Turkey Negative

Turkey Negative 1

-----Turkey Proliferation DA----- 3

Turkey Proliferation DA 1NC 4

Uniqueness 5

Uniqueness 6

Link 7

Link 8

Link 9

Link 10

Impact 11

2NC Impact Scenario-Russia 12

2NC Impact Scenario-Other Countries Proliferate 13

2NC Impact Scenario-Other Countries Proliferation 14

-----Relations DA----- 15

Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Good) 16

Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Good) 17

Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Good) 18

Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Good) 19

Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Good) 20

Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Bad) 21

Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Bad) 22

Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Bad) 23

Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Bad) 24

Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Bad) 25

Uniqueness (Russia-Turkey Relations Good) 26

Uniqueness (Russia-Turkey Relations Good) 27

Uniqueness (Russia-Turkey Relations Good) 28

Link (Hurts Relations) 29

Link (Hurts Relations) 30

Link (Hurts Relations) 31

Link (Helps Relations) 32

Link (Helps Relations) 33

Link (Helps Relations) 34

Link (Hurts Turkey-US, Helps Turkey-Russo) 35

Link (Hurts Turkey-US, Helps Turkey-Russo) 36

Internal Link-Trades off with Turkey/Russo Relations 37

Internal Link (Independent Turkey Bad) 38

US-Turkey Relations Good (Terrorism) 39

US-Turkey Relations Good Ext (Terrorism) 40

US-Turkey Relations Good (Afghanistan Stability) 41

US-Turkey Relations Good (East-West Dialogue) 1/2 42

US-Turkey Relations Good (East-West Dialogue) 2/2 43

US-Turkey Relations Good (Middle East Stability) 1/2 44

US-Turkey Relations Good (Middle East Stability) 2/2 45

US-Turkey Relations Good Ext (Middle East) 46

US-Turkey Relations Good (Caucasus) 47

Turkey-Russo Relations Good (Caucus Stability) 48

Turkey-Russo Relations Good (Pipelines) 49

Turkey-Russo Relations Good (Pipelines Extension) 50

-----Politics----- 51

Link-Plan Unpopular 52

Link-Plan Unpopular 53

Link-Plan=Win 54

Link-Hurts Political Capital 55

-----Topicality----- 56

T: Military Presence 57

-----Framework----- 58

Institutional Focus Good 59

-----A2: Nuclear Secrecy Bad Advantage----- 60

Nuclear Secrecy Good 61

Nuclear Secrecy Good 62

-----A2: Deterrence Bad Advantage----- 63

Deterrence is Moral 64

Deterrence is Moral 65

AT: US Nukes Not Key to Deterrence 66

AT: US Nukes Not Key to Deterrence 67

TNW’s in Europe K2 US and Euro Defense 68

TNWs Would Be Replaced 69

TNWs Would Be Replaced 70

TNWs Would Be Replaced 71

TNWs Would Be Replaced 72

-----A2: Iran Advantage----- 73

Turkey Doesn’t Fear Iran 74

Turkey Doesn’t Fear Iran 75

TNWs Deter Iran/Russia 76

TNWs deter Iran/Russia 77

TNWs Deter Iran 78

-----A2: Russia Advantage----- 79

Turkey Doesn’t Fear Russia 80

Turkey Doesn’t Fear Russia 81

Turkey Doesn’t Fear Russia 82

Removal = Russian Aggression 83

TNWs Deter Russia 84

-----A2: NATO Advantage----- 85

Removal = End of NATO 86

NATO Good-Democracy 87

NATO Good-Regional Stability 88

NATO Good-Peacekeeping Operations 89

NATO Good-Caucasus Stability 90

Caucasus Spillover (Extension) 91

NATO Good-Security 92

NATO Good-Terrorism 93

NATO Good-Terrorism (Extension) 94

NATO Good-Sea Power 95

NATO Good-Prevents Wars 96

NATO Good-Soft Power 97

NATO Good-Proliferation 98

NATO Won’t Collapse 99

NATO Won’t Collapse 100

-----A2: Democracy Advantage----- 101

Turkey Won’t Democratize 102

Turkey Won’t Democratize 103

Turkey Won’t Democratize 104

-----A2: EU Advantage----- 106

Turkey Wont Accede to EU 107

Turkey Won’t Accede to EU 108

Turkey Won’t Accede EU-30 Years 109

Turkey in EU Bad: Racism (1/2) 110

Turkey in EU Bad: Racism (2/2) 111

Turkey in EU Bad: War Scenario 112

Turkey In EU Bad: War Scenario (Extension) 113

Turkey EU Bad: Economy (1/2) 114

Turkey EU Bad: Economy (2/2) 115

Economy I/L Magnifier 116

Economy Link: Competitiveness 117

Turkey in EU Bad-Splits Europe 118

A2: European Economy Advantage 119

European Economy Resilient 120

European Economy Resilient 121

EU Economy Resilient 122

European Economy Not Key to Global Economy 123

-----A2: Iraq Advantage----- 124

A2: Iraq Stability: A2🡪withdrawal now 125

A2: Iraq Stability: Kuwait Solves 126

-----A2: Terrorism Advantage----- 127

No Risk of Nuclear Terrorism 128

A2: Terrorism: U.S. Intel fails 129

A2: Terrorism: Israel Fills In 130

A2: Terrorism: Troops Key to Stabilize 131

-----A2: Relations Advantage----- 132

A2: US/Turkey Relations: High 133

A2: US/Turkey Relations: High 134

A2: US/Turkey Relations: High 135

A2: US/Turkey Relations—SQ Sanctions Solve 136

A2: US/Turkey Relations—SQ Sanctions Solve 137

A2: US/Turkey Relations—SQ Sanctions Solve 138

A2: US/Turkey Relations: Iran No Nukes 139

A2: US/Turkey Relations: Iran No Nukes 140

A2: US/Turkey Relations: Iran No Nukes 142

A2: US/Turkey Relations: Iran No Nukes 143

A2: US/Turkey Relations: Good Relations Don’t Solve 144

A2: US/Turkey Relations: Good Relations Don’t Solve 145

A2: US/Turkey Relations: Good Relations Don’t Solve 146

A2: US/Turkey Relations: Iran Has The Bomb Now 147

A2: US/Turkey Relations: Arms Control Turn 148

A2: US/Turkey Relations: Opacity Turn 149

A2: US/Turkey Relations: Opacity Turn 150

US Turkey Relations Resilient 151

US Turkey Relations Resilient 152

US Turkey Relations Resilient 153

Weaponitis 154

Link 155

Link 156

Link 157

Link 158

Link 159

Link 160

Link 161

Cap K Link 162

Alternative 163

Alternative 164

A2: Perm 165

A2: Perm 166

Aff Answers to Turkey Prolif DA 167

Non-Unique 168

Turn 169

A2: Treaties CP 170

A2: Topicality-Military Presence 172

A2: Russian Relations Tradeoff 173

-----Turkey Proliferation DA-----

Turkey Proliferation DA 1NC

Turkey sees the presence of TNWs as an incentive to not acquire nukes

Matishak 9 (Martin, reporter at Global Security Newswire, “U.S. Could Pull Back Europe-Based Nukes, State Department Official Says,” Global Security Newswire, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw\_20090805\_4929.php) MJ

The military value of the Europe-based tactical weapons has "dropped precipitously since the days of the Cold War," Einhorn said. However, they continue play a role in the "cohesion" of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, he added without elaborating. In addition, **"at least one" ally country believes the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on it soil reduces the incentive for it to acquire its own nuclear weapons capability**, Einhorn told the audience. Kristensen told Global Security Newswire yesterday in a telephone interview that **Einhorn was referring to Turkey. In its final** [**report**](http://www.usip.org/files/file/strat_posture_report_adv_copy.pdf) **to lawmakers in May the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States said that the requirements of "extended deterrence in Europe are evolving, given the changing relationship with Russia" and the perception of some allies that they are "keenly vulnerable to Russian military coercion." Nations located near Russia believe that U.S. nonstrategic forces in Europe remain necessary to prevent the Kremlin from using its nuclear arsenal as a means of coercion against them**, according to the report. **It warns that the United States should not abandon "strategic equivalency with Russia" and should not cede to Moscow "a posture of superiority in the name of de-emphasizing nuclear weapons in U.S. military strategy."**

If nuclear weapons were removed from Turkey, they would proliferate

Khaleej Times 10 (“NATO debates future of U.S. nuclear arms in Europe,” Khaleej Times Online, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle08.asp?xfile=data/international/2010/April/international\_April1246.xml&section=international)

**NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that while the 28-member Western security alliance must debate the matter, he personally thought U.S. nuclear weapons must stay in Europe**. “**I do believe that the presence of American nuclear weapons in Europe is an essential part of a credible deterrent**,” he told reporters. Clinton to explain principles A senior U.S. official said Clinton would lay out some guiding principles during the dinner meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Tallinn, the Estonian capital. Washington and Rasmussen have stressed the need for unity among the 28 NATO states and while no agreement is expected in Tallinn, the alliance aims to set out its nuclear stance in a new strategic vision due to be approved at a summit in November. Analysts say tactical nuclear arms have little military rationale in a post-Cold War world, especially since readiness had been so reduced that they would take months to deploy. But **a key concern is that any move to remove NATO nuclear weapons could prompt Turkey to develop its own deterrent, given its worries about nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.**

A nuclear Turkey would cause nuclear confrontations

Deliso 5 (Christopher, American journalist and travel writer, “Plame, Pakistan, a Nuclear Turkey, and the Neocons, http://www.antiwar.com/deliso/?articleid=8091) MJ

An even more frightening prospect is a nuclear Turkey. The country has been militarily subsidized even more than Pakistan; mass military aid and technology transfer were justified first of all by Turkey's status as a key Cold War ally and thereafter as a bulwark of secular Islam, holding the wall against Syria, Iran, and Iraq. However, the very same American leaders who have been arming Turkey and allowing, in some cases even profiting from, nuclear smuggling there have also ruined the delicate balance of regional power with the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and brought the world far closer to nuclear confrontations. In the former case, they put huge strain on the "pro-Western" Musharraf government, strengthening the hand of fundamentalist Islamists in both the mosque and in the armed forces. Musharraf has survived multiple assassination attempts, but there is no guarantee that he will enjoy lucky escapes forever. If he goes, what then? Any coup by a populist, fundamentalist-based leader would instantly put both Pakistan and India on high alert, taking us back to previous near-apocalyptic nuclear showdowns. Mired in numerous other bloody commitments of its own making, there's no certainty that the U.S. could finesse the situation as it did in 1990.

Uniqueness

Turkey feels comfortable in the status quo because of the protection of nuclear weapons

Bell 9 (Alexandra, Project Manager at the Ploughshares Fund, “Turkey’s Nuclear Crossroads,” http//www.good.is/post/turkeys-nuclear-crossroads/) MJ

At the moment, **Turkey seems alright with the status quo. It does not have a nuclear adversary**, **and** in addition to being covered by NATO’s strategic security umbrella, **it also houses an estimated 50 to 90 tactical nuclear weapons**. Turkish officials were cagey about discussing these weapons. A former Air Force general, following what seemed to be the official line, denied that there were nuclear weapons in Turkey, saying they were removed at the end of the Cold War. This differed from the other officials I met, whose wink-wink references basically confirmed the presence of the nukes. **They** **also hinted that the weapons would be critically important if a certain neighbor got the bomb. Polling I had seen previously indicated ample public support in Turkey for giving up these weapons, but my trip there made it clear that polling, papers, and news reports are no substitute for actually going to a country and meeting with people. Most Turks I met would answer disarmament questions in entirely different ways**, depending on whether or not Iran was referenced. Removing tactical nuclear weapons from Turkey will be difficult, but not impossible. In order to move towards a world free of nuclear weapons, U.S. policy makers have to start thinking about how things are connected**. Countries like Turkey rely on nuclear weapons for political and security reasons. To feel comfortable without nukes, these countries must be convinced that their neighbors will not acquire them**. That means efforts to reduce nuclear stockpiles—including tactical nukes—and efforts to stop the creation of new nuclear programs must happen in concert.

No proliferation in Turkey because of US nuclear umbrella

Barkey 9 (Henri, international relations professor-Leigh University, “Turkey's Perspectives on Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament,” Carnegie Middle East Center, http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=23975&lang=en) MJ

**Turkey lacks a coherently articulated national policy vis-à-vis nuclear weapons. This is partly due to the fact that as a member of NATO it is a direct beneficiary of the US nuclear umbrella and because the United States maintains a number of nuclear weapons at the Incirlik Air Force base in southern Turkey. The absence of such a policy is also the result of the unclear demarcation of lines of authority between civilian and military leaders on issues of national defense.** While this may not have been a problem in the past, civil-military relations have been strained under the current ruling government, led by the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Until recently, when it came to setting national priorities, the military establishment’s role could best be described as primus inter pares. The AKP’s preoccupation with expanding Turkey’s role in the region and its push to reform Turkish state structures, including the military’s prerogatives, are radically challenging the military’s control of the national security agenda.

Turkey is not proliferating because of US tactical nuclear weapons

Harvey 6/24 (Henri, professor at Lehigh University and visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Global Insider: Turkey's Nuclear Ambitions, World Politics Review, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/5881/global-insider-turkeys-nuclear-ambitions) MJ

Technically, it should not matter to the proliferation debates. **Turkey is unique, in that it does not need nuclear weapons because it enjoys the NATO and American nuclear umbrella that includes some 90 tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Turkey proper.** A Turkish nuclear energy program would, on the other hand, help reduce dependence on imported gas and oil. But even here, one nuclear plant would not make much of a difference, given the growing Turkish economy and the corresponding increase in its energy needs.

Uniqueness

Turkey thinks the security relationship is important

Larrabee 10 (F. Stephen, National Security Council, Troubled partnership : U.S.–Turkish relations in an era of global geopolitical change, Rand, pg 4)

**The security relationship remains important for Turkey as well. Turkey lives in a tough and volatile neighborhood and has disputes with several neighbors** (i.e., Syria, Iraq, Greece, and Armenia). **It also is within range of missiles fired from Iran and Iraq. Thus, Turkey views its security relationship with the United States as an important insurance policy against its growing exposure to risks coming from the Middle East**. Although U.S. involvement in the Middle East also entails risks for Turkey, on balance**, Turkey benefits from the U.S. military presence in adjacent regions. The United States is also Turkey’s most important arms supplier.** Despite recent efforts at diversification, Turkey still conducts roughly 80 percent of its defense-industrial activity with the United States. Large numbers of Turkish officers have been trained in the United States.3 This has allowed the Turkish armed forces to develop close ties to their American counterparts and obtain a deeper knowledge of U.S. military operational doctrine and thinking.

Link

Nuclear withdrawal leads countries like Turkey to proliferation

Laird 9 (Burgess, national security analyst, “A Guide to the Challenges Facing President Obama's Nuclear Abolition Agenda,” Carnegie Council, http://www.cceia.org/resources/articles\_papers\_reports/0025.html) MJ

Many disarmament advocates have argued for a withdrawal of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe for quite some time. The argument is that these weapons no longer have any operational utility as they were deployed to offset the sizeable advantage enjoyed by Soviet conventional forces—a quantitative advantage that disappeared with the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union—and that their number, size and geographic dispersal makes both the U.S. and Russian weapons difficult and costly to control and secure. In short, they are proliferation nightmares. Critics point out that such arguments neglect the views of our allies, who see these weapons as concrete symbols of U.S. extended deterrence guarantees. And to be sure, the high value of these weapons has been frequently reaffirmed, most emphatically, in NATO's 1999 "Strategic Concept." The Strategic Concept asserts that "The Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe…The Alliance's conventional forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence. **Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve the peace." Many U.S. allies, the argument proceeds, especially the newer member states of NATO as well as Turkey and Japan would interpret a withdrawal of the non-strategic nuclear weapons as a significant weakening of U.S. security commitments and, in response, some allies might well undertake nuclear weapons programs of their own to ensure their security.**

If the United States removes the tactical nuclear weapons, Turkey would proliferate.

Global Security Newswire 10 (“U.S. Urged to Remove Tactical Nukes in Europe,” NTI, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw\_20100422\_3466.php) MJ

“**Nuclear deterrence based in Europe must remain , as it preserves close trans-Atlantic ties and allows for greater flexibility in deterrence**," Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet said as the NATO summit began. While not specifically touching on nuclear weapons, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reaffirmed Washington's commitment to providing a strong defense to its partners. "Let me be clear," Clinton said to journalists in Tallinn, "our commitment to Estonia and our other allies is a bedrock principle of the United States and we will never waver from it." NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen suggested in an interview he believed the tactical arms should remain in Europe. "If we look at today's world, then there is no alternative to nuclear arms in NATO's deterrent capability," Rasmussen said. "**My personal opinion is that the stationing of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe is part of deterrence to be taken seriously**," he said (Agence France-Presse/Raw Story, April 22). NATO hopes to finalize its nuclear position at a meeting next November in Portugal, Reuters reported. On Monday, Rasmussen said, "No [nuclear] decision will be taken in Tallinn." "But I do think the principles of NATO's nuclear discussion are already clear: first that no ally will take unilateral decisions and second that as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will need a nuclear deterrent." Belgian Foreign Ministry spokesman Patrick Deboeck said the alliance must be in full agreement on whatever is decided. "We think it is important to maintain the credibility of nuclear deterrence, but we also see the possibility to go further" on nuclear arms reductions, he said. "NATO has a role to play on tactical nuclear weapons." The Center for European Reform's Tomas Valasek said that some NATO members in Central Europe could see the removal of the U.S. gravity bombs as "a unilateral step taken by their big Western allies that puts Russia's concerns ahead of theirs ... so it will be a divisive question." **There are also concerns that such a pullout could lead Turkey to seek its own nuclear weapons as a hedge against potential nuclear arms held by other Middle Eastern states** (David Brunnstrom, Reuters/Washington Post)

Link

Tactical Nuclear Weapons removal causes Allied prolif—nuclear umbrella

Spring and McNamara 10 (Baker, F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy, Sally, Senior Policy Analyst in European Affairs, “President Obama Must Not Remove Nuclear Weapons from Europe,” Heritage Foundation) MJ

T**he vast majority of America’s allies in Europe have not sought to join the club of nuclear weapons powers, largely because they enjoy the comfort of the U.S.’s nuclear umbrella**. However, **America’s unilateral nuclear disarmament may prompt some nations**—particularly Poland in light of Moscow’s war gaming and Warsaw’s general sense of a transatlantic distancing—**to seek alternate security insurance. Indeed, Turkey and countless other non-nuclear powers under the NATO umbrella could further be tempted to fill the security vacuum created by America’s unilateral disarmament by seeking their own weapons or forming alliances with other nuclear powers. The removal of American tactical nuclear weapons could also encourage a hostile nation to seek similar weapons if it perceives America’s indifference to the transatlantic alliance. Russia and rogue states such as Iran and Syria could be emboldened by America’s retreat from its security commitments to Europe**. Russia has already proved itself to be an authoritarian power, seeking to regain influence over its former satellites. In short, the ramifications of this measure are unpredictable and likely to be contrary to President Obama’s goal of nuclear disarmament.

The removal of US TNWs would lead to corrosive internal debate in NATO and nuclear Turkey

Podvig 10 (Pavel, researcher at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, “What to do about tactical nuclear weapons,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/pavel-podvig/what-to-do-about-tactical-nuclear-weapons) MJ

However, change is in the air. **While the presence of U.S. nonstrategic weapons in Europe** (based in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey specifically**) has always had nongovernmental critics, now some of these individual governments are raising questions as well**. Germany was the first to break ranks; its officials began speaking favorably about the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe several years ago. And last November, Berlin officially committed itself to the removal of U.S. weapons from German territory. Similarly, in early February, the Polish and Swedish foreign ministers [urged](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/02/opinion/02iht-edbildt.html) both the United States and Russia to reduce the number of tactical weapons in Europe. Most recently, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway [announced](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hKwgmbMz92w-InsAzjQo0EX-NS0w) that they will demand that the United States remove the weapons from Europe. Nonetheless, **there are still influential players who want the weapons to remain in Europe. Their key argument is that if the U.S. nuclear weapons are removed, NATO members would no longer trust Washington's commitment to protecting Europe. Such a move, the argument goes, will lead to all kinds of negative consequences--from triggering "a corrosive internal debate" within NATO to Turkey deciding to pursue its own nuclear weapon capability.**

Link

Turkey is afraid of Iran-wants to keep US TNWs

Sokolski 7(Henry, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, “What Nuclear Challenges Might the EU Meet?,” http://www.npolicy.org/files/20070616-Sokolski-Talk-AixEnProvence-Conference.pdf) MJ

Many officials within NATO are inclined to draw down the number of US tactical nuclear weapons Europe. If such reductions were occasioned by Russia’s reduction or elimination of the number of such weapons it has deployed, by a NATO commitment to prepare for the possible redeployment such weapons in time of war or crisis, and by deployment of European missile defenses against the emerging Iranian missile threat, then the optimal number of forward-deployed US tactical systems might be zero. One country that might disagree with this view, though, is Turkey. It is trying to figure out how to live with a nuclear weapons armed neighbor, Iran; is disappointed by its inability to be fully integrated into the EU; and is toying with getting its own nuclear capabilities. Whether or not Turkey does choose to go its own way and acquire a nuclear weapons-option of its own will depend on several factors, including Ankara’s relations with Washington, Brussels, and Tehran. To a very significant degree, though, it also will depend on whether or not the EU Members States are serious about letting Turkey join the EU. The dimmer these prospects look, the greater is the likelihood of that Turkey will chose to hedge its political, economic, and security bets by seeking a nuclear weapons-option of its own. This poses a difficult choice for the EU. Many key members are opposed to letting Turkey join the EU. There are arguments to favor this position. Yet, if Turkey should conclude that its interests are best served by pursuing such a nuclear weapons-option, it is almost certain to fortify the conviction of Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia to do the same. This will result in the building up a nuclear powder keg on Europe’s doorstep and significantly increase the prospect for nuclear terrorism and war.

Turkey is being threatened by Iran

Kalyoncu 5 (Mehmet, international relations analyst, “[How to Handle Turkey’s Legitimate Nuclear Aspirations (Turkey with Nuclear Weapons?,](http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1527797/posts) http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1527797/posts) MJ

**It is more obvious than ever that as long as it is headed by a man who does not hesitate to publicly pronounce his aspirations to wipe another sovereign country off the map, nuclear Iran will continue to be a major threat to Turkey. Even if Iran does not directly target Turkey, its nuclear confrontation with third parties equally threatens Turkey’s national security because the effects of nuclear warfare are not limited geographically as in conventional warfare. In this case, Iran’s confrontation with ever-vigilant Israel is a perfect threat for Turkey.**  Iran is rapidly rolling back from former President Khatami’s tolerant discourse, towards the revolutionary discourse of the 1980’s. On October 26, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared the annihilation of the Zionist regime as one of his government’s priorities during his speech at the “World without Zionism” conference. Referring to Iran’s revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini, Mr. Ahmedinejad insisted “As the Imam said; Israel must be wiped off the map.”[i] One could reasonably attribute such an extreme statement to Mr. Ahmadinejad’s political inexperience and ignorance of diplomacy. Nonetheless, it represents a major shift for Iran from Mr. Khatami’s moderation back to the revolutionary doctrine. More importantly, Mr. Ahmedinejad is not exhibiting an attitude original to him and his government. As he puts it in his statements, he justifies his anti-Israeli attitude by referring to earlier statements of Iran’s revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini. That makes the case even more critical and threatening. Both Tel-Aviv and Washington have responded in a relatively calmer mood to Mr. Ahmedinejad’s radical statements. Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Mark Regev, likening Mr. Ahmedinejad to another extremist and Hamas leader Mahmoud Zahar, noted “[t]he problem with these extremists is that they followed through on their violent declarations with violent actions.”[ii] Similarly, White House press secretary Scott McClellan added “[I]t confirms what we have been saying about the regime in Iran. It underscores the concerns we have about Iran’s nuclear intentions.”[iii] Although calm, these responses might set the stage for another legitimized “freedom operation” next to Turkey’s border. **Even if Turkey is not likely to be a direct target of any nuclear attack, it may still want to have nuclear weapons to deter attacks between its neighbors that would indirectly and yet extensively affect Turkey, especially indirect effects such as trans-border conflicts and forced migrations. A nuclear arms race reciprocated by other regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iraq would only increase Turkey’s legitimate desire to obtain nuclear weapons**. However, just as was the case in the 1980s and 1990s, Turkey is highly likely to face strong international opposition against its nuclear aspirations, most notably from the US and the EU.

Link

**Turkey Fears Nuclear Iran-would lead to regional catastrophe**

Bell 9 (Alexandra, Project Manager at the Ploughshares Fund, “Turkey’s Nuclear Crossroads,” http://www.good.is/post/turkeys-nuclear-crossroads/) MJ

I recently returned from a trip to Turkey, coordinated by the Truman National Security Project, an institute that recruits, trains, and positions a new generation of Americans to lead on national security**. In discussions with government officials, civil servants, retired military personnel, academics, and businessmen, two things became clear: First, that it is difficult to be positioned at a geographical and societal crossroads, and second, that you are stuck with your neighbors. The Turks look around them and see conflicts and threats in most directions.** I was interested in what the Turks saw when they looked towards Tehran. Specifically, I asked about the threat, perceived or real, from the Iranian nuclear program. The answers varied sharply**.  Some dismissed the threat, noting that the Turks and the Persians had not been in conflict for 500 years. Others shuddered at the mention of a nuclear Iran. But regardless of the official line that Iran is an important trading partner and a regional ally, I think the Turks would not abide a nuclear Iran. In fact, when asked directly about the response to Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, a high-ranking official from the Foreign Ministry said that Turkey would follow suit—immediately. I took this as a confirmation of the oft-repeated theory that if Iran attains a nuclear weapon, surrounding nations will acquire them too, resulting in a “cascade of proliferation.” Throwing multiple nuclear arsenals into a region with many long-standing tensions, disputed borders, and conflicting ethno-religious sects is a recipe for catastrophe.**

Impact

Nuclear Turkey would offset power in Europe and the Middle East

Deliso 5 (Christopher, American journalist and travel writer, “Plame, Pakistan, a Nuclear Turkey, and the Neocons, http://www.antiwar.com/deliso/?articleid=8091) MJ

**Proud Turkey has always wanted to be seen as an important country. Were it to declare itself a nuclear one, it would become, for a time at least, the most important country in the world. The entire balance of power in Europe and the Middle East would be radically altered overnight, and the overall side results would not at all be positive for Turkey or anyone else – except of course for those cashing in on illicit nuclear sales**. Nevertheless, the country is probably technologically capable by now. A new question that has thus arisen, as articulated recently by Turkish scholar [Mehmet Kalyoncu on Balkanalysis.com](http://www.balkanalysis.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=593), is the following: "If the U.S. and the EU do not approve of Turkey having nuclear weapons, what do they have to offer Turkey instead?"

Turkey proliferation creates regional instability

AHMP 99 (American Hellenic Media Project, “Community Urged to Protest Against A Nuclear Turkey,” http://www.ahmp.org/Nuketurk.html) MJ

**The media has been characteristically silent on an issue that could radically transform the geopolitical landscape of Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia: Turkey's program to construct nuclear reactors on its southern coastline**. American, Canadian and European companies are bidding for the right to sell sensitive nuclear reactor technology to Turkey. In 1981, Israeli fighter jets bombed Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor on the grounds that the reactor constituted the key to developing an Iraqi nuclear weapons program, and thus a threat to regional stability. **Given Turkey's increasingly expansionist agenda towards EU and NATO-member Greece, its belligerent posture towards neighbors Armenia and Syria, and its self-image as a regional superpower -- which led to a coup attempt against Azerbaijan's government in 1995 -- a far larger threat to regional stability would be posed by a nuclear Turkey. The development of a Turkish nuclear capability will arguably constitute the most significant geostrategic crisis to face Hellenism, Armenia, and the development of democracy in the Balkans and southwestern Asia in the coming century**. As reported by Economist correspondent Marcia Kurop in The Christian Science Monitor ("Accommodating Turkey", 7/31/98), Turkey's nuclear aspirations are an axial reason underlying the Turkish state's dogged determination to make its occupation of Cyprus permanent: "**the Turks - in contrast to what the United States tries to portray as a local, Balkan-type conflict - openly admit their strategic argument for wanting an independent north**: shipping to Turkey's southern coast; the development of nuclear facilities in southern Turkey; oil shipping ports to be based in Ceyhan; fortified bases at Adana and Iskanderun; military relations with Israel. All are part of their need for an independent north."

Nuclear Turkey will create nuclear arms race in Balkans and Mideast

Spyropoulos 99 (P.D., Executive Director of American Hellenic Media Project, Boston Globe, p. http://www.ahmp.org/bosglob8.html 2/18/10)

**Many are now convinced that a nuclear Turkey, already among the most highly militarized states in the world, will be the surest way to usher in a nuclear arms race in the Balkans and Mideast, two of the world's most volatile regions, and both at Europe's doorstep. Turkey's military adventurism in the Balkans, Cyprus, Central Asia and the Middle East should further underscore the fact that placing nuclear power into the hands of governments that have not yet developed the maturity to harness it can soon develop into the greatest global security threat of the coming century.**

2NC Impact Scenario-Russia

If US pulls their weapons, Russia will fill in

Global Security Newswire 10 (“U.S. Urged to Remove Tactical Nukes in Europe,” NTI, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw\_20100422\_3466.php) MJ

**Calls to pull the U.S. weapons from Europe could lead certain NATO states to seek corresponding action by Russia, which is believed to hold a significantly larger stockpile of tactical nuclear bombs within its borders**. A high-level U.S. official said it was important for NATO to come to a single position on the issue. "Our principle, and most important guidepost for moving into this discussion is that we don't want to divide the alliance on this issue," the official said. **Some NATO members from Eastern Europe, such as Estonia, favor keeping the weapons in Europe as a safeguard against Russia, which has moved to modernize its own nuclear forces and has placed them at the center of its broader deterrence strategy** (see GSN, Feb. 17).

2NC Impact Scenario-Other Countries Proliferate

If US removes TNWs, Turkey with face a direct threat from Iranian missiles

Warren and Kelleher 9 (Scott, Director of General Citizen, Helen, Professor at University of Maryland, “Getting to Zero Starts Here: Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009\_10/Kelleher) MJ

The principal issues with the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons are political and conceptual, rather than straightforwardly military, with the single but critical exception of the risk of terrorist seizure. **The notion of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, with tactical weapons serving as a real or potential down payment on a security commitment, particularly in Europe, still has significant traction within the Obama administration**. Key factions in the Pentagon and perhaps in the Department of State argue that the United States must still provide allies substantial security support, especially with Iran and North Korea deeply engaged in nuclear programs. **This is the case despite the indifference of many NATO allies toward technical weapons or, in some cases, direct demands for elimination. Some European countries, especially elites in the newer central and eastern European member states, attach a high symbolic importance to the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on European soil as evidence of U.S. security guarantees. Turkey also is thought to be particularly concerned about any withdrawal because it faces a more direct threat from Iranian missiles, although it is now included in the new U.S. plan for a European missile defense system.**

Nuclear weapons are critical to protect Turkey from neighbors with the bomb

Bell 9 (Alexandra, Project Manager at the Ploughshares Fund, “Turkey’s Nuclear Crossroads,” http://www.good.is/post/turkeys-nuclear-crossroads/) MJ

At the moment, **Turkey seems alright with the status qu**o. It does not have a nuclear adversary, and in addition to being covered by NATO’s strategic security umbrella**, it also houses an estimated 50 to 90 tactical nuclear weapons.** Turkish officials were cagey about discussing these weapons. A former Air Force general, following what seemed to be the official line, denied that there were nuclear weapons in Turkey, saying they were removed at the end of the Cold War. This differed from the other officials I met, whose wink-wink references basically confirmed the presence of the nukes. They also hinted that **the weapons would be critically important if a certain neighbor got the bomb. Polling I had seen previously indicated ample public support in Turkey for giving up these weapons, but my trip there made it clear that polling, papers, and news reports are no substitute for actually going to a country and meeting with people. Most Turks I met would answer disarmament questions in entirely different ways, depending on whether or not Iran was referenced**.

2NC Impact Scenario-Other Countries Proliferation

US presence key to defend against Middle East threats

Kirisci 98 (Kemal, Department of Political Science Boğaziçi University, MERICA, TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES: AMBIVALENT ALLIES, 2(4)) MJ

Turkey's full backing for U.S. efforts in the Kuwait crisis and the building of close links with Israel in the 1990s marked a sharp change in this policy. When Iraq seized Kuwait, following thinly veiled threats from Saddam Hussein directed against Turkey, the Turkish government supported UN sanctions and allied military operations against Iraq. While that decision at the time engendered considerable differences and criticism within Turkey it signalled a U.S.-Turkish convergence of opinion in the Middle East. President Turgut Ozal also actively sought to participate in the Madrid peace process and had already advocated the idea of building water pipelines from Turkey across the Middle East as a project to help promote peace in the area. **Although Turkey was not invited to the Madrid talks it did later take, with U.S. support and urging, an active part in the multilateral talks' working groups. This also coincided with a period when Turkey began to develop relations with Israel**, especially after the September 1993 Israel-PLO agreement. Since then this relationship has expanded considerably and clearly receives active U.S. support, including U.S. participation in the first naval exercise between Israel and Turkey in January 1998. **The United States did object**, though, **to certain aspects of Israeli-Turkish military cooperation particularly in the area of anti-missile technology. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East is another common concern to both Turkey and the United States. Turkish defense strategy is based on deterrence, including its NATO membership and air force strike capability. But during the Kuwait crisis, U.S. and NATO anti-missile batteries had to be deployed in southeastern Turkey to defend against potential Iraqi missile attacks. Clearly, the absence of Turkish anti- missile capability makes Turkey vulnerable to its three Middle Eastern neighbors amply equipped with weapons of mass destructio**n. The Turkish military is paying growing attention to this threat and countering it is an important part of Israel-Turkish military cooperation. In contrast, U**.S. strategy has focused mostly on preventing proliferation by pressuring exporters--Russia, China and North Korea--not to supply these countries**. In Iraq's case, the sanctions regime succeeded in destroying stockpiles where possible.

-----Relations DA-----

Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Good)

U.S.-Turkey relations haven’t deteriorated- working through the flotilla and Iran disagreements

Rozen 10 (Laura, masters in politics-harvard, CSM correspondent, Politico, June 21, Obama’s Turkey Bind, http://www.politico.com/blogs/laurarozen/0610/Obamas\_Turkey\_dilemma\_.html?showall)BAF

But in a region where the U.S. is stretched thin and short of even semireliable allies, the Obama administration is keeping its public criticism of Turkey muted and trying to move forward. The Obama administration “is in the worst of all worlds,” Eric Edelman, former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, told POLITICO. “The fundamental problem, I believe, which hasn’t been addressed, is that at this stage, the Turks believe we need them more than they need us. But they need us for a lot of things, too.” President Barack Obama and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan will both attend the G-20 meeting in Canada later this week. But U.S. officials were still vague about whether the two will meet on the sidelines, saying no meeting had been firmed up. Meanwhile, officials suggested that the Obama administration might try to use the quiet visit of Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak to Washington this week as an opportunity “to try to patch things up,” if possible, between Israel and Turkey, which have had strong defense ties. Turkey’s highly regarded envoy to Washington, Namik Tan, could be a constructive intermediary for Washington but may have limited room for maneuver given the government he serves. A veteran diplomat who served as Turkey’s ambassador to Israel from 2007 to 2009, Tan is a colleague and friend to many senior officials in Israel’s Foreign Ministry. In an interview with POLITICO, Tan described being on the phone with Israel’s ambassador to Washington, Michael Oren, late last month to arrange a meeting between Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that was supposed to take place in Washington on June 1. A few hours after they set up the meeting, and as Davutoglu was sitting on the tarmac in Brazil waiting for his flight to the United States, Israeli commandos intercepted the Gaza aid flotilla, in an operation in which eight Turks and one Turkish-American were killed. .... But Tan insisted there has been no breach in the U.S.-Turkey relationship in the wake of either the flotilla episode or Turkey’s vote against the Iran sanctions resolution. ... Tan said Turkey shares the United States’ concern about the prospect that Iran could get a nuclear weapon. But he said Turkey’s vote against the Iran sanctions resolution will allow Turkey to remain an intermediary with Iran and therefore enable the U.S. and the international community “to keep the door open to” Iran’s returning to the negotiating table. ... “We don’t doubt Turkey’s sincerity in trying to find a diplomatic way forward and a genuine way to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons,” a senior administration official told POLITICO. “And they assert that what they were doing is consistent with our objectives.”

Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Good)

US-Turkey relations stable: opposing ideas doesn’t mean relations have collapsed

Katcher 6/3/10 (Ben, Policy Analyst, American Strategy Program, Are the U.S. and Turkey Still Allies?, Washington Note, <http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2010/06/conceptualizing>) BAF

Fellow Steven Cook, writing in Foreign Policy, suggests that the Flotilla incident is the latest evidence that dreams of a "model partnership" between the United States and Turkey are mere fantasy. Cook suggests conceiving of Turkey as something closer to a "strategic competitor" with interests that sometimes converge but often diverge from those of Washington, particularly in the Middle East. Cook says: The Obama administration has yet to grapple with the ways the structural changes in the international system have affected U.S.-Turkey relations. All the talk about strategic cooperation, model partnership, and strategic importance cannot mask the fundamental shift at hand. The stark reality is that while Turkey and the United States are not enemies in the Middle East, they are fast becoming competitors. Whereas the United States seeks to remain the predominant power in the region and, as such, wants to maintain a political order that makes it easier for Washington to achieve its goals, Turkey clearly sees things differently. The Turks are willing to bend the regional rules of the game to serve Ankara's own interests. If the resulting policies serve U.S. goals at the same time, good. If not, so be it... Given the mythology that surrounds the relationship, the divergence between Washington and Ankara has proved difficult to accept. Once policymakers recognize what is really happening, Washington and Ankara can get on with the job of managing the decline in ties with the least possible damage. Obama's goal should be to develop relations with Turkey along the same lines the United States has with Brazil or Thailand or Malaysia. Those relations are strong in some areas, but fall short of strategic alliances. "Frenemy" might be too harsh a term for such an arrangement, but surely "model partnership" is a vast overstatement. It's time to recognize reality. I agree with much of Cook's analysis. He is certainly correct that Turkey and the United States are on opposing sides in the Israel-Palestine issue. The United States remains steadfastly committed to Israel, while Turkey under Prime Minister Erdogan has clearly distanced itself from the Jewish state and embraced the Palestinian cause. I also can see how disagreements between Washington and Ankara over Syria are likely to widen in the event of another conflict along Israel's northern border. On the other hand, there are areas of significant cooperation including, most significantly, in Iraq. Ankara's influence there is widely considered constructive. On Iran, yes there are differences between the Turkish and American positions, particularly in light of the recent uranium fuel-swap agreement. But Turkey can be forgiven for seeking to chart its own path given that U.S. policy toward Iran has failed for decades. I think Turkey is sincere that it does not want Iran to have a nuclear weapon and time will tell whether there is, in fact, less distance between the Turkish and American positions than may appear at the moment.

Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Good)

US Turkey relations fine- have their differences but so far not dividing

Ghattas 6/13/10 (Kim, American University of Beirut BBC correspondent, BBC, Are regional issues splitting US and Turkey, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/us_and_canada/10305519.stm>) BAF

In an interview with the BBC, US State Department official Phil Gordon said Washington was "disappointed that (Turkey) didn't stand with the United States as a longstanding Nato ally". The assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia said he did not doubt that Turkey was sincere in wanting to work with the international community to prevent Iran from pursuing a nuclear programme. Turkey voting against UN sanctions on Iran - 9 June 2010 Turkey voted against a US-backed resolution on tougher sanctions on Iran But he added Turkey clearly had different views about the sanctions resolution. Despite the disappointment, US officials have tried to sound sanguine about the disagreements with Turkey. "Turkey and the United States have never been without their differences, and we have some important differences now, but we also have a lot in common that we're working together on," said Mr Gordon. Foreign policy evolving However, the tension raised questions in Washington about whether the US is losing Turkey as an ally. While the relationship may be changing, so far no one either here or in Turkey is worried about a breakdown. But everybody is closely watching Turkey's evolving foreign policy. Defence Secretary Robert Gates made comments in London that suggested Turkey was turning away from the West. While he did not quite state it as an established fact, he did make clear why he thought Ankara could be going in that direction. "I personally think that if there is anything to the notion that Turkey is, if you will, moving eastward," said Mr Gates, "it is, in my view, in no small part because it was pushed, and pushed by some in Europe refusing to give Turkey the kind of organic link to the West that Turkey sought." If this is the view in Washington, then it is likely the Obama administration will be careful not to act in a way that could further push Turkey towards the Arab and Islamic world. The US also needs Turkey in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Turkey extending ties Turkey has also rejected the notion that it is looking more East with such a vehemence it seems to suggest it is worried about sending the wrong signals to the West. Continue reading the main story Nuh Yilmaz Seta (Turkish think-tank) Turkey is simply trying to "diversify its relations," says Nuh Yilmaz, the Washington DC director of the Turkish political think-tank Seta. It is pursuing ties with countries with which it had limited or bad contact before, he said. Turkey's vote at the UN was not about embracing Iran even if that was the impression it left. "We had no choice but to vote like this," said Mr Yilmaz. "Not because Iran is right, but because we had to stand by the deal that we reached with Iran, together with Brazil."

Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Good)

U.S.-Turkey relationships increasing- already communicating “axis shift” problems

TÜRKÖNE 6/19/10 (MÜMTAZ’ER, Gazi University Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Today’s Zaman, Business group sees communication gap between US, Turkey, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-213563-100-business-group-sees-communication-gap-between-us-turkey.html) BAF

Ankara and Washington need to be more careful in conducting a healthy dialogue that does not allow for misunderstanding or a lack of communication, Ümit Boyner, the president of the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (TÜSİAD), stated after talks with senior US officials in Washington, including US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, on Thursday. “I believe dialogue should continue in a way that does not allow for misunderstandings between parties and it should be normalized; that is to say, there is a need to avoid a sharp and accusatory discourse, one which could harm diplomatic relations and sensitivities,” Boyner was quoted as saying by the Anatolia news agency while speaking at a press conference held at the TÜSİAD office in Washington. In addition to a 40-minute meeting with Clinton, a TÜSİAD delegation led by Boyner also had talks on Thursday with Philip Gordon, assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, and US experts on Turkey. Gordon met on Wednesday with a delegation from the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) led by Adana deputy Ömer Çelik, the AK Party’s chairperson for external affairs. But the AK Party delegation did not meet with Clinton. Çelik, speaking to private NTV television late on Thursday, said his delegation had not requested a meeting with Clinton, responding to media speculation that the lack of contact with the US secretary of state was a sign of tension between the Turkish and US governments. Talk of Turkey’s “axis shift” away from the West is highly popular in the US capital, Boyner said in response to a question, Anatolia reported. She, however, noted that this issue was not clearly discussed during the meeting with Clinton. The agenda of this meeting was widely occupied by Turkey’s vote against a US-backed UN Security Council resolution for tougher sanctions on Iran, adopted on June 9, as well as the deadly May 31 raid by Israeli naval forces that led to the deaths of nine people on an aid flotilla in the eastern Mediterranean. According to Boyner, a letter sent by US President Barack Obama to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was interpreted differently by Turkish and US officials. The letter came ahead of a uranium swap that was jointly brokered by Turkey and Brazil and that Iran agreed to on May 17 prior to a US resolution seeking further sanctions against Iran. “I can openly say that it is not possible to say we are living through a very good period in regards to Turkish-American relations. There are concerns. However, we also got the impression that there are serious misunderstandings and communication problems,” Boyner said of the talks in Washington.

Turkey-U.S. relations good- Turkish East and West ties good

TÜRKÖNE 6/12/10 (MÜMTAZ’ER, Gazi University Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Today’s Zaman, Is Turkey weaning itself off the us? <http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-212874-109-centeris-turkey-weaning-itself-off-the-us-bribyi-brmumtazerturkonecenter.html>) BAF

The nuclear swap deal signed by and between Turkey, Brazil and Iran, the Gaza crisis and the ensuing no-vote on the sanctions package on Iran at the United Nations Security Council have refueled the debate over whether Turkey is shifting direction away from the US. This question is familiar to observers of Turkey, who can answer immediately. Turkey is not distancing itself from the US. There are no major changes in Turkey’s foreign policy. Turkey is not experiencing any deviation in its relations with the Western world in general and with the US in particular. What it is doing is actually pursuing an active foreign policy in its region by complying with its alliance with the West. It closely monitors the balances in the region and makes finely tuned interventions. In the first instance, it is not very likely that Turkey will change its axis because there is no alternative to the current axis. As a strategic ally of the US, Turkey is becoming more influential and powerful in its immediate region. There are visible contributions of Turkey’s growing influence and power over policies concerning the region. With Obama’s election, the US has started to recover its damaged image in the Muslim world. And the policies Turkey is pursuing make this rising image of the US more visible. The enhanced reputation of Turkey in the region implies more security for Israel. It will be more difficult for the Muslim world to show hostility towards Israel at the expense of offending a Turkey that has good relations with Israel. Despite the crisis in Gaza, Turkey’s position vis-a-vis and its value for Israel have not changed. On a global scale the question “Is Turkey distancing itself from the US?” is all the more meaningless. However, this question is particularly important for the domestic political players who seek to gain an advantage over the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party). Indeed, the different answers to this question have different effects on internal political balances.

**Uniqueness (**US-Turkey **Relations Good)**

Relations high

Hamiliton 10 (Lee, Dir. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars dir. of the Center on Congress at Indiana University, Indiana Star, Staying friends with Turkey, June 28, http://www.indystar.com/article/20100628/OPINION12/6280305/1002/OPINION/Staying-friends-with-Turkey)BAF

On his first presidential trip abroad in April 2009, Barack Obama, addressing the Turkish parliament, said: "Turkey and the United States must stand together -- and work together -- to overcome the challenges of our time." But a few weeks ago Turkey, in a U.N. Security Council vote, opposed a sanctions resolution against Iran, one of the Obama administration's top foreign-policy priorities. The no vote, in addition to the fallout from the deaths of eight Turks and an American at the hands of Israeli commandos aboard the Gaza-bound Mava Marmara, has many raising questions about the U.S.-Turkey relationship and the direction of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey has been a staunch NATO ally since 1952, fields its second largest military, and is the alliance's sole Muslim member-state. It has nearly 2,000 noncombat troops serving in Afghanistan. Bases along its southern border with Iraq are a crucial transit point for the American military, and it has played an important role in maintaining stability in the region. The U.S.-Turkey relationship is not in freefall. Turkey is an emerging power of 90 million people in transition. The economy will grow at close to 7 percent this year, and Turkey could even pass Japan, France and Germany to become the world's ninth largest economy in the distant future. The origins of Turkey’s rapid economic ascent were free-market reforms in the 1980s that gave rise to a more conservative and religious middle class in central and eastern Anatolia, in contrast to the historically secular power-brokers of Istanbul and Ankara. With economic clout came political clout, manifesting itself in the election of the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002, led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This was a significant development in a country whose founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, enforced a strict state-sponsored secularism to signify what he called Turkey's "place in the modern world." The AKP has sought to redress the historic power imbalance between weak politicians and a strong, interventionist military -- the guardian of Ataturk's secularist legacy -- through a series of constitutional reforms and legal actions. However, other Turks, more secular and moderate -- though not well organized as an opposition-- have charged the government with abusing power and are skeptical of the AKP's commitment to a secular state and strong relations with the West.

Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Bad)

U.S. Turkey relations are already deteriorated- Gaza flotilla and Iran relations prove

Butler June 26, 10(DESMOND, journalist, Associated Press, “US: Turkey must demonstrate commitment to West”, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5infX83Qg20idVFtW3FcluMFJNncgD9GIR8780>)

The United States is warning Turkey that it is alienating U.S. supporters and needs to demonstrate its commitment to partnership with the West. The remarks by Philip Gordon, the Obama administration's top diplomat on European affairs, were a rare admonishment of a crucial NATO ally. "We think Turkey remains committed to NATO, Europe and the United States, but that needs to be demonstrated," Gordon told The Associated Press in an interview this week. "There are people asking questions about it in a way that is new, and that in itself is a bad thing that makes it harder for the United States to support some of the things that Turkey would like to see us support." Gordon cited Turkey's vote against a U.S.-backed United Nations Security Council resolution on new sanctions against Iran and noted Turkish rhetoric after Israel's deadly assault on a Gaza-bound flotilla last month. The Security Council vote came shortly after Turkey and Brazil, to Washington's annoyance, had brokered a nuclear fuel-swap deal with Iran as an effort to delay or avoid new sanctions. Some U.S. lawmakers who have supported Turkey warned of consequences for Ankara since the Security Council vote and the flotilla raid that left eight Turks and one Turkish-American dead. The lawmakers accused Turkey of supporting a flotilla that aimed to undermine Israel's blockade of Gaza and of cozying up to Iran.

Relations bad- went sour over genocide vote

Kinzer 10 (Stephen, Northwester Univ journalism, The Guardian, Genocide Harms US Turkey Relations, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/mar/05/turkey-armenia-genocide-us-vote)

For the US house of representatives foreign affairs committee to decide that the killing of Armenians by Ottoman Turks in 1915 constituted genocide, as it did Thursday by a one-vote margin, would be acceptable and even praiseworthy if it were part of a serious historical effort to review all the great atrocities of modern history. But the singling out of Turks for censure, among all the killers of the 20th century, is something quite different. This vote was a triumph of emotion, a victory for ethnic lobbying, and another example of the age-old American impulse to play moral arbiter for the world. Turkey recalled its ambassador in Washington immediately after the vote, which was broadcast live on Turkish television. The resolution now goes to the full House of Representatives. Given the pull of moneyed politics, and President Obama's unwillingness or inability to bring Congress to heel on this issue, as Presidents Bush and Clinton did, it could pass. That would provoke much anger in Turkey, and might weaken the US-Turkish relationship at the precise moment when the US needs to strengthen it. In the past few years, Turkey has taken on a new and assertive role in the Middle East and beyond. Turkey can go places, talk to factions, and make deals that the US cannot. Yet it remains fundamentally aligned with western values and strategic goals. No other country is better equipped to help the US navigate through the region's treacherous deserts, steppes and mountains. Would it be worth risking all of this to make a clear moral statement? Perhaps. What emerged from Washington this week, though, was no cry of righteous indignation. Various considerations, including the electoral power of Armenian-Americans, may have influenced members of Congress. It is safe to surmise, however, that few took time to weigh the historical record soberly and seek to place the Ottoman atrocity in the context of other 20th century massacres. Two questions face Congress as it considers whether to call the 1915 killings genocide. The first is the simple historical question: was it or wasn't it? Then, however, comes an equally vexing second question: is it the responsibility of the US Congress to make sensitive judgments about events that unfolded long ago? The first question is debatable, the second is not. Congress has neither the capacity nor the moral authority to make sweeping historical judgments. It will not have that authority until it sincerely investigates other modern slaughters – what about the one perpetrated by the British in Kenya during the 1950s, documented in a devastating study that won the 2006 Pulitzer prize? – and also confronts aspects of genocide in the history of the United States itself. Doing this would require an enormous amount of largely pointless effort. Congress would be wiser to recognise that it does not exist to penetrate the vicissitudes of history or dictate fatwas to the world. This vote has already harmed US-Turkish relations because it has angered many Turks. If the resolution proceeds through Congress, it will cause more harm. This is lamentable, because declining US-Turkish relations will be bad for both countries and for the cause of regional stability. Just as bad, the vote threatens to upset the fragile reconciliation that has been underway between Turkey and Armenia in recent months. In this episode is encapsulated one of the timeless truths of diplomacy. Emotion is the enemy of sound foreign policy; cool consideration of long-term self-interest is always wiser. Congress seems far from realising this.

Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Bad)

U.S.-Turkey relations have hit rock bottom- Turkey proving independent of the U.S.

Schleifer 10 (Yigal, Istanbul freelance reporter in New York Times, Wash Post, and CSM, Eurasianet, US-Turkish Relations Appear Headed for Rough Patch, June 28, <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61426>) BAF

Analysts are warning that relations between Turkey and the United States may be heading for a period of volatility, particularly in the wake of the botched May 31 Israeli commando raid on a Gaza aid flotilla, along with Ankara’s recent decision to vote “no” in the United Nations Security Council on sanctions against Iran. “There is a ceiling above which Turkish-American relations cannot improve, and there’s a floor which it can’t go below. But we are getting pretty close to the floor and the ability of the two countries to improve their relations really has a huge question mark over it. We are now talking about an undeclared crisis in the relations,” said Bulent Aliriza, director of the Turkey Project at Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies. Indeed, in a recent interview with The Associated Press, Philip Gordon, the State Department’s top official for European and Eurasian affairs seemed to echo that assessment. Gordon suggested that Turkey needed to take demonstrable action to affirm its commitment to both the United States and the Atlantic Alliance. Ankara, in recent years, has been plotting an increasingly independent and ambitious foreign policy course, one that sees an increased role for itself in regional and even global affairs. But observers say Turkey’s role in the Gaza flotilla incident and its subsequent harsh rhetoric against Israel, as well as its decision regarding the Iran sanctions vote, have brought into sharper relief some of the differences between Ankara’s and Washington’s approach on some key issues.

Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Bad)

Relations bad- flotilla and Iran conflict just the beginning

Stanek 10 (Steven, foreign correspondent UC Berkley, US ties with Turkey in doubt after raid, The National (UAE national newspaper), June 5, http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100606/FOREIGN/706059928/1002)

The contrast between the forceful Turkish condemnation of the Israeli flotilla raid and the muted American response reflects a broader splintering between the two countries’ policies that has raised new doubts about the health of the US-Turkey relationship, some analysts have said. While Turkish officials denounced the raid in blunt terms – the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, called it a “bloody massacre” – the White House has tread more cautiously, issuing only a mild public rebuke and signing on to a UN statement expressing “deep regret” at the loss of life and calling for a transparent investigation. Turkish officials, including Ahmet Davutoglu, the foreign minister, publicly criticised the US position as too weak. Meanwhile, Hillary Clinton, the US secretary of state, urged Turkey and other countries to tone down the rhetoric, saying that the situation “requires careful, thoughtful responses from all concerned”. Officials on both sides deny that the public disagreement is a sign that relations have frayed. But many observers say the friction over the flotilla incident, in which nine activists died, including a dual US-Turkish citizen, is only the latest in a series of foreign policy clashes between two countries that are vying for influence in the Middle East. Henri Barkey, a professor of international relations at Lehigh University in Pennsylvania, said US-Turkey relations were already strained and the flotilla incident was “icing on the cake”. “There are very severe tensions,” said Mr Barkey, a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “I think there’s a real crisis in the air.” In May, Turkey – along with Brazil – brokered a deal with Iran to ship much of Iran’s low-enriched uranium to Turkey in exchange for 20 per cent-enriched uranium to fuel a medical reactor. The deal was hailed by Turkey as an “historic turning point” and was viewed as an important step in the country’s bid to assert itself as a regional power broker. But the deal irked US and European officials because it allows Iran to keep enough enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon and continue to enrich fuel. The White House also fears the deal could disrupt its efforts to build international consensus for a new round of United Nations sanctions. The day after the deal was announced, in fact, the United States and Europe submitted a sanctions resolution at the UN Security Council. The move was timed to convey their dissatisfaction with fuel swap deal, analysts said. That resolution, in turn, prompted Mr Erdogan to send letters to 26 countries opposing the sanctions and seeking support for deal. A vote on the sanctions is expected to occur this week. Steven Cook, who specialises in Turkish politics at the Council on Foreign Relations, an independent think tank that advises the US government, said the tit-for-tat is a sign of the increased competition between the two countries. He pointed to several other foreign policy issues on which Turkey and the United States have disagreed. Turkey, he noted, has criticised the US-led peace process for excluding Hamas and focusing almost exclusively on the West Bank. The United States, meanwhile, has objected to some of Mr Erdogan’s rhetoric on Israel. Ankara also has developed an increasingly cozy relationship with Damascus, raising the prospect of the United States and Turkey falling on opposite sides of a potential Israeli conflict with Syria, Mr Cook said. “There’s a host of questions about what would happen in that scenario and I think that the Turks would probably end up on a different side” than the United States, he said. “They just calculate interests differently than we do from where they sit

Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Bad)

U.S. Turkey relationships have been bad since the Iraq war

Cook 2006 (Steven, Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, U.S.-Turkey Relations Seriously Damaged by Iraq War, Finds Council Special Report http://www.cfr.org/publication/10934/usturkey\_relations\_seriously\_damaged\_by\_iraq\_war\_finds\_council\_special\_report.html)

“The growing schism between the West and the Islamic world is one of the primary challenges confronting American foreign and defense policymakers. As a consequence, the relationship between the United States and Turkey—a Western-oriented, democratizing Muslim country—is strategically more important than ever,” asserts a new Council on Foreign Relations Special Report. While Turkey has the potential to be an invaluable partner as Washington seeks to improve its standing in the Muslim world, U.S.-Turkey relations have been severely damaged by the war in Iraq. “Turks believe that the Bush administration committed two sins.” Before the war, “Washington dismissed Ankara’s warnings about the consequences of invading Iraq.” And now, “Turks believe the United States has not taken sufficient care to address Turkey’s security concerns” about the emergence of an independent Kurdistan, which could stoke nationalist sentiment among Turkey’s Kurdish minority. “Time is growing short to build new momentum in the U.S.-Turkey relationship. Over the course of the next two years, both countries will face a series of tough foreign policy questions concerning Iraq, Iran, the Middle East, and Cyprus just as politicians in both capitals are entering election cycles,” says the report, Generating Momentum for a New Era in U.S.-Turkey Relations

U.S.-Turkey relations in downward spiral

Bell and Loehrke 9 (Alexandra and Benjamin, Ploughshares Fund, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey>) BAF

But NATO's post-Cold War struggles with cohesion are a result of far more than disagreement over tactical nuclear deployments. NATO has given Turkey plenty of reasons to doubt its members' commitment to Ankara on several recent occasions. For example, before both Iraq wars, some NATO members hesitated to provide Turkey with air defenses or to assist it with displaced persons who had fled into its territory. Moreover, Turkey, which values NATO as a direct connection to Washington, witnessed the United States completely ignore its vehement opposition to the most recent Iraq War. Additionally, Ankara is dismayed by the reluctance of some of its NATO allies to label the Kurdistan Workers' Party, which has caused violent chaos along the Turkish border, as a terrorist organization. Then there is the issue of Tehran's nuclear program, which seriously complicates any discussion of the United States removing its tactical nuclear weapons from Turkey. An Iranian nuclear capability could spark an arms race in the Middle East and bring about a "proliferation cascade," which could cause Turkey to reconsider its nuclear options--especially if the United States pulls its nuclear weapons from Incirlik. When asked directly about its response to an Iranian nuclear weapon, a high-ranking Foreign Ministry official said that Turkey would immediately arm itself with a bomb. This isn't Ankara's official policy, but it seems to indicate a general feeling among its leaders. Whether Turkey is primarily concerned about security or prestige, the bottom line is that it would not sit idly by as Iran established a regional hegemony.

Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Bad)

Turkey and U.S. divided over nuclear policy, Iran, Israel, and Iraq

Wagner 6/17/10 (Daniel, Managing Dir. of Country Risk Solutions, “Brazil and Turkey's Message,” Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-wagner/brazil-and-turkeys-messag\_b\_615848.html) BAF

Turkish public opinion is divided between pressuring the government to assert itself against Iran - which many see as a competitor to Turkey's own regional political and economic ambitions - and opposing Western influence and security alliances. With both Iran and Russia becoming increasingly aggressive in international relations, Turkey feels pressure to assert itself on the global stage. Given that France, the UK, Russia, and Israel already possess nuclear weapons, and with Iran on an obvious path in that direction, Ankara has made its ambition to obtain nuclear weapons clear in recent months through a lobbying effort in Western capitals. The U.S. is torn on one hand between succumbing to the seemingly legitimate defense-related requests of an important strategic ally and Iranian neighbor -- that can act as a counter-balance to a future nuclear armed Iran -- and on the other hand by promoting the nuclear proliferation it seeks to prevent. Just last year President Obama referred to the U.S. and Turkey's bilateral relationship as a "model partnership", but bilateral relations have been deteriorating since the Gulf War, when President Bush was unsuccessful in facilitating Turkish action against Iraq. Tension has risen for weeks between the two countries over the Iran issue and more recently the Turkish flotilla to Palestine. Turkey has expressed disappointment over Washington's failure to condemn Israel's attack on the flotilla. Anti-U.S. sentiment among the Turkish public is now comparable to that of Pakistan - not exactly what Washington would expect from a 60-year post-war alliance.

Uniqueness (Russia-Turkey Relations Good)

Russia and Turkey relations include multiple facets of engagement, and both countries are looking to increase their involvement with each other

Baku 10, (Dmitry Medvedev: “Russia-Turkey relations are very important for the solution of regional problems” [ 13 Jan 2010 15:55 ] <http://en.apa.az/news.php?id=113843>) WDK

The meeting was held in the Russian President’s residence in Barvikha. Medvedev said Russia-Turkey relations were developing. “These are indeed the relations of the strategic partners. Though last year was not so easy, it was a successful year for our relations. We developed our economic relations. Despite some delays, these relations are very important,” he said. Dmitry Medvedev said Russia and Turkey were implementing large projects especially in the field of energy, expressed his confidence that one more step would be taken to strengthen these relations during Erdogan’s visit. “This is very important for the solution of problems, including regional problems that we regularly discuss with you. Our countries are neighbors. The microclimate in the region depends on the proximity of our positions,” he said. Erdogan said the relations between the two countries had reached culmination. “Political, economic and defense cooperation is developing. As you have said, the energy is of great importance. We have model cooperation in this context. We believe that there are many opportunities in various spheres – not only in the field of natural gas, but also in the field of oil, we can improve our cooperation in these fields,” he said.

Uniqueness (Russia-Turkey Relations Good)

**Turkey-Russia relations on the rise, with the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict expanding them rapidly**

Asbarez 9, (Russia-Turkey Relations Will Have Positive Impact on Karabakh, Says Davutoglu Monday, August 10th, 2009 <http://asbarez.com/69232/russia-turkey-relations-will-have-positive-impact-on-karabakh-says-davutoglu/>) WDK

The strengthening of relations between Russia and Turkey will have a positive impact of the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, said Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu in a television interview over the weekend. During his visit to Turkey last week, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said active steps were being taken to resolve the Karabakh conflict. “Serious work is being done to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and there is serious progress in this regard. Moscow is eager to see quick resolution of the conflict,” Putin added. Davutoglu praised what he called positive steps taken by Russia in the conflict resolution process. During his visit to Turkey, Putin signed several energy agreements, including an agreement to ensure Turkey’s participation in a planned Russian oil and gas pipeline, known as the South Stream, which is designed to rival the Western-backed Nabucco pipeline. Turkey is also participating in the construction of the Nabucco pipeline, which is a US and European venture, sidestepping Russia, to ensure the flow Caspian natural resources to the West. Both proposed projects side-step Armenia. While on a weekend visit to his hometown of Konya, Davutoglu was asked whether two major pipeline projects in which Turkey will play an integral role, Nabucco and South Stream, were rivals. “No. As we stressed several times before, we do not see such strategic projects as rivaling each other but instead as complementary to one another. We look at all developments in the fields of energy, transportation, economy and trade with different perspectives,” Davutoğlu was quoted as saying by the Anatolia news agency in response. Turkey’s course and priorities have not changed,” said a senior Turkish official on Friday, responding to suspicions likely to arise in the wake of Thursday’s deal, under which Turkey has allowed Russia to carry out feasibility studies in its exclusive territorial waters in the Black Sea for construction of the South Stream pipeline. Furthermore, Davutoğlu stressed that Turkey is not a place for rival projects but complementary ones, while noting that Turkey will serve as a secure energy route, strengthening both regional economic integration and global economic structure. “Any cooperation with the European Union and the Nabucco project, which connects the European Union and Turkey, is a strategic priority for Turkey. It should be assessed as a whole. The Nabucco project that we signed in July demonstrated Turkey’s central importance for energy suppliers and energy consumers between the East and West,” Davutoğlu said.

Russia and Turkey relations include multiple facets of engagement, and both countries are looking to increase their involvement with each other

Baku 10, (Dmitry Medvedev: “Russia-Turkey relations are very important for the solution of regional problems” [ 13 Jan 2010 15:55 ] <http://en.apa.az/news.php?id=113843>) WDK

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Uniqueness (Russia-Turkey Relations Good)

Turkey and Russia are investing heavily in each other, becoming closer every day

Liang 8, (Yan, Turkey wishes to strengthen relations with Russia 2008-07-02 22:34:27, [http://news.xinhuanet.c om/english/2008-07/02/content\_8478479.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/02/content_8478479.htm)) WDK

ANKARA, July 2 (Xinhua) -- Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan said Wednesday Turkey is aimed to enhance relations with Russia to make it a "multidimensional and intensified partnership." Babacan made the remarks at a joint news conference with visiting Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov following their meeting in the Turkish capital of Ankara. "Our objective for Turkey-Russia relations is a multidimensional and intensified partnership," he said, noting that both sides have the willingness to further improve bilateral relations as they "have considerable affinities in their approaches regarding international and regional issues." Babacan underlined economic relations between the two countries, saying that "trade volume between Turkey and Russia reached 28 billion U.S. dollars in 2007, making Russia the second biggest trade partner of Turkey." Turkish investment in Russia surpassed 6 billion dollars last year while Russian investment in Turkey amounted to 4 billion dollars, he said, adding that "more than 2.5 million Russian people visited Turkey" in 2007.

Turkey and Russia relations are multiplying

Catalano 10, (Arianna, [JTW Analysis-Dr. Guner Ozkan] Russia’s President to visit Turkey: Which prospects for an already ‘strategic’ partnership? <http://www.usak.org.tr/EN/haber.asp?id=373>) WDK

Certainly, several issues can be assumed as reasons for disagreement but today Turkey and Russia “are much more willing to cooperate and get benefits from the relation…they’re more prone to cooperate rather than compete.” Instability in Southern Caucasus seems to be the area upon which both countries have politically divergent stances. Russia would favour the settlement of frozen conflicts, like the dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno- Karabakh, but contemporarly she still holds the influence to shape the course of peace negotiations. On the contrary, in this regard Turkey has a smaller manouvering room. But as regard to the Black Sea region both actors agree on any further NATO presence. A pragmatic approach then appears to dominate: “political and geopolitical problems are there but Russia and Turkey want to make the prospect of cooperation beyond the disagreement….they just keep those issues aside and try to get benefits as much as possible from ‘soft issues”, Dr. Ozkan affirms. Hence, not only economic interdependence but also cooperation in different term, widening the range of cooperation to “social and cultural areas as well,” for instance. According to Dr. Guner Ozkan the establishment of tighter and deeper relations not just limited to the area of trade and energy but also involving wider sectors of Turkish and Russian society cannot but contributing to improve this already positive ‘atmosphere.’

Link (Hurts Relations)

TNWs key to U.S.-Turkey cohesion

Bell and Loehrke 9 (Alexandra and Benjamin, Ploughshares Fund, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey>) BAF

Roadblocks to removal. In 2005, when NATO's top commander at the time, Gen. James L. Jones, supported the elimination of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, he was met with fierce political resistance. (In addition to the 90 B61 bombs in Turkey, there are another 110 or so U.S. bombs located at bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.) Four years later, some U.S. and European officials still maintain that the political value of the nuclear weapons is enough to keep them deployed across Europe. In particular, they argue PDF that the weapons are "an essential political and military link" between NATO members and help maintain alliance cohesion. The Defense Department's 2008 report PDF on nuclear weapons management concurred: "As long as our allies value [the nuclear weapons'] political contribution, the United States is obligated to provide and maintain the nuclear weapon capability." Those who hold this view believe that nuclear sharing is both symbolic of alliance cohesion and a demonstration of how the United States and NATO have committed to defending each other in the event of an attack. They argue that removing the weapons would dangerously undermine such cohesion and raise questions about how committed Washington is to its NATO allies.

US TNW withdraw damages US-Turkey relations

Gormley, Lewis, et al 9 (Dennis M. Gormley, Patricia M. Lewis, Miles A. Pomper, Lawrence Scheinman, Stephen Schwartz, Nikolai Sokov, Leonard S. Spector, Four Emerging Issues in Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation: Opportunities for German Leadership, <http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/090717_german_leadership/german_leadership_full.pdf>

On the other hand, Turkey and new NATO members in Eastern Europe are more eager to retain American tactical nuclear weapons to insure against a resurgent Russia or a more capable Iran, just as they show greater interest in the European leg of the U.S. missile defense system. They also see the presence of the weapons as a means of insuring that the alliance remains focused on territorial defense rather than shifting to out-of-area efforts, such as the conflict in Afghanistan or the effort to inject NATO into areas such as arms control and nonproliferation. The Obama administration has already raised concerns among NATO’s Eastern European members by its decision to slow deployment of the U.S. missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. This slowdown may be particularly painful because the latter countries have invested considerable political resources to push through the decision to deploy the defenses that were perceived as highly important for Washington, but faced considerable opposition domestically in the two Eastern European states. Withdrawing TNW, a perceived symbol of U.S. commitment, in this light—and so soon after the conflict in Georgia—carries risks for alliance cohesion, regardless of the weapons’ military utility. Likewise, the wavering response of NATO to Turkish requests for conventional deployments in the run-up to the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars, the ongoing tension between Turkey and the EU over the former’s membership in the Union, and the bitter legacy of Turkish-U.S. relations in the Bush administration have raised questions in Ankara about NATO’s commitment to its security that would be seriously exacerbated by the removal of TNW from that country.

Removal of US tnw’s from Europe encourages Russian aggression, nuclear proliferation, and would be a major setback for global security

Heritage Foundation 10 (President Obama Must Not Remove Nuclear Weapons from Europe, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/03/President-Obama-Must-Not-Remove-Nuclear-Weapons-from-Europe>) MAH

In April 2009—less than three months into his term of office—President Barack Obama laid out the centerpiece of his foreign policy vision for his Administration: the global eradication of nuclear weapons. Citing America’s atomic strikes against the Japanese Empire during World War II, President Obama stated that America has a “moral responsibility” to walk the “road to zero.” This ideological positioning has set off a series of calls from European leaders for the removal of America’s nuclear arsenal from European soil. At this time, however, a withdrawal of America’s nuclear arsenal from [Europe](http://www.heritage.org/Places/Europe) would send the message that transatlantic security is no longer indivisible. It would also give Moscow a blank check to pursue its long-sought-after sphere of privileged interest and, ironically, could pave the way for further nuclear proliferation. The destabilization brought to the European continent from a premature removal of American nuclear weapons, or an unacceptable degradation of its force, would be a major setback for global security and stability.

Link (Hurts Relations)

US TNW withdraw damages US-Turkey relations

Gormley, Lewis, et al 9 (Dennis M. Gormley, Patricia M. Lewis, Miles A. Pomper, Lawrence Scheinman, Stephen Schwartz, Nikolai Sokov, Leonard S. Spector, Four Emerging Issues in Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation: Opportunities for German Leadership, <http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/090717_german_leadership/german_leadership_full.pdf>

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Turkey wants nukes- removing of TNWs causes U.S.-Turkey conflict

NTI 09 (Turkey Profile, Monterey Institute of International Studies James Martin Center, http://www.nti.org/e\_research/profiles/turkey/index.html)

As part of NATO's nuclear umbrella, Turkey continues to host approximately 90 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on its territory at Incirlik Air Base.[4] **There is some speculation in the Turkish press regarding possible conflict between Turkey's leaders and the United States should President Obama's commitment to "seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons" lead to the near-term withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Turkey**.[5] While the weapons serve little strategic purpose, they provide tangible evidence of a continued American commitment to Turkish security. Although Turkey's interest in nuclear technology dates to at least 1956, when the government founded the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK), Ankara's nuclear capabilities never moved beyond the research and development stages. Thus while Turkey conducts sophisticated nuclear fuel cycle research—primarily at the Cekmece Nuclear Research and Training Centre (CNRTC) and the Istanbul Technical University—it does not possess nuclear power reactors or industrial-scale enrichment or reprocessing capabilities.[6] Ankara possesses only two small research reactors, the TRIGA Mark II 250-KWt reactor and the TR-2 5MWt reactor—the former operates on 20% U-235 fuel, while the latter possesses a mixed HEU/LEU core that will soon be fully converted to run on LEU.[7] While past decades have witnessed numerous attempts by the government to acquire power reactors, all failed for a variety of political, diplomatic, and economic reasons.[8] However, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's AKP-led government is aggressively pursuing nuclear energy. While the government's announcement in 2006 that it would install 5,000MW nuclear energy by 2015 (3 reactors) has encountered numerous feasibility problems—and may not yield even one reactor by that date—the AKP remains unwaveringly politically committed to the endeavor.[9] After a troubled tender process in 2008, the government began assessing the sole bid for construction of the first nuclear plant. The offer from Russian-led consortium Atomstroyexport-Inter Rao-Park Teknik is still under consideration.

Link (Hurts Relations)

Pulling out TNWs kills Turkey-U.S. relations

Kelleher and Warren 09 (Catherine and Scott, snr fellow at Brown and prof @ brown univ., Arms Control Association, “Getting to Zero Starts Here: Tactical Nuclear Weapons”, October, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009\_10/Kelleher#bio)

The role of tactical nuclear weapons in these discussions has not loomed large in much of the public or private Washington discourse. It has received more informal play in Brussels, where the efforts to craft a new NATO strategic concept quickly ran into private concerns about the ultimate fate of tactical weapons. Several new working papers circulated by opponents of continued tactical nuclear deployment in Europe have garnered quiet support from others. Germany, in particular, stimulated the push for elimination of tactical weapons, as Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who also was a candidate for chancellor in the September 2009 elections, advocated the elimination position. Turkey, however, has reportedly suggested in internal conversations that a decision by the United States to reduce its tactical nuclear weapons further would mark the end the grand alliance bargain of the 1960s: Turkey, like other hosts, would have the U.S. nuclear shield and would share in the physical control of the weapons in return for Ankara’s promise not to develop its own nuclear weapons

Link (Helps Relations)

Pulling TNWs good for U.S. Turkey relations- public and government want weapons out

Political Affairs Magazine, 05 (Marxist thought magazine-turkish sector, Incirlik Base must be closed, http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/view/982/1/89/)BAF

Incirlik Base has been a trouble for Turkey. This base has been a jumping board for both NATO and the USA. This base has also been a center for the anti-popular character and missions of the rule of capital in Turkey. Only the capitalist class can ask a foreign country to bring and deploy its nuclear weapons to be used against the people in its own country if necessary. Like any other weapons, nuclear weapons in Incirlik are kept ready not only to attack the peoples of Middle East, but also the workers in Turkey. Working class of Turkey, its party TKP (Communist Party of Turkey), is demanding the disarmament of Incirlik. In this sense, the problem cannot be reduced to the "supervision by Turkish officers" or "permission by the Turkish government”. What are the Turkish officers going to supervise? How can an organization, whose primary concern has been getting top positions in the NATO projects and USA's plans for a long time, defend the country's interests? Again, it is none of our concern that the government of capitalists wants to check on the acts of the USA. In the formulas developed by Prime Minister Erdogan and his friends, it is possible to see some points, which aim to soften possible reactions. However, that the USA notifies Turkish government and military authorities doesn't have a practical reality. This is all cheating. After all, saying "let the parliament to discuss that" doesn't mean anything but supporting CHP's, the opposition party's, attempt to be part of the game. In summary, the legal status of Incirlik doesn't bear importance anymore. Working class of Turkey, its party TKP demands that Incirlik shall be closed at once. Of course, the problem doesn't consist of Incirlik. Today, there is not a single military base, which is not open to NATO and the USA. The demand for Incirlik to be closed doesn't mean the acceptance of this situation. On the contrary, the closing of Incirlik would be a challenge by the working class of Turkey against the treason and collaboration of capitalists and against imperialism. The revolution in Turkey will also be the process of purification of our country from imperialism. Working class of Turkey, its party TKP, is struggling for the purification of Incirlik from imperialism. The response to usual accusations like that the closing of a military base will endanger the "country's security" is clear. Whose security? The security of local and foreign monopolies, which possess the most important institutions of our country? The security of a handful of people, who live in extravagance through the poverty of tens of millions? The security of gangs, murderers and drug dealers? The security of IMF collectors? Whose security? If these are not the country's security, and they are obviously not, then Incirlik is clearly threatening the country's security. Incirlik not only threatens our people's security, but also the security of Palestinians, Iraqis and Iranians. Working class of Turkey, its party TKP, want to hinder Incirlik from being an element of threat. Sooner or later, working class of Turkey will take the power. And then, if it is necessary for the defense of an honorable and independent country, the revolutionary power, its revolutionary armed forces will turn Incirlik once again into a military base. But now, on our agenda is the closing of a base, which symbolizes the dependency of Turkey. Incirlik must be closed.

Link (Helps Relations)

U.S. NTW presence in Turkey unpopular

Lindborg 07 (Chris, co-director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, Foreign policy in focus, Iraq and the Transatlantic Alliance, http://www.fpif.org/articles/iraq\_and\_the\_transatlantic\_alliance) BAF

A long-time member of NATO, Turkey has been put in a particularly precarious situation because of the Iraq War. Turkey’s strategic position between Europe and the Middle East makes it a valuable U.S. ally. Yet Turks strongly opposed the war and felt that the United States had not consulted sufficiently with Turkish leaders. Turks have also feared the impact that the war might have on Kurds who live in Iraq and Turkey. While over half of Turks polled support the bid to join the EU, Turkey’s road to membership may be long and difficult. Ankara’s foreign policy perceptions and interests are shifting eastward, and the Iraq War has clearly hastened this movement. The United States will no longer be able to take this strategic ally for granted.

TNWs are a stopgap for Turkish leadership

Lamond and Ingram 9 (Claudine, Senior analyst and contributor to ‘International Security Report’ and Paul analyst for British American Security Information Council’ (BASIC), London, Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states http://www.atlantic-community.org/app/webroot/files/articlepdf/CLamondTNWinNATO.pdf)BAF

There is a rising sentiment amongst the population for the removal of US nuclear weapons from Turkish territory. In a recent survey,20 more than half the respondents stated that they are against nuclear weapons being stationed in Turkey. Almost 60% of the Turkish population would support a government request to remove the nuclear weapons from their country, and 72% said they would support an initiative to make Turkey a nuclear-free zone.21 There may be several causes behind this sentiment, including the Iraq War, Turkish relations with neighboring states, budget expenditure and the moral concern over nuclear weapons. The historic precedence of Greece, a NATO member and Turkey’s historic rival, ending its commitment to nuclear sharing in NATO may have further strengthened this tendency. There have been public expressions of resentment towards the US military presence in Turkey ever since the lead up to the US war with Iraq. The United States insisted on the government allowing American troops to use Turkey as a staging post, despite overwhelmingly antiwar Turkish public and political opinion. Limited permission was granted after heavy debates and delay in the Turkish parliament. Turkey’s location has added an element of both risk and opportunity to NATO nuclear sharing. Turkey’s close proximity to states deemed potentially hostile, such as Iran and Syria, make Turkey a preferred NATO base for tactical nuclear weapons. The risk, of course, is that stationing tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey might provoke a pre-emptive strike upon NATO bases. Turkish parliamentarians have expressed to NATO the difficulty of explaining the continued presence of US tactical nuclear weapons on Turkish territory to Muslim and Arab neighbors. There is a fear that they undermine Turkey’s clear diplomatic objectives to act as a mediator within the region. Turkey has a unique opportunity to play a positive role in promoting non-proliferation. Ending nuclear sharing and fully complying with the NPT would act as a powerful example to neighboring states and strengthen Turkey’s legitimacy. Moreover, efforts by the Turkish government to play a leading role in the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction would receive overwhelming public support

Link (Helps Relations)

**Removing the nuclear weapons would be popular with Turkey and improve Turkey’s relations with neighboring states**

Clamond and Ingram 9 (Claudine, Southeast Asian Security Analyst, Paul, BASIC, “Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states,” British American Security Information Council, http://www.basicint.org/gtz/gtz11.htm) MJ

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Link (Hurts Turkey-US, Helps Turkey-Russo)

US presence in the Middle East and Turkey hurts US-Turkey relations and significantly boosts Turkey-Russia relations

Oku 5, (Asim, 12.05.2005 Turkey-Russia Relations Dynamics Asim Oku, AIA Turkish section. The 90s: from "image of enemy" to "feeble partner" <http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=71>) WDK

Russia and Turkey today share much deeper understanding of geopolitical issues. After the intrusion of the USA in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the increase of the American military presence in the Eastern and Southern Europe, both states demonstrate obvious anti-American shift in their policy. Turkey aspires to enter the EU with its aversion to "US Hegemony", while Russia tries to strengthen ties with France and Germany – the principal conductors of the anti-American policy in Europe. Russia is extremely concerned about the loss of influence in Ukraine and Georgia, and Turkey is worried by the attempts to restrain its presence in the Balkans. Both countries emphasize their "Eurasian nature" (this phrase belongs to the ambassador of Russia in Turkey Alexander Lebedev), are dissatisfied with their minor role in the world, and look for the new allies in Asia, approaching Iran, China and India. Relations between Ankara and Damascus improved to a great extent after the Turkish Justice and Development Party came to power Kremlin also revives its "special relations" with the Syrian regime in economic and military sphere. Both Turkey and Russia refused to support the US military operation in Iraq in 2003. Growing concurrence of interests between Turkey and Russia leads to the signing, in 2001 in New York, of the "Eurasian cooperation agreement". Ankara in a pointed manner stays out of the US and NATO attempts to "entrench" on the Russian borders. In return Russia supports Turkish position on Cyprus. Frank anti-American moods dominate in the intellectual and political elite of both countries ("Edinaya Rossiya" - United Russia and Turkish Justice and Development Party). Both countries gradually chill off the cooperation with Israel – the main US ally in the Middle East, while simultaneously building partnership with Israel's sworn enemy - Syria. Both Ankara and Moscow indefatigably repeat that they "aspire only to defend their national interests".  In the ''real politic'' it is expressed by the attempts to regain influence, which both countries possessed throughout the blossoming era of the empires: the Russian - the Soviet and the Ottoman. With regard of the aforesaid, there is a tendency between the parties to coordinate the opposition to Washington and to create the Eurasian alignment to ''counterbalance'' the American "Atlantism".

US-Turkey relations trade off with Turkey-Russo relations, this seriously damages the Caucus pipelines

Enghdal 9, (F William, Apr 16, 2009. Editor for Asia Times, Middle East, [http://www.atime s.com/atimes/Middle\_East/KD16Ak01.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KD16Ak01.html))

Turkey is the key link in this complex game of geopolitical balance of power between Washington and Moscow. If Turkey decides to collaborate with Russia, Georgia's position becomes very insecure and Azerbaijan's possible pipeline route to Europe is blocked. If Turkey decides to cooperate with [Washington](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KD16Ak01.html##) and at the same time reaches a stable agreement with Armenia under US guidance, Russia's entire position in the Caucasus is weakened and an alternative route for natural gas to Europe becomes available, reducing Russian leverage against Western Europe.

Russia-Turkey and Turkey-US relations are based on zero sum, trade off is certain

Torbakov 8, (Igor, THE GEORGIA CRISIS AND RUSSIA-TURKEY RELATIONSPublished in the United States by The Jamestown Foundation http://www.jamestown. org/uploads/medi a/Georg iaCrisisTorbakov.pdf) WDK

One cannot fail to notice that Russian planners view the Caucasus Pact blueprint in general and Russia-Turkey relations in particular through the prism of a zero-sum game with the Americans. As the influential Kommersant newspaper put it in a recent commentary, the most important feature of the CSCP is that it “will allow Moscow and Ankara to strengthen their positions in the Caucasus thereby weakening Washington’s influence in the region.”

Link (Hurts Turkey-US, Helps Turkey-Russo)

Western alienation, especially US’, has opened the door for Turkey-Russia relations

Hallinan 10, (Conn, Friday, June 25, 2010 by Foreign Policy in Focus Turkey, America, and Empire's Twilight <http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/06/25-8>) WDK

The most common U.S. interpretation of the joint Turkish-Brazilian peace plan for Iran, as well as Ankara's falling out with Israel over the latter's assault on the Gaza flotilla, is that Turkey is "looking East." Rationales run the gamut from rising Islamism to U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates' explanation that the West alienated Turkey when it blocked Ankara from joining the European Union (EU). While Turkey's rise does indeed reflect internal developments in that country, its growing influence mirrors the ebb of American power, a consequence of the catastrophic policies Washington has followed in the Middle East and Central Asia. From Ankara's point of view, it is picking up the tab for the chaos in Iraq, the aggressive policies of the Israeli government, and the growing tensions around the Iranian nuclear program. As Sedat Laciner, director of the International Strategic Resource Center in Ankara, told The New York Times, "The Western countries do things and Turkey pays the bill." While the Cold War is over, argues Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, "a new global" order has yet to emerge. Until those "mechanisms" are in place, "It will therefore fall largely to nation-states to meet and create solutions for the global political, cultural, and economic turmoil." Davutoglu's observation about "a new global" order is an implicit critique of a UN Security Council dominated by the veto power of the "Big Five": the United States, Britain, France, Russia, and China. Increasingly countries like Turkey, Brazil, and India are unhappy with the current setup. They either want a place at the table or a reduction of the Council's power. The latest Iran sanctions passed 12 to 2 (with one abstention) in the Council. The sanctions would have failed a vote in the General Assembly. Turkey has expanded ties with Iran and worked closely with Russia on energy and trade.  It has even tried to thaw relations with Armenia. It has [mediated](http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,660635,00.html) between Damascus and Tel Aviv, brokered peace talks between Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq, and Serbians and Bosnians in the Balkans, and tried to reduce tension in the Caucasus. It has also opened 15 embassies in Africa and two in Latin America.

Internal Link-Trades off with Turkey/Russo Relations

US-Turkey relations trade off with Turkey-Russo relations, this seriously damages the Caucus pipelines

Enghdal 9, (F William, Apr 16, 2009. Editor for Asia Times, Middle East, [http://www.atime s.com/atimes/Middle\_East/KD16Ak01.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KD16Ak01.html))

Turkey is the key link in this complex game of geopolitical balance of power between Washington and Moscow. If Turkey decides to collaborate with Russia, Georgia's position becomes very insecure and Azerbaijan's possible pipeline route to Europe is blocked. If Turkey decides to cooperate with [Washington](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KD16Ak01.html##) and at the same time reaches a stable agreement with Armenia under US guidance, Russia's entire position in the Caucasus is weakened and an alternative route for natural gas to Europe becomes available, reducing Russian leverage against Western Europe.

Internal Link (Independent Turkey Bad)

Independent Turkey leads to cooperation with China and Russia

Sariibrahimoglu 1 (Lale, Eurasia analyst, Turkish Daily News, “US fears Turkey becoming another Israel,” http://gbulten.ssm.gov.tr/arsiv/2001/06/12/01\_1.htm) MJ

U.S. sources speaking to the Turkish Daily News say that Washington was ready to give Turkey 90 percent of the software source code of mission computer systems. "We (U.S.) can not transfer the remaining 10 percent of the software source code because it would reveal the vulnerability of the weapons systems," said the same source. Turkey has been negotiating with U.S. Bell for the coproduction of 145 helicopters in three batches worth about $4 billion. **U.S. fears that Turkey may set an example by becoming another Israel, which built its indigenous systems on U.S. products but then started cooperating with many countries including U.S.'s adversary China, enlarging its options in developing indigenous technologies. The United States has mounted pressure on Israel to stop arms exports, as well as cooperation with countries like China and Russia. The U.S. pressures being imposed on Ankara come at a time when Turkey has been signalling closer military ties with China and South Korea, Russia is also very keen to enter the Turkish arms market in terms of coproduction projects.**

US-Turkey Relations Good (Terrorism)

US-Turkey Relations key to fight terrorism

Cook 2(Steven, Brookings Institute Research Fellow, “U.S.-Turkey Relations and the War on Terroris,” http://bianet.org/english/english/6013-u-s--turkey-relations-and-the-war-on-terroris) MJ

**In the hours before U.S. and British forces first launched attacks on Taliban and al Qaeda targets, Vice President Dick Cheney telephoned Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer to inform him of operation** "Enduring Freedom." Sezer, in response and befitting the ties between close NATO partners, underscored Turkey's support and wished the United States success. **The phone call reflects Turkey's importance to the United States as Ankara has become a pivotal ally in Washington's new battle against terrorism**. While much of the Bush administration's diplomatic efforts have focused on the Arab Middle East, Turkey-a NATO ally, Muslim country, and aspirant to full-membership in the European Union-can offer the United States support in a range of areas where Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states are either unable or reluctant to assist. Unlike Washington's Arab allies, **Turkey has signaled clearly to the Bush administration its belief that a confluence of interests in fighting global terrorism exists between Washington and Ankara**. The Turkish government needed little persuading that Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network were responsible for the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. On October 3, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, in reference to Washington's presentation of evidence linking bin Laden to the attacks told the Turkish press, "**The fact that the U.S. found it persuasive persuades us also." Moreover, once the United States and Great Britain began military operations in Afghanistan, Ankara apparently dropped whatever reservations it may have harbored concerning its own commitment of forces to the effort**. Turkey's largest circulation daily, Hurriyet, reported that after a meeting in the early hours of October 8, Turkey's political and military leaders affirmed that they would support any NATO decision made within the framework of Article 5 of the North Atlantic treaty. Sezer's words on the eve of war-as well as those of Ecevit, Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, Chief of Staff Hussein Kivrikoglu, and other Turkish leaders-should not, however, be interpreted as blanket Turkish support for the U.S. action in Southwest Asia and the Middle East. Since September 11, the Turkish leadership has fashioned a policy that can only be characterized as guarded-receptive to Washington in some areas, but clearly wary of others. To be sure, Ankara is and will remain a valuable ally of the United States, yet it is important to recognize that Turkey's fragile domestic political situation and complex regional interests dictate caution. Underneath the public bilateral assurances to each other, there will be significant sensitivities and pressure points in the U.S.-Turkish relationship as the situation in Afghanistan develops and Washington more fully elaborates its practical response to terrorism.

A terrorist getting a hold of nuclear materials is the largest and most probable threat of our time

Siddiqi 4/16 (Shibil, Fellow with the Center for the Study of Global Power and Politics at Trent University, “Terrorism: The nuclear summit’s ‘straw man’,” Asia Times Online, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/LD16Ak02.html) MJ

**American President Barack Obama gathered 47 national delegations for the first Nuclear Security Summit** (NSS) in Washington on April 12 and 13. It was the largest gathering of world leaders in Washington since the close of World War II. The scale of the summit was meant to impress the gravity of the subject matter. **In Obama's words, "This is an unprecedented gathering to address an unprecedented threat": the prevention of nuclear terrorism**. In trademark style, Obama offered rhetorical flourishes to fit the occasion: "**Two decades after the Cold War we face a cruel irony of history. The risk of nuclear confrontation between nations has gone down, but the risk of nuclear attack as gone up". The president said that a tiny scrap of plutonium the size of an apple was now the biggest threat to world stability**, **with "just the tiniest amount of plutonium" in the wrong hands posing potential for catastrophe.** However, the president's assessment of global nuclear threats paper over some basic realities. **The threat of nuclear confrontation remains dangerously high despite the New START** (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) **with Russia and America's passive-aggressive Nuclear Posture Review. This is particularly true along the nuclear fault-lines in the Middle East and South Asia which have existed since the Cold War. Perhaps a "dirty bomb" made out of a handful of plutonium or other radiological material forms the most significant "nuclear" threat to the US**. But outside of this Western-centric world-view, it is the threat of nuclear attack or exchange in the Middle East and South Asia - home to nearly a fourth of the world's population - that clearly remains the largest global nuclear threat.

US-Turkey Relations Good Ext (Terrorism)

U.S.-Turkey relations key to fighting terrorism

HurriYet Daily 10 (Turkish newssource, “Turkish PM Erdoğan asks for more than ‘intelligence sharing’”, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey-asks-more-than-8216intelligence-sharing8217-2010-06-28>) BAF

An anti-terror mechanism set up between Turkey, Iraq and the United States should include functions other than “intelligence sharing,” according Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. “This is being negotiated within the trilateral mechanism. I think that the steps to be taken in this regard will be implemented,” Erdoğan told reporters at a press conference before his departure from Toronto early Monday where he attended a G-20 summit and held a bilateral meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama. The issues Erdoğan and Obama focused on were the joint fight against the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, the disagreement over Iran sanctions and the ongoing dispute between Turkey and Israel. Erdoğan said he mentioned the PKK’s recently launched terror campaign and asked Obama to enlarge their ongoing cooperation. The U.S. has been providing Turkey with actionable intelligence since late 2007 and initiated the establishment of what they call the trilateral mechanism – a broad cooperative measure between Turkey, Iraq and the U.S. intended to restrict the movement of terror agents in the region. However Turks seem unsatisfied with its function, a feeling Erdoğan voiced after his meeting with Obama.

US-Turkey Relations Good (Afghanistan Stability)

US-Turkey relations key to Afghanistan stability

Erman 10 (Aydemir, Turkey’s special coordinator for Afghanistan, Christian Science Monitor, How Turkey can help NATO in Afghanistan, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/0209/How-Turkey-can-help-NATO-in-Afghanistan)

At the recent London Conference on Afghanistan, the United States, its NATO allies, and Afghanistan’s regional neighbors agreed to more closely align civilian and military efforts to stabilize that nation so foreign forces can withdraw and local Afghan forces can take over security. Skip to next paragraph Related Stories On the civilian side, a new emphasis was placed on the key importance of building up Afghan institutions that can attract the allegiance of those who now stand with the Taliban. As a historically trusted friend of the Afghan people, Turkey, alone among members of the NATO alliance, has a “soft power” ingredient in its arsenal that is key to winning the hearts and minds of the population. It is said in Afghanistan that “no Afghan was ever killed by a Turkish bullet” and “no Afghan trained by Turks has ever betrayed his country.” Turks have aided the Afghan government and its people since the days of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, the “Iron Amir” who unified the country during his reign from 1880 to 1901 and embarked on a path of modernization. Afghanistan was the second country to recognize modern Turkey in 1921 after the USSR. Modern Turkey was instrumental in establishing the military academy, medical school, Kabul University and its faculty of political sciences, the music conservatory, and the public health service of Afghanistan. Good relations between Turks and Afghans are based on three factors: First, we do not share a common border and thus have no disputes on that score. Second, as a young republic that was a successor to a great empire, Turkey never displayed any imperial overtones as it embraced the young Afghan nation, which had suffered at the hands of the British and Russian empires, after independence. Undergoing its own process of modernization at the time, Turkey treated Afghanistan as an absolute equal. We never had a special agenda and had relations with all elements of the Afghan nation. Third, we share the religion of Islam. Unlike many other members of the international community, Turkey did not neglect Afghanistan in the years preceding 9/11 but was silently active. In my contacts with the Taliban during those years as Turkey’s special coordinator for Afghanistan, we pulled no punches. I explicitly told the Taliban leaders that we would not extend recognition to their regime. Turkey recognized the rump government of President Barhanuddin Rabbani that remained in only a small part of Afghanistan, mainly Badakshan Province and the Panshir Valley, until he was replaced by Hamid Karzai after the Taliban were driven from power by the US after 9/11. We openly criticized the Taliban’s lack of governing capacity, their profiteering from the opium trade, their support for terror organizations like Al Qaeda, and their treatment of their own people. Despite all this criticism, the Taliban nonetheless gave my colleagues and me free access to travel the country. I was always respected, and we were able to perform humanitarian work all over the Taliban-controlled parts of Afghanistan. I was told on several occasions by the Taliban leaders that as much as they may scorn my remarks, as a Turk I was welcomed. Shaped by our historical relationship with all parts of Afghan society, Turkey’s involvement there since 9/11 has quite consciously been a matter of “soft power projection.” As a NATO ally true to its obligations, Turkey sent troops to Afghanistan after 9/11 on the condition that they would not take part in combat operations. Despite pressure from allies, Turkey sticks strictly to this policy. Our presence in Afghanistan, both military and civilian, has been based on treating people with respect and as equals, not with paternalism or the imperial arrogance of an occupying power. Turkish troops deployed to Kabul have been under strict orders to treat Afghans with dignity. They have not broken into homes. Most patrols are conducted on foot and not in armored carriers. Troops wear no sunglasses in order to maintain eye contact. Touching women is totally taboo. Medical personnel serve Afghan people as well as their own forces. Turkish troops have thus not only contributed to the security of Kabul but became an unobtrusive part of Afghan daily life. In the critical province of Wardak, Turkey today is also operating the only civilian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team. Generally, PRTs are operated by NATO soldiers. Since 2006, the Turkish government has spent $20 million in the province funding a police training academy, building schools, restoring a mosque, and setting up a medical clinic. Halim Fedai, the governor of Wardak Province, has said: “The Turkish programs are very well received and readily accepted by Afghans because they work within Afghan culture. They are sensitive to Afghan values. We have very good, strong, historical relationships with Turkey.” Clearly, the crescent and star have once again proved as reliable a trademark in Afghanistan today as in the past. Because of this success, the Turkish government will soon set up another PRT elsewhere in Afghanistan. The Turkish lesson in Afghanistan is clear: Winning hearts and minds requires better understanding and respect for local values. Handing out cans of soda with colonial airs won’t yield tangible results. For many of these same reasons – our historical relationships in the region and deep understanding of local values and cultures – Turkey may be one of the few countries, if not the only country, that can bring Afghanistan and Pakistan together to sort out their differences. President Karzai made a point at the London Conference of stressing Turkey’s mediating role, following upon the “trilateral” Turkey-Afghanistan-Pakistan meeting he had earlier attended in January in Istanbul with Pakistani President Asif Zardari. Unfortunately, India’s absence so far in this process has weakened the Turkish initiative. It is critical to get them on board because the Afghan problem cannot be solved unless India and Pakistan come to terms over their interests in Afghanistan. The international community in general, and the allies in particular, should lend their support to Turkey. Turkey’s NATO membership and historical soft-power capacity can make a critical difference in Afghanistan.

US-Turkey Relations Good (East-West Dialogue) 1/2

1) Relations key to east west dialogue

Gresser 2 (Edward, director of PPI’s Project on Trade and Global Markets, Policy Report, A New U.S. Trade Relationship with Turkey, http://www.tusiad.us/Content/uploaded/TRADE\_TURKEY\_9021.PDF)BAF

The administration’s QIZ proposal is, of course, well motivated. It may have some important short-term benefits in particular industries, and would be at least a symbolic vote of confidence in the Turkish reform effort. But in its present form, it is a secondary measure rather than a step that—to use the administration’s phase—will put economic ties with Turkey on a strategic level. The stakes are high enough to demand something more. Turkey has a long and honorable record as a NATO member and a contributor to western and international security. In reforming its economy, liberalizing domestic politics, and seeking to join the EU, Turkey adds something more. These steps, whose success is as yet uncertain, can make Turkey the first majority-Muslim country to commit itself fully to a common destiny with the West. This is a process of genuine and profound importance—one an American administration should be willing to take some risks to support. A slight change in the bill, adding the laborintensive goods now excluded, would require the administration to spend some political capital. But the benefits to Turkey’s reform effort would be far greater than the domestic risk, and that is what counts. Half-measures don’t often make history.

US-Turkey Relations Good (East-West Dialogue) 2/2

2) East West dialogue key to Turkish stance on terrorism, economy and democracy

**Gresser 2** (Edward, director of PPI’s Project on Trade and Global Markets, Policy Report, A New U.S. Trade Relationship with Turkey, http://www.tusiad.us/Content/uploaded/TRADE\_TURKEY\_9021.PDF)BAF

The United States has a long list of requests for Muslim countries these days—from support for the war on terrorism to commitment to domestic liberalization and economic reform through peace in the Middle East. What do we do when a government says yes to all of the above? This question is not hypothetical—the country in question is Turkey. Over the past year, Turkey’s cooperation against terrorism has included commitment of its own soldiers in Afghanistan. At home, the economic and political liberalization program overseen by Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit and his former economic policy chief, former World Bank executive Kemal Dervis, is a remarkable counterpoint to the closed economies and polities of much of the Middle East. Its specifics include trade and financial reform, the opening of Kurdish language schools, and even the abolition of the death penalty; unifying these individual policies is a drive for full integration with the values and institutions of the West. Such a program, building on a longstanding commitment as a NATO member, is of extraordinary importance as a vision for Turkey and as an example for Muslim nations elsewhere. The Bush administration, to its credit, has recognized the importance of support for such policies. But the plan it has developed in response— a partial duty-free program, a much more limited version of the U.S.-Jordan Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) project of 1997-2001—seems less than the moment requires. The Context as a NATO member, Turkey has been a strategic partner to the United States for many years. Most recently, American and British aircraft have maintained the no-fly zone in northern Iraq from a base in southern Turkey, and Turkish soldiers are serving as peacekeepers in post-Taliban Afghanistan. Barring a major change in Turkey’s political outlook, this strategic relationship will remain fundamental to Western security policy for many years to come: Turkey has the second largest military force of any NATO member state and a relatively stable democratic political system, and Turkish governments since the 1920s have been viscerally opposed to threats from religious fundamentalism. Turkey’s economic and social reforms, however, represent something new. Aimed at membership in the European Union, they mark the first time a major Muslim nation has committed itself to the complete spectrum of Western economic and legal political institutions. As such, reform in Turkey is an unusual endeavor in modern history, and one with significant strategic meaning for the United States. But just as the Turkish reform is a unique effort, it also faces some unique challenges. A convenient point of reference is the set of reform policies adopted in Southeast Asia after the financial crisis of 1997-1999. Like Turkey’s current program, they emerged in the aftermath of economic trauma and represent an internationalist, prowestern view of the future. But the Asian countries have some advantages Turkey lacks—notably a cooperative regional self-help effort in the ASEAN Free Trade Area, as well as China’s entry into the World Trade Organization as a spur to reform and a new market for regional exports. Most of Turkey’s neighbors, by contrast, have policies far removed from self-help. To the south, Iraq, in refusing to comply with Gulf War ceasefire agreements, has sealed itself off from the world by sanctions for 10 years. The Middle East as a whole, fragmented by trade barriers and political conflict, is little more promising. To the north and west, the Caucasus and the Balkans have their own deeply rooted troubles. In such an environment, reform, growth, and recovery from recession are harder; the role of Western policy correspondingly becomes more important and perhaps more decisive. Much of the responsibility lies with the European Union, which will meet in December to decide on membership for 10 or more aspiring neighbors. Turkey’s politicians and public alike view EU membership as one of the reform program’s major goals. And, although the reforms have added momentum to Turkey’s bid, the prospects and possible dates for EU accession remain uncertain. So, as the administration recognizes, the United States can also make a contribution. According to Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz: “The United States sees our partnership with Turkey extending to the economic field…We want to help in Turkey’s recovery. We want to help promote Turkey’s economic growth, and we want to help Turkey become competitive in the global economy. President Bush has raised our economic relations with Turkey to a strategic level; we are pursuing every effort to increase our trade and investment from a base that is admittedly too low.”

US-Turkey Relations Good (Middle East Stability) 1/2

A. US-Turkey relation key to Middle east stability and terrorism

Menon and Wimbush 7(Rajan, Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, S. Enders, Vice President for International Programs and Policy at Hudson Institute, The US and Turkey: The End of an Alliance?” Survival, 49(2), pg 129-144) MJ

**If Turkey, a key friend and ally, turns away from the United States, the damage to American interests will be severe and long lasting. Turkey remains exceptionally important to the United States, arguably even more so than during the Cold War.** Turkey is the top of an arc that starts in Israel and wends its way through Lebanon, Syria, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Iran. **It abuts**, or is proximate to, **countries pivotal to American foreign policy and national security, whether allies and friends, adversaries, or loci of instability. Turkey’s critical location means that instability within it could spill beyond its borders, with unpredictable effects rippling across its neighbourhood, particularly the Middle East. Turkey sits astride critical waterways and narrows** (the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Bosporous and Dardanelles) **that are channels for trade and the flow of energy to global markets.** Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan is the terminus of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. Turkey is therefore essential to American efforts to reduce the dependence of Azerbaijan, and potentially Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, on Russia’s energy pipelines. **Turkey’s substantial economic and political ties with Georgia and Azerbaijan contribute to the stability of these countries, whose strategic significance far exceeds their standing in commonplace measures of power.** Georgia is a corridor for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, and its stability is under threat because of its testy relationship with Russia and its conflicts with the Russian-supported secessionist stateless Abkhazia and South Ossetia. **Azerbaijan is not only a major energy producer, but also a fellow Turkic country, whose territorial dispute with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh could boil over into wa**r, just as it did in the 1990s, **possible igniting a wider conflagration drawing in Turkey** (Azerbaijan’s ally) **and Russia** (Armenia’s patron) **and putting the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline at risk. Turkey is a democratic and secular Muslim state, and its alliance with the United States helps demonstrate that the United States can maintain friendly and productive ties with an array of Muslim countries – that America does not oppose Islam** per se, but rather the violent extremists who invoke it to justify their violence against innocents and their retrograde, intolerant agenda. This is crucial if the American campaign against terrorism is not to be seen by the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims, as Islamic terrorist groups would like it to be, as a war against Islam itself. **Turkey’s cooperation is essential to any durable political settlement in Iraq, particularly because it borders Iraq’s Kurdish north and fears that the emergence there of a Kurdish state would increase the already-considerable violence and resilient separatist sentiment in its own Kurdish-populated south-east**. The fragmentation of Iraq could therefore prompt Turkish military intervention, which in turn could deal a death blow to the US-Turkish alliance, perhaps even culminating in Turkey’s exit from NATO. (Turkish forces intervened in northern Iraq to attack the camps of the Kurdish separatists guerillas in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War; in March 2003 roughly 1, 500 Turkish troops entered this region; and Turkish Special Forces have reportedly carried out covert operations in post-Saddam Iraq.) Turkey’s disillusionment with the West could prompt a reorientation of its foreign policy away from the United States, the European Union and NATO, and toward a new strategy that looks to China, India, Iran, Russia and Syria. Such a shift is already being discussed in Turkey, and the assumption that it amounts to bluff and bluster may prove short sighted. The new strategic landscape created by the end of the Cold War may pose new threats to Turkey, but it also provides it a choice of new partners as well. While a rethinking of Turkish grand strategy need not in itself undermine the alliance between Turkey and the United States, it could certainly do so if the force driving it is an anti-Western nationalism. **Turkey and the United States both face the threat of terrorism, and Turkey’s cooperation is essential to any truly effective American policy against global terrorist networks. More specifically, Turkey could also serve as a corridor for militant Islamists to infiltrate Iraq and Turkey’s other neighbours. Turkey’s participation in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan**, a military coalition that for a time was commanded by a Turkish general, **demonstrates that Ankara and Washington can cooperate in promoting stability and enabling economic development in war-torn countries**, although Turkey’s military forces in Afghanistan are small and are not deployed in the south, the central theatre of the anti-Taliban war. (Turkey is no different in this respect than the vast majority of other contributors to the force). Turkey is a member of NATO, and the air bases in its southeast, primarily Incirlik but also Batman, Diyarbakir, Maltya and Mus, remain important to the United States. The value of Turkish airfields was revealed after the 1991 Gulf War, when a no-fly zone was established over northern Iraq to protect the Kurds from Saddam Hussein’s military machine. Moreover, despite Washington’s inability to open a second front from the Turkish territory against Iraqi forces in March 2003, American aircraft were permitted to use Turkish airspace for operations in Iraq, and Turkish installations are important for providing logistical support to US forces in Iraq.

US-Turkey Relations Good (Middle East Stability) 2/2

B. Need to prevent regional instability-hard to stop when upset and if unstable, destroys peace and economic stability

Blank 2000 (Stephen, professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. American Grand Strategy and the Transcaspian Region, “U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia,” World Affairs) MJ

**If real peace, true independence, economic stability, and the future prosperity that depends on those three factors are to endure, political stability must take root**. Unfortunately, most factors here work against long-term stability. **The linkage between authoritarian, personalist government and violence is a profound structural cause for regional unrest and ethnic violence**. Once that violence begins, it is hard to stop for two reasons. First, **ethnic wars where land, sovereignty, and the integrity of the state and of the government are at stake are intrinsically harder to stop, even more so than civil wars**.81 **Second, foreign powers are almost certain to try to exploit conflict and perhaps prolong it to their own advantage.**

C. A terrorist getting a hold of nuclear materials is the largest and most probable threat of our time

Siddiqi 4/16 (Shibil, Fellow with the Center for the Study of Global Power and Politics at Trent University, “Terrorism: The nuclear summit’s ‘straw man’,” Asia Times Online, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/LD16Ak02.html) MJ

**American President Barack Obama gathered 47 national delegations for the first Nuclear Security Summit** (NSS) in Washington on April 12 and 13. It was the largest gathering of world leaders in Washington since the close of World War II. The scale of the summit was meant to impress the gravity of the subject matter. **In Obama's words, "This is an unprecedented gathering to address an unprecedented threat": the prevention of nuclear terrorism**. In trademark style, Obama offered rhetorical flourishes to fit the occasion: "**Two decades after the Cold War we face a cruel irony of history. The risk of nuclear confrontation between nations has gone down, but the risk of nuclear attack as gone up". The president said that a tiny scrap of plutonium the size of an apple was now the biggest threat to world stability**, **with "just the tiniest amount of plutonium" in the wrong hands posing potential for catastrophe.** However, the president's assessment of global nuclear threats paper over some basic realities. **The threat of nuclear confrontation remains dangerously high despite the New START** (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) **with Russia and America's passive-aggressive Nuclear Posture Review. This is particularly true along the nuclear fault-lines in the Middle East and South Asia which have existed since the Cold War. Perhaps a "dirty bomb" made out of a handful of plutonium or other radiological material forms the most significant "nuclear" threat to the US**. But outside of this Western-centric world-view, it is the threat of nuclear attack or exchange in the Middle East and South Asia - home to nearly a fourth of the world's population - that clearly remains the largest global nuclear threat.

US-Turkey Relations Good Ext (Middle East)

Turkey-US cohesion key to Middle East stability- Iran, Afghanistan and Israel prove

Goodenough 09 (Patrick, International editor, CNS news, As Turkey Tilts Away From the West, Obama Hails Erdogan As ‘Friend’, <https://mail.google.com/mail/?shva=1#inbox/129bac1c6791f10e>) BAF

President Obama said Monday Turkey could be “an important player” in efforts to prod Iran to keep its nuclear program peaceful – although an increasingly assertive Ankara has tilted perceptibly towards Tehran this year in its standoff with the West. Characterizing Turkey as “a great country” and visiting Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan as a personal friend, Obama said he was optimistic about the prospect of “stronger and stronger” bilateral ties in the future. Turkey, a Muslim but officially secular member of NATO which aspires to join the European Union, is currently a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. It was among the handful of countries Obama visited in his first presidential trip outside North America last April. Speaking after their meeting – which Turkish media noted with enthusiasm had lasted for two hours – Obama praised Turkey for its “outstanding contributions” in Afghanistan. Turkey recently doubled the number of troops deployed in the NATO-led mission there to about 1,750, although none are combat troops. Turkey has the second-largest standing army in NATO (after the U.S.), more than twice the size of that of Britain, which has almost 10,000 troops in Afghanistan. The warm words at the Oval Office came despite recent trends in Turkey, including its criticism of the West’s handling of the Iran issue and a significant cooling in relations with Israel since last winter’s military offensive against Hamas in Gaza. At a time when the West is edging closer to tightening sanctions against Iran, Turkey is pushing in the other direction. Erdogan’s government last week did not support an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolution censuring Iran for its uranium enrichment activities and referring the matter to the U.N. Security Council. Addressing a press conference at a Washington hotel after the White House meeting, Erdogan reiterated his opposition to sanctions. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan addresses lawmakers in Ankara on Tuesday, Dec. 1, 2009. (AP Photo) “We have specifically stated that the [Iran nuclear] question can be resolved through diplomacy and diplomacy only,” he said. U.S. ‘disappointed’ by Turkey’s stance in IAEA vote In a background briefing ahead of the visit, a senior administration official stressed the importance of U.S.-Turkey relations, but also hinted at some of the problem areas. “We have no problem with Turkey reaching out to Iran, talking to Iran,” he said. “But it is important to us that the message be the same” as that of “the rest of the international community.” The official said the U.S. believed sanctions would be most effective if broad and “multi-nationally imposed,” and that “Turkey would be an important player on this issue.” He said Ankara’s decision to abstain rather than vote in favor of the Nov. 27 IAEA resolution had “disappointed” the U.S., which would continue to encourage Turkey and others to join “what we hope will be a common line.” In the vote by the 35-member board of IAEA governors, three countries – Venezuela, Cuba and Malaysia – voted against the resolution and Turkey was joined by Afghanistan, Egypt, Pakistan, Brazil and South Africa in abstaining. Although Turkey has traditionally had better ties with Israel than any other important country in the Muslim world, that changed dramatically this year, with Ankara positioning itself as a leading critic of the Jewish state. On ties with Israel, a second administration official at the briefing said that if the Turks wished to play a constructive role in Mideast peace efforts, “they need to be seen by all relevant participants in such a dialogue as an honest broker.” If Turkey did not return to the “very strong and cooperative relationship” it previously had with Israel, the official said, “it’s going to be harder for them to lead in the way they would like to lead.”

US-Turkey Relations Good (Caucasus)

Without US-Turkey Relations, US would be one-sided on issues in Caucasus, causes instability

Aydin and Erhan 4 (Mustafa, Head of the Department of International Relations, [Çağrı](http://www.google.com/search?tbs=bks:1&tbo=p&q=+inauthor:%22%C3%87a%C4%9Fr%C4%B1+Erhan%22) , Assitant Professor at Ankara University, Turkish-American relations: past, present and future, pg 98) MJ

**The US and Turkish approaches to security issues in the Caucasus region have contained the elements of both convergence and divergence**. In the early 1990s, **Washington did not share Turkish concerns about Moscow’s efforts to reassert its influence over the former Soviet Union’s possessions in the region. Intent on integrating Russia into the Western community of nations and optimistic about its political and economic transformation, the US adopted a policy of benign neglect toward Moscow’s effort to implement its ‘near abroad’ doctrine through overt and covert actions**. Ankara’s objections to the Russian violations of the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in the northern Caucasus and the restationing of Russian forces along Turkey’s borders in Georgia and Azerbaijan did not receive a sympathetic hearing in Washington. However, the US gradually modified its policy in the wake of the conflict in Chechnya and adopted a discernibly more cautious approach to Russian policies in the Caucasus. **The US support for Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project and the American-backed ‘east-west energy corridor’ represented this new approach**, which closely aligned US and Turkish policies after the mid-1990s. The only major exceptionto the convergence of views between Ankara and Washington was the continued US tilt toward Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan. The Armenian diaspora in the US, through its powerful lobby in Washington, has influenced the shaping of US policy on the Azeri-Armenian conflict. After Israel, Armenia has been the second highest recipient of US foreign aid on a per capita basis despite its occupation of more than one-fifth of Azeri territory. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, has been excluded from US assistance by Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act. Turkey has voiced its opposition to this imbalance in US policies and has repeatedly called on Washington to adopt a more even-handed approach.

Conflict in Caucasus causes worldwide war

Blank 2000 (Stephen, professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. American Grand Strategy and the Transcaspian Region, “U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia,” World Affairs) MJ

**Washington’s burgeoning military-political-economic involvement seeks**, inter alia, **to demonstrate the U.S. ability to project military power even into this region or for that matter, into Ukraine where NATO recently held exercises that clearly originated as an anti-Russian scenario**. Secretary of Defense William Cohen has discussed strengthening U.S.-Azerbaijani military cooperation and even training the Azerbaijani army, certainly alarming Armenia and Russia.69 And Washington is also training Georgia’s new Coast Guard. 70 However, Washington’s well-known ambivalence about committing force to Third World ethnopolitical conflicts suggests that U.S. military power will not be easily committed to saving its economic investment. But this ambivalence about committing forces and the dangerous situation, where Turkey is allied to Azerbaijan and Armenia is bound to Russia, create the potential for wider and more protracted regional conflicts among local forces. In that connection, Azerbaijan and Georgia’s growing efforts to secure NATO’s lasting involvement in the region, coupled with Russia’s determination to exclude other rivals, foster a polarization along very traditional lines.71 In 1993 Moscow even threatened World War III to deter Turkish intervention on behalf of Azerbaijan. Yet the new Russo-Armenian Treaty and Azeri-Turkish treaty suggest that Russia and Turkey could be dragged into a confrontation to rescue their allies from defeat. 72 Thus **many of the conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict in which third parties intervene are present in the Transcaucasus**. For example, **many Third World conflicts generated by local structural factors have a great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often feel obliged to rescue their lesser proteges and proxies. One or another big power may fail to grasp the other side’s stakes since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons to prevent a client’s defeat are not as well established or apparent**. Clarity about the nature of the threat could prevent the kind of rapid and almost uncontrolled escalation we saw in 1993 when Turkish noises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan led Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in that case. 73 **Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally, Russian nuclear threats could trigger a potential nuclear blow** (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia’s declared nuclear strategies). **The real threat of a Russian nuclear strike against Turkey to defend Moscow’s interests and forces in the Transcaucasus makes the danger of major war there higher than almost everywhere else**. As Richard Betts has observed, **The greatest danger lies in areas where (1) the potential for serious instability is high; (2) both superpowers perceive vital interests; (3) neither recognizes that the other’s perceived interest or commitment is as great as its own; (4) both have the capability to inject conventional forces; and, (5) neither has willing proxies capable of settling the situation.74**

Turkey-Russo Relations Good (Caucus Stability)

Creation of Russo-Turkish pipelines are key to Abhkazi peace talks

Aparanjedze and Welt 4, (George and Cory, A Georgian-Russian Pipeline: For Peace or Profit?, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav030904.shtml>)

The proposal, however, contains one obvious obstacle: securing a pact that determines Abkhazia's political status. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Talks are currently at an impasse. Despite the public expressions of good will that surrounded Saakashvili's February 10-12 visit to Moscow, Russia and Georgia have been unable for more than a decade to find consensus on the Abkhazia question. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. In addition, Abkhaz leaders have shown no willingness to accept Georgia's current offer of broad autonomy within the Georgian state. In UN-hosted talks with Georgian representatives last month -- the first in three years -- Abkhazia maintained its demands for full independence. Abkhazia also refused to take part with Georgia in peace talks sponsored by Britain, Germany, Russia and the United States last month in Geneva. For Moscow, the timing may be right for both Abkhaz peace and a pipeline. **Russia has taken a dim view of growing US influence in Georgia.**

Caucus stabilty key to preventing further Ossetia invasions and preventing war in Chechnya

Peut 5, (Jean-Christophe, Caucasus/Central Asia: Analysts Expect Security, Economic Gains From BTC Pipeline, <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1058989.html>)

The leaders of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and Kazakhstan gathered near Baku today to inaugurate the $4 billion Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. The project is generally viewed as the key element of an overall plan to turn the Caucasus region into a transport corridor connecting Central Asia to Western Europe. But regional experts say that by helping make the region safer, the project's expected economic benefits might eventually outweigh its geostrategic importance. [For coverage of the ceremony, see "Caspian-Mediterranean Oil Pipeline Launched In Baku".] I believe that the idea of regional security is what prevails here," Tvalchrelidze said. "Had this pipeline been under construction in the years 1991 to 1992, for example, Georgia would never have gone into trouble with [its separatist republics] of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The reactions of the world community to these conflicts would have been totally different -- maybe even similar to that we've seen [recently] in Iraq." Tvalchrelidze also said he believes BTC might even have a positive impact of the war in Chechnya, since the pipeline could help cut many potential channels of oil contraband -- one of the main sources of revenues for both Russian army generals and Chechen fighters.

Turkey-Russo Relations Good (Pipelines)

A. Turkey-Russian relations are the foundation of pipelines and stability in the Caucuses

Bhadrakumar 10, M K, Asia Times Coordinator and Staff Writer, Central Asian segment, May 15, 2010, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/LE15Ag01.html>)

However, an historic breakthrough in Russia's ties with Turkey does not quite fall into this category. A tempo has been steadily building up over the past two decades for Russian-Turkish relations to develop into a strategic partnership between the two rivals who constantly jostled or even fought bloody wars against each other through centuries. Their post-Cold War "reset" - as much at Ankara's initiative as Moscow's - in actuality by far predates the Obama era, and is based on well-thought-out foundations of hardcore mutual interests. Medvedev's visit to Ankara this week has cemented this phenomenal transformation in the ties and launches it onto a far higher trajectory. A relationship that was heavily based on economic interests so far is rapidly acquiring political content. As Medvedev pointed out on Wednesday, "Russia and Turkey are strategic partners, not only in words but genuinely." Russia already meets close to 70% of Turkey's energy needs, and the established cooperation is also expected to grow. The two countries are discussing Russia's possible involvement in the north-south 550-kilometer oil pipeline to connect the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean, which was envisaged as a Turkish-Italian project. In effect, Russia is helping Turkey realize its ambition to become a global hub for energy transportation, while Moscow expects Ankara not to promote pipeline projects that rival Russia's. The two countries are inching closer to cooperation in the Moscow-backed South Stream gas pipeline project that binds the south European markets to Russia's energy sources. In geopolitical terms, among other things, Turkey is playing a role in facilitating the return of Russia to its Slavic backyard in the Balkans from where it was rudely evicted in the 1990s with the West's dismantling of the former state of Yugoslavia, as well as in buttressing Russia's lead role in supplying energy to Europe. The developing Russia-Turkish coordination of positions over the South Caucasus aims at creating a regional security system. Arguably, the process is also subject to the US's acceptance and the climate of a US-Russia "reset" will have a bearing. As a Turkish report pointed out, "Azerbaijan is leaning toward Turkey, Armenia has embraced Russia, and [Georgia](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/LE15Ag01.html##) has been seeking rapprochement with NATO and the US. When these countries lean (or are prodded) toward different supports, it usually ends badly, as proved by the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia."

B. Caucus stabilty key to preventing further Ossetia invasions and preventing war in Chechnya

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Turkey-Russo Relations Good (Pipelines Extension)

**Pipelines in the Caucuses are key to stopping the Karabakh conflict and assisting millions of refugees, leeches that are impairing the Caucuses’ stability**

Azerbaijan News 10, (Azerbaijan key for South Caucasus energy stability Sat 05 June 2010 | 07:03 GMT <http://www.news.az/articles/16946>)

Emphasizing regional security in the South Caucasus, Veliyev said mediation for the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave was essential for securing the energy supply in the region and to Europe.   
Veliev warned of instability and a “polarized South Caucasus,” citing over 1 million refugees from the Karabakh conflict and an influx of radicals from Asia and the Northern Caucasus trying to settle in Azerbaijan. He also lamented the lack of acceptance of the Madrid principle by Armenia, which he said would be a step toward solving the conflict.

Creation of Russo-Turkish pipelines are key to Abhkazi peace talks

Aparanjedze and Welt 4, (George and Cory, A Georgian-Russian Pipeline: For Peace or Profit?, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav030904.shtml>)

The proposal, however, contains one obvious obstacle: securing a pact that determines Abkhazia's political status. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Talks are currently at an impasse. Despite the public expressions of good will that surrounded Saakashvili's February 10-12 visit to Moscow, Russia and Georgia have been unable for more than a decade to find consensus on the Abkhazia question. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. In addition, Abkhaz leaders have shown no willingness to accept Georgia's current offer of broad autonomy within the Georgian state. In UN-hosted talks with Georgian representatives last month -- the first in three years -- Abkhazia maintained its demands for full independence. Abkhazia also refused to take part with Georgia in peace talks sponsored by Britain, Germany, Russia and the United States last month in Geneva. For Moscow, the timing may be right for both Abkhaz peace and a pipeline. Russia has taken a dim view of growing US influence in Georgia.

-----Politics-----

Link-Plan Unpopular

Withdrawal is unpopular with the senate, due to Obama’s flip flop on military deployment

MacAskill et al 9, (Ewen MacAskill , Washington, Richard Norton-Taylor and Nicholas Watt, The Guardian London Edition December 3, 2009, Thursday, Afghanistan: Obama's friends and enemies line up to hit out at withdrawal date: President faces struggle to sell $30bn plan to Congress as Democrats, Republicans and UK military question strategy) WDK

Obama's new Afghanistan plan met widespread skepticism yesterday from both Democrats and Republicans who challenged him over the troop escalation and the planned date for the start of withdrawal. US allies, in particular British military commanders, also questioned the wisdom of setting a withdrawal date and described US projections for expanding the Afghan army and police as optimistic. Obama sent the secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, the defence [secretary, Robert Gates](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9716714281&returnToId=20_T9716718603&csi=138620&A=0.1652854862157681&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE0009XOK%23&searchTerm=secretary,%20Robert%20Gates&indexType=P), and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, Mike Mullen, to Congress yesterday as part of a charm offensive. But Democrats and Republicans on the Senate armed services committee challenged [**Obama**](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9716714281&returnToId=20_T9716718603&csi=138620&A=0.1652854862157681&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0BO%23&searchTerm=Obama&indexType=P).

Republicans find many logical fallacies within withdrawal plans, Afghanistan as the empirical example

MacAskill et al 9, (Ewen MacAskill , Washington, Richard Norton-Taylor and Nicholas Watt, The Guardian London Edition December 3, 2009, Thursday, Afghanistan: Obama's friends and enemies line up to hit out at withdrawal date: President faces struggle to sell $30bn plan to Congress as Democrats, Republicans and UK military question strategy) WDK

Obama's security team. The Republican John McCain described the plan as "logically incoherent". He said it made no sense to announce a date. "That gives the wrong impression to our friends, it's the wrong impression to give our enemies." The opposition on Capitol Hill underlined the hard sell that lies ahead for [Obama](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T9716714281&returnToId=20_T9716718603&csi=138620&A=0.1652854862157681&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE000A0BO%23&searchTerm=Obama%20&indexType=P) as he needs congressional approval for the $30bn plan. He announced he was to send 30,000 extra troops, bringing the US total to 100,000, while also setting July 2011 as the date for the start of US withdrawal, though with no end date fixed.

Republicans dislike military withdrawal, preferring uninterrupted troop movements by the president

Yan 10, (Editor at Xianshian News Online, U.S. Republicans blast Obama's Afghanistan withdrawal date, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-06/28/c_13372358.htm>) WDK

In this political climate, debate rages over which branch of government ought to control the military. Republicans generally favor a strong Executive capable of conducting war without congressional interference.' Democrats tend to favor a reserved Executive unable to use military force in most instances without congressional consent.'' In support of these views, each party has claimed the high ground as the true guardian of the Constitution. The left claims to be protecting the Constitution's separation of powers.' The Right claims fidelity to the Constitution's understanding of the President as commander in chief."

Link-Plan Unpopular

Plan would divide his base—Dems want Incirlik Air Force Base

The Hill 7

Democrats torn over Turkey resolution - TheHill.com, <http://thehill.com/homenews/news/13384-democrats-torn-over-turkey-resolution>, By Jackie Kucinich - 10/17/07 08:26 AM ET

Senior House Democrats, including House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton (Mo.), have begun a campaign to oppose a resolution that would condemn Turkey for the Armenian genocide that occurred during World War I. Skelton and Rep. Solomon Ortiz (D-Texas) asked their colleagues on Oct. 11 to sign a letter to Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) objecting to the resolution, arguing its passage could harm U.S. security interests in the Middle East. The non-binding resolution would require the president to call the killing of an estimated 1.5 million Armenians between the years 1915 and 1923 “genocide.” The House Foreign Affairs panel passed the resolution 27-21 on Oct. 10. “The government of Turkey, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, eight former Secretaries of State, and the three former Secretaries of Defense have warned us that congressional recognition of genocide claims will lead to a review by Turkey of the entire U.S.-Turkey relationship,” Skelton wrote. “Over half the cargo flown into Iraq and Afghanistan comes through Incirlik Air Base,” the letter continued. “Additionally, the U.S. military’s use of Incirlik Air Base will be an invaluable component to a successful and safe redeployment of our troops when the time comes.”

Link-Plan=Win

Withdrawing from Incirlik would be a win for Pelosi—It has been on her agenda for years

The Hill 7

Democrats torn over Turkey resolution - TheHill.com, <http://thehill.com/homenews/news/13384-democrats-torn-over-turkey-resolution>, By Jackie Kucinich - 10/17/07 08:26 AM ET

Pelosi and Majority Leader Steny Hoyer (D-Md.), longtime human rights supporters, both favor the resolution. Hoyer told reporters on Tuesday that he hoped a vote could take place before Nov. 16, although he said he would confer among other Democrats first.   “[Democrats] seem more interested in declaring an Armenian genocide than then they are interested in stopping funding for the war. This could almost be Terri Schiavo,” Rep. Tom Davis (R-Va.) said.       Skelton and Ortiz are not the only Democrats concerned about the vote. Pelosi ally Rep. John Murtha (D-Pa.) will hold a press conference with four other Democrats on Wednesday to try and persuade their leadership to keep the legislation from coming to the House floor. Democratic Reps. Alcee Hastings (Fla.), Robert Wexler (Fla.), Steve Cohen (Tenn.), and John Tanner (Tenn.) will also participate in the news conference “This happened a long time ago. I don’t know if it was a massacre or a genocide,” said Murtha, who chairs the House Appropriations Defense subcommittee. “But we’ve got to deal with today’s world.” Murtha said he had discouraged Pelosi from bringing the bill to a vote six months ago. “Turkey is a valuable ally,” Murtha said, noting he had helped lead the fight against the resolution in 1987 as well. “Thirty percent of our material goes through Turkey.” Rep. Jane Harman (D-Calif.) on Tuesday also voiced her opposition to the resolution, calling it “highly destabilizing.” Despite the growing opposition, Pelosi has her allies. Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Tom Lantos (D-Calif.) strongly backs the bill, a reversal from his prior stance. In 2000, he said that “Saddam Hussein will be the prime beneficiary of this legislation.” Lantos’s office did not return a call for comment. Turkish officials have said the resolution would harm relations between Turkey and the United States. Turkey acknowledges that hundreds of thousands of Armenians died as modern Turkey grew out of the crumbling Ottoman Empire, but it contends the killings were part of a civil war and that atrocities were committed on both sides.

Plan is a win for Obama—it reverses Bush’s aggressive foreign policy

Kevin Tuma 4-2 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-creamer/ten-rules-for-democratic\_b\_521574.html

The midterms will see dramatic Democratic losses...passage of Obamacare insured what was already a very high likelihood of losses. The key problem for this administration is that a silent majority of US voters wants two things: A.) A better economy, and B.) Less government intrusion in their lives. Obama deserves some sympathy for his failure to quickly reverse the economy's downward trend since that was caused by 35 years of Keynesianism and too much Bush Administration spending, especially on foreign wars. On the other hand, Obama's surge in Afghanistan and his foolish decision to continue neo-con foreign policy in Iraq, instead of ending the war, insured even more gluttonous military spending with no end in sight. As far as the Patriot Act and other Draconian civil liberties issues, the performance of Obama and the current Congress can be described as nothing less than a 'betrayal'. It is obvious peace on Earth and civil liberties are, to Democrats in Washington, just another empty campaign issue to be ignored at best after getting into office. The midterms will be a disaster; at the very minimum as bad as Clinton's midterms in 1994.

Link-Hurts Political Capital

Weak foreign policy positions hurt Obama’s standing

**STAROBIN 2 – 1 – 10**  National Journal Contributor

[Paul Starobin, Obama's Weakened Position: What Does It Mean For U.S. Foreign Policy?, http://security.nationaljournal.com/2010/02/obamas-weakened-position-what.php]

President Obama is in a rough political patch with the apparent demise of his top domestic priority, universal health care; with the loss of a 60-vote Democratic supermajority in the Senate; with improved Republican prospects for the midterm elections in November; and with his once sky-high approval rating now below 50 percent. So, **what does his weakened position mean for his handling of foreign affairs and for the tack that allies, rivals and outright enemies take toward the U.S.?** With his focus on "jobs, jobs, jobs," **Obama devoted a grand total of nine minutes to national security issues in his State of the Union address.** Does this suggest **less activism on the foreign policy front**? If so, **Obama would be going against the historical pattern, which suggests that a president weakened on the domestic front is likely to become more energetic in foreign affairs** as the realm that is less subject to congressional and political control at home (Bill Clinton and Richard Nixon are examples). In any case, what is the best course for Obama at this juncture? **Should he try to improve his standing at home with a prestige-enhancing triumph abroad?** Are there such opportunities out there -- for example, a bold deal with the Russians on nuclear disarmament, a tough package of sanctions against Iran, a breakthrough on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Are the Russians, the Chinese, the Pakistanis, the Iranians, the Indians, the Japanese, the Europeans, likelier to be tougher or more accommodating with Obama facing troubles at home? (Or to put it another way: Do any of them want to see Obama fail?) Is a **weakened Obama in danger of being seen as another Jimmy Carter** -- that is, **as an ineffectual president not likely to serve another term**? (The analyst Les Gelb of the Council on Foreign Relations is already likening Obama to Carter.) Is his damaged domestic position likely to matter in any way to Al Qaeda and other anti-U.S. Islamic militant groups? Any and all speculations on this theme are welcome.

-----Topicality-----

T: Military Presence

US military presence and NATO TNWS are separate presences

Lamond 9 (Claudine, Senior analyst and contributor to International Security Report, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Russian Foreign Policy,” International Security Report, http://www.atlantic-community.org/app/webroot/files/articlepdf/140809\_ISR%20-%20Russian%20TNW%20C%20Lamond.pdf) MJ

**Recent years have signaled a low point in Russia‐US relations. NATO’s eastward expansion, the continued presence of NATO’s TNW in Europe, US military and oil presence in central Asia**, and the Bush administration’s plans for new missile defense systems on Russia’s border **have been seen as direct attacks on Russian influence and her ability to protect herself.** In a recent speech in Helsinki, Russian President Dimitri Medvedev said: “The rules of international law are applied selectively, on the basis of so‐called political expediency, and sometimes simply ignored. In our view, there are quite a few examples of this in contemporary Europe: the military operation in the Balkans, the recognition of Kosovo, the Caucasus crisis resulting from the attack on South Ossetia last year, and the crisis in talks on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. These examples could be multiplied indefinitely.”12 Former President Gorbachev also complains that US behaviour since the end of the Cold War (that he played such a central role in facilitating) stymied any progress over 20 years and still has the potential to threaten a new arms race.13

-----Framework-----

Institutional Focus Good

Institutional focus allows for functional decisionmaking and concrete policy

Taylor Et Al 05 (Bryan C, University of Colorado at Boulder, WILLIAM J. KINSELLA North Carolina State University, STEPHEN P. DEPOE MARIBETH S. METZLER University of Cincinnati, “Nuclear Legacies: Communication, Controversy, and the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Production Complex.”, Communication Yearbook 29, http://comm.colorado.edu/~taylorbc/Nuclear%20Legacies%20CY29.pdf) BAF

First, further research is warranted regarding the rhetorical practices by which stakeholders are hailed (both by officials and each other) to participate in policy making (Boiko et al., 1996) and are subsequently enabled and constrained. Crucial here are institutional dynamics that function pragmatically to shape the terms of discussion, the scope of actors’ involvement, the legitimacy of particular speakers and speech acts, the rate, sequence, and duration of decision making, and the ways in which technical and nontechnical discourses are articulated (Fiorino, 1996; Kinsella, 2001, 2002, 2004; Laird, 1993; Mehta, 1998). Research with this focus would engage the micropractices of participants: How do officials manage public meetings and respond to hostile questions (Campbell, Follender, & Shane, 1998; McComas, 2001, 2003a, 2003b)? How appropriately do facilitators summarize the discourse of focus groups? How do opponents succumb to or resist capture and the subversion of their Nuclear Legacies 383 alternate values by expert nuclear discourses (Cohn, 1987)?10 This focus recovers nuclear democracy as a local, communicative accomplishment, whose forms and practices may vary widely from one scene to another, based on the structures and cultures of particular decision-making and advisory groups (Bradbury & Branch, 1999; Weeks, 2000). A related issue concerns the integrity of communicative practices suppressed in vernacular criteria used by officials to manage, and by researchers to assess, public participation programs. Stakeholders, for example, commonly perceive particular attributes as necessary for successful programs (e.g., the decision-making process allows full and active stakeholder participation; Carnes, Schweitzer, Peelle, Wolfe, & Munro, 1998; Hanford Advisory Board, 2002). They often lack, however, sufficient resources for understanding how actual (as opposed to hypothetical or idealized) communication accomplishes these outcomes. This focus recovers the practices that saturate nuclear decision making in local, concrete situations (Mehta, 1998) and enables the development of associated practical theory (Cronen, 1995). Potentially, this research clarifies how affected groups may successfully self-organize to emerge as effective counterpublics, developing and using multipronged, multimodal opposition to engage the complexities of nuclear weapons production and its persistent culture of secrecy. At sites such as Fernald and Hanford, for example (Metzler, 1997; Ratliff, 1998), liminal actors such as whistleblowers, independent scientists, and downwinders (Kinsella, 2001) have effectively challenged the DOE by deploying alternative discourses and forms of knowledge.

-----A2: Nuclear Secrecy Bad Advantage-----

Nuclear Secrecy Good

Nuclear security is necessary to prevent terrorism

Kestenbaum 07 (David, bachelor’s from Yale University and doctorate from Harvard, NPR correspondent, U.S. Nuclear Warhead Numbers Are Kept Secret,

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10816625, NPR)OLW

The U.S. government announced Thursday that it has increased the rate at which it is dismantling nuclear warheads. The actual number of weapons taken apart is classified, however, as are most numbers associated with the stockpile. Some officials and lawmakers are trying to change that. Thomas D'Agostino, an official at the National Nuclear Security Administration in Washington, oversees the dismantlement work. He says taking apart a nuclear weapon requires time and care. "I don't want to make it seem this is just grab your Phillips screwdriver and start unscrewing things and taking them apart," D'Agostino said. "These are warheads that have conventional high explosives. We worry about lightning. We worry about static electricity. And we are not about to tolerate any errors in this area." D'Agostino said crews have taken apart 50 percent more nuclear warheads in the past eight months than they dismantled all year in 2006. He said he couldn't be more specific. "I am a bit frustrated I can't tell you the details," D'Agostino said. "I think it would be a good thing for you to hear them." He said the numbers reflect that the Cold War is over and that the stockpile is shrinking. Some lawmakers have expressed frustration about the policy that keeps the numbers secret: It dates back to the 1990s. U.S. Rep. David Hobson (R-OH) said at a Congressional hearing that he wants the figures made public in order to facilitate open debate about what the total number of warheads should be. "I've been pushing this for years, and the administration has resisted. I don't know why," Hobson said. "I suspect our potential adversaries know the number of U.S. nuclear warheads much better than do the members of Congress. I think I know the number, but I can't talk about it." The Department of Defense issued a statement to NPR, saying, "The basis for the security requirement ... is to deny militarily useful information to potential or actual enemies, to enhance the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence and to contribute to the security of nuclear weapons, especially against threats of sabotage and terrorism."

**Secrecy key to security**

National Research Council, 5 (Committee on International Security and Arms Control, Monitoring Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear-Explosive Materials:

An Assessment of Methods and Capabilities, page 183 http://books.nap.edu/catalog.php?record\_id=11265)

We concluded in Chapters 2 and 3 that procedures and technology are available to verify with high confidence declarations of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and nuclear-explosive materials (NEM) at declared sites. But undeclared nuclear weapons and NEM could exist as a consequence of retention of undeclared existing nuclear weapons and NEM or could come into existence by the clandestine production of nuclear weapons from existing NEM. In addition, undeclared NEM for weapons might be produced clandestinely or diverted covertly from peaceful nuclear power programs. Current non-nuclear weapon states and possibly terrorist groups might also acquire nuclear weapons or NEM. The potential for clandestine activities in these categories poses the largest challenges to efforts to strengthen transparency and monitoring for nuclear weapons, components, and materials on a comprehensive basis.

**Nuclear secrecy key to deterrence**

Noonan 3/4/10 (John, staff writer, The Weekly Standard, DoD releases nuclear stockpile figures, http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/dod-releases-nuclear-stockpile-figures)

Yesterday, the Obama administration released the DoD's official nuclear stockpile figures. For decades, the size and shape of America's atomic arsenal have been deliberately kept secret, and for good reason. There's always been a calculated sense of ambiguity around our nuclear forces and our deterrence strategies, with the logic being that an enemy --if left to speculate about how, when, where, and if we'd use our nukes-- would err on the side of caution and keep his fangs tucked.

Nuclear Secrecy Good

Classification is needed to secure the U.S.

National Research Council 95 (National Academy of Sciences think tank for pub policy, A review of the Department of Energy classification policy and practice http://books.google.com/books?id=qWettBF2ZYwC&source=gbs\_navlinks\_s page 1-2)

DOE’s initiatives take place within a larger, government-wide effort to reexamine classification policy in the wake of the end of the Cold War. U.S. national security policy is no longer directed against the overarching threat of the Soviet Union and its allies. The primary concern of protecting information related to nuclear weapons has shifted to stemming the threat of nuclear proliferation. This complicates some aspects of maintaining the classification system. Protecting information about old nuclear weapons designs or outdated production techniques was formerly considered important but had a lower priority simply because a sophisticated nuclear weapons power like the Soviet Union already had such information. Now, however, protecting such information is essential because the would-be nuclear powers of the greatest proliferation concern are less technically sophisticated nations or even terrorist groups, and older (or generally simpler) design and production techniques might better match the capabilities of a potential proliferator. No forseeable new nuclear state would pose a threat to the United States and its allies comparable to the threat from the former Soviet bloc. Thus, information that could have helped the Soviet bloc war planners such as the size and composition of fissionable materials inventories or data on most past nuclear weapons activities (but not designs) that might reveal present total capability, is not longer as sensitive as it was once believed to be. Classification policy must reflect a balance of opposing values. Powerful and compelling reasons continue to exist for protecting genuinely sensitive nuclear weapons information even though considerable information is already in the public domain. Access to classified information is no longer necessary for a potential proliferator to construct a simple nuclear weapon, but such access could make it significantly easier to build such a device or to make it more effective. The Department would fail in its responsibilities if it did not protect certain design and production information, but the appropriate scope of the information that warrants such careful protection is difficult to define.

Disclosing information on stockpiles allows terrorists to seize weapons

AFP 2009 (Slip-up lays bare US secret nuclear sites: NYT, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5h8C28WJK0nKl6ADPSI4cMr1OXQmg)

WASHINGTON (AFP) — The US government accidentally made public a secret report detailing its nuclear sites, programs and even exact locations of nuclear stockpiles, The New York Times reported Wednesday. "The federal government mistakenly made public (the) 266-page report," the Times reported, noting that the blunder was revealed Monday in an online newsletter about federal secrecy. "That set off a debate among nuclear experts about what dangers, if any, the disclosures posed. It also prompted a flurry of investigations in Washington into why the document had been made public," the Times said, adding that by late Tuesday "after inquiries from The New York Times, the document was withdrawn from a Government Printing Office Web site." House Speaker Nancy Pelosi said Wednesday she had called for an investigation into the incident. "The disclosure of information related to nuclear facilities suggests that the current system does not provide adequate review and safeguards," she said in a statement. "Accordingly, I have asked the Government Accountability Office to investigate immediately what led to the disclosure of this information and to make recommendations to prevent a similar disclosure in the future." Several analysts said the security breach was not devastating "given that the general outlines of the most sensitive information were already known publicly," the report said. "These screw-ups happen," the Times quoted John Deutch, a former director of central intelligence now a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as saying. "It's going further than I would have gone but doesn't look like a serious breach." The information was described as "confidential but not classified," the Times added. David Albright, of the Institute for Science and International Security here, told the paper however that making the locations of nuclear material available "can provide thieves or terrorists inside information that can help them seize the material, which is why that kind of data is not given out."

-----A2: Deterrence Bad Advantage-----

Deterrence is Moral

Far from being immoral, nuclear deterrence can help to prevent conflict

Shaw 84 (William, Chair and Professor of Philosophy, San Jose State University, Nuclear Deterrence and Deontology p. 250-251) MAH

Suppose, however, that in order to deter Hatfield, McCoy threatens I-latfield’s family. Those who would suffer from McCoy’s threatened re- taliation would thus include some who were not guilty of launching the initial, immoral attack. This brings the analogy doser to the real world of nuclear deterrence, in which a retaliatory second strike (whether “counterforce” or "countervalue") would clearly result in the death of millions who are not culpable for the original attack. ln some circumstances nations can be viewed as corporate actors, but I know of no plausible theory of moral responsibility which, given political realities today, would hold that the citizenry of an atomic aggressor deserves decimation. Nor will any “double-think about double effect” make such a response morally permissible? McCoy may be permitted to punish Hatfield, but he cannot justifiably attack Hatfield°s innocent family in order to retaliate against Hatfield, even for the destruction of his (McCoy’s) own family. Such a response falls outside the lex talionis and would be immoral from almost any imaginable normative perspective. l shall therefore assume, though l shall not argue for it further, that it would be immoral for a nation to carry out a nuclear second strike, the threatening of which is the basis of deterrent strategy. (Note that the deontologist's case against deterrence will not get very far if this assumption is not granted, that is, if it is morally permissible to retaliate against the civilian population of the other side.) Does it follow from the above that it is immoral for McCoy to threaten to respond to Hatfield’s attack with an action which it would be immoral for him actually to carry out? A number of philosophers have held that it is indeed immoral to threaten an immoral action. Michael Walzer, for example, endorses Paul Ramsey's declaration that “whatever is wrong to do is wrong to threaten,” clearly holding that nuclear threats are immoral and that our deterrent policy is essentially a “commitment to murder." Likewise, Anthony Kenny holds that 'NATO defense policy involves a readiness to commit murder on a gigantic scale.” The threat to do so is, of course, conditional, but “one may not intend even conditionally to do what is forbidden absolutely.” lf deterrence is successful, of course, then the threatened immoral action will not in fact happen. But this is not thought to make much moral difference since we are in effect holding the civilian population of the other nation hostage. Ramsey, for example, views the targeting of cities as morally equivalent to tying children to the bumpers of cars in order to ensure that people drive carefully, and Douglas Lackey contends that nuclear deterrence is analogous to McCoy kidnapping Hatfield’s child and wiring him to explosives in order to prevent Hatfield’s attack. McCoy, he says, has no right to increase the chance of Hatfeld’s child dying. On closer inspection, however, this line of reasoning is less conclusive than Ramsey and Lackey think. First, their analogies involve kidnapping, yet “holding hostage" the opposed population with nuclear weapons in no way limits its movement or activities. The mere pointing of French ICBMs at Soviet cities, scary as it may be, restricts no Soviet citi1en’s liberty. Soviet are not being tied to bumpers or wired to explosives: their lives of joy and sorrow will unfold much the same whether or not they are “held hostage.” Second, McCoy need not claim a “right” to threaten the Hatfield child (let alone to kidnap him), in the sense of putting Hatfield under an obligation not to remove his child from that threat. Rather, McCoy need only advance the weaker claim that he has no obligation not to threaten conduct harmful to Hatlield's child in order to dissuade Hatfield from an immoral action. Does Hatfield’s child have some right, which could furnish the ground of this putative obligation, not to have his life made the basis of a threat directed at his father (indeed the child himself may not know about the threat), or do the denizens of Leningrad have a right not to have French missiles pointed their way? Talk of rights is frequently rather loose these days, but even so it is hard to see what would be the basis of these supposed rights. Third, does McCoy's threat actually increase the chance of Hatlield's child dying, as Lackey assumes? lf McCoy’s threat were a bluff, then it would not enhance the chiId’s danger. On the other hand, if the threat is real but deters successfully, then no harm comes to the youngster. Has his chance of dying nonetheless been increased? The answer will obviously depend upon the circumstances, but if the predictable response to Hatfield's actions involves some risk to his family in any case (perhaps they will inevitably be endangered when he is pursued), then McCoy‘s threat may in fact lower the actual. though perhaps not the perceived, risk to Hatlield’s child. Many people assume that the nuclear era has made our lives more perilous, but if it were the case that the American hydrogen arsenal has prevented not just nuclear war, but a conventional conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union that would have occurred in a non- nuclear post-World War ll world, then it may actually have increased not only our safety, but the safety of the civilians held “hostage” in the USSR.

Deterrence is Moral

Nuclear deterrence is not deontologically immoral

Shaw 84 (William, Chair and Professor of Philosophy, San Jose State University, Nuclear Deterrence and Deontology p. 250-251) MAH

Although it is easy to be misled by current talk of limited nuclear exchanges and of the importance of winning nuclear encounters, the basis of American policy has been and continues to be the deterrence of nuclear warfare. We have grown accustomed to the concept of nuclear deterrence and to the corresponding reality of mutual balance of terror, but as the political debate grows, the strategy of deterrence deserves renewed ethical scrutiny. Technical discussions of nuclear policy generally proceed along at least implicitly utilitarian lines. Nuclear deterrence, though widely held to be distasteful, is nonetheless presumed to be, in some form or other, justifiable as the best course of action available to us under the circumstances. Over the years, however, a number of philosophers and theologians, focusing on the moral rather than technical aspects of nuclear deterrence. have challenged it from a deontological perspective, and it is this challenge that l wish to examine. Conventional wisdom may be mistaken in supposing that utilitarianism sanctions nuclear deterrence but such an issue involves questions of political fact and probabilities which l shall try to avoid here. In this essay I set aside the utilitarian approach in order to investigate the deontological critique of deterrence as much as possible on its own territory. After examining various grounds for rejecting a strategy of nuclear deterrence, I argue that such a strategy does not stumble over any deontological hurdles.

AT: US Nukes Not Key to Deterrence

Claims that TNW’s no longer deter is a flawed assumption that relies on nonexistent knowledge about how future leaders will react to nuclear threats

Payne 9 (Keith, President and co-founder of the National Institute for Public Policy, On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2009/Spring/payne.pdf>) MAH

Some contemporary commentators take the plausible cases described above to the extreme and assert that US nuclear weapons now offer little or no added value for deterrence over nonnuclear capabilities. The rationale for this assertion is derived from the old balance of terror formula: predictable deterrent effect is equated to the United States’ capability to threaten the destruction of a select set of opponents’ tangible, physical targets. Consequently, if nonnuclear weapons now can threaten to destroy most or all of that set of targets, then nuclear weapons supposedly no longer are of value for deterrence. The vulnerability of the designated targets, not the specific US instrument of threat, is expected to determine the deterrent effect. The first of these propositions—that deterrent effect can be equated to target coverage—is fundamentally flawed. The second also is highly suspect; it certainly is possible to hope that US nuclear weapons no longer are critical for deterrence, just as it is possible to hope that all leaders will learn to be responsible and prudent. To assert confidently that US nuclear weapons no longer are valuable for deterrence purposes, however, is to claim knowledge about how varied contemporary and future leaders in diverse and often unpredictable circumstances will interpret and respond to the distinction between nuclear and nonnuclear threats. Those who make such a claim presume knowledge that they do not and cannot have. In addition, a popular refrain of some commentators is that US nuclear weapons should be considered useful only for deterring nuclear attack.2 This is not, and has not been, US deterrence policy. The only apparent rationale for this assertion is to buttress the claim that the deterrence value of nuclear weapons is narrow in scope and purpose and that the commentators’ favored steps toward nuclear disarmament could eliminate even that value; if deterring nuclear threats is the only purpose for US nuclear weapons, they will then have no unique value if others move away from nuclear weapons. This proposition is logical but artificially narrow. It misses other severe nonnuclear threats to the United States and allies that may not be deterred reliably absent US nuclear capabilities, such as threats posed by chemical and biological weapons (CBW). Commentators can claim for political reasons that US nuclear capabilities should be considered pertinent for deterring only nuclear threats but CBW threats are real and growing and there is no basis to conclude that US nonnuclear capabilities would suffice to deter them. Even if the vision of the complete worldwide elimination On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Spring 2009 [ 45 ] of nuclear weapons were to be realized, CBW threats would remain. The most that can be said in this regard is that US nuclear weapons might or might not be necessary for this deterrence goal—hardly a robust basis for making profound policy decisions about the most fundamental security questions.

US Nuclear weapons can successfully deter threats

Payne 9 (Keith, President and co-founder of the National Institute for Public Policy, On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2009/Spring/payne.pdf>) MAH

The question in this scenario is whether US nonnuclear capabilities alone would constitute an adequate basis for this deterrence message. As noted above, there is no useful a priori answer to this question. Some plausible circumstances, however, suggest the potential unique value of nuclear threats. For example, if a pitched conventional conflict is in progress and the opponent already has been subjected to an intense US campaign of nonnuclear “shock and awe,” could the threat of further US nonnuclear fire in response to an opponent’s CBW attack be decisive in the opponent’s decision making? The United States could threaten to set aside some targeting limitations on its nonnuclear forces for this deterrence purpose. Would such a nonnuclear threat dominate the opponent’s calculation of risk, cost, and gain? Or, might it look like “more of the same” and have little prospect of being decisive in the opponent’s decision making? The answers to such questions certainly are not so self-evident as to suggest that US nuclear threats would provide no unique added deterrent value. Nuclear weapons may be so much more lethal and distinguishable from nonnuclear threats that, on occasion, they can deter an opponent who would not otherwise be susceptible to control. Strategic nuclear threats have the potentially important advantages of extreme lethality from afar and a relatively obvious firebreak. These could be important qualities to deter CBW first or second use and to help deter future third-party CBW use. Clinton administration secretary of defense Les Aspin rightly pointed to the prospective value of US nuclear weapons for the deterrence of CBW threats given the proliferation of the latter: “Since the United States has forsworn chemical and biological weapons, the role of US nuclear forces in deterring or responding to such nonnuclear threats must be considered.”

AT: US Nukes Not Key to Deterrence

Even if they are not useful for fighting wars, nuclear weapons are still successful deterrents

Payne 9 (Keith, President and co-founder of the National Institute for Public Policy, On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2009/Spring/payne.pdf>) MAH

Linking the assertion that there are few, if any, necessary “combat” roles for nuclear weapons to the conclusion that nuclear weapons lack deterrence value is a non sequitur, even if true. Nuclear weapons could be deemed to have no value whatsoever for combat missions and remain absolutely key to the deterrence of war and the assurance of allies. Deterrence involves exploiting opponents’ fears and sensitivities and may have little or no connection to US preferences for the wartime employment of force for combat missions. Assurance, in turn, requires the easing of allies’ fears and sensitivities, which again may have little or nothing to do with how the United States might prefer to terminate a conflict. Whether US nuclear capabilities are regarded as useful or not “to fight or terminate a conventional conflict” may tell us nothing about their potential value for the political/psychological purposes of assurance and punitive deterrence. Deterrence, assurance, and war fighting are different functions with possibly diverse and separate standards for force requirements. The potentially different force standards for these different goals should not be confused. This most basic confusion was apparent during the congressional discussions of the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP). The RNEP evolved from studies conducted during the Clinton administration and subsequently was pursued by the Bush administration as potentially important for deterrence purposes.6 Yet, some congressional opponents of the RNEP pointed to the apparent lack of a “specific military requirement” as a basis for their opposition.7 One prominent member of Congress stated that no “military requirement for a nuclear earth penetrator” has been “articulated to me.”

Israeli – Iraqi conflict proves threats can be deterred with nuclear weapons

Payne 9 (Keith, President and co-founder of the National Institute for Public Policy, On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2009/Spring/payne.pdf>) MAH

Whether or not nuclear weapons are considered useful for combat missions or have been asked for by military commanders, a quick review of available evidence points toward their potentially unique value or deterrence and assurance. For example, in the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq launched 88 conventionally armed Scud missiles against targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia; those missile strikes continued until the end of the war. In Israel and the United States there was concern that Iraq would use chemical weapons.9 The anticipation of such attacks led Israeli citizens to take shelter in specially sealed rooms and to wear gas masks. Although Iraq did not employ chemical or biological warheads, Scud strikes directly inflicted more than 250 Israeli casualties and were indirectly responsible for a dozen deaths, including children, resulting from the improper use of gas masks.10 UN officials have stated that Iraqi bombs and missiles contained enough biological agents to kill hundred of thousands,11 and US officials have confirmed that if Iraq had used available biological weapons, the military and civilian casualty levels could have been horrific.12 Saddam Hussein was neither a philanthropist nor particularly humane. Why then did he not use the available chemical or biological weapons? Was he deterred by the prospect of nuclear retaliation? Israeli commentators frequently suggest that the apparent Israeli nuclear threat deterred Iraqi chemical use. In this regard it should be noted that during a CNN interview on 2 February 1991, then-US defense secretary Dick Cheney was asked about the potential for Israeli nuclear retaliation to Iraqi chemical strikes. Secretary Cheney observed that this would be a decision that ‘‘the Israelis would have to make—but I would think that [Hussein] has to be cautious in terms of how he proceeds in his attacks against Israel.” The following day, when asked about Secretary Cheney’s statement, Israeli defense minister Moshe Arens replied, “I think he said that Saddam has reasons to worry—yes, he does have reasons to worry.”13 This reply, and Secretary Cheney’s original statement—in which he did not object to the premise of the question about the possibility of Israeli nuclear retaliation, at least to Israeli analysts—was key to deterring Iraqi chemical weapons use.14

TNW’s in Europe K2 US and Euro Defense

US TNW’s in Europe deter against threats

McNamara, Spring 9 ([Sally McNamara](http://www.heritage.org/About/Staff/M/Sally-McNamara), Senior Policy Analyst, European Affairs, [Baker Spring](http://www.heritage.org/About/Staff/S/Baker-Spring), F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy, Presedent Obama must not remove Nuclear Weapons from Europe, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/03/President-Obama-Must-Not-Remove-Nuclear-Weapons-from-Europe>) MAH

From a strategic standpoint, a proactive national defense relies on the ability to defend physical territory, as well as the ability to deter an enemy attack in the first place. In a highly dangerous world where hostile states—such as Iran and North Korea—possess both nuclear and conventional forces capable of striking the U.S. and its allies, a credible nuclear deterrence, not unilateral disarmament, is the best chance for peace. Therefore, the U.S., in consultation with its allies, should use nuclear weapons in Europe and in the U.S. to protect and defend the U.S. and its allies against strategic attack. This position is consistent with a more defensive, broader strategic posture that would require the deployment of robust defensive systems, including ballistic missile defenses. This posture would also require modernizing the nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal, including their delivery systems, to make them better suited to destroying targets that are likely to be used to launch strategic attacks against the U.S. and its allies, as well as targets whose destruction requires the more powerful force of nuclear weapons. These targets could include missiles in hardened silos, deeply buried command and control facilities, and heavily protected nuclear weapons depots.

TNWs Would Be Replaced

We won’t just leave Turkey undefended- TNWs would be replaced with conventional weapons

Sokov 09 (Nikolai, Senior Research Associate CNS NIS Nonproliferation Program Center for Nonproliferation Studies, German Leadership 6(4), Tactical (Substrategic) Nuclear Weapons, http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/090717\_german\_leadership/german\_leadership\_6\_issue\_4.pdf)

The Obama administration has already raised concerns among NATO’s Eastern European members by its decision to slow deployment of the U.S. missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. This slowdown may be particularly painful because the latter countries have invested considerable political resources to push through the decision to deploy the defenses that were perceived as highly important for Washington, but faced considerable opposition domestically in the two Eastern European states. Withdrawing TNW, a perceived symbol of U.S. commitment, in this light—and so soon after the conflict in Georgia—carries risks for alliance cohesion, regardless of the weapons’ military utility. Likewise, the wavering response of NATO to Turkish requests for conventional deployments in the run-up to the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars, the ongoing tension between Turkey and the EU over the former’s membership in the Union, and the bitter legacy of Turkish-U.S. relations in the Bush administration have raised questions in Ankara about NATO’s commitment to its security that would be seriously exacerbated by the removal of TNW from that country. Thus, the issue of maintaining the American security “umbrella” in the absence of TNW should be handled with utmost care, especially where “new” members of NATO and Turkey are concerned. The congressional strategic posture commission underscored the importance of this issue in its recently released report, indicating that, “All allies depending on the U.S. nuclear umbrella should be assured that any changes in its [nuclear] forces do not imply a weakening of the U.S extended nuclear deterrence guarantees. They could perceive a weakening if the United States (and NATO) does not maintain other elements of the current arrangement than the day-to-day presence of U.S. nuclear bombs.”30 To shore up the NATO commitment absent TNW, some experts have suggested, for example, conducting real operational contingency planning for a Russian conventional attack on the Baltics. At the same time, it is necessary to keep in mind that an attempt to create a more tangible security commitment, whether in the form of deployment of conventional forces or explicit contingency planning for response to a potential Russian attack, is likely to be seen in Moscow as an increase in the level of threat from NATO. There is real danger of sliding into a classic security dilemma—an attempt to defend against potential Russian threat could be regarded as a threat in itself.

TNWs Would Be Replaced

If TNWs were removed, the US would develop assymetrical conventional weapons

**Bell and Loehrke 9** (Alexandra and Benjamin, Ploughshares Fund, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey>) BAF

Today, Turkey hosts an estimated 90 B61 gravity bombs at Incirlik Air Base. Fifty of these bombs are reportedly PDF assigned for delivery by U.S. pilots, and forty are assigned for delivery by the Turkish Air Force. However, no permanent nuclear-capable U.S. fighter wing is based at Incirlik, and the Turkish Air Force is reportedly not certified for NATO nuclear missions, meaning nuclear-capable F-16s from other U.S. bases would need to be brought in if Turkey's bombs were ever needed. Such a relaxed posture makes clear just how little NATO relies on tactical nuclear weapons for its defense anymore. In fact, the readiness of NATO's nuclear forces now is measured in months as opposed to hours or days. Supposedly, the weapons are still deployed as a matter of deterrence, but the crux of deterrence is sustaining an aggressor's perception of guaranteed rapid reprisal--a perception the nuclear bombs deployed in Turkey cannot significantly add to because they are unable to be rapidly launched. Aggressors are more likely to be deterred by NATO's conventional power or the larger strategic forces supporting its nuclear umbrella. So in effect, U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey are without military value or purpose. That means removing them from the country should be simple, right? Unfortunately, matters of national and international security are never that easy.

TNWs would be replaced once withdrawn- won’t leave Turkey stranded

Bell and Loehrke 9 (Alexandra and Benjamin, Ploughshares Fund, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey) BAF

A prescription for withdrawal. Preventing Turkey (and any other country in the region) from acquiring nuclear weapons is critical to international security. Doing so requires a key factor that also is essential to paving the way toward withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons: improved alliance relations. The political and strategic compasses are pointing to the eventual withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe--it's a strategy that certainly fits the disarmament agenda President Barack Obama has outlined. But to get there, careful diplomacy will be required to improve U.S.-Turkish ties and to assuage Turkish security concerns. The U.S.-Turkish relationship cooled when Turkey refused to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom, after which Turkish support for U.S. policy declined through the end of the George W. Bush administration. Obama's election has helped to mend fences, and his visit to Turkey in April was warmly received. In fact, all of the administration's positive interactions with Turkey have been beneficial: Washington has supported Turkey's role as a regional energy supplier and encouraged Ankara as it undertakes difficult political reforms and works to resolve regional diplomatic conflicts. For its part, Turkey recently doubled its troop contribution to NATO's Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan--a boon to U.S. efforts there. By incorporating Ankara into its new European missile defense plans--intended to protect Turkey and other countries vulnerable to Iran's short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles--Washington could further shore up its military relationship with Turkey. Ship-based Aegis missile systems will be the backbone of the strategy, with considerations left open for later deployments of mobile ground-based interceptors in Eastern Europe or Turkey. This cooperation could provide the bond with Washington and perception of security that Turkey seeks in the face of a potential Iranian bomb.

TNWs Would Be Replaced

If TNWs are removed, the US will defend Turkey with higher level technology weapons

Warden 2010 (John, research assistant working with the Project on Nuclear Issues, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: An Ineffective Deterrent, Unnecessary for Assurance,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, <http://csis.org/blog/us-nuclear-weapons-europe-ineffective-deterrent-and-unnecessary-assurance>)

Fortunately, U.S. defense of Europe doesn’t rely on NSNW. To whatever extent nuclear weapons do deter adversaries, the United States (along with Britain and France) will continue protect NATO allies under the umbrella of its strategic nuclear weapons (these are the weapons that would be actually used in an nuclear conflict anyway). The United States will also continue to station troops in Europe and give our allies access to effective missile defense technology. Opponents might argue that nuclear deployments are critical because they are the most stable U.S. commitment. While certainly a reasonable argument, there’s no reason other capabilities can’t be a more permanent part of the alliance in the future. George Perkovich of the Carnegie Foundation identifies a number of far more effective commitments that the United States can make to defend NATO allies: Debate over the fate of the NATO-based nuclear bombs will be constructive only if it puts much-needed attention on the need to reduce threats in Europe and to deploy strategies and capabilities to deter and defeat at an appropriate scale those threats that cannot be removed. NATO nuclear bombs are no substitute for cyber defense and deterrence; diversification of natural gas supply lines to reduce Russia’s coercive power; renovated confidencebuilding measures between Russia and NATO states to limit the scale and offensive character of military exercises, or if Russia refuses, enhanced forward deployment of defensive capabilities in new NATO states that would deter by denying Russia the prospect of a quick successful incursion. The moral hazard in Europe today is not in taking useless tactical nuclear weapons out, it is in pretending that they can protect allies from twenty-first century threats and doing too little in the meantime to develop capabilities and diplomatic strategies to deny those threats. A second objection to withdrawing NSNW from Europe is allied proliferation. In particular, Miller, Robertson, and Schanke argue that U.S. nuclear weapons stationed in Turkey play an important role in dissuading Turkey from acquiring an arsenal of their own. This is certainly an important concern, especially as Iran continues to expand its nuclear program, while ignoring its obligations under the NPT. However, for the same reasons that NSNW are an ineffective deterrent, they are unlikely dissuade Turkish proliferation. According to Alexandra Bell and Benjamin Loehrke of the Ploughshares Fund, the readiness problem is even more pronounced in Turkey: Today, Turkey hosts an estimated 90 B61 gravity bombs at Incirlik Air Base. Fifty of these bombs are reportedly assigned for delivery by U.S. pilots, and forty are assigned for delivery by the Turkish Air Force. However, no permanent nuclear-capable U.S. fighter wing is based at Incirlik, and the Turkish Air Force is reportedly not certified for NATO nuclear missions, meaning nuclear-capable F-16s from other U.S. bases would need to be brought in if Turkey's bombs were ever needed. Other capabilities, such as missile defense and strategic deterrence are more important in demonstrating U.S. commitment to Turkey (there are rumors that the United States will place an AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey). According to Johan Bergenäs of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, “senior Turkish officials recently indicated that they ‘would not insist’ that NATO retain its forward-deployed nuclear weapons, and that conventional forces were sufficient to satisfy Ankara's security requirements. Such a position is perhaps motivated by the knowledge that Turkey would still be covered by the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella.”

TNWs Would Be Replaced

US is going to replace TNWs with even more accurate missiles

Interfax 10 (information compiler for China, Russia and Eurasia, March 04, 2010 U.S. to replace tactical nukes with non-nuke missiles – Kommersant, http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?id=150270)

The United States may replace its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe with planned non-nuclear missiles that would be deployed on U.S. soil but take less than an hour to reach any spot on the globe, Kommersant said on Thursday, citing American sources. This may follow a review of the American nuclear potential that the U.S. administration is preparing, the Washington correspondent for the Kommersant newspaper said. The U.S. has tactical nuclear weapons deployed at American military bases in Germany, Italy, Belgium, Turkey, and the Netherlands, Kommersant said. The daily newspaper cited U.S. administration officials as saying these weapons serve a political rather than military purpose. Kommersant, which said a review would be published at the beginning of April at the earliest, cited experts as saying the U.S. is ready to officially abandon designing new types of nuclear weapons this year. The newspaper deduced from all this that the White House is going to opt for non-nuclear weapons. The paper said last month's Quadrennial Defense Review, a review of Defense Department strategy and priorities, announced a plan to develop a new class of non-nuclear missiles that would take less than an hour to reach any spot on the globe. Kommersant said, citing American sources, that missiles of this class, called Prompt Global Strike, are planned to be deployed in the U.S. and that their launch pads might be open for international, including Russian, inspectors to make sure the rockets carry no nuclear warheads. Weapons of this type would be capable of massive strikes against Al Qaeda positions in Afghanistan or preventing North Korea from firing a missile. Supporters of Prompt Global Strike are sure the proposed missiles would be as effective as tactical nuclear weapons but could rule out a full-scale nuclear war, Kommersant said.

-----A2: Iran Advantage-----

Turkey Doesn’t Fear Iran

Turkey is in an alliance with Iran-doesn’t fear them

[Bar'el](http://www.haaretz.com/misc/writers/zvi-bar-el-1.693) 5/18 (Zvi, Middle Eastern affairs analyst, “Why does Iran see Turkey as an 'honest broker' for a nuclear deal?” http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/why-does-iran-see-turkey-as-an-honest-broker-for-a-nuclear-deal-1.290874) MJ

**Why did Iran choose to see Turkey as an "honest broker" and make the deal with it instead of with the permanent Security Council members? The two countries' good relations are not free of suspicion, but both Iran and Turkey have adopted a policy of expanding their influence in the Middle East, influence of the sort that relies on cooperation rather than competition. The closer ties between Turkey and Syria, Iran's ally; the similar attitude that Turkey and Iran have toward Hamas; their shared interests in Iraq; and a similar view of radical Islamic terrorism all combined with Turkey's disappointment over European views of its candidacy to join the European Union to create a confluence of interests that, for the time being, trumps their disagreements**. Moreover, from an ideological standpoint, Iran prefers Turkey to the U.S.: Any concession to Washington or its Security Council partners would be perceived as a surrender. **The uranium transfer deal transforms Iran and Turkey into strategic allies without undermining Turkey's standing as a NATO member or as a U.S. ally in Afghanistan.** It was also not conditioned on Turkey severing its ties with Israel. And if the deal surmounts all the expected obstacles, Turkey will gain new status as a mediator, a status it will also be able to use in other conflicts in the region, and especially in the Israeli-Syrian peace process.

Turkey has embraced Iran-no fear

Krieger 6/6 (Hilary, staff writer, “Oren: Turkey has embraced the leaders of Iran and Hamas,” Jerusalem Post, http://www.jpost.com/International/Article.aspx?id=177577) MJ

**“Turkey has embraced the leaders of Iran and Hamas, all of whom called for Israel’s destruction,” Ambassador Michael Oren declared. “Our policy has not changed but Turkey’s policy has changed, very much, over the last few years,**” he said. “**Under a different government with an Islamic orientation, Turkey has turned away from the West.**” But Oren, speaking on a conference call organized by The Israel Project, held out hope for reconciliation. “**We certainly do not have any desire in any further deterioration in our relations with the Turks,” he said. “It’s an important Middle Eastern power. It has been a friend in the past.”**

Turkey is close to Iran

Schleifer 9(Yigal, staff writer, “Turkey-Iran ties grow, as do question marks,” Kuwait Times, http://www.kuwaittimes.net/read\_news.php?newsid=NzkxNDQ5ODg0) MJ

**The visit Tuesday of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Tehran is yet another sign of the rapidly improving relations between neighbours and regional powers Turkey and Iran. Over the last several years, the two countries have deepened their trade relations, as well as their cooperation in the areas of security and energy.** But analysts suggest that Turkey and Iran's growing relations might be put to the test by Western expectations that Turkey take a harder line on Tehran's controversial nuclear programme. I can detect a perception in the US and Europe that Turkey is softer on Iran. They would like Turkey to have a tougher profile and a tougher stance vis-a-vis Iran," says Mustafa Kibaroglu, an expert on nuclear non-proliferation issues at Bilkent University in Ankara. **Relations between NATO member Turkey and Iran have improved dramatically in recent years, particularly since the arrival of the ruling liberal Islamic Justice and Development Party** (AKP) in 2002, which has pledged to pursue a regional foreign policy of "zero problems" with its neighbours.

Turkey Doesn’t Fear Iran

Turkey-Iran relationship good-Turkey supports Iran, doesn’t fear

IRNA 10 (Islamic Republic News Agency, “Turkey restates support for nuclear power in Iran,” News.az, http://www.news.az/articles/9434) MJ

Mehmet Ali Sahin was hosting a delegation led by Iran's minister of education and culture, Hamid-Reza Hajibaba’i. The delegation is visiting Turkey at the invitation of Education Minister Nemat Cubukcu. **During the meeting the Turkish parliament speaker described the two countries’ relations, especially in recent years, as satisfactory. “Turkey-Iran parliamentary relations, too, grew rapidly during this period,” he said. Sahin also expressed satisfaction at bilateral regional cooperation. “Taking peaceful advantage of nuclear energy is the natural right of any country and Turkey has a very clear stance on the matter**.” He emphasized, “**Iran’s nuclear dispute with the West needs to be settled by peaceful means and Turkey will do anything necessary in that respec**t.” Sahin reiterated that the visit of Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu to Iran on Tuesday "was aimed at securing the same objective”. He said, “So long as you pursue your righteous policies in your nuclear program, we will continue our support for you.” Hajibaba’i conveyed warm greetings from the Iranian Majlis speaker, Ali Larijani, to his Turkish counterpart. He said, “Mr Larijani is longing to receive you in Tehran.” He said that the head of the Iranian parliament’s National Security Commission, Alaeddin Boroujerdi and members of the Iran-Turkey parliamentary friendship group, were planning to visit Turkey. Referring to a protocol on cooperation in education signed on Tuesday by Iran and Turkey, Hajibaba-i said, “We have had fruitful and constructive meetings during this visit with Turkish officials.” Hajibaba’i earlier on Wednesday met Turkey’s minister of culture and tourism, deputy prime minister and the managing director of Turkey’s Religious Affairs Organization.

TNWs Deter Iran/Russia

TNWs in Turkey deters Iran from attacking and Russia from increasing their stockpile

Meier 08 (Olivier, Arms Control Association, Fondation pour la Rechercher Stratégique, Rechercher And Documents, Number 2, Annexe 2 au rapport final

armes nucléaires tactiques et la sécurité de l’Europe Le débat belge The German Debate on Tactical Nuclear Weapons <http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/rd/RD_20080129.pdf>) BAF

Thinking 10-15 years ahead, a possible scenario in which it might be important to have a NATO-based nuclear deterrent would involve a nuclear-armed Iran which, after the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, has developed friendly relations with Iraq and Lebanon. In the scenario, Israel, which has developed close relations with NATO, is calling on the Alliance to protect it against Iranian threats and terrorist activities sponsored by Tehran. In such a crisis, it might be sensible to deter Iran by nuclear means from directly threatening Israel. A credible nuclear deterrent should not be based only on U.S. nuclear assets because Europeans might not want to depend on Washington’s decisions alone. British Trident SLMBs are not flexible enough to provide a credible deterrent and France might decide not to contribute to a NATO deterrence posture. From a European perspective, nuclear sharing provides a forum for consultations on the one hand, and an instrument to demonstrate resolve, on the other hand. Thus, under the scenario, a deployment of dual-capable aircraft at Incirlik might signal the seriousness of NATO’s nuclear guarantees. Whether nuclear deterrence will become relevant in the context of out-of-area deployments depends largely on whether NATO will actually become a global security provider. The larger question at stake is whether in a world in which the number of nuclear weapon states is increasing we really want to rely only on the United States, the United Kingdom and France to provide a nuclear umbrella. From the perspective of NATO non-nuclear weapon states, the most important political reason to maintain nuclear sharing is the influence it provides on the nuclear policies of nuclear allies. If, vice versa, it should become clear that non-nuclear weapon states such as Germany have no influence on the nuclear weapons policies of NATO nuclear powers, the rationale for maintaining nuclear sharing is gone. Then, these arrangements should be terminated. Nations that provide dual-capable aircraft do have greater influence in Alliance nuclear consultations, for example in the Nuclear Planning Group, than non- DCA nations. Alliance discussions on a new nuclear doctrine have thus far not taken place because such a debate is perceived to be politically too dangerous. NATO members fear that no new international consensus might be found on the purpose of nuclear weapons and currently no NATO member appears keen to take the initiative on the issue. From a German perspective, taking the lead on nuclear weapons issues in NATO could endanger the reputation gained in the context of EU3 negotiations with Iran. The Bush administration, on the other hand, is currently unlikely to take the initiative within NATO because it is interested in improving transatlantic relations more generally. A withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe by itself will not solve the problem of having to decide on a nuclear-capable follow-on system for the Tornado. It would, however, be difficult to justify procurement of a nuclear-capable aircraft when nuclear weapons are no longer deployed in Europe. There is no specific date when the nuclear-capable Tornado will have to be replaced by the Eurofighter*.* This depends largely on procedures for certifying the nuclear capability of the *Tornado* and the question will not become urgent before 2018. The Ministry of Defence is trying push a decision as far as possible into the future. From the perspective of Alliance coherence and solidarity, it is interesting to see that Europeans are refusing to grant U.S. technicians access to the *Eurofighter.* For financial and possibly other reasons, Germany is unable to buy the *Joint Strike Fighter.* Discussions between the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Ministry on the nuclear paragraphs in the 2006 Defence White Paper are a reflection of institutional interests and old divisions between the two bureaucracies over the relative importance of nuclear arms control vis-à-vis NATO nuclear sharing. Having an arms control dialogue with Russia on tactical nuclear weapons is the only way to work towards a reduction of these weapons. The Russian tactical nuclear weapons stockpile is the greatest problem. While NATO is transparent to some degree, we know very little about the status of Russia’s short-range nuclear weapons. It would certainly be useful to start talks on tactical nuclear weapons before the 2010 NPT Review Conference. However, expectations should be modest and there will be no “zero option” for tactical nuclear weapons.

TNWs deter Iran/Russia

TNWs protect Ankara from Iran bomb and token to be traded for Russia disarmament

**Bell and Loehrke 9** (Alexandra and Benjamin, Ploughshares Fund, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey>) BAF

By incorporating Ankara into its new European missile defense plans--intended to protect Turkey and other countries vulnerable to Iran's short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles--Washington could further shore up its military relationship with Turkey. Ship-based Aegis missile systems will be the backbone of the strategy, with considerations left open for later deployments of mobile ground-based interceptors in Eastern Europe or Turkey. This cooperation could provide the bond with Washington and perception of security that Turkey seeks in the face of a potential Iranian bomb. Because Russia weighs significantly in Turkish security calculations, reductions to Russian strategic and nonstrategic nuclear arsenals also would help improve Ankara's peace of mind. The United States and Russia soon will seek ratification of a follow-on agreement to START. And treaty negotiations in pursuit of further reductions to the U.S. and Russian arsenals should involve forward-deployed nuclear weapons, including the U.S. weapons in Turkey. During any such negotiations, Turkey must be fully confident in NATO and U.S. security guarantees. Critically, any removal of the weapons in Turkey would need to happen in concert with efforts to prevent Iran from turning its civil nuclear energy program into a military one. Otherwise, Washington would risk compromising Turkey as a NATO ally and key regional partner. If used properly, Turkey actually can play an important role in this complex process, and the United States and its allies should seriously consider Turkish offers to serve as an interlocutor between Iran and the West. First, Ankara's potential influence with Tehran should not be underestimated. As Princeton scholar Joshua Walker has noted, given its long-established pragmatic relations and growing economic ties with Iran, Ankara is in a position to positively influence Tehran's behavior.

**TNWs Deter Iran**

TNWs and conventional force deters Iran better than strategic nukes

Daley 5 (Tad, Writing Fellow, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

1985 Nobel Peace Laureate Organization, The Non-Proliferation Treaty Fiasco The Me-Too Club, http://www.counterpunch.org/daley05312005.html)BAF

During the Cold War's long atomic arms race, it became clear that nuclear weapons had little actual military value. It was difficult to conceive of any scenario where the benefits of employing a nuclear warhead could possibly exceed the almost infinite risks. Instead, nuclear arsenals came to be seen less as usable weapons, and more as a means to persuade others not to use weapons. To some extent nuclear weapons discouraged conventional aggression. American military doctrine explicitly threatened to respond to Soviet tank divisions crossing the Elbe River in Germany both by attacking those divisions with "tactical nuclear weapons" (an earlier generation of George Bush's oxymoronic "mininukes"), and by lobbing immensely more powerful strategic nuclear weapons directly onto Soviet soil. This is why American presidents, Democratic and Republican, always refused to commit to "no first use." To accomplish this deterrent purpose, however, the US might need, oh, 70 invulnerable nuclear warheads or so. But during the Cold War the total number reached more than 70,000! We needed thousands of nuclear weapons, the argument ran, to dissuade our Soviet adversary from launching thousands of nuclear weapons against us. This, of course, was the logic behind the doctrine known as "mutually assured destruction," or "MAD" (surely the most appropriate acronym in history). As the Cold War ground on, it became apparent that the only rational purpose for nuclear weapons was to deter the use of nuclear weapons by others. If Iran and North Korea acquire nuclear arsenals, their function for these regimes will be dramatically different. For Teheran and Pyongyang, the primary function of their nuclear weapons won't be to deter the use of someone else's nuclear weapons. Why not? Because Iran and North Korea aren't afraid that the U.S. is going to attack them with nuclear weapons. Iran and North Korea are afraid that the U.S. is going to attack them. Consider the outside world as viewed from Tehran and Pyongyang. George Bush delivers his 2002 State of the Union address, and singles out three countries as constituting an "axis of evil." He announces his intention to initiate unilateral and preemptive wars against nations that his Administration subjectively determines to be a potential threat. Defying almost universal world opinion, he actually starts such a war against one of the three, and succeeds in decapitating its regime, killing its leader's sons, and driving that leader himself into a pathetic hole in the ground. In the case of Iran, he surrounds it on all sides with bristling American military power -- Iraq to the west, Afghanistan to the east, enormous new US bases in Central Asia to the north, and the unchallengeable US Navy in the Persian Gulf to the south. In the case of North Korea, he adamantly refuses to offer the non-aggression pledge that Pyongyang has repeatedly requested. And even when he tries to offer reassurances he only exacerbates fears. "This notion that the U.S. is getting ready to attack Iran is simply ridiculous," he proclaims, only to immediately follow with "that being said, all options are on the table." Does it occur to anyone in the bowels of the Bush Administration that these statements and actions might clash with their accompanying insistence that these two nations engage in immediate unilateral disarmament? Iran and North Korea, of course, cannot hope to take on the United States in a direct military confrontation. But they can aspire to deter what must seem to them to be the very real threat of American military attack. How? By developing the capability to vaporize an American military base or three abroad, or an American carrier group in the Indian Ocean or the Sea of Japan, or even an American city. And by holding out the possibility that they would respond to any assault by employing that capability immediately, before it becomes too late, following the venerable maxim: "Use them or lose them." (This, we have learned in recent years from now elderly former Soviet military officers who were on the ground during the Cuban missile crisis, is precisely what they were prepared to do with the nuclear warheads in their hands at the first hint of an American strike on Cuba.) There is, of course, only one thing that can provide these two countries with the capability to inflict that kind of damage. Hint: it's not nuclear electricity. Iran and North Korea don't need thousands of nuclear warheads to fulfill this deterrent purpose. They just need perhaps a couple of dozen, well hidden and well protected. American military planners might be almost certain that they could take out all Iranian or North Korean nuclear capabilities in a lightning "surgical strike." But "almost" isn't good enough. It is inconceivable that the anticipated benefits of an attack on Iran or North Korea could outweigh the risk of losing perhaps a million Americans - 3 times as many as during the long years of WWII, 300 times as many as on 9/11 - in the blink of an eye, the snap of a finger, the single beat of a human heart. If these states can create enough uncertainty in the minds of a potential adversary about the possible catastrophic response to any attack, it will probably be enough to cause that adversary to pause indefinitely. It is difficult, on the other hand, to imagine any circumstances in which American commanders would find it militarily necessary to employ nuclear weapons against Iran or North Korea. After all, the United States today spends more on its military power than all the other countries in the world put together - a situation probably unprecedented in all of world history. The US toppled the Iraqi regime in a few short weeks with conventional weaponry alone. (Securing the peace, of course, has been another matter - but no one has suggested that America's vast nuclear arsenal can do anything to help with that.) This is especially true of the US Air Force, which today can operate at will over most of the world with virtually zero risk to its aircraft or crews. If any country can exercise deterrence without having to resort to nuclear deterrence, it is us. Hence we see one of the more delicious paradoxes of the embryonic new nuclear age. Iran and North Korea need nuclear weapons to deter the United States. The United States doesn't need nuclear weapons to deter Iran or North Korea. The country that has them doesn't need them. And the countries that need them don't have them. Perhaps. Yet.

-----A2: Russia Advantage-----

Turkey Doesn’t Fear Russia

Turkey doesn’t fear Russia-they are partners

Oku 5 (Asim, AIA Turkish and Cacasian sections, “Russia - Turkey: The New Eurasian Alliance: The Quest For the Lost Empires,” Axis and Information Analysis, http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=149) MJ

**From the beginning of the new millennium Russia and Turkey started to see each other not as opponents but as partners, both economic, and political** (3). **As mutual fears declined , animosity to America increased** . Nationalist Slavophile tendencies were more distinctly traced to the ruling Russian establishment's policy, while the Turkish ruling party of Justice and Development persistently emphasized that the country belongs to the Muslim world. Turkey’s already unsteady relations with Israel, continue to deteriorate (4), in order to become chairman of the Organization Islamic Conference. Russia hopes to strengthen its own status in this organization. **An anti-American mood reigns in the political and intellectual elites of both countries, and simultaneously in both Moscow and Ankara nostalgia over lost influence is felt. Both Russians and Turks do not want the West to consider them as minor, "younger" partners, and they aspire to regain their influence over the borders of former empires** – the Ottoman and Russian (and later - Soviet). Political leaders and nationalist intellectuals see Turkey and Russia as carriers of the Eurasian historical tradition, compelled to resist the Atlantic cultural and political intrusion into the area. **Thus two fundamental factors of Russian - Turkish relations take shape: the common aspiration to reach "strategic depth**" (the term of Turkish professor Ahmet Davutoglu (5), meaning the actual return to historical spheres of influence) **and unity on the ground of " Eurasian historical commonality".**

Turkey and Russia have mutual trust-no fear exists

Engdahl 9 (F. William, leading researcher, economist and analyst of the New World Order, “The Geopolitical Great Game: Turkey and Russia Moving Closer,” http://www.engdahl.oilgeopolitics.net/Geopolitics\_\_\_Eurasia/Turkey\_\_\_Russia/turkey\_\_\_russia.html) MJ

**Turkish President** Abdullah **Gul paid a four-day visit to the Russian Federation** from February 12 to 15, **where he met with** Russian president Dmitry **Medvedev, Prime Minister** Vladimir **Putin, and also travelled to Kazan**, the capital of Tatarstan, **where he discussed joint investments.** Gul was accompanied by his state minister responsible for foreign trade, and Minister of Energy, as well as a large delegation of Turkish businessmen. Foreign Minister Ali Babacan joined the delegation. **The largest autonomous republic in Russian Federation whose population mainly consists of Muslim Tatar Turks, is a sign how much relations between Ankara and Moscow have improved in recent months as Turkey has cooled to Washington foreign policy**. In previous years, Moscow was convinced that Turkey was trying to establish Pan-Turanism in the Caucasus and Central Asia and inside the Russian Federation, a huge concern in Moscow. **Today clearly Turkish relations with Turk entities inside the Russian Federation are not considered suspicious as it was once, confirming a new mood of mutual trust**.

Turkey Doesn’t Fear Russia

Turkey not afraid of Russia-friendship and cooperation between them

Turkish Weekly 8 (“Turkey, Russia to work on simplified customs to overcome trade row,” http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/59035/turkey-russia-to-work-on-simplified-customs-to-overcome-trade-row.html) MJ

**Russia and Turkey are working on a simplified customs system in order to overcome the ongoing trade row between the countries. Russian and Turkish foreign ministers also emphasized the friendship and significant cooperation between the two neighbors.** The Russian Foreign Minister paid a one-day working visit to Turkey on Tuesday where he met his Turkish counterpart Ali Babacan in Istanbul. The two ministers had discussed the trade row, recent developments in Caucasus, and Iran and Iraq. Russia was not discriminating against Turkey in the trade relations between the countries, hit by a recent customs dispute, **Lavrov told the joint conference with Babacan, adding Russian customs authorities were working to simplify their bilateral customs system.** Hundreds of trucks transporting Turkish exports to Russia have been held at the country's checkpoints for up to four weeks, costing exporters billions of dollars in losses. The row has triggered speculation that Russia is trying to punish Turkey for allowing U.S. warships carrying aid to Georgia to pass through the Bosporus to the Black Sea. Lavrov, however, denied that stricter Russian controls on Turkish imports are politically motivated, underlining Russia's commitment to reach the 25-billion-dollars trade volume target in 2008. **He said some countries had breached customs regulations prompting Russian authorities to take more stringent measures. Babacan said he believed that trade problems between Turkey and Russia would be overcome with a flexible attitude and the cooperation of Russia. "We discussed in a sincere and constructive way the problems caused by keeping and checking Turkish products at Russian customs gates longer than usual,**" Babacan told the conference.

Turkey and Russia are friends-Turkey not afraid

Singh 5/20 **(K. Gajendra, Indian ambassador to Turkey and Azerbaijan, “Medvedev Consolidates Russian Influence in Turkey & Syria,” http://www.boloji.com/analysis2/0599.html) MJ**

**Turkey and Russia with others in the region are charting a policy of friendship based on solid economic alliances. Turkey with its pre-Ottoman and Ottoman past shares ethnic, cultural and linguistic affinities with central Asia, Caucasus and Balkans. Ankara has excellent relations with East European nations and tie ups with its former Vilayats** (provinces). With economic gains as bait Ankara can even help Moscow re-enter Balkans including new states created out of Yugoslavia, from where Russia was forced out by US and NATO during 1990s. **While their interests do not always coincide, the two can help each other out in the Caucasus, as and when US power and influence ebb there. With Gul besides him, Medvedev proclaimed in Ankara, "Russia and Turkey are working together to maintain global and regional stability. Sitting in the president's office just now we spoke about the fact that the Black Sea countries themselves, and above all the region's two biggest countries, Russia and Turkey, bear direct responsibility for the situation in the region**." Russia, certainly and even Turkey might want to forestall any attempt to make the Black Sea a "NATO lake". Moscow hopes Ankara would help keep outside powers at bay. Russia itself is trying its best to limit NATO's activities in Georgia and even the East European Black Sea coast. Any Russia-Turkish attempt to create a regional security system or understanding in the South Caucasus will be resisted by Washington, which has its proxy ruling in Georgia and close relationship with Azerbaijan based on exploitations of its oil and gas reserves. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline gives US a handle to keep Baku and Georgia in line. Azerbaijan has close relations with Ankara but an agreement between Turkey and Armenia to normalise relations has sent Baku fuming. Armenia remains allied to Russia, Georgia is unlikely to join NATO any time soon after the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia. On the whole Washington’s influence is on the decline.

Turkey Doesn’t Fear Russia

Turkey does not fear Russia

Oku 5 (Asim, AIA Turkish and Cacasian sections, “Turkey-Russia Relations Dynamics,” Axis and Information Analysis, http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=71) MJ

**After collapse of the USSR, Moscow continued perceiving Turkey as NATO sentinel and a traditional rival in the area of the vital Russian interests**: the Caucasus, the Balkans, the Central Asia and the Middle East. Kremlin considered Ankara as a leading sponsor of Islamic and separatist movements in the Caucasus. Russian leadership was afraid that Turkey, appealing to "pan -Turkism" and wide common cultural grounds with the peoples of the Central Asia, is trying to expand its influence upon them. **Turkish government was irritated by Russian counteracts against lining of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline**. **Both countries accused each other in supporting separatists:** the Chechen - in Russia, the Kurdish - in Turkey. **Revision by both states of previously developed stereotypes begins at the end of the '90s. Ankara and Moscow start to perceive each other not as a threat, but rather as a weak and, consequently not very dangerous competitors**, **colliding with the same external challenges and problems. "The Default" in Russia**, its military failures in the war with the Chechen resistance, its inability to defend interests of Serbia in the Balkans, **reduced the fear of "Russian Bear" in Ankara**. Correspondingly, political and economic crisis in Turkey at the beginning of 2001 was perceived in Moscow as a sign of weakness and instability. **It lowers the level of concern about the possibility of Turkish expansion in the Central Asia and the Caucasus. Both countries aspire to benefit from mutual relations - both on political and economic level**. **Simultaneously, the rising of the US influence in the Caucasus leads to a rapprochement of the former adversaries.**

Removal = Russian Aggression

Removal of US TNW’s from Europe encourages Russian aggression, nuclear proliferation, and would be a major setback for global security

Heritage Foundation 10 (President Obama Must Not Remove Nuclear Weapons from Europe, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/03/President-Obama-Must-Not-Remove-Nuclear-Weapons-from-Europe>) MAH

In April 2009—less than three months into his term of office—President Barack Obama laid out the centerpiece of his foreign policy vision for his Administration: the global eradication of nuclear weapons. Citing America’s atomic strikes against the Japanese Empire during World War II, President Obama stated that America has a “moral responsibility” to walk the “road to zero.” This ideological positioning has set off a series of calls from European leaders for the removal of America’s nuclear arsenal from European soil. At this time, however, a withdrawal of America’s nuclear arsenal from [Europe](http://www.heritage.org/Places/Europe) would send the message that transatlantic security is no longer indivisible. It would also give Moscow a blank check to pursue its long-sought-after sphere of privileged interest and, ironically, could pave the way for further nuclear proliferation. The destabilization brought to the European continent from a premature removal of American nuclear weapons, or an unacceptable degradation of its force, would be a major setback for global security and stability.

TNWs Deter Russia

TNWs deter Russia

Wood 09 (David, staff writer and prof @ Univ. Wisconsin, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, the Menace No One Is Talking About, Politics Daily, <http://www.politicsdaily.com/2009/07/08/tactical-nuclear-weapons-the-menace-no-one-is-talking-about/>) BAF

In the shifting geopolitics of post-Cold War Europe, tactical nuclear weapons play an increasingly important role in Russian military doctrine, a brute reminder of Russian power against the growing influence of the West along its borders. For instance, the Russians are working to fit tactical nuclear warheads onto submarine-launched cruise missiles, a weapon that "will play a key role'' in Russian strategy, according to Vice Adm. Oleg Bursev of the Russian General Staff. "Their range and precision are gradually increasing,'' he said this spring. On the U.S. side, the arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe serves as a powerful symbol of America's guarantee of protection to its European allies, including former Soviet satellites such as Poland and the Czech Republic. Small wonder, given the military and political clout of these armaments, that the summit agreement to reduce nuclear weapons never mentioned tactical nukes. "I'm not surprised -- tactical nuclear weapons is a much tougher issue,'' said Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the nonpartisan Federation of American Scientists. Strategic nuclear weapons are the big, obvious ones, the warheads mounted inside the nose cones of intercontinental ballistic missiles blasted from underground silos or submarines. They also include the heavy thermonuclear bombs carried by long-range bombers. These strategic weapons, hundreds of times more powerful than the 1945 Hiroshima bomb, are too terrible ever to be used. They are not for war-fighting; they are for deterrence. The United States has missiles humming away in their silos, pointed at Russia (and elsewhere), so that the Russians wouldn't dare shoot. And Medvedev has his missiles pointed at us. This, say nuclear strategists, makes us safe. Tactical nukes are a different matter. These are bombs carried on ordinary jets, like F-16s, and mounted on short-range ballistic missiles. This class of weapons might still include the nuclear land mines and nuclear artillery shells that were deployed by the tens of thousands in Europe during the Cold War. The United States and Russia both say they've gotten rid of these weapons, but intelligence services on each side harbor doubts. The U.S. tactical weapons, mostly B-61 thermonuclear bombs, are stored in underground vaults in Belgium, Holland, Germany, Italy, and Turkey, where they are under the control of U.S. Air Force munitions support squadrons. The arrangement is that in wartime, they'd be handed over to the host nation to use in its own aircraft as part of a NATO military operation. The Air Force, in a worldwide inspection of its nuclear facilities, looked at these bases in 2007 and found that "most sites require additional resources to meet DOD [Department of Defense] security requirements.'' Part of the problem, according to the Federation of American Scientists, which obtained the internal Air Force report, is that the base security provided by the host nations varies widely, with some bases being guarded by military conscripts with little training or experience. Almost nothing is known publicly about Russia's tactical nuclear weapons storage sites. The exact numbers and types of tactical nuclear weapons also are secret. Kristensen puts the number of deployed Russian weapons at 2,050, with an additional 5,390 in deep storage. Deployed U.S. weapons are said to number "less than 500.'' "Russia enjoys a sizable numerical advantage,'' the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, a blue-ribbon panel headed by former Defense Secretary William Perry, reported this spring. Russia "stores thousands of these weapons in apparent support of possible military operations west of the Urals,'' the report said. Whatever the number, strategists are coming to consider these weapons as an increasingly destabilizing factor in Europe. Ultimately, of course, there is concern about miscalculation in an escalating confrontation over, say, Georgia. Many conflicts start unintentionally, and the tactical nuclear weapons are close at hand for saber-rattling purposes. A more immediate problem looms, however. As Russia and the United States reduce their strategic nuclear weapons, the relative clout of tactical nukes rises. The existing imbalance in tactical nukes "will become more apparent" and U.S. allies will be "less assured,'' the commission said. As Kristensen described it to me, the concern is that "as you cut down the deployed strategic forces, you end up with more tactical than strategic weapons deployed and that begins to create some problems. In the U.S., we don't have very many non-strategic [tactical] nuclear weapons compared to the Russians. If we agree to go down to very low levels of strategic weapons, that begins to matter to strategists.'' Especially to strategists concerned about maintaining a strong "nuclear umbrella'' over its friends and allies in Europe. Let's say, however improbable, that Moscow and Washington agree to throw tactical nuclear weapons into the arms reduction negotiations that Obama and Medvedev agreed to this week. How likely is a deal? Not very, experts suggest. For one thing, tactical nukes are small and easily hidden. And their "delivery vehicles'' -- arms-control jargon for the aircraft or missiles that carry them -- are also used for other purposes. Reliably counting these weapons and verifying reductions is devilishly difficult, the experts say. Another reason is that the numbers are too important to each side to think seriously about reductions. Russia's conventional military forces are smaller and vastly inferior to those of the United States, and Russian analysts see their nuclear weapons as a critical counterbalance. Russia also needs its tactical nukes to deter problems along its long border with China. On the U.S. side, a key goal is keeping Europeans reassured that Russia can't muscle them around. It's not that Washington would fire off its tactical nuclear weapons in a crisis, but that simply withdrawing the weapons would make some vulnerable European nations -- Lithuania comes to mind -- uneasy. And "uneasy'' is something to be avoided in a crisis. The blue-ribbon commission, in laying out a proposed U.S. approach to the issue, succinctly demonstrated the problem: The United States should go after deep cuts in Russian tactical nukes, but go easy in cutting its own. "All allies depending on the U.S. nuclear umbrella,'' it said in a statement that probably mirrors the Kremlin's own thinking, "should be assured that any changes in its forces do not imply a weakening of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence guarantees.'' Tactical nukes, then, will stay.

-----A2: NATO Advantage-----

Removal = End of NATO

The removal of American TNW’s from Europe would spell the end of NATO

McNamara, Spring 9 ([Sally McNamara](http://www.heritage.org/About/Staff/M/Sally-McNamara), Senior Policy Analyst, European Affairs, [Baker Spring](http://www.heritage.org/About/Staff/S/Baker-Spring), F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy, Presedent Obama must not remove Nuclear Weapons from Europe, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/03/President-Obama-Must-Not-Remove-Nuclear-Weapons-from-Europe>) MAH

Not since radical leftist sentiment gripped Western Europe in the 1980s has the transatlantic relationship faced such a serious ideological challenge to the mutual security of North America and Europe. The removal of American tactical nuclear weapons from European and NATO bases would spell the end of the alliance and the concept of indivisible security. The Russian militarization of the Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad and Moscow’s recent simulation of a nuclear attack on Poland require a robust response from NATO, reinforced by America’s continued nuclear guarantee. Moscow’s simulation—in which Russian armed forces invaded Poland and its air force fired nuclear missiles against Warsaw and acted in conjunction with Belarus to suppress Polish minorities in Belarus—was codenamed “West” and labeled Poland as the aggressor country. Following this exercise, as well as President Obama’s ill-defined policy of “resetting” relations with Russia, Central and Eastern Europe has sought specific assurances as to the indivisibility of the alliance’s security. In addressing these concerns, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has stated: I want to reaffirm as strongly as I can the United States ’ commitment to honor Article 5 of the NATO treaty. No Ally—or adversary—should ever question our determination on this point. It is the bedrock of the Alliance and an obligation that time will not erode. Our nation faces threats elsewhere in the world, but we view peace and stability in Europe as a prerequisite for addressing all of the other challenges. A nuclear pullout from Europe does not comport with Secretary Clinton’s commitments outlined above. Rather than pulling back from the alliance’s commitments, the U.S. should honor Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty and plan against Moscow’s threat to the territorial integrity, political independence, and security of one of its members. This preparation should be underpinned by the sanctity of Article 5, America’s tactical and strategic nuclear insurance.

NATO Good-Democracy

NATO creates stable democracies

Farley 8(Robert, Assistant Professor, “But What Does it Mean for NATO?” The American Prospect, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=but\_what\_does\_it\_mean\_for\_nato) MJ

**I believe that NATO has had a strongly positive impact on Eastern Europe, and that the expansion undertaken so far was well conceived. NATO and the European Union are the two major institutional components of the post-World War II European peace. This institutional settlement has been remarkably successful, as Europe has enjoyed intra-continental peace and substantial economic growth**. Although NATO has included non-democratic members in the past, both NATO and the EU now place democracy high on their list of values and thereby pushed prospective members to adopt democratic reforms. The expansion of both to Eastern Europe has helped to solidify economic and political gains in the post-Cold War era. The European Union may have played the larger role of the two, but **NATO has substantially accomplished two critical goals. The first is securing the states of Eastern Europe from external coercion and attack**. This assurance has allowed the former Warsaw Pact states to moderate their defense spending and to pursue political reform without the threat of outside interference. **The second accomplishment of NATO has been to acclimate the military institutions of Eastern Europe to Western norms of civil-military relatio**ns. The militaries of the Warsaw Pact, unlike NATO, were designed primarily to protect the government from the people. **The ability of NATO to facilitate a shift away from this model has helped make stable democracy in Eastern Europe possible. Stable democracy is good both for the people who live in it and for the national interest of the United States**.

Democracy prevents wars

Diamond, 95(Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 1995, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm)

OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations**,** and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies **do not sponsor terrorism** against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use onor to threatenone another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

NATO Good-Regional Stability

NATO adapts to create more relationships-encourages internal and regional stability

Weinrod 8 (W. Bruce Weinrod, US Defense Advisor for the US Mission to NATO, “NATO and Asia’s Changing Relationship,” East Asia Foundation, 3(3), http://globalasia.org/articles/issue7/iss7\_11.html) MJ

After extensive consideration, **NATO’s member nations chose to maintain a robust alliance of nations with shared values seeking to protect their security but at the same time adapt to a new international environment**. As a crucial aspect, NATO decided to engage outside of its traditional borders with the nations of the former Warsaw Pact and the former republics of the Soviet Union. At a minimum, **NATO sought to develop formal relationships to encourage internal and regional stability, and**, at a maximum, **sought to permanently consolidate democratic institutions and practices.** For these purposes, **NATO established the Partnership for Peace**, which is discussed in more detail below. The PFP, which continues to function and now has 24 members, encapsulates a range of military and political activities between NATO and participating nations. Separately, another significant evolution of NATO’s geographical reach gradually emerged after the former Yugoslavia began to disintegrate in the early 1990s. **NATO eventually intervened twice militarily in the Balkans, primarily for humanitarian reasons but also to prevent a widening of the conflic**t. In addition, **NATO established the Mediterranean Dialogue** (which includes seven North African and Middle Eastern nations**) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative** (which includes four Persian Gulf states as members) **as forums for political-military discussion and the development of military-related projects**.

Need to prevent regional instability-hard to stop when upset and if unstable, destroys peace and economic stability

Blank 2000 (Stephen, professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. American Grand Strategy and the Transcaspian Region, “U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia,” World Affairs) MJ

**If real peace, true independence, economic stability, and the future prosperity that depends on those three factors are to endure, political stability must take root**. Unfortunately, most factors here work against long-term stability. **The linkage between authoritarian, personalist government and violence is a profound structural cause for regional unrest and ethnic violence**. Once that violence begins, it is hard to stop for two reasons. First, **ethnic wars where land, sovereignty, and the integrity of the state and of the government are at stake are intrinsically harder to stop, even more so than civil wars**.81 **Second, foreign powers are almost certain to try to exploit conflict and perhaps prolong it to their own advantage.**

NATO Good-Peacekeeping Operations

NATO teams up with other nations to improve the ability of peace keeping and crisis management operations

Weinrod 8 (W. Bruce Weinrod, US Defense Advisor for the US Mission to NATO, “NATO and Asia’s Changing Relationship,” East Asia Foundation, 3(3), http://globalasia.org/articles/issue7/iss7\_11.html) MJ

**A key NATO objective with respect to Asia is to enhance national military capabilities of friendly countries so as to ensure that Asian nations choosing to engage with NATO will have military forces that can operate effectively with the military forces of NATO allies**. **NATO is seeking to accomplish this by developing a broad web of relationships with interested nations.**  As a result**, NATO has worked with Central Asian nations on non-Afghanistan projects. One area of focus has been interoperability, with the goal of improving the ability of these nations to support NATO-led peacekeeping and crisis management operations.** For example, Kazakhstan has created a battalion and a brigade with the help of NATO forces and plans to establish a PFP Training/Education Center. In addition, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have declared a number of units available for possible participation in NATO operations. **Another distinct but important area of cooperation has been disaster preparedness and response**, known as Civil Emergency Planning in NATO parlance. Activities in this area included exercises in disaster-response hosted by Uzbekistan in 2003. Finally, **there has been collaboration in the fields of science and the environment through the NATO Science for Peace and Security Program**. **That program led to the development of a Virtual Silk Highway project to improve access to the Internet in Central Asia through a satellite-based network, and provided grants to Central Asian partners to improve the security of telecommunications facilities.**

Peacekeeping Operations prevent internal violence and lessen the effects of war

ACT 95 (The Center for Advanced command Concepts and Technology, “Operations Other Than War (OOTW):

The Technological Dimension,” http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Center\_OOTW.pdf) MJ

**OOTW includes peace operations, as well as a wide range of other non-traditional military operations**. The U.S. Army's Field Manual 100-5 defines OOTW as consisting of "support to U.S., state, and local governments, disaster relief, nation assistance, drug interdiction, peacekeeping, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, noncombatant evacuation, and peace enforcement." **Peace operations**, particularly those conducted under the auspices of the UN Charter, **have become more common in the post- Cold War world**. Because of its training and culture, **the U.S. military has been somewhat reluctant to engage in OOTW. Nevertheless, such operations are becoming more common, in many cases subsuming traditional military missions.** **There are many reasons for this increased involvement. Some nations and groups tend to avoid direct confrontation with the U.S. military, but they still find ways to challenge the U.S. directly or indirectly. In other cases, internal problems in foreign countries cause conditions that U.S. policymakers cannot ignore. These can include**, for example**, loss of government control and resulting internal violence** (as in Rwanda) **or concerns about the possible spill-over of ongoing hostilities** (as in the former Yugoslavia). In such cases, **OOTW is seen as a way to lessen the effects of war or prevent it altogether**. Further, U.S. forces are increasingly being tasked to respond to other non-traditional military missions (such as disaster relief or restoration of democracy).

NATO Good-Caucasus Stability

NATO promotes regional stability

Weinrod 8 (W. Bruce Weinrod, US Defense Advisor for the US Mission to NATO, “NATO and Asia’s Changing Relationship,” East Asia Foundation, 3(3), http://globalasia.org/articles/issue7/iss7\_11.html) MJ

**Central Asia will likely continue to be a key area of NATO interest**. Given that several of these nations directly border Afghanistan, their stability could be relevant to the success of NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan. Should anti-Western extremists take power in any of these nations, this could affect not only NATO’s re-supply efforts, but also create additional fronts in the Afghanistan conflict. Conversely, the establishment of a regime in Kabul fundamentally hostile to the West might result in support for similar forces in Central Asia. Given that instability in nearby nations could add another layer of complexity to the existing challenges in Afghanistan, NATO **has a strong interest in regional stability**. Thus, **NATO also has been promoting security sector reform, effective management of defense institutions and civilian and democratic control of the armed forces in Central Asia.** **In addition, NATO has established certain structured elements to enhance its relationship with Central Asia. First, NATO has had a Special Representative to the Caucasus and Central Asia** since 2004; **second, NATO has a liaison officer for Central Asia who travels regularly in the region; and third, NATO has utilized a meeting format at the action-officer level** that includes all 26 NATO allies plus representatives of the five Central Asian partners and Afghanistan. Most significantly, **NATO has established a military-to-military relationship with Pakistan.** Several years ago, a Tripartite Commission including representatives from NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Afghanistan and Pakistan was established to provide a joint forum on military and security issues. Representatives of the commission meet regularly to discuss security matters in the four main areas of cooperation: intelligence sharing, border security, countering improvised explosive devices and initiatives related to information operations. Recently, NATO has taken the decision to enhance its interaction with Pakistan to ensure that Islamabad is aware of its concerns and interests regarding developments in Pakistan that may impact on NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan. **This could be a very significant development in the months and years ahead.** India, of course, is also located close to Afghanistan and has its own interests in that nation and the region. Currently, there is no formal interaction between NATO and India. There has been, however, informal discussion within NATO circles regarding the possibility of establishing formal contacts with India.

Conflict in Caucasus causes worldwide war

Blank 2000 (Stephen, professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. American Grand Strategy and the Transcaspian Region, “U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia,” World Affairs) MJ

**Washington’s burgeoning military-political-economic involvement seeks**, inter alia, **to demonstrate the U.S. ability to project military power even into this region or for that matter, into Ukraine where NATO recently held exercises that clearly originated as an anti-Russian scenario**. Secretary of Defense William Cohen has discussed strengthening U.S.-Azerbaijani military cooperation and even training the Azerbaijani army, certainly alarming Armenia and Russia.69 And Washington is also training Georgia’s new Coast Guard. 70 However, Washington’s well-known ambivalence about committing force to Third World ethnopolitical conflicts suggests that U.S. military power will not be easily committed to saving its economic investment. But this ambivalence about committing forces and the dangerous situation, where Turkey is allied to Azerbaijan and Armenia is bound to Russia, create the potential for wider and more protracted regional conflicts among local forces. In that connection, Azerbaijan and Georgia’s growing efforts to secure NATO’s lasting involvement in the region, coupled with Russia’s determination to exclude other rivals, foster a polarization along very traditional lines.71 In 1993 Moscow even threatened World War III to deter Turkish intervention on behalf of Azerbaijan. Yet the new Russo-Armenian Treaty and Azeri-Turkish treaty suggest that Russia and Turkey could be dragged into a confrontation to rescue their allies from defeat. 72 Thus **many of the conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict in which third parties intervene are present in the Transcaucasus**. For example, **many Third World conflicts generated by local structural factors have a great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often feel obliged to rescue their lesser proteges and proxies. One or another big power may fail to grasp the other side’s stakes since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons to prevent a client’s defeat are not as well established or apparent**. Clarity about the nature of the threat could prevent the kind of rapid and almost uncontrolled escalation we saw in 1993 when Turkish noises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan led Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in that case. 73 **Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally, Russian nuclear threats could trigger a potential nuclear blow** (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia’s declared nuclear strategies). **The real threat of a Russian nuclear strike against Turkey to defend Moscow’s interests and forces in the Transcaucasus makes the danger of major war there higher than almost everywhere else**. As Richard Betts has observed, **The greatest danger lies in areas where (1) the potential for serious instability is high; (2) both superpowers perceive vital interests; (3) neither recognizes that the other’s perceived interest or commitment is as great as its own; (4) both have the capability to inject conventional forces; and, (5) neither has willing proxies capable of settling the situation.74**

Caucasus Spillover (Extension)

Caucasus needs international community to prevent escalation to major conflicts

Blank 2000 (Stephen, professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. American Grand Strategy and the Transcaspian Region, “U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia,” World Affairs) MJ

More specifically, the Transcaspian has become, perhaps, the most important area of direct Western- Russian contention today. Those areas of contention with Russia embrace economic issues such as energy routes and pipelines, as well as classical issues of security, territorial integrity of states, and defense. They also overlay the ethnic fractures and tendencies towards conflict throughout the region. A study by Terence Hopmann of Brown University, based on interviews with regional specialists in these states and Russia, concluded that, However, it is **in the Caucasus, where ethno-political separatism reflecting in part the long history of collisions of ancient civilizations, where the greatest threats to military security are likely to develop over the next ten years. If the fractured identities within this region are reinforced by the intervention of outside parties**, such as Turkey, Iran, Russia, and Western Europe, **the threats to security of the region and even of the world could become quite serious. The greatest dangers are likely to be a consequence of conflicts of identity in a region where states are weak and national identities are being rediscovered or even created. The continuing crises of the economy, environment, and politics may exacerbate these underlying conflicts, even if they are not the primary cause. Concerted diplomatic efforts within the region and by the entire international community may be necessary to avert such a tragedy**.23

Escalation of violence in Caucasus likely-full of overhyped media

Blank 2000 (Stephen, professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. American Grand Strategy and the Transcaspian Region, “U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia,” World Affairs) MJ

**The absence of effective control over armed forces both abets and reflects the widespread regional ethnic conflicts**, the fourth structural factor of instability. **The North Caucasus and Transcaucasia are saturated with scholarly, pseudo-scholarly, crackpot, chauvinist, and ethnographic theories masquerading as scholarship which are consciously used for nationalistic incitement and the creation of nationalist “militias**” as in Nagorno-Karabakh. 61 **Local media are also saturated by the mentality of zero-sum conflict, ethnic suspicion, and propaganda, and are universally regarded as state instruments for political indoctrination**. **Not surprisingly, ethnic tension is pervasive. The growing restiveness and rising incidence of political violence in the North Caucasus which could develop into full-fledged organized ethnic violence likewise is not surprising**.62 In April 1997, renewed fighting also broke out in the war over Nagorno-Karabakh. And in mid-1998 Georgian irregulars seeking to force their way back into Abkhazia triggered conflicts that only led to Abkhazian victories and more Georgian refugees. A few months later there was a mutiny or coup attempt from within the Georgian Army. In February 1998 the Karabakh faction of the Armenian government launched a coup that unseated the government. The issue that prompted the coup was the government’s willingness to accept a less nationalistic negotiated solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh war than the Karabakhites would have preferred.

NATO Good-Security

NATO good-largest network of security

Martonyi 99 (Janos, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary, “TEXT: HUNGARY'S FOREIGN MINISTER ON NATO ENTRY, MARCH 12,” USIS Washington File, http://www.fas.org/man/nato/national/99031208\_tpo.htm) MJ

**"NATO enlargement is not a zero-sum game, but part of a prudent strategy benefiting all nations of Europe, all members of the Atlantic Community**," Hungary's Minister of Foreign Affairs Janos Martonyi said March 12 during the accession ceremony at the Truman Library. **NATO is "the largest network of security that history has ever known" and by joining the alliance, Hungary is demonstrating that it wants "not to win but to prevent wars,**" the Foreign Minister said. "**Hungary is now a genuine and stable democracy" and is ready to enjoy the advantages of NATO membership and to meet its obligations**, Minister Martonyi said. Accession into NATO will return Hungary to its "manifest destiny" which is to rejoin those with whom it shares "the same values, interests and goals," he said. Martonyi also noted that "it is a matter of vital importance that other states of the region remain committed to joining NATO," and that Hungary will support them in their aspirations.

NATO maintains unity, security and freedom

**The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation** (NATO) **enters the second decade of the twenty-first century as an essential source of stability in an uncertain and unpredictable world**. Looking ahead, the Alliance has ample grounds for confidence. **The democratic principles that initially brought it together remain valid. The Cold War rivalry that once stirred fears of nuclear Armageddon has long since disappeared. NATO’s role in maintaining the unity, security and freedom ofthe Euro-Atlantic region is ongoing. lts status as the globe’s most successful political-military Alliance is unchallenged**. Yet NATO’s past accomplishments provide no guarantee for the future. Between now and 2020, it will be tested by the emergence of new dangers, the many-sided demands of complex operations, and the challenge of organising itself efficiently in an era where rapid responses are vital, versatility critical, and resources tight

NATO Good-Terrorism

NATO is devoted to fighting terrorism

Gilmore and Williams 1 (Gerry J, American Forces Press Service, Rudi, American Forces Press Service, “NATO Sends Radar Surveillance Planes to Protect United States,” Department of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44663) MJ

**NATO has sent five of its Airborne Warning and Control Systems aircraft from Germany to Oklahoma in a historic first**. **The action will free America's own AWACS radar aircraft for operations against terrorism elsewhere**, according to Air Force Gen. Joseph W. Ralston, supreme allied commander, Europe. This marks the first time in NATO's 52-year history that the alliance's assets are being used to help protect the United States, NATO officials noted. The AWACS planes, plus a support aircraft, will assist U.S. continental defense operations in the wake of the Sept. 11 terror attacks in New York City and Washington, said Air Force Capt. Ed Thomas, spokesman for the North American Aerospace Defense Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colo. The NATO aircraft began deploying Oct. 9 from Geilenkirchen, Germany, and the last of the five are expected to be in place at Tinker Air Force Base, Okla., by Oct. 11, Thomas said. **The aircraft, under NORAD command, will be flown by multinational crews from 12 NATO nation**s, he noted. **NORAD is responsible for air defense and early air warning for North American airspace. The aircraft feature high-tech airborne surveillance, command and control, and communications systems and a crew of up to 19, depending on the mission**, he remarked. The NATO AWACS planes, he said, will be providing radar coverage and surveillance operations for NORAD combat air patrols. "**They'll augment what our U.S. resources were doing ... and provide an enhanced situational awareness to NORAD**," he remarked, adding that the planes would "be here as long as we need them." **After the terror attacks on America, NATO invoked Article 5 of its charter, which states that a foreign attack on one member is considered an attack on the other 18 members.** Thomas said the United States requested the assistance. NATO ambassadors, who expressed their full support for the United States and the United Kingdom's global campaign against terrorism, approved the U.S. request. Ralston said NATO naval assets taking part in an exercise off the coast of Spain have been reassigned to the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean, consisting of nine ships from eight NATO countries. "They've set sail to provide an allied military presence in the eastern Mediterranean and to demonstrate our resolve," the general said. **"These two actions underline the unwavering commitment of the 19 NATO nations to fight terrorism**," Ralston said. **"We stand ready to provide any additional support requested by the United States, on order of the North Atlantic Council**."

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A terrorist getting a hold of nuclear materials is the largest and most probable threat of our time

Siddiqi 4/16 (Shibil, Fellow with the Center for the Study of Global Power and Politics at Trent University, “Terrorism: The nuclear summit’s ‘straw man’,” Asia Times Online, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/LD16Ak02.html) MJ

**American President Barack Obama gathered 47 national delegations for the first Nuclear Security Summit** (NSS) in Washington on April 12 and 13. It was the largest gathering of world leaders in Washington since the close of World War II. The scale of the summit was meant to impress the gravity of the subject matter. **In Obama's words, "This is an unprecedented gathering to address an unprecedented threat": the prevention of nuclear terrorism**. In trademark style, Obama offered rhetorical flourishes to fit the occasion: "**Two decades after the Cold War we face a cruel irony of history. The risk of nuclear confrontation between nations has gone down, but the risk of nuclear attack as gone up". The president said that a tiny scrap of plutonium the size of an apple was now the biggest threat to world stability**, **with "just the tiniest amount of plutonium" in the wrong hands posing potential for catastrophe.** However, the president's assessment of global nuclear threats paper over some basic realities. **The threat of nuclear confrontation remains dangerously high despite the New START** (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) **with Russia and America's passive-aggressive Nuclear Posture Review. This is particularly true along the nuclear fault-lines in the Middle East and South Asia which have existed since the Cold War. Perhaps a "dirty bomb" made out of a handful of plutonium or other radiological material forms the most significant "nuclear" threat to the US**. But outside of this Western-centric world-view, it is the threat of nuclear attack or exchange in the Middle East and South Asia - home to nearly a fourth of the world's population - that clearly remains the largest global nuclear threat.

NATO Good-Terrorism (Extension)

NATO adapts-terrorism policy proves

Ulbrich 1 (Jeffrey, Associate Press, “Prepare for worst, Rumsfeld tells NATO allies,” Army News, http://www.armytimes.com/legacy/new/1-292925-667618.php) MJ

**NATO has invoked Article 5 of its founding treaty, declaring that the attacks on the United States in September should be treated as an attack on** all 19. But the alliance has had no front-line role in the war in Afghanistan and none is envisaged. **Though NATO’s 1999 strategic concept points to terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction among the major threats facing NATO, the alliance is still heavily geared toward fighting wars of territorial defense and not the shadowy forces of terror**. Rumsfeld told fellow ministers that now is the time - while Sept. 11 is still fresh in the minds of people everywhere - to increase defense spending. **Added NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson: “We must draw the necessary conclusions, even if that means additional resources for defense and security and new balances inside our defense programs.” The defense ministers are expected to task the alliance with developing a new concept for defense against terrorism, reviewing NATO’s current effectiveness in this fight, developing new capabilities to fight terrorism and the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and improving information-sharing, a senior NATO official said**.

NATO Good-Sea Power

NATO protects the oceans with sea power

Sokolsky 97 (Joel, Professor of Political Science at Royal Military College of Canada, “PROJECTING STABILITY: NATO AND MULTILATERAL NAVAL COOPERATION IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA,” http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/95-97/sokolsky.pdf) MJ

**Had strategic nuclear deterrence been the sole, or even dominant, role of sea power in the Cold War, then the USN and other western navies would never have attained the size and sophistication that they did. But navies continued to be concerned with traditional roles, protection of the sea lanes of communication**(SLOC), **the projection of force ashore, gun-boat diplomacy, and naval presence. Even in the absence of a comparable rival Soviet high seas fleet, sea power maintained a relevance in the global balance of power**. Indeed, Samuel P. Huntington argued in 1954 that the USN’s monopoly of the seas and Soviet land power in Eurasia had resulted in a new kind of navy -- a “transoceanic” one. The USN’s role was not to prepare for a Mahanian fleet-on-fleet struggle for the high seas but to apply power on the “narrow lands and the narrow seas which like between” the “great oceans on the one hand and the equally immense spaces of the Eurasian heartland on the other.”5 **This was especially the case for the NATO alliance. From its earliest days the Alliance focused on securing the seas immediately adjacent to Europe.** Moreover, while it was the case as Huntington argued that the **USN and its allies dominated the high seas**, **in the “narrow seas” around Western Europe the Soviet Union could, even in these early years, deploy sea denial forces** (principally submarines) **that would have made the immediate projection of force ashore difficult. I**n later years when, due to the emergence of a more powerful and high seas capable Soviet fleet along with a considerable land-based naval aviation capability, **NATO grew increasingly apprehensive about its ability to protect the transatlantic SLOC upon which the strategy of flexible response rested, sea power had been an essential component of collective defence**.6

Sea power deters wars

Conway et al 7 (James, General, U.S. Marine Corps and Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gary Roughead, Admiral, U.S. Navy and Chief of Naval Operations, Thad W. Allen, Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard and Commandant of the Coast Guard, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” http://www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf) MJ

**No other disruption is as potentially disastrous to global stability as war among major powers. Maintenance and extension of this Nation’s comparative seapower advantage is a key component of deterring major power war.** While war with another great power strikes many as improbable, the near-certainty of its ruinous effects demands that it be actively deterred using all elements of national power. **The expeditionary character of maritime forces—our lethality, global reach, speed, endurance, ability to overcome barriers to access, and operational agility—provide the joint commander with a range of deterrent options. We will pursue an approach to deterrence that includes a credible and scalable ability to retaliate against aggressors conventionally, unconventionally, and with nuclear forces.**

NATO Good-Prevents Wars

NATO deters war

Kober 98 (Stanley, Research Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies, “NATO Expansion Flashpoint No. 3 Kaliningrad,” Foreign Policy Briefing, http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-046.pdf) MJ

**NATO expansion is based on the premise that deterrence is the best way to prevent war**. According to that view, **NATO prevented war in Europe during the Cold War by deterring Soviet aggression, and what worked during the Cold War should work just as well, if not better, in the** aftermath of the Cold War, when the military balance has shifted so decisively in favor of the United States. According to the conventional wisdom, **countries embraced by NATO have an absolute guarantee of protection, since Russia would not dare challenge the United States. That pervasive belief explains the scramble of countries in the former Soviet bloc to join NATO and their fear of being left out of the alliance. According to the logic of advocates of expansion, gray areas--that is, countries not within NATO but not in the Russian orbit either-- invite aggression because "nature abhors a vacuum."**

NATO Good-Soft Power

NATO successfully uses soft power to stop conflicts

Tarvainen 8(Tina, Doctoral research fellow, Department of Political Science, University of Turku , “NATO and the CBRN terrorism - mission: An Overview,” Journal of Security Issues, 2(1) pg 38)

Views of these threats are, therefore, not apolitical or indifferent. On the contrary, **threat estimations affect on counterterrorist and non-proliferation efforts and finally even to foreign policy-making. NATO’s role is so linked with the current risk assessment and threat analyses: how severe they are and how to resist them. It is surprising**, even paradoxical, **that while critics of the Alliance blame it for being too militaristic organization, its counterterrorist role has still been quite moderate. It participates to the ‘global fight against terrorism’ by offering its material resources and by acting in different kind of crisis management operations, which, on the long run, can help to prevent conflicts and further radicalization. NATO does, indeed, use not only the hard power, but the soft power as well.** Compared to the counterterrorist strategies of the United States, NATO’s guidelines can be described more defensive and reactive. De Nevers argues that **NATO has ‘soft’ strategy in this regard due its focus on vulnerability reducing and capability-enhancing**, while the United States uses harder measures in order to prevent terrorists’ strikes against the homeland (de Nevers, 2007, p. 38). The idea behind ‘protecting the homeland’ –rhetoric is closely related to the claimed change of the current security environment.

Soft power key to prevent the spread of infectious diseases, global warming, and create democracy

Nye 4(Joseph, Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University, “Soft power: the means to success in world politics,” pg 17) MJ

**Soft power is also likely to be more important when power is dispersed in another country rather than concentrated. A dictator cannot be totally indifferent to the views of the people in his country, but he can often ignore whether another country is popular or not when he calculates whether it is in his interests to be helpful. In democracies where public opinion and parliaments matter, political leaders have less leeway to adopt tactics and strike deals than in autocracies**. Thus it was impossible for the Turkish government to permit the transport of American troops across the country in 2003 because American policies had greatly reduced our popularity in public opinion and in the parliament. In contrast, it was far easier for the United States to obtain the use of bases in authoritarian Uzbekistan for operations in Afghanistan. Finally, though soft power sometimes has direct effects on specific goals-witness the inability of the United States to obtain the votes of Chile or Mexico in the UN Security Council in 2003after our policies reduced our popularity-it is more likely to have an impact on the general goals that a country seeks. Fifty years ago, Arnold Wolfers distinguished between the specific “possession goals” that countries pursue, and their broader “milieu goals,” like shaping an environment conducive to democracy. Successful pursuit of both types of goals is important in foreign policy. If one considers various American national interests, for example, soft power may be less relevant than hard power in preventing attack, policing borders, and protecting allies. But **soft power is particularly relevant to the realization of “milieu goals.” It has a crucial role to play in promoting democracy, human rights, and open markets. It is easier to attract people to democracy than to coerce them to be democratic. The fact that the impact of attraction on achieving preferred outcomes varies by context and type of goals does not make it irrelevant, any more than the fact that bombs and bayonets do not help when we seek to prevent the spread of infectious diseases, slow global warming, or create democracy.**

NATO Good-Proliferation

NATO prevents nuclear proliferation

NATO 9 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO publishes new policy to combat weapons of mass destruction proliferation,” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\_57234.htm?selectedLocale=en) MJ

**The North Atlantic Council decided on 31 August 2009 to make public a new strategic policy for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction** (WMD) **and defending against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear** (CBRN) **threats**. The document, which stems from the Bucharest Summit in 2008, was endorsed by Heads of State and Government at the Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl in April 2009 and constitutes a new basis for NATO’s efforts in the field of WMD. “**The document is comprehensive in scope**,” said Ambassador Jacek Bylica, Head of NATO’s WMD Centre. “It **is guided by a clear vision: that the Alliance – its populations, territory and forces – will be secure from threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and related materials. It provides high-level political guidance for our future activities in support of international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and regimes, as well as for military planning and capacity-building for defending against the threats posed by these weapons.” The new document highlights “strategic enablers” that will allow the Alliance to prevent the proliferation of WMD, protect against a WMD attack, and recover should an attack take place**. These enablers consist of intelligence and information sharing, international outreach and partner activities, as well as public diplomacy and strategic communication. “**In implementing this policy, NATO will foster cooperation with partners, and international and regional organizations in order to develop a common understanding of the WMD threat,”** Ambassador Bylica said. “It will encourage participation in and compliance with international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.” At the 2006 NATO Summit in Riga, the spread of WMD and the possibility that terrorists will acquire them were identified as the main threats to the Alliance over the next 10-15 years

Proliferation leads to extinction

Utgoff 2 (Victor A., Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division, “Survival”, p.87-90)

In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed towards a world that will mirror the American **Wild** West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear “six shooters” on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather together on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

NATO Won’t Collapse

There’s no identity crisis- many backgrounds allows NATO to stay together

Osborn 10 (Dan, poli sci UC Berkley, Marin Forum, The Role of Identity in Security Organizations, http://marin-forum.com/)BAF

A security organization’s strength is related to the number of identity constructs present. NATO is strong because the geographic, racial, religious, historical, and ideological constructs are all present. The presence of numerous constructs allows the organization to emphasis or de-emphasis certain constructs based on the situation. Had NATO been solely a religious organization (Christian-secular) it would have been very difficult to incorporate Turkey (Islamic-secular). Instead NATO emphasized its historical and ideological constructs (along with the external threat dimension) and as a result Turkey provides the second largest standing army in the NATO alliance. The presence of more constructs makes the organization more stable since when a certain construct becomes a volatile issue the organization can quickly shift its identity to a different construct. The relationship between the internal and external formation of identity is vital for the strength of the organization. Just as the organization can shift its internal identity among its shared identity constructs, the organization can shift its emphasis between its internal and external identity formations. In the case of Turkey the threat of communism and the Soviet Union provided further reason to join NATO in the absence of shared internal identity constructs. Following the end of the Cold War NATO shifted its focus toward its internal identity formation in order to keep the alliance relevant as it lacked an external identity dimension. When both dimensions of identity are present the organization is strong as NATO was during the Cold War; if one dimension disappears than the organization will weaken over the long term.

NATO is a permanent alliance- flawed cooperation is better than none

Sloan 10 (Stanely, Director of the Atlantic Community Initiative, NATO a Permanent Alliance: Outlook for the Future, June 16, http://www.acus.org/new\_atlanticist/nato-permanent-alliance-outlook-future)

Chances are, if the United States and the European allies continue to see transatlantic security cooperation as in their interest, they will find ways to compromise on difficult issues and to move ahead, using ad hoc coalition approaches when absolutely necessary to get around opposition to making an operation a formal NATO mission. Respect for the sovereign decisions of member states has, of course, been the underlying problem with NATO’s operation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. ISAF’s effectiveness was handicapped by the fact that some countries were unwilling to allow their troops to operate in parts of Afghanistan and in circumstances that would put them at greater risk. It is well understood that political realities and historical experiences have determined the approaches that nations have taken to this issue. The eventual evaluation of NATO’s performance in Afghanistan will undoubtedly reflect such problems, even if the long run produces a relatively successful outcome. Assessing the mission’s effectiveness will become part of the process of adapting the alliance to future security challenges. Will the NATO members continue to find NATO cooperation to their advantage, even with a difficult experience in Afghanistan? Only time will tell. However, history suggests that, in spite of their differences, the United States and Europe will try to keep their act together. And today, NATO remains an important part of the script for that routine. Dealing with the threats posed by terrorism and managing most other aspects of transatlantic relations demand more effective transatlantic cooperation in political, economic, financial, and social as well as military aspects of the relationship. The bottom line, therefore, is that the transatlantic bargain will survive Afghanistan. The alliance has already shown its resilience during the early twenty-first century when decisions by the Bush administration put alliance cooperation under severe pressure. The bargain will survive in part because the security of the member states cannot be ensured through national measures alone. It will survive because the member states will continue to recognize that imperfect cooperation serves their interests better than no cooperation at all. NATO will be adapted to meet new challenges. And the value foundation of the transatlantic bargain will persist, in spite of differences over specific issues and shifting patterns of member state interests. It will survive in part because the bargain is not just NATO. In fact, recent trends suggest that there is much more creative thought and political momentum behind enhancing transatlantic cooperation rather than diminishing it. As Lawrence S. Kaplan has observed, “The transatlantic bargain still resonates in the twenty-first century.” As a result, this bargain in the hearts and minds of the member states has become as close as one could imagine to being a “permanent alliance.”

NATO Won’t Collapse

NATO won’t collapse- Obama building stronger relations leading to a greater NATO role

Konurov 9 (Andrei, Оrbis Terrarum writer, Strategic Culture Foundation Barack and NATO, http://en.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=1962)BAF

And now the time of Barack Obama has come. There are so many expectations for this man that it is just frightening. It seems that only Antichrist would be met on Earth with more exaltation. Obama has plans regarding Iran, Africa and even Fidel Castro said a couple of good words about him let alone traditional allies of the US. Their expectations are getting stronger thanks to the presence of such symbolic figure from Bill Clinton’s team as Hillary Clinton at the post of State secretary. Will it mean the new thriving of NATO and the comeback of the good old days? It is known that political carrier of Barack Obama was very impetuous and its recent period before he became the president did not relate to US’ international relations. That is why both experts and wide audience learnt about Obama’s views on US foreign policy only during his election campaign. Obama had repeatedly spoken about his views on the foreign policy issues including the transatlantic relations. Obama called for the strengthening of these relations it would be strange if he did the opposite. In his election program he stated that once he was elected as the US president he would strengthen the current alliances and form new ones for the US. In his program he also made it clear that he expected NATO to provide US more active support regarding US actions in Afghanistan. But neither his election program nor his speeches make an impression that NATO will become the key issue of his foreign policy agenda. On the contrary - Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Palestine – it has been said and written more about any of these countries than about NATO. In general it looks like in his foreign policy program Obama plans to reduce the use of force and to lay stress on diplomacy to achieve US foreign policy goals. It is enough to remember his promise to open American consulates even in very remote countries. Until the last moment all weekly addresses of the president to his nation were dedicated to the US economy rescue plan he has signed recently. By now there have been only two meetings with foreign leaders - Obama has visited Canada on the invitation of Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso at the White House. And though Canada is a member of NATO the talks’ main topics were the power sector and the climate change. In his first address to the Congress, on February, 25, Obama was speaking almost exclusively about the economic crisis and gave only five minutes of his one hour speech to the international relations. He mentioned Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, China, Japan, Korea and Germany. Of all these states only Germany is a member of NATO but the president only mentioned it saying that the US is inferior to Germany in terms of solar batteries use. Again Obama did not say a single word about NATO. Meanwhile the people in Obama’s team who are in charge of national security and foreign policy issues have experience in US-Europe interaction within NATO framework and know how to use NATO to promote American interests. First of all it is Joe Biden who before his election as the Vice President was the head of The United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Then it is Hillary Clinton who, as evil tongues say, had great influence on US foreign policy in the times of her being the First Lady. Not to forget about James Jones, Obama’s national security advisor who before his resignation was in charge for NATO forces in Europe. That is why it can be expected that the relations between US and Western Europe will improve and no collapse of NATO, which in fact took place in times of Bush’s presidency, will take place.

-----A2: Democracy Advantage-----

**Turkey Won’t Democratize**

No democratization----secularization

NYT 07 (New York Times, Democracy in Turkey http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/01/opinion/01sat4.html) BAF

The election of Abdullah Gul, an observant Muslim, to the Turkish presidency was a victory for democracy. The military, which has a habit of defending Turkish secularism at the expense of Turkish democracy, tried to block his candidacy last spring. Rather than bow to the generals, the government took the issue to the people, who delivered Mr. Gul’s party a mandate in July’s Parliamentary elections, smoothing the way for lawmakers to overwhelmingly approve Mr. Gul for the presidency. Though nearly all of Turkey’s 70 million people identify themselves as Muslim, the Turkish Constitution calls for strict secularity in public life. The insistence on secularism, in place since the country’s founding in 1923, was intended to counter what were viewed as anti-modern strains within Islam that impeded development. Over time, however, it led to the entrenchment of a secular ruling elite and the exclusion of more openly devout Muslims. In recent years, that observant group — which also accounts for much of the Turkish middle class — has fought back at the ballot box and scored victories. Secular Turks have been understandably anxious about the ascendancy of Mr. Gul’s Justice and Development party. Widely known for its Islamist roots, the party now holds all the top offices in government. Mr. Gul himself has attracted a great deal of attention because his wife wears the Muslim headscarf, a visceral affront to some secularists. They fear that religion may creep into government and then into their own lives, encroaching on precious freedoms such as women’s rights. Mr. Gul and his party have pledged to maintain a secular government, and their five-year record in power so far — a time of economic growth and legal reforms that have brought Turkey closer to joining the European Union — suggests that they will keep their word. The military, which has toppled four elected governments since 1960, waves the banner of Turkey’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, in its ferocious embrace of secularism. But Ataturk’s ultimate goal was for Turkey to become a Western-style democracy. And in such a democracy, the military exists to serve the government, not the other way around. The generals, who treasure Turkey’s ties to the West as a member of NATO, have yet to grasp this. On Tuesday, they disrespected the very notion of democratic development by boycotting Mr. Gul’s inauguration. Like their counterparts in other NATO countries, they need to help the elected government to succeed — by staying out of politics.

No democratization- Shariah history impedes

Ozgunes 08 (Ahmet A., Istanbul Staff correspondent, Turkey and democracy; The American model, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/01/opinion/01iht-edlet.html) BAF

Democracy in Turkey is still not in good order. The Islamic sects and the civil and military bureaucracies still exert undue influence on the political process, and basic liberties are not secured. Why does the democratization process prove to be so slow and problematic? The answer lies in the history. Like all traditional Islamic states, the Ottoman Empire was governed by a coalition of autocratic rulers and the religious class. Shariah, the Islamic law, was supreme and provided authority and legitimacy to the rulers. The judiciary was in the hands of the religious scholars. This happy arrangement functioned well in keeping the general population subservient until the 19th century when the ideas and the increasingly powerful armies of the West convinced the rulers that the old order was obsolete and the empire had to modernize. This new situation led to centralization of authority in the hands of the bureaucrats, taking also the judiciary out of the hands of the religious class. After the establishment of the Turkish republic, Shariah was deemed the main obstacle to progress and banished from the public domain. However, the religious class never agreed to its new modest position, and ever since has been fighting to regain its former power and glory. Democracy was established in Turkey after the World War I, and since then the power struggle between the secular state establishment and the religious class has been the underlying current of Turkish politics. Recently, the chief prosecutor asked the constitutional court to close down the ruling Islamist-oriented Justice and Development Party, or AK, and ban its leaders from politics on the grounds that they undermine the secular principles of the republic. This latest political crisis once again demonstrates the power of these underlying currents. The AK Party came to power in 2002 with the realization that the great majority of the Turkish people wanted more prosperity and more liberty. They carried out sweeping economic and political reforms, the economy boomed and they came to power again in 2007 with almost half of the electorate voting for them. Since this election, we have observed a mysterious change of mood in AK; the reforms have stalled and apparently more radical elements in the party have been given a free hand in their efforts to re-Islamize the country. Could this latest crisis teach AK leaders a lesson or two to continue with their reform agenda rather than surrender to the Islamist elements in their midst? The ordeals of Turkish democracy are not over.

**Turkey Won’t Democratize**

Democracy won’t flourish soon- Turkey encroaches on citizen freedoms

Rodrick 10 (Dani, prof. of Int’l Poli Econ at Harvard University, Wall Street Journal, The Death of Turkey's Democracy, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704009804575308182324490568.html)

It wasn't so long ago that the country seemed to be taking significant strides in the direction of human rights and democracy. During its first term in government, between 2002 and 2007, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) worked hard to bring the country into the European Union, to reform its legal regime, and to relax restrictions on Kurds. But more recently, the same government has been responsible for a politics of deception, dirty tricks, fear, and intimidation that couldn't present a sharper contrast to its rhetoric on democracy. Several Turkish intellectuals abroad who have expressed critical views have told me they are afraid to return to Turkey. Eavesdropping has reached such levels that even housewives refrain from chatting about "sensitive" matters on the phone. The AKP government has launched massive, politically motivated court cases against its opponents. Most glaring are the hundreds of current and retired military officers, lawyers, academics, and journalists who have been charged with membership in an armed terror organization, dubbed "Ergenekon," which aims to destabilize and topple the AKP government. View Full Image rodriklt Associated Press Ultra-nationalist supporters holding a banner identifying the "real" villain in the Ergenekon affair: "The plot will be foiled, America will lose, Turkey will win." rodriklt rodriklt Pursued by a group of specially appointed prosecutors, and loudly cheered by AKP-friendly and AKP-controlled media, these Ergenekon trials make a mockery of due process. They are based on indictments full of inconsistencies, rely on anonymous informants of questionable credibility, and evince systematic prosecutorial misconduct. The evidence behind the charges ranges from the insubstantial to the blatantly manufactured. The main purpose of the prosecutions seems to be to discredit the accused and keep them under detention for as long as possible. My personal wake-up call came in February when retired General Cetin Dogan, my father in law, was arrested in a parallel case. Mr. Dogan, an outspoken critic of the AKP, was charged with being the leader of an elaborate coup plot to overthrow the newly elected government in 2002-2003. The documents backing the charges, produced as usual by an anonymous informant, were full of anachronisms, discrepancies, and mistakes, raising serious questions about their authenticity. None of this derailed the government. Prosecutors ignored all indications of forgery, a government-controlled scientific body produced a patently misleading report lending support to the charges, and the pro-AKP media launched a vicious campaign of character assassination against Mr. Dogan. Mr. Erdogan and his circle joined in the chorus of attacks while denigrating judges that would dare rule in favor of the defendants. Mr. Dogan was kept for months in jail pending trial, along with tens of other active-duty and retired officers, despite the absence of credible evidence and obvious signs of fabrication. Inexplicably, many supposed Turkish democrats and liberals have made common cause with the AKP government and have acted as cheerleaders for these cases. Their hope seems to be that the Ergenekon trials will bring the so-called "deep state"—clandestine networks of the military and their civilian allies—to account. There is little doubt that Turkey's pre-AKP secular order featured strong anti-democratic undercurrents. But the AKP government has shown little interest in uncovering actual crimes or bringing real culprits to justice. Even though some of the Ergenekon suspects may be guilty of transgressions, they have been indicted not for specific, demonstrable offences, but for nebulous or fictitious crimes unlikely to result in convictions in a fair trial. Moreover, in these and other cases the government engages in exactly the kinds of activities that the liberals decry and want to bring to justice.

**Turkey Won’t Democratize**

Turkey far from consolidating democracy- infringing on voting rights, personal freedoms, and an independent government

Tezcur 07 (Gunes Murat, prof of poli sci @ Loyola Univ. Chicago, Open Democracy, Turkey divided: politics, faith and democracy, http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-turkey/turkey\_divided\_4593.jsp)BAF

A convulsive crisis is gripping Turkey. At stake is not just the choice of the next president or even the future political direction of the country, but the fundamental identity of the Turkish state and society. How this crisis is resolved will determine the evolution of this pivotal nation for years to come, and will - whatever the outcome - have repercussions far beyond Turkey's borders. A crisis which has exposed the profound rifts in Turkish society began with the decision of the ruling Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice & Development Party / AKP) to have the new president elected in advance of the parliamentary elections scheduled for November 2007. Turkey's 1982 constitution specifies that the president in Turkey is elected by parliament; although the prime minister is the main executive officer, the president is the highest political authority and wields some substantial veto powers. This makes the presidency, currently held by Ahmed Necdet Sezer, a coveted political position. It has long been speculated that the prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan - an ex-Islamist centre-right politician whose party has been in power since the election of November 2002 - sought to parachute himself to the presidency, a process that would start with a nomination from his AKP party by the scheduled date of 26 April 2007. The AKP leadership was aware of the widespread opposition to Erdoğan's promotion, and decided to wait until the last moment to announce its candidate in order to expedite the project. The plan failed, as hundreds of thousands of secular Turks rallied against his candidacy in Ankara on 14 April in the first of a series of massive demonstrations. Erdoğan's default move was to promote as an alternative the candidacy of his foreign minister and longstanding ally, Abdullah Gül. This failed to appease the opposition, but the proposal came to the parliament for the first round of voting on 27 April. According to the constitution, Gül needed two-thirds of legislators (367 votes) in the first two rounds and 276 in the third round to be elected president. In the event - after a boycott by opposition MP's who sought to abort the process by making the vote inquorate - 361 parliamentarians participated in the voting, of whom 357 of them voted for Gül. The main opposition party, the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party / CHP) argued that the voting was unconstitutional on the grounds that the constitution requires a quorum of 367 parliamentarians; it then appealed to the constitutional court to rule on the validity of the process. The very same night, a major player in all Turkish constitutional issues - the army - announced its presence in the drama. On its website, the Turkish general staff published a stern memorandum stating that certain groups were relentlessly exploiting sacred religious feelings for their sinister goals and challenging the state's authority. The memo made clear that the armed forces would not stay neutral: as guardian of the state's secular character, it would uncompromisingly defend the principle of secularism. The government responded by criticising the memorandum while adopting a conciliatory tone towards the military. Two days later, hundreds of thousands again marched in Istanbul in support of secularism, and denounced Gül's candidacy. On 1 May, the constitutional court considered the CHP's application and ruled that the vote for the president in the parliament was invalid. The government's response was swift: prime minister and AKP chairman Erdoğan, called for early parliamentary elections. On 3 May, the parliament in Ankara supported him by voting to hold elections on 22 July rather than November. On 4 May, Erdogan held a two-hour meeting with the Turkish military's chief-of-staff, Yasar Buyukanit. At this stage, it still appears that the newly elected parliament will elect the eleventh president of the Turkish republic. The roots of crisis The current conflict has its deeper roots in the late Ottoman period when a group of highly educated modernisers identified popular traditions and Islamic practices as the cause of their society's backwardness. Their vision of secularism - more strictly, laicism - entailed not only separation between state and religion, but more importantly strict restrictions on public expressions of Islamic identity and the state's control over Islamic organisations. They consolidated their rule with the establishment of the Turkish republic in 1923 and engaged in an ambitious modernisation project. The military and the judiciary gradually became the self-declared guardians of the republic. As the new state became consolidated in the 1940s, an alternative elite started to emerge: loyal to the republican order, but promoting a more inclusive and tolerant version of secularism. The introduction of free multiparty elections in 1950 brought this elite to power. Over time the conflict between two competing versions of the role of Islam in Turkey's socio-political affairs crystallised into the division between centre-left and centre-right parties. Centre-right parties have been predominant in Turkey; they won nine of the fourteen elections held between 1950 and 2002. But during the 1990s - partly under pressure of frenetic social change and economic dislocation - the support-base of the centre-right parties started to erode, and religious and xenophobic nationalistic parties rose to fill the vacuum. The electoral victory of the Islamist, but not extreme, AKP in the 2002 elections seemed to restore the pivotal position of the centre-right in Turkish politics, but it did not mend the great rift of Turkish politics. The AKP and the secular republic The AKP government has a successful record in many respects. It inaugurated an era of political stability that translated into sustainable growth rates, major democratic reforms, increasing linkages with the European Union, and growing influence in the middle east. However, the AKP also came to resemble the decaying centre-right parties it had replaced. It rapidly matured into a patronage-distributing and hierarchical organisation with very limited pluralism and grassroots participation in decision-making. Moreover, the AKP has proved unable to overcome the military's hegemony over Turkey's Kurdish policy and take bold initiatives that would contribute to the peaceful solution of the endemic Kurdish problem in the southeast of the country (and accentuated by developments in Iraq). It refused to reduce a 10% threshold of guaranteed seats, which had the effect of excluding Kurdish nationalists from the Turkish parliament and making the body unrepresentative of the full spectrum of political loyalties in the country. This uneasy relationship to democracy also became apparent in its consistent rejection of the idea of having the president elected by direct popular vote of the Turkish people - until it became clear that Abdullah Gül would not be elected by parliament, when it executed an immediate u-turn. The implications of the events of the last week are twofold. First, it has become clear that Turkish democracy is far from being consolidated. Consensus on even the basic constitutional rules is non-existent and major political actors have little trust in each other. The military left no doubt that it would not tolerate the assumption of the presidency by an ex-Islamist activist and founder of the AKP whose wife (as does the prime minister's) wears a headscarf. It did not matter to the army that Abdullah Gül has been a staunch advocate of Turkey's democratisation and membership of the EU since the early 2000s. Second, the Turkish citizens who marched in the streets and are backed by the guardians of the state are fearful of the AKP not because of its perceived undemocratic agenda but because of its perceived majoritarianism. They are anxious in a political system where the AKP leaders occupy the three top elected positions - presidency, prime ministry and the speaker of parliament - they would be completely marginalised. It may seem hard to understand that these citizens are afraid of a party that enthusiastically supports Turkey's membership of the European Union, has acted within the parameters of the republic's laws, and is committed to political and economic liberalisation. But their attitude also fits the logic of Turkey's modern political development, where the main categories of identification - state and society, left and right, secular and religious - resist easy or rigid classification. In this light, it would be too easy to dismiss the protestors' concerns as being unfounded. In their view, secularism does not only mean the separation of state and religion but also a mindset that categorically resists religious communalism and conformism. They may not be right in associating those tendencies with the AKP. Nonetheless, the strength of laicism in Turkey has been a strong factor in taming illiberal forms of Islam. Freedom from religion would have better prospects in the Muslim world if defenders of "secularism" were to march also in Cairo, Islamabad, or Tehran.

-----A2: EU Advantage-----

Turkey Wont Accede to EU

**Turkey is unlikely to be allowed in EU after they froze eight chapters**

Head 6/30

**Candidate countries have to open and then close 35 chapters of talks bringing their own laws and institutions in line with the EU's. The opening of Turkey's 13th chapter** - on food and veterinary safety - **may turn out to be the last. Cyprus joined the EU in 2004, but Turkey backs its breakaway north. The northern part of the island is still governed by an unrecognised administration. The Greek-Cypriot government vetoed a plan to allow the Turkish part to trade with EU member states. Turkey retaliated by blocking access to its ports for Cypriot ships, which led the EU to freeze eight negotiating chapters**.

Turkey is not going to finish the chapters to get into EU

Jones 9 (Dorian, Chief Information Officer, at Illinois Department of Public Health, “Turkey sees growing reservations over EU bid,” http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4790731,00.html) MJ

However, Bagis' optimism is increasingly meaningless, according to Professor Cengiz Aktar, head of European Union studies at Istanbul's Bachesehir University. **Aktar said such reports from the EU executive were merely becoming an academic exercise. He said the results represented "total schizophrenia."** "**On the one hand, Turkey is now moving with this Kurdish opening and this opening towards Armenia**," Aktar told Deutsche Welle. "**It's all in line with EU membership and yet, the negotiations are completely stalled. It is like day and night**." **Aktar said the rest of Europe was absent. "The European Commission is there, but the European Union member states are not," he said. "They are not supporting Turkey in its endeavors." Currently, various EU members are blocking 15 of the 35 chapters - areas where reforms may be necessary to bring a country in line with EU legislation - that Turkey must complete to achieve membership. With only a handful of chapters remaining, the entire process is threatening to grind to a halt.**

Turkey won’t be acceded into EU-won’t open ports to Cyprus

Jones 9 (Dorian, Chief Information Officer, at Illinois Department of Public Health, “Turkey sees growing reservations over EU bid,” http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4790731,00.html) MJ

**Many of the chapters are blocked because of an impasse over the divided Mediterranean island of Cyprus. Turkey has refused to open its ports and airports to the Greek Cypriots until the EU lifts its embargo against the Turkish side of the island.** **The EU accession report warned that Turkey must meet its obligations to all EU members - including Cyprus**. But Suat Kiniklioglu, spokesman for the Turkish parliamentary foreign affairs committee, said **Turkey won't back down despite the EU requirements that it open direct trade with Cyprus. "There is no way we are going to open the ports to Greek Cyprus," Kiniklioglu said**. The row over the ports could come to a head at the end of this year. Under a protocol signed by Turkey with the EU, it risks having the talks suspended unless it opens its ports to Cyprus by December**. Richard Howitt, a member of the European Parliament's committee on Turkey, said that Ankara was in danger of throwing away all the good work it had achieved with this year's report**. "I warn them that there isn't too much ambiguity, I would even argue no ambiguity in that legal text agreed by the council ministers," **Howitt said**. "So **don't underestimate the threat of the talks being suspended altogether.**" But such a threat does not carry the weight it once did. For with French President Nicholas Sarkozy, who opposes Turkey's bid to join the 27-nation bloc on principle, there is a growing belief both among the people and politicians that its bid is doomed to forever remain just that: a bid.

Turkey Won’t Accede to EU

Turkey will not accede into EU-won’t accept

SAPA 4 (South African Press Association, “Turkey won't join EU on conditions,” http://za.mg.co.za/article/2004-12-15-turkey-wont-join-eu-on-conditions) MJ

Turkey will not accept entry to the European Union on any conditions, **Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul said in a newspaper interview published on the eve of a key EU decision on the issue. "We will not say yes at any price. We have told the EU that**," Gul told the Milliyet daily, in comments published on Wednesday. Gul's comments echoed those of **Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who on Tuesday told diplomats from EU states that his country will reject conditions posed by the EU authorities in Brussels if it considers them contrary to its interests**. During an EU summit in Brussels on Thursday and Friday, the 25-nation grouping is due to set a date for the long-awaited opening of negotiations on Turkey's application. In his interview, **Gul laid down what he said are four "red lines" that Turkey will not cross: Negotiations must have as their final aim complete EU membership for Turkey. The EU must not oblige Turkey to extend diplomatic recognition to the Republic of Cyprus, which became an EU member in May this year. The decision to open membership negotiations with Turkey** -- expected to be taken at the Brussels summit -- **must be very clear, and not conditional on any subsequent decision by EU leaders. There should be no special conditions imposed permanently on Turkey. "Turkey will not accept an injustice**," Gul said, adding that to impose special conditions -- as demanded by some EU countries -- would "violate European law". Gul was later due to fly to the summit in Brussels.

Chapters key to Turkey accession are blocked by Greek Cypriots and France

Doğan 10 (Yonca Poyraz Doğan, Istanbul Kultur University, Global Political Trends Center, “Cyprus conflict could interrupt Turkey’s EU accession ,” http://www.gpotcenter.org/news/426) MJ

“[Greek Cypriots] believe that Turkey will give in at the end when it becomes a member of the EU. But this is not a realistic option for the Greek Cypriots. They should realize that they lost leverage in the EU because many chapters are being blocked by them and France,” he told Today’s Zaman for Monday Talk. Akgün added that Turkey has lost its desire to become a member of the EU and is not ready to make any sacrifice. “Even in the reform process, EU membership is a non-issue. Look at the debate on and around the Kurdish problem -- you won’t see any reference to the Copenhagen political criteria,” he said.

Turkey won’t accede EU-won’t open ports

Hawley 6 (Charles, staff writer, “Is Ankara Gambling Away its EU Future?” Spiegel Online, http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,446107,00.html) MJ

And what's at stake? If Turkey loses, its decades-long dream of European Union membership could finally fizzle out. **Forty-six years of waiting, negotiating, reforming, convincing: wasted. No more future within the world's most powerful economy. It's a huge gamble and Ankara has shoved all of its chips to the center of the table. Problem is, Turkey's hand is terrible. The issue, of course, is Cyprus. Less than a week before the European Commission releases a report on Turkey's progress toward joining the EU, the country still hasn't fulfilled what would seem to be an elemental requirement: opening up its ports to all EU members**. Cypriot ships remain unwelcome in Turkey. **The EU is not impressed -- and Turkey's going to hear about i**t on Nov. 8. "**If this situation continues, Turkey's accession is doomed to failure**," said Heinz Kramer, an expert on Turkish progress toward EU membership with the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin, referring to the ongoing stalemate over Cyprus.

Turkey Won’t Accede EU-30 Years

Its unlikely Turkey will accede into EU-if they do, it won’t be for 30 years

Birch 9 ([Nicholas Birch](http://www.eurasianet.org/taxonomy/term/1559), specialist in Turkey, Iran and the Middle East, “Turkey: Is Ankara Trying to Tame the Russian Bear?” Eurasianet.org, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav081409a.shtml) MJ

Public opinion appears to be helping rapprochement efforts. **Polls show 70 percent of Russians to have a positive view of Turkey**, a ratio that the influx of Russian tourists into Turkey (2.8 million last year) is likely to bolster. In Turkey, meanwhile, recent Pew Research Center polls show that the replacement of George Bush by Barack Obama has had a negligible impact on anti-Americanism in the country. **And while polls still show a majority of Turks supporting the country's struggling European Union accession process, few Turks believe Europe will ever let them in. A prominent advisor to Vladimir Putin, Sergei Markov shares that opinion. "Turkey won't get into the EU for another 30 years," he said in February**, adding that Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Turkey should form an economic union parallel to the EU. It's a suggestion that raises polite smiles in Ankara. The architect of Turkey's new multilateral foreign policy, Ahmet Davutoglu may appear more at home in the Middle East, but he insists European Union accession remains Turkey's "number one priority."

Turkey in EU Bad: Racism (1/2)

1) Turkey is too different from the EU- kills EU unity

Parker 02 (Randall, Professor of Economics at East Carolina University, Should Turkey Join The European Union?, ParaPundit, http://www.parapundit.com/archives/000790.html)

Woollacott mentions the growth of the imam hatip schools in Turkey as a means that the Islamists have used to expand their ranks. They apparently seek to teach a new generation of Turks to be fundamentalist Muslims. This brings up an important question: Is there a higher percentage of Turkish school children attending Islamist schools than was the case 10 or 20 years ago? Is that percentage rising or falling? Will the AKP government increase funding for Islamist schools? Will the desire to achieve EU membership cause the military to hold back from blocking this move? There is a very basic question that should be asked: Is the Islamist influence in Turkey growing or declining? A follow-up question: If Turkey joins the EU will the Islamist influence be more likely to grow or decline? Many in the pro-membership camp assume that EU membership will increase the power of the secular faction in Turkey. But it is by no means obvious that Turkey's membership in the EU will help ensure the secularization of Turkish government and society. If EU demands for greater religious freedom translate into greater latitude for the Islamists to get control of cultural and education institutions it is quite possible that EU membership will have the opposite effect. A Turkey outside of the EU is a Turkey whose military will be free to stomp down on the Islamists when Islamist influence begins to grow too strong. A Turkey inside the EU will be one whose historical protector of its secular character - the Turkish military - will no longer be able to perform that function. Jonny Dymond finds young Turks in Istanbul cafes who doubt Turkey's suitability for EU membership. It is not the grand clash of civilisations that disturbs, said Verda, it is that being Muslim means you embrace change more slowly, that you are culturally different. 'Muslims have a lot of traditions; they are not leaving their traditions, they are keeping them. A lot of my Muslim friends, despite being highly educated, think that they are not suitable for the EU. 'The reason is that they are Muslim, they have their own culture, their own lifestyle, and it is too hard to change it.' Istanbul, said Verda, is different - not really Turkey at all, the cosmopolitan city has a history of European civilisation and intermingling of cultures. All the same, she says, it is not Europe either. 'It's like the combination of East and West together - one day you feel you are very European, very modern, the next you wake up and find out that you are from the Middle East.' The EU is demanding greater civilian control over the Turkish military. The EU has so far refused to start membership talks with Turkey until the government meets minimum requirements on human rights and democracy. But Mr Erdogan argued that tougher standards were being applied to Ankara than to other nations vying to join the EU. Although Turkey has passed laws banning the death penalty and granting more rights to its Kurdish minority, the EU has noted shortcomings in human rights, including restrictions on freedom of expression, the torture of prisoners and insufficient civilian control over its military. Is that wise? The one institution that is most loved and respected by the Turkish people is their military. The Turkish military has protected the secular state and Turkey would be nowhere near ready to join the EU in the first place if the Turkish military hadn't played its role of constitutional protector for about 80 years. If Islamism grows as a force in Turkey and Turkey is admitted to the EU then what will the EU be able to do to stop the growth of a religious state within its borders? German opposition leader Edmund Stoiber predicts EU membership for Turkey will destroy the political union. “Membership for Turkey would spell the end of political union in Europe. We do not have that kind of integrative strength,” Herr Stoiber, the Christian Democratic opposition leader, said. “We want a proper political union, not just a free trade zone, yet that is what we would end up with if we let in Turkey.”Germany and France agreed a “conditional rendezvous clause”, allowing the start of entry talks with Turkey in July 2005, providing Ankara satisfied the EU that it had met standards on minority rights, judicial and prison reform, institutional democracy and market economics. “If you set 2005 as a possible date for talks, as Chancellor Schröder has done, then you will not be able to hold up the process,” Herr Stoiber said yesterday. When he talks about a political union versus a free trade zone he's making an important point: In order to achieve a political union one needs a lot of common values. The EU already faces enormous obstacles brought about lack of a common language, differences in historical experiences and differences in cultures between the existing EU members. There are large differences in living standards, levels of corruption, and the strength of civil society among the EU members. The addition of Turkey as a member would make the differences even greater and the number of issues on which a consensus can be formed would be reduced. Dr. John Casey, a fellow of Gonville & Caius, Cambridge, believes that there are cultural differences that make Turkey incompatible with the EU. The Turkish question is a much more acute version of a problem that could in the long run bring to nought the dreams of those who seek "ever closer union" in Europe itself. How can there be a European "state" - how can there be a common sense of allegiance among citizens of the EU - where there is no common language, where there is such cultural diversity, and where the political and legal traditions of at least one important European country - the United Kingdom - differ so radically from those of many of the others? Yet the European idealists can point to two great facts to oppose the sceptics. Almost all of Europe has a Christian inheritance, which means that the great majority of us, whether believers or not, are profoundly shaped by up to two millennia of Christian culture. You can only think this does not matter profoundly if you fail to see how culture overwhelmingly makes us what we are, and does help give us a sense of European identity despite the manifold differences. John O'Farrell says the Europeans really need to figure out what they want to accomplish.

Turkey in EU Bad: Racism (2/2)

2) Disunity leads to racism

Castle 06 (Stephen, Middle East specialist, The Independent, Muslims on front line as racism rises across EU, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/muslims-on-front-line-as-racism-rises-across-eu-409325.html)BAF

Racism, xenophobia and far-right extremism are on the rise across Europe, according to a comprehensive survey which found that Muslim communities face mounting discrimination and prejudice. The report, by non-governmental organisations in 20 EU countries, criticises governments for losing interest in the battle against racism, and says the political reaction to terrorist attacks has made life harder for ethnic minorities. The inquiry by the European Network against Racism highlights a trend towards "increased tolerance for discriminatory behaviour particularly against immigrants and Muslims". It adds that "a lack of political will to address racism is sometimes evident and disturbing". The section on the UK, compiled by the Runnymede Trust, chronicles the reaction to the July 7 terror attacks in London last year concluding that new immigration and security policies have helped create a situation in which racism has flourished. The report on France describes immigration policies as being "at the heart of institutional racism" in the country. In Germany almost 15,000 refugees had their asylum claims revoked last year, compared with 577 in 1998. Anti-terror crackdowns have led to racial profiling which, by the nature of stereotyping, impacts on the wider ethnic minority groups, the report says. "Since January 2005 police in the Netherlands can ask for proof of identity. The UK also reports an increase in the disproportionate use of 'stop and search' against minority groups. "Muslim women were disproportionately affected by an ordinance proposed by the Mayor of Treviso [Italy] in 2004 that forbade the covering of one's face on municipal territory." Across the Continent researchers found evidence that police forces have failed in their duty to investigate and prevent racist crime. "Sometimes racially motivated crime is simply not taken seriously," says the document, adding that police are "reluctant to record a crime as such, as highlighted for instance in the reports on Hungary and Lithuania. In some cases police might not recognise the racist element and treat an incident as hooliganism." Even more worrying is the growth of extremist political forces. The report notes: "A rise of right-wing extremism, as well as other forms of nationalism, is evident in a number of countries, such as Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Latvia, Malta and Slovak Republic. "The use of the internet as a tool for the dissemination of racist sentiment, crime and propaganda is particularly worrying given that internet crime is not often recorded and the legal difficulties that have been experienced in challenging internet-based criminal activity." Victims of racism range from Europe's Jewish communities to its Roma minorities. But a separate document on Islamophobia reports a dramatic increase in incidents against Muslims, particularly in France. It says: "The rise of intolerance and discrimination towards Muslims has risen in the last year and the underlying tones of Islamophobia have infiltrated all forms of public and private lives for Muslims in Europe."

Turkey in EU Bad: War Scenario

1) People reject Turkey ascension- divides Europe

BBC 05 (EU opens Turkey membership talks, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4305500.stm)

Monday saw Austria put under intense pressure, as it, alone among the EU's 25 members, demanded that the draft framework for entry talks should be rewritten. The EU's member states must unanimously approve a negotiating mandate before talks can begin. Austrian Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik said her country was "listening to the people" by questioning full membership for Turkey. "There are moments when we have to say that such fundamental things are at stake that a compromise is not possible," she warned. But after a series of meetings with Mr Straw, it appeared she gave way. There is deep popular opposition in Austria and other European countries to Turkey's accession to the EU, with sceptics citing Turkey's size, poverty, and main religion - Islam - as reasons to keep it at a distance. Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel has said he wants the EU to acknowledge popular concerns over its expansion. But Mr Straw warned of a "theological-political divide, which could open up even further down the boundary between so-called Christian-heritage states and those of Islamic heritage"

2) Disunity in the EU stops effective policymaking

Luskin 8 (Robert C. (University of Texas at Austin) James S. Fishkin (Stanford University) Stephen Boucher (Notre Europe, Paris) Henri Monceau (Notre Europe, Paris) Deliberative Poll, Considered Opinions on Further EU Enlargement: Evidence from an EU-Wide Deliberative Poll\* <http://cdd.stanford.edu/research/papers/2008/EU-enlargement.pdf>) BAF

We begin with the post-deliberation attitudes toward enlargement in general. Participants who thought that adding a Muslim country would improve the EU’s relations with the Muslim world or that adding more countries would help its economy or its security smiled distinctly more on the idea of enlargement. Those who thought that adding a Muslim country would make the EU too diverse frowned distinctly more on it. The one significant but apparently anomalous coefficient estimate in these results belongs to the empirical premise that adding more countries would make it more difficult for the EU to make decisions. The more the participants endorsed this proposition, the more they wanted to see the EU admit new member states. The anomaly disappears for the equation explaining the pre- to post-deliberation change in attitudes toward enlargement in general, does not appear in either of the equations explaining attitudes toward admitting Turkey, but then reappears in the equation explaining post-deliberation attitudes toward admitting Ukraine. We are unsure what to make of this, but one possibility is that some segment of the sample would prefer that the EU have a hard time making decisions—that decision making rest as much as possible with the individual member states. From that point of view, admitting more countries, if it impaired EU level decision–making, might be a plus. It may be worth noting that this effect appears to be confined to old-member-state participants. But what of the change from pre-deliberation attitudes? Here too a belief that adding a Muslim country would improve the EU’s relations with the Muslim world was important. Those who came to believe this more came to approve more of enlargement. So did those who came to place a higher value on traditionalism or their personal economic security. In addition, the more the participants believed their country could take care of its own security, the more favorably they viewed the prospect of enlargement. It is worth noting that the effect of personal was confined to the participants from the new member states, suggesting that part of the slide in support for enlargement was a matter of these participants realizing that their countries’ contributions from the EU might be reduced if they had to be shared with additional new member states.

Turkey In EU Bad: War Scenario (Extension)

Unity in policymaking key to stop war

The Economist 4 (Peace in our time, http://www1.economist.com/surveys/displaystory.cfm?story\_id=E1\_PTJQPGV)

Many of the European Union's most ardent supporters still see the EU as a crucial bulwark against the return of war to Europe. In pressing the case for monetary union, Mr Kohl argued that adopting the euro was ultimately a question of war and peace in Europe. When efforts to write a European constitution looked like stalling, Elmar Brok, a prominent German member of the EU's constitutional convention (and confidant of Mr Kohl), gave warning that if Europe failed to agree on a constitution, it risked sliding back into the kind of national rivalries that had led to the outbreak of the first world war. Remember the bad old days? Such arguments resonate particularly strongly among an older generation of French and German politicians, but also have wider currency. Timothy Garton Ash of St Antony's College, Oxford, one of Britain's most astute observers of European affairs, says in a recent book that the Union is needed “to prevent us falling back into the bad old ways of war and European barbarism which stalked the Balkans into the very last year of the last century.” Mr Garton Ash concedes that “we can never prove that a continent-wide collection of independent, fully sovereign European democracies would not behave in the same broadly pacific way without the existence of any European Union. Maybe they would, but would you care to risk it?” Believers in the pacifying effects of the drive for European unity acknowledge the contributions to peace in post-war Europe made by American troops and by the spread of prosperity and democracy. But they argue that the EU has played the central role, by forcing European leaders to co-operate intensively and continuously, by proving that membership of the Union brings prosperity and by demanding that all EU countries adhere to basic principles of democracy, human rights and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

Turkey EU Bad: Economy (1/2)

1)Turkish ascension into the EU leads to instability

**The Economist 4** (Peace in our time, http://www1.economist.com/surveys/displaystory.cfm?story\_id=E1\_PTJQPGV)

At a time when relations between the West and the Islamic world are so delicate, most EU leaders seem to feel that refusing to admit a large Islamic country into the Union would be seen as a disastrous confirmation of the “clash of civilisations”. European diplomats, for their part, hope that admitting Turkey to the EU will bring confirmation that Islam is not incompatible with western values. They point out with some pride that the prospect of EU membership has already driven forward reforms in Turkey such as increased political and civil rights for the Kurdish minority and the abolition of the death penalty. Many citizens fear that rather than exporting stability, the EU will import instability. For geo-strategic thinkers sitting in foreign ministries in London, Paris and Berlin, the arguments for using the EU to spread peace and democratic stability seem compelling. But ordinary European citizens find them much less convincing. Many fear that rather than exporting stability, the EU will import instability. In western Europe, public debate about EU enlargement has tended to concentrate on fears about competition from low-cost labour and waves of immigration. So far such fears have proved containable, and the admission of the new members from central Europe has not caused too much of a fuss. But the new central European members, though poorer than the European average, are smallish (except for Poland), and all are predominantly Christian. Turkey, which on current trends will have a larger population than any current EU member by 2020, is a different proposition. Because all EU citizens are free to live and work anywhere in the EU, there could be serious resistance to Turkish membership in France, Germany and the Netherlands, where the rapid growth of Muslim populations in the past 30 years is already a highly sensitive issue. Even without such worries, the traditional arguments for European integration as a “peace project” have anyway been losing force with the passing years. The current generation of EU leaders still has some memories of the depredations of war in Europe. Gerhard Schröder, the German chancellor, never knew his father, who was killed in the second world war; Jacques Chirac, the French president, lived through the war as a child. But for most younger Europeans, the threat of war in western Europe now seems almost unimaginably remote..

Turkey EU Bad: Economy (2/2)

2. Member unity key to solve the econ crisis

Tucker 10 (James, journalist specializing in int’l econ, AFP, Global Elites Struggle to Keep EU, <http://www.prisonplanet.com/global-elites-struggle-to-keep-eu-euro-intact.html>) BAF

Bilderberg members pushed hard in a frantic attempt to save the euro during the recent weekend-long economic summit in Toronto, but this action was ignored by the major media, which is under control of the secret group of international financiers and political czars. “As the euro faces a challenge like none before, the question is whether it will last,” wrote Neil Irwin of the Bilderberg-controlled Washington Post way over in Frankfurt, Germany, as heads of state were gathering in Ontario, Canada’s largest city. “The debt crisis that began in Greece and menaces half a dozen other European nations has caused the euro to lose 15 percent of its value relative to the dollar since January,” he wrote. “Some economists consider it obvious that the currency union will not survive in its present form, that one or more southern European nations could end up reverting to liras, pesetas and drachmas.” What Irwin failed to write is that this is what was being said inside the Toronto G-20 summit. As we go about our busy lives, the future of the euro and the European Union itself is being addressed in Toronto and Paris, with most leaders acting in unison in an effort to save the euro—which was high on the Bilderberg agenda in early June at their secretive meeting in Spain Saving the euro appears to be critical to Bilderberg’s overall plans. Their shadowy schemes have been seriously set back in recent years, to maintain the European Union’s role as a single superstate and to create a parallel “American Union” that also would use a continental currency, the “amero.” In a glass skyscraper in Paris, a Bilderberg-connected banker named Jean-Claude Trichet and his 16,000 employees are struggling to save the euro and promote the “amero.” The European Central Bank is under heavy pressure to save the euro. So Trichet’s bank is buying billions of euros worth of government bonds in an effort to stabilize markets. But this has generated new tensions as Germany objects, saying it is a violation of the central bank’s rules. Unlike Ben Bernanke’s Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank must strictly monitor inflation and is limited in the amount of euros it can loan into circulation. As the economy fizzled further, Trichet decided that the goal of European unity was more important than the law and presented a compromise: They would buy bonds on the open market, not directly from governments, ducking the prohibition on funding government debt. At the same time, they would take other steps to avoid increasing the money supply to ease inflationary pressures. In Toronto, Bilderberg-linked participants strongly supported Trichet’s money plan. “It’s the only way to save the euro, and without the euro, the European Union falls apart and the American Union never comes into existence” said one, echoing the agony expressed at Bilderberg’s meeting in Spain. “We can’t let that happen, ever.” “Euro-area governments have effectively thrown away the rule book,” moaned Volker Wieland, an economist at Goethe University Frankfurt. “It’s a complete regime change. No bailouts and individual fiscal responsibility have been replaced with mutual guarantees” for government debt. Bilderberg also is reportedly supporting strong international regulations on banks, as a step toward creating a world treasury department, which gained much approval in Toronto. “The stakes are so high, I think the incentives are high to sort it out,” Wieland said.

3. Unstable EU market leads to world economic downturn\

Schneider and Irwin 10 (Howard and Neil, Stony Brook University prof of journalism, Washington Post, One false move in Europe could set off global chain reaction, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/23/AR2010052304170\_pf.html)BAF

But the knife-edge psychology currently governing global markets has put the future of the U.S. economic recovery in the hands of politicians in an assortment of European capitals. If one or more fail to make the expected progress on cutting budgets, restructuring economies or boosting growth, it could drain confidence in a broad and unsettling way. Credit markets worldwide could lock up and throw the global economy back into recession. For the average American, that seemingly distant sequence of events could translate into another hit on the 401(k) plan, a lost factory shift if exports to Europe decline and another shock to the banking system that might make it harder to borrow. "If what happened in Greece were to happen in a large country, it could fundamentally mark our times," Angelos Pangratis, head of the European Union delegation to the United States, said Friday after a panel discussion on the crisis in Greece sponsored by the Greater Washington Board of Trade. That local economic development boards are sponsoring panels on government debt in Greece is perhaps proof enough that Europe's problems are the world's. That the dominoes can tumble fast was shown Thursday when a new and narrowly drawn stock-trading policy in Germany helped trigger a sell-off on Wall Street. It marks a change, Barclays Capital chief European economist Julian Callow wrote in a Friday analysis, from a situation in which the bonds of European countries were considered to carry virtually zero risk to a "brave new world" where sovereign default in one of the world's core economic areas is a tangible threat. Bank holdings of European debt are now being studied with the same focus given to holdings of U.S. mortgage-backed securities as the global financial crisis unfolded in 2008 -- and with the same suspicion that problems in one part of the world could wreck others. The most vulnerable European countries -- Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland -- may represent only about 4 percent of world economic activity, but "the debt crisis and its ripple effects are bad news for all corners of the world," said Cornell University economist Eswar Prasad.

Economy I/L Magnifier

It just takes one country to pull out or be pushed out of the eurozone to collapse the econ

Fernando 10 (Vincent, adviser to the multi-strategy fund Railay Capital Partners, The Business Insider, Why A Eurozone Break-Up Would Trigger The Mother Of All Financial Crises, http://www.businessinsider.com/eurozone-break-up-would-trigger-the-mother-of-all-financial-crises-2010-5#ixzz0syGJzNe1)

No matter how much some may want a nation to leave the euro, the cost of leaving is just too great now. Just preparing for a euro-exit would trigger the 'mother of all financial crises' according to Mr. Eichengreen writing at VOX EU:. The economic costs: 'A country that leaves the euro area because of problems of competitiveness would be expected to devalue its newly-reintroduced national currency. But workers would know this, and the resulting wage inflation would neutralise any benefits in terms of external competitiveness. Moreover, the country would be forced to pay higher interest rates on its public debt. Those old enough to recall the high costs of servicing the Italian debt in the 1980s will appreciate that this can be a serious problem.' The political costs: 'A country that reneges on its euro commitments will antagonise its partners. It will not be welcomed at the table where other European Union-related decisions were made. It will be treated as a second class member of the EU to the extent that it remains a member at all.' The infrastructure adjustment costs: 'Reintroducing the national currency would require essentially all contracts – including those governing wages, bank deposits, bonds, mortgages, taxes, and most everything else – to be redenominated in the domestic currency. The legislature could pass a law requiring banks, firms, households and governments to redenominate their contracts in this manner. But in a democracy this decision would have to be preceded by very extensive discussion. And for it to be executed smoothly, it would have to be accompanied by detailed planning. Computers will have to be reprogrammed. Vending machines will have to be modified. Payment machines will have to be serviced to prevent motorists from being trapped in subterranean parking garages. Notes and coins will have to be positioned around the country. One need only recall the extensive planning that preceded the introduction of the physical euro.' The market costs: 'Market participants would be aware of this fact. Households and firms anticipating that domestic deposits would be redenominated into the lira, which would then lose value against the euro, would shift their deposits to other euro-area banks. A system-wide bank run would follow. Investors anticipating that their claims on the Italian government would be redenominated into lira would shift into claims on other euro-area governments, leading to a bond-market crisis. If the precipitating factor was parliamentary debate over abandoning the lira, it would be unlikely that the ECB would provide extensive lender-of-last-resort support. And if the government was already in a weak fiscal position, it would not be able to borrow to bail out the banks and buy back its debt. This would be the mother of all financial crises.' Thus the market effects of an exit from the euro-zone are the main challenge. A eurozone exit can't be done overnight since a lot of preparationg would be required. Hence the argument is that markets would push an exiting nation into financial crisis as they tried to trade ahead of the euro-exit. Thing is, does this only apply to financially-weak Eurozone nations? What about nations that might be far better off outside of the eurozone, such as Germany? We feel a nation such as Germany might be able to avoid the negative market effects described above.

Economy Link: Competitiveness

Turkey’s economy lags behind the EU creating a brain drain, crashing competitiveness

Parker 02 (Randall, Professor of Economics at East Carolina University, Should Turkey Join The European Union?, ParaPundit, http://www.parapundit.com/archives/000790.html)

Update: The economic disparity between the existing and new EU members is already taxing the limits of the generosity of the taxpayers of the richer EU states. Martin Walker reports that the new EU members together produce less than the 16 million people in the Netherlands. The 10 new members have a combined population of 75 million, but a combined GDP of just $338 billion -- less than that of Holland. The EU is increasing its population by almost a quarter, but increasing its wealth by just 4 percent. The EU's GDP per head last week was around $25,000, close to that of the United States. The new, enlarged EU's GDP per head next week will be just $20,000 -- uncomfortably close to that of South Korea. According to the chart at the bottom of this article Turkey has a per capita GDP that is lower than that of all the 10 new EU members. While Turkey is ahead of Bulgaria and Romania they weren't let into the EU in the latest round either. Therefore money is a big obstacle to the acceptance of Turkey as an EU member. When West Germany merged with East Germany it was in a far better position to fund the reconstruction of East Germany than the EU is to fund the new Eastern European EU members, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. Yet, as Martin Walker points out, in spite of the large amount of money spent on East Germany East Germany still lags West Germany by a large margin and there is a brain drain and youth brain of the brighter and more capable East Germans toward West Germany. Imagine what would happen with a much larger income gradient between Turkey and Western Europe if Turkey was allowed into the EU with full labor mobility.

Turkey in EU Bad-Splits Europe

EU members don’t want Turkey- splits Europe creating conflict

Cooper 10- (Zaki, staff writer, Should Turkey join the European, theo think tank, Union?http://www.theosthinktank.co.uk/Should\_Turkey\_join\_the\_European\_Union.aspx?ArticleID=2116&PageID=47&RefPageID=11)

Against this background of enhanced faith-based diplomacy, the issue of Turkish membership of the EU has been boiling away. Turkey was officially recognised as a candidate for membership in 1999 and opened its accession negotiations with the EU in October 2005. The country, with its 97% Muslim population, has harboured European ambitions for decades. Indeed it has been an associate member of the EU and its predecessors since 1964. However, not everyone is enamoured by the prospect of Turkish membership. The issue has split Europe. Many in the UK have been suppotive of Turkey's membership, and the accession talks were launched as a result of the British government's push in 2005. On the other hand, British public opinion has been less enthusiastic, as the issue of Turkish accession has become linked to migration concerns. Elsewhere in Europe, leaders have been less keen than British politicians. French President Nicolas Sarkozy has been outspoken in his opposition to Turkey's full membership, as has Anegla Merkel, the German Chancellor. Their reservations are surpassed by other member states, in particular Austria, which tried to block the accession talks and where the climate of opinion is implacably against Turkey's membership. The issues around Turkish membership are extremely complex. There is the dispute over Cyrpus, human rights issues, including treatment of the Kurds, and Turkey's position on the Armenian genocide, to name three leading issues. All these will need to be dealt with in the talks, which will conclude by 2014 at the earliest and probably much later.

A2: European Economy Advantage

European Economy Resilient

The European economy is resilient

Sisci 2 **(**Francesco, Director of the Institute of Italian Culture in Beijing, **“Crisis in confidence: The China factor,” Asia Times, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/DG24Ad04.html) MJ**

This is the essence of the failure of confidence US Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan in his recent testimony to Congress spoke about, and this is the reason for the failure of the dollar vis-ŕ-vis the euro. According to figures, **the US economy still outperforms the European economy at the moment, but are these figures true? Investors asked that question as they became more confident in the European economy, which had little or no experience with the new economy and creative accounting, and which had endured terrorism for decades without any September 11-type nervous breakdown**. In a sentence: **the US economy proved more volatile, for internal and external reasons, while the European one proved more resilient**. That said, it is also true that the European market lacks the US market's ability to face its ghosts, be it the new economy, creative accounting or terrorism, and to bounce back: its volatility is also vitality**. No failures in a technology-based economy or accounting have occurred in Europe, yet no technological leaps have taken place either**. Despite the failures of new accounting, America's fresh ways of doing business, when not taken to the extreme, made it possible to see the potential of new business and growth; and it forced businesses to look for resources inside and outside the company in order to reap this potential. Little of the kind happened in Europe.

European Economy is resilient

Gumbel 8(Peter, journalist and foreign correspondent, “Europe's Economy: Falling Down,” Time, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1821234,00.html) MJ

**Over the past year, at a time when the world economy has been buffeted by the U.S. housing and financial crisis, slowing growth in most developed nations and soaring inflation everywhere, one of the big surprises has been Europe's relatively strong performance**. The picture has been uneven, with countries such as Spain and Italy — and increasingly the U.K. — running into problems. **But overall growth, especially in the 15 nations that use the rapidly appreciating euro, has confounded the skeptics**. In early June, **the International Monetary Fund actually revised its 2008 growth forecast for the euro area sharply upwards, declaring that it had become "a zone of stability in the international economy."** Likewise, in late May, **the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development praised the European economy for its "resilience."**

European Economy Resilient

European Economy proves resilient among global recession

**Investment International 9** (“Emerging European economies resilient in the face of global recession,” http://www.investmentinternational.com/news/business/emerging-european-economies-resilient-in-the-face-of-the-global-recession-3044.html) MJ

**The resilience of the underlying economies in Emerging Europe has been one of the more positive surprises to come out of the global recession**. **Matthias Siller**, manager of Baring Emerging Europe plc (BEE) **says,** “**During the recent results season, earnings across the Emerging Europe universe generally beat expectations. At the same time, the economic growth outlook for the region has been revised up.** Indeed, it looks as though some parts of Emerging Europe, specifically Poland, central Europe’s largest economy, will not shrink in 2009.” Matthias explains: “The Emerging European economies are strengthening in part due to the massive monetary stimulus in markets across the region. Since late 2008, Turkish interest rates have been cut dramatically and interest rates in Central Europe have also fallen, albeit not to the same extent. In Russia, interest rates have been slashed recently. Importantly**,** whilst these economies were fighting significant global headwinds, domestic governments, particularly the Russian government, had the money to spend on economic support initiatives. “**A buoyant export sector and domestic market also add to the region’s resilience**.  The export sector has improved due to Germany’s quick economic recovery (much of Central Europe’s export industry is focused on Germany) and the continuous opportunities arising from the urbanisation of China. We expect those sectors relying on exports to experience volatility in the short term but the long term story remains promising.” Matthias continues: “**The domestic market in the Emerging European region is also proving resilient. Whilst consumers in the West are over-burdened with debt, the situation across most of our investment universe is completely different. Consumers in Central and Eastern Europe carry a fraction of the level of debt of their western counterparts. Furthermore, consumption has held up quite well during the crisis; consumers may be down but they are definitely not out**.”

EU Economy Resilient

EU economy resilient

McCreevy 8 (Charlie, Commissioner for Internal Market And Services, “The International Financial Crisis: Its causes and what to do about it,” http://www.alde.eu/fileadmin/webdocs/key\_docs/Finance-book\_EN.pdf) MJ

But the problems have not been limited to the financial markets. They have also spilled into the real economy. **Evidence suggests that the economic situation in the US is deteriorating**. Against this background, the Federal Reserve has continued to ease monetary policy, a substantial fiscal stimulus has been agreed and there has been a government-sponsored rescue package for holders of sub-prime mortgages. **In the EU, the economic situation and prospects appear less worrying. The ECB has played a decisive role in stabilizing conditions in the Euro-area interbank markets, while at the same time maintaining a clear focus on its primary objective – price stability. For the moment the EU economy seems to be quite resilient** but a slow-down in European growth is inevitable given the inter-linkages with the US economy. **With almost daily reports of further deterioration in the US housing market and weakening consumer demand it requires something of a leap of faith to be confident that the jump in loan defaults in the US mortgage and consumer credit markets will not spread to include highly leveraged corporate given the more challenging economic environment in which they will be operating in the months ahead.**

European Economy Not Key to Global Economy

European Economy Not Key to Global Economy-Other countries will fill in

ACUS 4 (The Atlantic Council of the United States, “The Transatlantic Economy in 2020: A Partnership for the Future?” http://www.acus.org/files/publication\_pdfs/82/0411-Transatlantic\_Economy\_2020\_Partnership\_Future.pdf) MJ

Despite the fact that the transatlantic economy seems to grow ever larger and more closely knit, problems of a serious order may lie ahead. **The United States and the European Union confront serious macroeconomic issues and a looming demographic crunch, which will place a strain on pension, unemployment, and health insurance schemes. If current trends in growth, productivity, and demographics continue uninterrupted — particularly in Europe — the strong economic foundation for the transatlantic partnership may become seriously eroded**. The United States faces great challenges in terms of reducing deficits and absorbing new security costs. But in Europe, where the demographic crunch is likely to be much more severe, prosperity can only be maintained by reducing government expenditures, stimulating faster economic growth, and increasing labor utilization. Despite the impressive achievements of the single market and the euro — and the promise of the new, reform-oriented European Commission under José Manuel Barroso — there is reason to question whether the European Union will once again be able to accomplish what is necessary to renew its economy. **At the same time that the United States and the EU find that their economies are moving in different directions, China, India, and others are likely to experience strong economic growth and to lay claim to a bigger role in economic decision making, challenging the traditional joint stewardship of the United States and Europe.** In sum, **the conditions that allowed transatlantic political relations to flourish over the past fifty years and fostered U.S. and European joint leadership of the world economy may no longer exist by the year 2020.**

European Economy not key to global economy-US turns for others for cooperation

ACUS 4 (The Atlantic Council of the United States, “The Transatlantic Economy in 2020: A Partnership for the Future?” http://www.acus.org/files/publication\_pdfs/82/0411-Transatlantic\_Economy\_2020\_Partnership\_Future.pdf) MJ

**The future of the transatlantic economy has implications not only for global economic governance, but also for the close political and economic linkages between the two sides of the Atlantic that have been fundamental to international stability for the last fifty years**. Those links are expressed through cooperation in institutions like NATO and the UN, in continuing U.S.-EU undertakings in the framework of the New Transatlantic Agenda, and via bilateral U.S. relations with individual European states. **If the European economy continues to lose ground, not only will Europe become more inward looking, but the EU will not have the resources or inclination to play a larger international role and to join the United States as a partner in dealing with some of the strategic challenges around the world**. **The United States may well try to turn elsewhere, and with the likely rise of new global players such as China and India**, the United States will have alternatives. These potential partners are unlikely to share fully the democratic values that have been at the core of transatlantic cooperation, but that will be less important if these partnership arrangements are temporary and aimed at specific issues. **Over time, the U.S. reflex of turning first to Europe when seeking cooperation may fade.**

-----A2: Iraq Advantage-----

A2: Iraq Stability: A2🡪withdrawal now

No Iraqi withdrawal, multiple obstructions present

Wood 7, (Withdrawal of Troops, Supplies Could Take at Least 20 Months, Officials Say, Baltimore Sun. http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/239/37845.html) WDK

But others doubt that all will go smoothly. A new report by the Government Accountability Office, the analysis agency of Congress, found severe problems in the U.S. Central Command logistics system, which will handle the withdrawal. The GAO found fragmented lines of authority, a shortage of skilled logisticians, and computer systems that can't connect with each other.

**Even if US begins withdrawals, delays are inevitable**

Chulov 10, (Martin, The Guardian, Published on Wednesday, May 12, 2010 by [The Guardian/UK](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/12/iraq-us-troop-withdrawal-delay) <http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/05/12-3>) WDK

The United States is likely to delay the withdrawal of the first large phase of combat troops from Iraq for at least a month after escalating bloodshed and political instability in the country. The US Commanding General Ray Odierno had been due to give the order within 60 days of the general election held in Iraq on 7 March, when the cross-sectarian candidate Ayad Allawi edged out the incumbent leader, Nouri al-Maliki. US officials had been prepared for delays in negotiations to form a new government, but now appear to have balked after Maliki's coalition aligned itself with the theocratic Shia bloc to the exclusion of Allawi, who attracted the bulk of the minority Sunni vote. There is also concern over interference from Iraq's neighbours, Iran, Turkey and Syria.

**Withdrawal won’t do much, at best 50,000 troops will remain as peace-keepers**

Friedman 10, (George, Chairman, co-founder, intelligence officer at Strategic Forecasting Inc. (StratFor), The U.S. Withdrawal From Iraq March 5, 2010 | 2147 GMT http://web.stratfo r.com/images/write rs/IRAQ\_WITHDRAWAL.pdf?fn=2815454939) WDK

That said, the United States is not leaving Iraq completely. Some 50,000 non-combat troops will still be there in late 2010 even under the most optimistic scenarios, and future agreements could keep an American military presence in the country long after the current Status of Forces Agreement requires they be withdrawn.

A2: Iraq Stability: Kuwait Solves

The majority of supplies will be shipped via Jordan/Kuwait, NOT Turkey

Carter 9, (Chelsea J, Associated Press, 8/31/2009 12:43 PM, U.S. ramps up withdrawal from Iraq, Republished with Permission by: USA Today, <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2009-08-30-withdrawal_N.htm>) WDK

The military has identified more than 1.5 million pieces of equipment, from tanks to antennas, that need to be shipped out of Iraq, Brown said. Under the plan, much of that equipment would go by ground to Kuwait, 330 miles south of Baghdad, and to Jordan's Aqaba port, more than 500 miles southwest of Baghdad, where it would either be shipped back to the states or sent to troops in Afghanistan, Brown said. Some will likely go through Turkey as well.

-----A2: Terrorism Advantage-----

**No Risk of Nuclear Terrorism**

No risk of terrorism: nuclear weapons secure

Knops 10 (Raymond, Netherlands representative, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 048 DSCFC 10 E - U.S. NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE: A FUNDAMENTAL NATO DEBATE, http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=2083)

Recent incidents have also raised questions regarding the safety and security of U.S. nuclear weapons installations in Europe and whether the potential for theft, diversion or other loss of control exists.  Indeed, a 2008 high level U.S. Air Force panel determined that most sites used for deploying nuclear weapons in Europe did not meet the Department of Defense’s security requirements.(26)  The problems cited at the bases included inadequate fencing and security systems, staffing shortages, and inadequately trained security personnel.(27)         Despite these reports, NATO believes that “there is no question that nuclear weapons deployed in Europe are safe and secure,” according to Guy Roberts, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary-General for Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy and Director for Nuclear Policy.  Roberts told Arms Control Today in August 2008 that the above-cited U.S. Air Force report contained no new concerns that NATO was not aware of, and that NATO was implementing “a number of enhancements” in response to its internal oversight procedures.

Nuclear Weapons are secure

Kristensen 05 (Hans, Natural Resources Defense Council, U.S. Nuclear

Weapons in Europe, http://www.nukestrat.com/pubs/EuroBombs.pdf)

Schlesinger’s views were partially influenced, according to one recent account, by the outbreak of war in July 1974 between two nuclear-equipped NATO countries, Turkey and Greece. Schlesinger wanted to know if the U.S. nuclear weapons were secure and asked his director of telecommunications and command and control systems, Thomas C. Reed, if he could talk to the U.S. officers holding the keys to the weapons. Reed reported back that the U.S. custodians were in charge, but at one Air Force base “things got a little dicier.” “The local Army troops outside the fence wanted in. Their Air Force countrymen inside wanted them kept out. The nukes on alert aircraft were hastily returned to bunkers as the opposing commanders parleyed under a white flag. Soon both sides went off to dinner, but through it all we held out breath.” 39 Fears about the physical security of the weapons had been raised during the military coup d’état in Greece in 1967, where “political tension in the vicinity of some of our nuclear storage facilities” had caused concern in Washington. 40 As a result of the Turkish-Greek war, the United States removed its nuclear bombs from Greek and Turkish alert fighterbombers and transferred the nuclear warheads from Greek Nike Hercules missile units (see Figure 9) in the field to storage. Greece saw this as another pro-Turkish move by NATO and responded by withdrawing its forces from NATO’s military command structure. This forced Washington to contemplate whether to remove its nuclear weapons from Greece altogether, but in the end the Ford administration decided against it after the State Department warned that removal would further alienate the Greek government from NATO. 41 U.S. Nothing was said about this nuclear dilemma in the final communiqué from NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) that met in December 1974. The group remarked it had “discussed the recent legislation in the United States calling for an examination of the doctrine for the tactical use of nuclear weapons and of NATO's nuclear posture….” 42 Other than that, the public was kept in the dark. The Turkish and Greek episode and the discoveries at Pacific Command led to immediate improvements in the command and control of the forward-deployed nuclear weapons. A wave of terrorist attacks in Europe at the time added to the concerns. By the end of 1976, all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons were equipped with Permission Action Links (PALs). The June 1975 NPG meeting made a vague reference to this by stating that, “actions [were taken] to enhance the security of nuclear weapons stored in NATO Europe.” 43

A2: Terrorism: U.S. Intel fails

U.S. intel is useless to Turks fighting PKK. Turkey can now provide its own intel.

Yuvuz 10 (Ercan, journalist, *“U.S intelligence-sharing against terror not ‘real-time’, evidence shows” Today’s Zaman, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-213347-us-intelligence-sharing-against-terror-not-really-real-time-evidence-shows.html*)MKB

The real-time intelligence-sharing agreement reached between Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and former US President George W. Bush on Nov. 5, 2007, which was supposed to aid the Turkish military in air and land strikes on Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorist camps in northern Iraq have turned out to be neither “real-time” nor “effective.” MHP Adana deputy Kürşat Atılgan, a longtime major general in the Turkish Air Forces, said the real-time nature of the intelligence is overly exaggerated. It is believed that real-time intelligence is provided immediately. This is not how it works. The US does not provide raw footage, it submits filtered images,” Atılgan said. Nearly 260 PKK members have reportedly been killed during air strikes thanks to the US’ real-time intelligence sharing. Political sources said intelligence-sharing, which previously could only be provided with a 24-hour lag, is now being provided in 45 minutes due to negotiations between Turkish authorities and their American counterparts. However, 45 minutes is not enough for the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) to hit moving targets. Because of this, fighter planes and helicopters in Diyarbakır and Batman must stay ready all the time to effectively hit moving targets. Those air forces not on a constant state of high alert need at least an hour to be ready to take off. Even if the location of moving targets is detected, at least two hours are required to be ready -- enough time for terrorists to escape and hide. Atılgan, who served as a pilot in many similar operations in the past, notes that the intelligence provided to Turkey by the US does not allow the military to hit moving targets. “Real-time intelligence is significant. But American intelligence-sharing is not enough. The fact that American intelligence is not enough was revealed in the Aktütün attack in 2008. The biggest problem is that the US does not provide the raw images that its intelligence planes record. The images are transmitted to General Staff headquarters with a 45-minute delay and then transferred to Diyarbakır or Batman to scramble the air force against the terrorists. It takes two or sometimes three-and-a-half hours for the air forces to take off and attack targets. This in turn makes it easier for moving terrorists to escape and hide,” the former pilot said. Turkey has fought the terrorist PKK since it was formed in 1984 with the goal of establishing an autonomous Kurdish state in the eastern and southeastern parts of Turkey. More than 40,000 soldiers and civilians have been killed in the clashes thus far. The PKK has been declared a terrorist organization by the international community, including the US and the EU. The United States has shared intelligence with Turkey since 2007, and former Chief of General Staff retired Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt once praised this intelligence sharing, saying that the intelligence on PKK movements and camps resembled the footage available of the reality TV show “Big Brother.” Büyükanıt’s remarks were met with criticism by all opposition parties, particularly former Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal. The aptness of this reaction was proved on Oct. 3, 2008, when the Aktütün outpost on the Turkish-Iraq border was attacked by 350 PKK terrorists, leaving 17 soldiers dead. The Taraf daily published shocking evidence on Oct. 13 of that year that security flaws played a large role in the deaths of the 17 soldiers. Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ, surrounded by high-ranking commanders during a press briefing, did not respond to questions raised by Taraf but lashed out at the media for publishing classified information, saying this was “an attack” on the military, on Oct. 28, 2008. He also said the military was taking legal action over the leak of reports on the attack of Oct. 3 on the Aktütün outpost. Although the probe was concluded, its findings have never been publicly announced. Today’s Zaman has learned from political sources that the TSK has organized operations against the terrorists without finding any, raising the eyebrows of Turkish intelligence agencies, too. It was revealed that images provided to Turkey were not live clips; rather, they were provided with a six-hour delay. In fact, a deal reached with the US on real-time intelligence sharing did not initially include providing live intelligence to Turkey. The images were originally submitted to Turkey with a 24-hour delay, which was then reduced to six hours. Turkish intelligence units understood that the intelligence was filtered before it was handed out to Turkish authorities subsequent to the Aktütün attack. To remedy this situation, Turkish officials restarted negotiations with the US to obtain intelligence images more quickly. As a result of closed-door talks, the US has started to provide intelligence with a 45-minute delay. After this change, images showing Turkish fighter planes hitting PKK camps in northern Iraq were unveiled by General Staff. Considering the weaknesses it perceives in intelligence shared by the US, the General Staff started preparations to obtain its own unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). It decided to purchase 10 Heron UAVs from Israel in 2007 but only one or two of them have been delivered to Turkey due to delays and a diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Israel. Despite issues with Turkey’s first Israel-made UAVs during trial flights in Batman, the TSK was for the first time able to get its own images of northern Iraq. As a result of this, Turkey detected intelligence weaknesses in the intelligence provided by the US.

A2: Terrorism: Israel Fills In

U.S. intel is useless to Turks fighting PKK. Turkey can now provide its own intel.

Yuvuz 10 (Ercan, journalist, *“U.S intelligence-sharing against terror not ‘real-time’, evidence shows” Today’s Zaman, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-213347-us-intelligence-sharing-against-terror-not-really-real-time-evidence-shows.html*)MKB

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A2: Terrorism: Troops Key to Stabilize

\*\*\*The US cannot afford an upset of the balance in Turkey, troops or otherwise\*\*\*

Giachetti 8, (David M. UNITED STATES MILITARY RELATIONS WITH TURKEY, A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements 15 February 2008, <https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/display.aspx?rs=enginespage&ModuleID=be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153&Action=downloadpaper&ObjectID=9692bb4e-a132-48c0-b7b3-03ea195ec95c>) WDK

As stated at the outset, the issues that link the U.S. and Turkey in the current environment cannot be dealt with in isolation but there are many issues of mutual interest that the U.S. and Turkey can concentrate on to solidify the relationship. The most important in the current context is cooperation on the way ahead for engagement with the PKK and northern Iraq. Turkey sees the battle against the PKK as a sine qua non of U.S.-Turkish cooperation in Iraq. A stabilized northern Iraq is in the national interest of Turkey and the U.S. in terms of border security and stopping the incursions of the PKK and the overall stabilization of Iraq. Currently the most stable region in Iraq, the U.S. cannot afford for this delicate balance to be upset.

Turkey will counterbalance Iran

Tait 10. Robert, the Guardian's correspondent for Tehran. Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty. June 21, 2010. <http://www.rferl.org/content/Iran_and_Turkey_Friends_Today_Rivals_Tomorrow/2078363.html> (LRH)

Far from being the gateway to a long-standing alliance, Turkey's new engagement with the Middle East and vocal support for the Palestinians could trigger Iranian suspicions and eventually restore the formerly competitive relationship between the two countries. Meir Javedanfar, an Iranian-born analyst with the MEEPAS think tank in Israel, believes Turkey's new Middle East-centered foreign policy -- which includes rapprochement with Iran's close ally, Syria -- is a threat to Tehran's desire to be the Islamic world's dominant power. "Both countries are rivals for the same title, which is leader of the Islamic world," Javedanfar says. "And the Iranians have a set of economic and political advantages to offer any country who wants to side with them, and the Turks have another set of advantages which are far more than the Iranian ones.

-----A2: Relations Advantage-----

A2: US/Turkey Relations: High

US/Turkey Relations have been warming since Bush

Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs March 10 (http://www.state.gov /r/pa/ei/bgn/3432.htm U.S. Department of State Diplomacy in Action.) WDK

Turkish relations focus on areas such as strategic energy cooperation, trade and investment, security ties, regional stability, counterterrorism, and human rights progress. Relations were strained when Turkey refused in March 2003 to allow U.S. troops to deploy through its territory to Iraq in Operation Iraqi Freedom, but regained momentum steadily thereafter and mutual interests remain strong across a wide spectrum of issues. On July 5, 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul signed a Shared Vision Statement to highlight the common values and goals between our two countries and to lay out a framework for increased strategic dialogue. President George W. Bush welcomed Prime Minister Erdogan to Washington for a White House visit on November 5, 2007, during which he committed to provide greater assistance to Turkey in its fight against terrorism from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK or Kongra Gel), which he characterized as a "common enemy" of Turkey, Iraq, and the United States. He reiterated this commitment during President Gul's January 8, 2008, White House visit. Turkey allows the use of Incirlik Air Base for the transport of non-lethal cargo in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Turkey is lever against Russia

TheLibrary of Congress CountryStudies**;** CIA World Factbook 95 (<http://www.photius.com/countries/turkey/national_security/turkey_national_security_military_cooperation~2468.html> republished from Library of Congress, with permission) Kind of a shitty card in terms of dates, still useful. WDK

During the postwar era, Turkey's foremost ally has been the United States. Because of Turkey's strategic location in the Middle East, its proximity to the Soviet Union's military installations and test sites, and its control of the Black Sea straits, military ties with the United States were a crucial factor in the East-West confrontation. The alliance originated soon after the end of World War II, when Soviet dictator Josef V. Stalin made a series of demands on Turkey that the Turkish government and the Western powers interpreted as a possible prelude to military action. The begrudging withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces from northern Iran in May 1946 and communist guerrilla warfare in Greece heightened fears of a Soviet drive into the Middle East. The United States responded with proclamation of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947. Both Greece and Turkey were provided with aid to resist the Soviet threat. Because of concerns over extending a United States military commitment to the Middle East, the United States initially was not convinced that Turkey's admission to NATO should be approved. Turkish troops' noteworthy participation in the Korean War changed this view; Turkey entered NATO in 1952. In accordance with bilateral defense arrangements under NATO auspices, the United States has developed and maintained several major military installations on Turkish bases. Of particular significance are several electronic intelligence posts considered vital for monitoring Russian weapons and Moscow's compliance with strategic arms limitation agreements. A long-range radar system has been established at Pirin�lik, near Diyarbakir, to monitor Russian missile testing. At Belbasi, near Ankara, nuclear testing can be monitored by means of seismic data collection.

A2: US/Turkey Relations: High

Relations are resilient—even if there is a crisis it would never lead to a break

Schleifer 6/28/10 (Yigal, US-Turkish Relations Appear Headed for Rough Patch, <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61426> )AC

Analysts are warning that relations between Turkey and the United States may be heading for a period of volatility, particularly in the wake of the botched May 31 Israeli commando raid on a Gaza aid flotilla, along with Ankara’s recent decision to vote “no” in the United Nations Security Council on sanctions against Iran. “There is a ceiling above which Turkish-American relations cannot improve, and there’s a floor which it can’t go below. But we are getting pretty close to the floor and the ability of the two countries to improve their relations really has a huge question mark over it. We are now talking about an undeclared crisis in the relations,” said Bulent Aliriza, director of the Turkey Project at Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies. Indeed, in a recent interview with The Associated Press, Philip Gordon, the State Department’s top official for European and Eurasian affairs seemed to echo that assessment. Gordon suggested that Turkey needed to take demonstrable action to affirm its commitment to both the United States and the Atlantic Alliance. Ankara, in recent years, has been plotting an increasingly independent and ambitious foreign policy course, one that sees an increased role for itself in regional and even global affairs. But observers say Turkey’s role in the Gaza flotilla incident and its subsequent harsh rhetoric against Israel, as well as its decision regarding the Iran sanctions vote, have brought into sharper relief some of the differences between Ankara’s and Washington’s approach on some key issues. [For background see EurasiaNet’s archive]. “I think the administration realizes it has a problem with Turkey, but it’s not a major rift. It’s subtler than that. I think what they will do is start looking at Turkey at a more transactional level for a while, meaning ‘What are you doing for me?’ and ‘This is what I can do for you,’” said Henri Barkey, a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. “In the past we would have jumped through hoops for the Turks, but the Turks need to start being more sensitive to our concerns,” Barkey added.

Turkey and the us are currently resolving their diplomatic issues

Anatolia News 10 (Turkish premier, Obama discuss PKK, Iran, Turkish-Israeli ties, June 27, Lexisnexis) AC

Toronto, 27 June: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Saturday [26 June] met with US President Barack Obama in Toronto, Canada where they attended the G20 summit. Erdogan and Obama discussed a wide range of issues from Turkish-US cooperation against PKK to Iran's nuclear programme and relations between Israel and Turkey, diplomats said. On cooperation against the terrorist organization PKK, leaders focused on benefits of tripartite mechanism of Turkey, United States and Iraq and they underscored the need to continue the mechanism. Turkey voiced its expectations from the United States and US officials pledged to continue to support Turkey against PKK. On relations between Turkey and Israel, Obama said United States was uneasy about what happened recently between Turkey and Israel which he described as two ally countries. Turkish-Israeli relations strained after a 31 May Israeli raid on a flotilla carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza which killed eight Turks and an American of Turkish origin. Obama said United States would continue to contribute to efforts for a solution to problem between the two countries, diplomats said. Turkey reiterated its demands that Israel apologize, pay damages and lift blockade on Gaza. Erdogan also thanked for US help in bringing back Turkish citizens after ships were seized by Israel. Iran's nuclear programme was also on the agenda of the meeting of Erdogan and Obama, , diplomats said, adding that the two sides discussed the issue in detail and explained their positions on it. Source: Anatolia news agency, Ankara, in English 0659 gmt 27 Jun 10

A2: US/Turkey Relations: High

Turkey’s vote in the UN Security Council didn’t create a relations crisis.

Anatolia News 10 (Deputy premier says Turkey's Iran vote at UN not to affect relations with USA, June 11, Lexisnexis)AC

Ankara, 11 June: Turkish State Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc said on Friday [11 June] that Turkey's stance in the United Nations was a consequence of Turkey's principles and its decisive and honest position pursued in foreign policy. "Those who think that Turkey's previous stance (during voting in UN regarding sanction on Iran) was very pursuant and salutary should not be astonished about Turkey's negative vote. This is a result of principled position and definitely Turkish-US relations will not be affected," Arinc said speaking at his meeting with Hasan Bozer, parliament Speaker of the [self-declared] Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Asked to comment on the criticisms whether Turkey was reconsidering its place in the region and if an axis shift was in question, Arinc underlined that this was certainly not an axis shift. "Negative votes of Turkey and Brazil in UN were not considered as extraordinary. Earlier, they thanked Turkey over the swap deal. They said Turkey made steps that may resolve the crisis. However, later this was not accepted by atomic energy in Austria and UN Security Council made decision to impose sanction on Iran with the insistence of the United States," Arinc said. Referring to the views that had been stated after rejection of a motion in the Turkish parliament, pertaining to dispatch US ships, planes and troops via Turkey to open a front in Iraq, that the United States would refuse Turkey, would not answer its phones, value of the US dollar would rise and that Turkey would be isolated, Arinc said, "However, common sense prevailed after the crisis and relations between Turkey and the United States were settled on better ground. I believe that neither the United States nor the other countries would wish disruption of relations with Turkey against such an issue." Arinc said Turkey was trying to keep away from the elements which threaten both the regional and the world peace and make its statements honestly and in a determined way. "The UN Security Council made a decision with 12 votes in favour but at the same time it is the right of other countries to oppose this decision. This is not an axis shift definitely. Turkey is in a multilateral foreign policy but on the one side it is careful for balances in Asia and on the other side sees African fact. Turkey also assesses well the crisis points in the Middle East. I believe that Turkey's negative vote in the UN Security Council is an indication of Turkey's decisive and honest stance and will yield positive results for Turkey and the world peace. Furthermore, whoever addressed the Security Council he eulogized Turkey's efforts and stated that swap deal made with Iran should also be on the table. Turkey had to give negative vote, not abstained, to display its decision because only an honest country could do this." Source: Anatolia news agency, Ankara, in English 1040 gmt 11 Jun 10

A2: US/Turkey Relations—SQ Sanctions Solve

Signs of success are already showing.

Benhorin 10 (Yitzhak, journalist, “U.S.: Sanctions having an effect” YNET, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3909180,00.html) MKB

WASHINGTON – First signs of success: **The latest sanctions against Iran have been slammed for not being firm enough, yet US officials are saying that the punitive steps are already having an effect.**

**The latest round of UN sanctions prompted several private sector companies to cut their ties with the Ayatollah regime**, US Undersecretary of Treasury Stuart Levey said Tuesday "**The impact of these actions on Iran has been significant and is deepening as a result of Iran's own conduct**," he said. Levey, who is the architect of the financial boycott against Iran in the Treasury, told Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee **that private sector companies are joining banks in ending their ties with Iran. Virtually all major financial institutions have either completely cut off or dramatically reduced their ties with Iran**," he said. "**We are now starting to see companies across a range of sectors, including insurance, consulting, energy, and manufacturing make similar decisions**," Levey said, adding **that ties with Iran are increasingly feared because of the "reputational risk" inherent in such contacts.**

A2: US/Turkey Relations—SQ Sanctions Solve

Sanctions cut off Iran’s ability to get the bomb for many years.

Lopez 10 (George, chair at Kroc institute for international peace studies, “On the Issues: Iran Sanctions” United States Institute for Peace, http://www.usip.org/resources/the-issues-iran-sanctions) MKB

**The new U.N. resolution captures the important policy subtlety that sanctions must pressure for compliance, not punish for capitulation. It provides an effective balance between a sanctions bite** that **hurts and a style of imposition that rejects isolating Iran**. Instead, these targeted **sanctions rightly aim to refocus Tehran on** internationally accepted **standards of atomic energy development and use.**

The resolution’s first strength is that **it undermines real assets and capabilities that Iran might use for weapons production.** The document astutely mixes **compulsory and voluntary measures targeted at the diverse economic sectors that bolster Iranian uranium enrichment and missile development. These measures will complicate further progress in both areas, and** may **extend significantly the time that Iran would need to develop a**n actual **weapon.** This resolution also underscores why and how **sanctions constitute the cornerstone**, rather than the entire edifice, **of a nuclear rollback policy. The** past **successful cases of Ukraine, South Africa and Libya illustrate that** an astute application of narrowly targeted **sanctions are the critical first step of a larger policy process,** the second element of which is engaged negotiation between imposers of sanctions and their targets. Rather unique in this week’s sanctions resolution is a section providing six full paragraphs expressly dealing with engagement. **The resolution** also **includes** as an annex **the** 2008 **incentives package** crafted primarily by the EU3 (France, Britain and Germany), **which lays out a workable path for Iran to develop peaceful nuclear energy.** The resolution’s conventional arms embargo may be the most extensive imposed on a nation not embroiled in civil war. **The measures prohibit Iranian purchases of missiles, naval ships, tanks, artillery** and **armored vehicles**, as well as an array of **aircraft, most notably attack helicopters**. In addition, **the draft resolution puts real teeth into the missile system restrictions that first appeared in earlier U.N. resolutions, while also prohibiting other states from supplying training, spare parts or other assistance for any of these arms.**

A2: US/Turkey Relations—SQ Sanctions Solve

Sanctions are highly effective.

Cole 10 (Rocky, University of Georgia- International Affairs, “The case for sanctions against Iran” Roosevelt Institute, http://www.rooseveltcampusnetwork.org/blog/case-sanctions-against-iran-some-simple-analytics) MKB

The research, inspired by President Obama's recent attempts to secure international support for tougher sanctions laws against Iran, seeks to determine if economic sanctions can stop states from acquiring nuclear weapons. **After an exhaustive study that included both rigorous quantitative and qualitative analysis of all instances of sanctions used for nonproliferation purposes, we reached the following conclusions. Security concerns within a target state**--meaning a state that is the target of the sanctions--**do not affect sanction outcome**s. Since nuclear weapons often play an important role in state security, this is an incredible finding for nonproliferation purposes. Essentially, it means that **arguments positing sanctions as ineffective because states are more concerned about deterring conventional or nuclear military threats than their economic health are simply not true. The total cost of the economic sanctions to the target is by far the most important variable in determining sanction outcomes**. In all our models, **this variable consistently remained statistically significant and important.** Episodes of sanction busting--third-party states taking advantage of sanctions by increasing trade volume with a sanctioned state--negatively affect sanction outcomes. This is an important finding, as it means **that international cooperation is indeed important in determining sanction outcomes; however, the number of states participating in sanctions is not what matters. It's how strongly they uphold the sanctions laws.** Now that we've developed this extremely accurate model, what will it say about Iran? Here are some simple analytics using findings from our research at UGA. Let's consider sanctions against Iran's oil supply**. Iran is one of the world's leading exporters of crude**, exporting roughly 2560 thousand bbl/day. **Thirty eight percent of Iran's GDP is trade; eighty percent of Iran's exports are crude; therefore, roughly sixteen percent of Iran's GDP is oil exports**. Now, **let's consider three scenarios in which states agree to reduce their consumption of Iranian oil by various amounts. In the first, only states that strongly support stronger sanctions on Iran** (as determined by coding statements made by public officials) **give up twenty five percent of their Iranian oil consumption.** **In the second, the top ten consumers of Iranian oil give up 25 percent of their consumption. In the third, only states that strongly support sanctions against Iran give up all of their consumption. When these calculations are finished, and if the price of a barrel of oil is pegged at $90** (the average for the last year), **the different sanction scenarios would impact Iranian GDP by following amounts: %GDP- 3.66 Effectiveness Score- 41.02. % GDP 2.36 Effectiveness Score- 26.71- % GDP 1.66 Effectiveness Score- 18.99. Since sanction success scores only go to 16, it's pretty obvious that sanctions against Iran, if legislated and targeted correctly, could have a serious impact on Iran's strategic calculus.**

A2: US/Turkey Relations: Iran No Nukes

Iran lacks materials for nuclear weapons, and isn’t attempting to get them.

Mikkelsen 9 (Randall, Journalist, “Iran lacks weapons-grade nuclear material” Reuters, http://in.reuters.com/article/idINWAT01111620090310) MKB

March 10 (Reuters) - **Iran lacks weapons-grade highly enriched uranium and has not yet made a decision on whether to produce any, U.S. intelligence officials told Congress** on Tuesday. **The officials -- Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair and Defense Intelligence Agency Director Lt. Gen. Michael Maples -- also said recent Iranian missile tests were not directly related to its nuclear activities**. They said the two programs were believed to be on separate development tracks

A2: US/Turkey Relations: Iran No Nukes

The probability of Iran getting the bomb is very low and the timeframe is very long.

Cirincione et al 10 (Joseph, Pres of Ploughshares focused on nuclear weapons policy, “How Iran can build a bomb” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/07/01/how\_iran\_can\_build\_a\_bomb?page=0,0) MKB

In fact, **it is much harder to build a deliverable weapon** than most pundits assume. **Panetta's estimate** **leans toward the** worst-case scenario, in which the **weapons-building process proceeds perfectly smoothly. But the best expert assessments indicate that it would actually take Iran about three to five years** to develop a nuclear bomb. **Here's how that process would** probably **unfold** -- and the reasons why it's not likely to happen in the timeline the doomsayers would have you believe. **Step 1:** The DecisionIran is certainly moving to acquire the technology that would enable it to make a weapon. But, as a 2009 Joint Threat Assessment by the EastWest Institute concludes, "[I]t is not clear whether [Iran] has taken the decision to produce nuclear weapons. "**The regime must weigh the political and security costs of developing nuclear weapons before moving ahead**. And **Iran might decide**, like Japan, **that its needs are best served by approaching the threshold of building a bomb** (acquiring the technical capability and know-how) **but not actually crossing the line and risking an arms race among** its rivals **or a pre-emptive attack** from the United States or Israel. "Nobody knows if Iran has taken this decision," Sharon Squassoni, director of the Proliferation Prevention Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told Agence France-Press on June 28. "It's more in their interest to have this ambiguity." **Step Two:** The Right StuffShould **Iran** decide to proceed, it **must accumulate a sufficient quantity of the indispensable component for the core of the bomb** -- highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium. Iran is pursuing production paths for both, though its uranium enrichment capabilities are years ahead of its plutonium reprocessing plans. There are two ways for Iran to produce HEU, uranium that includes 90 percent of the isotope U-235. Using its centrifuges at the Natanz facility, it could take natural uranium, composed of 0.07 percent U-235, and steadily enrich it to weapons-grade material. **This would be a flagrant violation of its obligations under the** Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (**NPT**). If Iran chose this route, it would have to withdraw from the treaty and kick out international inspectors**. Running full tilt at Natanz, it then would take Iran about one year to enrich enough uranium for one bomb**. More likely, **Iran could continue its current path of increasing its stockpile of low-enriched uranium** (3 percent U-235), which it claims is for peaceful purposes. **At some point, Iran could** then leave the NPT, kick out the inspectors, **and pump the uranium back through the centrifuges** to enrich it to higher levels. The Joint Threat Assessment estimates this path could produce one bomb's worth of HEU within three to six months. Panetta seemed to say that, using this method, Iran could have enough HEU to construct two bombs in one year. Still, recent **technological difficulties** could **prolong the process**: In February, the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security reported that **the number of working Iranian centrifuges**, the machines that enrich uranium, **had decreased** since mid-2009. Although Iran continues to install centrifuges, it operates nearly 1,000 fewer centrifuges than it did in May 2009. Recently, Iran has enriched uranium to about 20 percent, purportedly as fuel for its research reactor. If Iran accumulated enough 20 percent-enriched uranium -- it had 11 kilograms at the end of May -- and used this as source material, it could produce weapon-quality HEU even more quickly. In all cases, **it would take Iran an additional six months to convert the HEU from its current gaseous form into metal for a bomb. Step 3:** The GadgetThe technical path to a bomb does not end with HEU. **To produce a crude nuclear device would take an additional year, assuming Iran has a workable design and the components to build it**.  But **the leap to a sophisticated nuclear warhead, one that could be used as a weapon, could take an additional two to five years.** During this period, **Iran would need to manufacture the nonnuclear components, test and refine them, and** ultimately**, conduct one or more** nuclear explosive **tests**. Troubleshooting the nonnuclear components might go undetected, but **global monitors would detect any nuclear test explosion, surely leading to increased pressure** on Iran. Vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, **Gen.** James **Cartwright, confirmed this timeline** before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 14. He said a "deliverable weapon that is usable tactically" would take "another two to three, potentially out to five years." **Step 4:** Honey, I Shrunk the Warhead I**ran could make a very heavy crude nuclear device**, deliverable by truck, approximately **one year after it produced the HEU. But this** heavier **device**, though useful as a weapon, **would be too large to deliver on Iran's planes or missiles**, which can't carry a weapon that weighs over 1,000 kilograms. A smaller, more sophisticated weapon is needed if Iran is to develop a credible nuclear deterrent -- and shrinking a nuclear warhead doesn't happen overnight. Retired U.S. **Gen**. Eugene **Habiger says** that "**the miniaturization of a nuclear warhead is probably the most significant challenge that any proliferant would have to face**." Habiger noted: The first U.S. ICBM's [intercontinental ballistic missiles], the warheads on those ICBM's, were in the 4,000-5,000 kg range. That's the best we could come up with when we first started ... **Only after six to eight years, of very intensive engineering development and aggressive testing**, did we get down to 1,000 kg. **Step 5**: Deliverance Iran would also have to develop a re-entry vehicle for its weapon. A ballistic missile follows a parabolic trajectory, shooting up through the atmosphere, traveling a short distance through outer space, and re-entering the atmosphere to strike its target. **The warhead must be sturdy enough to survive the extreme conditions it encounters along this flight path**, and developing this technology is no small task. It is one thing to test a nuclear weapon in carefully controlled conditions. It is another to build a weapon that can withstand the **fierce vibrations, G-forces, and high temperatures** of launch and re-entry into the atmosphere. **Iran has not demonstrated the capability to build such a re-entry vehicle** thus far. **Step 6**: Range Matters Today, **Iran's ballistic missiles can reach targets no more than 1,600 kilometers** from Iran's borders, carrying bombs that weigh no more than 750 kilograms. **That's barely enough range to hit even Iran's closest neighbors.** A new report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies concludes that Iran won't be able to field long-range missiles capable of hitting Western Europe, approximately 3,700 kilometers away, before 2014 or 2015. The report also extends the timeline for an Iranian ICBM, suggesting that Tehran must first field an intermediate-range missile before embarking on a program that could develop a missile capable of striking the United States, which is 9,000 kilometers away. Thus, the report concludes that **an Iranian ICBM "is more than a decade away from development."** Iran could accelerate this timeline if it received foreign assistance. An April report by the Pentagon on Iran's military potential estimated that with foreign assistance, Iran could develop an ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015. However, continued efforts to isolate Iran and work with key states, including Russia and China, to restrict of the spread of nuclear and missile-related technologies help reduce the likelihood of this assistance.

A2: US/Turkey Relations: Iran No Nukes

Iran’s nuclear program remains static. It’s still not nuclear capable.

Stewart 10 (Phil, Journalist, “Iran not nuclear weapons capable for at least a year- Gates” Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSWBT01379320100413) MKB

**Iran is not expected to be capable of producing nuclear weapons for at least a year, maybe more, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said** on Tuesday. **Asked about reported comments that Iran might be able to join the nuclear club in months, Gates said: "I don't believe it."** "**I think that most estimates that I've seen, haven't changed since the last time we talked about it, which is probably at least a year, and maybe more**," Gates told reporters on a flight to South America.

The threat of nuclear weapons in Iran is media hype. The IAEA confirms that it is for peaceful uses.

Global Research 7 (“IAEA confirms the ‘peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities” Global Research, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=6655) MKB

**The mainstream media has failed to report the agreement reached between the** International Atomic Energy Agency (**IAEA**) **and the Iranian government in regards to the Iranian nuclear energy program.** An understanding has been reached between the two. **The IAEA has given Iran's nuclear program a clean bill of health. Why is the U.S. media not reporting on this matter? Why do the U.S. and its Western allies continue to threaten Iran with punitive bombings for its alleged non-compliance, when everything indicates that Iran has a bona fide nuclear energy program and does not have the capabilities of developing nuclear weapons?** The following are highlights from the document: Article IV (1): These modalities cover all remaining issues and the Agency [meaning **IAEA**] **confirmed that there are no other remaining issues and ambiguities regarding Iran's past nuclear program and activities.** Article IV (3): **The Agency's delegation is of the view that the agreement on the above issues shall further promote** **the efficiency of the implementation of safeguards** in Iran and **its ability to conclude the exclusive peaceful nature of the Iran's nuclear activities.** Article IV (4): **The Agency has been able to verify the non-diversion of the declared nuclear materials at the enrichment facilities in Iran and has therefore concluded that it remains in peaceful use. The Director-General of the IAEA** has **also confirmed**in an interview published by *Profil*, an Austrian magazine **that it is highly unlikely that Iran would pursue the development of a nuclear weapons program.** The document is a slap in the face for the Bush Administration. In light of these developments, it is no surprise that the Washington is now seeking to justify military action on the grounds that Iran is allegedly behind the killings of American troops in Iraq. The fact of the matter is that the U.S. and its Coaltion partners, as confirmed by several reports, are in an "advanced state of readiness" to wage a military operation directed against Iran. What they now require is a new fabricated pretext which portrays Iran, in the eyes of public opinion, as a threat to world peace. **The Western media bears a heavy burden of responsibility in the current wave of disinformation regarding Iran.**

A2: US/Turkey Relations: Iran No Nukes

The threat of nuclear weapons in Iran is media hype. The IAEA confirms that it is for peaceful uses.

Derhally 10 (Massoud, Journalist, “ ‘Show the world Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful’ ” Press TV, http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=118568&sectionid=351020104) MKB

**Tehran has urged brotherly states**, and Turkey above all, **to make efforts to help convince the international community that Iran's nuclear activities are totally peaceful.**   
They should say that **not** **even a single case of deviation from peaceful nuclear activities has ever been found, Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson** Ramin **Mehmanparast told the Trend news** agency on Saturday.   
**“Iran's nuclear activities have been of a peaceful nature at all times. The Islamic Republic has pursued its nuclear program through transparent measures, and relevant clean bills of health put the seal of approval on such a claim,”** Mehmanparast noted. He added that the Islamic Republic of **Iran has been committed to its obligations in its civilian nuclear activities and strives to fulfill all its duties** in this regard.   
On Tuesday, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu stated that he believes there is still common ground for talks between Iran and the parties involved in the nuclear negotiations. Ankara still wants to see a diplomatic solution to the dispute over Iran's nuclear program, he stated shortly after Iranian nuclear technicians set dozens of centrifuges spinning to begin enriching uranium stocks to a level of 20 percent purity in a move which heightened tension in some quarters. Davutoglu said he believes that diplomatic routes have not yet been exhausted and there may still be a window of opportunity. Turkey has been taking all options into consideration and holding talks on various formulae to help resolve the dispute, he added. The Turkish foreign minister will arrive in Tehran on February 16 for an official visit, during which he is scheduled to meet President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, and other senior Iranian officials. **Iran says that as a signatory to the N**uclear Non-**P**roliferation **T**reaty**, it is entitled to the peaceful application of nuclear energy. The country expects to generate 17.5 percent** — 20,000 megawatts — **of the country's electricity demand through nuclear energy** over the next two decades. Over the years, Washington and its allies have accused the Islamic Republic of pursuing a military nuclear program. However**, the** **I**nternational **A**tomic **E**nergy **A**gency **has conducted numerous inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities and has found no evidence of the diversion of nuclear material**.

A2: US/Turkey Relations: Good Relations Don’t Solve

The U.S., Turkey, and Iran won’t enter an alliance because of lack of interest. Even if they did, it would take too long to solve the issue.

Larison 10 (Daniel, Journalist, “The U.S., Turkey, and Iran” Eunomia, http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2010/07/03/the-u-s-turkey-and-iran/) MKB

**Improbable as it may seem right now, given the current regime in Iran, a partnership that unites Turkey, Iran, and the United States is the future and makes sense** for two reasons: The three countries share strategic interests, and their people share values. Our evolving relationship with a changing Turkey offers a model for the kind of relationship we might one day–not necessarily tomorrow–have with a changing Iran. This is the tantalizing possibility of a new way for the U.S. to engage with the Middle East in the 21st century.**I am quite skeptical whenever someone tries to justify a present or future alliance even in part by invoking shared “values.”** This is usually added to the mix when supporters of the alliance cannot point to any tangible or significant benefit from the alliance for the U.S. For example, pro-Georgian enthusiasts here in the U.S. have to lean heavily on Georgian democracy and Georgia’s market-oriented economic reforms to make sense of U.S. support for Georgia, which is in almost every other respect a stategic liability. There may be no American interest served in sending aid or selling weapons to Georgia, and it does complicate and sometimes damage relations with Russia to do these things, but if Georgians share our “values” then that makes everything all right. This doesn’t apply in the cases of Turkey and Iran, whose strategic importance is obvious but whose respective “values” are not entirely ours. That said, I find Kinzer’s proposal interesting. Over the last few years, I have made it pretty clear that I think rapprochement with Iran is the obvious and wise course to pursue, and in the last month I have been emphasizing the value of the Turkish alliance at a time when many Americans seem to have decided that Turkey is no longer an ally. The trouble for Kinzer’s proposal and for my arguments is that much of the political class has been turning against Turkey partly because Turkey has become too accommodating with Iran. As Kinzer will have noticed, **“our evolving relationship with a changing Turkey” has meant a deteriorating relationship with an increasingly alienated Turkey, and the relationship has deteriorated in no small part because Turkey has already started improving ties with Iran right now**. **Ankara isn’t waiting for the far-off day when the Iranian opposition becomes organized and effective enough to force some internal political change in Iran, in part because its “zero problems” approach does not require that Turkey’s neighbors share “values” with the Turks.** Kinzer is not quite so bold as to argue that this triple alliance will exist anytime soon:**A new triangular relationship involving the United States, Turkey, and Iran cannot emerge overnight**. In order to become a reliable American partner, **Iran would have to change dramatically. Turkey would also have to change**, although not nearly as much. **So would the United** **States.** Our world, however, advances only as a result of strategic vision. First must come a grand concept, a destination; once the destination is clear, all parties can concentrate on finding the way to reach it.

Unfortunately, **leaving it to Iran to “change dramatically” before this realignment** or new “triangle” **of relationships could be established guarantees that it will not happen for decades.** If we are going to wait until Iran dramatically changes, **it may never happen** at all.

A2: US/Turkey Relations: Good Relations Don’t Solve

Turkey’s role as a mediator is highly dangerous and could isolate Turkey from the West and end up being a tool for Iran.

Sobecki 10 (Nichole, Journalist, “Turkey caught in U.S- Iran Nuke Rift” News Max World, http://www.newsmaxworld.com/europe/Turkey\_US\_Iran/2010/05/04/314985.html) MKB

And **despite warming relations between the two neighbors, Ankara has its own fears** about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. “**If Iran continues on this path there is long-term potential for cascading nuclear proliferation and regional instability**,” said Ian Lesser, an expert on Turkey and Iran at the Washington-based German Marshall Fund. “**I see no good news for Turkey coming from Iran’s current position**.” **If their efforts to resolve this crisis through mediation fail, Turkey is likely to face a tough choice between historic Western alliances and newfound friends in Tehran**. “**It is clear that if he** [Davutoglu] **can pull it off and ease the international tension over Iran, then both his and Turkey’s international prestige will increase** greatly,” wrote Semih Idiz, a Turkish columnist, in the Turkish paper Hurriyet Daily News. “**But if he cannot, then Turkey will not just have been isolated in NATO and Europe, but will also end up having been used by Iran to buy time against the West.”**

A2: US/Turkey Relations: Good Relations Don’t Solve

Turkey will only be mediator if it is explicitely asked to do so. Iran refuses to do so.

Uslu 9 (Emrullah, Journalist, “Would Iran want Turkey as a mediator for U.S.- Iranian Negotiations?” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 6, Issue 46 ) MKB

**While encouraging Iran to hold discussions with the United States, Turkey is not going so far as to declare itself a mediator** between Washington and Tehran. Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan said that he would not carry a message from the United States to Iranian officials on his current visit. **Turkey would, however, consider serving as a mediator if both sides requested it** (*Today's Zaman*, March 10). Clinton stated that **"the United States would ask Turkey to help push forward President Obama's plan to engage Iran"** (*Iran Daily*, March 9).

**The Iranian side**, however, **does not seem as enthusiastic** about opening up contacts with the United States. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr **Mottaki said,** "We are closely pursuing all the current developments in Washington's policies. However, **we have seen no revolution as a result of** Barack **Obama's change motto**" (Tehran Times, March 10). To understand Iran's attitude, one must remember its long history of mistrust toward the United States. The official Iranian News Agency IRNA quotes a UK-based **Iranian political analyst** Bijan Zhand **Shakibi** as **say**ing, **"I remain skeptical that the U.S. will make any dramatic moves. The domestic political climate in America and the geopolitical situation in the Middle East play a major role in the U.S. inability or unwillingness to make a dramatic move toward Iran**" (*Tehran Times,* March 9). **The Iranian side says that the United States should take the first step toward Iran.** Mottaki stated that "**The prospects for the establishment of relations between Iran and the U.S. will not be bright until the U.S. changes its approach**" (*Tehran Times*, March 9). **Iranian leaders see the U.S. attitude as aggressive**. Mottaki describes the differences in approach between the United States and Iran with an analogy to American football and a game of chess. "We have no interest in American football. Rather, we are interested in a fair chess match, which requires fortitude and patience because in chess an unnecessary or illogical move will lead to defeat" (*Tehran Times*, March 9). With this "chess game" mentality, Iranians misunderstand Hillary Clinton's recent visit to Ankara "as a calculated move to reduce tensions between the two sides" (*Siaset-e Rouz* [Iranian Daily], quoted in *Iran Daily*, March 9). One of the challenges between Ankara and Washington that *Siaset-e Rouz* lists is the "differences between the two countries regarding regional developments, in particular how to interact with Iran, Palestine, and Iraq, plus the excessive demands of the U.S. in its relations with the Turks" (*Iran Daily*, March 9). While the United States seizes every opportunity, including Turkey's good relations with Iran, to end Iran's nuclear weapons program, Iranians think that Clinton visited Turkey to reduce the tension with the United States. **Overcoming Iran's misunderstanding of world politics, even Turkish-U.S. relations, will be Ankara's biggest problem in convincing Tehran to come to the negotiating table, if such a mediatory role is requested by both sides.** Moreover, Iran's "chess game" with the world would make a Turkish role even more difficult. On February 26, for example, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip **Erdogan revealed that Iran had asked Turkey to mediate between the United States and Iran during the Bush administration** (*Hurriyet*, February 26); **but a week later** Hasan **Gasgavi,** **the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman, told the** conservative **Iranian daily** *Kayhan* that **"Iran has asked neither** Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip **Erdogan nor any other foreign dignitary to serve as a mediator between Iran and the United States**" (www.byegm.gov.tr, March 4). **Gasgavi added that** "In the last 30 years there is no channel that [has been] closed. In addition, **there is no unexpected development that [would] require someone to open [a] channel. If needed, Iran and the U.S. [can] officially share their views in a diplomatic manner**" (www.byegm.gov.tr, March, 4). Iran's reluctant attitude indicates two things: First, **negotiations between Iran and the United States would be a major policy shift for Iran, requiring political and psychological preparation on a societal as well as a leadership level**. **Iran's zigzag attitude about whether it wants Turkey to be a mediator shows hesitancy in the Iranian leadership.** Given that the Foreign Ministry spokesman denied to a conservative newspaper that Iran had asked Turkey to serve as a mediator indicates that **conservative segments of Iranian society and the leadership** may be **resist**ing **the idea of negotiations with the United States**. In fact, Gul's planned meeting with Ali Khamenei may have been planned for the purpose of convincing the conservative leadership to accept negotiations. Second, **requesting Turkish mediation would harm Iran's self-proclaimed role of being a regional power. If Turkey successfully convinced Iran and the United States to begin negotiations, it would make Ankara and Tehran competitors for the role of regional power**. Such a peace agreement would make Turkey appear as an absolute regional power while Iran would seem to be jumping on the Turkish bandwagon. For this reason, **Iran would not want Turkey to be the peace broker and the policy maker of the region,** however necessary it might be. Tehran would want direct talks with the United States only if it would clearly serve Iran's national interests.

A2: US/Turkey Relations: Iran Has The Bomb Now

Top U.S. officials admit that Iran has nuclear weapons.

World Net Daily 9 (“Axelrod claims Iran has nuclear weapons” World Net Daily, http://www.wnd.com/?pageId=102520) MKB

President **Obama's senior adviser** **David Axelrod stated** during an interview yesterday **there are nuclear weapons in Iran which are a threat to the entire world.** No country has ever claimed Iran currently has a nuclear arsenal. A 2007 U.S. intelligence estimate previously claimed Iran halted its nuclear weapons-related work in 2003, although that report was highly criticized. Other American agencies have stated Iran could obtain nukes by 2013 or later. **Israel maintains Iran could have enough enriched uranium to produce a nuclear weapon in less than a year**, although other Israeli estimates put the timeline at 2012. **Axelrod, meanwhile, said** yesterday in little noticed comments to ABC **News that there are already nuclear weapons in Iran. "I think the president's sense of solicitude with those young people has been very, very clear, and we're very mindful of that,"** said Axelrod.**"We are also mindful of the fact that the nuclear weapons in Iran and the nuclearization of that whole region is a threat to that country, all countries in the region, and the world. And we have to address that. We can't let that lie,"** he said. Axelrod was responding to a question from ABC News' Chief Washington Correspondent George Stephanopoulos about whether U.S. talks with Iran's leadership would undermine the opposition movement in Tehran. The White House did not immediately respond to a WND query about whether the U.S. has new information indicating Iran possesses nuclear weapons.

A2: US/Turkey Relations: Arms Control Turn

Arms control destroys deterrence and increases the probability of conflict.

Schofield 10 (Julian, journalist, “Arms Control Failure and the Balance of Power” Canadian Volume of Political Science, Volume 33, page 769) MKB

This calculus may work for conventional weapons, but **the destructive potential of nuclear weapons may overpower any deterrent threat inherent in the balancing function of the international system**. Albert Wohlstetter has argued that **with** certain technologies, such as **nuclear weapons, stability is far more delicate than commonly believed. It' is here that the logic of secure deterrent forces and arms control can compensate for the weakness of the balance of power**. In this context, **arms control policies enhance the security of both parties in a rivalry by stabilizing their forces**.92By stabilization I mean the **creation of deterrent postures and procurements that do not encourage surprise attacks or first strikes, decapitatior~attacks, pre-emption, offensive advantages, a launch-on-warning response system, military action without confirmation, weapons which are difficult to control, fait accompli attacks, or the deployment of vulnerable use-it-or-lose-it sys- tems.** These measures may be taken unilaterally, as in the deployment of secure second-strike systems (this is the justification for the deploy- ment of nuclear missile-armed submarines). Other measures may be taken co-operatively, such as the 1972 SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, that actually sought to minimize instability by preserving the status quo vulnerability of the superpower countervalue targets. **Arms control that makes pre-emptive escalation or war impossi- ble may, perversely, lead to still greater conflict. This is because it is the fear of a conflict escalating to a nuclear war that creates fear, and thereby restraint**. Glenn Snyder's ***stability-instability* paradox hypoth- esizes that perfect strategic stability (certain retaliation) creates opportu- nities for violence at lower levels. The practice of informal arms control measures by India and Pakistan in Kashmir has not stemmed the persistent infiltrations and exchanges of artillery fire between these two nuclear-armed states. Arms control must**, therefore, **never under- mine the threat of escalation that creates the fear of initial provocation. Arms control can also increase the likelihood of war if it prohibits an offensive weapon that a state needs to guarantee the extended deterrence of an ally.**

A2: US/Turkey Relations: Opacity Turn

**A. The NPT causes opaque proliferation and waists resources that are better spent on arms control that are responsive to circumstances in the Middle East.**

Wesley 5 (Michael, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 59( 3), It’s time to scrap the NPT) KGL

The NPT was always a flawed regime, based on an unequal distribution of status and security. Its apparent effectiveness in containing nuclear proliferation was largely due to other factors. The events of the past 15 years have only magnified the NPT’s flaws. The end of the Cold War decoupled the possession of nuclear weapons from the global power structure. While many commentators were applauding the expansion of the number of NPT signatories, and South Africa, South Korea, Brazil and Argentina renounced plans to acquire nuclear weapons, deeper and more insistent proliferation pressures were building among the emerging great powers of Asia. The succession of Persian Gulf wars demonstrated to many insecure states that only nuclear\*/not chemical or biological\*/weapons deter conventional military attack. The international community was repeatedly surprised by the extent and sophistication of Iraq’s, Pakistan’s, North Korea’s and Libya’s progress in acquiring nuclear materials and know-how, each time underlining the inadequacies of the non-proliferation regime. After the 1998 South Asian nuclear tests, India’s highly effective rhetorical defence of its policy and the world’s half-hearted and short-lived sanctions against India and Pakistan damaged the moral authority of the NPT regime, perhaps terminally. Even worse than being ineffective, the NPT is dangerous, because it increases the pressures for opaque proliferation and heightens nuclear instability. Equally flawed, I argue, is the current counter-proliferation doctrine of the United States. I advocate scrapping the NPT (and the doctrine of counter-proliferation) and starting again, because the NPT is a failing regime that is consuming diplomatic resources that could be more effectively used to build an alternative arms control regime that is responsive to current circumstances. We need to confront the practicalities of scrapping the NPT\*/the positives and the negatives\*/and think clearly about the requirements of a replacement regime.

Opaque Proliferation makes nuclear war and detonation inevitable due to accidents, miscal, terrorism, and preemption

Wesley, Professor of Strategic Studies, 5 (Michael Wesley, Professor Michael Wesley is director of the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University. Prior to taking this position he was the Assistant Director-General for Transnational Issues at the Office of National Assessments, Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 283/299, ‘It’s time to scrap the NPT” September 2005)

By prohibiting proliferation, without the capacity or moral authority to enforce such a prohibition, the NPT makes opaque proliferation the only option for aspiring nuclear weapons states.4 Opaque proliferation is destabilising to regional security. It breeds miscalculation\*/both overestimation of a state’s nuclear weapons development (as shown by the case of Iraq), and underestimation (in the case of Libya)\*/that can force neighbouring states into potentially catastrophic moves. Even more dangerous, argues Lewis Dunn, is the likelihood that states with covert nuclear weapons programs will develop weak failsafe mechanisms and nuclear doctrine that is destabilising: In camera decision making may result in uncontrolled programs, less attention to safety and control problems and only limited assessment of the risks of nuclear weapon deployments or use. The necessary exercises cannot be conducted, nor can procedures for handling nuclear warheads be practised, nor alert procedures tested. As a result, the risk of accidents or incidents may rise greatly in the event of deployment in a crisis or a conventional conflict. Miscalculations by neighbours or outsiders also appear more likely, given their uncertainties about the adversary’s capabilities, as well as their lack of information to judge whether crisis deployments mean that war is imminent (1991: 20, italics in original).

A2: US/Turkey Relations: Opacity Turn

**Nuclear-Capable states operate under secrecy because of other states that already have nuclear weapons, not because of the NPT**

Leaver 5 (Richard, Prof of Int’l Relations at Flinders U., ‘The failing NPT,’ Australian Journal of International Affairs) KGL

The problem of covert proliferation is, of course, very real. But it is, in my view, much too simple to lay it at the feet of the NPT. There is not one of today’s nine nuclear-capable states that chose to develop their early capacities under anything other than conditions of maximum secrecy. And the reason they all opted against transparency had very little to do with the incentive to cheat created by the NPT. Secrecy was, above all, dictated by the possible reactions of those already in ‘the nuclear club’. So, for example, both the United States and the USSR individually gave thought at different points in time during the 1960s to the possibility of making a preventive strike against China’s embryonic nuclear and missile programs. In both cases, they both drew back from the brink not because of fears of the Chinese response, but primarily because they could not be certain that their superpower adversary would remain passively on the sidelines throughout the exercise. It seems reasonable to think that such experiences can only multiply as the size of the nuclear-armed crowd increases. Equally, it would be shortsighted to think that a world without the NPT would be more transparent about the birth of new nuclear powers.

The NPT makes proliferation more dangerous because it encourages secrecy in proliferating states, which causes regional instability in the Middle East

**Wesley 5 (**Michael, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 59( 3), It’s time to scrap the NPT) KGL

By prohibiting proliferation, without the capacity or moral authority to enforce such a prohibition, the NPT makes opaque proliferation the only option for aspiring nuclear weapons states.4 Opaque proliferation is destabilising to regional security. It breeds miscalculation both overestimation of a state’s nuclear weapons development (as shown by the case of Iraq), and underestimation (in the case of Libya)\*/that can force neighbouring states into potentially catastrophic moves. Even more dangerous, argues Lewis Dunn, is the likelihood that states with covert nuclear weapons programs will develop weak failsafe mechanisms and nuclear doctrine that is destabilising: In camera decision making may result in uncontrolled programs, less attention to safety and control problems and only limited assessment of the risks of nuclear weapon deployments or use. The necessary exercises cannot be conducted, nor can procedures for handling nuclear warheads be practised, nor alert procedures tested. As a result, the risk of accidents or incidents may rise greatly in the event of deployment in a crisis or a conventional conflict. Miscalculations by neighbours or outsiders also appear more likely, given their uncertainties about the adversary’s capabilities, as well as their lack of information to judge whether crisis deployments mean that war is imminent (1991: 20, italics in original).And because both the NPT and the current US counter-proliferation doctrine place such emphasis on preventing and reversing the spread of nuclear weapons, states such as Pakistan, which desperately need assistance with both failsafe technology and stabilising nuclear doctrine, have been suspicious of US offers of assistance (Pregenzer 2003). As the dramatic revelations of the nature and extent of the A. Q. Khan network showed, some states undertaking opaque proliferation have been prepared to rely on transnational smuggling networks to gain vital components, materials and knowledge. Quite apart from the incapacity of the NPT regime to deal with this new form of proliferation (Clary 2004), such non-state networks raise very real risks that for the right price, criminals or other facilitators could pass nuclear

US Turkey Relations Resilient

Turkey-U.S. relations strong: will stay together over Middle East conflict

Walker 10 (Joshua, Fellow at the Transatlantic Academy, Foreign Policy, Turkey: still America’s best ally in the Middle East?, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/25/turkey\_still\_america\_s\_best\_ally\_in\_the\_middle\_east)BAF

Listening to the Beltway rhetoric one would think that Turkey is a newly emerging threat to the United States and interests in the Middle East. The speed with which Washington has gone sour on its self-declared "model partner" is astonishing and should be cause for concern. Having just returned from Turkey and with meetings with Turkish officials, it is clear that Turkey has not suddenly "switched sides" but rather still objectively represents America's best ally. Not because Ankara blindly goes along with Western policies or is subservient to America, but because it offers the U.S. more strategic possibilities and support than any other state in the region. Unlike Arab allied governments which lack legitimacy among their own populations and Israel that is besieged on all sides, Turkey is a truly democratic, independent, and powerful ally to be courted, not demonized by the U.S. Today, Turkey represents a critical partner to the U.S. on its three most urgent strategic issues: Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran. On Afghanistan, Turkey is better placed culturally and militarily than any other NATO ally to play a leading role in Kabul; in this respect, it is America's ideal partner on Afghanistan. The soft and hard power advantages that the Turks enjoy among the Afghan population offer a sorely needed bright spot in an otherwise dark struggle for America. On Iraq, there is renewed impetus to resolve the long-simmering Kurdish issue given the battle against the PKK and continued incursions into northern Iraq. Without Turkey's constructive engagement, America's vital interests and the future of Iraq cannot be secured. Short of coercive action, Ankara is determined to prevent a nuclear Iran and has been attempting its own trilateral diplomacy with the help of Brasila to deal with Tehran. Unfortunately, these attempts -- which were originally encouraged by the Obama administration -- have led to a divide on the means necessary for the same end goal of a nuclear weapon-free Iran. Given the timing of the Mavi-Marmara incident in the lead-up to the Iran sanction vote at the UN, former friends of Turkey are linking the two events and blaming the AKP's "Islamist" roots rather than looking at the tough domestic realities confronting Turkey's leaders. While the AKP has admittedly gone over the top in its rhetoric given the domestic pressures it faces from a resurgent nationalist movement and upcoming national elections, its actions speak much louder than its words. Diplomatic relations remain intact with Israel despite the killing of nine Turkish citizens (one of whom was a dual American citizen) and Turkey remains actively engaged in all of its Western commitments and institutions.

US Turkey Relations Resilient

US-Turkey relations resilient- empirically gotten through differences

Kirisci 98 (Kemal, prof of poli sci Bogazici University, Middle East Review of International affairs, TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES: AMBIVALENT ALLIES http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1998/issue4/jv2n4a3.html#author)BAF

Since so much of the U.S.-Turkish relationship was based on the situation of the Cold War years, their partnership has undergone important changes in the new era. By focusing on different issues and emphases, however, their association has adjusted quite well, despite continuing divergences on several issues. Given the enormous strategic significance of the region surrounding Turkey in the post-Cold War era, Turkish-U.S. relations will remain extremely important.Specific incidents and disagreements in bilateral relations have at times displeased both sides without negating the alliance's impressive strategic achievements. Most of their joint objectives have been fulfilled, achieving a great deal in contributing to peace and stability both in Europe and the Middle East.It would probably be wrong to describe the bilateral relationship simply as a function of cooperation against a common enemy or threat. The Turkish modernist commitment to developing a Western-oriented secular state in a predominantly Muslim country accompanied by a democratization process beginning in the 1940s provided a basis of shared values. Still, the link between the U.S.-Turkish alliance's origins and the Cold War could not be clearer. In April 1946, as Winston Churchill was warning an American audience that an iron curtain was dividing Europe and a Cold War starting, the U.S. warship Missouri arrived in Istanbul. That visit is often cited as the symbolic event signaling the start of this bilateral strategic relationship. This was not a new idea for Turkish leaders. Even during the early 1920s, during the Turkish war of liberation, they had been seeking U.S. cooperation in an effort to counterbalance Britain in the region. But given American isolationism and limited interests in the area, relations between the two countries did not even start until 1927. As late as in 1945 the United States was supporting Soviet demands to revise the Montreux Agreement governing the status of the Turkish Straits, a situation extremely wearing for Turkish decisionmakers. The situation worsened when Soviet leader Joseph Stalin made territorial demands on the Straits and two Turkish provinces bordering the USSR. Thus, it was only when the United States came to regard the Soviet Union as an expansionist power that Turkey's geo-strategic significance became an invaluable asset for U.S. policy. Following the USS Missouri's visit, U.S.-Turkish relations took off and Turkey became a beneficiary of both the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and the Marshall Plan launched the following year. Subsequently, especially with Turkey's participation the in the Korean War on the side of U.S.-led UN forces did the United States sponsor Turkey's membership to NATO in 1952. During the ensuing Cold War decades, the two countries developed an intimate strategic relationship. Turkey provided critical base facilities for the U.S. military while, in turn, the United States provided extensive economic and military aid to Turkey. A symbol of this relationship--and how it has changed in the post-Cold War era--were the U.S. military and intelligence bases in Turkey. During the Cold War, U.S. and NATO bases provided a major strategic advantage toward the Soviet Union. However, these bases often became sources of tension especially during the 1970s when both the Turkish government and public wanted to see their closure. On the hand Turkey resisted U.S. demands to be able to use them for their rapid deployment operations in the Gulf area during the 1980s creating considerable disappointment and frustration in U.S. circles. Yet, with the end of the Cold War the United States dismantled most of its military bases in Turkey often to the great disappointment of local communities for whom the bases were an important source of income. Paradoxically, the Turkish government has welcomed the U.S. decision for domestic political reasons but at the same time recognized that this has left it without an important source of leverage over the United States. Furthermore, the bases were also seen as a symbol of U.S. commitment to Turkey. The only remaining major U.S./NATO military base of strategic and military significance is the one in Incirlik not far from the Syrian border. This base as well as other Turkish air force bases had played a pivotal role during the allied operations against Iraq during the Gulf crisis. The safe zone in northern Iraq continues to be enforced from Incirlik. All indications are that the United States would like to maintain its presence at this base. The cooperation between Turkey and the United States over the use of this base will be very much a function of Turkish domestic politics and Turkish decisionmakers perception of their own security needs. Most important, in the back of their minds there will be the concern of how to balance the need to have U.S. support for Turkish security but not get drawn into a situation where the base is used by the United States for a regional intervention which Turkey is not ready to support. This was for example the case in February 1998 when Turkey refused the United States the use of the base to compel Iraq to cooperate with UN arms inspectors. However, the relationship, with the exception of the 1950s and early 1960s, has been marred with difficulties and Turkish mistrust of American friendship and intentions. This resulted from three developments: First, was the U.S. decision to remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey following the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The Turkish elite's view that this result from a bargain made by two superpowers behind its back fostered doubt about the U.S. commitment to Turkish security. Second, in 1964 then Prime Minister Ismet Inonu, a founders of the Turkish republic and a national hero, received what was considered a humiliating letter from President Lyndon Johnson. The letter, during a Cyprus crisis jeopardizing the Turkish minority there, warned Turkey not to use U.S. weapons in Cyprus and that if its involvement there provoked a Soviet military response Turkey could not count on U.S. support. Third, the United States imposed arms supply sanctions on Turkey after the 1974 Cyprus crisis when Turkish forces captured one-third of the island. Contemporary areas of conflict include fundamental differences over the U.S. policy of dual containment and frequent disagreements over the future of Cyprus, Greek-Turkish relations, Turkish weapons acquisition programs, and Turkish human rights problems. Nevertheless, the alliance remains quite strong. On the strategic level, the two countries share common objectives on many issues as varied as expanding NATO's membership, Turkish accession to the European Union, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or missiles, to the opening of new oil pipeline routes from the Caspian basin to the West, avoiding both Russian and Iranian territory. What are the issues over which Turkey and the United States have a convergence of interest and policy as opposed to issues that generate conflict of interest?

US Turkey Relations Resilient

US- Turkey alliance is resilient: rely on each other for too much

James 9 (Jeffery, Ankara ambassador for the US, Embassy of the United States, “Ask the Ambassador”, http://turkey.usembassy.gov/ask\_ambassador\_jeffrey.html)

Turkey and the United States have been friends since 1923, and allies in Korea and NATO for fifty-eight years. Ours is a special partnership, a relationship that is important to both Washington and Ankara. It’s a partnership that has undergone significant change as the international political landscape has evolved. It is a far broader relationship than I experienced during my first assignment here in 1983. Then, security concerns dominated. Security cooperation is still an important dimension of our partnership, but now we work closely on issues as wide ranging as energy, trade, fighting international drug trafficking, and promoting ties between Turkish and American universities. The strains that developed over our Iraq policy are a less welcome change in the Turkish-American relationship. The downturn in Turkish attitudes about U.S. policy and the United States has been a source of deep concern to policymakers in the U.S. and to me personally. I believe that we’ve made some progress in reversing this trend since President Bush and Prime Minister Erdogan opened a new chapter in counter-terrorism cooperation last year. We share the same view of the PKK. It’s a terrorist organization that’s a common enemy of Turkey, the United States and the broader international community. We have backed up our verbal commitment to assisting Turkey in its efforts to counter the PKK threat with deeds. We’re sharing information and supporting Turkey’s political and economic steps to counter the PKK’s propaganda. We have a lot more work to do to expand Turkish-American cooperation and further improve our relations. I’m committed to doing this and I’m interested in talking to you about how to go about doing it. I’m interested in your ideas about how we can better understand each other and work together. Close friends will always disagree on some issues, but the U.S. and Turkey cannot and will not let such differences stand in the way of cooperation that serves both our countries. The Turkish-American relationship is too important and offers too much promise for doing good in the region and beyond.

Relations resilient- both countries support each other despite challenges

Muhammad 9 (Jenin, staff writer, Hurriyet, Obama says Turkey is a critical ally; declares not at war with Islam, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/11376078.asp)

"Some people have asked me if I chose to continue my travels to Ankara and Istanbul to send a message. My answer is simple: Evet ('Yes' in Turkish). Turkey is a critical ally. Turkey is an important part of Europe. And Turkey and the United States must stand together – and work together – to overcome the challenges of our time," Obama told in his 45-minutes-long speech. The U.S. and Turkey had disagreements time to time, but the two countries have stood together through many challenges over the last sixty years and because of the strength of this alliance and the endurance of this friendship, both America and Turkey are stronger, and the world is more secure, Obama added. "So in meeting the challenges of the 21st century, we must seek the strength of a Europe that is truly united, peaceful and free. Let me be clear: the United States strongly supports Turkey’s bid to become a member of the European Union. We speak not as members of the EU, but as close friends of Turkey and Europe. Turkey has been a resolute ally and a responsible partner in transatlantic and European institutions. And Turkey is bound to Europe by more than bridges over the Bosporus," Obama said in his speech. Obama praised Turkey's reforms in its EU accession bid but urged more steps to be taken. He urged for the reopening of Halki seminary and the strengthening of minority rights. The two democracies are confronted by an unprecedented set of challenges, Obama said and defined them as an economic crisis that recognizes no borders; extremism that leads to the killing of innocent men, women and children; strains on our energy supply and a changing climate; the proliferation of the world’s deadliest weapons, and the persistence of tragic conflict. Messages to the Islamic world The president declared that the U.S. is not at war with Islam and it will never be. "In fact, our partnership with the Muslim world is critical in rolling back a violent ideology that people of all faiths reject. But I also want to be clear that America’s relationship with the Muslim world cannot and will not be based on opposition to al Qaeda. Far from it. We seek broad engagement based upon mutual interests and mutual respect," he added. He pledged to be respectful, even when there are disagreements and to convey America's deep appreciation for the Islamic faith, which has done so much over so many centuries to shape the world for the better. "The United States has been enriched by Muslim Americans. Many other Americans have Muslims in their family, or have lived in a Muslim-majority country – I know, because I am one of them," he added.

Weaponitis

Link

The Aff’s error in thought by focusing on the nuclear arms race feeds the paradigm where society thinks weapons matter. This “weaponitis” benefits the profiteers in the arms race.

Schwartz and Derber 90 (William and Charles, Professors at Yeshiva U and Boston College, Nuclear Seduction) PR

Weaponitis persists, while the real sources of nuclear peril are ignored, partly because of an error in thought—the incorrect diagnosis of the arms race as the main danger of the nuclear age. The error, however, is useful; weaponitis serves important interests of the parties to the nuclear debate. Weaponitis most obviously benefits those who profit from the continual arms buildup it legitimates:

the huge defense corporations that build the weapons, the military bureaucracies that buy and control them, and the professional military strategists and intellectuals who make their livings and their reputations by rationalizing and planning the arms race. To acknowledge that the arms race no longer matters to the security and power of the United States would be bad business for military contractors and bad politics for the military. Corporate executives want to increase, not undermine, the market for their products, just as military officers want to command more, not fewer, nuclear weapons systems and new ones rather than old ones. Similarly, to dominate the nuclear debate after existential deterrence took hold in the 1950s, the experts on throw weight, hard target kill capability, and the like had to make it appear that such matters continued to be important. They erected an imposing edifice of deterrence theory and related historical lore that only the specialists can fully master and that makes the details of the hardware seem vitally important. Looking at the nuclear problem from a different, more political, point of view would cede the issue to other intellectual approaches—and to other intellectuals. Moreover, if intellectuals in government, private think tanks such as the Rand Corporation, and academia want to stay friendly with the powers that be and remain on their lucrative contract lists, they must frame inquiry into the nuclear issue, like other issues, in an ideologically acceptable manner. Weaponitis does the job nicely, even when disagreements about technical details emerge within the paradigm. Denouncing, say, road-mobile ICBMs in favor of rail-mobile ones may at worst annoy government officials holding a different view.   
Denouncing American foreign policy, beyond narrow limits, can get one blacklisted.

Link

Removing TNWs would spur increased spending in conventional and new weapon technologies

Schwartz and Derber 90 (William and Charles, Professors at Yeshiva U and Boston College, Nuclear Seduction) PR

When treated as an economic and social issue, the nuclear arms race raises serious questions and problems not normally considered when it is opposed for military reasons. If the real goal is economic reallocation, the first question is how, as a practical matter, to free up military dollars for alternative uses. Perhaps surprisingly, neither arms control nor opposition to individual weapons systems (whether nuclear or conventional) necessarily saves money. Consider the INF treaty, which unlike previous treaties actually banned weapons systems already deployed by the superpowers. A revealing article in the business section of the *New York Times* shortly after the superpowers announced that an INF agreement seemed imminent noted: "Whatever it does for peace, an arms control treaty may actually benefit military contractors. … war stocks have not been hurt." Military analyst Douglas Lee points out one reason: "You don't free up any resources by taking apart things that have already been built." As the *Times* reported, "The military already has spent most of the $9, billion that was planned for buying Pershing 2 missiles, made by Martin Marietta, and ground-launched cruise missiles made by General Dynamics." Moreover, "now the weapons will be withdrawn from Europe, but the Pentagon only appears likely to seek more funds to buy tanks, artillery, and aircraft for the defense of Europe."[[23](http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&chunk.id=nsd0e3729&toc.id=endnotes&toc.depth=1&brand=ucpress;query=enormous%20changes&anchor.id=d0e3978#X)] The INF agreement, like others before it, creates direct political pressure for increased "compensatory" spending on both conventional forces and other nuclear weapons—even though, in the case of the INF treaty and in almost all other cases, there is actually no real military loss to compensate for. As Nicholas Wade observes, referring to a book by former intelligence analyst Bruce Berkowitz: "Limits on arms … play the same role as does natural selection in Darwinian theory. They spur the evolution of species that are not constrained. The SALT I treaty of 1972 limited missile launchers because silos and submarines are easy to count. But the constraint spurred the evolution of missiles with multiple warheads … and cruise missiles"—both extremely costly items. The same is true of conventional arms. As the *New York Times* reported, "According to Joshua M. Epstein, who analyzes military budgets for the Brookings Institution, after the Reykjavik summit talks, Congressional leaders such as Representative Les Aspin, the Wisconsin Democrat who is chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, 'have consistently called for increases in conventional forces in the aftermath of any arms controls.'"[[24](http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&chunk.id=nsd0e3729&toc.id=endnotes&toc.depth=1&brand=ucpress;query=enormous%20changes&anchor.id=d0e3985#X)] So has the military. In February 1988 the commander of American and allied forces in Europe, General John R. Galvin, "said on the record what senior officers have been saying privately … 'I would caution them [those who think arms control will save money] and everyone else that this is wrong'" because of highly expensive conventional and nuclear weapons "modernization" programs that must accompany any "arms control" treaties. As one congressional analyst said of the INF treaty, "Quite honestly, if anything there will be incentives to increase spending both on the conventional side and on the nuclear side, on other forces." Indeed, "the same companies that profited from producing the nuclear arms will profit from compensating for their withdrawal." Wolfgang Demisch, who analyzes military firms for the First Boston Corporation, pointed out that "Martin Marietta makes the Pershing 2, and the company is also a leading factor in the smart sensors and enhanced munitions that presumably will be needed to replace it." As Demisch told the *Times,* the economic bottom line of nuclear arms agreements is that "the relative complacency of the Street [Wall Street] is justified. Unless you develop, on the basis of arms control, a political consensus to reduce defense spending, it won't make any difference."[[25](http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&chunk.id=nsd0e3729&toc.id=endnotes&toc.depth=1&brand=ucpress;query=enormous%20changes&anchor.id=d0e3995#X)] That is the key point.

Link

Even DRASTIC nuclear cuts won’t help lessen the threat of nuclear war, deterrence (even at the lowest level) will not work because the weapons in excess make it redundant and unnecessary.

Schwartz and Derber 90 (William and Charles, Professors at Yeshiva U and Boston College, Nuclear Seduction) PR

What about reductions far more radical than START, toward the much-discussed "minimum deterrent"—the lowest level of nuclear forces consistent with maintaining the balance of terror? Opinions differ about how low that level is—whether a few thousand, a few hundred, or a few dozen nuclear weapons—but by definition it would preserve existential deterrence. Hence, even the most radical nuclear reductions seriously proposed short of total nuclear disarmament should not greatly alter the calculations of political leaders in considering the use of nuclear weapons or taking risks during crises. All of the superpowers' weapons in excess of the minimum deterrent are redundant. Removing them changes little. As we have seen, even the amount of destruction in the event of a nuclear war might not change much should the superpowers slash their strategic arsenals by 90 percent or more. If the remaining weapons land on cities—and with so few weapons on hand, that is probably where they would be aimed—they might kill nearly as many people as today's arsenal would if used to attack the full range of military targets. A recent National Academy of Sciences study concluded that a few hundred weapons exploded over cities would immediately kill 20 million to 40 million people in the United States and 30 million to 50 million people in the Soviet Union; a full-scale attack against 2,000 military and economic targets, the study found, would kill roughly the same number of people.

**Link**

Nuclear arms control just doesn’t do the job, leader’s use nuclear weapons to suit their own purposes.

Schwartz and Derber 90 (William and Charles, Professors at Yeshiva U and Boston College, Nuclear Seduction) PR

Nuclear arms control, as we have seen, can play only a limited role in helping to prevent nuclear war, and as currently practiced it may do no good whatsoever. Changes in foreign policy could do far more because, as Part II shows, almost all actual nuclear danger points have resulted from superpower recklessness and intervention in the Third World. Can the World be Made Safe for Conventional State Violence?Can we avoid nuclear danger *without* constraining the conventional violence that is raging around the world? It is in the interests of the superpowers that we believe so. Moscow does not want its actions in Afghanistan to go down in history as a reckless threat to humanity, just as Washington would like those concerned about nuclear war to ignore American actions in Lebanon and the Persian Gulf. In the United Sta

tes, at least, specialists pin great hopes on "crisis management." Former U.S. defense secretary Robert McNamara claims that "there is no longer any such thing as strategy, only crisis management." One of its most eminent proponents, William Ury of the Harvard Law School's Nuclear Negotiation Project, goes even further: "Thanks to fire stations and fire hydrants, emergency exits and smoke detectors, building regulations and fire drills in school, trained firefighters and their modern equipment—in short, a comprehensive fire prevention and firefighting system—we live in relative safety. The same approach can be taken with crises…. They can be effectively stopped before they go out of control."**[**[**1**](http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&chunk.id=nsd0e4568&toc.id=endnotes&toc.depth=1&brand=ucpress;query=enormous%20changes&anchor.id=d0e4593#X)**]** Can they really? Even a leader who *wants* to avoid escalation may not be able to do so because the opponent's actions can be difficult to control. Deterrence, based ultimately on filling the adversary with fear of nuclear war, can surely induce caution. But as Part I makes clear, its strength rests on the existential threat of mutual annihilation and cannot be greatly boosted by shifts in weapons or doctrine. The many examples we cited in Part II leave no doubt that the existential risk is often just not enough to do the job, because—to be blunt—leaders on both sides are willing to run it periodically for their purposes of the moment. Even if more cautious and well-intentioned leaders could be found, they would be no more able than their predecessors to confidently prevent major blunders, mishaps, and miscalculations, such as the U.S. jet that blithely wandered into Soviet airspace—and onto Soviet nuclear attack warning radars—during the Cuban missile crisis. Progress can be made. But no one, not even the professors of crisis, can repeal Murphy's Law. There are no emergency exits from nuclear war, no fire hydrants to tap to put it out, no safe ways to play with matches near the oil fields of the Middle East or the massive ammunition dumps many Third World nations have become.As a recent reminder of the many dangers, a conference on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis suggested that even a quarter century of exhaustive scholarship has not revealed the full magnitude of recklessness and foul-up during the worst nuclear crisis in history, long considered an early success for deterrence and an inspiring model of crisis management.

Link

The nuclear arms race and the affirmative’s focus on nuclear weapons has no effect on the dangers of nuclear war because of the actual powers behind the nuclear violence. The affirmative’s approach to the problem is flawed.

Schwartz and Derber 90 (William and Charles, Professors at Yeshiva U and Boston College, Nuclear Seduction) PR

In Part I we argued that the arms race has little to do with the dangers of nuclear war today. Does that mean arms control is meaningless? Arms control is certainly not the answer to the nuclear peril, and, as currently practiced, it probably will not make us any safer at all. Nor will it achieve another oft-cited goal: saving money now wasted on redundant weapons. Arms control could deliver some security and economic benefits if it seriously took on important problems, such as conventional weapons, nuclear proliferation, doomsday weapons, preventing nuclear accidents, and redirecting the vast sums wasted on the arms race to the urgent problems of our time. Arms control to date has not noticeably reduced the danger of nuclear war or even slowed the cavalcade of expensive new weapons systems. Its most impressive accomplishment was probably the 1963 limited test ban treaty. Although of marginal military value, this treaty was an important environmental protection and public health measure because it outlawed atmospheric test explosions of nuclear weapons. The 1970 nuclear nonproliferation treaty might have made a real difference to the nuclear threat. But "it is hard to identify instances where the treaty has had any effect in slowing the spread of nuclear weapons." "Most of the countries of concern—India, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina, Israel, and South Africa—are not parties to the treaty," the treaty's controls over signatory states such as Iraq and Libya are weak, and the treaty not only failed to limit but actually encouraged what is arguably the most important activity promoting nuclear weapons proliferation transfer of "peaceful" nuclear technology and materials to non-nuclear signatory states. The 1972 ABM treaty concerned a category of weapons, antiballistic missiles, that both superpowers judged to be useless anyway and that, despite the pretensions of Star Wars, still are useless. The two SALT treaties, concerning offensive nuclear strike forces, have not "had any significant effect on the magnitude of damage that would be expected should a nuclear war occur, and it is doubtful if either has significantly enhanced deterrence or strategic stability."[1] They do not even appear to have constrained any major weapons programs on either side, the only clear case being the single U.S. Poseidon submarine decommissioned by the Reagan administration to remain within the SALT II limits. In fact, arms control treaties have traditionally spurred efforts to develop nuclear weapons that were not covered by the treaties…. One month after SALT I was signed, the [U.S.] Department of Defense requested … an additional $20 million to develop long-range cruise missiles. Prior to this request the Defense Department had not worked on the development of long-range cruise missiles for over 10 years. Unlike the SALT treaties, the 1987 INF treaty did lead to constraints on weapons, indeed to the destruction of some already deployed. But "history may repeat itself. Plans are already being made to develop and deploy new U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe" in the wake of that treaty.[2] INF will cause no perceptible changes in the consequences or risks of nuclear war. Neither will the much more dramatic START treaty, if successfully concluded. (We discuss both treaties later.) The American peace movement has not stopped a single new U.S. nuclear weapons system despite highly committed and courageous efforts to do so, nor has it achieved any of its more ambitious weapons-related goals, such as the comprehensive test ban or the nuclear freeze. In this context, those seeking to avert a holocaust must confront "the possibility that many initiatives aimed at affecting arms, including arms control efforts, may be so diversionary as to be, on balance, pernicious, even though they may seem desirable from a narrow perspective."[3] Some types of arms control, though, could bring great benefits.

**Link**

The conventional arms control method the aff proposes are flawed because nuclear weapons are different from conventional weapons. Nuclear weapons are not built to neutralize the other side’s nukes. Any reduction short of total disarmamaent will fail.

Schwartz and Derber 90 (William and Charles, Professors at Yeshiva U and Boston College, Nuclear Seduction) PR

The existence of nuclear weapons is a fundamental feature of the modern world. Their possession—by the human race generally or by any particular nation—definitively matters. They have completely changed the consequences of full-scale war between the dominant world powers, posing a threat to the very survival of civilization and the natural order. Correspondingly, international nuclear disarmament, or even unilateral denuclearization of individual states, would be singular historical events. The fallacy of weaponitis lies in attributing great significance to the size and technical characteristics of the superpowers' nuclear stockpiles, and especially to the *margins* of each arsenal—incremental additions to or subtractions from the immense current force, such as building MX missiles or removing Pershing II and cruise missiles from Europe. With *conventional* military technology, such concerns about weapons make sense. From the ancient discovery of the club, reenacted in *2001: A Space Odyssey,* to the horrors of modern saturation bombing, the types and quantities of conventional weaponry have undeniably affected military and political power. Conventional arms races matter because conventional wars are processes of attrition. The guns, tanks, and planes of one side oppose and try to neutralize the weapons and fighters of the other. One side's forces must deplete those of the enemy before a threat of destruction can be posed to the enemy's inner society. Because no single weapon or small arsenal of weapons determines the result, the quality and size of the overall fighting forces matter. The side with more or better weapons does not always win, of course, because technical factors must share the military stage with psychological, social, economic, and political ones. In modern guerrilla warfare, for example, primitively armed local organizations sometimes defeat huge, highly advanced military powers. But the military balance has determined much of human history. Firearms helped European settlers conquer Native Americans. Germany's buildup of naval power prior to World War I increased the military threat to Britain. Large, technically advanced interventionary forces supported American power in Korea and other Third World conflicts after World War II. At the beginning of the nuclear age, too, the weapons paradigm made sense. The atomic bomb was a new weapon, and it revolutionized war and politics. The reason was the immense power of an individual atomic weapon, especially the later hydrogen weapon—so powerful that a single warhead could destroy a city. As Bernard Brodie wrote in 1959: "People often speak of atomic explosives as the most portentous military invention 'since gunpowder.' But such a comparison inflates the importance of even so epoch-making an event as the introduction of gunpowder."**[**[**2**](http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&chunk.id=nsd0e396&toc.id=endnotes&toc.depth=1&brand=ucpress;query=enormous%20changes&anchor.id=d0e442#X)**]** Consider what a single large warhead could do to Chicago: One twenty-megaton nuclear bomb explodes just above ground level, at the corner of LaSalle and Adams. In less than one millionth of a second the temperature rises to 150,000,000 degrees Fahrenheit, four times the temperature of the center of the sun. A roar follows but no one is alive to hear it. Chicago has disappeared. The crater is 600 feet deep, one-and-one-half miles in diameter. Within a five-mile radius, skyscrapers, apartment buildings, roads, bridges, trains, subways, planes, hospitals, ambulances, automobiles, gas mains, trees, earth, animals, people—all have vanished…. The fireball is hotter than five thousand suns. The firestorm roars out in all directions, absorbing all available oxygen, thereby suffocating or incinerating all the living in its path. Before it burns out it will devastate 1,400,000 acres and most of the people on them. The firestorm is followed by the shockwave, the latter at close to the speed of sound. Then the mushroom cloud, reaching twenty miles in height, and the beginning of lethal radioactive fallout.**[**[**3**](http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&chunk.id=nsd0e396&toc.id=endnotes&toc.depth=1&brand=ucpress;query=enormous%20changes&anchor.id=d0e458#X)**]** All weapons are subject to diminishing returns, but with weapons this powerful the point of saturation—when increasing the number or quality of weapons adds little to military potential or risks—was reached very soon, perhaps as early as 1955 and no later than the early 1960s, although the date is unimportant now. Both sides had by then acquired so much destructive power that only secondary importance would attach to any further quantitative or qualitative improvements in the leading weapons of the day. The same was true for even large reductions in weapon stockpiles. The weapons paradigm was already obsolete. For with nuclear weapons, a nation's armed forces no longer must be defeated, or even seriously confronted, before its inner society can be destroyed, because the penetration of so few warheads is needed to accomplish the task.[[4](http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&chunk.id=nsd0e396&toc.id=endnotes&toc.depth=1&brand=ucpress;query=enormous%20changes&anchor.id=d0e467#X)]General war would no longer be a drawn-out process of attrition but an orgy of mutual devastation. Additional weapons on one side could do little to inflict greater damage on the other. Even modern air attack with huge conventional bombs does not dispense with the task of defeating the enemy's armed forces. For example, the Allied bombing of German cities during World War II killed hundreds of thousands of people but did not make a decisive difference in the war. In more recent memory, the heavy bombardment of cities such as Hanoi and Beirut caused unimaginable human horror, but even in combination with the extensive bombing and shelling of other cities and villages, it did not completely destroy Vietnamese or (at least so far) Lebanese society. In contrast, as McGeorge Bundy writes, "a decision that would bring even one hydrogen bomb on one city of one's own country would be recognized in advance as a catastrophic blunder; ten bombs on ten cities would be a disaster beyond history; and a hundred bombs on a hundred cities are unthinkable." Herbert York, another former high-level American official, concurs: "From one to ten are enough whenever the course of events is being rationally determined." Yet we urgently debate the composition of nuclear arsenals that now number not in the tens but in the tens of thousands. As the military historian Michael Howard notes, the amount of damage to be expected from a war that employs such weapons is so insensitive to the sizes of the nuclear arsenals held by the opposing powers that "the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers could be reduced by a factor of a hundred without affecting their capacity to destroy each other, and probably the rest of the world as well."

Link

Deterrence and the reduction of nuclear threat is separate to the nuclear arms race. The aff is a technical fix to a political problem.

Schwartz and Derber 90 (William and Charles, Professors at Yeshiva U and Boston College, Nuclear Seduction) PR

After four decades of effort and hundreds of billions of dollars of investment, no one has found a way to sharpen the weapon to eliminate or even greatly reduce this risk. That much is well known. In a 1984 survey 90 percent of Americans agreed that "we and the Soviets now have enough nuclear weapons to blow up each other several times over"; 89 percent said that "there can be no winner in an all-out nuclear war; both the U.S. and the Soviet Union would be completely destroyed"; 71 percent believed that "there is no defense in a nuclear war"; and 83 percent thought that "a limited nuclear war is nonsense."**[**[**11**](http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&chunk.id=nsd0e396&toc.id=endnotes&toc.depth=1&brand=ucpress;query=enormous%20changes&anchor.id=d0e516#X)**]** McGeorge Bundy coined the term "existential deterrence" to describe the implications of these basic nuclear realities. He observes that the "terrible and unavoidable uncertainties in any recourse to nuclear war" invalidate all strategies based on specific weapons and scenarios. **[**[**12**](http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&chunk.id=nsd0e396&toc.id=endnotes&toc.depth=1&brand=ucpress;query=enormous%20changes&anchor.id=d0e520#X)**]** All that matters is the possibility of uncontrolled escalation once the nuclear shooting begins. No one knows the likelihood of escalation or how to prevent it. So real political leaders, as opposed to abstract models of nuclear strategists, concern themselves only with the gross fact that catastrophic escalation could occur—that is all that they really know. The whole complex labyrinth of nuclear hardware and the doctrines governing its use thus collapse to a single easily understood fact: each side has "large numbers of thermonuclear weapons that could be used against the opponent, even after the strongest possible preemptive attack." This reality is "essentially unaffected by any changes [in weapon deployments] except those that might truly challenge the overall survivability of the forces on one side or the other."**[**[**13**](http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&chunk.id=nsd0e396&toc.id=endnotes&toc.depth=1&brand=ucpress;query=enormous%20changes&anchor.id=d0e527#X)**]**The remote likelihood of such a challenge (see Chapter 2) makes deterrence inherent in the existence of the weapons. If the strength of deterrence—the main force preventing nuclear war—is existential and thus relatively independent of the arms race, then logically the risk of nuclear war should be also. Like most nuclear doves, however, Bundy is well known for his opposition to "the competition in weapons systems," which, he dramatically writes, "is now itself becoming the largest single threat to peace." Similarly, George Kennan writes that "today we have achieved, we and the Russians together, in the creation of these devices and their means of delivery, levels of redundancy of such grotesque dimensions as to defy rational understanding"; that "the nuclear bomb is the most useless weapon ever invented"; and that "the relative size of the arsenals has no serious meaning." But Kennan too looks to these "redundant" and "useless" weapons for solutions to the nuclear problem, most dramatically with his well-known advocacy of a mutual 50 percent across-the-board cut in superpower nuclear arsenals.**[**[**14**](http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&chunk.id=nsd0e396&toc.id=endnotes&toc.depth=1&brand=ucpress;query=enormous%20changes&anchor.id=d0e532#X)**]** Yet if this "modest proposal" were ever carried out, could Kennan claim that deterrence and the risks of war had been fundamentally altered—rooted as they are in a "redundancy of grotesque dimensions" that even a 50 percent cut would hardly begin to undo? The right, the center, and the left seem equally misguided in attaching great significance to which nuclear weapons are deployed or destroyed by the superpowers. Because no realistic changes in the pace, balance, or even direction of the arms race can alter the basic conditions of our nuclear existence, they should make little difference to the incentives to start nuclear war, the damage we can expect should a war occur, or the division of international political power. Even major steps by the superpowers to rearm (including Star Wars) or to disarm (including the nuclear freeze or large cuts in nuclear arsenals) would leave the nuclear problem essentially unchanged, as we argue in more detail in succeeding chapters. The common tendency to identify the problem of nuclear war with the nuclear arms race is a logical fallacy that dangerously distorts nuclear politics by promoting technical fixes to what is overwhelmingly a political problem.

Cap K Link

Witthdrawals of nuclear weapon systems will NOT lessen the nuclear danger, and will perpetuate the capitalist system because it will inject money back into the privately owned companies.

Schwartz and Derber 90 (William and Charles, Professors at Yeshiva U and Boston College, Nuclear Seduction) PR

Activists, then, should not try to stop U.S. nuclear weapons systems or promote negotiated arms control treaties on the dubious grounds that the nuclear danger will then recede *or* on the equally dubious grounds that money will automatically be saved, or if it is saved that it will necessarily go toward better purposes. If those better purposes are to feed children, clean the air and water, or build clinics, they should be pursued directly with whatever money can be found—including the funds now wasted on superflous missiles and bombers *when* such funds can be clearly redirected. To take one example of a promising initiative, in 1987 the Soviet Union was among 148 countries represented at a United Nations conference on the relation between disarmament and international economic development. The Soviets proposed an international fund to channel money saved on future arms control agreements to Third World needs. Though even the sharp reductions in strategic nuclear weapons contemplated in the START negotiations would probably not lead to much if any savings (as we discuss later), at least the Soviets supported the principle that the superpowers should actually beat their nuclear swords into ploughshares. (The United States, in contrast, boycotted the U.N. conference. The United States has long insisted that arms control and economic development should not be linked and has refused to commit any money saved by future arms treaties to Third World programs.)[[27](http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&chunk.id=nsd0e3729&toc.id=endnotes&toc.depth=1&brand=ucpress;query=enormous%20changes&anchor.id=d0e4016#X)] Savings from either the nuclear or conventional parts of the military budget would not *necessarily* benefit the macroeconomy any more than they would automatically go toward social needs at home or abroad. There is much debate about the economic purposes and consequences of high military spending. Some (on both the right and the left) regard it as a motor of the economy—military Keynesianism—providing a politically acceptable way for a capitalist state to inject huge sums of capital into privately owned high-technology companies and providing a guaranteed market for tremendous industrial output that might otherwise go unsold in an American economy that is steadily losing ground to Japanese, European, and even Third World producers. In this view, the arms race is driven largely by broad corporate interests, shared perhaps by workers and communities that depend on corporate prosperity for their own livelihood. Others claim that high military spending primarily benefits only the few giant corporations that build the weapons and is in fact *ruining* the U.S. economy—reducing employment by emphasizing capital intensive high technology and eroding competitiveness by draining from the civilian sector the bulk of the nation's scientific and technical brainpower and its research and development capital. But whatever the interests behind high military spending and whatever economic benefits or damage it brings, one must be skeptical of all predictions about how a smaller military budget would ultimately affect overall employment, inflation, and other macroeconomic indices.

Alternative

We must focus on militarism as a whole and total disarmament instead of just the irrelevant “arms race” in order to help solve the constant nuclear threat

Schwartz and Derber 90 (William and Charles, Professors at Yeshiva U and Boston College, Nuclear Seduction) PR

Continuation of the weapons strategy by those who understand the near-irrelevance of the arms race would amount to a calculated deception—something no democratic movement should tolerate and few activists would support. It is unconscionable to cause people to fear that they and their children face grave new **dangers** when the first MX missiles are deployed or when arms talks break off without an agreement. There are surely enough real problems to worry about today without terrifying people about false ones. It would be better for the movement in the long run to mobilize fewer people around the real issues than more around the false ones—if that is the choice. And it may not be. Insisting on the falsehood that the arms race is the problem could actually damage the peace movement's ability to mobilize populations in the long run regardless of how the political battles over weapons systems turn out. A major movement victory such as the freeze—literally the end of the arms race—could destroy public concern through complacency even though the risk of nuclear war would not change. It has happened before. As Carl Conetta observes of the first big phase of American anti-nuclear war popular organizing, in the late 1950s, "The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty effectively ended that movement." He worries that the second phase, which began in 1980, may suffer a similar fate: "Today, peace activists are claiming the recent U.S.-Soviet INF agreement as a movement victory. But does this victory, like the Partial Test Ban before it, mean that the disarmament movement will enter a long period of quiescence?" Similarly, historian Paul Boyer notes that before the 1963 treaty and, to a lesser extent the 1972 SALT I treaty, "there was enormous public concern about testing and nuclear war, but afterwards there was an immediate decline in public concern about these issues. Much the same thing may happen in the wake of an INF treaty," which could "take the wind out of the sails of the peace movement."**[**[**44**](http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&chunk.id=nsd0e4568&toc.id=endnotes&toc.depth=1&brand=ucpress;query=enormous%20changes&anchor.id=d0e5027#X)**]** By periodically "just saying yes" to central but inconsequential movement demands about weapons, the state can easily unbalance its adversaries without conceding anything of importance. Major antiweapons campaigns will probably continue to fail, however, as they usually have in the past, because of the many powerful interests supporting the arms race. In this case too the movement risks demobilization—through despair—as in the European peace movement after the defeat of massive campaigns to prevent the deployment of the Euromissiles and in the American one after the failure to achieve the bilateral freeze or to defeat even one new weapons system. As Michael Howard writes: It cannot be wise to encourage the belief that security lies only in the achievement of an unattainable goal or in the conclusion of agreements which, even if they could be reached, would do little or nothing in themselves to produce a more peaceful world. These false expectations engender unnecessary and debilitating fears, fears which find expression in such phrases as "the next round of arms talks will provide the last opportunity for mankind to get the arms race under control," or that failure to achieve a "breakthrough" will be catastrophic…. The higher the expectations aroused by governments responding to (or exploiting) public opinion, the greater will be the disappointment when they are not fulfilled, the more bitter will be the mutual recrimination, and the worse the international climate as a result.**[**[**45**](http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&chunk.id=nsd0e4568&toc.id=endnotes&toc.depth=1&brand=ucpress;query=enormous%20changes&anchor.id=d0e5035#X)**]** True, many businesspeople, professionals, workers, and others in the American political mainstream might defect from the movement if it criticized American foreign policy rather than American missile policy. One former activist with Physicians for Social Responsibility told us that when he tried to turn the organization's attention to more political issues, he was informed that the doctors who supported the group financially would not tolerate the change. The neurosurgeons and cardiologists were happy to oppose the arms race, but not American actions in El Salvador and Lebanon. A politicized peace movement might find a less friendly reception in Congress, the press, and liberal foundations as well; the already highly political parts of the peace movement, notably those opposing U.S. intervention in Central America, certainly do. That is not surprising, nor is it a valid reason for preserving weaponitis. A movement that opposes the aggressive foreign policies of the nuclear states will inevitably face greater hostility than one working for politically respectable goals such as arms control. That is simply the price of not accepting the establishment's invitation to dance. If basic changes do not occur, history suggests that we may be heading for disaster.

Alternative

The aff fails, only FULL nuclear disarmament will solve anything

Schwartz and Derber 90 (William and Charles, Professors at Yeshiva U and Boston College, Nuclear Seduction) PR

That conclusion may be too pessimistic. A huge global mass movement (ignited, perhaps, by a nuclear accident, a small nuclear war, or some other scare) could force nuclear disarmament on the nations of the world—if it is prepared to use civil disobedience on a huge scale and to endure the terrible state violence that would likely be unleashed against it in the West, the East, and the Third World alike. Whether a powerful enough movement could be organized, and whether it could succeed, no one can know. But it is probably the *only* way nuclear disarmament could be achieved prior to radical political changes in the world order. We must surely abandon the hope that arms control as we know it is a promising strategy for pursuing nuclear abolition. Many insist that arms control is at least a "step in the right direction." One bumper sticker reads: "The Freeze: Step One." The communications director of the largest U.S. antinuclear organization, SANE/Freeze, said in reference to the INF treaty, "Our slogan is 2000 down, 48,000 to go."**[**[**72**](http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&chunk.id=nsd0e3729&toc.id=endnotes&toc.depth=1&brand=ucpress;query=enormous%20changes&anchor.id=d0e4544#X)**]** The metaphor is misleading, another reflection of weaponitis. The path to nuclear disarmament is not like a continuous road from here to there on which one makes gradual progress by taking step after step. It is more like a road interrupted by a vast canyon. States can indeed take gradual steps toward the edge of the canyon—the minimum deterrent. But once there they would quickly discover not only that they still faced the threat of nuclear annihilation but also that all the prior "steps in the right direction" had not brought nuclear disarmament any closer. That goal requires *crossing* the canyon—getting the most powerful states on a violent planet to relinquish their ultimate weapons with no guaranteed assurances that all others would do the same. That is an entirely different enterprise from junking redundant weapons that don't really matter anyway. Deep cuts in nuclear arsenals might do some good at a purely symbolic level, suggesting that if reductions are good elimination would be even better. But the symbolism could cut both ways. Dramatic progress in arms control could in fact hurt the prospects for abolition by breeding complacency about the nuclear peril while doing nothing to undermine the real forces that motivate states to get and keep nuclear weapons. Those forces must be confronted *directly* by restraining the illegitimate violence of our governments wherever we can. Considering the immense power and low moral standards of modern states, world peace will of course not come in a day. But reducing aggression and intervention by the leading states is probably a prerequisite for a long-run institutional solution to international violence, whether by means of world government, conventional disarmament, the "peace system" that some advocate, or other schemes.**[**[**73**](http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&chunk.id=nsd0e3729&toc.id=endnotes&toc.depth=1&brand=ucpress;query=enormous%20changes&anchor.id=d0e4562#X)**]** In the meantime, we must do what we can to make sure we survive long enough to find out. In short, peace is the path to nuclear disarmament, not the other way around. Paradoxically, a disarmament movement working to reduce the weapons that it seeks to abolish probably cannot establish the conditions under which abolition might be possible. That requires a peace movement.

A2: Perm

The Aff plan’s focus diverts attention from the militarism aspect of the nuclear arms threat and instead focuses on the less important “arms control” aspect.

Schwartz and Derber 90 (William and Charles, Professors at Yeshiva U and Boston College, Nuclear Seduction) PR

For the government itself, and for those who support the essentials of its long-standing, bipartisan foreign policy, weaponitis has an irresistible virtue: in a society deeply alarmed by the possibility of nuclear war, it diverts attention from Third World U.S. military interventionism and toward the far less important nuclear arms competition. Arms control plays a particularly important role in this process, as we noted in Chapter 9. It is a widely popular, seemingly progressive, and highly visible activity that the state can use to show its commitment to reducing the nuclear danger. The executive branch manages the negotiation process and the information flow about it. The Soviets can be blamed for problems even when the Americans are balking. Years can be spent working out treaties on minor issues such as the Euromissiles, with tremendous public relations bonanzas at the end if the efforts succeed. And all the while Soviet and American leaders can bomb Third World countries, support unstable dictatorships, arm belligerents, pursue foreign policy as usual, and still receive relatively good press on the nuclear question because of their "commitment to arms control." This manipulation cleverly coopts the peace movement's critique of the arms race into a slick government public relations tool. It is an effective way to manage an issue that could explode into serious popular dissent and unrest if the public grasped where the real hazards lie. For American politicians, particularly in the large political center, arms control is a uniquely comfortable politics. It provides a popular, nearly risk-free agenda for "addressing" the nuclear problem. Liberal arms control supporters earn much political support this way, even from progressives, while countenancing and sometimes actively encouraging military interventions in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Cambodia, and the Persian Gulf in a time of enormous public concern about war and peace. The downside of weaponitis for the politicians is an occasional peace movement victory, perhaps the scaling back or someday even the cancellation of a weapons system, and a few arms control treaties concluded under public pressure. In most cases the actual result is programs to build enormously costly nuclear systems with a cleaner political bill of health, such as the purportedly stabilizing Midgetman missile to "replace" the MXs not built, or the variety of conventional and nuclear arms destined to "compensate" for the Euromissiles banned under INF. These are all small potatoes. They do not greatly affect American foreign policy or American power in the world.

A2: Perm

Even calls for nuclear peace link back to the disease that is “weaponitis” because of the belief that weapons still matter.

Schwartz and Derber 90 (William and Charles, Professors at Yeshiva U and Boston College, Nuclear Seduction) PR

The real threat of the anti-nuclear war movement has always been that it might politicize and encourage a mass revolt against American militarism in the Third World. This could well occur if the U.S. population realized that the victims include not only Salvadorans, Nicaraguans, Lebanese, Libyans, Grenadans, Angolans, and so on, but potentially themselves and their families as well. As long as concerned citizens busy themselves with learning MX missile throw weights and Pershing II flight times, demonstrating at nuclear weapons bases, and pressuring Congress about Star Wars, this threat is coopted. These functions of weaponitis have not gone completely unnoticed within the anti-nuclear weapons movement. Activist Tom Atlee observes that weapons systems and arms control proposals—technically complex and easily multiplied year after year—are ideal for keeping the opposition busily ineffective. He asks, "Could it be that our friends in the Military Industrial Complex Establishment (let's call them MICE, shall we?) long ago figured out how to keep us (in the peace movement) hopping around on their playing field, dutifully following their game plan—without us realizing we were being manipulated?" The method is simple. "The MICE entice us into debates about weapons systems…. The catch is that even when we 'win' one of these debates, the MICE always come up with new weapons systems … for us to argue about. And since it takes the American public months or years just to figure out what each debate is about, the MICE have plenty of time to start a new development before the old one runs out of steam. So we never catch up to the MICE…. It is their game and they rig it in their favor." Writing in mid-1986, Atlee catalogs some of the recent acts of this political drama. "To counter our predeployment opposition to Euromissiles, the MICE came up with the zero/zero [theater nuclear forces arms control proposal] option…. Brilliantly the MICE framed the debate—and we obliged, arguing the faults of zero/zero." After the Soviets rejected it and walked out of the talks, "we peace people, without realizing what a trap we were walking into, tried to make 'Reagan's lack of [arms control] talks' an election issue. Reagan let the issue blossom and then invited the Soviets back to talk. Perfect: if they agreed, he'd be a peacemaker; if they turned him down, that just proved they were the bad guys. And so it goes." Similarly, "let's suppose that the MX is, at this point, nothing more than a decoy. Let's suppose that the MICE know the MX is a losing proposition—but also know that by holding it up and shaking it, they can get us to shoot at it, thus absorbing our energy." Then comes the next act: Star Wars. "Right on cue, we are flocking to the microphones and mimeograph machines and, backed by panels of impressive scientists, we're telling how it can't work without even noticing that the MICE have led us into another canyon ambush." Atlee is aware that "our whole focus on arms control ties us into the MICE's game plan." He notes a *Washington Post*report that Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle "favors talking to the Soviets, in part because negotiations help maintain political support for military spending in the West." These talks simply become another forum for enticing the peace movement into endless (and largely ineffective) antiweapons campaigns. Atlee concludes: "This stage on which we dance is filled with trap doors, shadow projections, fleeting mirages and colored curtains that rise and fall at the bidding of the MICE. They even control the audience lights and sound system. We just dance."[[43](http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&chunk.id=nsd0e4568&toc.id=endnotes&toc.depth=100&brand=ucpress&anchor.id=d0e5005#X)] The peace movement obligingly dances in part because of a sincere belief that the weapons matter, but also, one must admit, because it too enjoys definite functions of weaponitis. The same depoliticization of the nuclear issue that shields the state and mainstream politicians from criticism of America's behavior in the world offers similar advantages to an opposition movement seeking wide public support, including that of the elites. Each new nuclear monster such as MX is a fat easy target. Large segments of the population, the media, and the Congress can be mobilized against these monsters. Funds can be raised; elections can be affected. The nuclear freeze drew the support of three-quarters of the population and the U.S. House of Representatives. The idea that bloated nuclear arsenals must be reduced is attractive and saleable; in many circles the arms race is now a dirty word. Changing strategy to highlight political questions about American foreign policy, many fear, might undermine a remarkably comfortable position for an opposition mass movement in American politics—meaning fewer members, less money, less favorable press. Attracting support for the movement, some activists told us, is the necessary first step in galvanizing public opposition to the nuclear threat. If weapons are powerful mobilizing symbols, they are also a valid strategy for opposing nuclear war. Many believe that giving up a focus on weapons would mean abandoning the entire effort to avert a cataclysm. As one European peace researcher and activist told us in response to the argument that the weapons themselves do not much matter, "You are analytically correct, but politically I am not so sure." That seems an unrealistic fear. The real triumph of the anti-nuclear war movement was awakening people to the nuclear danger by relentlessly showing how destructive nuclear war would be. That educational task could have been accomplished without promoting the theory that the nuclear danger comes chiefly from the arms race. This "weapons strategy" was a political choice. The American people could have understood and acted on the "nuclear war is unwinnable and must never be fought" message even if they had not been bombarded as well by the "arms race is the problem" message.

Aff Answers to Turkey Prolif DA

Non-Unique

US TNWs are irrelevant for Turkish prolif

Warden 10 (John, research assistant working with the Project on Nuclear Issues, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: An Ineffective Deterrent, Unnecessary for Assurance,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, http://csis.org/blog/us-nuclear-weapons-europe-ineffective-deterrent-and-unnecessary-assurance) MJ

Therefore, **the greater worry is not that nuclear weapons are withdrawn, but that friction between the United States and Turkey convinces Ankara that they can’t rely on the United States for protection**.  [Just yesterday](http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hOYvneTCsAm2avtWLc_zSATjOhHQD9E8GC800), Turkey withdrew its ambassador after a House committee approved a resolution calling the killing of Armenians during World War I a genocide. However**, it’s also possible that no outside assurance will dissuade Turkey from acquiring its own nuclear capability.  While nuclear weapons are seen by some as the ultimate guarantee of security, others view them as an essential component of international prestige.  If Iran did acquire a nuclear weapons capability, Turkey, envisioning itself as a leader of the Muslim world, might be unwilling to continue as a non-nuclear state.**

Turkey wants to proliferate

Kalyoncu 5 (Mehmet, international relations analyst, “[How to Handle Turkey’s Legitimate Nuclear Aspirations (Turkey with Nuclear Weapons?,](http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1527797/posts) http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1527797/posts) MJ

This provocative analysis of Turkey's nuclear ambitions, informed by current political realities and a historical summary of the country's previous plans and nuclear partnerships, asks the devil's advocate question: what do the US and EU plan to give Turkey to keep it from going nuclear**? Recent heated statements of a nuclear variety made by both Iran and Israel toward each other introduce a whole new dimension for Turkey’s security concerns in its neighborhood. Given the current circumstances, Turkey could even be considered late in developing nuclear capabilities for defense purposes**. However, that **Turkey can and that Turkey might procure nuclear weapons are determined by two different sets of conditions. The former possibility largely depends on Turkey’s financial and technical capabilities as well as political connections with nuclear powers such as Pakistan**. The latter possibility depends on primarily the US’, secondarily the European Union’s approval. There are legitimate reasons for them not to approve Turkey going nuclear. The question is: what do they have to offer Turkey instead, to convince it not to go nuclear? Accordingly, how can Turkey take advantage of the nuclear debate going on in its immediate neighborhood? Despite its seemingly stable (albeit somewhat rocky) relationship with Iran, Turkey neighbors here on one of the most threatening nuclear powers of the time. Recently, openly radical Islamist and anti-democratic Mr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his aides seized power in the country. Accordingly, Iran has been more confrontational not only with its long time foe, the US, but also with arguably friends, or relatively less foes, the European powers. Let alone it does not comply with the rule and regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on opening its all facilities for inspection.

Turkey-Iran Alliance Strong

Zubairy 9 (Sahar, Bachelor of Arts degree in Economics, Turkey and Iran: A Growing Alliance, http://iran.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2009/11/05/turkey-and-iran-a-growing-alliance/) MJ

An analysis by [Yigal Schleifer in the Kuwait Times](http://www.kuwaittimes.net/read_news.php?newsid=NzkxNDQ5ODg0) details the relationship between the two countries: **Trade between the two countries**, for example, **hit $10 billion in 2008, compared to a level of $1 billion in 2000. Iran also supplies close to a third of Turkey’s gas supply**. **Turkish officials**, meanwhile, **were among the first and only to congratulate Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad** after his recent controversial reelection. Turkey and Iran share a 499-km border, and both Turkish and Iranian diplomats like to point out that the two Muslim neighbours have been at peace for centuries. **Iran and Turkey also share one common threat: their receptive Kurdish separatist movement**.  **Growing collaboration between PKK** (Kurdish rebels fighting against Turkey) **and PJAK** (Kurdish rebels fighting against Iran) **has led Iranian and Turkish military to cooperate to attack the rebel group’s bases in Iraqi Kurdistan**. Recently, **their relationship made headlines when Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan supported Iran’s right to a nuclear program**.  Erdogen was quoted as saying that Iran’s nuclear program ” is an energy project with peaceful, humanitarian purposes”. He said talks between Tehran and world powers in Geneva on October 1 showed that it “can work with” the United States and Russia on uranium enrichment.  As [Al Jazeera](http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2009/10/2009102711739736523.html) reported his latest remarks came after an interview in Britain’s The Guardian newspaper in which he accused Western powers of treating Iran unfairly and referred to Ahmadinejad as a “friend”.

Turn

Turn-Removing TNWs from turkey is a step to a world free of nukes

Bell 9 (Alexandra, Project Manager at the Ploughshares Fund, “Turkey’s Nuclear Crossroads,” http//www.good.is/post/turkeys-nuclear-crossroads/) MJ

**Removing tactical nuclear weapons from Turkey will be difficult, but not impossible. In order to move towards a world free of nuclear weapons, U.S. policy makers have to start thinking about how things are connected. Countries like Turkey rely on nuclear weapons for political and security reasons. To feel comfortable without nukes, these countries must be convinced that their neighbors will not acquire them. That means efforts to reduce nuclear stockpiles—including tactical nukes—and efforts to stop the creation of new nuclear programs must happen in concert.**

Turn-United States disarmament leads to Russia disarmament

Global Security Newswire 10 (NTI, “U.S. Urged to Remove Tactical Nukes in Europe,” http://www.nationaljournal.com/defense/gsn/?us-urged-to-remove-tactical-nukes-in-europe-1271908800)

**The role that U.S. tactical nuclear weapons play in NATO's defense strategy is expected to be a key topic of discussion among alliance foreign ministers who began meeting today in Estonia** (see GSN, March 15). B-61 nuclear gravity bomb disarmament procedures are demonstrated in 2008 on a "dummy" weapon at Volkel Air Base in the Netherlands, one site believed to house U.S. tactical nuclear weapons (U.S. Air Force/Federation of American Scientists). "**It's time to make progress on disarmament. That includes on nuclear weapons,**" German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle said in the Estonian capital of Tallinn, where the top diplomats from the 28-nation alliance are meeting, Agence France-Presse reported. "We must take advantage of this window of opportunity for disarmament," Westerwelle added. Five European nations -- Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway -- have joined together to call for the withdrawal of an estimated 240 U.S. gravity bombs that remain on the continent as a Cold War holdover. The weapons are thought to be located at bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. **Calls to pull the U.S. weapons from Europe could lead certain NATO states to seek corresponding action by Russia, which is believed to hold a significantly larger stockpile of tactical nuclear bombs within its borders**. A high-level U.S. official said it was important for NATO to come to a single position on the issue. "Our principle, and most important guidepost for moving into this discussion is that we don't want to divide the alliance on this issue," the official said.

A2: Treaties CP

Although nuclear arms control can lead to better relations between nations, that does not demonstrate “progress” in peace. A reduction in militarism as a whole does.

Schwartz and Derber 90 (William and Charles, Professors at Yeshiva U and Boston College, Nuclear Seduction) PR

Another popular notion about the political or symbolic effects of arms agreements such as the SALT treaties and INF is that they can reduce the nuclear danger by promoting better relations between the superpowers. This idea has become so widespread that few feel the need to explicitly defend it. Two assumptions hide within the argument: (1) that better relations between the superpowers are a major factor determining the risk of nuclear war and (2) that nuclear arms agreements help establish better relations. Both premises deserve examination. As we noted, each superpower bloc has wisely decided not to pose any direct military threat to the sovereignty of the other, knowing that to do so would probably result in the destruction of the planet. This kind of restraint does not require good relations but only an instinct for self-preservation. Since World War II superpower interventions have usually taken another form entirely—responses to *local* conflicts in Europe and the Third World. Such operations can and do continue in times of relatively warm cultural and diplomatic contacts between the United States and the Soviet Union. The American war in Vietnam, after all, proceeded with awful intensity despite détente because it was not directed against the Soviets in the first place. Similarly good relations with the United States would probably not have prevented the Soviet attack on Afghanistan, aimed as it was against a domestic Afghan threat to Soviet power in the country. Superpower violence in the Third World, the main contemporary trigger for nuclear war, is quite consistent with good relations between the superpowers themselves.**[**[**46**](http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&chunk.id=nsd0e3729&toc.id=endnotes&toc.depth=1&brand=ucpress;query=enormous%20changes&anchor.id=d0e4271#X)**]** Still, warm relations *could* make an important difference in some cases. One superpower must challenge the actions of the other to make a crisis, and détente might help discourage such challenges. But again the historical record should make us cautious about such predictions. Recall that the most dangerous nuclear confrontation since the Cuban missile crisis occurred in 1973, immediately after the June 1973 Nixon-Brezhnev Summit II, whose centerpiece, ironically, was the "Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War." This was perhaps the height of détente. But the pursuit of important interests overrode any barriers to confrontation arising from détente. Nixon understood the profound limitations of détente in this regard: I evaluated the Soviet behavior during the Mideast crisis not as an example of the failure of détente, but as an illustration of its limitations-limitations of which I had always been keenly aware…. The Soviet Union will always act in its own self-interest; and so will the United States. Détente cannot change that. All we can hope from détente is that it will minimize confrontation in marginal areas and provide, at least, alternative possibilities in the major ones. The shocking 1973 nuclear crisis did not even prevent the occurrence of Summit III in June 1974. Nixon reports Brezhnev's "willingness to pick up the dialogue of détente where it had left off before the Mideast crisis," a willingness he shared.**[**[**47**](http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&chunk.id=nsd0e3729&toc.id=endnotes&toc.depth=1&brand=ucpress;query=enormous%20changes&anchor.id=d0e4283#X)**]** In other circumstances, of course, particularly in what Nixon calls the "marginal areas," warm diplomatic relations may well discourage intervention and crisis by giving the superpowers something to lose should open conflict between them erupt. Détente may also help to resolve crises that do occur, though not necessarily. Kissinger's diplomatic access to Moscow in 1973, and the Soviets' willingness to rely on his solemn assurances, permitted him to double-cross the Russians and reignite the crisis by giving Israel permission to violate the cease-fire that he had just negotiated. In other circumstances, though, particularly in the case of an outright accident or mistake, cordial relations could help prevent a disaster by encouraging negotiations rather than military action. Moreover, détente may reduce the mutual popular paranoia that helps each superpower justify the subset of its international adventures that become publicly known and debated. To the extent that Gorbachev, for example, is perceived in the United States as a man of peace, the American government may have a more difficult time using the Soviet threat as a pretext for Third World intervention. Whatever happens to the U.S.-Soviet relationship, the most meaningful barometer of change is not the warmth or coolness of rhetoric but the actual behavior of both states in the political conflicts that could lead to war. Better relations do not necessarily demonstrate progress. Less militarism in the Third World would. Whatever the importance of superpower relations, it would be surprising if nuclear arms agreements of minimal military and economic significance profoundly improved them. Indeed, "on the record … there is no reason to believe that such improvements will be of long duration."**[**[**48**](http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&chunk.id=nsd0e3729&toc.id=endnotes&toc.depth=1&brand=ucpress;query=enormous%20changes&anchor.id=d0e4294#X)**]** Arms treaties, like other negotiated agreements between states, particularly those between adversaries, are founded on self-interest, not trust or good will. True, any superpower agreement—not just those concerning nuclear weapons—can both reflect and promote better relations. But often they simply become another terrain of conflict and propaganda. As Nicholas Wade writes: "The general pattern of arms accords is to cap the new weapons each side wants to build, scrap those that are obsolete, and leave problem weapons for the next agreement. That makes each new treaty harder to negotiate. Verification becomes trickier, which increases suspicions and charges of cheating, and worsens relations—just the opposite of what arms control is meant to achieve." "Wrongly designed," he adds, arms control "can spur new competition in dangerous technologies, foster accusations of cheating and speed the very tensions it seeks to avert." SALT II, for example, was initially hailed as a great leap forward for superpower relations but quickly degenerated into bitter superpower conflict—first over the U.S. Senate's failure to ratify it, later over alleged minor violations of it by both sides, and finally over the U.S. government's unilateral decision to violate it explicitly by deploying more cruise missiles than it allows. Similar conflicts developed over the ABM treaty regarding alleged cheating and the permissibility of the testing and deployment of Star Wars components. In 1986 a former chief of the U.S. delegation to SALT II and director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Ralph Earle II, wrote in *Foreign Policy* that "inadvertently or intentionally" the Reagan administration's "mishandling" of the nuclear treaty compliance issue "created an unnecessary and undeniable self-inflicted wound" that may do "irreparable damage" to "U.S.-Soviet relations."**[**[**49**](http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&chunk.id=nsd0e3729&toc.id=endnotes&toc.depth=1&brand=ucpress;query=enormous%20changes&anchor.id=d0e4302#X)**]** In retrospect, no one could seriously claim that ABM, SALT, or SALT II led to better relations in any sustained or basic sense, though each of course played a role in the normal cycle of periodic upswings and downswings. Did the INF treaty lead to better relations and a safer world in the meaningful sense of reduced international conflict involving the superpowers? Certainly not right away. Indeed, the period immediately surrounding INF was one of unusually great superpower militarism, with both nations engaged in their largest interventions of many years. The Soviets continued their murderous occupation of Afghanistan, complete with frequent attacks on U.S.-backed Pakistan, while the United States continued to support segments of the Afghan resistance with large quantities of weapons and other aid used for killing Soviet soldiers and for terrorist attacks in Kabul and elsewhere, including advanced anti-aircraft missiles used to down both military and civilian Afghan and Soviet planes. On the very day banner headlines hailed the INF signing in the morning papers, a barely reported UPI dispatch stated, "A diplomat quoted a senior Afghan medical officer as saying, 'more casualties were being brought into Kabul' from [the Afghan cities] Khost and Kandahar 'than at any time during the war.'" Although the Afghan situation soon changed dramatically, it had not yet done so when Gorbachev was being toasted as a new Soviet man of peace around the world. The reasons for the ultimate Soviet withdrawal can be traced not to INF, of course, but to the fortunes of the battlefield, domestic discontent, and the huge cost of the war, similar to the considerations that ultimately drove the United States from Vietnam. In and around the Persian Gulf in the immediate post-INF period, the United States continued its largest and most dangerous military intervention since the Vietnam War, undertaken despite an urgent Soviet proposal for all foreign warships to stay clear of that explosive war zone.**[**[**50**](http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&chunk.id=nsd0e3729&toc.id=endnotes&toc.depth=1&brand=ucpress;query=enormous%20changes&anchor.id=d0e4310#X)**]** Even as the Central American peace treaty was being enacted, the United States increased supplies to the Nicaraguan contras (who in turn widely expanded terrorist attacks against Nicaraguan civilians), continued a devastating economic embargo (even blocking a convoy of American veterans bearing medical and other humanitarian aid), and kept up an unrelenting ideological campaign against Managua. Prominent in this campaign was President Reagan's demand—found nowhere in the Central American treaty—that the Nicaraguans eject their Cuban and Soviet advisers, which would be comparable to a Soviet demand that, say, Pakistan, not known for a commitment to democracy and human rights, expel American civilian and military officials. The United States continued to support the South African regime, which in support of the Angolan rebels it sponsors invaded Angola outright shortly after the announcement of the nuclear treaty, killing not only many Angolans but also Cubans and possibly Soviets helping to defend the country from the apartheid state. Many other cases could be cited. Even the routine hazards of superpower militarism seemed unchanged or intensified by unusual recklessness on both sides right after the treaty. On February 12, as the U.S. Senate debated INF, two American warships—the guided-missile cruiser *Yorktown* and the destroyer *Caron* —deliberately violated Soviet territorial waters by steaming to within ten miles of the sensitive Soviet coastline on the Black Sea. President Reagan, the Pentagon said, personally ordered the provocative operation to assert the right of "innocent" passage into other nations' territorial waters under an interpretation of international law disputed by the Soviet Union.

A2: Topicality-Military Presence

US Nuclear Weapons are a military presence

Colville 8 (Liz, BA from Wesleyan, “Continued U.S. Military Presence Abroad Stirs Mixed Reactions,” http://www.findingdulcinea.com/news/Europe/May-June-08/Continued-U-S--Military-Presence-Abroad-Stirs-Mixed-Reactions.html)

**The presence of B-61 nuclear bombs at a base in southern Germany is just one example of how the U.S. retains its military presence—real and symbolic—abroad**.30-Second Summary A military alliance remains between the United States and Europe, even if only theoretically. American B-61 nuclear warheads at the German Air Force’s base near Büchel, in southwest Germany, have remained there since the Cold War, and are still used during military practices by the German forces, according to Der Spiegel. The bombs are a symbol of a NATO agreement forged nearly 20 years ago, which called for “Nuclear Sharing” between military allies. **Their presence**, supported by Germany’s deputy defense minister Thomas Kossendey, **has “encountered strong opposition” within the government**. But removing the bombs would “permanently weaken the relationship between Europe and North America,” Kossendey argues. **But even the U.S. is convinced of these and other weapons’ redundancy: most that remain in Germany, and a handful of other countries including Belgium and Turkey, do not comply with Department of Defense security standards**. A gradual reduction of the number of weapons deployed in Europe was seen to be imminent after the U.S. withdrew its U.K.-based weapons from RAF Lakenheath, a base outside London, this June. **Weapons are only one aspect of the United States’ strong presence around the glob**e. Military base presence and troops’ behavior have provoked negative sentiments and requests that the U.S. reduce its presence in locations such as Okinawa, the small Japanese island where about 50,000 U.S. soldiers are stationed.

A2: Russian Relations Tradeoff

The US and Turkey are working to engage each other, not compete over Turkey

TAŞPINAR et al 9, (Omer, TURKEY, RUSSIA AND REGIONAL ENERGY STRATEGIES Nonresident Fellow and Director, Turkey Project The Brookings Institution, [http://www.brook ings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2009/0715\_turkey\_russia/20090715\_turkey\_russia\_energy.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2009/0715_turkey_russia/20090715_turkey_russia_energy.pdf))

Some people have portrayed our energy policy and Russia's as the next round in the great game in Central Asia and President Obama specifically rejected this analogy when he was in Moscow. Security is not a zero-sum game. Our policy is not anti-Russia. As President Obama said at the summit in Moscow last week, the United States and Russia have more in common than they have differences, and we're working to have an open and frank dialogue with Russia in the energy area and to identify areas of mutual interest and benefit including investment on both sides of the ocean and in third countries. Zero-sum games are too expensive and we need to try to find areas where we can cooperate. In this spirit, at the summit, the White House announced a new Binational Presidential Commission which will cover a host of different issues including energy.

Zero Sum is nonexistent between the trilateral of Turk-US-Russo relations, cooperation is active

Crawley 6, (Vince, Washington File, Staff Writer, 07, July 2006, U.S. Says Turkey Can Be Cultural Example, Energy Hub in Europe EU membership would end "fallacy" of "war of civilizations," State's Fried [http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2006/July/2006070 7171724MVyelwarC0.8118402.html](http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2006/July/20060707171724MVyelwarC0.8118402.html))

Fried also spoke favorably of Turkey’s ambitions to become a major energy hub, connecting Europe to the petroleum and gas reserves of the Caspian region, Central Asia and parts of Russia. The United States backed the newly completed Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline that is bringing Caspian oil to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast. A parallel gas pipeline is under construction. Turkey and Russia also are developing jointly a Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline that could pump Russian oil from Turkey’s Black Sea coast to the growing petroleum terminal around Ceyhan on the Mediterranean. “Turkey and Russia are neighbors,” Fried said. “How could we possibly object to improved relations between Turkey and its Russian neighbor? This is not a zero-sum game where Turkey has to choose between the United States and Russia. That's ridiculous.” The United States believes in multiple pipelines, multiple sources of energy and competition, he said. “What we don't believe in is monopolies.”