In 2001 the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard contributed almost $500 million to the local economy through payroll and local purchases.41

# TI = Vessels

**Counter Interpretation— Vessels are transportation infrastructure**

**US Commission on Ocean Policy ’04** [US Commission on Ocean Policy,“Inventory of U.S. Ocean and Coastal Facilities Appendix 5 to An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century Final Report of the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy,” 2004, http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/full\_color\_rpt/append\_5.pdf, AZhang]

The Marine Transportation System is an informal system comprising both physical infrastructure (e.g., ports, vessels) and associated human components (e.g., shipbuilders, merchant marines) that has evolved to handle the movement of waterborne commerce and passengers. Nearly every federal, state, local, and private marine resource that assists with the movement of cargo and passengers falls under this system, from the construction of a vessel to the delivery of its cargo. The MTS does not include activities that support the individual segments, such as the construction of the diesel engine that is used in a ship. This section describes the MTS and the associated economic impact of its components.

**Jones Act vessels are transportation infrastructure**

**MARAD ’07** [“The Maritime Administration and the U.S. Marine Transportation System: A Vision for the 21st Century” pp.7, November 2007, http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Vision\_of\_the\_21st\_Century\_10-29.pdf, AZhang]

Since 1775, the marine transportation industry- has met the needs of our Nation during peace and war. Our fleet continues to be a critical component of the Nation’s transportation infrastructure and military readiness. The domestic “Jones Act” component, a fleet of over 38,000 vessels, is “Made in America” and represents an aggregate $48 billion investment. Building and main- taining the Jones Act fleet sustains roughly 150,000 jobs throughout the U.S. economy. This fleet is being continuously upgraded and renewed, with domestic maritime carriers moving almost one billion tons of cargo annually along our coasts, on our rivers and lakes, the Great Lakes, and to and from Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and Guam.

**Increasing transportation infrastructure investment includes domestic shipping and shipyards**

**MARAD ’07** [“The Maritime Administration and the U.S. Marine Transportation System: A Vision for the 21st Century” pp.23, November 2007, http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Vision\_of\_the\_21st\_Century\_10-29.pdf, AZhang]

While the marine transportation industry is increasingly global in nature, it is criti- cally important to encourage and sustain American involvement and investment in it. This is important for the economy during times of peace and a matter of survival during times of war or national emergency. The maritime industry is also an important source of jobs and positive revenue for America’s balance of pay- ments. The Maritime Administration must preserve and expand the U.S. maritime industry and increase investment in U.S. marine transportation infrastructure, including domestic shipping, shipyards and maritime personnel.

**Fleets are part of transportation infrastructure**

**MARAD ’07** [“The Maritime Administration and the U.S. Marine Transportation System: A Vision for the 21st Century” pp.24, November 2007, http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Vision\_of\_the\_21st\_Century\_10-29.pdf, AZhang]

In addition to being an essential link in our national transportation infrastructure, the domestic trade fleet is a critical component of America’s military readiness. This is especially true for vessels in the non-contiguous trades to and from the mainland and Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and Guam. Eighty-five percent of the oceangoing vessels in the fleet are militarily useful.

# TI = MOTs

**Military Ocean Terminals are TI**

**Krivit and Krivit No Date** [Attorneys at Law, “Success Stories,” http://www.krivitandkrivit.com/projects.html, AZhang]

Bayonne NJ: Krivit & Krivit helped to secure a total of $4.2-million in federal funding to support important transportation infrastructure projects in Bayonne that are vital for regional commerce and economic development, including major road improvements and intermodal access improvements to support ongoing redevelopment of the former Military Ocean Terminal-Bayonne.