# **China Arms Race Turn**

## **1NC—China Arms Race Turn**

### **US space leadership guts the Chinese economy and tanks U.S.-Sino relations.**

Johnson-Freese 4 (Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese Chair, Department of National Security Studies, Naval War College “Space Wei Qi: The Launch of Shenzhou V” <http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/ba695c64-2c13-4913-a6f5-9ebcec9aa311/Space-Wei-Qi--The-Launch-of-Shenzhou-V---Johnson-F> //Donnie)

Apparently, since rumors of consideration of a reinvigorated U.S. manned space effort began within two months of the successful Chinese launch, Washington realized that “doing nothing” was not an option. If the United States ignored the Chinese launch, China would simply seek out and likely find other countries more favorably disposed to working with it. That would leave the United States in the seeming position of having been “caught,” if not overtaken, by the Chinese in a manned space race driven by public perceptions, as well as the very real likelihood of more unwanted partnerships, of the Galileo variety, between China and third nations or groups, with the United States increasingly the odd man out. Although the American public was apathetic about Yang Liwei’s flight, the fickle nature of the public meant that could change. If the Chinese continued with manned space activity and the United States continued on an ambivalent path, the latter would eventually have to decide if it were comfortable with an overall first place in space but gold medals for China in manned space exploration and development. China’s technology would not have outpaced that of the United States, but its sustained political commitment would have. With the status quo not being an option, the relevance of how the United States would reinvigorate its program becomes critical. Simply announcing intent says little, as the devil is always in the details. The United States can declare a space race, unilaterally developing a long-awaited manned program to return to the moon or a manned Mars mission, or some combination of the two. However, it is unlikely that the ISS partners would support a program developed without their input; in fact, their post–Shenzhou V congratulatory messages, especially those of Russia and Europe, suggest that they would support no program that excluded the Chinese. Further, the continuing financial and technical problems of the still-incomplete ISS make it unlikely that its sponsors will be anxious to commit themselves, even if invited, to an expanded manned program. ISS is struggling. Debate followed the 20 October 2003 arrival of the fresh crew at the station when it was disclosed that some NASA staff felt the station unsafe, because air, water, and radiation monitors, medical devices, and some other systems were ailing or broken. NASA management itself declared the overall station safe, at least temporarily. Clearly, however, ISS needs immediate attention and possibly additional funding. The benefits to the United States of a competitive approach are the same kinds it enjoyed earlier with Apollo—prestige, technology development, and jobs in aerospace. At the risk of losing face and allowing the technology gap to grow, China would be pushed to put more money into its manned program and at a faster rate than it would otherwise have, thereby diverting it from military programs. It would be the equivalent of forcing the Soviet Union to spend money to counter Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”) technology. There are three drawbacks to this approach: Can the United States afford this kind of a program and maintain the requisite political will to fund it through completion? Is this really the best long-term strategy for long-term U.S.-China relations? Does, finally, the United States want to reinforce the view that it prefers unilateralism to multilateralism?

Economic collapse causes global war.

Friedberg 11 (July/August, Aaron L., professor of politics and international affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics, The National Interest, lexis)

Such fears of aggression are heightened by an awareness that anxiety over a lack of legitimacy at home can cause nondemocratic governments to try to deflect popular frustration and discontent toward external enemies. Some Western observers worry, for example, that if China’s economy falters its rulers will try to blame foreigners and even manufacture crises with Taiwan, Japan or the United States in order to rally their people and redirect the population’s anger. Whatever Beijing’s intent, such confrontations could easily spiral out of control. Democratic leaders are hardly immune to the temptation of foreign adventures. However, because the stakes for them are so much lower (being voted out of office rather than being overthrown and imprisoned, or worse), they are less likely to take extreme risks to retain their hold on power.

### China relations key to world peace

**Zhou 8** — Assistant Professor in the Department of Asian Languages and Cultures at Hobart and William Smith Colleges – NY -- Dr. Jinghao, Does China’s Rise Threaten the United States? Asian Perspective, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2008, pp. 171-182

Third, there are many common interests between China and the United States.26On the one hand, China-U.S. relations are critical not only to both countries but also to the entire international community. David M. Lampton notes that “there is no global issue that can be effectively tackled without Sino-American cooperation.”27On the other hand, it is one of the greatest challenges for the United States to coexist with China in the new century.28To be sure, they share many opportunities for mutual benefit. Economically, the Chinese economy heavily relies on Western expertise, Chinese foreign trade largely depends on foreign-invested companies, and about 60 percent of China’s total exports are produced by foreign-funded enterprises. All of this makes China sensitive to the ups and downs of the international economy, and in particular that of the U.S. economy. If the U.S. economy has troubles, it hurts China’s economic growth. In turn, China is the largest market of the United States. Sara Bongiorni has recounted the story of how her family wanted to spend a year without buying anything made in China. In fact, Bongiorni discovered it was not only difficult but also not worthwhile to do so, because she found that there are vast consumer areas that are nearly all Chinese-dominated. Thus, it is really difficult to exclude China from economic globalization.29 Politically, China and Western societies need to work closely together in order to maintain the global peace. In fact, China has successfully worked with Western governments on several key international issues. China hosted the Six Party Talks. As a result, **North Korea** agreed to disable its nuclear programs by the end of 2007.30 China took tough actions on **Iran’s nuclear program,** showing the seriousness of China’s commitment to **nonproliferation.** The United States and China also share common interests in energy, global warming, human rights, anti-corruption, social welfare, the role of nongovernmental organizations, **AIDS and other disease prevention**, United Nations reform, **and counterterrorism**. China and the United States recently signed an agreement to open a military hot line between their defense departments. Fourth, a hostile U.S. relationship with China would damage both countries’ interests and make it impossible for them to work jointly on global issues. As early as 60 years ago, an Australian ambassador warned the United States that it was very dangerous to be hostile to China and suggested that it keep China as a friend, because China might easily become a very powerful military nation in 50 years. Likewise, John Ikenberry advised that the United States cannot stop China’s rise.31 If the United States tries to keep China weak, it would increase China’s domestic instability, which would negatively affect global peace and development. The most important thing for the United States to do is not to block China from becoming a powerful country, but to understand China and learn to live with a rising China. In the meantime, the United States should urge the Chinese government to become a responsible, accountable, and democratic stakeholder.32 If China moves in that direction, the United States can focus on shared interests such as fighting terrorism and promoting world peace.

## Arms Race Uniqueness

### China does not perceive U.S. space leadership as a threat now—Obama policies.

Zhang 11 (Baohui Zhang is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University, Hong Kong. He wishes to thank an anonymous reviewer for the helpful comments that contributed to the revision of this article. Email: <bzhang@ln.edu.hk>. “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship” accessed by means of JSTOR, Donnie)

As Kevin Narizny points out in his study of grand strategy, political turnover in the executive office often leads to dramatic shifts in state behavior. In particular, changes in control of government from one party to another can lead states to redefine their strategic goals and the means of promoting them. 40 The profound and ongoing strategic adjustment by the Obama administration has indeed borne out this argument. The much-maligned grand strategy of primacy and unilateralism has given way to a new stance that emphasizes strategic restraint and multilateral diplomacy. Smart power, rather than military preponderance, is now seen by many as the best way to pursue U.S. interests in the world. The current strategic adjustment by the U.S. has significantly lowered China’s traditional concern about the threat posed by a hegemonic America. China’s foreign policy analysts have reached a consensus that the U.S. has suffered a significant relative decline and is in the process of strategic retreat. 41 As a result, the old hegemonic system is believed to have disintegrated. This new perception of the U.S. position in the world has also led the PLA to reassess the likelihood of war between the two countries. Some Chinese military strategists now believe that the relative decline of the U.S. has critically affected the ability and will of the American military to engage in major foreign wars. Lei Sihai, a strategist with a PLA background, claims that “the military capability of the U.S. has declined significantly and it is no longer capable of launching major wars.” 42 Major General Jin Yinan, a strategist at the PLA National Defense University, has suggested that the rise of China and the relative decline of the U.S. have made a war scenario between them very unlikely. 43 Thus, the strategic landscape between China and the U.S., as seen by Chinese experts from both civilian and military backgrounds, has shifted because of changes in American grand strategy and military strategy. This change in perception has relaxed Chinese concerns about national security. It marks a significant turnaround from China’s view of the American threat from the mid-1990s to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, when the American pursuit of hegemony was seen as the greatest threat in China’s strategic environment. After U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced major changes in the Pentagon’s 2010 budget, including cancelling the procurement of F-22 fighters and key missile defense programs, one PLA strategist characterized these adjustments as “a comprehensive rethinking about U.S. geopolitical strategies.” As the analysis emphasizes, “Gates’s and Obama’s thinking no longer shows aggressiveness. Instead, they seek a new security framework through accommodation. These significant adjustments in U.S. military strategies, especially the decisions to cut missile defense and stop procurement of F-22 fighters, which are directed mainly against China and Russia, should be welcomed. They are conducive for relaxing relations among great powers and reducing their strategic misunderstanding.” 44 Moreover, Chinese experts have taken keen notice of the new space policy of the Obama administration, which opposes deployment of weapons in space and is willing to explore international agreements on the issue. As observed by a recent PLA analysis, “Obama’s willingness to reach an international treaty banning space-based weapons and to establish a global cooperative mechanism will have positive impacts on the world’s efforts for space arms control and prevention of an arms race.” 45

## Space Leadership Spurs Arms Race

### Space primacy causes full on arms race

Zhang 11 (Baohui Zhang is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University, Hong Kong. He wishes to thank an anonymous reviewer for the helpful comments that contributed to the revision of this article. Email: <bzhang@ln.edu.hk>. “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship” accessed by means of JSTOR, Donnie)

In both cases, Chinese security experts believe that the U.S. seeks “absolute security” in order to maximize protection for the American population from external threats.9 This means that China at least recognizes the defensive motivations behind the U.S. quest for space dominance and missile defense. However, with the chaotic nature of international relations, one country’s efforts to maximize its security could degrade the security of others by changing the balance of power. Inevitably, the U.S. **quest for “absolute security**” evokes **countermeasures** from other countries. As Kenneth Waltz observes, when a great power seeks superiority, others will respond in kind, since “maintaining status quo is the minimum goal of any great power.”10 According to Robert Jervis, “The heart of the security dilemma argument is that an increase in one state’s security can make others less secure, not because of misperceptions or imagined hostility, but because of the anarchic context of international relations.” In this context, “Even if they can be certain that the current intentions of other states are benign, they can neither neglect the possibility that the others will become aggressive in the future nor credibly guarantee that they themselves will remain peaceful.”11 Inevitably, when one state seeks to expand its military capability, others have to take similar measures. The first factor that caused the security dilemma in the Sino-U.S. military space relationship is the professed American quest for space dominance. This quest is a reflection of the U.S. obsession with primacy that predates the Obama administration. The primacy strategy demands undisputed military dominance in different areas, including space, to ensure the best possible protection of U.S. national security. The U.S. is the only country in the world that has articulated a coherent national strategy for space dominance. As emphasized by Michael W. Wynne, former Air Force secretary, “America’s domination of the space domain provides an unrivaled advantage for our nation and remains critical to creating the strategic and tactical conditions for victory.”12 The U.S. is the leader in the militarization of space. It was the first country that established a dedicated command, the U.S. Space Command, to unify military operations in space. In fact, as its Vision for 2020 proclaims, the Space Command seeks to achieve “full spectrum dominance” in space.13 Furthermore, it envisions permanent dominance in the military dimension of space operations: “Today, the U.S. is the preeminent military space power. Our vision is one of maintaining that preeminence—providing a solid foundation for our national security.”14 General Lance W. Lord, former commander, Air Force Space Command, points out the importance of space dominance: “Space superiority is the future of warfare. We cannot win a war without controlling the high ground, and the high ground is space.”15 In December 2007, the U.S. Air Force released a White Paper called The Nation’s Guardians: America’s 21st Century Air Force, in which General T. Michael Moseley made a similar statement: “No future war will be won without air, space and cyberspace superiority”; thus, “the Air Force must attain cross-domain dominance. Cross-domain dominance is the freedom to attack and the freedom from attack in and through the atmosphere, space and electromagnetic spectrum.”16 This strategy of space dominance, however, generates the classic security dilemma between the U.S. and other countries. Although the U.S. may be motivated by defensive purposes, such as shielding the American population from nuclear weapons and other threats, **other countries have to assume the worst in an anarchic world**. As observed by Joan Johnson-Freese, “I would argue that the rest of the world accepts U.S. space supremacy. What the Bush Administration claims is space dominance, and that’s what the rest of the world won’t accept.”17 Chinese strategists certainly perceive the U.S. quest for space dominance as damaging to China’s national security; whoever controls space will have the edge in winning the next war. Indeed, Chinese military and civilian strategists argue that the U.S. search for “absolute security” **jeopardizes** other countries’ security. It is widely reported in Chinese military literature that the U.S. has already developed and is in fact implementing a master plan for military dominance in space. The challenge for China is to prevent the U.S. from jumping too far ahead. As observed by a major study organized by the General Staff of the PLA, “In recent decades the U.S. has been consistently pursuing dominance in space in order to become its overlord.”18 The study also points out that the U.S. is the first country to develop a full set of doctrines for space militarization and dominance: In April 1998, the U.S. Space Command published its long-term strategic development plan, Vision for 2020, which specifically proposed the concept of space dominance and revealed the goals of allowing the American military to use space weapons to attack the enemy’s land, sea, air, and space targets. World opinion believes this represented the formal debut of U.S. space war theory and indicated an important first step by the U.S. military toward space war.19 Li Daguang, one of the most influential PLA experts on space war, also alleges that the U.S. has initiated “a new space war” to maintain its status as “the overlord of space.” He claims that the ultimate goal of the U.S. space program is to “build a powerful military empire in outer space that attempts to include any space between earth and moon under American jurisdiction.” Under this empire, “without U.S. permission, any country, including even its allies, will not be able to use outer space for military or other purposes.”20

### The mere perception of our argument triggers an all-out arms race.

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 One particular concern for the Chinese military is that the U.S. may no longer be content with merely militarizing space, which involves extensive use of satellites for military operations. Instead, weaponization of space is on the agenda. The PLA now **believes** that the U.S. is on the verge of important breakthroughs in the development of weapons for space war. As one study claims: “Currently, the U.S. military already possesses or will soon possess ASAT technologies with real combat capabilities, such as aircraft-launched ASAT missiles, land-based laser ASAT weapons, and space-based energy ASAT weapons.”21 Moreover, the PLA suggests that the U.S. is trying to acquire space-based weapons to attack targets on earth: The U.S. military is developing orbital bombers, which fly on low altitude orbits, and when given combat orders, will re-enter the atmosphere and attack ground targets. **This kind of weapon has high accuracy and stealth capability, and is able to launch sudden strikes**. These capabilities make it impossible for enemies to defend against. Orbital bombers thus can strike at any target anywhere on the planet. It is the major means for the U.S. military to perform global combat in the 21st century.22 This perception of the American lead in space militarization and attempts for its weaponization is a major motive for the Chinese military to develop similar projects and thus avoid U.S. domination in future wars. The PLA believes that control of the commanding heights will decide the outcome of future wars, and China cannot afford to cede that control to the U.S. As a result, space war is a key component of the PLA Air Force’s (PLAAF) new doctrines. In 2006 the PLAAF released a comprehensive study called Military Doctrines for Air Force, which makes the following statement: **In future wars, merely possessing air superiority will no longer be sufficient for seizing the initiative of battles**. In significant ways, only obtaining space superiority could ensure controlling the initiative of war. The contest in outer space has become the contest for the new commanding heights. Seizing control of space will mean control of the global commanding heights, which will in turn enable dominance in air, land, and sea battles. Thus, it is impossible to achieve national security without obtaining space security.23 Another driver of the PLA’s efforts to counter U.S. dominance in space is the time factor. **There is a genuine sense of urgency about controlling the commanding heights in space**. The U.S. is seen as already possessing a decisive lead in the race toward space hegemony. As observed by Lieutenant General Ge Dongsheng, vice president of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences: Establishing space capability is not only important but also urgent. This is due to the fact that the U.S. and Russia have already taken the steps and now enjoy a vast lead over us. Even India, Japan, and European countries have ambitious plans to develop their own space capabilities. Under this situation, if we do not hasten implementing our own plan, there will be the possibility of having to face a generational gap in space capabilities.24

### **China is peaceful now, plan reveres that trend**

Hagt 8 (Eric Hagt is the director of the China Program at the World Security Institute, in Washington, D.C. His research interests include Sino-U.S. relations in the field of space, energy and a range of non-traditional security issues. The author would like to thank Chen Yali, Theresa Hitchens, Ann Li and Su Dejin for their comments and suggestions on this article “Mutually Assured Vulnerabilities in Space” <http://www.wsichina.org/attach/cs2_8.pdf> //Donnie)

China is pursuing space primarily as a market, not as a battleground. Imperative economic development priorities steer China’s interests overwhelmingly toward peaceful exploitation of space. However, a number of factors threaten to alter that course. China is growing increasingly concerned that U.S. plans to develop a robust missile defense and space control capabilities are both inevitable and directed squarely at it. If the United States were successful in those pursuits, China fears its nuclear deterrent would be jeopardized, which in turn would force Beijing into a destabilizing arms race. Less understood are the uncertainties emerging from China’s rapidly-evolving space program. Driven by perceived strategic threats as well as commercial interests, an increased Chinese focus on developing capabilities and placing assets in space is creating a new environment that will influence the security of space. China’s bold plans in commercial space, coupled with the inherent dual-use application of satellite technology, are bringing about vulnerabilities for China and arousing misgivings with its potential peer competitors, particularly the United States. China thus is even further compelled to hedge against perceived threats from U.S. missile defense systems, especially a future system based in space. China’s consideration of hedging strategies to counter the United States in space in turn further drives U.S. military space plans in the direction of a weaponization strategy – thus entrenching a security dilemma. This impasse can be ameliorated by greater transparency regarding both capabilities and intention. Transparency, however, is conceived differently by the Chinese and American sides, with the former focusing on underlying strategic objectives, and the latter, capabilities

## Guts Relations

### **Beating China kills relations.**

Pollpeter 8 (Kevin Pollpeter is China Program Manager at Defense Group Inc.’s Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis. Previously, he was a researcher at the Rand Corporation. Mr. Pollpeter is widely published on China national security issues and focuses on the Chinese space program.“Building for the Future: China's Progress in Space Technology during the Tenth 5-Year Plan and the U.S. Response” <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=852> //Donnie)

The rise of China as a space power also raises the question of whether the United States should cooperate with China in space. The difficulty in deciding an appropriate response arises from the inability of both sides to determine whether their relationship will be friendly or hostile. Nevertheless, the United States is presented with four policy options to meet the changing dynamics presented by China?s space program: contain, compete, cooperate, and do nothing. Containment is the least viable of the four options, and as China becomes more integrated with the world, it will become even less practical. Competition may also be problematic. U.S.-China relations may be ambivalent, but extensive cooperation does take place in many araeas, and it is not apparent how defining China as a competitor in a space race will further relations. It is also not apparent whether the American public will support a race which will require additional funding with little short-term gain. Cooperation, on the other hand, has the potential to increase transparency and trust and to lessen competitive aspects that may lead to armed conflict. A policy that treats China as a friend, however, has its own shortcomings. Because China?s strategy is designed to further its own national interests and because its interests are often not aligned with U.S. interests, it is unlikely that assisting China in increasing its space power may eliminate these differences and may, in fact, exacerbate them. Doing nothing is a safe option that does not risk the transfer of technology or expertise. A policy of inaction does risk ignoring the possible benefits of cooperation.

## Economy Internal Link/Impact

### **Chinese resources are finite—they need to go to domestic social policy to maintain growth—the impact is power conflict.**

Mead 9 (Walter Russell Mead is the Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of God and Gold: Britain, America and the Making of the Modern World. Lauren Gottlieb provided research assistance for this article. “Only Makes You Stronger: Why the recession bolstered America.” <http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2169866/posts> //Donnie)

At the same time, Beijing will have to devote more resources and more attention to stabilizing Chinese society, building a national health care system, providing a social security net, and caring for an aging population, which, thanks to the one-child policy, will need massive help from the government to support itself in old age. Doing so will leave China fewer resources for military build-ups and foreign adventures. As the crisis has forcefully reminded Americans, creating and regulating a functional and flexible financial system is difficult. Every other country in the world has experienced significant financial crises while building such systems, and China is unlikely to be an exception. All this means that China's rise looks increasingly like a gradual process. A deceleration in China's long-term growth rate would postpone indefinitely the date when China could emerge as a peer competitor to the United States. The present global distribution of power could be changing slowly, if at all. The greatest danger both to U.S.-China relations and to American power itself is probably not that China will rise too far, too fast; it is that the current crisis might end China's growth miracle. In the worst-case scenario, the turmoil in the international economy will plunge China into a major economic downturn. The Chinese financial system will implode as loans to both state and private enterprises go bad. Millions or even tens of millions of Chinese will be unemployed in a country without an effective social safety net. The collapse of asset bubbles in the stock and property markets will wipe out the savings of a generation of the Chinese middle class. The political consequences could include dangerous unrest--and a bitter climate of anti-foreign feeling that blames others for China's woes. (Think of Weimar Germany, when both Nazi and communist politicians blamed the West for Germany's economic travails.) Worse, instability could lead to a vicious cycle, as nervous investors moved their money out of the country, further slowing growth and, in turn, fomenting ever-greater bitterness. Thanks to a generation of rapid economic growth, China has so far been able to manage the stresses and conflicts of modernization and change; nobody knows what will happen if the growth stops.

### **Space exploration is a huge financial distraction—collapses Chinese growth.**

MacDonald 8 (Bruce, is a Senior Director, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Program. “China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security” i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/China\_Space\_CSR38.pdf //Donnie)

Until China becomes substantially more dependent upon its space assets, the United States will need to supplement this strategy with alternative asymmetric means to deter China from attacking U.S. space interests, including potential disruption of PLA communications and the ability to attack high-value ground targets, though this would also risk serious escalation. In the long run, if China sustains its economic growth to a point where its economic and technological prowess is roughly comparable to at least Japan’s, if not the United States’, U.S. offensive counterspace superiority could be more difficult to sustain if China decided it wanted parity or more, a distinct possibility. Yet by that time, China would be struggling with the economic and political impact of its demographics, where its one-child policy will lead to a rapidly aging workforce. Chinese leaders require decades of external stability so that they “can continue to focus their attention on economic growth and political reform. China can ill afford external distractions that would absorb resources and jeopardize the environment that China requires for continued economic growth.” 20 China has many other looming sociopolitical issues, too, making space force parity likely a lower priority for it, as long as it could maintain space deterrence. If the United States and China can successfully navigate the shoals of uncertainty over the next two or three decades and achieve friendlier relations, such considerations could shrink greatly in significance. But achieving such a state requires that these issues be discussed and debated, with as much information as can safely be made public. As a former Air Force vice chief of staff recently wrote, “It is important to encourage a debate on space power to include development of a space deterrent theory. We need something similar to the intellectual ferment that surrounded nuclear deterrence.” 21

## Turns Hegemony

### **Space race guts US primacy—China will catch up.**

MacDonald 8 (Bruce, is a Senior Director, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Program.“China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security” i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/China\_Space\_CSR38.pdf //Donnie)

A third doctrinal option is sustained offensive U.S. space dominance. In this case, the United States would maintain such a powerful offensive and defensive counterspace capability that no other nation could compete with it. Such a capability would be highly sensitive to the motivations and responses of China and other CRINKIL countries. Even if China adopted a policy of minimum space deterrence, space dominance would be unstable because U.S. efforts to maintain it would by definition weaken China’s ability to deter. Chinese efforts to restore its deterrent would then spark responsive efforts by the United States to maintain dominance, and a serious arms competition in space would be inevitable unless one side gave up. Where a U.S. adversary was determined to maintain rough parity in offensive space capability, the resulting strategic space environment would be even more unstable. Sudden technological breakthroughs by either side, rarely predictable, would aggravate this dynamic. Such a dominant stance could theoretically convince a competitor like China that it should not even attempt to develop the capability to attack U.S. space systems, much less put such capabilities in space, but in reality such a result is highly unlikely. China’s burgeoning economy, its nonmilitary space programs, and its strong nationalist streak make it far more likely to continue to spend considerable resources on its satellites and counterspace capabilities. China would see such a U.S. doctrine as provocative, and it would likely stimulate a more determined Chinese response. Attempting to maintain space dominance would thus be very costly, destabilizing, and ultimately unsuccessful, compromising U.S. ability to pursue other military and nonmilitary priorities in the meantime.

# CCP Collapse Turn

## **1NC—CCP Collapse Turn**

### **China is not a space challenger to the US—status quo success gives the CCP legitimacy at home.**

Wiggin 10 (Stuart, is a freelance writer based in Beijing, “Asian space race more about prestige than power” <http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/foreign-view/2011-04/585161.html> //Donnie)

At the start of this month China launched its first lunar probe. This was the latest step of an arduous journey, with the final goal of sending a manned mission to the moon. Many countries have praised Chinese efforts in space exploration, but some observers have been left with the puzzling question of why the Chinese government feels the need to pursue a space program now. Are these efforts purely related to scientific research, or is China actually trying to com-pete with the world's leading space powers? The true answer lies somewhere in the middle. China is one of only three countries to have sent manned flights into space, and in doing so they have confirmed their status as a world leader in innovation and technological capability. Yet, amid these great achievements, some observers have misread China's efforts at pursuing a space program as an challenge to the US. When China destroyed one of its own weather satellites with a ballistic missile in 2007, many felt that this was a flexing of military muscle. However, the 2008 space walk and the launching of the Chang'e-2 probes should not be interpreted along the same lines. China is not attempting to trigger a 21st century space race between itself and the US. If there is a space race, it's an Asian one. India, Japan, South Korea and China are all competing for ascendancy and popular glory. In the competition to be among the world's new powers, space is an important frontier. The US is looking on with interest, but is not alarmed about the situation and has almost no interest in responding with a competitive stance. This relaxed viewpoint is because China is still four decades or so behind the US in its technological capabilities in space and, while they are closing the gap fast, it will be some time before China is in direct competition with the US in this field. China's space ambitions can be fruitfully compared to the 19th century imperial adven-tures of European nations. Many then recently created European countries, such as Belgium, Germany, and Italy, followed Britain's lead in carving up the globe in an effort to confirm their status as a nation-state. Asian space exploration is not driven by the same urge, but is a way of pursuing legitimacy in the eyes of the developed world, as well as appealing to domestic needs. Through the space program, China not only gains legitimacy as a functioning and capable nation in the eyes of outside observers, but more importantly, it gains legitimacy among its own people. Success in space is a huge boost to national pride and a strong sign of advances barely thought possible a decade earlier. The official standpoint regarding China's space program is that it represents the fundamental task of humanity to research humanity's origin and develop a sustainable lifestyle, as stated by Qian Weiping, a chief designer of the Chang'e-2 mission. Qian went on to say that it is China's responsibility to carry out such research, rather than an act of imitation. Whether out of responsibility, or a desire to prove to the rest of the world that they are indeed capable of success in space, a large element of pride is at play within the motivating factors, evidenced by Qian's declaration to the nation that "we will shorten the gap (between China and the US/Russia) fast."

### **Chinese space leadership is key to CCP stability.**

Johnson-Freese 4 (Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese Chair, Department of National Security Studies, Naval War College “Space Wei Qi: The Launch of Shenzhou V” <http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/ba695c64-2c13-4913-a6f5-9ebcec9aa311/Space-Wei-Qi--The-Launch-of-Shenzhou-V---Johnson-F> //Donnie)

China faces Herculean challenges on a daily basis keeping its population employed, fed, housed, and subsequently stable. 8 Why, then, would its leaders spend severely limited government resources on a manned space program? There are many reasons, in addition to which Chinese program supporters had the benefit of being able to learn from the American and Russian experiences. China has read the playbooks from both countries on how to maximize program benefits and strategic opportunities. Additionally, in terms of the technology used, China did not reinvent the wheel but instead chose to build on proven Russian designs. Project 921, as this, the second Chinese attempt at a manned space program, is called, was initiated and championed by former Chinese president, and still head of the military, Jiang Zemin. 9 It was undertaken in 1992 because the time was ripe: China was on an economic upswing and more technologically adept than during its first attempt in the 1970s; 10 China desired advanced space technology for both domestic telecommunications and the military; and the program created a positive focal point for national pride to counter negative 1989 Tiananmen Square images. China has not, however, sent a man into space because Jiang Zemin is a space visionary, yearning to explore the heavens as an expression of humankind’s essential nature. Jiang is a pragmatist, a skilled politician and a technocrat who ascended to power by maneuvering his way through the Byzantine maze of China’s power structure. His support for the manned program—publicly evidenced by his visit to Johnson Space Center in October 2002, his presence at the March 2003 launch of the Shenzhou III unmanned precursor, and ultimately more importantly, through sustained government funding—has been a calculated risk. Domestic pride and international prestige, economic development (including skilled jobs and expanded science and engineering educational programs), and dual-use technology development are all proven reasons for pursuing manned space programs. Jiang understood that if space successes are spectacular, so too are space failures. Not only were national goals on the line but his own position relative to his successor as president, Hu Jintao. Failure would be devastating. As it turned out, success may have had personal implications as well—one of the few surprises of the carefully choreographed launch was the absence of Jiang Zemin. Although he had been scheduled to speak to the taikonaut during the launch and offer congratulations afterward, he was conspicuously missing from the launch site and media events. While a disaster would have certainly reflected poorly on Jiang, apparently being poised to accept credit, even by inference, presented issues as well for him. It was Hu Jintao at the launch site who spoke to Yang before the launch, Hu on the phone during the flight, and Hu there to proclaim the mission a complete success afterward. Twice on CCTV (China Central Television) news on the evening of the flight Hu spoke, saying that he was representing Jiang. People’s Daily reported that “in a phone call to [General] Li Jinai, chief commander of China’s space program, Jiang said, ‘I am very happy and excited to hear that our country’s first manned space flight has turned out to be a complete success.’” 11 CCTV also showed footage of the Chinese defense minister, General Cao Gangchuan, talking to Yang in orbit. Cao too said he was representing Jiang. But it was clearly Hu that dominated the news that Wednesday night, with CCTV airing long portions of his two speeches on the space launch. 12 Jiang’s absence at the pre- and postlaunch events possibly indicated ambiguity about how the Chinese leadership wants the launch perceived. Since Jiang’s sole remaining formal post is that of chairman of the Communist Central Military Commission, a visible role for him might have sent too loud a message about military involvement. Although the Chinese want the United States to view the Chinese military capabilities with respect, they do not want it to view this launch as a threat that requires a response. But since both People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Generals Cao and Li were in attendance, perhaps Jiang’s absence primarily indicates Jiang’s further distancing from power, pari passu with Hu’s rise. 13 The 1957 launch of Sputnik was a huge psychological boost for both the Soviet people and the Soviet government during the Cold War, and conversely a huge blow to both the people and the government of the United States. Pride, and a consequent “rallying-around” in the Soviet Union after Sputnik (as experienced as well in the United States after the Apollo moon landing), also translated into credibility and **hence governmental legitimacy**. Credibility and legitimacy are important considerations in Beijing. One Chinese official stated of the Shenzhou V launch, “This is not America where money comes from the taxpayers. This is money of the Communist Party—they would do with it what they decide. It is great they are investing in something that makes us proud.” 14 Beijing’s interest in manned spaceflight for reasons of domestic pride and international prestige parallels its interest in bringing the Olympics to Beijing in 2008. Indeed, Yang carried an Olympic flag with him into orbit, unfurling it ceremoniously upon his return. 15 Six centuries ago a Ming dynasty inventor, Wan Hu, is said to have strapped rockets onto his chair and ordered his assistants to light them. When the smoke cleared, Hu and the chair were, not surprisingly, gone. Yang Liwei has now joined Wan Hu as a space hero. A statue of Yang is already planned in his home province, Liaoning, a rust-belt region ripe for the revitalization Yang is intended to inspire. The Shenzhou V capsule will be displayed at the Millennium Monument in Beijing, where crowds estimated in the thousands celebrated at the time of the launch. Most celebrations appeared largely choreographed, as opposed to the many celebrations that spontaneously erupted when Beijing was named the 2008 Olympic host city. The space mission was both an event meant to be filmed and shown to the world, and one directed by and supported from the top levels of government. Having planned celebrations at the Millennium Monument rather than in Tiananmen Square also deflected comparisons with or reference to other times in Tiananmen that were neither celebratory nor reflective of national pride and unity. The diminutive (and now promoted) Colonel Yang’s biography reads like “the right stuff”—thirty-eight, college-educated, fighter pilot, selfless wife, adoring son. He is described as having been a bright youth and a bit of a mischief maker. In postlaunch interviews he is personable, connecting well with average people. His political credentials must also be assumed impeccable, as he is both the new poster boy for the Chinese leadership and the role model for China’s youth.

### Nuclear war.

Yee 2 — Professor of Politics and International Relations at the Hong Kong Baptist University and Storey, Lecturer in Defence Studies at Deakin University, (Herbert Yee, Professor of Politics and International Relations at the Hong Kong Baptist University and Ian Storey, Lecturer in Defence Studies at Deakin University, 2002, “The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality,” p5)

The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialisation and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government's ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China's neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario - nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords.2 From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.

## Space Leadership Key to CCP

### **Space leadership is key to the CCP—it serves as a rallying point to glue the population together, this is empirically proven by the USSR and Sputnik—that’s Freese .**

### **More evidence, its key to techo-nationalism which preserves legitimacy.**

Johnson-Freese 5 (Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese Chair, Department of National Security Studies, Naval War College 5 “Prepared Statement by Joan Johnson-Freese: "Human Space Flight - The Space Shuttle and Beyond"” <http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=16644> //Donnie)

Those same benefits, jobs, education, economic development, dual-use technology and prestige are still motivating factors for space activity. Since the 1950's, Europe has pursued space under the premise that space activity generated technology, technology generated industry, and industry led to economic development. China learned from the Apollo playbook as well. Training and employing workers in high-technology aerospace jobs in China keeps large numbers of people employed, which is a Chinese priority. It also demonstrates to the world that China is able to, as one Chinese commentator put it, "make more than shoes," thereby supporting their overarching economic development goal by attracting global industries to China. China is also experiencing growth in science and engineering education programs at unprecedented levels. China is clearly interested in modernizing its military, and, again learning from the U.S. playbook, China has seen the benefits space can yield in force enhancement capabilities. And finally, there is prestige. Prestige takes on two dimensions for China: first, domestically it bestows credibility on the Communist government much in the same way bringing the Olympics to Beijing does. In regional and international terms, prestige translates into techno-nationalism, where perceived technical prowess is equated to regional power. This is particularly important to China, which has been working hard and been largely successful at using economics and soft power to transform its regional image from that of the bully, to a rising power that countries can work with. For countries like Japan and India, these perceptions are important. Speculation about an Asian space race floats on the wind, but it is unlikely. After the Shenzhou V launch in October 2003, the Indian science community claimed it too could have accomplished such an achievement, but had simply chosen not to. That response was intended to quell concerns from both the Indian public and politicians about China's technical prowess compared to India's techno-nationalism. Initial Japanese responses to the launch varied. Space officials downplayed the technical significance of the event, while nonetheless congratulating China. A Japanese official spoke to the media directly in geostrategic terms. "Japan is likely to be the one to take the severest blow from the Chinese success. A country capable of launching any time will have a large influence in terms of diplomacy at the United Nations and military affairs. Moves to buy products from a country succeeding in human space flight may occur." One woman on the street was quoted in Japanese media coverage as saying, "It's unbelievable. Japan lost in this field." While Japan's "losing" to China through the Shenzhou V launch was more perception than reality, China's success juxtaposed against power failures on both the Japanese environmental satellite Midori-2 and on its first Mars probe, Nozomi, as well as the November 2003 launch failure of two Information Gathering Satellites (IGS), resulted in calls for a reexamination of the Japanese program. However, because of the problems initiating and sustaining human space programs in democracies, combined with unique internal politics in both countries, the initiation of an autonomous human program in either Japan or India is unlikely.

### Successful Chinese space program key to CCP stability—the plan risks total collapse.

Chambers 9 — Major, United States Air Force B.A., Chinese Language & Literature M.S., Strategic Intelligence, Joint Military Intelligence College, (Rob, “ CHINA’S SPACE PROGRAM: A NEW TOOL FOR PRC “SOFT POWER” IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS?” Master’s Thesis, March, <http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2009/Mar/09Mar_Chambers.pdf>)

There are a variety of reasons behind Chinese motivations for manned spaceflight, and one of them has a domestic political spin: the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Dean Cheng comments, “Just because there aren’t elections, doesn’t mean that there are no means for the population to express its displeasure”.96 As Peter Aldhous notes: Its [the Chinese space program] value in promoting a domestic feel-good factor should not be underestimated. Even China’s authoritarian rulers have to worry about keeping the country’s billion-strong population reasonably happy. A successful space program could paper over the cracks for a while.97 Noting China’s semi-obsessive behavior with its national image and prestige, as well as the CCP’s determination to retain absolute control of the country, William Martel and Toshi Yoshihara echo the conventional wisdom: Success in China’s manned space program will confer a strong sense of national dignity and international status on the country, which are viewed as crucial elements to sustain the legitimacy of the Communist Party and replace its declining ideological appeal. This intangible yet powerful expression of Chinese nationalism partially explains why Beijing invests substantial resources into its space program.98 Morris Jones, an Australian-based space analyst says, “China’s space program reflects the power and legitimacy of the Communist Party. They are using manned space exploration as a political demonstration of their legitimacy”.99 Jones also notes that the launch date of the Shenzhou-7 came on the heels of not only the Beijing Olympics, but also close to the conclusion of the Paralympics and Chinese National Day on October 1, “making the space mission a nice bridge between two major nationalistic events”.100 Roger Launius, senior curator of space history at the National Air and Space Museum, focuses more on the symbolism of Chinese technological achievements in his perspective: It [China’s space program] is a prestige program, no question. I think China has entered the [manned spaceflight] arena for the same reasons that the United States and Soviet Union did in 1961. It is a demonstration of technological virtuosity. It’s a method for showing the world they are second to none – which is a very important objective for them.101 David Chandler echoes similar sentiments in his analysis: The Chinese government expects its manned space program to enhance the reputation of China’s high-tech exports, giving it greater diplomatic and commercial power. It also sees space technology as critical to achieving technological parity with western nations and Japan. Specifically, it hopes the manned space programme will raise standards in computing, materials science, manufacturing and electronics.102 With the tumultuous events of the Sichuan earthquake, inflation at decades-high levels, a stock market that was at a 21-month low, and seemingly incessant protests over government corruption and social injustice, Willy Lam, a Hong Kong-based political scientist, said that “a successful Shenzhou-7 mission would help distract China’s 1.3 billion people from serious economic and social concerns…and will further consolidate the [Chinese Communist] Party’s claim that they can get things moving”.103 Lam also commented that, “the leadership is banking on patriotism and nationalism to pull them through”.104 Whether China’s first spacewalk truly “distracted” China’s massive population from their woes or not may never be truly known, but the event was certainly maximized for full propaganda value. Most newspapers carried “two or three pages devoted to the spacewalk,” and tens of millions watched the 15-minute spacewalk live broadcast on government-run China Central Television (CCTV), “witnessing the symbolic moment when he [Zhai Zhigang] waved a Chinese flag in the weightlessness of low orbit”.105 Internet blogs were full of patriotic postings, such as, “I’m proud of the great achievement of the motherland” and “I’m full of confidence in the future of the motherland!”106 Quoting the old Chinese idiom of, “When riding a tiger, it is difficult to get off” (qihu nanxia), Stacey Solomone notes that: The CCP, and subsequently, the PLA would lose face should they decide to back off from developing the space program. It would appear to as if the CCP and PLA were conceding to the Chinese people that they were not advanced as the United States or Russia. The CCP and PLA would risk losing face in the international community and popular support at home. The Chinese space program provides an ample amount of legitimacy to the CCP which so often totes how the space program is aiding the national economy and security.107

### **More evidence, it is the key internal link.**

Dellios 5 (Rosita Dellios is Associate Professor of International Relations at Bond University and a China defence specialist. “China's space program: A strategic and political analysis” <http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1093&context=cm&sei-redir=1#search=%22China%20Space%20program%20economy%20budget%20Soviets%22> //Donnie)

If the Chinese Communist Party is to retain its legitimacy at a time of increasing irrelevance of Communist ideology, then a grand project like the space program may indeed be a unifying cause, a source of pride as to what China can do. The CCP also needs the public acclaim that comes from such a prestige project as space exploration to offset a measure of public dissatisfaction with official corruption and social injustice. In 2004, according to government records, there were 74,000 protests in China, involving some three million people.(22) The space program helps improve the party's image. Yet China has been criticized for spending an estimated 19 billion yuan or US$2.4 billion, though the PRC figure is half this,(23) on the Shenzhou-6 launch when such funds could have been better used to help the poor.(24) This is especially so in view of another event in October 2005 - the meeting of the CCP's Central Committee which decided to enhance efforts in adjusting income distribution and alleviating the widening wealth gap. One response by the Chinese to the criticism of privileging the glories of space over grim realities on the ground is that such criticisms are ill-informed. Space officials have defended their work by noting that their space program is used for "sustainable human development" in various sectors from improved food production to telecommunications;(25) while spending on the Shenzhou6 mission was dwarfed by the 190 billion yuan (US$23.5 billion) spent on pollution control in 2004. (26) In the end, assessments need to be made within the wider framework of China's code of 'comprehensive national strength'. This concept, to which discussion will return, alludes to coordinative efforts between space and terrestrial concerns, as well as between defence and the civilian economy generally.

## Uniqueness—China Space Program Strong

### **China is rising now—it’s a symbolic decline in US power.**

AP 11 (“Moon, Mars, Venus: China aims high in space” <http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2011/07/11/business-financial-impact-as-china-space_8558522.html> //Donnie)

This year, a rocket will carry a boxcar-sized module into orbit, the first building block for a Chinese space station. Around 2013, China plans to launch a lunar probe that will set a rover loose on the moon. It wants to put a man on the moon, sometime after 2020. While the United States is still working out its next move as the space shuttle program winds down, China is forging ahead. Some experts worry the U.S. could slip behind China in human spaceflight - the realm of space science with the most prestige. "Space leadership is highly symbolic of national capabilities and international influence, and a decline in space leadership will be seen as symbolic of a relative decline in U.S. power and influence," said Scott Pace, an associate NASA administrator in the George W. Bush administration. He was a supporter of Bush's plan - shelved by President Barack Obama - to return Americans to the moon. China is still far behind the U.S. in space technology and experience, but what it doesn't lack is a plan or financial resources. While U.S. programs can fall victim to budgetary worries or a change of government, rapidly growing China appears to have no such constraints. "One of the biggest advantages of their system is that they have five-year plans so they can develop well ahead," said Peter Bond, consultant editor for Jane's Space Systems and Industry. "They are taking a step-by-step approach, taking their time and gradually improving their capabilities. They are putting all the pieces together for a very capable, advanced space industry."

### **China is poised to take the lead now**

Keating 11 (Joshua E. Keating is an associate editor at Foreign Policy.“Houston, We Have a Problem” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/07/houston_we_have_a_problem?page=0,0> //Donnie)

The U.S. space shuttle program will be no more after Friday, when the shuttle Atlantis makes its final launch from Cape Canaveral. While it's not the death of U.S. space travel, the demise of the expensive shuttle will leave the U.S. reliant, for now, on Russian rockets and hopeful that the private sector will soon be able to pick up the slack. Here's a look at the countries and companies looking to seize this opportunity to lay a claim to the great beyond. RUSSIA Budget: $3.8 billion Next steps: The country that began the space race with the launch of Sputnik in 1957 appears -- at least in terms of manned flight -- to have prevailed. Russia nearly abandoned space altogether following the collapse of the Soviet Union. It finally shut down its flagship orbital station, Mir, in 2001. But Russia has reinvested in its space program under the Putin/Medvedev tandem and now accounts for 40 percent of all global space launches. With the end of the U.S. shuttle program, Russia will have a monopoly on transporting astronauts to the International Space Station, using its ageing Soyuz rockets, until at least 2016. It's a lucrative business -- the United States is paying Russia about $43.4 million per astronaut -- but Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has said that Russia should not content itself to be a mere "ferryman" to the stars. Russia and China will jointly launch an unmanned Mars probe later this year. The Russian space agency's more ambitious plans include a manned mission to the moon by 2025, potentially followed by an "inhabited station." CHINA Budget: $1.3 billion Next steps: China is a relative latecomer to the space race and its achievements so far are somewhat modest. It launched its first manned mission in 2003 -- becoming the third country to do so -- and hasn't sent a person up since 2008. But, unsurprisingly, its ambitions are enormous. Later this year, China plans to launch the first of three separate temporary space stations which will eventually lead to a permanent orbital station sometime around 2020 or 2022. China also launched an unmanned moon probe, Chang'e-2, last October. Chang'e 1, launched in 2007, crashed by design on the moon's surface in 2009. By 2020, it hopes to have an unmanned lunar lander bring back samples and, if all goes well, is hoping to launch a manned mission to the moon by 2022. Former NASA Chief Administrator Michael Griffin told a Senate panel in 2007 that "China will be able to put people on the moon before we will be able to get back [there]." Barring any unforeseen contingencies, that now seems to be almost a certainty. In addition to its manned spaceflight ambitions, China raised eyebrows in 2007 with its test of an anti-satellite missile.

## A2: Uniqueness Overwhelms The Link

### **False—China’s recent rise in space does not guarantee its success—socialism and inefficiency.**

Moltz 11 (Dr. James Clay Moltz Naval Postgraduate School“China’s Space Technology: International Dynamics and Implications for the United States” <http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written_testimonies/11_05_11_wrt/11_05_11_moltz_testimony.pdf> //Donnie)

But China’s recent rise in space does not guarantee its success. China remains behind world standards in a number of critical space technologies, raising questions among partner nations in terms of the quality of its spacecraft. Despite Thailand’s membership in APSCO, for example, Bangkok turned to a European consortium to purchase its Thailand Earth Observation Satellite (THEOS), whose remote­sensing technology is more sophisticated than China’s. Similarly, China had technical problems with its Nigcomsat­1 due to a faulty solar array, causing the spacecraft to cease functioning in 2008. Beijing has had to offer a replacement satellite. Another problem that China may face in the future relates to its state­run model of organization. With the steady expansion of private entrepreneurship in global space activities, it remains to be seen whether the Chinese state is flexible enough to thrive in the next stage of international space competition. A 2010 study by China expert Eric Hagt for the U.S. Army War College, for example, described China’s space industry as “dispersed, bloated, and located in geographically isolated regions.” The sector has also had to deal with a series of reforms as Chinese authorities have sought to inject greater civilian management and innovation into hide­bound defense industries. With this in mind, the Chinese State Council demoted the old umbrella organization for scientific research and development for the defense industry, COSTIND, in 2008. In its place, a new department called the State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) has been created under the new super­Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. Still, many of China’s state­run organizations continue to suffer from legacy inefficiencies of the socialist economy.

## A2: China Can Never Be a Space Power

### **False.**

Stafira 7 (Stanley Stafira, Jr., Lt Col, USAF“DRAGON IN ORBIT: CHINA’S PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO SPACE STRATEGY” pg online, Donnie)

In addition to satellite communications and direct broadcasting, the Chinese are on course to develop weather and land monitoring satellites to improve their capabilities. China wants to lead third world countries into space since they have generally been ignored by the western world.116 To do this, it is tapping into a niche market ignored by the other space powers. It won a contract with Nigeria to provide an entire, turn-key satellite system including the communications satellite, launcher and ground system.117 China put the satellite into orbit, developed a training package on the operation of the system and provided this complete system to the government of Nigeria who now has its own, indigenously controlled satellite which will service its country and others in Africa.118 China will continue to seek opportunities to provide this capability to other third world countries and was contracted by Venezuela in 2005 to do the same. China continues to partner with other countries to expand its space capabilities. China set up the Asia-Pacific space cooperation organization with Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, Argentina, Malaysia, Russia and Ukraine to promote cooperation and Chinese space leadership in the East.119 In addition, China is working with other countries such as Brazil, France and the European Union. China wants to accelerate its access to technology through involvement in these multinational agreements.120 By gaining access to this technology, China can further its space program by rolling this new information into its current program and allowing it to make faster technological leaps than it would normally be able to do to catch up to the other great space powers. China has a distinct advantage over other commercial providers. Its space industry is generally consolidated under the China Aerospace Corporation (CASC) while the PLA’s General Armaments Department controls the program.121 State control of the space industry ensures there is no competition for resources. The state can also use its resources to underwrite the industry’s action; thereby, allowing it to compete more aggressively around the world. State control also enables the government to easily move technological advances gained through commercial interaction into both its military and civil programs. The development of a state run space industry has improved China’s ability to work with more countries because they find it easier to work with a commercial organization vice a governmental one whose policies they might not agree with. China’s commercial space industry has enhanced the country’s technology level and increased its revenue received. In the future, China can be expected to add new partnerships and fly new capabilities marketed to other third world countries that possess no space capability, but wish to capitalize from space technology.122

## A2: No Impact — Small Increase in Chinese Space Power

### **That just proves that your plan does not solve for heg—takes out your impact**

### **AND, even small increases create a huge perception of leadership**

Johnson-Freese 5 (Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese Chair, Department of National Security Studies, Naval War College 5 “Prepared Statement by Joan Johnson-Freese: "Human Space Flight - The Space Shuttle and Beyond"” <http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=16644> //Donnie)

China has spent approximately $2.2 billion on its Shenzhou program, whereas NASA's annual budget is in excess of $16 billion. Shenzhou V was launched in 2003; Shenzhou VI will likely be launched in 2005. From the Chinese perspective, there was no need to go any sooner, as China has been able to enjoy its new found status as the third country capable of human spaceflight, while improving its technical capabilities, and keeping spending to a manageable level. Nevertheless, China's ability to successfully launch their first taikonaut while the U.S. Space Shuttle was grounded **added to the perception** of China's technical prowess compared to the U.S., not an inconsequential or unrewarding benefit for the Chinese. If the Shuttle is still not flying next Fall when the Chinese launch again, the Chinese will reap further prestige and publicity at the expense of the U.S. The U.S. has historically been the reigning human space champion, but there is always interest and even tacit support -- when a spoiler overtakes, or even appears to overtake, a champion. The U.S. appears in, and to some losing, a human space race, because the U.S. has been unable to set and implement a realistic way forward, and because of U.S. political reluctance to use cooperation, historically shown successful, to co-opt and shape the Chinese space program as we have other programs. The Chinese are playing Tortoise to the U.S. Hare.

## A2: CCP Won’t Collapse

### Even if they don’t collapse—loss of legitimacy causes Taiwan war—that escalates globally.

Lewis 10 (Dan, Research Director of Economic Research Council, “The nightmare of a Chinese economic collapse” World Finance, http://www.worldfinance.com/news/home/finalbell/article117.html)

It has been calculated that to keep China’s society stable – ie to manage the transition from a rural to an urban society without devastating unemployment - the minimum growth rate is 7.2 percent. Anything less than that and unemployment will rise and the massive shift in population from the country to the cities becomes unsustainable. This is when real discontent with communist party rule becomes vocal and hard to ignore. It doesn’t end there. That will at best bring a global recession. The crucial point is that communist authoritarian states have at least had some success in keeping a lid on ethnic tensions – so far. But when multi-ethnic communist countries fall apart from economic stress and the implosion of central power, history suggests that they don’t become successful democracies overnight. Far from it. There’s a very real chance that China might go the way of Yugoloslavia or the Soviet Union – chaos, civil unrest and internecine war. In the very worst case scenario, a Chinese government might seek to maintain national cohesion by going to war with Taiwan – whom America is pledged to defend.

### Global nuclear war.

Hunkovic 9 (American Military University [Lee J, 2009, “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict
Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America”, <http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf>)

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study

## **CCP Impact Calc**

### **Loss of CCP support causes lashout at Taiwan.**

Szonyi 2k (Michael Szonyi is a professor of History at the University of Toronto and a recognized international authority on Asia, “Commentary No. 79: Canadian Security Intelligence Service Publication” <http://www.csis.gc.ca/pblctns/cmmntr/cm79-eng.asp> //Donnie)

The political implications of the problems anticipated for the next stage of reform are significant. The most important political support of the CCP has always been farmers and industrial workers, precisely the two groups which stand to lose the most. Under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, the CCP abandoned collectivism and egalitarianism as the basis of regime legitimacy, substituting rapid economic development and rising income for all. But the former is proving difficult to sustain, and in any case it is no longer obvious that it leads to the latter. The regime's greatest fear must be the bottom-up challenge of endemic and accelerating pattern of urban and rural mass protest. Over 100 000 mass demonstrations were reported to the government in 1999; the real number is surely many times higher. Various types of grievances send people to the streets in China today. In the cities, the most important include the closure of bankrupt state-owned enterprises and resulting layoffs; unpaid wages, privatization of housing which involves eviction from public housing and levels of compensation inadequate for purchase of a private home, and other erosions of social welfare. In May, students at Beijing University, long a touchstone for the national sentiments, demonstrated against the unsafe campus environment after the rape and murder of a fellow student. In rural areas, people demonstrate and riot against excessive taxation, government failures to pay for procured products, land disputes, corruption and embezzlement by local officials, and manipulation of village elections. Rural and urban residents protesting against government closures of investment funds for illegal activity have been particularly outspoken because they believed that the state actively promoted and guaranteed the investment funds. Over one hundred mass demonstrations related to investment funds are said to have occurred in the upper Yangtze city of Chongqing alone. Three aspects of the demonstrations are noteworthy. First, they are occurring throughout China, in both rich and poor areas, because there are dissatisfied people everywhere. In a single week of January 2000, there were reports of anti-government protests in Guangdong's Zhongshan county, close to Hong Kong and one of China's richest counties, and in impoverished Shanxi in the north.(10) Second, the scale of the protests is large and growing. In the northern province of Liaoning, over twenty thousand miners demonstrated in February 2000 against inadequate payoffs when their bankrupt mine shut down. In May, five thousand steelworkers demonstrated, also in Liaoning. Media reports suggest the People's Liberation Army is increasingly being called upon to restore order. Rural protests are also growing in scale. In January 1999, over five thousand villagers near the Hunan capital of Changsha were dispersed by police after gathering to demonstrate against taxes and corruption.(11) Third, despite their size and intensity, the demonstrations are narrowly focused on specific economic grievances, and there is no coordination or organization linking separate protests. Thus, popular expressions of dissatisfaction will probably not become regime-threatening in the period 2001-2006. They would become much more worrying if their demands broadened to include political change, if a coordinating organization emerged, or if they become serious enough that the leadership feels compelled to distract popular feeling by manipulating nationalism, perhaps through aggressive action against Taiwan, discussed below.

### **Lashout would mean nuclear chemical and bio war—causes extinction.**

Renxing 5 (San Renxing staff writer for epoch times, “The CCP’s Last-ditch Gamble: Biological and Nuclear War” <http://en.epochtimes.com/news/5-8-5/30975.html> //Donnie)

Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to extend its life. The CCP, which disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, along with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. These speeches let the public see the CCP for what it really is. With evil filling its every cell the CCP intends to wage a war against humankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. That is the main theme of the speeches. This theme is murderous and utterly evil. In China we have seen beggars who coerced people to give them money by threatening to stab themselves with knives or pierce their throats with long nails. But we have never, until now, seen such a gangster who would use biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons to threaten the world, that they will die together with him. This bloody confession has confirmed the CCP’s nature: That of a monstrous murderer who has killed 80 million Chinese people and who now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.

### And, that comparatively outweighs your impacts

OCHS 2 — Richard, member of the Baltimore Emergency Response Network and founding chairman of the Students for a Democratic Society in 1964 at the University of Maryland in College Park, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS MUST BE ABOLISHED IMMEDIATELY, 6/9, http://www.freefromterror.net/other\_articles/abolish.html

Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories.
While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause.

# Hegemony Defense

## **1NC—Not Key to Hegemony**

### Winning the space race is a meaningless token—it does nothing to help exercise US leadership.

Lester and Robinson 10 (Daniel F. Lester, Michael Robinson, Department of Astronomy C1400, University of Texas, Austin, TX 78712, USA b Hillyer College, University of Hartford, Visiions of Exploration, Space Policy 25“The Death of the Constellation Program” <http://timetoeatthedogs.com/2010/02/02/the-death-of-the-constellation-program/> //Donnie)

3. If we abandon human space flight, we will soon be outpaced by the China, Russia, India, [insert developing industrial nation] in the space race. The United States did gain prestige from landing astronauts on the moon in 1969, showing up our Cold War rival, the Soviet Union. But how much did that prestige, or “soft power” actually benefit the United States? Prestige did not stop the Vietnam War, or the Arab Oil Embargo, or the onset of stagflation. How much, then, is this type of prestige worth in the post-Cold War Age, a time when the United States is, arguably, supposed to reap the benefits of belonging to a multilateral world? What does the United States gain in winning the space race against China when they are losing the economic race to China back on Earth?

### There are literally no challengers, space is not key.

Edelman 10 (Eric S. Edelman has served in senior positions at the White House and the Departments of State and Defense, including postings as U.S. ambassador to Finland and Turkey. He is currently a distinguished fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, for which he produced a longer version of this article. “The Broken Consensus: America's Contested Primacy” <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2010-NovDec/full-Edelman-ND-2010.html> //Donnie)

It’s important to remember that American decline will not be determined purely by economic gains or losses. The future shape of the international system will depend more on broader measures of national power than percentage shares of global production. Factors like GDP, population, defense spending, and a variety of other criteria should also be taken into account. The key variable would seem to be the efficiency and effectiveness with which nations convert resources into usable hard and soft power. At least as important as the objective measures of national power are the subjective assessments by international statesmen and military leaders of the international distribution of power. Those judgments are inevitably affected by a range of cultural, psychological, bureaucratic, and political factors. It is worth asking how the putative competitors stack up on some of these dimensions. Europe. Over the years, most declinist predictions have assumed that a united Europe would be a key component of a multipolar world. But even before the current economic crisis began to take the wind out of Europe’s sails, the EU had failed to translate its economic clout into global political power. Continued dependence on the United States security guarantee may have allowed Europeans to spend less for their own security, but it also diminished their capacity to project power. Moreover, Europe’s mixture of a graying population with a growing percentage of immigrants will exacerbate its economic and social problems, making it highly unlikely its military power will increase—or even be wielded outside of Europe. Even if the old powers were able to surmount these demographic trends, the political challenges of deeper and more extensive European integration remain. As Global Trends 2025 suggests, the EU could well become a “hobbled giant distracted by internal bickering and competing national agendas, and less able to translate its economic clout into global influence.” Japan. In the 1970s and 1980s it was widely assumed that Japan would join Europe as part of an emerging multipolar world in which the United States would be cut down to size. Rather than scaling the heights of global economic dominance, however, Japan entered a decade of deep recession, economic stagnation, income loss, high levels of unemployment, and political drift as its “asset bubble” burst. Today, Japan barely figures in the discussions of what comes next for two reasons: the “lost decade” of stagnation, compounded by the current recession, and daunting demographics in the form of a wave of aging that is not only larger than that of any other developed country but also approaching much faster. Brazil. Will Brazil fill the vacuum left by Japan’s own undisputed decline? Its rise to great-power status has certainly been anticipated for years. Brazil combines high growth with democracy, relatively tranquil domestic politics, varied exports, and a business climate relatively welcoming to foreign investors. On the regional level, Brazil has already played a leading role in managing hemispheric security issues like the crises in Haiti and more recently in Honduras; however, as the National Intelligence Council suggests, a more global role would appear to be a bit of a stretch given the country’s economic and social vulnerabilities. There is a vast gap separating the rich from the poor, and Brazil trails other large developing countries in levels of educational attainment, spending on research, and infrastructure development. Violent crime is endemic. The country suffers from chronic underinvestment, and government spending is growing at an alarming pace. Regulations and labor laws have grown complicated and constraining, and there are chronic fears about the country’s finances. If anything, Brazil after Lula could be a prime candidate to forge a stronger relationship with the U.S. in order to ease its successful integration into the global economy and establish it as an alternative to the populist, anti-globalization agenda promoted by Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez. Russia. Russia’s prospects put it in a different category than the other BRIC countries because its catastrophic demographic situation is a powerful limitation and suggests Russia is a declining rather than a rising power. Nicholas Eberstadt has described Russia’s contemporary demographic disaster in these pages as only the most recent episode of population decline in the past hundred years, albeit the first not resulting from revolution, forced collectivization, or war (but rather from the peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union). Demographic and health-related limits on military manpower are likely to compel Russia into continued, long-term reliance on nuclear weapons as the only conceivable counterbalance to foreign military power. Its conventional forces, while posing a limited threat to former parts of the Soviet empire such as Ukraine and Georgia, will be a decreasing concern at the global level, and without a concerted effort at modernization, Russia’s economy will likely face a secular decline. India. In 2004, the NIC’s Mapping the Global Future report identified India as a rising power along with China. At current rates of growth, India will surpass China sometime after 2025 as the country with the world’s largest population. India has been averaging about five percent economic growth per year for the last decade, and forecasts for the future are bright. Economic success is also generating increased military capability, and India is likely to be one of the most lucrative markets for arms exports in the years ahead. But the country is also beset by an array of demographic, economic, social, political, and security problems that are daunting, to say the least. Still, even if the most bullish projections for India do not come to pass, it is clearly a country on an upward trajectory. Exactly what kind of great power India will become remains a matter of some debate. Because of its colonial background, national sovereignty issues are particularly sensitive, but India seems a strong candidate for an enhanced relationship with the United States. Both countries share democratic values and, at least among the elite in India, the English language. India and the United States also share the same strategic preoccupations: both are worried about the activities of Islamist extremists and the rise of China. Although the development of a U.S.-Indian strategic partnership will not come easily or quickly given past differences, such an outcome is more likely than the emergence of India as a peer competitor. China. That leaves China, whose rise has attracted more attention than that of any of the other BRIC countries. It has unseated Japan as the world’s second-largest economy and will, according to the New York Times, surpass the U.S. as early as 2030. The global recession has barely put a dent in China’s ascent. Chinese officials have been at pains to assure one and all that they have no aspirations of hegemony or dominion over other countries. China’s intentions and aims, however, may become more expansive as its power increases, and its increasingly assertive international behavior has begun to trouble many. But China too has many significant challenges to overcome. The strong hold of the state on the economy and the patronage relationships that link the party and state to major industries have generated massive waste and inefficiencies in the economy. Rising income inequality and arbitrary abuses of authority have created a combustible mix of socioeconomic tension and unrest, to the point that increasing levels of social protest have become an everyday occurrence. China’s demography, however, may present the country’s leaders with the most intractable issues of all. In the next decade and a half, China’s population will stop growing and begin to decline. The proportion of elderly to working-age individuals will also shift, giving China a so-called “4-2-1” population structure in which one child will have to support two parents and four grandparents. China’s approaching demographic shifts will also intersect with a growing gender imbalance in which males vastly outnumber females in the younger portions of the population as an indirect result of the one-child policy. In fact, the potential for a perfect storm of economic, demographic, and social unrest has led some observers to conjecture that China, far from being a rising power, is actually on the verge of collapse. For the moment, however, China must be seen as a strong competitor, in particular because its economic advance has enabled it to amass significant and growing military capabilities. Even if the country experiences turbulence, it will continue to be assertive, although it is hard to know exactly what form that new assertiveness will take. Some suggest that China’s increasing economic and military strength will drive a contest for power in the region and a long-term strategic competition with the United States. Others believe China’s increased interaction with multilateral institutions will help it integrate peacefully into the international system as a responsible stakeholder. Much will depend on the ideas that China develops about its global role. The increasing discussion of the “decline” of the United States, and the West more broadly, could have an impact on the attitudes of Chinese leaders and the methods they employ in accomplishing their international objectives. America’s moment of unipolarity has been based on a singular fact: the United States is the first leading state in modern international history with decisive preponderance in all the underlying components of power: economy, military, technology, and geopolitics. All of its competitors face internal and external security challenges that are as or more serious than America’s own. Japan faces not only economic and demographic challenges, but also a rising China and a de facto nuclear-armed failing state, North Korea. India has domestic violence, insurgencies in bordering countries, and a persistent security dilemma in the form of China. Demographic challenges will be particularly acute for Europe, Japan, and Russia in the areas of military manpower and economic growth. China, India, Brazil, and Russia all suffer from significant regional disparities that have led, or could lead, to social unrest and political instability. Europe faces the challenge of incorporating the new members of the EU into its institutional structures against a backdrop of a major economic slump. The United States, by contrast, has several underappreciated sources of national power and continued advantage. As Samuel P. Huntington has noted, U.S. power “flows from its structural position in world politics . . . geographically distant from most major areas of world conflict” as well as from “being involved in a historically uniquely diversified network of alliances.” Natural resources are another area of advantage for the United States. Agriculture has been “a bastion of American competitiveness,” and America’s farmers and producers have never been more efficient or productive than they are today. The media may have lavished a great deal of attention on U.S. dependence on imported oil—a true strategic liability—but they have neglected its abundant coal and gas resources. In fact, the United States (combined with Canada) trails only the Middle East in the overall wealth of its energy resources.

### International co-operation checks your impacts from escalating.

Mason 9 (Professor David S. Mason teaches U.S. politics, society and foreign policy, international politics, and comparative politics (especially European) at Butler University in Indianapolis. “Response to Essays by Joseph Nye and M.D. Nalapat” <http://www.chinausfriendship.com/article1.asp?mn=194> //Donnie)

American decline is not necessarily a bad thing, though, given the increasing interconnectedness of countries and global issues. It will be easier for the United States to interact cooperatively with other countries-and for them to deal with Washington-if the U.S. is not so dominant and domineering. President Obama has adopted a much more conciliatory and modest approach to other countries-viz. his speeches in Ankara and Cairo-and this befits a country that has less reason to crow about its superiority and exceptionalism. As Professor Nye points out, most of the big issues facing the U.S., and the rest of the world, are not susceptible to the application of power by a single country. More things are ''outside the control of even the most powerful state.''

### **Space leadership guts US soft power**

Brown 9 (Trevor (BA, Indiana University; MSc, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University [Singapore]) is a new author interested in political, economic, and military strategy for the medium of space.vor, is a “Soft Power and Space Weaponization” <http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/spr09/brown.html> //Donnie)

Evidently, rhetoric emanating from the United States regarding space has made members of the international community suspicious that America could bar them from the medium on nothing more than a whim. Such apprehensions unnecessarily contribute to further reductions in soft power. The United States should take care to ensure that other nations receive the impression that it has no intention of hindering their peaceful use of space. If those countries find current US space supremacy tolerable, then perhaps in time they could endure the United States’ possession of weapons if this were a significant aspect of US primacy in space and maintenance of the status quo. But if US rhetoric and posturing leave other nations with the belief that the United States has stratagems for orbital despotism, then the international system will hesitate to look to it for leadership. Furthermore, even if most nations cannot compete in space, they will nevertheless do whatever they can to oppose the United States.

### Soft power key to heg, internal link turns your advantage.

Nye 4 (Joseph S., Professor of International Relations at Harvard. “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,” Summer 2004, Political Science Quarterly, Volume 119, Issue 2; page 255, proquest, download date: 9-21-07)

In the global information age, the attractiveness of the United States will be crucial to our ability to achieve the outcomes we want. Rather than having to put together pick-up coalitions of the willing for each new game, we will benefit if we are able to attract others into institutional alliances and eschew weakening those we have already created. NATO, for example, not only aggregates the capabilities of advanced nations, but its interminable committees, procedures, and exercises also allow these nations to train together and quickly become interoperable when a crisis occurs. As for alliances, if the United States is an attractive source of security and reassurance, other countries will set their expectations in directions that are conducive to our interests. Initially, for example, the U.S.-Japan security treaty was not very popular in Japan, but polls show that over the decades, it became more attractive to the Japanese public. Once that happened, Japanese politicians began to build it into their approaches to foreign policy. The United States benefits when it is regarded as a constant and trusted source of attraction so that other countries are not obliged continually to re-examine their options in an atmosphere of uncertain coalitions. In the Japan case, broad acceptance of the United States by the Japanese public "contributed to the maintenance of US hegemony" and "served as political constraints compelling the ruling elites to continue cooperation with the United States."18 Popularity can contribute to stability. Finally, as the RAND Corporation's John Arquila and David Ronfeldt argue, power in an information age will come not only from strong defenses but also from strong sharing. A traditional realpolitik mindset makes it difficult to share with others. But in an information age, such sharing not only enhances the ability of others to cooperate with us but also increases their inclination to do so. As we share intelligence and capabilities with others, we develop common outlooks and approaches that improve our ability to deal with the new challenges. Power flows from that attraction. Dismissing the importance of attraction as merely ephemeral popularity ignores key insights from new theories of leadership as well as the new realities of the information age. We cannot afford that.

## **Not Key to Hegemony**

### **More evidence, control of the commons is not key to overall heg.**

Brown et al 4 (Michael E Brown, is Dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs and Professor of International Affairs and Political Science at The George Washington University (Michael E. Brown Owen R. Coté Jr. Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller) mitpress.mit.edu/books/chapters/0262524554pref2.pdf //Donnie)

In “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” Barry R. Posen develops an innovative argument about the sources, nature, limitations, and implications of U.S. military hegemony. Whereas Wohlforth looks at the economic, military, technological, and geopolitical sources of U.S. power, Posen focuses exclusively on military capabilities. One of the keys to U.S. military preeminence, Posen says, is the country’s unprecedented “command of the commons—command of the sea, space, and air.” Although command of the commons gives the United States tremendous strategic advantages, it **does not mean that the United States will go unchallenged everywhere**. Posen notes that adversaries will be able to ªght U.S. forces with “some hope of success” in several contested zones. These are arenas—“on land, in the air at low altitudes, and at sea in the so-called littorals”—where geography, knowledge of the local terrain, strong political motivations, and access to weaponry will enable adversaries to mount stiff resistance to U.S. military actions. Posen argues that the U.S. command of the commons and the persistence of contested zones have important implications for U.S. grand strategy: “Even before the September 11 terrorist attacks, the foreign policy debate had narrowed to a dispute between primacy and selective engagement, between a nationalist, unilateralist version of hegemony, and a liberal, multilateral version of hegemony. U.S. command of the commons provides an impressive foundation for selective engagement. **It is not adequate for a policy of primacy**.” The Bush administration’s embrace of primacy is problematic, Posen argues, because it creates unease among allies and “may cause others to ally against the United States.” A policy of selective engagement, on the other hand, would be more effective and more sustainable because it would help to “make U.S. military power appear less threatening and more tolerable.”

## A2: We Beat China—Key To Hegemony

### **Not true—if your internal links are true it’s too late to win.**

McCoy 10 (Alfred W. is the J.R.W. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the author of A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, From the Cold War to the War on Terror (“The Decline and Fall of the American Empire” <http://www.thenation.com/article/156851/decline-and-fall-american-empire> //Donnie)

No such luck. Under current projections, the United States will find itself in second place behind China (already the world's second largest economy) in economic output around 2026, and behind India by 2050. Similarly, Chinese innovation is on a trajectory toward world leadership in applied science and military technology sometime between 2020 and 2030, just as America's current supply of brilliant scientists and engineers retires, without adequate replacement by an ill-educated younger generation. By 2020, according to current plans, the Pentagon will throw a military Hail Mary pass for a dying empire. It will launch a lethal triple canopy of advanced aerospace robotics that represents Washington's last best hope of retaining global power despite its waning economic influence. By that year, however, China's global network of communications satellites, backed by the world's most powerful supercomputers, will also be fully operational, providing Beijing with an independent platform for the weaponization of space and a powerful communications system for missile- or cyber-strikes into every quadrant of the globe.

## A2: Conflict Inevitable

### **Cold war with china is not inevitable—empirics and structural problems, reject their authors unwarranted fear-hyped analysis.**

Day 8 (Dwayne A. Day is an American space historian and policy analyst and served as an investigator for the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.“The China gambit” <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1042/1> //Donnie)

Yet there is a strong view around the world and in American politics on all parts of the political spectrum that views a future Cold War between the United States and China as inevitable. The people who hold this view reason that China is in rapid economic and military ascendancy, the United States is in relative decline (i.e. inflation, the falling dollar, the slide toward recession, perpetual military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a deeply unpopular president), and sometime in the next few decades China and the United States will be bipolar rivals. They view the two countries as lines on a graph, with the U.S. heading down and China heading up. At some point they will cross and there will be Cold War. Some liberals naively welcome such a development, believing that it will place a check on what they view as American unilateralist, even imperialist, actions around the world. Some conservatives equally naively believe that the United States must start building up its arsenal right now and prepare for inevitable conflict. But of course, a Cold War between China and the United States is not inevitable, just as perpetual hostility between the United States and China beyond 1969 was not inevitable. Things can change, both as a result of powers beyond the control of governments, and as the results of the actions of leaders. There has been a lot of discussion in the United States about American decline. It has been the topic of many books such as Charles Kupchan’s The End of the American Era, Chalmers Johnson’s Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic, and the most well known, Cullen Murphy’s Are We Rome?: The Fall of an Empire and the Fate of America. But the American decline—assuming that it is real and not a temporary cyclical event—could still reverse, and it is important to consider that much of this discussion of decline is ideologically driven and exaggerated, either by people who wish it to happen, or those who want to avert it. Consider that the United States has experienced numerous periods where many people considered it in decline: the Sputnik crisis, the “multipolar reality” of the late 1960s, the Oil Crisis of 1973, Jimmy Carter’s malaise era, and Paul Kennedy’s “imperial overstretch” theory and fears of Japanese ascendancy in the 1980s. Some of these perceived declines were nonexistent (Sputnik), and others badly conceived (imperial overstretch), and others reversed when the “threat” fell apart (OPEC, Japan). And of course the Soviet Union fell apart, leaving the United States in the role of unrivaled world leader for nearly two decades, despite most theorists’ predictions. The Prophets of Doom have some explaining to do. Similarly, the Chinese ascendancy could also reverse. Severe structural weaknesses underlie China’s economic growth. Furthermore, many aspects of China’s political, economic, and military growth have been exaggerated. China’s foreign interests also are mostly confined to trading around the world and maintaining control of those territories that it considers traditionally Chinese, like Tibet and Taiwan. China has not demonstrated an interest in fomenting revolution around the world for decades. China has been modernizing its military, but it has not demonstrated an interest in substantially increasing its strategic capabilities, such as rapidly developing a blue water navy or changing its strategic nuclear posture. Taiwan can always flash up, but for the most part China has a greater commercial interest in the rest of the globe than it does an ideological interest, a situation that did not exist during the Cold War. Finally, the Chinese, unlike the Soviet Union during the Cold War, have an interest in a healthy United States, which can purchase its products and borrow its money (at interest)—China does not want to bury the Americans, they want to buy the Americans, and that can only happen if the Americans are selling (or borrowing).

## **1NC—China Rise Good**

### China rise is key to strengthens relations with Russia

Lieven 11 (Anatol Lieven, a former senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, previously covered Central Europe for The Financial Times; Pakistan, Afghanistan, the former Soviet Union, and Russia for The Times (London), and India as a freelance journalist. “U.S.-Russian Relations and the Rise of China” 7/11 <http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/us_russian_relations_and_the_rise_of_china> //Donnie)

Viewed from an objective and realist perspective, free of the prejudices and priorities of the past (including the recent past), this should lead to a radical shift in U.S. policy towards Russia. To put it simply: When the U.S. establishment believed in the possibility of a unipolar world dominated by the USA, they drew the conclusion that this required a weak Russia, which would either occupy a very subordinate place in the U.S. international order or would be excluded and marginalized as far as possible by U.S. client states on its borders, grouped together in NATO. Faced with an increasingly powerful China, real U.S. needs become the diametrical opposite of previous perceived needs: a strong Russia in a multipolar world. This of course is also the aim of the Russian establishment. In principle, therefore, real U.S. and Russian needs for the future are very similar. Classical realist theory would suggest that faced with the rise of China, the U.S. and Russia should and indeed will engage in explicit strategic "balancing" against the new superpower. Something of the sort may well already be happening in East Asia, as China's neighbors become alarmed by its economic growth, its increased military spending, its territorial claims, and its increasingly strident popular nationalism. It is possible that Russia could have been drawn into such a security system in the early 1990s, when Russia was at its weakest and faith in the U.S. was still great; but for several years now, China has been far too strong for Russia to contemplate such an explicit alliance – even if it were ever to be offered by the U.S. As senior Russian officials have told me, in the event of a Sino-U.S. clash it would turn eastern Siberia into a geopolitical hostage, without the U.S. being either willing or able to help Russia defend itself. As for Russia's own diminished forces, in the event of a conventional war they would be simply swept away by the Chinese: "we would have to go nuclear immediately," in a Russian general's phrase. Incidentally, Russia's tacit reliance on nuclear superiority to deter China makes it even less likely that Russia would ever agree to reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons to minimal levels, let alone their abolition. Similarly, there is very little that Russia can do to help the U.S. against China in the short to medium term. Elsewhere in the world, Russia's ability to help the U.S. is also limited but not entirely inconsequential. Most important is backing for the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, including both supply routes and air bases in Central Asia which the U.S. can use to bring pressure to bear on the Taliban after most U.S. ground troops are withdrawn. Russia can also play a useful though limited role in seeking to contain Iran's nuclear ambitions. A full-scale military alliance between Iran and Russia would bring neither side very much compared to the dangers of increased Chinese hostility – even if a full-scale alliance would ever be accepted by the U.S. Senate or the U.S. Republican Party, let alone the Russian government. Rather, what the U.S. and Russia need to do is to reduce or eliminate points of tension between them in ways that will also free their attention and their resources for the real challenges facing them. In other words, they need to move from the present détente, not to alliance, but to entente. On the U.S. side, the first thing for this is a recognition that the bipartisan U.S. strategy towards Russia of 1992 to 2008 has indeed collapsed – and although this might seem completely obvious, it will be very difficult for many Americans to accept; as the briefest look at Congressional statements, briefings by the Heritage Foundation or AEI, speeches by leading Republicans (including Tea Party members), and even some Obama administration officials makes very clear.22 One can see the reduction of U.S.-Russian tension as resembling the way in which the British Empire in the 20 years before 1914 drastically reduced its commitments in various parts of the world in order to concentrate its resources on the rising threat from Germany. In the British case this was often accompanied by moves to create new military alliances, which cannot be the case between the U.S. and Russia. Equally, the new British strategy was the product of a bipartisan realist consensus between liberals and conservatives in the British establishment. Is the U.S. establishment today capable of such a consensus? Or will a future Republican administration block moves towards further rapprochement or even tear up the agreements already made and resume a policy (even if only rhetorically) of hostility to Russia. This is what Russian officials often reply when asked by their U.S. counterparts for some greater concession to the U.S.: that due to the workings of U.S. democracy and the Republican foreign policy mind, U.S. policy towards Russia cannot be guaranteed after 2012, and therefore it makes no sense for Russia to make permanent sacrifices for the sake of temporary gains. If, however, Obama wins in 2012 and continues existing policies, things may look rather different. Eight years of an absence of U.S.-Russian crises and of rising Chinese power may create a bipartisan consensus in Washington of the need to retain good relations with Russia. Equally, eight years of greatly diminished U.S. pressure may convince even hard-line members of the Russian establishment that they no longer have much to fear from the U.S. When it comes to a more deeply-rooted rapprochement between the U.S. and Russia, however, great problems remain. Russian-US economic ties are rather limited and it will be difficult to deepen them (outside certain limited areas like space exploration), given the structure of the two economies. Very much deeper ties exist between Russia and the European Union, and especially its largest economy, Germany. Here, however, the dysfunctional nature of both the EU and Russian systems form a major obstacle to closer ties. Russia's semi-authoritarianism, deep corruption, and perennially violent North Caucasus region are not in principle an obstacle to alliance with the U.S. – the U.S. has had and still has far more unsavory allies in the Middle East and elsewhere. However, as many other cases round the world demonstrate, these features of Russia will certainly be used by American political elements opposed to rapprochement with Russia, and to judge by the attitudes of the U.S. media, they may well continue to have considerable success in this regard. In addition, Russia's internal problems are a genuinely important obstacle to a deeper relationship with the EU, with its very high official and public standards – though it may be that over time, the examples of EU members like Italy, let alone Bulgaria, Romania and elsewhere will make preaching these standards somewhat absurd. There will remain the problem of the European Union's hopelessly tangled decision-making process, made much worse in the case of Russia by the ingrained hostility of Baltic States and Central Europeans towards Russia. Nonetheless, in Kotkin's words, "In the end, there can be no resetting of U.S.-Russian relations without a transcending of NATO and the establishment of a new security architecture in Europe. And without such a genuine reset, China will retain the upper hand, not only in its bilateral relationship with Russia but also in the strategic triangle comprising China, Russia, and the United States."23 The U.S. can greatly help in the creation of closer ties between the EU and Russia simply by ceasing to obstruct them – which is what it has been doing to a great extent over most of the past 20 years. In particular, the U.S. can encourage its allies in Eastern Europe and Britain to drop their own hostility and forge greater ties with Russia. The U.S. can also take a giant step towards drawing Russia into security consultations by seriously engaging with Russian proposals for a European security council of which the U.S. would also be a member. Incidentally, membership of this council might also do something to limit growing Turkish hostility to the U.S., by recognizing Turkey's status as a European great power. In the short to medium term, only relatively small steps to entente between the U.S., the EU, and Russia can be taken. These steps are essential, however, not just to reduce the strain on a gravely overstretched America but so as to open the way for much deeper possible co-operation in the radically changed world of the future. The rise of China has been discussed as one immensely significant change; climate change could present another. A third is likely to be the vast growth of unassimilated Muslim populations in western Europe and parts of Russia – something which neither Russia nor Western states have any real idea of how to manage.

### **That’s key to prevent Russian aggression.**

Lieven 11 (Anatol Lieven, a former senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, previously covered Central Europe for The Financial Times; Pakistan, Afghanistan, the former Soviet Union, and Russia for The Times (London), and India as a freelance journalist. “U.S.-Russian Relations and the Rise of China” 7/11 <http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/us_russian_relations_and_the_rise_of_china> //Donnie)

How Russia will fit into a world shaped by the rise of China and some degree of U.S.-Chinese rivalry is not at all clear. What is clear is that Russia does not wish for an alliance with either country even if one were on offer. On the one hand, hostility to the U.S. has become deeply ingrained in the Russian mass psyche, and has also to a considerable extent been encouraged by the ruling system that has taken shape in Russia since Vladimir Putin's accession to power in 1999. Much of U.S. policy from the mid-1990s to the Obama presidency was seen in Russia as deeply hostile to Russian interests – and not always wrongly.8 The expansion of NATO, the encouragement of revolutions against pro-Moscow regimes in the former Soviet Union, the construction of energy pipelines bypassing Russia and the sponsorship of anti-Russian regional groupings were all rightly seen in Moscow as inspired in whole or part by anti-Russian sentiments and calculations. The culmination of all this in Russian eyes was U.S. arming of Georgia and encouragement of Georgian hopes of NATO membership, widely believed in Russia to have given the Georgian government the green light to attack South Ossetia in August 2008, leading to the brief Georgian-Russian war and an explosion of mutual hostility in the U.S. and Russian media.9 August 2008 was what seems likely to have been the high point of U.S. ambitions in the former Soviet Union and by the same token, the lowest point of U.S.-Russian relations in the post-Cold War period. The most important fact about the U.S. role in the Georgian-Russian war is that it did not in fact intervene to help Georgia, and in consequence stood by while Georgia was crushingly defeated. In view of what happened, it seems extremely unlikely that a future U.S. administration will resume real pressure for Georgia's membership of NATO, even if European NATO members would agree to this, which most assuredly won't. The U.S. strategy of subordinating and/or marginalizing Russia not just on the world stage (which was realistic enough and has to a considerable extent happened) but within Russia's own region came to an end in 2008-2010 with the Georgian war and the global economic crisis. These events finished off at least for a generation – and probably forever – the desire of European Union states for further eastward expansion. This knocked away the greatest real incentive for countries to join the West. Given the continued corruption of Romania and Bulgaria, the hostility of European populations to immigration, and perhaps most of all, deep opposition to Turkey's membership, it is in my view highly unlikely that full membership of the EU will ever again be on the table for Georgia, Ukraine and other states in the traditional Russian sphere of influence. Finally, the Ukrainian presidential elections of 2010 revealed yet again both the deep divisions in Ukrainian society and the fact that a large majority do not in fact want Ukraine to join NATO. Finally, the impossibility of Turkey joining the EU, and the growth of Turkish hostility to Israel and the U.S., has largely eliminated Turkey's historic role as a U.S. ally against Russia and indeed more generally. Faced with this new reality, the Obama administration very sensibly moved to diminish tensions with Russia through the so-called "reset" in relations. NATO expansion has been shelved (though not of course formally abandoned); plans for missile defense in Eastern Europe drastically reduced; a new START treaty on a formal basis of equality signed with Moscow; and rhetoric about democracy and human rights in Russia greatly diminished. Given not just the rise of China, but the war in Afghanistan, America's endless strategic entanglement in the Middle East, and indeed the growing problems of Mexico (a good deal closer to the U.S. than is Georgia or Afghanistan), reducing U.S. commitments elsewhere reflected a sober and sensible realist approach in the White House, State Department, and Pentagon. In return, Russia has become more helpful over Iran and Afghanistan and has not sought to stir up trouble in the Baltic States or exploit U.S. difficulties elsewhere in the world. The lack of attempts by Moscow to exploit ethnic tensions in the Baltic States is especially striking in view of the acute economic sufferings of Latvia and Lithuania as a result of the global economic recession, something that has made much of their populations doubt the benefits of NATO and EU membership. There is certainly no objective reason for the U.S. to return to a strategy of challenging Russia in the former Soviet Union. As Stephen Kotkin has pointed out, this U.S. strategy has only served the interests of China: "As Russia pursues the chimera of a multipolar world, the United States pursues the delusion of nearly limitless NATO expansion. And in the process, both unwittingly conspire to put Russia in China's pocket."10As far as the West is concerned, our truly vital interest in this region is to avoid conflicts which could indirectly destabilize areas where we really do have vital interests: Central and even Western Europe, and the Middle East. They are of course of much greater interest to Russia, but Russia's ambitions have also been far more limited than many in the West have assumed, largely because of a deep unwillingness to make the sacrifices and run the risks involved in bringing the other republics of the former Soviet Union into a much tighter alliance with Russia.11 Moscow's conception of a sphere of influence on the territory of the former Soviet Union is more defensive than it is offensive. It is focused chiefly on the exclusion of rival sources of geopolitical influence and power, above all the United States. In Ukraine, the closeness and intermingling on the ground between Russians and Ukrainians suggests that if Russia does exert its influence in Ukraine in a restrained way, it seems quite possible that it may regain elements of a hegemonic position without setting off a massive reaction from within Ukraine, or triggering a strong response from the West. If Moscow uses its influence quietly to accumulate a dominant position for Russian firms in the Ukrainian economy, it would unlikely create a major public backlash – especially if the Russian financial-industrial groups are careful to seek alliances with Ukrainian magnates. Not even hard-line nationalists in Galicia are liable to be very agitated by this. The U.S. and EU should use their influence to encourage Russia to go on pursuing a restrained policy of extending soft influence, not a ruthless and illegitimate extension of hard power.