Turkey TNW Straight Up Index

[Turkey TNW Straight Up Index 1](#_Toc267050742)

[1AC – Plan 3](#_Toc267050743)

[1AC – Preemption Adv 4](#_Toc267050744)

[1AC – Preemption Adv 6](#_Toc267050745)

[1AC – Preemption Adv 8](#_Toc267050746)

[1AC – Preemption Adv 9](#_Toc267050747)

[1AC – NATO Adv 10](#_Toc267050748)

[1AC – NATO Adv 11](#_Toc267050749)

[1AC – NATO Adv 12](#_Toc267050750)

[1AC – NATO Adv 13](#_Toc267050751)

[1AC – NATO Adv 14](#_Toc267050752)

[1AC – NATO Adv 15](#_Toc267050753)

[1AC – NATO Adv 16](#_Toc267050754)

[1AC – NATO Adv 17](#_Toc267050755)

[\*\*\*Iran Links\*\*\* 18](#_Toc267050756)

[TNW’s Cause Preemption 19](#_Toc267050757)

[Threat Con Wrong 21](#_Toc267050758)

[Threat Con Wrong 22](#_Toc267050759)

[Preemption Coming 23](#_Toc267050760)

[Preemption Coming (Neocons) 24](#_Toc267050761)

[Preemption Coming (UN Pressure) 25](#_Toc267050762)

[Preemption Doctrine Causes Iran Prolif 26](#_Toc267050763)

[Preemption Bad (Kills People, turns out) 27](#_Toc267050764)

[TNW’s cause Iran Prolif 28](#_Toc267050765)

[TNW’s cause ME Prolif 29](#_Toc267050766)

[Iran Prolif Bad – Israel Strikes 30](#_Toc267050767)

[Israel Strikes Impact 32](#_Toc267050768)

[Iran Prolif Bad – Really Bad 33](#_Toc267050769)

[Iran Prolif Bad – NPT 34](#_Toc267050770)

[NPT Solves Prolif 35](#_Toc267050771)

[Prolif Bad 38](#_Toc267050772)

[OSB Solves 39](#_Toc267050773)

[\*\*\*Russia\*\*\* 40](#_Toc267050774)

[TNWs hurt Relations 41](#_Toc267050775)

[Plan Solves Relations 43](#_Toc267050776)

[TNWs cause Miscalc 44](#_Toc267050777)

[Accidental Launch Impacts 46](#_Toc267050778)

[\*\*\*NATO\*\*\* 47](#_Toc267050779)

[Plan Collapses NATO 48](#_Toc267050780)

[Excludes Russia 50](#_Toc267050781)

[“Russian belligerence” 51](#_Toc267050782)

[Imperialism 52](#_Toc267050783)

[Kills Heg 53](#_Toc267050784)

[China Conflict 54](#_Toc267050785)

[Arms Sales 55](#_Toc267050786)

[Afghanistan 56](#_Toc267050787)

1AC – Plan

The United States federal government should withdraw all of its tactical nuclear forces from Turkey.

1AC – Preemption Adv

Advantage One is Preemptive Strike

The tactical nuclear weapons currently based in Turkey are tools used by the West to defend against the growing uncertainty in the Middle East in a hubristic attempt to deter and preempt irrationality itself. NATO and the Pentagon both call for a preemptive strike against Iran in order to safeguard the western way of life.

Chussodvosky, 2k8 (Michel, professor of economics at the [University of Ottawa](file://localhost/wiki/University_of_Ottawa), “The US-NATO Preemptive Nuclear Doctrine: Trigger a Middle East Nuclear Holocaust to Defend ‘The Western Way of Life’”, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php? context=va&aid=8048)

What the Western allies face is a long, sustained and proactive defence of their societies and way of life. To that end, they must keep risks at a distance, while at the same time protecting their homelands. International terrorism today aims to disrupt and destroy our societies, our economies and our way of life. … These different sources of [Islamist] propaganda and/or violence vary in their intellectual underpinnings, sectarian and political aims, … . But what they have in common isan assault on the values of the West– on its democratic processes and its freedom of religion… Notwithstanding the common perception in the West, the origin of Islamist terrorism is not victimhood, nor an inferiority complex, but a well-financed superiority complex grounded in a violent political ideology. If the irrational and fanatical [Islamist organizations] get out of hand, there is a risk that, … the rise of fundamentalisms and despotisms will usher in a new, illiberal age, in which the liberties that Western societies enjoy are seriously jeopardized. The threats that the West and its partners face today are a combination of violent terrorism against civilians and institutions, wars fought by proxy by states that sponsor terrorism, the behaviour of rogue states, the actions of organised international crime, and the coordination of hostile action through abuse of non-military means. Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World: Renewing Transatlantic Partnership”. Group report by former chiefs of staff General John Shalikashvili, (US), General Klaus Naumann (Germany), Field Marshal Lord Inge (UK), Admiral Jacques Lanxade (France) and Henk van den Breemen (The Netherlands), published by the Netherlands based Noaber Foundation, December 2007, (emphasis added) The controversial NATO sponsored report entitled “Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World: Renewing Transatlantic Partnership“ calls for a first strike use of nuclear weapons. The preemptive use of nukes would also be used to undermine an “increasingly brutal World” as a means to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction: “They [the authors of the report] consider that nuclear war might soon become possible in an increasingly brutal world. They propose the first use of nuclear weapons must remain “in the quiver of escalation as the ultimate instrument to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction”.(Paul Dibb, Sidney Morning Herald, 11 February 2008) The group, insists that the option of first strike of nuclear weapons is “indispensable, since there is simply no realistic prospect of a nuclear-free world.” (Report, p. 97, emphasis added): Nuclear weapons are the ultimate instrument of an asymmetric response– and at the same time the ultimate tool of escalation. Yet they are also more than an instrument, since they transform the nature of any conflict and widen its scope from the regional to the global. … …Nuclear weapons remain indispensable, and nuclear escalation continues to remain an element of any modern strategy. Nuclear escalation is the ultimate step in responding asymmetrically, and at the same time the most powerful way of inducing uncertainty in an opponent’s mind. (Ibid, emphasis added) The Group’s Report identifies six key “challenges”, which may often result as potential threats to global security: • Demography. Population growth and change across the globe will swiftly change the world we knew. The challenge this poses for welfare, good governance and energy security (among other things) is vast. • Climate change. This greatly threatens physical certainty, and is leading to a whole new type of politics – one predicated, perhaps more than ever, on our collective future. • Energy security continues to absorb us. The supply and demand of individual nations and the weakening of the international market infrastructure for energy distribution make the situation more precarious than ever. • There is also the more philosophic problem of the rise of the irrational –the discounting of the rational. Though seemingly abstract, this problem is demonstrated in deeply practical ways. [These include] the decline of respect for logical argument and evidence, a drift away from science in a civilization that is deeply technological. The ultimate example is the rise of religious fundamentalism, which, as political fanaticism, presents itself as the only source of certainty. • The weakening of the nation state. This coincides with the weakening of world institutions, including the United Nations and regional organizations such as the European Union, NATO and others. • The dark side of globalization … These include internationalized terrorism, organized crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but also asymmetric threats from proxy actors or the abuse of financial and energy leverage. (Ibid) Deterrence and Pre-emption According to the Report, a new concept of deterrence is required directed against both State and non-state actors, This “new deterrence” is based on pre-emption as well as on the ability to “restore deterrence through [military] escalation”. In this context, the Report contemplates, what it describes as: “escalation dominance, the use of a full bag of both carrots and sticks—and indeed all instruments of soft and hard power, ranging from the diplomatic protest to nuclear weapons.” (Report, op city, emphasis added). Iran In much the same terms as the Bush administration, the NATO sponsored report states, without evidence, that Iran constitutes “a major strategic threat”: “An Iranian nuclear weapons capability would pose a major strategic threat – not only to Israel, which it has threatened to destroy, but also to the region as a whole, to Europe and to the United States. Secondly, it could be the beginning of a new multi-polar nuclear arms race in the most volatile region of the world.” (Report, op. cit., p. 45) Careful timing? The controversial NATO sponsored report calling for a preemptive nuclear attack on Iran was released shortly after the publication of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report entitled Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. The latter denies Iran’s nuclear capabilities. The NIE report, based on the assessments of sixteen US intelligence agencies, refutes the Bush administration’s main justification for waging a preemptive nuclear war on Iran. The NIE report confirms that Iran “halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003.” “These findings constitute a damning indictment of the Bush administration’s relentless fear-mongering in relation to an alleged nuclear threat from Iran. They demonstrate that just as in the buildup to the war against Iraq five years ago, the White House has been engaged in a systematic campaign to drag the American people into another war based on lies.” (See Bill van Auken, 24 January 2008) It should be noted that this recently declassified intelligence ( pertaining to Iran contained in the 2007 NIE report) was known by the White House, the Pentagon and most probably NATO since September 2003. Ironically, US military documents confirm that the Bush Administration initiated its war preparations against Iran in July 2003, two months prior to the confirmation by US intelligence that Iran did not constitute a nuclear threat. The July 2003 war scenarios were launched under TIRANNT: Theater Iran Near Term. The justification for TIRANNT as well as for subsequent US war plans directed against Iran ( which as of 2004 included the active participation of NATO and Israel), has always been that Iran is developing nuclear weapons and plans to use them against us. Following the publication of the 2007 NIE in early December, there has been an avalanche of media propaganda directed against Tehran, essentially with a view to invalidating the statements of the NIE concerning Tehran’s nuclear program. Moreover, a third sanctions resolution by the UN Security Council, was initiated with a view to forcing Iran to halt uranium enrichment. The proposed UNSC resolution, which is opposed by China and Russia includes a travel ban on Iranian officials involved in the country’s nuclear programs, and inspections of shipments to and from Iran “if there are suspicions of prohibited goods” (AFP, 11 February 2008). Meanwhile, French President Nicolas Sarkozy together with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, have been calling for a unified EU sanctions regime against Iran. Contradicting the US national intelligence estimate (NIE), Bush’s most recent speeches continue to portray Iran as a nuclear threat: “I feel pretty good about making sure that we keep the pressure on Iran to pressure them so they understand they’re isolated, to pressure them to affect their economy, to pressure them to the point that we hope somebody rational shows up and says, okay, it’s not worth it anymore,” Bush said.

1AC – Preemption Adv

TNW’s blur the line between nuclear and conventional weapons; they are painted as usable, humanitarian bombs whose use is necessary to safeguard the west against an irrational fundamentalist Middle East.

Chussodvosky, 2k8 (Michel, professor of economics at the [University of Ottawa](file://localhost/wiki/University_of_Ottawa), “The US-NATO Preemptive Nuclear Doctrine: Trigger a Middle East Nuclear Holocaust to Defend ‘The Western Way of Life’”, http://www.globalresearch.ca/ index.php?context=va&aid=8048)

 Threat to “The Western Way of Life” The Western media is involved in a diabolical disinformation campaign, the purpose of which is to persuade public opinion that the only way to “create a nuclear free World” is to use nuclear weapons on a preemptive basis, against countries which “threaten our Western Way of Life.” The Western world is threatened. The NATO report, according to Paul Dibb: “paint(s) an alarming picture of the threats confronting the West, arguing that its values and way of life are under threat and that we are struggling to summon the will to defend them.”(Dibb, op cit) A preemptive nuclear attack — geographically confined to Middle East (minus Israel?)– is the proposed end-game. The attack would use US tactical nuclear weapons, which, according to “scientific opinion” (on contract to the Pentagon) are “harmless to the surrounding civilian population because the explosion is underground”. (See Michel Chossudovsky The Dangers of a Middle East Nuclear Holocaust, Global Research, 17 February 2006) B61-11 bunker buster bombs with nuclear warheads Made in America, with an explosive capacity between one third to six times a Hiroshima bomb, are presented as bona fide humanitarian bombs, which minimize the dangers of “collateral damage”. These in-house “scientific” Pentagon assessments regarding the mini-nukes are refuted by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS): Any attempt to use a [B61-11 bunker buster nuclear bomb] in an urban environment would result in massive civilian casualties. Even at the low end of its 0.3-300 kiloton yield range, the nuclear blast will simply blow out a huge crater of radioactive material, creating a lethal gamma-radiation field over a large area ” (Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons by Robert W. Nelson, Federation of American Scientists, 2001). Professor Paul Dibb is a former Australian Deputy Secretary of Defense., who has over the years also occupied key positions in Australia’s defense and intelligence establishment. Dibb carefully overlooks the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons in a conventional war theater. According to Dibb, NATO preemptive nuclear doctrine, which replicates that of the Pentagon, constitutes a significant and positive initiative to “halt the imminent spread of nuclear weapons”. . “They [the group] believe that the West must be ready to resort to a pre-emptive nuclear attack to try to halt the imminent spread of nuclear weapons.” Never mind the nuclear holocaust and resulting radioactive contamination, which would spread Worldwide and threaten, in a real sense, the “way of life”. There is no “way of life” in a World contaminated with deadly radioactive material. But this is something that is rarely discussed in the corridors of NATO or in strategic studies programs in Western universities. Nukes: Just Another Tool in the Military Toolbox What is frightening in Professor Dibb’s article is that he is not expressing an opinion, nor is he analyzing the use of nuclear weapons from an academic research point of view. In his article, there is neither research on nuclear weapons nor is there an understanding of the complex geopolitics of the Middle East war. Dibb is essentially repeating verbatim the statements contained in NATO/Pentagon military documents. His article is a “copy and paste” summary of Western nuclear doctrine, which in practice calls for the launching of a nuclear holocaust. The stated objective of a Middle East nuclear holocaust is “to prevent the occurrence of a nuclear war”. An insidious logic which certainly out- dwarfs the darkest period of the Spanish inquisition… Neither NATO nor the Pentagon use the term nuclear holocaust. Moreover, they presume that the “collateral damage” of a nuclear war will in any event be confined geographically to the Middle East and that Westerners will be spared… But since their in-house scientists have confirmed that tactical nuclear weapons are “safe for civilians”, the labels on the bombs have been switched much in the same way as the label on a packet of cigarettes: “This nuclear bomb is safe for civilians” The new definition of a nuclear warhead has blurred the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons: ‘It’s a package (of nuclear and conventional weapons). The implication of this obviously is that nuclear weapons are being brought down from a special category of being a last resort, or sort of the ultimate weapon, to being just another tool in the toolbox,” (Japan Economic News Wire, op cit) This re-categorization has been carried out. The ” green light” for the use of tactical nuclear weapons has been granted by the US Congress. . ” Let’s use them, they are part of the military toolbox.” We are a dangerous crossroads: military planners believe their own propaganda. The military manuals state that this new generation of nuclear weapons are “safe” for use in the battlefield. They are no longer a weapon of last resort. There are no impediments or political obstacles to their use. In this context, Senator Edward Kennedy has accused the Bush Administration for having developed “a generation of more useable nuclear weapons.” Russia and China Who else constitutes a threat to “the Western way of life”? Nukes are also slated to be used against Russia and China, former enemies of the Cold War era. This post Cold War logic was first revealed, when the Pentagon’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was leaked to The Los Angeles Times in January 2002. The NPR includes China and Russia alongside the rogue states as potential targets for a first strike nuclear attack. According to William Arkin, the NPR “offers a chilling glimpse into the world of nuclear-war planners: With a Strangelovian genius, they cover every conceivable circumstance in which the president might wish to use nuclear weapons-planning in great detail.” (Los Angeles Times, March 10, 2002) “Decapitate Their Leadership and Destroy their Countries as Functioning Societies” The use of nukes against “rogue states”, including Iran and North Korea (which lost more than a quarter of its population in US bombings during the Korean war) is justified because these countries could act in an “irrational” way. It therefore makes sense to “take em out” before they do something irrational. The objective is: “decapitate their leadership and destroy their countries as functioning societies”: “One line of reasoning is that so-called rogue states, such as Iran and North Korea, are sufficiently irrational to risk a pre-emptive nuclear strikeon the US or its allies, such as Israel and South Korea. The supposition here is that deterrence – that is, threatening the other side with obliteration – no longer works. But even the nasty regimes in Tehran and Pyongyang must know that the US reserves the right to use its overwhelming nuclear force to decapitate the leadership and destroy their countries as modern functioning societies. (Dibb, op cit., emphasis added) Use nuclear weapons to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction. But of course, lest we forget, America’s nuclear arsenal as well as that of France, Britain and Israel are not categorized as “weapons of mass destruction”, in comparison with Iran’s deadly nonexistent nuclear weapons program.

1AC – Preemption Adv

Iran will retaliate with missile attacks on the US and Israel—escalating the war into a nuclear Armageddon risking the extinction of humanity

Chossudovsky 5 Michel Chossudovsky is the author of the international best seller "The Globalization of Poverty " published in eleven languages. He is Professor of Economics at the University of Ottawa and Director of the Center for Research on Globalization, at www.globalresearch.ca . He is also a contributor to the Encyclopaedia Britannica. His most recent book is entitled: America’s "War on Terrorism", Global Research, 2005.http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=1714

Tehran has confirmed that it will retaliate if attacked, in the form of ballistic missile strikes directed against Israel (CNN, 8 Feb 2005). These attacks, could also target US military facilities in Iraq and Persian Gulf, which would immediately lead us into a scenario of military escalation and all out war. At present there are three distinct war theaters: Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine. The air strikes against Iran could contribute to unleashing a war in the broader Middle East Central Asian region. Moreover, the planned attack on Iran should also be understood in relation to the timely withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, which has opened up a new space, for the deployment of Israeli forces. The participation of Turkey in the US-Israeli military operation is also a factor, following last year's agreement reached between Ankara and Tel Aviv. More recently, Tehran has beefed up its air defenses through the acquisition of Russian 29 Tor M-1 anti-missile systems. In October, with Moscow`s collaboration, "a Russian rocket lifted an Iranian spy satellite, the Sinah-1, into orbit." (see Chris Floyd) The Sinah-1 is just the first of several Iranian satellites set for Russian launches in the coming months. Thus the Iranians will soon have a satellite network in place to give them early warning of an Israeli attack, although it will still be a pale echo of the far more powerful Israeli and American space spies that can track the slightest movement of a Tehran mullah’s beard. What’s more, late last month Russia signed a $1 billion contract to sell Iran an advanced defense system that can destroy guided missiles and laser-guided bombs, the Sunday Times reports. This too will be ready in the next few months. (op.cit.) Ground War While a ground war is not envisaged under CONPLAN, the aerial bombings could lead through the process of escalation into a ground war. Iranian troops could cross the Iran-Iraq border and confront coalition forces inside Iraq. Israeli troops and/or Special Forces could enter into Lebanon and Syria. In recent developments, Israel plans to conduct military exercises as well as deploy Special Forces in the mountainous areas of Turkey bordering Iran and Syria with the collaboration of the Ankara government: Ankara and Tel Aviv have come to an agreement on allowing the Israeli army to carry out military exercises in the mountainous areas [in Turkey] that border Iran. [According to] ... a UAE newspaper ..., according to the agreement reached by the Joint Chief of Staff of the Israeli army, Dan Halutz, and Turkish officials, Israel is to carry out various military manoeuvres in the areas that border Iran and Syria. [Punctuation as published here and throughout.] [Dan Halutz] had gone to Turkey a few days earlier. Citing certain sources without naming them, the UAE daily goes on to stress: The Israeli side made the request to carry out the manoeuvres because of the difficulty of passage in the mountain terrains close to Iran's borders in winter. The two Hakari [phonetic; not traced] and Bulo [phonetic; not traced] units are to take part in the manoeuvres that have not been scheduled yet. The units are the most important of Israel's special military units and are charged with fighting terrorism and carrying out guerrilla warfare. Earlier Turkey had agreed to Israeli pilots being trained in the area bordering Iran. The news [of the agreement] is released at a time when Turkish officials are trying to evade the accusation of cooperating with America in espionage operations against its neighbouring countries Syria and Iran. Since last week the Arab press has been publishing various reports about Ankara's readiness or, at least, agreement in principle to carry out negotiations about its soil and air space being used for action against Iran. (E'temad website, Tehran, in Persian 28 Dec 05, BBC Monitoring Services Translation) Concluding remarks The implications are overwhelming. The so-called international community has accepted the eventuality of a nuclear holocaust. Those who decide have swallowed their own war propaganda. A political consensus has developed in Western Europe and North America regarding the aerial attacks using tactical nuclear weapons, without considering their devastating implications. This profit driven military adventure ultimately threatens the future of humanity. What is needed in the months ahead is a major thrust, nationally and internationally which breaks the conspiracy of silence, which acknowledges the dangers, which brings this war project to the forefront of political debate and media attentiion, at all levels, which confronts and requires political and military leaders to take a firm stance against the US sponsored nuclear war. Ultimately what is required are extensive international sanctions directed against the United States of America and Israel.

1AC – Preemption Adv

And that escalates to Global war

**London 6/28** (Herbert I. London, President of the Hudson Institute, a New York University based political think tank, and professor of Humanities at New York University, *Hudson New York,* 6/28/10, <http://www.hudson-ny.org/1387/coming-crisis-in-the-middle-east>) CS

The coming storm in the Middle East is gaining momentum; like conditions prior to World War I, all it takes for explosive action to commence is a trigger. Turkey's provocative flotilla, often described in Orwellian terms as a humanitarian mission, has set in motion a gust of diplomatic activity: if the Iranians send escort vessels for the next round of Turkish ships, which they have apparently decided not to do in favor of land operations, it could have presented a *casus belli*. [cause for war] Syria, too, has been playing a dangerous game, with both missile deployment and rearming Hezbollah. According to most public

accounts, Hezbollah is sitting on 40,000 long-, medium- and short-range missiles, and Syrian territory has been serving as a conduit for military materiel from Iran since the end of the 2006 Lebanon War. Should Syria move its own scuds to Lebanon or deploy its troops as reinforcement for Hezbollah, a wider regional war with Israel could not be contained. In the backdrop is an Iran, with sufficient fissionable material to produce a couple of nuclear weapons. It will take some time to weaponize the missiles, but the road to that goal is synchronized in green lights since neither diplomacy nor diluted sanctions can convince Iran to change course. From Qatar to Afghanistan all political eyes are on Iran, poised to be "the hegemon" in the Middle East; it is increasingly considered the "strong horse" as American forces incrementally retreat from the region. Even Iraq, ironically, may depend on Iranian ties in order to maintain internal stability. For Sunni nations like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, regional strategic vision is a combination of deal-making to offset the Iranian Shia advantage, and attempting to buy or develop nuclear weapons as a counterweight to Iranian ambition. However, both of these governments are in a precarious state; should either fall, all bets are off in the Middle East neighborhood. It has long been said that the Sunni "tent" must stand on two legs: if one, falls, the tent collapses.

1AC – NATO Adv

Advantage Two is NATO

Plan causes NATO collapse

McNamara and Spring 10 (Sally and Baker, Director of IR for American Legislative Exchange Council, Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/03/President-Obama-Must-Not-Remove-Nuclear-Weapons-from-Europe) AC

Not since radical leftist sentiment gripped Western Europe in the 1980s has the transatlantic relationship faced such a serious ideological challenge to the mutual security of North America and Europe. The removal of American tactical nuclear weapons from European and NATO bases would spell the end of the alliance and the concept of indivisible security. The Russian militarization of the Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad and Moscow’s recent simulation of a nuclear attack on Poland require a robust response from NATO, reinforced by America’s continued nuclear guarantee. Moscow’s simulation—in which Russian armed forces invaded Poland and its air force fired nuclear missiles against Warsaw and acted in conjunction with Belarus to suppress Polish minorities in Belarus—was codenamed “West” and labeled Poland as the aggressor country. Following this exercise, as well as President Obama’s ill-defined policy of “resetting” relations with Russia, Central and Eastern Europe has sought specific assurances as to the indivisibility of the alliance’s security. In addressing these concerns, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has stated: I want to reaffirm as strongly as I can the United States ’ commitment to honor Article 5 of the NATO treaty. No Ally—or adversary—should ever question our determination on this point. It is the bedrock of the Alliance and an obligation that time will not erode. Our nation faces threats elsewhere in the world, but we view peace and stability in Europe as a prerequisite for addressing all of the other challenges. A nuclear pullout from Europe does not comport with Secretary Clinton’s commitments outlined above. Rather than pulling back from the alliance’s commitments, the U.S. should honor Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty and plan against Moscow’s threat to the territorial integrity, political independence, and security of one of its members. This preparation should be underpinned by the sanctity of Article 5, America’s tactical and strategic nuclear insurance.

1AC – NATO Adv

There are three impact scenarios.

The first impact scenario is imperialism. The US uses NATO and strong militarism to expand its global imperialist agenda.

Hassan 8 (Ghali, Independent Writer for CounterCurrents, http://www.countercurrents.org/hassan250808.htm) PR

Despite its irrelevant role, NATO has become part of the U.S. military. Instead of dismantling the once defence alliance, the U.S. pushed to enlarge NATO and expand its boundaries. The U.S. has lured most European nations, including former Warsaw Pact members, the so-called “New Europe”, to join its military. Poland, Hungry and the Czech Republic joined in 1999; Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuanian, Estonia, Slovakia and Romania in 2004, others are waiting in line. Becoming a NATO member proves to be a profit bonanza for U.S.-Israeli weapon industries and arm dealers. All new recruits into NATO are obliged to increase their “defence” budgets to modernise and enlarge their military arsenals at the expense of vital public services. It is important to bear in mind that the U.S.-NATO demands for expansion have met with opposition from Russia, China – with a legitimate concern against unprovoked threat – and nations such as Germany, the Netherlands and France. Almost all new mini-dictators supported the illegal U.S. aggression against the Iraqi people. They are in complete complicity in the war crimes committed by the regime of George Bush despite overwhelming majority of their citizens’ opposition to U.S. aggression. From the criminal U.S. aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the ongoing murderous occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, the new European armies have become U.S. foot soldiers serving U.S. imperialist interests. Engineering and using crisis in Europe and elsewhere, the U.S. cancelled the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in order to locate ABMs and to lure more nations to sign up for the system, including Australia, South Korea and Japan. Under the fraudulent pretext of defence against “rogue” states, the U.S. has just signed a “deal” with Poland to station on Polish soil U.S. “interceptor missiles”. The provocative deal is seen by Russians as a dangerous opportunity for the U.S. to expand its military presence and threat across the world. Poland hailed the deal as a counter to Russian “threat”. Of course Poland is fully aware that the missiles are against Russia not Iran, as the U.S. continues to mislead the public. After Poland, the U.S. is planning to build a twin anti-missile radar system in the Czech Republic. Many Poles as well as Czechs are against the deals and rightly believe their countries are becoming vassal states of a dangerous U.S. militarism. Since the end of the so-called “Cold War”, the U.S. aim has always been a quest for imperialist domination of the globe through U.S. militarism, including the establishment of U.S. military bases in strategic areas of the world. The U.S. policy of destabilising Russia and undermining Russia’s integration with Europe is aimed at controlling Eurasia’s natural resources . The events of 9/11 provided the U.S. with a pretext to justify the U.S. war on Islam and a global imperialist expansion. It is hard to believe that the recent unprovoked aggression by Georgia’s President Mikheil Saakashvili against the semi-independent district of South Ossetia wasn’t engineered by the U.S. ruling class in Washington. The aggression came at the time when Russia’s Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was at the Beijing Olympics Opening Ceremony and President Dmitry Medvedev on holiday. Georgian air force and heavy rocket and artillery indiscriminately attacked the town of Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia at midnight destroying schools, hospitals, homes, and even the University, leaving much of the city in ruins. Hundreds of innocent civilians were killed in the first hours of the attack. Saakashvili’s U.S.-Israeli trained Special Forces shot 10 Russian peacekeepers stationed there under an international peace agreement. Saakashvili’s aim was to take control of South Ossetia and ethnically cleanse it of its majority Russian inhabitants.

1AC – NATO Adv

US imperialism threatens to spur major world conflict

Kuang et al 5 (Xinnian, teaches modern Chinese literature at Tsinghua University, “Preemptive War and a World Out of Control” http://muse.jhu.edu/journals /positions/v013/13.1kuang.html) JL

The existing world order was constructed under the leadership of the United States following World War II. The United Nations, the representative of this order, is certainly not an entirely democratic organization. Since its inception, the United Nations has been controlled by two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. These two superpowers used the United Nations as a stage on which to vie for power. But it is important to note that [End Page 159] neither the United States nor the Soviet Union doubted the significance or efficacy of the United Nations—and the United States, in particular, used the United Nations to export its values to the rest of the world. Both their confrontations and their mutual hold on power gave the second half of the twentieth century a long peace. However, after the collapse of the U.S.S.R., the surviving hegemon, the United States, no longer had the patience to use the United Nations to put forward its own values, but rather pursued what might be referred to as peace under imperial domination (diguo tongzhi xia de heping). America's invasion of Iraq has damaged the authority of the United Nations and the principle of the inviolability of national sovereignty. Before the war broke out, Bush repeatedly sent out warnings in which he stated that if the Security Council refused to pass a resolution authorizing the use of force, the United Nations would become irrelevant. Some hawks in the administration and conservative newspapers even threatened that the United States could withdraw from the United Nations, bringing it to an ignominious end. The strategy of preemption as espoused by American neoconservatism, along with new interpretations of sovereignty, will bring about a revolution in the twenty-first century, and the war in Iraq will serve as a model. The United States will use its neo-imperialist imagination in an attempt to recreate the so-called rogue states and restore world order. The strategy of preemption is a sign of America's abandonment of both traditional Western international regulatory systems and the principle of rule by law as established under the U.N. charter. Instead, America is bringing about the return to an era where naked power takes preeminence. At a press conference held June 27, 2003, after talks with the French minister of foreign affairs, Dominique de Villepin, Nelson Mandela commented on this shift: "Since the establishment of the U.N., there have been no world wars; therefore, anybody, and particularly the leaders of the superpowers, who takes unilateral action outside the frame of the U.N. must receive the condemnation of all who love peace." On a visit to Ireland on June 20, 2003, he went on to say, "Any organization, any country, any movement that now decides to sideline the United Nations, that country and its leader are a danger to the world. We cannot allow the world to again degenerate into a place where the will of the powerful dominates over all other considerations."4 [End Page 160] The strategy of preemption is not simply a military strategy, but is, in fact, a kind of barbaric politics, a serious attack against civilized humanity. It is ultimately tied to the question of whether the world is seeking civilization and order, or whether it is entering into a period of violence and chaos. The United States' adoption of this strategy provoked the intense opposition of Europe and, indeed, the entire world because many believe that a strategy of preemption would take the world in the latter direction. As a result of the Iraq War, a deep rift was opened up between America and its western European allies, to which the media now frequently affix the label "Old Europe." Modern history, beginning in 1492, has been a Eurocentric history of colonialism, imperialism, and expansion. However, the United States has replaced Europe as imperialist colonizer. The imagination of American neoconservative politics has inspired the United States to become a tyrannical and self-appointed hegemon, willfully changing global boundaries, and a particularly intense force for the destruction of world order. Europe, on the other hand, has become a force for rationality and civilization. The dispute that arose between Europe and America during the Iraq War was both a conflict of potential profit and a sign of civilizational disparity.

1AC – NATO Adv

US imperialist practices result in racism, sexism, and violence on the population. This militarization of daily life is vital to the maintenance of empire.

MOHANTY in 6 (CHANDRA TALPADE, Department of Women’s Studies, Syracuse

University, Gender, Place and Culture Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 7–20, February 2006, US Empire and the Project of Women’s Studies: Stories of citizenship, complicity and dissent, <http://www.uccs.edu/~pkeilbac/courses/intlpol/readings/US%20Empire.pdf>)

The clearest effects of US empire building in the domestic arena are thus evident in the way citizenship has been restructured, civil rights violated and borders repoliced since the commencement of the war of drugs, and now the war on terrorism and the establishment of the homeland security regime. While the US imperial project calls for civilizing brown and black (and now Arab) men and rescuing their women outside its borders, the very same state engages in killing, imprisoning, and criminalizing black and brown and now Muslim and Arab peoples within its own borders. Former political prisoner Linda Evans (2005) calls the US a ‘global police state’ one that has adopted a mass incarceration strategy of social control since the Reagan years. Analyzing the militarization of US society, Evans argues that the new definition of ‘domestic terrorism’ heralds the now legal return of the Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) that conducted illegal covert operations in the 1960s and 1970s against the Black Panther party, the American Indian movement, the Puerto Rican Independence movement, and left/socialist organizations. Racial profiling, once illegal, is now legitimated as public policy, including a requirement that Arab and Muslim men from over 25 countries register and submit to INS interrogation. Similarly, Julia Sudbury analyzes the global crisis and rise in the mass incarceration of women, suggesting that we must be attentive to ‘the ways in which punishment regimes are shaped by global capitalism, dominant and subordinate patriarchies and neocolonial, racialized ideologies’ (see Sudbury, 2005, p. xiii). This prison industrial complex is supported by the militarization of domestic law enforcement. As Anannya Bhattacharjee (2002) suggests, there have been dramatic increases in funding, increasing use of advanced military technology, sharing of personnel and equipment with the military, and the general promotion of a war-like culture in domestic law enforcement and also in a range of public agencies (welfare, schools, hospitals—and now universities?) that are subjected to an accelerated culture of surveillance and law enforcement (see Silliman & Bhattacharjee, 2002). The effects of these conjoined economic/military policies of the US imperial state represents an alarming increase of violence against women, children and communities bearing the brunt of US military dominance around the world. In the US, policies clearly target poor and immigrant communities. In her new work, Jacqui Alexander (2005) analyzes the primacy of processes of heterosexualization in the consolidation of empire. She suggests that the mobilization of the loyal heterosexual citizen patriot is achieved through the collapse of constructions of the enemy, the terrorist and the sexual pervert. Similarly, Jasbir Puar and Amit Rai (2002) analyze the ‘terrorism’ industry since 9/11, exploring the production of the monster, the fag, and the terrorist as figures of surveillance and criminalization. This clearly gendered, sexualized, and racialized culture of militarism and surveillance is buttressed by a hegemonic culture of consumption and neo-liberal conservatism wherein discourses of advancement and technological superiority, anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim sentiments dovetail with ideologies of patriotism, and faith-based initiatives and ideologies to justify the war at home and the war abroad. Take Abu Ghraib for instance.

1AC – NATO Adv

The second impact scenario is Russia. NATO has become representative of a European identity that excludes Russia

Browning 1 (Christopher S. Browning Ph.D. Candidate Department of International Relations, University of Wales “The Region-Building Approach Revisited: The Continued Othering of Russia in Discourses of Region-Building in  the European North” [www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI\_publications/COPRI.../6-2001.doc](http://www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI_publications/COPRI.../6-2001.doc) ) MAH

In this respect, like the EU, NATO has become representative of a civilisational identity of Europe that excludes Russia. As it expands Russia is further pushed to the edges and re-inscribed as somehow not properly or naturally European. Moreover, as Williams and Neumann note, to the extent that NATO has become a symbolic marker of Europe it has become increasingly difficult for Russia to maintain it too is European and to argue for a European security structure outside of a NATO-based framework. "If Russia were to be a European country, then it had to accept the expansion of NATO. Russia could only oppose enlargement at the cost of seeming 'un-European', that is uncivilised or proto-imperialist". Thus, like the underlying discourses of region-building in the European north, NATO discourses also tend to reaffirm Russia's difference from Europe. Or, if Russia is to be European, it is expected to subordinate itself to NATO. Despite the rhetoric of the Permanent Joint Council Russia is not an equal in NATO-Russian discussions and is not treated like one. With the NATO question looming so large in Russia there is therefore a considerable possibility that these exclusionary NATO discourses will overshadow any attempts of the new region-building to dissolve the difference of Russia as a marker of Western and European identity. This will be the case particularly if NATO does expand to include the Baltic States which, given the civilisational tone of NATO rhetoric, does appear likely at some point.

Nuclear Stockpiles stress US Russia relations, their removal would signal a new era engagement

Diakov, Miasnikov, and Kadyshev 4 (Anatoli, Eugene, and Timur, Publication of the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies

Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Dolgoprudny, 2004) AC

It is symptomatic that Russian officials, commenting on disputes with NATO, in the last year were mostly focused on such questions as the coming into force of the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, adherence of the Baltic countries to the Treaty, approaches to the Iraq problem, etc., but did not mention the necessity of a complete withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from the territory of Europe. 232 Perhaps an exception was the statement of the Russian delegation at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference in Geneva in April 28, 2003,declaring: 233 "... removal of the tactical nuclear weapons…from Europe and elimination there of respective infrastructure would become an important practical step ultimately overcoming the vestiges of the cold-war period. Such a decision in our opinion could serve the purposes of strengthening of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty... "

1AC – NATO Adv

Relations key to prevent accidental launch.

David E. **Mosher**, Senior Policy Analyst, Expert BMD and Nuclear issues, Lowell H. Schwartz, is an associate international policy analyst, David R. Howell, associate Dean and Professor of Economics and Public Policy, Milano Graduate School of Management Lynn E. Davis, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, “Beyond the Nuclear Shadow: A Phased Approach for improving nuclear safety and US—Russian Relations,” Rand National Security Devision, 20**03**, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1666/index.html.

The phased approach to the Nuclear Safety Initiative that we recommend here is based on the premise that nuclear safety, U.S.- Russian relations, and U.S. security more broadly are inextricably linked. Progress in one area will improve the situation in another. Given the improving relations between Russia and the United States and the emerging security context for the United States, there is now a historic opportunity to address one of the more vexing problems left from the Cold War: how to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized nuclear use to as close to zero as possible.

Accidental launch kills billions

**PR NEWSWIRE**, staff, April 29, 19**98**, LN.

An 'accidental' nuclear attack would create a public health disaster of an unprecedented scale, according to more than 70 articles and speeches on the subject, cited by the authors and written by leading nuclear war experts, public health officials, international peace organizations, and legislators. Furthermore, retired General Lee Butler, Commander from 1991-1994 of all U.S. Strategic Forces under former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, has warned that from his experience in many "war games" it is plausible that such an attack could provoke a nuclear counterattack that could trigger full-scale nuclear war with billions of casualties worldwide. The authors describe the immediate effects of an "accidental" launch from a single Russian submarine that would kill at least six to eight million people in firestorms in eight major U.S. cities. With hospitals destroyed and medical personnel killed, and with major communications and transportation networks disrupted, the delivery of emergency care would be all but impossible, according to Forrow and his colleagues.

Russia-US war leads to extinction

Bostrom 2 [Nick, Oxford philosophy faculty, “Published in the Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, March, <http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html>]JFS

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that *might* have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[[4]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn4%22%20%5Co%20%22)  Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently.

1AC – NATO Adv

The third impact scenario is Afghanistan.

NATO military presence in Afghanistan fuels the Taliban

**Mercier 10** (Gilbert, The Post, May 6 2010, http://newsjunkiepost.com /2010/05/06/afghanistan-us-and-nato-are-still-losing-hearts-and-minds/)IM

The military operation in Marjah, launched in February 2010, was the first deployment after the surge of 30,000 additional troops decided by the Obama administration. The planning of the operation emphasized the needs of the Afghan people, and the importance of winning “hearts and minds”. However, according to a new report just released by the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS), this objective was not met. The reality on the ground did not match the rhetoric, and the attack turned out to be a recruiting tool for the Taliban. The ICOS report reviews the local perception of the operation from more than 400 Afghan men from Marjah, Lashkar Gah and Kandahar interviewed by the ICOS in March 2010. The report reveals that Operation Moshtarak has contributed to “high levels of anger among local Afghans”, with 61 percent of those interviewed feeling “more negative about NATO forces than before the military offensive”. In other words, the objective of winning “hearts and minds”-one of the fundamental tenets of the new counter-insurgency strategy- was not met. The report finds a few key factors at plays, and mistakes made that have translated into more recruits for the Taliban, especially in the context of a much larger city such as Kandahar. The legitimate grievance of the people of Marjah are used by the Taliban who will seek to recruit the region’s angry young men. Of those interviewed, 95 percent believed more young Afghans have joined the Taliban in the last year. 78 percent of the respondents were “often or always angry”, and 45 percent stated they were “angry at the NATO occupation, civilian casualties and night raids”. The report says that Operation Moshtarak, and similar operations in the future, provide a perfect propaganda tool for the Taliban in their recruitment strategy. The report recommends the adoption of a new “Counter insurgency impact equation to balance any negative impact, and ensure that the positive impact is greater than the negative impact”. Another point highlighted by the report has to do with the refugee situation created by the offensive, and the shortcomings to deal with it. The report found that despite advance planning, very little aid or infrastructure was made available for refugees. 97 percent of Afghans interviewed by ICOS said that the operation had led to new flow of internally displaced people. Thousands of displaced Afghans were forced to move to non existent or overcrowded refugee camps with insufficient food, medical supplies and shelters. 59 percent of those interviewed believed the Taliban will return to Marjah after the operation. 67 percent did not support a strong NATO-ISAF presence in their province, and 71 percent stated they wanted NATO forces to leave. Afghans are also very sceptical about NATO’s chances to win against the Taliban with 67 percent of those interviewed stating they did not believe “NATO and the Afghan government would win against the Taliban”, and 14 percent saying that “NATO would never win”. “The lack of humanitarian planning has been a propaganda victory for the Taliban, who will use the grievances of local Afghans to radicalize and recruit young men,” said Jorrit Kamminga Director of Policy Research at ICOS.

1AC – NATO Adv

Further Talibanization of Afghanistan spillover in Pakistan, wars across Central Asia, and escalatory nuclear strikes against India and Israel

Morgan 6 (Stephen J, British Labour Party Exectutive Committee, *Electric Articles*) ET

Musharraf probably hopes that by giving de facto autonomy to the Taliban and Pashtun leaders now with a virtual free hand for cross border operations into Afghanistan, he will undercut any future upsurge in support for a break-away independent Pashtunistan state or a “Peoples’ War” of the Pashtun populace as a whole, as he himself described it. However events may prove him sorely wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him. As the war intensifies, he has no guarantees that the current autonomy may yet burgeon into a separatist movement. Appetite comes with eating, as they say. Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer al of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but captures at least half of the country, then a Taliban Pashtun caliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan. Then, the likely break up of Afghanistan along ethnic lines, could, indeed, lead the way to the break up of Pakistan, as well. Strong centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unity of Pakistan, and, in the context of the new world situation, the country could be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist uprisings, probably including a military-fundamentalist coup d’état. Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was “Osama” (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe for a coup d’état by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations. The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could no be ruled out. Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a “Pandora's box” for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US. What is at stake in “the half-forgotten war” in Afghanistan is far greater than that in Iraq. But America’s capacities for controlling the situation are extremely restricted. Might it be, in the end, they are also forced to accept President Musharraf's unspoken slogan of «Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan!

And, the impact is extinction

Fai 1 (Dr. Ghulam Nabi, executive director of the Kashmiri American Council,  *The Washington Times*, 8 July 2001) ET

The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan.  It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe.  The United States would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view.  The Director of Central Intelligence, the Department of Defense, and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries.  Both India and Pakistan are racing like thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations.  Neither country has initialed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention.

\*\*\*Iran Links\*\*\*

TNW’s Cause Preemption

The TNWs in turkey are a fundamental to NATO’s preemptive nuclear policy

Rozoff, 10 (Rick, Manager of Stop NATO Internationl, “Nuclear Weapons and Interceptor Missles: Twin Pillars of U.S.-NATO Military Strategy In Europe”, April 24, http://australia.to/2010/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=2378:nuclear-weapons-and-interceptor-missiles-twin-pillars-of-us-nato-military-strategy-in-europe&catid=94:breaking-news)

The two-day NATO foreign ministers meeting in the Estonian capital of Tallinn on April 22-23 focused on the completion of the military alliance’s first 21st century Strategic Concept and on the war in Afghanistan, the near-complete absorption of the Balkans into the bloc, and the expansion of operations at the Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence established by NATO two years ago in the same city. The most important deliberations, however, were on the integrally related questions of U.S. nuclear weapons stored on air bases in five NATO member states and the expansion of the Pentagon’s interceptor missile program to all of Europe west of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Discussions on the role of nuclear arms in Europe a generation after the end of the Cold War are in line with the Nuclear Posture Review released last month by the U.S. Department of Defense. NATO has never been known to deviate from American precedents and expectations. Its role is to accommodate and complement Pentagon initiatives. A nation like the Netherlands or Poland proposes, Washington disposes. While speaking at a press conference in the ministerial meeting’s host city, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen directly tied together the retention of U.S. nuclear arms in Europe and NATO’s cooperation with its dominant member on a continent-wide interceptor missile system: "NATO’s core business, its raison-d’etre, is to protect our territory and our populations….And in a world where nuclear weapons actually exist, NATO needs a credible, effective, and safely managed deterrent. "Missile defence is no replacement for an effective deterrent. But it can complement it. Because there are states, or other actors, who might not be rational enough to be deterred by our nuclear weapons. But they might be deterred by the realisation that their few missiles might not get through our defences." What Rasmussen failed to mention was that in the event NATO collectively or a coalition of its main powers was to launch first strikes against nations to the east and south with conventional weapons, nuclear ones or a combination of both, an advanced phase interceptor system could prevent effective retaliation. The NATO chief also said, "The missile threat to Europe is clear, and it is growing….Which means, to my mind, that we need to take on Alliance missile defence as a NATO mission." Recent statements by Rasmussen, one of which has drawn the ire of Iran directly, would indicate from where the missile threat to Europe is alleged to emanate, but Rasmussen has no aversion to belaboring – or exaggerating – a point and added, "30 countries, including of course Iran, have or are developing missiles." To address the non-existent challenge to Europe Rasmussen announced that the foreign ministers in attendance would discuss "issues surrounding missile defence, including cost, command and control," and stated that at the bloc’s summit in Lisbon, Portugal this November "NATO nations will decide whether or not it will to take on Alliance missile defence as a NATO mission." After the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO ordinarily held a summit every third year in the 1990s and every second year from 1999 to 2008. But this year’s summit will be the third of what have become annual events: Romania in 2008, France and Germany in 2009, and Portugal this year. The last will be the first NATO summit held entirely in a founding member state since the fiftieth anniversary one in Washington, DC in 1999. Not only the increased frequency (the Alliance has never before in its 61-year history conducted summits in three successive years), but the locations of the summits reveal the intensification of NATO activity and its steady drive to the east over the last decade. In the ten years between the Washington and last year’s Strasbourg, France-Kehl, Germany summits, every one was held in Eastern Europe: In the Czech Republic in 2002, Turkey in 2004, Estonia in 2006 and Romania in 2008. The sites, to the east and south of previous ones, are indicative of what NATO has become in the 21st century: An expansionist, active military force that has deployed troops to several current and recent conflict zones – Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan and Somalia – and to numerous adjoining nations such as Albania, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Jordan and Kuwait. There were 50,000 multinational forces under NATO command in Kosovo in 1999. There are now over 90,000 (of 120,000 foreign troops) in Afghanistan, with both the aggregate number and the percentage to increase shortly. In his opening statement at the foreign ministers meeting in Estonia, Rasmussen emphasized the centrality of U.S.-led missile shield plans in relation to the upcoming summit in Portugal and the new Strategic Concept that will be adopted there: "In Lisbon, NATO nations will decide if missile defence for our European territory and population should become an Alliance mission. I make no secret that I think it should." He linked maintaining American nuclear gravity bombs in several European nations and the expansion of interceptor missile facilities in Eastern Europe to the Alliance’s so-called collective defense doctrine. In his main address Rasmussen stated: "[W]e are delivering solidarity through our unflinching commitment to territorial defence. This core task of NATO is embodied in Article 5 of our founding treaty: An attack on one Ally is considered an attack on all. This is the very foundation of our Alliance….We need the right type of military capabilities. We need modern and mobile armed forces. Armed forces that are not static. Forces that are able to deploy quickly to assist an Ally in need." The secretary general faithfully echoed the two rationales for nuclear first strikes continued in the new U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, and indeed the American global war on terror phraseology of the past nine years, in asserting that NATO "must retain a nuclear capability as long as there are rogue regimes or terrorist groupings that may pose a nuclear threat to us." But he then segued seamlessly into identifying that NATO’s main prospective target remains what it has always been: Russia. Without identifying it (or needing to in the following context), he said: "We also need a visible presence of NATO across the entire territory of our Alliance. And we see a perfect example here in this region. We have put in place arrangements to police the Baltic airspace. A range of NATO members are actively engaged – sharing responsibility – showing solidarity – and demonstrating a capable and credible Alliance that is determined to defend our territory and to protect our populations. "We also need to guard against new risks and threats to the security of our nations, such as energy cut-offs or cyber attacks. And here as well, we have a good example right here in Estonia, with the Alliance’s Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence." There are neither rogue nations nor al-Qaeda operatives with "nuclear suitcases" in the Baltic Sea region. References to energy cut-offs and cyber attacks are undeniable and exclusive allusions to actions NATO states have accused Russian of perpetrating. The patrolling of Baltic air space by NATO warplanes and the – to call it by its proper name – cyber warfare center in Estonia are both aimed at Russia and Russia only. In his speech Rasmussen was unequivocal in his pro-nuclear weapons stance. In addition to affirming that "What we…need is a credible nuclear deterrent" – supposedly because of "rogue regimes or terrorist groupings" – he added "for this reason, we also need a credible missile defence system, providing coverage for all the Allies." Again the connection between U.S. nuclear arms at NATO nations’ air bases in Europe and anti-ballistic missile installations on or near Russia’s borders was made directly and again with the transparently untenable claim that both are needed against Iran and al-Qaeda. What plans the new Strategic Concept to be endorsed at the November summit will finalize were indicated in another statement by Rasmussen: "The United States already has a missile defence system. Some European Allies have a capacity to protect deployed forces against missile attacks….If we connect national systems into a NATO wide missile shield to protect all our Allies, that would be a very powerful demonstration of NATO solidarity in the 21st Century. And I hope we can make progress in that direction by the time of the next NATO Summit in Lisbon in November." He repeated NATO’s position on nuclear arms in an interview on Estonian public television: "If we look at today’s world, then there is no alternative to nuclear arms in NATO’s deterrent capability….My personal opinion is that the stationing of US nuclear weapons in Europe is part of deterrence to be taken seriously." The 2010 Strategic Concept will not differ in any substantive manner from the current one adopted in 1999, which states: "The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies. "A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe." The presence of nuclear weapons in Europe is a foundational tenet of NATO and one of the root purposes for the bloc’s existence. The first NATO Strategic Concept (The Strategic Concept For The Defense Of The North Atlantic Area), that of the year of its founding, 1949, includes among its commitments to: "Insure the ability to carry out strategic bombing including the prompt delivery of the atomic bomb. This is primarily a US responsibility assisted as practicable by other nations." NATO’s policy in the intervening 61 years years has also obligated European member states to adhere to what is called nuclear sharing or nuclear burden sharing; that is, nuclear bombs stationed on bases in Europe are to be delivered by the host nations’ air forces.

Threat Con Wrong

The United States lies about the threat in Iran. They label Iran as a threat with no true evidence-you cannot trust the claims about Iran by the US

Herman and Peterson 6 (Edward, Professor Emeritus of Finance at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, David, independent journalist and researcher, US Aggression-Time Once Again: Target Iran, http://www.counterpunch.org/herman05112006.html) MJ

What is mind-boggling in all this is that new attacks and threats by a country that is in the midst of a serial aggression program, that runs a well documented and widely condemned global gulag of torture,5 that has committed major war crimes in Iraq-Fallujah may well replace Guernica as a symbol of murderous warfare unleashed against civilians6-and that openly declares itself exempt from international law and states that the UN is only relevant when it supports **U.S. policy**,7 **is not only not condemned for its Iran aggression, but is able to enlist support for it in the EU, UN and global media. This enlistment of support occurs despite the further fact that it is now generally recognized that the Bush and Blair administrations lied their way into the Iraq invasion-occupation** (but still quickly obtained UN and EU acceptance of the occupation and ensuing ruthless pacification program),8 and that they cynically misused the inspections program, all of which makes the new accommodation to the aggression-in-process and planned larger attack truly frightening. **The mechanism by which this is accomplished by the aggressor state is to cry-up an allegedly dire threat that Iran might be embarking on a program to obtain nuclear weapons-it might be doing this secretively**, and although it has submitted itself to IAEA inspections for the past three years, it has not been 100 percent cooperative with the Agency.9 **Combining this with demonization**,10 **intensive and repeated expressions of indignation and fear, and threats to do something about the intolerable threat, the Washington regime has managed to produce a contrived "crisis," with huge spikes in media attention and supportive expressions of concern and actions by the UN, IAEA, and international community**.11 **These groups join the aggressor partly to avoid offending it, but also to try to constrain its determination to get its way-but in the process they accept its premises that there is a real threat and hence give at least tacit support to its aggression program, and sometimes more**. On the home front, with the acceptance of the seriousness of the manufactured crisis by the mainstream media and Democrats, and with leading politicos like Hillary Clinton and Evan Bayh even egging Bush on, the noise creates its own self-fulfilling pressures on the leadership that manufactured the crisis, who now must "do something" about it to avoid political loss.12 This time, **the EU appears to be cooperating even more fully in the developing aggression against Iran than it did in the Iraq case. Although Iran has an absolute and "inalienable" right to enrich uranium under NPT rules** (i.e., the NPT's sole condition is that the enrichment can only be "for peaceful purposes"), and although the NPT imposes upon other parties to the treaty the obligation to "facilitatethe fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,"13 under British, French and German urging Iran, in November 2004, agreed "on a voluntary basis to continue and extend its suspension to include all enrichment related and reprocessing activities," while these states agreed to continue negotiations in good faith for the sake of an agreement that "will provide objective guarantees that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes," and "firm guarantees on nuclear, technological and economic cooperation and firm commitments on security issues."14 But subsequent stages of negotiations

Threat Con Wrong

Fear of terrorism is the result of propaganda and a projection of insecurity

Chussodvosky, 2k8 (Michel, professor of economics at the [University of Ottawa](file://localhost/wiki/University_of_Ottawa), “The US-NATO Preemptive Nuclear Doctrine: Trigger a Middle East Nuclear Holocaust to Defend ‘The Western Way of Life’”, http://www.globalresearch.ca/ index.php?context=va&aid=8048)

Bin Laden’s Nuclear Program Now comes the authoritative part of the NATO sponsored report: We need to use nukes against bin Laden, because Islamic “fanatics” can actually make a nuclear weapons or buy them from the Russians in the black market. The Report calls for a first strike nuclear attack directed against Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda, which has the ability, according to expert opinion, of actually producing small nuclear bombs, which could be used in a Second 9/11 attack on America: . The second line of reasoning [contained in the NATO sponsored report] ismore difficult to refute. It argues that extreme fanatical terrorists, such as al-Qaeda, cannot be deterred because (a) they do not represent a country and therefore cannot be targeted and (b) they welcome death by suicide. So, we have to shift the concept of nuclear deterrence to the country or regime supplying the terrorists with fissile material. Nuclear weapons require materials that can be made only with difficulty. Once these materials are obtained by terrorists, however, the barriers to fabricating a weapon are much lower. In that sense the nuclear threat today is greater than it was in the Cold War and it seems the terrorists cannot be deterred.( Dibb, op cit, emphasis added) The alleged nuclear threat by Al Qaeda is taken very seriously. The Bush administration has responded with overall defense spending (budget plus war theater) in excess of one trillion dollars. This massive amount of public money has been allocated to financing the “Global War on Terrorism” (GWOT). Confirmed by Pentagon documents, this military hardware including aircraft carriers, fighter jets, cruise missiles and nuclear bunker buster bombs, is slated to be used as part of the “Global War on Terrorism”. In military jargon the US is involved in asymmetric warfare against non-State enemies. (The concept of Asymmetric Warfare was defined in The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (2005) “The American Hiroshima” The US media has the distinct ability to turn realities upside down. The lies are upheld as indelible truths. The “Islamic terrorists” have abandoned their AK 47 kalashnikov rifles and stinger missiles; they are not only developing deadly chemical and biological weapons, they also have nuclear capabilities. The fact, amply documented, that Al Qaeda is supported by the CIA and Britain’s MI6 is beside the point. The nuclear threat is not directed against the Middle East but against the USA, the perpetrators and architects of nuclear war are bin Laden’s Al Qaeda, which is planning to launch a nuclear attack on an American city: “U.S. government officials are contemplating what they consider to be an inevitable and much bigger assault on America, one likely to kill millions, destroy the economy and fundamentally alter the course of history,… According to captured al-Qaida leaders and documents, the plan is called the “American Hiroshima” and involves the multiple detonation of nuclear weapons already smuggled into the U.S. over the Mexican border with the help of the MS-13 street gang and other organized crime groups. (World Net Daily, 11 July 2005, emphasis added) The New York Times confirms that an Al Qaeda sponsored “American Hiroshima” “could happen” . “Experts believe that such an attack, somewhere, is likely.” (NYT, 11 August 2004) According to the Aspen Strategy Group which is integrated among others, by Madeleine Albright, Richard Armitage, Philip D. Zelikow, Robert B. Zoellick, “the danger of nuclear terrorism is much greater than the public believes, and our government hasn’t done nearly enough to reduce it.”:If a 10-kiloton nuclear weapon, a midget even smaller than the one that destroyed Hiroshima, exploded in Times Square, the fireball would reach tens of millions of degrees Fahrenheit. It would vaporize or destroy the theater district, Madison Square Garden, the Empire State Building, Grand Central Terminal and Carnegie Hall (along with me and my building). The blast would partly destroy a much larger area, including the United Nations. On a weekday some 500,000 people would be killed. (NYT, 11 August 2004) “Threaten them with a devastating [nuclear] attack” According to professor Dibb, nuclear deterrence should also apply in relation to Al Qaeda, by holding responsible the governments which help the terrorists to develop their nuclear weapons capabilities: “Ashton Carter, a former US assistant secretary for defense, has recently argued, the realistic response is to hold responsible, as appropriate, the government from which the terrorists obtained the weapon or fissile materials and threaten them with a devastating [nuclear] strike. In other words, deterrence would work again. (Dibb, op cit) The real nuclear threat is coming from bin Laden. The objective is to “to do away with our way of life”:None of this is to underestimate the impact of a nuclear weapon being detonated in an American city. It could be catastrophic, but it is highly unlikely to threaten the very survival of the US. To believe otherwise risks surrendering to the fear and intimidation that is precisely the terrorists’ stock in trade.General Richard Myers, another former chairman of the joint chiefs of staff,has claimed that if [Islamic] terrorists were able to kill 10,000 Americans in a nuclear attack, they would “do away with our way of life”. But Hiroshima and Nagasaki incurred well over 100,000 instant deaths and that did not mean the end of the Japanese way of life. (Ibid, emphasis added) In an utterly twisted and convoluted argument, professor Dibb transforms the US-NATO threat to wage a nuclear war on Iran into an Al Qaeda operation to attack an American city with nuclear weapon.

Preemption Coming

The US uses fear mongering frames and suppresses information to justify invasion of Iran. In reality there is no threat, but the US manipulates the public to believe Iran is a risk to the world.

Herman and Peterson 6 (Edward, Professor Emeritus of Finance at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, David, independent journalist and researcher, US Aggression-Time Once Again: Target Iran, http://www.counterpunch.org/herman05112006.html) MJ

**Since the spring of 2003, U.S. power has produced a steady and indignant focus on Iran's alleged foot-dragging on inspection**s. As in the case of Iraq's failure through March 2003 to prove that it did not possess any "weapons of mass destruction" (WMD), the U.S.-driven allegations and inspections regime channeled through the IAEA have focused on Iran's parallel failure to disprove a negative-namely, that Iran prove that it is not secretly engaging in practices that are prohibited under the NPT and subsequent Safeguards Agreement (May 15, 1974) and the Additional Protocols (signed December 18, 2003, though only observed "on a voluntary basis"). Moreover, throughout the current 38-month cycle of allegations and inspections to which the IAEA has now subjected Iran, the IAEA has repeatedly adopted a phraseology to the effect that **the IAEA is "unable to confirm the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities inside Iran"-an inherently politicized condition that no state would be capable of meeting**, no matter what it agreed to do, and whose application depends ultimately on the strength of the political forces that pressure the IAEA to continue the search.17 With enough political pressure, no amount of "transparency" and "confidence-building" measures on the part of the accused state can meet it, as was evident in the Iraq case. And as long as the IAEA reports that it is unable to confirm the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities inside Iran, Iran is helpless before the IAEA's negative condition. **The "threat" and crisis have been sustained in the media by the use of patriotic and fear-mongering frames and suppressions of relevant fact that may even be more brazen and misleading than those justifying the invasion of Iraq**. **The crisis-supporting frames are**: **(1)** **that Iran is a dangerous theocratic state, with an irrational and unstable political and clerical leadership that has supported terrorists and threatened Israel and is therefore not to be trusted with a nuclear program**; **(2)** **that it has been secretive about its nuclear program**, has not been fully cooperative with the inspections program of the IAEA, and that the reason for this secrecy is Iran's intention to develop nuclear weapons; (**3) that its acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability would be intolerable, would destabilize the Middle East if not the whole of Western Civilization, and must be stopped**.

Preemption Coming (Neocons)

**Obama is under the neocon influence to strike Iran**

Dreyfuss 8 (Robert, Contributing editor at the Nation magazine <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bob-dreyfuss/still-preparing-to-attack_b_147876.html>)JFS

A familiar coalition of hawks, hardliners, and neoconservatives expects Barack Obama's proposed talks with Iran to fail -- and they're already proposing an escalating set of measures instead. Some are meant to occur alongside any future talks. These include steps to enhance coordination with Israel, tougher sanctions against Iran, and a region-wide military buildup of U.S. strike forces, including the prepositioning of military supplies within striking distance of that country.   Once the future negotiations break down, as they are convinced will happen, they propose that Washington quickly escalate to war-like measures, including a U.S. Navy-enforced embargo on Iranian fuel imports and a blockade of that country's oil exports. Finally, of course, comes the strategic military attack against the Islamic Republic of Iran that so many of them have wanted for so long. It’s tempting to dismiss the hawks now as twice-removed from power: first, figures like John Bolton, Paul Wolfowitz, and Douglas Feith were purged from top posts in the Bush administration after 2004; then the election of Barack Obama and the announcement Monday of his centrist, realist-minded team of establishment foreign policy gurus seemed to nail the doors to power shut for the neocons, who have bitterly criticized the president-elect's plans to talk with Iran, withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq, and abandon the reckless Global War on Terrorism rhetoric of the Bush era. When it comes to Iran, however, it's far too early to dismiss the hawks. To be sure, they are now plying their trade from outside the corridors of power, but they have more friends inside the Obama camp than most people realize. Several top advisers to Obama -- including Tony Lake, UN Ambassador-designate Susan Rice, Tom Daschle, and Dennis Ross, along with leading Democratic hawks like Richard Holbrooke, close to Vice-President-elect Joe Biden or Secretary of State-designate Hillary Clinton -- have made common cause with war-minded think-tank hawks at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), and other hardline institutes. The [report](http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/8448) of the Coats-Robb task force -- "Meeting the Challenge: U.S. Policy Toward Iranian Nuclear Development" -- went far beyond the WINEP task force report that Lake and Rice signed off on. It concluded that any negotiations with Iran were unlikely to succeed and should, in any case, be short-lived. As the report put the matter, "It must be clear that any U.S.-Iranian talks will not be open-ended, but will be limited to a pre-determined time period so that Tehran does not try to 'run out the clock.' Anticipating the failure of the talks, the task force (including Ross) urged "prepositioning military assets," coupled with a "show of force" in the region. This would be followed almost immediately by a blockade of Iranian gasoline imports and oil exports, meant to paralyze Iran's economy, followed by what they call, vaguely, "kinetic action." That "kinetic action" -- a U.S. assault on Iran -- should, in fact, be massive, suggested the Coats-Robb report. Besides hitting dozens of sites alleged to be part of Iran's nuclear research program, the attacks would target Iranian air defense and missile sites, communications systems, Revolutionary Guard facilities, key parts of Iran's military-industrial complex, munitions storage facilities, airfields, aircraft facilities, and all of Iran's naval facilities. Eventually, they say, the United States would also have to attack Iran's ground forces, electric power plants and electrical grids, bridges, and "manufacturing plants, including steel, autos, buses, etc." This is, of course, a hair-raising scenario. Such an attack on a country that had committed no act of war against the United States or any of its allies would cause countless casualties, virtually destroy Iran's economy and infrastructure, and wreak havoc throughout the region. That such a high-level group of luminaries should even propose steps like these -- and mean it -- can only be described as lunacy. That an important adviser to President-elect Obama would sign on to such a report should be shocking, though it has received next to no attention.

Preemption Coming (UN Pressure)

The United States frames Iran as a threat so the world fears them. The US scares society into allowing unjustified actions

**Zarif 7** (Mohammad Javad, Former Representative of Iran to the UN & PhD in Int’l Law and Policy – U of Denver, Journal of International Affairs, “Iran,” pg 76, 77, http://www.zarif.net/Articles/Columbia%20JIA.pdf) MJ

In spite of Iran’s record, a massive campaign has been underway to portray Iran as a proliferator of nuclear weapons and a threat to regional stability. The recent flurry of diplomatic activities and divisive public statements—primarily by the United States and the United Kingdom—to frighten the countries of the region and to create an anti-Iran coalition has become the centerpiece of a strategy to rescue the failed policies of the United States in the region.22 According to the Wall Street Journal, “The threat of Iran’s rise has become for the U.S. a sort of diplomatic glue…to patch together an alliance aimed at helping heal not only Iraq, but also Lebanon and the Palestinian conflict…[U.S. allies] are…apprehensive about lining up too publicly alongside the U.S. in a Cold War-style, anti-Iran bloc.”23 The enemy paradigm is so pervasive that the U.S. administration opted for an escalation against Iran contrary to the advice of the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group. The surge in blaming Iran for the insecurity and sectarian violence in Iraq is designed to justify the escalation, while such claims cannot be explained by facts on the ground or by any calculation of Iranian interest in Iraq. In fact, U.S. vision has been so blurred by the prevalence of the paradigm, that American policymakers alienate and threaten Iran, while seeking help from those who have magnified—and instigated for their own motives—the sectarian divide in Iraq long before sectarian clashes started.24 This policy clearly illustrates that no lessons have been learnt from the devastation caused by many decades of the implementation of that policy in the Persian Gulf region. The manufacturing of the “Iran Nuclear Crisis” has similarly shown that old habits die hard, and the same tendencies that caused the misery of the last four years continue to prevail in major power circles in Washington and London. The same cabal has orchestrated a massive campaign to portray Iran’s peaceful nuclear program as a threat, and in order to give that a semblance of international legitimacy, has resorted to substantial economic and political pressure to compel members of the Security Council to adopt two unwarranted resolutions within five months.25

Preemption Doctrine Causes Iran Prolif

Nuclear weapons posing as a deterrent might spur Iran to do the same

Larsen 6 (Jeffrey A, The future of US non-strategic nuclear weapons and implications for NATO)

 Iran is within several years of having an indigenously produced nuclear weapons arsenal and delivery capability. This would present the Alliance with a new nuclear-armed state on its southeastern flank, one that abuts a NATO member (Turkey) and which has serious anti-Western attitudes. Other states in the region considered likely candidates to acquire nuclear weapons in the longer term include Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Egypt. These are all within range of NATO Europe, and all lay within the so-called “arc of instability” that crosses the Middle East and extends through South Asia. Most European member states do not see Tehran as an adversary today. Indeed, as one French diplomat explained, the United States appears to be demonizing the Iranian regime and overstating its nuclear capabilities in order to force Europeans to choose sides—something they are not ready to do.168 Some Turks point out that their border with Iran is its most stable frontier, prudent military planning would advise the Alliance to expect Iran to have a nuclear capability within the next 10 years, just about the time that the Alliance will most likely be removing the last vestiges of its Cold War nuclear posture from Europe. In addition, several European members have made security commitments to Israel, which would be the most likely target of Iranian nuclear threats. Several states, including Canada, believe that nuclear weapons have only one purpose: to deter other nuclear weapons. According to this view, the Alliance needs to try and prevent nuclear proliferation to other states, thereby relaxing the requirement to keep its own weapons as a deterrent.

Preemption Bad (Kills People, turns out)

It escalates to full-scale nuclear war

Hirsch 6 (Professor of physics at the University of California San Diego Jorge, “America and Iran: At the Brink of the Abyss,” <http://www.antiwar.com/orig/hirsch.php?articleid=8577>)JFS

The U.S. has just declared that it will defend Israel militarily against Iran if needed. Presumably this includes a scenario where Israel would initiate hostilities by unprovoked bombing of Iranian facilities, as it did with Iraq's Osirak, and Iran would respond with missiles targeting Israel. The U.S. intervention is likely to be further bombing of Iran's facilities, including underground installations that can only be destroyed with low-yield nuclear bunker-busters. Such nuclear weapons may cause low casualties, perhaps only in the hundreds, but the nuclear threshold will have been crossed. Iran's reaction to a U.S. attack with nuclear weapons, no matter how small, cannot be predicted with certainty. U.S. planners may hope that it will deter Iran from responding, thus saving lives. However, just as the U.S. forces in Iraq were not greeted with flowers, it is likely that such an attack would provoke a violent reaction from Iran and lead to the severe escalation of hostilities, which in turn would lead to the use of larger nuclear weapons by the U.S. and potential casualties in the hundreds of thousands. Witness the current uproar over cartoons and try to imagine the resulting upheaval in the Muslim world after the U.S. nukes Iran.

TNW’s cause Iran Prolif

TNW’s cause Iran Prolif

Kibaroglu 10 (Mustafa, Fellow at the Harvard University’s BelferCenter for Science and International Affairs, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010\_06/Kibaroglu#bio) PR

 Because of the view that NATO’s deterrent will be more credible with the presence of forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons in the allied territories in Europe, Turkish diplomats believe that the burden of hosting these weapons should continue to be shared collectively among five allies, as has been the case over the last several decades. Even if all of Turkey’s allies accept this proposal and act accordingly, Turkey will still face a dilemma in its foreign and security policies if it sees the hosting of U.S. nuclear weapons as the only way for it to fulfill its burden-sharing obligations. Ankara’s continuing support for the presence of the U.S. weapons on Turkish territory could be justified only if there were a threat from the military capabilities of Turkey’s neighbors, the two most significant of which would be Iran and Syria, and if the Western allies shared that threat assessment. There can be no other meaningful scenario that would justify Turkey’s policy of retaining U.S. nuclear weapons on its territory as well as leaving the door open for the deployment of U.S. missile defenses in Turkey in the future. Recent trends, however, appear to be moving from such a threat assessment by Turkey. Over the last few years, Turkey has experienced an unprecedented rapprochement with its Middle Eastern neighbors. Last year, Turkey held joint ministerial cabinet meetings with Iraq in October and Syria in December. Until recently, Turkey had treated both countries as foes rather than friends. These meetings have produced a significant number of protocols, memoranda of understanding, and other documents on a wide array of issue areas including the thorniest subjects, such as ways and means of dealing with terrorism effectively and using the region’s scarce water resources more equitably. Moreover, these high-level meetings resulted in the lifting of the visa requirement for Turkish citizens traveling to Syria and vice versa. That action has paved the way to an opening of the borders between the two countries; the borders had stayed closed for decades due to the presence of large numbers of heavy land mines on both sides. The mines will soon be cleaned up with a view to opening huge land areas to agriculture. In addition to improvements in bilateral relations with its immediate neighbors, Turkey has become more involved in wider Middle Eastern political affairs than it ever has been since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. A key part of this regional involvement is mediation efforts between Israel and Syria. Another element is a willingness to take on a similar role in Iran’s dispute with the international community over the nature and scope of Tehran’s nuclear program, which is generally considered by Turkey’s NATO allies to have the potential for weaponization and thus further proliferation in the region. Top Turkish political and military officials have suggested on various occasions that the most promising way out of the conflict in the longer term would be the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Against that background, the continued insistence of the Turkish security elite on hosting U.S. nuclear weapons has drawn criticism from Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors. Some of these neighbors, such as Iran and Syria, criticize Turkey’s policy of retaining nuclear weapons because they see the weapons as being directed against them. Others in the Arab world, such as Egypt, portray these weapons as a symbol of Western imperialism. Turkey therefore will have to seriously reconsider its policy on U.S. nuclear weapons. For this to happen, a debate should take place in the country in various platforms, in closed as well as open forums, with the participation of experts, scholars, officials, and other concerned citizens. There is a common belief in Turkey that the U.S. weapons constitute a credible deterrent against threats such as Iran’s nuclear program and the possible further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region in response to Tehran’s program. Others contend that if Turkey sends the weapons back to the United States and Iran subsequently develops nuclear weapons, Turkey will have to develop its own such weapons. These observers argue that even though they are against the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on Turkish soil in principle, the weapons’ presence in the country will keep Turkey away from such adventurous policies. Similar views have also been expressed by foreign experts and analysts who are concerned about Turkey’s possible reactions to the developments in Iran’s nuclear capabilities in case U.S. nuclear weapons are withdrawn from Turkish territory. The negative effects of the weapons deployments on Turkish-Iranian relations need to be assessed as well. Some Iranian security analysts even argue that the deployment of the weapons on Turkish territory makes Turkey a “nuclear-weapon state.” There is, therefore, the possibility that the presence of the weapons could actually spur Iranian nuclear weapons efforts. This issue may well be exploited by the Iranian leadership to justify the country’s continuing investments in more ambitious nuclear capabilities.

TNW’s cause ME Prolif

The presence of our nuclear weapons in Turkey will cause proliferation.

Korkut 6 (Tolga, Journalist and geopolitics specialist, *Obianet. cahttp://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=4873*) MKB

 The presence of 90 American nuclear bombs at the Incirlik Air Base in the Southeast Turkish province of Adana is being brought before parliament by the country's main opposition Republic Peoples Party (CHP) deputy and former Turkish ambassador to the United States, **Sukru** Elekdag**.** In an exclusive interview with bianet last week, Elekdag said no justification could be made by civilian or military authorities to retain these weapons after the Cold War and that, in his view, their presence delivered a blow to the regional political prestige of Turkey. Elekdag is calling on the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to explain if there is any valid military purpose in still allowing these weapons to be held in Turkish soil despite the end of the Cold War. "In 1991 father Bush made a historical statement and said 'there is no such threat. We are withdrawing all of our land tactical missiles in Europe.' Then they said 'air to surface bombs will stay for a while and we will liquidate them'. But these were all forgotten. It is only now that it's revealed what these weapons really are. Previously it was impossible to prove this. Authorities were neither saying yes or no," Elakdag explained. Noting that Turkey itself was not under any threat, Elekdag said "These weapons that are under USA control are not necessary. If there is a reason, let us know. If there is not, they should be taken out of the country". Elekdag added, "Middle East countries are concerned over the existence of these weapons. The new strategy of the USA is a pre-emptive strategy. In other words, to strike the source of a danger it sees without waiting. This, as in Iraq, leads to disaster". "We do not want to Iran to be nuclear armed. This issue has three actors, the USA, Israel and Iran. There is only one way out in solving this tension," he said. "The Middle East should become a nuclear free zone. Turkey should revitalise this draft". He said, however, that "it cannot support this with nuclear weapons. Being the secretary of the Islamic Conference Organisation, Turkey could take the responsibility of such a project at the level of the United Nations on a legal platform. It is difficult, but this is the only way out". Elekdag said that for his part, he now planned to bring the **United Nations Convention to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons** on the agenda of the Turkish Parliament. "I will reveal the arbitrary way the USA is enforcing this convention. If we do not want the 21st century to be the century of disaster, we have to enforce this convention fastidiously. Otherwise, other countries will revive the nuclear armament projects that they had shelved". Asked whether he would work together with non-governmental organisations already active on the issue, Elekdag said "I need to consider this. I do not know what their agenda is. I need to find this out. I am not against necessary defence measures being taken. Whatever required should be done. But I do think that there is no defence justification related to nuclear bombs".

Iran Prolif Bad – Israel Strikes

Expansion of Iran leads to Israeil air strikes – Ahmadinajed threats and Hizbollah funding

Atlas 6 (Pierre, asst. prof of Poli Sci @ Franciscan Center for Global Studies @ Marian College, 10/31/6, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/10/are\_israel\_and\_iran\_on\_a\_colli.html

The Israel-Hezbollah conflict is on temporary hold, but the issues that led to war this summer have not been resolved. Iran continues to be the primary external source of arms, training, and ideological inspiration for Hezbollah, Lebanon's Shiite Islamist guerrilla force. Should Israel launch a pre-emptive strike against Iran's nuclear facilities, Iran might use Hezbollah to create a "second front" by restarting the Lebanon war--with devastating consequences for Israeli and Lebanese civilians. The Iranians have stated repeatedly that their uranium enrichment program is for peaceful purposes only. But their refusal to allow IAEA inspections (as called for in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Iran signed) and their rejection of reasonable alternatives offered by the European Union and Russia have convinced many in the international community that Iran's nuclear ambitions are strategic. The Islamic Republic of Iran has long sought to become a major player in the region. According to Dr. Uzi Rabbi, a senior researcher at Tel Aviv University's Center for Iranian Studies, "nuclear power is but a tool by which to turn Iran into a hegemonic power." This week, an Iranian news organization announced that the Islamic Republic has started a second cascade of centrifuges, and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad brazenly declared that "today, the [nuclear] capability of our nation has multiplied tenfold over the same period last year." Iran's nuclear ambitions make the words of its president sound all the more ominous, especially to Israel. Ahmadinejad has repeatedly declared that Israel does not have the right to exist and should be "wiped off the map." Israeli security experts and elected leaders view Iran as Israel's greatest existential threat, and the government is moving to address it. On the same day that Iran's president boasted of his country's nuclear progress, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert announced that the Russian immigrant party Israel Beiteinu, led by ultra-right winger Avigdor Lieberman, would be joining the governing coalition. Lieberman's 11 Knesset seats will shore up Olmert's government, weakened and shaken by the Lebanon war. In exchange, Lieberman--a man with no experience in military or strategic planning--has been appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Strategic Affairs, assigned to direct Israel's response to Iran.

Continued Iranian proliferation will prompt an Israeli preemptive strike on Iran’s nuclear installations—drawing in the US

Dr. James Phillips, Senior Researcher of Middle Eastern Affairs, 10

An Israeli Preventive Attack on Iran's Nuclear Sites: Implications for the U.S.

January 15, 2010 by James Phillips, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/01/An-Israeli-Preventive-Attack-on-Iran-Nuclear-Sites-Implications-for-the-US>, s Senior Research Fellow for Mid­dle Eastern Affairs in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.

The Iranian regime's drive for nuclear weapons, rapid progress in building up its ballistic missile arse­nal, ominous rhetoric about destroying Israel, and the failure of international diplomatic efforts to halt Iran's nuclear weapons program have potentially created a--literally--explosive situation. Israel may launch a preventive strike against Iran's nuclear weapons infra­structure. The United States would almost certainly be drawn into an Israeli-Iranian conflict. The Obama Adminis­tration must start planning now to counter and mini­mize the destabilizing consequences of an expected Iranian backlash. To mitigate the threats posed by Iran to U.S. national security and to protect U.S. interests, the United States must: \* Recognize Israel's right to take action in self-defense against Iran's growing threat; \* Prepare for a violent Iranian response to an Israeli preventive strike, including preparations for a possible U.S. war with Iran; \* Deploy missile defenses to defend Israel and other U.S. allies from Iranian missile attacks; \* Enhance deterrence against Iranian attacks by making it clear to Iran's leadership that such attacks will make a bad situation worse for Iran; \* Work with allies to take precautions to miti­gate the impact of a possible Iranian-instigated oil crisis; \* Block arms sales to Iran; and \* Veto any U.N. Security Council resolution that does not acknowledge Iran's provocations and continued defiance of U.N. Security Council res­olutions on the nuclear issue.

Israel Strikes Impact

Israel attack of Iran would draw US into nuclear conflict

Hirsch 05 (Jorge , Oct, 27, a professor of physics at the University of California, San Diego, United States. www.antiwar.com/hirsch/?articleid=7649 accesed 7/2) CM

The stage is set for a chain of events that could lead to nuclear war over chemical weapons in the immediate future. If these events unfold, the trigger will be Israel, the target Iran, the nuclear aggressor the U.S. These are the reasons: The U.S. State Department determined in August 2005 that "Iran is in violation of its CWC [Chemical Weapons Convention] obligations because Iran is acting to retain and modernize key elements of its CW infrastructure to include an offensive CW R&D capability and dispersed mobilization facilities." According to the CIA, "Iran likely has already stockpiled blister, blood, choking, and probably nerve agents – and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them – which it previously had manufactured." According to (then undersecretary for arms control and international security, now U.S. ambassador to the UN) John Bolton's testimony to the House of Representatives (June 24, 2004), "We believe Iran has a covert program to develop and stockpile chemical weapons," and on Iran's ballistic missiles, "Iran continues its extensive efforts to develop the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction," and "The 1,300-km range Shahab-3 missile is a direct threat to Israel, Turkey, U.S. forces in the region, and U.S. friends and allies." In the IAEA resolution of Sept. 24 [.pdf], Iran was found to be in "noncompliance" with its NPT safeguards agreements. Members of the Israeli parliament from across the political spectrum are urging the United States to stop Iran's nuclear programs, or Israel will "act unilaterally." Statements of grave concern about Iran's nuclear program have been made by Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom, and Mossad chief Meir Dagan (Iran poses an "existential threat" to Israel). Shin Bet chief Avi Dichter accuses Iran of plotting relentlessly to attack Israeli targets. According to the head of the Russian Atomic Energy Organization, Alexander Rumyantsev, Russia will ship the first cargo of nuclear fuel for Iran's Bushehr's reactor at the end of 2005 or early 2006. Israel bombed Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor (which was under IAEA supervision) in 1981 just before nuclear fuel was loaded into it (to prevent nuclear fallout). President Bush has said that "all options are on the table" if diplomacy fails to halt Iran's nuclear program. The U.S. House of Representatives on May 6, 2004, by a vote of 376-3, called on the United States to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. In the recently released draft document "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations" [.pdf], the Pentagon states that it will respond to the threat of WMD (which includes chemical and biological weapons) with nuclear weapons. Conclusion: according to Israel, the U.S. administration, and 99.2 percent of the U.S. House of Representatives, Iran will not be allowed to have access to any nuclear technology. No diplomatic options to achieve that goal will remain when Russia and China veto Security Council sanctions, or if the IAEA refuses on Nov. 24 to refer Iran to the Security Council. Military action will occur before Russia ships uranium fuel to Iran, and will inevitably lead to the use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. against Iran. How will it all get started? No matter how much Bush and Cheney want it, the U.S. Senate is unlikely to authorize the bombing of Iranian installations out of the blue. Unless there is some major disturbance in Iraq that can be blamed on Iran, Israel is likely to pull the trigger. It knows how to and has every motivation to do so. Once Israel drops the first bomb on an Iranian nuclear facility, as it did with Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981, there is no return. Bushehr is likely to be the first target; other installations will follow. Iran will respond – how can it not? At a minimum, it will shoot missiles at Israel. It may or may not shoot Iran will respond – how can it not? At a minimum, it will shoot missiles at Israel. It may or may not shoot at U.S. forces in Iraq initially, but given the U.S.-Israel "special relationship," there is no way the U.S. will stay out of the conflict. Many of Iran's targeted facilities are underground, and U.S. bombs will be needed to destroy them all. Once the U.S. enters the conflict, 150,000 U.S. troops in Iraq will be at risk of Iranian missiles with chemical warheads, or of being overrun by Iran's conventional forces streaming into Iraq. According to the Pentagon planning [.pdf], nuclear weapons will be used: "To demonstrate U.S. intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter adversary use of WMD." "Against an adversary using or intending to use WMD against U.S., multinational, or alliance forces or civilian populations…" "[O]n adversary installations including WMD, deep, hardened bunkers containing chemical or biological weapons or the C2 infrastructure required for the adversary to execute a WMD attack against the United States or its friends and allies" "[T]o counter potentially overwhelming adversary conventional forces…" "For rapid and favorable war termination on U.S. terms…" "To ensure success of U.S. and multinational operations…"

Iran Prolif Bad – Really Bad

Iranian nuclearization ignites Middle Eastern war- 28 million dead in 21 days, 33 million to follow, global economy destroyed- extinction

Walker 7 [Martin Senior Director of the Global Business Policy Council November 22 Middle East Times http://www.metimes.com/Opinion/2007/11/22/analysis\_a\_mideast \_nuclear\_war/4411/ ] KLS

He has now turned his laser-like research and forensic intelligence skills to studying the real implication of the endless diplomatic minuet at the United Nations over Iran's nuclear ambitions. In the real world, this matters mainly because an Iranian nuclear capability would transform the power balance in the wider Middle East, and leave the region and the rest of us living under the constant prospect of a nuclear exchange between Iran and Israel. This would mean, Cordesman suggests, some 16 million to 28 million Iranians dead within 21 days, and between 200,000 and 800,000 Israelis dead within the same time frame. The total of deaths beyond 21 days could rise very much higher, depending on civil defense and public health facilities, where Israel has a major advantage. It is theoretically possible that the Israeli state, economy and organized society might just survive such an almost-mortal blow. Iran would not survive as an organized society. "Iranian recovery is not possible in the normal sense of the term," Cordesman notes. The difference in the death tolls is largely because Israel is believed to have more nuclear weapons of very much higher yield (some of 1 megaton), and Israel is deploying the Arrow advanced anti-missile system in addition to its Patriot batteries. Fewer Iranian weapons would get through. The difference in yield matters. The biggest bomb that Iran is expected to have is 100 kilotons, which can inflict third-degree burns on exposed flesh at 8 miles; Israel's 1-megaton bombs can inflict third-degree burns at 24 miles. Moreover, the radiation fallout from an airburst of such a 1-megaton bomb can kill unsheltered people at up to 80 miles within 18 hours as the radiation plume drifts. (Jordan, by the way, would suffer severe radiation damage from an Iranian strike on Tel Aviv.) Cordesman assumes that Iran, with less than 30 nuclear warheads in the period after 2010, would aim for the main population centers of Tel Aviv and Haifa, while Israel would have more than 200 warheads and far better delivery systems, including cruise missiles launched from its 3 Dolphin-class submarines. The assumption is that Israel would be going for Iran's nuclear development centers in Tehran, Natanz, Ardekan, Saghand, Gashin, Bushehr, Aral, Isfahan and Lashkar A'bad. Israel would also likely target the main population centers of Tehran, Tabriz, Qazvin, Isfahan, Shiraz, Yazd, Kerman, Qom, Ahwaz and Kermanshah. Cordesman points out that the city of Tehran, with a population of 15 million in its metropolitan area, is "a topographic basin with mountain reflector. Nearly ideal nuclear killing ground." But it does not end there. Cordesman points out that Israel would need to keep a "reserve strike capability to ensure no other power can capitalize on Iranian strike." This means Israel would have to target "key Arab neighbors" - in particular Syria and Egypt. Cordesman notes that Israel would have various options, including a limited nuclear strike on the region mainly inhabited by the Alawite minority from which come the ruling Assad dynasty. A full-scale Israeli attack on Syria would kill up to 18 million people within 21 days; Syrian recovery would not be possible. A Syrian attack with all its reputed chemical and biological warfare assets could kill up to 800,000 Israelis, but Israeli society would recover. An Israeli attack on Egypt would likely strike at the main population centers of Cairo, Alexandria, Damietta, Port Said, Suez, Luxor and Aswan. Cordesman does not give a death toll here, but it would certainly be in the tens of millions. It would also destroy the Suez Canal and almost certainly destroy the Aswan Dam, sending monstrous floods down the Nile to sweep away the glowing rubble. It would mean the end of Egypt as a functioning society. Cordesman also lists the oilwells, refineries and ports along the Gulf that could also be targets in the event of a mass nuclear response by an Israel convinced that it was being dealt a potentially mortal blow. Being contained within the region, such a nuclear exchange might not be Armageddon for the human race; it would certainly be Armageddon for the global economy. So in clear, concise and chillingly forensic style, Cordesman spells out that the real stakes in the crisis that is building over Iran's nuclear ambitions would certainly include the end of Persian civilization, quite probably the end of Egyptian civilization, and the end of the Oil Age. This would also mean the end of globalization and the extraordinary accretions in world trade and growth and prosperity that are hauling hundreds of millions of Chinese and Indians and others out of poverty.

**Iran Prolif Bad – NPT**

Iran prolif collapses the NPT, risks Middle East War due to miscalc

Ackerman 09 (Gary is part of the Presidential Task Force on Iranian Proliferation, Regional Security, and U.S. Policy, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Preventing a Cascade of Instability: U.S. Engagement to Check Iranian Nuclear Progress,” March, p. 2)

If Iran “gets away” at low cost with years of safe­guards violations and defiance of UN Security Council resolutions, nonproliferation norms likely will further erode across the globe. Other countries may consider taking the same path, especially if Iran’s programs gain legitimacy. If the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is seen as fraying, it may be difficult to make progress on supplementary means to shore up the nonproliferation regime. The greater the number of countries with nuclear weapons, the higher the risk that misperception and miscalculation could lead to a nuclear confrontation, with horrible consequences. In the Middle East, those who see themselves as regional powers may want nuclear capabilities matching those in Iran—including enrichment or reprocessing facil­ities—for both strategic and prestige-related reasons. To be sure, Middle East states would need many years to build an indigenous nuclear infrastructure, but the pursuit of a broad range of nuclear capabilities could be destabilizing by creating the impression that the military nuclearization of the region is inevitable.

NPT Solves Prolif

Collapse of the NPT means over 40 countries will breakout overnight

Rublee ‘8 - Professor of Government and World Affairs @ University of Tampa [Maria Rost Rublee, “Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness,” International Studies Review, 22 Aug 2008, Volume 10, Issue 3, Pages 420-450WileyInterScience]

However, I would argue that before the United States (or any other country) gives up on the NPT and associated nuclear nonproliferation regime, we should take full account of not only the regime’s failures, but also its successes. Indeed, the success of the NPT is in many ways more surprising than its recent failures: for almost four decades, almost all states in the international system chose to forgo nuclear weapons, and in some cases, even gave them up. Numerous reports in the 1960s warned that the number of new nuclear states could reach as high as 20 in a few decades (The Bomb 1965:53). Instead, the count by 2008 is only four: India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea.2 The fact that so many states abstained from nuclear weapons tells us to look closely at the nuclear nonproliferation regime. What role has it played in encouraging nuclear forbearance? With the risk of nuclear theft or accidents increasing with each new nuclear weapons state, the international community needs all the help it can get in discouraging nuclear proliferation. This is especially important given the growing numbers of ‘‘latent nuclear states,’’ those with the ‘‘necessary industrial infrastructure and scientific expertise to build nuclear weapons on a crash basis if they chose to do so’’ (Sagan 1996:56). In 2004, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimated that over 40 countries were ‘‘nuclear latent states’’. Given the high stakes, we need to better understand how and in what ways the NPT has actually helped discouraged nuclear proliferation. In doing so, we can also understand the mechanisms through which international regimes work to influence policymakers. So what about the NPT—if anything—has led to such a stunning record of nonproliferation? Certainly, a number of authors have tackled the topic of how the NPT contributes to halting nonproliferation. What tends to be missing, however, is a systematic and theoretically grounded way to assess the NPT’s utility. In this article, I propose such a framework, drawing from social psychology. Within the social psychology literature, scholars agree that persuasion and influence happen through distinct, recognizable mechanisms. I argue that the influence of the nuclear nonproliferation regime of state elites could be understood through the lens of social psychology.3 In other words, I propose taking social psychology’s framework for how attitudes and behavior change, and applying it to the NPT. I do so through a three-step process. I first break apart ‘‘nuclear forbearance’’ (or compliance with the NPT) into three different outcomes identified by the social psychology literature: persuasion (behavior resulting from genuine transformation of preferences), social conformity (behavior resulting from the desire to maximize social benefits and ⁄ or minimize social costs, without a change in underlying preferences), and identification (behavior resulting from the desire or habit of following the actions of an important other). Next, I investigate the different mechanisms through which the international social environment exerts influence on policymakers: creating a ‘‘list’’ effect in which those in noncompliance are obviously in a small minority, linking nuclear nonproliferation to other strongly held values, establishing a public record of state commitment which makes it hard for a state to withdraw, and more. Finally, I assess the utility of the framework by examining the case of Japan: to what extent does it help us understand Japanese nuclear decision-making? I conclude with some thoughts on how this framework could be applied in a number of different issue areas in international relations. Because the framework is drawn from social psychology, it should be applicable to more than just nuclear proliferation. To what extent is it useful to understand compliance with international regimes as three different outcomes (persuasion, identification, and conformity)? Do the mechanisms work in other issues areas? Are some mechanisms more potent in specific issue areas, or perhaps in different types of regimes (for example, regimes formalized through treaties, informal regimes, track-two diplomacy, etc.)? While my immediate focus is how this framework helps us to understand nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation, it could provide fertile ground for research across a number of different fields. What is Nuclear Forbearance? Almost all states have both ratified and adhered to the NPT, giving up nuclear weapons and exercising ‘‘nuclear forbearance.’’ One may think that this nuclear forbearance means these states have permanently given up the nuclear option, and if the NPT is weakened, these states’ nuclear decision-making would not change. That would be the case if these states were ‘‘persuaded’’—that is, they have internalized the message of the NPT and no longer need the treaty to exist for them to adhere to its precepts. However, this outcome of ‘‘persuasion’’ is not the only type of nuclear forbearance possible. It could be that the elite are forgoing nuclear weapons due to ‘‘conformity’’—to gain social prestige and ⁄ or avoid social costs. In this case, if the NPT collapsed, the social costs and benefits associated with it may no longer exist, potentially leading to a reassessment of a state’s nuclear posture. Or, leadership could be following the lead of an important ‘‘other’’—the outcome of identification. If the important ‘‘other’’ helped to weaken the NPT, then leadership may no longer be as concerned about adhering to the treaty. While the behavioral outcome is currently the same—nuclear forbearance—the attitude and motivation behind the behavior is not. This unpacking of nuclear forbearance is based on social psychology. Alastair Iain Johnston (2001) has taken the field considerably forward by his identification from the social psychology literature of two methods of behavior change: persuasion and social influence. Johnston argues that in addition to transformation of state interests (persuasion), multilateral institutions can also exert, or provide a forum through which members exert, ‘‘social influence’’—essentially, a social version of material carrot-stick factors that states include in cost-benefit calculations. Roughly, ‘‘persuasion’’ can be characterized as ‘‘I now see that X is better than Y’’ and ‘‘social influence’’ can be characterized as ‘‘I think Y is correct (or I like Y better), but since everyone else says X, I will do X so I don’t rock the boat’’ (Johnston 2001). Social rewards for conformance with institutional norms include backpatting; for nonconformance, shaming. Social influence, then, is a cost-benefit calculation made with social factors, whereas persuasion is true preference change (Kelman 1958). This is an important point: constructivists often construe the effect of multilateral institutions as that of changing a state’s conception of its national interest. While that is an important effect to investigate, it is also crucial to recognize that this is not the only ‘‘nonmaterial’’ way through which states’ behavior may change. In other words, it does not have to be all-or-nothing: either states transform their attitudes and behavior (validating constructivism) or they don’t (validating realism). Constructivism allows us to explore ways in which the social milieu created by regimes can influence state behavior without ‘‘converting’’ them. Social conformity is one conceptualization of this influence short of conversion. Another example is the cooperative process documented by Dalia Dassa Kaye (2001) in her study of the Middle East peace process, which she shows to help states gain common understandings without necessarily wholesale transformation of state preferences. Distinguishing between full-fledged persuasion and social conformity is critical to nuclear policymaking. As Ariel Levite (2002) argues, some states that have adhered to the NPT may actually be engaged in ‘‘nuclear hedging’’—that is, not actively engaging in nuclear weapons development but maintaining capacity to develop them quickly if desired. On the surface, what looks like NPT compliance and what seems to indicate persuasion may better be described as social conformity. This paper argues, however, that our model of persuasion and influence needs to be more detailed to provide a robust guide in our exploration. First, instead of the term ‘‘social influence,’’ I propose the use of ‘‘social conformity’’ to signal outward acceptance with private rejection, because in social psychology literature, this is the terminology most often used. Beyond this terminology issue, I argue that, in addition to persuasion and social conformity, we must also include ‘‘identification’’ as a method of behavioral change. Identification takes place when an actor wants to be like another, and so changes his or her actions to mimic those they admire. It can take place when a friend agrees with another friend, not because he has really changed his mind, but because it is important to a significant other. Herbert Kelman (1958:51) defines identification in this way: Identification can be said to occur when an individual accepts influence because he wants to establish or maintain a satisfying self-defining relationship to another person or group. This relationship may take the form of classical identification, in which the individual takes over the role of the other, or it may take the form of a reciprocal role relationship. The individual actually believes in the responses which he adopts through identification, but their specific content is more or less irrelevant. He adopts the induced behavior because it is associated with the desired relationship. Identification falls between outright persuasion (where preferences have changed) and social conformity (where preferences have not changed). In fact, while identification can be an influence outcome between individuals, it is a common result from group membership. Called ‘‘ingroup identification,’’ Marilynn Brewer and R. J. Brown (1998:561) note that ‘‘when a collection of individuals believe that they share a common in-group membership, they are more likely to act in the interest of collective welfare than are individuals in the same situation who do not have a sense of group identity.’’ In contrast to social conformity (which is strategic and motivated by straightforward utility maximization), identification is based on an affective desire to create, maintain, or strengthen a relationship. Why is it important to include identification as a third method of behavioral change? After all, models are theoretical constructs that help us understand reality, not chart it out in full detail. However, mechanisms that produce original policy results should be included in models. That is, if the behavior change mechanism of identification leads to different policy results than persuasion and social influence, then it should be included. A current example from the nonproliferation arena will illustrate. Over the past decade, the United States has backed away from some of its obligations in the nonproliferation regime: a continued push for new nuclear weapons, public declaration of the decision to continue designing and computer-testing new nuclear weapons, and a decision to employ a limited ballistic missile defense system. Some also argue that the Bush administration’s proposed nuclear agreement with India undermines the basis of the NPT by encouraging nuclear trade with a state that refuses to sign the NPT. If an ally of the United States’ (call this state Ally X) had initially followed the United States lead on nuclear nonproliferation due to persuasion, Ally X would remain persuaded, and thus would likely express disappointment, as well as encourage the United States to get back on course. If, however, another ally’s behavior was based on identification with the United States (call this state Ally Y), then which United States would it identify with: the United States of action or rhetoric? Identification is also important because even if the United States works to uphold the nonproliferation regime, the fact that Washington maintains nearly 10,000 nuclear weapons—and almost 60% of them are operational— may send the message that to be powerful, a country needs nuclear armaments (United States Profile 2007). In addition, because in reality states are not unitary actors, the distinctions between persuasion, conformity and identification likely play out in domestic politics. In fact, each of the influence outcomes could be represented by some segment of society interested in nuclear policy. One example would be nongovernmental organization (NGOs) and activists are ‘‘persuaded’’ that nuclear weapons are detrimental to state prestige and identity, policy wonks in the diplomatic core ‘‘identify’’ with their Western allies, and members of the military bow to ‘‘social conformity.’’ In each case, the behavior is the same: nuclear forbearance. The reasons behind the actions are different, however, and material or social changes could lead to behavioral changes. A short narrative of how different domestic factions might play out in Ally X and Ally Y will illustrate. This description is not meant to describe any two countries, but rather simply highlight what differently influenced groups might look like with regard to nuclear policy, and how they might react to US behavior. In the case of Ally X and Ally Y (both confronted by the US’s changing behavior with regard to the nuclear nonproliferation regime), Ally X’s nuclear policy could be supported by a coalition of civil servants in a bureaucracy that has supported the NPT for many years, political appointees who believe in nonproliferation, and antinuclear activists with embedded ties to the policymaking apparatus—all of whom are ‘‘persuaded.’’ The United States’ current actions probably would inspire disappointment, resentment, disgust—but a change of heart is not likely because these actors are genuinely persuaded of the merits of nonproliferation. However, other elements in that government and state—those who support nonproliferation because of identification or social conformity—will likely have a different reaction. Those who believe their state should forgo nuclear weapons due to the negative diplomatic effects any other position would have, might rethink their position in light of the US’s stance, as well as the ineffectual response to North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006. In the short run, it is not likely that the state’s behavior would change, but in the long run, those persuaded may change their minds or may lose ground to growing ranks of those who disagree. In the case of Ally Y, where nuclear policy is guided by identification with the United States, confusion is likely to result, based on gap between US rhetoric and actions. How do you behave when the one you have patterned yourself after starts to do something different from what they have said all along? Depending on the strength of the persuaded and conforming segments, and the result of any internal struggle between them, the state could move more definitively against nuclear acquisition or could move toward exploring the nuclear option. In short, understanding that nuclear forbearance is actually the result of three separate attitudes—and that undermining the NPT could undermine commitment to nuclear nonproliferation with two of the three attitudes—leads to the conclusion that undermining the NPT could lead to a wave of nuclear proliferation among states we assumed would never think about the nuclear option again. In other words, the value of the NPT cannot be evaluated without assessing the extent to which it has helped to prevent proliferation. How specifically does the NPT do this? I posit that it has created an international social environment that influences elite decision-making through a number of specific and distinct mechanisms. Without the NPT, those mechanisms fall apart. It is to this social environment and the ‘‘influence’’ mechanisms fostered by it that the papers turns to next.

Prolif Bad

Rapid prolif risks nuclear war.
Horowitz ‘9 – Professor of Political Science @ University of Pennsylvania

([Michael Horowitz Former Emory debater and NDT Champion), “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict: Does Experience Matter?,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 53 Number 2, April 2009 pg. 234-257]

Learning as states gain experience with nuclear weapons is complicated. While to some extent, nuclear acquisition might provide information about resolve or capabilities, it also generates uncertainty about the way an actual conflict would go—given the new risk of nuclear escalation—and uncertainty about relative capabilities. Rapid proliferation may especially heighten uncertainty given the potential for reasonable states to disagree at times about the quality of the capabilities each possesses.2 What follows is an attempt to describe the implications of inexperience and incomplete information on the behavior of nuclear states and their potential opponents over time. Since it is impossible to detail all possible lines of argumentation and possible responses, the following discussion is necessarily incomplete. This is a first step. The acquisition of nuclear weapons increases the confidence of adopters in their ability to impose costs in the case of a conflict and the expectations of likely costs if war occurs by potential opponents. The key questions are whether nuclear states learn over time about how to leverage nuclear weapons and the implications of that learning, along with whether actions by nuclear states, over time, convey information that leads to changes in the expectations of their behavior—shifts in uncertainty— on the part of potential adversaries. When a new state acquires nuclear weapons, how does it influence the way the state behaves and how might that change over time? Although nuclear acquisition might be orthogonal to a particular dispute, it might be related to a particular security challenge, might signal revisionist aims with regard to an enduring dispute, or might signal the desire to reinforce the status quo. This section focuses on how acquiring nuclear weapons influences both the new nuclear state and potential adversaries. In theory, systemwide perceptions of nuclear danger could allow new nuclear states to partially skip the early Cold War learning process concerning the risks of nuclear war and enter a proliferated world more cognizant of nuclear brinksmanship and bargaining than their predecessors. However, each new nuclear state has to resolve its own particular civil–military issues surrounding operational control and plan its national strategy in light of its new capabilities. Empirical research by Sagan (1993), Feaver (1992), and Blair (1993) suggests that viewing the behavior of other states does not create the necessary tacit knowledge; there is no substitute for experience when it comes to handling a nuclear arsenal, even if experience itself cannot totally prevent accidents. Sagan contends that civil–military instability in many likely new proliferators and pressures generated by the requirements to handle the responsibility of dealing with nuclear weapons will skew decision making toward more offensive strategies (Sagan 1995). The questions surrounding Pakistan’s nuclear command and control suggest there is no magic bullet when it comes to new nuclear powers’ making control and delegation decisions (Bowen and Wolvén 1999). Sagan and others focus on inexperience on the part of new nuclear states as a key behavioral driver. Inexperienced operators and the bureaucratic desire to “justify” the costs spent developing nuclear weapons, combined with organizational biases that may favor escalation to avoid decapitation—the “use it or lose it” mind-set— may cause new nuclear states to adopt riskier launch postures, such as launch on warning, or at least be perceived that way by other states (Blair 1993; Feaver 1992; Sagan 1995).3 Acquiring nuclear weapons could alter state preferences and make states more likely to escalate disputes once they start, given their new capabilities.4 But their general lack of experience at leveraging their nuclear arsenal and effectively communicating nuclear threats could mean new nuclear states will be more likely to select adversaries poorly and to find themselves in disputes with resolved adversaries that will reciprocate militarized challenges. The “nuclear experience” logic also suggests that more experienced nuclear states should gain knowledge over time from nuclearized interactions that helps leaders effectively identify the situations in which their nuclear arsenals are likely to make a difference. Experienced nuclear states learn to select into cases in which their comparative advantage, nuclear weapons, is more likely to be effective, increasing the probability that an adversary will not reciprocate. Coming from a slightly different perspective, uncertainty about the consequences of proliferation on the balance of power and the behavior of new nuclear states on the part of their potential adversaries could also shape behavior in similar ways (Schelling 1966; Blainey 1988). While a stable and credible nuclear arsenal communicates clear information about the likely costs of conflict, in the short term, nuclear proliferation is likely

OSB Solves

A nuclear Iran is inevitable, but with offshore balancing the United States would be able to avoid Iranian retaliation against them.

Layne 07 (Layne, Christopher. "America's Middle East Grand Strategy after Iraq: The Moment for Offshore Balancing has Arrived"*Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL*, Aug 30, 2007 <Not Available>. 2010-06-07 http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p210973\_index.html)

As an offshore balancer, rather than confronting Iran militarily over its nuclear program and its regional ambitions, the U.S. would follow a two-tracked strategy of deterrence and diplomacy. Diplomatically, the U.S. should try to negotiate an arrangement with Iran that exchanges meaningful security guarantees, diplomatic recognition, and normal economic relations for a verifiable cessation of Tehran’s nuclear weapons program. Given the deep mutual distrust between Washington and Tehran, and domestic political constraints in both the U.S. and Iran, it is an open question whether such a deal can be struck. If it cannot, however, rather than attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities, the U.S. should be prepared to live with a nuclear armed Iran - just as it did with China in the 1960s, when China was seen as far more dangerous a rogue state than Iran is today.23 Advocates of the current strategy, of course, would reject this approach and argue that a nuclear-armed Iran would have three bad things consequences: there could be a nuclear arms race in the Middle East; Iran might supply nuclear weapons to terrorists; and Tehran could use its nuclear weapons to blackmail other states in the region, or to engage in aggression. Each of these scenarios, however, is improbable.24 A nuclear Iran will not touch off a proliferation snowball in the Middle East. Israel, of course, already is a nuclear power. The other three states that might be tempted to go for a nuclear weapons capability are Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. However, each of these states would be under strong pressure not to do so, and Saudi Arabia lacks the industrial and engineering capabilities to develop nuclear weapons indigenously. Notwithstanding the Bush administration’s hyperbolic rhetoric, Iran is not going to give nuclear weapons to terrorists. This is not to deny Tehran’s close links to groups like Hezbollah and Hamas. However, there are good reasons that states - even those that have ties to terrorists - draw the line at giving them nuclear weapons (or other WMD): if the terrorists were to use these weapons against the United States or its allies, the weapons could be traced back to the donor state, which would be at risk of annihilation by an American retaliatory strike.25 Iran’s leaders have too much at stake to run this risk. Even if one believes the administration’s claims that rogue state leaders are indifferent to the fate of their populations, they do care very much about the survival of their regimes, which means that they can be deterred. For the same reason, Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons will not invest Tehran with options to attack, or intimidate its neighbors. Israel’s security with respect to Iran is guaranteed by its own formidable nuclear deterrent capabilities. By the same token, just as it did in Europe during the Cold War, the U.S. can extend its own deterrence umbrella to protect its clients in the region - Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and Turkey. American security guarantees not only will dissuade Iran from acting recklessly, but also restrain proliferation by negating the incentives for states like Saudi Arabia and Turkey to build their own nuclear weapons. Given the overwhelming U.S. advantage in both nuclear and conventional military capabilities, Iran is not going to risk national suicide by challenging America’s security commitments in the region. In short, while a nuclear-armed Iran hardly is desirable, neither is it “intolerable,” because it could be contained and deterred successfully by the United States. For three reasons, a combination of containment, deterrence, and diplomacy is a far wiser policy than attacking Iran. First, outside the administration, experts widely agree that, at best, the U.S. can only succeed at slowing down Iran’s nuclear program because it cannot destroy all of Tehran’s nuclear facilities. Second, if the United States attacks Iran, Tehran has a number of retaliatory options. Iran can drive up oil prices (by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz and/or embargoing its oil exports); it can act in concert with Iraq’s Shiites to attack American forces in Iraq; it can cause trouble in Palestine and Lebanon by using Hamas and Hezbollah as proxies to pressure Israel; and it can support and conduct terrorist strikes on American targets in the Middle East and beyond. Finally, going to war with Iran would cause U.S. political standing to collapse completely in the Middle East, and could ignite a true clash of civilizations pitting the United States against the entire Islamic world

\*\*\*Russia\*\*\*

TNWs hurt Relations

Nuclear stockpiles violate the NPT removal of these bombs would greatly strengthen the NPT and open up talks betweem US and Russia over Bilateral Nuclear Weapon Reduction

Diakov, Miasnikov, and Kadyshev 4 (Anatoli, Eugene, and Timur, Publication of the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Dolgoprudny, 2004) AC

Article 2 of the NPT, in turn, forbids non-nuclear weapon states to receive nuclear weapons or control over them from nuclear weapon states. Thus, the current NATO nuclear strategy, which assumes delivery of US nuclear bombs by the dual-capable aircraft of NATO allies that are not nuclear weapon states, contradicts the NPT. The contradiction between NATO nuclear strategy and the commitments of its member nations under the NPT is one of most frequently discussed issues at the conferences of the Preparatory Committee for the NPT Extension. It is also discussed in a number of studies.X 223 Positions of the parties to the NPT regarding this problem differ dramatically. The United States and other members of the alliance adhere to the position that there is no direct prohibition of the deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of the nonnuclear weapon states in the Treaty, and also that there is no direct prohibition of participation of non-nuclear weapon states in planning nuclear operations or preparation of national armed forces for the use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, NATO allies recognize that the use of dual-capable aircraft for nuclear missions by the non-nuclear weapon states of the alliance in wartime will infringe on the NPT. In the days of the Cold War when NATO viewed the Soviet Union as the main threat, the United States justified such possible actions with the argument that observance of the NPT under such circumstances would not make any sense. The US argument was that the Treaty is directed at averting the danger of nuclear war, as declared in the NPT preamble, while NATO can use nuclear weapons only when nuclear war begins or becomes inevitable, i.e. when the NPT fails to fulfill its mission. Now that the Cold War is over and NATO is unable to identify one common enemy, these arguments make no sense – if they ever did.X It is important to emphasize that neither the USSR nor the Russian Federation have ever agreed with the US arguments. Even during preparation of the Treaty, the USSR declared that it would not be bound by any unilateral interpretation of the NPT. At the same time, the Soviet Union did not object to the substance of the US interpretation per se.X 224 A radical solution of the existing contradiction could be a commitment by nuclear weapon powers not to deploy their nuclear weapons outside their national territories. This would not only rule out the deployment of US nuclear weapons on European territory, but would also practically rule out the transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them to non-nuclear-weapon states. Russia put forward such a proposal in 1995 and actually made it a prerequisite for the beginning of negotiations on the reduction of TNWs. As follows from the above analysis, Russia’s proposal was governed not only by a concern about its own national security, but also a desire to strengthen the NPT and the existing international legal regime.X

U.S. missile and air bases in Turkey send a signal to Russia that the is trying to contain them—crushing relations

Engdahl 7 (William F., Journalist and geopolitics specialist, *Global Research. cahttp://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=4873*) MKB

It’s true that the overall number of nuclear weapons in the US military stockpile has been declining since the end of the Cold War. But not, it seems, because the US is moving the world back from the brink of nuclear war by miscalculation. The new missile defense expansion to Poland and Czech Republic is better understood from the point of the remarkable expansion of NATO since 1991. As Putin noted, ‘NATO has put its frontline forces on our borders… think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact?’ *US bases encircle Russia* As Russian strategist and military expert, Yevgeny Primakov, a close adviser to Putin, recently noted, NATO was ‘founded during the Cold War era as a regional organization to ensure the security of US allies in Europe.’ He adds, ‘NATO today is acting on the basis of an entirely different philosophy and doctrine, moving outside the European continent and conducting military operations far beyond its bounds. NATO…is rapidly expanding in contravention to earlier accords. The admission of new members to NATO is leading to the expansion of bases that host the U.S. military, air defense systems, as well as ABM components.’ Today, NATO member states include not only the Cold War core in Western Europe, commanded by an American. NATO also includes former Warsaw Pact or Soviet Union states Poland, Latvia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia, formerly of Yugoslavia. Candidates to join include the Republic of Georgia, Croatia, Albania and Macedonia. Ukraine’s President, Victor Yushchenko, has tried aggressively to bring Ukraine into NATO. This is a clear message to Moscow, not surprisingly, one they don’t seem to welcome with open arms. New NATO structures have also been formed while old ones were abolished: The [NATO Response Force](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Response_Force) (NRF) was launched at the [2002 Prague Summit](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=2002_Prague_Summit_of_NATO&action=edit). In [2003](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003), just after the fall of Baghdad, a major restructuring of the NATO military commands began. The Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic was abolished. A new command, [Allied Command Transformation](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allied_Command_Transformation) (ACT), was established in [Norfolk, Virginia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norfolk%2C_Virginia). ACT is responsible for driving ‘transformation’ in NATO. By 2007 Washington had signed an agreement with Japan to co-operate on missile defense development. She was deeply engaged in testing a missile defense system with Israel. She has now extended her European Missile Defense to Poland, where the Minister of Defense is a close friend and ally of Pentagon neo-conservative war-hawks, and to the Czech Republic. NATO has agreed to put the question of the Ukraine and Republic of Georgia’s bids for NATO membership on a fast track. The Middle East, despite the debacle in Iraq, is being militarized with a permanent network of US bases from Qatar to Iraq and beyond. On February 15, the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee approved a draft, the Orwellian-named NATO Freedom Consolidation Act of 2007 reaffirming US backing for the further enlargement of NATO, including support for Ukraine to join along with Georgia.  From the Russian point of view, NATO's eastward expansion since the end of the cold war has been in clear breach of an agreement between then-Soviet leader [Mikhail Gorbachev](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikhail_Gorbachev) and US President [George H.W. Bush](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_H.W._Bush) which allowed for a peaceful [unification of Germany](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_reunification). NATO's expansion policy is seen as a continuation of a Cold War attempt to surround and isolate Russia.

Plan Solves Relations

The U.S. and Russia have pledged to “reset” relations. This is the U.S.’s only opportunity for a fresh start, so the U.S. should work to consider Russian opinion in order to save relations.

Gordan 10 (Philip H., Assistant Secretary of Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, *“U.S.- Russia relations under the Obama administration” U.S. Department of State. http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2010/143275.htm*) MKB

President Obama and Secretary Clinton had no illusions about the differences we had and continue to have with Russia, but they also recognized that the level of acrimony and distrust that pervaded U.S.-Russian relations did not serve U.S. interests. Moreover, they saw that the poisonous atmosphere between the two countries was a threat to the stability and security of Europe itself. The relationship was undermined by a lack of trust and the absence of any political structures for constructive dialogue, let alone cooperation. This meant not only were we not getting anything done but that Russia had nothing at stake in its relations with the United States and so was uninterested in considering U.S. positions. And so the idea behind the reset was a simple one: The United States and Russia have significant common interests and where the United States and Russia have common interests, we should cooperate. Where we have differences, we will be honest about them, both in private and in public, and work to move the Russians to more reasonable positions. We will pursue a better relationship with Russia in our mutual interest and we will do so without sacrificing our principles or our friends. With these basic propositions as a guide, we have pursued a path of principled engagement. And we believe that path will yield considerable results.

TNWs cause Miscalc

TNW’s cause miscalc which escalates to a hot war between U.S. and Russia that culminates in extinction.

Engdahl 7 (William F., Journalist and geopolitics specialist, *Global Research. cahttp://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=4873*) MKB

With NATO troops creeping up to Russia’s borders on all sides, US nuclear B-52s and SSBN submarines being deployed to strategic sites on Russia’s perimeter, Washington extending its new missile shield from Greenland to the UK, to Australia, Japan and now even Poland and the Czech Republic, it should be no surprise that the Russian Government is responding. While Washington planners may have assumed that because the once-mighty Red Army was a shell of its former glory, that the state of Russian military preparedness since the end of the Cold War was laughable. But Russia never let go of its one trump card—its strategic nuclear force. During the entire economic chaos of the Yeltsin years, Russia never stopped producing state-of-the art military technology. In May 2003, some months after George Bush unilaterally ripped up the bilateral Anti-Missile Defense Treaty with Moscow, invaded Afghanistan and bombed Baghdad into subjugation, Russia’s President delivered a new message in his annual State of the Union Address to the Russian nation. Putin spoke for the first time publicly of the need to modernize Russia’s nuclear deterrent by creating new types of weapons, ‘which will ensure the defense capability of Russia and its allies in the long term.’ In response to the abrogation by the Bush Administration of the ABM Treaty, and with it Start II, Russia predictably stopped withdrawing and destroying its SS-18 MIRVed missiles. Start II had called for full phase out of multiple warhead or MIRVed missiles, by both sides by 2007. At that point Russia began to reconfigure its SS-18 MIRV missiles to extend their service life to 2016. Fully loaded SS-18 missiles had a range of 11,000 kilometers. In addition, it redeployed mobile rail-based SS-24 M1 nuclear missiles. In its 2003 Budget, the Russian government made funding of its SS-27 or Topol-M single-warhead missiles a ‘priority.’ And the Defense Ministry resumed test launches of both SS-27 and Topol-M. In December 2006, Putin told Russian journalists that deployment of the new Russian mobile Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile system was crucial for Russia’s national security. Without naming the obvious US threat, he declared, ‘Maintaining a strategic balance will mean that our strategic deterrent forces should be able to guarantee the neutralization of any potential aggressor, no matter what modern weapons systems he possesses.’  It was unmistakable whom he had in mind, and it wasn’t the Al Qaeda cave-dwellers of Tora Bora. Russian Defense Minister, Sergei Ivanov, announced at the same time that the military would deploy another 69 silo-based and mobile Topol-M missile systems over the following decade. Just after his Munich speech Putin announced he had named his old KGB/FSB friend, Ivanov to be his First Deputy Prime Minister overseeing the entire military industry. The Russian Defense Ministry reported that as of January 2006, Russia possessed 927 nuclear delivery vehicles and 4,279 nuclear warheads against 1,255 and 5,966 respectively for the United States. No two other powers on the face of the earth even came close to these massive overkill capacities. This was the ultimate reason all US foreign policy, military and economic, since the end of the Cold War had covertly had as endgame the complete deconstruction of Russia as a functioning state. In April 2006, the Russian military tested the K65M-R missile, a new missile designed to penetrate US missile defense systems. It was part of testing and deploying a uniform warhead for both land and sea-based ballistic missiles. The new missile was hypersonic and capable of changing flight path. Four months earlier, Russia successfully tested its Bulava ICBM, a naval version of the Topol-M. It was launched from one of its Typhoon-class ballistic missile submarines in the White Sea, travelling a thousand miles before hitting a dummy target successfully on the Kamchatka Peninsula. The Bulava missiles were to be installed on Russian Borey-class nuclear submarines beginning 2008. During a personal inspection of the first regiment of Russian mobile Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles in December 2006, Putin told reporters the deployment of mobile Topol-M ICBMs were crucial for Russia’s national security, stating, ‘This is a significant step forward in improving our defense capabilities.’ ‘Maintaining a strategic balance,’ he continued, ’will mean that our strategic deterrent forces should be able to guarantee the neutralization of any potential aggressor, no matter what modern weapons systems he possesses.’  Putin clearly did not have France in mind when he referred to the unnamed ‘he.’ President Putin had personally given French President Chirac a tour of one of Russia’s missile facilities that January, where Putin explained the latest Russian missile advances. ‘He knows what I am talking about,’ Putin told reporters afterwards, referring to Chirac’s grasp of the weapon’s significance.  Putin also did not have North Korea, China, Pakistan or India in mind, nor Great Britain with its ageing nuclear capacity, not even Israel. The only power surrounding Russia with weapons of mass destruction was its old Cold War foe--the United States. The Commander of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces, General Nikolai Solovtsov, was more explicit. Commenting on the successful test of the K65M-R at Russia’s Kapustin Yar missile test site last April, he declared that US plans for a missile defense system, ‘could upset strategic stability. The planned scale of the United States’ deployment of a…missile defense system is so considerable that the fear that it could have a negative effect on the parameters of Russia’s nuclear deterrence potential is quite justified.’ Put simply, he referred to the now open US quest for Full Spectrum Dominance—Nuclear Primacy. A new Armageddon is in the making. The unilateral military agenda of Washington has predictably provoked a major effort by Russia to defend herself. The prospects of a global nuclear conflagration, by miscalculation, increase by the day. At what point might an American President, God forbid, decide to order a pre-emptive full-scale nuclear attack on Russia to prevent Russia from rebuilding a state of mutual deterrence?  The new Armageddon is not exactly the Armageddon which George Bush’s Christian fanatics pray for as they dream of their Rapture. It is an Armageddon in which Russia and the United States would irradiate the planet and, perhaps, end human civilization in the process.  Ironically, oil, in the context of Washington’s bungled Iraq war and soaring world oil prices after 2003, has enabled Russia to begin the arduous job of rebuilding its collapsed economy and its military capacities. Putin’s Russia is no longer a begger-thy-neighbor former Superpower. It’s using its oil weapon and rebuilding its nuclear ones. Bush’s America is a hollowed-out debt-ridden economy engaged on using its last card, its vast military power to prop up the dollar and its role as world sole Superpower.

Accidental Launch Impacts

An accidental launch causes retaliatory strikes and extinction within half an hour

The American Prospect, 2/26/01 (Newspaper, Lexis)JFS

The bitter disputes over national missile defense (NMD) have obscured a related but dramatically more urgent issue of national security: the 4,800 nuclear warheads -- weapons with a combined destructive power nearly 100,000 times greater than the atomic bomb that leveled Hiroshima -- currently on "hair-trigger" alert. Hair-trigger alert means this: The missiles carrying those warheads are armed and fueled at all times. Two thousand or so of these warheads are on the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) targeted by Russia at the United States; 1,800 are on the ICBMs targeted by the United States at Russia; and approximately 1,000 are on the submarine-based missiles targeted by the two nations at each other. These missiles would launch on receipt of three computer-delivered messages. Launch crews -- on duty every second of every day -- are under orders to send the messages on receipt of a single computer-delivered command. In no more than two minutes, if all went according to plan, Russia or the United States could launch missiles at predetermined targets: Washington or New York; Moscow or St. Petersburg. The early-warning systems on which the launch crews rely would detect the other side's missiles within tens of seconds, causing the intended -- or accidental -- enemy to mount retaliatory strikes. "Within a half-hour, there could be a nuclear war that would extinguish all of us," explains Bruce Blair. "It would

\*\*\*NATO\*\*\*

Plan Collapses NATO

Reducing the stockpile of nuclear weapons will weaken NATO

Karaganov 10. (Sergei, dean of the School of World Economics and Foreign Affairs at Moscow State University. “Nuke Arms Save Humanity from Itself.” ChinaDaily. p.1-2. May 7, 2010. <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-05/07/content_9820383.htm> LRH)

If stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons are reduced, as some US, European, and Russian experts have proposed, the opponents of Russia's ongoing military reform will have even more reason to object to the reconfiguration of the country's conventional armed forces away from confrontation with NATO toward a flexible-response capability vis--vis other threats. Similarly, if the US withdraws its largely nominal tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, US-Europe strategic ties would weaken. Many Europeans, above all in the new NATO member states, would then demand more protection from the mythical Russian leviathan. The world community seems to be losing its strategic bearings. Instead of focusing on the real problem, namely the increasingly unstable international order, it is trying to apply Cold War-era concepts of disarmament. At best, these are marginally useful; more often, they are harmful in today's circumstances. What is most needed nowadays is clear thinking about how to live with an expanding club of nuclear states while keeping the world relatively stable. To this end, the two great nuclear powers need a coordinated deterrence policy towards new nuclear states

Removal of Nuclear Weapons from Turkey would undermine NATO cohesion.

Bell and Loehrke 9 (Alexandra and Benjamin, writers at The Bulletin, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey) PR

In 2005, when NATO's top commander at the time, Gen. James L. Jones, supported the elimination of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, he was met with fierce political resistance**.** (In addition to the 90 B61 bombs in Turkey, there are another 110 or so U.S. bombs located at bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.) Four years later, some U.S. and European officials still maintain that the political value of the nuclear weapons is enough to keep them deployed across Europe. In particular, they argue PDF that the weapons are "an essential political and military link" between NATO members and help maintain alliance cohesion. The Defense Department's 2008 report PDF on nuclear weapons management concurred: "As long as our allies value [the nuclear weapons'] political contribution, the United States is obligated to provide and maintain the nuclear weapon capability." Those who hold this view believe that nuclear sharing is both symbolic of alliance cohesion and a demonstration of how the United States and NATO have committed to defending each other in the event of an attack. They argue that removing the weapons would dangerously undermine such cohesion and raise questions about how committed Washington is to its NATO allies. But NATO's post-Cold War struggles with cohesion are a result of far more than disagreement over tactical nuclear deployments. NATO has given Turkey plenty of reasons to doubt its members' commitment to Ankara on several recent occasions. For example, before both Iraq wars, some NATO members hesitated to provide Turkey with air defenses or to assist it with displaced persons who had fled into its territory. Moreover, Turkey, which values NATO as a direct connection to Washington, witnessed the United States completely ignore its vehement opposition to the most recent Iraq War. Additionally, Ankara is dismayed by the reluctance of some of its NATO allies to label the Kurdistan Workers' Party, which has caused violent chaos along the Turkish border, as a terrorist organization.e Then there is the issue of Tehran's nuclear program, which seriously complicates any discussion of the United States removing its tactical nuclear weapons from Turkey. An Iranian nuclear capability could spark an arms race in the Middle East and bring about a "proliferation cascade," which could cause Turkey to reconsider its nuclear options--especially if the United States pulls its nuclear weapons from Incirlik. When asked directly about its response to an Iranian nuclear weapon, a high-ranking Foreign Ministry official said that Turkey would immediately arm itself with a bomb. This isn't Ankara's official policy, but it seems to indicate a general feeling among its leaders. Whether Turkey is primarily concerned about security or prestige, the bottom line is that it would not sit idly by as Iran established a regional hegemony.

Withdrawal of the US nuclear weapons would undermine NATO stability and cohesion thus murdering the drastically imperialist and aggressive nature of the West

Larsen 6 (Jeffrey A, The future of US non-strategic nuclear weapons and implications for NATO)

Many in NATO fear any alternative that involves the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons, for varying reasons. Doing so in hopes that Russia would follow suit in good faith disarmament is dangerous, they argue. Any option that called for the reintroduction of U.S. weapons in a crisis would be ludicrous given public opposition and the danger of raising the crisis level as the result of such a move. This is a future that some argue would please both Russia and France, but it is not one the rest of the allies would necessarily welcome. One senior NATO official even went so far as to say that the removal of U.S weapons from Europe “would be the beginning of the end of the Alliance.”267 Is that right? Could the Alliance survive the loss of its nuclear linkage to North America? On the other hand, others advocate the immediate and complete withdrawal of U.S. weapons for the simple reason that the Alliance can no longer answer the question over the purpose of those weapons in Europe—NSNW are not justifiable. Removal would eliminate an entire class of weapons, save money, and appease militarists in Russia who point to NATO NSNW as proof of the West’s aggressive nature.268

Excludes Russia

The enlargement of NATO will result in an increase in Russian securitization

Browning 1 (Christopher S. Browning Ph.D. Candidate Department of International Relations, University of Wales “The Region-Building Approach Revisited: The Continued Othering of Russia in Discourses of Region-Building in  the European North” [www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI\_publications/COPRI.../6-2001.doc](http://www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI_publications/COPRI.../6-2001.doc) ) MAH

Despite positive attitudes expressed across the region (including within Russia) the key to the future development of region building in the European north lies with the future development of NATO. The central issue here is the fact that Moscow continues to view NATO primarily as an instrument of US foreign policy and within which Russia remains designated in the role of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Viewed as an anti-Russian alliance Russia's negative attitude towards NATO enlargement becomes understandable. From the Russian perspective enlargement can only result in negative outcomes. In particular enlargement, they argue, will only increase instability in East and Central Europe because it would compel the Russians to view these states as a potential threat to Russia's security. To quote Valery Loshchinin, Director of the Second European Department in the Russian Foreign Ministry: The enlargement of NATO will result in the appearance of new watersheds and division lines in Europe. This will effect [sic] our inner-political situation as well: defence expenditures will increase and the demilitarization process will be slowed down. This will also influence the already signed agreements on disarmament and those which are only being prepared at the moment. All this will inevitably aggravate the tension and lead to confrontation. We are against such a development of events. That is why Russian society is unanimous in its non-acceptance of the enlargement of the Alliance. Two points can be seen to contribute to continuing Russian mistrust of NATO. Firstly, as in the discourses underlying the new region-building initiatives, in NATO-Russia relations it is patently clear that despite NATO rhetoric Russia is not regarded in any respect as an equal partner. Despite the fact that in 1997 a Permanent Joint Council was established between NATO and Russia with the signing of the Founding Act on NATO-Russia relations, this Council is widely viewed in Moscow as little more than a talking shop. Such conclusions have been drawn from NATO's enlargement to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1999 despite Russian protestations. Moreover, NATO aggression (without a UN Security Council mandate) against Yugoslavia in March 1999 reaffirmed this view. As Moshes notes, the NATO bombings in Yugoslavia both "violated the letter and spirit of the Founding Act with Russia, and thus showed how little attention the Alliance really pays to this relationship". Thus, despite the NATO rhetoric of engaging with Russia and developing a NATO-Russian partnership, Russia continues to feel alienated by NATO and excluded from playing a role in developing Europe's geopolitical framework. In this respect, Russia opposes NATO enlargement because it moves geopolitical barriers closer to Russia's borders and "symbolises a decrease of Russia's role in Europe".

“Russian belligerence”

NATO spurs Russian aggression

Reiter 1. (Dan, Associate Professor of Political Science and Winship Research Professor at Emory University, International Security, 5(4), p.48. Spring 2001. (LRH)

Second, NATO enlargement is likely to increase the chances of renewed Russian belligerence, rather than provide a useful insurance policy against it. Some observers have expressed concern that enlargement will jeopardize the West’s relationship with Russia. George Kennan, author of the famous “Sources of Soviet Conduct” essay that laid the groundwork for U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War, stated it bluntly: “Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of the entire post–cold war era.” The historian John Lewis Gaddis was equally critical: “Some principles of strategy are so basic that when stated they sound like platitudes: treat former enemies magnanimously; do not take on unnecessary new ones; keep the big picture in view; balance ends and means; avoid emotion and isolation in making decisions; be willing to acknowledge error. . . . NATO enlargement, I believe, manages to violate every one of the strategic principles just mentioned.”24Good?

Imperialism

NATO’s policy of extended deterrence forces allied, non-nuclear countries, to be drudging underlings in their regime of nuclear imperialism.

Chalmers 10 (Malcolm, NATO’s tactical nuclear dilemma, Occasional Paper)

Yet, as the first of these chapters makes clear, some other key NATO member states, together with influential policy experts, are far from convinced of the wisdom of unilaterally ‘going to zero’ in NATO DCA deployments. Since their inception in the1960s, dual-key nuclear deployments have played a critical role in symbolising the sharing of nuclear burdens between nuclear and non-nuclear member states. As long as extended nuclear deterrence plays a central role in NATO doctrine, they argue, it is important to ensure that as many member states as possible are involved in the maintenance of the forces that symbolise that policy, not least because this act ensures that non-nuclear states then have to ‘dip their hands in the blood’ of preparing to use these weapons. Were non-nuclear states no longer to have a role in preparing for nuclear use, they argue, it might be increasingly difficult to convince nuclear-armed alliance members (the US, UK and potentially France) to risk the lives of their own citizens to extend an ‘umbrella’ over their nonnuclear partners. Longstanding supporters of the nuclear status quo have been reinforced in their opposition to a ‘zero option’ by representatives of the Baltic states, who express concern that the nuclear ‘umbrella’ (that was so central to NATO strategy during the Cold War) should not be used to hedge against a resurgent Russia. It is often argued, in response, that extended deterrence does not require basing on land (as the US nuclear guarantee to Japan, which does not involve the basing of US nuclear weapons there, illustrates). Moreover, Cold War nuclear deployments derived their political and symbolic significance from their deployment in locations close to potential Soviet invasion routes, and were thus specifically configured in order to lend credibility to NATO’s doctrine of flexible response. By contrast, there is little, if any, deterrent value to be obtained from continuing to deploy weapons in locations, and with capabilities, that are functionally irrelevant. Given this new operational reality, it is questionable whether the US government will press for such weapons to be the primary test case for nuclear burden-sharing in the alliance. Some might also argue that nuclear burden-sharing is itself of declining relevance, given the marked reduction in the role of nuclear weapons in NATO doctrine since the Cold War. At a time when Russia retains much larger arsenals of sub-strategic nuclear weapons, however, the Baltic states worry that unilateral withdrawal of all equivalent NATO weapons could be seen as diluting US guarantees of their security. The foreign ministers of Sweden and Poland have added to calls for Russian sub-strategic weapons to be included in the discussion, calling for sharp mutual reductions as part of US/Russian arms control talks, starting with Russian weapons deployed close to European Union member states (in the Kola peninsula and Kaliningrad).1 Finally, critics of a NATO ‘zero option’ point to the critical role that NATO extended nuclear deterrence has played in preventing proliferation within NATO. Today, the development of independent German and Italian nuclear weapons is not a serious possibility. Given current trends in Iran, however, the risk of Turkey moving in this direction cannot be dismissed so easily. At the very least, any steps towards revising the role of nuclear weapons in NATO doctrine must take the Turkish dimension into account. Debates on nuclear weapon policy are, perhaps inevitably, strongly political and symbolic – ‘theological’ even – in character. Unlike their conventional counterparts, all concerned devoutly hope that they will never be used. As ‘political’ weapons, appearances matter as much, if not more, than what might, or might not, happen in the event of war.

Kills Heg

NATO Requires overstretch that collapses hegemony

Merry 3 ( E. Wayne, Therapy’s End: Thinking Beyond NATO, The National Interest, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m2751/is\_74/ai\_112411717/pg\_8/?tag=content;col1

For better or worse, the United States has global responsibilities and unique global capabilities. At the same time, **Washington's** diplomatic and political **capacities are already overburdened**. While U.S. operational and logistical capabilities are today supreme, America's overall force structure is little more than half the size it was a generation ago, and its reserves are seriously overcommitted. The best forces can cover only limited tasks, especially for a democratic nation that employs only volunteers. Stated plainly, **NATO is a luxury the United States can no longer justify. This vast subsidy for Europe is in direct conflict with the procurement and development budgets required to maintain the American technological lead in an ever-competitive world. Today's precision weapons will be commonplace tomorrow, and even the Pentagon's immense budget cannot always keep up**.

China Conflict

The CP causes NATO overreach which causes conflict with China – other issues stabilize the alliance.

Heisbourg 6 ( Special adviser at the Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, 2006

Francois, Paris, “Why Nato needs to be less ambitious,” Financial Times, 11/22/06, lexis

Yet it is as clear that Nato is no longer a pivot of US strategy, as demonstrated by its marginal treatment in America's latest quadriennal defence review. Indeed, the word "Nato" is all too often, in American political and media parlance, a euphemism for the phrase "the European allies" - which is not saying quite the same thing. Nato's expansion may be reaching the limits beyond which it would become a force of regional instability rather than one of stabilisation: Ukraine is literally split down the middle over the issue of entry to the Nato alliance. Going "out of area", as in Afghanistan, has helped keep Nato in business but in the process the alliance has become an a la carte multilateral institution. The Atlantic alliance has also ceased to be the principal point of US-European consultation on the key strategic issues of our times: the rise of China, the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea and the fate of the crisis-ridden Middle East are dealt with mainly outside the Nato framework. In itself, this reduction of Nato's place in the overall scheme of strategic affairs should not be a big concern for those who live and work beyond the confines of the Nato bureaucracy. After all, Nato is immensely and uniquely useful in fostering interoperability between the military forces of its members, which is key to forming effective coalitions of forces. In a world in which the mission determines the coalition, this ability is more important than ever. Similarly, Nato remains key in ensuring that the partner states of eastern Europe press on with reform of their security sectors. Unfortunately, Nato is not sticking to its core competencies. In a quest to carve a greater role for itself and demonstrate global relevance, the alliance is running the risk of overreaching itself in strategic and political terms, with potentially dangerous consequences. In the run-up to Riga, there has been much talk of a "Nato-bis", or second version, of a privileged partnership between Nato and hopefully like-minded states in the Asia-Pacific region such as Japan and Australia. The wisdom of this is questionable, to put it mildly, given its potential for needless friction with a rising China. The push for a Nato-bis is probably not intended to foster a "west against the rest" alignment in east Asia; but that could be its inadvertent effect. Nato should not be acting like a solution in search of a problem.

The impact is nuclear war

Johnson 1 (Charles Former Professor of Poly Sci @ Berkeley, Former Chairman of the Department and Chair of the Center for Chinese Studies, 5-14-01,

Chalmers, *The Nation*, n19v272 p. 20, L/N)

China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious US militarists know that China's minuscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the overwhelming US power arrayed against it (twenty archaic Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US warheads). Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains the most dangerous place on earth. Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo led to a war that no one wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the United States and China into a conflict that neither wants. Such a war would bankrupt the United States, deeply divide Japan and probably end in a Chinese victory, given that China is the world's most populous country and would be defending itself against a foreign aggressor. More seriously, it could easily escalate into a nuclear holocaust. However, given the nationalistic challenge to China's sovereignty of any Taiwanese attempt to declare its independence formally, forward-deployed US forces on China's borders have virtually no deterrent effect.

Arms Sales

**NATO arms sales contribute to regional instability**

Rozoff 9 (Rick, Global Research, Sep 22, [http://www.globalresearch.ca/ index.php?context=va&aid=15339](http://www.globalresearch.ca/%20index.php?context=va&aid=15339)) LL

The vast preponderance of American and other NATO states' arms are sold to nations neither in North America and Europe nor on their peripheries. They are sold to nations like Saudi Arabia, India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Australia, Egypt, Taiwan, South Korea, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Kuwait, the Philippines, Morocco and other Western client states and military outposts far removed from the much-vaunted Euro-Atlantic space. The weapons along with the military technicians, trainers and advisers that inevitably accompany them are spread throughout nations in geostrategically vital areas of the world, near large oil and natural gas reserves and astride key shipping lanes and choke points. In many instances Western-fueled arms buildups are accelerating in nations bordering Russia, China, Iran and Venezuela. Geopolitics in its most transparent, cynical and brutal manifestation. The growing sales of Western arms in the Persian Gulf, the South Caucasus, South America (Chile and Colombia most pronouncedly), Africa, Far East Asia and the South Pacific (Australia in the first instance) are an integral element of American and general Western plans to gain access to and domination over world energy resources. The campaign is not limited to efforts to muscle into nations and regions rich in oil and natural gas (and uranium), nor to employing fair means or foul, peaceful or otherwise, to seize the commanding heights of the international energy market. The overarching objective is to control the ownership, transport and consumption of energy worldwide. To determine who receives oil and natural gas, through which routes and at which prices. And to dictate what the political and military quid pro quo will be for being invited to join a U.S.-dominated international energy transportation and accessibility network. Those who are allowed to exploit, sell and transit hydrocarbons to the Western and ultimately world market are levied for a handsome share of their energy-derived revenues for unprecedented acquisition of arms and for the stationing of U.S. and other NATO states' military forces on their soil. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Azerbaijan and Georgia are salient examples. The last two-named nations have increased their military budgets by well over 1,000 percent in the first case and by over 3,000 percent in the second in the span of a few years. A United Press International report of August 25, 2009 estimated that Middle Eastern nations would purchase $100 billion worth of arms over the next five years, with the lion's share going to the oil-rich Western client states of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Iraq. There are six major areas in the world that the United States and its allies have targeted in history's largest scramble for hydrocarbons and, it's important to remember, against a recent backdrop of diminishing energy consumption, plunging prices and both the discovery and presumption of oil and natural gas reserves hitherto unexploited.

Afghanistan

NATO presence increases violence and terrorist activity in Afghanistan

**AP 10** (Robert Reid, Associated Press, June 19 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeq M5hvWEqwq3CrRvaQCmt21MfoYhjZJQD9GEFQ980)IM

KABUL, Afghanistan — The United Nations reported Saturday that insurgent violence has risen sharply in Afghanistan over the last three months, with roadside bombings, complex suicide attacks and assassinations soaring over last year's levels. The three-month report by U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to the U.N. Security Council appeared at odds with Pentagon assertions of slow but steady progress in Afghanistan — an assessment that was challenged by U.S. lawmakers during recent hearings on Capitol Hill. In the report, Ban said the overall security situation in Afghanistan has not improved since his last report in March and instead the number of violent incidents had "increased significantly compared to previous years and contrary to seasonal trends." The most "alarming trend" was a sharp rise in the number of roadside bombings, which soared 94 percent in the first four months of this year compared with the same period in 2009, Ban said. Moreover, assassinations of Afghan government officials jumped 45 percent, mostly in the ethnic Pashtun south, he said. NATO has launched a major operation to secure the biggest southern city, Kandahar, the Taliban's spiritual birthplace. At the same time, suicide attacks are occurring at the rate of about three per week, Ban said, half of them in the south. Complex attacks employing suicide bombers, rocket-propelled grenades and small arms fire were running about two a month, double the number in 2009, he added. During testimony Tuesday before the Senate Armed Services Committee, senior Pentagon official Michele Flournoy said the percentage of complex attacks had fallen steadily since a peak in February and were averaging below last year's levels. She gave no figures. "The shift to more complex suicide attacks demonstrates a growing capability of the local terrorist networks linked to al-Qaida," Ban said. He attributed the rise in violence to increased NATO and Afghan military activity in the south during the first quarter of the year, including the U.S.-led attack on the Taliban stronghold of Marjah. He also cited "significant anti-government element activities" in the east and southeast of the country. "The majority of incidents continue to involve armed clashes and improvised explosive devices, each accounting for one third of the reported incidents," Ban said, referring to the military term for roadside bombs.

NATO presence creates more targets for terrorists ad causes innumerable civilian casualties

**Kabul Press 9** (Matthew Nasuti, US State Dept official, Nov 8 2009, http://kabulpress.org/my/spip.php?article4239)IM

NATO operates 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, with a goal to add teams to every one of its 34 provinces. The PRTs primarily consist of military personnel, with a mix of civilian aid officials and technical experts. They serve a dual function of supporting military operations and aiding civilian reconstruction and are an integral part of NATO’s counterinsurgency (COIN) war plan. C. Stuart Calison, Ph.D, a Senior Development Economist with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), recently released the October 2, 2009 memo he wrote to the Director of USAID in which he complained that Ambassador Richard Holbrooke was interfering with USAID’s COIN projects and objectives in Afghanistan’s border region. The memo reflects a growing reality, which is that all American aid seems cloaked with military goals and objectives. One of the many problems with such a transformation in policy is that it violates international law. Another is that militarizing aid places civilian aid personnel at risk as they are seen as simply a tool of the Pentagon. The Fourth Geneva Convention, Part I, Article 5, essentially provides that if a military force such as the Taliban “is satisfied” that a civilian aid worker “is definitely suspected of” hostile activity, such aid worker could lose his or her protected status and would become a legitimate target. Thus, civilians who accompany or provide services and support to the armed forces could fall outside of the definition of “civilians” as set out in the Third Geneva Convention, Article 4. Major General Michael Tucker of ISAF-Kabul was quoted by Kevin Baron in the September 15, 2009, edition of Stars and Stripes as stating that NATO uses humanitarian aid as a “key factor” in its “population-centric operations.” This prompted Stephen Cornish, the director of bilateral programs for CARE Canada, to state that: NATO had placed “a counterinsurgency umbrella” over humanitarian aid in Afghanistan, which now places aid workers at risk. He went on to tell Stars and Stripes that aid organizations are being targeted if there is any suspicion of collaboration with the American forces. Stars and Stripes then interviewed a Taliban spokesman who stated: “We only respect truly neutral and independent aid organizations that do not work at the behest of American and Western forces.”

Civilian causalities are the Taliban’s biggest support- they blame the US military

Jaffe 9 (Greg, Washington Post Staff Writer, *Washington Post*, May 8—9) ET

The truth of what happened in Farah may be less important than what the Afghan people believe took place in the remote western region. Gates said that a cornerstone of the Taliban campaign is to blame civilian deaths on U.S. troops. And he suggested that the best way to counter the enemy's strategy would be to reduce civilian casualties throughout the country. "Even if the Taliban create these casualties or exploit them, we need to figure out a way to minimize them and hopefully make them go away," he said. The difficulty of the civilian casualty issue was evident in Farah, where anti-American protests erupted Thursday. The Associated Press reported that Afghan police wounded one demonstrator.

Increased Taliban power causes pakistan nuclear war that goes nuclear
Gregorian 1(Vartan, president of Carnegie Corporation of New York *NY Times* ,11/15/01) ET

After Sept. 11, with options and allies in short supply, Pakistani leader Pervez Musharraf agreed to cooperate with the United States against the Taliban. Both countries now face the thorny issue of the Pashtuns. Wiping out the Taliban won't end the prospect of Pashtunistan -- it may even energize it. If a government dominated by the Northern Alliance denies the Pashtuns power in Afghanistan proper, they will exert power elsewhere. Taliban forces could retreat into Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province and form alliances with their Pashtun cousins. If, on the other hand, Pashtuns were to become a dominant power in Afghanistan in the post-Taliban era, Pakistan could face a revival of Afghan interest in expanding into Pakistani territory. Pakistan cannot afford any movement that threatens to fragment it, and it cannot withstand simultaneous challenges in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Nor can it afford a civil war between disappointed fundamentalists and disappointed nationalists -- particularly given its possession of nuclear weapons.

Pre-emptive strike by India ensures nuclear confrontation

Ricks 1 (Thomas, Washington Post Staff Writer, *Washington Post*, Oct 21-1) ET

The prospect of Pakistan being taken over by Islamic extremists is especially worrisome because it possesses nuclear weapons. The betting among military strategists is that India, another nuclear power, would not stand idly by, if it appeared that the Pakistani nuclear arsenal were about to fall into the hands of extremists. A preemptive action by India to destroy Pakistan's nuclear stockpile could provoke a new war on the subcontinent. The U.S. military has conducted more than 25 war games involving a confrontation between a nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, and each has resulted in nuclear war, said retired Air Force Col. Sam Gardiner, an expert on strategic games.