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Plan:

The United States federal government should substantially reduce its military presence in the Republic of Turkey by withdrawing its airlift and surveillance capabilities from the Incirlik Air Force Base.

1ac Turkey Affirmative--Advantage\_\_\_: PKK

Advantage \_\_ is the PKK

US intel has lead to increased crackdowns on the PKK

Tyson et al 7 (Ann Tyson and Robin Wright, Pentagon correspondant, “U.S Helps Turkey Hit Rebel Kurds in Iraq” Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/12/17/AR2007121702150.html) MKB

The United States is providing Turkey with real-time intelligence that has helped the Turkish military target a series of attacks this month against Kurdish separatists holed up in northern [Iraq](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/iraq.html?nav=el), including a large airstrike on Sunday, according to Pentagon officials. U.S. military personnel have set up a center for sharing intelligence in Ankara, the Turkish capital, providing imagery and other immediate information gathered from U.S. aircraft and unmanned drones flying over the separatists' mountain redoubts, the officials said. A senior administration official said the goal of the U.S. program is to identify the movements and activities of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), which is fighting to create an autonomous enclave in Turkey. The United States is "essentially handing them their targets," one U.S. military official said. The Turkish military then decides whether to act on the information and notifies the United States, the official said.

Turkey reacts to PKK attacks out of proportion, killing nearly a hundred Kurdish citizens per Turkish soldier.

Israel today 10 (“While Criticizing Israel, Turkey kills Kurds”, Israel Today, http://www.walrusmagazine.com/articles/2008.09-international-affairs-a-land-apart-turkey-politics-christopher-frey/1/) MKB

On the same day as the flotilla raid, Kurdish rebels attacked a Turkish naval base, killing 12 soldiers. Last week, Erdogan's government responded with air strikes on Kurdish positions in northern Iraq that killed 120 people, including a 7-year-old girl. There were no condemnations of Turkey for using "disproportionate" force, and no UN Security Council meetings regarding the latest flare-up of a 26-year conflict that has claimed the lives of more than 40,000 people. Some 30 million Kurds live in adjoining portions of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. Together, these areas make up Kurdistan, the ancient homeland of the Kurdish people, a distinct ethnic group without a country of their own. For decades, Turkey has oppressed its Kurdish minority of 14 million people by forbidding the use of the Kurdish language and other symbols of national identity in state schools and government institutions. A Kurdish parliamentarian, Layla Zana, was expelled from parliament in 1994 and imprisoned a year later for daring to utter a single sentence in Kurdish from the podium.

Turkish genocide of the Kurds is systemic and ongoing--the Kurds are used as scapegoats and called terrorists to justify Turkey’s actions to the international community.

Fatah 6 (Rebwar, journalist, “The Accepted Genocide of Kurds in Turkey” Kurdish Media, http://kurdmedia.com/article.aspx?id=13491) MKB

Since the Armenian genocide, Turkey has done very well to hide and disguise its dark history from the international community. But a shady past rarely dawns a bright future. Instead, Turkey is re-branding itself with Europe-friendly terms to essentially get rid of what it has always wanted to be rid of. Turkey’s tidy up of its language: words with a distinct Kurdish origin wiped out and replaced. Indeed, anything that is not strictly Turkish has been linked to “terrorism” – a trigger word guaranteed to win the sympathies of the international community. The Turkish constitution does not recognise Kurds in Turkey, and so often labels them as terrorists, providing a convenient scapegoat for military uprisings and other political issues. Thus, “terrorist” becomes a synonym for Kurds. Turkey frequently argues that the PKK is a terrorist organisation; hence all Kurdish organisations are banned for what they may imply. Turkey is desperately in need of an imaginary threat to its “national security”, “territorial integrity” and “sovereignty”, achieved by “separatist/terrorist” Kurds. The scale of the suffering Kurds and destruction of Kurdish homeland does not fit into any “terrorist” definition. In 1999, the death toll of Kurds killed in Turkish military operations increased to over 40,000. According to the figures published by Turkey’s own Parliament, 6,000 Kurdish villages were systematically evacuated of all inhabitants and 3,000,000 Kurds have been displaced. This sounds like an elimination of a people, a culture and a homeland. If Turkey is genuine in its elimination of terrorism, it must take brave steps, accepting Kurdish people and their homeland, Kurdistan, and ending its history of oppression. Professor Noam Chomsky called the Turkish response to Kurds an “ethnic cleansing”, resulting in the death of thousands, the emigration of over two million people and the destruction of approximately 6000 villages. In fact, these methods by which Turkey has sought to oppress the Kurdish people are similar to those used by Saddam Hussein in the recent past, including the destruction of Kurdish land, mass evacuation and deportation. In some other areas, Turkey has used more oppressive methods to achieve its “Final Solution” of the Kurdish Issue. Some have found this unsurprising, given Turkey’s Ottoman ancestry. During World War I, for example, the Ottoman Empire allied itself with Germany, and in the conflict’s immediate aftermath conducted a programme aiming to exterminate the Armenians, Greeks, Yezidis and Alwis. To date, however, Turkey denies these genocidal campaigns. The oppression of Kurdish people within Turkey can be defined as genocide in various ways; cultural, linguistic and physical all play a part in the cleansing of Kurdish ethnicity from Turkey itself, and are still embraced by the Turkish constitution. The head of the British Parliamentary Human Rights Commission, Lord Avebury, said of Turkish atrocities in 1996 that, "Just as many people in western Europe turned a blind eye to Hitler's preparations for the Holocaust in the thirties, the democratic world ignores the evidence of incipient genocide against the Kurds in Turkey today."

Genocide is the ultimate crime: it eats away at civilization and erodes institutions, risking global conflict

Campbell 1 (Kenneth, professor of Poli Science, “Misunderstanding Genocide,” GENOCIDE AND THE GLOBAL VILLAGE )AC

Genocide is the supreme crime! It is arguably the worst crime that can be committed in the present global system of nation-states and peoples. Genocide is equal to or worse than the crime of aggression.40 Genocide attacks civilization itself Contemporary civilization is based upon ce tain fundamental shared moral values, one of which is the principle that groups of people have the right to exist as a distinct nationality, race, ethnicity, and religion. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) spoke to this point in an Advisor)- Opinion on the Genocide Convention in 1951: The Convention was manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose ... its object on the one hand is to safeguard the very ex istence of certain human groups and on the other to confirm and endorse the most elementary principles of morality In such a convention the contracting states do not have any interests of their own; they merely have, one and all. a common interest, namely, the accomplishment of those high purposes.4' If left unchecked, genocide eats away like a cancer at the structure of global society, eventually undermining and destroying just those interna tional institutions designed to foster global cooperation, mitigate global conflict, and avoid global catastrophe such as the world experienced in the 1930s and 1940s. Most scholars, political analysts, and policymakers, unfortunately, treat genocide as a mere humanitarian concern, having little to do with the traditional interests of nation-states. They too often fail to see geno cide as a threat tostrategic global interests, such as political stability, eco nomic prosperity, peace, and security. Genocide, in fact, occupies a unique area of overlap between humanitarian concerns and more traditional state interests to the degree that international peace and security are indivisi ble in a world of rapidly increasing globalization. For globalization not only speeds up the positive effects of open markets, open technologies, and open societies, it increases the spread of pathological behavior such as genocide.42

Plan Solves--Only by withdrawing our militaristic support of Turkey can we end the genocide.

Levene 98 (Mark, Prof. Humanities, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, p. 420) MKB

While the Kurdish security zone experiment withered, the West got on with its normal business of upholding and defending those nation-states it had previously accepted as members of the international community. Even the crime and current pariah status of Saddam's Iraq was not for the deportations and depopulations of its Kurds from the Kirkuk oilfields; or for the Anfal campaigns of genocide; or for its atrocities against the Shi'a and Marsh Arabs in the south; but rather for invading oil- rich neighboring, Western-sponsored Kuwait. As for Turkey, its continued appalling human rights record, exemplified in the destruction of more than two thousand Kurdish villages in Eastern Anatolia; the dislocation of some two million of its inhabitants; its quasi-genocidal attacks on Kurds and Alevis, 'fito say nothing of its massive, cross-border military raids into the supposed Western-protected safe haven to gun down its own separatists from the Workers' Party of Kurdistan (the PKK) have failed to dent Western support. And so it should be no surprise that Professor Lewis Thomas, an American scholar writing in the early 1950s, could celebrate the inception and development of the modem Turkish state as follows: By 1918 with the definitive excision of the total Armenian Christian population from Anatolia and the Straits area. The hitherto largely peaceful process of Turkification and Moslemization had been advanced in one great surge by the use of force. How else can one assess the final blame except to say that this was a tragic consequence of the impact of western European nationalism upon Anatolia? Had Turkification and Moslemization not been accelerated by the use of force, there certainly would not today exist a Turkish Republic, a Republic owing its strength and stability in no small measure to the homogeneity of its population, a state which is now a valued associate of the United States.148 Never mind the laughable reference to the "peaceful process" before 1914, nor the absurd euphemism regarding what happened to the Armenians, nor even the falsehood about Turkish "homogeneity" at the expense of its huge Kurdish population; Professor Thomas did, inadvertently, get it right. By adopting a Western formula of nationalism, the leaders of post-Ottoman Turkey punched their way towards modern nation-statehood and sovereign independence. Western states reciprocated not only by recognizing the state, but by entering into national political arrangements with it which, in turn, were cemented by economic ones. The fact that Turkey had torn up the official rules in the process and taken a series of "accelerated" short- cuts, including genocide, were conveniently ignored. Iraq's own bloody drive towards genuine independence followed a similar route. Again, war, revolution, and genocide proved no barrier to international acceptance, provided the state did not directly challenge western interests .

Turkey can only attack once it has US intel, withdrawal prevents them from tracking the PKK

**Tyson et al 7** (Ann Tyson and Robin Wright, Pentagon correspondent, “U.S Helps Turkey Hit Rebel Kurds in Iraq” Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/12/17/AR2007121702150.html) MKB

But persistent attacks in Turkey by PKK rebels operating from bases in the Qandil mountains have presented a thorny dilemma for U.S. policymakers. Turkey has threatened to mount a full-scale, cross-border incursion to clear out PKK camps in northern Iraq. That could effectively open a new front in the Iraq war and disrupt the flow of supplies to the U.S. military in Iraq, which receives 70 percent of its air cargo and a third of its fuel through Turkey. The intelligence cooperation comes as senior U.S. military and Pentagon officials have engaged in talks with their Turkish counterparts to produce a more comprehensive strategy for combating the PKK, according to a senior military official familiar with the discussions. In addition to providing targets, U.S. military officials said they have encouraged the Turks to employ nonmilitary measures against the PKK and to hold a dialogue with the Iraqi government. U.S. intelligence allowed the Turkish military to inflict what it called "significant" losses on a group of scores of Kurdish rebels in Iraq in an operation on Dec. 1. It was also decisive in another Turkish strike on Sunday, when Iraqi officials said Turkish warplanes pounded Kurdish villages deep in northern Iraq, killing one woman and forcing hundreds of villagers to flee their homes in the largest aerial assault from Turkey this year

1ac Turkey Affirmative--Advantage \_\_\_:US/Turkey Relations

US-Turkish relations have bottomed out for multiple reasons: Iraq, Iran, and energy

Menon 7 (Rajan, Professor of International Relations Lehigh University, Hudson Institute, Is The United States Losing Turkey?) KGL

So low has confidence in the United States become among Turks and so high is the level of resentment that Seyfi Tashan, a leading Turkish political commentator and long-time proponent of Turkey’s integration into the West, observed that whereas the United States and Turkey had stood together during the Cold War, now the United States (together with Europe) appeared to be waging “an undeclared Cold War” against Turkey.2 Let us give a heavy discount for hyperbole; nevertheless, that a prominent member of the foreign policy establishment could characterize the US-Turkish relationship thus is telling, not least because Tashan’s sentiments are not only representative of public sentiment, they are milder by comparison. For instance, a potboiler imagining a war between the US and Turkey in northern Iraq proved wildly popular among Turks, more than 80 percent of whom also opined in a 2005 survey that American policies in their region endangered Turkey’s security.3 The cold reality, then, is that Turkey and the United States are drifting apart—and rapidly. Senior officials and respected academic experts in Turkey and the United States now concur that there is something fundamentally wrong with the state of US-Turkish relations and that if both sides do not recognize this reality and attend to it with seriousness and vigor, a strategic partnership that has served both Americans and Turks well for more than half a century could suffer serious damage

Good relations with Turkey key to winning the global war on terror

Giachetti 8, (David M. UNITED STATES MILITARY RELATIONS WITH TURKEY, A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements 15 February 2008, <https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/display.aspx?rs=enginespage&ModuleID=be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153&Action=downloadpaper&ObjectID=9692bb4e-a132-48c0-b7b3-03ea195ec95c>) WDK

The relationship between the United States and Turkey has been an enduring and at times tumultuous one wherein the United States has long considered Turkey a critical strategic ally. Many factors have influenced the nature of this sometime fragile relationship since the formation of the Turkish Republic by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923 through his vision of a strong secular nationalist state. Turkey emerged from World War II as a critical geostrategic and geopolitical world player and soon held key importance as a NATO member and anchor of NATO’s strategic southern flank and a hedge against the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War. Recently, Turkey has emerged as a vital partner in the war on terror and it continues to play an important role in U.S. foreign policy and military strategy vis-à-vis Russia and the Middle East. Although at times fraught with differences and difficulties, from its basing support for troop rotations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom to Turkey’s geographical location straddling Europe and Asia and political position at the crossroads of Islam and democracy, this pivotal state is and will continue to be an ideal military and strategic political partner. In the continued development and nurturing of this strategic partnership

Further, strong diplomatic relations with Turkey is key to check Iranian Proliferation

Dagi 10 (Ishan, Turkey's "diplomatic engagement" intended to prevent nuclear Iran, June 14, lexisnexis) AC

When the American administration asks for Turkey to mediate the nuclear issue it has to understand what Turkey is trying to do and why. Let me explain. First of all, Turkey does not want conflict in the region. As the Iraq war demonstrated, Turkey is deeply affected by instability and conflicts in its neighbourhood. It is trying to avoid yet another conflict in the region with undesired repercussions on Turkish politics, economy and society. As such it is doing its best to calm tension and build peace in its region while concerned about the possibility of an intense conflict between Iran and the US. Turkey is after peace and stability in its region simply because these are absolute requirements for Turkey to reach its "great goals," namely democratization, economic development and EU membership. Turkey's grand objectives require a zone of peace and tranquillity in its neighbourhood. By trying to find a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue Turkey wants to contribute to peace and stability in the region. Secondly, the reason for Turkey's diplomatic engagement to settle the nuclear issue is that Turkey does not want Iran to develop nuclear weapons. I think this has to be clearly understood by the Americans. How on earth does Turkey act softly on a neighbouring country that tries to develop nuclear weapons? This would be suicidal. On the contrary, Turkey wants to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons. The way to do so for the Turkish government and the public at large is not to impose sanctions on Iran and force it to ignore international control mechanisms. In order to achieve this objective Iran has to be kept within the international system and be forced to be open to the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Otherwise, Iran may withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and then go its own way. I think what the Americans do not understand is that an Iran armed with nuclear weapons is a direct threat to Turkey leading to a nuclear arms race in the region. No reasonable person in Turkey wants its neighbour to develop nuclear weapons. Americans need keep in mind that an Iran armed with nuclear weapons is not a direct threat to the US but is to Turkey. Therefore, this is an issue that concerns Turkey more than the US. Turkey is not only sincere in its efforts to stop Iran developing weapons but also regards this as a matter of utmost national security. It is therefore nonsense to accuse Turkey of being soft on Iran. What the Turkish government is doing is to find an "effective way" to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons while recognizing its right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. So if the Americans are sincere about preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons, they should follow through the path Turkish diplomacy has opened for them. But if their real intention is to harm Iran, they cannot do it without risking their troops in the region and their vital interests in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the end of the day the neocons in Washington may not lose, but Obama and the Democrats will certainly be the losers.

Continued Iranian proliferation will prompt an Israeli preemptive strike on Iran’s nuclear installations—drawing in the US

Dr. James Phillips, Senior Researcher of Middle Eastern Affairs, 10

An Israeli Preventive Attack on Iran's Nuclear Sites: Implications for the U.S.

January 15, 2010 by James Phillips, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/01/An-Israeli-Preventive-Attack-on-Iran-Nuclear-Sites-Implications-for-the-US>, s Senior Research Fellow for Mid­dle Eastern Affairs in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.

The Iranian regime's drive for nuclear weapons, rapid progress in building up its ballistic missile arse­nal, ominous rhetoric about destroying Israel, and the failure of international diplomatic efforts to halt Iran's nuclear weapons program have potentially created a--literally--explosive situation. Israel may launch a preventive strike against Iran's nuclear weapons infra­structure.

The United States would almost certainly be drawn into an Israeli-Iranian conflict. The Obama Adminis­tration must start planning now to counter and mini­mize the destabilizing consequences of an expected Iranian backlash. To mitigate the threats posed by Iran to U.S. national security and to protect U.S. interests, the United States must:

\* Recognize Israel's right to take action in self-defense against Iran's growing threat; \* Prepare for a violent Iranian response to an Israeli preventive strike, including preparations for a possible U.S. war with Iran; \* Deploy missile defenses to defend Israel and other U.S. allies from Iranian missile attacks; \* Enhance deterrence against Iranian attacks by making it clear to Iran's leadership that such attacks will make a bad situation worse for Iran; \* Work with allies to take precautions to miti­gate the impact of a possible Iranian-instigated oil crisis; \* Block arms sales to Iran; and \* Veto any U.N. Security Council resolution that does not acknowledge Iran's provocations and continued defiance of U.N. Security Council res­olutions on the nuclear issue.

Iran will retaliate with missile attacks on the US and Israel—escalating the war into a nuclear Armageddon risking the extinction of humanity

Chossudovsky 5 Michel Chossudovsky is the author of the international best seller "The Globalization of Poverty " published in eleven languages. He is Professor of Economics at the University of Ottawa and Director of the Center for Research on Globalization, at www.globalresearch.ca . He is also a contributor to the Encyclopaedia Britannica. His most recent book is entitled: America’s "War on Terrorism", Global Research, 2005.http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=1714

Tehran has confirmed that it will retaliate if attacked, in the form of ballistic missile strikes directed against Israel (CNN, 8 Feb 2005). These attacks, could also target US military facilities in Iraq and Persian Gulf, which would immediately lead us into a scenario of military escalation and all out war.

At present there are three distinct war theaters: Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine. The air strikes against Iran could contribute to unleashing a war in the broader Middle East Central Asian region. Moreover, the planned attack on Iran should also be understood in relation to the timely withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, which has opened up a new space, for the deployment of Israeli forces. The participation of Turkey in the US-Israeli military operation is also a factor, following last year's agreement reached between Ankara and Tel Aviv. More recently, Tehran has beefed up its air defenses through the acquisition of Russian 29 Tor M-1 anti-missile systems. In October, with Moscow`s collaboration, "a Russian rocket lifted an Iranian spy satellite, the Sinah-1, into orbit." (see Chris Floyd) The Sinah-1 is just the first of several Iranian satellites set for Russian launches in the coming months. Thus the Iranians will soon have a satellite network in place to give them early warning of an Israeli attack, although it will still be a pale echo of the far more powerful Israeli and American space spies that can track the slightest movement of a Tehran mullah’s beard. What’s more, late last month Russia signed a $1 billion contract to sell Iran an advanced defense system that can destroy guided missiles and laser-guided bombs, the Sunday Times reports. This too will be ready in the next few months. (op.cit.) Ground War While a ground war is not envisaged under CONPLAN, the aerial bombings could lead through the process of escalation into a ground war. Iranian troops could cross the Iran-Iraq border and confront coalition forces inside Iraq. Israeli troops and/or Special Forces could enter into Lebanon and Syria.

In recent developments, Israel plans to conduct military exercises as well as deploy Special Forces in the mountainous areas of Turkey bordering Iran and Syria with the collaboration of the Ankara government: Ankara and Tel Aviv have come to an agreement on allowing the Israeli army to carry out military exercises in the mountainous areas [in Turkey] that border Iran. [According to] ... a UAE newspaper ..., according to the agreement reached by the Joint Chief of Staff of the Israeli army, Dan Halutz, and Turkish officials, Israel is to carry out various military manoeuvres in the areas that border Iran and Syria. [Punctuation as published here and throughout.] [Dan Halutz] had gone to Turkey a few days earlier. Citing certain sources without naming them, the UAE daily goes on to stress: The Israeli side made the request to carry out the manoeuvres because of the difficulty of passage in the mountain terrains close to Iran's borders in winter. The two Hakari [phonetic; not traced] and Bulo [phonetic; not traced] units are to take part in the manoeuvres that have not been scheduled yet. The units are the most important of Israel's special military units and are charged with fighting terrorism and carrying out guerrilla warfare. Earlier Turkey had agreed to Israeli pilots being trained in the area bordering Iran. The news [of the agreement] is released at a time when Turkish officials are trying to evade the accusation of cooperating with America in espionage operations against its neighbouring countries Syria and Iran. Since last week the Arab press has been publishing various reports about Ankara's readiness or, at least, agreement in principle to carry out negotiations about its soil and air space being used for action against Iran. (E'temad website, Tehran, in Persian 28 Dec 05, BBC Monitoring Services Translation) Concluding remarks

The implications are overwhelming. The so-called international community has accepted the eventuality of a nuclear holocaust. Those who decide have swallowed their own war propaganda. A political consensus has developed in Western Europe and North America regarding the aerial attacks using tactical nuclear weapons, without considering their devastating implications. This profit driven military adventure ultimately threatens the future of humanity. What is needed in the months ahead is a major thrust, nationally and internationally which breaks the conspiracy of silence, which acknowledges the dangers, which brings this war project to the forefront of political debate and media attentiion, at all levels, which confronts and requires political and military leaders to take a firm stance against the US sponsored nuclear war. Ultimately what is required are extensive international sanctions directed against the United States of America and Israel.

Even without a first strike a nuclear Iran would collapse the NPT, risk miscal and war in the Middle East

Ackerman 09 (Gary is part of the Presidential Task Force on Iranian Proliferation, Regional Security, and U.S. Policy, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Preventing a Cascade of Instability: U.S. Engagement to Check Iranian Nuclear Progress,” March, p. 2)

If Iran “gets away” at low cost with years of safe­guards violations and defiance of UN Security Council resolutions, nonproliferation norms likely will further erode across the globe. Other countries may consider taking the same path, especially if Iran’s programs gain legitimacy. If the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is seen as fraying, it may be difficult to make progress on supplementary means to shore up the nonproliferation regime. The greater the number of countries with nuclear weapons, the higher the risk that misperception and miscalculation could lead to a nuclear confrontation, with horrible consequences. In the Middle East, those who see themselves as regional powers may want nuclear capabilities matching those in Iran—including enrichment or reprocessing facil­ities—for both strategic and prestige-related reasons. To be sure, Middle East states would need many years to build an indigenous nuclear infrastructure, but the pursuit of a broad range of nuclear capabilities could be destabilizing by creating the impression that the military nuclearization of the region is inevitable.

Collapse of the NPT means over 40 countries will breakout overnight

Rublee ‘8 - Professor of Government and World Affairs @ University of Tampa [Maria Rost Rublee, “Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness,” International Studies Review, 22 Aug 2008, Volume 10, Issue 3, Pages 420-450WileyInterScience]

However, I would argue that before the United States (or any other country) gives up on the NPT and associated nuclear nonproliferation regime, we should take full account of not only the regime’s failures, but also its successes. Indeed, the success of the NPT is in many ways more surprising than its recent failures: for almost four decades, almost all states in the international system chose to forgo nuclear weapons, and in some cases, even gave them up. Numerous reports in the 1960s warned that the number of new nuclear states could reach as high as 20 in a few decades (The Bomb 1965:53). Instead, the count by 2008 is only four: India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea.2 The fact that so many states abstained from nuclear weapons tells us to look closely at the nuclear nonproliferation regime. What role has it played in encouraging nuclear forbearance? With the risk of nuclear theft or accidents increasing with each new nuclear weapons state, the international community needs all the help it can get in discouraging nuclear proliferation. This is especially important given the growing numbers of ‘‘latent nuclear states,’’ those with the ‘‘necessary industrial infrastructure and scientific expertise to build nuclear weapons on a crash basis if they chose to do so’’ (Sagan 1996:56). In 2004, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimated that over 40 countries were ‘‘nuclear latent states’’. Given the high stakes, we need to better understand how and in what ways the NPT has actually helped discouraged nuclear proliferation. In doing so, we can also understand the mechanisms through which international regimes work to influence policymakers. So what about the NPT—if anything—has led to such a stunning record of nonproliferation? Certainly, a number of authors have tackled the topic of how the NPT contributes to halting nonproliferation. What tends to be missing, however, is a systematic and theoretically grounded way to assess the NPT’s utility. In this article, I propose such a framework, drawing from social psychology. Within the social psychology literature, scholars agree that persuasion and influence happen through distinct, recognizable mechanisms. I argue that the influence of the nuclear nonproliferation regime of state elites could be understood through the lens of social psychology.3 In other words, I propose taking social psychology’s framework for how attitudes and behavior change, and applying it to the NPT. I do so through a three-step process. I first break apart ‘‘nuclear forbearance’’ (or compliance with the NPT) into three different outcomes identified by the social psychology literature: persuasion (behavior resulting from genuine transformation of preferences), social conformity (behavior resulting from the desire to maximize social benefits and ⁄ or minimize social costs, without a change in underlying preferences), and identification (behavior resulting from the desire or habit of following the actions of an important other). Next, I investigate the different mechanisms through which the international social environment exerts influence on policymakers: creating a ‘‘list’’ effect in which those in noncompliance are obviously in a small minority, linking nuclear nonproliferation to other strongly held values, establishing a public record of state commitment which makes it hard for a state to withdraw, and more. Finally, I assess the utility of the framework by examining the case of Japan: to what extent does it help us understand Japanese nuclear decision-making? I conclude with some thoughts on how this framework could be applied in a number of different issue areas in international relations. Because the framework is drawn from social psychology, it should be applicable to more than just nuclear proliferation. To what extent is it useful to understand compliance with international regimes as three different outcomes (persuasion, identification, and conformity)? Do the mechanisms work in other issues areas? Are some mechanisms more potent in specific issue areas, or perhaps in different types of regimes (for example, regimes formalized through treaties, informal regimes, track-two diplomacy, etc.)? While my immediate focus is how this framework helps us to understand nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation, it could provide fertile ground for research across a number of different fields. What is Nuclear Forbearance? Almost all states have both ratified and adhered to the NPT, giving up nuclear weapons and exercising ‘‘nuclear forbearance.’’ One may think that this nuclear forbearance means these states have permanently given up the nuclear option, and if the NPT is weakened, these states’ nuclear decision-making would not change. That would be the case if these states were ‘‘persuaded’’—that is, they have internalized the message of the NPT and no longer need the treaty to exist for them to adhere to its precepts. However, this outcome of ‘‘persuasion’’ is not the only type of nuclear forbearance possible. It could be that the elite are forgoing nuclear weapons due to ‘‘conformity’’—to gain social prestige and ⁄ or avoid social costs. In this case, if the NPT collapsed, the social costs and benefits associated with it may no longer exist, potentially leading to a reassessment of a state’s nuclear posture. Or, leadership could be following the lead of an important ‘‘other’’—the outcome of identification. If the important ‘‘other’’ helped to weaken the NPT, then leadership may no longer be as concerned about adhering to the treaty. While the behavioral outcome is currently the same—nuclear forbearance—the attitude and motivation behind the behavior is not. This unpacking of nuclear forbearance is based on social psychology. Alastair Iain Johnston (2001) has taken the field considerably forward by his identification from the social psychology literature of two methods of behavior change: persuasion and social influence. Johnston argues that in addition to transformation of state interests (persuasion), multilateral institutions can also exert, or provide a forum through which members exert, ‘‘social influence’’—essentially, a social version of material carrot-stick factors that states include in cost-benefit calculations. Roughly, ‘‘persuasion’’ can be characterized as ‘‘I now see that X is better than Y’’ and ‘‘social influence’’ can be characterized as ‘‘I think Y is correct (or I like Y better), but since everyone else says X, I will do X so I don’t rock the boat’’ (Johnston 2001). Social rewards for conformance with institutional norms include backpatting; for nonconformance, shaming. Social influence, then, is a cost-benefit calculation made with social factors, whereas persuasion is true preference change (Kelman 1958). This is an important point: constructivists often construe the effect of multilateral institutions as that of changing a state’s conception of its national interest. While that is an important effect to investigate, it is also crucial to recognize that this is not the only ‘‘nonmaterial’’ way through which states’ behavior may change. In other words, it does not have to be all-or-nothing: either states transform their attitudes and behavior (validating constructivism) or they don’t (validating realism). Constructivism allows us to explore ways in which the social milieu created by regimes can influence state behavior without ‘‘converting’’ them. Social conformity is one conceptualization of this influence short of conversion. Another example is the cooperative process documented by Dalia Dassa Kaye (2001) in her study of the Middle East peace process, which she shows to help states gain common understandings without necessarily wholesale transformation of state preferences. Distinguishing between full-fledged persuasion and social conformity is critical to nuclear policymaking. As Ariel Levite (2002) argues, some states that have adhered to the NPT may actually be engaged in ‘‘nuclear hedging’’—that is, not actively engaging in nuclear weapons development but maintaining capacity to develop them quickly if desired. On the surface, what looks like NPT compliance and what seems to indicate persuasion may better be described as social conformity. This paper argues, however, that our model of persuasion and influence needs to be more detailed to provide a robust guide in our exploration. First, instead of the term ‘‘social influence,’’ I propose the use of ‘‘social conformity’’ to signal outward acceptance with private rejection, because in social psychology literature, this is the terminology most often used. Beyond this terminology issue, I argue that, in addition to persuasion and social conformity, we must also include ‘‘identification’’ as a method of behavioral change. Identification takes place when an actor wants to be like another, and so changes his or her actions to mimic those they admire. It can take place when a friend agrees with another friend, not because he has really changed his mind, but because it is important to a significant other. Herbert Kelman (1958:51) defines identification in this way: Identification can be said to occur when an individual accepts influence because he wants to establish or maintain a satisfying self-defining relationship to another person or group. This relationship may take the form of classical identification, in which the individual takes over the role of the other, or it may take the form of a reciprocal role relationship. The individual actually believes in the responses which he adopts through identification, but their specific content is more or less irrelevant. He adopts the induced behavior because it is associated with the desired relationship. Identification falls between outright persuasion (where preferences have changed) and social conformity (where preferences have not changed). In fact, while identification can be an influence outcome between individuals, it is a common result from group membership. Called ‘‘ingroup identification,’’ Marilynn Brewer and R. J. Brown (1998:561) note that ‘‘when a collection of individuals believe that they share a common in-group membership, they are more likely to act in the interest of collective welfare than are individuals in the same situation who do not have a sense of group identity.’’ In contrast to social conformity (which is strategic and motivated by straightforward utility maximization), identification is based on an affective desire to create, maintain, or strengthen a relationship. Why is it important to include identification as a third method of behavioral change? After all, models are theoretical constructs that help us understand reality, not chart it out in full detail. However, mechanisms that produce original policy results should be included in models. That is, if the behavior change mechanism of identification leads to different policy results than persuasion and social influence, then it should be included. A current example from the nonproliferation arena will illustrate. Over the past decade, the United States has backed away from some of its obligations in the nonproliferation regime: a continued push for new nuclear weapons, public declaration of the decision to continue designing and computer-testing new nuclear weapons, and a decision to employ a limited ballistic missile defense system. Some also argue that the Bush administration’s proposed nuclear agreement with India undermines the basis of the NPT by encouraging nuclear trade with a state that refuses to sign the NPT. If an ally of the United States’ (call this state Ally X) had initially followed the United States lead on nuclear nonproliferation due to persuasion, Ally X would remain persuaded, and thus would likely express disappointment, as well as encourage the United States to get back on course. If, however, another ally’s behavior was based on identification with the United States (call this state Ally Y), then which United States would it identify with: the United States of action or rhetoric? Identification is also important because even if the United States works to uphold the nonproliferation regime, the fact that Washington maintains nearly 10,000 nuclear weapons—and almost 60% of them are operational— may send the message that to be powerful, a country needs nuclear armaments (United States Profile 2007). In addition, because in reality states are not unitary actors, the distinctions between persuasion, conformity and identification likely play out in domestic politics. In fact, each of the influence outcomes could be represented by some segment of society interested in nuclear policy. One example would be nongovernmental organization (NGOs) and activists are ‘‘persuaded’’ that nuclear weapons are detrimental to state prestige and identity, policy wonks in the diplomatic core ‘‘identify’’ with their Western allies, and members of the military bow to ‘‘social conformity.’’ In each case, the behavior is the same: nuclear forbearance. The reasons behind the actions are different, however, and material or social changes could lead to behavioral changes. A short narrative of how different domestic factions might play out in Ally X and Ally Y will illustrate. This description is not meant to describe any two countries, but rather simply highlight what differently influenced groups might look like with regard to nuclear policy, and how they might react to US behavior. In the case of Ally X and Ally Y (both confronted by the US’s changing behavior with regard to the nuclear nonproliferation regime), Ally X’s nuclear policy could be supported by a coalition of civil servants in a bureaucracy that has supported the NPT for many years, political appointees who believe in nonproliferation, and antinuclear activists with embedded ties to the policymaking apparatus—all of whom are ‘‘persuaded.’’ The United States’ current actions probably would inspire disappointment, resentment, disgust—but a change of heart is not likely because these actors are genuinely persuaded of the merits of nonproliferation. However, other elements in that government and state—those who support nonproliferation because of identification or social conformity—will likely have a different reaction. Those who believe their state should forgo nuclear weapons due to the negative diplomatic effects any other position would have, might rethink their position in light of the US’s stance, as well as the ineffectual response to North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006. In the short run, it is not likely that the state’s behavior would change, but in the long run, those persuaded may change their minds or may lose ground to growing ranks of those who disagree. In the case of Ally Y, where nuclear policy is guided by identification with the United States, confusion is likely to result, based on gap between US rhetoric and actions. How do you behave when the one you have patterned yourself after starts to do something different from what they have said all along? Depending on the strength of the persuaded and conforming segments, and the result of any internal struggle between them, the state could move more definitively against nuclear acquisition or could move toward exploring the nuclear option. In short, understanding that nuclear forbearance is actually the result of three separate attitudes—and that undermining the NPT could undermine commitment to nuclear nonproliferation with two of the three attitudes—leads to the conclusion that undermining the NPT could lead to a wave of nuclear proliferation among states we assumed would never think about the nuclear option again. In other words, the value of the NPT cannot be evaluated without assessing the extent to which it has helped to prevent proliferation. How specifically does the NPT do this? I posit that it has created an international social environment that influences elite decision-making through a number of specific and distinct mechanisms. Without the NPT, those mechanisms fall apart. It is to this social environment and the ‘‘influence’’ mechanisms fostered by it that the papers turns to next.

Rapid prolif risks nuclear war.

**Horowitz ‘9 – Professor of Political Science @ University of Pennsylvania**

([Michael Horowitz Former Emory debater and NDT Champion), “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict: Does Experience Matter?,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 53 Number 2, April 2009 pg. 234-257]

Learning as states gain experience with nuclear weapons is complicated. While to some extent, nuclear acquisition might provide information about resolve or capabilities, it also generates uncertainty about the way an actual conflict would go—given the new risk of nuclear escalation—and uncertainty about relative capabilities. Rapid proliferation may especially heighten uncertainty given the potential for reasonable states to disagree at times about the quality of the capabilities each possesses.2 What follows is an attempt to describe the implications of inexperience and incomplete information on the behavior of nuclear states and their potential opponents over time. Since it is impossible to detail all possible lines of argumentation and possible responses, the following discussion is necessarily incomplete. This is a first step. The acquisition of nuclear weapons increases the confidence of adopters in their ability to impose costs in the case of a conflict and the expectations of likely costs if war occurs by potential opponents. The key questions are whether nuclear states learn over time about how to leverage nuclear weapons and the implications of that learning, along with whether actions by nuclear states, over time, convey information that leads to changes in the expectations of their behavior—shifts in uncertainty— on the part of potential adversaries. When a new state acquires nuclear weapons, how does it influence the way the state behaves and how might that change over time? Although nuclear acquisition might be orthogonal to a particular dispute, it might be related to a particular security challenge, might signal revisionist aims with regard to an enduring dispute, or might signal the desire to reinforce the status quo. This section focuses on how acquiring nuclear weapons influences both the new nuclear state and potential adversaries. In theory, systemwide perceptions of nuclear danger could allow new nuclear states to partially skip the early Cold War learning process concerning the risks of nuclear war and enter a proliferated world more cognizant of nuclear brinksmanship and bargaining than their predecessors. However, each new nuclear state has to resolve its own particular civil–military issues surrounding operational control and plan its national strategy in light of its new capabilities. Empirical research by Sagan (1993), Feaver (1992), and Blair (1993) suggests that viewing the behavior of other states does not create the necessary tacit knowledge; there is no substitute for experience when it comes to handling a nuclear arsenal, even if experience itself cannot totally prevent accidents. Sagan contends that civil–military instability in many likely new proliferators and pressures generated by the requirements to handle the responsibility of dealing with nuclear weapons will skew decision making toward more offensive strategies (Sagan 1995). The questions surrounding Pakistan’s nuclear command and control suggest there is no magic bullet when it comes to new nuclear powers’ making control and delegation decisions (Bowen and Wolvén 1999). Sagan and others focus on inexperience on the part of new nuclear states as a key behavioral driver. Inexperienced operators and the bureaucratic desire to “justify” the costs spent developing nuclear weapons, combined with organizational biases that may favor escalation to avoid decapitation—the “use it or lose it” mind-set— may cause new nuclear states to adopt riskier launch postures, such as launch on warning, or at least be perceived that way by other states (Blair 1993; Feaver 1992; Sagan 1995).3 Acquiring nuclear weapons could alter state preferences and make states more likely to escalate disputes once they start, given their new capabilities.4 But their general lack of experience at leveraging their nuclear arsenal and effectively communicating nuclear threats could mean new nuclear states will be more likely to select adversaries poorly and to find themselves in disputes with resolved adversaries that will reciprocate militarized challenges. The “nuclear experience” logic also suggests that more experienced nuclear states should gain knowledge over time from nuclearized interactions that helps leaders effectively identify the situations in which their nuclear arsenals are likely to make a difference. Experienced nuclear states learn to select into cases in which their comparative advantage, nuclear weapons, is more likely to be effective, increasing the probability that an adversary will not reciprocate. Coming from a slightly different perspective, uncertainty about the consequences of proliferation on the balance of power and the behavior of new nuclear states on the part of their potential adversaries could also shape behavior in similar ways (Schelling 1966; Blainey 1988). While a stable and credible nuclear arsenal communicates clear information about the likely costs of conflict, in the short term, nuclear proliferation is likely

The risk of extinction from nuclear war trumps every impact—reducing numbers of weapons is key to decrease the risk  
Sandberg, Matheny, and Ćirković ‘8,

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The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter. We may face even greater risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive. Pathogens have been [implicated](http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/118564287/abstract) in the extinctions of many wild species. Although most pandemics "fade out" by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing human extinction. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling [Moore's Law](http://www.intel.com/technology/mooreslaw/index.htm).

Farther out in time are technologies that remain theoretical but might be developed this century. Molecular nanotechnology could allow the creation of self-replicating machines capable of destroying the ecosystem. And advances in neuroscience and computation might enable improvements in cognition that accelerate the invention of new weapons. A survey at the Oxford conference found that concerns about human extinction were dominated by fears that new technologies would be misused. These emerging threats are especially challenging as they could become dangerous more quickly than past technologies, outpacing society's ability to control them. As H.G. Wells noted, "Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe."

Such remote risks may seem academic in a world plagued by immediate problems, such as global poverty, HIV, and climate change. But as intimidating as these problems are, they do not threaten human existence. In [discussing](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19831201faessay8351/carl-sagan/nuclear-war-and-climatic-catastrophe-some-policy-implications.html) the risk of nuclear winter, Carl Sagan emphasized the astronomical toll of human extinction:

A nuclear war imperils all of our descendants, for as long as there will be humans. Even if the population remains static, with an average lifetime of the order of 100 years, over a typical time period for the biological evolution of a successful species (roughly ten million years), we are talking about some 500 trillion people yet to come. By this criterion, the stakes are one million times greater for extinction than for the more modest nuclear wars that kill "only" hundreds of millions of people. There are many other possible measures of the potential loss--including culture and science, the evolutionary history of the planet, and the significance of the lives of all of our ancestors who contributed to the future of their descendants. Extinction is the undoing of the human enterprise.

There is a discontinuity between risks that threaten 10 percent or even 99 percent of humanity and those that threaten 100 percent. For disasters killing less than all humanity, there is a good chance that the species could recover. **If we value future human generations, then reducing extinction risks should dominate our considerations.** Fortunately, most measures to reduce these risks also improve global security against a range of lesser catastrophes, and thus deserve support regardless of how much one worries about extinction. These measures include:

Removing nuclear weapons from hair-trigger alert and further reducing their numbers;

Placing safeguards on gene synthesis equipment to prevent synthesis of select pathogens;

Improving our ability to respond to infectious diseases, including rapid disease surveillance, diagnosis, and control, as well as accelerated drug development;

Funding research on asteroid detection and deflection, "hot spot" eruptions, methane hydrate deposits, and other catastrophic natural hazards;

Monitoring developments in key disruptive technologies, such as nanotechnology and computational neuroscience, and developing international policies to reduce the risk of catastrophic accidents.

U.S. military presence unpopular in Turkey – seen as oil-hungry, destabilizing, racist—only withdrawal boost relations

Kull 8 (Steven, director of Program on International Policy Attitudes. “Can Obama Restore the U.S. Image in the Middle East?” Harvard International Review, http://hir.harvard.edu/index.php?page=article&id=1812) MKB

To an extent that some US citizens may find difficult to understand, people in the Middle East perceive US forces as posing a threat to them. In a 2007 Pew poll of eight Middle Eastern nations, majorities ranging from 57 percent in Lebanon to 92 percent in Morocco said they were worried “that the US could become a military threat to our country someday.” Even in Turkey – a NATO ally -- 76 percent had such a worry, as did 61 percent in Kuwait, a country the United States has defended.

Polls show very strong support for removing all US military forces from the region. In a 2007 WorldPublicOpinion.org (WPO) poll, conducted in conjunction with the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (START) Center at the University of Maryland, large majorities supported the goal of getting “the US to remove its bases and its military forces from all Islamic countries” in Morocco (72 percent), Egypt (92 percent), and Pakistan (71 percent).

US bases in the Persian Gulf are similarly quite unpopular. In a 2008 WPO poll, large majorities said it is a “bad idea” for the United States to have naval forces in the Persian Gulf, including Egyptians (80 percent), Jordanians (76 percent), Palestinians (90 percent), and Turks (77 percent). Equally large majorities also believe (apparently correctly) that this is the majority view throughout the region.

The argument that US forces in the region offer stability is not persuasive to Middle Eastern audiences. In a 2007 BBC/GlobeScan/PIPA poll, respondents were asked, “Do you think the US military presence in the Middle East is a stabilizing force or provokes more conflict than it prevents?” Large majorities in all four Middle Eastern countries polled said it provokes more conflict than it prevents, including people in Egypt (85 percent), Turkey (76 percent), Lebanon (77 percent) and even the UAE (66 percent)—a country that hosts such a base and is ostensibly more secure as a result.

US military presence is viewed in the context of several invidious goals widely attributed to the United States. One of these assumed goals is to coercively assure US access to oil. In a WPO poll, robust majorities agreed with the statement “America pretends to be helpful to Muslim countries, but in fact everything it does is really part of a scheme to take advantage of people in the Middle East and steal their oil,” a position endorsed by majorities in Egypt (87 percent), Morocco (62 percent), and Pakistan (56 percent). According to one WPO poll, very large majorities said that they think it is a goal of the United States to “maintain control over the oil resources of the Middle East,” including Egyptians (91 percent), Moroccans (82 percent), Pakistanis (68 percent), Jordanians (87 percent), Palestinians (89 percent), and Turks (89 percent).

The United States is also seen as having goals hostile to Islam. Large majorities across six countries said that a goal of US foreign policy is to “weaken and divide the Islamic world,” including Egypt (92 percent) the Palestinian Territories (87 percent), Turkey (82 percent), Jordan (80 percent), Morocco (78 percent), and Pakistan (73 percent). The United States is seen as feeling threatened by Islam: large majorities agreed that “It is America’s goal to weaken Islam so that it will not grow and challenge the Western way of life” including in Egypt (87 percent), Morocco (69 percent) and Pakistan (62 percent).

1ac Turkey Affirmative--Advantage \_\_\_: Erdogan and the AKP

First, the AKP will lose the 2011 election in the SQ

Ronen 6/6/10. (Gil, Editor of Israel National News. “Erdogan Poised to Lose Next Election, Expert Says.” Israel National News. June 6, 2010. <http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/news.aspx/137906>). LRH.

Public support for the ruling Islamic party is in decline, the expert added, mostly due to corruption and abuse of civil rights. “Were elections held last week, the Islamist party would lose many seats, and two secular parties would possibly have made up the coalition. If current public opinion is held till the next elections, scheduled for July 2011, it is likely that Turkey will emerge with a new prime minister. It is possible that precisely due to his domestic situation as reflected in the polls, Erdogan has decided to exacerbate his relations with Israel in order to gain public support.”

Second the AKP has tried to pass legal reforms in the SQ but failed—too much opposition

Barysch 10

Katinka Barysch, Katinka Barysch is the deputy director at the Centre for European Reform, Turkey's turmoil, Thursday, April 01, 2010, http://centreforeuropeanreform.blogspot.com/2010/04/turkeys-turmoil.html.

The opposition accuses Erdogan’s AK party of transforming Turkey into an Islamist state and of using the police and the judiciary to get rid of its opponents. They feel vindicated by the government’s hasty moves to amend the constitution in a way that would give the AKP more influence over the composition of the constitutional court and the ‘supreme board of judges and prosecutors’.

AKP needs to win the 2011 election to get the legal reform package—which is key to EU accession

Barysch 10

Katinka Barysch, Katinka Barysch is the deputy director at the Centre for European Reform, Turkey's turmoil, Thursday, April 01, 2010, http://centreforeuropeanreform.blogspot.com/2010/04/turkeys-turmoil.html

The new enlargement commissioner, Stefan Fule, has said that “the proposed reforms [in the constitutional package] go in the right direction”. But while broadly satisfied with the substance, Fule and his colleagues are unhappy about the process. They are right. Even if the AKP manages to push through its package (it will probably have to resort to a referendum since it lacks the necessary super-majority in parliament), it is questionable whether the current antagonistic climate is a good time for a very incomplete constitutional reform. The move smacks of political manoeuvring and could discredit the very process of constitutional renewal. Given that Turkey’s democracy badly needs better rules, rights and institutions, this would be a tragedy. The AKP should wait until after the 2011 parliamentary election and then start the broad constitutional debate, including opposition parties and civil society, that it has promised ever since 2007. The EU is right not to take sides in Turkey’s current political battles. But it should not be afraid to say loud and clear that a more thorough reform of the constitution and the law on political parties is necessary if such battles are not to undermine Turkey’s accession chances in the medium term.

Turkish accession is necessary for EU competiveness and to stop backsliding and another global recession

Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, 9

EU and Turkey – Tackling economic downturn trough partnership, 3-26-2009, <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/09/148&type=HTML>,

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The EU and Turkey have long and well-established strategic, economic and trade relations. We are bound to work together to tackle major security challenges. Stability in the Southern Caucasus, peace in the Middle East, security of energy supplies, prosperity of our citizens and the global economic crisis are such challenges.

Turkey can provide many assets for the EU. Turkey is a big emerging economy and a large market. It has a young and dynamic workforce. It is located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, with good connections in the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Middle East, Russia and Central Asia. Turkey has already become a key element of Europe’s competitiveness in the global economy.

At the same time, the EU is a strategic asset for Turkey. The EU has a sizeable internal market regulated by a solid system of common rules and standards. It is an anchor for reform and modernisation of the Turkish society and for stabilisation of her economy. It is a channel for further integration of the Turkish economy into the global economy. Since the establishment of the Customs Union in 1996, trade between the EU and Turkey has almost tripled. The EU is now the most important trade partner of Turkey, while Turkey is the seventh biggest trade partner of the EU. Half of Turkey's foreign trade is done with the EU. However, we need to complete the Customs Union in order to enhance its effectiveness. We need to remove remaining dysfunctions. For this we count on the active support of the business community. Turkey's EU accession process which started in 2005 is moving forward. So far we have opened negotiations in 10 policy areas, the so-called chapters.

But more needs to be done. I trust that Turkey will renew its efforts in a number of key areas where reforms are still needed. The business community has also a crucial role to play in this endeavour.

One of the cornerstones of the European model is the close consultation of employers, workers and authorities. This has proven essential in ensuring that everybody's interests are taken into account in a balanced manner. Before we can open negotiations on a chapter on social policy and employment, Turkey still needs to amends its laws to comply with ILO and EU standards in this regard. Here the business community can make an important contribution to the accession process, by actively participating in the necessary consensus building for the adoption of the laws, including the one on trade unions. Regarding energy, further development of EU-Turkey energy cooperation will be mutually beneficial. A deepened EU-Turkey energy cooperation can help Turkey develop its role as energy crossroads and address concerns about its security of supply.

In this respect, I welcome Turkey's decision to resume negotiations in view of joining the Energy Community Treaty. Another pressing issue today is the Nabucco pipeline. We both agree on the need for this pipeline; we must address outstanding issues. The opening of accession negotiations increased confidence in Turkey and promoted trade and Foreign Direct Investment. The annual flow of FDI from the EU into Turkey increased sharply from less than € 1 billion in 2002 to more than € 16 billion in 2007. Mergers and acquisitions between EU and Turkish companies have also intensified. The business community is playing a very dynamic role in this field. This year the European Business Summit is taking place in the middle of a serious financial crisis and economic recession. World trade is falling quickly and industrial production has almost collapsed in a number of sectors. The crisis has affected all our economies in various degrees, with serious repercussions to employment and general welfare. So far the Turkish economy has shown remarkable resilience thanks to bold reforms in particular of its financial and banking sectors.

However, both the EU and the Turkish economy are expected to contract in 2009. Strong and coordinated policy action – including in the context of the G-20 – is indispensable in order to prevent the global economy from sliding to recession.

We also need to avoid any form of protectionism. Our joint priority should now be to coordinate efforts in order to stabilise the economy and financial markets.

Collapse of the economy will lead multiple scenarios for nuclear war

Mead 9

Walter Russell Mead is the Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of God and Gold: Britain, America and the Making of the Modern World. Lauren Gottlieb provided research assistance for this articlehttp://freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2169866/posts

None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises.

Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born?

The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.

Withdrawal of American Troops from Turkey would be a huge win for the AKP—the plan is extremely popular

Abramowitz and Barkey 9. (Morton, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey from 1989-91, and Henri J, a nonresident Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. p5. “Turkey's Transformers: The AKP Sees Big." Foreign Affairs. November/December 2009 <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Turkeys_Transformers.pdf>). LRH.

Perhaps the AKP government's most ballyhooed effort has been its diplomatic activism in the Middle East. The Turkish government took advantage of the vacuum created by President George W. Bush's a unpopular policies in the region to participate in indirect talks between Israel and Syria. It injected itself into the negotiations following the crises in Lebanon in 2006 and Gaza in late 2008 and early 2009. French President Nicolas Sarkozy invited Davutoglu, then a foreign policy adviser, to join the French delegation that traveled to Damascus to discuss the Gaza crisis. Ankara has taken partial credit for the agreement governing the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq; it reportedly deserves some for hosting talks between U.S. representatives and Iraqi insurgents earlier this year. And Foreign Minister Davutoglu jumped at the opportunity to mediate Iraq and Syria's recent dispute (Iraq claims that bombings in Baghdad's Green Zone in August were carried out by insurgents from Syria).

Popularity is key to the agenda and election

Derfner 5. (Larry, writer for the Jerusalem Post. “Land of Milk and Honey.” The Jerusalem Post. September 29, 2005). LRH

HE IS NOW in a sweet spot that very few elected leaders ever find - he faces no political opposition and everything on his agenda is backed overwhelmingly by the public. This means he doesn't have to "spend political capital" - the more he advances his agenda the more political power he attains and the easier it becomes to advance his agenda further. Most importantly his goals are not only popular but worthy. By doing good Sharon also does well.

His overriding goal is to deter terror from Gaza and keep it in check in the West Bank. Then I would say he wants to capitalize on the world's nod of approval to Israel since disengagement and develop relations with Pakistan the Gulf states and other traditional enemies that have been softening their attitudes or at least their rhetoric.

1ac Turkey Affirmative--Advantage\_\_\_: Iraq Stability

The US is poised to remove most of the soldiers in Iraq within the next month, the rest will soon follow

Carter 9, (Chelsea J, Associated Press, 8/31/2009 12:43 PM, U.S. ramps up withdrawal from Iraq, Republished with Permission by: USA Today, <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2009-08-30-withdrawal_N.htm>) WDK

The U.S. military is packing up to leave Iraq in what has been deemed the largest movement of manpower and equipment in modern military history — shipping out more than 1.5 million pieces of equipment from tanks to antennas along with a force the size of a small city. The massive operation already underway a year ahead of the Aug. 31, 2010, deadline to remove all U.S. combat troops from Iraq shows the U.S. military has picked up the pace of a planned exit from Iraq that could cost billions. The goal is to withdraw tens of thousands of troops and about 60% of equipment out of Iraq by the end of next March, Brig. Gen. Heidi Brown, a deputy commander charged with overseeing the withdrawal, told the Associated Press in one of the first detailed accounts of how the U.S. military plans to leave Iraq. Convoys carrying everything from armored trucks to radios have been rolling near daily through southern Iraq to Kuwait and the western desert to Jordan since President Obama announced the deadline to remove combat troops, leaving up to 50,000 troops under a U.S.-Iraqi security agreement until the end of 2011. First out, Brown said, will be the early withdrawal of an Army combat brigade of about 5,000. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has said a brigade would leave by the end of the year, months ahead of schedule, if violence in Iraq did not escalate beyond current levels. That will be followed by the Marine Corps, which has already shipped out about half of its 22,000 troops and more than 50% of its equipment since May. "In about six months or less, they will be gone," she said. The U.S. military also plans to shrink the contractor force from roughly 130,000 to 50,000 by September 2010. Those remaining would pick up additional duties from departing troops, Brown said. The nearly 300 American bases and outposts currently remaining in Iraq will shrink to 50 or less by the president's deadline, Brown said.

The only chance for a stable Iraq is continued US presence. Withdrawal will erase all pervious progress

Bohandy 10 (S.R., RAND Corp., Security in Iraq Emerging Threats as U.S. Forces Withdraw, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/2010/RAND_RB9481.pdf> ) WDK

After years of bitter and violent fighting, Iraq is finally becoming more stable. The main partisan political groups—Sunni, Kurd, and Shi’a—are cooperating to confront common concerns. The new, nonviolent political order, with the government of Iraq at its core, is winning growing popular support. Extremist groups, such as al Qaeda in Iraq, lack, at least for now, the ability to incite factional fighting. U.S. troops have begun their drawdown. But the security situation is still shaky, and the end of U.S. occupation could bring consequences that could destroy Iraq’s hard-won progress. Particularly of fighting among Iraq’s main groups, many of which are sufficiently well armed to throw the country into a new cycle of violence. The book suggests that the most likely dangers are not necessarily the most consequential and points to what the United States can do to help guard against a renewed upsurge of large-scale factional conflict that would undercut both Iraqi and U.S. interests

Iraqi Security Forces are not prepared to stop the backsliding—only risks US being drawn back in after collapse

The Memriblog July 2, 2010 http://www.thememriblog.org/blog\_personal/en/28229.htm

Wednesday, June 30 marked the first anniversary of the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Iraqi cities, following the security agreement signed between the two countries to restore sovereignty over the cities to the Iraqi government.

Experience has shown that the Iraqi security forces have failed to establish their authority over the cities upon the withdrawal of the U.S. forces. As a result, the U.S. military has been drawn back into the cities over the past 12 months, supporting the Iraqi security forces who confront armed groups that have caused the death of 3,000 Iraqis, mainly in the capital city of Baghdad.

Iraqi Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani conceded that during the civil war (2006-2007) half of the ministry's patrol vehicles were used by security personnel for kidnapping and looting, but he added that the ministry has cleaned up its act since then.

Iraq will disintegrate into civil war in the security vacuum left by the US

Associated Press 7, (7/9/2007 2:29:47 PM ET, Republished by: MSNBC with permission Top official warns of Iraq collapse if U.S. leaves White House says it isn't considering a pullout, despite loss of GOP support <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19676021/>) WDK

Iraq’s foreign minister warned on Monday that a quick American military withdrawal from the country could lead to a full-scale civil war, the collapse of the government and spillover conflicts across the region. Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said Iraqis “understand the huge pressure that will increase more and more in the United States” ahead of the progress report by the U.S. ambassador and top commander in Iraq. “We have held discussion with members of Congress and explained to them the dangers of a quick pullout and leaving a security vacuum,” Zebari said. “The dangers could be a civil war, dividing the country, regional wars and the collapse of the state.”

Civil war, sparks nuclear wars risking extinction

Gerecht, 7 (Reuel, resident fellow at American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, “The Consequences of Failure in Iraq”, Jan 15, http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25407,filter.all/pub\_detail.as)

If we leave Iraq any time soon, the battle for Baghdad will probably lead to a conflagration that consumes all of Arab Iraq, and quite possibly Kurdistan, too. Once the Shia become both badly bloodied and victorious, raw nationalist and religious passions will grow. A horrific fight with the Sunni Arabs will inevitably draw in support from the ferociously anti-Shiite Sunni religious establishments in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and on the Shiite side from Iran. It will probably destroy most of central Iraq and whet the appetite of Shiite Arab warlords, who will by then dominate their community, for a conflict with the Kurds. If the Americans stabilize Arab Iraq, which means occupying the Sunni triangle, this won't happen. A strong, aggressive American military presence in Iraq can probably halt the radicalization of the Shiite community. Imagine an Iraq modeled on the Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps. The worst elements in the Iranian regime are heavily concentrated in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and the Ministry of Intelligence, the two organizations most active inside Iraq. The Lebanese Hezbollah is also present giving tutorials. These forces need increasing strife to prosper. Imagine Iraqi Shiites, battle-hardened in a vicious war with Iraq's Arab Sunnis, spiritually and operationally linking up with a revitalized and aggressive clerical dictatorship in Iran. Imagine the Iraqi Sunni Islamic militants, driven from Iraq, joining up with groups like al Qaeda, living to die killing Americans. Imagine the Hashemite monarchy of Jordan overwhelmed with hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Sunni Arab refugees. The Hashemites have been lucky and clever since World War II. They've escaped extinction several times. Does anyone want to take bets that the monarchy can survive the implantation of an army of militant, angry Iraqi Sunni Arabs? For those who believe that the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is the epicenter of the Middle East, the mass migration of Iraq's Sunni Arabs into Jordan will bury what small chances remain that the Israelis and Palestinians will find an accommodation. With Jordan in trouble, overflowing with viciously anti-American and anti-Israeli Iraqis, peaceful Palestinian evolution on the West Bank of the Jordan river is about as likely as the discovery of the Holy Grail. The repercussions throughout the Middle East of the Sunni-Shiite clash in Iraq are potentially so large it's difficult to digest. Sunni Arabs in Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia will certainly view a hard-won and bloody Shiite triumph in Iraq as an enormous Iranian victory. The Egyptians or the Saudis or both will go for their own nukes. What little chance remains for the Americans and the Europeans to corral peacefully the clerical regime's nuclear-weapons aspirations will end with a Shiite-Sunni death struggle in Mesopotamia, which the Shia will inevitably win. The Israelis, who are increasingly likely to strike preemptively the major Iranian nuclear sites before the end of George Bush's presidency, will feel even more threatened, especially when the Iranian regime underscores its struggle against the Zionist enemy as a means of compensating for its support to the bloody Shiite conquest in Iraq. With America in full retreat from Iraq, the clerical regime, which has often viewed terrorism as a tool of statecraft, could well revert to the mentality and tactics that produced the bombing of Khobar Towers in 1996. If the Americans are retreating, hit them. That would not be just a radical Shiite view; it was the learned estimation of Osama bin Laden and his kind before 9/11. It's questionable to argue that the war in Iraq has advanced the radical Sunni holy war against the United States. There should be no question, however, that an American defeat in Mesopotamia would be the greatest psychological triumph ever for anti-American jihadists. Al Qaeda and its militant Iraqi allies could dominate western Iraq for years--it could take awhile for the Shiites to drive them out.

Independently, The marshes in Iraq are at a crossroads--the next decade is critical

ENS 10

Water Scarcity Endangers Iraq's Migratory Birds, Water Scarcity Endangers Iraq's Migratory Birds, Iraq, May 6, 2010 (ENS) – http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/may2010/2010-05-06-01.html

To mark World Migratory Bird Day this Sunday, the nongovernmental organization Nature Iraq is joining its BirdLife International partners around the world to celebrate bird migration, and to highlight the difficulties facing some the world's most threatened species.

The Mesopotamian marshes in the region of southern Iraq between the Euphrates and Tigris rivers are especially important for wintering waterbirds, and Nature Iraq has worked to restore these marshes after they were 90 percent drained under Saddam Hussein's regime. After several years of richer water flows, the marshes are again drying up because of drought and upstream dams.

"Iraq is, for good reasons, focused on security and development, but unless the country acts soon, many important species will simply not be here in 10 years' time," said Dr. Azzam Alwash, CEO of Nature Iraq. A Critically Endangered sociable lapwing (Photo courtesy AEWA)

World Migratory Bird Day is a global initiative to raise awareness of the need to conserve all migratory birds. This year's theme, "Save Migratory Birds in Crisis - Every Species Counts," is aimed at raising awareness of migratory birds on the very edge of extinction - the 31 species of birds classed as Critically Endangered by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, IUCN. Some of them depend on habitat in Iraq.

"In the Middle East, for example," warned Alwash, "the Critically Endangered sociable lapwing, Vanellus gregarius, could become extinct within a human generation due to persecution and habitat loss."

Northern Iraqi marshes are key to global biodiversity-migratory birds

ODU 6/22/10

<http://www.odu.edu/ao/news/index.php?todo=details&id=22607>, News at Old Dominion University

ODU Signs Memorandum of Understanding with Iraqi University

Mesopotamian marshes where the Tigris and Euphrates rivers meet in southern Iraq have promoted global biodiversity through the millennia. Up until four decades ago, the nearly 20,000 square kilometers of nurturing grounds for plants and animals composed the largest wetlands tract in the Middle East. But between 1970 and 2000, dam projects and the purposeful draining of marshes reduced the marshlands by about 90 percent.

This loss of wetlands has adversely affected biodiversity from Siberia to southern Africa.

The marsh water buffalo will go extinct without immediate restoration of the marshes

Dr. Michelle Stevens, Professor CSUS, 9

Terrible Water Scarcity In Marshes; Desperate Plight of the Mesopotamian Marshes, southern Iraq

Michelle L. Stevens, Assistant Professor, CSUS, Environmental Studies Department, 916-765-7397, stevensm@csus.edu

The marshes are a culturalized landscape, formed over thousands of years by agricultural and traditional Water buffalo illustrate this point, as they represent both an umbrella species and a cultural icon, important to the well-being of indigenous Ma’dan people. They are also a keystone species in the marsh ecosystem. “Water buffalo are widespread through the marshes in the south of Iraq. There are no houses in the marshes without a water buffalo. They are the main source of livelihood of people in the marshes, and are indicators of the quality of marsh life and restoration of the Iraqi marshes. I expect that the absence of water buffaloes will lead to the disappearance of people in the marshes” (Al Fartosi, pers comm., 2009).

Loss of keystone species causes extinction.

Diner, '94 (Judge Advocate General's Corps – US Army, Winter, 143 Mil. L. Rev. 161, GENDER MODIFIED) "Biologically diverse ecosystems…may be edging closer to the abyss."

The main premise of species preservation is that diversity is better than simplicity. n77 As the current mass extinction has progressed, the world's biological diversity generally has decreased. This trend occurs within ecosystems by reducing the number of species, and within species by reducing the number of individuals. Both trends carry serious future implications. n78

[\*173] Biologically diverse ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches. These ecosystems inherently are more stable than less diverse systems. "The more complex the ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a stress. . . . [l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can resist collapse better than a simple, unbranched circle of threads -- which if cut anywhere breaks down as a whole." n79

By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, n80 mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.

The environment is not resilient—small changes cause catastrophe

ENN in 1

Environmental News Network in 1m “Gradual change can push ecosystems into collapse.” 10/12/1. http://www.well.com/~davidu/collapse.html

After decades of continuous change imposed by human activity, many of the world's natural ecosystems appear susceptible to sudden catastrophic change, an international consortium of scientists reported. Coral reefs and tropical forests are vulnerable, as are northern lakes and forests, the team has found. Marten Scheffer, an ecologist at the University of Wageningen in the Netherlands, said, "Models have predicted this, but only in recent years has enough evidence accumulated to tell us that resilience of many important ecosystems has become undermined to the point that even the slightest disturbance can make them collapse."

Adaptation fails

Bertollini 2

Colin L. Soskolne and Roberto Bertollini, Prof dep’t of health sciences U of Alberta and WHO. 2002. Conservation Medicine, eds. Aguirre, Ostefeld, Tabor, House & Pearl, 2002 p 374.

There are evolutionary biologists who claim that fears about ecological degradation and the collapse of ecological life support systems are unfounded. The considered response of this position is that ecological concern is based on the lack of appreciation for the rate at which changes in life support systems are indeed taking place (Lubchenco 1998). The time frame of the evolutionary biologist tends to be many thousands of years. The evolutionary perspective, requiring millennia for a recovery to establish itself in support of life as we know it today, thus could indeed be correct. However, the time frame of concern from the public health—related discipline perspective is for current and future generations (i.e., decades and perhaps a century or two), not thousands or even millions of years into the future. Presently, adaptation to ecological disintegrity has meant high levels of disease and unemployment among most of the world poor, as can be seen in many of the cities in the developing world. The passive option benefits a minority of wealthy people and seems to be embraced by more economic policy makers in developed countries each year (Funtowicz and Raretz 1994; Korten 1998; UNDP 1998).

Plan solves stability is key to reversing the destruction of the marshland

Dr. Michelle Stevens, Professor CSUS, 9 Terrible Water Scarcity In Marshes; Desperate Plight of the Mesopotamian Marshes, southern Iraq Michelle L. Stevens, Assistant Professor, CSUS, Environmental Studies Department, 916-765-7397, stevensm@csus.edu

The marshes are a culturalized landscape, formed over thousands of years by agricultural and traditional management. Because the marsh ecosystem is adapted to human management, economic stability and the success of the restoration effort depends on integration of both the Marsh Arab and local Iraqi culture, sustainable ecosystem services, and the economic stability of a large portion of southern Iraq. Water buffalo illustrate this point, as they represent both an umbrella species and a cultural icon, important to the well-being of indigenous Ma’dan people. They are also a keystone species in the marsh ecosystem. “Water buffalo are widespread through the marshes in the south of Iraq. There are no houses in the marshes without a water buffalo. They are the main source of livelihood of people in the marshes, and are indicators of the quality of marsh life and restoration of the Iraqi marshes. I expect that the absence of water buffaloes will lead to the disappearance of people in the marshes” (Al Fartosi, pers comm., 2009). Jassim Al-Asadi of Nature Iraq, says “There is drought, the water levels are getting lower and water quality has worsened; the marshes are continuously shrinking. This leads to great suffering, especially for the water buffalo breeders and fishermen. We must put pressure on decision makers to implement temporary solutions to provide marshes with water from the rivers.

Without Access to Turkish Air Bases Iraq withdrawal will be severely slowed—ensuring US presence past August

Lubold 9 (Gordon, Staff Write Christian Science Monitor, Turkey could furnish a safe way home as US departs Iraq, February 17)AC

Turkey is likely to play a prominent role as the US begins to remove thousands of tons of equipment and supplies from Iraq over the next year or so. The American military has been quietly shipping construction materials, food, fuel, and other nonlethal items into Iraq through Turkey using a two-lane commercial border crossing known as the Habur Gate in southeastern Turkey. But as the US considers its options for pulling out of Iraq – and the pace of that redeployment – the route through Turkey may play a conspicuous part, defense officials say. In addition to Kuwait, and probably Jordan, Turkey would give the US military an alternative exit as it attempts to move thousands of trucks, Humvees, and as many as 120,000 shipping containers back home. "Basically, nothing is off the table," says one American defense official, referring to the role Turkey might play. The country, which hosts a large US airbase at Incirlik, could also be a major hub for the United States as it ramps up operations in Afghanistan. Earlier this month the government of Kyrgyzstan announced it would no longer allow the US to operate a key base there. That presents a prickly logistical challenge as the US prepares to send as many as 30,000 new troops to Afghanistan. Today, some 1,000 commercial trucks cross the Turkish border into Iraq every day, many of which carry goods for the US military. That's a reverse from 2003, when Turkey, which opposed the American-led invasion of Iraq, refused to allow US troops to use the country for the invasion, despite a generous incentive package offered by the US. The US 4th Infantry Division, led by then-Maj. Gen. Ray Odierno, was to have entered Iraq through Turkey but instead mobilized through Kuwait. General Odierno is now senior commander in Iraq and will preside over the massive drawdown of troops and equipment. Relations between the US and Turkey cooled for years until the two allied in response to the growing threat posed by the PKK, the militant Kurdish nationalist group operating along the Turkish-Iraqi border. The US and Turkey created a joint intelligence center in 2007 to help target the militants, and the two countries have worked on other issues concerning Iraq as well. The dusty, busy supply line through Turkey illustrates the new ties between the two countries. "It is so much more than that right now," says one Turkish diplomat, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. "This issue is just a mere proof of us being allies. This is as it should be." The supply line would give the US a ground exit in northern Iraq that probably would not be as hostile as the two other likely exit points, Kuwait and Jordan. "Turkey is going to be very instrumental in terms of the withdrawal from Iraq," says Stephen Flanagan, a senior analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. US and Turkish officials have tried to kept a low profile regarding the Habur Gate. But in 2007 about 25 percent of the fuel for "coalition forces" entered Iraq through it. The crossing is also a boon to the local economy. Turkish officials say they would welcome an expanded use of the Habur Gate should the US decide to leave Iraq through it. "Postconflict stability" is in the Turks' best interest, Mr. Flanagan notes. But there is a limit to what they will support the US doing in Turkey, he says. "They don't want to give us a blank check for staging counterinsurgency operations." Kuwait, on Iraq's southern border, was the main launching point for American forces in the 2003 invasion. The conventional wisdom has been that Kuwait will be the main exit point as American troops and gear are loaded onto ships and airplanes. But there have been concerns that Kuwait could become a chokepoint, and the US has searched for other options.

1ac Turkey Affirmative--Solvency and Preempts:

All your proliferation good arguments are wrong—they are based on flawed Cold war models of the European theatre—proliferation in Asia or the Middle East will spark a nuclear war—accidental or intentional

Cimbala ‘8 – Professor of Political Science @ Pennsylvania State University Brandywine [Stephen J. Cimbala, “Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia,” Comparative Strategy, Volume 27, Issue 2 March 2008, pages 113 – 132*Informaworld]*

The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social, and cultural crosscurrents contributory to the possibility of war. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the ColdWar, in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.12 The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear-capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues.13 The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another’s vitals. But short-range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially “strategic” effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and North Korea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on. The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first strike–vulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policymakers and academic theorists. For policymakers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).14 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passe, on account of the emergence of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” and its encouragement of information-based warfare.15 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large-scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.16 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare. For theorists, the argument that the spread of nuclear weapons might be fully compatible with international stability, and perhaps even supportive of international security, may be less sustainable than hitherto.17 Theorists optimistic about the ability of the international order to accommodate the proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems in the present century have made several plausible arguments based on international systems and deterrence theory. First, nuclear weapons may make states more risk averse as opposed to risk acceptant, with regard to brandishing military power in support of foreign policy objectives. Second, if states’ nuclear forces are second-strike survivable, they contribute to reduced fears of surprise attack. Third, the motives of states with respect to the existing international order are crucial. Revisionists will seek to use nuclear weapons to overturn the existing balance of power; status quo–oriented states will use nuclear forces to support the existing distribution of power, and therefore, slow and peaceful change, as opposed to sudden and radical power transitions. These arguments, for a less alarmist view of nuclear proliferation, take comfort from the history of nuclear policy in the “first nuclear age,” roughly corresponding to the ColdWar.18 Pessimists who predicted that some thirty or more states might have nuclear weapons by the end of the century were proved wrong. However, the Cold War is a dubious precedent for the control of nuclear weapons spread outside of Europe. The military and security agenda of the ColdWar was dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union, especially with regard to nuclear weapons. Ideas about mutual deterrence based on second-strike capability and the deterrence “rationality” according to American or allied Western concepts might be inaccurate guides to the avoidance of war outside of Europe.19

\*\*\*Iraq Stability Adv\*\*\*

Iraq Stability Adv: Withdrawal Now

US will remove majority of forces within a month, the rest by the end of the year

Carter 9, (Chelsea J, Associated Press, 8/31/2009 12:43 PM, U.S. ramps up withdrawal from Iraq, Republished with Permission by: USA Today, <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2009-08-30-withdrawal_N.htm>) WDK

The U.S. military is packing up to leave Iraq in what has been deemed the largest movement of manpower and equipment in modern military history — shipping out more than 1.5 million pieces of equipment from tanks to antennas along with a force the size of a small city. The massive operation already underway a year ahead of the Aug. 31, 2010, deadline to remove all U.S. combat troops from Iraq shows the U.S. military has picked up the pace of a planned exit from Iraq that could cost billions. The goal is to withdraw tens of thousands of troops and about 60% of equipment out of Iraq by the end of next March, Brig. Gen. Heidi Brown, a deputy commander charged with overseeing the withdrawal, told the Associated Press in one of the first detailed accounts of how the U.S. military plans to leave Iraq. Convoys carrying everything from armored trucks to radios have been rolling near daily through southern Iraq to Kuwait and the western desert to Jordan since President Obama announced the deadline to remove combat troops, leaving up to 50,000 troops under a U.S.-Iraqi security agreement until the end of 2011. First out, Brown said, will be the early withdrawal of an Army combat brigade of about 5,000. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has said a brigade would leave by the end of the year, months ahead of schedule, if violence in Iraq did not escalate beyond current levels. That will be followed by the Marine Corps, which has already shipped out about half of its 22,000 troops and more than 50% of its equipment since May. "In about six months or less, they will be gone," she said. The U.S. military also plans to shrink the contractor force from roughly 130,000 to 50,000 by September 2010. Those remaining would pick up additional duties from departing troops, Brown said. The nearly 300 American bases and outposts currently remaining in Iraq will shrink to 50 or less by the president's deadline, Brown said.

Iraq pullout will continue, in spite of security and stability risks

Lando 5, (2010-05-13, Ben Lando, The Wall Street Journal, Next U.S. Challenge in Iraq: Leaving, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704247904575239951065614546.html>) WDK

U.S. commanders in Iraq and Washington are moving ahead with pulling their troops from the country, despite fresh worries about security raised by recent insurgent attacks and political gridlock in Baghdad. U.S. commanders have been monitoring the violence and political stalemate that followed March 7 parliamentary polls, but so far are sticking to the Obama administration's timeline. "We are on track with our responsible drawdown plan," said U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Stephen Lanza, the top spokesman for American forces in Iraq. The plan calls for commanders to reduce troop strength in Iraq to 50,000 by Sept. 1 from the current roughly 92,000. In that period, the number of U.S. bases—from large installations to smaller outposts—will drop to 97 from 135, officials say.

Iraqi security forces themselves are worried about a US withdrawal and subsequent implosion of the Iraqi military

Wood 7, (Withdrawal of Troops, Supplies Could Take at Least 20 Months, Officials Say, Baltimore Sun. http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/239/37845.html) WDK

Once Washington signals its intent to withdraw, Iraqis working in the security forces will begin looking elsewhere for protection, making them "unreliable combat partners," said Steven Simon, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former White House National Security Council official. Some expect large-scale desertions. Iraqi government officials, translators and others closely identified with U.S. forces may join the exodus from the country, crippling critical government services. For U.S. troops during a withdrawal, "casualty avoidance" will become the main mission. "It will be politically untenable to sacrifice lives in a cause that has already been abandoned," Simon explained, adding: "It's going to be dangerous for everybody."

Iraq Stability Adv: Withdrawal Now

A lack of official planning risks a violent withdrawal process, original Iraqi invasion proves

Wood 7, (Withdrawal of Troops, Supplies Could Take at Least 20 Months, Officials Say, Baltimore Sun. http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/239/37845.html) WDK

These potential difficulties have provoked rising concern about the lack of planning for withdrawal, not only among military officers here but also in Washington. On Friday, two of the Senate's most respected Republican authorities on international and military affairs, Richard G. Lugar of Indiana and John W. Warner of Virginia, introduced a measure to compel the Bush administration to "immediately initiate planning" for the next steps in Iraq, "including a drawdown or redeployment of troops." "We saw in 2003 after the initial invasion of Iraq the disastrous results of failing to plan adequately," Lugar said in a floor speech. "We need to be planning for what comes next." Others have urged the administration to persuade Iran to use its influence with Shiite insurgents in Iraq to achieve a relatively peaceful withdrawal - just as the United States reached an understanding with China to persuade its Viet Cong allies not to interfere with the American reduction of forces.

Despite costs and other potential difficulties, the withdrawal can and will move forward with logistical support

Wood 7, (Withdrawal of Troops, Supplies Could Take at Least 20 Months, Officials Say, Baltimore Sun. http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/239/37845.html) WDK

Despite the costs and other problems, logisticians insist they can handle withdrawal. "We know how to do this - it's our job," said Maj. Stephen Sherbody, an Army logistician at Camp Anaconda in Iraq who studies Wal-Mart's trucking operations in his off-hours. The difficulty, he said, "is people are shooting at us."

**Iraq agrees on prompt US pullout, but harbor serious fears of political instability**

Chulov 10, (Martin, The Guardian, Published on Wednesday, May 12, 2010 by [The Guardian/UK](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/12/iraq-us-troop-withdrawal-delay) <http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/05/12-3>) WDK

All US combat forces are due to leave Iraq by 31 August, a date the Obama administration is keen to observe as the US president sends greater reinforcements to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan – a campaign he has set apart from the Iraq war, by describing it as "just". Iraqi leaders remain adamant that combat troops should leave by the prescribed deadline. However, they face the problem of not having enough troops to secure the country if the rejuvenated insurgency succeeds in sparking another lethal round of sectarian conflict.

Iraq Stability Adv: Withdrawal Now

**Political stalemate has decreased Iraqi stability, US troop withdrawal would further the terrorism**

Chulov 10, (Martin, The Guardian, Published on Wednesday, May 12, 2010 by [The Guardian/UK](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/12/iraq-us-troop-withdrawal-delay) <http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/05/12-3>) WDK

"The presence of foreign forces sent shock waves through Iraqis," said Hoshyar Zebari, the foreign minister. "And at the beginning it was a terrifying message that they didn't dare challenge. But then they got emboldened through terrorism and acts of resistance. And as the Americans are leaving, we are seeing more of it." From his office in central Baghdad, destroyed in a massive explosion last August at the start of a new phase in the insurgency, Zebari said Iraq's neighbours were taking full advantage of the political stalemate. He also hinted that they may be directly backing the violence.

Empirically proven that Iraqi forces are not prepared and will ultimately lead to a mutinous political climate founded in civil unrest

Bumiller and Baker 9, (Published: July 29, 2009 The New York Times Gates Sees Faster Iraq Troop Pullout, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/30/world/middleeast/30military.html?\_r=1)

The fighting at the Iranian exile camp 60 miles north of Baghdad illustrated the shifting balance of power in Iraq as the Americans increasingly turn over responsibility to Iraqi security forces. Iraqi military and police units clashed with members of an Iranian opposition group for a second day on Wednesday as government forces sought to seize control of the camp, Camp Ashraf, which had been protected by American forces since 2003. At least six people who lived in Camp Ashraf were killed during the assault, two of whom had been shot to death, according to the government and residents. General Odierno told reporters in Baghdad on Tuesday that the military did not know that the Iraqis were going to raid the camp, even though United States forces had guarded the camp until several months ago. Iraqi officials blamed camp residents for the violence, saying security personnel had only fired their guns in the air during the assault but were met by a hail of stones and Molotov cocktails. “Our forces went to this camp in a peaceful way, but people threw rocks at them,” said Ali al-Dabbagh, a government spokesman. Residents said security forces struck people with clubs and sprayed fire hoses as they entered the camp, and produced a video to back up their version of events. Dr. Hamid Gazayeri, a physician who lives at the camp, said its 50-bed hospital was filled with the injured.

By the end of the summer, a steep troop withdrawal will leave a fraction of US presence

Bumiller and Baker 9, (Published: July 29, 2009 The New York Times Gates Sees Faster Iraq Troop Pullout, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/30/world/middleeast/30military.html?_r=1>) WDK

About 130,000 American troops remain in Iraq; most will stay to provide security through Iraqi elections in January. From March through August 2010, the Obama administration plan calls for a steep drawdown of some 80,000 troops, so that by the end of next summer only a residual force of 30,000 to 50,000 would still be in place until they too withdraw by the end of 2011.

Withdrawal = Political Instability

US has acted as a bulwark against negative Iranian power projection in the region, withdrawal crumbles the levies

Friedman 10, (George, Chairman, co-founder, intelligence officer at Strategic Forecasting Inc. (StratFor), The U.S. Withdrawal From Iraq March 5, 2010 | 2147 GMT http://web.stratfo r.com/images/write rs/IRAQ\_WITHDRAWAL.pdf?fn=2815454939) WDK

U.S. drawdown plans are jeopardized not only by events and players within Iraq. One result of the U.S. move to effect regime change in Baghdad has been the rise of Iran. The Islamic republic, through its Shiite allies, has gained a disproportionate amount of influence in Iraq, which it is using to project power into the region. The dominant presence of the U.S. military in Iraq and the U.S. hand in the political system has thus far served as a counterweight. A U.S. withdrawal will give Iran an opening to enhance its position in the country.

US withdrawal will lead to friction between the Kurds and Arab majorities, increasing ethnic violence and political entropy

Friedman 10, (George, Chairman, co-founder, intelligence officer at Strategic Forecasting Inc. (StratFor), The U.S. Withdrawal From Iraq March 5, 2010 | 2147 GMT http://web.stratfo r.com/images/write rs/IRAQ\_WITHDRAWAL.pdf?fn=2815454939) WDK

The Iraqi Kurds are vastly outnumbered by the country’s Arab majority, are located in a landlocked area and lack any external patrons. As such, they do not know what their place will be in a post-American Iraq and are on the defensive. A continued U.S. military presence would serve their interests of consolidating and enhancing their regional autonomy, so their ideal situation would involve a permanent U.S. military presence in Iraq. But since a drawdown eventually will come in some form, their best hope is to maintain sufficient internal unity to resist the Sunnis, Shia, Iran, Turkey and Syria, all of whom have an interest in keeping the Kurds boxed in. The Kurdish areas came together as part of an autonomous federal zone called the [Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090130_iraq_elections_and_kurd_arab_struggle?fn=4415454959) in the post-Baathist political arrangement. Ethnic differences between the Kurds and the Arab majority meant Kurdish areas [remained largely free of ethnic militia violence](http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary_pragmatism_iraqi_kurds?fn=3315454942) that ravaged the rest of Iraq from 2003 to 2007. With the Obama administration wanting to stick to its military withdrawal timetable, there are serious questions about the relative calm that has prevailed between the Kurds and the Arabs. While the Kurds want to prolong the U.S. presence in Iraq, they also have been preparing for the inevitable departure of American troops by exploiting the Shia-Sunni sectarian fault line. That said, they themselves remain bitterly at odds with both the Sunnis, with whom they have territorial disputes and the Shia, who seek to consolidate their nascent domination of the country and are thus at odds with Kurdish ambitions for greater autonomy.

Sunni-Shia conflict with the Kurds will prevent the formation of a successful post-Ba’athist Democracy

Friedman 10, (George, Chairman, co-founder, intelligence officer at Strategic Forecasting Inc. (StratFor), The U.S. Withdrawal From Iraq March 5, 2010 | 2147 GMT http://web.stratfo r.com/images/write rs/IRAQ\_WITHDRAWAL.pdf?fn=2815454939) WDK

Control over energy resources could unite the Sunnis and Shia against the Kurds to a certain degree: The Sunnis want control of the oil-rich Kirkuk region in the north, while the Shia want to limit the extent to which the Kurds can export energy resources from KRG territory on their own. Each of these issues has existed since the post-Baathist system began to take shape, but the presence of U.S. forces in the country has kept them in check. Given the looming U.S. withdrawal and the elections — which may result in a weakening of the Kurdish share of the parliament, as the Sunnis are not boycotting polls like they did last time — the question is whether the Kurds can continue to avoid major conflicts with the Sunnis and Shia.

Iran has and will continue to undermine any political harmony in Iraq, only US forces prevent

Friedman 10, (George, Chairman, co-founder, intelligence officer at Strategic Forecasting Inc. (StratFor), The U.S. Withdrawal From Iraq March 5, 2010 | 2147 GMT http://web.stratfo r.com/images/write rs/IRAQ\_WITHDRAWAL.pdf?fn=2815454939) WDK

For Iran, Iraq is both a threat and an opportunity: a threat because invasions have historically been launched from Iraq, an opportunity because when Iraq has been under Persian control, it has served as a launch pad for Iranian regional ambitions. For this reason, Iran worked with the United States in the latter’s efforts to oust the Baathist regime, with which the Islamic republic had fought a long and costly war during the 1980s. Furthermore, Iraq’s Shia majority, a core ally of Washington in the move to effect regime change, is politically dominated by entities closely aligned with Iran. The Iranians thus saw a double benefit in the U.S. invasion of Iraq in that it would rid Iran of a major foe, and likely replace it with a friendly regime. It was in the second step that U.S.-Iranian interests sharply diverged. Not wanting to rely too heavily on the Shia and thus empower Iran, the United States sought to bring the Sunnis, many of whom were former Baathists, back into the Iraqi political equation and exploit the internal divisions among the Shia to undermine Iranian influence. The result has been a long struggle between Washington and Tehran over Baghdad — one that continues even as the United States works toward withdrawal. To ensure its own dominance in Iraq, Iran has several levers. It enjoys a close alliance with most major Shiite political parties, equally close ties with Shiite Islamist militant groups, solid religious associations in the Shiite south as well as long-standing ties to a much wider spectrum of Kurdish and even Sunni (political and militant) actors. Its main lever is the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) led by Ammar al-Hakim and the Iraqi National Alliance (INA). But short-term dynamics and considerations complicate the way Iran moves toward its long-term goal of consolidating control over Iraq. The sooner American troops withdraw, the sooner Tehran can further solidify its position in Baghdad, but the United States’ presence in Iraq provides Iran leverage as a deterrent to American air strikes on its nuclear program. In other words, while Iran wants U.S. forces removed from Iraq as it would pave the way for Tehran to better project power in the region, it also does not want Washington to have a freer hand in taking military action against it. Also, though U.S. troops are no longer as central to the security situation in Iraq as they were in 2006, they potentially would be the only force capable of re-establishing stability if Iran were to re-ignite sectarian violence. This is not something Iran necessarily wants to do, but just like a self-defeating attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz, which would rob Iran of refined gasoline imports upon which it is dependent, it makes for a persuasive deterrent.

A withdrawal will lead to civil war, governmental collapse, and regional conflicts

Associated Press 7, (7/9/2007 2:29:47 PM ET, Republished by: MSNBC with permission Top official warns of Iraq collapse if U.S. leaves White House says it isn't considering a pullout, despite loss of GOP support <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19676021/>) WDK

Iraq’s foreign minister warned on Monday that a quick American military withdrawal from the country could lead to a full-scale civil war, the collapse of the government and spillover conflicts across the region. Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said Iraqis “understand the huge pressure that will increase more and more in the United States” ahead of the progress report by the U.S. ambassador and top commander in Iraq. “We have held discussion with members of Congress and explained to them the dangers of a quick pullout and leaving a security vacuum,” Zebari said. “The dangers could be a civil war, dividing the country, regional wars and the collapse of the state.”

Multiple groups, political or otherwise, rely on US presence in Iraq

Oliker et al 10 (RAND Corp. The Impact of U.S. Military Drawdown in Iraq on Displaced and Other

Vulnerable Populations Analysis and Recommendations, Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Approved for public release; distribution unlimited, [http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\_p apers/2010/RAND\_OP272.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP272.pdf)) WDK

Groups at particular risk as U.S. forces depart Iraq include tens of thousands of Iraqis and their families who are affiliated with the United States in any of a variety of ways, smaller minorities among Iraq’s permanent citizens who have relied on U.S. forces for protection. Palestinians who took refuge in Iraq under the Saddam Hussein government other refugee groups from outside Iraq who have taken shelter in that country over the years2 the Mujeheddin e-Khalq (MEK), a cult-like dissident group from Iran that received sanctuary in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1991 and whose members have since lived in their own enclave, from 2003 to early 2009 under the protection of U.S. forces. Violence against these populations is a real danger as U.S. forces draw down. It would surely present a humanitarian tragedy to which the global community may not be able to respond in time. The United States would likely be held at least partially accountable, with detrimental results for U.S. image, credibility, and influence. It could also serve as a starting point for renewed violence in Iraq.

Iraq is stabilizing with US help, a withdrawal will erase any progress made in the past decade

Bohandy 10 (S.R., RAND Corp., Security in Iraq Emerging Threats as U.S. Forces Withdraw, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/2010/RAND_RB9481.pdf> ) WDK

After years of bitter and violent fighting, Iraq is finally becoming more stable. The main

partisan political groups—Sunni, Kurd, and Shi’a—are cooperating to confront common concerns. The new, nonviolent political order, with the government of Iraq at its core, is winning growing popular support. Extremist groups, such as al Qaeda in Iraq, lack, at least for now, the ability to incite factional fighting. U.S. troops have begun their drawdown. But the security situation is still shaky, and the end of U.S. occupation could bring consequences that could destroy Iraq’s hard-won progress. Particularly of fighting among Iraq’s main groups, many of which are

sufficiently well armed to throw the country into a new cycle of violence. The book suggests that the most likely dangers are not necessarily the most consequential and points to what the United States can do to help guard against a renewed upsurge of large-scale factional conflict that would undercut both Iraqi and U.S. interests.

Kurd-Iraq political hostility will be the end of Iraq

Bohandy 10 (S.R., RAND Corp., Security in Iraq Emerging Threats as U.S. Forces Withdraw, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/2010/RAND_RB9481.pdf> ) WDK

The U.S. drawdown is creating a window in which the Iraqi Security Forces have not yet effectively replaced U.S. troops and other groups’ forces are still relatively strong, compared with the government’s. This security gap presents a formidable period of uncertainty. Although the Sadrists’ militant arm seems already overmatched and the Sons of Iraq are quickly losing ground, the Kurdish Peshmerga could still effectively counter the Iraqi Security Forces in Iraqi Kurdistan. Should the Kurds calculate that force offers a better option than peaceful politics to achieve their goal of a self governed Kurdistan in Iraq, they probably have the ability to hold off the Iraqi Security Forces in Kurdistan in the near term. Any event that makes them feel isolated or threatened could tip them in that direction—a local incident, loss of political leverage in Baghdad, a Sunni-Shi’a coalition leading to Kurdish marginalization, or consolidation of power by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. Oil wealth is also at stake. Because the Kurds would need to act before the capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces become superior to the Pesh- merga’s and the odds shift against them, the main danger is in the next few years. The consequence, should the Kurds take this step, could be the break-up of Iraq.

Iraq Stability Adv: Iraq Withdrawal Bad

Iraq withdrawal would result in a bloody civil war

Bukay, No Date. (David, Ph.D, Professor at the School of Political Science in the University of Haifa and writer for the Heritage Foundation. “Should the U.S. Immediately Begin Withdrawal from Iraq?” <http://www.answerbag.com/debates/us-immediately-withdrawal-iraq_1855460>). LRH.

At least five likely consequences would flow from abruptly abandoning the people of Iraq. Such a shortsighted U.S. policy would be a severe blow to the Iraqi security situation, oil exports, American allies in the region, the global war against terrorism, and the future of all Iraqis.   
A sudden U.S. withdrawal would raise the risks of full-fledged civil war and disintegration of the army into hostile factions. The defection of soldiers to various militias, taking with them their heavy equipment, would bolster the militias’ firepower and capacity to seize and hold terrain. The result would be a bloody and protracted civil war, such as the conflict in Bosnia following the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

An immediate withdrawal from Iraq would collapse peace and stability in Iraq  
Bukay, No Date. (David, Ph.D, Professor at the School of Political Science in the University of Haifa and writer for the Heritage Foundation. “Should the U.S. Immediately Begin Withdrawal from Iraq?” <http://www.answerbag.com/debates/us-immediately-withdrawal-iraq_1855460>). LRH.

While Iraq has made remarkable progress over the past year in virtually every category, including security, economic growth, humanitarian issues and governance, the outcome is still in doubt. The U.S. military presence remains, for the moment, an indispensable stabilizing force; its effective employment in training and supporting Iraqi security forces, defeating al-Qaeda, and improving security conditions so that refugees can return to their homes is important in helping the Iraqis achieve peace and stability. While the long-term presence of American combat troops is not in the interests of the United States or the Iraqi government, how U.S. troops leave Iraq (when the country is clearly on the path to peace and stability) is much more important than when the troops come home.

Iraq Stability Adv: Desertification Add-on

The Plan Solves Continued US presence is key to preventing collapse, current government can’t fix the problem alone

Hanks 8 (Steven, COMMENTARY: Left in the Desert: The Environmental Fallout of the Iraq War, <http://www.emagazine.com/view/?4285>)

The fiery furnace of the Iraqi desert bears witness to some of the most appalling environmental conditions in the world. Alongside the human suffering in the drawn-out Iraq War exists a struggling and ravaged land. The U.S. coalition's occupation of Iraq has threatened a fragile ecosystem with more than just the tools of war. Complicating matters is an unstable, provisional government that does not have the means, or the manpower, to protect the land. But with billions of dollars flowing into the region, it would simply take a little recognition and focused effort to get the environmental tragedy under control. The influx of massive numbers of troops has brought stress upon the Middle Eastern desert. Despite sky-darkening sandstorms and oppressive heat, the Mesopotamian desert is not a dead world. The ecology of the desert environment is diverse and self-sustaining. But it is also a carefully balanced mix of flora and fauna that does not react well to aggressive external incursion. The thousands of plant species, dozens of terrestrial mammals, and untold numbers of reptiles, amphibians and insects have all been pushed to the brink without the protection of an environmental sustainability policy. Along with the influx of combat troops comes the support required to keep those troops viable. U.S. tax dollars encourage contractors to flood into the desert in numbers that dwarf that of the combat force. With all these auxiliary civilians come the trappings and byproducts of civilian society. There seems to be little or no concern for the immediate or future environmental implications as machinery grinds across the arid landscape. If policies to mitigate this effect exist, they are neither mandated nor adhered to. As if the hazardous materials generated by conducting an ongoing military campaign were not enough, the waste generated by the untold thousands of civilians compounds the problem. Civilians create excess amounts of garbage that is included in the military’s massive open burns. Choking the sky with black smoke, these burns can be seen from miles away. The stench of burning trash permeates the air and infects the soil, containing high levels of carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, lead, arsenic, mercury and barium. These compounds cause reactions ranging from mild irritation to deadly disease among the local population and wildlife. And these open burns do not allow for the complete combustion of refuse, due to their low relative burning temperatures. Ash particulates of halogenated hydrocarbons create a continuous buildup of hazardous substances that leach into the soil and groundwater where they can remain for decades. Besides the discarded trash, thousands of gallons of raw waste sewage (black water) is generated in the region. Without a working infrastructure, disposal of the waste is cause for environmental concern. Waste water facilities exist only in their infancy, and many others have fallen into disrepair. At central military bases and sub-compounds, raw sewage is trucked off-site and pumped directly into roadside canals. Rarely is waste transported more than a mile from a base or compound before being recklessly discarded. At some sites, the waste is taken directly to a hole in the exterior wall of the compound and simply sprayed into the desert. Other sites feature troughs where the raw sewage is sluiced off the base and then mixed with the groundwater immediately surrounding the compound. Local contractors show no concern for their own environment. Coalition forces tend to turn a blind eye to the systematical, blatant disregard for health and safety. With a sanitation system in shambles, the thousands of troops and civilians require a healthy supply of clean water. One Baghdad plant, opened in 2006, serves to fill this need. The plant generates 450,000 one-liter bottles of water per day. That translates into the equivalent of 37,500 cases or 625 pallets of water. To put those numbers in perspective, a 45 foot long tractor trailer holds only 22 pallets. This seemingly beneficial production has led to a growing environmental concern—the plastic water bottles must go somewhere. They are certainly not trucked out of the country and recycled. Without a sufficient system to recycle these items, they often end up buried, burned, or strewn across the countryside. And then there are the more obvious byproducts of war—the open disposal of hazardous materials and junk equipment. War, by its very nature, causes destruction to equipment of all types. Hundreds of miles of open junk fields scar the Iraqi landscape. Thousands of vehicles, ordnance items, construction materials, air conditioning units, armor, tires, and parts litter these fields. Never is this vast destructive creation reused, recycled or rebuilt. It is all left to decay in the sand, poisoning the very land upon which it sits. The United States government has continued stewardship over the country of Iraq. Will the burden of rebuilding the Iraqi environmental infrastructure fall upon the American taxpayers? Government contracts are typically planned out down to the most specific detail, yet the impact this war has had upon the environment seems to be a second thought at best. The final word on this tragic situation will be written by policy-makers who have never stepped foot in the land they have helped destroy. People speaking on behalf of the environment need to demand answers.

Militarization in an Iraqi civil war would disrupt the already unstable desert environment collapsing biodiversity

Thompson 91 (JL, Professor of zoology, University of London, England., Waging war on the Earth, Environmental Action 22(5), EBSCO)

There has been a huge military build up in the gulf--both in Kuwait by the Iragis and in Saudi Arabia by the U.S. and other nations--with a lot of troops and heavy equipment. What kinds of impacts are these likely to create in the desert environment? Deserts, as everyone knows, are very fragile environments. And therefore, any movement--particularly of armored and heavy vehicles--cuts through the top surface and then erosion will set in and so the effects on the environment will last for centuries. And it is not something that could be recovered from? Does it depend on the kind of desert? Yes, some sorts are more vulnerable. Where you have a surface which is held together by microorganisms, once the surface is cut up you get erosion, and so there will be deep troughs and valleys where the sand gets blown away, where it has been destabilized. Vehicles then get close to the roots of plants. The wind will also expose the roots, and the plants will die. Most of us when we think of deserts don't think of plant life or much life at ale What kinds are there? Except in very extreme deserts, shrubs of various kinds are in the Arabian peninsula. It is a very interesting desert, because it is so varied. You get dunes in parts, and you get rocky deserts and you get flat, level desert and so on. Part of the trouble is that not only will deserts destabilize, but you will spoil the appearance. Future generations of people may be rather sorry not to see how it really looked, after it has been spoiled by so much transport and so on. There have been many reports of Iraq digging trenches and the U.S. and others are dug in as well on their side of the border. I imagine that would have an even greater impact than the tanks and other vehicles, In 1941, the 7th Armored Divisional Axis drove across Libya, and after a very short while the surface became extremely covered with dust: about 18 inches to two feet of dust and then very bumpy underneath. There was this channel where the division moved backwards and forwards--only one real major movement forward and back--and yet I think that should be there thousands of years, millennia. Dust storms would be much easier to create because of the erosion? All through the desert war [World War II] because of the erosion there were tremendous dust storms. I remember once when it was so bad, I held my hand out in front of my face and I couldn't see it. In another storm at night, I wanted to go from my own tank to my troop sergeant's tank. I put a torch down and I walked in his direction. I took three steps backward and I couldn't see the light of the torch. So, I waited until two days later when the dust stopped and could get over and make contact with him. It was as bad as that. Helicopters would add to this dust problem? The more mechanized these activities, the more damage is done to the environment. The problem is that when it is a matter of life and death one doesn't think all that much about the future. You think of the present and existing now. Winning the war in the present time. These dust storms, how far will they blow? Would they have an effect in terms of cooling the region? Well, they are part of a very big effect of wind erosion blowing the surface soil from desert regions of the world, but this has been going on ever since the Pleistocene really. In China, the rich fertile soil was based on top soil blown from nearby desert areas. Parts of the Atlantic have been known as the "dark sea" since the Middle Ages, because of the amount of dust in the sky blown from the Sahara. It is a perfectly natural phenomenon, but what human beings do is increase the rate of it very, very much. And the effects of the erosion and the subsequent dust are very hard to predict? That is what I am getting at. All you can be sure is that the effects will be very harmful. In World War II, nobody knew about the environment at all. It wasn't really considered, but it was obvious afterwards. It is a choice of evils and you want to know as many factors when you are making the choice.

Civil War rearmament will destroy Iraqi deserts

Perkins 4 (Sid, Thin Skin, <http://www.phschool.com/science/science_news/articles/thin_skin.html>)

As they barreled across the desert toward Baghdad during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq last March, the tanks, trucks, and armored personnel carriers churned up huge clouds of dust. Iraqi vehicles mobilized to defend against the onslaught generated their own plumes of grit. In a literal sense at least, much of the dust in Iraq has begun to settle. If history is a guide, however, the ruts the combat vehicles left behind will spew prodigious amounts of dust for years. That airborne material can cause major environmental and health problems. As the battalions maneuvered across the arid terrain, their vehicles often broke through a delicate crust known as desert pavement. This type of veneer covers as much as half of the world's arid lands. Despite the connotations of its name, desert pavement isn't robust. It's merely a thin shell of stones that lies atop the dust, soil, or sand. Multi-ton tanks easily breach these fragile mosaics, but so do dirt bikes and all-terrain vehicles. Even trudging hikers, grazing animals, and the scrabbling of rodents and birds can disrupt desert pavements, exposing subsurface material to erosion and disrupting fragile ecosystems of fungi and algae. Damage can happen in a moment, but the processes that sculpt desert pavement typically act slowly, taking centuries to generate a surface resistant to wind erosion. Therefore, when desert pavements and their biota are wounded by human activity, it will take human action to heal them on a shorter timescale. Scientists are currently developing large-scale experiments to determine what methods might be most effective for mending a scarred desert. Successful techniques, far from being of interest only in war-torn regions, might also address a plague of problems that could result from an increase in the recreational use of environmentally sensitive public lands in the American Southwest. Back to the future In August 1990, Iraqi troops invaded and captured Kuwait. For the next 6 months, they dug pits in the desert to hide equipment, excavated trenches to protect soldiers, and built 2-meter-tall sand berms to slow opposing troops. Military maneuvers during the liberation of Kuwait in February 1991 scarred the desert further. A comparison of satellite images taken just before and after the conflict show that almost 950 square kilometers of desert pavement were destroyed by such activity, says Farouk El-Baz, a geologist at Boston University. The planting or removal of land mines denuded another 3,500 km2 or so. In all, the desert pavement across more than 20 percent of Kuwait's land area was disrupted. As a result, immense quantities of the area's fine-grained soil, previously locked beneath a stony blanket, were lofted by winds. Airborne dust reduced visibility and exacerbated a variety of health problems, such as asthma and other respiratory ailments, says El-Baz. Within months, the fine sands accumulated in dune fields on the northern shore of Kuwait Bay. In western portions of the country, sheets of sand smothered some roads and farms.

Iraq Stability Adv: Iran Prolif Add-On

The US must keep troops in Iraq to check Iran prolif

Bukay, No Date. (David, Ph.D, Professor at the School of Political Science in the University of Haifa and writer for the Heritage Foundation. “Should the U.S. Immediately Begin Withdrawal from Iraq?” <http://www.answerbag.com/debates/us-immediately-withdrawal-iraq_1855460>). LRH.

The other alternative is whether the US can come to terms with Iran, to stop its onslaught to rule the whole region. Again, the answer is not. The US cannot reach this goal since Iran is too revisionist, too ambitious to stop, too inflamed with the belief of its religious superiority to come true, and visions the strategic balance in favor of her. This is the American tragedy: to stop Iran the US must hold Iraq. No internal power, even regional exists to take the mission. "Fortress America" is not an option.

Iraq withdrawal would result in Iranian dominance and would undermine US leadership  
Bukay, No Date. (David, Ph.D, Professor at the School of Political Science in the University of Haifa and writer for the Heritage Foundation. “Should the U.S. Immediately Begin Withdrawal from Iraq?” <http://www.answerbag.com/debates/us-immediately-withdrawal-iraq_1855460>). LRH.

The chief beneficiary of a rapid U.S. pullout would be Iran, which still has considerable influence over the dominant Shiite political parties, which represent most Iraqi Shiites (about 65 percent of the population). If Iraq imploded, Iran quickly could gain dominance over an emerging “Shiastan” rump state endowed with the bulk of Iraq’s oil reserves. This would give Iran additional resources and a staging area to escalate subversive efforts targeted at the Shiite majority in Bahrain and Shiite minorities in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. These and other countries look to the United States to serve as a guarantor against an aggressive Iran. If the United States fails to follow through on its commitment to establish a stable government in Iraq, it will severely undermine its credibility. Abandoning Iraqi allies would erode the confidence of other allies in U.S. leadership (particularly in Pakistan where they eye U.S. calls to take on the Taliban with some degree of skepticism) and further fuel conspiracy theories about American plots to carve up Iraq to keep Arabs weak and divided.

The US must keep its troops in Iraq in order to keep Iran’s power in check

Bukay, No Date. (David, Ph.D, Professor at the School of Political Science in the University of Haifa and writer for the Heritage Foundation. “Should the U.S. Immediately Begin Withdrawal from Iraq?” <http://www.answerbag.com/debates/us-immediately-withdrawal-iraq_1855460>). LRH.

Under these circumstances, the question that the US should have asked was, do we have an alternative to Saddam regime that can put Iran at bay that can withhold Iranian onslaught to stir up, to revolutionize the whole Middle East? The answer is not. This brings the US to decide: if it sees Iran as a lethal threat to the whole region, and there is no strong and stable alternative to undermine it, than it must stay in Iraq with all its military power, even without trying to establish a democracy there. The US must bear in mind that there is a clear-cut Shiite majority in Iraq, and if it leaves, Iran will wipe out Iraq, bringing it under its fold, together with Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority. At best, Iraq will be separated to three regions as was the situation before the British Mandate until 1930 (a Kurdish non-Arab Sunni regime in the north; an Arab-Shiite regime in the south, and a mixed chaotic Sunni-Shiite situation at the center).

Iraq Stability Adv: Turkey key to US withdrawal

**Once requested, the US will rely on the usage of Turkey’s air bases to withdraw forces from Iraq**

United Press International 9, (Ankara (AFP) Turkey may allow US to use bases for Iraq pullout: ministerMarch 4, 2009 [http://www.spacewar.com/reports /Turkey\_may\_allow\_US\_t o\_use\_bases\_for\_Iraq\_pullout\_minister\_999.html](http://www.spacewar.com/reports%20/Turkey_may_allow_US_t%20o_use_bases_for_Iraq_pullout_minister_999.html) ) WDK

Turkey's government is open to the United States using its military bases during Washington's planned withdrawal of troops from neighbouring Iraq, Foreign Minister Ali Babacan said Wednesday. "We have not received a concrete request, but if a request is made to us, we will evaluate it," he said, cited by Anatolia news agency. "But frankly our attitude is favourable." Media reports have suggested such a demand could be made when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visits Ankara on Saturday as part of a regional tour. "We will speak clearly about the quantity and the nature of the equipment that will transit and the time that it will take to carry out the process," Babacan said of the upcoming discussions with the Americans. On Friday, US President Barack Obama ordered an end to US combat in Iraq by August 31, 2010. Up to 50,000 US troops are to remain under a new mission until the end of 2011. More recently, Turkish forces have carried out raids on Kurdish rebel bases in northern Iraq with the help of intelligence supplied by the United States.

As the US’ close regional ally, Turkey is the major player in the exit strategy

Friedman 10, (George, Chairman, co-founder, intelligence officer at Strategic Forecasting Inc. (StratFor), The U.S. Withdrawal From Iraq March 5, 2010 | 2147 GMT http://web.stratfo r.com/images/write rs/IRAQ\_WITHDRAWAL.pdf?fn=2815454939) WDK

More significant, the United States is depending on Turkey — a close ally whose global rise is not seen yet by the United States as a threat to its interests — to manage not just Iraq but the wider Middle East as it seeks to militarily disengage from the Islamic world. In other words, there is a convergence of American and Turkish interests in Iraq, which will serve to facilitate the U.S. military pullout. Also, Turkey has shed the simple pro-Western foreign policy it maintained during the Cold War and adopted a more nuanced one. Ankara also remains upset that it is not getting substantive cooperation from Washington against Iraq-based Kurdish rebels. Turkey will work to facilitate a U.S. military exit from Iraq, especially since it will allow Turkey to emerge as a major player in the country. But the United States needs to placate Iraqi Kurds to maintain the domestic peace, which could conflict with Turkish interests and complicate matters with Ankara.

Turkey critical to US withdrawal

Parsens and King 9 (Christi and Laura, Washington Tribune’s ‘Swamp” section April 7, 2009 [Obama in Iraq: A careful withdrawal](http://www.swamppolitics.com/news/politics/blog/2009/04/obama_in_iraq_a_careful_withdr.html) <http://www.swamppolitics.co> m/news/politics/blog/2009/04/ob ama\_in\_ir aq\_a\_careful\_withdr.html)

One step toward that goal was Obama's visit to Turkey on Monday and Tuesday to visit with the president and prime minister. Turkey would probably play a critical role in a withdrawal from Iraq as a staging area for personnel and equipment. The country also provides critical supply lines for military troops in the region. The president's first visit to Iraq comes six years into a war which first the candidate for president, and now the commander-in-chief, has vowed to end. Obama has pledged to remove U.S. combat forces from Iraq by August 2010.

Any other major powers in the region are not capable nor motivated enough to assist in an Iraqi pullout, leaving Turkey to do it on its own

Parsens and King 9 (Christi and Laura, Washington Tribune’s ‘Swamp” section April 7, 2009 [Obama in Iraq: A careful withdrawal](http://www.swamppolitics.com/news/politics/blog/2009/04/obama_in_iraq_a_careful_withdr.html) <http://www.swamppolitics.co> m/news/politics/blog/2009/04/ob ama\_in\_ir aq\_a\_careful\_withdr.html)

Jordan and Kuwait also border Iraq, but we did not single them out for analysis because neither of these countries has the level of capability or motivation to intervene in Iraqi affairs that is possessed by the other four states. To the extent that they do possess these capabilities or motivations, we expect such intervention to largely align with U.S. interests. That said, because the drawdown can exacerbate the Iraqi refugee challenge within Jordan, we consider that aspect of the drawdown’s effect on Jordan in our discussion of mitigation measures.

Iraq Stability Adv: Turkey key to Iraq W/D (logistical support)

Turkey’s bases provide substantial logistical support for moving supplies in and out of Iraq

Asghar 7. (Akmal, Deputy Editor of New Civilisation. “[The US and the West has no Moral Authority to Lecture the People of Turkey on Genocide](http://www.khilafah.com/kcom/index.php/analysis/america/1137-the-us-and-the-west-has-no-moral-authority-to-lecture-the-people-of-turkey-on-genocide).” October 18, 2007. <http://www.khilafah.com/kcom/index.php/analysis/america/1137-the-us-and-the-west-has-no-moral-authority-to-lecture-the-people-of-turkey-on-genocide>). LRH

However, Turkey's threat to limit co-operation with the US over Iraq as a result of this episode is unlikely to materialise. With CNN reporting that 70% of air cargo for US forces in Iraq goes through Turkey, denying logistical support and routes will clearly impact considerably upon the US's Iraq operations. The Turkish government has only considered this step after feeling insulted over remarks about her nations history-they have not, however, considered acting in similar fashion on the grounds that the continuing US occupation of Iraq has shattered an entire nation and resulted in the ongoing killing of hundreds of thousands of people.  
  
Turkish denial of logistical support would have seriously dented the US build-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and could have prevented this disasterous episode in Iraq's history from ever materialising, particularly if supported by similar actions from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait. The US invasion of Iraq has brought instability to the region, emboldened Kurdish nationalism and threatened stability in the Kurdish regions of Turkey directly.

Turkey is key to logistical operations in Iraq: 70% of the air cargo going to Iraq goes through Turkey

Erdem 7. (Suna, correspondent for the Sunday Times. “Turkish ambassador recalled from US amid fury at genocide claims.” The Sunday Times. October 12, 2007. <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article2636523.ece>). LRH.

Ankara had given warning that military co-operation with the United States could be damaged if the “genocide resolution” is passed by Congress, despite opposition from President Bush. Much of the logistic supplies for Iraq go through the Incirlik airforce base and many workers in the area are Turkish. Yesterday Robert Gates, the US Defence Secretary, said that 70 per cent of US air cargo headed for Iraq goes through Turkey. “Access to airfields and to the roads in Turkey would be put at risk if this resolution passes,” said Mr Gates in London.

Without Turkish military bases, moving troops in and out of Iraq would be almost impossible: other bases are too far away

Biddle 7. (Stephen, Senior Fellow for Defense Policy Council on Foreign Relations. “Evaluating Options for Partial Withdrawals of US Forces from Iraq” p.9. July 25, 2007). LRH

Perhaps most important, however, it is far from clear that such a redeployment could be sustained logistically without Turkish support. Kurdistan is more than 400 miles from the US logistical support base in Kuwait. If US combat forces withdraw from Iraq south of Kirkuk, supplies for forces in Kurdistan would have to be moved over literally hundreds of miles of undefended roads engulfed in bitter internecine civil warfare. This resupply effort would be extremely dangerous and very costly if it could be sustained at all. Without active Turkish support, the only alternative would be to supply the US garrison entirely from the air. But the cost of an open-ended commitment to support tens of thousands of combat troops for years through an airhead hundreds of miles from the nearest US logistical hub would be enormous – and especially so if that garrison came under attack from Iraqi factions reluctant to accept a US protectorate atop one of Iraq’s most productive oil regions. Whether we value the US relationship with Turkey or not, the Turks could dramatically increase the cost of a US deployment in Kurdistan simply by refusing to permit us to resupply it across their border. Our ability to ignore their interests could thus have important limits.

Iraq Stability Adv: Turkey Key to time table

Denying the US access to Incirlik air base would make it logistically difficult for the US to move in and out of Iraq

Subcommittee on Europe 7. (The Subcommittee on Europe, a [US House Committee on Foreign Affairs](http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/subcommittees.asp?committee=4).

“U.S.-Turkish Relations and the Challenges Ahead.” Serial No. 110–30. p.60. March 15, 2007. <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/34040.pdf>). LRH.

The U.S. can conduct operations in the region without Incirlik air base. However, if Turkey were to deny U.S. access to Incirlik, it would impose a serious and increased logistical burden on U.S. forces operating in Iraq and Afghanistan and a significant and increased financial burden on the U.S. Securing access to an alternative airbase would take time, scarce additional resources, and would disrupt the timely delivery of the fuel and supplies that our troops need to do their jobs. Incirlik Air Base serves as a key logistical hub for U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nearly 60% of air cargo heading for U.S. forces in Iraq transits Incirlik. Access to the base allows 6 planes to deliver the supplies it previously took 9–10 planes to move from Germany, saving $160 million per year. KC–135 tankers operating out of Incirlik have flown over 3,800 sorties and delivered more than 40 million gallons of fuel to U.S. fighter and transport aircraft on missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Iraq Stability Adv: Turkey key to Iraq W/D (logistical support)

Turkish logistical support is key to pulling US troops out of Iraq

Lesser 8. (Ian O, Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington. “BEYOND SUSPICION: RETHINKING US–TURKISH RELATIONS.” The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. p.19. <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/events/docs/beyondsuspicion.pdf> 2008. )LRH.

Many of the options for American disengagement or redeployment in Iraq will depend critically on Turkish logistical and political support. A “package” approach to expanded US-Turkish cooperation on Iraq would support both American and Turkish priorities: prompt American political and military pressure on the PKK issue, Turkish pressure on Syria and Iran over their role in the Iraqi insurgency, and long-term planning for stabilization—at a minimum, containment of chaos—in Iraq. Working with Turkey should not be a controversial matter. It would not require the wrenching strategic choices implied in dealing with Tehran or with Syria. Above all, the United States must be responsive to a leading security challenge facing a NATO ally.

Turkey’s base at Incirlik is key to moving supplies in and out of Iraq

Subcommittee on Europe 7. (The Subcommittee on Europe, a [US House Committee on Foreign Affairs](http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/subcommittees.asp?committee=4).

“U.S.-Turkish Relations and the Challenges Ahead.” Serial No. 110–30. p.60. March 15, 2007. <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/34040.pdf>). LRH.

It is important to recognize that there could be consequences. Turkey plays a highly significant logistical support role for NATO operations in Afghanistan and for coalition forces in Iraq. Turkey’s cargo hub at Incirlik Air Base is responsible for 74% of air cargo into Iraq. Six U.S. military C–17 aircraft based at Incirlik move the amount of cargo it took 9–10 military aircraft to move from Germany, saving $160 million per year. KC–135 tankers operating out of Incirlik have flown 3,400 sorties and delivered 35 million gallons of fuel to U.S. fighter and transport aircraft on missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Approximately 25% of the fuel used by Coalition forces enters Iraq from Turkey via the Habur Gate border crossing. In addition, 29% of the fuel used by Iraqi consumers—250,000 tankers and 1.6 billion gallons of fuel since 2003—enters through Habur Gate, despite Iraqi arrears that have approached $1 billion. Turkey provides through Habur Gate a significant amount of the food and water that Iraqis consume.

Not only does the US use Incirlik and bases like it to project power, they rely on it (For this card, it could also be cut as negative in some f\*cked up way, as in Incirlik k2 Iraq war, removal= failure in Iraq or something)

Giachetti 8, (David M. UNITED STATES MILITARY RELATIONS WITH TURKEY, A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements 15 February 2008, <https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/display.aspx?rs=enginespage&ModuleID=be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153&Action=downloadpaper&ObjectID=9692bb4e-a132-48c0-b7b3-03ea195ec95c>) WDK

In the Pentagon the frustration with Turkey resulted in a sharp drop of official military contacts and impatience with the attention that furtherance of the relationship required.41 The military relationship between the two countries has yet to fully recover from this issue. Regardless, the U.S. military continues to rely on the use of Incirlik Air Base as a critical transportation hub in support of its Iraqi operations. Fully 60% of all air cargo destined for U.S. forces in Iraq passes through Incirlik. Further, the Habur Gate at the Turkish-Iraq border, 25% of fuel used by coalition forces and 29% of the fuel and 19% of food and water used by Iraqi consumers enters the country.42 The Turkish government also continues to provide over-flight clearance for missions supporting Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom. This is a quietly executed yet critical contribution of the Turkish government to the continuing U.S. operations

Removal of troops and supplies is moved via Turkey

Wood 7, (Withdrawal of Troops, Supplies Could Take at Least 20 Months, Officials Say, Baltimore Sun. http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/239/37845.html)

At four bases in Iraq, a Pentagon agency maintains toxic stockpiles of hazardous material, including battery acid, contaminated oils, lead and industrial solvents, in stacks of 50-gallon drums. A spokesman for the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service said it wasn't clear what would become of the toxic dumps. "Some of this stuff we can sell for scrap, some equipment we'd give to the Iraqis, but at the end of the day we will move a lot of this stuff back," said Air Force Maj. Gen. Ron Ladnier, director of the Tanker Airlift Control Center at Scott Air Force Base, Ill. Most of it will move by truck, south to Kuwait or north into Turkey for eventual shipment home. Convoys will move along Route Tampa, already jammed with 2,000 trucks a day needed for normal resupply of U.S. forces.

Turkey key entry and exit point in the Iraq war

Vick 3 (Karl, Staff Writer, Washington Post Online <http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2003-06-25/news/0306240432_1_incirlik-turkey-s-cabinet-humanitarian-aid>, republished with permission by The Sun Sentinel) WDK

ISTANBUL — Turkey will allow its air bases and seaports to be used in shipping humanitarian aid to Iraq, a decision that may also open the facilities for use by U.S. and other foreign armed forces, Turkish officials said Tuesday. "We want to make Turkey an artery for humanitarian aid but it could also cover logistical matters as long as it's within the scope" of the U.N. resolution passed last month that removed sanctions on Iraq and urged international cooperation in the country's reconstruction, an official said. The decision by Turkey's Cabinet, which U.S. officials welcomed, represents the first step toward repairing relations between Turkey and the United States. Ties have been strained since March, when the Turkish parliament failed to approve requests to make the country's bases available to U.S. forces to open a northern front in the Iraq war. Turkey then massed its troops on the Iraqi border, threatening to send them across to police northern Iraq's Kurdish minority. Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul indicated "humanitarian" would be defined broadly, including transit for military forces involved in maintaining security in Iraq. "If a country involved in Iraq's reconstruction is sending peacekeeping forces to Iraq to provide security, if it wants, it will be able to use our facilities," Gul said Monday.

The U.S. assists/is assisted by Turkey in intelligence and defense measures, Incirlik proves

Burns 7, (Nicholas, Remarks at the Atlantic Council of Commissions, transcribed with permission. http://www.state.gov)

The U.S. military continued to use Incirlik Air Base to support Operation Northern Watch, previously called OPC, now protecting Iraq’s northern Kurdish population from the regime of Saddam Hussein more than providing humanitarian relief. Simultaneously, while enduring great political risk, the Turkish government took in nearly 500,000 Kurdish refugees. With some acknowledged irony, at the same time the U.S. and Turkey were cooperating to protect the Iraqi Kurds, the Turkish government launched another round of attacks against the PKK in southeastern Turkey bordering Iraq. The U.S. would assist Turkey in this endeavor by offering intelligence and assisting in the capture of the leader of the PKK Abdallah Ocalan in 1999.

U.S. is heavily staked in Incirlik, using it for intelligence, supplies, and support

Burns 7, (Nicholas, Remarks at the Atlantic Council of Commissions, transcribed with permission. http://www.state.gov)

In the Pentagon the frustration with Turkey resulted in a sharp drop of official military contacts and impatience with the attention that furtherance of the relationship required. The military relationship between the two countries has yet to fully recover from this issue. Regardless, the U.S. military continues to rely on the use of Incirlik Air Base as a critical transportation hub in support of its Iraqi operations. Fully 60% of all air cargo destined for U.S. forces in Iraq passes through Incirlik. Further, the Habur Gate at the Turkish-Iraq border, 25% of fuel used by coalition forces and 29% of the fuel and 19% of food and water used by Iraqi consumers enters the country.The Turkish government also continues to provide over-flight clearance for missions supporting Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom. This is a quietly executed yet critical contribution of the Turkish government to the continuing U.S. operations.

Iraq Stability Adv: Turkey K2 Withdrawal

Turkey is critical to United States withdrawal from Iraq

Lubold 9 (Gordon, Staff Write Christian Science Monitor, Turkey could furnish a safe way home as US departs Iraq, February 17)AC

Turkey is likely to play a prominent role as the US begins to remove thousands of tons of equipment and supplies from Iraq over the next year or so. The American military has been quietly shipping construction materials, food, fuel, and other nonlethal items into Iraq through Turkey using a two-lane commercial border crossing known as the Habur Gate in southeastern Turkey. But as the US considers its options for pulling out of Iraq - and the pace of that redeployment - the route through Turkey may play a conspicuous part, defense officials say. In addition to Kuwait, and probably Jordan, Turkey would give the US military an alternative exit as it attempts to move thousands of trucks, Humvees, and as many as 120,000 shipping containers back home. "Basically, nothing is off the table," says one American defense official, referring to the role Turkey might play. The country, which hosts a large US airbase at Incirlik, could also be a major hub for the United States as it ramps up operations in Afghanistan. Earlier this month the government of Kyrgyzstan announced it would no longer allow the US to operate a key base there. That presents a prickly logistical challenge as the US prepares to send as many as 30,000 new troops to Afghanistan.

Turkey is a key actor in the Middle East specifically regarding the withdrawal from Iraq

Cohen 9 (Ariel, senior research fellow Heritage Found., Turkey’s Dangerous Shift, The Washington Times, April 10, lexisnexis)AC

According to Mr. Erdogan, Turkey is open to providing assistance for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq through Turkey. This statement was borderline offensive in view of Turkey's refusal to allow U.S. troops to cross its territory into Iraq in 2003. Yet the planned withdrawal of troops from Iraq raises the importance of the Incirlik U.S. Air Force Base through which 70 percent of supplies to Iraq move. Beyond this, Turkey has long-standing ties to Afghanistan and Pakistan and continues to play a positive role in both countries. Mr. Obama attended a meeting between Turkish and Armenian foreign ministers, signaling U.S. support to the rapprochement between the two old foes. Mr. Obama avoided alienating a key ally by not by using the "G" word (genocide) when talking about Turkish-Armenian relations. He may face a domestic political blowback for this. Yet a strong U.S. endorsement for the enhanced Turkish-Azerbaijani cooperation is also necessary, and hopefully forthcoming. Despite Turkey's movement away from the West, the country continues to play a key role in NATO and the region. Washington should devote more attention to U.S.-Turkish relations. Strong bilateral security relations are particularly important for cooperation on the Iraq withdrawal, Afghanistan, dealing with Iran, and addressing a resurgent Russia. The administration should stress that it is in Turkey's long-term interests to remain politically oriented toward the West.

Iraq Stability Adv: A2 Kuwait Solves

Kuwait can’t solve alone it create a bottleneck for US soldiers, significantly slowing withdrawal

Lubold 9 (Gordon, Staff Write Christian Science Monitor, Turkey could furnish a safe way home as US departs Iraq, February 17)AC

"Turkey is going to be very instrumental in terms of the withdrawal from Iraq," says Stephen Flanagan, a senior analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. US and Turkish officials have tried to kept a low profile regarding the Habur Gate. But in 2007 about 25 percent of the fuel for "coalition forces" entered Iraq through it. The crossing is also a boon to the local economy. Turkish officials say they would welcome an expanded use of the Habur Gate should the US decide to leave Iraq through it. "Postconflict stability" is in the Turks' best interest, Mr. Flanagan notes. But there is a limit to what they will support the US doing in Turkey, he says. "They don't want to give us a blank check for staging counterinsurgency operations." Kuwait, on Iraq's southern border, was the main launching point for American forces in the 2003 invasion. The conventional wisdom has been that Kuwait will be the main exit point as American troops and gear are loaded onto ships and airplanes. But there have been concerns that Kuwait could become a chokepoint, and the US has searched for other options. One of President Obama's campaign pledges was to bring troops home from Iraq within 16 months. Plans based on either a 16-, 19-, or 23-month schedule are now under discussion. It remains unclear how much gear would be left behind and turned over to the Iraqis, but having multiple exit points could allow the military to speed its withdrawal. US marines stationed in Anbar Province in western Iraq are working with Jordan to determine if the port of Aqaba could be another option for troops leaving western Iraq. Gen. James Conway, commandant of the Marine Corps, said last month that the US expects to have options. "We don't think it has to be Kuwait," he said.

\*\*\*Iraq Stability Democracy Adv\*\*\*

Iraq Stability Adv: Democracy Add-On

A. Now is the key time to reform to democracy in the middle east—

Hansen 2 (Victor D., Prof. of Military Affairs at U.S. Naval Academy, “Democracy in the Middle East” Weekly Standard. http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/001/769bfuqn.asp?page=5) MKB

There are now millions of exiles from the Middle East residing in Western countries who want Western liberalism to take root in their native lands. Democracy has no rival in French Marxism, Communist nostalgia, or Baathist nonsense. Unlike communism, Islamic fundamentalism does not even purport to bring progress and equality. Nor has it a nuclear patron with global reach, like the old Soviet Union. We need not fear a universal Islamic fundamentalism. It may thrive in Saudi Arabia, where fanaticism of one sort or another is the only way to foment revolution, but it has alienated the masses in theocratic Iran, now that the extremists have lost the romance of tormented idealists and are seen as accountable for their institutionalized oppression. We also have an ally in global popular culture. However crass, free expression subverts theocracy and dictatorship. We must not be naive. Establishing lawful rule in lawless places entails real costs and dangers. Thus, war or the threat of force may be the necessary catalyst. Germany and Japan did not abandon fascism voluntarily. Noriega and Milosevic had to be forced out. Armed resistance can bring profound change because defeat brings humiliation, and humiliation sometimes precipitates a collective change of heart. The Eastern Europeans, and eventually the Russians, broke free because they saw the Soviet Union was exhausted, had lost the Cold War, and was near collapse. When the generals and colonels of Greece and Argentina brought military ruin and embarrassment to their countries, they fled. South Korea and Taiwan were born out of war; they survived and eventually democratized because America vowed to protect them with force.

B. We solve all of your turns—even if you are right that in the short term democracy causes some instability it is the way to long term stability and accountability—solves corruption

Hansen 2 (Victor D., Prof. of Military Affairs at U.S. Naval Academy, “Democracy in the Middle East” Weekly Standard. http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/001/769bfuqn.asp?page=5) MKB

In response to this depressing state of affairs, an exasperated United States has tried everything from appeasement to confrontation--everything except systematic, sustained, and unqualified support for democratic reform. On that score, our experience in Afghanistan is encouraging. A year ago, no country in the Middle East was more lawless, anti-American, or brutal than Afghanistan under the Taliban; today, our intervention has produced a more consensual government, and refugees are going home. A secular and democratic Turkey, meanwhile, proves that Islam is not intrinsically incompatible with liberal society. And reforms in Qatar promise hope for eventual elections; Qatar's liberality explains the absence of a Saudi-style backlash from the populace, as well as the regime's willingness to work with us on energy and defense.

The "realist" rejoinder is that elections in the Middle East are a onetime thing. In Iran, the ouster of the autocratic shah made way for an election, after which the mullahs destroyed democracy; Khomeini's death only brought in more fanatics. Arafat rigged an election and hasn't held another. Jordan's parliament is a façade behind which King Abdullah rules by kowtowing to Iraq, Syria, the Palestinians, and the United States. The very idea of elections brought disaster in Algeria.

Yet even these dismal scenarios are instructive. The fact that the mullahs were elected in Iran has put an enormous burden of legitimacy upon them; their abject failure may better serve the long-term interests of the United States than the Saudi royal family's success. Palestinians too are talking more about the need for fair elections than the need to keep Arafat in office. America has much to gain when democracy works, while autocratic regimes profess stability but are volatile under the surface. Better to deal with a subverted democracy: At least its people will soon realize that they, not the United States, are responsible for their disasters.

THE PROBLEM with the old realpolitik is not just that it is occasionally amoral but also that it has been tried and found wanting. Short-term stability has left unaddressed the festering long-term problem of Arab development. The rot now overwhelms us.

AND, C. Solves terrorism

THE GUARDIAN, staff, August 3, 2006, LN.

There has always been a Republican "realist" position, associated with figures such as Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser to Bush Sr. After Iraq, and this latest imbroglio, it could regain the upper hand in the run-up to the 2008 presidential election. It could win out on the other side of American politics too. If one looks at the foreign-policy debate among Democrats, one finds a strong strain of such "realism" - though tagged with "progressive". The argument that the US should pull back from this poisonous world, look to its own economic interests and find allies wherever it can appeals to a significant part of the Democratic electorate. For many Democrats, the fact that the current president has identified himself so strongly with the promotion of democracy is another reason for being sceptical about the promotion of democracy. If democratising the Middle East means Iraq, Hizbullah and Hamas, better not try it. I believe this is precisely the wrong conclusion to draw. In the long run, the growth of liberal democracies is the best hope for the wider Middle East. It's the best hope of modernisation, which the Arab world desperately needs; of addressing the root causes of Islamist terrorism, inasmuch as they lie in those countries rather than among Muslims living in the west; and of enabling Arabs, Israelis, Iranians, Kurds and Turks to live side by side without war. But it will be a long march. We know from elsewhere that the intermediate period of transition to democracy can be a dangerous time, that it can actually increase the danger of violence, especially in countries divided along ethnic and religious lines, and where you rush to the party-political competition for power without first having a functioning state with well-defined borders, a near-monopoly of force, the rule of law, independent media and a strong civil society. That's what happened in the former Yugoslavia. That's what's been happening, in different ways, in Palestine, in Lebanon and in Iraq. Full, liberal democracy contributes to peace; partial, half-baked democratisation can increase the danger of war. What we in the community of established liberal democracies should do is not abandon the pursuit of democratisation but refine it. Recognise that only in exceptional circumstances (such as postwar Germany and Japan) do democracies grow from under military occupation, and that the purpose of building democracy does not justify military intervention. Accept that, as the Iranian dissident Akbar Ganji wrote in the New York Times, it's better for people to find their own paths to freedom, and our job is to support them. Learn from experience that well-defined borders, the rule of law and independent media are as important as an election - and may need to precede it. That along the way you have to negotiate with nasty people and regimes, such as Syria and Iran. And that, in this dirty, complicated world, advocates of armed struggle - terrorists, if you will - can become democratic leaders. Like Menachem Begin. Like Gerry Adams. Like Nelson Mandela. So let's not throw out the democratisation baby with the Bush bathwater. There's a seriously good idea there. It just needs to be a lot better executed, and with patience for the long haul. The right conclusion is strange but true: a little democracy is a dangerous thing - so let's have more of it.

Iraq Stability Adv: Democracy Add-On

Without democracy, Middle Eastern countries rely on bribery, oppression, and scape-goating the U.S. The lack of accountability has allowed economies to falter as a rising population threatens to outgrow resources.

Hansen 2 (Victor D., Prof. of Military Affairs at U.S. Naval Academy, *“Democracy in the Middle East” Weekly Standard. http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/001/769bfuqn.asp?page=5*)MKB

The events of the last year prove that both extremist and moderate governments in the Middle East are riding a tidal wave of resentment. Governments of both kinds seek to survive largely through bribery, oppression, and censorship, and by scapegoating Israel and America. This they hope will postpone an accounting with their people. In the absence of elections, free speech, or any public audit of government finances, our "friends" must divert the attention of their restless populations to the bogeyman of the West. Yet at root, the Arab masses probably hate us less than they abhor their own governments for lack of freedom and economic progress. If Islamic zeal were the cure for what ails these regimes, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran would be pillars of stability. The pathologies of the Middle East are urgent and will only get worse if left alone. The last two decades of ruined economies have brought nothing but disaster. The unusually candid "Arab Human Development Report 2002," issued by leading Arab intellectuals under the auspices of the United Nations, provides the details. An exploding population (38 percent is under 14 years of age) will have to fight for scarce resources: The 22 Arab countries have a combined gross domestic product less than Spain's. The wealthiest 85,000 Saudi families have overseas assets of $700 billion. Labor productivity fell between 1960 and 1990, while it soared elsewhere. Even Africa outperformed the Arab world in rates of economic growth and the incidence of constitutional government between 1975 and 1990. More foreign books were translated into Greek than into Arabic last year. The report speculates that half the youths in most Arab countries desire to emigrate--usually to the lands of the infidels, Europe or the United States.

Iraq Stability Adv: Democracy Add-On (Peace Theory)

Democracy stops war against the U.S. and other democracies and can beat authoritarian regimes. They treat their citizens better and help oppose terrorism.

Hansen 2 (Victor D., Prof. of Military Affairs at U.S. Naval Academy, “Democracy in the Middle East” Weekly Standard. http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/001/769bfuqn.asp?page=5) MKB.

Americans hope for constitutional governments in the Middle East not because we are naive, but because we seek democracy's practical dividends. Modern democracies rarely attack America or each other. When they fight illiberal regimes, they win. The Falklands, Panama, Serbia, and the Middle East all demonstrate the power of legitimate governments over dictatorships. Yet this pragmatic consideration is often dismissed as starry-eyed idealism. Only belatedly have we advocated democratic reform for the Palestinians, as a remedy for our previous failed policy of appeasement of Arafat and his corrupt regime.

We are not talking of Jeffersonian democracy all at once. First, remove the dictator, to permit a more lawful society to evolve on the model of Panama, Grenada, Serbia, and the Philippines. Keep up the pressure of American and world opinion, international aid, the return of Westernized dissidents, the emancipation of women, and the occasional threat of American force. Let September 11 remind us that inaction can be as deadly as intervention. IN THE PAST, Americans were told that the Middle East was divided roughly into two camps (plus democratic Israel): the sometime sponsors of terror (Afghanistan, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, and Yemen) and the so-called moderate dictatorships (Egypt, the Gulf states, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia). Although the latter group ruled without a popular mandate and made use of coercion and intimidation, they nevertheless curbed their brutality and either condemned or ignored but did not openly abet terrorists.

Arguments against democracy claiming backlash and instability are empirically untrue- look at Japan, Germany, and Italy post World War II.

Hansen 2 (Victor D., Prof. of Military Affairs at U.S. Naval Academy, “Democracy in the Middle East” Weekly Standard. http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/001/769bfuqn.asp?page=5) MKB

History provides more encouragement than we might think. Cynics in 1945 warned us that Japanese terrorists would make an American occupation of mainland Japan impossible. The traditions of Japan were Asian and authoritarian, they said, and we should not confuse a desire for Western weapons and industry with any capacity for democracy. Yet we plunged in, and in five years Japan had become the sanest and most humane society between San Francisco and Beijing. Rather than search for a Westernized leader, we took on the greater burden of establishing institutions in a completely foreign landscape. Simultaneously, Germany and Italy, both historically unstable republics, were transmogrified from fascist killer states into liberal republics almost overnight.

We poured in aid, brought their rehabilitated governments into the world community, interfered with their school systems, empowered women, stationed troops to monitor recidivism, sought out moderates, dissidents, and exiles, helped to draft constitutions, tried the guilty--then crossed our fingers that the people's inclusion in decision-making and enjoyment of personal freedom would bring a new maturity and responsibility to society. Today, without the specter of a global and nuclear Soviet Union to make "regime change" difficult and distort elections, we are once again free to promote democracy in unlikely places.

Iraq Stability Adv: Biodiversity XT

Evolution to slow to keep up with extinction--

Miguel SANTOS, Baruch College Professor of Ecology, 1999 The Environmental Crisis. Pg. 35-36

In view of their ecologic role in ecosystems, the impact of species extinction may be devastating. The rich diversity of species and the ecosystems that support them are intimately connected to the long-term survival of humankind. As the historic conservationist Aldo Leopold stated in 1949,

The outstanding scientific discovery of the twentieth century is not television or radio but the complexity of the land organisms.... To keep every cog and wheel is the first precaution of intelligent tinkering.11

An endangered species may have a significant role in its community. Such an organism may control the structure and functioning of the community through its activities. The sea otter, for example, in relation to its size, is perhaps the most voracious of all marine mammals. The otter feeds on sea mollusks, sea urchins, crabs, and fish. It needs to eat more than 20 percent of its weight every day to provide the necessary energy to maintain its body temperature in a cold marine habitat. The extinction of such keystone or controller species from the ecosystem would cause great damage. Its extinction could have cascading effects on many species, even causing secondary extinction. Traditionally, species have always evolved along with their changing environment. As disease organisms evolve, other organisms may evolve chemical defense mechanisms that confer disease resistance. As the weather becomes drier, for example, plants may develop smaller, thicker leaves, which lose water slowly. The environment, however, is now developing and changing rapidly, but evolution is slow, requiring hundreds of thousands of years. If species are allowed to become extinct, the total bio­ logical diversity on Earth will be greatly reduced; therefore, the potential for natural adaptation and change also will be reduced, thus endangering the diversity of future human life-support systems.

Biodiversity loss outweighs all other impacts   
Chen 2000 [Jim, Professor of Law at the U of Minnesota, Minnesota Journal of Global Trade Winter 2000, pg. 211]  
  
The value of endangered species and the biodiversity they embody is “literally . . . incalculable.” What, if anything, should the law do to preserve it? There are those that invoke the story of Noah’s Ark as a moral basis for biodiversity preservation. Others regard the Judeo-Christian tradition, especially the biblical stories of Creation and the Flood, as the root of the West’s deplorable environmental record. To avoid getting bogged down in an environmental exegesis of Judeo-Christian “myth and legend,” we should let Charles Darwin and evolutionary biology determine the imperatives of our moment in natural “history.” The loss of biological diversity is quite arguably the gravest problem facing humanity. If we cast the question as the contemporary phenomenon that “our descendents [will] most regret,” the “loss of genetic and species diversity by the destruction of natural habitats” is worse than even “energy depletion, economic collapse, limited nuclear war, or conquest by a totalitarian government.” Natural evolution may in due course renew the earth will a diversity of species approximating that of a world unspoiled by Homo sapiens – in ten million years, perhaps a hundred million.

\*\*\*Erdogan Adv\*\*\*

Erdogan Adv: Uniqueness--AKP Losing

AKP will lose many votes this election, but only by a small margin

Bozkurt 10 (Goksel, Turkish political analyst, *“Elections in Fall”* Hurriyet News, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=the-corridor-2010-06-11*)* MKB

The second argument is that the AKP may lose votes and have less deputies in Parliament because the AKP won 47 percent of the votes in the 2007 general elections with the help of an e-memorandum issued by the General Staff on April 27, 2007. That additional support was lost in the 2009 local elections, and the AKP fell back to 38 percent. Without a doubt, the eight-year-old government is wearing out in power. With that in mind, the AKP may lose some more votes in the upcoming elections. Opinion polls support the idea. The AKP will try hard not to lose any votes or seats in Parliament so will push the election date as far as possible.

The AKP will lose the election if they pass any more controversial legislation

Bhadrakumar 8. (M K, former Indian career diplomat. “A Triumph for Turkey - And its Allies.” Asia Times. Aug 2, 2008. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/JH02Ak03.html.)

The yellow card implies that Erdogan has to be extra careful now until the next parliamentary election due in July 2011, as he simply cannot afford another brush with the constitutional court. At least seven of the sitting judges will not retire for the next five years, which means that the court's political or ideological makeup will largely remain the same all through Erdogan's remaining term.

The head of the constitutional court, Hasim Kilic, was explicit that Erdogan is expected to draw some stern conclusions. "This verdict is a serious warning. I hope the party [AKP] draws the necessary lessons from this," he told the media. The hard fact is that 10 out of 11 judges in the constitutional court found the AKP to be a "center of anti-secular activity", though only six of them voted to close down the party, whereas seven needed to for a verdict banning the party to come into effect. No doubt, Erdogan escaped by a whisker.

Erdogan Adv: Uniqueness- AKP Losing

The AKP is dropping rapidly in polls due to the high unpopularity of their Kurdish Initiative.

Bozkurt 6/25/10. (Goksel, writer for Hurriyet Daily News. “THE CORRIDOR - The initiative resumes but how?”Hurriyet Daily News. Friday, June 25, 2010. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=the-corridor-2010-06-25>). LRH.

Although Erdoğan sends messages for the continuation of the initiative, it’s being underlined behind the closed doors that the target in the Kurdish initiative cannot be reached anymore. Apparently, the AKP government will not claim the Kurdish initiative strongly enough. Until elections, the AKP will not shelve the initiative for good. However, it will not be pursued effectively either.

A “low density” approach will be adopted for the initiative. My impression from the backstage is that this is how the process will be carried out until the elections.

The AKP is planning to pass the bill on “stone throwing children” this week. The ruling party shows, however, no intentions to seek a legal regulation on the initiative after that. To expect solid, visible, big, important changes is just a dream.

Until the elections, which the rumor is in the AKP backstage is that elections may be held in May or June of 2011, the AKP will rather focus on not to have a “Turkish initiative” because the government has to deal with the “Turkish conflict” while trying to settle the Kurdish question. Funeral ceremonies of the soldiers killed in the PKK attacks have fomented nationalist reactions. The AKP is quickly losing votes in the West. In fact, the AKP deputies from the Aegean, Black Sea, Mediterranean and Central Anatolia have begun to convey the disturbance rising from party grassroots to the party administration. Opinion polls highlight the drop in AKP votes.

This is alarming for Erdoğan and his team. The governing party makes plans to tame down the nationalist rage in Western Turkey and to change the situation for its own good.

Erdogan is likely to lose in the upcoming election

Ronen 6/6/10. (Gil, Editor of Israel National News. “Erdogan Poised to Lose Next Election, Expert Says.” Israel National News. June 6, 2010. <http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/news.aspx/137906>). LRH.

Public support for the ruling Islamic party is in decline, the expert added, mostly due to corruption and abuse of civil rights. “Were elections held last week, the Islamist party would lose many seats, and two secular parties would possibly have made up the coalition. If current public opinion is held till the next elections, scheduled for July 2011, it is likely that Turkey will emerge with a new prime minister. It is possible that precisely due to his domestic situation as reflected in the polls, Erdogan has decided to exacerbate his relations with Israel in order to gain public support.”

Erdogan Adv: Uniqueness- AKP Losing

The CHP is gaining momentum against the AKP in the polls

Today’s Zaman 5/31/10. (“Poll: New CHP carries ‘warning message’ for AK Party.” Today's Zaman, a Turkish newspaper. May 31, 2010. <http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-211593-poll-new-chp-carries-warning-message-for-ak-party.html>) LRH.

A recent opinion poll has shown that the newly elected leader of the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) is likely to boost public support for his party, an indicator of the emergence of a viable political alternative for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party).

Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu's CHP would garner 30.1 percent of the national vote if parliamentary elections were held today, according to a survey conducted by the MetroPOLL Strategic and Social Research Center. Kılıçdaroğlu was voted in as the new CHP head on May 22 after the party's long-time leader, Deniz Baykal, resigned from his position when a video clip showing an alleged affair between him and a party deputy emerged.

The same survey showed that the AK Party would receive 37.3 percent of the vote in the general elections. The increase in the CHP votes is directly linked to the election of a new leader after a years-long Baykal hegemony. The poll showed the party is now perceived as an “emergency exit” for voters who are dissatisfied with AK Party policies. What will clarify the future of the growing public support for the main opposition are the policies to be pursued by the new Kılıçdaroğlu administration in the settlement of the country's chronic problems.

An overwhelming 68.9 percent of respondents said they thought the CHP would increase its national vote under the new leader. Observers say the figure should be taken seriously by the AK Party, which has enjoyed its solid position as the most popular in Turkey for the past several years. Respondents are currently pleased at the removal of the Baykal domination over the CHP, according to the survey.

The AKP is likely to lose in the upcoming elections

Mellow 3/6/10. (Craig, writer for Institutional Investor. “Turkey Shuns Loans As It Cuts Public Spending And Shockproofs Banks.” Institutional Investor. March 6, 2010) LRH.

AKP's legislative majority indeed looks vulnerable in the 2011 elections. Polls indicate the party's support has gone from the 47&percent it won at the last vote in 2007 to something above 30&percent. Istanbul financiers feel uneasy with the AKP's Islamic roots and theocratic moves such as the AKP's purging of professors who honored Charles Darwin at the venerable Istanbul University. But bankers are more afraid of Turkey returning to its tradition of weak coalition governments that can never refuse any special-interest demands. "The pension age in this country before AKP took power was 43 for men and 38 for women," says Yarkin Sebeci, chief economist for JP Morgan Chase’s Co. in Istanbul. "That's incredible, but that's what coalition government got us." Erdogan's party has pushed retirement thresholds up to age 60 and 56, respectively.

Erdogan Adv: Uniqueness- 2011 Turkey Election will be Close

The 2011 election in Turkey will be close: the AKP can’t afford losing any more votes

Al-Ahram Weekly 6/30/10. (“Where’s ‘Plan B’?” Al-Ahram Weekly. June 30, 2010. <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2010/1004/re4.htm>) LRH

Although the latest attacks have demonstrated the PKK's continued ability to cause casualties, the organisation is aware that it is not strong enough to defeat the Turkish military on the battlefield. The main purpose of the PKK's recent upsurge in violence appears to be to demonstrate that it cannot be completely defeated militarily and that the Turkish state has no choice but to open direct negotiations. Yet, with a general election due in July 2011 at the latest, the AKP cannot afford to risk losing any more Turkish nationalist votes by being seen to be negotiating with the PKK.

Erdogan Adv: Uniqueness- AKP Winning

The AKP will win the next election: they are far ahead of other parties in the polls

Today’s Zaman 5/25/10. (“Poll: Kılıçdaroğlu ‘wind’ proves weak, AK Party likely to sweep votes.”Today’s Zaman, a Turkish newspaper. May 25, 2010. <http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-211105-poll-kilicdaroglu-wind-proves-weak-ak-party-likely-to-sweep-votes.html>). LRH

A recent opinion poll has shown that the Republican People’s Party (CHP) will probably fail to pose a threat to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in the next parliamentary elections under its new leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu.

According to Pollmark’s survey, the AK Party will garner more than 40 percent of the national vote in the upcoming elections, slated for July 2011, while the CHP will manage to bring in only 21.9 percent. Slightly more than 14 percent of respondents said they plan to vote for the National Movement Party (MHP) while 6.7 percent pledged to vote for the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP).

Israel’s attack allowed Erdogan to gain points in the polls

Bozkurt 6/4/10. (GÖKSEL, “Why didn’t Kılıçdaroğlu back Tekin?” Hurriyet Daily News, Turkey’s major English newspaper. June 4, 2010. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=the-corridor-2010-06-04>). LRH.

With Israel’s attack against the humanitarian aid convoy, the possibility of holding elections earlier is being voiced in Parliament. The scenario is: “Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan gained points because of Israel’s attitude and that could have repercussions at home. The ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, might want to bear the fruit of having elections in the fall of 2010 rather than the spring of 2011.”

On the AKP front, the dominating view is “Elections will be held as scheduled. Erdoğan has no wish to have elections earlier.” If there is no big surprise, the likelihood of having polls in the spring of 2011 seems high…

Erdogan Adv: AKP K/T Fiscal Rule

If the CHP, AKP’s opposition, wins, fiscal rule would be voted down because they oppose any AKP policy.

Hurriyet Economic Review 10 (Turkish News Service, *AKP Needs to Rebuild Bridges, Turkey’s Opposition Leader Says*, Hurriyet Daily News, http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/103228/akp-needs-to-rebuild-bridges-turkey-39-s-opposition-leader-says.html) MKB

The CHP leader said Turkey should get rid of the AKP’s false policies, speaking Saturday in the Black Sea town of Amasya.

“Turkey needs to launch a new independence war,” Kılıçdaroğlu said. “The CHP is the candidate to rule the country. We will serve our country. The real face of the AKP has now been disclosed.”

AKP power in Parliament is key to passing the fiscal rule bill

Gokoluk 6/16/10. (Selcuk, writer for Interactive Investor. “UPDATE 2-Turkish mkts pick up on rating upgrade hopes.” Interactive Investor. June 16, 2010. <http://www.iii.co.uk/news/?type=afxnews&articleid=7946700&subject=markets&action=article>) LRH.

Other agencies have said parliamentary approval of the fiscal rule may trigger an upgrade of Turkey's sovereign rating, presently two notches below investment grade.  
The ruling AK Party, which has a large majority in parliament, aims to pass the fiscal rule bill by the end of this month before the summer recess begins.  
The bill would reduce the budget deficit to 1 percent of gross domestic product in 10 years and the debt-to-GDP ratio to around 30 percent in five to 10 years.

Erdogan Adv: Link US presence unpopular

U.S. presence unpopular- policy regarding U.S. affects Turkish politics.

Foreign Affairs and Trade (*“Republic of Turkey Key Facts”* New England Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Key Facts,[*http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Middle-East/Turkey.php*](http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Middle-East/Turkey.php)*)* MKB

Turkey has traditionally had a strong bilateral relationship with the United States, including stationing of US personnel in Turkey for strategic purposes. In 2003, the new AKP Government was faced with a significant foreign policy challenge over whether to extend the arrangement to allow US forces to operate from Turkish soil in support of the military campaign in Iraq. But public sentiment was overwhelmingly opposed to this and the Government failed to secure parliamentary support to accommodate the US basing request and for the deployment of Turkish forces to Iraq. Both sides now say bilateral tensions from the Turkish decision not to send troops to Iraq are in the past.

Erdogan Adv: Fiscal Rule Good

Fiscal rule innovatively solves deficit spending and stabilizes the economy.

Ahmad 9 (Taimurl, Editor- in- chief, *“Taking A Stand”* Emerging Markets, <http://www.emergingmarkets.org/article.asp?ArticleID=2308890&CategoryID=200&PageMove=7>) MKB

Turkey will also introduce a “fiscal rule” in 2011, which will define the level of available spending according to deficit level. “it’s the first time in our history we have used such a rule, which will bring long-term predictability to our fiscal framework and reduce risk premiums,” says Babacan.

He says he will not provide explicit debt to GDP targets under a fiscal rule- “The deficit target will imply a public dept to GDP ratio for the long term. But the essence here is that if we are too far away from our target then the annual fiscal targets will be higher. If we are closer to the target, the adjustments will be smaller.”

Similarly, the fiscal rule will also allow higher deficits in years when growth is below the long-term average, and conversely, lower deficits when growth exceeds expectations, he says. “In good times we are planning to save for bad times- this is the essence of the fiscal rule,” Babacan says. Market reaction to the medium-term programme has been mixed so far. Stanford & Poor’s and Moody’s both raised the country’s outlook to stable, while Turkish bond and stock prices were mainly carried along by the broader emerging market reality.

Fiscal rule cuts debt to 1% GDP.

Aydogu 10 (Hatice, journalist, *“Turkey’s fiscal rule could cut debt stock to 30% GDP”* Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSIST00689520100512) MKB

A draft fiscal rule would cut [Turkey](http://www.reuters.com/places/turkey)'s debt stock to some 30 percent of gross domestic product within 5-10 years, and to some 15 percent in the very long term, Treasury Undersecretary Ibrahim Canakci said on Wednesday.

Economy Minister Ali Babacan said on Tuesday he expected parliament to approve by July the new fiscal plan, under which the budget deficit will be reduced to 1 percent of GDP by the 10th year of fiscal rule, according to Canakci.

The Fiscal Rule Bill is key to Turkish fiscal discipline

Hurriyet Daily News 6/20/10. (Hurriyet Daily News, Turkey’s major English newspaper. “Fiscal rule passes first hurdle at Parliament.” June 20, 2010. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=fiscal-rule-passes-first-hurdle-at-parliament-2010-06-20>). LRH

A commission in the Turkish Parliament approved a proposed fiscal rule that would force the government to target a budget deficit of 1 percent of economic output.

Ratings companies including Fitch Ratings are monitoring implementation of the rule before considering an increase of Turkey’s rating to investment grade. The legislation will be discussed in the assembly in Ankara in the coming days and, after passage, will go into effect at the start of 2011, Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan said on Friday.

The Court of Accounts in Ankara would monitor government compliance with the rule, according to the legislation, which aims to reduce the ratio of debt to gross domestic product, or GDP, to 15 percent in the long term, from about 45 percent now.

“As long as there’s support for this law there will be no problem,” Babacan told the commission on Friday. “Governments that abandon implementation of the rule will suffer loss of credibility.”

For most of the past decade, Turkey relied on the International Monetary Fund, or IMF, to underwrite its budget plans and secure investor confidence. Turkey broke off talks on new loans in March, saying its economy is ready to stand alone. The fiscal rule will be a “major milestone for entrenching fiscal discipline,” the IMF said on May 26 after a staff visit to Turkey.

Erdogan Adv: A2 AKP Bad

Even if they win the AKP is somewhat bad, all other Turkish parties are far worse

Kilic 10. (Ali Aslan, Writer for Today’s Zaman, “Deep state did great injustice to non-Muslim minorities, says Çelik.” Today’s Zaman. March 21, 2010. <http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-204959-deep-state-did-great-injustice-to-non-muslim-minorities-says-celik.html>). LRH.

“The deep state and the pro-single-party spirit of the Republican People’s Party [CHP] lies behind the injustices that were done to non-Muslims in Turkey, which runs entirely contrary to the foundations of our culture,” said Hüseyin Çelik, the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) deputy chairman.

Speaking to Sunday’s Zaman in an exclusive interview, Çelik, who was formerly Turkey’s education minister, said the CHP and Turkey’s deep state have “otherized” most of the population, which he identified as being villagers, Alevis, Kurds, non-Muslims and the pious.

The single-party period of Turkey begins with the CHP being the only party after the founding of the republic on Oct. 29, 1923 and ends in 1946 with the establishment of the National Development Party (MKP).

“Serious injustices were done to all these groups during the single-party era in Turkey; however, the injustices done to the non-Muslims were more severe. The wealth tax was a disgrace. The closure of the Greek seminary was a great shame. The Sept. 6-7 incidents were an inhumane conspiracy that humiliated Turkey in the eyes of the world. The alienated villagers were unable to enter Ankara’s city center until 1946. The violation of the rights of the humiliated Alevis, Kurds and the pious have continued until today,” Çelik explained.

Erdogan Adv: Peace Talks K to Withdrawal from Cyprus

Turkey is in strong support of the Cyprus peace talks.

The Daily Star 10. (“Turkey calls for Cyprus deal by year-end – report.” The Daily Star, a leading source of Middle East news and information on the Internet  June 19, 2010. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=2&article_id=116158#axzz0sHnNt5Av>) LRH.

ANKARA: Turkish President Abdullah Gul Friday urged Cypriot leaders to seize the “opportunity” of UN-sponsored talks and find a settlement to the island’s division by year-end, the Anatolia news agency reported.

“The talks, of course, cannot go on forever … They should finish this year,” Gul was quoted by the agency as telling a joint press conference with Turkish Cypriot leader Dervis Eroglu.

The island, divided since 1974, should avoid a repeat of the events of 2004 when Greek Cypriots voted down a UN reunification blueprint that Turkish Cypriots overwhelmingly approved, he added.

“I hope the present opportunity for a referendum will not be missed through the failure of the talks,” he said.

The UN-led talks, launched in September 2008, were suspended for seven weeks ahead of Turkish Cypriot leadership elections in April, in which hardliner Eroglu beat pro-solution incumbent Mehmet Ali Talat.

Earlier this month, Cypriot President Demetris Christofias cancelled a planned round of negotiations with Eroglu over his comments doubting the basis of the talks.

“Mr. Eroglu is pursuing the talks in a positive, constructive manner in the same way [as Talat]. I believe the Greek Cypriot side should understand this and the world public opinion should view it as a good development,” Gul said.

Turkey will withdraw its troops from Cyprus as long as there is a peace deal

World Bulletin 10. (“Turkish troops can quit Cyprus if peace deal, PM says.” World Bulletin. March 2, 2010. <http://www.worldbulletin.net/news_detail.php?id=54860>) LRH.

Turkey would be willing to withdraw its troops from Cyprus if a peace deal is reached between estranged Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan was quoted as saying on Tuesday. Turkey sent its troops to Cyprus in 1974 following a decade of attacks on Turkish Cypriots by Greek Cypriot groups favoring unification with Greece and eventually a Greek-inspired coup on the island. In an interview with three Greek Cypriot newspapers published on Tuesday, Erdogan said Turkey would consider withdrawing its troops from northern Cyprus if there were a peace settlement. "With respect to the withdrawal of troops, we've spoken about this before. Over a period of time, those troops can be withdrawn," Erdogan was quoted as saying. "EU member" Greek Cyprus threatens Turkey to veto openings of new chapters in EU talks. "We are ready to do our share to achieve that goal, and no one should or can doubt Turkey's sincerity," he said. Ankara would consider a troop withdrawal if there was a deal, but would not respond to calls for an immediate pullout, Erdogan said. "Over a period of time, those troops can be withdrawn," Erdogan was quoted as saying. The Turkish and Greek Cypriot sides started peace talks in September 2008, but still a clear progress has been not made. Cyprus joined the EU as a divided island when Greek Cypriots in the south rejected the UN reunification plan in twin referendums in 2004 even though the Turkish Cypriots in the north overwhelmingly supported it.

Erdogan Adv: Peace Talks K to Withdrawal from Cyprus

Turkey’s membership with NATO is blocking a Cyprus peace agreement.

Schleifer 10. (Yigal, correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor. “Nationalist wins Cyprus election, sparking concern about peace talks; Hardline nationalist Dervis Eroglu won Sunday's Cyprus election, but his victory in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus could stall fragile peace talks and harm Turkey's troubled bid to join the European Union.” The Christian Science Monitor. April 19, 2010.) LRH

"What Eroglu wants is very difficult for the Greek Cypriot to accept and he wants to revisit everything that's been talked about over the last two years. If time runs away with this again, then partition will become irreversibly entrenched," says Hugh Pope, an analyst with the Brussels-based International Crisis Group. "Barring a miracle, [a suspension in talks] would put Turkey's EU membership negotiations in deep freeze," says Pope. "Everyone loses." Turkey's EU bid Turkey's troubled EU-membership drive is inextricably tied up with the Cyprus problem. The Greek-speaking southern part of the island joined the EU in 2004, and has since used its position in Brussels to stymie Ankara's EU bid. Turkey, meanwhile, is using its NATO membership to strike back, blocking enhanced cooperation between the EU and the defense alliance in protest of what it considers a Brussels held captive by the Greek Cypriot agenda. EU officials are also pressuring Turkey to open up its ports to Greek Cypriot vessels, something Ankara has so far resisted doing. As a result, several parts of Turkey's membership negotiations have been frozen. In a Sunday interview with the private NTV television channel, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erodgan put Ankara's weight behind continued talks on Cyprus. "Turkish Cypriots must continue the talks which is something Eroglu also believes in. It is our aim to find a solution by the end of the year," he said. Turkey, which invaded Cyprus in 1974 after a pro-Greek coup, currently has some 35,000 troops stationed on the island. Will talks continue?In a victory speech given to his supporters, Eroglu said he does not plan to suspend the peace negotiations. "Talks will continue, because I want peace more than those who say that I don't," he said. But Lefteris Adilinis, political editor of the Greek Cypriot newspaper Politis, says there is "concern" on the Greek side about the Eroglu victory. "The statements that we have heard from him so far have been worrying," he says. Some 164,000 Turkish Cypriots were eligible to vote. Observers say much of Eroglu's popularity can be attributed to Turkish Cypriots' sense of being betrayed by the international community after they voted in favor of a 2004 UN plan to reunite the island. The Greek Cypriots rejected the plan. "The voters are trying to send a message that we have been cheated, in the sense that we did our best and the international community did not reward us," says Mete Hatay, a Turkish Cypriot political analyst. "They are trying to show their anger," says Hatay. "But it doesn't mean they don't want a solution. It's a gut reaction."

Erdogan Adv: Uniqueness- EU Ascension Being Prevented Now

Opponents of the AKP are preventing EU ascension now

Barysch 10 (Katinka, the deputy director at the Centre for European Reform. “Turkey's turmoil.” Centre for European Reform. April 01, 2010, http://centreforeuropeanreform.blogspot.com/2010/04/turkeys-turmoil.html)

Political convulsions are nothing new in Turkey. But recent events have made some observers gloomy about the fate of the country and its suitability as an EU member. Tensions are escalating between the ruling AK party, on the one hand, and the army and the secular opposition, on the other. Some observers warn that another military coup cannot be ruled out completely. Others think that the highest court could launch a new case to ban the AKP. Political disputes, however heated, do not disqualify Turkey from EU accession. The danger is that the government and its opponents damage state institutions and undermine the rule of law by using the police, courts and other public bodies in their battle for political survival. This is where the EU must focus its efforts.

Erdogan Adv: Uniqueness- Turkey isn’t a Democracy Now

Turkey isn’t a democracy in the SQ

Barysch 10 (Katinka, the deputy director at the Centre for European Reform. “Turkey's turmoil.” Centre for European Reform. April 01, 2010, http://centreforeuropeanreform.blogspot.com/2010/04/turkeys-turmoil.html)

A complex mix of social change, internal power struggles and clashing ideologies is behind the current commotion. A changing Turkey needs a new system of political checks and balances. For too long, Turkey’s secular establishment has relied on the army, the constitutional court and the (traditionally secular) president to keep elected politicians in check. In each decade since Turkey became democratic in 1950, the army has forced an elected government from power. The constitutional court has banned scores of political parties suspected of undermining the secular order or the unity of the state. Much of the media and the education system used to spread Kemalist ideology. These are not the ingredients of a modern democracy.

Erdogan Adv: Fiscal Rule Add-On

The AKP is key to fiscal rule: the opposing party won’t pass it

Deliveli 10 (Emri, Economic journalist, *“Yet More on Fiscal Rule”* Economics, http://emredeliveli.blogspot.com/2010/05/yet-more-on-fiscal-rule.html) MKB

At the press conference for the Inflation Report a couple of weeks ago, CBT President Durmus Yilmaz noted that he expected the government's new fiscal rule to be agreed by the end of June 2010, and this timetable seems to be consistent with the Treasury's timetable. With fiscal worries high on the investors' agenda, even an ill-designed fiscal rule would be a boost, at least in the short-term, to Turkish assets. But I am not sure if the government will be able to deliver, especially since we are in May and the government is a political mess that will go all the way to a Referendum and Constitutional Court (if CHP keeps its promise [to battle the AKP on all grounds](http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/We_shall_fight_on_the_beaches)).

The Fiscal Rule Bill is key to Turkish fiscal discipline

Hurriyet Daily News 6/20/10. (Hurriyet Daily News, Turkey’s major English newspaper. “Fiscal rule passes first hurdle at Parliament.” June 20, 2010. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=fiscal-rule-passes-first-hurdle-at-parliament-2010-06-20>). LRH

A commission in the Turkish Parliament approved a proposed fiscal rule that would force the government to target a budget deficit of 1 percent of economic output. Ratings companies including Fitch Ratings are monitoring implementation of the rule before considering an increase of Turkey’s rating to investment grade. The legislation will be discussed in the assembly in Ankara in the coming days and, after passage, will go into effect at the start of 2011, Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan said on Friday. The Court of Accounts in Ankara would monitor government compliance with the rule, according to the legislation, which aims to reduce the ratio of debt to gross domestic product, or GDP, to 15 percent in the long term, from about 45 percent now. “As long as there’s support for this law there will be no problem,” Babacan told the commission on Friday. “Governments that abandon implementation of the rule will suffer loss of credibility.” For most of the past decade, Turkey relied on the International Monetary Fund, or IMF, to underwrite its budget plans and secure investor confidence. Turkey broke off talks on new loans in March, saying its economy is ready to stand alone. The fiscal rule will be a “major milestone for entrenching fiscal discipline,” the IMF said on May 26 after a staff visit to Turkey.

Fiscal discipline is key to preventing Turkish economic collapse

Today’s Zaman 10. (“Markets anxious European crisis may hit Turkey’s economy.” Today’s Zaman, most-circulating English-language newspaper in Turkey. May 27, 2010. <http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-211293-markets-anxious-european-crisis-may-hit-turkeys-economy.html>) LRH.

Amid growing concerns that the eurozone crisis will spread and derail the global economic recovery, Turkey, with its economy highly integrated with the eurozone, will not be able stay out of the fire, İbrahim Öztürk, a professor of economics at Marmara University, told Today’s Zaman in a phone interview. As regards the possible impacts of the EU debt crisis on the Turkish economy, Öztürk said Turkey will not be able to escape the destructive waves from the continent. “Our economy is integrated with the EU; the union is our largest export market, and we attract the highest number of tourists from Europe. These two sectors will be hit first should the current crisis expand further,” he explained. Observers argue that EU governments initially have to intensify their quest to step up fiscal consolidation and introduce growth-increasing reforms of pension systems, labor and other markets. Another major step the EU needs to take is the establishment a general mechanism that will allow for orderly debt workouts among other institutional reforms, an anchor of confidence in the markets. Economic recovery in the world’s richest countries is accelerating thanks to a “substantial” rebound in trade and growth in Asia, but austerity measures are needed to reduce deficits -- as Europe’s debt crisis proves. The period of significant financial instability that began in August 2007 is not yet over, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) warned in its latest biannual Economic Outlook. Öztürk says the future of continent’s economy lies in the ability of the EU governments to handle the issue with a realistic fiscal rule. “If the current fire spreads to large EU economies such as Spain, then it will have a domino effect on others, eventually turning into a second wave of global financial turmoil after 2009.” Citing an “imbalanced expansion” in the EU as one of the major factors behind the current crisis on the continent, Öztürk said the EU lacks adequate experience in crisis management and that Turkey’s crisis experience could be a good example for the union. “They need to study Turkey’s experience … learn lessons from it.”

Hegemony Bad Adv: Turkey🡪US power projection in Middle East

Turkey acts a platform for US power projection and pro-western influence in the Middle East

Hammond 4 (Harvey L. Jr. TITLE: US/TURKISH RELATIONSHIPS after OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM FORMAT: Strategy Research Project DATE: 07 January 2004 <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada423623&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>)

Prior to OIF, the U. S. objectives and interests in Turkey were based on preventing regional disputes and expanding market reform and democratic principles. 21 The end of the Cold War spurred many new foreign policy considerations. With this shift away from the Russian threat, the mid-level powers such as Iran and Iraq drew much U.S. attention. Turkey’s strong NATO alliance made its geo-strategic importance very high. Four main areas of strategic U.S. interests existed prior to OIF. First is Turkey’s ability to serve as a power projection platform in the region. Turkey is uniquely situated on the edge of many areas of possible conflict and specifically allowed enforcement of the United Nations (UN) no-fly zone in northern Iraq. Secondly, Turkey acts as a very strong pro-western regime in an area of possible radical regimes. Simply stated, it stabilizes the area by its strong association to the West. Thirdly, Turkey has a very large military with the ability to deploy a large force if required. For example, Turkey took over a large portion of the security operations in Afghanistan. Finally, Turkey is a model for Middle Eastern countries to follow. Turkey’s population is 98% Muslim and it has a working democratic republic.

The US engages in multiple facets of Turkey’s infrastructure in order to protect military power in the region is projected

Hammond 4 (Harvey L. Jr. TITLE: US/TURKISH RELATIONSHIPS after OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM FORMAT: Strategy Research Project DATE: 07 January 2004 <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada423623&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>)

COA (Course of Action #1) number one maintains the pre OIF level of engagement with Turkey. This is a viable COA because all elements of U.S. national power are used to engage Turkey while ensuring that U.S. interests in the region are successfully projected. Under this option, the U.S. would maintain strong economic, diplomatic and informational support for the government of Turkey in all its international endeavors and provide economic aid to ensure Turkey remains economically successful. In fact, the Bush administration signaled its desire to mend the relationship by approving a $1 billion aid package.32 Military engagement would continue to be robust with exercises, basing and aid to each other. Considering Turkey’s geographic location and NATO membership, the past U.S. relationship with Turkey has been heavily weighted toward military engagement.

The US supports Turkey in its endeavors, in return using the country for its own military interests

Hammond 4 (Harvey L. Jr. TITLE: US/TURKISH RELATIONSHIPS after OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM FORMAT: Strategy Research Project DATE: 07 January 2004 <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada423623&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>) WDK

The U.S. has used a multi-faceted approach to accomplish its objectives in Turkey. Engagement at all levels has been the norm, but much has been made of the economic and military elements. The Turkish economy has performed poorly and the U.S. has been willing to help with aid and support in the world banking system.23 The U.S. retains a healthy trade relationship with Turkey and maintains an even import/export ratio.24 Close connections on the military front and the use of Incirlik Air Base in Adana were critical to U.S. efforts to enforce the UN sanctions against Iraq.25 The U.S. also uses its diplomatic efforts in world opinion to support Turkey and its desire to become an EU member, as well as, its many other international endeavors.26 U.S. information policies show support for Turkey in all the media formats worldwide.27 In fact, the U.S. uses all elements of national power to support Turkey; however, there are risks associated with this support. U.S. interests in the region are traditionally regarded as necessary due to Turkey’s geographic location as the bridge between Europe, the Middle East and Asia.28 A lack of success in our middle-eastern policies could lead to instability in an area which remains vital to U.S. interest. 29 Therefore the balance of ends, ways and means must be carefully fine tuned to produce minimum risk.30 Prior to OIF, U.S. policies were feasible, suitable and acceptable, but the situation has changed. As a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the regime change in Iraq and the rise of asymmetrical threats such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, we must refine our policies toward Turkey. 31 Considering these changes, what possible COA is best for the future of U.S./Turkish relationships?

Hegemony Bad Adv: Turkey🡪US power projection in Middle East

Turkey is key to US power projection

Bagci and Kardas 3 (*Hüseyin, Saban  Middle East Technical University. Post-September 11 Impact: The Strategic Importance of Turkey Revisited* Prepared for the CEPS/IISS European Security Forum, Brussels, 12 May 2003, <http://www.eusec.org/bagci.htm>) WDK

In developing this relationship, Turkey's special ties with the region again appeared to be an important asset for U.S. policy. Turkey had a lot to offer: Not only did Turkey have strong political, cultural and economic connections to the region, but it had also accumulated a significant intelligence capability in the region. Moreover, the large experience Turkey accumulated in fighting terrorism would be made available in expanding the global war on terrorism to this region.[[43]](http://www.eusec.org/bagci.htm" \l "ftn43#ftn43) As a result, after the locus of interest shifted to a possible operation against Afghanistan, and then to assuring the collaboration of the countries in Central Asia, Turkish analysts soon discovered that Turkey's geo-strategic importance was once again on the rise. It was thought that, thanks to its geography's allowing easy access to the region, and its strong ties with the countries there, Turkey could play a pivotal role in the conduct of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, and reshaping the politics in Central Asia: "Turkey is situated in a critical geographic position on and around which continuous and multidimensional power struggles with a potential to affect balance of power at world scale take place. The arcs that could be used by world powers in all sort of conflicts pass through Turkey. Turkish territory, airspace and seas are not only a necessary element to any force projection in the regions stretching from Europe and Asia to the Middle East, Persian Gulf, and Africa, but also make it possible to control its neighborhood... All these features made Turkey a center that must be controlled and acquired by those aspiring to be world powers... In the new process, Turkey's importance has increased in American calculations. With a consistent policy, Turkey could capitalize on this to derive some practical benefits... Turkey has acquired a new opportunity to enhance its role in Central Asia."[[44]](http://www.eusec.org/bagci.htm" \l "ftn44#ftn44)

Turkey key to US Central Asia strategy and hegemony

Radtke 7, Kurt W. Affiliated Fellow, International Institute of Asian Studies, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2007 China and the Greater Middle East: Globalization No Longer Equals Westernization, <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=2&hid=10&sid=8f4b5db5-fd83-4155-b94e-10cbdb880945%40sessionmgr10>) WDK

Similar to theories of the importance of securing the Eurasian heartland for global domination, Chinese analysts frequently emphasize that Central Asia is the spill of global geopolitics. Zhang Wenmu(2004), a leading Chinese analyst of international politics and strategy, added that US failure in Central Asia will also become the graveyard for continued global hegemony, since US attempts to isolate and encircle China will be thwarted in Central Asia (and Zhang might have added, in the GME as well). Some Chinese writings ascribe an absolute key role to the fate of Iran in the struggle of the US for global supremacy, adding that it is far from certain that the US is on the winning side (Jin 2004). Iran is the last country of the GME preventing US dominance in Iran’s neighborhood that links a strategically vital area from the Middle East, Turkey, Afghanistan, and reaching into Central Asia. US access to or even domination of Iran would whittle away China’s buffer zones on the Eurasian continent, and greatly reduce China’s strategic rear vital to maintain a role as a great power (daguo). It therefore does not surprise that Zhang Wenmu argues that the nuclear issue is a means to corner Iran, but not the main target of US strategy (Zhang 2004).

\*\*\*Relations Good\*\*\*

US/Turkey Relations Adv: Low

Kurdish terrorism poses a threat to diplomatic ties between the United States and Turkey

Bozkurt 6/28/10 (Abdullah, PKK Terror Hurts The US, EU And Israel Too, <http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=353364> )

I believe the PKK is trying to score multiple points with the increased violence, both on the domestic front and abroad. Our allies should come out stronger than ever in condemning these attacks and offer substantive support in stemming the violence. They ought to use all available avenues to corner the PKK and its affiliates into giving up their terrorist methods. Complacency and the unwillingness to act on the PKK network will add credibility to these unsubstantiated reports. Alarmingly, these news stories appear not only in fringe sites but also in mainstream media. The US, whose popularity is low in Turkey, is a prime target, of course. These groups have capitalized on news of the last-minute cancellation of a June 16 meeting between Turkish and American officials on terrorism. We`ve recently seen reports that real-time actionable intelligence-sharing doesn`t really help the Turkish military fight terrorists due to the time delay and the filtering mechanism. After the PKK attack on Sunday, some experts accused the US of not sharing information with Turkey on groups gathering around the border to prepare for raids.

Turkey’s regional aspirations sharply contradict United States goals causing extreme diplomatic tension between the two

Tavernise and Slackman 10 ( Sabrina and Michael, Turkey, Long a Pliable Ally for the United States, Displays a New Assertiveness, Ney York Times, Late Edition, June 9, Lexisnexis)AC

For decades, Turkey was one of the United States' most pliable allies, a strategic border state on the edge of the Middle East that reliably followed American policy. But recently, it has asserted a new approach in the region, its words and methods as likely to provoke Washington as to advance its own interests. The change in Turkey's policy burst into public view last week, after the deadly Israeli commando raid on a Turkish flotilla, which nearly severed relations with Israel, Turkey's longtime ally. Just a month ago, Turkey infuriated the United States when it announced that along with Brazil, it had struck a deal with Iran to ease a nuclear standoff, and on Tuesday it warmly welcomed Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and the Russian prime minister, Vladimir V. Putin, at a regional security summit meeting in Istanbul. Turkey's shifting foreign policy is making its prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a hero to the Arab world, and is openly challenging the way the United States manages its two most pressing issues in the region, Iran's nuclear program and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Turkey is seen increasingly in Washington as ''running around the region doing things that are at cross-purposes to what the big powers in the region want,'' said Steven A. Cook, a scholar with the Council on Foreign Relations. The question being asked, he said, is ''How do we keep the Turks in their lane?'' From Turkey's perspective, however, it is simply finding its footing in its own backyard, a troubled region that has been in turmoil for years, in part as a result of American policy making. Turkey has also been frustrated in its longstanding desire to join the European Union. ''The Americans, no matter what they say, cannot get used to a new world where regional powers want to have a say in regional and global politics,'' said Soli Ozel, a professor of international relations at Bilgi University in Istanbul. ''This is our neighborhood, and we don't want trouble. The Americans create havoc, and we are left holding the bag.''

US/Turkey Relations Adv: Incirlik key

Incirlik is the largest internal link to the US/Turkey relations

Giachetti 8, (David M. UNITED STATES MILITARY RELATIONS WITH TURKEY, A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements 15 February 2008, <https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/display.aspx?rs=enginespage&ModuleID=be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153&Action=downloadpaper&ObjectID=9692bb4e-a132-48c0-b7b3-03ea195ec95c>) WDK

The Turks are far less enthusiastic about the EU than several years ago. Offense is taken by the continued threats from the EU concerning the Turks recognition of Armenian genocide, concessions concerning the Cypriots and the demand to improve the civilian control of the military. Considering the uncertainty that Turkey’s accession faces, it seems that the strategic bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Turkey will continue to deepen even taking into account the strains that the relationship now endures. The current value of the Turkish relationship to Washington stems from the use of Incirlik Air Base as a transit hub for the supply of U.S. forces in Iraq, Turkey’s support for ISAF and their continued support of ongoing UN peacekeeping missions.

US/Turkey Relations Adv: Iran Prolif Now

Iran will build up more nuclear facilities: it deters foreign intervention and increases Iranian leaders’ support

Phillips 10. (James, Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at the Heritage Foundation. “An Israeli Preventive Attack on Iran's Nuclear Sites: Implications for the U.S.” The Heritage Foundation. January 15, 2010. <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/01/An-Israeli-Preventive-Attack-on-Iran-Nuclear-Sites-Implications-for-the-US>). LRH.

On the contrary, isolated internationally and stripped of any semblance of legitimacy at home, the regime now has an even greater incentive to finish its nuclear weapons project to ensure its own survival. Iran's hard-line leaders see a nuclear capability as a trump card that will deter foreign intervention and give at least a modest boost to their shrinking base of popular support. Negotiations are useful to the regime for buying time and staving off more international sanctions, but Tehran will obstinately resist international efforts to persuade it to halt uranium enrichment, as its leaders continue to publicly proclaim at every opportunity.

Iran is proliferating now: The UN has several reports of Iran violating the nuclear non- proliferation treaty

Horn 10. (Jordana, Jerusalem Post correspondent. “UN sanctions panel receives over 90 reports of potential Iranian violations since March.” June 30, 2010). LRH.

NEW YORK -ÊMembers of the UN Security Council committee monitoring the implementations of sanctions on Iran told the full council on Monday that they're continuing to examine reports of Iranian violations of a ban on imports of arms and related materials.

Yukio Takasu of Japan, the committee's head, briefed the Security Council on the report covering March through June 2010. The committee has received 92 reports from UN member states of potential Iranian violations.

Since March, Takasu said, the committee has instructed various member states that, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1929, they are authorized and obliged to seize and dispose of banned materials supplied, sold, transferred or exported to Iran. Takasu also referenced Security Council Resolution 1747, which widened the scope of earlier sanctions against Iran by banning arms exports to it as well as freezing assets and restricting travel of people engaged in Iranian nuclear proliferation.

Iran is proliferating now: Iranian hardliners believe they would get more concessions if they were to cross the nuclear threshold

Sadjapour 10. (Karim, Associate, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Containment Policy for a Nuclear Iran?” June 17, 2010. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/22447/containment_policy_for_a_nuclear_iran.html?breadcrumb=/region/404/iran>). LRH.

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Before last year's presidential election in Tehran, the conventional wisdom was that Iran was in pursuit of the Japan model; it wanted to be a screwdriver-turn away from weaponizing its program. There is increasing concern that given the purge of pragmatic elements from the Iranian government's decision-making structure, there are now many hardliners who are more intrigued by the example of Pakistan than that of Japan. They believe that when Pakistan tested a weapon there was international outrage for a week, followed by a rush to engage Pakistan and incentivize it not to use its weapon. The world was so terrified about the prospect of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan that it became a successful policy of extortion by the Pakistani government. At least some Iranian hardliners similarly believe that, paradoxically, the pressure against them would be alleviated if they actually cross the nuclear weapons threshold.

US/Turkey Relations Adv: Iran Prolif Bad

Iran proliferation leads to extinction:

A. If Iran continues to proliferate, Israel will respond by striking Iran

Phillips 10. (James, Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at the Heritage Foundation. “An Israeli Preventive Attack on Iran's Nuclear Sites: Implications for the U.S.” The Heritage Foundation. January 15, 2010. <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/01/An-Israeli-Preventive-Attack-on-Iran-Nuclear-Sites-Implications-for-the-US>). LRH.

Israel has repeatedly signaled a willingness to attack Iran's nuclear sites if diplomacy fails to dissuade Iran from continuing on its current threatening course. The Israel Air Force staged a massive and widely publicized air exercise over the Mediterranean Sea in June 2008 in which Israeli warplanes, refueled by aerial tankers, simulated attacks on tar gets that were more than 870 miles away, approximately the same distance from Israel as Iran's uranium enrichment facility at Natanz. Lt. General Dan Halutz, the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces in 2006, when asked how far Israel would go to stop Iran's nuclear program, replied simply: "Two thousand kilometers."[[1]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/01/An-Israeli-Preventive-Attack-on-Iran-Nuclear-Sites-Implications-for-the-US" \l "_ftn1)

Last year, Israeli officials leaked the details of a secret Israeli air attack against a convoy transporting Iran-supplied arms in Sudan that was headed for Egypt's Sinai Peninsula to be smuggled through tunnels to Hamas. The officials stressed that the long distances involved signaled Israeli preparedness to launch other aerial operations against Iran if necessary.[[2]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/01/An-Israeli-Preventive-Attack-on-Iran-Nuclear-Sites-Implications-for-the-US" \l "_ftn2)

The government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has sent even stronger signals since entering office last March. In an interview conducted on the day he was sworn into office, Netanyahu warned that, "You don't want a messianic apocalyptic cult controlling atomic bombs. When the wide-eyed believer gets hold of the reins of power and the weapons of mass death, then the entire world should start worrying, and that is what is happening in Iran."[[3]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/01/An-Israeli-Preventive-Attack-on-Iran-Nuclear-Sites-Implications-for-the-US" \l "_ftn3) Significantly, both Netanyahu and his Defense Minister, Ehud Barak, formerly served as commandos in the Israel Defense Forces and would be open to bold and risky action if the circumstances warrant it. From May 31 to June 4, 2009, Israel staged its largest country-wide civil defense drill, which simulated widespread missile attacks. In late June, an Israeli Dolphin-class submarine transited the Suez Canal for the first time to deploy in the Red Sea, and two Israeli Saar-class warships followed in July. An Israeli official warned that if Iran failed to halt its nuclear program, "These maneuvers are a message to Iran that Israel will follow up on its threats."[[4]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/01/An-Israeli-Preventive-Attack-on-Iran-Nuclear-Sites-Implications-for-the-US" \l "_ftn4) The high-profile transits of the canal also signaled that Egypt, which shares Israeli concerns about the threats posed by Iran, particularly after the discovery of a large Hezbollah cell operating in Egypt, is willing to cooperate with Israel to defend against threats posed by Iran.

B. An Israeli strike would escalate to the point of extinction

SOP Newswire 10 (“Israel's Threatened Attack on IRAN to Embroil Gulf in Nuclear War?” SOP newswire2. June 25, 2010. http://thesop.org/story/world/2010/06/25/israels-threatened-attack-on-iran-to-embroil-gulf-in-nuclear-war.php)

The foremost danger facing our world, today, is that the increasingly vocal rhetoric from certain quarters that threatens a violent, unilateral attack upon Iran, could suddenly crystallize and within just a week or two, turn a regional conflict into the world`s first nuclear war. Israel is, we are told, is ready and able to carry out a pre-emptive strike, (with or without American assistance), in which it will target suspected Iranian nuclear facilities in Natanz, the holy city of Qom, gas storage systems in Isfahan and a heavy-water reactor in Arak. Iran has, of course, no nuclear weapons - but Mahmoud Ahamedinajad would be expected to immediately retaliate against such a strike with long-range missile/ rocket attacks upon Tel Aviv, Haifa and the Dimona nuclear arsenal. With an estimated death toll in these major centers of population and military technology, possibly running into thousands, Israel will, it is assumed, then have no option but to use its undeclared nuclear arsenal of between 200 and 300 warheads - it`s sole priority being the security of its own borders, at all costs. It is expected that there will be no other major consideration, not even an expected rise in the global price of gasoline to possibly $10, or more, a gallon if or when oil shipments from the Gulf are cut and world stock markets go into freefall. Once these nuclear weapons are deployed by Israel, the world as we know it will then have changed forever. The conflict may well escalate throughout the Middle East and the Gulf, to Europe and the wider world, and the non-IAEA nuclear states of Pakistan and North Korea could also become involved. The other nuclear powers, the US , Russia , France , China , Britain and India could jump in different directions, for no one can predict what the eventual global consequences would be as lethal radioactivity starts to shroud and then envelop the Middle East, the Gulf and the Mediterranean .

Iran’s rapid nuclear proliferation will lead to a nuclear war: Israel and the US will be drawn in

Phillips 10. (James, Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at the Heritage Foundation. “An Israeli Preventive Attack on Iran's Nuclear Sites: Implications for the U.S.” The Heritage Foundation. January 15, 2010. <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/01/An-Israeli-Preventive-Attack-on-Iran-Nuclear-Sites-Implications-for-the-US>). LRH.

The Iranian regime's drive for nuclear weapons, rapid progress in building up its ballistic missile arsenal, ominous rhetoric about destroying Israel, and the failure of international diplomatic efforts to halt Iran's nuclear weapons program have potentially created a--literally--explosive situation. Israel may launch a preventive strike against Iran's nuclear weapons infra structure.

The United States would almost certainly be drawn into an Israeli-Iranian conflict. The Obama Adminis­tration must start planning now to counter and minimize the destabilizing consequences of an expected Iranian backlash. To mitigate the threats posed by Iran to U.S. national security and to protect U.S. interests, the United States must:

Iranian prolif is the most urgent threat to the world order.

Inbar 6 (Efraim, Director of BESA Center for Strategic Studies, “The Need to Block a Nuclear Iran” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Volume 10, No. 1, Article 7) MKB

**The Islamic Republic of Iran is the greatest, most urgent threat to regional order in the Middle East and a challenge to American hegemony** in world affairs. **Iran is a revisionist state trying to export its Islamic revolution,** a mission intertwined with the nationalistic aspirations for grandeur rooted in a historic awareness of being an ancient civilization. In its behavior, revolutionary **Iran** largely conforms to what Yehezkel Dror termed a "Crazy State." Such a state **is characterized by far-reaching goals in its foreign policy, a propensity for high risk policies, intensive commitment and determination to implement these policies, and unconventional diplomatic style. If Iran becomes nuclear, these foreign policy features will probably be even more pronounced.**

**Iran actively supports the insurgency in Iraq against the establishment of a stable, pro-American regime.** **Tehran encourages radical Shi'a elements in Iraq** in order to promote the establishment of another Islamic republic and foments trouble in the Shi'a communities in the Gulf states. **It opposes a more liberal regime that could potentially serve as a catalyst for democratization in the area. Iran is allied with Syria, another radical state with an anti-American predisposition, and seeks to create a radical Shi'a corridor from Iran to the Mediterranean**. Moreover, **Tehran lends critical support to terrorist organizations such as Hizballah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad**. According to the U.S. State Department, **Iran is the most active state sponsor of terrorism.**

**Iran's nuclear program coupled with long-range delivery systems, in particular, threatens regional stability in the Middle East. Iran's possesses the Shehab-3 long-range missile** (with a range of 1,300 kilometers) **that can** probably **be nuclear-tipped** and is working on extending the range of its ballistic arsenal. American allies, such as **Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf States are within range, as well as several important U.S. bases**. The Chief of the IDF Intelligence Department, Maj. Gen. Aharon Zeevi (Farkash) reported that **Iran has also acquired 12 cruise missiles with a range of up to 3,000 kilometers and with an ability to carry nuclear warheads**.[

Further **improvements** in Iranian missiles **would initially put most European capitals, and eventually, the North American continent, within range of** a potential Iranian attack. **Iran has an ambitious satellite launching program based on the use o**f multi-stage, solid propellant launchers, with **intercontinental ballistic missile properties** to enable the launching of a 300-kilogram satellite within two years. If Iran achieves this goal, it will put many more states at risk of a future nuclear attack..

Iranian nuclearization escalates- Israel can’t check.

Inbar 6 (Efraim, Director of BESA Center for Strategic Studies, “The Need to Block a Nuclear Iran” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Volume 10, No. 1, Article 7) MKB

The nuclear ambitions of the Islamic Republic of Iran are, of course, a challenge to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime (NPT). **A nuclear Iran might well bring an end to this regime and to American attempts to curb proliferation in the Middle East and in other parts of the world**. Indeed**, the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran would have a chain-effect, generating further nuclear proliferation in the immediate region**. **Middle Eastern leaders, who invariably display high threat perceptions, are unlikely to look nonchalantly** on a nuclear Iran. States such as **Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and**, of course, **Iraq would hardly be persuaded by the United States that it can provide a nuclear umbrella** against Iranian nuclear blackmail or actual nuclear attack. American extended deterrence is very problematic in the Middle East. Therefore, **these states would not resist the temptation to counter Iranian influence by adopting similar nuclear postures**. **The resulting scenario of a multi-polar nuclear Middle East would be a recipe for disaster**. This strategic prognosis is a result of two factors: a) the inadequacy of a defensive posture against nuclear tipped missiles, and b) the difficulties surrounding the establishment of stable nuclear deterrence in the region. Missiles are the most effective means of delivering nuclear weapons. While the United States is developing a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system and Russia claims to have a missile intercept capability with its S-300 missile system**, only Israel possesses a serious capability to parry a nuclear missile attack**. Israel has developed a defensive layer around the Arrow-2 anti-ballistic missile, which is designed to intercept the family of Scud missiles. This program, which began in the late 1980s, benefited from generous American funding and amounts to the only deployed operational anti-ballistic missile system so far in the world. Since 2000, Israel has deployed several operational batteries of Arrow missiles. The interception range is about 150 kilometers away from Israel's borders.  On December 2, 2005, Israel launched an Arrow missile that successfully intercepted a mock-up of an Iranian Shehab-3 missile. The goal of the test was to expand the range of Arrow missiles to a higher altitude and to evaluate the interface between the Arrow and the American-improved Patriot missile system, which is meant to go into operation if the Arrow fails to shoot down its target. **The interception of a missile armed with a nuclear head at a lower altitude and closer to home by the Patriot system is, of course, problematic. While this test and others have proven that the Arrow does hit its target, no defense system is foolproof**. **The Arrow-2** provides a certain measure of protection, but it **is a first generation weapon system, and even its developers do not claim a one hundred percent interception rate**. Moreover, it is not clear how the Arrow would function if enemy missiles were equipped with countermeasures or if the enemy were to use saturation tactics. **Israel has hitherto had the upper hand in the regional technological race, but there are no assurances that this will always be so. The difficulties that Israel faces in dealing with Katyushas, Qassams, and tunnels show that Israeli ingenuity may not come up with immediate adequate responses. This is true of the United States as well. Even if defensive solutions are eventually devised, there may be windows of vulnerability, which could be of catastrophic dimensions in a nuclear scenario.**All Middle Eastern states are so far defenseless against Iranian missiles. Indeed, as the Iranian nuclear program progresses, one can clearly detect a rise in threat perception on the part of most Arab states in the region. **Several states within Iranian range, such as Turkey and India, have shown interest in purchasing the Israeli BMD system**, whose export requires American approval. However, at present, while **Israel is partly protected from Iranian nuclear missiles, the rest of the region remains vulnerable to such a threat.**The Iranian nuclear threat is also to be taken seriously in light of the difficulties of achieving a stable deterrence with Tehran. Unfortunately, **there are scholars who belittle such fears by releasing optimistic evaluations regarding a potentially stable "balance of terror" between Israel and Iran, modeled on the relationship between the two superpowers during the Cold War. Such a bilateral relationship, where the two sides deter each other, cannot be easily emulated in the Middle East. A "balance of terror" between two nuclear protagonists is never automatic, and could not be taken for granted even between the United States and the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the situation in the Middle East is even less stable**. **A second-strike capability**, which allows a state to respond in kind after being subjected to a nuclear attack, **is critical in establishing credible deterrence**. **During the Cold War, submarines constituted the platform for any second-strike capability**; the difficulty in locating them under water rendered them less vulnerable to an enemy first-strike attack. Indeed**, the Soviet Union and United States relied on the survivability and mobility of submarines, characteristics that would enable them to carry out a second-strike with nuclear-tipped missiles**. **While the superpowers possessed large submarine fleets, it is doubtful that any Middle Eastern power owns enough submarines equipped to do the job.** Israel's current fleet includes three Dolphin-class submarines, to be augmented by the end of the decade by two additional vessels recently purchased in Germany. However, **it is not clear whether the Israeli submarines carry enough punch to deter adversarie**s. In this context, it is important to note that **no fleet can ever be fully operational**. Some vessels are in port for maintenance, while others are en route to the designated area of operations or on their way back to the homeport. Furthermore, the most appropriate launching area in the Indian Ocean is far away from Israel.

Iranian nuclearization emboldens terrorists and creates nuclear war in the Middle East.

Inbar 6 (Efraim, Director of BESA Center for Strategic Studies, “The Need to Block a Nuclear Iran” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Volume 10, No. 1, Article 7) MKB

**While it can be argued that Middle East leaders behave rationally, many of them engage in "brinkmanship" leading to miscalculation**. Even of greater consequence**, their sensitivity to costs and their attitudes to human life hardly conform to Western values. Iranian leaders have said that they are ready to pay a heavy price for the destruction of the Jewish state.** For example, on December 14, 2001, the Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani declared that the use of a nuclear bomb against Israel would destroy the Jewish state, producing only "damages in the Muslim world." Moreover, while Arab leaders issued similar statements in the past, **the historical animosity between Persians and Arabs could also produce motivations to use nuclear weapons under extreme circumstances**. **Strong mutual mistrust, a basic feature of Middle Eastern political culture, creates a psychological environment that is conducive to rigidity and inflexibility.** These are highly dangerous qualities in a nuclear situation, where it is important to leave the enemy a way to retreat, what Thomas Schelling calls the "last clear chance." The "dialectics of the antagonists” in the Middle East can hardly turn a "balance of terror" into a "balance of prudence," in which each adversary exerts maximum caution and consideration, permitting coexistence. Nuclear deterrence is probably harder to achieve than deterrence theorists had believed, because there is great variation in how people calculate their interests and react to threats.

Furthermore, as the nuclear taboo is eroding at the interstate level, **Iran,** or a faction, or even individual officials in the government **may decide to pass a nuclear device to a terrorist organization**, such as Hamas or Hizballah, **to be used against Israel or a "heretic"** (Muslim or **Christian) regime.** This possibility is intensified by the fact that the weapons are apparently institutionally under the control of hardliners even in the context of the Iranian government, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The "crazy state" posture may be conducive toward Iranian nuclear largesse to other radical Islamic groups operating outside the Middle East. The Iranians have used proxies to carry out attacks against their enemies in the past. An indirect mode of operation would put many capitals in the world in danger and make Iran a somewhat less likely subject to retaliation. In any case, **a nuclear Iran might provide emboldened global Jihadist terrorist groups a haven where they think they are immune to Western reach.**

**A nuclear Iran would also enhance Iranian hegemony in the strategic energy sector, by its mere location along the oil-rich Persian Gulf area and the Caspian Basin. These two adjacent regions form the "energy ellipse," which holds over 70 percent of the world's proven oil and over 40 percent of natural gas reserves.** Giving revolutionary Iran a better ability to intimidate the governments controlling parts of this huge energy reservoir would further strengthen Iran's position in the region and world affairs. Such a position would also make Iran's containment even more difficult and would necessarily embolden Islamic radicals everywhere.

Iran is on its way to building the bomb, and it will proliferate immediately. There is also a high risk of miscalculation.

Allison 6 (Graham, Harvard Professor of Political Science, former Pentagon advisor *“The will to prevent: global challenges of nuclear proliferation”* Entrepreneur, http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/156803100\_2.html)MKB

Meanwhile, Iran is testing the line in the Middle East. On its current trajectory, the Islamic Republic will become a nuclear weapons state before the end of the decade. According to the leadership in Tehran, **Iran is exercising its "inalienable right" to build Iranian enrichment plants and make fuel for its peaceful civilian nuclear power generators. These same facilities, however, can continue enriching uranium to 90 percent U-235, which is the ideal core of a nuclear bomb**. No one in the international community doubts that Iran's hidden objective in building enrichment facilities is to build nuclear bombs. **If Iran crosses its nuclear finish line, a Middle Eastern cascade of new nuclear weapons states could trigger the first multi-party nuclear arms race, far more volatile than the Cold War** competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Given **Egypt's** historic role as the leader of the Arab Middle East, the **prospects of it living unarmed alongside a nuclear Persia are very low.** **The IAEA's reports of clandestine nuclear experiments hint that Cairo may have considered this possibility**. **Were Saudi Arabia to buy a dozen nuclear warheads that could be mated to the Chinese medium-range ballistic missiles it purchased secretly in the 1980s, few in the US intelligence community would be surprised.** **Given Saudi Arabia's role as the major financier of Pakistan's clandestine nuclear program** in the 1980s, **it is not out of the question that Riyadh and Islamabad have made secret arrangements for this contingency.**

**Such a multi-party nuclear arms race in the Middle East would be like playing Russian roulette--dramatically increasing the likelihood of a regional nuclear war. Other nightmare scenarios for the region include an accidental or unauthorized nuclear launch from Iran, theft of nuclear warheads from an unstable regime in Tehran, and possible Israeli preemption against Iran's nuclear facilities, which Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has implied,** threatening, "Under no circumstances, and at no point, can Israel allow anyone with these kinds of malicious designs against us to have control of weapons of destruction that can threaten our existence."

US/Turkey Relations Adv: Good Relations K to Solve Prolif

Improving US-Turkish relations is key to holding Iran up to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Ozerkan10. (Fulya, writer for Hurriet Daily News. “Turkey's no vote on Iran sanctions a 'strong rebuke,' former US politician says.” Hurriet Daily News. June 16, 2010. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey8217s-no-vote-on-iran-sanctions-was-a-strong-rebuke-2010-06-16>) LRH.

Turkey’s “no” vote against U.N. sanctions on Iran is a dramatic example of Ankara enacting foreign policy contrary to the U.S.’s core interests and the dismay in Washington should not be underestimated, according to a former U.S. congressman.

“The no vote was a vote against the Obama administration’s efforts to isolate Iran and prevent it from obtaining nuclear weapons,” said Robert Wexler, the former chairman of the congressional caucus on U.S.-Turkish relations. “Most importantly, it was a vote against holding Iran to its international obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” Wexler told the Hürriyet Daily News & Economic Review in an interview Wednesday.

Improved US-Turkish relations are key to preventing Iran prolif: this goes beyond sanctions

Salem 10. (Paul, Dir. of the Carnegie Middle East Center. “Rising Turkey in a Changing Middle East.” July 6, 2010. <http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=41113>). LRH.

On the Iranian file, Turkey has been trying to coordinate for years with the Europeans, Americans, and the P5+1—the permanent members of the Security Council and Germany—to help mediate with the Iranians. This is something that for most of the time, the P5+1 and particularly the United States was grateful for. Turkey sees the deal that it recently struck with Brazil and Iran as something in the general interest of the West in finding a negotiated solution with the Iranians. Ankara does not perceive it as something that goes against Western interests. It is important to keep in mind that Turkey is more fearful of an Iranian nuclear weapon than the United States as Turkey is right next door and there are strong concerns in Turkey, Europe, Russia, and the United States.   
An unfortunate set of diplomatic misunderstandings on both sides have unfolded. Both the United States and Turkey need to move forward and rebuild trust. They need to cooperate on the Iranian nuclear issue because sanctions themselves are not going to solve the problem. According to all players, the door for negotiation with Iran needs to remain open. Negotiations need to be pursued and the Turks are still well placed to play an important role in doing that.

Good US/ Turkey relations are key to getting Turkey to vote on Iran sanctions, which would stop Iran prolif

Reuters 10. “U.S.: Turkey must back Iran nuclear sanctions.” Reuters. March 17, 2010. <http://www.haaretz.com/news/u-s-turkey-must-back-iran-nuclear-sanctions-1.264909>). LRH.

But he said Turkey, a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council that has been leery of the U.S.-led push to further punish Iran, must show it is "on board" with the move toward new sanctions. "Many would be disappointed if Turkey is an exception to an international consensus on dealing with Iran," he told a news briefing before a speech on U.S. relations with Turkey, a fellow NATO member and pivotal regional ally to Washington. "Turkey wants to be an important, responsible actor on the international scene. And I think joining the majority of the Security Council in doing this would reinforce that image," Gordon said. "Not doing so would not contribute to that positive outcome ... I think that's a consequence." The United States and other Western powers are seeking support new U.N. sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program, which they fear is a cover for developing atomic weapons. But China, a permanent, veto-wielding member of the Security Council, along with non-permanent members Turkey and Brazil, have urged more time for diplomacy with Iran, which insists its nuclear program is purely for peaceful purposes. Damage Control Amid the Iran push, U.S. officials are trying to control the damage after a House of Representatives committee vote this month on the non-binding "genocide" resolution over the 1915 killings, a move which infuriated Turkey. The House vote appeared to jeopardize halting progress by Armenia and Turkey to normalize relations, one key to stability in the south Caucasus, a region crisscrossed by oil and gas pipelines to Europe. Turkey withdrew its ambassador to Washington and has said he will not return until Ankara gets assurances about the fate of the resolution, which the Obama administration opposed. Gordon repeated the White House's hope that the resolution would not move forward in Congress but denied there was any deal with Democratic lawmakers to kill the bill outright. "There's no deal. The Congress is an independent body and they're going to do what they decide to do," he said. But Gordon called on Ankara to return the ambassador anyway, saying the breadth of the bilateral relationship -- which includes cooperation on Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and the Middle East -- was too important to link to any one issue. "We would like to see the ambassador here. We think he should be here, making Turkey's case," Gordon said. He said the relationship was a two-way street and noted that Washington was a strong supporter of Turkey's bid to join the European Union, one of Ankara's chief goals. "On nearly every issue that is critical to Turkey's future, the United States plays an enormously important role as a trusted friend and ally," Gordon said. The relationship, he added, "requires hard work and attention -- on both sides."

Turkey can successfully bridge U.S. and Iranian interests.

Schulte 10 (Gregory L., U.S. ambassador to IAEA, “Why Turkey cannot abstain on Iran’s nuclear violations” Daily News, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=why-turkey-cannot-abstain-on-iran8217s-nuclear-violations-2010-04-19) MKB

**Mediation can play a role**. Certainly, **Turkey has better insights into Iran and contacts with its leaders than do the United States** and many other countries seeking a diplomatic solution. At one point last fall, it appeared that **Turkey’s mediation could bring Tehran to accept an IAEA proposal to ship much of Iran’s illicitly-produced low-enriched uranium out of the country in exchange for fuel for a research reactor.** **This** prospective deal **gave hope for a diplomatic breakthrough that would build confidence and buy time for further diplomacy**. But the deal died – either a victim of Iranian domestic politics or another Iranian ploy to avoid Security Council action.

**Iranian authorities recognize the value of mediation** – not to secure a diplomatic solution but to divide the international community. **Iran has regularly convinced countries and politicians that they could serve as important mediators. Being a mediator is a comfortable position. It gives an excuse to avoid confrontation and tough positions. Prospects for success bring special attention**. Failure can be blamed on the parties or external meddling.

**Iran’s interest in encouraging mediation is to chip away at the coalition of international concern about its illicit nuclear pursuits. It often encourages mediation by countries that have significant trade ties with Iran or that can influence key international decisions. Turkey, now on both the IAEA Board and UN Security Council, meets both criteria.**

Turkey is in the initial steps of a successful role as mediator. Both the U.S. and Iran are receptive.

Arab News 10 (“Turkey sees progress over Iran; US rules out military strike for now” Arab News, http://arabnews.com/middleeast/article45904.ece) MKB

**Turkish Foreign Minister** Ahmet **Davutoglu has reported progress in efforts to resolve tension between Iran and Western powers over the Islamic republic’s nuclear program**, in remarks published on Wednesday.

**Asked whether “certain progress has been made” in his talks with Iranian officials** in Tehran on Tuesday, **Davutoglu answered “yes,”** speaking to Turkey’s English-language Today’s Zaman newspaper.

**“What is most important is the fact that the Iranian side is very receptive**. There are also steps that I will take from now on. I’m very hopeful,” he was quoted as saying.

**Turkey**, a UN Security Council member opposed to fresh sanctions against Iran, **insists the dispute should be resolved through diplomatic means and has offered to act as a mediator.**

**Turkey “is ready to act as an intermediary in the issue of uranium exchange as a third country and hopes to have a fruitful role in this,”** Davutoglu said in Tehran Tuesday.

**The United States welcomed Turkey’s mediation efforts,** but expressed renewed skepticism about Iran’s willingness to engage in talks.

US/Turkey Relations: Sanctions Don’t Solve

Experts say sanctions will fail. History Proves.

Soloman 10 (Jay, journalist, “Panetta Warns of Iran Threat” Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704846004575332823388936154.html) MKB

Even as the White House trumpets the U.N. vote imposing the toughest sanctions to date against Iran, **a former U.S. official and expert on sanctions say they "almost never succeed."**

In a CBS News interview, economist C. Fred Bergsten says **the chances the new sanctions will get Iran to capitulate on its nuclear program are "virtually zero."**

**"It's sad but true," said Bergsten, a former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in the Carter Administration and currently director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics**.

**His organization has made a comprehensive study of the use of sanctions to alter nations' behavior** and he says they rarely do

Then why bother to impose sanctions? **Bergsten says nations don't want to go to war, but putting sanctions in place makes them feel "they're doing something against the bad guys**."

President Obama seemed to concede that point in his remarks today on the new sanctions against Iran.

"We know that the Iranian government will not change its behavior overnight," he said, "but today's (U.N.) vote demonstrates the growing costs that will come with Iranian intransigence."

**When CBS News asked the White House to name** an example or two of **nations that changed major policies as a result of sanctions, an official cited South Afric**a, which ended apartheid, **and Libya**, which abandoned its program to produce weapons of mass destruction.

Bergsten says the **changes in those two nations were more the result of internal politics and other factors than international sanctions**.

And he believes **no country illustrates the failure of sanctions to bring about change more than Cuba,** against which a U.S. embargo has been in effect since 1960.

"Our conclusion is that the Cuban sanctions have been a total failure," said Bergsten in a debate on the subject of sanctions in 1998. He said he stills stands by that assessment.

**Bergsten says sanctions can occasionally get a country to give in on a minor policy matter. But he says the historical record shows it's rare that sanctions will ever compel a strong nation to alter a high-priority program.**

US/Turkey Relations: Sanctions Don’t Solve

Sanctions won’t affect Iran because their strong oil industry remains untouched.

Neely 10 (Brett, journalist, “Will new Iranian sanctions be effective?” Marketplace, http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2010/06/09/pm-will-new-iran-sanctions-be-effective/) MKB

Today's Security Council resolution expands an international arms embargo against Iran. More Iranian banks and companies involved with the nuclear weapons program will be added to a U.N. blacklist and won't be able to trade abroad.

**"It makes it a little bit more difficult for Iran to do business as usual," said** Jacqueline Shire**, a former U.S. diplomat and a U.N. weapons inspector who's now at the Center for Science and International Security.**

**But today's new sanctions don't touch Iran's oil industry, its biggest source of revenue.** That decision faced up to a political reality, says Shire.

"**China wanted assurances that nothing in this resolution would really change the way Iran does its daily non-nuclear-related business**," she said.

**The sanctions are designed to increase the pressure on Iran, says** George **Lopez**, who is **a sanctions expert at the U.S. Institute of Peace.**

**"You know it's not a total lockdown, let's not fool ourselves here,"** Lopez said. "But **it does have a ripple effect that changes that the way the leaders in Tehran will think about the costs of continuing to pursue this nuclear program."**

But **three earlier rounds of U.N. sanctions haven't stopped the Iranian nuclear weapons program**. Karim Sadjadpour, an associate at the Carnegie Endowment, says **Iran has plenty of oil to export and an economy that's already been isolated for decades.**

**"Further sanctioning Iran is kind of like sentencing a recluse to house arrest**," Sadjadpour said.

Ahmadinejad denies any effect.

Meek 10 (James Gordon, journalist, “Ahmadinejad laughs off sanctions” New York Daily News, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/2010/06/09/2010-06-09\_un\_security\_council\_hits\_iran\_with\_new\_sanctions\_over\_alleged\_nuke\_program\_brazi.html) MKB

**Iran's hate-spewing leader laughed off a new round of tough UN sanctions** imposed Wednesday to prevent his country from making a doomsday weapon.

"**From right and from left, they adopt sanctions, but for us they are annoying flies, like a used tissue," yapped** Iranian President Mahmoud **Ahmadinejad.**

But President **Obama said new sanctions against Iran because of its nuclear program are the "most comprehensive" yet and send an "unmistakable" message to its leaders**.

Turkey encouraging U.S.- Iranian negotiations. Turkey is a historically successful mediator.

Yackley 9 (Ayla Jean, Turkish Journalist, “Turkey would consider mediating between Iran, U.S.” Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5271P820090308) MKB

**Foreign Minister** Ali **Babacan said** on Sunday - **after meeting** U.S. Secretary of State Hillary **Clinton and shortly before leaving for Tehran - that Turkey was trying to bridge differences between the United States and Iran.**

**Tukey, the only predominantly Muslim member of NATO, has offered to help resolve the standoff between the United States, its traditional ally, and its neighbor Iran over Tehran's nuclear program**.

Clinton said in an interview on Turkish television on Saturday that the United States would ask Turkey to help push forward U.S. President Barack Obama's plan to engage Iran.

**Babacan,** who held talks with Clinton in Ankara on Saturday**, will visit Iran for an Economic Cooperation Organiztion meeting chaired by Iranian President** Mahmoud **Ahmadinejad.**

Turkish officials are working to create "better understanding" between the United States and Iran and both sides are pleased with its efforts, Babacan said in an interview with the broadcaster NTV.

Babacan said he would not carry a message from the United States to Iranian officials and that Turkey was not acting as a facilitator or mediator between the two sides.

**"Tukey has advised both the United States and Iran that dialogue and diplomacy are key to lowering tension and that tough statements by both sides have yielded few results so far**,"Babacan said.

**Clinton** also met Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul in Ankara, the last stop in her week-long trip to the Middle East and Europe. She **praised Turkey's role as a mediator between** **Syria and Israel.**

Turkey is critical for U.S.- Iran nuclear negotiations.

Yackley 9 (Ayla Jean, Turkish Journalist, “Turkey would consider mediating between Iran, U.S.” Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5271P820090308) MKB

**Turkey would consider serving as mediator between Iran and the United States, Foreign Minister Ali Babacan said** on Sunday after meeting U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and shortly before leaving for Tehran.

**Turkey would weigh any requests by the two sides to serve as a mediator and current efforts to open a dialogue are "an important opportunity,"** Babacan told reporters before leaving for Tehran for an Economic Cooperation Organizationmeeting chaired by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Clinton, who was in Ankara for talks with Babacan, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul, said in an interview on Turkish television on Saturday **that the United States would ask Turkey to help push forward U.S. President Barack Obama's plan to engage Iran.**

**Turkey**, the only predominantly Muslim member of NATO, **has said it can help resolve the standoff over Tehran's nuclear programme between the United States, its traditional ally, and its neighbor Iran, with which it also enjoys good ties.**

"**We can contribute to bringing relations between the two countries to a much better place, and our hope is that this search for dialogue will bring concrete results," Babacan said,** according to the state-run Anatolian news agency.

**Turkish officials are working to create "better understanding" between the United States and Iran and both sides are pleased with its efforts**, Babacan said earlier in an interview with the broadcaster NTV.

If Iran developed nuclear weapons, deterrence would become impossible and proliferation would go unchecked. The world would erupt in nuclear war, culminating in extinction,

Wimbush 7 (S. Enders, Director of Center for Future Security Strategies, “The End of Deterrence- a nuclear Iran will change everything” Weekly Standard, http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/013/154auoqp.asp) MKB

**The opportunities nuclear weapons will afford Iran far exceed the prospect of using them to win a military conflict**. **Nuclear weapons will empower strategies of coercion, intimidation, and denial** that go far beyond purely military considerations. **Acquiring the bomb as an icon of state power will enhance the legitimacy of Iran's mullahs and make it harder for disgruntled Iranians to oust them**. With nuclear weapons, **Iran will have gained the ability to deter any direct American threats, as well as the leverage to keep the United States at a distance and to discourage it from helping Iran's regional opponents.** Would the United States be in Iraq if Saddam had had a few nuclear weapons and the ability to deliver them on target to much of Europe and all of Israel? Would it even have gone to war in 1991 to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi aggression? Unlikely. Yet Iran is rapidly acquiring just such a capability. If it succeeds, **a relatively small nuclear outcast will be able to deter a mature nuclear power. Iran will become a billboard advertising nuclear weapons as the logical asymmetric weapon of choice for nations that wish to confront the United States.** It should surprise no one that **quiet discussions have already begun in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and elsewhere in the Middle East about the desirability of developing national nuclear capabilities to blunt Iran's anticipated advantage** and to offset the perceived decline in America's protective power. **This is just the beginning. We should anticipate that proliferation across Eurasia will be broad and swift, creating nightmarish challenges**. The diffusion of nuclear know-how is on the verge of becoming impossible to impede. Advanced computation and simulation techniques will eventually make testing unnecessary for some actors, thereby expanding the possibilities for unwelcome surprises and rapid shifts in the security environment. **Leakage of nuclear knowledge and technologies from weak states will become commonplace, and new covert supply networks will emerge to fill the gap** left by the neutralization of Pakistani proliferator A. Q. Khan. **Non-proliferation treaties, never effective in blocking the ambitions of rogues** like Iran and North Korea, **will be meaningless**. **Intentional proliferation to state and non-state actors is virtually certain, as** newly capable **states seek to empower their friends and sympathizers. Iran, with its well known support of Hezbollah, is a particularly good candidate to proliferate nuclear capabilities beyond the control of any state as a way to extend the coercive reach of its own nuclear politics**. Arsenals will be small, which sounds reassuring, but in fact it heightens the dangers and risk. New players with just a few weapons, including Iran, will be especially dangerous. **Cold War deterrence was based on the belief that an initial strike by an attacker could not destroy all an opponent's nuclear weapons, leaving the adversary with the capacity to strike back in a devastating retaliatory blow. Because it is likely to appear easier to destroy them in a single blow, small arsenals will increase the incentive to strike first in a crisis. Small, emerging nuclear forces could also raise the risk of preventive war**, as leaders are tempted to attack before enemy arsenals grow bigger and more secure. Some of the **new nuclear actors are less interested in deterrence than in using nuclear weapons to annihilate their enemies. Iran's leadership has spoken of its willingness**--in their words--**to "martyr" the entire Iranian nation**, and **it has even expressed the desirability of doing so as a way to accelerate** **an** inevitable, **apocalyptic collision between Islam and the West** that will result in Islam's final worldwide triumph. **Wiping Israel off the map**--one of Iran's frequently expressed strategic objectives--**even if it results in an Israeli nuclear strike on Iran, may be viewed as an acceptable trade-off. Ideological actors of this kind may be very different from today's nuclear powers who employ nuclear weapons as a deterrent to annihilation. Indeed, some of the new actors may seek to annihilate others and be annihilated, gloriously, in return. It should surprise no one that quiet discussions have already begun in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and elsewhere in the Middle East about the desirability of developing national nuclear capabilities to blunt Iran's anticipated advantage** and to offset the perceived decline in America's protective power. **This is just the beginning. We should anticipate that proliferation across Eurasia will be broad and swift, creating nightmarish challenges. The diffusion of nuclear know-how is on the verge of becoming impossible to impede. Advanced computation and simulation techniques will eventually make testing unnecessary** for some actors, **thereby expanding the possibilities for unwelcome surprises and rapid shifts in the security environment. Leakage of nuclear knowledge and technologies from weak states will become commonplace**, and new covert supply networks will emerge to fill the gap left by the neutralization of Pakistani proliferator A. Q. Khan. 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US/Turkey Relations: Iran will Have Bomb and Sanctions Don’t Solve

In two years Iran will have the bomb. Sanctions will have little practical effect.

Soloman 10 (Jay, journalist, “Panetta Warns of Iran Threat” Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704846004575332823388936154.html) MKB

**C**entral **I**ntelligence **A**gency **Director** Leon **Panetta said Iran has enough fissile material for two atomic bombs, and that it could develop nuclear weapons in two year**s if it wanted, in the Obama administration's starkest assessment to date of Tehran's nuclear work.

**The CIA chief's comments mark a further distancing of the U.S. government from a controversial 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, compiled by Washington's 16 spy agencies, that concluded Tehran had stopped developing atomic weapons in 2003.**

The office of the Director of National Intelligence, the U.S.'s top intelligence body, has been preparing a new NIE that was expected to be released as early as last December. **Tehran has announced in recent months that it had begun enriching uranium at levels closer to weapons grade**. In recent weeks**, Iranian officials** have also **said they were limiting the activities inside Iran of some inspectors from the** United Nations' nuclear watchdog, the **I**nternational **A**tomic **E**nergy **A**gency.

**The IAEA in a May report on Iran's nuclear program estimated that Tehran has produced roughly 2,400 kilograms of low-enriched uranium at its nuclear facilities.**

Nuclear **experts say this is enough to build two atomic weapons**, if the fissile material were enriched further to weapons-grade levels.

Iran recently began producing nuclear fuel enriched to 20% purity, but it would need to process it further to about 90% purity, to create the fissile reaction for an atomic weapon.

Mr. Panetta said it would take Iran roughly a year to produce the highly enriched uranium needed for a nuclear weapon, once the decision was made to produce it.

He said it would take an additional year "to develop the kind of weapon delivery system" needed to carry atomic warheads.

The U.N., European Union and U.S. Congress all imposed substantial new economic sanctions on Iran this month in an effort to curb Tehran's nuclear work.

The sanctions seek to cut off Iran from the global financial system and to hobble its oil-and-gas sector. The measures also target the businesses of Tehran's elite military unit, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Mr. **Panetta** on Sunday **expressed doubt that these new financial penalties would be enough to pressure Iran** into ending its nuclear activities.

"**Those sanctions will have some impact.…It could help weaken the regime. It could create some serious economic problems,**" he said. **"Will it deter them from their ambitions with regards to nuclear capability? Probably not."**

US/Turkey Relations Adv: NPT Solves

**The NPT is the most important non proliferation regime – it provides a barrier that prevents nuclear weapons from spreading globally.**

Bureau of Public Affairs 10 (U.S. Department of State, April 30, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Promoting Non-Proliferation, State Department Documents and Publications) KGL

As the only legally binding agreement that provides a global barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons, the NPT is the cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime. It enhances the security of every state, as well as global and regional security. Articles I and II seek to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Article III requires non-nuclear-weapon states to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to verify that nuclear activities serve only peaceful purposes. The NPT encourages regional groups of states to conclude treaties to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons on their territories. Five such treaties have been concluded. Challenges to the NPT's nonproliferation pillar are several and serious. Robust verification of the NPT depends upon the IAEA having the necessary authorities and financial resources to fulfill its obligations. The revelation of the A.Q. Khan network's illicit activities makes clear the potential threat of illicit nuclear supply to states and non-state actors. Concerns are growing about the potential for abuse of the NPT's withdrawal clause, particularly if a Party seeking to withdraw from the NPT is already found to be in violation of its Treaty obligations. U.S. Actions in Support of the NPT's Nonproliferation Pillar \*Supporting the IAEA's safeguards program and working to ensure that the Agency has the resources it needs to fulfill its safeguards obligations. \* Currently working with eight countries to prepare the infrastructure necessary to effectively implement the IAEA's model Additional Protocol, designed to require more detailed disclosure regarding a states' nuclear program by providing bilateral and multilateral workshops. \* Working to revitalize international safeguards technology and expertise through the U.S. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative. \* Bringing our Additional Protocol into force in January 2009 and encouraging all other states to do likewise. \* Addressing Iran's non-compliance with its NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations and North Korea's announced withdrawal from the Treaty after violating its NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations. \* Working with concerned NPT Parties to identify effective mechanisms to dissuade both violation of the Treaty and subsequent withdrawal. \* Implementing a comprehensive system of export controls for material, equipment, and technology that could be used for nuclear explosive purposes. \* Meeting our obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1540 which, among other things, requires all States to adopt and enforce effective laws prohibiting proliferation, and supporting the efforts of other states to meet theirs. \* Strengthening cooperative international nonproliferation efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and encouraging their growth. \* Having led the initiative to amend the Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials to cover physical protection of nuclear materials in domestic use, storage and transport and of nuclear facilities. \* Hosting the Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010, as part of President Obama's initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years. Signing and ratifying the protocols to the Latin American Nuclear-Weapons- Free Zone (NWFZ) and having signed the protocols to the South Pacific and African NWFZs.

It’s empirically proven that the NPT is key to preventing the spread of proliferation

Rublee 8 (Maria Rost Rublee, Professor of Government and World Affairs @ University of Tampa, “Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness,” International Studies Review, 22 Aug 2008, Volume 10, Issue 3, Pages 420-450WileyInterScience) KGL

However, I would argue that before the United States (or any other country) gives up on the NPT and associated nuclear nonproliferation regime, we should take full account of not only the regime’s failures, but also its successes. Indeed, the success of the NPT is in many ways more surprising than its recent failures: for almost four decades, almost all states in the international system chose to forgo nuclear weapons, and in some cases, even gave them up. Numerous reports in the 1960s warned that the number of new nuclear states could reach as high as 20 in a few decades (The Bomb 1965:53). Instead, the count by 2008 is only four: India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea.2 The fact that so many states abstained from nuclear weapons tells us to look closely at the nuclear nonproliferation regime. What role has it played in encouraging nuclear forbearance? With the risk of nuclear theft or accidents increasing with each new nuclear weapons state, the international community needs all the help it can get in discouraging nuclear proliferation. This is especially important given the growing numbers of ‘‘latent nuclear states,’’ those with the ‘‘necessary industrial infrastructure and scientific expertise to build nuclear weapons on a crash basis if they chose to do so’’ (Sagan 1996:56). In 2004, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimated that over 40 countries were ‘‘nuclear latent states’’. Given the high stakes, we need to better understand how and in what ways the NPT has actually helped discouraged nuclear proliferation.

**The NPT is crucial to negotiations on Iranian proliferation.**

Shultz 7 (George P., William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn

The Wall Street Journal, A WORLD FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS) KGL

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) envisioned the end of all nuclear weapons. It provides (a) that states that did not possess nuclear weapons as of 1967 agree not to obtain them, and (b) that states that do possess them agree to divest themselves of these weapons over time. Every president of both parties since Richard Nixon has reaffirmed these treaty obligations, but non-nuclear weapon states have grown increasingly skeptical of the sincerity of the nuclear powers. Strong non-proliferation efforts are under way. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Additional Protocols are innovative approaches that provide powerful new tools for detecting activities that violate the NPT and endanger world security. They deserve full implementation. The negotiations on proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea and Iran, involving all the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany and Japan, are crucially important. They must be energetically pursued.

The NPT is key to preventing Iranian proliferation, which leads to Middle East proliferation and puts nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists.

Muller 5 (Harald, director of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt in Germany and a professor of international relations at Frankfurt University, “The 2005 NPT Review Conference,” The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, October 14,<http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No31.pdf>) KGL

In the Middle East, the possibility cannot be ignored even today that Egyptian tactics in New York foreshadowed a movement away from the non-nuclear commitment by the most important Arab country. If the Israeli nuclear status was already difficult to accept for Egypt, an Iranian nuclear-weapon option is seen as an acute threat. The same threat could induce Saudi Arabia to attempt obtaining bombs for money. If Egypt approaches a nuclear option, Arab rivals such a Syria or Algeria might also not keep quiet. A nuclearising Middle East may then even induce Turkey to reconsider its non-nuclear stance. At this point, the status-minded middle powers would be challenged: Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, Indonesia, Argentina might feel compelled to put their long buried nuclear option back on the agenda for consideration. The NPT would inevitably erode. This is a scenario for the next ten to fifteen years. In 2020 or 2025, we might confront the world that was President Kennedy’s nightmare: a world with twenty or so nuclear-weapon states, some of which would be located in the world’s most volatile regions. Whoever believes that in this constellation, stable deterrent relationships will blossom and we will keep nuclear weapons and fissile materials out of terrorists’ hands may as well believe that the world is a disk, and the moon is made of cheese.

Without the NPT states will aggressively pursue nuclear options without concerns for safety, causing accidents

Miller & Sagan 10 (Steven E. Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom Member of the Board, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Scott D. Professor of Political Science Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies Ph.D., Harvard University, Dædalus Winter 2010, Alternative nuclear futures) KGL

A much more negative vision of the future finds that the global expansion of nuclear power has produced an array of undesirable consequences. If nuclear newcomers lack confidence in the international market for nuclear fuel, however it is con½gured, some will surely seek to master the nuclear fuel cycle themselves (as Iran has done) in order to ensure a reliable supply of reactor fuel for their nuclear programs and, perhaps, to maintain a weapons option for the future. Neighboring states will be nervous, great powers will be alarmed, and friction is likely to ensue–as evidenced in the past decade in the cases of Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Coping with this problem will be even worse if the standing of the iaea were to erode and its ability to provide transparency and reassurance were undermined. It is certainly possible that in the future the iaea, hobbled by inadequate resources, handicapped by its limited legal mandate, partially blinded by the lack of its own intelligence capabilities, tainted by the political maneuverings of member states, harmed by past failures, and crip- pled by the de½ance of troublesome states, would be judged insuf½cient, incapable of addressing the challenges of a more nuclear world. The iaea has its critics even today, but its problems could easily be compounded in the future. If the iaea were no longer regarded as an effective tool in the nonproliferation regime, this would weaken another barrier that stands between nuclear power and nuclear weapons. In the event that the nonproliferation system seems to be breaking down, institutionalized efforts to provide global governance in the nuclear realm are also likely to decay or fail. In a world in which states are aggressively pursuing their own nuclear interests and the institutions and mechanisms of nonproliferation are weakening, rules are less likely to be accepted, respected, or enforced. The evolution toward universal high standards for safety and physical security would be stifled and the result could be very uneven safety and security efforts in national nuclear programs –meaning higher risk of accident or incident.

NPT and agreements on arms control are key to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

Miller & Sagan 10 (Steven E. Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom Member of the Board, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Scott D. Professor of Political Science Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies Ph.D., Harvard University, Dædalus Winter 2010, Alternative nuclear futures) KGL

The most disturbing variant of this negative vision for the nuclear future would be one in which the norm against acquisition of nuclear weapons is fractured and new nws emerge. States that determined for their own self-interested reasons to acquire nuclear weapons could defy or ignore the npt/iaea system or simply withdraw from the npt (as North Korea did). In conflict-prone regions in which fuel cycle capabilities exist in multiple states, there arises the possibility of the competitive pursuit of nuclear weapons (as occurred in South Asia between India and Pakistan). If enrichment and reprocessing are more widely distributed across states, acquisition of nuclear weapons by one power could more easily trigger nuclear acquisition by others. In the past, rapid cascades of proliferation–though sometimes predicted–have not occurred and are not certain to occur in the future.15 But the dynamic could well be different if the nonproliferation regime is thought to be eroding and more nnws possess the latent capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. The reassuring record of a past era marked by few nws, a sturdy norm against acquisition, a reasonably sound nonproliferation regime, very infrequent spread of nuclear weapons to new states, and possession of fuel cycle capabilities by only a few states may not be a reliable guide to the future if trends slide in a negative direction. Decades ago, Henry Rowen and Albert Wohlstetter famously worried about the dangers of “life in a nuclear-armed crowd.” Decades hence, we could find ourselves living in that world if unwise choices and unfortunate preferences lead us down an undesirable nuclear path. Momentum toward a proliferated world would be reinforced if the current nws fail to move away from reliance on nuclear weapons. The notable cooling in U.S.-Russia relations could plausibly lead to a restoration of their nuclear rivalry and to a resurrection of nuclear deterrence as the centerpiece of the strategic relationship between the world’s two largest nuclear powers. Indeed, both powers retained substantial nuclear arsenals postured at least in part to “hedge” against the possibility that hostility would resume in their bilateral relationship. The nuclear obsession that marked the Cold War could return. But even if that does not happen, both the United States and Russia have continued to embrace nuclear weapons and to adopt doctrines and defense policies that accord a prominent role to nuclear weapons. If the arms con- trol process sputters and breaks down, if multilateral agreements founder and fail to enter into force because of strenuous opposition within nws, if the articulated commitments to nuclear disarmament come to be regarded as false promises, then relations between nuclear haves and have-nots are likely to be difficult and the international atmosphere will be more conducive to the spread of nuclear weapons.

NPTs allow for the use of nuclear power while ensuring nonproliferation

Miller & Sagan 10 (Steven E. Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom Member of the Board, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Scott D. Professor of Political Science Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies Ph.D., Harvard University, Dædalus Winter 2010, Alternative nuclear futures) KGL

The most optimistic vision of the future sees the substantial expansion and spread of nuclear energy use around the globe, but with effective constraints placed on the potential adverse security consequences. There would be many more nuclear reactors on a global scale, contributing to the mitigation of climate change and to energy security, but fuel cycle capabilities would not have spread. Nuclear newcomers would rely on international arrangements for the fuel to run their reactors and would use international or regional repositories to store spent fuel, rather than hold it or reprocess it at home. In this way, the link between nuclear power and nuclear weapons could be limited. Ideally, further reassurance about the purely peaceful applications of the world’s additional investments in nuclear power would be provided by a larger, stronger, better funded iaea, presiding over a regime that institutionalized high levels of transparency and empowered the iaea with suf½cient investigative powers to produce con½- dence that cheaters will not undermine the regime. If the international governance of the world’s nuclear affairs can evolve and strengthen, then it may be possible to establish and promote compliance with high common standards for safety and physical security –for example, through the re½nement and enforcement of un Security Council Resolution 1540, which already calls on states to ensure “appropriate and effective” levels of security at their nuclear facilities (but without ever de½ning what steps meet that standard). It will never be possible to eliminate all risk, of course; but the world would be a safer place if all states possessing nuclear technology were not only obliged to accept desirable standards, but made more genuine and monitored efforts to meet those standards. A system that possessed this set of attributes would be a robust nonproliferation regime that would allow the wide exploitation of nuclear power while circumscribing the potential risks and problems associated with nuclear power.

\*\*\*Terrorism Adv\*\*\*

Terrorism Adv—US intel key to crackdowns

U.S. presence in Turkey is critical to Turkish attacks of Kurds because the U.S. gives them intel about the location of Kurds through U.S. aircraft and drones.

Tyson et al 7 (Ann Tyson and Robin Wright, Pentagon correspondant, “U.S Helps Turkey Hit Rebel Kurds in Iraq” Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/12/17/AR2007121702150.html) MKB

The United States is providing Turkey with real-time intelligence that has helped the Turkish military target a series of attacks this month against Kurdish separatists holed up in northern [Iraq](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/iraq.html?nav=el), including a large airstrike on Sunday, according to Pentagon officials.

U.S. military personnel have set up a center for sharing intelligence in Ankara, the Turkish capital, providing imagery and other immediate information gathered from U.S. aircraft and unmanned drones flying over the separatists' mountain redoubts, the officials said. A senior administration official said the goal of the U.S. program is to identify the movements and activities of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), which is fighting to create an autonomous enclave in Turkey.

The United States is "essentially handing them their targets," one U.S. military official said. The Turkish military then decides whether to act on the information and notifies the United States, the official said.

US withdrawal would increase US/Iraq relations

Tyson et al 7 (Ann Tyson and Robin Wright, Pentagon correspondant, “U.S Helps Turkey Hit Rebel Kurds in Iraq” Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/12/17/AR2007121702150.html) MKB

"They said, 'We want to do something.' We said, 'Okay, it's your decision,' " the official said yesterday, although he denied that the United States had explicitly approved the strikes.

Sunday's airstrikes provoked outrage in Baghdad, particularly among Kurdish members of the country's leadership. Massoud Barzani, president of the Kurdish regional government, which administers three northern Iraqi provinces, called the attack "a violation of Iraq's sovereignty." He blamed the U.S. military, which controls Iraqi airspace, for allowing Turkish warplanes to cross the border. The Iraqi parliament also condemned the attacks yesterday.

The American role in aiding Turkey, a NATO ally, could complicate U.S. diplomatic initiatives in Iraq, particularly efforts to push Iraqi political leaders to enact legislation aimed at promoting political reconciliation.

The cooperation with Turkey also places the United States in the position of aiding a country that refused to allow U.S. forces to use its territory to open a northern front against the government of Saddam Hussein in 2003. It also alienates Iraq's Kurdish minority, whose leaders strongly support the U.S. troop presence in Iraq.

Intelligence sharing key to crackdowns

Tyson et al 7 (Ann Tyson and Robin Wright, Pentagon correspondant, “U.S Helps Turkey Hit Rebel Kurds in Iraq” Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/12/17/AR2007121702150.html) MKB

But persistent attacks in Turkey by PKK rebels operating from bases in the Qandil mountains have presented a thorny dilemma for U.S. policymakers. Turkey has threatened to mount a full-scale, cross-border incursion to clear out PKK camps in northern Iraq. That could effectively open a new front in the Iraq war and disrupt the flow of supplies to the U.S. military in Iraq, which receives 70 percent of its air cargo and a third of its fuel through Turkey.

The intelligence cooperation comes as senior U.S. military and Pentagon officials have engaged in talks with their Turkish counterparts to produce a more comprehensive strategy for combating the PKK, according to a senior military official familiar with the discussions. In addition to providing targets, U.S. military officials said they have encouraged the Turks to employ nonmilitary measures against the PKK and to hold a dialogue with the Iraqi government.

U.S. intelligence allowed the Turkish military to inflict what it called "significant" losses on a group of scores of Kurdish rebels in Iraq in an operation on Dec. 1. It was also decisive in another Turkish strike on Sunday, when Iraqi officials said Turkish warplanes pounded Kurdish villages deep in northern Iraq, killing one woman and forcing hundreds of villagers to flee their homes in the largest aerial assault from Turkey this year.

U.S. intel allows the Turks to attack PKK members and continue the genocide against Kurdish civilians.

INN staff 10 (Israeli newspaper *“U.S. Takes Sides with Turkey on Kurdish Struggle” Arutz Shev, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-213347-us-intelligence-sharing-against-terror-not-really-real-time-evidence-shows.html*)MKB

US Supports Turkish Anti-Kurd EffortsThe United States ambassador to Turkey, meanwhile, released a statement earlier this week that America supports Turkey's efforts to clamp down on Kurdish resistance fighters and is ready to "urgently" consider any new request for help from Ankara. "We stand ready to review urgently any new requests from the Turkish military or government regarding the PKK," Ambassador James Jeffrey said in a written statement on Monday.

"The PKK is a common enemy of both Turkey and the U.S. and we actively support the efforts of our Turkish allies to defeat this terrorist threat," Jeffrey said, stressing that "there has been no change in the level of U.S.-Turkey intelligence sharing regarding the PKK in northern Iraq."

The United States has reportedly been supplying Turkey, a NATO ally, with intelligence on rebel movements in northern Iraq, used particularly in Turkish air raids on PKK hideouts and Kurdish civilian areas in the region.

US intelligence gather is critical in Turkey crackdown on the PKK

Giachetti 8, (David M. UNITED STATES MILITARY RELATIONS WITH TURKEY, A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements 15 February 2008, <https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/display.aspx?rs=enginespage&ModuleID=be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153&Action=downloadpaper&ObjectID=9692bb4e-a132-48c0-b7b3-03ea195ec95c>) WDK

The recent agreement with the Bush administration for intelligence sharing with the TAF in their battle against the PKK is a positive first step in military to military cooperation. The U.S. government has formally declared the PKK a terrorist organization and expressed its commitment in assisting Turkey combat the PKK. This is an important and visible stage in setting the conditions for the defeat of the PKK, but the Turkish government and especially the Turkish public will be looking for substantial actions in this all-important effort. Another significant step would be to increase the individual level military to military contact between the U.S. and Turkey. The positive military relationship has always been the basic building block for a flourishing international relationship. An increase in joint military exercises and officer exchanges is especially important in the current environment to facilitate understanding of the operational setting faced by each country’s military with respect to Iraq. This ‘tactical’ level engagement allows an accurate understanding not only of current operations but future intentions as well. This type of personal confidence building cannot be accomplished at the government-to-government level. The formation of a close military relationship is critical in the long term regional access and freedom of action for the furtherance of U.S. strategic objectives in the region. Ankara for its part must be willing to accept its role as a power projection partner as it attempts to counter Turkey’s and the U.S.’s regional challenges.

U.S. uses its military bases to provide intel to Turkey on the PKK.

Hurriyet Daily News 10 (Ann Tyson and Robin Wright, Pentagon correspondant, *“U.S Continues Full Cooperation with Turkey on PKK” Azerbaijan News. http://azerbaijan.world-countries.net/archives/4991*)MKB

The level of cooperation between Turkey and the US in confronting the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, remains unchanged.

Commenting on the PKK's latest attacks in Turkey in a daily press briefing, US State Department spokesman Philip Crowley responded to a question on whether the US had recently stopped intelligence sharing with Turkey in combating the terrorist organization.

"There has been no change in the level of US-Turkey cooperation in confronting the PKK. The PKK is a foreign terrorist organization and presents a joint common threat to Turkey, to Iraq and to the United States," Crowley said. Turkey and the European Union also label the PKK a terrorist organization.

Crowley noted that the PKK was a threat to the stability of the region and that the US supported efforts by its Turkish and Iraqi allies to deal with the challenge posed by the terrorist organization.

The PKK has launched a wave of new attacks, killing 12 soldiers in the country's south-east over the weekend and five people in Istanbul on Tuesday.

"We offer our condolences to the families and friends of the victims," Crowley said. "And this is expressly why we continue to cooperate fully with Turkey and understand Turkey's ongoing efforts to defeat the PKK."

Several Turkish dailies ran stories on Monday questioning the lack of US intelligence support before the weekend attacks in the south-east.

Terrorism Adv—US intel key to crackdowns

Intelligence sharing key to crackdowns

Tyson et al 7 (Ann Tyson and Robin Wright, Pentagon correspondant, “U.S Helps Turkey Hit Rebel Kurds in Iraq” Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/12/17/AR2007121702150.html) MKB

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The intelligence cooperation comes as senior U.S. military and Pentagon officials have engaged in talks with their Turkish counterparts to produce a more comprehensive strategy for combating the PKK, according to a senior military official familiar with the discussions. In addition to providing targets, U.S. military officials said they have encouraged the Turks to employ nonmilitary measures against the PKK and to hold a dialogue with the Iraqi government.

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US intelligence gathering against the PKK diverts from other stability operations

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Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates earlier stated that a dearth of "actionable intelligence" was preventing more aggressive actions against the separatists. Senior military officials acknowledged that the PKK, labeled a terrorist organization by the United States, had not been not a priority for the U.S. military in Iraq as it grappled with a persistent insurgency and sectarian fighting.

"We want to help the Turks with the PKK," Gates said in October. "If we were to come up with specific information, that we and the Iraqis would be prepared to do the appropriate thing and . . . provide that information," he said. Until now, however, officials had not provided details of the intelligence provided or how it was gathered. The officials, citing the sensitivity of the subject, spoke only on the condition of anonymity.

Turkey, according to U.S. officials, was eager to have the information. "They wanted to go after them," a U.S. military official said. The intelligence center was set up in Ankara with the help of U.S. military personnel. In addition, scarce U.S. military reconnaissance aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles were diverted from other parts of Iraq to search for PKK locations in the mountainous area along Iraq's border with Turkey.

Terrorism Adv—US intel key to crackdowns

U.S. still provides intel to Turkey.

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Terrorism Adv—US intel key to crackdowns

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Giachetti 8, (David M. UNITED STATES MILITARY RELATIONS WITH TURKEY, A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements 15 February 2008, <https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/display.aspx?rs=enginespage&ModuleID=be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153&Action=downloadpaper&ObjectID=9692bb4e-a132-48c0-b7b3-03ea195ec95c>) WDK

The recent agreement with the Bush administration for intelligence sharing with the TAF in their battle against the PKK is a positive first step in military to military cooperation. The U.S. government has formally declared the PKK a terrorist organization and expressed its commitment in assisting Turkey combat the PKK. This is an important and visible stage in setting the conditions for the defeat of the PKK, but the Turkish government and especially the Turkish public will be looking for substantial actions in this all-important effort. Another significant step would be to increase the individual level military to military contact between the U.S. and Turkey. The positive military relationship has always been the basic building block for a flourishing international relationship. An increase in joint military exercises and officer exchanges is especially important in the current environment to facilitate understanding of the operational setting faced by each country’s military with respect to Iraq. This ‘tactical’ level engagement allows an accurate understanding not only of current operations but future intentions as well. This type of personal confidence building cannot be accomplished at the government-to-government level. The formation of a close military relationship is critical in the long term regional access and freedom of action for the furtherance of U.S. strategic objectives in the region. Ankara for its part must be willing to accept its role as a power projection partner as it attempts to counter Turkey’s and the U.S.’s regional challenges.

US use of drones and tech ensure up to the minute intell on the Kurds

Tyson et al 7 (Ann Tyson and Robin Wright, Pentagon correspondant, “U.S Helps Turkey Hit Rebel Kurds in Iraq” Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/12/17/AR2007121702150.html) MKB

The United States is providing Turkey with real-time intelligence that has helped the Turkish military target a series of attacks this month against Kurdish separatists holed up in northern [Iraq](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/iraq.html?nav=el), including a large airstrike on Sunday, according to Pentagon officials.

U.S. military personnel have set up a center for sharing intelligence in Ankara, the Turkish capital, providing imagery and other immediate information gathered from U.S. aircraft and unmanned drones flying over the separatists' mountain redoubts, the officials said. A senior administration official said the goal of the U.S. program is to identify the movements and activities of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), which is fighting to create an autonomous enclave in Turkey.

The United States is "essentially handing them their targets," one U.S. military official said. The Turkish military then decides whether to act on the information and notifies the United States, the official said.

Terrorism Adv: US intelligence🡪Genocide

Our defense of Turkey as an ally and fellow nation-state enables genocide against the Kurds. Only by withdrawing our militaristic support of Turkey can we end the genocide.

Levene 98 (Mark, Prof. Humanities, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, p. 420) MKB

While the Kurdish security zone experiment withered, the West got on with its normal business of upholding and defending those nation-states it had previously accepted as members of the international community. Even the crime and current pariah status of Saddam's Iraq was not for the deportations and depopulations of its Kurds from the Kirkuk oilfields; or for the Anfal campaigns of genocide; or for its atrocities against the Shi'a and Marsh Arabs in the south; but rather for invading oil- rich neighboring, Western-sponsored Kuwait. As for Turkey, its continued appalling human rights record, exemplified in the destruction of more than two thousand Kurd- ish villages in Eastern Anatolia; the dislocation of some two million of its inhabi- tants;145 its quasi-genocidal attacks on Kurds and Alevis,'4fito say nothing of its mas- sive, cross-border military raids into the supposed Western-protected safe haven to gun down its own separatists from the Workers' Party of Kurdistan (the PKK),147 have failed to dent Western support. And so it should be no surprise that Professor Lewis Thomas, an American scholar writing in the early 1950s, could celebrate the inception and development of the modem Turkish state as follows:

By 1918 with the definitive excision of the total Armenian Christian population from Anatolia and the Straits area. the hitherto largely peaceful process of Turkification and Moslemization had been advanced in one great surge by the use of force. How else can one assess the final blame except to say that this was a tragic consequence of the impact of western European nationalism upon Anatolia? Had Turkification and Moslemization not been accelerated by the use of force, there certainly would not today exist a Turkish Republic, a Republic owing its strength and stability in no small measure to the homogeneity of its population, a state which is now a valued associate of the United States.148 Never mind the laughable reference to the "peaceful process" before 1914, nor the absurd euphemism regarding what happened to the Armenians, nor even the falsehood about Turkish "homogeneity" at the expense of its huge Kurdish popula- tion; Professor Thomas did, inadvertently, get it right. By adopting a Western formula of nationalism, the leaders of post-Ottoman Turkey punched their way towards mod- ern nation-statehood and sovereign independence. Western states reciprocated not only by recognizing the state, but by entering into national political arrangements with it which, in turn, were cemented by economic ones. The fact that Turkey had torn up the official rules in the process and taken a series of "accelerated" short- cuts, including genocide, were conveniently ignored. Iraq's own bloody drive towards genuine independence followed a similar route. Again, war, revolution, and genocide proved no barrier to international acceptance, provided the state did not directly chal- lenge western interests.

U.S. intel allows the Turks to attack PKK members and continue the genocide against Kurdish civilians.

INN staff 10 (Israeli newspaper *“U.S. Takes Sides with Turkey on Kurdish Struggle” Arutz Shev, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-213347-us-intelligence-sharing-against-terror-not-really-real-time-evidence-shows.html*)MKB

US Supports Turkish Anti-Kurd EffortsThe United States ambassador to Turkey, meanwhile, released a statement earlier this week that America supports Turkey's efforts to clamp down on Kurdish resistance fighters and is ready to "urgently" consider any new request for help from Ankara. "We stand ready to review urgently any new requests from the Turkish military or government regarding the PKK," Ambassador James Jeffrey said in a written statement on Monday.

"The PKK is a common enemy of both Turkey and the U.S. and we actively support the efforts of our Turkish allies to defeat this terrorist threat," Jeffrey said, stressing that "there has been no change in the level of U.S.-Turkey intelligence sharing regarding the PKK in northern Iraq."

The United States has reportedly been supplying Turkey, a NATO ally, with intelligence on rebel movements in northern Iraq, used particularly in Turkish air raids on PKK hideouts and Kurdish civilian areas in the region.

Turkey’s ongoing genocide against the Kurds is equivalent to the Holocaust. The Kurds are a scapegoat, and the idea that they are “terrorists” is only Turkey’s effort justify its actions to the international community.

Fatah 6 (Rebwar, journalist, “The Accepted Genocide of Kurds in Turkey” Kurdish Media, http://kurdmedia.com/article.aspx?id=13491) MKB

Since the Armenian genocide, Turkey has done very well to hide and disguise its dark history from the international community. But a shady past rarely dawns a bright future.

Instead, Turkey is re-branding itself with Europe-friendly terms to essentially get rid of what it has always wanted to be rid of. Turkey’s tidy up of its language: words with a distinct Kurdish origin wiped out and replaced. Indeed, anything that is not strictly Turkish has been linked to “terrorism” – a trigger word guaranteed to win the sympathies of the international community.

The Turkish constitution does not recognise Kurds in Turkey, and so often labels them as terrorists, providing a convenient scapegoat for military uprisings and other political issues. Thus, “terrorist” becomes a synonym for Kurds.

Turkey frequently argues that the PKK is a terrorist organisation; hence all Kurdish organisations are banned for what they may imply.

Turkey is desperately in need of an imaginary threat to its “national security”, “territorial integrity” and “sovereignty”, achieved by “separatist/terrorist” Kurds. The scale of the suffering Kurds and destruction of Kurdish homeland does not fit into any “terrorist” definition. In 1999, the death toll of Kurds killed in Turkish military operations increased to over 40,000. According to the figures published by Turkey’s own Parliament, 6,000 Kurdish villages were systematically evacuated of all inhabitants and 3,000,000 Kurds have been displaced. This sounds like an elimination of a people, a culture and a homeland.

If Turkey is genuine in its elimination of terrorism, it must take brave steps, accepting Kurdish people and their homeland, Kurdistan, and ending its history of oppression.

Professor Noam Chomsky called the Turkish response to Kurds an “ethnic cleansing”, resulting in the death of thousands, the emigration of over two million people and the destruction of approximately 6000 villages.

In fact, these methods by which Turkey has sought to oppress the Kurdish people are similar to those used by Saddam Hussein in the recent past, including the destruction of Kurdish land, mass evacuation and deportation. In some other areas, Turkey has used more oppressive methods to achieve its “Final Solution” of the Kurdish Issue. Some have found this unsurprising, given Turkey’s Ottoman ancestry. During World War I, for example, the Ottoman Empire allied itself with Germany, and in the conflict’s immediate aftermath conducted a programme aiming to exterminate the Armenians, Greeks, Yezidis and Alwis. To date, however, Turkey denies these genocidal campaigns.

The oppression of Kurdish people within Turkey can be defined as genocide in various ways; cultural, linguistic and physical all play a part in the cleansing of Kurdish ethnicity from Turkey itself, and are still embraced by the Turkish constitution.

The head of the British Parliamentary Human Rights Commission, Lord Avebury, said of Turkish atrocities in 1996 that,

"Just as many people in western Europe turned a blind eye to Hitler's preparations for the Holocaust in the thirties, the democratic world ignores the evidence of incipient genocide against the Kurds in Turkey today."

Terrorism Adv: Solvency

Withdrawing troops would solve- Turkey needs continued, strong U.S. intelligence support in order to continue attacking Kurds.

Villelabeitia 10 (Ibon, journalist, *“Turkey sends troops to iraq border after PKK raid”, Reuters**http://www.jordantimes.com/?news=27692*)MKB

Erdogan, who has said Kurdish militants would “drown in their own blood”, faces mounting criticism for his government’s failure to stop the escalation in violence.

Images of soldiers’ coffins, draped in red-and-white Turkish flags, have raised tensions in Turkey, with relatives of dead soldiers chanting slogans against the government at funerals.

Erdogan has granted more political and cultural rights to minority Kurds in an effort to end separatist violence.

But his “Kurdish initiative” floundered after it was poorly received in the rest of the country and following a decision by the constitutional court late last year to ban the largest Kurdish political party in parliament for its links to the PKK.

Sabotage charge

Turkey, which relies partly on its NATO ally the United States for intelligence sharing on PKK movement in northern Iraq, struck a more critical tone, following a Cabinet meeting.

“We expect more support from countries with which we have friendly relations,” said Deputy Prime Minister Cemil Cicek.

Intelligence-sharing with the United States, which brands the PKK a terrorist group, has helped Turkish bombing raids on rebel targets in northern Iraq, both in the past and since Saturday’s attack.

“The PKK is a common enemy of Turkey and of the United States,” said US Ambassador to Turkey James Jeffrey in a statement. “There is no change to the level of our intelligence-sharing with Turkey regarding PKK activities in northern Iraq.”

Erdogan has said the latest wave of attacks was an attempt to sabotage efforts by his ruling AK Party to end the 25-year conflict. He faces an election before July 2011.

Turkish genocide attacks Kurdish citizens, not just the PKK. Rather than seeing the violence as a result of the PKK, the Turks see it as a result of the entire ethnic group.

Frey 8 (Christopher, Doctor of Philosophy, *“Can Turkey fulfill its promise as a bridge between East and West when its own peoples stand divided?”,* Republic of Iraq Department of Water Ministry, http://www.mowr.gov.iq/english/login.php*)* MKB

In the days following the PKK ambush, the forty-five-year-old Kurdish journalist Salih Sezgin rarely left his fourth-floor office at the newspaper Gündem. He felt safer there than at home. From his desk, he could poke his head out the window to scan the streets for shady characters, or see who was buzzing in. Occasionally, in the late afternoon, he would leave for a brisk, head-clearing stroll. On the fifth day after the soldiers were killed, Sezgin paused briefly on Istiklal Caddesi, a bustling and very European boulevard lined with brand name boutiques and restaurants on Istanbul’s western flank. A small rally was taking place, to demand that Turkey leave nato. Turning away from the protesters, he shuffled along narrow side streets, finally taking a seat at a café next to Ali Turgay, Gündem’s twenty-something publisher. A stout, diminutive man possessing a gentle, rounded face framed with days-old stubble and a comb-over, Sezgin had the air of a struggling shopkeeper. “I spent nineteen years in prison,” he joked. “I never look very healthy.”  
Gündem had recently had its right to publish suspended by Turkish authorities, who feared that the paper’s pro-Kurdish reporting would embolden critics. For a few days, the pair had been able to get stories onto the paper’s website, which had seen its traffic surge from a daily average of 10,000 hits to 80,000 during the crisis. But then the government blocked that, too, forcing them to use another url. Days later, hackers broke into their server, causing it to crash, and the website was gone again.  
Had they been able to publish, Turgay and Sezgin would have been reporting the growing incidence of attacks against Kurdish citizens. According to the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (dtp), its constituency office in Istanbul’s Fatih neighborhood had been firebombed; other dtp offices across the city had to be protected by police from angry mobs. In Kadiköy, a Kurdish student was taken to hospital after an attempted lynching; in other neighbourhoods, homes belonging to Kurdish families were singled out with derogatory markings. Some of these events were making it into the mainstream media, but most were not. Kurds in Istanbul were talking about a return to the grim days of the 1980s and early ’90s, when skirmishes between the military and the pkk forced thousands from their villages in the country’s southeast, destroying the region’s economy and social fabric, and resulting in more than 35,000 casualties. The armed clashes of October were hardly on that scale, but rumours and reports of personal attacks were nevertheless keeping people indoors. “It’s enough just to have darker skin to get harassed on the street,” said Sezgin.  
He leaned forward over his tea. “The problem is that everyone sees the Kurdish problem as an ethnic problem. But we are a part of this country. We are part owners; we now live all across Turkey; we are not simply an ethnic minority or immigrants. Turkey’s problem is not an ethnic problem; it’s an identity problem.”

A2 Violence Against PKK Good: Turkey Reacts Disproportionally

Turkey reacts to PKK attacks out of proportion, killing nearly a hundred Kurdish citizens per Turkish soldier.

Israel today 10 (*“While Criticizing Israel, Turkey kills Kurds”, Israel Today, http://www.walrusmagazine.com/articles/2008.09-international-affairs-a-land-apart-turkey-politics-christopher-frey/1/*)MKB

On the same day as the flotilla raid, Kurdish rebels attacked a Turkish naval base, killing 12 soldiers. Last week, Erdogan's government responded with air strikes on Kurdish positions in northern Iraq that killed 120 people, including a 7-year-old girl.

There were no condemnations of Turkey for using "disproportionate" force, and no UN Security Council meetings regarding the latest flare-up of a 26-year conflict that has claimed the lives of more than 40,000 people.

Some 30 million Kurds live in adjoining portions of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. Together, these areas make up Kurdistan, the ancient homeland of the Kurdish people, a distinct ethnic group without a country of their own.

For decades, Turkey has oppressed its Kurdish minority of 14 million people by forbidding the use of the Kurdish language and other symbols of national identity in state schools and government institutions. A Kurdish parliamentarian, Layla Zana, was expelled from parliament in 1994 and imprisoned a year later for daring to utter a single sentence in Kurdish from the podium.

A2 Violence Against PKK Good: PKK Good

The PKK is not a terrorist organization- it is a nationalist group that seeks to create a Kurdish state to protect the Kurds from the oppression they face in the Middle East.

Carnegie Convention on Preventing Deadly Conflict 98 (*“Turkey’s Kurdish Problem”, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers**http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/kur/kurfr.htm*)MKB

From the outset, the PKK has proclaimed its goal to be the creation of a unified, independent Kurdish state, and thus it has made no secret of its pan-Kurdish aspirations. The PKK sought not only independence, but also a political and social revolution among the Kurds in order to trans- form their society’s feudal structure. It described itself early on as Marxist- Leninist and adopted the generally left-wing anti-imperialist rhetoric of the period to oppose ‘‘imperialism,’’ including ‘‘Turkish imperialism’’ in Turkish Kurdistan. The PKK’s program mirrored the slogans of the ex- treme Left: Kurdistan with all four of its segments, controlled by Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, represented the weakest link in ‘‘capitalism’s chain,’’ and the fight against imperialism was a fight to save Kurdistan’s natural resources from exploitation. The PKK adopted a tight paramilitary structure and Leninist ‘‘democratic centralism’’ that essentially denied any inter- nal debate or any transparency of organization and activity—features that largely have remained intact today, even if Marxism-Leninism has been abandoned in keeping with the new post–Cold War environment.

As an organization, the PKK takes itself very seriously. It has attempted to demonstrate that it is a ‘‘national liberation’’ organization that can institutionalize itself to survive the long haul. It periodically organizes national congresses, in which decisions are taken ‘‘democratically.’’ It has laws re- garding military conscription, promotions in its army, and so forth.8 While these congresses and the publication of its decisions are intended to dispel the notion that the organization is totally controlled by one person, there is no doubt that these activities are designed to show that this is a movement with a structure, goals, and the political means to achieve them.

Claiming to have abandoned Marxism-Leninism, the PKK justifies its earlier radical stance as a reflection of the broad, extreme-leftist milieu that dominated Turkish politics at the time. In addition, PKK spokesmen claim that the Turkish state had then succeeded in winning over a large number of the wealthy Kurdish landlords, or aghas, as well as the mercantile class, leaving the PKK to seek adherents among the poorer classes of workers and peasants. Armed struggles worldwide, too, were nearly all from the left and propagated the appropriate leftist revolutionary rhetoric and ideol- ogy to justify their movements. The PKK thus very early on became com- mitted to revolutionary violence against the Turkish state.

In fact, behind the left-wing rhetoric, the PKK had always been a na- tionalist movement. Its promise to save the exploited of Turkey and the rest of the Middle East notwithstanding, its very formation represented a break with the Turkish Left and abandonment of the ‘‘common struggle.’’9 To be sure, this may have been directly and indirectly caused by a Turkish Left that sought recruits from the east and southeast as cannon fodder in its own particularistic struggle of the 1970s. Hence, its assumption of a nationalistic image is in fact not just in keeping with the times but also a return to its real self. Although a product of the doctrinaire Turkish left- wing movements, the PKK watched from close these groups’ destruction by the military in 1980. The radical and violent Left failed to succeed anywhere in Europe or the Middle East. By contrast, nationalist groups proved to have much longer shelf life. Nationalism has proven to have no equal in mobilizing them. Although the PKK is primarily a nationalist organization, it would be wrong to assume that it has completely abandoned the political Left. Its discourse is that of a national-liberation movement dedicated to the con- struction of a socialist state. O ̈ calan, in acknowledging the decision to do away with the hammer and sickle on the party flag, also stated that this did not represent a distancing from socialism.10 If it has not completely abandoned its ‘‘left-wing roots,’’ it is because of both tactical and strategic considerations. Tactically, it is easier to modify one’s ideology than abandon it altogether.

The PKK is not a militaristic or terrorist organization. It is a political movement that uses violence only because the Turkish government refuses to allow constructive dialogue.

Carnegie Convention on Preventing Deadly Conflict 98 (*“Turkey’s Kurdish Problem”, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers**http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/kur/kurfr.htm*)MKB

It would be incorrect to assume that the PKK is simply a military cum terrorist organization. No nationalist movement has ever achieved as much as the PKK has without recourse to political activism and preparation. The group’s military prowess has only made it easier to organize politically. The PKK is first and foremost a political organization with distinct political objectives—even if they are modified when necessary—that employs violence, often extensively and even erroneously from its own standpoint. This violence is basically secondary to its fundamental character; while this does not imply that violence is unimportant for the PKK, it does mean that violence is used to define and pursue political objectives.

In late 1995 the PKK dedicated increasing attention to the role of outside forces in helping to strengthen its political clout for negotiations with the Turkish government. Two factors could be at work here. The first could be increasing concern about the military setbacks dealt to the PKK in the field in the period. In contrast to the early 1990s, when it controlled towns, villages, and even roads, especially after nightfall, it has now lost control of many of the major cities in the southeast; visitors note that the cities witness fewer incidents and are safer to walk in. It has had to curtail protest actions such as boycotts and shop closings. On the other hand, this relative quiet has been bought at high cost, as the military has had to saturate the region with troops and other security forces. The state can probably suppress PKK operations in the cities and in many parts of the countryside as long as it is willing to dedicate massive force to the task. It would seem likely that once the military begins to cut back on it presence,Enter the PKK 27

PKK activities will spring back into place once again. It may be tempting for the state to argue that, when the PKK makes major new efforts for a dialogue with the government, it is dealing from weakness. But one need ask if this apparent weakness is transient or permanent. In our view, the government has not been able to repress the broader Kurdish nationalist movement—of which the PKK is the main leader and beneficiary—and probably is contributing to a continuing growth and deepening of the Kurdish nationalist movement on the political level despite military set- backs.

The second reason for the PKK’s emphasis on negotiations with Turkey is that they represent the ultimate political goal of the PKK at this stage—to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the Turkish state as an interlocutor. The PKK can resist the government’s military operations indefinitely— with greater or lesser strength—but in the end some kind of Kurdish- Turkish negotiations must occur if the armed struggle is to have meaning. The PKK cannot win the armed struggle in any military sense. ‘‘Winning’’ can only mean forcing the state into recognition of the PKK in some form. Here, the PKK may be growing more distraught about its ability to reach an accommodation with the Turkish state; indeed, the state seems paralyzed within its own toils and unable to break out into any new initiative, even if considerable groundwork already exists. Thus the PKK must place additional external pressures upon the state to accelerate the states’s willingness to ‘‘negotiate’’ with a Kurdish identity.

**\*\*\*Russia Adv\*\*\***

Russia Adv: Add-On

U.S. missile and air bases in Turkey send a signal to Russia that the is trying to contain them—crushing relations

Engdahl 7 (William F., Journalist and geopolitics specialist, *Global Research. cahttp://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=4873*) MKB

It’s true that the overall number of nuclear weapons in the US military stockpile has been declining since the end of the Cold War. But not, it seems, because the US is moving the world back from the brink of nuclear war by miscalculation. The new missile defense expansion to Poland and Czech Republic is better understood from the point of the remarkable expansion of NATO since 1991. As Putin noted, ‘NATO has put its frontline forces on our borders… think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact?’

*US bases encircle Russia*

As Russian strategist and military expert, Yevgeny Primakov, a close adviser to Putin, recently noted, NATO was ‘founded during the Cold War era as a regional organization to ensure the security of US allies in Europe.’ He adds, ‘NATO today is acting on the basis of an entirely different philosophy and doctrine, moving outside the European continent and conducting military operations far beyond its bounds. NATO…is rapidly expanding in contravention to earlier accords. The admission of new members to NATO is leading to the expansion of bases that host the U.S. military, air defense systems, as well as ABM components.’

Today, NATO member states include not only the Cold War core in Western Europe, commanded by an American. NATO also includes former Warsaw Pact or Soviet Union states Poland, Latvia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia, formerly of Yugoslavia. Candidates to join include the Republic of Georgia, Croatia, Albania and Macedonia. Ukraine’s President, Victor Yushchenko, has tried aggressively to bring Ukraine into NATO. This is a clear message to Moscow, not surprisingly, one they don’t seem to welcome with open arms.

New NATO structures have also been formed while old ones were abolished: The [NATO Response Force](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Response_Force) (NRF) was launched at the [2002 Prague Summit](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=2002_Prague_Summit_of_NATO&action=edit). In [2003](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003), just after the fall of Baghdad, a major restructuring of the NATO military commands began. The Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic was abolished. A new command, [Allied Command Transformation](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allied_Command_Transformation) (ACT), was established in [Norfolk, Virginia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norfolk%2C_Virginia). ACT is responsible for driving ‘transformation’ in NATO.

By 2007 Washington had signed an agreement with Japan to co-operate on missile defense development. She was deeply engaged in testing a missile defense system with Israel. She has now extended her European Missile Defense to Poland, where the Minister of Defense is a close friend and ally of Pentagon neo-conservative war-hawks, and to the Czech Republic. NATO has agreed to put the question of the Ukraine and Republic of Georgia’s bids for NATO membership on a fast track. The Middle East, despite the debacle in Iraq, is being militarized with a permanent network of US bases from Qatar to Iraq and beyond.

On February 15, the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee approved a draft, the Orwellian-named NATO Freedom Consolidation Act of 2007 reaffirming US backing for the further enlargement of NATO, including support for Ukraine to join along with Georgia.

From the Russian point of view, NATO's eastward expansion since the end of the cold war has been in clear breach of an agreement between then-Soviet leader [Mikhail Gorbachev](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikhail_Gorbachev) and US President [George H.W. Bush](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_H.W._Bush) which allowed for a peaceful [unification of Germany](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_reunification). NATO's expansion policy is seen as a continuation of a Cold War attempt to surround and isolate Russia.

Relations key to prevent accidental launch.

David E. **Mosher**, Senior Policy Analyst, Expert BMD and Nuclear issues, Lowell H. Schwartz, is an associate international policy analyst, David R. Howell, associate Dean and Professor of Economics and Public Policy, Milano Graduate School of Management Lynn E. Davis, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, “Beyond the Nuclear Shadow: A Phased Approach for improving nuclear safety and US—Russian Relations,” Rand National Security Devision, 20**03**, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1666/index.html.

The phased approach to the Nuclear Safety Initiative that we recommend here is based on the premise that nuclear safety, U.S.- Russian relations, and U.S. security more broadly are inextricably linked. Progress in one area will improve the situation in another. Given the improving relations between Russia and the United States and the emerging security context for the United States, there is now a historic opportunity to address one of the more vexing problems left from the Cold War: how to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized nuclear use to as close to zero as possible.

Accidental launch kills billions

**PR NEWSWIRE**, staff, April 29, 19**98**, LN.

An 'accidental' nuclear attack would create a public health disaster of an unprecedented scale, according to more than 70 articles and speeches on the subject, cited by the authors and written by leading nuclear war experts, public health officials, international peace organizations, and legislators. Furthermore, retired General Lee Butler, Commander from 1991-1994 of all U.S. Strategic Forces under former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, has warned that from his experience in many "war games" it is plausible that such an attack could provoke a nuclear counterattack that could trigger full-scale nuclear war with billions of casualties worldwide. The authors describe the immediate effects of an "accidental" launch from a single Russian submarine that would kill at least six to eight million people in firestorms in eight major U.S. cities. With hospitals destroyed and medical personnel killed, and with major communications and transportation networks disrupted, the delivery of emergency care would be all but impossible, according to Forrow and his colleagues.

Russia Adv: Bases Hurt Relations

This is empirically proven- the presence of U.S. air bases in Kyrgyzstan hurt relations and angered the Kremlin. Russia strongly supports the the closure of U.S. bases.

Feifer 10 (Gregory, Journalist and geopolitics specialist, *“Russian Moves in Kyrgyzstan Raise Questions Over U.S. Bases” Radio Free Europe http://www.rferl.org/content/russian\_moves\_in\_kyrgyzstan\_raise\_questions\_over\_us\_base/2007784.html*) MKB

When Temir Sariev returned from a trip to Moscow on April 6, the opposition leader carried a surprise message. He told supporters he'd just met with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who pledged support for Kyrgyzstan's opposition. It was a day before the bloody street uprising in Bishkek that left more than 70 dead and forced President Kurmanbek Bakiev to flee the capital. Sariev was soon arrested along with most of the country's other opposition leaders in a move that helped prompt the protest. Now they've taken power. Moscow has previously treated popular uprisings in former Soviet republics as a threat. But this time the first -- and so far only -- country to recognize the new leadership was Russia. The Kremlin's support has helped fuel speculation about its possible role in this week's events and raised questions about the future of Washington's main interest in Kyrgyzstan -- a U.S. air base that's crucial for the military effort in Afghanistan.  
Implicit Kremlin Support  
For his part, Putin denied any involvement in Kyrgyzstan's unrest when asked about it on April 7. "The only thing I can say is that neither Russia, nor your humble servant, nor Russian officials have anything to do with these events," he said. "As for me personally, the events have taken me by surprise." But Putin gave his implicit support, criticizing the ousted leader who came to power in 2005 following street protests that forced his predecessor Askar Akaev into exile. "I can remember that when President Bakiev came to power, he harshly criticized toppled President Akaev for nepotism and giving his relatives or friends top economic and political posts at every corner," Putin said. "I have the impression that Bakiev has fallen into the same trap." It was a starkly different message from five years ago, when Putin called Akaev's ouster in the so-called Tulip Revolution "illegitimate." The uprising followed "colored" revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia that toppled corrupt old administrations and installed pro-Western leaders the Kremlin saw as a threat to its power. The Manas air base outside Bishkek is key to U.S. supply of troops in Afghanistan.

But following the defeat of Ukraine's Orange Revolution leaders in a presidential election won by the pro-Moscow candidate earlier this year, the Kremlin is seeing regime change in its former Soviet subject states in a new light.

**Air-Base Geopolitics**  
That's not entirely surprising. Last year, Bakiev pleased Moscow by saying he would force Washington to close an air base crucial for supplying U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and key to President Barack Obama's plan to send 30,000 more U.S. troops there.  
The same day, Bakiev accepted $150 million of aid on top of a $2 billion loan in what was seen as quid pro quo from a Kremlin unhappy over U.S. military bases in its backyard.  
But the Kyrgyz president infuriated Moscow months later by reversing his decision over the Manas air base after Washington agreed to pay triple the rent and give $150 million in other concessions.  
Less than a year later, the base's future is again in doubt, after interim government member Omurbek Tekebaev on April 8 told the Reuters news agency there was a "high probability" the U.S. lease on the Manas air base would be cut short.  
Partly by way of explanation, Tekebaev said Russia had "played its role in ousting Bakiev."

Putin has pledges to neutralize a “potential aggressor” with its powerful nuclear arsenal. U.S. bases in Turkey makes the U.S. appear to be this aggressor. Miscalculation and the need for nuclear primacy will escalate to a hot war between U.S. and Russia that culminates in extinction.

Engdahl 7 (William F., Journalist and geopolitics specialist, *Global Research. cahttp://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=4873*) MKB

With NATO troops creeping up to Russia’s borders on all sides, US nuclear B-52s and SSBN submarines being deployed to strategic sites on Russia’s perimeter, Washington extending its new missile shield from Greenland to the UK, to Australia, Japan and now even Poland and the Czech Republic, it should be no surprise that the Russian Government is responding. While Washington planners may have assumed that because the once-mighty Red Army was a shell of its former glory, that the state of Russian military preparedness since the end of the Cold War was laughable. But Russia never let go of its one trump card—its strategic nuclear force. During the entire economic chaos of the Yeltsin years, Russia never stopped producing state-of-the art military technology. In May 2003, some months after George Bush unilaterally ripped up the bilateral Anti-Missile Defense Treaty with Moscow, invaded Afghanistan and bombed Baghdad into subjugation, Russia’s President delivered a new message in his annual State of the Union Address to the Russian nation.

Putin spoke for the first time publicly of the need to modernize Russia’s nuclear deterrent by creating new types of weapons, ‘which will ensure the defense capability of Russia and its allies in the long term.’

In response to the abrogation by the Bush Administration of the ABM Treaty, and with it Start II, Russia predictably stopped withdrawing and destroying its SS-18 MIRVed missiles. Start II had called for full phase out of multiple warhead or MIRVed missiles, by both sides by 2007.

At that point Russia began to reconfigure its SS-18 MIRV missiles to extend their service life to 2016. Fully loaded SS-18 missiles had a range of 11,000 kilometers. In addition, it redeployed mobile rail-based SS-24 M1 nuclear missiles.

In its 2003 Budget, the Russian government made funding of its SS-27 or Topol-M single-warhead missiles a ‘priority.’ And the Defense Ministry resumed test launches of both SS-27 and Topol-M.

In December 2006, Putin told Russian journalists that deployment of the new Russian mobile Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile system was crucial for Russia’s national security. Without naming the obvious US threat, he declared, ‘Maintaining a strategic balance will mean that our strategic deterrent forces should be able to guarantee the neutralization of any potential aggressor, no matter what modern weapons systems he possesses.’

It was unmistakable whom he had in mind, and it wasn’t the Al Qaeda cave-dwellers of Tora Bora.

Russian Defense Minister, Sergei Ivanov, announced at the same time that the military would deploy another 69 silo-based and mobile Topol-M missile systems over the following decade. Just after his Munich speech Putin announced he had named his old KGB/FSB friend, Ivanov to be his First Deputy Prime Minister overseeing the entire military industry.

The Russian Defense Ministry reported that as of January 2006, Russia possessed 927 nuclear delivery vehicles and 4,279 nuclear warheads against 1,255 and 5,966 respectively for the United States. No two other powers on the face of the earth even came close to these massive overkill capacities. This was the ultimate reason all US foreign policy, military and economic, since the end of the Cold War had covertly had as endgame the complete deconstruction of Russia as a functioning state.

In April 2006, the Russian military tested the K65M-R missile, a new missile designed to penetrate US missile defense systems. It was part of testing and deploying a uniform warhead for both land and sea-based ballistic missiles. The new missile was hypersonic and capable of changing flight path.

Four months earlier, Russia successfully tested its Bulava ICBM, a naval version of the Topol-M. It was launched from one of its Typhoon-class ballistic missile submarines in the White Sea, travelling a thousand miles before hitting a dummy target successfully on the Kamchatka Peninsula. The Bulava missiles were to be installed on Russian Borey-class nuclear submarines beginning 2008.

During a personal inspection of the first regiment of Russian mobile Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles in December 2006, Putin told reporters the deployment of mobile Topol-M ICBMs were crucial for Russia’s national security, stating, ‘This is a significant step forward in improving our defense capabilities.’

‘Maintaining a strategic balance,’ he continued, ’will mean that our strategic deterrent forces should be able to guarantee the neutralization of any potential aggressor, no matter what modern weapons systems he possesses.’

Putin clearly did not have France in mind when he referred to the unnamed ‘he.’ President Putin had personally given French President Chirac a tour of one of Russia’s missile facilities that January, where Putin explained the latest Russian missile advances. ‘He knows what I am talking about,’ Putin told reporters afterwards, referring to Chirac’s grasp of the weapon’s significance.

Putin also did not have North Korea, China, Pakistan or India in mind, nor Great Britain with its ageing nuclear capacity, not even Israel. The only power surrounding Russia with weapons of mass destruction was its old Cold War foe--the United States.

The Commander of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces, General Nikolai Solovtsov, was more explicit. Commenting on the successful test of the K65M-R at Russia’s Kapustin Yar missile test site last April, he declared that US plans for a missile defense system, ‘could upset strategic stability. The planned scale of the United States’ deployment of a…missile defense system is so considerable that the fear that it could have a negative effect on the parameters of Russia’s nuclear deterrence potential is quite justified.’ Put simply, he referred to the now open US quest for Full Spectrum Dominance—Nuclear Primacy.

A new Armageddon is in the making. The unilateral military agenda of Washington has predictably provoked a major effort by Russia to defend herself. The prospects of a global nuclear conflagration, by miscalculation, increase by the day. At what point might an American President, God forbid, decide to order a pre-emptive full-scale nuclear attack on Russia to prevent Russia from rebuilding a state of mutual deterrence?

The new Armageddon is not exactly the Armageddon which George Bush’s Christian fanatics pray for as they dream of their Rapture. It is an Armageddon in which Russia and the United States would irradiate the planet and, perhaps, end human civilization in the process.

Ironically, oil, in the context of Washington’s bungled Iraq war and soaring world oil prices after 2003, has enabled Russia to begin the arduous job of rebuilding its collapsed economy and its military capacities. Putin’s Russia is no longer a begger-thy-neighbor former Superpower. It’s using its oil weapon and rebuilding its nuclear ones.

Bush’s America is a hollowed-out debt-ridden economy engaged on using its last card, its vast military power to prop up the dollar and its role as world sole Superpower.

The U.S. and Russia have pledged to “reset” relations. This is the U.S.’s only opportunity for a fresh start, so the U.S. should work to consider Russian opinion in order to save relations.

Gordan 10 (Philip H., Assistant Secretary of Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, *“U.S.- Russia relations under the Obama administration” U.S. Department of State. http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2010/143275.htm*) MKB

President Obama and Secretary Clinton had no illusions about the differences we had and continue to have with Russia, but they also recognized that the level of acrimony and distrust that pervaded U.S.-Russian relations did not serve U.S. interests. Moreover, they saw that the poisonous atmosphere between the two countries was a threat to the stability and security of Europe itself. The relationship was undermined by a lack of trust and the absence of any political structures for constructive dialogue, let alone cooperation. This meant not only were we not getting anything done but that Russia had nothing at stake in its relations with the United States and so was uninterested in considering U.S. positions. And so the idea behind the reset was a simple one: The United States and Russia have significant common interests and where the United States and Russia have common interests, we should cooperate. Where we have differences, we will be honest about them, both in private and in public, and work to move the Russians to more reasonable positions. We will pursue a better relationship with Russia in our mutual interest and we will do so without sacrificing our principles or our friends. With these basic propositions as a guide, we have pursued a path of principled engagement. And we believe that path will yield considerable results.

\*\*\*NATO Adv\*\*\*

NATO Adv: TNW not a deterrent

Iran Deterrence isn’t necessary. No Impact to Proliferation.

Layne 7 (Christopher, Mary Julia and George R. Jordan professorship of international affairs, World Policy Journal Fall 2007)AC

Rather than confronting Iran militarily over its nuclear program and its regional ambitions, the United States might better follow a two-tracked strategy of deterrence and diplomacy. Diplomatically, the United States should try to negotiate a “grand bargain” with Iran that exchanges meaningful security guarantees, diplomatic recognition, and normal economic relations for a verifiable cessation of Tehran’s nuclear weapons program. Given the deep mutual distrust between Washington and Tehran, and domestic political constraints in both the United States and Iran, it is unclear whether a grand bargain can be struck. If it cannot, however, rather than attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities, the United States should be prepared to live with a nuclear-armed Iran—just as it did with China in the 1960s, when China was seen as far more dangerous a rogue state than Iran is today. 28 Even if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, the worst-case scenarios—that there could be a nuclear arms race in the Middle East; that Iran might supply nuclear weapons to terrorists; and that Tehran could use its nuclear weapons aggressively or to blackmail other states in the region—are improbable. 29 A nuclear Iran is unlikely to touch off a proliferation snowball in the Middle East. Israel already is a nuclear power. The other states that might be tempted to attain nuclear weapons capability—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey—would be under strong pressure not to do so. (Saudi Arabia also lacks the industrial and engineering capabilities to develop nuclear weapons indigenously.) Despite the Bush administration’s hyperbolic rhetoric and Tehran’s close links to groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, Iran is not likely to supply nuclear weapons to terrorists. If it did and the terrorists were to use these weapons against the United States or its allies, the weapons could be traced back to the donor state, which would be at risk of annihilation by an American retaliatory strike. 30 Even if one believes the administration’s claims that rogue state leaders are indifferent to the fate of their populations, they do care very much about the survival of their regimes.

Nuclear weapons are no longer a useful deterrent and merely risk terrorism

Kibaroglu 5 (Mustafa, Prof Department of IR at Belkins University, *European Security,* 14(4) )AC

Dramatic changes have taken place in the international security environment over the last decade. These changes, however, are being assessed differently among officials and experts regarding the role of nuclear weapons. The viability as well as the credibility of the nuclear posture of NATO, including the implicit ‘first use’ strategy of the Alliance, is still of utmost importance for Turkish officials. 23 However, the very nature of the emerging threats, especially since the 9/11 attacks, requires a thorough revision of the ways and means of dealing with them. Admittedly, nuclear weapons have become inappropriate in the face of the new threats posed to the free world by terrorist organizations. Retaining them simply increases the probability of theft and the use by terrorists of some crude radiological devices or even nuclear weapons. Therefore, in addition to taking tighter measures to safeguard nuclear and radiological material in places where they are stored, bolder steps must be taken by concerned countries to ultimately get rid of nuclear weapons. Such steps should begin with drawing-down the US nuclear weapons deployed in allied countries overseas including Turkey. Nevertheless, the official view is diametrically opposed to their withdrawal. Below is an account of why this is the case.

American Nukes have no value as a deterrent and should be removed.

Kibaroglu 5 (Mustafa, Prof Department of IR at Belkins University, *European Security,* 14(4) )AC

However, the sui generis conditions of the superpower rivalry during the Cold War period cannot be used as a pretext for keeping the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons or for developing new ones when the international security environment is undergoing dramatic changes. The perception of threat to states has been subject to thorough revision especially in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the US. Almost every state has started to seriously consider how to deal with the threat posed by the so-called ‘non-state actors’ which are believed to have the capability to build weapons of mass destruction or to have unauthorized access to ready-made weapons of that sort. 31 Therefore, it becomes more and more irrelevant to consider nuclear weapons as a symbol of prestige or national pride, or as a perfect deterrent against other states. The probability of use of elaborate or crude nuclear devices by states or non-state actors increases as more and more actors on the world political stage have the capability and/or the intention to build such weapons. To avoid a nuclear catastrophe in the future, every nation must start thinking about effective ways of getting rid of the remaining nuclear weapons or further limiting their numbers and deployment sites. These steps must be taken regardless of previously held policies in order to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorist organizations which may use them with no thought for the consequences. Fewer pretexts or justifications may be created for new states to aspire de facto nuclear weapons status.

NATO won’t be able to stop Russian aggression

Markendov 9. (Sergey, head of the Political and Military Analysis Institute Department for Problems in International Relations. “Russian pundit urges radical review of NATO strategy to "reset" relations.” BBC. April 14, 2009. LRH)

The notion that any strengthening of the Russian Federation's positions in neighbouring countries means the revival of neo-Soviet hegemony has only strengthened. On the other hand, events in South Ossetia showed that NATO does not have the resolve (given the desire, it would have been possible to find the resources) to openly counteract Russia and its foreign policy aspirations. After all, casting aside all the emotional rhetoric on "Russian aggression," the bottom line remains an unwillingness to enter into confrontation with Moscow over Georgia. That is why practically all statements by official NATO representatives since "hot August" have been aimed at reconciliation with Russia to one degree or another - naturally, with reservations and traditional phrases about supporting Ukraine and Georgia's North Atlantic aspirations. However, the general trend has been that we cannot live without each other. Furthermore, it was not Russian diplomats and politicians who were more actively fighting for a "reset" but precisely both representatives of NATO and the leaders of individual member countries of the bloc. This is understandable, since the bloc itself throughout the whole of 2008 overrated its forces and possibilities and, on the contrary, underrated (out of a lack of full understanding) the interests of Russia in the southern Caucasus.

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NATO Adv: TNW removal collapses NATO

Reducing the stockpile of nuclear weapons will weaken NATO

Karaganov 10. (Sergei, dean of the School of World Economics and Foreign Affairs at Moscow State University. “Nuke Arms Save Humanity from Itself.” ChinaDaily. p.1-2. May 7, 2010. <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-05/07/content_9820383.htm> LRH)

If stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons are reduced, as some US, European, and Russian experts have proposed, the opponents of Russia's ongoing military reform will have even more reason to object to the reconfiguration of the country's conventional armed forces away from confrontation with NATO toward a flexible-response capability vis--vis other threats.

Similarly, if the US withdraws its largely nominal tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, US-Europe strategic ties would weaken. Many Europeans, above all in the new NATO member states, would then demand more protection from the mythical Russian leviathan.

The world community seems to be losing its strategic bearings. Instead of focusing on the real problem, namely the increasingly unstable international order, it is trying to apply Cold War-era concepts of disarmament. At best, these are marginally useful; more often, they are harmful in today's circumstances.

What is most needed nowadays is clear thinking about how to live with an expanding club of nuclear states while keeping the world relatively stable. To this end, the two great nuclear powers need a coordinated deterrence policy towards new nuclear states

NATO could Collapse without the protection guarantee of American Nuclear Weapons

McNamara and Spring 10 (Sally and Baker, Director of IR for American Legislative Exchange Council, Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/03/President-Obama-Must-Not-Remove-Nuclear-Weapons-from-Europe) AC

Not since radical leftist sentiment gripped Western Europe in the 1980s has the transatlantic relationship faced such a serious ideological challenge to the mutual security of North America and Europe. The removal of American tactical nuclear weapons from European and NATO bases would spell the end of the alliance and the concept of indivisible security. The Russian militarization of the Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad and Moscow’s recent simulation of a nuclear attack on Poland require a robust response from NATO, reinforced by America’s continued nuclear guarantee. Moscow’s simulation—in which Russian armed forces invaded Poland and its air force fired nuclear missiles against Warsaw and acted in conjunction with Belarus to suppress Polish minorities in Belarus—was codenamed “West” and labeled Poland as the aggressor country. Following this exercise, as well as President Obama’s ill-defined policy of “resetting” relations with Russia, Central and Eastern Europe has sought specific assurances as to the indivisibility of the alliance’s security. In addressing these concerns, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has stated: I want to reaffirm as strongly as I can the United States ’ commitment to honor Article 5 of the NATO treaty. No Ally—or adversary—should ever question our determination on this point. It is the bedrock of the Alliance and an obligation that time will not erode. Our nation faces threats elsewhere in the world, but we view peace and stability in Europe as a prerequisite for addressing all of the other challenges. A nuclear pullout from Europe does not comport with Secretary Clinton’s commitments outlined above. Rather than pulling back from the alliance’s commitments, the U.S. should honor Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty and plan against Moscow’s threat to the territorial integrity, political independence, and security of one of its members. This preparation should be underpinned by the sanctity of Article 5, America’s tactical and strategic nuclear insurance.

NATO Adv: TNWs crush US/Russian Relations

Nuclear Stockpiles stress US Russia relations, their removal would signal a new era engagement

Diakov, Miasnikov, and Kadyshev 4 (Anatoli, Eugene, and Timur, Publication of the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies

Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Dolgoprudny, 2004) AC

It is symptomatic that Russian officials, commenting on disputes with NATO, in the last year were mostly focused on such questions as the coming into force of the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, adherence of the Baltic countries to the Treaty, approaches to the Iraq problem, etc., but did not mention the necessity of a complete withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from the territory of Europe. 232 Perhaps an exception was the statement of the Russian delegation at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference in Geneva in April 28, 2003,declaring: 233 "... removal of the tactical nuclear weapons…from Europe and elimination there of respective infrastructure would become an important practical step ultimately overcoming the vestiges of the cold-war period. Such a decision in our opinion could serve the purposes of strengthening of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty... "

Nuclear stockpiles violate the NPT removal of these bombs would greatly strengthen the NPT and open up talks betweem US and Russia over Bilateral Nuclear Weapon Reduction

Diakov, Miasnikov, and Kadyshev 4 (Anatoli, Eugene, and Timur, Publication of the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Dolgoprudny, 2004) AC

Article 2 of the NPT, in turn, forbids non-nuclear weapon states to receive nuclear weapons or control over them from nuclear weapon states. Thus, the current NATO nuclear strategy, which assumes delivery of US nuclear bombs by the dual-capable aircraft of NATO allies that are not nuclear weapon states, contradicts the NPT. The contradiction between NATO nuclear strategy and the commitments of its member nations under the NPT is one of most frequently discussed issues at the conferences of the Preparatory Committee for the NPT Extension. It is also discussed in a number of studies.X 223 Positions of the parties to the NPT regarding this problem differ dramatically. The United States and other members of the alliance adhere to the position that there is no direct prohibition of the deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of the nonnuclear weapon states in the Treaty, and also that there is no direct prohibition of participation of non-nuclear weapon states in planning nuclear operations or preparation of national armed forces for the use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, NATO allies recognize that the use of dual-capable aircraft for nuclear missions by the non-nuclear weapon states of the alliance in wartime will infringe on the NPT. In the days of the Cold War when NATO viewed the Soviet Union as the main threat, the United States justified such possible actions with the argument that observance of the NPT under such circumstances would not make any sense. The US argument was that the Treaty is directed at averting the danger of nuclear war, as declared in the NPT preamble, while NATO can use nuclear weapons only when nuclear war begins or becomes inevitable, i.e. when the NPT fails to fulfill its mission. Now that the Cold War is over and NATO is unable to identify one common enemy, these arguments make no sense – if they ever did.X It is important to emphasize that neither the USSR nor the Russian Federation have ever agreed with the US arguments. Even during preparation of the Treaty, the USSR declared that it would not be bound by any unilateral interpretation of the NPT. At the same time, the Soviet Union did not object to the substance of the US interpretation per se.X 224 A radical solution of the existing contradiction could be a commitment by nuclear weapon powers not to deploy their nuclear weapons outside their national territories. This would not only rule out the deployment of US nuclear weapons on European territory, but would also practically rule out the transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them to non-nuclear-weapon states. Russia put forward such a proposal in 1995 and actually made it a prerequisite for the beginning of negotiations on the reduction of TNWs. As follows from the above analysis, Russia’s proposal was governed not only by a concern about its own national security, but also a desire to strengthen the NPT and the existing international legal regime.X

NATO Adv: NATO Triggers Russia Adventurism

NATO spurs Russian aggression

Reiter 1. (Dan, Associate Professor of Political Science and Winship Research Professor at Emory University, International Security, 5(4), p.48. Spring 2001. (LRH)

Second, NATO enlargement is likely to increase the chances of renewed Russian belligerence, rather than provide a useful insurance policy against it. Some observers have expressed concern that enlargement will jeopardize the West’s relationship with Russia. George Kennan, author of the famous “Sources of Soviet Conduct” essay that laid the groundwork for U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War, stated it bluntly: “Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of the entire post–cold war era.” The historian John Lewis Gaddis was equally critical: “Some principles of strategy are so basic that when stated they sound like platitudes: treat former enemies magnanimously; do not take on unnecessary new ones; keep the big picture in view; balance ends and means; avoid emotion and isolation in making decisions; be willing to acknowledge error. . . . NATO enlargement, I believe, manages to violate every one of the strategic principles just mentioned.”24Good?

NATO Adv: TNW🡪Proliferation

The presence of our nuclear weapons in Turkey will cause proliferation.

Korkut 6 (Tolga, Journalist and geopolitics specialist, *Obianet. cahttp://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=4873*) MKB

The presence of 90 American nuclear bombs at the Incirlik Air Base in the Southeast Turkish province of Adana is being brought before parliament by the country's main opposition Republic Peoples Party (CHP) deputy and former Turkish ambassador to the United States, **Sukru** Elekdag**.**

In an exclusive interview with bianet last week, Elekdag said no justification could be made by civilian or military authorities to retain these weapons after the Cold War and that, in his view, their presence delivered a blow to the regional political prestige of Turkey.

Elekdag is calling on the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to explain if there is any valid military purpose in still allowing these weapons to be held in Turkish soil despite the end of the Cold War.

"In 1991 father Bush made a historical statement and said 'there is no such threat. We are withdrawing all of our land tactical missiles in Europe.' Then they said 'air to surface bombs will stay for a while and we will liquidate them'. But these were all forgotten. It is only now that it's revealed what these weapons really are. Previously it was impossible to prove this. Authorities were neither saying yes or no," Elakdag explained.

Noting that Turkey itself was not under any threat, Elekdag said "These weapons that are under USA control are not necessary. If there is a reason, let us know. If there is not, they should be taken out of the country".

Elekdag added, "Middle East countries are concerned over the existence of these weapons. The new strategy of the USA is a pre-emptive strategy. In other words, to strike the source of a danger it sees without waiting. This, as in Iraq, leads to disaster".

"We do not want to Iran to be nuclear armed. This issue has three actors, the USA, Israel and Iran. There is only one way out in solving this tension," he said. "The Middle East should become a nuclear free zone. Turkey should revitalise this draft".

He said, however, that "it cannot support this with nuclear weapons. Being the secretary of the Islamic Conference Organisation, Turkey could take the responsibility of such a project at the level of the United Nations on a legal platform. It is difficult, but this is the only way out".

Elekdag said that for his part, he now planned to bring the **United Nations Convention to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons** on the agenda of the Turkish Parliament.

"I will reveal the arbitrary way the USA is enforcing this convention. If we do not want the 21st century to be the century of disaster, we have to enforce this convention fastidiously. Otherwise, other countries will revive the nuclear armament projects that they had shelved".

Asked whether he would work together with non-governmental organisations already active on the issue, Elekdag said "I need to consider this. I do not know what their agenda is. I need to find this out. I am not against necessary defence measures being taken. Whatever required should be done. But I do think that there is no defence justification related to nuclear bombs".

NATO Adv: TNW W/D 🡪Disarm

Removal of TNW leads to disarm and doesn’t trigger Russia link

Penketh 10. (Anne, Washington Program Director of the British American Security Information Council. “Edging towards a nuclear-free world.” The Independent. p.30. April 5, 2010.) LRH

As Obama looks ahead to the next steps in his security agenda, there is an opportunity for real disarmament, in the heart of Europe, which would lead to the removal of the 200 or so US nuclear weapons from five European countries under the Nato umbrella.

We don't know how many there are exactly because we have never been told. They are holdovers from the Cold War, when they were deployed secretly in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey under bilateral agreements with Washington.

Why do we need them? We don't. They have been quietly removed from Britain and Greece. It is widely held, even by the military, that the remaining B61 gravity bombs serve no military purpose and will never be used. At a time of war, it would take weeks for them to be operational on US aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons - which are no longer stationed in Turkey anyway.

Germany, the first Nato country to raise its head above the parapet to seek the weapons' withdrawal, will soon have to bite the bullet and decide whether to invest at huge cost in dual capable aircraft to carry bombs which it officially wishes to see removed.

Russia certainly isn't trembling at the thought of these obsolete weapons in need of refurbishment stored on US bases around Europe. So it should be easy to get rid of them, right?