# no impact--war

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# NO IMPACT: NUKE WAR

**Nuclear war is survivable and nuclear winter isn't real**

**NYQUIST 1999** (J.R., Defense Analyst, Worldnetdaily.com, May 20, 1999)

I patiently reply to these correspondents that nuclear war would not be the end of the world. I then point to studies showing that "nuclear winter" has no scientific basis, that fallout from a nuclear war would not kill all life on earth. Surprisingly, few of my correspondents are convinced. They prefer apocalyptic myths created by pop scientists, movie producers and journalists. If Dr. Carl Sagan once said "nuclear winter" would follow a nuclear war, then it must be true. If radiation wipes out mankind in a movie, then that's what we can expect in real life. But Carl Sagan was wrong about nuclear winter. And the movie "On the Beach" misled American filmgoers about the effects of fallout. It is time, once and for all, to lay these myths to rest. Nuclear war would not bring about the end of the world, though it would be horribly destructive. The truth is, many prominent physicists have condemned the nuclear winter hypothesis. Nobel laureate Freeman Dyson once said of nuclear winter research, "It's an absolutely atrocious piece of science, but I quite despair of setting the public record straight." Professor Michael McElroy, a Harvard physics professor, also criticized the nuclear winter hypothesis. McElroy said that nuclear winter researchers "stacked the deck" in their study, which was titled "Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences of Multiple Nuclear Explosions" (Science, December 1983). Nuclear winter is the theory that the mass use of nuclear weapons would create enough smoke and dust to blot out the sun, causing a catastrophic drop in global temperatures. According to Carl Sagan, in this situation the earth would freeze. No crops could be grown. Humanity would die of cold and starvation. In truth, natural disasters have frequently produced smoke and dust far greater than those expected from a nuclear war. In 1883 Krakatoa exploded with a blast equivalent to 10,000 one-megaton bombs, a detonation greater than the combined nuclear arsenals of planet earth. The Krakatoa explosion had negligible weather effects. Even more disastrous, going back many thousands of years, a meteor struck Quebec with the force of 17.5 million one-megaton bombs, creating a crater 63 kilometers in diameter. But the world did not freeze. Life on earth was not extinguished. Consider the views of Professor George Rathjens of MIT, a known antinuclear activist, who said, "Nuclear winter is the worst example of misrepresentation of science to the public in my memory." Also consider Professor Russell Seitz, at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs, who says that the nuclear winter hypothesis has been discredited. Two researchers, Starley Thompson and Stephen Schneider, debunked the nuclear winter hypothesis in the summer 1986 issue of Foreign Affairs. Thompson and Schneider stated: "the global apocalyptic conclusions of the initial nuclear winter hypothesis can now be relegated to a vanishingly low level of probability." OK, so nuclear winter isn't going to happen. What about nuclear fallout? Wouldn't the radiation from a nuclear war contaminate the whole earth, killing everyone? The short answer is: absolutely not. Nuclear fallout is a problem, but we should not exaggerate its effects. As it happens, there are two types of fallout produced by nuclear detonations. These are: 1) delayed fallout; and 2) short-term fallout. According to researcher Peter V. Pry, "Delayed fallout will not, contrary to popular belief, gradually kill billions of people everywhere in the world." Of course, delayed fallout would increase the number of people dying of lymphatic cancer, leukemia, and cancer of the thyroid. "However," says Pry, "these deaths would probably be far fewer than deaths now resulting from ... smoking, or from automobile accidents." The real hazard in a nuclear war is the short-term fallout. This is a type of fallout created when a nuclear weapon is detonated at ground level. This type of fallout could kill millions of people, depending on the targeting strategy of the attacking country. But short-term fallout rapidly subsides to safe levels in 13 to 18 days. It is not permanent. People who live outside of the affected areas will be fine. Those in affected areas can survive if they have access to underground shelters. In some areas, staying indoors may even suffice. Contrary to popular misconception, there were no documented deaths from short-term or delayed fallout at either Hiroshima or Nagasaki. These blasts were low airbursts, which produced minimal fallout effects. Today's thermonuclear weapons are even "cleaner." If used in airburst mode, these weapons would produce few (if any) fallout casualties.

# NO IMPACT: NUKE WAR

**Nuclear war doesn’t cause extinction – models prove**

**Seitz 2006 -** former associate of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University’s Center for InternationalAffairs (Russell, “The' Nuclear Winter ' Meltdown Photoshopping the Apocalypse”, <http://adamant.typepad.com/seitz/2006/12/preherein_honor.html>)

All that remains of Sagan's Big Chill are curves such as this , but history is full of prophets of doom who fail to deliver, not all are without honor in their own land. The 1983 'Nuclear Winter " papers in Science were so politicized that even the eminently liberal President of The Council for a Liveable World called "The worst example ofthe misrepesentation of science to the public in my memory." Among the authors was Stanford President Donald Kennedy. Today he edits Science , the nation's major arbiter of climate science--and policy. Below, a case illustrating the mid-range of the ~.7 to ~1.6 degree C maximum cooling the 2006 studies suggest is superimposed in color on the Blackly Apocalyptic predictions published in Science Vol. 222, 1983 . They're worth comparing, because the range of soot concentrations in the new models overlaps with cases assumed to have dire climatic consequences in the widely publicized 1983 scenarios -- "Apocalyptic predictions require, to be taken seriously,higher standards of evidence than do assertions on other matters where the stakes are not as great." wrote Sagan in Foreign Affairs , Winter 1983 -84. But that "evidence" was never forthcoming. 'Nuclear Winter' never existed outside of a computer except as air-brushed animation commissioned by the a PR firm - Porter Novelli Inc. Yet Sagan predicted "the extinction of the human species " as temperatures plummeted 35 degrees C and the world froze in the aftermath of a nuclear holocaust. Last year, Sagan's cohort tried to reanimate the ghost in a machine anti-nuclear activists invoked in the depths of the Cold War, by re-running equally arbitrary scenarios on a modern interactive Global Circulation Model. But the Cold War is history in more ways than one. It is a credit to post-modern computer climate simulations that they do not reproduce the apocalyptic results of what Sagan oxymoronically termed "a sophisticated one dimensional model." The subzero 'baseline case' has melted down into a tepid 1.3 degrees of average cooling- grey skies do not a Ragnarok make . What remains is just not the stuff that End of the World myths are made of. It is hard to exaggerate how seriously " nuclear winter "was once taken by policy analysts who ought to have known better. Many were taken aback by the sheer force of Sagan's rhetoric Remarkably, Science's news coverage of the new results fails to graphically compare them with the old ones Editor Kennedy and other recent executives of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, once proudly co-authored and helped to publicize. You can't say they didn't try to reproduce this Cold War icon. Once again, soot from imaginary software materializes in midair by the megaton , flying higher than Mount Everest . This is not physics, but a crude exercise in ' garbage in, gospel out' parameter forcing designed to maximize and extend the cooling an aeosol can generate, by sparing it from realistic attrition by rainout in the lower atmosphere. Despite decades of progress in modeling atmospheric chemistry , there is none in this computer simulation, and ignoring photochemistry further extends its impact. Fortunately , the history of science is as hard to erase as it is easy to ignore. Their past mastery of semantic agression cannot spare the authors of "Nuclear Winter Lite " direct comparison of their new results and their old. Dark smoke clouds in the lower atmosphere don't last long enough to spread across the globe. Cloud droplets and rainfall remove them. rapidly washing them out of the sky in a matter of days to weeks- not long enough to sustain a global pall. Real world weather brings down particles much as soot is scrubbed out of power plant smoke by the water sprays in smoke stack scrubbers Robock acknowledges this- not even a single degree of cooling results when soot is released at lower elevations in he models . The workaround is to inject the imaginary aerosol at truly Himalayan elevations - pressure altitudes of 300 millibar and higher , where the computer model's vertical transport function modules pass it off to their even higher neighbors in the stratosphere , where it does not rain and particles linger.. The new studies like the old suffer from the disconnect between a desire to paint the sky black and the vicissitudes of natural history. As with many exercise in worst case models both at invoke rare phenomena as commonplace, claiming it prudent to assume the worst. But the real world is subject to Murphy's lesser known second law- if everything must go wrong, don't bet on it. In 2006 as in 1983 firestorms and forest fires that send smoke into the stratosphere rise to alien prominence in the modelers re-imagined world , but i the real one remains a very different place, where though every month sees forest fires burning areas the size of cities - 2,500 hectares or larger , stratospheric smoke injections arise but once in a blue moon. So how come these neo-nuclear winter models feature so much smoke so far aloft for so long?

**Belief in nuclear extinction is only media scaremongering**

**MARTIN 1982**

(Dr Brian Martin is a physicist whose research interests include stratospheric modelling. He is a research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, Journal of Peace Research, No 4, http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/82jpr.html)

(k) Media. The media tend to promote drama and death, and hence promote exaggeration and emphasis on worst cases in relation to nuclear war, and promote those who make these emphases. This arises partly from the lack of continuity and social context in most media stories, and from providing sufficient bad news (death, destruction) so that the consumers of the media can delight in the 'good' news (advertising of products, one's own ordinary untraumatic life). These tendencies in the media are accentuated by centralised control over the form and content of the media.

# NO IMPACT: NUKE WAR

**Effects of nuclear war are exaggerated**

**MARTIN 1984** (Dr Brian Martin is a physicist whose research interests include stratospheric modelling. He is a research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, and a member of SANA, SANA UPDATE, MARCH)

Opponents of war, including scientists, have often exaggerated the effects of nuclear war and emphasized worst cases. Schell continually bends evidence to give the worst impression. For example, he implies that a nuclear attack is inevitably followed by a firestorm or conflagration. He invariably gives the maximum time for people having to remain in shelters from fallout. And he takes a pessimistic view of the potential for ecological resilience to radiation exposure and for human resourcefulness in a crisis. Similarly, in several of the scientific studies of nuclear winter, I have noticed a strong tendency to focus on worst cases and to avoid examination of ways to overcome the effects. For example, no one seems to have looked at possibilities for migration to coastal areas away from the freezing continental temperatures or looked at people changing their diets away from grain-fed beef to direct consumption of the grain, thereby greatly extending reserves of food.

**Nuclear war won't cause extinction**

**MARTIN 1984** (Dr Brian Martin is a physicist whose research interests include stratospheric modelling. He is a research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, and a member of SANA, SANA UPDATE, MARCH)

Yet in spite of the widespread belief in nuclear extinction, there was almost no scientific support for such a possibility. The scenario of the book and movie On the Beach [2], with fallout clouds gradually enveloping the earth and wiping out all life, was and is fiction. The scientific evidence is that fallout would only kill people who are immediately downwind of surface nuclear explosions and who are heavily exposed during the first few days. Global fallout has no potential for causing massive immediate death (though it could cause up to millions of cancers worldwide over many decades) [3]. In spite of the lack of evidence, large sections of the peace movement have left unaddressed the question of whether nuclear war inevitably means global extinction.

**Only a small fraction of warheads will actually explode**

**MARTIN 1982** (Dr Brian Martin is a physicist whose research interests include stratospheric modelling. He is a research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, Current Affairs Bulletin, December, http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/82cab/index.html)

What fraction of the 11,000Mt would be exploded in a major nuclear war? This is hard to assess, but almost certainly much will not be exploded. Both the United States and the Soviet Union place a high priority on targeting their opponent's military forces, nuclear forces in particular. A sizable fraction of nuclear arsenals is likely to be destroyed before use (attacks on nuclear submarines, airfields, missile silos), be unavailable for use (submarines in port, missiles cut off from communications) or fail to perform properly.[47] One estimate is that one sixth to one third of superpower arsenals will be used, depending on whether the war occurs suddenly or builds up gradually.[48]

# NO IMPACT: NUKE WAR

**No extinction—fallout, ozone, fires, and nuclear winter are all wrong**

**MARTIN 1982** (Dr Brian Martin is a physicist whose research interests include stratospheric modelling. He is a research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, Journal of Peace Research, No 4, http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/82jpr.html)

(a) Global fallout. The main effect of long-term fallout would be to increase the rate of cancer and genetic defects by a small percentage. Tens of millions might be affected worldwide over a period of many decades, but this would provide no threat to the survival of the human species.[6] (b) Ozone. Nuclear war would cause an increase in ultraviolet light from the sun which reaches the earth's surface, due to reductions in stratospheric ozone caused by its catalytic destruction by nitrogen oxides produced in nuclear explosions. This would increase the incidence of skin cancer (which is mostly non-lethal) and possibly alter agricultural productivity, but would be most unlikely to cause widespread death.[7] (c) Fires. Extensive fires caused directly or indirectly by nuclear explosions would fill the lower atmosphere in the northern hemisphere with so much particulate matter that the amount of sunlight reaching the earth's surface could be greatly reduced for a few months. If this occurred during the northern spring or summer, one consequence would be greatly reduced agricultural production and possible widescale starvation.[8] (d) Climatic changes. Such changes might be caused, for example, by injection of nitrogen oxides or particulate matter into the upper atmosphere. The more calamitous possibilities include a heating trend leading to melting of the polar ice caps, the converse possibility of a new ice age, and the changing of climatic patterns leading to drought or unstable weather in areas of current high agricultural productivity.[9] The rate of impact of such climatic change is likely to be sufficiently slow - decades, or years in some cases - for the avoidance of the death of a substantial portion of the world's population through climatic change.

**Even the worst possible nuclear war would leave 90% of the world’s population unhurt—huge areas would not be effected**

**MARTIN 1982** (Dr Brian Martin is a physicist whose research interests include stratospheric modelling. He is a research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, Journal of Peace Research, No 4, http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/82jpr.html)

To summarise the above points, a major global nuclear war in which population centres in the US, Soviet Union, Europe and China ware targeted, with no effective civil defence measures taken, could kill directly perhaps 400 to 450 million people. Induced effects, in particular starvation or epidemics following agricultural failure or economic breakdown, might add up to several hundred million deaths to the total, though this is most uncertain. Such an eventuality would be a catastrophe of enormous proportions, but it is far from extinction. Even in the most extreme case there would remain alive some 4000 million people, about nine-tenths of the world's population, most of them unaffected physically by the nuclear war. The following areas would be relatively unscathed, unless nuclear attacks were made in these regions: South and Central America, Africa, the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, Australasia, Oceania and large parts of China. Even in the mid-latitudes of the northern hemisphere where most of the nuclear weapons would be exploded, areas upwind of nuclear attacks would remain free of heavy radioactive contamination, such as Portugal, Ireland and British Columbia. Many people, perhaps especially in the peace movement, believe that global nuclear war will lead to the death of most or all of the world's population.[12] Yet the available scientific evidence provides no basis for this belief. Furthermore, there seem to be no convincing scientific arguments that nuclear war could cause human extinction.[13] In particular, the idea of 'overkill', if taken to imply the capacity to kill everyone on earth, is highly misleading.[14]

# A2: STUDIES

**Err on our side—studies assume the worst case**

**MARTIN 1982** (Dr Brian Martin is a physicist whose research interests include stratospheric modelling. He is a research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, Journal of Peace Research, No 4, http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/82jpr.html)

Another major point to be made in relation to statements about nuclear war is that almost exclusive attention has been focussed on the 'worst case' of a major global nuclear war, as indeed has been done in the previous paragraphs. A major global nuclear war is a possibility, but not the only one. In the case of 'limited' nuclear war, anywhere from hundreds of people to many tens of millions of people might die.[16] This is a real possibility, but peace movement theory and practice have developed almost as if this possibility does not exist.

# A2: STUDIES

**Powerful psychological motives cause us to exaggerate the impact of nuclear war**

**MARTIN 1982**

(Dr Brian Martin is a physicist whose research interests include stratospheric modelling. He is a research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, Journal of Peace Research, No 4, http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/82jpr.html)

Here I outline a number of possible reasons for exaggeration of the effects of nuclear war and emphasis on worst cases. While the importance of most of these reasons may be disputed, I feel it is necessary to raise them for discussion. The points raised are not meant to lay blame on anyone, but rather to help ensure that peace movement theory and strategy are founded on sound beliefs. By understanding our motivations and emotional responses, some insight may be gained into how better to struggle against nuclear war.(a) Exaggeration to justify inaction. For many people, nuclear war is seen as such a terrible event, and as something that people can do so little about, that they can see no point in taking action on peace issues and do not even think about the danger. For those who have never been concerned or taken action on the issue, accepting an extreme account of the effects of nuclear war can provide conscious or unconscious justification for this inaction. In short, one removes from one's awareness the upsetting topic of nuclear war, and justifies this psychological denial by believing the worst.This suggests two things. First, it may be more effective in mobilising people against nuclear war to describe the dangers in milder terms. Some experiments have shown that strong accounts of danger - for example, of smoking[17] - can be less effective than weaker accounts in changing behaviour. Second, the peace movement should devote less attention to the dangers of nuclear war and more attention to what people can do to oppose it in their day-to-day lives. (b) Fear of death. Although death receives a large amount of attention in the media, the consideration of one's own death has been one of the most taboo topics in western culture, at least until recently.[18] Nuclear war as an issue raises the topic insistently, and unconsciously many people may prefer to avoid the issue for this reason. The fear of and repression of conscious thoughts about personal death may also lead to an unconscious tendency to exaggerate the effects of nuclear war. One's own personal death - the end of consciousness - can be especially threatening in the context of others remaining alive and conscious. Somehow the death of everyone may be less threatening. Robert Lifton[19] argues that children who learn at roughly the same age about both personal death and nuclear holocaust may be unable to separate the two concepts, and as a result equate death with annihilation, with undesirable consequences for coping individually with life and working collectively against nuclear war. Another factor here may be a feeling of potential guilt at the thought of surviving and having done nothing, or not enough or not the right thing, to prevent the deaths of others. Again, the idea that nearly everyone will die in nuclear war does not raise such disturbing possibilities. (c) Exaggeration to stimulate action. When people concerned about nuclear war describe the threat to others, in many cases this does not trigger any action. An understandable response by the concerned people is to expand the threat until action is triggered. This is valid procedure in many physiological and other domains. If a person does not heed a call of 'Fire!', shouting louder may do the trick. But in many instances of intellectual argument this procedure is not appropriate. In the case of nuclear war it seems clear that the threat, even when stated very conservatively, is already past the point of sufficient stimulation. This means that what is needed is not an expansion of the threat but rather some avenue which allows and encourages people to take action to challenge the threat. A carefully thought out and planned strategy for challenging the war system, a strategy which makes sense to uncommitted people and which can easily accommodate their involvement, is one such avenue.[20] (d) Planning and defeatism. People may identify thinking about and planning for an undesirable future - namely the occurrence and aftermath of nuclear war - with accepting its inevitability (defeatism) or even actually wanting it. By exaggerating the effects of nuclear war and emphasising the worst possible case, there becomes no post-war future at all to prepare for, and so this difficulty does not arise. The limitations of this response are apparent in cases other than nuclear war. Surely it is not defeatism to think about what will happen when a labour strike is broken, when a social revolution is destroyed (as in Chile) or turns bad (as in the Soviet Union), or when political events develop in an expected though unpleasant way (as Nazism in the 1920s and 1930s). Since, I would argue, some sort of nuclear war is virtually inevitable unless radical changes occur in industrialised societies, it is realism rather than defeatism to think about and take account of the likely aftermath of nuclear war. An effective way to deal with the feeling or charge of defeatism is to prepare for the political aftermath of nuclear war in ways which reduce the likelihood of nuclear war occurring in the first place. This can be done for example by developing campaigns for social defence, peace conversion and community self-management in ways which serve both as preparation to resist political repression in time of nuclear crisis or war, and as positive steps to build alternatives now to war-linked institutions.[21] (e) Exaggeration to justify concern (I). People involved with any issue or activity tend to exaggerate its importance so as to justify and sustain their concern and involvement. Nuclear war is only one problem among many pressing problems in the world, which include starvation, poverty, exploitation, racial and sexual inequality and repressive governments. By concentrating on peace issues, one must by necessity give less attention to other pressing issues. An unconscious tendency to exaggerate the effects of nuclear war has the effect of reducing conscious or unconscious guilt at not doing more on other issues. Guilt of this sort is undoubtedly common, especially among those who are active on social issues and who become familiar with the wide range of social problems needing attention. The irony is that those who feel guilt for this reason tend to be those who have least cause to feel so. One politically effective way to overcome this guilt may be to strengthen and expand links between anti-war struggles and struggles for justice, equality and the like. (f) Exaggeration to justify concern (II). Spokespeople and apologists for the military establishment tend to emphasise conservative estimates of the effects of nuclear war. They also are primarily concerned with military and economic 'survival' of society so as to confront further threats to the state. One response to this orientation by people favouring non-military approaches to world order and peace is to assume that the military-based estimates are too low, and hence to exaggerate the effects and emphasise worst cases. The emotional underpinning for this response seems to be something like this: 'if a militarist thinks nuclear war will kill 100 million people and still wants more nuclear weapons, and because I am totally opposed to nuclear war or plans for waging it, therefore nuclear war surely would kill 500 million people or everyone on earth.' This sort of unconscious reasoning confuses one's estimate of the size of a threat with one's attitude towards it. A more tenable conclusion is that the value structures of the militarist and the peace activist are sufficiently different to favour very different courses of action when considering the same evidence. The assumption that a given item of information will lead to a uniform emotional response or conclusion about its implications is false. The primary factor underlying differences in response to the threat of nuclear war is not differences in assessments of devastation, but political differences.

# A2: HIGH YIELDS

**High yields do not guarantee extinction—overkill numbers are misleading**

**MARTIN 1982** (Dr Brian Martin is a physicist whose research interests include stratospheric modelling. He is a research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, Current Affairs Bulletin, December, http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/82cab/index.html)

Many people believe that the capacity of nuclear weapons for 'overkill' means that all or most of the people on earth would die in a major nuclear war. In spite of the prevalence of this idea, there is little scientific evidence to support it. Many calculations of 'overkill' appear to be made using the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki as a baseline. Estimates of the number of people killed at Hiroshima from a 13kt bomb range from 63,000 to over 200,000. Adopting a figure of 130,000 for illustrative purposes gives ten people killed for each tonne of nuclear explosive. By linear extrapolation, explosion of a third of a million times as much explosive power, 4000Mt, would kill a third of a million times as many people, namely 40,000 million, or nearly ten times the present world population. But this factor of ten is misleading, since linear extrapolation does not apply. Suppose the bomb dropped on Hiroshima had been 1000 times as powerful, 13Mt. It could not have killed 1000 times as many people, but at most the entire population of Hiroshima perhaps 250,000. Re-doing the 'overkill' calculation using these figures gives not a figure of ten but of only 0.02. This example shows that crude linear extrapolations of this sort are unlikely to provide any useful information about the effects of nuclear war.

# A2: NUCLEAR WINTER

**Nuclear winter won't cause extinction**

**MARTIN 1984** (Dr Brian Martin is a physicist whose research interests include stratospheric modelling. He is a research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, and a member of SANA, SANA UPDATE, MARCH)

The latest stimulus for doomsday beliefs is 'nuclear winter': the blocking of sunlight from dust raised by nuclear explosions and smoke from fires ignited by nuclear attacks. This would result in a few months of darkness and lowered temperatures, mainly in the northern mid-latitudes [5]. The effects could be quite significant, perhaps causing the deaths of up to several hundred million more people than would die from the immediate effects of blast, heat and radiation. But the evidence, so far, seems to provide little basis for beliefs in nuclear extinction. The impact of nuclear winter on populations nearer the equator, such as in India, does not seem likely to be significant. The most serious possibilities would result from major ecological destruction, but this remains speculative at present.

**Nuclear winter can't be proven—their studies are politically biased**

**AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PHYSICS, AUGUST 2003**

("Wintry Doom," http://www.aip.org/history/climate/Winter.htm)

Atmospheric scientists were well-placed to take up the question of smoke from a nuclear war. Measurements like Crutzen's of the effects of soot and the like had greatly advanced since the 1975 study. Richard Turco and others, working on the dinosaur extinction problem, had developed a computer model of a haze-filled atmosphere. Meanwhile James Pollack and Brian Toon had been working with Carl Sagan on how the aerosol smoke from volcanoes could affect climate. Joining forces, they calculated that after an exchange of hydrogen bombs, the sooty smoke from burning cities could bring on a "nuclear winter" — months or even years of cold so severe it would gravely endanger living creatures.(8) The scientists did this work mainly for public consumption. When they announced their results in 1983, it was with the explicit aim of promoting international arms control. Surely the likelihood that all-out nuclear war was literally suicidal would persuade nations to reduce their arsenals? But the studies meanwhile advanced scientific understanding of how aerosols could affect climate.(9) In fact the computer models were so simplified, and the data on smoke and other aerosols were still so poor, that nothing could be said for certain. Critics, mostly people opposed to nuclear disarmament, quickly pointed out the deficiencies. In the mid 1980s, detailed studies confirmed that it was indeed likely that a nuclear war would temporarily alter global climate. But as Schneider and a co-author explained in a widely read article, it would probably not bring an apocalyptic winter, but only a "nuclear fall."(10) There were so many variable factors that nobody could say with confidence what would happen.

**Volcanoes disprove nuclear winter**

**MARTIN 1982** (Dr Brian Martin is a physicist whose research interests include stratospheric modelling. He is a research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, Current Affairs Bulletin, December, http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/82cab/index.html)

Stratospheric dust from a nuclear war seems unlikely to cause such climatic change. In 1883 the volcanic eruption at Krakatoa deposited some 10 to 100 thousand million tonnes of dust in the stratosphere, and the 1963 Mt Agung eruption about half as much. These injections seem to have caused a minor cooling of the surface temperature of the earth, at most about half a degree Celsius, lasting a few years, with no long term consequences. A nuclear war involving 4000Mt from present arsenals would probably deposit much less dust in the stratosphere than either the Krakatoa or Mt Agung eruptions.[38]

# A2: NUCLEAR WINTER

**Nuclear winter is exaggerated—studies assume high yields and exclude nitrogen effects**

**MARTIN 1982** (Dr Brian Martin is a physicist whose research interests include stratospheric modelling. He is a research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, Current Affairs Bulletin, December, http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/82cab/index.html)

Another possibility is that decreases in ozone or increases in oxides of nitrogen levels in the stratosphere, caused by nuclear war, could lead to climatic change. A reduction in ozone levels by a factor of two could cause a decrease in surface temperature of one half to one degree Centigrade, but including oxides of nitrogen in the calculation reduces this effect. Whether or not a change in temperature at the earth's surface by this amount for a few years could cause irreversible climatic change is hard to assess. The National Academy of Sciences study concluded that the effects of dust and oxides of nitrogen injection into the stratosphere 'would probably lie within normal global climatic variability, but the possibility of climatic changes of a more dramatic nature cannot be ruled out'.[39] Since the Academy assumed a nuclear war with the explosion of many more high-yield weapons than are presently deployed, the danger of climatic change from dust or oxides of nitrogen is almost certainly less than assessed in their report.

**Nuclear winter is all hippy propaganda—real scientists have disproven it**

**KEARNY 2003** (Cresson, scientist recruited by Nobel Prize Laureate and Manhattan Project Scientist Eugene Wigner as researcher for civil defense Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Nuclear War Survival Skills, http://www.oism.org/nwss/s73p904.htm)

° Facts: Unsurvivable "nuclear winter" is a discredited theory that, since its conception in 1982, has been used to frighten additional millions into believing that trying to survive a nuclear war is a waste of effort and resources, and that only by ridding the world of almost all nuclear weapons do we have a chance of surviving. Non-propagandizing scientists recently havecalculated that the climatic and other environmental effects of even an all-out nuclear war would be much less severe than the catastrophic effects repeatedly publicized by popular astronomer Carl Sagan and his fellow activist scientists, and by all the involved Soviet scientists. Conclusions reached from these recent, realistic calculations are summarized in an article, "Nuclear Winter Reappraised", featured in the 1986 summer issue of Foreign Affairs, the prestigious quarterly of the Council on Foreign Relations. The authors, Starley L. Thompson and Stephen H. Schneider, are atmospheric scientists with the National Center for Atmospheric Research. They showed " that on scientific grounds the global apocalyptic conclusions of the initial nuclear winter hypothesis can now be relegated to a vanishing low level of probability." Their models indicate that in July (when the greatest temperature reductions would result) the average temperature in the United States would be reduced for a few days from about 70 degrees Fahrenheit to approximately 50 degrees. (In contrast, under the same conditions Carl Sagan, his associates, and the Russian scientists predicted a resulting average temperature of about 10 degrees below zero Fahrenheit, lasting for many weeks!)

# A2: NUCLEAR WINTER

**Nuclear winter is just propaganda—scientific studies were manipulated for political reasons and dissenters were intimidated into silence**

**KEARNY 2003** (Cresson, scientist recruited by Nobel Prize Laureate and Manhattan Project Scientist Eugene Wigner as researcher for civil defense Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Nuclear War Survival Skills, http://www.oism.org/nwss/s73p904.htm)

The theory that smoke from burning cities and forests and dust from nuclear explosions would cause worldwide freezing temperatures was conceived in 1982 by the German atmospheric chemist and environmentalist Paul Crutzen, and continues to be promoted by a worldwide propaganda campaign. This well funded campaign began in 1983 with televised scientific-political meetings in Cambridge and Washington featuring American and Russian scientists. A barrage of newspaper and magazine articles followed, including a scaremongering article by Carl Sagan in the October 30, 1983 issue of Parade, the Sunday tabloid read by millions. The most influential article was featured in the December 23,1983 issue of Science (the weekly magazine of the American Association for the Advancement of Science): "Nuclear winter, global consequences of multiple nuclear explosions," by five scientists, R. P. Turco, O. B. Toon, T. P. Ackerman, J. B. Pollack, and C. Sagan. Significantly, these activists listed their names to spell TTAPS, pronounced "taps," the bugle call proclaiming "lights out" or the end of a military funeral. Until 1985, non-propagandizing scientists did not begin to effectively refute the numerous errors, unrealistic assumptions, and computer modeling weakness' of the TTAPS and related "nuclear winter" hypotheses. A principal reason is that government organizations, private corporations, and most scientists generally avoid getting involved in political controversies, or making statements likely to enable antinuclear activists to accuse them of minimizing nuclear war dangers, thus undermining hopes for peace. Stephen Schneider has been called a fascist by some disarmament supporters for having written "Nuclear Winter Reappraised," according to the Rocky Mountain News of July 6, 1986. Three days later, this paper, that until recently featured accounts of unsurvivable "nuclear winter," criticized Carl Sagan and defended Thompson and Schneider in its lead editorial, "In Study of Nuclear Winter, Let Scientists Be Scientists." In a free country, truth will out - although sometimes too late to effectively counter fast-hittingpropaganda. Effective refutation of "nuclear winter" also was delayed by the prestige of politicians and of politically motivated scientists and scientific organizations endorsing the TTAPS forecast of worldwide doom. Furthermore, the weakness' in the TTAPS hypothesis could not be effectively explored until adequate Government funding was made available to cover costs of lengthy, expensive studies, including improved computer modeling of interrelated, poorly understood meteorological phenomena.

# A2: FOOD CONTAMINATION

**Food contamination has no impact—you just have to peel your apples**

**KEARNY 2003** (Cresson, scientist recruited by Nobel Prize Laureate and Manhattan Project Scientist Eugene Wigner as researcher for civil defense Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Nuclear War Survival Skills, http://www.oism.org/nwss/s73p904.htm)

° Facts: If the falloutparticles do not become mixed with the parts of food that are eaten, no harm is done. Food and water in dust-tight containers are not contaminated by fallout radiation. Peeling fruits and vegetables removes essentially all fallout, as does removing the uppermost several inches of stored grain onto which fallout particles have fallen. Water from many sources -- such as deep wells and covered reservoirs, tanks, and containers -- would not be contaminated. Even water containing dissolved radioactive elements and compounds can be made safe for drinking by simply filtering it through earth, as described later in this book.

# A2: GENETIC DAMAGE

**No impact to genetic damage**

**KEARNY 2003** (Cresson, scientist recruited by Nobel Prize Laureate and Manhattan Project Scientist Eugene Wigner as researcher for civil defense Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Nuclear War Survival Skills, http://www.oism.org/nwss/s73p904.htm)

Myth: Most of the unborn children and grandchildren of people who have been exposed to radiation from nuclear explosions will be genetically damaged will be malformed, delayed victims of nuclear war. ° Facts: The authoritative study by the National Academy of Sciences, A Thirty Year Study of the Survivors qf Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was published in 1977. It concludes that the incidence of abnormalities is no higher among children later conceived by parents who were exposed to radiation during the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki than is the incidence of abnormalities among Japanese children born to un-exposed parents. This is not to say that there would be no genetic damage, nor that some fetuses subjected to large radiation doses would not be damaged. But the overwhelming evidence does show that the exaggerated fears of radiation damage to future generations are not supported by scientific findings.

# A2: ANY NUKES = EXTINCTION

**Numbers are important—low warhead numbers minimize the global effects of nuclear war**

**MARTIN 1982** (Dr Brian Martin is a physicist whose research interests include stratospheric modelling. He is a research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, Current Affairs Bulletin, December, http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/82cab/index.html)

The overwhelming bulk of nuclear explosive power resides in the arsenals of the two nuclear superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. In 1960 this explosive power totalled perhaps 60,000Mt. But due to the trend noted above, present arsenals total about 11,000Mt: about 3,500Mt for the United States and 7,500Mt for the Soviet Union.[46] While the trend to larger numbers of smaller warheads increases the potential area destroyed by nuclear weapons, the reduction in total megatonnage reduces the potential global effects. This is especially the case since the clouds from nuclear explosions of 1Mt or less are unlikely to rise high into the stratosphere, reducing stratospheric fallout and effects on ozone.

**Nuclear war would not automatically escalate—even superpower war could remain limited**

**MARTIN 1982** (Dr Brian Martin is a physicist whose research interests include stratospheric modelling. He is a research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, Journal of Peace Research, No 4, http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/82jpr.html)

It often has been argued that the use of a few nuclear weapons could lead, gradually or suddenly, to an all-out nuclear war between the superpowers. But it is also at least possible that a nuclear exchange could occur without this leading to all-out war. A nuclear war might be waged solely in the Middle East; or an 'exchange' might occur consisting of nuclear attacks by the US on remote installations in southern Soviet Union and by the Soviet Union on remote US installations in Australia; or 'tactical' nuclear weapons might be used in a confrontation restricted to Europe, or to the border region between China and the Soviet Union. The likelihood of any such possibilities is a matter of some dispute. What should not be in dispute is the possibility - whatever assessment is made of its likelihood - that a nuclear war can occur which is less than all-out global nuclear war.

# A2: FALLOUT

**No impact to fallout—particles would degrade in the stratosphere before they fall to earth**

**MARTIN 1982** (Dr Brian Martin is a physicist whose research interests include stratospheric modelling. He is a research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, Current Affairs Bulletin, December, http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/82cab/index.html)

By the time stratospheric fallout reaches the earth, its radioactivity is greatly reduced. For example, after one year, the time typically required for any sizable amount of fission products to move from the northern to the southern stratosphere, the rate of decay will be less than a hundred thousandth of what it was one hour after the blast. It is for this reason that stratospheric fallout does not have the potential to cause widespread and immediate sickness or death.

**Fallout is survivable—a global nuclear war would only produce a million deaths from radiation**

**MARTIN 1982** (Dr Brian Martin is a physicist whose research interests include stratospheric modelling. He is a research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, Current Affairs Bulletin, December, http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/82cab/index.html)

An authoritative report on the effect of ionising radiation, called Beir III,[14] concludes that exposure of the whole body to 100 millisieverts will result in an increase in the naturally occurring cancer death rate of 0.5 per cent to 1.4 per cent, and 50 to 750 additional serious genetic disorders per million live births. An average exposure of 20 millisieverts from delayed fallout from a nuclear war could, according to these figures, cause 600,000 to 1,700,000 additional cancer deaths and 40,000 to 600,000 additional genetic defects, manifested over a period of 50 years or more. Figures on risks of cancer and genetic defects from exposure to ionising radiation used by the International Commission on Radiological Protection[15] for radiation protection purposes lie within the range of uncertainty specified by the Beir report. If the effects of carbon-14 over many thousands of years are included, these figures should be doubled.

**Fallout cannot cause extinction—death rates would be relatively low even if reactors were targeted**

**MARTIN 1982**

(Dr Brian Martin is a physicist whose research interests include stratospheric modelling. He is a research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, Current Affairs Bulletin, December, http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/82cab/index.html)

Previous nuclear explosions have injected an estimated 5 tonnes of plutonium into the atmosphere.[22] No one knows what effect this is having on human health. One of the highest estimates of the consequences is by John Gofman, who thinks 950,000 people worldwide may die of lung cancer as a result of this plutonium, over a period of many decades.[23] A 4000Mt nuclear war could cause the release of ten times as much plutonium, some 50 tonnes, with ten times the consequences. Large nuclear power reactors contain an average inventory of perhaps 300 kilogrammes of plutonium. If it is assumed that all the plutonium from 20 large reactors - more than one tenth of the world total - were dispersed in a 4000Mt nuclear war, this would add another six tonnes of plutonium to the total released into the atmosphere. This would be about one tenth the amount directly released by the nuclear explosions themselves. The cancers and genetic defects caused by global fallout from a nuclear war would only appear over a period of many decades, and would cause only a small increase in the current rates of cancer and genetic defects. The scientific evidence clearly shows that global fallout from even the largest nuclear war poses no threat to the survival of the human species. Nevertheless, the fact that hundreds of thousands or millions of people who would suffer and die from global fallout cannot be ignored. Furthermore, many more people than this would die from exposure to fallout in the immediate vicinity of nuclear explosions.

# A2: OZONE

**Ozone argument is wrong**

**MARTIN 1984** (Dr Brian Martin is a physicist whose research interests include stratospheric modelling. He is a research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, and a member of SANA, SANA UPDATE, MARCH)

The next effect to which beliefs in nuclear extinction were attached was ozone depletion. Beginning in the mid-1970s, scares about stratospheric ozone developed, culminating in 1982 in the release of Jonathan Schell's book The Fate of the Earth [4]. Schell painted a picture of human annihilation from nuclear war based almost entirely on effects from increased ultraviolet light at the earth's surface due to ozone reductions caused by nuclear explosions. Schell's book was greeted with adulation rarely observed in any field. Yet by the time the book was published, the scientific basis for ozone-based nuclear extinction had almost entirely evaporated. The ongoing switch by the military forces of the United States and the Soviet Union from multi-megatonne nuclear weapons to larger numbers of smaller weapons means that the effect on ozone from even the largest nuclear war is unlikely to lead to any major effect on human population levels, and extinction from ozone reductions is virtually out of the question [3].

**Nuclear war would not destroy ozone**

**MARTIN 1982** (Dr Brian Martin is a physicist whose research interests include stratospheric modelling. He is a research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, Current Affairs Bulletin, December, http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/82cab/index.html)

Calculations made in the mid-1970s assuming large nuclear arsenals with many high-yield explosions concluded that reductions of ozone could reach 50 per cent or more in the northern hemisphere, with smaller reductions in the southern hemisphere.[30] But since the number of high-yield weapons in present nuclear arsenals is now smaller, much less oxides of nitrogen would be deposited in the stratosphere by nuclear war than assumed in earlier calculations, and so significant ozone reductions are unlikely.[31]

**No impact to U.V. radiation**

**MARTIN 1982** (Dr Brian Martin is a physicist whose research interests include stratospheric modelling. He is a research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, Current Affairs Bulletin, December, http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/82cab/index.html)

If significant ozone reduction did occur, the most important direct effect on humans would be an increase in skin cancer. However, this is seldom lethal, and could be avoided by reducing exposure to sunlight. Potentially more serious would be effects on crops.[32] Some of the important grains, for example, are sensitive to uv. Whether the net effects on crop yields would be significant is hard to estimate. But whatever the reduction in ozone, ozone levels would return pretty much to normal after a few years.[9] It seems unlikely that in the context of a major nuclear war the changes in uv alone would be of serious concern. In particular, the threat of human extinction raised by Jonathan Schell in The Fate of the Earth,[33] based mostly on effects of increased uv from ozone reduction, seems very small indeed.

# A2: OZONE

**Ozone depletion is a myth—better studies disprove it**

**KEARNY 2003** (Cresson, scientist recruited by Nobel Prize Laureate and Manhattan Project Scientist Eugene Wigner as researcher for civil defense Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Nuclear War Survival Skills, http://www.oism.org/nwss/s73p904.htm)

° Facts: Large nuclear explosions do inject huge amounts of nitrogen oxides (gasses that destroy ozone) into the stratosphere. However, the percent of the stratospheric ozone destroyed by a given amount of nitrogen oxides has been greatly overestimated in almost all theoretical calculations and models. For example, the Soviet and U.S. atmospheric nuclear test explosions of large weapons in 1952-1962 were calculated by Foley and Ruderman to result in a reduction of more than 10 percent in total ozone. (See M. H. Foley and M. A. Ruderman, 'Stratospheric NO from Past Nuclear Explosions", Journal of Geophysics, Res. 78, 4441-4450.) Yet observations that they cited showed no reductions in ozone. Nor did ultraviolet increase. Other theoreticians calculated sizable reductions in total ozone, but interpreted the observational data to indicate either no reduction, or much smaller reductions than their calculated ones. A realistic simplified estimate of the increased ultraviolet light dangers to American survivors of a large nuclear war equates these hazards to moving from San Francisco to sea level at the equator, where the sea level incidence of skin cancers (seldom fatal) is highest- about 10 times higher than the incidence at San Francisco. Many additional thousands of American survivors might get skin cancer, but little or no increase in skin cancers might result if in the post-attack world deliberate sun tanning and going around hatless went out of fashion. Furthermore, almost all of today's warheads are smaller than those exploded in the large- weapons tests mentioned above; most would inject much smaller amounts of ozone-destroying gasses, or no gasses, into the stratosphere, where ozone deficiencies may persist for years. And nuclear weapons smaller than 500 kilotons result in increases (due to smog reactions) in upper tropospheric ozone. In a nuclear war, these increases would partially compensate for the upper-level tropospheric decreases-as explained by Julius S. Chang and Donald J. Wuebbles of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

# A2: BLINDNESS

**Nuclear war wouldn’t cause blindness**

**MARTIN 1982** (Dr Brian Martin is a physicist whose research interests include stratospheric modelling. He is a research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, Current Affairs Bulletin, December, http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/82cab/index.html)

It is sometimes claimed that nuclear war could destroy ozone to such an extent that humans and animals would be blinded by excess uv. Even if large numbers of high-yield weapons were exploded, this possibility seems very unlikely except for a contribution to snow blindness in the far north. Stratospheric ozone can never be completely removed, but at most reduced greatly. Even if a 50 per cent or more reduction in ozone occurred - and as noted this seems improbable with present nuclear arsenals - protection from uv for humans could be obtained from sunglasses or just ordinary glasses, which absorb uv. For animals, the following considerations are relevant. Ozone levels vary considerably from place to place and from time to time, both seasonally and daily (sometimes by up to 50 per cent). Sunlight at the equator typically passes through only half as much ozone as at the mid-latitudes, yet animals at the equator are not known to go blind more often than elsewhere. Furthermore, most ozone reductions from a nuclear war would be in the mid and high latitudes, where ozone levels are higher to start with and where the 'path length' of sunlight through ozone is increased due to its oblique angle of incidence. But this does not mean complacency is warranted, as the concerns of John Hampson illustrate.

# A2: CITY BURNING

**City burning and sun blockage are deliberate lies by Soviet scientists to demoralize Americans**

**KEARNY 2003** (Cresson, scientist recruited by Nobel Prize Laureate and Manhattan Project Scientist Eugene Wigner as researcher for civil defense Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Nuclear War Survival Skills, http://www.oism.org/nwss/s73p904.htm)

Soviet propagandists promptly exploited belief in unsurvivable "nuclear winter" to increase fear of nuclear weapons and war, and to demoralize their enemies. Because raging city firestorms are needed to inject huge amounts of smoke into the stratosphere and thus, according to one discredited theory, prevent almost all solar heat from reaching the ground, the Soviets changed their descriptions of how a modern city will burn if blasted by a nuclear explosion. Figure 1.6 pictures how Russian scientists and civil defense officials realistically described - before the invention of "nuclear winter" - the burning of a city hit by a nuclear weapon. Buildings in the blasted area for miles around ground zero will be reduced to scattered rubble - mostly of concrete, steel, and other nonflammable materials - that will not burn in blazing fires. Thus in the Oak Ridge National Laboratory translation (ORNL-TR-2793) of Civil Defense. Second Edition (500,000 copies), Moscow, 1970, by Egorov, Shlyakhov, and Alabin, we read: "Fires do not occur in zones of complete destruction . . . that are characterized by an overpressure exceeding 0.5 kg/cm2 [- 7 psi]., because rubble is scattered and covers the burning structures. As a result the rubble only smolders, and fires as such do not occur." Firestorms destroyed the centers of Hamburg, Dresden, and Tokyo. The old-fashioned buildings of those cities contained large amounts of flammable materials, were ignited by many thousands of small incendiaries, and burned quickly as standing structures well supplied with air. No firestorm has ever injected smoke into the stratosphere, or caused appreciable cooling below its smoke cloud.

# EXTINCTION CLAIM = RACIST

**Belief in nuclear extinction is a product of racism and Eurocentrism**

**MARTIN 1984** (Dr Brian Martin is a physicist whose research interests include stratospheric modelling. He is a research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, and a member of SANA, SANA UPDATE, MARCH)

There are quite a number of reasons why people may find a belief in extinction from nuclear war to be attractive [8]. Here I will only briefly comment on a few factors. The first is an implicit Western chauvinism The effects of global nuclear war would mainly hit the population of the United States, Europe and the Soviet Union. This is quite unlike the pattern of other major ongoing human disasters of starvation, disease, poverty and political repression which mainly affect the poor, nonwhite populations of the Third World. The gospel of nuclear extinction can be seen as a way by which a problem for the rich white Western societies is claimed to be a problem for all the world. Symptomatic of this orientation is the belief that, without Western aid and trade, the economies and populations of the Third World would face disaster. But this is only Western self-centredness. Actually, Third World populations would in many ways be better off without the West: the pressure to grow cash crops of sugar, tobacco and so on would be reduced, and we would no longer witness fresh fish being airfreighted from Bangladesh to Europe.

# NO U.S.-CHINA WAR

**U.S.-China conflict will never occur–many factors restrain China**

**BRZEZINSKI 2005** (Zbigniew, Counselor at CSIS, Foreign Policy, Jan/Feb, http://www.worldthreats.com/Asia/Clash%20of%20Titans.htm)

Today in East Asia, China is rising—peacefully so far. For understandable reasons, China harbors resentment and even humiliation about some chapters of its history. Nationalism is an important force, and there are serious grievances regarding external issues, notably Taiwan. But conflict is not inevitable or even likely. China's leadership is not inclined to challenge the United States militarily, and its focus remains on economic development and winning acceptance as a great power. China is preoccupied, and almost fascinated, with the trajectory of its own ascent. When I met with the top leadership not long ago, what struck me was the frequency with which I was asked for predictions about the next 15 or 20 years. Not long ago, the Chinese Politburo invited two distinguished, Western-trained professors to a special meeting. Their task was to analyze nine major powers since the 15th century to see why they rose and fell. It's an interesting exercise for the top leadership of a massive and complex country. This focus on the experience of past great powers could lead to the conclusion that the iron laws of political theory and history point to some inevitable collision or conflict. But there are other political realities. In the next five years, China will host several events that will restrain the conduct of its foreign policy. The 2008 Olympic Games is the most important, of course. The scale of the economic and psychological investment in the Beijing games is staggering. My expectation is that they will be magnificently organized. And make no mistake, China intends to win at the Olympics. A second date is 2010, when China will hold the World Expo in Shanghai. Successfully organizing these international gatherings is important to China and suggests that a cautious foreign policy will prevail. More broadly, China is determined to sustain its economic growth. A confrontational foreign policy could disrupt that growth, harm hundreds of millions of Chinese, and threaten the Communist Party's hold on power. China's leadership appears rational, calculating, and conscious not only of China's rise but also of its continued weakness. There will be inevitable frictions as China's regional role increases and as a Chinese "sphere of influence" develops. U.S. power may recede gradually in the coming years, and the unavoidable decline in Japan's influence will heighten the sense of China's regional preeminence. But to have a real collision, China needs a military that is capable of going toe-to-toe with the United States. At the strategic level, China maintains a posture of minimum deterrence. Forty years after acquiring nuclear-weapons technology, China has just 24 ballistic missiles capable of hitting the United States. Even beyond the realm of strategic warfare, a country must have the capacity to attain its political objectives before it will engage in limited war. It is hard to envisage how China could promote its objectives when it is acutely vulnerable to a blockade and isolation enforced by the United States. In a conflict, Chinese maritime trade would stop entirely. The flow of oil would cease, and the Chinese economy would be paralyzed.

**China will never go to war against the U.S.–American strategic advantages are too overwhelming**

**STRATFOR 2001**

(2001 annual forecast, January 1, http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read\_article.php?selected=&id=101197&showForecasts=1&forecasts=1)

It is impossible to understate the positions of relative weakness of the Russian and Chinese governments, a position that will fuel concern. Neither is prepared militarily, politically, economically or socially to weather serious hostility with the United States. China is only beginning to restructure and upgrade its military. And the Chinese government has only begun to expand its military and political sphere of influence, regionally and globally. The Chinese economy is particularly vulnerable, still relying on a steady flow of foreign direct investment from the United States and its allies. This capital flow is important in controlling the huge social disparities between the regions of China. In addition, China has not yet secured access to vital resources, especially oil, free from potential U.S. interdiction in the event of a crisis like the one that flared in the Taiwan Strait in the 1990s. A premature downturn in relations with Washington would choke off investment and trade - and leave Beijing unable to control the regions and competing domestic interests that threaten to tear China apart.

# CHINA WEAK

**China is not a military threat–lack of combined arms capability, disorganized command, and poor training undermine power projection**

**DOD REPORT 2000** (Report to Congress by the Secretary of Defense, June 23, "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China," http://www.newsmax.com/articles/?a=2000/8/7/160447)

Should China decide to attack Taiwan, Beijing's goal would be to erode Taipei's will to fight with sufficient alacrity to avoid escalation of the conflict and potential third party intervention in the hope of forcing a political resolution in Beijing's favor. Synchronized application of SRBM, LACM, air-launched ASCM, maritime, and SOF assets likely would be a necessary requirement for success. However, while Beijing understands the theoretical aspects of integrating various weapons systems and strike assets, the PLA's principal obstacles lie in doctrinal and tactical deficiencies. China has no real-time reconnaissance and surveillance capability and its ability to effectively command and control its military forces--particularly in a joint service environment--is practically non-existent. The PLAAF and the PLANAF rarely exercise together. While the PLA and PLAAF reportedly exercise together as do the PLAN and PLANAF, rarely do three or more services exercise jointly. The PLA apparently conducts interservice exercises at the tactical level, but the services are not integrated fully into a cohesive combat force. So-called joint exercises appear to be highly scripted, with little or no free play. Disparate elements train simultaneously and in proximity, but are not controlled at the operational level by a joint commander and staff with interoperable C4I systems and a joint operational plan. There is a paucity of information on how the PLA would integrate IW into a joint operational environment. Apparently only the 2nd Artillery has shown some progress in developing a training regimen which incorporates interaction with other service elements. China is not expected to develop comprehensive joint power projection capabilities for at least the next two decades; as a result, its ability to control a multidimensional battlespace likely will remain limited.

**China is not a military threat to the U.S.**

**PEÑA 2006** (Charles, senior fellow at the Independent Institute, a senior fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, a senior fellow with the George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, an adviser to the Straus Military Reform Project, and an analyst for MSNBC television, antiwar.com, Feb. 16, http://antiwar.com/pena/?articleid=8546)

Certainly, Chinese military developments bear watching, and although many see China as the next great threat, even if China modernizes and expands its strategic nuclear force (as many military experts predict it will), the United States will retain a credible nuclear deterrent with an overwhelming advantage in warheads, launchers, and variety of delivery vehicles. Moreover, China does not possess the sea- or airlift to be able to project its military power and threaten the U.S. homeland. And like Russia, China may not have the wherewithal to compete with and challenge the United States. In 2003, U.S. GDP was almost eight times more than China's ($10.9 trillion vs. $1.4 trillion). China spent fractionally more of its GDP on defense than the United States (3.9 percent vs. 3.7 percent), but in absolute terms the U.S. defense expenditures were seven times that of China's ($404.9 billion vs. $55.9 billion). So China would have to devote one-quarter of its GDP to defense to equal the United States.

# CHINA = PEACEFUL

**History doesn't matter–nuclear weapons and modern threats make China more likely to rise peacefully**

**BRZEZINSKI 2005** (Zbigniew, Counselor at CSIS, Foreign Policy, Jan/Feb, http://www.worldthreats.com/Asia/Clash%20of%20Titans.htm)

As an occasional scholar, I am impressed by the power of theory. But theory—at least in international relations—is essentially retrospective. When something happens that does not fit the theory, it gets revised. And I suspect that will happen in the U.S.-China relationship. We live in a very different world than the one in which hegemonic powers could go to war without erasing each other as societies. The nuclear age has altered power politics in a way that was already evident in the U.S.-Soviet competition. The avoidance of direct conflict in that standoff owed much to weaponry that makes the total elimination of societies part of the escalating dynamic of war. It tells you something that the Chinese are not trying to acquire the military capabilities to take on the United States. How great powers behave is not predetermined. If the Germans and the Japanese had not conducted themselves the way they did, their regimes might not have been destroyed. Germany was not required to adopt the policy it did in 1914 (indeed, German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck followed a very different path). The Japanese in 1941 could have directed their expansionism toward Russia rather than Britain and the United States. For its part, the Chinese leadership appears much more flexible and sophisticated than many previous aspirants to great power status.

**China won't be aggressive–the u.s. deters it and a world without american dominance would be worse for china**

**BRZEZINSKI 2005** (Zbigniew, Counselor at CSIS, Foreign Policy, Jan/Feb, http://www.worldthreats.com/Asia/Clash%20of%20Titans.htm)

How can China push the United States out of East Asia? Or, more pointedly, how can China push the United States out of Japan? And if the United States were somehow pushed out of Japan or decided to leave on its own, what would the Japanese do? Japan has an impressive military program and, in a matter of months, it could have a significant nuclear deterrent. Frankly, I doubt that China could push the United States out of Asia. But even if it could, I don't think it would want to live with the consequences: a powerful, nationalistic, and nuclear-armed Japan. Of course, tensions over Taiwan are the most worrisome strategic danger. But any Chinese military planner has to take into account the likelihood that even if China could overrun Taiwan, the United States would enter the conflict. That prospect vitiates any political calculus justifying a military operation until and unless the United States is out of the picture. And the United States will not be out of the picture for a long, long time.

# A2: USA WILL LOSE

**The U.S. would quickly win a war with China**

**RECORD 2001**

(Jeffrey, professor of strategy and international security at the Air War College, Aerospace Power Journal, Winter, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/win01/record.html)

Primary Sino-American war starters seem to be Chinese aggression against Taiwan and in the South China Sea. Yet, a US defense of Taiwan and of freedom of navigation in the western Pacific would play greatly to America's traditional military strengths while at the same time exploit long-standing Chinese weaknesses. Historically, China's sole strategically impressive war-fighting suit has been the quantity of its ground forces, which counts for little in the pursuit of offshore imperial ambitions. Asserting and maintaining dominance over Taiwan and the South China Sea require mastery of air and naval power—arenas in which the United States is peerless and likely to remain so for decades (assuming no retreat to isolationism plus a determination to maintain both conventional military supremacy and a forward military presence in East Asia—neither to be taken for granted). Chinese naval and air forces are rudimentary by US standards, but perhaps an even greater deficiency is the absence of any modern combat experience. China has not fought a major war since Korea (where US airpower pummeled the PLA), whereas the United States has had a virtual cornucopia of such experience since the end of the Cold War. Practice may not make perfect, but it is surely better than sitting on the military bench for almost half a century. (China's brief and highly restricted invasion of Vietnam in 1979 pitted masses of poorly armed and trained Chinese troops against better-equipped North Vietnamese combat veterans.) Crucial to sound thinking about war with China is recognition that to shift America's primary strategic focus from Europe to Asia is to shift from a predominantly ground-air to a predominantly air-sea theater of operations. Why? Because of the asymmetrical distributions of wealth and power between the two regions. Most of Asia's wealth and power still lies in offshore and peninsular states, whereas in Europe it is concentrated ashore. Thus, maintaining a balance of power in Europe (i.e., preventing Europe's domination by a hostile power) mandated a willingness and capacity to wage ground warfare deeply inland. In contrast, maintaining an Asian balance of power requires performing the simpler task of keeping offshore and peninsular Asia outside a continental hegemon's grasp.9 Large land-warfare operations in the Asian interior are not just unnecessary; they are to be avoided at all costs because they would pit US weaknesses against a continental hegemon's strengths. Even Gen Douglas MacArthur, who in 1951 wanted to expand the Korean War into an air and sea assault on China, declared that "it would be a master folly to contemplate the use of United States ground troops in China," adding that "I can conceive of no strategic or tactical position where I would put in . . . units of American ground troops in continental China."10 In addition to naval and air inferiority, China would approach war with the United States with significant strategic disadvantages. Regionwide suspicion of China's imperial ambitions has deprived Beijing of significant allies and even friends in East Asia, whereas the United States is rich in both. India remains a strategic competitor, and Chinese behavior in the South China Sea has alienated most of Southeast Asia. The post–Cold War rapprochement between China and Russia has not eliminated centuries-old national and racial animosities between the two countries, animosities that can be heightened only by the growth of Chinese economic influence and demographic "aggression" in the RFE. In any event, Russian military power has virtually evaporated in Asia. A robust, land-based strategic nuclear deterrent is the only real asset that Moscow could make available to China in a Sino-American war, but it staggers the mind to imagine that Russia would invite its own destruction on behalf of promoting Chinese interests in East Asia. Finally, a war with the United States could be economically and even politically catastrophic for the communist rulers in Beijing. Unlike the defunct Soviet Union, China has an enormous stake in the international capitalist trading order. Indeed, China's whopping annual trade surpluses with the United States have been indispensable to sustaining China's remarkable economic growth and have provided large amounts of hard currency with which to finance its selective military modernization. A war with the United States would destroy Sino-American commerce (as well as China's lucrative trade with and investment from Taiwan). China's attractiveness as a magnet for foreign capital would cease. The consequent effects of collapsed growth would not be just economic. Because the post-Marxist regime in Beijing has staked so much of its legitimacy on its ability to deliver higher living standards, a war-caused economic depression could topple the government itself.

# A2: CHINESE EXPANSIONISM

**Even if China attacked India, Vietnam or Russia the U.S. would not intervene**

**RECORD 2001** (Jeffrey, professor of strategy and international security at the Air War College, Aerospace Power Journal, Winter, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/win01/record.html)

Chinese military action against Asian mainland states not allied with the United States probably would not occasion a direct, armed US response. Sino-Russian, -Indian, and -Vietnamese war scenarios of the kind that transpired in 1962, 1969, and 1979, respectively, would not directly engage the vital interests of the United States—unless they spilled over into attacks on US forces and allies. Why would the United States intervene in such conflicts? To be sure, it has a general interest in peace and stability on the Asian mainland and a specific interest in deterring nuclear war between other states. But would it go to war to prevent a nuclear exchange between, say, Russia and China? It was certainly not prepared to do so to deter an Indo-Pakistani exchange during the South Asian nuclear-war scare of 1999.

# A2: RUSSIA-CHINA WAR

**Even if China attacked the Russian Far East, the U.S. would not be drawn in**

**RECORD 2001** (Jeffrey, professor of strategy and international security at the Air War College, Aerospace Power Journal, Winter, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/win01/record.html)

What if China began absorbing the RFE? This prospect is certainly plausible. Moscow's control over the RFE has steadily weakened since the Soviet Union's demise; the RFE's economy is fast becoming a subsidiary of China's; and Chinese demographic infiltration of the RFE could eventually raise the issue of the RFE's self-determination in China's favor. Yet, on what basis would the United States intervene against even an overt Chinese invasion of the RFE, and could it intervene effectively? To be sure, China's assumption of control over the RFE's littoral and Siberia's vast, if hard to extract, resources would call for a fundamental reassessment of Chinese intentions and capabilities in Asia—perhaps leading to the creation of new security alliances in South and Southeast Asia and major increases in defense expenditure. But it is difficult to imagine an American war on behalf of Russian attempts to hold on to nineteenth-century czarist territorial gains in the Far East. But for its long-range nuclear missiles, one could consider Russia finished as a great power; in any event, it is highly doubtful that US airpower alone could overturn a Chinese invasion of the RFE. During the Cold War, the United States and its Pacific allies lived with a hostile East Asian mainland littoral stretching from the Bering Sea to the South China Sea. Why should the United States fear Chinese nuclear missiles in the RFE more than it did Soviet missiles there?

**China will never attack the Russian Far East–it would be diplomatic and military suicide**

**MENON 2003** (Rajan, Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, The National Interest, Fall)

By contrast, China's military, which was quite recently a giant horde of foot soldiers, is modernizing steadily-chiefly with Russian weaponry, much of it supplied from cash-starved military industries in Khabarovsk, Komsomol'sk and Vladivostok. It may lag far behind the United States, but in force projection, speed, accuracy and lethality it is a wholly different force than it was a decade ago, thanks to Russian fighter jets, submarines, tanks and missiles, many of them built in the Russian Far East. Yet the chances that China will attempt to conquer Russia's Far East are slim. Such a brazen power play would damage China's wider interests. Taiwan might recoil in terror and treat Beijing's proposals for a negotiated reunification with even greater skepticism and wariness. The prevailing Western rationale for economic engagement with China-that commerce will transform and co-opt that country-would be shredded. China would likely face a counterbalancing, encircling coalition of the United States, India, Japan, Russia and Vietnam. Would such setbacks justify the burdens of ruling the vast, problem-infested Russian Far East? The Chinese leaders know their Sun Tzu: what they seek from the Russian Far East (access to resources and a benign northern front) can be had by means of silk-gloved hegemony. Chinese interests can be served without its formal occupation of the territory. Indeed, what may emerge could be a "reverse Manchurian" scenario, where the Russian Far East remains a titular part of Russia but is increasingly integrated into Beijing's sphere of influence. That is precisely what the conspiracy among geography, demography, power and time may create in Russia's Far East.

# A2: IRAQ COLLAPSE

**Even if Iraq collapsed, it won’t cause terrorism–Iran and Saudi Arabia would contain it**

**BALTIMORE SUN 10-27-2005**

President Bush argues that a U.S. withdrawal would leave Iraq to al-Qaida terrorists who would use it to threaten their neighbors, Europe and the United States. But they are less than 10 percent of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq. And if Iraq fragmented and the United States began withdrawing, virtually all Iraqis and all Iraqi neighbors, including Syria and Iran, would recognize al-Qaida in Iraq as an enemy dedicated to overthrowing them. They would be compelled to prevent it from prevailing in Iraq.

# A2: SPACE MILITARIZATION

**The paranoia over space militarization has started a cycle of foreign reaction in the status quo–all of their impacts are both exaggerated and inevitable**

**USA TODAY 6-13-05**

Is the sanctity of the heavens about to be violated by the United States making a unilateral introduction of aggressive weapons that could spark a destabilizing arms race? Is the White House about to unleash an unprecedented expansion of regions to fight over in the future? You'd be forgiven for thinking so, based on news reports in recent weeks and on complaints from foreign countries such as Russia and China. According to major U.S. newspapers, a wide range of high-tech armaments may soon be approved and funded, with deployment in space only a matter of time. At that point, reluctant foreign nations will feel compelled to "respond in kind," unleashing an expensive and dangerous new arms race. But a sober reality check can put the issue into better perspective. If anything is likely to spark a "new arms race," this time in outer space, it's unlikely to be the usual suspects. Gung-ho space-superiority mantras have been coming from U.S. Air Force leaders for decades, but without funding, it has mostly been just bold talk. Space hardware with weapons-like applications has also been around, on Earth and in space, for decades — but using it to break things in orbit never made much military sense, then or now or in the foreseeable future. Nothing here has changed. No, the impetus for a future foreign "reaction" doesn't need a genuine U.S. "action" — it only needs the near-hysterical ranting from American newspapers, from lobby groups posing as "information centers" but having long-familiar agendas, and from foreign nations eager to score cheap propaganda points. By whipping up anxieties with little rational justification, these self-serving fear mongers may actually lead to the creation of something well worth fearing: the arming of a new battleground, out in space.

**Space weapons have already been deployed–all of their arms race arguments are false**

**USA TODAY 6-13-05**

We've seen it before, nations reacting not to threats but to illusory phantoms, or to badly reasoned deductions. Russia is particularly vulnerable to such manipulation, from the major defensive weapons systems it fielded to counter U.S. armaments that appeared only on the pages of Aviation Week, to scary space hardware it actually built to combat what it saw as "soldier-astronauts" aboard militarized Gemini, Apollo and space shuttle vehicles. In recent years, historians have revealed that Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev bankrupted his country's space program by demanding that his engineers build a copy of NASA's space shuttle because his advisers persuaded him that the United States wanted to use it for bombing Moscow. Aside from the waste, building such hardware created new hazards to everyone involved. Now come the newest stories that echo down the interconnected corridors of the American mainstream media, about "killer satellites" and "death stars" and "Rods from God" bombardment systems — as if the Hollywoodized terminology wasn't a clue that most of the subject matter was equally imaginary. Take the opening paragraph of a recent Christian Science Monitor editorial that denounced what it portrayed as "the possible first-ever overt deployment of weapons where heretofore only satellites and astronauts have gone." But history reveals an entirely different reality. Weapons have occasionally been deployed in space for decades, without sparking mass arms races or hair-trigger tensions. These are not just systems that send warheads through space, such as intercontinental missiles or the proposed global bomber. These are systems that put the weapons into stable orbits, circling Earth, based in space. And these systems were all Russian ones, by the way, most of them predating President Reagan's "Strategic Defense Initiative" to develop an anti-missile system.

**Their space mil arguments are simply naive–orbital physics guarantees that we will continue to rely on land attack forces**

**USA TODAY 6-13-05**

So scary tales about U.S. "death stars" hovering over target countries promising swift strikes from space rely merely on readers not understanding the basics of orbital motion in space. A satellite circles Earth in an ever-shifting path that passes near any particular target only a few times every 24 hours, not every 10 minutes. It's quicker and cheaper to strike ground targets with missiles launched from the ground.

# A2: RUSSIA ATTACKS USA

**Russia will never go to war against the United States–American strategic advantages could bleed the country dry and quickly cripple aggression**

**STRATFOR 2001** (2001 annual forecast, January 1, http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read\_article.php?selected=&id=101197&showForecasts=1&forecasts=1)

Russia, likewise, is grossly unprepared for confrontation with the United States. President Vladimir Putin is only beginning to collect the shards of Russian political, economic, and military power. Russia's population is in decline, swept by alcoholism, low birth rates and epidemics of tuberculosis and AIDS, situations compounded by an effective collapse of the Russian health care system. The Russian military is in shambles.

Abroad, the Putin government is only beginning to see some small successes in the campaign to reassert influence and control over the resource rich and strategically important Central Asian and Caucasus nations. Putin's new campaign to tie Russia's political and economic future to Europe, as a supplier of resources and transportation links to the Far East, has just started to take off. It would take little effort and capital at this time for the United States to bring Russia's nascent recovery to a halt, counter Moscow's initiatives and bleed the country dry.

**Russia is not a military threat to the United States, and couldn’t do it if they tried**

**PEÑA 2006** (Charles, senior fellow at the Independent Institute, a senior fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, a senior fellow with the George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, an adviser to the Straus Military Reform Project, and an analyst for MSNBC television, antiwar.com, Feb. 16, http://antiwar.com/pena/?articleid=8546)

With the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States no longer faces a serious military challenger or global hegemonic threat. And the U.S. military is, by far and away, the most dominant military force on the planet. Russia comes closest to having the capability to be a military threat to the United States, but instead of being a threat to Europe, it now has observer status with NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and, despite having more main battle tanks than the U.S. Army, is no longer considered a threat to sweep through the Fulda Gap to occupy Western Europe. Even if Russia were to change course and adopt a more hostile position, it is not in a position to challenge the United States – either economically or militarily. In 2003, Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) was a little more than a tenth of U.S. GDP ($1.3 trillion vs. $10.9 trillion). And although a larger share of Russia’s GDP was for defense expenditures (4.9 percent vs. 3.7 percent), in absolute terms the United States outspent Russia by more than 6-to-1. So Russia would have to devote more than 20 percent of its GDP to defense – which would exceed what the Soviet Union spent during the height of the Cold War during the 1980s – to equal the United States.

**No impact–Russia won’t attack the U.S.**

**BOSTON HERALD 2000** (Sept 13)

Despite the hard-line mentality of the Russian military, it is inconceivable that Moscow would ever launch a nuclear strike against the United States. It's quite conceivable that China would. Remember when high-ranking Chinese generals threatened Los Angeles, if we decided to interfere with their conquest of Taiwan?

# A2: USA ATTACKS RUSSIA

**The United States will never attack Russia**

**CURRENT DIGEST OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS 9-15-2004**

Ivanov's position would seem to be entirely rational and sound. First of all, it's hard to imagine that, over the next few years, the mood in Washington will swing toward launching a war against Russia. Or even to conceive of some sort of military provocations. Admittedly, we have not exactly become fast friends with Washington over the past decade, but neither do we regard each other as enemies. No US politicians in their right minds are currently thinking in terms of thermonuclear war -- their No. 1 enemy is terrorism. Moreover, what would war against Russia really mean for the Americans? Mass casualties, which would inevitably spell the end of many political careers. And enormous economic costs as well -- after all, the population of a country occupying one sixth of the planet's land mass would need to be fed and maintained somehow or other, and that kind of drain would overcome even the economy of the United States of America.

# NO RUSSIA WAR

**Their arguments are just demonization—Russia is the least war prone of the great powers**

**MANDELBAUM 1999** (Michael, Professor of American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins University; Director, Project on East-West Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, “Transcript: is Major War Obsolete?” Transcript of debate with John Mearsheimer, CFR,

Feb 25, http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/cfr10/)

Prof. Mandelbaum: Can I make two quick comments? First on the subject of Russia, it’s been my observation that almost anything can now be said or believed about Russia, not by somebody like [previous questioner] who knows it well, but somehow we are willing to impute things to Russia that we wouldn’t impute to any other country. It’s a country with troubles, but it’s not on another planet. And furthermore, at this point, no country is less bellicose; anti-war sentiment is nowhere as strong as it is in Russia. I count it as a question mark only because I think the political arrangements and the political culture of Russia are unsettled, but the Russians are not champing at the bit, waiting to jump to wash their boots in the Caspian Sea.

# A2: RUSSIA TARGETS CITIES

**Russia would not target cities—they would target military facilities**

**KEARNY 2003** (Cresson, scientist recruited by Nobel Prize Laureate and Manhattan Project Scientist Eugene Wigner as researcher for civil defense Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Nuclear War Survival Skills, http://www.oism.org/nwss/s73p904.htm)

Myth: A Russian nuclear attack on the United States would completely destroy all American cities.

° Facts: As long as Soviet leaders are rational they will continue to give first priority to knocking out our weapons and other military assets that can damage Russia and kill Russians. To explode enough nuclear weapons of any size to completely destroy American cities would be an irrational waste of warheads. The Soviets can make much better use of most of the warheads that would be required to completely destroy American cities; the majority of those warheads probably already are targeted to knock out our retaliatory missiles by being surface burst or near-surface burst on their hardened silos, located far from most cities and densely populated areas.

# A2: ATTACK ON USA

**Nuclear attack on the U.S. is extremely unlikely–Russia won’t do it and all other countries are vastly outmatched**

**ROTHSTEIN, AUER AND SIEGEL 2004**

(Linda, editor, Catherine, managing editor, and Jonas, assistant editor of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, BAS, November/December, http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art\_ofn=nd04rothstein)

Is an incoming nuclear missile attack plausible? Yes, but unlikely. The Cold War is over, and the ballistic missile threat from nuclear-capable nations is extremely minor. In February 2001, the Defense Intelligence Agency listed Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as "countries of concern" that might someday field long-range, WMD-capable missiles, and Russia and China as nations expanding their long-range missile programs. One presumes Iraq is now off the list. As to Iran and North Korea, both nations have decent missile capabilities, but Iran cannot strike the United States, and most analysts believe the same about North Korea, despite its boasts. On the other hand, North Korea has nuclear material, and Iran is believed to be working toward a nuclear weapons capability. China has a whopping 20 Dong Feng missiles that can reach America. (The United States has close to 6,000 operational strategic nuclear weapons, as the Bulletin's May/June "Nuclear Notebook" reported.) Russia's capabilities are more comparable to America's, and Russia is expanding its capabilities, according to the July/August "Nuclear Notebook," but a planned attack from Moscow is extremely improbable.

# A2: ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH

**No risk of accidental launch–Russia doesn’t rely on deteriorating systems**

**PODVIG 2003** (Pavel, Center for Arms Control Studies, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, FORUM ON PHYSICS & SOCIETY of The American Physical Society, January, http://www.aps.org/units/fps/newsletters/2003/january/article1.cfm)

As we can see, the Russian early-warning network is indeed in a serious decline and cannot provide the Russian strategic forces with the support necessary to exercise the launch-on-warning option. In fact, there is virtually no chance that the system will ever recover to be of any use for launch-on-warning. What is important to note that the system has been constantly losing its capabilities for quite some time now and the Russian military are very well aware of this fact. Given that the Soviet and Russian military have never relied on the early warning system to begin with, it should not have been difficult for them to adjust operations of the strategic forces to completely exclude the deteriorating system from the decision-making process. Further degradation of the early-warning system will only diminish its role and is very unlikely to increase the danger of inadvertent launch.

# NO INDIA-PAKISTAN WAR

**India-Pakistan war won’t happen and won’t escalate even if it does**

**LIMAYE 2003** (Satu, director of research at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, Asia Times, Jan 8, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South\_Asia%5CEA08Df02.html)

Kashmir's dangers and costs are sobering, but should not be overdrawn. Brinksmanship is used by all parties to purpose. Weaker Pakistan ratchets up tensions to gain US pressure on India to negotiate. India uses coercive diplomacy to get US pressure on Pakistan to halt the infiltration of militants. Both seek these ends without war: Pakistan because it might lose; India because it might not win. Each wants the US to hold them back, while pushing their interests forward. Militants use dramatic attacks to loosen India's grip on Kashmir, and warn Pakistan against reducing commitment to their cause. Outsiders use acute tensions to leverage influence. Tensions employed carefully are creative. Outsiders should not be "guided by vanities" that they are the most important bulwark against war. Nor should the negative implications of nuclear war in the subcontinent be exaggerated. Horrific as the humanitarian costs would be, they must be set against the staggering existing humanitarian challenges in the region. Second, many feared that India and Pakistan's 1998 nuclear blasts would unhinge the nuclear order. They did not. Similarly, if India and Pakistan use nuclear weapons, other countries involved in disputes with their neighbors will not necessarily follow. A nuclear war in the subcontinent could give a fillip to nonproliferation efforts. Resolving Kashmir would remove a nuclear flashpoint, but not the capabilities and underlying antagonisms that make nuclear war possible.

# NO BALKAN WAR

**Balkan war won’t happen–regional powers have incentives to cooperate and relations are too solid**

**BURNS 2006** (Nicholas, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State, “Knocking on NATO’s Open Door,” Feb 19, http://zagreb.usembassy.gov/issues/060221.htm)

A decade ago, the countries of Southeast Europe were reeling from the impact of Europe's bloodiest war in half a century. With the determined intervention of NATO, genocide and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia were brought to an end; a few years later in Kosovo, NATO again intervened to end ethnic cleansing in the region. Southeast Europe seemed to some a tangle of intractable inter-ethnic conflicts in which only massive international peacekeeping deployments could keep the warring parties apart. But the United States and its friends in the region looked to tell a different story: one that would require friends to make hard choices for the sake of a peaceful and prosperous future for their people. Today's story is indeed different, in part thanks to the tremendous efforts of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia. The region's nascent democracies have largely normalized their relations. Peacekeeping contingents have downsized, and a return to war is unlikely. The region is not only increasingly stable, but it contributes to international coalitions that work to end conflicts elsewhere. Southeast Europe is on the path to changing from being a consumer to a provider of security. On February 13 in Washington, the United States hosted the Foreign Ministers of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to discuss recent accomplishments of these members of the Adriatic Charter, or "A3." Founded in May 2003, the A3 brings Albania, Croatia and Macedonia into a partnership with the United States to advance their individual and collective candidacies for NATO and other Euro-Atlantic institutions. Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina were present as observers. At the meeting, we reviewed A3 progress on their individual NATO Membership Action Plans, and sought ways to bring NATO membership closer. We also shared lessons learned from deployments in international coalitions. Finally, we recommitted ourselves to our cooperation as friends and, if reforms continue to meet necessary standards, full Allies in the greatest Alliance in history: NATO. Not so long ago, such goals would have been impossible to imagine. The countries of the region have worked hard to gain this new status. With fresh memories of war and dictatorship, the A3 partners share a resolve to strengthen their democratic institutions, market economies and human rights, and to fight corruption and crime. The path to NATO and the European Union promotes a positive cycle of change: the more candidate countries do to pursue reforms required for membership, the more support they get for the accession process. Though difficult, the reforms are key to lasting peace and prosperity in the region.

# NO IRAN WAR

**The U.S. can credibly deter iran**

**POSEN 2006** (Barry, Ford International Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, AlterNet, March 30, http://www.alternet.org/audits/34219/)

Some worry that Iran would be unconvinced by an American deterrent, choosing instead to gamble that the United States would not make good on its commitments to weak Middle Eastern states -- but the consequences of losing a gamble against a vastly superior nuclear power like the United States are grave, and they do not require much imagination to grasp.

**Iranian prolif would not cause arms race**

**POSEN 2006** (Barry, Ford International Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, AlterNet, March 30, http://www.alternet.org/audits/34219/)

A Middle Eastern arms race is a frightening thought, but it is improbable. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, among its neighbors, only Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey could conceivably muster the resources to follow suit. Israel is already a nuclear power. Iranian weapons might coax the Israelis to go public with their arsenal and to draw up plans for the use of such weapons in the event of an Iranian military threat. And if Israel disclosed its nuclear status, Egypt might also find it diplomatically difficult to forswear acquiring nuclear weapons. But Cairo depends on foreign assistance, which would make Egypt vulnerable to the enormous international pressure it would most likely face to refrain from joining an arms race. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has the money to acquire nuclear weapons and technology on the black market, but possible suppliers are few and very closely watched. To develop the domestic scientific, engineering and industrial base necessary to build a self-sustaining nuclear program would take Saudi Arabia years. In the interim, the Saudis would need nuclear security guarantees from the United States or Europe, which would in turn apply intense pressure on Riyadh not to develop its own arms. Finally, Turkey may have the resources to build a nuclear weapon, but as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it relied on American nuclear guarantees against the mighty Soviet Union throughout the cold war. There's no obvious reason to presume that American guarantees would seem insufficient relative to Iran.

**No impact to Iran prolif**

**HARVARD GAZETTE 3-23-06**

(http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2006/03.23/13-iran.html)

"The second set of problems," he said, "are essentially 'bold Iran' problems," which include Iran arming terrorists with nuclear weapons, engaging in "nuclear coercion," or engaging in conventional aggression while imagining that its nuclear capabilities give it a safe umbrella. A nuclear Iran is not likely to do any of these, said Posen, because to do so would put Iran in at least two bull's-eyes - those of the United States and Israel - "and these are the gun sights of some very potent nuclear states." Therefore, he argues, a nuclear Iran is a bad thing and a problem, but a manageable problem.

# NO REGIONAL WAR

**Armed conflict decreasing ---- it’s a trend**

**Marshall, 2008** - Research Prof. Public Policy and Dir. Research Center for Global Policy at George Mason , And Cole , GMU Proffesor ( Monty and Benjamin , “Global Report on Conflict, Governance

and State Fragility 2008” , <http://www.systemicpeace.org/Global%20Report%202008.pdf>)

The Global Report series and its signature State Fragility Index and Matrix first appeared in the March 2007 edition of the Foreign Policy Bulletin.1 It was designed by Monty G. Marshall and Jack Goldstone at the Center for Global Policy, George Mason University, and patterned after the Peace and Conflict series created by Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr in 2001. These global report series were designed to satisfy the imperative for knowing the contrasting conditions characterizing the many states comprising the emerging global system and gauging general system performance in an era of dynamic globalization. The original report published in 2000 sparked controversy within the global policy community with its prescient observation, and presentation of supporting evidence, that “the extent of warfare among and within states lessened by nearly half in the first decade after the [end of the] Cold War.”2 This claim was initially dismissed as either mistaken or misinformed by most officials and analysts in the United Nations Secretariat when it was brought to their attention. The claim clearly challenged the prevailing perception of increasing global disorder and that the world was becoming a more, not less, dangerous place.3 It took several years before critical reaction turned away from examining the claim itself to offering explanations for the global decrease in warfare. In the current Global Report, we continue the original claim by observing that global warfare has remained in decline through 2007 and has diminished by over sixty percent since its peak in the late 1980s. Consistent with the decline in major armed conflicts has been the continuing increase in the number and consolidation of democratic regimes, rising to ninety-four at the end of 2007 (nearly sixty percent of the 162 countries examined in this report). Some cause for concern must also be reported: the number of ongoing armed conflicts may be showing signs of leveling off, the frequency of onsets of new armed conflicts in the world has not decreased substantially since the end of the Cold War in 1991, and the occurrence of “high casualty terrorist bombings” has continued to increase through 2007. It appears that, while world politics have been successful in gaining peaceful settlements to many of the world’s armed conflicts, several long-running wars continue to resist peaceful settlement and new armed conflicts continue to break out regularly.

**Wars and Battle Deaths are decreasing – Best data analysis**

**Russett Et Al 2006 -** Dean Acheson Prof. IR @ Yale U., Editor of Journal of Conflict Resolution and Past President of the International Studies Association, ‘6 ( Bruce , Bethany Lacina, And Nils Petter Gleditsch, “The Declining Risk of Death in Battle” , International Studies Quarterly, <http://www.prio.no/sptrans/564439087/2006bl001.pdf>)

The Correlates of War (COW) data set tracking the incidence and characteristics of interstate, intrastate (civil), and extrastate (often called colonial or imperial) wars is one of the most widely cited sources of conflict data in international relations scholarship. Sarkees, Wayman, and Singer (2003) recently introduced readers of ISQ to an update of this data set through 1997. According to them, the data ‘‘reflect a disquieting constancy in warfare’’ (2003:49) with relatively little change over the past 150 years in the rate at which human lives are being lost to battle. This pessimism is surprising given that the new COW data, in accord with similar conflict monitoring projects (Esty et al. 1998; Gleditsch et al. 2002; Harbom, Ho¨gbladh, and Wallensteen 2006; Marshall and Gurr 2006), find a decrease in the number of armed conflicts in recent years (Sarkees, Wayman, and Singer 2003:Figure 4).1 There has been no direct conventional war between major powers since 1954, and the incidence of interstate war has declined over the past half century. Of course, the number of ongoing armed conflicts is not necessarily proportional to their total cost. It is here the authors make their case, arguing that ‘‘with the risk of death in battle trending neither up nor down since the date of Napoleon’s exile,’’ (Sarkees, Wayman, and Singer 2003:65) warfare is actually shifting between types from imperial wars in the late nineteenth century, to interstate wars in the early 1900s, to civil wars in the post-World War II eraFwhile the global level of battle violence remains relatively constant (Sarkees, Wayman, and Singer 2003:64). Their argument concurs with literature arguing that contemporary civil wars are fundamentally ‘‘new,’’ in that they are driven by primordial ethnic hatreds and are especially vicious compared with conventional wars and ideological internal conflicts (Snow 1996; Duffield 1998; Kaldor 1999; Henderson 2002). We challenge that conclusion by questioning the authors’ interpretation of their own data and by pointing to several irregularities in the COW data. In the first section, we reinterpret the data presented by Sarkees et al., pointing out that their ‘‘flat-line’’ finding is driven primarily by the massive spikes in the middle of their timeline representing the two World Wars. These wars were several orders of magnitude more deadly than any conflicts before or since, and their presence in the regression line obscures other trends. We then discuss problems of consistency in the COW deaths data, leading to a reanalysis of the data on deaths in COW wars. We find that the annual incidence of battle deaths declined in the decades after World War II, and again after the end of the Cold War.2

# NO WAR

**No war --- hard data, economics, democracy, costs and nuclear deterrence**

**Easterbrook,** senior fellow at The New Republic, **05** [Greg, “EXPLAINING 15 YEARS OF DIMINISHING VIOLENCE — The End of War?”, <http://democraticpeace.wordpress.com/2009/05/31/easterbrook-end-of-war/>]

Daily explosions in Iraq, massacres in Sudan, the Koreas staring at each other through artillery barrels, a Hobbesian war of all against all in eastern Congo — combat plagues human society as it has, perhaps, since our distant forebears realized that a tree limb could be used as a club. But here is something you would never guess from watching the news: War has entered a cycle of decline. Combat in Iraq and in a few other places is an exception to a significant global trend that has gone nearly unnoticed — namely that, for about 15 years, there have been steadily fewer armed conflicts worldwide. In fact, it is possible that a person’s chance of dying because of war has, in the last decade or more, become the lowest in human history. Five years ago, two academics — Monty Marshall, research director at the Center for Global Policy at George Mason University, and Ted Robert Gurr, a professor of government at the University of Maryland — spent months compiling all available data on the frequency and death toll of twentieth-century combat, expecting to find an ever-worsening ledger of blood and destruction. Instead, they found, after the terrible years of World Wars I and II, a global increase in war from the 1960s through the mid-’80s. But this was followed by a steady, nearly uninterrupted decline beginning in 1991. They also found a steady global rise since the mid-’80s in factors that reduce armed conflict — economic prosperity, free elections, stable central governments, better communication, more “peacemaking institutions,” and increased international engagement. Marshall and Gurr, along with Deepa Khosla, published their results as a 2001 report, *Peace and Conflict*, for the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland [reports avaiable [here](http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/peace_and_conflict.asp)]. At the time, I remember reading that report and thinking, “Wow, this is one of the hottest things I have ever held in my hands.” I expected that evidence of a decline in war would trigger a sensation. Instead it received almost no notice. “After the first report came out, we wanted to brief some United Nations officials, but everyone at the United Nations just laughed at us. They could not believe war was declining, because this went against political expectations,” Marshall says. Of course, 2001 was the year of September 11. But, despite the battles in Afghanistan, the Philippines, and elsewhere that were ignited by Islamist terrorism and the West’s response, a second edition of *Peace and Conflict*, published in 2003, showed the total number of wars and armed conflicts continued to decline. A third edition of the study, published last week, shows that, despite the invasion of Iraq and other outbreaks of fighting, the overall decline of war continues. This even as the global population keeps rising, which might be expected to lead to more war, not less. In his prescient 1989 book, *Retreat from Doomsday*, Ohio State University political scientist John Mueller, in addition to predicting that the Soviet Union was about to collapse — the Berlin Wall fell just after the book was published — declared that **great-nation war had become “obsolete**” and might never occur again. [A related article by Mueller is [here.](http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/SECSTUD.PDF)] One reason the Soviet Union was about to collapse, Mueller wrote, was that its leaders had structured Soviet society around the eighteenth-century assumption of endless great-power fighting, but great-power war had become archaic, and no society with war as its organizing principle can endure any longer. So far, this theory has been right on the money. It is worth noting that the first emerging great power of the new century, China, though prone to making threatening statements about Taiwan, spends relatively little on its military. Last year Mueller published a follow-up book, *The Remnants of War*, which argues that fighting below the level of great-power conflict — small-state wars, civil wars, ethnic combat, and clashes among private armies — is also waning. *Retreat from Doomsday* and *The Remnants of War* are brilliantly original and urgent books. Combat is not an inevitable result of international discord and human malevolence, Mueller believes. War, rather, is “merely an idea” — and a really bad idea, like dueling or slavery. This bad idea “has been grafted onto human existence” and can be excised. Yes, the end of war has been predicted before, prominently by H.G. Wells in 1915, and horrible bloodshed followed. But could the predictions be right this time? First, the numbers. The University of Maryland studies find the number of wars and armed conflicts worldwide peaked in 1991 at 51, which may represent the most wars happening simultaneously at any point in history. Since 1991, **the number has fallen steadily**. There were 26 armed conflicts in 2000 and 25 in 2002, even after the Al Qaeda attack on the United States and the U.S. counterattack against Afghanistan. By 2004, Marshall and Gurr’s latest study shows, the number of armed conflicts in the world had declined to 20, even after the invasion of Iraq. All told, there were less than half as many wars in 2004 as there were in 1991. Marshall and Gurr also have a second ranking, gauging the magnitude of fighting. This section of the report is more subjective. Everyone agrees that the worst moment for human conflict was World War II; but how to rank, say, the current separatist fighting in Indonesia versus, say, the Algerian war of independence is more speculative. Nevertheless, the *Peace and Conflict* studies name 1991 as the peak post-World War II year for totality of global fighting, giving that year a ranking of 179 on a scale that rates the extent and destructiveness of combat. By 2000, in spite of war in the Balkans and genocide in Rwanda, the number had fallen to 97; by 2002 to 81; and, at the end of 2004, it stood at 65. This suggests the extent and intensity of global combat is now less than half what it was 15 years ago. How can war be in such decline when evening newscasts are filled with images of carnage? One reason fighting seems to be everywhere is that, with the ubiquity of 24-hour cable news and the Internet, we see many more images of conflict than before. As recently as two decades ago, the rebellion in Eritrea occurred with almost no world notice; the tirelessly globe-trotting Robert Kaplan wrote of meeting with Eritrean rebels who told him they hoped that at least spy satellites were trained on their region so that someone, somewhere, would know of their struggle. Today, fighting in Iraq, Sudan, and other places is elaborately reported on, with a wealth of visual details supplied by minicams and even camera-enabled cell phones. News organizations must prominently report fighting, of course. But the fact that we now see so many visuals of combat and conflict creates the impression that these problems are increasing: Actually, it is the reporting of the problems that is increasing, while the problems themselves are in decline. Television, especially, likes to emphasize war because pictures of fighting, soldiers, and military hardware are inherently more compelling to viewers than images of, say, water-purification projects. Reports of violence and destruction are rarely balanced with reports about the overwhelming majority of the Earth’s population not being harmed. Mueller calculates that about 200 million people were killed in the twentieth century by warfare, other violent conflicts, and government actions associated with war, such as the Holocaust. About twelve billion people lived during that century, meaning that a person of the twentieth century had a 1 to 2 percent chance of dying as the result of international war, ethnic fighting, or government-run genocide. A 1 to 2 percent chance, Mueller notes, is also an American’s lifetime chance of dying in an automobile accident. The risk varies depending on where you live and who you are, of course; Mueller notes that, during the twentieth century, Armenians, Cambodians, Jews, kulaks, and some others had a far higher chance of death by war or government persecution than the global average. Yet, with war now in decline, for the moment men and women worldwide stand in more danger from cars and highways than from war and combat. World Health Organization statistics back this: In 2000, for example, 300,000 people died in combat or for war-related reasons (such as disease or malnutrition caused by war), while 1.2 million worldwide died in traffic accidents. That 300,000 people perished because of war in 2000 is a terrible toll, but it represents just .005 percent of those alive in that year. This low global risk of death from war probably differs greatly from most of the world’s past. In prehistory, tribal and small-group violence may have been endemic. Steven LeBlanc, a Harvard University archeologist, asserts in his 2003 book about the human past, *Constant Battles*, that warfare was a steady feature of primordial society. LeBlanc notes that, when the aboriginal societies of New Guinea were first observed by Europeans in the 1930s, one male in four died by violence; traditional New Guinean society was organized around endless tribal combat. Unremitting warfare characterized much of the history of Europe, the Middle East, and other regions; perhaps one-fifth of the German population died during the Thirty Years War, for instance. Now the world is in a period in which less than one ten-thousandth of its population dies from fighting in a year. The sheer number of people who are being harmed by warfare is without precedent. Next consider a wonderful fact: Global military spending is also in decline. Stated in current dollars, annual global military spending peaked in 1985, at $1.3 trillion, and has been falling since, to slightly over $1 trillion in 2004, according to the Center for Defense Information, a nonpartisan Washington research organization. Since the global population has risen by one-fifth during this period, military spending might have been expected to rise. Instead, relative to population growth, military spending has declined by a full third. In current dollars, the world spent $260 per capita on arms in 1985 and $167 in 2004. The striking decline in global military spending has also received no attention from the press, which continues to promote the notion of a world staggering under the weight of instruments of destruction. Only a few nations, most prominently the United States, have increased their defense spending in the last decade. Today, the United States accounts for 44 percent of world military spending; if current trends continue, with many nations reducing defense spending while the United States continues to increase such spending as its military is restructured for new global anti-terrorism and peacekeeping roles, it is not out of the question that, in the future, the United States will spend more on arms and soldiers than the rest of the world combined. Declining global military spending is exactly what one would expect to find if war itself were in decline. The peak year in global military spending came only shortly before the peak year for wars, 1991. There’s an obvious chicken-or-egg question, whether military spending has fallen because wars are rarer or whether wars are rarer because military spending has fallen. Either way, both trend lines point in the right direction. This is an extremely favorable development, particularly for the world’s poor — the less developing nations squander on arms, the more they can invest in improving daily lives of their citizens. What is causing war to decline? The most powerful factor must be the end of the cold war, which has both lowered international tensions and withdrawn U.S. and Soviet support from proxy armies in the developing world. Fighting in poor nations is sustained by outside supplies of arms. To be sure, there remain significant stocks of small arms in the developing world — particularly millions of assault rifles. But, with international arms shipments waning and heavy weapons, such as artillery, becoming harder to obtain in many developing nations, factions in developing-world conflicts are more likely to sue for peace. For example, the long, violent conflict in Angola was sustained by a weird mix of Soviet, American, Cuban, and South African arms shipments to a potpourri of factions. When all these nations stopped supplying arms to the Angolan combatants, the leaders of the factions grudgingly came to the conference table. During the cold war, Marshall notes, it was common for Westerners to say there was peace because no fighting affected the West. Actually, global conflict rose steadily during the cold war, but could be observed only in the developing world. After the cold war ended, many in the West wrung their hands about a supposed outbreak of “disorder” and ethnic hostilities. Actually, both problems went into decline following the cold war, but only then began to be noticed in the West, with confrontation with the Soviet empire no longer an issue. Another reason for less war is the rise of peacekeeping. The world spends more every year on peacekeeping, and peacekeeping is turning out to be an excellent investment. Many thousands of U.N., nato, American, and other soldiers and peacekeeping units now walk the streets in troubled parts of the world, at a cost of at least $3 billion annually. Peacekeeping has not been without its problems; peacekeepers have been accused of paying very young girls for sex in Bosnia and Africa, and nato bears collective shame for refusing support to the Dutch peacekeeping unit that might have prevented the Srebrenica massacre of 1995. But, overall, peacekeeping is working. Dollar for dollar, it is far more effective at preventing fighting than purchasing complex weapons systems. A recent study from the notoriously gloomy rand Corporation found that most U.N. peacekeeping efforts have been successful. Peacekeeping is just one way in which the United Nations has made a significant contribution to the decline of war. American commentators love to disparage the organization in that big cereal-box building on the East River, and, of course, the United Nations has manifold faults. Yet we should not lose track of the fact that the global security system envisioned by the U.N. charter appears to be taking effect. Great-power military tensions are at the lowest level in centuries; wealthy nations are increasingly pressured by international diplomacy not to encourage war by client states; and much of the world respects U.N. guidance. Related to this, the rise in “international engagement,” or the involvement of the world community in local disputes, increasingly mitigates against war. The spread of democracy has made another significant contribution to the decline of war. In 1975, only one-third of the world’s nations held true multiparty elections; today two-thirds do, and the proportion continues to rise. In the last two decades, some 80 countries have joined the democratic column, while hardly any moved in the opposite direction. Increasingly, developing-world leaders observe the simple fact that the free nations are the strongest and richest ones, and this creates a powerful argument for the expansion of freedom. Theorists at least as far back as Immanuel Kant have posited that democratic societies would be much less likely to make war than other kinds of states. So far, this has proved true: Democracy-against-democracy fighting has been extremely rare. Prosperity and democracy tend to be mutually reinforcing. Now prosperity is rising in most of the world, amplifying the trend toward freedom. As ever-more nations become democracies, ever-less war can be expected, which is exactly what is being observed. For the great-power nations, the arrival of nuclear deterrence is an obvious factor in the decline of war. The atomic bomb debuted in 1945, and the last great-power fighting, between the United States and China, concluded not long after, in 1953. From 1871 to 1914, Europe enjoyed nearly half a century without war; the current 52-year great-power peace is the longest period without great-power war since the modern state system emerged. Of course, it is possible that nuclear deterrence will backfire and lead to a conflagration beyond imagination in its horrors. But, even at the height of the cold war, the United States and the Soviet Union never seriously contemplated a nuclear exchange. If it didn’t happen then, it seems unlikely for the future. In turn, lack of war among great nations sets an example for the developing world. When the leading nations routinely attacked neighbors or rivals, governments of emerging states dreamed of the day when they, too, could issue orders to armies of conquest. Now that the leading nations rarely use military force — and instead emphasize economic competition — developing countries imitate that model. This makes the global economy more turbulent, but reduces war. In *The Remnants of War*, Mueller argues that most fighting in the world today happens because many developing nations lack “capable government” that can contain ethnic conflict or prevent terrorist groups, militias, and criminal gangs from operating. Through around 1500, he reminds us, Europe, too, lacked capable government: Criminal gangs and private armies roamed the countryside. As European governments became competent, and as police and courts grew more respected, legitimate government gradually vanquished thug elements from most of European life. Mueller thinks this same progression of events is beginning in much of the developing world. Government and civil institutions in India, for example, are becoming more professional and less corrupt — one reason why that highly populous nation is not falling apart, as so many predicted it would. Interstate war is in substantial decline; if civil wars, ethnic strife, and private army fighting also go into decline, war may be ungrafted from the human experience. Is it possible to believe that war is declining, owing to the spread of enlightenment? This seems the riskiest claim. Human nature has let us down many times before. Some have argued that militarism as a philosophy was destroyed in World War II, when the states that were utterly dedicated to martial organization and violent conquest were not only beaten but reduced to rubble by free nations that initially wanted no part of the fight. World War II did represent the triumph of freedom over militarism. But memories are short: It is unrealistic to suppose that no nation will ever be seduced by militarism again. Yet the last half-century has seen an increase in great nations acting in an enlightened manner toward one another. Prior to this period, the losing sides in wars were usually punished; consider the Versailles Treaty, whose punitive terms helped set in motion the Nazi takeover of Germany. After World War II, the victors did not punish Germany and Japan, which made reasonably smooth returns to prosperity and acceptance by the family of nations. Following the end of the cold war, the losers — the former Soviet Union and China — have seen their national conditions improve, if fitfully; their reentry into the family of nations has gone reasonably well and has been encouraged, if not actively aided, by their former adversaries. Not punishing the vanquished should diminish the odds of future war, since there are no generations who suffer from the victor’s terms, become bitter, and want vengeance. Antiwar sentiment is only about a century old in Western culture, and Mueller thinks its rise has not been given sufficient due. As recently as the Civil War in the United States and World War I in Europe, it was common to view war as inevitable and to be fatalistic about the power of government to order men to march to their deaths. A spooky number of thinkers even adulated war as a desirable condition. Kant, who loved democracy, nevertheless wrote that war is “sublime” and that “prolonged peace favors the predominance of a mere commercial spirit, and with it a debasing self-interest, cowardice and effeminacy.” Alexis De Tocqueville said that war “enlarges the mind of a people.” Igor Stravinsky called war “necessary for human progress.” In 1895, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. told the graduating class of Harvard that one of the highest expressions of honor was “the faith … which leads a soldier to throw away his life in obedience to a blindly accepted duty.” Around the turn of the twentieth century, a counter-view arose — that war is usually absurd. One of the bestselling books of late-nineteenth-century Europe, *Lay Down Your Arms!*, was an antiwar novel. Organized draft resistance in the United Kingdom during World War I was a new force in European politics. England slept during the ’30s in part because public antiwar sentiment was intense. By the time the U.S. government abolished the draft at the end of the Vietnam War, there was strong feeling in the United States that families would no longer tolerate being compelled to give up their children for war. Today, that feeling has spread even to Russia, such a short time ago a totalitarian, militaristic state. As average family size has decreased across the Western world, families have invested more in each child; this should discourage militarism. Family size has started to decrease in the developing world, too, so the same dynamic may take effect in poor nations. There is even a chance that the ascent of economics to its pinnacle position in modern life reduces war. Nations interconnected by trade may be less willing to fight each other: If China and the United States ever fought, both nations might see their economies collapse. It is true that, in the decades leading up to World War I, some thought rising trade would prevent war. But today’s circumstances are very different from those of the Fin de siècle [turn of the century]. Before World War I, great powers still maintained the grand illusion that there could be war without general devastation; World Wars I and II were started by governments that thought they could come out ahead by fighting. Today, no major government appears to believe that war is the best path to nationalistic or monetary profit; trade seems much more promising. The late economist Julian Simon proposed that, in a knowledge-based economy, people and their brainpower are more important than physical resources, and thus the lives of a country’s citizens are worth more than any object that might be seized in war. Simon’s was a highly optimistic view — he assumed governments are grounded in reason — and yet there is a chance this vision will be realized. Already, most Western nations have achieved a condition in which citizens’ lives possess greater economic value than any place or thing an army might gain by combat. As knowledge-based economics spreads throughout the world, physical resources may mean steadily less, while life means steadily more. That’s, well, enlightenment. In his 1993 book, *A History of Warfare*, the military historian John Keegan recognized the early signs that combat and armed conflict had entered a cycle of decline. War “may well be ceasing to commend itself to human beings as a desirable or productive, let alone rational, means of reconciling their discontents,” Keegan wrote. Now there are 15 years of positive developments supporting the idea. Fifteen years is not all that long. Many things could still go badly wrong; there could be ghastly surprises in store. But, for the moment, the trends have never been more auspicious: Swords really are being beaten into plowshares and spears into pruning hooks. The world ought to take notice.

# NO WAR

**Major war is obsolete—conflicts between great powers will not happen**

**MANDELBAUM 99** (Michael Mandelbaum is Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC; and Director, Project on East-West Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, New York Survival, Winter 1998-99)

Political, social and technological trends that began or have accelerated in the twentieth century have made major war obsolete by raising its costs while reducing the incentives for waging it. Major war is obsolete in the way that styles of dress are obsolete: it is something that is out of fashion and, while it could be revived, there is no present demand for it. Major war is obsolete in the way that slavery, duelling or foot-binding are obsolete: it is a social practice that was once considered normal, useful - even desirable - but that now seems odious." It is obsolete in the way that the central planning of economic activity is obsolete: it is a practice once regarded as a plausible, indeed a superior way of achieving a socially desirable goal, but that changing conditions have made ineffective at best, counter-productive at worst. It is possible that not only major war - protracted struggles among great powers with revolutionary consequences for international politics - but even modern war - the use of mechanised weapons in formal battles between the professional armed forces of sovereign states - is dying out. The toll that modem weapons extract and the diminishing benefits their use seems likely to bring, which are potent factors in the foreign policies of the great powers, must weigh on the calculations of the lesser ones as well.32 True, Washington is even now preparing to fight two modern wars. The precedents for the two 'major regional contingencies' that form the basis for post-Cold War US military planning are wars the US fought in Korea in the early IgS and in the Persian Gulf in 1991. Not coincidentally, the regimes against which the US went to war on those occasions remain in power in both places. But neither North Korea's Kim I1 Sung nor Iraq's Saddam Hussein believed, when they launched the attack that began each war, that it would lead to a military confrontation with the US, and it is unlikely that either regime is eager to repeat the experience. Warlessness may still be unknown on the Korean Peninsula and in the Middle East, but there is no reason to doubt that deterrence has put down roots in both places.

**Major war is impossible—no motive**

**MANDELBAUM 99**

(Michael Mandelbaum is Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC; and Director, Project on East-West Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, New York Survival, Winter 1998-99)

One recurring motive for armed conflict has been economic gain. War may have begun as a contest for resources, with settled agricultural communities organising the first armed forces to defend themselves against nomadic raiders.' Over the centuries, princes have ordered wars to swell their treasuries and men have fought them to collect loot. War often was, and even more often was thought to be, a paying proposition. It is no more. Ironically, the most elaborate theory imputing major war to economic motives, Lenin's theory of imperialism, was developed just at the time when war was becoming an indisputably loss-making enterprise? Well into the twentieth century, Lenin's doctrine, and the general proposition on which it rests, commanded belief. Now no one believes it.9 Beliefs themselves, of the kind that sent armies into battle in the past, are lacking or are far weaker in the societies now capable of waging major war. Religious beliefs caused considerable bloodshed within and between sovereign states in European history. In most of Europe today, they have lost the motivating power they once commanded - Northern Ireland and former Yugoslavia being two conspicuous exceptions. Over the last two centuries, the political role once played by religion has been usurped by secular creeds. The most militant of these in the second half of the twentieth century, Marxism-Leninism, is now deflated, deprived of power, credibility and active adherents everywhere. Virtually no one is now prepared even to live under orthodox communism, much less die for it. This is not to say that ideology is dead. To the contrary, the ideology that competed with and vanquished Marxism-Leninism is alive, triumphant and on the march. But that ideology, liberalism, and the form of government that embodies it, democracy, do not lend themselves to wars of conversion. Their spread, in fact, contributes to the process of debellicisation. Historically, men have fought not only for gold and glory, but also for honour. Honour was a principal cause of conflict among the ancient Greeks: Homer's Iliad, a story well known to all of them, is a catalogue of insults received and avenged. In one form, this motive has persisted into the twentieth century: surveys of combat solders have shown that their reasons for performing their assigned tasks in battle are largely personal. They fight to avoid disgrace in the eyes of their comrades. But honour no longer animates the decisions of modern governments to put their armies in harm's way. The twentieth-century political motivation for war that comes closest to the honour of ancient and medieval times is credibility; but credibility involves considerations of self-defence, not the vindication of moral principles.

# NO WAR

**No great power warfare --- nuclear weapons, economics and globalization**

**Deudney,** **prof**essor of **poli**tical **sci**ence at **John Hopkins et al, 09** [Daniel, and John Ikenberry, professor of international affairs at Princeton, Foreign Affairs, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63721/daniel-deudney-and-g-john-ikenberry/the-myth-of-the-autocratic-revival>]

This bleak outlook is based on an exaggeration of recent developments and ignores powerful countervailing factors and forces. Indeed, contrary to what the revivalists describe, the most striking features of the contemporary international landscape are the intensification of economic globalization, thickening institutions, and shared problems of interdependence. The overall structure of the international system today is quite unlike that of the nineteenth century. Compared to older orders, the contemporary liberal-centered international order provides a set of constraints and opportunities-of pushes and pulls-that **reduce the likelihood of severe conflict** while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving. Those invoking the nineteenth century as a model for the twenty-first also fail to acknowledge the extent to which war as a path to conflict resolution and great-power expansion has become largely obsolete. Most important, nuclear weapons have transformed great-power war from a routine feature of international politics into an exercise in national suicide. With all of the great powers possessing nuclear weapons and ample means to rapidly expand their deterrent forces, warfare among these states has truly become an option of last resort. The prospect of such great losses has instilled in the great powers a level of caution and restraint that effectively precludes major revisionist efforts. Furthermore, the diffusion of small arms and the near universality of nationalism have severely limited the ability of great powers to conquer and occupy territory inhabited by resisting populations (as Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now Iraq have demonstrated). Unlike during the days of empire building in the nineteenth century, states today cannot translate great asymmetries of power into effective territorial control; at most, they can hope for loose hegemonic relationships that require them to give something in return. Also unlike in the nineteenth century, today the density of trade, investment, and production networks across international borders raises even more the costs of war. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan, to take one of the most plausible cases of a future interstate war, would pose for the Chinese communist regime daunting economic costs, both domestic and international. Taken together, these changes in the economy of violence mean that the international system is far more primed for peace than the autocratic revivalists acknowledge.

**Zero risk of great power war**

**Walt**, Professor of IR Harvard, **09** [“Another "Axis" to grind The dangers of glibness”, <http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/02/20/another_axis_to_grind_the_dangers_of_a_glib_but_misleading_label>]

In his [introduction](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4681), Niall Ferguson suggests that these current troubles share the same features that ignited World War II: ethnic distintegration, economic volatility, and empires in decline. This claim makes the situation sound alarming, but the good news is that an even more important ingredient is missing. Today, there are no territorially expansionist and highly risk-acceptant great powers like Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan, countries that combined significant military power with deeply revisionist ambitions. Ironically, the main revisionist power in recent years has been the United States, which spent the past 15 years expanding NATO into Eastern Europe and then tried to "transform" the Middle East and Persian Gulf by force. Yet even George W. Bush didn't seek to redraw borders the way that Hitler or Tojo did. For the foreseeable future, **the danger of a global conflagration is minimal**.

**The frequency and intensity of war is decreasing now**

**Mueller**, a professor of political science at Ohio State University, **09** [John, Political Science Quarterly, “War Has Almost Ceased to Exist:

An Assessment”, http://tigger.uic.edu/~bvaler/Mueller%20War%20Dead.pdf]

THE PRESENT CONDITION No matter how defined, then, there has been a most notable **decline in the frequency of wars** over the last years. As Table 1 suggests, between 2002 and 2008, few wars really shattered the 1,000 battle or battle-related death threshold.37 Beyond the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, violent flare-ups have exceeded the yearly battle death threshold during the period in Kashmir, Nepal, Colombia, Burundi, Liberia, Chechnya, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Chad, Somalia, Pakistan and Uganda. Almost all of these have just barely done so. Indeed, if the yearly threshold were raised to a not-unreasonable 3,000, almost the only war of any kind that has taken place anywhere in the world since 2001 would be the one in Iraq. Several of these intermittent armed conflicts could potentially rise above the violence threshold in the future, though outside of Afghanistan, most of these seem to be declining in violence. Ethiopia and Eritrea continue to glare at each other, and plenty of problems remain in the Middle East, where in 2006and again in 2009, Israel took on a substate group based in another country, and where the Iraq conflict could have spillover effects. And, of course, new wars could emerge in other places: concerns about China and the Taiwan issue, for example, are certainly justified, and many in the developed world advocate the application of warfare as a last resort to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by undesirable countries.38 Moreover, there has been “intercommunal” or “substate” violence in countries like Nigeria (and Iraq) that often certainly resembles warfare, but is removed from consideration here by the definitional requirement that something labeled a “war” must have a government on at least one side. However, war, as conventionally, even classically, understood, has, at least for the time being, become a remarkably rare phenomenon. Indeed, if civil war becomes (or remains) as uncommon as the international variety, **war could be on the verge of ceasing to exist as a substantial phenomenon.**

# NO WAR

**Great power war is obsolete**

**Mueller**, a professor of political science at Ohio State University, **09** [John, Political Science Quarterly, “War Has Almost Ceased to Exist:

An Assessment”, http://tigger.uic.edu/~bvaler/Mueller%20War%20Dead.pdf]

RESPONSES Many people still consider war to be normal and an inevitable part of international and domestic life. Effectively, even if they accept the trend I have outlined as genuine, they are inclined to see it simply as a readily reversible blip. As one commentator put it to me, “You may be right, but I still have faith in my fellow man.” And of course, I have no way to be certain that the trend in warfare, particularly civil warfare, will continue on its notable, but only rather recent, downward trajectory. After all, Gooch was writing in a period when international war was quite rare and seemed to be becoming even more so, and there were other periods of comparative quiet in the century before World War I.62 Perhaps we have today slumped only temporarily into a similar sort of hiatus even as hideous explosions await us around the corner. Indeed, Colin Gray has recently published a book, Another Bloody Century, confidently asserting that war “will always be with us,” that it “is a permanent feature of the human condition,” and that “interstate war, including great power conflict, is very much alive and well.”63 Nevertheless, the incredible, completely unprecedented, and now remarkably long-term absence, or near-absence, of international war in Europe, that once most warlike of continents, suggests that something new may indeed be afoot. Moreover, the relatively peaceful periods in Europe before 1914 were far shorter than the present one, and they were accompanied, as noted earlier, by routine and profuse fulminations about the glories and the sublime benefits of war. Also significant is the near-absence for the last few decades of international wars in which states directly go after each other in the classic manner over matters of dispute such as territory. Moreover, the frequency of civil war, far the most common form of warfare over the last half-century, has now remained at low levels for several years. Although it is obviously far too soon to be completely confident that these levels will continue, there does not seem to be a large number of countries about to descend into internal armed conflict.64 At base, it may turn out that war is merely an idea, an institution that has been grafted onto human existence, rather than a trick of fate, a thunderbolt from hell, a natural calamity, a systemic necessity, or a desperate plot contrivance dreamed up by some sadistic puppeteer up high. And the institution may be in pronounced decline, as attitudes toward it have changed, roughly following the pattern according to which the ancient and once-formidable institution of formal, state-sponsored slavery became discredited and then obsolete. All this could conceivably come about without changing human nature; without creating an effective world government or system of international law; without modifying the nature of the state or the nation-state; without expanding international trade, interdependence, or communication; without fabricating an effective moral or practical equivalent to war; without enveloping the earth in democracy or prosperity; without devising ingenious agreements to restrict arms or the arms industry; without reducing the worldʼs considerable store of hate, selfishness, nationalism, religious intolerance, and racism; without increasing the amount of love, justice, or inner peace in the world; without altering the international system; without establishing security communities; without improving the competence of political leaders; and without doing much of anything about nuclear weapons. Even if war fades, however, all sorts of other calamities will persist: the decline of war hardly means that everything will be perfect. Indeed, the one-sided violence committed by predatory militia bands in places like Sudan and Congo can cause more damage and suffering than many wars. But since these bands rarely fight each other—that is, they mostly manage to avoid twosided violence—the resulting destruction does not constitute warfare by the definition applied in this article. In addition, crime will still exist, and so will terrorism, which, like crime, can be carried out by individuals or by very small groups.65 Indeed, if policing wars are in decline, criminals may take advantage of the situation and expand their predations; whether any such developments cumulate to the point where the situation could be considered warfare would be determined primarily by the response of governments. And, of course, there will certainly be plenty of other problems to worry about—famine, disease, malnutrition, pollution, corruption, poverty, politics, economic travail, and the potential for climate change. Moreover, violent intercommunal warfare remains, as noted, rather extensive, a costly phenomenon that is excluded from my definition of war through its requirement that a government be one of the parties in the armed conflict. But a continuing decline in war does seem to be a fairly reasonable prospect. And it may be at least time to begin to consider not so much that we “ainʼt gonna study war no more,” but rather that, as with formal dueling, as Gooch rather prematurely suggested a hundred years ago, war, as classically defined, may be in the process of becoming a matter mainly of historical interest.

# NO WAR

**Even inflated threat perceptions and miscalculation will not result in war—there are multiple disincentives to major war and nothing to gain**

**MUELLER 1988**

(John, Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester, International Security, Fall)

The argument thus far leads to the conclusion that stability is overdetermined—that the postwar situation contains redundant sources of stability. The United States and the Soviet Union have been essentially satisfied with their lot and, fearing escalation to another costly war, have been quite willing to keep their conflicts limited. Nuclear weapons may well have enhanced this stability—they are certainly dramatic reminders of how horrible a big war could be. But it seems highly unlikely that, in their absence, the leaders of the major powers would be so unimaginative as to need such reminding. Wars are not begun out of casual caprice or idle fancy, but because one country or another decides that it can profit from (not simply win) the war—the combination of risk, gain, and cost appears preferable to peace. Even allowing considerably for stupidity, ineptness, miscalculation, and self-deception in these considerations, it does not appear that a large war, nuclear or otherwise, has been remotely in the interest of the essentially-contented, risk-averse, escalation-anticipating powers that have dominated world affairs since 1945. It is conceivable of course that the leadership of a major power could be seized by a lucky, clever, risk-acceptant, aggressive fanatic like Hitler; or that an unprecedentedly monumental crisis could break out in an area, like Central Europe, that is of vital importance to both sides; or that a major power could be compelled toward war because it is consumed by desperate fears that it is on the verge of catastrophically losing the arms race. It is not obvious that any of these circumstances would necessarily escalate to a major war, but the existence of nuclear weapons probably does make such an escalation less likely; thus there are imaginable circumstances under which it might be useful to have nuclear weapons around. In the world we’ve actually lived in, however, those extreme conditions haven’t come about, and they haven’t ever really even been in the cards. This enhancement of stability is, therefore, purely theoretical—extra insurance against unlikely calamity.

**Major war is obsolete—there won’t be nuclear wars or even great power wars like World War Two**

**MUELLER 1988** (John, Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester, International Security, Fall)

In the second part, these notions are broadened to a discussion of stability in the postwar world. It is concluded that there may be a long-term trend away from war among developed countries and that the long peace since World War II is less a peculiarity of the nuclear age than the logical conclusion of a substantial historical process. Seen broadly, deterrence seems to be remarkably firm; major war—a war among developed countries, like World War II or worse—is so improbably as to be obsolescent; imbalances in weapons systems are unlikely to have much impact on anything except budgets; and the nuclear arms competition may eventually come under control not so much out of conscious design as out of atrophy born of boredom.

**The memory of World War II deters major war**

**MUELLER 1988** (John, Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester, International Security, Fall)

THE MEMORY OF WORLD WAR II. A nuclear war would certainly be vastly destructive, but for the most part nuclear weapons simply compound and dramatize a military reality that by 1945 had already become appalling. Few with the experience of World War II behind them would contemplate its repetition with anything other than horror. Even before the bomb had been perfected, world war had become spectacularly costly and destructive, killing some 50 million worldwide. As former Secretary of State Alexander Haig put it in 1982: “The catastrophic consequences of another world war—with or without nuclear weapons—make deterrence our highest objective and our only rational military strategy.”

# NO WAR

**Major war is extremely unlikely—many reasons**

**MANDELBAUM 99** (Michael Mandelbaum is Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC; and Director, Project on East-West Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, New York Survival, Winter 1998-99)

Major war is not impossible. None of the countries that would take part in another major conflict has renounced war entirely; indeed, all are prepared to fight. A major war is unlikely but not unthinkable. There are still people charged with the responsibility for waging such a conflict and they continue to think about it. But it is obsolete in the sense that it is no longer in fashion. It is obsolete in the sense that it no longer serves the purpose for which it was designed. It has gone out of fashion not through any decree or ruling, but rather as the result of trends and developments that are not under the control of any agency or authority. To obsolesce is an intransitive verb. Obsolescence is not imposed or created by anyone or anything; it happens. In the case of major war, the signs that obsolescence is happening are abundant. The trend began while the most recent major war was still under way. The Cold War lacked a central feature of its three predecessors: direct battles between and among the belligerent powers. Since it ended, the trend toward obsolescence has gathered momentum. Major war is talked and written about less than before. Articles, essays, books, lectures and symposia are more likely to study the global economy than global warfare. Crises in Europe and Asia are economic rather than military in nature. The shift has apparently also made an impression on the vast majority of the world's inhabitants who do not read articles or attend conferences on international affairs. In the summer of 1998, as in other summers, the US film industry sought to appeal to what is evidently a broad interest in, and presumably fear of, the Earth's destruction. Hollywood, whose economic viability depends on accurately gauging the global Zeitgeist, offered two motion pictures with a contemporary version of the apocalypse as their theme. In the films Deep Impact and Armageddon, however, the threat of total destruction came not, as in previous examples of the genre, from major war waged with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Rather, it came from the random workings of the cosmos, in the forms, respectively, of an asteroid and a meteor rushing towards Earth that must be destroyed or deflected by heroic measures if life as we know it is to continue. Major war is apparently no longer plausible enough to serve as the premise of a major motion picture, which is one sure sign of obsolescence at work. Yet another sign is the appearance of a term to describe the trends that contribute to it: debellicisation.l Unlike the word that is perhaps closest to being a synonym - 'warlessness' - its Latin root gives debellicisation a solid, scientific aura, like a newly discovered species of plant or element of the periodic table. And while warlessness implies an achieved condition, debellicisation suggests an ongoing process. This is appropriate because, with the Cold War extinct for less than a decade, and with aversion to war less firmly rooted in some places than in others - and not irreversible anywhere - it is probably premature to pronounce major war terminally out of fashion.2 Plainly, though, it is going out of fashion; if it is not yet fully obsolete, it is certainly obsolescent. Why is this so? Two reasons are particularly important: a dramatic increase in the price, in terms of property and human lives, of fighting a major war; and a steep decline in the rewards of winning one.

**Great power wars won’t occur and conflicts won’t escalate**

**PIETRZYK 2001** (Mark, instructor in political science at Benedictine University in Lisle, International Journal of world peace, September 1)

The end of the Cold War has brought about a renewed debate over competing theoretical traditions in the study of international relations. Realism and so-called Neo-Realism, which formerly dominated the discipline, appear to be increasingly unhelpful in explaining broad trends in international politics today Contrary to fears that the collapse of the bi-polar order would result in large-scale instability the contemporary international system is characterized by a high degree of peace and cooperation among the major developed powers. Certainly, the developing world still contains a good deal of strife, but even here, great power cooperation has often had the effect of checking and moderating such conflicts so that they do not spin out of control. The type of great power conflicts which led to major wars in the past are hardly to be found today, and international cooperative institutions such as the United Nations and the European Community appear to be growing in effectiveness. Traditional realist notions of na tional interest, power-seeking among states, and pervasive competition and conflict are inadequate to account for these developments.

**Costs have risen and benefits shrunk – war doesn’t resolve modern disputes, destroys gains from the security community**

**Jervis 2002** - Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics, Columbia University**,**

(Robert, , “Theories of War in an Era of Leading Power Peace”. American Political Science Review 96:1–14.)

My explanation for the development and maintenance of the Community combines and reformulates several factors discussed previously. Even with the qualifications just discussed, a necessary condition is the belief that conquest is difficult and war is terribly costly. When conquest is easy, aggression is encouraged and the security dilemma operates with particular viciousness as even defensive states need to prepare to attack (Van Evera 1999). But when states have modern armies and, even more, nuclear weapons, it is hard for anyone to believe that war could make sense. Of course statesmen must consider the gains that war might bring as well as its costs. Were the former to be very high, they might outweigh the latter. But, if anything, the expected benefits of war within the Community have declined, in part because the developed countries, including those that lost World War II, are generally satisfied with the status quo.16 Even in the case that shows the greatest strain-U.S.-Japanese relations-no one has explained how a war could pro- vide anyone much gross, let alone net, benefit: it is hard to locate a problem for which war among the Community members would provide a solution. The other side of this coin is that, as liberals have stressed, peace within the Community brings many gains, especially economic. While some argue that the disruption caused by relatively free trade is excessive and urge greater national regulation, no one thinks that conquering others would bring more riches than trad- ing with them. Despite concern for relative economic gain (Grieco 1990; Mastanduno 1991) and economic disputes, people believe that their economic fates are linked more positively than negatively to the rest of the Community.

# NO WAR

**Fear of conventional escalation checks war**

**MUELLER 1988** (John, Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester, International Security, Fall)

THE BELIEF IN ESCALATION. Those who started World Wars I and II and so not because they felt that costly wars of attrition were desirable, but because they felt that escalation to wars of attrition could be avoided. In World War I the offensive was believed to be dominant, and it was widely assumed that conflict would be short and decisive. In World War II, both Germany and Japan experienced repeated success with bluster, short wars in peripheral areas, and blitzkrieg, aided by the counterproductive effects of their opponents’ appeasement and inaction. World war in the post-1945 era has been prevented not so much by visions of nuclear horror as by the generally-accepted belief that conflict can easily escalate to a level, nuclear or not, that the essentially satisfied major powers would find intolerably costly.

**Even without nuclear deterrence there would be no major war—the memory of World War Two, superpower contentment, and the fear of conventional escalation check**

**MUELLER 1988** (John, Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester, International Security, Fall)

The postwar world might well have turned out much the same even in the absence of nuclear weapons. Without them, world war would have been discouraged by the memory of World War II, by superpower contentment with the postwar status quo, by the nature of Soviet ideology, and by the fear of escalation. Nor do the weapons seem to have been the crucial determinants of Cold War developments, of alliance patters, or of the way the major powers have behaved in crises.

**Nuclear and conventional deterrence are each sufficient to deter major war**

**MUELLER 1988** (John, Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester, International Security, Fall)

To be clear: None of this is meant to deny that the sheer horror of nuclear war is impressive and mind-concentratingly dramatic, particularly in the speed with which it could bring about massive destruction. Nor is it meant to deny that decision-makers, both in times of crisis and otherwise, are fully conscious of how horribly destructive a nuclear war could be. It is simply to stress that the sheer horror of repeating World War II is not all that much less impressive or dramatic, and that powers essentially satisfied with the status quo will strive to avoid anything that they feel could lead to either calamity. World War II did not cause total destruction in the world, but it did utterly annihilate the three national regimes that brought it about. It is probably quite a bit more terrifying to think about a jump from the 50th floor than about a jump from the 5th floor, but anyone who finds life even minimally satisfying is extremely unlikely to do either.

**Their evidence is biased – signifies a refusal of scholars to admit that war is outdated**

**FETTWEIS 2006** Christopher J.(National Security Decision Making Department) US Naval War College International Studies Review 8, 677–697 4. ASP

Mueller (1995:14) described the tendency of people to romanticize the past, elevating prior ages over the present, even if today for the first time there is no danger of major, cataclysmic war. Human beings have a tendency to look backward with misty eyes, to see the past as much more benign, simple, and innocent than it really was. . . . That is, no matter how much better the present gets, the past gets better in reflection, and we are, accordingly, always notably worse off than we used to be. Golden ages, thus, do happen, but we are never actually in them: they are always back there somewhere (or, sometimes, in the ungraspable future). ‘‘As big problems . . . become resolved,’’ Mueller (1995:8) argues, ‘‘we tend to elevate smaller ones, sometimes by redefinition or by raising standards, to take their place.’’ Today a golden age of peace may well be dawning, but human nature might make it impossible for both citizens and scholars to appreciate its benefits. Widespread recognition of fundamental changes in state behavior often occurs slowly. After all, long-held beliefs take time to change. Too many analysts have made deep emotional and intellectual investments based upon assumptions of static and unchanging behavior across regions and eras for there to be much rapid evolution in IR theory. In this case, the international system may be demonstrating a potential to change greater than that of the scholars who spend their lives observing it. But one point seems incontrovertible: if, indeed, major war has become obsolete, then the field of IR cannot remain simultaneously unchanged and accurate. The implications of great power peace would be hard to overestimate. In fact, only a few observers inside and outside the academy seem to have grasped the possibility that the world stands at the edge of such a golden age, terrorist incidents notwithstanding. ‘‘Here at the end of the 20th century,’’ the late historian Stephen Ambrose (1999) argued toward the end of his life, ‘‘we once again live in a time where it is possible to believe in progress, to believe that things will get better.’’ ‘‘Things’’ have gotten better for the vast majority of the world’s people, a higher percentage of whom live in peace than at any time in history. And most importantly, none are experiencing major war. For the first time in history, it is possible to believe they never will.

# NO WAR

**Major war even on the scale of World War II will never happen again—the trend of stability is increasing**

**MUELLER 1988** (John, Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester, International Security, Fall)

It seems reasonable, though perhaps risky, to extrapolate from this trend and to suggest that, whatever happens with crisis stability in the future, general stability is here to stay for quite some time. That is, major war—war among developed countries—seems so unlikely that it may well be appropriate to consider it obsolescent. Perhaps World War II was indeed the war to end war—at least war of that scale and type.

**There is a general trend away from great power war—major war is now unthinkable**

**MUELLER 1988**

(John, Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester, International Security, Fall)

Since 1945 the major nuclear powers have stayed out of war with each other, but equally interesting is the fact that warfare of all sorts seems to have lost its appeal within the developed world. With only minor and fleeting exceptions (the Falklands War of 1982, the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia), there have been no wars among the 48 wealthiest countries in all that time. Never before have so many well-armed countries spent so much time not using their arms against each other. This phenomenon surely goes well beyond the issue of nuclear weapons; they have probably been no more crucial to the non-war between, say, Spain and Italy than they have been to the near-war between Greece and Turkey or to the small war between Britain and Argentina. Consider the remarkable cases of France and Germany, important countries which spent decades and centuries either fighting each other or planning to do so. For this age-old antagonism, World War II was indeed the war to end war. Like Greece and Turkey, they certainly retained the creativity to discover a motivation for war if they had really wanted to, even under an over-arching superpower balance; yet they have now lived side-by-side for nearly half a century, perhaps with some bitterness and recrimination, but without even a glimmer of war fever. They have become Hollandized with respect to one another. The case of Japan is also instructive: another formerly aggressive major power seems now to have embraced fully the virtues and profits of peace. The existence of nuclear weapons also does not help very much to explain the complete absence since 1945 of civil war in the developed world (with the possible exception of the 1944-49 Greek civil war, which could be viewed instead as an unsettled carryover of World War II). The sporadic violence in Northern Island or the Basque region of Spain has not really been sustained enough to be considered civil war, nor have the spurts of terrorism carried out by tiny bands of self-styled revolutionaries elsewhere in Western Europe. Except for the case of Hungary in 1956, Europeans under Soviet domination have not (so far) resorted to major violence, no matter how desperate their disaffection. By one count, 43 civil wars (in addition to scores of anti-colonial wars, bloody coups, communal conflicts, and wars between regions of a country) were begun between 1945 and 1980; none of these civil wars occurred in the developed world. As a form of activity, war in the developed world may be following once-fashionable dueling into obsolescence: the perceived wisdom, value, and efficacy of war may have moved gradually toward terminal disrepute. Where war was often casually seen as beneficial, virtuous, progressive, and glorious, or at least as necessary or inevitable, the conviction has now become widespread that war in the developed world would be intolerably costly, unwise, futile, and debased.

**War is going away – nuclear weapons, democratization, economic links**

**Steel 1997 -** professor of international relations at the University of Southern California

(Ronald, author, essayist, and professor of international relations at the University of Southern California, member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies." “A new realism. (concept of national security)” World Policy Journal)

While I would not go so far as to argue that nuclear proliferation is a good thing because it tempers hotheads who might otherwise go to war, the fact is that the possession of nuclear weapons has probably saved Israel and dissuaded India and Pakistan from open war. They are also likely to restrain China in its pursuit of great power status, and also other states that contest its right to do so. There are other reasons why war among major states may be less likely in the future. One is that industrial societies, under the pressures of economic competition and innovation, are perforce becoming more democratic. Democratic states, while not necessarily peace-prone, are harder to arouse to war against other democratic states than are authoritarian ones. A further, and to my mind more compelling, reason is that the great trading states--those with the capacity to fight major wars--have become far more interdependent than in the past. This is one beneficial result of the global economy. With these economic links come a whole chain of other dependencies, all of which make war more self-defeating than in the past.

# NO WAR

**Economic interdependence, socio-economic conditions, and nuclear deterrence. these checks on conflict are irreversible.**

**FETTWEIS 2006** Christopher J.(National Security Decision Making Department) US Naval War College International Studies Review 8, 677–697 4. ASP

However, one need not be convinced about the potential for ideas to transform international politics to believe that major war is extremely unlikely to recur. Mueller, Mandelbaum, Ray, and others may give primary credit for the end of major war to ideational evolution akin to that which made slavery and dueling obsolete, but others have interpreted the causal chain quite differently. Neoliberal institutionalists have long argued that complex economic interdependence can have a pacifying effect upon state behavior (Keohane and Nye 1977, 1987). Richard Rosecrance (1986, 1999) has contended that evolution in socio-economic organization has altered the shortest, most rational route to state prosperity in ways that make war unlikely. Finally, many others have argued that credit for great power peace can be given to the existence of nuclear weapons, which make aggression irrational ( Jervis 1989; Kagan et al. 1999). With so many overlapping and mutually reinforcing explanations, at times the end of major war may seem to be overdetermined ( Jervis 2002:8–9). For purposes of the present discussion, successful identification of the exact cause of this fundamental change in state behavior is probably not as important as belief in its existence. In other words, the outcome is far more important than the mechanism. The importance of Mueller’s argument for the field of IR is ultimately not dependent upon why major war has become obsolete, only that it has. Almost as significant, all these proposed explanations have one important point in common: they all imply that change will be permanent. Normative/ideational evolution is typically unidirectionalFfew would argue that it is likely, for instance, for slavery or dueling to return in this century. The complexity of economic interdependence is deepening as time goes on and going at a quicker pace. And, obviously, nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented and (at least at this point) no foolproof defense against their use seems to be on the horizon. The combination of forces that may have brought major war to an end seems to be unlikely to allow its return. The twentieth century witnessed an unprecedented pace of evolution in all areas of human endeavor, from science and medicine to philosophy and religion. In such an atmosphere, it is not difficult to imagine that attitudes toward the venerable institution of war may also have experienced rapid evolution and that its obsolescence could become plausible, perhaps even probable, in spite of thousands of years of violent precedent. The burden of proof would seem to be on those who maintain that the ‘‘rules of the game’’ of international politics, including the rules of war, are the lone area of human interaction immune to fundamental evolution and that, due to these immutable and eternal rules, war will always be with us. Rather than ask how major war could have grown obsolete, perhaps scholars should ask why anyone should believe that it could not.

**More evidence with more reasons – recognition of the terrorist threat, living conditions, and peaceful citizens in major powers.**

**FETTWEIS 2006** Christopher J.(National Security Decision Making Department) US Naval War College International Studies Review 8, 677–697 4. ASP

Increased international recognition of the threat that Islamic fundamentalism poses to the vital national interests of every one of the great powers has brought post- September 11 cooperation to new, unprecedented levels. More than ever before, a common enemy has united the global northFan otherwise pessimistic analyst from London’s International Institute of Strategic Studies admitted that even if many countries ‘‘remain suspicious of the Bush administration and view a unipolar world as a threat to their interests,’’ still ‘‘the relations of Russia, China, and India with the United States have improved greatly since September 11’’ (Blanche 2003). While the immediate post-September 11th cooperation may prove to be short lived, what seems to be part of a broader trend is the recognition that Al Qaeda and its allies represent a threat to the combined interests of the great powers. More and more, the zone of peace is presenting a united front, setting precedents for peaceful conflict resolution. Global pessimism might be tempered by a bit of historical perspective: Today a far greater percentage of the world’s population lives in peace than at any time before in history. As discussed above, the number and intensity of all types of warfare have dropped steadily since the early 1990s, which is especially significant when one considers the rapid increase in population over the same period. When World War Two began, the total global population was around 2.3 billion, the vast majority of whom lived in societies that were touched in some way by the war. Over four billion souls have been added to the world since, including almost a billion in the 1990s alone (US Bureau of the Census 2000). This unprecedented exponential population growth in big and small states has not led to Malthusian clashes for resources in most areas of the world, despite decades of predictions to the contrary (Homer-Dixon 1999; Kaplan 2000; Klare 2001). Although a few minor wars and terrorist attacks have occurred since 9/11, it seems as if more citizens of the twenty-first century will lead mundane, peaceful lives than in any that came before, bothered perhaps by quiet desperation but not by the violence of war. This is a nontrivial statistic. War and conflict may grab the headlines, but conflict is not a daily fact of life for the vast majority of the people on this planet; indeed, the percentage of those for whom it remains a reality is steadily shrinking. This underreported proliferation of peace is especially apparent for those fortunate citizens of the great powers, 100% of whom have been free of major war for a half-century.

# NO WAR

**Economics mean zero risk of great power war**

**Mueller**, a professor of political science at Ohio State University, **09** [John, Political Science Quarterly, “War Has Almost Ceased to Exist:

An Assessment”, http://tigger.uic.edu/~bvaler/Mueller%20War%20Dead.pdf]

Economics, Technology, Communication, Trade If the demise of war is dependent on economic development or on the achievement of some sort of economic equality among (or within) nations, as many have postulated, there seems to be a long way to go: the earth has hardly been enveloped in prosperity, while miserable poverty and spectacular economic inequalities remain. There have been notable increases in international trade and in economic interdependence, but there clearly is a long way to go on this as well. International communications have also greatly improved, but the connection between this still rather limited development and the decline of war is difficult to divine. However, shifting attitudes toward the desirability of war may have been notably enhanced over the last couple of centuries by economic thinking.51 Specifically, to the degree that economists have been able to get across a pair of key ideas, the result could be an enhanced desire for peace. One of these holds that the growth of economic well-being should be a dominant goal. Historically, non-economic values have often been deemed more worthy than economic growth, and an important area in which non-economic values have usually dominated is war. For the most part, in fact, economic motivations often seem like a rationale for impulses that are actually more nearly moral, aesthetic, emotional, or psychological.52 It seems likely, then, that if people with business motivations had actually been running the world, its history would have been quite a bit different (and generally better). By helping to teach the world to value economic well-being above passions that are often economically absurd, economists and their like-minded allies have made an important contribution.53 Economists have also been in the lead in advancing a second idea, one holding that wealth is best achieved through exchange, not through conquest. In this regard, Richard Rosecrance cites the striking and important examples of two recent converts: “Today West Germany and Japan use international trade to acquire the very raw materials and oil that they aimed to conquer by military force in the 1930s. They have prospered in peaceful consequence.” Among “trading states” like that, Rosecrance observes, “**the incentive to wage war is absent**.”54 Put another way, free trade furnishes the economic advantages of conquest without the unpleasantness of invasion and the sticky responsibility of imperial control. Thus, war is unlikely if countries take prosperity as their chief goal and if they come to believe that trade is the best way to achieve that goal. Thanks in part to the success of economists, both ideas have now gained wide currency. Although trade alone may enhance the prospects for peace, a better case could perhaps be made for the opposite causal proposition: peace often leads to, or at any rate facilitates, trade. That is, peace ought to be seen not as a dependent, but rather as an independent, variable in such considerations. The long and historically unprecedented absence of war among the nations of Western Europe, for example, has not been caused by their increasing economic harmony. Rather, economic harmony has been caused, or at least substantially facilitated, by the long and historically unprecedented peace they have enjoyed. Put the other way, international tensions and the prospect of international war have a strong dampening effect on trade, since each threatened nation has an incentive to isolate itself from the rest of the world economically in order to ensure that it can survive if international exchange is cut off by military conflict. In this respect, the Cold War could be seen in part as a huge trade barrier. With the demise of such politically derived and economically foolish constructs, trade was liberated. But it was the rise of peace that facilitated the trade, not the opposite.

# NO EUROPE WAR

**War is impossible between European powers**

**MANDELBAUM 99** (Michael Mandelbaum is Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC; and Director, Project on East-West Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, New York Survival, Winter 1998-99)

Armaments are both a cause and a consequence of the insecurity that anarchy creates for all sovereign states. Because they feel insecure, states equip themselves with weapons that in turn make others feel insecure. Even with the purest of benign intentions, no country would be willing to do without any means of self-defence. Total disarmament is thus not possible. But a series of treaties signed at the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the post-Cold War period regulate both nuclear and non-nuclear arms in ways designed to engender confidence throughout Europe that no country harbours aggressive intentions towards any other signatory.2' Two features of these treaties convey reassurance. First, the treaties make military forces more suitable for defence than for attack. For nuclear weapons, concentrated in the hands of two countries, the US and Russia, this involves, ironically, ratifying the unchallengeable supremacy of the offence. When the assured capacity to destroy the other side is mutual, it serves as a deterrent against attack. The 1995 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty reconfigures military forces on the continent according to the principle of 'defence dominance' by mandating numerical equality and reducing the size of the forces - numerical advantage ordinarily being required for a successful attack and by limiting the types of weapons on which an attacking force would rely. The second confidence-inspiring feature of the European arms agreements is transparency. Every country in Europe knows which armaments the others have and what each is doing with them. (Limits are set on the scope and frequency of military exercises lest they be used to camouflage actual attacks.) Satellite photography and on-site inspections have turned Europe, where armed forces are concerned, into a larger version of a department store continuously and comprehensively monitored by video cameras to prevent shoplifting. This common security order is the result of a common renunciation of the motives for war among the countries of Europe and North America, a common recognition that even in the absence of such motives arms remain necessary but create insecurity, and the common adoption of measures to alleviate, if not entirely eliminate, this insecurity. As such, it is the descendant of the informal series of understandings and practices that emerged in Europe in the second decade of the nineteenth century after the wars of the French Revolution, which were designed to prevent another major conflict and were known, collectively, as the Concert of Europe.22 Democracy, which has become the predominant, if not always perfectly realised, form of government in Europe, is conducive to common security. Democracies are more likely than others to subscribe to such a system because they are more likely to fulfill its fundamental condition: rejecting the motives for which sovereign states have traditionally gone to war. It is, moreover, easier for democracies than for others to adopt one of common security's central practices - transparency - because politics within democratic systems is normally conducted in transparent fashion.

# A2: EMPIRICALLY FALSE

**The “no war” prediction might have failed after World War One, but it’s true after World War Two**

**MANDELBAUM 1999** (Michael, Professor of American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins University; Director, Project on East-West Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, “Transcript: is Major War Obsolete?” Transcript of debate with John Mearsheimer, CFR,

Feb 25, http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/cfr10/)

If I can make one other point; when I first gave this talk in Oxford at the annual conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and somebody got up and said, ’You know, you’re just repeating the mistake of Norman Angell, the man who wrote the book The Grand Illusion in the first part of the century saying, “ War could never happen."’ And shortly thereafter, World War I broke out. And, indeed, it could have been said in the 1920s that war really was finished, given what had happened between 1914 and 1918, and yet we know what happened between 1939 and 1945. So Fareed raises a point which is germane and which has to be dealt with in my argument. I chose to deal with it then, and I will beg your indulgence to deal with it now by telling one of my favorite jokes. The joke is about the two men sitting in front of the television set watching the eleven o’clock news. On the eleven o’clock news there’s a man threatening to jump off the top of a 20-story building. The first watcher says to the second, ‘I’ll bet you 100 bucks he jumps.’ The second guy says, ‘You’re on.’ Sure enough, the man jumps off the building. The second man reaches into his pocket, pulls out his wallet, and starts to peel off $100. The first guy says, ‘Wait a minute. I can’t take your money.’ Second guy says, ‘What do you mean?’ First guy says, ‘I have a confession to make. I saw this on the six o’clock news.’ Second guys says, ‘Well, so did I, but I couldn’t believe he’d be dumb enough to do it twice.’ It seems to me that the fact of the twentieth century argues in favor of my point of view. And it also seems to me that those of us who make our living from education are poorly placed to argue that people never learn anything. Surely what has happened in the twentieth century has made an impact even in Russia and China, not just with us.

# A2: EVOLUTION

**Evolutionary theories about warfare are flawed --- they cant explain decreases in warfare**

**Mueller**, a professor of political science at Ohio State University, **09** [John, Political Science Quarterly, “War Has Almost Ceased to Exist:

An Assessment”, http://tigger.uic.edu/~bvaler/Mueller%20War%20Dead.pdf]

Biology and Psychology As Kenneth Waltz points out, one set of explanations for war has stressed that they arise from the essential nature of the human creature.44 “Iʼm not so naïve or simplistic,” proclaimed former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, “[as] to believe we can eliminate war.Weʼre not going to change human nature any time soon.”45 And on confronting the argument in 1989 that at least some kinds of war might be in the process of notable decline, Samuel Huntington deemed that to be quite implausible, due in part to the “weakness and irrationality of human nature,” not to mention the human capacity for behavior that is “stupid, selfish, cruel, and sinful.”46 Yet war may be disappearing without much in the way of perceptible changes—or improvements—in human nature. Nor has the “aggressive drive” been noticeably attenuated. Testosterone levels seem to be as high as ever, and the thrill and exhilaration that war and combat often incite do not seem to have diminished. Nor has any sort of psychic “moral equivalent” to war—or for that matter a practical one—been fabricated. Some observers have seen the impetus for war not so much in human nature as in the nature of political leadership. However, it does not seem likely that today’s leaders are more rational or competent than the leaders of old, that they are less susceptible to bias and misperception, or that they lust less for power. **Evolutionary theories** about the value and persistence of war **do not seem to be doing very well** either, and they are likely to have little to say about the important, remarkably abrupt, and quite recent decline in civil warfare.

# A2: NATIONALISM

**Nationalism and internal social factors don’t drive warfare --- decreases in civil warfare prove our argument**

**Mueller**, a professor of political science at Ohio State University, **09** [John, Political Science Quarterly, “War Has Almost Ceased to Exist:

An Assessment”, http://tigger.uic.edu/~bvaler/Mueller%20War%20Dead.pdf]

Resentments Nationalism, religious extremism, ethnic tension, and social inequalities seem to be about as common as ever, and there do not appear to be notable reductions in the worldʼs considerable store of hate, selfishness, and racism. Extrapolating from the apparently ethnically based conflict in Bosnia in the early 1990s, Huntington promulgated a notion about “clashes of civilizations.”47 However, although there is no reason to think that civilizational angst has decreased since his book appeared in 1996, civil warfare stemming from that (or any other) condition has declined remarkably. And for well over a decade now, Bosnia has managed to remain completely at peace, despite all those supposedly consequential subliminal hatreds we heard so much about in the early 1990s. Looking at the issue from the opposite perspective, there does not seem to have been a notable surge in the amount of love, justice, harmony, cooperation, brotherhood, good will, or inner peace in the world. Yet war has declined without benefit of such developments.

# NO ESCALATION

**Small wars won’t escalate—lack of overarching superpower conflict has removed the incentive**

**MANDELBAUM 1999**

(Michael, Professor of American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins University; Director, Project on East-West Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, “Transcript: is Major War Obsolete?” Transcript of debate with John Mearsheimer, CFR, Feb 25, http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/cfr10/)

Prof. Mandelbaum: Well, as I said in response to [an earlier] comment, I do not envision the end of foreign policy. I do not envision...here I do think that we have a disagreement. I think that we do understand escalation quite well and we do have good reasons to believe that it won’t happen. Korea is the hardest case, to be sure, but we had peripheral conflict drawing in the great powers because the great powers saw their interests at stake and believed that if they suffered a setback in the periphery it would come closer to home. This was the domino theory. With the advance, at least, of great-power rivalry what happens in the periphery becomes much less important and we’ve already seen that. And if I may again indulge myself by reading from the original article, “ ...when the world is integrated powerful countries can justify fighting weak adversaries or waging war far from their borders, or both, on the grounds of self defense...” That is you stop them there because otherwise it’ll come closer. “ When the war is disaggregated, the rationale loses its force. One of the most vivid examples of the workings of an integrated international system was the scramble for Africa at the end of the nineteenth century when the European powers rushed to stake out positions and control territory simply to preempt their rivals. The opposite dynamic was recently on display in the Balkans. The collapse of authority in Europe’s poorest and most backward country in 1997 set off a scramble from Albania. The countries of western Europe maneuvered to avoid taking any responsibility for its fate. The Italians, handicapped by geographic proximity, were the losers.”