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1AC

# 1AC (1/11)

**Contention One: Inherency**

## Turkey currently hosts 90 U.S B-61 gravity bombs at the Incirlik Air Base – and there outdated

**Bell and Loehrke 09** (Alexandra is a Truman National Security Fellow and Benjamin is a grad student at the U of Maryland, “The status of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey”, accessed at http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey on 6/21/10//dml)

For more than 40 years, Turkey has been a quiet custodian of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, Washington positioned intermediate-range nuclear missiles and bombers there to serve as a bulwark against the Soviet Union (i.e., to defend the region against Soviet attack and to influence Soviet strategic calculations). In the event of a Soviet assault on Europe, the weapons were to be fired as one of the first retaliatory shots. But as the Cold War waned, so, too, did the weapons' strategic value. Thus, over the last few decades, the United States has removed all of its intermediate-range missiles from Turkey and reduced its other nuclear weapons there through gradual redeployments and arms control agreements. Today, Turkey hosts an estimated 90 B61 gravity bombs at Incirlik Air Base. Fifty of these bombs are reportedly assigned for delivery by U.S. pilots, and forty are assigned for delivery by the Turkish Air Force. However, no permanent nuclear-capable U.S. fighter wing is based at Incirlik, and the Turkish Air Force is reportedly not certified for NATO nuclear missions, meaning nuclear-capable F-16s from other U.S. bases would need to be brought in if Turkey's bombs were ever needed. Such a relaxed posture makes clear just how little NATO relies on tactical nuclear weapons for its defense anymore. In fact, the readiness of NATO's nuclear forces now is measured in months as opposed to hours or days. Supposedly, the weapons are still deployed as a matter of deterrence, but the crux of deterrence is sustaining an aggressor's perception of guaranteed rapid reprisal--a perception the nuclear bombs deployed in Turkey cannot significantly add to because they are unable to be rapidly launched. Aggressors are more likely to be deterred by NATO's conventional power or the larger strategic forces supporting its nuclear umbrella. So in effect, U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey are without military value or purpose**.**

# 1AC (2/11)

**Text: The United States federal government should withdraw its tactical nuclear presence from Turkey.**

# 1AC (3/11)

**Advantage one is Iran:**

**Iran is building a nuclear arsenal**

 **Pike, 10.** (John Pike, Globalsecurity.org, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nuclear Weapons, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/nuke.htm>, 2010.)

**In December 2003 Presidential hopeful John Kerry said that he would explore "areas of mutual interest" with Iran. And in June 2004 Kerry proposed providing nuclear fuel to Iran in exchange for Iran's abandoning the fissile material production complex** at Esfahan, Arak, Natanz and other locations. In an interview on 29 August 2004, reported in the [Washington Post on 30 August](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45216-2004Aug29.html), Democratic vice presidential nominee John Edwards proposed a "Grand Bargain" with Iran, under which the US would drop objections to the nuclear power reactor at Bushehr, in exchange for Iran abandoning the material production complex. **According to Edwards, if Iran rejected this offer, it would confirm that it was building atomic bombs.** Edwards also said that Kerry would ensure that European allies would join the US in imposing sanctions on Iran. "If we are engaging with Iranians in an effort to reach this great bargain and if in fact this is a bluff that they are trying to develop nuclear weapons capability, then we know that our European friends will stand with us," Edwards said. **"Iran is further along in developing a nuclear weapon than they were when George Bush came into office... A nuclear Iran is unacceptable for so many reasons, including the possibility that it creates a gateway and the need for other countries in the region to develop nuclear capability -- Saudi Arabia, Egypt, potentially others," Edwards said.**

**Turkish credibility is key to reducing Iran’s arsenal – they’re the single most influential actor**

**Ben-Meir, 09** (Alon Ben-Meir, Senior Fellow at the Center for Global Affairs in New York University and teaches courses on the Middle East and international negotiations, Spring 2009, The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, Nuclear Iran is Not an Option: A New Negotiating Strategy to Prevent Iran from Developing Nuclear Weapons)

**The presence of a third party acting as mediator** between the United States and Iran **may prove to be necessary, particularly if this party represents a major Muslim state with the stature of Turkey.** Apart from Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s recent claims that “[Turkey is] ready to be the mediator” between the United States and Iran, due to its recent diplomatic achievements between Israel and Syria, **there are many reasons why Turkey may succeed in mediating a peaceful solution to the nuclear impasse.** To begin with, **Turkey has a vested interest in the success of the negotiations. Many Turkish officials and academics have expressed grave concerns about the growing danger of yet another avoidable and potentially devastating war in the Middle East.** For the Turks, finding a diplomatic solution is not one of many options but the only sane option to prevent a horrific outcome. Other than being directly affected by regional events, **Turkey generally enjoys good relations with all states in the region; it has not been tainted with the war in Iraq; and it is a predominantly Muslim state, Middle Eastern as well as European. Turkey shares the longest border with Iran, and has maintained good neighborly relations with Tehran for centuries, with expanding trade relations. Moreover, Turkey and Iran have collaborated recently on the Kurdish issue, and both have a shared interest in this regard for the emergence of a stable Iraq. Turkey, as a fellow Muslim state, stands a much better chance to convey to Iran Israel’s sentiments to prevent a terrible miscalculation. Because of Turkey’s standing in the region, and as a credible bridge between East and West, it has the potential to succeed where others have failed**. Turkey is a close ally and a reliable friend of the United States; it is an important member of NATO; it has worked fervently to maintain the democratic nature of the state; and it has received due praise for its recent diplomatic mediating efforts. **Turkey can better understand the nature of Iran’s threats, specifically in connection with the United States, which has made no secret of its efforts to support Ahmadinejad’s opponents. Turkey may also be in a better position than the EU representatives to bypass Ahmadinejad and reach out directly to Iran’s supreme leader** Ayatollah Khamenei. Khamenei, whose power goes practically unchecked in the Iranian government and institutions, has refused to speak to any American representatives. **Turkey plays a strategic role in this sense because it can appeal to Khamenei, who will ultimately be responsible for any course of action the Iranian government decides to make on the nuclear issue. In addition, Turkey may offer an alternative where Iran can be persuaded to enrich uranium on Turkish soil under strict IAEA monitoring. Turkey, in short, can change the dynamics by offering a new venue for Americans and Iranians to meet and by generating a new momentum for serious dialogue. Finally, Turkey can provide Iran with a dignified disengagement plan, because if Iran is to make any concessions it will more likely make them to a fellow Muslim-majority state with which it has long and friendly relations.**

# 1AC (4/11)

**However, Turkey can’t convince Iran to stop their nuclear program unless the U.S removes their TNWs**

Kibaroglu 6/7/10 (Mustafa, Professor and Vice Chair of the IR dept @ Bilkent U, “Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey”, Arms Control Today pg 12, June 2010//dml)

In addition to improvements in bilateral relations with its immediate neighbors, **Turkey has** become more involved in wider Middle Eastern political affairs than it ever has been since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. A key part of this regional involvement is mediation efforts between Israel and Syria. Another element is **a willingness to take on a** similar **role in Iran’s dispute with the international community over the nature and scope of Tehran’s nuclear program, which is** generally **considered by** Turkey’s **NATO** allies **to have the potential for weaponization and thus further proliferation in the region**. Top Turkish political and military officials have suggested on various occasions that **the most promising way out of the conflict in the longer term would be the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East**. Against that background, the **continued insistence of the Turkish security elite on hosting U.S. nuclear weapons has drawn criticism from Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors**.21 **Some of these neighbors**, such as Iran and Syria, **criticize Turkey’s policy of retaining nuclear weapons because they see the weapons as being directed against them.** 22 Others in the Arab world, such as Egypt, portray these weapons as a symbol of Western imperialism. **Turkey** therefore **will have to** seriously **reconsider its policy on U.S. nuclear weapons**.

**A nuclear Iran makes proliferation inevitable: the nuclear program has already violated many terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty**

Calabresi, 03. (Massimo Calabresi, author for Time magazine, “Iran’s Nuclear Threat.” March 8th, 2003. http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,430649,00.html) AV

Iran announced last week that it intends to activate a uranium conversion facility near Isfahan (under IAEA safeguards), a step that produces the uranium hexafluoride gas used in the enrichment process. Sources tell Time the IAEA has concluded that Iran actually introduced uranium hexafluoride gas into some centrifuges at an undisclosed location to test their ability to work. That would be a blatant violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which Iran is a signatory. The IAEA declined to comment. A senior State department official said he believed El Baradei was trying to resolve the issue behind the scenes before going public. But experts say the new discoveries are very serious and should be handled in public. "If Iran were found to have an operating centrifuge, it would be a direct violation [of the non-proliferation treaty] and is something that would need immediately to be referred to the United Nations Security Council for action," says Jon Wolfstahl of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Iran insists that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes and told elBaradei that Tehran intends to bring all of its programs under IAEA safeguards. U.S. officials have said repeatedly they believe Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons. The new discoveries could destabilize a region already dangerously on edge in anticipation of war in Iraq. Israel — which destroyed an Iraqi nuclear plant in Osirak in a 1981 raid — is deeply alarmed by the developments. "It's a huge concern," says one Israeli official. "Iran is a regime that denies Israel's right to exist in any borders and is a principal sponsor of Hezbollah. If that regime were able to achieve a nuclear potential it would be extremely dangerous." Israel will not take the "Osirak option" off the table, the official says, but "would prefer that this issue be solved in other ways."

# 1AC (5/11)

Iranian proliferation leads to spiraling regional conflict including Israeli first strike

**Romero, 99** (Juan Romero**,** Researcher of Middle Eastern affairs at Jane’s Intelligence Review, March 1st, 1999)

Recently, Israel expressed concern about the possible Iranian development of an inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) and even suggested a pre-emptive strike against Iran. This suggestion has even been put forward by a representative of Likud, Israel's Labour Party. According to an assessment by Israel's military intelligence, Iran will need between three to six years to acquire a nuclear capability, which would seem to make an Israeli strike a rather urgent matter. Some Arab analysts see a connection between Tel Aviv's warning of an Iranian nuclear bomb and Washington's quick offer to sell Israel 30 more F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft, which can reach both Iraq and Iran. In this context Iran's defence minister, Ali Shamkhani, has stated that Iran will continue its Shehab-4 and Shehab-5 missile programmes in accordance with its defence needs. In an interview with the United Arab Emirates daily al-Ittihad, Shamkhani further emphasised that Iran will answer in a surprising way if Israel attacks the nuclear reactor in Bushehr or any other vital installation. It is also worth noticing that Damascus has expressed support for Tehran after Israel's threats. The recent tensions between Turkey and Syria also go to show how quickly bilateral relations in the Middle East can deteriorate. A further factor that complicates this situation is that it might not be sheer coincidence that the Turko-Syrian tensions and the explicit Israeli threats to Tehran coincide, although Israel has publicly stated that the relations between Syria and Turkey concern these two countries only. It could all be a concerted act, lest the neighbouring Arab countries become too friendly with Tehran. For Israel and Turkey it surely makes sense to act covertly in unison with the intention of dividing their opponents' attention with spectacular manoeuvres aimed at different antagonists. Seen in this context, Tel Aviv's warning of Iranian ICBMs and the threats aimed at Tehran may have served a dual purpose. Possibly, they were intended to both convince Washington of Israel's need for more long-range military aircraft and also to distract Tehran from getting too involved in the Turko-Syrian crisis - all this without asking the USA to provide the aircraft or publicly siding with Turkey in the crisis between Ankara and Damascus. Tehran's status as a mediator between the two neighbours, however, did not prevent it from expressing support for Damascus during the crisis and criticising Turkey during Foreign Minister Cem's visit to Tehran recently for its military co-operation with Israel. Finally, Arab analysts will certainly interpret the frosty relations between Ankara and Damascus as a result of increased Turkish self-assertion owing to Ankara's military co-operation - or alliance, as Arab newspapers prefer to call it - with Tel Aviv. The recent signs of an Iraqi-Syrian rapprochement worry Israel, particularly if improved relations between the former arch-enemies results in military co-operation with Iran. Therefore, the recent discord between Syria and Turkey plays into Tel Aviv's hands (as the outcome, from an Israeli-Turkish perspective, hopefully will be a weakened Syrian position in the region) and serves as a warning to Damascus not to seek military co-operation with Iraq and Iran. As for Syria and Iran, the result of this will, however, likely be the opposite. Damascus, realising its awkward position between two hostile countries, will increase its efforts to create a military alliance with Tehran, possibly in due course including Baghdad and other Arab capitals. Arab reactions According to press reports, many Palestinians welcomed the Pakistani nuclear tests, seeing in them a possible solution to the Israeli occupation of their country and naturally hoping that the prospect of future nuclear war in the Middle East will drive the Israelis out of the occupied territories. It comes as no surprise that reactions in the Islamist camp are more extreme. The Islamist al-Muhajiroun organisation in the UK welcomed the tests, urging Pakistan to defend Muslims not only in Kashmir but also in Palestine and Kosovo. The organisation furthermore called on Pakistan to declare the establishment of al-Khilafa (the caliphate) and a jihad (holy war) against India to liberate that country. Hamas leader Ahmad Yasin rejoiced at the tests, seeing them as an asset for Arab and Islamic nations. It is obvious that Islamist groups really see Pakistani nuclear weapons as 'Islamic bombs'. In early October, al-Sharq al- Awsat reported that the Lebanese Shia spiritual leader Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah had offered Iran the use of Lebanese territory to attack Israel with sophisticated weapons were Israel to subject Iran to an attack. It is further Fadlallah's opinion that Iran will attack Israel if Tel Aviv strikes at Damascus since the Iran-Syria relationship is a strategic one, meaning that any aggression against Syria will be considered aggression against Iran. In general it seems that the Arab media and masses both are very enthusiastic about Pakistan's membership in the nuclear club and their support for Islamabad has apparently grown with increased US pressure on Pakistan. The Pakistani nuclear tests have certainly fanned anti-US and anti-Israeli sentiments in the Arab world. This also came to light immediately after the Indian tests, when several Arab newspapers encouraged Pakistan to go ahead with its own tests, stressing Islamabad's right to respond in kind to the Indian nuclear explosions. The Egyptian Islamist periodical al-Sha'b even went as far as suggesting that the Arabs develop their own nuclear weapons. It has obviously not been lost on Arab media that India and Pakistan seem to be in a better position to discuss bilateral issues after the tests than before them - a view echoed by Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif according to the Pakistani daily newspaper The Dawn on 24 October, implying that Tel Aviv would take a more flexible stance in the peace process should its Arab neighbours acquire nuclear capability. The US offer to sell strike aircraft to Israel recently has angered Tehran and is seen by Arab countries as another example of Washington's double standards when it comes to dealing with Israel and the Islamic countries of the Middle East. The Qatari newspaper The Gulf Times claimed on 29 September that "Iran and any other country in the region has as much right to acquire arms as Israel does". Israeli Lieutenant-General Mofaz's declaration that Israel is willing to intervene against the Iranian missile systems is unambiguous evidence to Iranians and Arabs alike of Israel's hostile intentions. Where Tel Aviv is concerned, this shows a surprising lack of psychology, as such declarations will only strengthen the case of Islamist extremists who claim that the only way to talk to the Israelis is with a gun in one's hand.

# 1AC (6/11)

An Israeli strike results in extinction

Ivashov, 07 (Leonid Ivashov, analyst at the Strategic Culture Foundation, 4/21/2007, "Iran: the Threat of a Nuclear War," <http://www.megachip.info/modules.php?name=Sections&op=viewarticle&artid=3871>)

What might cause the force major event of the required scale? Everything seems to indicate that Israel will be sacrificed. Its involvement in a war with Iran - especially in a nuclear war - is bound to trigger a global catastrophe. The statehoods of Israel and Iran are based on the countries' official religions. A military conflict between Israel and Iran will immediately evolve into a International one, a conflict between Judaism and Islam. Due to the presence of numerous Jewish and Muslim populations in the developed countries, this would make a global bloodbath inevitable. All of the active forces of most of the countries of the world would end up fighting, with almost no room for neutrality left. Judging by the increasingly massive acquisitions of the residential housing for the Israeli citizens, especially in Russia and Ukraine , a lot of people already have an idea of what the future holds. However, it is hard to imagine a quiet heaven where one might hide from the coming doom. Forecasts of the territorial distribution of the fighting, the quantities and the efficiency of the armaments involved, the profound character of the underlying roots of the conflict and the severity of the International strife all leave no doubt that this clash will be in all respects much more nightmarish than WWII.

# 1AC (7/11)

**The impact is ARMAGEDDON – Iranian proliferation leads to every major impact**

**Wimbush and Ford, 10** (S. Enders Wimbush, Senior Vice President for International Programs and Policy at Hudson Institute, and Christopher A. Ford, senior fellow and director of the Center for Technology and Global Security at Hudson Institute, 1-14-10, Hudson Institute, Perspectives Upon a Nuclear Iran)

Possession of nuclear arms may well encourage the clerical regime’s **worst instincts for regional provocation** by seeming to remove the threat of possible outside intervention, and could **catalyze further nuclear weapons proliferation among Iran’s frightened neighbors.** We may debate if Iran’s ultimate ambitions should be understood as fundamentally “Persian” or fundamentally “revolutionary” — that is, whether Tehran is likely to wish only for some kind of regional hegemony or rather for a more sweeping vanguard role in regional or global Islamic revolution. Clearly a lot will depend on who ends up in charge of Iran’s new capabilities. That said, there seems to be little difference in nuclear policy between the radicalized clique that runs the current government and the somewhat more democratically minded “moderates” now being persecuted for having done too well at the polls last summer. (Although it has been reported that some of the pro-democracy demonstrators currently being abused or simply murdered in the streets by security forces have begun chanting “Death to Russia” and “Death to China” in apparent reference to those countries’ use of UN Security Council veto threats to protect the Iranian regime from accountability for its nuclear lawlessness.) Conventional wisdom insists that Iran’s neighbors will recoil from a nuclear Iran and that some of them will likely build their own nuclear arsenals. This is indeed a possibility; the list of potential candidates would certainly include **Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria, Egypt, and conceivably even Iraq**, perhaps through the acquisition of “peaceful” nuclear programs that can later be turned to other purposes. Yet it is not a given that Iran’s neighbors will form anti-Iranian coalitions or otherwise overtly seek to balance its growing power. Some may choose to “bandwagon” with Iran — that is, to collaborate in ways that link Iran’s nuclear accomplishments to their own objectives. The presence or absence of a continued U.S. role in the Middle East will be a critical factor in how such regional dynamics develop. An America that remains active and engaged will have a powerful ability to influence the degree to which Iran’s nuclear empowerment is destabilizing. An America that withdraws from engagement — whether out of moralistic disdain for power politics, fear of Iranian nuclear weapons, financial insolvency in this era of trillion-dollar federal budget deficits, or simply from strategic fatigue — will **cede the field to others.** Fundamentally, Iran would likely aspire to fill a post-American power vacuum itself, claiming the de facto regional hegemony that its proud but insecure sense of historical self seems to demand. Other outsiders, however, might end up playing important roles. **Putin-era Russia**, which is — not unlike Iran — a corrupt, grievance-nursing autocracy with revanchist dreams that imperil its neighbors’ security, **clearly seeks to reacquire its strategic leverage in the Middle East**, a historic focus of Russia’s foreign policy. Yet despite its ambitions, Russia is unlikely to possess sufficient capability to exercise great influence — though one should not entirely discount **the Kremlin’s appetite for the kind of Middle Eastern troublemaking** that would drive up oil prices with the aim of keeping the regime in Moscow afloat on a sea of petrodollars. China was more likely than Russia eventually to fill the role of outside player. This might take the form of a Sino-Persian condominium, in which Beijing steps in as a quasi-guarantor of Iranian hegemony in return for assured and preferential energy access, and global status as the new primus inter pares of the Great Powers. Alternatively, a Middle East destabilized as a result of Iran’s nuclear empowerment might **draw in China**, possibly even against its will, in order to forestall threats to the oil supplies upon which Beijing depends. If an exogenous power is needed to stabilize the region, and the United States has withdrawn, China might fill the vacuum. As Beijing continues to build a “blue water” navy increasingly capable of long-distance power projection while the U.S. Navy continues its precipitous decline — down from some 600 ships in the Reagan administration to well under 300 today, and projected to fewer than 200 in the next decade — this is by no means inconceivable as a mid-term scenario. India has a potential to be a powerful force in the region, either as the increasingly important strategic partner of an America determined to remain engaged in the Middle East, or as a potential balancer of some future Sino-Persian alliance, or both. Yet India today remains psychologically, politically, institutionally, and militarily unprepared for such a role. And if it doesn’t step into this role of its own accord, and develop the requisite military capabilities and political will that such a role requires, the promising Indo-U.S. strategic partnership is unlikely to take off; indeed, it may wither. Even if Iranian hegemony contains the seeds of its own demise, as seems increasingly apparent, a fragile or wounded Iran could be especially dangerous. Tehran’s rise to preeminence would exacerbate simmering tensions between Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims, a dynamic that would be worsened by national rivalries and insecurities, and by ethnic tensions between Persians and Arabs. Iranian hegemony would, therefore, face powerful centrifugal forces that could erode it over time, increasing the likelihood of eventual balancing (instead of bandwagoning) regional reactions even in the absence of a strong outside player. Nevertheless, the decay of Iran’s position — and indeed perhaps the clerical regime’s own internal decay, if today’s demonstrators are cowed into submission as the regime clearly intends — would take time, and might entail much instability. Such tensions could propel Iran into increasingly aggressive behavior to suppress regional resistance, distract from internal contradictions, and to build political legitimacy for its hegemony. It might also choose to claim a regional, or pan-Islamic, leadership role as the barrier against infidel encroachment. This dynamic could, of course, prove most problematic for Israel, but it would likely affect any outside power seeking to play a role in Middle Eastern affairs. If Iran is to have access to nuclear weapons as it tries to build and maintain regional hegemony — and then as it subsequently declines and perhaps disintegrates — **the perilous stakes for everyone else will rise exponentially.** The implications of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, converging with the growing sense of superpower decline-ism currently in vogue in Washington and welcomed by many on the political left, are profound and unsettling. Among defense and security planners in Asia and the Middle East, the debate on whether the United States will withdraw from their regions increasingly leads them to entertain downside scenarios about the shape of the security landscape and the dynamics of the strategic competition once America’s influence declines. If we give them reasons to expect such developments, we should not be surprised if those considering these scenarios end up acting on them in ways that harm American interests. These worrisome scenarios are not inevitable, but they are becoming more likely. The Obama administration can make them less probable by providing some upside scenarios of its own, aimed at those doubting America’s commitment and resolve — beginning by taking a firm line against Iran acquiring the ability to produce nuclear weapons. For it is Iran’s nuclear future, far more than outcomes in Iraq or Afghanistan, that will affect the shape and dynamics of both the Middle East and Asia, **while defining America’s role to everyone else.**

# 1AC (8/11)

**Advantage two is Russia:**

## Russia isn’t reducing its arsenal now – but withdrawal of our TNWs puts pressure on them to reciprocate.

## Potter 09 [Miles Pomper, MA, editor of Arms Control Today @ ACA, Nikolai Sokov, Ph.D., is senior research associate at James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies at Monterey Institute of International Studies, William Potter, Ph.D., is Institute Professor and Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) “Breaking the U.S.-Russian deadlock on nonstrategic nuclear weapons,” http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/breaking-the-us-russian-deadlock-nonstrategic-nuclear-weapons]

## For many years Moscow's position on nonstrategic nuclear weapons has been inflexible and stagnant. And its agreement to begin negotiations on them has been linked to U.S. acceptance of the idea that nuclear weapons should only be based in national territories--i.e., the withdrawal of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons from Europe. Effectively, Russia is betting that NATO, which is the custodian of the U.S. nuclear weapons stationed in Europe, will refuse to accept that principle, and therefore, it will not have to take meaningful measures to address its own nonstrategic weapons. Calling Moscow's bluff could be the key to meaningful progress. If U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons are withdrawn from Europe, it would be hard for Russia to continue stonewalling. While such a step is bound to generate controversy in the United States and NATO, especially in Eastern Europe, it is likely to have little impact on U.S. and alliance security, despite assertions to the contrary. There is little evidence, for example, that Washington would resort to nuclear weapons use, much less nuclear weapons of a tactical variety, if an attack were to occur. Furthermore, nonstrategic nuclear weapons are no longer frontline weapons. In fact, they currently can reach only a few targets in Russia and relocation further east would violate the 1997 NATO-Russia Charter. More importantly, the presence (or absence) of a limited number of U.S. nuclear bombs in Europe can hardly influence the Russian perception of the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence. And if need be, Washington has many other tools of reassurance it can employ--e.g., new missile defenses and extended air patrols, not to mention its vast strategic nuclear arsenal. Ultimately, the question is about the political will of U.S. leaders, not about specific assets. Lastly, the window of opportunity for using nonstrategic weapons in Europe as a lever to induce change in the Russian position is narrow. The dual-capable aircraft that are intended to deliver nonstrategic nuclear weapons are nearing the end of their lifetime. If these systems are allowed to expire, NATO would lose the lever; if they are replaced at high cost, then trading them away would be politically complicated, at best. To utilize this opportunity, Washington could put forward a statement on its own, or on behalf of NATO, in conjunction with unilateral nonstrategic weapon withdrawal in which it would disclose basic information about its total nonstrategic stockpiles (including those on U.S. territory) and invite Russia to respond in kind. Moscow also could be encouraged to respond by redeploying its nonstrategic nuclear weapons to bases that are geographically further removed from Europe. There is no guarantee, of course, that unilateral withdrawal of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons from Europe would lead Russia to change its position. It would, however, make it more politically costly, if not impossible, for Moscow to continue to stall. If implemented against the background of positive movement in other areas such as strategic arms reduction, this tactic has a good chance of succeeding. After all, something must be done--and soon. The continuing stalemate over nonstrategic nuclear weapons is unacceptable and represents a needless threat to transatlantic security and President Barack Obama's vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

# 1AC (9/11)

**Absent plan, uncertainty over stockpiles leads to US-Russian war**

## Pomper, Potter and Sokov, 2009

[Miles A, William, and Nikolai, The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” December]

Lack of transparency The failure to conclude a formal treaty resulted in the absence of any kind of hard data on the number of warheads to be put in central storage (without defining the term "central storage"), eliminated, or deployed. The initiatives only indicated the share of warheads subject to elimination, and inevitably produced two unwelcome consequences which haunt the U.S.-Russian and international arms control agenda today: uncertainty with respect to their implementation and considerable disparity in numbers. For some time, the United States and Russia updated each other and other countries on the progress of reductions. A more formalized process was initiated in 1997 when the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council emerged as a venue for exchanges of information with respect to TNW reductions. To be sure, even in that forum, the sides only revealed the share of warheads eliminated or transferred to central storage, not absolute numbers. In 1999, in the wake of the NATO bombing of the former Yugoslavia, contacts in the Permanent Joint Council were severely limited and information exchanges on TNW temporarily stopped. The absence of any kind of verification and transparency measures led to at least one serious political crisis after a report, in early 2001, that Russia was transferring nuclear warheads for tactical Tochka-U missiles to Kaliningrad Oblast.5 These allegations caused considerable international consternation, especially in Eastern Europe, and led Poland to` publicly demand an inspection of Russian military facilities in that region.6 Subsequent investigation showed that the rumors were based on questionable and misinterpreted information7 and the crisis soon dissipated. It remains a reminder, however, of the potential for new crises to arise due to the lack of transparency and predictability inherent in the PNIs. The current status of the 1991-92 statements, at least where Russia is concerned, is uncertain at best. The United States announced the completion of its unilateral obligations in 2000 (two years later than the original deadline). The original Russian deadline (2000) also slipped, but the last time Moscow formally reported on the implementation of PNIs was at the NPT Prep Com in April 2004. At that time, the Russian representative specifically mentioned that his country had "practically implemented" its "initiatives" except for warheads assigned to Ground Forces and that the pace of elimination was constrained by the technological capability of the Russian nuclear industry and available funding.8 Six months later, an official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry declared Russia was not bound by the PNIs, which were characterized as a "goodwill" gesture, not an obligation.9 In a report distributed at the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Russia declared that it had reduced its TNW arsenal to one-fourth of what it was in 1991 (without a direct reference to the PNIs).10 The following year, the Chief of the 12th GUMO (the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense responsible for handling nuclear weapons), confirmed that information and even asserted that reductions exceeded the original promise (He asserted that the 1991 statements foresaw a 64 percent reduction while Russia had reduced its TNW arsenal by 75 percent) . n Speaking in 2007, the new Chief of the 12th GUMO, General Vladimir Verkhovtsev, repeated the 75 percent figure and added that the promised elimination of TNW warheads assigned to Ground Forces had been completed.12 He also indicated that Russia did not deploy TNW on surface ships and submarines, but "if necessary... could deploy them [and], no one should doubt that."13 In the absence of official baseline data, it is difficult to assess absolute numbers. If the figure provided by Alexei Arbatov, a prominent Russian researcher and a former deputy chair of the Duma Defense Committee, is taken as a baseline, in 1991 the Soviet sub-strategic stockpile (including both deployed and stored warheads) consisted of 21,700 warheads.14 This would render a figure for 2004 of about 5,400 warheads. By 2007, if all warheads assigned to Ground Forces had been eliminated, as Verkhovtsev asserted, the stockpile was reduced to less than 5,000 warheads.15 Breaking down that figure into categories is a considerably more challenging task and there is no satisfactory data on how many warheads are assigned to different forces (see Appendix for details). While official data on the U.S. sub-strategic arsenal is absent, nongovernmental sources typically estimate that U.S. TNW stands at 1,100 warheads), including 300 warheads for SLCMs (the remainder are gravity bombs),16 which are currently stored on shore, but reportedly can be redeployed on submarines, primarily for possible use in defending Japan (100 of these warheads are said to be in operational condition).17 As with Russia, the number of nuclear weapons (gravity bombs) the United States keeps in Europe is declining. A decade ago that total was estimated at roughly 500. Today, following the withdrawal of American gravity bombs from the United Kingdom (some were apparently transferred to other bases in Europe while others were returned to the United States), Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists estimates the total number of U.S. TNW in Europe at between 150 and 200.18 Crisis (In)Stability An issue of serious concern is the relative availability of TNW for early deployment. While the location of remaining TNW stocks are unknown, it is reasonable to expect that a large share of the warheads for short-range delivery vehicles is kept close to those delivery vehicles in a relatively high degree of readiness for use. The PNIs do not define the meaning of "central" storage and fail to provide for a clearcut distinction between warheads that should be considered "deployed" as opposed to "nondeployed." Warheads for aircraft kept at or near airbases are usually classified as "deployed" while warheads for sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), which Russia also keeps at bases, are supposed to be "nondeployed." In reality, the bulk of Russian SLCM warheads could be deployed at relatively short notice. These storage sites are classified by Russia as "central" because administratively they belong to the 12th GUMO rather than the Navy. Similarly, the United States keeps a number of warheads for SLCMs available for deployment as part of its extended deterrence capability in support of Japan. The absence of any degree of transparency with regard to warheads that are stored adjacent to delivery vehicles fosters crisis instability because each party could expand its nuclear arsenal on short notice without the knowledge of the other. In this regard, the overwhelming superiority of Russia in the TNW category presents a serious problem. Yet, even a much smaller TNW arsenal of the United States, especially the ability to equip SLCMs with nuclear warheads, is regarded as a potential security challenge by Russia. Furthermore, employment of TNW is closely associated with conventional forces: both the American extended deterrence and the Russian "de-escalation" strategies foresee conflicts that start as conventional ones that more or less quickly transcend the threshold into limited use of nuclear weapons. The theoretical scenarios of employment of TNW argue for the pre-delegation of launch authority to combatant commanders in the early stages of or perhaps even in the run-up to a conventional war with further decrease of crisis stability, diminished control by political leaders, and the lowering of the nuclear threshold. Thus, in a very direct and tangible way the continued existence of TNW in national arsenals enhances the probability of nuclear war, whether intentional or by accident, and represents a threat to international security.

# 1AC (10/11)

**And, absent withdrawal, TNWs proliferate – China, India, and Pakistan all get them**

## Pomper, Potter and Sokov, 2009 [Miles A, William, and Nikolai, The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” December]

Proliferation of TNW The longer the stalemate over TNW continues, the greater the chance that negative features associated with U.S. and Russian TNW will spread to other countries. The arsenals of short-range missiles and other delivery vehicles in China, India, and Pakistan continue to grow along with the potential risk that they will be fitted with nuclear weapons. The bulk of the (still very small) arsenals of the latter two consist of short- and intermediate-range weapons, which are apparently not permanently equipped with nuclear warheads. Consequently, they present the same challenges of unauthorized access as described above with regard to American and Russian arsenals. Reliance on sub-strategic nuclear weapons in these countries and potentially in China is also fraught with the danger of crisis instability along the lines outlined above. Early practical steps by the United States and Russia to reduce and eventually eliminate their TNW stockpiles could contribute in a tangible way to averting the same threats and challenges in other nuclear weapons states.

## Leads to nuclear war and Indo-Pak war.

## Krepon, 2004 [Michael Krepon, MA, is Co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center, Ziad Haider, Charles Thornton, “Are Tactical Nuclear Weapons Needed in South Asia?” <http://www.docstoc.com/docs/17725558/Nuclear-Weapons-in-south-Asia>]

## The most prominent applicable dilemma associated with the use of tactical, battlefield, or short-range nuclear weapon delivery relates to escalation control. Any use of such a weapon – even a singular demonstration shot by the weaker party to signal the urgency of stopping a threatening advance – presents a strong likelihood of uncontrolled escalation. The leadership of the country that is warned by a singular nuclear detonation, including a low-yield detonation in a remote area that does not produce immediate casualties, would need to make momentous, nation-threatening decisions very quickly. Questions would immediately arise as to whether a singular nuclear detonation would be followed quickly by many more, either through a breakdown in command and control or in anticipation of punishing strikes, as the stated nuclear postures of India and Pakistan promise. As western deterrence strategists concluded, escalation control is far easier below the nuclear threshold than across it. In both circumstances, prerequisites of escalation control include properly functioning lines of communication, trust in the messages received, correct calculations of an adversary’s intentions, cool-headedness in excruciatingly difficult circumstances, and the ability of national leaders to slow down the clock for decision-making when time is of the essence. The imperative of speedy decisions would fall most heavily on rivals whose nuclear assets are most susceptible to preemption on whose targeting strategy depends heavily on striking quickly.

**India-Pakistan nuclear war will escalate globally and destroy the planet**

Caldicott 02, Founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility [Helen, The New Nuclear Danger: George W. Bush’s Military-Industrial Complex, p. X]

The use of Pakistani nuclear weapons could trigger a chain reaction. Nuclear-armed India, an ancient enemy, could respond in kind. China, India's hated foe, could react if India used her nuclear weapons, triggering a nuclear holocauston the subcontinent. If any of either Russia or America's 2,250 strategic weapons on hair-trigger alert were launched either accidentally or purposefully in response, nuclear winter would ensue, meaning the end of most life on earth.

# 1AC (11/11)

## Plan is key – Russia is only going to open up to TNW reduction if we reciprocate

## Higgins, 2005 [Davida, CND and Lakenheath Action Group, “US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe,” http://www.cnduk.org/pages/binfo/nato2005.pdf]

In addition, withdrawal is a precondition for TNW negotiations with Russia, which has a longstanding desire to rid Europe of nuclear weapons. On June 2nd this year Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov said, “We are prepared to start talks about tactical nuclear weapons only when all countries possessing them keep these weapons in their own territory. Russia stores its TNW on its own territory, which cannot be said about other countries.” This would pave the way for further reductions in Russian and US tactical nuclear weapons. A US/Russian arms control and reduction agreement would provide more secure storage and effective monitoring and verification. This would greatly reduce the opportunities for terrorist acquisition and the spread of nuclear equipment and technology around the world.

\*\*\*2AC Stuff

# 2AC NATO Add-On

**First, Current NATO debate over the TNWs deployed in Turkey is enough to splinter the alliance**

**Landler 10** (The International Herald Tribune April 23, 2010 Friday U.S. to resist NATO push to remove tactical arms MARK LANDLER diplomatic correspondent of The New York Times, based in Washington. Mark is a 1987 graduate of Georgetown University, and was a Reuter Fellow at Oxford in 1997 http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/ [lexis])

Fresh off signing a strategic nuclear arms deal with Russia**, the United States is parrying a push by NATO allies to withdraw its aging stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe**. At a meeting of foreign ministers of NATO countries here, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and other countries were prodding the United States to begin negotiations with Russia for steep reductions in so-called nonstrategic weapons - mostly aerial bombs which, in the case of the United States, are stored in underground vaults on air bases in five NATO countries. But Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton was expected to urge caution in remarks to the ministers on Thursday. A senior American official said she was to underscore the need for NATO to maintain a deterrent capability and the **need for the alliance to act together on this issue**. The **Obama administration is also pushing for NATO to embrace the American missile-defense system in Eastern Europe as a core mission of the alliance. Some officials worry that the debate over tactical nuclear weapons, if not properly handled, could splinter the alliance - pitting longtime NATO members against newer members like Turkey and the former Soviet satellites, which are more reluctant to push for the removal of these weapons.** The meeting comes at a time when NATO's 28 members are rethinking much of the rationale for this Cold War alliance. The United States, for its part, is pushing to streamline NATO's bureaucracy and make it more responsive to threats in places like Afghanistan.

**Second, removing our TNW’s from Turkey is the way to refocus and save NATO**

Kristensen 6 (Director of the Nuclear Information Program at the Federation of American Scientists
(Hans, US Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Proposed Solution,http://www.allacademic.commeta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/1/0/0/9/1/pages100915/p100915-1.php)

 Then there is the institutional justification: That U.S. nuclear weapons are deployed in Europe as a trans-Atlantic link that illustrates Washington’s commitment to defend its European allies. A sub-category of the institutional justification is the argument about burden-sharing: That by having U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, the NATO allies shoulder the cost of having a nuclear deterrent, share the risk of enemy attacks, and get a unique insight into (and presumably also influence on) the strike plans. If U.S. nuclear bombs in Europe are necessary to keep NATO together, then I think the alliance is in deep trouble. The real-world realities of NATO’s operations, priorities, and struggles have very little – if anything at all – to do with nuclear weapons, and I think those who use the link-argument are not doing NATO a favor. The NATO allies have plenty of burdens they need to share on non-nuclear missions, such as force structure modernizations, peacekeeping operations, and rapid reaction forces. Those are the issues that NATO should focus on to provide the “glue” across the Atlantic since they will determine the future of the alliance, rather than clinging to outdated arrangements from an era that has passed. The NATO nuclear mission is a significant operational and political burden that prevents NATO from transitioning to a post-Cold War alliance.

# 2AC NATO Add-On

**Moreover, NATO will collapse without modernizing**

**I.A.N., 08** (International Analyst Network,) "General (ret.) Klaus Naumann: "The Gap between NATO Missions and Means is growing as we speak," \_\_http://www.analyst-network.com/article.php?art\_id=1607\_\_)

**This is the key issue** and we do not have any illusion or high-flying expectations at all. **On the other hand, a NATO that enlarges and enlarges without having the capabilities to meet the obligations to defend an enlarged treaty area runs the risk of becoming a hollow alliance.** In addition, NATO is facing a real challenge in Afghanistan, where self-imposed restrictions deprive NATO of a possible success. **Moreover, the gap between missions and means is growing as we speak. We do not want to be prescriptive, but we saw it as our duty to speak up and to call for change since we are firmly convinced that there is no better answer to the challenges of our times than a vibrant and strong transatlantic alliance. We sincerely hope that our political leaders will note that there is an urgent need of acting and that they are aware of the first and foremost obligation: To do all they can to protect their nations’ citizens in the best possible way.**

**Finally, a unified NATO key to deal with political violence and prevent nuclear war**
 **Brzezinski 09**, (Zbigniew Brzezinski, former U.S. National Security Adviser, Sept/Oct 2009, “An Agenda for NATO,” Foreign Affairs, 88.5, Ebsco)

**NATO's potential is not primarily military.** Although NATO is a collective-security alliance, its actual military power comes predominantly from the United States, and that reality is not likely to change anytime soon. **NATO's real power derives from the fact that it combines the United States' military capabilities and economic power with Europe's collective political and economic weight** (and occasionally some limited European military forces). Together, that combination makes NATO globally significant. **It must therefore remain sensitive to the importance of safeguarding the geopolitical bond between the United States and Europe as it addresses new tasks. The basic challenge that NATO now confronts is that there are historically unprecedented risks to global security.** Today's world is threatened neither by the militant fanaticism of a territorially rapacious nationalist state nor by the coercive aspiration of a globally pretentious ideology embraced by an expansive imperial power**. The paradox of our time is that the world, increasingly connected and economically interdependent for the first time in its entire history, is experiencing intensifying popular unrest made all the more menacing by the growing accessibility of weapons of mass destruction -- not just to states but also, potentially, to extremist religious and political movements.** Yet there is no effective global security mechanism for coping with the growing threat of violent political chaos stemming from humanity's recent political awakening. The three great political contests of the twentieth century (the two world wars and the Cold War) accelerated the political awakening of mankind, which was initially unleashed in Europe by the French Revolution. Within a century of that revolution, spontaneous populist political activism had spread from Europe to East Asia. On their return home after World Wars I and II, the South Asians and the North Africans who had been conscripted by the British and French imperial armies propagated a new awareness of anticolonial nationalist and religious political identity among hitherto passive and pliant populations. The spread of literacy during the twentieth century and the wide-ranging impact of radio, television, and the Internet accelerated and intensified this mass global political awakening. In its early stages, such new political awareness tends to be expressed as a fanatical embrace of the most extreme ethnic or fundamentalist religious passions, with beliefs and resentments universalized in Manichaean categories. **Unfortunately, in significant parts of the developing world, bitter memories of European colonialism and of more recent U.S. intrusion have given such newly aroused passions a distinctively anti-Western cast.** **Today, the most acute example of this phenomenon is found in an area that stretches from Egypt to India. This area, inhabited by more than 500 million politically and religiously aroused peoples, is where NATO is becoming more deeply embroiled. Additionally complicating is the fact that the dramatic rise of China and India and the quick recovery of Japan within the last 50 years have signaled that the global center of political and economic gravity is shifting away from the North Atlantic toward Asia and the Pacific.** And of the currently leading global powers -- the United States, the EU, China, Japan, Russia, and India -- at least two, or perhaps even three, are revisionist in their orientation. **Whether they are "rising peacefully"** (a self-confident **China), truculently**

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# 2AC NATO Add-On

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 (an **imperial**ly nostalgic **Russia**) **or boastfully** (an assertive India, despite its internal multiethnic and religious vulnerabilities), **they all desire a change in the global** pecking **order**. The future conduct of and relationship among these three still relatively cautious revisionist powers will further intensify the strategic uncertainty**. Visible on the horizon but not as powerful are the emerging regional rebels, with some of them defiantly reaching for nuclear weapons. North Korea has openly flouted the international community by producing** (apparently successfully**) its own nuclear weapons -- and also by profiting from their dissemination.** At some point, its unpredictability could precipitate the first use of nuclear weapons in anger since 1945. Iran, in contrast, has proclaimed that its nuclear program is entirely for peaceful purposes but so far has been unwilling to consider consensual arrangements with the international community that would provide credible assurances regarding these intentions. In nuclear-armed Pakistan, an extremist anti-Western religious movement is threatening the country's political stability. **These changes together reflect the waning of the post-World War II global hierarchy and the simultaneous dispersal of global power. Unfortunately, U.S. leadership in recent years unintentionally, but most unwisely, contributed to the currently threatening state of affairs. The combination of Washington's arrogant unilateralism in Iraq and its demagogic Islamophobic sloganeering weakened the unity of NATO and focused aroused Muslim resentments on the United States and the West more generally.**

# Military Presence = TNWs

**Military Presence includes the presence of TNWs**

**United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research in 02** < United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons; Time for Control” Pgs 9-10, November 2002.>

Although it is hard to imagine the utility of TNWs in meeting security threats in Central Asia, the Russian resolve to keep all of its military options open has probably increased since the post-11 September rise in intensity of conflict in the region**. The new prospect of a long term United States military presence in the area likely reinforces that conviction**. The last noteworthy, recent development is the more frequent discussions in the United States and Russian press since 11 September 2001 **of both the access of non-State actors to TNWs and the possible use of TNWs by State actors.** Regarding the former issue, although there has been no fundamental change recently in the vulnerability of United States or Russian TNWs arsenals, the potential for diversion of weapons not in central storage is a risk that merits more attention.

**Military Presence includes Tactical Nuclear Weapons**

**Shmemann 89** <Serge Shmemann, New York Times, Section A; Page 2, Column 3; Foreign Desk. January 20, 1989 “USSR Says it will withdraw its nuclear arms from Europe”>

The reduction of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe to which Mr. Shevardnadze referred was announced by Mikhail S. Gorbachev at the United Nations in December. The Soviet leader said 50,000 men and 5,000 tanks would be pulled out of East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Mr. Gorbachev did not say at the time that the withdrawing units would take their nuclear arms with them, but the impression he gave was that they would leave with all their weapons. Thus Mr. Shevardnadze's announcement was not viewed by diplomats as a major breakthrough**. ''Pursuing its declared** **fundamental objective of removing any foreign military presence** and bases from the territories of other countries, the Soviet Union will withdraw from Central Europe military formations and units with all their organic armaments**, including tactical nuclear weapons**,**''** the Foreign Minister said. In Moscow, the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman, Gennadi I. Gerasimov, said plans for reducing the Soviet troops will be drawn up by April, and that the first withdrawals will be from Hungary.

**Military Presence includes nuclear arsenal**

**Greenwald 3** <Lou Ann Greenwald, 2003. LA Times excerpt. http://www.zlatanvukosavljevic.com/Docs/zlatan-vukosavljevic-text.htm>

Vukosavljevic's installation reflected the spirited response of some Americans at the start of the Cold War in the 1960s when the threat of **nuclear weapons for mass destruction spurred individuals to action, inspiring the widespread construction of underground shelters equipped with food, water and survival supplies to protect a family in the case of attack.  The artist cites the start of the Cold War as a shift away from the heroic and monumental presence of the military toward a military presence** that is imminent, pervasive, invisible and mediated.

# A2: Turkish Prolif DA

**Withdrawal of U.S tactical nukes in Turkey restores U.S-Turkish relations and Turkish perception of security**

Bell and Loehrke 09 (Alexandra Bell and Benjamin Loehrke, Truman National Security Fellow and research assistant at thePloughshares Fund and a graduate student at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, November 23rd, 2009. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, The Status of U.S Nuclear Weapons in Turkey.) http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey) AV

Preventing Turkey (and any other country in the region) from acquiring nuclear weapons is critical to international security. Doing so requires a key factor that also is essential to paving the way toward withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons: improved alliance relations. The political and strategic compasses are pointing to the eventual withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe--it's a strategy that certainly fits the disarmament agenda President Barack Obama has outlined. But to get there, careful diplomacy will be required to improve U.S.-Turkish ties and to assuage Turkish security concerns. The U.S.-Turkish relationship cooled when Turkey refused to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom, after which Turkish support for U.S. policy declined through the end of the George W. Bush administration. Obama's election has helped to mend fences, and his visit to Turkey in April was warmly received. In fact, all of the administration's positive interactions with Turkey have been beneficial: Washington has supported Turkey's role as a regional energy supplier and encouraged Ankara as it undertakes difficult political reforms and works to resolve regional diplomatic conflicts. For its part, Turkey recently doubled its troop contribution to NATO's Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan--a boon to U.S. efforts there. By incorporating Ankara into its new European missile defense plans--intended to protect Turkey and other countries vulnerable to Iran's short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles--Washington could further shore up its military relationship with Turkey. Ship-based Aegis missile systems will be the backbone of the strategy, with considerations left open for later deployments of mobile ground-based interceptors in Eastern Europe or Turkey. This cooperation could provide the bond with Washington and perception of security that Turkey seeks in the face of a potential Iranian bomb.

TNW removal improves relations – Turkish government wants a nuclear-free Middle East. Conventional forces compensate any loss of deterrence.

Lewis 09 (Jeffrey, “Official: Ankara Doesn't Need NATO Nukes,” Arms Control. 12/18/09 Wonk, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2561/official-ankara-would-not-insist-on-nato-nukes)

The most interesting part, to me, concerned the role of nuclear weapons in Turkish security. Kalin reiterated that “Turkey wants a nuclear-free Middle East, and this applies to Iran as well as other countries suspected of having nuclear bombs.” This is a very sensible position, but — since the two powers in “the region” that have nuclear weapons are Israel and NATO — it also provided an opening to ask about where Ankara was on those U.S. nuclear weapons believed to be stationed at Incirlik Airbase in Turkey. (For a nice background on the current debate, see: Alexandra Bell and Benjamin Loehrke, The status of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey, November 23, 2009.) I asked about the few hundred nuclear weapons that the United States forward-deploys in five NATO member-states. (I carefully avoided specifying Turkey as one of the five.) I noted that US Air Forces-Europe (USAFE) would love to bring those weapons home, but that in Washington the conventional wisdom is that they must remain forward-deployed to assure Turkey. So, I asked, does Ankara’s commitment to a nuclear weapon-free Middle East mean that the Turkish Government would support withdrawal of the weapons now or possible under some future agreement? Kalin answered the question. He began, as he should, with all the standard things: That it was up to the United States, that this is a conversation that should occur within NATO, Turkey’s commitment to a nuclear-weapon free region was a serious proposal, etc. Then he said something remarkable: As for his own personal opinion, Kalin said, Turkey “would not insist” that NATO retain forward-deployed nuclear weapons. Conventional forces are sufficient, he added, to meet Turkish security needs. Kiniklioglu didn’t flinch. That’s pretty remarkable. Normally, when asked about forward-deployed nuclear weapons, a foreign officials will assess the condition of his shoeshine and then mumble something into his tie. A little data point for the next time someone asserts that we can’t withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, lest the Turks build nuclear weapons.

# A2: Turkish Prolif DA

**Turkey won’t pursue nuclear weapons for risking US and EU alienation**

**Barkey 09** (Henri, Ph.D., Political Science, University of Pennsylvania; M.S., Political Science, University College, September 22, 2009, “TURKEY'S PERSPECTIVES ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DISARMAMENT”Unblocking the road to zero)

Go nuclear option: **This could not be achieved quickly**. As will be described below, **Turkey does not have the technical wherewithal to produce nuclear weapons anytime soon. It can decide to make the necessary investments, but it would take time and resources** to reach fruition. Moreover, **Turkey does not have the possibility of pursuing this option clandestinely because of the close relationships it has developed with the United States and Europe** over the years, making the country fairly transparent. An open nuclear endeavor **would risk alienating the Europeans and Americans**, but **a covert program would do so even more**. During the Reagan Administration, the United States was very concerned about the existence of a nuclear supply relationship between Pakistan and Turkey. President **Reagan** and his aides **warned the Turks** in a number of different settings **about this relationship until means for greater cooperation between the two countries were instituted.** 22 **Ankara is** intent on being far more **cautious on this front**; in June 2008, Turkish **officials met** a visiting **Syrian energy ministers suggestion for nuclear cooperation** between Turkey and Syria **with silence**

**Turkey doesn’t have the capability to proliferate and wouldn’t be able to in the near future**

**Riedel and Samore 08** ( Bruce and Gary, Senior Fellow, [Foreign Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy.aspx), [Saban Center for Middle East Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/saban.aspx) and Vice President and Director of Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, DECEMBER 2008 “Managing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East” Brookings institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2008/12_nuclear_proliferation_riedel.aspx>)

Since **no Arab state has the technical or industrial capacity to build its own bomb in the next decade** or more, the United States should focus its concerns on the possibility that one or more of the super-rich Gulf states might try to buy one. If Saudi Arabia already has such an arrangement with Pakistan, it is conceivable that other wealthy Gulf states—most notably, the United Arab Emirates—might do the same. To reduce this risk, the next administration will have a variety of options. One would be to extend any nuclear umbrella and security guarantees offered to Israel to the Saudis and other Gulf states. Such a formal commitment would reduce the incentive for the Saudis to get a weapon from Pakistan and would make clear to the Iranians that the United States will not tolerate nuclear blackmail in the Persian Gulf. The issue of Israel will again complicate the issue. The Arabs will ask why they must forgo their own nuclear weapons program but Israel does not, and the United States must articulate that any nuclear umbrella does not include U.S. protection for Israel should it initiate conﬂict against these Gulf states. Of course, the United States already has such a nuclear commitment to Turkey through the NATO alliance. Unlike the Arab states, **Turkey has a well-developed 117industrial and scientiﬁc infrastructure, but it has not invested resources in the development of its nuclear sector beyond small-scale scientific research. Therefore Turkey does not have the technical capability to build its own bomb in the near term.** Moreover, in our discussions with Turkish ofﬁcials and experts, **we did not detect a strong motivation to acquire nuclear weapons to counter Iran. The Turks see Iran as a “peer competitor,” and they believe that Iran’s nuclear program is an element of Iran’s effort to strengthen its inﬂuence in the region, but they do not generally see Iran as a military threat that would justify the expense and risk of acquiring nuclear weapons**, especially since Turkey already has U.S. nuclear assurances under NATO.

# a2: Turkish Prolif DA

**Turkey is committed to nuclear non-proliferation**

**Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 10** <”Turkey’s Approach to Arms Control and Disarmament” Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affiars, website updated June 23, 2010. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/arms-control-and-disarmament.en.mfa>>

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their delivery means is a growing tangible threat in the 21st century. Easy access to these weapons through trafficking and willingness of some states to cooperate with terrorist, extremist or organized crime groups increase the concern that such weapons might end up in illegal hands. In the light of the threatening dimension of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Turkey sincerely desires to see that all countries will come to share the goals of non-proliferation and collectively work towards a safer and more stable world. In this vein, Turkey has welcome the UN Security Counsil Resolution 1540 on the non-proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. Turkey, regularly reports to and contributes to the work of the Committee established pursuend to the UNSC Resolution 1540. **Turkey does not provide any form of support and/or assistance to Non-State Actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transfer or use WMD and their means of delivery and fully supports all international efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD.** The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery continue to be a matter of serious concern for Turkey. Since Turkey is situated close to regions posing high risks of proliferation, she monitors with vigilance the developments in this field and takes part in collective efforts aimed at devising measures to reverse this alarming trend. Turkey attaches great importance to arms control and non-proliferation treaties and also to export control regimes as means to prevent such proliferation. In this context, in order to follow the developments and enable an effective exchange of views in the field of non-proliferation regarding Turkey’s obligations; regular meetings are held in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the participation of representatives of all related institutions. Turkey became party to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1979 and to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 2000. Turkey is also party to both the Chemical Weapons Convention since 1997 and the Biological Weapons Convention since 1974. In 1996, Turkey became the founding member of the Wassenaar Arrangement regarding export controls of conventional weapons and dual-use equipment and technologies. Turkey joined the Missile Technology Control Regime in 1997, the Zangger Committee in 1999, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Australia Group which seeks to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons, in 2000.

**Turkey doesn’t have the capability to proliferate and wouldn’t be able to in the near future**

**Riedel and Samore 08** ( Bruce and Gary, Senior Fellow, [Foreign Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy.aspx), [Saban Center for Middle East Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/saban.aspx) and Vice President and Director of Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, DECEMBER 2008 “Managing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East” Brookings institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2008/12_nuclear_proliferation_riedel.aspx>)

Since no Arab state has the technical or industrial capacity to build its own bomb in the next decade or more, the United States should focus its concerns on the possibility that one or more of the super-rich Gulf states might try to buy one. If Saudi Arabia already has such an arrangement with Pakistan, it is conceivable that other wealthy Gulf states—most notably, the United Arab Emirates—might do the same. To reduce this risk, the next administration will have a variety of options. One would be to extend any nuclear umbrella and security guarantees offered to Israel to the Saudis and other Gulf states. Such a formal commitment would reduce the incentive for the Saudis to get a weapon from Pakistan and would make clear to the Iranians that the United States will not tolerate nuclear blackmail in the Persian Gulf. The issue of Israel will again complicate the issue. The Arabs will ask why they must forgo their own nuclear weapons program but Israel does not, and the United States must articulate that any nuclear umbrella does not include U.S. protection for Israel should it initiate conﬂict against these Gulf states. Of course, the United States already has such a nuclear commitment to Turkey through the NATO alliance. Unlike the Arab states, **Turkey has a well-developed 117industrial and scientiﬁc infrastructure, but it has not invested resources in the development of its nuclear sector beyond small-scale scientific research. Therefore Turkey does not have the technical capability to build its own bomb in the near term**. Moreover, in our discussions with Turkish ofﬁcials and experts**, we did not detect a strong motivation to acquire nuclear weapons to counter Iran. The Turks see Iran as a “peer competitor,” and they believe that Iran’s nuclear program is an element of Iran’s effort to strengthen its inﬂuence in the region, but they do not generally see Iran as a military threat that would justify the expense and risk of acquiring nuclear weapons**, especially since Turkey already has U.S. nuclear assurances under NATO.

# a2: Turkish Prolif DA

**Economic and political sanctions deter turkey prolif**

**Al-Marashi 9** (Ibrahim al-Marashi, Ph.D., Associate Dean of International Relations at IE School of Communication-IE University, Nilsu Goren, M.A., Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Turkish Perceptions and Nuclear Proliferation” Strategic Insights, Volume VIII, Issue 2, <http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2009/Apr/marashiApr09.html>)

By 2015, Turkey expects to complete the construction of three nuclear power stations based on energy needs, being subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard measures and inspections. These plans have generated controversy within the country among anti-nuclear activists and opposition members of the Turkish parliament.[[50](http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2009/Apr/marashiApr09.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22references)] As official state policy, Turkey complies with the Nonproliferation Treaty(NPT), Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, Comprehensive test-ban Treaty (CTBT), and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Even if Turkey were to build a nuclear arsenal it would not be able to deploy nuclear weapons without disrespecting the rule of international law, i.e. noncompliance with the international regimes it has adhered to. In this case, the benefits of acquiring nuclear weapons do not outweigh the costs of economic and political sanctions that the country would face leaving the NATO umbrella and breaking its strategic alliance with United States. During an interview on the *Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel*’s program “Today’s Encounter” in February 2006 the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was asked: “Regarding the Iranian nuclear file, we know that the issue is now heading toward escalation, but we also know that Turkey is preparing to launch a nuclear energy program. What are the limits of this nuclear program?” Erdogan responded that: “We have not announced our nuclear program yet, but it is designed for peaceful and humanitarian purposes.” He emphasized that the program was designed for Turkey to secure an energy source without depending on its neighbors.[[51](http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2009/Apr/marashiApr09.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22references)] Proving the energy dependency, on January 3, 2007, Iran cut off the natural gas flow, constituting the one third of Turkish gas imports, to Turkey, based on its high domestic demands.[[52](http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2009/Apr/marashiApr09.html#references)] Turkish officials announced that this situation wouldn’t affect Turkey drastically due to its access to the Russian Blue Stream and other Western pipelines. Still, the questionable cut and Turkish energy dependency stirred a lot of debate and concerns on electricity shortage. After Ankara’s contacts with Iranian officials, on January 8, Tehran apologized for “the inconvenience” and resumed pumping gas, claiming that a newly-established Iranian refinery had resolved the issue.[[53](http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2009/Apr/marashiApr09.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22references)] Based on these developments, Turkish Ministry of Energy decided to accelerate the nuclear plant project. The proposal to build one of Turkey’s three planned nuclear power reactors in Sinop, for example, a scenic town on the Black Sea, has elicited strong opposition from Turkish environmentalists, as well from the opposition party in the Turkish parliament, which opposes the efforts of the governing Justice and Development Party (known as the “AK Party” in Turkish) to import nuclear technology. For its part, the AK Party has justified these efforts on the ground that Turkey’s demand for energy is growing but the country lacks natural energy resources to meet these needs. A February 2006 report on the private Turkish news channel *NTV* quoted Engin Altay, a member of the parliamentary opposition as stating: “Construction of a nuclear plant is a catastrophic project with zero safety.” The lawmaker expressed concern that Turkey would become a “dumping ground” for third-rate nuclear technology that the United States and European countries had already abandoned. He accused the current government of giving in to “nuclear lobbies” and claimed that Turkey could increase electricity supplies by reducing unregistered electricity consumption.[[54](http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2009/Apr/marashiApr09.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22references)] A U.S.-Turkey nuclear agreement was signed on July 26, 2000, and approved by the Turkish parliament on January 14, 2005. On July 9, 2006, the Government of Turkey formally adopted the instrument of ratification for the U.S.-Turkey Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.[[55](http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2009/Apr/marashiApr09.html#references)] The underlying purpose of the agreement was to authorize and set the conditions for transfers to Turkey of U.S. civil nuclear technology, equipment, components, and material, including nuclear power reactors and their low enriched uranium fuel.

# A2: Deterrence DA

**U.S Tactical Nuclear Weapons serve no deterrent purpose in Turkey.**

Bell and Loehrke 09 (Alexandra Bell and Benjamin Loehrke, Truman National Security Fellow and research assistant at thePloughshares Fund and a graduate student at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, November 23rd, 2009. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, The Status of U.S Nuclear Weapons in Turkey.) http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey) AV

Today, Turkey hosts an estimated 90 B61 gravity bombs at Incirlik Air Base. Fifty of these bombs are reportedly assigned for delivery by U.S. pilots, and forty are assigned for delivery by the Turkish Air Force. However, no permanent nuclear-capable U.S. fighter wing is based at Incirlik, and the Turkish Air Force is reportedly not certified for NATO nuclear missions, meaning nuclear-capable F-16s from other U.S. bases would need to be brought in if Turkey's bombs were ever needed. Such a relaxed posture makes clear just how little NATO relies on tactical nuclear weapons for its defense anymore. In fact, the readiness of NATO's nuclear forces now is measured in months as opposed to hours or days. Supposedly, the weapons are still deployed as a matter of deterrence, but the crux of deterrence is sustaining an aggressor's perception of guaranteed rapid reprisal--a perception the nuclear bombs deployed in Turkey cannot significantly add to because they are unable to be rapidly launched. Aggressors are more likely to be deterred by NATO's conventional power or the larger strategic forces supporting its nuclear umbrella.

TNW removal improves relations – Turkish government wants a nuclear-free Middle East. Conventional forces compensate any loss of deterrence.

Lewis 09 (Jeffrey, “Official: Ankara Doesn't Need NATO Nukes,” Arms Control. 12/18/09 Wonk, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2561/official-ankara-would-not-insist-on-nato-nukes)

I attended an interesting meeting today that Flynt Leverett hosted with two high-powered Turkish officials from the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) — Ibrahim Kalin, chief foreign policy adviser to the Prime Minister, and a Suat Kiniklioglu, a Turkish MP who serves as deputy chairman of foreign affairs for the party. It was a very interesting meeting with two very sharp guys. And it was, with a few exceptions, on the record. The most interesting part, to me, concerned the role of nuclear weapons in Turkish security. Kalin reiterated that “Turkey wants a nuclear-free Middle East, and this applies to Iran as well as other countries suspected of having nuclear bombs.” This is a very sensible position, but — since the two powers in “the region” that have nuclear weapons are Israel and NATO — it also provided an opening to ask about where Ankara was on those U.S. nuclear weapons believed to be stationed at Incirlik Airbase in Turkey. (For a nice background on the current debate, see: Alexandra Bell and Benjamin Loehrke, The status of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey, November 23, 2009.) I asked about the few hundred nuclear weapons that the United States forward-deploys in five NATO member-states. (I carefully avoided specifying Turkey as one of the five.) I noted that US Air Forces-Europe (USAFE) would love to bring those weapons home, but that in Washington the conventional wisdom is that they must remain forward-deployed to assure Turkey. So, I asked, does Ankara’s commitment to a nuclear weapon-free Middle East mean that the Turkish Government would support withdrawal of the weapons now or possible under some future agreement? Kalin answered the question. He began, as he should, with all the standard things: That it was up to the United States, that this is a conversation that should occur within NATO, Turkey’s commitment to a nuclear-weapon free region was a serious proposal, etc. Then he said something remarkable: As for his own personal opinion, Kalin said, Turkey “would not insist” that NATO retain forward-deployed nuclear weapons. Conventional forces are sufficient, he added, to meet Turkish security needs. Kiniklioglu didn’t flinch. That’s pretty remarkable. Normally, when asked about forward-deployed nuclear weapons, a foreign officials will assess the condition of his shoeshine and then mumble something into his tie. A little data point for the next time someone asserts that we can’t withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, lest the Turks build nuclear weapons.

# A2: Deterrence DA

Turkey’s primary form of deterrence is NATO assistance and its ground army – not America’s nuclear weapons

 Barkey 09 (Henri, visiting scholar in the Carnegie Middle East Program @ Lehigh University, “Turkey’s Perspective on Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament”, accessed at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Nuclear\_Turkey.pdf on 6/22/10//dml)

 However, **in the absence of any nuclear weapons of its own**, when it comes to contemplating threats from nuclear-armed nations, **Turkey has little else to rely on other than NATO’s guarantees**. This might be relevant in considering the possibility of a revanchist Russia, or scenarios in which Iran and/or Syria acquire nuclear weapons. Hence, despite the discordant voices emanating from various groups, Turks continue to rely on the American security umbrella. **Ankara has always stressed the importance of its NATO commitments**. Moreover, as will be discussed below**, there is no easy way for Turkey to obtain such weapons, even assuming it was willing to forsake its alliance and treaty pledges. It currently has no nuclear power plants and only the beginnings of a research/technical infrastructure. What has made the Turkish military a potent force has been its NATO links. The combination of NATO, a robust army, and a willingness to take security seriously has served effectively as Turkey’s primary form of deterrence.**

**No risk – TNWs increasingly less important.**

**Kelleher and Warren, 2009** [Catherine M. Kelleher, College Park Professor at the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland and a senior fellow at the Watson Institute at Brown University. During the Clinton administration, she was defense adviser to the U.S. mission to NATO and deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia. She is a member of the Arms Control Association’s board of directors. Scott L, recent graduate of Brown University, currently serving as executive director of the nonprofit Generation Citizen, “Getting to Zero Starts Here: Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” Oct., http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009\_10/Kelleher]

**Strategically, the weapons have little real value in the post-Cold War climate. They are vulnerable to a rogue or terrorist attack, too small or risky for independent military use, and unpopular with military forces and most political audiences.** Lately, **maintaining these weapons has provided many more disadvantages than advantages** for the countries that possess them in their arsenals—France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—at least as **measured in terms of the costs of safety and security, of the operational burden of dedicating and preserving delivery aircraft, and of ensuring ongoing certification of forces. Even within NATO**, for all but a few countries, **tactical weapons have come to represent a decreasingly meaningful symbolic commitment rather than a concrete deterrent or escalation tripwire.** From a U.S. standpoint, the relatively low numbers of such weapons that still exist, at approximately 1,000 in the U.S. arsenal with only 20-25 percent of that number located outside U.S. borders, would seem to make it easy to secure and verify their ultimate elimination.[2]

# A2: Deterrence DA

**Nope, nope, nope.**

**Dixon, 2009** [John, Roosevelt Institute, “The Tactical Nuclear Weapons Dilemma,” http://www.rooseveltcampusnetwork.org/blog/tactical-nuclear-weapons-dilemma]

In other words, using TNW could make other countries more inclined to use their weapons in war (think an India-Pakistan scenario). This is one reason why the Bush Administration’s proposed Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, or nuclear “bunker buster,” met so much resistance. **The United States deployed thousands of TNW in Europe during the Cold War to help bolster its deterrent force. Some still regard TNW as an important part of American security guarantees to members of NATO,** especially newer member-states from Eastern Europe. On the other hand, **Western European members of NATO have called for the removal of TNW from their territory.** According to the Federation of American Scientists, the United States maintains around 200 deployed TNW in bases throughout Europe. Resolving this tension within NATO will be difficult, especially in light of the strain over Afghanistan. However, **it is evident that tactical nuclear weapons serve little purpose in today’s security environment. In the words of one NATO diplomat, countries like Iran and North Korea “do not give a toss about what NATO doeswith its weapons.”** (1)

##  No Link– the US has been withdrawing TNW’s for 20 years

Bell and Loehrke 09 (Alexandra, Truman National Security Fellow, Benjamin, Grad student in Public Policy, “The Status of US nuclear weapons in Turkey”)

**For more than 40 years, Turkey has been a quiet custodian of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons**. During the Cold War, Washington positioned intermediate-range nuclear missiles and bombers there to serve as a bulwark against the Soviet Union (i.e., to defend the region against Soviet attack and to influence Soviet strategic calculations). In the event of a Soviet assault on Europe, the weapons were to be fired as one of the first retaliatory shots. **But as the Cold War waned, so, too, did the weapons' strategic value. Thus, over the last few decades, the United States has removed all of its intermediate-range missiles from Turkey and reduced its other nuclear weapons there through gradual redeployments and arms control agreements.**

## Deterrence empirically fails – it only leads to escalation of what would be minor wars

**Kober 6/13** (Stanley, PhD in Law and Diplomacy, “The Deterrence illusion http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/jun/10/deterrence-war-peace)
**The first world war was the product of a mode of rational thinking that went badly off course.** The peace of Europe was based on security assurances. Germany was the protector of Austria-Hungary, and Russia was the protector of Serbia. **The prospect of escalation was supposed to prevent war, and it did– until, finally, it didn't. The Russians, who should have been deterred – they had suffered a terrible defeat at the hands of Japan just a few years before – decided they had to come to the support of their fellow Slavs. As countries honoured their commitments, a system that was designed to prevent war instead widened it.** We have also been living in an age of globalisation, especially since the end of the cold war, but it too is increasingly being challenged. And just like the situation at the beginning of the last century, deterrence is not working. Much is made, for example, of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) invoking Article V – the famous "three musketeers" pledge that an attack on one member is to be considered as an attack on all – following the terrorist attacks of September 11. **But the United States is the most powerful member of Nato by far. Indeed, in 2001, it was widely considered to be a hegemon, a hyperpower. Other countries wanted to be in Nato because they felt an American guarantee would provide security. And yet it was the US that was attacked. This failure of deterrence has not received the attention it deserves. It is, after all, not unique. The North Vietnamese were not deterred by the American guarantee to South Vietnam. Similarly, Hezbollah was not deterred in Lebanon in the 1980s, and American forces were assaulted in Somalia.** What has been going wrong?

# A2 Consult NATO

**Consultation with NATO to withdraw the TNWs in Turkey is normal means**

**Today’s Zaman 4/3/10** (Turkish newspaper, “Report: US considers withdrawing nuclear bombs from Turkey,” accessed at <http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-206266-report-us-considers-withdrawing-nuclear-bombs-from-turkey.html> on 6/26/10//dml)

The United States may withdraw its tactical nuclear weapons deployed in five NATO member European countries, including Turkey, The Times reported on Friday. **The United States positioned B61 gravity bombs in Turkey**, Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Germany during the Cold War years **to serve as a bulwark against the Soviet Union**. There are a total of 200 B61 bombs deployed in the five countries, The Times said. **Turkey is believed to be hosting 90 bombs at İncirlik Air Base** in southern Anatolia. According to the report, **the Obama administration is preparing to revise US policy on nuclear weapons** -- heralding further reductions in the US stockpile and a pledge not to develop new systems. **But a possible decision to withdraw the B61 gravity bombs is not expected to be included in th****e revised nuclear policy, as it is a matter for discussion within NATO.**

**NATO will say no, Many Eastern European nations see them as vital to Russian deterrence**

**Oxford Research 10** (6/10/10 *Oxford Analytica Global Strategic Analysis* “Europe: London and Paris will maintain Nuclear Posture” http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdweb?index=6&did=2054790861&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1277750302&clientId=17822)

TNWs in Europe. Nuclear weapons play a key role in NATO's present Strategic Concept. However, a new version is to be released at the Lisbon summit in November: Numbers and purpose. The United States maintains 150-200 TNWs in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. The current Strategic Concept sees these weapons as vital to Europe's security, and the NPR sees them as a contribution to alliance cohesion and reassurance. Russia has several thousand TNWs -- many in territory near NATO states -- and views them as a counterweight to NATO's conventional superiority. Withdrawal. NATO member states are divided over the future of US TNWs in Europe. Some consider their dismantling as a sign of NATO's commitment to nuclear disarmament, without compromising NATO's capacities. The German government has called for the withdrawal of nuclear forces from its soil. A February 2010 letter to NATO's secretary-general from the foreign ministers of Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway called for the inclusion of TNWs in future arms control measures after New START. Deterrent. *Many East European NATO members have little desire for TNWs to be removed and see them as a defence against Russia.* NATO has referred to them as a credible deterrent. Quid pro quo. Others, including the United States, argue that the weapons could in principle be withdrawn, but only in return for greater transparency and reductions in Russia's TNW arsenal.

## NATO will say no to removing TNWs from Turkey. NATO plans on relocating the TNWs from other countries to Turkey

Weitz 10 (4/12/10, Richard, Dr. Weitz is a graduate of Harvard College (B.A. with Highest Honors in Government), the London School of Economics (M.Sc. in International Relations), Oxford University (M.Phil. in Politics), and Harvard University (Ph.D. in Political Science). Held a position on the U.S. Dept of Defense. “The Turkey Analyst” http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2010/100412-TRA.pdf)

As part of the current NATO deliberation, there have been proposals to increase the number of U.S. nuclear weapons stored in Turkey as part of an alliance-wide consolidation of NATO’s TNW arsenal. Some proponents of retaining NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements favor removing them from those European countries that no longer want them on their soil and relocating them into those countries that do, which might only include Turkey and perhaps Italy. If NATO withdrew U.S. TNW from all other European countries, the Turkish government could find it uncomfortable remaining the only NATO nuclear-hosting state, and might request their removal from its territory as well. But then Turkey might proceed to develop an independent nuclear deterrent in any case for the reasons described above.

# A2 Consult NATO

## Even if NATO says yes, NATO interaction makes solving the Iran and Russian advantages impossible

Rühle 09 ( Michael, Senior Political Adviser in the NATO Secretary General’s Policy Planning Unit, on NATO’s International Staff since 1991, MA in political science, “NATO and extended deterrence” pg 15)

Put differently, **Iran is not going to give up its nuclear ambitions because NATO abandons its nuclear sharing arrangements. Even if this step were only meant as an initial move to demonstrate Western goodwill, it would have little, if any, effect. The NGO community, whose criticism of nuclear sharing meanwhile borders on the pathological, would simply argue that NATO had finally corrected a mistake it had been clinging to for far too long. Russia would argue along similar lines, pointing to the fact that she had returned her TNW back to Russia a long time ago and that NATO was only belatedly following Moscow’s example. Indeed, it is difficult to find any party that would appreciate such an initiative beyond a sympathetic nod.** Nor should this be surprising. In a political context dominated by abolitionist rhetoric, any limited disarmament measure will by definition fall short of expectations, and will this not provide much political “mileage.” What is gone is gone.

## Perm – Do the plan then CP during the the Strategic Concept NATO summit

**Introducing plan to N.A.T.O. causes serious political problems and controversy, doing the plan avoids NATO conflict which would lead to rejection, but consulting afterwards accesses the neg’s net- benefits**

**Sokov ’09-** Phd from Umich in historical sciences, candidate of Historical Sciences degree from the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (1986), Tactical (Substrategic) Nuclear Weapons, June 2009, Iss. 4

http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/090717\_german\_leadership/german\_leadership\_6\_issue\_4.pdf

European NATO members, however, are split on the subject. Many Western European governments (including some of the few countries where the weapons continue to be based) would just as well do without the weapons, facing public opposition to their presence and sensing little security benefit from them. Moreover, some countries, such as Germany, are less than eager to take on the cost of fielding a new generation of dual-capable aircraft, given the low probability of their use.25 However, these countries believe that even discussing the issue in NATO and other foray can only lead to political problems and would prefer that the United States make a decision and announce it to other states. One representative of a European state complained in a recent interview that the Obama administration had been seeking his country’s advice on what to do about nonstrategic nuclear weapons. “They shouldn’t come here asking us what to do,” he said. “They should decide what to do, and pull the weapons out a week later.”26 In recent years, these countries have been accommodated by a slow but silent drawdown of these weapons. Rose Gottemoeller, the Obama administration’s lead nuclear arms control negotiator, summed up the current awkward status quo last year, before taking on her new official duties: It appears that the United States and the NATO allies have arrived at a new place in their long and stormy marriage, without explicit action but decisive effect: They have decided to sell the nuclear beach house and buy a conventional house in the mountains. Now they just have to figure out how to tell the children.27 To be sure, there are conservative elements in these countries, particularly in their defense ministries, and in NATO headquarters that argue for the continued deployment of these weapons. They stress that unless European members of NATO are willing to share the burden of nuclear defense, the United States will not allow them to influence its nuclear weapons policy and their interests will be sacrificed as the United States decouples from Europe.28

# A2 Consult NATO

## Perm – Do the CP, just wait until after the Strategic Concept NATO summit

## Perm solves best - It accesses all the net benefits of the Counter Plan while increasing the chance of the plan being accepted by NATO

Regehr 10 (Ernie, professor of peace and conflict studies and Conrad Grebel and Waterloo University 4/26/10, “NATO takes the opportunity to miss another opportunity” http://www.cigionline.org/blogs/2010/4/nato-takes-opportunity-miss-another-opportunity)

But then came the meeting. The Obama Administration’s formal approach was, as expected, to defer the question of tactical US nuclear weapons in Europe to the fall summit that is intended to approve a new NATO Strategic Concept. The signals sent by US Secretary of State Clinton were, however, more pointed. She insisted that while cuts in US battlefield nuclear weapons still in Europe were possible, they should not all be removed until Russia agrees to cut its arsenals. “We should recognize that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance,” she said. Adding that, “as a nuclear alliance, sharing nuclear risks and responsibilities widely is fundamental.”[vi] NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen took a similar line, emphasizing Alliance unity and that "decisions on nuclear policy will be made by the Alliance together,” also reinforcing the Clinton point about nuclear sharing. These are the hard the line voices. They equate North Atlantic extended deterrence and defence cooperation with the physical presence of nuclear weapons in Europe, and they are out of sync with, not only the sentiments of central Europeans, but also the US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).[vii] The NPR, to no one’s surprise, reinforces US extended deterrence, but it goes on to explain that this “nuclear umbrella” comes in different guises, including “the strategic forces of the U.S. Triad, non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed forward in key regions, and U.S.-based nuclear weapons that could be deployed forward quickly to meet regional contingencies.” The point is there is no intrinsic requirement that extended deterrence, whatever one thinks of it, requires the presence of nuclear weapons throughout the geography of the American nuclear umbrella. The NPR also acknowledges that “the risk of nuclear attack against North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members is at an historic low.” It is thus non-prescriptive on the fate of US nuclear weapons in Europe, noting only that “any changes in NATO’s nuclear posture should only be taken after a thorough review within – and decision by – the Alliance.”[viii] The west European States behind the call for change have emphasized that they are looking for a collective decision in NATO and are not contemplating unilateral action, and, notably, that they do not equate the removal of weapons from Europe with either the “denuclearization of NATO” or with an end to US extended deterrence covering Europe.[ix] Their stance essentially follows the model of the US nuclear umbrella over North-East Asia. The latter is a region that is rather less stable than Europe, and yet there are no US nuclear weapons deployed to any states under its nuclear umbrella there.[x] In fact, Japan, while continuing to claim the American nuclear deterrent for itself, insists, through its three nuclear principles,[xi] that no nuclear weapons be on its territory.

# A2: Security (Aff Specific)

**Turn – allowing Turkey regional autonomy is a way of changing security constructs of the region**

**Sandrin 5/9/10** (Paula, Ph.D. candidate in Politics and IR @ Westminster, “Turkey’s Competing Security Cultures and Their Impact on Foreign Policy,” accessed at [http://changingturkey.com/2010/05/09/turkey’s-competing-security-cultures-and-their-impact-on-foreign-policy/](http://changingturkey.com/2010/05/09/turkey%E2%80%99s-competing-security-cultures-and-their-impact-on-foreign-policy/) on 6/27/10//dml)

One important political actor which seems to be informed by a different conception of Turkey’s identity and adifferent security understanding is the AKP. Following Turgut Ozal and Ismail Cem, the AKP also stresses Turkey’s multicivilizational character and its ability to be active in many regions: “Turkey enjoys multiple regional identities and thus has the capability as well as the responsibility to follow an integrated and multidimensional foreign policy” (Davutoglu 2010). Turkey should no longer be a frontier country, as it was during the Cold war, or a bridge between civilizations, as it was perceived in the 1990s. Now Turkey should be a central country providing security and stability in its areas of influence, where it has historical responsibilities, namely the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Gulf and the Caspian, Black and Mediterranean Seas (Davutoglu 2008). It is interesting to observe that the Ahmet Davutoglu’s doctrine of Strategic Depth is very much infused with ideas of geopolitics, just as traditional recipes for Turkey’s behavior in external affairs have always been. Notwithstanding, Professor Davutoglu’s reading of Turkey’s geography is significantly different from the reading of traditional actors, and therefore his policy prescriptions also differ. Davutoglu promotes a drastic change in the narrative of Turkey’s foreign relations. Instead of a borderline paranoid assessment that Turkey is encircled by unfriendly countries all involved in “playing games over Turkey”, Davutoglu establishes “**areas of influence**” in which Turkey should increase its role as a facilitator, **promoting diplomatic relations and setting channels for political dialogue**. Turkey is no longer the “victim” of its neighbours or its neighbours “victims” of Turkey’s aggression in self-defence. Now Turkey should be a benign leader in its bordering regions, prioritizing dialogue as a means of solving crisis. The main features of Turkey’s traditional security culture, i.e., the Sèvres Syndrome, geographical determinism, fear of encirclement, territorial disintegration, and abandonment, **give way to** concepts of “sphere of influence”, “zero-problem policy” and **desecuritization.** In short, instead of seeing the regions around it as a source of risks, Turkey began to see them as **areas where it could play a proactive role in the maintenance of peace** and stability. This change is due to Turkey’s different perception of itself: no longer the lone civilized country in an uncivilized neighborhood, but a country with historical affinities with its neighbors. This distinct identity construction led to a change in the perception of “the others”, and consequently **changes**assumptions on what constitutes insecurities and the best way to tackle them.

**Turn – the only way to change security ideas in the context of the aff is to reduce the influence of military concepts in Turkish foreign politics.**

**Bilgin 05** (Pinar, Department of IR @ Bilkent in Turkey, “Turkey’s changing security discourses: The challenge of globalization”, European Journal of Political Research 44: 175–201//dml)

Space does not permit a detailed discussion as to whether the military’s role in Turkish politics has increased (Cizre 1997, 2000, 2003, 2004; Jenkins 2001) or decreased (Karaosmano lu 2000; Heper & Güney 1996) during the 1990s. Even if one were, for the sake of argument, to put the reservations of those who support the prior view aside, and side with those who argue that the military’s involvement in politics is gradually diminishing and it is increasingly likely to only get involved in issues to do with national security, one thing remains unchanged: so long as the military is the major actor in shaping the contours of national security, its role in Turkish politics is likely to remain central. This is because, given the influence the term ‘security’ has on peoples’ thinking and practices, those who have the power to define what ‘national security’ means in a given context also have the power to shape political processes. And, as Waever (1995: 54; emphasis in original) has argued, ‘trying to press the kind of unwanted political change on a ruling elite is similar to playing a game in which one’s opponent can change the rules at any time s/he likes. Power holders can always try to use the instrument of *securitisation* of an issue to gain control over it.’ From Waever’s (1995: 55) perspective, the only alternative left open to the critics of prevalent definitions of security is that of attempting ‘speech act failure’ – that is, ‘narrowing the field to which security act [is] applied’ so that issues and developments could be addressed through normal politics (but see Bilgin et al. 1998: 148; see also Wyn Jones 1999). Yet, given the authority of the state elite when discussing issues to do with national security, achieving ‘speech act failure’ is no easy task.

# A2: Security (Aff Specific)

**Case outweighs – a nuclear Iran is just plain dangerous, threat construction or not**

**USNews.com 6/25/10** (News website, Mortimer B Zuckerman, “3 Steps to Stop Iran From Getting a Nuclear Bomb, accessed at <http://politics.usnews.com/opinion/mzuckerman/articles/2010/06/25/3-steps-to-stop-iran-from-getting-a-nuclear-bomb.html> on 6/27/10//dml)

A nuclear Iran, already a neighborhood bully, would export its revolutionary ideology and destabilize the Middle East. It would be more effective in its subversion of neighbors and its fomenting of worldwide terrorism. We'd see even bolder interference in Iraq and Afghanistan, more meddling in Lebanon, more incitement and aggressive support for Hamas and Hezbollah—both of which it already funds, trains, and arms to conduct terrorist attacks against Israel. It would sabotage any dialogue between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. It would incite the Shiite populations in the Persian Gulf states and altogether threaten the survival of modern Arab governments there. Iran already plays an extensive role in Shiite southern Iraq. When American forces withdraw fully, likely over the longer term, an uprising may be fomented in Iraq that might well lead to a full takeover by an Iranian-dominated Iraqi government, which would then pressure its neighbor, Jordan. It would put at risk the whole international nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, foreshadowing a nuclear arms race all over the Middle East and nuclear weapons getting into the hands of non-state actors. A nuclear Iran, emboldened by its success in fooling and defying the world, might well be tempted to challenge its neighbors in the Gulf to reduce oil production and limit the presence of U.S. troops there. The United States has declared that a nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable. So if Iran succeeds, it would be seen as a major defeat and open our government to doubts about its power and resolve to shape events in the Middle East. Friends would respond by distancing themselves from Washington; foes would aggressively challenge U.S. policies.

**Perm – vote aff to reject securitization. Western intervention in Turkey is part of an imperialist movement to securitize Turkey – the act of rejecting Western intervention through the plan is a metaphor for rejecting Western securitization**

**Bilgin 08** (Pinar, Department of IR @ Bilkent U in Turkey, “Thinking Past “Western” IR?” Third World Quarterly, 29: 1, 5 — 23//dml)

The third international dimension to Turkey’s turn to secularism emerges through a reading of Turkey’s project of modernisation and of ‘gaining respect in the eyes of the civilised world’ as part of a solution to a security problem. As with Ottoman attempts at Westernisation, Turkey’s grand project of Westernisation is almost always explained as an attempt to achieve the level of and/or join ‘contemporary civilisation’. In such explanations, the ‘international’ dimension is acknowledged, but it is represented either as a ‘lifestyle choice’ or as a purely instrumental move to prevent military decline. However, both the Ottoman and Turkish Westernisations were more than that. They were [was an] attempts to become a member of ‘contemporary civilisation’ not only to provide an end to battlefield losses but also to remove the ground for ‘European’ interventions and claims to the right to rule the ‘uncivilised’. Postcolonial movements around the world have had to fight not only the forces but also the culture of imperialism,67 for the latter allowed the former to occur. The culture of imperialism, together with an Orientalist mindset,68 provided the basis for the ‘West’s claim to enjoy ‘the right to better rule’ ‘non-Western’ peoples. It was on the basis of such claims that ‘European’ actors had interfered numerous times in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire.69 Viewed as such, Turkey’s turn to secularism, as the centrepiece of the project of Westernisation, could be considered as a part of a strategy adopted by the leaders of the revolutionary movement to cope with a specific security problem—a strategy of seeking to become ‘similar’ in a world that was perceived to be not-so-hospitable to ‘difference’.

# A2: Security (Aff Specific)

**Perm – do the plan and all non-competitive parts of the alternative. The criticism alone is useless – merely discussing our representations can’t actually change anything – material action is needed.**

**Jarvis 2000** (Darryl, Associate prof of IR @ Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, *International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline* pg 198//dml)

I am, of course, being flippant. Yet we do have a right to ask such questions of subversive postmodernists if only because they portend to a moral highground, to insights otherwise denied realists, modernists, positivists, and mainstream international relations scholars. We have every right to ask, for example, how subversive postmodern theory speaks to the practical problems endemic to international relations, to the actors and players who constitute the practices of world politics, or how literary devices and deconstructive readings help us better picture world society. My point, of course, is much the same as Robin Brown’s, that textual analysis and deconstruction does not, and cannot, speak to such problems other than to detect the limits of a particular “text by identifying origins, assumptions, and silences.” What it cannot do, however, is deal with the practical problem of international relations.” Similarly, Hoffman too gives no answers to these questions save this justification for the turn to interpretivism. “This move,” he writes, “connects international relations, both as a practice and a discipline, with similar developments within social and political theory and within the humanities,” But what justification or rationale is this? So we are now doing what literary theorists do: ruminating over international theory as if such were the verses of lyricists written for the pleasures of reading and consumed only for their wit and romance. But there is a difference between the concerns and interests of, say, English departments and those of departments of Political Science or International Relations. Where literary criticism delights in the ethereal play of words and has as its epistemic basis the belief that “one reads for pleasure,” politics dabbles in the material, distributive, punitive play of power whose consequences effect much more than a sensibility committed to reading fiction. Why should we assume that tools developed in English departments are useful to theorists of international relations? Why should we take heed of the writings of Jacques Derrida who never once addressed issues of international relations, but from whom postmodernists now claim a wisdom which they insist is reason enough to dispense with past theory and begin anew our theoretical and disciplinary enterprise?

# A2: Hegemony DA

**Everybody supports withdrawal of the TNWs**

**Mutzenich, Vankrunklesven & Kolesnikov 08 (**Last Updated 6/25/8 Time to remove tactical nuclear weapons from Europe? Dr. Rolf Mützenich MdB, SPD Spokesperson on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament Patrik Vankrunklesven MP Belgium, PNND Council Member Sergei Kolesnikov, Member of the Russian Duma, PNND Council Member <http://www.gsinstitute.org/pnnd/pubs/Tactical_nukes.pdf>)

**The retired NATO military officials will be unlikely to quell the growing public support for complete removal of US weapons. A Spiegel poll in 2005 indicated that 76% of Germans were in favour of withdrawal while 18**% were not. This sentiment was matched in parliament: Russia has indicated some willingness to consider further reducing their tactical weapons stockpile, for example by abstaining on a 2002 resolution at the United Nations General Assembly on the issue (France, the U.K. and U.S. voted against). However, this position has hardened since 2003. The 2006 Russian White Paper on Defence makes no mention of Russian tactical weapons, but instead criticizes US deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on foreign soil (in NATO countries). It is likely that the US plans for forward deployment of Ballistic Missile Defences in former Eastern Bloc countries – the Czech Republic and Poland – have also contributed to this hardening attitude. Similar numbers were reflected in a 2006 Greenpeace poll which found that 69% of citizens in nuclear deployment States supported a nuclear weapons free Europe. This included **88% in Turkey, 71% in Italy, 71% in Germany, 65% in Belgium and 63% in Netherlands, and 56% in Britain.**

[If you need more, just add the TNWs not key to deterrence cards]

Negative

# NATO DA 1NC

**Removing the NATO tactical weapons would be enough to splinter the organization between newer members- former Soviet satellites- and the older members.**

**Landler 4/23**

The International Herald Tribune April 23, 2010 Friday U.S. to resist NATO push to remove tactical arms MARK LANDLER

diplomatic correspondent of The New York Times, based in Washington. He has reported for The Times from 46 countries on five continents, ranging from Afghanistan to Iceland. Prior to taking up his post in January 2009, Mark was a foreign correspondent for 10 years, serving as European economic correspondent in Frankfurt, from 2002 to 2008, and as Hong Kong bureau chief, from 1998 t0 2002. He joined The Times in 1995 as a reporter in Business Day. From 1990 to 1995, he was a reporter and editor at Business Week magazine. He began his career at The Times in 1987 as a copy boy. Mark is a 1987 graduate of Georgetown University, and was a Reuter Fellow at Oxford in 1997 <http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/> [lexis]

Fresh off signing a strategic nuclear arms deal with Russia, the United States is parrying a push by NATO allies to withdraw its aging stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. At a meeting of foreign ministers of NATO countries here, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and other countries were prodding the United States to begin negotiations with Russia for steep reductions in so-called nonstrategic weapons - mostly aerial bombs which, in the case of the United States, are stored in underground vaults on air bases in five NATO countries. But Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton was expected to urge caution in remarks to the ministers on Thursday. A senior American official said she was to underscore the need for NATO to maintain a deterrent capability and the need for the alliance to act together on this issue. The Obama administration is also pushing for NATO to embrace the American missile-defense system in Eastern Europe as a core mission of the alliance. Some officials worry that the debate over tactical nuclear weapons, if not properly handled, could splinter the alliance - pitting longtime NATO members against newer members like Turkey and the former Soviet satellites, which are more reluctant to push for the removal of these weapons. The meeting comes at a time when NATO's 28 members are rethinking much of the rationale for this Cold War alliance. The United States, for its part, is pushing to streamline NATO's bureaucracy and make it more responsive to threats in places like Afghanistan.

## Turkey is key.

**Bell & Loehrke 11/23/9**

The status of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey BY ALEXANDRA BELL AND BENJAMIN LOEHRKE | 23 NOVEMBER 2009 http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey

Four years later, some U.S. and European officials still maintain that the political value of the nuclear weapons is enough to keep them deployed across Europe. In particular, they argue PDF that the weapons are "an essential political and military link" between NATO members and help maintain alliance cohesion. The Defense Department's 2008 report PDF on nuclear weapons management concurred: "As long as our allies value [the nuclear weapons'] political contribution, the United States is obligated to provide and maintain the nuclear weapon capability." Those who hold this view believe that nuclear sharing is both symbolic of alliance cohesion and a demonstration of how the United States and NATO have committed to defending each other in the event of an attack. They argue that removing the weapons would dangerously undermine such cohesion and raise questions about how committed Washington is to its NATO allies. But NATO's post-Cold War struggles with cohesion are a result of far more than disagreement over tactical nuclear deployments. NATO has given Turkey plenty of reasons to doubt its members' commitment to Ankara on several recent occasions. For example, before both Iraq wars, some NATO members hesitated to provide Turkey with air defenses or to assist it with displaced persons who had fled into its territory. Moreover, Turkey, which values NATO as a direct connection to Washington, witnessed the United States completely ignore its vehement opposition to the most recent Iraq War. Additionally, Ankara is dismayed by the reluctance of some of its NATO allies to label the Kurdistan Workers' Party, which has caused violent chaos along the Turkish border, as a terrorist organization.

# NATO DA 1NC

**The dilapidation of NATO shatters global economic structures and seriously threatens international security and agriculture.**

**Ahmed 11/25/9**

Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed uthor and political scientist specialising in interdisciplinary security studies. He teaches [International Relations](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Relations) at the School of [Social Sciences](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_Sciences) and [Cultural Studies](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultural_Studies), [University of Sussex](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Sussex), [Brighton](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brighton), where he recently completed Doctoral research on European imperial [genocides](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genocides) from the 15th to the 19th centuries. <http://www.mediamonitors.net/mosaddeq12.html> 11/25/9

For this reason, according to Robert J. Art - a research associate at the Olin Institute at Harvard, and Herter Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University - America’s “overarching stake” in Europe consists partly of “the valuable investment the United States has to protect [which] is the politico-economic cohesion of Western Europe”, the objective being to “produce an outward-looking, liberal trading community, not an inward-looking protectionist one”,[[65]](http://www.mediamonitors.net/mosaddeq12.html#_edn65) thus maintaining the integration of the whole of Europe under the “stability” a US-dominated international economic system. It is in this context that we may note the particular objective of eradicating socialism in the Balkans and throughout the region in general, to enforce and secure US corporate economic interests.[[66]](http://www.mediamonitors.net/mosaddeq12.html#_edn66) The inseparable linkage between US/Western militarism and US/Western corporate economic interests is thus absolutely clear.[[67]](http://www.mediamonitors.net/mosaddeq12.html#_edn67) One high-ranking and experienced Western European diplomat put it succintly: “The United States presence in Europe is crucial. The role of the United States goes beyond balancing the Soviet Union. The United States keeps our national rivalries down. We are now faced with the emergence of a friendly local superpower - Germany. Our chances of succeeding are greater if the United States stays. If it goes, however, the effects will be felt way beyond the security field - in GATT, agriculture, and so forth. If NATO breaks up, our economic structures are threatened also.”[[68]](http://www.mediamonitors.net/mosaddeq12.html#_edn68) By strengthening NATO and expanding US military hegemony over Europe through NATO, not only does the US manage to prevent the arisal of an independent European security apparatus that may rival NATO, but furthermore, all European nations become subordinate within the US-dominated NATO alliance, thus once more eliminating the possibility of any significant rivalry. In this way, US economic hegemony is maintained within the global “economic structures” of the international system, protected under a military hegemony dominated by American leadership.

## Without NATO, free Europe doesn’t exist. Enemies from the East would move in for the attack, and the world would be plunged into global war.

**Steingart 10/20/06**

Spiegel Online 10/20/6 Gabor Steingart chief editor of Handelsblatt, Germany's leading economic newspaper. http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,443306,00.html

For 50 years it was a highly controversial institution. Today, though, every schoolchild knows that without the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, free Europe wouldn't exist. If the Western alliance hadn’t ostentatiously demonstrated its power -- with its fighter jets, tank divisions and continually updated weaponry -- Soviet communism would have expanded westward instead of imploding as it did. By the end of the Cold War, even NATO’s fiercest critics had learned their lesson: The dove of peace could only survive because the hawk was ready on his perch. The world war for wealth calls for a different, but every bit as contradictory, solution. Alas, once again many lack the imagination to see that the aims of our economic opponents are far from peaceful. Yet what sets this situation apart from what we usually call a conflict -- what paralyzes the West -- is how quietly the enemy is advancing. The two camps are divided between Europe and America on the one side and Asia on the other. But so far there has been no shouting, no bluster and no shooting. Nor have there been any threats, demands or accusations. On the contrary, there is an atmosphere of complete amiability wherever our politicians and business executives might travel in Asia. At airports in Beijing, Jakarta, Singapore and New Delhi red carpets lie ready, Western national anthems can be played flawlessly on cue -- and they even parry Western complaints about intellectual property theft, environmental damage and human rights abuses with a polite patience that can only be admired. The Asians are the friendliest conquerors the world has ever seen

# XT: Link

**Removing weapons will destroy NATO from the inside out**

**Podvig 2/25**

What to do about tactical nuclear weapons BY PAVEL PODVIG | 25 FEBRUARY 2010

Pavel Podvig is a researcher at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. Before coming to Stanford in 2004, he worked at the Center for Arms Control Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT), which was the first independent research organization in Russia dedicated to analysis of technical issues related to arms control and disarmament. In Moscow, Podvig was the leader of a major research project and the editor of the book Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (MIT Press, 2001). In recognition of his work in Russia, the American Physical Society awarded Podvig the Leo Szilard Lectureship Award of 2008

<http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/pavel-podvig/what-to-do-about-tactical-nuclear-weapons>

Nonetheless, there are still influential players who want the weapons to remain in Europe. Their key argument is that if the U.S. nuclear weapons are removed, NATO members would no longer trust Washington’s commitment to protecting Europe. Such a move, the argument goes, will lead to all kinds of negative consequences–from triggering “a corrosive internal debate” within NATO to Turkey deciding to pursue its own nuclear weapon capability.

# XT: Turkey doesn’t like the plan

## Turkish officials don’t want the TNWs pulled out of Turkey- they feel they are a political asset

**Turkish Daily News 8**

In addition to the resources of Hürriyet, Doğan Group newspapers and the 600-member team of Doğan News Agency which we use through translation, we have our own staff of more than 50 reporters and editors. We maintain fulltime bureaus in Ankara, Antalya, İzmir and Washington, D.C. http://www.ingilizceforum.net/incirlik-becomes-major-host-for-american-nuclear-weapons-t-21898.html

Turkish officials, meanwhile, do not seem to complain much compared to other European countries that voice their uneasiness with America's storage of nuclear weapons in their territories. The issue was high on the agenda several years ago when the United States was trying to relocate its military bases, something that sparked tense discussions mainly on the European continent, home to a massive American troop presence remaining from the post-World War II era. Remaining silent in these discussions, Turkish officials admitted the existence of American nuclear weapons but said that it's an important asset for Turkey to preserve its strategic importance in the eyes of the U.S., which is Turkey's closest ally.

## Turkey likes being included in NATOs umbrella of protection and likes the TNWs.

**Bell 9**

Alexandra Bell on August 25, 2009 at 10:17 am PDT Alexandra Bell is a Project Manager at the Ploughshares Fund and a Truman National Security Fellow. http://www.good.is/post/turkeys-nuclear-crossroads/

Turkey has a vastly superior military force and would not be directly threatened by Iran (a few people I spoke to flippantly noted that it was Israel who would be in trouble). Nevertheless, nations acquire nuclear weapons not only for security, but also for pride and prestige. Having a nuclear capability elevates a nation into an elite, if dubious, club. At the moment, Turkey seems alright with the status quo. It does not have a nuclear adversary, and in addition to being covered by NATO’s strategic security umbrella, it also houses an estimated 50 to 90 tactical nuclear weapons.Turkish officials were cagey about discussing these weapons. A former Air Force general, following what seemed to be the official line, denied that there were nuclear weapons in Turkey, saying they were removed at the end of the Cold War. This differed from the other officials I met, whose wink-wink references basically confirmed the presence of the nukes. They also hinted that the weapons would be critically important if a certain neighbor got the bomb.

**Turkey doesn’t want the U.S. to withdraw the TNWs- they still perceive a threat from Iran.**

**Kelleher & Warren 9**

By Catherine M. Kelleher and Scott L. Warren

Catherine M. Kelleher is a College Park Professor at the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland and a senior fellow at the Watson Institute at Brown University. During the Clinton administration, she was defense adviser to the U.S. mission to NATO and deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia. She is a member of the Arms Control Association’s board of directors. Scott L. Warren is a recent graduate of Brown University, currently serving as executive director of the nonprofit Generation Citizen.

October 2009 <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_10/Kelleher>

The principal issues with the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons are political and conceptual, rather than straightforwardly military, with the single but critical exception of the risk of terrorist seizure. The notion of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, with tactical weapons serving as a real or potential down payment on a security commitment, particularly in Europe, still has significant traction within the Obama administration. Key factions in the Pentagon and perhaps in the Department of State argue that the United States must still provide allies substantial security support, especially with Iran and North Korea deeply engaged in nuclear programs. This is the case despite the indifference of many NATO allies toward technical weapons or, in some cases, direct demands for elimination. Some European countries, especially elites in the newer central and eastern European member states, attach a high symbolic importance to the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on European soil as evidence of U.S. security guarantees. Turkey also is thought to be particularly concerned about any withdrawal because it faces a more direct threat from Iranian missiles, although it is now included in the new U.S. plans for a European missile defense system.[3]

# Turkish Proliferation DA 1NC

**Turkey will start building nuclear weapons if the U.S. removed the TNWs**

**The Washington Post 4/22**

U.S. Urged to Remove Tactical Nukes in Europe Thursday, April 22, 2010 (<http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100422_3466.php> ) //DoeS

Belgian Foreign Ministry spokesman Patrick Deboeck said the alliance must be in full agreement on whatever is decided. "We think it is important to maintain the credibility of nuclear deterrence, but we also see the possibility to go further" on nuclear arms reductions, he said. "NATO has a role to play on tactical nuclear weapons." The Center for European Reform's Tomas Valasek said that some NATO members in Central Europe could see the removal of the U.S. gravity bombs as "a unilateral step taken by their big Western allies that puts Russia's concerns ahead of theirs ... so it will be a divisive question."

There are also concerns that such a pullout could lead Turkey to seek its own nuclear weapons as a hedge against potential nuclear arms held by other Middle Eastern states

## A nuclear Turkey will provoke a militarized Cyprus and Greece, sparking nuclear conflict throughout the Middle East, Europe, pulling in Russia and going global.

**Martin 1**

David H. Martin is a researcher with over fifteen years of experience working on nuclear, as well as other energy and utility issues. He is the Research Director of Nuclear Awareness Project, a non-profit environmental organization dedicated to raising public awareness about nuclear issues and energy alternatives. The group carries out research and public education projects; operates a public resource centre; and publishes a newsletter. (<http://www.cnp.ca/issues/nuc-threat-mediterranean.pdf>) Last updated: October 21, 2001//DoeS

There have also been reports that Israel, the United States, and Turkey have been involved with a plan to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities. In 1996, Israeli Government Press Office head Uri Dromi said it had become a "working assumption" that a "Western-led coalition" will conduct a pre-emptive strike against Iran to stop its nuclear weapons program.[232] One reported target was Iran's Neka nuclear plant, 100 miles north-east of Tehran on the Caspian Sea. According to Egyptian sources, the basis of the 1995 Israeli-Turkish military cooperation agreement may be plans for an air strike against Iran's nuclear facilities. Iran has already made counter-threats against the possible attacks.[233] Another report claimed that Israeli pilots are training in Turkey's Central Anatolia region in preparation to bomb Iranian nuclear reactors and other nuclear weapons facilities.[234] There has already been some reason for security concerns about a proposed nuclear plant at Akkuyu Bay. The plant would almost be within sight of the divided island of Cyprus. The Turkish ferry port to Cyprus isjust outside of Silifke. Cyprus has been divided for over 25 years, since Turkey invaded and occupied the northern third of island in 1974, following a coup engineered by the military junta that ruled Greece at the time. About 30,000 Turkish troops occupy the northern part of Cyprus, which declared itself an independent state in 1983, but is recognized only by Turkey. In January 1997, the Cypriot government announced that it would buy the Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system as a defence against Turkish air force incursions. The missiles have a range of about 150 km. Turkey, then under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan of the Islamist Welfare Party, declared that it would consider a military strike against the placement of the missile launchers, and that it would attack ships carrying the missiles to Cyprus.[235] Russia stated that it would consider attacks on its ships to be an act of war, and it would almost certainly initiate a regional war between Turkey and Greece, because of the defence pact between Greece and Cyprus. Turkish/Cypriot relations were already strained by four deaths in Cyprus in 1996. Exhibiting considerable statesmanship and restraint, following a December 1998 consultation between Greece and Cyprus, the Cypriot government of President Glafcos Clerides decided that it would abandon the proposed missile siting in Cyprus, and deploy them on the Greek island of Crete.[236] In Turkey, the Cypriot decision was commonly seen as a 'victory' for the aggressive position that had been taken against the missile deployment. This 'victory' over Cyprus was a factor contributing to the victory of Bulent Ecevit and the strong showing of the nationalist MHP in the April 1999 election. Ecevit was Prime Minister of Turkey in 1974, when he ordered the invasion of Cyprus. The problem of Cyprus is far from resolved, and the presence of the Akkuyu nuclear plant will pose an additional aggravation and complicating factor if it is built. The plant would pose a tempting target to Turkey's hostile neighbours. Potential conflicts are not just with Greece and Cyprus, but with countries such as Iran, Iraq and Syria, all of whom may perceive a nuclear program in Turkey as a threat to their national security.

# XT: Link

## Removing TNWs from Turkey will cause Turkey to proliferate.

**Reuters 4/21**

## Apr 21, 2010 - 23:05 NATO to debate future of nuclear arms in Europe By David Brunnstrom (<http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/news/international/NATO_to_debate_future_of_nuclear_arms_in_Europe.html?cid=8725114>) //DoeS

## Another key concern is that any move to remove NATO nuclear weapons could prompt Turkey to develop its own deterrent, given its worries about nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. NATO STRESSES COMMON APPROACH NATO aims to set out its nuclear stance in a new strategic vision due to be approved at a summit in Lisbon in November and stresses the need for a common approach. "No decision will be taken in Tallinn," NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said on Monday. "But I do think the principles of NATO's nuclear discussion are already clear: first that no ally will take unilateral decisions and second that as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will need a nuclear deterrent."

**If we pull the TNWs out of Turkey, Turkey will develop it’s own nuclear weapons.**

**IKV Pax Christi 5/12**

US Tactical Nuclear Weapons in TURKEY http://www.ikvpaxchristi.nl/files/Documenten/Veiligheid%20en%20Ontwapening/Nucleaire%20ontwapening/TNW%20Italy%20and%20Turkey.pdf

Incirlik’s proximity to potential Middle-East adversaries gives it an added geopolitical importance. While the TNW in other European countries have lost their military relevance, the Incirlik bombs could in deterrence logic still function as a deterrent. However, Turkish officials indicated in 2009 and 2010 that ‘Turkey would not insist’ that NATO retain a TNW arsenal in Turkey, and that that conventional NATO forces are sufficient to satisfy Ankara’s security requirements. Another rationale heard to support keeping TNW in Incirlik is that Turkey may develop its own nuclear arsenal if it feels it can no longer rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Indeed one official in November 2009 stated that Turkey would immediately arm itself with a bomb if Iran were to develop one.

# Impact- Middle Eastern War

## A nuclear Turkey will allow a nuclear PKK and nuclear war in the Middle East

**Martin 1**

David H. Martin is a researcher with over fifteen years of experience working on nuclear, as well as other energy and utility issues. He is the Research Director of Nuclear Awareness Project, a non-profit environmental organization dedicated to raising public awareness about nuclear issues and energy alternatives. The group carries out research and public education projects; operates a public resource centre; and publishes a newsletter. (<http://www.cnp.ca/issues/nuc-threat-mediterranean.pdf>) Last updated: October 21, 2001//DoeS

Terrorists do not need nuclear weapons if they can trigger a catastrophic radiation release by attacking a nuclear power plant. Security risks at a future nuclear power plant in Turkey are an extremely serious consideration for several reasons. Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the Kurdish Workers Party, PKK, has called off the armed struggle, but factions of the PKK and other organizations remain committed to fighting. Sabotage of energy infrastructure is already an established PKK tactic. On January 24, 1997, the PKK attacked the Mardin-Midyat oil pipeline, near the city of Mardin. After an explosion, the resulting fire was only controlled after 24 hours, and damage was estimated at $700,000 (US).[230] The PKK and others have engaged in suicide attacks, which are extremely hard to defend against. The possibility that nuclear installations might contribute to nuclear weapons capability has already resulted in military attacks at these sites, and contributed significantly to the risk and escalation of conventional war in the Middle East. In 1981, Israel bombed the Osiraq reactor at Iraq's Tuwaitha nuclear research centre near Baghdad. The Osiraq reactor, purchased by Iraq in 1976 from France, was capable of irradiating uranium targets to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. The Israeli bombing prevented start- up of the reactor. With its own nuclear weapons program put on hold as a result of the Israeli bombing, Iraq turned its attention to Iran's restart of its nuclear program which had originally begun under the Shah. On February 12 and March 4, 1985, Iraq launched air bombing raids of Iran's Bushehr nuclear power station, which was about 70% complete at the time. An earlier air raid had taken place on March 24, 1984.[231]

## Conflict in the Middle East would pull in the U.S. & go global and nuclear.

## Chossudovsky 6

## The Dangers of a Middle East Nuclear War New Pentagon Doctrine: Mini-Nukes are "Safe for the Surrounding Civilian Population" by Michel Chossudovsky is Director of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG). He has taught as visiting professor at academic institutions in Western Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia, has acted as economic adviser to governments of developing countries and has worked as a consultant for international organizations including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the African Development Bank, the United Nations African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (AIEDEP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Health Organisation (WHO), the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). In 1999, Chossudovsky joined the Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research as an adviser.February 17, 2006 (<http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=1988>) //DoeS

The preemptive nuclear doctrine (DJNO), which applies to Iran and North Korea calls for "offensive and defensive integration". It explicitly allows the preemptive use of thermonuclear weapons in conventional war theaters. In the showdown with Tehran over its alleged nuclear weapons program, these Pentagon "guidelines" would allow, subject to presidential approval,  for the launching of punitive bombings using "mini-nukes" or tactical thermonuclear weapons. While the "guidelines" do not exclude other (more deadly) categories of nukes in the US and/or Israeli nuclear arsenal, Pentagon "scenarios" in the Middle East are currently limited to the use of tactical nuclear weapons including the B61-11 bunker buster bomb. This particular version of the bunker buster is a thermonuclear bomb,  a so-called Nuclear Earth Penetrator or NEP. It is a Weapon of Mass Destruction in the real sense of the word. Its utilization by the US or Israel in the Middle East war theater would trigger a nuclear holocaust.

# Impact- Earthquakes

**Akkuyu would be built if Turkey proliferated, and would be used to produce nuclear bombs.**

**Martin 1**

David H. Martin is a researcher with over fifteen years of experience working on nuclear, as well as other energy and utility issues. He is the Research Director of Nuclear Awareness Project, a non-profit environmental organization dedicated to raising public awareness about nuclear issues and energy alternatives. The group carries out research and public education projects; operates a public resource centre; and publishes a newsletter. (<http://www.cnp.ca/issues/nuc-threat-mediterranean.pdf>) Last updated: October 21, 2001//DoeS

Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK). In June 1998, TAEK submitted its annual report to the Turkish National Assembly / State-Owned Utilities Commission, following hard on the heals of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons tests. Even in that context, the overt support for nuclear weapons development was astonishing, given the government's official opposition. The report was prepared under the leadership of former TAEK chairman Mehmet Ergin. The report stated, "Nuclear technology...makes the country honourable and powerful, and it allows the country to advance one step further because nuclear technology has scientific, technological, strategic and economic components."[330] The report laments that Turkey has not made much progress in nuclear technology despite being one of the first countries to start work on it. TAEK goes on to express admiration for the achievements of India in its nuclear weapons program... "India constructed reprocessing plants by itself. Only a few countries have these plants that reprocess nuclear fuel, the transfer of which is strictly forbidden. In the last years, India has been in a race with developed countries. In addition to this, on the one hand it is aiming to double its nuclear power capacity, and on the other hand to continue to test atomic bombs and endeavouring to develop hydrogen bombs."[331] The report also emphasized that since 1997, Turkey has started research and development on a domestic reactor design, as well as development of nuclear fuel facilities, including thorium fuel. Support for nuclear weapons continues to be expressed in Turkey's halls of power. In the minds of politicians, even at the cabinet level, there is clearly a link between nuclear power and nuclear weapons. In March 2000, Enis Oksuz, the Minister of Transport in the Ecevit coalition government was publicly attacking the critics of Akkuyu, as well as defending Turkey's development of nuclear weapons, as if it were simply a given.

## The plant at Akkuyu would be decimated by earthquakes in the region, causing a meltdown and “unimaginable disaster”

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One of the most controversial issues about the proposed Akkuyu nuclear plant is whether a nuclear station at that site will be acceptably safe from earthquake damage. Independent research has indicated that an active fault line, known as the Ecemis Fault is close to the plant. Ignoring this strong evidence, the government of Turkey and the nuclear vendors have maintained that there is no active faulting in the vicinity of the plant, and that there is negligible danger of a nuclear accident being caused by an earthquake. Earthquakes can simultaneously damage multiple operating and safety systems in nuclear reactors[237] , leading to a catastrophic accident that could cause an unimaginable disaster in the eastern Mediterranean region. One independent team of nuclear experts has already determined that for the Darlington nuclear generating station in Ontario, Canada (which has less earthquake risk than a plate boundary area such as Akkuyu), the most likely cause of a catastrophic accident is an earthquake.[238] The same finding would also likely hold true for a nuclear station built at Akkuyu in Turkey. Canadian earthquake expert Dr. Karl Buck thought has suggested that there is "an unacceptable level of risk associated with the proposal to place nuclear reactors at Akkuyu Bay".[239]

# Impact- Meltdown (1/2)

## If Turkey were to proliferate, they would start with building a nuclear plant at Akkuyu

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Reliable independent cost studies show that nuclear power plants are about twice as expensive to build and operate as high- efficiency natural gas generating plants. Canada has been forced to temporarily shut down one-third of its own nuclear power reactors because of poor performance, bad management and safety problems. CANDU reactors have the worst performance among competitive reactor designs, yet AECL is trying to sell this flawed technology to countries in the developing world. Turkey's state utility TEAS vastly overestimates electricity demand over the next twenty years, and does not take into account the effects of electricity sector restructuring. As electricity prices rise to reflect the phase-out of historic subsidies, demand will be moderated. Private sector projects will easily meet new demand without requiring an expensive and risky nuclear power plant. An Integrated Resource Plan can determine the right balance of energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies, which are cheaper, cleaner and safer than nuclear power. Turkey has the historic opportunity to 'leapfrog' ahead of other countries with efficiency programs and renewable energy development, and by avoiding the disastrous mistake of building nuclear power plants in the first place. Turkey has made five attempts to start a nuclear power program, beginning in the 1960s. The selection of the winning nuclear vendor to build the Akkuyu plant was first supposed to have been made in June 1998. Between then and April 2000, the selection announcement was delayed at least 8 times. There has been increasing opposition in Turkey to the proposed nuclear plant at Akkuyu Bay. That opposition includes local citizens who depend on the land and the sea for their livelihoods, as well as members of the intelligentsia and nuclear establishment itself.

**The Akkuyu plant would be extremely vulnerable to terrorist attacks.**

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# Impact- Meltdown (2/2)

## Which would cause extinction.

## Wasserman ‘02

(Harvey, Senior Editor – Free Press, Earth Island Journal, Spring, [www.earthisland.org/eijournal/new\_articles.cfm?articleID=457&journalID=63](http://www.earthisland.org/eijournal/new_articles.cfm?articleID=457&journalID=63))

The intense radioactive heat within today's operating reactors is the hottest anywhere on the planet. Because Indian Point has operated so long, its accumulated radioactive burden far exceeds that of Chernobyl. The safety systems are extremely complex and virtually indefensible. One or more could be wiped out with a small aircraft, ground-based weapons, truck bombs or even chemical/biological assaults aimed at the work force. A terrorist assault at Indian Point could yield three infernal fireballs of molten radioactive lava burning through the earth and into the aquifer and the river. Striking water, they would blast gigantic billows of horribly radioactive steam into the atmosphere. Thousands of square miles would be saturated with the most lethal clouds ever created, depositing relentless genetic poisons that would kill forever. Infants and small children would quickly die en masse. Pregnant women would spontaneously abort or give birth to horribly deformed offspring. Ghastly sores, rashes, ulcerations and burns would afflict the skin of millions. Heart attacks, stroke and multiple organ failure would kill thousands on the spot. Emphysema, hair loss, nausea, inability to eat or drink or swallow, diarrhea and incontinence, sterility and impotence, asthma and blindness would afflict hundreds of thousands, if not millions. Then comes the wave of cancers, leukemias, lymphomas, tumors and hellish diseases for which new names will have to be invented. Evacuation would be impossible, but thousands would die trying. Attempts to quench the fires would be futile. More than 800,000 Soviet draftees forced through Chernobyl's seething remains in a futile attempt to clean it up are still dying from their exposure. At Indian Point, the molten cores would burn uncontrolled for days, weeks and years. Who would volunteer for such an American task force? The immediate damage from an Indian Point attack (or a domestic accident) would render all five boroughs of New York City an apocalyptic wasteland. As at Three Mile Island, where thousands of farm and wild animals died in heaps, natural ecosystems would be permanently and irrevocably destroyed. Spiritually, psychologically, financially and ecologically, our nation would never recover.

# Impact- Monk Seals

**Akkuyu would be built if Turkey proliferated, and would be used to produce nuclear bombs.**

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**Akkuyu would be the extinction of the Mediterranean Monk Seal**

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The fate of the Mediterranean Monk Seal is a tragic sidebar to the Akkuyu story. With only 50 to 100

animals left in Turkey, and perhaps as few as 200 left in the entire Mediterranean, the Monk Seal is one of

the most critically endangered animals in the world. One of the few Monk Seal colonies is on Beshparmak

Island in the mouth of Akkuyu Bay. Since Akkuyu will be built and supplied by ship, there will be intense marine traffic in and out of the Bay. There is also the risk that seals will become trapped by the cooling water intakes for the nuclear plant.

**The extinction of the Monk seal would collapse the Meditteranean ecosystem**

## Ververi, Nurlu, Ege 9

GLOBALISATION AND THE MEDITERRANEAN MONK SEAL (MONACHUS MONACHUS) ON KARABURUN PENINSULA Ozan Veryeri, Engin Nurlu, Umit Erdem Ege University, Izmir, Turkey (<http://ressources.ciheam.org/om/pdf/a57/04001967.pdf>) Last updated May 2009 //DoeS

The factors threaten the survival of the Mediterranean monk seal also threaten the overall health of the

Mediterranean ecosystems and human cultures. Monk seals have the priority of being the sensitive indicator species of the ecosystem's health. Monk seal researchers in Turkey believe that “Conserving the Mediterranean Monk Seal means conserving the Mediterranean” (SAD/AFAG, 2001).

## Ecosystem collapse and snowballs into human extinction.

**Diner 94**

"The Army and the Endangered Species Act: Who's Endangering Whom" (lexis)

By causing widespread extinctions, [humans] humyn have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly perceived and intertwined effects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and[human] humyn extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.

# XT: Akkuyu would be built if Turkey Proliferated

## If Turkey were to proliferate, they would start with building a nuclear plant at Akkuyu

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## If Turkey decided to build nukes it would build the Akkuyu plant under the guise of an energy plant.

## Udum 7

Turkey’s non-nuclear weapon status A theoretical assessment Şebnem Udum Bilkent University, Department of International Relations, Ankara, Turkey Journal on Science and World Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2007 57-65 Sebnem Udum is a MAIPS candidate 2001 at Graduate School of International Policy Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA. (<http://www.scienceandworldaffairs.org/PDFs/Vol3No2_Sebnem.pdf>) //DoeS

Turkey has recently announced its decision to transfer civilian nuclear technology for energy purposes – the latest attempt in the past four decades. There are views supporting and opposing such transfer from energy and security viewpoints. What is relevant to this study is that there are those in several circles that view this transfer as a technological capability that would give Turkey a nuclear option in case its current policy converges to a security deficiency as a result of international and regional developments [19]. The assessment of such a view is the subject of another study, but it should be underlined that post-9/11 developments, that is, deteriorating relations with the United States and Israel, doubts about NATO, growing anti- Americanism and anti-EU sentiments, Iran’s nuclear program and North Korea’s recent test, resulted in questions over Turkey’s non-nuclear-weapon state status particularly in terms of the effectiveness of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and the reliability of Turkey’s alliances vis-à-vis the rising proliferation of WMD in the region.

# Impact- EU (1/2)

## Turkey’s choice to go nuclear would kill its shot at getting into the EU.

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On the other hand, a decision for Turkey’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would not be a rational choice: if Turkey would decide to go nuclear, international pressure would be intense. Turkey is already a candidate to the EU, and has a membership perspective, which ties Turkey firmly to the West and the Western liberal zone. Becoming an EU/EC member has been a state policy, based on the modernisation process dating back to the Ottoman times. Turkey’s nuclear aspirations would jeopardise this process and would have high political costs.

## That would push Turkey & other Middle Eastern countries to proliferate further and scare them into using their weapons, even if by accident.

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What would draw Turkey into making a choice would not only be questions on its alliances and threat perceptions. Turkey’s difference from the other states in the Middle East, which are concerned about Iran’s nuclear program, is its EU perspective. Turkey is materially and ideationally between the East and the West. Its EU prospects keep the country in cooperative mechanisms to address security issues. If this perspective is lost, it is highly likely that it will be drawn into the Realist zone of international security in the East, and could base its security policy on material capabilities. Considering the status of relations with the United States and the instability in the region, the country could be motivated to seek self-sufficiency, and perhaps to seek a nuclear weapons capability. Most of the issues that are brought forward in the United States and the EU accession negotiations touch upon Turkey’s national security referents, basically social and territorial integrity, which lead the country to take a defensive position and to prioritise its security interests over political goals. Thus, it is integral to understand Turkey’s security concerns, and to keep it in the Western liberal zone of security. The cases of Iran and North Korea and the way they have been tackled are not promising for a vigorous nuclear nonproliferation regime. The US policy after 9/11 has not been very helpful: the new strategy does not rule out the use of nuclear weapons, hence it legitimises them as an instrument of statecraft. On the other hand, there were proposals to revise the NPT in a way that would prevent proliferation by denying the transfer of sensitive technologies (which were also endorsed by the Director General of the IAEA [21]), but the proposed amendments are likely to be opposed on the grounds that it would not strengthen the Treaty, and rather lead to rifts, mainly due to economic concerns [22]. Multilateralism is pivotal in keeping a strong regime. As the United States gave up working by consensus following 9/11, relations with allies soured, leading to a tendency to shift from the neo-liberal bases of international politics to a more realist one, in which states would be inclined to provide self- help and turn inwards, as it is the case with Iran and North Korea. Nuclear weapons have been those of deterrence, and to keep it stable, the United States and the Soviet Union had spent great effort. New nuclear powers will be inexperienced in crisis management, which would increase risks of misuse or accident.

# Impact- EU (2/2)

## Extinction

## Ross 7

Larry Ross January 27 2007 Preparing For and Justifying Nuclear Extinction Nuclear Destruction, A Brief History of Cold War Nuclear Developments, The Proliferation,  Living with the Bomb, The Impacts of the Nuclear Arms Race on Culture and Society,  Harnessing the Atom for Peaceful Purposes, The Ecological Legacy, The Corruption of Public Ethics,

(http://www.nuclearfreenz.org.nz/nucleardestruction.htm)//DoeS

The following article shows how humanity has developed its 'cold wars' and nuclear arms races since 1945. There are about 25,000 nuclear weapons, many on hair-trigger 'launch-on-warning' alert status. Humanity could become virtually extinct in an afternoon "by accident, miscalculation or act of madness" as President Kennedy warned at the UN in 1962 and many other statesmen and experts have warned since. Since 1945 humanity has become adjusted to living on the "brink of the nuclear abyss" as ex-UK Chief of Staff, Lord Louis Mountbatten defined it in 1979. People hardly give it a thought. If it's brought up, they either dismiss it or change the subject. Throughout human history we have used every weapon we have ever invented. 99% of all species of life on this planet have become extinct for a variety of reasons - many because their environment was changed so it would no longer support life. We are doing the same with our various systems, to change our natural environment and bring on global warming which can destroy us in a few decades. But we also spend hundreds of billions of dollars making devices that can provide nuclear explosions, blast, fires, nuclear winter, radiation, that can create human extinction many times over. This gives us the power to change our environment instantly and make it uninhabitable for most life forms. Bush has surrounded himself with the kind of people who don't ask questions or raise objections - people who will say "yes" to using nuclear weapons and not count the possible costs. It is lefties who are cowardly and raise problems and criticise they claim.

# Impact- Human Rights

## Nuclear weapons in Turkey would exacerbate the human rights crisis occurring there.

**Martin 1**

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Ongoing human rights violations in Turkey are deeply troubling. These are gross violations, including systematic widespread torture and murder of prisoners in custody; death squad murders; disappearances; restrictions on freedom of speech; and incommunicado detention without legal representation. There have been modest improvements in recent years, but not what would be expected with the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, and his subsequent ceasefire call. Restrictions on free speech and overt political repression have continued despite pressure to meet western standards because of Turkey's desire to join the European Union. The incidence of torture actually worsened in 1999 as compared to the previous two years. Given these ongoing problems, it is morally and ethically repugnant to engage in nuclear trade in the absence of tangible human rights improvements.

# A2: Russian Tactical Nukes Advantage

## Russian reductions will not happen even if the U.S. cuts first, which it shouldn’t. Laundry list.

**Wood 9**

David Wood writes about war for Politics Daily. In 30 years of covering conflict, he has filed dispatches from dozens of battlefields (alphabetically, from Afghanistan to Zambia) and has embedded many times with U.S. Army and Marine Corps units as well as with guerrillas and brigands in Africa. He is a birthright Quaker and former conscientious objector, and was a Pulitzer Prize finalist for his reporting on conflict, national security and foreign affairs. Wood has won the Gerald Ford Prize for Distinguished Reporting on National Defense, and in 2008 won the Headliners Club award for his reporting on Iraq. He has lectured at the Marine Staff College, the Joint Forces Staff College and the Army's Eisenhower Fellows conference, and has appeared on CNN, CSPAN, the PBS News Hour, and on BBC and National Public Radio.

(<http://www.politicsdaily.com/2009/07/08/tactical-nuclear-weapons-the-menace-no-one-is-talking-about/>) //DoeS

Especially to strategists concerned about maintaining a strong "nuclear umbrella'' over its friends and allies in Europe. Let's say, however improbable, that Moscow and Washington agree to throw tactical nuclear weapons into the arms reduction negotiations that Obama and Medvedev agreed to this week. How likely is a deal? Not very, experts suggest. For one thing, tactical nukes are small and easily hidden. And their "delivery vehicles'' -- arms-control jargon for the aircraft or missiles that carry them -- are also used for other purposes. Reliably counting these weapons and verifying reductions is devilishly difficult, the experts say. Another reason is that the numbers are too important to each side to think seriously about reductions. Russia's conventional military forces are smaller and vastly inferior to those of the United States, and Russian analysts see their nuclear weapons as a critical counterbalance. Russia also needs its tactical nukes to deter problems along its long border with China. On the U.S. side, a key goal is keeping Europeans reassured that Russia can't muscle them around. It's not that Washington would fire off its tactical nuclear weapons in a crisis, but that simply withdrawing the weapons would make some vulnerable European nations -- Lithuania comes to mind -- uneasy. And "uneasy'' is something to be avoided in a crisis. The blue-ribbon commission, in laying out a proposed U.S. approach to the issue, succinctly demonstrated the problem: The United States should go after deep cuts in Russian tactical nukes, but go easy in cutting its own. "All allies depending on the U.S. nuclear umbrella,'' it said in a statement that probably mirrors the Kremlin's own thinking, "should be assured that any changes in its forces do not imply a weakening of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence guarantees.'’

# A2: Iran Advantage

**1. Diplomatic initiatives fail and the status quo solves the aff**

Glenn **Kessler**, **4-22-10**, The Washington Post, Even as momentum for Iran sanctions grows, containment seems only viable option

After months of first attempting to engage Iran and then wooing Russia and China to support new sanctions against the Islamic republic, the Obama administration appears within reach of winning a modest tightening of U.N. measures targeting Tehran. But administration officials acknowledge that even what they call "crippling" sanctions could prove ineffective in keeping Iran from developing nuclear weapons. That stalemate, in the view of many analysts, means that **a strategy of containing Iran is inevitable** -- diplomatic isolation backed by defense systems supplied to Persian Gulf allies. "I think we are in for a long cold war with Iran. It will be containment and deterrence," said Mark Fitzpatrick, a former top State Department official who is now a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. "Iran will muddle along building its stockpile **but never making a nuclear bomb because it knows that crossing that line would provoke an immediate military attack."**

**2. Political changes in Iran guarantee failure – they’ll never negotiate**

Glenn **Kessler**, **4-22-10**, The Washington Post, Even as momentum for Iran sanctions grows, containment seems only viable option

Indeed, **few experts think that any negotiations with Iran will amount to much.** Iran has been engaged, off and on, with European and U.S. interlocutors since 2003 over its nuclear program. Over time, the offers from the U.S.-European side have grown sweeter, with little response from Iran. The U.N. Security Council has imposed three sets of sanctions on Tehran for failing to negotiate seriously about its program. So far, said Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations, the pressure has "cost the Iranian economy but not affected Iranian decision-making." But he warned that containment will be "hard and difficult and may require the use of force to enforce red lines." Karim Sadjadpour, an Iran specialist at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said that "there is a clique in power" in Tehran that "**does not respond to incentives** and does not respond to disincentives." The Iranian government, under siege from the popular uprising last year after a disputed presidential election, views the nuclear program as **a rallying point for national pride** -- and it thrives on the perception of the United States as an implacable enemy, he said. "The **overwhelming focus** of this leadership is on the narrow focus of enriching uranium," Sadjadpour said. "If the Iranian government makes the decision that Iran wants to bet the farm on the nuclear program, it will be difficult to deter them from doing so." Sadjadpour says that the **purge of moderates** from the decision-making structures in Iran has made it more likely that the country will attempt "the Pakistan option." Under this scenario, Iran would declare itself a nuclear-weapons state, endure the condemnation and then watch as the world comes crawling, anxious to bring it back into the international fold.

# 1NC Repeal Embargo CP

**TEXT: The United States Congress, with Presidential support, should end the economic embargo on Iran. We’ll clarify.**

**Contention 1: Ending the U.S. embargo solves for democracy in Iran**

Abbas **Milani**, Director of Iranian studies at Stanford University and co-director of the Hoover Institution's Iran Democracy Project, 20**05**, The Washington Quarterly, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Future of Democracy in Iran

The Iranian case demands a nuanced sense of realism bereft of the extremist ideologies that advocate panaceas such as conducting military strikes, tightening the embargo, or accepting the current regime as enduring and stable and engaging with it as the sole solution. To use the embargo as an example, dogmatic advocates of a continued or hardened embargo pay little heed to empirical evidence revealing the heavy costs that the embargo has inflicted both on U.S. companies and the Iranian people, amounting to billions of dollars on each side. They seem to care little that the embargo has benefited European companies, as well as the most **corrupt** and **ruthless** elements of the Islamic Republic. The embargo **strengthens the regime** specifically by enabling it to richly reward its **domestic allies**, such as **right-wing** vigilantes, with "import licenses" for embargoed, hard-to-find commodities. The embargo also **empowers the bonyads** with illicit gains from the same import licenses. The Revolutionary Guards, clearly the regime's most important tool of suppression, have made millions of dollars from importing banned and expensive commodities into their own private ports. "End the embargo, and you consolidate the regime," Manichean champions of the status quo claim. In reality, **end the embargo**, and it will **reduce the power and privilege of these vigilantes**, bonyads, and the Revolutionary Guards. As the regime is **dependent on patronage** for its survival, limiting their potential avenues would be one more **nail in the coffin** of an **increasingly despised regime**. It will also help hundreds of U.S. companies hoping to pursue ventures and sales in Iran, such as Cisco, ready to sell routers to Iran and thus pave the highways and byways of information, and Boeing, which stands to make huge profits from refurbishing Iran's dangerously aging and ailing airline industry.

Ending the embargo will also help further integrate Iran into the global economy, and ample evidence indicates that the more a regime such as Iran is allowed into the **global network**, the more the legal and economic opacities that nourish such regimes dissipate. Such integration will allow for the emergence of a more **vibrant middle class** and will **strengthen the private sector and civil society**. Because this tripartite force is the **harbinger of democracy**, ending the embargo will directly help the country's often **economically strangled democratic movement.** The growth of the private sector, now stifled under the heavy weight of the parasitic bonyads, the regime's rampant crony capitalism, and its occasional flirtation with forms of state socialism, is an **essential step** in **strengthening the Iranian democratic movement**. It is an adage **as old as Aristotle**, yet witnessed as recently as the empirical realities of countries such as Taiwan and South Korea, that a middle class and its civil society, as well as the painfully uneven growth of a free market, are a society's **best guarantors** and **promoters of democracy.**

# 1NC Repeal Embargo CP

**Strengthening the democratic movement in Iran can help end the nuclear program**

Abbas **Milani**, Director of Iranian studies at Stanford University and co-director of the Hoover Institution's Iran Democracy Project, 20**05**, The Washington Quarterly, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Future of Democracy in Iran

Ironically, although democracy has always been the Islamic Republic's Achilles' heel, these enumerated failures have turned the nuclear question into the clerics' Herculean club. It has been the only issue in the last 15 years around which the regime has been able to garner public support. To solve Iran's nuclear problem, the West has to stop playing to the regime's strength and instead concentrate on its weakness. In other words, in spite of the many dire and serious warnings about the nuclear threat, the key to **solving Iran's nuclear problem** is the **fate of the country's democratic movement**. Democracy is in fact the **focal point** where Iranians' interests **converge with those of the U**nited **S**tates. If the past is any indication, democracies are far more likely than dictatorships to engage in a **serious and honest "roll back" of their nuclear programs.** Furthermore, only in a democracy can there be a **serious national dialogue** about the real costs and benefits of "going nuclear." Finally, democracies are **far less likely** to allow terrorists access to their arsenals. Fortunately, in contrast to most Muslim countries in the Middle East, Iran has a **viable, indigenous democratic movement.** Also setting it apart, the United States is, for the most part, admired politically and culturally by many elements of Iran's democratic movement and by the Iranian population in general. The movement sees the United States as its potential ally, but it is also wary of being used, in appearance or in reality, as a **bargaining chip** in a realpolitik between Tehran and Washington. The United States must treat Iran's democracy movement as an independent ally, not a ward. It must respect its autonomy and its political exigencies at home, and most importantly, it must not interfere in the movement by anointing any person, group, or faction. Patronizing the democratic movement by throwing money at it will only serve to strengthen the regime's claims that democrats in Iran are tools of the United States.

# Solvency Extensions

**Lifting sanctions prevents the current regime from blaming the U.S. for their economic woes and re-energizes the democratic movement**

**Bangor Daily News**, **5-11-06**, Talking Beats Bombing

An intriguing suggestion for a possible course of diplomacy has come from the Iran Democracy Project of the conservative Hoover Institution at Stanford. The New York Times reports that the project directors propose U.S. engagement with Tehran "with just enough diplomatic relationship to create a platform to **support the beleaguered reform movement** in the country." They would lift **most U.S. economic sanctions**, so that the Iranian government could **no longer blame the sanctions for its troubles**, and encourage the Iranian people to **press for democratic rule.**

# A2: No Democratic Movement

**Rising unemployment rates and discontent with the government are feeding the growing democratic movement**

Abbas **Milani**, Director of Iranian studies at Stanford University and co-director of the Hoover Institution's Iran Democracy Project, 20**05**, The Washington Quarterly, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Future of Democracy in Iran

Making the present situation far more volatile, however, is the existence of a **seasoned democratic movement** that only appears dormant to the untrained eye. Beneath the veneer of calm are **millions of unemployed youth.** According to a recent report prepared for the government by its own National Youth Organization, 30 percent of young Iranians are now unemployed. With the young demographic structure of the population, the number of the unemployed, according to the same organization, is likely to increase. Furthermore, systemic corruption and economic incompetence; ideological bankruptcy; and, most importantly, the women's movement have been **feeding into a sea of popular discontent**. The misogyny of some Islamic laws—allowing girls to be legally married at the "age of puberty," denying women custody of any children over the age of seven, and allowing men to have multiple wives while forcing women to remain in unhappy marriages—makes it impossible for women to achieve parity with men under the **current Islamic regime**. Can the current regime successfully combat these forces in the long run?

# Middle East Prolif F/L

**Iranian nuclear acquisition won’t result in a Middle East arms race**

Christopher **Layne**, Associate Professor of International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and a member of the Board of Directors of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, 4-10-**06**, The American Conservative, Iran: The Logic of Deterrence

The same architects of illusion who fulminated for war with Iraq say that if Iran gets nuclear weapons, three bad things could happen: it could trigger a **nuclear arms race** in the **Middle East**; it might supply nuclear weapons to terrorists; and Tehran could use its nuclear weapons to blackmail other states in the region or to engage in aggression. Each of these scenarios, however, is **improbable in the extreme**. During the early 1960s, American policymakers had similar fears that China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would trigger a proliferation stampede, but these fears **did not materialize**, and a nuclear Iran is **no more likely** to start a proliferation snowball in the Middle East. Israel, of course, already is a nuclear power. The other three states that might be tempted to seek nuclear-weapons capability are Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. But as MIT professor Barry Posen points out, each of these three states would be **under strong pressure** not do to so. Egypt is particularly vulnerable to outside pressure to refrain from going nuclear because its **shaky economy** depends on foreign—especially U.S.—economic assistance. Saudi Arabia would find it hard to purchase nuclear weapons or material on the black market, which is closely watched by the United States, and, Posen notes, it would take the Saudis years to develop the industrial and engineering capabilities to develop nuclear weapons indigenously.

**Most experts are on our side – a nuclear Iran won’t result in an arms race**

Judith S. **Yaphe**, Senior Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, Colonel Charles D. **Lutes**, USAF, Senior Military Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, August 20**05**, Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran

Beyond the gulf region, few experts—apart from the Israelis—see a direct correlation between Iran getting the bomb and everyone else wanting it. More relevant, they argue, is what a government defines as the primary challenges to its immediate and longer-term security. Muslim and Arab governments profess not to see a serious risk from a nuclear- armed Iran, just as they professed not to see a similar risk from a nuclear- hopeful Iraq. these governments look more toward commitments from the united states and the united nations, and signatories’ compliance with the NPT and IAEA regulations. Egypt at present appears to be abiding by its decades-old decision to sign the NPT and not pursue nuclear weapons. This could change, however, if Israel openly declares its nuclear weapons program. Syria and Libya would not seem to have an option for nuclear weapons; libya has abandoned its efforts, and Syria, under close scrutiny because of its occupation of Lebanon and accusations of aiding Iraqi insurgents, will probably remain reliant on its chemical weapons and missile programs. It can afford little else.

# Middle East Prolif F/L

**Middle East proliferation would lead to territorial settlements**

Justin **Logan**, Foreign Policy Analyst @ CATO, 12-4-**06**, CATO: Policy Analysis, The Bottom Line on Iran: The Costs and Benefits of Preventive War versus Deterrence

By this logic—Shamir’s argument implies that even the occupied territories represent vital

Israeli interests—the prospect that a nuclear Iran could cause Israel to become more prone to make territorial concessions is indeed excessively dangerous to Israel. But as Waltz points out, “Establishing the credibility of a deterrent force requires moderation of territorial claims on the part of the would-be deterrer.” This potential moderation is extremely troubling to those who hold grave doubts about territorial concessions, but would have less impact on Israel’s (and certainly America’s) long-term security than they believe. Rosen argued: A stable regional system of mutual assured destruction would have as an almost unavoidable political corollary the assumption of a return of the captured territories, combined with agreements for the limitation of forces in the areas surrendered by Israel. Indeed, the major virtue of nuclearization of the Middle East is that, while it will make a territorial settlement necessary, it will also render it possible.

**Middle East proliferation would DECREASE the chance of war**

Justin **Logan**, Foreign Policy Analyst @ CATO, 12-4-**06**, CATO: Policy Analysis, The Bottom Line on Iran: The Costs and Benefits of Preventive War versus Deterrence

This concern is probably real but overstated. Those who fear the prospect of an arms race in the Middle East argue that it would increase the likelihood of war. But in fact war becomes more likely if neighboring states do not arm themselves. If neighboring states maintain their current, anemic military efforts and allow Iran to build power based on its nuclear capability, that would increase the likelihood of war by lowering the perceived cost to Iran of provoking conflict. As it happens, key states in the region are quite wary of a nuclear war.

# Terrorism F/L

**Iran won’t supply terrorists with nuclear weapons**

Christopher **Layne**, Associate Professor of International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and a member of the Board of Directors of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, 4-10-**06**, The American Conservative, Iran: The Logic of Deterrence

Notwithstanding the near-hysterical rhetoric of the Bush administration and the neoconservatives, **Iran is not going to give nuclear weapons to terrorists**. This is not to say that Tehran has not abetted groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon or Hamas in the Palestinian Authority. However, there are good reasons that states—even those that have ties to terrorists—draw the line at giving them nuclear weapons or other WMD: if the terrorists were to use these weapons against the United States or its allies, the weapons could be **traced back to the donor state**, which would be **at risk of annihilation** by an American retaliatory strike. Iran’s leaders have too much at stake to run this risk. Even if one believed the administration’s hype about the indifference of rogue-state leaders to the fate of their populations, they care very much about the **survival of their regimes**, which is why deterrence works.

**Those who control nuclear weapons in Iran won’t transfer them to terrorists**

Judith S. **Yaphe**, Senior Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, Colonel Charles D. **Lutes**, USAF, Senior Military Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, August 20**05**, Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran

Most experts agree that the Iranian government is unlikely to share its new nuclear weapons technology with terrorist groups, including the Lebanese Hizballah. Iranian intelligence officers and IRGC personnel will continue to train surrogates and provide safe haven for a select few. Iran’s WMD programs are probably under the control of the IRGC, whose **leaders** would **understand the risk** to the regime if caught passing on sensitive technology to **extremist groups**. Consensus is important in Iranian decisionmaking, but the IRGC or so-called rogue elements may be able to circumvent senior government decisionmakers opposed to sharing the new and dangerous technology with surrogates. The stakes would have to be very high—perhaps regime survival—before the IRGC and its political patrons would risk giving nuclear weapons to terrorists. the harder—and probably unanswerable—question is whether Iranian official controls would be durable enough to prevent “leakage” by rogue actors. The risk that pro-Iranian terrorist groups would be heartened by their patron’s new capabilities also presents a new challenge for deterrence. Iran is not likely to provide nuclear weapons assistance to Sunni religious extremists or terrorist groups; it fears them more than it favors them. A more plausible concern is that a group long affiliated with Iran— for example, Hizballah in Lebanon—would **feel emboldened** to take **more aggressive action against Israel**, assuming that it is protected by a nuclear-armed Iran.

# Israel F/L

**Iran’s leadership is both rational and strategic – they won’t strike Israel**

Justin **Logan**, Foreign Policy Analyst @ CATO, Ted Galen **Carpenter**, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, **2-15-07**, CATO, Evidence Suggests Iran Wouldn’t Pull Nuclear Trigger

Some hawks in the Iran debate argue that the Iranian leadership is not rational, and hence, fundamentally undeterrable. Bernard Lewis, the Princeton historian and adviser to Vice President Dick Cheney, argues that Iran's president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Iranian government "clearly believe" that "the cosmic struggle at the end of time ... ending in the final victory of the forces of good over evil" has begun. Israeli historian Benny Morris posits that a nuclear Iran would bring about a "second Holocaust." If Lewis and Morris were right, there would be no point even contemplating deterring a nuclear Iran — Israel's and even America's nuclear arsenals would be useless against it. Thankfully, their reasoning is **flawed** and **their evidence thin.** First, Ahmadinejad is not a Stalinesque — or even Putinesque — center of power in Tehran. The Iranian president has increasingly been a target of official criticism, and recent reports indicate that he may not remain in power to the end of his four-year term. Iran's powerful Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is a **more significant political player** than Ahmadinejad. Though Khamenei also embraces odious ideas, it is important to evaluate Iran's actions, not just its rhetoric. Consider the Iran-Iraq War. Smoldering with radicalism from the Islamic revolution, Iran's early rhetoric was uncompromising, and in November 1981, it issued clear proclamations that it had no intention of stopping the war as long as Saddam Hussein remained in power. By 1988, however, a long string of devastating tactical routs had made clear that outright strategic defeat was possible, so the Iranian leadership changed course. They sued for peace, jettisoning their original objective of deposing Hussein and taking a deal that left Iran on the light side of the postwar balance of power. That the clerical leadership saw this reality and decided to end the conflict suggests that for all its religious bombast, it was making rational strategic calculations. In hindsight, even extreme radicals like Khomeini — who were viewed at the time as irrational — did not meet the description. The evidence indicates that Iran's leadership remains rational today. Though it would certainly terrify the Israeli population, Iran has never passed chemical or biological weapons to Hezbollah or other client organizations. Why? Most likely because they fear Israeli reprisals. And if the Iranians fear Israel's response to a chemical or biological attack, they are certainly aware how much more severely Israel would respond to a nuclear assault, whether by proxy or directly launched from Iran. Never in history have leaders made a decision that was absolutely certain to destroy their own country in a matter of hours. Until someone can come up with definitive evidence that Iran is the first such country, we must work from the assumption that Chirac's reasoning is right.

# Israel F/L

**Iran knows Israel has a strong second-strike capability – they’d never attack**

Justin **Logan**, Foreign Policy Analyst @ CATO, 12-4-**06**, CATO: Policy Analysis, The Bottom Line on Iran: The Costs and Benefits of Preventive War versus Deterrence

Israeli vice premier Shimon Peres helpfully pointed out the flaws in this reasoning during an interview with Reuters in May 2006 when he made clear that “when it comes to destruction, Iran, too, can be destroyed.” Israel is thought to currently possess roughly 200 nuclear weapons, dispersed throughout its (admittedly small) territory. Given that Israel reportedly possesses both nuclear-equipped Jericho-2 missiles in hardened silos and submarines armed with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles (both of which are extremely difficult to destroy, even with highly accurate weapons), it is clear that any conceivable Iranian first strike in the foreseeable future would not destroy Israel’s retaliatory capability. In addition, an Israeli second strike would have a devastating effect on Iran, as roughly two-thirds of its population is located in urban centers. It is difficult to believe that the Iranian leadership would bring about the destruction of its own country only to pave the way for Sunni states like Saudi Arabia to position themselves as the vanguard of a triumphant, post-Israel Islam.