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\_\_\_\*\*US-ROK – 1NC

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Relations improving – cooperation after the Cheonan incident proves

RTT 10 (RTT global financial newswires, 6/17, <http://www.rttnews.com/Content/GeneralNews.aspx?Node=B1&Id=1336908>) LL

(RTTNews) - Sending a strong signal to Pyongyang ahead of a joint show of defense strength, South Korea and the United States expressed solidarity over the sinking of a Southern warship they blame on North Korea, with a senior American diplomat saying the allies face the reclusive Communist nation from a position of "profound strength." It coincides with reports that the top U.S. General on the Korean peninsula will lead a major U.S.-South Korean military exercise this summer, as questions were raised about the South's ability to respond to a North Korean attack in the wake of renewed tension in the region. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell, who is on a two-day visit to Seoul, met with South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan and Vice- Foreign Minister Chun Yung-woo separately, as Seoul steps up its diplomatic drive to convince the U.N. Security Council members to punish Pyongyang over the March sinking of the warship. A joint investigation by U.S., British, Australian and Swedish experts concluded that the South Korean frigate 'Cheonan' - which sank on March 26 killing 46 sailors - was hit by a torpedo, probably originating from the North. South Korea suspended commercial relations with the North and demanded an official apology from Pyongyang for the incident. Pyongyang denied the charges, and announced that it was severing all relations with South Korea and cutting communications links. It also issued the threat of "total war" with South Korea. Both the countries presented their cases before the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) on Monday. North Korea's envoy repeated the threat of war "If the Security Council releases any documents against us, condemning or pressuring us." The UNSC expressed concern that the sinking could endanger peace on the peninsula, and it urged Seoul and Pyongyang to refrain from any provocative acts. Addressing the media after the meeting in Seoul Thursday, Campbell said: "We face North Korean provocation from a position of profound strength." He told reporters that the international community must take a "strong stance" and Washington would strengthen cooperation with Seoul. "We are determined to show that our alliance is standing very firmly together during an absolutely critical period," Yonhap News Agency quoted Campbell as saying in opening remarks at the meeting with Yu Myung-hwan. Seoul's Foreign Ministry said informal discussions on the issue were underway among 15 members of the UNSC, including five veto-wielding permanent members. U.S. Forces Korea commander Gen. Walter Sharp will reportedly lead the Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) military exercise, the date of which is not finalized. "We are adjusting UFG to better account for provocations and threats we see coming from [North Korea] today," USFK spokeswoman Col. Jane Crichton was quoted as saying. Ulchi Freedom Guardian is one of two joint major military drills the U.S. and South Koreaconduct annually. This year's UFG was to be the third of four testing South Korea's ability to lead troops before the planned transfer of operational control in 2012. The maneuvers by the Navies of the two allied nations, which focuse on anti-submarine drills, are due this month. Reports said U.S. naval attack group led by nuclear-powered aircraft carrier George Washington had left for South Korea early this month. About 10,000 U.S. troops and 55,000 South Korean soldiers participated in last summer's exercise. The U.S. government on Tuesday extended economic sanctions on North Korea for another year, saying its nuclear program is posing an "unusual and extraordinary threat" to U.S. security and foreign policy.

Pullout signals abandonment – functionally ends the US-ROK alliance.

Kelley 09 (“Should the US Pull Out of South Korea (2): No” Robert E Kelly, Political Science & Diplomacy Pusan National University, December 18, 2009)

2. It also means that the US will lose SK as an ally, because without the troops, they’ll feel, rightfully, that the US abandoned them. It would be nice to assure SK security without the ground forces, but US infantry on the ground (the USFK logo above) sends a much greater signal of commitment than air and sea power. SK will slide into China’s orbit if the US leaves. It’s already edging that way now. If America bails, it loses them. It is correct that SK no longer needs us to win a second Korean war though. So after unification, US retrenchment from Asia would be more possible and likely. But if America sticks with the Koreans through these difficult times, it will have them as good allies long into the future. Consider how loyal Kuwait and Germany are to the US because of historical goodwill. When Korea finally does unify – and it will happen as the post-Cold War North is in a permanent economic and legitimacy crisis – the Koreans will be deeply grateful if the US is here, or deeply resentful, and likely very pro-Chinese, if the US is not.

US-ROK – 1NC

**South Korean cooperation is the lynchpin of US-China cooperation over Asian war**

Center for U.S.-Korea Policy 9 ( The Asia Foundation, http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/DPRKContingencyCUSKP0908.pdf)

The United States and South Korea must coordinate with China based on mutual understandings of China’s response to U.S.-ROK planning and assessment of the North Korean situation. Existing bilateral channels may serve as a staring point. The China-ROK strategic cooperative dialogue launched in 2008 could include discussion of rules and principles for responding to North Korean contingencies such as China’s “Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” to prevent any abrupt Chinese intervention that is feared by South Korea, in addition to practical steps such as military hotlines that remain a weak spot in China-ROK military cooperation. As an initial confidence-building measure South Korea could also begin a new track 1.5 or 2 dialogue with China on DPRK contingency in close coordination with the United States and in parallel with a similar U.S.-China dialogue. This form of dialogue may eventually evolve 18 into a track 1 U.S.-China-ROK trilateral, with a focus on discreet military talks. In addition, Seoul may gain from U.S. access to Chinese thinking through existing U.S.- China mechanisms for possible DPRK information-sharing such as the Senior Dialogue, Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED), and bilateral summits, although most North Korearelated discussion at these forums have been in the context of the Six Party Talks

Communication avoids strategic blunders that instantly go nuclear – outweighs the Aff

Lind 05 (William, Director of the Center for Cultural Conservativism, “War With China?”, http://www.lewrockwell.com/lind/lind65.html)

I regard a war with China – hot or cold – as perhaps the greatest strategic blunder the United States could make, beyond those it has already made. The end result would be the same as that from the 20th century wars between Britain and Germany: it reduced both to second-rate powers. In the 21st century, the real victors would be the non-state forces of the Fourth Generation, who would fill the gap created by the reduction of both Chinese and American power. Given my foreboding – in George W. Bush’s Washington, it seems the rule is that any blunder we can make, we will make – I was struck by the title of Robert D. Kaplan’s article in the June *Atlantic Monthly*, "How We Would Fight China." Kaplan has written some excellent material on the breakdown of the state and the rise of non-state elements. Here, however, I think he gets it wrong. Kaplan sees the 21st century being defined by a new Cold War between China and the United States, rather than the clash between states and non-state forces. I believe this phenomenon will be far more century-shaping than any conflict between states. While Kaplan writes about how the U.S. could use naval power – subtly – to contain a rising China, within the framework of a Bismarckian *Realpolitik* that accommodates everyone’s interests, he recognizes the danger to all of a Cold War turning hot. He writes, "Only a similarly pragmatic approach (similar to Bismarck’s) will allow us to accommodate China’s inevitable re-emergence as a great power. The alternative will be to turn the earth of the twenty-first century into a battleground." Regrettably, there are influential voices in Washington that want a war with China, the sooner the better. The most likely cause is Taiwan. Few in Washington understand why China is so adamant about Taiwan remaining officially part of China. The reason is China’s history, throughout which her greatest threat has not been foreign invasion but internal division. China has often fractured, sometimes into many parts. Today, Beijing fears that if one province, Taiwan, achieves independence, others will follow. China will go to war, including with the United States, to prevent that from happening. Correctly, Kaplan observes that China is not able to successfully fight a sea and air war with America: China has committed itself to significant military spending, but its navy and air force will not be able to match ours for some decades. The Chinese are therefore not going to do us the favor of engaging in conventional air and naval battles, like those fought in the Pacific during World War II. So how would China fight us? If we send some carrier battle groups to intervene in a war between China and Taiwan, I think China will do something Kaplan does not mention. She will go nuclear at sea from the outset. When the Cold War ended, we found out that the Soviet Union planned to do exactly that (so much for Reagan Administration plans to send our carriers charging up to the Kola Peninsula). The Chinese might employ nuclear-armed anti-ship missiles and torpedoes, fired from submarines or surface ships, but I think her little surprise for us may be nastier. Kaplan briefly mentions that China "may eventually be able to lob missiles accurately at moving ships in the Pacific" from deep in Chinese territory. I think those missiles, ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, may be ready now – perhaps with a bit of clandestine targeting assistance from a Russia whose sphere of influence the United States is aggressively invading. The Chinese way of war is indirect. In most cases, that means China will engage us with "soft power," as she is already doing on multiple fronts. But in the case of American intervention in a Taiwan crisis, what if a Chinese ballistic missile popped a nuke say, 100 miles from an advancing American carrier battle group? No one gets hurt, but the message would be loud and clear: keep coming and you’re toast. If we kept coming anyway and the Chinese did nuke a carrier, we would immediately face an asymmetrical situation. How would we respond? By nuking a Chinese carrier? China doesn’t have any. If we drop a nuke on Chinese territory, we have initiated a strategic nuclear exchange. Is Taiwan worth Seattle or L.A.?

\_\_\_\*\*US-ROK – UQ

US-ROK – UQ

Relations high – cooperation over naval matters prove

Sung-ki, 6-18 (Jung, The Korea Times, June 18, <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/06/116_67878.html>) LL

South Korea and the United States have agreed to stage joint naval exercises later this month in the West Sea, an official at the Ministry of National Defense said Friday. “We’ve decided to stage joint naval drills in the final week of this month,” the official said. “U.S. warships belonging to the U.S. 7th Fleet, including an aircraft carrier, will join the drills as planned before.” The two governments were originally scheduled to hold naval exercises, including a joint anti-submarine drill, in early June in a show of force against possible North Korean provocation in waters near the sea border. But the plan was postponed as the allies put more weight on diplomatic efforts to censure the North, blamed for the March 26 sinking of the Navy frigate Cheonan. A multinational investigation team released a report last month saying that a North Korean submarine had torpedoed the 1,200-ton frigate. Forty-six sailors lost their lives in the naval disaster. The forthcoming exercises will address scenarios, such as thwarting special forces infiltration into the South, detecting North Korean submarines, and combined operations of the Navy and Air Force, according to ministry officials. A joint anti-submarine exercise is expected to be held next month, they said. The U.S. 7th Fleet will likely dispatch the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington, as well as nuclear-powered submarines, Aegis-equipped warships and amphibious assault landing ships, the officials said. Named after the first president of the United States, George Washington is the sixth ship in the Nimitz class. Commissioned in July 1992, she is 233 meters in length and 78 meters in width. The 100,000-ton aircraft carrier based in the Yokosuka naval base in Japan can accommodate about 6,250 crew members and carry some 90 fixed wing aircraft and helicopters. South Korea plans to mobilize 4,500-ton KDX-II destroyers, 1,800-ton Type-214 attack submarines and F-15K fighter jets for the exercise.

US-ROK – UQ

Relations improving – meetings with Lee prove

AFP 10 (June 23, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jsAiJzddNAaF7ml1rbip8_nC2rWA>) LL

WASHINGTON — US President Barack Obama, twice forced to cancel a trip to Asia this year, will launch a major diplomatic push on the region by meeting five key leaders at this weekend's G20 summit.

The White House said Obama would have meetings in Toronto with the leaders of India, China, South Korea, Japan and Indonesia, and five of his six bilateral encounters there will focus on Asia.

Aides said Obama wanted to make a statement about the importance with which he views US links with the dynamic region, ahead of a planned trip to India, South Korea and Japan in November.

"You'll note that five out of the six bilaterals mentioned are with Asia-Pacific countries," a senior administration official told reporters.

"That is, I think, an eloquent demonstration of the importance that the president attaches to Asia, the importance of Asia to our political security and economic interests.

"It's an area of rising influence globally."

Obama, who will also attend a G8 summit in Canada, will discuss key global issues, including emerging from the worst economic crisis in decades, and security threats including North Korea with the Asian leaders, aides said.

"We of course have been cooperating and coordinating closely with China on a number of leading priorities heading into this summit, both in terms of the global economy and in terms of security issues," an official said.

The administration says its relationship with China is productive, despite disagreements on some key issues, and points to the recently passed UN Security Council sanctions on Iran as the fruit of good ties with Beijing.

Obama is also likely to discuss North Korea's nuclear challenge with Hu, and the aftermath of the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel, which an investigation blamed on Pyongyang.

North Korea will also be the dominant issue when Obama meets South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak also on Saturday.

"The focus of this meeting will be security and alliance issues in the wake of the sinking of the (ship) as the result of a torpedo attack by North Korea," an official said.

The meeting will be a public and a private demonstration of our strong solidarity with our South Korean ally in the wake of this episode."

On Sunday, Obama will have breakfast in Toronto with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia.

The US leader was forced to cancel a planned visit to Indonesia, a country where he spent four years as a boy, earlier this month, as the Gulf of Mexico oil spill escalated into America's worst environmental crisis.

Earlier in the year, a previous attempt to visit Indonesia was dropped as Obama successfully lobbied for his landmark health care reform bill.

"Regrettably, (Obama) has not been able to make it to Indonesia yet, but he very much wants to continue the close coordination that we have with Indonesia on a number of issues," the official said.

Obama will also meet Sunday with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, as a precursor to his promised trip to India in November -- when he is also due to attend the next G20 summit in South Korea and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) in Japan.

US-ROK – UQ

Relations improving – Gates proves

Padden 10 (Brian, Voan News, June 5, <http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/usa/US-Defense-Secretary-Announces-Plans-for-Joint-US-South-Korean-Military-Exercises-95680549.html>) LL

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates says the United States will participate in combined military exercises with South Korea to counter North Korea's recent provocative military action. He made the announcement Saturday at an Asia security summit for defense ministers and intelligence officials in Singapore. During his speech Saturday at an Asia Summit in Singapore, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates again condemned North Korea's provocative military action in sinking a South Korean warship in March and killing 46 sailors. He said the incident is part of larger pattern of reckless behavior and that North Korea continues to undermine the peace and security of Asia. "North Korea has for some time faced the choice of continuing as a destitute, international pariah, or charting a new path. Since then, the North Korean regime has only further isolated itself from the international community," he said. North Korea has denied any involvement in the attack, but a multinational investigation team concluded that North Korea was responsible. Gates promised continued U.S. support for South Korea and said the two nations will conduct joint military exercises in response to the sinking. Pentagon officials say any such exercises may not take place until it becomes clear what the United Nations will do. Gates said the intention is to demonstrate to Pyongyang that its aggression will not go unchecked. "Since the sinking of the Cheonan, the United States, the Republic of Korea, and others have been in close consultations," he said. "My government has offered full support of our ally in this difficult hour. We will conduct combined military exercises with South Korea and support action in the United Nations Security Council. At the same time, we are assessing additional options to hold North Korea accountable." The U.S. defense secretary called upon other nations in the region to collectively pressure North Korea to change its belligerent behavior.

Relations improving – naval cooperation proves

Yonhap News 10 (June 18, <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2010/06/18/73/0301000000AEN20100618002100315F.HTML>) LL

SEOUL, June 18 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States agreed to stage joint naval drills later this month in waters off the South's west coast in a show of force against North Korea's torpedo attack on a Seoul warship, a high-ranking official said Friday. "After consultations, South Korea and the U.S. have decided to hold the naval drills in the final week of June," said the official at the South's Ministry of National Defense. "A fleet of U.S. warships, including an aircraft carrier of the U.S. 7th Fleet, will join the drills," the official said on the condition of anonymity. The two allies are expected to conduct more anti-submarine exercises in early July in the Yellow Sea, where the South Korean warship Cheonan was sunk on March 26. A team of international experts concluded last month that the ship was downed by a torpedo fired by a North Korean submarine. Forty-six sailors were killed. South Korea and the U.S. had originally planned to hold the naval drill early this month, but postponed it as the U.S. side needed more time to prepare. This week, South Korean Navy Chief of Staff Adm. Kim Sung-chan and U.S. 7th Fleet commander, Vice Adm. John Bird, agreed to bolster their joint defense posture against North Korean submarines. North Korea says the probe results were fabricated and threatened war if it is punished.

US-ROK – UQ

Relations improving – naval cooperation serves the basis for increased bilateral action

Yonhap 10 (June 16, <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2010/06/16/97/0301000000AEN20100616006900315F.HTML>) LL

SEOUL, June 16 (Yonhap) -- The navies of South Korea and the U.S. have agreed to forge closer cooperation against North Korean submarines amid tensions over Pyongyang's torpedo attack on a Seoul warship, Seoul's Navy officials said Wednesday. The agreement was reached after a meeting earlier in the day between South Korean Navy Chief of Staff Adm. Kim Sung-chan and U.S. 7th Fleet commander, Vice Adm. John Bird, the South's Navy said in a statement. Under the agreement, the two allies will bolster sharing of intelligence in monitoring activities of North Korean submarines and strengthen joint anti-submarine exercises, according to the statement. The two navies also agreed to closely work together in a U.S.-led anti-proliferation exercise that could be used to stop North Korean weapons traffic in and out of South Korean waters, it said. "I am confident that this agreement against North Korea will lay the groundwork for the navies of the two nations to consolidate our bilateral alliance," Kim said in the statement. In return, Bird said in the statement that the U.S. navy would step up its support to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula. On Tuesday, South Korea's defense ministry officials said the two allies have again postponed joint naval exercises targeting North Korea as Seoul and Washington ramp up diplomatic efforts to censure Pyongyang at the U.N. Security Council for attacking the Cheonan on March 26. The drills had been originally scheduled for early this month, but were put off for the second time. Currently, South Korea and the U.S. are looking to hold the drills after the Security Council takes action against North Korea, ministry officials said. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula remain high after a multinational investigation blamed a North Korean submarine for torpedoing the Cheonan near the Yellow Sea border. North Korea has vehemently denied any role in the attack, threatening to wage a war in response to any punishment attempts.

US-ROK – UQ

**The US-RoK alliance has maintained and even grown despite domestic issues in Korea**

**Campbell et. al 9** (Kurt, Assistant Secretary @ Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, co-founder and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf) JPG

At 3:30 am on the morning of Roh’s June 2005 visit to the White House, I was awakened by a phone call from the Situation Room. I was patched through to U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) officials who had just received word from United States Forces South Korea (USFK) that an elderly Korean woman pushing a food cart had been hit and killed by a U.S. military vehicle. An action plan was instantly put into place in which DoD and U.S. embassy officials in Seoul provided redress to the aggrieved family members while we awoke our South Korean National Security Council (NSC) counterparts in Washington to alert them of the death and our actions. Both sides sought to address the situation in a prompt and proper manner in order to avoid the mistakes of 2002, when two Korean schoolgirls were killed during a training incident. When Bush greeted Roh in the Oval Office later that morning, his first words were an apology for the death of the Korean woman. **As tragic as the event was, it did not become politicized as a rallying cry for antiAmerican demonstrations** seen in 2002. **This level of coordination and cooperation reflected a significant upgrade** in the institutions and communication channels that have undergirded the alliance over the past several years. Traditionally, **the alliance has been dominated by DoD and military channels of communication**, the most prominent of which was the long-established Security Consultative Mechanism (SCM) dating back to March 1968. 7 **Although this was the key institution upon** which the alliance was built and upon which successful deterrence of North Korean aggression rested, **there was a perceived need to deepen the institutional foundations of the alliance as its scope grew beyond a military alliance.** On the diplomatic front, the Bush White House oversaw the creation of an informal but highly effective channel between the two NSCs. The primary forms of communication were phone calls between the national security advisors or deputy national security advisors and periodic visits to Washington and Seoul at the deputy national security advisor level. This channel was used to convey policy priorities but also to clear the air whenever statements on either side were picked up by the press as signs of alliance discontent. In addition to managing mini-crises such as the one on the morning of the 2005 summit, this channel was instrumental, for example, in clarifying misunderstandings created by Roh’s public comments in March 2005 about Korea’s role as a “balancer” between the United States and China. 8 This channel also was critical in coordinating policy with Seoul (and Tokyo) in the aftermath of the North Korean missile tests in July 2006 and nuclear test in October 2006. Real-time **communications among** point people in **Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo ensured** that initial statements and **messages** regarding details of the test **were perfectly coordinated and uniform.** In the following days and weeks, daily communication helped to precipitate a strong UN Security Council resolution.

Relations high now – Unequivocal support for South Korea

Mason 10( Jeff, White house correspondent, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN24206347, 5/24/10)

President Barack Obama has directed the U.S. military to coordinate with South Korea to "ensure readiness" and deter future aggression from North Korea, the White House said on Monday. The United States gave strong backing to plans by South Korean President Lee Myung-bak to punish North Korea for sinking one of its naval ships, White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said in a statement. The White House urged North Korea to apologize and change its behavior, he said. "We endorse President Lee's demand that North Korea immediately apologize and punish those responsible for the attack, and, most importantly, stop its belligerent and threatening behavior," Gibbs said. "U.S. support for South Korea's defense is unequivocal, and the president has directed his military commanders to coordinate closely with their Republic of Korea counterparts to ensure readiness and to deter future aggression," he said. Obama and Lee have agreed to meet at the G20 summit in Canada next month, he said. Late last week, a team of international investigators accused North Korea of torpedoing the Cheonan corvette in March, killing 46 sailors in one of the deadliest clashes between the two since the 1950-53 Korean War. Lee said on Monday South Korea would bring the issue before the U.N., whose past sanctions have damaged the already ruined North Korean economy. The United States still has about 28,000 troops in South Korea to provide military support. The two Koreas, still technically at war, have more than 1 million troops near their border. "We will build on an already strong foundation of excellent cooperation between our militaries and explore further enhancements to our joint posture on the Peninsula as part of our ongoing dialogue," Gibbs said. Gibbs said the United States supported Lee's plans to bring the issue to the United Nations Security Council and would work with allies to "reduce the threat that North Korea poses to regional stability."

\_\_\_\*\*US-ROK – Links/Internals

Link - Abondonment

Military presence is key – it’s the defining aspect of the US-ROK alliance.

Sneider 06 (Daniel Sneider Associate Director for Research@Stanford, “RE-IMAGINING THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE” 11-12, 2006)

The two militaries have a vital legacy of decades of combined command, training and war planning. American military forces in significant numbers have remained in place to help defend South Korea from potential aggression from the North. South Korean troops have deployed abroad numerous times in support of American foreign policy goals, including currently in Iraq and Afghanistan. 2 This foundation of security is not only essential to this alliance but is the very definition of the nature of alliances in general, as distinct from other forms of cooperation and partnership in international relations. “Alliances are binding, durable security commitments between two or more nations,” Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, a Stanford scholar and former Clinton administration senior defense official, wrote recently. “The critical ingredients of a meaningful alliance are the shared recognition of common threats and a pledge to take action to counter them. To forge agreement, an alliance requires ongoing policy consultations that continually set expectations for allied behavior.” Alliances can survive a redefinition of the common threat that faces them but not the absence of a threat. Nor can alliances endure if there is not a clear sense of the mutual obligations the partners have to each other, from mutual defense to joint actions against a perceived danger. “At a minimum,” Sherwood-Randall says, “allies are expected to take into consideration the perspectives and interests of their partners as they make foreign and defense policy choices.”

Link – Perception

**US presence provides a symbol of the US-RoK alliance**

**Campbell et. al 9** (Kurt, A**ssistant Secretary @ Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, co-founder and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security,** http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf) JPG

**Across the range of criteria** that determines the functional success of a military alliance, **the U.S.-ROK alliance has done well. Efficient alliances do not just provide for a state’s security,** but do so in a relatively cost effective (**both politically and economically**) manner than would otherwise be the case (i.e., versus the self-help option). In this vein, an alliance’s success is measured by the extent to which it: (1) serves as a facilitator of power accretion and projection; (2) operates as a unified command; (3) enables common tactics and doctrine through joint training; (4) promotes a division of security roles; (5) facilitates cooperation in production and development of military equipment; and (6) elicits political support among domestic constituencies. **The U.S.-ROK alliance enabled the stationing of 37,000 American troops directly at the point of conflict on the peninsula, providing the South with an unequivocal symbol of Washington’s defense** commitment and deterring the North with its tripwire presence. **The alliance has also constituted an integral part of a larger security triangle** in Northeast Asia with the U.S.-Japan alliance. Despite the historical antagonisms between Japan and Korea, the United States has encouraged the cohesion of this triangle and treated the two alliances as strategically complementary. **The presence of U.S. ground forces in South Korea was as much an extended frontline of defense for Tokyo as it was for Seoul**. The American 7th Fleet and Marine units in Japan provided rear-guard support for the ROK. This relationship was spelled out in 1969 with the Nixon-Sato Korea clause, in which Japan acknowledged that Korean security was crucial to Japan and therefore would allow the United States unlimited access to bases in Okinawa to defend the South.

**Realignment of troops is perceived as a sign of weakening alliance – weakened deterrence and lack of commitment**

**Zissis and Lee 8** (Carin and Youkyung, Carin – journalist and analyst @ Council on Foreign Affairs (CFR), Youkyung – analyst @ CFR, 4/14/8, http://www.cfr.org/publication/11459/ussouth\_korea\_alliance.html) JPG

In February 2007, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert **Gates and** South Korean Minister of National Defense Kim **Jang-soo** [**reaffirmed**](http://seoul.usembassy.gov/410_022307.html) **that the** U.S. Force Korea (**USFK**), the combined American air, ground, and naval forces, will transfer its wartime command authority to South Korea by 2012. **The peacetime command was transferred to Korea in 1994,** and transition of the wartime operational control (OPCON) is expected to be completed on April 17, 2012. The current ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) will be disestablished. **The two have agreed on a slow drawdown in the number of U.S.troops, as well as a redeployment of American forces away from populated areas close to the northern border.** The United States handed control of some military bases over to South Korea in 2004, and announced its plans to decrease its number of troops from roughly 30,000 at present to 25,000 by 2008. The Bush administration already reduced the U.S.military presence in South Korea to 28,000 troops as the U.S. Defense Department saw greater need for military resources in Middle East conflicts. For his part, former President Roh depicted the power transfer, and gradual troop withdrawal as a matter of national sovereignty.

The rearrangement of the U.S.-South Korea military alliance has represented a hot domestic political issue in South Korea since the negotiation of command structural began. **Citing concerns about Seoul’s defense preparedness**, some **conservative sectors in Korea insist on renegotiating the year of the transfer.** The rise of South Korea’s defense budget from 2.8 percent of GDP in 2007 to 3.2 percent in 2008, **and the costs of relocating U.S. troops** out of the Yongsan garrison in Seoul, also **faced criticism**. Others were suspicious of the U.S. military presence and remembered the 2002 killings of two South Korean teenagers who were accidentally struck by a USFK armored vehicle, an incident which sparked widespread street protest.

Experts have expressed concerns over how the development in military alliance would shape the future of Northeast Asia. Michael O’Hanlon at Brookings posits that **the realignment of the military may be perceived** by North Korea as “[**a sign of weakening**](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2006/0828southkorea_ohanlon.aspx) **of the alliance’s strength and strong deterrence against the North.**” However, Gen. B. B. Bell, **commander of USFK, says the United States is continuously committed to the political alliance regardless of the military command structure.** “Commanding control apparatus is not a statement of the commitment of the two nations to each other’s security,” [said Bell](http://www.koreasociety.org/dmdocuments/2008-01-28-us-rok-military-alliance-bell.mp3) during his visit at Korea Society. **The restructure of the U.S.-Korea military alliance also reflects the changing role and paradigm of U.S. leadership in the world.** Hyeong Jung Park, a former fellow at Brookings, points out that “the alliance now is designed more for [assisting U.S. global and regional strategy](http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/12_north_korea_park.aspx) than for the defense of South Korea in the narrow sense.”

Link –Public

Public Fears US Pullout – Tripwire

Global Security 4(http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/06/wwwh40616.htm

The English-language pro-government Korea Herald observed (6/9): "It is expected that a third of the 37,000 men and women of the U.S. Forces Korea will have left by the end of 2005 if there is no drastic change in the security situation on the peninsula during the next year and half.... Of the 12,500 U.S. troops to be withdrawn, 3,600 will depart for Iraq this summer. The two partners of the half-century-old military alliance have begun serious "negotiations" on this important matter. But the talks kicked off in Seoul this week will most likely be about complementary measures needed to ensure that the combined defense capabilities here are least affected by the troop cut, rather than about the partial pullout plan itself. Each time the U.S. has moved to reduce its troop strength in South Korea, the decision has created profound reactions. Previously, Washington cited cost reduction as the reason, but this time a new realignment plan for worldwide U.S. forces deployment, called the 'global defense posture review,' has been introduced. Still, most Koreans are showing the same anxiety and apprehension about the security of their country as they have done on similar occasions since the end of the Korean War. A rather new phenomenon is a sort of self-reproach that the surge of anti-Americanism in some sectors of Korean society is to blame for the U.S. moves to lower its military presence here. They often cite American officials' remarks that U.S. forces will remain only in places where they are welcome. Yet, another conspicuous awareness rising in Korea is that the stationing of foreign forces in the country for a full 50 years after the end of the war is by no means normal.... If North Korea changes, the way we cope with it should change. And, even if North Korea is not changing despite the transformation of international situation surrounding it, the mode of military alliance that was created to deter invasion from the North could still change because the strategies and defense capabilities on this side continue to develop.... While concerned people in the South expressed worries over what was seen as abandoning the U.S. forces "tripwire" role, which they deemed as a vital defense tactic, North Korea blasted the plan as a plot to launch a preemptive strike for a military solution to the problem of its nuclear development.... At this juncture, we had better look at the development from a more positive perspective: that the situation on and around the Korean Peninsula has changed enough now to warrant a review of the level of U.S. forces presence here. It is undeniable that every Korean can feel the change, so why not the American policymakers?.... Weakening of the alliance is least desirable as it would tip the security balance in this area. The USFK reduction is a U.S. decision based on its judgment of the local, regional and global security situations. Any effort on Seoul's part to delay its implementation to, say, 2007 after the completion of the relocation project, or 2013 after the accomplishment of Korea's 'cooperative independent defense program' may not produce satisfactory results. The task in front of the Korean government is to continue to make earnest efforts to reduce North Korean aggressive threats through dialogue and economic exchanges while, on the other hand, building up our own defense capabilities with all available resources. Negotiations with the U.S. authorities should be conducted in a manner that will deepen mutual understanding.... The Korean public and civic society, for their part, whether or not they like the presence of foreign uniformed people on Korean soil, should try to avoid creating unnecessary misconceptions about bilateral relations with the U.S. and react more prudently to the troop reduction move."

Link –Troop Withdrawal

Troop Withdrawal unpopular- Experts prove

IDA 2. (Institute for Defense Analyses, on task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD – Volume 1, Main Report” IDA Paper P-370, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954.)

The importance ofa **c**ollaborative processwith astrong componentof educationof awide rangeof Korean expertsisunderscoredby the fact that evidence from our notfor- attribution interviews with Korean experts reveals a strong preference for no more than minimal reductions in the US troop presence in Korea, especially ground force presence, at least in the near term. This sensitivity and caution was mirrored by the US experts that were most familiar with Korean sensibilities on this topic.

**Continued US presence bolsters a mutual alliance**

**Hwang 5** (Balbina, PhD in Intl Relations @ Georgetown and guest lecturer in economics and foreign policy, 1/18, http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/policy-forums-online/security/0505A\_Hwang.html/) JPG

**The U.S.-ROK alliance has been a crucial cornerstone of stability and security in Northeast Asia** for the past half century **and will continue to play this critical role** in the future-but only if both countries can narrow the gap between American and South Korean mindsets. **Reaffirming this** important and successful **alliance will be essential to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and achieving a permanent peace** on the Korean peninsula. From "Going Together" to a Gap in Views Much in the U.S.-South Korea relationship remains strong and positive. The alliance was formalized in 1953 by the Mutual Defense Treaty. The motto "Let's Go Together," a phrase drawn from the text of the treaty, handily captures the closeness and cooperation that have characterized the relationship for the past 50 years. Indeed, America sacrificed over 37,000 servicemen during the Korean War, and the ROK quickly answered the U.S. request for assistance in the Vietnam War by sending more than 50,000 troops, which suffered over 4,400 casualties. Today, **the United States remains strongly committed to the defense of the ROK, as manifested by the continued presence of U.S. forces** on the peninsula. **South Korea**, for its part, **remains a staunch supporter of the United States**, as demonstrated by its deployment of 3,600 troops to Iraq, making South Korea the second largest coalition partner in Iraq. **The leaders of both countries have also pledged to work together** and with other countries in the region to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem diplomatically. Beyond the mechanics of the alliance and the shared tragedy of war and bloodshed, **America and South Korea have intertwined their relationship through economic, political, and social bonds.** Bilateral trade between the two countries surpassed $56 billion in 2003. Ever since 1962, the United States has invested nearly $27 billion in South Korea, with nearly $4.5 billion invested in 2003 alone. South Korea is America's seventh-largest trading partner, and the United States is the ROK's second-largest trading partner. The United States remains the largest export market for South Korea and is the second largest source of imports, with American firms exporting more than $22.6 billion in goods to South Korea in 2003.

Link – Troop Withdrawal

**South Korea needs US presence- withdrawal would shock relations**

**Levin 4** (Norman, senior analyst at RAND, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA439630&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

At a time when Western media are trumpeting the “rising anti- Americanism” in Korea and strident Korean “demands” for changes in the security relationship, it might be useful to begin by exploring the benefits Koreans have gained from security cooperation with the United States. These benefits, it turns out, are far-reaching. **They are also highly valued, if not always widely appreciated**.1 Topping the list is **the formal U.S. defense commitment and credible U.S. capability to deter** and, if necessary, defeat **potential North Korean aggression.** Despite North Korea’s economic free-fall and the ROK’s own significant military modernization, **most South Koreans responsible for their country’s security are not confident of their ability to handle Pyongyang without U.S. assistance**. This is particularly true in the context of unconventional warfare. Although **ROK military leaders** feel increasingly able to deal with the North’s conventional capability, they **see themselves at a major disadvantage against North Korea’s** weapons of mass destruction (**WMD).** **They thus see a continued U.S. military presence in Korea as indispensable to Korean security**. **This view is mirrored by public opinion**. Polls over the last 15 years routinely show that **an overwhelming majority of South Koreans regard the presence of U.S. military forces as important to their security**.2 Most South Korean leaders also see **this presence as essential to successfully engaging North Korea in a pursuit of** tension reduction and **peaceful coexistence.** **Pyongyang’s aggressive WMD programs and historic willingness to take risks highlight the importance of the U.S. military commitment**. Only slightly below the U.S. commitment as a top South Korean benefit is the “bang” the ROK gets for an exceedingly small Korean “buck.” If war were ever to come to the peninsula, **the combat power deployed by the U.S. would in aggregate more than double South Korea’s combat power.**3 This additional power, moreover, would come from largely active duty, extremely well-trained U.S. personnel with equipment considerably better than Koreans could field on their own. The cost in dollar terms is paltry**: Out of a total cost annually of nearly $3 billion** for stationing U.S. troops in Korea, **South Korea’s direct financial contribution** in 2002 **was $490 million** (up from $399 million in 2000).4 The cost in terms of U.S. personnel is similarly small: a mere 37,000 U.S. troops deployed in peacetime, divided between a very small combat force and a modest-sized logistical base to facilitate U.S. force deployments. **Few countries have Korea’s ability to rapidly draw on such enormous combat power at so little expense in peacetime**. If Korea had to replicate this power itself, the impact would resonate throughout South Korean society.

AT: Link Turns

**Support for USFK is strong**

**Campbell et. al 9** (Kurt, Assistant Secretary @ Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, co-founder and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf) JPG

**In exercises as well as actual maneuvers** during the Cold War, **Japan and Korea essentially comprised one integrated unit in U.S. defense planning**. U.S.-ROK military exercises regularly employed bases in Japan for logistic support; U.S. tactical air wing deployments rotated frequently between Japan and Korea; and U.S. air and naval surveillance of the North operated out of bases in Japan. In addition, **Seoul and Tokyo conducted periodic exchanges of defense officials, developed** bilateral fora for discussion of **security policies**, **and engaged in** partial **sharing of** intelligence and **technology.** 5 Throughout the Cold War, **the U.S. and South Korean militaries represented the classic example of an alliance operating under a joint, unitary command** (the Combined Forces Command, or CFC) with a common doctrine and clear division of combat roles practiced through frequent and extensive joint training. Although there have been some negative civil-military externalities associated with the stationing of U.S. forces in Korea, **overall host-country support for the alliance remains reasonably strong.**

Pulling troops out fail – Strategic Differences

Kwang 10( Jin Ha, National Assembly for the Republic of Korea, http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/HwangKeynote100325.pdf)

As already stated above, disbanding CFC and OPCON transfer might downplay the deployment of U.S. forces in Korea. The completion of OPCON transfer to the ROK government would ease the defense burden on the United States in defending the Korean Peninsula. But, I believe that OPCON transfer would impede the successful evolution of the ROK-US alliance into a global partnership. The reason is that the two nations would face strategic difficulties with advancing a common strategic goal of alliance transformation without securing security and peace on the Korean Peninsula. In other words, implementing OPCON transfer seems to widen the strategic gap between the two nations rather than strengthening our solidarity. While the ROK and the United States are working together to realize Joint Vision agreed at the summit talks in June, 2006, we must review the planned OPCON transfer.

Internal – Deterrence

US- ROK alliance key- Sanctions and deterrence

Associated Press 10( 5/24/10 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37309788/ns/world\_news-asiapacific)

South Korea won U.S. support Monday for slashing trade toNorth Korea  and vowed to haul its communist neighbor before the U.N. Security Council for a torpedo attack that sank a South Korean warship and killed 46 sailors. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said he expects the Security Council to take action against North Korea, calling the evidence that the North was responsible "overwhelming and deeply troubling." The U.S. and South Korea are planning two major military exercises off the Korean Peninsula in a display of force intended "to deter future aggression" by North Korea, the White House said. President Lee Myung-bak laid out the economic and diplomatic measures aimed at striking back at the impoverished North, including halting some trade and taking the regime before the Security Council. International investigators concluded last week that a torpedo from a North Korean submarine tore apart the warship Cheonan on March 26 in the Yellow Sea off the west coast in one of South Korea's worst military disasters since the 1950-53 KoreanWar Lee said it was another example of "incessant" provocation by North Korea, including a 1983 attack in Myanmar on a South Korean presidential delegation that killed 21 people, and the bombing of an airliner in 1987 that claimed 115 lives. "We have always tolerated North Korea's brutality, time and again. We did so because we have always had a genuine longing for peace on the Korean peninsula," Lee said in a solemn speech at the War Memorial.

US- ROK alliance key to Detterence

CNN 10 ( 5/24/10 http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/05/24/south.korea.naval.exercises/index.html)

President Obama on Monday directed U.S. military commanders to work with South Korean troops "to ensure readiness and to deter future aggression" from North Korea, according to a White House statement. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, meanwhile, announced Monday that his country was suspending trade with North Korea, closing its waters to North Korean ships and adopting a more aggressive military posture toward its neighbor. Lee said his country was adopting a posture of "proactive deterrence" toward the North. He promised that "combat capabilities will be reinforced drastically" and that he will focus on improving national security readiness and military discipline. "If our territorial waters, airspace or territory are violated, we will immediately exercise our right of self-defense," Lee said. Lee said the alleged attack violated the armistice and nonaggression agreements between the two countries, and said he will refer the incident to the United Nations Security Council "so that the international community can join us in holding the North accountable."

Internal – Energy Security

US- ROK relations k2 Energy Independence

Bae 9 (Director of the Center for International Relations Studies at KINU, September 2009 <http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/US-ROK%2520Alliance%2520in%2520the%252021st%2520Century_Denmark%2520and%2520Fontaine.pdf>.

We will continue to deepen our strong bilateral economic, trade and investment relations. We recognize that the Korea-U.S. (KORUS) Free Trade Agreement could further strengthen these ties and we are committed to working together to chart a way forward. We aim to make low-carbon green growth into a new engine for sustainable economic prosperity and will closely cooperate in this regard. We will strengthen civil space cooperation, and work closely together on clean energy research and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

US- ROK committed to Energy Security –APP proves

Schriver 9 ( Randy, Partner Armitage International Feburary 2009, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf)

This is particularly true of the U.S.-ROK alliance. As two of the main energy importers/consum-ers in the Asia-Pacific region — along with China, India, and Japan — the United States and South Korea’s energy interests are largely complementary and would benefit from more detailed discus-sion. Pollution from China commonly crosses the Yellow Sea to South Korea, and under some wind conditions it reaches as far as the western coast of the United States. Thus, both nations share an interest in crafting regional policies that will improve their air and water quality in the short and long term. Given regional concerns over energy security, it would also benefit both sides to discuss their assessments of projected trends in Asian energy consumption and to consider what potential effect changes in world supplies of energy outside the region might have on regional energy dynamics. Extending beyond the realm of alliance relation-ships, the United States could also establish a permanent energy security dialogue among the major Asia-Pacific energy consumers and produc-ers. The emphasis on energy security at the second East Asian Summit, including a four-part dec-laration of measures designed to address energy efficiency, shows that this is an area in which the United States must assert a leadership role or risk losing its opportunity to shape future trends. For this reason, existing regional or multilateral organizations or initiatives including or supported by the ROK and the United States — such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative or the 2008 summit meeting of the G8 energy ministers with those of China, India, and South Korea — can serve as fora in which to build and promote a common American and South Korean agenda on energy security. Another potentially fruitful avenue for multilat-eral energy cooperation involving South Korea and the United States is the strengthening of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP), a seven-nation partnership that constitutes more than one-half of the world’s energy consumption and a significant fraction of its non-oil energy resources. The APP’s emphasis on the diffusion of energy-efficient technolo-gies and practices is especially appropriate for Asia given the region’s wide variation in energy and environmental practices and its especially pressing need to reconcile economic growth with increasingly acute concerns over environmental protection. Through the APP as well as their bilat-eral relations, the United States and South Korea should cooperate with each other and with other advanced industrial nations to provide these tech-nologies to countries that currently lack them. In addition, they should find ways to transmit knowl-edge of best environmental practices and standards to developing economies to help them create the conditions for long-term sustainable development and economic growth without imposing a high environmental and health cost on other countries in the region

South Korea

Internal – Stability

US- ROK alliance key- East Asia

Cossa 9 ( Ralph A. Cossa, Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS, <http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/US-ROK%2520Alliance%2520in%2520the%252021st%2520Century_Denmark%2520and%2520Fontaine.pdf>.

The United States of America and the Republic of Korea are building an Alliance to ensure a peaceful, secure and prosperous future for the Korean Peninsula, the Asia-Pacific region, and the world. Our open societies, our commitment to free democracy and a market economy, and our sustained partnership provide a foundation for the enduring friendship, shared values, and mutual respect that tightly bind the American and Korean peoples. The bonds that underpin our Alliance and our partnership are strengthened and enriched by the close relationships among our citizens. We pledge to continue programs and efforts to build even closer ties between our societies, including cooperation among business, civic, cultural, academic, and other institutions. The United States-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty remains the cornerstone of the U.S.-ROK security relationship, which has guaranteed peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia for over fifty years. Over that time, our security Alliance has strengthened and our partnership has widened to encompass political, economic, social and cultural cooperation. Together, on this solid foundation, we will build a comprehensive strategic alliance of bilateral, regional and global scope, based on common values and mutual trust. Together, we will work shoulder-to-shoulder to tackle challenges facing both our nations on behalf of the next generation The Alliance is adapting to changes in the 21st Century security environment. We will maintain a robust defense posture, backed by allied capabilities which support both nations’ security interests. The continuing commitment of extended deterrence, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella, reinforces this assurance. In advancing the bilateral plan for restructuring the Alliance, the Republic of Korea will take the lead role in the combined defense of Korea, supported by an enduring and capable U.S. military force presence on the Korean Peninsula, in the region, and beyond.

US Korea key- Coordination

Bae 9 ( Jung-Ho ,Director of the Center for International Relations Studies at KINU, <http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/US-ROK%2520Alliance%2520in%2520the%252021st%2520Century_Denmark%2520and%2520Fontaine.pdf>. )

In the Asia-Pacific region we will work jointly with regional institutions and partners to foster prosperity, keep the peace, and improve the daily lives of the people of the region. We believe that open societies and open economies create prosperity and support human dignity, and our nations and civic organizations will promote human rights, democracy, free markets, and trade and investment liberalization in the region. To enhance security in the Asia-Pacific, our governments will advocate for, and take part in, effective cooperative regional efforts to promote mutual understanding, confidence and transparency regarding security issues among the nations of the region.

**Relations are k2 Stability- Global coordination**

Bae 9 ( Jung-Ho ,Director of the Center for International Relations Studies at KINU, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/US-ROK%2520Alliance%2520in%2520the%252021st%2520Century\_Denmark%2520and%2520Fontaine.pdf. )

Our governments and our citizens will work closely to address the global challenges of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, piracy, organized crime and narcotics, climate change, poverty, infringement on human rights, energy security, and epidemic disease. The Alliance will enhance coordination on peacekeeping, postconflict stabilization and development assistance, as is being undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan. We will also strengthen coordination in multilateral mechanisms aimed at global economic recovery such as the G20.

Internal- US – ROK k2 Terrorism

**Relations good- interoperability and intelligence gathering**

**Levin 4** (Norman, senior analyst at RAND, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA439630&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

Fourth is interoperability. **One of the “benefits” of having been locked together for 50 years** in a suspended state of war (i.e., under an armistice rather than peace agreement) **is that an enormous number of bilateral agreements have been worked out that enable the two allies to function together**. Decades of **efforts to improve interoperability** in rules of engagement, standard operating procedures, tactics, strategy, intelligence, and other areas give substance to these agreements. **This situation contrasts sharply with that between the U.S. and Japan, for example, which is overwhelmingly “joint” rather than “combined” and largely parallel.** Indeed, finding ways to expand interoperability with Japan is a topic of growing interest in the United States. Holes certainly exist in the U.S.-ROK case, but **interoperability in the military-to-military relationship is arguably further along than it is most anywhere else**. **A fifth benefit** stemming from the military alliance **is** **extremely close like-service relationships**. This is particularly true between the USAF and ROKAF, which share the daily mission of defending Korea’s airspace. USAF and ROKAF pilots live, work, and socialize together, according to knowledgeable USAF officials, reinforcing shared experiences gained in the tactical environment. Close like-service relations are reinforced by the nature of command relationships in the combined defense system. The commander of the 7th Air Force is dual-hatted as commander of the Combined Air Component Command (CACC), for example, where his deputy is his Korean counterpart. The permanent location of the air component commander in his area of responsibility (AOR) facilitates USAF-ROKAF interactions and helps sustain movement in military-to-military programs over time and minimize drift or deterioration. **Extensive, synergistic intelligence-sharing is a sixth benefit. Although Korea is heavily dependent on the U.S. in critical intelligence area**s, as noted above, **it also has certain comparative advantages**. Not the least of these comes from the large number of **people** **it can place along the DMZ and devote elsewhere** (human intelligence or HUMINT) **to monitor developments inside North Korea**, which South Korea largely administers. **U.S. ability to do sophisticated analysis creates a synergistic effect that maximizes the respective comparative advantages**. More indirectly, perhaps, the combined, allsource **intelligence centers provide U.S. forces with an ability to talk** with their South Korean counterparts **at high levels of classification**. At its best, **this sets a tone of openness** and facilitates other discussions as well. **The extensive network of intelligence cooperation more broadly enables active ROK contributions to information-sharing on terrorist and related issues.**

**US-ROK relations bolster arms sales and war on terror**

**Levin 4** (Norman, senior analyst at RAND, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA439630&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

Still **another benefit** stemming from the decades-long military to- military relationship **relates to military sales.** **Supporting U.S. military contractors abroad and promoting their technology has always been an important U.S. interest** and is particularly so post-9/11. **Korea is one of America’s best customers**. As noted above, **the U.S. is the source for almost 80 percent of Korea’s foreign military purchases**, an amount that totals roughly $2 billion annually. Moreover, **the cost and complexity of the systems Korea wants to procure to achieve greater self-reliance and be able to counter potential regional threats** after unification (advanced fighter aircraft, air defense missiles, Aegisclass destroyers, etc.) **ensure that it will remain an attractive customer for many years to come**. As also noted above, however, the Korea of today is not the Korea of old. And in fighter aircraft, submarine technology, and other areas, it increasingly has options other than the United States.19 While few would argue that the U.S.-ROK militaryto- military relationship is the sole determinant of Korean procurement decisions on major weapons systems, even fewer would deny that it is a major factor influencing the internal deliberations. Finally, **Korea has provided active support for the U.S. global war on terrorism**. Former **President Kim** sent a message to President Bush immediately after the terrorist attacks on September 11 expressing his shock and deep sorrow. In a follow-up message a few days later, he **expressed Korea’s full support for the U.S. war on terrorism**. Emphasizing “that **the Republic of Korea will provide all necessary cooperation and assistance as a close U.S. ally in the spirit of the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty**,” President Kim pledged that Korea “will take part in the international coalition to support the U.S. actions against terrorism.”20

Internal- US – ROK k2 Terrorism

US-ROK deters Terrorism – Navy and NPT

Denmark 9 ( Abraham Denmark, Center for a New America Security, CNAS, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/US-ROK%2520Alliance%2520in%2520the%252021st%2520Century\_Denmark%2520and%2520Fontaine.pdf)

One area in which the ROK has already demonstrated the alliance’s extra-peninsular context has been in the global war on terror. South Korea played a significant role in Iraq, providing the third-largest ground contingent, and in Afghanistan, where it provided logistics and medical support. Yet, there are many other areas of potential growth; Korea’s proven record of peacekeeping operations in places such as East Timor and Lebanon show that Seoul can play an increasingly prominent leadership role in other areas of domestic instability including Africa, the Middle East, and the Pacific island nations. The ROK Navy can perform important regional tasks to maintain freedom of navigation in Asian waters. Korea’s emphasis on nuclear power makes it a major player in efforts to move countries such as China away from carbon-based strategies to cleaner and more carbon-neutral energy development. Additionally, Korea’s record as a responsible Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) member could become even stronger in the future through the potential leadership role that Seoul could play in dismantling a nuclear program inherited from a collapsed Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Seoul is also seeking to enhance its global profile as a provider of development assistance, in particular by helping countries make the transition into modernity through assistance in information technology.

Internal - US- ROK key to North East Asia Stability

**Relations are key – Power Projection**

Denmark 9( Abraham Denmark, Center for a New America Security, CNAS September 2009, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/US-ROK%2520Alliance%2520in%2520the%252021st%2520Century\_Denmark%2520and%2520Fontaine.pdf)

America’s ability to maintain stability and project power in the Asia Pacific has long depended on its hub-and-spoke system of bilateral alliances. South Korea has been a valuable component of this system, serving as a regional hub of U.S. power, and projecting “spokes” of U.S. influence across the region. It has become increasingly obvious, however, that the sum of South Korea’s influence and interests can no longer be viewed merely in a regional context. The Republic of Korea (ROK) is actively establishing new economic and diplomatic relationships with countries across the globe. Similarly, the South Korean military is already engaging in complex out-of-area operations in the Gulf of Aden. In order to address global challenges, the United States must look to its friends and allies to shoulder some responsibility for maintaining the international system upon which we all rely. Beyond helping to defray costs and support regional stability, *4 Chapter 1* alliances can help America deal with the multifaceted threat profiles of the 21st century and add greater legitimacy to shared international enterprises.

Internal - Chinese Relations

**Six Party Talks key- Alliance**

Center for U.S.-Korea Policy 9 ( The Asia Foundation, http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/DPRKContingencyCUSKP0908.pdf)

China must be included in U.S.-ROK planning if China is to be reassured that any future scenario will not adversely affect Chinese interests. Engaging China on North Korea contingency planning will require engaging both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and PLA; recent PLA preparations including increased border security, military exercises, and intelligence collection, have not been accompanied by any corresponding political or diplomatic planning by the civilian leadership. There has been no Chinese military coordination with the United States and South Korea despite China’s awareness of potential needs such as deconfliction with U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). Other, smaller steps to engage China may include expanding Korea personnel in the Beijing embassy or expanding Chinese ties with USFK through the Seoul embassy; inviting the PLA to Seoul for joint ROK/Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)-PLA consultations; sending a U.S. military delegation including USFK to Beijing; including a military component to a five party session of Six Party Talks; and informal discussions on the sidelines of the Six Party Talks.

**Alliance key- Mutual understanding**

Center for U.S.-Korea Policy 9 ( The Asia Foundation, http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/DPRKContingencyCUSKP0908.pdf)

Although the United States, China, and South Korea share a strong interest in developing mutual understandings on responding to North Korea, some gaps in priorities suggest considerable points of potential conflict in U.S.- China-ROK coordination in a crisis scenario.48 Seoul primarily wants to avoid sudden regime collapse in the North, but is also cautious to limit direct intervention by China and the United States despite South Korea’s lack of capacity to solely manage large-scale 47 Finnegan, 2008. 48 Finnegan, 2008. 20 North Korean instability. The United States would support South Korean efforts in crisis management to prevent any spillover effects that would draw U.S. military intervention, but the U.S. priority concern would lie in addressing a potential “loose nukes” scenario. China would want to avoid the economic and regional security implications of instability in North Korea but also has a strategic interest in restricting U.S.-led intervention. From a long-term perspective, Seoul also seeks a policy package that integrates nuclear policy, engagement policy, and unification policy into a coordinated strategy toward North Korea. Such differences highlight the urgent need for effective policy coordination among the three parties on managing instability in North Korea, without which simultaneous interventions in the event of crisis could lead to direct military conflict between the three military force

Internal –Global Public Private Partnerships

US- ROK relations are k2 closing Digitial divide- fosters PPP

Schriver 9 ( Randy, Partner Armitage International Feburary 2009, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf)

Although state diplomacy will be an important component of South Korea’s foreign policy, the country also has a vibrant non-state sector that makes it uniquely positioned among U.S. allies in Asia to promote the types of public-private part-nerships that represent a 21st-century vision for global engagement. Seoul is the most wired and broadband-penetrated city in the world. There is a growing recognition in South Korea that its high tech society is important not just for commerce, but also for alleviating poverty and promoting economic development around the world. In recent years, South Korea has taken advantage of its relative strength in the high-tech sphere to expand its provision of technological assis-tance. South Korea’s development agency, Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), has partnered with high-tech companies to provide technical assistance and training throughout the developing world. 55 In fact, such assistance now accounts for about 13 percent of the entire KOICA operating budget — a trend that is likelyto intensify in the future. 56 For the Korean gov-ernment, information and communications technology development “promotes[s] the admin-istrative efficiency and transparency of developing partner governments. Since narrowing the digital divide in a knowledge-based society expedites poverty alleviation and promotes sustainable eco-nomic development, KOICA has made continuous efforts to reduce the digital divide and facilitate economic development.” 57

Internal – Japan Relations

US-ROK alliance key to Trilateral Alliance- Abduction Proves

Campbell, Ford, Patel, Singh 9 (Kurt M. Lindsey Nirav Vikram J, Center for a New American Security http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf)

In addition, the alliance has begun to reflect a renewed awareness of Japanese interests and a potential willingness to factor these into the emerging structure of the revitalized U.S.-ROK alliance. In the meetings between Rice and Yu, the American and the South Korean parties have demonstrated some sensitivity to Japan’s posi-tion in the progression of the Six-Party Talks, particularly its concern over the need to resolve the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea. Yu urged North Korea to “demonstrate more sincerity with regard to Japan-North Korea bilateral issues,” and indicated that he hopes Japan might be able to “participate in economic and energy assistance [to the DPRK] without delay.” 18 Meanwhile, Rice confirmed that she has assured the Japanese government that the United States will continue to take the abduction issue seriously and work quickly to help Japan resolve it. 19 The recent emphasis on Japan’s concerns holds out the possibility of successful trilateral coordination on the North Korean issue and potentially beyond it to address long-term regional issues of strategic and economic significance.

Internal- Nuclear Power

US- ROK K2 Nuclear power- East Asian Model & Nonproliferation

Patel 9 (Nirav Center for a New American Security http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf)

Another area in which the United States and South Korea can collaborate is the issue of civil-ian nuclear energy. South Korea’s extensive use of civilian nuclear power and East Asia’s high reli-ance on this energy source increase the imperative for strong regional efforts to promote responsible management of civilian nuclear technologies. This also presents an opportunity for South Korea to establish itself as a model civil nuclear power, and more broadly, to eventually establish East Asia as a model of responsible management for the rest of the world. Deriving a solution to the North Korean problem will continue to be the foundational and most immediate nonproliferation concern for the alliance, but it cannot be allowed to forestall broader cooperation on this important global issue. Moreover, the alliance needs to seek non threatening means through which to expand its current engagement on this issue in order to antici-pate a future in which global proliferation issues, rather than North Korean issues, will form the bedrock of the alliance’s proliferation cooperation.

Internal- Soft Power

Alliance allows for a Quid pro Quo

Singh 9 (Vikram J., February 2009 http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf)

Alliance managers must work to overcome resis-tance to the expansion of the alliance beyond the scope of the mutual defense treaty. The ability of the United States and the ROK to articulate shared values and global interests will help establish a foundation that will sustain the alliance beyond the peninsular context. In order to maximize the soft-power potential of the alliance, the United States should consider instituting a high-level dialogue to discuss how the United States and the ROK can best coordinate their development assis-tance efforts. Korea’s assistance in Afghanistan and Iraq has been a valuable complement to U.S. recon-struction efforts, and can provide a useful template for future cooperation on overseas development initiatives. Alliance managers should also consider broadening the scope of collaborative development efforts by looking to better coordinate Japanese, Korean, and U.S. development assistance

Internal- Human Rights

Obama and Lee Committed to Human Rights- UN resolution proves

Cha 9( Vicor D., Associate Professor D.S. Song-Korea Foundation Chair, <http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel_Going%20Global_February09.pdf>, Feburary 2009)

The Obama administration and the Lee govern-ment have the opportunity to reboot and realign their relative positions on human rights. Bush and Lee, both deeply religious men, took a step in this direction, agreeing to include a specific reference to DPRK human rights problems in their 2008 joint statement. Additionally, the ROK under Lee has voted for the annual UN resolution on North Korean human rights abuses (whereas previous ROK governments did not). Nonetheless, there is clearly room for more coordination. Seoul could appoint its own special envoy for DPRK human rights, who could host the first international conference on the issue. Whatever the specific measures, the benchmark for United States and the ROK should be to move beyond an agreement in words to achieving measurable steps that improve the lives of the North Korean people.

Internal- Managing Populism

US-ROK k2 challenging jingoism

Cha 9( Vicor D., Associate Professor D.S. Song-Korea Foundation Chair, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf, Feburary 2009)

The second challenge for the alliance relates to managing populist fervor in Korea. Although it is a consolidated democracy by most metrics, the ROK’s intense nationalism, very active non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and tightly interconnected society lead to occasional flare ups of populist anger and protest that can be very destructive to the alliance’s reservoir of goodwill. In the early spring of 2008, for example, the newly elected Lee government was paralyzed by dem-onstrations throughout the country. The streets of Seoul were blocked by candlelight vigils in the city center. The opposition party refused to attend the opening session of the National Assembly in which the newly elected president would tradi-tionally give a State of the Union speech. Joining the civil society NGOs in the protests were labor unions that undertook a work stoppage that cost the Korean government tens of millions of dollars in lost productivity. The ostensible reason for the demonstrations was Lee’s perceived rash decision to accede to the reopening of the Korean market to U.S. beef imports. Protestors saw this as a high handed decision by a “CEO president” who was out of touch with common Koreans’ concerns about the safety of American beef and who sought only to improve his relationship with Bush prior to histrip to Camp David (the first such trip by a Korean president to the Maryland retreat in the history of the alliance).

Internal –Eduation

US- ROK k2 Education in South Korea- WEST proves

Cha 9( Vicor D., Associate Professor D.S. Song-Korea Foundation Chair, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf, Feburary 2009)

The visa waiver program and the Work, English Study, and Travel (WEST) program are two initiatives undertaken by the United States that should be promoted by the new administration. South Koreans’ longtime quest for accession to the U.S. visa waiver program became a presiden-tial initiative from the Bush-Roh 2005 Gyeongju Joint Declaration and was achieved in November 2008. In conjunction with the visa waiver, the new WEST program will soon allow 5,000 students to study and work for 18 months at a time in the United States. A memorandum of understand-ing was signed between the two governments in September 2008, the implementation of which will fall to the next U.S. government.

Internal – Regime Collapse

US- ROK k2 having a peaceful Regime Change

The Asia Foundation 9 ( Center for US- Korea Policy, http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/DPRKContingencyCUSKP0908.pdf

Reports of Kim’s ailing health since fall 2008 have prompted U.S. officials and scholars to call for resumption of U.S.-ROK negotiations on contingency planning for instability in North Korea.7 North Korea’s previous crisis in 1998 stimulated the adoption of an initial plan (5029-98) between the U.S. and ROK militaries to respond to contingencies in the North, the first joint military plan to consider potential threats that might derive from North Korean state failure rather than aggression. An attempt to update that plan in 2005 was reported to address five scenarios including civil war; natural disasters; massive refugee flows; kidnapping of ROK citizens; and loss of control over Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). But efforts were ultimately set aside as a result of concerns under the Roh administration that such a plan might provoke Pyongyang and give the United States disproportionate influence on the direction of events on the Korean peninsula. Emerging issues that must be part of continued discussion include the question of how to respond to North Korea’s nuclear weapons capacity and the implications of South Korean resumption of wartime command by 2012.8 Policy coordination discussions on North Korean instability scenarios have resumed under the Lee administration and will likely continue to take place with the Obama administration.

US- ROK gearing up for Regime Collapse- Alliances with Japan and China

Cha 9( Vicor D., Associate Professor D.S. Song-Korea Foundation Chair, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf, Feburary 2009)

A pressing task for the U.S.-ROK alliance is to prepare for change in North Korea. An altering of the political status quo north of the DMZ could potentially be one of the most significant events in postwar East Asian international relations. A leadership vacuum in North Korea could have ramifications for Chinese and Japanese security. It would impact U.S.-Chinese and Korean Chinese relations. If political leadership change in Pyongyang led to a collapse of political order, the potential for “loose nukes” or other military sce-narios could create a crisis of proportions not seen since the Korean War

Internal (Navy Addon) – Terrorism and Piracy

ROK Maritime Assistance k2 Anti- Terrorism- Somalia proves

Weeks 9( Stanley B, Institute for Defense Analysis, Naval War College, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/US-ROK%2520Alliance%2520in%2520the%252021st%2520Century\_Denmark%2520and%2520Fontaine.pdf)

Clearly, the ROK blue-water Navy has a potential lead role in helping build the “comprehensive strategic Alliance of bilateral, regional, and global scope” endorsed in the recent SCM Joint Communique. This role is most immediately manifested through cooperation with the U.S. and other nations in countering the Nroth Korean nuclear and missile threat through interdiction of proliferation by sea, and through sea-based missile defense. Beyond this, however, the ROK Navy now has capabilities to contribute to the Alliance’s broader vision by making operational contributions to U.S. and multilateral maritime cooperation against various nonstate threats such as piracy and maritime terrorism. Indeed, the distant deployment this year of new KDX-II ROK Navy ships (carrying Marines and helicopters) for anti-piracy operations off Somalia marks a new era of ROK Navy cooperation with the U.S. Navy and other Navies. In so doing, the ROK Navy is of course directly defending its own national interests in secure sea lanes for its vital trade and energy flows across the Indian Ocean from the Persian Gulf. But the ROK Navy, in contributing to the international anti-piracy effort, is also, with the U.S. and other Navies, contributing to broader global security interests in the maritime commons.

Internal ( Navy Addon) – Disaster Relief

US- ROK Navy k2 Disaster Relief- Training and positioning

Weeks 9( Stanley B, Institute for Defense Analysis, Naval War College, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/US-ROK%2520Alliance%2520in%2520the%252021st%2520Century\_Denmark%2520and%2520Fontaine.pdf)

Another area of potential future ROK Navy contribution is in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR). The ROK Navy’s new Dokdo-class LPHs are ideal platforms from which to conduct such operations, which are increasingly in demand in, and beyond, the region. The U.S. Navy can contribute to broadening the Alliance in this area by dedicated training and exercises with the new ROK LPHs and perhaps a joint humanitarian deployment in the region. Finally, the U.S. Navy is increasingly concerned with naval operations in the closer-in littoral seas. The ROK Navy, with its past extensive experience of coastal operations and its new Fast Patrol Boats, is well positioned to help the U.S. Navy in this area, through shared information and combined exercises, particularly as the U.S. Navy deploys its new class of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) in the region. In summary, the U.S.-ROK Alliance can be further broadened in the maritime domain by enhanced U.S.-ROK Navy cooperation and operations in global counter-piracy/counter-terrorism, Humanitarian Assiastance and Disaster Relief, and coastal operations

\_\_\_\*\*US-ROK – Impact Stuff/A2

Presence Good – Relations – North Korea (1/2)

**A) North Korean belligerence has caused an anti-North Korean bloc**

**Lee 6/23** (Peter, *writes on East and South Asian affairs and their intersection with US foreign policy @ Asia Times, 6/23/10,* http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/KF23Dg02.html) JPG

Campbell frankly described the US military presence in Asia as America's "ticket to the big game" and gave the highest priority to relations with Japan and South Korea as a counterweight to China. The main venue for demonstrating enhanced US-Japanese cooperation as a viable alternative to Chinese diplomatic suzerainty over North Asia is North Korea. **The North Korea crisis has provided the Obama administration a useful opportunity to** correct some problems of the George W Bush years and **reaffirm the alliance with Asian democracies.** In this process, Kim Jong-il has played the role of useful idiot: provoking a security crisis and providing a readymade justification for the United States to play to its primary geopolitical strength, as the world's pre-eminent military power, and discount the value of China's growing economic weight. At the end of 2008, North Korea concluded a cycle of deal-breaking and finger-pointing on all sides by repudiating the six-party talks that involve it, the US, Japan, South Korea, China and [Russia](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/KF23Dg02.html). Since then it has embarked on a series of provocations - nuclear tests, missile launches, apocalyptic rhetoric and the arrest of two American journalists - intended to draw the US into direct negotiations. The Obama administration has refused to take the bait. Instead, **it is exploiting North Korea's belligerence to leverage its primary remaining advantage in Asian power politics - America's overwhelming military superiority - and assert America's continued relevance in North Asia**. The Obama administration's approach is welcome news to **Japan and South Korea**, which **are relieved at the US desire to make common cause with the region's democracies** **and not sacrifice their interests for the sake of security** and economic cooperation with China. This approach, though placing the US in more comfortable alignment with its allies in the near term, does little to address the long-term challenge to American influence in Asia: the rise of China. And it does nothing to relieve the plight of the immiserated people of North Korea. The Obama administration has made the determination that Pyongyang would never abandon its nukes, virtually the sole internationally recognized achievement and asset of the regime. It also realized that **the ascendancy of conservative governments in Seoul and** [**Tokyo**](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/KF23Dg02.html) **made possible a cohesive anti-North Korean bloc**. Therefore, Washington declared itself unwilling to engage in another round of ritualized atomic extortion with Kim Jong-il's regime. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it, "I'm tired of buying the same horse twice." Instead, the Obama administration meticulously cultivated the powers that the Bush administration or North Korea had either insulted or disregarded at various junctures, taking special care to reach out to China.

**Presence Good – Relations – North Korea (2/2)**

**B) Plan sends signal of US weakness on Korea killing the foundation of the relationship**

**Singh & Patel 8** (Vikram & Nirav, Vikram – Senior Defense Advisor to the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, MA in Int’l Relations @ Columbia, Nirav – Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) where he oversees the Center’s Asia Initiative '09 projects, 4/6/8, Center for a New American Security, http://www.cnas.org/node/157) JPG

**Washington and Seoul will not last long without more harmony on** the most important issue for the relationship: **North Korean denuclearization**. At the Camp David press conference with new South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, President Bush accentuated the positive and ignored the negative by choosing not to mention North Korea in his opening remarks. It was the first sign of trouble in the new courtship between Washington and Seoul that began with Lee’s inauguration in March. **Lee’s pro- U.S. stance and conservative approach to North Korea promised to bring the partners closer** than they have been in a decade. His visit to Washington, D.C. in April should have set the course for alli- ance bliss. Lee was the first South Korean leader invited to Camp David. He was presented with a promise of visa waivers for South Koreans visiting America. The warm tone of his visit had been set in advance by landmark agreements to ease South Korean restrictions on importing American beef--a limit which threatened to derail congressional ratification of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) negotiated last June. Unfortunately, the summit did not live up to the expectations of its observers or participants. Beef and visas are the stuff of a great first date, but the strength of the long-term relationship rests on mutual understanding and trust about the toughest issues. In this case, **the leaders must establish a common approach to North Korea.** **The** recent **visit suggested** to the world **a startling switch of positions between Seoul and Washington** and the continued lack of U.S. strategic coherence on the North Korea issue. Who’s Playing Bad Cop? Lee Myung-bak was viewed by Washington as a breath of fresh air. **He has called for a pragmatic approach to North Korea, in stark contrast to his predecessor and much more in tune with the Bush Administration.** Under Lee, Seoul would demand that North Korea show results of its promises and receive minimal support without complete and accurate verification of its nuclear weap- ons program and activities. **This is a drastic switch from a decade in which unrequited assistance from South Korea to the North worked at cross-purposes with a hard-line U.S. approach on verifiable denuclearization**. In particular, the change meant **Seoul would likely support Washington’s “complete and correct” formulation** that included not just pluto- nium reprocessing but also any uranium enrichment and proliferation activi- ties to countries like Syria. Pyongyang responded in a predictable hard-line man- ner, with vicious rhetoric, expelling South Korean officials residing in North Korea, and belligerent missile launches. **Given the prospects for stronger U.S.­ROK relations, reports of a bilateral softening of the U.S.** approach to North Korea just before the recent summit **came as an unwelcome surprise**.  According to the New York Times, National Security Council offi  cials confirmed reports that “declarations regarding proliferation and uranium would be negotiated separately” from plutonium issues.1  The signing of the not-so-secret “secret memoranda” between Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, Christopher Hill, and North Korea’s chief diplomat, Kim Kye Gwan raised concerns about whether the United States and South Korea really do see eye-to-eye.  **Many in Seoul and other Asian capitals think this shift undermines earlier agreements** and gives Pyongyang time to stall or evade true disarmament.

**A2 – “North Korea ≠ Threat”**

**RoK perceives elevated threat from North Korea**

**Harrington 10** (Patrick, 5/28/10, writer @ Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-28/u-s-south-korea-forces-say-they-can-repel-north-as-raptors-ships-deploy.html) JPG

**North Korea** yesterday said it would cut a military hotline with the South and **threatened to attack any ships that entered its waters**, the state-run Korean Central News Agency said. **South Korea has begun broadcasting propaganda** into the North **and threatened its own military strikes** should it come under attack. U.S. forces in South Korea include about 18,000 Army troops, as many as 8,000 Air Force personnel, 500 Navy sailors and about 70 Marines, military spokesman David Oten said by phone from Seoul. Army troops in South Korea belong to the [Second Infantry Division](http://www.2id.korea.army.mil/), which is comprised of aviation and ground-combat units, Oten said. **Live-fire exercises conducted** by the division on April 14 **involved** AH-64 Apache Longbow attack helicopters **destroying targets on a range with missiles**, according to a [press release.](http://www.usfk.mil/usfk/%28S%28prpvw145zfjc1f4550e2pw45%29A%28Ih9prtsvywEkAAAAZDk0ZGY4MmUtMjdkOC00ZWRhLWI3OWMtYmRlOWNmMTlkOTBhmv6XWc_OSU6BKxTd-lGSGWf3uFE1%29%29/ShowArticle.aspx?ID=557) **There are also two tactical fighter wings stationed in South Korea,** which use the F-16 fighter, Oten said, without providing an exact number of aircraft. A typical F-16 fighter wing contains about 72 planes, he said. There is also a squadron of 18 A-10 aircraft, he said. The A-10 is a low-flying ground attack or tank-killing airplane.

Impact- Nuclear Launches

North Korean Launch Deadly – Chemical and Biological missiles

Weeks 9( Stanley B, Institute for Defense Analysis, Naval War College, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/US-ROK%2520Alliance%2520in%2520the%252021st%2520Century\_Denmark%2520and%2520Fontaine.pdf)

As noted above, North Korean ballistic missiles pose a significant threat in and beyond South Korea. Most numerous are the more than 600 Scud missiles with 300 mile range reaching all of South Korea. Some newer versions first tested in 2006 are more quickly launchable solid-fuel missiles, and there are also recent reports of improvements in the accuracy of these and other North Korean missiles. Then there are the 200 to 300 intermediate- range Nodong missiles, with over 900 mile range, covering the main islands of Japan. The new longer-range Taepodong X/ Musudan missile, with its 1,500 to 2,400 mile range can reach vital U.S. military forces on Okinawa and Guam. This missile has also now been exported to, and publicly displayed by, Iran. North Korea additionally continues to develop a very long-range missile, Taepodong II, that could reach Alaska, Hawaii, or the U.S. west coast. Unsuccessful flight tests of this missile were conducted in August 1998 and again in july 2006, and most recently in April of 2009. This most recent flight reached a range of 1,980 miles. This numerous and varied North Korean ballistic missile inventory and active development program is a matter for great concern to the U.S. and ROK in and beyond the Korean peninsula, particularly if mated with North Korea’s nuclear or (much more numerous) chemical and biological warheads, and can be used by North Korea not only for direct attack but also for coercion and proliferation. A final North Korean nuclear and missile threat impact is more indirect—the impact of potentially destabilizing the longstanding 228 Chapter 7 U.S.-ROK Alliance. As Victor Cha recently wrote, “Policy on North Korea is perhaps the most important challenge for future alliance interaction.”12 Under the previous two South Korean Presidents, the higher priority given by the U.S. to ending North Korea’s nuclear (and missile) threats contrasted and often clashed with the South Korean Presidents’ prioritization of a “Sunshine Policy” of engagement and dialogue with North Korea. Maintaining the recently restored close coordination and common strategy agreed between the U.S. and the ROK on dealing with the North Korean nuclear problem must be a continuing priority in future Alliance relations

Impact- Energy Wars

Energy War causes conflict- Energy Security Key

Schriver 9 ( Randy, Partner Armitage International Feburary 2009, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf)

It is also important that competition over energy sources does not manifest into an energy-related incident or even a military crisis. Although much attention has been paid to the role of Africa and the Middle East in assessing the relationship between energy availability and future conflict scenarios, Asia too is marked by the presence of disputed areas with the potential to supply energy to whoever controls them. It is conceivable, therefore, that ongoing territorial disputes over energy-rich areas could lead to conflict. Tensions between China and Japan have cooled temporarily, but major issues remain unresolved with respect to disputes over underwater oil reserves. Within the U.S. alliances, dialogue on energy security issues should be elevated as a higher-priority agenda item in order to mitigate the risk of energy-related ten-sions developing without a clear plan for how to manage and resolve them.

Impact ( Populism) – Political Capital/Perception

Populist Movement cause Political Challenges

Cha 9( Vicor D., Associate Professor D.S. Song-Korea Foundation Chair, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf, Feburary 2009)

These beef demonstrations demonstrated the unpredictable nature of populist movements in Korea. Just when things looked as though they were back on an even keel and the memories of the 2002 anti-American demonstrations in Korea had started to fade, these protests recalled all of the perennial difficulties in the alliance relationship. The beef demonstrations do represent a chal-lenge to the alliance for the new administration in Washington. Yet, these all-paralyzing protests were not about American beef, which is safe by interna-tional standards. (Indeed, U.S. beef took some 39 percent of the Korean domestic market within one week of its return to grocery store shelves). Instead, they represent a fundamental new problem for Korea’s populist democracy — that is, the capacity of Korea’s political left to operate effectively within established democratic institutions.

2NC Hegemony Add on

Withdrawal will wreck U.S. influence

Kang & Cha 3  (associate professor of Business at Dartmouth, AND \*\*associate professor of government Georgetown’s school of Foreign Service May/June 2003, David C. Kang, Victor D. Cha, Foreign Policy, “Think Again: The Korea Crisis,” http://www.ituassu.com.br/asia\_fp1.pdf, )

  “The United States Should Pull Its Troops Out of an Ungrateful South Korea” Not yet. Massive demonstrations, Molotov cocktails hurled into U.S. bases, and American soldiers stabbed on the streets of Seoul have stoked anger in Congress and on the op-ed pages of major newspapers about South Korea. As North Korea appears on the nuclear brink, Americans are puzzled by the groundswell of anti-Americanism. They cringe at a younger generation of Koreans who tell cbs television’s investigative program 60 Minutes that Bush is more threatening than Kim, and they worry about reports that South Korea’s new president, Roh Moo-hyun, was avowedly anti-American in his younger days. Most Koreans have complicated feelings about the United States. Some of them are anti-American, to be sure, but many are grateful. South Korea has historically been one of the strongest allies of the United States. Yet it would be naive to dismiss the concerns of South Koreans about U.S. policy and the continued presence of U.S. forces as merely emotional. Imagine, for example, how Washingtonians might feel about the concrete economic impact of thousands of foreign soldiers monopolizing prime real estate downtown in the nation’s capital, as U.S. forces do in Seoul. But hasty withdrawal of U.S. forces is hardly the answer to such trans-Pacific anxiety, particularly as the U.S.–South Korean alliance enters uncharted territory. The North Koreans would claim victory, and the United States would lose influence in one of the most dynamic economic regions in the world—an outcome it neither wants nor can afford. In the long term, such a withdrawal would also pave the way for Chinese regional dominance. Some South Koreans might welcome a larger role for China—a romantic and uninformed notion at best. Betting on China, after all, did not make South Korea the 12th largest economy and one of the most vibrant liberal democracies in the world. The alternatives to the alliance are not appealing to either South Koreans or Americans. Seoul would have to boost its relatively low level of defense spending (which, at roughly 3 percent of gross domestic product, is less than that of Israel and Saudi Arabia, for example). Washington would run the risk of jeopardizing its military presence across EastAsi**a,** as a U.S. withdrawal from the peninsula raised questions about the raison d’être for keeping its troops in Japan. A revision in the U.S. military presence in Korea is likely within the next five years, but withdrawal of that presence and abrogation of its alliance are not. - Show quoted text

2NC Proliferation Add on

ROK is k2 Navy Modernization

Weeks 9( Stanley B, Institute for Defense Analysis, Naval War College, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/US-ROK%2520Alliance%2520in%2520the%252021st%2520Century\_Denmark%2520and%2520Fontaine.pdf)

An insightful recent analysis of the future of the U.S.-South Korea Alliance noted that recent South Korean naval modernization developments “appear particularly promising for future alliance cooperation.”20 With South Korea’s near-total dependence on the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) to carry he trade and energy flows powering its globalized economy, South Korea began in the 1990s a naval modernization program designed to transform the previous localized defensive South Korean Navy into an open-ocean, blue water Navy of regional and even global reach. Well before the September 2005 ROK adoption of the 15-year Defense Reform Plan (DRP) 2020, then-South Korean President Kim Dae Jung in March 2001 announced that South Korea would create a new “strategic mobile fleet” to protect the state’s interests and play the role of peacekeeper in the oceans of the world.21 The current ROK President Lee Myung-bak similarly stated last year that “we have to build a state-of-the-art force that can protect our maritime sovereignty. With a vision for an advanced, deep-sea Navy, our Navy should become a force that can ensure the security of maritime transportation lines, and contribute to peace in the world.22 In short, the South Korean Navy, backed by the vigorous ROK economy and the world’s largest shipbuilding industry, is now a decade into its transformation to a modern, open-ocean Navy whose roles potentially go far beyond the previous ROK Navy’s defensive missions of interdiction of North Korean ships and submarines and support for the U.S. Seventh Fleet-

[Insert Prolif impact]

ROK Navy solves Proliferation- PSI proves

Weeks 9( Stanley B, Institute for Defense Analysis, Naval War College, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/US-ROK%2520Alliance%2520in%2520the%252021st%2520Century\_Denmark%2520and%2520Fontaine.pdf)

In dealing with one of the major North Korea nuclear and missile threats—proliferation by sea—this new blue-water ROK Navy has great potential to contribute to U.S. and multinational efforts. Both the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (which South Korea adhered to in May 2009) and UN Security Council Resolution 1874 provide for international cooperation to interdict North Korean shipments of nuclear and missile weapons or components. *PSI*.27 Initiated by the U.S. and ten other nations in May 2003, the PSI is an activity (not an organization), whose adhering states pledge to endorse a statement of anti-proliferation principles, strengthen national authorities as required to prevent proliferation, identify national points of contact and exchange information, identify national assets to contribute to PSI efforts, and be willing to actively participate in PSI interdiction training and exercises or actual activities. An informal PSI coordinating structure, the twentynation Operational Experts Group (OEG) meets periodically to discuss proliferation concerns and plan future events and exercises. In the six years since the initiation of the PSI, 95 nations have adhered to it, most recently South Korea. The latest of several annual PSI exercises just completed in Singapore on October 29, 2009 with a demonstration of a ship search inport.28 Although the PSI covers interdiction of air, ground, or sea transportation in proliferation of WMD, delivery systems (such as ballistic missiles), or their components, most of the PSI exercises have focused on procedures for at-sea interdiction by locating, boarding, and search.

Impact – Loose Nukes

Regime collapse leads to Loose Nukes- US-ROK key

Weeks 9( Stanley B, Institute for Defense Analysis, Naval War College)

Yet another concern regarding North Korea’s nuclear threat is the danger of “loose nukes” in the event of a collapse of the North Korean regime. Such a collapse, as a result of disputed leadership change, internal uprising or civil war, or other measures leading to an end to the North Korean state’s traditional harsh control of its people, could lead to contending factions in North Korea proliferating or even using nuclear and other weapons and technology of mass destruction.11 The U.S. and ROK (as well as other major regional states) will need to have in place close coordination to deal with the consequences of such a sudden collapse of the North Korean regime. This area is ripe for resuming the previous planning dialogue on this issue within the U.S.-ROK Alliance

AT: NPR/ OPCON doesn’t solve Deterrence ( Korea)

OPCON solves Detterence – Cooperative Decision Making

Kim 9 (Tae-Woo , Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, Korea Instuite for National Unification)

Third, a revision along with a supplement of the OPLAN 5027 is critical. OPLAN 5027 serves as the main operation plan in deterring a war from arising on the Korean peninsula. Since the 1980s, it has been revised to exclude South Korea’s participation in the U.S. decision making with regard to use of nuclear weapons. After 1992, the plan was completely devoid of the mention of nuclear weapons. Currently, wartime operational control (OPCON) is under the U.S.-led authority of the Combined Forces Command (CFC), and according to the 2007 agreement, OPCON is scheduled to be transferred to the ROK forces as of April 17, 2012. Accordingly, some experts negate the need for any revisions considering that the OPLAN 5027 will be dissolved with the separation of OPCON in 2012. However, if we were to focus on the classic truth of “never allowing for a blind spot in security” until OPLAN 5027 is substituted, there has to be measures to counter the extant of the North Korean nuclear threat—especially considering the possibility of delay in the scheduled transfer date of OPCON.18 For a more formidable deterrence against North’s WMDs, it is necessary to include policies and methods of extended deterrence through nuclear weapons in OPLAN 5027. By referencing the European model of mutual agreement in case of use of nuclear weapons, the road must be paved at least in a limited capacity for the South to 18\_ Since the inauguration of President Lee’s administration, both governments of the ROK and the U.S. have not mentioned any changes to the 2007 agreement on OPCON transfer, with the necessary preparatory work ongoing as scheduled. However, opposition by conservative NGOs and some portion of South Korean population continue to oppose the OPCON separation and dissolution of the CFC. So far, some 9 million people have signed up for the opposition campaign which has been initiated by the Korea Veterans’ Association. Subsequently, one cannot completely rule out the possibility of the ROK-U.S. renegotiation over the timing of the OPCON transfer. 206 Chapter 6 participate in the U.S. decision making with regard to the use of nuclear weapons.19 If OPCON transfer does proceed as scheduled in 2012, whatever operation plan that may follow thereafter must share in the prior mutual consensus on specific methods for extended deterrence. If the points above are mutually-agreed upon and subsequently reflected in the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the credibility of extended deterrence will be further fortified. Considering that the NPR is a trusted document advocating the tenets of the U.S. nuclear strategy to the outside world, it will be extremely important to give relative weight to the provision of extended deterrence to South Korea. Extended deterrence will become even more tenable, if the NPR deals simultaneously with how to protect Japan as well as South Korea, the main U.S. allies in East Asia.

AT: Extended Deterrence doesn’t solve( South Korea)

US-ROK key- Nuclear Umbrella

Kim 9 (Tae-Woo , Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, Korea Instuite for National Unification)

Foremost, in order to add credibility to the promised extended deterrence as agreed to at the summit, the most pressing measure is to let North Korea unmistakably be on notice that a WMD attack against the South will lead to unsparing retaliation by the U.S. To that end, the U.S. could consider customizing its regular military exercises and deploying nuclear submarines or other weapons of deterrence at all times in East Asia against North Korea. Once such measures are in place supporting what was agreed to at the summit, North Korea will fully understand the consequences any levity of the situation will bring about. Second, the U.S. must include North Korea’s chemical, biological weapons as well as missiles in its basket of extended deterrence. Therefore, it is important for the heads of both countries to understand that the expression referenced in the June 16 agreement of an ‘extended deterrence including the nuclear umbrella,’ should be repeatedly elucidated in later documents or verbal agreements. If the use of the expression ‘nuclear umbrella’ confuses consensusbuilding, such usage should be abandoned and instead use ‘extended deterrence

AT: US-ROK doesn’t solve Nuclear Threat

US Korea key to deterrence- Six Party Talks

Weeks 9( Stanley B, Institute for Defense Analysis, Naval War College, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/US-ROK%2520Alliance%2520in%2520the%252021st%2520Century\_Denmark%2520and%2520Fontaine.pdf)

The Joint Communique issued in Seoul on October 22, 2009 after the annual U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) between the Defense Minister, military heads, and senior defense and foreign affairs officals of the two states clearly stated an agreed U.S.-ROK policy on the North Korean nuclear and missile threat. The SCM Joint Communique “reiterated that the ROK and the U.S. will not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapon state,” criticized recent North Korean nuclear and missile tests as violations of UN Security Council resolutions and Six Party Talks agreements, and pledged both nations to fully implement the UN Security Council Resolutions (1718 and 1874), and ”to continue joint efforts to achieve the complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea 12\_ Victor D. Cha, “Outperforming Expectations: The U.S.-ROK Alliance,” in Kurt M. Campbell, Victor D. Cha, Lindsey Ford, Nirav Patel, Randy Schriver, and Vikram J. Singh, Going Global: The Future of the U.S-South Korea Alliance, Center for a New American Security (February 2009), p. 21. Stanley B. Weeks 229 in a peaceful manner through the Six-Party Talks.”13 The SCM Joint Communique went on to make clear that the U.S. would support ROK efforts “to develop inter-Korean relations through dialogue, while making the denuclearization of North Korea a top priority.” This statement reflects the agreement now of both nations on relative priorities following the election last year of the more conservative South Korean President Lee Myung-bak

AT: Ships fail at Proliferation

ROK Navy Modernization Effective – 3 warrants

Weeks 9( Stanley B, Institute for Defense Analysis, Naval War College, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/US-ROK%2520Alliance%2520in%2520the%252021st%2520Century\_Denmark%2520and%2520Fontaine.pdf)

*Surface Ships*. The surface ships of this modernized ROK Navy include three classes of Destroyers. The largest and most capable class consists of three (and perhaps eventually another three) KDX-III 7650 ton destroyers equipped with the Aegis weapons system. The first of these destroyers is now operational, with two more building to complete by 2012. Though initially equipped with the long-range SM-2 air defense interceptor missiles, these destroyers could later be upgraded to provide missile defense capability using SM-3 interceptor missiles.24 The ROK Navy also has six new KDX-II 4500 ton destroyers, and three earlier KDX-I smaller 3000 ton destroyers. Four underway replenishment ships are now available to extend these ships’ range of operations and sustainability. A new class of Frigate, FFX, is planned to enter service in the next few years to supplement the thirty smaller Corvettes and dozens of Fast Patrol Boats (including the new 500 ton PKX class) used in littoral defense against North Korea. (Unfortunately, given the potential mine threat, the ROK Navy has less than a dozen mine countermeasures vessels, and no plans to build more.) *Submarines*. The ROK Navy is building nine of the larger German Type 214 1800 ton submarines, with the first two recently completed, to add to their existing nine shorter-range German Type 209 1200 ton submarines. With air-independent conventional propulsion allowing extended quiet submerged periods, the nine new larger submarines will have longer range and endurance, enabling more distant patrols of sea lanes. *Amphibious Ships*. In 2007, the ROK Navy commissioned the Dokdo, the first of three planned Landing Platform Helo (LPH) amphibious ships. At 14,000 tons and over 660 feet in length, with a welldeck for deploying landing craft and a capacity to carry up to fifteen helicopters and up to 750 Marines, these ships provide a significant capability for the ROK Navy to project force (and influence) regionally and globally. In the future, such ships could even be modified to serve as carriers for short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft.25 These ships have extensive command and communications capabilities and are a potential centerpiece, with the KDX-III Aegis destroyers, of the “strategic mobile squadrons” the ROK Navy plans to base and deploy from a new ROK Navy base strategically located south of the peninsula on JeJu island, which is planned to be completed by 2014.26 *Aircraft*. The current ROK naval aircraft inventory includes two dozen Lynx helicopters for use from destroyers and LPHs, plus eight P-3C long-range maritime patrol aircraft (with plans to purchase eight more P-3C aircraft from the U.S.)

AT: You can’t solve Energy Security

United States and Korea Committed to Energy Security

Campbell, Ford, Patel, Singh 9 (Kurt M. Lindsey Nirav Vikram J, Center for a New American Security http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf)

Greater cooperation can be initiated in several areas. First, South Korea and the United States should institutionalize an energy security and climate change dialogue at the cabinet/ministe-rial level. Building on President Lee’s vision for a green revolution in Korea and President Barack Obama’s commitment to reducing carbon emis-sions, this dialogue would help both nations to think creatively and cooperatively about how to mitigate carbon emissions and reduce dependence on foreign sources of oil. In addition to increas-ing state-to-state dialogues, South Korea and the United States also need to move more proactively to incentivize greater private-sector investment in green technology research and public-private col-laboration on the development and production of these technologies.

US-ROK Committed – APP Proves

Schriver 9 ( Randy, Partner Armitage International Feburary 2009, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf)

Another potentially fruitful avenue for multilat-eral energy cooperation involving South Korea and the United States is the strengthening of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP), a seven-nation partnership that constitutes more than one-half of the world’s energy consumption and a significant fraction of its non-oil energy resources. The APP’s emphasis on the diffusion of energy-efficient technolo-gies and practi ces is especially appropriate for Asia given the region’s wide variation in energy and environmental practices and its especially pressing need to reconcile economic growth with increasingly acute concerns over environmental protection. Through the APP as well as their bilat-eral relations, the United States and South Korea should cooperate with each other and with other advanced industrial nations to provide these tech-nologies to countries that currently lack them. In addition, they should find ways to transmit knowl-edge of best environmental practices and standards to developing economies to help them create the conditions for long-term sustainable development and economic growth without imposing a high environmental and health cost on other countries in the region.

AT: Financial Crises prevents Energy Security

Renewable Energy Lowers cost

Campbell, Ford, Patel, Singh 9 (Kurt M. Lindsey Nirav Vikram J, Center for a New American Security http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf)

The current financial crisis may dampen politi-cal support for these types of investments, but increased production of green technologies will help lower the unit costs of renewable energies and will also support the types of innovation and infrastructure development that are necessary to reshape both economies for the 21st century.

AT: You can’t solve Proliferation(PSI)

**South Korea Commited to Non Proliferation – 3 Warrants**

Campbell, Ford, Patel, Singh 9 (Kurt M. Lindsey Nirav Vikram J, Center for a New American Security http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf)

South Korea has a vested national interest in curb-ing the proliferation of WMD and their associated technologies. More than most nations, South Korea understands the tangible threat of nuclear aggression. South Korea has historically taken a strong stance on nonproliferation: it is a respon-sible member of the NPT and it complies with the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. Additionally, although it is not a formal member of PSI, South Korea has provided critical intelligence for PSI-related interdiction operations. South Korea’s support for nonproliferation and counterproliferation has been naturally driven by the North Korean nuclear threat. In recent years, however, South Korea has begun to look outside of the peninsular context to help manage the potential reemergence of nuclear politics worldwide.

AT: You can’t solve for Nuclear Proliferation

**South Korea commited to Non Proliferation – Opposition to Proliferation Network**

Campbell, Ford, Patel, Singh 9 (Kurt M. Lindsey Nirav Vikram J, Center for a New American Security http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf)

Obama has stated that nuclear proliferation is perhaps the most significant challenge facing the international community and that strong non-proliferation policies will be a priority for his administration. 71 He has also stated his intent to institutionalize and broaden the scope of the Bush administration’s PSI. 72 The incoming adminis-tration’s desire to broaden PSI’s scope provides an opportunity for South Korea to reframe the domestic debate over signing the PSI. South Korea’s decision to join the initiative should no longer be viewed merely in opposition to North Korea, but rather in opposition to broader global proliferation networks. The decision to support the U.S. administration’s efforts on this front will pave the way for a deepened and closer engagement on nonproliferation.

AT: South Korea’s economy is too small for impact

Korean FTA’s make Collapse a chain reaction

Campbell, Ford, Patel, Singh 9 (Kurt M. Lindsey Nirav Vikram J, Center for a New American Security

http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf)

The proliferation of Korean-led FTAs is another strong indication that Korea is taking a more proactive role in global affairs. South Korea’s economy is highly dependent on trade, both on exports from its heavy industry and manufactur-ing sectors and on imports for its energy needs. Recognizing the need to secure its access to key markets, South Korea has in recent years embarked on a global campaign to establish itself as the foremost trade and economic hub in Northeast Asia. 50 South Korea has strategically targeted many of its efforts toward resource-rich areas, offering to help build important economic and social infra-structure for these countries as a component of its new trade relationships. In Latin America, South Korea was one of the first Asian nations to signon as a permanent observer to the Organization of American States, and in 1997 it established the South Korea-Latin America Business Forum. 51 Additionally, South Korea’s first FTA was signed with a Latin American country, Chile. It has since worked to craft agreements with Mexico and Peru. Korea has pursued similar goals in Africa, begin-ning with President Roh’s 2006 visit, which was the first visit to Africa by a South Korean head of state in 25 years. Roh’s visit resulted in deals with Nigeria for the development of large deepwater oil fields, information technology exchange programs with Egypt, and the exploration of ways to pro-mote relations between the ROK and the Islamic world in a meeting with Secretary General Amr Moussa of the Arab League. 52 More recently, Korea has expressed a desire to develop an FTA with the Southern African Customs Union (a five-member union that includes Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, and Swaziland).

South Korean Economy k2 United States Trading

Schriver 9 ( Randy, Partner Armitage International Feburary 2009, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf)

Nevertheless, South Korea has grown into becoming the United States’ seventh-largest trading partner and the thirteenth-largest economy in the world over the past decades. 25 Given the impor-tance of the Asia-Pacific region to the United States and the mounting challenges facing the globe, it is becoming increasingly important and necessary for the United States to fortify and transform the U.S.-ROK alliance into one that is not constrained to protecting the peace and security of the Korean peninsula and that can address the full range and scope of post-Cold War challenges.

AT: China’s Economy more significant

**Korea Counterbalancing China in Economic development**

Campbell, Ford, Patel, Singh 9 (Kurt M. Lindsey Nirav Vikram J, Center for a New American Security

http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf)

Korea clearly benefits from the expansion of its economic interactions around the world. This increased Korean activity also has a positive second-order effect on American interests. As one high-ranking MOFAT official described it, South Korea-led FTAs expand the fundamentals of eco-nomic liberalism and help compete (and hedge) against the proliferation of illiberal Chinese-led FTAs. 54 South Korea’s growing economic pres-ence has allowed it to emerge as an important democratic counterweight to China’s influence in regions such as Africa and Latin America. The value of South-South trade is only expected to increase in the coming years, and the importance of an alternative source of Asian economic leader-ship should not be underestimated. Many scholars and policymakers have expressed concern that China’s model of state-controlled capitalism has been gaining in appeal in the global South, often at the expense of America’s model of free-market cap-italism. As long as Korean FTAs provide tangible benefits, they will provide a useful counterpoint to China’s efforts by promoting free and open markets. Additionally, the contrast between South Korea’s and China’s FTAs can serve to remind developing nations that China’s promises lack sub-stance and fail to serve the long-term interests of poor, underdeveloped nations and their citizens

AT: South Korea has no Perception

South Korea effective at Counter-Terrorism

Schriver 9 ( Randy, Partner Armitage International Feburary 2009, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf)

In addition, the Asia-Pacific region carries the threat of radical Islam in Southeast and Southwest Asia. Given South Korea’s role as a member of the coalition forces in Iraq and as home to signifi-cant numbers of U.S. military serving overseas, Washington and Seoul share an interest in close counterterrorism collaboration, including domes-tic preparedness, emergency management, andcollaboration on tracing terrorist financing. Indeed, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service announced in September 2008 that it had arrested at least 20 people for suspected connections to terrorism, including for collecting information on U.S. forces stationed in the ROK. 7 Moreover, a Chicago Council on Foreign Relations study found that the two nations share a perception of a heightened threat from terrorism, indicating public support for counterterrorism cooperation within the alliance framework. 8 Beyond the bilat-eral level, the United States and South Korea have both signed the Southeast Asian Anti-Terrorism Cooperation Pact, providing a multilateral forum in which to collaborate with other Asian nations to address regional threats.

AT: China is insignificant

**China is driving force of the Current Age**

Schriver 9 ( Randy, Partner Armitage International Feburary 2009, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf)

Despite the near-hyperbolic rhetoric in recent years surrounding the rise of China, it remains unfore-seeable at this point whether China will continue on a path of dramatic rise, experience catastrophic economic failure or social breakdown, or hover somewhere in between. No matter the precise direction of China’s trajectory, outcomes in China will undeniably have a profound impact on U.S. interests and those of U.S. allies. In fact, the defin-ing strategic challenge of the current age is likely to be how well the world addresses the emergence of China. A profound transformation has occurred in Chinese foreign policy. Taylor Fravel and Evan Medeiros noted in *Foreign Affairs* in 2003 that Chinese scholars today write less about a Chinese foreign policy motivated by “150 years of shame and humiliation” and more frequently about the need to adopt a “great-power mentality.” This transformation in self perception is informing a more robust and creative Chinese diplomacy. China is growing not only in terms of its compre-hensive national power but also in its willingness and ability to promote its interests through the exploitation of that power. There is little doubt that China is more active, engaged, and influen-tial in many parts of the world than it has ever been before.

AT: Empirically Denied No loose Nukes

Loose Nukes will happen – No sucession to Leadership

Cha 9( Vicor D., Associate Professor D.S. Song-Korea Foundation Chair, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf, Feburary 2009)

Those who have studied the peninsula might entertain such concerns with a jaded sense of pas-sivism. After all, when Kim Il Sung died suddenly in July 1994, there was no collapse of the regime. Ongoing nuclear negotiations with the United States were completed a mere three months later. The country went through a period of famine in the 1990s — the only industrialized society in recent history to have suffered one due to eco-nomic mismanagement — and survived. And Kim Jong-il, despite his many eccentricities and health problems, still appears to be in control. Yet, a confluence of forces leads one to believe that the DPRK regime will come under severe stress in the near future. The first factor has to do with the rumors circulating about Kim Jong-il’s health in 2008. Although it is difficult to confirm any of these rumors, it is fairly clear that the 66-year-old dictator’s physical wellbeing has reached a tipping point. Having undergone at least one heart pro-cedure in 2007 and likely another in 2008 based on foreign press reports, the Dear Leader’s time in office appears limited. If not incapacitated already, another stroke could be debilitating, if not fatal. Major heart or brain surgery, moreover, would carry a high mortality risk. Unlike the last leader-ship transition, there is no clear line of succession to any of his three sons.

AT: South Korea doesn’t want Renewable Energy

South Korea is Committed – Energy Security and Climate change key Priorities

Campbell, Ford, Patel, Singh 9 (Kurt M. Lindsey Nirav Vikram J, Center for a New American Security http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf)

President Lee has named energy security and climate change policies as two of his administra-tion’s key priorities, setting ambitious goals to reduce the country’s reliance on fossil fuels and invest in alternative energy sources. Renewable energy sources constitute a small but growing portion of South Korea’s energy production, and Lee aimed to increase renewable energy invest-ments by 60 percent in 2008. 63 Moreover, the Lee administration has set lofty targets to increase the country’s future production of green energy from its present rate of 2.28 percent to 10 percent by 2020. 64 This will not be an easy undertaking, but as a nation Korea is well positioned to try. South Korea possesses a high-tech industrial base that is rapidly

increasing its development and produc-tion of green technologies, which are expected to be an important source of economic growth in the coming years. South Korea is already in the process of constructing the world’s largest solar and tidal energy plants, and industrial giants such as Hyundai, LG,

and Samsung have been making aggressive strides to move into the green market through the production of photovoltaic cells, hybrid cars, and even hydrogen fuel cell buses. 65 South Korea is also diversifying its energy sources by investing vast amounts of money in the pro-duction of nuclear power plants. Nuclear energy currently accounts for 40 percent of South Korea’s energy production, and the government plans to produce 60 percent of the nation’s electricity from nuclear power plants by 2035. 66 Policymakers in South Korea and the United States have recognized the usefulness of the alliance in providing a foundation for mutual efforts toaddress climate change and energy security. Both countries have an interest in reducing global com-petition for fossil fuels, share the need to protect access to energy resources through sea lines of communication, and have world-class technology sectors that can collaborate on the development on new green technologies. Yet, little has been done to take advantage of these shared aims and complementary capabilities. As the leading global power and a vital player in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States needs to step forward and take advantage of the opportunities for collaboration. The inauguration of a new U.S. president presents a window of opportunity for the United States to conduct a strategic reassessment of its efforts on this front, and for Washington and Seoul to begin exploring areas of cooperation on the issue of cli-mate change and energy security.

AT: Asia Attack

US will still be on top – Cohesion

Denmark 9 ( Abraham Denmark, Center for a New America Security, CNAS, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/US-ROK%2520Alliance%2520in%2520the%252021st%2520Century\_Denmark%2520and%2520Fontaine.pdf)

While the rise of Asia is an undeniable fact, rhetoric about a major power shift toward the East and the end of American “domination” is overstated. While Asia’s economic rise is nothing short of remarkable, it’s economic size still pales in comparison to that of th`e United States or the EU (Figure 1.1). This is in part a function of scale—China’s GDP has more than quadrupled since 1998, yet the U.S. economy grew by $5.6 trillion during the same period, an amount larger than any economy in Northeast Asia.6 A lack of uniformity in Northeast Asia’s economic growth also undermines a discussion of the region as a cohesive whole. China’s rapid economic growth (an average rate of 9.5% annual growth from 1998-2008) eclipsed the relatively slow growth rates in South Korea and Taiwan (4.2% and 3.9% respectively). Moreover, Japan’s anemic annual rate of growth during this time period (0.989%) has permitted China’s near-emergence as Northeast Asia’s largest economy These trends are likely to become more pronounced in the coming years. According to IMF projections, China’s GDP in 2014 will remain less than half that of the U.S. while the economies of Japan, South Korea, Russia, and Taiwan will continue to fall behind (Figure 1.2).9 Thus, while the United States and the EU will remain economically dominant for the foreseeable future, China’s economy will soon overtake Japan’s and quickly become the strongest in Northeast Asia. The state of affairs is made starker, of course, when one compares per capita income in the countries under question..

\_\_\_\*\*US-ROK – Aff Answers

US-ROK – UQ

**US-ROK security alliance weakening – 4 reasons**

Robert E **Kelly, ‘9** – Assistant Professor Department of Political Science & Diplomacy Pusan National University. “Start Admitting that the US Commitment to SK is Weakening,” http://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2009/04/24/start-admitting-that-the-us-commitment-to-sk-is-weakening.

The Korean press has been filled for months with the coverage of the US military’s redeployment from north to south of Seoul. Usually these reports include protestations from both sides that the military commitment of the US to the South has not diminished. I just can’t see how that can be the case. **I want the US commitment to remain strong, but** I think **this is wishful thinking. 1. The US has slowly reduced its ground forces in Korea over the last few decades. US force totals are now around 28k and may sink below 25k by 2015. By contrast, the US has about twice that number in Japan and Germany**, neither of whom are as directly threatened as SK. The common response is that the US can provide the same level of protection with fewer people because of today’s greater lethality per US warfighter, as well as the continuing cover provided by the US air force and navy. Essentially this is a Rumsfeldian transformation argument. The ‘transformation’ of the US military has made each US solider more individually effective, so you need fewer of them for the same job. This is achieved through better training, and use of IT to coordinate firepower better. Smart soldiers and combined arms have multiplier effects we didn’t enjoy during the Cold War. So instead of blowing up a whole valley to kill the enemy, you only need the firepower to blow up a part of it, because IT (‘the networked battlefield’) will tell you exactly which part the enemy is in. I find this moderately compelling, but the verdict is not really in yet on transformation. (See Thomas Ricks at Foreign Policy and Fred Kaplan at Slate, who have long chronicled the ups and downs of this notion.) While it seemed to work well in Afghanistan, it was an abysmal failure in Iraq, where low force totals were the single biggest US problem until the surge. **Transformation and smaller forces** also seem to **run against a basic military lesson – more is better**. Ceteris paribus, a larger force should improve options and create a greater cushion to absorb casualties and defeats. I think we all assume that NK’s military is clapped out, but it is over 1 million strong, and US totals seem awfully low. Also, should the US be involved in another war – as we are now – at the time of a conflict with the DPRK, more is again better. It just seems awfully risky. **2. US forces are being moved south of Seoul. To me, this is the most obvious sign of decreased willingness. During the Cold War, US troops were purposefully strewn along the DMZ, so that if there was a conflict, US lives would be lost almost immediately. Dead Americans would then rouse US public opinion to commit to the war**. NATO followed the same logic in central Europe. The more flags on the initial coffins, the more likely collective security would be honored. **It seems willful blindness to say that the US is not looking to avoid casualties and therefore the public opinion chain-gang effect by this southward move**. This may be good for the US. It lowers the likelihood of an immediate public outcry, and so gives DoD and the White House some time in a crisis. But if I were South Koreans, I would be nervous. Similarly, **US forces will no longer be located between Seoul, the capital, and the DMZ**. 20m people live in greater Seoul – 40% of the national population. It is extremely exposed. It is only 30 miles from the DMZ; it is extremely dense, and it is filled with skyscrapers and high apartment tower blocks that would fall easily if it hit by NK artillery. (Picture the horrifying WTC collapse happening dozens of times.) I imagine the ROK army will be put in the US place, but still if I were a Korean, I would be pretty spooked that the US is no longer protecting what would obviously be the primary target if the DPRK drove south. **3. In 2012, the US will relinquish wartime authority to control SK forces. This abolition of** Combined Forces Command (**CFC) is marketed as restoring sovereignty and control to the South, but an obvious extra for the US is that it is no longer obligated to command in the case of a war**. Again, this gives the US more wiggle room. 4. **Finally**, I think **US public opinion is hardly deeply committed the defense of SK anymore**. The Cold War is over. If SK were to go communist now, it would not matter to US security as much as before. And Americans are exhausted from Iraq, Afghanistan, and the general stress of the GWoT. To the extent Americans even know where SK is, most of their political images will be of a wealthy country (Samsung TVs, etc, etc) that should be able to defend itself. **The American attitude, and** probably **that of DoD, is burden-sharing**. Allies should carry more of their own defense. NK is SK’s problem, let them fix it; it’s their war, let them fight it. In sum, the bulk of smaller US forces will be 100 miles from the DMZ, south of Seoul, and **we don’t have the authority to command the SK military in a fight most Americans won’t see as critical for national security**. In other words, we are reserving options for ourselves, including just how much we want to commit.

US-ROK – UQ

**The NPR will decrease nuclear aid and call for SoKo to put up or shut up**

Park **Yong-ok, ‘9**. – Research Fellow Sejong Institute. “Nuclear Armed North Korea and Extended Deterrence ― Issues, Prospects and Suggestions,” December, Korea Focus, <http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/design2/essays/view.asp?volume_id=92&content_id=102814&category=G>.

The **Obama** administration **is** currently **conducting another** round of Nuclear Posture Review (**NPR**). It is possible that **the 2009 NPR will produce a dramatically different outcome** from those of two previous NPRs, considering that President Obama is a strong advocate of a nuclear-free world. The 1993 NPR under the Clinton administration virtually followed the Cold War concept despite the changes in world situation since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It maintained the offensive strategy based on the “nuclear triad” consisting of the land-based ICBM, submarine-based SLBM and strategic bombers all capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The 2001 NPR under the Bush administration reflecting the post-Cold War situation established a “new triad,” which consisted of the three types of offensive arms of the old triad (both nuclear- and conventionally-armed), defensive systems, including missile defense, and a responsive infrastructure for addressing unexpected developments. It combined both offensive and defensive strategies presupposing the preemptive use of nuclear weapons. The ongoing 2009 NPR of the Obama administration is inclined toward considerably reducing dependence on nuclear arms in accordance with the objective of a nuclear-free world. It is generally recognized that the previous nuclear posture of the United States has caused a burden to its nuclear nonproliferation and anti-terror efforts and that Washington needs to exercise strong leadership in realizing a nuclear-free world although the maintenance of nuclear capabilities is still necessary as a means of strategic deterrence. **Yet, it needs further observation to determine whether Obama`s NPR can completely depart from Bush`s** NPR. The Obama administration should accept the role and functions of nuclear arms in restraining foes and protecting friends, and it therefore faces the question of maintaining balance and harmony between nuclear deterrence and denuclearization. No consensus seems to have been reached in the United States and little change may be expected in its general nuclear posture for the time being. **What is clear, however, is that the concepts of nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence and their operational principles can be altered in accordance with the outcome of the current review** of the U.S. nuclear posture. **One possible area of changes is whether emphasis will be placed on unilateral U.S. assistance or increased role of allies** in the future mode of security cooperation. **In the event** that **Washington reduces the strategic importance of nuclear arms,** a drastic increase in the role of allies will be called for**. Changes will be unavoidable and South Korea will be required to equip itself with enough capabilities necessary for playing its role in any restructured security situation in the future.**

Link Turns

**Reduction of troop presence reduces tensions in the alliance**

**Campbell et. al 9** (Kurt, Assistant Secretary @ Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, co-founder and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf) JPG

**Despite the U.S.-ROK alliance’s efficiency**, **its Cold War-era constitution was in dire need of revision**, as aspects of both the regional and global environment changed in the post-Cold War era. For the United States, Korea presented an anomaly in terms of overall global force posture. It was a heavy, **ground-based presence built to deal only with a potential North Korean attack**. In this sense, the presence there did not fit with overall U.S. aspirations for its military deployments to be capable of deploying regionally and in global contingencies. At the same time, **the U.S. military’s large physical footprint in Korea** — most conspicuously at the 8th Army headquarters in central Seoul — **became increasingly anachronistic** in a country that was democratic, educated, and affluent, a far cry from the war-torn country that first hosted the American presence after the Korean War. A wakeup call came in the winter of 2002, when **a U.S. military court’s acquittal of two soldiers involved in the killing of two Korean schoolgirls** during a training accident led to widespread protests in Korea. **These trends impelled significant changes** in the location of American billets in South Korea. Since 2002, **the two governments have agreed on a major base realignment and restructuring** agreement **constituting** the most far-reaching changes in **U.S. presence** on the peninsula since the end of the Korean War. **Measures include the removal of U.S. forces from the Korean** Demilitarized Zone (**DMZ**), the move of U.S. Army headquarters (Yongsan garrison) out of the center of Seoul, and the eventual return of more than 60 bases and camps to the ROK. These base moves fit with larger U.S. military transformational needs, centering more air and naval capabilities out of Pyongtaek and Osan, but they maintain the same level of credible U.S. defense commitments to Seoul. Moreover, **the reduction of the large U.S. military footprint in the center of Seoul** — the equivalent of putting a foreign military installation the size of Central Park in New York City — **serves to reduce civil-military tensions in the alliance.**

**Removal bolsters US-RoK relations**

**Campbell et. al 9** (Kurt, Assistant Secretary @ Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, co-founder and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09.pdf) JPG

**More** work **can clearly be done** on both sides **to advance U.S.-ROK relations and to build the alliance for the future. Carrying out the basing moves and the realignment agreements are** clearly **an important task** for the new U.S. administration. Nevertheless, they are operational issues that do **ROK alliance remains one of America’s most stable and valuable alliances.** By all measures, **the alliance has proved its efficiency and durability**. A look at the history of the alliance demonstrates its remarkable ability to surpass expectations. **What began as a security guarantee among highly unequal parties has now evolved into a mature partnership between two strong and secure democracies**. When considering the future of the alliance, it is instructive to remember how far the alliance has come. Of course, the alliance, like all partnerships, will face challenges ahead. The difficulty of managing the peninsular question and reversing North Korea’s nuclear ambitions will continue to be a central focus of the alliance and a potential problem spot. **Past management of this challenge** — especially on the issues of denuclearization strategies, inter-Korean cooperation, and human rights in the DPRK — **has indicated the potential for gaps in alliance coordination**. Other potential problems spots include growing populism in South Korea and political obstacles to ratification of the ground-breaking KORUS FTA.

Link Turns

**Perceptions from both sides risk a collapse of the US-RoK alliance – plan solves**

**Hwang 5** (Balbina, PhD in Intl Relations @ Georgetown and guest lecturer in economics and foreign policy, 1/18, http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/policy-forums-online/security/0505A\_Hwang.html/) JPG

However, despite the success of the formal alliance relationship and close economic and social ties, **the bilateral relationship has suffered in recent years with increased problems of perception** on both sides of the Pacific. Many **Americans have become** increasingly **concerned about** flare-ups of **anti-American sentiment**, including mass demonstrations against the United States staged in late 2002 to protest the death of two schoolgirls in a traffic accident involving U.S. military personnel.[ [1](http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/policy-forums-online/security/0505A_Hwang.html#1) ] More disturbing are the less overt signs that **South Korean attitudes toward America have shifted**. For example, recent public opinion surveys reveal that **more South Koreans see the United States as a greater threat** to their security **than North Korea**.[ [2](http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/policy-forums-online/security/0505A_Hwang.html#2) ] Today, **the feeling of trust** between the United States and South Korea that for decades has been taken for granted **is eroding. The formal alliance relationship**, which is critical to the security interests of both countries, **may also be in jeopardy**. Sources of the Gap Several factors have contributed to this divergence of views. One important factor is that **South Korea has undergone a profound** political, economic, and social **transformation** during the past two decades. Two decades ago South Korea was an authoritarian country. Today it is one of the most vibrant and thriving democracies in East Asia, with a vigorous civil society and freedom of expression, fueled in part by the explosive use of the Internet. South Korea's economy has rapidly grown from one of the poorest in the region at the end of the Korean War to a regional powerhouse and the 12th largest economy in the world. Today, South Korean society is dominated by the younger generation- in both number and influence-who are struggling to adjust to the immense challenges that accompany such changes. These include reconciling national pride and achievements with lingering feelings of inadequacy and dependency stemming from its recent bitter history as a Japanese colony, which was followed by division and war. Regrettably, **such "growing pains" are often manifested in nationalistic rhetoric, which is often couched in anti-American expressions.** At the same time, changes have also occurred in the United States. The events of September 11, 2001, changed not only the strategic orientation of the United States, but also the attitudes of the American people. After 9/11, **America**-both its government and its people-**is less inclined to tolerate anti-American sentiments and is less patient with and accommodating of allies** that hesitate to support the United States in endeavors that serve their mutual interests. North Korea Contributing to the growing gap between the United States and South Korea are their fundamentally altered and divergent views of North Korea. From the U.S. perspective, North Korea remains an imposing threat because of the regime's military strength, illicit pursuit of nuclear weapons, "military first" policy at the cost of mass starvation of its citizens, proliferation of arms and missiles, record of state-sponsored terrorism, continued hostile military stance toward South Korea and other neighbors such as Japan, and its continued widespread violations of the human rights of its own people. Yet from South Korea's perspective, the North Korean threat has less to do with its strength as a regime than its weakness. Today, **South Koreans fear a North Korean collapse more than an attack, because a collapse would unleash** social, political, and economic **chaos** that would impose unacceptable costs. Regrettably, because of this widespread perception gap, some **South Koreans have chosen to accept at face value the North Korean propaganda** that the United States is an obstacle to reconciliation and reunification. Many South Koreans seem to blame President Bush's principled stance against North Korea for slow progress in inter-Korean rapprochement and the break in dialogue with Pyongyang-even though North Korea is solely responsible for creating a nuclear crisis in the region. This perception was further reinforced when President Bush named North Korea a part of "the axis of evil." Nevertheless, **perceptions matter in foreign policy, and both Washington and Seoul should pay heed to the changing environments in both countries**. Various components of the leadership in both countries have been making concerted efforts to adjust the formal details of the alliance to reinvigorate the relationship and improve its efficiency. For example, as part of the Department of Defense's Global Posture Review, **the Pentagon and the ROK Defense Ministry have been discussing** the future of the alliance with the object of implementing **needed changes to the U.S. force structure on the Korean peninsula**. As part of the plan **to increase the** efficiency and **efficacy of the alliance** and the U.S. defense commitment, **they have agreed to a gradual drawdown** and repositioning of U.S. forces on the peninsula.

Link Turns

**Military presence will collapse the US-RoK alliance – plan solves**

**Duk-min 00** (Yun, Professor Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, 7/22/00,

http://koreafocus.or.kr/design1/layout/content\_print.asp?group\_id=1094) JPG

But to many Koreans**, the standing of and respect for the U.S. military in Korea has plummeted** from that of guarantor of Korean and regional peace and stability to a source of both personal and environmental wrongdoings. Why has anti-American sentiment spread throughout Korean society so suddenly? **This situation is very likely related to the success of the recent inter-Korean summit talks**. If nothing else, **the summit talks** between North and South Korea **have given rise to the thought that** the primary mission of U.S. troops in Korea, namely to deter **the military threat of North Korea, is coming to a close while the U.S. military presence is now seen as a possible impediment** to lasting peace and the unification of the Korean peninsula. Ironically, whereas North Korea has reportedly acknowledged the positive peace-keeping role that American forces play on the Korean peninsula at the recent summit meeting in Pyeongyang, **attitudes toward the American military among South Koreans have become increasingly negative**. Moreover, while opinion in South Korea is divided on the nature of the North Korean regime between conservatives and liberals, **there appears to be broad consensus on the issue of U.S. forces in the South**. Even **among South Korean conservatives, there is a deeply rooted tendency to view the American military as retarding the country's development** of a self-reliant military while also restricting its foreign policy autonomy. In this context, **anti-American sentiment may well be an outlet for venting Korean nationalism**. If inter-Korean relations continue to progress, **there will likely be growing demands for the withdrawal of U.S. forces** from the South so as not to hinder national unification. But one must wonder whether unification and related Korean issues could be resolved any more easily if the American troops were withdrawn from Korea.

Cheonan Incident False

Cheonan incident is a fallacy- Scientific Accuracy

KNS 10( Korean News Service, 6/22/10 http://kcna.co.jp/item/2010/201006/news22/20100622-14ee.html)

The "story about a torpedo attack by the north" is a sheer fabrication as it is devoid of scientific accuracy. As for the 1.5 meter-long propelling body, it is what dozens of U.S. and south Korean warships equipped with up-to-date radars failed to find out in more than 50 days of search operations. But they claim it was suddenly netted by a civilian fishing boat, something incredible and not understandable either. The group of traitors even produced a video showing the propelling body being netted by the fishing boat and helicoptered, and then took it to the UN in a bid to justify it. But it is clear to everybody that such video showing "the retrieval" of this mysterious thing can hardly serve as evidence proving the propelling body of the torpedo. A screw of propelling axis and an engine, etc. which they alleged were used for breaking "Cheonan" into two were neither bent nor damaged. Yun Tok Yong who headed the "joint investigation team" said its American and Australians concerned were "surprised" to learn that the propelling body was in very good shape. There is a rumor in south Korea that the story about the retrieval of the propelling body is just like asserting that "a stone picked up at roadside dates back to the Old Stone Age."  The U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces claimed that the property of the metal used in making the propelling body is just the same as that of "the north's training torpedo" obtained 7 years ago and its design is also same as the design introduced in the "north Korea's torpedo brochure." This is sheer sophism

Cheonan incident false- Propaganda effort from the South

KNS 10( Korean News Service, 6/22/10 http://kcna.co.jp/item/2010/201006/news22/20100622-14ee.html)

Yun, when announcing the results, said that no comparison was made in the metal property between the two torpedoes. As for the brochure which he said he saw for himself, puppet Minister of Defence Kim Thae Yong later said that "it was recorded on CD", an indication that this "evidence" is also doubtful. As far as "No.1" written on the propelling body is concerned, there is need to call attention to the fact that the north and the south use the same language. If there is possibility that it was written in the writing style of the north it is similarly possible that it can be written in the style of the south. The puppet authorities, deliberately defying the stark reason, persistently asserted that it was written in the north's style. They have consistently dodged analysis of the felt-tip pen used for writing it. Kyunghyang Daily News of south Korea dated June 1, referring to the scientific discrepancy of the letter, said: The boiling points of general-use ink are 138.5℃, 110.6℃ and 78.4 ℃. Had the propelling body been heated up to 300℃ it might have been melted away. If the paint of the hull had burnt away, the letter "No. 1", too, might have done so. This is science. But high temperature-resistant paint burnt away while low temperature-resistant ink remained. The group of traitors presented "evidence" proving that absorptive found in the bow, stern, funnel and other parts of the ship is aluminum oxides that was found in the propelling body of the north's torpedo. This is unscientific. They asserted that this substance is a byproduct of fine aluminum powder that was mixed with the gunpowder in a bid to increase the effect of their propaganda that the warship was broken into pieces by the "north's torpedo attack", adding that this substance turned into non crystalline substance due to intense heat at the time of "explosion" and contact with cold sea water. A test and analysis of it conducted by a Korean professor at Virginia University of the U.S. at the request of a National Assemblyman from the south Korean Democratic Party proved that not all fine aluminum powder turn to crystalline substance in that case**.** The professor made public a paper on this test and sent it to the UN. Much upset by this, the "joint investigation team" officially admitted its investigation error at a session of the "National Assembly" on June 11.

Cheonan Incident False

**Cheonan incident is government propaganda- Survivors**

KNS 10( Korean News Service, 6/22/10 http://kcna.co.jp/item/2010/201006/news22/20100622-14ee.html)

Survivors of the sunken "Cheonan" said that they smelt no gunpowder at the time of sinking. But the puppet forces insisted on the "story about a torpedo attack by the north", turning down for no reason the public opinion about the possible formation of aluminum oxides in the course of the firing of artillery pieces from the warship. The "investigation results" are censured by south Koreans and the world public for their contradictions and doubtful points. The Solidarity for Democratic Society and the People for Achieving Peace and Reunification, the progressive organizations of south Korea, together with a Korean organization in the U.S. sent letters to the member nations of the UN Security Council on June 11 and 14.  The letters totally negated the "story about the north's torpedo attack," saying that had the "north's torpedo" exploded near "Cheonan", its fragments might have embedded in the warship body, leaving some deaf and some with broken bones, etc.  Fluorescent lamps of "Cheonan" remain intact and not a shoal of sand eels was found dead in the waters where the warship sank. Such humors as "magic fluorescent lamps" and "intelligent sand eel shoal in waters off Paekryong Islet" are rampant in south Korea, a refutation and derision of the authorities' "investigation results".