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1NC – (1/2)

A. Turkish econ vulnerable- sustained only by short term measures implemented by the government

Rubin 6/23 (Michael, Commentary Magazine, http://www.commentarymagazine.com/viewarticle.cfm/turkey--from-ally-to-enemy-15464 ) KLS

Both Turks and Westerners can be forgiven for taking Erdogan at his word. He had cultivated an image of probity as a local official that stood in sharp contrast with the corruption of many incumbent Turkish politicians. Rather than upend the system or pursue a divisive social platform, as prime minister Erdogan first sought to repair the Turkish economy. This was an attractive prospect for Turks across the political spectrum, since in the five years prior, the Turkish lira had declined in value eight-fold, from 200,000 to 1.7 million to the dollar, leading to a ruinous banking crisis in 2001. A Coca-Cola cost millions. Erdogan stabilized the currency and implemented other popular reforms. He cut income taxes, slashed the value-added tax, and used state coffers to subsidize gasoline prices. The Turkish electorate rewarded his party for its efforts. The AKP won 42 percent of the vote in the March 2004 municipal elections and placed mayors in four of Turkey’s five largest cities. In July 2007, it increased its share of the popular vote to 47 percent. But there was far less here than met the eye. Rather than base economic reform on sound, long-term policies, Erdogan instead relied on sleight of hand. He incurred crippling debt and, in effect, mortgaged long-term financial security of the republic for his own short-term political gain. Deniz Baykal, the former leader of the main opposition party, has said that the state debt accrued during Erdogan’s first three years in power surpassed Turkey’s total accumulated debt in the three decades prior.

B. The US continues to fund Turkey for bases – perception of the end of monetary aid sends the Turkish economy spiraling downward

Laurens 3 (Peter, Analyst @ Central Asia Caucasus Inst., 4/9/3, CACI, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/1048) JPG

The capital markets can be driven as much by rumor as by fundamental economic realities. This was perfectly illustrated by the Turkish stock market over the last month: by end-March, the Istanbul Stock Exchange (IMKB) national-100 index slid towards historic lows, trading around 9000 points, on fears that several billion dollars in official U.S. monetary aid for the Turkish economy would not be forthcoming. By Monday April 7, the index had bounced back, rising to over 10,700 on news that money from the U.S. might be made available after all. Similarly, by Monday the Turkish lira had strengthened to around 1,692,500 to the U.S. dollar, from 1,760,000 two weeks earlier.Given the degree of popular domestic opposition to war in Iraq, Turkey’s new prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been reluctant to alienate his constituency by challenging the parliament’s rejection of basing U.S. troops. On the other hand he and his party are aware of how much the country needs Washington’s financial aid. Last week, the U.S. Congress reiterated its intention to make available cash grants and nearly $9 billion in U.S.-backed loans to Turkey. Ankara has now agreed to provide some logistical support for the U.S. forces fighting in the north of Iraq and has given them the right to make emergency landings at Turkish air bases.   
Markets remain skittish about Turkey. Investors no longer feel that the U.S. needs Ankara to facilitate its military operations in the north of Iraq, and the Turkish economy is reeling from the pressures of a $125 billion external debt burden, amounting to 60% of the country’s GDP. Turkey must now draw upon its $16 billion stand-by loan package, granted by the IMF after the country’s 2001 banking crisis. Nevertheless, Ankara continues with an expensive buildup of troops, now reportedly numbering about 40,000, on the border with Iraq. This action reflects the state’s fear that the Iraqi Kurds may take possession of the oil fields of Kirkuk and encourage a revival of Kurdish separatism within Turkey.

1NC – (2/2)

C. Turkey is key to EU’s economic viability – collapse devastates the union.

Ulgen 6 (Sinan, chairman of the Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, [http://www.bridge-mag.com/magazine/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=188&Itemid=74] AD: 6/23/10)JM

‘Will Turkish business remain enthusiastic about EU membership despite the disillusionment of political leaders and voters? Several factors suggest that business support is likely to remain strong, at least for now. First, Turkish businesses have invested a lot in their pro-EU policies, for example in the form of new representative offices in Brussels and numerous EU-related events and seminars. Second, economic and business links between the EU and Turkey continue to multiply. Since the creation of the customs union, Turkey’s economy has become considerably more open. Exports now account for 32 percent of GDP, a ratio that is higher than those of EU members Spain and Portugal. Over half of Turkey’s exports go to the EU (53 percent of the total), and the EU is the single biggest supplier of imports (43 percent of the total). EU countries are also by far the largest foreign investors in the Turkish economy, accounting for 58 percent of total foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows in 2005. This proportion rose to 91 percent in the first half of 2006. ‘There has been a string of multi-billion dollar acquisitions over the last couple of years, as outside investors have sought to establish a foothold in Turkey’s fast-growing market and take advantage of the business opportunities created by pre-accession reforms. For example, Citigroup bought a 20 percent stake in Akbank, Fortis (a Dutch-Belgian bank) took over Disbank, the UK’s Vodafone bought mobile operator Telsim, and Oger, a Saudi business group, acquired Turkish Telecom. The sale of Finansbank (a midsized Turkish bank) to the National Bank of Greece is particularly notable. Even a few years ago, a major Greek-Turkish merger would have been inconceivable, given the level of mistrust that used to prevail between Greece and Turkey. Growing trade and investment links have created a new dynamic that will persuade most Turkish businesses that EU accession is central to their interests and needs to continue.’

D. A strong EU solves scenarios for extinction, specifically, the Russians.

Strokes 3/17 (Bruce, international econ columnist for National Journal, [http://tinyurl.com/23o7p3k] AD: 6/23/10)JM

WASHINGTON ― To paraphrase the noted economist Woody Allen, Europe is at a crossroads as it confronts the Greek economic crisis. One path leads to utter hopelessness and despair, the other to total extinction. One can only hope that the Europeans have the wisdom to choose correctly. Since American financial institutions aided and abetted Greek budgetary profligacy and because the choices Europeans make and will make in the months ahead will directly affect American economic and foreign policy interests, Washington can ill afford to stand on the sidelines. The Greek crisis is a textbook example of the interconnectedness of the global economy and the foreign policy environment. For most of the last decade, the Greek economy grew faster than others in the euro area. Yet, the country's balance sheets worsened. By 2009 the annual government deficit equaled 13 percent of the economy and public debt was 107 percent of GDP. So, when the global recession hit, and the Greek economy contracted by 2 percent in 2009, international bond markets panicked, fearing that Athens was going to have trouble meeting its obligations. By mid-February the Greek government was paying three percentage points more to borrow money than the interest rate charged Germany, worsening the mismatch between Greek revenues and expenditures. Wall Street bears some of the blame for this mess. Goldman Sachs and possibly other American financial institutions reportedly helped Athens understate its true indebtedness through the creation of innovative financial instruments. "We are looking into a number of questions relating to Goldman Sachs and other companies and their arrangements with Greece," said U.S. Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke in recent Congressional testimony. But Washington has more self-interested concerns. Europe is America's largest export market. But, in part thanks to the Greek crisis, the euro has fallen in value by 8 percent against the dollar since November, 2009, making American products more expensive for Europeans. An extended period of weakness for the euro would undermine the Obama administration's ambitions to double U.S. exports. But it is the foreign policy implications of the Greek crisis that are keeping people awake at night in the White House. Washington needs Europe's help in Afghanistan and in dealing with Iran, China and Russia. But the growing preoccupation of governments in Berlin, London and Paris with staving off a financial meltdown and their populations' isolationist response to the crisis leave Europe with little time, political capital or cash to be spent on America's foreign policy priorities. The most immediate cost may be the lost opportunity to further defuse Greek-Turkish tensions, long an American goal for the region. The new Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou is the most pro-Western leader Greece has elected in decades. And he had hoped to improve relations with Turkey. But now his government will, at best, be consumed with the crisis and, at worst, could fall thanks to populist frustration with the belt-tightening that lies ahead. Europe's spreading financial troubles also leave it dangerously vulnerable to Russian meddling. Former U.S. Treasury secretary Henry Paulson alleged in his recent book ``On the Brink'' that Moscow dumped its Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bonds in 2008 in a bid to force a costly Washington bailout of those mortgage-finance firms. A similar attack on the European bond market, to demonstrate Russian influence in Europe's moment of vulnerability, can not be ruled out. A united Europe has also long been an American foreign policy priority. So any threat to the future of the euro and the cohesiveness of the European Union sets off alarm bells in Washington.

\*\*\*Uniqueness\*\*\*

UQ – Econ Up – Government Supported

Turkish econ vulnerable- sustained only by short term measures implemented by the government

Rubin 6/23 (Michael, Commentary Magazine, http://www.commentarymagazine.com/viewarticle.cfm/turkey--from-ally-to-enemy-15464 ) KLS

Both Turks and Westerners can be forgiven for taking Erdogan at his word. He had cultivated an image of probity as a local official that stood in sharp contrast with the corruption of many incumbent Turkish politicians. Rather than upend the system or pursue a divisive social platform, as prime minister Erdogan first sought to repair the Turkish economy. This was an attractive prospect for Turks across the political spectrum, since in the five years prior, the Turkish lira had declined in value eight-fold, from 200,000 to 1.7 million to the dollar, leading to a ruinous banking crisis in 2001. A Coca-Cola cost millions. Erdogan stabilized the currency and implemented other popular reforms. He cut income taxes, slashed the value-added tax, and used state coffers to subsidize gasoline prices. The Turkish electorate rewarded his party for its efforts. The AKP won 42 percent of the vote in the March 2004 municipal elections and placed mayors in four of Turkey’s five largest cities. In July 2007, it increased its share of the popular vote to 47 percent. But there was far less here than met the eye. Rather than base economic reform on sound, long-term policies, Erdogan instead relied on sleight of hand. He incurred crippling debt and, in effect, mortgaged long-term financial security of the republic for his own short-term political gain. Deniz Baykal, the former leader of the main opposition party, has said that the state debt accrued during Erdogan’s first three years in power surpassed Turkey’s total accumulated debt in the three decades prior.

UQ – Econ Up – Fiscal Disc

**Strict fiscal rule must be implemented to keep Turkish economy afloat**

BBC 6/15 (2010, BBC Monitoring Europe, Lexis) KLS

Istanbul, 15 June 2010: A slowing pace of economic growth would be the major concern for the Turkish economy, an analyst with the global accounting and consulting firm, Deloitte, said on Tuesday (15 June), warning against Turkey's dependence on foreign funds. "The thing that concerns us is that whether Turkey has a game plan. We have a problem about the inflow of money, much-needed for the continuation of our economic growth. We need funds if we want to keep the growth rate around 5.5 per cent by the end of this year," Murat Ucer, Deloitte analyst and co-head of Turkey Data Monitor, told the Anadolu Agency. "Otherwise, there will be a political panic which would trigger higher jobless rate, soaring inflation and deteriorating financial discipline." Ucer said Turkey could compensate the situation in Europe, specifically in Greece, by strengthening its own game plan, stressing that the fiscal rule was a major step to that end. "But we need to be careful when implementing the fiscal rule. The political power should make clear that it stands by it and create an environment which it believes in the fiscal rule," Ucer said. Ucer said the he expected the jobless rate would not drop below 12 per cent unless the country grew well above 4 per cent. "It is highly unlikely that we can see unemployment below 12 per cent if we do not grow at least seven per cent."

**Turkish economy making positive gains but fiscal restraint is vital to sustainability**

BBC 6/15 (2010, BBC Monitoring Europe, Lexis) KLS

Turkey's statistics authority, TurkStat, announced the unemployment rate for March as 13.7 per cent on Tuesday. Simsek who spoke to reporters on his way out of a panel in Istanbul commented on the unemployment figures. He said Turkish economy resumed a trend of growth, and with growth came a decline in the unemployment rate. Simsek said their government was taking measures to take unemployment rate further down, noting that the key to creating jobs was increase in investments and growth. "Decline in unemployment does not come as a surprise in that sense. It will continue to fall. In the months to come it will continue to fall both with the seasonality effect and the contribution of economic growth and new investments," said Simsek. Also commenting on the budget performance of their government in May and the first five months, Simsek said spending in the government budget was under control. He said a rise in the primary budget spending could be noticed noting that this was due to high expenditure on defence and infrastructure. Simsek said the revenues of the government rose significantly in the mean time. "This has to do with the recovery in economy. But of course it is apparent that effectiveness of tax auditing and collection has also increased. For example, thanks to our efforts, we have 150,000 new tax payers with income from rent collections. As the Ministry of Finance we are satisfied with our performance said," Simsek.

Turkish econ up but highly susceptible to regional volatility and fiscal irresponsibility

BBC 5/29 (2010, BBC Monitoring Europe, Lexis) KLS

Turkey's Premier Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Turkey was carrying an active foreign policy in order to contribute to solution of regional problems. "We are saying in every opportunity that Turkey is a reliable and good-willed country that backs justice," Erdogan told a televised address to the nation. Erdogan said, "We cannot say that 'Iraq is not our concern'. We cannot be indifferent to Iran. Turkey is also influenced by issues of Syria, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia and Georgia." "We attach a great importance to tranquillity, stability, peace and prosperity in our region and neighbouring countries," he said. Erdogan said they had significant responsibilities and should take important and big steps in economy, foreign policy, domestic policy, basic rights and freedoms, justice, security, health and education. Erdogan said Turkish economy showed a great performance during global economic crisis and it was appreciated by the world. Turkey's exports increased by 25.4 per cent to 9.4bn US dollars in April and its exports rose by 23 per cent to 35bn US dollars in the first four months of 2010 when compared to the same period last year, he said. There has been decrease in the number of unemployed people, he said. "Unemployment rate was 16.1 per cent in February 2009 and the figure dropped to 14.4 per cent in February 2010," Erdogan said. International organizations confirmed that Turkey weathered financial crisis with the lowest damage and said that Turkish economy would grow remarkably in 2010 and 2011, he said. Erdogan said that the government prepared Fiscal Rule Bill, a very important step in economy.

UQ – Econ Up – Regional Security

Turkish econ lookin sharp but needs regional security to sustain trend

BBC 5/27 (2010, BBC Monitoring Europe, Lexis) KLS

Erdogan also said Turkey had become the 17th biggest economy in the world today with an annual growth of 4.3 per cent, and it was the biggest sixth economy in Europe. Premier Erdogan is paying a formal visit to Brazil, the first leg of his formal tour to Brazil, Argentina and Chile. Erdogan attended the inauguration ceremony of Turkey's new Consulate General in Sao Paulo, and First Turkey Export Goods Fair, and visited Embraer, the third biggest aircraft factory in the world, on Wednesday. On Thursday, Erdogan is scheduled to meet Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and exchange views on international and regional matters. Two countries are expected to sign several agreements during the prime minister's visit. Premier Erdogan will also meet Michel Elias Temer, the president of the Chamber of Deputies of Brazil. Erdogan is expected visit Brazilian Oil Company PetroBras, which carries out joint oil research studies with Turkey's TPAO in the Black Sea. The Turkish prime minister will proceed to Rio de Janeiro on 27 May to attend Third Forum of the Alliance of Civilizations which will take place on 28-29 May. Erdogan will address the opening of the forum and attend lunch which will be hosted by Brazilian President Silva. Premier Erdogan will return to Turkey on June 2 after visiting Argentina and Chile. Erdogan further said on Wednesday that, "a new period starts between Turkey and Brazil today." "We target to improve bilateral relations between Turkey and Brazil to strategic partnership," Erdogan said while addressing Turkey-Brazil business forum. Commenting on Turkish economy, Erdogan said global crisis had some impact on Turkish economy and noted that, "Turkey managed to contain this impact and succeeded in overcoming with the least damage." "In the last quarter of 2009, Turkish economy recorded 6 per cent growth. The shrinkage in whole of the year was below the estimations and recorded as 4.7 per cent. Many financial institutions, including IMF, World Bank and OECD reaffirmed that Turkey would be the fastest growing country of the world in 2010 and afterwards. Turkey preserves its high growth performance despite the serious problem in Europe," Erdogan said. Erdogan said: "Since September 2008, the time when signals of global crisis started, rating note of many countries were reduced, notes of only 17 countries were upgraded. Turkey was the only country whose credit note was upgraded one after the other by four different institutions." Erdogan said active initiatives of Turkey in foreign policy had positive reflections on foreign trade, "as Turkey served to peace in its region with the approach 'zero problem with neighbours', it gained the confidence of the neighbouring countries being the address of compromise and mediation. We have broadened the axis of foreign trade and commercial relations to a great extend. We have been endeavouring to boost cooperation with Latin America and the Caribbeans as well as initiatives to Africa."

UQ – Econ Up – Stability, Unemployment

Turkish economy improving but not in the clear- stability and unemployment necessary milestones

Ankara 6/20 (Ali Aslan Kilic, 2010, Today’s Zaman http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-213643-105-govt-pleased-by-falling-unemployment-rate-opposition-incredulous.html)

MHP Ankara deputy Associate Professor Mehmet Günal is not keen on accepting the current levels of the unemployment rate as a noteworthy accomplishment. Only a rate below 10 percent should be noted in the government’s report card as a success, according to Günal. “A 2.1 percentage point difference is important,” he said, adding, however, that this was already inevitable after seeing such high levels of around 15 percent. Besides, the recruitment of seasonal workers also contributed to the decline in March’s figures, Günal argued. To ensure that the fall in the unemployment rate continues, the government must implement extra measures in addition to existing ones, said the MHP deputy, who is also a member of Parliament’s Planning and Budget Commission. He went on to say: “The development is significant, but it should promote new measures, not relaxation. Thinking that this serious problem will be cured in just two months would be wrong.” His suggestions included the creation of new job opportunities and the achievement of a sustainable growth rate in the economy to fuel the creation of new jobs. “The changes in rates via TurkStat’s manipulation of the numbers and definitions will benefit no one. There is a slow reinvigoration of the economy, but it needs to be supported by permanent measures that guarantee the achievement of an unemployment rate below 10 percent,” Günal noted.

Turkey’s economy is stable and making slight improvements.

MENAFN 5/26 (The Middle East North Africa Financial Network, international news agency, ProQuest, AD: 6/22/10)JM

(MENAFN) Turkey's Economy Minister, Ali Babacan, said that the country's economy is doing better than expected, citing improved growth, budget and employment indicators, Reuters reported. The minister said that the government plans to unveil a strategy that would bolster the labor market by early July at the latest. Earlier this month, Babacan unveiled the medium-term program, which is designed to restore the government's finances after a spending splurge last year to cushion the impact of the global financial crisis. Finance Minister, Mehmet Simsek, said earlier that the government was not considering cutting tax rates to create new jobs since this would hurt macroeconomic stability. In the January to March period, Turkey's unemployment reached 14.4 percent, showing a slight improvement from previous months as an economic recovery gathers pace. Growth is expected to reach nearly 5 percent this year, after a 4.7 percent contraction last year.

\*\*\*Links\*\*\*

Link – Perception

The US continues to fund Turkey for bases – perception of the end of monetary aid sends the Turkish economy spiraling downward

Laurens 3 (Peter, Analyst @ Central Asia Caucasus Inst., 4/9/3, CACI, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/1048) JPG

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Markets remain skittish about Turkey. Investors no longer feel that the U.S. needs Ankara to facilitate its military operations in the north of Iraq, and the Turkish economy is reeling from the pressures of a $125 billion external debt burden, amounting to 60% of the country’s GDP. Turkey must now draw upon its $16 billion stand-by loan package, granted by the IMF after the country’s 2001 banking crisis. Nevertheless, Ankara continues with an expensive buildup of troops, now reportedly numbering about 40,000, on the border with Iraq. This action reflects the state’s fear that the Iraqi Kurds may take possession of the oil fields of Kirkuk and encourage a revival of Kurdish separatism within Turkey.

Link – US Support

US support to Turkey is instrumental to economic development and growth

Gillis 4 (Patrick, Lieutenant Col. in US army, USAWC strategy research project, 5/3/4, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada424313&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) JPG

The United States and Turkey share common economic interests. Notwithstanding Turkey’s designation as a “big emerging market” by the Department of Commerce, the economic dimension of the relationship has developed more slowly than anticipated. Turkey would like to expand and diversify its markets while also receiving more foreign trade and investment. The Turkish private sector has been vocal in describing the opportunities for Turkish-American cooperation in support of Turkey’s economic development. The U.S. would like to see Turkey become a strong, stable regional economy. This would reduce the amount of assistance the U.S. would have to provide Turkey, while countering Russian and Iranian economic influence of the Caucasus and Central Asia.The U.S. sees a Turkey fully integrated into the EU as extremely positive not only for Turkey’s economy, but for that of the entire region as well. In 1999 the U.S. endorsed Turkey’s inclusion in the G-20 group, the club of the most important developed and developing economies expected to play a central role in shaping the world economy. 27 The U.S. was instrumental in garnering the necessary backing for the BTC pipeline. This pipeline, which started construction in 2002, offers an additional source of energy from the Caspian region. In addition, it will encourage the economic and political independence of the Central Asian republics and provide a greater guarantee for energy sources.

Link – Security Guarantee

The US-Turkish security relationship is necessary to create economic ties which is necessary for Turkey to address its economic challenges

Gillis 4 (Patrick, Lieutenant Col. in US army, USAWC strategy research project, 5/3/4, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada424313&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) JPG

It would be advantageous for the U.S. to improve economic relations with Turkey. Deeper

U.S. economic ties will reinforce the U.S.-Turkish relationship so that when the next contentious issue arises ties will not rest uniquely upon a security-based foundation. In addition, strong economic ties would provide an additional market for U.S. investment and foreign trade. The U.S. can take several immediate steps to improve economic relations with Turkey. In Iraq, the U.S. can work to increase Turkey’s role in reconstruction by incorporating Turkey into the post- conflict rebuilding contracts. Turkey is the largest economy in the Middle East and can act as a direct supplier of urgently needed goods and services to Iraq.42 Washington can also strongly encourage private U.S. firms to conduct trade with Turkey and to invest in Turkey’s economic future. Most of Turkey’s economic woes can be directly attributed to the malfunctioning political system in which leaders have refused to assume responsibility and accountability. 43The U.S. can also provide assistance in helping Turkey’s political establishment address its economic challenges.

Link – Assistance

The US offers economic assistance for bases in Turkey

First Coast News 3 (2/6/3, http://www.firstcoastnews.com/news/news-article.aspx?storyid=394) JPG

The United States is planning to spend several hundred million dollars to modernize Turkish bases. The renovations could start quickly after Thursday's vote.Turkey fears that a war in Iraq could reverse its fragile economic recovery and has agreed with the United States on a package that would cushion the country from the effects of war. The package would range between $4 billion and $15 billion, depending on the length of the war and its economic impact.The separate vote at the end of the holiday would allow U.S. soldiers to be based in Turkey and would allow Turkish soldiers to move into Iraq if there was a war.Turkey has repeatedly said that it would move its forces into Iraq to maintain stability in the region and prevent a flood of refugees.Many analysts believe that the main aim would be to prevent the creation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq if the central government in Iraq collapses.

Turkey uses its bases as a quid pro quo to receive economic aid and as payment for arms

IMF 5 (International Monetary Fund, Pres Release no. 05/104, 5/11/5, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2005/pr05104.htm) JPG

The US administration offered preliminary aid of USD 800 million to Turkey against using Turkish military facilities in carrying out a US-led military attack against Iraq, a well informed Turkish military source told KUNA. "Deputy US Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and deputy secretary of state Mark Grossman will arrive in Ankara next Tuesday to discuss relevant details with the Turkish government", added the source. "USA has officially informed Turkey of the offer a few days back, through the US embassy in Ankara." The US administration will offer USD 800 million, as first installment out of a total of US USD 3.0 billion to be given to Turkey in return for allowing US forces to use Turkish bases. The source said the Turkish government would insist on its demands of canceling part of the USD 36 billion military debts due to the USA, and rescheduling the remaining part. The source also underlined the Turkish government refusal to send Turkish forces to fight by the US troops in an attack against Iraq, but can offer military facilities within relevant UN resolutions.

Link – Assistance

US-Turkish arms exchange is beneficial for both economies

Gabelnick et. al. 99 (Tamar, *Director of the Federation of American Scientists, Published on Federation of American Scientists, October 1999, http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/reports/turkeyrep.htm#hr) JPG*

In addition to the benefits that the Turkish military has derived from the billions of dollars in U.S. military grants and loans that it has received over the past two decades, Turkey's military industry has been a prime beneficiary of assistance from U.S. arms exporters as a result of arms sales offsets. Offsets are arrangements negotiated between arms exporting firms and their major client nations in which the weapons company agrees to provide specified investments and other economic assistance to "offset" the costs of importing the system in question. An offset deal is essentially a quid pro quo: if we buy your weapons, you have to plow some money into our economy. Direct offsets involve production of components of the weapons system in the purchasing country. If major portions of the system are produced overseas (including final assembly), a direct offset deal is known as a coproduction arrangement. There are also indirect offsets, in which weapons companies make investments or undertake promotional activities on behalf of the client nation in non-military areas. For example, a company might agree to help build a hotel complex in the client nation, or provide subcontracts to companies in the host country for non-military projects, or help promote that client nation's exports in the U.S. market.[(16)](http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/reports/turkeyrep.htm#N_16_) The investments and technology transfers provided by U.S. arms companies to their foreign clients have mushroomed into a multi-billion dollar business. In many instances, the business transferred overseas as part of an offset deal comes at the expense of U.S. firms - e.g., in a 1997 Commerce Department survey, 83% of the defense contractors surveyed reported losing significant business to foreign companies as a result of offset deals.[(17)](http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/reports/turkeyrep.htm#N_17_)

In the case of Turkey, offset deals often directly benefit officials of the armed forces, who are heavily involved in Turkish industry via stock ownership and representation on corporate boards of directors. As a result, U.S. offset deals with Turkey serve to enhance the economic power of Turkey's military elite, which in turn increases their already considerable political clout. Since the Turkish arms industry is one of the top beneficiaries of defense offsets from the United States (see Appendix Table C, below), the economic and political impacts of these deals are substantial. Under the "Peace Onyx" program, Lockheed Martin (and its predecessor on the F-16 program, General Dynamics) has helped Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) establish one of the largest assembly lines for combat aircraft in the world in a facility located on the southern outskirts of Ankara. Since the program was inaugurated in 1984, Turkey has ordered 240 F-16s, of which 175 have been delivered to date. The vast majority of the aircraft have been assembled at TAI's Ankara facility, which employs 2,000 production workers.[(18)](http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/reports/turkeyrep.htm#N_18_)

Turkey's F-16 program goes far beyond merely assembling components produced in the United States. U.S. firms are providing Turkey with technology, training, and financing to establish a foothold in the major aspects of military aerospace production. Towards that end, General Electric helped create Tusas Engine Industries, a Turkish-American joint stock company which manufactures engine parts and assembles the F110-GE-100 engine for the TAI F-16 production line. Lockheed Martin owns a 49% share in MIKES, a Turkish firm that produces the ALQ-178-V5 radar and electronic countermeasures systems used on the F-16. And Litton is collaborating with the Turkish firm Aselsan to build F-16 components.

Just as Lockheed Martin is at the center of helping Turkey build its own aerospace industry, the U.S.-based FMC Corporation (which now produces armored vehicles as part of a joint venture arrangement with the Harsco Corporation under the name United Defense) has been in on the ground floor of helping Turkish industry develop a capability to build armored personnel carriers and military trucks. In 1991, the Turkish firm FMC-Nurol began production on 1,698 U.S.-designed M-113 armored personnel carriers; as of last year 1,500 of the vehicles had been delivered. The Texas Instruments corporation is helping the Turkish firm Aselsan build optical sights and night vision equipment for the Turkish M-113s, and the U.S. firm Sergant Fletcher has a joint venture with the Turkish company Kayseri Werkplaats to upgrade existing Turkish M-113s. With assistance from United Defense, FMC-Nurol has developed a 'family of military vehicles' ranging from light military trucks to armored personnel carriers that it is now seeking to export to markets in Europe and the Middle East.[(19)](http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/reports/turkeyrep.htm#N_19_)

Turkey will also be seeking coproduction of its new attack helicopter, which is being bid on by both Boeing (the Apache) and Bell Helicopter Textron (the King Cobra, an advanced version of the company's Super Cobra model), as well as a planned $7 billlion purchase of main battle tanks, in which foreign bidders must team up with potential Turkish co-producers.[(20)](http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/reports/turkeyrep.htm#N_20_) An early 1990s deal for coproduction of Sikorsky Black Hawk helicopters fell through after criticisms were raised about the use of these aircraft to ferry Turkish troops into combat in the southeast, but during this decade Turkey has purchased a total of 95 Black Hawks through direct commercial channels.

Link – Arms Trade

U.S presence in Turkey continues the arms trade.

Hen-Tov 3 (Elliot, doctoral student in contemporary Turkish affairs in the Near Eastern Studies Department at Princeton University, “The Political Economy of Turkish Military Modernization”, *The Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 8(4)) JM

Due to the specific nature of the defense industry as a highly regulated market and the politicization of foreign military sales, the emergence of Turkey as a major buyer will also have profound effects on the political economy of Western weapons supplier states. Given the data source and time lag problems concerning the measurement of arms sales, this study uses the most complete, most commonly used, and most recent report by the U.S. State Department (World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade 2000). [1]Furthermore, this study will focus on the defense industry in the United States, with occasional reference to European or Israeli industries. The reason is that the United States has an absolute majority of global arms sales and is designated as Turkey's major supplier throughout the modernization period. Moreover, this study argues that modernization has become not only a goal, but also a vehicle of Turkish foreign policy in light of the political economies of Western defense industries.

Arms trade key to economic stability.

Hen-Tov 3 (Elliot, doctoral student in contemporary Turkish affairs in the Near Eastern Studies Department at Princeton University, “The Political Economy of Turkish Military Modernization”, The Middle East Review of International Affairs, 8(4)) JM

In fact, when analyzing Turkey's capabilities, it is evident that Turkey fundamentally has the potential to develop a major defense industry. According to Luis Bitencourt, in order to succeed in defense industrialization, a developing country needs to have a perception of threat, access to financial resources, a diversified industrial base, a domestic procurement budget, sufficient domestic education, and superpower support.[10] Indeed, even if the country's recent economic crisis casts doubt on Turkey's financial and industrial development, Turkey does fulfill all of Bitencourt's prerequisites. If Turkey succeeds, the relationship between the military and private business may improve, contributing to further democratization and economic liberalization. Ironically, military modernization--i.e., strengthening the military institutions--may produce a more democratic society because it links the military with business interests, which are mainly concerned with creating stable macroeconomic conditions through liberalization and good governance.

Link – Signal

US support to Turkey signals changes which reduce inflation and generate sustainable growth

IMF 5 (International Monetary Fund, Pres Release no. 05/104, 5/11/5, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2005/pr05104.htm) JPG

The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) today approved a three-year, SDR 6.66 billion (about US$10 billion) Stand-By Arrangement to support Turkey's economic and financial program through May 2008. An amount equivalent to SDR 555.17 million (about  
US$ 837.5 million) will be made available immediately, with the remaining balance distributed in eleven equal installments. The Board also approved a one-year extension of Turkey's repurchase expectations totaling SDR 2.52 billion (about US$ 3.80 billion) arising in 2006. Following the Executive Board's discussion on Turkey, Mr. Rodrigo de Rato, Managing Director and Chairman, made the following statement: "Turkey's economic performance is at its strongest in a generation. Growth was 8 percent on average over the last three years, while inflation has fallen to single digits, its lowest level in more than 30 years. Strong policy implementation under the previous Fund-supported program has given rise to this impressive performance. Together with the EU's decision to open accession negotiations, this signals a sea change in Turkey's economic prospects."The authorities' new three-year program is designed to extend these gains in economic performance and reduce Turkey's remaining vulnerabilities. The government's commitment to maintain the primary surplus target at 6½ percent of GNP will steadily reduce the public debt and help contain the current account deficit. Continued independence of the central bank, together with next year's introduction of full inflation targeting, will help consolidate the reduction in inflation. These macroeconomic policies should facilitate further reductions in interest rates and generate sustained growth.

\*\*\*Internal Links\*\*\*

Internal Link – Turkey Key to World Economy

Turkey key to the world

Paul 6/9 (Amanda, Economic Analyst,Turkish Press, http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=352709) KLS

As neighbor Greece continues to suffer from its economic meltdown, Turkey has weathered the financial crisis far better than many other countries, including a significant number of European Union member states. As a result Turkey has become a more integrated and bigger player in the global economy, with a strong emerging economy making it one of only a few countries with post-crisis potential. Therefore, it is not surprising that Turkey is boasting about this achievement at every opportunity, including last week when Turkey's dynamic and super-smart finance minister, Mehmet Simsek, was in Brussels. Indeed, after a number of meetings at the European Commission, he has come away 'feeling sorry' for the EU.

Internal Link – Trade Key

Trade is key to turkeys economy

Laurens 3 (Peter, Analyst @ Central Asia Caucasus Inst., 4/9/3, CACI, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/1048) JPG

To keep the economy growing and to avoid defaulting on its loans, Turkey needs trade. In this context, Erdogan’s January visit to the energy economies of Central Asia points to this urgent need. Pronouncements were made on such topics as importing electricity from Turkmenistan and speeding up the completion of the trademark Azerbaijan pipeline projects to run through Turkey. The benefits to Turkey are relatively secure and inexpensive future supplies of electric power, oil and gas, and revenues from tariffs on transit of the latter two commodities. However, most projects are still several years away from completion. In the meantime, the recession in Turkey depresses investment abroad through the high cost of borrowing money. Many in Turkey’s business community perceive the Central Asian countries as business-unfriendly places, and the potential profits are not high enough to justify the logistical and start-up costs to be incurred by Turkish businesses during a time of recession at home. The Central Asian energy economies themselves attract investment chiefly to their public sectors, as the private sectors are not developed enough to attract significant trade. Turkish investment in Central Asia will take off only when the domestic economy improves enough to justify all the costs to be borne by Turkish business. By turning down the U.S. money that was offered, Turkey has overplayed its Gulf War hand. This time around, policymakers failed to take into account the notion that perhaps the U.S. military can achieve most of its Iraq objectives without Turkish help. Indeed the perception of several commentators in the U.S. was that Ankara tried to blackmail U.S. into forking over more money—a charge that stung badly in Turkey. Nevertheless, that country’s need for financing is urgent enough to overrule the short-term concerns of party politics, and Turkey is likely to be more accommodating to the Bush administration’s policy in the region during the next phase of the war involving occupation of Iraq by U.S. ground troops.

Internal Link – US Aid Key

US aid to Turkey is key to their economic stability

Gillis 4 (Patrick, Lieutenant Col. in US army, USAWC strategy research project, 5/3/4, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada424313&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) JPG

Turkey’s governmental economic record throughout the latter part of the 20th century is one of mismanagement and corruption. Previous governments have prevented transparency within the economic system, postponed difficult reforms and, when problems erupted, blamed individuals rather than examining structural/systemic causes. While it is the 16th largest economy in the world, Turkey stands as an example of potential unrealized.21 This situation culminated in February 2001 with the worst economic crisis in the Republic’s history. 22 The Bush administration came to Turkey’s aid by pushing through a 31 billion dollar combined IMF/World Bank bailout package. The AKP has, for the most part, adhered to the conditions set forth by the IMF. The economic situation in Turkey has begun to stabilize but Turkey must seriously address basic problems to fix its economic woes. Necessary economic reforms include the presence of a strong market economy, the capacity to withstand competitive pressure and market forces within the EU, and free movement of goods, capital, services, and people.23 Turkey will need support from both the EU (More than 50 percent of Turkish trade has consistently been with European countries.24) and the U.S. in order to take the required steps to reform its economy and thus become a more stable country.

\*\*\*Impacts\*\*\*

Impact – Econ Good – Democracy (1/2)

A. Turkish economic collapse sparks coups causing cyclical political turmoil, damning democracy and killing thousands

Ankara 5/28 (Ali Aslan Kilic, Staff Writer 2019 Today Zaman http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-211320-101-the-economic-repercussions-of-may-27-2-osman-demir-may-27-stabbed-the-economy-in-the-back.html)

Professor Demir noted that the Turkish economy was in a state of complete downturn, due to external developments as well, during the 1970s, which he defined as lost years for political and economic stability. “A comparison of the five years before and after the coup tells us the sad story of the coup and its aftereffects. In the five years after the coup, the economy grew at a lower rate compared to the five years before it, unemployment rates rocketed and national income fell. Economic deterioration, in turn, disrupted the social equilibrium, creating internal conflicts, even leading to armed clashes, with bloodshed prevailing all over the country. Much blood was spilt on the streets during the internal conflicts of the ‘70s, and then came the coup of 1980. May 27 not only disrupted the balance but also gave rise to the misconception that a new coup may cure all the imbalances. Thus, it became the mother of all the subsequent military coups,” he said. No one can give a simple explanation of why May 27 was conducted, Demir said, and drew attention to the fact that the coup had not been started by the upper echelons of the military. Rather, some groups within the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), seeking to establish a tutelary regime, wanted to send an “I’ve-got-the-power” message by overthrowing the government on May 27, 1960. “This power ... evolved into a tradition, rearing its ugly head on March 12, (1971) Sept. 12, (1980) and so on. The post-modern coup of Feb. 28 (1997) followed the same tradition. This, naturally, prevents democracy from maturing sufficiently. How much confidence can you have in the markets in a country without a mature democracy? International investors will shy away from such countries, won’t they?” Demir indicated that investors cannot make long-term plans during periods when interim-regime governments are in power because they are characterized by closed structures and a lack of control over the people in charge. The traces of the coup are not easy to erase even after the end of military rule, he said. “It was hard to create confidence in people and the belief that new coups would not be conducted in the future. New coups happened before this confidence could emerge. All coups and planned coups have dealt a great blow to the country’s long-term development and economic growth,” he said.

Impact – Econ Good – Democracy (2/2)

B. Democracy key to human survival

Montague 98 (Peter Montague, co-director Environmental Research Foundation and publisher of Rachael’s Environment and Health News, 14 October 1998 <http://www.greenleft.org.au/1998/337/20135>)

The environmental movement is treading water and slowly drowning. There is abundant evidence that our efforts -- and they have been formidable, even heroic -- have largely failed. After 30 years of exceedingly hard work and tremendous sacrifice, we have failed to stem the tide of environmental deterioration**.** Make no mistake: our efforts have had a beneficial effect. Things would be much worse today if our work of the past 30 years had never occurred. However, the question is, Have our efforts been adequate? Have we succeeded? Have we even come close to stemming the tide of destruction? Has our vision been commensurate with the scale and scope of the problems we set out to solve? To those questions, if we are honest with ourselves, we must answer No. What, then, are we to do? This article is intended to provoke thought and debate, and certainly is not offered as the last word on anything. Openness. Open, democratic decision-making will be an essential component of any successful strategy. After the Berlin wall fell, we got a glimpse of what had happened to the environment and the people under the Soviet dictatorship. The Soviets had some of the world's strictest environmental laws on the books, but without the ability for citizens to participate in decisions, or blow the whistle on egregious violations, those laws meant nothing. For the same reason that science cannot find reliable answers without open peer review, bureaucracies (whether public or private) cannot achieve beneficial results without active citizen participation in decisions and strong protection for whistle-blowers. Errors remain uncorrected, narrow perspectives and selfish motives are rewarded, and the general welfare will not usually be promoted. The fundamental importance of democratic decision-making means that our strategies must not focus on legislative battles. Clearly, we must contend for the full power of government to be harnessed toward achieving our goals, but this is quite different from focusing our efforts on lobbying campaigns to convince legislators to do the right thing from time to time. Lobbying can mobilise people for the short term, but mobilising is not the same as organising. During the past 30 years, the environmental movement has had some notable successes mobilising people, but few successes building long-term organisations that people can live their lives around and within (the way many families in the '30s, '40s and '50s lived their lives around and within their unions' struggles). The focus of our strategies must be on building organisations that involve people and, in that process, finding new allies. The power to govern would naturally flow from those efforts. This question of democracy is not trivial. It is deep. And it deeply divides the environmental movement, or rather movements. Many members of the mainstream environmental movement tend to view ordinary people as the enemy (for example, they love to say, “We have met the enemy and he is us”.). They fundamentally don't trust people to make good decisions, so they prefer to leave ordinary people out of the equation. Instead, they scheme with lawyers and experts behind closed doors, then announce their “solution”. Then they lobby Congress in hopes that Congress will impose this latest “solution” on us all. Naturally, such people don't develop a big following, and their “solutions” -- even when Congress has been willing to impose them -- have often proven to be expensive, burdensome and ultimately unsuccessful. Experts. In the modern era, open democratic decision-making is essential to survival. Only by informing people, and trusting their decisions, can we survive as a human society. Our technologies are now too complex and too powerful to be left solely in the hands of a few experts. If they are allowed to make decisions behind closed doors, small groups of experts can make fatal errors. One thinks of the old Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) justifying above-ground nuclear weapons testing. In the early 1950s, their atomic fallout was showering the population with strontium-90, a highly radioactive element that masquerades as calcium when it is taken into the body. Once in the body, strontium-90 moves into the bones, where it irradiates the bone marrow, causing cancer. The AEC's best and brightest studied this problem in detail and argued in secret memos that the only way strontium-90 could get into humans would be through cattle grazing on contaminated grass. They calculated the strontium-90 intake of the cows, and the amount that would end up in the cows' bones. On that basis, the AEC reported to Congress in 1953, “The only potential hazard to human beings would be the ingestion of bone splinters which might be intermingled with muscle tissue in butchering and cutting of the meat. An insignificant amount would enter the body in this fashion.” Thus, they concluded, strontium-90 was not endangering people. The following year, Congress declassified many of the AEC's deliberations. As soon as these memos became public, scientists and citizens began asking, “What about the cows' milk?” The AEC scientists had no response. They had neglected to ask whether strontium-90, mimicking calcium, would contaminate cows' milk, which of course it did. Secrecy in government and corporate decision-making continues to threaten the well-being of everyone on the planet as new technologies are deployed at an accelerating pace after inadequate consideration of their effects. Open, democratic decision-making is no longer a luxury. In the modern world, it is a necessity for human survival.

Impact – Econ Good – Israel Relations

Economic prosperity is the only deterrent against deepening Israel- Turkish relations

Wrobel 6/1 (Sharon, Economist, The Jerusalem Post, Page 17, Lexis)

Local investment houses should suspend their investments and divest from Turkey in reaction to its condemnation of the IDF operation against the Gaza flotilla, Israeli investment firm Halman Aldubi said Monday. "Israeli investments in Turkey are likely to endanger the money of investors and savers in these times," Halman Aldubi chairman Roni Halman said. "Turkey is on a militant path aimed at strategically damaging Israel, and there is no reason for Israeli investment houses to help the Turkish economy." The Halman Aldubi investment committee on Monday approved a decision to liquidate all of the group's investments in Turkey and to put a freeze on any new investments in Turkey unless the situation changes. Halman Aldubi said other investment houses should join them in suspending all investments in Turkey or Turkish companies unless Turkey changes its policy against Israel. "The damage the consequences of the Gaza flotilla incidence could cause is likely to be very hard for Israel, its economy and the local capital market, and there is no reason for investment houses in Israel to stream money into the capital market in Turkey," Halman said. Uriel Lynn, president of the Federation of Israeli Chambers of Commerce (FICC), on Monday urged the business sector to act responsibly and not let political tensions between Israel and Turkey damage economic relations. He asked Rifat Hisarciklioglu, president of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey, to help preserve economic relations between the two countries. "Each side should call upon the business sector in its country to continue doing business with its neighboring country in order to maintain good trade relations between the countries," Lynn said.

Impact – Econ Good – NATO

Turkish economic collapse hurts U.S and NATO readiness.

Poulter and Brummer 1 (Sean and Alex, reporters for the Daily Mail, a London newspaper, Feb 23, 2001, [http://findarticles.com/p/news-articles/daily-mail-london-england-the/mi\_8002/is\_2001\_Feb\_23/turkey-turmoil-loan-rate-hits/ai\_n36346117/] AD: 6/23/10)JM

The West cannot stand by and watch Turkey's economy implode like that of Russia in 1998. The country contains some of America's most important strategic European air bases while its security and stability is seen as vital to the West. Turkey plays a pivotal role within the Nato alliance, providing bases for British and U.S. warplanes patrolling the northern No-Fly zone over Iraq.

Impact – Econ Good – Laundry List (1/3)

A. In the wake of Turkish economic collapse, the nation will cease to exist as we know it.

Brenner, Schlör, and Williams 94 (Michael, Wolfgang F., and Phil, all professors at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, U of Pittsburgh, [http://www.kas.de/db\_files/dokumente/7\_dokument\_dok\_pdf\_1003\_1.pdf] AD: 6/23/10)JM

Influence in Central Asia: Turkey's potential influence in Central Asia would be affected by economic collapse in two ways: First, Turkey would lose the ability to provide any aid or investment in the region. Trade would also decrease. Second, Turkey would lose its attraction as a development model for the newly independent countries in Central Asia. A failure of Turkey's economy might lead these countries to look for other paths towards economic development. Both of these effects will contribute to minimizing Turkey's influence in Central Asia. Thus, Turkey's strategic importance for both the United States and Germany will correspondingly diminish. Political stability: Economic collapse and the resulting policy measures by the Turkish government are likely to further strengthen Muslim fundamentalist groups in Turkey, and lead to general civil unrest, including politically motivated violence. Such unrest could divert government and military attention away from the Kurdish uprising in Eastern Turkey, thereby loosening government control over these areas. If the government shows itself to be unable to cope with these problems, it is highly likely that the military might once again assume power. Such a scenario could pose serious dilemmas both for Germany and the United States. On the one hand, human rights abuses, which usually come hand in hand with the imposition of military rule, will generate public and political pressure in Germany for sanctions against Turkey. The United States will also be concerned about human rights abuses, but there is likely to be less direct pressure for action against a military regime. At the same time, the specter of a fundamentalist regime in Turkey is of great strategic concern both for the United States and Germany. The United States, however, will be more able to act on this strategic interest than Germany. Thus, it is likely that increased political instability in Turkey will lead to major policy divergence between the United States and Germany. This divergence, however, will focus on Turkey itself and will be only indirectly related to the issue of the Central Asian successors to the Soviet Union. Economic disaster, setbacks in the campaign against the Kurdish insurgency, and the Muslim fundamentalist success in elections combine to bring the military back into politics. A coup attempt fails, however. Subsequent elections are marred by violence and result in a victory for fundamentalist groups. The new government suspends its membership in NATO and announces its active support for Azerbaijan against Armenia. - 126 - A scenario featuring political instability in Turkey includes a two-stage policy response from the United States and Germany. Policies aimed at reversing a process of destabilization would be at issue in the first stage. In the second stage, instability is perceived as "permanent," and both the U.S. and Germany would have accepted that Turkey has sunk into chaos. The distinction is important because it directly affects many of the strategic and economic benefits Turkey has for either Germany and the United States. For example, Turkey's role as NATO's bulwark at the Southern Flank is no longer credible if the country succumbs to civil war, or if a fundamentalist government comes into power. In such a case, damage limitation strategies will replace strategies that rely on Turkey as a strategic asset. However, in such a case Turkey would once again become an issue with respect to Central Asia: Muslim fundamentalist success in Turkey might serve as a catalyst for such political forces in the Central Asian Soviet successor states. Radical forces in Turkey might not be inhibited by international restraints from interfering in the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. A Turkey riveted by civil war will not be available as a trading partner or transit route for Central Asia and the Caucasus region. Countries in these regions might then orient themselves towards Iran in order to fulfill their economic needs. From a European security point of view, such a development would bring the fundamentalist threat closer to Europe's doorstep. Germany, which is already affected by Kurdish terrorism on its territory, will experience additional "spillover" due to the large number of Turkish residents.

Impact – Econ Good – Laundry List (2/3)

B. Status quo Turkey solves terrorism.

Baç 7 (Meltem Müftüler, Ph.D. in Political Science at Temple U, February 2007 [http://www.iai.it/pdf/Quaderni/Quaderni\_E\_08.pdf] AD: 6/23/10)JM

In answering these two related questions, one could focus on the following factors: in the European Union’s fight against terrorism, Turkey would be an important card and make Huntington’s clash of civilizations argument- Western civilisation versus the Islamic civilisation, void.17 An important question to pose here is that whether Turkey’s version of Islam will enable the EU to claim Western values and Islam are compatible. This is an appropriate question to pose because for all the Arab countries of the Middle East, Turkey is not perceived as fulfilling Islam’s main requirements. Given the fact that in the post 9/11 period, the main threat to European values and security comes from terrorism, which has fundamentalist Islamic origins, Turkey’s role might be essential. This is of course not a very straightforward issue, as Turkey could also bring new security risks because it has a Muslim population. However, the fact that Turkey has been a secular democracy and part of the European order for more than a century indicates that this is a small risk. In addition, “As a long-standing NATO member, Turkey has been a crucial part of Europe’s defences. It has been a beacon of good sense in a combustible bit of the world”.18 Turkey is, in response to the requirements of this change, transforming its military. “Instead of a large, heavy, and cumbersome army, Turkey is transforming its armed forces into a swift, mobile, flexible cadre with rapid deployment capabilities available for out of area operations”.19 Thus, Turkey’s military capabilities will increasingly adapt to the EU’s new strategic objectives and enhance the EU’s military operability.

C. Terrorism leads to extinction.

Sid-Ahmed 4 (Mohamed, political analyst for the 'Al-Ahram' newspaper, 26 August, [http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm] AD:6/23/10)JM

A nuclear attack by terrorists will be much more critical than Hiroshima and Nagazaki, even if -- and this is far from certain -- the weapons used are less harmful than those used then, Japan, at the time, with no knowledge of nuclear technology, had no choice but to capitulate. Today, the technology is a secret for nobody. So far, except for the two bombs dropped on Japan, nuclear weapons have been used only to threaten. Now we are at a stage where they can be detonated. This completely changes the rules of the game. We have reached a point where anticipatory measures can determine the course of events. Allegations of a terrorist connection can be used to justify anticipatory measures, including the invasion of a sovereign state like Iraq. As it turned out, these allegations, as well as the allegation that Saddam was harbouring WMD, proved to be unfounded. What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

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Impact – Econ Good – Laundry List (3/3)

D. Turkey solves proliferation and human trafficking.

Baç 7 (Meltem Müftüler, Ph.D. in Political Science at Temple U, February 2007 [http://www.iai.it/pdf/Quaderni/Quaderni\_E\_08.pdf] AD: 6/23/10)JM

Since its Association Agreement with the EC in 1963, Turkey’s relations with the EU have been problematic. In the last decade, as the EU began to enlarge towards the Central and Eastern European countries, Turkey’s ambivalent position has become clearer. This paper argued that within the ambivalent position, an important benefit that Turkey’s accession to the EU revolves around the EU’s security concerns. This is, to a large extent, independent of the EU’s security aspirations, whether the EU will continue on the hard road of further integration remains unclear, especially in the light of the referendums in France and the Netherlands for the Constitutional Treaty. What is clear is that the EU will need to take more responsibility for its own security specifically in the post 9/11 international environment. This is why Turkey’s role matters, both in terms of a more abstract level and in terms of concrete military capabilities. If one considers that the EU’s security concerns are mostly on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and trafficking of humans and drugs for the next century, than Turkey’s geographical location becomes critical in furthering security goals based on these concerns. As Ian Lesser notes, “Turkey is most directly affected by a key trend shaping Western security: the erosion of traditional distinctions between the European, Middle Eastern and Eurasian theatres….Turkey is at the center of this phenomenon and the country’s future role will be strongly influenced by it.”25 Thus, this paper argued that within the rational intergovernmentalist theoretical lenses, Turkey’s main potential utility for the EU would be on the EU’s 2nd pillar development. This, however, does not mean that the EU will have to accept Turkey as a member because of these concerns, just the opposite there is already a process well underway and this paper stresses the potential value of Turkey’s accession to the EU from a very narrow perspective, that of security.

Impact – Econ Good – EU Econ (1/2)

Turkey is key to EU’s economic viability – collapse devastates the union.

Ulgen 6 (Sinan, chairman of the Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, [http://www.bridge-mag.com/magazine/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=188&Itemid=74] AD: 6/23/10)JM

‘Will Turkish business remain enthusiastic about EU membership despite the disillusionment of political leaders and voters? Several factors suggest that business support is likely to remain strong, at least for now. First, Turkish businesses have invested a lot in their pro-EU policies, for example in the form of new representative offices in Brussels and numerous EU-related events and seminars. Second, economic and business links between the EU and Turkey continue to multiply. Since the creation of the customs union, Turkey’s economy has become considerably more open. Exports now account for 32 percent of GDP, a ratio that is higher than those of EU members Spain and Portugal. Over half of Turkey’s exports go to the EU (53 percent of the total), and the EU is the single biggest supplier of imports (43 percent of the total). EU countries are also by far the largest foreign investors in the Turkish economy, accounting for 58 percent of total foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows in 2005. This proportion rose to 91 percent in the first half of 2006. ‘There has been a string of multi-billion dollar acquisitions over the last couple of years, as outside investors have sought to establish a foothold in Turkey’s fast-growing market and take advantage of the business opportunities created by pre-accession reforms. For example, Citigroup bought a 20 percent stake in Akbank, Fortis (a Dutch-Belgian bank) took over Disbank, the UK’s Vodafone bought mobile operator Telsim, and Oger, a Saudi business group, acquired Turkish Telecom. The sale of Finansbank (a midsized Turkish bank) to the National Bank of Greece is particularly notable. Even a few years ago, a major Greek-Turkish merger would have been inconceivable, given the level of mistrust that used to prevail between Greece and Turkey. Growing trade and investment links have created a new dynamic that will persuade most Turkish businesses that EU accession is central to their interests and needs to continue.’

Europe is interconnected – crisis in one country sends shockwaves through the continent.

Strokes 3/17 (Bruce, international economics columnist for the National Journal, [http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2010/03/137\_62527.html] AD: 6/23/10)JM

The Greek crisis is a cautionary tale. In a global economy, financial earthquakes in one nation have the potential to destabilize international markets and wreck havoc with the foreign policy objectives of even super powers like the United States. In the future, the domestic budgetary problems of even small countries can expect to be subject to greater international scrutiny. And the budgetary problems of big economies, such as America, can no longer be considered to be purely a domestic, sovereign concern.

Impact – Econ Good – EU Econ (2/2)

A strong EU solves scenarios for extinction, specifically, the Russians.

Strokes 3/17 (Bruce, international economics columnist for the National Journal, [http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2010/03/137\_62527.html] AD: 6/23/10)JM

WASHINGTON ― To paraphrase the noted economist Woody Allen, Europe is at a crossroads as it confronts the Greek economic crisis. One path leads to utter hopelessness and despair, the other to total extinction. One can only hope that the Europeans have the wisdom to choose correctly. Since American financial institutions aided and abetted Greek budgetary profligacy and because the choices Europeans make and will make in the months ahead will directly affect American economic and foreign policy interests, Washington can ill afford to stand on the sidelines. The Greek crisis is a textbook example of the interconnectedness of the global economy and the foreign policy environment. For most of the last decade, the Greek economy grew faster than others in the euro area. Yet, the country's balance sheets worsened. By 2009 the annual government deficit equaled 13 percent of the economy and public debt was 107 percent of GDP. So, when the global recession hit, and the Greek economy contracted by 2 percent in 2009, international bond markets panicked, fearing that Athens was going to have trouble meeting its obligations. By mid-February the Greek government was paying three percentage points more to borrow money than the interest rate charged Germany, worsening the mismatch between Greek revenues and expenditures. Wall Street bears some of the blame for this mess. Goldman Sachs and possibly other American financial institutions reportedly helped Athens understate its true indebtedness through the creation of innovative financial instruments. "We are looking into a number of questions relating to Goldman Sachs and other companies and their arrangements with Greece," said U.S. Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke in recent Congressional testimony. But Washington has more self-interested concerns. Europe is America's largest export market. But, in part thanks to the Greek crisis, the euro has fallen in value by 8 percent against the dollar since November, 2009, making American products more expensive for Europeans. An extended period of weakness for the euro would undermine the Obama administration's ambitions to double U.S. exports. But it is the foreign policy implications of the Greek crisis that are keeping people awake at night in the White House. Washington needs Europe's help in Afghanistan and in dealing with Iran, China and Russia. But the growing preoccupation of governments in Berlin, London and Paris with staving off a financial meltdown and their populations' isolationist response to the crisis leave Europe with little time, political capital or cash to be spent on America's foreign policy priorities. The most immediate cost may be the lost opportunity to further defuse Greek-Turkish tensions, long an American goal for the region. The new Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou is the most pro-Western leader Greece has elected in decades. And he had hoped to improve relations with Turkey. But now his government will, at best, be consumed with the crisis and, at worst, could fall thanks to populist frustration with the belt-tightening that lies ahead. Europe's spreading financial troubles also leave it dangerously vulnerable to Russian meddling. Former U.S. Treasury secretary Henry Paulson alleged in his recent book ``On the Brink'' that Moscow dumped its Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bonds in 2008 in a bid to force a costly Washington bailout of those mortgage-finance firms. A similar attack on the European bond market, to demonstrate Russian influence in Europe's moment of vulnerability, can not be ruled out. A united Europe has also long been an American foreign policy priority. So any threat to the future of the euro and the cohesiveness of the European Union sets off alarm bells in Washington.

Impact – Econ Good – EU Accession (1/2)

Turkey won’t accede to the EU without a strong economy.

Sage 2 (Robert C., reporter for Helium news, “Allowing Turkey to be a part of the EU,” [http://www.www.helium.com/items/645890-allowing-turkey-to-be-a-part-of-the-eu] AD: 6/23/10)JM

Turkey's accession to the EU is virtually inevitable. It has the second largest army in NATO after the US and prides itself on its fiercely secular government, despite the country being predominantly Muslim. With a population of about 85 million, Turkey has a growing consumer market that European companies seek to penetrate. Nonetheless, there are several political issues that Turkey will need to settle before joining the E.U.

Poor economy kills EU accession.

Barysch and Hermann 7 (Katinka, chief economist, and Rainer, business correspondent, June 2007, [http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/essay\_turkey\_business\_22june07\_forweb.pdf] AD: 6/23/10)JM

Turkey’s current boom is all the more remarkable given its long history of economic underperf o rmance and instability. Periods of mediocre growth were interspersed with economic crises. After the most recent one, in 2001, the lira plummeted by 40 per cent, inflation shot up to 70 per cent and the budget deficit exceeded 15 per cent of GDP. From a West European perspective, the country looked poor, peripheral and volatile. Turkey’s economy was the biggest obstacle to its EU accession aspirations. West Europeans feared not only a massive influx of unskilled Turks seeking to escape poverty and unemployment at home. They also thought that Turkey’s vast, inefficient farm sector would overwhelm the EU’s limited budget. In short, Turkey’s economy looked like a threat or burden, not an opportunity. The post-2001 recovery has changed this perception, at least in the eyes of the West European business community.

Accession solves democracy and human rights violations.

Canan 7 (Fuat, “Main Costs and Benefits of Turkish Accession to the European Union,” April 2007, [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_7057/is\_2\_9/ai\_n28498815/pg\_3/?tag=content;col1] AD: 6/23/10)JM

Main argument put forward by pro-EU groups on this issue is that: Turkey's EU bid for membership ensures the democratization of the country and fully safeguards human rights for Turkish citizens. Therefore, a key goal should be to keep Turkey firmly on track for EU membership. Advocates of this view mostly claim that none of the recent political and economic reforms in Turkey would have been possible without the EU incentive. (14) (15) It is therefore crucial to keep this incentive and Turkey's European vocation alive. According to this discourse Turkey has inherited an authoritarian legacy from the military rulers that cannot easily be eliminated. Thus, urgent question facing Turkey is the establishment of a consolidated, sustainable democracy, underpinned by both liberalization and democratization. (16) They often argue that the overall aim should be to reform the country, with the EU providing the requisite formal leverage. (17) These groups often assert the idea that efforts to meet the Copenhagen criteria and accession process itself will contribute to Turkey becoming a more democratic and prosperous country. Ogutco, for example, finds the accession process itself a catalyst that will act as a spur to improvement, not only in terms of democracy and human rights, but also in respect to economy. (18) It is undeniable that the new period starting from 1999 in the mutual relations has produced greater and deeper changes in Turkey than did the preceding 40 years. Turkey's EU candidacy since 1999 has stimulated the Turkish political and legal reforms and intensified the Europeanization process in Turkey. Muftuler-Bac identifies the process in Turkey as Europeanization which accelerated since 1999 and which was mostly described as democratization. (19)

Impact – Econ Good – EU Accession (2/2)

Democracy stops extinction.

Diamond 95 (Larry, leading contemporary scholar in the field of democracy studies, [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/fr.htm] AD: 6/23/10)JM

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

Impact – Econ Good – U.S Economy

US economic collapse causes nuclear war

Cook, 7 [Richard C., Writer, consultant, and retired federal analyst in U.S. Treasury Dept.; “It’s Official: The Crash of the U.S. Economy has begun,” Global Research, June 14. Accessed: [http://www.globalresearch.ca/index/php?context=va&aid=5964](http://www.globalresearch.ca/index/php?context=va&aid=5964" \t "_blank)]

Times of economic crisis produce international tension and politicians tend to go to war rather than face the economic music . The classic example is the worldwide depression of the 1930s leading to World War II. Conditions in the coming years could be as bad as they were then. We could have a really big war if the U.S. decides once and for all to haul off and let China, or whomever, have it in the chops. If they don't want our dollars or our debt any more, how about a few nukes?

\*\*\*Aff Answers\*\*\*

NUQ – Econ Down – Structural Problems

Short term econ stats deceptive, systemic problems remain that plague Turkish econ

Ankara 6/20 (Ali Aslan Kilic, 2010, Today’s Zaman http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-213643-105-govt-pleased-by-falling-unemployment-rate-opposition-incredulous.html)

Deputy Prime Minister and Economy Minister Ali Babacan shared his prediction that the rate will continue to fall steadily to 10 percent during the summer season, in a meeting held the same day as TurkStat announced its “glad tidings” on unemployment. He was also bold enough to predict that while average unemployment figures continue to decrease in Turkey, they will rise in the EU in both 2010 and 2011. “The Turkish economy started its recovery earlier than everyone else, and this recuperation in the economy has brought a reduction in the unemployment rate. Employment rose by 1.59 million in Turkey in a single year, and there are no figures to match to this anywhere across Europe,” he asserted. Answering Sunday’s Zaman’s questions regarding the latest unemployment figures, Harun Öztürk, CHP İzmir deputy and a prominent voice shaping his party’s position on the economy, was skeptical of success. He claimed the drop was caused by seasonal factors and added, “Besides, looking at this year’s figures alone would be deceptive.” Still he didn’t hesitate to agree that there have been positive developments in the economy recently while also underlining that the sustainability of these figures would be manifest by fall.

NUQ – Econ Down – Efficiency

Turkish econ on the decline- cost control, efficiency

USSEC 9 (December 31, Filed April 1, 2010 United States Security and Exchange Commission,

EDGAR Online, Lexis )

As expected, the Turkish economy and domestic Turkish construction activity continued to contract in 2009. Implementation of strong cost-control measures and improved operating efficiencies helped partly to offset the downturn in domestic demand. Overall operating profit was lower.

NUQ – Econ Down – Investment, Confidence

Turkish econ permanently damned by 70’s coup- lack of capital investment, corruption and low confidence deters foreign investment

Ankara 5/28 (Ali Aslan Kilic, Staff Writer 2019 Today Zaman http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-211320-101-the-economic-repercussions-of-may-27-2-osman-demir-may-27-stabbed-the-economy-in-the-back.html)

Professor Demir asserted that the lack of capital accumulation is extremely detrimental to the economy, and the military coup of May 27 is a serious contender for being a major hindrance. Defining “confidence” as a key concept for a sustainable economy, Demir asked, “Is capital accumulation possible in a country that is worried about the military overthrowing the government at any moment?” Without accumulated capital, the economy cannot be competitive, he said, with this negative effect on an already feeble economy having repercussions in the future. “Under normal circumstances, small investors can use their profits to boost their capital and grow further. But if this process is obstructed, things cannot function as they should, and worse, if the banks are weakened by corrupt practices during these periods that lack transparency, is capital accumulation possible in such a country? How can we know what happens behind the scenes if the channels of communication are not as open as they are today? Capital accumulation is impossible in a non-transparent environment,” he said. The heaviest price paid with the process that was started by the May 27 coup was paid during the post-modern coup of Feb. 28, 1997. Demir indicated that the Turkish nation is still paying for the bad debts of the banks that went out of business during this coup. Demir reiterated that there were retired generals on the executive boards of these banks and argued that the general public’s concern about potential coups is well evidenced by the generals’ admission that they were invited by the banks to became board members. “There could be two explanations for this. Either the capital owners felt the need to maintain close or amicable relations with the power groups for survival, or they were guided by their ambitions for unfair profits. Can an economy function properly under such an atmosphere? As a consequence, many banks failed, with the nation paying the price. We are still paying it,” he said. Professor Demir added that international investors will not be inclined to invest in a country where local investors are reluctant to do the same. “If the country’s own investors prefer to invest in financial sectors abroad rather than investing in non-financial sectors in their own country, will international investors be eager to invest in that country?” he asked. Demir noted that economic, social and political relations are processes that complement each other and that unemployment inevitably emerges because employment opportunities cannot be created due to the lack of capital accumulation and appeal for international investors.

NUQ – Econ Down – Greece

Turkish econ experiencing the fallout from Greece crisis

Asian Pulse 5/9 (http://www.thefreelibrary.com/(ECO)+TURKISH+ECONOMY+MINISTER+SAYS+SEES+MINIMAL+FALLOUT+FROM+GREEK...-a0226011838)KLS

May 9, 2010 (TUR tur: see ibex. ) -- Turkish Economy Minister Ali Babacan on Saturday Saturday: see week; Sabbath.  said a debt crisis in Greece might have "indirect effects" on Turkey's economy, citing his country's "relatively isolated" position against the Euro zone. "An economic slowdown in the Euro zone may affect our exports as one might argue because the demand in the EU will go down. Our financial sector has no intricate ties with euro countries," Ali Babacan told reporters after a meeting in Istanbul. Babacan said Turkey's public finance system and its financial sector had become much safer but the country would "feel more or less if an economic storm breaks out." "The important thing is that Turkey retains its position better other countries, and everyone believes that it will," Babacan said.

NUQ – Econ Down – Euro

Turkish manufacturing taking a hit because of depreciation of the Euro

Turkish Weekly 5/31 (2010, http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/102544/euro-decline-triggers-losses-for-turkish-exporters.html) KLS

The sovereign debt crisis in Europe is not only harming nations such as Greece and Spain, but it is also hampering efforts to increase exports from Turkey as well. A top executive from a Turkish truck maker said the depreciation of the European currency is hurting vehicle exports. “Due to the decline of the euro, we are enduring a serious exchange rate loss. We are losing 40,000 Turkish Liras in every bus we sell,” said Mehmet Buldurgan, chief executive of Temsa Global, a Turkish truck maker. Speaking to the Anatolia news agency, Buldurgan said the global economic crisis had “collapsed” the EU market and that the decline of the euro had affected exporting manufacturers severely, causing many problems. Buldurgan said a decrease in demand as well as a fluctuation in exchange rates had caused a remarkable exchange rate loss. “The consequences are now unbearable,” he said. “A few months ago, the euro was at 2.16 Turkish Liras. A truck we manufactured then would be sold today at a euro/lira exchange rate of 1.92. Thus, we are losing 40,000 liras per bus.” Dangers of ‘hot money’ “There is a serious hot money flow toward Turkey, which affects the Turkish economy negatively,” he said. “Hot money enters the market very easily, but it is for certain that it will cause much damage when it leaves the country. If the entrance of hot money weren’t this easy, it wouldn’t have made the exchange rates decrease as much. Precautions should be taken by the Central Bank of Turkey,” Buldurgan said.

No Link – Turkey Resilient

Turkish economy resilient- credit rating

BBC 6/12 (2010,BBC Asian Monitoring, Lexis) KLS

Ankara, 12 January: Prime Minister [Recep Tayyip Erdogan](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9606512628&returnToId=20_T9606512658&csi=10962&A=0.6981542158153414&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A592%23&searchTerm=Recep%20Tayyip%20Erdogan%20&indexType=P" \t "_parent) said on Tuesday (12 January) that Turkey was included among 14 countries whose credit ratings have been increased during global economic crisis. The ruling Justice and Development Party Chairman Erdogan delivered a speech at his party's parliamentary group meeting. Erdogan said rise in credit rating of Turkish economy was an evidence of its resilience against economic crisis. Erdogan said Turkey was shown among countries which would record a great economic growth in 2010 and following years. "International rating agencies confirmed that Turkey will be among countries which will weather global economic easily," he added. Turkey has recently won upgrades from Fitch and Moody's, two international credit rating agencies.

Turkey has proven itself to be economic crisis-proof.

Paul 6/9 (Amanda, reporter for the TurkishPress.com, [http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=352709] AD: 6/21/10)JM

TODAY'S ZAMAN- While Turkey's European friends are having difficulty with a $1 trillion bailout package, Turkey is emerging from the crisis in pretty impressive shape. While the Turkish economy has not been immune to the negative consequences of this crisis, it has nevertheless showed considerable resilience, having managed to maintain its macroeconomic balance. As neighbor Greece continues to suffer from its economic meltdown, Turkey has weathered the financial crisis far better than many other countries, including a significant number of European Union member states. As a result Turkey has become a more integrated and bigger player in the global economy, with a strong emerging economy making it one of only a few countries with post-crisis potential. Therefore, it is not surprising that Turkey is boasting about this achievement at every opportunity, including last week when Turkey's dynamic and super-smart finance minister, Mehmet Simsek, was in Brussels. Indeed, after a number of meetings at the European Commission, he has come away 'feeling sorry' for the EU. Turkey has done incredibly well thanks to a sharp and visionary financial strategy. Ankara has learned from the financial catastrophes of the past. Indeed, Turkey is quite accustomed to financial crises and the recessions that usually follow them, with the recent global financial crisis being the fifth to hit the country in the last 30 years. However, Turkey was better prepared this time and managed to stay afloat as a result of its strong financial foundations, after making good progress in the financial sector in recent years with an increase of gross domestic product (GDP) from $230 billion in 2002 to $740 billion just before the crisis. Clearly the financial crisis rocked this growth, which led to a 4.7 percent decrease. But the last few quarters have shown a strong comeback, and Turkey is well on the road to recovery.

No Link – No Effect on Turkey Econ

Turkeys economy has stabilized and US aid has significantly decreased

Migdalovitz 8 (Carol, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 8/29/8, Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34642.pdf) JPG

Turkey’s geostrategic importance to the United States is symbolized by the Incirlik Air Base. Since the 1950's, with minor interruption, Turkish governments of all political persuasions have granted the United States forces permission to use the base under a bilateral defense cooperation agreement. In the past, the U.S. granted Turkey considerable foreign aid, tacitly in exchange for such access. In recent years as Turkey’s economy has grown, however, the United States has not provided it with much assistance. The following sections of this report describe Turkey’s policies on selected issues and, as appropriate, U.S. Administration and congressional views of Turkey in these contexts. The last section deals with Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base, which symbolizes the unwavering geostrategic importance of Turkey for the United States, despite bilateral differences on a growing range of subjects.

Link Turn – Investment

U.S military presence is bad for the economy – it stunts investment and causes inflation in Turkey.

Gabelnick 99(Tamar, member of the Federation of American Scientists, May 1, 1999 [http://www.fpif.org/reports/turkey\_arms\_and\_human\_rights] AD: 6/23/10)JM

U.S. arms sales and continued conflict in Turkey also damage Turkey’s economy and prospects for economic cooperation with the West. The 1998 CIA Factbook states that Turkey spends about $7 billion a year on the war with the PKK, which contributed to a 99% inflation rate for 1998 and a national debt equal to half the government’s revenue. War-related political and financial instability has discouraged foreign investment. A U.S.-backed plan would route a Caspian Sea oil pipeline through territory where the PKK operates, leaving it susceptible to rebel attacks. An end to the war and improvements in human rights are also necessary preconditions for Turkey’s entry into the European Union (EU), which the U.S. believes would draw Turkey closer to the West. Turkey’s ceaseless provocation of Greece, again using U.S. arms, is another barrier to EU entry.

Link Turn – Leverage Bad

Military presence entails leverage and that hurts Turkey’s economy

Turks Us 3 (Turks Us, Turkish news agency, March 13, 2003 [http://www.turks.us/article.php?story=20030313081501982] AD: 6/23/10)JM

ISTANBUL — The U.S. is exerting economic pressure to persuade Turkey's parliament to authorize the presence of U.S. combat troops for an Iraq war, and a leading U.S. credit rating service warned that Turkey's rating would suffer if it didn't go along. Turkish media on Wednesday termed the statement an ultimatum. As a result of the warning on Tuesday from Moody's Investors Service, the Turkish stock markets suffered losses in early trading Wednesday and by noon the market had not recovered. The Turkish lira also lost value against the U.S. dollar. On Tuesday, Moody's Turkish analyst Kristin Lindow told journalists that if parliament doesn't approve U.S. military cooperation soon, it would lose out on an aid package of about $30 billion in grants and loans. The economy would suffer as a result and Moody's would be obliged to cut Turkey's investment rating, he said. The Turkish daily Milliyet on Wednesday quoted Lindow as saying that "if the Turkish parliament waits it will be too late. I fear that if they wait more than about a week, the money involved in the ongoing negotiations will leave the table." Milliyet said Lindow's statement was "like an ultimatum." Turkey's population is overwhelmingly opposed to a war against Iraq and on March 1 parliament rejected the stationing of as many as 62,000 troops in Turkey for an expected Iraq invasion. Turkey's new government is expected to resubmit a troop authorization measure to parliament and it could be approved next week. U.S. officials have told Turkey they want approval by Monday, March 17, the date by which the U.S. had hoped it would receive U.N. authorization for military action against Iraq.

No Turkish political leverage post – The AKP failed.

Barkey 3 (Henri J., Cohen Professor of Inter- national relations at Lehigh University, 12 May, 2003 [http://www.eusec.org/barkey.htm] AD: 6/23/10)JM

One potential ramification of these developments and changes is the civilianization of the Turkish-American relationship. This, however, depends very much on the performance of the new AKP government and does not mean that Turkey's military significance within NATO will be diminished. The AKP administration came to power promising first and foremost to focus on improving Turkey's chances with Europe which, in turn, meant the furthering of the democratization process, improving the economy and dealing with Cyprus. Such a development-especially when compared with the Islamist Welfare Party's discourse after its first-place finish in 1995-was welcome news to Washington. Should the AKP succeed in pushing forward on these then the Turkish-American relationship would improve significantly. For Washington, Turkey's EU aspirations are important because they represent the shortest route to long-term stability based on a working democracy and economic prosperity. So far, however, the AKP government has allowed itself to be checkmated-temporarily albeit-on Cyprus by the hard liners in the country and has made little progress if any on the other issues. It has wasted its precious time in foreign and domestic policy. In short, with the disappearance of Saddam Hussein, Ankara lost an important part of its leverage in Washington. Nothing of the same import is out there to replace it; Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Iran are important but Turkey's influence and abilities are not as vital as with Saddam's Iraq. Of course, if the US's Iraq experiment turns foul and a pluralistic regime does not succeed in rooting itself in Baghdad, Turkey will once again loom large in the American imagination. For the time being, however, the reevaluation of Turkey's contribution to the US will open new opportunities in the relationship. Perhaps what the US hopes from this new government is that it tries to emulate O¨zal's approach.

No Internal Link – Turkey Not Key to World Econ

Turkish economy will never rank supreme- export base precludes

BBC 6/3 (2010, BBC Monitoring, Lexis) KLS

Referring to economic targets, [Prime Minister Erdogan](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.uhd.edu/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9606539803&returnToId=20_T9606584143&csi=10962&A=0.07757899791919043&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A592%23&searchTerm=Prime%20Minister%20Erdogan%20&indexType=P" \t "_parent) said: "Our target is to become one of the world's first ten economies in 2023. We have adopted an economic understanding based on exports. Our exports increased fourfold to 102bn dollars in the last 7.5 years. Turkish economy became the 17th biggest economy of the world in this process. Now, we aim at increasing our exports up to 500bn dollars by the year 2023. It is not a dream. It is not an uncatchable target."

No Impact – No Middle East Escalation

**War in the Middle East will never escalate to all-out war – conflicts remain relatively localized – five reasons**

Cook, Takeyh, and Maloney, 7 (Douglas Dillon Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Ray, Senior Fellow For Middle Eastern Studies at the CFR, Suzanne, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, June 28, , online: http://www.cfr.org/publication/13702/why\_the\_iraq\_war\_wont\_engulf\_the\_mideast.html,) KLS

Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

No Impact – No Terrorism

**A. Middle East instability prevents a rising wave of terrorism from hitting the West - without a war to keep jihadists busy**

**Cetron and Davies 7** (president of Forecasting International Ltd, Owen, former senior editor at Omni magazine and a freelance writer specializing in science, technology, and the future 2007, The Futurist, http://www.versaterm.com/about\_vtm/advisory/53TrendsNowShapingTheFuture.pdf) KLS

To date, most commentators have simply assumed that a generalized war in the Middle East would be a bad thing, and today's concerns have limited their analyses to policy implications for the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Certainly, wholesale carnage is never to be welcomed, and the risk of unrestrained slaughter must be factored into any decision the United States makes about the land it chose to occupy. Yet, **the United States will not remain in Iraq forever, forced comparisons with Korea notwithstanding, and its departure is likely to leave a power vacuum in that country**. Under the circumstances, there are questions that need to be answered in some detail. **What would a regional war in the Middle East imply for the United States and its allies? And what should the West do to influence the situation to its advantage, now and in the future?** Thus far, **many possibilities have been overlooked**. For example, **the Iraq war has inspired, recruited, trained, and battle-hardened a new generation of future terrorists who, when freed from Iraq, are likely to turn their attention to the United States and its allies, especially in the U.K. and France. Having a Middle Eastern war to keep them occupied may be the West's only protection against a jihad that could make terrorism to date seem relatively tame.**

No Impact – No Terrorism

**B. Middle East war inevitable, immediate stays central solving terrorism**

**Cetron and Davies 7** (president of Forecasting International Ltd, Owen, former senior editor at Omni magazine and a freelance writer specializing in science, technology, and the future 2007, The Futurist, http://www.versaterm.com/about\_vtm/advisory/53TrendsNowShapingTheFuture.pdf) KLS

In the long run, such a division conceivably could be the beginning of broader change. In the end, we might finally see the birth of an Islam comparable to modern Christianity and Judaism, one that is able to coexist with other religions and with secular authority and one with which the West would find it much easier to coexist in turn. We are not forecasting that a Muslim reformation would emerge from a Middle Eastern war. Such a change of heart in Islam is a long shot at best, and it is at least equally likely that war would spread fundamentalist extremism throughout the Muslim world. Yet a general war in the Middle East is the only possible trigger for a Muslim reformation we have ever recognized. The grimness of this potential war cannot be overestimated. Millions of people in that region would die needlessly. Many hundreds of millions elsewhere would face a period of economic chaos that could, if mismanaged, dwarf the Great Depression of the 1930s.

No Impact – No China War

A. Middle East war would cut off Iranian oil from China, which would set back their global power projection for years

Cetron and Davies 7 (president of Forecasting International Ltd, Owen, former senior editor at Omni magazine and a freelance writer specializing in science, technology, and the future 2007, The Futurist, http://www.versaterm.com/about\_vtm/advisory/53TrendsNowShapingTheFuture.pdf) KLS

**China** is well supplied with oil from Africa, which it has on long-term contracts. However, it **is even more dependent on Iranian oi**l, which it would be unlikely to receive. **This deficit would lead Beijing to develop its own oil shale, but its reserves are modest. Its hope of supplying its energy needs will continue to depend on the massive development of biomass, a process that is planned but has hardly begun. China is likely to find its economic growth, and its global power, reduced for many years.**

B. That prevents large-scale US-China war

Mearsheimer 5 (John J. distinguished service professor of political science at the University of Chicago http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16538) KLS

China cannot rise peacefully, and if it continues its dramatic economic growth over the next few decades, the United State and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war. Most of China’s neighbors, including India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, and Vietnam will likely join the united state to contain China’s power.

Impact Turn – Assistance Bad

The US-Turkish alliance formed around monetary exchange is used to suppress the Kurds in both Turkey and Iraq

Vann 2 (Bill, , 9/17/2, International Committee of the Fourth International, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2002/sep2002/iraq-s17.shtml) JPG

While Turkey will be dragooned into any US war on Iraq—its air bases at Diyarbakir and Incirlik are already being used in US-British air raids on the Arab country—the unstable government of Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit has expressed grave concerns about an invasion’s impact on his country. In an attempt to allay the concerns of the Turkish rulers, Bush inserted in his speech a carefully worded reference to US support for a “united Iraq.” The phrase was designed to reassure countries in the region, especially Turkey, that Washington would suppress any move by Iraq’s Kurdish minority to realize its long-standing aim of creating a separate state in Iraq’s north and would back Ankara’s military campaign against Turkey’s own Kurds. At least 30,000 Kurds have already died in the 17-year counterinsurgency campaign in eastern Turkey. Turkish military forces have long conducted cross-border raids into Iraq “in pursuit” of guerrillas affiliated to the PKK Kurdish separatist movement. Money is also likely to change hands in assuring Turkey’s full cooperation in a US invasion. The regime in Ankara is anxious that Washington assure the favorable disbursement of a $16 billion credit already approved by the International Monetary Fund, and is seeking forgiveness on $5 billion in debt to the US for weapons contracts.

Impact Turn – Assistance Bad

US arms exchange with Turkey exports jobs and hurts our national security interests

Gabelnick et. al. 99 (Tamar, *Director of the Federation of American Scientists, Published on Federation of American Scientists, October 1999, http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/reports/turkeyrep.htm#hr) JPG*

Coproduction arrangements with Turkey raise a number of economic and security questions. On the economic front, coproduction shifts jobs to Turkey from arms plants in the United States. Lockheed Martin now assembles or produces components of its F-16 fighter in 11 countries, with full assembly lines in South Korea and Turkey that rival its main U.S. line - in Fort Worth, Texas - in size. The assembly line in Turkey has been used not only to produce the planes purchased by Ankara, but also as the primary production site for an order of 40 F-16s that went to Egypt in the wake of the Persian Gulf War. The Egyptian deal - in which aircraft paid for by $1.6 billion in U.S. military aid were produced in Turkey - is a worst case example of how coproduction can result in the export of U.S. jobs. To add insult to injury, the Turkish facility has also been used to train South Korean workers in production techniques for use on the F-16 line in Seoul - only after unionized workers at the U.S. F-16 plant in Fort Worth, Texas refused to train their South Korean counterparts to do their jobs.[(21)](http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/reports/turkeyrep.htm#N_21_) Similarly, FMC-Nurol's interest in exporting U.S.-designed M-113s and military trucks could cut into business that might otherwise go to U.S. firms - including FMC's own U.S. facilities.

On the security front, the massive transfer of arms production techniques has implications both for arms proliferation and for the ability of the United States to exert leverage over Turkey's use of U.S.-supplied systems. As Turkish firms master larger and larger shares of the production techniques needed to build U.S. systems, it will be harder for the U.S. government to influence Turkish behavior by cutting off spare parts. In addition, the involvement of Turkish firms in the production of sensitive systems based on U.S. technology - from ammunition production in conjunction with the U.S. firm General Defense to the participation of the Turkish firms Aselsan and Rokestan in a European consortium building the Stinger shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles - could eventually lead to a situation in which Turkey might become yet another significant source of light weaponry to regions of active conflict.

Impact Turn – Turkish Spending Bad

A. Turkish arms purchases are directly used to perform genocide on Kurds

Gabelnick et. al. 99 (Tamar, *Director of the Federation of American Scientists, Published on Federation of American Scientists, October 1999, http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/reports/turkeyrep.htm#hr) JPG*

Turkey's arms buying plan has multiple rationales, ranging from assisting in peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in Bosnia and Kosovo to deterring regional rivals like Iran, Syria, and Greece to building a capability to project force eastward into the Central Asian states of the former Soviet Union. But the most costly items on Ankara's shopping list have direct applications in Turkey's war against the Kurds.

Earlier this year the Turkish government speeded up its $560 million deal for Sikorsky Black Hawk helicopters with the explicit intention of putting them to work ferrying troops to and from the front lines of the war with the PKK in the southeast. In order to expedite the deal, Turkish authorities agreed to buy the aircraft directly, without demanding offsets or coproduction in Turkey. As of late July of 1999, 10 helicopters out of the 50 ordered had already been delivered. Given past experience, there is a high probability that Turkey's planned fleet of 145 modern attack helicopters - for which the Boeing Apache and the Bell-Textron King Cobra are both strong competitors - would also be used to attack Kurdish villages, refugee camps, and mountain strongholds of the PKK or suspected PKK sympathizers. And Human Rights Watch has already documented the use of older generation U.S. tanks in the destruction of Kurdish villages, so there is a danger that some of the 1,000 new tanks sought by the Turkish army - for which the General Dynamics M-1A2 is a strong contender - could be used for similar purposes. A late 1998 sale of 140 U.S.-built armored personnel carriers and crowd control vehicles to the Turkish police has obvious applications in repressing popular dissent, both in Turkey as a whole and in the volatile southeastern region.

In announcing a 30-year weapons purchasing program all at once, Turkish authorities clearly have more than purely military objectives in mind. They want to get the world's arms manufacturers salivating over what appears to be a huge long-term market, in the hopes that they will pressure their governments to cast aside concerns about Turkey's human rights record and turn their efforts towards helping their home country's weapons makers close the deal on one or more major weapons sales to Ankara. This strategy has clearly worked with respect to U.S. arms makers, who have pressured Congress and the Clinton administration to clear the way for U.S. firms to win controversial contracts like the sale of 140 armored vehicles to the Turkish police and compete for deals like the $4 billion tender for 145 attack helicopters. And General Dynamics, which has been looking to foreign sales of its M-1 tank to Greece and Turkey to resuscitate a domestic tank production line which has been subsisting on upgrade funds from the Army, will no doubt put its lobbying muscle to bear in favor of substantial new U.S. government subsidies if it becomes a finalist in the competition for 1,000 new main battle tanks for Turkey. But advocates of arms sales to Turkey who base their case on economic and pork barrel arguments can expect to face stiff opposition from arms control and human rights organizations and their allies in Congress.

The most controversial recent U.S. arms sale to Turkey was the late 1998 decision to grant a license to the Michigan-based AV Technology division of General Dynamics to sell 140 armored vehicles to the Turkish anti-terror and anti-riot police. According to a description of the deal by Dana Priest of the Washington Post, the deal includes "11-ton, armored Patrollers, equipped with water cannons, ramming arms, and front gun ports for urban anti-riot police, and Dragoons, an armored personnel carrier that would transport anti-terror police." Because of the dismal human rights records of Turkey's anti-terror and anti-riot police and the intention to finance the deal using funds from the U.S. Export-Import Bank, the deal triggered a review under the "Leahy Law" - Section 570 of the 1997 Foreign Operations Appropriations Law sponsored by Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT) - which states that "no funds from the Foreign Operations Appropriations, including financing from the Export-Import Bank, can be used to provide equipment to foreign security units if credible evidence of gross human rights violations by specific units exists."[(50)](http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/reports/turkeyrep.htm#N_50_)

B. Genocide leads to social death which is the precondition for killing

Card 3 (Claudia, Ph.D in Philosophy from Harvard, Hypatia Vol. 18 No. 1, Winter 2003 pp. 63-79, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hyp/summary/v018/18.1card02.html) JPG

Specific to genocide is the harm inflicted on its victims’ social vitality. It is not just that one’s group membership is the occasion for harms that are defin- able independently of one’s identity as a member of the group. When a group with its own cultural identity is destroyed, its survivors lose their cultural heri- tage and may even lose their intergenerational connections. To use Orlando Patterson’s terminology, in that event, they may become “socially dead” and their descendants “natally alienated,” no longer able to pass along and build upon the traditions, cultural developments (including languages), and projects of earlier generations (1982, 5–9). The harm of social death is not necessar- ily less extreme than that of physical death. Social death can even aggravate physical death by making it indecent, removing all respectful and caring ritual, social connections, and social contexts that are capable of making dying bear- able and even of making one’s death meaningful. In my view, the special evil of genocide lies in its infliction of not just physical death (when it does that) but social death, producing a consequent meaninglessness of one’s life and even of its termination. This view, however, is controversial.