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US-Turkey Relations Good – 1NC

**Turkey Relations are rising due to Middle East cooperation**

Karabat 6/24 (Ayse, Today’s Zaman, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-214071-102-turkey-us-intel-sharing-against-pkk-working-fine-says-armitage.html

Intelligence sharing in northern Iraq, where the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) main camps are based, is working smoothly, according to the chairman of the American-Turkish Council (ATC), Ambassador Richard Armitage. Armitage, who is leading a delegation of visiting ATC members in Turkey, expressed his condolences to the Turkish nation for the victims of the recent terrorist attacks. Speaking about the level of cooperation between Turkey and the US against terrorist activity, he said, “When an ally is in trouble, we are troubled,” and added that intelligence sharing between the US and Turkey against the PKK is working, the cooperation between the two countries regarding Iraq and Afghanistan is going well and economic relations are improving, too. In related developments, US Assistant Secretary of State Philip J. Crowley also made a statement in a press conference yesterday on a PKK attack on Tuesday that killed five people in İstanbul and another PKK attack over the weekend that left 11 soldiers dead. He offered condolences to the families and friends of the victims, and said: “There has been no change in the level of US-Turkey cooperation in confronting the PKK. The PKK, as you know, is a Foreign Terrorist Organization and presents a joint common threat to Turkey, to Iraq and to the United States. They are a threat to the stability of the region and we support efforts by our Turkish allies and our Iraqi allies to deal with the challenge posed by the PKK.” However, during his statement Armitage also hinted that nowadays they have some difficulties in explaining some aspects of Turkish foreign policy back in the US, but they believe that talking more can overcome these difficulties.

Ending US military presence sends a signal to Turkey cooperation is over – this causes them to shift their alliances to Iran

Flanagan and Brennan 8 (Steven and Samuel, senior vice president and director of the International Security Program at CSIS, fellow with the CSIS International Security Program, CSIS, http://www.setav.org/ups/dosya/18532.pdf)

Coincident with growing U.S.-Turkey tensions over Iraq, Turkey has greatly expanded its ties throughout the greater Middle East. The Iraq War not only damaged U.S.-Turkey cooperation in the region, it also diminished Turkey’s confidence in NATO when France sought to block Ankara’s request for deployment of NATO missile defense assets consistent with allied collective defense (Article V) commitments. This inaction reinforced the belief of many Turks that the NATO allies are not serious about its security, especially when the threat emanates from the Middle East. Without a reliable multilateral security framework, Turkey has sought to strengthen its security along its longest land borders, with Syria, Iraq, and Iran through unilateral means and diplomatic openings. In January 2004, Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad made a historic visit to Turkey (the first by a Syrian President since 1946),58 and in December of that year, the two countries signed a freetrade agreement.59 On Iran, the Turkish government does not oppose what it has publicly called peaceful nuclear activity and declares that only diplomatic means will solve any problem with Tehran. 60 Turkey has also departed from Europe and the United States in its self-appointed role in the Arab-Israeli peace process and engagement with the Hamas government. In 2006 in Khartoum, Sudan, Erdoğan became the first Turkish Prime Minister to attend an Arab League Summit. To the consternation of many secular Turks and the delight of many at the summit, he opened the occasion with a verse from the Quran.61 Subsequently, Turkey was given permanent guest status, and in January 2008 Turkey and the Arab League signed an agreement to carry out talks on regional issues.62 Turkey has also departed significantly from its U.S. and European allies in its interaction with various pariah regimes in the region and beyond. In early January 2008, Sudanese President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir visited Ankara.63.

US-Turkey Relations Good – 1NC

Closer Iran-Turkey ties accelerate the Iranian nuclear program and spark widespread proliferation

Peters 5/21 (Ralph, New York Post, Post Opinion Columnist, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/nukes\_gone\_wild\_e1DsERRbLf9qsRnyDadpwK)

Iran's "agreement" to ship a slice of its enriched-uranium pie to Turkey for reprocessing is pure gamesmanship. We expect that from Iran. The alarming part is that, this time, Turkey and Brazil are in on the game. The ludicrous terms of this con-job have long since been overtaken by events. Brazil's President Lula da Silva and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan aren't trying to stop Iran's nuke program. They're eager to facilitate it. What Brazil and Turkey just did wasn't intended to impede Tehran, but to make it harder for Western powers to impose sanctions. Both countries want Iran to run interference for them. Once Iran gets the bomb and takes the (slight) heat, Brazil and Turkey both intend to go nuclear. Brazil wants vanity nukes to cement its position as South America's hegemon, a regional alternative to the US. Turkey's slow-roll Islamist government dreams of a new Ottoman age -- as it turns from the West to embrace the Muslim states it ruled a century ago. After easing Tehran's path to the bomb, Ankara will claim that it needs its own nuclear capability to maintain regional stability. But the coming widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons will be profoundly destabilizing. Each Middle Eastern country, especially, that goes nuclear increases the probability of a nuke exchange exponentially. As Western states fantasize about a "nuclear-weapons-free world," their developing-world darlings are scrambling like mad to develop nuclear arsenals. And we don't get it. Which leads to the second problem with our asleep-at-the-wheel foreign policy (content to equate Arizona's human-rights record with China's): New alliances are developing that are already destabilizing our strategic architecture -- even without nukes. Let's connect a few of the Iran-Turkey-Brazil dots: \* Iran and Brazil share close ties to Venezuela's Hugo Chavez and support other left-wing movements in Latin America. \* Russia sells arms to Iran and Venezuela. Iran supplies weaponry to Hezbollah and Hamas. Venezuela equips Latin narco-terrorists and guerrillas -- to which Brazil turns a blind eye -- and backs Islamist terror. \* While artfully dismantling Turkey's once-secular constitution, Ankara increasingly supports radical-Muslim causes abroad. Turkey's new embrace of Iran is paralleled by a growing intimacy with Russia, as well. \* After flirting with Israel, Turkey chose Syria (whose regime also seeks nukes) as its neighborhood partner. Syria cooperates with Iran in support of Hezbollah and Hamas -- and has deep ties to Russia. \* China's working hard to strengthen its strategic ties with Brazil and Venezuela, and Beijing's already Iran's staunchest defender on the international stage. \* What do Iran, China, Russia, Venezuela, Brazil, Syria and even our "NATO ally" Turkey have in common? They're all resentful of American power and want to see Washington taken down several notches. In the depths of the Cold War, the Non-Aligned Movement was a sorry joke in which rhetorical grandstanding and leftist economics stopped development in its tracks for decades. Member countries hurt themselves far more than they annoyed us. The emerging constellation of alliances will mean a lot more trouble. Not least, because so many countries will have nukes. Several years ago, I wrote that, despite the end of yesteryear's superpower confrontation, our military's going to find itself on a nuclear battlefield, after all -- either smack in a war, or running a gruesome cleanup operation. The odds of that happening will soar as proliferation worsens. And we are not prepared

US-Turkey Relations Good – 1NC

Absent Iranian disarmament, Israel will strike Iran--results in a nuclear holocaust

IHT 8 (Benny Morris. a professor of Middle Eastern history at Ben-Gurion University, International Herald Tribune. July 18, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/18/opinion/18morris.html?pagewanted=print)

Which leaves only Israel — the country threatened almost daily with destruction by Iran’s leaders. Thus the recent reports about Israeli plans and preparations to attack Iran (the period from Nov. 5 to Jan. 19 seems the best bet, as it gives the West half a year to try the diplomatic route but ensures that Israel will have support from a lame-duck White House). The problem is that Israel’s military capacities are far smaller than America’s and, given the distances involved, the fact that the Iranian sites are widely dispersed and underground, and Israel’s inadequate intelligence, it is unlikely that the Israeli conventional forces, even if allowed the use of Jordanian and Iraqi airspace (and perhaps, pending American approval, even Iraqi air strips) can destroy or perhaps significantly delay the Iranian nuclear project. Nonetheless, Israel, believing that its very existence is at stake — and this is a feeling shared by most Israelis across the political spectrum — will certainly make the effort. Israel’s leaders, from Prime Minister Ehud Olmert down, have all explicitly stated that an Iranian bomb means Israel’s destruction; Iran will not be allowed to get the bomb. The best outcome will be that an Israeli conventional strike, whether failed or not — and, given the Tehran regime’s totalitarian grip, it may not be immediately clear how much damage the Israeli assault has caused — would persuade the Iranians to halt their nuclear program, or at least persuade the Western powers to significantly increase the diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran. But the more likely result is that the international community will continue to do nothing effective and that Iran will speed up its efforts to produce the bomb that can destroy Israel. The Iranians will also likely retaliate by attacking Israel’s cities with ballistic missiles (possibly topped with chemical or biological warheads); by prodding its local clients, Hezbollah and Hamas, to unleash their own armories against Israel; and by activating international Muslim terrorist networks against Israeli and Jewish — and possibly American — targets worldwide (though the Iranians may at the last moment be wary of provoking American military involvement). Such a situation would confront Israeli leaders with two agonizing, dismal choices. One is to allow the Iranians to acquire the bomb and hope for the best — meaning a nuclear standoff, with the prospect of mutual assured destruction preventing the Iranians from actually using the weapon. The other would be to use the Iranian counterstrikes as an excuse to escalate and use the only means available that will actually destroy the Iranian nuclear project: Israel’s own nuclear arsenal. Given the fundamentalist, self-sacrificial mindset of the mullahs who run Iran, Israel knows that deterrence may not work as well as it did with the comparatively rational men who ran the Kremlin and White House during the cold war. They are likely to use any bomb they build, both because of ideology and because of fear of Israeli nuclear pre-emption. Thus an Israeli nuclear strike to prevent the Iranians from taking the final steps toward getting the bomb is probable. The alternative is letting Tehran have its bomb. In either case, a Middle Eastern nuclear holocaust would be in the cards.

That draws in every major power

Ivashov 7 (General Leonid Ivashov, vice-president of the Academy on geopolitical affairs. Global Research April 9, 2007. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=5309>)

What might cause the force major event of the required scale? Everything seems to indicate that Israel will be sacrificed. Its involvement in a war with Iran - especially in a nuclear war - is bound to trigger a global catastrophe. The statehoods of Israel and Iran are based on the countries' official religions. A military conflict between Israel and Iran will immediately evolve into a religious one, a conflict between Judaism and Islam. Due to the presence of numerous Jewish and Muslim populations in the developed countries, this would make a global bloodbath inevitable. All of the active forces of most of the countries of the world would end up fighting, with almost no room for neutrality left. Judging by the increasingly massive acquisitions of the residential housing for the Israeli citizens, especially in Russia and Ukraine, a lot of people already have an idea of what the future holds. However, it is hard to imagine a quiet heaven where one might hide from the coming doom. Forecasts of the territorial distribution of the fighting, the quantities and the efficiency of the armaments involved, the profound character of the underlying roots of the conflict and the severity of the religious strife all leave no doubt that this clash will be in all respects much more nightmarish than WWII.

US-Turkey Relations Bad – 1NC

Relations with Turkey are low now over differing interests in the Middle East

Abramovitz and Barkey 6/17 (Morton and Henri, former ambassador to Turkey and prof of international relations, National Interest, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23588)

Acrimony permeates American-Turkish relations. Harsh words have been exchanged at high levels over Gaza and Iran. The American right-wing has virtually declared Turkey beyond the pale and appears to long for the Turkish military to take over. Turkey’s nationalistic media talk about the country’s noble role in the flotilla crisis, and the words of senior leaders border on the conspiratorial. Many wonder whether our interests are now so different that they preclude close collaboration. This is not a new phenomenon. Turkey has always been a prickly ally, not one that simply saluted. During the Cold War the Turks closed U.S. bases and kicked out the Peace Corps after we imposed an arms embargo in response to their invasion of northern Cyprus. As for our secular Turkish military friends, they barely supported the United States in the first Gulf War and undermined it in the run up to the second; and refuse to send combat troops to Afghanistan. Besotted by the language of strategic partnership it invented for Ankara’s benefit, the United States has been slow in recognizing how Turkey’s perspective and interests have changed. Whatever America’s importance to Turkey, the dependency of the past is over. Russia is no longer an enemy but a valued economic partner. Turkey’s EU membership is distant and Ankara’s interest in the body is diminishing. AKP rule produced sizeable economic growth for much of this decade and Turkish economic activity is now global. Ankara is on the move and feeling it. Change would have happened under any circumstances, but the foreign-policy activism of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu hastened it. They moved on all fronts, but most importantly strengthened Turkey’s involvement in the Middle East, where they think the United States is vulnerable and wrong. Conflict with America has slowly developed, particularly over Iran and Israel. Erdogan can hardly contain his ambition to make Turkey a dominant regional actor and a global player.

<Insert Link from \*\*Links – Alliance Bad>

US-Turkish relations trade-off with US-Greek relations

Borowiec 2k [Andrew, The Washington Times, Oct. 22, Lexis]

Mr. Burns and the United States have often been targets of the Greek media, and despite official, and often solemn, pledges of U.S.-Greek friendship, the relations between the two countries have not always been smooth. There are myriad reasons. Washington has complained that Athens has done little to stem terrorism, mainly by the notorious 17th November terrorist organization whose victims over the past 25 years have included five members of the U.S. Embassy here killed and 20 wounded. Greece - and particularly its freewheeling press - has accused Washington of tilting toward Turkey, Greece's historic foe, and of not doing enough to end the division of Cyprus, where Turkey had carved out a separate area for the Turkish Cypriot minority, protected by 35,000 mainland Turkish troops. More recent accusations from Greek media include charges that by excessively stressing the danger of terrorism, the United States is trying to destroy Greece's tourism and is undermining its ability to guarantee security for the 2004 Olympics.

B. US-Greek relations key to Balkan stability

Kornblum 96 [John, Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, http://www.hri.org/cgi-bin/brief?/news/misc/misc-news/1996/96-05-09\_3.misc.html]

Just two weeks ago I visited Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus to emphasize the importance the U.S. attaches to this region. Here we find our close friends and NATO allies divided by disputes that for too long have been left unsettled. But I believe new opportunities lie before us today. To the east of Turkey, to the north of Greece, new states are moving forward toward democracy and economic development. Greece and Turkey should play leading roles in this process. This requires, however, moving beyond the disputes which have divided them, advancing a settlement with Cyprus, and addressing key internal problems as well. Greece -- a key NATO ally, democracy, and a member of the EU -- offers a natural port to the Balkans and bridge to the East. It has a key role to play in building ties of commerce and peace in the Balkans. Today, Greek troops work with us on IFOR and Greece is making significant progress in improving its relations with its neighbors -- including the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania.

US-Turkey Relations Bad – 1NC

C. Balkan instability causes WW3

Gaur 6 [Kalki, World Renowned Philosopher, “Nuclear Weapons Doctrine,” <http://kalkigaur.googlepages.com/66>]

Three important areas, which could ignite the Third World War, are in Kosovo, Australia, and Saudi Arabia. Firstly, The NATO's barbaric bombardment of civilian industrial infrastructure of Yugoslavia is a form of War of Religions between Catholic and Orthodox Christianity. NATO's operations in Kosovo, and subsequent rise of Vladimir V. Putin as the next President of Russia guarantees that the third World War would take place on European continent. Western Europe would again witness the total destruction of industrial infrastructure in the next World War. The destruction of Western industrial infrastructure shall reestablish the preponderance of the United States and Russia in European affairs. Next Balkan War would destroy European Union.

D. Balkan war escalates to nuclear extinction.

Chicago Daily 99 [May 9, “Dogs of War,” Lexis]

We need to stop the war and return to the negotiating table to end the suffering in Kosovo before the "dogs of war" are unleashed and there is no controlling the catastrophic - we're near that point. Most of us realize that in war the unexpected is often the rule, often resulting in chaos. There must be an end to military operations and the ethnic cleansing against Kosovo civilians. Something has gone wrong; the very people we were supposed to be saving are suffering thousands of dead and millions homeless. Dialogue must be aimed at reaching a peaceful settlement that respects the wishes of the inhabitants of Kosovo, while respecting history, international law and minority rights. It seems to me the Clinton administration embarked on a military adventure that has not been thought through. The administration has been dealing with Milosevic for six years. We hear the grim rationale for sending in ground troops "to salvage the credibility of the NATO Alliance." I don't want any American servicemen/women to die for the idea that once you have embarked on a disastrous course of action, you can only continue on ... that's nonsense. On a recent news program the Italian and German foreign ministers stated troop deployment is not acceptable as part of their national defense - the French representative waffled. Both France and Germany have large Muslim populations. The German official said the NATO Alliance weapons, planes, missiles are primarily American with minimum involvement of NATO allies. Let's not forget that Russia has warned NATO countries that this action could culminate in a third world war. The war in the Balkans could easily become the flash point of world conflict resulting in nuclear war and incalculable self-destruction.

\*\*Relations High

US-Turkey Relations High

Relations are strong—flotilla and sanctions incidents don’t harm relations

Rozen 6/21 (Politico, national security correspondent, Laura, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0610/38806.html,

But Tan insisted there has been no breach in the U.S.-Turkey relationship in the wake of either the flotilla episode or Turkey’s vote against the Iran sanctions resolution. “We have excellent relations with all members of the administration,” Tan said. “We are able to talk with them in an extensive, comprehensive manner, in face-to-face meetings and several phone conversations,” he said, citing recent conversations between Davutoglu and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and with National Security Adviser Jim Jones. Tan said Turkey shares the United States’ concern about the prospect that Iran could get a nuclear weapon. But he said Turkey’s vote against the Iran sanctions resolution will allow Turkey to remain an intermediary with Iran and therefore enable the U.S. and the international community “to keep the door open to” Iran’s returning to the negotiating table. The U.S. “has indicated publicly and privately that we are very unhappy” with Turkey’s “no” vote on the U.N. Security Council Iran resolution, “but [we] want to move forward on crucial elements of relations,” a U.S. official told POLITICO Monday on condition of anonymity. Turkish officials said the Obama administration has given them mixed signals on a possible Iran nuclear fuel swap proposal that Ankara and Brazil negotiated last month, under which 1,200 kilograms of Iran’s low-enriched uranium would be sent to Turkey in exchange for nuclear fuel for a Tehran reactor that supplies isotopes to treat Iranian cancer patients. Though the U.S. formally dismissed the Turkey-Brazil-Iran nuclear deal as insufficient and proceeded with a Security Council resolution sanctioning Iran earlier this month, Obama has said that the resolution does not close the door on diplomacy. “We don’t doubt Turkey’s sincerity in trying to find a diplomatic way forward and a genuine way to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons,” a senior administration official told POLITICO. “And they assert that what they were doing is consistent with our objectives.”

US-Turkey relations high- cooperation over PKK

Daily News 6/21 (http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=us-is-ready-to-review-measures-against-pkk-2010-06-21)

The United States actively supports the efforts of its Turkish allies to defeat the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey said Monday. “We stand ready to review urgently any new requests from the Turkish military or government regarding the PKK,” U.S. Ambassador to Turkey James Jeffrey said in a written statement, echoing remarks made Sunday by an embassy spokeswoman. Twelve Turkish soldiers were killed in PKK attacks over the weekend, with most of the deaths occurring when members of the outlawed group assaulted a border unit at the Iraqi frontier. Following the attacks there has been speculation that the U.S. might not have passed on actionable intelligence in its possession regarding PKK movements toward the border. While Turkey’s “no” vote on fresh U.N. sanctions against Iran and a simmering crisis with Israel has sparked concern in Turkey that the United States may withhold support from Ankara’s struggle against the PKK, Jeffrey stressed “there has been no change in the level of U.S.-Turkey intelligence sharing regarding the PKK in northern Iraq.” Describing the PKK as a terrorist group and a “common enemy” to both Ankara and Washington, Jeffrey said the U.S shared Turkey’s grief at the loss of its heroic troops and police in the joint struggle against terrorism. “Our sincere condolences go out to the families of the victims,” he said. The PKK has been listed as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States and the European Union.

Relations strong- complying with the US on foreign policy

Turkone 6/12 (Mumtaz’er, Today’s Zaman, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-212874-109-centeris-turkey-weaning-itself-off-the-us-bribyi-brmumtazerturkonecenter.html)

This question is familiar to observers of Turkey, who can answer immediately. Turkey is not distancing itself from the US. There are no major changes in Turkey’s foreign policy. Turkey is not experiencing any deviation in its relations with the Western world in general and with the US in particular. What it is doing is actually pursuing an active foreign policy in its region by complying with its alliance with the West. It closely monitors the balances in the region and makes finely tuned interventions. In the first instance, it is not very likely that Turkey will change its axis because there is no alternative to the current axis. As a strategic ally of the US, Turkey is becoming more influential and powerful in its immediate region. There are visible contributions of Turkey’s growing influence and power over policies concerning the region. With Obama’s election, the US has started to recover its damaged image in the Muslim world. And the policies Turkey is pursuing make this rising image of the US more visible.

US-Turkey Relations High

It’s just growing pains- US-Turkey alliance is evolving into a stronger partnership

Yilmaz and Ulutas 10 (Nuh, director of the Washington D.C. office of SETA, a non-profit think tank based in Ankara, and Ufuk, Ph.D Candidate, Coordinator of the Middle East Program at SETA Washington D.C, 4/6, The Middle East Channel, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/06/whats\_on\_the\_menu\_for\_erdogans\_visit\_to\_the\_us)

Yet this transformation from a hierarchical relationship to a model partnership does not seem to be appreciated fully by analysts, especially those used to seeing the Turkey-US relationship within the former hierarchical framework (where any disagreement between the two states was considered to justify US intervention in Turkish domestic politics). As such, it is important to further conceptualize and give meaning to what the notion of a model partnership might actually look like in practice, including the potential roadblocks that can still make this re-framing of relations a difficult one. There are different approaches that the two countries can now pursue to resolve certain conflicts, which can be summed up as a comprehensive approach versus a fragmented approach. Ankara fully supports Washington's comprehensive approach in Iraq, Afghanistan, and more recently in the Middle East Peace Process. It appreciates Washington's new strategy that treats these conflicts not as isolated issues but as regional problems, by taking into consideration the concerns of neighboring countries. However, Ankara believes that the US does not follow the same comprehensive strategy in dealing with Turkish-Armenian relations or in its attitude towards Iran. The Turkish side expects the US to deal with the Armenian and Iranian issues in a comprehensive manner and has thus found it lacking in these instances. Since Prime Minister Erdogan did not postpone his visit to Washington as some observers expected, we can assume that Turkish-US relations are starting to get back on track. But now all eyes are turned towards potential points of contention between Turkey and the US that will be discussed during Erdogan's visit to the US, especially the Turkish-Armenian relations and Iranian nuclear issue.

US-Turkey cooperation over PKK still strong

AFP 6/21 (http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5isCQVH-i7jHrWLknxxs4H6PC\_\_Zw)

ANKARA — The United States supports Turkey's struggle against separatist Kurdish rebels and is ready to "urgently" consider any new request for help from Ankara, the US ambassador to Turkey said Monday. "We stand ready to review urgently any new requests from the Turkish military or government regarding the PKK," Ambassador James Jeffrey said in a written statement. He was referring to the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), listed as a terrorist group by both Ankara and Washington, which has dramatically stepped up violence in Turkey's southeast. "The PKK is a common enemy of both Turkey and the US and we actively support the efforts of our Turkish allies to defeat this terrorist threat," Jeffrey said. He stressed "there has been no change in the level of US-Turkey intelligence sharing regarding the PKK in northern Iraq." The United States has been supplying Turkey, a NATO ally, with intelligence on rebel movements in northern Iraq, used particularly in Turkish air raids on PKK hideouts in the region.

Relations strong—Obama trying to undo damage of invasion of Iraq

Amies 10 (Nick, freelance journalist, DW World, 2/6, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5641395,00.html)

Bilateral relations by their nature have mutual benefits and Turkey isn't the only partner seeking support. The United States sees Turkey as a key Muslim ally and the Obama administration has been working hard to repair the damage to relations caused by the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. Turkey had refused at the time to allow the US to use its territory as a staging ground for invasion. Since then, the US and Turkey have set-up intelligence sharing networks in the on-going fight against international terrorism while Turkey hosts the US military infrastructure needed for its missions in neighbouring Iraq and Afghanistan. "Turkey is still a key Muslim ally to the US and is a favorite partner, one which is held up as an example of a predominantly Islamic country with a growing democracy," Joost Lagendijk said. "The US won't want to jeapordise that. If it turns on Turkey for any reason, then the whole rhetoric Washington has created about reforming the Islamic world will crumble."

A2 Turkey Voted Against Sanctions

Turkey voted against sanctions to preserve the possibility of diplomacy with Iran

Kelemen 6/18 (Michele, NPR newscaster, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127931787)

The U.S. and European Union are moving to tighten the financial noose around Iran to pressure it to curb its nuclear ambitions. They are calling on all countries — including those that voted against sanctions in the U.N. Security Council earlier this month — to do the same. One of those no votes came from Turkey, which disapproves of what it calls "coercive diplomacy." Turkey says it is working behind the scenes, with U.S. encouragement, to keep diplomatic options alive in relations between Iran and the West. Ibrahim Kalin, an adviser to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, says his country agrees with the U.S. and Europe on the ultimate goal — to prevent Iran from having a nuclear bomb. "We don't disagree in substance; we disagree in style," he told reporters at the Turkish Embassy in Washington this week. In a statement read at Friday prayers in Iran, the country's Supreme National Security Council called the U.N. sanctions "illegal." The U.S. says it will vigorously apply the sanctions, which include an expanded arms embargo. The United States and its allies are concerned that Iran's nuclear program, which includes uranium enrichment, could ultimately produce a nuclear weapon

\*\*Relations Low

US-Turkey Relations Low

Relations low—split over Israel and recognition of Armenian genocide

Kreiger 6/17 (Hilary Leila, Washington correspondent for Jerusalem Post, Jerusalem Post, http://www.jpost.com/International/Article.aspx?id=178687)

WASHINGTON – US Congressmen ratcheted up their criticism of Turkey Wednesday, warning that Ankara was risking its historically warm ties with Congress by reaching toward Iran and breaking with Israel. In a press conference defending Israel’s raid on a Turkish-flagged aid ship trying to break the Gaza blockade, several dozen of whose passengers had ties to terror organizations, numerous members of Congress turned their ire toward Turkey. “Turkey is responsible for the nine deaths aboard that ship. It is not Israel that’s responsible,” declared Rep. Shelley Berkley (D-Nevada), who pointed to Turkish funding and support for the expedition. “If Israel is at fault in any way, it’s by falling into the trap that was set for them by Turkey.” She continued: “The Turks have extraordinary nerve to lecture the State of Israel when they are occupiers of the island of Cyprus, where they systematically discriminate against the ecumenical patriarch, and they refuse to recognize the Armenian genocide.” Her comments – which were accompanied by an announcement that Turkish representatives were no longer welcome in her office – touched on sensitive issues with Turkey that the US has often shied away from pressing Ankara on aggressively. Her words raised the prospect that the US Congress at least would be more assertive about its displeasure with Turkey. Speaking at the same press conference, Rep. Mike Pence (R-Indiana) said he recently warned the Turkish ambassador that “With regard to Congress of the United States, there will be a cost if Turkey stays on its current path of growing closed to Iran and more antagonistic to the State of Israel.” Among other issues, he said, he was now likely to switch his vote to support a resolution recognizing the mass killing of Armenians during the Ottoman empire as a genocide, a move he had voted against in the past because he thought relations with Turkey were more important. Turkey has vehemently opposed the resolution, briefly recalling its ambassador to the US when the measure passed a House committee earlier this year

US-Turkey Relations Low

Iran splits US and Turkey

Abramovitz and Barkey 6/17 (Morton and Henri, former ambassador to Turkey and prof of international relations, National Interest, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23588)

Turkey has also parted company with the United States over Iran. While actively opposing additional sanctions, it has muddied the waters by making Israeli nuclear weapons—and not Pakistani or Indian ones—the issue instead of Iranian violations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which it is a signatory. Ankara has legitimate reasons to oppose sanctions but refuses to comprehend the strategic importance Iran represents for the Obama administration. America spurned Turkey’s recent deal with Iran and Brazil as inadequate. NATO-member Ankara further alienated Washington by voting against sanctions instead of simply abstaining. The United States and Turkey still share important common interests and importantly work closely together in Iraq, Afghanistan and NATO, and on energy-related issues. The United States still wants Turkey ensconced in the EU. But the question increasingly is how Washington responds to a self-confident Turkey whose interests conflict with ours on major issues. It is complicated by the AKP leadership’s Islamic bent and differential morality, which ignores mass atrocities committed by Islamic nations—and even embraces those states. Turkey is a growing power and possesses assets we do not have. Where we can get their help we should elicit it. Where we differ we can acknowledge their interests. Retaliation is no answer to differences over key issues. The U.S. government does not and should not question whether Turkey is part of the West. Any Turkish government will pursue its own interests as it defines them at any point in time

All groups in Congress oppose Turkey—previous Turkey supporters and lobbies changed their mind

Bogardus 6/13 (Kevin, The Hill, http://thehill.com/homenews/house/102891-turkey-alliance-comes-under-increasing-criticism-from-lawmakers

Lawmakers have vigorously defended Israel after that one ship — out of the six in the flotilla — was raided by Israeli commandos on May 31, resulting in the death of nine activists and several injured soldiers. In turn, Turkey, often lauded for its Western-style democracy and strong military ties to the United States, has come under attack from members of Congress. Many have suggested that the country is not the strong U.S. ally that they expected, even implying it may be America’s enemy now. It is a marked shift from months ago, when several lawmakers came to the defense of Turkey when they were lobbying against a non-binding congressional resolution that would recognize the Ottoman Empire’s World War I-era killing of 1.5 million Armenians as genocide. The flotilla incident, along with Turkey’s vote last week against a new round of United Nations sanctions against Iran, has many in Congress moving against Turkey. Rep. Anthony Weiner (D-N.Y.) did not mince words when he discussed the flotilla’s supporters on the House floor Wednesday. “It had an enormous amount of support by some of the worst enemies of peace in that region, and some of the worst enemies, quite literally, not only of Israel, but of the United States as well. And I mean Turkey, Iran, Hamas. These are not entities that were looking for some peaceful resolution here,” Weiner said. In a statement last week, Rep. John Sarbanes (D-Md.) suggested Turkey should share some of the blame for the skirmish between the Israeli commandos and the activists. “Some have expressed the view that Israel alone should account for this incident. That perspective neglects the role that Turkey played in staging the flotilla and Turkey’s readiness to condone this kind of brinksmanship,” Sarbanes said. Criticism of Turkey has been bipartisan as well, and from self-proclaimed Turkish supporters in the past. “The complicity of Turkey in launching a flotilla to challenge the blockade in Gaza, the ensuing violence that occurred, the grievous loss of life is deeply troubling to those of us who have supported the U.S.-Turkish alliance in the past,” Rep. Mike Pence (R-Ind.) said on the House floor Wednesday. “Turkey needs to decide whether its present course is in its long-term interests, but America will stand with Israel.” U.S.-based Jewish lobby groups, traditionally supportive of Turkey during its congressional battles over the Armenian genocide resolution, have begun to distance themselves. For example, the Anti-Defamation League has called for the State Department to designate the Humanitarian Relief Foundation — the Turkish-based charity group that helped to organize the flotilla — as a terrorist group.

US-Turkey Relations Low

US-Turkey relations low—post Cold War era means each nation is defining its own role

Menon and Wimbush 7 (Rajan, Prof of International Relations, S. Enders, Director of Center for Future Security Strategies, March 25, http://www.hudson.org/files/pdf\_upload/turkey%20pdf.pdf)

The cold reality, then, is that Turkey and the United States are drifting apart—and rapidly. Senior officials and respected academic experts in Turkey and the United States now concur that there is something fundamentally wrong with the state of US-Turkish relations and that if both sides do not recognize this reality and attend to it with seriousness and vigor, a strategic partnership that has served both Americans and Turks well for more than half a century could suffer serious damage. This assessment is not overblown. It is grounded in considerable, compelling, and consistent evidence derived from opinion polls in Turkey, discussions in the Turkish media, and the analyses and pronouncements of those who conduct Turkish foreign policy, or influence it. Nor does this conclusion rest on a romanticized assumption that there was once an idyllic, perfect friendship that is now dissolving and that must and can be reconstituted in its pristine form. The past was never halcyon, and veteran observers of Turkey well understand that the United States and Turkey have disagreed on important issues in the past, that their relationship has encountered rough terrain on numerous occasions, and that such differences will surface in the future. Nevertheless, the current situation is different in their minds because the two countries are increasingly defining their place in the world, their assessments of major security threats, and their national interests in radically divergent ways. There will be two consequences if this trend is not revered: First, future crises that test the strongly strength of the bilateral bond will have greater destructive potential than before; second, even far less consequential instances of discord will prove harder to handle than ever before and the cumulative effect will take a steep toll on the alliance. This loss of cushioning is particularly important because, in the aftermath of the Cold War, Turkey and the United States face a new, unfamiliar, and complex environment and will be hard put to adapt their alliance creatively to new conditions without trust and goodwill, both of which are being depleted.

Relations low due to lack of US action on the PKK

Cook and Sherwood-Randall 6 (Steven, expert on Arab and Turkish politics, and Elizabeth, research scholar at Stanford, Council on Foreign Relations, No. 15, June)

With regard to the PKK, the Turks would like the United States to honor President Bush’s principle of “you are either with us or against us.” Beginning in 2004, the PKK ended its self-declared five-year cease-fire and through the early winter of 2005–2006 killed ninety Turkish soldiers in a string of terrorist attacks. Turkish officials argue that Ankara lined up with the United States very soon after the September 11 attacks and has demonstrated its solidarity with Washington through the Turkish armed forces’ ongoing mission in Afghanistan. From Ankara’s perspective, given the PKK’s renewed operations, Washington must use the opportunity that its occupation of Iraq provides to strike a lethal blow against the PKK. Turkish officials point out that if ninety U.S. soldiers were killed in terrorist attacks along either the Mexican or Canadian borders, Washington’s response would be rapid and violent. While the Turks have grudgingly recognized that they are constrained—by the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq and by their own drive for EU membership—from hot pursuit of PKK fighters, Turkey expects the United States to use military force against Ankara’s “own al-Qaeda.”3 Moreover, Ankara wants the United States to pressure Iraqi Kurdish leaders, especially Massoud Barzani, to hand over PKK leaders to Turkey. Much to Ankara’s disappointment, U.S. forces in Iraq are highly unlikely to expend more blood or treasure in direct pursuit of the PKK. In the early phase of the occupation, the United States did take some action against the PKK, clearing out the Mahmur refugee camp and bombing some suspected PKK hideouts. The Turkish government alleges that Mahmur, which currently contains approximately 10,000 refugees, is a PKK stronghold. During Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s April 2006 visit to Ankara, she told her Turkish counterpart that the United States will work with Turkey “through information sharing and other means to prevent any vacuum [in northern Iraq] from being used to inflict harm on Turkey.” She also committed Washington to working with the Iraqi government to resolve the PKK issue. Nevertheless, given the unanticipated strength of the Iraqi insurgency and the relative stability of northern Iraq, operations in Iraqi Kurdistan are not a high priority for the U.S. military. Further, it would be illogical for U.S. forces to take any action that might destabilize the only region of Iraq that has been relatively quiet. While the Turks recognize the constraints that Washington faces in Iraq, they remain adamant that the United States must—in keeping with the global war on terror—work to eliminate PKK violence emanating from Iraq.

\*\*Brink

US-Turkey Relations Brink

Turkey is starting to drift but still in line with the US—a push away aligns Turkey with the Middle East

Hadar 9 (Leon, research fellow in foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy, international trade, the Middle East, and South and East Asia, 12/14, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11048)

Like Japan, Turkey was a leading strategic ally of the United States during the Cold War. Turkey was not only an important member of NATO but it also helped the Americans contain the threat from the Soviet Union and its allies in the Middle East while maintaining close military ties with Israel. And like in the case of U.S.-Japan relationship, both Ankara and Washington seemed to be interested in maintaining their alliance after the Cold War had ended. While the Americans promised to assist Turkey in its efforts to join the European Union (EU), Turkey expressed its willingness to cooperate with the United States in containing the Islamic Republic of Iran and other radical Islamist forces in the Middle East. But dramatic political changes in Turkey in the form of the growing influence of political Islamic movement that challenged Turkey's traditional secular and pro-Western orientation, and in particular, the 2002 electoral victory of the Justice and Development Party (AKP)that is committed to an Islamist ideology, seemed to be raising doubts about the continuing viability of the U.S.-Turkey alliance while the failure of Washington to help bring Turkey into the EU played into the hands of those Turks who were questioning their nation's ties to the West. But it was the Turkish decision not to support the American invasion Iraq in 2003 and its refusal to allow U.S. forces to cross Turkish territory on their way to Iraq that marked a turning point in the relationship between the two countries. The AKP-led government headed by Prime Minister Recep Erdogan insisted that the ousting of Iraq's Saddam Hussein and the Americans attempts to 'remake" the Middle East ran contrary to Turkish interests by creating political instability and leading to new military conflicts in the Persian Gulf and the Levant (that prediction proved to be on target). Indeed, the collapse of the U.S. hegemonic project in the Middle East and the rise of Iran as the new regional power, has created incentives Turkey to fill the strategic vacuum by strengthening its political and economic ties with Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq and other Arab governments as well as with Iran (Erdogan has defended that country's nuclear program) and even with old-time foes like the Armenians and the Kurds, while distancing itself from Israel. In a way, not unlike Japan, Turkey seems to be in the process of reorienting its relationship from the United States as it attempts to re-establish itself as a regional power. But the new foreign policy direction that seems to be embraced by Turkey and Japan is not an indication that these two governments are pursuing an anti-American agenda or are embarking on a civilizational confrontation with a U.S.-led. Turkey is not about to join Iran or anti-American governments and groups to force the U.S. out of the Middle East. Instead, it is responding the erosion in the power of the U.S. there by creating new partnerships that could help stabilize the region: helping other Sunni governments to counter-balance the rising power of Shiite Iran's; trying to serve as a peace mediator (between Syria and Israel, for example); preventing the disintegration of Iraq by strengthening ties with the Kurds; and facilitating trade and investment.

**not quite sure how this card has value actually- maybe as brink (last line)?**

Menon and Wimbush 7 (Rajan, Prof of International Relations, S. Enders, Director of Center for Future Security Strategies, *Survival* Vol. 49 No. 2, http://www.newamerica.net/files/nafmigration/Menon\_and\_Wimbush\_US\_Turkey\_Alliance\_Survival\_2007.pdf)

This talk about a strategic recalculation might simply be empty rhetoric from a Turkey that is angry and wants Washington to notice. But it would be foolhardy to put the proposition to the test; the costs to the United States of being wrong would be considerable and long lasting. The wiser course would be to take steps to ensure the continued vitality of an alliance that both Ankara and Washington need to deal effectively with unfamiliar dangers, and that has lost none of its importance for America's national-security interests despite the momentous changes that have occurred in international politics over the past 20 years. The alliance appears to be on auto-pilot even as it veers off course. America's preoccupation with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and Turkey's anger over American policies must not obscure the larger picture: without serious attention from both sides the badly frayed alliance may fall apart.

US-Turkey Relations Brink

Turkey is seeking more recognition from the America but is also pushing toward involvement in the Middle East

Flanagan and Brennan 8 (Steven and Samuel, senior vice president and director of the International Security Program at CSIS, fellow with the CSIS International Security Program, CSIS, http://www.setav.org/ups/dosya/18532.pdf)

The new focus on the Middle East and Turkey’s general eastward shift can be explained by the lack of a Mediterranean threat from Greece. With its accession to the EU, as well as that of Cyprus, Greece no longer engages in its traditional rivalry with the same single-minded focus. Attention to southern and eastern borders is the historical norm—interrupted by World War I and resulting Soviet-European intrigues—but also brings Turkey into a natural tension with the United States. For decades, the respective relations of Turkey and the United States with the Middle East have seemingly run parallel to the U.S.-Turkey relationship, framed in strictly Euro-Atlantic terms. Turkey would welcome the opportunity for greater inclusion in U.S. policy and strategy in the Middle East, and the United States could benefit from a different source of soft influence and, when need be, military coercion to aid its stabilization of the region. The Euro-Atlantic relationship also must reshape itself to cooperate more effectively in the Middle East, and if the United States and Turkey are serious about Turkey joining the EU, a new framework and consensus on priorities must arise, either pulling from existing institutions such as NATO or thinking beyond these. It is also a fair observation that Europe may increasingly turn its focus from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean and North Africa, where Turkey’s influence could be a potent asset. As Europe grows increasingly wary about Russia, Turkey also clearly has a role to play in that dynamic—especially in its unique role as an energy corridor.

**Asymmetric nature of the US-Turkey alliance means relations are perpetually on the brink**

Loğoğlu 8 (O. Faruk, President of the Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies in Ankara and a former Turkish ambassador to the U.S, Atlantic Council, http://www.acus.org/publication/us-turkey-relations-require-new-focus/logoglu)

It is an asymmetric relationship. Turkey is a regional power with an outreach into several adjacent regions including the Balkans and Central Asia. Turkish interests, concerns, priorities, and timelines are primarily shaped by localized perceptions and are processed within a framework whose references are regional. Turkish regional concerns and perspectives are much more detailed and sophisticated in comparison to those of the U.S. whose perceptions manifest in broad strokes. The U.S. is a super power whose interests and needs are calculated on a global basis and it is generally not fine tuned to the sensitivities of a regional actor like Turkey. Moreover, whereas Turkish foreign policy requirements change more slowly, American concerns and priorities shift and evolve much more rapidly. Thus, when American views are communicated to the Turks, they do not always sit well with the Turkish mind set. For the U.S., its requests are always important and of high priority. But because the relationship is asymmetrical, what is crucial and immediate for the Turkish side generally does not carry the same importance or urgency for the Americans. In short, American demands and expectations from Turkey are presented as if they are sacrosanct while Turkish needs and priorities are treated by the U.S. in the much broader setting of American interests on a global scale. The Turkish-American relationship is a sensitive and fragile one. It easily gets sidetracked by specific events or by careless comments of political leaders and public officials on both sides or because of commentary in the media or even by movies. When not nurtured and left to fend for itself, the relationship underperforms.

US-Turkey Relations Brink

Turkish relations are workable—but growing anti-Americanism means a shift is plausible

Menon and Wimbush 7 (Rajan, Prof of International Relations, S. Enders, Director of Center for Future Security Strategies, *Survival* Vol. 49 No. 2, http://www.newamerica.net/files/nafmigration/Menon\_and\_Wimbush\_US\_Turkey\_Alliance\_Survival\_2007.pdf)

Turkey’s polity and society have become more difficult for American policy- makers to understand. The familiar elites — secular Kemalists, whether civilian or military — continue to be powerful in setting the tone of Turkey’s internal and external orientation, but they have had to yield political space to those whose political views are influenced by their Islamic faith and heritage and who tend to originate from Anatolia’s rising commercial class and less affluent groups from its rural regions, as opposed to ’European Turkey'. This shift in the political currents does not in itself endanger the US—Turkish alliance. The Islamic party that now governs Turkey favours a strong relationship with the United States, sought (albeit without success) to convince the Turkish parliament to authorise the opening of a second American military front against Saddam Hussein’s army from Turkish soil in March 2003, and is demonstrably committed to gaining membership in the European Union. Still, the dynamics of Turkish politics have changed in fundamental ways, and this makes for a Turkey that is less familiar to and more complicated for Americans. The possibility that Turkey whether Kemalist or Islamist, could reassess its long—standing alliance with the United States is quite real. Indeed, some of Turkey's foreign—policy choices — which are being discussed forthrightly in influential Turkish circles — involve reducing its reliance on the United States, or even turning away from Washington, and deepening ties with America's competitors. Accompanying Turkish discussions about a new strategic orientation has been the growth of a deep anti—Western, and specifically anti—American, mood — one that now shapes the thinking of Turks, regardless of political persuasion, and that has sunk deep roots among the Kemalists, Ame1ica's traditional interlocutors.

Anti-American strain is pushing the alliance to the brink—means minor mistakes become fatal

Menon and Wimbush 7 (Rajan, Prof of International Relations, S. Enders, Director of Center for Future Security Strategies, *Survival* Vol. 49 No. 2, http://www.newamerica.net/files/nafmigration/Menon\_and\_Wimbush\_US\_Turkey\_Alliance\_Survival\_2007.pdf)

The United States does not, of course, 'own‘ Turkey and must never manage its relationship with Ankara in ways that even hint it thinks it does. The Turks are a proud people with a long and illustrious history and Turkey is a key regional power, with influence extending to the United States, Europe, the Middle East, the South Caucasus, Central Asia and Russia. Turkish nationalism has become both combative and embittered during the past few years; it could turn against the United States and indeed be shaped strongly by anti-Americanism. This is not a hypothetical danger: there is abundant and unmistakable evidence that Washington’s relationship with Ankara is under severe, indeed unprecedented, strain, which is why minor missteps could have a disproportionate effect, fraying the alliance further. For example, while the United States may value Turkey as a country with a tradition of moderate Islam and a secular polity, statements that praise it a ‘model‘ for Muslims strike Turks as paternalistic, not complimentary. So low has confidence in the United States become among Turks and so high is the level of resentment that Seyfi Tashan, a leading Turkish political commentator and long-time proponent of Turkey’s integration into the West, observed that whereas the United States and Turkey had stood together during the Cold War, now the United States (together with Europe) appeared to be waging “an undeclared Cold Wan against Turkey.” Even if one takes account of the hyperbole; it is nevertheless significant that a prominent member of the foreign—policy establishment could characterise the US—Turkish relationship in this fashion. And although Tashan’s sentiments are representative of public sentiment, they are milder by comparison. For instance, a 2005 potboiler imagining a war between the United States and Turkey in northern Iraq proved wildly popular among Turks, more than 80% of whom also opined in a 2005 survey that American policies in their region endangered Turkey’s security.

**\*\*Links- Alliance Good**

Link- Generic

Withdrawing our military presence in Turkey strains the alliance

Larrabee 10 (F. Stephen, senior staff member of RAND, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND\_MG899.pdf)

The security relationship remains important for Turkey as well. Turkey lives in a tough and volatile neighborhood and has disputes with several neighbors (i.e., Syria, Iraq, Greece, and Armenia). It also is within range of missiles fired from Iran and Iraq. Thus, Turkey views its security relationship with the United States as an important insurance policy against its growing exposure to risks coming from the Middle East. Although U.S. involvement in the Middle East also entails risks for Turkey, on balance, Turkey benefits from the U.S. military presence in adjacent regions.

A failure to defend Turkey has empirically been a blow to relations

Larrabee 10 (F. Stephen, senior staff member of RAND, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND\_MG899.pdf)

Despite the end of the Cold War, Turkey has powerful reasons for wanting to maintain close security links to the United States. However, Turkish perceptions of the benefits of ties to the United States have shifted markedly in the last several decades. During the Cold War, the feeling that Turkey derived important benefits from its security relationship with the United States was widespread among the Turkish elite and general population alike. This perception began to change after the Cyprus crisis in 1963– 1964. The famous “Johnson letter”—in which President Lyndon Johnson warned that the United States might not come to Turkey’s defense if Turkish intervention in Cyprus provoked a Soviet response—came as a shock to the Turks. The crisis underscored that there were costs associated with being so heavily dependent on the United States, and it prompted an effort by Ankara to broaden its security ties and reduce its dependence on Washington. The perception that there were important costs attached to maintaining close security ties to the United States was reinforced in 1975, when the United States imposed an arms embargo on Turkey in response to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The embargo was regarded by Turkey as a slap in the face to a loyal ally and led to a sharp deterioration of U.S.-Turkish relations. It is still remembered with bitterness today, coloring Turkish attitudes about the degree to which the United States can be considered a reliable ally. These crises put severe strains on the U.S.-Turkish partnership and prompted Turkey to begin to diversify its foreign policy and reduce its dependence on the United States for its security. However, this effort to diversify its foreign policy was mitigated by the constraints imposed by the Cold War. Faced with a residual Soviet threat, both sides felt the need to maintain a strong security partnership.

Link- Generic

Withdrawing from Turkey sends a signal that we don’t want to cooperate

Committee on International Relations 5 (5/11, https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/21205.pdf&pli=1)

Ms. BARAN. I know you want to move to the next question, but very briefly let me remark on the transition period. I think since the end of the Cold War this has been a transitional relationship. I think regardless of who was right or whether it was a mistake, March 1 did lead to a lot of people in America to question whether Turkey is going to be as essential for the United States as it used to be, not only because of possible changes in Iraq, where you might have a secular democratic Iraq, but also because Turkey has mainly provided a military base assistance and now we see that Romania, Uzbekistan and many other countries could provide the same kind of assistance. So from the United States perspective, Turkey may not be as essential as far as its location and its ability to cooperate on key military operations. I think, though, if we look at why U.S. Administration after Administration has supported Turkey’s entry into the EU, it is to make sure that Turkey is going to be safely anchored in the Western World, in the Western institutions. I think what we have seen is since the Erdogan Government took office and until the ‘‘yes’’ vote from the EU, there was a roadmap, which was in part put together by the United States, and Turkey received the EU ‘‘yes’’ vote with American support.

Turkey supports US presence (?)

IDA 2 (Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370 http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954.)

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In Figure V-1, we describe Greece and Turkey as neutral (or indifferent) with respect to a continuous US military presence in-country. Of course, both now host some such presence. As will be discussed below, neither Greek nor Turk experts seemed to see a threat against which a US military presence is helpful. On the other hand, in the context of supporting OEF, both indicated willingness to host additional US military presence, if asked. Among Greeks we found an emphasis on whether the request was in a NATO context.

Turkey values US presence—checks regional conflict

IDA 2 (Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370 http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954.)

By “irregular and/or internal” threats we mean terrorism, international crime, insurgencies, refugee flows, and generalized worry about coercion or aggression short of a conventional attack. Turkey provides a good example. It faces a Kurd insurgency that has employed terrorism. Refugees are flowing in from the Balkans, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. It views Russia as destabilizing the Caucasus but not attacking Turkey directly. Turkey does not seem to worry about Iran, Syria, or Iraq. Turkey and Greece remain at loggerheads over issues in various places, including Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, but neither seems to fear a conventional attack by the other. Both countries worry about their ethnic brethren in Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, and Mid-Eastern locales rife with conflict. Greece also worries about crime, terrorism, and refugee flows, but much less intensely than Turkey. While both countries were neutral with respect to US military presence in their countries, including US naval presence in the Aegean Sea, they valued it in the region broadly

Link- TNWs

Turkey prefers the presence of TNWs- commitment to burden sharing

Kibaroglu 10 (Mustafa, fellowship at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Arms Control Today, June, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010\_06/Kibaroglu#bio)

A second reason for Turkey to host U.S. nuclear weapons has been the burden-sharing principle within the alliance. Turkey has strongly subscribed to this principle since it joined NATO in 1952. In fact, Turkey had already displayed unequivocally its willingness to share the burden of defending the interests of the Western alliance by committing a significant number of troops to the Korean War in 1950, even before NATO membership was in sight. Yet, if Turkey is likely to be left as the only country, or one of only two countries, where U.S. nuclear weapons will still be deployed after a possible withdrawal of these weapons from other allies and no other NATO country will be willing to assume the burden of hosting nuclear weapons, Turkey may very well insist that the weapons be sent back to the United States. From Turkey’s current standpoint, this would not be the desired outcome of the current deliberations within the alliance. According to a Turkish official, the principle of burden sharing should not be diluted. To live up to their commitment to solidarity, which was reaffirmed in Tallinn, the five countries that currently host these weapons should continue to do so for the foreseeable future, the official said.[20] Deterrence Against Whom? Because of the view that NATO’s deterrent will be more credible with the presence of forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons in the allied territories in Europe, Turkish diplomats believe that the burden of hosting these weapons should continue to be shared collectively among five allies, as has been the case over the last several decades. Even if all of Turkey’s allies accept this proposal and act accordingly, Turkey will still face a dilemma in its foreign and security policies if it sees the hosting of U.S. nuclear weapons as the only way for it to fulfill its burden-sharing obligations. Ankara’s continuing support for the presence of the U.S. weapons on Turkish territory could be justified only if there were a threat from the military capabilities of Turkey’s neighbors, the two most significant of which would be Iran and Syria, and if the Western allies shared that threat assessment. There can be no other meaningful scenario that would justify Turkey’s policy of retaining U.S. nuclear weapons on its territory as well as leaving the door open for the deployment of U.S. missile defenses in Turkey in the future. Recent trends, however, appear to be moving from such a threat assessment by Turkey. Over the last few years, Turkey has experienced an unprecedented rapprochement with its Middle Eastern neighbors.

Link- TNWs

Removing TNWs shakes Turkey’s faith in the alliance

Bell and Loehrke 9 (Alexandra and Benjamin, Special Assistant to the President, Research Assistant at the Ploughshares Fund, 10/23, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey)

Those who hold this view believe that nuclear sharing is both symbolic of alliance cohesion and a demonstration of how the United States and NATO have committed to defending each other in the event of an attack. They argue that removing the weapons would dangerously undermine such cohesion and raise questions about how committed Washington is to its NATO allies. But NATO's post-Cold War struggles with cohesion are a result of far more than disagreement over tactical nuclear deployments. NATO has given Turkey plenty of reasons to doubt its members' commitment to Ankara on several recent occasions. For example, before both Iraq wars, some NATO members hesitated to provide Turkey with air defenses or to assist it with displaced persons who had fled into its territory. Moreover, Turkey, which values NATO as a direct connection to Washington, witnessed the United States completely ignore its vehement opposition to the most recent Iraq War. Additionally, Ankara is dismayed by the reluctance of some of its NATO allies to label the Kurdistan Workers' Party, which has caused violent chaos along the Turkish border, as a terrorist organization. Then there is the issue of Tehran's nuclear program, which seriously complicates any discussion of the United States removing its tactical nuclear weapons from Turkey. An Iranian nuclear capability could spark an arms race in the Middle East and bring about a "proliferation cascade," which could cause Turkey to reconsider its nuclear options--especially if the United States pulls its nuclear weapons from Incirlik. When asked directly about its response to an Iranian nuclear weapon, a high-ranking Foreign Ministry official said that Turkey would immediately arm itself with a bomb. This isn't Ankara's official policy, but it seems to indicate a general feeling among its leaders. Whether Turkey is primarily concerned about security or prestige, the bottom line is that it would not sit idly by as Iran established a regional hegemony.

Turkey’s security hinges on a robust US nuclear presence – any cuts could spark overreaction.

Guray 1 [Al, First Lieutenant, Turkish Army, Turkish military Academy, Doctoral Thesis. “Turkey’s response to threats of weapons of mass destruction” Naval Post Graduate School, December, 2001, <http://theses.nps.navy.mil/Thesis_01dec_Al.pdf>]

Dramatic changes have occurred in Turkey’s security environment, but NATO’s security guarantees and **U.S. extended deterrence commitments with a robust nuclear presence in Turkey remain essential elements of Turkey’s security.** Therefore, **NATO’s security guarantees**, which **hinge ultimately on the U.S. nuclear presence and U.S. extended deterrence commitments in Europe**, **and Turkey’s own national defense and deterrence posture must remain convincing and credible to Turkey and to nations that possess WMD and potential WMD proliferators in the region.** As Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, a prominent professor of international relations at Bilkent University of Ankara, has observed, “Turkey needs to be reassured that it would be protected against proliferation if and when it indeed occurs.”379

Link- TNWs

Turkey would not like removal of TNWs—they have no nuclear deterrent

Lunn 10 (Simon, March, http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/NATOs\_Nuclear\_Dilemma.pdf)

Officials also emphasised that the presence of DCA with American nuclear warheads was an important element of reassurance for Turkey, and in their view obviated the need for the development by Turkey of a national nuclear deterrent. Turkey, therefore, would be against their removal. A senior Turkish official concurred that they would like to keep US warheads in Europe in sufficient numbers ‘not for ourselves per se but for the Alliance’. He added, however, that speculations in the press and academia on Turkish nuclear ambitions were unrealistic. Turkey was an NPT signatory and had no such ambitions. They needed to diversify energy and take advantage of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Turkey shared President Obama’s goal as the ultimate aim, but this goal had to take into account current realities. The situation in the region has given additional strategic relevance to the NATO base at İncirlik, where it is reported American nuclear warheads are maintained. One Alliance official suggested that because weapons of mass destruction were an issue in the region, the presence of DCA could also provide an effective crisis management tool – although he did not elaborate on what sort of a role this would be. The use of DCA as a collective deterrent or crisis management capability for regional threats is increasingly mentioned. However, according to officials, the feasibility and credibility of such a posture and its implications has received little indepth study or discussion.

Absent TNWs Turkey would develop its own nuclear deterrent and align with Iran

Bloom 6/9 (Oliver, CSIS, http://csis.org/blog/turkeys-new-direction

And while a nuclear-armed Iran would certainly be a concern for Turkey and could spark their own nuclear development, Turkey’s own economic interests in Iran may be a higher priority. NiacINsight blog noted that Turkey, whose exports to Iran have increased 800 percent under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, also has an interest in preventing sanctions. Turkey has been buying gas from the Islamic Republic below market prices. Turkey was so committed to its nuclear swap deal with Iran, in fact, that it voted against the newest round of UN sanctions. In a sense, Turkey is having its cake and eating it too. It is expanding its influence and economic ties in the Middle East and pursuing its only diplomatic course vis-à-vis Israel and Iran at the same time it relies on the United States’ and NATO’s security umbrella. Its independent diplomatic path regarding Iran sanctions builds credibility in the Mideast and asserts Turkish influence as a major global actor, but at the same time, it doesn’t have to deal with the consequences of diplomatic failure. Turkey can take comfort in the fact that should a nuclear-armed and more assertive Iran threaten Turkey’s security, it can rely on those U.S. and NATO guarantees. Interestingly, one of the primary arguments for keeping American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe has been to maintain the American and NATO commitment to Turkey, and dissuade it from developing a nuclear deterrent of its own. As the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists noted Nonetheless, it will be difficult to remove [American tactical nuclear weapons] from Turkey given Ankara's concerns about the Iranian nuclear program and its somewhat strained relationship with the United States.

Link- Turkey Arms Sales

Ending arm sales with Turkey turns them away from the US

Larrabee 10 (F. Stephen, senior staff member of RAND, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND\_MG899.pdf)

The general downturn in U.S.-Turkish relations has been reflected in defense and defense-industrial cooperation. In recent years, U.S. defense cooperation with Turkey has been marred by significant difficulties. Congress has held up a number of major weapon sales to Turkey due to Turkey’s human rights policy and its policy toward Cyprus. These delays have had a damaging impact on U.S.-Turkish defense cooperation. As a result, Turkey has begun to expand its defense relationships with other nations that have fewer procurement restrictions, particularly Israel and Russia. The U.S.-Turkish defense-industry relationship has two aspects: government-to-government purchases based on foreign-military sales and commercial sales in which U.S. firms have to compete with foreign rivals. The government-to-government sales have continued to develop reasonably well. Turkey is set to buy new fighter aircraft and related services worth $15 billion over the next 10–15 years, including 100 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, 30 F-16s, and the modernization of older Turkish F-16s.1 Commercial sales, however, have been declining. Until Sikorsky finalized a sale of 17 Seahawk helicopters in the fall of 2006, no U.S. firm had won a major direct commercial sale since 2002.2 Since 2006, Turkey decided to conclude a $2.7-billion deal with the Italian-British firm Augusta Westland for attack helicopters, and it has also decided to buy trainer aircraft and main battle tanks from South Korean firms. Many U.S. companies failed to bid on these projects, complaining that Turkish terms were not compatible with U.S. export requirements. Some of the problems in the defense-industry relationship— particularly delays due to Congress’s concerns about Turkey’s human rights record—have been on the U.S. side. Strict U.S. restrictions on technology transfer have also caused the Turks to shun U.S. weapon systems and turn to non-U.S. manufacturers, such as Israel and South Korea

Link – Presence k2 Allies\*\*

**US military presence is vital to relations**

**IDA, ‘2**. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

In the mid-1990s, **Zakheim** et al. [1996] **conducted an extensive assessment**. Based upon a variety of interviews with foreign representatives, they concluded that **US presence**, especially naval presence, **provides** strong assurance value to friends and allies **in** many parts **of the world**. The study team found that interviewees shared the view that **US military presence is crucial to preserving stability, which in turn is crucial to regional economic growth**, itself a US economic and national security interest. Many respondents were even more explicit about the linkage between military presence and the preservation, indeed enhancement, of their own and US economic interests. **This feeling was** said to be widespread throughout each of the regions. In 1995, **Thomason** et al. **found** two principal things: first, **US allies and friends indicated very clearly that they were more assured by greater, rather than less, US military presence**. Second, in some parts of the world (Western Europe and Korea) land-based presence was considered much more helpful, all things considered, than sea-based presence in providing assurance, whereas in other parts of the world (e.g., much of the Persian Gulf), just the opposite appeared to be true. Overall, friends and allies want help, presence, but on their own terms, which means, increasingly, as unobtrusively as possible in most instances; and they want to be recognized as political equals. [p. 8] As a part of the same study, Thomason et al. also conducted off-the-record interviews with approximately three dozen US security experts in the mid-1990s to assess the “assurance” and other values these experts assigned to various levels and types of US presence, power projection capability, and other factors (for a synopsis, see Thomason, 2001). Current and former Service chiefs, commanders in chief of Unified Commands, and other senior policy makers and diplomats were interviewed as to the effectiveness of various kinds of presence and other instruments of national power in promoting the principal objectives of presence. Overall, these **US decision-makers saw reassurance of friends and allies as a vital part of our foreign policy** and national security strategy. **They viewed reassurance as a complex, ongoing process**, calling for high-quality and, frequently, high-level attention. **They cited** continuous, face-to-face involvement and **relationships**—both military and civilian—**as necessary in establishing the trust and understanding that underpins strong** friendships, **partnerships, and coalitions**. Many of the interviewees noted that the establishment of an ongoing dialogue helps both parties to avoid misinterpreting one another’s intentions and contributes to an understanding of the way in which both parties think.

Link – Presence k2 Allies – AT: Turns\*\*

**Multiple reasons they can’t access a link turn –**

**Won’t work without compensation and consultation**

**IDA, ‘2**. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

**In discussions with over 50 representatives of 22 countries**1 **we found that US friends and allies were generally comfortable with current levels and forms of US military presence in their countries and reg**ions. In this chapter we summarize and assess— • These representatives’ attitudes regarding continuous US military presence levels in their countries and regions • Relations between these representatives’ views of security threats facing their countries and their attitudes regarding US military presence • Relation between their views of the need to deter a conventional military threat to their countries and their perspectives on the value of US military presence • The types of US military presence forces that they most valued, by country and region • The purposes for which they valued US military presence • US military presence (and related) activities that these representatives valued The chapter concludes, **with respect to potential changes in US military presence posture**, that latitude can be found to substitute less personnel-intensive forms of presence for the current ones. However, **to avoid undercutting the assurance objectives of US national security policy**, it cautions that **changes** in US presence numbers need to involve consultations with our allies and very likely will require compensatory changes in activities, capabilities, and non-military diplomacy.

**It paints a snapshot of uniqueness, while the link is an enduring trend**

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Looking at SEA/Australia, South Asia, and even some of SWA in Figure V-1, **we are not saying that all countries** in this great sweep **would unequivocally oppose a continuous in-country US military presence** of any kind. We do say that under the circumstances they foresee, almost all their **governments would** very much **prefer not to receive a** proposal from the US for a **continuous visible military presence** in their countries, and **if one is received, the shorter the proposed duration**, the better. Again, that does not mean opposition to all US military-related presence. For example, Australia clearly is willing to consider US use of its facilities, including training ranges and repair facilities; Singapore welcomes port visits and aircraft transits; and so on.

**Post-op tradeoffs fail**

**IDA, ‘2**. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

Second, **if there is no capability assessment, US earnests of mutual suffering and risk sharing may become salient for assurance** of the foreign expert. The **Korean affinity for boots on the ground clearly relates to this**. The European preference for boots on the ground may be colored by the intra-NATO debates on peacekeeping forces in the Balkans. **In our discussions with representatives of countries in which US military presence is valued, we also encountered an** unwillingness to consider **increased military technical or reinforcement capabilities as substitutes for numbers of US military personnel present**. This was rarely an explicit rejection of specific tradeoffs; rather, **it was either an early statement to the effect that nothing could substitute for physical presence or a dismissive comment or gesture when the idea of a tradeoff was raised.**

Link – Presence k2 Allies – AT: Turns\*\*

**Most experienced observers concur with the link**

**IDA, ‘2**. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

**Most experienced observers believe that US overseas military presence is effective** (to some degree) **in** strengthening deterrence, **assuring friends and allies, positioning the US to be able to protect key interests in crisis situations, stabilizing the security environment**, preserving an open international economic environment, **and retarding the spread of nuclear weapons**. The arguments and hypotheses of Colin Powell, Joseph Nye, Robert Art, Bradford Dismukes, and Richard Haass over the last decade are illustrative.

**Colin Powell concurs**

**IDA, ‘2**. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

**Colin Powell Writing in 1991** in Foreign Affairs, General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, offered an eloquent statement of the importance of a continuing overseas military presence. **Our forward presence is a given—to signal our commitment to our allies and to give second thoughts to any disturber of the peace**…. Economic power is essential; political and diplomatic skills are needed; the power of our beliefs and values is fundamental to any success we might achieve; but **the presence of our arms to buttres**s these **other elements is as critical to us as the freedom we so adore.** [p. 36]

**The Joint Chiefs concur**

**IDA, ‘2**. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of

Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

QDR 2001 is a recent official manifestation of a long-standing general hypothesis regarding US military presence activities: that they can and regularly do help promote fundamental security objectives of the nation. Another illustration of this kind of belief and hypothesis appears in a recent doctrinal publication of the Joint Staff: “**In peacetime, the Armed Forces of the United States help to deter potential aggressors from using violence to achieve their aims. Forward presence activities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances**, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US influence and access.”

Link – Presence k2 Allies – XT

**Military presence is crucial to allied assurances – the 1NC IDA evidence cites two wide-reaching, long-term studies that show near-universal backing for US presence**

**Presence is vital to relationship building – without it, trust collapses**

**IDA, ‘2**. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

Our **interlocutors valued relationships with Americans at all levels**. Thus, in addition to high-level visits, **presence activities** of many kinds **were valued in large measure for their role in relationship building**. In particular, building personal relationships was seen by foreign experts as a co-equal goal for many activities that are seen from the US side as focused mainly on substantive training. **One of our interlocutors characterized the goal of relationship building as developing a capability so that when problems arise one can move quickly with people who are already known quantities to solve the problems**. Most interlocutors, however, were not precise, seeing relationship building in terms of a more diffuse comfort level. International military education and training (IMET), Partnership for Peace (PfP), and similar programs were seen as valuable as much for their relationship building aspects as for substantive learning. Exchange programs and combined exercises also were seen as important relationship building activities.

**The opposition to the plan is uniform and unforgiving**

**IDA, ‘2**. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

Overall, **the kinds of activities described here were clearly highly valued by essentially all our friends and allies**. However, **among allies where US military forces are present, no one volunteered that there is a tradeoff between activities and numbers in US military presence**. **In** nearly all **cases our interlocutors were** clearly opposed to any reductions **and** had no interest in discussing **what might compensate for reduced numbers**. It seems clear, however, that if numbers are to be reduced, in the vast majority of cases these findings on activities can point the way to a less painful process if they are taken into account. At a minimum, consultation should be a part of the process. In general, the US should consider significant tailored increases in the areas of relationship building and institutional interoperability to compensate, at least in part, for any reductions in numbers.

**Military presence is key to the most important and enduring foreign relationships**

**IDA, ‘2**. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

There was broad agreement that **one of the highest payoffs of** past **US military presence** activities **has been the establishment of favorable long-term relationships with key foreign officials. In many cases these relationships were initially established years before the foreign officials rose to high positions. The value of such relationships has repeatly been proven when the US has needed to quickly establish military and diplomatic coalitions and to gain access to operating bases and sources of supply**. The web of such relationships was also cited as an effective vehicle for assuring friends and allies of continuing US interest in their security situations. As one official said, “We need US Army generals to visit countries that are being run by generals.”

Link – Presence k2 Allies – XT

**Troops are a key expression of commitment and will – senior US decision-makers agree**

**IDA, ‘2**. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

**Among** these **senior US decision-makers, a firm, widely shared belief was evident**: strong, continuous, **high-quality personal level** interactions and **relationships are necessary** to promote the reassurance objective. **But they are not sufficient. They need to be combined with some regular, credible evidence of** US will and ability **to be there to help when needed**. On this latter point, however, **no real consensus was evident regarding the** essentiality of any one particular **level** (or type) **of presence forces for effective reassurance.** This finding may be explained in part by the possibility that what respondents viewed as “credible” may have been—at least broadly—a function of what they viewed as either the current or latent threat level in a particular region at the time. It may also have been due to genuine uncertainty as to what “works” to offset various perceived threat levels.

Presence k2 Middle East

**Withdrawing presence causes severe political backlash**

**IDA, ‘2**. Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954>.

**As for the Middle East, the NDU** study **emphasized** a likely increasing threat to maritime forces there, **a need for better** TMD, **force protection**, more WMD detectors, an increase in naval presence (especially TMD-capable surface ships), and a possible shift to more amphibious forces in lieu of some ground forces in the region. Flournoy’s group considered the value of increasing long-range strike capabilities (from Diego Garcia) as well, but warned that **a “reduction in visible presence” in the region could have “a** severe and deleterious political effect, **eroding both deterrence and regional support.” The threat environment in the Middle East was said to be increasingly likely to feature WMD;** the study team expressed serious concerns regarding WMD attacks on US forces, host nation citizens and others, including Host Nation Support (HNS) personnel. Overall, the study concluded that the long-term US ground presence prospects in the region are quite uncertain.

\*\*Links- Alliance Bad

Link- Generic Turkey

Withdrawing military presence strengthens relations with Turkey- perceived as adapting to the security climate

Larrabee 10 (F. Stephen, senior staff member of RAND, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND\_MG899.pdf)

To hedge against a serious deterioration of U.S.-Turkish relations that could result in severe constraints on the use of Turkish bases or denial of their use altogether, the United States could gradually reduce its military presence in Turkey and conduct some of the missions currently carried out in Turkey from other friendly or allied countries in the region, such as Kuwait or Qatar. Doing so could have several benefits. It could reduce popular Turkish resentment against the U.S. military presence and diminish anti-Americanism in Turkey, while still allowing the United States to continue to carry out most of the current missions being performed at İncirlik and other facilities in Turkey. Such a move could be portrayed as an adjustment to the new security requirement arising after the end of the Cold War and as part of the overall Global Posture Review initiated by the Bush administration

Link- Iraq

Iraq deployment is the critical factor in US-Turkey relations- withdrawal would strengthen the alliance

Gordon and Taspinar 6 (Philip and Omer, senior fellow in foreign policy studies, director of the Turkey program at Brookings, The Washington Quarterly, 23:3, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/articles/2006/summer_turkey_gordon/20060525.pdf>)

The most troubling aspect of Turkey’s relations with the West is that Ankara no longer has a fallback U.S. option in case its relations with the EU sour. Turkish-U.S. relations have become a casualty of the war in Iraq. U.S. anger over the Turkish parliament’s March 1, 2003, refusal to allow U.S. forces access to Turkish territory for the invasion and Turkish frustration over U.S. support for Iraqi Kurds have led to unprecedented mutual resentment between Ankara and Washington. Numerous opinion polls confirm that growing numbers of Turks perceive their NATO ally as a security problem rather than a strategic partner. A 2005 BBC poll, for example, found that 82 percent of Turks considered U.S. policies in the Middle East as a threat to peace and security.5 In analyzing Turkey’s frustration with the United States, one needs to go beyond the Bush administration’s negative global image. The German Marshall Fund’s May 2005 transatlantic survey, for example, showed that although anti-Americanism is in relative decline in Europe, the trend in Turkey is in the opposite direction.6

Alliance is declining due to Iraq- withdrawal reverses the trend

Menon and Wimbush 7 (Rajan, Prof of International Relations, S. Enders, Director of Center for Future Security Strategies, *Survival* Vol. 49 No. 2, http://www.newamerica.net/files/nafmigration/Menon\_and\_Wimbush\_US\_Turkey\_Alliance\_Survival\_2007.pdf)

The divergence between Turkish and American perspectives resonates among all of Turkey's political constituencies. American popularity, particularly in the aftermath of the Iraq War, is at an all-time low and the notion that the United States seeks to weaken, even dismember, Turkey is commonplace, no matter how far fetched this may seem to Americans. The Bush administration, for its part, expected cooperation from a NATO ally in the run-up to the war against Iraq and regarded the Turkish parliament's vote disallowing US forces to use southeastern Turkey to open a second front against Saddam Hussein's armed forces as tantamount to betrayal. Ankara is now convinced that Washington seeks to punish it for a decision based not on animus toward the United States but on vital national interests, specifically the fear that allowing US forces to open an additional front would implicate Turkey in a war that was widely unpopular, especially in the Muslim world, and exacerbate problems in its Kurdish-populated southeast.

Link- Iraq

Iraq is poisoning the US-Turkey alliance- withdrawal would ease tensions

Boyer and Katulis 8 (Spencer, Director of International Law and Diplomacy at the Center for American Progress and Brian, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, December, Center for American Progress, <http://www.turkey-now.org/db/Docs/CAP_turkey.pdf>)

A major turn in U.S.-Turkish relations came during the lead-up to America’s 2003 invasion of Iraq. The Turkish parliament unexpectedly rejected a measure that would have allowed for the transit of U.S. troops through Turkish territory into northern Iraq.26 From the perspective of many Turks, Saddam Hussein, whom the United States deemed to be an unacceptable risk to international security, did not pose a real threat to Ankara. Furthermore, Turks largely had a negative impression of U.S. action in Iraq after the first Gulf War, which left Turkey with economic losses and greater tensions with the PKK in northern Iraq.27 Many Turks also believed that an Iraq without a dictator would be a far more difficult country with which to interact.28 Some Turks calculated that the lack of cooperation on the military front might actually prevent the United States from invading Iraq in the first place. Turkish politicians feared the establishment of a federated or independent Kurdish state and were focused on maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq.29 Instead of heeding Turkey’s warnings against invasion, the Bush administration pushed ahead with war. It later responded to Turkey’s rejection of military cooperation by withdrawing an offer of aid to the country.30 In general, Turkey’s actions generated harsh feelings among U.S. policymakers who were shocked by the parliament’s decision, and viewed Turkish actions as those of a disloyal ally. The United States even turned down a Turkish offer later in the year to deploy Turkish forces to Iraq to assist with reconstruction.31 Tensions between Turkey and the United States over Iraq were heightened in July 2003 when reports surfaced that 11 Turkish Special Forces officers and others were detained for allegedly attempting to assassinate Kurdish political figures.32 U.S. forces acted on what they believed to be compelling evidence that terrorists would attempt to assassinate the Kurdish Governor of Kirkuk (in order to weaken the Kurds in the north), and raided a Turkish liaison office in Sulaymaniyah in northern Iraq where the operation was supposedly being planned.33 International and Turkish press reports of the raid, which included handcuff s and sacks over the alleged perpetrators’ heads, put the U.S. military on the defensive.34 The Turkish government was outraged and demanded the release of the detained Special Forces personnel. Senior U.S. administration officials, including Vice President Richard Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, worked to calm the volatile situation.35 After a joint investigation of the incident, both the United States and Turkey expressed regret over the situation.36 This incident further damaged U.S.-Turkish relations. The humiliation of Turkish troops reinforced a perception among the Turkish people and military that the United States should not be counted on as a trusted friend.37 In the end, the war in Iraq helped create a new breed of anti- American stereotypes in Turkey. Turks praised Prime Minister Erdogan for standing up to the “American bully,” and supported his decision to keep Turkey out of Iraq once the United States became bogged down.38 Ultimately, Turkey saw the war as a demonstration that the United States did not truly care about Turkey’s security concerns, and was not willing to listen to Ankara’s advice about the regional perils of invading Iraq.

Link- Iraq

Turkey perceives the invasion of Iraq as abandoning its security—withdrawing from Iraq saves the alliance

Cook and Sherwood-Randall 6 (Steven, expert on Arab and Turkish politics, and Elizabeth, research scholar at Stanford, Council on Foreign Relations, No. 15, June)

The United States and Turkey agree on two primary principles regarding Iraq policy: The disintegration of Iraq into three independent states is not in the interest of either country, and the PKK is a terrorist organization. In fact, Washington has long urged its European partners to identify the PKK as such. Beyond these two principles, however, Washington and Ankara have profound disagreements. Turkish popular discontent with the United States regarding Iraq is undergirded by the economic costs Turkey had to bear resulting from the international sanctions imposed on Iraq between 1990 and 2003 as well as the twin issues of Kurdish independence and the PKK. Ankara argues that the international isolation of Iraq, which prior to the first Gulf War was Turkey’s largest trading partner, cost the Turkish treasury an estimated $35 billion and damaged the local economy of the region bordering Iraq—one of the most underdeveloped in Turkey. By the late 1990s, although the Turkish government officially abided by the sanctions regime, brisk cross-border trade took place between Turkey and Iraq. In the run-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Turkish public feared that Turkey would pay a huge price in terms of trade and tourism revenues as a result of the invasion. Turks believe that the Bush administration committed two additional sins regarding Iraq. First, in the run-up to the war, Washington summarily dismissed Ankara’s warnings about the consequences of invading Iraq. Second, as events have confirmed Turkey’s grave misgivings about the war, Turks believe the United States has not taken sufficient care to address Turkey’s security concerns. As a result, both opinion leaders and average Turks have drawn the conclusion that Washington does not support Ankara in Turkey’s struggle with the PKK and that the United States supports (despite its protestations to the contrary) an independent Kurdistan. These widely held views have damaged the standing of pro-American Turkish officials and politicians as well as the general stature of the United States among the Turkish public.

Withdrawing from Iraq sends a signal that we value the alliance

Mlade 4 (Nicole, Senior Policy Analyst for National Security at the Center for American Progress, 12/17, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2004/12/b273815.html

However, the U.S.-Turkey relationship has lost the strength and warmth of the past. The Iraq War – the single most explosive issue – has been terribly unpopular among the Turkish public= The Turkish parliament voted to disallow the U.S. military to launch the invasion of Iraq, a border country, from Turkish soil. In November 2004, the chairman of the parliamentary human rights commission called U.S. activity in Iraq "genocide." The Iraq War also heightened concerns in Turkey that its own Kurdish population will reinvigorate efforts for an independent homeland. In fact, the Turks have often felt that the United States does not appreciate Turkey or recognize its interests, and are concerned that it will depart Iraq and leave an independent Kurdistan. They have memories of 1991, when they suffered economically by abiding by UN sanctions on Iraq. They also remember the 1960s, when they agreed to host Atlas missiles and risk provoking the Soviet Union, only to see the United States walk away as a trade-off following the Cuban Missile Crisis. Now the United States has a chance to fortify its relationship with Turkey. The Bush administration must find ways to do this that do not further aggravate Turkish public opinion or visibly interfere in the accession question. The administration has several opportunities before it.

Link- Iraq

Iraq is the reason the alliance is weak- withdrawal helps the alliance

Gun 8 (Mustafa, Research Coordinator at Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies, http://www.bilgestrateji.com/store/dergi2/Mustafa.pdf)

President Bush declared the US manner against terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11 in Manichean. The well known quota of President Bush is “if you are not with us, you are against us.” That speech was a result of stability to terrorism. Nonetheless, that speech was hard to digest by some Muslim countries. Kemalists23 and Islamists didn’t like this perspective due to different reasons.24 Due to Turkey’s strategic importance for Iraq war, the US wanted to use Turkish territory to defeat Saddam Hussein. The deterioration of the US-Turkish relations began over this problem. Turkish civil, military, and politic societies didn’t agree about opening the Iraq border to the US troops to access Iraq because of fear of independent Kurdish state, economic results, and of course uncontrolled the PKK in Northern Iraq. Ankara offered to the US to send 20,000 Turkish troops to help reconstruction, yet the US didn’t agree with Turks and ignored Turkish anxieties on Northern Iraq.25 Before the voting, AKP administration, higher military generals and President Ahmet Necdet Sezer had often met to comprehend and finalize desire of the US on Iraqi-Turkish border. Turkey also wanted to get 92 billion dollars because of compensation of effect of Iraq war on Turkish economy. But, Turkey was refused again by Bush administration. Turkey had not yet defeated its anxieties and its anxieties had always been ignored by the US. Both Turkish civil society and opposition party and some AKP members didn’t definitely want the US troops in the Turkish border. Turkish Military was hesitant about this intervention trough Turkish border. Therefore, on 1 March 2003, Turkish Grand National Assembly refused the request of Bush administration to use Turkish territory in order to access to Iraq.26 After the repair diplomacy, Turkey wasn’t convinced to open border to American troops. As a result, the US was really shocked because Bush administration didn’t assume such decision of Turkish side. The US had to choose a different way to access Iraq, and that meant much money and less efficiency of operation. As expected, The US and Turkish relations got worse as never been before. In addition to this crisis, Turkish Special Force was detained by the US soldier on 4 July 2003 in Suleymaniah, Northern Iraq. Hence, Turkey and the United States were living the worst relationship period in their history.27 As a consequence of the detention of Turkish soldiers in Northern Iraq, public opinion about Bush administration was also deteriorated.28 Turkish people saw America as second “best friend” in a widely public poll in 2002. The first friend was “nobody” at 33 percent, and second friend was the “US” at 27 percent.29 In two years after Iraq intervention, another poll which shows public opinion about the US- Turkey relations was conducted in Ankara in 2005. The result of survey was basically: 91 percent of Turkish public does not approve Bush policies. Only 0.5 percent approves George W. Bush’s policies.

Link- Kurd Killing

Turkey is pursuing Kurd terrorism into Iraq

Fraser 6/16 (Suzan, Associated Press writer, Newstimes.com, http://www.newstimes.com/news/article/Military-Turkish-troops-cross-into-northern-Iraq-525704.php)

Turkey sent hundreds of elite troops into northern Iraq on Wednesday to chase Kurdish guerrillas in an operation that could increase tensions within the region. The soldiers killed four rebels escaping after a failed attack on a Turkish unit near the border, the Turkish military said. It did not say when the troops, who were supported by Turkish warplanes, would withdraw. But private NTV television, without citing any sources, said the soldiers were on their way back to Turkey. The military has repeatedly staged air and ground assaults against Kurdish rebel bases in northern Iraq. The last major incursion was in February 2008, when thousands of ground forces staged a weeklong offensive into Iraq that worried Iraqi Kurds. Iraqi Kurds have been cooperating with Turkey in its fight against the rebels of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, sharing intelligence on the guerrillas' movements and positions. However, the latest incursion could trigger protests from Baghdad and the semiautonomous Iraqi Kurdish region. The incursion comes as the rebels have stepped up attacks in Turkey, killing more than 30 soldiers in recent months and causing public outrage. The conflict has killed some 40,000 people since it began in 1984. Many PKK guerrillas shelter in the mountains of neighboring Iraq, crossing the border for hit-and-run assaults. The group is considered a terrorist organization by both the European Union and United States. The public fury and escalating military response threaten to derail an already faltering government effort to defuse the insurgency by granting unprecedented cultural and political freedoms to Turkey's Kurds, the country's largest minority group.

Continued PKK strikes will lead Turkey to cross the Iraq border—and spark a resurgence of the PKK in Turkey

Parris 7 (Mark, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/0706turkey\_parris.aspx)

Turkey's top general said again last week he would like to cross Turkey's border with Iraq to strike terrorist camps of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). Leaders of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's ruling AK Party (which its critics label "Islamist") have publicly suggested an incursion is possible before Turkey's July 22 general elections. Will Turkey shoot? Maybe. Turkey has a genuine terrorism problem. Over the last 18 months, terrorist attacks have exacted a steady and rising toll among Turkish security forces and civilians. A U.S.-Turkish-Iraqi mechanism created to squeeze the PKK in northern Iraq has produced few visible results. It is widely viewed in Turkey as a palliative designed to keep the Turkish army on its side of the border. Turkish forces along that border have been reinforced and Turkish diplomats have shared with international organizations and third countries Turkey's case for unilateral action. It appears Ankara is on a hair trigger. But there is a subtext in Turkey's current debate on how to deal with the PKK that has been largely missed in Western media coverage of Turkish saber rattling. There are good reasons why Turkey's generals may not, in fact, be anxious to cross the border. And the push-pull between the AKP and its secular critics over who should take responsibility for ordering such an operation has a strong whiff of election politics. A close reading of comments by Turkey's Chief of Staff suggests he, at least, understands that hitting PKK sanctuaries in Iraqi Kurdistan, whatever its military value, is not without serious risks. He has explicitly mused on the difficulty in defining the mission and on potential unintended consequences. How to declare "success" against so illusive a foe? What if Massoud Barzani's peshmerga shoot back? He has not articulated, but cannot have failed to realize, other likely downsides: sparking an actual increase in terror inside Turkey by a PKK anxious to show it is still in business; jeopardizing quiet but significant U.S. intelligence and other cooperation against the PKK. Most importantly, the generals must know that intervention in Iraq could drive the United States and Mr. Barzani closer together in the run-up to this fall's referendum on the status of Kirkuk. Postponing the referendum is among Ankara's highest strategic priorities. Turks hope a Bush administration reaching a pivotal moment in its "surge" will ultimately prevail upon Mr. Barzani to defer the poll. But if the Americans have used capital with Iraqi Kurds to manage the consequences of a Turkish incursion, they may find Mr. Barzani harder to handle when they turn to Kirkuk.

Link- Afghanistan

Withdrawal from Afghanistan strengthens the alliance- Turkish commitment to the conflict drains its fight against the PKK

Hyland 8 (Frank, served in the Central Intelligence Agency's Counter-Terrorist Center, 2/13, Terrorism Focus Vol. 5 No. 6, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no\_cache=1&tx\_ttnews%5Btt\_news%5D=4723)

Relations between the United States and Turkey encountered a new obstacle in recent days. The latest disagreement comes, somewhat surprisingly, amid a period of overall warming and increased military and diplomatic cooperation between the two long-time NATO allies. The obstacle comes in the form of a request by the United States for an increase in the number of Turkish troops committed to the Afghan theater of operations. Most important is a request to change the mission of those troops from a presence only in and around Kabul to deployment in Afghanistan’s south and east, and from permission to fire only in self defense to a more active role in combat missions against al-Qaeda and the resurgent Taliban. The Turkish press has called the request a quid pro quo for U.S. real-time intelligence assistance in Turkey’s campaign against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) bases in northern Iraq (Hürriyet, February 8). Following cordial meetings between Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and President Bush last November and additional sessions with other high-ranking Turkish figures such as President Abdullah Gül and General Ergin Saygun, deputy chief of the Turkish Armed Forces, the United States began providing real-time intelligence on PKK activities and positions to the Turkish military (Turkish Daily News, November 9, 2007). Subsequent pinpoint bombing missions by the Turkish Air Force were successful in reducing the PKK threat to Turkey (Today’s Zaman, February 7). The U.S. request for an alteration in the mission of Turkish troops in Afghanistan, notwithstanding the context of vital U.S. assistance against the PKK, will likely be viewed by Turkey as unreasonable at this time, at least partly due to existing Turkish military commitments in its fight against the PKK in southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq (BBC, February 8). Following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was assembled for a long-term presence in the country. ISAF now numbers 42,000 troops in Afghanistan, with contingents from all 26 NATO member nations as well as Australia and a number of other non-NATO members (Afghan News, January 30). Turkey has promoted its interests over the years by contributing military forces to efforts outside its borders alongside its NATO allies. At least partly in pursuit of its drive to join the European Union, for example, Turkish troops served in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (Zaman, September 23, 2006). Turkey is the only Muslim nation with troops under the NATO flag in Afghanistan, though non-NATO members Albania and Jordan both provide small ISAF contingents. Turkey has twice led ISAF in Afghanistan and its 1,000-plus troops are engaged primarily in the reconstruction and enhancement of Afghanistan’s infrastructure as well as the training of Afghan police forces. It should also be noted that Turkey is not the only NATO ally balking at an expanded role in Afghanistan. Germany, Italy and Spain have also rebuffed the U.S. request to send additional forces to augment troops from the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia and the Netherlands, which currently see most of the combat in Afghanistan’s restive southern provinces (Alalam, February 9). The refusals are made more serious by the Canadian threat to pull its 2,500 troops out of Afghanistan when its present mandate expires in 2009 unless other NATO allies take on a greater share of the fighting in the south (Toronto Star, February 9). The resurgence of the Taliban in the south of Afghanistan—coupled with the refusal of several NATO allies to allow their troops to deploy to the south—presents a frustrating situation for military commanders there. With 26,000 U.S. troops deployed in Afghanistan as either part of ISAF or under independent U.S. command, Washington is well aware of the strong hand it brings to negotiations with Turkey, considering the latter’s need to locate and track PKK guerrillas in support of Turkish military operations. The PKK’s 2007 campaign against Turkey enjoyed considerable success, with a multi-front strategy that combined urban attacks in Turkey’s cities with hit-and-run guerrilla attacks in the southeast (see Terrorism Focus, November 6, 2007). Added to the latter campaign was an increased PKK use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), a tactic that resulted in a rising number of killed and wounded Turkish troops that alarmed both ordinary Turkish citizens and the national leadership, civilian and military. The U.S. decision to give real-time intelligence on northern Iraq to the Turkish military resulted in considerable discontent among the political leadership in Baghdad and the Kurdish Regional Government of northern Iraq. In turn, Turkey’s position and initial response to the United States should come as no surprise to Washington. As noted, it required and continues to require considerable courage for Turkey to provide military forces to a largely Western and non-Muslim occupation of a Muslim nation. Turkey is, in effect, walking a religious and cultural tightrope through its participation in ISAF. Weighing heavily on the side of providing additional troops is al-Qaeda’s decision to carry out a series of bombing attacks in Istanbul in 2003 that killed almost 60 people and wounded nearly 700 (see Terrorism Focus, June 12, 2007). Turkey undoubtedly appreciated the U.S. decision to provide actionable intelligence on the PKK at a time when its troops were being killed and wounded in mounting numbers, but may remain unreceptive to this new appeal unless the United States explicitly decouples the enhanced intelligence capability from the request for more troops in Afghanistan

Link- Afghanistan

War in Afghanistan hurts relations- troop commitment

Asbarez 9 (12/3, Asbarez.com, http://asbarez.com/74149/turkey-refuses-us-request-for-combat-troops-in-afghanistan/)

ANKARA (Hurriyet)–Turkish troops in Afghanistan will not engage in combat with the Taliban, Turkey’s defense minister and diplomats emphasized on Thursday in reaction to the United States’ request for extra soldiers for ‘flexible’ missions. Ankara responded coolly late Wednesday to the United States’ request for more Turkish forces to be deployed to Afghanistan as officials emphasized the country’s policy of keeping its troops out of combat in the war-torn country. U.S. President Barack Obama’s call for NATO allies to dispatch more soldiers came only days before Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is set to visit Washington. Turkey increased its troops in Afghanistan by sending 958 more soldiers last month, Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul said late Wednesday. Noting Turkey’s reluctance to take part in armed clashes with the Taliban, Gonul underscored “no shift in this policy.” “We maintain our reservations about Turkish troops’ involvement in military operations and combat in Afghanistan,” Gonul told reporters, although U.S. Ambassador to Ankara James Jeffrey called for “more flexibility” regarding job descriptions. After wrapping up his talks in Jordan, Turkish President Abdullah Gul also rejected the idea of Turks participating in combat missions in Afghanistan. “No doubt, our efficiency will increase, but we will decide how to do so,” Gül told reporters. “We do not want to be in a position of fighting there.”

Afghan war will inevitably strain relations- tension over troop commitment

PressTv 9 (12/4, http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=112807&sectionid=351020403)

Turkey says it will not contribute troops to NATO's mission to Afghanistan, but may boost its contributions to the training of Afghan security forces. President Abdullah Gul, talking to private CNN-Turk television on Thursday said Ankara does not want to be "in a state of war waging" but still the government is reviewing whether to abide by its NATO commitments. Turkey has already doubled its troop strength to 1,750 after they took over the rotating command of the NATO peacekeeping operation in Kabul last month. None of the Turkish soldiers are assigned to combat missions. He added that the level of activities will rise, "but we have to decide how we will do it". Participating in combat could alienate Muslims there and in the broader Muslim world, he stressed. Turkey is the only Muslim member of the NATO alliance. It says it is working with US troops to beat back Taliban militants and deny al-Qaeda a safe haven. Turkey's Foreign Ministry in a statement late Wednesday had said that his country is reviewing an increase in non-combat forces to train Afghan security forces and also increase its contributions to the development of health, education and agriculture in Afghanistan

\*\*Internals- Alliance Good

Foreign Policy K2 Alliance

Foreign policy is the key issue in the alliance—little historical basis and drifting views on China and Russia

Menon and Wimbush 7 (Rajan, Prof of International Relations, S. Enders, Director of Center for Future Security Strategies, *Survival* Vol. 49 No. 2, http://www.newamerica.net/files/nafmigration/Menon\_and\_Wimbush\_US\_Turkey\_Alliance\_Survival\_2007.pdf)

In the post-Soviet world, it is much harder for officials and national-security and foreign-policy experts on both sides to explain what precisely unites their two countries. One rationale invariably trotted out as the basis for continued strategic solidarity is a shared commitment to democratic values. Yet the United States has had close relationships with a number of countries that are anything but democratic — for example, Saudi Arabia — and maintained close ties with Turkey during the years when its democracy was quashed by the military. The common Western heritage rooted in the Enlightenment often invoked in discussions of America’s kinship with Europe does not apply; Turkey belongs to an altogether different tradition, as Islam’s rise as a force in Turkish politics has made clear. In truth, there is not much in the way of a historical and cultural foundation in the Turkish-American relationship. This makes a solid convergence in matters of foreign policy and national security all the more important there is little else to fall back on. To begin with, post-Cold War Turkey and the United States assess relations with Russia quite differently. Washington is increasingly troubled by Russia’s drift toward authoritarianism, its support of separatist movements in Georgia and Moldova, and its use of energy as a political tool against its neighbors, particularly Ukraine. But these issues do not concern Turkey which has expanded economic ties with Moscow. Turkish companies have made major investments in Russia and bilateral trade has increased fourfold since 2000. And Turkish criticisms of American foreign policies echo several of the themes contained in the broadside Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered against American conduct in the world during a February 2007 conference on global security in Munich. Indeed Russia evokes more goodwill than the United States in Turkey today. The same dissonance between Ankara and Washington is evident on China. Washington routinely underscores China’s military build-up and the long-term threat it poses to stability in East Asia, but this issue barely registers in Turkish national-security discourse. For Turkey; China is a potential partner, not a problem.

EU Internal

eu membership will fail inevitably-->weak alliance = Turkey drifts away to iran -->strong alliance = safety

Turkey’s bid for EU membership will inevitably fail—strong relations preclude a shift towards the Middle East

Cook and Sherwood-Randall 6 (Steven, expert on Arab and Turkish politics, and Elizabeth, research scholar at Stanford, Council on Foreign Relations, No. 15, June)

The much more alarming prospect today is that the Turkish bid for accession will ultimately be unsuccessful. The French and Dutch “no” votes to the proposed European constitution in the spring of 2005 were in part an expression of widespread public opposition to Turkish membership. More broadly, many European states are struggling to assimilate their large Muslim minorities, and there is increasing public anxiety about Islamist militancy in Europe. If Turkey were to become a member of the European Union, it would have the largest population in the organization and one in three Europeans would be Muslim. In some quarters, these demographic projections fuel xenophobic and specifically anti-Turkish sentiments. Alternatively, should Ankara’s bid for EU membership fail, there is significant risk that the country will become unmoored from the West and look elsewhere for strategic advantage and opportunity. In this scenario, Turkey’s democratic development would be slowed or even reversed while Turkish nationalism intensifies and compels the Turks to seek alternative partners in Russia and the Islamic world. Doubts about Turkey’s European future, and the attendant prospect of its strategic drift, should cause American policymakers to seek opportunities to prevent such an outcome by strengthening and solidifying U.S. bonds with this long-standing ally.

Strained relations with both the US and the EU turn Turkey away from the West

Larrabee 8 (F. Stephen, senior staff member of RAND, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada479985&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

At the same time, Turkey’s ties with the West have deteriorated. Turkey has found its path to European Union (EU) membership blocked by rising concern in Europe about immigration, unemployment, and enlargement.1 Cyprus has also emerged as a bone of contention in Turkey’s relations with the EU. Increasingly, Turks feel unwanted and resentful at what they see as Europe’s patronizing attitude toward them. As a result, Turkey’s relations with the EU—and Europe generally—have become increasingly strained. Relations with the United States have also deteriorated. The U.S. invasion of Iraq has exacerbated Turkey’s security problems and strained its relations with Washington. When Turkey’s relations with the EU have been strained in the past, Turkey could always look to the United States for support. Today, however, Turkey faces an unprecedented situation in which its relations with both the EU and the United States are poor simultaneously. The deterioration of relations with the West has contributed to a growing sense of vulnerability and distrust of the West in parts of Turkish society. Many Turks feel that they can no longer rely on their traditional allies in the West as much as they have previously. This has reinforced a growing trend toward nationalism and a feeling that Turkey must rely more heavily on its own devices. These trends have coincided with important domestic changes in Turkish society. The old pro-Western Kemalist elite that has shaped Turkish foreign policy since the end of World War II is gradually being replaced by a more conservative, nationalist elite that is suspicious of the West. These new elites have begun to challenge the dominance and outlook of the pro-Western elite. They are also more religious and have a more positive attitude toward Turkey’s Ottoman past.

EU Internal- EU Relations Low

EU relations strained now

Larrabee 8 (F. Stephen, senior staff member of RAND, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada479985&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

Membership in the EU has long been a major Turkish foreign policy goal. Turkey sees EU membership as the culmination of the centuries long effort at Westernization and an affirmation of the Kemalist revolution. However, the EU remains ambivalent about Turkish membership. At its summit in Brussels in December 2004, the EU agreed to open accession negotiations with Turkey. However, the EU combined its assent with a number of caveats and escape clauses, noting that the initiation of negotiations did not guarantee their successful completion or preclude other forms of association short of membership. Turkey’s membership prospects have dimmed since the Brussels decision. The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by France and the Netherlands in May and June 2005 made clear that large parts of the European public think the EU is moving too far, too fast. Bulgaria and Romania were admitted in January 2007. However, further enlargement is likely to be put on hold for some years, as EU members seek to develop a consensus about the EU’s future evolution and priorities. The Cyprus issue also complicates Turkey’s relations with the EU. Under the Customs Union agreement signed with the EU in 1996, Turkey is obligated to open its ports and airports to Cypriot vessels and aircraft now that Cyprus is a full member of the EU. However, Turkey has refused to do so until the EU fulfills its promise to lift its trade embargo against Northern Cyprus. In response, in December 2006, the EU Council voted to suspend eight out of 35 chapters in the accession negotiations. As a result, relations with the EU have become strained. At the same time, frustration with and anger toward the EU is rising in Turkey. Support for Turkish membership in the EU has declined visibly over the last year. In 2004, 73 percent of the Turkish population supported Turkish membership; in 2006, that portion dropped to 54 percent.7 This decline reflects a significant erosion of support for Turkish membership in the EU and illustrates how the public mood in Turkey toward the EU has soured of late.

EU Internal- Failure Inevitable

Turkey will never join the EU- resentment and inevitable postponements

Gordon and Taspinar 6 (Philip and Omer, senior fellow in foreign policy studies, director of the Turkey program at Brookings, The Washington Quarterly, 23:3, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/articles/2006/summer_turkey_gordon/20060525.pdf>)

The situation is only slightly better on the European front. Turkey’s hopes to join the EU, although boosted by Brussels’s October 3, 2005, decision to begin accession negotiations, remain distant and uncertain. Such pessimism is justified on many counts, perhaps most significantly as a result of the EU’s enlargement fatigue following the addition of 10 new members in 2004. In the aftermath of the French and Dutch rejection of the EU constitution, it is now much more difficult for European politicians to ignore public opinion, particularly when critical decisions about Europe’s future are at stake. France last year even went so far as to change its constitution to require that a referendum be held to approve all future EU enlargements. Other countries may also require putting Turkish membership to a public vote. This is clearly bad news for Turkey. Already struggling with problems such as unemployment, immigration, Islamic terrorism, and Muslim integration within their current borders, Europeans are in no mood to embrace 70 million more Muslims. Even if Turkey continues to develop its democracy and economy, major obstacles still threaten to thwart its European integration. Ankara’s hopes of membership could easily be dashed by anything ranging from a crisis over Cyprus to a national veto from one of the 25 EU countries. Equally troubling for Ankara are French and German proposals for a “privileged partnership” instead of full membership. Fueling Turkish concern about second-class membership are EU guidelines for accession negotiations that already spell out the possibility of permanent safeguards against Turkey on issues ranging from freedom of movement to regional aid. Similarly, the fact that the EU has described the accession process as not only open ended but also conditional on the EU’s absorption capacity was not lost on the many Turks who believe Brussels will always find reasons to say no to Turkey. Such dynamics do not bode well for the future of Turkey’s relations with the West. In the past, Ankara could always rely on its strategic partnership with Washington in case things went wrong with Europe. Such an alternative may now no longer exist. For the first time in its history, Turkey has a strained relationship with the United States and the EU at the same time. Combined with issues such as Turkish resentment over the West’s failure to deliver on its promises to do more to ease Turkish Cypriots’ isolation following their approval of a settlement plan that the Greek side rejected, the revival of violence and terrorist attacks by the separatist Kurdish Workers’ Party (known by the Kurdish acronym PKK) now partly based in northern Iraq, and Western pressure for the recognition of the Armenian “genocide,” all the ingredients for a Turkish nationalist backlash are in place.

\*\*Impact Modules- Alliance Good

Ext- Turkish Prolif

Decline in relations pushes Turkey into going nuclear—and spurs nuclear war

Sokolski 7 [Henry, the Non-proliferation policy education center, Jun 14, http://www.npec-web.org/Presentations/20070616-Sokolski-Talk-AixEnProvence-Conference.pdf]

Whether or not Turkey does choose to go its own way and acquire a nuclear weapons-option of its own will depend on several factors, including Ankara’s relations with Washington, Brussels, and Tehran. To a very significant degree, though, it also will depend on whether or not the EU Members States are serious about letting Turkey join the EU. The dimmer these prospects look, the greater is the likelihood of that Turkey will chose to hedge its political, economic, and security bets by seeking a nuclear weapons-option of its own. This poses a difficult choice for the EU. Many key members are opposed to letting Turkey join the EU. There are arguments to favor this position. Yet, if Turkey should conclude that its interests are best served by pursuing such a nuclear weapons-option, it is almost certain to fortify the conviction of Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia to do the same. This will result in the building up a nuclear powder keg on Europe’s doorstep and significantly increase the prospect for nuclear terrorism and war.

A failure to credibly defend Turkey will lead to speedy nuclearization

Clawson, ‘3 [Patrick, Deputy Director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East: Who is next after Iran, April, 2003, <http://www.npec-web.org/Essays/Presentation030401%20Clawson%20Nuclear%20Prolif%20TB.pdf>]

Historically Turkey has been at peace with Iran, and the two countries have generally paid relatively little attention to each other, compared to what one might expect from two neighbors with considerable economic interaction. That said, **Turkey has many reasons to worry** **about meddling by an Islamic Republic** which is ideologically opposed to Ankara’s secular policies. If Turkey faces serious internal problems – be it from Islamists or from Kurds – Iran might seek to take advantage of that situation, and Iranian nuclear weapons would make Turkey think long and hard about how much it could complain about such Iranian meddling. In other words, an Iranian nuclear capability could make the Turkish General Staff nervous. Faced with a nuclear-armed Iran, Turkey’s first instinct will be to turn to NATO**. Turkey places extraordinary value on its NATO membership**, which symbolizes the West’s acceptance of Turkey – a delicate issue for a country which feels it is excluded from the EU on civilizational grounds more than for any other reason. **The cold reality is that NATO was not designed to defend Turkey**: assisting Turkey faced with a general Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe is one thing; defending Turkey when it alone faces a threat is an altogether different matter. **It is not clear how much NATO members want to take on this burden**. **It will be only natural for Turkey to wonder how much it can rely on NATO. Were Turkey to decide that it had to proliferate in order to defend itself, it has good industrial and scientific infrastructures which it could draw upon to build nuclear weapons on its own. It would be difficult to prevent a determined Turkey from building nuclear weapons in well under a decade.**

Ext- Turkey supports Iran

Iran is becoming the breaking point between the US and Turkey

Cook 10 (Steven, senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Policy, 6/1, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/01/how\_do\_you\_say\_frenemy\_in\_Turkish?page=0,1)

Perhaps the biggest issue separating the United States and Turkey is Iran. There is a full-blown controversy brewing over exactly what the Obama administration communicated to Erdogan and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva before the two leaders traveled to Tehran in May. There, Lula and Erdogan hammered out a deal that would shift 1,200 kilograms of Iran's low-enriched uranium to Turkey in exchange for fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). So far, Washington's explanation of what it did and did not tell Ankara and Brasilia is rather weak -- a perplexing lapse of communication and coordination for an administration that puts a premium on these virtues. Regardless of the Obama administration's mistakes, the Turkish-Brazilian deal demonstrates just how far apart Washington and Ankara are on Iran. The Obama administration sees the TRR agreement as yet another Iranian effort to split Washington, its allies in Europe, the Chinese, and the Russians, thereby forestalling a new round of U.N.-mandated sanctions, all while the Iranians continue to enrich uranium. The Turks think the deal is a promising start to the painstaking task of moving Washington and Tehran toward broader negotiations.

Lack of support from the US unmoors Turkey and drives them to Russia or Islamic influence

Sherwood-Randall 7 [Elizabeth, Sr. Advisor, Preventative Defense Project, “Tend to Turkey” The Belfer Center, Fall, 2007, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/17425/tend_to_turkey.html>]

In the wake of the Iraq debacle, the United States will occupy a position of greatly diminished stature and leverage among the many allies that stepped forward to offer unqualified support immediately after September 11, 2001. No relationship has been more badly damaged in this relatively short period of time, or is in greater need of repair, than the alliance between the United States and Turkey. Although America’s standing has declined precipitously across Europe, **Turkey is the one NATO country at risk of becoming strategically unmoored**.  The war has had a profound and disorienting effect on Turkey–the only Muslim nation anchored in the West through bilateral ties with the United States and membership in NATO. In some polls, **Turks are reported to have the least favorable public opinion of the United States** among countries surveyed. **The Bush Administration’s actions have ominously alienated a generation of young people unfamiliar with the positive legacy of American global leadership**. Across the population, a slow process of disenchantment and disengagement has taken place. **If this negative trajectory is not reversed, Turkey could seek alternative affiliations–most likely with its Islamic neighbors or with Russia–at the expense of its connections to the United States and Europe.**

Ext- Turkey supports Iran

Turkey-Iran relationship growing- cooperation over energy and PKK

Larrabee 8 (F. Stephen, senior staff member of RAND, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada479985&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

Iran presents a longer-term security challenge. Iran’s growing regional influence since the U.S. invasion of Iraq is a concern in Ankara. So is the prospect that Iran might acquire nuclear weapons. At the same time, Turkey has a strong incentive to maintain good ties with Iran. The two countries share a common concern about the growth of Kurdish nationalism. This has led to an intensification of cooperation in the security field. During Erdogan’s visit to Tehran in July 2004, Turkey and Iran signed a security agreement that branded the PKK a terrorist organization. Since then, the two countries have stepped up cooperation to protect their borders against guerrilla attacks by the PKK and its affiliates. Energy is also a major driver behind the warming of Turkey’s ties with Iran. Iran is the second largest supplier of natural gas to Turkey after Russia. In July 1996, shortly after taking office, Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan concluded a $23 billion natural-gas deal with Iran. The deal set the framework for delivery of natural gas for the following 25 years. However, the deal also caused strains with the United States because it ran contrary to U.S. efforts to isolate Iran and prevent third-country investment there. In the decade since then, energy ties have continued to expand. In July 2007, Turkey and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding to transport 30 billion m3 of Iranian and Turkmen natural gas from Iran to Europe. The deal envisages the construction of two separate pipelines to ship gas from Iranian and Turkmen gas fields. In addition, the state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation will be granted licenses to develop three different sections of Iran’s South Pars gas field, which has estimated total recoverable reserves of 14 trillion m3.11 These plans have drawn criticism from the United States, which continues to oppose third-country investment in Iran and favors transporting Turkmen gas by routes that avoid Iran.12 Turkey’s growing cooperation with Iran in recent years, especially in the energy sector, highlights the degree to which U.S. and Turkish strategic perspectives in the Middle East have begun to diverge in some areas. Turkey has a strong political and economic stake in maintaining good ties with Iran. Ankara has thus been concerned about the calls for regime change in Tehran that some U.S. officials and outside specialists have made, which Ankara fears would further destabilize the Middle East. Instead, it has favored the establishment of a diplomatic dialogue with Tehran—a move advocated by the Baker- Hamilton report on Iraq

Absent strong relations Turkey would support Iran

CSIS 6 (4/13, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/tu060413.pdf)

US pressure to join the campaign against Iran would be extremely unwelcome to the Erdogan government as it would undercut two fundamental goals in its foreign policy, namely the development of good relations with all of Turkey’s neighbors and to act as intermediaries between the West and the Islamic world. Throughout his term in office, Erdogan has been endeavoring to formulate a new slant in Turkish foreign policy involving the balancing of the alliance with the United States and eventual accession to the European Union (EU) with a stronger relationship with the rest of the Islamic world and thus to emerge as the indispensable bridge between its two worlds. Being obliged to side openly with the United States against Iran would effectively scuttle this effort. Moreover, in view of its location as a direct neighbor of Iran, Turkey would be particularly susceptible to the negative effects of the gathering storm over Iran. Having seen Turkey simultaneously buffeted by post-war instability in Iraq – in addition to the incremental rise in deaths due to PKK terrorism, over a hundred Turkish truck drivers have been killed in Iraq during the past three years – the JDP government would view with alarm the additional costs a US-Iranian confrontation would bring. The Turks have bitter memories of the economic losses due to their participation in the decade-long embargo against Saddam after his invasion of Kuwait and would not be favorably disposed to assuming similar costs, which would inevitably follow the interruption of contacts and trade with Iran. An important source of gas for the Turkish energy market, Iran also sends almost a million of its citizens to Turkey as tourists every year while serving as the primary conduit for Turkish trade with Central Asia. At a broader level, the Turks also have serious reasons for concern about the negative impact growing regional tensions and the possibility of conflict would have on foreign investment and, consequently, on the management of the growing Turkish current accounts deficit. In any case, cooperation with the United States is far from desirable to most Turks. A recent opinion poll discovered that 79.2 percent were opposed to military action against Iran while 74.2 percent apparently considered America the main threat to world peace. Needless to say, the Iranians are doing their best to take advantage of the Turkish mood. On March 29, Ahmadinajad praised the JDP’s ‘new attitude towards a stronger role in the Islamic world’ and called for ‘Islam to become the foundation for Iran and Turkey on global issues,’ while the Iranian Ambassador in Ankara was quoted by Radikal on April 8, as saying that the US was ‘using the PKK to stir up trouble in Turkey and the Middle East,’ Iran was ‘ready to cooperate with Turkey on this issue as in the past’ and that Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul was expected in Tehran to discuss closer relations in the near future

Ext- TNWs- Iranian Prolif

TNWs are a key assurance against Iranian proliferation.

Blechman 9 [Barry, Stimson Distinguished Fellow currently working on developing solutions for the nuclear threat “Extended Deterrence: Cutting Edge of the Debate on Nuclear Policy” 2-28, Stimson, <http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?ID=811>]

In Europe, US nuclear commitments were made credible during the Cold War by the stationing of thousands of US nuclear weapons on the continent. **Although only a few hundred US nuclear weapons remain in Europe, NATO’s new “strategic concept” may require that difficult decisions** be made about them. Maintaining a credible extended deterrent in Europe requires spending money to modernize storage facilities, ensuring that the weapons themselves remain safe and reliable, and replacing the aircraft that had been planned to deliver them with more modern fighters with special electronics required for nuclear attack capabilities**.  Some of the newer NATO members**, especially those who previously were occupied by Soviet forces, **worry about a resurgent nationalist Russia which, itself, has thousands of short-range nuclear weapons on its European territory**, **and argue that the weapons and the policy should be retained to deter Russian nuclear-use in the event of conflict. The strong possibility that Iran will soon have nuclear weapons adds another motivation as Turkey, a NATO member with US nuclear weapons on its soil, sees their presence as deterring any future Iranian aggressiveness.**  The problem is that most of the NATO allies would hate to see the issue debated in their parliaments, as might result from the new “strategic concept,” or would certainly result if appropriations were requested for nuclear-related facilities or aircraft. European publics are generally strongly anti-nuclear, so while the officials of defense and foreign ministries may wish to retain the policy, their political masters are desperate to avoid any action that might renew public debate on nuclear weapons and adversely affect elections for sitting governments.

Ext- Iran Prolif Impact

Iranian proliferation would lead to proliferation throughout the middle east – makes extinction inevitable

Inbar 6 (Efraim, Professor of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University, The Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol 10 No 1 Article 7 March 2006 <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue1/jv10no1a7.html>)

The nuclear ambitions of the Islamic Republic of Iran are, of course, a challenge to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime (NPT). A nuclear Iran might well bring an end to this regime and to American attempts to curb proliferation in the Middle East and in other parts of the world. Indeed, the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran would have a chain-effect, generating further nuclear proliferation in the immediate region. Middle Eastern leaders, who invariably display high threat perceptions, are unlikely to look nonchalantly on a nuclear Iran. States such as Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and, of course, Iraq would hardly be persuaded by the United States that it can provide a nuclear umbrella against Iranian nuclear blackmail or actual nuclear attack. American extended deterrence is very problematic in the Middle East.[16] Therefore, these states would not resist the temptation to counter Iranian influence by adopting similar nuclear postures. The resulting scenario of a multi-polar nuclear Middle East would be a recipe for disaster. This strategic prognosis is a result of two factors: a) the inadequacy of a defensive posture against nuclear tipped missiles, and b) the difficulties surrounding the establishment of stable nuclear deterrence in the region. Missiles are the most effective means of delivering nuclear weapons. While the United States is developing a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system and Russia claims to have a missile intercept capability with its S-300 missile system, only Israel possesses a serious capability to parry a nuclear missile attack. Israel has developed a defensive layer around the Arrow-2 anti-ballistic missile, which is designed to intercept the family of Scud missiles. This program, which began in the late 1980s, benefited from generous American funding and amounts to the only deployed operational anti-ballistic missile system so far in the world.[17] Since 2000, Israel has deployed several operational batteries of Arrow missiles. The interception range is about 150 kilometers away from Israel's borders. On December 2, 2005, Israel launched an Arrow missile that successfully intercepted a mock-up of an Iranian Shehab-3 missile. The goal of the test was to expand the range of Arrow missiles to a higher altitude and to evaluate the interface between the Arrow and the American-improved Patriot missile system, which is meant to go into operation if the Arrow fails to shoot down its target. The interception of a missile armed with a nuclear head at a lower altitude and closer to home by the Patriot system is, of course, problematic. While this test and others have proven that the Arrow does hit its target, no defense system is foolproof. The Arrow-2 provides a certain measure of protection, but it is a first generation weapon system, and even its developers do not claim a one hundred percent interception rate. Moreover, it is not clear how the Arrow would function if enemy missiles were equipped with countermeasures or if the enemy were to use saturation tactics. Israel has hitherto had the upper hand in the regional technological race, but there are no assurances that this will always be so. The difficulties that Israel faces in dealing with Katyushas, Qassams, and tunnels show that Israeli ingenuity may not come up with immediate adequate responses. This is true of the United States as well. Even if defensive solutions are eventually devised, there may be windows of vulnerability, which could be of catastrophic dimensions in a nuclear scenario. All Middle Eastern states are so far defenseless against Iranian missiles. Indeed, as the Iranian nuclear program progresses, one can clearly detect a rise in threat perception on the part of most Arab states in the region. Several states within Iranian range, such as Turkey and India, have shown interest in purchasing the Israeli BMD system, whose export requires American approval. However, at present, while Israel is partly protected from Iranian nuclear missiles, the rest of the region remains vulnerable to such a threat. The Iranian nuclear threat is also to be taken seriously in light of the difficulties of achieving a stable deterrence with Tehran.[18] Unfortunately, there are scholars who belittle such fears by releasing optimistic evaluations regarding a potentially stable "balance of terror" between Israel and Iran, modeled on the relationship between the two superpowers during the Cold War. Such a bilateral relationship, where the two sides deter each other, cannot be easily emulated in the Middle East. A "balance of terror" between two nuclear protagonists is never automatic, and could not be taken for granted even between the United States and the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the situation in the Middle East is even less stable. A second-strike capability, which allows a state to respond in kind after being subjected to a nuclear attack, is critical in establishing credible deterrence. During the Cold War, submarines constituted the platform for any second-strike capability; the difficulty in locating them under water rendered them less vulnerable to an enemy first-strike attack. Indeed, the Soviet Union and United States relied on the survivability and mobility of submarines, characteristics that would enable them to carry out a second-strike with nuclear-tipped missiles. While the superpowers possessed large submarine fleets, it is doubtful that any Middle Eastern power owns enough submarines equipped to do the job. Israel's current fleet includes three Dolphin-class submarines, to be augmented by the end of the decade by two additional vessels recently purchased in Germany. However, it is not clear whether the Israeli submarines carry enough punch to deter adversaries. In this context, it is important to note that no fleet can ever be fully operational. Some vessels are in port for maintenance, while others are en route to the designated area of operations or on their way back to the homeport. Furthermore, the most appropriate launching area in the Indian Ocean is far away from Israel.[19] More significant is the fact that maintaining a second-strike capability is an ongoing process requiring continuous improvement, which depends to a large extent on the adversary's actions. Such a process is inherently uncertain and ambiguous. Moreover, before an initial"effective" second-strike capability is achieved, a nuclear race may create the fear of a first-strike nuclear attack, which might in itself trigger a <CONTINUED>

Ext- Iran Prolif Impact

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nuclear exchange. This is all the more probable because adequate warning systems cannot be erected when the distances between enemies are so small, as is the case in the Middle East. The influence of haste and the need to respond quickly can have extremely dangerous consequences. The discussion above has focused on the problems of establishing bilateral nuclear deterrence between Iran and Israel. In a nuclear multipolar environment, achieving stable deterrence would be even more difficult. Deterrence may work in part because a threat is transmitted correctly and not misread by the enemy. Yet, Middle Eastern countries have not established any hotlines or special communication links with Iran and/or each other, which could have serious consequences in a nuclear crisis. In the Middle East, communication is not only a technological problem, but is also a political problem, as several states have refrained from establishing diplomatic links with a number of regional capitals. Middle Eastern powers would also have to establish early warning systems searching in all directions. Moreover, the requirements for an "all directions" second strike force are very complicated. In addition, the rather rudimentary nuclear forces in the region would be likely to be prone to accidents and mistakes. The newly acquired nuclear arsenals would lack the sophisticated technology of the great powers, which reduces such mishaps through devices for locking, fusing, remotely controlling, and releasing nuclear warheads from afar. Nuclear arms in the hands of several Middle East powers would actually increase the possibility of preemptive strikes and catalytic wars.

Iranian prolif ushers in a new era of Middle Eastern proliferation and nuclear war

Allison ‘06 [Graham, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, Boston Globe, March 12, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/1525/nightmare\_this\_time.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2F20213%2Fway\_forward\_on\_missile\_defense)

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change warned in December 2004 that current developments in Iran and North Korea threatened to erode the entire nonproliferation regime to a point of 'irreversibility" that could trigger a 'cascade of proliferation." If Iran crosses its nuclear finish line, a Middle Eastern cascade of new nuclear weapons states could produce the first multiparty nuclear arms race, far more volatile than the Cold War competition between the US and USSR. Given Egypt's historic role as the leader of the Arab Middle East, the prospects of it living unarmed alongside a nuclear Persia are very low. The International Atomic Energy Agency's reports of clandestine nuclear experiments hint that Cairo may have considered this possibility. Were Saudi Arabia to buy a dozen nuclear warheads that could be mated to the Chinese medium-range ballistic missiles it purchased secretly in the 1980s, few in the American intelligence community would be surprised. Given its role as the major financier of Pakistan's clandestine nuclear program in the 1980s, it is not out of the question that Riyadh and Islamabad have made secret arrangements for this contingency. In 1962, bilateral competition between the US and the Soviet Union led to the Cuban missile crisis, which historians now call 'the most dangerous moment in human history." After the crisis, President Kennedy estimated the likelihood of nuclear war as 'between 1 in 3 and even." A multiparty nuclear arms race in the Middle East would be like playing Russian roulette with five bullets in a six-chamber revolver-dramatically increasing the likelihood of a regional nuclear war.

Impact Module- Multiple Scenarios

Collapse of US-Turkey alliance causes multiple scenarios for war—Central Asian stability, terrorism, Iraq fragmentation

Menon and Wimbush 7 (Rajan, Prof of International Relations, S. Enders, Director of Center for Future Security Strategies, *Survival* Vol. 49 No. 2, http://www.newamerica.net/files/nafmigration/Menon\_and\_Wimbush\_US\_Turkey\_Alliance\_Survival\_2007.pdf)

If Turkey a key friend and ally turns away from the United States, the damage to American interests will be severe and long lasting. Turkey remains exceptionally important to the United States, arguably even more so than during the Cold War. Turkey is the top of an arc that starts in Israel and wends its way through Lebanon, Syria, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Iran. It abuts, or is proximate to, countries pivotal to American foreign policy and national security whether allies and friends, adversaries, or loci of instability. - Turkey’s critical location means that instability within it could spill beyond its borders, with unpredictable effects rippling across its neighborhood, particularly the Middle East. - Turkey sits astride critical waterways and narrows (the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Bosporus and Dardanelles) that are channels for trade and the flow of energy to global markets. - Turkey‘s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan is the terminus of the Baku- Ceyhan pipeline. Turkey is therefore essential to American efforts to reduce the dependence of Azerbaijan, and potentially Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, on Russia's energy pipelines. · Turkey's substantial economic and political ties with Georgia and Azerbaijan contribute to the stability of these countries whose strategic significance far exceeds their standing in commonplace measures of power. Georgia is a corridor for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, and stability is under threat because of its testy relationship with Russia and its conflicts with the Russian-supported secessionist statelets Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Azerbaijan is not only a major energy producer but also a fellow Turkish country whose territorial dispute with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh could boil over into war just as it did in the 1990s, possibly igniting a wider conflagration drawing in Turkey (Azerbaijan’s ally) and Russia (Armenia’s patron) and putting the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline at risk. Turkey is a democratic and secular Muslim state, and its alliance with the United States helps demonstrate that the United States can maintain friendly and productive ties with an array of Muslim countries - that America does not oppose Islam per se, but rather the violent extremists who invoke it to their violence against innocents and their retrograde, intolerant agenda. This is crucial if the American campaign against terrorism is not to be seen by the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims, as Islamic terrorist groups would like it to be, as a war against Islam itself. · Turkey's cooperation is essential to any durable political settlement in Iraq, particularly because it borders Iraq’s Kurdish north and fears that the emergence there of a Kurdish state would increase the already-considerable violence and resilient separatist sentiment in its own Kurdish-populated-south-east. The fragmentation of Iraq could therefore prompt Turkish military intervention, which in turn could deal a death blow to the US-Turkish alliance, perhaps even culminating in Turkey's exit from NATO. (Turkish forces intervened in Northern Iraq to attack the camps of the Kurdish separatist guerillas in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War; in March 2003 roughly 1,500 Turkish troops entered this region; and Turkish Special Forces have reportedly carried out covert operations in post-Saddam Iraq.) Turkey's disillusionment with the West could prompt a reorientation of its foreign policy away from the United States, the European Union and NATO, and toward a new strategy that looks to China, India, Iran, Russia and Syria. Such a shift is already being discussed in Turkey, and the assumption that it amounts to bluff and bluster may prove short sighted. The new strategic landscape created by the end of the Cold War may pose new threats to Turkey, but it also provides it a choice of new partners as well. While a rethinking of Turkish grand strategy need not in itself undermine the alliance between Turkey and the United States, it could certainly do so if the force driving it is an anti-Western nationalism. Turkey and the United States both face the threat of terrorism, and Turkey's cooperation is essential to any truly effective American policy against global terrorist networks. More specifically, Turkey could also serve as a corridor for militant Islamists to infiltrate Iraq and Turkey's other neighbors. Turkey's participation in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, a military coalition that for a time was commanded by a Turkish general, demonstrates that Ankara and Washington can cooperate in promoting stability and enabling economic development in war-torn countries, although Turkey's military forces in Afghanistan are small and are not deployed in the south, the central theatre of the anti-Taliban war. (Turkey is no different in this respect than the vast majority of other contributors to the force). Turkey is a member of NATO, and the air bases in its southeast, primarily Incirlik but also Batman, Diyarbakir, Malatya, and Mus, remain important to the United States. The value of Turkish airfields was revealed after the 1991 Gulf War, when a no-fly zone was established over northern Iraq to protect the Kurds from Saddam Hussein's military machine. Moreover, despite Washington's inability to open a second front from Turkish territory against Iraqi forces in March 2003, American aircraft were permitted to use Turkish airspace for operations in Iraq, and Turkish installations are important for providing logistical support to US forces in Iraq.

Impact Module- Turkish Prolif

Closer relations with the US stop Turkish proliferation

Kibaroglu 8 [Mustafa, Middle East Policy, 12-22-2008, <http://www.articlearchives.com/asia/western-asia-saudai-arabia/2282012-1.html>]

Even though there is much talk in Turkey about why the state should develop nuclear weapons among those who approach the issue from the perspective of national pride and prestige as well as security, **most decision makers are quite aware that the possible consequences of going nuclear would mean violation of Turkey's international obligations**. Outside powers point to the difficulties Turkey may have to endure, but it also is state practice in institutions such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military. **These entities have always formulated and conducted Turkey's foreign and security policies in line with Ataturk's dictum, "peace at home, peace in the world." Against this backdrop, one should not expect Turkey to embark upon a rushed nuclear weapons program, even if Iran crosses the critical threshold**. Should this happen, however, what will keep Turkey from developing nuclear weapons will not simply be responsible state practice. **The extent to which Turkey's allies are willing and able to allay its fears emanating from the worsening regional security situation will also have a decisive effect on policy makers. Improving relations with the United States** and the EU, **as well as strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime, will make the greatest impact in this regard.**

A nuclear Turkey destabilizes the Middle East

Deliso 5 (Christopher, Balkan-based Journalist, November 21, 2005<http://www.antiwar.com/deliso/?articleid=8091>)

Proud Turkey has always wanted to be seen as an important country. Were it to declare itself a nuclear one, it would become, for a time at least, the most important country in the world. The entire balance of power in Europe and the Middle East would be radically altered overnight, and the overall side results would not at all be positive for Turkey or anyone else – except of course for those cashing in on illicit nuclear sales. Nevertheless, the country is probably technologically capable by now. A new question that has thus arisen, as articulated recently by Turkish scholar Mehmet Kalyoncu on Balkanalysis.com, is the following: "If the U.S. and the EU do not approve of Turkey having nuclear weapons, what do they have to offer Turkey instead?"

That goes nuclear.

Steinbach, ‘2 [John Centre for Research on Globalisation 2002 Israeli Nuclear weapons: a threat to peace, 3/3 <http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/mat0036.htm>]

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration

Impact Module- Hegemony

Strong relations key to hegemony—ally in the Middle East

Malik ’97 [Mustafa, Senior Associate Strategy Group, May 15, Lexis]

Despite its Islamists-led government, Turkey is again one of America's favorite allies, and Washington has stepped up efforts to help latch it more closely to Western economic and security systems. Americans are warning European governments not to belie the continent's secular credentials by barring Turkey from the European Union. The EU has so far refused to act on Turkey's decade-old membership application. Strobe Talbott has brought it out into the open. The American deputy secretary of state publicly ridiculed the EU's argument that having Muslim Turkey as its member would trigger a culture clash. References to Turkish culture, he said at a U.S.-EU conference in Washington, are "euphemisms for religion." Must the "European-ness" of a village, he asked, be judged by "whether its landmarks are church spires of minarets"? America's No. 2 diplomat also dismissed the suggestion that Turkey's human-rights violations (in combating Kurdish insurgency) disqualify it for the EU membership. He reminded Europeans that "many current EU members have overcome far greater traumas in this century--and that's putting it mildly." Talbott probably was alluding to the past Greek and Portuguese dictatorships, anti-Jewish pogroms and the holocaust. One American diplomat grumbled later that West European statesmen opposing Turkey's admission into the EU are being shamed by Turkish generals who are fighting their own government to preserve the secular character of their state. U.S. officials use the words "crucial" and "critical" to underscore Turkey's importance to American interests in that region. And the administration has established contacts with Islamists in the Turkish government. This pro-Turkish stance is the latest among a half-dozen twists that America's Turkish policy has undergone in eight years. The unraveling of the Soviet Union led U.S. policy-makers to drop Ankara from their strategic equations. Turkey had been NATO's front-line member against the Soviet power. It regained importance to Americans during Desert Storm as a key partner in the anti-Iraq coalition. Then early in the first Clinton administration, human-rights concerns considerably strained U.S. ties to Turkey. They were all but repaired again by Turkey's strong support for American efforts to end the Bosnian crisis. The American peace broker for Bosnia, Richard Holbrooke, assured the Turks publicly that the human-rights debate would not harm U.S.-Turkish relations. Perhaps unforeseen by him, the Islamist Refah party soon came to power at the head of a coalition government in Ankara. And despite the State Department's half-hearted assurance that "secularism" is "not a condition" of good U.S.-Turkish relations, Washington remained leery about Turkey's Islamist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. That trepidation has eased now. Erbakan has agreed, though grudgingly, to retain Turkey's ties to Europe, the United States and Israel, and committed himself to working within the secular Turkish constitution. But American interest in Turkey has actually been heightened by a string of other events affecting U.S. strategic interests. China's economic and military resurgence is causing unease in Washington. Beijing appears to aspire for the status of a second superpower. And the Russian announcement of a new military doctrine stipulating the first use of nuclear weapons in a desperate conflict was a reminder that the honeymoon with the Russians is over. Even though President Boris Yelstin has swallowed the NATO expansion plans, the Russian parliament could hold off on ratifying the second strategic arms reduction treaty requiring Moscow to dismantle thousands of nuclear warheads. And Yeltsin recently joined Chinese President Jiang Zemin in a statement criticizing the U.S. domination of world affairs and calling for a "multipolar world." A multipolar, bi-polar world may not be around the corner, but the United States needs allies in the periphery of the world's second- and third-largest military powers that are resentful of its superpower status. Turkey is its only ally in the periphery of both. Turkish politics, however, remain extremely fluid and Islamic revivalism is far from over. The best way to promote stability and secularism in Turkey, its secular politicians and diplomats have been telling the West, is to integrate it with Western Europe politically and economically. Talbott's impassioned plea to the EU indicates that Washington is listening. Recently, a Turkish diplomat in Washington acknowledged that "the United States, happily, is showing a greater appreciation" of his country "during the last two, three months." He was quick to point out, though, that "the helicopters and frigates issue" remained unresolved. U.S.-Turkish relations have never been smooth. Under pressures from the Greek lobby, Congress has held up the delivery of 10 Super Cobra helicopters and three guided-missile frigates to Turkey. Besides, influential groups are sounding the alarm bell about the Islamists in the Turkish government. Yet Turkey is likely to remain strategically important to Americans as long as they have stakes in its neighborhood.

**Hegemony is crucial to preventing great power nuclear war**

**Khalilzad**, **’95** Former RAND Fellow, Current US Ambassador

[Zalmay, “Losing the Moment?” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, pg. 84, Spring, Lexis]

<Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a **global nuclear exchange**. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

Impact Module- Afghanistan (1/2)

Turkey is the crucial mediator in Afghanistan

Erman 10 (Aydemir, Turkish Ambassador, 2/9, Christian Science Monitor,

http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/0209/How-Turkey-can-help-NATO-in-Afghanistan/(page)/2)

As a NATO ally true to its obligations, Turkey sent troops to Afghanistan after 9/11 on the condition that they would not take part in combat operations. Despite pressure from allies, Turkey sticks strictly to this policy. Our presence in Afghanistan, both military and civilian, has been based on treating people with respect and as equals, not with paternalism or the imperial arrogance of an occupying power. Turkish troops deployed to Kabul have been under strict orders to treat Afghans with dignity. They have not broken into homes. Most patrols are conducted on foot and not in armored carriers. Troops wear no sunglasses in order to maintain eye contact. Touching women is totally taboo. Medical personnel serve Afghan people as well as their own forces. Turkish troops have thus not only contributed to the security of Kabul but became an unobtrusive part of Afghan daily life. In the critical province of Wardak, Turkey today is also operating the only civilian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team. Generally, PRTs are operated by NATO soldiers. Since 2006, the Turkish government has spent $20 million in the province funding a police training academy, building schools, restoring a mosque, and setting up a medical clinic. Halim Fedai, the governor of Wardak Province, has said: “The Turkish programs are very well received and readily accepted by Afghans because they work within Afghan culture. They are sensitive to Afghan values. We have very good, strong, historical relationships with Turkey.” Clearly, the crescent and star have once again proved as reliable a trademark in Afghanistan today as in the past. Because of this success, the Turkish government will soon set up another PRT elsewhere in Afghanistan. The Turkish lesson in Afghanistan is clear: Winning hearts and minds requires better understanding and respect for local values. Handing out cans of soda with colonial airs won’t yield tangible results. For many of these same reasons – our historical relationships in the region and deep understanding of local values and cultures – Turkey may be one of the few countries, if not the only country, that can bring Afghanistan and Pakistan together to sort out their differences. President Karzai made a point at the London Conference of stressing Turkey’s mediating role, following upon the “trilateral” Turkey-Afghanistan-Pakistan meeting he had earlier attended in January in Istanbul with Pakistani President Asif Zardari. Unfortunately, India’s absence so far in this process has weakened the Turkish initiative. It is critical to get them on board because the Afghan problem cannot be solved unless India and Pakistan come to terms over their interests in Afghanistan. The international community in general, and the allies in particular, should lend their support to Turkey. Turkey’s NATO membership and historical soft-power capacity can make a critical difference in Afghanistan. Those who know and are trusted historically by the Afghan people can show the way for those who truly want to help the Afghans stand on their own feet. If NATO sticks to a clear mandate within a defined time frame for withdrawal and the international community allocates sufficient resources, Afghanistan can be brought back into the fold of the international community. Turkey helped them join the world when Afghanistan was a young nation. It can do so again today.

Failure in Afghanistan sends the signal of defeat to jihadists emboldening terrorism

KORB 7 [11.6 Lawrence J., Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, & Caroline Wadham, National Security Senior Policy Analyst, November 6, 2007, Center for American Progress http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/11/pdf/afghanistan\_report.pdf p. 5]

Al Qaeda Central is based in the borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan and threatens the United States, its allies, and its interests. From their sanctuary in Afghanistan in 2001, Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda trained for and organized the attacks of September 11. During the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, they were mostly driven from this base. But Al Qaeda has reconstituted itself, and the borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan now serve as a territorial hub for Al Qaeda Central, the core leadership of Al Qaeda.5 While Al Qaeda has become a more dispersed, decentralized enemy since 2001, it now uses its sanctuary in the tribal areas of Pakistan to plan and launch attacks against Afghan, NATO-International Security Assistance Force, and U.S. forces in Afghanistan.6 This haven provides Al Qaeda with the space to train, recruit, and rebuild in order to achieve its objective of attacking the United States, its allies and interests. The Afghan insurgency includes elements with purely local objectives—groups who hope to topple the Karzai government and establish control—but it also includes members that are directly linked to the international jihadist network of Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda supports the Taliban and other insurgents by providing training, technical skills, manpower, and financing. A failed mission in Afghanistan could allow the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and its affiliates to gain control of a significant amount of territory in Afghanistan, or even to seize control of the entire state apparatus and operate with impunity. Failure in Afghanistan would be a nearmortal strategic and psychological blow to U.S. efforts in the fight against international terrorist networks and a tremendous boost to the global jihadist movement. Defeat for the United States and the international community would allow Al Qaeda to claim that it has defeated two superpowers in Afghanistan— the United States and the former Soviet Union—and that history is on its side.

Impact Module- Afghanistan (2/2)

Terrorism causes extinction.

Sid-Ahmed 4 (Mohamed, political analyst for the 'Al-Ahram' newspaper, 26 August, [http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm] AD:6/23/10)JM

A nuclear attack by terrorists will be much more critical than Hiroshima and Nagazaki, even if -- and this is far from certain -- the weapons used are less harmful than those used then, Japan, at the time, with no knowledge of nuclear technology, had no choice but to capitulate. Today, the technology is a secret for nobody. So far, except for the two bombs dropped on Japan, nuclear weapons have been used only to threaten. Now we are at a stage where they can be detonated. This completely changes the rules of the game. We have reached a point where anticipatory measures can determine the course of events. Allegations of a terrorist connection can be used to justify anticipatory measures, including the invasion of a sovereign state like Iraq. As it turned out, these allegations, as well as the allegation that Saddam was harbouring WMD, proved to be unfounded. What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive.  But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

Impact Module- Iraq

Low relations with Turkey cripples the Iraq war effort

Committee on Foreign Affairs 7 (3/15, https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/34040.pdf)

Prime Minister Erdogan’s government remains deeply involved in Afghanistan, and is opposed to Iran’s nuclear weapon program. Furthermore, Turkish cooperation is essential for our troops in Iraq. The substantial majority of the military assets used by Amer- ican troops are flown into Turkey, and then transported to Iraq. For example, 74% of air cargo into Iraq transits through Incirlik Airbase. Despite the high level of cooperation between our two nations, it is undeniable, however, that relations have been strained at times during the recent years. Most alarmingly, a recent pew center poll shows that only 12% of Turks have a favorable opinion of the United States

Iraqi instability causes global catastrophe – spills over to the rest of the Middle East

Ben-atar 6 (Doron– July 11, “Immediate withdrawal: power vacuums in gaza and Iraq” http://www.theglobalist.com/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=5488 TBC 6/26/10)

The governments of both Iraq and the Palestinian authority are weak, ineffective and corrupt. Iraq, like the Gaza strip, is caught in a turf war between armed militias. Islamist militants in both places have created a culture that glorifies ethnic-based murder. And while the focus of the insurgency in Iraq at the moment is on the outside enemy, just as the focus of the militants in Gaza was on fighting the Israeli army, the conflict between ethnicities, regions and interests in Iraq is flaring into a brutal civil war. Americans should not fantasize, as Israelis did a year ago, that once the hated enemy is gone, the crazy quilt of militias could find a peaceful way to negotiate their differences. A state of chaos If the departure of the U.S. troops is followed by Gaza-like chaos, Iraq would become a failed state in the most strategic location on earth. Unlike the Vietnam scenario, the turmoil would not remain confined to the international boundaries of Iraq. Just as Hamas terror spread to Egypt, Iraqi terrorism would destabilize societies all over the region. The misery in Gaza is purely a local humanitarian issue. A global threat But the prosperity of the entire world is threatened by anarchy in Mesopotamia. And once American troops depart, no politician would dare to send American soldiers back into the quagmire. Republicans and Democrats should eschew the popular impulse to bring our boys home. The strategic blunder of invading Iraq could turn into a global catastrophe if a fully functioning state with an effective army and absolute monopoly over the exercise of power is not secured before the departure of U.S. troops.

I/L- Turkey -> radical Islam

Turkey is on the path towards increasingly radical Islam if not reigned in

Flanagan and Brennan 8 (Steven and Samuel, senior vice president and director of the International Security Program at CSIS, fellow with the CSIS International Security Program, CSIS, http://www.setav.org/ups/dosya/18532.pdf)

Those who remain suspicious of the motives of the new Turkish political class point to a creeping Islamization, manifested by what they perceive as dissembling about true intentions (the term for this hidden agenda is takiye) and the growing connection to the Muslim world at the expense of ties with the West. Of the reemergence of Turkey’s Muslim identity, former U.S. ambassador to Turkey Robert Pearson writes, “Turks did not cease to be Muslims [during decades of by-the-book Kemalism]… This deeper current of life in Turkey never disappeared… Over the years, as Turkey’s political parties jockeyed for new support, they began to reach down to this Muslim undercurrent and use it to nourish the political life of the country.”19 Rising religiosity characterizes globalization in every region except Europe (and there, it is strong among minority Muslim populations), so it is no surprise that it has reemerged in Turkey. But the question of the rise of Sunni Islamist tendencies in Turkey is extremely sensitive because of the perceived threat of an aggressive, developing strain of Islam that is anathema to free and open societies. While Turkey is generally regarded as an important, moderating interlocutor, many worry that it may in fact be headed inexorably toward a more radical brand of Islam, with an inherently undemocratic, anti-Semitic, and anti- Western bent. Pearson is more sanguine on this point: “If Turkey continues to register…progress, it will likely avoid the backlash of a religious revolt from its younger generation [as has occurred elsewhere in the Middle East].”20 There is some cause for concern, however. The youth population in Turkey is suffering from an above-average unemployment rate of 18 percent (compared to a national rate of 9 percent unemployment). UN resident coordinator in Turkey Mahmood Ayub has stated that “[i]f Turkey does not succeed in preparing its youth for the challenging global markets of tomorrow and in providing them with more and better jobs, the youth of the future could be a source of social, political and economic tensions in Turkey.”21

\*\*Impacts- Alliance Bad

Ext – Greek Relations k2 Econ

**Strong US-Greek ties are key to cases protecting intellectual property rights**

**Office of the Press Secretary,** 11/20/**99,** “Measures to Strengthen U.S.-Greek Relations,” http://clinton4.nara.gov/textonly/WH/New/Europe-9911/facts/1999-11-20.html

**Due to the substantial progress made by Greece in addressing the intellectual property rights issue, the President has announced that the United States government will proceed rapidly towards a resolution of its** World Trade Organization **(WTO) case against the Greek government for violating television copyright laws.** While U.S. industries estimate losses of $120 million in 1998, strong action by the Greek government reduced that amount by over half this year.

Intellectual property right protection is key to economic growth

**PAULWELL**, **2002** (PHILLIP, SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, “MESSAGE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WEEK,” <http://www.mct.gov.jm/JIPO2.pdf>.

**Intellectual Property Rights** (IPRs), including patents, trademarks, copyrights, **are a key factor in fostering innovation and growth in today’s economy. By promoting innovation, intellectual property rights also serve to strengthen competition in particular markets for** our **goods and services.**  Intellectual Property Week is an extremely important event on the Jamaican calendar, as it underscores the necessity and benefit of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and, very importantly, helps to increase public awareness of how intellectual property is used as a vehicle for the promotion of domestic wealth. **We see intellectual property protection**, therefore, not only **as a means of encouraging foreign investment in information and technology-based industries,** but also as a tool to encourage the exploitation of our cultural heritage.

**Decline in economic growth leads to war--two reasons**  
**RUSSET, 1983**, Bruce, Professor of International Relations, Yale University, INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, **1983**, p. 384.   
**Economic stagnation relative to a state’s rivals may lead to war through either of two routes. First, it may embolden a rival to attack it during its period of weakness, especially if that rival has been able to maintain the dynamism of its own economy**. For example, Iraq chose 1980 as a time to settle affairs with an economically and seemingly politically enfeebled rival, Iran. **Secondly, the stagnation may produce insecurity, fear, and frustration in the minds of the governing elite, leading them to over-react to foreign threats, or to decide to fight a rival immediately, before their own economy has become further weakened.**

Ext – Greek Relations k2 Disease

**Strong US-Greek ties are key to agriculture agreements that halt disease**

**Office of the Press Secretary,** 11/20/**99,** “Measures to Strengthen U.S.-Greek Relations,” http://clinton4.nara.gov/textonly/WH/New/Europe-9911/facts/1999-11-20.html

**The Greek Ministry of Agriculture has agreed to allow** the **U.S.** to resume **humanitarian grain shipments through Greece to other countries in the region. This decision will allow the United States to provide much needed food assistance to many of the Balkan and other Central European countries.** Grain shipments had been impeded due to Greek concerns about U.S. testing methods. **The U.S. and Greece have since agreed upon survey and regulatory control activities designed to make the risk of disease negligible**.

**EMERGING DISEASE THREATENS PLANETARY EXTINCTION  
The Toronto Sun,** 10/16/**1994**, Pg. M6   
**Nor did the media go beyond** Surat **and explain how this largely inconsequential epidemic**, a kind of false alarm in a much larger microbial saga, **was another sharp warning of our species' growing vulnerability to infectious disease. Imagine**, for a moment, if Surat had aroused **a different airborne microbe, a so-called "emerging virus," beyond the waning reach of antibiotics. Suppose that the headliner germ had been a new strain of Ebola** that dissolves internal organs into a bloody tar **or the mysterious "X" virus that killed thousands** in the Sudan last year**. Had such a microbe been unleashed, the final death toll might have been millions, and the world might now be mourning a "new Black Death." The planet, in fact, might be an entirely different and emptier place altogether.**

**DISEASE IS DEADLIER THAN THEIR WAR SCENARIO--DISEASE WILL KILL MORE PEOPLE *AND* COLLPASE HEG**  
**ASHER**, Spring **2001**, Laura Law Student, Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law, 9 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 135, p. 135 (MHHARV5095)  
**The spread of infectious disease is surging** and as it spreads, the need for international regulation also expands. Throughout history **epidemics have been responsible for millions of deaths and the number will undoubtedly rise, due** in part **to** the increasing ease and speed of **international travel. Statistically, disease is a more formidable killer than war, with the power to completely destabilize governments**.

Impact- Israel Relations

Obama is trapped between relations with Israel and Turkey

Rozen 6/21 (Politico, national security correspondent, Laura, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0610/38806.html,

As Turkish-Israeli relations deteriorate, the Obama administration is in a bind. Congress is expressing alarm and demanding that Turkey pay a price for its leaders’ increasingly anti-Israel rhetoric in the wake of Israel’s interception of a Gaza aid flotilla last month and Turkey’s recent vote against a U.S.-backed Iran sanctions resolution. Turkey, meanwhile, is demanding that Israel apologize for killing its citizens in the flotilla and has expressed dismay that the U.S. did not take up an Iranian nuclear fuel swap deal that it negotiated in May. But in a region where the U.S. is stretched thin and short of even semireliable allies, the Obama administration is keeping its public criticism of Turkey muted and trying to move forward. The Obama administration “is in the worst of all worlds,” Eric Edelman, former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, told POLITICO. “The fundamental problem, I believe, which hasn’t been addressed, is that at this stage, the Turks believe we need them more than they need us. But they need us for a lot of things, too.” President Barack Obama and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan will both attend the G-20 meeting in Canada later this week. But U.S. officials were still vague about whether the two will meet on the sidelines, saying no meeting had been firmed up. Meanwhile, officials suggested that the Obama administration might try to use the quiet visit of Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak to Washington this week as an opportunity “to try to patch things up,” if possible, between Israel and Turkey, which have had strong defense ties

US-Israel relations are key to stopping Iranian nuclearization

Danzinger 95

(Raphael Danziger is research and information director at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee and editor of Near East Report, and Bradley Gordon is legislative director at AIPAC. The Middle East Quarterly. End American Aid to Israel?: No, It Remains Vitalhttp://www.meforum.org/article/259)

Nothing has happened in the past sixteen years to detract from the validity of this statement. Quite the contrary, Israel has proved time and again to be indispensable for upholding vital American interests. Through much of the cold war, Israel held pro-Soviet Arab states at bay, helping to constrain radicals from taking over the vulnerable oil-rich Persian Gulf states. In 1981, it destroyed Iraq's nuclear reactor, saving American soldiers from having to face a nuclear-armed Iraq in Operation Desert Storm.

**The end of the cold war has increased Israel's value to the United States, as the Middle East now holds out great threats and benefits for the United States. Israel is uniquely placed to help the United States deal with these threats.**

**Nuclear arms. Iran, Iraq, and Libya--all rogue states--have active programs to develop weapons of mass destruction** (nuclear, chemical, biological), and have sought to acquire long-range ballistic missiles. T**he detailed briefing Secretary of Defense William Perry received in Israel in March on Iran's nuclear capabilities points to Israel's intelligence contribution to countering this dangerous threat. Israel would most likely be the first** -- although not the only -- **target of Iraqi or Iranian nuclear aggression, giving it supreme motivation to help the United States avert that danger. Indeed, Israeli authorities have made clear they will consider direct action if a nuclear threat materializes in Iran or Iraq.**

Impact- Israel Relations

Absent Iranian disarmament, Israel will strike Iran--results in a nuclear holocaust

IHT 8 (Benny Morris. a professor of Middle Eastern history at Ben-Gurion University, International Herald Tribune. July 18, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/18/opinion/18morris.html?pagewanted=print)

Which leaves only Israel — the country threatened almost daily with destruction by Iran’s leaders. Thus the recent reports about Israeli plans and preparations to attack Iran (the period from Nov. 5 to Jan. 19 seems the best bet, as it gives the West half a year to try the diplomatic route but ensures that Israel will have support from a lame-duck White House). The problem is that Israel’s military capacities are far smaller than America’s and, given the distances involved, the fact that the Iranian sites are widely dispersed and underground, and Israel’s inadequate intelligence, it is unlikely that the Israeli conventional forces, even if allowed the use of Jordanian and Iraqi airspace (and perhaps, pending American approval, even Iraqi air strips) can destroy or perhaps significantly delay the Iranian nuclear project. Nonetheless, Israel, believing that its very existence is at stake — and this is a feeling shared by most Israelis across the political spectrum — will certainly make the effort. Israel’s leaders, from Prime Minister Ehud Olmert down, have all explicitly stated that an Iranian bomb means Israel’s destruction; Iran will not be allowed to get the bomb. The best outcome will be that an Israeli conventional strike, whether failed or not — and, given the Tehran regime’s totalitarian grip, it may not be immediately clear how much damage the Israeli assault has caused — would persuade the Iranians to halt their nuclear program, or at least persuade the Western powers to significantly increase the diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran. But the more likely result is that the international community will continue to do nothing effective and that Iran will speed up its efforts to produce the bomb that can destroy Israel. The Iranians will also likely retaliate by attacking Israel’s cities with ballistic missiles (possibly topped with chemical or biological warheads); by prodding its local clients, Hezbollah and Hamas, to unleash their own armories against Israel; and by activating international Muslim terrorist networks against Israeli and Jewish — and possibly American — targets worldwide (though the Iranians may at the last moment be wary of provoking American military involvement). Such a situation would confront Israeli leaders with two agonizing, dismal choices. One is to allow the Iranians to acquire the bomb and hope for the best — meaning a nuclear standoff, with the prospect of mutual assured destruction preventing the Iranians from actually using the weapon. The other would be to use the Iranian counterstrikes as an excuse to escalate and use the only means available that will actually destroy the Iranian nuclear project: Israel’s own nuclear arsenal. Given the fundamentalist, self-sacrificial mindset of the mullahs who run Iran, Israel knows that deterrence may not work as well as it did with the comparatively rational men who ran the Kremlin and White House during the cold war. They are likely to use any bomb they build, both because of ideology and because of fear of Israeli nuclear pre-emption. Thus an Israeli nuclear strike to prevent the Iranians from taking the final steps toward getting the bomb is probable. The alternative is letting Tehran have its bomb. In either case, a Middle Eastern nuclear holocaust would be in the cards.

That draws in every major power

Ivashov 7 (General Leonid Ivashov, vice-president of the Academy on geopolitical affairs. Global Research April 9, 2007. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=5309>)

What might cause the force major event of the required scale? Everything seems to indicate that Israel will be sacrificed. Its involvement in a war with Iran - especially in a nuclear war - is bound to trigger a global catastrophe. The statehoods of Israel and Iran are based on the countries' official religions. A military conflict between Israel and Iran will immediately evolve into a religious one, a conflict between Judaism and Islam. Due to the presence of numerous Jewish and Muslim populations in the developed countries, this would make a global bloodbath inevitable. All of the active forces of most of the countries of the world would end up fighting, with almost no room for neutrality left. Judging by the increasingly massive acquisitions of the residential housing for the Israeli citizens, especially in Russia and Ukraine, a lot of people already have an idea of what the future holds. However, it is hard to imagine a quiet heaven where one might hide from the coming doom. Forecasts of the territorial distribution of the fighting, the quantities and the efficiency of the armaments involved, the profound character of the underlying roots of the conflict and the severity of the religious strife all leave no doubt that this clash will be in all respects much more nightmarish than WWII.

Impact- Turkey/Syria War (1/2)

A. Strong US-Turkish relations spark Turkish aggression that destabilizes the Middle East and cause war with Syria

Carpenter ’99 [Ted Galen, VP Foreign Policy Studies & Defense at CATO, Jan, http://www.hri.org/forum/intpol/carpenter.html]

The strategy of making Turkey a keystone American ally is myopic and potentially very dangerous. U.S. policymakers have been down a similar path before--with disastrous results. During much of the Cold War, Washington treated Iran as an indispensable ally and an important stabilizing force in the region. President Jimmy Carter's infamous 1977 New Year's Eve toast praising the shah for making Iran "an island of stability" in a turbulent part of the world encapsulated long-standing U.S. assumptions.[21](http://www.hri.org/forum/intpol/carpenter.html#21) Washington had used the Central Intelligence Agency to orchestrate a coup to oust Iran's democratic government in 1953 and put the shah back on his throne. Thereafter, it appeared that the shah's regime could do no wrong in the eyes of U.S. policymakers. Not only did Washington ignore Teheran's massive human rights abuses, but it remained silent as the shah systematically suppressed democratic opponents. Washington's indulgent policy toward the authoritarian behavior of Turkey's military is eerily reminiscent of the U.S. policy toward Iran under the shah. We are still paying a steep price for the latter folly. Perhaps even worse, Washington's incessant courtship of Ankara is giving Turkey an inflated sense of its own strategic importance. That courtship is also encouraging (one assumes inadvertently) abrasive, indeed aggressive, behavior on the part of Turkey. Turkey's assumption that it is Washington's essential ally could cause Ankara to provoke a war with Greece over Cyprus or over control of islands in the Aegean.[22](http://www.hri.org/forum/intpol/carpenter.html#22) Likewise, the perception of U.S. acquiescence, if not outright support, might encourage Turkey to seek a new confrontation with Syria or one of its other neighbors over some other issue. For example, Ankara has already imposed a brutal economic blockade against Armenia because of that country's armed struggle with Azerbaijan over control of the latter's predominantly Armenian enclave of Nakorno-Karabakh. A scenario in which Turkey might choose to escalate its coercion against Armenia is hardly fanciful. The Clinton administration's pro-Turkish tilt is based on multiple misconceptions. One fallacy is that Turkey is an indispensable strategic ally. In reality, the United States does not have vital security or economic interests in that part of the world--especially when there is no longer the need to contain the expansionist ambitions of a rival superpower. In particular, the importance of the Caspian oil supply is vastly overrated.[23](http://www.hri.org/forum/intpol/carpenter.html#23) The world already is awash in oil, and given the rapid advancements in discovery techniques and extraction technologies, it is retrograde thinking to regard oil as a scarce and vital commodity.[24](http://www.hri.org/forum/intpol/carpenter.html#24) Unless the United States and other oil-consuming nations replicate their economically illiterate energy policies of the 1970s, oil prices (already nearing record lows in inflation-adjusted terms) are likely to follow the prices of other plentiful commodities to even lower levels. There is no need to support Turkey to gain control of the supposedly essential Caspian oil output. A second fallacy is that Turkey's political system is stable and reliably pro-American. In fact, Turkey is a Potemkin democracy with an authoritarian military elite holding ultimate political power in its own hands. The country is also beset by massive corruption, a serious (albeit perhaps waning) secessionist problem, and a potent Islamist movement.[25](http://www.hri.org/forum/intpol/carpenter.html#25) Building U.S. strategic ties with such an ally is akin to constructing a fortress on quicksand. Finally, the worst fallacy is the pervasive assumption of U.S. policymakers that Turkey is a stabilizing regional power that will help the United States to maintain a relatively benign status quo in the region. To the contrary, Turkey shows signs of being a revisionist--and perhaps an aggressively revisionist--power. Several of its actions in recent years--especially those directed toward Greece, Syria, and Armenia--are typical of a country that has ambitions to become a regional hegemon. Even its behavior regarding the crises in the Balkans, although somewhat less aggressive, is consistent with that pattern. Washington apparently assumes that its policy agenda and Ankara's are compatible, if not congruent. But U.S. leaders must consider the very real possibility that Ankara may have ambitions that would be disruptive to the region and undermine U.S. objectives. Washington's indulgent double standard toward Turkey is objectionable on the grounds of hypocrisy, but there is a more pragmatic reason that it should be abandoned forthwith. By treating Turkey as an indispensable ally, the United States may be sowing the seeds of regional disorder and perhaps even armed conflict that might otherwise be avoidable. It is not America's responsibility to preserve peace and stability throughout the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, but Washington should at least not pursue policies that increase the prospect of tragedy.

Impact- Turkey/Syria War (2/2)

B. Syrian war leads to WMD use.

Al ’01 [Guray, 1st Lt. Turkish Army, Dec, http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA401656&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf]

In an armed confrontation, Ankara is well placed to achieve an operational success. Syria is preoccupied on other fronts, the Golan Heights and Lebanon, and is in no position to confront Turkey openly.226 Turkey's ground forces are twice as large as Syria's and more combat-experienced, and most of Syria's ground orders of battle are pinned down on the Golan or in Lebanon. 227 Moreover, according to some analysts, Turkey reckons that Damascus, fearing Turkish-Israeli military coordination, would feel uncomfortable redeploying significant forces to its border with Turkey. Therefore, Turkey could easily make a quick advance in days deep inside Syrian territory, and the Syrian army could suffer enormous casualties. If Syrian forces are unable to halt the Turkish offensives, then it is highly possible that Syria might consider using weapons of mass destruction to stem Turkish incursions into Syrian territory. A serious PKK-related Turkish-Syrian clash in this manner could have significant consequences for Turkey. Although a large-scale Turkish intervention aimed at toppling the Syrian leadership is unlikely, an unequivocal Syrian ground-defeat might well weaken the current regime and perhaps change the dynamics in the Middle East peace- process in favor of Israel.228 The situation could easily evolve into a directly threatening character for the survival of the Assad regime. After being defeated on three occasions on the conventional battlefield in 1967, 1973 and 1982, Syria might consider using WMD against Turkey if the Syrian leadership deemed a total defeat inevitable or the survival of the regime is at stake. According to Ian O. Lesser, under such conditions, use of WMD against Turkey is a distinct possibility: In the case of an open confrontation, if significant amount of Syrian territory is lost or the survival of the Assad regime is threatened, it is not beyond imagining that Syria might employ Scud B and Scud C missiles against Turkish targets, possibly including Ankara. Adana and Iskenderun would be particularly vulnerable.

Impact- Terrorism (1/2)

US-Turkey relations are key to several areas of democracy promotion

Baran 7 (Zeyno, Director of International Security and Energy Programs at The Nixon Center,

[The U.S.-Turkey Partnership: Looking to the Future, http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol2Issue27/Vol2Issue27Baran.html]

At the same time, Turkey could serve as a possible “example” to the greater Middle East, which includes Iran, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, at a recent meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Countries (OIC) in Tehran, stated that the current Turkish government wants to prove that “a Muslim society can be democratic, open, transparent, pluralistic and modern, while preserving its identity.” He urged that:  “countries in the Islamic world must act with a refreshed  vision in which good governance, transparency and accountability will reign, the fundamental rights and freedoms as well as gender equality are upheld, and there would be no place for blunting rhetoric and slogans….we should first put our house in order. Rationalism should be our driving force, as we draw our strength from our spiritual values. Creating a synergy from these values inherent in our being will be our test in, as well as our contribution to, our modern age…I challenge the view that modernity and democracy based on the rule of law, political and economic participation, and gender equality cannot exist in the Muslim world. The Turkish experience proves otherwise.” Gul also said the Turkish government would explore with the United States and Europe ideas on:   Regional good neighborliness charter or a code of conduct Regional security and cooperation process Regional trade liberalization Enhanced economic and cultural interrelationship Regional anti-terror pact These approaches provide many opportunities for cooperation. While the United States works with Turkey on promoting the “Turkish example” for the greater Middle East, however, it needs to better understand what the “Turkish model” is—it is truly unique and the U.S. ought not try to shape it to become a bit more religious or a bit less secular so that it can be more applicable for the Arab Middle East. The U.S. does not have a good track record in dealing with political Islam and ought to stay out of this area in Turkey as well.

Emerging Middle East democracies will empower terrorists- empirically proven

Ottawayis & Carothers 4 [Marina, senior associate at the Democracy and Rule of Law Project of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace & Thomas Carothers, author of Aiding Democracy Abroad and a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment, Foreign Policy, November/December 2004, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\_id=2705]

“Middle East Democracy Is the Cure for Islamist Terrorism” No. This view is rooted in a simplistic assumption: Stagnant, repressive Arab regimes create positive conditions for the growth of radical Islamist groups, which turn their sights on the United States because it embodies the liberal sociopolitical values that radical Islamists oppose. More democracy, therefore, equals less extremism. History tells a different story. Modern militant Islam developed with the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the 1920s, during the most democratic period in that country’s history. Radical political Islam gains followers not only among repressed Saudis but also among some Muslims in Western democracies, especially in Europe. The emergence of radical Islamist groups determined to wreak violence on the United States is thus not only the consequence of Arab autocracy. It is a complex phenomenon with diverse roots, which include U.S. sponsorship of the mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s (which only empowered Islamist militants); the Saudi government’s promotion of radical Islamic educational programs worldwide; and anger at various U.S. policies, such as the country’s stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the basing of military forces in the region.Moreover, democracy is not a cure-all for terrorism. Like it or not, the most successful efforts to control radical Islamist political groups have been antidemocratic, repressive campaigns, such as those waged in Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria in the 1990s. The notion that Arab governments would necessarily be more effective in fighting extremists is wishful thinking, no matter how valuable democratization might be for other reasons. The experience of countries in different regions makes clear that terrorist groups can operate for sustained periods even in successful democracies, whether it is the Irish Republican Army in Britain or the ETA (Basque separatists) in Spain. The ETA gained strength during the first two decades of Spain’s democratization process, flourishing more than it had under the dictatorship of Gen. Francisco Franco. In fragile democratic states—as new Arab democracies would likely be for years—radical groups committed to violence can do even more harm, often for long periods, as evidenced by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, or the Maoist rebels in Nepal.

Impact- Terrorism (2/2)

Terrorism causes extinction

Pacotti 3 (March 31http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2003/03/31/knowledge/index.html)

A similar trend has appeared in proposed solutions to high-tech terrorist threats. Advances in biotech, chemistry, and other fields are expanding the power of individuals to cause harm, and this has many people worried. Glenn E. Schweitzer and Carole C. Dorsch, writing for The Futurist, gave this warning in 1999: "Technological advances threaten to outdo anything terrorists have done before; superterrorism has the potential to eradicate civilization as we know it." Schweitzer and Dorsch are so alarmed that they go on to say, "Civil liberties are important for a democratic society; the time has arrived, however, to reconfigure some aspects of democracy, given the violence that is on the doorstep." The Sept. 11 attacks have obviously added credence to their opinions. In 1999, they recommended an expanded role for the CIA, "greater government intervention" in Americans' lives, and the "honorable deed" of "whistle-blowing" -- proposals that went from fringe ideas to policy options and talk-show banter in less than a year. Taken together, their proposals aim to gather information from companies and individuals and feed that information into government agencies. A network of cameras positioned on street corners would nicely complement their vision of America during the 21st century. If after Sept. 11 and the anthrax scare these still sound like wacky Orwellian ideas to you, imagine how they will sound the day a terrorist opens a jar of Ebola-AIDS spores on Capitol Hill. As Sun Microsystems' chief scientist, Bill Joy, warned: "We have yet to come to terms with the fact that the most compelling 21st-century technologies -- robotics, genetic engineering, and nanotechnology -- pose a different threat than the technologies that have come before. Specifically, robots, engineered organisms, and nanobots share a dangerous amplifying factor: They can self-replicate. A bomb is blown up only once -- but one bot can become many, and quickly get out of control." Joy calls the new threats "knowledge-enabled mass destruction." To cause great harm to millions of people, an extreme person will need only dangerous knowledge, which itself will move through the biosphere, encoded as matter, and flit from place to place as easily as dangerous ideas now travel between our minds. In the information age, dangerous knowledge can be copied and disseminated at light speed, and it threatens everyone. Therefore, Joy's perfectly reasonable conclusion is that we should relinquish "certain kinds of knowledge." He says that it is time to reconsider the open, unrestrained pursuit of knowledge that has been the foundation of science for 300 years. "[D]espite the strong historical precedents, if open access to and unlimited development of knowledge henceforth puts us all in clear danger of extinction, then common sense demands that we reexamine even these basic, long-held beliefs."

\*\*Aff

Random QPQ Aff Card

Europe and Turkey aren’t barriers and quid pro quo fails—other concessions necessary and process is lengthy

Bergenäs 10 (Johan, research associate at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, 3/2, http://www.connectusfund.org/blogs/bombs-away-removing-tactical-nukes-europe)

First, some argue that the bombs stationed in Europe offer allies reassurance about the credibility of U.S. security commitments should the continent be attacked by a foreign power. But this argument is unrealistic in today's environment. Instead, Obama should reassure U.S. allies that Europe falls under the U.S. strategic nuclear weapons umbrella regardless of tactical nuclear weapons deployments, as former Defense Secretary William Perry did in the 1980s. Additionally, the combination of missile defense and conventional deterrence is more than sufficient to deter any perceived threats against Europe, including against Eastern and Central European states and the Baltic countries. Second, some suggest that NATO should utilize these outdated weapons as leverage in negotiations with Russia, seeking comparable reductions in the Russian tactical nuclear arsenal. But quid pro quo cutbacks with Russia should not be the guiding principle in removing tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. To begin with, Russia still has thousands of such tactical warheads and rejects asymmetrical reductions, so such an approach would need to include other costly concessions. Furthermore, if the START negotiations are any indication, this process would likely be a lengthy and painful one. Instead, Obama should prevent this scenario by taking action within the NATO context, thereby calling these weapons home without such lengthy and unpredictable negotiations with Moscow. A third barrier to removing these weapons is Turkey's perceived desire to keep them within its territory. However, senior Turkish officials recently indicated that they "would not insist" that NATO retain its forward-deployed nuclear weapons, and that conventional forces were sufficient to satisfy Ankara's security requirements. Such a position is perhaps motivated by the knowledge that Turkey would still be covered by the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella. But were NATO to remove its weapons from other nuclear-sharing nations, Turkey would be left as the sole nation hosting them. That's a scenario Ankara would prefer to avoid having to explain to its Middle Eastern neighbors, some of whom already view the current situation as a violation of the NPT.

Relations Collapse Inevitable

Relations collapse inevitable- failure of domestic politics

Walker ’07 [Joshua, Graduate Fellow & PhD Candidate Princeton, Washington Quarterly, Winter ’07-’08, http://www.twq.com/08winter/docs/08winter\_walker.pdf]

Although the United States and Turkey have had serious policy disagreements in the past, there has always been an overarching strategic vision to keep the alliance intact. Now, with the absence of a common threat from the Soviet Union and with new civilian-military dynamics in Turkey, the future of the U.S.-Turkish alliance needs to be carefully reexamined. Because of its Islamic roots and Muslim outlook, the AKP has brought with it an unprecedented willingness to reach out to Turkey’s Middle East- ern neighbors, such as Iran and Syria, which have traditionally been viewed as common enemies by Ankara and Washington. Articulating a new vision for Turkey that is not dependent on Washington while actively seeking ways to balance its relationships and alliances, the AKP still has many domestic hurdles to overcome. Although the AKP’s policy of maintaining optimal inde- pendence and leverage on the global and regional stage appeals to its Turkish constituency, this type of policy does not bode well for Turkey’s historic alli- ance with the United States. Although all relationships as complex as the U.S.-Turkish alliance experi- ence natural ebbs and flows, the rupture in strategic vision between these allies has been so egregious that some commentators have placed the blame squarely on the AKP. Given the internal tensions within Turkey surrounding the Islamist roots of the party and the sensitivities of Turkey’s secular estab- lishment, the argument goes that the U.S.-Turkish relationship has become the latest victim of domestic Turkish politics.1 The March 1, 2003, vote in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) to reject the U.S. request to open a northern front against Iraq has come to symbolize the clear divergence of strategic interests between the United States and Turkey, and it has also erroneously been used to demonstrate the anti- American bias of the AKP. Yet, by tracking the ascent of the AKP from the November 2002 elections to the most recent ones, it is clear that, far from being the source of anti-Americanism in Turkey, the AKP represents an ideal partner for the United States in the region.

No Prolif

No risk of Turkish prolif - too many constraints

Kibaroglu, ‘8 [Mustafa, “Implications of a nuclear Iran for Turkey” Middle East Policy, 12-22-2008, <http://www.articlearchives.com/asia/western-asia-saudai-arabia/2282012-1.html>]

Hence, one particular condition for Turkey to go nuclear would be to secure the endorsement of such a power. This, however, is not imminent. Short of such support, the **only possible way of meeting the scientific and technological requirements would be through an illegal network** similar to that of Abdel Qader Khan, the "father of the Pakistani bomb," now under house arrest in Pakistan. The **magnitude and scope of illegal acquisition would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, in a country like Turkey**, where there are still small but effective groups of concerned people who would do their best to reveal such critical information to the world. **Should such a development take place, Turkey would be treated as a "rogue state, "something unthinkable and unacceptable given Turkey's record of nonproliferation efforts.  Notwithstanding** these difficulties, even if one considers for a moment that Turkey has decided to go nuclear and managed to get the support of a nuclear power, or that it has established a clandestine nuclear-weapons procurement network and gotten away with it without being noticed, **what will be the role of nuclear weapons in Turkey's security and foreign policies?** Will nuclear weapons enhance Turkey's security? Or, will they simply harm Turkey's interests?  The lead author of this article has spent years studying military history, superpower rivalry, arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation. Even when looked at from these rich perspectives, no feasible scenarios are imaginable under which nuclear weapons would bring additional security to Turkey. On the contrary**, any attempt to illegally pursue, let alone acquire, nuclear weapons will be extremely damaging to Turkey's vital interests. Turkey is passing through a difficult domestic and international political conjuncture in which there are many sensitive issues** (social, economic, political) **to be exploited by its rivals. In addition, at a time when its relations with the United States and the EU are in decline, these countries may be of no help in dealing with the problems that will arise.**

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Turkey’s aligning itself with the Middle East

Tisdall 6/21 (Simon, assistant editor of Guardian, UTV, http://www.u.tv/News/Turkeys-zero-problems-policy-is-a-flop/892cc436-4130-415e-9ca8-5e26e23e34f8)

But the renewed fighting also poses a larger question: to what extent the policy espoused by Erdogan and his high-profile foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, of "zero problems with neighbours" is producing tangible, lasting results. On a range of fronts, high ambitions are colliding with intractable realities on the ground. Erdogan's fierce condemnation of the killing on Saturday of 11 soldiers by Kurdistan Workers party (PKK) fighters possibly reflected frustration that Ankara's pursuit of non-military solutions has produced little that is concrete in the eight years since his Justice and Development party (AKP) first came to power. "Today we will not make the traitors happy," Erdogan said during a visit to Van. "We will defend this ground heroically ... "I say here very clearly, they will not win. They will gain nothing. They will melt away in their own darkness ... they will drown in their own blood." Such rhetoric, echoing Erdogan's full-blooded attacks on Israel over Gaza, could not disguise widely felt dismay that a conflict that has claimed an estimated 40,000 lives since 1984 may be reviving, partly due to political failures. Citing continuing Turkish military attacks, the PKK announced this month it was ending a unilateral ceasefire. The decision followed the banning by Turkey's constitutional court of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society party (DTP), a ruling strongly criticised by Massoud Barzani, president of Iraqi Kurdistan, and the EU. Concern is now growing that further clashes could lead to a repeat of the 2008 Turkish military incursion into northern Iraq, where some PKK fighters are based. Such an outcome could strain Ankara's relations with Baghdad, where its efforts to encourage a role in government for Iraq's Sunni Muslim minority are already viewed as unwelcome meddling by some Shia politicians. Turkey's "zero problems" has also run into trouble around Azerbaijan's disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, where four ethnic Armenian and one Azeri soldier were killed in a skirmish on Saturday. Turkey and Armenia struck a supposedly historic peace accord last year but the deal backfired when close Turkish ally Azerbaijan angrily insisted the Nagorno-Karabakh stand-off be settled first. Instead of easing tensions, Erdogan's initiative inflamed them. Despite its aspirations to act as a regional powerbroker, Turkish talk has not been matched by persuasive actions in another troublespot – Cyprus. Elections earlier this year saw Turkish Cypriots vote in a new president who appears to favour the permanent partition of the island, notwithstanding the ongoing UN-sponsored reunification talks backed by Greece and the EU. Erdogan has certainly improved relations with one important neighbour: Iran. His decision to vote against the latest UN sanctions on Tehran dismayed the US and European countries while delighting President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In contrast, relations with Israel are at low ebb after the Gaza flotilla debacle, with Turkish media reporting that diplomatic and military relations will be frozen indefinitely. Erdogan's regional foreign policy initiatives, his flirtation with Iran, his split with Israel, and his courting of supposedly suspect countries such as Syria have led western commentators to speculate about a "strategic realignment" in Turkish policy, away from the west and Nato and towards the Arab and Muslim worlds, in parallel with the AKP's pursuit of a neo-Islamist agenda at home. "Turkey's Islamist government [seems] focused not on joining the European Union but the Arab League – no, scratch that, on joining the Hamas-Hezbollah-Iran resistance front against Israel," complained American columnist Tom Friedman.

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Turkey becoming aligned with the Middle East—anti-American propaganda and increasing Islamic influence

Rubin 10 (Michael, scholar at American Enterprise Institute, July/August, http://www.commentarymagazine.com/viewarticle.cfm/turkey--from-ally-to-enemy-15464)

A decade ago, Turks saw themselves in a camp with the United States, Western Europe, and Israel; today Turkish self-identity places the country firmly in a camp led by Iran, Syria, Sudan, and Hamas. Turkey may be a NATO member, but polls nevertheless show it to be the world’s most anti-American country (although, to be fair, the Pew Global Attitudes Project did not conduct surveys in Libya or North Korea). Nor do Turks differentiate between the U.S. government and the American people: they hate Americans almost as much as they hate Washington. This is no accident. From almost day one, Erdogan has encouraged, and his allies have financed, a steady stream of anti-American and anti-Semitic incitement. Certainly, many Turks opposed the liberation of Iraq in 2003, but this was largely because Erdogan bombarded them with anti-American incitement before Parliament’s vote, which withdrew the support promised to the operation. Much of Erdogan’s incitement, however, cannot be dismissed as a dispute over the Iraq war. In 2004, Yeni Safak, a newspaper Erdogan endorsed, published an enemies list of prominent Jews. In 2006, not only did Turkish theaters headline Valley of the Wolves, a fiercely anti-American and anti-Semitic movie that featured a Jewish doctor harvesting the organs of dead Iraqis, but the prime minister’s wife also publicly endorsed the film and urged all Turks to see it. Turkish newspapers reported that prominent AKP supporters and Erdogan aides financed its production. While much of the Western world boycotted Hamas in the wake of the 2006 Palestinian elections in order to force it to renounce violence, Erdogan not only extended a hand to the group but also welcomed Khaled Mashaal, leader of its most extreme and recalcitrant faction, as his personal guest. The question for policymakers, however, should not be whether Turkey is lost but rather how Erdogan could lead a slow-motion Islamic revolution below the West’s radar. This is both a testament to Erdogan’s skill and a reflection of Western delusion. Before taking power, Erdogan and his advisers cultivated Western opinion makers. He concentrated not on American pundits who found U.S. policy insufficiently leftist and sympathetic to the Islamic world but rather on natural critics, hawkish American supporters of Turkey and Israel who helped introduce Erdogan confidantes to Washington policymakers.

Turkey’s strengthening relations with Iran--Kurd minority and energy

Cook and Sherwood-Randall 6 (Steven, expert on Arab and Turkish politics, and Elizabeth, research scholar at Stanford, Council on Foreign Relations, No. 15, June)

Ankara’s policy toward Iran is similar to its posture vis-à-vis Syria. While Turkish officials acknowledge that the Iranian regime is a source of tension and instability in the region, they regard cordial relations with the Iranians as a means of guarding against potential Iranian meddling. In addition, the Turks have significant economic and energy interests in Iran. Trade between the two countries exceeded $4 billion by the end of 2005, and in a deal extending until 2022, Iran supplies Turkey with 10 billion cubic meters of gas annually. The energy agreement has, however, been a source of tension between the two countries. In late January 2006, the flow of gas from Iran to Turkey inexplicably dropped by 70 percent. Tehran blamed the decrease on technical problems, but the Turks remain wary of what they perceive to be Iran’s use of gas as a lever to intimidate Turkey at the same time that Ankara’s Western partners seek sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program. Despite the dispute over gas supplies, Ankara and Tehran have sought to maintain good relations. In late February 2006, the eleventh Iran-Turkey High Security Council met in Tehran. This bilateral meeting, which was presided over at the deputy minister level, reaffirmed Turkish-Iranian trade relations and included discussions concerning border security and drug smuggling. Finally, the same logic that is driving close relations between Ankara and Damascus is at work in Turkey’s relations with Iran: the common desire to forestall Kurdish independence in northern Iraq. Like Turkey and Syria, Iran has a large Kurdish population that could agitate for political rights should Iraq’s Kurds achieve independence

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Turkey increasingly supports Iran’s nuclear program

Coughlin 6/10 (Con, a world-renowned expert on the Middle East and Islamic terrorism, Telegraph, http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/concoughlin/100043002/turkeys-alliance-with-iran-is-a-threat-to-world-peace/)

Turkey’s decision to veto the latest U.N. Security Council resolution on Iran should be of concern for all those, like me, who desire a peaceful resolution of the international crisis over Iran’s nuclear programme. The Turks are apparently upset that the West has not responded positively to the nuclear deal it recently negotiated with Iran, with Brazil’s assistance, whereby Tehran would ship some of its stockpile of enriched uranium to Ankara in return for fuel rods for its so-called research reactor in Tehran. In fact this deal was nothing more than a watered-down version of the agreement Iran negotiated with the world’s leading powers in Geneva last year, and then reneged upon. Crucially, it made no provision for Iran to call a halt to the controversial uranium enrichment programme at Natanz that allows it to produce another 100 kilos of fissile material each month. (Iran now has about 2.5 tons of enriched uranium, more than enough to make an atom bomb.) But the Iran-Turkey deal is indicative of a far more worrying trend in relations between the two countries. I now gather that Iranian officials were in close contact with the “aid” activists responsible for organising the flotilla that tried to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza. Turkey has, of course, become an increasingly vocal supporter of Iran’s right to develop nuclear technology in recent weeks, and my fear now that, having been thwarted in its attempts to negotiate an end to the nuclear crisis, it will be tempted to help Iran beat the new sanctions regime by smuggling goods across their joint border. This would be disastrous not just for the West, but for Turkey as well. If the sanctions fail, then the pressure will grow for more robust action to prevent Iran from achieving its aim of developing nuclear weapons. Does Turkey really want to be the country responsible for launching a war between Iran and the West? I sincerely hope not, and that Ankara comes to realise that, so far as its policy with Iran is concerned, it is playing with fire.

**Turkey is becoming more independent—Kurds, use of air bases, and Middle Eastern orientation**

Larrabee 8 (F. Stephen, senior staff member of RAND, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada479985&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

In the future, Turkey is likely to be a less predictable and more difficult ally. While it will continue to want good ties with the United States, Turkey is likely to be drawn more heavily into the Middle East by the Kurdish issue, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and the fallout from the crisis in Lebanon. As a result, the tension between Turkey’s Western identity and its Middle Eastern orientation is likely to grow. At the same time, the divergences between U.S. and Turkish interests that have manifested themselves over the last decade are likely to increase. Given its growing equities in the Middle East, Turkey is likely to be even more reluctant in the future to allow its bases, particularly Incirlik, to be used to undertake combat operations in the Middle East. President Özal’s willingness to allow the United States to fly sorties out of Incirlik during the Gulf War was the exception, not the rule. Since then, Turkey has increasingly restricted U.S. use of Incirlik for combat missions in the Middle East. The United States should therefore not count on being able to use Turkish bases, particularly Incirlik, as a staging area for combat operations in the Gulf and Middle East. Moreover, given the importance of the Kurdish issue for Turkish security, Turkey has strong reasons to pursue good ties with Iran and Syria, both of which share Turkey’s desire to prevent the emergence of an independent Kurdish state. Turkey’s growing energy ties with Iran have reinforced interest in that particular tie. Thus, Turkey is unlikely to support U.S. policies aimed at isolating Iran and Syria or overthrowing the regimes in either country. Rather, Ankara is likely to favor policies aimed at engaging Iran and Syria and to encourage the United States to open dialogues with both countries.

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Roots of tension are harder to solve than a simple change in policy

Larrabee 10 (F. Stephen, senior staff member of RAND, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND\_MG899.pdf)

While some analysts have sought to blame the AKP for the growth of anti-Americanism, disenchantment with U.S. policy is widespread and is not limited to any one party. The growth of anti- Americanism is visible across the entire Turkish political spectrum. This is well illustrated by the political evolution of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the main opposition party. Traditionally one of the most pro-Western and pro-American parties in Turkey, the CHP has since 2003 increasingly adopted a more nationalistic and anti- American tone, largely in reaction to U.S. policy in Iraq and to the reluctance of the United States to support Turkey’s struggle against the PKK more actively. Significantly, the change in U.S. policy since late 2007 (discussed in more detail in a later section) has led to only a slight decline in Turkish anti-American sentiment.7 Turkey remains one of the most anti- American counties in the world. The “Obama bounce,” visible elsewhere in Europe, has been considerably weaker in Turkey. This suggests that disenchantment with the United States in Turkey has deep roots and reflects more than simple dissatisfaction with U.S. policy toward Iraq and the PKK. Thus, regaining support for U.S. policy in Turkey is likely to take longer and prove more difficult than elsewhere in Europe.8