Extinction 1st

#### Extinction is categorically the ultimate risk – It is necessary to try and prevent it

Schell, 1982 (Jonathan, professor at Wesleyan University, former writer and editor at the New Yorker, “The Fate of the Earth,” 1982, pg. 93-94)

<To say that human extinction is a certainty would, of course, be a misrepresentation—just as it would be a misrepresentation to say that extinction can be ruled out. To begin with, we know that a holocaust may not occur at all. If one does occur, the adversaries may not use all their weapons. If they do use all their weapons, the global effects, in the ozone and elsewhere, may be moderate. And if the effects are not moderate but extreme, the ecosphere may prove resilient enough to withstand them without breaking down catastrophically. These are all substantial reasons for supposing that mankind will not be extinguished in a nuclear holocaust, or even that extinction in a holocaust is unlikely, and they tend to calm our fear and to reduce our sense of urgency. Yet at the same time we are compelled to admit that there may be a holocaust, that the adversaries may use all their weapons, that the global effects, including effects of which we are as yet unaware, may be severe, that the ecosphere may suffer catastrophic breakdown, and that our species may be extinguished. We are left with uncertainty, and are forced to make our decisions in a state of uncertainty. If we wish to act to save our species, we have to muster our resolve in spite of our awareness that the life of the species may not now in fact be jeopardized. On the other hand, if we wish to ignore the peril, we have to admit that we do so in the knowledge that the species may be in danger of imminent self-destruction. When the existence of nuclear weapons was made known, thoughtful people everywhere in the world realized that if the great powers entered into a nuclear-arms race the human species would sooner or later face the possibility of extinction. They also realized that in the absence of international agreements preventing it an arms race would probably occur. They knew that the path of nuclear armament was a dead end for mankind. The discovery of the energy in mass—of "the basic power of the universe"—and of a means by which man could release that energy altered the relationship between man and the source of his life, the earth. In the shadow of this power, the earth became small and the life of the human species doubtful. In that sense, the question of human extinction has been on the political agenda of the world ever since the first nuclear weapon was detonated, and there was no need for the world to build up its present tremendous arsenals before starting to worry about it. At just what point the species crossed, or will have crossed, the boundary between merely having the technical knowledge to destroy itself and actually having the arsenals at hand, ready to be used at any second, is not precisely knowable. But it is clear that at present, with some twenty thousand megatons of nuclear explosive power in existence, and with more being added every day, we have entered into the zone of uncertainty, which is to say the zone of risk of extinction. But the mere risk of extinction has a significance that is categorically different from, and immeasurably greater than, that of any other risk, and as we make our decisions we have to take that significance into account. Up to now, every risk has been contained within the frame of life; extinction would shatter the frame. It represents not the defeat of some purpose but an abyss in which all human purposes would be drowned for all time. We have no right to place the possibility of this limitless, eternal defeat on the same footing as risks that we run in the ordinary conduct of our affairs in our particular transient moment of human history. To employ a mathematical analogy, we can say that although the risk of extinction may be fractional, the stake is, humanly speaking, infinite, and a fraction of infinity is still infinity. In other words, once we learn that a holocaust might lead to extinction we have no right to gamble, because if we lose, the game will be over, and neither we nor anyone else will ever get another chance. Therefore, although, scientifically speaking, there is all the difference in the world between the mere possibility that a holocaust will bring about extinction and the certainty of it, morally they are the same, and we have no choice but to address the issue of nuclear weapons as though we knew for a certainty that their use would put an end to our species. In weighing the fate of the earth and, with it, our own fate, we stand before a mystery, and in tampering with the earth we tamper with a mystery. We are in deep ignorance. Our ignorance should dispose us to wonder, our wonder should make us humble, our humility should inspire us to reverence and caution, and our reverence and caution should lead us to act without delay to withdraw the threat we now pose to the earth and to ourselves. In trying to describe possible consequences of a nuclear holocaust, I have mentioned the limitless complexity of its effects on human society and on the ecosphere—a complexity that sometimes seems to be as great as that of life itself. But if these effects should lead to human extinction, then all the complexity will give way to the utmost simplicity—the simplicity of nothingness. We—the human race—shall cease to be.>

Calculation Good

Calculation is good. We must attempt to act as calculating machines in order to understand that we’re not. Only this approach can open space for politics

Chaloupka 92 (William Chaloupka is a Professor of political science at U Montana, 1992, “Knowing Nukes,” pg. 133-4)

But neither political science nor common sense is notably effective in the face of the nuke. A massive exercise in self-delusion will be necessary to raise expectations, putting not only the problem but also the solution into the realm of the fictional. This is not a partisan insight; if you happen to take deterrence’s peace-keeping abilities seriously then its success doesn’t raise realistic hopes, either. It simply means that surveillance will be with us forever. Deterrence and nuclearism are now the classic excuse for surveillance. To repeat: whatever the particular political position, party, or ideology, delusion (fiction, metaphor, image) will henceforth be more central to it than facts, objects and certainties. Regan’s famed vagueness with the “details” and even the broader circumstances of administration is not the “crime against the nature of society” some of his critics seem to think it is. But the qualities of his performance can still be exposed and criticized. Political action can still proceed, even in lieu of higher expectations, objective analysis, or appeal to common consensus based on clear community values. By not recognizing this possibility, liberal antinuclearists have remained wary of some of the styles and attitudes that have, in fact, served them best. The heavily responsible, even dismal, attitude seems necessary; distracted citizens do not “want to know.” Indeed, they are presumed to want to forget. Warnings and horror stories, then, are the liberal reminder that the escape to hedonism and consumption is a vain dodge. The privileged liberal form becomes the stern lecture, the sermon. The appeal to terror – in Helen Caldicott’s work, in films like television’s “The Day After,” and even on bumper stickers and buttons – has been a main staple of antinuclearist politics, a sober, anti-ironic terrorism of images. This is only the most recent, most desperate version of a political stance familiar in this century. Liberals, conservatives, Marxists, Christians – all felt, all along, that they were dealing with the *real*, with reality. The gravity of that encounter meant that public life would be formed in competitive narrations of sober, somber articulations of the necessary, the universal. As the real becomes less and less compelling a mediator of disputes, the mood turns desperate. If the horror stories fail to hold attention, the logic of the situation dictates a negatively nihilistic diagnosis of “human nature.” Citizens who seem oblivious to the strongest warning call must be in the mold of Nero. The requirements imposed by the real – not the deconstruction of those requirements – are the source of nihilism. The postmodern analysis is more compelling. Rather than a nihilistic subject, somehow already burned by the nuke, we have subjects constituted in new ways. Political authority is still explicable, even if shared convictions about reality become untenable. In a monarchy, subjects just *knew* that the king or queen embodied political authority – power was vested in the monarch. Then, the anti-royalists we now call classical liberals just *knew* that the science of historical materialism represented reality, promising a future revolution that would dissolve political authority. These last two form the base of modernity. These two great opponents – liberals and Marxists – have shared a privileged certainty, which both obtained from a shared, scientific base. The term “postmodern” implies that the era is ending, but it hardly signals the demise of political power. No longer externalized in the body of the king or relations of production, or nature, power becomes internalized. We started to create a new self, a new set of habits and practices that we use to identify ourselves as individuals. We become calculators, seeing problems as opportunities to weigh costs and benefits, knowing very well that any other kind of motivation will be suspect. Still, we continually find ourselves in situations that demand that great decisions be made before we know the categories. Calculations require facts, but politics continually presents situations without facts. That should tell us that we are not calculating machines, or at least we aren’t very good ones. And such contradictions begin to promise a politics.

#### Action must be taken to prevent Nuclear War

Harlan M. **Smith,** Professor at the University of Minnesota, 19**97**. Book Review: Jonathan Schell’s Fate of the Earth and The Abolition, [www.tc.umn.edu/~smith097/articles/L%2011.The%20**Fate**%20of%20the%20**Earth**%20.pdf](http://www.tc.umn.edu/~smith097/articles/L%2011.The%20Fate%20of%20the%20Earth%20.pdf)

Schell paid attention to what the scientists told us after the first nuclear bombs destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He listened to scientists who said that if the USSR & Russia got into a nuclear war, it would almost certainly destroy both countries--instead of either country winning, it would likely be suicidal for both. And if all the bombs in both country’s stockpiles was thrown at the other country, the fallout from those bombs might destroy whatever life on earth was left after the massive killing when the bombs exploded. This book forces you to think about why no generation should do anything that might preclude the opportunity of life for future generations. It should be clear that we could do so by inaction--by allowing our nation and others to continue to rely on stockpiling nuclear weapons, which, if all used in a nuclear war, might destroy human life on earth. That is a real possibility. And it might not even happen by deliberate human decisions. It could happen by miscalculation, or by mere accident, perhaps even by computer error. This book review has already informed you that the end of the cold war did not end the danger about which Schell writes. We have not paid enough attention to what scientists told us about the magnitude of this danger, or in any case we have failed to be alarmed by it enough to take action (as we did some years ago to prevent atmospheric nuclear tests when the small fallout from them was found in the milk of nursing mothers). What needs to be done now to end the greater danger the world is now in?There are still more than enough nuclear bombs in the world to end human life on the planet if used in a world war. U.S. bombs could not protect this country even with a “star wars” defensive system. (Read STAR WARS by military scientist Robert Bowman if you think otherwise.) And although the U.S. and Russia no longer target each other, they could re-target in minutes. Russia’s control system is deteriorating, so a malfunction or accident (or mistaking a weather satellite launch for a bomb-- which happened already but the mistake was discovered just in time) could launch nukes toward us anytime. We have not cooperated with Russia enough to enable us to help them prevent that.

#### The Risk of extinction Outweighs anything and everything, we have both an ethical and practical obligation to take all action for its prevention

Jonathan **Schell**, The Harold Willens Peace Fellow at The Nation Institute 19**82**, Fate of the Earth, pp. 93-96

To say that human extinction is a certainty would, of course, be a misrepresentation – just as it would be a should lead us to act without delay to withdraw the threat we now post to the world and to ourselves. To begin with, we know that a holocaust may not occur at all. If one does occur, the adversaries may not use all their weapons. If they do use all their weapons, the global effects in the ozone and elsewhere, may be moderate. And if the effects are not moderate but extreme, the ecosphere may prove resilient enough to withstand them without breaking down catastrophically. These are all substantial reasons for supposing that mankind will not be extinguished in a nuclear holocaust, or even that extinction in a holocaust is unlikely, and they tend to calm our fear and to reduce our sense of urgency. Yet at the same time we are compelled to admit that there may be a holocaust, that the adversaries may use all their weapons, that the global effects, including effects of which we as yet unaware, may be severe, that the ecosphere may suffer catastrophic breakdown, and that our species may be extinguished. We are left with uncertainty, and are forced to make our decisions in a state of uncertainty. If we wish to act to save our species, we have to muster our resolve in spite of our awareness that the life of the species may not now in fact be jeopardized. On the other hand, if we wish to ignore the peril, we have to admit that we do so in the knowledge that the species may be in danger of imminent self-destruction. When the existence of nuclear weapons was made known, thoughtful people everywhere in the world realized that if the great powers entered into a nuclear-arms race the human species would sooner or later face the possibility of extinction. They also realized that in the absence of international agreements preventing it an arms race would probably occur. They knew that the path of nuclear armament was a dead end for mankind. The discovery of the energy in mass – of "the basic power of the universe" – and of a means by which man could release that energy altered the relationship between man and the source of his life, the earth. In the shadow of this power, the earth became small and the life of the human species doubtful. In that sense, the question of human extinction has been on the political agenda of the world ever since the first nuclear weapon was detonated, and there was no need for the world to build up its present tremendous arsenals before starting to worry about it. At just what point the species crossed, or will have crossed, the boundary between merely having the technical knowledge to destroy itself and actually having the arsenals at hand, ready to be used at any second, is not precisely knowable. But it is clear that at present, with some twenty thousand megatons of nuclear explosive power in existence, and with more being added every day, we have entered into the zone of uncertainty, which is to say the zone of risk of extinction. But the mere risk of extinction has a significance that is categorically different from, and immeasurably greater than that of any other risk and as we make our decisions we have to take that significance into account. Up to now, every risk has been contained within the framework of life; extinction would shatter the frame. It represents not the defeat of some purpose but an abyss in which all human purpose would be drowned for all time. We have no right to place the possibility of this limitless, eternal defeat on the same footing as risk that we run in the ordinary conduct of our affairs in our particular transient moment of human history. To employ a mathematician's analogy, we can say that although the risk of extinction may be fractional, the stake is, humanly speaking, infinite, and a fraction of infinity is still infinity. In other words, once we learn that a holocaust might lead to extinction we have no right to gamble, because if we lose, the game will be over, and neither we nor anyone else will ever get another chance. Therefore, although, scientifically speaking, there is all the difference in the world between the mere possibility that a holocaust will bring about extinction and the certainty of it, morally they are the same, and we have no choice but to address the issue of nuclear weapons as though we knew for a certainty that their use would put an end to our species. In weighing the fate of the earth and, with it, our own fate, we stand before a mystery, and in tampering with the earth we tamper with a mystery. We are in deep ignorance. Our ignorance should dispose us to wonder, our wonder should make us humble, our humility should inspire us to reverence and caution, and our reverence and caution

Util Good

#### Utilitarianism is key to change the problems of society

Dale **Jamieson**, New York University, 5/14/**07**. Cambridge Journals: “When Utilitarians Should Be Virtue Theorists, “http://www.journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=1015132&jid=&volumeId=&issueId=02&aid=1015128&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0953820807002452

Part of the answer is that we are simply able to recognize some extreme cases as such: we just do it. When the house is on fire, a child is screaming, atrocities are being committed and civilizations threatened, moral mathematics are not needed in order to see that the patterns of behavior that are generally best may not be up to it in the present case. Of course there may also be cases in which calculation would be needed in order to see that it would be best to break patterns of behavior given to us by the green virtues. But on these occasions the virtuous green will just have to forgo the best, trusting in the overall utility-maximizing power of the green virtues. 19. There is a further challenge to which I have already briefly alluded (in section 11). If others are having a good time changing climate, destroying ozone and driving species to extinction, and the green cause is hopeless, then it appears that I am morally obliged to join in the fun. A utilitarian should not, at great cost to herself, plow through the snow on her bike while everyone else is blowing past her in their gas-guzzling ‘suburban utility vehicles’ (SUVs). If the world is to be lost anyway, then the morally responsible utilitarian will try to have a good time going down with the planet. If the best outcome (preventing global environmental change) is beyond my control and the worst outcome would be for me to live a life of misery and self-denial in a futile attempt to bring about the inaccessible best outcome, then the best outcome that I can produce may involve my living a high-consumption lifestyle. But everyone can reason in this way and so we may arrive at the conclusion, not just that it is permissible to live like a normal American, but that utilitarians are morally obliged to do so. This seems truly shocking. There are really two arguments here. The first argument concerns the decision process of a single agent; the second claims that the first argument generalizes to all similarly situated agents. Consider the second argument first. This argument trades on equivocating as to whether or not the best outcome is in fact accessible to an agent. Imagine a world of only two agents, Kelly and Sean. From Kelly's point of view, if it is clear that Sean will fail to behave in an environmentally friendly way, then it may be best for Kelly to fail to do so as well. But if Sean is in the same position with respect to her decision as Kelly, then it cannot be taken as given that Sean will not engage in the environmentally friendly behavior, for that is just what she is reasoning about. If there is any point to her reasoning about this, then the environmentally friendly behavior must be accessible to her, contrary to what we assumed when we considered Kelly's decision process. The apparent generalization of the first argument introduces an equivocation that is not implicit in the first argument itself.47The first argument should not be confused with what might be called the Nero objection. This objection states that, just as Nero fiddled while Rome burned, so a utilitarian agent should fiddle (or its functional equivalent) while global environmental change ravages the planet. Since Nero's fiddling was morally horrendous, the functionally equivalent utilitarian fiddling must be morally horrendous as well. However, Nero's fiddling and that of the utilitarian are not equivalent in relevant respects. What is horrendous about the image of Nero fiddling while Rome burns is that he probably set the fires, or could have had than it could be. As we have seen, utilitarianism can have no such implication.

#### The moral obligation to take the utilitarian approach it allows us to solve the problems of the squo through public deliberation

Dale **Jamieson**, New York University, 5/14/**07**. Cambridge Journals: “When Utilitarians Should Be Virtue Theorists, “http://www.journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=1015132&jid=&volumeId=&issueId=02&aid=1015128&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0953820807002452

If the best outcome is truly inaccessible to me, then it is not obviously implausible to suppose that I have a duty to make the best of a bad situation.[50](http://www.journals.cambridge.org/action/#fn50) When I was a kid, growing up in a neighborhood that would certainly have been a ‘first-strike’ target had there been a nuclear war between the Americans and the Russians, we often seriously discussed the following question. Suppose that you know that they have launched their missiles and that We have retaliated (or vice versa), and that in twenty minutes the planet will be incinerated. What should you do?[51](http://www.journals.cambridge.org/action/#fn51) The idea that we should enjoy the life that remains to us may not be the only plausible response to this question, but it is surely not an implausible one.

What many people find grating about this answer, I think, is the idea that we have a duty to enjoy life in such a situation. Some might agree that it would be prudentially good to do so, but find it outrageous that morality would be so intrusive, right up to the end of the world. When it comes to the case in which the green cause is hopeless, it might be thought that matters are even worse. It is one thing to say that it is permissible or excusable to abandon our green commitments in such circumstances; it is another thing entirely to say that we have an affirmative duty to join the ranks of the enemy, and to enjoy the very activities that destroy the features of nature that we cherish.[52](http://www.journals.cambridge.org/action/#fn52)

This objection has proceeded under the assumption that we might find ourselves in circumstances in which we know that living according to our green values would be entirely ineffectual, and that we would enjoy helping ourselves to the pleasures of consumerism. On these implausible assumptions, the objector is correct in claiming that utilitarianism would require us to join the side of the environmental despoilers. However, there is nothing really new in principle about this kind of case. It is another example of either the demandingness of utilitarianism, or of how utilitarianism holds our ‘ground projects’ (and therefore our integrity) hostage to circumstances beyond our control.[53](http://www.journals.cambridge.org/action/#fn53)

It is not my task here to defend utilitarianism as anything more than a plausible research program. However, it is surely old news that utilitarianism can require us to break familiar patterns of behavior that are dear to our hearts when doing so would realize what is best. Of course this would be difficult to do, and most of us, most of the time, would not succeed in doing what is right. (No one said that it was easy to be a utilitarian.) But our failures to do what is right would not count against doing what is best as a moral ideal, anymore than the human proclivity for violence should lead us to give up on peace as a cherished moral value. Or so it seems at first glance.

However, the most important point is this. My present concern is not with alternative realities or possible worlds; it is facts about this world that are relevant for present purposes. I am concerned with how a utilitarian agent should respond to the problem of global environmental change that we actually face here and now. Global environmental change is not like the case of an impending interplanetary collision that is entirely beyond our control. Nor is it an ‘all or nothing’ phenomenon. Collectively, we can prevent or mitigate various aspects of global environmental change, and an individual agent can affect collective behavior in several ways. One's behavior in producing and consuming is important for its immediate environmental impacts, and also for the example-setting and role-modeling dimensions of the behavior.[54](http://www.journals.cambridge.org/action/#fn54) It is a fact of life that one may never know how one's long-term projects will fare, or even how successful one has been in motivating and enlisting other people to pursue them, but this is as much grounds for optimism as pessimism. Nor does an environmentally friendly lifestyle have to be a miserable one.[55](http://www.journals.cambridge.org/action/#fn55) Even if in the end one's values do not prevail, there is comfort and satisfaction in living in accordance with one's ideals.[56](http://www.journals.cambridge.org/action/#fn56) All of this taken together suggests that real utilitarian agents here and now should try to prevent or mitigate global environmental change rather than celebrate its arrival.

However, presently there is no algorithm for designing the optimal utilitarian agent.[57](http://www.journals.cambridge.org/action/#fn57) Nor is there an algorithm for constructing the perfect constitution, which constrains majority rule when it should, but does not prevent its expression when it should not.[58](http://www.journals.cambridge.org/action/#fn58) Nevertheless, we have better and worse people and constitutions, and sometimes we know them when we see them. It might be nice to have a calculus that we could apply to constitutions and character, but absent this, we can still go forward living our lives and organizing our societies. These responses may not satisfy those who are concerned with the logic of collective action or who believe that every question must admit of a precise answer. But they should go some way towards satisfying those who like me are concerned with the moral psychology of collective action, and are willing to accept Aristotle's view that deliberation can never be completely divorced from practical wisdom.

**Util is the only real framework for policymaking. Even deontology requires making certain decisions that WILL hurt someone – the best framework is to achieve the most moral result for the most people – sacrificing along the way is inevitable and can still be a moral action**

David **Cummiskey**, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Bates College and a PhD from UM, 19**96**, Kantian Conseuquentialism, Pg. 158-159.

Indeed, despite Kant’s deontological intuitions about particular moral cases, his basic normative principle is best interpreted as having a fundamentally consequentialist structure. In order to justify agent-centered constraints, one needs a non-value-based rationale. Many Kantians attempt to provide such a rationale by appealing to the Kantian principle of treating persons as ends. The Kantians’ strategy is clear: Treating persons as ends involves respecting persons, and respecting persons involves recognizing agent-centered constraints on action. We have seen, however, that this strategy is problematic. The Kantian principle itself generates a duty to advance a moral goal: The duty to strive as much as one can to promote the flourishing of rational beings, and to make others’ ends one’s own, is the very essence of treating humanity as an end. Morality thus constrains and shapes the pursuit of individual well-being or happiness. We have seen, however, that Kant’s moral theory does not provide a rationale for basic agent-centered constraints that limit what we can do in the pursuit of this complex moral goal. The imperative to respect persons thus does indeed generate a consequentialist normative theory, rather than the desired deontological alternative.

It certainly seems that a Kantian ought to be a normative consequentialist. Conscientious Kantian agents have a basic duty to strive, as much as possible, to promote the freedom and happiness of all rational beings. In the pursuit of this moral goal, it may be necessary for the interests of some to give way for the sake of others. If we are sacrificed, we are not treated simply as a means to another’s goal; on the contrary, our sacrifice is required by a principle we endorse. Our non-moral interests and inclinations may cause us to feel reluctant, but since our sacrifice furthers a moral goal that we endorse and that we are required to pursue, our sacrifice does not violate our moral autonomy or our rights.

Util Good – Deontology Requires Sacrifices Too

**Only utilitarianism takes into account the inevitability of sacrifices and compromise – any other framework is utopian and inevitably fails.**

#### Nye, prof. of IR at Harvard University, 1986 (Joseph, “Nuclear Ethics”, p. 24)

Whether one accepts the broad consequentialist approach or chooses some other, more eclectic way to include and reconcile the three dimensions of complex moral issues, there will often be a sense of uneasiness about the answers, not just because of the complexity of the problems “but simply that there is no satisfactory solution to these issues – at least none that appears to avoid in practice what most men would still regard as an intolerable sacrifice of value.” When value is sacrificed, there is often the problem of “dirty hands.” Not all ethical decisions are pure ones. The absolutist may avoid the problem of dirty hands, but often at the cost of having no hands at all. Moral theory cannot be “rounded off and made complete and tidy.” That is part of the modern human condition. But that does not exempt us from making difficult moral choices.

Util Good – Deontology Requires Sacrifices Too

**Conflicting moral claims are inevitable – this necessitates utilitarianism.**

**Mulholland,** prof. of philosophy at the University of Newfoundland, 19**86** (Leslie, *Journal of Philosophy*, June, p. 328)

For many, the persuasiveness of utilitarianism as a moral theory lies in its power to provide a way out of difficulties arising from the conflict of moral principles. The contention that utilitarianism permits people to override rights in case of conflict of principles or in those cases where some recognized utility requires that a right be disregarded, is then not an internal objection to utilitarianism. Nor does it even indicate a plausible alternative to the convinced utilitarian. For him, utilitarianism has its force partly in the coherence and simplicity of the principle in explaining the morality of such cases.

Util Good – Moral

The type of morality the aff tries to engage in is utopian because these theories were developed before extinction became possible – now the true moral self must be committed to bringing about the best possible world and that necessitates util

Jamieson 07 [Dale Jamieson, New York University, 5/14/07. Cambridge Journals: “When Utilitarians Should Be Virtue Theorists, “http://www.journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=1015132&jid=&volumeId=&issueId=02&aid=1015128&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0953820807002452]

For present purposes I assume that our problem is a moral problem. I investigate utilitarian approaches to our problem because utilitarianism, with its unapologetic focus on what we bring about, is relatively well positioned to have something interesting to say about our problem. Moreover, since utilitarianism is committed to the idea that morality requires us to bring about the best possible world, and global environmental change confronts us with extreme, deleterious consequences, there is no escaping the fact that, for utilitarians, global environmental change presents us with a moral problem of great scope, urgency and complexity. However, I would hope that some of those who are not card-carrying utilitarians would also have interest in this project. Consequences matter, according to any plausible moral theory. Utilitarianism takes the concern for consequences to the limit, and it is generally of interest to see where pure versions of various doctrines wind up leading us. Moreover, I believe that the great traditions in moral philosophy should be viewed as more like research programs than as finished theories that underwrite or imply particular catechisms. For this reason it is interesting to see how successfully a moral tradition can cope with problems that were not envisioned by its progenitors.

Util Good – Moral

**Upholding life is the ultimate moral standard.**

**Uyl and Rasmussen,** profs. of philosophy at Bellarmine College and St. John’s University, 19**81** (Douglas Den and Douglas, “Reading Nozick”, p. 244)

Rand has spoken of the ultimate end as the standard by which all other ends are evaluated. When the ends to be evaluated are chosen ones the ultimate end is the standard for moral evaluation. Life as the sort of thing a living entity is, then, is the ultimate standard of value; and since only human beings are capable of choosing their ends, it is the life as a human being-man's life qua man-that is the standard for moral evaluation.

Util Good – Value to Life

Util is key to value of life – it maximizes happiness for the most people – making it the best framework for the policymaker and those whom are affected

[**Smith** 19**97**. Book Review: Jonathan Schell’s Fate of the Earth and The Abolition, [www.tc.umn.edu/~smith097/articles/L%2011.The%20**Fate**%20of%20the%20**Earth**%20.pdf](http://www.tc.umn.edu/~smith097/articles/L%2011.The%20Fate%20of%20the%20Earth%20.pdf)]

Utilitarianism begins by generalizing the hedonistic pleasure principle in terms of

happiness. Then what is moral or good is that which brings an agent happiness. This thesis is further generalized to say that happiness should be secured for as many agents in the community as possible. Every action, therefore, should be motivated in terms of trying to maximize as much happiness for as many agents as possible within the given community. The use of happiness in this thesis is in relation to the overall consequences of all the agents in the given community. The basic argument is that individual good is maximizing individual happiness. Morality though, involves the common good of all the agents in the community. The common good, therefore, is maximizing every ones happiness. I think the most promising variation of utilitarianism is rule utilitarianism where emphasis is placed on the consequences of every agent in the community adopting a particular action as a rule. Implicit within rule utilitarianism is a strong consistency thesis which places necessary constraints on the basic utilitarian argument.

A2: Moral Obligation

**Practical problems negate abstract obligations. Otherwise acting on moral obligation could make things worse.**

**Kuper** 20**02**

Andrew Kuper, Fellow at Trinity College, Cambridge University, 2002 (*Ethics & International Affairs*, 16:1, p. 113).

If we are to make judgments to act in this world, we should not confuse abstract with practical requirements. From the fact that we have an abstract obligation of aid or charity, it does not follow that we are practically obliged to donate to the poor. How we address poverty is a matter of judgment: understanding the relevant features of a social system or situation; considering which principles are relevant; whether they present competing demands in practice, and how other agents are likely to act; and finally, adjudicating on a contextual course of action. Nothing in the principle of aid or charity determines that the right action in any or all contexts is donation.All-too-quick recommendations are not just a leap from principle to action, they are symptomatic of an implicitly apolitical outlook that does not take the real demands of contextual judgment seriously.

Calculations Inevitable

**Political calculations are inevitable and good – some people will always be wronged under any policy**

**Frankel,** prof. of philosophy and public affairs at Columbia University, 19**75** (Charles, “Morality and U.S. Foreign Policy”, http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/media/v18\_i006\_a006.pdf)

What are we to make of statements like Professor Morgenthau’s to the effect that “the political act is inevitably evil”? In the ordinary use of the word evil the ‘statement is false: political acts aren’t inevitably evil. A successful negotiation staving off a bloody war, a nuclear test-ban treaty, an international agreement to combat malaria are none of ‘them evil in the everyday language of everyday people. The only explanation for this otherwise puzzling statement is that Professor Morgenthau is using the word in an esoteric way. He means, one must presume, that in negotiating an end to a war or arriving at international agreements some people’s interests will be adversely affected, that forms of bargaining will probably take place which would not be appropriate in a roomful of old friends, and that some moral values will be treated as less important than other. In sum, choosing, weighing, balancing, and blending take place. But to call this “evil” is to reserve the word “good” for only those kinds of behavior where we know exactly what the right thing to do is, and don’t need to think about the matter at all. It saves the word “good” for the behavior of gods.

Calculations Good – Value to Life

**Our body counts are good – the alternative is a dehumanized world of endless bloodshed without responsibility to the dead or the living**

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"We don't do body counts," says America's soldier-in-chief, Tommy Franks. That's a damn shame.
During the Vietnam war, the body count was served up every day on the evening news. While Americans ate dinner, they watched a graphic visual scorecard: how many Americans had died that day, how many South Vietnamese, and how many Communists. At the time, it seemed the height of dehumanized violence. Compared to Tommy Franks' new way of war, though, the old way looks very humane indeed. True, the body count turned human beings into abstract numbers. But it required soldiers to say to the world, "Look everyone. I killed human beings today. This is exactly how many I killed. I am obliged to count each and every one." It demanded that the killers look at what they had done, think about it (however briefly), and acknowledge their deed. It was a way of taking responsibility. Today's killers avoid that responsibility. They perpetuate the fiction so many Americans want to believe-that no real people die in war, that it's just an exciting video game. It's not merely the dead who disappear; it's the act of killing itself. When the victim's family holds up a picture, U.S. soldiers or journalists can simply reply "Who's that? We have no record of such a person. In fact, we have no records at all. We kill and move on. No time to keep records. No inclination. No reason." This is not just a matter of new technology. There was plenty of long-distance impersonal killing in Vietnam too. But back then, the U.S. military at least went through the motions of going in to see what they had done. True, the investigations were often cursory and the numbers often fictional. No matter how inaccurate the numbers were, though, the message to the public every day was that each body should be counted. At some level, at least, each individual life seemed to matter. So It's much more likely that "we don't do body counts" because Vietnam proved how embarrassing they could be. As the U.S. public turned against that war, the body count became a symbol of everything that was inhumane and irrational about that war. The Pentagon fears that the same might happen if the Iraq war bogs down. How much simpler to deny the inhumanity and irrationality of war by denying the obvious fact of slaughter. What I fear is a world where thousands can be killed and no one is responsible, where deaths are erased from history as soon as they happen. The body count was more than an act of responsibility. It was a permanent record. It made each death a historical fact. You can go back and graph those Vietnam deaths from day to day, month to month, year to year. That turns the victims into nameless, faceless abstractions. But it least it confirms for ever and ever that they lived and died, because someone took the time to kill and count them. In Iraq, it is as if the killing never happened. When a human being's death is erased from history, so is their life. Life and death together vanish without a trace. The body count has one other virtue. It is enemy soldiers, not civilians, who are officially counted. Antiwar activists rightly warn about civilian slaughter and watch the toll rise at www.iraqbodycount.org. It is easy to forget that the vast majority of Iraqi dead and wounded will be soldiers. Most of them were pressed into service, either by brute force or economic necessity. As the whole world has been telling us for months, there is no good reason for this war, no good reason for those hapless Iraqi foot-soldiers to die. They are victims of brutality-inflicted by their own government and by ours-just as much as the civilians. They deserve just as much to be counted So let us bring back the body count. If we must kill, let us kill as one human being to another, recognizing the full humanity of our victims. Without a body count, our nation becomes more of a robotic killing machine. As we dehumanize Iraqis, we slip even further into our own dehumanization. Let us bring back the body count. if only to recover our own sense of responsibility to the world's people, to history, to our own humanity.