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Contention one is Enframing

The tactical nuclear weapons currently based in Turkey are tools used by the West to defend against the growing uncertainty in the Middle East in a hubristic attempt to deter and preempt irrationality itself.

Chussodvosky, 2k8 (Michel, professor of economics at the [University of Ottawa](file:///C%3A%5Cwiki%5CUniversity_of_Ottawa), “The US-NATO Preemptive Nuclear Doctrine: Trigger a Middle East Nuclear Holocaust to Defend ‘The Western Way of Life’”, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=8048)

What the Western allies face is a long, sustained and proactive defence of their societies and way of life. To that end, they must keep risks at a distance, while at the same time protecting their homelands. International terrorism today aims to disrupt and destroy our societies, our economies and our way of life. … These different sources of [Islamist] propaganda and/or violence vary in their intellectual underpinnings, sectarian and political aims, … . But what they have in common isan assault on the values of the West– on its democratic processes and its freedom of religion… Notwithstanding the common perception in the West, the origin of Islamist terrorism is not victimhood, nor an inferiority complex, but a well-financed superiority complex grounded in a violent political ideology. If the irrational and fanatical [Islamist organizations] get out of hand, there is a risk that, … the rise of fundamentalisms and despotisms will usher in a new, illiberal age, in which the liberties that Western societies enjoy are seriously jeopardized. The threats that the West and its partners face today are a combination of violent terrorism against civilians and institutions, wars fought by proxy by states that sponsor terrorism, the behaviour of rogue states, the actions of organised international crime, and the coordination of hostile action through abuse of non-military means. Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World: Renewing Transatlantic Partnership”. Group report by former chiefs of staff General John Shalikashvili, (US), General Klaus Naumann (Germany), Field Marshal Lord Inge (UK), Admiral Jacques Lanxade (France) and Henk van den Breemen (The Netherlands), published by the Netherlands based Noaber Foundation, December 2007, (emphasis added) The controversial NATO sponsored report entitled “Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World: Renewing Transatlantic Partnership“ calls for a first strike use of nuclear weapons. The preemptive use of nukes would also be used to undermine an “increasingly brutal World” as a means to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction: “They [the authors of the report] consider that nuclear war might soon become possible in an increasingly brutal world. They propose the first use of nuclear weapons must remain “in the quiver of escalation as the ultimate instrument to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction”.(Paul Dibb, Sidney Morning Herald, 11 February 2008) The group, insists that the option of first strike of nuclear weapons is “indispensable, since there is simply no realistic prospect of a nuclear-free world.” (Report, p. 97, emphasis added): Nuclear weapons are the ultimate instrument of an asymmetric response– and at the same time the ultimate tool of escalation. Yet they are also more than an instrument, since they transform the nature of any conflict and widen its scope from the regional to the global. … …Nuclear weapons remain indispensable, and nuclear escalation continues to remain an element of any modern strategy. Nuclear escalation is the ultimate step in responding asymmetrically, and at the same time the most powerful way of inducing uncertainty in an opponent’s mind. (Ibid, emphasis added) The Group’s Report identifies six key “challenges”, which may often result as potential threats to global security: • Demography. Population growth and change across the globe will swiftly change the world we knew. The challenge this poses for welfare, good governance and energy security (among other things) is vast. • Climate change. This greatly threatens physical certainty, and is leading to a whole new type of politics – one predicated, perhaps more than ever, on our collective future. • Energy security continues to absorb us. The supply and demand of individual nations and the weakening of the international market infrastructure for energy distribution make the situation more precarious than ever. • There is also the more philosophic problem of the rise of the irrational –the discounting of the rational. Though seemingly abstract, this problem is demonstrated in deeply practical ways. [These include] the decline of respect for logical argument and evidence, a drift away from science in a civilization that is deeply technological. The ultimate example is the rise of religious fundamentalism, which, as political fanaticism, presents itself as the only source of certainty. • The weakening of the nation state. This coincides with the weakening of world institutions, including the United Nations and regional organizations such as the European Union, NATO and others. • The dark side of globalization … These include internationalized terrorism, organized crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but also asymmetric threats from proxy actors or the abuse of financial and energy leverage. (Ibid)

Deterrence and Pre-emption According to the Report, a new concept of deterrence is required directed against both State and non-state actors, This “new deterrence” is based on pre-emption as well as on the ability to “restore deterrence through [military] escalation”. In this context, the Report contemplates, what it describes as: “escalation dominance, the use of a full bag of both carrots and sticks—and indeed all instruments of soft and hard power, ranging from the diplomatic protest to nuclear weapons.” (Report, op city, emphasis added). Iran In much the same terms as the Bush administration, the NATO sponsored report states, without evidence, that Iran constitutes “a major strategic threat”: “An Iranian nuclear weapons capability would pose a major strategic threat – not only to Israel, which it has threatened to destroy, but also to the region as a whole, to Europe and to the United States. Secondly, it could be the beginning of a new multi-polar nuclear arms race in the most volatile region of the world.” (Report, op. cit., p. 45) Careful timing? The controversial NATO sponsored report calling for a preemptive nuclear attack on Iran was released shortly after the publication of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report entitled Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. The latter denies Iran’s nuclear capabilities. The NIE report, based on the assessments of sixteen US intelligence agencies, refutes the Bush administration’s main justification for waging a preemptive nuclear war on Iran. The NIE report confirms that Iran “halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003.” “These findings constitute a damning indictment of the Bush administration’s relentless fear-mongering in relation to an alleged nuclear threat from Iran. They demonstrate that just as in the buildup to the war against Iraq five years ago, the White House has been engaged in a systematic campaign to drag the American people into another war based on lies.” (See Bill van Auken, 24 January 2008) It should be noted that this recently declassified intelligence ( pertaining to Iran contained in the 2007 NIE report) was known by the White House, the Pentagon and most probably NATO since September 2003. Ironically, US military documents confirm that the Bush Administration initiated its war preparations against Iran in July 2003, two months prior to the confirmation by US intelligence that Iran did not constitute a nuclear threat. The July 2003 war scenarios were launched under TIRANNT: Theater Iran Near Term. The justification for TIRANNT as well as for subsequent US war plans directed against Iran ( which as of 2004 included the active participation of NATO and Israel), has always been that Iran is developing nuclear weapons and plans to use them against us. Following the publication of the 2007 NIE in early December, there has been an avalanche of media propaganda directed against Tehran, essentially with a view to invalidating the statements of the NIE concerning Tehran’s nuclear program. Moreover, a third sanctions resolution by the UN Security Council, was initiated with a view to forcing Iran to halt uranium enrichment. The proposed UNSC resolution, which is opposed by China and Russia includes a travel ban on Iranian officials involved in the country’s nuclear programs, and inspections of shipments to and from Iran “if there are suspicions of prohibited goods” (AFP, 11 February 2008). Meanwhile, French President Nicolas Sarkozy together with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, have been calling for a unified EU sanctions regime against Iran. Contradicting the US national intelligence estimate (NIE), Bush’s most recent speeches continue to portray Iran as a nuclear threat: “I feel pretty good about making sure that we keep the pressure on Iran to pressure them so they understand they’re isolated, to pressure them to affect their economy, to pressure them to the point that we hope somebody rational shows up and says, okay, it’s not worth it anymore,” Bush said.

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The result is a violent ontology that refuses to question itself in favor of remaining a champion certainty and arbiter metaphysical truths guaranteeing systematic error replication and conservativism

Burke, 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory and Event, 10.2, Muse)

By itself, such an account of the nationalist ontology of war and security provides only a general insight into the perseverance of military violence as a core element of politics. It does not explain why so many policymakers think military violence works. As I argued earlier, such an ontology is married to a more rationalistic form of strategic thought that claims to link violent means to political ends predictably and controllably, and which, by doing so, combines military action and national purposes into a common -- and thoroughly modern -- horizon of certainty. Given Hegel's desire to decisively distil and control the dynamic potentials of modernity in thought, it is helpful to focus on the modernity of this ontology -- one that is modern in its adherence to modern scientific models of truth, reality and technological progress, and in its insistence on imposing images of scientific truth from the physical sciences (such as mathematics and physics) onto human behaviour, politics and society. For example, the military theorist and historian Martin van Creveld has argued that one of the reasons Clausewitz was so influential was that his 'ideas seemed to have chimed in with the rationalistic, scientific, and technological outlook associated with the industrial revolution'.54 Set into this epistemological matrix, modern politics and government engages in a sweeping project of mastery and control in which all of the world's resources -- mineral, animal, physical, human -- are made part of a machinic process of which war and violence are viewed as normal features. These are the deeper claims and implications of Clausewitzian strategic reason. One of the most revealing contemporary examples comes from the writings (and actions) of Henry Kissinger, a Harvard professor and later U.S. National Security Adviser and Secretary of State. He wrote during the Vietnam war that after 1945 U.S. foreign policy was based 'on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in emerging countries'. This 'scientific revolution' had 'for all practical purposes, removed technical limits from the exercise of power in foreign policy'.55 Kissinger's conviction was based not merely in his pride in the vast military and bureaucratic apparatus of the United States, but in a particular epistemology (theory of knowledge). Kissinger asserted that the West is 'deeply committed to the notion that the real world is external to the observer, that knowledge consists of recording and classifying data -- the more accurately the better'. This, he claimed, has since the Renaissance set the West apart from an 'undeveloped' world that contains 'cultures that have escaped the early impact of Newtonian thinking' and remain wedded to the 'essentially pre-Newtonian view that the real world is almost entirely internal to the observer'.56 At the same time, Kissinger's hubris and hunger for control was beset by a corrosive anxiety: that, in an era of nuclear weapons proliferation and constant military modernisation, of geopolitical stalemate in Vietnam, and the emergence and militancy of new post-colonial states, order and mastery were harder to define and impose. He worried over the way 'military bipolarity' between the superpowers had 'encouraged political multipolarity', which 'does not guarantee stability. Rigidity is diminished, but so is manageability...equilibrium is difficult to achieve among states widely divergent in values, goals, expectations and previous experience' (emphasis added). He mourned that 'the greatest need of the contemporary international system is an agreed concept of order'.57 Here were the driving obsessions of the modern rational statesman based around a hunger for stasis and certainty that would entrench U.S. hegemony: For the two decades after 1945, our international activities were based on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in "emerging countries". This direct "operational" concept of international order has proved too simple. Political multipolarity makes it impossible to impose an American design. Our deepest challenge will be to evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world, to base order on political multipolarity even though overwhelming military strength will remain with the two superpowers.58 Kissinger's statement revealed that such cravings for order and certainty continually confront chaos, resistance and uncertainty: clay that won't be worked, flesh that will not yield, enemies that refuse to surrender. This is one of the most powerful lessons of the Indochina wars, which were to continue in a phenomenally destructive fashion for six years after Kissinger wrote these words. Yet as his sinister, Orwellian exhortation to 'evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world' demonstrated, Kissinger's hubris was undiminished. This is a vicious, historic irony: a desire to control nature, technology, society and human beings that is continually frustrated, but never abandoned or rethought**.** By 1968 U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the rationalist policymaker par excellence, had already decided that U.S. power and technology could not prevail in Vietnam; Nixon and Kissinger's refusal to accept this conclusion, to abandon their Cartesian illusions, was to condemn hundreds of thousands more to die in Indochina and the people of Cambodia to two more decades of horror and misery.59 In 2003 there would be a powerful sense of déja vu as another Republican Administration crowned more than decade of failed and destructive policy on Iraq with a deeply controversial and divisive war to remove Saddam Hussein from power. In this struggle with the lessons of Vietnam, revolutionary resistance, and rapid geopolitical transformation, we are witness to an enduring political and cultural theme: of a craving for order, control and certainty in the face of continual uncertainty. Closely related to this anxiety was the way that Kissinger's thinking -- and that of McNamara and earlier imperialists like the British Governor of Egypt Cromer -- was embedded in instrumental images of technology and the machine: the machine as both a tool of power and an image of social and political order. In his essay 'The Government of Subject Races' Cromer envisaged effective imperial rule -- over numerous societies and billions of human beings -- as best achieved by a central authority working 'to ensure the harmonious working of the different parts of the machine'.60 Kissinger analogously invoked the virtues of 'equilibrium', 'manageability' and 'stability' yet, writing some six decades later, was anxious that technological progress no longer brought untroubled control: the Westernising 'spread of technology and its associated rationality...does not inevitably produce a similar concept of reality'.61

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Furthermore, the conflation of natural and human sciences in the form of realism results in genocide

Burke, 7 ( Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory and Event, 10.2, Muse)

We sense the rational policymaker's frustrated desire: the world is supposed to work like a machine, ordered by a form of power and governmental reason which deploys machines and whose desires and processes are meant to run along ordered, rational lines like a machine. Kissinger's desire was little different from that of Cromer who, wrote Edward Said: ..envisions a seat of power in the West and radiating out from it towards the East a great embracing machine, sustaining the central authority yet commanded by it. What the machine's branches feed into it from the East -- human material, material wealth, knowledge, what have you -- is processed by the machine, then converted into more power...the immediate translation of mere Oriental matter into useful substance.62 This desire for order in the shadow of chaos and uncertainty -- the constant war with an intractable and volatile matter -- has deep roots in modern thought, and was a major impetus to the development of technological reason and its supporting theories of knowledge. As Kissinger's claims about the West's Newtonian desire for the 'accurate' gathering and classification of 'data' suggest, modern strategy, foreign policy and Realpolitik have been thrust deep into the apparently stable soil of natural science, in the hope of finding immovable and unchallengeable roots there. While this process has origins in ancient Judaic and Greek thought, it crystallised in philosophical terms most powerfully during and after the Renaissance. The key figures in this process were Francis Bacon, Galileo, Isaac Newton, and René Descartes, who all combined a hunger for political and ontological certainty, a positivist epistemology and a naïve faith in the goodness of invention. Bacon sought to create certainty and order, and with it a new human power over the world, through a new empirical methodology based on a harmonious combination of experiment, the senses and the understanding. With this method, he argued, we can 'derive hope from a purer alliance of the faculties (the experimental and rational) than has yet been attempted'.63 In a similar move, Descartes sought to conjure certainty from uncertainty through the application of a new method that moved progressively out from a few basic certainties (the existence of God, the certitude of individual consciousness and a divinely granted faculty of judgement) in a search for pure fixed truths. Mathematics formed the ideal image of this method, with its strict logical reasoning, its quantifiable results and its uncanny insights into the hidden structure of the cosmos.64 Earlier, Galileo had argued that scientists should privilege 'objective', quantifiable qualities over 'merely perceptible' ones; that 'only by means of an exclusively quantitative analysis could science attain certain knowledge of the world'.65 Such doctrines of mathematically verifiable truth were to have powerful echoes in the 20th Century, in the ascendancy of systems analysis, game theory, cybernetics and computing in defense policy and strategic decisions, and in the awesome scientific breakthroughs of nuclear physics, which unlocked the innermost secrets of matter and energy and applied the most advanced applications of mathematics and computing to create the atomic bomb. Yet this new scientific power was marked by a terrible irony: as even Morgenthau understood, **the control over matter afforded by the science could never be translated into the control of the weapons themselves, into political utility and rational strategy**.66 Bacon thought of the new scientific method not merely as way of achieving a purer access to truth and epistemological certainty, but as liberating a new power that would enable the creation of a new kind of Man. He opened the Novum Organum with the statement that 'knowledge and human power are synonymous', and later wrote of his 'determination...to lay a firmer foundation, and extend to a greater distance the boundaries of human power and dignity'.67 In a revealing and highly negative comparison between 'men's lives in the most polished countries of Europe and in any wild and barbarous region of the new Indies' -- one that echoes in advance Kissinger's distinction between post-and pre-Newtonian cultures -- Bacon set out what was at stake in the advancement of empirical science: anyone making this comparison, he remarked, 'will think it so great, that man may be said to be a god unto man'.68 We may be forgiven for blinking, but in Bacon's thought 'man' was indeed in the process of stealing a new fire from the heavens and seizing God's power over the world for itself. Not only would the new empirical science lead to 'an improvement of mankind's estate, and an increase in their power over nature', but would reverse the primordial humiliation of the Fall of Adam: For man, by the fall, lost at once his state of innocence, and his empire over creation, both of which can be partially recovered even in this life, the first by religion and faith, the second by the arts and sciences. For creation did not become entirely and utterly rebellious by the curse, but in consequence of the Divine decree, 'in the sweat of thy brow thou shalt eat bread'; she is now compelled by our labours (not assuredly by our disputes or magical ceremonies) at length to afford mankind in some degree his bread...69 There is a breathtaking, world-creating hubris in this statement -- one that, in many ways, came to characterise western modernity itself, and which is easily recognisable in a generation of modern technocrats like Kissinger. The Fall of Adam was the Judeo-Christian West's primal creation myth, one that marked humankind as flawed and humbled before God, condemned to hardship and ambivalence. Bacon forecast here a return to Eden, but one of man's own making. This truly was the death of God, of putting man into God's place, and no pious appeals to the continuity or guidance of faith could disguise the awesome epistemological violence which now subordinated creation to man. Bacon indeed argued that inventions are 'new creations and imitations of divine works'. As such, there is nothing but good in science: 'the introduction of great inventions is the most distinguished of human actions...inventions are a blessing and a benefit without injuring or afflicting any'.70 And what would be mankind's 'bread', the rewards of its new 'empire over creation'? If the new method and invention brought modern medicine, social welfare, sanitation, communications, education and comfort, it also enabled the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust and two world wars; napalm, the B52, the hydrogen bomb, the Kalashnikov rifle and military strategy. Indeed some of the 20th Century's most far-reaching inventions -- radar, television, rocketry, computing, communications, jet aircraft, the Internet -- would be the product of drives for national security and militarisation. Even the inventions Bacon thought so marvellous and transformative -- printing, gunpowder and the compass -- brought in their wake upheaval and tragedy: printing, dogma and bureaucracy; gunpowder, the rifle and the artillery battery; navigation, slavery and the genocide of indigenous peoples. In short, the legacy of the new empirical science would be ambivalence as much as certainty; degradation as much as enlightenment; the destruction of nature as much as its utilisation.

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Contention 2 is Secrecy

US-NATO nuclear policy is shrouded in a veil of secrecy and propaganda

Chussodvosky, 2k8 (Michel, professor of economics at the [University of Ottawa](file:///C%3A%5Cwiki%5CUniversity_of_Ottawa), “The US-NATO Preemptive Nuclear Doctrine: Trigger a Middle East Nuclear Holocaust to Defend ‘The Western Way of Life’”, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=8048)

 Threat to “The Western Way of Life” The Western media is involved in a diabolical disinformation campaign, the purpose of which is to persuade public opinion that the only way to “create a nuclear free World” is to use nuclear weapons on a preemptive basis, against countries which “threaten our Western Way of Life.” The Western world is threatened. The NATO report, according to Paul Dibb: “paint(s) an alarming picture of the threats confronting the West, arguing that its values and way of life are under threat and that we are struggling to summon the will to defend them.”(Dibb, op cit) A preemptive nuclear attack — geographically confined to Middle East (minus Israel?)– is the proposed end-game. The attack would use US tactical nuclear weapons, which, according to “scientific opinion” (on contract to the Pentagon) are “harmless to the surrounding civilian population because the explosion is underground”. (See Michel Chossudovsky The Dangers of a Middle East Nuclear Holocaust, Global Research, 17 February 2006) B61-11 bunker buster bombs with nuclear warheads Made in America, with an explosive capacity between one third to six times a Hiroshima bomb, are presented as bona fide humanitarian bombs, which minimize the dangers of “collateral damage”. These in-house “scientific” Pentagon assessments regarding the mini-nukes are refuted by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS): Any attempt to use a [B61-11 bunker buster nuclear bomb] in an urban environment would result in massive civilian casualties. Even at the low end of its 0.3-300 kiloton yield range, the nuclear blast will simply blow out a huge crater of radioactive material, creating a lethal gamma-radiation field over a large area ” (Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons by Robert W. Nelson, Federation of American Scientists, 2001). Professor Paul Dibb is a former Australian Deputy Secretary of Defense., who has over the years also occupied key positions in Australia’s defense and intelligence establishment. Dibb carefully overlooks the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons in a conventional war theater. According to Dibb, NATO preemptive nuclear doctrine, which replicates that of the Pentagon, constitutes a significant and positive initiative to “halt the imminent spread of nuclear weapons”. . “They [the group] believe that the West must be ready to resort to a pre-emptive nuclear attack to try to halt the imminent spread of nuclear weapons.” Never mind the nuclear holocaust and resulting radioactive contamination, which would spread Worldwide and threaten, in a real sense, the “way of life”. There is no “way of life” in a World contaminated with deadly radioactive material. But this is something that is rarely discussed in the corridors of NATO or in strategic studies programs in Western universities. Nukes: Just Another Tool in the Military Toolbox What is frightening in Professor Dibb’s article is that he is not expressing an opinion, nor is he analyzing the use of nuclear weapons from an academic research point of view. In his article, there is neither research on nuclear weapons nor is there an understanding of the complex geopolitics of the Middle East war. Dibb is essentially repeating verbatim the statements contained in NATO/Pentagon military documents. His article is a “copy and paste” summary of Western nuclear doctrine, which in practice calls for the launching of a nuclear holocaust. The stated objective of a Middle East nuclear holocaust is “to prevent the occurrence of a nuclear war”. An insidious logic which certainly out- dwarfs the darkest period of the Spanish inquisition… Neither NATO nor the Pentagon use the term nuclear holocaust. Moreover, they presume that the “collateral damage” of a nuclear war will in any event be confined geographically to the Middle East and that Westerners will be spared… But since their in-house scientists have confirmed that tactical nuclear weapons are “safe for civilians”, the labels on the bombs have been switched much in the same way as the label on a packet of cigarettes: “This nuclear bomb is safe for civilians” The new definition of a nuclear warhead has blurred the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons: ‘It’s a package (of nuclear and conventional weapons). The implication of this obviously is that nuclear weapons are being brought down from a special category of being a last resort, or sort of the ultimate weapon, to being just another tool in the toolbox,” (Japan Economic News Wire, op cit) This re-categorization has been carried out. The ” green light” for the use of tactical nuclear weapons has been granted by the US Congress. . ” Let’s use them, they are part of the military toolbox.” We are a dangerous crossroads: military planners believe their own propaganda. The military manuals state that this new generation of nuclear weapons are “safe” for use in the battlefield. They are no longer a weapon of last resort. There are no impediments or political obstacles to their use. In this context, Senator Edward Kennedy has accused the Bush Administration for having developed “a generation of more useable nuclear weapons.” Russia and China Who else constitutes a threat to “the Western way of life”? Nukes are also slated to be used against Russia and China, former enemies of the Cold War era. This post Cold War logic was first revealed, when the Pentagon’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was leaked to The Los Angeles Times in January 2002. The NPR includes China and Russia alongside the rogue states as potential targets for a first strike nuclear attack. According to William Arkin, the NPR “offers a chilling glimpse into the world of nuclear-war planners: With a Strangelovian genius, they cover every conceivable circumstance in which the president might wish to use nuclear weapons-planning in great detail.” (Los Angeles Times, March 10, 2002) “Decapitate Their Leadership and Destroy their Countries as Functioning Societies” The use of nukes against “rogue states”, including Iran and North Korea (which lost more than a quarter of its population in US bombings during the Korean war) is justified because these countries could act in an “irrational” way. It therefore makes sense to “take em out” before they do something irrational. The objective is: “decapitate their leadership and destroy their countries as functioning societies”: “One line of reasoning is that so-called rogue states, such as Iran and North Korea, are sufficiently irrational to risk a pre-emptive nuclear strikeon the US or its allies, such as Israel and South Korea. The supposition here is that deterrence – that is, threatening the other side with obliteration – no longer works. But even the nasty regimes in Tehran and Pyongyang must know that the US reserves the right to use its overwhelming nuclear force to decapitate the leadership and destroy their countries as modern functioning societies. (Dibb, op cit., emphasis added) Use nuclear weapons to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction. But of course, lest we forget, America’s nuclear arsenal as well as that of France, Britain and Israel are not categorized as “weapons of mass destruction”, in comparison with Iran’s deadly nonexistent nuclear weapons program.

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The deployment of secret knowledge results in depoliticized conflict through the creation of unquestionable threats reducing policymaking to pure ideology

Masco, 2007 (Joseph , Dept. of Anthropology @ U Chicago, “The Nuclear Public Sphere,” Ethnografeast III: Ethnography and the Public Sphere, available at http://ceas.iscte.pt/ethnografeast/papers/joseph\_masco.pdf)

Finally, the secret society that is the state is ultimately headless, an effect of both the systematic distortion in the believability of knowledge as it moves up a compartmentalized infrastructure and the demands on individuals to protect perceptions of their position through systematic lying. But there is an even more powerful aspect of state secrecy when taken to the level of the current nuclear state: the “idea” of secret knowledge itself becomes deployable, corrupting public understandings of what is possible and what is not but also giving the executive authority the ability to seem more knowing then they actually are. In the lead up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Bush Administration systematically deployed the idea that there weapons of mass destruction as well as an imminent threat to the U.S.– to enable war. Vice President Cheney, for example, stated in a speech to the Veterans of Foreign War National Convention on August 26, 2002 that there was absolute certainty about the Iraqi threat:

Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us. And there is no doubt that his aggressive regional ambitions will lead him into future confrontations with his neighbors -- confrontations that will involve both the weapons he has today, and the ones he will continue to develop with his oil wealth.8

There is no doubt. Here is the secrecy/threat matrix in action, for Cheney implies that the intelligence community has documented with perfect clarity not only the technical terms of the Iraqi biological, chemical, and nuclear programs but also the intent of the regime to use them “against our friends, against our allies and against us.” This is not a deployment of actual knowledge, as the lack of any evidence of weapons in Iraqi after the invasion demonstrates, **but it is a deployment of the idea of secret knowledge** (knowledge that can only be revealed in its conclusions not its substance).

In his presentation to the United Nations in September 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell was more exacting in his deployment of the secret/threat matrix.9 He portrayed an Iraqi biological weapons program that was so advanced it was already capable of threatening the United States. Claiming sources within the Iraqi government, he presented cartoon diagrams of mobile weapons labs (See Figure 6) and satellite imagery of WMD production facilities (See Figure 7). Powell states conclusively:

We know that Iraq has at least seven of these mobile, biological agent factories. The truck-mounted ones have at least two or three trucks each. That means that the mobile production facilities are very few -- perhaps 18 trucks that we know of. There may be more. But 18 perhaps that we know of. Just imagine trying to find 18 trucks among the thousands and thousands of trucks that travel the roads of Iraq every single day....

We know. This depiction of mobile “biological agent factories” effectively transforms every truck in Iraq into a potential Weapon of Mass Destruction laboratory.But the nature of the threat is even more specific in Powell’s presentation:

We know from Iraq's past admissions that it has successfully weaponized not only anthrax, but also other biological agents including botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin. But Iraq's research efforts did not stop there. Saddam Hussein has investigated dozens of biological agents causing diseases such as gas-gangrene, plague, typhus, tetanus, cholera, camelpox, and hemorrhagic fever. And he also has the wherewithal to develop smallpox....The Iraqi regime has also developed ways to disperse lethal biological agents widely, indiscriminately into the water supply, into the air. For example, Iraq had a program to modify aerial fuel tanks for Mirage jets. This video of an Iraqi test flight obtained by UNSCOM some years ago shows an Iraqi F-1 Mirage jet aircraft. Note the spray coming from beneath the Mirage. That is 2,000 liters of simulated anthrax that a jet is spraying. In 1995, an Iraqi military officer, Mujahid Salleh Abdul Latif told inspectors that Iraq intended the spray tanks to be mounted onto a MiG-21 that had been converted into an unmanned aerial vehicle, or UAV. UAVs outfitted with spray tanks constitute an ideal method for launching a terrorist attack using biological weapons...We know. Powell here describes the variety of “weaponized” biological agents, as well as the intense interest of the Hussein regime in finding ways to deliver them. Iraqi jets as well as unmanned aerial vehicles are presented as a means not only of threatening Middle Eastern states but also the U.S. and Britain. After this discussion of WMDs, Iraqi capabilities, and interests, Powell concludes not only that the weapons inspectors have failed but that the threat is immediate: There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the capability to rapidly produce more, many more. And he has the ability to dispense these lethal poisons and diseases in ways that can cause massive death and destruction.

There can be no doubt. Secretary of State Powell’s cartoons and fuzzy pictures of industrial sites appear, in retrospect, not simply as a fabrication of knowledge but rather as a tactical deployment of the idea of secret information, for his presentation was loaded with the promise that more detailed and exacting information existed, that could not be made public without putting U.S. interests at risk. Indeed, he began his presentation by stating: “I cannot tell you everything that we know, but what I can share with you, when combined with what all of us have learned over the years, is deeply troubling.”

The deployment of “secret” knowledge as political propaganda relied here on the mechanisms of government that were initially established to protect information about the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The argument for an invasion of Iraq also drew on culturally established forms of nuclear fear developed in the U.S. during the Cold War. We see here one end result of this multigenerational system of secrecy: a fundamental corruption in the terms of knowledge, where the idea of knowledge replaces actual content as a means of engaging the world. The “will to believe” (in Iraqi “wmds” and links between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda) by the Bush Administration is staggering but it was only enabled as state policy by the vast deployment of secrecy to both limit debate and to discount all alternative sources of information either irrelevant or politicized. The secrecy/threat matrix has been revealed as a core tool of governmental agency in the “war on terror” but it has also been revealed to be a highly over-determined form, one that functions to fundamentally distort both expertise and knowledge. And in a security state where knowledge itself is rendered suspect, only ideology remains as the basis for action.

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Status quo secrecy prevents individuals from engaging larger structures of militarism and renders all decisionmaking epistemologically unsound.

Taylor, 07 (Bryan C., assoc. prof. of Comm @ U of Colorado Boulder, “The Means to Match their Hatred”: Nuclear Weapons, Rhetorical Democracy, and Presidential Discourse”, Presidential Studies Quarterly 37, no. 4, December)

To varying degrees, these critiques all assert a fundamental incompatibility between nuclear weapons and the ideals of the democratic state. They argue that oppres- sive conditions surrounding the development of nuclear weapons subvert the capabilities of citizens to acquire, deliberate, and act on information concerning nuclear policy. As a result, the nuclear public is characterized as fragmented, alienated, uninformed, and unable to participate in deliberation with forceful and reasoned discourse. Commonly listed elements in this indictment include: an official regime of secrecy which suppresses and distorts nuclear information; official cultivation of a climate of permanent emergency that promotes public inertia and acquiescence to authoritarian rule; undue deference by nominal agents of congressional oversight to the interests of military elites and corporate defense contractors; a timid and amnesiac news media; **and official demonization of anti-nuclear dissent as extreme, irrelevant, and unpatriotic** (Rosen 1989). “This long train of official lies,” argues James Stegenga (1988, 89), “has made truly informed consent an impossibility” (emphasis in original).

These critiques grow more valuable as they conceptualize the relationships between rhetoric, democracy, and nuclear weapons. One provocative claim here addresses how, under conditions of MAD, all aspects of postwar American society were enrolled in the semiotic project of signifying to the Communist enemy both capability and willingness to use nuclear weapons in the national defense. Rhetorical scholars have largely failed to appreciate how, under these conditions, **the demos itself was conscripted and disciplined as an element in this apparatus:**

The continuous task of the president and his subordinates is to make their essentially incredible threats seem credible. So leaders have wanted to present themselves as speaking forcefully on behalf of a monolithically supportive American population. Naysayers needed to be discouraged, the democratic debate on these matters minimized, in the interest of promoting the credibility of the threats. The people are meant or supposed to avoid thinking about or speaking out on these matters. (Stegenga 1988, 89, emphasis in original; see also Bok 1989)

Clarifying this condition helps us to conceptualize nuclear weapons as an ontologi- cal tangle of discursive and material phenomena. It also establishes that—far from being a mere adornment of policy language—rhetoric is an inherent, inevitable, and reflexive challenge for the nuclear nation-state. Official rhetoric, in other words, must be developed and deployed in tandem with nuclear weapons to ensure that the whispers, conversation, and shouts of the people do not subvert the principal—and, according to Jacques Derrida’s (1984) famous critique, **sole—function of those weapons as rhetoric.**

This interdependency between security and rhetoric is further clarified in argu- ments conceptualizing nuclear weapons as a legitimation crisis for the liberal-democratic nation-state (Deudney 1995, 209). Rosow (1989) argues that traditional conceptualiza- tion of nuclear deterrence as a strategic issue obscures its status as “a system of social relations” (564). In adopting this alternate perspective, Rosow argues, we may reclaim nuclear weapons from official discourses that have sheared off from their necessary grounding in—and authorization by—the discourses of the nuclear life world: “[Strate- gic] debate scarcely touches on the experience of nuclear deterrence as a cultural and political-economic production. . . . The result is a serious discontinuity between the claims on which the validity of nuclear policy rests . . . and the actual effects of nuclear deterrence on the material well-being and consciousness in the advanced capitalist West” (564). Rosow’s argument establishes the democratic status of nuclear weapons as a rhetorical problem: he conceptualizes nuclear deterrence as a discourse composed of “interpretive claims” and imperative expressions and theorizes its mediation of both institutional structures and forms of identity. Viewed in this light, we can recognize how, as artifacts, nuclear weapons clarify a fundamental contradiction between their destructive potential and their legitimating cultural discourses: “The same forces that are to produce peace and prosperity, i.e., science, knowledge, rationality, also produce the tools for destroying the very civilization they are designed to protect and whose values and future they embody.” Richard Falk (1982, 9) has suggested the implications of this condition for a nuclear-rhetorical democracy: “Normative opposition to nuclear weapons or doctrines inevitably draws into question the legitimacy of state power and is, therefore, more threatening to governmental process than a mere debate about the property of nuclear weapons as instruments of statecraft.” As a result, Rosow concludes, changes in nuclear policy may exacerbate inherent conflict between “the [cultural] consciousness of democratic citizenship” and the legitimacy of the state (1989, 581). As the state increas- ingly rests its security on weapons systems requiring centralized control and automated decision making, it becomes increasingly difficult to assert that the legitimacy of those weapons arises from authentic popular consent. Fault lines in this hegemony are opened when public rhetoric informs Americans about the international consequences of nuclear imperialism and encourages their identification with negatively affected groups. In the post-Cold War era, Rosow predicted, it will become increasingly difficult for the state to normalize nuclear weapons as a familiar and legitimate icon.

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Thus, we affirm that:

The United States federal government should withdraw all of the United States’ nuclear weapons from Turkey

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**The ontology behind current nuclear policy in Turkey must be challenged before formulating a policy response to avoid recreating the problems of the status quo**

Burke, 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory and Event, 10.2, Muse)

What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action.

 The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' 22

The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state.23 This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror'.24 Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth.25 However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made.

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Violent ontologies are the BIGGEST proximate cause of nuclear and ecological violence

Burke, 7 ( Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory and Event, 10.2, Muse)

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87

 What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic.

 The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force.

 But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more.

 When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90

 This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

**A2: Framework**

Knowledge production preconfigures the debate space to be complacent in violence

Chow, 2k6 (Rey, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities and Professor of Modern Culture & Media Studies, Comparative Literature, and English, The Age of the World Target: Self-Referentiality in War, Theory, and Comparative Work, Duke University Press, pg. 38-39)

Once the relations among war, racism, and knowledge production are underlined in these terms, it is no longer possible to assume, as some still do, that the recognizable features of modem war—its impersonality, coerciveness, and deliberate cruelty—are "divergences" from the "antipathy" to violence and to conflict that characterize the modern world.41 Instead, it would be incumbent on us to realize that the pursuit of war—with its use of violence—and the pursuit of peace—with its cultivation of knowledge—are the obverse and reverse of the same coin, the coin that I have been calling "the age of the world target." Rather than being irreconcilable opposites, war and peace are coexisting, collaborative functions in the continuum of a virtualized world. More crucially still, only the privileged nations of the world can afford to wage war and preach peace at one and the same time. As Sherry writes, "The United States had different resources with which to be fanatical: resources allowing it to take the lives of others more than its own, ones whose accompanying rhetoric of technique disguised the will to destroy."46 From this it follows that, if indeed political and military acts of cruelty are not unique to the United States—a point which is easy enough to substantiate—what is nonetheless remarkable is the manner in which such acts are, in the United States, usually cloaked in the form of enlightenment and altruism, in the form of an aspiration simultaneously toward technological perfection and the pursuit of peace. In a country in which political leaders are held accountable for their decisions by an electorate, violence simply cannot—as it can in totalitarian countries—exist in the raw. Even the most violent acts must be adorned with a benign, rational story.

It is in the light of such interlocking relations among war, racism, and knowledge production that I would make the following comments about area studies, the academic establishment that crystallizes the connection between the epistemic targeting of the world and the "humane" practices of peacetime learning.

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The TNWs in Turkey are a byproduct of United States militarism and deterrence policies

Kibaroglu, 2005 (Mustafa, Professor and Vice Chair, International Relations Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey, “Isn’t it Time to Say Farewell to Nukes in Turkey?,” European Security, Vol. 14, No. 4, December)

The sub-strategic and tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Turkey have become a topic of public debate even though they have never been part of the official discourse.1 There are differing views among Turks extending from outright opposition to their presence on Turkish territory, to appreciation of their deterrent capability against actual and potential rivals in the region, especially in the Middle East. Turkish officials have always been careful to make no official public statements on the existence of nuclear weapons in Turkey, or to comment on their role in Turkey’s security. Turkish officials maintain that, even though the nuclear weapons play an essential role in NATO’s military strategy, the ambiguity principle should apply regarding their status. Therefore, officials suggest, ‘when asked about the presence of US nuclear weapons in the territory of NATO allies in general, and in Turkey in particular, the answer would be neither to deny nor to confirm.’2 Notwithstanding the silence of officials, experts in the field who have access to various reliable sources discuss the current and future status of nuclear weapons deployed in Turkey.3 It is reported that there are in total some 90 nuclear (gravity) bombs kept at the Incirlik base near Adana on Turkey’s eastern Mediterranean shore, and in the Murted Air base of the Turkish Air Force in the environs of Ankara.4 Hence, this paper aims to discuss the role that US nuclear weapons have played in Turkey’s security both throughout the Cold War period and in its aftermath, and why this role must be terminated. Accordingly, the paper will first discuss the reasons why Turkey originally agreed to host US nuclear weapons on its soil in the early 1960s despite the ensuing delicate situation in its relations with the neighboring Soviet Union. Then a section will be devoted to explaining Turkey’s position with regard to the universal arms control and disarmament agreements and similar multilateral initiatives. In this context, Turkey’s general stance vis-a`-vis the nuclear strategies of NATO will also be highlighted. A discussion will follow about the reasons why Turkish officials wanted to retain the US nuclear weapons in Turkey after the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union; at this time most of them were withdrawn from the territories of other NATO allies.5 Finally, the paper will discuss the reasons why the US tactical nuclear weapons should now be withdrawn from Turkey. The Role of US Nuclear Weapons in Turkey’s Security After the creation of NATO with the signing of the Washington Treaty on 4 April 1949, the US vigorously supported Turkey’s desire for membership. The Americans believed that, due to its geographical location, Turkey could play a very important role in their strategic vision for the post-Second World War period. However, Western European allies were not equally enthusiastic about the idea. The defense of Turkey was the key issue of contention between Europeans and Americans as they did not have identical lists of enemy states against which the allied territories would have to be defended. No country is explicitly cited in the text of the Washington Treaty as the ‘enemy’ of NATO.6 However, Article 6 of the Treaty delineated the territory that would have to be defended collectively against attacks from outside; the Soviet Union and its satellite countries were implied as the potential aggressor(s) at that time. Whereas the Europeans were mainly concerned about the Soviet threat, the American concern was much wider, encompassing countries in the Middle East, especially those hostile to Israel. When the US suggested preparing contingency plans encompassing the Persian Gulf region, the West European members of NATO generally opposed the idea as the threat perceived from Eastern Europe was of primary importance for them. In other words, the Middle East was ‘out-of-area’ of their defense commitment.7 Turkey, on the other hand, was a member of the Western camp, but having neighbors like Syria, Iraq and Iran (after the Islamic revolution) prompted it to closely watch the security situation in the Middle East. There were basically three reasons for the divergence of views within the Alliance vis-a`-vis the Middle East. First of all, countries like Syria and Iraq were not posing a serious threat to the Western European members of NATO, even though they had had intensive relations with the Soviet Union since the 1970s. Secondly, most of the countries in the region were either actual or potential trade partners of Western European countries. A third factor was the degree of historical relations between the Middle Eastern countries and the key European allies. The European members of NATO had no desire to be put in a quandary because of an ally’s (Turkey’s) conflict with its southern neighbors; such a conflict could eventually escalate into a superpower rivalry and nuclear exchange that could devastate all of Europe. Therefore, in informal gatherings, leading European members of NATO have made it clear, time and again, that their loyalty to the Article 5 commitment (alliance solidarity) of the Washington Treaty would cover only these situations where Turkey had to be defended against its northeastern neighbor, namely the Soviet Union.8 The discrepancy between the views of Europeans and Americans concerning ‘which territory to defend against whom’ has been lingering on within the Alliance since Turkey’s membership in 1952. Due to the selective attitude of the European allies in matters pertaining to the defense of Turkey, it was the Americans who most of the time prevailed in the debates within the Alliance on these matters. As such, for many Turks NATO meant the US and vice versa, and Turkish\_/American relations evolved as an alliance within the Alliance throughout the Cold War.9 When Turkey joined NATO, the parties tacitly agreed that the Turks would help contain the Soviet Union. Should deterrence fail, Turkey would have made its facilities available to NATO and would have distracted as many Soviet forces as possible from a campaign in Central Europe.10 The military thinking of the Alliance focused on the central front as the main area of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat, putting an overwhelming emphasis on the contingency of a massive attack through Germany into Western Europe.11 Therefore, defending Turkey would be vitally important to the Europeans as it would retard, or even prevent, a powerful Soviet assault on Western Europe. Indeed, as a NATO ally, Turkey risked its own devastation by virtue of its location in the immediate neighborhood of the Soviet Union. During the 1960s and well into the 1970s, the Soviet threat was felt more explicitly both in Turkey and in the US as the Soviet Union closed the gap with the US in the nuclear arms race. The Soviets increased their military presence and capabilities in conventional and unconventional weaponry along Turkey’s eastern frontier as well as their naval presence in the Mediterranean. That period also witnessed intensifying relations between the Soviets and Syria in all respects, including the military field. The Soviet Union’s growing military presence both in quantitative and qualitative terms across the southern flank of NATO prompted the Alliance in general and Turkey in particular to rely extensively (though gradually) on nuclear forces. The Washington Treaty did not involve specific requirements for the member states regarding the deployment of nuclear weapons. The Turkish political and security elite considered these weapons to be a credible deterrent against the Warsaw Treaty Organization (the Warsaw Pact) in general, and the huge military might of the Soviet Union in particular. Hence, nuclear weapons were deployed according to the mutual commitments of Turkey and NATO.12 Fully aware of the overwhelming superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries in conventional weapons systems, Turkey opposed the proposal to establish a nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in the Balkans. The proposal for a nuclear weapons-free Balkans was first put forward by the Soviet Union on 25 June 1959, when the deployment of US medium range nuclear missiles to Turkey was on the horizon. The Soviets initiated counter-measures at the international level, and ‘recommended’ to the Turks that they not accept these weapons, which could hit targets in the Soviet Union and would therefore be targeted by the Soviet nuclear missiles. But Turkey did not give in to the Soviet threats. The non-deployment or removal of nuclear weapons from Turkey would expose the country to a very difficult military situation. For Turkey, the existence of nuclear weapons on its soil meant the active presence and full backing of NATO and the US in contingency plans involving the Warsaw Pact countries. Hence, Turkish officials did not support the idea of establishing a nuclear weapon-free Balkans even though this proposal had political advantages for some countries in the region because of the opportunities it presented to conduct ‘high politics’ with the help of disarmament rhetoric.13 Turkey and Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements Even though nuclear weapons have been deployed in Turkey for nearly half a century, the fundamental thrust of Turkish foreign and security policy has been to become a state party to international nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements. Turkey signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 28 January 1969, and subsequently ratified it on 17 April 1980. Turkey’s rather late ratification of the NPT may raise the question of whether Turkish politicians wanted to keep the nuclear option open. The conventional wisdom suggests that this is unlikely. However, the traditional influence of the military on matters relating to national security was probably a factor that delayed ratification. During the 1970s, there was a growing interest in nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in neighboring countries like Iran, Iraq, and Syria; at that time the Turkish military might not have wanted to give the impression, by means of a hasty ratification, that Turkey would definitely forgo the nuclear option. Although they had no real nuclear intention, Turkish officials wished to leave the issue ambiguous as a deterrent against regional rivals and enemies. Other factors in Turkey should also be mentioned. In the second half of the 1970s, Turkey went through a period of chaos ending in the military intervention of 1980; many political analysts feel this rescued the country from the brink of an all-out civil war. Ratification of the NPTwas not a priority for the Turkish Grand National Assembly at a time when the country was struggling with anarchy and there was no non-proliferation culture. In addition to this, the nuclear infrastructure of Turkey was not significant. Two small-scale nuclear research and training reactors were probably not considered by policymakers as compelling reasons for speeding up the ratification process that would then require Turkey to conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA). In line with its general stance toward international arms control and disarmament initiatives, Turkey has also become state party to the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 by ratifying it in November 1974. Turkey signed the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993 that was followed by its ratification by the Turkish Grand Assembly in April 1997. Moreover, Turkey has taken several steps, especially since the mid-1990s, to become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); this finally happened in June 2000.14 Turkey has also speeded up the process of adjusting its national export control regime (i.e., laws and regulations) to that of the NSG countries. Turkey has undertaken the same stance toward the Zangger Committee and became a member almost as an automatic outcome of formal accession to the NSG.15 Turkey also became a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in April 1997, which aims to demonstrate to actual and potential proliferants that there is a solid block of like-minded nations which are unified in their determination to fight proliferation.16 Turkey also signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 and ratified it in 2000. It is one of 44 states whose ratification was necessary for the treaty to become effective because it has two small nuclear research reactors. As a member of the Conference on Disarmament, ‘Turkey is pleased to have joined the overwhelming majority of nations in the effort to conclude a CTBT.’17 The complete ban on nuclear testing, the core function of the Treaty, is thought by the Turkish officials to be an effective measure to control nuclear weapons technology and an important step towards the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Turkey never sought to acquire weapons of mass destruction; it also contributed to international efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and participated actively in the process of enhancing the IAEA’s verification system with a view to making the safeguards inspections more stringent. As for the Additional Protocol that was released by the IAEA as a result of ‘Programme 93\_/2’; Turkey ratified the document in July 2000.18 Indeed, following the adoption of the Protocol, there were some concerns among policymakers in Turkey that the right of access given to IAEA inspectors would be virtually unlimited, leading to UNSCOM-like applications in chosen countries. Diplomatic negotiations led to the resolution of potential problem areas and ratification was granted. Turkey and the Nuclear Strategy of NATO From a general perspective, Turkish officials view the abolition of nuclear weapons as a noble aim, one that should stay on the agenda. However, officials argue that the international context requires them to acknowledge that this aim can only be reached in stages. Moreover, Turkey endorses NATO’s ‘first-use’ strategy, which has been in effect, at least on paper, since the first decisions taken within the Nuclear Planning Group of the Alliance. In order to avoid any confusion or misinterpretation of the terms, Turkish officials emphasize that NATO’s ‘first use’ strategy does not imply ‘pre-emptive use’, which means the use of nuclear weapons before any aggression occurs. Rather, ‘first-use’ implies that NATO may be the first to use nuclear weapons during an aggression, if no other option can provide a better way of defending the allies against the aggressor(s). When the Soviet Union declared in 1982, as part of a peace offensive, that it would not be the first to resort to nuclear weapons and initiated a ‘no-first-use’ strategy, Turkey considered the Soviet pledge to be a mere propaganda tool. During the East\_/West rivalry, NATO countries relied on their nuclear capability to offset the superiority of theWarsaw Pact countries in conventional weaponry.19 Because it was envisaged that NATO might not win a war without resorting to nuclear weapons, whereas the Warsaw Pact countries might, with their conventional superiority. In the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, even though simple logic might have suggested that NATO with its indisputable superiority in conventional forces might have adopted the ‘no-first-use’ strategy. But things were not so simple. NATO had a number of constraints as far as the threat of proliferation of WMD, especially in the Middle East was concerned. In the mid-1990s, it was anticipated that European capitals would soon be within the range of ballistic missiles from the Middle East, and that the southern members of NATO would be the first to feel the political and military consequences of proliferation trends on Europe’s periphery.20 Therefore, in June 1996, NATO foreign and defense ministers endorsed a comprehensive approach to counter the military risks posed by such threats.21 NATO’s efforts to adapt itself to meet the challenges of the new security environment have produced guidelines for appropriate responses to proliferation. The overarching principles were determined to be to ‘maintain freedom of action and demonstration to any potential adversary that the alliance will not be coerced by the threat or use of WMD.’ Contending Views on Draw-Down of US Nukes from Turkey Dramatic changes have taken place in the international security environment over the last decade. These changes, however, are being assessed differently among officials and experts regarding the role of nuclear weapons. The viability as well as the credibility of the nuclear posture of NATO, including the implicit ‘first use’ strategy of the Alliance, is still of utmost importance for Turkish officials.23 However, the very nature of the emerging threats, especially since the 9/11 attacks, requires a thorough revision of the ways and means of dealing with them. Admittedly, nuclear weapons have become inappropriate in the face of the new threats posed to the free world by terrorist organizations. Retaining them simply increases the probability of theft and the use by terrorists of some crude radiological devices or even nuclear weapons. Therefore, in addition to taking tighter measures to safeguard nuclear and radiological material in places where they are stored, bolder steps must be taken by concerned countries to ultimately get rid of nuclear weapons. Such steps should begin with drawing-down the US nuclear weapons deployed in allied countries overseas including Turkey. Nevertheless, the official view is diametrically opposed to their withdrawal. Below is an account of why this is the case. ‘Nukes Should Stay’ Turkish officials consider nuclear weapons more as political weapons than as having a significant military value; they do not seriously think of contingencies where nuclear weapons could or even should be used. Having said that, they do believe in the deterrent value of US nuclear weapons stationed in Turkey. It is true that the Middle East and adjacent regions are far from being peaceful or stable; this situation is unlikely to change soon. Adding to the unrest arising from the political situation in Iraq, and the Palestine\_/Israel conflict, is Iran’s substantial nuclear development program that may have weapons development potential. Uncertainty about Iran’s capabilities as well as its intentions further complicate threat assessments by Turkish officials. Hence, retaining US nukes in Turkey ‘to be on the safe side’ sounds like a better option to them. However, the fundamental reason why Turkish officials want to keep the weapons has more to do with the nature and the scope of Turkish\_/American relations in particular, and Turkey’s place in the Western alliance in general. First and foremost, the deployment of the remaining tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey is believed to strengthen the bonds between the US and Turkey; these bonds were severely strained during and after the crisis in Iraq in late 2002 and neither party got what it wanted.24 Withdrawing the US nuclear weapons from Turkey during such a delicate period could weaken the bonds in the longstanding strategic alliance (or the ‘partnership’ as many Turkish and American analysts would prefer to term it). Turkish officials also see the deployment of these weapons as part of the ‘burden sharing’ principle within the Alliance. They would prefer that some other allies also continue to host US nuclear weapons on their soil, if only in symbolic numbers. Then Turkey would not stand out as the only country in NATO that retains US nuclear weapons in Europe. Reportedly, there are some 480 tactical US nuclear weapons that are still deployed in a handful of NATO allies.25 The significance of retaining American nuclear weapons in Europe is said to be to ‘anchor the US to the Continent’ especially in an age when the transatlantic ties are seemingly weakened due to the diverging views over the US war on Iraq. Otherwise, it is feared that the ‘isolationist’ view and those who advocate the idea of ‘disengagement’ in the US may have the upper hand in American domestic politics. It is believed that such an eventuality could cause further deterioration in transatlantic relations, and might not make either side better off politically, economically or militarily. Having expressed their desire to keep US nuclear weapons in Turkey at the expense of the political and economic burden attached to them, Turkish officials also point out a serious concern regarding the true desire of the American administration. They worry that the US may have secretly developed (or may be in the process of developing) new weapons systems, which may not necessitate overseas deployment. Should this be the case, Turkish officials fear that the solidarity principle may be seriously hurt and the Alliance may lose its spirit and its ‘raison d’eˆtre’.26 ‘Nukes Must Go’ The above-cited views of Turkish officials contain very valid points in explaining why Turkey has long favored the deployment of US nuclear weapons and still wants to keep them. However, any discussion of nuclear weapons must also incorporate a description of the peculiarities as well as the possible effects of these weapons. Whether it is about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East; or nuclear arms reduction treaties between the US and the Russian Federation; or the implications of a draw-down of US tactical nuclear weapons from the territories of NATO allies, such discussions mostly revolve around the notion of deterrence as well as the nature of bilateral relations with the US. It is true that nuclear weapons are the most powerful weapons so far invented and developed by mankind. However, nuclear weapons may have unprecedented consequences for mankind as well as the environment if and when they are used deliberately or accidentally.27 Thus, approaching the nuclear weaponsrelated issues merely from the perspective of the concept of balance of power or the notion of deterrence would be both incomplete and misleading. Even the civil or military leaders, who have the authority to resort to nuclear weapons if deterrence based on the threat of use of these weapons fails, may not necessarily have a clear idea about the catastrophic consequences of their decision. Nuclear weapons were used for the first\*/and hopefully the last\*/time in wartime conditions on 6 and 9 August 1945 in Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the US.28 Since then, nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons that are thousands of times more powerful than the ones used against Japan have been produced and stockpiled by a number of states.29 Over time, both the types and the delivery platforms of nuclear weapons have become more diversified. Then the so-called ‘second-strike capabilities’ of the superpowers were developed; this maintained stability during the Cold War. It was virtually impossible for one of the parties to launch a surprise attack with a view to disarming the other. Well-protected nuclear stockpiles, multi-megaton-yield nuclear warheads on long-range missiles in nuclear submarines, strategic-range bomber aircraft and ground-based ICBMs that could reach each others’ strategic assets (both military and civilian) reduced the likelihood of war almost to zero. Since it was impossible to fight, the parties had to deter each other. Since the world has seen the effects of the ‘primitive’ nuclear weapons that were detonated in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the fear of a nuclear catastrophe served well the purpose of a perfect deterrent during the Cold War.30 However, the sui generis conditions of the superpower rivalry during the Cold War period cannot be used as a pretext for keeping the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons or for developing new ones when the international security environment is undergoing dramatic changes. The perception of threat to states has been subject to thorough revision especially in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the US. Almost every state has started to seriously consider how to deal with the threat posed by the so-called ‘non-state actors’ which are believed to have the capability to build weapons of mass destruction or to have unauthorized access to ready-made weapons of that sort.31 Therefore, it becomes more and more irrelevant to consider nuclear weapons as a symbol of prestige or national pride, or as a perfect deterrent against other states. The probability of use of elaborate or crude nuclear devices by states or non-state actors increases as more and more actors on the world political stage have the capability and/or the intention to build such weapons. To avoid a nuclear catastrophe in the future, every nation must start thinking about effective ways of getting rid of the remaining nuclear weapons or further limiting their numbers and deployment sites. These steps must be taken regardless of previously held policies in order to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorist organizations which may use them with no thought for the consequences. Fewer pretexts or justifications may be created for new states to aspire de facto nuclear weapons status.

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The TNWs in turkey are a fundamental to NATO’s preemptive nuclear policy

Rozoff, 10 (Rick, Manager of Stop NATO Internationl, “Nuclear Weapons and Interceptor Missles: Twin Pillars of U.S.-NATO Military Strategy In Europe”, April 24, http://australia.to/2010/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=2378:nuclear-weapons-and-interceptor-missiles-twin-pillars-of-us-nato-military-strategy-in-europe&catid=94:breaking-news)

**T**he two-day NATO foreign ministers meeting in the Estonian capital of Tallinn on April 22-23 focused on the completion of the military alliance’s first 21st century Strategic Concept and on the war in Afghanistan, the near-complete absorption of the Balkans into the bloc, and the expansion of operations at the Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence established by NATO two years ago in the same city.

The most important deliberations, however, were on the integrally related questions of U.S. nuclear weapons stored on air bases in five NATO member states and the expansion of the Pentagon’s interceptor missile program to all of Europe west of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine.

Discussions on the role of nuclear arms in Europe a generation after the end of the Cold War are in line with the Nuclear Posture Review released last month by the U.S. Department of Defense. NATO has never been known to deviate from American precedents and expectations. Its role is to accommodate and complement Pentagon initiatives. A nation like the Netherlands or Poland proposes, Washington disposes.

While speaking at a press conference in the ministerial meeting’s host city, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen directly tied together the retention of U.S. nuclear arms in Europe and NATO’s cooperation with its dominant member on a continent-wide interceptor missile system:

"NATO’s core business, its raison-d’etre, is to protect our territory and our populations….And in a world where nuclear weapons actually exist, NATO needs a credible, effective, and safely managed deterrent.

"Missile defence is no replacement for an effective deterrent. But it can complement it. Because there are states, or other actors, who might not be rational enough to be deterred by our nuclear weapons. But they might be deterred by the realisation that their few missiles might not get through our defences."

What Rasmussen failed to mention was that in the event NATO collectively or a coalition of its main powers was to launch first strikes against nations to the east and south with conventional weapons, nuclear ones or a combination of both, an advanced phase interceptor system could prevent effective retaliation.

The NATO chief also said, "The missile threat to Europe is clear, and it is growing….Which means, to my mind, that we need to take on Alliance missile defence as a NATO mission."

Recent statements by Rasmussen, one of which has drawn the ire of Iran directly, would indicate from where the missile threat to Europe is alleged to emanate, but Rasmussen has no aversion to belaboring – or exaggerating – a point and added, "30 countries, including of course Iran, have or are developing missiles." To address the non-existent challenge to Europe Rasmussen announced that the foreign ministers in attendance would discuss "issues surrounding missile defence, including cost, command and control," and stated that at the bloc’s summit in Lisbon, Portugal this November "NATO nations will decide whether or not it will to take on Alliance missile defence as a NATO mission."

After the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO ordinarily held a summit every third year in the 1990s and every second year from 1999 to 2008. But this year’s summit will be the third of what have become annual events: Romania in 2008, France and Germany in 2009, and Portugal this year.

The last will be the first NATO summit held entirely in a founding member state since the fiftieth anniversary one in Washington, DC in 1999.

Not only the increased frequency (the Alliance has never before in its 61-year history conducted summits in three successive years), but the locations of the summits reveal the intensification of NATO activity and its steady drive to the east over the last decade. In the ten years between the Washington and last year’s Strasbourg, France-Kehl, Germany summits, every one was held in Eastern Europe: In the Czech Republic in 2002, Turkey in 2004, Estonia in 2006 and Romania in 2008.

The sites, to the east and south of previous ones, are indicative of what NATO has become in the 21st century: An expansionist, active military force that has deployed troops to several current and recent conflict zones – Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan and Somalia – and to numerous adjoining nations such as Albania, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Jordan and Kuwait. There were 50,000 multinational forces under NATO command in Kosovo in 1999. There are now over 90,000 (of 120,000 foreign troops) in Afghanistan, with both the aggregate number and the percentage to increase shortly.

In his opening statement at the foreign ministers meeting in Estonia, Rasmussen emphasized the centrality of U.S.-led missile shield plans in relation to the upcoming summit in Portugal and the new Strategic Concept that will be adopted there: "In Lisbon, NATO nations will decide if missile defence for our European territory and population should become an Alliance mission. I make no secret that I think it should."

He linked maintaining American nuclear gravity bombs in several European nations and the expansion of interceptor missile facilities in Eastern Europe to the Alliance’s so-called collective defense doctrine. In his main address Rasmussen stated: "[W]e are delivering solidarity through our unflinching commitment to territorial defence. This core task of NATO is embodied in Article 5 of our founding treaty: An attack on one Ally is considered an attack on all. This is the very foundation of our Alliance….We need the right type of military capabilities. We need modern and mobile armed forces. Armed forces that are not static. Forces that are able to deploy quickly to assist an Ally in need."

The secretary general faithfully echoed the two rationales for nuclear first strikes continued in the new U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, and indeed the American global war on terror phraseology of the past nine years, in asserting that NATO "must retain a nuclear capability as long as there are rogue regimes or terrorist groupings that may pose a nuclear threat to us."

But he then segued seamlessly into identifying that NATO’s main prospective target remains what it has always been: Russia. Without identifying it (or needing to in the following context), he said:

"We also need a visible presence of NATO across the entire territory of our Alliance. And we see a perfect example here in this region. We have put in place arrangements to police the Baltic airspace. A range of NATO members are actively engaged – sharing responsibility – showing solidarity – and demonstrating a capable and credible Alliance that is determined to defend our territory and to protect our populations.

"We also need to guard against new risks and threats to the security of our nations, such as energy cut-offs or cyber attacks. And here as well, we have a good example right here in Estonia, with the Alliance’s Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence."

There are neither rogue nations nor al-Qaeda operatives with "nuclear suitcases" in the Baltic Sea region. References to energy cut-offs and cyber attacks are undeniable and exclusive allusions to actions NATO states have accused Russian of perpetrating.

The patrolling of Baltic air space by NATO warplanes and the – to call it by its proper name – cyber warfare center in Estonia are both aimed at Russia and Russia only.

In his speech Rasmussen was unequivocal in his pro-nuclear weapons stance. In addition to affirming that "What we…need is a credible nuclear deterrent" – supposedly because of "rogue regimes or terrorist groupings" – he added "for this reason, we also need a credible missile defence system, providing coverage for all the Allies."

Again the connection between U.S. nuclear arms at NATO nations’ air bases in Europe and anti-ballistic missile installations on or near Russia’s borders was made directly and again with the transparently untenable claim that both are needed against Iran and al-Qaeda.

What plans the new Strategic Concept to be endorsed at the November summit will finalize were indicated in another statement by Rasmussen:

"The United States already has a missile defence system. Some European Allies have a capacity to protect deployed forces against missile attacks….If we connect national systems into a NATO wide missile shield to protect all our Allies, that would be a very powerful demonstration of NATO solidarity in the 21st Century. And I hope we can make progress in that direction by the time of the next NATO Summit in Lisbon in November."

He repeated NATO’s position on nuclear arms in an interview on Estonian public television: "If we look at today’s world, then there is no alternative to nuclear arms in NATO’s deterrent capability….My personal opinion is that the stationing of US nuclear weapons in Europe is part of deterrence to be taken seriously."

The 2010 Strategic Concept will not differ in any substantive manner from the current one adopted in 1999, which states:

"The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.

"A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe."

The presence of nuclear weapons in Europe is a foundational tenet of NATO and one of the root purposes for the bloc’s existence. The first NATO Strategic Concept (The Strategic Concept For The Defense Of The North Atlantic Area), that of the year of its founding, 1949, includes among its commitments to:

"Insure the ability to carry out strategic bombing including the prompt delivery of the atomic bomb. This is primarily a US responsibility assisted as practicable by other nations."

NATO’s policy in the intervening 61 years years has also obligated European member states to adhere to what is called nuclear sharing or nuclear burden sharing; that is, nuclear bombs stationed on bases in Europe are to be delivered by the host nations’ air forces.

A2: T-Military Presence

United States TNWs are viewed as a military presence

Potter 1(William, Institute Professor and Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Additional Measures to Reduce Tactical Nuclear Weapons”, UNIDIR, http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art1746.pdf) MJ

**If there is some prospect for ongoing multilateral discussion of TNWs controls in the NPT context, the chances of United States-Russian negotiations is much less encouraging**. Although shortly after the conclusion of the 2000 NPT Review Conference the United States formally proposed to Russia that both States reaffirm the 1991 parallel declarations, Russia chose not to respond directly to the proposal. Instead, it reiterated the position that the United States withdraw its TNWs from Europe. Today, with START III dead in the water, there appears to be no prospect in the near term for progress in addressing TNWs within the strategic arms control negotiating arena as once was envisaged. Although it may be possible to achieve future reductions of strategic nuclear arms on the basis of less formal negotiations, neither the Bush nor Putin administrations have shown any interest to date in the further reduction of TNWs or in the strengthening of the existing non-legally binding TNW regime. Another promising means to control non-strategic nuclear weapons—the creation of a Nuclear- Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ) in Central Asia—also has been stymied for over a year. The problem relates primarily to a shift in Russian diplomacy, which now interprets the Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security to allow for Russian deployment of nuclear weapons in Central Asia under certain circumstances. **This policy shift has led a number of the Central Asian States to support language in the nearly complete draft NWFZ treaty, which, if adopted, could be interpreted as sanctioning the presence of TNWs in a NWFZ.** Although it is hard to imagine the utility of TNWs in meeting security threats in Central Asia, the Russian resolve to keep all of its military options open has probably increased since the post-11 September rise in intensity of conflict in the region. **The new prospect of a long term United States military presence in the area likely reinforces that conviction. The last noteworthy, recent development is the more frequent discussions in the United States and Russian press since 11 September 2001 of both the access of non-State actors to TNWs and the possible use of TNWs by State actors. Regarding the former issue, although there has been no fundamental change recently in the vulnerability of United States or Russian TNWs arsenals, the potential for diversion of weapons not in central storage is a risk that merits more attention.**

A2: T-Military Presence

TNWs act as a presence in the countries they are located

Sokov 9 (Nikolai, Senior Research Associate at CNS, “ Tactical (Substrategic) Nuclear Weapons,” CNS, http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/090717\_german\_leadership/german\_leadership\_6\_issue\_4.pdf) MJ

**U.S. officials have told their European counterparts that they are prepared to withdraw TNW** if that is what other NATO members want. Indeed, the U.S. European Command and an Air Force task force have cited concerns about the operating and security procedures for the weapons, with **USEUCOM concluding that the U.S. military would be better off if they were withdrawn from Europe**.23 A task force report for Defense Secretary Robert Gates cited comments from senior EUCOM officers complaining that it could cost between $120 million and $180 million to cope with emerging threats to the weapons’ security, with **one senior military leader saying: “We pay a king’s ransom for these things and . . . they have no military value**.”24 European NATO members, however, are split on the subject. **Many Western European governments** (including some of the few countries where the weapons continue to be based) **would just as well do without the weapons, facing public opposition to their presence and sensing little security benefit from them.** Moreover, some countries, such as Germany, are less than eager to take on the cost of fielding a new generation of dual-capable aircraft, given the low probability of their use.25

United States’ TNWs in Turkey are viewed as a military presence

Lamond and Ingram 9 **(**Claudine, Senior analyst and contributor to International Security Report, Paul , BASIC, “Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states,” British American Security Information Council, http://www.basicint.org/gtz/gtz11.htm) MJ

**There is a rising sentiment amongst the population for the removal of US nuclear weapons from Turkish territory**. In a recent survey,20 more than half the respondents stated that they are against nuclear weapons being stationed in Turkey. Almost 60% of the Turkish population would support a government request to remove the nuclear weapons from their country, and 72% said they would support an initiative to make Turkey a nuclear-free zone.21 There may be several causes behind this sentiment, including the Iraq War, Turkish relations with neighboring states, budget expenditure and the moral concern over nuclear weapons. The historic precedence of Greece, a NATO member and Turkey’s historic rival, ending its commitment to nuclear sharing in NATO may have further strengthened this tendency. **There have been public expressions of resentment towards the US military presence in Turkey ever since the lead up to the US war with Iraq**. The United States insisted on the government allowing American troops to use Turkey as a staging post, despite overwhelmingly antiwar Turkish public and political opinion. Limited permission was granted after heavy debates and delay in the Turkish parliament. Turkey’s location has added an element of both risk and opportunity to NATO nuclear sharing. **Turkey’s close proximity to states deemed potentially hostile, such as Iran and Syria, make Turkey a preferred NATO base for TNWs**. The risk, of course, is that stationing TNWs in Turkey might provoke a pre-emptive strike upon NATO bases. **Turkish parliamentarians have expressed to NATO the difficulty of explaining the continued presence of US TNWs on Turkish territory to Muslim and Arab neighbors**. There is a fear that they undermine Turkey’s clear diplomatic objectives to act as a mediator within the region. Turkey has a unique opportunity to play a positive role in promoting non-proliferation. Ending nuclear sharing and fully complying with the NPT would act as a powerful example to neighboring states and strengthen Turkey’s legitimacy. Moreover, efforts by the Turkish government to play a leading role in the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction would receive overwhelming public support.22

Framework

Open, public nuclear rhetoric is imperative to challenge the authority of the nuclear professionals and deconstruct the hegemonic grasp over the American public that nuclear professionals have created

Taylor and Hendry 8 (Bryan, Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Colorado-Boulder and Judith, Lecturer in the Department of Communication and Journalism at the University of New Mexico, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 11(2), Insisting on Persisting: The Nuclear Rhetoric of "Stockpile Stewardship", Muse) OLW

In response, rhetorical critics have sought to challenge the unwarranted exclusion of cultural and political diversity from spheres of nuclear deliberation, and to restore their integrity as a standard for adequate representation of human interests in the management of potentially world-ending military technology. In this process, critics have clarified the intransigence of Cold War and "nuclearist" rhetoric in normalizing nuclear weapons as a legitimate and necessary means of preserving U.S. national security. In this essay, we have argued that the flexibility of this rhetoric has enabled nuclear weapons institutions to, at least temporarily, survive the challenge posed to their authority and mission by the end of the Cold War. Nonetheless, observes Richard Falk, the extraordinary level of violence associated with the use of nuclear weapons creates an ongoing moral and political crisis for all nominally democratic states who develop them: "Normative opposition to nuclear weapons or doctrines inevitably draws into [End Page 323] question the legitimacy of state power and is, therefore, more threatening to governmental process than a mere debate about the property of nuclear weapons as instruments of statecraft."[83](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v011/11.2.taylor.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f83) For this and other reasons discussed in this essay, nuclear policy rhetoric is highly resistant to changes that arise in cultural consciousness in response to shifting political conditions.

As a result, we judge official SSP rhetoric to be an institutional defense mounted against the possibility of undesirable, externally imposed change created as U.S. citizens consider the need for continued nuclear deterrence in the absence of a traditional superpower enemy. Our critique demonstrates the need to reinvigorate the dormant nuclear-public sphere so that citizens—and their elected officials—can adequately deliberate issues surrounding management of the nuclear arsenal. To achieve this goal, significant support must be provided for remedies that empower public understanding of associated technical, value, and policy issues. Ideally, robust programs of education and debate would enable speakers to develop a framework for discussion that allows explicit room for diverse interpretations, to make it possible to recognize common goals where they exist, acknowledge the internal consistency of other positions, and articulate clearly those areas where participants can agree to disagree.[84](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v011/11.2.taylor.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f84)

Subsequent deliberation should consider not only narrow technical arguments but also cherished Maintainer premises, including that SSP officials are the sole credible and dispassionate judges of nuclear safety and reliability; that claims of "confidence" in stockpile "reliability" are referential in nature, and not constitutive or performative; that alleged decreases of warhead safety and reliability resulting from the CTBT genuinely compromise national security; and that nuclear weapons are a necessary or effective instrument of that security. As a result, new options for thought and action may emerge for nuclear officials, workers, and citizens who are currently producing—whether by direct action or tacit consent—the future of nuclear weapons.

In the absence of such efforts, deliberation surrounding stockpile stewardship will default to its traditional "guardianship" structure, in which scientific, military, and policy elites presume to control that process in order to protect the public from itself. Indeed, this presumption is exacerbated by the SSP's "surprisingly strong assumption that the function of the stockpile as a deterrent is based on the credibility of weapons designers and engineers, rather than the technical characteristics of the weapons themselves."[85](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v011/11.2.taylor.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f85) One means of transforming this rhetorical situation, then, involves directly engaging the incongruity between nuclear officials' nominal deference to the demos as owner of the nuclear object, and their actual wariness of citizen voice. Far from intruding [End Page 324] on the domain of nuclear policy, citizens and scholars engaging in this debate would be performing necessary—and otherwise neglected—oversight functions. As rhetorical critic David J. Tietge notes, it is a characteristic of the Cold War that nuclear scientists had time to create, but not to adequately anticipate or reflect upon the appropriations and consequences of their creations.[86](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v011/11.2.taylor.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f86)

That being said, SSP opponents face considerable challenges in unseating the presumption of incumbent, pro-nuclear stewards. Specifically, those stewards have shown significant rhetorical skill in redirecting residual Cold War anxiety away from a concrete national enemy to the more shadowy condition of "uncertainty."[87](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v011/11.2.taylor.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f87) In this depiction, uncertainty is likened to the stigmatized condition of "instability," and requires the mobilization of programs to reduce its associated risks. Because "certainty" in the realm of nuclear weapons is an asymptotic—and potentially disastrous—condition, however, it will always be a malleable resource exploitable by pro-nuclear rhetoric. As a result, policy alternatives such as the bold vision of total nuclear "abolition" may be made to appear even more extreme and undesirable. The SSP, we conclude, has thus sustained itself as an institutional relief of anxiety arising from the rhetorically induced intolerance of uncertainty. Rhetorical critics may continue to examine this accomplishment, providing guidance on how future knowledge and policy claims may ideally be produced and judged. Issues guiding this critique should include: What constitutes adequate evidence for claims concerning stockpile reliability? How do those claims constitute, distort, and foreclose potential understandings? How much of which kinds of uncertainty surrounding stockpile safety and reliability may be tolerated in order to minimize the undesirable costs and consequences of continued nuclear weapons development? Whose values should be included in associated claims? How should those values be represented in policy deliberation to ensure their adequate consideration?

Framework

Language constructs reality and can work to filter out particular realities in order to create a desired reality

Allan 88 (Stuart, Department of Sociology, Carleton University Carleton University, Talking our Extinction to Death: Nuclear Discourse and the News Media, CANADIAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION, VOL. 14, NO. 1)OLW

A view to outlining a new conceptual basis for the situation of the social (re)production of public discourse within the complex system of the mass media as an institutional apparatus has only recently been recognized by some media theorists as a necessary prerequisite for the continued advancement of more sophisticated notions of meaning construction; hence a new focus on the work of certain linguists concerned with the language of the media (see Davis and Walton, 1983; Fowler, Hodge, Kress and Trew, 1979). In the course of the past three decades, theoretical perspectives such as symbolic-interactionism, phenomenology and ethnomethodology have sparked a considerable upheaval within the field of linguistics (generally defined). Consequently, a number of divergent approaches have emerged, some of which are in direct opposition to what many recognize to be the dominant framework for the analysis of language practice, namely that provided by studies of transformational generative grammar. Of interest here is critical linguistics, an approach which set about attempting to demonstrate that language is an integral part of the social process (thus the 'language' and 'society' division indicative of sociolinguistics collapses) and, as such, is implicated in the prevailing forms of economic and social organization (see Fowler and Kress, 1979). If the precise institutional and organizational conditions and practices of linguistic production have been left relatively undertheorized (often simply asserted within a text-context dynamic), critical linguistics has proven capable of providing the necessary tools to explore[d] how discursive practices are themselves the site of linguistic conflict where particular 'realities' are systematically 'filtered out'. Through accentuating the productive dimension of discourse, the integration of the text with the social context of its articulation is then confirmed (the effect is itself anchored in a certain modality of power) and thus, in this way, new understandings of how prevailing modes of social control are systematically ex-nominated (Barthes, 1973) may be realized. As will be discussed below, this is achieved primarily through explicating a discourse's conditions of existence in addition to the internal form of its signification.

Solvency

Nuclear transparency is imperative to create counter-hegemonic discourses that can challenge expert control of knowledge

Allan 88 (Stuart, Department of Sociology, Carleton University Carleton University, Talking our Extinction to Death: Nuclear Discourse and the News Media, CANADIAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION, VOL. 14, NO. 1)OLW

Work on nuclear discourse is explicitly political: efforts to facilitate the articulation of alternative knowledges pose a direct threat to the current reproduction of mass acquiescence to the 'nuclear phenomenon'. As detailed above, to disrupt the processes through which nuclear discourse places people (as historical subjects) within modes of identification working to secure preferred relations of inference, new critical and emancipatory positions must first be located and then reinforced. For discourses of dissent to intervene against the prevailing structures of 'obvious', 'common-sensical' knowledges about the dominant nuclear reality (and the socially contingent nature of its phallocentric truth), they must succeed in transcending the boundaries established through discursive lines of demarcation (see Pecheux, 1982). This may be best achieved through a number of interrelated strategies, such as explicating the means by which these counter-hegemonic knowledges are denied ascendancy into 'official' knowledge, or, similarly, attempting to identify as a site of struggle the patriarchal assumptions on which such discourses have come to depend. Another would be to address the very multiplicity of the discourses at play in news text (as well as the conditions of their hierarchical legitimacy for 'newsworthiness') and the 'naturalness' of their alignment with the 'real'. Furthermore, the operational rules and codes of newsgathering as routinized work could be examined, including its attendant reliance on the 'official sources' and 'expert opinions' found within bureaucratic support systems, in relation to the sense-making practices of the newsworkers themselves. The conceptual tools of discourse analysis may also prove well suited to assist with the further exploration of how an antagonistic differentiation could be imposed within the larger, public dispersion of nuclear discourse. After all, the 'official' lexicon made available for newsworkers to draw upon not only helps them to construct a general framework of facticity within their respective news accounts, it may also structure each account so as to reify a technical or scientific authority set above 'reasonable' opposition. Associations of order, efficiency and institutional control may then be actualized within the produced text, at least to the extent that those determinate power relations effected through narrative closure remain embedded within the realm of a 'taken-for-grantedness' understood implicitly by both newsworker and newsconsumer alike. Accordingly, having first rendered the pertinent concepts inaccessible to the non-specialist, the 'inside' language barrier (necessary for reinforcing the materialized practices of 'official' ways of knowing) is then itself preserved. Given the potential implications for nuclear discourse, Thompson's (1980) concern with the form of 'normality' so configured is particularly important. In his view, 'inside' language works to habituate the addressed individual to certain expectations, thus not only does it encourage[s] resignation to the problem of nuclear war, it also beckons on the event (Thompson, 1980: 5 1). This paper has attempted to argue for the importance of formulating for investigation a new object of analysis: the social reproduction of nuclear discourse as it traverses the strategic field of the news media. Practitioners of media studies are well placed to elaborate upon present theoretical efforts to counteract the nation-state's 'official' discourse by opening it up to the broader forms of critique and contestation through the re-definition of its primary elements. This practice of criticism may even, in turn, be correlated with socio-political involvement as institutions currently posited within counter hegemonic discourses (not necessarily limited to groups involved with the advancement of specific peace and disarmament causes) hold vast potential for assistance in the realization of this critical agenda. Such an approach could severely limit the ease with which nation-states articulate the relatively stable stereo-types and narrative syntagms of the Cold War binarism (particularly its external 'Other'). Evidently, until this 'nuclear reality' is transformed, 'the Balance of Terror' will continue to preclude a clear appraisal of the nation-state's legitimate defence needs. This while the minute hand of the 'doomsday clock' ticks ever closer to 'midnight' and the practices of discourse management become increasingly refined.

Solvency

Informed deliberation creates policy that benefits society

Taylor Et Al 05 (Bryan C, University of Colorado at Boulder, WILLIAM J. KINSELLA North Carolina State University, STEPHEN P. DEPOE MARIBETH S. METZLER University of Cincinnati, “Nuclear Legacies: Communication, Controversy, and the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Production Complex.”, Communication Yearbook 29, http://comm.colorado.edu/~taylorbc/Nuclear%20Legacies%20CY29.pdf) BAF

As much a theoretical construct as an empirical context, the public sphere evokes sharp debate concerning the status of participation, democracy, and deliberation in the late-modern and postmodern eras. Participants in this debate variously orient to Habermas’s (1962/1989) history of the modern bourgeois public sphere. Many commentators, subsequently, have utilized the critical public sphere as a normative ideal to evaluate actual public deliberation. This ideal rests upon four conditions. First, all citizens should have access to, and competency in, the available means of expression. Second, citizens should debate openly, democratically, and rationally, deferring their preexisting differences of status and expertise. As a result, speakers should be able to reflect on the intelligibility, truthfulness, and situational appropriateness of offered claims. They should seek to reach consensus through the use of practical reasoning concerned with the quality of a shared lifeworld. Third, citizens should debate matters of general interest. These matters should be accessible to public discourse, and citizens should be sufficiently motivated and informed to engage them. Fourth, deliberation should lead not only to the formation of public opinion, but should also influence official decision making. Used in this fashion, the critical public sphere clarifies the rhetorical practices by which matters are deliberated in the public interest. Critics utilizing this construct emphasize the ethics and politics that surround the framing of issues, the selection of speakers, and the interpretation of evidence in controversies. Responding to a variety of challenges to this ideal (e.g., concerning the colonization of public discourse by commercial or corporate interests), current public sphere scholars seek to achieve at least three goals. The first involves recovering “a multiplicity of dialectically related public spheres rather than a single, encompassing arena of discourse” (Asen & Brouwer, 2001, p. 6). In so doing, scholars reverse a declinist thesis emphasizing the disruption and fragmentation of traditional deliberation. They reframe the expansion of deliberation created by oppositional counterpublics as a potential benefit to society (e.g., Olson & Goodnight, 1994). Second, critics reconceptualize traditionally opposed entities (e.g., counterpublics and the state; technical and public spheres) to reflect their relative permeability and interdependency (Asen & Brouwer, 2001; Goodnight, 1982). Finally, they Nuclear Legacies 381 examine the tactics used by publics and counterpublics to alternately affiliate and compete with each other and to maintain and transform the mechanisms of deliberation. In this process, critics reveal how standards of decorum and norms of deliberation mistakenly presumed to be transcendent or permanent structures are actually local, contingent accomplishments (Farrell, 1993; Phillips, 1999)

Solvency

Desecuritization is essential to conquering Western myths about Russia that perpetuate insecurity

Browning 2001 (Christopher S. Browning Ph.D. Candidate Department of International Relations, University of Wales “The Region-Building Approach Revisited: The Continued Othering of Russia in Discourses of Region-Building in  the European North” [www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI\_publications/COPRI.../6-2001.doc](http://www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI_publications/COPRI.../6-2001.doc) ) MAH

With an aim to establish a more egalitarian discourse post-Cold War region-building in the European north has been viewed positively for a number of reasons. In the first instance, and as noted above, favourable opinions tend to derive from the notion that regional projects such as the Northern Dimension Initiative, the CBSS and the BEAR treat Russia as an equal partner and subject in region-building efforts. As Pertti Joenniemi puts it: The Northern Dimension introduces a setting with Russia as a potential partner, and not an object of the policies of others. It opens for a genuine dialogue and provides Russia, in concrete terms, with a seat at an EU ministerial meeting that ponders issues of a strategic character... Russia is offered the option of having a voice in a debate that focuses on the policies to be pursued by the Union in areas also important for Russia The emphasis on a relationship of dialogue is important. As Fierke notes, relations based on dialogue can be contrasted with relations premised on negotiation. The difference, Fierke contends, is that whereas negotiation is essentially an adversarial mode of communication, “constructed around a ‘we-them’ relationship, within which each party tries to maximise its own interests; dialogue, by contrast, is part of a problem solving approach that requires actors to step outside their own position and empathise with the experience and suffering of the other”. In a relationship premised on dialogue, therefore, the other participant is emploted as an equal partner, a subject with a legitimate voice. Of particular salience is the fact that in dialogue language is not used strategically to gain maximum benefit for the self, since in a relationship of dialogue “there is no a priori certainty about who will learn from whom”. Commentators maintaining a positive view of the Northern Dimension and other region-building initiatives clearly view them as examples of dialogue, rather than negotiation, and at a structural level Russia’s status of equal partner in the dialogue appears confirmed by the fact that decision-making in meetings of the CBSS requires unanimity. Secondly, the new regional approaches are also seen to enhance regional security. Despite the fact that officially security is not on the agenda the Northern Dimension, the CBSS and the BEAR, are frequently viewed as rather enlightened security policies for the European north. By not explicitly 'talking security' and rather concentrating on practical matters of pollution, crime and so forth, such initiatives are seen to contribute to regional security simply for the reason that they remove traditional questions of military security from the regional agenda. To utilise the rhetoric of the Copenhagen School the new region-building stands as an example of de-securitisation. This is to say, by not engaging with traditional security rhetoric the potential of constructing identities in terms of enmity and threat is reduced. One consequence of this is that issues of a state's territorial sovereignty are also undermined opening space for a different character of region building and regional cooperation that can be characterised as post-modern and post-sovereign in nature. By removing issues of military security and state territorial sovereignty from discussion the new region-building initiatives facilitate the re-conceptualisation of the ordering of political space in non-territorial terms and, moreover, facilitate the re-conceptualisation of national identities in terms of commonness rather than enmity. The result is that initiatives such as the Northern Dimension, the CBSS and the BEAR are considered to promote a growing regionality in the European north, with regionality referring to the growth and development of regional networks outside the framework and independent of sovereign entities. As Jaeger puts it: "It is all about post-modern and post-sovereign politics of flexibility and change, speed and access, functionality and centrality - in short, it is about social interaction besides representations of sovereignty". Thirdly, and extending this point concerning regionality, the refocusing of attention towards the north and away from the 'imperial' centres of Brussels and Moscow is itself depicted as a move towards emancipation, egalitarianism and the emergence of a post-modern spatial politics of loosely defined networks rather than rigidly defined exclusionary state borders. In this respect the new region-building is seen to offer the possibility of envisaging a restructured Europe in which peripherality becomes a resource for action rather than a burden that confines one to the margins. In this vein both Joenniemi and Medvedev have talked of the Northern Dimension contributing to a construction of a 'Europe of Olympic Rings' in which the different yet interdependent regions/rings of Europe (Northern-Baltic Europe, the Mediterranean, Central Europe, etc...) become simply nodes in a wider framework. Such a vision offers considerable potential for liberating politics from Cold War 'us-them' suppositions. Not least, in a Europe of Olympic Rings the East-West division itself would become somewhat anachronistic. Such a vision is also in stark contrast to more traditional notions of an empire-like 'Europe of Concentric Circles' emanating out from Brussels, in which subjectivity (and power) decreases the further you are from the centre. Furthermore, the metaphor of Olympic Rings is also presented as a way to integrate Russia into Europe once and for all. As Medvedev puts it, the 'Olympic Ring' of the CBSS, BEAC and Northern Dimension framework "reaches out to Russia, engaging her in a non-discriminating manner, not as a periphery but as a full-fledged partner". In such a vision Russia is seen to possess regulating and constituting power to engage on equal terms in defining the new northernness. In contrast, the dominant Europe of Concentric Circles is seen to maintain the peripheralisation of Russia from the European project. On this reading the new region-building in the European north is presented as benign, yet invigorating, and as offering a neutral framework with which it is up to Russia whether it becomes involved. The issue is a very big one as such a vision does not simply reconstitute the political space of EU-Europe, but also envisages the de-centralisation of Russia, an issue we will see that remains controversial in Russia. To summarise, understood as establishing a relationship of equal partnership with Russia through dialogue, as desecuritising the whole north European discourse, and as opening northern Europe to a new regionality, the new region-building initiatives, to utilise the rhetoric of Medvedev, are seen to provide an opportunity to 'desacralise' Western myths of Russia as a locus of chaos and instability that have emploted it as the constituting other of the West for centuries. By treating Russia as an equal partner the Northern Dimension, the CBSS and the BEAR are seen to provide the opportunity to integrate Russia into Europe once and for all. Moreover, desecuritisation is seen as a first step in a liberation of Europe from the politics of modernity with its focus on state sovereignty and territorial security. In contrast, the new region-building sets the European north on the post-modern road in which societal concerns replace state concerns and in which power is dispersed through processes of networking. These views of the new regional initiatives are clearly enlightened, whether they are justified is more problematic and is the focus of the rest of this paper.

Solvency

The ontologies of war create a chain that ensures violent choices are made and prevent understanding international relations as anything else. The only option is to critique dominant images of political being and ways of securing to end the chain of violence

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, 18,19, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory\_and\_event/v010/10.2burke.html) MJ

**The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined**. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. **This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues**, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, **that  'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state**.[23](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn23%22%20%5Co%20%22) This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror'.[24](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn24%22%20%5Co%20%22) Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that **obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth**.[25](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn25%22%20%5Co%20%22)  However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus **in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made**. The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: **if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have**, as Heidegger suggests, **come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped?**[26](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn26%22%20%5Co%20%22) How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? **Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political.**

Solvency

The Affirmative solves the us/them binary by removing the exclusionary principles used to determine who can/can’t have the nuclear weapons.

Gusterson, 99 (Hugh, Associate Professor of Anthropology and Science and Technology Studies at MIT,  “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination,” JSTOR) PR

The strategy of exclusion is based pragmatically in the conventions of real politik. It involves the candid declaration that, while nuclear weapons may be no more dangerous in the hands of Muslims or Hindus than in those of Christians, they are a prerogative of power, and the powerful have no intention of allowing the powerless to acquire them. This is a position that, in its rejection of easy racism and phony moralism, is at least honorable in its frankness. It is the position of New York Times columnist Flora Lewis in her remark that "the 'rights' of nations are limited, and the limits must be imposed by those who can. They may not be more virtuous, but they must strive for it. That is the reason to keep insisting on nonproliferation" (1990:23). The second position, participation, is based on Kenneth Waltz's argument that all countries benefit from acquiring nuclear weapons. This position may have more appeal in certain parts of the Third World than in the West. It is the position of India, Israel, and Pakistan, for example, who have, like the older nuclear nations, sought to maximize their power and freedom by acquiring a nuclear capability. These countries pursued nuclear weapons in search of greater security vis-a-vis regional rivals and out of a desire to shift the balance of power in their client relationships with the superpowers. 134 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY The third strategy would be renunciation. This strategy breaks down the distinctions we have constructed between "us" and "them" and asks whether nuclear weapons are safe in anyone's hands. "What-must-on-no-account-beknown," says Salman Rushdie, is the "impossible verity that savagery concealed beneath decency's well-pressed shirt" (1984:219).

Solvency

Discussion about tactical nuclear weapons is key to break the nuclear silence

Chossudovsky 06 (Michel, Professor of Economics at the University of Ottawa and Director of the Center for Research on Globalization, Is the Bush Administration Planning a Nuclear Holocaust?, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=2032)

The antiwar movement is in many regards divided and misinformed on the nature of the US military agenda. Several non-governmental organizations have placed the blame on Iran, for not complying with the "reasonable demands" of the "international community". These same organizations, which are committed to World Peace tend to downplay the implications of the proposed US bombing of Iran. To reverse the tide requires a massive campaign of networking and outreach to inform people across the land, nationally and internationally, in neighborhoods, workplaces, parishes, schools, universities, municipalities, on the dangers of a US sponsored war, which contemplates the use of nuclear weapons. The message should be loud and clear: Iran is not the threat. Even without the use of nukes, the proposed aerial bombardments could result in escalation, ultimately leading us into a broader war in the Middle East.  Debate and discussion must also take place within the Military and Intelligence community, particularly with regard to the use of tactical nuclear weapons, within the corridors of the US Congress, in municipalities and at all levels of government. Ultimately, the legitimacy of the political and military actors in high office must be challenged. The corporate media also bears a heavy responsibility for the cover-up of US sponsored war crimes. It must also be forcefully challenged for its biased coverage of the Middle East war.  For the past year, Washington has been waging a "diplomatic arm twisting" exercise with a view to enlisting countries into supporting of its military agenda. It is essential that at the diplomatic level, countries in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Latin America take a firm stance against the US military agenda. Condoleezza Rice has trekked across the Middle East, "expressing concern over Iran's nuclear program", seeking the unequivocal endorsement of  the governments of the region against Tehran. Meanwhile the Bush administration has allocated funds in support of Iranian dissident groups within Iran. What is needed is to break the conspiracy of silence, expose the media lies and distortions, confront the criminal nature of the US Administration and of those governments which support it, its war agenda as well as its so-called "Homeland Security agenda" which has already defined the contours of a police State. The World is at the crossroads of the most serious crisis in modern history. The US  has embarked on a military adventure, "a long war", which threatens the future of humanity.  It is essential to bring the US war project to the forefront of political debate, particularly in North America and Western Europe. Political and military leaders who are opposed to the war must take a firm stance, from within their respective institutions. Citizens must take a stance individually and collectively against war.

Solvency

Desecuritization is the only way of achieving true security – conventional attempts at securitization only exacerbate the problem

Jæger 2k(Øyvind, PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, 7-2) MAH

Moreover, viewing security as a speech act not only makes it possible to include different sectors in a study of security, and thus open up the concept. It also clears the way for resolving security concerns by desecuritising issues which through securitisation have raised the concern in the first place. Knowing the logic of securitisation and pinning it down when it is at work carries the possibility of reversing the process by advocating other modalities for dealing with a given issue unluckily cast as a matter of security. What is perceived as a threat and therefore invoking defence, triggering the spiral, might be perceived of otherwise, namely as a matter of political discord to be resolved by means of ordinary political conduct, (i.e. not by rallying in defence of sovereignty). A call for more security will not eliminate threats and dangers. It is a call for more insecurity as it will reproduce threats and perpetuate a security problem. As Wæver (1994: 8)[[6]](http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/pcs/Jaeger72PCS.htm%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn6%22%20%5Co%20%22) puts it: "Transcending a security problem, politicizing a problem can therefore not happen through thematization in terms of security, only away from it." That is what de-securitisation is about.

Solvency

Interupting security discourse is the only way to achieve true security

Jæger 2k(Øyvind, PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, 7-2) MAH

However, this article maintains that the Westward thrust of the Baltic states to date has been part and parcel of a Baltic discourse of danger delineating Russia as Other and Europe as Self. With few exceptions the discourse on Baltic security identifies an array of dangers emanating from Russia and threatening the entire gamut of Baltic security from sovereignty to ethnicity. The conflation of state and nation and the invoking of historical memory as legitimisation of state-building enterprises reproduces the perception of threat and perpetuates the discourse of danger. A rationale for widespread securitisation is provided, and a precarious Baltic state identity is (re)produced. Precisely because identity is precarious and elusive and because state institutions are weak, faltering or lacking, the entire state project is perceived as vulnerable. The discourse of danger is instrumental in propping up state institutions, borders and identity to mitigate the sense of vulnerability. Only firmly anchored to "the West" can the Baltic countries ascertain their state identity, it is held. This, however, implies that the division line between East and West must be reinscribed between Russia and the Baltic states, which in turn perpetuates insecurity, permits securitisation, and bolsters identity by "othering" difference. In short, Russia is the Baltic states’ constituting Other (cf. Neumann 1993; 1996b; Knutsen and Neumann 1995: 31). Rather, the discourse of danger should be substituted with one of difference; the mode of discourse should shift from one of threat-defence sequences to one of discord-mediation sequences, allowing difference to meet and discord to be resolved without the conjuring up of existential threats, danger and in-security. Otherness need not be invoked to ascertain and (re)produce identity – difference will suffice. A struggle of speak is now waged against the continuos re-inscription of the division line between East and West in Europe. This is performed not only by the Balts but also by those elements in the West subscribing to classical, hard-ware, enemy-producing security, as well as in the entire belt of states currently separating NATO and Russia. This is the struggle between the modernist and the post-modernist security agenda – in a sense also a struggle between East and West. The question is not which will prevail – but how to get together.

Solvency (IR theory)

**Critical approaches to IR theory is key to create broader implications. The current realist approach that claims to interpret other nations without communicating justifies violence and coercion**

**Richmond 7** (Oliver, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, , Alternatives 32.2, OneFile, pg 447) MJ

It has long been widely argued by many IR theorists that one of the key challenges facing the analysis of international relations today is to open itself up to interdisciplinarity and its ensuing implications. This would, it is suggested, qualitatively improve the nature of peace that IR theory implicitly promotes.50 Orthodox theory assumes that it presents the international, whereas more critical approaches indicate that presentation is merely representation and seek to open up the broader implications of this for both the way orthodox international relations theorizes the international and how it might be possible to move beyond the weaknesses that this uncovers.51 Underlying Dadaism was this very argument: that claims of presentation were dangerous and allowed lazy and self-defeating assumptions of eternal truth to afflict both knowledge and the future and, more importantly, the everyday lives of individuals. From an elite and official perspective, this allowed for dispassionate decisions for the greatest good, although what Dadaists saw instead was domination and stagnation leading to the greatest loss for ordinary people. Such ontologies created epistemes and methods for the analysis of international relations that rested upon the historically and strategically conditioned, rational, and positivist assumptions that peace was limited, that coercion and even violence might be justified, and that nonintervention even in cases of serious need could be tolerated. In this context, liberal, democratic, and neoliberal forms of governance and their representation crucial for peace was seen to be an important advance. Yet, even this advance underlines how orthodox IR theory is subject to a differend in regard to peace. This is derived from the claim to be able to legitimately interpret the other with little input from that other. The problems this causes have often been responded to in the context of critical discussions of emancipation, often associated with peace.52 Yet even the debates on emancipation cover a familiar terrain and often require an external progenitor, definer, and defender. What emancipation actually means is strongly contested, particularly in the context of self-emancipation.

Secrecy now

Nuclear secrecy is changing but the tides could be forced to change SARIIBRAHIMOĞLU 9 (LALE, London School of Economics and Political Science 's International Relations Department, Today’s Zaman, Turkey to face pressure over US nukes on its soil, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=174286&bolum=100)BAF

Neither NATO nor the US will publicly admit to the existence of nuclear weapons deployed during the Cold War years in five NATO countries, including Turkey. NATO and the US Department of Defense do not publicly release information on the deployment of those weapons, either. Belgium and Germany, which also hosts US nuclear weapons on its soil, debated in their parliaments almost two weeks ago the withdrawal of those weapons from their territory. Those debates have now raised questions over what Turkey's policy will be on the fate of those weapons believed to be deployed at the İncirlik base in southern Turkey. According to the US-based Arms Control Association, under NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements, an estimated 480 tactical nuclear weapons remain deployed in five NATO non-nuclear-weapon states (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey) and in the United Kingdom, which also possesses an independent nuclear arsenal. Canada and Greece ended their participation in nuclear sharing. At this stage Turkish diplomatic sources decline to comment on what Ankara's policy will be if NATO presses and finally agrees on a unanimous decision to withdraw the weapons from Turkish soil, too.

Secrecy now

The U.S. has claimed to support nuclear transparency but nothing binds TNWs

Miller and Alexander 01 (Alistair, Pres Fourth Freedom Forum Dir. Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation and Brian Dir Cuba Policy Foundation, Fourth Freedom Forum, Uncovered Nukes: Arms Control and the Challenge of Tactical Nuclear Weapons <http://www.fourthfreedom.org/Applications/cms.php?page_id=27#bio20>) BAF

The problems mentioned above with tactical arsenals, and the continued reliance on these weapons by the U.S. and Russia, are indications that that the 91/92 PNIs, as with unilateral initiatives toward arms control in general, have serious shortcomings. Although they do circumvent the lengthy and complicated process of treaty negotiations (and expediency was one of the goals of the 91/92 initiatives) unilateral initiatives:

• are not legally binding, allowing either side to modify or withdraw from the arrangement;

• do not provide consistent means for data sharing and verification;

• this lack of transparency increases uncertainty regarding stockpile levels, implementation of the agreement, and the manner and timing as to when information is shared;

• do not limit research and development into other similar, newer, or related weapons systems;

• provide no way of assuring the Russian or American public that any reduction is taking place;

• are vulnerable to changes in other international agreements; and

• are vulnerable to shifts in international affairs or attitudes, undercutting long-term commitment to the terms of the agreement.28

The need for greater U.S.-Russian initiatives to address the safeguarding of TNW arsenals goes well beyond the U.S.-Russian context, and could possibly serve as a productive starting point for addressing the multilateral nature of the problem. The security architecture of Europe in the twenty-first century will have to address the Russian military balance, including the Russian tactical nuclear arsenal, and the role of the nearly 150 to 200 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons currently based across eight European countries. The degree of U.S.-Russian cooperation on arms control issues will deeply affect the global strategic outlook in the post–cold war security environment by influencing the weapons policies of other nuclear states. To reduce risks within these states, and to prevent other nations (and nonstate actors) from attaining these weapons, the U.S. and Russia must actively address the need to reduce the political status they attach to their nuclear weaponry.

At the March 1997 Helsinki Summit, the possibility was raised of addressing TNWs in the context of START III negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons.29 In recent communiqués following NATO ministerial meetings, placing TNWs on the agenda of future arms control discussions has been repeatedly suggested.30 Thus far, however, nothing substantive has come from these suggestions. One notable development in the international arena is the Cooperative Threat Reduction Initiative of U.S. senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Richard Lugar (R-IN), an effort to address the problems posed by Russia’s decaying nuclear system and other lingering dangers of the Soviet Union.

Secrecy now

US TNW policy is draped in nuclear secrecy

Pollack 10 (Joshua, analyst w/ Dr. Jeffery Lewis, Arms Control, NATO's Nuclear Opacity, <http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2662/natos-nuclear-opacity>) BAF

Make that 20 years. For about a generation’s time now, the North Atlantic alliance has been drifting, in Larsen’s words, “toward the withering away of its nuclear capabilities.” Nuclear debates have been deferred indefinitely, leading to the present situation, wherein acquisition decisions (or non-decisions) have long substituted for fundamental policy choices. But now we’re having the discussion, which at times has manifested as a semi-public debate between the German Foreign Ministry and the German Defense Ministry. Behold the nuclear side of what SecDef Gates recently dubbed “the demilitarization of Europe – where large swaths of the general public and political class are averse to military force and the risks that go with it.” Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Now that the argument has finally commenced, the official silence and habitual secrecy surrounding the exact numbers and whereabouts of NATO’s bombs must rank among the quirkier legacies of the Big Shhh that descended years ago over U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. Consider this passage from the above-cited study by Larsen, which was sponsored by NATO: Most estimates claim that there remain several hundred U.S. tactical nuclear warheads in Europe, at some eight bases in six European nations that could be delivered by a fleet of dual-capable aircraft (fighter-bombers) manned by up to eight allied nations. [5] [5] See, for example, Hans Kristensen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning (Washington: Natural Resources Defense Council, February 2005); Kristensen and Stan Norris, “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2006,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2006, pp. 68-71; and Brian Alexander and Alistair Millar, eds., Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Emergent Threats in an Evolving Security Environment (Washington: Brassey’s, 2003). Or this passage from an instant classic of Shhh, a February 2010 paper by Franklin Miller, George Robertson, and Kori Schake: According to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), the US possesses about 1,200 tactical nuclear weapons, of which 500 are operational warheads (the rest are in storage or in the process of being dismantled). The FAS indicates that 200 of the operational weapons are deployed in Europe, stationed with US and allied air crews in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Turkey. [2] [2] Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/03/russia-2.php. Now, George Robertson used to be NATO’s Secretary-General. Who supposes that he needs Hans Kristensen & Co. to tell him where the bombs are? This sudden deference to NRDC or FAS is the NATO equivalent of a phrase that appears, in some version, in every Israeli news report or commentary about Israel’s “nuclear option”: According to foreign media… That fig leaf is enough to keep the military censor out of the hair of reporters and editors.

Secrecy Now

Nuclear secrecy is spreading like wildfire

Masco 07 (Joseph, Univ of Chicago dept of anthropology prof., *Ethnografeast III: Ethnography and the Public Sphere,* The Nuclear Public Sphere, <http://ceas.iscte.pt/ethnografeast/papers/joseph_masco.pdf>) BAF

With the 1946 Atomic Energy Act and the 1947 National Security Act, the United States effectively removed huge areas of governmental affairs from citizens’ purview. These acts formally installed a new security state within the United States, constituting a rather fundamental change in the nature of American democracy. The Atomic Energy Act created the first kind of information – nuclear weapons data -- that did not need to be formally classified: it was “sborn” that way, while the National Security Act created whole new governmental institutions (the Central Intelligence Agency as well as the National Security Agency – the first of what would become 16 intelligence agencies in the U.S.) which by charter would not be publicly accountable to citizens. Created in peacetime, the new agencies and logics marked the establishment of a permanent war economy as well as a fundamental commitment to state secrecy in the United States. Rationalized as an effort to protect military secrets about the atomic bomb in an uncertain world, these acts inaugurated a split between national security and state security in the U.S., with citizens implicitly recognized as a potential barrier to state security policies. The evolving U.S. security state increasingly used nuclear fear after 1945 as a means of reconstituting the line between domestic and international politics to mobilize citizens as Cold Warriors. While the concept of a “state secret” was not invented during the Manhattan Project, the state structures that were established to build the bomb have subsequently evolved into a unprecedentedly massive infrastructure in the U.S. – so massive in fact, that its sheer scale is difficult to access. Today there is certainly more knowledge that is classified than is not, more knowledge that is produced and locked up in the military industrial state than is offered by all nonmilitary academic literatures. Peter Galison has recently tried to calculate the scale of secret versus public knowledge in the United States, using the Library of Congress as a metric. He offers this perspective (2004:231): 11 There are 500,000 college professors in the United States – including both two- and fouryear institutions. Of course there are others – inventors, industrial scientists, computer programmers – responsible for generating and conveying knowledge, especially technical knowledge. But to fix ideas, four million people hold [security] clearances in the United States, plus some vast reservoir who did in the past but no longer do. Bottom line? Whether one figures by acquisition rate, by holding size, or by contributors, the classified universes is, as best I can estimate, on the order of five to ten times larger than the open literature that finds its way in our libraries. The classified universe is five to ten times larger than the open literature. Produced in the name of citizens who have no access to this knowledge except as employees of the security state, the classified universe is not simply a means of protecting the nation-state from the spread of dangerous military information; official secrecy is a social technology, a means of internally regulating American society. The organizing principle for this system of secrecy is the atomic bomb, which is positioned within the universe of classification as the ideal type of state secret. Indeed, the system of secrecy that developed after World War II was premised on the idea that every thing marked as “classified” had the potential to produce catastrophic results if made public. An important part of the cultural work accomplished by the state’s recitation of nuclear threat in the first decades of the Cold War was to establish this linkage between the “classified” and the “apocalyptic” – merging a bureaucratic system for managing the military industrial economy with images of imminent destruction for the slightest slippage or revelation. By discursively positioning every classified file as potentially an “atomic secret” the state transformed a vast system of secrecy into a fully nationalized system of perception management in the form of the secrecy/threat matrix. Since 2001, secrecy has been a core tool in transforming the U.S. from a countercommunist to a counter-terrorist state, and is an ever-expanding practice.

Secrecy Bad

Current nuclear policy is the result of Cold War mentality distorting the public sphere

Masco 07 (Joseph, Univ of Chicago dept of anthropology prof., *Ethnografeast III: Ethnography and the Public Sphere,* The Nuclear Public Sphere, http://ceas.iscte.pt/ethnografeast/papers/joseph\_masco.pdf) BAF

Currently, the logics and policy goals of the national security state – including the evidence for war, the terms of extraordinary rendition and the “detainee,” as well as the surveillance of U.S. citizens -- have all been formally designated as “secrets” under a discourse of imminent threat. The “newness” of the “war on terror,” however, masks the deep structure of this logic and the profound mutation in the nature of the state produced by the advent of the atomic bomb and the accompanying expansion of state secrecy devoted to protecting it. Indeed, the invention of the national security state after World War II transformed America into a new kind of secret society, one in which state power rests to an unprecedented degree precisely on the ability of officials to manage the public/secret divide through the mobilization of threat. This “secrecy/threat matrix” marks all state secrets as the equivalent of the atomic secret, making revelation not just a matter of politics but of the life or death of the nation-state. The Cold War arms race – founded on the minute-to-minute possibility for nuclear war – installed the secrecy/threat matrix as the grounds for a new species of politics in the United States. I argue that the transformation of the United States from a counter-communist to a counter-terrorist state formation has reconstituted and amplified this secrecy/threat matrix, revealing aspects of its essential form in a highly distorted public sphere.

Secrecy Bad

A professional vocabulary that separates people from nuclear professionals creates an Orwellian-like dystopia in which the common person is subjugated to the powers of the ruling class of technocratic, professional elites

Allan 88 (Stuart, Department of Sociology, Carleton University Carleton University, Talking our Extinction to Death: Nuclear Discourse and the News Media, CANADIAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION, VOL. 14, NO. 1)OLW

Much has been written about Orwell's sagacity as his portrayal of 1984 society has proven to be increasingly evocative in the decades following the novel's publication; even today the work is considered to be a remarkably catalytic one. While many of the themes of which Orwell wrote so eloquently have provided a helpful framework to the study of linguistic control of nuclear ideology, it is his startling portrait of the means by which a fictitious state is able to maintain and reproduce its hegemony through the reification of preferred discursive practices that deserves particular attention here. Described in considerable detail are the strategies and techniques exploited by Oceania's ruling class to delimit the bounds of possible thought of its citizenry, achieved primarily through the inflection of state discourses on public knowledge. With this novel, Orwell effectively illustrates a linkage between language and the larger patterns of the distribution of power within a class society: a precept absent from much of the non-Marxist linguistic analysis of the period. Of prime importance for those engaged in research on the power/language paradigm, however, is Orwell's notion of 'Newspeak' and the static, closed semantic system it embodies, for he argues that it is the underpinning element upon which the central asymmetry of power relations within Oceania is configurated.

As envisioned in the novel, a discursive practice sanctioned by the sate is an ex­plicit form of domination, hence the formulation of Newspeak as a mechanism of con­trol serving to define an 'official' realitywhere War is Peace', 'Freedom is Slavery', and 'Ignorance is Strength'. It is the Oceanic state's insidious plan to narrow the range of possible thought (on the part of its population) through the imposition of the Newspeak program, the consequences of which are carefully interwoven throughout the text. As the 'ultimate political language', Newspeak functions as a restricted code designed to reinforce and legitimize Oceania's power structure. Practitioners of Newspeak accomplish this work in a number of ways, such as through the falsifica­tion of those records on which world history is based (so that they correspond to the Party's current views). As a popular Oceanic slogan dictates: 'Who controls the present controls the past', thus the continuous manipulation of 'factual data' produces the effect of 'stopping' history. To the extent that the 'popular memory' relies on such documentation, the notion of a common past or heritage ceases to exist. In its place is a kind of continuous present in which the Party always acts correctly: "Day by day and almost minute by minute, the past was brought up to date... All history was a palimpsest, scraped clean and re-inscribed exactly as often as was necessary" (Orwell, 1954: 39).

The replacement of 'Oldspeak' (terms or expressions considered undesirable be­cause they possess orthodox or secondary connotations) with Newspeak is also criti­cal, as to the extent that oppositional views are dependent on terms such as these ones, thinking is made safe for Oceania's ruling class. Furthermore, this literal destruction of a counter-vocabulary is complemented by the extensive use of euphemisms in 'official' discourse. Overt examples include the names given to various state ap­paratuses: the 'Ministry of Truth' is responsible for falsehoods, the 'Ministry of Plenty' for managing scarcity, the 'Ministry of Peace' for conducting war, the 'Minis­try of Love' for torture and terror, and the 'Ministry of Minitrue' for propaganda. In establishing Newspeak as the sole medium of expression for the world view and 'men­tal habits' proper to the citizenry, the state succeeds in exercising a form of thought control which makes speech as nearly as possible independent of consciousness. Fu­ture citizens, fully conversant in Newspeak, will be virtually incapable of committing most 'crimes' due to an inability to imagine them in the first place. While the importance of Orwell's notion of Newspeak for the purposes of this paper is evident, it should be acknowledged that serious reservations have been ex­pressed regarding the deterministic nature of his views on language (see Chilton, 1984; Hodge and Fowler, 1979; and Slater, 1975). Given limitations of space here, perhaps one of the more pronounced examples may suffice: namely Orwell's implied thesis that language largely determines thought. As he writes, "a Party member called upon to make a political or ethical judgement should be able to spray forth the correct opinions as automatically as a machine gun spraying forth bullets ... the language gave him [sic] an almost foolproof instrument..." (Orwell, 1954: 265). He repeatedly points out that it is due to the state's capacity to control a subject's mind through the struc­ture of language that it is subsequently able to control the behavior of its citizenry. Surely, however, the imposition of certain linguistic devices, in and by itself, would prove inadequate as the sole means of reinforcing state hegemony. After all, coercive state apparatuses are clearly required to enforce Oceania's reified conceptions of reality, thus state practices of censorship, 'disinformation', and 'language reform' are made as chillingly effective as they are only through the implicit threat of further coer­cive measures by the 'Ministry of Love' and the 'Thought Police'. This latter point, if not acknowledged explicitly by Orwell, does allow him to escape the charge of propagating an extreme view of Whorfian linguistics.

Secrecy Bad

Nukespeak is employed by the state as a conscious attempt to deceive the public and coerce them into believing that the state’s nuclear policy is rational and correct

Allan 88 (Stuart, Department of Sociology, Carleton University Carleton University, Talking our Extinction to Death: Nuclear Discourse and the News Media, CANADIAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION, VOL. 14, NO. 1)OLW

For Chilton, who has been recognized as the originator of the term itself (see Beed­ham, 1983; Fawcett, 1985), to employ the notion of nukespeak is essentially to make three claims. First, that there is currently in use a specialized vocabulary for speak­ing about nuclear issues which relies on habitual metaphors and preferred grammati­cal construction; second, that this variety of English is `ideologically loaded' to the extent that it works to justify `nuclear culture'; lastly, that this is of importance to the extent that language affects how people think and therefore act on related issues (Chil­ton, 1982: 95). Hook makes an important addition in terms of the notion of perspec­tive. He suggests that the term nukespeak implies a fundamental choice between a view of nuclear 'reality' from the top down'; that is, from the 'official' definition, or `bottom up', which signifies the 'victims' position (Hook, 1985: 67). Further, Hook contends that "the perspective of the victims has been consistently excluded from the hegemonic nuclear discourse... [as they] ...are most commonly viewed from the perspective of the executioners" (1985: 67). Such a configuration allows for the con­sideration of the choice itself, precisely as it is reproduced through the social framing of the predominant ways of speaking nuclear issues, as an explicit manifestation of particular relations of domination and resistance. Characteristic of much of the work completed on this problem to date is the view of nukespeak function[s]ing as a conscious attempt on the part of the nation-state to facilitate the continued production and deployment of nuclear weapons. Often the primary focal point for this type of analysis is that nukespeak is designed to ensure that the nation-state's policy on defence and security issues is perceived by the public as constituting the only sensible, rational and correct approach. The terminology and grammatical constructions attributed to those individuals and institutions positioned within the dominant nuclear discourse are therefore defined as controlled responses directed at potential threats to the nation-state's legitimacy (for a general discussion of the 'maleness' of related scientific discourses, see Easlea, 1983).

Secrecy Bad

Nuclear secrecy rhetoric is a tactic employed by nuclear officials in order to cast themselves in the light of the knowledgeable and powerful to deflect challenges to their authority

Taylor and Hendry 8 (Bryan, Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Colorado-Boulder and Judith, Lecturer in the Department of Communication and Journalism at the University of New Mexico, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 11(2), Insisting on Persisting: The Nuclear Rhetoric of "Stockpile Stewardship", Muse) OLW

There is much at stake, then, in how nuclear stewardship rhetoric is produced, circulated, and taken up by citizens as "equipment for living" in post–Cold War culture. In this essay, we argue that nuclear officials have employed stewardship rhetoric to cast themselves as exclusive guardians of nuclear resources for the benefit of current and future generations, and to deflect undesirable challenges posed to their continued legitimacy and authority by public reconsideration of nuclear deterrence. Nuclear stewardship discourse, however, is polysemic, unstable, and contested. As a result, its associated rhetoric forms a symbolic site of struggle through which the possibilities of nuclear democracy are alternately opened and foreclosed.

We argue that the official rhetoric of stockpile stewardship has succeeded—at least temporarily—in sustaining nuclear weapons institutions through the [End Page 304] legitimation crisis posed by the end of the Cold War. While ostensibly promoting the values of stewardship, that rhetoric tilts strongly toward nuclear "guardianship."[7](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v011/11.2.taylor.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f7) It continues to employ[s] misleading euphemisms and dauntingly arcane professional codes that insulate nuclear weapons development from adequate oversight and opportunity for dissent. It naturalizes nuclear weapons as a noncontingent artifact of U.S. national security, and minimizes the risks posed by historical and continued nuclear weapons development (for example, in catalyzing international nuclear proliferation). We develop these claims through a critique of three themes in SSP rhetoric.[8](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v011/11.2.taylor.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f8) First, however, we provide a brief overview of the SSP and its rhetorical situation.

Secrecy Bad

Nuclear maintainers employ professional rhetoric that creates the appearance of secure nuclear arsenals to the public in order to maintain a secretive professionalism that appeals to public audiences

Taylor and Hendry 8 (Bryan, Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Colorado-Boulder and Judith, Lecturer in the Department of Communication and Journalism at the University of New Mexico, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 11(2), Insisting on Persisting: The Nuclear Rhetoric of "Stockpile Stewardship", Muse) OLW

In responding to this exigency, Maintainers engage not only in the technical work of science and engineering, but also in the rhetorical work of managing evolving nuclear meanings. Both forms of this work are guided by preferred visions of the integrity of nuclear artifacts, defined as their coherence, durability, and ability to successfully influence audiences. This construct of integrity supports Maintainer rhetoric seeking to secure the ongoing viability and legitimacy of nuclear weapons for post–Cold War military strategy and foreign policy. Stockpile stewardship is thus rhetorical work when its speakers develop and employ classification systems that symbolically (and temporarily) resolve the ambiguous status of nuclear weapons. These classification systems are organized by the boundaries between negative values of uncertainty, nonconformity, and ineffectiveness, and their more positive opposites. In this process, Maintainers employ rhetoric to ensure that nuclear artifacts appear to audiences as temporally well managed. This rhetoric establishes that nuclear weapons are not prematurely wasted—that they will be sustained to meet the needs of national security—and also that they are not overly preserved—that "spoiled" weapons will not be mistaken for their safe and reliable opposites. In this process, Maintainers sustain a historical, nuclear-professional expertise in vigilantly monitoring, and strategically punctuating, the boundaries between ontologically oscillating nuclear phenomena.[23](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v011/11.2.taylor.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f23) As a result, "what once . . . [might] only be regarded as waste [or anachronism], and treated accordingly, can henceforth be reintegrated in the system, recycled in a secondary process of production. Impurity thus suddenly finds itself newly valued."[24](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v011/11.2.taylor.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f24)

Secrecy Bad

Through secrecy rhetoric Maintainers subjugate the global welfare to national security’s interests

Taylor and Hendry 8 (Bryan, Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Colorado-Boulder and Judith, Lecturer in the Department of Communication and Journalism at the University of New Mexico, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 11(2), Insisting on Persisting: The Nuclear Rhetoric of "Stockpile Stewardship", Muse) OLW

The first strategy involves deferring and rationalizing this threat through recourse to the "central axiom" of deterrence logic: that maintaining nuclear weapons will ensure they are never "used."[27](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v011/11.2.taylor.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f27) In this reasoning, Maintainers perpetuate five familiar premises of Cold War military strategy and technological forecasting: (1) The future is uncertain; (2) Lack of certain knowledge about the future, including the potential development of weapons of mass destruction by "rogue" nations, poses unacceptable risk to preferred interests; (3) Protecting those interests requires urgent action in the present by maintaining nuclear arsenals; (4) Such action must inevitably be based on imperfect extrapolation from ambiguous signs, including intelligence depicting other nations' construction and use of weapons production facilities; and finally (5) In making these decisions, associated ambiguity should be resolved in favor of minimizing risk to preferred interests. The historical vulnerability of this process to rhetorical distortion and fraud is well documented, and has produced exclusive privileging of national security over global welfare as the preferred interest, the promotion of an arms race over disarmament as the preferred means, and inflated assertions of military force "gaps" and associated threats.[28](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v011/11.2.taylor.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f28)

Secrecy Bad

Professional nuclear rhetoric forces nuclear weapons to take residence in the American home, causing Americans to associate deterrence with personal freedom

Taylor and Hendry 8 (Bryan, Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Colorado-Boulder and Judith, Lecturer in the Department of Communication and Journalism at the University of New Mexico, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 11(2), Insisting on Persisting: The Nuclear Rhetoric of "Stockpile Stewardship", Muse) OLW

Here, we see an example of the "domestication" dialect of "nukespeak" rhetoric described by critic Edward Schiappa.[35](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v011/11.2.taylor.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f35) Schiappa argues that, as practiced by nuclear officials, this dialect utilizes metaphor and analogy to minimize public perception of nuclear threat, articulating nuclear phenomena with other, more familiar and innocuous images. In this process, the dreadful aura of extraordinary and risky technology is sanitized and neutralized. The following inventory of Maintainer analogies compiled in 2002 by *Wired Magazine* journalist Evan Ratliff confirms—with one exception—the influence of this dialect in Maintainer rhetoric: "An aging nuke, it turns out, is somewhat like a tape recorder, a space shuttle, a desk chair, a baby, a car parked in the sun, a car parked in a driveway, a car parked in a garage, and a car parked in front of a dam."[36](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v011/11.2.taylor.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f36) Here, in Dekin's analogy, nuclear weapons take up symbolic residence in the American home, assuming the form of a quintessential consumer technology that, in the symbolic register of transportation, conveniently associates personal mobility with the "freedom" repeatedly cited as the core cultural value guaranteed by nuclear deterrence. In this analogy, the nuclear-symbolic realms of mundane "home" and professional "field" are rhetorically collapsed.[37](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v011/11.2.taylor.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f37) The accessibility of this vernacular rhetoric, not surprisingly, has led to the use of counter-analogies by Denuclearizers. In a published 1995 debate with cultural anthropologist Hugh Gusterson, for example, antinuclear activists Jacqueline Cabasso and John Burroughs rejected his characterization of the SSP's ambiguously multifunctional National Ignition Facility as a "giant exercise machine for tennis players," arguing instead that it is "more like a snort of cocaine to an addict."[38](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v011/11.2.taylor.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f38)

Secrecy Bad

Nuclear secrecy preserves the culture of nuclear weaponeers at society’s cost

Taylor and Hendry 8 (Bryan, Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Colorado-Boulder and Judith, Lecturer in the Department of Communication and Journalism at the University of New Mexico, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 11(2), Insisting on Persisting: The Nuclear Rhetoric of "Stockpile Stewardship", Muse) OLW

For this and other reasons, Maintainer rhetoric is viewed with suspicion by Denuclearizers, who charge that Maintainers have deliberately mystified the necessity of, the challenges facing, and the requirements for maintaining their professional expertise. This "scientific overkill," Denuclearizers claim, serves a "true" and "hidden" purpose: preserving the jobs—and thereby the culture—of nuclear weaponeers.[44](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v011/11.2.taylor.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f44) Representative David Hobson (R-OH), then chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, for example, reported with some ambivalence the findings of his tours of DOE facilities during 2003 and 2004:

Secrecy Bad

Professional nuclear rhetoric portrays the American public as informed about deterrence allowing nuclear professionals to shirk nuclear consequences

Taylor and Hendry 8 (Bryan, Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Colorado-Boulder and Judith, Lecturer in the Department of Communication and Journalism at the University of New Mexico, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 11(2), Insisting on Persisting: The Nuclear Rhetoric of "Stockpile Stewardship", Muse) OLW

Here we note an inconsistency between the conventional meaning of "stewardship" and its appropriation by SSP officials. In traditional usage, the steward defers and accounts to the absentee owner. In the case of stockpile stewardship, however, powerful institutional myths of secrecy and technological complexity have inhibited public participation in nuclear policy deliberation.[51](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v011/11.2.taylor.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f51) Limited and dubious representations of "the American people" as informed about and supportive of deterrence have, in turn, encouraged nuclear professionals to presume their legitimacy and minimize their accountability for the consequences of nuclear weapons development. In his August 2004 presentation to the National Academies symposium, for example, the director of DOE/NNSA's policy planning staff, John R. Harvey, blithely asserted,

Secrecy Bad

Official nuclear rhetoric allows biased professionals to cast themselves as the guardians of nuclear resources and to deflect questions of the legitimacy of their authority

Taylor and Hendry 8 (Bryan, Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Colorado-Boulder and Judith, Lecturer in the Department of Communication and Journalism at the University of New Mexico, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 11(2), Insisting on Persisting: The Nuclear Rhetoric of "Stockpile Stewardship", Muse) OLW

In summary, these three critical themes establish that—despite its pretense to rational documentation of objective conditions—official SSP rhetoric is not a neutral vehicle for transmitting pre-formed thought. By appropriating the discourse of "stewardship," Maintainers have simultaneously cast themselves as guardians of nuclear resources for the benefit of current and future generations, and have deflected implications of this persona that undermine their perceived legitimacy and authority. In a calculated and ultimately unsustainable incongruity, they have maintained the appearance of selfless duty and restraint while pursuing their preferred interests of survival and gratification.

Secrecy Bad

Nuclear secrecy creates oppressive conditions that alienate the nuclear public and place them in a passive spectator position

Taylor and Hendry 8 (Bryan, Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Colorado-Boulder and Judith, Lecturer in the Department of Communication and Journalism at the University of New Mexico, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 11(2), Insisting on Persisting: The Nuclear Rhetoric of "Stockpile Stewardship", Muse) OLW

What then, we may ask, does this debate portend for the future of nuclear weapons, rhetoric, and democracy? Traditionally, the relationship between these phenomena has been, if not antithetical, then deeply conflicted. Oppressive conditions of secrecy, security, centralization, and containment surrounding the institutionalization of nuclear weapons have undermined the willingness and ability of citizens to acquire, deliberate, and act on nuclear information. As a result of decades of conditioning by exclusionary technocratic discourse, the nuclear public has arguably become fragmented, alienated, uninformed, and unable to generate forceful and reasoned discourse. Its members have been dubiously positioned in official rhetoric as passive—and nominally consenting—spectators of a grand, expensive, and terribly dangerous nuclear drama.[80](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v011/11.2.taylor.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f80) As a result, notes political scientist James A. Stegenga, "[t]he main reason that it is difficult to determine the extent of [actual] support for or opposition to nuclear deterrence is that the democratic debate that should furnish the answer has . . . been a shriveled, truncated affair. It has been impaired by various forms of . . . deception, manipulation, intimidation, and discouragement."[81](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v011/11.2.taylor.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f81) Here we may consider psychologist Robert J. Lifton and

political scientist Richard Falk's warning that such conditions lead to the "perpetuation of dangerous self-deception and the prevention of the kind of informed exchange that might result in more constructive [nuclear] policies."[82](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v011/11.2.taylor.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f82)

Secrecy Bad

Secrecy destroys policy making

Fuchs 06 (Meredith, George Washington University prof of poli sci, Administrative Law Review 58 Admin. L. Rev. “Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy”, p133-139, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/admin58&div=10&g\_sent=1&collection=journals#139)

Unnecessary secrecy and the resulting lack of informed debate and diminished accountability can interfere with the formulation of independent, well-grounded policy positions. Luther Gulick, a high-level Roosevelt Administration official during World War II, observed that, despite the apparent efficiencies of totalitarian political organizations, democracy and expressive freedom gave the United States and its democratic allies an important competitive advantage because public debate encouraged wise policy choices. The corollary is also true. As Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan concluded, the Cold War and related arms race were greatly exacerbated by the secrecy imposed by the military establishment. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence made a similar observation in the context of its investigation of pre-war intelligence concerning weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The Committee concluded that the CIA hampered its assessment of the situation by “examining few alternatives, selective gathering of information, pressure to conform within the group or withhold criticism, and collective rationalization.” Opennes can improve bureaucratic decisionmaking by allowing criticism of poor or inadequate analysis. It can also temper extremist viewpoints by exposing them to public scrutiny.

Secrecy Bad

Secrecy is a government tool to make policy cut and dry but corrupts public understanding, killing debate and creating bad policy options

Masco 07 (Joseph, Univ of Chicago dept of anthropology prof., *Ethnografeast III: Ethnography and the Public Sphere,* The Nuclear Public Sphere, <http://ceas.iscte.pt/ethnografeast/papers/joseph_masco.pdf>) BAF

Finally, the secret society that is the state is ultimately headless, an effect of both the systematic distortion in the believability of knowledge as it moves up a compartmentalized infrastructure and the demands on individuals to protect perceptions of their position through systematic lying. But there is an even more powerful aspect of state secrecy when taken to the level of the current nuclear state: the “idea” of secret knowledge itself becomes deployable, corrupting public understandings of what is possible and what is not but also giving the executive authority the ability to seem more knowing then they actually are. In the lead up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Bush Administration systematically deployed the idea that there weapons of mass destruction as well as an imminent threat to the U.S.– to enable war. Vice President Cheney, for example, stated in a speech to the Veterans of Foreign War National Convention on August 26, 2002 that there was absolute certainty about the Iraqi threat: Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us. And there is no doubt that his aggressive regional ambitions will lead him into future confrontations with his neighbors -- confrontations that will involve both the weapons he has today, and the ones he will continue to develop with his oil wealth.8 There is no doubt. Here is the secrecy/threat matrix in action, for Cheney implies that the intelligence community has documented with perfect clarity not only the technical terms of the Iraqi biological, chemical, and nuclear programs but also the intent of the regime to use them “against our friends, against our allies and against us.” This is not a deployment of actual 18 knowledge, as the lack of any evidence of weapons in Iraqi after the invasion demonstrates, but it is a deployment of the idea of secret knowledge (knowledge that can only be revealed in its conclusions not its substance). In his presentation to the United Nations in September 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell was more exacting in his deployment of the secret/threat matrix.9 He portrayed an Iraqi biological weapons program that was so advanced it was already capable of threatening the United States. Claiming sources within the Iraqi government, he presented cartoon diagrams of mobile weapons labs (See Figure 6) and satellite imagery of WMD production facilities (See Figure 7). Powell states conclusively: We know that Iraq has at least seven of these mobile, biological agent factories. The truck-mounted ones have at least two or three trucks each. That means that the mobile production facilities are very few -- perhaps 18 trucks that we know of. There may be more. But perhaps 18 that we know of. Just imagine trying to find 18 trucks among the thousands and thousands of trucks that travel the roads of Iraq every single day.... We know. This depiction of mobile “biological agent factories” effectively transforms every truck in Iraq into a potential Weapon of Mass Destruction laboratory. Figure 6: Iraqi Mobile Labs 19 Figure 7: Iraq Weapons Sites But the nature of the threat is even more specific in Powell’s presentation: We know from Iraq's past admissions that it has successfully weaponized not only anthrax, but also other biological agents including botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin. But Iraq's research efforts did not stop there. Saddam Hussein has investigated dozens of biological agents causing diseases such as gas-gangrene, plague, typhus, tetanus, cholera, camelpox, and hemorrhagic fever. And he also has the wherewithal to develop smallpox....The Iraqi regime has also developed ways to disperse lethal biological agents widely, indiscriminately into the water supply, into the air. For example, Iraq had a program to modify aerial fuel tanks for Mirage jets. This video of an Iraqi test flight obtained by UNSCOM some years ago shows an Iraqi F-1 Mirage jet aircraft. Note the spray coming from beneath the Mirage. That is 2,000 liters of simulated anthrax that a jet is spraying. In 1995, an Iraqi military officer, Mujahid Salleh Abdul Latif told inspectors that Iraq intended the spray tanks to be mounted onto a MiG-21 that had been converted into an unmanned aerial vehicle, or UAV. UAVs outfitted with spray tanks constitute an ideal method for launching a terrorist attack using biological weapons... We know. Powell here describes the variety of “weaponized” biological agents, as well as the intense interest of the Hussein regime in finding ways to deliver them. Iraqi jets as well as unmanned aerial vehicles are presented as a means not only of threatening Middle Eastern states but also the U.S. and Britain. After this discussion of WMDs, Iraqi capabilities, and interests, Powell concludes not only that the weapons inspectors have failed but that the threat is 20 immediate: There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the capability to rapidly produce more, many more. And he has the ability to dispense these lethal poisons and diseases in ways that can cause massive death and destruction. There can be no doubt. Secretary of State Powell’s cartoons and fuzzy pictures of industrial sites appear, in retrospect, not simply as a fabrication of knowledge but rather as a tactical deployment of the idea of secret information, for his presentation was loaded with the promise that more detailed and exacting information existed, that could not be made public without putting U.S. interests at risk. Indeed, he began his presentation by stating: “I cannot tell you everything that we know, but what I can share with you, when combined with what all of us have learned over the years, is deeply troubling.” The deployment of “secret” knowledge as political propaganda relied here on the mechanisms of government that were initially established to protect information about the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The argument for an invasion of Iraq also drew on culturally established forms of nuclear fear developed in the U.S. during the Cold War. We see here one end result of this multigenerational system of secrecy: a fundamental corruption in the terms of knowledge, where the idea of knowledge replaces actual content as a means of engaging the world. The “will to believe” (in Iraqi “wmds” and links between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda) by the Bush Administration is staggering but it was only enabled as state policy by the vast deployment of secrecy to both limit debate and to discount all alternative sources of information either irrelevant or politicized. The secrecy/threat matrix has been revealed as a core tool of governmental agency in the “war on terror” but it has also been revealed to be a highly over-determined form, one that functions to fundamentally distort both expertise and knowledge. And in a security state where knowledge itself is rendered suspect, only ideology remains as the basis for action.

Nuclear secrecy leads to fragmented nuclear discourse killing any possible change

Taylor and Hendry 08 (Bryan, University of Colorado prof. and grad fellow Univ. Utah , and Judith, prof. of comm.. @ Univ. of New Mexico, Rhetoric and Public Affairs journal, Insisting on Persisting, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v011/11.2.taylor.html>) BAF

We have argued that SSP rhetoric has served as a site of struggle between nuclear officials and stakeholders in the post–Cold War era. Through their production and consumption of stewardship rhetoric, these groups have alternately sustained and challenged the viability of nuclear weapons as a technology of national security. In this process, a regnant symbol of the Cold War **[End Page 322]** continues its restless slumber (with one gleaming eye fixed open), buffeted by profound cultural ambivalence mixing pride and fear, responsibility and indifference, and repetition and remembering. In critiquing this struggle as a rhetorical phenomenon, this essay contributes to four interdisciplinary conversations focused on, respectively, nuclear weapons as the rhetoric of science and technology, the organizational and institutional dimensions of national security rhetoric, the social and political dimensions of nuclear weapons development, [78](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v011/11.2.taylor.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f78) and stewardship as a historical and cultural discourse.

What then, we may ask, does this debate portend for the future of nuclear weapons, rhetoric, and democracy? Traditionally, the relationship between these phenomena has been, if not antithetical, then deeply conflicted. Oppressive conditions of secrecy, security, centralization, and containment surrounding the institutionalization of nuclear weapons have undermined the willingness and ability of citizens to acquire, deliberate, and act on nuclear information. As a result of decades of conditioning by exclusionary technocratic discourse, the nuclear public has arguably become fragmented, alienated, uninformed, and unable to generate forceful and reasoned discourse. Its members have been dubiously positioned in official rhetoric as passive—and nominally consenting—spectators of a grand, expensive, and terribly dangerous nuclear drama. As a result, notes political scientist James A. Stegenga, "[t]he main reason that it is difficult to determine the extent of [actual] support for or opposition to nuclear deterrence is that the democratic debate that should furnish the answer has . . . been a shriveled, truncated affair. It has been impaired by various forms of . . . deception, manipulation, intimidation, and discouragement." Here we may consider psychologist Robert J. Lifton and political scientist Richard Falk's warning that such conditions lead to the "perpetuation of dangerous self-deception and the prevention of the kind of informed exchange that might result in more constructive [nuclear] policies.

Secrecy Bad

Nuclear secrecy kills the ability to make moral judgment over nuclear policy

Taylor 07 (Bryan, University of Colorado prof. and grad fellow Univ. Utah, Presidential Studies Quarterly, The Means to Match Their Hatred, <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6387/is_200712/ai_n32246236/pg_5/?tag=content;col1>) BAF

First, there is general agreement that nuclear weapons constitute the extreme case of secrecy in that regime (Bok 1989; Hudson 2004; Kinsella 2005). Nuclear weapons are not only a highly cherished and protected technology but are also the impetus for policies and procedures that restrict the circulation of information necessary for adequate deliberation by the public and elected officials. Here, classification and censorship buffer nuclear elites from democratic oversight and inhibit their accountability for neglect, mistakes, fraud, and abuse. Secrecy is arguably inherent to nuclear weapons. A wartime climate of urgency led to their covert development, and thus their introduction to the American public as a fait accompli, rather than a potential innovation requiring collective authorization of its development. Bok (1989) has argued that this secrecy both isolated and empowered early nuclear elites, investing them with a grave sense of professional responsibility. This structure of feeling, however, can easily shade into presumptuous entitlement. Coercive regimes of secrecy, Bok (1989) notes, also enabled Manhattan Project workers to minimize and suppress doubts about the morality of their work and to accommodate strategic redefinition by officials of its purpose (see also Hales 1997). Secrecy can thus debilitate the reasoning and moral judgment of nuclear-political actors. Institutionalized as a postwar tradition, it has also constrained nuclear deliberation by facilitating a regime of authoritarian rule (Kinsella 2005, 61). This regime is rife with irony and paradox. It is, for example, self-perpetuating: secrecy limits public knowledge of nuclear matters, and this limitation is in turn used to justify excluding an "uninformed" public from subsequent deliberation. Additionally, "national security" is commonly invoked to discourage public debate of nuclear policy on the assumption that such debate might damage national security itself. As discussed above, however, the symptomatic concern with "revealing secrets" discloses larger official unease with democracy's potential to subvert the necessary supporting role that public discourse itself plays in the apparatus of deterrence. This condition makes nuclear officials highly anxious about the potential for oppositional discourse to create national vulnerability and to subvert their autonomy. Far from being the ground of authority, the public is rhetorically conceptualized and managed as an unpredictable threat to the stability of nuclear order (Tannenwald 1999). Further, declared nuclear secrets are often already more publicized, and the actual effects of their disclosure less significant, than officials concede. In this way, the nuclear "secret" is less an objective, preexisting referent of security discourse than a symbolic resource to be strategically invoked in institutional practices that produce desired effects (see Masco 2002; Taylor 2002). Finally, notes Howard Morland (2000,54), "One of the most pernicious effects of secrecy is to cause nuclear weapons to be overvalued. . . . The United States encourages the world to copy its free market economy and its democratic institutions, but it quakes in fear that 'rogue' nations might copy a tenth of one percent of its nuclear arsenal." I will explore below the implications of Morland's claim; its relevance here involves the role of secrecy in fueling the political fetish of weaponry.

Silencing nuclear discourse forces acquiescence to militarist elites instead of engaging in debate

Taylor 07 (Bryan, University of Colorado prof. and grad fellow Univ. Utah, Presidential Studies Quarterly, The Means to Match Their Hatred, <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6387/is_200712/ai_n32246236/pg_5/?tag=content;col1>) BAF

These critiques grow more valuable as they conceptualize the relationships between rhetoric, democracy, and nuclear weapons. One provocative claim here addresses how, under conditions of MAD, all aspects of postwar American society were enrolled in the semiotic project of signifying to the Communist enemy both capability and willingness to use nuclear weapons in the national defense. Rhetorical scholars have largely failed to appreciate how, under these conditions, the demos itself was conscripted and disciplined as an element in this apparatus: The continuous task of the president and his subordinates is to make their essentially incredible threats seem credible. So leaders have wanted to present themselves as speaking forcefully on behalf of a monolithically supportive American population. Naysayers needed to be discouraged, the democratic debate on these matters minimized, in the interest of promoting the credibility of the threats. The people are meant or supposed to avoid thinking about or speaking out on these matters. (Stegenga 1988, 89, emphasis in original; see also Bok 1989) Clarifying this condition helps us to conceptualize nuclear weapons as an ontological tangle of discursive and material phenomena. It also establishes that-far from being a mere adornment of policy language-rhetoric is an inherent, inevitable, and reflexive challenge for the nuclear nation-state. Official rhetoric, in other words, must be developed and deployed in tandem with nuclear weapons to ensure that the whispers, conversation, and shouts of the people do not subvert the principal-and, according to Jacques Derrida's (1984) famous critique, sole-function of those weapons as rhetoric.

Open discussion of nuclear rhetoric is sabotaged by the secrecy of technocratic institutions

Taylor and Hendry 8 (Bryan, Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Colorado-Boulder and Judith, Lecturer in the Department of Communication and Journalism at the University of New Mexico, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 11(2), Insisting on Persisting: The Nuclear Rhetoric of "Stockpile Stewardship", Muse) OLW

One standard for evaluating this rhetoric involves its shaping of citizens willing and able to engage in the deliberation required by a nuclear democracy. Historically, achievement of this ideal has been undermined by official rhetoric promoting secrecy, centralization, containment, and distortion in nuclear policy development.[3](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v011/11.2.taylor.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f3) This essay critiques contemporary nuclear "stewardship" rhetoric in light of this history. Such rhetoric is currently used by U.S. Department of Energy (hereafter, DOE) officials and their stakeholders to depict and interpret the DOE's "Stockpile Stewardship Program" (hereafter, SSP), a program that involves ongoing efforts by nuclear scientists and officials to certify the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal in the absence of currently banned explosive nuclear testing.

Nuclear secrecy kills the ability to make informed judgment about nuclear policy

Taylor 07 (Bryan, University of Colorado prof. and grad fellow Univ. Utah, Presidential Studies Quarterly, The Means to Match Their Hatred, <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6387/is_200712/ai_n32246236/pg_5/?tag=content;col1>) BAF

First, there is general agreement that nuclear weapons constitute the extreme case of secrecy in that regime (Bok 1989; Hudson 2004; Kinsella 2005). Nuclear weapons are not only a highly cherished and protected technology but are also the impetus for policies and procedures that restrict the circulation of information necessary for adequate deliberation by the public and elected officials. Here, classification and censorship buffer nuclear elites from democratic oversight and inhibit their accountability for neglect, mistakes, fraud, and abuse. Secrecy is arguably inherent to nuclear weapons. A wartime climate of urgency led to their covert development, and thus their introduction to the American public as a fait accompli, rather than a potential innovation requiring collective authorization of its development. Bok (1989) has argued that this secrecy both isolated and empowered early nuclear elites, investing them with a grave sense of professional responsibility. This structure of feeling, however, can easily shade into presumptuous entitlement. Coercive regimes of secrecy, Bok (1989) notes, also enabled Manhattan Project workers to minimize and suppress doubts about the morality of their work and to accommodate strategic redefinition by officials of its purpose (see also Hales 1997). Secrecy can thus debilitate the reasoning and moral judgment of nuclear-political actors. Institutionalized as a postwar tradition, it has also constrained nuclear deliberation by facilitating a regime of authoritarian rule (Kinsella 2005, 61). This regime is rife with irony and paradox. It is, for example, self-perpetuating: secrecy limits public knowledge of nuclear matters, and this limitation is in turn used to justify excluding an "uninformed" public from subsequent deliberation. Additionally, "national security" is commonly invoked to discourage public debate of nuclear policy on the assumption that such debate might damage national security itself. As discussed above, however, the symptomatic concern with "revealing secrets" discloses larger official unease with democracy's potential to subvert the necessary supporting role that public discourse itself plays in the apparatus of deterrence. This condition makes nuclear officials highly anxious about the potential for oppositional discourse to create national vulnerability and to subvert their autonomy. Far from being the ground of authority, the public is rhetorically conceptualized and managed as an unpredictable threat to the stability of nuclear order (Tannenwald 1999). Further, declared nuclear secrets are often already more publicized, and the actual effects of their disclosure less significant, than officials concede. In this way, the nuclear "secret" is less an objective, preexisting referent of security discourse than a symbolic resource to be strategically invoked in institutional practices that produce desired effects (see Masco 2002; Taylor 2002). Finally, notes Howard Morland (2000,54), "One of the most pernicious effects of secrecy is to cause nuclear weapons to be overvalued. . . . The United States encourages the world to copy its free market economy and its democratic institutions, but it quakes in fear that 'rogue' nations might copy a tenth of one percent of its nuclear arsenal." I will explore below the implications of Morland's claim; its relevance here involves the role of secrecy in fueling the political fetish of weaponry.

Nuclear secrecy leads to the destruction of all meaningful discussion

Taylor 07 (Bryan, University of Colorado prof. and grad fellow Univ. Utah, Presidential Studies Quarterly, The Means to Match Their Hatred, <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6387/is_200712/ai_n32246236/pg_5/?tag=content;col1>) BAF

In the summer of 1987, the American poet Donald Hall published a poem in the Paris Review. Entitled "Prophecy," Hall offered in this work a grimly lyrical vision of the nuclear apocalypse. Hall's poem expressed an ache that had been steadily building in the U.S. body politic as nuclear officials and protestors struggled for control over the nation's nuclear story (Mehan, Nathanson, and Skelly 1990). "Prophecy" channeled this tension through a familiar strategy of anti-nuclear aesthetics, in which the destruction of cherished, mundane scenes is prospectively mourned in order to stimulate preemptive action in the present: "Where shopping / malls spread plywood and plaster out, and roadhouses / serve steak and potatoskins beside Alaska King Crab . . . weeds and ashes will drowse in continual twilight." This elegiac inventory also depicted suffering figures: "Unlettered dwarves will burrow for warmth and / shelter / in the caves of dynamos and Plymouths, dying / of old age at seventeen. " Had the poem operated only at this level, it would still serve our purposes as an entrée to consider the relationship between nuclear weapons, rhetoric, and democracy. That is, "Prophecy" establishes how-if democracy embodies the principle that government decisions should represent the voices of those affected by them-the line of speakers auditioning for consideration in nuclear matters is long indeed. Justly composed, that list leaps scales of time and space to include groups, regions, nations, species, and generations. Here, the genres of census and testimony converge to assert the integrity of diversity as a measure of the criminality of wanton destruction. What is arguably most useful about this poem, however, is that its point of view is not the abstract third person. Instead, it is the voice of the bomb itself, speaking an uncanny mixture of vengeful condemnation, methodical attention to detail, and lonely responsibility. It is, in short, quite mad: "I reject the old house and the new car... I reject Waterford / I reject the five and dime ... I reject leaded panes ... I reject the appointment made at the tennis net or on the seventeenth green." Because the revelation of even that which is frightening may come as a relief for audiences, there is pleasure here in recognizing the chilling voice of uninhibited nuclear agency: "I will strike from the ocean with waves afire; / I will strike from the hill with rainclouds of lava; / I will strike from darkened air with melanoma in the shape of decorative hexagonals." As the poem climaxes, its narrator adopts mystical imagery: "And the full moon grow red with blood swollen inside it / and stars fall from the sky like wind-blown apples, / while Babylon's managers burn in the rage of the Lamb." Clearly, this poem invokes the ancient tradition of apocalyptic rhetoric to serve the political needs of late modernity. I suggest, however, that it also offers us unexpected insight into a different genre, one that is the focus of this essay: nuclear-presidential rhetoric. This connection may seem perverse: the elite voice of the presidency operates very far in cultural space from the realm of poetry. And for the nation's elected leader, nuclear weapons are typically a matter of grave importance and thus (one would expect) rational voice. Nonetheless, there are at least three connections to be made. First, although there is scholarly disagreement surrounding the utility of "the rhetorical presidency" as an analytic concept (Ivie 2005; Medhurst 1996), it is largely uncontested that presidents use the full power of language at their command to interpret the interests of the nation and to advocate policies that serve them. Here, politics, poetry, and rhetoric may intersect as nuclear presidents draw on formal literary devices such as metaphor and ideological narratives establishing what is true, beautiful, and good for the nation in order to justify America's historical development of nuclear weapons. Here, Hall's poem reminds us that poetic language dialogically shadows the rational deliberation of nuclear policy and potentially intervenes in its abstractions and exclusions. Second, Hall's poem depicts a postnuclear landscape that is marked by human silence. Here, it is nature that "speaks" in the nondiscursive register of relentless decay and regeneration. Only the broken husks of speakers remain to suggest that there was ever meaningful speech. By depicting its chief and universal destroyer, Hall implicitly challenged nuclear audiences to seek new ways of speaking that transcended depoliticized consumerism and self-gratification. That alternative, of course, is embodied in the ideal of a robust, deliberative democracy, facilitated by its chief executive. Finally, in explicitly rendering the expressive subject of nuclear agency, Hall invites us to turn via allegory to other, now-recognizable voices whose claim upon the control of nuclear weapons renders them politically equivalent to the poem's narrator. Political scientist Richard Falk has also made this connection (1982, 4): "Increasingly, the leadership of the main nuclear power possesses a capacity for destruction commensurate with what traditional religions attributed to the divine, a capacity to cause in the fullest sense a global or human apocalypse." In this way, "Prophecy" points us toward the voice of the nuclear presidency and invites us to assess in light of democratic ideals its integrity in facilitating vital civic deliberation.1

Secrecy cedes decisionmaking to the militarist elite

Taylor 07 (Bryan, University of Colorado prof. and grad fellow Univ. Utah, Presidential Studies Quarterly, The Means to Match Their Hatred, <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6387/is_200712/ai_n32246236/pg_5/?tag=content;col1>) BAF

Second, as this discussion of secrecy has introduced, nuclear weapons exemplify centralization as a condition which limits the range of voices in deliberation of U.S. foreign policy and military strategy. Under this condition, "democratic procedures are said to be too cumbersome for the swiftness and decisiveness required for ... [such] decisionmaking" (Hudson 2004, 299). This condition is exacerbated by secrecy in that only elites with restricted access to information are deemed responsible for nuclear decisions. It is also intensified by the tremendously high stakes created by the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the strategic imperatives of MAD. These conditions drastically shorten decision-making windows in attack situations and require careful maintenance of the balance between centralized control and the predelegation of launch authority. Indeed, the risk posed by unsecured nuclear weapons has led technology scholar Langdon Winner (1980) to argue that they inherently require rigid and hierarchical institutions of governance. These systems "must be authoritarian: there is no other way" (131). Indeed, democratic states must labor to ensure that this authoritarianism does not "spin off or spill over into the polity as a whole" (131). As a result, Winner concludes, the democratic hopes of anti-nuclear activists are "dead wrong" (135). This is a rhetorical matter in that centralization has historically been produced and maintained through a discourse of nuclear "guardianship" that shadows the more benevolent image of nuclear control as "stewardship" (Taylor and Hendry 2006; Taylor 2007). Historically, this image arises from a logical entailment constructed in nuclear discourse between the sublime "mystery" of nuclear phenomena and the quasi-theological authority of officials charged with their understanding and control (Kinsella 2005). More specifically, it has been developed in accounts of the tense relationship between civilian and military systems of control of U.S. nuclear weapons (Born 2006; Feaver 1992; Nolan 1989). Commenting on the political debate that culminated in the 1946 passage of the Atomic Energy Act, for example, Bazerman (2001, 267) notes, "At no point, interestingly, did the definition of civilian control {ever} seriously include the actual voting citizenry of the United States or other nations, nor did the issue of access to information become framed in relation to general public access." And even in the relatively open system of postwar American democracy, note Dalton et al. (1999, 12), "a corporate culture [of nuclear weapons production] was created in which a broader public accountability was systematically de-emphasized from the top down." Dahl (1985) argues that guardianship has been the de facto system of U.S. nuclear governance in the Cold War era. In this system, a minority of technocratic and military elites contrasts their expert knowledge and patriotic commitment with that of the general citizenry. Because these elites control the ideological terms on which that contrast is performed, they are able to conclude that the needs of citizens are best served by the elites' exclusive control of decisions concerning nuclear security and risk. In presuming that citizens are inherently unqualified to participate in arcane matters of nuclear governance, and in perpetuating conditions of secrecy to inhibit that participation, guardianship is both anti-democratic and autonomous. It fosters an authoritative "priesthood" culture among nuclear professionals, in which their sense of entitlement protects them from inconvenient challenges raised by popular voice. In the discourse of guardianship, formal responsibility for and custody of nuclear weapons are infused with a solemn morality (Taylor 2007, 205).

Nuclear secrecy leads to corruption and lies, degrading all knowledge

Masco 07 (Joseph, Univ of Chicago dept of anthropology prof., *Ethnografeast III: Ethnography and the Public Sphere,* The Nuclear Public Sphere, <http://ceas.iscte.pt/ethnografeast/papers/joseph_masco.pdf>) BAF

There is a remarkable moment in Daniel Ellsberg’s autobiography (2002: 237-8), in which he describes a conversation with Henry Kissinger, who was on the verge of becoming the Secretary of State in 1969. Ellsberg, the Rand analyst who will eventually leak the top secret U.S. history of the Vietnam War known as the Pentagon Papers to *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* (see Prados and Porter 2004), is trying to prepare Kissinger for the psychological effects of having access to above top-secret information. He tells Kissinger that, over the coming years, he will feel in order: exhilarated (at the access), then foolish (for what he once thought he knew), then contempt for those who do not have access, then increasing skepticism about the quality of classified information. In the end, he tells Kissinger (Ellsberg 2003: 237-8): It will become hard for you to learn from anybody who doesn’t have these clearances. Because you’ll be thinking as you listen to them “What would this man be telling me if he knew what I know? Would he be giving me the same advice, or would it totally change his predictions and recommendations?” And that mental exercise is so torturous that after a while you give it up and just stop listening. I’ve seen this with my superiors, my colleagues…and with myself…You will deal with a person who doesn’t have those clearances only from the point of view of what you want him to believe and what impression you want him to go away with, since you’ll have to lie carefully to him about what you know. In effect, you will have to manipulate him. You’ll give up trying to assess what he has to say. The danger is, you’ll become something like a moron. You’ll become incapable of learning from most people in the world, no matter how much experience they may have in their particular areas that may be much greater than yours. *You’ll become something like a moron*. Ellsberg reveals here a rarely commented on aspect of compartmentalized secrecy in the U.S.: that it relies not only on withholding information but also on lying. Individuals must lie in order to protect their own classification level in everyday interactions throughout the system, and thus, distort their social relations to protect the system of secrecy. Knowledge itself thus becomes doubly corrupted: first, because of the effect of compartmentalization on perceptions of expert knowledge as described by Ellsberg, and second, because perception control becomes as important as information management. Deception via classification becomes the internal structure of the security state, which over time works not to underscore the value of information, the assumed effect of a system of compartmentalized classification, but rather to corrode the terms of knowledge and expertise, making individual motivations also suspect.

We can never question nuclear policy until truth is obtained

Taylor 98 (Bryan C., Ph.D., University of Utah, Western Journal of Communication 63(3), Nuclear Weapons and Communication Studies: A Review Essay http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=11&sid=50263fbb-c217-4cbf-a563-1f105dc4f078%40sessionmgr13&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=eric&AN=EJ600991)

In a conference held at Cornell University in April 1984, these scholars assembled to develop a uniquely nuclear criticism, one that would "demonstrate how the forms of the current nuclear discussion are being shaped by literary or critical assumptions whose implications are often, perhaps systematically, distorted" ("Proposal," 1984, p. 2). In his keynote address, Derrida (1984) delivered a mixed prognosis for the project from the vantage of deconstruction. The good news, he offered, was that since nuclear war had not (yet) happened and yet was the hotly-contested object of simulations (such as computer war-games), its ontological status was "fabulously textual"-- and thus uniquely suited for criticism. The bad news was that--for the very same reasons-critics had no more authority to make definitive claims about the nuclear "referent" than the speakers they were critiquing. This condition meant that critics could "speak" to nuclear "power"--but not with certainty of unproblematic "Truth" (see Ruthven, 1993). Confounded at launch, nuclear criticism fractured but still ignited. As a method for confronting the limits of knowledge, deconstruction seemed uniquely suited for the imagined catastrophe of nuclear war, which threatened to destroy the very grounds of speech--self, world, and other. In turn, the high stakes of this project offered to redeem deconstruction's alleged relativism (Chaloupka, 1992). Two genres of scholarship emerged in subsequent studies of public-policy, media journalism, and popular-cultural texts. One genre was metatheoretical, and embraced Derridean textualism to critique the possibilities of valid nuclear-critical discourse. The other was more pragmatic, and analyzed texts with the goal of ethical intervention in public deliberation. Generally, scholars of both genres agreed that "nuclearism"( n1) was intertextually configured by potent cultural discourses such as militarism, nationalism, bureaucracy, and technical-rationality. This hybrid discourse, they argued, suppressed its contingencies, normalized the presence and use of nuclear weapons, deferred the accountability of nuclear professionals, and inhibited ethical reflection about the risks and consequences of nuclear war (Aubrey, 1985; Chilton, 1986; Cohn, 1987). Beyond this initial spate of activity, however, scholarly interest in nuclear criticism per se proved temporary.

Security discourse created by American political leaders portrays an “idyllic” America in contrast to “terrorist”, “rogue” states, constructing a violent other that must be controlled and eradicated

Tan 02 (See Seng, Assistant Professor at IDSS. What fear hath wrought : missile hysteria and the writing of "America"., http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP28.PDF, July 2002) OLW

 On May 1, 2001, President Bush gave a long-anticipated speech on missile defence. He began by emphasizing the "vastly different world" of today in perceived opposition to the alleged certainty of yesterday's Cold War era, describing our contemporary milieu as "still a dangerous world, a less certain, a less predictable one," and the existence and ongoing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (including biological and chemical weapons), as well as ballistic missile technology. Further, the president intimated at length: Most troubling of all, the list of these countries includes some of the world's least-responsible states. Unlike the Cold War, today's most urgent threat stems not from the thousands of ballistic missiles in the Soviet hands, but from a small number of missiles in the hands of these states, states for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life. They seek weapons of mass destruction to intimidate their neighbours, and to keep the United States and other responsible nations from helping allies and friends in strategic parts of the world.... Like Saddam Hussein, some of today's tyrants are gripped by an implacable hatred of the United States of America. They hate our friends, they hate our values, they hate democracy and freedom and individual liberty. Many care little for the lives of their own people. In such a world, Cold War deterrence is not enough.... To maintain peace, to protect our own citizens and our own allies and friends, we must seek security based on more than the grim premise that we can destroy those who seek to destroy us. This is an important opportunity for the world to re-think the unthinkable, and to find new ways to keep the peace.41 One may, of course, explain away these forebodings as either a mere rhetorical ploy or ideological device on the part of the Bush administration in order to justify the building of a missile defence system. One can point to the silences in the discourse that can be potentially self-incriminating where US international history is concerned.42 For our purposes, the differentiation in discourse of identity and difference, of Self and Other, as mentioned earlier, is no innocent exercise but, in effect, is a practice of statecraft fundamental to the constitution of the state in discourse. Differentiation occurs on multiple dimensions or (as Shapiro has put it) axes: the "security" axis, with the key element here being threats; or, the "ethical" axis, the element here being responsibility or right behaviour, and so on.43 From this standpoint we can see the effects, in discourse, of presupposition in the president's missile defence statement: the "world" in which we live is fundamentally flawed — a "dangerous," uncertain and unpredictable world in which weapons of mass destruction (or WMD) abound. It is a world comprised of states. But this is not all. Particular predicates — say, on the responsible versus irresponsible axis — are uncritically attached to certain identities: there is apparently a blacklist of "the world's least responsible states...for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life" — unnamed, of course, but linked as that notion is to the discourse on rogue states, "we" already know exactly who "they" are. These "bad" nations use WMD "to intimidate their neighbours, and to keep the United States and other responsible nations from helping allies and friends in strategic parts of the world." Further, these "tyrants," just like Saddam, share "an implacable hatred" for the US and its citizens. The verb "hate" is liberally used here: "they" hate "our" friends, hate "our" values, hate democracy, freedom and individual liberty, and so on. Finally, these Others "care little for the lives of their own people," and they "seek to destroy us."44 Positioned against the preceding litany of textual vitriol is the self-identity of America as a "responsible" international subject, an America that seeks to help its allies and friends, an America that is everything those irresponsible nations are not. Instead, America is friend to one-and-all; an America that espouses universally accepted values such as democracy, freedom and individual liberty; an America that cares deeply for its own people, and so on — all cast in opposition to rogue states and, inferable in some cases, China and Russia as well. And it is precisely this America that is being threatened and provoked by states and peoples who hold an "implacable hatred" against everything that America purportedly is and for which it stands, and who will do everything in their power to "destroy" the US. Hence, the argument concludes, the dire need for missile defence. Yet, it is, as I hope to show below, precisely such inscriptions of difference — of danger and vulnerability — that are intrinsic to the instantiation of a particular American identity —an instantiation that is only tenuously held together because of the slippage between discursive performance and its appropriated effect.45 Those differences comprise an Otherness without which it would be impossible to imagine a particular American self that shall always remain, owing to the constitutive failure of the performative, an idealization. Significantly, my foregoing argument neither maintains that the foreign policies of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, or those of Russia and China, are therefore benign, nor that the Bush Administration, the Rumsfeld Commission, and other missile defence proponents wilfully fabricated a danger where none could be perceived. Events that ostensibly fuelled the drive for missile defence were "real": nuclear tests in South Asia; missile tests by North Korea; "rogue states" committing sizeable levels of resources to developing their ballistic missile capabilities, and their resort to denial and deception to hide the development and deployment of those capabilities; China's and Russia's gross exportation of enabling technologies (including ballistic missile technology per se) to countries "hostile" to the US;46 China's defence budget burgeoning by as much as fifty percent in the last decade,47 or its bellicose rhetoric concerning Taiwan; and so on. The difficulty, however, lies with the claim that such events could have constituted themselves or "emerged" as objects outside of any discursive condition of possibility. That it is precisely these and not other events that have come to be interpreted or figured as threats is dependent upon particular modes of representation that enframe, delimit, and domesticate a certain identity that is, so to speak, "essentially America" — a fictive Self instantiated through the incessant negation of contradiction, contingency, and difference. These representational modes are not exactly new since they have also figured in past articulations of danger cardinal to the repetitive writing of political identity. What is especially interesting is how the writing of danger is not exclusively dependent upon the perceived expanding missile capabilities of rogue states, salient as this has been and remains.48 Indeed, those who affirm the notion of a missile threat principally on the basis of power capabilities mostly do so with apparent care, nuance, and lack of gratuitous exaggeration as the following statements — the first from a senior Bush Administration official, the second from an analyst — suggest. Note, however, that no further discussion is provided in either to justify why, in the face of markedly reduced power capabilities, the threat of missile attack against the US has instead intensified: The emerging missile threats from countries like North Korea, Iran and Iraq will not only be fewer in numbers [than the former Soviet ones], but lower in terms of accuracy, yield, survivability, reliability, and range-payload capability. That said, these new systems will represent a real threat.49 What has changed in recent years is both the strategic context within which NMD would be deployed and the nature of the threat confronting the United States. The Cold War has ended, easing fears that defensive deployments will inevitably trigger an offensive arms race and raise the risk of war. Instead, with the Soviet Union on the ash heap of history, the threat of a small-scale missile attack from lesser powers now looms larger than before.5° As the above statements imply, the care taken to eschew gross exaggeration of ballistic missile power capabilities in either the rogue states or in China and Russia in no way impedes the discursive representations of these nations as posing serious threats to the US. So much so, in fact, that a senior CIA official, referring to just such alleged missile threats, proffered this sombre estimation: "The picture I have painted points to one conclusion: the possibility that a missile bearing a weapon of mass destruction will be used against US forces or interests is higher today than it was during most of the Cold War."51 No option for an alternative interpretation is given. Indeed, no possibility for further reflection on the matter is even entertained in many of these discourses, as Defense Secretary Rumsfeld once made clear by unequivocally assuming the ontological high ground with this remark: "The existence of this [missile] threat is not debatable. It is real."52 The apparent paradox of "decreasing capabilities, increasing threats" is all the more startling in the light of the US Department of Defense's recently released 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which, among other concerns, calls for changes in security planning from a "threat-based" model for defence planning to one based on "capabilities" — a model that, as its progenitors at the Pentagon put it, "focuses more on how an adversary might fight rather than who that adversary might be or where a war might occur."53 In other words, the QDR report essentially calls for a return to quantitatively based net assessments of men and materiel, and less so qualitatively based readings of elite intentions and motives. Nonetheless, at a testimony given before the Senate Armed Services Committee on October 4, Deputy Defense Secretary (and Rumsfeld Commission alumnus) Paul Wolfowitz, when presenting the QDR report to Congress, made the following observation: [W]e [the US] will also face new adversaries in the decades ahead — with different motivations and different capabilities. Some may simply seek regional hegemony, and see the US as a roadblock to their ambitions. Others may be motivated by hatred of America, and the traditions of freedom and religious toleration we represent. Our new adversaries may be, in some cases, more dangerous that those we faced in the past.54 Granted, Wolfowitz's statement was issued over three weeks past the September 11 terrorist incident, which doubtless colours much of Washington's security outlook these days. But the statement also implies, as the argument here wants to maintain, that there is something else at work that cannot be quantified primarily in terms of power capabilities. This "capabilities-plus-plus" approach is patently obvious in the following evaluation by US intelligence: We expect the threat to the United States and its interests to increase over the next 15 years. However, projecting political and economic developments that could alter the nature of the missile threat many years into the future is virtually impossible.... Recognizing these uncertainties, we have projected foreign ballistic missile capabilities into the future largely based on technical capabilities and with a general premise that relations with the United States will not change significantly enough to alter the intentions of those states pursuing ballistic missile capabilities.55 In the last two statements, "intentions" and "motivations" clearly matter. And since all of the assessments examined thus far concur that the power capabilities of the various states of concern are significantly less than what the former Soviet Union possessed, their common conclusion on the vastly increased threat of missile attack therefore necessarily invokes not only elite intentions and motives, but also summons interrelated discourses that allow for certain representations to be naturalized and, in turn, justify that conclusion — a discursive economy of self-referentiality, as it were. Insofar as security discourses serve to enframe, delimit and domesticate a particular identity, a multiplicity of other discourses — individual and national traits or types, forms of domestic order, social relations of production, area studies, geopolitics, and so on — as well as the various subjectivities to which these give rise are deployed in juxtaposition with, are interwoven into, security discourse. The domesticating or disciplinary effect of these "intertextually" linked discourses serve to reproduce the constituting practices that write into being "America" in the face of different, contradictory and, to be sure, threatening interpretations. Simply put, the writing of danger in the discourse of missile defence effectively relies upon a host of interrelated discourses that pivot on the construction of Otherness by explicit references to how, say, "North Korea" or "Iraq" or "China" differs in contrast to "America." The notion that these national identities are especially threatening to the US thereby "emerges" out of differences, to borrow from the patois of the former Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), in "history and geography, in...economic conditions and structure, and...political system and ideology."56 As Simon Dalby has shown, the CPD, by unreservedly repudiating détente and appropriating "Team B" intelligence estimates during the 1970s, constructed the Soviet Union as a dangerous Other principally through the demarcation of "radical differences" between, on one hand, the Soviet Union and, on the other, the US and other democracies.57 This intimate nexus between difference, Otherness, and threat is similarly present in the discourse of missile defence advocates. Again, hear Wolfowitz — an academic/practitioner widely praised for his ability to "think out of the box" — distinguish between "democracies" and a certain breed of "leaders": Here there seems to be a persistent difference between democracies, which look constantly for pragmatic solutions to resolve concrete problems in isolation, and those more ruthless and avaricious leaders who see every such effort as a sign of weakness and whose real goal is to change power relationships in a fundamental way."58 First, no explication is given for why the above statement turns on a reported difference between two distinct levels-of-analysis in international relations: the state/regime-as-actor level (democracies) and the individual-as-actor level (leaders of authoritarian and/or rogue nations). Further, we can see that the creation of Otherness here occurs along several axes; take, for instance, what may be termed the rational/irrational axis. In the former case, the individual-as-actor has been effaced, thereby leaving only a regime-type (democracy) that is purportedly predisposed to technical problem solving, and incessantly in search of "pragmatic solutions to resolve problems." No politics — and with it any attendant irrationality and uncertainty — need apply in a society in which history and/or ideology "have ended,"59 in which problems are solved "in isolation." Positioned against this rational, democratic institutional subjectivity stands a lesser, rather loathsome subjectivity: a coterie of so-called "ruthless and avaricious leaders," all of whom hail presumably from non-democracies and who purportedly regard rational cum technical problem solving — the ostensible focus of democracies — as "a sign of weakness." This blanket inscription of the authoritarian Other as ill disposed and even hostile toward rational problem solving disregards the writings on the rational technocratic elites of, say, the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of Latin America,60 or those of the dirigiste economies of East Asia — many of which used to be (or in some cases still are) of the "soft" authoritarian variety.61 Otherness, in Wolfowitz's rendition, is also discursively constituted along a moral/immoral — or, alternatively, responsible/irresponsible — axis. Equally interesting is the notion that authoritarian or rogue-state leaders, besides lacking in rationality and viewing problem solving as a form of weakness, are "ruthless and avaricious" — an intentional, not accidental, choice of predicates. That (and here we are left to infer) "North Korea" or "Iraq" is ruled by such roguish elements can only mean that such states can, indeed they should, therefore be properly referred to as rogue states. Against these inscriptions of immorality or amorality stand, in diametric contrast, moral "America." And here the unequal adoption by Wolfowitz's discourse, in the case of "democracies," of the analytical level of state/regime connotes that all America, and not only its leaders or certain individuals, is thereby kind, compassionate, altruistic — the polar opposite of all that rogue states, and possibly even China and Russia, represent. To be sure, nowhere in his words does Wolfowitz imply that there are as such no immoral or irresponsible Americans. Nor does he even hint that all citizens of rogue states are therefore roguish; political correctness, after all, is the norm in these enlightened times. But the discursive effect is such that we are left with the impression that leaders of rogue nations — Saddam Hussein, Kim Chong-il, and their ilk — epitomize the darkest of the dark metaphysics of human nature.

Nuclear secrecy is strictly used to suppress the individual killing deliberation

Taylor Et Al 05 (Bryan C, University of Colorado at Boulder, WILLIAM J. KINSELLA North Carolina State University, STEPHEN P. DEPOE MARIBETH S. METZLER University of Cincinnati, “Nuclear Legacies: Communication, Controversy, and the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Production Complex.”, Communication Yearbook 29, http://comm.colorado.edu/~taylorbc/Nuclear%20Legacies%20CY29.pdf) BAF

Brought to bear on the history of U.S. nuclear weapons production, this strand of critical theory reveals a public sphere constricted and degraded by technocratic domination (Fisher, 1987, pp. 57–84; Hardert, Reader, Scott, Moulton, & Goodman, 1989; Kinsella, 2002, 2004; Krasniewicz, 1992; Kuletz, 1998; Metzler, 1997; Nelson & Beardsley, 1987). A wartime climate of urgency led to the secret development of nuclear weapons and to their introduction as a fait accompli rather than their consideration as a potential innovation requiring public ratification. The postwar embrace by U.S. officials of nuclear weapons as a necessary evil legitimated their production under the expansive warrant of national security. Compromised structures of civilian control aligned regulation with the political and economic interests of weapons production and promoted an authoritarian model of nuclear guardianship by scientific, military, and political elites over democratic control practiced by an informed and motivated citizenry (Dahl, 1985; Nolan, 1989). Indeed, this model construed involvement by an unpredictable public as a threat to the high-stakes order of nuclear deterrence (Tannenwald, 1999). In this context, autonomous, centralized, defensive, secretive, and securityconscious cultures developed and became entrenched at nuclear weapons production facilities. The suppression and distortion of information (e.g., through the use of jargon, euphemism, threat inflation, etc.) precluded informed consent by citizens to the consequences of operations. This process involved officials’ use of technical expertise (e.g., of epidemiological science) to colonize public moral argument (Fisher, 1987), and to neutralize alternative (e.g., anecdotal) modes of reasoning. Officials also adopted authoritarian, cynical, superficial, and perfunctory approaches to public participation opportunities (e.g., public hearings). They engineered communication with citizens (e.g., through agenda setting) to minimize perceived irrelevancy and disruption, to discredit unease as irrational perception, and to remove potentially controversial topics and premises from deliberation. Although powerful, this domination was not monolithic or constant. For example, Dalton, et al. (1999) argued that the strong democracy, weak state structure of U.S. politics (e.g., that mandates agency compliance with Freedom of Information Act requests) has facilitated relative democratization of the post-Cold War nuclear public sphere, at least in comparison to Russia. Similarly, Glass (1993) argued that because the Cold War lifeworld was too complex for total colonization, pockets of critical instability (e.g., created by regional particularity) remained through which citizens could fashion alternate definitions of security and loyalty. Because they could not supplant the totemic warrant of national security, however, these successes were ultimately partial, “fragile, hard to predict, and even harder to repeat” (Glass, 1993, p. 106). Analyses of movements such as the Nuclear Freeze (Bjork, 1992; Hogan, 1994; Rojecki, 1999) and women’s peace encampments 382 COMMUNICATION YEARBOOK 29 (Couldry, 1999; Krasniewicz, 1992) additionally confirm that counterpublics opposing the Cold War nuclear state faced formidable challenges. These challenges included skillful appropriation of their rhetorical visions by officials, ambivalent coverage by news media identified with state power over citizen participation, and inevitable tradeoffs between the adoption of technically substantive and popularappealing rhetorical strategies.

Secrecy fails

Secrecy destroys possibility of disarm

Schaper 6 (Annette, Senior Research Fellow RD: Policies for Security Governance of States, Transparency and in nuclear weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction commission, http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No34.pdf )

Increased transparency of nuclear-weapons-related information is an indispensable prerequisite for more progress in nuclear disarmament and its verification. For many years, and on various occasions, it has been demanded by the international community. At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, nuclear transparency was part of the thirteen practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which were agreed on by consensus. Step 9B stipulates “increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to their nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.” And step 12 stipulates regular reporting on the implementation of nuclear disarmament. But there is not yet any such commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon states. Today, the world is not even informed about the status quo of nuclear disarmament: How many nuclear weapons are stationed in which countries? Which types of weapons? How many are being held in reserve and how many are being dismantled? The numbers are not exactly known; the reports on weapon dismantlement remain vague. Only a few countries have published figures of their holdings of nuclear materials, the quantities of others are still shrouded in secrecy. Transparency would also be needed during the process of nuclear disarmament. There are plenty of open questions that must be dealt with in order to prepare for the next disarmament steps. They do not only concern numbers, types or locations of existing warheads but also quantities and properties of fissile materials, information on production facilities or information on activities that help understand the compliance with nuclear arms control treaties. Examples of possible further steps in nuclear disarmament are: verification of nuclear weapon disarmament; a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT); projects and treaties on the disposition 1 of excess weapons plutonium – and safeguards, projects and treaties on assistance for improving the security of fissile materials in Russia; further reforms of international safeguards, especially in cases where these are implemented in nuclear-weapon possessing states outside the NPT; and the implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). All such measures would be facilitated by more information related to nuclear weapons, but the situation is still far from satisfying. A lot of this information is still secret and their owners do not want to release it.

**Secrecy fails**

Secrecy kills any hope of total disarmament

Lamond and Ingram 9 (Claudine, Senior analyst and contributor to ‘International Security Report’ and Paul analyst for British American Security Information Council’ (BASIC), London, Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states http://www.atlantic-community.org/app/webroot/files/articlepdf/CLamondTNWinNATO.pdf)BAF

While exact figures of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe are classified (NATO does not publish figures on its nuclear arsenals); it is believed there are approximately 200-350 US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.2 In Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands there are said to be 10-20 TNW B-61s based at each of the following airbases: Kliene Brogel, Buchel and Volkel. In Italy around 50 TNW are thought to be based on the Aviano airbase and 20-40 on the Ghedi Torre airbase. The United States is believed to hold around 50-90 TNW at the Incirlik airbase in Turkey. In a multi-polar, post-Cold War strategic context, there are several reasons why NATO members would want to reconsider the forward deployment of TNW, three of which are: Nuclear weapons are irrelevant to the majority of security threats considered within NATO, particularly now that it is universally recognized that the Soviet/Russian threat from a supposedly superior conventional capability it so manifestly absent today. Even if European states still feel the need for an explicit US nuclear umbrella, TNWs would not be the method of choice for US military planners. Funds allocated to storing, maintaining and protecting nuclear weapon facilities could be better spent focusing on current non-traditional threats. NATO’s nuclear sharing is the source of considerable disquiet amongst some member states within the NPT.3 It substantially weakens the authority of NATO states to demand stronger non-proliferation mechanisms essential to strengthening European and global security, and surely undermines any claim on the part of NATO members to having the necessary political will to engage in serious moves towards a world free of nuclear weapons. NATO states’ inability to resolve the problem allows Russia to avoid its disarmament responsibilities with respect to its far more substantial arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons

Nuclear secrecy is the greatest barrier to checking terrorist obtainment of weapons

Larson 6 (Jeffrey, PHd NATO’s 2005-06 Manfred Wörner Fellow. A Senior Scientist with Science Applications International Corporation, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, The Future of U.S. Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/05-06/larsen.pdf)

A major concern for the U.S. government is the possibility that weapons such as NSNW will fall into the wrong hands. The greatest threat of such proliferation would appear to come from Russia, which has a large tactical nuclear arsenal left over from the Cold War—most analysts have estimated that it maintains at least 3,500 NSNW, and some estimate as many as 15,000 or more—that remain uncovered by any international arms control treaty and are in a questionable state of protection, safety, and security. Questions regarding Russia’s level of commitment to abiding by the 1991-92 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, following which the United States reduced its NSNW stockpile by 90 percent, and Russia’s increased emphasis on nuclear forces in recent military doctrine revisions, raise legitimate concerns over the purpose of Russia’s nuclear arsenal and its trustworthiness as a political partner of the United States and the West. Even before the 9/11 attacks the West recognized this proliferation potential. As a U.S. Congressional commission stated in January 2001, “The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states.”3 And former Senator Sam Nunn testified before Congress that “Tactical nuclear weapons are another piece of unaddressed business. These weapons have never been covered in arms control treaties. We can only guess at the numbers in each other’s inventories as well as the locations. Yet these are the weapons most attractive to terrorists—even more valuable to them than fissile material and much more portable than strategic warheads.”4 Within this larger security consideration, there are policy implications and possibilities for diplomacy, arms control, nonproliferation efforts, and nuclear deterrence. For example, there remains a continued responsibility for the United States (particularly the U.S. Air Force) to provide dual-capable aircraft and tactical nuclear warheads to maintain the decades-old deterrent mission in NATO Europe. Most estimates claim that there remain several hundred U.S. tactical nuclear warheads in Europe, at some eight bases in six European nations that could be delivered by a fleet of dual-capable aircraft (fighter-bombers) manned by up to eight allied nations.5 There are also several hundred nuclear weapons in the arsenals of both France and the United Kingdom. While those numbers have diminished substantially since the high point of 7,200 U.S. warheads in Europe in 1971, questions have been raised regularly since the end of the Cold War about the continued necessity for that mission. NATO policy, however, continues to rely on this deterrent capability, as the Alliance made clear in its 1999 Strategic Concept:The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. They will continue to fulfill an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies’ response to military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational option. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies… The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe.6

That position has not changed in the seven years since that document was released—or indeed, since the wording was first formulated in 1991. Has the world changed enough to require a revision of that doctrine? This question is under consideration within Alliance circles, with some states proposing to have a revised doctrine approved and in place in time for the Alliance’s 60th anniversary in 2009.

U.S. policy of nuclear secrecy contradicts our pursuit of disarmament

Sokov 2 (Nikolai, Senior Research Associate CNS NIS Nonproliferation Program Center for Nonproliferation Studies, NTI research Library, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, <http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_10a.html>) BAF

TNWs are the least-regulated category of nuclear weapons covered in arms control agreements. They are only subject to an informal regime created by unilateral, parallel declarations made by George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in the fall of 1991. Prompted by mounting concern about the security of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union, George Bush announced on September 17, 1991 that the United States would eliminate its entire worldwide inventory of ground-launched TNWs and would remove all nuclear weapons from surface ships and attack submarines. While the Soviet government would have preferred a formal, negotiated action on TNWs, it accepted the U.S. approach as an opportunity to achieve its long-standing objective of reducing the number of U.S. TNWs in Europe. Mikhail Gorbachev responded on October 5, 1991, largely repeating the measures outlined by George Bush. Namely, the Soviet Union promised to remove all categories of nuclear weapons from deployment to “central storage facilities,” while maintaining the deployment of one-half of its air-based weapons; between one-third and one-half of the weapons removed from deployment were scheduled for elimination. In January 1992, the Gorbachev statement was confirmed and slightly expanded by Boris Yeltsin in the name of Russia. Reductions (both removal to central storage and elimination) have been measured in thousands of warheads and represent the single largest reduction of nuclear warheads, surpassing all other agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia. Both countries have completed the regime’s stated withdrawals from deployment, and the United States has also completed the elimination of warheads. In Russia, the target date for elimination of warheads was the year 2000, and in 1999, Russia reported the job as completed for some categories and “almost” completed for the rest. In 2002, however, Russia moved the completion date to 2004, citing lack of funding for warhead elimination. In the absence of a formal a treaty, the United States and Russia do not exchange information about stockpiles and cannot verify the process of implementation. From time to time, they have updated each other on the progress within the framework of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (established in 1997), but these exchanges specify only the share of weapons eliminated rather than hard numbers. The informal nature of the 1991 regime has resulted in considerable uncertainty with regard to implementation, as well as considerable disparity in numbers.

A2: Security

The discourse of war is structured in a way where nobody is safe

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, 8, 9, 10, Project Muse) MJ

Thus **war and existence are intertwined. However within such existential imperatives to war lies a more technical, performative** (and thus rationalistic) **discourse: that once it is deemed necessary to use force in defence of one's right to exist it is possible to do so, to translate military means into political ends in a controlled and rational way. This is the second, rationalist form of state reason that most commonly takes the name of 'strategy'.** Its fundamental tenet was most famously expressed in Carl Von Clausewitz's argument that war 'is a mere continuation of policy by other means...a pulsation of violent force...subject to the will of a guiding intelligence'.[10](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn10%22%20%5Co%20%22) That this is a textbook model of instrumental reason, one that imports Newtonian physics into human relations, is clear in Clausewitz's influential definition: **'War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will'**.[11](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn11%22%20%5Co%20%22)This purposive rationality is expressed by the Israeli war plan for Lebanon, long in preparation, to which we are not privy. We can however deduce from the IDF's campaign that it had the objective of confronting Hezbollah: degrading their ability to operate, coercing them to hand over the two captured Israeli soldiers and, indirectly, coercing the Lebanese government into disarming Hezbollah and removing them from southern Lebanon. Other officials stated that the complete destruction of Hezbollah was their objective. It is telling that at the cessation of hostilities none of these objectives had been fully achieved.[12](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn12%22%20%5Co%20%22)The IDF's chosen weapons, until the last few days when a limited ground operation was conducted, were F-16s and artillery strikes deployed against Hezbollah offices and facilities along with crucial infrastructure, and against civilians in their homes and vehicles. The doctrinal influences appeared to be Clausewitz and the generation of twentieth century airpower theorists such as Guilio Douhet. Douhet believed that command of the air would ensure victory 'all down the line'; he argued that **'modern warfare allows for no distinction between combatants and noncombatants' and**, in one analyst's paraphrase, **that nations must 'at the outset be prepared to launch massive bombing attacks against the enemy centres of population, government and industry -- hit first and hit hard to shatter enemy civilian morale, leaving the enemy government no option but to sue for peace'**.

Ontologies of war limits debate and generates violence

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, 14, Project Muse) MJ

I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, **when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such.** The second is its intimate relation with violence**: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence**. **Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence** (strategy) **joined to an ontology of violence** (the national security state**). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone** (and doubly in combination**) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects.** In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being.

A2: Secrecy

Classification laws are so ambiguous it can cover nearly all government information

Masco 07 (Joseph, Univ of Chicago dept of anthropology prof., *Ethnografeast III: Ethnography and the Public Sphere,* The Nuclear Public Sphere, <http://ceas.iscte.pt/ethnografeast/papers/joseph_masco.pdf>) BAF

The most important aspect of the SBU category of information is that it has never been defined by federal law, it is a strategically vague concept that is used differently by each federal agency. A recent study by the Government Accounting Office (2006) found 56 different definitions of SBU currently used within the Federal government, as well as few provisions to identify which (and how many) officials within an agency can designate information as SBU. The SBU designation is today a largely unregulated category within the Federal government. The first SBU concept, which is still used today by the Department of Energy, was written two decades ago by John Poindexter (who was the head of DARPA until the proposed “total information awareness” data mining project forced him to step down in 2002; prior to that, he gained notoriety for his role in the Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980s). In 1986, as President Reagan’s National Security Advisor, Poindexter defined SBU information this way (quoted in Knezo 2003:20): Sensitive, but unclassified information is information the disclosure, loss, misuse, alteration or destruction of which could adversely affect national security or other Federal Government interests. National Security interests are those unclassified matters that relate to the national defense or the foreign relations of the U.S. government. Other government interests are those related, but not limited to the wide range of government or government-derived economic, human, financial, industrial, agricultural, technological and law enforcement information, as well as privacy or confidentiality of personal or commercial proprietary information provided to the U.S. government by its citizens. The “related but not limited to” concept here expands the SBU category to include most of governmental work. Recent surveys of the SBU category have suggested that as much as 75% of non-classified government produced information could be designated as Sensitive but Unclassified. From the perspective of the security state, the value of SBU as a category is not only its ambiguity – as literally anything in government can now be separated from the public sphere – it is that there is no formal review process required to designate information as SBU. There is no agency in government charged with regulating SBU information or hearing appeals. It is therefore up to each branch and agency within the federal government to decide how to 14 draw the line between public accountability and security, allowing near infinite flexibility in standards and logics. The SBU category effectively expands national security to include any kind of information that might be inconvenient to the execution of state policy. Articulated as an antiterrorism provision – it was sold to protect “critical infrastructure from terrorist attack” -- the new SBU practices, as well as the laws, regulations, and federal guidance on information management, now position all citizens as potential terrorists. For if having basic information about governmental practices can be constituted as a “threat”, then SBU functions to blur the distinction between the citizen and the enemy. It makes any kind of federal information subject to noncirculation, creating an expansive category between the explicitly classified and the public. Following the declassification campaigns of the immediate post-Cold War Period, and the enormous democratization of information access enabled by the Internet in the last decade, the 21st century has thus witnessed a fundamental shift in the idea and mechanisms of openness and transparency in the United States. Consequently, a central part of the conversion of the U.S. to a counter-terrorist state has been an information strategy of non-circulation but also of censoring the existing public record. The National Archives have become an explicit front in the counterterrorism project, as historical records relating to Presidential Authority, war-authorizations, intelligence on weapons of mass destruction issues, and other military matters going back to the start of the Cold War have been removed, and designated as either SBU or re-classified (ISOO 2006).5 At least one million pages of previously declassified materials have been pulled from the National Archives.6 Thus, the past history of the security state as well as its current projects are being subject to new forms of secrecy, which attempt not only to protect ongoing activities but to purge past mistakes and debates from the public record. From the perspective of the counterterrorist security state, the value of SBU as a category is not only its ambiguity – as literally anything in government can now be separated from the public sphere – it is that there is no formal review process that citizens can take to release information designated SBU. There is no agency in government charged with regulating the use of SBU or hearing appeals. But while an informed citizenry is the first victim of the elaborate secrecy system in the United States, policymakers also suffer.

A2: Security

The idea of national security justifies the otherization of those who do not fit a selected identity

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, 21, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory\_and\_event/v010/10.2burke.html)

**The conceptual template for such an image of  national security state can be found in the work of Thomas Hobbes, with his influential conception of the political community as a tight unity of sovereign and people in which their bodies meld with his own to form a 'Leviathan', and which must be defended from enemies within and without. His image of effective security and sovereignty was one that was intolerant of internal difference and dissent, legitimating a strong state with coercive and exceptional powers to preserve order and sameness. This was a vision not merely of political order but of existential identity, set off against a range of existential others who were sources of threat, backwardness, instability or incongruity**.[29](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn29%22%20%5Co%20%22) **It also**, in a way set out with frightening clarity by the theorist Carl Schmitt and the philosopher Georg Hegel, **exchanged internal unity, identity and harmony for permanent alienation from other such communities (**states). Hegel presaged Schmitt's thought with his argument that individuality and the state are single moments of 'mind in its freedom' which 'has an infinitely negative relation to itself, and hence its essential character from its own point of view is its singleness': Individuality is awareness of one's existence as a unit in sharp distinction from others. **It manifests itself here in the state as a relation to other states, each of which is autonomous vis-a-vis the others...this negative relation of the state to itself is embodied in the world as the relation of one state to another and as if the negative were something external.**[30](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn30%22%20%5Co%20%22)

A2: Security

Ontology of the national security state and of strategy makes humans utilitarian instruments

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, 15, Project Muse) MJ

This essay describes firstly **the ontology of the national security state** (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) **and** secondly **the rationalist ontology of strategy** (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they **crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification**, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. **This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force** -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- **can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.**[19](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn19%22%20%5Co%20%22) **The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction**. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,[20](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn20%22%20%5Co%20%22) the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that **in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'.** **[21](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn21%22%20%5Co%20%22)**

A security based foreign policy causes the nation to resort to violence

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, 17, Project Muse) MJ

**The epistemology of violence** I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) **claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order.** However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, **instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation**. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, **strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things**, including other humans, **which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects**. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'.Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' [22](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn22%22%20%5Co%20%22)

A2: Security

In a world of war everybody is a combatant. You are either a friend or an enemy

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, 22,23,24,25 Project Muse)

Schmitt is important both for understanding the way in which such alienation is seen as a definitive way of imagining and limiting political communities, and for understanding how such a rigid delineation is linked to the inevitability and perpetuation of war. **Schmitt argued that the existence of a state 'presupposes the political', which must be understood through 'the specific political distinction...between friend and enemy'. The enemy is 'the other, the stranger; and it sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in an extreme case conflicts with him are possible'**.[31](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn31%22%20%5Co%20%22) **The figure of the enemy is constitutive of the state as 'the specific entity of a people'.****[32](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn32%22%20%5Co%20%22) Without it society is not political and a people cannot be said to exist: Only the actual participants can correctly recognise, understand and judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict...to judge whether the adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one's own form of existence**.[33](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn33%22%20%5Co%20%22) Schmitt links this stark ontology to war when he states that **the political is only authentic 'when a fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public enemy**, **because everything that has a relationship to such a collectivity of men**, particularly to the whole nation, **becomes public by virtue of such a relationship...in its entirety the state as an organised political entity decides for itself the friend-enemy distinction'**.[34](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn34%22%20%5Co%20%22) **War**, in short, **is an existential condition: the entire life of a human being is a struggle and every human being is symbolically a combatant. The friend, enemy and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing.** War follows from enmity. War is the existential negation of the enemy.[35](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn35%22%20%5Co%20%22) Schmitt claims that his theory is not biased towards war as a choice ('It is by no means as though the political signifies nothing but devastating war and every political deed a military action...it neither favours war nor militarism, neither imperialism nor pacifism') but it is hard to accept his caveat at face value.[36](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn36%22%20%5Co%20%22) When such a theory takes the form of a social discourse (which it does in a general form) such an ontology can only support, as a kind of originary ground, the basic Clausewitzian assumption that war can be a rational way of resolving political conflicts -- because the import of **Schmitt's argument is that such 'political' conflicts are ultimately expressed through the possibility of war. As he says: 'to the enemy concept belongs the ever-present possibility of combat**'.[37](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn37%22%20%5Co%20%22) Where Schmitt meets Clausewitz, as I explain further below, **the existential and rationalistic ontologies of war join into a closed circle of mutual support and justification.**

A2: Security

Over classification is unnecessary, killing informed nuclear discourse

Fuchs 06 (Meredith, George Washington University prof of poli sci, Administrative Law Review 58 Admin. L. Rev. “Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy”, p133-139, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/admin58&div=10&g\_sent=1&collection=journals#139)

Since the September 11th attacks on the United States, government secrecy has dramatically increased. Security classification of information, the formal process by which information is marked and protected against disclosure, has multiplied, reaching an all time high of 15.6 million classification actions in 2004, nearly double the number in 2001. Moreover, the cost of the program has skyrocketed from an estimated $4.7 billion in 2002 to $7.2 billion in 2004. Officials throughout the military and intelligence sectors have admitted that much of this classification activity is unnecessary. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumseld acknowledged the problem in 2005 Wall Street Journal op-ed: “I have long believed that too much material is classified across the federal government as a general rule….” The extent of over-classification is significant. Under repeated questioning from members of Congress at a 2004 hearing concerning over-classification Deputy Under Secretary of Defense of Counterintelligence and Security Carol A. Haave eventually conceded that approximately 50 percent of classification decisions are unnecessary over-classification. These opinions echoed that of the current Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Porter Goss, who told the 9/11 Commission, while then serving as the Chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, “We overclassify very badly. There’s a lot of gratuitous classification going on, and therea are a variety of reasons for it.”

A2: Security

The discourse of securitization prioritizes self preservation over all foreign policy and legitimizes extraordinary measures in the name survival

Jæger 2k(Øyvind, PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, 7-2) MAH

Security is a field of practice into which subject matters can be inserted as well as exempted. Security is a code for going about a particular business in very particular ways. By labelling an issue a security issue, that is, a threat to security, one legitimises the employment of extraordinary measures to counter the threat, because it threatens security. In other words, security is a self-referential practice that carries its own legitimisation and justification. Security issues are allotted priority above everything else because everything else is irrelevant if sovereignty is lost, the state loses independence and ceases to exist. This makes for the point that it is not security as an objective or a state of affairs that is the crux of understanding security, but rather the typical operations and modalities by which security comes into play, Wæver (1995) notes.[[5]](http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/pcs/Jaeger72PCS.htm%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn5%22%20%5Co%20%22) The typical operations are speech-acts and the modality threat-defense sequences. That is, perceiving and conveying threats and calling upon defence hold back the alleged threat. This is also a self-referential practice with the dynamic of a security dilemma: Defensive measures taken with reference to a perceived threat cause increased sense of insecurity and new calls for defense, and so forth. Wæver’s argument is that this logic is at work also in other fields than those busying themselves with military defence of sovereignty.

A2: Security

Secrecy hinders social development, risking societal wellbeing

Fuchs 06 (Meredith, George Washington University prof of poli sci, Administrative Law Review 58 Admin. L. Rev. “Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy”, p133-139, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/admin58&div=10&g\_sent=1&collection=journals#139)

The association of disclosure of government information with threats to our national security is a false dichotomy. Sharing highly sensitive information that could be used by a terrorist obviously involves a high social cost. There also are, however, real costs associated with keeping unnecessary secrets. As the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, the governmental agency responsible to the President for policy oversight of the government-wide security classification system and the National Industrial Security Program, has explained: Classification of course can be a double-edged sword. Limitations on dissemination of information that are designed to deny information to the enemy on the battlefield can increase the risk of a lack of awareness on the part of our own forces, contributing to the potential for friendly fire incidents or other failures. Similarly, imposing strict compartmentalization of information obtained from human agents increases the risk that a Government official with access to other information that could cast doubt on the reliability of the agent would not know of the use of that agent’s information elsewhere in the Government. Simply put, secrecy comes at a price. That price includes undermining the legitimacy of government actions, reducing accountability, hindering critical technological and scientific progress, interfering with the efficiency of the marketplace, and breeding paranoia.

And, transparency key to security

Fuchs 06 (Meredith, George Washington University prof of poli sci, Administrative Law Review 58 Admin. L. Rev. “Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy”, p133-139, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/admin58&div=10&g\_sent=1&collection=journals#139)

Indeed, the inquiries concerning the September 11th attacks on the United States taught us this lesson: Better information dissemination both empowers the public and enables agencies to protect national security. Eleanor Hill, the Staff Director of the Joint House-Senate Intelligence Committee Investigation into the September 11th Attacks, directly addressed this lesson in her congressional testimony, in which she stated that the record presented to Congress demonstrated that the most potent weapon against terrorism is “an alert and committed American public.” This conclusion is echoed in the report produced by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States (the 9/11 Commission or the Commission), which made only one finding that the federal government might have prevented the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. According to the interrogation of the hijackers’ paymaster, if the organizers- particularly Khalid Sheikh Mohammed- had known that the so-called 20th hijacker, Zacarias Moussaoui, had been arrested at his Minnesota flight school on immigration charges, then Osama Bin Ladin and Mohammed would have called off the 9/11 attacks. News of that arrest might also have alerted the FBI agent in Phoenix, who had warned the FBI of the enrollment of Islamic militants in U.S. flight schools in a July 2001 memo. Instead, that memo vanished into the FBI’s vaults in Washington and was not connected to Moussaoui in time to prevent the attacks. The Commission’s wording on this issue is important: Only “publicity…. Might have derailed the plot.” Disclosure of security-related information may reduce risk by alerting the public to current threats and enabling better-informed responses from both local and federal agencies.

Otherization

The discourse and philosophy behind Turkey’s EU ascension creates a paternalistic relationship between the EU and Turkey.

Hülsse 00 (Rainer, FU Berlin and EUI Florence, Looking beneath the surface – invisible othering in the German discourse about Turkey’s possible EU-accession Paper) PR

In the preceding chapter it was shown that Turkey’s europeanness had been an important topic within the discourse about a possible EU-membership of Turkey. In this section I will examine how Klaus Kinkel judged Turkey’s europeanness. A first glance at the quotes from chapter 3 gives the impression that Klaus Kinkel sees Turkey as a European country: Turkey is part of Europe, Turkey belongs to Europe, Turkey’s European vocation/option/perspective, Turkey belongs to the European family. My analysis, however, does not stop here but takes a second look at the texts, the results of which will be presented in the following. On a general level, it gives prove of what is being remarked about the dissemination of metaphors in the literature: “Once one begins with the observation of the phenomenon of language called metaphor, human speech will seem to be composed of metaphors just as the black forest is of trees” (Bühler 1934, quoted in Schmitt 1995: 72, my translation).18 This insight and the importance of metaphors in the process of constructing reality discussed above explain why my microanalysis will for the most part be an interpretation of metaphors. Most of the metaphors to be found in my text-corpus can be classified as one of the namely to construct these countries as European, while at the same time giving way to diverging interpretations. Furthermore, the first part of the sentence deserves some attention. A signal is being given. But - one may ask - why is there a need to signal that Turkey belongs to the family? Western-type families may be regarded as prototypical container-metaphors, since for them the unity-feature is particular fitting. Someone who does not belong to the family by birth may become a member of the family only through marriage or adoption. Thus the signal given to Turkey makes sense only if Turkey is not considered to be an original family member. The fact that we are the ones who signal that Turkey belongs to the family indicates a hierarchical relation, thus the possible accession of Turkey is seen more like an adoption of a child than a marriage between equals. In any case, an interpretation of this sequence shows that it produces a sceptical evaluation of Turkey’s europeanness, despite the fact that the text surface seems to indicate quite the opposite. Lastly, the agents do not simply set a signal, but only *want* to set a signal. It is an expression of will and thus much weaker than a commitment to act. Two interpretations may be thought of: Either, we are dealing with an intention, the realisation of which is uncertain. Or, we find the speaker - and those he speaks for - willing to integrate Turkey, however it is up to Turkey to see this signal. Thus, the use of the term want also contributes to the weakening of the original confirmation of Turkey’s belonging to the European family. In conclusion, one can hardly see how this statement constructs Turkey as clearly inside or outside the container that is Europe. While it seems to see Turkey as being inside it contains several moments of doubts about its own message on the latent level. A further example of the container-metaphor is the conceptualisation of Europe as a house (Schäffner 1996: 43). Its most famous application is the ‘common house of Europe’, an expression which was coined by Gorbatshev and which featured very prominently in European discourses before and after the events of 1989 (Chilton/Ilyin 1993). Though one cannot find explicit usage of the house-metaphor in my textcorpus, an interesting derivation of the house metaphor can be found: Doors, which one cannot picture without some form of building. If the idea of a door (or windows, for that matter) is inextricably linked to the idea of a house, one can regard them as 13following two types of metaphors*: container-metaphors* or *movement-metaphors.* In the literature this classification of metaphors is quite common, at times complemented by other groups. In addition, these two types are said to cover large parts of metaphor use in political discourse (Lakoff/Johnson 1980; Schäffner 1995,1996; Chilton/Lakoff 1995). *Container-Metaphors* The common feature of metaphors of this type is the picturing of Europe as a container. This container is a closed entity to which one either belongs or not, just as one can be either inside or outside a container (Schäffner 1995: 176). In political discourse this type is very popular for the description of states (Chilton/Lakoff 1995: 50). However, it is used in quite diverse ways, some of which will be discussed here. A frequently used concrete instance of the container-metaphor-type is the family metaphor. It characterises Europe as a family, thus turning Turkey’s EU-application into a request to become a member of the family. Answers to this request may be extracted from the following citation: “With the European Conference we want to set a sign that Turkey belongs to the European family” (Kinkel-speech, German Federal Council, 18.11.97).19 In this statement it seems to be confirmed that Turkey is part of the European family. Due to what usually is associated with the term ‘family’ - especially common descent/origin - Turkey is marked as a European country. However, one may wonder why the family membership needs to be confirmed in the first place. Would it make sense if there were no doubts about Turkey being part of the family? Or, as a counterfactual: Would it make sense to confirm Switzerland’s membership in the European family? In my opinion, the confirmation of Turkey’s being part of the family suggests doubts about what is being confirmed. Surely, the former communist states of Middle and Eastern Europe, too, have been welcomed as members of the European family. However, I would hold that this is part of the very same process, being part of the same subgroup of metaphors. There is frequent talk of doors in my text corpus, particularly as to their function of allowing someone in. “The *door* for Turkey to Europe remains open” (Kinkel-speech, German Parliament, 5.3.98).20 To begin with one could try to paraphrase the statement in the following way: Turkey may not be part of Europe, but Europe wants Turkey to become part of Europe. This statement constructs Turkey as being outside the European house, since only then it makes sense to keep the door to Europe open. If it is by walking through a door that Turkey would get to Europe, she cannot yet be inside. The word order of the sentence is quite awkward in the English translation, but in German, too, it sounds rather strange. Instead of simply saying that for Turkey the door to Europe remains open, it gives the impression that there is a door which is for use by Turkey only, a special entrance so to say. Turkey may not use the normal entrance. She is constructed as a special case. This reminds us of the rapprochement-strategy, invented by the Luxembourg summit to comfort Turkey for not being granted the status of a candidate. Furthermore, it may be noticed that the door *remains* open. It follows that the door must have already been open before. Nothing has changed. If one looks at the context within which this remark has been made its meaning becomes quite clear. After the Luxembourg summit Turkish politicians held Germany to be responsible for what Turkey considered the discriminating result of the European Council. The Turkish Prime Minister Yilmaz even compared Germany’s politics vis-à-vis the Middle-and Eastern European countries with Hitler’s ‘Lebensraumpolitik’, a comparison that provoked angry reactions by the German government. Thus the offer to keep the door open for Turkey may be read as ‘we keep the door open for you, though we would have the right to close it considering your misbehaviour’. Thus we encounter a double construction: the own position is described positively - the generosity of keeping the door open - while at the same time the apparent mistakes of the other are alluded to. I will return to this combination of positive self-representation and negative representation of the other in the chapter on identity.

Otherization

The discourse of EU acension creates a binary relationship which renders turkey as outside of a uniform Western identity

 Hülsse 00 (Rainer, FU Berlin and EUI Florence, Looking beneath the surface – invisible othering in the German discourse about Turkey’s possible EU-accession Paper) PR

As with the container-metaphors movement-metaphors are frequently used in political discourse (Schäffner 1996: 37). Realisations of movement-metaphors stress different aspects of movement: the action of moving, the destination, the speed, or the means of transport (Schäffner 1996: 43-51). Unlike container-metaphors movement-metaphors are dynamic. Thus they are well-suited to describe developments. Whereas the discourse on European integration usually constructs the EU/Europe as the moving subject (e.g. two-speed Europe), the moving subject in the discourse studied here is Turkey. She moves in the direction of Europe. Klaus Kinkel’s favourite movement-metaphors are all from the realm of railways, this at least is the impression one gets from the discourse on Turkey’s possible EUaccession. His tendency to use train-metaphors was so strong that a newspaper editorial gave him the nickname ‘stationmaster’ (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 27.3.97). Most of Kinkel’s uses of railway-metaphors follow the same pattern: Turkey is on the track to Europe or Turkey is on/in the European train. Thus not only the destination (Europe), but also the means of transport (train) as well as the movement as such (be on the track/train) are included. How Turkey’s europeanness is constructed in these metaphors will be discussed by looking at an example: “But she is still sitting on the European track and may not uncouple her own wagon from the European train (...) At present, Turkey is uncoupling herself a little bit” (Kinkel-interview, Phönix, 8.4.98).21 In this utterance several related metaphors are combined into a metaphorical phrase. Europe is both, track and train. Implicitly Europe is also the destination of the rail journey, thus the European train is on the European track to Europe. Turkey, on the other side, is a wagon in the European train, she is sitting on the European track. However, we are presently witnessing a breakdown, due to Turkey’s attempts to uncouple her wagon. The trip to Europe is interrupted. The statement constructs Turkey as being on the way to Europe. But, by constructing her as on the way it is implied that she has not yet arrived. And she herself is responsible for the delay, due to her uncoupling efforts. Movement-metaphors describe a movement between two places. Turkey has left one place (however it is not specified, what place that is) and is on the way to the other which is Europe. Since she has not yet arrived, she is ‘in-between’ or ‘hybrid’, as theories of postcolonialism would have it (Bhaba 1996). I will return to this aspect in chapter 5. Whereas container-metaphors normally construct Europe as the acting subject, most of the movement-metaphors in the examined corpus ascribe agency to Turkey: Turkey is sitting on the track, she is uncoupling herself. The only possibility expressed, the only reality constructed through this phrase is a movement of Turkey in the direction of Europe. The opposite, a Europe approaching Turkey, is not implied - it is not part of the reality constructions and thus outside possible ways of acting. Europe is the centre towards which all movement is oriented. Turkey is the periphery that is attracted by the centre. And she is not even allowed to move away from the centre: she may not uncouple her own wagon. It is revealing to recall the context of the statement: In protest against the Luxembourg resolution of the European Council, Turkey did not participate at the European Conference. The latter was held in London in March 1998 and was organised as part of the special rapprochement-strategy for Turkey. Interpreting Turkey’s decision as uncoupling, constructs Turkey as an uncertain European. Turkey is seen as turning away from Europe as soon as she is no longer satisfied with Europe’s decisions. Turkey’s reaction is not interpreted as a normal decision, but instead as a repudiation of Europe. This, again, gives evidence of how the question of accession was linked to the question of europeanness (proposition 1) and of the ambivalent assessment of Turkey’s europeanness (proposition 2).

“Identity and difference are inextricably entwined. You can not have one without the other (...) Interrogating identity is to highlight how ‘otherness’ is constructed” (Campbell 1992: 8). In this section I will explore some connections between the discourse under study here and the formation of European identity. In the introductory chapter the claim was made that European identity is constructed through the discourse about a possible EU accession of Turkey. This assumption is based on the discussion about the ‘self/othernexus’ in identity theory (Neumann 1996). The principle argument is the following: One’s identity is knowable only by knowing what one is not, by an awareness of difference. Only through an idea of what Europe is not, of who and what is not European, the concept of Europe is taking shape. Demarcation thus is a necessary component of identity building, in fact ‘othering’ is a core activity in the construction of identities (see for example: Neumann 1996; Hall 1997a: 229-237; Wagner 1998: 45; Smith 1992: 75). As far as this study is concerned, my discourse analysis should then not only help us to understand how the discourse constructs Turkey, but also how it constructs Europe. The latter, I strive to do by discussing six different, albeit related, aspects of the identity building going on in the discourse about Turkey’s EUaccession. *First* one may notice that the question of a possible EU-accession of Turkey triggered, or at least boosted, a debate on the future boundaries of the EU. In this context it has, for example, been warned that an EU-membership of Turkey would make the EU share a border with Iran and Iraq. Kinkel, however, opposed the fixing of the EU’s future borders (Kinkel-speech ‘Grenzfall Europa’, 1998). None the less he could not halt the linking of the two issues, especially by his government partners, the CDU/CSU. Through the reflection on who should be in- and who should be outside the EU, they were engaging in a process of identity construction. The second aspect focuses on identity formation through othering. In chapter 4 it was shown that the confirmation of Turkey’s europeanness on the texts’ surface did not match with the meaning created by the metaphors. The metaphors constructed Turkey as not truly European. Rather than being a clear-cut other, she was made a hybrid ‘inbetween space’.22 But this, too, involves othering. Some students of identity (Neumann 1996: 167; Hall 1997a: 236; Norton 1988) in fact argue that doubtful others of this kind are particularly interesting cases. Since the hybrid entities are relatively similar to it, the self needs to make a special effort to discursively construct some difference. The discourse constructing Turkey as a hybrid thus constructs an idea of Europe proper, it makes a distinction between Europe, of which Turkey may possibly be part of, and Europe proper, to which Turkey definitely does not belong. European identity, thirdly, is constructed through the presentation of Europe as a homogenous entity. Rather than differentiating between the various EU-memberstates, not to mention the Commission or the European Council, (EU-)Europe is constructed as a uniform actor that is facing Turkey. In fact, one could argue that this makes for a binary opposition Europe/Turkey (Doty 1996: 229). Binary oppositions make meaning from the difference between opposites, as in white/black or man/woman. The world thus established is void of nuances, its either black or white, but not grey (Hall 1997a: 235). Turkey and Europe thus become mutually exclusive. At the same time the binary opposition (EU-)Europe/Turkey makes Europe a nationstate- like entity, since the opposites are categories of the same level, like the pair man/woman, for example. The discourse thus constructs Europe as an entity that goes beyond a supranational organisation, constructing it as a quasi nation-state. Taking this point a bit further one can argue a fourth point: On the one hand the binary opposition raises the EU to the same level as Turkey, on the other side it also 18 establishes a power relation in favour of the EU. According to Derrida binary oppositions are rarely neutral. Instead they create and reflect a power relation, for instance by connotating one pole positively, the other negatively as is the case in man/woman or white/black (Hall 1997a: 235). I claim that the discourse under study here constructs a hierarchy of a superior (EU-)Europe and an inferior Turkey. Two considerations may help to justify this claim: On the one hand it is the agency-issue which has already been mentioned in chapter 4: There I argued that container-metaphors construct the EU as the agent which can decide about Turkey’s becoming member or not. Thus the EU is being constructed as active and capable of acting whereas Turkey is passive and acted upon. This creates identities based upon a difference of power. On the other hand the positive representation of (EU-)Europe in many of Kinkel’s statements may be recalled, contrasting with the negative representation of Turkey in some of his statements. Thus, a Europe is being constructed which one likes to identify with due to its positive connotations. A fifth identity constituting effect of the discourse is the equation of the EU with Europe. This aspect has already been pointed to in chapter 3: The discourse rarely makes a distinction between the EU and Europe, instead the two are used synonymously. This implies a cultural-geographical definition of the EU rather than a mere political one. Speaking of the EU as Europe underlines the importance of cultural and geographical characteristics, they are made the substance of (EU)European identity. The sixth and last aspect once more takes us back to the container-metaphors. They construct Europe in a way that creates a sense of unity and togetherness. Talking about Europe as if she was a family emotionalises people’s relation to Europe. Belonging to Europe is like belonging to a family. Thus container-metaphors create European identity by referring to the common origin of the family members. In sum, we may state that the discourse about Turkey’s possible accession to the EU becomes part of the discourse on European identity. The discourse about Turkey’s accession coincides frequently with reflecting upon the borders of Europe, a reflection that is part of the process of constructing European identity. Talking about Turkey’s EU-accession thus not only constitutes the object (Turkey), but also the subject (EUEurope).

Otherization

 The Western discourse on nuclear proliferation with relation Islamic countries is flooded with a fear of widespread Islamic terrorism and thus indicates our “domination” over the state of the “Islamic other”

Gusterson, 99 (Hugh, Associate Professor of Anthropology and Science and Technology Studies at MIT,  “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination,” JSTOR) PR

The Western discourse on nuclear proliferation is also permeated by a recurrent anxiety that Third World nations will use nuclear weapons to pursue religious squabbles and crusades. Commentators particularly fear an "Islamic bomb" and a Muslim holy war. Said (1978:287) identified the fear of a Muslim holy war as one of the cornerstones of orientalist ideology. Senator Edward Kennedy worries about a scenario in which "Libya, determined to acquire nuclear weapons, receives a gift of the Bomb from Pakistan as an act of Islamic solidarity" (1982:ix). Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan warns that "you could have an Islamic bomb in no time, and God have mercy on us" (Associated Press 1998). Mary McGrory fears that "nothing is more important than keeping the 'Islamic bomb' out of the hands of Iran. Let it be introduced into the Middle East and you can kiss the world we know goodbye" (1998a:A3). The San Francisco Examiner quotes an analyst who explained Saddam Hussein's willingness to forego $100 billion in oil revenues rather than end his nuclear weapons program by saying, "The single most important reason is Saddam's vision of his role in 126 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY history as a saviour of the Arab world. He is comparing himself with Saladin" (Kempster 1998:A17). Finally, syndicated columnist Morton Kondracke speculates about a despot "like the Shah of Iran" who "secretly builds an arsenal to increase his prestige": Then he is overthrown by a religious fanaticr esemblingt he AyatollahR uhollah Khomeini, who then uses some of the Shah's bombs to intimidate or destroy neighboringc ountries.A nd otherb ombsh e passes on to terroristst hat will use them to wage holy wars. Be gladt hati t didn'th appeni n reall ife. Buts omethingl ike it could. [1983] The Western discourse on proliferation also stresses the supposedly ancient quality of feuds and hatreds in South Asia and the Middle East. As British journalist Nigel Calder puts it, "In that troubled part of the world, where modern technology serves ancient bitterness and nuclear explosions seem like a just expression of the wrath of God, imagining sequences of events that could lead to a regional nuclear conflict is not difficult" (1979:83). Explaining why Pakistan named its new missile the Ghauri, Senator Moynihan said, "Ghauri was a Muslim prince who invaded India in the twelfth century. These things don't go away" (1998). "Nuclear missiles named for ancient warriors will probably be deployed by two nations with a history of warfare, religious strife, and a simmering border dispute," said an ABC News reporter (Wouters 1998). In this vein it was widely reported in the U.S. media that the Indian Prithvi missile was named after an ancient warrior-king and that India's Agni missile was named for the god of fire (e.g., Marquand 1998). This widely circulated claim is particularly striking because, while it resonates with our stereotypes of Hindus enslaved to religion and tradition, it is quite untrue. The word Prithvi means "world" or "earth," and Agni means fire itself and does not refer to a god. The Indians are naming their missiles after elements, not after warriors or gods (Ghosh 1998). Of course, if Western commentators were looking for a country that names its nuclear weapons after ancient gods and dead warriors, they need have looked no further than the United States, with its Jupiter, Thor, Poseidon, Atlas, Polaris, Minuteman, and Pershing missiles. After dictators and religious fanatics, the Western imagination is most afraid of Third World military officers. The academics Brito and Intriligator, for example, tell us that Third World governments might acquire nuclear weapons "mainly for deterrence purposes but might not be able to control such weapons once they were available .... Unilateral initiatives by junior officers could lead to these weapons going off" (Brito and Intriligator 1982:140). One finds the same presumption in the writings of Nigel Calder, who also worries about Third World military officers: "An American or Russian general in Europe is not going to let off the first nuclear weapon on his own initiative, even in the heat of battle, but will the same discipline apply to ... a Pakistani general who has a private nuclear theory about how to liberate Kashmir?" (1979:77). Oliver North notwithstanding, it is taken as so obvious it does not need explaining that Third World junior officers, unlike our own, are prone to take NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE OTHER 127 dangerous unilateral initiatives. Calder's passage only makes sense if one accepts the contrast it states as unquestionably natural. It is the kind of ideological statement that the French theorist Roland Barthes characterized as "falsely obvious" (1972:11). As Edward Said says, once a group has been orientalized, "virtually anything can be written or said about it, without challenge or demurral" (1978:287). This presumption that the Third World body politic cannot control its military loins is, I believe, a coded or metaphorical way of discussing a more general lack of control over impulses, a pervasive lack of discipline, assumed to afflict people of color. But what if one tries to turn these contrasts inside out, asking whether the historical behavior of the Western nuclear powers might also give rise to concerns about undemocratic nuclear bullying, religious fanaticism, and unilateral initiatives by military officers? Because of its contradictions, gaps, and silences, the discourse on proliferation can always be read backward so that our gaze is directed not toward the Other but toward the author. Then the flaws and double standards of the discourse are illuminated. Thus, instead of asking whether Third World countries can be trusted with nuclear weapons, one can ask, how safe are the official nuclear powers from coups d'etat, renegade officers, or reckless leaders?

Universalizing Western discourse destroys multiculturalism

Browning 1 (Christopher S. Browning Ph.D. Candidate Department of International Relations, University of Wales “The Region-Building Approach Revisited: The Continued Othering of Russia in Discourses of Region-Building in  the European North” [www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI\_publications/COPRI.../6-2001.doc](http://www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI_publications/COPRI.../6-2001.doc) ) MAH

More particularly the universalising, civilising discourse of Western cultural conceptions of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets and the separation of the church and state has been seen as denying the value of particularism between societies. As A. S. More particularly the universalising, civilising discourse of Western cultural conceptions of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets and the separation of the church and state has been seen as denying the value of particularism between societies. As A. S. In turn such critiques have provided foundations for Russians to conceptualise Russian national identity in terms of an opposition to Western discourses. As Panarin thus further notes, multiculturalism will only be preserved if the West is balanced by other cultural centres. Russia's mission must therefore be "to further multipolarity by creating a counterbalance to the monocentrism rooted in the power of the United States". Thus, what is perceived as the civilisational challenge of the West is to be met by constructing a Russian-centred civilisation in opposition, and one that rejects any connection of Russia and Russianness with Europe and Europeanness. Proclamations that Russia is not a part of the West are not hard to find. Pozdnyakov, for example, contended in 1991 that “Russia cannot return to Europe because it never belonged to it. Russia cannot join it because it is part of another type of civilization, another cultural and religious type”. Even pro-Western reformers in Russia have expressed doubts as to whether Russia will ever be able to make the transition to Western civilisation. Andrei Novikov, for example, has lamented thus:

Discourse Bad (NATO)

NATOs discourse is imperialist

Behnke 2000 (Andreas, Professor of Political Science, nternational Journal of Peace Studies, “Inscriptions of Imperial Order: NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative, http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol5\_1/behnke.htm) MJ

While sticking to our critical hermeneutics, **we might nonetheless flesh out the 'identification' of the South as a constitutive Othe**r. In November 1997, the RAND Corporation presented an 'authoritative study' on NATO's Mediterranean Initiative to the Alliance's top political and military authorities. **Its institutionalized intertextual relationship with NATO's discourse was established through the Opening Speech by Secretary General Solana at the RAND conference at which the report was submitted** (Solana 1997c), and a summary by the NATO Office of Information and Press in NATO Review (de Santis, 1998:32). Among the many issues and topics of the report, three aspects will receive particular attention here. Firstly, **the report constitutes a paradigmatic case of 'securitization' by rendering a particular region 'accessible' to the strategic gaze of a military alliance.**[10](http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol5_1/behnke.htm#Notes) Secondly**, the RAND study's 'problematization' of the 'proliferation' of Weapons of Mass Destruction** (WMD) **draws on and reproduces a specific mode of differentiation between the West and the South which is deeply indebted to 'orientalist' clichés**. Thirdly, **the resulting mode of exchange** (of information, trust, and knowledge) **is implicitly conceived as a hierarchical and monological one.** Overall, **the report emulates and reinforces NATO's imperial gesture in the Mediterranean Initiative**.

The discourse used by NATO is orientalist

Behnke 2000 (Andreas, Professor of Political Science, nternational Journal of Peace Studies, “Inscriptions of Imperial Order: NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative, http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol5\_1/behnke.htm) MJ

Two implications of these arguments deserve elaboration. First, there is **the reversal of the traditional relationship between WMD and rationality. For what makes the presence of WMD in the South so worrisome is the absence of the requirements of reason and rationality. Within NATO's discourse on the South, 'revolutionary orientation' accounts for the undesirability of distributing these weapons to such unfit hands**. In order to qualify for their possession, reason and rationality must be present -- as they are obviously assumed to be in the West. **The discourse of proliferation consequently produces a third entailment by constructing the relationship between West and South in 'orientalist' terms. In this rendition, the South becomes the quintessential antithesis of the West**, the site of irrationality, passion, and terror (Said, 1995). Within this site, different rules apply, which are not necessarily subject to Western ideals of enlightened reason. 'Proliferation' articulates a hierarchical structure in global politics, with the West as the privileged site of from which to surveil, control, and engage the rest of the world. **This privilege is further dramatized in the above complaint about the possibility of retaliation. For the South to achieve the possibility of influencing NATO decisionmaking is to violate the epistemic sovereignty of the West. 'U.S. and European actions' and interventions have to be unrestrained in order to constitute proper crisis management**. **NATO demands a docile subjectivity and accessible territory from the South, the latter's identity cannot be ascertained against the West. Its arms have to be surrendered, its retaliatory capabilities to be revoked. 'Information' is the third mode besides 'Securitization' and 'Proliferation' within which we can discern the subjugation of the South to the strategic Western gaze. A central purpose of the Mediterranean Initiative/Dialogue is to improve 'mutual understanding' and to 'dispel some of the misperceptions and apprehensions that exist, on both sides of the Mediterranean**' (Solana, 1997a:5). And both the RAND Corporation and NATO put some emphasis on public information and perception. Yet the structure of this relationship proves to be unbalanced and virtually unilateral. As mentioned above, for NATO, t**he prime task is above all the "further refinement of its definition of securit**y" (de Santis, 1998). **The general identity of the South as a site of danger and insecurity is consequently never in question. Western perceptions are never problematized. Knowledge of the South is, it appears, a matter of matching more and better information with proper conceptual tools.**

Discourse Bad (Proliferation)

Discourse using the word proliferation puts the blame on the ‘spread of weapons,’ not the external agents that actually spread them

Behnke 2000 (Andreas, Professor of Political Science, nternational Journal of Peace Studies, “Inscriptions of Imperial Order: NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative, http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol5\_1/behnke.htm) MJ

David Mutimer (1997) has argued that **the use of the metaphor 'proliferation' carries certain entailments**. That is to say, **it structures our understanding and handling of the problem**. In particular, he refers to **the "image of a spread outward from a point or source", and the "technological bias" introduced in the discourse** (Mutimer 1997:201-2). As concerns the first point, **'proliferation' presupposes a center at which WMD are to be held and controlled, and from which these weapons disseminate into the body of the international society**. **To the extent that this process gets out of the center's control, certain measures have to be taken to 'suffocate', limit, or curb the 'spread' of these weapons**. As concerns the second point, Mutimer (1997:203) points out the peculiar agency implied in the concept: "**Notice that the weapons themselves spread; they are not spread by an external agent of some form - say, a human being or political institution". The fact that a large number of these weapons were actually 'spread' by Western states is consequently hidden through this discursive structure**. These points are also relevant for the Mediterranean Initiative. We can add a third entailment to the list which appears through a critical reading of the NATO/RAND narrative. As the RAND authors (1998:15) observe, "The mere existence of ballistic missile technology with ranges in excess of 1,000 km on world markets and available to proliferators around the Mediterranean basin would not necessarily pose serious strategic dilemmas for Europe."

Discourse Bad (War)

The language of war entrenches the framework of the nation-state

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, 57, Project Muse) MJ

I was motivated to begin the larger project from which this essay derives by a number of concerns. I felt that **the available critical, interpretive or performative languages of war** -- realist and liberal international relations theories, just war theories, and various Clausewitzian derivations of strategy -- **failed us, because they either perform or refuse to place under suspicion the underlying political ontologies that I have sought to unmask and question here. Many realists have quite nuanced and critical attitudes to the use of force, but ultimately affirm strategic thought and remain embedded within  the existential framework of the nation-state. Both liberal internationalist and just war doctrines seek mainly to improve the accountability of decision-making in security affairs and to limit some of the worst moral enormities of war, but (**apart from the more radical versions of cosmopolitanism) **they fail to question the ontological claims of political community or strategic theory**.**[82](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn82%22%20%5Co%20%22)**

Discource Bad (Policy Maker)

The current policymaking discourse leads us to make irrational decisions that are ineffective and ignore other discourses.

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, 18,19, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory\_and\_event/v010/10.2burke.html) MJ

What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that **the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity** -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- **derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being**. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe**, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die**. Viewed in this light, **'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints** -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- **and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic**.

The policy analysis entrenches the security paradigm, we need to look to alternative ways of thinking

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, 63, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory\_and\_event/v010/10.2burke.html) MJ

**When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined** (sometimes quite wilfully) **within the overarching strategic and security paradigms**. Or, more hopefully, **policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action**.[90](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn90%22%20%5Co%20%22)

Discourse Bad (Security)

Deterrence discourse conceptualizes the “enemy” as a comparison to idyllic self and assumes mutual deterrence

Allan 88 (Stuart, Department of Sociology, Carleton University Carleton University, Talking our Extinction to Death: Nuclear Discourse and the News Media, CANADIAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION, VOL. 14, NO. 1)OLW

Further attempts to dismantle the 'theory of deterrence' as an ideological construct include the work of Van Belle and Claes (1985) who offer an examination of 'NATO' defence policy where 'words play as big a part as arms'. The 'official doctrine of NATO policy' is based on 'mutual deterrence', the logic of which they contend rests on a confusion between "the most spiritual power—belief—with the most material power—destruction by nuclear arms" (Van Belle and Claes, 1985: 99). By assuming a perspective on deterrence which defines it as a semiotic behavior, the authors are able to analyze the 'psycho-logic' of the notion: firstly, in terms of closed systems of inference; secondly, in terms of culturally entrenched stereotypes and stories, and; fmally, in terms of 'psycho-pathological relations' between persons (1985: 95-101). NATO's 'deterrence discourse', they conclude, connotes that the 'enemy' or the 'other' is not seen as a 'real' other; rather it is always compared with an 'ideal image' of self (e.g. 'democracy' or 'freedom'), thus the dominant notion of deterrence is itself based upon a 'fundamental mistrust' (1985: 101). If the 'spiral of armament' is to be stopped, this mistrust must be eliminated through the development of an international dialogue that has as its subject the politics of deterrence itself (1985: 101). Kress (1985) offers a complementary approach to the 'politics of deterrence' for­mulation by placing a new emphasis on the capacity of language to function as a form of 'social action'. Abasic anti-Soviet attitude, he contends, is present in all pm-nuclear deterrent texts (or constructed by its absence). Therefore, to devise strategies to alter the present ideological determinations of these texts, the social determination of lin­guistic practice must be theorized without precluding individual differences vis-a-vis the reader's role (Kress, 1985: 66-67, 81-84). Strictly defined efforts to explicate lin­guistic action can not, he *insists,* account for how such arguments are embedded in those discourses which constitute the social life of most individuals, including discour­ses of work, the family, morality, nationalism, sexism and patriarchy (1985: 84). }Cress's conclusion is thus similar to that of Van Belle and Claes to the extent that the very basis of the motivating ideology of pro-nuclear texts must be analytically privileged if the long-term ideological-political realignments articulated through strategic texts are to be brought about (1985: 84-86).

TNWs=deterrence

US TNW withdraw from Turkey would be perceived as major decrease in security and Russian deterrence

Heritage Foundation 10 (President Obama Must Not Remove Nuclear Weapons from Europe, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/03/President-Obama-Must-Not-Remove-Nuclear-Weapons-from-Europe>) MAH

In April 2009—less than three months into his term of office—President Barack Obama laid out the centerpiece of his foreign policy vision for his Administration: the global eradication of nuclear weapons. Citing America’s atomic strikes against the Japanese Empire during World War II, President Obama stated that America has a “moral responsibility” to walk the “road to zero.” This ideological positioning has set off a series of calls from European leaders for the removal of America’s nuclear arsenal from European soil. At this time, however, a withdrawal of America’s nuclear arsenal from [Europe](http://www.heritage.org/Places/Europe) would send the message that transatlantic security is no longer indivisible. It would also give Moscow a blank check to pursue its long-sought-after sphere of privileged interest and, ironically, could pave the way for further nuclear proliferation. The destabilization brought to the European continent from a premature removal of American nuclear weapons, or an unacceptable degradation of its force, would be a major setback for global security and stability

The United States uses TNWs in Turkey as deterrence

**Kibaroglu 10** (Mustafa, prof at Dep of Int Relations at Bilkent Univ, Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010\_06/Kibaroglu#bio) MJ

NATO is revising its Strategic Concept; the alliance is due to complete work on the document in November. **A key issue in the revision is the deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe as part of the alliance’s policy of extended nuclear deterrence. Although Turkey has long been in agreement with its allies on the value of these forward deployments, it may soon find itself in a delicate position on the question of how to continue the policy effectively**. With other NATO countries such as Luxembourg and Norway supporting them, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands have indicated a desire to reassess the case for continued deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on their territories. Should these countries advocate withdrawal of U.S. weapons from Europe, **Turkish decision-makers might conclude that two fundamental principles of the alliance, namely solidarity and burden sharing, have been seriously weakened. Those principles have been the basis for Turkey’s agreement, since the early 1960s, to the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on its soil.** The issue is contentious within NATO, which makes its decisions by consensus—an approach that was reaffirmed by the alliance’s foreign ministers at an April meeting in Tallinn, Estonia, and by an Experts Group report released in May. Although final decisions on the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons probably are not imminent, the debate has already been joined, and Turkey should be an active participant. If Turkey continues to sit on the sidelines of that debate, as it has done until now, it could find itself in an uncomfortable spot: A decision to remove the U.S. weapons from Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands would likely leave Turkey and Italy as the only NATO members with foreign nuclear weapons on their soil.[[1](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_06/Kibaroglu#1)] Such a situation would put pressure on Turkey to reverse its long-standing policy of hosting U.S. nuclear weapons on its territory—even more so if the U.S. nuclear weapons are removed from Italy as well. Turkey’s calculus must include an additional element because it has Middle Eastern neighbors that are a source of concern to some allies but with whom Turkey is developing increasingly close diplomatic ties after a long period of animosity that extended beyond the end of Cold War rivalry. **The most sensible course for Turkey is to support the efforts of other host nations to create a consensus within the alliance that would lead to a withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe. That step would help Ankara to continue cultivating relationships with its non-European neighbors and could be achieved without undermining extended nuclear deterrence.**

United States has left TNWs in Turkey to keep deterrence against surrounding countries

**Kibaroglu 10** (Mustafa, prof at Dep of Int Relations at Bilkent Univ, Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010\_06/Kibaroglu#bio) MJ

**Turkey has hosted U.S. nuclear weapons since intermediate-range Jupiter missiles were deployed there in 1961 as a result of decisions made at the alliance’s 1957 Paris summit**. Those missiles were withdrawn in 1963 in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis. Since then, no nuclear missiles have been stationed in Turkey. The only nuclear weapons that have been deployed are the bombs that would be delivered by U.S. F-16s or Turkish F-100, F-104, and F-4 “Phantom” aircraft at air bases in Eskisehir, Malatya (Erhac), Ankara (Akinci/Murted), and Balikesir.[[12](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_06/Kibaroglu#12)] All such weapons, whether on U.S. or Turkish aircraft, have been under the custody of the U.S. Air Force. **Turkey still hosts these U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on its territor**y, albeit in much smaller numbers.[[13](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_06/Kibaroglu#13)] They are limited to one location, the Incirlik base near Adana on the eastern Mediterranean coast of Turkey.[[14](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_06/Kibaroglu#14)] All other nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from the bases mentioned above.[[15](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_06/Kibaroglu#15)] Moreover, **the Turkish air force no longer has any operational link with the remaining tactical nuclear weapons deployed at Incirlik**.[[16](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_06/Kibaroglu#16)] F-104s have not been in service since 1994. F-4s are still in service after modernization of some 54 of them by Israeli Aerospace Industries in 1997. Yet, only the F-16 “Fighting Falcons” of the Turkish air force participate in NATO`s nuclear strike exercises known as “Steadfast Noon,” during which crews are trained in loading, unloading, and employing B61 tactical nuclear weapons.[[17](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_06/Kibaroglu#17)] The Turkish aircraft in these exercises serve as a non-nuclear air defense escort rather than a nuclear strike force.[[18](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_06/Kibaroglu#18)] **There were two main reasons for Turkey to host U.S. nuclear weapons. First and foremost has been the deterrent value of these weapons against the threat posed by the nuclear and conventional weapons capabilities of its enormous neighbor, the Soviet Union**, during the Cold War. Similarly, after the Cold War, **these weapons were believed by Turkish military commanders to constitute a credible deterrent against rival neighbors in the Middle** East, such as Iran, Iraq, and Syria, which used to have unconventional weapons capabilities as well as delivery vehicles such as ballistic missiles.[[19](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_06/Kibaroglu#19)] **A second reason for Turkey to host U.S. nuclear weapons has been the burden-sharing principle within the alliance.** Turkey has strongly subscribed to this principle since it joined NATO in 1952. In fact, Turkey had already displayed unequivocally its willingness to share the burden of defending the interests of the Western alliance by committing a significant number of troops to the Korean War in 1950, even before NATO membership was in sight.

TNWs=deterrence

US and NATOP TNWs used for deterrence

Bell and Loehrke 9(Alexandra and Benjamin, Ploughshares Fund, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey)

**For more than 40 years, Turkey has been a quiet custodian of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons**. During the Cold War, Washington positioned intermediate-range nuclear missiles and bombers there to serve as a bulwark against the Soviet Union (i.e., to defend the region against Soviet attack and to influence Soviet strategic calculations). In the event of a Soviet assault on Europe, the weapons were to be fired as one of the first retaliatory shots. But as the Cold War waned, so, too, did the weapons' strategic value. Thus, over the last few decades, the United States has removed all of its intermediate-range missiles from Turkey and reduced its other nuclear weapons there through gradual redeployments and arms control agreements. **Today, Turkey hosts an estimated 90 B61 gravity bombs at Incirlik Air Base.** Fifty of these bombs are [reportedly](http://nukestrat.com/pubs/EuroBombs.pdf) PDF assigned for delivery by U.S. pilots, and forty are assigned for delivery by the Turkish Air Force. However, no permanent nuclear-capable U.S. fighter wing is based at Incirlik, and the Turkish Air Force is [reportedly](http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/stockholm/06123.pdf) PDF not certified for NATO nuclear missions, meaning nuclear-capable F-16s from other U.S. bases would need to be brought in if Turkey's bombs were ever needed. Such a relaxed posture makes clear just how little NATO relies on tactical nuclear weapons for its defense anymore. In fact, the readiness of NATO's nuclear forces now is measured in months as opposed to hours or days. Supposedly**, the weapons are still deployed as a matter of deterrence, but the crux of deterrence is sustaining an aggressor's perception of guaranteed rapid reprisal--a perception the nuclear bombs deployed in Turkey cannot significantly add to because they are unable to be rapidly launched.** Aggressors are more likely to be deterred by NATO's conventional power or the larger strategic forces supporting its nuclear umbrella.

Criticism of Deterrence

The United States posture themselves as defensive and benign so that anyone who withdraws from the nuclear paradigm of only we get the nukes can be labeled villainous- then we use this as justification to attack the “villain”

Zizek 5 (Slavoj, In These Times, August 11, http://www.lacan.com/zizekiranian.htm) MJ

**Classic power functioned as a threat that operated precisely by never actualizing itself, by always remaining a threatening gesture**. Such functioning reached its climax in the Cold War, when the threat of mutual nuclear destruction had to remain a threat. **With the "war on terror", the invisible threat causes the incessant actualization, not of the threat itself, but, of the measures against the threat. The nuclear strike had to remain the threat of a strike, while the threat of the terrorist strike triggers the endless series of preemptive strikes against potential terrorists**. **We are thus passing from the logic of MAD** (Mutually Assured Destruction) **to a logic in which ONE SOLE MADMAN runs the entire show and is allowed to enact its paranoia. The power that presents itself as always being under threat, living in mortal danger, and thus merely defending itself, is the most dangerous kind of power**-the very model of the Nietzschean ressentiment and moralistic hypocrisy. And indeed, it was Nietzsche himself who, more than a century ago, in Daybreak, provided the best analysis of the false moral premises of today's "war on terror": **No government admits any more that it keeps an army to satisfy occasionally the desire for conquest**. Rather, the army is supposed to serve for defense, and one invokes the morality that approves of self-defense. But this implies one's own morality and the neighbor's immorality; for **the neighbor must be thought of as eager to attack and conquer if our state must think of means of self-defense**. **Moreover, the reasons we give for requiring an army imply that our neighbor, who denies the desire for conquest just as much as our own state, and who, for his part, also keeps an army only for reasons of self-defense, is a hypocrite and a cunning criminal who would like nothing better than to overpower a harmless and awkward victim without any fight.** **Thus all states are now ranged against each other: they presuppose their neighbor's bad disposition and their own good disposition. This presupposition, however, is inhumane, as bad as war and worse. At bottom, indeed, it is itself the challenge and the cause of wars**, **because as I have said, it attributes immorality to the neighbor and thus provokes a hostile disposition and act**. We must abjure the doctrine of the army as a means of self-defense just as completely as the desire for conquests. Is not the ongoing "war on terror" proof that "terror" is the antagonistic Other of democracy-the point at which democracy's plural options turn into a singular antagonism? Or, as we so often hear, "In the face of the terrorist threat, we must all come together and forget our petty differences." More pointedly, **the difference between the "war on terror" with previous 20th century worldwide struggles such as the Cold War is that the enemy used to be clearly identified with the actually existing Communist empire, whereas today the terrorist threat is inherently spectral**, without a visible center. It is a little bit like the description of Linda Fiorentino's character in The Last Seduction: "Most people have a dark side ... she had nothing else." Most regimes have a dark oppressive spectral side ... the terrorist threat has nothing else. **The paradoxical result of this spectralization of the enemy is an unexpected reflexive reversal. In this world without a clearly identified enemy, it is the United States, the protector against the threat, that is emerging as the main enemy**-much like in Agatha Christie's Murder on the Orient-Express, where, since the entire group of suspects is the murderer, the victim himself (an evil millionaire) turns out to be the real criminal.

Deterrence Bad

Deterrence theory becomes invalid as nuclear secrecy makes discourse become interpretive

Taylor 07 (Bryan, University of Colorado prof. and grad fellow Univ. Utah, Presidential Studies Quarterly, The Means to Match Their Hatred, <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6387/is_200712/ai_n32246236/pg_5/?tag=content;col1>) BAF

To varying degrees, these critiques all assert a fundamental incompatibility between nuclear weapons and the ideals of the democratic state. They argue that oppressive conditions surrounding the development of nuclear weapons subvert the capabilities of citizens to acquire, deliberate, and act on information concerning nuclear policy. As a result, the nuclear public is characterized as fragmented, alienated, uninformed, and unable to participate in deliberation with forceful and reasoned discourse. Commonly listed elements in this indictment include: an official regime of secrecy which suppresses and distorts nuclear information; official cultivation of a climate of permanent emergency that promotes public inertia and acquiescence to authoritarian rule; undue deference by nominal agents of congressional oversight to the interests of military elites and corporate defense contractors; a timid and amnesiac news media; and official demonization of anti-nuclear dissent as extreme, irrelevant, and unpatriotic (Rosen 1989). "This long train of official lies," argues James Stegenga (1988, 89), "has made truly informed consent an impossibility" (emphasis in original). These critiques grow more valuable as they conceptualize the relationships between rhetoric, democracy, and nuclear weapons. One provocative claim here addresses how, under conditions of MAD, all aspects of postwar American society were enrolled in the semiotic project of signifying to the Communist enemy both capability and willingness to use nuclear weapons in the national defense. Rhetorical scholars have largely failed to appreciate how, under these conditions, the demos itself was conscripted and disciplined as an element in this apparatus: The continuous task of the president and his subordinates is to make their essentially incredible threats seem credible. So leaders have wanted to present themselves as speaking forcefully on behalf of a monolithically supportive American population. Naysayers needed to be discouraged, the democratic debate on these matters minimized, in the interest of promoting the credibility of the threats. The people are meant or supposed to avoid thinking about or speaking out on these matters. (Stegenga 1988, 89, emphasis in original; see also Bok 1989) Clarifying this condition helps us to conceptualize nuclear weapons as an ontological tangle of discursive and material phenomena. It also establishes that-far from being a mere adornment of policy language-rhetoric is an inherent, inevitable, and reflexive challenge for the nuclear nation-state. Official rhetoric, in other words, must be developed and deployed in tandem with nuclear weapons to ensure that the whispers, conversation, and shouts of the people do not subvert the principal-and, according to Jacques Derrida's (1984) famous critique, sole-function of those weapons as rhetoric. This interdependency between security and rhetoric is further clarified in arguments conceptualizing nuclear weapons as a legitimation crisis for the liberal-democratic nation-state (Deudney 1995, 209). Rosow (1989) argues that traditional conceptualization of nuclear deterrence as a strategic issue obscures its status as "a system of social relations" (564). In adopting this alternate perspective, Rosow argues, we may reclaim nuclear weapons from official discourses that have sheared off from their necessary grounding in-and authorization by-the discourses of the nuclear life world: "[Strategic] debate scarcely touches on the experience of nuclear deterrence as a cultural and political-economic production. . . . The result is a serious discontinuity between the claims on which the validity of nuclear policy rests . . . and the actual effects of nuclear deterrence on the material well-being and consciousness in the advanced capitalist West" (564). Rosow's argument establishes the democratic status of nuclear weapons as a rhetorical problem: he conceptualizes nuclear deterrence as a discourse composed of "interpretive claims" and imperative expressions and theorizes its mediation of both institutional structures and forms of identity. Viewed in this light, we can recognize how, as artifacts, nuclear weapons clarify a fundamental contradiction between their destructive potential and their legitimating cultural discourses: "The same forces that are to produce peace and prosperity, i.e., science, knowledge, rationality, also produce the tools for destroying the very civilization they are designed to protect and whose values and future they embody." Richard FaIk (1982, 9) has suggested the implications of this condition for a nuclear-rhetorical democracy: "Normative opposition to nuclear weapons or doctrines inevitably draws into question the legitimacy of state power and is, therefore, more threatening to governmental process than a mere debate about the property of nuclear weapons as instruments of statecraft." As a result, Rosow concludes, changes in nuclear policy may exacerbate inherent conflict between "the [cultural] consciousness of democratic citizenship" and the legitimacy of the state (1989, 581). As the state increasingly rests its security on weapons systems requiring centralized control and automated decision making, it becomes increasingly difficult to assert that the legitimacy of those weapons arises from authentic popular consent. Fault lines in this hegemony are opened when public rhetoric informs Americans about the international consequences of nuclear imperialism and encourages their identification with negatively affected groups. In the post-Cold War era, Rosow predicted, it will become increasingly difficult for the state to normalize nuclear weapons as a familiar and legitimate icon.

Deterrence Bad

Taking an action with the intention to kill is immoral

Lee 85 (Steven, Dir of School Psychology Program-UK, Ethics, 95(3), p. 552)MJ

But our interest is in the institution of nuclear deterrence. Nuclear deterrence must accord with PMSI if it is to be morally justified. In order to determine whether it so accords, we should begin by examining it from a nonconsequentialist perspective. **Nuclear deterrence is frequently claimed to be unacceptable from a non-consequentialist perspective on the following argument: it is wrong to kill innocent persons; because retaliation with nuclear weapons would inevitably kill innocent persons, nuclear deterrence involves the intention to kill innocent persons; but it is wrong to intent what it would be wrong to do; therefore nuclear deterrence is morally unacceptable**

Nuclear deterrence causes hostage holding that is immoral on many levels.

Lee 85 (Steven, Dir of School Psychology Program-UK, Ethics, 95(3), p. 553-554)MJ

Without entering into the debate over these two objections, we can see the advantage there would be in a nonconsequentialist argument against nuclear deterrence that avoided them. There is such an argument. **It can be found by attending not to the moral status of the intentions involved in the policy of nuclear deterrence but directly to the moral status of the activity that involves having those intentions. This is an activity of threatening**, but threatening of a special kind. **The threat is largely against innocent third parties, persons who would not be responsible for the actions prompting the nuclear retaliation**. The persons whose behavior the threat seeks to control, the opponent's military and political leaders, are for the most part not the persons on whom harm would be visited should the threat be carried out. This kind of threat may be referred to as a third-party threat. **The making of a third-party threat is the holding of hostages, and nuclear deterrence, like vicarious pun-ishment, is an institution of hostage holdin**g.8 **It is often noted that nuclear deterrence is a policy of holding hostage the population of one's opponent to the good behavior of its leaders, but the moral implications of this have not always been fully appreciated**.9 What is morally wrong with hostage holding? The basis of the non-consequentialist objection to hostage holding can be seen in the following terms. Hostages are persons threatened with harm without their consent in order to control the behavior of some other person or group. First, **central to the moral wrongness of hostage holding is that the persons threatened are not the same as the persons whose behavior the threatener seeks to control** (i.e., the threat is a third-party threat). **Those threatened are innocent in the sense that they generally have no control over, nor responsibility for, the behavior of the persons the threatener seeks to control.** It is this feature of innocence and not the illegitimacy of the threatener's demands that makes hostage holding wrong. If the tax man threatens your spouse unless you surrender your money, this is just as much a case of hostage holding as if a gunman does the same thing. **Second, hostages are persons who are threatened, and the moral wrongness of hostage holding results from the fact that they are threatened, whether or not the threat is carried out**. What is wrong with the mere threat is that it imposes a risk of harm on the hostages, whether or not the potential harm is actualized through the threat's being carried out. Otherwise, the moral wrongness of hostage holding would be dissolved by the success of the threat, which is absurd. Just as it is wrong to harm someone who is not deserving of harm, it is wrong to create or increase the risk that such a person will be harmed. **Third, hostages are those on whom a risk of harm is imposed without their consent. Third-party threats are morally wrong only insofar as the third parties have not consented to the imposition of the threat**. If I pledge someone else's fidelity with my life or put up bail for someone else in jail, I have consented to the threat imposed on me by the authorities to control the behavior of that other person. I am not being held hostage, and there may be nothing wrong with a third-party threat in this kind of case.

Deterrence Bad

The ethics of deterrence is immoral

Bulletin of Peace Proposals 84(Security Dialogue, 15(3)) MJ

The ethics of deterrence are the ethics of threatening to do something which one believes would be immoral, which one intends to do only in circumstances which will not arise because of the conditional threat. In analyzing this issue we begin by noting that what is threatened is a response to aggression by means which we have already suggested cannot be morally acceptable. i.e. by military actions which cannot but harm civilians and be disproportionate. If making this threat means that the West will take these actions should occasion arise, and occasion might arise, the West has implicitly agreed to act immorally in certain possible circumstances. Such a conditional intention implies that one has consented in one’s mind to act immorally. For moral theology, sin is completed in act but begins in consent, and the consent to act immorally, even though the act be never performed, is already sinful.

The idea of using nuclear deterrence to threaten to kill innocent people is immoral

Megorden 00 (Kima, Epistemology of Nuclear Deterrence, http://isme.tamu.edu/JSCOPE01/Megorden01.html#\_edn1) MJ

The present method of avoiding nuclear, biological, and/or chemical attack is deterrence strategy. The indiscriminate nature of nuclear weapons contribute to the moral absurdity of nuclear deterrence reflected in the efficacy of the intention to indiscriminately kill another nation’s innocents to prevent the indiscriminate killing of a nation’s own innocents. Basic nuclear deterrence is dependant upon on this threat of an immoral attack. This method of avoiding a morally problematic form of warfare has a significant moral tension in itself – between its evil intentions and the likely evil it is intended to prevent. Nuclear deterrence prevents the deaths of innocents in general, yet its mere presence risks nuclear annihilation of those same innocents.

**The premise of a threat created by deterrence is immoral**

Megorden 00 (Kima, Epistemology of Nuclear Deterrence, http://isme.tamu.edu/JSCOPE01/Megorden01.html#\_edn1) MJ

Deterrence is based on the premise of a threat – the philosophy of supreme emergency only concedes a bit of morality to the end consequence of a failed deterrence. Supreme emergency does provide a token of moral justification for the action, but does not solve the moral quandary of the simple threat of deterrence. The evil intention in itself is not resolved by supreme emergency. No matter how imminent or serious the situation, the problem of the immorality of the threat itself is not resolved. Supreme Emergency does make progress in the search for moral justification by providing a form of a moral scapegoat that claims ad hoc necessity. Clearly, supreme emergency is an imperfect way of making an action seem a bit more moral. However, there must be work done in the area of intentions to alleviate the sense of immorality in the intention to kill innocent civilians, no matter what the ad hoc justification for the killings are.

Deterrence Bad

The concept of nuclear deterrence is unethical because it is used with the intention to murder

Barton and Weiler 76 (John and Lawrence, Stanford Law School fac and Stanford Arms Ctl Grp, International Arms Control, p. 130-131) MJ

The most striking criticism is the ethical one. The concept of deterrence leads to targeting on population centers, which are held as innocent hostages. But one of the most traditional ethical principles of war, reflected in much of the law of war, is a duty to spare the innocent. As Vatican II stated in 1965, “Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their population is a crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation.” Similarly, Protestant thinker Paul Ramsey drew on traditional just-war theory to present two principles for the conduct of war; “(a) the principle of discrimination or the moral immunity of non-combatants from intended direct attack, and (b) the principle of proportion or prudence, or the requirement that costs in destruction accepted and exacted be warranted by benefits there is reasonable expectation of gaining.” Dr. Ramsey did not hesitate to draw the implication that the Vatican Council had left unstated: “To put the point bluntly, if counter-population warfare is murder, then counter-population deterrent threats are murderous.” Under traditional standards, nuclear deterrence is unethical.

Deterrence is immoral—its intent is to murder innocent people

**Lee 90 (**Stephen**,** Dir of School Psychology Program-UK, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19(1), p.94) MJ

**The authors conclude that nuclear deterrence is morally prohibited and should be abandoned immediately.** Because mutual nuclear disar-mament cannot be achieved at once, the West must proceed unilaterally**. They base their argument for this on their view of common morality and on their conclusion that nuclear deterrence involves an intention to kill innocents.** They also argue that Soviet domination is likely if the West abandons nuclear weapons. In their view, those who have prescribed unilateral nuclear disarmament have generally not faced the facts about the nature of Soviet power. The main strength of their analysis, as they see it, is that they squarely face these facts, yet hold fast to the moral demand that nuclear deterrence be abandoned.

**Nuclear deterrence swamps the goals in the interest of humanity**

Lee 96 (Stephen, Dir of School Psychology Program-UK , Morality, Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons, pg. 42) MJ

**The confluence between morality and prudence demonstrated by the consequentialist argument means a joining of the discourses of realism and morality on nuclear deterrence, because the risk of nuclear war swamps any consideration of realist goals that might be opposed to the general interests of humanity**. But it would be too quick to claim that this succeeds in avoiding the conflict between morality and prudence, for only half of everyday moral reasoning has been heard from. **One cannot claim that nuclear deterrence is overall morally permissible or required without also taking into account the deontological approach**. This approach we must now again assume.

Deterrence Bad

Deterrence is immoral- reduces populations to means

Lee 96 (Stephen, Dir of School Psychology Program-UK , Morality, Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons, pg. 46, 47) MJ

Nuclear deterrence is hostage holding in the sense that it exhibits those features that make hostage holding morally wrong. In a condition of mutual vulnerability, each side threatens the other with societal destruction, which would involve the killing of a large number of its civilians. Most of these people are third parties in the threat transaction, because they are not the agents of the behavior the threatener is seeking to control. Nor have they consented to the imposition of the risk. The threat of their being killed creates a risk of harm to those persons. The threat cannot be a bluff, and there is no guarantee that the threat will succeed, so retaliation may occur. The risk is compounded by the real possibility that a nuclear war will start accidentally, just as the risk to airline hostages is compounded by the possibility that the hijacker’s bomb will accidentally go off. Given enough time, the possibility of deterrence failure or accident is not negligible, so the risk is real. The creation of the risk, along with the innocent and nonconsenting status of the hostages, puts the policy at odds with the injunction not to treat persons as mere means. The kind of behavior the hostage holder seeks from the second party may or may not be something the hostage holder is morally or legally entitled to demand, but hostage holding is wrong in any case. Hostage holders’ demands are often illegitimate, but that is not what makes what they do wrong. For example, holding hostages in demand of money is wrong even if the money rightfully belongs to the hostage holder. The tax collector threatening your children with harm unless you pay the government what you legitimately owe it is as much a hostage holder as a mugger threatening your children with harm if you do not hand over your wallet, and the action of each is to that extent morally wrong. Thus, nuclear deterrence cannot be justified by the fact that the behavior the threatening nation seeks from its opponent – nonaggression – is something to which the nation is morally entitle.

**Nuclear deterrence is immoral because it treats civilians as a means**

Lee 96 (Stephen, Dir of School Psychology Program-UK , Morality, Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons, pg. 50) MJ

The moral objection to nuclear deterrence as hostage holding is not simply that risk is created, but that that risk is used in a morally unacceptable way, that those put at risk are used as mere means. This objection applies because nuclear deterrence is based on the threat of societal destruction. Conventional military deterrence is not based on such a threat, so the risk posed to civilians by conventional war is not the principal element on which conventional deterrence is based. Conventional deterrence is based primarily on the threat of denial, whereas nuclear deterrence is based primarily on the threat of punishment. A threat of punishment treats civilians as a means because it uses the risk to them to achieve deterrence, whereas the threat of denial does not do this. So even if nuclear threats lower the overall level of risk to their hostages, this does not blunt the chief moral objection to the risk the threats create.

**Deterrence Strategy Outdated**

Deterrence is outdated—Cold War

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 10 **(**The U.S. Role in South Asia's Nuclear Deterrence, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=news.item&news\_id=586568)

Over the past few decades, the United States has lent a helping hand to defuse Indo-Pakistani crises, particularly the 1990 Kashmir crisis, the 1999 Kargil conflict, the 2001-2002 India-Pakistan military standoff, and the 2008 Mumbai terrorism crisis. “All of these incidents had nuclear implications, and the United States was a powerful factor in diffusing the tension,” said Wilson Center Fellow Bhumitra Chakma. “It’s difficult to know what might have happened if the United States was not a [stabilizing] force.” Each incident had the potential to escalate and yield dangerous consequences. Chakma, a lecturer and director of the South Asia project at the University of Hull in England, said much of the literature about nuclear deterrence was created during the Cold War in the context of U.S.-Soviet bilateral nuclear relations. Chakma said this analytical model is outdated and should not be used when explaining the nuclear issue between India and Pakistan. Unfortunately, he added, analysts have used the Cold War framework to interpret South Asia’s nuclear deterrence. “It is wrong to use the Cold War deterrence framework,” he said. “A broad multi-layered nuclear landscape has emerged after the Cold War. We are now in a second nuclear age.” Today, he said, nuclear deterrence must be analyzed in light of a new and complex nuclear environment. There are great powers with overwhelming nuclear capabilities; there are middle-range nuclear powers, regional nuclear weapons states, aspirant nuclear weapons states, and non-state actors who seek nuclear weapons, all of which constitute different categories of nuclear deterrence. “The nuclear landscape has changed and we need to reassess what is nuclear deterrence,” Chakma said. “The old definition no longer applies. We need to rethink our understanding of it and reformulate our strategies.” He noted the new global nuclear order, particularly paying attention to the more recent nuclear weapons powers. One major difference between developed countries with nuclear capability and such countries as India and Pakistan is that these South Asian countries are not wealthy nor are they technologically advanced, said Chakma. They lack the resources to develop a robust command and control system, which puts the entire security of their nuclear assets into question. Recognizing this danger, the United States is providing technological expertise and advice to help Pakistan develop its command and control systems. There is little chance of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands from sources in India, said Chakma. “But assistance to Pakistan is in the U.S. national interest,” he said. “In Pakistan, there is the possibility of these weapons falling into the wrong hands either because of state fragility or by rogue nuclear scientists or rogue military commanders. If terrorists obtain nuclear weapons from Pakistan, their first target would be the United States.” Chakma contends that the Untied States, given its friendship with India and Pakistan, has acted like a neutral referee in South Asian crises, preventing tensions from escalating. The United States, he said, has come to provide a third dimension, acting as a powerful factor in South Asia’s nuclear deterrence. The U.S. role in the South Asian nuclear landscape is likely to remain similar to that of the past for the foreseeable future.

**Deterrence Strategy Outdated**

**Deterrence fails-terrorism**

Art and Waltz 4 (Robert and Kenneth, Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University and faculty at Columbia University, The use of force: military power and international politics, pg 325) MJ

The third element of the new strategy maintains that the Cold War concept of deterrence is outdated. Deterrence, sovereignty, and the balance of power work together. When deterrence is no longer viable, the larger realist edifice starts to crumble. The threat today is not other great powers that must be managed through second-strike nuclear capacity but the transnational terrorist networks that have no home address. They cannot be deterred because they are either willing to die for their cause or able to escape retaliation. The old defensive strategy of building missiles and other weapons that can survive a first strike and be used in a retaliatory strike to punish the attacker will no longer ensure security. The only option, then, is offense.

Deterrence fails-rogue states

**Colby 7** (Elbridge, Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Restoring Deterrence, Orbis, pg 414) MJ

At the same time, **the question of the role of deterrence has taken on renewed salience abroad. In the Middle East, Iran appears to be proceeding full bore towards developing a nuclear weapons capability, shielded by the smoke and mirrors of its talented negotiators**. In the Far East, **the truculent North Korean regime has called the American bluff and tested a nuclear weapon, becoming the world’s most recent member of the** (public) **nuclear club. The threat of massive WMD terrorist attacks against the United States continues, with new revelations of terrorist plots** in Britain and elsewhere **only reaffirming the peril Al Qaeda and its brood pose. And**, of course, **the United States continues to face strategic challenges of a lesser magnitude worldwide**, from China’s developing military through Russia’s threat to lower its nuclear threshold in the event of war to Venezuelan potentate Hugo Chavez’ blustery pledges to become Latin America’s first nuclear power. **Familiar voices**, including the Vice President’s and much of the neoconservative commentariat, **continue to intone that deterrence will not work and that America must take preventive action to eradicate the most extreme of these gathering threat**s. But there are new players, too. Even a well-respected technocrat like former Secretary of Defense William Perry has called for preventive strikes against North Korea weapons sites.3 **Indeed, that deterrence is no longer a reliable policy for the United States seems to have become almost conventional wisdom**.

**Deterrence Strategy Outdated**

Our idea of deterrence is outdated

Manwaring 1(Max, Strategic Studies Institute, Deterrence in the 21st century , pg 133) MJ

**There are two fundamentals that must be considered in thinking through the deterrent role of nuclear weapons in the contemporary and future security environments. First, there are the countries that represent nuclear threats. Second, there is the question of ‘how’ US nuclear weapons might deter those discrete threats**. Ambassador Joseph makes four conclusions. First, there is a need to retain a nuclear weapons infrastructure that is sufficiently robust to confront actual and potential new adversaries – with new capabilities. Second, **the US must not let outdated Cold War concepts and treaties stand in the way of acquiring new deterrence and denial capabilities to ensue national and global security.** Third, echoing Professor Quester, the author argues that **the US must be more realistic about the likely contributions to security that current arms control proposals can mak**e. Finally, **the world has changed fundamentally in the past ten years and will continue to evolve rapidly. Our thinking about who and how to deter must also change.**

Deterrence has NO predictive functions

**Payne 6** (Keith, President and co-founder of the National Institute for Public Policy, Nuclear Deterrence for a New Century, The Journal of International Security Affairs, http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2006/10/payne.php) MJ

**In short, Cold War-like confidence in the predictable functioning of deterrence remains the all-purpose rationale for not revising our thinking about deterrence or our nuclear force structure, not preparing to protect ourselves against deterrence failure, and not moving away from our Cold War legacy nuclear arsenal**. What appears to be unrecognized by most critics of the Bush administration is that the assumed conditions that permitted Cold War confidence in MAD no longer pertain. **Under post-Cold War conditions, those who make confident predictions about reliable deterrence will be proven wrong; it is only a matter of time. Overconfidence in deterrence has been a staple of the U.S. strategic community for almost two generations. It has been absorbed by an entire cadre of academics who address the subject, journalists who report on it, members of Congress who decide which military programs will or will not be funded, and civilian and military officials who seek funding for forces**. The NPR and the Bush administration’s strategic initiatives should be understood for what they are—attempts to keep pace with the dramatic changes that have taken place in the global security environment.

**Deterrence Strategy Outdated**

The Cold War deterrence paradigm is obsolete

Payne 6 (Keith, President and co-founder of the National Institute for Public Policy, Nuclear Deterrence for a New Century, The Journal of International Security Affairs, http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2006/10/payne.php) MJ

**The Cold War deterrence paradigm was comforting and convenient. It is now obsolete. Moving beyond it is necessary if we are to adjust our thinking to new realities. But we should harbor no illusions; comforting and convenient beliefs are easily embraced, and given up only with great reluctance. Modernizing our thinking about nuclear deterrence will require a continuing effort to dispel the MAD adages about deterrence and strategic forces so deeply ingrained by our Cold War experience.**

A2: Bluff Deterrence more Moral

Using Bluff Deterrence just hides ill intentions while being ineffective in solving the problem

Megorden 00 (Kima, Epistemology of Nuclear Deterrence, http://isme.tamu.edu/JSCOPE01/Megorden01.html#\_edn1) MJ

It can be argued that the morality of the threat or intention itself can be resolved by likening the intention to kill to a bluff. Why is it that some people are so willing to concede to a nuclear strategy that has an indiscriminate nature? Perhaps it is because we have become used to the fact that “not only don’t we do anything to other people, we also don’t believe that we will ever have to do anything.”[[1]](#endnote-1)[17] Walzer suggests that the secret of nuclear deterrence is that it is a kind of bluff. The bluff seems to solve the problem of intention because one does not truly intend to kill others. It also seems to solve the problem of the likely consequences of nuclear war because other nations will still fear our nuclear strategy, which provides effective deterrence. Though this bluff deterrence strategy seems appealing, it does very little to actually solve the problem of ill intentions, and it can be very undermining to end results. Though it curtails the evil intention by avoiding the declaration of an outright intention to kill others, its efficiency is based on a lie. It is based on the perception of doing what a nation does not intend to do. Instead of remedying the previous evil intention, it simply replaces it with a seemingly less morally offensive intention. But how much more morality does bluff deterrence give to traditional deterrence strategy by basing the defense of a nation on a falsification? It seems that there is little morality added to the nature of intentions; bluff deterrence simply replaces the fundamentally morally flawed intention of traditional deterrence with its own fundamentally flawed intention based on a lie! If it could be shown that bluff deterrence was essentially ‘more moral’ in intention than traditional deterrence, then perhaps ethical progress would have been made. However, there would only be some sense of progress if this idea of bluff deterrence reduced the problematic nature of intentions without compromising the effectiveness of deterrence strategy itself. It is important to remember that the success of deterrence in preventing the killing of millions of innocents has a tremendously important role in the moral justification of deterrence itself. In short – if bluff deterrence could be viewed as just as effective, (i.e. preventing the destruction of the world) then it could be considered more moral than a simple deterrence strategy because it lessened the dissolute nature of the intentions of deterrence. However, bluff deterrence is problematic because there is always the chance that the bluff is called and the effectiveness of deterrence strategy itself is undermined. Once the bluff is called, the world will see that the nation has no intention of retaliating, therefore undermining the ‘peace’ or stability established by traditional deterrence. It is very problematic to base the future existence of a nation’s population on a bluff. Bluff deterrence is not effective because it does little to solve the problem of intent. Moreover, it is based on a perception that is shakier in the ends than the original deterrence. It is morally problematic to try and appease the ill intentions of nuclear deterrence by basing the future of mankind on an espoused and only ‘hopefully’ efficient perception

A2: Deterrence DA

The perception of nuclear bombs in Turkey does not significantly add to deterrence

Bell and Loehrke 9(Alexandra and Benjamin, Ploughshares Fund, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey)

**For more than 40 years, Turkey has been a quiet custodian of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons**. During the Cold War, Washington positioned intermediate-range nuclear missiles and bombers there to serve as a bulwark against the Soviet Union (i.e., to defend the region against Soviet attack and to influence Soviet strategic calculations). In the event of a Soviet assault on Europe, the weapons were to be fired as one of the first retaliatory shots. But as the Cold War waned, so, too, did the weapons' strategic value. Thus, over the last few decades, the United States has removed all of its intermediate-range missiles from Turkey and reduced its other nuclear weapons there through gradual redeployments and arms control agreements. Today, Turkey hosts an estimated 90 B61 gravity bombs at Incirlik Air Base**.** Fifty of these bombs are [reportedly](http://nukestrat.com/pubs/EuroBombs.pdf) PDF assigned for delivery by U.S. pilots, and forty are assigned for delivery by the Turkish Air Force. However, no permanent nuclear-capable U.S. fighter wing is based at Incirlik, and the Turkish Air Force is [reportedly](http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/stockholm/06123.pdf) PDF not certified for NATO nuclear missions, meaning nuclear-capable F-16s from other U.S. bases would need to be brought in if Turkey's bombs were ever needed. Such a relaxed posture makes clear just how little NATO relies on tactical nuclear weapons for its defense anymore. In fact, the readiness of NATO's nuclear forces now is measured in months as opposed to hours or days. Supposedly**, the weapons are still deployed as a matter of deterrence, but the crux of deterrence is sustaining an aggressor's perception of guaranteed rapid reprisal--a perception the nuclear bombs deployed in Turkey cannot significantly add to because they are unable to be rapidly launched.** Aggressors are more likely to be deterred by NATO's conventional power or the larger strategic forces supporting its nuclear umbrella.

A2: Deterrence DA

US TNWs are with no purpose

Bell and Loehrke 9(Alexandra and Benjamin, Ploughshares Fund, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey) MJ

**Such a relaxed posture makes clear just how little NATO relies on tactical nuclear weapons for its defense anymore.** In fact, **the readiness of NATO's nuclear forces now is measured in months as opposed to hours or days**. Supposedly, **the weapons are still deployed as a matter of deterrence, but the crux of deterrence is sustaining an aggressor's perception of guaranteed rapid reprisal--a perception the nuclear bombs deployed in Turkey cannot significantly add to because they are unable to be rapidly launched. Aggressors are more likely to be deterred by NATO's conventional power or the larger strategic forces supporting its nuclear umbrella.** So in effect, **U**.**S. tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey are without military value or purpose. That means removing them from the country should be simple**, right? Unfortunately, matters of national and international security are never that easy.

A2: Turkey Prolif DA (Uniqueness)

Turkey proliferating now

Wagner 6/17 (Daniel, Managing Director of Country Risk Solutions, “Brazil and Turkey's Message,” Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-wagner/brazil-and-turkeys-messag\_b\_615848.html) MJ

Turkish public opinion is divided between pressuring the government to assert itself against Iran - which many see as a competitor to Turkey's own regional political and economic ambitions - and opposing Western influence and security alliances. With both Iran and Russia becoming increasingly aggressive in international relations, Turkey feels pressure to assert itself on the global stage. Given that France, the UK, Russia, and Israel already possess nuclear weapons, and with Iran on an obvious path in that direction, Ankara has made its ambition to obtain nuclear weapons clear in recent months through a lobbying effort in Western capitals. The U.S. is torn on one hand between succumbing to the seemingly legitimate defense-related requests of an important strategic ally and Iranian neighbor -- that can act as a counter-balance to a future nuclear armed Iran -- and on the other hand by promoting the nuclear proliferation it seeks to prevent. Just last year President Obama referred to the U.S. and Turkey's bilateral relationship as a "model partnership", but bilateral relations have been deteriorating since the Gulf War, when President Bush was unsuccessful in facilitating Turkish action against Iraq. Tension has risen for weeks between the two countries over the Iran issue and more recently the Turkish flotilla to Palestine. Turkey has expressed disappointment over Washington's failure to condemn Israel's attack on the flotilla. Anti-U.S. sentiment among the Turkish public is now comparable to that of Pakistan - not exactly what Washington would expect from a 60-year post-war alliance.

Turkish leader says Turkey is close to proliferation

News.Az 10 (Armenian News, “Turkey to have its nuclear weapon soon,” http://www.news.az/articles/9355) MJ

According to the Israeli mass media, the urgent meeting of Premier Binyamin Netanjahu with Greek counterpart Georgios Papandrew was held in Moscow on February 15. **According to Turkish Zaman, Netanjahu said Turkey will soon have its own nuclear weapon. He noted that if Iran creates a nuclear bomb, this will cause arm racing in the whole region and then Turkey may also become a nuclear power**. "**Not only Turkey but also Saudi Arabia would want to have its nuclear weapon.** I think Greece is not indifferent to the processes ongoing in the region", Netanjahu said. On February 16, Turkish FM Ahmed Davutoglu said in Iran: "**The tragedies and clashes should not repeat in our region. We wish the Middle East to turn into the region which is developing with economic cooperation and raising political dialogue between cultures and ethnic groups. Iran's contribution is necessary for such a region".**

A2: Turkey Prolif DA (Uniqueness)

Turkey’s agreement with Iran leads to proliferation

Peters 5/21 (Ralph, Strategic Analyst, “Nukes gone wild,” New York Post, http://www.nypost.com/f/print/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/nukes\_gone\_wild\_e1DsERRbLf9qsRnyDadpwK) MJ

The world changed this week and we yawned. Our government and media utterly failed to grasp the meaning of the Iran-Brazil-Turkey nuke deal. Undercutting the sanctions-lite bargain Secretary of State Hillary Clinton thinks she has with Russia and China was the least of it. We're so obsessed with the single (albeit important) issue of terrorism that we're missing profound global realignments and the rise of grave new threats. **Iran's "agreement" to ship a slice of its enriched-uranium pie to Turkey for reprocessing is pure gamesmanship.** We expect that from Iran. **The alarming part is that**, this time, **Turkey and Brazil are in on the game. The ludicrous terms of this con-job have long since been overtaken by events. Brazil's President Lula da Silva and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan aren't trying to stop Iran's nuke program. They're eager to facilitate it. What Brazil and Turkey just did wasn't intended to impede Tehran, but to make it harder for Western powers to impose sanctions. Both countries want Iran to run interference for them. Once Iran gets the bomb** and takes the (slight) heat, **Brazil and Turkey both intend to go nuclear**. Brazil wants vanity nukes to cement its position as South America's hegemon, a regional alternative to the US. **Turkey's slow-roll Islamist government dreams of a new Ottoman age -- as it turns from the West to embrace the Muslim states it ruled a century ago. After easing Tehran's path to the bomb, Ankara will claim that it needs its own nuclear capability to maintain regional stability**. But the coming widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons will be profoundly destabilizing. Each Middle Eastern country, especially, that goes nuclear increases the probability of a nuke exchange exponentially.

A2: Turkey Prolif DA

Removing Nuclear Weapons outweighs the costs of not-Engage Russia to withdraw

Reed 8(Charlie, reporter for Stars and Stripes, “U.S. nukes moved from Lakenheath, official claims,” Stars and Stripes, http://www.stripes.com/news/u-s-nukes-moved-from-lakenheath-official-claims-1.80457) MJ

The move at Lakenheath coincides with similar reductions at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, in 2005 and Greece in 2001, and reduces the total number of U.S. nuclear bombs in Europe to between 150 to 240, Kristensen said. **The remaining B-61 bombs are at Aviano Air Base in Italy and Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, as well at other bases in Italy, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. Coupled with security concerns highlighted in a recent Air Force investigation of nuclear weapons in Europe, the apparent reductions could be the first sign of a major nuclear weapons consolidation on the continent**, he said. **But by keeping the withdrawals secret in the post-Cold War era, Kristensen wrote, "NATO and the United States have missed huge opportunities to engage Russia directly and positively about reductions to their non-strategic nuclear weapons, and to improve their own nuclear image in the world in general." "What is at stake is not whether NATO should be protected with nuclear weapons, but why it is still necessary to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Europe**. **Japan and South Korea are also covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but without tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Asia**," he wrote. "**The benefits from withdrawing the remaining non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe far outweigh the costs, risks and political objectives of keeping them there.**

A2: Turkey Prolif DA

No Link-The TNWs have no military use

Reed 8(Charlie, reporter for Stars and Stripes, “U.S. nukes moved from Lakenheath, official claims,” Stars and Stripes, http://www.stripes.com/news/u-s-nukes-moved-from-lakenheath-official-claims-1.80457) MJ

**"Obviously we’re concerned about where the bombs are going. We want them disarmed. We’re not happy if they’re just going to be deployed somewhere else," said Hudson**, adding that the group plans to celebrate at the gates of Lakenheath next Friday. Hudson, like Kristensen, questions the policy of nuclear secrecy. "This is a positive thing. **It can really help the international political climate**," she said. "**It would be so constructive to let people in on things.… It’s not conducive to an atmosphere of trust. I wish they would explain what they’ve done**." But other anti-nuclear advocates warn that public disclosure of arms reductions must be handled with kid gloves. "At the moment relations (with Russia) are not positive," said Paul Ingram, executive director of the British American Security Information Council, a nuclear disarmament group based in London. "So you have to tread lightly when making demands on Russia to avoid the unintended consequences of pushing them in the corner." Still, the withdrawal at Lakenheath "was the most obvious step," he said. "**These tactical nuclear weapons have no military significance. They only have political significance in tying the European states in the U.S. nuclear strategy."**

US TNWs are of no military value

Westberg 9 (Gunnar, [TFF Board member](http://www.transnational.org/SAJT/tff/people/g_westberg.html), “More Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones,” The Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, http://www.transnational.org/Resources\_Treasures/2009/Westberg\_MoreNWFZ.html) MJ

A NWFZ in the Nordic countries has been repeatedly proposed and discussed since at least four decades, and should still be possible although Norway and Denmark are members of NATO; they have both abstained from having nuclear weapons (and foreign soldiers) on their soil. Such a zone could lead to a Central European NWFZ , an old idea which time has come. There is a good chance that the new Nuclear Doctrine of NATO, which is presently under discussion and will be decided during 2010, may allow for the removal of the few remaining **US nuclear weapons** from European NATO allies. They **are at present deployed in Turkey, Italy, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. There are little more that 200 nuclear charges, all of the old B61 gravity bombs type. These so-called tactical nuclear weapons are of no military value. Their existence is only a symbol of the acceptance by the host country of the NATO nuclear doctrine. Other NATO countries, such as Denmark and Poland, are not required to accept this “burden sharing”.** It is thus quite possible that within one or two years there are no nuclear weapons stored in Europe outside of the Nuclear Weapon States, Russia, France and Great Britain (actually Scotland). The Non Proliferation Treaty, NPT, requires that the Nuclear Weapon States do not deploy or transport nuclear weapons through non-nuclear weapon states. Thus, the establishment of a NWFZ can be seen as a codification of the NPT principles for the area. A European NWFZ could consist of Scandinavia and Finland, including Greenland and Iceland, the “Benelux” countries, Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Italy, the Former Yugoslav states, Malta, Greece, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Switzerland and of course Austria. States bordering the EU in the East should also be invited, if they are not already members of the Central Asian NWFZ.

A2: Turkey Prolif DA (impact defence)

United States cannot stop Turkey from Proliferating

Wagner 6/17 (Daniel, Managing Director of Country Risk Solutions, “Brazil and Turkey's Message,” Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-wagner/brazil-and-turkeys-messag\_b\_615848.html) MJ

**The Obama Administration has failed to see Lula's and Erdogan's actions in a broader geostrategic context. The reality is that in the 21st century, U.S. allies will no longer automatically side with America on important matters in international affairs**, as was the case during the Cold War. **Brazil, Turkey, China, India and Russia are all rising at a time when America's position at the top of the foreign policy mound is eroding. The new reality is a shifting geopolitical landscape in which emerging powers may take a position diametrically opposed to U.S. foreign policy, and there is little the U.S. can do about it. Turkey remains a strong U.S. ally and an assertive Turkey should be viewed positively, as a counter-weight to and increasingly aggressive Iran and Russia, rather than simply as an ally that has fallen out of line**. The same is true vis-à-vis Brazil, which may be viewed as a counter-weight to Hugo Chavez and the socialist tide that is spreading across Latin America. As allies, Brazil and Turkey are assets. Until the time comes that they may no longer be seen as allies, the U.S. should treat them as allies, rather than adversaries. **It is vitally important that U.S. foreign policy continue to nurture strong bilateral relations with the 21st century's emerging powers**, but acknowledge that America can no longer call the shots going forward. The U.S. should see Brazil's and Turkey's actions as a harbinger of things to come**. As Joseph Nye has noted, the paradox of American power is that in spite of all its might, the U.S. cannot get what it wants by acting alone.**

A2: Prolif DA

**Turn: Removal key to prevent proliferation**

Bell and Loehrke 9(Alexandra and Benjamin, Ploughshares Fund, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey) MJ

Preventing Turkey (and any other country in the region) from acquiring nuclear weapons is critical to international security. Doing so requires a key factor that also is essential to paving the way toward withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons: improved alliance relations. The political and strategic compasses are pointing to the eventual withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe--it's a strategy that certainly fits the disarmament agenda President Barack Obama has outlined. But to get there, careful diplomacy will be required to improve U.S.-Turkish ties and to assuage Turkish security concerns. The U.S.-Turkish relationship cooled when Turkey refused to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom, after which Turkish support for U.S. policy declined through the end of the George W. Bush administration. Obama's election has helped to mend fences, and his visit to Turkey in April was warmly received. In fact, all of the administration's positive interactions with Turkey have been beneficial: Washington has supported Turkey's role as a regional energy supplier and encouraged Ankara as it undertakes difficult political reforms and works to resolve regional diplomatic conflicts. For its part, Turkey recently doubled its troop contribution to NATO's Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan--a boon to U.S. efforts there. By incorporating Ankara into its new European missile defense plans--intended to protect Turkey and other countries vulnerable to Iran's short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles--Washington could further shore up its military relationship with Turkey. Ship-based Aegis missile systems will be the backbone of the strategy, with considerations left open for later deployments of mobile ground-based interceptors in Eastern Europe or Turkey. This cooperation could provide the bond with Washington and perception of security that Turkey seeks in the face of a potential Iranian bomb.

A2: Disarmament CP

Disarmament policy allows the US to assert its dominance justifying violence

Parrish and BondGraham 9 (Will and Darwin, sociologist, PhD UC Santa Barbra in poli sci, Foreign Policy in Focus, Anti-nuclear Nuclearism, http://www.fpif.org/articles/anti-nuclear\_nuclearism) BAF

The Obama administration is likely to continue a policy that we call “anti-nuclear nuclearism.” Anti-nuclear nuclearism is a foreign and military policy that relies upon overwhelming U.S. power, including the nuclear arsenal, but makes rhetorical and even some substantive commitments to disarmament, however vaguely defined. Anti-nuclear nuclearism thrives as a school of thought in several think tanks that have long influenced foreign policy choices related to global nuclear forces. Even the national nuclear weapons development labs in New Mexico and California have been avid supporters and crafters of of it. As a policy, anti-nuclear nuclearism is designed to ensure U.S. nuclear and military dominance by rhetorically calling for what has long been derided as a naïve ideal: global nuclear disarmament. Unlike past forms of nuclearism, it de-emphasizes the offensive nature of the U.S. arsenal. Instead of promoting the U.S. stockpile as a strategic deterrence or umbrella for U.S. and allied forces, it prioritizes an aggressive diplomatic and military campaign of nonproliferation. Nonproliferation efforts are aimed entirely at other states, especially non-nuclear nations with suspected weapons programs, or states that can be coerced and attacked under the pretense that they possess nuclear weapons or a development program (e.g. Iraq in 2003). Effectively pursuing this kind of belligerent nonproliferation regime requires half-steps toward cutting the U.S. arsenal further, and at least rhetorically recommitting the United States to international treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It requires a fig leaf that the United States isn’t developing new nuclear weapons, and that it is slowly disarming and de-emphasizing its nuclear arsenal. By these means the United States has tried to avoid the charge of hypocrisy, even though it has designed and built newly modified weapons with qualitatively new capacities over the last decade and a half. Meanwhile, U.S. leaders have allowed for and even promoted a mass proliferation of nuclear energy and material, albeit under the firm control of the nuclear weapons states, with the United States at the top of this pile. Many disarmament proponents were elated last year when four extremely prominent cold warriors — George P. Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn — announced in a series of op-eds their commitment to "a world free of nuclear weapons." Strange bedfellows indeed for the cause. Yet the fine print of their plan, published by the Hoover Institute and others since then, represents the anti-nuclear nuclearist platform to a tee. It’s a conspicuous yet merely rhetorical commitment to a world without nuclear weapons. These four elder statesmen have said what many U.S. elites have rarely uttered: that abolition is both possible and desirable. However, the anti-nuclear posture in their policy proposal comes to bear only on preventing non-nuclear states from going nuclear, or else preventing international criminal conspiracies from proliferating weapons technologies and nuclear materials for use as instruments of non-state terror. In other words, it’s about other people's nuclear weapons, not the 99% of materials and arms possessed by the United States and other established nuclear powers. This position emphasizes an anti-nuclear politics entirely for what it means for the rest of the world — securing nuclear materials and preventing other states from going nuclear or further developing their existing arsenals. U.S. responsibility to disarm remains in the distant future, unaddressed as a present imperative. Exclusive Route around the CTBT Concerns about the nuclear programs of other states — mostly Islamic, East and South Asian nations (i.e., Iran, North Korea, etc.) — conveniently work to reinforce existing power relations embodied in U.S. military supremacy and neocolonial relationships of technological inequality and dependence. By invoking their commitment to a "world free of nuclear weapons," the ideologues behind the anti-nuclear nuclearist platform justify invasions, military strikes, economic sanctions, and perhaps even the use of nuclear weapons themselves against the "rogue states" and "terrorists" whose possession of weapons technologies vastly less advanced than those perpetually stockpiled by the United States is deemed by the anti-nuclear nuclearists the first and foremost problem of the nuclear age.

Disarmament solidifies U.S. dominance- only applies to other countries, not the U.S.

Parrish and BondGraham 9 (Will and Darwin, sociologist, PhD UC Santa Barbra in poli sci, Foreign Policy in Focus, Anti-nuclear Nuclearism, http://www.fpif.org/articles/anti-nuclear\_nuclearism) BAF

Unfortunately the Obama administration is likely to pursue this Orwellian policy of anti-nuclear nuclearism rather than taking a new, saner direction. A strong early indication of this trajectory is his selection of many Clinton administration advisers and officials as national security officials in his Cabinet. The Clinton administration fought hard for the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1999, which would commit the United States to cease all nuclear explosions. But, in true anti-nuclear nuclearist fashion, it also gave the United States nuclear weapons labs the Stockpile Stewardship Program, by which they could move forward with a massive scientific effort to develop the knowledge and scientific expertise for virtual weapons design and testing via a multi-billion dollar infrastructure of supercomputers, laser, and flash X-ray facilities that brazenly give the United States an exclusive route around the CTBT. Meanwhile, the United States has further violated the spirit of the treaty by detonating an average of 10 so-called "sub-critical" nuclear bombs every year at the Nevada Test Site since 1997: explosions involving as many as 3.3 pounds of plutonium that stop just short of splitting the atom. Because non-nuclear states aren’t able to go nuclear without actual testing, the ostensibly anti-nuclear CTBT would lock in less technologically advanced states into a nuclear status quo. By conducting nuclear tests, the non-nuclear nations would justify sanctions under the treaty and presumably trigger military action by the United States. Former Secretary of State Madeline Albright said as much in her testimony before Congress in 1999: Since America has no need and does not plan to conduct nuclear explosive tests, the essence of the debate over the CTBT should be clear. It is not about preventing America from conducting tests; it is about preventing and dissuading others from doing so. It's about establishing the principle on a global basis that it is not smart, not safe, not right, and not legal to conduct explosive tests in order to develop or modernize nuclear weapons. The Bush administration has been widely viewed by both former Clinton staff and conservative "realists" such as Brent Scowcroft and Kissinger as having squandered opportunities to enact an anti-nuclear nuclearist regime. By pushing aggressively and publicly for new nuclear weapons programs, George W. Bush lost the necessary perception of moral high ground required for such a strategy to succeed. But then again, the neoconservatives have never believed in the "softer" forms of hegemonic power advocated by the Democrats and previous Republican administrations. Picking Up Where Clinton Left Off Obama's administration will inevitably pick up where the Clinton administration left off. Senate Republicans voted down the CTBT in 1999. The Stockpile Stewardship program moved ahead smoothly but is incapable of serving as an effective program for designing the new generation of nuclear weapons envisioned by the U.S. nuclear establishment. Thus, the next stage of the new nuclear imperialism is now being enacted: the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program, an effort to develop new nuclear arms and reinvigorate the nuclear weapons complex under the rubric of "replacing" existing nuclear warheads. Over the next four years, we’re likely to see an increasing commitment to international treaties like the NPT and CTBT on the part of the United States. The Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty's (SORT) goal of reducing the U.S. strategic force to 1,700-2,200 operational weapons is likely to be achieved and made permanent, thereby creating a false veneer of U.S. intention to disarm. Further cuts might proceed. Most assuredly we’ll witness incredibly aggressive efforts to stop proliferation of nuclear technology aimed at Iran, North Korea, and beyond, involving the use of diplomacy, force, economic coercion, sabotage, proxy attacks, political destabilization, and more. What’s harder to predict is the fate of the RRW program. On the surface, antinuclear nuclearism is incompatible with new weapons development, and RRW is most certainly a new weapon, no matter what Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratory scientists and administrators claim. But herein lies the unknown. It’s possible that the RRW will get the go-ahead eventually. Just as the Clinton White House relented and gave the weapons labs the Stockpile Stewardship Program, partly as a political pay-off to ensure they wouldn't obstruct the CTBT's ratification, so might the Obama administration ratify the new program now so strongly desired by the nuclear weapons complex, so as to secure room for U.S. officials to pursue their nonproliferation efforts at the international level. Not coincidentally, technological advancements under the Stockpile Stewardship program enable U.S. development of the RRW without the politically taboo need for nuclear testing, as Robert Gates — Bush's Defense Secretary and now Obama's — noted in a November 3 speech before the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Gates, of course, was simply referring to an outcome that that Clinton's Energy and Defense departments sought from day one: the ability to develop and test nuclear weapons using the new virtual weapons development infrastructure at the weapons labs, all without violating the letter of the CTBT. Thus, U.S. status as the world's leading nuclear hegemon is ensured. For any of this to happen, the RRW, or the RRW by another name, will have to be significantly repackaged and re-sold to the U.S. public and international community so that it appears as a design intended to reduce U.S. dependence on nuclear weapons and facilitate large cuts in the stockpile, alongside a downsizing of the weapons complex. Leading nuclear weapons scientists, military leadership, and U.S. nuclear officials are calling the RRW "not a new weapon," and uttering assurances that its purpose is to facilitate reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. That it would give the United States nuclear weapons complex a new lease on life into the distant future, cost untold billions of dollars, re-establish plutonium pit production in the United States, and hand over a brand-new weapon design to the military are all rhetorically de-emphasized by the program’s proponents.

A2: Iran DA

The United States lies about the threat in Iran. They label Iran as a threat with no true evidence-you cannot trust the claims about Iran by the US

Herman and Peterson 6 (Edward, Professor Emeritus of Finance at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, David, independent journalist and researcher, US Aggression-Time Once Again: Target Iran, http://www.counterpunch.org/herman05112006.html) MJ

What is mind-boggling in all this is that new attacks and threats by a country that is in the midst of a serial aggression program, that runs a well documented and widely condemned global gulag of torture,5 that has committed major war crimes in Iraq-Fallujah may well replace Guernica as a symbol of murderous warfare unleashed against civilians6-and that openly declares itself exempt from international law and states that the UN is only relevant when it supports **U.S. policy**,7 **is not only not condemned for its Iran aggression, but is able to enlist support for it in the EU, UN and global media. This enlistment of support occurs despite the further fact that it is now generally recognized that the Bush and Blair administrations lied their way into the Iraq invasion-occupation** (but still quickly obtained UN and EU acceptance of the occupation and ensuing ruthless pacification program),8 and that they cynically misused the inspections program, all of which makes the new accommodation to the aggression-in-process and planned larger attack truly frightening. **The mechanism by which this is accomplished by the aggressor state is to cry-up an allegedly dire threat that Iran might be embarking on a program to obtain nuclear weapons-it might be doing this secretively**, and although it has submitted itself to IAEA inspections for the past three years, it has not been 100 percent cooperative with the Agency.9 **Combining this with demonization**,10 **intensive and repeated expressions of indignation and fear, and threats to do something about the intolerable threat, the Washington regime has managed to produce a contrived "crisis," with huge spikes in media attention and supportive expressions of concern and actions by the UN, IAEA, and international community**.11 **These groups join the aggressor partly to avoid offending it, but also to try to constrain its determination to get its way-but in the process they accept its premises that there is a real threat and hence give at least tacit support to its aggression program, and sometimes more**. On the home front, with the acceptance of the seriousness of the manufactured crisis by the mainstream media and Democrats, and with leading politicos like Hillary Clinton and Evan Bayh even egging Bush on, the noise creates its own self-fulfilling pressures on the leadership that manufactured the crisis, who now must "do something" about it to avoid political loss.12 This time, **the EU appears to be cooperating even more fully in the developing aggression against Iran than it did in the Iraq case. Although Iran has an absolute and "inalienable" right to enrich uranium under NPT rules** (i.e., the NPT's sole condition is that the enrichment can only be "for peaceful purposes"), and although the NPT imposes upon other parties to the treaty the obligation to "facilitatethe fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,"13 under British, French and German urging Iran, in November 2004, agreed "on a voluntary basis to continue and extend its suspension to include all enrichment related and reprocessing activities," while these states agreed to continue negotiations in good faith for the sake of an agreement that "will provide objective guarantees that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes," and "firm guarantees on nuclear, technological and economic cooperation and firm commitments on security issues."14 But subsequent stages of negotiations

A2: Iran DA

The US uses fear mongering frames and suppresses information to justify invasion of Iran. In reality there is no threat, but the US manipulates the public to believe Iran is a risk to the world.

Herman and Peterson 6 (Edward, Professor Emeritus of Finance at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, David, independent journalist and researcher, US Aggression-Time Once Again: Target Iran, http://www.counterpunch.org/herman05112006.html) MJ

**Since the spring of 2003, U.S. power has produced a steady and indignant focus on Iran's alleged foot-dragging on inspection**s. As in the case of Iraq's failure through March 2003 to prove that it did not possess any "weapons of mass destruction" (WMD), the U.S.-driven allegations and inspections regime channeled through the IAEA have focused on Iran's parallel failure to disprove a negative-namely, that Iran prove that it is not secretly engaging in practices that are prohibited under the NPT and subsequent Safeguards Agreement (May 15, 1974) and the Additional Protocols (signed December 18, 2003, though only observed "on a voluntary basis"). Moreover, throughout the current 38-month cycle of allegations and inspections to which the IAEA has now subjected Iran, the IAEA has repeatedly adopted a phraseology to the effect that **the IAEA is "unable to confirm the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities inside Iran"-an inherently politicized condition that no state would be capable of meeting**, no matter what it agreed to do, and whose application depends ultimately on the strength of the political forces that pressure the IAEA to continue the search.17 With enough political pressure, no amount of "transparency" and "confidence-building" measures on the part of the accused state can meet it, as was evident in the Iraq case. And as long as the IAEA reports that it is unable to confirm the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities inside Iran, Iran is helpless before the IAEA's negative condition. **The "threat" and crisis have been sustained in the media by the use of patriotic and fear-mongering frames and suppressions of relevant fact that may even be more brazen and misleading than those justifying the invasion of Iraq**. **The crisis-supporting frames are**: **(1)** **that Iran is a dangerous theocratic state, with an irrational and unstable political and clerical leadership that has supported terrorists and threatened Israel and is therefore not to be trusted with a nuclear program**; **(2)** **that it has been secretive about its nuclear program**, has not been fully cooperative with the inspections program of the IAEA, and that the reason for this secrecy is Iran's intention to develop nuclear weapons; (**3) that its acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability would be intolerable, would destabilize the Middle East if not the whole of Western Civilization, and must be stopped**.

The United States frames Iran as a threat so the world fears them. The US scares society into allowing unjustified actions

**Zarif 7** (Mohammad Javad, Former Representative of Iran to the UN & PhD in Int’l Law and Policy – U of Denver, Journal of International Affairs, “Iran,” pg 76, 77, http://www.zarif.net/Articles/Columbia%20JIA.pdf) MJ

In spite of Iran’s record, **a massive campaign has been underway to portray Iran as a proliferator of nuclear weapons and a threat to regional stability. The recent flurry of diplomatic activities and divisive public statements**—primarily by the United States and the United Kingdom—**to frighten the countries of the region and to create an anti-Iran coalition has become the centerpiece of a strategy to rescue the failed policies of the United States in the region.**22 According to the Wall Street Journal, “**The threat of Iran’s rise has become for the U.S. a sort of diplomatic glue**…to patch together an alliance aimed at helping heal not only Iraq, but also Lebanon and the Palestinian conflict…[U.S. allies] are…apprehensive about lining up too publicly alongside the U.S. in a Cold War-style, anti-Iran bloc.”23 **The enemy paradigm is so pervasive that the U.S. administration opted for an escalation against Iran** contrary to the advice of the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group. **The surge in blaming Iran for the insecurity and sectarian violence in Iraq is designed to justify the escalation, while such claims cannot be explained by facts on the ground or by any calculation of Iranian interest in Iraq**. In fact, **U.S. vision has been so blurred by the prevalence of the paradigm, that American policymakers alienate and threaten Iran, while seeking help from those who have magnified—and instigated for their own motives—the sectarian divide in Iraq long before sectarian clashes started**.24 This policy clearly illustrates that no lessons have been learnt from the devastation caused by many decades of the implementation of that policy in the Persian Gulf region. The manufacturing of the “Iran Nuclear Crisis” has similarly shown that old habits die hard, and the same tendencies that caused the misery of the last four years continue to prevail in major power circles in Washington and London. **The same cabal has orchestrated a massive campaign to portray Iran’s peaceful nuclear program as a threat**, and in order to give that a semblance of international legitimacy, has resorted to substantial economic and political pressure to compel members of the Security Council to adopt two unwarranted resolutions within five months.25

A2: Iran DA

Nuclear weapons posing as a deterrent might spur Iran to do the same

Larsen 6 (Jeffrey A, The future of US non-strategic nuclear weapons and implications for NATO)

Iran is within several years of having an indigenously produced nuclear weapons arsenal and delivery capability. This would present the Alliance with a new nuclear-armed state on its southeastern flank, one that abuts a NATO member (Turkey) and which has serious anti-Western attitudes. Other states in the region considered likely candidates to acquire nuclear weapons in the longer term include Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Egypt. These are all within range of NATO Europe, and all lay within the so-called “arc of instability” that crosses the Middle East and extends through South Asia. Most European member states do not see Tehran as an adversary today. Indeed, as one French diplomat explained, the United States appears to be demonizing the Iranian regime and overstating its nuclear capabilities in order to force Europeans to choose sides—something they are not ready to do.168 Some Turks point out that their border with Iran is its most stable frontier, prudent military planning would advise the Alliance to expect Iran to have a nuclear capability within the next 10 years, just about the time that the Alliance will most likely be removing the last vestiges of its Cold War nuclear posture from Europe. In addition, several European members have made security commitments to Israel, which would be the most likely target of Iranian nuclear threats. Several states, including Canada, believe that nuclear weapons have only one purpose: to deter other nuclear weapons. According to this view, the Alliance needs to try and prevent nuclear proliferation to other states, thereby relaxing the requirement to keep its own weapons as a deterrent.

A2: Terrorism DA

Fear of terrorism is the result of propaganda and a projection of insecurity

Chussodvosky, 2k8 (Michel, professor of economics at the [University of Ottawa](file:///C%3A%5Cwiki%5CUniversity_of_Ottawa), “The US-NATO Preemptive Nuclear Doctrine: Trigger a Middle East Nuclear Holocaust to Defend ‘The Western Way of Life’”, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=8048)

Bin Laden’s Nuclear Program Now comes the authoritative part of the NATO sponsored report: We need to use nukes against bin Laden, because Islamic “fanatics” can actually make a nuclear weapons or buy them from the Russians in the black market. The Report calls for a first strike nuclear attack directed against Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda, which has the ability, according to expert opinion, of actually producing small nuclear bombs, which could be used in a Second 9/11 attack on America: . The second line of reasoning [contained in the NATO sponsored report] ismore difficult to refute. It argues that extreme fanatical terrorists, such as al-Qaeda, cannot be deterred because (a) they do not represent a country and therefore cannot be targeted and (b) they welcome death by suicide. So, we have to shift the concept of nuclear deterrence to the country or regime supplying the terrorists with fissile material. Nuclear weapons require materials that can be made only with difficulty. Once these materials are obtained by terrorists, however, the barriers to fabricating a weapon are much lower. In that sense the nuclear threat today is greater than it was in the Cold War and it seems the terrorists cannot be deterred.( Dibb, op cit, emphasis added) The alleged nuclear threat by Al Qaeda is taken very seriously. The Bush administration has responded with overall defense spending (budget plus war theater) in excess of one trillion dollars. This massive amount of public money has been allocated to financing the “Global War on Terrorism” (GWOT). Confirmed by Pentagon documents, this military hardware including aircraft carriers, fighter jets, cruise missiles and nuclear bunker buster bombs, is slated to be used as part of the “Global War on Terrorism”. In military jargon the US is involved in asymmetric warfare against non-State enemies. (The concept of Asymmetric Warfare was defined in The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (2005) “The American Hiroshima” The US media has the distinct ability to turn realities upside down. The lies are upheld as indelible truths. The “Islamic terrorists” have abandoned their AK 47 kalashnikov rifles and stinger missiles; they are not only developing deadly chemical and biological weapons, they also have nuclear capabilities. The fact, amply documented, that Al Qaeda is supported by the CIA and Britain’s MI6 is beside the point. The nuclear threat is not directed against the Middle East but against the USA, the perpetrators and architects of nuclear war are bin Laden’s Al Qaeda, which is planning to launch a nuclear attack on an American city: “U.S. government officials are contemplating what they consider to be an inevitable and much bigger assault on America, one likely to kill millions, destroy the economy and fundamentally alter the course of history,… According to captured al-Qaida leaders and documents, the plan is called the “American Hiroshima” and involves the multiple detonation of nuclear weapons already smuggled into the U.S. over the Mexican border with the help of the MS-13 street gang and other organized crime groups. (World Net Daily, 11 July 2005, emphasis added) The New York Times confirms that an Al Qaeda sponsored “American Hiroshima” “could happen” . “Experts believe that such an attack, somewhere, is likely.” (NYT, 11 August 2004) According to the Aspen Strategy Group which is integrated among others, by Madeleine Albright, Richard Armitage, Philip D. Zelikow, Robert B. Zoellick, “the danger of nuclear terrorism is much greater than the public believes, and our government hasn’t done nearly enough to reduce it.”:If a 10-kiloton nuclear weapon, a midget even smaller than the one that destroyed Hiroshima, exploded in Times Square, the fireball would reach tens of millions of degrees Fahrenheit. It would vaporize or destroy the theater district, Madison Square Garden, the Empire State Building, Grand Central Terminal and Carnegie Hall (along with me and my building). The blast would partly destroy a much larger area, including the United Nations. On a weekday some 500,000 people would be killed. (NYT, 11 August 2004) “Threaten them with a devastating [nuclear] attack” According to professor Dibb, nuclear deterrence should also apply in relation to Al Qaeda, by holding responsible the governments which help the terrorists to develop their nuclear weapons capabilities: “Ashton Carter, a former US assistant secretary for defense, has recently argued, the realistic response is to hold responsible, as appropriate, the government from which the terrorists obtained the weapon or fissile materials and threaten them with a devastating [nuclear] strike. In other words, deterrence would work again. (Dibb, op cit) The real nuclear threat is coming from bin Laden. The objective is to “to do away with our way of life”:None of this is to underestimate the impact of a nuclear weapon being detonated in an American city. It could be catastrophic, but it is highly unlikely to threaten the very survival of the US. To believe otherwise risks surrendering to the fear and intimidation that is precisely the terrorists’ stock in trade.General Richard Myers, another former chairman of the joint chiefs of staff,has claimed that if [Islamic] terrorists were able to kill 10,000 Americans in a nuclear attack, they would “do away with our way of life”. But Hiroshima and Nagasaki incurred well over 100,000 instant deaths and that did not mean the end of the Japanese way of life. (Ibid, emphasis added) In an utterly twisted and convoluted argument, professor Dibb transforms the US-NATO threat to wage a nuclear war on Iran into an Al Qaeda operation to attack an American city with nuclear weapon.

A2: Weaponitis

Schwartz and Derber downplay the importance of nuclear doctrine on militarism

 McLauchlan 91 (Gregory, Asst. Prof. Sociology Department, University of Oregon , Review of The Nuclear Seduction by Derber and Schwartz, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 28, No. 3, Aug. 1991. Pp. 325-330) MJ

But perceptions are shaped not only by weapons, but also by strategies and doc-trine. How do we account for the prolifer-ation of new variations of nuclear strategy in the 1970s and 1980s, including a renewed emphasis on both fighting limited nuclear war and counterforce strategies, in a period when the nuclear stockpiles of the super-powers had reached a total of some 50,000 weapons? **Schwartz and Derber are too willing to treat nuclear strategy and doctrine as epiphenomenal, and verge on the suggestion that developments in strategy and doctrine are in essence part of a cleverly calculated superpower competition of appearances and bluff**. **The danger here is that an undeserved rationality may be imputed to the nuclear past (and present). Nuclear strategy and doctrine** - however illusory some of these might be - **have mattered more in the history of the arms race than the discussion in The Nuclear Seduction implies**. What should peace movements do in the face of provocative or irrational nuclear strategies? The authors argue they should expose the falseness and danger of the strategy, but that opposing weapon systems only gives credence to claims that weapons matter. The former is certainly necessary, but **it is also clear that the proliferation of nuclear strategies has followed closely on the heels of technological advances in nuclear weaponry. If we take away the weapons**, peace movements and arms controllers have argued, **we take away the basis for some of the most dangerous nuclear doctrines.** Weapon systems can be opposed on grounds broader than those characterized as weaponitis, as many have argued.

**Discourse on nuclear strategy directly intervenes into conflict escalation**

McLauchlan 91 (Gregory, Asst. Prof. Sociology Department, University of Oregon , Review of The Nuclear Seduction by Derber and Schwartz, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 28, No. 3, Aug. 1991. Pp. 325-330) MJ

**The Nuclear Seduction shows persuasively that there can be a 'deadly connection' between intervention or regional conflict and nuclear war. But the other side of this deadly connection - that possession of vast nuclear arsenals may have facilitated or been an impetus to intervention - is not explored. The theoretical problem here is the idea that causal forces between intervention and the arms race flow in only one direction. The connections between the arms race and intervention may not be so explicit, but this is all the more reason for scrutiny.** For example, **the Cuban missile crisis**, discussed at great length by the authors, was a case involving complex interaction between the arms race and intervention, **where what might be called the 'politics of nuclear prestige' led to intervention** (a US naval blockade) **and nearly to nuclear war, not the other way around. Once superpowers invest a great deal of political capital in nuclear arsenals, this may be seen by some political elites as requiring risky acts and intervention, to preserve the capital**. The political problem here is expressed in the book's sub-title - 'Why the Arms Race Doesn't Matter - and What Does'. While rhetorical over-statement is often useful to make a point, the unfortunate consequence here is a view that the politics of opposition to the arms race and the politics of opposition to super-power intervention are dichotomous. I am not certain the authors would want to go this far, but this is how some may read their argument.

A2: Weaponitis

Schwartz and Derber views arms control in a narrow, one dimensional fashion that looks over the importance of nuclear arms control

McLauchlan 91 (Gregory, Asst. Prof. Sociology Department, University of Oregon , Review of The Nuclear Seduction by Derber and Schwartz, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 28, No. 3, Aug. 1991. Pp. 325-330) MJ

**The concluding chapters present a powerful critique of what the authors characterize as the politics of arms control, a politics they claim is subscribed to by many peace movements even if this is not fully acknowledged**. Arms control in their view is not only ineffectual, but ultimately reinforces weaponitis. An arms control approach is always on the defensive, forever challenging this or that new weapon that rolls out of the laboratory. Worse, an arms control orientation leads to demobilization of peace movements, even as treaties such as INF and START do not appreciably reduce the risk or consequences of nuclear war. They put forward an eloquent argument for a more broadly based, forward-looking and politically-oriented peace movement, concluding with the observation that 'peace is the path to nuclear disarmament, not the other way around' (p. 207). **As far as it goes, this is a provocative critique. But they have characterized arms control in a narrow, one-dimensional fashion which makes such a critique rather easy.** **Arms control has also had profoundly political dimensions; it is ironic that in treating arms control as a solely technological phenomenon the authors ignore their own admonition against 'weaponitis'. Nuclear arms control has always been a crucial part of the political discourse between the super-powers**, for obvious reasons. While INF or START will not qualitatively change super- power arsenals, they have been integral to creation of a radically altered political relationship. Arms control can also have powerful domestic political effects. For example, Gorbachev needed arms control agreements to rein in his military and continue his pro-gram of domestic economic transformation. These points do support the broader contention of The Nuclear Seduction that political advances, not merely technological limits, are the real key to survival in the nuclear age. Perhaps the most significant contribution of this work may be in its efforts to prevent an outbreak of what we might call the nuclear delusion, the belief that in the emerging post-Cold War world the previous dangers of the arms race and nuclear war will fade into obscurity. We are reminded that all the ingredients in the recipe for nuclear danger continue to exist, though in changing proportions (with corresponding uncertainty). INF and START will not in themselves slow nuclear 'modernization'. Intervention in the Third World continues. Regional conflicts in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, some involving nuclear states as well as allies or clients of the USA and the Soviet Union, threaten to erupt into war (where they are not already in a state of war). States with nuclear weapons confront states with chemical and possibly biological weapons. Prevention of a state (Iraq) from acquiring a nuclear weapon is argued by some as a legitimate reason for war. Instability in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe bring uncertainty and possible danger. Meanwhile the superpowers, and a growing number of additional states, remain armed with tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. In short, the end of the Cold War brings with it as many questions as answers.

A2: CP- don’t use nukes

Using Bluff Deterrence just hides ill intentions while being ineffective in solving the problem

Megorden 00 (Kima, Epistemology of Nuclear Deterrence, http://isme.tamu.edu/JSCOPE01/Megorden01.html#\_edn1) MJ

It can be argued that the morality of the threat or intention itself can be resolved by likening the intention to kill to a bluff. Why is it that some people are so willing to concede to a nuclear strategy that has an indiscriminate nature? Perhaps it is because we have become used to the fact that “not only don’t we do anything to other people, we also don’t believe that we will ever have to do anything.”. Walzer suggests that the secret of nuclear deterrence is that it is a kind of bluff. The bluff seems to solve the problem of intention because one does not truly intend to kill others. It also seems to solve the problem of the likely consequences of nuclear war because other nations will still fear our nuclear strategy, which provides effective deterrence. Though this bluff deterrence strategy seems appealing, it does very little to actually solve the problem of ill intentions, and it can be very undermining to end results. Though it curtails the evil intention by avoiding the declaration of an outright intention to kill others, its efficiency is based on a lie. It is based on the perception of doing what a nation does not intend to do. Instead of remedying the previous evil intention, it simply replaces it with a seemingly less morally offensive intention. But how much more morality does bluff deterrence give to traditional deterrence strategy by basing the defense of a nation on a falsification? It seems that there is little morality added to the nature of intentions; bluff deterrence simply replaces the fundamentally morally flawed intention of traditional deterrence with its own fundamentally flawed intention based on a lie! If it could be shown that bluff deterrence was essentially ‘more moral’ in intention than traditional deterrence, then perhaps ethical progress would have been made. However, there would only be some sense of progress if this idea of bluff deterrence reduced the problematic nature of intentions without compromising the effectiveness of deterrence strategy itself. It is important to remember that the success of deterrence in preventing the killing of millions of innocents has a tremendously important role in the moral justification of deterrence itself. In short – if bluff deterrence could be viewed as just as effective, (i.e. preventing the destruction of the world) then it could be considered more moral than a simple deterrence strategy because it lessened the dissolute nature of the intentions of deterrence. However, bluff deterrence is problematic because there is always the chance that the bluff is called and the effectiveness of deterrence strategy itself is undermined. Once the bluff is called, the world will see that the nation has no intention of retaliating, therefore undermining the ‘peace’ or stability established by traditional deterrence. It is very problematic to base the future existence of a nation’s population on a bluff. Bluff deterrence is not effective because it does little to solve the problem of intent. Moreover, it is based on a perception that is shakier in the ends than the original deterrence. It is morally problematic to try and appease the ill intentions of nuclear deterrence by basing the future of mankind on an espoused and only ‘hopefully’ efficient perception

A2: US Dismantle CP

Secrecy preclude public oversight over dismantling process

Kestenbaum 7 (David, NPR host, NPR, U.S. Nuclear warheads are kept secret, <http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=10816625>) BAF

KESTENBAUM: D'Agostino is proud to say that things are ahead of schedule. In the past eight months, he says they have taken apart 50 percent more nuclear warheads than in the whole previous year. But it can't get more specific. Mr. D'AGOSTINO: I am a bit frustrated that I can't tell you the details, so it would be - I think it would be a good thing for you to hear them. KESTENBAUM: D'Agostino says the numbers would highlight that the Cold War is over and the stockpile, is shrinking. The policy to keep the numbers secret dates back to the 1990s, and it frustrates some lawmakers. Here's Republican Representative David Hobson of Ohio at a hearing earlier this year. He wants the figures made public so there can be an open debate about what the total number of warheads should be. Representative DAVID HOBSON (Republican, Ohio): I've been pushing this for years, and the administration has resisted. I don't know why. I suspect our potential adversaries know the number of U.S. nuclear warheads with much better precision than do the members of Congress. I think I know the number, but I can't talk about it. KESTENBAUM: NPR asked the Department of Defense about the policy. The DOD issued a statement saying, quote, "the basis for the security requirement is to deny militarily useful information to potential or actual enemies, to enhance the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence and to contribute to the security of nuclear weapons, especially against threats of sabotage and terrorism. But that policy hasn't stopped independent analysts from trying to pin down the numbers. Mr. ROBERT NORRIS (Senior Research Analyst, Natural Resources Defense Council): I'm Robert Norris. I'm a senior research analyst here at the Natural Resources Defense Council in Washington, D.C. KESTENBAUM: Do you know how many nuclear weapons the United States has? Mr. NORRIS: Yes, I do. We have approximately 10,000, and we feel rather confident based on years of analysis that that's pretty close to the real number. KESTENBAUM: Norris says sometimes there are leaks and nods from people who know, or you can do things like count the missiles that carry the warheads. President Bush has ordered that the arsenal he started with be cut in half by the year 2012. According to Norris' figures, that will leave about 6,000 in the stockpile. Hans Kristensen collaborates with Norris - he's at the Federation of American Scientists - and says the announcement today means the U.S. is now dismantling a few hundred warheads a year, probably. Mr. HANS KRISTENSEN (Project Director, Federation of American Scientists): One of the ridiculous things we've run into is, just seven years ago, you could call up the Pantex plant down in Texas and ask them, oh, so how many weapons did you dismantle last month? And they would give you the number because it wasn't classified. And, you know, I find this so Alice in Wonderland -suddenly, numbers that are very important to assure other countries, friends or allies, that we're going in the right direction about dismantling nuclear weapons cannot be told anymore. KESTENBAUM: Thomas D'Agostino, the official overseeing the dismantlement, says he has been told the secrecy is precisely because the stockpile is getting smaller. And there is concern adversaries could now use the numbers to puzzle out detailed information.

A2: Schmitt/Rasch/Nietzsche Ks

The distinction between friend and enemy causes violence between each other

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, 26,27, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory\_and\_event/v010/10.2burke.html)

This closed circle of existential and strategic reason generates a number of dangers. Firstly, the emergence of conflict can generate military action almost automatically simply because the world is conceived in terms of the distinction between friend and enemy; because the very existence of the other constitutes an unacceptable threat, rather than a chain of actions, judgements and decisions. (As the Israelis insisted of Hezbollah, they 'deny our right to exist'.) This effaces agency, causality and responsibility from policy and political discourse: our actions can be conceived as independent of the conflict or quarantined from critical enquiry, as necessities that achieve an instrumental purpose but do not contribute to a new and unpredictable causal chain. Similarly the Clausewitzian idea of force -- which, by transporting a Newtonian category from the natural into the social sciences, assumes the very effect it seeks -- further encourages the resort to military violence. We ignore the complex history of a conflict, and thus the alternative paths to its resolution that such historical analysis might provide, by portraying conflict as fundamental and existential in nature; as possibly containable or exploitable, but always irresolvable. Dominant portrayals of the war on terror, and the Israeli-Arab conflict, are arguably examples of such ontologies in action. Secondly, the militaristic force of such an ontology is visible, in Schmitt, in the absolute sense of vulnerability whereby a people can judge whether their 'adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life'.[38](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn38%22%20%5Co%20%22) Evoking the kind of thinking that would become controversial in the Bush doctrine, Hegel similarly argues that: ...a state may regard its infinity and honour as at stake in each of its concerns, however minute, and it is all the more inclined to susceptibility to injury the more its strong individuality is impelled as a result of long domestic peace to seek and create a sphere of activity abroad. ....the state is in essence mind and therefore cannot be prepared to stop at just taking notice of an injury after it has actually occurred. On the contrary, there arises in addition as a cause of strife the idea of such an injury...[39](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn39%22%20%5Co%20%22)

Imperialism bad

Expression of Western Imperialism leads to racism, widespread impoverishment, ethnic conflict, and violence.

WCAR 1 (NGO, Anti Racism Organization, Forum Declaration, http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/focusSearch.do?risb=21\_T9642847427&pap=results\_listview\_Listview&formStateKey=29\_T9642847430&format=GNBLIST&returnTo=20\_T9642847428)

120. Globalisation including structural adjustment policies, privatisation, trade liberalisation and unequal terms of trade create new and exacerbate already existing conditions of exclusion of all individuals and communities, particularly women, who are the victims of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance. 121. We denounce processes of globalisation that concentrate power in the hands of powerful Western nations and multinational corporations, and that has an impact on every aspect of social life in every country and region, as racist and unjust. It widens economic inequalities within and between countries, further impoverishing and marginalizing masses of peoples, and places them at risk to the demand for cheap and informal labour in labour-importing countries. Tools of globalisation such as structural adjustment policies result in poverty, famine and the collapse of health and educational systems. Globalisation leads to economic and social disintegration, unemployment and marginalisation. It particularly implies both feminisation and racialisation of poverty. Compensatory measures must be extended in this context. 122. The processes of social exclusion that accompany globalisation create situations of polarisation that result in the disintegration of local communities and countries, sometimes leading to an increase in organised crime and ethnic conflicts. 123. Globalisation is the continuation of colonial and imperial control. It is inherently racist and anti-democratic, and creates a network of laws and policies that unevenly integrate the world through markets, trade, transnational corporations and information and communication technology. 124. The wealth and the power of globalisation is concentrated in the global capitalist class and is inherently linked to racism and casteism, including environmental racism, and leading to many different forms of violence, militarisation and nuclearisation of countries and cities. The UN itself is shaped by the same powers that control the process of globalisation. 125. New commodities, information and communication technologies that are apart of globalisation process increase the gap among "have" and "have nots", creating a free market for capitals and goods but restricting the movement of labour.

Imperialism Links

The US, along with other international organizations like the UN and NATO, are pursuing a post-modern imperialist policy.

Fearon and Laitin 4 (James and David, Professors of PoSci Stanford Univ, *International Security* 28.4 (2004) 5-43) PR

The Bush team was particularly critical of U.S. participation in quixotic efforts at nation building for failed states. As a candidate, Vice President Dick Cheney created a significant flap in August 2000 when he suggested that the Bush administration would end U.S. participation in NATO's Bosnia mission.2 Condoleezza Rice, who would become Bush's national security adviser, expressed dismayed amazement that U.S. troops were being used to take children to kindergarten in Bosnia.3 The message was clear: The Bush administration would not engage in state-building efforts.4 [End Page 5]Ironically, the Bush administration has since undertaken state-building projects that are vastly larger and more difficult than anything the Clinton administration ever attempted. The U.S. military is now building kindergartens in Afghanistan, in addition to paving roads and assisting with many other major infrastructure projects in both Afghanistan and Iraq.5 GIs report on instructing Iraqis in how to run a town meeting with an agenda and turn taking—"It's basic P.T.A. stuff," one commented.6 These are local-level complements to the complex, higher-level efforts to build workable national political structures in both countries. And all this is happening without any significant reduction in U.S. involvement in ongoing peacekeeping operations in Kosovo or Bosnia. Indeed, the Bush administration even took on new peacekeeping responsibilities in Liberia, albeit very small ones thus far.7It can be argued that despite the apparent about-face, the Bush administration has actually kept true to its realist principles. It is attempting to rebuild "rogue" states that the United States attacked and destroyed as perceived threats to national security, rather than states that failed largely on their own. Arguing that chaos in Liberia does not threaten U.S. security, Pentagon officials successfully resisted the strong "CNN effect," as well as international and possibly State Department pressure for a more active U.S. role. In broader terms, the administration claims that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, changed the game, clarifying a new security threat.We argue to the contrary that the Bush administration's brand of realism has collided with post-Cold War realities that shaped the Clinton administration's foreign policy as well. Even before September 11, the world was changing in such a way that the main security threats and problems now emerge not from great power security competition—Russia and China, for example—but from the consequences of political disorder, misrule, and humiliation in the third world. These threats and problems have the character of "public bads" for the major powers. That is, collapsed states and rogue regimes seeking nuclear weapons impose diffuse costs on the major powers and other states. The total [End Page 6] costs are often large enough that it would pay to address them, but not so large that doing so is necessarily worthwhile for any one state. Given the nature of the problem, the incentives for burden sharing through multilateral arrangements are strong. Furthermore, whether the problem is a failed state or a rogue regime that has been attacked and destroyed, state-building efforts led by major power interveners and international organizations are practically inevitable (to the Bush administration's chagrin).As a result, the United States is now drawn toward a form of international governance that may be described as neotrusteeship, or more provocatively, postmodern imperialism. The terms refer to the complicated mixes of international and domestic governance structures that are evolving in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and, possibly in the long run, Iraq. Similar to classical imperialism, these efforts involve a remarkable degree of control over domestic political authority and basic economic functions by foreign countries. In contrast to classical imperialism, in these new forms of rule subjects are governed by a complex hodgepodge of foreign powers, international and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and domestic institutions, rather than by a single imperial or trust power asserting monopoly rights within its domain. In contrast to classical imperialism but in line with concepts of trusteeship, the parties to these complex interventions typically seek an international legal mandate for their rule. Finally, whereas classical imperialists conceived of their empires as indefinite in time, the agents of neotrusteeship want to exit as quickly as possible, after intervening to reconstruct or reconfigure states so as to reduce threats arising from either state collapse or rogue regimes empowered by weapons of mass destruction (WMD).Can this evolving form of neotrusteeship effectively coordinate international action to address the problems posed by collapsed states? Much more than is generally appreciated, the approach worked in the 1990s, with the United Nations playing a central role. Yet the international system remains badly organized and badly served for dealing with the implications of state collapse, whether indigenous or induced by invasion.

Impact Scenarios

(I/L) Clear and informed discussion key to democracy

Taylor 07 (Bryan, University of Colorado prof. and grad fellow Univ. Utah, Presidential Studies Quarterly, The Means to Match Their Hatred, <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6387/is_200712/ai_n32246236/pg_5/?tag=content;col1>) BAF

Rhetorical scholars thus view speech in democracy as "the medium within which the ethical self-government of autonomous individuals can be articulated with the imperatives of democratic governance" (Hicks 2002, 224). They reconceptualize ideals of deliberative democracy such as inclusion, equality, and reason to rigorously assess their associated discursive practices. They raise questions about how these practices hail citizens to participate in the democratic process as particular kinds of acting subjects, endow them with a sense of entitlement and agency, mediate their understanding of others' interests and the effects of their actions upon those interests, and develop their ability to not only competently reason together within existing structures but to critique and transform those structures to ensure that their limitations as means do not subvert democratic ends (Cloud 2004, 79). Of particular concern here is the hegemony in democracy of "reason" as a framing standard (i.e., of rationality) and a conventional practice of accountability that constrains deliberation through normalized assumptions concerning the source and range of legitimate support for expression and the ontological status of political interests in relation to language (Welsh 2002). In challenging those assumptions, rhetorical scholars rigorously critique the ethics and politics of selfdescribed democratic discourse. They ensure that it does not prematurely foreclose the expression of relevant interests and that it encourages their patient and ethical cultivation as a resource for innovative transformation of self and other. Finally, rhetorical scholars of democracy oppose corrosive discourse which forecloses the possibility of achieving mutual identification between opponents and thus cooperation.

Nuclear secrecy undermines informed civic engagement

Taylor 07 (Bryan, University of Colorado prof. and grad fellow Univ. Utah, Presidential Studies Quarterly, The Means to Match Their Hatred, <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6387/is_200712/ai_n32246236/pg_5/?tag=content;col1>) BAF

Liberal scholars and other commentators who assess the relationship between nuclear weapons and democracy balance cynicism and optimism (see, for example, FaIk 1982; Mitchell 2000; Peterson 2007). Their tone frequently evokes the morbid genres of diagnosis, autopsy, and obituary, but their grieving, condemnation, and pleading also seek a healing-if not outright resurrection-of the nuclear-democratic body. This activity typically grows more active during periods of nuclear instability, in which possibilities for reconfiguring the relationship between nuclear officials and citizens are at least temporarily opened. During the late Cold War and post-Cold War periods, then, several speakers addressed this relationship in the context of extraordinary changes in international politics (Deudney 1995; FaIk 1982; Rosen 1989; Rosow 1989; Stegenga 1988). Collectively, these speakers considered how institutions sediment around the artifact of nuclear weapons and how that process yields rhetoric that undermines the possibility of robust democratic speech. To varying degrees, these critiques all assert a fundamental incompatibility between nuclear weapons and the ideals of the democratic state. They argue that oppressive conditions surrounding the development of nuclear weapons subvert the capabilities of citizens to acquire, deliberate, and act on information concerning nuclear policy. As a result, the nuclear public is characterized as fragmented, alienated, uninformed, and unable to participate in deliberation with forceful and reasoned discourse. Commonly listed elements in this indictment include: an official regime of secrecy which suppresses and distorts nuclear information; official cultivation of a climate of permanent emergency that promotes public inertia and acquiescence to authoritarian rule; undue deference by nominal agents of congressional oversight to the interests of military elites and corporate defense contractors; a timid and amnesiac news media; and official demonization of anti-nuclear dissent as extreme, irrelevant, and unpatriotic (Rosen 1989). "This long train of official lies," argues James Stegenga (1988, 89), "has made truly informed consent an impossibility" (emphasis in original).

(Impact) Nuclear secrecy cedes the debate to the elites, ensuring militarism

Taylor 07 (Bryan, University of Colorado prof. and grad fellow Univ. Utah, Presidential Studies Quarterly, The Means to Match Their Hatred, <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6387/is_200712/ai_n32246236/pg_5/?tag=content;col1>) BAF

In his related critique of rhetoric surrounding the global war on terror, Robert Ivie (2005) establishes that the continued degradation of American political culture stems from long-standing "demophobia." In this condition, democracy is an ideal that must be enforced on international others to preserve essential American interests. Simultaneously, however, it is viewed as a threatening source of domestic dissent and change that offends the republican and federalist sense of political order. Ivie unflinchingly probes this throbbing paradox in the history of U.S. war making: even as they claim to serve democracy through military adventurism abroad, U.S. officials consistently distort the interests of their opponents and cripple citizen deliberation. They do so through use of a "decivilizing" rhetoric that blends irrational, aggressive, rigid, paranoid, and exceptionalist discourses to demonize Other-ness and delegitimate domestic dissent. The consequences of this practice, Ivie argues, are grave indeed. It degrades cultural diversity required for successful adaptation to changing political conditions; it suppresses the contradiction between the ideal of deliberation and the coercive use of armed force; it exacerbates tensions that lead to war's irrevocable destruction; and it marginalizes alternate formats (such as poetry) that may serve political deliberation. Ivie's solution to these problems is neither direct nor simple: he calls for nothing less than a radical reorientation to the possibilities of political discourse. Here, political speakers would privilege the comic pole of Burkean discourse and reject short-sighted, cynical, desperate, and self-indulgent discourses. Instead, political actors resign themselves to continuous and "adventurous" struggle (Peterson 2007) and cultivate the civil possibilities of rhetoric and performance for achieving tolerance, coexistence, and dialogue. As a result, militarist and imperialist discourses of national security that have attained unwarranted authority and autonomy may be rejoined with a full range of democratic voices.

Nuclear secrecy leads to ambiguous use of nukes

Lunn 10 (Simon, Secretary General, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Royal United Services Institute, Nato’s Nuclear Dilemma, http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/NATOs\_Nuclear\_Dilemma.pdf)

Nuclear weapons have long played a central role in NATO strategy. During the Cold War, the perceived superiority of Warsaw Pact conventional forces meant that NATO’s strategy of flexible response contained the explicit threat of escalation to the use of nuclear weapons. Flexible response was a compromise between the different national and transatlantic positions on the respective roles of nuclear and conventional forces in deterrence and defence. The priority was to deter of any form of aggression. However, NATO always made clear that if deterrence failed, it would use whatever force was necessary to end the aggression. At what stage nuclear weapons would be used was left deliberately ambiguous to accommodate the different views; ‘As soon as necessary and as late as possible’ was the expression used by the nuclear community to reflect this ambiguity. What types of nuclear forces were necessary to make the strategy credible, where they should be based, and the guidelines for their potential use, were all kept under constant review. Alliance nuclear forces consisted primarily of US strategic forces, US sub-strategic capabilities deployed forward with certain European Allies, as well as with the independent nuclear forces of the UK and France (although the latter were not formally declared to NATO). The concept of a multilateral NATO nuclear force surfaced from time to time – and continues to surface according to those familiar with the recent study carried out by the High Level Group of the Nuclear Policy Group – but such ideas always foundered on the issue of command and control. Allies could be involved in nuclear policy, but there could only be one centre of decision-making: the nuclear power concerned.

Russia securitization

Russians feel they are being used by the West as a vehicle of imperialism

Browning 1 (Christopher S. Browning Ph.D. Candidate Department of International Relations, University of Wales “The Region-Building Approach Revisited: The Continued Othering of Russia in Discourses of Region-Building in  the European North” [www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI\_publications/COPRI.../6-2001.doc](http://www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI_publications/COPRI.../6-2001.doc) ) MAH

Clearly such proclamations implicitly accept Western definitions of Europe in cultural terms to the exclusion of Russia. From this perspective, often termed nationalist or Eurasianist in debates on Russia, central Russian values are not those of Western individualism, but rather of sobornost and obshchina, that is of putting the collective before the individual and more specifically of reifying the state as the essence of the nation. Such state-centrism of course stands in stark opposition to the development of de-bordered post-modern space within the European Union and which is also a key element of region-building projects in the European north. Given the fact that for many Russians the West has become representative of a civilisational challenger, and to the extent that these initiatives have been subsumed within this Russian national debate between Westernisers and Eurasianists, it is notable that since their initiation some Russians have begun to view such projects with suspicion, seeing them as just one further plot to dissolve and fragment Russia, and as even being the vehicle of Western neo-imperialism. Such a view can be seen in the complaint of Slavo Hodko, the head of the St. Petersburg International Cooperation Centre, that: “The northern dimension sees Russia solely as a source of raw materials but overlooks the development of the country’s industry and tourism. It is in our national interests that we should not just sell raw materials”. It is also interesting that debates concerning the content of school education have also moved away from emphasising Western utilitarian individualism as in the early 1990s, to emphasising the distinctiveness of a Russian culture centred in ideology, orthodoxy, spirituality and stressing the Russian 'collective spirit'

Russia Securitization

The West’s quest for self-identification has caused it to employ securitization as a mechanism to distinguish itself from the perceived “other,” leading to the constant creation of enemies

Jæger 2k(Øyvind, PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, 7-2) MAH

David Campbell (1992) has taken the discursive approach to security one step further. He demonstrates that security is pretty much the business of (state) identity. His argument is developed from the claim that foreign policy is a discourse of danger that came to replace Christianity’s evangelism of fear in the wake of the Westphalian peace. But the effects of a "evangelism of fear" and a discourse of danger are similar – namely to produce a certitude of identity by depicting difference as otherness. As the Peace of Westphalia signified the replacement of church by state, faith by reason, religion by science, intuition by experience and tradition by modernity, the religious identity of salvation by othering evil ("think continually about death in order to avoid sin, because sin plus death will land you in hell"[7] – so better beware of Jews, heretics, witches and temptations of the flesh) was replaced by a hidden ambiguity of the state. Since modernity’s privileging of reason erased the possibility of grounding social organisation in faith, it had to be propped up by reason and the sovereign state as a anthropomorphic representation of sovereign Man was offered as a resolution. But state identity cannot easily be produced by reason alone. The problem was, however, that once the "death of God" had been proclaimed, the link between the world, "man" and certitude had been broken (Campbell 1992: 53). Thus ambiguity prevailed in the modernist imperative that every presumption grounded in faith be revealed by reason, and on the other hand, that the privileging of modernity, the state, and reason itself is not possible without an element of faith. In Campbell’s (1992: 54) words: In this context of incipient ambiguity brought upon by an insistence that can no longer be grounded, securing identity in the form of the state requires an emphasis on the unfinished and endangered nature of the world. In other words, discourses of "danger" are central to the discourses of the "state" and the discourses of "man". In place of the spiritual certitude that provided the vertical intensity to support the horizontal extenciveness of Christendom, the state requires discourses of "danger" to provide a new theology of truth about who and what "we" are by highlighting who and what "we" are not, and what "we" have to fear. The mode through which the Campbellian discourse of danger is employed in foreign (and security) policy, can then be seen as practices of Wæverian securitisation. Securitisation is the mode of discourse and the discourse is a "discourse of danger" identifying and naming threats, thereby delineating Self from Other and thus making it clear what it is "we" are protecting, (i.e. what is "us", what is our identity and therefore – as representation – what is state identity). This is done by pointing out danger, threats and enemies, internal and external alike, and – by linking the two (Campbell 1992: 239): For the state, identity can be understood as the outcome of exclusionary practices in which resistant elements to a secure identity on the "inside" are linked through a discourse of danger (such as Foreign Policy) with threats identified and located on the "outside." To speak security is then to employ a discourse of danger inter-subjectively depicting that which is different from Self as an existential threat – and therefore as Other to Self. Securitisation is about the identity of that which is securitised on behalf of, a discursive practice to (re)produce the identity of the state. Securitising implies "othering" difference – making difference the Other in a binary opposition constituting Self (Neumann 1996b: 167).

Russia Securitization

Since the fall of the Soviet Union the West has fostered a hatred towards Russia-This is exacerbated by the common Western assumption that we have more insight than other countries while still remaining free from prejudices

Lieven 2k (Anatol, Senior Researcher at the New American Foundation, World Policy Journal 17-4) MAH

Ever since the Cold War ended, Western officials and commentators have been telling the Russians how they need to grow out of their Cold War attitudes toward the West and Western institutions, and learn to see things in a "modern" and "normal" way. And there is a good deal of truth in this. At the same time, it would have been good if we had subjected our own inherited attitudes toward Russia to a more rigorous scrutiny. For like any other inherited hatred, blind, dogmatic hostility toward Russia leads to bad policies, bad journalism, and the corruption of honest debate-and there is all too much of this hatred in Western portrayals of and comments on Russia. From this point of view, an analysis of Russophobia has implications that go far beyond Russia. Much of the U.S. foreign policy debate, especially on the Republican side, is structured around the belief that American policy should be rooted in a robust defense of national interest-and this is probably also the belief of most ordinary Americans. However, this straightforward view coexists with another, equally widespread, view that dominates the media. It is, in Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's words, that "the United States stands taller than other nations, and therefore sees further." The unspoken assumption here is that America is not only wise but also objective, at least in its perceptions: that U.S. policy is influenced by values, but never by national prejudices. The assumption behind much American (and Western) reporting of foreign conflicts is that the writer is morally engaged but ethnically uncommitted and able to turn a benign, all-seeing eye from above on the squabbles of humanity.

Russia Securitization

The Western assumption that the United States is an objective neutral party leads to irrational and violent racism towards Russia

Lieven 2k (Anatol, Senior Researcher at the New American Foundation, World Policy Journal 17-4) MAH

It is impossible to exaggerate how irritating this attitude is elsewhere in the world, or how misleading and dangerous it is for Western audiences who believe it. Not only does it contribute to mistaken policies, but it renders both policymakers and ordinary citizens incapable of understanding the opposition of other nations to those policies. Concerning the Middle East, it seems likely that most Americans genuinely believe that the United States is a neutral and objective broker in relations between Israelis and Palestinians-which can only appear to an Arab as an almost fantastically bad joke. This belief makes it much more difficult for Americans to comprehend the reasons for Palestinian and Arab fury at both the United States and Israel. It encourages a Western interpretation of this anger as the manipulation of sheep-like masses by elites. At worst, it can encourage a kind of racism, in which certain nations are classed as irrationally, irredeemably savage and wicked. Concerning Russia, the main thrust of the official Western rhetoric with respect to the enlargement of NATO, and Russia's response, has been that the alliance is no longer a Cold War organization or a threat to Russia, that NATO enlargement has nothing to do with Russia, that Russia should welcome enlargement, and that Russian opposition is not merely groundless but foolish and irrational. It is of course true that Russian fears of NATO expansion have been exaggerated, and some of the rhetoric has been wild. Still, given the attitudes toward Russia reflected in much of the Western media (especially among the many supporters of NATO enlargement), a Russian would have to be a moron or a traitor to approve the expansion of NATO without demanding guarantees of Russian interests and security.

Russia securitization

Until the West and Russia are able to accept their common difference both factions will secure themselves against the “other”

Browning 1 (Christopher S. Browning Ph.D. Candidate Department of International Relations, University of Wales “The Region-Building Approach Revisited: The Continued Othering of Russia in Discourses of Region-Building in  the European North” [www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI\_publications/COPRI.../6-2001.doc](http://www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI_publications/COPRI.../6-2001.doc) ) MAH

Arguably, such a turn of events is problematic for those who see the new region-building initiatives favourably as a means of de-securitising northern space. The problem in this respect is that de-securitisation implies an underlying acceptance of the common values of how different groups should engage after de-securitisation of traditional military enemy images has occurred. However, from the perspective of Russian Eurasianists/nationalists it is precisely their values (identity) that are under threat. Consequently, when presented as having the goal of extending 'universal' Western values of liberal democracy to the East, the new region-building initiatives actually have the potential to be securitised in Russia as a threat to Russian values. Moreover, and as we will see below, Eurasianist rejections of Western values in turn become characterised in the West as a challenge to the validity of Western universalist principles and consequently of Western identity. Russia becomes characterised as opposing the Western mission, a fact which in turn has the potential to result in the re-securitisation of West-Russia relations as well as to re-inscribe Russia's difference from the West

Russia securitization

Post Cold War perceptions of Russia have caused the West to construe every Russian interest as illegitimate

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Secondly, given post-Cold War post-modern constructions of Western identity in terms of integration, cooperation, networks, de-bordering and so forth, Russia's use of the language of 'spheres of interest', the 'near abroad' and the 'national interest' almost invariably appears revanchist, suspicious and abhorrent in the West, and as a reflection of the 'old' security agenda. Moreover, Russian assertions of its interests in the near abroad, of its plans to subordinate NATO to the OSCE, of its desire to play a peacekeeping role in the CIS, and of its offer of security guarantees to the Baltic States are all equally unacceptable to the West and do not receive serious contemplation. Arguably, this is because such Russian proposals are seen as challenging the Western civilising mission. These are rather understood as specifically Western duties, rights and obligations. The fact that NATO could be subordinate to a European Security Council in which Russia had a veto is simply unacceptable in the West. In short, Russian attempts to play an 'equal' role in setting the agenda in Europe are understood as threatening and as signs of a 'turn for the worse' in Russia as they undermine the right of the West to dictate the agenda. Only the West should be allowed to play the 'missionary' role. That Russia might have 'interests' at odds with Western preferences is considered intolerable. Indeed, the very notion of 'Russian interests' has negative connotations in the West, which are easily de-legitimised and made to sound parochial and self-interested by construing them in terms of the now 'unacceptable' paradigm of realist power politics. Being 'parochial' and 'power political' Russian interests become illegitimate and can be ignored. This of course reflects the widespread belief prevalent in constructions of Western identity, and highlighted earlier, that the West itself is not parochial or self-interested, but rather benevolent and enlightened in its desire to spread its 'universal' values throughout the world. In this vein, Russia's difference as a site of self-identification for the West is once more retained.

Russia securitization

The West is attempting to draw Russia into Capitalism

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This opens the question of whether the Russians really are interested in Western liberal democracy or whether they are merely paying lip service to it in order to get vital international credits? As we have seen, both voices exist in Russia. A negative response, however, would neatly tie up with the sceptical view of Western ambitions through the new regional initiatives, that all many important voices in the West really aim for is opening Russia up for economic exploitation by creating a minimum level of stability through drawing Russia into international capitalist economic structures. Indeed, despite his longer-term hopes for regional cooperation this is in fact how Medvedev characterises the present state of Russia. As Medvedev notes, despite the nationalist/Eurasianist rhetoric Russia is no longer a military threat to the West as it is so thoroughly dependent on Western resources and markets. This is particularly the case regarding the fuel and energy complex, which desperately needs Western markets and investments to upgrade an ageing infrastructure. Moreover, as Medvedev points out, it has actually been the high export revenues accrued from the recent rise in oil prices that has financed the Russian war effort in Chechnya, and which many in the West see as evidence of the potential of a renewed Russian threat. Yet, whilst Russian capitalism is a fact, this does not mean Russia is also on the way to liberal democracy. In Medvedev's words, at best Russia is an 'electoral democracy', but not a 'liberal democracy'. Elections are ritualistic rather than impacting on the governing of the state. Russia remains a largely undemocratic, nepotistic and oligarchic society lacking civil society, a civic culture and notions of the rule of law. Thus, whilst Western ideas have spread to Russia these in turn appear to have been adapted and transformed to Russian culture. For example, whilst civil society is absent personal networks (friends, families, personal contacts in local bodies of the authority, illegal or semi-legal trades, etc) that became so important during the Communist period have retained salience. In this respect Russia very much remains 'different' and non-Western.

Russia securitization

**The West has a moral obligation to enter into a relationship with Russia built on dialog and equality**

Browning 1 (Christopher S. Browning Ph.D. Candidate Department of International Relations, University of Wales “The Region-Building Approach Revisited: The Continued Othering of Russia in Discourses of Region-Building in  the European North” [www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI\_publications/COPRI.../6-2001.doc](http://www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI_publications/COPRI.../6-2001.doc) ) MA

Secondly, it is worth returning to Fierke's analysis of the concept of dialogue introduced at the start of this paper. As Fierke notes, whilst dialogue may be utilised strategically, as I have argued has been the case in some instances regarding region-building in the European north, even when utilised strategically actors have a tendency to get entangled in their language. This is to say the language actors use often serves to constrain as well as to enable certain future courses of action. This is for the reason that to disregard one's past pronouncements and justifications of action is to contradict one's self-proclaimed identity in the eyes of others. As Fierke puts it, "A failure to live up to previously stated norms or ideals produces shame or disrespect, which arises because other actors see that normative expectations have been dashed". The point is that broken promises do not reflect well on the West. Having proclaimed a relationship of dialogue and equal partnership with Russia there is thus something of a moral responsibility on the part of the West to live up to such proclamations if the West wishes to remain seen as a genuine beneficent moral actor in the eyes of the world audience.

Russia securitization

The West has historically treated Russia as an equal when Russia has rejected dialog for negotiation, a relationship of otherness

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However, it is also important to realise that the maintenance of Russia as a place and people different from 'us', is not necessarily experienced totally negatively in either the West or East, or necessarily as a failure of regional cooperation under the Northern Dimension. For example, Russia's utilisation of strategic realist discourse tends to result in a comparative shift towards such discourse in the West as well, or in Fierke's language, the West moves away from dialogue (relationship of partnership) back to negotiation (relationship of otherness). This became particularly evident during the Kosovo crisis, and not least with the Russian forces surprise escapade to Pristina airport. The event was interesting for two reasons. Firstly, despite the resulting 'crisis diplomacy' it was clear there was never any question that matters between the West and Russia would ever get really out of hand. As Medvedev has noted, Russia's economic dependency on the West has meant that the West-Russia relationship has in fact become quite stable, and this is something to which the new region-building approaches have contributed. However, the second point, which Medvedev also highlights, is that the crisis situation actually appeared comforting to Russia. From being sidelined in questions of NATO expansion at the end of the 1990s all of a sudden Russia became a key player with an international role and a position at the negotiating table. National pride could be restored. Ironically, it was only through rejecting partnership for confrontation and negotiation that Russia found a relationship resembling equality with the West available. Moreover, arguably many in the West also find a relationship of negotiation rather than dialogue with Russia more comfortable. Although in a relationship of negotiation Russia is depicted as an obstacle to be overcome, such a relationship is, after all, what Western diplomats are used to, with the exception that this time the ultimate danger of nuclear annihilation is greatly reduced. Further, the re-emplotment of Russia as an obstacle also maintains notions of the historic Western mission to oppose the East. Finally, this mission is further preserved by the lack of development of civil society in Russia, leaving the West with the continuing 'challenge' to develop the forces of democracy in the East.

Russia securitization

United States disarmament leads to Russia disarmament

Global Security Newswire 10 (NTI, “U.S. Urged to Remove Tactical Nukes in Europe,” http://www.nationaljournal.com/defense/gsn/?us-urged-to-remove-tactical-nukes-in-europe-1271908800)

**The role that U.S. tactical nuclear weapons play in NATO's defense strategy is expected to be a key topic of discussion among alliance foreign ministers who began meeting today in Estonia** (see GSN, March 15). B-61 nuclear gravity bomb disarmament procedures are demonstrated in 2008 on a "dummy" weapon at Volkel Air Base in the Netherlands, one site believed to house U.S. tactical nuclear weapons (U.S. Air Force/Federation of American Scientists). "**It's time to make progress on disarmament. That includes on nuclear weapons,**" German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle said in the Estonian capital of Tallinn, where the top diplomats from the 28-nation alliance are meeting, Agence France-Presse reported. "We must take advantage of this window of opportunity for disarmament," Westerwelle added. Five European nations -- Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway -- have joined together to call for the withdrawal of an estimated 240 U.S. gravity bombs that remain on the continent as a Cold War holdover. The weapons are thought to be located at bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. **Calls to pull the U.S. weapons from Europe could lead certain NATO states to seek corresponding action by Russia, which is believed to hold a significantly larger stockpile of tactical nuclear bombs within its borders**. A high-level U.S. official said it was important for NATO to come to a single position on the issue. "Our principle, and most important guidepost for moving into this discussion is that we don't want to divide the alliance on this issue," the official said.

Russia securitization

Western intervention in post soviet areas has been perceived as a threat by Russia which - This lead to an increase in Russian securitization

Browning 1 (Christopher S. Browning Ph.D. Candidate Department of International Relations, University of Wales “The Region-Building Approach Revisited: The Continued Othering of Russia in Discourses of Region-Building in  the European North” [www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI\_publications/COPRI.../6-2001.doc](http://www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI_publications/COPRI.../6-2001.doc) ) MAH

Eurasianist sentiments have been influential in Russian foreign policy. From the end of 1992 the explicitly Westernising agenda in Russian foreign policy was dropped to be replaced by one emphasising the maintenance of the strong state and the preservation of national interests. Under the influence of these derzhavniki (proponents of state power) Russian foreign policy has become more authoritarian, and although not overtly anti-Western, there is a clear aim to assert Russia's national interests in those areas in which Russian interests are seen to conflict with Western interests (e.g., questions of NATO enlargement and the former Yugoslavia). Of particular centrality here, and explicitly deriving from Eurasianist philosophy, is the idea that Russia's Western relations must not undermine "Russia's role as an independent great power with its own 'spheres of influence'". Thus, Russia is seen to have a special role to play in its 'near abroad'. Russia's 'duty' here is seen as that of regional policeman ensuring stability. Indeed, in 1994 Kozyrev even applied to the UN and OSCE for permission for Russia to assume an international mandate as official peacekeeper in the post-Soviet space. Such assertions are manifest evidence that Russia refuses to accept what it sees as the unipolar aspirations of the United States (West). Rather Russia emphasises a multipolar world much in line with traditional realist balance of power thinking. Indeed, Sergounin further notes that current Russian security thinking is dominated by the paradigms of realism and geopolitics and by the related language of 'power balance', 'national interests', 'national security' and 'national sovereignty'. In view of this 'multipolarity paradigm' Russia opposes NATO expansion, particularly to the former Soviet territory of the Baltic States in which Russia maintains it has vital national interests, not least in preserving the rights of the significant Russian minority populations in those countries. Thus, Russia, whilst accepting the independence of the Baltic States, has offered them independent security guarantees. Finally, we might also note that Russia has tried to pre-empt NATO enlargement with a project to transform the OSCE into a collective security organisation centred on a European Security Council to which NATO would be subordinated.

Russia securitization

NATO is an alliance built upon the idea of perpetuating security – It justifies its existence by rebranding itself as a civilization project

Browning 1 (Christopher S. Browning Ph.D. Candidate Department of International Relations, University of Wales “The Region-Building Approach Revisited: The Continued Othering of Russia in Discourses of Region-Building in  the European North” [www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI\_publications/COPRI.../6-2001.doc](http://www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI_publications/COPRI.../6-2001.doc) ) MAH

Secondly, the process of NATO enlargement also needs to be seen in the context of the re-envisaging of NATO's role, mission and raison d'être since the end of the Cold War in civilisational and cultural terms, much in the same way as the EU and discourse surrounding the new region-building in the European north talk of 'Europe'. As Williams and Neumann have noted, from being ostensibly a military alliance NATO has steadily re-conceptualised itself as a civilisational project in order to justify its continued existence. As they put it, NATO has increasingly become portrayed not as a conventional alliance defined by the existence of the Soviet threat and the Cold War, but as an organisation whose essential identity and history is correctly understood as one of cultural, or even civilisational commonality centred around the shared democratic foundations of its members. As they then further note, one result of this is that NATO is no longer simply understood as a military alliance but also as a security community. Consequently, new members are not seen merely as "allies in the traditional sense, but as societies which naturally belonged to NATO by dint of their political structure and cultural values" (emphasis added). Consequently, as with the EU, on this reading membership of NATO is potentially open to all so long as applicants have successfully imbibed the (Western) values of the security community. As US State Secretary Madeline Albright assured the Baltic States in a speech in Vilnius in 1997, "We have said all along that NATO is open to all democratic market systems in Europe". Likewise, the US-Baltic Charter of Partnership of January 1998 affirms that the Baltic States "will not be left out or discriminated against due to factors of history or geography". Understood in such civilisational terms membership of NATO has thus become highly symbolic for the Baltic States as a marker and symbol of their membership in the Western club. Or as Peter van Ham puts it, membership "is considered a necessary and natural element of being a European country, of not just being an integral part of geographical Europe, but also of political Europe".

Russia Securitization

Our perception of Russia is heavily influenced by cold war mythologies that justify securitization by any and all means necessary

Jæger 2k (Øyvind, PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, 7-2) MAH The Russian war on Chechnya is one event that was widely interpreted in the Baltic as a ominous sign of what Russia has in store for the Baltic states (see Rebas 1996: 27; Nekrasas 1996: 58; Tarand 1996: 24; cf. Haab 1997).

 The constitutional ban in all three states on any kind of association with post-Soviet political structures is indicative of a threat perception that confuses Soviet and post-Soviet, conflating Russia with the USSR and casting everything Russian as a threat through what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) call a discursive "chain of equivalence". In this the value of one side in a binary opposition is reiterated in other denotations of the same binary opposition. Thus, the value "Russia" in a Russia/Europe-opposition is also denoted by "instability", "Asia", "invasion", "chaos", "incitement of ethnic minorities", "unpredictability", "imperialism", "slander campaign", "migration", and so forth. The opposite value of these markers ("stability", "Europe", "defence", "order", and so on) would then denote the Self and thus conjure up an identity. When identity is precarious, this discursive practice intensifies by shifting onto a security mode, treating the oppositions as if they were questions of political existence, sovereignty, and survival. Identity is (re)produced more effectively when the oppositions are employed in a discourse of in security and danger, that is, made into questions of national security and thus securitised in the Wæverian sense. In the Baltic cases, especially the Lithuanian National Security Concept is knitting a chain of equivalence in a ferocious discourse of danger. Not only does it establish "[t]hat the defence of Lithuania is total and unconditional," and that "[s]hould there be no higher command, self-controlled combat actions of armed units and citizens shall be considered legal." (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 1, 2) It also posits that  [t]he power of civic resistance is constituted of the Nation’s Will and self-determination to fight for own freedom, of everyone citizen’s resolution to resist to [an] assailant or invader by all possible ways, despite citizen’s age and [or] profession, of taking part in Lithuania’s defence (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 4). When this is added to the identifying of the objects of national security as "human and citizen rights, fundamental freedoms and personal security; state sovereignty; rights of the nation, prerequisites for a free development; the state independence; the constitutional order; state territory and its integrity, and; cultural heritage," and the subjects as "the state, the armed forces and other institutions thereof; the citizens and their associations, and; non governmental organisations,"(National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 2, Sc. 1, 2) one approaches a conception of security in which the distinction between state and nation has disappeared in all-encompassing securitisation. Everyone is expected to defend everything with every possible means. And when the list of identified threats to national security that follows range from "overt (military) aggression", via "personal insecurity", to "ignoring of national values,"(National Security Concept,Lithuania, Ch. 10) the National Security Concept of Lithuania has become a totalising one taking everything to be a question of national security. The chain of equivalence is established when the very introduction of the National Security Conceptis devoted to a denotation of Lithuania’s century-old sameness to "Europe" and resistance to "occupation and subjugation" (see quotation below), whereby Russia is depicted and installed as the first link in the discursive chain that follows. In much the same way the "enemy within" came about in Estonia and Latvia. As the independence-memory was ritualised and added to the sense of insecurity – already fed by confusion in state administration, legislation and government policy grappling not only with what to do but also how to do it given the inexperience of state institutions or their absence – unity behind the overarching objective of independence receded for partial politics and the construction of the enemy within. This is what David Campbell (1992) points out when he sees the practices of security as being about securing a precarious state identity. One way of going about it is to cast elements on the state inside resisting the privileged identity as the subversive errand boys of the prime external enemy.

Russia Securitization

Western nations derive their identity from the perception of an “other” as the root of all evil and the opposite of themselves – this leads to illogical securitization and mistreatment of “opposition”

Jæger 2k (Øyvind, PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, 7-2) MAH

The Russian war on Chechnya is one event that was widely interpreted in the Baltic as a ominous sign of what Russia has in store for the Baltic states (see Rebas 1996: 27; Nekrasas 1996: 58; Tarand 1996: 24; cf. Haab 1997). The constitutional ban in all three states on any kind of association with post-Soviet political structures is indicative of a threat perception that confuses Soviet and post-Soviet, conflating Russia with the USSR and casting everything Russian as a threat through what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) call a discursive "chain of equivalence". In this the value of one side in a binary opposition is reiterated in other denotations of the same binary opposition. Thus, the value "Russia" in a Russia/Europe-opposition is also denoted by "instability", "Asia", "invasion", "chaos", "incitement of ethnic minorities", "unpredictability", "imperialism", "slander campaign", "migration", and so forth. The opposite value of these markers ("stability", "Europe", "defence", "order", and so on) would then denote the Self and thus conjure up an identity. When identity is precarious, this discursive practice intensifies by shifting onto a security mode, treating the oppositions as if they were questions of political existence, sovereignty, and survival. Identity is (re)produced more effectively when the oppositions are employed in a discourse of in security and danger, that is, made into questions of national security and thus securitised in the Wæverian sense.

Securitization logic dictates that because Russia was once an aggressive imperialist country it will always be a constant threat

Jæger 2k(Øyvind, PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, 7-2) MAH

Reading Baltic literatures on security, one is not left in much doubt that Russia is the organised political power, (i.e. the representation of an anthropomorphic collective will). The Russian state is the danger to the Baltic. The danger of Russia is primarily seen as one of encroachment – be it by ways of political or economic subversion, or by downright military aggression – on their state sovereignty. Conflating state and nation, everything Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian is thereby also threatened. The sheer size and might of Russia, and the asymmetric power relations between Russia and the Baltic states itself is inscribed with danger. The prevalent economic and political instability in Russia is denoted as a threat in terms of uncertainty and unpredictability, that is, installed as one link in a discursive chain of equivalence casting Russia as anarchy, the binary opposition to state sovereignty. Baltic state sovereignty is thus underpinned by a discourse of danger securitising culture, crime, diseases, alleged smear campaigns and possible invasions alike. In this discourse of danger, the current thaw and policy of liberal reform in Russia is interpreted as a mere parenthesis in a brutal history of Russian imperialism, her true nature, as it were. It is widely held among the Balts that the imperial traditions in Russian foreign policy might resuscitate at any time and imminently pose a threat to the Baltic states. The bottom line of Baltic threat perception and assessment is one of Russian coercive aggression.

Russia Securitization

Russophobia has been fostered and exploited by Western elites

Lieven 2k (Anatol, Senior Researcher at the New American Foundation, World Policy Journal 17-4) MAH

Outworn Stereotypes Western Russophobia has various roots. One shoot is the continuing influence of what the political scientist Michael Mandelbaum has called "residual elites": groups and individuals who rose to prominence during the Cold War and have lacked the flexibility to adapt to a new reality. To these can be added others who have sought to carve out careers by advocating the expansion of U.S. influence into the lands of the former Soviet Union, in direct competition with Russia. Then there are various ethnic lobbies, whose members hate and distrust Russia for historical reasons and whose sole remaining raison d'Otre is to urge an anti-Russian geopolitical agenda. Finally, there are those individuals who need a great enemy, whether from some collective interest or out of personal psychological need. Much of the intellectual basis for, and even the specific phraseology of, Russophobia was put forward in Britain in the nineteenth century, growing out of its rivalry with the Russian Empire. [2](http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/wpj/wpj_winter00b.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22note2)Given Britain's own record of imperial aggression and suppression of national revolt (in Ireland, let alone in India or Africa), the argument from the British side was a notable example of the kettle calling the pot black. Many contemporary Russophobe references to Russian expansionism are almost word-for-word repetitions of nineteenth-century British propaganda [3](http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/wpj/wpj_winter00b.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22note3)(though many pre-1917 Russians were almost as bad, weeping copious crocodile tears over Britain's defeat of the Boers shortly before Russia itself crushed Polish aspirations for the fourth time in a hundred years). When it comes to Western images of other nations and races, there has been an effort in recent decades to move from hostile nineteenth-century stereotypes, especially when linked to "essentialist" historical and even quasi-racist stereotypes about the allegedly unchanging nature and irredeemable wickedness of certain peoples (though it seems that this enlightened attitude does not apply to widespread American attitudes toward Arabs).

NATO otherization

NATO has become representative of a European identity that excludes Russia

Browning 1 (Christopher S. Browning Ph.D. Candidate Department of International Relations, University of Wales “The Region-Building Approach Revisited: The Continued Othering of Russia in Discourses of Region-Building in  the European North” [www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI\_publications/COPRI.../6-2001.doc](http://www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI_publications/COPRI.../6-2001.doc) ) MAH

In this respect, like the EU, NATO has become representative of a civilisational identity of Europe that excludes Russia. As it expands Russia is further pushed to the edges and re-inscribed as somehow not properly or naturally European. Moreover, as Williams and Neumann note, to the extent that NATO has become a symbolic marker of Europe it has become increasingly difficult for Russia to maintain it too is European and to argue for a European security structure outside of a NATO-based framework. "If Russia were to be a European country, then it had to accept the expansion of NATO. Russia could only oppose enlargement at the cost of seeming 'un-European', that is uncivilised or proto-imperialist". Thus, like the underlying discourses of region-building in the European north, NATO discourses also tend to reaffirm Russia's difference from Europe. Or, if Russia is to be European, it is expected to subordinate itself to NATO. Despite the rhetoric of the Permanent Joint Council Russia is not an equal in NATO-Russian discussions and is not treated like one. With the NATO question looming so large in Russia there is therefore a considerable possibility that these exclusionary NATO discourses will overshadow any attempts of the new region-building to dissolve the difference of Russia as a marker of Western and European identity. This will be the case particularly if NATO does expand to include the Baltic States which, given the civilisational tone of NATO rhetoric, does appear likely at some point.

Russia securitization

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NATO/Russia

The enlargement of NATO will result in an increase in Russian securitization

Browning 1 (Christopher S. Browning Ph.D. Candidate Department of International Relations, University of Wales “The Region-Building Approach Revisited: The Continued Othering of Russia in Discourses of Region-Building in  the European North” [www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI\_publications/COPRI.../6-2001.doc](http://www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI_publications/COPRI.../6-2001.doc) ) MAH

Despite positive attitudes expressed across the region (including within Russia) the key to the future development of region building in the European north lies with the future development of NATO. The central issue here is the fact that Moscow continues to view NATO primarily as an instrument of US foreign policy and within which Russia remains designated in the role of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Viewed as an anti-Russian alliance Russia's negative attitude towards NATO enlargement becomes understandable. From the Russian perspective enlargement can only result in negative outcomes. In particular enlargement, they argue, will only increase instability in East and Central Europe because it would compel the Russians to view these states as a potential threat to Russia's security. To quote Valery Loshchinin, Director of the Second European Department in the Russian Foreign Ministry: The enlargement of NATO will result in the appearance of new watersheds and division lines in Europe. This will effect [sic] our inner-political situation as well: defence expenditures will increase and the demilitarization process will be slowed down. This will also influence the already signed agreements on disarmament and those which are only being prepared at the moment. All this will inevitably aggravate the tension and lead to confrontation. We are against such a development of events. That is why Russian society is unanimous in its non-acceptance of the enlargement of the Alliance. Two points can be seen to contribute to continuing Russian mistrust of NATO. Firstly, as in the discourses underlying the new region-building initiatives, in NATO-Russia relations it is patently clear that despite NATO rhetoric Russia is not regarded in any respect as an equal partner. Despite the fact that in 1997 a Permanent Joint Council was established between NATO and Russia with the signing of the Founding Act on NATO-Russia relations, this Council is widely viewed in Moscow as little more than a talking shop. Such conclusions have been drawn from NATO's enlargement to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1999 despite Russian protestations. Moreover, NATO aggression (without a UN Security Council mandate) against Yugoslavia in March 1999 reaffirmed this view. As Moshes notes, the NATO bombings in Yugoslavia both "violated the letter and spirit of the Founding Act with Russia, and thus showed how little attention the Alliance really pays to this relationship". Thus, despite the NATO rhetoric of engaging with Russia and developing a NATO-Russian partnership, Russia continues to feel alienated by NATO and excluded from playing a role in developing Europe's geopolitical framework. In this respect, Russia opposes NATO enlargement because it moves geopolitical barriers closer to Russia's borders and "symbolises a decrease of Russia's role in Europe".

NATO bad

NATO’s treatment of Turkey indicates a distinct dichotomous and abusive “master-slave” relationship that clearly proves its imperialistic agenda.

Larsen 6 (Jeffrey A, The future of US non-strategic nuclear weapons and implications for NATO)

Turkey also flies F-16s and has had DCA responsibilities in the past, but it is not currently certified for that NATO mission. Istanbul has not yet made a commitment to purchasing a replacement aircraft in the next decade, but it has earmarked some $10 billion to buy that generation of aircraft.227 Turkey also supposedly maintains nuclear storage bunkers for American warheads in two locations, according to open sources.228 Despite generally supportive comments by the Turkish government regarding its role as a storage site and potential deliverer of nuclear weapons, recent actions have called that commitment into question. For example, during the 2003 war in Iraq, Ankara refused to give the United States permission for major ground forces to move through Turkey into Iraq. And in December 2004 it made it clear that it would “not back any U.S. military action on Iran.”229 Nevertheless, Turkey would like to be more involved in NATO nuclear matters, according to interviews with Turkish officials. But it is limited from doing so for political reasons. Turkey’s population is unaware of its nuclear role or the Alliance’s mission, and its government wants to keep it that way. It perceives no change to its current role or level of support to the Alliance.

NATO=imperialist

 The US uses NATO and strong militarism to expand its global imperialist agenda.

Hassan 8 (Ghali, Independent Writer for CounterCurrents, http://www.countercurrents.org/hassan250808.htm) PR

Despite its irrelevant role, NATO has become part of the U.S. military. Instead of dismantling the once defence alliance, the U.S. pushed to enlarge NATO and expand its boundaries. The U.S. has lured most European nations, including former Warsaw Pact members, the so-called “New Europe”, to join its military. Poland, Hungry and the Czech Republic joined in 1999; Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuanian, Estonia, Slovakia and Romania in 2004, others are waiting in line. Becoming a NATO member proves to be a profit bonanza for U.S.-Israeli weapon industries and arm dealers. All new recruits into NATO are obliged to increase their “defence” budgets to modernise and enlarge their military arsenals at the expense of vital public services. It is important to bear in mind that the U.S.-NATO demands for expansion have met with opposition from Russia, China – with a legitimate concern against unprovoked threat – and nations such as Germany, the Netherlands and France. Almost all new mini-dictators supported the illegal U.S. aggression against the Iraqi people. They are in complete complicity in the war crimes committed by the regime of George Bush despite overwhelming majority of their citizens’ opposition to U.S. aggression. From the criminal U.S. aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the ongoing murderous occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, the new European armies have become U.S. foot soldiers serving U.S. imperialist interests. Engineering and using crisis in Europe and elsewhere, the U.S. cancelled the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in order to locate ABMs and to lure more nations to sign up for the system, including Australia, South Korea and Japan. Under the fraudulent pretext of defence against “rogue” states, the U.S. has just signed a “deal” with Poland to station on Polish soil U.S. “interceptor missiles”. The provocative deal is seen by Russians as a dangerous opportunity for the U.S. to expand its military presence and threat across the world. Poland hailed the deal as a counter to Russian “threat”. Of course Poland is fully aware that the missiles are against Russia not Iran, as the U.S. continues to mislead the public. After Poland, the U.S. is planning to build a twin anti-missile radar system in the Czech Republic. Many Poles as well as Czechs are against the deals and rightly believe their countries are becoming vassal states of a dangerous U.S. militarism. Since the end of the so-called “Cold War”, the U.S. aim has always been a quest for imperialist domination of the globe through U.S. militarism, including the establishment of U.S. military bases in strategic areas of the world. The U.S. policy of destabilising Russia and undermining Russia’s integration with Europe is aimed at controlling Eurasia’s natural resources . The events of 9/11 provided the U.S. with a pretext to justify the U.S. war on Islam and a global imperialist expansion. It is hard to believe that the recent unprovoked aggression by Georgia’s President Mikheil Saakashvili against the semi-independent district of South Ossetia wasn’t engineered by the U.S. ruling class in Washington. The aggression came at the time when Russia’s Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was at the Beijing Olympics Opening Ceremony and President Dmitry Medvedev on holiday. Georgian air force and heavy rocket and artillery indiscriminately attacked the town of Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia at midnight destroying schools, hospitals, homes, and even the University, leaving much of the city in ruins. Hundreds of innocent civilians were killed in the first hours of the attack. Saakashvili’s U.S.-Israeli trained Special Forces shot 10 Russian peacekeepers stationed there under an international peace agreement. Saakashvili’s aim was to take control of South Ossetia and ethnically cleanse it of its majority Russian inhabitants.

NATO=imperialist

NATO’s policy of extended deterrence forces allied, non-nuclear countries, to be drudging underlings in their regime of nuclear imperialism.

Chalmers 10 (Malcolm, NATO’s tactical nuclear dilemma, Occasional Paper)

Yet, as the first of these chapters makes clear, some other key NATO member states, together with influential policy experts, are far from convinced of the wisdom of unilaterally ‘going to zero’ in NATO DCA deployments. Since their inception in the1960s, dual-key nuclear deployments have played a critical role in symbolising the sharing of nuclear burdens between nuclear and non-nuclear member states. As long as extended nuclear deterrence plays a central role in NATO doctrine, they argue, it is important to ensure that as many member states as possible are involved in the maintenance of the forces that symbolise that policy, not least because this act ensures that non-nuclear states then have to ‘dip their hands in the blood’ of preparing to use these weapons. Were non-nuclear states no longer to have a role in preparing for nuclear use, they argue, it might be increasingly difficult to convince nuclear-armed alliance members (the US, UK and potentially France) to risk the lives of their own citizens to extend an ‘umbrella’ over their nonnuclear partners. Longstanding supporters of the nuclear status quo have been reinforced in their opposition to a ‘zero option’ by representatives of the Baltic states, who express concern that the nuclear ‘umbrella’ (that was so central to NATO strategy during the Cold War) should not be used to hedge against a resurgent Russia. It is often argued, in response, that extended deterrence does not require basing on land (as the US nuclear guarantee to Japan, which does not involve the basing of US nuclear weapons there, illustrates). Moreover, Cold War nuclear deployments derived their political and symbolic significance from their deployment in locations close to potential Soviet invasion routes, and were thus specifically configured in order to lend credibility to NATO’s doctrine of flexible response. By contrast, there is little, if any, deterrent value to be obtained from continuing to deploy weapons in locations, and with capabilities, that are functionally irrelevant. Given this new operational reality, it is questionable whether the US government will press for such weapons to be the primary test case for nuclear burden-sharing in the alliance. Some might also argue that nuclear burden-sharing is itself of declining relevance, given the marked reduction in the role of nuclear weapons in NATO doctrine since the Cold War. At a time when Russia retains much larger arsenals of sub-strategic nuclear weapons, however, the Baltic states worry that unilateral withdrawal of all equivalent NATO weapons could be seen as diluting US guarantees of their security. The foreign ministers of Sweden and Poland have added to calls for Russian sub-strategic weapons to be included in the discussion, calling for sharp mutual reductions as part of US/Russian arms control talks, starting with Russian weapons deployed close to European Union member states (in the Kola peninsula and Kaliningrad).1 Finally, critics of a NATO ‘zero option’ point to the critical role that NATO extended nuclear deterrence has played in preventing proliferation within NATO. Today, the development of independent German and Italian nuclear weapons is not a serious possibility. Given current trends in Iran, however, the risk of Turkey moving in this direction cannot be dismissed so easily. At the very least, any steps towards revising the role of nuclear weapons in NATO doctrine must take the Turkish dimension into account. Debates on nuclear weapon policy are, perhaps inevitably, strongly political and symbolic – ‘theological’ even – in character. Unlike their conventional counterparts, all concerned devoutly hope that they will never be used. As ‘political’ weapons, appearances matter as much, if not more, than what might, or might not, happen in the event of war.

NATO guides US

Despite opposition to Nuclear Arsenal in Europe, US stalls withdrawal by using NATO as a “guide”

Burns 10 (Robert, AFP, US cautions on removing nuclear arms from Europe)

The U.S. is taking a go-slow approach on one of the touchiest and least discussed national security issues: whether to remove the last remaining Cold War-era U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. Some officials in Germany and other U.S. allies in Europe are advocating a withdrawal, citing President Barack Obama's call last year for a nuclear-free world. But the U.S. is putting off an early decision, preferring to consult within NATO, starting at a meeting of foreign ministers in April that Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton plans to attend, according to several Obama administration officials. The officials discussed the matter on condition of anonymity because details are secret and the administration is in the midst of an internal review of the role and purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The estimated 200 weapons in Europe are a fraction of that total. Results of the review, originally due to Congress in December, have been delayed repeatedly and now aren't expected before April. The study, known as the Nuclear Posture Review, is expected to call for a reduced role for nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy, as reflected in the substantial reductions being negotiated with Russia in a replacement for the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START. That negotiation does not apply to the U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, which are categorized as "nonstrategic" because they are short-range bombs designed to be launched by fighter jets based in Europe - including by NATO members' jets. Ivo Daalder, the U.S. ambassador to NATO, said on Feb. 23 that the review "will not make any decisions that preclude any option with respect to nuclear weapons and NATO." The START negotiations aim to reduce U.S. and Russian long-range nuclear weapons, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles carried on submarines. Talks have bogged down for months. The White House said Obama on Saturday had an "encouraging" telephone conversation with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev about prospects for an early end to the arms negotiations. The bombs in Europe are a sensitive subject because they reflect a long-standing U.S. military and political commitment to the defense of its European allies, who have relied on the U.S. nuclear "umbrella" as an alternative to developing their own nuclear weapons. Washington has a similar commitment to Asian allies, including Japan and South Korea, but it has maintained that role with U.S.-based long-range nuclear weapons. Asia-based U.S. nuclear arms were withdrawn in the early 1990s by President George H.W. Bush. The U.S. government as a matter of policy will not confirm the location of U.S. nuclear weapons, but it is well known that the sites in Europe are in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Turkey. The U.S. has had nuclear arms in Europe since the 1950s. Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, which advocates nuclear arms control, believes the administration is inclined to remove the nuclear weapons from Europe but wants to take a cautious approach. "The Obama administration came in with a strong pledge to mend ties with the allies, and so the last thing it wants to be seen to do is to make a decision over the heads of the allies," he said in an interview Sunday. "The U.S. would move these weapons tomorrow if this were just its own decision." One apparent impediment to an early withdrawal of the weapons is the view of newer members of NATO - those closer to Russia, such as the Baltic states. They see the U.S. weapons as an important symbol of a NATO guarantee of their territorial integrity. Older NATO members see it differently. Five of them - Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Norway - in February called for consultations on the question of a U.S. nuclear withdrawal, and NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said this month that "a hot issue like our nuclear posture" will be on the agenda, beginning at the April foreign ministers meeting. The consultations are likely to last for months, possibly into 2011. Parliament members from several European NATO countries are circulating a letter to be sent to Obama stating that the elimination of short-range nuclear weapons in Europe is an urgent matter and should be addressed once the U.S. and Russia complete their START treaty. "It is the sincere wish of the majority of people in Europe that tactical nuclear weapons are withdrawn from Europe and eliminated," the letter says, according to a copy published by the Global Security Institute, an international group that advocates nuclear disarmament. The traditional U.S. view of the nuclear bombs in Europe is that they are a pillar of NATO unity and that they link U.S. and NATO security. Even so, they are not targeted at any specific country and their aircraft used to launch them are not as ready for combat as in years past. An in-depth study of the issue by an expert panel assembled by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, made public one month before Obama took office, said that since 1995 the aircraft's ability to go into combat with the bombs "is now measured in months rather than minutes." That study also revealed internal NATO divisions, saying that some senior U.S. officials at NATO's military command headquarters in Mons, Belgium, do not support having U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. It quoted one unnamed U.S. general as saying that the weapons are not needed because the American role of deterring a nuclear attack on its allies can be performed with weapons outside Europe.

NATO = political symbol

NATO’s nuclear deployments act as a political symbol rather than an actual, efficient deterrent

Larsen 6 (Jeffrey A, The future of US non-strategic nuclear weapons and implications for NATO)

A scathing assessment of NATO’s continued nuclear role concurs with respect to current Alliance policy. Referring to paragraph 46 of the 1999 Alliance Strategic Concept, this report comments: Instead of formulating a clear and bold new vision for its nuclear policy for the 21st century, NATO bureaucrats have put together a hodgepodge of justifications consisting of slightly rewritten policy language from the past, outdated remnants of Cold War threats… unsubstantiated claims of deterring proliferators of weapons of mass destruction, vague and exaggerated rhetoric about preserving peace and preventing “any kind of war,” and peripheral managerial issues of providing a political and military link between Europe and the United States. Under this vision, forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons appeared to serve essentially any purpose against any opponent in Europe or outside the region.183 This quote is obviously overblown and meant to serve political purposes. It neglects the fact that NATO policy is approved by all the heads of state and government by consensus, and therefore reflects the view that the member states believe that such weapons still have a role to play in today’s security environment. Nevertheless, the Alliance has not publicly responded to this criticism, nor provided an updated rationale for its continued reliance on nuclear weapons.

NATO security bad

NATO is an alliance built upon the idea of perpetuating security – It justifies its existence by rebranding itself as a civilization project

Browning 1 (Christopher S. Browning Ph.D. Candidate Department of International Relations, University of Wales “The Region-Building Approach Revisited: The Continued Othering of Russia in Discourses of Region-Building in  the European North” [www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI\_publications/COPRI.../6-2001.doc](http://www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI_publications/COPRI.../6-2001.doc) ) MAH

Secondly, the process of NATO enlargement also needs to be seen in the context of the re-envisaging of NATO's role, mission and raison d'être since the end of the Cold War in civilisational and cultural terms, much in the same way as the EU and discourse surrounding the new region-building in the European north talk of 'Europe'. As Williams and Neumann have noted, from being ostensibly a military alliance NATO has steadily re-conceptualised itself as a civilisational project in order to justify its continued existence. As they put it, NATO has increasingly become portrayed not as a conventional alliance defined by the existence of the Soviet threat and the Cold War, but as an organisation whose essential identity and history is correctly understood as one of cultural, or even civilisational commonality centred around the shared democratic foundations of its members. As they then further note, one result of this is that NATO is no longer simply understood as a military alliance but also as a security community. Consequently, new members are not seen merely as "allies in the traditional sense, but as societies which naturally belonged to NATO by dint of their political structure and cultural values" (emphasis added). Consequently, as with the EU, on this reading membership of NATO is potentially open to all so long as applicants have successfully imbibed the (Western) values of the security community. As US State Secretary Madeline Albright assured the Baltic States in a speech in Vilnius in 1997, "We have said all along that NATO is open to all democratic market systems in Europe". Likewise, the US-Baltic Charter of Partnership of January 1998 affirms that the Baltic States "will not be left out or discriminated against due to factors of history or geography". Understood in such civilisational terms membership of NATO has thus become highly symbolic for the Baltic States as a marker and symbol of their membership in the Western club. Or as Peter van Ham puts it, membership "is considered a necessary and natural element of being a European country, of not just being an integral part of geographical Europe, but also of political Europe".

Plan undermines NATO

Withdrawal of the US nuclear weapons would undermine NATO stability and cohesion thus murdering the drastically imperialist and aggressive nature of the West

Larsen 6 (Jeffrey A, The future of US non-strategic nuclear weapons and implications for NATO)

Many in NATO fear any alternative that involves the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons, for varying reasons. Doing so in hopes that Russia would follow suit in good faith disarmament is dangerous, they argue. Any option that called for the reintroduction of U.S. weapons in a crisis would be ludicrous given public opposition and the danger of raising the crisis level as the result of such a move. This is a future that some argue would please both Russia and France, but it is not one the rest of the allies would necessarily welcome. One senior NATO official even went so far as to say that the removal of U.S weapons from Europe “would be the beginning of the end of the Alliance.”267 Is that right? Could the Alliance survive the loss of its nuclear linkage to North America? On the other hand, others advocate the immediate and complete withdrawal of U.S. weapons for the simple reason that the Alliance can no longer answer the question over the purpose of those weapons in Europe—NSNW are not justifiable. Removal would eliminate an entire class of weapons, save money, and appease militarists in Russia who point to NATO NSNW as proof of the West’s aggressive nature.268

US withdrawal from its use of a nuclear deterrent would cause a huge rift in the NATO “Alliance” and could lead to its demise.

US Withdrawal and NATO Abrogation of its Reliance on a Nuclear Deterrent: This is the most extreme alternative, although one which may not be hard to foresee given today’s trends. This option also has the greatest potential for causing irrevocable rifts in the Alliance, or even causing its demise. On the other hand, should the Alliance survive such a change, many of the current coupling functions could be retained. The NPG, for example, could be kept as a consultative body with a new name, such as the Strategic Planning Group.

Removal of Nuclear Weapons from Turkey would undermine NATO cohesion.

Bell and Loehrke 9 (Alexandra and Benjamin, writers at The Bulletin, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey) PR

In 2005, when NATO's top commander at the time, Gen. James L. Jones, supported the elimination of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, he was met with fierce political resistance**.** (In addition to the 90 B61 bombs in Turkey, there are another 110 or so U.S. bombs located at bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.) Four years later, some U.S. and European officials still maintain that the political value of the nuclear weapons is enough to keep them deployed across Europe. In particular, they argue PDF that the weapons are "an essential political and military link" between NATO members and help maintain alliance cohesion. The Defense Department's 2008 report PDF on nuclear weapons management concurred: "As long as our allies value [the nuclear weapons'] political contribution, the United States is obligated to provide and maintain the nuclear weapon capability." Those who hold this view believe that nuclear sharing is both symbolic of alliance cohesion and a demonstration of how the United States and NATO have committed to defending each other in the event of an attack. They argue that removing the weapons would dangerously undermine such cohesion and raise questions about how committed Washington is to its NATO allies. But NATO's post-Cold War struggles with cohesion are a result of far more than disagreement over tactical nuclear deployments. NATO has given Turkey plenty of reasons to doubt its members' commitment to Ankara on several recent occasions. For example, before both Iraq wars, some NATO members hesitated to provide Turkey with air defenses or to assist it with displaced persons who had fled into its territory. Moreover, Turkey, which values NATO as a direct connection to Washington, witnessed the United States completely ignore its vehement opposition to the most recent Iraq War. Additionally, Ankara is dismayed by the reluctance of some of its NATO allies to label the Kurdistan Workers' Party, which has caused violent chaos along the Turkish border, as a terrorist organization.e Then there is the issue of Tehran's nuclear program, which seriously complicates any discussion of the United States removing its tactical nuclear weapons from Turkey. An Iranian nuclear capability could spark an arms race in the Middle East and bring about a "proliferation cascade," which could cause Turkey to reconsider its nuclear options--especially if the United States pulls its nuclear weapons from Incirlik. When asked directly about its response to an Iranian nuclear weapon, a high-ranking Foreign Ministry official said that Turkey would immediately arm itself with a bomb. This isn't Ankara's official policy, but it seems to indicate a general feeling among its leaders. Whether Turkey is primarily concerned about security or prestige, the bottom line is that it would not sit idly by as Iran established a regional hegemony.

A2: Russia influence DA

Baltic States divorced themselves from Russian influence

Browning 1 (Christopher S. Browning Ph.D. Candidate Department of International Relations, University of Wales “The Region-Building Approach Revisited: The Continued Othering of Russia in Discourses of Region-Building in  the European North” [www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI\_publications/COPRI.../6-2001.doc](http://www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI_publications/COPRI.../6-2001.doc) ) MAH

Furthermore, also problematic for the contention that the new region-building is capable of breaking down dualities of identity and difference in the region is the fact that to a considerable degree the newly independent Baltic States have set about constructing their identities in direct opposition to Russia. As Aalto notes, the Huntington thesis of the Clash of Civilisations has been widely accepted and politicians and academics in the Baltic States have drawn on the rhetoric of primordial identities as a way to dissociate the Balts from the Eastern Slavs and to construct a rather impermeable border between the two. Such a difference is further inscribed by the idea that these nations (and the idea is also apparent in Finland) are 'returning to Europe', implying that they have broken free from non-European binds. This return to Europe is justified in terms of historical discourses drawing on the inter-war period of Baltic independence that depict the Baltic States as having had archetypal democratic systems. 'Europe' is thus depicted in terms of a Western liberal democratic community to which the Baltic States naturally belonged, until they were kidnapped by the 'East'. Thus, the re-inscription of Russia's difference has been a central element through which the Baltic States have sought to construct an identity of themselves and to emplot themselves in post-Cold War Europe. One result of such discourses, however, has been that the Russian Federation is widely conflated with the Soviet Union. Therefore, whilst the Balts had their inter-war independence stripped from them by an imperialistic Soviet Union, Russia is now cast in the same terms as an expansionist threat. A discourse of danger is present that depicts the current liberal thaw in Russia "as a mere parenthesis in a brutal history of Russian imperialism". The implication is that at any time such imperial traditions may be resuscitated and Russia will once more pose an existential threat to the Baltic States. Russian talk of its near abroad, its actions in Chechnya and the emergence of the multipolarity paradigm have further fuelled such fears. Interestingly, such discourses conflating present day Russia with the Soviet Union are also apparent in Finland. As Vaahtoranta and Forsberg note, a common mode of thought in Finland today is to believe that a great power status is an essential aspect of Russia’s identity and that “Russia sees herself as the centre of the Eurasian civilisation and fundamentally different from other civilisations. According to this view, Russia is not aiming at joining the Western structures but is instead strengthening her own significance”. Likewise Erkki Toivanen notes that “there is some reason to doubt whether Russia’s imperial habit can disappear overnight or even by the end of this century”. Consequently, those adhering to the view that Russia is in fact merely a slumbering expansionist great power have been critical of the Finnish government's attempts at engaging Russia through such things as the Northern Dimension. Whilst attempts to 'reform' and 'civilise' Russia may be seen as noble, on this reading they are, for the most part, futile. As Heikka puts it: The rhetoric of Finnish leaders about an emerging democratic peace, a Europe without dividing lines, and a Russia adhering to international norms is from a different world than the self-understanding of the Russian elite.

A2: NATO DA

U.S. and NATO need to reduce arms but so far nothing has been disclosed

Podvig 10 (Pavel, research associate at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, What to do about tactical nuclear weapons, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/pavel-podvig/what-to-do-about-tactical-nuclear-weapons)

Since the United States and Russia might soon sign a new treaty that limits their strategic nuclear weapons, it's natural to wonder about Washington and Moscow's tactical nuclear weapons, which the treaty won't cover. The hope is that the momentum for a nuclear-weapon-free world, the renewed U.S.-Russian negotiations, and the ongoing review of the U.S. nuclear posture and NATO strategic concept will help make progress on reducing nonstrategic nuclear arsenals--an issue that has been largely neglected for more than a decade.

 NATO should admit that if its members cannot trust each other unless they are held together by a nuclear booby trap, the alliance has significant problems."

A primary reason for this neglect is the charged political atmosphere that accompanies any discussion of tactical nuclear weapons. For Washington's part, tactical nuclear weapons always have been an instrument of assuring its European and Asian allies of its commitment to protect them against aggression. Moscow, on the other hand, claims that its tactical weapons compensate for the relative decline of its conventional forces. So while both sides have been quietly reducing their tactical forces--according to the Bulletin's Nuclear Notebook, during the last decade Russia reduced the number of its nonstrategic warheads by about one-half and the United States by more than two-thirds--neither side has been willing to engage in formal talks about these reductions.

A2: Realism

****Realism is false, it cannot explain World War I and many other wars.****

Zagare, 96 (Frank C., Dept. Poly Sci @ U of Buffalo, “Classical Deterrence theory: A critical assessment”, International Interactions, 21:4, 377) MJ

As even Waltz (1993: 77) observes, “**if Mearsheimer is right in believing that an ‘equality of power … among the major powers; minimizes the likelihood of war, World War I should never have been fought.” Particularly troubling is the fact that precisely the opposite appears to be the case. World War I is not an anomaly. All major power wars** (Levy, 1983) **for which reliable data exists have been fought under parity conditions, including the Franco-Prussian war, the Russo-Japanese war, World War II** (Organski and Kugler, 1980; ch 1), **the Seven Weeks War** (Bueno de Mesquita, 1990), **the Crimean War and the War of Italian Unification** (Kim, 1989, 1991). Additionally, **there is a growing empirical literature that suggests that a rough equality of power resources is associated with other, lesser, types of militarized interstate disputes** (Bremer, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Garnham. 1976; Gochman, 1990; Houwelling and Siccama, 1988a, 1988b; Lemke, 1995; Leng, 1993; Siverson and Sullivan, 1983; Sullivan, 1990; and Weede, 1976).

****Classical Deterrence Theory is deficient and logically inconsistent.****

Zagare, 96 (Frank C., Dept. Poly Sci @ U of Buffalo, “Classical Deterrence theory: A critical assessment”, International Interactions, 21:4, 380) MJ

**Empirical difficulties aside, Classical Deterrence Theory also suffers from a much more serious deficiency: in its standard formulation, it is logically inconsistent. To demonstrate the problem, consider again the game of Chicken** (see Figure 2). **Recall that Chicken encapsulates in matrix-form the underlying theoretical framework of Classical Deterrence Theory**. **Especially noteworthy is the presumption that conflict in the nuclear age is at once unthinkable and irrational**. This critical assumption is Chicken’s defining characteristic. If one accepts the above characterization and the presumption that Chicken accurately reflects the structural and psychological conditions of a bipolar nuclear relationship, then the problem with the theory is clear; assuming instrumentally rational players, deterrence should not work. More specifically, **given that each player initially chooses to cooperate** (i.e., chooses C), **each player also has an incentive not to cooperate** (i.e., to switch to D). **Neither is deterred since neither should fear retaliation by a rational opponent. To understand why, suppose that one state, say B, upsets the status quo by switching from its C to its D strategy, thereby gaining a momentary advantage. At this point the present outcome of the game is (2,4). Now, what is the rational response of State A? A has two choices: to stay at (2,4) by continuing to cooperate, or to move to (1,1) by defecting and executing its deterrent threat. Since A (by assumption) prefers (2,4) to (1,1), it should, if it is rational, “chicken out” and accept B’s transgression. And if A can be expected not to retaliate, then B should not hesitate to upset the status quo.**

A2: Realism

Realism and Deterrence fail—impossible to calculate self interest

Gralnick 88 (Alexander, vice president of the Society of Medical Psychoanalysts, Trust, Deterrence, Realism, and Nuclear Omnicide, 9(1), pg 182) MJ

**There exists a struggle between peoples whose values differ. Some would place the preservation of mankind, now synonymous with preventing nuclear war and outlawing "the bomb**," above all else, **and would be glad for its sake to forego other priorities and accept otherwise unwelcome changes.** **Others, in the face of the nuclear threat, would minimize its possibility, and/or arm to the teeth with nuclear weapons," believing" that this will deter use.** **They would believe that a nuclear war of limited scope is possible and "winnable," and that a defense against its annihilitive prospects is possible**. They believe this way because their priority is not the preservation of mankind but the maintenance of standards they hold closer to their hearts. For these things **they would risk mankind or very major portions of** **it**. **The status quo, not the preservation of mankind, is of the highest priority to them**. They think in terms of Armageddon. **They are not realistic! They do not see the nuclear bomb as an impetus for social change and the eradication of "the ultimate violence," but as a means to preserve the status quo**. Einstein's words apply to them. After the atom bombs were dropped he said: "Everything has changed except human thinking."The philosopher Somerville(1 975) says it another way: "**A revolution in ways of thinking and habits of acting must take place both among leaders and the general public if the all-too-final war to end all wars is to be avoided**."

Realism cannot be achieved while using deterrence. Deterrence destroys the trust that is key between states to uphold the idea of realism. The outcome is deception and misrepresentation of the amount of weapons stored.

Gralnick 88 (Alexander, vice president of the Society of Medical Psychoanalysts, Trust, Deterrence, Realism, and Nuclear Omnicide, 9(1), pg 182, 183) MJ

**Trust is the critical link of any policy designed or meant to prevent nuclear holocaust. Without trust there is no safety in the policy of deterrence. Realism requires trust. Lacking trust there will be nuclear omnicide. Lacking trust man will use his weapons in warfare as he always has.** The current human condition demands trust. It is an inseparable aspect of any negotiation and human endeavor. Government leaders who hold mankind in their hands must be capable of trust. These are the facts: (1)The United States is the greater power, yet it states that the other has the military advantage; (2) neither power has gained an advantage that the other has not equaled; (3) each can destroy the other and in the process both can effectively destroy the world; (4) use of nuclear bombs by any one power will contribute to the death of its own people through the resulting" fallout" and "nuclear winter;"(5 ) superiority in nuclear weapons does not insure against one's own destruction; (6) there can be no victor in a nuclear war; (7) the peoples of the world want peace; (8) man has always used the destructive weapons he has created;( 9) the United States proclaims it is the greatest power, yet lives in fear of the other. In the face of these facts are the main protagonists realistic in the course they follow? **Realism requires facing the harsh realities of life. This can hardly be said to be so now. Perhaps there are other realities not being made explicit. We may suspect there are hidden agendas. Certainly we know there is concealment, exaggeration, and misrepresentation meant to gain advantage but not the goal of mutual trust. Honesty and truth are sacrificed. Peace is the price paid. Mankind continues threatened. Realism is unknown!** Webster defines" trust" as "assured reliance on another's integrity, ver-acity, justice; assured anticipation; confident hope; to give credence to; be-lieve; to hope or expect confidently." We see in this definition words with strong emotional overtones-words with which we have been raised from childhood. Some have an almost religious coloring and coincide with our most positive human values, such as "love thy neighbor." **Think of "integrity," "veracity,"" justice," and their power as pillars of our culture. Give thought to "hope,"" credence," and "believe," and their implications. All of them are involved in "trust." All are critical to a successful peace process. Generally we tend to see ourselves without blemish, as without self-interest and of pristine purity, and our adversary as without merit, untrustworthy, without integrity and for whom justice has no meaning. Our leaders view things in this manner and they and the media uniformly promote and encourage us to see things similarly. There then is little hope for and faint faith in the peace process. Under these conditions can there be the essentials of hope and trust? Can there be "truth?" Deception becomes necessary, not trust.**

A2: Realism

**Deterrence is paranoid and hypocritical**

Gralnick 88 (Alexander, vice president of the Society of Medical Psychoanalysts, Trust, Deterrence, Realism, and Nuclear Omnicide, 9(1), pg 183) MJ

**Neither nation trusts the other. Neither has a kind word for the other, nor can one allow the other to have any advantage, no matter how slight. This despite the fact that each can destroy the other several times over, no matter any advantage. Each professes to want peace, yet no visible progress is made in the disarmament talks. The distrust grows. Each professes to be serious about reducing nuclear weapons, yet there is a growing number of them. There is no logic to this except to conclude that one's intentions may be questioned if one professes peace but continues to increase and refine his instruments of war**.

The theory of realism and deterrence is inadequate for application and explanation of international politics

Achen and Snidal 89 **(**Christopher, Princeton University Department of Politics, Duncan**, Committee on International Relations, World Politics, 41(2), pg**143, 144) MJ

Rational deterrence is a highly influential social science theory. Not only has it dominated postwar academic thinking on strategic affairs, but it has provided the intellectual framework of Western military policy in the same period as well. The theory’s success derives largely from its clearheaded logic, which is as persuasive as it is elegant. Yet **rational deterrence theory has been sharply criticized by an impressive array of case-study analysts. Examining historical instances of deterrence and deterrence failure, they conclude that the theory fails both descriptively and prescriptively**. As George and Smoke put it, “**the contemporary abstract, deductivistic theory of deterrence is inadequate for policy application,” since actual cases exhibit “complexities which in many respects are not addressed by the abstract theory of deterrence.” A more extreme critic asserts that the theory is completely nonpredictive: “We found that challenges of commitments were largely independent of whether or not those commitments appeared to satisfy our four conditions for successful deterrence”**; moreover, “**deterrence is inadequate as an explanatory theory of international politics because [of] the growing body of empirical evidence**….” The current state of deterrence studies is therefore rather puzzling. On the one hand, the theory is widely regarded as logically compelling. On the other, **the most substantial body of empirical evidence leads to the conclusion that it is seriously deficient**. The apparent contradiction between logic and evidence provides the starting point for this paper.

A2: Realism

The use of rational deterrence theory is counterintuitive

Achen and Snidal 89 **(**Christopher, Princeton University Department of Politics, Duncan**, Committee on International Relations, World Politics, 41(2), pg** 153) MJ

**The power of rational deterrence theory is conceptual**, not mathematical**. It derives from the underlying logical cohesion and consistency with a set of simple first principles, not from the particular language in which it is expressed. In consequence, the model has been astonishingly fecund, both for theory and for policy. It’s surprising implication**s, now familiar from the literature, **include “the rationality of irrationality,” the dangers of total disarmament, and the value of aiming for strategic equivalence between the superpowers**. Perhaps most importantly, **it was rational deterrence theory that sensitized policy makers to the negative aspect of defensive systems** such as civil defense, the ABM, and SDI, which make first strikes less dangerous. **The point is strongly counterintuitive**; indeed, Aleksey Kosygin told Lyndon Johnson at Glassboro that he didn’t understand it. **But this surprising conclusion is a clear implication of rational deterrence theory.**

Rational Deterrence theory does not take into account all conflicts.

Achen and Snidal 89 **(**Christopher, Princeton University Department of Politics, Duncan**, Committee on International Relations, World Politics, 41(2), pg** 156) MJ

George and Smoke argue correctly that the deterrence failures of the second and third patterns are not those envisaged by the conventional rational deterrence theory. We would add that **rational deterrence does not contradict these scenarios; it simply does not consider them. In conventional deterrence theory, crises have to do with competitive risk taking and the slippery slope of inadvertent war – a very different process from the one discovered by George and Smoke**. To our knowledge, **crisis sequences like Quemoy and Berlin have received no attention at all from rational deterrence theorists. Yet they are clearly of major importance for policy, and for theory as well. The discovery of empirical generalizations like these is a considerable achievement, and a success that only comparative case studies are likely to achieve**.

A2: Realism

Rational deterrence theory claims to solve for problems they don’t

Achen and Snidal 89 **(**Christopher, Princeton University Department of Politics, Duncan**, Committee on International Relations, World Politics, 41(2), pg** 165) MJ

**Rational deterrence theory does contain some minimal psychological content**: for example, **the initiator must realize that the defender exists and threatens to defend. But rational deterrence is agnostic about the actual calculations decision makers undertake. It holds that they will act as if they solved certain mathematical problems, whether or not they actually solve them**. Just as Steffi Graf plays tennis as if she did rapid computations in Newtonian physics (and in game theory, too—at least against Navratilova), **so rational deterrence theory predicts that decision makers will decide whether to go to war as if they did expected-utility calculations. But they need not actually perform them.**

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Rational Deterrence theory does not take into account all conflicts.

Achen and Snidal 89 **(**Christopher, Princeton University Department of Politics, Duncan**, Committee on International Relations, World Politics, 41(2), pg** 156) MJ

George and Smoke argue correctly that the deterrence failures of the second and third patterns are not those envisaged by the conventional rational deterrence theory. We would add that **rational deterrence does not contradict these scenarios; it simply does not consider them. In conventional deterrence theory, crises have to do with competitive risk taking and the slippery slope of inadvertent war – a very different process from the one discovered by George and Smoke**. To our knowledge, **crisis sequences like Quemoy and Berlin have received no attention at all from rational deterrence theorists. Yet they are clearly of major importance for policy, and for theory as well. The discovery of empirical generalizations like these is a considerable achievement, and a success that only comparative case studies are likely to achieve**.

Deterrence falsely assumes that decisions are always objectively calculated

Achen and Snidal 89 **(**Christopher, Princeton University Department of Politics, Duncan**, Committee on International Relations, World Politics, 41(2), pg** 165) MJ

**Rational deterrence theory does contain some minimal psychological content**: for example, **the initiator must realize that the defender exists and threatens to defend. But rational deterrence is agnostic about the actual calculations decision makers undertake. It holds that they will act as if they solved certain mathematical problems, whether or not they actually solve them**. Just as Steffi Graf plays tennis as if she did rapid computations in Newtonian physics (and in game theory, too—at least against Navratilova), **so rational deterrence theory predicts that decision makers will decide whether to go to war as if they did expected-utility calculations. But they need not actually perform them.**

A2: Realism

Realism leads to empire building-dictatorship

Demenchonok 7(Edward, senior researcher at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Philosophy After Hiroshima, pg 17) MJ

**Despotic world empire is “the enslavement of all from one point” and a source of unfreedom, for it must assert itself by force. Empire building by conquest leads to dictatorship, even if the starting point is free democracy: “Democracy that conquers abandons itself. Democracy that lives on good terms with others lays the foundations for the union of all with equal rights.”15 The concept of world empire is well known to people of the twentieth and twenty-first centurie**s. With this symbol, **Jaspers warns against regressions of the civilized world toward a neototalitarian society. A peaceful alternative to this is world order, which is unity based not on force but on negotiation, on the rule of law, the common rights of all, and agreements along the legally fixed path. This unity cannot be taken for granted, but can be achieved through the highest spiritual-existential aspiration**s. The crucial condition for this peaceful world order is the moral way of thinking. At a certain point, history requires this moral way of thinking as an internal determinant of the movement toward such a future in which there is no imperialist domination and no wars. This dilemma outlined by Jaspers reminds us of Kant’s warning against “a world republic” as a despotic “universal monarchy,” the alternative to which is a peaceful voluntary federation of free nations (foedus pacificum), leading toward a cosmopolitan order.

Realism ignores CULTURAL difference in calculating self-interest

Demenchonok 7(Edward, senior researcher at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Philosophy After Hiroshima, pg 19, 20) MJ

**Many countries faced in some way or another the problem of the interrelation between the imperatives of socioeconomic development and cultural traditions, showing a variety of ways of development. This means that cultures contend with differing self-interpretations of modernity, which can lead to clashes and violence. This poses the problem of interrelationship between socioculturally diverse so**cieties. In contrast to the concepts of “clash of civilizations” and the incompatibility of the West and the East, there are many positive examples of the dialogical interrelations between different cultures. This keeps at the forefront discussions about the concept of toleration. **The conflicted modernity and post-secular society have changed the context for toleration as a way to respond to the challenge of political conflict**. As David Rasmussen writes: “And it is in this context that we are challenged to expand our notion of toleration to include all reasonable religious and secular positions. To be sure, in a world of violent conflict this is an optimistic position. However, it remains to be concretized through the developing discourses of international law.”

A2: Realism

Realism fails to create stability

Demenchonok 7(Edward, senior researcher at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Philosophy After Hiroshima, pg 27) MJ

**The Cold War may have kept a “balance of terror” in geopolitical rivalry, but it led to an escalation of global violence, as the new imperial powers waged proxy wars all over the earth. Millions died. At the same time, the U.S.-Soviet conflict demonstrated “the powerlessness of power,” showing that force is unable to solve the deeper problems of security and human rights.** **Regarding human rights**, **it was**, on the contrary, **counterproductive in terms of openness and exchange of information; instead, it played into the hands of authoritarian regimes.** Furthermore, **the terror of the nuclear threat was a welcome gift to such regimes: following a classical scenario of authoritarianism, the foreign threat was used by these governments to keep the people under control in a permanent state of war, thus justifying the infringement of civil liberties, human rights violations, spying on citizens, manipulation of public opinion through mass media, and urging citizens to sacrifice their economic well-being and even their lives as a patriotic duty**. This worked against the internal efforts for change and the reformist movements within these societies. Conversely, a period of détente and the relaxation of superpower tensions were favorable to the internal movement for democratization. The SALT and START negotiations and the peaceful end of nuclear confrontation were followed by the end of authoritarian rule. The “regime change” was not introduced from the outside or by force but, rather, it came from within society, under favorable outer conditions.

A2: Realism

War used as a political instrument underminds realism

Demenchonok 7(Edward, senior researcher at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Philosophy After Hiroshima, pg 35) MJ

Machiavelli’s thesis that the end justifies the means, later underscored by Clausewitz’s statement that “**war is the continuation of politics by other means,” underpins the “realist” balance-of-power and hegemonic stability theories of realpolitik, which still remain predominant in foreign policy. The use of war as a political instrument is now dressed up in the humanitarian guise of “spreading democracy” and the “global war on terrorism.”** During the past years, there has emerged a category of publications justifying unrestricted unilateral use of force as the means for security and human rights protection.45 The paradox of war in the name of peace and democracy shows rather a discrepancy between the means and the ends.

Realism ignores all the possibilities beyond what is

Brincat, 9 (Shannon, U of Queensland, “Reclaiming the Utopian imaginary in IR theory”, Review of International Studies (2009), 35, 581-609) MJ

Sometime in the shadowy inter-war years saw the demise of utopianism as a viable aspect of IR theory. E.H. Carr gave the date of utopianism’s actual death in the events of 1931,24 and while that may or may not be accurate, one of the many casualties of World War II was the utopian imaginary and its replacement with what Levitas has described as an ‘anti-utopian utopianism’ – a political sphere that represses and obscures images of the good life, effectively removing them from consideration.25 One reason why IR theory has shown only the most sedentary flickers of a transformative capacity is, I contend, because of this dismissal of the utopian tradition near to the discipline’s inception in the debates between realism and liberal internationalism. Carr’s so-called ‘devastating attack’ on utopianism contained in the opening salvo of The Twenty Years’ Crisis has been the widely accepted as the coup d’état of all utopian thought in IR.26 In the aftermath of this First Great Debate**, it was the methodology of realism that prevailed having ‘irrefutably’ discredited its alternative. Since then, like Alice in Wonderland, IR theory has had little practice in imagining what it considers ‘impossible things.’ For all its sensibilities, mainstream IR simply cannot see beyond the lens of its own looking-glass, where what is possible is deemed impossible, where what is in principle alterable is cast with permanence. That is, if the dominant approach to the field cannot believe what it considers impossible – and the immutability thesis of realism holds that any form of progressive change constitutes such an impossibility27 – then not only is all imagination of betterment expunged from disciplinary knowledge but so too is any conceptualisation of change at all. In this way, realism asphyxiates thought in IR because of its inability to imagine anything other than what is**.28 As shall be seen however, the philosophical grounds on which the forced exile of utopianism from IR was compelled are not as unassailable as is so widely assumed.

A2: Realism

Realism dismisses any chance of utopian change

Brincat, 9 (Shannon, U of Queensland, “Reclaiming the Utopian imaginary in IR theory”, Review of International Studies (2009), 35, 581-609) MJ

Carr dismissed utopianism on the epistemic ground that it was abstract and metaphysical, and on the normative ground that the utopianist’s desire for justice and perfection could rupture the ordered fragility of the international status quo.29 In distinction, realism sought to compel IR theorists to reflect only on empirical, non-ideal features of the world system, and to thus constrain the political imagination to present conditions alone. Yet these **core realist assumptions suffer from two fatal contradictions. The first is the ontological problem that pertains to the relative position of different actors within the world system that would give different considerations to what is deemed objectively possible and desirable in world politics. What is considered impossible for the realist may be considered possible (and necessary) for peripheral groups who have long-term aims for the transformation of political power and community**.30 **The second contradiction relates to the false logic inherent to Carr’s assumption of impossibility – any estimation of the possibility or impossibility of utopian transition is not a prima facie ground for dismissing utopianism altogether. There can be no logical certainty deducible from a subjective estimate of what is considered possible,** nor does Carr substantiate what it is exactly that makes utopianism impossible, other than vague references to the superiority of a scientific approach.**31 This view completely excludes the powerful ideational role that the utopian imagination can have at the level of will formation of agents in inspiring change.** Moreover, such an argument only concerns the probability of change – and one could contend that the material/productive basis of society today provides far more potential for positive transformations towards utopia than has hitherto existed in history

Realism excludes identity

Ruggie 98 (John, Professor in Human Rights and International Affairs at Harvard, International Organization, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge,” 52(4), pg 863) MJ

Second, **not only does neo-utilitarianism have no analytical means for dealing with the generic identities and interests of states qua states, it also excludes consideration of how specific identities of specific states shape their interests and, thereby, patterns of intemationai outcomes. This is tme even of treatments of the United States—the century's central great power and yet so atypical in its advantageous geopolitical position and intemal political and ethnic makeup**. I have indicated elsewhere how the postwar intemationai order would have differed if the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany had ended up as its hegemon instead of the United States; indeed, important things would have differed if Britain had become the leading power. Thus, contra neorealism, I argued that American hegemony was every bit as important as American hegemony in shaping the postwar order.^^ And, contra neoliberal institutionalism, I noted that **America's choice of the specific features of the postwar institutional frameworks**—be it the United Nations, indivisible security commitments in NATO, or nondiscriminatory norms in trade and monetary relations—**cannot be rendered accurately merely in terms of marginal utility but also reflected America's sense of self as a nation**.

A2: Realism

Neoutilitarianism distorts reality to justify their theory

Ruggie 98 (John, Professor in Human Rights and International Affairs at Harvard, International Organization, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge,” 52(4), pg 865) MJ

In a frequently cited remark. Waltz has stated that his theory does not pretend to explain everything, but what it does explain is important.''^ He is right on both counts. But the subjects addressed in the studies noted here (and others like them) are hardly unimportant either. Indeed, all are important for precisely those dependent variables that Waltz's theory claims to explain. The same point also holds, correspondingly, for neoliberal institutionalism. **More empirical work in the social constructivist vein is necessary, and the origins of identities and other normative factors need to be better theorized. But it is not an undue stretch to conclude**, even at this point, **that neoutilitarianism's assumptions that the identities and interests of states are exogenous and given (in contrast to being treated as endogenous and socially constructed) pose potentially serious distortions and omissions, even as they provide the basis on which neo-utilitarianism's theoretical payoff rests.**

Realism ignores the ideological motivations for foreign policy

Ruggie 98 (John, Professor in Human Rights and International Affairs at Harvard, International Organization, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge,” 52(4), pg 865) MJ

Waltz's neorealist model is physicalist in character. Hence, **ideational factors make only cameo appearances in it. Take his reference to the recurrent normative element in U.S. foreign policy: "England claimed to bear the white man's burden; France spoke of her mission civilisatrice. In like spirit, we** [the United States] **say that we act to make and maintain world order. . . . For countries at the top, this is predictable behavior**.'"\*\* It is Waltz's sole reference to the role of norms. **Ideational factors enter the picture again briefly in the form of socialization, one of the mechanisms by which states**, according to Waltz, **learn to conform to the dictates of the system**."\*' Numerous critics have been puzzled by the presence of socialization in a physicalist model that disclaims any sociality on the part of its actors. But perhaps even more serious is the fact that Waltz, in this instance as elsewhere in his Theory, turns what is supposed to be a methodological principle into an ontological one: Waltz has actual states becoming socialized to his model of the international system, not to the more variegated world of actual international relations .''^ Other neorealists have modestly modified Waltz's model. Krasner has explored the role of ideology in North-South economic negotiations,"' and more recently he has made reference to states” ‘ideational interests."^" But neither factor has been fully squared with his enduring neorealist premises. Following the collapse of the Soviet system, several neorealists discovered nationalism, which was previously blackboxed into domestic factors, said to have no role in systemic theory.^' However, as Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil note, **neorealists' interest in nationalism is largely limited to its role as a source of conflict or in affecting the capability of existing or would-be states to wage conflicts, thus "making it difficult to conceive of a nontautological relationship between 'nation' and 'state'.**"'^ Finally, Katzenstein has pointed out that neorealists who seek to add greater determinative content to the predictions of Waltz's sparse model often do so by importing into it unacknowledged ideational factors, such as the role of culture as an instrument of social mobilization or in generating threat perceptions.'^

IR Theory Impacts

**IR theory replicates a discourse of violence and war**

**Richmond 7** (Oliver, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, , Alternatives 32.2, OneFile, pg 447) MJ

**Much of orthodox IR theory is antipeace because, with its emphasis on sovereignties, states, and institutions, it generally fails to deal with, or empathize with, everyday human life**.13 Such reductionism might be useful in considering conflict in a Westphalian, state-centric world, but it omits any consideration of other knowledge systems not local to the elites of the West or North.14 Indeed, **orthodox IR’s representational habits15 and knowledge systems explicitly isolate themselves to maintain their unity**,16 **at the expense of diverse issues of everyday life.** **This removes or deprioritizes such issues as culture, identity, gender, class, race, language, children, and the environment by claiming to faithfully reproduce the “real” as something immutable. This means that IR theory replicates a discourse of violence and war.** Roland Bleiker and others have shown how the hegemonic mimetic representation that lies at the heart of orthodox **IR theory is used to perpetuate its myths**.17 Bleiker argues that “direct aesthetic encounters with the political can contribute to a more inclusive and just world order.”18 A range of thinkers from Foucault to Deleuze effectively challenge the attempt of orthodox theory and methodology to represent and interpret through an appeal to a narrow range of scientific approaches that mimic a hegemonic aesthetic and claims it as truth. **Such myths may be conducive to the claims of Western or liberal hegemony as well as mainstream theories of international relations, regardless of whether or not they arise purposefully or through the uncritical replication of biased or flawed knowledge systems**. This is captured by Jean-Francois Lyotard’s work on the “differend,” which identifies the dilemmas of institutions and frameworks that produce injustice for their members or components even when operating in good faith and with consensus.19 **They inevitably marginalize some participants as a consequence of the underlying ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions and frameworks they represent and that inevitably favor participants with similar assumptions.**

Terrorism Add-on

The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons creates the risk of terrorists groups stealing

them

Mützenich et. al. 8(Rolf, SPD Spokesperson on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, Patrik Vankrunklesven MP Belgium, PNND Council Member, Sergei Kolesnikov, Member of the Russian Duma, PNND Council Member, “Time to remove tactical nuclear weapons from Europe?” http://www.gsinstitute.org/pnnd/pubs/Tactical\_nukes.pdf)

**The Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction** (Blix Commission) **notes that there are over 400 United States tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and possibly a larger number of Russian tactical weapons deployed in western Russia. The Commission notes that these tactical weapons “would be easier** (than strategic weapons) **for outsiders to use, such as a terrorist group**”, **and that “There is a risk of theft or diversion during transport or storage in the field.” The Commission thus recommends that the US and Russia “should agree to withdraw all non-strategic nuclear weapons** to central storage on national territory, pending their eventual elimination.”

Turn-US TNWs are not secure and are targeted by terrorists

Hanley 10 (Charles, Pulitzer Prize winning journalist, “Cold War relics ignite controversy,” Santa Fe New Mexican, http://www.santafenewmexican.com/LocalNews/Cold-War-relics-ignite-controversy) MJ

Unseen beyond the grazing Holsteins and rolling pastures of eastern Belgium, the 12-foot-long tapered metal cylinders sit in their underground vaults, waiting for the doomsday call that never came. Each packs the power of many Hiroshimas. **America's oldest nuclear weapons, unwanted, outdated, a legacy of the 20th century, are now the focus of a political struggle that could shake the NATO alliance in the 21st. The questions hanging over the B-61 bombs, an estimated 200 of them on six air bases across Europe, relate not just to why they're still here, but to how safe and secure they are**. For one thing, **al-Qaida terrorists have already targeted this Belgian air base 52 miles northeast of Brussels**. For another**, U.S. Air Force inspectors found inadequate security at most of the six sites. And three months ago a "bombspotter" team**, anti-nuclear activists, **penetrated nearly a half-mile inside Kleine Brogel, reaching its innermost bunkers**. "It was a shock," Theo Kelchtermans, mayor of the neighboring town of Peer, said of the protesters' infiltration, which went unchallenged for an hour. **His bottom line: "I hope these bombs will disappear." It's a hope shared by the governments of Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, three of the five NATO countries, with Italy and Turkey, that host the Cold War leftovers.**

TNWs bad

NATO’s tactical nuclear armaments cause unnecessary fear in the name of “deterring” an absent Iranian threat

Larsen 6 (Jeffrey A, The future of US non-strategic nuclear weapons and implications for NATO)

Threats from theMediterranean andMiddle East**—**particularly, in the mid-term, from a nuclear-armed, pro-terrorist, and anti-Western Iran**—**could elicit a much higher threat awareness on the part of Europe, potentiallyequaling fears of the Soviet threat during the Cold War**.** These fears could justify a continued or even strengthened Alliance nuclear capabilityas a hedgeand response against these rising new threats on the Alliance’s periphery**.** Iranian nuclear weapons could set off a domino effect of new nuclear states in the region, which could, in turn, affect theEuropeanallies’ calculus of assurance levels required for their security. At the moment, however, most European states see no proximate threat from Iran or the Middle East that would justify such a reversal of trends regarding NATO nuclear capabilities. Indeed, the common perspective of many European NATO officials interviewed in early 2006 was that Iran would not threaten Europe’s capitals and was unlikely to be nuclear capable for at least five to ten years. Universally it was felt that the United States was making more of this threat than was really there—although some Europeans admitted that they recognize that the United States holds a global perspective quite different than do its NATO allies.264 Others believe that the United States is by its nature pessimistic and takes a longer term view of potential adversaries when it comes to assessing threats, whereas Europe is more optimistic, putting faith in the goodness of human nature.

TNWs Bad

TNWS are outdated and threaten nuclear stability

Lamond and Ingram 9 (Claudine, Senior analyst and contributor to ‘International Security Report’ and Paul analyst for British American Security Information Council’ (BASIC), London, Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states http://www.atlantic-community.org/app/webroot/files/articlepdf/CLamondTNWinNATO.pdf)BAF

NATO’s member states have reached an impasse on the future of nuclear sharing in Europe, and currently appear to be operating on the assumption of business as usual through fear of change. While there would be mainstream support on both sides of the Atlantic for the practice to end, governments are reluctant to take action that may appear to challenge the relevance or the future of the NATO Alliance. Even under an Obama Administration, the United States may be reluctant to remove forward-based tactical nuclear weapons from Europe for as long as allied governments wish them to remain, in order to be seen as fulfilling commitments to NATO collective security.1 Likewise, European host states will be reluctant to suggest that the United States remove them if the removal were interpreted to be anti-American or reflect a reduced commitment to NATO. Yet the sustained presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe is a legacy from an outdated security agenda and no longer serves a credible purpose within NATO’s nuclear posture. Prolonging nuclear sharing arrangements in Europe may harm global nuclear stability, provide additional tension with Russia and end up a costly enterprise for both the United States and host member states.

Our policy of nondisclosure of TNW arsenals is the greatest threat to overall world security

Sokov 2 (Nikolai, Senior Research Associate CNS NIS Nonproliferation Program Center for Nonproliferation Studies, NTI research Library, Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW) <http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_10a.html>) BAF

Tactical (nonstrategic) nuclear weapons (TNWs) typically refer to short-range weapons, including land-based missiles with a range of less than 500 km (about 300 miles) and air- and sea-launched weapons with a range of less than 600 km (about 400 miles). Though TNWs constitute a large percentage of the arsenals of the nuclear weapon states, TNWs are the least-regulated category of nuclear weapons covered in arms control agreements. They are only subject to an informal regime created by unilateral, parallel declarations made by George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in the fall of 1991. But the informal nature of the 1991 regime has resulted in considerable uncertainty with regard to implementation, as well as considerable disparity in numbers. In some respects, TNWs are more dangerous than strategic weapons. Their small size, vulnerability to theft, and perceived usability make the existence of TNWs in national arsenals a risk to global security. And the new perception of the usability of nuclear weapons in both Russia and the United States, albeit for different reasons, could create a dangerous precedent for other countries. In the last several years, a number of states have tried to push the two nuclear powers toward action in the area of TNWs. The 2000 Conference adopted a Program of Action (Next Steps) on Nuclear Disarmament, and the 2002 Preparatory Committee for the Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference reinforced that message, but practical action by nuclear weapon states still seems far away.

covered in arms control treaties. We can only guess at the numbers in each other’s inventories as well as the locations. Yet these are the weapons most attractive to terrorists—even more valuable to them than fissile material and much more portable than strategic warheads.”4 Within this larger security consideration, there are policy implications and possibilities for diplomacy, arms control, nonproliferation efforts, and nuclear deterrence. For example, there remains a continued responsibility for the United States (particularly the U.S. Air Force) to provide dual-capable aircraft and tactical nuclear warheads to maintain the decades-old deterrent mission in NATO Europe. Most estimates claim that there remain several hundred U.S. tactical nuclear warheads in Europe, at some eight bases in six European nations that could be delivered by a fleet of dual-capable aircraft (fighter-bombers) manned by up to eight allied nations.5 There are also several hundred nuclear weapons in the arsenals of both France and the United Kingdom. While those numbers have diminished substantially since the high point of 7,200 U.S. warheads in Europe in 1971, questions have been raised regularly since the end of the Cold War about the continued necessity for that mission. NATO policy, however, continues to rely on this deterrent capability, as the Alliance made clear in its 1999 Strategic Concept:The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. They will continue to fulfill an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies’ response to military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational option. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies… The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe.6

That position has not changed in the seven years since that document was released—or indeed, since the wording was first formulated in 1991. Has the world changed enough to require a revision of that doctrine? This question is under consideration within Alliance circles, with some states proposing to have a revised doctrine approved and in place in time for the Alliance’s 60th anniversary in 2009.

TNWs Bad

TNWs aren’t monitored and risk falling into the hands of terrorists

Miller and Alexander 01 (Alistair, Pres Fourth Freedom Forum Dir. Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation and Brian Dir Cuba Policy Foundation, Fourth Freedom Forum, Uncovered Nukes: Arms Control and the Challenge of Tactical Nuclear Weapons <http://www.fourthfreedom.org/Applications/cms.php?page_id=27#bio20>) BAF

For three decades, arms control treaties have provided a legal basis for the limitation and reduction of long-range nuclear weapons. However, safeguards on entire classes of nuclear weapons have not been included in this process. Thousands of substrategic, or tactical, nuclear weapons (TNWs) are not monitored or controlled by any existing treaties or formal agreements, even though these weapons pose dangers that can be equal to or greater than those of strategic nuclear weapons.

The only substantive effort to address these weapons has been a regimen of unilateral, parallel reductions undertaken by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev in late 1991 and capitalized upon by President Yeltsin in 1992 in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Initiatives such as these, while bold at the time, possess intrinsic weaknesses in ensuring tactical nuclear weapons control today. Ultimately, this entire class of nuclear weapons still remains largely unmonitored and uncontrolled.2

Reducing the risks associated with this neglect in safeguarding tactical nuclear weapons is particularly urgent in light of recent events. Current efforts to develop a National Missile Defense system and decisions to put aside traditional international arms control mechanisms emphasize the need for a multilateral system of safeguarding TNWs. Further, the3 terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 dramatically illustrate the need for intensified efforts to prevent nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from proliferating, whether to terrorist groups, nonstate actors, or nuclear aspiring states.3

TNWs bad

US/NATO Tactical Nukes in Turkey are an expression of Western Imperialism

Kibaroglu 10 (Mustafa, Fellow at the Harvard University’s BelferCenter for Science and International Affairs, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010\_06/Kibaroglu#bio) PR

 Because of the view that NATO’s deterrent will be more credible with the presence of forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons in the allied territories in Europe, Turkish diplomats believe that the burden of hosting these weapons should continue to be shared collectively among five allies, as has been the case over the last several decades. Even if all of Turkey’s allies accept this proposal and act accordingly, Turkey will still face a dilemma in its foreign and security policies if it sees the hosting of U.S. nuclear weapons as the only way for it to fulfill its burden-sharing obligations. Ankara’s continuing support for the presence of the U.S. weapons on Turkish territory could be justified only if there were a threat from the military capabilities of Turkey’s neighbors, the two most significant of which would be Iran and Syria, and if the Western allies shared that threat assessment. There can be no other meaningful scenario that would justify Turkey’s policy of retaining U.S. nuclear weapons on its territory as well as leaving the door open for the deployment of U.S. missile defenses in Turkey in the future. Recent trends, however, appear to be moving from such a threat assessment by Turkey. Over the last few years, Turkey has experienced an unprecedented rapprochement with its Middle Eastern neighbors. Last year, Turkey held joint ministerial cabinet meetings with Iraq in October and Syria in December. Until recently, Turkey had treated both countries as foes rather than friends. These meetings have produced a significant number of protocols, memoranda of understanding, and other documents on a wide array of issue areas including the thorniest subjects, such as ways and means of dealing with terrorism effectively and using the region’s scarce water resources more equitably. Moreover, these high-level meetings resulted in the lifting of the visa requirement for Turkish citizens traveling to Syria and vice versa. That action has paved the way to an opening of the borders between the two countries; the borders had stayed closed for decades due to the presence of large numbers of heavy land mines on both sides. The mines will soon be cleaned up with a view to opening huge land areas to agriculture. In addition to improvements in bilateral relations with its immediate neighbors, Turkey has become more involved in wider Middle Eastern political affairs than it ever has been since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. A key part of this regional involvement is mediation efforts between Israel and Syria. Another element is a willingness to take on a similar role in Iran’s dispute with the international community over the nature and scope of Tehran’s nuclear program, which is generally considered by Turkey’s NATO allies to have the potential for weaponization and thus further proliferation in the region. Top Turkish political and military officials have suggested on various occasions that the most promising way out of the conflict in the longer term would be the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Against that background, the continued insistence of the Turkish security elite on hosting U.S. nuclear weapons has drawn criticism from Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors. Some of these neighbors, such as Iran and Syria, criticize Turkey’s policy of retaining nuclear weapons because they see the weapons as being directed against them. Others in the Arab world, such as Egypt, portray these weapons as a symbol of Western imperialism. Turkey therefore will have to seriously reconsider its policy on U.S. nuclear weapons. For this to happen, a debate should take place in the country in various platforms, in closed as well as open forums, with the participation of experts, scholars, officials, and other concerned citizens. There is a common belief in Turkey that the U.S. weapons constitute a credible deterrent against threats such as Iran’s nuclear program and the possible further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region in response to Tehran’s program. Others contend that if Turkey sends the weapons back to the United States and Iran subsequently develops nuclear weapons, Turkey will have to develop its own such weapons. These observers argue that even though they are against the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on Turkish soil in principle, the weapons’ presence in the country will keep Turkey away from such adventurous policies. Similar views have also been expressed by foreign experts and analysts who are concerned about Turkey’s possible reactions to the developments in Iran’s nuclear capabilities in case U.S. nuclear weapons are withdrawn from Turkish territory. The negative effects of the weapons deployments on Turkish-Iranian relations need to be assessed as well. Some Iranian security analysts even argue that the deployment of the weapons on Turkish territory makes Turkey a “nuclear-weapon state.” There is, therefore, the possibility that the presence of the weapons could actually spur Iranian nuclear weapons efforts. This issue may well be exploited by the Iranian leadership to justify the country’s continuing investments in more ambitious nuclear capabilities.

TNWs fail

The presence of TNWs is strictly symbolic

Lamond and Ingram 9 (Claudine, Senior analyst and contributor to ‘International Security Report’ and Paul analyst for British American Security Information Council’ (BASIC), London, Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states http://www.atlantic-community.org/app/webroot/files/articlepdf/CLamondTNWinNATO.pdf)BAF

Nuclear burden sharing is far less of a foundation stone for the NATO alliance than it was in the Cold War, and is losing public support. More than 70% of the population in nuclear weapon states and the states involved in nuclear sharing believe nuclear weapons have a negative effect on international security. 32 The removal of US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe may also find support within defense ministries, as it would also diminish the opportunity cost arising from planned modernization of storage facilities and aircraft. Member states attitudes towards the issue have all too often been characterized by a fear of moving first, and opening up a Pandora’s box. NATO’s Strategic Concept of 2009/2010 represents an opportunity for NATO to reassess its stance on nuclear sharing and present a clear position to the global community on its nuclear posture. The Strategic Concept of 1999 stated ‘The presence of United States conventional and nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe…’,33 yet it is widely acknowledged that presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe serves only a political role. The review of the Strategic Concept today must question whether this role still has the necessary significance 20 years after the end of the Cold War to justify the financial, political and diplomatic costs, and explore new and more solid foundations on which to base the Alliance. 1

No data

U.S. policy of nuclear secrecy means there is no quantitative data on TNWs in Turkey

Diakov et al 4 (Anatoli Diakov, Eugene Miasnikov and Timur Kadyshev

Publication of the Center for Arms Control, http://www.armscontrol.ru/pubs/en/NSNW\_en\_v1b.pdf)BAF

In particular, the allies are to be ready to deploy nuclear weapons on their territories should such a need arise. Documents confirm that the decision about whether a country is prepared to deploy nuclear weapons on its territory is made even before this country joins NATO – such decisions are made on the basis of a bilateral agreement with the United States. For example, "The Agreement on the Status of the US Armed Forces in a Host Country" handed over by the US Embassy to the Government of the Slovak Republic in 1996 states: "…The government of the country will allow the US forces to deliver nuclear weapons to its territory and to deploy them in convenient positions..."179 NATO adheres to the practice of not announcing the locations of US nuclear weapons or the number of deployed weapons. Nevertheless, there are strong reasons to believe that today they are deployed on the territories of six NATO member states: Belgium, the UK, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey (see Table 7).180 Until 2001, nuclear weapons were also deployed in Greece (Araxos airbase).181

US hypocritical

The US wants international disarmament yet practices nuclear secrecy

House of Commons 08 (Defense committee, The future of NATO and European defence, The Stationary Office, Pg. 133-134, http://books.google.com/books?id=3jp8W\_aX0gYC&dq=u.s.+%22tactical+nuclear+weapons%22+in+%22turkey%22+location+amount+OR+number+-russia&source=gbs\_navlinks\_s)

NATO nuclear forces include strategic weapons provided by the United States, France and the United Kingdom, along with US “sub-strategic” or “tactical” nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. Within NATO these sub-strategic weapons are seen as symbolic of the transatlantic link between the U.S. and is European allies. Some may also regard them as a hedge against future uncertainties, although NATO retains overwhelming conventional supremacy. Expenditures by actual or potential adversaries like Al Qaeda, the Iraq insurgency, Iran or North Korea barely register compared with the combined NATO military budget. Iran, for example, spends les than 1% of what NATO spends for military purposes. The NATO nuclear arsenal is thought to consist of between 350 and 480 US tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of six Member States: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The lower number was suggested by expert Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists in July 2007 and is based on circumstantial evidence that some nuclear weapons stored in Germany may have been removed. NATO does not publish details on the number of nuclear weapons remaining in Europe, despite the Member States’ commitment to transparency in the 2000 NPT Final Document. This combined NATO nuclear tactical arsenal is larger than China’s nuclear stockpile. UP to 180 of the 480 US tactical nuclear weapons are flagged for delivery by European pilots in wartime (although they remain under US control in peacetime). This raises questions as to whether basing these weapons in “non-nuclear” countries violates the NPT, which commits those countries “… not to receive the transfer… of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly…:. Of course, preparation for their use (flight training etc) occurs during peacetime, so the argument that these weapons are only transferred in the event of war, when the NPT is technically no longer in effect, is disingenuous at best.

1. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)