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AT: Weapons Inevitable

Space weapons inevitable claim stems from US insecurities and the need to control their future

Park 6 (Andrew T. Park, University of Houston Law Center, incremental steps for achieving space security: the need for a new way of thinking to enhance the legal regime for space, March 22nd 2006, <http://www.hjil.org/ArticleFiles/28_3_871.pdf> EL)

The simplest argument for space weaponization (inevitability) may also be the most reckless because of its self-fulfilling nature. Proponents of the inevitability of space weaponization have proffered multiple theories as to why the realm of space will eventually become weaponized.86 According to the logic of these inevitability proponents, the United States should lead the way rather than be left in the dust as military technology continues to rapidly develop.87 However, while the inevitability argument may have some merit, its true danger lies in its unverifiable nature until weaponization actually occurs. Moreover, it is important to note that this premise is driven not only by American insecurities, but also by the need for the United States to control its own future. Since the ideological divide between “space doves” and those who believe space weaponization is inevitable is not likely to be bridged soon, the international community must recognize the need for a legal regime for space with teeth—or, put another way, a legal regime that goes beyond simply establishing a set of norms that have little to no consequences.

AT: Weapons Inevitable – Cold War

**Space weaponization not inevitable – Cold War theories are irrelevant**

Lowery 1-13 (Scott Lowery, Why the Weaponization of Space Should Not Be Pursued, January 13th 2011, <http://ebookbrowse.com/lowery-why-the-weaponization-of-space-should-not-be-pursued-pdf-d49100654> EL)

It is clear that the weaponization of space is not inevitable. However, does the concern of foreign weaponization justify the pursuit of space weapons anyway? The answer is an emphatic no. Although doing so would seem to increase the asymmetric space advantage the US has, it would actually have a destabilizing effect and result in a decreased advantage. The idea of space weapons brings to mind visions of military omnipotence, with the US able to easily strike down any adversary without fear of retaliation. Such an ability would deter many conflicts. A similar rationale developed in the 1940s with the creation of the atom bomb. It too seemed to provide infinite power that would cause the rest of the world to kneel before the US or suffer unimaginable retaliation. This idea worked once, ending World War II. Once the atom bomb became public, it sparked a massive arms race as other nations developed nuclear power. The stockpiling of nuclear arms led to the Cold War, an era defined by a world on the brink of destruction and rapidly shifting political climates. It is not a large leap in logic to conclude that since space weapons offer advantages of similar magnitude to nuclear weapons, their development will cause a similar situation. Other nations will not stand idle as the US weaponizes space—they will follow suit. In the end, space will become a volatile political liability and the medium for a new Cold War–style weapons spiral.

Weaponization not inevitable- Cold War proves

Krepon, 2004, ( Michael Krepon, Founding President of the Henry L. Stimson Center and author of Cooperative Threat Reduction, Missile Defense and the Nuclear Future, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 2004 http://www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/publications/journal/Issues/sf04/Forum%20Krepon.pdf EL)

Dire predictions to the contrary, the weaponization of space, or a “space Pearl Harbor” is not inevitable.1 If the weaponization of space were inevitable, it would surely have occurred during the Cold War. While many countries have used space to support military operations, no weapons are deployed in space, interactive ASAT testing during the Cold War ended two decades ago, and no satellites have been destroyed in warfare. Thus, the weaponization of space is cer tainly not inevitable, unless this mindset holds sway.

AT: Weapons Inevitable – Alt Weapons

Weaponization not inevitable other states prefer alternatives

Krepon 3(Michael Krepon, director of the South Asia and Space Security programs, 2003, Space Assurance or Space Dominance: The Case Against Weaponizing Space, <http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2377.pdf> EL)

The weaponization of space is not inevitable. If it were, it would have occurred during the Cold War. Rather than engaging in such a competition now, a far wiser course would be to strengthen efforts to promote space assurance. Key elements of a space assurance posture include unilateral initiatives that enhance situational awareness in space and reduce satellite vulnerability; research and development programs that deter others from crossing key thresholds and hedge against adverse developments by potential adversaries; and cooperative measures, international agreements and codes of conduct for responsible space space-faring nations. Cooperative measures, including information exchanges and greater transparency regarding space launches and payloads, could lend credence to declaratory statements of peaceful intent, while also serving to clarify threatening and destabilizing activities in space. Transparency measures must be sufficient enough to alleviate concerns over worrisome activities, particularly that military capabilities designed for other purposes are not being tested in ways that are virtually indistinguishable from preparations for space warfare. If states are sufficiently concerned about the weaponization of space, they will agree to significant, intrusive and broad ranging cooperative and transparency measures.

**AT: Weapons Now**

Space is not weaponized now- difference between militarization and weaponization

Saperstein 2 (Alvin, Physics Dept., Wayne State University, “Weaponization” Vs. “Militarization” Of Space, APS http://www.aps.org/units/fps/newsletters/2002/july/saperstein.pdf, KR)

Currently, space is not weaponized. There are no weapons deployed in space or terrestrially (in air, sea, or on the ground) meant to attack space objects, such as satellites; nor are satellite weapons deployed against terrestrial targets. At the same time, space is an increasingly vital part of our military activities from which the US obtains great advantages with respect to other nations. We use space for communication; for surveillance and targeting over the battlefields; for weather prediction; for precise mapping and positioning of our own and opposition military assets; for early warning of missile and air attacks; and for general military, economic, and technological intelligence worldwide. Thus space is “militarized” though not yet “weaponized.”

No weaponization now-all current military use of space is as a force enhancer

Logsden 1 (John, Just Say wait to Space Power, NAS, http://www.freepatentsonline.com/article/Issues-in-Science-Technology/75286573.html, KR

Some definitions may be useful here. The most general concept--space power--can be defined as using the space medium and assets located in space to enhance and project U.S. military power. Space militarization describes a situation in which the military makes use of space in carrying out its missions. There is no question that space has been militarized; U.S. armed forces would have great difficulty carrying out a military mission today if denied access to its guidance, reconnaissance, and communications satellites. But to date, military systems in space are used exclusively as "force enhancers," making air, sea, and land force projection more effective. The issue now is whether to go beyond these military uses of space to space weaponization: the stationing in space of systems that can attack a target located on Earth, in the air, or in space itself. Arguably, space is already partially weaponized. The use of signals from Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites to guide precision weapons to their targets is akin to the role played by a rifle's gunsight. But there are not yet space equivalents of bullets to actually destroy or damage a target.

No Space Weaponization now-no funds

Selding 9 (Peter, policy analyst, Pentagon: U.S. not developing space weapons, Space, 2/20/09, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29301771/ns/technology\_and\_science-space/t/pentagon-us-not-developing-space-weapons/, KR)

The United States is not developing space weapons and could not afford to do so even if it wanted to, an official with the Pentagon's National Security Space Office said Thursday. Pete Hays, a senior policy analyst at the space office who is also associate director of the Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies, said [U.S. policy on space weaponry](http://www.space.com/news/080221-satshot-transparency.html) has remained pretty much the same over the last 30 years despite the occasionally heated debate on the subject during the administration of former U.S. President George W. Bush. "There has not been one minute spent on this issue as far as I know," Hays said of U.S. Defense Department policy on [using weapons in space](http://www.space.com/news/080221-asat-aftermath.html). "There are no space weaponization programs. It's an issue that academics like to flog now and then, but in terms of funded programs, there aren't any. I can tell you that categorically." Hays made his remarks during a space security conference organized by the International Space University here. He said that even if the United States decided to embark on a [space-based weapon system](http://www.space.com/php/video/player.php?video_id=080221-satellite-kill), it could not pay for it given its current military program commitments.

**Not Inevitable**

Calling Weaponization Inevitable is a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

Park 6 (Andrew, Ecology Depatment, University of Georgia, Houston Journal of International Law , Incremental steps for achieving space security: the need for a new way of thinking to enhance the legal regime for space, Spring 06, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_hb3094/is\_3\_28/ai\_n29271382/pg\_6/?tag=mantle\_skin;content, KR)

The fallacy of the inevitability argument is that, in the short run at least, the United States is the only country that possesses the resources and capabilities necessary to deploy space weapons. (92) This has never been the case in American history. As one historian notes, from the "development of ironclad warships in the 1860s, Dreadnought battleships after 1900, or atomic weapons in the 1940s," different nations were simultaneously developing the same technology. (93) This left a choice to the different governments to either take the lead in the arms race or get passed by. (94) In the space weapons debate, in contrast, "the United States can unilaterally [for the time being] choose whether space will be weaponized." (95) Consequently, the United States controls the inevitability of space weaponization. This conviction is dangerously close to evolving into a self-fulfilling prophecy that simply cannot be refuted. (96) While the realms of air, land, and sea have already been weaponized, presumably irrevocably so, they have become so as a result of three very different paths. (97) Moreover, the evolutionary patterns of military and commercial uses of new environments have [also] varied widely across the range of human experience. To conclude that this evidence proves that the fourth will also be weaponized would require a degree of deterministic fatalism that would make the most doctrinaire Marxist or environmental doomsayer blush. (98) The question of whether weaponization will occur is still yet to be determined, but it will undoubtedly be affected by the decisions of U.S. military space policymakers in the coming years. (99) Because the choices ahead are so important, it would be irresponsible of the United States to rely solely on an argument lacking in critical analysis and "based upon little more than superficial historical analogies and glib strategic aphorisms." (100) The bottom line is that the use of the word "inevitable," in the context of the weaponization of space, is dangerous simply because there are too many variables to be able to discern the future with any degree of certainty at this point. (101)

Weaponization is not inevitable

Lowery 9 (Scott, University of Colorado, Why the Weaponization of Space Should Not Be Pursued, University of Colorado Press, 6/17/09 http://www.colorado.edu/ArtsSciences/PWR/occasions/articles/Lowery\_Why%20the%20Weaponization%20of%20Space%20Should%20Not%20Be%20Pursued.pdf, KR)

The pro-weaponization adherents’ arguments of inevitability focus on the notion that the United States must have an early lead in space weapons or suffer the consequences. They have several reasons for believing in inevitability; however, each argument contains logical fallacies that preclude it from representing a rational policy. Karl Mueller of the International Studies Association best sums up the deficiency of their arguments, which are “based on a smattering of evidence and logic, extrapolated into facile overgeneralizations that are well-suited for television talk-show punditry but which provide a poor basis for national policymaking (Mueller).”

Not Inevitable

Space weaponization is not inevitable-different from naval or air militarization

Lowery 9 (Scott, University of Colorado, Why the Weaponization of Space Should Not Be Pursued, University of Colorado Press, 6/17/09 http://www.colorado.edu/ArtsSciences/PWR/occasions/articles/Lowery\_Why%20the%20Weaponization%20of%20Space%20Should%20Not%20Be%20Pursued.pdf, KR)

The second argument for inevitability draws on historical analogies of the weaponization of the sea and air. Though it seems that the progression to space power would mirror the progression to sea power, this is not the case, as there is a difference of functionality. Navies were developed to defend against pirates and raiders, but there are no analogous threats to the theater of space that would warrant a buildup of defensive weapons. The similarities between air and space are more intuitively striking, at least at first glance. In fact, the two theaters have not evolved along the same lines at all. One reason is timescale: less than ten years after Kitty Hawk there were airborne weapons in World War I, yet after more than fifty years since the launch of Sputnik, there has been no great buildup. The other difference is a lack of a multiplying effect in space. In the case of air power, the development of one system, such as a bomber, necessitated other developments, such as escort fighters. In contrast, the deployment of a new satellite constellation does not require a new weapon system. It seems then that drawing conclusions from sea and air power history fails to provide any support for weaponization.

Space weaponization not inevitable-No motive for attack

Lowery 9 (Scott, University of Colorado, Why the Weaponization of Space Should Not Be Pursued, University of Colorado Press, 6/17/09 http://www.colorado.edu/ArtsSciences/PWR/occasions/articles/Lowery\_Why%20the%20Weaponization%20of%20Space%20Should%20Not%20Be%20Pursued.pdf, KR)

The third argument for inevitability is that the expanding influence space has on the economy will precipitate an attack on space systems. Pro-weaponizers see the economic dependence on space as a vulnerability waiting to be exploited. However, the 6 logic behind such an attack is lacking. It is unreasonable for another nation state to attack US space assets for the sole purpose of economic disruption. Because the US is a superpower, its economy is interlinked with the rest of the world, so that if another nation—for instance, China—damaged US space assets, it would most likely feel the economic effects of the attackitself, namely through the loss of the $200 billion (Trade) of goods it exports to the United States. Similarly, attacking space assets as a terrorist action is also illogical. There are many surface targets whose destruction would also cause widespread havoc such as dams, bridges, refineries, computer systems, and so on. All of them require far less sophistication to destroy than satellites.

Even if Weaponization is inevitable, time frame is key

Mueller 2 **(**Karl, PhD in politics, political scientist, Is the Weaponization of Space Inevitable?, International Studies Association Annual Convention, 3/27/02, http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/noarchive/mueller.html, KR)

In contrast, whether weaponization is inevitable is of relatively little consequence to some other perspectives on space weaponization. For many ardent weaponization advocates, the right time to deploy space weapons is immediately, or at least as soon as possible, regardless of what other countries may or may not be likely to do later on. For space sanctuary advocates, who fear that weaponization will cause international instability or will erode U.S. hegemony, averting the deployment of space weapons as long as possible is desirable, even if that will not be for very long (though if the effort is doomed to rapid failure, it may not be worth pursuing very energetically). From both of these contending perspectives, those who care mainly about not being preempted in the deployment of space weapons are adhering to an unsatisfying and poorly developed theoretical creed—not so much a rationale for building space weapons as a mere excuse for doing it.

Not Inevitable

Weaponization is not inevitable-even if it does occur, it is in the distant future

Mueller 2 **(**Karl, PhD in politics, political scientist, Is the Weaponization of Space Inevitable?, International Studies Association Annual Convention, 3/27/02, http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/noarchive/mueller.html, KR)

Is the weaponization of space in the foreseeable future one of the few things in life that is certain, as death and taxes are reputed to be? In spite of the large number of people who apparently believe this to be true, there is a striking absence of highly persuasive arguments in favor of the inevitability thesis. Together with the apparent plausibility of multiple future scenarios in which weaponization might be avoided, there is good reason for prudent policymakers to assume that the weaponization of space is not in fact predestined. In the short run, only the United States is capable of weaponizing space, and it clearly has the option of not doing so. The long-term picture is more complex, because in addition to the inherent uncertainty of long-range prediction, the number of players capable of building space weapons will grow. Yet it is possible to say something about the conditions that would tend to make the weaponization of space by other countries relatively likely. First, the greater the apparent military advantage to be gained from building space weapons, the more likely they are to be built. Second, the more affordable they are expected to be, the more attractive space weapons programs will become. Third, the smaller the anticipated political, diplomatic, and other costs of weaponization, the more appealing this policy option will be. The United States will have considerable influence over the values of each of these variables, though it will not entirely control any of them.

\*\*Impact Modules\*\*

Weapons Bad – Prolif (1/2)

Weaponization kills disarmament and causes Prolif

Zhang 5 (Hui, Senior Research Associate, Harvard University, Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China, Arms Control Association, Dec 2005, http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1943, KR)

Moreover, space weaponization would seriously disrupt the arms control and disarmament process. The initiation of U.S. space-based missile defenses would likely cause Russia as well as the United States (in response to Russia) to make smaller reductions in their nuclear arsenals. China would likely be forced to build more warheads to maintain its nuclear deterrent, which could in turn encourage India and then Pakistan to follow suit. Also, Russia has threatened to respond to any country’s deployment of space weapons. Failure to proceed with the nuclear disarmament process would also further undermine the already fragile nuclear nonproliferation regime. As Ambassador Hu Xiaodi warned in 2001, “With lethal weapons flying overhead in orbit and disrupting global strategic stability, why should people eliminate [weapons of mass destruction] or missiles on the ground? This cannot but do harm to global peace, security and stability, hence be detrimental to the fundamental interests of all states

Weapons Bad – Prolif (2/2)

Proliferation causes Nuclear War.

Horowitz 09 (Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict: Does Experience Matter?,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 53 Number 2, April 2009 pg. 234-257, KR)

Learning as states gain experience with nuclear weapons is complicated. While to some extent nuclear acquisition might provide information about resolve or capabilities, it also generates uncertainty about the way an actual conflict would go – given the new risk of nuclear escalation – and uncertainty about relative capabilities. Rapid proliferation may especially heighten uncertainty given the potential for reasonable states to disagree at times about the quality of the capabilities each possesses.3 What follows is an attempt to describe the implications of inexperience and incomplete information on the behavior of

nuclear states and their potential opponents over time. Since it is impossible to detail all possible lines of argumentation and possible responses, the following discussion is necessarily incomplete. This is a first step. The acquisition of nuclear weapons increases the confidence of adopters in their ability to impose costs in the case of a conflict and the expectations of likely costs if war occurs by potential opponents. The key questions are whether nuclear states learn over time about how to leverage nuclear weapons and the implications of that learning, along with whether or not actions by nuclear states, over time, convey information that leads to changes in the expectations of their behavior – shifts in uncertainty – on the part of potential adversaries. Learning to Leverage? When a new state acquires nuclear weapons, how does it influence the way the state behaves and how might that change over time? Though nuclear acquisition might be orthogonal to a particular dispute, it might be related to a particular security challenge, might signal revisionist aims with regard to an enduring dispute, or might signal the desire to reinforce the status quo. This section focuses on how acquiring nuclear weapons influences both the new nuclear state and potential adversaries. In theory, system-wide perceptions of nuclear danger could allow new nuclear states to partially skip the early Cold War learning process concerning the risks of nuclear war and enter a proliferated world

more cognizant of nuclear brinksmanship and bargaining than their predecessors. However, each new nuclear state has to resolve its own particular civil-military issues surrounding operational control and plan its national strategy in light of its new capabilities. Empirical research by Sagan, Feaver, and Blair suggests that viewing the behavior of other states does not create the necessary tacit knowledge; there is no substitute for experience when it comes to handling a nuclear arsenal, even if experience itself cannot totally prevent accidents (Blair 1993; Feaver 1992; Sagan 1993). Sagan contends that civil-military instability in many likely new proliferators and pressures generated by the requirements to handle the responsibility of dealing with nuclear weapons will skew decision-making towards more offensive strategies (Sagan 1995). The questions 9

surrounding Pakistan’s nuclear command and control suggest there is no magic bullet when it comes to new nuclear powers making control and delegation decisions (Bowen and Wolvén 1999). Sagan and others focus on inexperience on the part of new nuclear states as a key behavioral driver. Inexperienced operators, and the bureaucratic desire to “justify” the costs spent developing nuclear weapons, combined with organizational biases that may favor escalation to avoid decapitation, the “use it or lose it” mindset, may cause new nuclear states to adopt riskier launch postures, like launch on warning, or at least be

perceived that way by other states (Blair 1993; Feaver 1992; Sagan 1995).4 Acquiring nuclear weapons could alter state preferences and make them more likely to escalate disputes once they start, given their new capabilities.5 But their general lack of experience at leveraging their nuclear arsenal and effectively communicating nuclear threats could mean new nuclear states will be more likely to select adversaries poorly and find themselves in disputes with resolved adversaries that will reciprocate militarized challenges.

Ext. Prolif

Space Weaponization causes Prolif

Krepon 4(Michael, Weapons in the Heavens: A Radical and Reckless Option, Arms Control Today, http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary\_0286-5378395\_ITM, November 2004, KR)

Weaponizing space would poison relations with China and Russia, whose help is essential to stop and reverse proliferation. ASAT weapon tests and deployments would surely reinforce Russia’s hair-trigger nuclear posture, and China would likely feel compelled to alter its relaxed nuclear posture, which would then have negative repercussions on India and Pakistan. The Bush Administration’s plans would also further alienate America’s friends and allies, which, with the possible exception of Israel, strongly oppose the weaponization of space. The fabric of international controls over weapons of mass destruction, which is being severely challenged by Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, could rip apart if the Bush Administration’s interest in testing space and nuclear weapons is realized.

Weaponization causes Proliferation

Krepon 5 (Michael, Space Weapons and Proliferation, the Nonproliferation Review,

Vol. 12, No 2, July 2005, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Space\_Weapons\_and\_Proliferation.pdf, KR )

We argue that additional proliferation of nuclear weapons, rather than new arms races, is the most likely outcome in the event of renewed interest in space warfare. Proliferation will be a natural consequence of more nations feeling less secure as a result of space weapons. Adverse proliferation consequences could be both direct and indirect. China and Russia will likely feel most directly threatened by US space warfare initiatives. Beijing will likely increase its nuclear weapon requirements to counter increased threat perceptions without engaging in an arms race, while Moscow will likely seek to adjust the contraction of its nuclear arsenal, to the extent the Kremlin believes that its deterrent might be challenged by US initiatives. Indirect, horizontal proliferation is likely to result from greater strains in major power relations and in US-alliance ties triggered by US initiatives to dominate space. In the absence of united fronts against proliferation by major powers and by US friends and allies, international efforts to strengthen nonproliferation and disarmament norms are likely to fail, and hedging strategies against a more worrisome future are likely to multiply.

Space weaponization triggers global proliferation.

Katz-Hyman and Krepon 10. (Michael Katz-Hyman and Michael Krepon, Katz is a research assistant at Stimson and Krepon is the co-founder of Stimson, and director of the South Asia and Space Security programs. Space Weapons and Proliferation, The Stimson Institute. 12/17/10. NP. <http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Space_Weapons_and_Proliferation.pdf> DM)

We argue that additional proliferation of nuclear weapons, rather than new arms races, is the most likely outcome in the event of renewed interest in space warfare. Proliferation will be a natural consequence of more nations feeling less secure as a result of space weapons. Adverse proliferation consequences could be both direct and indirect. China and Russia will likely feel most directly threatened by US space warfare initiatives. Beijing will likely increase its nuclear weapon requirements to counter increased threat perceptions without engaging in an arms race, while Moscow will likely seek to adjust the contraction of its nuclear arsenal, to the extent the Kremlin believes that its deterrent might be challenged by US initiatives. Indirect, horizontal proliferation is likely to result from greater strains in major power relations and in US-alliance ties triggered by US initiatives to dominate space. In the absence of united fronts against proliferation by major powers and by US friends and allies, international efforts to strengthen nonproliferation and disarmament norms are likely to fail, and hedging strategies against a more worrisome future are likely to multiply.

Ext. Prolif

U.S. space weaponization would cause ICBM proliferation and destabilize the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Podvig and Zhang 11. (Pavel Podvig and Hui Zhang, Podvig is a  an affiliate and former research associate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University and Zhang is a a Senior Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space, American Academy of Arts and Sciences. 6/29/11. NP. <http://www.amacad.org/publications/militarySpace.aspx> DM**)**

Zhang arrives at similar conclusions. He describes how U.S. military plans for space will negatively affect peaceful uses of outer space, disrupting civilian and commercial initiatives, but he focuses his discussion on a much greater concern among Chinese officials—that actions by the United States in space will result in a loss of strategic nuclear parity. China’s options for response, as detailed by Zhang, include building more ICBMs, adopting countermeasures against missile defense, developing ASAT weapons, and reconsidering China’s commitments on arms control. Thus, a U.S. decision to introduce weapons into space would destabilize the already vulnerable international nonproliferation regime. Zhang concludes, “U.S. space weaponization plans would have potentially disastrous effects on international security and the peaceful use of outer space. This would not benefit any country’s security interests.”

Weapons Bad – Debris (1/1)

Weaponization increases space debris-precludes space exploration and use

Primack 4( Joel September 2004, “Pelted by Paint, Drowned by Debris”, Bulletin of Atomic Sciences, September 2004, http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2002/so02/so02primack.html)

Weaponization of space would make the debris problem much worse, and even one war in space could encase the entire planet in a shell of whizzing debris that would thereafter make space near the Earth highly hazardous for peaceful as well as military purposes. The nickname "Star Wars" for missile defense all too accurately reflects the popular fantasy about how things work in space. In the Star Wars movies and in hundreds of other popular science fiction films, we see things blow up in space and the fragments quickly dissipate, leaving empty space behind. But in reality, space does not clear after an explosion near our planet. The fragments continue circling the Earth, their orbits crossing those of other objects. Paint chips, lost bolts, pieces of exploded rockets--all have already become tiny satellites, traveling at about 27,000 kilometers per hour, 10 times faster than a high-powered rifle bullet. A marble traveling at such speed would hit with the energy of a one-ton safe dropped from a three-story building. Anything it strikes will be destroyed and only increase the debris. With enough orbiting debris, pieces will begin to hit other pieces, fragmenting them into more pieces, which will in turn hit more pieces, setting off a chain reaction of destruction that will leave a lethal halo around the Earth. To operate a satellite within this cloud of millions of tiny missiles would be impossible: no more Hubble Space Telescopes or International Space Stations. Even communications and GPS satellites in higher orbits would be endangered. Every person who cares about the human future in space should also realize that weaponizing space will jeopardize the possibility of space exploration.

This dooms humanity to extinction-Colonization is key to survival

Baum 10 (Seth D., Ph.D, scholar at Columbia University's Center for Research on Environmental Decisions, “Cost–Benefit Analysis Of Space Exploration: Some Ethical Considerations”, Space Policy Volume 25, Issue 2, May, pg 75-80, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964609000198)

Another non-market benefit of space exploration is reduction in the risk of the extinction of humanity and other Earth-originating life. Without space colonization, the survival of humanity and other Earth-originating life will become extremely difficult – perhaps impossible – over the very long term. This is because the Sun, like all stars, changes in its composition and radiative output over time. The Sun is gradually converting hydrogen into helium, thereby getting warmer. In some 500 million to one billion years, this warming is projected to render Earth uninhabitable to life as we know it [25] and [26]. Humanity, if it still exists on Earth then, could conceivably have developed technology to survive on Earth despite these radical conditions. Such technology may descend from present proposals to “geoengineer” the planet in response to anthropogenic climate change [27] and [28].2 However, later – around seven billion years later – the Sun will lose mass that spreads into Earth's orbit, causing Earth to slow, be pulled into the Sun, and evaporate. The only way life could survive on Earth would be if, by sheer coincidence (the odds are on the order of one in 105 to one in 106 [29]), the planet happened to be pulled out of the Solar System by a star system that was passing by. This process might enable life to survive on Earth much longer, although the chances of this are quite remote. While space colonization would provide a hedge against these very long-term astronomical threats, it would also provide a hedge against the more immediate threats that face humanityand other species. Such threats include nuclear warfare, pandemics, anthropogenic climate change, and disruptive technology [30]. Because these threats would generally only affect life on Earth and not life elsewhere, self-sufficient space colonies would survive these catastrophes, enabling life to persist in the universe. For this reason, space colonization has been advocated as a means of ensuring long-term human survival [32] and [33]. Space exploration projects can help increase the probability of long-term human survival in other ways as well: technology developed for space exploration is central to proposals to avoid threats from large comet and asteroid impacts [34] and [35]. However, given the goal of increasing the probability of long-term human survival by a certain amount, there may be more cost-effective options than space colonization (with costs defined in terms of money, effort, or related measures). More cost-effective options may include isolated refuges on Earth to help humans survive a catastrophe [36] and materials to assist survivors, such as a how-to manual for civilization [37] or a seed bank [38]. Further analysis is necessary to determine the most cost-effective means of increasing the probability of long-term human survival.

Ext. Space Debris

Weaponization Increases Space Debris

Zhang 5 (Hui, Senior Research Associate, Harvard University, Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China, Arms Control Association, Dec 2005, http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1943, KR)

China also fears the increasing population of space debris. Such debris, resulting from 50 years of space activity, already poses a considerable hazard to spacecraft. Under U.S. space weaponization plans, this crowding problem could worsen as a large number of space weapons could be deployed in LEO. The launching and testing of weapons would also increase space debris. Moreover, deploying space-based weapons in the increasingly crowded realm of LEO would leave less room for civilian systems. Those problems would also occur during periods of peace. If a number of satellites were to be destroyed during the course of a war, some scientists warn, they would create so much debris that it would prevent future satellites from being stationed in space and generally limit space access. Indeed, pointing to the debris problem, Chinese scientists and officials have said that space weaponization should be considered an environmental threat as well as a security problem.

Space war causes debris

Krepon 5 (Michael, “Seven Questions: Space Weapons”, Foreign Policy, 8/19/05, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2005/08/18/seven\_questions\_space\_weapons, KR)

Once you blow something up in space, the debris lingers. It isnt like a sea battle where the remains of two warships sink to the bottom. The last anti-satellite weapons test was carried out in 1985 by the United States. We took aim at an old, dying Air Force satellitejust as a testand it created 200 pieces of debris that were large enough to track. The last piece of debris finally left low Earth orbit 17 years later, and one of the pieces came within 1 mile of the International Space Station and could have done significant damage. Debris is the single greatest threat to the space shuttle.

Space arms race causes enoughspace debris to block future satellites. Zhang 05.

(Hui Zhang, a Senior Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China, Arms Control Association. December 2005. NP. <http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1943> DM)

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Space warfare creates dangerous debris

The Space Review **8,** (Taylor Dinerman, “Messy Battlefields,” 3-24-2008 <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1089/1> EL)

When it happens, war in space is going to be a very messy business, especially in low Earth orbit (LEO), where most of the really lucrative targets are. Big high-performance spy satellites are especially important. They provide those nations that own and operate them with very high-resolution imagery across swaths of the electromagnetic spectrum. Knocking them out in the first moments of a conflict is going to be a priority. During the Cold War this was expected and planned for. The US expected to USSR to knock out its big Keyhole satellites as a prelude to an all-out nuclear attack. It was one of the reasons why some leaders in the US figured they could count on at least a small margin of early warning. Today, when the possibility of a major nuclear war has receded, space warfare may be fought without the cloud of atomic uncertainty hanging over every operation. According to one report in *Aviation Week*, the US is now building a pair of advanced Keyhole satellites at a cost of about $15 billion. The idea that the US will launch a defenseless military asset that costs $7.5 billion seems to defy logic, yet that is exactly what the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) seems to have in mind. As space technology spreads, the incentives for small and medium-sized states to seek space warfare capability increases. A dictator who does not want to end the way Saddam Hussein did may seek way to hurt US warfighting capability in such a way as to impose major costs and casualties on the US early on. The destruction of a major US satellite would be both a substantive and a symbolic victory over the US. Hitting a number of satellites would increase the effect. Such an attack would result in a major increase in the amount of debris orbiting the Earth. This would be the equivalent of a “scorched earth” policy if enough deadly debris were created. One possibility that has not been publicly examined might be to build highly- or ultra-destructive ASAT weapons that would literally pulverize the target and leave nothing behind but bits of dust. Even small particles can do some damage, but paint flakes like those that sometimes hit space shuttles have not managed to destroy an orbiter.

Weapons Bad – Arms Race (1/1)

Weaponization triggers an arms race

Zhang 5 (Hui, Senior Research Associate, Harvard University, Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China, Arms Control Association, Dec 2005, http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1943, KR)

One major Chinese concern about U.S. space weaponization plans, as addressed frequently in statements at the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD), is that the deployment of space weapons “will disrupt strategic balance and stability, undermine international and national security and do harm to the existing arms control instruments, in particular those related to nuclear weapons and missiles, thus triggering new arms races.”[14] Because space weapons are at once threatening and vulnerable, it is reasonable to assume that other countries would attempt to block such a move by political and, if necessary, military means. One possible response, for example, would be the development of anti-satellite weapons to target space-based weapon systems. It is widely believed that space weapons and sensor satellites would themselves become prime high-value targets and the most vulnerable elements for defense suppression attacks.[15] It is reasonable to believe that other countries could resort to a number of low-cost and relatively low-technology anti-satellite devices to counter those critical and vulnerable U.S. space-based weapons. Eventually, China fears that the U.S. space weaponization plan would lead to an arms race in outer space and turn outer space into a battlefield.

Nuclear War

Cox 7 (Stan, Staff writer, Real-Life Star Wars: The Militarization of Space”, Global Research, 11/19/07, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=7373>, KR)

They stress that the first deployment of weapons will set off a multi-trillion-dollar arms race, risk littering orbital space with enough debris to make it unusable for any civilian purpose, and possibly trigger a nuclear war. The central problem is the vulnerability of orbiting spacecraft. They have the great advantage of "seeing"vast regions of the Earth's surface, but that leaves them hanging out there fully exposed. Space objects not only have nowhere to hide; they also move in fully predictable ways, making them vulnerable to attack at an adversary's convenience. USSTRATCOM's Gen. Kehler -- who, ironically, bears a slight resemblance to the late actor Peter Sellers (but only as he played the amiable [President Muffley](http://www.strategic-air-command.com/gallery/movies/dr_strangelove.htm), not the crazed Dr. Strangelove) -- emphasized that dilemma with an old war axiom: "If the enemy's within range, so are you." That places space weapons in a classic "use 'em or lose 'em" position, pushing their owner to launch a preemptive strike at the first sign of danger. In the words of one analyst, "The hair trigger that characterized nuclear deterrence during the Cold War would be elevated to the heavens."

Ext. Arms Race

Space Weaponization risks Arms Race

Blazejewski 8 (Kenneth, JD/MPA joint degree student at NYU School of Law and the Woodrow Wilson School, Space Weaponization and US-China Relations, Strategic Studies Quarterly, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Spring/blazejewski.pdf, KR)

First, if the United States proceeds with space weaponization China will respond by bolstering its own military capabilities.37 China’s response will seek to preserve the asymmetric threat it poses to US space assets and maintain its nuclear deterrent. Under each of the interpretations considered, China is not willing to allow the United States to build up its space weapons program unchallenged. In the least, China would develop additional ASAT weapons to which the United States would seek to develop effective countermeasures.38 Alternatively or in addition, China could invest in more ICBMs and nuclear warheads,39 acquiring the capacity to overwhelm a BMD shield. An option less likely in the near future, China could counter US space weaponization by deploying its own space weapons. Other potential Chinese responses include adopting a “launch on warning” policy or abandoning its no-first-use pledge.40 Each of these strategies would seek to counter the effectiveness of US space weapons. The United States, of course, could always respond to China’s response, but such tit-for-tat policy making risks devolving into an arms race. Chinese officials claim that an arms race would “likely emerge” unless a negotiated solution can be reached on PAROS.41 It is noteworthy, however, that under at least two interpretations, this is not China’s preferred outcome. Under the first and second interpretations, China will only proceed with further developing ASAT technology and acquiring additional weapons if it cannot be assured that the United States does not plan to weaponize outer space.

Space Weapons inevitably trigger an arms race

Eisendrath and Caldicott 5 (Craig, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and an adjunct professor at Temple University and Helen, Helen Caldicott, MD. PHYSICIAN – AUTHOR – SPEAKER, No weapons in space, The Baltimore Sun, 5/16/05, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2005-05-16/news/0505160107\_1\_weapons-in-space-space-based-weapons-outer-space, KR)

First, placing weapons in space inevitably would provoke an arms race there. Such a race eventually would consume hundreds of billions of dollars. It is simply inconceivable that the United States could place weapons in outer space without provoking other nations such as China, Russia, Japan and countries in the European Union to do the same.

Ext. Arms Race

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Weapons Bad – US Russia War (1/2)

Space Weapons Cause Nuclear Miscalc and US-Russia War

Lewis 4 (James, Analyst, CDI, What if Space Were Weaponized? Possible Consequences for Crisis Scenarios, Center for Defense Information, July 2005, http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf, KR)

By 2010, the United States may, in fact, have an arsenal of ASATs (perhaps even on orbit 24/7) ready to conduct these kinds of missions – to coerce opponents and, if necessary, support preemptive attacks. Moscow would certainly have to worry that these ASATs could be used in conjunction with other space-enabled systems – for example, long-range strike systems that could attack targets in less than 90 minutes – to disable Russia’s nuclear deterrent before the Russian leadership understood what was going on. What would happen if a piece of space debris were to disable a Russian early-warning satellite under these conditions? Could the Russian military distinguish between an accident in space and the first phase of a U.S. attack? Most Russian early-warning satellites are in elliptical Molniya orbits (a few are in GEO) and thus difficult to attack from the ground or air. At a minimum, Moscow would probably have some tactical warning of such a suspicious launch, but given the sorry state of Russia’s warning, optical imaging and signals intelligence satellites there is reason to ask the question. Further, the advent of U.S. on-orbit ASATs, as now envisioned50 could make both the more difficult orbital plane and any warning systems moot. The unpleasant truth is that the Russians likely would have to make a judgment call. No state has the ability to definitively determine the cause of the satellite’s failure. Even the Accidental Nuclear War Scenarios 27 United States does not maintain (nor is it likely to have in place by 2010) a sophisticated space surveillance system that would allow it to distinguish between a satellite malfunction, a debris strike or a deliberate attack – and Russian space surveillance capabilities are much more limited by comparison. Even the risk assessments for collision with debris are speculative, particularly for the unique orbits in which Russian early-warning satellites operate. During peacetime, it is easy to imagine that the Russians would conclude that the loss of a satellite was either a malfunction or a debris strike. But how confident could U.S. planners be that the Russians would be so calm if the accident in space occurred in tandem with a second false alarm, or occurred during the middle of a crisis? What might happen if the debris strike occurred shortly after a false alarm showing a missile launch? False alarms are appallingly common – according to information obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) experienced 1,172 “moderately serious” false alarms between 1977 and 1983 – an average of almost three false alarms per week. Comparable information is not available about the Russian system, but there is no reason to believe that it is any more reliable.51 Assessing the likelihood of these sorts of coincidences is difficult because Russia has never provided data about the frequency or duration of false alarms; nor indicated how seriously earlywarning data is taken by Russian leaders. Moreover, there is no reliable estimate of the debris risk for Russian satellites in highly elliptical orbits.52 The important point, however, is that such a coincidence would only appear suspicious if the United States were in the business of disabling satellites – in other words, there is much less risk if Washington does not develop ASATs. The loss of an early-warning satellite could look rather ominous if it occurred during a period of major tension in the relationship. While NATO no longer sees Russia as much of a threat, the same cannot be said of the converse. Despite the warm talk, Russian leaders remain wary of NATO expansion, particularly the effect expansion may have on the Baltic port of Kaliningrad. Although part of Russia, Kaliningrad is separated from the rest of Russia by Lithuania and Poland. Russia has already complained about its decreasing lack of access to the port, particularly the uncooperative attitude of the Lithuanian government. 53 News reports suggest that an edgy Russia may have moved tactical nuclear weapons into the enclave.54 If the Lithuanian government were to close access to Kaliningrad in a fit of pique, this would trigger a major crisis between NATO and Russia. Under these circumstances, the loss of an early-warning satellite would be extremely suspicious. It is any military’s nature during a crisis to interpret events in their worst-case light. For example, consider the coincidences that occurred in early September 1956, during the extraordinarily tense period in international relations marked by the Suez Crisis and Hungarian uprising.55 On one evening the White House received messages indicating: 1. the Turkish Air Force had gone on alert in response to unidentified aircraft penetrating its airspace; 2. one hundred Soviet MiG-15s were flying over Syria; 3. a British Canberra bomber had been shot down over Syria, most likely by a

Weapons Bad – US Russia War (2/2)

MiG; and 4. The Russian fleet was moving through the Dardanelles. Gen. Andrew Goodpaster was reported to have worried that the confluence of events “might trigger off … the NATO operations plan” that called for a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union. Yet, all of these reports were false. The “jets” over Turkey were a flock of swans; the Soviet MiGs over Syria were a smaller, routine escort returning the president from a state visit to Moscow; the bomber crashed due to mechanical difficulties; and the Soviet fleet was beginning long-scheduled exercises. In an important sense, these were not “coincidences” but rather different manifestations of a common failure – human error resulting from extreme tension of an international crisis. As one author noted, “The detection and misinterpretation of these events, against the context of world tensions from Hungary and Suez, was the first major example of how the size and complexity of worldwide electronic warning systems could, at certain critical times, create momentum of its own.” Perhaps most worrisome, the United States might be blithely unaware of the degree to which the Russians were concerned about its actions and inadvertently escalate a crisis. During the early 1980s, the Soviet Union suffered a major “war scare” during which time its leadership concluded that bilateral relations were rapidly declining. This war scare was driven in part by the rhetoric of the Reagan administration, fortified by the selective reading of intelligence. During this period, NATO conducted a major command post exercise, Able Archer, that caused some elements of the Soviet military to raise their alert status. American officials were stunned to learn, after the fact, that the Kremlin had been acutely nervous about an American first strike during this period.56 All of these incidents have a common theme – that confidence is often the difference between war and peace. In times of crisis, false alarms can have a momentum of their own. As in the second scenario in this monograph, the lesson is that commanders rely on the steady flow of reliable information. When that information flow is disrupted – whether by a deliberate attack or an accident – confidence collapses and the result is panic and escalation. Introducing ASAT weapons into this mix is all the more dangerous, because such weapons target the elements of the command system that keep leaders aware, informed and in control. As a result, the mere presence of such weapons is corrosive to the confidence that allows national nuclear forces to operate safely.

MAGNITUDE – WAR WITH RUSSIA THE ONLY EXISTENTIAL RISK BECAUSE OF SHEER MAGNITUDE OF NUCLEAR ARSENALS

Bostrom 2 - Ph.D. Philosophy @ Oxford and really smart dude

(Nick, Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, <http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html>)

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization. Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently.

Ext. Russia War

Weaponization causes Russian Miscalc

Scheetz 6(Lori, Trade expert, Infusing Environmental Ethics into the Space Weapons Dialogue, Georgetown International Environment Law Review, Fall 2006, pg. 62, KR)

Many in the arms control community, on the other hand, believe that space weapons will destabilize the global community and promote a costly arms race. Emphasizing the destabilizing consequences of space weapons, Thomas Graham Jr. asserts that, because American missile interceptors in space could quickly wipe out Russian early warning satellites, the mere existence of these weapons will escalate tension between the two countries and place Russia on constant alert. One false signal from an early warning satellite could lead to a Russian nuclear strike. Moreover, weaponization of space might not significantly reduce American vulnerability to attack because most weapons systems will depend on ground facilities and radio links, which can be attacked through electronic hacking and jamming. The actual weaponry based in space is also susceptible to attack.

Ext. Russia War

A space weapons treaty solves instability on earth - prevents Russia/China reaction

Povdig & Zhang 8 (Pavel, research associate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University and former researcher at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, and Hui, research associate at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, “Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space”, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, March 2008, <https://www.amacad.org/publications/militarySpace.pdf>, preface pg v., JH)

In recent years, Russia and China have urged the negotiation of an international treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space. The United States has responded by insisting that existing treaties and rules governing the use of space are sufficient. The standoff has produced a six-year deadlock in Geneva at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, but the parties have not been inactive. Russia and China have much to lose if the United States were to pursue the programs laid out in its planning documents. This makes probable the eventual formulation of responses that are adverse to a broad range of U.S. interests in space. The Chinese anti-satellite test in January 2007 was prelude to an unfolding drama in which the main act is still subject to revision. If the United States continues to pursue the weaponization of space, how will China and Russia respond, and what will the broader implications for international security be? The American Academy called upon two scholars to further elucidate answers to these questions and to discuss the consequences of U.S. military plans for space. Pavel Podvig, a research associate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University and former researcher at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, discusses possible Russian responses, given their current capabilities and strategic outlook. Hui Zhang, a research associate at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, considers Chinese responses. Each scholar suggests that introducing weapons into space will have negative consequences for nuclear proliferation and international security. As Podvig points out, Russia’s main concern is likely to be maintaining strategic parity with the United States. This parity will be destroyed by the deployment of weapons in space, making a response from Russia likely. Podvig writes, “Russia does not have many options for the development of its own weapon systems in space or for its reaction to the development of this capability by other countries. . . . However, this does not mean that there will be no reaction.” He suggests that Russia will be more likely to undertake other countermeasures such as extending the life of its ballistic missiles, measures that are “the most significant and dangerous global effects of new military developments, whether missile defense or space-based weapons.” Zhang arrives at similar conclusions. He describes how U.S. plans will negatively affect peaceful uses of outer space, disrupting current civilian and commercial initiatives, but focuses on a much greater concern among Chinese officials—that actions by the United States in space will result in a loss of strategic nuclear parity. China’s options for response, as detailed by Zhang, include building more ICBMs, adopting countermeasures against missile defense, developing ASAT weapons, and reconsidering China’s commitments on arms control. Thus introducing weapons into space would destabilize the already vulnerable international non-proliferation regime. Zhang concludes, “U.S. space weaponization plans would have potentially disastrous effects on international security and the peaceful use of outer space. This would not benefit any country’s security interests.”

Weapons Bad – China War (1/1)

U.S. space weaponization causes an arms race with China and risks a war over Taiwan. Zhang 05.

(Hui Zhang, a Senior Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China, Arms Control Association. December 2005. NP. <http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1943> DM)

Historically, China’s stated purpose for developing nuclear weapons was to guard itself against nuclear blackmail. Beijing’s official statements do not discuss potential responses to U.S. space weaponization, but many Chinese officials and scholars argue that China must ensure that U.S. efforts do not negate the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent. As one Chinese official stated: China is not in a position to conduct an arms race with the United States and it does not intend to do so, particularly in the field of missile defense. However, China will not sit idly by and watch its strategic interests being jeopardized without taking necessary measures. It is quite possible and natural for China to review its military doctrine and a series of policies on the relationship with big powers, Taiwan issues, arms control and nonproliferation, etc. Certainly, the best option for China is to reach an arms control agreement to prevent space weaponization, as it is advocating now. However, if this effort fails and if what China perceives as its legitimate security concerns are ignored, China would very likely develop other responses to neutralize the perceived threat. Because it is not clear what type of missile defense system the United States will finally deploy or whether the U.S. space control plans will be implemented, it is difficult to identify conclusively China’s specific countermeasures. Yet, there are certain options that it would be likely to consider. It should be noted that these discussions are based on China’s capabilities and do not characterize China’s intentions.

( ) The impact is extinction

Straits Times 2k [Jun 25, LEXIS]

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

Ext. China War

China will neutralize the perceived threat of US space militarization

[Zhang](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/print/1943#bio) 5, (Hui Zhang, Ph.D. Restoration Robotics, Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China, December 2005, <http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1943> EL)

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Weapons Bad – Soft Power (1/2)

Weaponization Kills Soft Power-hugely unpopular

Brown 9 (Trevor, BA, Indiana University, Soft Power and Space Weaponization, Air & Space Power Journal, 1 March 2009, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/spr09/brown.html, KR)

The military options for Russia and China are not very appealing since neither can compete directly with the United States in space on an equal financial, military, or technical footing. Consequently, their first and best choice is the diplomatic route through the United Nations (UN) by presenting resolutions and treaties in hopes of countering US space-weaponization efforts with international law. Although such attempts have thus far failed to halt US plans, they have managed to build an international consensus against the United States. Indeed, on 5 December 2007, a vote on a UN resolution calling for measures to stop an arms race in space passed by a count of 178 to one against the United States, with Israel abstaining.6 The problem for the United States is that other nations believe it seeks to monopolize space in order to further its hegemonic dominance.7 In recent years, a growing number of nations have vocally objected to this perceived agenda. Poor US diplomacy on the issue of space weaponization contributes to increased geopolitical backlashes of the sort leading to the recent decline in US soft power—the ability to attract others by the legitimacy of policies and the values that underlie them—which, in turn, has restrained overall US national power despite any gains in hard power (i.e., the ability to coerce).8 The United States should not take its soft power lightly since decreases in that attribute over the past decade have led to increases in global influence for strategic competitors, particularly Russia and China. The ramifications have included a gradual political, economic, and social realignment, otherwise known as “multipolarism” and translated as waning US power and influence. “Soft power, therefore, is not just a matter of ephemeral popularity; it is a means of obtaining outcomes the United States wants. . . . When the United States becomes so unpopular that being pro-American is a kiss of death in other countries’ domestic politics, foreign political leaders are unlikely to make helpful concessions. . . . And when U.S. policies lose their legitimacy in the eyes of others, distrust grows, reducing U.S. leverage in international affairs.”9 Due to US losses of soft power, the international community now views with suspicion any legitimate concerns that the United States may have about protecting critical assets in space, making it far more difficult politically for the Air Force to make plans to offer such protection.

Weapons Bad – Soft Power (2/2)

Soft Power is key to heg

Layne, 09 Professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher, “The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality”,  International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1, Summer 2009)

In The Post-American World, Fareed Zakaria argues that both China and India are rising great powers and are destined to emerge as the number two and three economies in the world during the next several decades (p. 21). But, in an odd formulation, he says that his book is “not about the decline of America but rather about the rise of everyone else” (p. 1).22 Indeed, Zakaria’s view of the United States’ power trajectory is remarkably sanguine. Instead of mounting traditional geopolitical challenges, he argues, China and India are focusing on soft power challenges to U.S. primacy. Thus, China has adopted an “asymmetric” strategy comprising skillful diplomacy and economic statecraft, and highlighting its own model of political and economic development, to make itself “an attractive partner, especially in a world in which the United States is seen as an overbearing hegemon” (p. 127).23 Although his book’s title is provocative, Zakaria engages in the literary equivalent of bait and switch, because he concludes that U.S. relative power, in fact, is not declining significantly. Although paying lip service to the notion that the post-1991 unipolar order is waning, Zakaria maintains that the United States can retain most of its international political dominance. Such decline as the United States is experiencing, he says, is economic—not geopolitical—and shallow, not steep (pp. 42–45).24 Zakaria argues, moreover, that the problems besetting the U.S. economy—overconsumption, low savings, current account and budget deficits, and reliance on foreign creditors—could be fixed except that a dysfunctional U.S. political system is incapable of undertaking needed reforms (pp. 210–214). When Zakaria looks at U.S. “decline,” he sees a glass still nearly full rather than one half-empty and leaking. The world, he says, is moving America’s way with respect to modernization, globalization, human rights, and democracy [End Page 155] (p. 218). The United States has the opportunity to “remain the pivotal player in a richer, more dynamic, more exciting world” (p. 219). All it must do is to renounce the unilateralism and blunderbuss diplomacy that characterized the George W. Bush administration, and revert to its tradition of working through multilateral institutions and relying on diplomacy and persuasion. Zakaria argues that the United States can remain at the center of the international system for a long time to come because there is “still a strong market for American power, for both geopolitical and economic reasons. But even more centrally, there remains a strong ideological demand for it” (p. 234). The United States can remain the pivot of international politics by assuaging the need of rising powers for validation of their status; avoiding the imposition of its preferences on the rest of the world; and engaging in “consultation, cooperation, and even compromise” (p. 233).25 For the United States, Zakaria argues, the way to retain preeminence in the emerging international system is through soft power, not hard power.

**Solves Nuclear War**

**Khalilzad 95** (Zalmay, Policy Analyst, The Washington Quarterly, “Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War,” Spring 1995, Vol. 18, No. 2, KR**)**

A world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and receptive to American values--democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, renegade states, and low level conflicts. Finally, U S leadership would help preclude the rise of another global rival, enabling the U S and the world to avoid another cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange.

Weaponization Bad-Soft Power

**Space Weaponization Crushes US Soft Power**

Krepon 4(Michael, Weapons in the Heavens: A Radical and Reckless Option, Arms Control Today, http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary\_0286-5378395\_ITM, November 2004, KR)

Even if space weapons are not used, their flight-testing or presence overhead, capable of impairing a country’s ability to see, hear, navigate, detect impending danger, and fight, would have profound implications for international relations. The medium of space is not country-specific. The placement of space weapons in low-Earth orbit will be of concern to any country over which the space weapon passes or could pass with orbital adjustments. Washington policy-makers do not talk often or publicly about space warfare, and China and Russia continue to seek improved ties to the United States. There is, however, considerable awareness in Moscow and Beijing about the Pentagon’s plans and deep skepticism that the Pentagon’s interest in space warfare is directed solely at states such as North Korea and Iran. Instead, the Air Force’s new counterspace doctrine is widely viewed in the broader context of the Bush Administration’s endorsement of pre-emptive strikes and preventive wars, open-ended national missile defense deployments, and the integration of improved broad-area surveillance and conventional deep-strike capabilities alongside US nuclear forces, which remain on high states of alert.

Space Weapons Destroy Relations

Krepon 7(Michael, Co-Founder of the Stimson Center, Space Assurance or Space Dominance?

THE CASE AGAINST WEAPONIZING SPACE, Stimson Center, 1/30/07, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/spacebook.pdf, KR)

U.S. initiatives to “seize” the high ground of space are likely to be countered by asymmetric and unconventional warfare strategies carried out by far weaker states—in space and to a greater extent on Earth. In addition, U.S. initiatives associated with space dominance would likely alienate longstanding allies, as well as China and Russia, whose assistance is required to effectively counter terrorism and proliferation, the two most pressing national security concerns of this decade. No U.S. ally has expressed support for space warfare initiatives. To the contrary, U.S. initiatives to weaponize space would likely corrode bilateral relations and coalition-building efforts. Instead, the initiation of preemptive or preventive warfare in space by the United States based on assertions of an imminent threat—or a threat that cannot be ameliorated in other ways—is likely to be met with deep and widespread skepticism abroad.

Space Weaponization collapses IR

Krepon 4(Michael, Weapons in the Heavens: A Radical and Reckless Option, Arms Control Today, http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary\_0286-5378395\_ITM, November 2004, KR)

Weaponizing space would poison relations with China and Russia, whose help is essential to stop and reverse proliferation. ASAT weapon tests and deployments would surely reinforce Russia’s hair-trigger nuclear posture, and China would likely feel compelled to alter its relaxed nuclear posture, which would then have negative repercussions on India and Pakistan. The Bush Administration’s plans would also further alienate America’s friends and allies, which, with the possible exception of Israel, strongly oppose the weaponization of space. The fabric of international controls over weapons of mass destruction, which is being severely challenged by Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, could rip apart if the Bush Administration’s interest in testing space and nuclear weapons is realized.

Ext. Soft Power

Space Weapons Destroy Relations

Krepon 7(Michael, Co-Founder of the Stimson Center, Space Assurance or Space Dominance?

THE CASE AGAINST WEAPONIZING SPACE, Stimson Center, 1/30/07, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/spacebook.pdf, KR)

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Weaponization Kills Soft Power-hugely unpopular

Brown 9 (Trevor, BA, Indiana University, Soft Power and Space Weaponization, Air & Space Power Journal, 1 March 2009, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/spr09/brown.html, KR)

The military options for Russia and China are not very appealing since neither can compete directly with the United States in space on an equal financial, military, or technical footing. Consequently, their first and best choice is the diplomatic route through the United Nations (UN) by presenting resolutions and treaties in hopes of countering US space-weaponization efforts with international law. Although such attempts have thus far failed to halt US plans, they have managed to build an international consensus against the United States. Indeed, on 5 December 2007, a vote on a UN resolution calling for measures to stop an arms race in space passed by a count of 178 to one against the United States, with Israel abstaining.6 The problem for the United States is that other nations believe it seeks to monopolize space in order to further its hegemonic dominance.7 In recent years, a growing number of nations have vocally objected to this perceived agenda. Poor US diplomacy on the issue of space weaponization contributes to increased geopolitical backlashes of the sort leading to the recent decline in US soft power—the ability to attract others by the legitimacy of policies and the values that underlie them—which, in turn, has restrained overall US national power despite any gains in hard power (i.e., the ability to coerce).8 The United States should not take its soft power lightly since decreases in that attribute over the past decade have led to increases in global influence for strategic competitors, particularly Russia and China. The ramifications have included a gradual political, economic, and social realignment, otherwise known as “multipolarism” and translated as waning US power and influence. “Soft power, therefore, is not just a matter of ephemeral popularity; it is a means of obtaining outcomes the United States wants. . . . When the United States becomes so unpopular that being pro-American is a kiss of death in other countries’ domestic politics, foreign political leaders are unlikely to make helpful concessions. . . . And when U.S. policies lose their legitimacy in the eyes of others, distrust grows, reducing U.S. leverage in international affairs.”9 Due to US losses of soft power, the international community now views with suspicion any legitimate concerns that the United States may have about protecting critical assets in space, making it far more difficult politically for the Air Force to make plans to offer such protection.

Ext. Soft Power

space weaponization will kill US soft power

Brown 9 (Trevor Brown,  BA, Indiana University; MSc, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University [Singapore]) is a new author interested in political, economic, and military strategy for the medium of space., March 1st 2009, <http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/spr09/brown.html#brown> EL)

The problem for the United States is that other nations believe it seeks to monopolize space in order to further its hegemonic dominance.7 In recent years, a growing number of nations have vocally objected to this perceived agenda. Poor US diplomacy on the issue of space weaponization contributes to increased geopolitical backlashes of the sort leading to the recent decline in US soft power—the ability to attract others by the legitimacy of policies and the values that underlie them—which, in turn, has restrained overall US national power despite any gains in hard power (i.e., the ability to coerce).8 The United States should not take its soft power lightly since decreases in that attribute over the past decade have led to increases in global influence for strategic competitors, particularly Russia and China. The ramifications have included a gradual political, economic, and social realignment, otherwise known as “multipolarism” and translated as waning US power and influence. “Soft power, therefore, is not just a matter of ephemeral popularity; it is a means of obtaining outcomes the United States wants. . . . When the United States becomes so unpopular that being pro-American is a kiss of death in other countries’ domestic politics, foreign political leaders are unlikely to make helpful concessions. . . . And when U.S. policies lose their legitimacy in the eyes of others, distrust grows, reducing U.S. leverage in international affairs.”9 Due to US losses of soft power, the international community now views with suspicion any legitimate concerns that the United States may have about protecting critical assets in space, making it far more difficult politically for the Air Force to make plans to offer such protection.

Ext. Soft Power

**Space weaponization risks preemptive strike as well as killing soft power**

Coffelt 2005 (CHRISTOPHER A. COFFELT, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, THE BEST DEFENSE: CHARTING THE FUTURE OF US SPACE STRATEGY AND POLICY , June 2005, [www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=111160&coll=limited](http://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=111160&coll=limited) EL)

Putting weapons in space may elicit a preemptive attack from a threatened state or states. Striking in the early phases of a space weapon deployment is advantageous because the new weapon system may not have its full capability. Additionally, striking before the United States could potentially prepare and mass for a first-strike gives the threatened state its best chance for success. Aside from the militarily negative consequences of deploying weapons into space, there are also distinct non-military disadvantages. Weaponizing space also decreases the United States’ ability to influence adversaries and achieve policy objectives short of military action (soft power). It undermines the legitimacy of the United States’ actions and its role as the leader of the free world. How can the United States assume the mantle of world leadership if it continues to act unilaterally at the expense of the international cooperation, peace, and interests it claims to value? Putting weapons in space is the ultimate unilateral act and affords no opportunity to form “coalitions of the willing.”289 the united states currently enjoys a significant superiority in air/land/sea combat power, robustly enhanced and enabled by space capabilities. In this position of advantage, it makes little strategic sense to disrupt the status quo with the deployment of destabilizing, offensive weapons in space. Putting weapons in space or pursuing an offensive space strategy upsets an advantageous status quo and overplays the United States’ hand, shortening the period of advantage. Moreover, if, as some believe, the world is on a path to the inevitable weaponization of space, there are clear advantages in assuming the follower role.

Ext. Soft Power

Space weaponization prevents US power projection and risks direct strikes on satellites and cities

Hitchens 2 (Theresa Hitchens, Center for Defense Information Vice President, Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette? April 18th 2002, <http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm> EL)

Spurring other nations to acquire space-based weapons of their own, especially weapons aimed at terrestrial targets, would certainly undercut the ability of U.S. forces to operate freely on the ground on a worldwide basis — negating what today is a unique advantage of being a military superpower.32 U.S. commercial satellites would also become targets, as well as military assets (especially considering the fact that the U.S. military is heavily reliant on commercial providers, particularly in communications). Depending on how widespread such weapons became, it also could even put U.S. cities at a greater risk than they face today from ballistic missiles.

Weapons Bad – Economy (1/2)

Space Weapons Kill Commercial Space

Hitchens 2 (Theresa, Director Of United Nations Institute For Disarmament Research. Director Of United Nations Institute For Disarmament Research, "Space Weapons: More Security or Less?, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2002, http://cns.miis.edu./pubs/opapers/op10/op10.pdf, KR)

The competitive and cost challenges the U.S. satellite industry faces could be increased if the United States moved to make space a battlefield. Until now, the threat that commercial satellites could become direct wartime casualties has been negligible. But an aggressive U.S. pursuit of ASATs would likely encourage others to do the same, thus potentially heightening the threat to commercial satellites. This could be costly for industry, especially because current commercial satellites have little protection (electronic hardening, for example, has been considered too expensive). There would be costs for increasing protection, not to mention the likely further skyrocketing of already sky-high insurance costs, and it is not at all clear that the U.S. government would cover all those costs.

Commercial Space sector key to Economy

Gydesen 6 (Paul, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, What Is The Impact To National Security Without Commercial Space Applications?, Air University, Feb 06, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc/gydesen.pdf, KR)

The United States is growing more and more economically dependent upon commercial space assets. Commercial space applications are vitally important to the prosperity, economic well-being, and overall confidence of the business climate**.** Space applications enhance such things as: television broadcast, telecommunications, navigation, and computer network timing. Revenue from space commerce was $97 billion in 2003 and is projected to top $137 billion by 2009. The availability of space systems, especially Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation and timing data, continues to find new uses within industry. This includes: power generation, mapping services, agriculture, and public utilities. Without the use of satellite systems by commercial companies, the impact to the United States economy could be severe in the short term. Over the long term, the national security of the United States can be maintained. A sudden loss of satellite services could cause economic chaos. The greatest risk to the economy is in overall consumer confidence. When American consumers cannot receivecable TV, satellite TV, cash from ATMs, they may lose confidence and stop spending money; pushing the economy into a recession. The extent of the chaos is dependent upon how quickly critical services such as financial transactions, network timing, and stock market services can be switched to fiber-optic networks. Currently, the fiber-optic network has many terabits of excess capacity. Strong leadership from government officials and a quick conversion to fiber-optic is critical.

Weapons Bad – Economy (2/2)

Economic decline cause nuclear war.

Liutenant Colonel Bearden -2K (Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army, 2000, The Unnecessary Energy Crisis: How We Can Solve It, 2000, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Big- Medicine/message/642)

Bluntly, we foresee these factors - and others { } not covered - converging to a catastrophic collapse of the world economy in about eight years. As the collapse of the Western economies nears, one may expect catastrophic stress on the 160 developing nations as the developed nations are forced to dramatically curtail orders. International Strategic Threat Aspects History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China - whose long range nuclear missiles can reach the United States - attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is his side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all, is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs, with a great percent of the WMD arsenals being unleashed . The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.

Ext. Economy

Commercial Satellites Key to the Economy

Dacey 2 (Robert, Director of Information Security, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Commercial Satellite

Security Should Be More Fully Addressed, GAO, 10/3/02, http://www.gao.gov/htext/d02781.html, KR)

The commercial satellite industry is also a critical component of the worldwide and national economy: the industry generated $85 billion in revenue in 2000. Accordingly, disruption of satellite services, whether intentional or not, can have a major adverse economic impact. One indication of the importance of satellite services was provided in 1998 by the failure of the Galaxy IV satellite, which disrupted 80 to 90 percent of 45 million pagers across the United States for 2 to 4 days and blocked credit card authorization at point-of-sale terminals (such as gasoline pumps).

Weaponization kills private sector space development

Kaufman et al 8 (Richard, Director of Bethesda Research Institute, Henry Hertzfeld, and Jeffrey Lewis, SPACE, SECURITY AND THE ECONOMY, Economists for Peace and Security, Sept 8, http://www.epsusa.org/publications/papers/spacesecurity.pdf, KR)

However, continued growth and dynamism, especially in the commercial space sector is dependent on a space environment that is free of conflict. The policy of space dominance threatens that precondition. If there are more anti-satellite tests, or if space-based missile defenses are deployed, it will be difficult to prevent the proliferation of weapons in space. The next step could be the transformation of space from an area of peaceful use into an area of conflict. Once the process of weaponization gets under way, the ability to use the space environment for peaceful purposes will be put at risk, as a number of experts have warned.13 At some point commercial investors in space will have to consider the security of their investments. It is hard to believe they would place additional resources at risk in a vulnerable area of military conflict.

Space Weapons disincentivize investment- Increase Financial Risk

Space War 7 (Staff Writers, Teal Group Assesses Satellite Market Impact Of China ASAT Test, Space War, 1/22/07,http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Teal\_Group\_Assesses\_Satellite\_Market\_Impact\_Of\_China\_ASAT\_Test\_999.html, KR)

The event likely added hundreds of trackable debris objects and tens of thousands of small particles to the growing problem," he said. The Briefing stresses the fact that these types of military activities in space can have a significant and immediate impact on the commercial satellite market. In the 1980s when the US conducted its last ASAT weapon test, there were far fewer commercial satellites than there are today, especially in LEO. Teal Group estimates that there are about 175-200 LEO commercial satellites currently in operation, in addition to other types of satellites and the International Space Station (ISS). The operational hardware in LEO represents a public/private investment of about $120 billion. According to Caceres, "The overall satellite market is in the midst of a resurgence following a down cycle of roughly 5-6 years." He continues, "An ASAT weapons race will have the effect of increasing the financial risk of any satellite program, and this will undoubtedly be felt most within the commercial market through decreased investor confidence and(or) high insurance rates."

Ext. Economy

Space weaponization kills competitiveness and results in satellite destruction

Hitchens 2 (Theresa Hitchens, Center for Defense Information Vice President, Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette? April 18th 2002, <http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm> EL)

The competitive and cost challenges the U.S. satellite industry faces could be increased if the United States moved to make space a battlefield. Up to now,the threat that commercial satellites could become direct wartime casualties has been negligible. But an aggressive U.S. pursuit of ASATs would likely encourage others to do the same, thus potentially heightening the threat to U.S. satellites. Space industry executives, whose companies often are working atthe margins of profitability, are concerned about U.S. commercial satellites and their operations becoming targets, especially because current commercial satellites have little protection (electronic hardening, for example, has been considered too expensive). There would be costs to commercial providers for increasing protection, and it is highly unclear whether the U.S. government would cover all those costs.

Weapons Bad – Terrorism

Space militarization kills heg, triggers a massive global race risking international war, and increasing terrorism

Hitchens 2 (Theresa Hitchens, Center for Defense Information Vice President, Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette? April 18th 2002, <http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm> EL)

It is inconceivable that either Russia or China would allow the United States to become the sole nation with space-based weapons. "Once a nation embarks down the road to gain a huge asymmetric advantage, the natural tendency of others is to close that gap. An arms race tends to develop an inertia of its own," writes Air Force Lt. Col. Bruce M. DeBlois, in a 1998 article in Airpower Journal.[29](http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm" \l "_ftn29" \o ")  Chinese moves to put weapons in space would trigger regional rival India to consider the same, in turn, spurring Pakistan to strive for parity with India. Even U.S. allies in Europe might feel pressure to "keep up with the Joneses." It is quite easy to imagine the course of a new arms race in space that would be nearly as destabilizing as the atomic weapons race proved to be. Such a strategic-level space race could have negative consequences for U.S. security in the long run that would outweigh the obvious (and tremendous) short-term advantage of being the first with space-based weapons. There would be direct economic costs to sustaining orbital weapon systems and keeping ahead of opponents intent on matching U.S. space-weapon capabilities — raising the proverbial question of whether we would be starting a game we might not be able to win. (It should be remembered that the attacker will always have an advantage in space warfare, in that space assets are inherently static, moving in predictable orbits. Space weapons, just like satellites, have inherent vulnerabilities.) Again, the price tag of space weapons systems would not be trivial — with maintenance costs a key issue. For example, it now costs commercial firms between $300 million and $350 million to replace a single satellite that has a lifespan of about 15 years, according to Ed Cornet, vice president of Booz Allen and Hamilton consulting firm.[30](http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm" \l "_ftn30" \o ")  Many experts also argue there would be costs, both economic and strategic, stemming from the need to counter other asymmetric challenges from those who could not afford to be participants in the race itself. Threatened nations or non-state actors might well look to terrorism using chemical or biological agents as one alternative. Karl Mueller, now at RAND, in an analysis for the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base, wrote, "The United States would not be able to maintain unchallenged hegemony in the weaponization of space, and while a space-weapons race would threaten international stability, it would be even more dangerous to U.S. security and relative power projection capability, due to other states' significant ability and probably inclination to balance symmetrically and asymmetrically against ascendant U.S. power.

Weapons Bad – Hegemony

Space weaponization key to U.S. hegemony

Dolman 5 (Everett C. Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the U.S. Air Force, “US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space,” September 14th 2005 [http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space\_hearing\_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20%26%20Space.pdf](http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space_hearing_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20%2526%20Space.pdf) EL)

This rationality does not dispute the fact that US deployment of weapons in outer space would represent the addition of a potent new military capacity, one that would assist in extending the current period of American hegemony well into the future. This would clearly be threatening, and America must expect severe condemnation and increased competition in peripheral areas. But such an outcome is less threatening than any other state doing so. Placement of weapons in space by the United States would be perceived correctly as an attempt at continuing American hegemony. Although there is obvious opposition to the current international balance of power, the *status quo*, there is also a sense that it is at least tolerable to the majority of states. A continuation of it is thus minimally acceptable, even to states working towards its demise. So long as the US does not employ its power arbitrarily, the situation would be bearable initially and grudgingly accepted over time.

Weapons Bad – Hegemony

Space weaponization causes backlash and undermines conventional U.S. hegemony

Katz-Hyman and [Krepon](http://spacedebate.org/author/577) 2003 ( [Assurance or Space Dominance The Case Against Weaponizing Space](http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=81), April 2003, <http://spacedebate.org/evidence/1304/> EL)

Given the extraordinary and growing differential in power that the United States enjoys in ground warfare, sea power, and air power, it is hard to propound compelling arguments for seeking to supplement these advantages by weaponizing space. The current U.S. lead in the military utilization of space has never been greater and is unchallenged. If the United States pushes to extend its pronounced military dominance into space, others will view this through the prism of the Bush administration's national security strategy, which places emphasis on preventive war and preemption. Foreign leaders will not passively accept U.S. initiatives to implement a doctrine of space dominance. They will have ample, inexpensive means to take blocking action, as it is considerably easier to negate U.S. dominance in space than on the ground, at sea, and in the air. The introduction of space weaponry and ASAT testing are therefore likely introduce grave complications for the terrestrial military advantages that the United States has worked so hard, and at such expense, to secure.

Weapons Bad – PreEmptive Strikes

Space Weaponization necessitates preemptive strikes

Krepon 7(Michael, Co-Founder of the Stimson Center, Space Assurance or Space Dominance?

THE CASE AGAINST WEAPONIZING SPACE, Stimson Center, 1/30/07, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/spacebook.pdf, KR)

In space, as with terrestrial missile defenses, it is far more challenging to mount a successful defense than to penetrate a soft target. Because of their threatening nature and their vulnerability, weapons designed for space warfare, whether on the ground or in orbit, would become extremely high-value targets. To prevent a precarious and dangerous mix of satellites interspersed with ASATs, the United States would seek to prevent space mines and other attacking devices either from being launched or from being parked in orbit. Alternatively, if the United States does not prevent the deployment of foreign ASATs in space, it must be prepared to wage war by shooting first and asking questions later. Military operations in space would thus be placed on continual hair-trigger alert because successful dominance in space would not be possible without the capacity for preemptive strikes or preventive measures. Having first crossed key thresholds relating to the flight-testing and deployment of space weaponry, would the United States arrogate to itself the right during peace time to carry out preemptive strikes to prevent others from following suit? And having rejected arms control arrangements prohibiting the flight-testing and deployment of space weaponry, would the United States seek to impose or dictate these constraints solely on others, and by force of arms?

**Weapons Bad – Instability**

**U.S. space weaponization cause global instability, lead to a space arms race, lead to a U.S. Russia war, and cause an Indo-pak nuclear war. Zhang 05**

(Hui Zhang, a Senior Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China, Arms Control Association. December 2005. NP. <http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1943> DM)

One major Chinese concern about U.S. space weaponization plans, as addressed frequently in statements at the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD), is that the deployment of space weapons “will disrupt strategic balance and stability, undermine international and national security and do harm to the existing arms control instruments, in particular those related to nuclear weapons and missiles, thus triggering new arms races.”[[14](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/print/1943#note14)] Because space weapons are at once threatening and vulnerable, it is reasonable to assume that other countries would attempt to block such a move by political and, if necessary, military means. One possible response, for example, would be the development of anti-satellite weapons to target space-based weapon systems. It is widely believed that space weapons and sensor satellites would themselves become prime high-value targets and the most vulnerable elements for defense suppression attacks.[[15](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/print/1943#note15)] It is reasonable to believe that other countries could resort to a number of low-cost and relatively low-technology anti-satellite devices to counter those critical and vulnerable U.S. space-based weapons. Eventually, China fears that the U.S. space weaponization plan would lead to an arms race in outer space and turn outer space into a battlefield. Moreover, space weaponization would seriously disrupt the arms control and disarmament process. The initiation of U.S. space-based missile defenses would likely cause Russia as well as the United States (in response to Russia) to make smaller reductions in their nuclear arsenals. China would likely be forced to build more warheads to maintain its nuclear deterrent, which could in turn encourage India and then Pakistan to follow suit. Also, Russia has threatened to respond to any country’s deployment of space weapons. Failure to proceed with the nuclear disarmament process would also further undermine the already fragile nuclear nonproliferation regime. As Ambassador Hu Xiaodi warned in 2001, “With lethal weapons flying overhead in orbit and disrupting global strategic stability, why should people eliminate [weapons of mass destruction] or missiles on the ground? This cannot but do harm to global peace, security and stability, hence be detrimental to the fundamental interests of all states.”

Space weapons would destabilize the world. Liller 11.

(Dwayne E. Lillier, Peacekeeper instructor of the USAF in Warren AFB in Wyoming. America Needs Space, High Frontier. 6/30/11. Page 36. <http://www.scribd.com/doc/1448689/US-Air-Force-AFD060524005> DM)

Military operations in the air also offer some insights for future space policy. The first has to do with issues of state sovereignty. Foreign aircraft, while not actually occupying the territory of another nation by flying over it, are seen as violating state sovereignty if the flight is not authorized. When one thinks of the potential intelligence gathering equipment or weapons employed aboard aircraft, it becomes obvious why nations choose to include airspace into their territorial sovereignty. This same concept can surely be applied to space where intelligence gathering assets can look down on any nation and weapons, if employed, could threaten multiple nations. It is equivalent to having an armed or spy aircraft flying over any nation on earth at any time. Intelligence gathering satellites are already in space and were an important asset through the Cold War and remain vital today. Nations have begrudgingly tolerated their existence because they could either do nothing about it or the information the satellites provided served to prevent a broader and devastating conflict. Opponents to weapons in space theorize that intelligence assets in space are 'stabilizing' due to the information they provide while weapons in space are 'overtly threatening and destabilizing.' Weapons in space do present the problem of directly threatening a nation, much as an armed aircraft does, but with little or no way to detect or prevent attack.

Weapons Bad – Accidents

Space militarization sparks accidental war

Ritchie, 82, (David Ritchie, tomic Energy Commission's first chairman “Space War,” 1982 <http://spacedebate.org/evidence/1768/> EL)

Perhaps the greatest danger posed by the militarization of space is that of war by accident. At any given time, several thousand satellites and other pieces of equipment -- spent booster stages and the like -- are circling the earth, most of them in low orbit. The space immediately above the atmosphere has begun to resemble an expressway at rush hour. It is not uncommon for satellites to miss each other by only a kilometer or two, and satellites crashing into each other may explain some of the mysterious incidents in which space vehicles simply vanish from the skies. One civillian TV satellite has been lost in space; it never entered its intended orbit, and no signals were heard from it to indicate where it might have gone. Collision with something else in space seems a reasonable explanation of this disappearance. Even a tiny fragment of metal striking a satellite at a relative velocity of a few kilometers per second would wreck the satellite, ripping through it like a Magnum slug through a tin can. Now suppose that kind of mishap befell a military satellite -- in the worst possible situation, during a time of international tension with all players in the spacewar game braced for attacks on their spacecraft. The culpable fragment might be invisible from the ground; even something as small and light as a paper clip could inflict massive damage on a satellite at high velocity. Unaware of the accident, a less than cautious leader might interpret it as a preconceived attack. Wars have begun over smaller incidents

AT: Not Inevitable - Weaponization Now

N/UQ-China perceives US space weaponization now

Zhang 11 (Baohui, PhD in polital science and associate professor at Lingnan University, The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship: The Prospects for Arms Control, Asian Survey, April 11, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink?Ver=1&Exp=06-27-2016&FMT=7&DID=2350421351&RQT=309)

Li Daguang, one of the most influential PLA experts on space war, also alleges that the U.S. has initiated “a new space war” to maintain its status as “the overlord of space.” He claims that the ultimate goal of the U.S. space program is to “build a powerful military empire in outer space that attempts to include any space between earth and moon under American jurisdiction.” Under this empire, “without U.S. permission, any country, including even its allies, will not be able to use outer space for military or other purposes.”20 One particular concern for the Chinese military is that the U.S. may no longer be content with merely militarizing space, which involves extensive use of satellites for military operations. Instead, weaponization of space is on the agenda. The PLA now believes that the U.S. is on the verge of important breakthroughs in the development of weapons for space war. As one study claims: “Currently, the U.S. military already possesses or will soon possess ASAT technologies with real combat capabilities, such as aircraft-launched ASAT missiles, land-based laser ASAT weapons, and space-based energy ASAT weapons.”21 Moreover, the PLA suggests that the U.S. is trying to acquire space-based weapons to attack targets on earth: The U.S. military is developing orbital bombers, which fly on low altitude orbits, and when given combat orders, will re-enter the atmosphere and attack ground targets. This kind of weapon has high accuracy and stealth capability, and is able to launch sudden strikes. These capabilities make it impossible for 19. Ibid., p. 250. 20. Li Daguang, “Meiguo Xingqiou Dazhan Jian Zhi Zhongguo Zhankai Yichang Xin Leng- zhan” [The sword of U.S. space war plan points toward China and indicates a new cold war], October 21, 2008, Huanqiu shibao [Global Times], <http://world.huangiu.com/roll/2008-10/258122.html>, accessed October 22, 2008. 21. Xu Hezhen, Zuozhan Fangshi di Geming Xing Bianhua, p. 252. 318 • ASIAN SURVEY 51:2 enemies to defend against. Orbital bombers thus can strike at any target any- where on the planet. It is the major means for the U.S. military to perform global combat in the 21st century.22 This perception of the American lead in space militarization and attempts for its weaponization is a major motive for the Chinese military to develop simi- lar projects and thus avoid U.S. domination in future wars. The PLA believes that control of the commanding heights will decide the outcome of future wars, and China cannot afford to cede that control to the U.S. As a result, space war is a key component of the PLA Air Force’s (PLAAF) new doc- trines. In 2006 the PLAAF released a comprehensive study called Military Doctrines for Air Force, which makes the following statement: In future wars, merely possessing air superiority will no longer be sufficient for seizing the initiative of battles. In significant ways, only obtaining space supe- riority could ensure controlling the initiative of war. The contest in outer space has become the contest for the new commanding heights. Seizing con- trol of space will mean control of the global commanding heights, which will in turn enable dominance in air, land, and sea battles. Thus, it is impossible to achieve national security without obtaining space security.23

AT: Not Inevitable – Weaponization Now

China perceives Vision for 2020 as a weaponization plan-should have triggered the link

Zhang 11 (Baohui, PhD in polital science and associate professor at Lingnan University, The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship: The Prospects for Arms Control, Asian Survey, April 11, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink?Ver=1&Exp=06-27-2016&FMT=7&DID=2350421351&RQT=309)

Chinese strategists certainly perceive the U.S. quest for space dominance as damaging to China’s national security; whoever controls space will have the edge in winning the next war. Indeed, Chinese military and civilian strategists argue that the U.S. search for “absolute security” jeopardizes other countries’ security. It is widely reported in Chinese military literature that the U.S. has already developed and is in fact implementing a master plan for military dominance in space. The challenge for China is to prevent the U.S. from jumping too far ahead. As observed by a major study organized by the General Staff of the PLA, “In recent decades the U.S. has been consistently pursuing dominance in space in order to become its overlord.”18 The study also points out that the U.S. is the first country to develop a full set of doc- trines for space militarization and dominance: In April 1998, the U.S. Space Command published its long-term strategic development plan, Vision for 2020, which specifically proposed the concept of space dominance and revealed the goals of allowing the American military to use space weapons to attack the enemy’s land, sea, air, and space targets. World opinion believes this represented the formal debut of U.S. space war theory and indicated an important first step by the U.S. military toward space war.19

N/UQ-X-37s are Space weapons

Lasker 10 (John, Freelance Journalist, US Space Weapon Now Circling the Globe, Toward Freedom, 5/27/10, http://towardfreedom.com/home/content/view/1980/1/, KR)

The X-37 officially is a US Military Space Place or MSP, and like most US space weapons, spreading anxiety across the globe. The Pentagon also has an unknown number of "dual purpose" space planes in the works; the Pentagon has publicly stated in their budgets these prototypes have been tested in wind tunnels. They might be space bombers, but no one is completely sure. They're so secret, no one can say what they'll be used for or how far developed they are.   A space vehicle that can repair, deploy and even attack satellites, or insert reconnaissance drones back into the atmosphere - all within hours of orders - is also desired. As one NASA official put it, the space plane will "be the key to opening and conquering the space frontier." To those trying to keep weapons out of space, such as Gagnon and his Global Network, the orbiting X-37 is a set-back. "I would say it is one of the first (space weapons) to be deployed, so yes the X-37 is now operating in space and should be defined as a space-based weapon," says Gagnon. "The Pentagon though will claim it is not permanently stationed in space and thus falls outside the Outer Space Treaty - which is why we are strong advocates for a new comprehensive treaty to ban all weapons in space."