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# BMD 1NC

## 1NC Uniqueness- BMD

### Obama has cut funding for missile defense programs that would threaten China and Russia; new programs would undo this and force their militarization.

Zhang 11 (Baohui, March/April, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship”, Asian Survey, Pg 325-27, Vol. 51, No. 2, http://www.jstor.org/action/showArticleInfo?doi=10.1525%2FAS.2011.51.2.311)

NEW DIRECTION IN U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE The space security dilemma could also be moderated if the U.S. is willing to restrain its missile defense, which has been a key driver of China’s military space programs. Now, the Obama administration’s willingness to curb missile defense for both financial and diplomatic reasons offers new hope. The administration has reduced the budget for missile defense and cancelled potentially controversial weapons systems. For the 2010 budget year, the administration has asked Congress for $7.8 billion to fund missile defense, a cut of about $1.2 billion from 2009. More important, the Obama government has cancelled the development of new weapons systems, including Northrop’s Kinetic Energy (KEI) program and Lockheed Martin’s Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) program. The KEI system was being designed for boost-phase interception of ballistic missiles and would have constituted a key part of a multilayered missile defense system. This multilayered approach presents a great threat to China and Russia because it improves the probability of successful interception. Moreover, the system requires forward deployment to achieve boost-phase interception, which could generate controversies with China and Russia. Although the Obama administration’s official justification for cancelling the program was its high cost and potentially limited combat effectiveness, concerns about Chinese and Russian reactions may have played a role in the decision. Chinese and Russian concerns were certainly important in the cancellation of the MKV program, which was being designed to use independently guided submunitions to intercept not only warheads but also decoys or other countermeasures during a missile attack. The system was once considered vital for countering potential actions by China or Russia to overwhelm U.S. missile defense. Indeed, the system was designed “to restore balance between offense and defense.” Chinese nuclear deterrence experts were gravely concerned by the emerging MKV program, calling it “a snake with nine heads” for its ability to intercept multiple targets. If deployed, the MKV program certainly would have triggered strong protests from both China and Russia. The official cancellation for strategic reasons was explained by Secretary Gates in his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on May 13, 2009. Gates stated that MKV was cancelled because it “was designed to deal with a more complex threat that would have potentially come from either China or Russia.” 46 Thus, the message to China and Russia was that they should not overly worry about U.S. missile defense. Indeed, the Obama administration has stated that missile defense will now focus on threats from rogue states like Iran and North Korea. The Chinese military has paid keen attention to the cancellation of the MKV program. For example, one analysis called the end of MKV “truly a surprise, since for both technical and security considerations the U.S. military does not have good reasons to do so.” The analysis concluded that the decision could be understood only in the context of U.S. strategic adjustment and as “a compromise in its long-term strategic goals.” Specifically, the decision was made to “complement Obama’s new global diplomacy,” which seeks to build partnerships with other major powers such as China and Russia. 47

## 1NC Link- China- BMD

### BMD forces china to militarize space, causing an arms race culminating in space weaponization.

Zhang 11 (Baohui, March/April, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship”, Asian Survey, Pg 319, Vol. 51, No. 2, http://www.jstor.org/action/showArticleInfo?doi=10.1525%2FAS.2011.51.2.311)

COUNTERING U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE The second factor adding to the security dilemma in the U.S.-China military space relationship involves U.S. efforts to rewrite the established rule of nuclear deterrence, i.e., mutually assured destruction (MAD), that prevailed during the Cold War era. According to Glasner and Fetter, the U.S. has been pursuing a new deterrence posture that combines offensive and defensive capabilities. 25 Chinese strategists believe that the U.S. military space program, to a significant extent, is driven by missile defense. For example, in a study organized by the General Staff of the PLA, Major General Xu Hezhen charges that the U.S. is developing space-based laser weapons for missile defense. According to him, “A total of 14–24 satellites deployed on different orbits will constitute a defensive system. Relying on data from early warning systems, it can intercept ballistic missiles launched from anywhere in the world.” 26 In another study, Major General Ling Yongshun argues that the U.S. is implementing a coherent plan to neutralize other countries’ strategic deterrence through the deployment of space-based missile defense. As he observes: Using space weapons to attack ballistic targets is a major goal of space weapon development. The U.S. believes that others’ ballistic missiles pose significant threats to its security. To be immune from this threat, the U.S. is putting major efforts into ballistic missile defense, with space-based weapons being one of the important intercepting platforms. 27 In October 2008, the U.S. Congress approved $5 million for an independent study of possible space-based missile defense. This move gravely alarmed the Chinese military, which believed that the deployment of space-based missile defense could become inevitable. In fact, some PLA experts have claimed that “Star Wars has come back.” 28 Li Daguang even charged that this decision by the U.S. Congress amounted to “declaring a new Cold War against China.” 29 Chinese military strategists believe U.S. missile defense poses a real threat to China’s nuclear deterrent. Until recently, the Chinese military tended to believe that U.S. missile defense could not effectively deter a major nuclear power like China or Russia. It was thought that a range of countermeasures, such as deploying decoys and multiple warheads, could be employed to deceive and overwhelm U.S. missile defense. Now, however, with the maturing of a multilayered missile defense system by the U.S. and its allies, Chinese nuclear experts are losing confidence in China’s offensive capabilities. This pessimism was illustrated in a 2008 interview of Wang Wenchao in a Chinese military magazine. Wang, credited with being the chief designer of China’s sea-based strategic missiles, expressed grave pessimism about China’s offensive nuclear capability against U.S. missile defense. He said, “I have done research: Facing a multi-tiered missile defense system, if any single layer can achieve a success rate of 70%, then 100 single warhead missiles could all be intercepted even if they are mounting a simultaneous attack.” 30 This is why Wu Tianfu—arguably the most important deterrence strategist of the Second Artillery of the PLA, which runs China’s strategic nuclear forces—charges that the U.S. has “forced China to engage in a space arms race.” 31 More specifically, U.S. missile defense has forced China to integrate space war with its strategic nuclear deterrence. China must possess the ability to weaken American space-based assets such as early-warning satellites, to ensure the credibility of its own offensive nuclear forces. Thus, space war and nuclear war are now intertwined in Chinese strategic thinking. Indeed, China’s official media have credited Wu with establishing the PLA’s first space war research institute. 32 Shen Dingli, a prominent Chinese nuclear expert, also states that the January 2007 ASAT test was crucial for China’s nuclear deterrence: “When an America with both superior nuclear and conventional arsenals aspires to build missile defense, China’s response is first to oppose it verbally, then counter it with action if the U.S. refuses to stop. China cannot afford to lose the effectiveness of its still-limited nuclear deterrent.” 33 The result is China pursuing an emerging integrated space-nuclear strategy. As argued by Hou Xiaohe and Zhang Hui, strategists at the PLA National Defense University, space warfare will aim at the eyes and ears of missile defense, which are early-warning satellites and other sensors deployed in space. China’s ability to cripple these U.S. space assets will significantly weaken the effectiveness of American missile defense, allowing less time and providing less accurate information to guide ground-based interceptors toward the incoming missiles. The strategists also point out that this strategy is more cost-effective than merely expanding China’s nuclear missiles: “Using limited resources to develop anti-satellite weapons to attack enemy space assets that are costly and easily damaged will become an important choice for weaker countries.” 34 Lieutenant General Ge Dongsheng gives the most systematic elaboration of the new integrated space-nuclear strategy: “Developing space capability and creating a new type of integrated space-nuclear strategic force is the guarantee of effective deterrence and counter-strike.” According to General Ge, this strategy is now a necessity with the emerging link between space war and nuclear deterrence: With the development and integration of space and information technologies, we must recognize that early warning, surveillance, tracking, communication and guidance, which are all critical for nuclear war, are increasingly dependent on space systems. Thus, improving nuclear capability through space capability is now an unavoidable trend. We therefore must accelerate the development of space capability to create a new type of integrated space-nuclear strategic force. . . . Through anti-satellite weapons, we can clear a pathway for nuclear missiles so that our nuclear force can survive, effectively penetrate, and accurately hit targets. 35 The Chinese effort to integrate nuclear and space warfare capabilities is an inevitable response to the security dilemma created by U.S. missile defense. As Joan Johnson-Freese and Thomas Nicols point out, “It is unsurprising that other nations would logically view the same capability as a direct threat to the effectiveness of their own nuclear deterrent.” They argue that given the very limited size of the Chinese nuclear deterrent, U.S. missile defense has forced China to pursue space war capabilities as a countermeasure. 36

## 1NC BMD Impact

### Space weapons accidentally fire- escalation to the worst war of history would be inevitable.

Mitchell et al., Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh, Ayotte and Helwich, Teaching Fellows in the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, 2001 (Dr. Gordon R., Kevin J., David Cram, ISIS Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defence, "Missile Defence: Trans-Atlantic Diplomacy at a Crossroads", No. 6 July, http://www.isisuk.demon.co.uk/0811/isis/uk/bmd/no6.html)

A buildup of space weapons might begin with noble intentions of 'peace through strength' deterrence, but this rationale glosses over the tendency that '… the presence of space weapons…will result in the increased likelihood of their use'.33 This drift toward usage is strengthened by a strategic fact elucidated by Frank Barnaby: when it comes to arming the heavens, 'anti-ballistic missiles and anti-satellite warfare technologies go hand-in-hand'.34 The interlocking nature of offense and defense in military space technology stems from the inherent 'dual capability' of spaceborne weapon components. As Marc Vidricaire, Delegation of Canada to the UN Conference on Disarmament, explains: 'If you want to intercept something in space, you could use the same capability to target something on land'. 35 To the extent that ballistic missile interceptors based in space can knock out enemy missiles in mid-flight, such interceptors can also be used as orbiting 'Death Stars', capable of sending munitions hurtling through the Earth's atmosphere. The dizzying speed of space warfare would introduce intense 'use or lose' pressure into strategic calculations, with the spectre of split-second attacks creating incentives to rig orbiting Death Stars with automated 'hair trigger' devices. In theory, this automation would enhance survivability of vulnerable space weapon platforms. However, by taking the decision to commit violence out of human hands and endowing computers with authority to make war, military planners could sow insidious seeds of accidental conflict. Yale sociologist Charles Perrow has analyzed 'complexly interactive, tightly coupled' industrial systems such as space weapons, which have many sophisticated components that all depend on each other's flawless performance. According to Perrow, this interlocking complexity makes it impossible to foresee all the different ways such systems could fail. As Perrow explains, '[t]he odd term "normal accident" is meant to signal that, given the system characteristics, multiple and unexpected interactions of failures are inevitable'.36 Deployment of space weapons with pre-delegated authority to fire death rays or unleash killer projectiles would likely make war itself inevitable, given the susceptibility of such systems to 'normal accidents'. It is chilling to contemplate the possible effects of a space war. According to retired Lt. Col. Robert M. Bowman, 'even a tiny projectile reentering from space strikes the earth with such high velocity that it can do enormous damage — even more than would be done by a nuclear weapon of the same size!'. 37 In the same Star Wars technology touted as a quintessential tool of peace, defence analyst David Langford sees one of the most destabilizing offensive weapons ever conceived: 'One imagines dead cities of microwave-grilled people'.38 Given this unique potential for destruction, it is not hard to imagine that any nation subjected to space weapon attack would retaliate with maximum force, including use of nuclear, biological, and/or chemical weapons. An accidental war sparked by a computer glitch in space could plunge the world into the most destructive military conflict ever seen.

# Weapons DA 1NC

## 1NC Uniqueness

### Obama is working toward a ban of space weapons now, and has reversed tension initiated by space missile defense plans- now is key to prevent space weaponization.

Zhang 11 (Baohui, March/April, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship”, Asian Survey, Pg 328-31, Vol. 51, No. 2, http://www.jstor.org/action/showArticleInfo?doi=10.1525%2FAS.2011.51.2.311)

Important changes in U.S. strategic posture, missile defense, and the Taiwan Strait situation may now allow Washington and Beijing to extricate themselves from their space security dilemma, paving the way for arms control. In fact, these changes have already led to rising optimism among Chinese security experts with regard to the possibility of arms control in outer space. Zhao Kejin, a space security expert at Qinghua University, argues that there is no need for China to “engage the U.S. in a space arms race.” Instead, “Facing the possibility of emerging anarchy in outer space, China and the U.S. can work together to push for arms control negotiations, with the aim of establishing effective mechanisms for the monitoring and management of outer space.” 50 This upbeat mood among Chinese experts represents a big change from the pessimism of the Bush era. The challenge for China and the U.S. is to seize the opportunity and forge a realistic approach to space arms control. In this regard, China and the U.S. could pursue a two-stage strategy. The first stage would have to focus on reducing strategic misunderstandings and thus the vicious effects of the security dilemma. If so, the root cause of the action/counteraction spiral that defines a classic arms race will lose its hold on the two countries. Recent and important changes in the strategic landscape have improved the chances of achieving such a goal. Once the vicious circle of action and counteraction has been minimized, China and the U.S. could move on to the second stage, which is to pursue multilateral agreements banning weapons in space. Until recently, because of the Bush administration’s steadfast opposition to any legally binding treaty that would limit the U.S.’s military use of space, a multilateral approach to arms control seemed beyond reach. Now, however, the Obama administration’s willingness to take a leadership role in constructing a global treaty offers the hope of success. In the context of the changing strategic landscape between China and the U.S., specific measures could be taken to reduce their mutual concerns. One important measure, often overlooked in the space relationship, is for top civilian leaders to exercise greater oversight over military space programs. Often, statements and actions by the military have driven the fears of the other side. If the U.S. and China intend to build a new partnership in world affairs, civilian leaders must recognize that unscrutinized actions by their own militaries can invite mutual mistrust, which in turn hinders broader political and security cooperation. On the U.S. side, the Obama government needs to take a much closer look at the U.S. Air Force (especially its Space Command) and the Missile Defense Agency. These two institutions periodically try out new space projects that China and Russia perceive as threatening to their national security. For example, in October 2005 the U.S. Air Force conducted a maneuverability experiment with its XSS-11 microsatellite. According to internal Air Force studies, the XSS program was intended as a precursor to an anti-satellite program. Theresa Hitchens, a longtime watcher of the U.S. military space program, suggests that both Congress and the White House should exercise much tighter control over military space programs. She noted during an interview that the U.S. military’s move toward space warfare is a strategic issue with a lot of potential fallout. Thus, the military cannot make that decision on its own. As Hitchens said, “Congress hasn’t asked about this. Congress hasn’t debated this. There hasn’t been a change of White House policy and therefore there has been no public debate. And I think it is a serious mistake. This is something that ought to be debated at the national level with congressional and public input. It’s a bigger deal than just a military decision.” 51 China’s civilian leadership must also rein in the military space program. Indeed, after the 2007 ASAT test, some U.S. experts questioned whether the Chinese civilian leadership fully grasped the issue. Just as many U.S. projects have caused concern in China and Russia, the Chinese leadership must recognize that its own military space projects may be worrying U.S. decision makers. Thus, China’s political leadership needs to understand that restraining its military space program will be vital for forging security cooperation with the U.S.

### Read a specific link, or,

## 1NC Link

### All space activity can be used for military purposes; other nations perceive all space development as weaponization.

Hsu 10 (Jeremy, 05 May, “Is a New Space Weapon Race Heating Up?”, SPACE.com, http://www.space.com/8342-space-weapon-race-heating.html)

A U.S. Air Force space plane and a failed hypersonic glider tested by the Pentagon represent the latest space missions to raise concerns about weapons in space. But while their exact purpose remains murky, they join a host of new space technology tests that could eventually bring the battlefield into space. Some space technology demonstrations are more obviously space weapons, such as the anti-satellite missile capabilities tested by the U.S. and China in recent years. India has also begun developing its own anti-satellite program which would combine lasers and an exo-atmospheric kill vehicle, as announced at the beginning of 2010. The U.S. military and others have also long developed and deployed more neutral space assets such as rockets and satellites for military purposes. In that sense, both the Air Force's X-37B robotic space plane and the HTV-2 hypersonic glider prototype of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) could represent similarly ambiguous technologies which may or may not lead to weapons. "Space has been militarized since before NASA was even created," said Joan Johnson-Freese, a space policy analyst at the Naval War College in Newport, RI. Yet she sees weaponization as a different issue from militarization because "so much space technology is dual use" in terms of having both civilian and military purposes, as well as offensive or defensive use. Such uncertainty regarding space technology can make it tricky for nations to gauge the purpose or intentions behind new prototypes, including the X-37B space plane or the HTV-2 hypersonic glider. The U.S. military could even be using the cloak of mystery to deliberately bamboozle and confuse rival militaries, according to John Pike, a military and security analyst who runs GlobalSecurity.org. He suggested that the X-37B and HTV-2 projects could represent the tip of a space weapons program hidden within the Pentagon's secret "black budget," or they might be nothing more than smoke and mirrors. The devil is in the details Many existing space technologies play dual roles in both military and civilian life. The Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) system which started out as military-only has since become common in consumer smartphones and car navigation systems. Modern rocketry grew in part from the technology and scientific minds behind Nazi Germany's V-2 rockets of World War II, and continued to evolve alongside ballistic missile technology. Even something as basic as a satellite image can be used for either military weapons targeting or civilian crop rotation, Johnson-Freese said. Space plane technology can seem equally ambiguous ? the Air Force deputy undersecretary of space programs scoffed at the notion of X-37B paving the way for future space weapons. "The whole issue is further complicated because beyond technologies like lasers, Rods from God, explosives, etc.... virtually any object traveling in space can be a weapon if it can be maneuvered to run into another object," Johnson-Freese told SPACE.com. Uncertainty matters a great deal for how other nations view the recent U.S. space plane and hypersonic glider tests, regardless of whether or not the technologies lead to future weapons. "They are testing capabilities that could certainly be useful to the military if it chose to use them in an offensive manner," Johnson-Freese said. "And the military has been silent on intent." Intrigue and deception Pike said the current work under way by the U.S. military leaves plenty of room for misinterpretations or even outright deception, which could be a ploy to distract other nations with military space projects. "One of them could be a deception program and the other could be the spitting image of the real thing," Pike noted. He said that such misdirection could force other nations' militaries to waste money chasing down dead ends. Both the Air Force space plane and DARPA's hypersonic glider may have a combined budget of several hundred million dollars per year, Pike estimated. He described such spending as "chump change" compared to the Pentagon's black budget spending in recent years of $6 billion to $8 billion annually ? and he pointed to decades worth of known space plane programs which had amounted to little. "I conclude that the hypersonic trans-atmospheric space plane domain is either unusually badly managed even for government programs, or there's a lot of hocus pocus here," Pike said. "I defy anyone to tell the difference between hocus pocus and mismanagement." Of course, the U.S. military could theoretically make good use of either the X-47B or HTV-2. An operational space plane could launch quickly as a replacement for recon satellites disabled in the opening salvoes of a conflict, and could "play hide and seek" to avoid being shot down easily. Similarly, a hypersonic aircraft or weapon might allow the U.S. to eliminate threats early on without warning.

Look for how specific countries would react.

## 1NC Internal Link

### **If China feels threatened by space weapons, they’ll militarize, and draw India, Pakistan, Russia, and others into a nuclear space arms race.**

Hui 05 (Zhang, “Space Weaponization And Space Security: A Chinese Perspective”, World Security Institute, http://www.wsichina.org/space/focus.cfm?focusid=94&charid=1)

Arms race Due to the threatening nature of space weapons, it is reasonable to assume that China and others would attempt to block their deployment and use by political and, if necessary, military means.11 Many Chinese officials and scholars believe that China should take every possible step to maintain the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent. This includes negating the threats from missile defense and space weaponization plans.12 In responding to any U.S. move toward deployment space weapons, the first and best option for China is to pursue an arms control agreement to prevent not just the United States but any nation from doing so -- as it is advocating presently. However, if this effort fails and if what China perceives as its legitimate security concerns are ignored, it would very likely develop responses to counter and neutralize such a threat. Despite the enormous cost of space-based weapon systems, they are vulnerable to a number of low-cost and relatively low-technology ASAT attacks including the use of ground-launched small kinetic-kill vehicles, pellet clouds or space mines. It is reasonable to believe that China and others could resort to these ASAT weapons to counter any U.S. space-based weapons.13 This, however, would lead to an arms race in space. To protect against the potential loss of its deterrent capability, China could potentially resort to enhancing its nuclear forces. Such a move could, in turn, encourage India and then Pakistan to follow suit. Furthermore, Russia has threatened to respond to any country's deployment of space weapons.14 Moreover, constructing additional weapons would produce a need for more plutonium and highly enriched uranium to fuel those weapons. This impacts China's participation in the fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT).15 Eventually, failure to proceed with the nuclear disarmament process, to which the nuclear weapon states committed themselves under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, would damage the entire nuclear nonproliferation regime itself, which is already at the breaking point. As Hu Xiaodi, China's ambassador for disarmament affairs, asked, "With lethal weapons flying overhead in orbit and disrupting global strategic stability, why should people eliminate weapons of mass destruction or missiles on the ground? This cannot but do harm to global peace, security and stability, and hence be detrimental to the fundamental interests of all States."16

## 1NC Impact

### Space weapons accidentally fire- escalation to the worst war of history would be inevitable.

Mitchell et al., Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh, Ayotte and Helwich, Teaching Fellows in the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, 2001 (Dr. Gordon R., Kevin J., David Cram, ISIS Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defence, "Missile Defence: Trans-Atlantic Diplomacy at a Crossroads", No. 6 July, http://www.isisuk.demon.co.uk/0811/isis/uk/bmd/no6.html)

A buildup of space weapons might begin with noble intentions of 'peace through strength' deterrence, but this rationale glosses over the tendency that '… the presence of space weapons…will result in the increased likelihood of their use'.33 This drift toward usage is strengthened by a strategic fact elucidated by Frank Barnaby: when it comes to arming the heavens, 'anti-ballistic missiles and anti-satellite warfare technologies go hand-in-hand'.34 The interlocking nature of offense and defense in military space technology stems from the inherent 'dual capability' of spaceborne weapon components. As Marc Vidricaire, Delegation of Canada to the UN Conference on Disarmament, explains: 'If you want to intercept something in space, you could use the same capability to target something on land'. 35 To the extent that ballistic missile interceptors based in space can knock out enemy missiles in mid-flight, such interceptors can also be used as orbiting 'Death Stars', capable of sending munitions hurtling through the Earth's atmosphere. The dizzying speed of space warfare would introduce intense 'use or lose' pressure into strategic calculations, with the spectre of split-second attacks creating incentives to rig orbiting Death Stars with automated 'hair trigger' devices. In theory, this automation would enhance survivability of vulnerable space weapon platforms. However, by taking the decision to commit violence out of human hands and endowing computers with authority to make war, military planners could sow insidious seeds of accidental conflict. Yale sociologist Charles Perrow has analyzed 'complexly interactive, tightly coupled' industrial systems such as space weapons, which have many sophisticated components that all depend on each other's flawless performance. According to Perrow, this interlocking complexity makes it impossible to foresee all the different ways such systems could fail. As Perrow explains, '[t]he odd term "normal accident" is meant to signal that, given the system characteristics, multiple and unexpected interactions of failures are inevitable'.36 Deployment of space weapons with pre-delegated authority to fire death rays or unleash killer projectiles would likely make war itself inevitable, given the susceptibility of such systems to 'normal accidents'. It is chilling to contemplate the possible effects of a space war. According to retired Lt. Col. Robert M. Bowman, 'even a tiny projectile reentering from space strikes the earth with such high velocity that it can do enormous damage — even more than would be done by a nuclear weapon of the same size!'. 37 In the same Star Wars technology touted as a quintessential tool of peace, defence analyst David Langford sees one of the most destabilizing offensive weapons ever conceived: 'One imagines dead cities of microwave-grilled people'.38 Given this unique potential for destruction, it is not hard to imagine that any nation subjected to space weapon attack would retaliate with maximum force, including use of nuclear, biological, and/or chemical weapons. An accidental war sparked by a computer glitch in space could plunge the world into the most destructive military conflict ever seen.

# Uniqueness

## Uniqueness

### No space weapons now – US deployment will cause other countries to follow

Michael Krepon, 2005, o-Founder and President of Emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center, a non-profit institution that seeks to promote pragmatic steps to enhance international security. He directs the South Asia program at the Center, Space Security or Space Weapons, <http://www.gsinstitute.org/docs/Stimson_Space_brief.pdf>

The United States has a very important choice to make between space security and space weapons. Space security means that the satellites we depend on every day to save lives, grow our economy, and support national security will remain available when needed. No nation benefits more from space or has more to lose if space becomes a shooting gallery than the United States. Space is now mercifully free of weapons. The last Cold War test of a satellite-killing weapon occurred twenty years ago. This moratorium is now being challenged. The US Air Force has published and seeks to implement a new doctrine calling for space weapons. If the US tests and deploys these weapons, other nations will surely follow suit, and then everyone’s satellites will be endangered. Satellites are expensive and extremely hard to defend. Space weapons don’t cost very much and are easy to build. Debris in space kills indiscriminately. Space warfare would risk the loss of live-saving satellites. We can also expect far greater casualties in war. US leadership, global commerce, and US alliances will suffer. Space weapons undercut national and international security.

### No space weapons now

Michael Krepon, 2005, o-Founder and President of Emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center, a non-profit institution that seeks to promote pragmatic steps to enhance international security. He directs the South Asia program at the Center, “Space weapons and proliferation”, <http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Space_Weapons_and_Proliferation.pdf>

While space has long been used for military purposes, no weapons are deployed in space and the last flight-test of an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon occurred in 1985. Consequently, the resumption of ASAT weapon tests after a hiatus of two decades would be a significant event. During the Cold War, Washington and Moscow were both extremely leery of carrying out the first direct attack against a satellite in the history of warfare. To do so might trigger a nuclear exchange, since nuclear forces depended on satellites for early warning and targeting. Nuclear deterrence and deterrence of space warfare was therefore intertwined.

## Uniqueness- Brink- US/China

### China and the US are at a crossroads in terms of space- now is key to determine whether or not an arms race with China is imminent.

MacDonald 08 (Bruce, September 2008, “China, space weapons, and U.S. security” By W., Council on Foreign Relations, Pgs. 3-4)

On January 11, 2007, China launched a missile into space, releasing a homing vehicle that destroyed an old Chinese weather satellite. The strategic reverberations of that collision have shaken up security think­ing in the United States and around the world. This lest demonstrated that, if it so chose, China could build a substantial number of these anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) and thus might soon be able to destroy substantial numbers of U.S. satellites in low earth orbit (LEO), upon which the U.S. military heavily depends. On February 21, 2008, the United States launched a modified missile-defense interceptor, de­stroying a U.S. satellite carrying one thousand pounds of toxic fuel about to make an uncontrolled atmospheric reentry. Thus, within fourteen months. China and the United States both demonstrated the capability to destroy LEO satellites, heralding the arrival of an era where space is a potentially far more contested domain than in the past, with few rules. Having crossed a space Rubicon with their ASAT demonstrations, neither nation can un-invent these capabilities. As the United States approaches major security policy reviews with the advent of a new administration in early 2009, both it and China face fundamental choices about the deployment and use of such capabilities, and the de­velopment of more advanced space weapons.2 The United States and China stand at a crossroads on weapons and space: whether to control this potential competition, and if so, how. While the United States is likely well ahead of China in offensive space capability, China current­ly is much less dependent on space assets than the U.S. military, and thus in the near term has less to lose from space conflict if it became inevitable. China's far smaller space dependence, which hinders its military potential, ironically appears to give it a potential relative near-term offensive advantage: China has the ability to attack more U.S. space assets than vice versa, an asymmetry that complicates the issue of space deterrence, discussed later. This asymmetric Chinese advantage will likely diminish as China grows increasingly dependent on space over the next twenty years, and as the United States addresses this space vulnerability. Thus, the time will come when the United States will be able to inflict militarily meaningful damage on Chinese space-based assets, establishing a more symmetric deterrence potential in space. Before then, other asymmetric means are available to the United States to deter China, though at possibly greater escalatory risk. That is, the United States could threaten to attack not just Chinese space assets, but also ground-based assets, including ASAT command-and-control centers and other military capabilities. But such actions, which would involve attacking Chinese soil and likely causing substantial direct casualties, would politically weigh much heavier than the U.S. loss of space hardware, and thus might climb the escalatory ladder to a more damaging war both sides would probably want to avoid.

## Uniqueness- Obama

### Obama puts out ban for space weapons

Change. Gov 4/23/07, official website of the office of the president-elect, “The Obama-Biden Plan”, <http://change.gov/agenda/defense_agenda/>

Ensure Freedom of Space: The Obama-Biden administration will restore American leadership on space issues, seeking a worldwide ban on weapons that interfere with military and commercial satellites. They will thoroughly assess possible threats to U.S. space assets and the best options, military and diplomatic, for countering them, establishing contingency plans to ensure that U.S. forces can maintain or duplicate access to information from space assets and accelerating programs to harden U.S. satellites against attack.

## Uniqueness- Canada

### Canada opposed to space weaponization

Allan Thompson, Toronto Star, May 7, 2003, “Canada opposed to weapons in space”, found on lexis

Talks with U.S. to stress land-based system: Graham Cabinet discusses proposed missile defence system Canada is opposed to putting weapons in space and will negotiate with the United States only about an Earth-based missile defence system, Foreign Affairs Minister Bill Graham said yesterday. "Canada's clear policy is we're against weaponization of space and we'll continue to make that position forcefully with the Americans," Graham said after the cabinet finished a prolonged discussion of Canada's potential role in Washington's National Missile Defence program, without coming to a decision. Graham said Canada should enter formal negotiations with the U.S. to "lay down these markers," against putting weapons in space. "Ballistic missile defence, which is what we'll be discussing with the United States, is ballistic missile defence - nothing more, nothing less. That is directed towards an Earth-based interceptor missile, which would intercept another missile coming in," he said. Graham said putting any kind of weapons in orbit could result in an arms race in space.

## Uniqueness- Rus/China

### Russia and China will retaliate if US begins space arms race

Richard Rozoff June 18, 2009, manages the Stop NATO e-mail list (http://groups.yahoo.com/group/stopnato) and website (http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com) and writes on the threat of international militarization, especially on the globalization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Militarization Of Space: Threat Of Nuclear War On Earth”, <http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/08/31/militarization-of-space-threat-of-nuclear-war-on-earth/>

The statement by the Russian and Chinese presidents also came the day after the first-ever heads of state summit of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) nations in the same Russian city. To confirm the seriousness and urgency of Hu's and Medvedev's concerns over the expansion of the arms race and potential armed conflict into space, on the same day as their statement was released Russian Deputy Defence Minister Vladimir Popovkin addressed a press conference in Moscow and issued comments that were summarized by the local media as "Russia warns that technology failure with weapons in space may accidentally invite a massive response amounting to nuclear war." He warned that his nation's "response to American weapons in orbit would be asymmetric but adequate." [3]

## Uniqueness- EU/US

### EU sets up code of conduct banning space weapons – US to sign on in status quo

Washington Times 1/27/11, “U.S., EU eye anti-satellite weapons pact”, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jan/27/us-eu-eye-anti-satellite-weapons-pact/>

The Obama administration is negotiating with the European Union on an agreement limiting the use of anti-satellite weapons, a move that some critics say could curb U.S. development of space weapons in general. Three congressional staffers told The Washington Times that Pentagon and intelligence analysts said in a briefing Monday that the administration is looking to sign on to the European Union’s Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. The briefing followed the completion of an interagency review that recommends the United States sign on to the document with only a few minor changes to its language, according to two administration officials familiar with the review. That recommendation is awaiting final approval from the National Security Council. “The United States is continuing to consult with the European Union on its initiative to develop a comprehensive set of multilateral TCBMs, also known as the Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities,” Rose Gottemoeller, assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification and compliance, said Thursday at the U.N. Conference on Disarmament. TCBM stands for “transparency and confidence-building measures.” \*\*FILE\*\* President Barack Obama (Associated Press) “We plan to make a decision in the coming weeks as to whether the United States can sign on to this code, including what, if any, modifications would be necessary,” Ms. Gottemoeller added. A draft of the code of conduct dated Sept. 27 says countries that sign on to the document vow to “refrain from any action which intends to bring about, directly or indirectly, damage or destruction of outer space objects unless such action is conducted to reduce the creation of outer space debris and/or is justified by the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the United Nations Charter or imperative safety considerations.” The United States has worried about the safety of commercial, intelligence and military satellites for years, but that concern has heightened since 2007. That year, the Chinese military successfully tested a ground-based missile that destroyed one of its own satellites. In 2009, a communications satellite owned by satellite-phone maker Iridium crashed into a Russian satellite over northern Siberia. Both incidents created debris that could collide with other satellites. “Space debris, to me, I equate it with global warming in orbit,” said Matthew Hoey, a military space consultant who has worked for the U.S. government and the U.N. Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies. “It is a race against time, and once we pass the tipping point, there is no reversing it. The ramifications of a collision on economics, space exploration and communications — these are grand issues.” Mr. Hoey said the code of conduct’s emphasis on space debris is “a good thing,” adding that the EU code “is a great precedent.”

## Uniqueness- China

### China is only trying develop a deterrent force, and will not militarize space absent a change in US space policy.

MacDonald 08 (Bruce, September 2008, “China, space weapons, and U.S. security” By W., Council on Foreign Relations, Pgs. 3-4)

China has been developing a significant military and civilian space capability since 1955. This effort was led by Tsien Hsue-shen, a brilliant U.S.-trained rocket scientist who cofounded the U.S. Jet Propulsion Laboratory at Caltech, but whom the United States deported to China during the excesses of the McCarthy era. While Dr. Tsien helped China develop ballistic missiles to improve its nuclear deterrent, Beijing has mainly concentrated on economic development in the past three decades: Ol Deng Xiao ping's "Lour Modernizations," national defense received the least priority. Recently, though still focused on economic growth, China has been building its military strength, including multiple offensive counterspace options, with the I IS. Department of Defense noting China's "multidimensional program to generate the capability to deny others access to outer space."3 Well aware of its military inferiority to the United States, China is likely doing what countries in comparable security situations do: developing military capabilities targeted against the vulnerabilities of its stronger potential adversary. The United States' relative space advantage will probably shrink as China strengthens its space capabilities over the next ten to twenty years. The voluminous People's Liberation Army (PLA) literature on space conflict underscores that PLA officers are explicitly interested in space weapons. But Chinese military writings are no more likely to accurately reflect Beijing's policy than mid level U.S. military writings would Washington's official policy. However, arguments that this PLA literature is merely academic lost some credibility in the aftermath of China's 2007 ASAT test. It is unclear whether China's offensive counterspace capabilities are intended for deterrence or as usable weapons of war, though deterrence is repeatedly discussed. As a possible precedent, China's strategic nuclear policy has been one of minimum deterrence and declared "no first use." The small Chinese nuclear force is not meant to wage war, but is capable of destroying a few cities, a capability that allows China to resist potential foreign coercion. However, space and nuclear deterrence are not the same. Because the effects are not as devastating as the detonation of a nuclear weapon, crossing the space weapons "threshold" is easier, especially if the effects are temporary. Some PLA writings suggest China is considering a "no first use" space weapons policy, though the lower level of destruction in space conflict makes it more likely China would preempt in space if it were advantageous to do so. Some PLA authors see space conflict as a natural evolution of military technology, and space weapons as desirable for China, though others appear to adopt a more deterrence-oriented framework for those weapons. Some in the PLA directly connect Chinese doctrine on strategic nuclear forces with that on space weapons, urging the same "minimum deterrence" doctrine.4 Chinese leader Mao Zedong was explicitly quoted on China's 1975 nuclear policy: "We will not attack unless we are attacked. If we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack." Important for China, as for the United States, would be the credibility and effectiveness of its counterspace forces, which could be either ground or space based. Deploying weapons in space could appear risky to China due to the difficulty in assuring their survivability. The primary weakness of all space-based arms is their vulnerability, making them high-priority targets for opponents and thus a major source of crisis instability by which an attacker would stand to reap significant advantage. In contrast, ground-based space weapons have fewer such drawbacks, being more easily maintained and defended, and thus more difficult to attack. Chinese writings suggest a preference for such weapons over space-based ones. In a number of fora and military writings, China has unofficially indicated that the United States should not underestimate China in space or its ability to respond to U.S. military space initiatives that China perceives as a threat. Chinese specialists have stated that, in addition to protecting their satellites against U.S. offensive capabilities, China will develop a deterrent space force if there is no change in U.S. space policy, which they see as shunning any restrictions and reflecting U.S. attraction to space dominance. They have suggested that China would be prepared to deploy sufficient offensive counterspace capability to build confidence in its ability to deter U.S. use of weapons against Chinese space assets. This would not require China to match U.S. space-force deployments, but to have enough to deter. In general, as the CFR-sponsored Independent Task Force report on U.S.-China relations noted in 2007. "China does not need to surpass, or even catch up with, the United States in order to complicate U.S. defense planning or influence U.S. decision-making in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait or elsewhere. This could reflect Chinese thinking on space weapons, as well.

## Uniqueness- Russia

### Russia no plans for space weapon deployment now

ITAR-TASS news agency, Moscow, in Russian 1703 gmt 26 Aug 04, “Russia has no plans to deploy weapons in space – spokesman”, found on lexis

Text of report by Russian news agency ITAR-TASS Geneva, 26 August: "The Russian Federation does not have plans for the development or deployment in space of any space weapon systems" now or in the near future. This statement was made at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva by the Russian Federation's permanent representative, Leonid Skotnikov, today. "The development of space weapons is not our choice," he noted. Leonid Skotnikov drew attention to the presence of "obvious gaps" in international space law. Among the unregulated types of activity in space can be numbered, in particular, the development of antisatellite weapons and the development of space-based ABM systems. Meanwhile, the appearance of weapons in space carries the risk of "the most serious complications and dangers". The 2002 Russian and Chinese proposal to draw up a treaty preventing the deployment of weapons in space and the use of force or the threat of the use of force against space objects was designed partly to close these "gaps", the envoy noted. Experts in Geneva note that the Russian and Chinese initiative is meeting with broad support in the Disarmament Committee, of which 65 countries are members. French, Canadian, Swedish and Sri Lankan representatives who spoke at the plenary session today backed Russia and China in their evaluation of the problem and voiced additional constructive ideas. Until such time as the international community reaches an appropriate accord on space weapons, Russia proposes that a moratorium be imposed on the deployment of weapons in space by way of a first practical step in this direction.

### Russia has no plans to deploy space weapons now but has capabilities to if US attacks

Moscow News 6/17/9, “Russia: No need for weapons in Space”, <http://www.moscowtopnews.com/?area=postView&id=1212>

Russia does not plan to deploy any weapons in space, Russia's Deputy Defense Minister has said, at least not before it figures out how weapons in space could be useful.Speaking at a press conference in Moscow on Wednesday, the former Commander of Russia's Space Troops, Vladimir Popovkin said technically the task of deploying arms in space was easy, but needed serious consideration MosNews reports. "This is a philosophic question," Popovkin was quoted by RIA Novosti as saying when a journalist asked him whether Russia was developing a system of defense in space. "To get weapons in space, we first need to figure out what we need them for," he said.Popovkin drew attetnion to the costly Cold War era "star wars" between the USSR and the United States, adding there were other means of solving conflicts.

# Links

## Link- Generic 1/3

### Space is a high-ground the military needs, so they piggyback on NASA missions, and NASA gives them all completed technology.

Gagnon 09 (Bruce, March 21, “The Space Arms Race and the NASA Scam”, http://www.antiwar.com/orig/bgagnon.php?articleid=14436)

NASA was created as a civilian agency with a mission to do peaceful space exploration. But the growing influence of the military industrial complex has rubbed out the line between civilian and military programs. When George W. Bush appointed former Secretary of the Navy Sean O'Keefe to head NASA in late 2001, the new space agency director announced that all NASA missions in the future would be "dual use." This meant that every NASA space launch would be both military and civilian at the same time. The military would ride the NASA Trojan horse and accelerate space weapons development without the public's knowledge. NASA would expand space nuclear power systems to help create new designs for weapons propulsion. Permanent, nuclear-powered bases on the moon and Mars would give the United States a leg up in the race for control of those planetary bodies. The international competition for resource extraction in space (helium-3 on the moon) is now full on. NASA's job is to do the research and development, and then be ready to turn everything over to private corporate interests once the technology has been sorted out. The taxpayers will fund the technology investment program. The military will create the space weapons systems to ensure free corporate access to the space highways of the future. The aerospace industry is already making record profits from the ever-escalating cost of space technology systems. Virtually every system now under development is well over budget. Just one illustration is NASA's International Space Station. Originally slated to cost the taxpayers $10 billion, the project has now grown to $100 billion and is not yet finished. High Ground in Space A little-known congressional study from 1989 called Military Space Forces: The Next 50 Years spells out much of the Pentagon's plan for achieving dominance in space. The Air Force Association published the report in book form, and congressional leaders like Representatives Ike Skelton (D-MO) and John Spratt (D-SC), Senator John Glenn (D-OH) and now-Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL) signed the forward. In the book, congressional staffer John Collins reports: "Military space forces at the bottom of the Earth's so-called gravity well are poorly positioned to accomplish offensive/defensive/deterrent missions, because great energy is needed to overcome gravity during launch. Forces at the top, on a space counterpart of 'high ground,' could initiate action and detect, identify, track, intercept, or otherwise respond more rapidly to attacks." Collins goes on to propose to Congress that the United States needs bases on the moon, at the top of the "gravity well," and on armed space stations on either side of the lunar surface. He writes, "Nature reserves decisive advantage for L4 and L5, two allegedly stable libration points [on either side of the moon] that theoretically could dominate Earth and moon, because they look down both gravity wells. No other location is equally commanding." Collins then concludes that, "Armed forces might lie in wait at that location to hijack rival shipments on return." Space piracy is born. Like the Pentagon, the defense industries also have a plan for space. They're working 50-75 years ahead of the rest of us. They understand the enormous costs involved. They are moving to secure a funding source and working to bring "reliable allies" into the program to help pay for Star Wars. They've learned to dress up key aspects of the program as defense, as in "missile defense." Space is the new military frontier. It's now up to the peace movement to understand the issue and help the public do so as well. Unless this costly and destabilizing new space arms race is stopped, life on Earth will become much more difficult. We must keep space for peace.

Link- Generic 2/3

### Although treaties ensure ‘peaceful use’ of space, ambiguities over the meaning of that allow for military objectives to be pursued there; historically, militarization occurred under the guise of peaceful activity.

Wolff 03 (Johannes, “Making Space for Security?”, http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art1883.pdf)

The ambiguity of ‘peaceful uses’ When considering the early agreements and statements on outer space, one might have the impression that there has been accord on the peaceful use of outer space. Yet despite their claims that space should be reserved for peaceful uses, the United States and the Soviet Union were developing (and later launching) satellites that would serve a growing number of military objectives. As early as 1955, the United States Air Force contracted the development of reconnaissance satellites, an indication8 one • 2003 MAKING SPACE FOR SECURITY? that early space programmes were more driven by military considerations and requirements than civil or scientific ones. The seeming contradiction over peaceful use emerges from the fact that the relevant agreements never precisely defined ‘peaceful’ and ‘outer space’. With ambiguous definitions subject to various interpretations, certain activities that one would not normally consider peaceful have been pursued. For some nations the term ‘peaceful’ has been interpreted as ‘non-aggressive’ rather than ‘nonmilitary’, meaning that all military uses were and are allowed and lawful as long as they remain ‘nonaggressive’ as permitted under Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter, which basically prohibits ‘the threat or use of force’. The OST allows for ‘passive military’ use of space, for example through reconnaissance, surveillance, early warning or communication satellites. The OST also permits military personnel to conduct scientific research in space. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which relates to the right of self-defence, can be invoked in outer space. One might argue that using outer space for deterrent and defensive purposes serves the cause of peace and that only when it is used for offensive activities that it goes against the idea of peaceful use. However, the distinctions between ‘offensive and defensive actions, active and passive weapons, and aggression and self-defence becomes more and more blurred.’ The lack of a clear definition was recognized as a potential problem at an early stage. In 1967, after expressing his satisfaction concerning the adoption of the OST, the then United Nations SecretaryGeneral stated that ‘the door is not yet barred against military activities in space. The crux of the difficulty is that space activity is already part of the arms race, a fact which we have to reckon with until humanity reaches the stage of an agreement on full and complete disarmament’. Other arms control treaties have successfully defined the term peaceful. It appears, for example, in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and in the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention). The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 is considered as the most authoritative aid in the interpretation of the term ‘peaceful’. It declares, ‘Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type of weapons.’ This document has been key in the non-militarization of Antarctica. Although we continue to speak about the peaceful uses of outer space, it has become a question of rhetoric rather than reality. The current international space regime cannot be viewed as peaceful in a strict sense, as activities related to defensive weapons and support of military functions are carried out in outer space. The militarization of space, and the military reliance on space-based intelligence, surveillance and navigation assets, is well established and continues to grow. It is impossible to turn back time in order to preserve space for truly peaceful purposes, yet it may not be too late to prohibit space weaponization and regulate space activities to prevent offensive and defensive activities and deployments. Boundary of space When attempting to differentiate between permitted and prohibited activities in outer space, it is essential to have an operational definition of the boundary between airspace (where certain activities Although we continue to speak about the peaceful uses of outer space, it has become a question of rhetoric rather than reality.one ‘Peaceful uses’, militarization and weaponization are allowed) and outer space (where comparable activities are banned, restricted or otherwise regulated). Similar to the question of defining peaceful uses, the demarcation of airspace from outer space has been left to several interpretations. In practical terms, below an altitude of approximately 69 miles (about 110km), sustained orbit is practically impossible. Above an altitude of approximately 53–62 miles (about 85–100km) aerodynamic lift is largely non-existent. However, there are aircrafts that have flown higher than 62 miles and there are satellites and other spacecrafts that pass through orbits lower than 69 miles. While stating that outer space should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, the OST fails to define the boundaries of the area to be kept free from military uses (the boundary between the airspace and outer space). The OST could have made a very useful contribution to the definition question had it been consistent in its use of the term ‘outer space’. The treaty sometimes speaks of outer space without any addition and in other instances of outer space as including the Moon and other celestial bodies. Other fora have not had greater success. Notwithstanding the fact that the definition problem has been on the agenda of COPOUS and its Legal and Scientific and Technical Subcommittees since 1959, there have been no concrete results in regards to the demarcation of outer space. It has also been a subject of considerable debate among experts on international law and on space law, yet no consensus has emerged. Weapons can be categorized according to deployment mode and with respect to their targets. There are weapons that can be based in space, in the air or on the ground. Similarly, these weapons can be aimed at targets in space, in the air or on the ground. For any future discussions on outer space activities, it will be essential to delimit airspace (where use of certain weapons would still be allowed) from outer space (where use of some weapons would not be). An agreed definition would eliminate the significant ‘grey area’ that has permitted the militarization of space and might one day permit its weaponization. ‘

Link- Generic 3/3

### NASA operations dual use for military will lead to weaponization of space

[Bruce K. Gagnon 6/27/09 (Coordinator of the Global Network Against Nuclear Power and Weapons in Space)] “Arms Race in Space” Foreign Policy in Focus: International Relations Think Tank. March 19, 2009 http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5971 RFF

NASA was created as a civilian agency with a mission to do peaceful space exploration. But the growing influence of the military industrial complex has rubbed out the line between civilian and military programs. When George W. Bush appointed former Secretary of the Navy Sean O'Keefe to head NASA in late 2001**,** the new space agency director announced that all NASA missions in the future would be "dual use." This meant that every NASA space launch would be both military and civilian at the same time. The military would ride the NASA Trojan horse and accelerate space weapons development without the public's knowledge. NASA would expand space nuclear power systems to help create new designs for weapons propulsion. Permanent, nuclear-powered bases on the moon and Mars would give the United States a leg up in the race for control of those planetary bodies. The international competition for resource extraction in space (helium-3 on the moon) is now full on. NASA's job is to do the research and development, and then be ready to turn everything over to private corporate interests once the technology has been sorted out. The taxpayers will fund the technology investment program. The military will create the space weapons systems to ensure free corporate access to the space highways of the future. The aerospace industry is already making record profits from the ever-escalating cost of space technology systems. Virtually every system now under development is well over budget. Just one illustration is NASA's International Space Station. Originally slated to cost the taxpayers $10 billion, the project has now grown to $100 billion and is not yet finished.

## Link- China 1/2

### China feels threatened by space militarization and space-based missile defense, and is preparing to develop space weapons to deter US attack.

Chase 11 (Michael, March 25, 2011, “Defense and Deterrence in China’s Military Space Strategy”, China Brief Volume: 11 Issue: 5, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no\_cache=1&tx\_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx\_ttnews%5Bany\_of\_the\_words%5D=chinese%20skypace%20world&tx\_ttnews%5Bpointer%5D=2&tx\_ttnews%5Btt\_news%5D=37699&tx\_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=950460e62f7bd4d7b0cfc946c742c5d8)

Chinese strategists regard space as a crucial battlefield in future wars. Chinese military publications characterize space as the high ground that both sides will strive to control in informatized local wars because of its influence on information superiority and its importance in seizing the initiative in a conflict [4]. Chinese analysts write that space systems serve as key enablers by providing support in areas such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), early warning, communications, navigation and positioning, targeting for precision weapons, surveying and mapping, and meteorological support. Chinese analysts also portray space systems as force multipliers that support joint operations and enhance the effectiveness of ground, air, and naval forces. In keeping with this emphasis on the importance of space systems in contemporary military operations, China is making major strides in improving its own space capabilities [5]. According to the 2010 DoD report, "China is expanding its space-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, and communications satellite constellations" [6]. As China places more satellites into orbit, the PLA’s reliance on space systems is growing. China’s military is becoming more dependent on space capabilities for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation and positioning, as well as communications. Chinese military publications suggest that China still sees itself as far less dependent on space than the United States, but they also recognize that with this increasing reliance on space comes greater vulnerability. Many Chinese analysts believe that China’s space systems face a variety of potential threats. Consequently, they argue that the PLA needs to be able to protect its space assets through defensive measures or deterrence. Chinese Perceptions of Foreign Threats to Chinese Space Systems A review of Chinese writings on military space operations indicates that Chinese strategists are concerned about a wide variety of perceived threats to Chinese space systems. In particular, Chinese analysts characterize U.S. space policy as inherently threatening to China’s interests because of its emphasis on space dominance. As Zhang Hui of Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs writes, "Many Chinese officials and security experts have great interest in U.S. military planning documents issued in recent years that explicitly envision the control of space through the use of weapons in, or from, space to establish global superiority" [7]. Similarly, according to Bao Shixiu, a senior fellow at the PLA’s Academy of Military Science (AMS), "the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the United States unilaterally seeks to monopolize the military use of space in order to gain strategic advantage over others" [8]. Given that China must protect its own interests, Bao argues, "China cannot accept the monopolization of outer space by another country." Consequently, he asserts that U.S. space policy "poses a serious threat to China both in terms of jeopardizing its national defense as well as obstructing its justified right to exploit space for civilian and commercial purposes" [9]. Chinese writers also assert that U.S. space war exercises reflect the growing militarization of space. Yet Beijing’s concerns are not limited to the realm of policy statements and war games. Indeed, some Chinese strategists appear to believe that other countries are actively developing counter-space capabilities that could threaten Chinese satellites. Some Chinese writers discussed what they characterize as a long history of ASAT research, development, and testing in the United States and Russia dating back to the Cold War [10]. Like their Western counterparts, Chinese writers divide these potential threats into two major categories: "soft kill" and "hard kill" [11]. Soft kill threats can cause temporary loss of the effectiveness of space systems, causing them to be unable to carry out operational functions. According to Chinese military researchers, the main methods of soft kill anti-satellite attack include electronic warfare and computer network attacks [12]. In contrast to soft kill threats such as jamming, hard kill capabilities are intended to cause permanent damage to spacecraft. Chinese writers identify kinetic energy weapons and directed energy weapons such as high-energy lasers as the main hard kill ASAT threats. Other Chinese writings offer more detailed discussions of perceived threats from a wide range of systems, such as kinetic energy interceptors, laser ASAT systems, nuclear ASAT systems, microwave weapons, and space planes that could be used to disable or destroy an adversary’s satellites [13]. In addition, some Chinese authors assert that U.S. missile defense interceptors provide the United States with an inherent ASAT capability [14]. In all, according to Chinese analysts, as a result of the actions of the world’s major space powers, space war is no longer the stuff of science fiction. Indeed, they argue that it is already more a reality than a myth. Consequently, they conclude that China must be prepared not only to degrade an adversary’s ability to use space, but also to protect its own space capabilities. Chinese writings suggest that Beijing would consider doing so through a combination of defensive measures and deterrence. Chinese Writings on Space Defense Because satellites are so essential to military operations, Chinese writers see an intensifying competition between ASAT technology and satellite defense. Consequently, Chinese authors write that to be prepared for space conflicts, besides having the ability to strike the enemy’s satellites, it is also necessary to improve the survivability of one’s own satellites. Against this background, Chinese writers discussed a wide variety of measures to enhance satellite survivability. Defensive measures mentioned in Chinese articles include signature reduction, hardening and other protective measures, electromagnetic protection, satellite mobility, improving space situational awareness, and renting foreign space systems. Chinese journal articles indicate that one way of defending space systems is employing signature reduction techniques, which makes it more difficult for the adversary to find and attack the spacecraft [15]. According to one Chinese analyst, concealment measures can include covering the satellite with special materials to reduce its visibility to enemy radar and reducing other signatures [16]. Some Chinese writers also suggest hardening or increasing protection for key components, such as the electro-optical sensors on imaging satellites. Another defensive measure that is emphasized is the enhancement of protection against electromagnetic interference. Still others include increasing satellite mobility, discharging bait and false targets, and using distributed small satellites. In addition, Chinese analysts underscore the importance of enhancing space situational awareness to observe enemy activities in space and provide warning of any attack. Spacecraft themselves are not the only assets that need to be defended. The protection of information links and ground stations is seen as equally essential. Chinese authors address defending information links by employing measures such as encryption and various types of anti-jamming technology. Chinese authors write that encryption makes it more difficult for the other side to collect intelligence while direct-sequence spread spectrum (DSSS), frequency hopping and related measures enhance the satellite link’s anti-jamming capabilities. They also assert that to deal with computer network threats, it is very important to ensure the secrecy, validity, and integrity of one’s own information systems. Defending ground support systems is also seen as vital. Measures for protecting ground elements evaluated in Chinese articles include camouflage and concealment, mobility, and redundancy. Camouflage and concealment reduces the probability that an enemy will be able to detect and target a facility. Mobile ground support systems make it harder to find and strike Chinese assets. Redundancy enhances survivability of the system in the face of enemy attacks. Finally, one Chinese author suggests that using leased foreign space systems poses a diplomatic and political dilemma for the enemy who would otherwise want to try to attack China’s space information systems. Leasing foreign space information systems "increases the attacking side’s decision-making burden" because they must contemplate attacking a satellite that is owned by a third party [17]. Space Deterrence In addition to defense, Chinese military writers also emphasize the growing importance of space deterrence. For example, Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi highlight space deterrence as one of the key types of strategic deterrence, placing it on par with nuclear deterrence, conventional deterrence, information deterrence, and "People’s War Deterrence" [18]. Other Chinese writers contend that China is still developing its space deterrence strategy. According to Bao Shixiu, "Currently, China does not have a clear space deterrence theory to guide its actions for countermeasures." Nonetheless, he argues, the rough outlines of China’s approach approximate Chinese thinking on deterrence in other areas and its overall "active defense" strategy. "The basic necessity to preserve stability through the development of deterrent forces as propounded by Mao and Deng remains valid in the context of space," Bao writes [19]. China’s development of a space deterrence strategy can thus proceed from a starting point that draws on the strategic guidance of Mao and Deng and resembles Cold War deterrence theory, at least at a general level. Chinese writers, like their Western counterparts, conclude that strategic deterrence requires a country to meet three basic conditions: the possession of deterrent capabilities; the will to use them; and the ability to communicate to an adversary that it has the capabilities and the determination to use them if necessary. Yet, Bao argues that space force deterrence will differ from nuclear deterrence in some key respects. According to Bao, "[although] there will be a taboo on the use of space weapons, the threshold of their use will be lower than that of nuclear weapons because of their conventional characteristics. Space debris may threaten the space assets of other ‘third party’ countries, but the level of destruction, especially in terms of human life, could be far less than nuclear weapons or potentially even conventional weapons." Within this broad context, Bao outlines a Chinese approach to space deterrence, one in which "an active defense will entail a robust deterrent force that has the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on an adversary" [20]. According to Bao, "under the conditions of American strategic dominance in space, reliable deterrents in space will decrease the possibility of the United States attacking Chinese space assets." Specifically, he writes, China "will develop anti-satellite and space weapons capable of effectively taking out an enemy’s space system, in order to constitute a reliable and credible defense strategy." This suggests that in addition to denying an enemy the ability to use its space systems in a war with China and countering the possibility of space-based missile defense capabilities undermining China’s nuclear deterrent, another of the missions for China’s counter-space capabilities could be protecting China’s own space systems by deterring an adversary from attacking them. Outlook and Implications As China continues to place more satellites into orbit, Chinese strategists are likely to become more interested in space defense and space deterrence, but this does not necessarily mean that their interest in attacking adversary space systems if required will be diminished. Indeed, Chinese writings on military space operations emphasize the importance of maintaining one’s own freedom of action in space while denying the adversary the ability to use space assets in a conflict with China. Moreover, many Chinese analysts indicate that they perceive the US military as heavily dependent on space assets for crucial functions such as ISR, communications, and navigation and positioning. Some Chinese writers also argue that space represents a crucial U.S. vulnerability, one that must be exploited to win a future local war under informatized conditions. Chinese concerns about the potential of enemy space-based missile defense systems to undermine China’s nuclear deterrence capabilities continue to provide another rationale for the development and possibly employment of ASAT capabilities [21]. Given the conviction that preventing an enemy from using space systems effectively in a conflict may very well be essential to gaining information superiority, or possibly even to preserving China’s ability to launch a retaliatory nuclear strike, it seems unlikely that China’s development of counter-space systems would be limited to deterring attacks against China’s own satellites. Consequently, even as its interest in space defense and space deterrence increases along with the need to protect its own growing satellite capabilities, Beijing will probably still view counter-space weapons as giving it the option of denying an enemy the advantages its forces derive from unhindered access to space systems.

Link- China 2/2

### If US weaponizes, China will develop responses

Hui Zhang 2005 a research associate in the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government., “Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China”, <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/Dec-cvr?print#bio>

Historically, China’s stated purpose for developing nuclear weapons was to guard itself against nuclear blackmail. Beijing’s official statements do not discuss potential responses to U.S. space weaponization, but many Chinese officials and scholars argue that China must ensure that U.S. efforts do not negate the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent. As one Chinese official stated: China is not in a position to conduct an arms race with the United States and it does not intend to do so, particularly in the field of missile defense. However, China will not sit idly by and watch its strategic interests being jeopardized without taking necessary measures. It is quite possible and natural for China to review its military doctrine and a series of policies on the relationship with big powers, Taiwan issues, arms control and nonproliferation, etc. Certainly, the best option for China is to reach an arms control agreement to prevent space weaponization, as it is advocating now. However, if this effort fails and if what China perceives as its legitimate security concerns are ignored, China would very likely develop other responses to neutralize the perceived threat. Because it is not clear what type of missile defense system the United States will finally deploy or whether the U.S. space control plans will be implemented, it is difficult to identify conclusively China’s specific countermeasures. Yet, there are certain options that it would be likely to consider. It should be noted that these discussions are based on China’s capabilities and do not characterize China’s intentions.

## Link- Russia

### Russia will retaliate if US launches space weapons

VLADIMIR ISACHENKOV, writer for the Advertiser, 9/29/07, “Russia to retalitate if weapons put in space”, found on lexis

RUSSIA'S Space forces chief said yesterday the nation would have to retaliate if others deployed weapons in space - a stern warning to the U.S. While Colonel-General Vladimir Popovkin did not name any specific country, he clearly was referring to U.S. plans for space-based weapons, which the Kremlin vociferously has opposed. ''We don't want to wage a war in space. we don't want to gain dominance in space but we won't allow any other nation to dominate space,'' Col Popovkin said in televised remarks. ''If any country deploys weapons in space, then the laws of warfare are such that retaliatory weapons are certain to appear.'' Russian President Vladimir Putin has criticised U.S. plans for space-based weapons, saying it could trigger a new arms race.

## Link- BMD

### BMD could easily bypass loopholes in laws and be used to attack targets on the ground.

Park 2005 (Andrew, Incremental Steps for Achieving Space Security: The Need for a New Way of Thinking to Enhance the Legal Regime for Space”, Houston Journal of International Law, http://www.hjil.org/ArticleFiles/28\_3\_871.pdf)

Integrally related to the first two ambiguities in the legal regime is the increasingly troubling aspect of the development and acquisition of equipment with “dual-use” potential. The term dual-use, originally used in the context of nuclear technology that could be used for both military and peaceful aims, has taken a slightly different meaning in the context of space. 71 In recognizing that space has long been a realm where commercial and military interests have co-existed, 72 the term dual-use addresses the potential of a space weapon to be both a defensive and devastatingly offensive tool. 73 It is vital to consider the clear dual-use potential of advanced systems envisioned by the United States as part of a space-based missile defense system. The most prominent of the potential dual-use programs is the Space Based Laser (SBL), which is designed to operate in Low Earth Orbit for the purpose of destroying “hostile ballistic missiles during their boost phase of flight.” 74 Military officials have discussed the potential usefulness of the SBL in enhancing U.S. force projection from space. 75 In fact, these officials have gone so far as to suggest that “SBLs could form the replacement for the B-2A Spirit bomber, using directed energy to destroy ground based targets.” 76 The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is also in the process of developing a space-based defense option in the form of kinetic kill vehicles. 77 Similar to the SBL, this particular system would seek to destroy enemy ballistic missiles during the boost phase. However, kinetic kill vehicles would accomplish this by the deployment of hundreds of small satellites around the earth rather than by one centralized laser. 78 Needless to say, it is feasible to see how such a defensive space network could be modified to offensively threaten the space assets of other nations. 79 Unfortunately, the creators of the current legal regime did not foresee the extent to which space technology would develop in such a short period of time. Nevertheless, if the international community seeks to establish a sustainable security regime for space, it is imperative that a reasonable balance is struck between the need to defend the principle of universal space access and desire to prevent the application of dual-use technology in space for destructive purposes

## Link- China- BMD

### BMD development threatens China- it doubles as a first-strike capability that could take out Chinese nukes.

Hui 05 (Zhang, “Space Weaponization And Space Security: A Chinese Perspective”, World Security Institute, http://www.wsichina.org/space/focus.cfm?focusid=94&charid=1)

Outer space objects, in the Chinese definition, include not only satellites but also ICBMs traveling through outer space.3 Since the GMD system would intercept its target in outer space, it could be seen as a space weapon. Moreover, the GMD system could be the first step toward a more robust, layered system for space control. Consequently, China feels that U.S. plans to deploy a missile defense system is an intentional first step toward the weaponization of space.4 In addition, the United States also pursues a number of other research programs that could lead to ASAT weapons. For instance, the Air Force has a research project to test small satellites, the Experimental Satellite Series (XSS), that could be used to attack other satellites.5 Further, the United States is pursuing space-based ballistic missile defense (BMD) for global engagement capabilities. It is believed that an effective, global-coverage BMD system must start intercepting an ICBM as early as the boost phase, which, under U.S. Missile Defense Agency plans, would entail the use of space-based interceptors. Indeed, the current U.S. budget for missile defense shows continued interest in a number of space weapon-related programs, such as the Near Field Infrared Experiment (NFIRE) satellite and Space-Based Interceptor Test Bed. The United States does have legitimate concerns about its space assets, given that U.S. military operations, economy and society are increasingly dependent on space assets and such assets are inherently vulnerable to attacks from many different sources. However, it does not mean that the United States currently faces credible threats from states that might exploit those vulnerabilities.6 Further, space-based weapons cannot protect satellites, since these weapons are also vulnerable to many types of attack, similar to the satellites requiring protection. The true aim of U.S. space plans is not to protect U.S. assets but rather to further enhance American military dominance. Prof. Du Xiangwan, vice president of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, recently presented his view that the Transformation Flight Plan indicated that "many types of space-based weapons will be developed," and "the tendency toward space weaponization is obvious and serious." He further noted that military dominance on Earth is not enough, "the U.S. also seeks to dominate space."7 Beijing fears that by unilaterally developing missile defense systems and pursuing space weaponization, the United States is seeking to establish a global military superiority using both offensive and defensive means.8 Moreover, China's fears about U.S. hegemonic tendencies are exacerbated by the fact that space weapons, due to their vulnerability to other less expensive, asymmetric measures, are inherently first-strike weapons. 9 Neutralizing China's nuclear deterrent In particular, China is concerned that the U.S. missile defense network will undercut China's strategic nuclear deterrent. Even a limited missile defense system could neutralize China's fewer than two dozen single-warhead ICBMs that are capable of reaching the United States. China is even more concerned about space-based BMD systems that would be far more dangerous to China's nuclear deterrent than a non-space-based BMD system. In addition, Beijing is worried that the deployment of missile defense systems would further promote a preemptive U.S. military strategy. As viewed by Chinese leaders, China's own small strategic nuclear arsenal appears to be a plausible target for U.S. missile defenses.10 China fears that the BMD network would give the United States more freedom and power to intervene in its affairs, including undermining the country's efforts at reunification with Taiwan. Moreover, China is concerned that putting weapons in space would constrain its civilian and commercial space activities. China sees itself as a developing economic space power, dependent on free access to space for financial gain. However, U.S. driven space weaponization directly threatens this access.

# Impacts

## Arms Race

### Space weapons lead to arms race in space and widespread proliferation.

RCW 8/27/8, Reaching Critical Will, “Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space A backgrounder on the militarization and weaponization of outer space”, <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/paros/wgroup/PAROS-factsheet.pdf>

The weaponization of space will destroy strategic balance and stability, undermine international and national security, and disrupt existing arms control instruments, in particular those related to nuclear weapons and missiles. These effects will inevitably lead to a new arms race. Space weaponization would seriously disrupt the arms control and disarmament process. The United States' withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2001 and the development of US ground- and sea- based “missile defenses” have already increased tensions with Russia and have led to increased missile proliferation. The deployment of these technologies or the development of space-based technologies will likely cause Russia, as well as the United States (in response to Russia), to make smaller and smaller reductions of their nuclear arsenals and to reject the development of new treaties to regulate nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. China would likely build more warheads to maintain its nuclear deterrent, which could in turn encourage India and then Pakistan to follow suit.

### U.S/China space militarization will lead to a global space arms race.

Bruce W. MacDonald, 2008 Council on Foreign Relations “China, space weapons, and U.S. security” n.38

While China represents the most prominent challenge to U.S. space assets, it is not the only one. Russia and others" are taking another look at space to counter U.S. military capability, and friendly countries such as India arc reexamining space's role in this new era, in at least partial response to China's 2007 test. India's army chief of staff has stated that "the Chinese space program is expanding at an exponentially rapid pace in both offensive and defensive content," and another Indian general has observed that "with time we will get sucked into a military race to protect our space assets and inevitably there will be a military contest in space."8 Such actions could possibly trigger responses from other regional adversaries as well.

## Arms Race Spills Over 1/2

### BMD causes Chinese militarization, which creates an unstable arms race that draws in India and Pakistan.

Basrur 2002 (Rajesh M., “Missile Defense and South Asia: An Indian Perspective”, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/SABMDBasrur.pdf)

The chief objection of the critics is that missile defense would have a destabilizing domino effect reaching all the way from the United States to South Asia. 17 The American program would cause China to embark on a qualitative and quantitative buildup. This would likely entail an expanded arsenal, multiple-warhead (MIRVed missiles), and the adoption of an alert posture. In India, the change would be perceived as threatening, the balance between moderates and hawks would tilt in favor of the latter, and a buildup would commence, followed by a like response from Pakistan. The result would be rising regional instability, raising the dire prospect of an already unstable India–Pakistan relationship sliding into war. American critics, including former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, echo this view. 18 Indians also fear that a China antagonized by American missile defense may draw even closer to Pakistan and accelerate strategic cooperation with it. 19 This is an emotive issue. Indians have long complained about the China–Pakistan nuclear and missile nexus as the central component of China’s efforts to “contain” and “encircle” India.

Arms Race Spills Over 2/2

### U.S.-China armament causes Japan and India to militarize- China’s weapons are destabilizing to Asia.

Theresa Hitchens 2007 “U.S.-Sino Relations in Space: From “War of Words” to Cold War in Space?” China Security, Winter, pp. 12 - 30 ©2007 World Security Institute Theresa Hitchens is Director of World Security Institute’s Center for Defense Information and the author of “Future Security In Space: Charting a Cooperative Course,” She also leads CDI’s Space Security Project. She serves on the editorial board of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and is a member of Women in International Security and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

And the most worrisome question of all – beside the potential for sparking a Sino-U.S. ASAT race – is whether China’s other rival nations, most specifically, India, will seek to react in kind. India’s media, predictably, has been harshly denouncing the Chinese test as a threat to India. “It threatens our own expanding civilian space assets, undermines the credibility of our nuclear deterrent, and exposes New Delhi's lack of a military space strategy,” the Indian Express newspaper said in an editorial on Jan. 20.41 M. Natarajan, science advisor to India’s Defense Ministry, said the government would be especially concerned if such Chinese missiles could “disable” satellites with military and/or navigation capabilities and told reporters that the Indian government is assessing “steps we need to initiate in this direction.”42 Unfortunately, the Chinese test comes amid a renewed push by the Indian Air Force to establish a military hold on Indian space policy and funding; a push that has been underpinned by Air Force lobbying regarding the “China threat.”43 There has been a steady drum-beat for a number of years regarding India’s need to compete in military space, including the development of ASAT weaponry. In April 2005, Chief Air Marshall S. P. Tyagi told reporters in New Delhi that India intends to set up a Strategic Air Command, in part to lay the groundwork for counter-space capabilities.44 His remarks echoed those of his predecessor, Srinivaspuram Krishnaswamy, made in October 2003, telling reporters that work on the command was aimed at deploying weapons in space: “Any country on the fringe of space technology like India has to work towards such a command as advanced countries are already moving towards laser weapon platforms in space and killer satellites.”45 While up to now, the Indian government has largely turned a deaf ear to Air Force advocacy, the Chinese ASAT test may turn the tide in its favor. When asked about India’s anti-satellite capabilities, Natarajan refused comment, but noted: “Maybe we need to talk to ISRO [Indian Space Research Organisation].”46 Likewise, the Chinese action may spur Japan not only to speed its at developing missile defenses but possibly to develop military space capabilities. “It may fuel the argument that Japan should develop space technology for national defense, especially as it came in the midst of the North Korean nuclear crisis,” said Yasunori Matogawa, a professor of space engineering at the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science, part of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency.47 Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said Tokyo had demanded an explanation from the Chinese government; while Foreign Minister Taro Aso criticized Beijing for failing to give advance notice of the test which he doubted was for “peaceful use” of space.48 Japanese officials have continued to charge that the Chinese government has yet to give a full and credible account of the test and future plans.49

## China/Russia Arms Race

### Space based missile defense causes a China and Russia military build up

Kenneth S. Blazejewski Spring 2008 “Space Weaponization and US-China Relations” Strategic Studies Quarterly Kenneth S. Blazejewski is in private practice in New York City, focusing primarily on international corporate and financial transactions. He received his master’s degree in public affairs from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University and his JD degree from the New York University School of Law

As described above, China’s opposition to a US ballistic missile defense shield emerges from its desire to maintain its nuclear deterrent capability vis-à-vis the United States. A US commitment not to launch space-based interceptors as part of a BMD shield would contribute to assuring China that the United States’ BMD system is not directed at limiting its nuclear deterrence. “If the [BMD] system [the United States] decides on includes weapons in space . . . a cascade of negative repercussions will follow. . . . If, however, U.S. missile defenses are designed to counter proliferation only and do not include weapons in space, Chinese and Russian fears could be assuaged.”59 Hui Zhang, a prominent Chinese expert on nuclear weapons policy, states: “A space-based, boost-phase defense would be particularly threatening.”60 Admittedly, even a terrestrial BMD, combined with possible US nuclear primacy and first-strike capacity,61 could pose a significant threat to China’s capacity for nuclear retaliation—even accounting for failings in US intelligence on Chinese missile locations.62 To deploy even a limited BMD shield, the United States may need to provide China (and Russia) with additional assurances to ease their concerns on BMD.63 However, a ban on space weapons would only contribute to this effort.

## Accidental War

### Space weapons will spur arms race and accidental nuclear war

Sherwood Ross, 4/1/09, worked as a reporter for the Chicago Daily News and a columnist for wire services. He currently operates a public relations firm for worthy causes, “Space Race Hikes Risk Of Nuclear War”, <http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0904/S00004.htm>

An unchecked race to militarize space is underway that is “increasing the risk of an accidental nuclear war while shortening the time for sanity and diplomacy to come into play to halt crises,” an authority on space warfare says. By 2025, the space capabilities of the leading space powers---the U.S., Russia, India and China---will be roughly equal “due to information sharing in a globalized economy,” says noted space researcher Matt Hoey in an exclusive interview. Hoey is international military space technology forecaster who provides analysis on issues related to technology proliferation and arms control. He is also a former senior research associate at the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies and has contributed to publications such as the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and the Space Review. Through their military and commercial research facilities, the world’s military powers are pursuing development of a reusable, unmanned, hypersonic, space-strike delivery platform that “would permit rapid precision strikes worldwide in 120 minutes or less,” Hoey said. The strike platform could loiter in near-space or in low earth orbit and assault terrestrial targets at incredible speed “with a nuclear or conventional payload and then return to any base in the world on demand,” he explained. While “there will not be a dedicated ‘space war’ in our lifetimes or our children’s,” Hoey said, “we are likely to witness acts of space warfare being committed…in concert with other theatres of combat” on land, sea, and air and cyber space.” Hoey said his research analysis suggests, “Back and forth escalation regarding military space capabilities would fuel each nation’s respective space industries as would commercial space races driven by national pride.” “If these systems are deployed in space we will be tipping the nuclear balance between nations that has ensured the peace for decades,” Hoey continued. “The military space race will serve the defense industry much like the cold war and this is already being witnessed in relation to missile defense systems.”

## Impact- Turns Solvency, Heg

### Dual-use technology leads to communication problems, causing tragedies like Challenger and Columbia that kill solvency and US credibility.

### **Cook 07** (Richard, January 22, “Militarization and The Moon-Mars Program: Another Wrong Turn in Space?”, Global Research)

At the landing of the fourth space shuttle mission by Columbia on July 4, 1982, nine months before his March 1983 speech inaugurating SDI, President Ronald Reagan told an audience at Edwards Air Force Base in California that a primary goal of the space program was to "strengthen the security of the United States." A fact sheet issued that day said that the use of space "for peaceful purposes…allows activities in pursuit of national security goals." The language of the October 2006 White House announcement is similar, defining "peaceful purposes" in the use of space as including all "U.S. defense and intelligence-related activities in pursuit of national interests." The announcement was amplified in a December 2006 speech by Undersecretary of State Robert G. Joseph, where he stated that "We reserve the right to defend ourselves against hostile attacks and interference with our space assets. We will, therefore, oppose others who wish to use their military capabilities to impede or deny our access to and use of space. We will seek the best capabilities to protect our space assets by active or passive means." Joseph spoke at the George C. Marshall Institute, which had published a policy statement two months earlier entitled, "The War in Space Has Already Begun." The mixing of civilian and military priorities by NASA led to the Challenger disaster of January 31, 1986, an incident which showed how muddled motives and lack of candor in public programs can result in tragedy. On February 9, 1986, almost two weeks after Challenger was lost, the New York Times published a series of explosive documents, including a memo I had written the previous July—and which I shared with Times science writer Phil Boffey— warning of a possible catastrophe from a flawed O-ring joint. Thus began a cascade of disclosures that included the account of how contractor engineers protested against launching in the cold weather and NASA’s past knowledge of the deficient booster rocket seals. But it was not until after the presidential commission which investigated the disaster completed its work that I learned why NASA kept flying shuttle missions after the worst damage to date had occurred on the seals during a January 1985 cold-weather flight, a full year before Challenger blew up. It was because a launch commit criterion for joint temperature could interfere with the military flights NASA planned to launch for the Air Force out of Vandenberg Air Force base in California, where the weather tended to be cooler than in Florida. Many of these flights were to carry "Star Wars" experiments in preparation for possible future deployment of "third-generation" nuclear weapons, such as the x-ray laser. Flying with the O-ring problem was but one of the design compromises made on the shuttle to accommodate the military. These began at the shuttle’s inception, when NASA abandoned a straight-wing design and agreed to a huge 65,000-pound capacity payload bay to launch military satellites. The shuttle orbiter also had to be as lightweight as possible, which accounted in part for the heat-shield tiles that have been so troublesome. This compromise contributed to the loss of Columbia in 2003 from a reentry fuselage burn-through that began with tile damage at liftoff. The shuttle will stop flying after 2010. But the nationalistic tone of Griffin's language about the moon-Mars program, combined with the gargantuan contract awarded to Lockheed Martin, the Bush administration's 2006 space policy declaration, and the Air Force’s "Strategic Master Plan for FY 2006 and Beyond," which designates space as "the ultimate high ground of U.S. military operations," sets the stage for another attempt to militarize NASA’s manned space activities. These issues point to a flawed direction in U.S. space policy that calls for national debate. The U.S. could gain credibility by reversing its opposition to ongoing efforts at the U.N. to ban weapons in space. NASA has said, almost as an afterthought, that they are talking to other nations, including Russia, China, and India, about involvement in the moon-Mars program, but wouldn’t an honest intention to forego using future manned space activities for military purposes start with the kind of overt international agreements observed with the ISS? Funding is also an issue. In ten years, $100 billion has been spent by the U.S. on the ISS, a half-finished six-person workshop in low-Earth orbit, a cost which does not count the expense of shuttle flights to build and service it. Critics might say the money was "squandered," since, according to Gregg Easterbrook writing in Slate, little of the promised private sector investment ever materialized. Meanwhile, NASA’s space science and aeronautics budgets have been drastically cut just to keep the shuttle and ISS aloft. Has Congress really determined what the moon-Mars program will eventually cost the U.S. government and what its impact will be on a budget whose deficits have again skyrocketed as they did in the Reagan era? Perhaps it's not NASA's question to answer, but it should also be asked how we as a nation can be planning to spend hundreds of billions more to extend our imperial reach throughout the solar system when we cannot provide for our own people at home—when over forty-five million citizens have no health insurance, thirty-five million lack what USDA calls "food security," the income of our middle class is in long-term decline, the city of New Orleans remains largely in ruins, the value of the dollar is plummeting, recession looms from deflating asset bubbles, and we must sell Treasury bonds to China to keep the doors of federal government offices open from one day to the next because, as stated in a July/August 2006 analysis published by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, "the U.S. government is, indeed, bankrupt." Addressing space policy concerns should now become an urgent priority of the new Congress.

## Space Debris

### Space weaponization causes debris, and explosions in space exponentially increase it- debris kills the environment and makes space exploration impossible.

Rebecca Johnson, Director of the Disarmament and Arms Control Programme at the Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, 2003, ("Missile defense and the weaponisation of space," ISIS Policy paper on missile defense, January, http://www.isisuk.demon.co.uk/0811/isis/uk/bmd/no11.html)

Space in low earth orbit is teeming with human generated debris, defined by NASA as “any man-made object in orbit about the Earth which no longer serves a useful purpose”. There are some 9,000 objects larger than 10 cm and over 100,000 smaller objects. As orbiting debris may be travelling at very high velocities, even tiny fragments can pose a significant risk to satellites or spacecraft, as experienced by US astronaut Sally Ride, when a tiny, orbiting fleck of paint gouged the window of the space shuttle during her first flight.25 If the fleck of paint had been metal, its impact might have had lethal consequences. As noted by Joel Primack, a physics professor at the University of California and expert on the problems of space debris, “the weaponisation of space would make the debris problem much worse, and even one war in space could encase the entire planet in a shell of whizzing debris that would thereafter make space near the Earth highly hazardous for peaceful as well as military purposes”.26 This would entomb the earth and jeopardise the possibility of further space exploration. In addition, Primack speculates that even a small number of “hits” in space could create sufficient debris to cause a cascade of further fragmentation (a kind of chain reaction). This, in turn, could potentially damage the Earth’s environment and, as the Sun’s rays reflect off the dust, cause permanent light pollution, condemning us to a “lingering twilight”.27

### US weaponization causes space debris

Hui Zhang 2005 a research associate in the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government., “Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China”, <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/Dec-cvr?print#bio>

China also fears the increasing population of space debris. Such debris, resulting from 50 years of space activity, already poses a considerable hazard to spacecraft. Under U.S. space weaponization plans, this crowding problem could worsen as a large number of space weapons could be deployed in LEO. The launching and testing of weapons would also increase space debris. Moreover, deploying space-based weapons in the increasingly crowded realm of LEO would leave less room for civilian systems. Those problems would also occur during periods of peace. If a number of satellites were to be destroyed during the course of a war, some scientists warn, they would create so much debris that it would prevent future satellites from being stationed in space and generally limit space access. Indeed, pointing to the debris problem, Chinese scientists and officials have said that space weaponization should be considered an environmental threat as well as a security problem.

# AT:

## AT: Solvency

### The tech won’t work --- revolutionary leaps in astrodynamics are required and visions of space dominances have historically failed

Lt Col Bruce M. DeBlois (BS, MS, Union College; PhD, Oxford University) is the division chief of Strategic Studies and Assessments at the National Reconnaissance Office, Chantilly, Virginia, Space Sanctuary: A Viable National Strategy, Aerospace Power Journal - Winter 1998, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj98/win98/deblois.html

Technological Limitations: An Overstated, Promised Capability Much of the space-weaponization argument hinges upon an assumed capability, given proper investment. Such “technological optimism” warrants a second look. As noted by a distinguished scientist, “Scientists and engineers now know how to build a station in space that would circle the Earth 1,075 miles up. . . . Within the next 10 or 15 years, the Earth will have a new companion in the skies, a man-made satellite that could be either the greatest force for peace ever devised, or one of the most terrible weapons of war—depending on who makes and controls it.”24 Surprisingly, the distinguished scientist is the father of the space rocket, Wernher von Braun, and the year he made this unrealized statement was 1952. More recently, space-shuttle design plans of the 1970s called for 160-hour turnaround times and a minimal-maintenance concept requiring three or four technicians.25 Obviously, we have not attained anything close to this vision either. Such optimistic projections on the future uses of space have been around since the beginning of the US space program, and that tradition continues today. We should remain cautious on several counts: 1. The energy differential between air flight and spaceflight is orders of magnitude,26 and requires not simply an evolutionary advance of current aerodynamics technology but revolutionary leaps in astrodynamics and rocket technology. 2. In the concept-design phase of many space systems, some aspects of the hostile space environment have underestimated effects. Micrometeorites, space debris, extreme temperatures, and excessive radiation all require shielding, insulation, and energy-dissipation mechanisms. 3. One of the biggest technical problems facing any spacecraft is generating and/or maintaining sufficient onboard energy. 4. Remote guidance and control of spacecraft have posed confounding problems since the advent of the rocket in the early 1940s.27

### Err neg --- their optimism in tech is misplaced

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All told, the story of proliferated space access and exploitation in the near future is grossly exaggerated. Since the beginning of the space age, we have readily assumed away the very many technical and political difficulties associated with access to and movement in space. It is a natural thing to do—the skies were readily conquered; why not space? Visions of Buck Rogers “flying” through space reinforce the natural, albeit false, analogy between the conquest of air and space—hence the misnomer spaceflight. This optimism is part of our American heritage. Although it is a positive motivator of our inevitable move into space, it must not cloud rational decisions.

## AT: Case Solves War

### Space weapons will not decide the outcome of war

Bao Shixiu, 2007, Chief Expert of State Program Senior Research Fellow Academy of Military Sciences, PLA China, “Deterrence Revisited:

Outer Space\*”, <http://www.wsichina.org/cs5_1.pdf>

At a fundamental level, space weapons – like nuclear weapons – will not alter the essential nature of war. Throughout history, there has been much ink spilled over new weapons that have the unique power and ability to change the underlying quality of war. For example, military theorists once exaggerated the tank’s role in deciding the war’s outcome during World War I. 11 The atom bomb itself is probably the most salient example, as many analysts and politicians described the weapon as the unique ultimate weapon. 1 But this was a fundamental misunderstanding of war and its implements. Nuclear weapons crossed a threshold in terms of their immense capacity for destruction. But deterrence, mutual assured destruction and the nuclear taboo evolved to consign the use of nuclear weapons to a near impossibility, negating its utility as a tool of war-fighting. Weapons to change the nature of war have not emerged in the past and will not emerge in the future. As such, space weapons will not be the ultimate weapon nor will they be able to decide the outcome of war, even if they are used as a first strike.

## AT: Case Solves Heg 1/2

### Limitations on research and development of space weapons good – countries won't seek space weapons and we gain strategically by letting them make the first move

Karl Mueller, Analyst @ RAND, March 27, 2002 (Is Weaponization of Space Inevitable? http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/mueller.html)

2. Enlightened Self-Interest. The second scenario assumes that space weapons do in fact prove to be fairly useful and cost-effective. In this case, there is a good chance that U.S. security in particular would be best served by perpetuation of the space sanctuary for purely nationalist reasons: as the leading spacefaring state and the country most dependent upon satellites for its military power and economic wealth, the United States has the most to lose if those satellites become more vulnerable to attack. In addition, having invested vast resources in developing a preponderance of land, sea, air and unweaponized space power, a true space weapon revolution that wiped the clean the slate of military competition might well represent a net power loss for the United States relative to its rivals (as the steam, ironclad, and Dreadnought revolutions each did in turn for the Royal Navy).[40]

One approach to dealing with this problem would be for the United States to announce a policy of conditional unilateral restraint in space weaponization: that it will not be the first nation to weaponize space, although it will continue to develop the relevant technologies in order to be prepared to respond in kind should other states violate the sanctuary. In this scenario, such an approach would not be motivated by an idealistic belief that eschewing space weapons would inspire or shame other states to do the same. Instead, it would be based on a hard-nosed, realist calculation: U.S. space weaponization would not only encourage other states to follow suit, but would greatly assist them in doing so, since they would be able to exploit the advantages of backwardness after the United States had paid the costs of trailblazing the new technologies. With the United States not leading the way, yet threatening to lift its self-restraint in the absence of reciprocity from its rivals (thus denying them the hope of establishing hegemony in space), other states might well find insufficient value in initiating space weaponization to justify its costs.

AT: Case Solves Heg 2/2

### Space power fails --- encourages balancing from great powers and asymmetric threats from lesser powers

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Demonstrations of atomic weapons at the close of World War II and the prospect of nuclear weapons married to emerging ballistic missile technology ushered in a new era of international relations. Threatening to use military force had always been an instrument of diplomacy, but the potential for instantaneous, indefensible, and complete annihilation posed a new rubric in the games nations play. Thus, nuclear deterrence was born.

Initial thoughts that such a threat relegated warfare to the shelves of history due to the prospects of massive nuclear retaliation proved naïve—subsequent lower-order conflict did not force nuclear escalation. Symmetric nuclear capabilities among the principal powers weakened the credibility of their use, while asymmetric responses (guerrilla and terrorist tactics, aligning with nuclear-capable parties, conflict protraction, etc.) still allowed lesser powers to test the resolve of the principals—particularly over issues of peripheral interest to those nuclear powers. Examples include Vietnam and Afghanistan. Visions of massive space superiority and the touted huge, coercive power advantage they provide will likely prove as bankrupt a notion as that of massive nuclear retaliation. In their logical evolution, both give way to strategies that recognize an international context of reactive nations. Principal powers will simply not allow a space hegemon to emerge, and lesser powers may concede hegemony but will continue to seek asymmetric counters.4 The result will be a space strategy that better aligns with what evolved out of the nuclear dilemma: mutual assured destruction (MAD).

## AT: Case Solves War-fighting

### Space systems don’t do anything to improve US war-fighting --- they’re vulnerable to interference, orbits can easy be thrown off, and reliance will always rely on primarily terrestrial systems --- prefer our qualified evidence

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Sound military reasons exist for not weaponizing space. For example, 1. space-weaponization strategies lack the element of survivability. Space systems will not survive if they are targeted. Military systems in space, like all others, follow well-established, fixed orbits (orbital transfers are energy- and cost-prohibitive). This leaves space systems exposed and vulnerable. As predominantly unmanned systems, they also require data link to a controller, leaving them vulnerable to interference in the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum. For instance, a nuclear explosion in space—with force and radiation not attenuated by the atmosphere—could negate the use of vast numbers of orbits. Or direct-ascent ASATs, constructed from modified cold war ICBMs, could disperse something as simple as sand in LEO, leaving anything passing through it (17,000 MPH @ 200 km) severely damaged or destroyed. Many futuristic war games are conducted throughout DOD each year, and the play of space systems has increased. One conclusion persists: the fight for space is first and fast, and many space systems do not survive. As space access matures, the survivability issue will become obvious. Nations will not rely on space systems for crisis situations—they will rely on terrestrial systems (perhaps redundant with more efficient but more vulnerable space counterparts). Hence, the value of space weapons to deny those space systems will be moot.

### The tech will get hijacked through low tech low cost means by weaker states --- even if it works, it can get easily hacked

Rebecca Johnson, Director of the Disarmament and Arms Control Programme at the Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, 2003, ("Missile defense and the weaponisation of space," ISIS Policy paper on missile defense, January, http://www.isisuk.demon.co.uk/0811/isis/uk/bmd/no11.html)

7. Can Outer Space be Made Secure? As noted above, US advocates of space weaponisation rest their case on three assumptions: inevitability, vulnerability and control. The higher the level of reliance on space assets for military purposes, the greater the vulnerabilities. As first demonstrated in the strikes on Former Yugoslavia over Kosovo and then in Afghanistan, the US now depends on an array of ‘smart’ weaponry that needs very sophisticated data and guidance systems, telemetry, and electronic communications. This ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA), in turn, depends on satellites.28 But military and commercial systems in space are not just vulnerable to space-targeted attacks, since they depend on ground facilities (telemetry, tracking and control, communications, data reception etc.) and radio links (carrying commands, communications, telemetry and data), which provide much more accessible opportunities for interference, disablement or destruction. It is unlikely that adversaries would risk a pre-emptive direct attack when electronic hacking, jamming or “spoofing” provide a low tech, low cost means of disrupting space assets.

## AT: Case Key to Deterrence

### Mutual Assured Destruction fails in space- it’s impossible to defend all national interests, weapons instigate first strike, and become a self-fulfilling prophecy: they’ll only be used if they’re there

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From this experience, one can draw and apply lessons as the possibility of space weapons emerges. Clearly, these weapons offer the potential for instantaneous and indefensible attack. Although the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 (outlawing weapons of mass destruction [WMD] in space) prohibits complete annihilation, the threat of annihilation would still exist—it is difficult to distinguish space-based WMD from space-based non-WMD. In simple terms, space weaponization could bring a new round of MAD. Although MAD successfully deterred a nuclear exchange over the past 40 years, it was a very costly means of overcoming the lack of trust between superpowers. The dissolution of that distrust and the corresponding reduction of nuclear arms lie at the very heart of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START). Comparing the emergence of nuclear-tipped ICBMs with the accession of space weapons does yield some stark differences, however. There is no single threat to focus diplomatic efforts aimed at building trust, and there does seem to be some international support for the idea of coalescing a strategy supporting space sanctuary and deterring third world space upstarts. Aside from these differences, though, one could assume the existence of proliferated space weapons and proceed with the thought experiment that a space-MAD strategy would emerge among the principal powers. Again, one would have to eliminate the notion of “winning” a space-weapons exchange, and on at least the first two counts, one could do so: 1. It is logical to concede the offensive dominance of space-based weapons in low-earth orbit (LEO). Any point on earth could have a weapon pointed at it with clear line of sight; the potential of directed-energy weapons takes the notion of instantaneous to the extreme; and defense of every national asset from such an attack would prove next to impossible. 2. The same argument against the logic of “tactical” nuclear weapons would also apply to the “tactical” use of space-based weapons. Once they were used, any conflict could automatically escalate to a higher level. 3. The failing of a space-MAD strategy comes on the third count: early warning or survivable second-strike capability. Should space be weaponized and two space-capable foes emerge, there will be no 30-minute early warning window from which one actor could launch a counterattack prior to the impact of the preemptive first strike. Furthermore, space basing is equivalent to exposure—no strike capability can be reliably hidden or protected in space in order to allow a surviving, credible second strike. Space-MAD weapons without early warning or reliable survivability logically instigate a first strike. This creates an incredibly unstable situation in which the viability of “winning” a space war exists and is predicated upon striking first (with plausible deniability exacerbating the problem), eliminating the “mutual” from MAD and only assuring the destruction of the less aggressive state. Obviously, this is not a good situation. Putting weapons in space could well be a self-fulfilling prophecy: we put them there because we anticipate we’ll need them, and because they’re there, we’ll be compelled to use them; hence, we needed them. The conclusion, then, of a nuclear weapons–space weapons analogy can only be that while the threats from each type of weapon are similar, the most successful strategy (MAD) for dealing with the former cannot work for the latter. Unlike the strategy for nuclear weapons, there exists no obvious strategy for employing space weapons that will enhance global stability. If the precedent of evading destabilizing situations is to continue—and that is compatible with a long history of US foreign policy—one ought to avoid space-based weapons. Further, even if one could construct a workable space-MAD strategy, the nuclear-MAD approach teaches that this is an intensely expensive means of dealing with mutual distrust between nations.

## AT: Case Solves Heg- Air Force

### Air power solves benefits of space – strategy of militarization causes escalatory retaliation and violent counterbalancing

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3. space-weaponization strategies are provocative. Space weapons are inherently offensive, and dominant offensive weapons encourage preemption against them.33 Hence, space weapons are militarily provocative and destabilizing. 4. space-weaponization strategies are escalatory. Space weapons, by their nature, are escalatory. Because they are remote, they offer plausible deniability; because they are typically unmanned, they are easier to use. As such, the use of space weapons blurs the distinction between peace and war. They are another ambiguous step on the slippery slope to escalation. 5. space-weaponization strategies are militarily self-defeating. A space arms race threatens to negate the overwhelming military advantages we now hold in space, as well as in the air, on land, or at sea. By proving the efficacy of space weapons, the United States may provide the international community with an asymmetric approach capable of offsetting current US global dominance. 6. space-weaponization strategies are politically self-defeating. Pursuing the military advantages of space weapons will inevitably incite military coalitions against the United States. 7. space-weaponization strategies are not a panacea. As mentioned, the anticipated advantages of massive space superiority will be neutralized by symmetric reactions of major powers and offset by asymmetric responses of lesser powers. 8. space-weaponization strategies are expensive. There are significant long-term-opportunity costs within the military, particularly in these times of diminishing DOD budgets. One can meet the same requirements with cheaper alternatives, such as combat unmanned ae-rial vehicles (UAV).34 Weaponizing space will necessarily come at the expense of satisfying documented military deficiencies (strategic-lift deficiencies and the C-17, air-superiority deficiencies and the F-22 or joint strike fighter, forward-basing deficiencies and carriers, ISR deficiencies and the next generation of ISR satellites,35 etc.). 9. space-weaponization strategies are a single-point solution. What can be done with space weapons can also be done from the air, without the political baggage of weaponizing space.

## AT: Others Militarizing Space

### Other countries don’t want to militarize space- the only risk is if the US does it.

Smith 07 (Jack, Mar 10, “The militarization of outer space”, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/IC10Aa03.html>)

Outer space begins where Earth's atmosphere ends, some 100 kilometers above the globe's surface. The United States wants the ability to militarize outer space to sustain its world dominance. The Pentagon can already monitor the world from space. Now it seeks to develop and deploy military systems in space that allow the US to strike with great force anywhere on Earth in less than an hour. The Defense Department's Global Strike Integration policy seeks to "gain and maintain both global and theater space superiority and deliver tailored, integrated, full-spectrum space support to the theater commander, while maintaining a robust defensive global counter-space posture". This means occupying space with surveillance and reconnaissance satellites and anti-satellites, ballistic missiles, missile or kinetic interceptors, and other advanced technology weapons to assist US land, sea and air forces in maintaining military hegemony throughout the world. It also means preventing any other country, by force if necessary, from using space for similar purposes, including self-defense. Aside from the satellites, which have become key to the Pentagon's battle plans, most of the other technology is in the research and development stage or awaiting deployment decisions from the White House that are complicated by political complexities. The George W Bush administration - especially the Defense Department and particularly the US Air Force (USAF) - is anxious to launch a full-scale militarization of space, regardless of its enormous expense and the fact that it will inspire worldwide condemnation, generate a dangerous arms race in outer space, and undoubtedly enhance prospects for major wars in this century. The rightists and neo-conservatives are not unaware of these potential consequences but they are confident the US will prevail because of its overwhelming power. In effect, "It's worth the price." But that mindset is not shared so far by most Americans outside the hard right, particularly in the absence of any other country that could come near to threatening the United States for global primacy. In addition, virtually every other nation in the world, including Washington's close allies in Canada and the European Union, opposes the weaponization of space, as is evident from repeated votes at the United Nations. What this means is that the US is clearly heading toward space militarization - more slowly during the Bill Clinton administration, more swiftly during the Bush administration - but not yet with the acceleration the war hawks demand or the Bushites would prefer. The annual US space budget amounts to about US$36 billion. This constitutes 73% of what the world's nations collectively spend on space, including China, Russia, the European Union, Japan and India, according to the Space Security Project. At a certain point, perhaps in the not distant future, one Washington administration or another may be able to convince the American people, and particularly the elite that rules the country, that Russia, China or both have become such grave threats to US hegemony that survival depends on extending the reach of Fortress Americana into the heavens. Since the Second Cold War against both these countries is getting under way, the pretext is in the process of becoming established. The plan to use outer space as part of America's war preparations was put forward by the right wing during the vehemently anti-Soviet years of the 1980s, resulting in president Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars" anti-missile program and the creation of the Air Force Space Command in 1982, the mission of which is to "defend North America through its space and intercontinental-ballistic-missile operations - vital force elements in projecting global reach and global power". By the 1990s, the neo-conservatives were developing ideas for projecting US power throughout the world, including the militarization of space - resulting in an influential document published in 2000 by the Project for the New American Century titled Rebuilding America's Defenses. A year after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the Pentagon and New York's World Trade Center, President Bush included most of these ideas in a new National Security Strategy for the United States. At about the same time, Bush withdrew the US from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which had barred development of missile defenses and space-based systems. One complication for the Pentagon is that the US, as a signatory of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, may not "place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction (chemical or biological killers), install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner". Thus at this stage the US military space program is based on "conventional" warfare, not weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but with a few adjustments this could change. For instance, more than 70% the Pentagon's "shock and awe" bombing of Baghdad during the first days of the invasion of Iraq was coordinated and sent to target through military satellites in space. These bombs were conventional explosives, but satellites could have guided nuclear weapons as long as they were not launched from space. According to Hans M Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists, "Although Global Strike is primarily a non-nuclear mission, the information collected [about the program] reveals that nuclear weapons are surprisingly prominent in both the planning and command structure for Global Strike." Both China and Russia, among many nations, have been attempting to gain UN passage of a new treaty banning conventional weapons in space as well as WMD, and also prohibiting the use of satellites to guide warfare on the ground. True to its militarist imperative, the US will not allow any such treaty to interfere with its plans. Bush put forward a 10-page unclassified version of the new US National Space Policy last October, superseding the Clinton administration policy of September 1996, but it generally obfuscated the government's real intentions. The new policy was similar in some instances to the Clinton era policy but more unilateral, arrogant and favorable toward space militarization, though not coming out with it honestly. Only by reading between the convoluted lines was it possible to comprehend fully that the US government intends to do as it pleases militarily in outer space, including preventing other countries from obtaining a similar strategic advantage. Here is an example: "The United States is committed to the exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes, and for the benefit of all humanity. Consistent with this principle, 'peaceful purposes' allow US defense and intelligence-related activities in pursuit of national interests." (Translation: Since we respect your peaceful purposes, you must respect ours, so butt out.) Here's another: "The United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit US access to or use of space. Proposed arms-control agreements or restrictions must not impair the rights of the United States to conduct research, development, testing, and operations or other activities in space for US national interests." (Translation: The US intends to militarize space, and as the principal member of the Security Council and world hegemon, we will not allow a new treaty to abrogate our rights.) Another: Under the title "National Security Space Guidelines", the document declared that the Defense Department would: "Develop and deploy space capabilities that sustain US advantage and support defense and intelligence transformation." Provide "reliable, affordable, and timely space access for national-security purposes". "Provide space capabilities to support continuous, global strategic and tactical warning as well as multi-layered and integrated missile defenses." "Develop capabilities, plans, and options to ensure freedom of action in space, and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries." (Translation: We're ready to roll, so move out of the way.) Theresa Hitchens, director of the Center for Defense Information, said that while the new policy "doesn't go as far as some space hawks wanted it to in openly endorsing the strategy of fighting 'in, from and through' space, neither has it served to put a blanket - even a thin one - on those ambitions. And in taking a decidedly 'us against them' tone, it is likely to further cement the view from abroad that the United States has taken on the role of a 'Lone Space Cowboy'." It took four years and three dozen revisions until a final version of the National Space Policy was approved - a reflection of how complex it must be to transform a military plan to control the world into a space travelogue. The report was actually delayed for 15 months after press reports revealed that Bush was leaning toward a USAF request for a presidential directive permitting the deployment of weapons in space. The uproar evidently persuaded the Bushites to tone down the policy - a problem solved by not mentioning it. Moscow and Beijing have been calling for years for an international ban on any kind of weaponization of outer space, including militarized reconnaissance and communications satellites, and conventional weapons as well as WMD. In 2002, China and Russia, co-sponsored by Vietnam, Syria, Indonesia, Belarus and Zimbabwe, presented a proposal to the United Nations for a treaty to demilitarize space completely, tentatively called the "Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space [and] the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects". The US not only rejected the possibility of such a treaty, it refused even to discuss the matter. Meanwhile, a number of other resolutions have also been introduced concerned with preventing an arms race in space and gained impressive majorities. In 2000, for example, a resolution on the Prevention of an Outer Space Arms Race was passed with a vote of 163-0 with three abstentions, Micronesia, Israel and the United States. In 2003, the UN vote to prevent an arms race in space was 174-4, with the Marshall Islands joining the "Big Three", which all voted in opposition this time. Last year, the UN General Assembly vote on preventing an arms race in space was passed 166-1. Israel abstained. The US voted No. Publicly, Washington maintains that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and other legal measures render a new treaty redundant, but that's only because the treaty allows the US to militarize space via the back door of satellites with battlefield connections and weapons other than WMD. Most of the rest of the world opposes any militarization of space, and Washington and Israel evidently cannot even always rely on the Marshall Islands and Micronesia. The Bush administration has repeatedly expressed contempt for the Russia-China treaty proposal and similar efforts from other countries. Former deputy defense secretary Paul Wolfowitz, perhaps the most vociferous of the neo-conservative initiators of the Iraq war, declared in October 2002, "Space offers attractive options not only for missile defense, but for a broad range of interrelated civil and military missions." Former US ambassador to the UN John Bolton, another war hawk, commented in Geneva in September 2004, "We are not prepared to negotiate on the so-called arms race in outer space. We just don't see that as a worthwhile enterprise." The White House is reluctant openly to acknowledge its intention to militarize space, but the USAF in particular has been quite frank. In 1996, the then head of the Space Command, General Joseph W Ashy, was quoted as saying: "We're going to fight from space, and we're going to fight into space. That's why the US has development programs in directed energy and hit-to-kill mechanisms. We will engage terrestrial targets some day - ships, airplanes, land targets - from space." In 2004, Under Secretary of the Air Force Peter B Teets, discussing America's intentions in space, declared bluntly, "We are paving the road of 21st-century warfare." In May 2005, the New York Times quoted General Lance Lord, another head of the Space Command, as revealing, "Space superiority is not our birthright, but it is our destiny. Space superiority is our day-to-day mission. Space supremacy is our vision for the future." He did not explain how space superiority is obtained, but there is only one way - dominant military force. The USAF acknowledges that the militarization of space is a prime objective.