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Turkey Politics 1NC (1/2)

If the elections happened today, Erdogan would lose.

Gil Ronen, IsraelNationalNews staff writer, Last Updated, 6/6/2010, “Erdogan Poised to Lose Next Election, Expert Says,” http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/news.aspx/137906 // vkoneru

Turkey's foreign policy shift away from friendship with Israel and the West may be a ploy by the country's prime minister to gain popularity for his party, which stands to lose the next election in July 2011, says a top expert on the region. The hostile stance taken by Turkey towards Israel is part of a major transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy, according to Begin-Sadat Center Director Prof. Efraim Inbar. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is turning away from the West, he explained, and moving closer to countries such as Sudan, Syria and Iran. However, “it is not a foregone conclusion that Turkey will persist in this direction,” Inbar said in a position paper: “Among Turkish society many still support the secular parties, which are far from pleased with the rush towards the Muslim world. Even among moderate Muslim quarters there is a sense of unease regarding the government’s policy pushing Turkey to join radical Islamic elements such as Hamas and Iran. One should also recall that Shiite Iran was an historic rival of the Sunni Turks.” (For an article on Turkey under Erdogan written by an Iranian freedom activist, click here.) **Public support for the ruling Islamic party is in decline**, the expert added, mostly due to corruption and abuse of civil rights. “Were elections held last week, the Islamist party would lose many seats, and two secular parties would possibly have made up the coalition. **If current public opinion is held till the next elections**, scheduled for July 2011, **it is likely that Turkey will emerge with a new prime minister**. It is possible that precisely due to his domestic situation as reflected in the polls, Erdogan has decided to exacerbate his relations with Israel in order to gain public support.” Prof. Inbar concludes that Israel “should stand its ground on Israeli vital interests” vis-a-vis Turkey. “Moreover, Israel should not tolerate insults. This will only be perceived as a weakness. Israel should distinguish between the Turkish state and society, and the current government that deserves a strong riposte. Firm, level-headed responses will be of assistance to pro-Western Turks in their domestic debate.”

TNWs and staging posts unpopular with the public – 72% against US presence

Claudine Lamond and Paul Ingram, British American Security Information Council, January 23, 2009, “Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states,” BASIC Getting to Zero Paper, www.atlanticcommunity.org/app/webroot/files/articlepdf/CLamondTNWinNATO.pdf // vkoneru

There is a rising sentiment amongst the population for the removal of US nuclear weapons from Turkish territory. In a recent survey,[20] more than half the respondents stated that they are against nuclear weapons being stationed in Turkey. Almost 60% of the Turkish population would support a government request to remove the nuclear weapons from their country, and 72% said they would support an initiative to make Turkey a nuclear-free zone.[21] There may be several causes behind this sentiment, including the Iraq War, Turkish relations with neighboring states, budget expenditure and the moral concern over nuclear weapons. The historic precedence of Greece, a NATO member and Turkey's historic rival, ending its commitment to nuclear sharing in NATO may have further strengthened this tendency. There have been **public expressions of resentment towards the US military presence** in Turkey ever since the lead up to the US war with Iraq. The United States insisted on the government allowing American troops to use Turkey as a staging post, **despite overwhelmingly antiwar Turkish public and political opinion**. Limited permission was granted after heavy debates and delay in the Turkish parliament.

Erdogan will get credit for the plan

Lale Kemal, staff writer and columnist for today’s zaman, 6/20/2010, “What will Erdoğan do over nukes at the İncirlik base?,” http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/columnists-207467-what-will-erdogan-do-over-nukes-at-the-incirlik-base.html // vkoneru

Erdoğan urged, once again, during a speech in Washington on Monday that a nuclear-free zone be established in Turkey's region, i.e., the Middle East, which in particular will include Israel. Erdoğan also said that Turkey does not want Iran or any other nation to have nuclear weapons.

Turkey Politics 1NC (2/2)

CHP win key to EU accession

The Jerusalem Post, May 31, 2010, “Turkey’s game changer?,” lexis

The CHP has failed to come up with its version of moving Turkey forward, instead merely opposing the AKP. Subsequently, and ironically for a leftist party, the CHP has become the party opposing change - the party of "no." The implications of the dirty tactics against Baykal aside, the shake-up in the CHP's leadership presents the party with an unprecedented opportunity - Turkish leaders do not quit politics until they die - to introduce New Kemalism, a forward vision for a European Turkey. Kilicdaroglu has already voiced support for EU accession, and the talk in Ankara is that he is wooing prominent liberal, pro-EU Turkish diplomats who feel disgruntled with the AKP's foreign policy to join the CHP. If the CHP becomes the party of change, it can even mold Turkey in the image of leftist parties that took Portugal and Spain into the European Union while transforming and liberalizing their societies. New Kemalism's aim would be to boost traditional Kemalism's commitment to Turkey's European vocation while reguiding it toward more liberal values. In the early 20th century, Kemal Ataturk wanted Turkey to go West, and that remains Kemalism's goal. Europe, however, has moved even further West since then. Joining this new Europe, the EU of liberal values, has to be New Kemalism's driving mantra.

Turkey’s accession into the EU is key to peace and stability in Cyprus

Stefan Nicola, Staff writer for United Press International, June 13, 2005, United Press International, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “Cyprus backs Turkey’s EU bid,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic\_id=109941&fuseaction=topics.item&news\_id=132754 // vkoneru

The accession of Turkey into the European Union is essential to solve the Cyprus problem, a senior Cypriot diplomat in Washington said Monday. "We are in favor of Turkey joining the EU," said Euripides Evriviades, ambassador of the Republic of Cyprus, at a luncheon hosted by the Nixon Center, a Washington-based think tank. "The EU solves problems by embracing them," he said, "it has managed to reunify the French and the Germans, and it will do it for Cyprus...Turkey joining the Union is fundamental for peace and stability and long-term prosperity in the region."A former British colony, Cyprus has been divided into the Republic of Cyprus -- the Greek Cypriot south -- and a Turkish-occupied north since Turkey invaded the Mediterranean island in 1974. Although only the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus joined the EU on May 1, 2004, every Cypriot carrying a passport has the status of a European citizen. EU laws, however, do not apply to the north, which has so far been recognized by Turkey alone. Evriviades said he hopes the rejection of the EU constitution in France and the Netherlands does not influence the timetable of the EU-accession talks with Ankara, which are scheduled to start Oct. 3. EU foreign ministers also approved an agreement on Monday adapting its customs union with Turkey to the 10 new EU member states, including Cyprus, bringing accession talks with Ankara a big step closer. Once Turkey signs the document, it will have met all the conditions to start the talks. In those talks, Cyprus hopes it will not get overlooked, as the issue is one that EU leaders have repeatedly stated they would like to be solved if Turkey wants to join the Brussels-based club. But the strategic interest of the United States in Turkey, a country that borders Iran and Iraq, might be disadvantageous to such a small country as Cyprus, the ambassador said. Evriviades criticized U.S.-lawmakers for what he felt would be an unjust foreign policy towards Nicosia: The ambassador said that in a Congress hearing earlier this year, it was said that "one politically risk-free option...for the United States to improve its relations with Turkey, is for the U.S. basically to deliver Cyprus." "How do you think I feel as a Cypriot," Evriviades asked, "if my own country is being used as an extension and a trump card for somebody else's foreign policy?" The Cypriot issue, which has seen repeated sparks of violent outbreaks over the last four decades, is also on the to-solve list of the United Nations. A U.N.-endorsed reunification plan facilitated direct talks between the leaders of both parties that culminated in a referendum last April. But while the Turkish north backed the plan, Greek Cypriotes overwhelmingly rejected the proposal.

Cyprus instability escalates to nuclear war

Tony Barber, Independent Staff Writer, 1/23/1997 “Europe's coming war over Cyprus: After 22 years of diplomatic stalemate, the world's most densely militarised confrontation zone may be about to explode, writes Tony Barber,” http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/europes-coming-war-over-cyprus-1284661.html // vkoneru

Just as EU foreign ministers sit down over lunch in Brussels to thrash out what to do, word arrives that four Greek Cypriots have been killed along the Green Line dividing government-held southern Cyprus from the Turkish-occupied north. The government, backed by Greece, retaliates by vowing to take delivery within a week of a batch of Russian S-300 anti- aircraft missiles ordered in January 1997. As a Russian-Greek naval convoy carrying the warheads and launchers edges towards the eastern Mediterranean, the Turkish armed forces swing into action. Troop reinforcements pour into northern Cyprus. Planes raid the Greek-built missile base near Paphos in south-western Cyprus. The Turkish navy prepares to blockade the island. Greece declares Turkey's actions a cause for war and, angry at lukewarm EU support, invokes the secret defence clause of a recently signed treaty with Russia. Fighting on Cyprus spreads to disputed Aegean islands on Turkey's coastline. The United States warns Russia not to get involved. President Alexander Lebed, with Chinese support, tells the US to mind its own business. All three powers go on nuclear alert. Like Cuba, another island involved in a missile dispute 36 years before, Cyprus has brought the world to nuclear confrontation.

2NC Uniqueness Wall

CHP is gaining popularity now – stats prove

Euractiv, Last Updated 7/16/2010, “Turkish opposition bids to lower ‘unfair’ election threshold,” http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/turkish-opposition-bids-lower-unfair-election-threshold-news-496427 // vkoneru

The CHP (Republican People's Party) was founded by Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938), the founder of modern Turkey. It is now the largest opposition party, having won 21% in the latest national election. Since the recent election of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu as CHP leader (EurActiv 26/05/10), the party's approval rating has surged above 30% in opinion polls.

CHP win likely – Support strong for nationalist/liberals

Comment Factory, 6/30/10, " The US must switch support to the CHP in Turkey ", http://www.thecommentfactory.com/the-us-must-switch-support-to-the-chp-in-turkey-3223/]

Despite the Kemalists’ positive transformation, ultra-nationalists still consider the United States a serious threat. In the latest speech of Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), he seems convinced that both the AKP and the Kurdish rebels of the PKK are controlled by the United States whose aim is to destroy Turkey. To win the elections with a landslide victory, CHP must obtain more votes than sum of votes of the AKP and MHP. However, because support for AKP within Turkey is still considerably high, there is a strong possibility that the next Turkish government will be constituted of a CHP and MHP coalition. With the current mindset of the MHP, the United States will definitely have difficulty repairing relations with Turkey and its citizens.

The public hates Erdogan, and he’s slipping in the polls

Steve Bryant, bloomberg and Ali Berat Meric, staff writers, 2/25/2010, “Turkish President Calls for Resolution of Army Row (Update2),” http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-02-25/turkey-jails-more-officers-as-erdogan-prepares-for-army-meeting.html // vkoneru

Erdogan’s vote declined to 39 percent in local polls in March 2009. The economy shrank about 6 percent last year, according to government forecasts. That enabled the central bank to slash the benchmark interest rate to 6.5 percent, below the forecast for inflation of 6.9 percent. The president’s statement today tried to “strike a conciliatory balance between the two sides,” Inan Demir, economist for Finansbank AS in Istanbul, said. “On one side it addresses the government’s concerns about a coup and on the other the mention of institutional respect can only aim to address the army’s concerns.” This week’s arrests are the latest in a two-year investigation that has seen scores of ex-officers, journalists and academics jailed and put on trial on charges of planning a coup. They follow a report in the Taraf newspaper on Jan. 21 that army officers drafted a plan in 2003 to stage bombings to undermine confidence in Erdogan’s government. Basbug said on Jan. 25 the allegations were part of a campaign of psychological warfare designed to undermine public trust in the forces. He said the army is committed to democracy and that coups are “a thing of the past.”

Uniqueness – Erdogan Unpopular

Erdogan’s islamist policies are unpopular with the Turkish public

Huffington Post, (blog), 7/19/10, "A Taste of Turkish Delight ," http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-brenner/a-taste-of-turkish-deligh\_b\_651188.html // vkoneru

The Islamist tinge of Erdogan's EDK at first was an obstacle to improved relations with Iran. The latter's radical and violent fundamentalism ran against the grain of the party's base of practicing Muslims because it directly contradicted their conception of Islam. It also hurt their party's image among the Turkish public.

Erdogan will lose and the CHP will win

Patrick Goodenough, International Editor cns news, 6/11/2010, “Turkey’s Opposition Troubled by Erdogan’s Stance on Iran and Israel,” http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/67573 // vkoneru

Far from writing Turkey off, some analysts are pointing to elections next year as an opportunity for the country to jettison the AKP. An opinion poll at late May put Erdogan’s party in second place, behind the CHP, for the first time since the AKP came to power eight years ago. The poll by the Sonar company gave the CHP 32.4 percent of the vote, up from 20 percent in the 2007 election. The AKP came in at 31 percent, down from 46 percent in 2007. The MHP was at 18.5 percent, up from 14 percent at the last election. “Among Turkish society many still support the secular parties, which are far from pleased with the rush towards the Muslim world,” said Prof. Efraim Inbar, director of the BESA Center for Strategic Studies at Israel’s Bar-Ilan University. “Even among moderate Muslim quarters there is a sense of unease regarding the government’s policy pushing Turkey to join radical Islamic elements such as Hamas and Iran.” Inbar said support for the AKP was slipping, “despite Erdogan’s remarkable political skills,” mostly as a result of corruption and the abuse of civil rights. When the AKP came to power in 2002 it did so with only 34 percent of the votes, although because a threshold of 10 percent is required for a party to make it into parliament, several small ones fell away and the AKP ended up with 66 percent of the seats. In the 2007 election, some smaller parties campaigned as independents to get around the threshold hurdle – which relates only to parties, not independent candidates. So although the AKP increased its share of the vote by 12 percent, it actually ended up with fewer seats in parliament. Despite the AKP’s boost at the polls in 2007, its main rivals did not do badly themselves – the CHP share of the vote rose slightly, from 19 to 20 percent, while the MHP climbed to 14 percent from eight in 2002. If the recent Sonar poll result was reflected in an election, a potential CHP-MHP coalition would easily defeat the AKP.

Uniqueness – Erdogan Unpopular

Erdogan unpopular

Marko Attila Hoare, 4/4/2009, “Turkey: Time for Erdogan and the AKP to go,” http://greatersurbiton.wordpress.com/2009/04/04/turkey-time-for-erdogan-and-the-akp-to-go/ // vkoneru

Nevertheless, any progressive regime that remains in power too long will cease to be progressive. And the indications are that **the AKP government has reached this point.** Its initially moderately Islamic ideology mirrored, for a time, the moderate Christianity of European Christian Democratic parties, and provided an appealing alternative Islamic message to that of the Islamists. By challenging the Kemalist establishment over the ban on headscarves in universities and the public sector, the government has simply been standing up for the right of religiously observant women to education and a career. Yet the government, whose public support has been declining and which performed badly in local elections last month, is increasingly slipping down the slope from moderate Islam to Islamic popularism. In January, Erdogan flounced off the stage during a panel discussion with Israeli president Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum, after accusing Peres over the Gaza offensive: ‘When it comes to killing, you know well how to kill.’ During the Gaza offensive, Erdogan regularly denounced Israel in Islamist terms, suggesting that ‘Allah would punish’ Israel, whose actions would lead to its own ‘destruction’. That this had more to do with pandering to Muslim populism and rising anti-Semitism than to any genuine concern at Palestinian suffering is indicated by the fact that Erdogan has not displayed quite the same degree of anger at the crimes of the Islamist Sudanese regime in Darfur. Indeed, Sudanese president Omar Hassan al-Bashir was invited to Turkey in January 2008, when he reviewed a military guard of honour in Ankara in the company of Turkey’s president, the AKP’s Abdullah Gul, who described him as a ‘friend’. Bashir was invited to Turkey again in August, despite his indictment for genocide by the International Criminal Court. 0at Istanbul’s Blue Mosque. Ankara is also pursuing an increasingly close collaboration with Russia, and is obstructing the transit of Azerbaijani gas to Europe via the Nabucco pipeline project, thereby threatening a source of energy for Europe that would be independent of Moscow. Perhaps most worryingly, Ankara has been blocking the accession of Danish prime minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen to become the next secretary-general of NATO, on account of his handling of the Danish cartoon controversy of 2005. In Erdogan’s own words: ‘We are receiving telephone calls from the Islamic world, telling us: “By God, this person should not become the secretary general of Nato and we have to take into consideration all these reactions”.’ The AKP’s Islamic populism is thus threatening the functioning of NATO. Meanwhile, the Turkish government has hardened its stand on the Kurdish issue, with Erdogan warning the Kurdish people that, with regard to Turkey, they should ‘love it or leave it’, creating major difficulties for the AKP’s own Kurdish deputies in relation to their constituents. This is apparently linked to increasing government paranoia over the role of the US and Israeli intelligence services in the country. This shift may account for the AKP’s poor showing in Kurdish regions in Turkey’s recent local elections. **Erdogan is mutating from a Muslim moderate into a Muslim bigot;** his government is becoming a negative force in world politics. **It is time for them to go.**

Erdogan support dropping now

Bloomberg, July 22, 2010, “Erdogan Losing Support as Turkish Opposition Pulls Ahead in Opinion Poll,” http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-22/erdogan-losing-support-as-turkish-opposition-pulls-ahead-in-opinion-poll.html

The main Turkish opposition party, led by Kemal Kilicdaroglu, has pulled ahead of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s party, a public opinion poll shows. In this month’s Sonar Arastirma poll, 33.5 percent of respondents said they would vote for Kilicdaroglu’s Republican People’s Party, as opposed to 31.1 percent for Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party. The prime minister’s party led in the Istanbul-based research group’s June poll, backed by 33.4 percent of respondents to 30.25 percent for the Republicans. The Nationalist Action Party would receive 13.8 percent of the vote, according to Sonar Arastirma’s July 3-10 poll, which was received by e-mail. The pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party would get 4.5 percent, below the 10 percent threshold needed for representation in parliament, the poll shows. Elections are planned by July of next year. In the last elections, in 2007, Erdogan’s Justice and Development won with 47 percent of the vote, to 21 percent for the Republicans. Erdogan received the lowest rating for trust of any Turkish leader or government branch listed in the poll, at 33 percent.

Uniqueness – Erdogan Unpopular

Erdogan unpopular with public now

World Tribune, intelligence briefing, 7/10/2010, “Turkish opposition charges Erdogan exploiting, ramping up Israel conflict,” http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2010/me\_turkey0513\_06\_10.asp // vkoneru

Opposition parliamentarians have accused Erdogan of engineering a crisis with Israel in an effort to mobilize Islamist support ahead of elections. The parliamentarians said Erdogan has been tainted by corruption and embezzlement in what has sharply reduced his electoral support. "Erdogan uses the Ten Commandments as a tool," Turkish opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu said. "But the Eighth Commandment says, 'Thou shall not steal.' What about that?" Opposition sources said Erdogan has been discussing the feasibility of moving up elections, scheduled for July 2011, to capitalize on the crisis with Israel, Middle East Newsline reported. They said the prime minister, who has proposed that the government hire 50,000 people over the next year, hoped that his Islamist constituency would mobilize behind the ruling Justice and Development Party. The opposition charged that Erdogan sought a confrontation with Israel when he supported a Turkish-sponsored flotilla to break the Egyptian and Israeli siege of the Gaza Strip. Opposition deputies said Ankara could have defused the situation through diplomacy with Jerusalem . "He [Erdogan] almost declared war against Israel in his party's meeting [on June 1]," Kilicdaroglu said. "The Turkish Foreign Ministry should publicly disclose correspondence made with Israel so that we may all learn whether Israel warned Turkey or not. Nothing should remain secret." Erdogan also faced criticism for his anti-Israeli policy from pro-Kurdish constituents. At one forum, the prime minister was asked how he could condemn Israel for the bloody naval interception of a Turkish-flagged ship to the Gaza Strip when Ankara was killing Kurdish insurgents. "How can you compare the two?" Erdogan asked. The prime minister has accused the opposition Republican People's Party of supporting Israel. Erdogan said the opposition wanted to limit the pro-Islamist government to conventional diplomacy. "Some people speak in the name of Tel Aviv, advocate for Tel Aviv," Erdogan said. "They question our way of diplomacy. The way you did things put us in this dire situation. As I said earlier, we do not work as the 'mon cher' diplomats do." But opposition sources and independent analysts asserted that Erdogan faced opposition to his anti-Israeli policy from within the Justice and Development Party, which commands a majority of parliament. They cited statements by the deputy prime minister as well as defense and foreign ministers that Ankara wanted to defuse the crisis with Israel. "If the prime minister wants to understand who is the advocate of Tel Aviv, he should look to his right and he will see [Deputy Prime Minister] Bulent Arinc making different statements from the government," Kilicdaroglu told Turkish television on June 7. In June, the cleric deemed as the Islamic guide of AKP criticized the Turkish-organized flotilla to the Gaza Strip. Fethullah Gulen, who heads the largest Muslim movement in Turkey and now lives in the United States , issued a statement that Ankara should have first received permission from Israel before sending the flotilla. Later, senior AKP officials agreed. "The government is purposely changing the agenda of the country," Kilicdaroglu said. "Some 114 Turkish soldiers have died since the AKP's move to end the terror problem in the country. Likewise, there have been recent developments in the CHP's agenda regarding unemployment and poverty. However, all discussion of these topics has ended. Nobody talks about them anymore."

Uniqueness – Erdogan Losing

Erdogan falling behind in polls

Benjamin Harvey, 7/22, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-22/erdogan-losing-support-as-turkish-opposition-pulls-ahead-in-opinion-poll.html// vkoneru

The main Turkish opposition party, led by Kemal Kilicdaroglu, has pulled ahead of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s party, a public opinion poll shows. In this month’s Sonar Arastirma poll, 33.5 percent of respondents said they would vote for Kilicdaroglu’s Republican People’s Party, as opposed to 31.1 percent for Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party. The prime minister’s party led in the Istanbul-based research group’s June poll, backed by 33.4 percent of respondents to 30.25 percent for the Republicans. The Nationalist Action Party would receive 13.8 percent of the vote, according to Sonar Arastirma’s July 3-10 poll, which was received by e-mail. The pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party would get 4.5 percent, below the 10 percent threshold needed for representation in parliament, the poll shows. Elections are planned by July of next year. In the last elections, in 2007, Erdogan’s Justice and Development won with 47 percent of the vote, to 21 percent for the Republicans. Erdogan received the lowest rating for trust of any Turkish leader or government branch listed in the poll, at 33 percent. The most trustworthy was the armed forces, with 78 percent. The poll also shows 46 percent of respondents had a negative outlook on the economy.

2NC Link Extension – Erdogan/Public Hates America

Removal of TNWs is the central issue to the Turkish public

Richard Weitz, PhD & Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute, 4-12-2010. (*The Turkey Analyst*, vol. 3, Number 7, page 5)

Today, Turkey remains one of five European members of NATO that hosts U.S. nuclear weapons within the framework of the alliance’s nuclear-sharing arrangement. The NATO nuclear arsenal in Turkey is unique in several respects. First, thanks to major reductions in other countries, Turkey has more U.S. nuclear weapons than any other alliance member outside the United States. Of the 200 or so B-61 nuclear bombs stationed in Europe, Turkey hosts approximately 90 at İncirlik Air Base. Second, according to public opinion polls, a majority of those surveyed in the five countries hosting U.S. TNWs would like to have the weapons removed, **but in Turkey, public opposition to the continued deployment of nuclear weapons is the highest of all** the host countries. In addition, Turkish legislators have complained that having U.S. TNWs on their soil weakens Turkish diplomatic efforts to oppose nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. At the same time, these high- level security decisions are often made by Turkish leaders even **in the face of substantial popular opposition**. The national security establishment of Turkey is traditionally granted considerable discretion in deciding such important policies.

The Turkish public has been Anti-American since troops were placed in Turkey

Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Assistant Prof. in Political Sci, 2010 [“Friends No More? The Rise of Anti-American Nationalism in Turkey,” The Middle East Journal, Volume 64, Number 1, 2010, pp. 51-66]

A distinct anti-American character is the main feature of the recent rise of nationalism in Turkey. It would be wrong to argue that anti-Americanism was previously unknown in Turkish society. It reached a peak in the 1970s, when the popularity of leftist opposition to US foreign policy in the Middle East and the developing world combined with the stationing of US troops on Turkish territory. Kemalist nationalism and its primary representative, the Republican People’s Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP) often employed — under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit — anti-Western and anti-American rhetoric in the 1960s and 1970s. Islamist anti-Americanism was also by no means unknown in Turkish politics. Parties such as the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP) adopted an anti-American political agenda, made common cause with the Palestinians, and objected to US intervention in Middle East politics. Israel was despised as the agent of US interests in the region and the oppressor of millions of Turkey’s Muslim brethren in the Middle East. However, the September 1980 coup removed all those political forces which could support the establishment of antiAmericanism in Turkish public discourse. Anti-Americanism in Turkey failed — until recently — to produce an enduring effect on Turkish politics.

Erdogan gets credit – he’s anti-american

Baltimore Jewish Times 7/1 [Robert O. Freedman, 7/1/10, " Turkey's Tarnish ", http://www.jewishtimes.com/index.php/jewishtimes/news/jt/cover\_story/turkeys\_tarnish/19498]

Soon after taking office, Erdogan was confronted by a major foreign policy problem — the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Its three major negative consequences for Turkey and for U.S.-Turkish relations were: • The U.S. invasion raised the possibility of an independent Kurdistan bordering southeast Turkey, which could have a major irredentist pull on the loyalty of the Turkish Kurds; • Perhaps seeing a new opportunity, the Turkish Kurds renewed their guerrilla war against Turkey’s government; • And the U.S. was angry that the Turkish Parliament did not approve the entry of U.S. forces into Iraq via Turkey. This all led to a deterioration of U.S.-Turkish relations and to a sharp rise in state-supported anti-American propaganda in the Turkish media. Meanwhile, the AKP government kept improving relations with its neighbors, Greece, Syria and Russia, which had been begun by its predecessors. One consequence was that Turkey appeared to have less need for a strong army, which remained highly suspicious of Erdogan and was the main bastion of Turkish secularism. Erdogan also added an Islamic dimension to this “Zero Problems” policy. He sought to improve relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran and embraced Hamas — despite both having openly called for Israel’s destruction.

Erdogan opposes US decisions, leadership, and presence

Michael Brenner**,** Senior Fellow, the Center for Transatlantic Relations, 7/19/2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-brenner/a-taste-of-turkish-deligh\_b\_651188.html, HD

The Turkish government, not just Erdogan, feels that it was misled and then offended by Washington in regard to the Turko-Brazilian initiative. That is an added factor in the considered Turkish conviction that it cannot trust American strategy, tactical decisions and leadership on all manner of issues in the Greater Middle East. Their cold-eyed appraisal of what we've done in Iran, Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan is that the Americans have poor judgment, are reckless and do not care what others in the region think or what their interests are.

2NC Link Extension – Erdogan/Public Hates America

Erdogan is extremely amti-american, and has stunted turkey’s ability to get into the EU

Semih Idiz, daily news, 6/14/2010, “Erdogan fans anti-Israeli, Anti-American sentiments for political gain,” http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=erdogan-fans-anti-israeli-anti-american-sentiments-for-political-gain-2010-06-14 // vkoneru

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan appears set to milk the popularity he gained in the streets of Turkey and the Middle East after the Marmara crisis in which nine Turks were killed by Israeli forces in a seriously botched up military operation. It is almost as if he was waiting for a new crisis with Israel to be able to work the streets in order to regain some of the political ground his ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, has been loosing over bread and butter issues at home. He and his party executives are clearly worried that the reinvigorated Republican Peoples Party, or CHP, may make headway given the successful manner in which its new leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, has been hitting at the government over topics that really matter for the average man on the street. He is also concerned that the Saadet (Felicity) Party, the other Islamist party, may steal votes from the AKP given the rising dissatisfaction among the public. Turks are fickle though, and easily swayed emotionally even if this means that the bread and butter issues of vital importance to them are pushed to the background. It is clear that there is great public animosity towards Israel today. As for the almost endemic anti-Americanism among Turks, this is also adding grist to Erdogan’s populist mill. So we see him increasingly turning up the volume of his demagoguery, and hitting at Israel and the United States at every opportunity that presents itself. No doubt he is keeping a close eye on the “political rating meter” as he sends his crowds to paroxysms of delirious applause with his remarks, some of which smack openly of anti-Semitism and reflect a growing anti-Western tendency. After the Marmara incident he was not only quick to use the harshest and most insulting adjectives when referring to Israel, but also had thinly veiled warnings to Washington, suggesting openly that those who stood behind Israel were also culpable in the crimes committed by that country. Over the weekend he went further and openly named the U.S. this time, thus revealing what lies in his heart-of-hearts. This is what he had to say while addressing an adoring crowd in Rize, on the Black Sea coast, where people are not only religious but also ultra-nationalist. “They are asking us what Turkey is doing in the Middle East, in Palestine. Why is Turkey bothered about Gaza? But could they not be asked in return what America is doing in Iraq? What is it doing in Palestine? Could it not be asked what is it doing in Afghanistan? What are France, Britain, and Holland, and so on, doing in these places?” Erdogan went on threateningly to say, “I am calling on the Israeli supported international media and their subcontractors at home: Turkey is not like other countries.” His only tribute to sophistication during this show of demagoguery was his reference to “the Israeli supported international media.” Previously he had made references to the “Jewish controlled international media” but must have been warned by his advisors that this was too overtly “anti-Semitic,” and thus politically incorrect. This no doubt forced him to make a slight modification in his nevertheless anti-Semitic reference to the international media. What is worse, however, is that Erdogan is set to raise the volume of his bellicosity in coming weeks and months, given that Turkey will, for all intents and purposes, be moving into “election mode.” We had an opportunity to talk to Hikmet Cetin, a highly respected veteran politician and former Foreign Minister, the other day. He too expressed serious concerns that Erdogan and the AKP would make anti-Israeli and anti-American rhetoric the centerpiece of his political campaign in the lead-up to the elections in 2011. Mr. Cetin is right to be concerned of course. Erdogan is, after all, utilizing the least sophisticated of political tools to increase support for the AKP at home, and totally disregarding what harm he may be doing to Turkey’s well established links with the West in general and the U.S. in particular – regardless of the periodic turbulence in these ties over specific issues. There are those who say that he is in fact doing all of this intentionally, because he is trying to turn Turkey’s direction from the West to the Islamic East. We personally believe that whatever his ultimate aim and intentions may be in this respect, Mr. Erdogan will find that it is much harder to turn Turkey’s direction than he thinks. But it can not be denied that he and his government are providing material for those in the West who feel Turkey is in fact “drifting away.” There is truth, of course, in the contention being also put forward by some in the West today that certain countries and leaders in Europe have made it easier for the AKP to hit at the West. This is highly apparent from Erdogan’s lambasting Europe while also pursuing his populist line of demagoguery. Some in Europe have been clinging to Mr. Erdogan and his party as the only viable reformist force in Turkey and providing him with a benefit of the doubt way beyond what is justified (even as he feeds the anti-western undercurrents in this country.) Less admiration and more attention on their part to what he is actually saying and doing at this stage should provide a wake-up call, as his latest actions and remarks appear to have done in Washington. The bottom line is that while some may be worrying that Mr. Erdogan and the AKP are changing Turkey’s course, the truth is that it is not clear what they are trying to do, or if they even have a viable master plan for a modern Westward looking Turkey at this stage. As matters stand it appears that Mr. Erdogan is simply riding the crest of a populist conservative and Islamist wave – with nationalist overtones - which enables him to fog some seminal questions about where he is taking the country. As for the great strides his party made over the past eight years, this may be true to an extent but it must not be forgotten that the road had already been laid for the AKP government to move on in terms of much of what they achieved over these years. For example Turkey’s EU orientation – which Mr. Erdogan never referred to in a positive light while in the opposition -is something that was well underway. He simply went along with it continuing a reform process that had been started under the previous Ecevit government. The much touted “zero problems with neighbors” policy, on the other hand, was always there but was called “a policy of good neighborliness.” As for

2NC Link Extension – Erdogan/Public Hates America

Idiz 2/2

the much lauded “opening up to the Middle East” this was the pet project of a host of former Turkish politicians ranging from Suleyman Demirel to Bulent Ecevit and Erdal Inonu, and not exclusive to the AKP. It may appear to some that nothing was achieved in this country prior to the AKP. Mr. Erdogan and his party executives are working overtime to spread that impression, of course. But it is wrong and misrepresents the facts. Mr. Erdogan’s vitriolic and bellicose attitude both in domestic and in foreign policy should help open many eyes on this score too in the coming period.

2NC Link Extension – Erdogan/Public hates America

Ethics Bob, 6/18/2010, “Is Turkey becoming anti-American, anti-Israeli, pro-Iran, and radical Islamist? What in the world is going on with Turkey?,” http://ethicsbob.com/2010/06/18/is-turkey-becoming-anti-american-anti-israeli-pro-iran-and-radical-islamist-what-in-the-world-is-going-on-with-turkey/ // vkoneru

Turkey, long America’s most reliable, and Israel’s only, ally in the Muslim world, is now being called anti-American, anti-Israel, and most alarming, Islamist, especially after the deadly May 31 incident when Turkish activists sailed into an Israeli blockade of Gaza and came off second best. Turkey’s Prime Minister, Recap Erdogan (pronounced Re-jep ERD-uh-WAN) is the favorite whipping boy of just about anybody who is for Israel or against Iran, radical Islamists, or Muslims in general. It’s ironic that Erdogan, who has led Turkey toward most of the western democratic-style reforms demanded by the European Union as a condition for Turkey’s acceptance, is at now being accused by many, including many Turks, of wanting to return Turkey to the Muslim caliphate of pre-Ataturk days.

Turkey moving away from the west

Desmond Butler (AP), 6/26, 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5infX83Qg20idVFtW3FcluMFJNncgD9GIR8780

The United States is warning Turkey that it is alienating U.S. supporters and needs to demonstrate its commitment to partnership with the West. The remarks by Philip Gordon, the Obama administration's top diplomat on European affairs, were a rare admonishment of a crucial NATO ally. "We think Turkey remains committed to NATO, Europe and the United States, but that needs to be demonstrated," Gordon told The Associated Press in an interview this week. "There are people asking questions about it in a way that is new, and that in itself is a bad thing that makes it harder for the United States to support some of the things that Turkey would like to see us support." Gordon cited Turkey's vote against a U.S.-backed United Nations Security Council resolution on new sanctions against Iran and noted Turkish rhetoric after Israel's deadly assault on a Gaza-bound flotilla last month. The Security Council vote came shortly after Turkey and Brazil, to Washington's annoyance, had brokered a nuclear fuel-swap deal with Iran as an effort to delay or avoid new sanctions. Some U.S. lawmakers who have supported Turkey warned of consequences for Ankara since the Security Council vote and the flotilla raid that left eight Turks and one Turkish-American dead. The lawmakers accused Turkey of supporting a flotilla that aimed to undermine Israel's blockade of Gaza and of cozying up to Iran. The raid has led to chilling of ties between Turkey and Israel, countries that have long maintained a strategic alliance in the Middle East. Turkey's ambassador to the United States, Namik Tan, expressed surprise at Gordon's comments. He said Turkey's commitment to NATO remains strong and should not be questioned. "I think this is unfair," he said. Tan said Turkish officials have explained repeatedly to U.S. counterparts that voting against the proposed sanctions was the only credible decision after the Turkish-brokered deal with Iran. Turkey has opposed sanctions as ineffective and damaging to its interests with an important neighbor. It has said that it hopes to maintain channels with Tehran to continue looking for a solution to the standoff over Iran's alleged nuclear arms ambitions. "We couldn't have voted otherwise," Tan said. "We put our own credibility behind this thing." Tan said that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was expected to discuss these issues with President Barack Obama on the margins of a summit of world economic powers in Toronto on Saturday. Gordon said Turkey's explanations of the U.N. episode have not been widely understood in Washington. "There is a lot of questioning going on about Turkey's orientation and its ongoing commitment to strategic partnership with the United States," he said. "Turkey, as a NATO ally and a strong partner of the United States not only didn't abstain but voted no, and I think that Americans haven't understood why."

Impact – EU

CHP win key to EU admittance

Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, 11/23/2002 “CHP Istanbul District Chairman Rinasi Oktem: "Unemployment and hunger must end in Turkey".,” http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary\_0286-26835327\_ITM// vkoneru

One more election has swept through Turkey and 45 percent of the voters are not represented in Parliament. It is a new picture and a new experience for Turkey. Are the government, the opposition and the public ready for this? It's not clear When we look at the deputies who entered parliament after the election, we see that those who will be able to work for the European Union (EU) most effectively are in the CHP. They, and the bureaucrats, are the best informed about the foreign policy to be followed vis-a-vis America and Europe and over Cyprus "Our approach towards Turkey's main problems is to be a constructive opposition. So we're not very interested in numbers anymore. The CHP will assist the party in power whenever it sees that it benefits the nation and the people"

CHP key to Turkish admittance into the EU

Marc Champion, wall street journal, 5/24/2010, “Turkey's Main Opposition Party Elects Its New Leader,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704904604575262051344507166.html // vkoneru

In another significant change, Mr. Kilicdaroglu focused on social democrat messages of support for the poor and pensioners. He also avoided talk of Turkey's secularist-Islamic divide. Many secular Turkish liberals support the AKP, because it embraced changes to some of Turkey's more draconian laws restricting freedoms of speech and religion that long prevented the country from starting talks to join the European Union. The CHP, self-described defenders of Turkey's secularist and pro-Western traditions, opposed many of these changes.

Impact – Turkey Relations

Erdogan has aligned himself with hamas and iran which kill US relations

Hilary Leila Krieger, jpost writer, 6/6/2010, “Oren: Turkey has embraced the leaders of Iran and Hamas,” http://www.jpost.com/International/Article.aspx?id=177577 // vkoneru

WASHINGTON – Israel envoy criticized Ankara’s outreach to terrorist groups Friday, the same day that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was quoted as saying Hamas is not a terrorist organization. “Turkey has embraced the leaders of Iran and Hamas, all of whom called for Israel’s destruction,” Ambassador Michael Oren declared. “Our policy has not changed but Turkey’s policy has changed, very much, over the last few years,” he said. “Under a different government with an Islamic orientation, Turkey has turned away from the West.” But Oren, speaking on a conference call organized by The Israel Project, held out hope for reconciliation. “We certainly do not have any desire in any further deterioration in our relations with the Turks,” he said. “It’s an important Middle Eastern power. It has been a friend in the past.” Erdogan on Friday declared at a rally that Hamas is not a terrorist organization, but a resistance movement, according to the Istanbul-based daily Hürriyet. Erdogan said that Hamas, the legitimate winner of the Palestinian elections, was fighting for its land. “You are always talking about democracy. You’ll never let Hamas rule. What kind of democracy is this?” he said, apparently addressing the Israeli leadership. “I do not think that Hamas is a terrorist organization,” Erdogan was quoted as saying. “They are Palestinians in resistance, fighting for their own land.” The Turkish leader went on to echo Tuesday’s speech, in which he called Israel’s boarding of the Gaza flotilla “a massacre.” In his address Friday, he said the Ten Commandments should have deterred the soldiers from killing the nine men who died onboard the Mavi Marmara. “If you do not understand it in Turkish, I will say it in English: You shall not kill,” he reportedly said – repeating the phrase in Hebrew. “They even slaughtered 19-year-old Furkan. They did not even care for the babies in the cradle,” Erdogan said. Nineteen-year-old Furkan Dogan, a Turkish-American was the youngest of the nine activists killed in the raid. His funeral Friday in his family’s hometown in Kayseri in central Turkey drew 10,000 people, some chanting, “Down with Israel.” “Neither I nor his mother or brother have any grief,” his father, Ahmet Dogan, told The Associated Press as he arranged flowers on his son’s coffin before prayers started. “We believe he became a martyr and God accepts martyrs to paradise.” In his speech, Erdogan also slammed Turkish media reports that were critical of his Justice and Development Party’s support of Hamas, saying the “columnists” had a slanted view of the events. Earlier on Friday, Turkey’s deputy prime minister said his country would work to reduce its military and economic cooperation with Israel. Existing contracts would be reviewed and reworked or canceled, he said.

Turkey Relations Impact – Heg

US-Turkish relations key to leadership—necessary to prevent Russia/China counterbalancing.

Mustafa Malik, 5/15/1997, Senior associate at The Strategy Group, an international foreign policy research entity in Washington. “TURKEY REMAINS STRONG U.S. ALLY, WHY NOT FOR EU?” Chicago Tribune, NewsBank, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1997-05-15/news/9705150295\_1\_muslim-turkey-us-turkish-relations-islamist-refah // vkoneru

That trepidation has eased now. Erbakan has agreed, though grudgingly, to retain Turkey's ties to Europe, the United States and Israel, and committed himself to working within the secular Turkish constitution. But American interest in Turkey has actually been heightened by a string of other events affecting U.S. strategic interests. China's economic and military resurgence is causing unease in Washington. Beijing appears to aspire for the status of a second superpower. And the Russian announcement of a new military doctrine stipulating the first use of nuclear weapons in a desperate conflict was a reminder that the honeymoon with the Russians is over. Even though President Boris Yelstin has swallowed the NATO expansion plans, the Russian parliament could hold off on ratifying the second strategic arms reduction treaty requiring Moscow to dismantle thousands of nuclear warheads. And Yeltsin recently joined Chinese President Jiang Zemin in a statement criticizing the U.S. domination of world affairs and calling for a "multipolar world." A multipolar, bi-polar world may not be around the corner, but the United States needs allies in the periphery of the world's second- and third-largest military powers that are resentful of its superpower status. Turkey is its only ally in the periphery of both. Turkish politics, however, remain extremely fluid and Islamic revivalism is far from over. The best way to promote stability and secularism in Turkey, its secular politicians and diplomats have been telling the West, is to integrate it with Western Europe politically and economically. Talbott's impassioned plea to the EU indicates that Washington is listening. Recently, a Turkish diplomat in Washington acknowledged that "the United States, happily, is showing a greater appreciation" of his country "during the last two, three months." He was quick to point out, though, that "the helicopters and frigates issue" remained unresolved. U.S.-Turkish relations have never been smooth. Under pressures from the Greek lobby, Congress has held up the delivery of 10 Super Cobra helicopters and three guided-missile frigates to Turkey. Besides, Yet (Turkish government., ) influential groups are sounding the alarm bell about the Islamists in the Turkey is likely to remain strategically important to Americans as long as they have stakes in its neighborhood.

Nuclear war

Zalmay Khalizhad, RAND Analyst, 1995, "Losing the Moment?”, Washington Quarterly, spring, ln.

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

Turkey Relations Impact – Long Prolif (1/2)

Relations key to prevent Turkish prolif

Bradley Bowman, Major and strategic plans and policy officer in the U.S. Army and International Affairs Fellow at CFR, 2008 “Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report,” http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/fact-book/documents/2008/080315-arms-race.pdf // vkoneru

If Iran acquires nuclear weapons in the next decade, this would also place significant pressure on Turkey to follow suit. Turkey and Iran do not see themselves as adversaries, but Turkey believes the centuries of peace and relative stability between the two states and their predecessor empires derive primarily from the rough balance of power between them. A nuclear-armed Iran would dramatically tip the balance in Iran’s direction. Turkey believes this increased Iranian power would lead to a more aggressive Iranian foreign policy and a marginalization of Turkey. Such a development would significantly undercut Turkey’s desired role as a respected and powerful mediator between east and west. In such a scenario, there would be strong voices in the Turkish General Staff, as well as among ultra-nationalist politicians, arguing for Turkey to respond by pursuing nuclear weapons. Thus, the possibility still exists that Turkey would respond to Iranian nuclear weapons by developing nuclear weapons as well. At the same time, there are significant disincentives to a Turkish pursuit of nuclear weapons. First, doing so would severely damage United States-Turkish relations, which represent an essential component of Turkish national security. Second, such a development would endanger Turkey’s good standing in NATO, another key component of Turkey’s national security. Third, a Turkish pursuit or acquisition of nuclear weapons would seriously undercut any remaining chance of Turkish accession into the European Union. Fourth, powerful popular voices within Turkey would likely oppose a Turkish attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. Unlike Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, the democratic system in Turkey would enable these popular forces to influence Turkey’s decisions on these issues. Staff believes U.S.-Turkey relations and Turkish perceptions regarding the reliability of NATO will serve as the decisive factors in Turkey’s decision regarding nuclear weapons. If the bilateral relationship with the United States is poor and Turkey’s trust in NATO low, Turkey would be more likely to respond to Iranian nuclear weapons by pursuing nuclear weapons as well. However, a fully restored bilateral relationship with the United States and a renewed Turkish trust in NATO provide the best means to discourage a Turkish pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Turkish proliferation permanently alienates turkey from the US and Europe undermines its mediating role between east and west

Sebnem Udum, Department of International Relations at Bilkent University, ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2007 pp.57-65 // vkoneru

On the other hand, a decision for Turkey’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would not be a rational choice: if Turkey would decide to go nuclear, international pressure would be intense. Turkey is already a candidate to the EU, and has a membership perspective, which ties Turkey firmly to the West and the Western liberal zone. Becoming an EU/EC member has been a state policy, based on the modernisation process dating back to the Ottoman times. Turkey’s nuclear aspirations would jeopardise this process and would have high political costs. Likewise, it would have adverse effects on relations with the United States, which is an indispensable ally despite all the tensions. Economic sanctions would be applied to the already sensitive Turkish economy, which would impair micro and macro balances. Condemnation and isolation from the international community would be unbearable militarily, politically and economically. What is more, the place of nuclear weapons in the military strategy is doubtful, that is, against which country would Turkey use it or threaten to use it? If it were Iran, there are other more powerful international and regional actors. Turkey has other leverages that it could use against Iran in diplomatic relations. Last but not least, it would make Turkey a target [20]. What would draw Turkey into making a choice would not only be questions on its alliances and threat perceptions. Turkey’s difference from the other states in the Middle East, which are concerned about Iran’s nuclear program, is its EU perspective. Turkey is materially and ideationally between the East and the West. Its EU prospects keep the country in cooperative mechanisms to address security issues. If this perspective is lost, it is highly likely that it will be drawn into the Realist zone of international security in the East, and could base its security policy on material capabilities. Considering the status of relations with the United States and the instability in the region, the country could be motivated to seek self-sufficiency, and perhaps to seek a nuclear weapons capability. Most of the issues that are brought forward in the United States and the EU accession negotiations touch upon Turkey’s national security referents, basically social and territorial integrity, which lead the country to take a defensive position and to prioritise its security interests over political goals. Thus, it is integral to understand Turkey’s security concerns, and to keep it in the Western liberal zone of security.

Turkey Relations Impact – Long Prolif (2/2)

This undermines middle east stability

Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, politico, 10/29/2009, “Serious Turkish diplomacy,” http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=9C706EC5-18FE-70B2-A85D74765AA0FF1E // vkoneru

We spent several days in Turkey last week, where we heard Erdogan describe his country’s “zero problems” policy vis-à-vis its neighbors. Regarding the Middle East more specifically, Erdogan’s chief foreign policy adviser explained to us that Turkey’s approach to the region is based on four principles: Engage all actors; respect the results of all democratic elections (including those in the Palestinian territories in 2006 and Iran in 2009); increase cultural and economic relations among countries in the region; and work with regional and international organizations to maximize possibilities for engagement. Turkey is, of course, a member of NATO and has long had a positive economic and strategic relationship with Israel. But, working from these four principles, the Erdogan government has in recent years effected major improvements in Turkey’s relations with a much wider range of Middle Eastern states, including Iran, Iraq and Syria. This opening to the broader Middle East has been very strongly in Turkey’s interest. Expanding trade and investment links to Iran, Iraq, Syria and other regional states has boosted the growth of Turkey’s economy and reinforced its status as an “emerging market” of international significance. Moreover, closer ties to Middle Eastern countries, along with links to Hamas and Hezbollah, have made Ankara an increasingly important player across a wide spectrum of regional issues. Erdogan wants to position Turkey to act as a mediator between its Muslim neighbors and the West — including the United States, which needs to move beyond nice speeches by Obama and undertake concrete diplomatic initiatives to repair its standing in the Middle East. But if Washington is too shortsighted to see the necessity of realigning its relations with key Middle Eastern actors such as Iran, the Erdogan government’s opening to the broader Middle East gives Ankara a wider array of strategic options for pursuing Turkish interests — the essence of successful diplomacy.

Global nuclear war

JohnSteinbach, March 3, 2002, Center for research on Globalization, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2002/03/00\_steinbach\_israeli-wmd.htm

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, &quot Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever reason - the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration.

Turkey Relations Impact – Short Prolif

Relations key to prevent Turkish prolif

Bradley Bowman, Major and strategic plans and policy officer in the U.S. Army and International Affairs Fellow at CFR, 2008 “Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report,” http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/fact-book/documents/2008/080315-arms-race.pdf // vkoneru

If Iran acquires nuclear weapons in the next decade, this would also place significant pressure on Turkey to follow suit. Turkey and Iran do not see themselves as adversaries, but Turkey believes the centuries of peace and relative stability between the two states and their predecessor empires derive primarily from the rough balance of power between them. A nuclear-armed Iran would dramatically tip the balance in Iran’s direction. Turkey believes this increased Iranian power would lead to a more aggressive Iranian foreign policy and a marginalization of Turkey. Such a development would significantly undercut Turkey’s desired role as a respected and powerful mediator between east and west. In such a scenario, there would be strong voices in the Turkish General Staff, as well as among ultra-nationalist politicians, arguing for Turkey to respond by pursuing nuclear weapons. Thus, the possibility still exists that Turkey would respond to Iranian nuclear weapons by developing nuclear weapons as well. At the same time, there are significant disincentives to a Turkish pursuit of nuclear weapons. First, doing so would severely damage United States-Turkish relations, which represent an essential component of Turkish national security. Second, such a development would endanger Turkey’s good standing in NATO, another key component of Turkey’s national security. Third, a Turkish pursuit or acquisition of nuclear weapons would seriously undercut any remaining chance of Turkish accession into the European Union. Fourth, powerful popular voices within Turkey would likely oppose a Turkish attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. Unlike Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, the democratic system in Turkey would enable these popular forces to influence Turkey’s decisions on these issues. Staff believes U.S.-Turkey relations and Turkish perceptions regarding the reliability of NATO will serve as the decisive factors in Turkey’s decision regarding nuclear weapons. If the bilateral relationship with the United States is poor and Turkey’s trust in NATO low, Turkey would be more likely to respond to Iranian nuclear weapons by pursuing nuclear weapons as well. However, a fully restored bilateral relationship with the United States and a renewed Turkish trust in NATO provide the best means to discourage a Turkish pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Turkish prolif causes a regional war.

Kibaroglu, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Feb 15 2005, http://www.iranwatch.org/privateviews/WINEP/perspex-winep-beyondiran-rapporteur-021505.htm // vkoneru

Turkey should not develop a nuclear weapons capability. Turkey does not need to possess nuclear weapons to protect itself from its rivals. A Turkish nuclear weapons capability would lead to the closure of NATO's nuclear umbrella, which is still a credible deterrent. Also, such an eventuality could, in the future, bring **more trouble to Turkey in the form of war by proxy by the country's neighbors.**

Global nuclear war

JohnSteinbach, March 3, 2002, Center for research on Globalization, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2002/03/00\_steinbach\_israeli-wmd.htm

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, &quot Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever reason - the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration.

Turkey Relations Impact – Terrorism/Central Asia (1/2)

Turkish relations key to checking terror and Central Asian war.

Huseyin Bagci and Saban Kardas, Middle East Technical University, 2003, “Post-September 11 Impact: The Strategic Importance of Turkey Revisited”, Prepared for the CEPS/IISS European Security Forum, Brussels, May 12, http://www.eusec.org/bagci.htm#ftnref112 // vkoneru

In developing this relationship, Turkey's special ties with the region again appeared to be an important asset for U.S. policy. Turkey had a lot to offer: Not only did Turkey have strong political, cultural and economic connections to the region, but it had also accumulated a significant intelligence capability in the region. Moreover, the large experience Turkey accumulated in fighting terrorism would be made available in expanding the global war on terrorism to this region.[43] As a result, after the locus of interest shifted to a possible operation against Afghanistan, and then to assuring the collaboration of the countries in Central Asia, Turkish analysts soon discovered that Turkey's geo-strategic importance was once again on the rise. It was thought that, thanks to its geography's allowing easy access to the region, and its strong ties with the countries there, Turkey could play a pivotal role in the conduct of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, and reshaping the politics in Central Asia: "Turkey is situated in a critical geographic position on and around which continuous and multidimensional power struggles with a potential to affect balance of power at world scale take place. The arcs that could be used by world powers in all sort of conflicts pass through Turkey. Turkish territory, airspace and seas are not only a necessary element to any force projection in the regions stretching from Europe and Asia to the Middle East, Persian Gulf, and Africa, but also **make it possible to control its neighborhood...** All these features made Turkey a center that must be controlled and acquired by those aspiring to be world powers... In the new process, Turkey's importance has increased in American calculations. With a consistent policy, Turkey could capitalize on this to derive some practical benefits... Turkey has acquired a new opportunity to enhance its role in Central Asia."

Central Asia is the most probable scenario for nuclear war.

Ahari M. Ehsan, Professor of National Security and Strategy of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School at the Armed Forces Staff College, August,2001,Jihadi Groups, Nuclear Pakistan and the New Great Game, Questia)

South and Central Asia constitute a part of the world where a well-designed American strategy might help avoid crises or catastrophe. The U.S. military would provide only one component of such a strategy, and a secondary one at that, but has an important role to play through engagement activities and regional confidence-building. Insecurity has led the states of the region to seek weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and conventional arms. It has also led them toward policies which undercut the security of their neighbors. If such activities continue, the result could be increased terrorism, humanitarian disasters, continued low-level conflict and potentially even major regional war or a thermonuclear exchange. A shift away from this pattern could allow the states of the region to become solid economic and political partners for the United States, thus representing a gain for all concerned.

Turkey Relations Impact – Terrorism/Central Asia (2/2)

Terrorists can easily acquire and build a nuclear weapon—causes U.S. retaliation and nuclear war

Patrick Speice, J.D. Candidate 2006, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, 47 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1427

Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that terrorists could acquire a nuclear device or fissile material from Russia as a result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and the end of stringent Soviet-era nuclear security measures. 39 Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods, including "steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given one by [\*1438] such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways." 40 Equally threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device on their own. Very little material is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon. 41 Although nuclear devices are extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon are not significant. 42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a nuclear device into the United States makes it incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon once it was built. 43 Accordingly, supply-side controls that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material in the first place are the most effective means of countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. 44 Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. 45 This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. 46 Although the economy has stabilized somewhat, there [\*1439] are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and who are too young to retire, 47 raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. 48 The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. 49 Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. 50 In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. 51 This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States [\*1440] or its allies by hostile states, 52 as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. 53

Turkey Relations Impact – Iran Prolif (1/2)

Relations key to Turkish diplomacy

Sebnem Udum, Department of International Relations at Bilkent University, ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2007 pp.57-65 // vkoneru

On the other hand, a decision for Turkey’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would not be a rational choice: if Turkey would decide to go nuclear, international pressure would be intense. Turkey is already a candidate to the EU, and has a membership perspective, which ties Turkey firmly to the West and the Western liberal zone. Becoming an EU/EC member has been a state policy, based on the modernisation process dating back to the Ottoman times. Turkey’s nuclear aspirations would jeopardise this process and would have high political costs. Likewise, it would have adverse effects on relations with the United States, which is an indispensable ally despite all the tensions. Economic sanctions would be applied to the already sensitive Turkish economy, which would impair micro and macro balances. Condemnation and isolation from the international community would be unbearable militarily, politically and economically. What is more, the place of nuclear weapons in the military strategy is doubtful, that is, against which country would Turkey use it or threaten to use it? If it were Iran, there are other more powerful international and regional actors. Turkey has other leverages that it could use against Iran in diplomatic relations. Last but not least, it would make Turkey a target [20]. What would draw Turkey into making a choice would not only be questions on its alliances and threat perceptions. Turkey’s difference from the other states in the Middle East, which are concerned about Iran’s nuclear program, is its EU perspective. Turkey is materially and ideationally between the East and the West. Its EU prospects keep the country in cooperative mechanisms to address security issues. If this perspective is lost, it is highly likely that it will be drawn into the Realist zone of international security in the East, and could base its security policy on material capabilities. Considering the status of relations with the United States and the instability in the region, the country could be motivated to seek self-sufficiency, and perhaps to seek a nuclear weapons capability. Most of the issues that are brought forward in the United States and the EU accession negotiations touch upon Turkey’s national security referents, basically social and territorial integrity, which lead the country to take a defensive position and to prioritise its security interests over political goals. Thus, it is integral to understand Turkey’s security concerns, and to keep it in the Western liberal zone of security.

Turkish diplomacy solves iran prolif

Mustafa Kibaroglu, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2007, “A Turkish Nuclear Turnaround,” Turn back the Clock: Proposals for a Safer World, Vol. 63, No. 6, pp. 64 // vkoneru

However, the tide has turned since the early 1990s, and Turkey has become more entrenched in Mideast politics. Dramatic events such as the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union shifted Turkey’s attention from its northeastern border to its southern border. Turkey started to play a more active role in the Palestinian question, thanks to its Muslim identity and its strategic relations with Israel. And since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the situation in Iraq has become the number one issue on Turkey’s foreign policy agenda—primarily due to the uncertainty surrounding the future of northern Iraq, where the local Kurdish administration aspires to an independent state. Indeed, many analysts now see Turkey as a full-fledged regional player. Some Iranian security elite even go so far as to characterize Turkey as a “nuclear weapon state” due to the presence of U.S. weapons on its soil. This serves as yet another justification of their ambitions to develop nuclear weapons. Sending back U.S. nuclear weapons will strengthen Turkey’s position visàvis the aspiring nuclear states in the region and will also improve the prospects of a NWZ in the Middle East. This decision would be perfectly compatible with Turkey’s long-standing efforts to stem proliferation. As a significant regional military power and a NATO member, Turkey will also send a message to Israel, Iran, and the Arab states that nuclear weapons are no longer vital for security considerations. Indeed, U.S. nuclear weapons have not been useful or instrumental in Turkey’s fight against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorism over the last quartercentury. On the contrary, these weapons have aggravated the animosity of Turkey’s neighbors, such as Syria, Iraq, and Iran, prompting them to increase their support for the PKK. If the family of sovereign nations is lucky enough, it may not be too late to implement a number of sober- minded steps to get rid of existing nuclear weapons, wherever they may be stockpiled or deployed. A Turkish initiative could help lead the way.

Turkey Relations Impact – Iran Prolif (2/2)

Nuclear Iran causes nuclear terrorism, instable Middle East, and Israel- Iran war that would draw in the U.S.

Charles S. Robb- former U.S. Senator and 2004 chair of the Iraq intelligence commission andGeneral Charles F.Wald, former deputy commander of U.S. European Command, director and senior advisor to the Aerospace & Defense Industry for Deloitte LLP- specializing in weapons procurement and deployment & counter terrorism, 7/9/20**10**, Washington Post, “Sanctions alone won’t work against Iran,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/08/AR2010070805070.html

Contrary to a growing number of voices in Washington, we do not believe a nuclear weapons-capable Iran could be contained. Instead, it would set off a proliferation cascade across the Middle East, and Iran would gain the ability to transfer nuclear materials to its terrorist allies. Meanwhile, even as it continued to threaten Israel's existence, Tehran would be able to dominate the energy-rich Persian Gulf, intensify its attempts to destabilize moderate Arab regimes, subvert U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, violently oppose the Middle East peace process, and increase support for terrorism across the region. An Iran emboldened by nuclear weapons clearly might overstep its boundaries, pulling the Middle East and the United States into a treacherous conflict.

An even more likely scenario, however, is that Israel would first attack Iranian nuclear facilities, triggering retaliatory strikes by Iran and its terrorist proxies. This would put the United States in an extremely difficult position. If we remained neutral in such a conflict, it would only invigorate Tehran, antagonize our regional allies and lead to greater conflict. On the other extreme, the United States could be dragged into a major confrontation at a time not of its choosing.

Impact – Democracy

CHP win key to democracy

Zekai Özçinar and Habib Güler, Ankara, Today’s Zaman, 7/23/2010 “Turkey has to end era of military intervention, says new CHP leader,” http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-212946-turkey-has-to-end-era-of-military-intervention-says-new-chp-leader.html // vkoneru

The newly elected leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Kemal Kılçdaroğlu, has said that everyone in Turkey should oppose any attempt at intervention in politics from the military. “**If we want there to be democracy in this country, if we say the will of the people is the highest power in the country, we should close all doors against interventions in democracy from outside**,” in an interview with Today’s Zaman. He said the nation was not interested in politics of conflict or tension, noting that he will employ a calm discourse as the CHP’s new leader. Kılıçdaroğlu stated his opinion that tense debates between politicians reflected negatively on citizens. “We can get results by using calm language and avoiding a tense style. If we can achieve this, then citizens would be interested in what we are saying. I prefer to use a calmer style. This does not mean that we will not criticize the government. We will, but we will also praise the things they do right. If they are making mistakes, it is the job of the opposition party to voice that. The more the government heeds criticism from the opposition, the narrower the opposition’s sphere. The government heeding the opposition’s criticism would be more beneficial for the government itself than it would be for the opposition.”

Extinction

Larry Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, 1996 http://wwwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.html // vkoneru

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another.  They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

Impact – Peaceful Israel Engagement

Only CHP will engage in peaceful confrontations with Israel

World Bulletin, 6/1/2010, “CHP leader: Israel has to be punished for crime against Turkish citizens,” http://www.worldbulletin.net/news\_detail.php?id=59343 // vkoneru

Turkey's main opposition party criticized on Tuesday the Israeli government and its policies in the aftermath of the Israeli attack on a Gaza-bound aid flotilla. Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the chairman of the Republican People's Party (CHP), said his party was not taking Israeli state and people as a target. "We are just criticizing the Israeli government and its policies," Kilicdaroglu said in the first parliament gathering of his party. Kilicdaroglu was elected the CHP chairman on May 22, and this was the first parliament gathering he participated as the leader of the main opposition party. "This is a crime irrespective of the reason or pretext Israel shows," Kilicdaroglu said. The main opposition leader said this crime against Turkish citizens had to be punished. Kilicdaroglu accused the Israeli government of using disproportionate force, and attacking on aid ships in international waters. The CHP chairman also said an inquiry should be opened regarding the attack. Israeli navy forces raided a convoy of aid ships of Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) carrying humanitarian aid for Gaza, killing nine people and injuring 30 others.

Impact – Terrorism/Demo Promo

CHP takes lead on ending terrorism and promoting democracy

GÖKSEL BOZKURT, July 15, 2010, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=kilicdaroglu-urges-turkish-pm-to-improve-quality-of-life-for-people-in-southeast-2010-07-15 // vkoneru

Important suggestions emerged from the "fight against terrorism" summit between Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the leader of the Republican People’s Party, or CHP, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, both leaders said Thursday. The meeting provided ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, the ground to share "special information" with the CHP under conditions of "confidentiality." At the meeting, Kılıçdaoğlu proposed five suggestions for a solution to the terror problem while Erdoğan stated that a decision was yet to be made regarding whether or not a specially trained professional army would form part of the military. Kılıçdaroğlu, at a press conference following the meeting, said he gave certain information to Erdoğan and his party’s suggestions on how to combat terror. His first suggestion, he said, was that the election threshold needed to be decreased to seven percent to strengthen democracy and ensure that the will of the people was reflected in Parliament. Furthermore, special courts that operated in contradiction to judicial principles should be removed, the CHP leaders said, adding that the government needed to set up factories and create jobs in the region lacking private sector investments and job opportunities. The next suggestion, he said, was to benefit more from the farming and livestock availabilities in Turkey’s eastern and southeastern region. Finally, cleared minefields in the east should be given to landless villagers, he said. At the press conference following the meeting, Kılıçdaroğlu said the CHP had no intelligence facilities so the party was unable to make suggestions regarding security in the fight against terror. Erdoğan briefed Kılıçdaroğlu about the formation of the specially trained military. It remains uncertain, however, whether the forces would augment military or police forces. Kılıçdaroğlu said they received "special" information from the prime minister, who had, however, requested that he not make it public. The special information was based on technical details, the Hürriyet Daily News & Economic Review learned. The information does not relate to cross-border operations but the problem of the lack of intelligence in the fight against terror, sources said. Erdoğan illustrated the problems of terrorism rather than his party’s solutions to the problem.

Impact – Stable Regional Relations

Turkey maintains stable relations with its neighbors to ensure stability and security

Michael Brenner**,** Senior Fellow, the Center for Transatlantic Relations, 7/19/2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-brenner/a-taste-of-turkish-deligh\_b\_651188.html, HD

The Turkish entente with Iran has been developing for seven years. It is part of a comprehensive strategic assessment that stresses: the value to Turkey as a status quo power of maintaining good relations with all its neighbors; the current opportunity for doing so in an historic first; Iran is an important neighbor with whom cordial relations are a reasonable expectation. Turkey's principal national interest is viewed as sustaining the rapid pace of economic development in which secure energy supplies play a major role. Indeed, the extensive accords signed with Iran in the past few years are seen as the essential element in a plan to diversify sources of oil and natural gas. In addition, the Iran connection is central to Ankara's vision of itself as an energy hub linking Central Asia, the Middle East and Europe. The depth of the government's feelings about a right to make its own strategic choices came across in the blunt remarks of President Gul last year in response to American criticism of its dealings with Iran: "Expansion of relations on a regional level seems quite natural for Turkey, and it is not important what other states think of it. Turkey cares for its own interests. Turkey will establish good ties with its neighbors with the aim of stability and security in the region...We are an independent country. We look out for our national interests. We have to make investment for the [energy] supply security of Turkey."

Impact – Turkey-Israel Conflict

Erdogan win means he will continue to confront Israel

Hilary Leila Krieger, jpost writer, 6/6/2010, “Oren: Turkey has embraced the leaders of Iran and Hamas,” http://www.jpost.com/International/Article.aspx?id=177577 // vkoneru

WASHINGTON – Israel envoy criticized Ankara’s outreach to terrorist groups Friday, the same day that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was quoted as saying Hamas is not a terrorist organization. “Turkey has embraced the leaders of Iran and Hamas, all of whom **called for Israel’s destruction,”** Ambassador Michael Oren declared. “Our policy has not changed but Turkey’s policy has changed, very much, over the last few years,” he said. “Under a different government with an Islamic orientation, Turkey has turned away from the West.” But Oren, speaking on a conference call organized by The Israel Project, held out hope for reconciliation. “We certainly do not have any desire in any further deterioration in our relations with the Turks,” he said. “It’s an important Middle Eastern power. It has been a friend in the past.” Erdogan on Friday declared at a rally that Hamas is not a terrorist organization, but a resistance movement, according to the Istanbul-based daily Hürriyet. Erdogan said that Hamas, the legitimate winner of the Palestinian elections, was fighting for its land. “You are always talking about democracy. You’ll never let Hamas rule. What kind of democracy is this?” he said, apparently addressing the Israeli leadership. “I do not think that Hamas is a terrorist organization,” Erdogan was quoted as saying. “They are Palestinians in resistance, fighting for their own land.” The Turkish leader went on to echo Tuesday’s speech, in which he called Israel’s boarding of the Gaza flotilla “a massacre.” In his address Friday, he said the Ten Commandments should have deterred the soldiers from killing the nine men who died onboard the Mavi Marmara. “If you do not understand it in Turkish, I will say it in English: You shall not kill,” he reportedly said – repeating the phrase in Hebrew. “They even slaughtered 19-year-old Furkan. They did not even care for the babies in the cradle,” Erdogan said. Nineteen-year-old Furkan Dogan, a Turkish-American was the youngest of the nine activists killed in the raid. His funeral Friday in his family’s hometown in Kayseri in central Turkey drew 10,000 people, some chanting, “Down with Israel.” “Neither I nor his mother or brother have any grief,” his father, Ahmet Dogan, told The Associated Press as he arranged flowers on his son’s coffin before prayers started. “We believe he became a martyr and God accepts martyrs to paradise.” In his speech, Erdogan also slammed Turkish media reports that were critical of his Justice and Development Party’s support of Hamas, saying the “columnists” had a slanted view of the events. Earlier on Friday, Turkey’s deputy prime minister said **his country would work to reduce its military and economic cooperation with Israel.** Existing contracts would be reviewed and reworked or canceled, he said.

Impact – Turkey-Israel Conflict

Turkey-israel war is on the brink now – once it breaks out, global escalation becomes inevitable

J. D. Longstreet, member of the American Legion and the Sons of Confederate Veterans, veteran of the US Army and US Army Reserve Right Side News, 6/4/2010, “Turkey-vs-Israel. ANOTHER War in the Middle East?,” http://www.rightsidenews.com/2010060410440/editorial/turkey-vs-israel-another-war-in-the-middle-east.html // vkoneru

There is the likelihood that war will breakout between Turkey and Israel at any hour. If Turkey sends Turkish military vessels and fighter aircraft to escort those so-called "peace activists" in another attempt to run the Gaza blockade, I have no doubt the IDF will sink Turkey's ships and shoot down most, if not all, of the Turkish fighter aircraft. Of course there will be Israeli causalities, but Turkey needs to recognize they will going up against one of the premier militaries on the planet. Remember, too, If Israel goes to war today, they will be going to war under Netanyahu, a former IDF Special Forces officer. Netanyahu can be as bellicose as the situation requires. Certain parts of the US President's nether region have been caught in a crack -- largely by his own ineptitude. Those who sniff out weakness in an American leader are applying pressure. North Korea, Iran, Turkey, Russia, and yes, China are the usual culprits - save for Turkey, which, however, seems to be making a maximum effort to break its bonds with NATO and join that list of delinquents as a permanent member. If Turkey goes through with committing its military in a skirmish with the Israeli Defense Forces, it will suffer withering loses as well as a tremendous loss of face. Look, Netanyahu is not to be messed with! Frankly, I wish the man were qualified to be a candidate for the US Presidency. He is what America needs - a former officer in Israel's elite special forces, he HAS the military experience required for a strong president. Unfortunately, America's leadership comes in a far distant second to Netanyahu. Israel's leader is perceived to be strong while America's leader is perceived to be, well, pitiful! President Obama's obvious disdain for Israel and his nauseating rash of sucking up to Islamic countries leads one to question whether he favors Islam over Israel. There are roughly 6 million Jews in Israel. There are roughly 6 million Jews in America. We would respectfully suggest that those American Jews, who support President Obama's Regime, might wish to re-evaluate that support in light of Obama's obvious dislike of the nation of Israel, which is, like it or not, recognized by the nations of the world as the Jewish state. The Obama Regime not only has Americans at each other's throats, it also has America's allies at each other's throats! There is something terribly wrong with America's current government led by the Obama Regime. America made a horrible mistake in 2006 and 2008 with the election of a socialist government to lead the country. Most sentient Americans have awakened to this fact and are determined to correct this error this November and again in November of 2012. If the correction isn't made in the next two elections, I think it is, indeed, plausible to see some of the American states again asserting their sovereignty by breaking away and re-establishing themselves as independent states. Look, most Americans have come to understand that we, as a country, cannot continue in the direction the country is currently headed. They are as sincere as it is possible to be when the say they want their country back. They stand ready to rescue and restore America and elect a leader Americans and the rest of the world can respect. America did not choose the role of policeman of the world. We were drafted into the job. Even if we threw up our hands and walked away, we would still have the job BY DEFAULT! It seems America has its very own Hamlet in the Oval Office. His wrestling with decisions is reinforcing the appearance of weakness -- and weakness in an American President can bring the world to the brink of war. In fact, **we may be tiptoeing along that brink even as I scribble these few words**.

2NC Impact Uniqueness – Brink Now

The flotilla incident has put Israel and turkey on the brink of war

TIME, Jason Motlagh / Istanbul, 7/1/2010, “Anger in Turkey Grows Over Israeli Raid,” http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1993227,00.html // vkoneru

For the second day in a row, hundreds of protesters chanted, "Down with Israel," outside the Israeli diplomatic missions in Ankara and Istanbul. In Istanbul, the commercial capital, women in headscarves and in tank tops from across the country's political spectrum waved Palestinian and Turkish flags alongside teenagers wearing green Islamic bands scrawled with Koranic and anti-Israel slogans. Civil society groups blew horns as they urged people of all ideological stripes to come together. "This is an attack against humanity," says Pinar Aksayan, 25, a member of the ruling AK Party's youth wing. "It doesn't matter if it happens in Israel, Turkey or Virginia. This was morally wrong, and there must be justice." Turkey used to be Israel's strongest friend among Muslim nations. But the deaths of several Turks on a merchant ship with Turkey's flag that was attempting to break through a naval blockade of Gaza appear to signal the tipping point of a relationship on the outs. In the central city of Konya, protesters reportedly burned Israeli flags and floated a mock-up of the ship painted blood red. Authorities urged an immediate boycott of Israeli goods and a more aggressive condemnation from the European Union and the U.S. Similar protests took place in cities around the country at a scale not seen since Israel's deadly December 2008 military offensive into Gaza left hundreds dead. (See pictures of Israeli commandos storming the Turkish aid ship to Gaza.) Some of the harshest words came from the very top. In an emotional address on Tuesday to Turkish lawmakers, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan called Israel's action a "bloody massacre" that showed "how good they are at killing people." He asserted that it would mark a "turning point" in bilateral relations. "Israel in no way can legitimize this murder. It cannot wash its hands of this blood," he said with tremors in his voice. For decades, predominantly secular Turkey and the Jewish state have had strong trade and military ties, an exception in a fractious Mideast region. The relationship dates to the post–World War II era, when Turkey welcomed Jews fleeing Nazi persecution and was one of the first countries to recognize Israel. But there has been a cooling off since Erdogan's moderately Islamist AK administration took power in 2002. The slide accelerated after Israel's war in Gaza two years ago. That conflict came on the heels of failed Turkish efforts to broker peace between Israel and Syria. Top Turkish officials have made no secret of their disdain for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's year-old hawkish government, reiterating their refusal to hold high-level meetings with them. Hugh Pope, a Turkey and Middle East analyst with the International Crisis Group, explains that in recent years, Turkey has "indexed" its relations with Israel based on Israel's treatment of Palestinians. Graphic media reports from the 2008-09 war and the ongoing blockade have stirred the Turkish public. "Now we're in new territory," he says. "This is the first time that Israelis have spilled Turkish blood, in a way that the whole world has condemned." The government has already withdrawn its ambassador to Israel and canceled a planned series of joint military exercises while demanding that the U.N. Security Council hold an emergency session and launch an immediate investigation. Some ministers have publicly suggested even sharper measures. "Turkey Launches Long-Term Diplomatic War Against Israel," read a Tuesday headline in the Hurriyet Daily News, an English-language daily. Given the Prime Minister's remarks and reports of a second aid flotilla, tensions are likely to get worse. Student activists, for their part, insist protests will go on until concrete measures are taken to punish the Israeli authorities responsible for the death of their countrymen. But they hedge that despite all the heated rhetoric, they are not against ordinary Israelis. "Of course we have no problem with the Israeli people, but we expect that they will pressure their government," says Can Acun, a political science student. "They should protest like us too."

Impact – Israel-Turkey Relations

CHP win is key to turkey-israel relations

Ümit Enginsoy, daily news and economic review, 6/5/2010, “Israeli conservatives hope for AKP defeat in polls,” http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=israeli-conservatives-hope-for-akp-fall-in-polls-2010-06-08 // vkoneru

Two prominent conservative Israeli intellectuals have said they hope Turkey’s government is unseated in 2011 elections, accusing the ruling party of turning Turkish foreign policy away from the West. “Only a change of government in Ankara can bring Turkey back into the Western fold and restore the partnership between Ankara and Jerusalem,” Efraim Inbar wrote in an article released Monday by the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies in Israel, which he heads. “Turkey [is sliding] away from the West into an independent posture largely colored by the Islamist tendencies of the current government,” Inbar wrote, referring to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP. “The next elections in July 2011 provide the Turkish citizens an opportunity to remain democratic and part of the West,” he said. Inbar’s comments, as well as those of Barry Rubin, director of the Global Research in International Affairs Center in Israel, come amid ongoing and unprecedented tensions over last week’s Israeli raid on a pro-Palestinian aid flotilla dispatched by a Turkish humanitarian group. “The [Turkish-Israeli] relationship breakdown was already clear – and in private every Israeli expert dealing seriously with Turkey said so – well over two years ago,” Rubin wrote in an article published Sunday on his center’s website. “The current Turkish government hates Israel.” Both Inbar and Rubin said they hope for a government change in Turkey in parliamentary elections planned for the summer of 2011.

Impact – Sanctions

Sanctions are successful

George Perkovich, vice president for studies and director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, research focuses on nuclear strategy and nonproliferation, research focus on South Asia and Iran, and on the problem of justice in the international political economy, former speechwriter and foreign policy adviser to Senator Joe Biden, adviser to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, member of the Council on Foreign Relations' Task Force on U.S. Nuclear Policy, expert in U.S. foreign policy, nonproliferation, security, global governance, non-governmental actors, India, Iran, and Pakistan, Ph.D., University of Virginia 6/28/10, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=41066

There are many reasons to pursue sanctions. Sanctions express the international community’s judgment on states that are breaking rules and acting illegitimately. With this in mind, sanctions demonstrate that the international community cares about the rules and is willing to enforce them. Ideally, sanctions also change a country’s behavior. So the question becomes whether or not the latest round of sanctions—or any tougher sanctions in the future—will force Iran to give up its nuclear program and stop enriching uranium. Unfortunately, in this case, no one is under the illusion that the sanctions are going to stop Iran. But there’s another reason for sanctions: to punish violators. The international community can inflict a cost for operating outside of global standards and demonstrate that it is prepared to enforce rules. Further sanctions on Iran raise the cost of enriching uranium and show that major powers are not going to look the other way and ignore Iran’s determination to push forward. In an ideal world, sanctions would be a diplomatic step to increase pressure that could be reinforced with the future threat of military force. Ultimately, if a country doesn’t cooperate and respond to sanctions, the international community can compel them to fall into line. Diplomacy and sanctions enjoy greater leverage if the threat of force is looming on the horizon. There is no good military option, however, for the United States, Israel, or anyone else when looking at the problem of Iran. Outside powers cannot physically destroy all of Iran’s capacity to make centrifuges and enrich uranium. For one thing, no one knows where all of the pieces of Iran’s nuclear program are positioned and many locations are burrowed deep into mountains and nearly impossible to target. There are other reasons why a military option is beyond unattractive. It is difficult to know how Iran would respond and military action could have implications for the conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq’s political evolution. Even at the end of the George W. Bush’s presidency, it became clear that the administration realized that there was no military option. As long as this is the case, sanctions are the toughest response available. They demonstrate resolve and show that the international community is not simply giving up. The problem is that Iranians recognize that there is not a successful military option on the table, and this weakens the impact of sanctions. Iran feels that if it can withstand sanctions, that there is nothing that the United States and Europe can physically do. That’s the difficult situation the world is in today—diplomacy is more challenging with insufficient military options to threaten Iran. Despite the impression that some in Washington and Israel try to create, having the political will to use force is not the issue. The question is whether using force would actually make the situation better or worse on the ground in Iran, the wider Middle East, and the global economy.

Cyprus Impact – Iraqi Civil War

Cyprus stability key to preventing Iraqi civil war

Nikolas K. Gvosdev, national review online, staff writer, 1/14/2003, “Key Isle,” http://article.nationalreview.com/267633/key-isle/nikolas-k-gvosdev // vkoneru

Iraq faces many of the same issues that bedevil Cyprus. Its current solution has been to subordinate all regional and ethnic groups to the personal, dictatorial tyranny of Saddam Hussein. When his regime falls, however, something must take its place. Simply dividing Iraq into three "cantons" — a Shiite province in the south, a Sunni center, and a Kurdish statelet in the north — is a recipe for disaster. Not only does such a "solution" fail to consider that populations are not neatly segmented (Baghdad, after all, has a largely Shiite population) and ignore other ethnic minorities dispersed throughout the country, it would preclude any central "Iraqi" identity from developing. This, in turn, would increase the risk of regional strife that would draw in neighboring states. (I commend readers to Dan Byman's excellent essay on this subject.) On the other hand, a functioning Cypriot bi-zonal, bi-communal federation could serve as a model for reconstructing postwar Iraq in a fashion that respects local autonomy yet permits freedom of movement and investment across Iraq, allows for the creation of a durable Iraqi "identity" and maintains a viable Iraqi state within its current boundaries. Another reason for making a settlement on Cyprus an urgent priority is that it can produce momentum toward solving other lingering conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus that have produced "brown zones" (whether unrecognized statelets like Abkhazia or ill-defined international protectorates like Kosovo) where definitive state authority is lacking. Such "holes" in the international system help to facilitate the activities of terrorists, organized crime factions and drug smugglers. If a workable bi-communal, bi-zonal federation can be created for Cyprus, it could then serve as a model upon which solutions for ethno-separatist conflicts such as Nagorno-Karabakh or Trans-Dniestria could be crafted. It might also help to redefine and strengthen currently weak states such as Bosnia, which endures largely because of the ongoing infusion of outside capital and troops to sustain the Dayton Accords. Crafting more viable states throughout the arc of Eurasia serves long-term American interests as well. After all, the best means for weakening international terrorist networks are effective governments that can police their borders and exercise supervision over their territories.

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\*\*2NC Shenanigans \*\*

Elections will be on Time

Turkish elections will be on time – erdogan push and economic demands

Today’s Zaman, no author, 7/20/2010, “Erdoğan vows to abolish EMASYA protocol, revise security priorities,” http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-200260-erdogan-vows-to-abolish-emasya-protocol-revise-security-priorities.html // vkoneru

In an attempt to settle the debate on the date of the next general elections in Turkey, the prime minister said 2011 would be the year for elections in Turkey, though it may be earlier than July 2011 considering weather and the summer vacation period. “However, nothing other than that can be considered. We will hold the elections during the scheduled time,” Erdoğan said. “Turkey should get used to this. We should not be a primitive country that changes its government every 16 months,” he also said. The prime minister warned that debates over early elections might hurt the Turkish economy. “Global capital investors are asking me if we will have snap elections. I would say definitely not.”

Court decision says no risk of an early election

Mark Bentley, Bloomberg buisnesweek, 7/8/2010, “Turkey Bonds, Stocks Advance as Ruling Eases Election Concern,” http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-07-08/turkey-bonds-stocks-advance-as-ruling-eases-election-concern.html // vkoneru

The court let articles stand that make it easier for civil courts to try military officers, widen labor union rights for government workers and to protect consumers and personal data. “Bottom line is that the court’s decision eliminated the risk of an early election, hence it’s a very pro-market move,” Istanbul-based Tera Brokers said in an e-mailed report. “Consequently one more uncertainty for the markets has vanished.”

10% Rule

10 % rule key to eliminating minority parties

Euractiv, Last Updated 7/16/2010, “Turkish opposition bids to lower ‘unfair’ election threshold,” http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/turkish-opposition-bids-lower-unfair-election-threshold-news-496427 // vkoneru

According to an OSCE report, the 10% national threshold in Turkey's electoral system virtually eliminates the possibility of regional or minority parties entering the Turkish Grand National Assembly and distorts the essential purpose of a proportional system.

Lowering the threshold to 7% doesn’t make a difference

Euractiv, Last Updated 7/16/2010, “Turkish opposition bids to lower ‘unfair’ election threshold,” http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/turkish-opposition-bids-lower-unfair-election-threshold-news-496427 // vkoneru

However, it is difficult to say if lowering the threshold to 7% will make a difference to Turkish politics. During the 2007 election, the AKP obtained 46.66% of the vote, followed by the CHP with 20.85% and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) with 14.28%. No other party made it to parliament, with the Democratic Party (DP) closest to the 10% barrier with 5.41%.

Early Elections on the Docket

Early elections are still on the docket for constitutional reforms

Euractiv, Last Updated 7/16/2010, “Turkish opposition bids to lower ‘unfair’ election threshold,” http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/turkish-opposition-bids-lower-unfair-election-threshold-news-496427 // vkoneru

Turkey is holding a referendum on proposed constitutional reforms in September, which may speed up political developments. Commentators are not ruling out early elections either.

AT: Elections Too Far off

1. Campaigning now – even if the elections aren’t for a year the AKP and CHP are vigorously campaigning to gather public support.

Michael Gunter, a political science professor at Tennessee Tech University and the International University in Vienna, has written nine books about the Kurdish people of the region, **June** 24, 2010, https://mail.google.com/mail/?shva=1#inbox/12a0b2b818efbb57

Gunter: I think Prime Minister Erdogan of Turkey has opened up his reelection campaign and, by taking this belligerent attitude toward the PKK, is trying to get some legitimate looking nationalist credentials for the upcoming Turkish election**.** Yes, I think **Turkey** may well have a **major** intervention into northern Iraq. But I'm saying it won't accomplish anything except rhetoric.

2. Policies have a lasting effect – Turkish citizens have a long memory and will remember Erdogans opposition to US TNW’s, this will increase his popularity come election time.

3. Withdrawal takes months – still be felt by election

Hugh Beach, former Master General of the Ordnance for the British Army, May/June 2004, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:QIJXfNN4ZywJ:www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd77/77hb.htm+TNW+OR+%22bunker+busters%22+OR+%22b-61%22+OR+%22tactical+nuclear+weapons%22+OR+%22mini+nukes%22+withdrawal+process+long+term&cd=4&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

Much less precise figures are available for Russian forces, but within a few months it had been announced that all TNW had been withdrawn from Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic States, Kazahkstan and the Central Asian republics.12 The UNIDIR study estimates that between 1991 and 2001 the number of deployed Russian TNW was reduced from more than 15,000 to 3,590 - a similar percentage reduction to that achieved by the US.13 In August 1998 the British government announced that all British free-fall nuclear bombs had been dismantled14 and in the same year *Hadès* disappeared from the French inventory.15

4. TNWs are the key issue proves that it won’t trump

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\*\*Aff Stuff\*\*

Too Far Off – Predict Popularity (Prez Race)

Way too far off to predict popularity

Yusuf Kanli Hürriyet, (blog), 7/18/10, " Post-Erdoğan scenario ," http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=post-erdogan-scenario-2010-07-18 // vkoneru

The claim is that in the summer of 2012, that is almost in two years time from now, when the five-year presidential tenure of President Abdullah Gül comes to an end Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will run for the presidency in the first-ever popular election of the president. The scenario, of course, is based on the assumption that Erdoğan will be elected president. Really? Who can guarantee that in election in two years time Erdoğan will maintain his popularity, no other candidate with strong popular backing will emerge, and the prime minister will be elected the president? Anyhow, that’s the assumption.

Too Far Off – No Stance

Erdogan hasn’t taken a legit stance on tnws

Lale Kemal, staff writer and columnist for today’s zaman, 6/20/2010, “What will Erdoğan do over nukes at the İncirlik base?,” http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/columnists-207467-what-will-erdogan-do-over-nukes-at-the-incirlik-base.html // vkoneru

When asked for his opinion on the nukes at İncirlik whilst on board the plane taking him to Washington on Sunday, Erdoğan refrained from talking about this specific issue. He only said there have been changes at İncirlik under his government, but he fell short of elaborating. Though his remarks over this issue were unclear, it is known that the US has expanded its operations at İncirlik in the last 10 years. The US has been using İncirlik as an air bridge for flights to Afghanistan and as a cargo hub for neighboring Iraq, and as a consequence Turkey has become more agreeable to İncirlik being used for other purposes.

Link Turn – TNW Removal Unpopular

Empirically, removal of TNW’s is met with political resistance

Bell & Loehrke 9 (Alexandra, Benjamin, 23 November, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey

In 2005, when NATO's top commander at the time, Gen. James L. Jones, supported the elimination of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, he was met with fierce political resistance. (In addition to the 90 B61 bombs in Turkey, there are another 110 or so U.S. bombs located at bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.) Four years later, some U.S. and European officials still maintain that the political value of the nuclear weapons is enough to keep them deployed across Europe. In particular, they argue PDF that the weapons are "an essential political and military link" between NATO members and help maintain alliance cohesion. The Defense Department's 2008 report PDF on nuclear weapons management concurred: "As long as our allies value [the nuclear weapons'] political contribution, the United States is obligated to provide and maintain the nuclear weapon capability." Those who hold this view believe that nuclear sharing is both symbolic of alliance cohesion and a demonstration of how the United States and NATO have committed to defending each other in the event of an attack. They argue that removing the weapons would dangerously undermine such cohesion and raise questions about how committed Washington is to its NATO allies.

Internal Link Turn – CHP Gets Credit

Erdogan is winning now – our ev assumes the flotilla incident

Patrick Goodenough, International Editor cns news, 6/11/2010, “Turkey’s Opposition Troubled by Erdogan’s Stance on Iran and Israel,” http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/67573 (CNSNews.com) // vkoneru

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is enjoying a surge of popularity in the Middle East for his positions on Iran and Israel, but a resurgent secularist opposition at home is warning that the government may be harming Turkey internationally. Amid debate over whether Turkey is shifting “eastward” under its ruling Islamist-leaning Justice and Development Party (AKP), members of the two main opposition parties expressed concern about Ankara’s vote against a U.N. Security Council resolution imposing new sanctions against Iran over its nuclear activities.

CHP will spin the plan to get credit

IPR Strategic Business Information Database, February, 2003, “TURKEY: US TROOPS SHOULD NOT BE STATIONED IN TURKEY - CHP LEADER.(Deniz Baykal of the Opposition Republic People's Party (CHP))(Brief Article),” http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_hb6465/is\_200302/ai\_n26298005/ // vkoneru

US TROOPS SHOULD NOT BE STATIONED IN TURKEY - CHP LEADER According to Hurriyet, Opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal declared his opposition to Turkey allowing the United States to station troops on Turkish soil. Baykal stated that the CHP's deputies in Parliament would vote in favor of a resolution to send Turkish troops to northern Iraq but against one allowing US troops to be stationed in Turkey for a possible Iraq intervention.

Turkey-Greece Uniqueness

Turkey-Greece relations improving

Simon Cameron-Moore, 08 Apr 2010, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE63712O.htm

ANKARA, April 8 (Reuters) - Old rivals Turkey and Greece agreed on Thursday to strengthen contacts between their militaries to reduce the chance of conflict between two countries that almost went to war in the mid-1990s. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and acting Greek Foreign Minister Dimitris Droutsas agreed in talks in Ankara to pursue joint training and military exchange visits. "We should allocate our budgets not to arms but health, education and welfare," Davutoglu told a joint news confererence. Turkey, which opened negotiations to join the European Union in 2005, has adopted a "zero problems" policy with its neighbours from the Balkans to the Middle East. Turkey and Greece have territorial disputes in the Aegean and differences over the divided island of Cyprus. Turkey also complains that Greece neglects the rights of a Turkish minority that lives in the country. But relations are far better than in 1996, when Greece and Turkey almost went to war over an uninhabited island in the Aegean. The two countries have many confidence building measures in place, including several related to their armed forces. The latest measures announced on Thursday included joint training programmes at Greek and Turkish facilities within the framework of NATO's 22-member Peace for Partnership programme. The contacts would also include visits by each other's chiefs of staff to give lectures at military academies, joint research, and reciprocal visits by staff colleges.

Erdogan wants to improve Greece relations

REUTERS, 5/14/2010, http://www.france24.com/en/20100514-turkey-greece-erdogan-athens-historic-visit-papandreou-military

Long-time rivals Greece and Turkey discussed easing tensions and cutting heavy defence budgets on Friday, seeking to distil some virtue from a Greek debt crisis shaking the euro. Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan arrived in Athens with 10 ministers and about 80 businessmen for what both sides hope will be a new era in ties between two NATO members who have come to the brink of war on several occasions in the last 50 years. Erdogan, the first Turkish prime minister to make an official visit to Greece since 2004, told Greek state NET TV on Thursday that issues he would discuss with Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou included cuts in armaments. “Both countries have huge defence expenses and they will achieve a lot of a savings in this way,” he said. “I believe this visit will be the start for putting Greek-Turkish relations on a better foundation,” Erdogan said later during a meeting with Greek President Karolos Papoulias. The two sides are to sign 21 bilateral agreements on issues ranging from tourism, energy and environment, to curbing illegal migrants coming through Turkey, a major problem for Greece. Businessmen from both sides would also be holding a conference, Erdogan said. “This is why we believe that this visit is extremely important,” he said. “I believe it is an historic visit.”

Random Cards

Turkey-Greece relations strained over Aegean Sea conflict

Panorama.am, 7/20/2010, http://www.panorama.am/en/politics/2010/07/20/regnum/

The continued division of Cyprus 36 years after the Turkish invasion is “unacceptable” and Turkish troops should leave the island, Greek Foreign Minister Dimitri Droutsas said Monday. “Thirty-six years after the Turkish invasion, too much time has passed,” Droutsas said at a press conference with his Cypriot counterpart, Markos Kyprianou. “The current situation in Cyprus is unacceptable. This must end and all the Turkish occupation troops must leave the island,” he added. Greek FM accused Turkey for the tensions in Aegean Sea and declared they would get resolution based on the international standards, Regnum reported.