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Jobs Bill Ptx DA

1. Non- Unique- bill not passing now because of the lack of democratic support

Jake Sherman, staff writer, 7-3-2010. [Politico, Dems in a jam as economy slows, http://fredericksburg.com/News/Web/politico?p\_id=2342]

President Barack Obama and the Democrats head into the summer campaign season with the economy slowing, unemployment flirting with double-digits — and few options for a quick fix.

Obama’s economic stimulus plan is winding down, right when Democrats need it most. And a big new jobs bill?

Forget it. House Democrats had to battle this week just to pass a bill to prevent teachers from being laid off, over the objections of 15 mostly conservative House Democrats and even Obama, who threatened a veto over how the House planned to pay for it.

1. No link: the Dryer evidence indicates it would drain Obama’s political capital in the eyes of the public, not Congress, withdraw is good
2. No link: plan popular- Obama won’t have to spend political capital- democrats are sick of being in Afghanistan

Richman 6/29, Josh Richman, “Political Blotter: House members want clear plan on Afghanistan”, BAY AREA NEWS GROUP, mercurynews.com, 07/05/2010

Rep. Barbara Lee, D-Oakland, led about two dozen House members in writing to President Barack Obama today to ask that he provide Congress with "a clear commitment and plan to withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan" before the vote on the supplemental funding bill. "It has been nearly a decade since we went to Afghanistan and we still are not sure why we are there or can define a successful mission," she said in a news release. "This war is now the longest war in American history. We simply cannot continue to fund a war that seemingly has no end in sight. It's past time we have a clear exit strategy and timeline for redeployment of our troops." The letter cites conflicting statements by members of the administration and the military command. For example, in the same Rolling Stone article that led to Gen. Stanley McChrystal being sacked, a senior military official stationed in Afghanistan indicated military success could lead to more U.S. troops deployed there, not fewer. "There's a possibility we could ask for another surge of U.S. forces next summer if we see success here," the official says. The letter also cites Defense Secretary Robert Gates on ABC's "This Week" last December as well as Gen. David Advertisement Petraeus in today's Washington Post indicating troops necessarily won't be meaningfully withdrawn in summer 2011. Among the other House members signing Lee's letter were Pete Stark, D-Fremont, and Lynn Woolsey, D-Petaluma.

1. Jobs bill not key to prevent double dip recession, the unemployment rate has been decreasing and we’re still headed toward recession, clearly- jobs aren’t key to the economy.
2. Turn: the jobs bill exacerbates the economic troubles and prevents spending on useful solutions

Michael **Tanner**, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, “Rethinking Jobless Benefits” **6-25**-10, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11915

Yet, a closer look reveals that extending unemployment benefits may do more harm than good. First, of course, there is the cost — and the fact that we don't have the money to pay that cost. Extending unemployment benefits will cost $47 billion. While that seems trivial compared with, say, a new $2 trillion health care program, it is a steady stream of these expenditures that adds up to a $13 trillion national debt. The money Congress borrows to spend on unemployment benefits today will have to be paid back by taxing workers and employers down the road. This slows economic growth and leads to fewer jobs in the future. Therefore, whatever help we give workers today comes at the expense of workers tomorrow. While old-fashioned Keynesian economists believe that extending unemployment benefits helps stimulate demand by pumping money into the economy, research by MIT's Jonathan Gruber and others suggests that only a portion of unemployment benefits goes to consumption. In fact, a Heritage Foundation study concluded that unemployment benefits add only a few cents to economic growth for every dollar spent. Virtually any other use of that money would provide more bang for the buck. But perhaps most important, extending unemployment benefits may be bad for workers in the here and now. A large body of economic evidence suggests that extending unemployment benefits increases unemployment and keeps people out of work longer. This is because workers are less likely to look for work, or accept less-than-ideal jobs, as long as they are protected from the full consequences of being unemployed. That is not to say that anyone is getting rich off unemployment, or that unemployed people are lazy. But it is simple human nature that people are a little less motivated as long as a check is coming in.

Jobs Bill Ptx DA

1. Case out weighs: The Thayer evidence outlines a more probable scenario for World War III than Mead does. Empirically proven- US primacy is key to prevent great power wars like the Cold War and currently, conflict between Israel-Egypt, India-Pakistan, South Korea-Japan. Mead empirically denied- the economy has been shitty for years.

Energy Ptx DA

1. Non- unique: Utility only considered the same as cap and trade meaning it still won’t pass

Stephen Power, staff writer, 7-1-2010. [Wall Street Journal, Political Insight and Analysis From The Wall Street Journal's Capital Bureau, p. http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/07/01/bingaman-do-or-die-time-on-energy-bill/]

Bingaman’s bill doesn’t require companies to pay for the right to emit greenhouse gases linked to climate change – something Obama insisted on both as a candidate and at a meeting last week with senators, including Bingaman. In the C-SPAN interview, Bingaman said he’s willing to support such a measure, targeting emissions from electric utilities, but that he’s “somewhat dubious that the votes are there to do even that.”

“When you look at the makeup of the Senate today, there are quite a few senators who are going to be resistant to anything that could be labeled as ‘cap and trade,’” said Bingaman, referring to the idea of setting a cap on emissions from various industries and requiring companies to hold permits that would let them emit greenhouse gases. Companies could buy and sell the permits, and the government would gradually reduce number, bringing down overall emissions.

1. Non-unique: Energy legislation is impossible this summer—extreme partisanship.

William O'Keefe, CEO, George C. Marshall Institute, 6-23-2010. [National Journal, Utility-Only Challenges, p. http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2010/06/what-fits-the-bill.php]

Unfortunately, insufficient collegiality and trust among Washington lawmakers has **poisoned the atmosphere** in the Senate. Efforts to represent the public’s interest have given way indulgent pursuits of partisan advantage. In almost any climate, it would be hard for Sen. Reid to secure 60 votes for a controversial energy/climate bill before the summer’s end. In this poisoned climate, **it’s nearly impossible.**

1. No link: plan popular- Obama won’t have to spend political capital- democrats are sick of being in Afghanistan

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Rep. Barbara Lee, D-Oakland, led about two dozen House members in writing to President Barack Obama today to ask that he provide Congress with "a clear commitment and plan to withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan" before the vote on the supplemental funding bill. "It has been nearly a decade since we went to Afghanistan and we still are not sure why we are there or can define a successful mission," she said in a news release. "This war is now the longest war in American history. We simply cannot continue to fund a war that seemingly has no end in sight. It's past time we have a clear exit strategy and timeline for redeployment of our troops." The letter cites conflicting statements by members of the administration and the military command. For example, in the same Rolling Stone article that led to Gen. Stanley McChrystal being sacked, a senior military official stationed in Afghanistan indicated military success could lead to more U.S. troops deployed there, not fewer. "There's a possibility we could ask for another surge of U.S. forces next summer if we see success here," the official says. The letter also cites Defense Secretary Robert Gates on ABC's "This Week" last December as well as Gen. David Advertisement Petraeus in today's Washington Post indicating troops necessarily won't be meaningfully withdrawn in summer 2011. Among the other House members signing Lee's letter were Pete Stark, D-Fremont, and Lynn Woolsey, D-Petaluma.

1. Utility Bill not key to solve warming. The Frank evidence refers to cap and trade in general being able to prevent climate change. A less extensive version of cap and trade would not be able solve. Additionally- Frank is a staff writer not a scientist- he’s not qualified to give an opinion on what will prevent climate change.
2. The Deibel evidence says there’s no way to reduce carbon levels in the atmosphere because it lasts about a century. Utility bill won’t solve, only hope is to solve the aff impacts in the meantime

Energy Ptx DA

1. Link Turn: withdraw increases political capital

Ackerman, 12.2.9 ( Spencer, “Obama Announces 30K more troops for Afghanistan”,

<http://minnesotaindependent.com/50905/obama-announces-30k-more-troops-for-afghanistan>)

Keeping congressional support for a controversial war now certain to last past the 2010 midterm elections, and most likely Obama’s first term in office, will be “a challenge” for the administration, said Rep. Joe Sestak (D-Penn.), a retired Navy admiral who is running for a seat in the Senate next year and who supports the troop increases. The war is unpopular, particularly within Democratic and progressive circles, constituencies the Democrats in Congress need to retain their majorities. Traditional Obama allies like the netroots giant MoveOn and the progressive veterans group VoteVets announced opposition to the strategy on Tuesday. And a just-released estimate by Todd Harrison, an analyst at the Center on Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, claims that Obama’s “extended surge” will  “increase costs by approximately $30 billion per year,” and speculated that a supplemental appropriation — something the administration has pledged not to seek — may be necessary in fiscal 2010. Still, Sestak believed that Obama could retain congressional and national support. “People believe in him,” the congressman said, adding that Obama’s “non-political” approach to decisionmaking in the war would **earn him popular support.** Obama’s weeks of deliberation on Afghanistan have come under significant conservative criticism. Although Dick Cheney, the former vice president, presided in part over the deterioration of the Afghanistan war before handing it off to Obama, he has said Obama was “dithering” on the war and described the administration as weak. Undeterred, the administration has said the result of the process would be a clear strategy and stronger national consensus. And senior officials said that the administration would launch another overall review of the strategy in in late 2010, even ahead of the “strategic inflection point” on July 2011.

1. Case outweighs: quicker timeframe, you can only die once so averting NATO collapse and heg decline is the priority.

Midterms- Obama Good

1. Non-unique: Republican’s win in the Midterms now- polls prove

Caitlin Huey-Burns**.** GOP Has Edge in Voter Enthusiasm. U.S. News and World Report (Politics and Policy). 6-30-2010. <http://politics.usnews.com/news/articles/2010/06/30/gop-has-edge-in-voter-enthusiasm.html>

A series of recent polls show anti-incumbency sentiments are at a record high and Republicans are more enthusiastic than ever about voting in the midterm elections when compared to Democrats. The results suggest it could be a favorable election year for the GOP. A recent Gallup poll shows 60 percent of those surveyed said most members of [Congress](http://www.usnews.com/congress) should not be reelected. Frank Newport, editor in chief of the [Gallup Poll](http://politics.usnews.com/news/articles/2010/06/30/gop-has-edge-in-voter-enthusiasm.html), says that percentage "is the highest in our history." When asked to explain why, 29 percent of those surveyed said lawmakers are "not doing a good job." According to the poll, 15 percent cited a need for fresh faces in office and another 15 percent were concerned that lawmakers were not representing their interests. Many cited general worries about partisanship and congressional self-interest. Another Gallup poll shows Republicans leading Democrats in voter enthusiasm by 28 percentage points. Newport says Republicans "have had more fervor" about voting in recent midterms, except for in 2006 when Democrats gained control of Congress. But this is the largest enthusiasm gap between the parties the poll has found since first asking the question in 1994, the year Republicans historically took over the House.

1. No link: pulling out of Afghanistan not considered weak foreign policy
2. Link turn: withdraw from Afghanistan is a win for Democrats

Agence France Presse 7-1-2010. [US lawmakers pass Afghan war funding, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hrIVooBldlIZuML9BBGBLKt1MiKw]

Lawmakers approved the monies -- including funds necessary to Obama's plan to deploy another 30,000 troops to turn the faltering campaign around -- only after giving voice to a **growing chorus of Democratic calls** for a withdrawal. Democrats backing the war, allied with the president's Republican foes, turned aside three amendments that posed stiff challenges to Obama's strategy. The House struck down one measure to cut all military spending from the bill by a 376-25 margin, and killing another to restrict the money to pay for a withdrawal of US forces by a 321-100 margin. n a 260-162 vote, they also defeated a Democratic amendment aimed at requiring Obama, who has set a July 2011 deadline for starting a US withdrawal, to set a complete timetable for that process. Democrats accounted for the lion's share of the yes votes in each case. But the fate of the bill was still clouded after Democrats attached more than 15 billion dollars in jobs and education programs in a 239-182 that defied a presidential veto threat over cuts designed to pay for the measure. The House changes meant the Senate, which approved the administration's request for **the vastly unpopular Afghan war** in May, would have to take up the measure the week of July 12 after the week-long July 4 recess. The amendments reflected growing US public pessimism about the war, by some measures now the longest in US history, ahead of key November mid-term elections.

1. Can’t solve warming- other countries are part of the problem, no evidence of modeling.
2. Cap and trade won’t solve warming- doesn’t low temperatures, and other countries are key

The Foundry, 7/21/09 (“A Baker’s Dozen of Reasons to Oppose Cap and Trade”, The Foundry, July 21st 2009, http://blog.heritage.org/2009/07/21/a-baker’s-dozen-of-reasons-to-oppose-cap-and-trade/)

10.) There’s no environmental benefit. Even the flawed and significantly biased cost estimates of $140 per year or $170 per year aren’t worth the alleged benefits since the bill would lower temperatures by only hundredths of a degree in 2050 and no more than two-tenths of a degree at the end of the century. The fact that EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson confirmed the bill would do nothing for global temperatures without commitment from large emitters like India and China following suit, as well as Greenpeace’s adamant opposition due to all the corporate handouts in the bill should be telling signs that the environmental benefits are nonexistent.

1. Case outweighs: quicker timeframe, you can only die once so averting NATO collapse and heg decline is the priority.

Midterms- Obama Bad

1. Non-unique: Dems winning now- polls prove

Nate Silver. Senate Forecast: After Primaries, Picture Slightly Improved for Dems. 6-28-2010.

<http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2010/06/senate-forecast-after-primaries-picture.html>

Locally, Democrats helped themselves in the primaries. Democratic fortunes were improved by the primaries in Nevada and Pennsylvania, California, North Carolina, and Kentucky, and worsened probably only in Arkansas (and South Carolina, which they had almost no chance of winning anyway.) This accounts for most of the movement in the rankings. Whereas, as of our last update, or simulations were projecting an average of 54.0 Democratic and 46.0 Republican seats, we now show 55.2 Democrats, 44.2 Republicans, and 0.6 Charlie Crists.

1. No link: Withdraw is seen as weak foreign policy and will hurt Democrats

FLY 1 – 28 – 10Executive Director - Foreign Policy Initiative & Research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations Jamie M. Fly, Does Obama Have a Foreign Policy?, http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/does-obama-have-foreign-policy

While it is understandable that given the state of the economy and lingering recession, most Americans are perhaps more focused on their job security than about what is happening in Kabul, Tehran, or Pyongyang, it is troubling that this president does not seem to have a clear agenda on these issues other than a retro-80s approach to twenty-first century challenges.  If the Christmas Day bomber, growing concern about Yemen, instability in Iran, continued uncertainty about nuclear Pakistan, and the difficult months (and years) ahead in Afghanistan are any indication, 2010 will be just as consequential for U.S. foreign policy as any year in recent memory with the exception of 2001. President Obama came into office with a foreign policy agenda that was essentially limited to expressing concern about nuclear weapons and showing the world that he was not George W. Bush.  He has now done the latter through speech after speech in Istanbul, Accra, Cairo, to cite just a few of the exotic venues.  Despite focusing on the former with his “reset” of the U.S.-Russian relationship, the foreign policy challenges he faced during 2009 were largely thrust upon him by events.  Despite several courageous decisions as commander in chief, he was clearly uncomfortable (witness the Afghanistan Strategy Review) with the issue set he was forced to focus on during year one. In this very political White House, foreign policy is viewed through the lens of mid-term elections in 2010 and the president’s reelection in 2012, just like any other issue.  Thus, it is important for Team Obama to act tough on security and kill terrorists (preferably using classified means), but most other foreign policy issues become time consuming obstacles to the pursuit of a robust domestic agenda.  This is foreign policy as a political tactic, not as a grand strategy or a coherent formulation of America’s global interests (with the exception of a headlong rush for disarmament). Despite the challenges the country faces on the domestic front, it would behoove the president in 2010 to do what he failed to do last night -- speak more frequently to the American people about what is at stake overseas and what his vision is for keeping Americans safe and advancing U.S. interests around the world.  Otherwise, he risks being nothing more than a reactionary president doing little more than what is required to avoid the wrath of the electorate.  He runs the risk of becoming an inconsequential commander in chief in very consequential times.

1. Turn: Heg key to the economy, securing American hegemony prevents economic decline

Thayer in 07, Bradley A., Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, “American Empire: A Debate,” Routledge publishing 2007, pg. 43

Economic prosperity is also a product of the American Empire. It has created a Liberal International Economic Order (LIEO)-a network of worldwide free trade and commerce, respect for intellectual property rights, mobility of capital and labor markets-to promote economic growth. The stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly states in the Third World. The American Empire has created this network not out of altruism but because it benefits the economic well-being of the United States. In 1998, the Secretary of Defense William Cohen put this well when he acknowledged that "economists and soldiers share the same interest in stability"; soldiers create the conditions in which the American economy may thrive, and "we are able to shape the environment [of international politics] in ways that are advantageous to us and that are stabilizing to the areas where we are forward deployed, thereby helping to promote investment and prosperity ... business follows the flag."60

Midterms: Obama Bad

1. No internal link from jobs to the economy: Jobs aren’t key, the unemployment rate has been steadily declining but the economy has not improved- there is not a clear inverse relationship between the two.
2. SKFTA not key to job creation: the NYT evidence is power tagged- it only indicates that SKFTA creates jobs, not that it is key to the economy.
3. Case out weighs: The Thayer evidence outlines a more probable scenario for World War III than Mead does. Empirically proven- US primacy is key to prevent great power wars like the Cold War and currently, conflict between Israel-Egypt, India-Pakistan, South Korea-Japan. Mead empirically denied- the economy has been shitty for years.

T- Presence not Combat Troops

1. We Meet:

The troops we remove are engaged in population centric counterinsurgency presence activities which is nation-building activities not combat.

Gentile 9, A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army, GIAN P. GENTILE, Autumn 2009,

Population-centric counterinsurgency is a military operation, a methodology, nothing more and nothing less. Its ideas and rules of tactics and operations should be familiar to anyone who has studied or thought about various approaches to COIN. They are:• Populations are always the focus, the center of gravity, and theyhave to be protected.• The enemy insurgent as a rule cannot be as important or given the same level of emphasis as the population.• Population-centric COIN requires patience on the part of the American people.• It demands a certain tactical approach of dispersion into small outposts to live amongst the people to win their hearts and minds; this has become the concept of clear, hold, and build.• Population-centric counterinsurgency equals nation-building, and it requires a major investment in time to be successful.

1. Counter Interpretation: Military forces means bases with combat forces

Layne 10, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the [George Bush School of Government and Public Service](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Bush_School_of_Government_and_Public_Service) (Christopher, “Definition of Military presence” May 12th, http://abnormalmeans.com/2010/05/definition-of-military-presence/)

My inter­pre­tation would be that “military presence” means bases with combat forces (or bases that normally are main­tained by skeleton units but are main­tained to receive combat forces crisis/surge type circum­stances). I do not think in the normal meaning of the term that the US has military bases in N. Korea.

1. Standards
2. Limits: we provide the best limits- theirs allows for thousands of menial, un topic related jobs, it literally allows for the cooks and janitors on military bases because they engage in non-combat routine activities, ours limits it to military bases with troops which is the intend limits of the topic
3. Ground: the ground we access is more educational because it’s focuses on the intent of the topic
4. Predictability: under their interp any job that takes place on a base is topical this includes things like doctors, cooks, teachers, child care providers- there’s no way anyone could predict these small jobs. Additionally, ours is more recent meaning it assumes the current political and military climate
5. Reasonability: as long as we aren’t blatantly un-topical don’t vote us down; competing interpretations creates too strong an incentive to go for T- kills policy education and over-penalizes the aff

AT: Extra T

1. Either we meet their interpretation or if we win our interp we aren’t extra T
2. They can CP our of sever extra-T parts
3. Even if we’re extra-T, this gives the neg more link ground.
4. Not a voter, only a risk of better debates- increases policy analysis and education – every plan includes some extra topical part

Security

AT: Security Links on Case

1. Frame work:

A. Interpretation: The aff is allowed a topical plan and the neg is allowed a competitive policy option.

 B. Voting Issue for education and ground.

C. Utopian Fiat—this is not real world at all and means that there is no real solvency for the kritiks harms.

D. Ground—there are thousands of Kritiks on every manner of subject. Allowing them would create an impossible research burden and explodes neg ground.

E. Policy options are better because they promote argumentation on the mechanisms of the resolutional actor and the repercussions that are unique to the plan or counter-plan.

F. Also, the neg’s discourse must be consistent with their criticism.

2. Political action is necessary to fully enmesh in theory

Pinar Bilgin, Prof. of IR @ Bilkent Univ, ‘5 [*Regional Security in The Middle East*, p. 60-1]

Admittedly, providing a critique of existing approaches to security, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold War Security Studies, is only a first step. In other words, from a critical security perspective, **self-reflection, thinking and writing are not enough in themselve**s. They should be compounded by other forms of **practice** (that is, action taken on the ground). It is indeed crucial for students of critical approaches to re-think security in both theory and practice by pointing to possibilities for **change immanent in world politics** and suggesting emancipatory practices if it is going to fulfil the promise of becoming a 'force of change' in world politics. Cognisant of the need to find and suggest alternative practices to meet a broadened security agenda without adopting militarised or zero-sum thinking and practices, students of critical approaches to security have suggested the imagining, creation and **nurturing of security** communities **as emancipatory practices** (Booth 1994a; Booth and Vale 1997). Although Devetak's approach to the theory/practice relationship echoes critical approaches' conception of theory as a form of practice, the latter seeks to go further in shaping global practices. The distinction Booth makes between 'thinking about thinking' and 'thinking about doing' grasps the difference between the two. Booth (1997: 114) writes: Thinking about thinking is important, but, more urgently, so is **thinking about doing** .... Abstract ideas about emancipation **will not suffice:** it is important for Critical Security Studies to engage with the real by **suggesting policies**, agents, and sites of change, **to help humankind,** in whole and in part, to move away from its structural wrongs. In this sense, providing a critique of existing approaches to security, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold War Security Studies**, is only a first** (albeit crucial) step. It is vital for the students of critical approaches to re-think security in both theory and **practice**.

Security

3. Alt doesn’t solve case- Don’t let them advocate our plan. Either the representations they criticize are inherent to out aff, or the perm solves

4. Also, we read specific ev that only a pullout will solve our harms. Even if……… the root cause is based in security rhetoric, the harms will be indefinitely replicated if we allow our troops to stay

5. And, this justifies perm: do both. Doing both allows for solving the harms outlined while recognizing and rejecting the security discourse. The kritik isn’t intrinsic to the aff, there will inevitably be security rhetoric, one additional instance won’t preclude the possibility of the alt

6. Security Means Human Emancipation not Mere Survival - Providing Safety Create Opportunities For Flourishing

Ken Booth, Prof. of IR @ Wales, ‘5 [*Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, p. 22]

The best starting point for conceptualizing security lies in the real conditions of insecurity suffered by people and collectivities. Look around. What is immediately striking is that some degree of insecurity, as a life determining condition, is universal. To the extent an individual or group is insecure, to that extent their life choices and chances **are taken away**; this is because of the resources and energy they need to invest in seeking safety from domineering threats - whether these are the lack of food for one’s children or organizing to resist a foreign aggressor. The corollary of the relationship between insecurity and a determined life is **that a degree of security creates life possibilities**. Security might therefore be conceived as synonymous with **opening up space in people’s lives.** This allows for individual and collective **human becoming** - the capacity to have some choice about living differently - consistent with the same but different search by others. Two interrelated conclusions follow from this. First, security can be understood as an instrumental value; it frees its possessors to a greater or lesser extent from life-determining constraints and so allows different life possibilities to be explored. Second, security is synonymous simply with survival. One can survive without being secure (the experience of refugees in long-term camps in war-torn parts of the world, for example). Security is therefore **more than mere** animal survival (basic animal existence). It is survival-plus, the plus being the **possibility to explore human becoming**, As an instrumental value, security is sought because it frees people(s) to some degree to do other than deal with threats to their human being. The achievement of a level of security - and security is always relative - gives to individuals and groups some time, energy, and scope to chose **to be or become**, **other than merely survival as human biological organisms**. Security is an important dimension of the process by which the human species can reinvent itself beyond the merely biological.

7. If the neg can sever discourse, then the aff can also, reason to prefer the perm

8. Policymakers can’t all be imagining threats at the same time, there is some realistic grounding.

9. Perm: Do the plan with the awareness of the kritik

Security

10. Turn: The Critique is a Stereotype of The Aff – We Productively use Representations to End Foreign Interference – This is Substantially More productive Than the Narssitic Criticism

MortenValbjørn, PhD in the Department of Political Science @ Aarhus, ‘4 [*Middle East and Palestine: Global Politics and Regional Conflict,* “Culture Blind and Culture Blinded: Images of Middle Eastern Conflicts in International Relations,” p. 65-6]

The reason why the problems concerning Blindness to the Self is also relevant in this connection is not due to any lack of awareness of the representer's place in representations of Otherness. Rather, the problem is to be found in the manner in which this issue is addressed. The thorough self-consciousness associated with the relational conception of culture is thus brought about by means of a radical constructivism, which, at least in its most outspoken versions, seems to replace a possibly naïve subject/object separation by an almost solipsistic subjectivism equivalent to Wight's "subject = fi" formula in the above. This radical constructivism is quite evident among IR's "dissident thoughts" and can also be recognized in statements by Said such as: "Orientalism responded more to the culture that produced it than to its putative object, which was also produced by the West" (1995: 22). However, first does it make sense to perceive representation as part of either a construction of identities or of some kind of subtle performance of power, and, second, is it really possible to represent the Other at one's own discretion? With regard to the first question, the almost unambiguously **negative and rather monolithic** depiction of "Western" representations of the Middle East that can to be found among proponents of the relational conception of culture seems to some extent to be based on a rather **problematic stereotyping**, far from the more balanced accounts by, for instance, Rodinson (1974, 1987). By presenting the orientalist scholarship in a very stereotyped and caricatured way, Said, for instance, almost ends up doing to the orientalists what he accuses orientalist scholarship of having done to Middle Eastern societies (Brimnes, 2000). Furthermore, it **is anything but obvious** that representations produced as part of the performance of power **must necessarily** be regarded as unreliable and without value as such. Halliday, among others, criticized this understanding and argued that the relationship between the origin and the validity of a discovery **is more ambiguous** than one might think: "the very fact of trying to subjugate a country would to some degree involve producing an accurate picture of it" (1995: 213). Regarding the second question, advocates of the relational conception of culture easily leave the impression that the way the Other is represented almost exclusively depends on the representer while the represented appears more or less as **an empty and passive object** onto which all kinds of conceivable fantasies and ideas can be projected. However, Bhabha, for instance, suggested that instead of regarding the representation of Otherness as a "hegemonic monologue" where the Other is a passive object on which all thinkable fantasies and conceptions can be projected-such as it sometimes seems to he the case in the works of, for example, Said and Campbell-we might rather think of it as a hybrid dialogue, though seldom equal nor without power plays (Bhabha, 1997; Keyman, 1997; Brimnes, 2000). Furthermore, the representation of Otherness has often had far more ambiguous effects than what this approach's advocates usually would acknowledge. Sadiq al-Azm, for example, coined therefore the notion of "Orientalism in reverse." Here, the classic essentialist and problematic Orient/Occident discourse allegedly used to legitimize imperialism is reversed and applied to the struggle **for an end of foreign interference**. In the Middle Eastern context, this is visible in Arab Nationalism, as well as among radical Islamist movements, in which the criticism of foreign (in)direct influence is often based on the argument of an allegedly unique Islamic or Arab culture (Azm, 2000). When advocates of the relational conception of culture seek to counter the prevailing lack of selfconsciousness within the universalist IR mainstream, as well as among proponents of the essentialist conception, it thus seems that they unintentionally have turned into what most of all appears **as a narcissist self-centeredness**. Apparently they lack enough concern for how the representation of Otherness is not only about the representer's projections, desires, fantasies, and so on. This kind of (over)reaction also seems to influence their ability to relate to Otherness **in a more substantial way.**

11. Perm: Do the plan and reject security logic

Security

12. Realism inevitable, states will act in self-interest: denial retrenches it

Stefano **Guzzini**, Assistant Professor at Central European Univ., Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy, 1998, p. 235

Third, this last chapter has argued that although the evolution of realism has been mainly a disappointment as a general causal theory, we have to deal with it. On the one hand, realist assumptions and insights are used and merged in nearly all frameworks of analysis offered in International Relations or International Political Economy. One of the book's purposes was to show realism as a varied and variably rich theory, so heterogeneous that it would be better to refer to it only in plural terms. On the other hand, to dispose of realism because some of its versions have been proven empirically wrong, ahistorical, or logically incoherent, does not necessarily touch its role in the shared understandings of observers and practitioners of international affairs. Realist theories have a persisting power for constructing our understanding of the present. Their assumptions, both as theoretical constructs, and as particular lessons of the past translated from one generation of decision‑makers to another, help mobilizing certain understandings and dispositions to action. They also provide them with legitimacy. Despite realism's several deaths as a general causal theory, it can still powerfully enframe action. It exists in the minds, and is hence reflected in the actions, of many practitioners. **Whether or not the world realism depicts is out there, realism is.** Realism is not a causal theory that explains International Relations, but, as long as realism continues to be a powerful mind‑set, we need to understand realism to make sense of International Relations. In other words, realism is a still **necessary hermeneutical bridge** to the understanding of world politics. Getting rid of realism without having a deep understanding of it, not only risks unwarranted dismissal of some valuable theoretical insights that I have tried to gather in this book; it would also be futile. Indeed, it might be **the best way to** tacitly and **uncritically reproduce it.**

13. Security isn’t viable option – Neocleous specifically references discourse as a means to overcome security. Neg is one giant perf con.

Commit to Timetable CP

1. Perm- do the plan and the counterplan
2. Perm- do the counterplan
3. Not functionally competitive: both the aff and counterplan result in the same action
4. Doesn’t solve for NATO collapse: everyday we stay in Afghanistan NATO is closer to disintegratation- That’s Wall street Journal 10, and the o’sullivan evidence says only NATO can check Russia and great power wars
5. Delay coutnerplans illegit
	1. Severance- severes out of the immediacy of the plan, vi for fairness
	2. Makes it impossible to be aff because the CP will always solve better at the point where it dosen’t link to the politics DA, this is only a result of the time of action, not the action itself
	3. Doesn’t test the desirability of the aff- only when it would be best- they will always win later is better bc it avoids the disad
	4. Infinitely regressive: they could have Obama commit to any nonchalant statement he’s made that has no grounding in the literature or is relevant to the topic, this provides for bad topic education
	5. VI- fairness and education
6. Obama is committed to a one-year timetable – he’s breaking with military brass.

Washington Times 6/20 [Sean Lengell, 6/20/10, " White House: Afghanistan withdrawal deadline firm ", http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jun/20/white-house-afghanistan-withdrawal-deadline-firm/]

The Obama administration has reaffirmed its promise to begin withdrawing troops from Afghanistan by July 2011, distancing itself from recent Pentagon comments that the move could take longer. "There's a firm date," said White House Chief of State Rahm Emanuel on ABC's "This Week" on Sunday. "The July [2011] date, as stated by the president, that's not moving, that's not changing. Everybody agreed on that date." Mr. Emanuel's remarks were in contrast to comments by Gen. David H. Petraeus, who told a congressional committee last week that any withdrawal would be "based on conditions" and that "July 2011 is not the date where we race for the exits." Mr. Emanuel said the " because both agree that "what will be determined [in July 2011], or going into that date, will be the scale and scope of the reduction. "But there will be no doubt that [a withdrawal is] going to happen" in July 2011, the aide said. Mr. Emanuel said the deadline has created a "sense of urgency" for the United States, its coalition allies, and Afghanistan's government and security forces to push toward greater stability in the country. The president's aide added that the administration's "surge" of 30,000 troops to Afghanistan this year -- a deployment that is about two-thirds completed -- also has done much to improve security in the country. "This is creating a window of opportunity for Afghanistan," Mr. Emanuel said. "We are now at that point in Afghanistan that, for the first time in . . . nine years they are actually meeting their police recruitment requirements, as well as their army recruitment requirements." Mr. Emanuel also said the war in Afghanistan has lead to the elimination of about half of al Qaeda's forces in the country in the past 18 months.

1. Proves the aff is still desirable
2. Aff and CP are the same, aff is preferable because it happens first, and life saved is a reason to vote aff

Commit to Timetable CP- Functional Competition Best

1. Textual Doesn’t test exclusivity- The ban the plan CP wouldn’t compete because the aff could just write not into their perm text to prove lack of competetiveness
2. More real world- Congressmen fight over how bills will function, not the words theyre written in
3. Predictable- The function of the CP is limited by normal means and the literature, if our ev. Says the CP competes, the aff should defend it
4. Textual encourages vague plan writing. Affs would write their plan texts vague enough to interpret that any CP isn’t textually competitive
5. Any CP can textually compete- you could literally rephrase the plan text and it would function the same in the real world.

Compensation DA

1. Non unique: defense Spending cuts now

Fox News 09, (Fox News, Defense Official: Obama Calling for Defense Budget Cuts 1/30/09) <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/01/30/defense-official-obama-calling-defense-budget-cuts/>

The Obama administration has asked the military's Joint Chiefs of Staff to cut the Pentagon's budget request for the fiscal year 2010 by more than 10 percent -- about $55 billion -- a senior U.S. defense official tells FOX News.

Last year's defense budget was $512 billion. Service chiefs and planners will be spending the weekend "burning the midnight oil" looking at ways to cut the budget -- looking especially at weapons programs, the defense official said.

1. No I/L: The NYT evidence hardly suggests that military contractors are going to be anxious about the effects of the budget and the Fox News ev is equally shitty: there’s one line about contracters that indicates they think ABLs are going to become more important
2. No I/L: aff solves the internal link to ABL development: if NATO is prevented from collapsing and strengthened it will be able to effectively deal with the rouge nations that contractors claim is the reason for ABLs
3. Afghan demand solves contracts despite withdrawal

Reuters 09 (Karen Jacobs, “Troop surge to aid intelligence companies” 12/7/09 http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5B703420091208)

"If you think of the types of operations that will be conducted on the ground, the folks that provide contracting support for U.S. personnel will benefit most directly and most immediately," said Dakota Wood, a senior fellow at the private Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Should a U.S. troop withdrawal begin in mid-2011, there will still be business for U.S. companies as Afghan natives assume more responsibility for security. Alliant Techsystems said last week it expects strong demand for its ammunition and protective vests after U.S. troops leave Afghanistan. Homeland Security Research Corp, a marketing analysis firm, concludes in a report due to be released on December 9 that an Afghan "train and equip" program will present U.S. businesses with over $37 billion of opportunities over the next few years, because of demand for everything from bullets and blankets to robots and secure-networking technologies.

1. Long TF: Rogers says arms race will take 25 years, aff impacts happen sooner
2. No I/L to space weaponization
3. Aff solves: Withdrawing troops from Afghanistan uniquely key to solve overstretch and maintain hegemony- that’s Surhke 10. Hegemony prevents great power wars, that’s Thayer 6. Without the risk of war, there’s no risk of hair trigger retaliation and ABL use.
4. Turn:
5. Contractors will Demand F-22s

Cole and Dreazen APRIL 7, 2009 ([AUGUST COLE](http://online.wsj.com/search/term.html?KEYWORDS=AUGUST+COLE&bylinesearch=true) and [YOCHI J. DREAZEN](http://online.wsj.com/search/term.html?KEYWORDS=YOCHI+J.+DREAZEN&bylinesearch=true),Wall street journal writers, Pentagon Pushes Weapon Cuts, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123903026250593091.html)

The International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers denounced the decision to discontinue the F-22 jet as unwise. "We simply cannot afford to cannibalize our national defense to repair damage caused by reckless financial institutions and greed-crazed corporate executives," union president Tom Buffenbarger said in a statement. Contractors, including Boeing and Lockheed, said they were still studying Mr. Gates's decisions. Defense stocks rallied after the budget announcement, ending a drawn-out period of uncertainty. Lockheed shares rose $5.97, or 8.9%, to $73.28; [Northrop Grumman](http://online.wsj.com/public/quotes/main.html?type=djn&symbol=NOC) Corp. gained $3.96, or 9%, to $47.94; Boeing was up 47 cents, or 1.3%, at $38.16; [General Dynamics](http://online.wsj.com/public/quotes/main.html?type=djn&symbol=GD) Corp. rose $2.90, or 6.8%, to $45.56; [Raytheon](http://online.wsj.com/public/quotes/main.html?type=djn&symbol=RTN) Co. was up $3.19, or 8.3%, at $41.66.

Compensation DA

1. Only the F-22 can prevent a Chinese strike on Taiwan

David Lague October 11 2007 (<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/11/world/asia/11china.html?pagewanted=print>) NY Times reporter in Beijing

The blanket of China’s air defense radar now almost matches similar networks in developed countries, state media reported today, in an announcement that coincided with Taiwan’s first National Day military parade in 16 years. A senior officer from Chinese Air Force headquarters, Fang Lei, said a seamless network of all-weather air defense radars had been installed to cover all Chinese airspace, according to a report on the Web site of the official military newspaper, the Liberation Army Daily. The network’s detection and surveillance capability was “very close” to those deployed in developed countries and could also assist Chinese forces in offensive operations, the report quoted Mr. Fang as saying. The development of a high-performance air defense system to complement China’s increasingly potent surface-to-air missiles and jet fighter interceptors has been a top priority for the People’s Liberation Army, military experts say. Senior Taiwanese and American military officers have acknowledged the improvement in Chinese air defenses as a significant indication of the country’s rapid modernization of its military. This system is a direct challenge for self-governing Taiwan as it seeks to counter the mainland’s growing military power. China regards the democratic island as part of its territory and has threatened to use force under a range of circumstances, including in the case of a formal declaration of independence by the government in Taipei. In a televised National Day speech today, Taiwan’s pro-independence president, Chen Shui-bian, called on the international community to demand that China withdraw its missiles aimed at the island and halt threatening military exercises. In addition to sophisticated surface-to-air missiles, the Chinese Air Force now has hundreds of advanced Russian-designed fighters. And earlier this year, China unveiled a locally developed fighter that compares favorably with its current Western counterparts, according to military specialists. As the military balance shifted in China’s favor, it was difficult for people in Taiwan to accept the Bush administration’s opposition to the new missile, Mr. Lai said. Senior defense officials in Taiwan have argued for decades that the island needs to have the capability to strike targets in China. China’s arms buildup could also pose challenges to the United States if it is drawn into a conflict with Beijing over Taiwan. The commander of American forces in Japan, Lt. Gen. Bruce Wright, told The Associated Press earlier this month that China’s air defenses were now almost impenetrable to the American F-15 and F-16 aircraft stationed in Asia. Only the stealthy F-22 or the Joint Strike Fighter still under development could carry out missions over China, he said. “Our planes are much older than the planes they would be matched against,” Mr. Wright said, the Associated Press reported. “For the first time in history, we are seeing another nation, in this case China, with newer fighters than we have.”

1. Taiwan pulls the US into a war with China which goes nuclear- Taiwan is the only internal link

Chalmers Johnson, author of Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, 5-14-2001, The Nation, Pg. 20

China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious US militarists know that China’s minuscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the overwhelming US power arrayed against it (twenty archaic Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US warheads). Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains the most dangerous place on earth. Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo led to a war that no wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the United States and China into a conflict that neither wants. Such a war would bankrupt the United States, deeply divide Japan and probably end in a Chinese victory, given that China is the world’s most populous country and would be defending itself against a foreign aggressor. More seriously, it could easily escalate into a nuclear holocaust. However, given the nationalistic challenge to China’s sovereignty of any Taiwanese attempt to declare its independence formally, forward-deployed US forces on China’s borders have virtually no deterrent effect.

Hegemony Extensions- AT: Forward Deployment Good

Entanglement significantly increases the risk of great power war.

Gholz, Press, and Sapolsky 1997 [Eugene and Darryl G., PhD candidates – Dept. Poli. Sci. @ MIT, Harvey M., Prof. Public Policy and Organization @ MIT, “Come Home, America, The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring, 1997), pp. 5-48 | VP]

Several prominent analysts favor a policy of selective engagement. These analysts fear that American military retrenchment would increase the risk of great power war. A great power war today would be a calamity, even for those countries that manage to stay out of the fighting. The best way to prevent great power war, according to these analysts, is to remain engaged in Europe and East Asia. Twice in this century the United States has pulled out of Europe, and both times great power war followed. Then America chose to stay engaged, and the longest period of European great power peace ensued. In sum, selective engagers point to the costs of others’ great power wars and the relative ease of preventing them. The selective engagers’ strategy is wrong for two reasons. First, selective engagers overstate the effect of U.S. military presence as a positive force for great power peace. In today’s world, disengagement will not cause great power war and continued engagement will not reliably prevent it. In some circumstances, engagement may actually increase the likelihood of conflict. Second, selective engagers overstate the costs of distant wars and seriously understate the costs and risks of their strategies. Overseas deployments require a large force structure. Even worse, selective engagement will ensure that when a future great power war erupts, the United States will be in the thick of things. Although distant great power wars are bad for America, the only sure path to ruin is to step in the middle of a faraway fight. Selective engagers overstate America’s effect on the likelihood of future great power wars. There is little reason to believe that withdrawal from Europe or Asia would lead to deterrence failures. With or without a forward U.S. presence, America’s major allies have sufficient military strength to deter any potential aggressors. Conflict is far more likely to erupt from a sequence described in the spiral model.

Entanglement guarantees escalation of regional conflict.

Gholz, Press, and Sapolsky 1997 [Eugene and Darryl G., PhD candidates – Dept. Poli. Sci. @ MIT, Harvey M., Prof. Public Policy and Organization @ MIT, “Come Home, America, The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring, 1997), pp. 5-48 | VP]

The larger long-term cost of selective engagement is the risk of involvement in faraway great power wars. Great power conflicts will continue to be a rare occurrence, but when they happen, the United States is much better off staying as far away from the combatants as possible. World War II resulted in the deaths of 400,000 Americans, many times that number wounded, and nearly 40 percent of GDP devoted to defense (compared to 4 percent today). A new great power conflict, with the possibility of nuclear use, might exact even higher costs from the participants. World War II was fought to prevent the consolidation of Europe and Asia by hostile, fanatical adversaries, but a new great power war would not raise that specter. The biggest cost of selective engagement is the risk of being drawn into someone else’s faraway great power war. The global economy may be disrupted by war, depending on who is involved, but even in the worst case, the costs would be manageable. Trade accounts for roughly 20 percent of the American economy, and sudden, forced autarky would be devastating for American prosperity. But no great power war could come close to forcing American autarky: essentially all goods have substitute sources of supply at varying marginal increases in cost. Furthermore, wars never isolate the fighting countries completely from external trade. Some dislocation is a real possibility, but these short-term costs would not justify the risks of fighting a great power war. The risk of nuclear escalation is a reason to worry about great power war, but it is a highly suspect reason to favor a military policy that puts U.S. forces between feuding powers. Nuclear weapons may not be used in a future great power war; the fear of retaliation should breed great caution on the part of the belligerents. But the larger point is that the possibility of a faraway nuclear exchange is precisely the reason that America should keep its military forces out of other country’s disputes. An Indo-Pakistani nuclear war would be a terrible thing, but it makes no sense to get in the middle. Distant wars would be costly, but not nearly as costly as the solution that selective engagers propose.

Warlords Extensions - AT: Taliban Negotiation DA

Only counterterrorist focus affect eventual Taliban negotiation – insurgents don’t care about continued nationbuilding.

Regehr 2007 [Ernie, Adjunct Prof. Peace and Conflict Studies @ Conrad Grebel U College - U of Waterloo, "Are calls for negotiation in Afghanistan premature?" Centre for International Governance Innovation, September 30, <http://www.cigionline.org/blogs/2007/9/are-calls-negotiation-afghanistan-premature> | VP]

The second point, the argument that negotiations should not be accompanied by an easing of military pressure, is relevant only if the tactical military victories of the government and its foreign backers actually produce strategic setbacks for the insurgents. But if ISAF's military victories succeed mainly in building up resentment against the government and its international backers, it is doubtful that continuing military action will work toward more effective negotiations. Current military pressure is as likely to work against the negotiating interests of ISAF and the Government of Afghanistan if that military pressure generates more alienation than trust. It is no wonder then that the Secretary-General points to the need for a shift in military focus away from assaults on insurgents. "Afghan civilian and military leaders," he says, "need to play a greater role in planning security operations and ensuring that military gains are consolidated with the provision of basic security by State institutions." In other words, instead of trying to kill more insurgents, and a lot of civilians in the process, the focus needs to be on the delivery of genuine security and consolidating gains through reconstruction and improved government services in those areas already held by the government, and then, from that base, to engage populations and combatants in insurgent-held areas in pursuit of a negotiated consensus in support of a new Afghan political alignment.

Terror Talk

1. Frame work:

A. Interpretation: The aff is allowed a topical plan and the neg is allowed a competitive policy option.

 B. Voting Issue for education and ground.

C. Utopian Fiat—this is not real world at all and means that there is no real solvency for the kritiks harms.

D. Ground—there are thousands of Kritiks on every manner of subject. Allowing them would create an impossible research burden and explodes neg ground.

E. Policy options are better because they promote argumentation on the mechanisms of the resolutional actor and the repercussions that are unique to the plan or counter-plan.

F. Also, the neg’s discourse must be consistent with their criticism.

2. Critical theory isn’t fully engaging the problem without a problem solving approach in addition to theory

Pinar Bilgin, Prof. of IR @ Bilkent Univ, ‘5 [*Regional Security in The Middle East*, p. 60-1]

Admittedly, providing a critique of existing approaches to security, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold War Security Studies, is only a first step. In other words, from a critical security perspective, **self-reflection, thinking and writing are not enough in themselve**s. They should be compounded by other forms of **practice** (that is, action taken on the ground). It is indeed crucial for students of critical approaches to re-think security in both theory and practice by pointing to possibilities for **change immanent in world politics** and suggesting emancipatory practices if it is going to fulfil the promise of becoming a 'force of change' in world politics. Cognisant of the need to find and suggest alternative practices to meet a broadened security agenda without adopting militarised or zero-sum thinking and practices, students of critical approaches to security have suggested the imagining, creation and **nurturing of security** communities **as emancipatory practices** (Booth 1994a; Booth and Vale 1997). Although Devetak's approach to the theory/practice relationship echoes critical approaches' conception of theory as a form of practice, the latter seeks to go further in shaping global practices. The distinction Booth makes between 'thinking about thinking' and 'thinking about doing' grasps the difference between the two. Booth (1997: 114) writes: Thinking about thinking is important, but, more urgently, so is **thinking about doing** .... Abstract ideas about emancipation **will not suffice:** it is important for Critical Security Studies to engage with the real by **suggesting policies**, agents, and sites of change, **to help humankind,** in whole and in part, to move away from its structural wrongs. In this sense, providing a critique of existing approaches to security, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold War Security Studies**, is only a first** (albeit crucial) step. It is vital for the students of critical approaches to re-think security in both theory and **practice**.

3. The alt offers no other way of viewing the “terrorists;” even the neg calls them terrorists. In the absence of a concrete alternative interp, you must default to our interp. Even if it is bad, it’s all you’ve got

4. Perm: Do Both

Terror Talk

5. The kritik is totalizing in its depiction, thus marginalizing necessary discussion of alternative views and destroying the validity of the criticism

(Mattias Iser, Contemporary Philosophy, 1998, “Habermas on Virtue”, http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Cont/ContIser.htm)

Roughly the argument proceeds as follows: Already by delivering a speech-act we raise a 'validity claim' (be it one of propositional truth or normative rightness). We necessarily imply, lest our statement is intended as a nonsensical utterance for the fun of simply uttering, that it is backed with good reasons. Reasons, however, to be counted as good or valid would have to withstand detailed scrutiny. Thus, our validity claim can in principle not be restricted to the person(s) to whom it was raised, but implies that it must be acceptable to every reasonable person. If we honestly search for 'truth' or 'rightness' we have, in order to consider every possible (counter)argument, in principle to engage in an intersubjective dialogue that allows all others to criticize our proposals and to bring forward their own. Excluding others therefore amounts to a 'performative contradiction'. Habermas as well as Apel thus engage in a reconstruction of what it means to deliver speech-acts, be it in the unthematized contexts of the lifeworld or the reflective stage that follows a problematization, namely discourse.

6. Perm: Do the plan and the alt

7. Perm: Do the plan and reject the connotations associated with the word “terrorist”

8. Security Means Human Emancipation not Mere Survival - Providing Safety Create Opportunities For Flourishing

Ken Booth, Prof. of IR @ Wales, ‘5 [*Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, p. 22]

The best starting point for conceptualizing security lies in the real conditions of insecurity suffered by people and collectivities. Look around. What is immediately striking is that some degree of insecurity, as a life determining condition, is universal. To the extent an individual or group is insecure, to that extent their life choices and chances **are taken away**; this is because of the resources and energy they need to invest in seeking safety from domineering threats - whether these are the lack of food for one’s children or organizing to resist a foreign aggressor. The corollary of the relationship between insecurity and a determined life is **that a degree of security creates life possibilities**. Security might therefore be conceived as synonymous with **opening up space in people’s lives.** This allows for individual and collective **human becoming** - the capacity to have some choice about living differently - consistent with the same but different search by others. Two interrelated conclusions follow from this. First, security can be understood as an instrumental value; it frees its possessors to a greater or lesser extent from life-determining constraints and so allows different life possibilities to be explored. Second, security is synonymous simply with survival. One can survive without being secure (the experience of refugees in long-term camps in war-torn parts of the world, for example). Security is therefore **more than mere** animal survival (basic animal existence). It is survival-plus, the plus being the **possibility to explore human becoming**, As an instrumental value, security is sought because it frees people(s) to some degree to do other than deal with threats to their human being. The achievement of a level of security - and security is always relative - gives to individuals and groups some time, energy, and scope to chose **to be or become**, **other than merely survival as human biological organisms**. Security is an important dimension of the process by which the human species can reinvent itself beyond the merely biological.

Terror Talk

9. Referring to terrorists as anything else legitimizes their actions

St. Petersburg Times, 2003 (Philip Gailey, “Word choice matters in Mid East Reporting,” August 31, Lexis)

The madness in the Mideast is all of those things and more, and the words you find in Webster's don't begin to describe just how horrible the terrorism and the military retaliation that follows each suicide bomber's success is in the daily lives of the Israelis and the Palestinians. When a Palestinian suicide bomber recently boarded a bus in Jerusalem and blew 20 men, women and children to bits, most of the wire service reports I saw, including one from the Associated Press, said the carnage was the work of Palestinian "militants." By that standard, I suppose Osama bin Laden is a militant, as was Mohammed Atta, who led the 9/11 terrorist attacks that killed more than 3,000 people in New York and Washington. And President Bush's war on terrorism is really a war on militancy. For me, it's not a hard call. Acts of terror are committed by terrorists, and the horrific bus attack on Israeli civilians, like the dozens of suicide bombings that preceded it, was an act of cold, indiscriminate terror. So why do so many news organizations insist on describing terrorists as militants? I don't think militants set out to deliberately kill children. Dr. Bruce Epstein wonders if the St. Petersburg Times is part of the problem, intentionally or not. In a recent letter, this Pinellas County physician complained that newspapers appear to want to "legitimatize" Palestinian terrorists by describing them as militants. I happen to believe the Palestinian cause - an independent and free Palestinian state - is legitimate and that the Palestinian people do have legitimate grievances over the Israeli occupation. That said, I believe Epstein raises a fair question about news coverage of Mideast violence. He objected in particular to a recent headline in the Times on a story about the assassination of a senior leader of the Islamic Jihad, a terrorist group - "Militant's death sparks vengeance threats." He later noticed another headline - "Dealer sympathized with terrorists." That headline was on a story about the arrest of a man in the New York area who was trying to sell surface-to-air missiles to terrorists (they turned out to be undercover agents) to bring down U.S. commercial airliners. Epstein writes: "In my mind, this double standard is both appalling and disturbing. If Americans are killed in a terror attack, the killers are called terrorists. If Jewish Israelis are killed in a terror attack, the killers are called militants. . . . By using the word "militant' to describe a terrorist, the Times legitimizes the terrorist. When the Times substitutes the word "militant' for terrorist, the newspaper conveys to its readers that these Palestinian (terrorist) groups are legal, legitimate and even moral." Contrary to what Epstein and other readers suggest, the Times has no such motive or policy. It needs a policy on how to distinguish a militant from a terrorist, and newsroom editors are in the process of drafting one, as are editors at other newspapers around the country. The Orlando Sentinel has been getting similar complaints from readers, and earlier this year its style committee reviewed the use of militant and terrorist and came up with this standard: "Use caution when using these terms (militants, terrorists), which can show bias toward one side in a conflict. Generally, "bombers', "attackers', or "suicide bombers' are preferred terms." Manning Pynn, the Sentinel's public editor, recently wrote that despite the style committee decision, the paper will continue to use "militant" to describe Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, both of which are on the State Department's list of terrorist organizations. "The term "terrorist' certainly expresses judgment: It imputes to the person or organization being described the motive of trying to instill fear. "Militant' seems to me much more neutral," Pynn wrote. Foolish me. I thought instilling fear is exactly what Hamas and Islamic Jihad mean to do when they send their suicide bombers into markets, restaurants and buses to kill and terrorize Israeli civilians. I'm all for fair and balanced reporting (I hope the Fox cable news network doesn't slap me with a lawsuit for trademark infringement), but I also believe that words do matter. And if the word "terrorism" is to have any real meaning, then blowing up a bus crowded with women and children must be condemned for what it is - an act of terrorism.

10. If the neg can sever discourse, then the aff can also, reason to prefer the perm

11. Turn: Security good- Human rights, democracy, and peace are the product of U.S. unipolarity, that’s Thayer 6. Also, heg prevents an apolar world with nuclear dark ages. Impact here are empirical, the dark ages before saw extreme warfare with biological warfare- the most advanced at the time

Consult NATO

1. Perm do the plan and do not reveal to NATO that the consultation was not genuine
2. Consultation collapses NATO alliance

Michael 2

(Rebecca, The Bologna Center Journal of International Affairs, Spring, www.jhubc.it/bcjournal/archive/print/2002/nato.pdf)

Consultation and cooperation in the security realm cannot create consensus among nations, but instead must presuppose a high degree of concord. An alliance based on division is not strong enough to create anything but timid policy. And if it does succeed in creating more forceful policy, it will necessarily be at the expense of the legitimacy of the alliance. “Devastated by military conflict in the 20th Century, Europe prefers to spend its money on social welfare at home and aid to poor countries abroad. The European Union provides 56 percent of the world’s aid and 36 percent of the budget of the United Nations.”6 These policy priorities stand in stark contrast to America’s in light of the US War on Terrorism. The increasingly dramatic contrast between European and US security goals can lead to only two results: Either NATO will continue to create strong policy based on weak consensus, inevitably leading to increased alienation among NATO members, or the alliance will witness a complete erosion of its legitimate basis for intervention

1. Consultation is irrelevant-NATO is resilient

Trueblood 4

 (Tad, National Security Analyst and Fmr Military Officer with 20 Years Experience, “Not Your Father’s NATO”, 4-1, <http://www.southernutah.com/Articles/World_Affairs/Document.2004-04-01.2317>)

Remember the Warsaw Pact? What a cool name, “pact”. Nobody has pacts anymore. The western world prefers multisyllabic constructs like “coalition” and “organization”. Lots of room for bureaucracy and politics in a multisyllabic outfit. But what could be more solid than a pact? Surely not some wimpy, eleven-syllable organization with longhaired troops and a Madison Avenue logo.Well, turns out those multisyllabic bureaucracies are more resilient than they seem. The authoritarian Warsaw Pact crumbled and was swept into history’s dustbin, while the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has expanded its membership and mission.

Consult NATO

1. Britain says no-collapse of NATO, terrorism

McClatchy News 6-30 quoting British defense secretary Fox

[Landay, Johnathan. “Britain warns against 'premature' Afghanistan withdrawal.” McClatchy News 6-30-10. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/06/30/96836/britain-warns-against-premature.html]

WASHINGTON — Britain warned Wednesday against a "premature" withdrawal of U.S. and NATO troops from Afghanistan as the U.S.-led international force suffered its highest monthly death toll of the nearly nine-year-old war. The 93,000-strong U.S. contingent is the largest in the International Security Assistance Force, followed by Britain's approximately 10,000 soldiers. June saw the highest death toll for coalition forces since the 2001 U.S.-led intervention began, with at least 102 troops killed, according to iCasualties.org, a website that tracks casualty tolls in Afghanistan and Iraq. The dead include the 300th British soldier to die in the Afghan war. At least 60 U.S. troops died in June. "To leave before the job is finished would leave us less safe and less secure," Britain's new defense secretary, Liam Fox, said in a speech at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative policy institute. "Our resolve would be called into question, our cohesion weakened and the (NATO) alliance undermined." He appeared to be referring to the July 2011 timeline that President Barack Obama set for beginning a U.S. troop pullout. Counterinsurgency experts and Republican lawmakers have criticized the time frame as insufficient to build capable Afghan security forces and stable, competent local and national governments. The Senate on Wednesday unanimously confirmed Army Gen. David Petraeus, who's been credited with helping to prevent Iraq from plunging into all-out sectarian war, as the new commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. He's scheduled to arrive in Kabul on Friday. Obama tapped Petraeus, the architect of the current U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, to replace Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal. Obama accepted McChrystal's resignation last week after the general and his staff made intemperate remarks to a magazine reporter about senior administration officials. In his speech Wednesday, Fox warned that withdrawing international forces "prematurely" would allow al Qaida to return to use Afghanistan as a sanctuary from which to attack, and could lead to new conflict among the country's ethnic groups. The instability could infect neighboring nuclear-armed Pakistan "with potentially unthinkable regional, and possibly nuclear, consequences," Fox continued, referring to the possibility of extremists obtaining a nuclear warhead. With the Taliban-led insurgency expanding and Afghan the war becoming bloodier and increasingly unpopular along their publics, the U.S. and British governments and other nations that are contributing to the U.S.-led military coalition are under growing pressure to pull out of the country. Fox also laid out a long-term strategic goal that seemed to go beyond stated U.S. policy in Afghanistan. The goal, he said, is to reverse "the momentum of the Taliban-led insurgency" and reduce the threat "to a level that allows the Afghan government to manage it themselves." Fox said, however, that the allies also must create "a stable and capable enough system of security and governance so the Afghan government can provide internal security on an enduring basis." His remarks contrasted with Obama's narrower goal of defeating, dismantling and disrupting al Qaida and building capable Afghan security forces. London has been pushing the United States for months to begin formulating a political strategy for forging a negotiated settlement that accommodates the divergent ideological stands of Afghanistan's opposing factions. Numerous experts, including some U.S. military officers and Western diplomats, say the administration hasn't begun to devise such an approach. "This needs to be a comprehensive effort," Fox said. "There is no cliff edge toward which the Taliban are being herded.

Consult NATO

1. **Consultation kills heg**

**Carroll** **09**

[“Back to the Future: Redefining the Foreign Investment and National Security Act's Conception of National Security,” Emory International Law Review, 23 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 167, Lexis]

n221. See Thomas Friedman, Op-Ed., 9/11 is Over, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 2007, § 4, at 12. This does not mean, however that foreign countries should hold a veto over the U.S. foreign or domestic policies, particularly policies that are not directly related to their national survival. Allowing foreign countries or international institutions to veto or modify unrelated U.S. policies would make a mockery of our foreign policy and the credibility of American leadership. Cooperation does not require making our policy subservient to the whims of other nations.

1. Collapse of NATO doesn’t cause war

Conry 95

(Barbara, Foreign Policy Analyst – Cato, Cato Policy Analysis, “The Western European Union as NATO’s Successor”, 9-18, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-239.html>]

It is inaccurate to suggest, as NATO partisans often do, that the only alternative to Atlanticism is a return to the dark ages of the interwar era: nationalized European defenses, American isolationism, xenophobia, demagoguery, and the other evils associated with the rise of Hitler and World War II. Former U.S. senator Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.) warns that weakening NATO will have dire consequences. "As we have thrice before in this dreadful century, [we will] set in motion an instability that can only lead to war, shed blood, and lost treasure. Pray that we are wiser."(4) Lawrence di Rita of the Heritage Foundation similarly defends NATO as an "insurance policy" against a future world war. "If keeping 65,000 young Americans in Europe will prevent 10 times that many new headstones in Arlington cemetery once the Europeans turn on themselves again--as they have twice this century--then it's a small price to pay."(5) Such alarmism underestimates the significance of 50 years of economic and political cooperation among the West European powers and the role of pan-European institutionssuch as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. It also ignores the fact that a viable institutional alternative to NATO--the Western European Union--already exists. With the proper resources and recognition on the part of Washington and the Europeans that an independent European defense is essential in the post-Cold War era, the WEU is a promising alternative to Atlanticism. Far from being a lame second choice to NATO or defense on the cheap, a robust WEU would be superior to NATO in many ways, better suited in the long run to protecting European and, indirectly, American interests.

7. Consult Counterplans Bad-

a. Infinitely regressive – There’s an infinite number of actors which makes it impossible to be aff

b. Topic education-shifts debate from debate about the topic-focuses on which actor is best

c. Aff ground-impossible for the aff to generate offense against the cp when it steals the entirety of the plan

d. Counter-interp – The aff gets the plan, and the neg can run everything outside the plan except consult-solves all of your offense

Consult Japan

1. Perm do the plan and do not reveal that the consultation was not genuine
2. Japan will say no-Obama has already pushed for troop increase

USA Today 09

 [“Obama joins Japan PM in call for change.”

Afghanistan is a complicating factor in the trip to a rapidly changing Asia reordering itself around China's surging economic and diplomatic clout. Obama's chief goal, the White House has said, is to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the region. Aside from [Japan](http://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/Places%2C%2BGeography/Countries/Japan), Obama will travel to Singapore, for meetings with Southeast Asian leaders, and then China and South Korea. Many governments are keen to see a revitalized U.S. engagement in part to counterbalance China, and even a newly powerful Beijing says it welcomes a continuing U.S. role in the region. Japan, long billed by Washington as the cornerstone of U.S. Asia policy, is caught up in these shifts. Hatoyama came to power calling for a more equal partnership with Washington and a more positive embrace of China, which will soon supplant Japan as the world's No. 2 economy. In a pre-trip interview with Japan's NHK network, Obama sought to minimize any friction and likened the election of Hatoyama's and his [Democratic Party of Japan](http://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/Democratic%2BParty%2Bof%2BJapan) after nearly 50 years of rule by another party to a "political earthquake." "I think that it is perfectly appropriate for the new government to want to re-examine how to move forward in a new environment," Obama said. "I don't think anybody expects that the U.S.-Japan relationship would be the same now as it was 50 years ago or 30 years ago or 20 years ago." As part of an effort to shift focus away from difficult security issues, Obama and Hatoyama are expected to discuss and issue a statement on climate change, nuclear disarmament and other global issues. Attempts to coax nuclear-armed [North Korea](http://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/Places%2C%2BGeography/Countries/North%2BKorea)— which occasionally threatens Japan with fiery rhetoric — to return to disarmament negotiations are likely to feature prominently, as is Iran's nuclear program. The stickiest issue in relations — the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma on the southern island of Okinawa — is likely to be glossed over. Hatoyama has suggested moving Futenma off Okinawa while the U.S. wants to move the base to a more remote location on the island, as part of a 2006 agreement on relocating 47,000 American troops in Japan. Trying to relieve some of the strain on relations, U.S. Secretary of State [Hillary Clinton](http://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/People/Politicians%2C%2BGovernment%2BOfficials%2C%2BStrategists/Executive/Hillary%2BRodham%2BClinton) and Foreign Minister [Katsuya Okada](http://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/Katsuya%2BOkada) agreed earlier this week to form a new committee to resolve the base issue. Tokyo also announced a new $5 billion aid package for Afghanistan, even as it reaffirmed a pledge to end the Indian Ocean refueling mission in January. Obama's visit would likely increase pressure on Japan to come up with a more rounded contribution to the Afghanistan war, Japanese media said. "Counterterrorism in Afghanistan is the most important foreign policy for the Obama administration. The U.S. expects Japan will present an alternative, which will replace Japan's naval refueling mission," said the liberal [Asahi Shimbun](http://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/Asahi%2BShimbun), which ran a special page Friday that included a profile on Obama and his inauguration speech

3. Consult Counterplans Bad-

a. Infinitely regressive – There’s an infinite number of actors which makes it impossible to be aff

b. Topic education-shifts debate from debate about the topic-focuses on which actor is best

c. Aff ground-impossible for the aff to generate offense against the cp when it steals the entirety of the plan

d. Counter-interp – The aff gets the plan, and the neg can run everything outside the plan except consult-solves all of your offense

Consult Japan 2ac

1. Non-binding consultation solves

**Cowan and Arsenault ‘8** (Geoffrey, U. Prof. and Chair in Comm. Leadership – USC and Dir. Center on Communication Leadership, and Amelia, Doc. Candidate and Graduate Research Fellow – USC, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, “Moving from Monologue to Diplogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy”, 616 Annals 10, March, L/N)

**While there has been very little,** if any, experimental research on the impact of dialogue in relation to public diplomacy, a century of communication research demonstrates that the need to be heard represents an almost universal human characteristic. Reciprocal communication is integral to lasting friendships between individuals, and many of the most effective and esteemed leaders are those who listen more than or as much as they speak (April 1999). People respond more favorably to requests or impositions if they are first engaged in conversation (Dolinski, Nawrat, and Rudak 2001). Democratization scholars also consistently find that individuals are more likely to feel favorably toward those with opposing viewpoints and consider political outcomes as fair, if not correct, if they have the opportunity to engage in discussion and debate (Delli, Carpini, Lomax, and Jacobs 2004; Lind and Tyler 1988; Tyler 1994). Public diplomacy practitioners can benefit from understanding this common desire to be heard and its benefits. During his 2004 reelection campaign, President Bush stressed his unwillingness to submit U.S. foreign policy decisions to a "global test," leading both presidential candidates to assert that they would never give other countries or entities a veto over American decision making. But while no nation wants to give a veto power to others, there are times when it makes sense to give people from other societies a voice rather than a vote. Dialogue may or may not lead to changed foreign policy positions or changed opinions about those foreign policy decisions. However, a willingness to listen and to show a respect for thoughtful, alternate voices may help to ameliorate conflicts, or at least facilitate understanding of positions taken by helping participants to articulate their policies in more easily understandable terms. One of the United States' greatest proponents of academic and cultural exchanges, Senator William J. Fulbright, argued that "in the long course of history, having people who understand your thought is much greater security than another submarine" (quoted in Simpson 1988). Fulbright's statement stresses the need for people to *understand*, though not necessarily to *agree* with, a nation's position**. Dialogue should first and foremost be approached as a method for improving relationships and increasing understanding, not necessarily for reaching consensus or for winning an argument**. According to Buber (1958), true dialogue occurs when both parties enter the relationship with mutual respect and a willingness to listen and, most important, view their interactions as the goal of the relationship. As public relations scholars Kent and Taylor (1998) pointed out, dialogue in its ideal form is not just a conversation but the basis for the formation of a relationship between communicators: it is not just a process but a product (p. 323).  [\*20]  Largely because America is the world's only superpower, people everywhere want and even sometimes demand more pathways for dialogue with the American government and the American people and attempt to create pathways when they feel there is no other recourse. In recent years, concerned citizens abroad and in the United States have created dozens of Web sites in an attempt to provide a private platform for dialogue with the United States, including Theworldvotes.org, www.apologiesaccepted.com, www.sorryeverybody.com, loveushateus.com, and the OpenDemocracy: My Letters to America Project. The desire for a greater voice is not limited to those who want to be heard by the United States. On issues ranging from trade to human rights to military conflicts, people have a similar desire to be heard by other global powers and by the leaders and people in neighboring countries and regional powers. The key here is to find a way to listen, to make people feel that they are being heard and that they have a voice, without also suggesting that they have a vote. At the very least, listening can help governments find a better way of articulating policies that might otherwise be needlessly unpopular. Scholars in the disciplines of communication, social psychology, and political science offer a range of evidence that dialogue, under the right conditions, can be integral to bridging social barriers and fostering or improving goodwill across groups. [n5](http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278791762030&returnToKey=20_T9717658022&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.231885.30419904008#n5) Monologue is critical for providing information and inspiration. But information, no matter how artfully crafted, has a limited ability to influence individuals to discard their preconceptions or stereotypes. Dialogue as a layer of public diplomacy is critical both as a symbolic gesture that emphasizes that reasonable people can find reasonable ways to disagree and as a mechanism for overcoming stereotypes and forging relationships across social boundaries.

Consult Japan 2ac

1. Perm do both-not intrinsic to have two nations cooperate
2. US threat credibility prevents war over Taiwan

Plate 98

(Tom, Prof. Pol. Sci. – UCLA, Los Angeles Times, “China’s Dangerous Perception Error”, 2-24, <http://articles.latimes.com/1998/feb/24/local/me-22441>*)*

If that's the actual Chinese belief, then the gap between the reality of U.S. military capabilities and China's perception of them is wide. Worse yet, Mulvenon's informed melancholy is shared in Washington. A recent Pentagon study, "Dangerous Chinese Misperceptions," agrees that, despite all the recent military-to-military contacts between Chinese officers and their U.S. counterparts, the true picture of America apparently is still fuzzy. Says the Pentagon report: "China's leadership holds a number of dangerous misconceptions that may well cause serious political friction or even military conflict with the United States. The consequences of China consistently underestimating the military power of potential opponents complicates any effort to deter China."

1. Nuke war.

Johnson ‘1

(Chalmers, Pres. Japan Policy Research Institute, The Nation, “Time to Bring the Troops Home (Page 2)” 4-26, <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20010514/johnson/2>)

China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious US militarists know that China's minuscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the overwhelming US power arrayed against it (twenty archaic Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US warheads). Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains the most dangerous place on earth. Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo led to a war that no one wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the United States and China into a conflict that neither wants. Such a war would bankrupt the United States, deeply divide Japan and probably end in a Chinese victory, given that China is the world's most populous country and would be defending itself against a foreign aggressor. More seriously, it could easily escalate into a nuclear holocaust.

Consult Japan 2ac

US-Japan alliance resilient despite Afghanistan

**Bisley ‘8**

 (Nick, Associate Prof. IR @ La Trobe U., Contemporary Southeast Asia, “Securing the "anchor of regional stability"? The transformation of the US-Japan alliance and East Asian security; Report”, 4-1, 30:1, L/N)

The US-Japan relationship stands on robust political foundations and has overcome many of the strategic and operational problems which had bedevilled it in the 1990s and it is one of the key pieces of America's global strategy. It rests on a number of pillars which include a shared set of interests, shared threat perceptions and policy responses, and is underpinned by a set of common values that are overtly expressed as vital to the relationship. In the words of a senior Japanese policy-maker, the US-Japan relationship is in a "mature phase".^' The quality of the relationship was personiiied by the concord which existed between President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi. Koizumi's iinal trip to the United States included not only a summit putting the rhetorical stamp on alliance transformation, it included an unprecedented presidential tour of Elvis Presley's home, Graceland. As a metaphor for the alliance more generally, the visit could hardly be more fitting. Although the personal relationship between the two was very important to the political and operational process of alliance enhancement, the strategic interests it advances and the extent of the consensus about these among policy-makers is such that, providing alliance managers exercise due care, the basic tenor of the current relationship will last long after these two political leaders have left the stage.^^ **Some have seen the November 2007 cessation of the Maritime SDF deployment to support the Afghanistan campaign as marking either an end to this process or a deeper rupture in the relationship. However, this overlooks the deeply-rooted character of the alliance- binding process**. Rather than representing a breakdown of the US- Japan relationship, the move was primarily a function of domestic politics. Indeed, once Bush has departed office, and is presumably replaced with an administration with a little more diplomatic finesse, managing the domestic politics of the alliance will become noticeably easier. To be clear, Fukuda is not Abe, and he will focus more directly on Japan's regional interests. But his inability to gain Diet approval of a further extension of the laws in November 2007 was a function of the LDP's disarray in the wake of Abe's collapse in popular support. However, Fukuda did manage to assuage concerns and secured re-approval of the law in early 2008. While some feel his voicing of a more Asian-centric foreign policy is a concern, it does not reveal a significant fracturing of the alliance or the process of its strategic change. One must recognize that an Asia-focused Japan that is firmly ensconced in Asian institutions is not at all contrary to America's interests and the functional imperatives of the alliance. Indeed with some creative policy-making it may give the alliance greater regional weight. Although that will not mean that such moves will not cause short term diplomatic difficulties for alliance managers. The United States and Japan now have a genuine alliance, although one distinguished by an unusual and clearly delineated divi- sion of labour, which is intended to be the foundation of Japanese defence and security, a mechanism to stabilize a strategically complex region and a vital piece of America's global strategy. In both states there is a strong consensus as to its long-term value. Although, the US-Japan alliance is still quite different from those which America has with other states, it is testimony to the scope of changes wrought in the past five years or so that it is now not impossible to imagine that, over the longer term, Japan could become an ally which carries a strategic weight similar to that born by the United Kingdom.

DOD CP

**1. Perm do the counterplan-DOD action is an example of the plan-it’s not severance**

**2. Agent counterplans are a voting issue-**

**A. Predictability-no way for the aff to prepare for all of the possible agents the negative could use-justifies counterplans with the IRS or Human Health Services as an actor-kills fairness-no way to prepare for the agent**

**B. Topic Specific Education-shifts the focus of the debate to the actor instead of the implementation**

**C. Counter-interp-any counterplan that uses the same actor as the aff**

3. Congress will check Obama-preventing plan passage

**Crenson and Ginsberg 07** Matthew Crenson and Benjamin Ginsberg. Crenson is a political science professor at Johns Hopkins University. Benjamin Ginsberg Ph.D. was a political science professor at Johns Hopkins University. He is now the Director of the Center for the Study of American Government and Chair of the Government Program of Advanced Academic Program at Johns Hopkins University, 2007. [Presidential Power: Unchecked and Unbalanced p. 218] [Cory Stern]

Through its general legislative powers, moreover, Congress can exercise broad influence over foreign policy. Congress may, for example, refuse to appropriate funds for presidential actions it deems to be unwise or inappropriate. Thus, in 1796, the House of Representatives was asked to appropriate funds to implement the Jay Treaty. Opponents of the treaty demanded that the House be given all papers and records pertaining to the negotiating process—a demand rejected by President Washington. The House narrowly approved funding but accompanied its acquiescence with a resolution affirming its right to refuse appropriations for the implementation of any treaty to which a majority of its members objected. On several occasions over the years, the House has indeed refused to appropriate funds needed to implement treaties negotiated by the president and ratified by the Senate. This power of the purse also extends to military action. Not only does Congress have the constitutional power to declare war, but under its general legislative powers it must appropriate the funds needed to support military activities. In Federalist 69, Hamilton argues that Congress’s power of the purse provides it with an ultimate check on the president’s power as commander in chief. This principle was illustrated during the Reagan administration when Congress enacted the so-called Boland Amendment, which prohibited the president from using any funds to provide military support for right-wing “Contra” guerilla forces in the civil war then raging in the nation of Nicaragua. The administration’s response was to seek funds from Saudi Arabia, the Sultan of Brunei, and even from private individuals. This attempt to circumvent Congress’s authority sparked the 1986 congressional Iran-Contra investigations, which led to criminal convictions for several high-ranking administration officials. In 2007, congressional Democrats threatened to use their power of the purse to gain some leverage over the bush administration’s Iraq policies.

**4. Global security evidence indicates that CENTCOM has control over coordinating operations-even if they organize the entire operation this does NOT mean they are exempt from executive approval for troop withdrawal**

DOD CP 2ac

**5. Perm do both**

6. Plan not key-Department of Defense will do everything necessary to stay in power.

Serwiech 08 (Tom, State Department, December “DOD controls U.S. government” <http://www.dark> government.com/news/dod-controls-us-government)

As military officers sought to take over the role played by civilian development experts abroad, Pentagon bureaucrats quietly populated the National Security Council and the State Department with their own personnel (some civilians, some consultants, some retired officers, some officers on "detail" from the Pentagon) to ensure that the Defense Department could keep an eye on its rival agencies. Vice President Cheney, himself a former secretary of defense, and his good friend Rumsfeld ensured the success of this seeding effort by some fairly forceful means. At least twice, I saw Cheney staffers show up unannounced at State Department meetings, and I heard other State Department officials grumble about this habit. The Rumsfeld officials could play hardball, sometimes even leaking to the press the results of classified meetings that did not go their way in order to get the decisions reversed. After I got wind of the Pentagon's dislike for the approved interagency anti-drug strategy for Afghanistan, details of the plan quickly wound up in the hands of foreign countries sympathetic to the Pentagon view. I've heard other, similarly troubling stories about leaks of classified information to the press.

DOD CP 2ac

1. DOD links to politics- spending trades off with other agenda items

Center for American Progress 2-26

[Korb, Lawrence. “Obama’s Defense Budget Is on Target.” Center for American Progress. 2-26-10. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/02/defense\_budget.html]

President Barack Obama’s topline budget projections for fiscal year 2010 allocate $534 billion to the Department of Defense, the largest allocation of any department. The amount represents roughly a 4-percent increase over the $513 billion allocated to the Pentagon in FY2009 under the Bush administration, and $6.7 billion more than the outgoing administration’s projections for FY 2010. Supporters of a vastly increased defense budget, including many who support the Pentagon’s internal request for $584 billion for FY2010, have argued that Obama’s baseline represents a budget cut in a time of war. They contend that this so-called reduction will unnerve our allies, embolden our enemies and, by ending programs like the F-22 Raptor and slowing down programs like the F-35 and Future Combat Systems, will not only weaken defense but hurt our economy. Objective analysis reveals that these arguments are without merit. The defense budget has nearly doubled in real terms in the last decade, and this year’s $534 billion baseline provides adequate funding to maintain the quality of our troops and military infrastructure, and modernize the force. This amount does not in any way undermine the war effort, as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are financed in separate supplementals, which to date total nearly $1 trillion. Obama has promised $130 billion more for these efforts in FY2010. Nor will this level of funding unnerve our allies or embolden our enemies. Adding the supplementals for the war to the regular budget will bring total defense spending to about $700 billion for FY2010, more in real terms than at anytime since World War II, and more than what the rest of the world combined spends on defense. The FY2010 budget offers two necessary changes from past Bush administration budgets. First, Obama will reportedly hold the defense budget flat at FY2010 levels over the next 10 years, adjusting only for inflation. The Center for American Progress made a similar recommendation in “[Building a Military for the 21st Century: New Realities, New Priorities](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/12/pdf/military_priorities.pdf),” which in December 2008 argued that the current sum of $534 billion: “If used wisely, is more than enough to ensure American military predominance while recapitalizing equipment lost in Iraq and Afghanistan, and growing and modernizing the force. The next administration should therefore keep the defense budget flat over the next four years, adjusting for inflation and fluctuations in the U.S. dollar.” Second, after over seven years of war in Afghanistan and nearly six years in Iraq, the Obama administration’s budget will include the cost of the two wars for the first time. Under the Bush administration, the cost of the wars—[currently](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf) totaling $657 billion for Iraq and $173 billion for Afghanistan[1]—was appropriated through emergency supplementals, a process that allowed the services to take advantage of war-funding bills to request money for significant non-war-related projects, such as additional F-22 Raptors, that should have been included in the DOD’s baseline budget. CAP advocated reforming the process: “DOD should in the future submit appropriations for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan with the baseline request in one consolidated budget. This procedure will allow lawmakers to scrutinize the items from the supplemental and force Congress and DOD leaders to make trade-offs and hard choices when considering the FY2010-13 defense budget priorities.”

Decentralization Good-Afghanistan

Decentralization good-Democracy, Stability

Menkhaus 02 Professor of Political Science Davidson College

[Menkhaus, David. “**“**Local Governance and Provision of Social Services: Lessons from Somalia.” UNDP February 2002. <http://www.undp.org/evaluation/documents/afghanistan-workshop/Menkhaus.pdf>**]**

This paper reviews lessons learned about local governance and social services from the Somalia setting – lessons both from the UNOSOM period of direct intervention (1993-95) and the post-UNOSOM period since 1995. Somalia is not identical to Afghanistan, but the two countries share very similar post-conflict rebuilding challenges. The paper emphasizes the problems that UNDP must anticipate in Afghanistan and highlights examples of “best practices” from Somalia. Over the past decade, the focus on building capacity of local administrations in post-conflict settings has been presented as part of a debate over centralized versus decentralized governance. It is nested in a broader debate between “top-down” versus “bottom-up” approaches to national reconciliation, representation, state-building, and delivery of social services. Advocates of decentralization make the following arguments in favor of empowering local administrations: Local polities, if selected locally, tend to be more representative, hence more democratic and legitimate; Decentralization yields more accountability, since decision-makers are closer to the people and living in the community, not in a distant capital; Local administrations are in a better position to know local needs and tailor services to the specific requirements of their communities, hence social services are likely to be more efficient and appropriate; In post-conflict settings, decentralized administration defuses political tensions between ethnic, factional, or regional groupings by allowing them a greater measure of local autonomy.

Jackson 5, “Writing the war on terrorism: language, politics and counter-terrorism”, Richard Jackson: Senior researcher at the Center for the Study of Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence, 2005

The ‘war on terrorism' therefore. is simultaneously a set of actual practices — wars, covert operations. agencies and institutions - and an accompanying series of assumptions, beliefs, justifications and narratives - it is an entire language or discourse. At the most basic level. the practice of counter-terrorism is predicated on and determined by the language of counter-terrorism. The language of counter-terrorism incorporates a series of assumptions. beliefs and knowledge about the nature of terrorism and terrorists. These beliefs then determine what kinds of counter-terrorism practices are reasonable or unreasonable. appropriate or inappropriate: if terrorists are assumed to be inherently evil. for example. then eradicating them appears apposite while negotiating with them appears absurd. The actual practice of counter-terrorism gives concrete expression to the language of counter-terrorism — in effect. it turns the initial words into reality Language and practice. in other words. are inextricably linked: they mutually reinforce each other: together they co-constitute social and political reality. For this reason. understanding the language of counter-terrorism is essential for a fully informed understanding of the 'war on terrorism'. Unfortunately, apart from some notable exceptions {see Collins and Glover 2002; Murphy 2003: Silberstein 2002: Zulaika and Douglass 1996). Studies on the language of counter-terrorism are few and far between. This book seeks to fill this gap through a systematic and critical analysis of the main features and aspects of the language of the 'war on terrorism`.

Compensation DA- FCS

* 1. Non-Unique – Gates has already Cut FCS budget and contractor budget

Robert Gates 4/6/9 [Secretary of Defense, speech “Defense Budget Recommendation Statement” http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341]

 Sixth, and finally, we will significantly restructure the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) program. We will retain and accelerate the initial increment of the program to spin out technology enhancements to all combat brigades. However, I have concluded that there are significant unanswered questions concerning the FCS vehicle design strategy. I am also concerned that, despite some adjustments, the FCS vehicles – where lower weight, higher fuel efficiency, and greater informational awareness are expected to compensate for less armor – do not adequately reflect the lessons of counterinsurgency and close quarters combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. The current vehicle program, developed nine years ago, does not include a role for our recent $25 billion investment in the MRAP vehicles being used to good effect in today’s conflicts. Further, I am troubled by the terms of the current contract, particularly its very unattractive fee structure that gives the government little leverage to promote cost efficiency. Because the vehicle part of the FCS program is currently estimated to cost over $87 billion, I believe we must have more confidence in the program strategy, requirements, and maturity of the technologies before proceeding further. Accordingly, I will recommend that we cancel the vehicle component of the current FCS program, re-evaluate the requirements, technology, and approach – and then re-launch the Army’s vehicle modernization program, including a competitive bidding process. An Army vehicle modernization program designed to meet the needs of the full spectrum of conflict is essential. But because of its size and importance, we must get the acquisition right, even at the cost of delay. A final recommendation that will have a significant impact on how defense organizations are staffed and operated. Under this budget request, we will reduce the number of support service contractors from our current 39 percent of the workforce to the pre-2001 level of 26 percent and replace them with full-time government employees. Our goal is to hire as many as 13,000 new civil servants in FY10 to replace contractors and up to 30,000 new civil servants in place of contractors over the next five years.

* 1. No Link – FCS no longer exists

Robert F. Hale 2/10 (Comptroller, DOD, “Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request” http://dcmo.defense.gov/documents/2011BudgetRequestOverviewBook.pdf)

Last year Secretary Gates restructured the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS). FCS was a core program with spin-outs of mature technologies to the current force. Its replacement – Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Modernization – is an incremental program focused on improving current forces as quickly as possible. The FY 2011 request for BCT Modernization is $3.2 billion, $2.5 billion for research and development. It will fund Increased ISR and related capabilities, Better and more robotic capability – both air and ground, more responsive precision fires, and better situational awareness and situational understanding of friendly and enemy locations in complex terrain, such as urban environments.

* 1. Turn - FCS saves lives in Afghanistan and Iraq

John Buckley 08 (Colonel and military strategist, United States Army “A complement to FCS” <http://www.armytimes.com/community/opinion/army_backtalk_modernization_080121>)

Army equipment must be reset, or rebuilt, because of enormous wear and tear from the war. Thus, to the greatest extent possible, the Army is creating financial efficiencies and upgrading select capabilities through reset. This will save taxpayer dollars while helping to accelerate modernization. Still, FCS will remain the cornerstone of Army modernization. Army Times implicitly questions the wisdom of this strategy, saying, “Troops in Iraq began questioning FCS years ago.” In fact, soldiers are acutely aware of initial FCS prototype capabilities, which are saving lives in theater. Indeed, there is a strikingly high correlation between the types of capabilities that commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan are requesting and the types of capabilities that are being developed through FCS. For example, there are more than 4,000 robots in Iraq and Afghanistan today, including an early version of the FCS Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle. Soldiers are using the SUGV prototype and other robots to clear caves and bunkers, search buildings, cross minefields and defuse improvised explosive devices. That’s why, during training exercises last February at Fort Bliss, Texas, and White Sands Missile Range, N.M., Army veterans from Iraq and Afghanistan were enthusiastic about these initial FCS capabilities. As one veteran succinctly put it, “You’re going to save lives with these new technologies.” Said another soldier-veteran: “Right now. Right now. Getting [these capabilities] out into theater would be beneficial to soldiers [who] are going to Iraq and Afghanistan.”

Compensation DA- ABL

1. Non-Unique – DOD already reduced ABL budget

Robert Gates 4/6/9 [Secretary of Defense, speech “Defense Budget Recommendation Statement” http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341]

Fourth, in the area of missile defense: We will restructure the program to focus on the rogue state and theater missile threat. We will not increase the number of current ground-based interceptors in Alaska as had been planned. But we will continue to robustly fund continued research and development to improve the capability we already have to defend against long-range rogue missile threats – a threat North Korea’s missile launch this past weekend reminds us is real. We will cancel the second airborne laser (ABL) prototype aircraft. We will keep the existing aircraft and shift the program to an R&D effort. The ABL program has significant affordability and technology problems and the program’s proposed operational role is highly questionable. We will terminate the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) program because of its significant technical challenges and the need to take a fresh look at the requirement. Overall, the Missile Defense Agency program will be reduced by $1.4 billion

1. Non-Unique – ABL test hasn’t changed Gates’ view

Mark Thompson 2/16/10 [ staff writer, Time magazine, “Star Wars Boosters Fired Up by Laser Show” http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1964310,00.html]

It's just that cramming a powerful laser into an airplane doesn't work very well. The goal is to destroy enemy missiles above the clouds — at more than 40,000 feet — within two minutes of launch, from within 250 miles (400 km). That would require deploying several such planes near enemy launchpads and having at least one fly continuously until the missiles are fired or the crisis eases. Gates wasn't impressed by the scheme. "After more than a decade of research and development, we have yet to achieve a laser with enough power to knock down a missile ... more than 50 miles from the launchpad — thus requiring these huge planes to loiter deep in enemy airspace to have a feasible shot at a direct hit," he noted after he axed the program. "Moreover, the 10 to 20 aircraft needed would cost about $1.5 billion each, plus tens of millions of dollars annually — each — for maintenance and operations," he added. "The program and operating concept were fatally flawed."

1. Non-Unique – Gates has cut contractor budget

Robert Gates 4/6/9 [Secretary of Defense, speech “Defense Budget Recommendation Statement” http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341]

 Sixth, and finally, we will significantly restructure the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) program. We will retain and accelerate the initial increment of the program to spin out technology enhancements to all combat brigades. However, I have concluded that there are significant unanswered questions concerning the FCS vehicle design strategy. I am also concerned that, despite some adjustments, the FCS vehicles – where lower weight, higher fuel efficiency, and greater informational awareness are expected to compensate for less armor – do not adequately reflect the lessons of counterinsurgency and close quarters combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. The current vehicle program, developed nine years ago, does not include a role for our recent $25 billion investment in the MRAP vehicles being used to good effect in today’s conflicts. Further, I am troubled by the terms of the current contract, particularly its very unattractive fee structure that gives the government little leverage to promote cost efficiency. Because the vehicle part of the FCS program is currently estimated to cost over $87 billion, I believe we must have more confidence in the program strategy, requirements, and maturity of the technologies before proceeding further. Accordingly, I will recommend that we cancel the vehicle component of the current FCS program, re-evaluate the requirements, technology, and approach – and then re-launch the Army’s vehicle modernization program, including a competitive bidding process. An Army vehicle modernization program designed to meet the needs of the full spectrum of conflict is essential. But because of its size and importance, we must get the acquisition right, even at the cost of delay. A final recommendation that will have a significant impact on how defense organizations are staffed and operated. Under this budget request, we will reduce the number of support service contractors from our current 39 percent of the workforce to the pre-2001 level of 26 percent and replace them with full-time government employees. Our goal is to hire as many as 13,000 new civil servants in FY10 to replace contractors and up to 30,000 new civil servants in place of contractors over the next five years.

Compensation DA- ABL

1. Impact turn- laser technology will save lives

 James Carafano 11/25/08 (P.h.d colonel, U.S. army (ret.) Deputy Director, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, “Pentagon Should Battle Pirates and Terrorists with Laser Technology” <http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2008/11/Pentagon-Should-Battle-Pirates-and-Terrorists-with-Laser-Technology>)

Directed Energy Weapons, particularly those powered by lasers, have long been the stuff of science fiction. Due to recent innovations in commercial solid-state lasers and their adaptation to military uses, potential and immediate national security applications for these weapons are apparent. The Pentagon, however, has been agonizingly slow in fielding operational prototypes. This must change. There are real-world missions for which laser weapons are needed right now. Additionally, fielding prototypes is essential for developing the appropriate tactics, techniques, and procedures for employing these new capabilities. Unless the military gets these new technologies in the field, it is doubtful the full potential of such weapons will ever be realized. Additionally, further delays make it unlikely that a constituency will develop within the military to strongly advocate for developing and fielding directed energy weapons. Pirates off the coast of Somalia, terrorists armed with shoulder-fired heat seeking missiles that can down commercial airliners, and road-side improvised landmines waiting to ambush military and civilian convoys all share something in common: They are threats capable of harassing both governments and the private sector. Additionally, such dangers are not easily countered by conventional military capabilities. At Sea, Terrorists, criminals, and pirates have all used small boats for attacking both military and civilian shipping and to smuggle contraband. In 2000, while docked in Yemen, the U.S. warship Cole was struck by a small boat laden with explosives. The al-Qaeda-directed operation killed 17 crew members and crippled the ship. Off the coast of Florida, smugglers attempt to run their human cargo to the United States at night in small, fast boats. Often the U.S. Coast Guard, which is charged with stopping these smugglers, has little alternative but to try to shoot out the engines while running at high speed, all the while trying not to injure the human cargo huddled in the belly of the boat. Routinely, pirates venture out into the waters of the Gulf of Aden in similar small craft, capturing commercial ships and selling their cargo while holding the crew and craft for ransom. In the Air. In 2002, terrorists fired two shoulder-fired missiles at a commercial airliner in Kenya. Thankfully, they missed; there were two-hundred passengers on board. In 2003, the U.S. government successfully intercepted an attempted arms sale of a shoulder-fired Igla SA-18 missile, capable of downing commercial aircraft three miles in range and two miles in altitude. These examples demonstrate that malicious actors have an enduring interest in obtaining and using shoulder-fired missiles as terrorist weapons. On the Ground. In Iraq, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), essentially home-made landmines, were used as the weapon of choice against collation forces. IEDs quickly became one of the major sources of death and injury to both military personnel and innocent civilians. Many of the tactics and innovations pioneered in Iraq were exported to other theaters. Similar IED attacks, for example, have been used against NATO troops in Afghanistan. All these means were adopted by terrorists and criminals because they are cheap, effective, and difficult to counter with conventional military and law enforcement means. Lasers can be effectively

used to counter the above-documented threats because they: Can use a high-powered beam of energy to disable electrical components or detonate explosives, rendering the attack means (e.g., boat) or the warhead of a missile useless; Come with an almost infinite magazine--as long as the weapons have power, they can be recharged and fired again; Can be aimed effectively using existing target acquisition systems (such as radars and optics like night-vision goggles); and Can be employed with a minimum of risk toward surrounding civilians, buildings, or vehicles (such as aircraft, cars, and ships)

These advantages provided by directed-energy weapons are achievable. The Pentagon, however, has been reluctant to field these weapons because the technology was not suitably mobile and robust enough for use on the battlefield. Lasers, for example, could be attenuated (their power diluted) by dust in the air. But the development of commercial solid-state lasers and improvements in laser optics has largely addressed these issues.

CMR DA

1. No backlash - the military will follow orders even if they disagree with them

**Ackerman 8** [Spencer, The Washington Independent, 11/13, “Productive Obama-Military Relationship Possible,” <http://washingtonindependent.com/18335/productive-obama-military-relationship-possible>]

Some members of the military community are more sanguine. Several say that if they disagree with the decision, they respect Obama’s authority to make it.“In the end, we are not self-employed. And after the military leadership provides its best military advice, it is up to the policy-makers to make the decision and for the military to execute those decisions,” said a senior Army officer recently back from Iraq, who requested anonymity because he is still on active duty. “Now, if those in the military do not like the decision, they have two choices. One, salute smartly and execute the missions given them to the best of their ability. Or, the other, leave the military if they do not feel they can faithfully execute their missions. That is one way the military does get to vote in an all-volunteer force.” Moss agreed. “The military will just follow the order,” he said. “The great majority of Americans want U.S. forces

1. CMR low now-1nc Cohen evidence says “For practically the last 20 years, in ways both trivial and deeply consequential, the civilian military balance has slowly eroded.” And this means impact is inevitable

CMR DA

1. **CMR is Resilient – Gates and high ranking Generals will respect any Obama decision and shield it from opposition.**

**Schake**, fellow at the Hoover Institution and holds the Distinguished Chair in International Security Studies at the United States Military Academy, 9-4-**‘9** (Kori, “So far so good for civil military relations under Obama,” Foreign Policy, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/04/so\_far\_so\_good\_for\_civil\_military\_relations\_under\_obama)

Crucial to Feingold's argument is that the Afghan people resent our military involvement. Both McChrystal, and now Gates, are persuaded that is not true. They argue that how we operate in Afghanistan will determine Afghan support to a much greater degree than the size of the force. Gates for the first time yesterday signaled his support for further force increases on that basis, indicating he will not be a political firewall for the White House if McChrystal and Mullen advocate politically uncomfortable increases. Afghanistan was always going to be a central national security issue, because President Obama had campaigned and carried over into governance his argument that it was the "right" war and negligently under-resourced during the Bush administration. Even with domestic anti-war sentiment on the rise and a potential rebellion by Congressional Democrats against funding the Afghan mission, Obama is seemingly trapped into supporting the military commander's troop requests. Hard to imagine the Houdini contortion that lets him sustain his claim that his predecessor neglected the most important war and then refuse troops to a commander who you put into position and who is supported by a well-respected Defense Secretary. Yet the President may -- and perhaps should -- do exactly that, and for reasons that are laudable in our system of civil-military relations. The American way of organizing for warfare has distinct responsibilities for the leading military and civilian participants. To work up the ladder, it's the military commander's job to survey the requirements for success and make recommendations. It's the job of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to evaluate the military judgment of that strategy and resourcing, advising the Secretary and the President on its soundness and other possible courses of military action. It's the Secretary of Defense's job to figure out how to provide those resources from a limited pool of people and equipment, to identify and manage the risk it creates for other operations and objectives (e.g., Iraq, managing China's rise, deterring North Korea, etc). It is the Commander in Chief's job to establish the war's objectives and determine whether they merit the resources it would require to be successful. He may determine the objectives are too costly in themselves, or that achieving them would distract too much effort from other national priorities, or that we do not have the necessary partners in the Karzai government to achieve our objectives.It should go without saying that it is not the National Security Advisor's job to intimidate military commanders into dialing down their requests to politically comfortable levels, although that is what Jim Jones is reported to have done when visiting Afghanistan during the McChrystal review. Such politicization of military advice ought to be especially noxious to someone who'd been both the Commandant of the Marine Corps and a Combatant Commander. When the Bob Woodward article recounting Jones' attempted manipulation as published, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen commendably defended McChrystal's independence. It is also curious that the one person invisible in this debate, as in the debate about relieving General McKiernan, is the CENTCOM commander, General Petraeus. But beneficially and importantly for our country, policy debates over the war in Afghanistan indicate that the system of civil-military relations is clearly working as designed. We owe much to Gates, Mullen, and McChrystal for shielding the process from politicization and providing military advice the President needs to make decisions only he can make.

1. 1nc kohn link evidence is not in the context of reduction sparking backlash-it’s in the context of trying to organize the national guard

CMR DA

1. **Link turn-presence in Afghanistan kills cmr-plan solves withdrawal**

**Haddick** 9/4 [Robert, managing editor of Small Wars Journal, This Week at War: McChrystal Plays Defense, SEPTEMBER 4, 20**09**, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/04/this\_week\_at\_war\_mcchrystal\_plays\_defense]

Gen. Stanley McChrystal's report on the situation in Afghanistan is likely to strain relations between the Obama administration and the uniformed military. The arrival of McChrystal's report in Washington is likely to spark its own low-level war of finger-pointing and blame-shifting between civilian policymakers in the White House and McChrystal's staff and defenders in the Pentagon. This strain in civil-military relations could last through the duration of the U.S. military's involvement in Afghanistan and beyond. McChrystal's report is supposedly secret, but anonymous staffers have already revealed its themes to the Washington Post. The goal of these staffers is to protect McChrystal and the uniformed military against White House officials they likely don't trust. These staffers have evidently concluded that they need to leak first in order to establish their position and put White House staffers on the defensive. The first task for McChrystal's report (and its leaking defenders) was to show how President Barack Obama's supposedly limited war aims actually result in broad, expensive, and open-ended goals for Afghanistan: Although the assessment, which runs more than 20 pages, has not been released, officials familiar with the report have said it represents a hard look at the challenges involved in implementing Obama's strategy for Afghanistan. The administration has narrowly defined its goal as defeating al-Qaeda and other extremist groups and denying them sanctuary, but that in turn requires a sweeping counterinsurgency campaign aimed at protecting the Afghan population, establishing good governance and rebuilding the economy. McChrystal's report has thus shifted responsibility over to the White House to either the rally the country and the Congress around a big nation-building campaign or to explicitly scale back the desired war aims. Next, according to the Washington Post, McChrystal's report lists numerous obstacles that could prevent success, barriers that are outside of the U.S. military's control: For instance, McChrystal thinks a greater push by civilian officials is vital to shore up local Afghan governments and to combat corruption, officials said. He is emphatic that the results of the recent Afghan presidential election be viewed as legitimate, but is also realistic in acknowledging that the goals of the government Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the coalition are not always as closely aligned as they could be, they said. Separately, officials said, McChrystal's assessment finds that U.S. and other NATO forces must adopt a less risk-averse culture, leaving bases and armored vehicles to pursue insurgents on foot in a way that minimizes Afghan civilian deaths.

In others words, McChrystal is saying, don't hold me responsible for success if Karzai's election is a fraud, civilian officials don't show up, or European soldiers are not allowed to patrol. The report illustrates the basic struggle between civilian policymakers and military commanders. Each side looks to the other to solve its problems. The White House staff is hoping that McChrystal will deliver a clear, high-probability war-winning strategy, a strategy that would reduce Afghanistan as an issue of concern. McChrystal, like all field commanders, wants his political masters to give him a realistic and measurable objective, with the resources needed to accomplish it. McChrystal's report implies a pessimistic outlook for U.S. success in Afghanistan. If he and his staff had an optimistic view about the Afghan challenge, there would have been no need to be so diligent about clarifying responsibility for what comes next. In the case of success, all would share the glory. McChrystal's report is a preemptive defense against blame and recrimination. That does not bode well for either the U.S. mission in Afghanistan or for civil-military relations.

1. Kohn evidence is ridiculous-it says military and civilians have distinct cultural divides and that this is good-it does NOT indicate that a strong military is good

CMR DA

1. **CMR clashes won’t escalate**

Richard H. **Kohn**, Professor of History of Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, World Affairs Winter **‘8**, “Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations” http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil-military.html

However it begins, a clash between the next administration and the armed forces need not metastasize into a full-blown crisis. Military leaders should start to consider how they will react to civilian demands, and which of their traditions they will choose. Will they acquiesce after due advice and consultation, as the Constitution and our tradition of civilian control suggests? Or will they resist, employing techniques borne of decades of inside-the-beltway maneuvering? Will they confine dissent to the appropriate channels? Or will they go public, enlisting their allies in Congress, industry, and veterans groups? Will they collaborate with their new civilian superiors? Or will they work to thwart every recommendation harmful to their service? Much will depend on the capacity of military leaders to establish a workable relationship with their civilian superiors and to embrace their own tradition of professionalism. Civilians have equal obligations. Will they tackle thorny defense issues in a serious, nonpartisan way, or will they succumb to their own posturing? Will they box themselves in with their campaign promises? Will they apply Band-Aids to the Pentagon budget, or will they address the more fundamental problem of reorganizing a Cold-War military for an age of asymmetric threats? Will they consider seriously, if not always heed, the counsel of military expertise? A crucial intermediary here will be the next secretary of defense. Someone in the mold of Melvin Laird or James Schlesinger or William Perry will be indispensable—that is, someone knowledgeable and politically skilled who can gain and keep the confidence of the military, Congress, and the president. Whoever wins the job must wear his or her authority without bluster or arrogance, and lead firmly while holding the military to account. Above all, the secretary must act with courtesy, fairness, and decisiveness. A new administration might even ask Robert Gates to stay on; he has presided over the Pentagon with a calming, steady hand after Rumsfeld’s departure. Staffing decisions at less senior levels will be nearly as important. Neither party can afford to populate the Defense Department with politicians on the make, congressional staffers beholden to special interests, or young know-nothings looking to plus-up their résumés. These positions require knowledgeable people from the business community, the federal bureaucracy, and other professions who understand and respect the military but will not be awed by medals and campaign ribbons. The service secretaries have the closest relationship with the military leadership and have a critical say in picking senior leaders for advancement into the key commands and the Joint Chiefs. Finding the right individuals for these slots will be essential. The new secretary of defense would do well to assemble his deputy, under secretaries, and service secretaries into a cohesive executive committee that would formulate an agenda, rethink policy, and oversee its implementation. The next administration should also act quickly to insulate the military leadership from partisan politics. The first act will be, after due consideration, the reappointment of Admiral Mullen as chairman. Then there should be a concerted search within the services for loyal but independent thinkers who understand the American system of civilian control but also know how to be dead honest in their advice. The recent appointment of General James Mattis of the Marines to head Joint Forces Command sends exactly the right message. Whoever comes into office in January 2009, in turn, needs to make clear up front that he or she will not hide behind the military, that he or she will not compromise the military’s professional ethos by delivering partisan speeches in front of uniformed audiences or trotting out the brass to market administration policies. Last of all, the new president ought to reach out to the armed forces in their own communities: visiting bases, praising the military with genuine sincerity, addressing veteran’s care, making certain that as troops are withdrawn from Iraq, no blame falls unfairly on them for what follows

Redeployment DA

**1. Non unique: Iran is not nuclearizing now, the AFP card only talks about a radar system that is deterring Syria.**

2. Iran will nuclearize despite US threats of intervention.

Ginor and Remez, research fellows at the Truman Institute of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. 6-29

(Isabella, Gideon, Tablet, “Bomb Proof” http://www.tabletmag.com/news-and-politics/37658/bomb-proof/)

Most important, Iran today has far greater capability to strike back at Israel than Iraq did in 1981, or than Israel had in 1967 to strike back at the Soviet Union or even at neighboring Arab states. Together with Iran’s geographic distance from Israel, these capacities will permit Tehran to retaliate with impunity. The recently [reported](http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=173217) transfer of Scud missiles from Syria to Hezbollah underlined the almost-complete coverage of Israel’s population centers by short- and mid-range rockets possessed in vast quantities by this Iranian-sponsored Shiite group, along with the smaller stocks possessed by Hamas in Gaza. The sporadic, but almost daily, launch of a rocket or two from Gaza into southern Israel has become so routine that it hardly makes the local news, much less the world media. But it demonstrates that Israel has yet to achieve and deploy an effective defense against the least- sophisticated types of such weapons. Obama—despite accusations of a policy tilt against Israel—has proposed, and Congress has just [approved](http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/u-s-congress-gives-obama-okay-to-fund-israel-rocket-defense-1.291339), U.S. funding to accelerate the deployment of Israel’s Iron Dome anti-rocket system. But even once installed, Iron Dome would provide only partial protection against massive volleys of short-range rockets, if only because it pits an advanced, costly projectile against each crude, cheap incoming round. We agree wholeheartedly that a bomb in Iranian hands would be pernicious in many ways and that it should be prevented by any reasonable means if not at all cost. We doubt, however, whether this can be accomplished. The new [sanctions](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/16/AR2010061603792.html?hpid=moreheadlines) package that was at last adopted by the U.N. Security Council had to be watered down to the point of doubtful effectivity in order to gain Russian and Chinese consent. Even so, the countries have since been blowing hot and cold about their compliance—and its practical significance remains in question, especially in respect of such vital aspects as energy, banking, and supply of air-defense systems that might doom any attack plan. Persuading the Iranians by other means that forswearing the nuclear option would be better for them is definitely worth a try, but the prospects are dim. Like it or not, then, it looks as though we will have to contend with a nuclear-armed Iran. Are the ayatollahs rational enough to be contained and deterred by Israel’s pre-existing nuclear reputation, not to mention U.S. overt and overwhelming power? Once the Iranians cross the threshold, will the region settle into an unfortunate but manageable balance of terror—or will they toss their bomb at Israel regardless of the national and personal suicide it means? Our historical research offers no clear answer to this question, and the two of us hold different opinions that are no better informed than those of other lay observers. What we did learn from studying the mistakes of the Egyptians and Soviets in 1967 is that embracing any option, and especially a massive military intervention, just because *something* has to be done is a potentially calamitous way to conduct policy—the first rule of warfare being that whatever can go wrong will go wrong. At a conference in Washington last October, our faces must have betrayed our dismay when a panel including a U.S. general and his Israeli counterpart came within an inch of explicit calls to bomb Iran forthwith. Someone at our table, clearly exhilarated by the prospect, noticed and asked our opinion, which was “heaven forbid.” “So, you’ve been deterred!” he sneered. You bet.

**3. No link: troops withdrawn from Afghanistan would not be redeployed to Iran. The Elay evidence talks about redeployment from Iraq that occurred in 07-08, proving that there is no link and that their impact should have already happened.**

Redeployment DA

4. U.S. Military intervention in Iran is off the table at the moment.

Kennedy, Associated Press, 4-21

(Alex, “Military strike against Iran not an option yet, U.S. official says” http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/798485--military-strike-against-iran-not-an-option-yet-u-s-official-says)

SINGAPORE-The U.S. has ruled out a military strike against Iran's nuclear program any time soon, hoping instead negotiations and United Nations sanctions will prevent the Middle East nation from developing nuclear weapons, a top U.S. defence department official said Wednesday. "Military force is an option of last resort," Undersecretary of Defence for Policy Michele Flournoy said during a press briefing in Singapore. "It's off the table in the near term." The U.S. and its allies fear Tehran is using its nuclear program to build arms. Iran denies the charges, and says its program only aims to generate electricity. "Right now the focus is a combination of engagement and pressure in the form of sanctions," Flournoy said. "We have not seen Iran engage productively in response." Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was quoted Wednesday by Iran's state media saying the country won't give in to U.S. pressure. Iran's elite Revolutionary Guard is preparing to hold large-scale military manoeuvres in the strategic Strait of Hormuz. "We've said time and again that we are not after weapons of mass destruction but the Iranian nation won't give in to such threats and will bring those threatening it to their knees," Khamenei said. Iran has rejected a 2009 UN-backed plan that offered nuclear fuel rods to Tehran in exchange for Iran's stock of lower-level enriched uranium. The swap would curb Tehran's capacity to make a nuclear bomb. But Iran has proposed variations on the deal, and Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said Tuesday that a fuel agreement could be a chance to boost trust with the West. Earlier this week, he said Iran wants direct talks about the deal with all the U.N. Security Council members, except one with which it would have indirect talks — a reference to the United States, which with Tehran has no relations. The U.S. is lobbying heavily in the Security Council for sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program.

**5. No impact; the world of the plan solves for U.S. interventionism and would prevent any pre-emptive strikes that would go nuclear.**

6. Strikes will be effective and won’t escalate to full war

Prochaska 05 (Chuck; University of Illinois, Daily Illini University Wire l/n)

The United Nations and the United States must take a hard line against the development of an Iranian nuclear weapon and must live up to their early promises to draft, pass and enforce Security Council resolutions. If and when this does not happen, the United States and Israel must physically eliminate Iran's nuclear capabilities. The parallels between this situation and the lead up to the war in Iraq are almost comical. We have never actually seen these weapons. Of course there have been satellite images taken, and Iran promises nukes are being built somewhere underground. But still, you liberals might ask, do we really know they are there? I'm still of the opinion that if a country tells you they have WMDs, and you've seen them building WMDs, then they have WMDs. Where the Iraq story and Iran story begin to separate is at the United Nations. The U.N. response to Iran has been encouraging -- Security Council leaders have promised to hold Iran accountable to international accords barring them from nuclear production. However, realists know this U.N. accountability song and dance -- they've lost legitimacy after the Resolutions 1441 and 687 debacles with Iraq. Should the U.N. not make good on their promises to stop Iranian nuclear production, either through bribery or persuasion, the United States and Israel must be prepared to do so. Because the United States must certainly not budge from the concept of a nuclear-free Iran, I'm led to believe our only option is to physically stop them from producing nuclear weapons should, and when, international diplomacy fails. Does this mean we must invade and change regimes? No. Ground troops are unnecessary; full scale invasions are impractical. The goal of war is to get your enemy to do your will. An allied precision bombing campaign that shuts down a fledgling nuclear program will be as close to war as we need to come.

Appeasement DA

 **1. Non unique: nation-building efforts in Afghanistan are failing, and fail to demonstrate a collective message against terrorists, that’s Galbraith 10.**

 **2. No link: we leave counter terrorist troops within Afghanistan who maintain a stance against terrorist aggression.**

 **3. Turn: terrorists would perceive the emphasis on counter terrorism as a reconsolidation of U.S. interests and would be intimidated.**

 **4. Turn: withdrawing would solve for growing anti-americanism, a major cause of terrorism.**

Center for Defense Information 2001 [“Lessons from history: US Policy towards Afghanistan 1978-2001,” http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/afghanistan-history.cfm]

In his statements and speeches since Sept. 11, U.S. President George W. Bush has been careful to distinguish the members of Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda organization and the Taliban, from the people of Afghanistan and Muslims of the world. Still, with military action in Afghanistan expected soon, it is necessary to look hard at Afghanistan's past two decades of turmoil and seek to learn lessons from that past. And while there are many factors leading to the dismal situation of Afghanistan today, it also is the case that missteps in U.S. foreign policy are, in part, to blame. U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, Russia and the region during the 1980s helped, at least indirectly, nurture the growth of anti-American and fundamentalist forces now controlling Kabul, and indeed, even some of the terrorists now being sought by the United States for the Sept. 11 attacks against New York and Washington. In planning for intervention in Afghanistan now, the Bush administration must work hard to avoid the mistakes of the past.

**5. An American willpower-centric policy revitalizes Islamic radicalism; withdrawing would end this policy**

Matthew Yglesias (political blogger former staff writer at Atlantic Monthly and New York Times, 06, http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2006/07/10/the\_green\_lantern\_theory\_of\_ge/, 7/10)

Suffice it to say that I think all this makes an okay premise for a comic book. But a lot of people seem to think that American military might is like one of these power rings. They seem to think that, roughly speaking, we can accomplish absolutely anything in the world through the application of sufficient military force. The only thing limiting us is a lack of willpower. What's more, this theory can't be empirically demonstrated to be wrong. Things that you or I might take as demonstrating the limited utility of military power to accomplish certain kinds of things are, instead, taken as evidence of lack of will. Thus we see that problems in Iraq and Afghanistan aren't reasons to avoid new military ventures, but reasons why we must embark upon them: "Add a failure in Iran to a failure in Iraq to a failure in Afghanistan, and we could supercharge Islamic radicalism in a way never before seen. The widespread and lethal impression of American weakness under the Clinton administration, which did so much to energize bin Ladenism in the 1990s, could look like the glory years of American power compared to what the Bush administration may leave in its wake." I don't even know what else to say about this business. It's just a bizarre way of looking at the world. The wreakage that the Bush administration is leaving in its wake is a direct consequence of this will-o-centric view of the world and Gerecht takes it as a reason to deploy more willpower.

 **6. No internal link to global war, it’s empirically disproven; Russia’s failure to commit and withdrawal from Afghanistan did not lead to worldwide aggression or instability.**

 **7. Plan solves for the impact: no actor, state or non-state would threaten war or attack another state with the U.S. as the global policeman. Selective engagement ensures global stability, that’s Thayer 06.**

Allied Proliferation DA

1. Non- Unique – Nuclear reductions, European doubts occurred throughout history without triggering impact

Yost 09 (David Yost, Professor at Naval Postgraduate School and PhD in IR; text from USC, International Affairs, “Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO”, 85:4, Wiley InterScience, p. 767-768, published 2009)

The remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe—reduced by more than 97 per cent from the high level reached during the Cold War—have been regarded as sufficient for assurance and extended deterrence owing in part to the continuing link to US strategic nuclear forces.37 According to the 1999 Strategic Concept, one of the important functions of the US nuclear weapons presence in Europe is to provide linkage to the strategic forces that constitute the ultimate deterrent to aggression or coercion. Ever since the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957 and developed the world’s first ICBMs, the alliance has been subject to periodic crises of confidence—in essence, European doubts about America’s will to defend its allies, given the risk of prompt intercontinental nuclear retaliation from Russia. These doubts have been aggravated whenever Americans have expressed anxieties about US strategic capabilities—as during the ‘bomber gap’ and ‘missile gap’ controversies in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the debates about ICBM vulnerability in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

1. No Link – Nuclear weapons not needed for extended deterrence – conventional weapons enough

Davis et al 09 (Jacquelyn Davis, Ex. VP – Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Pres. – IFPA and Prof. Int’l. Sec. Studies – Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts U. and former DOD Consultant, Charles M. Perry , VP and Dir. Studies – IFPA, and James L. Schoff, Associate Dir. Asia-Pacific Studies – IFPA, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis White Paper, “Updating U.S. Deterrence Concepts and Operational Planning: Reassuring Allies, Deterring Legacy Threats, and Dissuading Nuclear "Wannabes", February 2009, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating\_US\_Deterrence\_Concepts.pdf, p. 7-8)

As the Interim Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, previously cited, points out: Our non-proliferation strategy will continue to depend upon U.S. extended deterrence strategy as one of its pillars. Our military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, underwrite U.S. security guarantees to our allies, without which many of them would feel enormous pressures to create their own nuclear arsenals. So long as the United States maintains adequately strong conventional forces, it does not necessarily need to rely on nuclear weapons to deter the threat of a major conventional attack.

1. America’s allies will not proliferate because they are afraid of prolif

Foreign Affairs Committee 9, Foreign Affairs Committee - Fourth Report Global Security: Non-Proliferation, House of Commons, 7/14/09, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/222/22205.htm

17. During the course of our inquiry Barack Obama was sworn in as the 44th US President. There has been widespread expectation that his election will be positive for arms control efforts. Nicholas Sims of the LSE told us that: the coming-in of the new Administration in the United States gives the UK and other NATO countries an enormous, almost unprecedented opportunity to re-engage the United States in a much more wholehearted, reinvigorated multilateralism in this field, as in others.[[29](http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/222/22205.htm#note29)] […] Within the Democrat camp, there have been encouraging signs that the US would be much more engaged in multilateral endeavours generally.[[30](http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/222/22205.htm#note30)] Bill Rammell, Minister of State at the FCO, was similarly confident: The prospects for disarmament under President Obama are much greater and stronger than they were under President Bush. How do I adduce that in evidence? You can look, for example, at [Secretary of State] Hillary Clinton's confirmation hearings, when she talked about the importance of rebuilding staffing and financing the relevant bureaus within the State Department. Obama has made it clear that he wants to ratify, and have negotiations on, the fissile material cut-off treaty. All that I see and hear is very positive and I have belief in President Obama.[[31](http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/222/22205.htm#note31)] There is speculation that a change of attitude in the US might lead other states to alter their positions, with Bill Rammell telling us that when he was recently in Beijing "interesting discussions were taking place and there was a desire to know what the intentions of the Obama Administration were."[[32](http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/222/22205.htm#note32)] However, in relation to treaties, as Mr Rammell pointed out: There is a caveat: in the American system, you have to get those treaties through the Senate as well. I think that with the degree of support that the President has and the political make-up of the Senate at the moment, the grounds for that are optimistic, but it is not as simple as saying that the President decrees and it happens.[[33](http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/222/22205.htm#note33)] 18. In early 2009, President Obama appointed Gary Samore, previously of the Council on Foreign Relations, as coordinator for policy on weapons of mass destruction (including non-proliferation), based in the National Security Council.

Allied Proliferation DA

1. NATO wont proliferate because of the Obama administration

Foreign Affairs Committee 9, Foreign Affairs Committee - Fourth Report Global Security: Non-Proliferation, House of Commons, 7/14/09, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/222/22205.htm

19. The FCO highlighted the "significant role" of NATO in the area of non-proliferation and disarmament: The NATO summit of Heads of State and Government in Bucharest last year [2008] saw the approval of a paper on 'Raising NATO's profile in the field of arms control, disarmament and non proliferation'. NATO has several groups that meet regularly to discuss non-proliferation and disarmament issues and the Alliance continues to ensure that—as an important part of its broad approach to security—defence and arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation objectives remain in harmony. There has been a 90% reduction in the nuclear forces attributed to NATO since the end of the Cold War and the Alliance seeks to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the ability to provide for collective defence and to fulfil the full range of its missions.[[35](http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/222/22205.htm#note35)] 20. Independent analyst Martin Butcher emphasised in written evidence to us that whilst NATO had given significant support to arms control measures during the 1990s, its stance changed dramatically following the election of George W. Bush as US President: From this high point in late 2000, NATO's public commitment to threat reduction through multilateral agreement has steadily diminished [...] It appears that NATO has abandoned any attempt at threat reduction through arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament, in favour of a purely military response to potential WMD-armed adversaries […] European nations have submitted to the Bush administration's global outlook, and allowed it to become the policy of the entire Alliance. This despite the fact that it is clear that European nations do not share the bleak world view emanating from Washington DC. Both the European Security Strategy and the Strategy Against the Proliferation of WMD adopted by the EU place much more emphasis on multilateral diplomacy to construct security from WMD threats than is now the case for NATO—and yet, because of NATO's consensus rule Europeans have been overridden by the United States.[[36](http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/222/22205.htm#note36)] Mr Butcher believed that the new US Administration would reverse this trend, for example by being "more receptive to reviving NATO's traditional role in arms control and disarmament initiatives." He told us that "The British government is well-placed to take a lead in the Alliance in ensuring a positive outcome in this vital policy area."[[37](http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/222/22205.htm#note37)] Dr Dan Plesch of the School of Oriental and African Studies highlighted the role that NATO could play, including in the control of conventional weapons, particularly by supporting an Arms Trade Treaty. However, he noted that "NATO is not a trading organisation; there are limits to what it can do in that respect."[[38](http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/222/22205.htm#note38)] Giving evidence on the control of conventional weapons, Roy Isbister of the UK Working Group on Arms questioned whether NATO involvement was positive, explaining that "some states consider [the Alliance], rightly or wrongly, to be actively threatening […] you have to be careful about having NATO in the lead."[[39](http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/222/22205.htm#note39)]

Fem IR

1. Frame work:

A. Interpretation: The aff is allowed a topical plan and the neg is allowed a competitive policy option.

 B. Voting Issue for education and ground.

C. Utopian Fiat—this is not real world at all and means that there is no real solvency for the kritiks harms.

D. Ground—there are thousands of Kritiks on every manner of subject. Allowing them would create an impossible research burden and explodes neg ground.

E. Policy options are better because they promote argumentation on the mechanisms of the resolutional actor and the repercussions that are unique to the plan or counter-plan.

F. Also, the neg’s discourse must be consistent with their criticism.

FEM IR

2. Kritikal theory must incorporate problem solving approaches

Jeroen Gunning, Lecturer in International Politics @ Univ. of Wales, ‘7 [*Government and Opposition* 42.3, “A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies?” p. Blackwell-synergy]

The notion of emancipation also crystallizes the need for policy engagement. For, unless a ‘critical’ field seeks to be policy relevant, which, as Cox rightly observes, means **combining** ‘critical’ and ‘problem-solving’ approaches, it does not fulfil its ‘emancipatory’ potential.94 One of the temptations of ‘critical’ approaches is to **remain** mired in critique and deconstruction without moving beyond this to reconstruction and **policy** relevance.Vital as such critiques are, the challenge of a critically constituted field is also to engage with policy makers – and ‘terrorists’ – and work towards the realization of new paradigms, new practices, and a transformation, however modestly, of **political structures**. That, after all, is the original meaning of the notion of ‘immanent critique’ that has historically underpinned the ‘critical’ project and which, in Booth's words, involves ‘the discovery of the latent potentials in situations on which to build political and social progress’, as opposed to putting forward utopian arguments that are not realizable. Or, as Booth wryly observes, ‘this means building with one's feet **firmly on the ground**, not **constructing castles** in the air’ and asking ‘what it means for real people in real places’.96 Rather than simply critiquing the status quo, or noting the problems that come from an un-problematized acceptance of the state, a ‘critical’ approach must, in my view, also concern itself with offering concrete a**lternative**s. Even while historicizing the state and oppositional violence, and challenging the state's role in reproducing oppositional violence, it must wrestle with the fact that ‘the concept of the modern state and sovereignty embodies a **coherent response** to many of the **central problems** of political life’, and in particular to ‘the place of violence in political life’. Even while ‘de-essentializing and deconstructing claims about security’, it must concern itself with ‘hows ecurity is to be redefined’, and in particular on what theoretical basis.97 Whether because those critical of the status quo are wary of becoming co-opted by the structures of power (and their emphasis on instrumental rationality),98 or because policy makers have, for obvious reasons (including the failure of many ‘critical’ scholars to offer policy relevant advice), a greater affinity with ‘traditional’ scholars, the role of ‘expert adviser’ is more often than not filled by ‘traditional’ scholars.99 The result is that policy makers **are insufficiently challenged to question** the basis of their policies and develop new policies based on immanent critiques. A notable exception is the readiness of European Union officials to enlist the services of both ‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ scholars to advise the EU on how better to understand processes of radicalization.100 But this would have been impossible if more critically oriented scholars such as Horgan and Silke had not been ready to cooperate with the EU. Striving to be policy relevant does not mean that one has to accept the validity of the term ‘terrorism’ or stop investigating the political interests behind it. Nor does it mean that each piece of research must have policy relevance or that one has to limit one's research to what is relevant for the state, since the ‘critical turn’ implies a move beyond state-centric perspectives. End-users could, and should, thus include both state and non-state actors such as the Foreign Office and the Muslim Council of Britain and Hizb ut-Tahrir; the Northern Ireland Office and the IRA and the Ulster Unionists; the Israeli government and Hamas and Fatah (as long as the overarching principle is to reduce the political use of terror, whoever the perpetrator). It does mean, though, that a critically constituted field must work hard to bring together all the fragmented voices from beyond the ‘terrorism field’, to maximize both the field's rigour and its policy relevance. Whether a critically constituted ‘terrorism studies’ will attract the fragmented voices from outside the field depends largely on how broadly the term ‘critical’ is defined. Those who assume ‘critical’ to mean ‘Critical Theory’ or ‘poststructuralist’ may not feel comfortable identifying with it if they do not themselves subscribe to such a narrowly defined ‘critical’ approach. Rather, to maximize its inclusiveness, I would follow Williams and Krause's approach to ‘critical security studies’, which they define simply as bringing together ‘many perspectives that have been considered outside of the mainstream of the discipline’.101 This means refraining from establishing new criteria of inclusion/exclusion beyond the (normative) expectation that scholars self-reflexively question their conceptual framework, the origins of this framework, their methodologies and dichotomies; and that they historicize both the state and ‘terrorism’, and consider the security and context of all, which implies among other things an attempt at

empathy and cross-cultural understanding.102 Anything more normative would limit the ability of such a field to create a genuinely interdisciplinary, non-partisan and innovative framework, and exclude valuable insights borne of a broadly ‘critical’ approach, such as those from conflict resolution studies who, despite working within a ‘traditional’ framework, offer important insights by moving beyond a narrow military understanding of security to a broader understanding of human security and placing violence in its wider social context.103 Thus, a poststructuralist **has no greater claim** to be part of this ‘critical’ field than a realist who looks beyond the state at the interaction between the violent group and their wider social constituency.104

FEM IR

3. Alt doesn’t solve case- Don’t let them advocate our plan. Either the representations they criticize are inherent to out aff, or the perm solves

4. Also, we read specific ev that only a pullout will solve our harms. Even if……… the root cause is based in gender rhetoric, the harms will be indefinitely replicated if we allow our troops to stay

5. And, this justifies perm: do both. Doing both allows for solving the harms outlined while recognizing and rejecting the security discourse. The kritik isn’t intrinsic to the aff, there will inevitably be security rhetoric, one additional instance won’t preclude the possibility of the alt

6. Ethno-nationalist issues a major cause of war- (hate against the “Other” can breed violence)

Cockburn 10, Cynthia Department of Sociology, The City University London, UK b Centre for the Study of Women and

Gender, University of Warwick, UK (2010) 'Gender Relations as Causal in Militarization and War', International Feminist Journal of Politics, 12: 2, 139 — 157

Ethno-nationalist issues, foreignness, the expression of the perceived security interests of an ethnic or national self in relation to its others, is a second major cause of war (Horowitz 1985; Gurr and Harff 1994; Hutchinson 2005). It is often an antecedent cause, in Fogarty’s terms, if not an immediate one. Raids against the ones outside the walls of the first city states, the barbarians on the borders of the early empires. Later, the Infidel. Some contemporary wars are fought by an insurgent ethnic group trying to get recognition inside a larger polity, looking for more autonomy or its own state: as Chechen separatists seek to escape from the Russian Federation while the Russian military mobilize to stop them. How can this kind of racializing cause in war be detected? By listening to what the ideologues are saying, the religious leaders. What is the the propaganda, who is putting it out? What names are claimed, what names are being imposed on others?

7. Perm: Do the plan and reject gender discourse

9. Alt cause to war: K has limited solvency- only the aff can solve the immediate harms

Cockburn 10, Cynthia Department of Sociology, The City University London, UK b Centre for the Study of Women and

Gender, University of Warwick, UK (2010) 'Gender Relations as Causal in Militarization and War', International Feminist Journal of Politics, 12: 2, 139 — 157

Second, war-fighting between two armies is only the tip of the iceberg, as it were, of an underlying, less immediate, set of institutions and relationships that can be understood as systemic. The author most often credited for the term ‘war system’ is Betty Reardon. In her text Sexism and the War System she employs the term to refer to society in its entirety, ‘our competitive social order, which is based on authoritarian principles, assumes unequal value among and between human beings, and is held in place by coercive force’ (Reardon 1996: 10) While this accurately describes many modern societies, the women’s organizations I have studied, in so far as I have come to understand their analysis, do not in the main share Betty Reardon’s reduction of this social order to nothing other than a gender order. Few, I believe, would follow her in a belief that ‘patriarchy . . . invented and maintains war to hold in place the social order it spawned’ (Reardon 1996: 12). Looking at war from close quarters these women activists see all too clearly that other forces are at work in addition to gender.

FEM IR

9. Realism inev- states act in self interest and attemps at rejection reinforce the system

Stefano **Guzzini**, Assistant Professor at Central European Univ., Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy, 1998, p. 235

Third, this last chapter has argued that although the evolution of realism has been mainly a disappointment as a general causal theory, we have to deal with it. On the one hand, realist assumptions and insights are used and merged in nearly all frameworks of analysis offered in International Relations or International Political Economy. One of the book's purposes was to show realism as a varied and variably rich theory, so heterogeneous that it would be better to refer to it only in plural terms. On the other hand, to dispose of realism because some of its versions have been proven empirically wrong, ahistorical, or logically incoherent, does not necessarily touch its role in the shared understandings of observers and practitioners of international affairs. Realist theories have a persisting power for constructing our understanding of the present. Their assumptions, both as theoretical constructs, and as particular lessons of the past translated from one generation of decision‑makers to another, help mobilizing certain understandings and dispositions to action. They also provide them with legitimacy. Despite realism's several deaths as a general causal theory, it can still powerfully enframe action. It exists in the minds, and is hence reflected in the actions, of many practitioners. **Whether or not the world realism depicts is out there, realism is.** Realism is not a causal theory that explains International Relations, but, as long as realism continues to be a powerful mind‑set, we need to understand realism to make sense of International Relations. In other words, realism is a still **necessary hermeneutical bridge** to the understanding of world politics. Getting rid of realism without having a deep understanding of it, not only risks unwarranted dismissal of some valuable theoretical insights that I have tried to gather in this book; it would also be futile. Indeed, it might be **the best way to** tacitly and **uncritically reproduce it.**

(10. If the neg can sever representations, then the aff can also, reason to prefer the perm)

11. The public/private concept is essential in analyzing modern transformations.

Brigitte Bargetz, 2009. [Reconciling the Irreconcilable, The Politics of the Everyday: A Feminist Revision of the Public/Private Frame, http://www.iwm.at/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=130&Itemid=125-There]

Meanwhile, the public/private distinction is used – not only in feminist debates – in order to analyze transformations of the social, the economic, and the political. In the 1970s, for instance, Richard Sennett was concerned with the “increasing tyranny of intimacy’”. Currently, public/private is often discussed in the context of neoliberal transformations like the privatization of parts of the state, the ignorance of structural inequalities in public debates, and the economization and individualization of the social. Thus, Janine Brodie argues that “the current moment of restructuring can be viewed as a concerted discursive and political struggle around the very meaning of the public and the private”.

12. Perm solves: Both the public/private concept and the everyday concept have been important for feminists.

Brigitte Bargetz, 2009. [Reconciling the Irreconcilable, The Politics of the Everyday: A Feminist Revision of the Public/Private Frame, http://www.iwm.at/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=130&Itemid=125-There]

The public/private frame and the concept of the everyday share some common ground when taking into account their critique of androcentric science. Feminists have drawn on both concepts in order to reveal different (disciplinary) exclusions: of women as scientists, of women’s experiences, of questions of sex and gender relations, of patriarchy, etc. Moreover, both concepts are confronted with gendered and sexualized denigrations. Associating women with either the sphere of the private or the sphere of the everyday, they are often regarded as being “naturally” subordinated to the public sphere of male transcendence.