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## Topic K – 1NC

#### First, the link. Transportation infrastructure policies are enframed in biopolitical approaches to life that attempt to control the population through systems of security and management

Lundborg and Vaughn-Williams, 2011

[Tom, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, and Nick, Associate Professor of International Security at the University of Warwick, “Resilience, Critical Infrastructure, and Molecular Security: The Excess of “Life” in Biopolitics.” International Political Sociology, Vol. 5. Issue 4. December 2011, 367-383, Accessed Online via Wiley Online Library] /WFI-MB

Dillon and Reid deal with both aspects of this biopolitical/necropolitical logic. Their discussion of the liberal way of war explores the various ways in which killing takes place, the aporia accompanying universal justifications of it, and the lethal criteria by which politics is reduced to mere “animal husbandry” (Dillon and Reid 2009:104). What is more pertinent for our purposes, however, is the equally significant account they offer of attempts by liberal rule to make life live: If the vocation of biopolitics is to make life live, it must pursue that vocation these days by making live life the emergency of its emergence ever more fully and ever more resiliently; detailing, clarifying, amplifying and otherwise drawing out the entailments of the emergency in the effort to make life live it even more animatedly in both virtual and actual terms. (Dillon and Reid 2009:89) It is in this context that we can return more explicitly to the role of resilient CIs because it is precisely these material apparatuses through which liberal rule secures the way of life it needs to reproduce its vision of “correct living” and also, therefore, the authorization of its own authority. Dillon and Reid pick up on Foucault’s inversion of Clausewitz’s famous aphorism—“politics is the extension of war by other means”—to argue that the liberal peace is extended throughout society via CIs. They claim it is no coincidence that since 9/11 CIs have become reified as referent objects of securitization. Strategically and symbolically, CIs perform vital roles in securing the liberal way of rule and its vision of what “quality of life” must mean: ...the defence of critical infrastructure is not about the mundane protection of human beings from the risk of violent death at the hands of other human beings, but about a more profound defence of the combined physical and technological infrastructures which liberal regimes have come to understand as necessary for their vitality and security in recent years. (Dillon and Reid 2009:130) On this basis, Dillon and Reid extend the biopolitical diagnosis of resilience offered by Lentzos and Rose. Not only is resilience about the design and management of the “system of systems” in such a way as to enable a smooth and expeditious return to “normal” conditions. More importantly, resilient CIs are also necessary for the optimalization of virtual (that is pre-emptive) tactics against the becoming-dangerous of bodies-in-formation: tactics upon which the edifice of liberal rule ultimately rests. Moreover, Dillon and Reid shrewdly observe that the perception of “terrorist threats” in Western societies enables liberal regimes to further develop and entrench CIs, in turn extending and intensifying biopolitical control over life.

#### Second, the impact. This biopolitical structure promotes a kill-to-live mentality that justifies massive management, conflict and violence in the name of the protection and promotion of life

Lundborg and Vaughn-Williams, 2011

[Tom, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, and Nick, Associate Professor of International Security at the University of Warwick, “Resilience, Critical Infrastructure, and Molecular Security: The Excess of “Life” in Biopolitics.” International Political Sociology, Vol. 5. Issue 4. December 2011, 367-383, Accessed Online via Wiley Online Library] /WFI-MB

Dillon and Reid begin their book by characterizing liberalism as a “systemic regime of... power relations,” which, although committed to peace-making, is nevertheless marked by an equal commitment to war, continuous state of emergency, and constant preparedness for conflict (Dillon and Reid 2009:7). From this perspective, war and society are mutually constitutive and the liberal way of rule can be understood as: “a war-making machine whose continuous processes of war preparation prior to the conduct of any hostilities profoundly, and pervasively, shape the liberal way of life” (Dillon and Reid 2009:9). As such, the liberalism–war complex acts as a grid for the production of knowledge, preoccupations, and political subjectivities. Taking their lead from Foucault’s later work, Dillon and Reid argue that the basic referent object of liberal rule is life itself. From this perspective, the liberal way of rule/war is inherently biopolitical: “its referent object is biological being and its governmental practices are themselves, in turn, governed by the properties of species existence” (Dillon and Reid 2009:20). They stress, however, that the properties of species existence are not givens, but rather subject to changes in power/knowledge. Over the last 20 years, the Revolution in Military Affairs, accompanied by developments in the life sciences, has changed the way that life is viewed and understood. The move to “informationalize” life has led to the reduction in what it means to be a living being to a code, and as a result: “the very boundaries which long distinguished living from not living, animate from inanimate and the biological from the non-biological have been newly construed and problematized...” (Dillon and Reid 2009:22). The corollary of this account is that the informationalization of life has, in turn, changed the way in which war is waged by liberal rule: The development of the life sciences in general, and of complexity science in particular, comprising new knowledge about the complex emergent adaptive processes and properties of open living systems, has transformed the ways in which liberal regimes have come to understand that very nature of war, and of the relation of war to complex adaptive evolutionary models of rule and order. (Dillon and Reid 2009:111) The military is as interested now... in life-creating and life-adaptive processes as it is in killing, because, like the liberal way of rule and war more generally, it locates the nature of the threat in the very becoming-dangerous of the vital signs of life itself. (Dillon and Reid 2009:125) In other words, development in the life sciences has been embraced by liberal regimes, which, in turn, has affected the way that they view and fight wars. The move in life sciences away from Newtonian physics to complexity has enabled new biopolitical technologies of governance. Complexity science stresses the “anteriority of radical relationality,” the “dynamic and mobile nature of existence” and the “contingencies of bodies-in-formation” (Dillon and Reid 2009:72). Liberal biopolitical rule takes these problematizations of life as a starting point for securing its own existence. Thus, in a development of Foucault’s account of biopolitics as “making live and letting die,” Dillon and Reid argue that liberalism only promotes the kind of life that is productive for its own enterprise in light of new power/knowledge relations. A liberal biopolitical problematization of life entails security practices that can “pre-empt the emergence of life forms in the life process that may prove toxic to life” (Dillon and Reid 2009:87). For these reasons, as set out in the lengthy quotation above, the perceived nature of threats has changed along with the emergence of alternative problematizations of life. Threats are no longer viewed as straightforwardly actual, but what Dillon and Reid refer to as “virtual”: “the very continuous and contingent emergency of emergence of life as being-information; becoming-dangerous” (Dillon and Reid 2009:44). To put it differently, the threat with which liberal biopolitics is obsessed is the potentiality of some life to become dangerous and therefore detrimental to what living should involve. It is in this context that Dillon and Reid uncover a paradox of liberalism: the fact that according to its own logic it needs to kill in order to make life live.

#### Third is the alternative. Reject the 1ac’s management of life through transportation infrastructure in favor of the 1nc’s critical mapping of power.

#### The alternative solves—Critical cartography enables the effects of power to be exposed and resisted

Rose-Redwood, 2006

[Reuben, Dept. of Geography @ Penn. State Univ. “Governmentaity, geography, and the geo-coded world.” Progress in human geography, 30.4, 2006, 469-486, Accessed online] /WFI-MB

Blomley and Sommers (1999) also bring together the insights of governmentality studies (Rose and Miller, 1992; Rose, 1993; 1996) and Marxian critiques of the production of abstract space (Lefebvre, 1991; Harvey, 1996) in their study of ‘cartographic struggles’ in Vancouver. They argue that property relations have a ‘special significance in governmental discourse’ and that cartographic mapping not only represents ‘reality’ but is a strategy for ‘acting upon the real’ in order to govern the conduct of conduct (Blomley and Sommers, 1999: 263–65). Blomley and Sommers examine the practice of mapping as a field of contestation and struggle, rather than solely as a top-down imposition of state power. Their analysis of the spatial politics of urban mapping takes seriously the possibility that governmentality is not confined to the state but rather that non-state actors (such as community groups) can utilize technologies of government to suit their own ends. In his recent book, The political mapping of cyberspace, geographer Jeremy Crampton (2003: 17) suggests that governmentality should be conceptualized not merely as a tool of state power but instead as a ‘contact point’ between ‘technologies of the self ’ and ‘technologies of power and domination’. Whereas Hannah’s (2000) focus is the federal census, Crampton explores the possibility of a ‘critical politics’ of cartographic mapping in the digital age. Crampton critiques the manner in which maps have been used as normalizing devices, and he argues that a critical politics of mapping ‘opens and allows intervention in the struggle over the deployment of powerknowledge effects’ (Crampton, 2003: 61). One of the aims of such a critical politics, for Crampton (2003: 61), is to question, or problematize, the necessity of viewing cartography only in terms of the mapping out of ‘a Cartesian set of things located in space’. Similar to Blomley and Sommers (1999), Crampton views the production of cartographic knowledge as a site of political struggle. This recognition of struggle over the use of cartographic technologies of government moves beyond strictly state-centered conceptions of governmentality and examines how both state and non-state actors play a significant role in constructing governmental rationalities.

#### Finally is our framework. We must attend to the ways that the world is produced through discursive acts like the 1ac—discursive analysis must come prior to any other form of analysis because it produces the world as an object of study

Rose-Redwood, 2006

[Reuben, Dept. of Geography @ Penn. State Univ. “Governmentaity, geography, and the geo-coded world.” Progress in human geography, 30.4, 2006, 469-486, Accessed online] /WFI-MB

Governmentality scholars also consider the ways in which political rationalities structure the sphere of governmental action by establishing ‘discursive fields characterized by a shared vocabulary within which disputes can be organized’ (Rose, 1999: 28). Political rationalities aim to render reality intelligible and, thereby, amenable to government. There are, of course, multiple grids of intelligibility, and it is in the struggle between competing political rationalities that the politics of truth is played out. An analytics of 474 Governmentality, geography, and the geo-coded world government does not take the truth for granted as the basis of its analyses; instead, the aim is to decipher the ways in which truth operates within the field of government and how political rationalities produce material effects through the deployment of technologies of government. Combining Latour’s (1986; 1997) discussion of ‘inscriptions’ with Foucault’s analysis of governmentality, Miller and Rose emphasize the materiality of discourse and insist that analyses of governmental rationalities should devote: attention to the particular technical devices of writing, listing, numbering and computing that render a realm into discourse as a knowable, calculable and administrable object. ‘Knowing’ an object in such a way that it can be governed is more than a purely speculative activity: it requires the invention of procedures of notation, ways of collecting and presenting statistics, the transportation of these to centres where calculations and judgements can be made and so forth. It is through such procedures of inscription that the diverse domains of ‘governmentality’ are made up, that ‘objects’ such as the economy, the enterprise, the social field and the family are rendered in a particular conceptual form and made amenable to intervention and regulation. (Miller and Rose, 1990: 5) Technologies of government are of central importance to governmentality studies, because they operationalize governmental rationalities and construct the very ‘objects’ of government as in some sense ‘knowable’. Foucault takes the development of statistics during the eighteenth century as the quintessential example of a ‘technology’ of government, yet governmentality scholars have subsequently explored a multiplicity of such governmental technologies. Miller and Rose (1990) argue that technologies of government should not be seen as forming a unified matrix of governmental control. They suggest that the analysis of technologies of government should not overgeneralize the unity of such technical apparatuses of government, nor should their effectiveness be overestimated. On the other hand, if one fails to take into account the manner in which technologies of government construct fields of visibility that render governmental rationalities operable, then the relation between knowledge and power is obscured.

## Links

### Link – Critical Infrastructure

#### Link-The aff’s concept of “critical infrastructure” is part of the biopolitical and managerial process that defines human and non human

Aradau 10 (Claudia, Lecturer in International Studies in the Department of Politics and International Studies at The Open University (UK), “Security that Matters: Critical Infrastructure and Objects of Protection”, Security Dialogue, 2010)

The Foucault-inspired literature on the biopolitics of security and risk has also paid scant attention to the materiality of infrastructures. For Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero (2008: 267), for example, **biopolitics takes ‘species life as its referent object, and the securing of species life becomes the vocation of a novel and emerging set of discursive formations of power/knowledge’**. While they show how a dispositif of security is dependent upon the development of life sciences and they locate historical transformations of biopolitics given the changes in scientific knowledge about the nature of living material (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 273), materiality as such is not discussed. The things in the security dispositif are relegated to the margins of analysis. As noted previously, a **dispositif is a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of the said as much as the unsaid; ‘things’ are relegated to the margins of analysis, and the focus of analysis is shifted upon institutions, economic and social processes, systems of norms, techniques, types of classification and modes of characterization** (Foucault, 2002: 49**). Critical infrastructure protection as a dispositif would similarly bring together a heterogeneous array of discourses about terrorism, natural disasters, protection, risk management and security institutions, alongside architecture, design and construction experts, new regulations and laws, administrative measures, scientific knowledge about materials, and moral propositions about ‘objects of protection’**. As a methodological and epistemological tool, **the dispositif could shed light on how critical infrastructure protection emerges as a heterogeneous construction**. At the same, **critical infrastructure is**, in a sense, **subsumed to the logic of circulatory practices. The securitization of critical infrastructure is ultimately deriving from the practices that separate good from bad circulations and the associated forms of life**. Thus it remains unclear how the materiality of infrastructure is both generative and generated in Barad’s terms

### Link – Enframing Nature

#### The construction of transportation infrastructure and territory is part of the project of enframing nature and the commodification of the landscape

Rose-Redwood, 2006

[Reuben, Dept. of Geography @ Penn. State Univ. “Governmentaity, geography, and the geo-coded world.” Progress in human geography, 30.4, 2006, 469-486, Accessed online] /WFI-MB

If Hannah can justly be criticized for not focusing on ‘the mastery of territory’, this criticism cannot be made of Braun’s engagement with the governmentality literature. In his article ‘Producing vertical territory: geology and governmentality in late Victorian Canada’ (2000), Braun draws on the governmentality literature to examine the geological survey of Canada conducted by George Dawson in 1878 while also linking his discussion to recent debates concerning the social construction of nature (Braun and Castree, 1998; Castree and Braun, 2001). Braun (2000: 12, italics removed) critiques the current governmentality literature by arguing that few have explored how governmentality and biopolitics ‘brought the state directly into contact with its territory – and more precisely with the qualities of this territory’. Braun argues that Foucault himself took ‘territory’ and ‘nature’ as a given and did not thoroughly problematize them – focusing instead on notions of human ‘population’. As Braun (2000: 13, italics in original) puts it, ‘one cannot understand “governmentality” apart from how the territory of the state is brought into being as a space of difference, any more than one can understand forms of state rationality apart from the historical emergence of “population” as a problem of government’. Geologic surveys, says Braun (2000: 28), were an important governmental technology which ‘involved bringing the qualities of the state’s territory into the domain of political rationality’. His main point is to argue that: ‘To Foucault’s concept of governmentality must be added the problem of nature’s intelligibility’ (Braun, 2000: 28). Braun demonstrates how the discourse of geology in nineteenth-century Canada produced the notion of ‘verticality’ as a way of seeing geologically so as to increase the ‘productive’ capacities (in a capitalistic sense) of the population. Braun is breaking new ground here because much of the current governmentality literature coming out of sociology and the other social sciences focuses much more on the ‘social’ to the neglect of governmental knowledges of the physical sciences (including physical geography). Braun also recognizes that issues of class and capital accumulation cannot simply be disregarded. However, although he does find common ground with the Marxist notion of the ‘production of nature’, he argues that this view is ‘insufficient’ and too narrow (Braun, 2000: 13). Braun (2000: 14) seeks to provide a broader definition of the social production of nature by focusing on ‘how nature is continuously reconstituted at the intersection of multiple, interwoven practices’. In particular, Braun explores how nature is ‘enframed’ in a variety of ways, and he argues that ‘[s]cience, governmentality and capitalist production comprised different, interwoven threads of nature’s production’ (Braun, 2000: 39). Braun’s attempt to bridge the gap between governmentality studies and Marxian geography in order to re-examine the question of territory highlights the importance of geographical knowledge both to the establishment of governmental power and the commodification of the landscape.

### Link – Geo Coding

#### The manipulation of transportation infrastructure occurs against the backdrop of geo-coding that makes biopolitical control possible, this is the foundation of control and efficient management of populations

Rose-Redwood, 2006

[Reuben, Dept. of Geography @ Penn. State Univ. “Governmentaity, geography, and the geo-coded world.” Progress in human geography, 30.4, 2006, 469-486, Accessed online] /WFI-MB

Ó Tuathail (1996) argues that geographical knowledge production and the ordering of space were absolutely central to the formation of modern government, and he refers to such spatial practices as constituting the problematic of ‘geo-power’. Ó Tuathail (1996: 7) defines geo-power as ‘the functioning of geographical knowledge not as an innocent body of knowledge and learning but as an ensemble of technologies of power concerned with the governmental production and management of territorial space’. One of the main arguments of the current paper is that ‘geo-power’ is a fundamental prerequisite for what Foucault calls ‘biopower’, as I shall elaborate upon in the concluding section. To be more specific, I shall argue that the practice of geo-coding (broadly defined) provided the geographic foundation which linked governmental knowledges (both statistical and cartographic) with the governed population by constructing a ‘geo-coded landscape’. Geo-coding, I maintain, has a history that extends far beyond the spatially integrated databases of twenty-first-century GIScience. It is more than simply a geo-computational technique, since it often entails the construction of what I shall call a ‘spatial regime of inscriptions’3 that is literally, as Pickles (2004: 5) points out, ‘written on the surface of the earth’ itself. In many cases, for example, the practice of digital geo-coding presupposes the existence of an already geo-coded world of house numbers, zip codes, and the like (Monmonier, 2002; Curry et al., 2004; Curry, 2005) – that is, its condition of possibility is a spatial regime of inscriptions sequentially marked out on the earth’s surface, thereby producing what Pickles (2004) calls a ‘geocoded world’. What I am suggesting is that the spatial practice of house numbering is central to a genealogy of geo-coding and that such a practice is a principal geographic basis of what Foucault identifies as a biopolitics of the population. The history of house numbering, of course, is inseparable from the establishment of private property relations. Not only did house numbering offer a means of property identification, but it was also seen as a way of ‘economizing time’ by reducing the amount of time spent searching for the business or residence one sought to find, thereby speeding up the potential rate of the circulation of capital (at least theoretically). Although governmentality studies can offer insights into the house number as a technology of governmental knowledge production (eg, Joyce, 2003), it currently lacks the analytical tools needed to understand how the production of abstract spaces has historically been related to the contradictory processes of capital accumulation, the circulation of commodities, and the creative destruction of urban landscapes. Marxian urban theory, on the other hand, has produced an important body of literature examining precisely these issues (eg, Berman, 1988; Lefebvre, 1991; Harvey, 1996; 1999; Merrifield, 2002). In the concluding section of this paper, I offer a preliminary exploration of the spatial history of urban house numbering in the United States, in which I draw upon the insights of governmentality studies as well as Harvey’s (1996) dialectical theorization of spatial ‘permanences’. The purpose of focusing on the history of urban house numbering in this context is twofold. First, it illustrates the importance of spatial ordering (geopower) to the emergence of modern governmental rationality and also provides a clear example of how one of the most basic questions of positivist geography – that of the ‘whereness’ (Downs and Stea, 1977: 123) of an object or subject – was mobilized in the production of abstract space with the aim of spatially individualizing urban populations. Second, many geographical accounts consider governmentality in terms of the mechanisms of knowledge production that sovereign states have used to constitute their subjects and territories as ‘governable’. While this line of inquiry has produced considerable insights, I argue that analyses of governmentality should also explore how various non-state actors have utilized technologies of government in myriad ways. The early history of house numbering demonstrates the crucial role that non-state actors (in this case, city directory publishers) played not only in the ordering of urban space (via house numbering) but also in the production of geographical knowledges of individualization (ie, city directories) that were linked to such a spatial regime of inscriptions. I am not arguing that geographers and governmentality theorists should stop studying the ‘governmentalized’ state. I do maintain, however, that governmentality is not confined to the state, so we must take into account the various ‘governmental’ projects of non-state actors in addition to considering what Scott (1998: 9) calls ‘state projects of legibility and simplification’.

### Link – Management of Territory

#### The management of territory, through geo-coding is the root cause of biopolitical control of populations—spatial control enabled other forms of power

Rose-Redwood, 2006

[Reuben, Dept. of Geography @ Penn. State Univ. “Governmentaity, geography, and the geo-coded world.” Progress in human geography, 30.4, 2006, 469-486, Accessed online] /WFI-MB

While there has been a major focus on the importance of statistics and mapping as technologies of government, less attention has been devoted to explicitly theorizing the precise relations of statistical knowledge, mapping, and the production of abstract spaces. For instance, is one of these technologies of government the prerequisite for another? If social statistics are central to the biopolitical practice of managing entire populations, is not the construction of a geo-coded world the ‘spatial prerequisite’ (Hannah, 1992) for such biopolitical projects? In short, is not geopower a prerequisite for biopower? I would answer affirmatively, which is why I take geography (as both a disciplinary form of spatial knowledge and as the spatial organization of the earth’s surface) to be so important to understanding the development of governmentality. Although I stress the importance of geographic ‘inscription’ as a key element of geopower, I take seriously Gregory’s (1998: 11, emphasis in original) cautious suggestion that critical human geographers should engage in ‘a spatial analytics that does not treat space as an empty surface marked by the inscriptions of power and knowledge but which discloses the implication of spatiality in the production of power and knowledge’. By no means do I assume that the production of a spatial regime of inscriptions is the workings of a preexisting ‘knowledge’ that is inscribed upon an empty space by an already-constituted ‘power’. Rather, I maintain that the ordering of space is itself one of the requisites for producing governmental power/knowledges. It is in this sense that I insist that geo-power is the basis of a governmentalized biopolitics. To state the argument in concise terms: the biopolitical project of managing ‘populations’ by examining statistical regularities and mapping these patterns out cartographically (ie, totalization) is only possible once a ‘population’ has been individualized (via recordkeeping practices of various kinds), which in turn depends upon being able to locate ‘individuals’ spatially (hence the current focus on the making of a ‘geo-coded world’). The production of the ‘geo-coded landscape’ is an inherently geographic process, and if governmentality scholars seek to understand the spatiality of governmental rationality, it is important to conduct further research into the historical geography, or ‘spatial history’ (Elden, 2001), of the geo-coded world. It may well turn out that the reason why critical geographers have so much to offer to the analysis of governmentality is that, quite simply, geographical knowledge and the ordering of space have been at the heart of governmental rationality from its very inception. It is not a mere coincidence, for instance, that both census-taking and the development of house numbering systems arose together during the eighteenth century. The early history of house numbering provides crucial insights into understanding the complex interplay between state and nonstate actors with respect to the governmentalization of urban space. I shall briefly discuss the case of house numbering in US cities during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, yet a comparative historico-geographic analysis is needed to examine these processes in different contexts (eg, the history of house numbering in France was far more centralized than that of the United States; see Pronteau, 1966).

### Link – Mapping

#### The cartographic mapping of space through transportation projects is project of rendering the world visible and controllable by power

Rose-Redwood, 2006

[Reuben, Dept. of Geography @ Penn. State Univ. “Governmentaity, geography, and the geo-coded world.” Progress in human geography, 30.4, 2006, 469-486, Accessed online] /WFI-MB

In examining the historical emergence of technologies of government, various governmentality scholars highlight the importance of cartographic mapping and the rationalization of space as key strategies of governmentality. ‘To govern,’ says Rose (1999: 36), ‘it is necessary to render visible the space over which government is to be exercised.’The ordering and mapping of space as well as the rise of communication networks enabled the practice of ‘governing at a distance’ (Miller and Rose, 1990; Barry, 1996; Rose, 1999).7These networks were directly linked to the production of ‘striated’ space (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987), or what Barry (1996: 127–28) describes as ‘a space within which movements and flows are regulated in ways which enable authorities to act; a space that is measured, directed and standardized’. Likewise, a number of recent anthropological studies have acknowledged the importance of spatial ordering as a strategy of neoliberal governmentality in the age of privatized security systems and ever increasing global economic disparities (Merry, 2001; Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; Robins, 2002).

### Link – Mobility/Transportation

#### Link-Framing mobility and transportation as central to human freedom and progress is rooted in capitalist logic

Goodwin 10 (Katherine J., American University’s School of International Service, “Reconstructing Automobility”, Global Environmental Politics, November)

Contradictions of freedom and mobility aside, there is a second important point to make regarding the link between mobility and human flourishing. While humans have always been mobile creatures, the contemporary assumption that extensive movement is a necessary part of social well-being has fairly recent origins. The convergence in the nineteenth century of modern capitalist industry, the development of the railroad and telegraph, and the institutionalization of time by factories and states significantly changed the sense of space and time in which people lived.[55](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v010/10.4.goodwin.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f55) Two significant transformations concern us here. The first is the emergence of the daily commute between home and work or school, whereby routinized intraurban movement became habitual.[56](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v010/10.4.goodwin.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f56) The second is tourism. Before the nineteenth century, "the idea occurred to no one to go off to the seaside … Except for a few English aristocrats (considered perfectly eccentric), one did not travel for pleasure. One took to the road for business, for the service of the king, or to join—if one was a lady—one's husband."[57](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v010/10.4.goodwin.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f57) In the era of railroads and leisure time, however, touring other cities became feasible and desirable. These two transformations—commuting to work and travelling for pleasure—led to another new phenomenon: "the increasing experience of landscape from a moving rather than stationary vantage-point" and an "increasing sense of the body as an anonymized parcel of flesh which is shunted from place to place."[58](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v010/10.4.goodwin.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f58)At the most intimate scale, mobility became a daily embodied experience, eventually to be taken for granted as a natural part of human life. On a larger scale, Nigel Thrift points to the shifting symbolism of the era, where circulation became a prevalent metaphor and was understood to be "causally connected to progress" in the way that the circulation of blood is causally **[End Page 72]** connected to life.[59](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v010/10.4.goodwin.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f59)This perceived connection to progress was heightened and intensified by the modern capitalist impetus towards accessing markets. Fundamental to capitalism is the idea that "the ability of workers and machines and financial capital to find their best employment is essential to well-functioning markets, to efficient markets … a productive society is a mobile society."[60](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v010/10.4.goodwin.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f60) Beginning in the nineteenth century, urban planners with the light of progress in their eyes "produced elaborate plans to improve roadways, build canals, improve river navigation and so on, in order to improve the 'circulation' of goods and people."[61](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v010/10.4.goodwin.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f61) The state became invested in mobility on an unprecedented scale.

### Link – Securitization

#### The securitization of transportation infrastructure causes pre-emptive policing of potential enemies to protect their smooth functioning

Lipschutz, 2008

[Ronnie, Professor of Social Science, Politics, and Environmental Studies at UC Santa Cruz, “Imperial Warfare in the Naked City—Sociality as critical infrastructure.” International Political Sociology, 2008, 2, 204-218, Accessed online via Wiley Online Library] /WFI-MB

Critical infrastructure is ordinarily understood to encompass those systems that form the communicative and transactional backbone of late modern society; it includes ‘‘telecommunication networks, water systems, nuclear plants, cyberspace and knowledge-based experts networks, the commercial privatization of technologies of surveillance and control’’ (Kristian 2006). To these, we may add electrical grids, electronic networks, and transport and trade systems. The fear of system disruption, and its consequences, is captured most succinctly in the metaphor of an ‘‘electronic Pearl Harbor,’’ 8 involving one or a series of attacks on particular nodes and software in global computer networks that, in turn, result in massive crashes and data loss. 9 These could feed back into other electronically dependent systems (such as air transport, water, and electricity), causing them to go down, too (for illustration, see Live Free or Die Hard, 2007). As described by President Clinton’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, established in 1996 to study the problem and make recommendations, Today, the right command sent over a network to a power generating station’s control computer could be just as effective as a backpack full of explosives, and the perpetrator would be harder to identify and apprehend. The rapid growth of a computer-literate population ensures that increasing millions of people possess the skills necessary to consider such an attack. The wide adoption of public protocols for system interconnection and the availability of ‘‘hacker tool’’ libraries make their task easier. While the resources needed to conduct a physical attack have not changed much recently, the resources necessary to conduct a cyber attack are now commonplace. A personal computer and a simple telephone connection to an Internet Service Provider anywhere in the world are enough to cause a great deal of harm. (CCIP 1997, cited in Lipschutz 1999:421; emphasis added) The general assumption—supported to some degree by people’s behaviors during some widespread power failures—is that anarchy will inevitably follow the collapse of Leviathan’s ‘‘backbone,’’ threatening life, property, and order (other instances demonstrate precisely the opposite). Yet, much as is the case of attempts to model accident modes in complex technologies such as nuclear power plants, studies of CI vulnerability tend to focus on deliberate disruptions, at one or several points, that could lead to failure and disabling of entire systems. This approach leads to identiﬁcation of an almost unlimited number of weak points—including, apparently, courthouses in remote American towns, sports stadia full of people, and even holiday parades—efforts to strengthen them, and provision of funds to train ‘‘ﬁrst responders.’’ Inasmuch as there is no way to completely protect physical infrastructures against even ‘‘normal accidents’’ due to internal failures (Perrow 1999)—how much more difﬁcult, then, must it be to ensure against deliberate attacks? For example, during the last few days of January 2008, large parts of Asia and the Middle East experienced an Internet breakdown, attributed to the accidental cutting of undersea cables (CNN 2008a,b). Some observers thought the breakage to have been intentional—although to what end no one seemed certain. The point is that such incidents rarely happen more than once, and their recurrence can usually be avoided through some kind of technical ﬁx (it is less easy to design against ‘‘human error’’). 10 Prevention of intentional disruptions—preemptive security—is a good deal more difﬁcult, since such attacks generally involve exploitation of precisely those structural vulnerabilities that are vital to efﬁcient system operation. For example, the London Underground is able to move so many people every day—albeit with frequent breakdowns on the Northern Line—precisely because it can accommodate high rates of relatively unobstructed passenger ﬂow. Regular or even random inspection of passengers and their bags might prevent or deter If the United States closed its ports to inbound ships, the result would be equivalent to a man tripping at the base of a crowded down escalator. To prevent him from being crushed by successive waves of arriving humanity, the escalator must be turned off… [T]he more serious economic blow [from closing the ports] would be dealt to the manufacturing and retail sectors. Because 90 percent of the world’s general cargo moves inside these boxes [shipping containers], when the boxes stop moving, so do assembly lines, and shelves at retailers like Wal-Mart and Home Depot go bare. In recognition of the near-impossibility task of rendering CI invulnerable to intentional disruption, authorities seek increasingly to pre-empt attacks through detection and disruption of the social relations and networks that might give rise to such violence. This, however, is an enormously more difﬁcult task. 12 Jeremy Packer (2007:212) points out that, ‘‘Knowing where to draw the line between ally and enemy is… problematic. The potential to ‘pass’ has overpowered previous modes of enemy recognition. As such, new forms of scientiﬁc examination are being developed to know the truth of one’s enemies.’’ For example, as police discovered in their investigation of the July 7 attacks in London, three of the four bombers traveled to Pakistan, met there with various other individuals, apparently attended training sessions of one sort or another, and returned to the United Kingdom with virtually no notice. They might also have gone river rafting in Wales. One individual detained on suspicion of engaging in terrorism-related activities was later released by authorities who judged him not to be a security risk, a decision widely criticized in the British press and elsewhere, yet symptomatic of the difﬁculties of pre-emption. It is also the case that some arrested in connection with both successful and failed attacks might not be connected to groups and networks linked to Al Qaeda; instead, they have formed their own small groups, inspired through a globalized episteme of jihadism. These are believers who acted. Not all believers will act, but how can those few who will act be detected before they do so?

#### This securitized enemy making results in unending war and violence

Lipschutz, 2008

[Ronnie, Professor of Social Science, Politics, and Environmental Studies at UC Santa Cruz, “Imperial Warfare in the Naked City—Sociality as critical infrastructure.” International Political Sociology, 2008, 2, 204-218, Accessed online via Wiley Online Library] /WFI-MB

How should we understand such programs? In a thought-provoking discussion of Michel Foucault’s lectures in Society Must Be Defended, Andrew Neal (2004) addresses the former’s famous dictum that ‘‘Politics is the continuation of war by other means’’ (Foucault 2003:48). This assertion, long taken as an inversion of Clausewitz, is actually meant to apply to struggles between ‘‘historico-political discourses’’ within states, whose proponents sought to valorize ‘‘certain interpretations of historical events or even myths to great political or indeed tactical effect’’ (Neal 2004:387). The result was that ‘‘all historical claims became impositions of force…. Not only, then, is the content of history a continual struggle between competing forces, but, adding a dose of reﬂexivity, the practice of history itself is a continuation of that struggle’’ (Neal 2004:389). The ultimate result of this struggle, according to Neal (id: 396), is not only the effort to particularize a state form that conforms to the dictates of the victors but also to universalize the nation-state and render as dangerous all other forms. ‘‘The ‘enemy’ does not simply pose a threat to ‘our way of life,’’’ but must be excluded from all consideration. Attempts to marginalize those who dissent or are different is nothing new in the annals of the state. During the twentieth century, tens of millions died because they lost struggles over history and subjectivity. The GWOT is war, but it can also be understood as one more historico-political discourse in the hands of that ‘‘race’’ (Foucault 2003:60; see also Jabri 2006) seeking to instantiate an imperial ‘‘ideal’’ that cannot be challenged. The objective is to penetrate and manage both hearts and minds, not of the enemy but, rather, the citizen-subject, any of whose thoughts of dissent or deviance mark him or her as a risk to be excluded from ‘‘normal’’ life. Foucault (2003:61–62) concludes this particular lecture by arguing that, at some point, what might be thought of as the ‘‘conventional’’ view of threats to security disappears and is replaced by a discourse that claims: ‘‘We have to defend society against all the biological threats posed by the other race, the subrace, the counterrace that we are, despite ourselves, bringing into existence.’’ At this point, the racist thematic is no longer a moment in the struggle between one social group and another; it will promote the global strategy of social conservativisms. At this point… we see the appearance of a State racism: a racism that society will direct against itself, against its own elements, and its own products. This is the internal racism of permanent puriﬁcation, and it will become one of the basic dimensions of social normalization.

### Link – Transportation Infrastructure

#### Transportation infrastructure=biopolitics

Lundborg and Vaughn-Williams, 2011

[Tom, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, and Nick, Associate Professor of International Security at the University of Warwick, “Resilience, Critical Infrastructure, and Molecular Security: The Excess of “Life” in Biopolitics.” International Political Sociology, Vol. 5. Issue 4. December 2011, 367-383, Accessed Online via Wiley Online Library] /WFI-MB

While much of the existing literature on CIs and resilience planning has been of an explicitly policy-oriented nature, two notable exceptions are Lentzos and Rose (2009), and Dillon and Reid (2009). What distinguishes these contributions from other work is their critical insistence on questioning the political significance of CIs and resilience planning. Both locate this questioning within a biopolitical horizon inspired by the work of Michel Foucault. Lentzos and Rose (2009) seek to address the issue of how the political rationalities of advanced liberal democracies have become replaced by new technologies animated by the telos of security. In other words, they take as their starting point a curiosity about the nature of the contemporary relationship between governance in the West and security: a curiosity that Foucault had already begun to develop in his series of lectures at the Collège de France published recently as Society Must Be Defended (2004). Lentzos and Rose cite Foucault’s animating distinction between centripetal disciplinary mechanisms on the one hand and centrifugal biopolitical apparatuses on the other. The former isolates and closes off space in order to regulate bodies within that given area; the latter, by contrast, works with movements in ever-wider circuits in order to manage complex realities. In recent years, a number of authors have worked with and developed Foucault’s insights about how security can be made compatible with circulation in this way (Amoore 2006; Bigo 2007; Kavalski 2009; Salter 2006). As such, it is unnecessary to rehearse these relatively well-known arguments here, except to stress, as Lentzos and Rose do, that what is valued in liberal democratic societies is precisely the ability to keep people, services, and goods constantly on the move. The necessity to maintain these centrifugal forces therefore takes the analysis of security practices beyond simple (disciplinary) notions of prevention, “big-brother” style surveillance, and barricades. Instead, biopolitical apparatuses of security are shown to work with complexity, embrace and identify patterns in flows, and govern through the management of these dynamics. It is within this context that Lentzos and Rose situate what they call a “logic of resilience,” understood as “a systematic, widespread, organizational, structural and personal strengthening of subjective and material arrangements so as to be better able to anticipate and tolerate disturbances in complex worlds without collapse” (Lentzos and Rose 2009:243). On this view, therefore, resilience encompasses technologies of security that recoil from shocks to (and within) the “system of systems” they constitute, in order to ensure a return to “normal” conditions of circulation as quickly as possible. While also working within the Foucauldian-inspired biopolitical paradigm, Dillon and Reid (2009) examine more specifically the role of resilient CIs in securing what they call the “liberal way of rule.” Before exploring their treatment of CIs, it is first necessary to introduce aspects of their broader argument about the relationship between liberalism and war.

### Link – Transportation Infrastructure

#### Increased transportation infrastructure goes hand in hand with observation and management of the population in the United States

Rose-Redwood, 2006

[Reuben, Dept. of Geography @ Penn. State Univ. “Governmentaity, geography, and the geo-coded world.” Progress in human geography, 30.4, 2006, 469-486, Accessed online] /WFI-MB

Hannah concentrates mainly on biopolitical projects instigated by the state and combines Foucault’s analysis with critical state theory. His chief aim is to utilize the governmentality perspective as a means of illustrating his own theory of the ‘cycle of social control’, which consists of three ‘moments’: observation, judgment, and regulation (Hannah, 2000: 39). In order to regulate conduct, state officials must first construct the material and institutional infrastructure to collect statistical knowledge of the population, which provides the basis for making ‘normalizing judgments’ (Hannah, 2000: 40). Hannah (2000: 39) argues that the organization of space, or territory, is absolutely essential to the process of social control and that governmentality is based upon securing ‘epistemological access to all parts of the territory and everything in it . . . [in order to] make it possible to pin down and distinguish different units of resources and especially people, to make them susceptible to enumeration’. He recognizes, however, that such an epistemological project did have its limits and that governmentality was not based upon a ‘perfect’knowledge of population and territory. Nevertheless, he contends that the collection of statistics, mapmaking, and the rationalization of space were fundamental prerequisites for the consolidation of state power. Hannah emphasizes that such spatial orderings were not simply repressive impositions but were also enabling to the governed population itself (see Mann, 1993). As Hannah (2000: 128) explains, ‘an act of observation associated with a census requires that the agents of vision travel to their objects using the same infrastructure available to the objects themselves. The easier it is for government agents to move about, the easier it is likewise for the population at large.’ If this is true, then the rationalization of space cannot merely be reduced to an expression of repressive power as Lefebvre (1991) contends.9 Instead, the production of abstract space – while repressive in numerous ways – not only establishes the epistemological basis for state centered disciplinary projects; it also provides a system of orientation, or frame of reference, for the ‘population at large’.

## Impact

### Impact – Biopolitics – Violent

#### Biopolitical liberalism is violent—mired in a kill-to-save mentality

Lundborg and Vaughn-Williams, 2011

[Tom, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, and Nick, Associate Professor of International Security at the University of Warwick, “Resilience, Critical Infrastructure, and Molecular Security: The Excess of “Life” in Biopolitics.” International Political Sociology, Vol. 5. Issue 4. December 2011, 367-383, Accessed Online via Wiley Online Library] /WFI-MB

Bennett’s problematization of the notion of a superior, totalizing structure and her appreciation of the life force of materiality calls for a radical reconsideration of what “life” itself refers to in the biopolitical problematique. Earlier we noted that for Dillon and Reid liberal biopolitical rule only promotes the form of life that is productive for its own enterprise. On their view, the concern of such rule is the “potentiality” of some life to become dangerous and therefore detrimental to what living “should” involve according to the liberal paradigm. It is for this reason that liberalism, paradoxically, can be characterized as a violent mode of governance that is prepared to “kill” in order to “make life live.” In this context, then, “life” refers not just to something expendable but also to something controllable, calculable, and adaptable within the biopolitical machine. Hence, while acknowledging the unpredictability and contingency of life, Dillon and Reid rely on a rather limited notion of what “life” may actually refer to—as something that may always “become” dangerous and emerge as a threat. Consequently, their analysis is reduced to a concern with a form of life that is forced to obey and adapt within the biopolitical system.

### Impact – Biopolitics – No V2L

#### Biopolitics allows the sovereign to devalue life to the point where it’s not politically relevant, allowing it to become the subject of state management

Agamben, 98 (Giorgio, philosopher and bad ass, “Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life.” 1998, Stanford University Press, MB)

It is not our intention here to take a position on the difficult ethical problem of euthanasia, which still today, in certain coun­tries, occupies a substantial position in medical debates and pro­vokes disagreement. Nor are we concerned with the radicality with which Binding declares himself in favor of the general admissibility of euthanasia. More interesting for our inquiry is the fact that the sovereignty of the living man over his own life has its immediate counterpart in the determination of a threshold beyond which life ceases to have any juridical value and can, therefore, be killed without the commission of a homicide. The new juridical category of "life devoid of value" (or "life unworthy of being lived") corre­sponds exactly—even if in an apparently different direction:---to the bare life of homo sacer and can easily be extended beyond the limits imagined by Binding. It is as if every valorization and every "politicization" of life (which, after all, is implicit in the sovereignty of the individual over his own existence) necessarily implies a new decision concerning the threshold beyond which life ceases to be politically relevant, becomes only "sacred life," and can as such be eliminated without punishment. Every society sets this limit; every society—even the most modern—decides who its "sacred men" will be. It is even pos­sible that this limit, on which the politicization and the exceptio of natural life in the juridical order of the state depends, has done nothing but extend itself in the history of the West and has now— in the new biopolitical horizon of states with national sovereignty—moved inside every human life and every citizen. Bare life is no longer confined to a particular place or a definite category. It now dwells in the biological body of every living being.

## Alternative

### Alternative – Criticism of Management/Control

#### Reject the affirmatives attempt to use of transportation infrastructure as a mechanism of control through the establishment of fixed relationships in favor of viewing them as open, interdependent systems of interaction. This allows open, and free relationships to emerge in resistance to the 1AC

Lundborg and Vaughn-Williams, 2011

[Tom, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, and Nick, Associate Professor of International Security at the University of Warwick, “Resilience, Critical Infrastructure, and Molecular Security: The Excess of “Life” in Biopolitics.” International Political Sociology, Vol. 5. Issue 4. December 2011, 367-383, Accessed Online via Wiley Online Library] /WFI-MB

In order to problematize the idea of life as controllable and adaptable, we turn to Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of the “molar” and the “molecular,” which, in crude terms, can be understood as two different modes of composition. These modes can be applied to a variety of phenomena, such as, for example, material objects, spatial arrangements, institutions, classes, gender, and so on. On the one hand, the “molar” refers to a rigid composition, organized around fixed borders and identities. Regardless of what is being referred to, “molar” compositions always consist of separate, rigid segments, each of which has an identity and a territory, and can in some sense be calculated and controlled. Each segment is assumed to have a particular function and follow a certain, repeatable pattern. Moreover, even though the segments are different, it is precisely their mode of composition—as molar segments—that makes them fit together and operate next to one another, side by side. On the other hand, the “molecular” highlights a more open mode of composition characterized by fluctuating boundaries and uncertain identities. In this register, segments do not fit together neatly, but overlap or fall apart. Any sense of repetition or familiarity is disrupted and a secret molecular “life” of flows is revealed. In Deleuze and Guattari’s vocabulary, the molecular thereby introduces us to an uncertain, unpredictable, and indefinite becoming—rather than “being”—of life. Following such a process, one cannot simply turn into something static or definite, for example a woman, an animal, an adult, a terrorist. There is only ever a constant process of becoming, a becoming that eludes any “molar” categorizations: Yes, all becomings are molecular: the animal, flower, or stone one becomes are molecular collectivities, haecceities, not molar subjects, objects, or form that we know from the outside and recognize from experience, through science, or by habit. If this is true, then we must say the same of things human: there is a becoming-woman, a becoming-child, that do not resemble the woman or the child as clearly distinct molar entities… (Deleuze and Guattari 2004:303) Whereas the molar refers to a life that can be calculated and controlled in accordance with a particular pattern, system or structure, by contrast the molecular points to the existence of a life that eludes the given forms of any particular system. In this way, the register of the molecular embraces what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as “materiality’s power of variation”: the power of materiality to flow within as well as between the human and nonhuman and thereby alter different forms of becoming within an open set of relations. Applying this argument, we might say that Dillon and Reid’s analysis tends to focus on the molar composition of liberal biopolitical rule, whereas Bennett’s version of vital materialism is much closer to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of molecular flow. While of course they have very different aims in their respective analyses, Dillon and Reid, on the one hand, refer to “becoming” only in the context of a totalizing structure in which life may always “become” dangerous and therefore must be coded into risk categories. Bennett, on the other hand, provides a much broader conception of “becoming,” which signals an indefinite movement that always has the potential to resist the codes and categories that are imposed upon it by a particular system of rule or structure of control. It might be counter-argued that Dillon and Reid purposefully seek to diagnose the apparatus of liberal biopolitical rule precisely as a molar attempt to capture life. In this sense, theirs can be read as an immanent critique of that rule, but this would be to miss the molecular complexities that Bennett’s approach implies. By contrast, we seek to embrace the molecular layer of life insisted upon by Deleuze and Guattari and explore what happens when we treat resilient CIs not as totalizing structures, but open, complex, and interdependent systems, in which things do not always work the way they are supposed to.

### Alternative – Criticism Solves

#### The alternative criticism is necessary to understand the ways that transportation infrastructure works that shape and manage everyday life

Lundborg and Vaughn-Williams, 2011

[Tom, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, and Nick, Associate Professor of International Security at the University of Warwick, “Resilience, Critical Infrastructure, and Molecular Security: The Excess of “Life” in Biopolitics.” International Political Sociology, Vol. 5. Issue 4. December 2011, 367-383, Accessed Online via Wiley Online Library] /WFI-MB

Shifting the register of analysis from molar to molecular yields a number of significant outcomes that challenge extant ways in which we study not only resilient CIs, but practices of (in)securitization to which they relate more generally. First, a molecular frame posits a radically relational ontology, which encourages greater sensitivity toward the active role that material forces play in the composition of contemporary social and political life. The stuff that is part of our everyday milieu of interaction shapes behaviors, conditions the possibility of different outcomes, and is performative of different types of subjectivities. Moreover, the shared reliance on access to CIs indicates their vital function in reproducing certain forms of life and communities based around those visions. For this reason, CI and attempts to securitize it must be read as performing a political role in the fashioning of global security relations.

### Alternative – AT: Perm

#### The perm can solve the alt—analyzing power from the standpoint of institutions fails

John D. Caputo and Mark Yount, Villanova University, St. Joseph’s University, “Institutions, Normalization, and Power.” Foucault and the Critique of Institutions. 1993; mac//sam

The connection between Foucault and institutions seems an obvious one, but not because he wanted to make the institution the basic unit of analysis. On the contrary, Foucault situated institutions within the thin but all-entangling web of power relations. He did so explicitly in Discipline and Punish, and he subsequently read his later analysis between the lines of his earlier works. In this genealogy, institutions are the more readily definable macro-objects, grosser instruments for the finer, more elemental workings of power. Power is the thin, inescapable film that covers all human interactions, whether inside institutions or out. Institutional structures are saturated with sexual relations, economic relations, social relations, etc., and are always established of these power relations: relations between men and women, old and young, senior and junior, well-born and starved, colorless and colored, Occident and Orient. Institutions are the means that power uses, and not the other way around, not sources or origins of power. The analysis of power is thus always more fine-grained than any analysis of classes, of states, or of institutions in their own terms would be. That is why for Foucault--and for all of the studies that follow here--the workings of power cannot be described from the standpoint of a master discipline, especially a perspective that would seek an origin for power, or take political power to be its initial or privileged form. It is always a question of analyzing institutions from the standpoint of power, and not of analyzing power from the standpoint of institutions.' But we ought not to speak of power in the substantive, for there is no such thing. Instead, sets of "power relations" bathe the structures and edifices of human life, without power ever amounting to a thing or substance. It is not the very substance- and- subject of the historical process, like the Hegelian spirit, not the driving movement of contradictory social relations, as in Marx, not the unifying- gathering power that holds sway over all in Heidegger's history of Being. (The similarities might not be entirely accidental, though: see Mohanty's paper herein, 'Foucault as Philosopher, 1) Power is not one thing, but multiple and multiplied, scattered and disseminated. This means that power is not concentrated at a central point of organization and domination. Power is not first of all the power of the sovereign, There is power over freedom, and action on the action of others, but this is a domination that traverses the fields of power, that operates variably in various relationships. "In so far as power relations are an unequal and relatively stable relation of forces, it's clear that this implies an above and a below, a difference of potentials."' These potentials of power cannot be understood as brute force, though brutality is among their possible outcomes-as is seduction. Power relations are embedded in the very heart of human relationships, springing into being as soon as there are human beings. Power need not be harsh and abrasive or constrain narrowly and painfully; without overt violence it seeks its objectives in the more subtle, thus all the more effective, mode of "suasion," of "conduction " Power relations clear the ways for human behavior (conduire) to be subtly conducted (conduit), so that human actions are led as surely and effortlessly through their channels as water through a "duct" (ducere).

### Alternative – AT: Perm

#### Reformism fails—politics need to be re-examined and the state form of power challenged first

Agamben, 98 (Giorgio, philosopher and bad ass, “Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life.” 1998, Stanford University Press, MB)

Carl Schmitt's definition of sovereignty ("Sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception") became a commonplace even before there was any understanding that what was at issue in it was nothing less than the limit concept of the doctrine of law and the State, in which sovereignty borders (since every limit concept is always the limit between two concepts) on the sphere of life and becomes indistinguishable from it. As long as the form of the State constituted the fundamental horizon of all communal life and the political, religious, juridical, and economic doctrines that sustained this form were still strong, this "most extreme sphere" could not truly come to light. The problem of sovereignty was reduced to the question of who within the political order was invested with certain powers, and the very threshold of the political order itself was never called into question. Today, now that the great State structures have entered into a process of dissolution and the emergency has, as Walter Benjamin foresaw, become the rule, the time is ripe to place the problem of the originary structure and limits of the form of the State in a new perspective. The weakness of anarchist and Marxian critiques of the State was precisely to have not caught sight of this structure and thus to have quickly left the arcanum imperii'aside, as if it had no substance outside of the simulacra and. the ideologies invoked to justify it. But one ends up identifying with an enemy whose structure one does not understand, and the theory of the State (and in particular of the state of exception, which is to say, of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the transitional phase leading to the stateless society) is the reef on which the revolutions of our century have been shipwrecked.This book, which was originally conceived as a response to the bloody mystification of a new planetary order, therefore had to reckon with problems—first of all that of the sacredness of life— which the author had not, in the beginning, foreseen. In the course of the undertaking, however, it became clear that one cannot, in such an area, accept as a guarantee any of the notions that the social sciences (from jurisprudence to anthropology) thought they had defined or presupposed as evident, and that many of these notions demanded—in the urgency of catastrophe—to be revised without reserve.

## Framework

### Framework – Alt First – Policymaking Fails

#### The Alt comes first—Policy approaches to transportation infrastructure are the wrong questions—we need to examine the ways that security and infrastructure intersect and the social world they construct

Lundborg and Vaughn-Williams, 2011

[Tom, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, and Nick, Associate Professor of International Security at the University of Warwick, “Resilience, Critical Infrastructure, and Molecular Security: The Excess of “Life” in Biopolitics.” International Political Sociology, Vol. 5. Issue 4. December 2011, 367-383, Accessed Online via Wiley Online Library] /WFI-MB

In recent years, Western governments have invested signiﬁcantly in the enhancement of critical infrastructures (CIs). One prominent deﬁnition of CIs is offered by the United States (US) Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as ‘‘the framework of physical structures and cyber information networks that provides a continual ﬂow of information, goods, and services essential to the defense and economic security of the US’’ (DHS 2004:1). Similar deﬁnitions can be found in the United Kingdom (UK) and European Union (EU) contexts, all of which stress the importance of such networks for the functioning of everyday life and the return to ‘‘normality’’ in the event of natural disasters, accidents, or terrorist attacks. 2 Of course, the provision and maintenance of adequate CIs is not a ‘‘new’’ phenomenon, nor one conﬁned to the ‘‘West’’ (Dufﬁeld 2011). Rather, CIs are associated with the quintessence of statehood both historically and globally Nevertheless, what is arguably signiﬁcant about recent efforts to enhance CIs in the West is both the scale of investment and the extent to which developments in this context have come to permeate and structure economic, social, military, and political sectors. It is no coincidence that such trends have intensiﬁed as a result of the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon (2001), and the bombings in Madrid (2003) and London (2005)—attacks that struck multiple blows precisely at the heart of essential (and highly symbolic) ﬁnancial and transportation networks vital for the ‘‘continual ﬂow of information, goods and services.’’ Alongside investment in CIs has emerged the concept of ‘‘resilience’’ around which current security planning, design, policy, rhetoric, and practice increasingly revolves. Here resilient CIs are commonly understood in terms of systems that demonstrate the ‘‘ability... to withstand and recover from adversity’’ (Sir Michael Pitt, quoted in Cabinet Ofﬁce 2010:7). In this context, metaphors of ‘‘recoiling,’’ ‘‘bouncing back,’’ and ‘‘returning to normal’’ abound. 3 The inter-disciplinary study of CIs and resilience planning is developing rapidly. What this literature tends to focus upon, however, is the effectiveness of systems in place and prospects for better policy prescription. Thus, for example, a 2007 special issue dealt with the efﬁciency of international disaster management planning (Laporte 2007), the potential effects of social breakdown following the collapse of CIs (Boin and McConnell 2007), new design principles to better protect the management of CIs (Schulman and Roe 2007), and prospects for future European strategy (Fritzon, Ljungkvist, Boin, and Rhinard 2007). Elsewhere, Coaffee (2006) has charted the emergence of the concept of resilience from an urban planning perspective: ﬁrst as a metaphor for how ecological systems cope with stress induced by external factors; and later in its application to disaster management, economic recovery, and the embedding of emergency preparedness into the built environment of the city. Other work has considered the conceptual history of resilience (Handmer and Dovers 1996), the relation between resilience and risk (Schoon 2006), and legal dimensions of infrastructure (Likosky 2006). What has so far received less attention, however, is the broader political signiﬁcance of the reorientation of Western security relations around CIs and resilience planning: How do sovereign attempts to secure CIs enable certain forms of governance? How do these attempts interact with and produce the populations they seek to govern? How do CIs and resilience planning reveal assumptions about contemporary political life in the West? 4

### Framework – Discursive Analysis Key

#### The discursive-materialist approach is key—we need to interrogate the relationship between non-human transportation structures and their impact on social life and politics

Lundborg and Vaughn-Williams, 2011

[Tom, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, and Nick, Associate Professor of International Security at the University of Warwick, “Resilience, Critical Infrastructure, and Molecular Security: The Excess of “Life” in Biopolitics.” International Political Sociology, Vol. 5. Issue 4. December 2011, 367-383, Accessed Online via Wiley Online Library] /WFI-MB

The world of CIs necessitates a shift in the referent object of security away from the “spectacular” to the “banal.” Instead of high-profile speech-based acts of securitization, here we are dealing with telecommunications, transportation, and financial networks, water treatment and sewage works, electricity, and so on: semi-invisible phenomena that are often taken-for-granted as the fixtures and fittings of society, yet nonetheless vital for the maintenance of what is considered to be normal daily life. For this reason, our subject matter calls for a re-thinking of the very “stuff” considered to be apposite for the study of international security. Indeed, analyzing the role of CIs and resilience planning in global security relations adds particular resonance to existing calls within the IPS-related literature to broaden and deepen the way in which acts of securitization are conceptualized (Bigo 2002, 2008; Williams 2003; Balzacq 2005; McDonald 2008). As well as pushing the referent object of security beyond the “spectacle” of high-profile speech acts, the study of CIs prompts a further methodological question about what resources exist for the analysis of “material” phenomena. Arguably, the prominence of the “speech act” as a theoretical device for studying securitization is a reflection of the legacy of the so-called linguistic turn in social and political theory, which came to impact upon security studies—along with the broader discipline of International Relations (IR) of which it is largely a sub-field—from the late 1980s. Much of the literature associated with the linguistic turn in IR (Shapiro 1981; Der Derian 1987; Der Derian and Shapiro 1989; Campbell 1992; Connolly 1993) relied on “discourse” as a key methodological as well as theoretical tool. However, “discourse,” for these authors, did not only concern texts and words in a strictly linguistic sense. Rather, they invoked a more expansive conception of discourse to include the general “context” in which linguistic phenomena acquire their meaning. While such treatments of discourse have thus existed for quite some time, only recently have ideas about how to incorporate materiality in discursive studies of politics become popular. A small but growing number of theorists in political anthropology (Navaro-Yashin 2009), political philosophy (Bennett 2004, 2010; Braun and Whatmore 2010; Coole and Frost 2010), and IR (Coward 2009; Aradau 2010; Duffield 2011; Walker and Cooper 2011) have argued for the incorporation of nonlinguistic phenomena in political analysis generally. This work stresses that materiality exists—as a force, a spatial arrangement, an element in relations of power, and an object of knowledge. It exists, moreover, not as a passive background or object whose content and meaning can be captured, represented, or constructed by language, but rather as something that is both active and alive. According to Bennett (2004, 2010), materiality expresses a “life force” of its own: the affective quality of the thing itself. Rather than positing “a separate force that can enter and animate a physical body,” the notion of the “life force” is equated with the materiality of the thing or object as such (Bennett 2010:xiii). Referring to the “force of things” along these lines, Bennett contests the common assumption that “things are always already humanized objects” (2004:357) or that the force of materiality only can be grasped in relation to a social and economic context as per an historical-materialist perspective. Nor can its value or meaning be fully determined by humans: the nonhuman, on Bennett’s view, should not automatically be reduced to the human. Challenging the anthropocentrism that dominates much of contemporary political theory, she argues that it is important to maintain a distinction between them—in order to explore what things actually do, what kinds of effects they generate, but also to allow “nonhumanity to appear on the ethical radar screen” (2004:357). While stressing the importance of exploring the vitality and potentiality of the nonhuman, the form of “naive realism,”“onto-story” or “ecology of matter” that Bennett seeks to develop also emphasizes the need to examine “ways in which human being and thinghood overlap” (2004:349). Thus, alongside accounting for what things actually do, it is also necessary to explore the interaction or interplay between the “human” and the “nonhuman.” Indeed, an important theme running throughout not only Bennett’s work but much of the literature associated with the so-called materialist turn in political theory is the notion that a clear line between the “human” and the “nonhuman”cannot be easily drawn and maintained. In this sense, one of the main assumptions underpinning this literature is that materiality is always already implicit in the production and ongoing formation of what we commonly refer to as “human.” Hence, the materiality of the nonhuman is not something that supplements an already existing human entity: “The human body and its capacities emerge as such in relation to a technicity that precedes and exceeds it: there is no body, no original body, no origin outside this relation; no thinking, no thought, no logos, without that which forces thought” (Braun and Whatmore 2010:xix). On this view, it is necessary to consider how materiality is imbued in the network of relations that constitutes the human–nonhuman interaction, which is precisely what we seek to do in our treatment of the contemporary politics of CIs and resilience planning.

### Framework – Predictions Fail

#### Predictions are fundamentally impossible—transportation infrastructure attempts than manage complex series of movement and relationships that are fundamentally unmappable—blackouts prove predictions are impossible

Lundborg and Vaughn-Williams, 2011

[Tom, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, and Nick, Associate Professor of International Security at the University of Warwick, “Resilience, Critical Infrastructure, and Molecular Security: The Excess of “Life” in Biopolitics.” International Political Sociology, Vol. 5. Issue 4. December 2011, 367-383, Accessed Online via Wiley Online Library] /WFI-MB

Here we seek an additional layer to the biopolitical problematique outlined and applied to the analysis of CIs by Lentzos and Rose (2009) and Dillon and Reid (2009). To do so, we resist the idea of a totalizing biopolitical structure and point to the instability and unpredictability of resilient CIs as fundamentally open—and often dysfunctional—systems. In this regard, we find it instructive to first revisit Bennett’s conceptualization of the “life force” of materiality. From a vital materialist perspective, Bennett is careful not to develop an analysis in which a totalizing structure ultimately determines the force of things. Rather, by emphasizing the vital materialities underpinning the movement of bodies—human as well as nonhuman, people as well as technology, the animate as well as the inanimate—it is precisely the uncertain and unpredictable interplay of different forces that she argues deserves critical exploration. Consequently, from Bennett’s perspective, it is also necessary to reject the notion of a superior and totalizing structure, since such a structure would automatically subordinate all forces and life movements to a particular telos or overarching goal. As Bennett notes, a “structure” is “unable to give the force of things its due: a structure can act only negatively, as a constraint on human agency, or passively, as an enabling background or context for it” (Bennett 2010:29). In other words, to impose the notion of a superior, totalizing structure is to neglect the potential forces that reside in the materiality of things—forces that can produce unpredictable outcomes and strange effects. One such outcome, referred to earlier, is the case of the 2003 electrical power blackout. It was noted how the electrical power grid expresses a lifeworld of its own, in which different forces interact. Crucially, in this example there is no totalizing structure within the lifeworld of the grid—no “system of systems” that can determine the exact behavior and movement of electricity. The latter depends on a complex and unpredictable assemblage in which various forces—nonhuman as well as human—interact. As Bennett (2010:28) notes: “Electricity sometimes goes where we send it, and sometimes it chooses its path on the spot, in response to the other bodies it encounters and the surprising opportunities for actions and interactions that they afford.” Referring to a superior and totalizing structure in this context would be highly misleading, since no such structure could possibly account for the uncertain and unpredictable interaction of forces, which led to the power blackout.

### Framework – AT: Calc Good

#### Utilitarian calculation makes the destruction of life thinkable and possible

Dillon ‘99

[Political Theory, Another Justice – April 164-165]

Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism.34 They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability.35 Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value—rights—may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Here with, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, “we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure.”36 But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being. The event of this lack is not a negative experience. Rather, it is an encounter with a reserve charged with possibility. As possibility, it is that which enables life to be lived in excess without the overdose of actuality.37 What this also means is that the human is not decided. It is precisely undecidable. Undecidability means being in a position of having to decide without having already been fully determined and without being capable of bringing an end to the requirement for decision.

# Aff Answers

### 2AC – AT: Topic K

#### First, Our Interpretation: The resolution asks the question of desirability of USFG action. The Role of ballot is to say yes or no to the action and outcomes of the plan.

#### Second, is reasons to prefer:

#### (\_\_\_) A. Aff Choice, any other framework or role of the ballot moots 9 minutes of the 1ac

#### (\_\_\_) B. It is predictable, the resolution demands USFG action

#### (\_\_\_) C. It is fair, Weigh Aff Impacts and the method of the Affirmative versus the Kritik, it’s the only way to test competition and determine the desirability of one strategy over another

#### Finally, It is a voter for competitive equity—prefer our interpretation, it allows both teams to compete, other roles of the ballot are arbitrary and self serving

#### And, Scenario planning is good. In a catastrophe-ridden world—it’s vital to make predictions about the future.

Kurasawa, 2004

[Fuyuki, Professor of Sociology at York University, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention

and the Work of Foresight.” 2004, Constellations, Vol. 11, No. 4]

Independently of this room for maneuver and the chances of success. Humanitarian, environmental, and techno-scientific activists have convincingly shown that we cannot afford not to engage in preventive labor. contractualist justification, global civil society actors are putting forth a number of arguments countering temporal myopia on rational grounds. They make the case that no generation, and no part of the world, is immune from catastrophe. Complacency and parochialism are deeply flawed in that even if we earn a temporary reprieve, our children and grandchildren will likely not be so fortunate unless steps are taken today. Similarly, though it might be possible to minimize or contain the risks and harms of actions to faraway places over the short-term, parrying the eventual blowback or spillover effect is improbable. In fact, as I argued in the previous section, all but the smallest and most isolated of crises are rapidly becoming globalized due to the existence of transnational circuits of ideas, images, people, and commodities. Regardless of where they live, our descendants will increasingly be subjected to the impact of environmental degradation, the spread of epidemics, gross North-South socioeconomic inequalities, refugee flows, civil wars, and genocides. What may have previously appeared to be temporally and spatially remote risks are ‘coming home to roost’ in ever faster cycles. In a word, then, procrastination makes little sense for three principal reasons: it exponentially raises the costs of eventual future action; it reduces preventive options; and it erodes their effectiveness. With the foreclosing of long-range alternatives, later generations may be left with a single course of action, namely, that of merely reacting to large-scale emergencies as they arise. We need only think of how it gradually becomes more difficult to control climate change, let alone reverse it, or to halt mass atrocities once they are underway. Preventive foresight is grounded in the opposite logic, whereby the decision to work through perils today greatly enhances both the subsequent Moreover, I would contend that farsighted cosmopolitanism is not as remote or idealistic a prospect as it appears to some, for as Falk writes, “[g]lobal justice between temporal communities, however, actually seems to be increasing, as evidenced by various expressions of greater sensitivity to past injustices and future dangers.”36 Global civil society may well be helping a new generational self-conception take root, according to which we view ourselves as the provisional caretakers of our planetary commons. Out of our sense of responsibility for the well-being of those who will follow us, we come to be more concerned about the here and now.

#### And, Prefer consequentialist ethics—Consequentialism is key to ethical decision making, because it ensures beings are treated as equal—any other approach to ethics is arbitrary because it considers one’s preferences as more important than others

Lillehammer, 2011

[Hallvard, Faculty of Philosophy Cambridge University, “Consequentialism and global ethics.” Forthcoming in M. Boylan, Ed., Global Morality and Justice: A Reader, Westview Press, Online, <http://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/teaching_staff/lillehammer/Consequentialism_and_Global_Ethics-1-2.pdf>] /Wyo-MB

Contemporary discussions of consequentialism and global ethics have been marked by a focus on examples such as that of the shallow pond. In this literature, distinctions are drawn and analogies made between different cases about which both the consequentialist and his or her interlocutor are assumed to have a more or less firm view. One assumption in this literature is that progress can be made by making judgements about simple actual or counterfactual examples, and then employing a principle of equity to the effect that like cases be treated alike, in order to work out what to think about more complex actual cases. It is only fair to say that in practice such attempts to rely only on judgements about simple cases have a tendency to produce trenchant stand-offs. It is important to remember, therefore, that for some consequentialists the appeal to simple cases is neither the only, nor the most basic, ground for their criticism of the ethical status quo. For some of the historically most prominent consequentialists the evidential status of judgements about simple cases depends on their derivability from basic ethical principles (plus knowledge of the relevant facts). Thus, in The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidgwick argues that ethical thought is grounded in a small number of self-evident axioms of practical reason. The first of these is that we ought to promote our own good. The second is that the good of any one individual is objectively of no more importance than the good of any other (or, in Sidgwick’s notorious metaphor, no individual’s good is more important ‘from the point of view of the Universe’ than that of any other). The third is that we ought to treat like cases alike. Taken together, Sidgwick takes these axioms to imply a form of consequentialism. We ought to promote our own good. Yet since our own good is objectively no more important than the good of anyone else, we ought to promote the good of others as well. And in order to treat like cases alike, we have to weigh our own good against the good of others impartially, all other things being equal. iv It follows that the rightness of our actions is fixed by what is best for the entire universe of ethically relevant beings. To claim otherwise is to claim for oneself and one’s preferences a special status they do not possess. When understood along these lines, consequentialism is by definition a global ethics: the good of everyone should count for everyone, no matter their identity, location, or personal and social attachments, now or hereafter. v Some version of this view is also accepted by a number of contemporary consequentialists, including Peter Singer, who writes that it is ‘preferable to proceed as Sidgwick did: search for undeniable fundamental axioms, [and] build up a moral theory from them’ (Singer 1974, 517; Singer 1981). For these philosophers the question of our ethical duties to others is not only a matter of our responses to cases like the shallow pond. It is also a matter of whether these responses cohere with an ethics based on first principles. If you are to reject the consequentialist challenge, therefore, you will have to show what is wrong with those principles.

#### Next, The alternative does not result in the affirmative, this means that case is a disadvantage to the alternative.

#### And we outweigh, there is no impact to biopower—the liberal state sovles all their violence and oppression impacts

Dickinson, Prof @ University of Cincinnati, 2K4 (Edward Ross, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March)

In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakasble. Both are instances of the “disciplinary society” and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce “health,” such a system can —and historically does— create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a “logic” or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90 Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of “liberty,” just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering. This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian (and Peukertian) theory. Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not “opposites,” in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept “power” should not be read as a universal stifling night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively “the same.” Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, “tactically polyvalent.” Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create “multiple modernities,” modern societies with quite radically differing potentials.

#### And, Perm do both.

#### The perm solves best—we can use power to make the state more democratic and equitable

Deranty 2004

[Jean-Philippe, Macquarie University, “Agamben’s challenge to normative theories of modern rights,” borderlands e-journal, Vol. 3, No. 1, www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1\_2004/deranty\_agambnschall.htm, acc 1-7-05//uwyo-ajl]

47. If, with Rancière, we define politics not through the institution of sovereignty, but as a continual struggle for the recognition of basic equality, and thereby strongly distinguish politics from the police order viewed as the functional management of communities (Rancière 1999), then it is possible to acknowledge the normative break introduced by the democratic revolutions of the modern age without falling into a one-sided view of modernity as a neat process of rationalisation. What should be stressed about modernity is not primarily the list of substantive inalienable and imprescriptible human rights, but the equal entitlement of all to claim any rights at all. This definition of politics must be accompanied by the parallel acknowledgment that the times that saw the recognition of the fundamental equality of all also produced the total negation of this principle. But this parallel claim does not necessarily render the first invalid. Rather it points to a tension inherent in modern communities, between the political demands of equality and the systemic tendencies that structurally produce stigmatisation and exclusion. 48. One can acknowledge the descriptive appeal of the biopower hypothesis without renouncing the antagonistic definition of politics. As Rancière remarks, Foucault’s late hypothesis is more about power than it is about politics (Rancière 2002). This is quite clear in the 1976 lectures (Society must be defended) where the term that is mostly used is that of "biopower". As Rancière suggests, when the "biopower" hypothesis is transformed into a "biopolitical" thesis, the very possibility of politics becomes problematic. There is a way of articulating modern disciplinary power and the imperative of politics that is not disjunctive. The power that subjects and excludes socially can also empower politically simply because the exclusion is already a form of address which unwittingly provides implicit recognition. Power includes by excluding, but in a way that might be different from a ban. This insight is precisely the one that Foucault was developing in his last writings, in his definition of freedom as "agonism" (Foucault 1983: 208-228): "Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free" (221). The hierarchical, exclusionary essence of social structures demands as a condition of its possibility an equivalent implicit recognition of all, even in the mode of exclusion. It is on the basis of this recognition that politics can sometimes arise as the vindication of equality and the challenge to exclusion.

#### The critique is wrong—it is the lack of planning and downsizing of management that hurts the effectiveness of the transportation system—renewed interest is key

Ankner, 2005

[William, PhD is the Executive Director of the Missouri Transportation Institute, Professor of Management at the University of Missouri Rolla and founder of Transportation Solutions, “Revisiting transportation planning.” Public works and management policy, Vol. 9, No. 4, 270-277, Accessed online via sage journals] /WFI-MB

The overall transportation plan becomes the strategic investment and operational plan. It provides the reason or reasons for system investments, the type or types of systems, the data and support for the system investments, the political and social justification for the investments because the investments are tied to the customer purpose in the market shed, and the performance basis expected. The financial allocation of resources then is made against investments that are less politically driven and more performance driven. From this investment plan, one then creates the capital program of projects. To successfully do this, we also need to remove the financial shackles of federal funding silos to allow for funding transportation systems. We need to level the playing field in federal regulations between transit and highways so that the needs, as opposed to the process, drive the transportation decisions. We need to encourage a federal process that considers the best transportation investments, irrespective of mode. Conclusion Transportation planning as it is being practiced today is not making the grade. The narrow project and modal focus have resulted in significant financial and social costs. The inability to understand trip purposes has resulted in unnecessary inefficiencies and disruptions. Even when corridor analysis is undertaken, the analysis focuses on projects in the corridor and single-mode activity. Most corridor analyses do not consider the broad range of purposes for trips. Our transportation infrastructure is one of the more costly investments the public and private sectors can make. The dollar investments for the existing transportation system needs and the growth demands far outpace our current modal financial capacity. We need to be smarter and better in our transportation investment decisions. To accomplish that, we must rethink transportation planning. We cannot afford the luxury of modal competition, the lack of modal connections, the insensitivity to communities, and the lack of transportation management. But most of all, we can no longer remain intolerant of our customers’ purposes for transportation. We need to understand the dynamics of the market and its relationship to fundamental economic and social goals and the opportunities that technology can provide to better plan our transportation system. By focusing transportation on the purpose of trips and by using market sheds and corridors, the transportation community receives an extra bonus of understanding the economic, social, and environmental issues in the corridor early on and engaging the various communities early on. This will allow project planning to better address the potential issues and costs early and better justify their project or recognize that there might be better solutions. Unfortunately, most DOTs and transit properties are embarked on downsizing their planning departments to reduce operating costs. They compensate for this by contracting out the planning. The most available funding is tied to projects; it is not unusual for the majority of planning efforts to be project focused and modal. Thus, we perpetuate the problem. We need to reinvigorate our planning with a new direction and develop a new paradigm where transportation is planned and designed to meet market purposes within market sheds and a transportation system. We need a process that is accountable, with understandable measures. We need to rethink transportation planning in terms of the purposes for mobility, transportation’s role within a larger societal framework, and transportation as a system and not as specific modes with their own funding sources. We also need to level the federal playing field between the modes. Transit investments versus highway investments will fare poorly as long as major transit investments require more federal hoops, more local match, and have more uncertainty in funding than highways.

### 2AC – AT: Topic K – Terrorism Turn

#### Terrorist attacks against infrastructure are a high probability—viewed as a high priority target

Zeng et al, 2007

[Daniel Zeng, Univ. of Arizona and Chinese Academy of Sciences, Sudarshan S. Chawathe, University of Maine, Hua Huang, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Fei-Yue Wang, Chinese Academy of Sciences, “Protecting transportation infrastructure.” IEEE Intelligent Systems, Sept/Oct 2007, Accessed online via IEEE xplore] /WFI-MB

In the context of homeland security, critical infrastructures are “those physical and information technology facilities, networks, services and assets which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on the health, safety, security, or economic well-being of citizens or the effective functioning of governments.” 1 Transportation infrastructures are a key component of a nation’s critical infrastructures, covering physical assets such as airports, ports, and railway and mass transit networks as well as software systems such as traffic control systems. In effect, among various critical infrastructures spanning a range of economic sectors and government operations, 2 transportation is widely viewed as one of the most significant and impactful. A 2002 study concerning the significance of infrastructure components and the consequences of a destructive event rated transportation as “extremely significant.” 3 Other components at this highest level of significance were communications, power, emergency response personnel and assets, and national security resources. Transportation infrastructures are frequent targets of terrorist attacks because of their significance in several dimensions. Because physical transportation networks attract large numbers of people, they’re high-value targets for terrorists intending to inflict heavy casualties. Transportation infrastructures themselves are important to the modern economy, and related damages and destruction can have quick ripple effects. Operationally, transportation systems interact with and provide support for other systems, such as emergency response and public health, in complex ways. Terrorists can perceive an attack on such a link (that is, one that connects many systems) as an efficient means to create confusion, counter the countermeasures, and damage the targeted society as a whole. Furthermore, transportation infrastructures can be both the means and the end of an attack, making them a critical part of almost all terrorist attacks in the physical world.

#### Policy making is key to effective management of transportation infrastructure—that’s key to counter terrorism

Zeng et al, 2007

[Daniel Zeng, Univ. of Arizona and Chinese Academy of Sciences, Sudarshan S. Chawathe, University of Maine, Hua Huang, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Fei-Yue Wang, Chinese Academy of Sciences, “Protecting transportation infrastructure.” IEEE Intelligent Systems, Sept/Oct 2007, Accessed online via IEEE xplore] /WFI-MB

Effective information sharing across data sets and system boundaries, the ability to fuse information and data from sources that provide (partially) overlapping and complementary coverage, and efficient, secure data management have long been identified as key drivers of effective intelligence and homeland security-related information systems. 8 Information systems for protecting transportation infrastructure share the same design objectives. To support counterterrorism efforts such as preparing, detecting, and responding to terrorism events, large amounts of information in different modalities from many sources must be acquired, integrated, and interpreted in the right context, often in real time. 2 In addition, a critical need exists for a data-management infrastructure that can support information flows across jurisdictional and organizational boundaries (for example, intelligence, law enforcement, and emergency response communities). Despite existing efforts, researchers and practitioners must still make significant progress in this area from both technical and policy perspectives, with careful attention to laws and regulations, privacy considerations, and civil rights.

#### Terrorism causes retaliation that guarantees extinction

Morgan 9

 Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Yongin Campus – South Korea (Dennis, Futures, November, “World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race,” Science Direct), accessed 9-16-2011,WYO/JF

In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question “Is Nuclear War Inevitable??” In Section , Moore points out what most terrorists obviously already know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries. No doubt, they’ve figured out that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange. As Moore points out, all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and explode it on either Moscow or Israel. Because of the Russian “dead hand” system, “where regional nuclear commanders would be given full powers should Moscow be destroyed,” it is likely that any attack would be blamed on the United States” Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state, it would retaliate with the suicidal “Samson option” against all major Muslim cities in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on Russia and even “anti-Semitic” European cities In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate, and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia. China would probably be involved as well, as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere. Afterwards, for years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a nuclear winter that could last as long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well. And what many people fail to realize is what a precarious, hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on. Any accident, mistaken communication, false signal or “lone wolf’ act of sabotage or treason could, in a matter of a few minutes, unleash the use of nuclear weapons, and once a weapon is used, then the likelihood of a rapid escalation of nuclear attacks is quite high while the likelihood of a limited nuclear war is actually less probable since each country would act under the “use them or lose them” strategy and psychology; restraint by one power would be interpreted as a weakness by the other, which could be exploited as a window of opportunity to “win” the war. In other words, once Pandora's Box is opened, it will spread quickly, as it will be the signal for permission for anyone to use them. Moore compares swift nuclear escalation to a room full of people embarrassed to cough. Once one does, however, “everyone else feels free to do so. The bottom line is that as long as large nation states use internal and external war to keep their disparate factions glued together and to satisfy elites’ needs for power and plunder, these nations will attempt to obtain, keep, and inevitably use nuclear weapons. And as long as large nations oppress groups who seek self-determination, some of those groups will look for any means to fight their oppressors” In other words, as long as war and aggression are backed up by the implicit threat of nuclear arms, it is only a matter of time before the escalation of violent conflict leads to the actual use of nuclear weapons, and once even just one is used, it is very likely that many, if not all, will be used, leading to horrific scenarios of global death and the destruction of much of human civilization while condemning a mutant human remnant, if there is such a remnant, to a life of unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter.

### 2AC – AT: Topic K – Sprawl Turn

#### Planning and management of transportation investment is key—the alternative causes sprawl which is worse—causes unsustainable land use

Carvero, 2009

[Robert, “Infrastructure and Development: planning matters.” Planning Advisory Service Report 557 (Jul 2009): 41-V, Accessed online via proquest] /WFI-MB

One of my concerns is that if we blindly invest in new transportation infrastructure, without effective land-use planning, it will further flatten the density gradients and spin off growth to the exurban fringes. For example, if we proceed with President Obama's vision of aggressively investing in high-speed rail, such as in the Central Valley of California, and we site stations on the periphery of cities surrounded by parking lots, we know what will unfold. High-speed rail will induce further sprawl. If land use is simply an afterthought to any kind of regional infrastructure investment, history shows that the added infrastructure will be a force toward more decentralized growth, which in America equates to sprawl. Such infrastructure simply adds a new layer of accessibility to far-flung places, which, absent regulatory controls, unleashes new layers of sprawl. More important, transportation investment without coordinated land-use planning cannot meet the accessibility, mobility, and quality-of-life goals that many persons seek in our urban areas. Consider the example of Los Angeles.

#### Sprawl causes extinction—it reduces the photosynthesis capacity of the planet which destroys food production

Chandler, 2000

[Lynn, Goddard Space Flight Center, “Urban sprawl reduces annual photosynthetic production.” 2-21-2000, Online, <http://eugen.leitl.org/tt/msg01715.html>] /WFI-MB

According to Imhoff's research, urbanization and industrialization have resulted in the development of mega-cities and urban and suburban sprawl. The environment is altered as a result of replacing land cover with roads, housing, and commercial and industrial structures. "Human survival depends on the ability of the landscape to produce food," said Imhoff. "Food production can be fundamentally linked to primary production or photosynthesis. If the capacity of the landscape to carryout photosynthesis is substantially reduced -- then the ability of the planet to support human life must also be diminished." Imhoff said data from the mid-1990's from two different satellite systems were combined with land cover maps and census information on population and housing to study the effect of urbanization on photosynthetic production in the United States. Nighttime images from a Department of Defense satellite, which show a dramatic picture of Earth's city lights, were used to determine which areas and how much land have been converted to urban, suburban, or industrial use. Maps showing urban, peri-urban (suburban), and non-urbanized areas were created from the "city-lights" satellite data. "Using a computer, we combined the city-lights satellite data with another type of satellite data that records a measure of 'greenness' or photosynthetic potential of the landscape over the course of an entire year," Imhoff said. "By merging the satellite data we could examine how urbanization affects the potential of the land surface to carryout photosynthesis by looking at the 'greenness' index inside and outside the urbanized areas for the whole continental United States." Results show that urbanization can have a measurable but variable impact on photosynthetic productivity. Annual photosynthetic productivity can be reduced by as much as 20 days in areas where housing and commercial land use is very dense. "However, we also found that in resource limited regions, human activity can increase productivity by altering the environment," he said. "For example, this was the case for arid and semi-arid areas where lawn irrigation and planting changed the ecosystems from shrub lands and desert to deciduous forests." A most interesting finding according to Imhoff was that urbanization seems to elongate the growing season, yet still reduces the overall productivity of the land. "Vegetation greens up earlier in the spring and takes longer to senesce in the fall, but has lower peak season productivity than similar nearby areas that are not urbanized," he said. "This could be demonstrating a profound urban heat island effect and have implications in climate change, especially in the northern Hemisphere where urban development is most intense." Analysis of the data also found clear evidence that human beings definitely tend to locate themselves on the most productive land and that those lands are being transformed into less productive types. "The results of this study should increase our awareness of the importance of land use planning especially in the context of sustainable growth and development," Imhoff stated. "Human survival depends on photosynthesis. If urbanization and industrialization continue, the capacity of the landscape to carry out photosynthesis is substantially reduced. "

### 1AR – Policy Making Good

#### Policy making is critical to solve for mass transportation issues—the aff’s approach is key

Dyble 09 (Louise Nelson,  associate director for research, The Keston Institute for Public Finance and Infrastructure Policy, “Reconstructing Transportation”, Technology and Culture, July)

The vast majority of Americans rely on a remarkably costly and inefficient means of getting around. They purchase and maintain automobiles that they use to commute to work and carry out daily business, often sitting behind the wheel all alone, often battling traffic congestion. They pay taxes and fees to help pay for a pervasive network of streets and highways, built and maintained by public agencies with dedicated revenue and reliable budgets. In contrast, a minority of Americans rely on more efficient mass-transit systems that are chronically underfunded, serve only limited areas and segments of the population, and are subject to frequent though unpredictable cuts in funding. Despite the social and environmental benefits of mass transit, as well as growing demand that is reflected by the highest ridership since the 1950s, in most places the prospects for its expansion and improvement are uncertain at best.1 Although in theory, integrated, multimodal transportation systems have broad expert and popular support, U.S. policy makers seem to be a long way from an effective strategy for realizing them. Implementing and sustaining a new approach to transportation in the United States requires much more than shifting appropriations and priorities—it requires the reconstruction of fundamental institutions, including the public organizations and bureaucracies responsible for transportation. If mass transit continues to be financed and managed separately from and [End Page 631] in competition with infrastructure for motor vehicles, there is little chance of achieving a more sane and stable balance. However, as an integral function of new institutions designed to support mobility and accessibility with the most appropriate technologies, mass transit could become a significant component of more efficient and equitable local and regional transportation systems than the ones we have today. There are a few exceptions to the overall pattern of anemic, neglected mass transit in the United States, and they coincide with regional institutions that transcend modes. In particular, the extensive and heavily used mass-transit systems of metropolitan New York and the San Francisco Bay Area benefit significantly from toll revenue generated by local bridges and tunnels. Institutions are defined by their durability, frequently outlasting any of the physical structures they might produce. Economic and political upheaval can reduce or overcome institutional resistance to change and upset the established balance of power, thereby making significant changes in the administration and financing of transportation services and infrastructure much easier to achieve than under ordinary circumstances.2 Policy makers may now have a rare opportunity to transform transportation policy in the United States. Understanding the status quo, including the assumptions, patterns, and relationships that sustain it, is a crucial first step.

### 1AR – Alternative Fails

#### The alternative fails- their theoretical nonsense cannot be translated to public policy

Vick 08 (M., James Cook University, “Poststructuralist Theory and Methodology: a Complementary Approach to Road Safety Research”, online, October)

The potential for poststructuralism to inform road safety policy and practice at present is limited by at least three critical factors. First, the lack of available research studies and, even more so, evaluated policy and practice initiatives to demonstrate its credibility in the field. Second, the complexity of the theory itself, often coupled with the obscurity of much poststructuralist writing. And third, poststructuralist methodology has little resemblance to mainstream methods in road safety research, raising critical questions about issues such as what constitutes evidence, and how issues of reliability and validity are addressed.

### 1AR – Method Focus Bad

#### Method focus is bad—focus on abstract state power is totalizing, prefer specific applications of power like the 1ac evidence

Rose-Redwood, 2006

[Reuben, Dept. of Geography @ Penn. State Univ. “Governmentaity, geography, and the geo-coded world.” Progress in human geography, 30.4, 2006, 469-486, Accessed online] /WFI-MB

In his analysis, Raco often treats ‘government’ and ‘the state’ as synonymous terms. Raco (2003: 76) criticizes governmentality scholars for overemphasizing the coherence and totalizing nature of governmental (state?) programs, and he calls for a more dialectical analysis of governmentality. ‘There has been a tendency’, he maintains, ‘to neglect the extent to which programmes of government are internalized and translated by target communities’ (Raco, 2003: 91). He goes on to argue that ‘in practice government agendas are far from totalizing. They are contradictory, contested and influenced by the actions of subjects who respond to government agendas in a variety of ways’ (Raco, 2003: 91). While adopting what he refers to as a ‘Foucauldian, governmentalist’ approach, 476 Governmentality, geography, and the geo-coded world Raco (2003: 77) stresses the need to shift the methodological focus away from ‘abstract theorizations’ and towards ‘the empirical practices of government’.

### 1AR – Discourse Focus Bad

#### Discourse describes and reflects reality, it does not shape it—objective reality exists outside of language

Fram-Cohen ‘85

[Michelle, “Reality, Language, Translation: What Makes Translation Possible?” American Translators Association Conference, enlightenment.supersaturated.com/essays/text/michelleframcohen//possibilityoftranslation.html, 9-24-06//uwyo-ajl]

Nida did not provide the philosophical basis of the view that the external world is the common source of all languages. Such a basis can be found in the philosophy of Objectivism, originated by Ayn Rand. Objectivism, as its name implies, upholds the objectivity of reality. This means that reality is independent of consciousness, consciousness being the means of perceiving ?reality, not of creating it. Rand defines language as "a code of visual-auditory symbols that denote concepts." (15) These symbols are the written or spoken words of any language. Concepts are defined as the "mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted." (16) This means that concepts are abstractions of units perceived in reality. Since words denote concepts, words are the symbols of such abstractions; words are the means of representing concepts in a language. Since reality provides the data from which we abstract and form concepts, reality is the source of all words--and of all languages. The very existence of translation demonstrates this fact. If there was no objective reality, there could be no similar concepts expressed in different verbal symbols. There could be no similarity between the content of different languages, and so, no translation. Translation is the transfer of conceptual knowledge from one language into another. It is the transfer of one set of symbols denoting concepts into another set of symbols denoting the same concepts. This process is possible because concepts have specific referents in reality. Even if a certain word and the concept it designates exist in one language but not in another, the referent this word and concept stand for nevertheless exists in reality, and can be referred to in translation by a descriptive phrase or neologism. Language is a means describing reality, and as such can and should expand to include newly discovered or innovated objects in reality. The revival of the ancient Hebrew language in the late 19th Century demonstrated the dependence of language on outward reality. Those who wanted to use Hebrew had to innovate an enormous number of words in order to describe the new objects that did not confront the ancient Hebrew speakers. On the other hand, those objects that existed 2000 years ago could be referred to by the same words. Ancient Hebrew could not by itself provide a sufficient image of modern reality for modern users.