[Japan Prolif Links 3](#_Toc266219432)

[NATO Advantage Turns (Front-Line) 4](#_Toc266219433)

[NATO Advantage Turns (Front-Line) 5](#_Toc266219434)

[NATO Advantage Turns (Front-Line) 6](#_Toc266219435)

[NATO Advantage Turns (Front-Line) 7](#_Toc266219436)

[NATO Advantage Turns (Front-Line) 8](#_Toc266219437)

[NATO Impact Defense 9](#_Toc266219438)

[NATO Impact Defense 10](#_Toc266219439)

[NATO Turns—Block Overview 11](#_Toc266219440)

[NATO Turns—Block Overview 12](#_Toc266219441)

[NATO Turns: Link Shield 14](#_Toc266219442)

[NATO Cohesion Turns 15](#_Toc266219443)

[NATO Cohesion Turns 16](#_Toc266219444)

[NATO Cohesion Turns 17](#_Toc266219445)

[NATO Cohesion Turns 18](#_Toc266219446)

[NATO Relations-Global stability 19](#_Toc266219447)

[NATO Relations- Terrorism 20](#_Toc266219448)

[NATO Relations Impacts- Hegemony 21](#_Toc266219449)

[Consult NATO Solvency 22](#_Toc266219450)

[Credible Deterrence Links (Internal to Prolif Turns) 23](#_Toc266219451)

[Turkish Prolif Turns 24](#_Toc266219452)

[German Prolif Turn 25](#_Toc266219453)

[Accidents Advantage Answers 26](#_Toc266219454)

[NPT: Advantage 1NC Frontline 27](#_Toc266219455)

[NPT: Advantage 1NC Frontline 28](#_Toc266219456)

[NPT: NPT Collapse Good – Ext. Better Regime Fills the Gap 29](#_Toc266219457)

[NPT: Doesn’t Solve Prolif – Ext. External Factors Key, not NPT 30](#_Toc266219458)

[NPT: Doesn’t Solve Prolif – Ext. External Factors key, not NPT 31](#_Toc266219459)

[NPT: 2NC Alt Causes to NPT Collapse 32](#_Toc266219460)

[NPT: Alt Causes to NPT Collapse 33](#_Toc266219461)

[NPT: Causes Prolif – Ext. Underground 34](#_Toc266219462)

[NPT: Nuclear Terrorism Terminals 35](#_Toc266219463)

[NPT: Causes Prolif – Ext. Spreads Tech 36](#_Toc266219464)

[NPT: Causes Prolif – Ext. Spreads Tech 37](#_Toc266219465)

[NPT: Doesn’t Solve Prolif – Ext. NPT Fails 38](#_Toc266219466)

[NPT: Doesn’t Solve Prolif – Ext. NPT Fails 40](#_Toc266219467)

[NPT: Doesn’t Solve Prolif – Ext. NPT Fails 41](#_Toc266219468)

[NPT: Doesn’t Solve Prolif– A2: Make states more aggressive 42](#_Toc266219469)

[NPT: NPT is Resilient 43](#_Toc266219470)

[NPT: Doesn’t Solve Prolif – A2: Norms 44](#_Toc266219471)

[NPT Answers: Hypocrisy Over Israel Blocks Success 45](#_Toc266219472)

[NPT Answers: NPT Doesn’t Solve Prolif (Block Extensions) 46](#_Toc266219473)

[Proliferation Answers 47](#_Toc266219474)

[Proliferation Answers: No Snowball 48](#_Toc266219475)

[Proliferation Answers: No Snowball Extensions 50](#_Toc266219476)

[Proliferation Answers: No Crazy Leaders 51](#_Toc266219477)

[Proliferation Answers: Prolif is Slow 52](#_Toc266219478)

[Proliferation Answers: Crazy Leaders Are Deterrable 53](#_Toc266219479)

[Proliferation Answers: No War – History Proves 54](#_Toc266219480)

[NPT: Fuel Bank/Article IV CP Shell (1/2) 55](#_Toc266219481)

[NPT: Fuel Bank/Article IV CP Shell (2/2) 57](#_Toc266219482)

[Fuel Bank CP: Fuel Bank Solves Prolif 59](#_Toc266219483)

[Fuel Bank CP: Solvency – NPT 61](#_Toc266219484)

[Fuel Bank CP: A2 – Developing Countries (Iran) Won’t Participate 62](#_Toc266219485)

[Fuel Bank CP: A2 NTI/Buffet/IAEA/ SQ Fuel Banks 63](#_Toc266219486)

[Fuel Bank CP: A2 – GNEP Solves 64](#_Toc266219487)

[Fuel Bank CP: A2- Uranium Price DA’s 65](#_Toc266219488)

[Aff: Article IV CP: Permutation Solves Best 67](#_Toc266219489)

[Aff: Fuel Bank CP – Uranium Prices DA (needs an impact) 68](#_Toc266219490)

[Aff: Article IV CP: Fuel Bank Won’t Solve 69](#_Toc266219491)

[Turkey Advantage Answers 72](#_Toc266219492)

[Turkey Advantage Answers 73](#_Toc266219493)

[Turkish Prolif Counterplan 75](#_Toc266219494)

[Terrorism Answers 75](#_Toc266219495)

[Terrorism Answers 76](#_Toc266219496)

[Terrorism Answers 77](#_Toc266219497)

[Russia Modelling Answers 78](#_Toc266219498)

[Russian Reciprocity CP 79](#_Toc266219499)

[“Tactical” PIC 1NC 81](#_Toc266219500)

[“Tactical” PIC 1NC 82](#_Toc266219501)

[“Tactical” PIC 1NC 83](#_Toc266219502)

[“Tactical” PIC- Fear of bomb good 84](#_Toc266219503)

# Japan Prolif Links

## Undermining the US nuclear weapons presence in Europe casts doubt on credibility of the US nuclear umbrella over Japan:

David **Yost, 2009** (Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85: 4 (2009) 755–780; accessed via EBSCO)

**The US nuclear weapons presence in Europe as a link to US strategic nuclear forces** The remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe—reduced by more than 97 per cent from the high level reached during the Cold War—have been regarded as sufficient for assurance and extended deterrence owing in part to the continuing link to US strategic nuclear forces.37 According to the 1999 Strategic Concept, one of the important functions of the US nuclear weapons presence in Europe is to provide linkage to the strategic forces that constitute the ultimate deterrent to aggression or coercion. Ever since the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957 and developed the world’s first ICBMs, the alliance has been subject to periodic crises of confidence—in essence, European doubts about America’s will to defend its allies, given the risk of prompt intercontinental nuclear retaliation from Russia. These doubts have been aggravated whenever Americans have expressed anxieties about US strategic capabilities—as during the ‘bomber gap’ and ‘missile gap’ controversies in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the debates about ICBM vulnerability in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Given this historical pattern, if a new debate emerged in the United States about the adequacy of the US nuclear force posture for national security, allied experts and officials would probably ask questions about the implications for NATO—**and for Japan and other beneficiaries of US nuclear guarantees.** The recent Perry–Schlesinger report suggests that such a debate may be on the horizon.38 A polarizing internal US debate (perhaps stimulated by the forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review) could lead to public questions about the reliability of US nuclear forces, and **this could undermine allied confidence in US extended deterrence**.

## Japan monitors US decisions about NATO nuclear posture closely as a barometer of US extended deterrence:

David **Yost, 2009** (Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85: 4 (2009) 755–780; accessed via EBSCO)

Australian and Japanese officials and experts are, for example, monitoring US decisions about

extended deterrence globally; and they see US decisions about NATO’s nuclear posture and policy as emblematic of the US extended deterrence commitment to their own security. A loss of confidence in the reliability of the protection provided by US extended deterrence could lead some US allies and security partners to consider seeking their own national nuclear forces or to invest more in potential

hedging measures such as air and missile defences and/or enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.

# NATO Advantage Turns (Front-Line)

## (--) Turn: Cohesion:

## A) NATO cohesion is at an unprecedented high right now:

Philip H. **Gordon, 12/9/2009** (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2009/133417.htm>)

As I said, I began by highlighting Afghanistan because it is emblematic of how the United States and Europe can and do cooperate on the most important global challenges of the day. In that respect, I want to make two points absolutely clear tonight: First, the United States looks forward to working with a strong, cohesive Europe as a partner in meeting the security and economic challenges of the 21st century. And second, we have already seen in the first year of this administration an extraordinarily high—**and possibly unprecedented—level of unity and common purpose as the United States and Europe** have stood shoulder to shoulder to face gathering global threats. I have been working on U.S.-Europe issues for several decades, and would dare say that I don’t think **there has been a time in my professional career when our global strategies are as in sync as they are today**.

## B) The plan generates fierce resistance in NATO—risks dangerously undermining cohesion—evidence also draws the distinction between elimination and previous drawdowns they’ll cite to try and take out uniqueness for our turn:

Alexandra **Bell and** Benjamin **Loehrke, 2009** (http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey)

Roadblocks to removal. In 2005, when NATO's top commander at the time, Gen. James L. Jones, supported the **elimination** of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, **he was met with fierce political resistance.** (In addition to the 90 B61 bombs in Turkey, there are another 110 or so U.S. bombs located at bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.) Four years later, some U.S. and European officials still maintain that the political value of the nuclear weapons is enough to keep them deployed across Europe. In particular, they argue PDF that the weapons are "an essential political and military link" between NATO members and help maintain alliance cohesion. The Defense Department's 2008 report PDF on nuclear weapons management concurred: "As long as our allies value [the nuclear weapons'] political contribution, the United States is obligated to provide and maintain the nuclear weapon capability." Those who hold this view believe that nuclear sharing is both symbolic of alliance cohesion and a demonstration of how the United States and NATO have committed to defending each other in the event of an attack. They argue that removing the weapons would **dangerously undermine such cohesion** and raise questions about how committed Washington is to its NATO allies.

## Strong relations with NATO stops nuclear war:

**DUFFIELD**, assistant professor of government @ University of Virginia, 19**94**

(http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=1778229&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1122844474&clientId=3552, John, “NATO's functions after the Cold War”)

Above all, NATO pessimists overlooked the valuable intra-alliance functions that the alliance has always performed and that remain relevant after the cold war. Most importantly, NATO has helped stabilize Western Europe, whose states had often been bitter rivals in the past. By damping the security dilemma and providing an institutional mechanism for the development of common security policies, **NATO has contributed to making the use of force in relations among the countries of the region virtually inconceivable**. In all these ways, NATO clearly serves the interests of its European members. But even the United States has a significant stake in preserving a peaceful and prosperous Europe. In addition to strong transatlantic historical and cultural ties, American economic interests in Europe--as a leading market for U.S. products, as a source of valuable imports, and as the host for considerable direct foreign investment by American companies--remain substantial. If history is any guide, moreover, the United States could easily be drawn into a future major war in Europe, the consequences of which would likely be even more devastating than those of the past, given **the existence of nuclear weapons**.(11)

# NATO Advantage Turns (Front-Line)

## *Turn: Infighting:*

## *A) Obama has limited infighting between the US & NATO now—relations have now healed from the drift in the Bush years:*

Zhang **Wei, 12/25/2009** (<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-12/25/content_12703762.htm>)

The U.S.-Europe relations have **moved forward constantly in 2009** as both sides see more overlapping interests. Relations between the two sides had soured during the George W. Bush administration amid differences over Iraq between the United States and some of the major EU nations led by France and Germany. Obama intensified exchanges with Europe on many issues after he took office in January this year. The president actively engaged in a series of crucial talks with his European partners, including the London G20, NATO and Europe-U.S. summits. During the NATO summit in April, Obama held a relaxed and town hall style meeting with a French and German audience in Strasbourg, France. He told the audience his plan to repair the damaged relations with Europe. "We must be honest with ourselves," he said, "In recent years, we've allowed our alliance to drift." He pledged the United States would work toward a "better partner," and called for joint efforts to find a way out of their common problems. In the following EU-U.S. summit, **all the bloc's member state leaders were present in a rare display of solidarity with their transatlantic ally**.

## *B) The plan sparks infighting in NATO over whether or not French or British weapons should replace US weapons—the US deterrence force solves this dispute:*

David **Yost, 2009** (Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85: 4 (2009) 755–780; accessed via EBSCO)

The hypothetical alternative of relying on French nuclear forces instead of US protection has been evoked repeatedly since France became a nuclear power in the 1960s; but the option has never been taken up by the non-nuclear-weapon state allies. For example, in 1985 Manfred Wörner, then the West German Defence Minister, said, ‘France’s nuclear capability is insufficient to protect the Federal Republic [of Germany]. We will have to continue to rely on the American nuclear umbrella.’21 Some Germans have argued that the French should participate in NATO nuclear consultations rather than establishing a consultation arrangement (as the French have intermittently proposed since 1992) limited to Europeans, excluding the United States and implying that US nuclear commitments are unreliable. As Karl-Heinz Kamp observed in 1996, ‘From a German viewpoint any European nuclear

entity can only be one part of a European-transatlantic security structure.’22 In 2004 Peter Schmidt wrote, ‘For Germany, a European solution could only be sound in the near future if it was associated with the [NATO] Alliance’s nuclear policy.’23 In 2007 it was reported that German Chancellor Angela Merkel and her foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier had rejected French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s offer to give Germany a say in French decision-making on nuclear weapons.24 Expert observers from non-nuclear-weapon-state European allied nations have historically expressed several reservations regarding French proposals for a European Union dialogue on nuclear deterrence. First, the EU member states have not yet made alliance-like collective defence commitments to each other. Second, two EU members that are not NATO members (Ireland and Sweden) are among the countries that have long called in international forums for ‘the reduction of reliance on nuclear weapons in security doctrines’. In their view, ‘the possession of nuclear weapons' should give way to ‘nuclear disarmament and … a nuclear weapon- free world.’25 As a result, the willingness of Ireland and Sweden to be associated with an EU arrangement implying support for policies of nuclear deterrence is unclear. Third, some allies regard French (and British) nuclear capabilities as inadequate to provide a deterrent force to protect the EU and (aside from French and British national purposes) useful mainly as a supplement to the US extended deterrence arrangements with NATO members.26 Fourth, making France the guarantor of the European Union’s security would elevate France’s political status **to a level unacceptable to Germany, Italy, and other EU countries**. Fifth, despite their repeated proposals, the French have in practice shown little willingness to accept nuclear consultation obligations and mechanisms. For example, concrete implementation arrangements for President François Mitterrand’s 1986 promise to consult with the West German Chancellor before using nuclear weapons on German soil evidently never went very far.27 **Rather than welcoming an opportunity to grapple with the demanding political and strategic issues that would be raised** in an attempt to pursue the hypothetical alternative of depending on French or Franco-British nuclear protection, the non-nuclear-weapon-state allies **have preferred to rely on US extended deterrence arrangements in NATO**, supplemented by the British nuclear commitment to NATO.

# NATO Advantage Turns (Front-Line)

## *A) Tactical nuclear weapons in Europe a critical hedge versus Russian backsliding into authoritarian tendencies:*

David **Yost, 2009** (Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85: 4 (2009) 755–780; accessed via EBSCO)

Owing in large part to President George H. W. Bush’s initiatives in 1991, the US nuclear presence in Europe was drastically reduced, with the removal of all ground-based shorter-range systems. As noted above, the current US nuclear posture in Europe consists solely of dual-capable aircraft and gravity bombs.10 Inferences about current views concerning the requirements of assurance can be made from the declaratory policies of the allies and their operational practices. The 1999 Strategic Concept articulated longstanding views about what is necessary for assurance, including ‘widespread participation by European allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements’. 11 While all the allies except France participate in NPG and other alliance nuclear consultations, the practical significance of the concept of ‘widespread participation … in peacetime basing of nuclear forces’ has changed, and is continuing to change, with NATO enlargement. The number of allies accepting such responsibilities is a shrinking proportion of the total. Because NATO has not identified targets for its nuclear forces since the 1990s, it is a challenge to specify and analyse the 1999 Strategic Concept’s requirement for ‘adequate nuclear forces in Europe … at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability’. The minimum level may derive more from judgements about an appropriate level of risk- and responsibility-sharing among allies, and about what is necessary to demonstrate continuing US engagement and commitment, than from a quantitative analysis of potential contingencies. The continuing requirements of assurance in the nuclear domain deserve analysis, and not only because they relate to the alliance’s non-proliferation goals. This article considers the ‘why’ issues—the probable purposes and roles of US nuclear forces in Europe with respect to assurance—before turning to the ‘how’ issues: the various elements that appear to contribute to a credible and effective posture for assurance. Continuing assurance roles for US nuclear forces in Europe The assurance roles for US nuclear forces in Europe appear to include the following: to serve as a hedge against Russian recidivism; to deter regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD); to provide an alternative to considering dependence on French and/or British nuclear forces; to offer an alternative to the pursuit of national nuclear forces; and to supply evidence of the genuineness of US commitments. Each of these roles deserves a brief discussion. Hedge against Russian recidivism The alliance’s 1999 Strategic Concept dropped the ‘strategic balance’ language concerning NATO–Russia relations found in the 1991 Strategic Concept. It nonetheless included subtle references to the alliance’s continuing responsibility to hedge against the risk of backsliding in Moscow, given Russia’s long-term power potential, particularly its nuclear forces: Notwithstanding positive developments in the strategic environment and the fact that large-scale conventional aggression against the alliance is highly unlikely, the possibility of such a threat emerging over the longer term exists … The existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the alliance also constitutes a significant factor which the alliance has to take into account if security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area are to be maintained.12 In July 2002 Colin Powell, then the US Secretary of State, offered a rare public acknowledgement that one of the factors defining the US nuclear posture must be the continuing need for a hedge against potential adverse developments in Russia. In Powell’s words, ‘there are nuclear-armed nations out there, particularly Russia, [and] even though it is a new relationship, a new partnership—they will have nuclear weapons for many, many years to come, and one cannot predict the future with certainty. So therefore it is wise for us, in view of that … **to give us a hedge**.’13

# NATO Advantage Turns (Front-Line)

## *B) The hedge is critical to reassuring Eastern and Central European NATO allies—this is especially true after the Russian invasion of Georgia:*

David **Yost, 2009** (Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85: 4 (2009) 755–780; accessed via EBSCO)

The role of the alliance’s nuclear posture as a ‘hedge against Russian backsliding’ is generally not explicitly articulated in public statements by NATO or its member nations in part because of the interest in promoting cooperation with Russia in various areas, including the campaigns against terrorism and WMD proliferation. **However, this rationale remains pertinent and meaningful to allies**, despite differences in threat assessments. **Allies in Eastern and Central Europe are especially concerned** about trends in Russia towards more authoritarian and assertive rule. Russian officials have declared that certain new allies have made themselves potential targets for nuclear attack by supporting US missile defence plans.15 The NATO allies have agreed that Moscow’s **use of force against Georgia in August 2008** was ‘disproportionate and inconsistent with its peacekeeping role, as well as incompatible with the principles of peaceful conflict resolution set out in the Helsinki Final Act, the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration’.16 Officials of various allied nations have expressed concerns, though they have been cautious in their public remarks. For example, in December 2008 the President of Estonia affirmed the need for NATO’s deterrent posture in the light of the August 2008 Georgia–Russia conflict without explicitly mentioning that conflict: The fact that NATO is serious about its security has proved to be a powerful deterrent. Indeed, only an actor as irrational as Al Qaeda has dared to gamble with an attack against the world’s strongest conventional, nuclear, economic, and political organization … As this summer showed us, the reasons for NATO have not disappeared, but have in fact returned, if not with a vengeance, then certainly with a strong taste of revanche.17

# NATO Advantage Turns (Front-Line)

## *C) Russia and China are always a threat—under certain circumstances severe nuclear threats may be needed to deter them:*

**NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, 2001**

<http://www.nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Archives/Publication%20Archive%20PDF/volume%201%20complete.pdf>

As noted above, the basis on which recent proposals for nuclear disarmament or deep nuclear reductions reach their conclusions is to **set aside traditional U.S. security requirements** in favor of other priorities by **simply assuming, intuitively**, a future in which there is little or no requirement for nuclear weapons. Such an approach is **wholly inadequate for addressing the question, “how much is enough?”** The following is a concise description of a select number of the factors that must be considered prior to any recommendation concerning the appropriate size and composition of the U.S. nuclear force. Potential Adversaries and Their Strategies The **characteristics of adversaries** determine, in part, the locations, types, and numbers of targets, which, in turn, influence the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The only plausible hostile global powers in the 2000-2025 period are **Russia and China**, both of which possess large military establishments, industrial bases, and economic infrastructures spread over vast territories. Regional states of concern such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq have smaller militaries and economies, but as a result of proliferation, still may present considerable threats. **Under certain circumstances**, **very severe nuclear threats may be needed** to deter any of these potential adversaries—if they are highly motivated to challenge the United States and willing to accept high risk and costs in doing so. Significant numbers of nuclear weapons, **particularly against a hostile China or Russia**—or, worse yet, a Sino-Russian alliance—could be necessary for this task. 19 The U.S. arsenal also might need to be sufficiently survivable to withstand attacks by one nuclear-armed opponent and remain capable of deterring opportunistic blackmail attempts or actual attacks by others. The Clinton Administration identified the possibility of deterring or fighting multiple adversaries simultaneously as a rationale for maintaining a significant and secure nuclear reserve force.20

## *D) Nuclear war with Russia causes extinction*

Bostrom 02

(Nick, PhD @ Oxford University, [www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html))

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

# NATO Impact Defense

## *(--) NATO can’t solve peacekeeping or reconstruction—bad strategic approach and tactical reluctance undermine it:*

Mitchell A. **Belfer, 12/16/2009** (head of the Department of International Relations and European Studies at Metropolitan University,

<http://www.praguepost.com/opinion/3101-internal-conflict.html>)

Prior to Sept. 11, 2001, few would have guessed that an act of terrorism, perpetrated against the United States, would have mobilized the combined military power of NATO. Fewer still could have predicted how poorly NATO would fare, not only in engaging and combating its prescribed enemies (al Qaida and the Taliban), but in maintaining the political cohesion and grand strategy needed to ensure success. In many ways, it was fortunate that Article 5's first invocation occurred to combat a non-state entity in a distant land, as it is abundantly clear that NATO was (and continues to be) ill-prepared for combined military actions, and it is better for NATO to learn from its errors in a conflict where costs are relatively low rather than allowing its dysfunction to persist and mire collective efforts, especially if such efforts would eventually be undertaken within the North Atlantic area. NATO must not carry on its business as usual. Whether it is engaged in war-fighting, peacekeeping or reconstruction efforts, NATO's strategic approach and tactical reluctance need to be properly understood and adjustments made. Otherwise, the future of Afghanistan and NATO is bleak.

## *(--) Afghanistan is key to NATO: the plan can’t solve it:*

Mitchell A. **Belfer, 12/16/2009** (head of the Department of International Relations and European Studies at Metropolitan University,

<http://www.praguepost.com/opinion/3101-internal-conflict.html>)

Afghanistan and NATO share a symbiotic relationship and the failure of either - the collapse of Afghanistan as a state or the premature evacuation of NATO forces - would undermine security for both. Yet, NATO seems scarcely aware of the fragility of its global position, which rests on Afghanistan, and the U.S.-inspired "surge" will, in contrast to NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen's sentiment of "solidarity in action," result in "disunity in motion." The Taliban's counter-offensive has no end in sight. Having outflanked NATO in Pakistan and increasing the ferocity and frequency of violence against civilian and military targets in Afghanistan, the Taliban is a formidable military rival to both the current Afghan leadership and NATO forces. It is no longer a desperate motley crew waging an asymmetric conflict, but a tactically aware geopolitical entity with clear objectives and a growing will to achieve them.

# NATO Impact Defense

##  *(--) NATO disunity inevitable: multiple reasons they can’t solve for:*

Dr. Ian **Davis, 2009** (Options for NATO - pressing the reset button on the strategic concept, edited by Dr. Ian Davis, founding director of NATO Watch, <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/natoshadow.pdf>)

Ms Weiss suggested that the process of agreeing a new Strategic Concept could be a

unifying experience for NATO, but that several stumbling blocks needed to be overcome, including the force transformation/ capabilities gap, the Cyprus and Macedonia questions, and the role of the EU in security decision-making. Gareth Evans (International Crisis Group) asked whether NATO should be used for a wider range of global peace and security tasks, and in particular the role it might play in helping implement the international responsibility to protect (R2P) agenda. He argued that NATO has still not worked out what kind of post-Cold War organisation it wants to be and raised three broad future options: a retreat into Cold War nostalgia with little change from the past; a slightly modified approach involving an inner ring of transatlantic members and two outer rings of partners and allies; and his preferred third option of NATO “fundamentally recast” as a global military resource, potentially available to prevent and resolve security problems worldwide in partnership with others, but **only with appropriate UN authority.** Mr Evans concluded that such a

fundamental reshaping of NATO’s role **is not likely to be possible “any time soon”.**

# NATO Turns—Block Overview

## *When assessing our link turns versus their links—remember that we control uniqueness—this empirically denies their links to NATO cohesion—NATO has survived the fights between the have and the have nots regarding the US retaining tactical nuclear weapons in the first place, the only question is whether or not removing tactical nuclear weapons sparks an immediate fight—that’s our Yost evidence, or risks undermining the long-term cohesion in NATO—that’s our Bell & Lohrke evidence. Remember all their arguments about why there will be future fights are all empirically denied by the existence of tactical nuclear weapons combined with the high levels of NATO cohesion now—that’s our Gordon & our Wei evidence from December 09—significantly post-dating any uniqueness evidence that Baylor has for their advantage.*

## *A) NATO and the US have an unprecedented level of unity and common purpose: now: that’s our Gordon evidence—this proves tactical nuclear weapons are irrelevant to the overall state of US-NATO cooperation and cohesion this evidence is from 12/09 postdating all their NATO on the verge of collapse arguments…*

## *B) Our Wei evidence indicates that US-Europe relations are sky high now and that the member states are showing displays of solidarity with Obama now…that evidence is from Christmas Day…post-dating their claims that NATO is weak now…*

## *More evidence…US cooperation with Europe high on all major issues now:*

Philip H. **Gordon, 12/9/2009** (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2009/133417.htm>)

Some of the concerns that have been voiced stem from the fact that President Obama’s election was greeted with such high expectations around the world. Compared with those often unrealistically high expectations, our cooperation with Europe might not be so impressive: we must admit that differences still exist and that not all the world’s problems would be solved in a year. A more realistic assessment, however, I think reveals that the United States and Europe are **working extraordinarily well together** even on problems such as Iran, Iraq, climate change, closing Guantanamo, and the Middle East that so divided us in the past.

# NATO Turns—Block Overview

## *Extremely high cohesion exists between the US & Europe now:*

Philip H. **Gordon, 12/9/2009** (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2009/133417.htm>)

The cooperation we envision with Europe going forward builds on a solid foundation of engagement and progress over the past year. To be sure, we have not solved all the problems we face in the past eleven months. But what I want to emphasize tonight is that the challenges we have faced in some cases owe to the difficulty of the tasks at hand, not any lack of transatlantic cooperation. On the contrary, on some of the toughest problems we have seen **an unusually high degree of cohesion between the United States and Europe**. I have already mentioned Afghanistan as a prime example of this. The list of others is long, including responding to the global financial crisis, promoting peace in the Middle East, negotiating with Iran, and combating climate change.

## *But, the US nuclear presence key to NATO strength and cohesion—this turns their Duffield evidence:*

David **Yost, 2009** (Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85: 4 (2009) 755–780; accessed via EBSCO)

In other words, the traditional arguments for keeping US nuclear forces in Europe remain valid in the judgement of many officials and experts in the alliance. These arguments can be summed up as follows: US nuclear forces based in Europe send a more potent deterrent message about US commitments than reliance solely on US nuclear weapons at sea and in North America. With the US nuclear presence,

extensive nuclear risk- and responsibility-sharing, and consultative arrangements for multinational nuclear policy deliberations and implementation, **the alliance has greater confidence in its strength and cohesion than it would have without these interrelated attributes**—and greater confidence that adversaries will recognize NATO’s resolve and capabilities.

## *And decoupling: US nuclear weapons in Europe key to the transatlantic coupling of the alliance—it underscores the tangible link between the US & Europe:*

David **Yost, 2009** (Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85: 4 (2009) 755–780; accessed via EBSCO)

US nuclear weapons on European soil, in other words, offer assurance to the allies regarding the seriousness and credibility of US security commitments. In the view of many European (and American) analysts, US nuclear weapons in Europe can be considered ‘coupling mechanisms’—that is, key means (among others) to connect US security commitments to US intercontinental nuclear forces and thus underscore **a tangible ‘transatlantic link’** for protection in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

# NATO Turns: Link Shield

## *Allies historically trust the United States—this is predicated on the US willingness to have their back on security questions:*

David **Yost, 2009** (Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85: 4 (2009) 755–780; accessed via EBSCO)

Confidence in the reliability of the United States The confidence of the NATO allies in US reliability has historically been strong, despite significant differences over the Iraq conflict and the US ‘war on terror’.

Opinion polls have shown that, during the Cold War and subsequently, some West European allies have had more confidence in the reliability of the United States as an ally in collective defence contingencies than they have had in one another. Most of the new members that have joined the alliance since the end of the Cold War, particularly those in Eastern and Central Europe, appear to have more confidence in the reliability of the United States than in the reliability of their West European counterparts. This is partly for historical reasons, including the 1938 Munich conference where Britain, France, Italy and Germany decided the future of Czechoslovakia. Many Czechs and Slovaks—and other East and Central Europeans—remember that Édouard Daladier, the French Prime Minister, was at Munich with Neville Chamberlain in September 1938. Although London and Paris honoured their commitment to declare war on Germany when Poland was invaded in 1939, this action seems less vivid than the Munich betrayal (and certain events during the war) in the historical memories of some East and Central Europeans. Moreover, some East and Central Europeans recall Western passivity and restraint in response to events such as the 1948 communist coup de force in Prague, the 1956 Hungarian uprising, and the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. Another historical factor is persistent resentment in some quarters in East and Central Europe derived from the judgement that the policies of détente pursued by West Germany and other West European states during the Cold War stabilized and prolonged Soviet rule. From the perspective of some Central and East European observers, West European states gave priority to their dialogue with the Soviet Union rather than to solidarity with East and Central European nations. Some East and Central European observers have also perceived a recurrent tendency on the part of some of their West European allies to adopt a superior and condescending ‘we know best’ attitude. They cite as an example of this tendency French President Jacques Chirac’s February 2003 statement that the nations that had signed the Vilnius Group declaration supporting US policy on Iraq were ‘infantile’ and ‘poorly brought up’, had ‘missed a good chance to shut up’, and had placed in danger their prospects of joining the European Union.32 By contrast, despite the reservations of some West European allies, the United States championed the post-Cold War NATO enlargement process. In parallel to NATO's Membership the United States provided substantial advice and assistance to East and Central European countries to prepare them for alliance membership. Despite lingering historical grievances in some intra-alliance relationships, the conviction among the NATO allies as to their shared interests, values and purposes—a common ‘narrative’, as it is sometimes called—is the most fundamental factor in alliance cohesion and yet the most difficult to spell out. It encompasses the political foundations of the alliance, including the shared commitment to freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. It implies that the United States is prepared to uphold the security of its NATO allies for fundamental political reasons in addition to military security considerations.

# NATO Cohesion Turns

## *Turn: Political Signalling--Tactical nuclear weapons agreements politically signal alliance cohesion—this outweighs their links:*

David **Yost, 2009** (Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85: 4 (2009) 755–780; accessed via EBSCO)

Supporters of the ‘political and strategic functions perspective’ note that the US nuclear weapons in Europe, and the US and allied dual-capable aircraft, provide assurance to the NATO allies as to the existential nature of the US commitment. The weapons and aircraft make it possible for the United States and its NATO allies to constitute and maintain an alliance deterrent. Through these arrangements the allies demonstrate their solidarity and share risks and responsibilities, and they maintain capabilities for forward basing and political signalling (including a message of alliance cohesion) that might well be useful in crisis management. From this perspective, the United States and its NATO allies can maintain assurance and US extended deterrence **far more effectively** by sustaining the longstanding arrangements than by experimenting with an entirely US-based and operated nuclear deterrent posture.

## *Turn: Consultations:*

## *A) Removal of nuclear weapons from Europe makes us less likely to engage in consultations with allies:*

David **Yost, 2009** (Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85: 4 (2009) 755–780; accessed via EBSCO)

Over time the non-nuclear-weapon-state allies would almost certainly have less expertise regarding nuclear issues and less influence over (and less insight into) US policy-making.70 Some allied observers fear that with no US nuclear weapons in Europe, the United States might be **less likely to engage in consultations with allies** in defining doctrine and in making operational decisions.

## *B) These consultations are critical to the alliance:*

David **Yost, 2009** (Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85: 4 (2009) 755–780; accessed via EBSCO)

Among other advantages, the presence in Europe of US nuclear weapons enables allies to

contribute directly to the nuclear deterrent posture and to demonstrate NATO’s capability to undertake crisis management on a collective basis. Consultations make clear that the allies are not simply contributing to one country’s national strategy, but participating in a collective decision-making

process. All the allies except France participate in the NPG.40 **Consultations contribute to assurance because allies play an active role in the formation of NATO nuclear deterrence policy** and participate in the exchange of sensitive information.

# NATO Cohesion Turns

## *Turn: Direct planning: Nuclear sharing causes NATO experts to directly participate with US nuclear planners—this bolsters alliance cohesion:*

David **Yost, 2009** (Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85: 4 (2009) 755–780; accessed via EBSCO)

Participating directly in NATO’s nuclear posture provides select NATO allies with a cadre of nuclear experts and key officials with experience in thinking about nuclear deterrence and the requirements of nuclear crisis management operations. The national representatives in the NPG Staff Group at NATO headquarters in Brussels and the experts in nuclear policy issues in the defence ministries of NATO

governments are often active-duty or retired military officers with experience in nuclear planning and operations. The allied roles in NATO’s nuclear posture reflect a high degree of mutual trust and confidence. **These roles promote alliance cohesion**, add to assurance about the genuineness of US commitments, and **make consultations more informed and meaningful**.

## *Turn: Mutual Defense Pledges--NATO allies view the mutual defense pledges and nuclear sharing agreements as critical to the overall relationship:*

David **Yost, 2009** (Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85: 4 (2009) 755–780; accessed via EBSCO)

In other words, the political foundations of the alliance **contribute to trust in the reliability of the mutual defence pledges of the allies**. This factor reinforces confidence in the extended deterrence commitment of the United States. The openness of the United States to allied influence A closely related element of assurance concerns Washington’s openness to allied influence regarding the use of force, the conduct of diplomacy, and deterrence policy. Owing to their dependence on the United States as a security guarantor, European NATO members have historically been concerned to avoid two risks: (a) that a direct conflict between the United States and another major power might draw the allies into war; and (b) that the United States might seek its own security to the neglect of that of its NATO allies in Europe. To manage (if not resolve) this policy challenge the NATO allies have spent decades developing formal and informal means of influencing US decision-making. **NATO’s nuclear consultations arrangements have been of central importance in this respect,** and the allies have succeeded in influencing US nuclear deterrence policy in NATO in various ways over the decades.33

## *Experts on both sides of the Atlantic still think that nuclear weapons constitute the collective core of the alliance:*

David **Yost, 2009** (Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85: 4 (2009) 755–780; accessed via EBSCO)

Many allied experts and officials continue to hold that the US nuclear deterrence commitment—made manifest by US nuclear weapons in Europe—constitutes the collective defence core of the alliance.69 From their perspective, the US nuclear weapons presence in Europe bolsters the credibility of extended deterrence, provides assurance to allies as to the genuineness of US commitments, and makes

for fairer sharing of risks and responsibilities.

# NATO Cohesion Turns

## *Turn: Shared responsibilities: Giving up the shared nuclear response would undermine the shared risks and responsibilities of NATO—undermines cohesion:*

David **Yost, 2009** (Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85: 4 (2009) 755–780; accessed via EBSCO)

In short, some allied observers are concerned that giving up the shared nuclear

response capability could weaken the bonds that tie the NATO allies together as

a security community. Because the US extended deterrent provides NATO with

a capability that is jointly owned and operated, there is a high level of cohesion

based on shared risks and responsibilities, particularly among the NATO DCA

states. Moreover, some allied observers maintain, some current non-nuclearweapon-

state NATO allies cannot be protected from aggression or coercion

without nuclear deterrence capabilities. If the allies gave up the current nuclearsharing

arrangements and relied solely on the strategic nuclear forces of France,

the United Kingdom and the United States, the alliance’s nuclear deterrent posture

could be seen as less credible by the non-nuclear-weapon-state allies, if not by

potential adversaries. A security gap dividing the nuclear-weapon-state allies from

non-nuclear-weapon-state allies could emerge in the perceptions of the latter

group of countries. Indeed, if the British and French forces were reduced further,

the political gap between the United States and most of its NATO allies in nuclear

risk- and responsibility-sharing could be widened.

# NATO Cohesion Turns

## *Plan risks decoupling:*

David **Yost, 2009** (Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85: 4 (2009) 755–780; accessed via EBSCO)

Moreover, the withdrawal of the US nuclear weapons remaining in Europe

could be seen as a break with the historic transatlantic bargain whereby the

United States plays a leading role in return for providing a security guarantee.

It could contribute to launching a debate on the credibility of the US commitment

to the collective defence pledge in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty

at a time when the meaning of collective defence is being reconsidered, owing in

part to the emergence of new challenges such as cyberwarfare. Some European

allied observers hold that the complete withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from

Europe would be interpreted, at least in some quarters of the alliance, as an ipso facto

weakening of the credibility of the US extended deterrent. The implications for

assurance of the NATO European allies could therefore be profound.

The consequences of the withdrawal of the remaining US nuclear weapons in

Europe would include the loss of the crisis management options provided by an

alliance deterrent posture involving aircraft from multiple allies. This arrangement

makes possible the transmission to adversaries of a political signal—one of a united

and resolute alliance—distinct from a US (or British or French) national action.

It is difficult to imagine an alternative to the current arrangements for nuclear

risk- and responsibility-sharing that would provide equivalent benefits for alliance

cohesion as well as assurance and extended deterrence, but the examination of

other approaches may well be an issue in the alliance’s Strategic Concept review.

In this review assurance and extended deterrence will be considered in a dynamic

context involving other NATO policy challenges—including missile defence,

relations with Russia, the meaning of collective defence in light of new risks, force

transformation (including aircraft modernization), arms control and disarmament,

and current operations, notably in Afghanistan. The tradeoffs that may be made

remain to be seen.

# NATO Relations-Global stability

## US-NATO relations are critical to preserve global stability

Ron Asmus, executive director of the German Marshall Fund's Transatlantic Center in Brussels, Financial Times (London, England), February 7, 2007 LN

When western security experts gather this weekend in Munich to discuss the future of Nato at their annual security conference, they will be considering an Atlantic alliance that faces two rather stark choices: re-reinvent itself to handle the threats of a new century, or watch itself **drift slowly into strategic marginalisation**. I say "re-reinvent" because Nato once before reinvented itself, in the 1990s. Back then, the question was what to do in the wake of the cold war. After fierce debate, Nato members opted to enlarge the alliance to encompass central and eastern Europe, intervene in the Balkans and establish a new if bumpy relationship with Russia. With the benefit of hindsight, this strategic leap looks almost self-evident. At the time, however it was anything but that, and involved more than one near-death political moment as members brawled over the issues before them. We now look back at the 1990s as the lull before the storm - the inter-war period between the cold war and the onset of a new war against radical Islam and terrorism. But as these new threats have appeared, Nato has failed to keep pace. The alliance must be re-reinvented because the US and Europe face a set of real and growing threats in an "arc of crisis" stretching from northern Africa through the wider Middle East to Afghanistan and into central Asia. **Instability across this region arguably poses the greatest threat to global stability since the** early 1960s and **the Cuban missile crisis**. Nato alone cannot solve these problems. There must be a broader strategy that integrates civilian and military means. Yet, that strategy must also include the ability to act militarily to help bring stability to these troubled regions. Plain and simple, **Nato must become a more global alliance that takes it to places beyond the European heartland** and on missions beyond the imaginations of the founding fathers **if it hopes to remain a relevant alliance that addresses the main challenges of our era**. Nato's biggest test is taking place right now in Afghanistan. It is the first, but certainly not the last, time Nato members will fight an unconventional war beyond Europe with global partners that require a co-ordinated civilian and military effort with the European Union and United Nations. But the war there is not going well. Afghanistan will be with us far longer than Iraq and a defeat there would be catastrophic. The sheer difficulty of generating political will within the alliance to produce the necessary resources underscores the fact that Nato allies have not yet grasped the new threats faced or the stakes involved. When it comes to the other hotspots in this arc of crisis, Nato is largely missing in action. Yet there are clearly issues where a reinvented Nato could help make a difference. One is Iraq. While we should do everything possible to maintain Iraq's unity, it is clear the country could fragment. This will directly affect Nato members, above all Turkey. The best way to reduce that risk would be for Nato to be prepared to deploy troops to northern Iraq to help contain the spillover of an Iraqi civil war. Nato took a pass when it came to deploying troops in southern Lebanon. Yet one can envisage scenarios where more muscular reinforcements are needed and if such a situation emerges, Nato should be ready. The alliance should also **expand its political dialogue in the Middle East**. Even as the west seeks to curb Iran's nuclear aspirations, Nato should deepen its relations with the Persian Gulf states and Israel. If the shock of Balkan -ethnic cleansing lent impetus to the reinvention of Nato a decade ago, today's horror in Darfur should do the same. A centrepiece of the alliance's reinvention in the 1990s was enlargement. Nato's door must remain open for countries in the Balkans as well as candidates such as Georgia and Ukraine across the wider Black Sea region. This is especially true if, as seems likely, the EU's doors are closing. Such a policy could help stabilise the southern flank of the Euroatlantic community and counter spillover effects from an unstable Middle East**. It is time to stop pretending that all is fine in Brussels**. An open debate is needed about fixing the alliance and making the strategic leap to a new era. Nato must be re-reinvented to confront the gathering dangers we face. How to do this is the question that should be central to the discussions in Munich this weekend. **At stake is nothing less than the west's ability to meet fully the strategic challenges of our time.**

# NATO Relations- Terrorism

## An internally divided NATO fails to bring its resources to bear on global threats in the Middle East– terrorism, rogue states, poverty and proliferation.

Chuck Hagel, U.S. Senator from Nebraska, a Republican, and member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence 2001 http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0604/ijpe/hagel.htm

The threat to NATO today does not come from great powers, but from weak ones. Terrorism finds sanctuary in failed or failing states, in unresolved regional conflicts, and in the misery of endemic poverty and despair. No single state, including the United States, even with its vast military and economic power, can meet these challenges alone. The struggle in which we are now engaged is a global struggle that does not readily conform to our understanding of military confrontations or alliances of previous eras. It is not a traditional contest of standing armies battling over territory. Progress must be made in these countries with human rights, good governance, and economic reform, beyond military force, before we can expect lasting security and stability. Military power will continue to play a vital role; however, the future success of NATO will be determined by its members' ability to deepen and expand their cooperation in the intelligence, law enforcement, economic, diplomatic, and humanitarian fields. Adapting to this new strategic environment will not come easily or cheaply and will require a new NATO strategic doctrine. As the Alliance adjusts to both an expanded membership and a new global strategic environment, NATO must address the gaps in military expenditures and capabilities of its members. The tough decisions cannot continue to be deferred. It is essential that NATO members not allow themselves to drift into adversarial relationships over disagreements. The challenges and differences that will always exist among members must be resolved inside - not outside — of NATO. NATO can only be undermined by its own internal distractions. President Bush has offered a plan for the Greater Middle East that is potentially historic in scope, and conveys the strategic importance of this region for American foreign policy. America's support for freedom in the Greater Middle East must be matched with operational programs of partnership with the peoples and governments of the region to promote more democratic politics and more open economies. NATO is critical to this success. Let me suggest five specific areas where NATO can play a larger role in bringing security and stability to the Greater Middle East: Turkey, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Mediterranean, and the Israeli-Palestinian problem. Tom Friedman, the Pulitzer Prize winning columnist for the New York Times, has described this era in world politics as a "hinge of history." And Turkey hangs on that hinge. Our course of action with Arab and Islamic societies must emphasize building bridges rather than digging ditches — and the NATO Alliance can provide that mechanism. As Europe and NATO have reached out to a united Germany and the states of the former Warsaw Pact, we must now ensure that we apply the same inclusive approach to Turkey. Turkey has been a vital member of NATO. Its government has been a strong and honest force for the people of Turkey. It deserves credit and recognition for this effort. Turkey is also a cultural and geographic bridge to the Arab and Islamic world. By drawing Turkey closer, the Atlantic Alliance will have a better chance of encouraging continued political and economic reforms and improving the prospects for resolution of disputes involving that country. If we were to push Turkey away, we would jeopardize our interests in bringing peace and stability to the entire region. In Afghanistan, the Loya Jirga recently completed drafting a new constitution that sets a course for elections later this year and holds the promise of a democratic transition and the rule of law. The government of President Hamid Karzai and the people of Afghanistan have come a long way in the past two years. But the job in Afghanistan is far from complete. Reconstituted Taliban and al-Qaeda forces continue to threaten the fragile progress that has been made there.

## The impact is extinction.

Yonah **Alexander**, Inter-University for Terrorism Studies Director and Professor, WASHINGTON TIMES, August 28, **2003**, p. A20.

Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns.

# NATO Relations Impacts- Hegemony

## AFGHANISTAN PROVES EUROPEAN ALLIES HAVE MILITARY STRENGTH AND CONTRIBUTE TO AMERICAN POWER PROJECTION

**GORDON** Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies and Director of the Center on the United States and France at the Brookings Institution, 20**03** Philip H., Foreign Affairs January/February, volume 82, number 1

More recently, when the United States took military action in Afghanistan to retaliate against al Qaeda terrorists as well as to overthrow their host Taliban regime, European support and desire to participate was solid. In October 2001 as the fighting was going on, a poll showed that majorities in 11 out of 15 EU states "agreed with the U.S. military action," and in the largest states the majority was substantial (France 73 percent, Germany 65 percent, and the United Kingdom 68 percent). Majorities of European populations even agreed that their own country should take part in the fighting -- the leftist-dominated German parliament approved the sending of 3,900 combat troops -- and some European leaders chafed not at the fact that the United States was using force but that their offers to contribute forces of their own were rebuffed by a Pentagon that preferred to undertake the operation alone. Nonetheless, by early 2002, European forces were involved in bombing, reconnaissance, cave-clearing, and special forces operations. European countries (first the United Kingdom, then Turkey) took on the lead role in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) deployed to keep the peace; this year the ISAF command is likely to pass to Germany and the Netherlands, supported by NATO military planners. By summer 2002, there were as many European troops in Afghanistan as there were American.

## Nuclear war

Zalmay **Khalilzad**, RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 19**95**

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

## Alliance is key to solve backlash against US power.

**ROSEN**, Prof of National Security and Military Affairs @ Harvard, 20**03** Michael, National Interest. LN

It is a naive and perhaps uniquely American notion that those states inferior in power to the United States ought not resent their own subordinate status; that, if it is nice enough, Washington can build a "benign" imperium in which all love it. This does not mean that the United States should dispense with tact. Ritual plays a role in ameliorating tensions in a social hierarchy by creating and confirming expectations of how members of the hierarchy are treated, but rituals do not fundamentally change reality or the attitudes of those subordinate in power. Acting in a humble manner is a ritual worth much respect, so the United States does well to consult the United Nations and NATO councils before it acts. But such rituals will only reduce, not eliminate, the resentment toward the United States that springs from the fact that it can do what it must in any case. And what it must do, if it is to wield imperial power, is create and enforce the rules of a hierarchical interstate order.

# Consult NATO Solvency

## Strong pressure from NATO members for US to consult over TNW removal

**Lamond and Ingram ’09** [Claudine and Paul, Jan. 23, “Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states” <http://www.basicint.org/gtz/gtz11.pdf>]

**Increasing pressure from parliamentarians, pressure groups, budgets and public opinion from within host member states may yet provide an important catalyst for the US and NATO members to discuss the future of US nuclear sharing in Europe. The likely review of NATO’s Strategic Concept starting in 2009 represents an opportunity for the Alliance to reconsider its dependency on nuclear sharing and come up with alternative, more valuable measures that demonstrate commitment.**

## Any changes in nuclear policy in Europe should only be done after extensive consultation with NATO:

Sam **Nunn, 8/5/2009** (co-chair and chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative,

<http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20090805_4929.php>)

Nations located near Russia believe that U.S. nonstrategic forces in Europe remain necessary to prevent the Kremlin from using its nuclear arsenal as a means of coercion against them, according to the report. It warns that the United States should not abandon "strategic equivalency with Russia" and should not cede to Moscow "a posture of superiority in the name of de-emphasizing nuclear weapons in U.S. military strategy." Balance "does not exist in nonstrategic nuclear forces, where Russia enjoys a sizable numerical advantage," the report states, adding "the current imbalance is stark and worrisome to some U.S. allies in Central Europe." Einhorn cautioned that any changes to the United States' nuclear deployments in Europe "should only be considered after **extensive consultations** and **consensus-building** **within" NATO.**

# Credible Deterrence Links (Internal to Prolif Turns)

## *US nuclear weapons presence is a critical requirement for credible extended deterrence:*

David **Yost, 2009** (Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85: 4 (2009) 755–780; accessed via EBSCO)

Evidence of the genuineness of US commitments In NATO Europe (in contrast with, for example, Japan), it was generally agreed in leadership circles during the Cold War that **a US nuclear weapons presence was one of the requirements for credible extended deterrence**. As Alois Mertes, a Christian Democratic Union member of the Bundestag and CDU foreign policy spokesman, put it in 1981, when he argued for the deployment of land-based missiles instead of sea-based weapons, land-based nuclear forces ‘exercise a stronger deterrent impact, because **they are clearly visible** in a country whose protection the deterrent is intended to serve’. According to Mertes, the visibility—to Allied governments, if not to publics—of US nuclear forces in Europe ‘**demonstrates the indivisibility of the territory covered by the Alliance and of Western security’.** Mertes argued that relying on US nuclear forces at sea alone ‘could not adequately guarantee the linkage effect in favor of joint security for America and Europe’ and would eliminate the ‘visibility of American and European risk-sharing’.31

## *US nuclear weapons in Europe key to a credible extended deterrent:*

David **Yost, 2009** (Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85: 4 (2009) 755–780; accessed via EBSCO)

This judgement continues to be shared among many of the European politicians, officials and experts in NATO countries who take an active part in defence and security affairs. The primary rationales for US nuclear forces in Europe include contributing to the robustness of the transatlantic link and enhancing the credibility of US extended deterrence guarantees, in view of the judgement that US nuclear commitments would be **substantially less credible** if they depended solely on US forces at sea and in North America.

# Turkish Prolif Turns

## *Robust nuclear umbrella will deter Turkish prolif: even in the face of Iranian nuclear proliferation:*

David **Yost, 2009** (Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85: 4 (2009) 755–780; accessed via EBSCO)

It is noteworthy in this regard that in 2007 US congressional staff sought the views of Turkish political leaders regarding how US extended deterrence commitments might affect their country’s reaction to Tehran’s possible acquisition of nuclear arms: In a closed door meeting, staff asked a group of influential Turkish politicians how Turkey would respond to an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. These politicians emphatically responded that Turkey would pursue nuclear weapons as well. These individuals stated, ‘Turkey would lose its importance in the region if Iran has nuclear weapons and Turkey does not.’ Another politician said it would be ‘compulsory’ for Turkey to obtain nuclear weapons in such a scenario. However, when staff subsequently asked **whether a U.S. nuclear umbrella and robust security commitment would be sufficient to dissuade Turkey from pursuing nuclear weapons, all three individuals agreed that it would**.30

## *Turn: Tactical nuclear weapons critical to deter Turkish proliferation:*

David **Yost, 2009** (Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85: 4 (2009) 755–780; accessed via EBSCO)

Various potential WMD proliferation developments could strengthen the case for upholding US extended deterrence commitments in NATO and beyond. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran might influence decisions in nearby countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, regarding potential national nuclear weapons development or acquisition programmes. Maintaining the

credibility of US extended deterrence protection might be critical to assuring the beneficiaries of US security guarantees that they may safely forego pursuing their own national nuclear capabilities. A related policy challenge of pivotal importance is determining how the United States and its NATO allies might deter Iranian efforts to employ nuclear weapons.20

## *Credibility of extended deterrent key to solve Turkish prolif:*

David **Yost, 2009** (Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85: 4 (2009) 755–780; accessed via EBSCO)

These allies have, moreover, adhered to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states. Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, a prominent Turkish scholar, nonetheless pointed out in 1995 that ‘The Turkish commitment to non-nuclear weapons status is coupled with several strong qualifiers.’ The caveats associated with US nuclear commitments are perhaps the most significant: the strategic balance between the United States and NATO and the Russian Federation must not be allowed to erode, by the former’s unilateral moves to the disadvantage of NATO, until Russia gives sustained evidence that it has devalued the role of nuclear

weapons in its overall foreign policy, including its policy toward the near abroad and their neighbors rather than merely in its Western policy … In other words, the extended deterrence of the United States must remain convincing and credible to Turks as well as to de facto and de jure nuclear weapons states and potential proliferators.29

# German Prolif Turn

## *Turn: German Prolif: nuclear sharing agreement key to deterring German proliferation:*

David **Yost, 2009** (Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85: 4 (2009) 755–780; accessed via EBSCO)

Alternative to the pursuit of national nuclear forces The non-proliferation function of NATO’s nuclear posture concerns not only the alliance’s potential adversaries but also the members of the alliance that are non-nuclear-weapon states. The United States discovered in the mid-1960s that it was imperative to reach agreements with its NATO allies, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, on nuclear sharing and consultation arrangements—including Germany’s permanent membership in the NATO NPG founded in 1966–7—in order to be able to conclude the NPT.28 The NATO arrangements, including US nuclear forces in Europe, have served to assure Germany and other non-nuclear-weapon-state allies that they have no need to seek nuclear weapons of their own.

# Accidents Advantage Answers

## *Storage sites for tacs in Europe are secure:*

David **Yost, 2009** (Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85: 4 (2009) 755–780; accessed via EBSCO)

For example, in the June 2008 debate in the Bundestag on NATO’s nuclear posture the CDU/CSU speakers held that the storage sites for US nuclear weapons in Europe are secure, and argued that the removal of the US nuclear weapons deployed in Germany would weaken the transatlantic link, diminish

Germany’s influence in NATO decision-making, place nuclear-sharing and NATO strategy into question, and undermine the security of Germany and the alliance as a whole.

# NPT: Advantage 1NC Frontline

## NPT collapse irrelevant – replaced by better regime.

**Kimura** **2005** (Akira, Professor – Kagoshima University, “What Can We Do to Resolve the Crisis in the NPT Regime?”, 5-6, <http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/anew/KimuraE.pdf>) nsa

The NPT regime was not established with the sole aim of obligating the member nations to simply ensure nuclear nonproliferation, that is the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear nations. Rather, it must be emphasized that the regime clearly stipulates the duty of nuclear powers to act on nuclear disarmament, and includes the logical necessity or latent possibility of achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons as well as a vision of a nuclear free world. Although the ‘prohibition and prevention of nuclear proliferation’ and the ‘duty to implement nuclear disarmament’ are two sides of the same coin, there is no room for doubt that it is the latter that is the decisive factor for the survival of the NPT regime. The reason for this is the fact that non-nuclear nations have only accepted this unfair treaty based on the assumption that the nuclear nations would faithfully fulfill their duty of nuclear disarmament, and if that duty is not fulfilled there will be almost no meaning in continuing with the NPT regime. Yet, the collapse of the NPT regime would not necessarily bring about the chaos and confusion of immediate and uncontrolled nuclear proliferation, nor would this necessarily represent the worst case scenario. This is because non-nuclear nations that withdraw from the NPT regime would have the option of establishing a new ‘nuclear weapon prohibition treaty’ on their own to put pressure on nuclear nations to prohibit the preemptive use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear nations and fulfill their duty to eliminate nuclear weapons in a more effective manner. The important point here is that it is anticipated that the majority of non-nuclear nations that withdraw from the NPT regime would not choose to take the path of nuclear armament themselves, but rather on the contrary, they would implement initiatives and efforts to pursue not only promotion of nuclear non-proliferation but also the elimination of nuclear weapons ever more proactively. This is evident when one looks at the past activities and assertions of the member nations of the New Agenda Coalition or NPT nonmember nations.

## Collapse of the NPT won’t cause prolif: other considerations will keep prolif in check.

**Wesley**, Michael. Australian Journal of International Affairs, Sep **2005**, Vol. 59 Issue 3, p283-299, 17p nsa

The major concern of those who oppose scrapping the NPT is that it would result in a ‘proliferation break-out’. This suggests that without the constraints of the NPT, the number of nuclear weapons states would rise from the current nine acknowledged and non-acknowledged holders of nuclear weapons to dozens. However, this assumes that the NPT has been the main reason for the limited spread of nuclear weapons over the past 60 years, an unlikely proposition for a regime whose shortcomings have been acknowledged since its inception. A more likely explanation for the relative lack of proliferation is that most states have experienced insufficient demand-side pressures to over- come the costs of acquiring nuclear arsenals. For most states, this is a condition that will persist past the ending of the NPT. Even though states have grown wealthier and proliferation costs have fallen, it is important to recognise that developing a nuclear arsenal is not cost-free. Nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programs are expensive, meaning that most states will need to divert substantial resources from their conventional armed forces or other policy programs during the weapons development phase. Costs can also be incurred through the international opprobrium that will likely attend proliferation, from diplomatic boycotts to cancellation of aid funding to sanctions by states such as Japan. And a nuclear program brings risks, both the danger of catastrophic environmental and social damage from accidents, as well as arising from the strategic uncertainties generated among neighbouring states (Erickson 2001: 43). Potential proliferators must also confront the power of the nuclear taboo\*/which long pre-dates the NPT\*/ and shoulder the burden of justifying

to domestic and international public opinion why they need the bomb. These factors will persist past the demise of the NPT, and in the absence of a sudden decline in the security of a large number of states, fears of a proliferation break-

out are unfounded.

## Alt Causes to NPT collapse: Iran, North Korea, nuclear apartheid concerns, failure of other nuclear powers to adhere to Article VI.

# NPT: Advantage 1NC Frontline

## Turn: Prolif inevitable, NPT drives it underground, which is more destabilizing and causes nuclear terrorism.

**Wesley**, Michael. Australian Journal of International Affairs, Sep **2005**, Vol. 59 Issue 3, p283-299, 17p nsa

My central argument is that the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons

will probably continue at the rate of one or two additional nuclear weapons

states per decade, whether or not the NPT is retained. Persisting with the NPT

will make this proliferation much more dangerous than if the NPT is replaced

with a more practical regime. I argue that the NPT is a major cause of opaque

proliferation, which is both highly destabilising and makes use of transnational

smuggling networks which are much more likely than states to pass nuclear

components to terrorists. On the other hand, scrapping the NPT in favour of a

more realistic regime governing the possession of nuclear weapons would help

put transnational nuclear smuggling networks out of business and stabilise the

inevitable spread of nuclear weapons.

## Turn: NPT provides cover and tech for proliferation.

Wesley **Clark** **and** Will **Marshall**, Blueprint Magazine | May 17, **2006** <http://www.ppionline.org/ppi_ci.cfm?knlgAreaID=450004&subsecID=900021&contentID=253873> nsa

The key reform is to close the NPT loophole that allows states to develop civilian nuclear energy programs if they agree not to build nuclear weapons. The problem comes when countries demand, as Iran has done, a "right" under NPT to develop its own nuclear fuel supply rather than acquiring what it needs from the nuclear powers. As Ashton Carter and Stephen LaMontagne point out, "Enrichment and reprocessing facilities allow states to cross into a proliferation 'red zone,' putting them dangerously close to a nuclear weapons capability."

## Empirically, the NPT doesn’t solve prolif: 13 failures prove.

**The Straits Times** (Singapore), June 17, **2008** LN nsa

Controversial interpretations aside, the NPT failed to stop India, Israel, Pakistan, North Korea and South Africa from developing their own nuclear weapons. Neither was it a critical factor in South Africa and several former Soviet states (including Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) ultimately abandoning their nuclear weapons: They responded to incentives outside the accord. Nor did it constrain several other governments - including Argentina, Brazil, Libya, South Korea and Taiwan - from pursuing clandestine nuclear weapon programmes at various times.

# NPT: NPT Collapse Good – Ext. Better Regime Fills the Gap

## Regional regimes fill the gap - solve better than the NPT.

Chamundeeswari **Kuppuswamy**, Chevening Scholar and Doctoral Candidate, Department of Law, Centre for Law in its International Context, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK. Journal of Conflict and Security Law 1 March **2006** LN nsa

At the Wilton Park Conference, regional approaches to nuclear non-proliferation were favoured as perhaps being the way forward, because the global approach is not delivering. Stasis in the global scene means that we have to find new ways of moving forward. This was in keeping with the change in the atmosphere observed at the 2005 review conference where doubts were expressed about the underlying culture of the treaty. The NPT has put up a divide that is not working. Forums where participants would have an equal status were recommended. n28 This will be essential to take Resolution 1540 forward and invigorate international efforts towards non-proliferation. As one speaker put it: 'this is the only way you will take out some of the venom and anger that is there in nations'.

A true regional approach should come from within the region rather than from the outside as it is the case at present. In the Middle East, a track-2 approach involving the people, NGOs and the Arab League was recommended where small undramatic steps should be taken. This, it was felt, would eventually help the move towards a grand bargain on non-proliferation. The Euro Mediterranean dialogue n29 was seen as a forum to advance regional dialogue on nuclear issues. India's growing role in the region as a responsible nuclear power, although de facto was recognised. In the light of the failed six-party talks on North Korea, a potential role for India in the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) issue was identified as also a role in the wider context of South East Asia.

## Regional regimes fill-in and solve

Steinberg 94 (Gerald, Professor Political Studies-Bar Ilan U., U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy: Global Regimes and Regional Realities”, Contemporary Security Policy, 15(1), April, <http://faculty.biu.ac.il/~steing/arms/usnpt.htm>)nsa

Regional Factors in Proliferation Processes. As noted above, the paths and dynamics of nuclear proliferation are not uniform around the world, and vary according to regional patterns and factors. The processes of proliferation in South Asia, South America, and the Middle East are specific to each region, and the major factors are largely independent of events and processes in other regions. In South America, for example, the role of local political variables, such as the military regimes in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile were the major determinants of the rate of proliferation in this region. When the regimes changed and were replaced by civil rule and democratic governments, the development of nuclear arms slowed. In South Asia, the pace of nuclear proliferation is largely based on the relationship between India and Pakistan.20 During periods of tension between these states, the prominence of nuclear weapons programs of both states increased while in periods of detente, the prospects for mutual limitation increase. In the Middle East, nuclear proliferation is closely linked to the numerous and overlapping regional conflicts which characterize this region. Israel, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, and Iran all have nuclear weapons programs, and the nature of these efforts, and the factors which motivate the leaders of these states differ significantly.21 Given the defuse nature of regional proliferation patterns and causes, it would be surprising if any global approach and regime was successful in dealing with the various regions and factors. Indeed, as noted above, the institutions and practices of the global non-proliferation regime, including the NPT, IAEA, and Nuclear Supplier's Agreements, have failed in the Middle East and South Asia. Regional Structures: Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ). Instead of the exclusive focus on the singular global structure, regionally based non-proliferation regimes have been proposed as more useful and flexible structures in response to the particular problems of the Middle East and South Asia. In an analysis of non-proliferation policies, the Aspen Strategy Study Group concluded that the "global approach has reached a point of **diminishing marginal returns".**22 The existing regime is "not sufficient....What is needed are regional and country specific policies to complement those pursued at the global level."23 Some regional structures already exist, and others are under discussion. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the treaty of Tlateloclo) created a nuclear- weapons free zone in this region. The signatories agreed to accept full-scope safeguards, under the auspices of the IAEA. In addition, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) is given the authority to undertake special inspections when requested by signatories. Although the terms of the treaty have not come into force in the key countries of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, progress in this direction has been made in the last few years, and the terms of the treaty provide a promising background for the development of a regional arms control and limitation regime. A series of reciprocal visits to nuclear facilities have taken place, and in 1990, Argentina and Brazil signed a Declaration on Common Nuclear Policy, aimed at prohibiting nuclear weapons and testing.24

# NPT: Doesn’t Solve Prolif – Ext. External Factors Key, not NPT

## External factors, not the NPT drive prolif and accounts for NPT’s alleged empirical success.

**Wesley**, Michael. Australian Journal of International Affairs, Sep **2005**, Vol. 59 Issue 3, p283-299, 17p nsa

The NPT was always a flawed regime, based on an unequal distribution of status and security. Its apparent effectiveness in containing nuclear proliferation was largely due to other factors. The events of the past 15 years have only magnified the NPT’s flaws. The end of the Cold War decoupled the possession of nuclear weapons from the global power structure. While many commenta-tors were applauding the expansion of the number of NPT signatories, and South Africa, South Korea, Brazil and Argentina renounced plans to acquire

nuclear weapons, deeper and more insistent proliferation pressures were building among the emerging great powers of Asia. The succession of Persian Gulf wars demonstrated to many insecure states that only nuclear\*/ not

chemical or biological\*/weapons deter conventional military attack. The international community was repeatedly surprised by the extent and sophistica-tion of Iraq’s, Pakistan’s, North Korea’s and Libya’s progress in acquiring nuclear materials and know-how, each time underlining the inadequacies of the non-proliferation regime. After the 1998 South Asian nuclear tests, India’s highly effective rhetorical defence of its policy and the world’s half-hearted and short-lived sanctions against India and Pakistan damaged the moral authority of

the NPT regime, **perhaps** **terminally**.

## NPT can’t solve Asian prolif, driven by security concerns.

**Wesley**, Michael. Australian Journal of International Affairs, Sep **2005**, Vol. 59 Issue 3, p283-299, 17p nsa

The drivers of proliferation among several of Asia’s emerging great powers

combine both mounting demand-side incentives and crumbling supply-side

controls. Neither of these can adequately be addressed by the NPT in its current

state. The major demand-side incentives are greater strategic uncertainty among

regional powers and a rising thirst for international prestige. At the global level,

the actions and statements of the United States, which currently combines a

belief in its unassailable power with a post-11 September 2001 conviction of its

unrivalled vulnerability, have increased the strategic uncertainties of many

states. The current US preoccupation with terrorism and non-proliferation and

recent high-visibility demonstrations of US air power have enhanced the

credibility of Washington’s threats of coercion against ‘rogue states’. As the

United States’ inhibitions against the use of force have fallen, the attractiveness

of nuclear weapons\*/ the ultimate insurance policy\*/have risen.

## Extended deterrence, not the NPT are the best bet to curb prolif.

**Wesley**, Michael. Australian Journal of International Affairs, Sep **2005**, Vol. 59 Issue 3, p283-299, 17p nsa

The NPT’s inability either to prevent the spread of nuclear components,

materials and technology, or to secure the nuclear disarmament of the nuclear

weapons states (as discussed below), only adds to these demand-side pressures.

In developing nuclear weapons, Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea and

probably Iran have demonstrated that neither the NPT nor any other

international regime provides them with an adequate security guarantee against

either nuclear or conventional coercion. To the contrary, by confining the

possession of nuclear weapons to some states and not others, the NPT has

raised the attractiveness of nuclear weapons for those states not covered by the

nuclear weapons states’ guarantees of extended deterrence.

# NPT: Doesn’t Solve Prolif – Ext. External Factors key, not NPT

## The NPT can’t stop dominated nations from getting nukes – Iran, North Korea, Israel, India, Pakistan, Syria and Libya all prove

**Brookes 2003** [Peter Brookes, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense, is a senior fellow for national security affairs at The Heritage Foundation. “Halting Proliferation” June 27, 2003 http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed062703b.cfm]

The 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is instructive. The NPT, which bans nuclear programs for other than peaceful purposes, is essentially a gentleman's agreement-with no enforcement provisions. Nations routinely ignore its principles if they conflict with the country's perception of its national interests.

 - Iran, an NPT signatory, insists it is in compliance but is secretly pursuing nukes, while thwarting IAEA inspectors.

 - North Korea admitted to a U.S. diplomat last year that it had nuclear weapons while still a member of the NPT. (It has since withdrawn.)

 - India and Pakistan, which joined the nuclear club in 1998, never signed the treaty. Neither did --

 - Israel, a suspected nuclear power.

 - Libya and Syria, both signatories, still flirt with nuclear status.

Bottom line: Neither the NPT, nor any other current U.N. arms-control treaty, such as the Biological Weapons or Chemical Weapons Conventions, can stop a determined nation from pursuing WMD.

## NPT is ineffective: doesn’t prevent prolif.

**Choe**, Julia, Publication: Harvard International Review, Date: Jun 22 2006 12:00AM **2006** <http://www.allbusiness.com/sector-92-public-administration/national/1187444-1.html> nsa

At first glance, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) seems to offer a concrete solution to the problem posed by nuclear weaponry. As the most widely accepted arms-control agreement, the NPT attempts to codify the prevention of arms proliferation among states. However, a major weakness of the NPT lies in the enforcement of its policies. This weakness has been highlighted by the current defiance of two states and has brought into question the overall effectiveness of the treaty. Iran's continuing non-cooperation emphasizes the problems of measuring compliance and of determining the course of action to take toward uncooperative states. North Korea's past actions and withdrawal from the NPT question the treaty's usefulness as a means of coping with states that no longer find abiding by the agreement worthwhile. **Both cases represent the NPT's ineffectiveness in establishing a consistent and forceful system for preventing nuclear proliferation.** Surely future efforts should promote stronger consensus among participating states and uniform mechanisms for addressing illegitimate state action, but it is still uncertain how these goals should be incorporated into a working treaty.

# NPT: 2NC Alt Causes to NPT Collapse

## Extend 2NC number 4, multiple alt. causes to NPT failure, Iran, North Korea, discrimination accusations, and failure of other nuclear powers to adhere to Article 4 and 6 commitments. Here’s evidence.

## North Korea was the nail in the NPT’s coffin.

Prem Shankar **Jha**, Outlook India, Oct. 23 **2006** <http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?232929> nsa

North Korea's nuclear test has touched off a spate of mutual recrimination between liberals and conservatives in the US. Democrats are blaming the Bush administration for having tied up its army in a point-less Iraq invasion, allowing North Korea to thumb its nose at the US. Republicans are castigating president Clinton for not being tough with North Korea in the mid-'90s. The only issue on which they see eye to eye is the need to push the genie back into the bottle. Else the NPT will fall apart, and the world will become a jungle full of nuclear-armed predators. Almost no one is asking who let the genie out of the bottle in the first place. The non-proliferation lobby in Europe and US says that India and Pakistan loosened the stopper. North Korea and Iran are taking it out. Each new nuclear power destabilises the security balance in its neighbourhood. So a Domino effect follows. That is why North Korea has to be forced back in line, through targeted UN sanctions, and by forcing China into cutting off its food and oil supply. Beneath all the bluster is a feeling that **no matter what action is taken, the NPT is as good as dead.** Commentators are, therefore, now assessing how much of a threat nuclear North Korea will be. What none of the western nuclear powers is conceding is their role in freeing the genie. They began doing this long before the Iraq invasion, by converting a manifestly temporary treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear arms into an instrument to create a permanent hierarchy of power and world dominance. As if that wasn't enough, beginning in the late '90s one or several of them began eroding the pillars of the Westphalian international state system—the bedrock of all international treaties of the past three-and-a-half centuries.

## Iran will kill the NPT if it doesn’t end its nuclear program.

**The Irish Times**, 12 June **2008**, nsa

**Unfortunately, if Iran continues on its nuclear path, the NPT will be buried in the sands of the Middle East.** A report published last month Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East In the Shadow of Iran brings us up to date on a worsening situation, as seen by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). "In the span of 11 months between February 2006 and January 2007, at least 13 countries in the Middle East announced new or revised plans to pursue or explore civilian nuclear energy."Why? The single most salient factor, however, is Iran. Although Iran claims to seek only peaceful applications of nuclear energy, the historical secrecy of its nuclear programme, its multiple violations of IAEA safeguards, the military connections, the illogic of uranium-enrichment for a small fledgling programme and Iran's insistence on pursuing sensitive technologies in the face of UN Security Council mandates to suspend them lead most of Iran's neighbours, like much of the rest of the world, to assess that it is attempting to acquire at least a nuclear-weapons capability. The prospect of a nuclear Iran is unwelcome, albeit to different degrees, to other Middle Eastern states - whether Arab, Jewish or Turkish - most of which lie within the range of Iran's ballistic missiles . . . If Iran's nuclear programme is unchecked there is reason for concern that it could in time prompt a regional cascade of proliferation among Iran's neighbours." The IISS's overall conclusion on Iranian activities is sobering: "All signs indicate that Iran is moving towards an advanced latent nuclear capability by openly mastering industrial-level enrichment and claiming that there is a peaceful programme under the NPT". The NPT will collapse if Iran's neighbours respond with nuclear weapons programmes or if Israel declares its own nuclear weapons or actually attacked Iran. The Arab League announced on March 5th, 2008, that if Israel acknowledged having nuclear weapons then all Arab states would collectively withdraw from the NPT Treaty. Preventing such an announcement by Israel, or a possible attack by it on Iranian nuclear facilities is therefore crucial.

# NPT: Alt Causes to NPT Collapse

## Israel reinforces perception that NPT is discriminatory.

**Daley 2008** [Tad Daley is Writing Fellow with International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, winner of the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize. He has served as a foreign policy advisor to Congresswoman Diane Watson, Congressman Dennis Kucinich, and the late U.S. Senator Alan Cranston. “Radioactive Hypocrisy: American Hubris Threatens Perpetual Nuclear Proliferation” May 15, 2008. http://www.alternet.org/world/85375/radioactive\_hypocrisy:\_american\_hubris\_threatens\_perpetual\_nuclear\_proliferation/

Moreover, Soltanieh continued, "Israel, with huge nuclear weapons activities, has not concluded" any kind of agreement with the IAEA to allow for inspections of its own nuclear facilities. Now Israel, it must be said, has never signed the NPT, so it is under no international legal obligation to conclude such an agreement. (Nor are the NPT's nuclear weapon states for that matter -- under the NPT, only the non-nuclear weapon states must open themselves to international inspections.) Still, the aspiration for the NPT has always been that it would eventually apply universally. (It is, at present, the most nearly universal treaty in history, as all but four states on the planet -- Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea after its withdrawal -- are members.) Israel's failure to join the regime can hardly be expected to diminish the simmering antipathies -- and not just in Iran -- about the perception that in the nuclear realm, there are different rules for different actors.

## Failure of not only US but Russia, France, UK and China to commit to article VI causes failure, you need global modeling to solve.

**The Japan Times**, April 8, **2009**, Wednesday LN nsa

The speech could not have been more timely. It was just preceded by North Korea's launch of a multistage rocket, a critical step in Pyongyang's quest to put nuclear warheads on long-range missiles. Just over the horizon is the 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), a cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime. The NPT is in danger of collapse after North Korea's withdrawal, Iran's game of cat and mouse with nuclear inspectors, and the failure of the nuclear-weapon states - the U.S., Russia, France, Britain and China - to take their disarmament obligations more seriously.

## US India Nuclear deal will cause more infringement and illegal deals, killing the NPT.

**The Irish Times**, July 14, **2008** LN nsa

India, like Pakistan and Israel, is not an NPT signatory and has developed nuclear weapons outside the treaty. The US-India nuclear agreement would endorse and facilitate this outlaw behaviour and would not even require India to accept the same responsibilities as NPT signatories: full-scope IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards for non-nuclear- weapon states and a commitment from nuclear-weapon states to negotiate in good faith for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The fact that India's civilian nuclear facilities would be open for inspection as part of this agreement has been hailed as good news for the non-proliferation system in some quarters (including Mr Mohamed El Baredei, director general of the IAEA). It isn't. As a result of this deal, other de facto nuclear states could claim the same preferential treatment. Some non-nuclear-weapon states in the NPT, who are already disenchanted with the failure of the five acknowledged nuclear-weapon states (the US, France, UK, China and Russia) to comply with NPT rules, could view the renunciation of nuclear weapons as no longer in their national interest. The India-Pakistan nuclear arms race could be intensified. Finally, the deal could open the way for other nuclear-powered states that are ready and eager to enter into similar deals which are illegal under NPT rules.

# NPT: Causes Prolif – Ext. Underground

## NPT causes opaque prolif resulting in miscalculation and accidents .

**Wesley**, Michael. Australian Journal of International Affairs, Sep **2005**, Vol. 59 Issue 3, p283-299, 17p nsa

By prohibiting proliferation, without the capacity or moral authority to enforce

such a prohibition, the NPT makes opaque proliferation the only option for

aspiring nuclear weapons states. Opaque proliferation is destabilising to

regional security. It breeds miscalculation\*/ both overestimation of a state’s

nuclear weapons development (as shown by the case of Iraq), and under-

estimation (in the case of Libya)\*/ that can force neighbouring states into

potentially catastrophic moves. Even more dangerous, argues Lewis Dunn, is

the likelihood that states with covert nuclear weapons programs will develop

weak failsafe mechanisms and nuclear doctrine that is destabilising:

In camera decision making may result in uncontrolled programs, less

attention to safety and control problems and only limited assessment of the

risks of nuclear weapon deployments or use. The necessary exercises cannot

be conducted, nor can procedures for handling nuclear warheads be

practised, nor alert procedures tested. As a result, the risk of accidents or

incidents may rise greatly in the event of deployment in a crisis or a

conventional conflict. Miscalculations by neighbours or outsiders also

appear more likely, given their uncertainties about the adversary’s capabil-

ities, as well as their lack of information to judge whether crisis deployments

mean that war is imminent (1991: 20, italics in original).

## NPT causes underground prolif and sucks diplomatic resources which could be used to effectively solve prolif.

**Wesley**, Michael. Australian Journal of International Affairs, Sep **2005**, Vol. 59 Issue 3, p283-299, 17p nsa

Even worse than being ineffective, the NPT is dangerous, because it increases

the pressures for opaque proliferation and heightens nuclear instability. Equally

flawed, I argue, is the current counter-proliferation doctrine of the United

States. I advocate scrapping the NPT (and the doctrine of counter-proliferation)

and starting again, because the NPT is a failing regime that is consuming

diplomatic resources that could be more effectively used to build an alternative

arms control regime that is responsive to current circumstances. We need to

confront the practicalities of scrapping the NPT\*/ the positives and the

negatives\*/ and think clearly about the requirements of a replacement regime.

# NPT: Nuclear Terrorism Terminals

## Nuclear terrorism escalates to nuclear war.

Greg **Easterbrook**, senior editor with THE NEW REPUBLIC, November **2001**, p. www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0111/01/gal.00.html

Terrorists may not be held by this, especially suicidal terrorists, of the kind that al Qaeda is attempting to cultivate. But I think, if I could leave you with one message, it would be this: that the search for terrorist atomic weapons would be of great benefit to the Muslim peoples of the world in addition to members, to people of the United States and Western Europe, because if an atomic warhead goes off in Washington, say, in the current environment or anything like it, in the 24 hours that followed, a hundred million Muslims would die as U.S. nuclear bombs rained down on every conceivable military target in a dozen Muslim countries.

## NUCLEAR TERRORISM CAUSES NUCLEAR ESCALATION AND EXTINCTION

**BERES, 1984 (TERRORISM AND GLOBAL SECURITY; PG. 50-51)**

Nuclear terrorism could even spark full scale nuclear war between states. Such war could involve the entire spectrum of nuclear conflict possibilities, ranging from a nuclear attack upon a nonnuclear state to systemwide nuclear war. How might such far-reaching consequences of nuclear terrorism come about? Perhaps the most likely way would involve a terrorist nuclear assault against a state by terrorists “hosted” in another state. For example, consider the following scenario: Early in the 1980’s Israel and her Arab state neighbors finally stand ready to conclude a comprehensive, multilateral peace settlement. With a bilateral treaty between Israel and Egypt already several years old, only the interests of the Palestinians—as defined by the PLO—seem to have been left out. On the eve of the proposed signing of the peace agreement, half a dozen crude nuclear explosives in the one kiloton range detonate in as many Israeli cities. Public grief in Israel over the many thousand dead and maimed is matched only by the outcry for revenge. In response to the public mood, the government of Israel initiates selected strikes against terrorist strongholds in Lebanon, whereupon the Lebanese government and it allies retaliate against Israel. Before long, the entire region is ablaze, conflict has escalated to nuclear forms, and all countries in the area have suffered unprecedented destruction. Of course, such a scenario is fraught with the makings of even wider destruction. How would the United States react to the situation in the Middle East? What would be the Soviet response? It is entirely conceivable that a chain reaction of interstate nuclear conflict could ensue, one that would involve the superpowers or even every nuclear weapon state on the planet. What, exactly, would this mean? Whether the terms of assessment be statistical or human, the consequences of nuclear war require an entirely new paradigm of death. Only such a paradigm would allow us a proper framework for absorbing the vision of near-total obliteration and the outer limits of human destructiveness. Any nuclear war would have effectively permanent and irreversible consequences. Whatever the actual extent of injuries and fatalities, it would entomb the spirit of the entire species in a planetary casket strewn with shorn bodies and imbecile imaginations.

# NPT: Causes Prolif – Ext. Spreads Tech

## NPT causes nuclear terrorism because it encourages opaque prolif and attendant illicit nuclear markets.

**Wesley**, Michael. Australian Journal of International Affairs, Sep **2005**, Vol. 59 Issue 3, p283-299, 17p nsa

As the dramatic revelations of the nature and extent of the A. Q. Khan

network showed, some states undertaking opaque proliferation have been

prepared to rely on transnational smuggling networks to gain vital components,

materials and knowledge. Quite apart from the incapacity of the NPT regime to

deal with this new form of proliferation (Clary 2004), such non-state networks

raise very real risks that for the right price, criminals or other facilitators could

pass nuclear materials to terrorist groups or extortionists (Albright and

Hinderstein 2005). Both through its inadequacies and its obsessive focus on

stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, the NPT could be contributing to the

ultimate nightmare: terrorists armed with nuclear or radiological weapons.

# NPT: Causes Prolif – Ext. Spreads Tech

## Compliance with the NPT actually makes it EASIER to proliferate.

**Wesley**, Michael. Australian Journal of International Affairs, Sep **2005**, Vol. 59 Issue 3, p283-299, 17p nsa

Some of the causes of the NPT’s declining effectiveness in containing nuclear

proliferation have been rehearsed above. However the main cause of its

ineffectiveness is structural: as Frank Barnaby observes, ‘The problem is that

military and peaceful nuclear programs are, for the most part, virtually

identical’ (1993: 126). This directly erodes the viability of the deal that lies at

the heart of the NPT: that non-nuclear weapons states agree not to try to

acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for assistance with peaceful nuclear

programs, should they want them. The NPT and the International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA) are thus simultaneously engaged in promoting and

controlling two types of nuclear technology that are virtually indistinguishable

until a point very close to the threshold of assembling the components of a

nuclear weapon.

**For many states that have contemplated the nuclear option, adherence to the**

**NPT thus actually makes it easier to obtain cutting edge nuclear technology and**

**dual-use components that could be applied to a nuclear weapons program**

(Dunn 1991: 23). As Barnaby argues, ‘Under [Article X of] the NPT, a country

can legally manufacture the components of a nuclear weapon, notify the IAEA

and the UN Security Council that it is withdrawing from the Treaty, and then

assemble its nuclear weapons’(1993: 124). Although the IAEA’s inspections role

has been strengthened during the course of the 1990s, there is little prospect that

its powers will be increased to such a level that it will be able to counter the

highly sophisticated deception programs mounted by most covert proliferators.

The only remedy to this dilemma has been to question the need of states such as

Iran for peaceful nuclear power and to doubt the veracity of their statements

that they do not intend to acquire nuclear weapons. This only further opens the

regime up to charges of selectivity, unfairness and politicisation (Jones 1998).

## NPT spreads nuclear tech – causes prolif.

**Western Mail**, May 14, **2005** LN nsa

One reason why the NPT has so far proved ineffective in preventing the growth of nuclear weapons lies in the treaty itself.

As a carrot for not developing nuclear bombs, the major powers promised to provide small states with 'atoms for peace'. They would supply the technology needed to develop peaceful atomic energy, provided the recipients steered clear of bombs. The problem is that the technology needed to produce electricity in nuclear power stations is very similar to that needed for nuclear weapons. Once, for example, a country has the means of enriching uranium for peaceful purposes, it is well on the way to making the fuel it needs to produce bombs.

# NPT: Doesn’t Solve Prolif – Ext. NPT Fails

## Inability to get consensus in security counsel for violators hamstrings the NPT.

**Choe**, Julia, Publication: Harvard International Review, Date: Jun 22 2006 12:00AM **2006** <http://www.allbusiness.com/sector-92-public-administration/national/1187444-1.html> nsa

Since its creation in 1970, the NPT has been accepted by 187 states. Only India, Pakistan, and Israel have failed to sign, and North Korea has withdrawn. Under the NPT, the five declared nuclear weapons states--the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China--agree to not assist other states in acquiring nuclear weapons. They also consent to reduce and eventually eliminate their own nuclear arsenals. Non-weapons states are obligated not to pursue nuclear weapons and can individually allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect their nuclear facilities. All states are forbidden to supply certain nuclear-related weapons or materials to others unless they are under safeguards. Only peaceful nuclear technology such as energy technology is allowed under the NPT. To induce states to abide by its terms, the NPT relies on nuclear safeguards--agreements that allow the IAEA to make routine inspections. Though the IAEA has no third-party enforcement power, its inspectors can report NPT violations to the United Nations, which can then enact sanctions and other measures. At the May 1995 NPT Extension Conference, parties adopted the Strengthened Safeguards System, which gave inspectors more power, including complete access to nuclear records and environmental sampling. The NPT's principal shortcoming is its reliance on immediate referrals of treaty violations to the UN Security Council and on effective action within the United Nations--conditions that are rarely achievable.

## Iran proves, NPT cannot be enforced in even the clearest instances.

**Choe**, Julia, Publication: Harvard International Review, Date: Jun 22 2006 12:00AM **2006** <http://www.allbusiness.com/sector-92-public-administration/national/1187444-1.html> nsa

Despite the consensus embodied in the NPT that states should pursue non-proliferation, its provisions have not been enforced in a reliable manner. The NPT contains no procedures for the Security Council's management of non-compliance. After referring a country to the Security Council, the IAEA has no control over subsequent developments. In addition, the Security Council has no obligation to act in a specific way; it could ignore the situation or take military action. It is also difficult to define compliance within Article IV of the NPT, which establishes the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Because compliance is a nebulous issue, inconsistencies that might merit the label of non-compliance can go undetected. In recent years Iran's actions in this gray area have highlighted the treaty's weaknesses. Though Iran is a member of the NPT and has allowed the IAEA to inspect its nuclear facilities, its actions in recent years have breached NPT terms. Iran's nuclear program started in 1959 with a research reactor purchased from the United States. In December 2002, satellite photographs provided evidence of nuclear sites at Natanz and Arak intended for uranium enrichment and heavy-water production, respectively. Since then, IAEA inspections have revealed undeclared efforts toward uranium enrichment, separation of plutonium, as well as the presence of undeclared imported material. In February 2003, then Iranian President Mohammed Khatami stated that Iran planned to mine its own uranium and reprocess spent fuel from the reactor, contrary to previous understandings that the uranium would be returned to Russia. In a report issued in late November 2003, IAEA Director Mohomad ElBaradei stated that Iran had admitted to developing a uranium centrifuge enrichment program, adding that Iran had "failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its safeguards agreement." Current Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad asserted in September 2005 that the pursuit of nuclear weapons is "prohibited" under Iran's religious principles and has consistently denied that Iran has a nuclear weapons program. The international community, however, remains skeptical. Despite clear violations of the NPT, the IAEA mandated only that Iran suspend uranium enrichment and allow stricter inspections. Since then, Iran has failed to make significant moves toward compliance. An IAEA report in June 2004 condemned Iran's lack of complete cooperation after Iran admitted that it had understated the amount of plutonium it had enriched. Even so, the IAEA took no steps to divert Iran away from its path. The IAEA's statements, while well-intentioned, were issued in a way that did not lead to immediate action--a precedent that may have inadvertently lowered the IAEA's credibility. Negotiations throughout this time (beginning in 1993) had been ongoing with Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, collectively known as the EU-3.

# NPT: Doesn’t Solve Prolif – Ext. NPT Fails

## International community guts NPT effectiveness.

**Choe**, Julia, Publication: Harvard International Review, Date: Jun 22 2006 12:00AM **2006** <http://www.allbusiness.com/sector-92-public-administration/national/1187444-1.html> nsa

The events of the past three years in Iran demonstrate the difficulty of implementing the NPT's doctrines and reflect the sluggish and inadequate pace of treaty enforcement in a system reliant on states' self-initiative. They have also shown that there is no consensus on what NPT doctrine should be, leading to divisions that a nation like Iran can exploit. Under the NPT there is no concrete, automatic response to a state's nuclear pursuits, and enforcement is hindered by unrelated political events. As a result of the NPT's lack of action, Iran has been able to disregard calls for a reduction of its nuclear program for several months, as it continues with its nuclear program. These actions underscore the weakness of the NPT in defining and handling non-compliance before a nation begins to make nuclear arms.

## North Korea proves, proliferators will just withdraw and the NPT flounders.

**Choe**, Julia, Publication: Harvard International Review, Date: Jun 22 2006 12:00AM **2006** <http://www.allbusiness.com/sector-92-public-administration/national/1187444-1.html> nsa

Theoretically, the NPT should have been able to resolve the North Korean situation. North Korea's initial lack of cooperation ought to have caused the IAEA to declare it non-compliant and forward the case to the Security Council. While it is unclear how the Security Council would have acted, the NPT parties, at the very least, should have immediately referred North Korea to the Security Council to begin some form of consultation and prevent its withdrawal from the NPT. Now, however, the mechanisms for managing the North Korean standoff are even more unclear than in the Iran situation, since North Korea has left the NPT, and the treaty's framework can no longer be used. The IAEA Board of Governors did report North Korea to the Security Council in February 2003, but no condemnation was issued. The problem of finding consensus still exists, with China acting more as a mediator than as a punisher. The United States refuses to have bilateral talks with North Korea, preferring instead to go through the Six-Party Talks in a demonstration of a tougher policy against the country. Whether North Korea will temper its stance has yet to be determined. At the very least, the case of North Korea has made it clear that the NPT has been glaringly insufficient in resolving the issues of nuclear proliferation, particularly when a proliferator that has been caught withdraws from the system.

# NPT: Doesn’t Solve Prolif – Ext. NPT Fails

## NPT fails, international community ignores violations.

Mike **Whitney**, 3/2/**06** http://www.williambowles.info/guests/2006/0206/npt.html

The purpose of the NPT (Nonproliferation Treaty) is to reduce or eliminate the development of nuclear weapons. If it is to have any meaning at all it must be directed at nations that not only have weapons, but that demonstrate a flagrant disregard for the international laws condemning their use. The IAEA should focus its attention on those states that have a clear record of territorial aggression, military intervention, or who consistently violate United Nations resolutions. In its present form the IAEA and the NPT are utterly meaningless. Rather than leading the world towards nuclear disarmament, the agency and the treaty have simply ignored the misbehavior of the more powerful nations and humiliated the non-nuclear states with spurious accusations and threatening rhetoric.

# NPT: Doesn’t Solve Prolif– A2: Make states more aggressive

## NPT collapse won’t make states more aggressive or encourage risk taking.

**Wesley**, Michael. Australian Journal of International Affairs, Sep **2005**, Vol. 59 Issue 3, p283-299, 17p nsa

Another concern is that by making it easier for some states to acquire nuclear

weapons, scrapping the NPT will result in several states being willing to take

greater risks in advancing their strategic interests. This would work either by

emboldening aggressive states by reassuring them that they are able to deter

retaliatory action or through a version of extended deterrence, in keeping

outside powers out of regional conflicts (Dunn 1991: 26). Such misgivings,

however, ignore past evidence of the effect of nuclear weapons on their

possessors’ behaviour, and misunderstand the nature of nuclear weapons. In

effect, they assume that nuclear weapons imbue their holders with ‘super-

strategic’ properties. It has long been widely acknowledged that nuclear

weapons have no rational offensive value; by threatening a prospective

opponent with catastrophic destruction, their only logical use is to deter others’

attacks (Schelling 1963). In using nuclear threats offensively or as an explicit

adjunct to a conventional attack, a state would incur unacceptable risks

‘because no state can expect to execute the threat without danger to [itself]’

(Waltz 1981: 13). As Saunders observes, ‘There is little empirical evidence to

support claims that developing countries that acquire WMD and delivery

systems will behave less cautiously than other nuclear weapons states’ (2001:

133).

# NPT: NPT is Resilient

## NPT is resilient – no collapse coming.

Jones and McDonough 98 (Rodney W., Former Foreign Affairs Officer – U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Senior Advisor of the START II Project – Carnegie Endowment, and Mark G., Consultant – Carnegie Endowment’s Non-Proliferation Project, “Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts”, CEIP, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=125>) nsa

Success Stories: The setback in South Asia must not obscure major non-proliferation gains achieved in the 1990s. The good news includes: \* South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Romania, and Algeria have renounced nuclear arms and accepted strict international controls. \* Post-Soviet Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine were denuclearized in 1996, and joined the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states.

 \* Iraq’s nuclear weapons infrastructure has been physically destroyed, despite its recalcitrance. \* NPT extension and CTBT signature in 1995-96 show non-proliferation norms are strong \* The "nuclear program freeze" in North Korea illustrates NPT resilience.

 \* Russia has accepted the MTCR and Wassenaar Arrangement export controls. \* China finally embraced nuclear export control laws and policies consistent with the NPT. Continuing Threats: On the dark side, proliferation still threatens the regime and our security:\* Russian and Chinese nuclear and missile exports persist to Iraq, Iran, India, or Pakistan. \* United Nations efforts to eliminate Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons remain incomplete, and fears that Iraq will eventually rebuild its nuclear program are well founded.

 \* An international black market in nuclear and missile items from Russia and other post-Soviet states might put nuclear weapons-grade material and even nuclear weapons up for sale \* The scope of proliferation has been expanding: Iran, Iraq, Libya and other hostile countries have been developing chemical and biological weapons, and long-range missiles. \* Biological and chemical weapons spread increases the chances of terrorism, and the danger that it will inflict deep wounds on democratic societies. A Robust Regime: Although the non-proliferation regime has suffered two serious shocks with the latest nuclear tests in South Asia, it is essential to look to the long-term with patience and policy steadiness. In reality, the seemingly fragile non-proliferation regime is quite resilient, and will remain so as long as the worldwide trend of reducing the stockpiles and moving away from reliance on nuclear weapons continues. Keeping the regime strong has always depended on attention, reinvigoration, and innovation. This long-term perspective gives reason to be optimistic that focused diplomatic efforts can minimize and even reverse proliferation. Still, as the Indian and Pakistani breakout shows, the challenges ahead will require giving non-proliferation higher priority as well as vision, determination and ingenuity.

# NPT: Doesn’t Solve Prolif – A2: Norms

## States will still follow international norms post NPT collapse because globalization makes economic incentives not to be pariah states.

**Wesley**, Michael. Australian Journal of International Affairs, Sep **2005**, Vol. 59 Issue 3, p283-299, 17p nsa

A third concern is that by making it easier to acquire nuclear weapons, the

end of the NPT will give certain disgruntled states the confidence to defy global

and regional norms of behaviour. However, this concern assumes that such

states only comply with such norms due to a persisting sense of insecurity that

possession of nuclear weapons would remove. As Chayes and Chayes have

convincingly argued, states follow norms and agreements in international

relations not out of the fear of coercion but due to a general ‘propensity to

comply’ with agreements they have made or joined (1998). Even disgruntled

states exhibit great concern for their international reputation, especially in an

era of globalisation, where general reputation and confidence in a government is

necessary to secure the requirements for economic development. Colonel

Muammar Ghaddafi’s extraordinary about-face in compensating the victims

of Libyan-backed terrorist attacks and abandoning well-developed plans to

develop a nuclear arsenal have only underlined the importance of reputation

and co-operativeness in the age of globalisation.

## NPT lacks moral authority: nuclear apartheid charges.

**Wesley**, Michael. Australian Journal of International Affairs, Sep **2005**, Vol. 59 Issue 3, p283-299, 17p nsa

The unfairness of the NPT risks generating cynicism among states about their

obligations under the treaty, and therefore impacts directly on its effectiveness.

Friedrich Kratochwil (1989) has argued convincingly that states do not follow

rules out of a sense of unreflective obligation or blind habit, but on the basis of

explicitly developed justifications derived from socially shared conceptions of

rationality and justice. Because the NPT effectively enshrines an unequal

distribution of the security and status conferred by nuclear weapons, it

contravenes the principles of natural justice. This in turn detracts from its

legitimacy and ultimately from its effectiveness. As Abram Chayes and Antonia

Chayes have argued, ‘a system in which only the weak can be made to comply

with their undertakings will not achieve the legitimacy needed for reliable

enforcement of treaty obligations’ (1998: 3). Furthermore, by effectively

making the prohibition of the spread of nuclear weapons a higher priority

than the eradication of the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear weapons states, the

NPT regime implies that some states, and not others, can be trusted with

nuclear weapons. The implicit judgement the regime makes about competence

and trustworthiness only further aggravates the status inequality issues that

plague the NPT. By arguing that the NPT enshrines a system of ‘nuclear

apartheid’, Indian leaders and diplomats rehearsed many of these issues in their

defence of India’s nuclear tests in 1998. The effectiveness of this line of

argument, plus the fact that interests deemed more important than non-

proliferation soon brought an end to most states’ sanctions against India

and Pakistan, have done a great deal of damage to the moral authority of the

NPT.

# NPT Answers: Hypocrisy Over Israel Blocks Success

## *by non-nuclear weapons states—locking in the notion of nuclear apartheid.*

## *(--) Israel’s nuclear arsenal locks in perceptions of a double-standard—their AFF doesn’t solve:*

Tad **Daley, 5/15/2008** (foreign policy advisor to Congresswoman Diane Watson, AlterNet. Posted May 15, 2008

[http://www.alternet.org/world/85375/radioactive\_hypocrisy:\_american\_hubris\_threatens\_perpetual\_nuclear\_proliferation/](http://www.alternet.org/world/85375/radioactive_hypocrisy%3A_american_hubris_threatens_perpetual_nuclear_proliferation/))

So, the "double standard" or "nuclear apartheid," in Iran's latest rendering, did not just signify the basic chasm between the "nuclear haves" and the "nuclear have-nots." Instead, Ambassador Soltanieh conveyed what one might call a more sophisticated nuclear resentment -- first, at Washington's (allegedly) assisting Israel with nuclear technologies while at the same time hampering Iran's abilities to obtain the same, and second, at Washington demanding that certain adversaries submit to rigorous IAEA inspections -- profound intrusions on national sovereignty -- while certain allies are under no obligation to do so.

## *(--) Israeli unwillingness to sign the NPT locks in perceptions of hypocrisy by other regimes:*

Tad **Daley, 5/15/2008** (foreign policy advisor to Congresswoman Diane Watson, AlterNet. Posted May 15, 2008

[http://www.alternet.org/world/85375/radioactive\_hypocrisy:\_american\_hubris\_threatens\_perpetual\_nuclear\_proliferation/](http://www.alternet.org/world/85375/radioactive_hypocrisy%3A_american_hubris_threatens_perpetual_nuclear_proliferation/))

Now Israel, it must be said, has never signed the NPT, so it is under no international legal obligation to conclude such an agreement. (Nor are the NPT's nuclear weapon states for that matter -- under the NPT, only the non-nuclear weapon states must open themselves to international inspections.) Still, the aspiration for the NPT has always been that it would eventually apply universally. (It is, at present, the most nearly universal treaty in history, as all but four states on the planet -- Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea after its withdrawal -- are members.) **Israel's failure to join the regime** can hardly be expected to diminish the **simmering antipathies** -- and not just in Iran -- about the perception that in the nuclear realm, there are different rules for different actors.

## *(--) Hypocrisy to Israel prevents NPT success:*

Tad **Daley, 5/15/2008** (foreign policy advisor to Congresswoman Diane Watson, AlterNet. Posted May 15, 2008

[http://www.alternet.org/world/85375/radioactive\_hypocrisy:\_american\_hubris\_threatens\_perpetual\_nuclear\_proliferation/](http://www.alternet.org/world/85375/radioactive_hypocrisy%3A_american_hubris_threatens_perpetual_nuclear_proliferation/))

"Access of developing countries to peaceful nuclear materials and technologies has been continuously denied," Soltanieh said, "to the extent that they have had no choice than to acquire their requirements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy ... from open markets." Usually, he said, that means that countries like his own must purchase items that are more expensive, of poorer quality and less safe. Therefore, Soltanieh insisted that Iran would not submit to more intrusive IAEA inspections as long as this situation persisted. "The **existing double standard shall not be tolerated** anymore by non-nuclear weapon states," he said. "No additional measure in strengthening (IAEA) safeguards can be accepted by non-nuclear weapons parties unless these serious constraints and discrimination are removed." Moreover, Soltanieh continued, "Israel, with huge nuclear weapons activities, has not concluded" any kind of agreement with the IAEA to allow for inspections of its own nuclear facilities.

# NPT Answers: NPT Doesn’t Solve Prolif (Block Extensions)

## *(--) And lack of will prevents nations from enforcing the NPT:*

Jack **Spencer, 7/24/2008** (Research Fellow for Nuclear Energy Policy @ The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/tst072908b.cfm)

The question is whether supplier states follow the established rules and to what extent peaceful nations are willing to compel proliferators to discontinue risky behavior. North Korea, for example, did not surprise anyone when its so-called peaceful nuclear activities were revealed as a cover for a nuclear program. To the extent there were any surprises in the early 1990s, the international community **had ample time to respond**. Whether changes in policy toward North Korea altered its behavior can be debated, but certainly the nonproliferation regime worked insofar as it gave the world ample warning of North Korea's intentions. The same is true today with Iran. The world is not unaware of Iran's programs. The problem is with **states that enable Iran's actions** and the difficulty of developing a cohesive policy to compel a change in its behavior. One could argue that the Iran and North Korea problems are examples of nonproliferation regime failure. Perhaps they are to the extent that the purpose of nonproliferation policy is to prevent any spread of nuclear technology for the purposes of weaponization. But the reality is that as long as the basic building block of the international system is the sovereign nation-state, no international treaty or regime can stop a state from pursuing dangerous programs. It is not a problem of nonproliferation policy, but a problem of hostile, dangerous regimes.

# Proliferation Answers

## (--) Prolif impacts are exaggerated and the NPT doesn’t solve prolif – prolif decisions are determined by the personality of state leaders – massive downsides to proliferation limit proliferation by all but a few leadersJacques Hymans 06 (The psychology of nuclear proliferation, accessed via google books, p. 1-2)

This book is an analysis of why some—but only some—political leaders decide to endow their states with nuclear weapons. It finds that decisions to go or not to go nuclear result **not from the international structure**, but **rather from individual hearts**. Simply put, some political leaders hold a conception of their nation’s identity that leads them to desire the bomb; and such leaders can be expected to turn that desire into state policy. The book’s focus on individual leaders is unusual in the social-scientific literature on proliferation and non-proliferation. Indeed, most authors on the subject hardly even bother to ask the question of how leaders come to desire nuclear weapons. Instead, they simply adopt a tragic sensibility, viewing nuclear weapons as a symptom of a fallen humanity’s raw quest for power. More than a few even explicity and unironically refer to nuclear weapons as “temptations,” to those who succumb to those temptations as “nuclear sinners,” and to the goal of non-proliferation efforts as the construction of an inevitably fragile “nuclear taboo.” This book takes a different tack. It starts its analysis by pointing out the basic fact of the history of nuclear proliferation: the large and fast-growing number of nuclear-weapons **capable** states, **contrasted with** the small and slow-growing number of **actual** nuclear weapons states. This combination of **widespread capability with widespread restraint**, which has persisted despite **numerous shocks**, is baffling until one sheds the tragic sensibility. To do so need not mean adopting a blithe, sunny optimism about humankind. Rather, it means seeing political leaders for what they are—flesh-and-blood human beings—and the question of acquiring nuclear weapons for what it is—a revolutionary decision. Facing the unknown and unknowable nuclear future, burdened with the responsibility of protecting their nations from destruction, leaders can hardly do otherwise than look deep inside themselves for guidance. The answers they find via that process of introspection vary widely, but they can be systematically summarized and rigorously explained. The leaders who have chosen to thrust their nations into the nuclear club include the democratic and the dictatorial, the religious and the secular, the rough and the refined, the Western and the Eastern, the Northern and the Southern. Very little unites them. Yet on the basis of case studies of leaders from France, Australia, Argentina, and India, this book does find something that sets those few leaders with definite nuclear weapons ambitions apart from the many who do not harbor such ambitions. What sets those few leaders apart is a deeply held conception of their nation’s identity that I call “oppositional nationalist.” Oppositional nationalists see their nation as both naturally at odds with an external enemy, and as naturally its equal if not its superior. Such a conception tends to generate the emotions of fear and pride—an explosive psychological cocktail. Driven by fear and pride, oppositional nationalists develop a desire for nuclear weapons that goes beyond calculation, to self-expression. Thus, in spite of the tremendous complexity of the nuclear choice, leaders who decide for the bomb tend not to back into it. For them, **unlike the bulk of their peers**, the choice of nuclear weapons is neither a close call nor a possible last resort but an absolute necessity.

# Proliferation Answers: No Snowball

## Prolif doesn’t snowball—their argument is empirically denied and oversimplifies motives to get the bomb.

William C. **Potter, 2008** (International Security, Summer, Professor of Nonproliferation Studies @ Monterey Institute, EBSCO)

Hymans is keenly aware of the **deficiency of past proliferation projections**, which he attributes in large part to the “tendency to use the growth of nuclear capabilities, stances toward the non-proliferation regime, and a general ‘roguishness’ of the state as proxies for nuclear weapons intentions” (p. 217). Such intentions, he believes, cannot be discerned without reference to leadership national identity conceptions, a focus that appears to have been absent to date in intelligence analyses devoted to forecasting proliferation.49 Hymans is equally critical of the popular notion that “the ‘domino theory’ of the twenty-first century may well be nuclear.”50 As he points out, the new domino theory, like its discredited Cold War predecessor, **assumes an oversimplified view about why and how decisions to acquire nuclear weapons are taken**.51 Leaders’ nuclear preferences, he maintains, “are not highly contingent on what other states decide,” and, therefore, “proliferation tomorrow will probably remain as rare as proliferation today, with **no single instance of proliferation causing a cascade of nuclear weapons states**” (p. 225). In addition, he argues, the domino thesis embraces “an exceedingly dark picture of world trends by lumping the truly dangerous leaders together with the merely self-assertive ones,” and equating interest in nuclear technology with weapons intent (pp. 208–209). Dire proliferation forecasts, both past and present, Hymans believes, flow from four myths regarding nuclear decisonmaking: (1) states want the bomb as a deterrent; (2) states seek the bomb as a “ticket to international status”; (3) states go for the bomb because of the interests of domestic groups; and (4) the international regime protects the world from a flood of new nuclear weapons states (pp. 208–216). Each of these assumptions is faulty, Hymans contends, because of its fundamental neglect of the decisive role played by individual leaders in nuclear matters.

# Proliferation Answers: No Snowball Extensions

##  *(--) Extend our Potter evidence that prolif doesn’t snowball…*

## *A) Past proliferation projections are wrong…Potter compares them to the domino theories of the Cold War*

## *B) Their view is an oversimplified version about why leaders develop the bomb—the truth is that despite advances in the capability to develop nukes—very few nations have taken the gambit to weaponize*

## *(--) And…No prolif snowball—past predictions of rampant proliferation are empirically denied:*

Jacques **Hymans 06** (The psychology of nuclear proliferation, accessed via google books, p. 2-3)

A sense of tragic foreboding hangs over debates about international security today. Contemporary academic, policy and popular writings now routinely warn of a coming “second nuclear age,” as developing states and non-state actors obtain previously out of reach technologies and developed states begin stirring from a long, idealistic slumber. In response to this apparently gathering storm, “non-proliferation” advocates in the United States and elsewhere argue for tightened international systems of nuclear inspections and monitoring, “counter-proliferation” advocates who promote preventive wars and great defensive shields, and “abolitionists” point to America’s own fearsome arsenal as well as those of the other nuclear weapons states as the root cause of the worldwide danger. It is important to have this debate. But, amid the consternation, few have paused to consider whether the much-feared flood of nuclear weapons states **may in fact be little more than a mirage**. For **this is not the first time** we have faced widespread projections of a coming “second nuclear age.” The 1960s era US government and other estimates foresaw between **fifteen and twenty-five nuclear weapons states** by the end of the 1970s; 1970s era estimates foresaw as many as thirty-five nuclear weapons states by the end of the 1980s’ the early 1990s betting was that at least Germany and Japan and possibly more states would soon join the nuclear weapons “club.” Such forecasts—even supposedly optimistic ones—**have proved too pessimistic.** In spite of the **breathless reporting** about new uranium enrichment or fuel reprocessing capacities, it must be emphasized that the basic pattern in the history of nuclear proliferation to this point is the **small number of nuclear weapons states**, as compared to the large number of states **capable of building** those weapons. The expansion of nuclear technological capacities that previous generations feared has indeed occurred, but the expected realization of their military potential has not followed. Today, although nuclear technology is decidedly old technology and ex-Soviet scientists and fissile material have been on the market for over a decade, to the best of our knowledge fewer than ten states actually have the bomb. These are the United States (first nuclear weapons test 1945); Russia (1949); Great Britain (1952); France (1960); China (1964); India (“peaceful nuclear explosion” 1974; first official nuclear weapons test (1998); Pakistan (1998); plus almost certainly Israel (likely test 1979), and possibly North Korea (no test yet).

# Proliferation Answers: No Crazy Leaders

## *(--) Even so called crazy leaders behave rationally in the face of nuclear destruction:*

Jonathan **Tepperman,** 8/29/20**09** (staff writer,

<http://www.newsweek.com/id/214248>)

To understand why—and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way—you need to start by recognizing that all states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side—and millions of innocents pay the price. Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button—and everybody knows it—the basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, "Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything?"

# Proliferation Answers: Prolif is Slow

##  *(--) History is entirely on our side—the controversy and expense surrounding nuclear weapons development slows the pace to glacial speeds*

Jonathan **Tepperman,** 8/29/20**09** (staff writer,

<http://www.newsweek.com/id/214248>)

The risk of an arms race—with, say, other Persian Gulf states rushing to build a bomb after Iran got one—is a bit harder to dispel. Once again, however, history is instructive. "In 64 years, the most nuclear-weapons states we've ever had is 12," says Waltz. "Now with North Korea we're at nine. That's not proliferation; **that's spread at glacial pace**." Nuclear weapons are **so controversial and expensive that only countries that deem them absolutely critical** to their survival go through the extreme trouble of acquiring them. That's why South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan voluntarily gave theirs up in the early '90s, and why other countries like Brazil and Argentina dropped nascent programs.

## *(--) Prolif will be slow: lack of incentives means leaders won’t push for nukes:*

William C. **Potter, 2008** (International Security, Summer, Professor of Nonproliferation Studies @ Monterey Institute, EBSCO)

The more extreme position of the two authors is staked out by Hymans, for whom the real proliferation puzzle is not why there are so few nuclear weapons possessors, but why there are any at all (p. 8). Hymans finds the major international relations paradigms—realism, institutionalism, and constructivism—of limited utility in explaining the slow pace of proliferation and those rare instances of its occurrence. The answer to the puzzle, he believes, has to do primarily with the lack of motivation on the part of nearly all state leaders. Put simply, he argues, nonproliferation restraint stems less from external efforts to stop states from going nuclear, and more from “the hearts of state leaders themselves” (p. 7). Contrary to conventional wisdom, he maintains, few national political figures have either the desire or certitude to go nuclear (p. 8). According to Hymans, although the nonproliferation regime may have many virtues, the appearance of its success in containing proliferation results mainly from the fact “that few state leaders have desired the things it prohibits” (ibid.).

# Proliferation Answers: Crazy Leaders Are Deterrable

## *So called crazy leaders are deterrable—they look out for their own best interests:*

Jonathan **Tepperman,** 8/29/20**09** (staff writer,

<http://www.newsweek.com/id/214248>)

Nuclear pessimists—and there are many—insist that even if this pattern has held in the past, it's crazy to rely on it in the future, for several reasons. The first is that today's nuclear wannabes are so completely unhinged, you'd be mad to trust them with a bomb. Take the sybaritic Kim Jong Il, who's never missed a chance to demonstrate his battiness, or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has denied the Holocaust and promised the destruction of Israel, and who, according to some respected Middle East scholars, runs a messianic martyrdom cult that would welcome nuclear obliteration. These regimes are the ultimate rogues, the thinking goes—and there's no deterring rogues. But are Kim and Ahmadinejad really scarier and crazier than were Stalin and Mao? It might look that way from Seoul or Tel Aviv, but history says otherwise. Khrushchev, remember, threatened to "bury" the United States, and in 1957, Mao blithely declared that a nuclear war with America wouldn't be so bad because even "if half of mankind died … the whole world would become socialist." Pyongyang and Tehran support terrorism—but so did Moscow and Beijing. And as for seeming suicidal, Michael Desch of the University of Notre Dame points out that Stalin and Mao are the real record holders here: both were responsible for the deaths of some 20 million of their own citizens. Yet when push came to shove, their regimes balked at nuclear suicide, and so would today's international bogeymen. For all of Ahmadinejad's antics, his power is limited, and the clerical regime has always proved rational and pragmatic when its life is on the line. Revolutionary Iran has never started a war, has done deals with both Washington and Jerusalem, and sued for peace in its war with Iraq (which Saddam started) once it realized it couldn't win. North Korea, meanwhile, is a tiny, impoverished, family-run country with a history of being invaded; its overwhelming preoccupation is survival, and every time it becomes more belligerent it reverses itself a few months later (witness last week, when Pyongyang told Seoul and Washington it was ready to return to the bargaining table). These countries may be brutally oppressive, but nothing in their behavior suggests they have a death wish.

# Proliferation Answers: No War – History Proves

##  *(--) 64 years of evidence is on our side: nuclear nations don’t engage in conventional wars:*

Jonathan **Tepperman,** 8/29/20**09** (staff writer,

<http://www.newsweek.com/id/214248>)

The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them. Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, **there has not been any war among nuclear states."**

# NPT: Fuel Bank/Article IV CP Shell (1/2)

## Text: The United States will create an international low enriched uranium fuel bank and reprocessing capabilities which will provide affordable nuclear fuel and waste reprocessing to to any state which promises to verifiably forgo developing an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle. The United States will also provide favorable trade agreements to participant countries who maintain full compliance. The IAEA exclusively will determine eligibility to receive fuel bank assistance. Funding and enforcement guaranteed.

## Counterplan is not topical, competes via net benefits.

## Solvency: A fuel bank conditioned on abandoning indigenous enrichment fortifies the NPT, solves and proliferation, prevents cheating and solving Iran.

Senator Evan Bayh, United States Senator, Memo to da Prez, January 15, 2009 <http://www.dlc.org/ndol_ci.cfm?kaid=450020&subid=900203&contentid=254843> nsa

We can ill afford to allow rising demand for nuclear energy to become a pretext for rogue nations seeking to acquire a nuclear military capability. Yet that is precisely what is happening right now in Iran. And if that nation succeeds in defying the international community's legitimate demands that it desist from developing nuclear capacities, other countries will follow suit. That's why I urge you, Mr. President, to put nuclear nonproliferation at the top of your energy-security agenda. I believe the threshold question is this: How do we respond to valid and growing demands for civilian nuclear energy worldwide without permitting more countries to acquire nuclear weapons? The answer, in my view, is to set up an international nuclear-fuel bank that would supply fuel to any country that agrees not to develop its own enriching and reprocessing facilities. The fuel bank works like this: Developing nations seeking civilian nuclear power for peaceful purposes are given access to a reliable and affordable supply of nuclear fuel. In return, they must agree to forgo enriching uranium themselves. They must also submit to rigorous inspections of their civilian reactors to guard against North Korean and Iranian-style cheating. This approach makes both economic and national-security sense. We have learned a lot about the economics of nuclear power since the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (often referred to as the Nonproliferation Treaty, or NPT) was negotiated more than three decades ago. For starters, there is an enormous surplus of uranium in existing enrichment facilities worldwide. Due to bigger economies of scale, it is now much cheaper for countries lacking enrichment capacity to purchase fuel from a central repository than to mine, enrich, and reprocess it themselves. Even a small enrichment facility would cost at least $1 billion to build and more than $100 million to operate each year. But an international nuclear fuel bank could supply the same amount of fuel at market prices for roughly $15 million a year.1 An international nuclear-fuel bank would thus provide affordable fuel to countries genuinely interested in pursuing civilian nuclear power. It would allow countries to draw fuel for use in their own civilian nuclear reactors and then return the spent fuel for safe reprocessing under the oversight of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). By removing incentives for developing countries to create their own fissile materials, we would reduce the prospect of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of the world's most dangerous regimes. Such a bank would help to close what many regard as a dangerous loophole in the NPT. The treaty has been widely interpreted to allow non-nuclear weapons states to develop uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities if their use is intended exclusively for civilian nuclear energy. The problem, according to leading defense experts Ashton Carter and Stephen LaMontagne, is that "enrichment and reprocessing facilities allow states to cross into a proliferation 'red zone,' putting them dangerously close to a nuclear weapons capacity."2 The loophole in question lies in the NPT's Article IV, which recognizes the "inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes." Iran claims to be exercising this "inalienable right" today as it enriches uranium for what it says are strictly civilian uses. We should not forget, however, that North Korea used precisely the same tactic to realize its nuclear ambitions, and we are perilously close to seeing history repeat itself -- this time with an oil-rich nation that is deeply hostile to the United States and actively supporting international terrorist groups. Once this genie gets out of the bottle, there is no putting it back. At a minimum, allowing Iran to obtain a nuclear warhead would be a regionally destabilizing event certain to spark a Middle East arms race. At worst, it would be a global security catastrophe in which Tehran obtains the means to blackmail its European neighbors and threaten Israel's destruction. As Carter and LaMontagne point out, the NPT is clear that the right it confers to peaceful atomic power can only be exercised in conformity with the nonproliferation obligations that Iran and other nuclear aspirants assumed when they signed it. They add: "The solution to the red zone problem is to provide states with a multinational alternative to an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle. This will involve creating a multinational supply regime to provide enrichment and spent fuel removal services to states that abstain from domestic enrichment and reprocessing, submit to strict safeguards (such as those stipulated in the IAEA Additional Protocol), and reaffirm their intention not to purse nuclear weapons."3 Last year, I co-authored legislation with Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) that would create exactly this kind of "multinational supply regime." Recently, several provisions of that legislation were signed into law. The centerpiece of our approach was the first major federal investment in the creation of an international civilian nuclear-fuel bank. The establishment of a fuel bank would cut short the debate over nuclear-technology development rights. Every nation would have access to civilian nuclear power so long as they are willing to abide by conditions that protect global security. Countries that refuse fuel-bank services would come under immediate suspicion about their weapons intentions. Iran contends that it is pursuing a civilian nuclear program to reduce domestic oil consumption and sell its excess oil on the global market. If this claim is true, then surely Iran would leap at the opportunity for a more affordable supply of nuclear fuel. After all, fuel-bank services would provide it with a faster and cheaper path toward achieving its stated objective of a purely civilian nuclear program. Of course, if Tehran's pursuit of civilian nuclear power is a disingenuous ruse, as I strongly suspect, then its true ambitions will be revealed. This evidence will make it easier to rally world opinion for more aggressive international action against Iran before it's too late.

# NPT: Fuel Bank/Article IV CP Shell (2/2)

## Article IV is key to the NPT- its strength is central to incentivizing compliance with all other NPT provisions.

LEWIS A. **DUNN**, Arms Control Consultant, a senior vice president of Science Applications International Corp., Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, July **2009** <http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr_16-2_dunn.pdf> nsa

In light of the current controversies over Article IV\*and concern about an ‘‘Article IV

loophole’’ under which countries can pursue nuclear weapons while claiming only to be

exercising their Article IV right to peaceful uses\*it is important to look back at the origins

of the ‘‘inalienable right’’ obligation. **The negotiating record shows that Article IV was one**

**of the essential underlying bargains of the NPT,** and, as stated by one U.S. negotiator, ‘‘In

the course of the negotiations, a number of countries expressed the strong view that

neither their renunciation of nuclear weapons nor the concomitant safeguards should

prejudice their opportunity to share in the peaceful atom.’’ Two sets of countries pressed hard

on the peaceful uses issue: on the one hand, developed countries that needed to be

reassured that the NPT would in no way prejudice their future access or use of nuclear

energy (including countries in Europe as well as Japan, all of whose adherence was **critical**

**to the success of the NPT**); and on the other hand, developing countries (thereby resulting

in the specific reference in Article IV to ‘‘due consideration for the needs of the developing

countries’’). **With today’s growing interest in nuclear energy, the importance of Article IV,**

**in sustaining support for and legitimizing the NPT, is likely to increase.**

Finally, Iranian proliferation leads to multiple scenarios of terrorism and nuclear war
Kurtz 2006 (Stanley. National Review, “Our Fallout-Shelter Future.” Aug. 28)
**Rosen assumes** (rightly I believe) that proliferation is unlikely to stop with Iran. Once Iran gets the bomb, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are likely to develop their own nuclear weapons, for self-protection, and so as not to allow Iran to take de facto cultural-political control of the Muslim world. (I think you've got to at least add Egypt to this list.) With three, four, or more nuclear states in the Muslim Middle East, **what becomes of deterrence**? A key to deterrence during the Cold War was our ability to know who had hit whom. With a small number of geographically separated nuclear states, and with the big opponents training satellites and specialized advance-guard radar emplacements on each other, it was relatively easy to know where a missile had come from. But what if a nuclear missile is launched at the United States from somewhere in a fully nuclearized Middle East, in the middle of a war in which, say, Saudi Arabia and Iran are already lobbing conventional missiles at one another? Would we know who had attacked us? Could we actually drop a retaliatory nuclear bomb on someone without being absolutely certain? And as Rosen asks, What if the nuclear blow was delivered against us by an airplane or a cruise missile? It might be almost impossible to trace the attack back to its source with certainty, especially in the midst of an ongoing conventional conflict. More Terror We're familiar with the horror scenario of a Muslim state passing a nuclear bomb to terrorists for use against an American city. But imagine the same scenario in a multi-polar Muslim nuclear world. With several Muslim countries in possession of the bomb, it would be extremely difficult to trace the state source of a nuclear terror strike. In fact, this very difficulty would encourage states (or ill-controlled elements within nuclear states -- like Pakistan's intelligence services or Iran's Revolutionary Guards) to pass nukes to terrorists. The tougher it is to trace the source of a weapon, the easier it is to give the weapon away. In short, nuclear proliferation to multiple Muslim states greatly increases the chances of a nuclear terror strike. Right now, the Indians and Pakistanis "enjoy" an apparently stable nuclear stand-off. Both countries have established basic deterrence, channels of communication, and have also eschewed a potentially destabilizing nuclear arms race. Attacks by Kashmiri militants in 2001 may have pushed India and Pakistan close to the nuclear brink. Yet since then, precisely because of the danger, the two countries seem to have established a clear, deterrence-based understanding. The 2001 crisis gives fuel to proliferation pessimists, while the current stability encourages proliferation optimists. Rosen points out, however, that a multi-polar nuclear Middle East is unlikely to follow the South Asian model. Deep mutual suspicion between an expansionist, apocalyptic, Shiite Iran, secular Turkey, and the Sunni Saudis and Egyptians (not to mention Israel) is likely to fuel a dangerous multi-pronged nuclear arms race. Larger arsenals mean more chance of a weapon being slipped to terrorists. The collapse of the world's non-proliferation regime also raises the chances that nuclearization will spread to Asian powers like Taiwan and Japan. And of course, possession of nuclear weapons is likely to embolden Iran, especially in the transitional period before the Saudis develop weapons of their own. Like Saddam, Iran may be tempted to take control of Kuwait's oil wealth, on the assumption that the United States will not dare risk a **nuclear confrontation** by escalating the conflict. If the proliferation optimists are right, then once the Saudis get nukes, Iran would be far less likely to make a move on nearby Kuwait. On the other hand, to the extent that we do see conventional war in a nuclearized Middle East, the losers will be sorely tempted to cancel out their defeat with a nuclear strike. There may have been nuclear peace during the Cold War, but there were also many "hot" proxy wars. If conventional wars break out in a nuclearized Middle East, it may be very difficult to stop them from escalating into **nuclear confrontations.**

# Fuel Bank CP: Fuel Bank Solves Prolif

## A fuel bank solves: rebalances the NPT non proliferation bargain.

LAWRENCE **SCHEINMAN**, of the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies, June 7, **2004** <http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No5.pdf> nsa

Perhaps **the lesson to draw from this is that going down the path of denial without adequate incentives is a path not to be taken.** It also puts the emphasis on incentives that would attract others to a particular course of action. In terms of multinationalization of certain fuel cycle activities it is arguable that an arrangement that embraced all states, not just a class of states, would have a better chance of success- i.e. an approach that involved the existing technology holders for uranium enrichment and that brought them under the same regime as others. This could be done by offering inward investment in existing facilities to states that would (a) provide them with priority assurance of supply of low enriched uranium on a timely basis and at competitive market prices; and (b) give them a formal legal relationship to the enterprise involving membership on the entity board of directors with voting rights on such matters as general policy, pricing, investment strategy, and a right to share in corporate profits. In exchange, and to support nonproliferation objectives, states that entered into such arrangements would formally and verifiably foreswear developing enrichment on a national basis whether by the technology involved in the multinational enterprise or any other technology. In so far as the enterprise itself was concerned, investing states would limit their role to oversight, general policy, and management, but not be involved in operations or have access to the technology being used. On the other hand, the technology holder would be placing itself under a legal arrangement that brought a multinational dimension to its activities with formal responsibilities to its partners and a sharing of management and decision-making.

De facto approaches to the problem could focus on assurance of nuclear supply. That could be achieved in a variety of ways ranging from measures to reinforce the existing global enrichment market to the establishment of consortia of nuclear fuel suppliers now predominating the international market that would provide concurrent assurances on the consistency of supply on a timely basis for states foreswearing national enrichment and reprocessing, to the instituting of a nuclear fuel bank or banks. These could include establishing an IAEA bank of low enriched uranium (along lines envisioned in President Eisenhower’s Atoms-for-Peace proposal) to be available whenever the market could not effectively respond on a timely basis to a fuel requirement and/or a regional or even national bank that would function as does the strategic petroleum reserve.

## A fuel bank solves prolif.

Frank **Barnaby**, writer for Scitizen, 26 May, **2009** <http://scitizen.com/stories/future-energies/2009/05/The-Birth-of-an-International-Nuclear-Fuel-Bank/> nsa

The idea of a nuclear fuel bank under international safeguards is not new; it has been mooted on and off for more than thirty years. A nuclear fuel bank administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would, it is argued, assure a back-up supply of fuel for nuclear-power reactors on a non-discriminatory, non-political basis, thereby reducing the need for countries to develop their own uranium-enrichment and plutonium-reprocessing technologies (2). Uranium-enrichment and plutonium-reprocessing are the two most sensitive technologies insofar as nuclear-weapon proliferation is concerned.  The IAEA has been recommending for some time that a nuclear fuel bank should be set up in a way that would not disrupt the existing commercial market in nuclear fuels (3). IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei explains, "I want to make sure that every country that is a *bona fide* user of nuclear energy, and that is fulfilling its non-proliferation obligations, is getting fuel. It is not asking any State to give up its rights under the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty). The importance of this step is that, by providing reliable access to fuel at competitive market prices, we remove the need for countries to develop indigenous fuel cycle capabilities. In so doing, we could go a long way towards addressing current concerns about the dissemination of sensitive fuel cycle technologies” (4). The two most sensitive technologies, insofar as nuclear-weapon proliferation is concerned, are uranium-enrichment and plutonium-reprocessing.

# Fuel Bank CP: Solvency – NPT

## A fuel bank is critical so strengthen the NPT by reaffirming Article IV commitments at a key time.

Susan F. **Burk**, Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation

Geneva Center for Security Policy, Geneva, Switzerland, August 12, **2009** <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/127886.htm> nsa

The third pillar of the NPT calls for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. For many years, nations have harnessed peaceful uses of the atom in energy generation, agriculture, medicine, mining and manufacturing. Nuclear science is vitally important to the social and economic development of many countries. **Strengthening this pillar of the Treaty is more important than ever,** especially when one considers the renewed interest in nuclear power as a response to climate change, energy security, and the promotion of sustainable development. President Obama has called for a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation, including the creation and use of an international fuel bank, so that countries seeking nuclear power can access it more easily and cost effectively without the need to develop their own fuel production capabilities. The goal is not to deny countries access to fuel cycle technologies, but rather to encourage nuclear energy’s growth and provide affordable access to nuclear energy without increasing global proliferation risks.

## Article IV is the foundation of the NPT and is critical to the future of global nonproliferation.

**FARS News Agency**, Sept 25, **2009** <http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8802230999> nsa
"Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by associating my delegation with the statement already delivered by the distinguished representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement under this cluster. "To establish a balance between security concerns and the socio-economic requirements for development, especially for developing countries, Article IV of the Treaty guarantees "the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty" and provides for an undertaking by all parties to the Treaty "to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy". "This Article also **plays a crucial role** as the main incentive set forth to encourage non-nuclear-weapon States to join the Treaty and thereby foster the non-proliferation regime. "**This main pillar of the NPT has been underscored** in light of the increasing need of the world to nuclear energy in the third millennium. We have recently witnessed this promising trend in our region. We welcome the new initiatives of our brotherly neighbors to move toward the peaceful
application of nuclear energy. This trend confirms once again the long-standing position of Iran concerning the need for diversifying the energy resources in order to guarantee our future requirements. "The inalienable right of all States parties to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without discrimination indeed **constitutes the very foundation of the Treaty**. This inalienable right in itself emanates from two broader propositions. First, scientific and technological achievements are the common heritage of humanity. The second general proposition is the requisite balance between rights and obligations, which is the basis of any sound legal instrument. **This balance guarantees the longevity of the legal regime by providing incentives for membership.**

# Fuel Bank CP: A2 – Developing Countries (Iran) Won’t Participate

## Extend the Bayh evidence, the fuel bank will provide fuel for literally one percent of the cost of developing domestic tech. This incentive will generate participation.

## Extend the Bayh evidence – non participant countries will be unmasked as proliferators making international pressure easy to rally. Solves non participants.

## Counterplan provides for additional trade incentives, these solve, for Iran and other hold outs.

Mary Beth **Nikitin**, Coordinator Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Sept. 3 **2008** <http://www.nti.org/c_press/CRS_nuclear%20_fuel_cycle090308.pdf> nsa

Another factor that will shape the success of these proposals is the possible

addition of other incentives. Simply making nuclear energy cost-effective may not

induce countries to forgo indigenous enrichment and reprocessing. Such decisions

may require other incentives, perhaps even outside the nuclear realm, to make them

palatable. The experience of Iran may be instructive here. Russia’s offer to provide

assured enrichment services on Russian soil has gone nowhere; instead, other,

broader trade incentives may be necessary. While the case of Iran may illustrate the

extreme end of the spectrum, in terms of a country determined to develop a capability

for a weapons program, non-nuclear weapon states will clearly take notice of how a

solution develops for Iran.

## Failure to participate would make mounting global pressure easy, expose holdouts true proliferation intentions.

Bryan **Bender**, Boston Globe, June 8, **2009** <http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2009/06/08/with_eye_on_iran_obama_seeks_creation_of_world_uranium_fuel_bank/?page=2> nsa

Indeed, many specialists predict Iran will still insist on enriching uranium even with an international supply available for its nuclear reactors. But such a decision by Tehran would be new evidence that it has military uses in mind for its nuclear program and help build more international pressure to punish it.Iran's refusal to take advantage of the fuel bank "may give the US and other countries a stronger argument that Iran's program is really designed to give them a nuclear weapon potential," Kimball said.

# Fuel Bank CP: A2 NTI/Buffet/IAEA/ SQ Fuel Banks

## Status quo fuel bank doesn’t require foregoing indigenous enrichment.

Jonathan **Tirone**, March 5, **2009** <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aWS7hCi1PN3Y&refer=home> nsa

To access the money for the proposed fuel bank, countries won’t be required by the NTI to put aside their own uranium- enrichment programs, as originally envisioned, said Charles Curtis, an NTI co-chairman. An announcement by Kuwait that the desert kingdom will also contribute money to the project shows that the plan is gaining support, NTI spokeswoman Cathy Gwin said today by e-mail.

## Extend the Bayh evidence, abandoning domestic enrichment is key to solvency, prevents Iran and Korea style cheating.

## Status quo fuel bank is stalled by intractable IAEA politics, developing countries don’t like it.

Sylvia **Westall**, Reuters, June 18, **2009** <http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE55H58L20090618> nsa

A uranium fuel supply plan hailed by U.S. President Barack Obama as a way to stem the spread of nuclear arms stalled in talks at the U.N. atomic watchdog on Thursday after resistance from developing nations. The International Atomic Energy Agency and industrialized nations argue that a multilateral uranium-enrichment center would best meet growing global nuclear energy demand while dissuading nations from building proliferation-prone enrichment plants themselves.

## The counterplan doesn’t require IAEA approval, the US sets it up and just delegates eligibility decisions to the IAEA, but the US runs it.

## Status quo fuel bank doesn’t provide for additional trade incentives, developing nations will refuse participation in the SQ but the CP solves.

Mary Beth **Nikitin**, Coordinator Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Sept. 3 **2008** <http://www.nti.org/c_press/CRS_nuclear%20_fuel_cycle090308.pdf> nsa

Another factor that will shape the success of these proposals is the possible

addition of other incentives. Simply making nuclear energy cost-effective may not

induce countries to forgo indigenous enrichment and reprocessing. Such decisions

may require other incentives, perhaps even outside the nuclear realm, to make them

palatable. The experience of Iran may be instructive here. Russia’s offer to provide

assured enrichment services on Russian soil has gone nowhere; instead, other,

broader trade incentives may be necessary. While the case of Iran may illustrate the

extreme end of the spectrum, in terms of a country determined to develop a capability

for a weapons program, non-nuclear weapon states will clearly take notice of how a

solution develops for Iran.

# Fuel Bank CP: A2 – GNEP Solves

## GNEP doesn’t condition assistance on not developing indigenous fuel cycles and has had its funding slashed, not a fuel bank anymore.

Fiona **Simpson**, Arms Control Association, September **2008** http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008\_09/Simpson

However, GNEP has encountered difficulties internationally and domestically. Internationally, the United States shelved initial plans to require countries that joined the partnership to forswear enrichment and reprocessing. Instead, the United States has chosen to rely on a set of other bilateral incentives, such as help with financing, infrastructure, and workforce issues, as levers to convince countries to sign a bilateral memorandum of understanding (MOU) pledging to rely on the global nuclear fuel market instead of developing sensitive technology. For example, during the first half of 2008, three of the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) signed MOUs with the United States. A draft MOU between the United States and Qatar, presumably with a similar undertaking on the part of Qatar, is currently under consideration. Although U.S. officials express hope that other suppliers, such as France, will follow their lead, Paris has made no explicit commitment to do so. Domestically, since the Democrats gained control of Congress in 2007, the program has seen its funding cut on Capitol Hill and its effort limited to research. At the end of June, the House Appropriations Committee expressed its skepticism of GNEP in a very visible fashion, by "zeroing out" international fiscal year 2009 funding for the program and sharply curtailing funding for domestic research. In its report, the panel stated that the "initiative to reprocess spent nuclear fuel...undermines our Nation's nuclear non-proliferation policy."[[19](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_09/Simpson#19)] With the Bush administration only months away from leaving office and the future of GNEP under a new administration by no means assured, GNEP is, as one recent article has observed, in "limbo."[[20](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_09/Simpson#20)]

## Extend the Bahy evidence, a fuel bank is key and it must condition on refusing a domestic fuel cycle to avoid Iran and Korea style cheating and prolif.

# Fuel Bank CP: A2- Uranium Price DA’s

## Fuel bank will not supply enough to drop the bottom out of Uranium prices.

Bryan **Bender**, Boston Globe, June 8, **2009** <http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2009/06/08/with_eye_on_iran_obama_seeks_creation_of_world_uranium_fuel_bank/?page=2> nsa

"Some in the industry are concerned that the material in the fuel bank may take away clients from them or the material could be dumped on the market [and] temporarily depress prices," said a European diplomat directly involved in the IAEA deliberations who was not authorized by his government to speak publicly. Proponents, however, insist that at any given time the international supplies would be quite small and would have **no measurable impact on the market.** For example, the Russian proposal calls for a supply of 120 tons of low-enriched uranium, according to IAEA documents obtained by the Globe, while the IAEA plan calls for between 60 tons and 80 tons - amounting to about a three-year supply for a 1,000-megawatt light water reactor, the most common type around the world, which produces enough electricity for about 1 million homes.

## Uranium prices low now and will fall in the future.

Anna **Stablum** **and** Edmond **Lococo,** Sept 10 **2009** http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601081&sid=aAI7WnbY4HHw

The uranium market will have a surplus next year for the first time in at least three years as producers increase output faster than demand rises for the nuclear fuel, the London-based World Nuclear Association said in a report today. Secondary sources such as stockpiles will supply 18,711 metric tons in 2010 compared with 17,620 tons this year, the report showed.

“The Department of Energy has from time to time used uranium barter arrangements to fund cleanup work,” Jen Stutsman, a department spokeswoman, said today in an e-mail. “In order to avoid undue market disruption, DOE intends to stay within the 10 percent limit on domestic uranium sales or exchanges as laid out in the Department’s Uranium Management Plan.”

The sale or transfer of U.S. stockpiles to USEC Inc., the biggest domestic supplier of enriched uranium, may add 10 percent to U.S. fuel supplies in 2009 and next year, Max Layton, an analyst at Macquarie Bank Group Ltd. in London, said in an Aug. 10 report. The Department of Energy in July denied a loan guarantee to complete construction of the American Centrifuge plant in Ohio.

Sales Options “The DOE has been talking about selling uranium and using it as payment for decommission services,” Beyer said, adding one possible plan would be to sell a fixed dollar amount of uranium every quarter. “It would be much better if the DOE appointed a marketing manager who could sell the material on a long-term basis.” **Uranium prices will fall 25 percent this year** to an average of $48 a pound and slide as low as $40 by December, Layton said yesterday. The metal for immediate delivery was at $45 a pound as of Sept. 7, according to Roswell, Georgia-based Ux Consulting Co. Uranium rose to a record $136 in July 2007.

## Uranium prices falling.

Tirivangani **Masawi**, Informante, Thursday, 10 September **2009** http://www.informante.web.na/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=4819&Itemid=101

THE SLUMP in global uranium prices caused by the economic recession and variable market sentiments is negatively affecting local producers.Rössing Uranium Mine Corporate Communications Manager, Jerome Mutumba, said uranium prices fell from US$64 per pound in September 2008 to US$47.
“A drop in the price of uranium globally will translate into reduced profit margins for local producers as the simple equation on global uranium prices is the higher the price the better for us when it is coupled with a favourable exchange rate,” said Mutumba.

# Aff: Article IV CP: Permutation Solves Best

## \*Perm is key to solvency: Failure to make good faith progress on article 6 results in the diversion of article 4 tech, causing prolif.\*

LEWIS A. **DUNN**, Arms Control Consultant, a senior vice president of Science Applications International Corp., Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, July **2009** http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr\_16-2\_dunn.pdf

nsa

But the difficulty selling the view that Article IV has to be seen in the overall NPT context is also

tied to the unwillingness of many developing countries to adopt a stricter construction of

Article IV **when they believe that the NWS have not been prepared to do so for the nuclear**

**disarmament obligations of Article VI.**

Article IV Net Assessment. The ‘‘inalienable right,’’ ‘‘fullest possible exchange,’’ and

‘‘cooperate in contributing’’ provisions of Article IV all were necessary conditions for

successful negotiation of the NPT. There has been, however, a continuing nonproliferation

price for Article IV. The Article IV inalienable right has been, is being, and is likely to be

used again as a cover for pursuing nuclear weapons.

Steps to Strengthen Article IV via the 2010 NPT RevCon. Perhaps the most important

step to strengthen Article IV would be to create a consensus that the article’s rights are

conditional on good-faith NPT adherence. That consensus might be pursued via the next

UN Security Council resolution on Iran; it also could be pursued at the 2010 NPT Review

Conference. Put simply: Article IV’s inalienable right can be alienated by bad-faith actions.

The readiness of the non-nuclear weapon states to support that interpretation of Article IV,

as suggested above, **will be tied to the readiness of the NWS to make greater progress on**

**the Article VI nuclear disarmament goals.**

# Aff: Fuel Bank CP – Uranium Prices DA (needs an impact)

## Uniqueness: Slow in surplus soviet uranium pushing prices higher now.

Jay **Lehr**, In: Environment & Climate News, October **2009**, 10/01/2009 http://www.heartland.org/publications/environment%20climate/article/25969/A\_History\_of\_Americas\_Nuclear\_Power\_Experience\_Part\_Three.html

If ever the world has beaten swords into plowshares, this is it, writes Tucker. Actually, recycled Soviet weaponry depressed the uranium market for years, and uranium from Soviet weapons will probably run out in the next decade. Anticipation of this shortfall, plus an anticipated nuclear revival, has raised uranium prices from $10 a pound in 2004 to $80 a pound in 2008.

## Link: fuel bank depresses uranium prices.

Bryan **Bender**, Boston Globe Staff / June 8, **2009** http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2009/06/08/with\_eye\_on\_iran\_obama\_seeks\_creation\_of\_world\_uranium\_fuel\_bank/?page=2

For example, some sectors of the nuclear power industry fear losing customers or profits if there is a new international provider of uranium. There are four main providers that sell nuclear energy fuel, one in Russia, one in the United States, one in France, and a German-British-Dutch consortium. But they can sell only to countries approved by their governments. "Some in the industry are concerned that the material in the fuel bank may take away clients from them or the material could be dumped on the market [and] temporarily depress prices," said a European diplomat directly involved in the IAEA deliberations who was not authorized by his government to speak publicly.

# Aff: Article IV CP: Fuel Bank Won’t Solve

## No solvency: fuel banks can’t solve countries like Iran that proliferate for national security reasons.

Seamus **Kraft**, *Global Security Newswire*, August **2007** <http://nuclearthreatinitiative.org/d_newswire/issues/2007/8/3/bf8fec00-c8da-425d-afe3-643cd3d62bde.html> nsa

Nonproliferation consultant Fred McGoldrick cautioned the Senate panel not to lean too hard on a potential international program that would provide nuclear fuel to countries for energy purposes, thereby keeping them from developing technology that could be used to produce nuclear weapons “An international fuel bank is not going to be a magic bullet,” McGoldrick said.  A bank is “highly unlikely to have a direct impact on a country like Iran, [which] is determined to acquire such [nuclear fuel processing] facilities for national security reasons,” he added.

## Fuel bank fails: countries will think its discriminatory and insist on developing indigenous fuel cycles.

Frank **Barnaby**, writer for Scitizen, 26 May, **2009** <http://scitizen.com/stories/future-energies/2009/05/The-Birth-of-an-International-Nuclear-Fuel-Bank/> nsa

Any proposal to reduce the threats associated with the increase in the use of nuclear power is inevitably likely to have serious drawbacks. It is likely to be regarded by many non-nuclear-weapon countries to be discriminatory and, therefore, unacceptable. Some countries, such as Iran, insist that they want to acquire and operate all the elements of the nuclear fuel cycle themselves, as they have, under the NPT, the legal right to do.

# Turkey Advantage Answers

## *US-Turkish relations high now:*

**THE ANATOLIA NEWS AGENCY, 1/9/2010** (<http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-197923-100-turkey-seeking-major-role-in-europe-davutoglu-says.html>)

Responding to a question on relations with the United States, Davutoglu said Ankara and the Obama administration had minimized points of disagreements over the previous US leadership under George W. Bush, adding that the US support for Turkey in the latter's fight against terrorism had grown stronger.

## *(--) Any irritants in US-Turkish relations will be quickly overlooked:*

**China View, 12/31/2009** (<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009->

12/31/content\_12736236.htm)

On Washington's relations with Turkey, Turan said the country must be assessed separately from the Middle East and also from the whole Muslim world. "Having its economic and trade interests in its mind, Turkey is trying to develop deeper relations with its neighbors. So sometimes Turkey's decisions will irritate Washington. **But Washington has recently learnt how to deal with it."**

## *(--) Any problems with Turkey aren’t caused by tactical nuclear weapons—other issues trump:*

Alexandra Bell and Benjamin Loehrke, 11/23/2009 (<http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey>)

But NATO's post-Cold War struggles with cohesion are a result of far more than disagreement over tactical nuclear deployments. NATO has given Turkey plenty of reasons to doubt its members' commitment to Ankara on several recent occasions. For example, before both Iraq wars, some NATO members hesitated to provide Turkey with air defenses or to assist it with displaced persons who had fled into its territory. Moreover, Turkey, which values NATO as a direct connection to Washington, witnessed the United States completely ignore its vehement opposition to the most recent Iraq War. Additionally, Ankara is dismayed by the reluctance of some of its NATO allies to label the Kurdistan Workers' Party, which has caused violent chaos along the Turkish border, as a terrorist organization.

# Turkey Advantage Answers

## *US-Turkish relations strong now: regional energy supplies, regional diplomatic conflict cooperation and Afghanistan cooperation:*

Alexandra **Bell and** Benjamin **Loehrke,** 11/23/20**09** (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 23 November 2009, <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey>)

The U.S.-Turkish relationship cooled when Turkey refused to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom, after which Turkish support for U.S. policy declined through the end of the George W. Bush administration. Obama's election has helped to mend fences, and his visit to Turkey in April was warmly received. In fact, all of the administration's positive interactions with Turkey have been beneficial: Washington has supported Turkey's role as a regional energy supplier and encouraged Ankara as it undertakes difficult political reforms and works to resolve regional diplomatic conflicts. For its part, Turkey recently doubled its troop contribution to NATO's Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan--a boon to U.S. efforts there.

# Turkish Prolif Counterplan

## *Counterplan: Incorporate Turkey into European missile defense plans—solves relations and Turkish prolif:*

Alexandra **Bell and** Benjamin **Loehrke,** 11/23/20**09** (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 23 November 2009, <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey>)

By incorporating Ankara into its new European missile defense plans--intended to protect Turkey and other countries vulnerable to Iran's short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles--Washington could further shore up its military relationship with Turkey. Ship-based Aegis missile systems will be the backbone of the strategy, with considerations left open for later deployments of mobile ground-based interceptors in Eastern Europe or Turkey. This cooperation could provide the bond with Washington and **perception of security that Turkey seeks in the face of a potential Iranian bomb.**

# Terrorism Answers

## No historical examples of terrorist acquisition of nukes- Russian forces are secure

**Woolf ’09** [Amy, Jan. 28, specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy, Congressional Research Service, “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons” <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf>]

**There is no public evidence from western sources about any episodes of lost, sold, or stolen Russian nuclear weapons**, but concerns remain that these weapons might find their way to officials in rogue nations or non-state actors. For example, during comments made after a speech in October 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert **Gates stated that he was worried that the Russians did not know the numbers or locations of “old land mines, nuclear artillery shells, and so on”** that might be of interest to rogue states or terrorists.57 **Russia officials noted, in response to this comment, that its stocks of nuclear weapons were secure and well-guarded and that Gates’s concerns were not valid.**

## Terrorists prefer conventional weapons – they’re easier to get, and nukes are antithetical to their goals

Waltz 3 [Kenneth, Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, p. 42-43]cn

For terrorists who abandon tactics of disruption and harassment in favor of dealing in wholesale death and destruction, instruments other than nuclear weapons are more readily available. Poisons and germs are easier to get than nuclear weapons, and poisoning a city's water supply, though rather complicated, is more easily done than blowing a city up. Nevertheless, terrorists may seek to gain control of nuclear materials and use them to threaten or destroy. Yet, with shaky control of nuclear weapons materials in Russia and perhaps in Pakistan, and with the revelation in 1994 that the United States had lost track of some of its nuclear materials, one can hardly believe that nuclear weapons spreading to another country or two every now and then adds much to the chances that terrorists will be able to buy or steal nuclear materials. Plentiful sources are already available. Nuclear terror is a problem distinct from the spread of nuclear weapons to a few more countries. Terrorists have done a fair bit of damage by using conventional weapons and have sometimes got their way by threatening to use them. Might terrorists not figure they can achieve more still by threatening to explode nuclear weapons on cities of countries they may wish to bend to their bidding? Fear of nuclear terror arises from the assumption that if terrorists can get nuclear weapons they will get them, and then all hell will break loose. This is comparable to assuming that if weak states get nuclear weapons, they will use them for aggression. Both assumptions are false. Would the courses of action we fear, if followed, promise more gains than losses or more pains than profits? The answers are obvious. Terrorists have some hope of reaching their long-term goals through patient pressure and constant harassment. They cannot hope to do so by issuing unsustainable threats to wreak great destruction, threats they would not want to execute anyway.

## Terrorists don’t want nukes – obtaining them is too risky

Lavoy 95 [Peter, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Security Studies, Summer]cn

Waltz does not dispute the ability of terrorists to gain control of a. few nuclear explosives. He does doubt, however, that terrorists ever would use them. This sanguine view derives from three assumptions Waltz makes about the nature and aims of terrorist organizations. First, because 'secrecy is safety" for terrorists, Waltz believes that they would not wish suddenly to enlarge their ranks through the multiplication of "suppliers, transporters, technicians, and guardians" required to obtain and maintain nuclear weapons. Second, terrorists are not well suited to carrying out the time-consuming negotiations needed to obtain the compliance of a state placed under a terrorist nuclear threat. Third, terrorists favor tactics of disruption and harassment to threats of wholesale death and destruction; nuclear weapons do not help terrorists reach their long-term goals. If terrorists did seek to take many lives, Waltz reasons that poison would be a better weapon.

# Terrorism Answers

## Terrorists won’t use nukes – they think it’s immoral, undermines their goals, and are too powerful

Beckman 2k [Peter, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, et aI, The Nuclear Predicament: Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century, 3rd edition, p. 227-228]cn

Would it be rational for terrorists to use nuclear weapons? An act is rational only relative to the goals and assumptions of the actor. So, to ask whether nuclear terrorism is rational for a terrorist group is to ask whether it is rational relative to its goals and assumptions. Normally, a terrorist group has goals and assumptions different from those of the ordinary person. Still, there is some reason to think that nuclear use would not be rational for the terrorist, even from the terrorist's point of view. For one thing, the main concern of terrorists seems to be to make their grievances known, not just to kill people. Brian Jenkins notes: "Simply killing a lot of people has seldom been a terrorist objective.... Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead." He bolsters this point by observing that many terrorists are morally opposed to indiscriminate violence, given that "they regard a government as their opponent. not the people," and they do not want to alienate the people. There are other reasons to think that nuclear terrorism would be irrational from the terrorist's perspective. The cohesion of a terrorist group is of great importance to the group, and the use of nuclear weapons risks the loss of that cohesion. Given the revulsion some in the group might feel toward such an act, the decision to use nuclear weapons might shatter the group. Moreover, terrorists might well discover the same truth that states have discovered, namely, that nuclear weapons are too powerful. For the question arises: What demands could nuclear terrorists make that would correspond in magnitude to what they threaten, demands that they could be assured that the state would carry out, given the temporary nature of the nuclear threat they would pose?

## Small chance of theft- TNWs are safely stored and safeguards check- explains decades without accident

**Fetter ’98** [associate professor in the School of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland and member of the National Academy of Sciences' Committee on International Security and Arms Control “The Future of Russian-US Strategic Arms Reductions: START III and Beyond” Feb. 2-6, <http://www.armscontrol.ru/transforming/day3.htm>]

**Fetter offered no proof of a disparity in the security of strategic versus tactical weapons, and the Russians were clearly offended at the implication that they are incompetent enough to let the security of their tactical weaponry be compromised**. Michael Stafford added that official assessments of the situation were that the chances of warhead theft are small, but that the US was slightly more worried about the possibility of the theft of fissile materials. Aleksey **Ovcharenko noted that tactical nuclear weapons are stored rather than deployed in most cases.** **In storage, they are more closely safeguarded and less likely to be diverted. Roland Lajoie said that Russians had argued that by keeping those weapons that are deployed on their launchers, the possibility of diversion would also be lessened.**

# Terrorism Answers

## Terrorists can’t make, buy, or steal a nuke – multiple barriers makes the risk near zero

Milhollin 2 [Gary, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control]cn

Despite the reports, and despite the attendant warnings, the risk that a terrorist group like al Qaeda could get the bomb (or a "dirty" substitute) is much lower than most people think. That is the good news. There is also bad news: the risk is not zero. THERE ARE essentially two ways for a terrorist group to lay its hands on a nuclear weapon: either build one from scratch or somehow procure an already manufactured one or its key components. Neither of these is likely. Building a bomb from scratch would confer the most power: a group that could build one bomb could build several, and a nuclear arsenal would put it front and center on the world stage. But of all the possibilities, this is the unlikeliest--"so remote," in the words of a senior nuclear scientist at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, "that it can be essentially ruled out. " The chief obstacle lies in producing the nuclear fuel--either bomb-grade uranium or plutonium--that actually explodes in a chain reaction. More than 80 percent of the effort that went into making America's first bombs was devoted to producing this fuel, and it is no easy task. To make bomb-grade uranium, a terrorist group would need thousands of high-speed gas centrifuges, machined to exact dimensions, arranged in series, and capable of operating under the most demanding conditions. If they wanted to produce the uranium by a diffusion process, they would need an even greater number of other machines, equally difficult to manufacture and operate. If they followed Saddam Hussein's example, they could try building a series of giant electromagnets, capable of bending a stream of electrically charged particles--a no less daunting challenge. For any of these, they would also need a steady supply of natural uranium and a specialized plant to convert it to a gaseous form for processing. Who would sell these things to would be nuclear terrorists? The answer is: nobody. The world's nuclear-equipment makers are organized into a cooperative group that exists precisely to stop items like these from getting into unauthorized hands. Nor could a buyer disguise the destination and send materials through obliging places like Dubai (as Iran does with its hot cargoes) or Malta (favored by Libya's smugglers). The equipment is so specialized, and the suppliers so few, that a forest of red flags would go up. And even if the equipment could be bought, it would have to be operated in a place that the United States could not find. If manufacturing bombgrade uranium is out of the picture, what about making plutonium, a much smaller quantity of which is required to form a critical mass (less than fourteen pounds was needed to destroy Nagasaki in 1945)? There is, however, an inconvenient fact about plutonium, which is that you need a reactor to make enough of it for a workable bomb. Could terrorists buy one? The Russians are selling a reactor to Iran, but Moscow tends to put terrorist groups in the same category as Chechens. The Chinese are selling reactors to Pakistan, but Beijing, too, is not fond of terrorists. India and Pakistan can both build reactors on their own, but, for now, these countries are lined up with the U.S. Finally, smuggling a reactor would be no easier than buying one. Reactor parts are unique, so manufacturers would not be fooled by phony purchase orders. Even if terrorists somehow got hold ofa reactor, they would need a special, shielded chemical plant to chop up its radioactive fuel, dissolve it in acid, and then extract the plutonium from the acid. No one would sell them a plutonium extraction plant, either. It is worth remembering that Saddam Hussein tried the reactor road in the 1970's. He bought one from France--Jacques Chirac, in his younger days, was a key facilitator of the deal--hoping it would propellraq into the nuclear club. But the reactor's fuel was sabotaged in a French warehouse, the person who was supposed to certifY its quality was murdered in a Paris hotel, and when the reactor was finally ready to operate, a squadron oflsraeli fighter-bombers blew it apart. Asimilar fate would undoubtedly await any group that tried to follow Saddam's method today. IF MAKING nuclear-bomb fuel is a no-go, why not just steal it, or buy it on the black market? Consider plutonium. There are hundreds of reactors in the world, and they crank out tons ofthe stuff every year. Surely a dedicated band of terrorists could get their hands on some. This too is not so simple. Plutonium is only created inside reactor fuel rods, and the rods, after being irradiated, become so hot that they melt unless kept under water. They are also radioactive, which is why they have to travel submerged from the reactor to storage ponds, with the water acting as both coolant and radiation shield. And in most power reactors, the rods are welded together into long assemblies that can be lifted only by crane. True, after the rods cool down they can be stored dry, but their radioactivity is still lethal. To prevent spent fuel rods from killing the people who come near them, they are transported in giant radiation-shielding casks that are not supposed to break open even in head-on collisions. The casks are also guarded. If terrorists managed to hijack one from a country that had reactors they would still have to take it to a plant in another country that could extract the plutonium from the rods. They would be hunted at every step of the way. Instead of fuel rods, they would be better advised to go after pure plutonium, already removed from the reactor fuel and infinitely easier to handle. This kind of plutonium is a threat only if you ingest or inhale it. Human skin blocks its radiation: a terrorist could walk around with a lump of it in his front trouser pocket and still have children. But where to get hold of it? Russia is the best bet: it has tons of plutonium in weapon-ready fmID, and the Russian nuclear-accounting system is weak. Russia also has underpaid scientists, and there is unquestionably some truth behind all the stories one hears about the smuggling that goes on in that country. But very little Russian plutonium has been in circulation, with not a single reported case of anything more than gram quantities showing up on the black market. This makes sense. Pure plutonium is used primarily for making nuclear warheads, it is in military hands, and military forces are not exactly keen to see it come back at them in somebody else's bombs. One source of pure plutonium that is not military is a new kind of reactor fuel called "mixed oxide." It is very different from the present generation of fuel because it contains weapon-ready material. But precisely because it is weapon-ready, it is guarded and accounted for, and a terrorist group would have to win a gun battle to get close to it. Then they would probably need a crane to move it, and would have to elude or fight off their pursuers. If terrorists did procure some weapon-ready plutonium, would their problems be over? Far from it: plutonium works only in an "implosion"-type bomb, which is about ten times more difficult to build than the simple uranium bomb used at Hiroshima.

# Russia Modelling Answers

## *Russians won’t give on their tactical nuclear weapons:*

David **Wood, 7/8/2009** (<http://www.politicsdaily.com/2009/07/08/tactical-nuclear-weapons-the-menace-no-one-is-talking-about/>)

**Let's say, however improbable, that Moscow and Washington agree to throw tactical nuclear weapons into the arms reduction negotiations that Obama and Medvedev agreed to this week. How likely is a deal? Not very, experts suggest**. For one thing, tactical nukes are small and easily hidden. And their "delivery vehicles'' -- arms-control jargon for the aircraft or missiles that carry them -- are also used for other purposes. Reliably counting these weapons and verifying reductions is devilishly difficult, the experts say. Another reason is that **the numbers are too important to each side to think seriously about reductions. Russia's conventional military forces are smaller and vastly inferior to those of the United States, and Russian analysts see their nuclear weapons as a critical counterbalance**. Russia also needs its tactical nukes to deter problems along its long border with China.

# Russian Reciprocity CP

## *US should agree to reduce its tactical nukes in exchange for a Russian agreement to reposition its forward deployed tactical nuclear weapons:*

Sam **Nunn, 8/5/2009** (co-chair and chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative,

<http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20090805_4929.php>)

In a commentary last year former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former Defense Secretary William **Perry and** former Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam **Nunn called for eliminating short-range nuclear weapons designed to be forward-deployed. When considering future formal and informal arms control agreements, the United States should determine not only how they might serve "traditional" goals such as reducing incentives for a nuclear first strike, but also how they would affect "the likelihood of terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons or fissile materials," Einhorn said** Thursday during a U.S. Strategic Command symposium on nuclear deterrence in Omaha, Neb. **Addressing the "large U.S.-Russian asymmetry" in nonstrategic nuclear weapons would not only reduce the threats perceived by a number of European states, it would also reduce the risk of Moscow's tactical weapons from falling into terrorist hands,** Einhorn told the audience. Such a move in regards to tactical nuclear weapons would differ from Cold War thinking, when the central U.S. goal of arms control was reducing the risk of a massive nuclear war by limiting and reducing Soviet strategic forces that posed the "greatest risk" to U.S. retaliatory capabilities, Einhorn said. **"Removing such tactical nuclear weapons from forward-deployed locations and consolidating them in secure storage facilities deep within Russia could be just as worthwhile, and perhaps more feasible, than classic arms control solutions," he said. "This poses a question of whether the U.S., as an inducement to Russia to limit or consolidate its tactical weapons, should be prepared to reduce or eliminate the relatively small number of U.S. nuclear weapons that remain in Europe," according to Einhorn.**

# “Tactical” PIC 1NC

## Text: The USFG should \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ its forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Turkey.

## Observation 1: Competition- competes off the word “tactical”

## Observation 2: Net benefits

## Labeling weapons as “tactical” makes nuclear weapons more “useable” and cheapens their perceived effects

**Capello, Hall and Lambert ’02** [John, USAF Major, Assistant Director of Operations/Chief Long Range Planning. Gwendolyn, USAF Lieutenant Colonel, Commander of the Dean of Faculty Squadron Section and a Sequential Tour Officer at the Air Force Academy. Stephen, USAF Major, Special Air Missions Pilot with the 99th Airlift Squadron at Andrews AFB, MD “Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Debunking the Mythology” <http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:AJAFouZ1UxkJ:www.usafa.af.mil/df/inss/OCP/OCP46.pdf+%22yost%22+%22tactical+nuclear+weapons%22&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us>]

**It is unfortunate that the dynamic of arms control**—and its requirement to categorize and sometimes artificially label weapons in order to simply allow counting their numbers—**has removed an awareness of the immense destructive fire power of each “tactical” nuclear weapon.** While battlefield effects may vary based on the yields of various nuclear weapons, it is not tautological to state that a “nuclear weapon remains a nuclear weapon.” **To attempt to classify the extremely large number of “tactical” weapons** not limited by previous arms control arrangements **leads to several negative consequences. First, it reduces the discussion to a fruitless effort to categorize warheads or weapons that have thus far presented no productive way of being classified—due in large part to their great diversity, quantity, and the secrecy with which they are held. Second, it fundamentally ignores the strategic effect and political consequences that the future employment of any nuclear weapon will invariably have. Third, it reduces the overarching impact of nuclear deterrence by implying that the category of nuclear weapons artificially dubbed as “tactical” are somehow more “usable” or “less destructive” than other nuclear weapons**.

# “Tactical” PIC 1NC

## Nuclear “usability” makes nuclear development and war inevitable

**Kimball ’03** [Daryl, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association, Nov. 7, “Arms Experts Rap Congress for Backing Bush Administration's Nuclear Weapons Ambitions; A "Setback" for Addressing Global Nuclear” <http://www.armscontrol.org/print/2543>]

**A congressional decision announced today to allow the Bush administration to further explore new nuclear weapons is a “serious error that will be a setback to U.S. efforts to persuade and prevent other nations from developing nuclear weapons,” according to the Arms Control Association**, a nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to promoting effective arms control policies. As part of their consideration of the fiscal year 2004 defense authorization bill, House and Senate legislators complied with a White House request to repeal a 10-year-old ban on research leading to development of new nuclear weapons with yields of less than five kilotons, so-called “low-yield” weapons. They also approved Bush administration proposals to continue researching new types of nuclear “bunker busters” to destroy targets deep underground and shorten the time required to prepare for a full-scale nuclear test from 24 months to 18 months. “Congress and the Bush administration have made a mistake by opening the door to a new wave of global nuclear weapons competition. **The diplomatic and security costs of the Bush administration’s proposals to explore new nuclear weapons far outweigh any marginal benefits such arms might yield,” said Daryl Kimball**, executive director of the Arms Control Association. “**This sends a dangerous message that will hamper U.S. efforts to prevent other nations from developing nuclear weapons,”** he warned. Lawmakers have signaled that they also harbor some unease with the administration’s plans to reinvigorate U.S. nuclear weapons research and test preparations. While supporting research into new low-yields weapons, legislators withheld authorization to actually engineer, develop, and test new or modified nuclear bombs. And earlier this week, congressional appropriators cut proposed 2004 funding for studying bunker busters in half-from $15 million to just $7.5 million-and barred the Department of Energy from spending $4 million of an approved $6 million for new weapon concepts until it submits a report on U.S. nuclear stockpile requirements. This congressional skepticism may help head off future, more dangerous Bush administration nuclear arm proposals, Kimball noted. “Further efforts by this or another administration to win necessary congressional approval for engineering, development, and testing of new or modified nuclear weapons will be vigorously opposed and must be defeated,” he said. **Expert scientists have contradicted the arguments made by proponents of “low-yield” nuclear weapons, saying that new and “smaller” nuclear warheads are dirty, dangerous, and unnecessary**. Dr. Sidney **Drell**, a Stanford University physicist and longtime advisor to the U.S. nuclear program, **wrote** in Arms Control Today in March, **“Even a lower-yield, one-kiloton nuclear warhead** (1/13 the size of the Hiroshima bomb) detonated at a depth of 20-50 feet **would eject more than one million cubic feet of radioactive debris, forming a crater about the size of ground zero at the World Trade Center**.” Drell added, “The result would be a highly contaminated zone and atmospheric fallout that would endanger civilians, as well as military personnel who might be ordered into the area.” **The perceived “usability”of such weapons is a dangerous notion, Kimball argued. “Nuclear weapons should not be considered just another weapon in our arsenal. They are mass terror weapons whether used by the United States or another country,” he stressed.**

# “Tactical” PIC 1NC

## They diminish psychological fear of the bomb

**Capello, Hall and Lambert ’02** [John, USAF Major, Assistant Director of Operations/Chief Long Range Planning. Gwendolyn, USAF Lieutenant Colonel, Commander of the Dean of Faculty Squadron Section and a Sequential Tour Officer at the Air Force Academy. Stephen, USAF Major, Special Air Missions Pilot with the 99th Airlift Squadron at Andrews AFB, MD “Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Debunking the Mythology” <http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:AJAFouZ1UxkJ:www.usafa.af.mil/df/inss/OCP/OCP46.pdf+%22yost%22+%22tactical+nuclear+weapons%22&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us>]

While a 20 kiloton yield may be mathematically smaller than a one megaton yield, the destructive firepower of the smaller nuclear weapon remains so far above the conventional threshold that it still retains a dramatic qualitative and quantitative difference in physical damage and human casualty potential. **Fourth,** **it ignores, and possibly diminishes, the fundamental psychological element of nuclear weapons—that part of the nuclear equation that promises to inflict unimaginable terror, shock, and destruction on the enemy. Future discussions regarding national security, deterrence strategy, targeting policy, employment doctrine, or arms control should instead simply refer to nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons**. As Ambassador Robert Joseph has aptly stated, “we must not make this more difficult than it is. Not every element of this complex security environment is complex. In fact, some things are clear. This is the case with TNF, where old arms control notions— perhaps jazzed-up somewhat—represent nothing more than a problem masquerading as a solution.

## Fear of the bomb is key to prevent its use

**Rajaraman ’02** [Ran, Professor of Theoretical Physics, JNU, April 22, “Ban battlefield nuclear weapons” <http://www.hindu.com/2002/04/22/stories/2002042200431000.htm>]

**The U.S. in Vietnam and the Soviets in Afghanistan had to bear the ignominy of losing the wars to smaller and technologically less developed antagonists**. One might have imagined that under such severe circumstances nations would employ all available weapons in their power to turn defeat into victory. Yet, none of these countries used a nuclear bomb even once. **There were a variety of different reasons behind each of these examples of abstinence from using nuclear weapons. But one major common factor contributing to all of them has been an ingrained terror of nuclear devastation**. The well documented images of **Hiroshima and Nagasaki**, the awesome photographs of giant mushroom clouds emerging from nuclear tests in the Pacific and the numerous movies based on nuclear Armageddon scenarios **have all contributed to building up a deep rooted fear of nuclear weapons. This is not limited just to the abhorrence felt by anti-nuclear activists. It permeates to one extent or another the psyche of all but the most pathological of fanatics. It colours the calculations, even if not decisively, of the most hardened of military strategists. The unacceptability of nuclear devastation is the backbone of all deterrence strategies. There is not just a fear of being attacked oneself, but also a strong mental barrier against actually initiating nuclear attacks on enemy populations, no matter how much they may be contemplated in war games and strategies. As a result a taboo has tacitly evolved over the decades preventing nations, at least so far, from actually pressing the nuclear button even in the face of serious military crises.**

# “Tactical” PIC- Fear of bomb good

## Fearing nuclear weapons solves their use- all conflicts after WW2 prove

**Rajaraman ’02** [Ran, Professor of Theoretical Physics, JNU, April 22, “Ban battlefield nuclear weapons” <http://www.hindu.com/2002/04/22/stories/2002042200431000.htm>]

**That danger stems from opening, after a very long gap, the nuclear Pandora's box. It should be remembered that subsequent to the two atom bombs dropped on Japan in rapid succession at the end of World War II, there has been no known incidence of nuclear weapon usage except for tests. This despite the fact that the nuclear arsenals have grown from a handful of weapons in the hands of the Americans to tens of thousands of far more powerful bombs spread among a half a dozen countries**. It is not as if there has been a shortage of major conflicts involving countries possessing nuclear weapons. We have had, among others, the Korean War, the Vietnam war, the Soviet war in Afghanistan, the Iraqi war, the Sino-Soviet border skirmishes and most pertinently for us, the Kargil conflict. Some of these were long drawn out wars with heavy casualties. The U.S. in Vietnam and the Soviets in Afghanistan had to bear the ignominy of losing the wars to smaller and technologically less developed antagonists. **One might have imagined that under such severe circumstances nations would employ all available weapons in their power to turn defeat into victory. Yet, none of these countries used a nuclear bomb even once.**

## Fear of the bomb is key to prevent global war and chaos

Mearsheimer 1 (John, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, AD: 7-11-9) BL

The possible consequences of falling victim to aggression further amplify the importance of fear as a motivating force in world politics. Great powers do not compete with each other as if international politics were merely an economic marketplace. Political competition among states is a much more dangerous business than mere economic intercourse; the former can read to war, and war often means mass killing on the battlefield as well a mass murder of civilians. In extreme cases, war can even lead to the destruction of states. The horrible consequences of war sometimes cause states to view each other not just as competitors, but as potentially deadly enemies. Political antagonism, in short, tends to be intense, because the stakes are great. States in the international system also aim to guarantee their own survival. Because other states are potential threats, and because there is no higher authority to come to their rescue when they dial 911, states can’ t just depend on others for their own security. Each state tends to see itself as vulnerable and alone, and therefore it aims to provide for its own survival. In international politics, God helps those who help themselves.