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\*\*\*NEG – TERRORISM INTELLIGENCE\*\*\*

1NC – Terrorism Intelligence

PKK war on the brink now

BATMAN AND DIYARBAKIR 6/24 (Jun 24th 2010 Economist http://www.economist.com/node/16439205?story\_id=16439205 TBC 6/28/10)

Some 16 Turkish soldiers have been killed in recent attacks, as militants of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) escalate their 25-year-old war. On June 22nd four soldiers and the daughter of an officer died when the PKK’s urban arm, the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons, detonated a bomb on a bus carrying soldiers in Istanbul. “For the first time, there is a real risk that the PKK will carry the war outside the south-east,” says Henri Barkey of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Pressure is building on Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to respond. Devlet Bahceli, leader of the nationalist opposition party, has called for martial law to be reimposed in the south-east. Sezgin Tanrikulu, a Kurdish human-rights lawyer, mutters of a “last exit” before Turks and Kurds go their separate ways.

US troops defend and suppress PKK violence – Turkey expects full support from Obama

Uslu 8 (Emrullah, November 26, 2008 5 (40), Terrorism Focus, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no\_cache=1&tx\_ttnews[tt\_news]=34185)KFC

The strategic relationship between Turkey and the United States entered into a new phase on November 5, 2007, when President Bush pledged real-time intelligence sharing with the Turkish military while condemning the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan - PKK): "The PKK is a terrorist organization. They're an enemy of Turkey, they're an enemy of Iraq and they're an enemy of the United States” (Turkey.usembassy.gov, November 5, 2007). Since then, Turkish-U.S. intelligence sharing has been very productive in targeting the PKK camps in northern Iraq over the last year. This week, Iraq’s parliament is voting on approval of the Status-of-Forces Agreement (SOFA), an accord that spells out the conditions of the U.S. occupation and provides a timetable calling for a full withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq by December 31, 2011. Approval of the accord will open yet another chapter to shape Ankara’s counterterrorism polices against the PKK. Turkish journalist Fikret Bila, who is well known for his close relations with the Turkish military and whose work usually reflects the views of influential institutions in Ankara, is not expecting a total American withdrawal from Iraq: [U.S. President-Elect Barack] Obama would not seek to withdraw all American troops from Iraq. The U.S. would not give up its interests in Iraq. It would not change its traditional policy to control energy corridors and oil fields in the Middle East and the Caucasus. One of the options before Obama is to redeploy American troops into northern Iraq (Milliyet, November 2). It is a common belief among the Turkish security bureaucracy that the United States will not want to withdraw its troops from Iraq.

PKK intensifying – threatens middle east instability

Salih 8 (Mohammed A June 8 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/JF03Ak03.html TBC 6/28/10)

WASHINGTON - An intensifying fight between Turkey and a reorganized Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) threatens to introduce a new element of instability to the Middle East. And this at a time when some of the most serious crises in the region are taken on by regional actors, ironically with Turkey itself playing a key role as a peace mediator. That has left the United States in a dilemma over whether to continue with its traditional policy of giving a green-light for a militaristic approach by Turkey to deal with the long-standing Kurdish issue, or to pressure its longtime ally to try harder for a political solution.

1NC – Terrorism Intelligence

Destabilization in the middle east goes nuclear and causes extinction

Steinbach 2 (John, Researcher for the Centre for Research on Globalisation, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html, AD: 6/26/10) jl

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)

Uniqueness – US Fighting PKK Now

The US is actively helping the fight against the PKK in Turkey

Asbarez 6/21(June 21st, 2010, <http://asbarez.com/82334/us-reiterates-support-for-turkeys-war-on-pkk-as-troops-deploy-along-iraqi-border/>)KFC

The United States actively supports the efforts of its Turkish allies to defeat the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the U.S. ambassador to Turkey said Monday after Turkish troops deployed along the Iraqi border to stage fresh attacks against Kurds in Northern Iraq. Twelve Turkish soldiers were killed in PKK attacks over the weekend, with most of the deaths occurring when members of the outlawed group assaulted a border unit at the Iraqi frontier. Turkish state media said elite troops rappelled down from helicopters and poured out of mechanized infantry units Monday to mount an operation to surround the Kurds. Meanwhile, security sources were quoted as saying helicopter gunships bombed suspected PKK positions in the provinces of Hakkari and Sirnak, bordering Iraq. U.S. Ambassador James Jeffrey said the United States would “urgently” consider any requests from Ankara asking for help fighting the PKK, which Washington considers a terrorist group. “We stand ready to review urgently any new requests from the Turkish military or government regarding the PKK,” Jeffrey said in a written statement, echoing remarks made Sunday by an embassy spokeswoman. Following the weekend attacks there had been speculation that the U.S. might not have passed on actionable intelligence in its possession regarding PKK movements toward the border. While Turkey’s “no” vote on fresh U.N. sanctions against Iran and a simmering crisis with Israel has sparked concern in Turkey that the United States may withhold support from Ankara’s struggle against the PKK, Jeffrey stressed “there has been no change in the level of U.S.-Turkey intelligence sharing regarding the PKK in northern Iraq.” Describing the PKK as a terrorist group and a “common enemy” to both Ankara and Washington, Jeffrey said the U.S shared Turkey’s grief at the loss of its heroic troops and police in the joint struggle against terrorism. “Our sincere condolences go out to the families of the victims,” he said.

Uniqueness – Terror Threat

Terror is at an all time high in Turkey

İstanbul 9 (Zaman, 02 May 2009, <http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=174116>)KFC

The report stated that among the terrorist groups operating in Turkey, the PKK is taking the lead in terms of the frequency and impact of its attacks, targeting civilians as well as Turkish security forces. The explosions in Diyarbakır on Sept. 12, 2006, and in the Güngören district of İstanbul on July 27, 2008, were specifically referenced in the report presented to the US Congress. Two bombs exploded within minutes of each other in a crowded pedestrian area in Güngören, killing 17 people and wounding 154 others in the deadliest terror attack seen in Turkey in over five years; in Diyarbakır, the explosion of a bomb planted in a parked car on one of the city's main avenues caused the deaths of 10 people, including seven children. The US report also mentioned an ongoing investigation into Ergenekon, a shadowy network accused of plotting against the civilian government and trying to pave the way for a military coup. "Investigations into an organization named Ergenekon, allegedly composed of former military officials, bureaucrats, politicians, journalists, and underworld figures, began in 2007, leading to arrests in the summer of 2008," the report noted. "Alleged members of Ergenekon were on trial for a number of crimes including terrorism charges; the details of the case were murky, however, and Ergenekon's status as a terrorist organization remained under debate at year's end."

Turkey is angry over the lack of attention of the terror threat.

Hyland 7 (Frank, Terrorism Focus, 4 (42), December 19, 2007, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no\_cache=1&tx\_ttnews[tt\_news]=4619)KFC

Nevertheless, there has been recent political and popular pressure within Turkey to use the importance of Incirlik as a means of leverage in relations with the United States. As tensions in the relationship increased in October over the Armenian genocide bill and U.S. inaction over the PKK threat, Turkish officials stated that, while there was no official decision to impede operations, “there has been a move toward restrictions and slowing things down in procedures that we carry out on a regular basis.” These included a limitation in the number of authorizations granted for U.S. overflights of Turkish airspace, including those of U.S. military flights in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (Milliyet, October 22). At the same time, Gündüz Aktan, a retired ambassador and a leading MP of Turkey’s Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), issued a call for Turkey to “shut down Incirlik Air Base” (Turkish Daily News, October 16). There was little opposition to such calls from Turkish trade unions whose members work at the base: “We accept being unemployed if the nation’s interests are at stake” (Turkish Daily News, October 16).

Uniqueness – PKK War Coming

Turkey has failed – PKK issue on the brink now

Kamal 6/22 (Lale 2010 http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/columnists-213827-turkey-at-turning-point-on-terror.html TBC 6/28/10)

But this is Turkey, a member of NATO and a candidate member to the EU, which has failed to find a solution to its terror problem. The outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has increased its violence and this past weekend it attacked a unit on the border with Iraq near the township of Şemdinli in the war-stricken, Kurdish-dominated Southeast, killing 11 Turkish soldiers. There are various reasons behind the surge of PKK violence, including the government’s failure to turn the Kurdish reform, or democratic initiative process, into a meaningful one, initiating legal changes in laws that would increase political room for maneuver while lessening PKK violence. The blame should equally fall on the opposition parties, including the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), for failing to turn the democratic initiative into a viable process. I will focus, though, on the deep-rooted reasons for the continuation of the fight against the PKK.

PKK influence up – puts us on the brink

Salih 8 (Mohammed A June 8 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/JF03Ak03.html TBC 6/28/10)

"We are at the threshold of a most critical era in terms of the PKK's influence," wrote Mehmet Ali Birand, a prominent Turkish columnist, in the May 29 English-language Turkish Daily News, acknowledging the potentially destabilizing consequences of the current conflict. While Turkey appeared triumphant after the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999, it has witnessed an escalation of attacks by Kurdish insurgents since 2007, raising fears that the country might be plunged into a new era of intra Turk-Kurd fighting reminiscent of the 1980s and the 1990s. The fight between the PKK and Turkey has claimed about 40,000 lives over two decades. The PKK is considered a terrorist group by Ankara and dozens of Western countries, including the US and European Union members. Now, after years of relative inaction, all signs indicate the PKK has made a strong comeback and is gaining renewed momentum in Turkey and abroad. "It's clear that PKK has reorganized itself. I was in Europe recently ... and I was amazed how much stronger the PKK is," said Aliza Marcus, a journalist and author of Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence. "[PKK] has regained the support of many Kurds who are not necessarily outright PKK supporters but do not see another option," Marcus said.

Links – Terrorism

Not protecting Turkey from the PKK undermines the War on Terror.

Rubin 4 (Michael, August 05, 2004, http://old.nationalreview.com/rubin/rubin200408051220.asp)KFC

The continued PKK presence in northern Iraq is an embarrassment to the United States. Under terms of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483, the United States assumed legal responsibility as occupying power for the territory of Iraq. While our legal responsibility ended with the June 28, 2004, transfer of authority, moral responsibility continues. That a terrorist group — listed as such by the State Department since such designations were first made — operated with impunity from an area under U.S. responsibility undercuts the moral authority of the White House in waging the global war on terrorism. The Bush administration's failure to address the PKK presence in Iraq creates a dangerous precedent. It legitimizes the Lebanese government's decision to allow Hezbollah to conduct terrorist operations with impunity, for example, despite Lebanon's responsibilities under terms of U.N. Security Council Resolution 425. U.S. toleration of the PKK threatens to emerge as a hot issue in coming weeks. Since the PKK ended its ceasefire on June 1, southeastern Turkey has suffered a renewed wave of roadside bombs and assassinations. On July 27, PKK fighters killed a Turkish policeman and a soldier in the southeastern province of Bingol. On August 2, Turkish soldiers and PKK fighters clashed in southeastern Turkey. Those incidents that Turkish newspapers report may be the tip of the iceberg. In Konya and Kayseri, Turkish students spoke of a recent PKK execution of three Turkish conscripts along the Iranian border.

**The US is the key fighter of the PKK**

**UPI 6/35** (June 25, 2010, http://www.upi.com/Top\_News/Special/2010/06/25/US-aiding-in-PKK-fight-envoy-says/UPI-93801277491977/)KFC

ANKARA, Turkey, June 25 (UPI) -- While the United States is not "all-powerful," it is looking for ways to help Turkey tackle the problem of Kurdish militants, the U.S. envoy to Turkey said. Ankara has struggled to control a Kurdish militancy led by the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, for decades. The U.S. military since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 has helped Ankara tackle the PKK with intelligence information as the insurgent group is spread throughout the border regions. U.S. Ambassador to Turkey James Jeffrey told Turkey's daily newspaper Hurriyet that opinions of the United States in Turkey are down because Washington is not playing what some see as a more active role in the region. "We're looking at ways to improve that, and we've been looking at ways to improve this even before (recent PKK attacks)," he said. PKK militants are accused of launching attacks on military installations and interests in Turkey in recent weeks. Jeffrey said, however, that Washington did not have a magic wand in terms of counter-terrorism efforts in the Middle East. "We may be the most important country, but that doesn't mean that we are infallible or all-powerful," he said. "If we could deal with terrorists the way Turkey would like, then we would have dealt with Osama bin Laden a long time ago."

Links – Terrorism

US pull out sends the signal of severing cooperation on PKK intelligence

Zaman 8 (Amberin, Real Clear World, http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2008/11/turkey\_and\_us\_under\_obama.html, AD: 6/28/10) jl

One of the biggest reasons why Turks continue to dislike America (not Americans) in large numbers1 is because they believe that the United States is surreptitiously working to es¬tablish an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq that will eventually comprise fat chunks of southeastern Turkey. The “proof,” their argument runs, lies in the refusal by the United States to take military action against some 5,000 rebels of the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) based in northern Iraq. The suspicions persist even though the United States has been providing the Turkish army with real time intelligence on the PKK since November 2007, and has been allowing Turkish fighter jets to strike PKK bases across the border.

It hasn’t helped that the PKK is mounting increasinglyaudacious attacks, killing an ever-growing number of Turk¬ish soldiers each time. It would help for the new administra¬tion to call very publicly on the Iraqi Kurds to do more to prevent the PKK from moving so freely in areas under their control. At the same time, the notion that withdrawal from Iraq means abandoning the Iraqi Kurds should be firmly dispelled. Ankara’s recent overtures to the president of the Kurdish regional government, Massoud Barzani, should be encouraged, as should his efforts to peacefully disarm the PKK. Yet, America’s intentions will remain in question so long as it sits on the fence on a purportedly new separatist Kurdish group, the Party for Free Life in Kurdistan (Pejak), that is fighting for Kurdish autonomy inside Iran. It is an open secret that Pejak and the PKK are one and the same. Yet the U.S. Department of State does not label Pejak a terrorist group as it does the PKK. Not surprisingly, Iran (a country that in the past used to arm and shelter the PKK in an effort to undermine Turkey) is now helping Turkey hunt them down. The Obama administration would gain much sympathy in Turkey if it were to call Pejak by its real name—terrorists—and rouse the mettle to condemn their mischief in Iran. Talk of U.S. double standards would sub¬side, Turkish-Iranian military cooperation would be nipped in the bud, and Iran would have one less reason to believe the United States is committed to overthrowing its regime.

Withdrawal collapses attempts at successful PKK counter-intelligence

Turks dot US 8 (May 01 2008, http://www.turks.us/article.php?story=20080501075639609)KFC

A U.S. report on terrorism said U.S. President George W. Bush has committed to provide Turkey "real-time, actionable intelligence" to counter terrorist organization PKK in the north of Iraq. PKK directs its forces to target mainly Turkish security forces, the report said. The annual "Country Reports on Terrorism 2007," released on Wednesday by the U.S. Department of State, said the terrorist organization PKK, with a "separatist" agenda, operated from bases in the north of Iraq and directed its forces to target mainly Turkish security forces. "In 2005 and 2006, PKK violence claimed hundreds of Turkish lives. This persisted in 2007, when the PKK continued its terrorist tactics," it said, and added that PKK terrorists were discovered in late May in Turkish provinces Istanbul, Adana, Konya, and Mardin with explosive materials designed to carry out suicide attacks. "The Turkish parliament on October 17 overwhelmingly passed a motion authorizing cross-border military operations against PKK targets in northern Iraq. Turkish forces carried out extensive operations along the Turkey-Iraq border in the latter part of the year. On November 5th, President Bush committed to provide Turkey 'real-time, actionable intelligence' to counter the PKK in northern Iraq," the report said.

US support of Turkey is key to suppressing the PKK

Onay 8 (Abdulkadir, visiting military fellow in The Washington. Institute's Turkish Research Program, http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/previous.php?opt=1&id=224, AD: 6/28/10) jl

Last month, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani visited Ankara for a meeting with his Turkish counterpart Abdullah Gul to discuss, among other things, the PKK issue. The PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) currently controls a terror enclave in northeastern Iraq. The Iraqi Kurdish parties--Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party--flank the PKK enclave. The United States is currently cooperating with Turkey in its operations against the PKK by providing intelligence support. But this cooperation will not be successful unless the Iraqi Kurds, who have the ability to block the PKK enclave, come on board and take a stand against the group.   
What can Iraqi Kurds do in this regard and how would this affect their relationship with Turkey?   
The Iraqi Kurds reaped the benefits of an alliance with the United States in 2003 by providing assistance to the US against the Saddam Hussein regime. Since then, the KDP and PUK have resisted increasing US pressure to take action against the PKK enclave in northeastern Iraq, from where the PKK has carried out terror attacks against Turkey. The Iraqi Kurds cooperated with Turkey significantly against the PKK in the 1990s; during that time Turkey provided the Iraqi Kurds with vital commercial and physical access to the outside world, bypassing the Saddam Hussein regime. Turkey also supplied the Iraqi Kurds with crucial protection and access to US military support against Saddam from the Incirlik base in southern Turkey. However, since the start of the Iraq war in 2003, and with the end of Saddam's rule and the United States occupation of Iraq, the KDP and PUK have ignored their deal with Turkey. In due course, they suspended cooperation with Ankara against the PKK. Furthermore, according to western security contractors in Iraq, Kurdish local forces are now protecting the PKK and its franchise groups by facilitating or providing logistics support.

Links – Terrorism

Withdrawal removes US commitment to cooperation against the PKK

İstanbul 9 (Zaman, 02 May 2009, <http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=174116>)KFC

Cooperation in counterterrorism is a key element in America's strategic partnership with Turkey, the US Department of State said in an annual report, which also praised the Turkish contributions to the US efforts to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan. By April 30 of each year, the secretary of state provides Congress a comprehensive report on terrorism with particular references to more than 100 countries worldwide. This year's report, titled "Country Reports on Terrorism," was released on Thursday and examines the issue of terrorism in 139 countries. Turkey and the US are continuing their strategic partnership, including, but not limited to, the field of security policy. Whereas Turkey allows the US to use the İncirlik Air Base in Adana as an aircraft refueling hub for the transportation of non-lethal cargo to its troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US in return provides intelligence about the activities of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), one of the aforementioned 44 terrorist organizations. "Almost 60 percent of the air cargo for US troops in Iraq transits via İncirlik. The establishment of this hub allows six C-17 aircraft to transport the amount of goods it took nine to 10 aircraft to move from Germany, and it saves the United States almost $160 million per year. Between one-third and two-thirds of the fuel destined for the Iraqi people and more than 25 percent of fuel for the Coalition Forces transits from Turkey into Iraq via the Habur Gate border crossing," read the report, articulating the importance of Turkey for the US and NATO forces.

US withdrawal destroys cooperation with Turkey which is key to solving PKK terrorism

Aras 8 (Bulent, expert on Middle Eastern and Caucasian Affairs, http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/previous.php?opt=1&id=224, AD: 6/28/10) jl

Turkey has a new strategy in its war against Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terror. This new strategy is based on three principles: domestic peace, regional legitimacy and coordination with the United States and the European Union. This conceptualization guides Turkish policy to follow a new course at domestic, regional and international levels and has implications for relations with the Kurdish regional government in northern Iraq and the Iraqi state. An analysis of the strategy will help in understanding the future course of Turkish foreign policy toward Iraq.  
The Kurdish question is a serious domestic problem for Turkey. If one adds the terror dimension, it may be considered a more vital threat to domestic peace than political Islam. Turkey's EU membership process widened the boundaries of the political system and initiated a number of reforms for Kurdish language and cultural rights. However, the pace of reforms has slowed and subsequent crises over the presidential elections and AK Party closure cases have held Turkish politics hostage to domestic political considerations. The reforms as they were, did not go far enough to satisfy the demands of Kurdish parties in Turkey. The Democratic Society Party (DTP) formed a group in parliament after being elected as independent MPs, thus overcoming the 10 percent national threshold obstacle.   
But the ruling party still received more support than the DTP in populated Kurdish regions. Government reforms and voter preferences had created a relatively suitable environment for a solution to the Kurdish problem. The AK Party targets a normalization of its security-dominated agenda to preserve a peaceful atmosphere to address the problem. This was evident during the Turkish military incursion into northern Iraq to destroy PKK bases. There is speculation that the AK Party has a comprehensive package of measures to solve the domestic Kurdish problem, but the party has to date only announced some economic investment plans in Kurdish populated southeastern Turkey.  
Turkey's new strategy in the war against terror prioritizes regional legitimacy to draw the support of Iraq's neighbors and other influential states on this sensitive issue. Turkey utilizes the formalized meetings of Iraq's neighboring states to pursue regional diplomacy to make its case with the countries of the region. The Extended Iraqi Neighbors meeting in Istanbul in early November was a sign of Turkey's ability to pursue regional diplomacy for the Iraqi cause. Turkish sensitivities regarding the territorial unity of Iraq and PKK terror dominated the agenda at the meeting and generated support from Iraq's neighbors as well as US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. The final declaration emphasized the urgent need for cooperation against terrorist groups in Iraq. Turkey's military incursions, meanwhile, did not raise serious criticism in the region where there were only expressions of concern during the operation. Turkey has created a diplomatic channel with the countries of the region and is likely to preserve its dialogue with them in the war against PKK terror.  
Turkey also pursues international diplomacy and prioritizes coordination and cooperation with the US and EU. Recent months have witnessed a high level of Turkish diplomatic activity vis-a-vis the US and EU, including Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's meetings with US President George W. Bush and the heads of several European countries. Turkey secured US support in the war against the PKK and received intelligence support during the operations in northern Iraq. The single digit sympathy for the US in Turkish public opinion rose to double digits as a result. The US response to the operation was balanced and Turkish-American cooperation in this respect is likely to continue. Turkey also aims to prevent the diplomatic and financial activities of the PKK in Europe and, compared to recent years, EU support for Turkey in the struggle against PKK terror is more visible while there are new measures against PKK proxies in different European countries.

Internals – Middle East Stability

PKK instability kills US interests in the region and spills over into Iraq

Salih 8 (Mohammed A June 8 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/JF03Ak03.html TBC 6/28/10)

With Turkey's strategic weight increasing in the eyes of policy-makers in Washington - among other things, due to the need for a more solid partnership with Turkey over Iran's nuclear program and rising influence in the Middle East, and US pressure on Turkey to contribute more troops to fight a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan - any prospects of instability within its North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally's borders could significantly harm US designs for the region as a whole. There is a strong likelihood that the fighting may spill over to neighboring Iraq, where the PKK's headquarters are based. The evidence for that is ongoing as Turkey continues on a regular basis to conduct air raids into Iraq's Kurdistan region in the north. That could drag Iraqi Kurds into the conflict as well. Turkey launched a ground incursion in February into Iraqi Kurdistan amid initially consenting but increasingly apprehensive international reactions. Fearing that the operation could destabilize the one relatively safe part of Iraq, Washington finally stepped in and US Defense Secretary Robert Gates anxiously warned Turkey that if it did not blend military operations with "economic and political measures", then "at a certain point the military efforts become less and less effective".

\*\*\*AFF – TERRORISM INTELLIGENCE\*\*\*

Aff – Cooperation Fails

US-Turkish Cooperation on the PKK fail

Osman 8 (Hiwa, IWPR Iraq's country director, <http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/previous.php?opt=1&id=224>, AD: 6/28/10) jl

The twenty fifth Turkish military incursion into Iraqi Kurdistan to root out the PKK (Kurdish Workers' Party) and the way it ended proved that that there can be no military solution to this issue. It has been tried 25 times, with and without the help of the Iraqi Kurds and the United States, and it has not worked. The few times where a ceasefire was mediated--secretly or openly--have yielded some results. But they were not capitalized on or followed with other steps.  
An opportunity is emerging this time. It should not be spoiled. The Kurds of Iraq are more and more convinced that the PKK issue is an irritating factor that is hampering progress in relations with their much-needed neighbor Turkey.

For Iraq, Turkey is an important neighbor. For the Kurdistan region, Turkey is the only neighbor with access to the outside world. The Kurds appreciate the importance of long-term strategic ties with Turkey. US troops will one day leave; Turkey is staying. Similarly, a day will come when the PKK presence ends, but the Iraqi Kurds are staying.  
Since the early 1990s, the Kurds of Iraq understand that Turkey is a red line that cannot be crossed. They also now know that the United States is not "like a man with two wives" as an Iraqi Kurd in Sulaimaniya told the New York Times in the run-up to the Turkish military incursion into the region. Yet the events that followed and the level of US cooperation proved that this was wrong. America does have two allies: a long-standing Turkish one and a nascent Iraqi one.

US-Turkey efforts to eliminate terrorism fail.

YAVUZ 10 (ERCAN Today’s Zazman ‘Turkey values US intelligence but not hopeful on PKK extraditions’, 16 June http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-213247-turkey-values-us-intelligence-but-not-hopeful-on-pkk-extraditions.html)KM

Deputy Prime Minister Cemil Çiçek, who is responsible for the coordination of anti-terror efforts, has told Today’s Zaman that Turkey values US intelligence on terror but is not very hopeful about the extradition of terrorists. “Terrorists are not usually extradited. There are many reasons why the problem of extradition has not been solved. We need to admit that terror is an international issue. Is it a mere coincidence that not even a single terrorist has been extradited to Turkey for years?” the minister asked. Turkey has fought the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) since 1984, when it was set up with the goal of establishing an autonomous Kurdish state in the eastern and southeastern parts of Turkey. More than 40,000 soldiers and civilians have been killed in clashes thus far.

Aff – Cooperation Fails

US cooperation is shot – Trilateral initiatives, Armenian genocide, conspiracy

Parris 7 (Mark R., Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe October 31 The Brookings Institution http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/1031\_turkey\_parris.aspx TBC 6/28/10)

It won’t be easy. America’s fifty-plus year strategic partnership with Turkey has been in free-fall since early 2003. While Erdogan’s government has contributed the occasional sin of commission or omission to the process, it has by and large found ways to support U.S. policy on issues we really care about: Iraq, Iran, Arab-Israeli relations, energy. The same, unfortunately, cannot be said for Washington. The Bush Administration has periodically (most recently in a September speech by Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns at the Atlantic Council) “talked the talk” about Turkey’s importance and the advantages of strategic partnership. But it has simply not delivered on matters of greatest importance to Turkey. Since 2004, when the terrorist Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) resumed armed violence against Turkey from sanctuaries in northern Iraq, ending that threat has been at the top of Turkey’s list. Turks not unreasonably expected that a Bush Administration that had declared war on terror, that had announced in 2003 that “there was no place in post-Saddam Iraq” for groups like the PKK, and that had made clear it wanted Turkish troops to stay on their side of the border, would find ways to do so, or to help Turkey do so. What they have seen instead is a “slow roll”: a series of “trilateral initiatives” to bring Iraqi, Turkish and U.S. authorities together to discuss the problem. None have resulted in any concrete actions against the PKK. Indeed, the terrorists in recent months have escalated the tempo and scope of their operations. The result in Turkey (accelerated by gratuitous slaps like last month’s abortive attempt in the House of Representatives to pass an “Armenian genocide” resolution) has been a hemorrhaging of trust in and support for the United States. America’s public approval rating stood at a sobering 9 percent before the Armenian resolution was approved in committee. Our failure to act against the PKK has caused many Turks to conclude we are actually backing it: mourners at the funerals of soldiers killed in recent terrorist attacks have conjoined “PKK” and “USA” in their slogans.

Aff – Impact Turn

Turkish attack on PKK in Iraq causes WWIII

Manekshaw 7 (October 27 Rita Manekshaw, Indian Daily http://www.indiadaily.com/editorial/18613.asp TBC 6/28/10 )

Turkey is under heavy pressure from the United States, Iraq and other countries to refrain from a cross-border military offensive against Kurdish PKK rebels based in northern Iraq. Americans are trying to prevent an all out Turkish offensive on Northern Iraq. Iraq President, Talabani, a Kurd and supporter of PKK is up on arms with Turkey and wants America to prevent any Turkish infiltration into Northern Iraq. Even Iran has taken actions against Kurds to make sure Turkey does not infiltrate Iranian border. "Whenever an operation is needed to be carried out, we will do that. We will not ask permission from anyone” says Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan while talking to a flag-waving crowd in the western city of Izmit. He says Turkey will defend its strategic interests at any cost. The youngest member of NATO and EU, Turkey is ready to take on PKK. US, EU and others are scrambling to pacify the matter. Oil is moving towards $100 a barrel because of the possible disruption of oil supplies from Northern Iraq. PKK, the Kurdish rebels, are determined too. They do not plan to listen this time to Iraqi President Talabani. Eventually a political solution will be reached. The international debate is on if Iraqi and US led coalition force must disciple and somewhat neutralize the PKK infrastructure. This can potentially break all the loosely wired coalition in Iraqi Government too. The Kurds are not willing to see PKK crushed. The Sunnis and Shiites do not care what happens to PKK. The US led coalition must control the situation. Turkish action will create turmoil in Iraq. In turn the whole are can blow up in a massive civil war. That can form the seed of the third world war.

\*\*\*NEG – RELATIONS\*\*\*

1NC – Relations

How the US deals with the PKK is the litmus test for relations

Larrabee 8 (F Stephen, Fellow at RAND, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND\_MG694.sum.pdf, AD: 6/27/10) jl

Turkish officials will be watching closely to see how U.S. strategy toward Iraq evolves. Ankara does not want to see a precipitous withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq because that could lead to greater sectarian violence and draw in other outside powers—especially Iran and Syria, but possibly also Saudi Arabia. However, Turkey is adamantly opposed to increased deployment of U.S. troops in northern Iraq. Turkish officials have warned that such a move would sharply reduce Turkish cooperation with the United States and exacerbate strains in U.S.–Turkish relations. The strains in Turkey’s relations with the European Union are likely to affect U.S.–Turkish relations. In the past, when its relations with the European Union were bad, Turkey could always turn to the United States for support. But this option is no longer available. For the first time in decades, Turkey’s relations with both Washington and Brussels are strained at the same time. The simultaneous deterioration of relations with the United States and the European Union has reinforced a growing sense of vulnerability and nationalism in Turkey. Turkey increasingly feels that it cannot count on the support of its traditional allies and must rely on its own devices (see pp. 22–23). In short, the United States will need to get used to dealing with a more independent-minded and assertive Turkey—one whose interests do not always coincide with U.S. interests, especially in the Middle East. The Kurdish issue in particular could cause new divergences. How the United States handles this issue is likely to be a litmus test of the value of the U.S.–Turkish alliance in Turkish eyes. If the United States fails to take action to deal more resolutely with the PKK issue, U.S.–Turkish relations are likely to deteriorate further, and anti-Americanism in Turkey, already strong, is likely to grow.

Closer relations with the US stop Turkish proliferation

Kibaroglu 8 [Mustafa, Middle East Policy, 12-22-2008, http://www.articlearchives.com/asia/western-asia-saudai-arabia/2282012-1.html]

Even though there is much talk in Turkey about why the state should develop nuclear weapons among those who approach the issue from the perspective of national pride and prestige as well as security, **most decision makers are quite aware that the possible consequences of going nuclear would mean violation of Turkey's international obligations**. Outside powers point to the difficulties Turkey may have to endure, but it also is state practice in institutions such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military. **These entities have always formulated and conducted Turkey's foreign and security policies in line with Ataturk's dictum, "peace at home, peace in the world." Against this backdrop, one should not expect Turkey to embark upon a rushed nuclear weapons program, even if Iran crosses the critical threshold**. Should this happen, however, what will keep Turkey from developing nuclear weapons will not simply be responsible state practice. **The extent to which Turkey's allies are willing and able to allay its fears emanating from the worsening regional security situation will also have a decisive effect on policy makers. Improving relations with the United States** and the EU, **as well as strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime, will make the greatest impact in this regard.**

A nuclear Turkey destabilizes the Middle East

Deliso 5 (Christopher, Balkan-based Journalist, November 21, 2005http://www.antiwar.com/deliso/?articleid=8091)

Proud Turkey has always wanted to be seen as an important country. Were it to declare itself a nuclear one, it would become, for a time at least, the most important country in the world. The entire balance of power in Europe and the Middle East would be radically altered overnight, and the overall side results would not at all be positive for Turkey or anyone else – except of course for those cashing in on illicit nuclear sales. Nevertheless, the country is probably technologically capable by now. A new question that has thus arisen, as articulated recently by Turkish scholar Mehmet Kalyoncu on Balkanalysis.com, is the following: "If the U.S. and the EU do not approve of Turkey having nuclear weapons, what do they have to offer Turkey instead?"

1NC – Relations

That goes nuclear.

Steinbach, ‘2 [John Centre for Research on Globalisation 2002 Israeli Nuclear weapons: a threat to peace, 3/3 http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/mat0036.htm]

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration

Internals – Relations

Turkish involvement in an Iraqi-Kurdistan invasion would gut US-Turkey relations

Brookes 7 (Peter, Heritage Foundation sr Fellow and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, June 4, <http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/item_8YUKOtM6XKgHdbV53paHaJ/1>) LL

TURKEY could send troops into Iraq any day now. It's massing ground forces on its southeastern border for a possible strike against the terrorist/separatist group the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Turkish special ops are likely already on the ground in Iraq. This is the last thing we - or the Iraqis - need. Preventing it must be a top priority of America, Iraq and Europe. The Kurdish area is the most stable and pro-American part of Iraq; neither Washington nor Baghdad can afford to have it become a new item on the "problem" list. The Turks wouldn't go in unopposed, either. Besides the PKK, Iraqi Kurds have promised to resist any Turkish incursion into Iraq. The Kurdish Peshmerga militia troops - just recently integrated into the Iraqi national army - are no slouches, meaning plenty of bloodshed in a donnybrook with the Turks. Baghdad has also warned against any Turkish action. It needs Kurdish/Iraqi troops focused on fighting its bad guys: al Qaeda, foreign jihadists and other insurgents. Fighting between Turks and Kurds in Iraq could also spread to Turkey's large Kurdish population of about 15 million. Even an accidental engagement with U.S. troops would damage U.S.-Turkish relations, including Turkish air-base access for supplying U.S. forces in Iraq and Ankara's support to Coalition efforts in Afghanistan. All that said, the Turks have good cause for being agitated. The PKK, numbering 4,000 in Iraq and 2,000 in Turkey, is a vicious bunch. Since 1984, when it began pushing for an independent homeland in southeastern Turkey, over 30,000 have been killed in insurgent, terrorist and Turkish force operations; the PKK killed 600 in 2006 alone. It stepped up attacks recently, killing 20 soldiers and civilians in the last two weeks. A suicide bombing in Ankara in late May killed six and wounded more than 100. The Turks blame the PKK; the Kurdish rebels deny responsibility. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan noted: "Our patience has run out . . . necessary steps will be taken when needed." The Turkish chief of the General Staff said the army is ready - all he needs is the "go-ahead." The Turkish public seems up for a strike, too. An incursion into Iraq against the PKK wouldn't be unprecedented. Turkish forces crossed the border a decade ago; they came close to doing so again last year after the PKK ended a self-imposed cease-fire. But Turkey isn't entirely innocent here, either. Ankara has ruled the Kurds, 20 percent of Turkey's population, with a heavy hand. Kurdish autonomy across the border in Iraq hasn't gone unnoticed. And then there's the issue of Turkish domestic politics. The current ruling political party, the AKP, has been down on its political luck lately. It might see a little jingoism in the form of military action as just the ticket to boost its flagging popularity before upcoming elections. Still, it could all be a bluff - a warning. Turkey is fed up with the PKK and wants the United States (its NATO ally) and Iraq to do something about it. A military buildup sends a clear signal that Turkey wants - indeed, demands - action. In the mean time, maneuvers on the border could pacify the Turkish domestic audience. But if the PKK attacks in Turkey continue as they have, Ankara may just give the army the dreaded green light. That could mean a limited attack - targeting PKK strongholds in the Qandil mountains, using aircraft and helicopter gunships. Worse, Turk special ops could target Kurdish leaders they believe are turning a blind eye to the PKK. But that could escalate, too. Turkish ground troops might pour over the border, setting up a buffer zone in Iraqi territory along a portion of the 200-mile dividing line to prevent PKK infiltration into Turkey. So what to do? Call on the Turks to exercise restraint. Kick diplomacy into high gear, using all channels possible. Our current special envoy, Gen. Joseph Ralston (ret.), can use the uniform to appeal to the politically powerful Turkish military. NATO can do some arm-twisting of its fellow alliance member, too. And the European Union should act - shutting down the numerous PKK networks there. (The European Union can also remind Turkey that good behavior would help its chances of membership, although interest in joining among Turks is waning.) Iraq's leading Kurds need to do their share. President Bush's meeting last week with Iraqi President Jalal Talibani, an influential Kurd, could help move things off dead center. Fortunately, there's been some word out of the Kurdish Regional Government, leaning in the direction of a crackdown on the PPK. We need to see some action, not just words, on that front. If all else fails, U.S. and Iraqi forces could move against the PKK - a group on the U.S. terrorist list - closing camps and ending cross-border raids into Turkey. Not ideal, but better than a showdown with Ankara. More violence in Iraq, especially involving a major power and a strategic ally like Turkey, would make our challenges there even more difficult. A Turkish-PKK war in Iraq must be avoided at all costs.

Internals – Relations

US-Turkey relations key to solve terrorism—Turkish invasion of Iraq is the devastates the alliance

Menon and Wimbush 7 (Rajan and S. Enders, Prof of IR @ Lehigh, Fellow, New America Foundation and Director, Center for Future Security Strategies, Hudson Institute, Mar 25, http://www.hudson.org/files/pdf\_upload/Turkey%20PDF.pdf) LL

The alliance between the United States and Turkey, which has endured since the 1947 Truman Doctrine and has contributed to the security of both countries, is now in serious trouble. What is worse, neither side is facing up to this reality, let alone taking serious remedial measures, nor even making concerted efforts to understand the new political currents within each other’s societies. If this neglect continues, the price paid by both sides will be steep. It is becoming increasingly clear that Washington and Ankara see the world and define their interests in divergent ways. If allowed to continue, this trend could well undo the alliance. The good news is that there is still time to act, providing senior leaders on both sides move with dispatch. It is urgent that they do so, for despite the end of the Cold War, which provided a clear rationale for their alliance for four decades, Ankara and Washington still need each other, perhaps more so because they now face multiple and unfamiliar threats, not least those posed by terrorism. The most important source of discord between Turkey and the United States is the war in Iraq. Ankara fears that Iraq will break up as a result of the war and that a separate Kurdish state will arise, creating even greater disorder and stoking separatist sentiment in Turkey’s southeast, and increasing paramilitary and terrorist attacks by the Kurdish separatist organization, the PKK. Washington, for its part, feels betrayed by the Turkish parliament’s rejection of its request to open a second front from Turkey’s territory against Saddam Hussein’s army in the run-up to the 2003 war. But more fundamentally, the Bush administration is preoccupied by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and seems to have relegated Turkey to the back burner—or so it appears to many Turks. The widespread belief among Turks that the United States undertook the Iraq war without regard to the consequences for Turkey’s security and that Washington now seeks to punish it for the Turkish parliament’s vote has created enormous resentment toward the United States. This sentiment is reflected across the political spectrum. It is evident among elites, including the leadership of the Turkish military, arguably the country’s most influential institution, but also pervades society more generally. Opinion polls show that Turks, who once viewed the United States as an ally and friend, increasingly see it as not just unfriendly, but as a direct threat to their national security. As a result, influential Turks, government officials and foreign policy experts alike, are discussing a strategic reassessment. This reorientation would involve building deep ties with new partners, among them Russia, China, Iran, and Syria and would, moreover, abandon the longstanding premise that the United States remains the indispensable ally. It would be mistaken for the United States to dismiss these discussions as bluster. Turkey remains a crucial ally in the struggle against terrorism; it is a secular and democratic Muslim country; it sits atop an arc extending from Israel to Central Asia, a zone of actual or potential upheaval and war; it abuts waterways critical to the flow of commerce, particularly oil; its territory is a corridor for the strategically important Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline; and its cooperation is key to a durable settlement in Iraq and to an effective policy to counter the challenges posed by a resurgent (and potentially nuclear-armed) Iran.

Terrorism causes extinction

Alexander 3 (Yonah, Inter-University for Terrorism Studies Director, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2003/aug/27/20030827-084256-8999r/, AD: 6/27/10) jl

Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns.

Internals – Turkish Prolif

Decline in relations pushes Turkey into going nuclear—and spurs nuclear war

Sokolski 7 [Henry, the Non-proliferation policy education center, Jun 14, http://www.npec-web.org/Presentations/20070616-Sokolski-Talk-AixEnProvence-Conference.pdf]

Whether or not Turkey does choose to go its own way and acquire a nuclear weapons-option of its own will depend on several factors, including Ankara’s relations with Washington, Brussels, and Tehran. To a very significant degree, though, it also will depend on whether or not the EU Members States are serious about letting Turkey join the EU. The dimmer these prospects look, the greater is the likelihood of that Turkey will chose to hedge its political, economic, and security bets by seeking a nuclear weapons-option of its own. This poses a difficult choice for the EU. Many key members are opposed to letting Turkey join the EU. There are arguments to favor this position. Yet, if Turkey should conclude that its interests are best served by pursuing such a nuclear weapons-option, it is almost certain to fortify the conviction of Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia to do the same. This will result in the building up a nuclear powder keg on Europe’s doorstep and significantly increase the prospect for nuclear terrorism and war.

A failure to credibly defend Turkey will lead to speedy nuclearization

Clawson, ‘3 [Patrick, Deputy Director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East: Who is next after Iran, April, 2003, <http://www.npec-web.org/Essays/Presentation030401%20Clawson%20Nuclear%20Prolif%20TB.pdf>]

Historically Turkey has been at peace with Iran, and the two countries have generally paid relatively little attention to each other, compared to what one might expect from two neighbors with considerable economic interaction. That said, **Turkey has many reasons to worry** **about meddling by an Islamic Republic** which is ideologically opposed to Ankara’s secular policies. If Turkey faces serious internal problems – be it from Islamists or from Kurds – Iran might seek to take advantage of that situation, and Iranian nuclear weapons would make Turkey think long and hard about how much it could complain about such Iranian meddling. In other words, an Iranian nuclear capability could make the Turkish General Staff nervous. Faced with a nuclear-armed Iran, Turkey’s first instinct will be to turn to NATO**. Turkey places extraordinary value on its NATO membership**, which symbolizes the West’s acceptance of Turkey – a delicate issue for a country which feels it is excluded from the EU on civilizational grounds more than for any other reason. **The cold reality is that NATO was not designed to defend Turkey**: assisting Turkey faced with a general Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe is one thing; defending Turkey when it alone faces a threat is an altogether different matter. **It is not clear how much NATO members want to take on this burden**. **It will be only natural for Turkey to wonder how much it can rely on NATO. Were Turkey to decide that it had to proliferate in order to defend itself, it has good industrial and scientific infrastructures which it could draw upon to build nuclear weapons on its own. It would be difficult to prevent a determined Turkey from building nuclear weapons in well under a decade.**

\*\*\*AFF – RELATIONS\*\*\*

Aff – Alternative Causalities

No impact – Too many alternative causalities

Zaman 8 (Amberin, Real Clear World, http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2008/11/turkey\_and\_us\_under\_obama.html, AD: 6/28/10) jl

Turkey’s interests have not always con¬verged with those of the United States. This was never more evident than when the Turkish Parliament refused to let U.S. troops use Turkey as a launch¬ing pad to open a second front against Saddam Hussein in March 2003. The rebuttal unleashed a cycle of mutual hostility and recrimination that is only just beginning to ease.

Yet nothing alarms Turks quite as much as the prospect that Obama will fulfill his campaign promise to recognize the mass slaughter of the Ottoman Armenians in 1915 as genocide. While acknowledging the ground-breaking nature of the U.S. presidential election, it is from this narrow prism that many Turks tend to weigh the pros and cons of President-elect Barack Obama.

Aff – Collapse Inevitable

Relations collapse inevitable- failure of domestic politics

Walker ’07 [Joshua, Graduate Fellow & PhD Candidate Princeton, Washington Quarterly, Winter ’07-’08, http://www.twq.com/08winter/docs/08winter\_walker.pdf]

Although the United States and Turkey have had serious policy disagreements in the past, there has always been an overarching strategic vision to keep the alliance intact. Now, with the absence of a common threat from the Soviet Union and with new civilian-military dynamics in Turkey, the future of the U.S.-Turkish alliance needs to be carefully reexamined. Because of its Islamic roots and Muslim outlook, the AKP has brought with it an unprecedented willingness to reach out to Turkey’s Middle East- ern neighbors, such as Iran and Syria, which have traditionally been viewed as common enemies by Ankara and Washington. Articulating a new vision for Turkey that is not dependent on Washington while actively seeking ways to balance its relationships and alliances, the AKP still has many domestic hurdles to overcome. Although the AKP’s policy of maintaining optimal inde- pendence and leverage on the global and regional stage appeals to its Turkish constituency, this type of policy does not bode well for Turkey’s historic alli- ance with the United States. Although all relationships as complex as the U.S.-Turkish alliance experi- ence natural ebbs and flows, the rupture in strategic vision between these allies has been so egregious that some commentators have placed the blame squarely on the AKP. Given the internal tensions within Turkey surrounding the Islamist roots of the party and the sensitivities of Turkey’s secular estab- lishment, the argument goes that the U.S.-Turkish relationship has become the latest victim of domestic Turkish politics.1 The March 1, 2003, vote in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) to reject the U.S. request to open a northern front against Iraq has come to symbolize the clear divergence of strategic interests between the United States and Turkey, and it has also erroneously been used to demonstrate the anti- American bias of the AKP. Yet, by tracking the ascent of the AKP from the November 2002 elections to the most recent ones, it is clear that, far from being the source of anti-Americanism in Turkey, the AKP represents an ideal partner for the United States in the region.

Aff – N/U – Relations Low

Turkey becoming aligned with the Middle East—anti-American propaganda and increasing Islamic influence

Rubin 10 (Michael, scholar at American Enterprise Institute, July/August, http://www.commentarymagazine.com/viewarticle.cfm/turkey--from-ally-to-enemy-15464)

A decade ago, Turks saw themselves in a camp with the United States, Western Europe, and Israel; today Turkish self-identity places the country firmly in a camp led by Iran, Syria, Sudan, and Hamas. Turkey may be a NATO member, but polls nevertheless show it to be the world’s most anti-American country (although, to be fair, the Pew Global Attitudes Project did not conduct surveys in Libya or North Korea). Nor do Turks differentiate between the U.S. government and the American people: they hate Americans almost as much as they hate Washington. This is no accident. From almost day one, Erdogan has encouraged, and his allies have financed, a steady stream of anti-American and anti-Semitic incitement. Certainly, many Turks opposed the liberation of Iraq in 2003, but this was largely because Erdogan bombarded them with anti-American incitement before Parliament’s vote, which withdrew the support promised to the operation. Much of Erdogan’s incitement, however, cannot be dismissed as a dispute over the Iraq war. In 2004, Yeni Safak, a newspaper Erdogan endorsed, published an enemies list of prominent Jews. In 2006, not only did Turkish theaters headline Valley of the Wolves, a fiercely anti-American and anti-Semitic movie that featured a Jewish doctor harvesting the organs of dead Iraqis, but the prime minister’s wife also publicly endorsed the film and urged all Turks to see it. Turkish newspapers reported that prominent AKP supporters and Erdogan aides financed its production. While much of the Western world boycotted Hamas in the wake of the 2006 Palestinian elections in order to force it to renounce violence, Erdogan not only extended a hand to the group but also welcomed Khaled Mashaal, leader of its most extreme and recalcitrant faction, as his personal guest. The question for policymakers, however, should not be whether Turkey is lost but rather how Erdogan could lead a slow-motion Islamic revolution below the West’s radar. This is both a testament to Erdogan’s skill and a reflection of Western delusion. Before taking power, Erdogan and his advisers cultivated Western opinion makers. He concentrated not on American pundits who found U.S. policy insufficiently leftist and sympathetic to the Islamic world but rather on natural critics, hawkish American supporters of Turkey and Israel who helped introduce Erdogan confidantes to Washington policymakers.

Turkey’s strengthening relations with Iran--Kurd minority and energy

Cook and Sherwood-Randall 6 (Steven, expert on Arab and Turkish politics, and Elizabeth, research scholar at Stanford, Council on Foreign Relations, No. 15, June)

Ankara’s policy toward Iran is similar to its posture vis-à-vis Syria. While Turkish officials acknowledge that the Iranian regime is a source of tension and instability in the region, they regard cordial relations with the Iranians as a means of guarding against potential Iranian meddling. In addition, the Turks have significant economic and energy interests in Iran. Trade between the two countries exceeded $4 billion by the end of 2005, and in a deal extending until 2022, Iran supplies Turkey with 10 billion cubic meters of gas annually. The energy agreement has, however, been a source of tension between the two countries. In late January 2006, the flow of gas from Iran to Turkey inexplicably dropped by 70 percent. Tehran blamed the decrease on technical problems, but the Turks remain wary of what they perceive to be Iran’s use of gas as a lever to intimidate Turkey at the same time that Ankara’s Western partners seek sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program. Despite the dispute over gas supplies, Ankara and Tehran have sought to maintain good relations. In late February 2006, the eleventh Iran-Turkey High Security Council met in Tehran. This bilateral meeting, which was presided over at the deputy minister level, reaffirmed Turkish-Iranian trade relations and included discussions concerning border security and drug smuggling. Finally, the same logic that is driving close relations between Ankara and Damascus is at work in Turkey’s relations with Iran: the common desire to forestall Kurdish independence in northern Iraq. Like Turkey and Syria, Iran has a large Kurdish population that could agitate for political rights should Iraq’s Kurds achieve independence

Aff – Impact Turn – Syria

A. Strong US-Turkish relations spark Turkish aggression that destabilizes the Middle East and cause war with Syria

Carpenter ’99 [Ted Galen, VP Foreign Policy Studies & Defense at CATO, Jan, http://www.hri.org/forum/intpol/carpenter.html]

The strategy of making Turkey a keystone American ally is myopic and potentially very dangerous. U.S. policymakers have been down a similar path before--with disastrous results. During much of the Cold War, Washington treated Iran as an indispensable ally and an important stabilizing force in the region. President Jimmy Carter's infamous 1977 New Year's Eve toast praising the shah for making Iran "an island of stability" in a turbulent part of the world encapsulated long-standing U.S. assumptions.[21](http://www.hri.org/forum/intpol/carpenter.html#21) Washington had used the Central Intelligence Agency to orchestrate a coup to oust Iran's democratic government in 1953 and put the shah back on his throne. Thereafter, it appeared that the shah's regime could do no wrong in the eyes of U.S. policymakers. Not only did Washington ignore Teheran's massive human rights abuses, but it remained silent as the shah systematically suppressed democratic opponents. Washington's indulgent policy toward the authoritarian behavior of Turkey's military is eerily reminiscent of the U.S. policy toward Iran under the shah. We are still paying a steep price for the latter folly. Perhaps even worse, Washington's incessant courtship of Ankara is giving Turkey an inflated sense of its own strategic importance. That courtship is also encouraging (one assumes inadvertently) abrasive, indeed aggressive, behavior on the part of Turkey. Turkey's assumption that it is Washington's essential ally could cause Ankara to provoke a war with Greece over Cyprus or over control of islands in the Aegean.[22](http://www.hri.org/forum/intpol/carpenter.html#22) Likewise, the perception of U.S. acquiescence, if not outright support, might encourage Turkey to seek a new confrontation with Syria or one of its other neighbors over some other issue. For example, Ankara has already imposed a brutal economic blockade against Armenia because of that country's armed struggle with Azerbaijan over control of the latter's predominantly Armenian enclave of Nakorno-Karabakh. A scenario in which Turkey might choose to escalate its coercion against Armenia is hardly fanciful. The Clinton administration's pro-Turkish tilt is based on multiple misconceptions. One fallacy is that Turkey is an indispensable strategic ally. In reality, the United States does not have vital security or economic interests in that part of the world--especially when there is no longer the need to contain the expansionist ambitions of a rival superpower. In particular, the importance of the Caspian oil supply is vastly overrated.[23](http://www.hri.org/forum/intpol/carpenter.html#23) The world already is awash in oil, and given the rapid advancements in discovery techniques and extraction technologies, it is retrograde thinking to regard oil as a scarce and vital commodity.[24](http://www.hri.org/forum/intpol/carpenter.html#24) Unless the United States and other oil-consuming nations replicate their economically illiterate energy policies of the 1970s, oil prices (already nearing record lows in inflation-adjusted terms) are likely to follow the prices of other plentiful commodities to even lower levels. There is no need to support Turkey to gain control of the supposedly essential Caspian oil output. A second fallacy is that Turkey's political system is stable and reliably pro-American. In fact, Turkey is a Potemkin democracy with an authoritarian military elite holding ultimate political power in its own hands. The country is also beset by massive corruption, a serious (albeit perhaps waning) secessionist problem, and a potent Islamist movement.[25](http://www.hri.org/forum/intpol/carpenter.html#25) Building U.S. strategic ties with such an ally is akin to constructing a fortress on quicksand. Finally, the worst fallacy is the pervasive assumption of U.S. policymakers that Turkey is a stabilizing regional power that will help the United States to maintain a relatively benign status quo in the region. To the contrary, Turkey shows signs of being a revisionist--and perhaps an aggressively revisionist--power. Several of its actions in recent years--especially those directed toward Greece, Syria, and Armenia--are typical of a country that has ambitions to become a regional hegemon. Even its behavior regarding the crises in the Balkans, although somewhat less aggressive, is consistent with that pattern. Washington apparently assumes that its policy agenda and Ankara's are compatible, if not congruent. But U.S. leaders must consider the very real possibility that Ankara may have ambitions that would be disruptive to the region and undermine U.S. objectives. Washington's indulgent double standard toward Turkey is objectionable on the grounds of hypocrisy, but there is a more pragmatic reason that it should be abandoned forthwith. By treating Turkey as an indispensable ally, the United States may be sowing the seeds of regional disorder and perhaps even armed conflict that might otherwise be avoidable. It is not America's responsibility to preserve peace and stability throughout the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, but Washington should at least not pursue policies that increase the prospect of tragedy.

Aff – Impact Turn – Syria War

B. Syrian war leads to WMD use.

Al ’01 [Guray, 1st Lt. Turkish Army, Dec, http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA401656&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf]

In an armed confrontation, Ankara is well placed to achieve an operational success. Syria is preoccupied on other fronts, the Golan Heights and Lebanon, and is in no position to confront Turkey openly.226 Turkey's ground forces are twice as large as Syria's and more combat-experienced, and most of Syria's ground orders of battle are pinned down on the Golan or in Lebanon. 227 Moreover, according to some analysts, Turkey reckons that Damascus, fearing Turkish-Israeli military coordination, would feel uncomfortable redeploying significant forces to its border with Turkey. Therefore, Turkey could easily make a quick advance in days deep inside Syrian territory, and the Syrian army could suffer enormous casualties. If Syrian forces are unable to halt the Turkish offensives, then it is highly possible that Syria might consider using weapons of mass destruction to stem Turkish incursions into Syrian territory. A serious PKK-related Turkish-Syrian clash in this manner could have significant consequences for Turkey. Although a large-scale Turkish intervention aimed at toppling the Syrian leadership is unlikely, an unequivocal Syrian ground-defeat might well weaken the current regime and perhaps change the dynamics in the Middle East peace- process in favor of Israel.228 The situation could easily evolve into a directly threatening character for the survival of the Assad regime. After being defeated on three occasions on the conventional battlefield in 1967, 1973 and 1982, Syria might consider using WMD against Turkey if the Syrian leadership deemed a total defeat inevitable or the survival of the regime is at stake. According to Ian O. Lesser, under such conditions, use of WMD against Turkey is a distinct possibility: In the case of an open confrontation, if significant amount of Syrian territory is lost or the survival of the Assad regime is threatened, it is not beyond imagining that Syria might employ Scud B and Scud C missiles against Turkish targets, possibly including Ankara. Adana and Iskenderun would be particularly vulnerable.

Aff – Impact Turn – Balkan Instability

A. US-Turkish relations trade-off with US-Greek relations

Borowiec 2k [Andrew, The Washington Times, Oct. 22, Lexis]

Mr. Burns and the United States have often been targets of the Greek media, and despite official, and often solemn, pledges of U.S.-Greek friendship, the relations between the two countries have not always been smooth. There are myriad reasons. Washington has complained that Athens has done little to stem terrorism, mainly by the notorious 17th November terrorist organization whose victims over the past 25 years have included five members of the U.S. Embassy here killed and 20 wounded. Greece - and particularly its freewheeling press - has accused Washington of tilting toward Turkey, Greece's historic foe, and of not doing enough to end the division of Cyprus, where Turkey had carved out a separate area for the Turkish Cypriot minority, protected by 35,000 mainland Turkish troops. More recent accusations from Greek media include charges that by excessively stressing the danger of terrorism, the United States is trying to destroy Greece's tourism and is undermining its ability to guarantee security for the 2004 Olympics.

B. US-Greek relations key to Balkan stability

Kornblum 96 [John, Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, http://www.hri.org/cgi-bin/brief?/news/misc/misc-news/1996/96-05-09\_3.misc.html]

Just two weeks ago I visited Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus to emphasize the importance the U.S. attaches to this region. Here we find our close friends and NATO allies divided by disputes that for too long have been left unsettled. But I believe new opportunities lie before us today. To the east of Turkey, to the north of Greece, new states are moving forward toward democracy and economic development. Greece and Turkey should play leading roles in this process. This requires, however, moving beyond the disputes which have divided them, advancing a settlement with Cyprus, and addressing key internal problems as well. Greece -- a key NATO ally, democracy, and a member of the EU -- offers a natural port to the Balkans and bridge to the East. It has a key role to play in building ties of commerce and peace in the Balkans. Today, Greek troops work with us on IFOR and Greece is making significant progress in improving its relations with its neighbors -- including the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania.

C. Balkan instability causes WW3

Gaur 6 [Kalki, World Renowned Philosopher, “Nuclear Weapons Doctrine,” <http://kalkigaur.googlepages.com/66>]

Three important areas, which could ignite the Third World War, are in Kosovo, Australia, and Saudi Arabia. Firstly, The NATO's barbaric bombardment of civilian industrial infrastructure of Yugoslavia is a form of War of Religions between Catholic and Orthodox Christianity. NATO's operations in Kosovo, and subsequent rise of Vladimir V. Putin as the next President of Russia guarantees that the third World War would take place on European continent. Western Europe would again witness the total destruction of industrial infrastructure in the next World War. The destruction of Western industrial infrastructure shall reestablish the preponderance of the United States and Russia in European affairs. Next Balkan War would destroy European Union.

D. Balkan war escalates to nuclear extinction.

Chicago Daily 99 [May 9, “Dogs of War,” Lexis]

We need to stop the war and return to the negotiating table to end the suffering in Kosovo before the "dogs of war" are unleashed and there is no controlling the catastrophic - we're near that point. Most of us realize that in war the unexpected is often the rule, often resulting in chaos. There must be an end to military operations and the ethnic cleansing against Kosovo civilians. Something has gone wrong; the very people we were supposed to be saving are suffering thousands of dead and millions homeless. Dialogue must be aimed at reaching a peaceful settlement that respects the wishes of the inhabitants of Kosovo, while respecting history, international law and minority rights. It seems to me the Clinton administration embarked on a military adventure that has not been thought through. The administration has been dealing with Milosevic for six years. We hear the grim rationale for sending in ground troops "to salvage the credibility of the NATO Alliance." I don't want any American servicemen/women to die for the idea that once you have embarked on a disastrous course of action, you can only continue on ... that's nonsense. On a recent news program the Italian and German foreign ministers stated troop deployment is not acceptable as part of their national defense - the French representative waffled. Both France and Germany have large Muslim populations. The German official said the NATO Alliance weapons, planes, missiles are primarily American with minimum involvement of NATO allies. Let's not forget that Russia has warned NATO countries that this action could culminate in a third world war. The war in the Balkans could easily become the flash point of world conflict resulting in nuclear war and incalculable self-destruction.

Aff – Impact Turn – Terrorism

US-Turkey relations are key to several areas of democracy promotion

Baran 7 (Zeyno, Director of International Security and Energy Programs at The Nixon Center,

[The U.S.-Turkey Partnership: Looking to the Future, http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol2Issue27/Vol2Issue27Baran.html]

At the same time, Turkey could serve as a possible “example” to the greater Middle East, which includes Iran, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, at a recent meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Countries (OIC) in Tehran, stated that the current Turkish government wants to prove that “a Muslim society can be democratic, open, transparent, pluralistic and modern, while preserving its identity.” He urged that:  “countries in the Islamic world must act with a refreshed  vision in which good governance, transparency and accountability will reign, the fundamental rights and freedoms as well as gender equality are upheld, and there would be no place for blunting rhetoric and slogans….we should first put our house in order. Rationalism should be our driving force, as we draw our strength from our spiritual values. Creating a synergy from these values inherent in our being will be our test in, as well as our contribution to, our modern age…I challenge the view that modernity and democracy based on the rule of law, political and economic participation, and gender equality cannot exist in the Muslim world. The Turkish experience proves otherwise.” Gul also said the Turkish government would explore with the United States and Europe ideas on:   Regional good neighborliness charter or a code of conduct Regional security and cooperation process Regional trade liberalization Enhanced economic and cultural interrelationship Regional anti-terror pact These approaches provide many opportunities for cooperation. While the United States works with Turkey on promoting the “Turkish example” for the greater Middle East, however, it needs to better understand what the “Turkish model” is—it is truly unique and the U.S. ought not try to shape it to become a bit more religious or a bit less secular so that it can be more applicable for the Arab Middle East. The U.S. does not have a good track record in dealing with political Islam and ought to stay out of this area in Turkey as well.

Emerging Middle East democracies will empower terrorists- empirically proven

Ottawayis & Carothers 4 [Marina, senior associate at the Democracy and Rule of Law Project of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace & Thomas Carothers, author of Aiding Democracy Abroad and a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment, Foreign Policy, November/December 2004, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\_id=2705]

“Middle East Democracy Is the Cure for Islamist Terrorism” No. This view is rooted in a simplistic assumption: Stagnant, repressive Arab regimes create positive conditions for the growth of radical Islamist groups, which turn their sights on the United States because it embodies the liberal sociopolitical values that radical Islamists oppose. More democracy, therefore, equals less extremism. History tells a different story. Modern militant Islam developed with the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the 1920s, during the most democratic period in that country’s history. Radical political Islam gains followers not only among repressed Saudis but also among some Muslims in Western democracies, especially in Europe. The emergence of radical Islamist groups determined to wreak violence on the United States is thus not only the consequence of Arab autocracy. It is a complex phenomenon with diverse roots, which include U.S. sponsorship of the mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s (which only empowered Islamist militants); the Saudi government’s promotion of radical Islamic educational programs worldwide; and anger at various U.S. policies, such as the country’s stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the basing of military forces in the region.Moreover, democracy is not a cure-all for terrorism. Like it or not, the most successful efforts to control radical Islamist political groups have been antidemocratic, repressive campaigns, such as those waged in Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria in the 1990s. The notion that Arab governments would necessarily be more effective in fighting extremists is wishful thinking, no matter how valuable democratization might be for other reasons. The experience of countries in different regions makes clear that terrorist groups can operate for sustained periods even in successful democracies, whether it is the Irish Republican Army in Britain or the ETA (Basque separatists) in Spain. The ETA gained strength during the first two decades of Spain’s democratization process, flourishing more than it had under the dictatorship of Gen. Francisco Franco. In fragile democratic states—as new Arab democracies would likely be for years—radical groups committed to violence can do even more harm, often for long periods, as evidenced by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, or the Maoist rebels in Nepal.

Aff – Impact Turn – Terrorism

Terrorism causes extinction

Pacotti 3 (March 31http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2003/03/31/knowledge/index.html)

A similar trend has appeared in proposed solutions to high-tech terrorist threats. Advances in biotech, chemistry, and other fields are expanding the power of individuals to cause harm, and this has many people worried. Glenn E. Schweitzer and Carole C. Dorsch, writing for The Futurist, gave this warning in 1999: "Technological advances threaten to outdo anything terrorists have done before; superterrorism has the potential to eradicate civilization as we know it." Schweitzer and Dorsch are so alarmed that they go on to say, "Civil liberties are important for a democratic society; the time has arrived, however, to reconfigure some aspects of democracy, given the violence that is on the doorstep." The Sept. 11 attacks have obviously added credence to their opinions. In 1999, they recommended an expanded role for the CIA, "greater government intervention" in Americans' lives, and the "honorable deed" of "whistle-blowing" -- proposals that went from fringe ideas to policy options and talk-show banter in less than a year. Taken together, their proposals aim to gather information from companies and individuals and feed that information into government agencies. A network of cameras positioned on street corners would nicely complement their vision of America during the 21st century. If after Sept. 11 and the anthrax scare these still sound like wacky Orwellian ideas to you, imagine how they will sound the day a terrorist opens a jar of Ebola-AIDS spores on Capitol Hill. As Sun Microsystems' chief scientist, Bill Joy, warned: "We have yet to come to terms with the fact that the most compelling 21st-century technologies -- robotics, genetic engineering, and nanotechnology -- pose a different threat than the technologies that have come before. Specifically, robots, engineered organisms, and nanobots share a dangerous amplifying factor: They can self-replicate. A bomb is blown up only once -- but one bot can become many, and quickly get out of control." Joy calls the new threats "knowledge-enabled mass destruction." To cause great harm to millions of people, an extreme person will need only dangerous knowledge, which itself will move through the biosphere, encoded as matter, and flit from place to place as easily as dangerous ideas now travel between our minds. In the information age, dangerous knowledge can be copied and disseminated at light speed, and it threatens everyone. Therefore, Joy's perfectly reasonable conclusion is that we should relinquish "certain kinds of knowledge." He says that it is time to reconsider the open, unrestrained pursuit of knowledge that has been the foundation of science for 300 years. "[D]espite the strong historical precedents, if open access to and unlimited development of knowledge henceforth puts us all in clear danger of extinction, then common sense demands that we reexamine even these basic, long-held beliefs."

\*\*\*NEG – TROOP WITHDRAWAL\*\*\*

1NC – Troop Withdrawal

Incirlik used for troop withdrawal

HELICKE 4 (JAMES C. Jan 12 http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1056129/posts TBC 6/28/10)

The American military has begun using an air base in southern Turkey for a massive rotation of troops in and out of Iraq, a U.S. official told The Associated Press on Sunday, in a sign of improved U.S.-Turkish relations. Turkish permission to use its Incirlik air base marks a sharp contrast to last year, when the country - opposed to the invasion to oust Saddam Hussein - refused to allow U.S. troops on its territory for the war against its southern neighbor. It also comes as NATO ally Turkey is increasingly eager to win favor with the United States amid concerns over Iraqi Kurdish demands for greater autonomy in oil-rich northern Iraq. Turkey, and neighbors Syria and Iran, fear Iraqi Kurds might eventually push for independence and bring instability to their borders. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is expected to raise Turkey's concerns about Iraq during talks with President Bush in Washington later this month. The use of Incirlik helps the United States as it deals with the largest movement of troops in decades. The military is preparing to send some 130,000 U.S. troops in Iraq home over the coming months, replacing them with a more mobile, less heavily armed force of about 110,000.

Transfer of troops key to US-Turkey relations

SARIİBRAHİMOĞLU 9 (LALE 23 March http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=170385 TBC 6/28/10)

Davutoğlu's remarks have given a strong indication, among others, that Turkey may even soften its existing policy of not allowing arms and heavy military equipment to be transported through Turkey's İncirlik air base in the south, which has played a central role as a cargo hub in the US's war in Iraq. Prime Minister Erdoğan said earlier that Turkey could allow US troops to use İncirlik for their withdrawal but cannot permit the transport of military equipment. As Foreign Minister Ali Babacan stated previously, Erdoğan, as the head of the government, will decide on the issue of opening up Turkish soil for the US withdrawal. But government sources stated that Turkey's approach to any formal US demand of using Turkish soil for both troop withdrawal and arms shipment will form one of the legs and an important aspect of the new period in Turkish-US relations. "This means that Turkey will talk to the US without any prejudice -- i.e., including the possible transfer of arms via İncirlik," they said

1NC – Troop Withdrawal

US-Turkey relations key to solve terrorism—Turkish invasion of Iraq is the devastates the alliance

Menon and Wimbush 7 (Rajan and S. Enders, Prof of IR @ Lehigh, Fellow, New America Foundation and Director, Center for Future Security Strategies, Hudson Institute, Mar 25, http://www.hudson.org/files/pdf\_upload/Turkey%20PDF.pdf) LL

The alliance between the United States and Turkey, which has endured since the 1947 Truman Doctrine and has contributed to the security of both countries, is now in serious trouble. What is worse, neither side is facing up to this reality, let alone taking serious remedial measures, nor even making concerted efforts to understand the new political currents within each other’s societies. If this neglect continues, the price paid by both sides will be steep. It is becoming increasingly clear that Washington and Ankara see the world and define their interests in divergent ways. If allowed to continue, this trend could well undo the alliance. The good news is that there is still time to act, providing senior leaders on both sides move with dispatch. It is urgent that they do so, for despite the end of the Cold War, which provided a clear rationale for their alliance for four decades, Ankara and Washington still need each other, perhaps more so because they now face multiple and unfamiliar threats, not least those posed by terrorism. The most important source of discord between Turkey and the United States is the war in Iraq. Ankara fears that Iraq will break up as a result of the war and that a separate Kurdish state will arise, creating even greater disorder and stoking separatist sentiment in Turkey’s southeast, and increasing paramilitary and terrorist attacks by the Kurdish separatist organization, the PKK. Washington, for its part, feels betrayed by the Turkish parliament’s rejection of its request to open a second front from Turkey’s territory against Saddam Hussein’s army in the run-up to the 2003 war. But more fundamentally, the Bush administration is preoccupied by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and seems to have relegated Turkey to the back burner—or so it appears to many Turks. The widespread belief among Turks that the United States undertook the Iraq war without regard to the consequences for Turkey’s security and that Washington now seeks to punish it for the Turkish parliament’s vote has created enormous resentment toward the United States. This sentiment is reflected across the political spectrum. It is evident among elites, including the leadership of the Turkish military, arguably the country’s most influential institution, but also pervades society more generally. Opinion polls show that Turks, who once viewed the United States as an ally and friend, increasingly see it as not just unfriendly, but as a direct threat to their national security. As a result, influential Turks, government officials and foreign policy experts alike, are discussing a strategic reassessment. This reorientation would involve building deep ties with new partners, among them Russia, China, Iran, and Syria and would, moreover, abandon the longstanding premise that the United States remains the indispensable ally. It would be mistaken for the United States to dismiss these discussions as bluster. Turkey remains a crucial ally in the struggle against terrorism; it is a secular and democratic Muslim country; it sits atop an arc extending from Israel to Central Asia, a zone of actual or potential upheaval and war; it abuts waterways critical to the flow of commerce, particularly oil; its territory is a corridor for the strategically important Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline; and its cooperation is key to a durable settlement in Iraq and to an effective policy to counter the challenges posed by a resurgent (and potentially nuclear-armed) Iran.

Terrorism causes extinction

Alexander 3 (Yonah, Inter-University for Terrorism Studies Director, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2003/aug/27/20030827-084256-8999r/, AD: 6/27/10) jl

Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns.

Internals – Incirlik Troop Withdrawal

Incirlik used for troop withdrawal

HELICKE 4 (JAMES C. Jan 12 http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1056129/posts TBC 6/28/10)

Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul said Friday there was "nothing new" at the base but said Incirlik "has been used and will be used, because the transportation of certain soldiers is more secure through Incirlik." A U.S. spokesman at Incirlik refused to comment about the rotations Sunday, citing security concerns. U.S. forces had based some 50 warplanes at Incirlik after the 1991 Gulf War to patrol a no-fly zone over northern Iraq. But the U.S. withdrew its forces last year as tension escalated between Washington and Ankara. Since the Iraq war's end, Turkey has again agreed to open Incirlik and other sites to the U.S.-led coalition for logistical support as part of efforts to improve ties with Washington. Turkey even offered to send peacekeepers to Iraq, but that offer was shelved amid strong Iraqi opposition. Iraqi Kurds, for example, feared Turkish troops might threaten the autonomy they enjoyed in northern Iraq after the Gulf War. Turkey fought a 15-year war with Kurdish rebels in southeastern Turkey and fears a Kurdish state at its borders could spark new fighting. The 1,400 U.S. soldiers at Incirlik - half as many as before the war - have been supporting the Iraq operation with tankers to fuel aircraft in Iraq and by delivering supplies to Iraq, a U.S. military official at Incirlik air base said on condition of anonymity. The base has also occasionally sent U.S. troops to help support the Iraq mission, he added. During a visit to Ankara last month, U.S. Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman said the U.S. military wanted to continue using Incirlik as it realigns American troops and bases to better respond to new threats such as terrorism. The realignment is likely to close or scale down many of the permanent bases set up in Germany and other NATO nations to face the Soviet threat.

Troops leave through Turkey

Watson 9 (Ivan march 22 http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/03/22/turkey.iraq.us/index.html TBC 6/28/10)

ANKARA, Turkey (CNN) -- Turkey's prime minister said Saturday he would be receptive to the possibility of allowing American troops to withdraw from Iraq across Turkish territory, if the United States asks for permission. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan says he's "positive" on the idea of U.S. troops crossing his country. "With regard to the exit of the American soldiers, we are positive on that issue," said Recep Tayyip Erdogan, speaking through an interpreter. In an exclusive interview with CNN at the headquarters of his Justice and Development Party, Erdogan indicated he had not yet received an official request from his American ally for permission to move troops across Turkish soil. "If weapons and ammunition are going to come out, it has to be clear where they are going to be heading," Erdogan said. "If we are informed about where this military equipment would be going precisely, then we can make a proper evaluation." Watch Turkish prime minister's response »

Internals – Incirlik Troop Withdrawal

Iraq withdrawal happening now – We leave through Turkey

Kemal 9 (Lale March 3 http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/columnists-168486-is-turkey-vital-for-us-exit-strategy-from-iraq.html TBC 6/28/10)

Turkey is an important ally for the US, mainly due to its geographic location at the strategic junction of the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans. Due to this location, Turkey, a NATO ally, plays an important role in serving US national interests in this volatile region. In the words of a Western diplomat, if Turkey were not located in this critical geography, it would not have had any importance for the US. This is a realistic analysis that also dictates the relationship among the nations. That also explains why Turkish-US relations soured significantly when Parliament rejected a motion on March 1, 2003 -- soon before the US invasion of Iraq -- that would have opened Turkish soil to use by this NATO ally. Despite rejecting the motion allowing US soldiers to enter Iraq via Turkey, which would have eased the US invasion by providing it a second front, Ankara later allowed the US and other coalition forces to use İncirlik Air Base in the south as a cargo hub for non-lethal goods as well as for strategic airlifts to Afghanistan. The nearby port of İskenderun has also become vital for US forces; the port is used to meet a number of needs, from stockpiling arms to procuring other goods required for a warring nation. But the Turkish motion led to irreparable damage among the two allies, rightly or wrongly, since it marked a serious loss of confidence in particular on the part of Washington towards both Ankara's political leadership as well as towards the Turkish military, with which it has enjoyed privileged relations for decades. The US's supply of real-time intelligence to Turkey since November 2007, which has enabled the Turkish military to accurately pinpoint the bases of outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorists in northern Iraq, preventing serious collateral damage, helped restore the damage inflicted on the bilateral relations. Now that US President Barack Obama has made his final decision and announced on Feb. 27 that the US would withdraw most of its military forces from Iraq by mid-2010, the routes the US will use to evacuate its forces from the country are on the agenda. There are approximately 142,000 US troops in Iraq, according to the US Defense Department. A residual force of between 35,000 and 50,000 US troops will remain in Iraq into 2011 with the primary mission of training, equipping and advising Iraqi security forces; conducting targeted counterterrorism missions; and protecting US civilian and military efforts. The only thing that could alter the withdrawal timetable would be a new outbreak of insurgent violence. As US exit routes have begun to be discussed, the Turkish side has denied reports that Turkey and the US have started informal talks about using Turkish soil for US troop withdrawal. Despite these denials, using Turkish territory, among other routes, for US troop withdrawal will be on the agenda sooner or later.

Incirlik key to Drawdown

Incirlik is key to a stable drawdown out of Iraq

Lubold 9 (Gordon, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor February 18, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2009/0218/p02s01-usfp.html TBC 6/28/10)

The American military has been quietly shipping construction materials, food, fuel, and other nonlethal items into Iraq through Turkey using a two-lane commercial border crossing known as the Habur Gate in southeastern Turkey. But as the US considers its options for pulling out of Iraq – and the pace of that redeployment – the route through Turkey may play a conspicuous part, defense officials say. In addition to Kuwait, and probably Jordan, Turkey would give the US military an alternative exit as it attempts to move thousands of trucks, Humvees, and as many as 120,000 shipping containers back home. "Basically, nothing is off the table," says one American defense official, referring to the role Turkey might play. The country, which hosts a large US airbase at Incirlik, could also be a major hub for the United States as it ramps up operations in Afghanistan. Earlier this month the government of Kyrgyzstan announced it would no longer allow the US to operate a key base there. That presents a prickly logistical challenge as the US prepares to send as many as 30,000 new troops to Afghanistan. Today, some 1,000 commercial trucks cross the Turkish border into Iraq every day, many of which carry goods for the US military. That's a reverse from 2003, when Turkey, which opposed the American-led invasion of Iraq, refused to allow US troops to use the country for the invasion, despite a generous incentive package offered by the US. The US 4th Infantry Division, led by then-Maj. Gen. Ray Odierno, was to have entered Iraq through Turkey but instead mobilized through Kuwait. General Odierno is now senior commander in Iraq and will preside over the massive drawdown of troops and equipment. Relations between the US and Turkey cooled for years until the two allied in response to the growing threat posed by the PKK, the militant Kurdish nationalist group operating along the Turkish-Iraqi border. The US and Turkey created a joint intelligence center in 2007 to help target the militants, and the two countries have worked on other issues concerning Iraq as well. The dusty, busy supply line through Turkey illustrates the new ties between the two countries. "It is so much more than that right now," says one Turkish diplomat, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. "This issue is just a mere proof of us being allies. This is as it should be." The supply line would give the US a ground exit in northern Iraq that probably would not be as hostile as the two other likely exit points, Kuwait and Jordan. "Turkey is going to be very instrumental in terms of the withdrawal from Iraq," says Stephen Flanagan, a senior analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. US and Turkish officials have tried to kept a low profile regarding the Habur Gate. But in 2007 about 25 percent of the fuel for "coalition forces" entered Iraq through it. The crossing is also a boon to the local economy. Turkish officials say they would welcome an expanded use of the Habur Gate should the US decide to leave Iraq through it. "Postconflict stability" is in the Turks' best interest, Mr. Flanagan notes. But there is a limit to what they will support the US doing in Turkey, he says. "They don't want to give us a blank check for staging counterinsurgency operations."

Incirlik key to American withdrawal from Iraq

Zalewski 10 (Piotr 20 April Turkey’s Genocide Diplomacy: What’s in a word? Center for European Policy Studies freelance journalist and researcher at European Stability Initiative

The Turkish response to the House vote was fast and furious. Within a day's time, the government recalled its ambassador from Washington. (He has since returned.) Soon thereafter, officials in Ankara began to warn that Turkey might reconsider its contribution to the NATO coalition in Afghanistan and restrict US forces\* access to the Incirlik airbase. a step that would hinder the American withdrawal from Iraq in 2011. Finally, on 16 March. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan made headlines all over the world by threatening to expel 100,000 Armenians from Turkey. "In my country there arc 170,000 Armenians." said Erdogan. "70.000 of them are citizens. We tolerate 100.000 more. So, what am I going to do tomorrow'? If necessary I will tell the 100,000: okay, time to go back to your country. Why? They are not my citizens. I am not obliged to keep them in my country."1

Incirlik key to Military Operations

Incirlik key to military operations

Cagaptay 7 (Soner senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and an Ertegun professor at Princeton February 22 http://www.cagaptay.com/730/armenian-genocide-folly TBC 6/28/10)

For starters, the Incirlik Air Base in southern Turkey, an invaluable asset for U.S. military operations in the Middle East, would come under pressure. Three-quarters of all air cargo bound for Iraq transits Incirlik, and Turkey provides blanket clearance for military overflights supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. For instance, KC-135 tankers operating out of Incirlik have flown 3,400 sorties and delivered 35 million gallons of fuel to U.S. fighter and transport aircraft on missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. With its proximity to Iraq, Incirlik also helps defray the cost of American operations there. Six U.S. C-17 cargo aircraft based at Incirlik do the job of nine or 10 military aircraft based in Germany, saving the United States $160 million per year.

Chaotic Withdrawal Bad

Chaotic withdrawal causes civil war

Salih 6 (Khaled Edition 38 Volume 4 - October 12, Stay the course? independent analyst and consultant based in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. He is former senior advisor to the prime minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government. http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/previous.php?opt=1&id=152 TBC 6/28/10)

There is no doubt that an American withdrawal will happen; the question is when and how. From Kurdistan's perspective, it is difficult to see how any quick and messy US military and political withdrawal could bring about a better alternative to the current situation. A premature withdrawal plunges Iraq's major political processes into more chaos and deeper conflicts. Under such circumstances the Sunni Arab insurgency would escalate, with hopes to recapture Iraq's political, military and security institutions. Iraq's Shi'ite political forces and population would do their utmost to avoid failing in their historic opportunity to come to power and rule themselves. Kurdistan's achievement in terms of self-rule, stability and prosperity could easily fade away. Inevitably, more violent killings would follow as a consequence of haphazardly abandoning the emerging political arrangements based on Iraq's negotiated constitution under US and coalition protection. The idea of a federal, democratic and pluralistic Iraq can hardly survive without long-term American military, political and security commitments. On the contrary, a more likely outcome would be intervention by neighboring countries and terrorist groups to promote their own interests, exact revenge or punish those who sided with the Americans against Saddam Hussein's regime or dared to dream of a better and democratic future. In such circumstances, Kurdistan would pay a much higher price than we can anticipate: not only is the Kurdish leadership seen to be actively supporting redrawing Iraq's political system, but the entire population is viewed as supporting foreign forces, ideas and values. An American withdrawal before Iraq's political, military, security and economic institutions can survive on their own would invite extremist groups to penetrate Iraq's borders and cause more destruction than we have seen. Kurdistan is particularly vulnerable in such a scenario because of its geographic location and in view of the difficulties implied in controlling the region's mountains. If extremist groups managed to survive in Afghanistan, create a rule of horror and extend their influence across continents before they were confronted militarily, Kurdistan can potentially function in the same way for anti-Kurdish, anti-US, anti-western and anti-democratic forces. Panicked, unplanned and chaotic withdrawal is not the only answer to criticisms and demands for a different course of action in Iraq. It is not difficult to imagine the US rearranging its military and political presence but still remaining in Iraq. One option is to withdraw more from Baghdad and other cities in the hope that Sunnis and Shi'ites conclude that they cannot eliminate each other and therefore must find a modus vivendi.

Chaotic withdrawal kills Heg

BOOT 7 (MAX JULY 12 SENIOR FELLOW IN NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS1 BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS TBC 6/28/10)

To make my own position clear from the outset, I believe we should maintain the surge (160,000 troops, or 21 Brigade Combat Team equivalents) as long as militarily possible, then move to the pre-surge force of 140,000 troops (15 BCT’s), and then, when events on the ground permit, gradually transition to a force of perhaps 80,000-100,000 troops (4-6 BCT’s plus advisory, Special Forces, and logistics elements) focused primarily on assisting the Iraqi Security Forces for many years to come. That isn’t as dramatic as pulling all U.S. troops out of Iraq as soon as possible. But even if wanted to implement such a retreat it would be hard to do right away; estimates from within the military suggest that an orderly departure would take six to twelve months. It would certainly be possible to leave faster than that, but that would require a precipitous abandonment of allies and equipment. In such a scenario U.S. forces would probably have to fight their way out of the country, with insurgents determined to inflict a final humiliation on a defeated superpower. This pell-mell scramble would likely produce traumatic images along the lines of the last helicopter lifting off the Saigon roof.

Chaotic Withdrawal Bad

Chaotic withdrawal kills Heg, causes Terror, and Middle East instability

BOOT 7 (MAX JULY 12 SENIOR FELLOW IN NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS1 BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS TBC 6/28/10)

In short, neither calls for a diplomatic offensive nor calls for the partition of Iraq nor even calls for a military dictatorship offer a serious prospect for lessening the shock if all or almost all American troops were to leave Iraq anytime soon. It is, of course, impossible to know what would happen if we were to pull out anyway, without a stable political and security structure in place, but few serious analysts in or out of uniform think that the results would be pretty. Some advocates of withdrawal airily predict that if the U.S. were to leave the “Iraqis would get their act together,” and with American troops no longer acting as a crutch, they would have to resolve their differences through political compromise. Such rosy scenarios are highly improbable if not entirely impossible. Far more likely would be an all-out civil war. This would be a humanitarian tragedy for which the U.S. would bear indirect responsibility. We would have blood on our hands—the blood of countless Iraqis who trusted us with their lives only to have that commitment cruelly betrayed, as in generations past we betrayed the South Vietnamese, the Cambodians, the Hungarians, and too many others. Beyond the troubling moral implications there are equally troubling strategic implications. Advocates of withdrawal pretend that this would not constitute defeat. They call it “redeployment.” The world would not be fooled. In particular our enemies would see through such transparent public-relations ploys. If we are seen as the losers in Iraq—and we would be if we withdraw anytime soon--al Qaeda and the Islamic Republic of Iran would be seen as the winners. The perception of American weakness fed by a pullout would surely lead to increased terrorism against the U.S. and our allies, just as occurred following our ineffectual response to the Iran Hostage Crisis in 1979, the murder of our Marines in Beirut in 1983, the taking of additional hostages in Lebanon in the 1980s, the ambush of our Special Operations Forces in Mogadishu in 1993, the bombing of our African embassies in 1998, and numerous other outrages perpetrated by Islamist hate groups over the past several decades. Besides the general psychological boost for radical Shiite and Sunni extremists around the world and the concomitant blows to American prestige and credibility, there would also be a concrete price to be paid on the ground. In the chaos that would follow an American pullout, it is quite possible, even probable, that al Qaeda would succeed in turning western Iraq into a Taliban-style base for international terrorism. Although the momentum at the moment is running against al Qaeda in Anbar Province, the tribal forces that are now cooperating with the Iraqi government would be incapable of defeating al Qaeda on their 7 own. If the U.S. were to pull out, the tribes would likely go back to cooperating with al Qaeda for the sake of self-preservation. Meanwhile, in the Shiite south of the country, Iran would likely expand its imperial influence. That is only one of many possible effects of an Iraqi civil war that we need to contemplate before making the fateful decision to give up the fight. Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution, two serious Democratic analysts, issued a sobering study in January called "Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover From an Iraqi Civil War" that should be required reading for anyone calling for a pullout. Byman and Pollack studied a number of civil wars stretching back to the 1970s in countries from Congo to Lebanon, and found that they are never confined within the borders drawn neatly on maps. Civil wars export refugees, terrorists, militant ideologies and economic woes that destabilize neighboring states, and those states in turn usually intervene to try to limit the fallout or to expand their sphere of influence. "We found that 'spillover' is common in massive civil wars; that while its intensity can vary considerably, at its worst it can have truly catastrophic effects; and that Iraq has all the earmarks of creating quite severe spillover problems," they write. No surprise: After all, Iraq, with its oil wealth, has far more to fight over than Congo or Lebanon or Chechnya.

Chaotic withdrawal kills US oil access

Rogers 4 (Paul, 25 May 2004, http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict/article\_1920.jsp)TBC

This is the current situation, but what also has to be remembered is that this is a snapshot rather than the indicator of a trend. To assess the likely circumstances a generation or two ahead, the signs indicate that Gulf oil reserves will become steadily more important, especially as demand from China and India continues to grow. Put simply, whoever can exert the most influence over the Persian Gulf region, especially if that extends to a capability for military control, will wield quite extraordinary international power. For that reason alone, if current American policy in Iraq does fail and the result is a disorganised and chaotic withdrawal, the extent of the foreign policy disaster that will unfold will be much greater even than any immediate sense of victory felt by al-Qaida and its affiliated paramilitaries. It could set back US control of the world’s richest energy sources for well over a decade. In short, it is no exaggeration to say that what happens in Iraq over the next year could have a defining impact on global security trends well into the third decade of the 21st century.

Instability Spills Over

Instability caused by withdrawal spreads to the region

Barkey 10 (Henri J. visiting scholar in the Carnegie Middle East Program May http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR237\_Turkey's%20New%20Engagement%20in%20Iraq.pdf TBC 6/28/10)

The advent of the Obama administration confirmed and accelerated the Bush Administration‘ s decision to withdraw from Iraq. This decision, taken without any assurance that the new regime in Baghdad will survive and not perish under the weight of sectarian, ethnic, and regional rivalries, is as transformative as the initial decision to invade. The regional powers, which had to anticipate the effects of an Iraq that conformed to the American imagination, now have to contend with an uncertain future in Iraq. This uncertainty is even greater because the United States may decide to pull out sooner than expected or be asked to leave earlier by the Iraqis themselves.2 An unstable Iraq is likely to export its instability to the region. Whether such exports take the form of fundamentalist or jihadist organization and violence or nationalist stirrings, the repercussions will create opportunities for both regional cooperation and rivalries that may exacerbate conditions on the ground. Even if Iraq managed to emerge as a stable state—albeit one with limited influence in the medium term as it rebuilds from years of war and ravage—the fact of the matter is that the United States and the countries of the region would continue to pursue policies predicated on warding off the worst

\*\*\*AFF – TROOP WITHDRAWAL\*\*\*

Turkey Not Key

Turkey not key – Other routes, Relations

Kemal 9 (Lale March 3 http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/columnists-168486-is-turkey-vital-for-us-exit-strategy-from-iraq.html TBC 6/28/10)

Most US troop withdrawal is expected to take place via Kuwait and Jordan, i.e., through the Persian Gulf. Turkey stands as a supplementary, but also easier route, for pulling out US troops, depending on the location of US forces within Iraq. Recalling Turkey's initial foot-dragging attitude in allowing the use of İncirlik by both the US and other coalition forces back in 2003, Ankara-based Western diplomats are not very optimistic this time, stressing the difficulty of doing business with Ankara. Some Western diplomats also believe Turkey is not too vital in the US's troop withdrawal strategy.

No Impact

No Impact to Iraq Instability

Foreman et. al. 8 (Shelagh Report of the Task Force for a Responsible Withdrawal from Iraq June http://www.merip.org/taskforceresponsiblewithdrawal.pdf TBC 6/28/10)

Some have expressed concerns that US withdrawal from Iraq would be followed by an oil and land grab on the part of Iraq’s neighbors. Others worry that the civil conflict in Iraq will spill over its borders and embroil the entire region in war. But several factors weigh against such outcomes.12 For all of Iraq’s neighbors, the cost of occupying pieces of Iraq would be prohibitive. Moreover, all the neighboring countries share with the United States and the international community a strong interest in a stable, unified Iraq—though they may have different visions for what that means. There are a number of steps that might be taken to further reduce the risks.