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This aff ended up being surprisingly good. If you can convince people that North Korea building a functional nuclear bomb is a brink

for your impacts, you’re in good shape.

The misc section probably has the cards to write a good naval exercises aff. If it’s still inherent, that’s a pretty good aff.

I’m not sure if this is a .doc or a .docx. If it’s a .docx, sorry.

Plan 1/1

Plan: The Executive Branch of the United States federal government should withdraw its military presence from the Republic of Korea.

Nuclearization 1/7

Contention One: Nuclearization

Tensions are high in Korea—US military presence and drills exacerbate conflict.

NPR 7/25 (7/25/10, " US Holds Drills Off Korea As Pyongyang Talks War ", http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128758513) cp

The exercises will be the first in a series of U.S.-South Korean maneuvers conducted in the East Sea off Korea and in the Yellow Sea closer to China's shores in international waters.

The exercises also are the first to employ the F-22 stealth fighter — which can evade North Korean air defenses — in South Korea.

North Korea has called the drills an "unpardonable provocation" and threatened to retaliate with "nuclear deterrence" and "sacred war."

The North routinely threatens attacks whenever South Korea and the U.S. hold joint military drills, which Pyongyang sees as a rehearsal for an invasion. The U.S. keeps 28,500 troops in South Korea and another 50,000 in Japan, but says it has no intention of invading the North.

Still, the North's latest rhetoric carries extra weight following the sinking of the Cheonan warship in late March.

Rear Adm. Daniel Cloyd, the top U.S. official in the exercise, said he was confident the United States could respond to any threat. He said no significant action by the North's military had been observed.

"We are monitoring the region all the time and we are very confident we can respond to any situation," he said.

Washington and Seoul blame Pyongyang for the sinking of the 1,200-ton Cheonan warship near the Koreas' maritime border. A five-nation team of investigators concluded a North Korean torpedo sank the Cheonan, considered the worst military attack on the South since the 1950-53 Korean War.

North Korea, which denies any involvement in the sinking, has warned the United States against attempting to punish it.

"Our military and people will squarely respond to the nuclear war preparation by the American imperialists and the South Korean puppet regime with our powerful nuclear deterrent," the North's government-run Minju Joson newspaper said in a commentary headlined, "We also have nuclear weapons."

The commentary was carried by the official Korean Central News Agency.

The North's powerful National Defense Commission issued a similar threat Saturday, saying the country "will start a retaliatory sacred war."

Pyongyang's rhetoric was seen by most as bluster, but its angry response to the maneuvers underscores the rising tension in the region.

Nuclearization 2/7

North Korea’s nuclear program is making rapid progress—that destabilizes the peninsula and causes war. US troop presence is the root cause of nuclearization—withdrawal solves East Asian tensions.

Hui Zhang, leading a research initiative on China's nuclear policies for Harvard Kennedy School's Managing the Atom project. He is a physicist and specialist in issues related to nuclear arms control and Chinese nuclear policy, June 2009, “Don't Play Nuclear Chicken with a Desperate Pariah,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\_id=5020

In retaliation for tightened U.N. sanctions following North Korea's May 25 nuclear test and subsequent missile tests, Pyongyang defiantly upped the ante on Saturday, June 13. North Korea said it will move forward with its plans to build a nuclear arsenal, begin a program of uranium enrichment, and take resolute military actions against the United States and its regional allies. Then on Thursday, June 18, news surfaced that the next missile test might be pointed toward Hawaii (the missiles in question don't have the range to actually reach the islands -- only head that way). Pyongyang is also reportedly preparing another nuclear test.

This game of escalation will go on and on until North Korea gets what it desires most from Washington: a reliable security assurance. Of course, no one likes to yield to dictators. But ultimately, playing chicken with a desperate and nuclear-armed North Korea is too risky to endeavor. The more isolated the North Koreans become, the more likely they will be to use the nuclear card in threatening two hostages: South Korea and Japan. Everyone loses that game.

With two nuclear tests under its belt, Pyongyang should have more confidence in its capability to mate its smaller and low-yield warheads (about 4 kilotons) with its existing Scud missiles (which are capable of reaching all of South Korea) and Nodong missiles (with the range to strike all of Japan, including the U.S. military bases there). A 4-kiloton bomb would not be as powerful as the 15 to 20 kilotons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but it could cause greater casualties given the significantly higher population densities of South Korea and Japan today, especially in their capitals of Seoul and Tokyo. A 4-kiloton bomb could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths from the blast, burns, and ensuing radiation.

It gets worse. Pyongyang also said on Saturday that it had reprocessed more than one third of its newly discharged 8,000 spent fuel rods -- a claim that is likely true. Within another three months, North Korea could harvest between 8 and 12 kg of plutonium, or enough for one to two bombs. The country has also confirmed that it started a program to create highly enriched uranium (HEU). If North Korea were to successfully develop a centrifuge enrichment facility capable of producing one bomb's worth of HEU, it would pose a huge challenge to denuclearization. Unlike plutonium production, which involves large reactor facilities and generates a considerable amount of heat, the facility North Korea has in mind would be compact and thus easier to hide. Verification would require more-invasive inspections -- and the (unlikely) cooperation of Pyongyang.

Conveniently for North Korea, HEU is also much more attractive than plutonium to subnational groups in the market for nuclear weapons because HEU bombs are relatively easier to make. For an eager buyer, Pyongyang might become a willing supplier with the right situation and price. After all, North Korea has dabbled in selling missiles and missile technologies to Iran and others. North Korea reportedly helped Syria build a reactor that was destroyed by Israeli airstrikes in September 2007. The probability that any sane country would make such a nuclear transfer is extremely low, but an armed and desperate North Korea might do so in a last-ditch attempt to save the regime. From Pyongyang's perspective, what's not to like? North Korea could earn foreign currency and build anti-Washington alliances at the same time.

Under the new U.N. sanctions and the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative, Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul are meant to intercept and interdict any such shipments from North Korea. However, Pyongyang states clearly that an attempted blockade of any kind by the United States and its allies would be regarded as an act of war and met with a decisive military response.

**<continued>**

Nuclearization 3/7

Given North Korea's capabilities and its threatening rhetoric, it's important to ask: How likely is it to act on brinkmanship threats?

The short answer: likely enough to worry. Although Washington might want to facilitate North Korea's implosion and collapse through long-term isolation, a desperate Pyongyang would almost certainly not go down quietly. Military conflict could lead to a full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula in which the possibility of nuclear weapons being used, as Pyongyang has ominously threatened, should not be ruled out. The regime would do anything to survive.

Over the long term, North Korea cannot tolerate isolation and economic sanctions. Economic development, which the country sorely needs, requires that Pyongyang open its doors to the international community, and especially to foreign investment, trade, and aid. But long before that happens, Pyongyang wants to address its foremost security concerns -- mainly from the U.S. threat (read: troops) just across the border in South Korea. Given Kim Jong Il's health problems and North Korea's ever worsening economic situation, Pyongyang is eager to push Washington into offering reliable security assurances and guarantees.

Regardless of Pyongyang's intention, Washington's only way to win this game is to prepare a large carrot to induce Pyongyang to denuclearize, while the United Nations and others, including China, prepare sticks to enforce the deal. Simply taking time and waiting would result in consequences in no one's best interests. Taking chances on an escalating game of chicken could ultimately leave both sides bloodied.

North Korea is nearing a complete nuclear weapon—all that is left is miniaturization.

Reuters 4/20/10 (Factbox: A look at North Korea's nuclear arms program, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE63J11A20100420)ZDM

U.S. officials said prior to the North's May 25, 2009 nuclear test it had produced about 50 kg (110 lb) of plutonium, which proliferation experts said would be enough for six to eight nuclear weapons. The North has since said it extracted more fissile material from spent fuel rods cooling at Yongbyon, which experts said could provide it with material for one more bomb. NUCLEAR TESTING Its first test in October 2006 produced a relatively low yield in its explosive force, indicating problems with the North's bomb design or plutonium at its core, experts said. The 2009 test was stronger, but experts believe it may have only been about one-fifth to one-fourth as powerful as the plutonium bomb the U.S. dropped on the Japanese city of Nagasaki in 1945 at the end of World War Two. NUCLEAR WEAPONS Even though it has exploded nuclear devices, North Korea has not shown it has a working nuclear bomb. Experts say they do not believe the North has the ability to miniaturize an atomic weapon to place on a missile, but the secretive state has been trying to develop such a warhead. It needs more nuclear testing to build one. North Korea's aging fleet of Soviet-era bombers would also have difficulty evading the technologically advanced air forces of regional powers the United States, South Korea and Japan to deliver a nuclear bomb outside the country. URANIUM ENRICHMENT North Korea last year said it was enriching uranium, giving it another path for making atomic weapons and confirming long-held U.S. suspicions that Pyongyang had such a program. Uranium enrichment can be conducted away from the prying eyes of U.S. spy satellites and the North can fuel it with the ample supplies of natural uranium it has in its territory.

Nuclearization 4/7

The US just implemented new sanctions—they’ll fail—they don’t affect the regime where it hurts.

Christian Science Monitor 7/21 (Howard LaFranchi, 7/21/10, " North Korea sanctions: Are they meaningless? ", http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2010/0721/North-Korea-sanctions-Are-they-meaningless) cp

US sanctions on North Korea unveiled Wednesday by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton may sound like a move in the right direction: hurting the pariah state’s elites by targeting illicit and lucrative activities like counterfeiting and contraband sales.

But the measures are unlikely to produce the desired effect of coaxing Pyongyang back to stalled international talks on its nuclear program, some North Korea experts say. The moves resemble piecemeal steps of the past, they add, and are unlikely to strike where it hurts: the regime’s access to under-the-table international funds.

“If I were in Pyongyang, I would not be trembling in my boots about this,” says Nick Eberstadt, a North Korea specialist at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington.

Secretary Clinton, accompanied by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, announced the measures while on a visit to South Korea intended to show US resolve toward the North. The trip was also meant to show support for the South in the aftermath of the deadly attack in April on a South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan. Washington and Seoul blame Pyongyang for the attack that killed 46 South Korean sailors. The North denies responsibility.

Clinton and Secretary Gates included a visit to the De-Militarized Zone, 30 miles north of Seoul in their stopover, touring a building in a so-called “truce village” that straddles the north-south border.

At one point, curious North Korean soldiers peered through the building’s windows at the high-profile American visitors – a surreal juxtaposition, given that the sanctions that Clinton announced are designed in part to hit the North’s powerful military.

Clinton provided only a broad overview on the new steps against the North that will target the arms sales and other activities that fund the regime, as well as the purchase and importation of luxury goods used to reward the regime’s elites in the military and other administrations. More North Korean officials will be hit with travel bans while asset freezes are to be expanded.

Nuclearization 5/7

**US deterrence isn’t credible—but it does freak out the North and drive continued proliferation.**

**Kim**, Hyun-Wook, Professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, 5/14/**10** (Nuclear Posture Review and its Implications on the Korean Peninsula, http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article\_id=18286&topicID=66)ZDM

The NPR has two implications on the Korean peninsula. First, outlier countries such as North Korea and Iran that have violated their NPT obligations and continued to pursue nuclear weapons have been excluded from the negative security assurance. Therefore, there is high possibility that North Korea might refer to such provisions found in the NPR to justify its position of possessing nuclear weapons, while continuing to argue that the U.S. must abandon its hostile policy toward Pyongyang. In response to the NPR, North Korea's Foreign Ministry announced its plan to further increase and modernize its nuclear deterrent as long as the U.S. continues to pose a security threat to the North. Thus, the 2010 NPR could have the effect of further holding back North Korea from returning to the six-party process and also raises the possibility of reopening discussions, before North Korea's return to Six-Party Talks, on U.S.-DPRK normalization or on a peace regime. The NPR states that U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack against the U.S. or its allies, which implies the possibility of a U.S. preemptive strike against North Korea. This clearly illustrates the Obama government's rejection of the No First Use policy, which is an irritant to the North. In order to persuade Pyongyang to return to the six-party process, the U.S. should pose its policies more flexibly, even though its strategies should consistently emphasize dialogue and sanctions. Also, the NPR states that the United States will use nuclear weapons only to protect the vital interests of the U.S. or its allies, but it is not clear what those vital interests are. It is essential for Washington to clearly specify those interests to maintain a favorable position in negotiating with North Korea. Second, the 2010 NPR indicates that although a U.S. "nuclear umbrella" is provided by a combination of the strategic forces of the U.S. Triad, non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed forward in key regions, and U.S.-based nuclear weapons, many of these weapons were removed at the end of the Cold War. Instead, the U.S. has developed missile defense (MD), counter-weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities, conventional power-projection capabilities, and integrated command and control as its main tools for enhancing regional security. While continuing to maintain nuclear deterrence, the United States seeks to strengthen its regional deterrence capability through MD or conventional long-range missiles. Such a possibility raises the concern that U.S. deterrence capability achieved with nuclear weapons could be weakened, including U.S. extended deterrence capabilities provided to South Korea. South Korean concerns over U.S. extended deterrence pertain to the planned transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) scheduled for 2012. The possible weakening of U.S. nuclear extended deterrence as suggested in the NPR could mean a decline in U.S. defense support to South Korea, and in turn a weaker defense capability of the ROK vis-à-vis North Korea. Furthermore, the uncertain number of U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula associated with strategic flexibility of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) would signal a weakening of defense capability to the Korean people.

Nuclearization 6/7

**US deployments are overstretched—pullout forces China to end Korean nuclearization.**

StephenErickson**,** Executive Director of CenterMovement.org 5/6/10 “End the Cold War in Korea: Bring American Troops Home Before it’s Too Late,” <http://www.centermovement.org/topics-issues/end-the-cold-war-in-korea-bring-american-troops-home-before-its-too-late/>

South Korea, officially the “Republic of Korea,” has about half as many soldiers as the North, but they are better trained and far better equipped.  South Korea is wealthy and technologically advanced.  North Korea has half the population and 1/30th the economy of the South.  While the rulers of the North live lavishly, famine killed a million people in the 1990s, and the United Nation’s World Food Program is worried that this year may witness the worst food shortages since then.  Starving people can be dangerous people.  Historically North Korea uses its military, its only strength, as leverage to obtain outside assistance. South Korea today might well be able to ultimately defend itself against the North, but the bloodshed would be horrific.  A key factor in any future conflict is Seoul’s location so near the North.  Experts suggest (See “Is Kim Jong-il Planning to Occupy Seoul?” ) that a recently revised North Korean military strategy consists of swiftly taking Seoul and holding the city’s millions of people as hostages. All of this begs a couple of important questions.  How many more South Korean ships can be torpedoed before the South retaliates, surely starting a larger war?  And, what are 28,000 American troops doing in the middle of this Korean powder keg?  As the sinking of the Cheonan clearly indicates, the sparks are already flying. The permanent US military deployment in South Korea is a Cold War anachronism.   There is absolutely no reason that a nation as advanced and prosperous as South Korea cannot defend itself from its pathetically backward northern brothers and sisters.  A well-known night-time satellite image taken from space shows a brilliant South and a North languishing in the Dark Ages. The US presence creates political dysfunction while it minimally protects South Korea.  US soldiers on South Korean soil breed resentment.  Thousands of nationalist South Korean students regularly take to the streets to protest the Americans soldiers in their country and to call for unification between North and South. South Korean and US government policies are often awkwardly out of step with each other, with America often having the far more hawkish posture, as it did during the W. Bush years.   American security guarantees have perhaps sometimes led the government of the South to engage in policies of inappropriate appeasement toward the North. The threat of South Korea investing in nuclear weapons to counter the North might, for example, finally persuade China to put sufficient pressure of North Korea. A South Korea determined to match North Korean nuclear weapons development might paradoxically further the goal of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. Most crucially, from an American point of view, the US Army is stretched too thin to play much of a role in protecting South Korea.  As things stand, American soldiers are little more than targets for North Korean artillery and missiles.  A defense of Seoul, its re-conquest, and forcible regime change in the North are all beyond US military capabilities at this time, given its commitments elsewhere. US participation on the ground in a new Korean War would also stress the US federal budget beyond the breaking point. The United States never properly created a new foreign and defense policy when the Cold War ended.  Instead, it has generally maintained its Cold War military posture, with bases and commitments strewn throughout the globe, even as new challenges since 911 have called American forces to new missions.   The US military presence in Korea is a Cold War artifact that needs to be brought home before it’s too late.

Nuclearization 7/7

**China is the only country that can convince North Korea to denuclearize.**

**O’Hanlon**, Micheal E, Senior Fellow @ Brookings, **and Solarz**, Stephen J, Former Congressman, New York, 6/24/**09** (A New North Korea Strategy**,** http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0624\_north\_korea\_ohanlon.aspx)ZDM

If there is hope of a more effective strategy, it must center on China, North Korea's only ally by treaty. Beijing has also become Pyongyang's major economic partner, accounting for three-quarters of trade with the impoverished country and providing its main supplies of petroleum. China enjoys unrivaled leverage in pressuring North Korea to desist from its recent provocations. But how to rein in Pyongyang? It's a question that has bedeviled Presidents Clinton, Bush and now Obama. We have a fundamental problem. Like us, China is worried about a nuclear North Korea, concerned about the leadership succession process there and unhappy with the provocative actions of its troublesome ally. But it probably worries even more about the potential for North Korean collapse. It much prefers a buffer between its borders and American allies as well as U.S. military forces. And it abhors the idea of regional instability. North Korea's choic The only real hope of getting North Korea to relinquish its nuclear weapons is to apply such significant economic pressure that the regime is forced to make a choice between economic collapse and the verifiable dismantling of its nuclear weapons and facilities. Such pressure would need to be accompanied by an offer of full political and economic normalization if Pyongyang agreed to abandon its nuclear program. The only country capable of applying such pressure is China.

The plan is an olive branch to China—they’ll create a more stable balance of power in East Asia.

Emilson M. Espiritu, Commander, United States Navy, 3/15/2006, “THE EAGLE HEADS HOME: RETHINKING NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION,” submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree cp

One of the challenges the current Administration faces according to Park, is the “lack of strong policy coordination with China, in jointly leading the multinational diplomatic effort”38 The U.S. might use their withdrawal from South Korea as leverage for China to pursue a more strategic role in the Asia Pacific theater. According to the 2006 QDR, the U.S. is in a favor of China playing a more strategic role in the Asia-Pacific Theater. For China, “The United States remains focused on encouraging China to play a constructive, peaceful role in the Asia-Pacific region and to serve as partner in addressing common security challenges, including terrorism, proliferation, narcotics and piracy.” 39

East Asia 1/5

Contention Two: Impacts

Scenario One: East Asia

North Korean proliferation causes arms races throughout Asia—the impact is nuclear war.

Stephen J. Cimbala, Prof. of Political Science @ Penn State, ‘9 [Nuclear Weapons and Cooperative Security in the 21st Century, p. 117-8]

Failure to contain proliferation in Pyongyang could spread nuclear fever throughout Asia.  Japan and South Korea might seek nuclear weapons and missile defenses.  A pentagonal configuration of nuclear powers in the Pacific basis (Russia, China, Japan, and the two Koreas – not including the United States, with its own Pacific interests) could put deterrence at risk and create enormous temptation toward nuclear preemption.  Apart from actual use or threat of use, North Korea could exploit the mere existence of an assumed nuclear capability in order to support its coercive diplomacy.  As George H. Quester has noted:

If the Pyongyang regime plays its cards sensibly and well, therefore, the world will not see its nuclear weapons being used against Japan or South Korea or anyone else, but will rather see this new nuclear arsenal held in reserve (just as the putative Israeli nuclear arsenal has been held in reserve), as a deterrent against the outside world’s applying maximal pressure on Pyongyang and as a bargaining chip to extract the economic and political concessions that the DPRK needs if it wishes to avoid giving up its peculiar approach to social engineering.

A five-sided nuclear competition in the Pacific would be linked, in geopolitical deterrence and proliferation space, to the existing nuclear deterrents in India and Pakistan, and to the emerging nuclear weapons status of Iran.  An arc of nuclear instability from Tehran to Tokyo could place U.S. proliferation strategies into the ash heap of history and call for more drastic military options, not excluding preemptive war, defenses, and counter-deterrent special operations.  In addition, an eight-sided nuclear arms race in Asia would increase the likelihood of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war.  It would do so because: (1) some of these states already have histories of protracted conflict; (2) states may have politically unreliable or immature command and control systems, especially during a crisis involving a decision for nuclear first strike or retaliation; unreliable or immature systems might permit a technical malfunction that caused an unintended launch, or a deliberate but unauthorized launch by rogue commanders; (3) faulty intelligence and warning systems might cause one side to misinterpret the other’s defensive moves to forestall attack as offensive preparations for attack, thus triggering a mistaken preemption.

East Asia 2/5

That draws in great powers and collapses the global economy.

Jonathan S. Landay (staff) March 10 2000 “Top administration officials warn stakes for U.S. are high in Asian conflicts:, Knight Ridder Washington Bureau, l/n

WASHINGTON \_ The 3,700-mile arc that begins at the heavily fortified border between North and South Korea and ends on the glacier where Indian and Pakistani troops skirmish almost every day has earned the dubious title of most dangerous part of the world. Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. "Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile," said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. "We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster." In an effort to cool the region's tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia's capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia \_ with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources \_ indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.

Economic collapse causes World War III.

Michael J Green and Steven P Schrage, Senior Advisor and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Associate Professor at Georgetown University and the CSIS Scholl Chair in International Business and a former senior official with the US Trade Representative's Office, State Department and Ways & Means Committee, 3/26/2009, Asia Times, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Asian\_Economy/KC26Dk01.html

Facing the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, analysts at the World Bank and the US Central Intelligence Agency are just beginning to contemplate the ramifications for international stability if there is not a recovery in the next year. For the most part, the focus has been on fragile states such as some in Eastern Europe. However, the Great Depression taught us that a downward global economic spiral can even have jarring impacts on great powers. It is no mere coincidence that the last great global economic downturn was followed by the most destructive war in human history. In the 1930s, economic desperation helped fuel autocratic regimes and protectionism in a downward economic-security death spiral that engulfed the world in conflict. This spiral was aided by the preoccupation of the United States and other leading nations with economic troubles at home and insufficient attention to working with other powers to maintain stability abroad. Today's challenges are different, yet 1933's London Economic Conference, which failed to stop the drift toward deeper depression and world war, should be a cautionary tale for leaders heading to next month's London Group of 20 (G-20) meeting. There is no question the US must urgently act to address banking issues and to restart its economy. But the lessons of the past suggest that we will also have to keep an eye on those fragile threads in the international system that could begin to unravel if the financial crisis is not reversed early in the Barack Obama administration.

East Asia 3/5

The impact is fast—Japan goes nuclear in four days.

Toshi Yoshihara andJames R. Holmes, associate professors of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College,9 *Naval War College Review*, “Thinking About the Unthinkable: Tokyo’s Nuclear Option” cp

Will Japan go nuclear?Doubtful—but what if it does? It is possible to envision circumstances that would impel Tokyo and the Japanese populace to cast aside their long-standing dread of nuclear weapons and to construct an arsenal of their own for the sake of national survival. Menacing strategic surroundings or a collapse of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty are two such circumstances. If some nightmare scenario did come to pass, the common wisdom has it, Japan could build a working bomb in short order. In 1991, Richard Halloran averred that “Japan isNminus six months,” although he saw no evidence that Japan entertained any ambition to tap its latent weapons capability.1 In 2007, Gary Sick, a well known commentator on Middle East affairs, reported having been privately told that Japan “could do it, sort of, over a long weekend.”2 Japan, that is, may now qualify as a “threshold state,” a term “commonly understood to mean possession of the indigenous ability to acquire nuclear weapons within a relatively short time frame, ranging from a few hours to several months.”3 Japan inhabits a tough neighborhood,while the U.S.military position in Asia looks increasingly wobbly. Nearby North Korea conducted a nuclear test in 2006 and paid no penalty for defying the “six party”framework. In January 2009, in fact, Pyongyang announced it has assumed an “all-out confrontational posture” toward rival South Korea and has “weaponized” enough plutonium for four or five implosion-type nuclear warheads.4 Japanese thinkers have studied the rise of China closely and what it portends for Japan, positioned just off the Asian seaboard. Beijing has mounted an aggressive naval buildup over the past decade, gaining confidence in its capacity to subdue Taiwanmilitarily if need be while holdingU.S.Navy aircraft-carrier task forces at bay.Taiwan adjoins Japan’s southern strategic frontier, meaning that Tokyo could not look with equanimity on a cross-strait war or a return of the island tomainland rule. Indeed, Japanese imperialist expansion more than a century ago was designed precisely to secure its southern strategic flank, the back door to its Ryukyu island chain, which stretches to the coast of Taiwan.5 Since the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, Taiwan has been in “friendly hands” for over a century. Accordingly, Japanese policy makers do not take lightly a forcible Chinese acquisition of Taiwan. To complicate matters, as Chinese strategists look to the “day after Taiwan” they are considering how to exert influence on the sea lines of communication connecting Chinese ports with vital resources in the Middle East and Africa. China’s turn toward the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean may give Beijing not onlymore control over its ownmaritime security but alsomore control over the maritime communications on which the resource-dependent Japanese economy relies.

East Asia 4/5

Miscalculation in Asia is likely. Cold War deterrence model is not applicable.

Stephen J. Cimbala, Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University – Brandywine, March 2008, “Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia,” Comparative Strategy, Volume 27, Issue 2, pages 113 – 132, Informaworld

The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social, and cultural crosscurrents contributory to the possibility of war. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold War, in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.12

The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear-capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues.13 The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another's vitals. But short-range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially “strategic” effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and North Korea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on.

The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first strike-vulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation.

This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policymakers and academic theorists. For policymakers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).14 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passe, on account of the emergence of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” and its encouragement of information-based warfare.15 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large-scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.16 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare.

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For theorists, the argument that the spread of nuclear weapons might be fully compatible with international stability, and perhaps even supportive of international security, may be less sustainable than hitherto.17 Theorists optimistic about the ability of the international order to accommodate the proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems in the present century have made several plausible arguments based on international systems and deterrence theory. First, nuclear weapons may make states more risk averse as opposed to risk acceptant, with regard to brandishing military power in support of foreign policy objectives. Second, if states' nuclear forces are second-strike survivable, they contribute to reduced fears of surprise attack. Third, the motives of states with respect to the existing international order are crucial. Revisionists will seek to use nuclear weapons to overturn the existing balance of power; status quo-oriented states will use nuclear forces to support the existing distribution of power, and therefore, slow and peaceful change, as opposed to sudden and radical power transitions.

These arguments, for a less alarmist view of nuclear proliferation, take comfort from the history of nuclear policy in the “first nuclear age,” roughly corresponding to the Cold War.18 Pessimists who predicted that some thirty or more states might have nuclear weapons by the end of the century were proved wrong. However, the Cold War is a dubious precedent for the control of nuclear weapons spread outside of Europe. The military and security agenda of the Cold War was dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union, especially with regard to nuclear weapons. Ideas about mutual deterrence based on second-strike capability and the deterrence “rationality” according to American or allied Western concepts might be inaccurate guides to the avoidance of war outside of Europe.19

Even proliferation optimists agree that North Korean nuclearization is unstable.

Dong Sun Lee, Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University, 2007, Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 61, No. 4

North Korea's nuclear armaments can generate continual crises, posing a persistent threat to peace on the Korean peninsula. Even proliferation optimists—who believe the spread of nuclear weapons tends to promote peace—recognise that political relations can be unstable until all parties deploy reliable nuclear deterrents (Sagan and Waltz 2003). For instance, acute crises occurred between the nuclear-armed superpowers during the early Cold War (most notably over Berlin and Cuba) when mutual assured destruction had yet to be established. Furthermore, India and Pakistan—both nascent nuclear powers—fought a limited war over Kashmir in 1999 (Kapur 2005). These events indicate that, despite their potential for promoting caution, nuclear arsenals do not prevent dangerous crises altogether, especially when such arsenals are insecure. And the DPRK nuclear forces will remain so for the foreseeable future. Pyongyang's opponents are making far larger investments on conventional and/or nuclear armaments. The 2006 defence budget of North Korea amounted to an estimated US$2.3 billion, only a tiny faction of the military budgets of the United States (US$535), Japan (US$41.1), and the ROK (US$23.7) (Military Balance 2007). Therefore, resource-strapped North Korea will be unable to build a secure second-strike force anytime soon against the United States and its regional allies.6 To make things worse, behavioural tendencies shown by Americans and North Koreans do not bode particularly well for crisis prevention. Americans frequently forget that their actions could appear threatening to their adversaries, instead believing that their benign intentions are too obvious to misperceive. North Koreans are not known for their empathy and sensitivity to other states' security needs, either. Therefore, the chances of managing the security dilemma effectively and avoiding crises between the two countries do not look too good (Jervis 1989). And North Korean armament means that a crisis on the Korean peninsula can lead to a far more destructive war.

Middle East 1/4

Scenario Two: Middle East

North Korea exports its nuclear missile technology to the Middle East—sanctions don’t solve.

Fox News, 5/28/10, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/05/27/apnewsbreak-experts-say-nkorea-exporting-nuclear-ballistic-missile-technology/ cp

North Korea is exporting nuclear and ballistic missile technology and using multiple intermediaries,t6 shell companies and overseas criminal networks to circumvent U.N. sanctions, U.N. experts said in a report obtained by The Associated Press.

The seven-member panel monitoring the implementation of sanctions against North Korea said its research indicates that Pyongyang is involved in banned nuclear and ballistic activities in Iran, Syria and Myanmar. It called for further study of these suspected activities and urged all countries to try to prevent them.

The 47-page report, obtained late Thursday by AP, and a lengthy annex document sanctions violations reported by U.N. member states, including four cases involving arms exports and two seizures of luxury goods by Italy — two yachts and high-end recording and video equipment. The report also details the broad range of techniques that North Korea is using to try to evade sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council after its two nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009.

Council diplomats discussed the report by the experts from Britain, Japan, the United States, France, South Korea, Russia and China at a closed-door meeting on Thursday.

Its release happened to coincide with heightened tensions between North Korea and South Korea over the March sinking of a South Korean navy ship which killed 46 sailors. The council is waiting for South Korea to decide what action it wants the U.N.'s most powerful body to take in response to the sinking, which a multinational investigation determined was caused by a North Korean torpedo.

The panel of experts said there is general agreement that the U.N. embargoes on nuclear and ballistic missile related items and technology, on arms exports and imports except light weapons, and on luxury goods, are having an impact.

But it said the list of eight entities and five individuals currently subject to an asset freeze and travel ban seriously understates those known to be engaged in banned activities and called for additional names to be added. It noted that North Korea moved quickly to have other companies take over activities of the eight banned entities.

The experts said an analysis of the four North Korean attempts to illegally export arms revealed that Pyongyang used "a number of masking techniques" to avoid sanctions. They include providing false descriptions and mislabeling of the contents of shipping containers, falsifying the manifest and information about the origin and destination of the goods, "and use of multiple layers of intermediaries, shell companies, and financial institutions," the panel said.

It noted that a chartered jet intercepted in Thailand in December carrying 35 tons of conventional weapons including surface-to-air missiles from North Korea was owned by a company in the United Arab Emirates, registered in Georgia, leased to a shell company registered in New Zealand and then chartered to another shell company registered in Hong Kong — which may have been an attempt to mask its destination.

North Korea is also concealing arms exports by shipping components in kits for assembly overseas, the experts said.

As one example, the panel said it learned after North Korean military equipment was seized at Durban harbor in South Africa that scores of technicians from the North had gone to the Republic of Congo, where the equipment was to have been assembled.

Middle East 2/4

Iranian proliferation would lead to wildfire proliferation throughout the Middle East, making nuclear war inevitable. Cold War deterrence will fail.

Efraim Inbar, Professor of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University and Director of its Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 2006, “The Need to Block a Nuclear Iran,” Article was Peer Reviewed by David Leitner and Tamara Sternlieb, The Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol 10 No 1 Article 7 March 2006, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue1/jv10no1a7.html, AD: 7-31-09

Indeed, the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran would have a chain-effect, generating further nuclear proliferation in the immediate region. Middle Eastern leaders, who invariably display high threat perceptions, are unlikely to look nonchalantly on a nuclear Iran. States such as Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and, of course, Iraq would hardly be persuaded by the United States that it can provide a nuclear umbrella against Iranian nuclear blackmail or actual nuclear attack. American extended deterrence is very problematic in the Middle East.[16] Therefore, these states would not resist the temptation to counter Iranian influence by adopting similar nuclear postures.

The resulting scenario of a multi-polar nuclear Middle East would be a recipe for disaster. This strategic prognosis is a result of two factors: a) the inadequacy of a defensive posture against nuclear tipped missiles, and b) the difficulties surrounding the establishment of stable nuclear deterrence in the region.

Missiles are the most effective means of delivering nuclear weapons. While the United States is developing a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system and Russia claims to have a missile intercept capability with its S-300 missile system, only Israel possesses a serious capability to parry a nuclear missile attack. Israel has developed a defensive layer around the Arrow-2 anti-ballistic missile, which is designed to intercept the family of Scud missiles. This program, which began in the late 1980s, benefited from generous American funding and amounts to the only deployed operational anti-ballistic missile system so far in the world.[17] Since 2000, Israel has deployed several operational batteries of Arrow missiles. The interception range is about 150 kilometers away from Israel's borders.

On December 2, 2005, Israel launched an Arrow missile that successfully intercepted a mock-up of an Iranian Shehab-3 missile. The goal of the test was to expand the range of Arrow missiles to a higher altitude and to evaluate the interface between the Arrow and the American-improved Patriot missile system, which is meant to go into operation if the Arrow fails to shoot down its target. The interception of a missile armed with a nuclear head at a lower altitude and closer to home by the Patriot system is, of course, problematic. While this test and others have proven that the Arrow does hit its target, no defense system is foolproof. The Arrow-2 provides a certain measure of protection, but it is a first generation weapon system, and even its developers do not claim a one hundred percent interception rate. Moreover, it is not clear how the Arrow would function if enemy missiles were equipped with countermeasures or if the enemy were to use saturation tactics.

Israel has hitherto had the upper hand in the regional technological race, but there are no assurances that this will always be so. The difficulties that Israel faces in dealing with Katyushas, Qassams, and tunnels show that Israeli ingenuity may not come up with immediate adequate responses. This is true of the United States as well. Even if defensive solutions are eventually devised, there may be windows of vulnerability, which could be of catastrophic dimensions in a nuclear scenario.

All Middle Eastern states are so far defenseless against Iranian missiles. Indeed, as the Iranian nuclear program progresses, one can clearly detect a rise in threat perception on the part of most Arab states in the region. Several states within Iranian range, such as Turkey and India, have shown interest in purchasing the Israeli BMD system, whose export requires American approval. However, at present, while Israel is partly protected from Iranian nuclear missiles, the rest of the region remains vulnerable to such a threat.

The Iranian nuclear threat is also to be taken seriously in light of the difficulties of achieving a stable deterrence with Tehran.[18] Unfortunately, there are scholars who belittle such fears by releasing optimistic evaluations regarding a potentially stable "balance of terror" between Israel and Iran, modeled on the relationship between the two superpowers during the Cold War. Such a bilateral relationship, where the two sides deter each other, cannot be easily emulated in the Middle East. A "balance of terror" between two nuclear protagonists is never automatic, and could not be taken for granted even between the United States and the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the situation in the Middle East is even less stable.

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Middle East 3/4

A second-strike capability, which allows a state to respond in kind after being subjected to a nuclear attack, is critical in establishing credible deterrence. During the Cold War, submarines constituted the platform for any second-strike capability; the difficulty in locating them under water rendered them less vulnerable to an enemy first-strike attack. Indeed, the Soviet Union and United States relied on the survivability and mobility of submarines, characteristics that would enable them to carry out a second-strike with nuclear-tipped missiles. While the superpowers possessed large submarine fleets, it is doubtful that any Middle Eastern power owns enough submarines equipped to do the job. Israel's current fleet includes three Dolphin-class submarines, to be augmented by the end of the decade by two additional vessels recently purchased in Germany. However, it is not clear whether the Israeli submarines carry enough punch to deter adversaries. In this context, it is important to note that no fleet can ever be fully operational. Some vessels are in port for maintenance, while others are en route to the designated area of operations or on their way back to the homeport. Furthermore, the most appropriate launching area in the Indian Ocean is far away from Israel.[19]

More significant is the fact that maintaining a second-strike capability is an ongoing process requiring continuous improvement, which depends to a large extent on the adversary's actions. Such a process is inherently uncertain and ambiguous. Moreover, before an initial"effective" second-strike capability is achieved, a nuclear race may create the fear of a first-strike nuclear attack, which might in itself trigger a nuclear exchange. This is all the more probable because adequate warning systems cannot be erected when the distances between enemies are so small, as is the case in the Middle East. The influence of haste and the need to respond quickly can have extremely dangerous consequences.

No impact turns—their authors agree fast proliferation is destabilizing.

Brad Roberts**,** Institute for Defense Analyses, Fall 1999, Nonproliferation Review, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol06/64/robert64.pdf

But the standard answers don’t really take us very far into this problem any more. To grasp the full stake requires a broader notion of stability—and an appreciation of the particular historical moment in which we find ourselves. It is an accident of history that the diffusion of dual-use capabilities is coterminous with the end of the Cold War. That diffusion means that we are moving irreversibly into an international system in which the wildfire-like spread of weapons is a real possibility. The end of the Cold War has brought with it great volatility in the relations of major and minor powers in the international system. What then is at stake? In response to some catalytic event, entire regions could rapidly cross the threshold from latent to extant weapons capability, and from covert to overt postures, a process that would be highly competitive and risky, and which likely would spill over wherever the divides among regions are not tidy. This would sorely test Ken Waltz’s familiar old heresy that “more may be better”7—indeed, even Waltz assumed proliferation would be stabilizing only if it is gradual, and warned against the rapid spread of weapons to multiple states. At the very least, this would fuel NBC terrorism, as a general proliferation of NBC weaponry would likely erode the constraints that heretofore have inhibited states from sponsoring terrorist use of these capabilities. Given its global stature and media culture, America would be a likely target of some of these terrorist actions.

Middle East 4/4

Middle East wars cause extinction.

Bahig Nassar, coordinator of Arab coordination Center of NGOs 2002, keynote paper, online: inesglobal.org

Wars in the Middle East are of a new type. Formerly, the possession of nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union had prevented them, under the balance of the nuclear terror, from launching war against each other. In the Middle East, the possession of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction leads to military clashes and wars. Instead of eliminating weapons of mass destruction, the United States and Israel are using military force to prevent others from acquiring them, while they insist on maintaining their own weapons to pose deadly threats to other nations. But the production, proliferation and threat or use of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear chemical and biological) are among the major global problems which could lead, if left unchecked, to the extinction of life on earth. Different from the limited character of former wars, the current wars in the Middle East manipulate global problems and escalate their dangers instead of solving them. Natural resources, mainly oil, are the subject of major wars in the Middle East. But oil is a depleting resource which will soon vanish. This will lead to another global problem since all human civilisations depend mainly on this source of energy.

Contingency Plans 1/4

Contention Three: Contingency Plans

DPRK collapse is inevitable—Kim Jung Il’s health is failing.

Pei, Minxin, Professor of Government at Claremont McKenna College and adjunct senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment, 5/12/10 (Get Ready for DPRK Collapse, The Diplomat, http://the-diplomat.com/2010/05/12/get-ready-for-dprk-collapse/2/)ZDM

Judging by recent developments inside North Korea, however, clinging on to its nukes may not actually help prolong Kim Jong-il’s regime. The country’s unfolding economic catastrophe has clearly taken a toll on the regime’s legitimacy and durability—only the most desperate governments in history have resorted to outright confiscation of its people’s money. Seasoned analysts have also reported rising popular resentment against Pyongyang. Thanks to the sanctions imposed by the United Nations and other efforts to weaken Kim Jong-il’s regime, North Korea has failed to blackmail the international community into supplying more economic assistance. More importantly, the Kim Jong-il regime, which has become a classic family dictatorship, is about to face its most difficult test of survival: succession. Stricken by a stroke not too long ago, Kim Jong-il is in frail health and his hold on power is certain to weaken. He appears desperate to install his 27-year old son, Kim Jong-un, as his successor. Unfortunately for the Kim dynasty, this process is likely to end in failure. A review of transfers of power in modern family dictatorships (excluding traditional monarchies) shows that the chances of a successful succession from the first-generation dictator to his son are roughly one in four, and no grandson of a first-generation dictator has ever succeeded in taking over a regime and consolidating his power. Of course, the Kim dynasty may set a precedent. But given the worsening economy, the inexperience of the putative successor and the unknown reliability of the Korean military and security forces in the event of Kim Jong-il’s death, the rest of East Asia should be prepared for a scenario of rapid collapse in North Korea.

US-Military presence enrages China—naval drills prove.

Dingli, Shen professor and executive dean of the Institute of International Studies and director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University 7/14/10 (US-S.Korean maritime war games needlessly provocative, Global Times, Op-Ed, http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/commentary/2010-07/551234.html)ZDM

George Washington The US and South Korea are implementing joint military exercises this month in the Yellow Sea, with the possibility of deploying the US aircraft carrier. The running of such exercises so close to China's waters has left China strongly, and rightfully, dissatisfied. The US and South Korea may argue that the exercise is not in China's territorial waters, so China has no right to comment. However, even if the joint exercises are not in Chinese sovereign waters, they may take place in the waters of China's interests as the international waters at Yellow Sea near China's exclusive economic zone are extremely important to China's interests. Though there is still no final words as to where exactly the US-South Korea joint drill will take place, the issue and the tension it has aroused in Northeast Asia will continue for a long time. Military exercises aimed at provoking other countries in the waters of important Chinese interests can only be seen as a threat, and China should strongly oppose them. Given the sophisticated equipment it carries, the George Washington poses a real potential threat to Chinese territory. Even if the US-South Korea military exercises are outside China's territory, the striking power of the US nuclear-powered aircraft carrier also poses a serious threat to neighboring countries. China's strong reaction is also part of its defensive diplomacy, which aims at dissovling the tension before it escalates into a serious crisis. During the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, when the Soviet Union established nuclear missile bases on the island, the US objected to the close proximity of the Soviet weaponry even though they traveled only through international waters to reach Cuba, and the US set up a blockade to stop them being deployed. When the US ponders the idea of deploying its nuclear aircraft carrier in the Yellow Sea, very close to China, shouldn't China have the same feeling as the US did when the Soviet Union deployed missiles in Cuba? Historically speaking, for the Chinese public, the Yellow Sea area is also associated with a painful period in history when in 1894 China was defeated by the Japanese navy in the same waters. Thus it is a sensitive area that could especially agitate Chinese sensitivites. Such a provocative attitude damages US credibility in the region and its chance to build strong bilateral relations.

Contingency Plans 2/4

Strong US-China relations are key to react to instability in North Korea and prevent conflict.

Glaser, Bonnie, Staff Writer for Oil Price, 5/26/10 (Is North Korea on the Verge of Collapse?, http://oilprice.com/Geo-Politics/Asia/Is-North-Korea-on-the-Verge-of-Collapse.html)ZDM

The US cannot afford to let great power politics stand in the way of planning an effective response to North Korean instability; the risks are simply too great.  Instead, it should seek to create favorable conditions for the primary parties, namely itself, South Korea, and China, to discuss likely responses to North Korean instability, while keeping its ally Japan informed.All three governments should be prepared to offer reassurances to reduce the likelihood of miscalculation in the event of instability in North Korea.  For example, the US could assure that it would work with the United Nations; would coordinate with China to secure WMD facilities, materials, and expertise; and would not station troops north of the 38th parallel after stabilization and reconstruction operations are completed.  At the same time, the allies should seek assurances from Beijing that it would not intervene in North Korea’s domestic political situation to prop up a failing regime and would not obstruct ROK reunification efforts.  Moreover, all three nations should agree that their armies would not engage each other in the North, and that no nation would exploit instability in the DPRK as an excuse to threaten any other state.  Despite forecasts of North Korea’s collapse since the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994, the country is still intact.  But the risk of North Korean instability remains real.  Every day that Kim Jong-il’s health continues to deteriorate without clear succession arrangements makes political instability after his death or debilitation all the more likely.  And, every day that the regime continues to develop nuclear weapons and missiles or to pursue destabilizing actions makes the effects of instability all the more dangerous.

**US presence in South Korea guarantees the US would get dragged into conflict.**

**Bandow**, Doug, former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, 2/1/**07** (North Korea and Umbrella Proliferation, National Interest, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=13538)ZDM

However, though a military guarantee may help deter conflict in this way, it makes conflict more likely in other ways. First, if the U.S. commitment is not credible, there is no deterrent effect. Even a written treaty may not be enough. The famous Chinese challenge—you won't risk Los Angeles to protect Taipei—suggests some doubt in Beijing that the United States would pay the potential price of confronting a nuclear power in order to protect a peripheral geopolitical interest. Second, if war erupts, U.S. involvement (assuming America makes good on its promise) is automatic. Washington loses the ability to weigh costs and benefits in the particular case at the particular time. For decades the quintessential example of this policy was the forward deployment of U.S. forces in Korea, the so-called “tripwire” that ensured sufficient American deaths in any North Korean invasion to trigger U.S. involvement.  That policy may have reduced the likelihood of war breaking out, but only by ensuring U.S. involvement in any conflict. Even a small risk of war would be extraordinarily dangerous when dealing with nuclear-armed states. Confronting China, which has global ambitions, or even Iran or North Korea, assuming they develop a capacity to hit the United States, would be far different than attacking Serbia or Iraq. It would be tragically ironic to survive the Cold War without a nuclear exchange and then blunder into one by intervening in a small conflict of limited importance.

Contingency Plans 3/4

Conflict would escalate to full Sino-American war.

The Korea Times 5/5/09 (NK Collapse May Trigger US-China Clash, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/07/116\_44401.html)ZDM

If North Korea collapses, possible intervention by South Korea and the United States would be the biggest fear for China, according to a U.S. military expert. China, one of the North's closest allies, has been preparing itself to counteract, said Larry M. Wurtzel. In a report, titled ``Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan,'' published by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, he said that South Korean and U.S. intervention is ``certain.'' Therefore, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been prepared to move supplies and forces into North Korea to restore order and to secure the Sino-North Korean border, he said. Wurtzel quoted a senior Chinese official as saying, ``If the leaders in the United States think the U.S. military or its ally, South Korea, can simply march north in the event of a collapse in North Korea without some consultation with China, it will look like 1950 all over again.''

Extinction.

The Strait Times 00 (The Straits Times (Singapore), “No one gains in war over Taiwan”, June 25, 2000, L/N)

The doomsday scenario THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

Contingency Plans 4/4

We control timeframe and probability—even North Koreans admit Kim Jung Il won’t survive another three years.

The Chosun Illbo 7/21/10 (Speculation Mounts Over Kim Jong-il's Failing Health, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html\_dir/2010/07/12/2010071200481.html)ZDM

Doctors in North Korea have given the country's leader Kim Jong-il three years to live, Open Radio for North Korea claimed Friday. Quoting what it said was a high-level North Korean source, the broadcaster said a comprehensive medical check-up last month by a special medical department under the Guard Command, a military unit assigned to protect Kim, shows that he has "at most three years to live." His ailments including laryngitis and kidney disorders became chronic after he recovered from a stroke, it said. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, who is in charge of Korean affairs, in February said doctors abroad also speculated that Kim will not live another three years.

\*\*\*Nuclearization\*\*\*

Inherency – Nuclear Umbrella Now

South Korea’s under the nuclear umbrella now—Obama just re-expressed his commitment, but multiple factors hurt the security guarantee’s credibility.

Terence Roehrig, Associate Professor in National Security Studies at the U.S. Naval War College, 2/17/2010, “Nuclear Weapons and Extended Deterrence: The U.S. Nuclear Umbrella over South Korea," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Theory vs. Policy? Connecting Scholars and Practitioners, New Orleans Hilton Riverside Hotel, The Loews New Orleans Hotel, New Orleans, LA Online, accessed via *allacademic research* cp

After North Korea’s second test in May 2009, South Korea [Republic of Korea – ROK] was again concerned about the U.S. nuclear umbrella under the new Barack Obama administration. Following the test, South Korean officials pressed the Obama administration for a formal statement declaring its inclusion under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Washington reluctantly agreed to the request and included the guarantee in the “Joint Vision of the Alliance” statement produced during the summit. Throughout the Cold War, the United States maintained an extended deterrence commitment to protect South Korea as part of a system of alliances in East Asia. The guarantee included a mutual security treaty that formalized the U.S. pledge to defend its ally and basing troops along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) as a sign of U.S. determination to defend South Korea. The U.S. commitment also entailed the inclusion of South Korea under the U.S. nuclear umbrella whereby Washington vowed to use nuclear weapons to deter, and if need be, defeat an attack on the South. The United States has not given a “no first use” declaration thereby retaining the option to use nuclear weapons first either in response to an attack or to preempt an impending threat. The nuclear umbrella also included the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on the peninsula. However, these weapons were removed from South Korea in 1991. The nuclear umbrella has long been a part of U.S. extended deterrence in East Asia, yet there have always been some troubling aspects of this strategy, both here and in Europe. An important requirement for successful deterrence is credibility. An adversary must believe that the state threatening retaliation is likely to follow through should deterrence fail. Would the United States truly be willing to use nuclear weapons in the defense of an ally? What if that adversary possessed nuclear weapons that could strike the U.S. homeland or U.S. facilities in the region? Would the United States use nuclear weapons in response to a non-nuclear attack – conventional, biological, or chemical? These issues raise serious questions about the credibility of any U.S. nuclear umbrella. Despite these questions regarding credibility, South Korean leaders continue to place high value on remaining under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and have exerted great effort to have Washington provide explicit reassurances that this piece of the U.S. security guarantee has not changed. Adding another dimension to this issue are calls by President Obama and others to drastically reduce and move toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. In April 2009, President Obama committed his administration to a serious reassessment of U.S. nuclear forces, an examination that will be forthcoming in a new U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. During a speech in Prague, President Obama declared: the United States will take concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons. To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same. Make no mistake: As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies…. But we will begin the work of reducing our arsenal. It is unclear how far the administration intends to go in changing the U.S. nuclear posture. However, U.S. allies in East Asia have been concerned about the possible direction of this review along with the implications for their security and the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

Inherency – Nuclear Umbrella Now

Obama’s committed to extending a nuclear umbrella over South Korea.

Richard Halloran, free lance writer in Honolulu and former military correspondent for The New York Times, 6/21/2009 , *Real Clear Politics*, “Nuclear Umbrella,” http://www.realclearpolitics.com/printpage/?url=http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/06/21/nuclear\_umbrella\_97104.html cp

In a little noted change in US nuclear policy, President Barack Obama this week threatened to employ nuclear weapons against North Korea in retaliation for a nuclear attack on South Korea.

Rarely, if ever, has the US disclosed when or under what circumstances or in which country it would use nuclear weapons. Instead, US nuclear doctrine has been wrapped in generalities and ambiguity intended to deter a potential adversary from a nuclear attack by keeping ~~him~~ guessing. Day-to-day, that doctrine calls for never confirming or denying the presence of US nuclear weapons anywhere.

This week, however, the president and President Lee Myung-bak of South Korea issued a joint statement saying "the continuing commitment of extended deterrence, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella," provided assurance that the US would respond if Pyongyang ever put into action the belligerent rhetoric it has repeatedly hurled at South Korea.

After meeting in the White House, Presidents Obama and Lee appeared in the Rose Garden where the South Korean president said "President Obama reaffirmed this firm commitment to ensuring the security of South Korea through extended deterrence, which includes the nuclear umbrella." Mr. Obama did not mention this commitment during his remarks.

Statements prove.

Reuters, 6/16/2009, “South Korea to stay under U.S. nuclear umbrella: statement,” http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE55F4ZA20090616 cp

(Reuters) - The United States on Tuesday recommitted itself to the defense of South Korea, including keeping Seoul under its nuclear umbrella, the two countries said in a joint statement.

"We will maintain a robust defense posture, backed by allied capabilities which support both nations' security interests," said the statement, released after a meeting between U.S. President Barack Obama and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak.

"The continuing commitment of extended deterrence, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella, reinforces this assurance," the statement said.

North Korea – No Nukes

North Korea does not have the ability to mount its warheads on missiles.

GSN 4/1/10 (North Korea "Already Has Nuclear Weapons," Clinton Says, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw\_20100401\_6711.php)ZDM

In the past, Washington has refused to explicitly recognize North Korea as a nuclear-armed state, though the Stalinist state is estimated to have enough plutonium to build several nuclear weapons. Pyongyang has conducted two nuclear tests but has not yet, it is believed, developed the ability to place a nuclear warhead on a missile.

North Korea doesn’t have nukes.

Yonhap News, 4/10/10 (N. Korea has up to 6 nuclear weapons: Clinton, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2010/04/11/26/0301000000AEN20100411000200315F.HTML)ZDM

Meanwhile, the World Nuclear Stockpile Report, written by Hans Kristensen of the FAS and Robert Norris of the Natural Resources Defense Council in September, said North Korea appears to have 10 nuclear weapons, although it added, "There is no publicly available evidence that North Korea has operationalized its nuclear weapons capability."

Six Party Talks Stalled

Six Party Talks stalled—South Korea doesn’t trust the North.

BusinessWeek 7/20 (7/20/10, " Japan Says It Isn't Seeking Bilateral Meeting With North Korea ", http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-07-20/japan-says-it-isn-t-seeking-bilateral-meeting-with-north-korea.html) cp

North Korea on July 10 expressed a willingness to return to disarmament talks, a day after the United Nations Security Council adopted a statement falling short of blaming the country for the Cheonan attack. South Korea's Foreign Minister Yu Myung Hwan on July 18 dismissed the North Korean overture as a ploy to divert attention from the sinking.

North Korea withdrew from the six-party process after UN sanctions imposed in response to missile tests. The country exploded a second nuclear device in May 2009 after conducting its first test in 2006.

US, South Korea, and Japan distrust North Korea—they won’t restart talks.

Global Security Newswire 7/13 (7/13/10, " US Wary of North Korean Offer For Nuclear Negotiations ", http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw\_20100713\_4921.php) cp

The United States yesterday questioned the sincerity of North Korea's weekend offer to return to the six-party talks aimed at shuttering the Asian nation's nuclear program, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, July 12).

"If North Korea wants to engage seriously in the six-party process, there are very specific actions that North Korea has to take first before we would consider a resumption of the six-party process," U.S. State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said to journalists.

Crowley called on Pyongyang to end its "provocative behavior" demonstrated by the March sinking of a South Korean patrol ship which Washington and Seoul assert was attacked by a North Korean submarine. On Friday, the U.N. Security Council unanimously approved a nonbinding presidential statement that condemned the attack on the Cheonan without accusing the North of responsibility.

"If they're not prepared to show through affirmative actions a willingness to fulfill existing commitments under the six-party process -- that it's prepared to give up its nuclear program -- then you have to ask the fundamental question: What are we going to talk about?" Crowley said.

The six-party process has been paralyzed for more than a year since North Korea pulled out of negotiations with China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the United States. Pyongyang conducted in second nuclear test in May 2009 and was quickly penalized with heightened Security Council sanctions (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, July 12).

Seoul, meanwhile, seemed intent yesterday on denying North Korea the chance to gain any advantage from what some have termed the Security Council's "feeble" rebuke, the Korea Herald reported.

"We do not see the six-way talks in the near future, not until North Korea has spoken more sincerely regarding the Cheonan incident and shows real willingness at denuclearization," South Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman Kim Young-sun said.

While North Korea historically has been the typical source of holdups in the six-party talks, South Korea now seems determined to win an apology for the warship sinking before it returns to the nuclear negotiations.

“The North says it is ready for the six-party talks, but it has not been even remotely clear on exactly what kind of denuclearization we are talking about,” Kim said (Kim Ji-hyun, Korea Herald, July 12).

Tokyo also signaled today it was against resuming negotiations at this time, Kyodo News reported.

"Although we recognize the need to hold six-party talks to discuss the North's nuclear ambitions, missile launches and abductions (of Japanese nationals) we cannot resume the meeting soon after such an incident [as the Cheonan sinking]," Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada said to journalists (Kyodo News/Breitbart.com, July 13).

Six Party Talks Stalled

More ev.

Reuters, 7/23/2010, “N.Korea declares "sacred war" on U.S., South,” http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE66M10I20100724?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews cp

North Korea has called for the resumption of six-party nuclear disarmament talks that it had boycotted since late 2008, a move analysts said was an attempt to put the Cheonan incident behind and win lucrative aid through a deal with the South, the United States, Japan, Russia and China.

The United States and

South Korea have rejected the call and said Pyongyang must first prove that it is genuinely interested in change by first apologizing for sinking the Cheonan.

Presence Angers China

Joint US Korean exercises will alienate the Chinese.

Razoff, Rick, editor for stop NATO, an international email news list that examines, from an adversarial position, the expansion of NATO and affilated and allied military blocs 7/16/10 (U.S. Risks Military Clash With China In Yellow Sea, http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2010/07/16/u-s-risks-military-clash-with-china-in-yellow-sea/)ZDM

For weeks now leading Chinese foreign ministry and military officials have condemned the U.S.-led naval exercises, branding them a threat to Chinese national sovereignty and to peace and stability in the region. China’s influential Global Times wrote on July 12 that “The eventuality that Beijing has to prepare for is close at hand. The delayed US-South Korean naval exercise in the Yellow Sea is now slated for mid-July. According to media reports, a nuclear-powered US aircraft carrier has left its Japanese base and is headed for the drill area.” [1] Permanently based in Yokosuka, Japan, the USS George Washington is an almost 100,000-ton supercarrier: “The nuclear carrier, commissioned in 1992, is the sixth Nimitz-class vessel, carrying some 6,250 crew and about 80 aircraft, including FA-18 fighter jets and E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft.” [2] The F/A-18 Hornet is a supersonic, multirole jet fighter (F/A is for Fighter/Attack) and one of its primary roles is destroying an adversary’s air defenses. The E-2C Hawkeye has been described as the “eyes and ears” of American carrier strike groups, being equipped with long-range surveillance radar. In addition to the nuclear aircraft carrier, “an Aegis-equipped destroyer, an amphibious assault ship, about four 4,500-ton KDX-II-class destroyers, the 1,800-ton Son Won-il-class submarine and F-15K fighter jets are expected to join the exercise.” [3] U.S. Aegis class warships (destroyers and cruisers) are equipped for Standard Missile-3 anti-ballistic interceptor missiles, part of a U.S.-led Asia-Pacific (to date, along with the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Australia) and ultimately international interceptor missile system. The F-15K (“Slam Eagle”) is a state-of-the-art multirole (used for both aerial combat and ground attack) jet fighter supplied to South Korea by the U.S. The presence of a U.S. nuclear aircraft carrier and scores of advanced American and South Korean warplanes off the coast of China in the Yellow Sea – and near Russia’s shore in the Sea of Japan if the Washington is deployed there – qualitatively and precariously raises the level of brinkmanship in Northeast Asia. The drumbeat of confrontation has been steadily increasing in volume and tempo since the sinking of a South Korean corvette, the Cheonan, on March 26 with the resultant death of 46 crew members. An investigation into the incident was organized by the U.S. and included experts from the U.S., South Korea, Britain, Australia and Sweden, but not from China and Russia which both border the Korean Peninsula. On May 20 the five-nation team released a report blaming a North Korean torpedo for the sinking of the Cheonan. North Korea denied the accusation and neither Russia nor China, excluded from the investigation, have concurred with the U.S. accusation. American provocations escalated dramatically at the Group of 20 (G20) summit in Toronto on June 27 when U.S. President Barack Obama (in his own words) held a “blunt” conversation with China’s President Hu Jintao, accusing him and his nation of “willful blindness” in relation to North Korea’s “belligerent behavior.” Upbraiding his Chinese counterpart, Obama stated, “I think there’s a difference between restraint and willful blindness to consistent problems.” (On the same occasion Obama praised South Korea’s President Lee Myung-bak for his “extraordinary restraint.”) “My hope is that president Hu will recognise as well that this is an example of Pyongyang going over the line.” President Hu and the Chinese government as a whole would be fully justified in suspecting that mounting U.S. threats are aimed not only (and perhaps not so much) against North Korea as against China itself

Presence Angers China

The exercises anger China.

VOA 7/14/10 (US, South Korean Navies Will Exercise in Yellow Sea Despite Chinese Objections, http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/US-South-Korean-Navies-Will-Exercise-in-Yellow-Sea-Despite-Chinese-Objections-98453279.html)ZDM

A spokesman in Beijing said Tuesday U.S.-South Korean exercises in the Yellow Sea would threaten key Chinese interests including its sovereignty, security, territorial integrity and economic development. In addition, the official Xinhua News Agency said the plan "is gradually drawing widespread public ire in China," and called for "restraint" and "calm," rather than what it called "drastic moves." Two sets of naval exercises had originally been expected in late June or early July.  One was to be aimed at improving South Korea's ability to combat aggression by surface ships and the other was aimed at building its ability to fight submarines, such as the one that allegedly sank its ship, the Cheonan, in March.   Professor Clark Sorensen, Chairman of the Center for Korea Studies at the University of Washington, says such exercises seem to be needed. "I think they're probably necessary," said Clark Sorensen. "It seemed quite striking that the Cheonan, that Korean corvette [small warship] that was torpedoed, had no idea that there was a torpedo around.  And so it seems like they need more training so that they won't be caught off guard like that again." Sorensen says China is concerned about the plan because it wants to ease tensions and resume the six-party talks it hosts, which the professor says have so far failed to make significant progress toward curtailing North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

China feels encircled by the US military presence in South Korea.

Monthly Review March 02 (U.S. Military Bases and Empire, http://monthlyreview.org/0302editr.htm)ZDM

Military doctrine insists that the strategic significance of a foreign military base goes beyond the war in which it was acquired, and that planning for other potential missions using these new assets must begin almost immediately. For this reason the build-up of bases in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and three of the former Soviet republics of Central Asia is inevitably seen by Russia and China as constituting additional threats to their security. Russia has already indicated its displeasure at the prospect of permanent U.S. military bases in Central Asia. As for China, as the Guardian (London) noted on January 10, 2002, the base at Manas in Kyrgyzstan, where U.S. planes are landing daily, “is 250 miles from the western Chinese border. With U.S. bases to the east in Japan, to the south in South Korea, and Washington’s military support for Taiwan, China may feel encircled.”

China dislikes US presence -- Planned Naval drills.

Sify News 7/22/10 (China expresses "deep concern" over US-ROK September military drills, http://sify.com/news/china-expresses-deep-concern-over-us-rok-september-military-drills-news-international-khwmOefigec.html)ZDM

China has expressed "deep concern" over the joint military drills between the United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) slated to be held in the Yellow Sea by early September. "We resolutely oppose any foreign military vessel and aircraft conducting activities in the Yellow Sea and China's coastal waters that undermine China's security interests," The China Daily quoted Qin Gang, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, as saying. "We will continue to follow closely the developments of the situation," he added. The Yellow Sea is located between the Chinese mainland and the Korean Peninsula. The ROK calls it the Sea of Japan the East Sea. The US and ROK claim that the exercises aim to deter the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) from any future attack, after Seoul blamed Pyongyang for the sinking of ROK warship Cheonan in March. Earlier, Chinese military analysts had said that the exercises will put Beijing under the attacking sphere of the US aircraft carrier USS George Washington, which is involved in the drill. (ANI)

Presence Angers China

Deployment of the George Washington uniquely triggers these concerns.

The Korea Herald 7/15/10 (U.S. carrier to be deployed for joint drill in East Sea, http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20100715000799)ZDM

The exercise, which was originally scheduled for June, has become a delicate diplomatic and political issue as China has repeatedly shown its opposition to the exercise. China has appeared unnerved as the nuclear-powered 97,000-ton carrier has an operational range of some 1,000 kilometers and could glean intelligence on military facilities and installments along its eastern coastal regions if eployed in the West Sea. Another military official denied the allegations that the U.S. initially planned to send the carrier in the West Sea, but changed its plan due to the opposition from China.   
 “The aircraft carrier participated in an exercise in the West Sea in October 2009. From operational perspectives, it is not proper to deploy it again in the same place just months later,” he said, asking to remain anonymous.  
“Given the carrier’s operational range of 1,000 kilometers, whether it is deployed in the West Sea or the East Sea, it can practically cover all areas. Therefore, the fact itself that the carrier will operate off the Korean Peninsula is meaningful.”

US-ROK naval exercises cause tension with the PRC.

People’s Daily 7/16/10 (China has 'no plan' to hold Sino-DPRK exercise - People's Daily Online, http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7068229.html#)ZDM

Analysts said China is highly sensitive to foreign military presence in the Yellow Sea, described by Japanese media as a "gateway to China". China's strong protests against the US-ROK joint exercise, especially targeted at the aircraft carrier USS George Washington, has been cited as the main reason for the frequent delays of the upcoming drill. US defense officials said earlier this week that the USS George Washington will stay in the Sea of Japan. The ROK and US military will lead exercises in the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan separately, Yonhap News Agency reported on Thursday. Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell on Wednesday also dismissed comments that the rearrangement of the USS George Washington was made under pressure from China, saying that "those determinations are made by us, and us alone". But the Chosun Ilbo reported on July 13 that the move was a compromise which "tries its best not to irritate China and at the same time keep the face and stance of governments and militaries of the US and ROK". Song Xiaojun, a Beijing-based military analyst, said Washington has achieved its goal of delaying the handing over of the wartime operational control to the ROK for three years in the wake of the Cheonan incident. "Now there is no need for the US to irritate China for the ROK," he said. Details including the date of the latest US-ROK exercise will reportedly be decided at the meeting between US Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and their ROK counterparts on July 21 in Seoul. Pyongyang's military on Thursday also held its first talks with the US-led UN Command, which oversees the Korean War truce, on the sinking of the ROK warship. The colonel-level meeting was reportedly conducted in "an amiable mood". "There were a lot of smiles and a few laughs," one officer attending the meeting told Reuters. However, Jin Canrong, associate dean of the school of international relations at the Beijing-based Renmin University of China, said there were concerns that calls for continuous and escalated US-ROK exercises will "add to regional tensions and draw overreaction from Pyongyang, which nobody can predict".

China Pro-North Korea Now

China supports North Korea—US troop presence and regional security threats worry the Middle Kingdom.

William Tobey, Senior Fellow at Harvard University, Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 6/17/2010, *National Public Radio*, “Foreign Policy: Time For China To Act In North Korea,” http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127899225 cp

Again, the North has crossed the line of civilized behavior — if indeed it has ever resided on the proper side of that boundary — by torpedoing a South Korean ship and killing 46 sailors. This is not new behavior. In October 1983, North Korean agents attempted to blow up South Korean President Chun Doo-Hwan during a wreath-laying ceremony in Burma. The attempt failed, but killed 21 people, including several of Chun's cabinet. In the 1970s and 1980s, North Korea kidnapped dozens, if not hundreds of Japanese and South Korean citizens, ripping them from their families to exploit them for their knowledge of the outside world. In the 1990s, Pyongyang's policies of meeting military needs first and autarky starved more than 1 million North Koreans. Later, North Korea exported nuclear weapons material and technology to Libya and Syria.

In response to the North's latest atrocity, Chinese Premier Dai Bingguo toured Northeast Asia, urging restraint and maintaining studied neutrality between the aggressor and the aggrieved. Surely, this is a prelude to asking the United States, Japan, and South Korea to make further concessions to Pyongyang. At the same time, North Korea seems to be implementing plans for Kim Jong-Eun to succeed his father, perhaps after a period of regency. Undoubtedly, Pyongyang consulted its Chinese patrons on this plan. But rather than perpetuating this monstrous dynasty, Beijing should seize the opportunity for change.

For nearly a decade, the United States has attempted to invest Beijing with a sense of responsibility for solving the North Korea problem. As the country with the most at stake and the most influence over the issue, China should take the lead. While hosting the Six Party Talks on denuclearizing North Korea, China has graciously provided hundreds of lunches to diplomats, but utterly failed to take any of the tough actions necessary to bring about real change in North Korea.

Beijing fears instability, and rightly so. Military confrontations, refugee flows, and political turmoil are all to be avoided. But it is time China made a choice between a failed and cruel regime, and a modern, peaceful, and prosperous Korean Peninsula. The United States can stipulate that democratic reunification of Korea would diminish the need for U.S. ground forces — and certainly not motivate any movement of U.S. troops toward China's border with Korea. It would also lessen imperatives for regional missile defenses and closer U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan — providing strategic reassurance to Beijing. Advance planning and coordination on refugee flows, economic dislocations, nuclear proliferation, and security issues would mitigate the dangers of instability.

Solvency – Troop Withdrawal Key

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North Korean statements prove.

Amy Bickers, writer for VOA, 3/8/2004, *The Epoch Times*, “Report: N. Korea May Insist on US Troop Withdrawal from South,” http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/4-3-8/20324.html cp

TOKYO - North Korea said Monday it may insist on the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea unless Washington drops its demand that Pyongyang dismantle its nuclear weapons program.

In a report issued Monday by North Korea's Central News Agency, the isolated Communist state said it could soon slap new counter-demands on the United States.

The dispatch said Pyongyang may insist that U.S. troops leave South Korea as a precondition for resolving the ongoing standoff over the North's nuclear weapons program.

Washington bases 37,000 troops in South Korea to help protect it in case the North attacks. U.S. troops have remained in South Korea since the Korean War in the early 1950's.

Pyongyang also said Monday it might ask for a "verifiable and irreversible" security guarantee from the United States, echoing Washington's frequent demand that North Korea completely, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle its nuclear weapons program.

Solvency – China Key

China is key to check North Korea—it’s Kim Jong Il’s only life support system.

William Tobey, Senior Fellow at Harvard University, Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 6/17/2010, *National Public Radio*, “Foreign Policy: Time For China To Act In North Korea,” http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127899225 cp

For too long, Beijing has coddled, excused, shielded, subsidized, and appeased the indefensible — Kim Jong-Il's nightmarish regime in North Korea.

China is the key to solving the Korean quandary. The Middle Kingdom is North Korea's largest trade partner, most generous aid donor, and only real friend. Without help from China, North Korea is not viable — if such an impoverished and benighted nation can be said to be so. In what should be an embarrassment to modern business and political leaders in Beijing, relations between China and North Korea are still conducted by their recondite and fossilized Communist Parties.

Chinese involvement is key to preventing North Korean proliferation.

Bandow, Doug, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan,

9/9/09 (Bipolar Pyongyang, CATO Institute, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=10523

Washington, South Korea and Tokyo should simultaneously work together to encourage more intensive Chinese involvement. With increasing pessimism in Beijing that North Korea will agree to give up its nuclear potential, the allies should suggest that the People's Republic of China closely coordinate its policy with theirs for one last serious attempt to resolve the nuclear crisis through negotiation. In essence, Pyongyang's three antagonists would provide the carrots while its ally would wield the stick. If the DPRK chose to obstruct and obfuscate, it would demonstrate that it does not desire a diplomatic solution. In that case, Beijing should support—and, more importantly, enforce—an enhanced sanctions regime. China also should consider using whatever influence it has within the North to encourage more responsible behavior and/or better leadership.

China taking an active role in negotiations is key to stopping North Korean proliferation.

Zhang, Hui, leading a research initiative on China's nuclear policies for Harvard University's Project on Managing the Atom in the John F. Kennedy School of Government, July/Aug 09 (Ending North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions: The Need for Stronger Chinese Action, Arms Control Association, Arms Control Today, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009\_07-08/zhang#Bio)ZDM

Among the interested players in the North Korean nuclear issue, China has the most significant economic and political leverage over the North Korean regime. China has been a close ally of North Korea over the past 50 years, with a friendship cemented in blood during the Korean War. Also, China is North Korea's largest trading partner, reportedly supplying North Korea with up to 90 percent of its oil imports and about 45 percent of its subsistence-level food supplies. Moreover, cross-border trade in 2008 was reportedly about $2.7 billion, an increase of about 40 percent from 2007.[[3](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_07-08/zhang#3)] Since April 2003, China has hosted one trilateral negotiation and six rounds of the six-party talks. During these negotiations, China has acted not only as a host, but also as a mediator and constructive participant. China's major role in negotiations, as former Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the head of the Chinese delegation to the first three rounds of the six-party talks, emphasized, "is contributing to peace and talks" (*quan he cu tan*).[[4](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_07-08/zhang#4)] China, according to official statements, hopes the parties to the talks will take actions to build trust, reduce suspicions, enhance consensus, and promote cooperation in order to create a win-win situation.[[5](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_07-08/zhang#5)] In particular, China's role became even more proactive in the fourth round of the talks, leading to the breakthrough agreement on a joint statement of principles. During the fourth round, China not only tabled five drafts of the joint statement but also took a "reject/accept" approach to push the United States to accept the joint statement. Beijing also reportedly has lured Pyongyang to each round of the six-party talks with tens of millions of dollars in incentives. U.S. officials have praised China's active role in the talks, saying it has helped U.S.-Chinese relations.

Pullout Good – Stability

Withdrawal of troops is key to East Asian stability—countries will balance and resolve the North Korean nuclear issue.

Emilson M. Espiritu, Commander, United States Navy, 3/15/2006, “THE EAGLE HEADS HOME: RETHINKING NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION,” submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree cp

Can the U.S. live with the risk of an unstable Korean Peninsula? The obvious answer is “no.” It is clear that a stable Korean peninsula is more beneficial to the United States. Clearly North Korea is a major player to determining whether the Korean Peninsula remains stable. One would argue as long as the current regime of Kim Jung Il remains in power and continue to pursue WMD (i.e. Nuclear weapons) there will be a permanent unstable scenario in the region.62 On the other hand, as long as the United States remains in the region and continues to be forward deployed in South Korea, that the U.S. is contributing to such instability in the region. According to Revere, if there is an unstable region (Korean Peninsula), the U.S. goals become harder to achieve.63 Should an unstable Korean Peninsula exist, this could possibly lead to conflicts in the region, most obvious between the Koreas; promote unhealthy economic competition in the region, whereas more developed nations (Japan, China) do not provide any form of economic assistance to the Koreas; and more dangerously a weapons/arms race (maybe to include more nuclear weapons in the region) to maintain a power balance. In order to strengthen regional stability, the U.S. would need to succeed in countering terrorism, enhancing economic prosperity, eliminating weapons of mass destruction, promoting democracy, and addressing transnational issues.64 At what cost and risks is the U.S. willing to accept in order to achieve stability in the region?

Conclusion

The United States cannot live with the risks involved in an unstable region. The Korean Peninsula and the East-Asia Pacific region are home to many of the economic giants worldwide. Additionally, with the rising cost of economic commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. must rethink alternatives to bring stability in the East-Asia Pacific region more specifically, the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. must continue to pursue peace and stability using all elements of national power certainly using less emphasis on a military solution. Additionally, the U.S. must selectively engage the Koreas to bring stability to the Korean Peninsula by pursuing a combined strategy of isolationism and off-shore balancing. Diplomatic, Informational, and Economic solutions take time. Perhaps by using other countries particularly in the region would be beneficial to the United States but also to the other countries as well. Strategic positioning of U.S. troops not only around the Korean Peninsula but throughout the world is the key to pursuing the National Objectives.

By pursuing a stable Korean Peninsula without heavy U.S. involvement is beneficial both internationally and economically. Accelerating the withdrawal of U.S. troops, could lead to a multi-polar balance of power in the region.65 Obviously, this would require a significant change in foreign policy and power position in the region; it would certainly cause other nations to reconsider their national security strategy.

All in all, in a speech given by James A. Kelley, stated that “Regional stability remains our overarching strategic goal and provides the underpinnings for achievement of other key goals and objectives.”66 Finally, as stated in the 2006 QDR, “Victory can only be achieved through the patient accumulation of quiet successes and the orchestration of all elements of national and international power.” 67 Perhaps by completely withdrawing all U.S. troops from South Korea could potentially lead to one of these successes and bring stabilization to the region without heavy U.S. involvement. It is possible by taking the “let them work it out” (the Koreas) approach would certainly be advantageous to the U.S. The time is now for the Eagle to head home.

\*\*\*East Asia\*\*\*

Brink – Wildfire Prolif

Any amount of new proliferation would result in crossing the nuclear tipping point, resulting in run away prolif.

Reiss 04 (Mitchel B. a senior American diplomat and President-elect of Washington College. served as Director of Policy Planning at the Department of State. A Former White House Fellow and was assigned to the National Security Council, Chief Negotiator fin the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, an organization set up by the United States, South Korea, and Japan to implement the Agreed Framework on preventing nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula. The Nuclear Tipping Point, The Brookings institutions, Washington DC 2004. P 3-4)ZDM

Today, more than five decades after the dawn of the nuclear age, we once again find ourselves living in an age of anxiety. And again, a major reason is the potential unbridled spread of nuclear weapons. But now the risk is not that one or two countries might test a nuclear device every decade or so, thereby giving the international community time to accom­modate and integrate new nuclear powers into the existing order. Rather, the danger is that many countries might view nuclear weapons as useful, even essential, instruments to maintain security in a Hobbessian world where life is "poor, nasty, brutish, and short. In this environment, any number of events could spark countries into a headlong dash to acquire independent nuclear arsenals. For example, a single new entrant to the nuclear club could catalyze similar responses by others in the region with the Middle East and Northeast Asia the most likely candidatesActual use of chemical and biological weapons could also prompt countries to seek nuclear weapons as a deterrent. Perhaps most disturbingly, even a vague generalized sense that proliferation was inevitable and self restraint futile – that “everyone is doing it” -- could persuade countries that non nuclear virtue was a "mug’s game" that they cling to at their peril. Under these and other easily imaginable circum  stances, previous pledges of nuclear abstention would be quietly or openly abandoned as countries engaged in the nuclear equivalent of sauve qui peut. Or it may be that countries would not sprint to cross the nuclear finish line but rather hedge their bets by working quietly and methodically   to acquire the technology and materials necessary to build nuclear bombs on short notice once a political decision was made. Today, many of the building blocks for a nuclear arsenal-the scientific and engineer- ing expertise, precision machine tools, computer software, and nuclear design information-are more readily available than ever before. And what is unavailable on the open market can be purchased on the black market due to the flourishing illicit trade in nuclear technology and materials between and among rogue (or what used to be termed pariah) states. A hedging strategy would allow a state to gradually increase its nuclear competence and shrink the period of its greatest strategic vulner- ability: the time between a decision to acquire weapons and the actual possession of a usable nuclear arsenal. States that adopt this approach could remain poised on this non-nuclear precipice for months or even years, awaiting a political decision to tip them over the edge. In other words, in ways both fast and slow, we may very soo n be where many countries may decide to acquire nuclear arsenals on short notice, thereby triggering a proliferation epidemic. Should current proliferation trends continue, within the next decade there may be more declared nuclear weapons states, more undeclared nuclear weapons states, and more states devel- oping nuclear weapons than ever before. President John F. Kennedy's nightmare vision of a world with fifteen, twenty, or even twenty-five nuclear powers may yet occur. As Director of the CIA George Tenet tes- tified before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee on February 11, 2003, "The desire for nuclear weapons is on the upsurge. Additional countries may decide to seek nuclear weapons as it becomes clear their neighbors and regional rivals are already doing so. The 'domino theory' of the twenty-first century may well be nuclear."2 Should this occur, few would take comfort in the assurances of some academic theorists that more may be better.

North Korea Causes Global Prolif

North Korean proliferation causes global proliferation.

Rueters 5/26/09 (Proliferation challenge extends far beyond North Korea, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE54P6N620090526)ZDM

North Korea's second nuclear test, which has the Obama administration scrambling for an effective response, poses a far greater proliferation challenge than merely figuring how to make Pyongyang change course. Whether the United States can translate international condemnation of North Korea's second nuclear test in 2-1/2 years into concrete action will affect U.S. allies in Asia, nuclear powers like Pakistan and India and countries with suspected nuclear ambitions, such as Iran.

"North Korea's thrown something in our face that we have to deal with now and it could have tremendous ramifications for the ability to stop proliferation in the future," said David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, a nuclear disarmament think tank. The former arms inspector said international failure to respond resolutely could embolden [Iran](http://www.reuters.com/places/iran) in its suspected quest for a nuclear bomb, but also could see nuclear-armed Pakistan mimic the North in a test that might provoke India in turn. State Department spokesman Ian Kelly said Washington sought a tough U.N. Security Council response and wanted to make North Korea "pay a price" through a mixture of multilateral and U.S. measures, which he did not spell out.

Impact – Nuclear War

North Korean proliferation spurs nuclear war.

Hayes & Hamel-Green, 10 – \*Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, AND \*\* Executive Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development act Victoria University (1/5/10, Executive Dean at Victoria, “The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia,” <http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf>)

The international community is increasingly aware that cooperative diplomacy is the most productive way to tackle the multiple, interconnected global challenges facing humanity, not least of which is the increasing proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Korea and Northeast Asia are instances where risks of nuclear proliferation and actual nuclear use arguably have increased in recent years. This negative trend is a product of continued US nuclear threat projection against the DPRK as part of a general program of coercive diplomacy in this region, North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, the breakdown in the Chinese-hosted Six Party Talks towards the end of the Bush Administration, regional concerns over China’s increasing military power, and concerns within some quarters in regional states (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) about whether US extended deterrence (“nuclear umbrella”) afforded under bilateral security treaties can be relied upon for protection. The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack1, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions**.** But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states**.** The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

\*\*\*Middle East\*\*\*

North Korea Exporting Nuclear Tech Now

More evidence.

Fox News, 5/28/10, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/05/27/apnewsbreak-experts-say-nkorea-exporting-nuclear-ballistic-missile-technology/ cp

While North Korea maintains a wide network of trade offices which do legitimate business as well as most of the country's illicit trade and covert acquisitions, the panel said Pyongyang "has also established links with overseas criminal networks to carry out these activities, including the transportation and distribution of illicit and smuggled cargoes."

This may also include goods related to weapons of mass destruction and arms, it added.

Under council resolutions, all countries are required to submit reports on what they are doing to implement sanctions but as of April 30 the panel said it had still not heard from 112 of the 192 U.N. member states — including 51 in Africa, 28 in Asia, and 25 in Latin America and the Caribbean.

While no country reported on nuclear or ballistic missile-related imports or exports from North Korea since the second sanctions resolution was adopted last June, the panel said it reviewed several U.S. and French government assessments, reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency, research papers and media reports indicating Pyongyang's continuing involvement in such activities.

These reports indicate North Korea "has continued to provide missiles, components, and technology to certain countries including Iran and Syria ... (and) has provided assistance for a nuclear program in Syria, including the design and construction of a thermal reactor at Dair Alzour," the panel said.

Syria denied the allegations in a letter to the IAEA, but the U.N. nuclear agency is still trying to obtain reports on the site and its activities, the panel said.

The experts said they are also looking into "suspicious activity in Myanmar," including activities of Namchongang Trading, one of the companies subject to U.N. sanctions, and reports that Japan in June 2009 arrested three individuals for attempting to illegally export a magnetometer — which measures magnetic fields — to Myanmar via Malaysia allegedly under the direction of a company known to be associated with illicit procurement for North Korea's nuclear and military programs. The company was not identified.

Iran Causes Wildfire Prolif

Iran nuclearization causes wild-fire proliferation in the Middle East.

Joseph Cirincione (Senior Vice President for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress), April 4, 2006, Interviewed by Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor, Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/10331/>

They want to deter a United States or possibly Israeli attack, and they want the prestige that such a weapon would give them for their regional ambitions. And it's exactly for those reasons that other countries in the region would react. Saudi Arabia could not tolerate the political, military, and diplomatic power that a nuclear weapon would give Iran. And that's the great danger-that other countries in the region would start exploring their nuclear options.

There are already stories that Saudi Arabia is cooperating with the Pakistanis on nuclear research. We don't know if this is true, but we do know that the Saudis bankrolled the Pakistani nuclear program. My great fear is that the Saudis might take a nuclear shortcut, and invite Pakistan to station some of its nuclear weapons on Saudi territory. This, in fact, would actually be legal under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Saudi Arabia is a member of, just the way the United States stations nuclear weapons in Europe. Egypt might also react. They used to have a nuclear program in the 1960s; they might decide that they have to beat the Iranian challenge in their own way. So might Turkey.

In fact, if there's a unified government of Iraq within five years, Iraq-long-term foe of Iran-might consider that it needs to balance Iranian power. So that's really the great threat, is that you would go from a Middle East with one nuclear weapons state, Israel, to one with three, four, or five nuclear weapons states with the remaining political, economic, and ethnic conflicts unresolved. That's a recipe for nuclear war.

Impact – Nuclear War

Middle Eastern nuclearization causes nuclear war and NPT breakdown.

David Krieger, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and a councilor on the World Future Council, 6/11/2009, *Nuclear Age Peace Foundation*, “A Middle East Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone,” http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2009/06/11\_krieger\_mideast\_nwfz.php) cp

The Middle East has been and remains one of the most volatile and violent regions of the world. It is a region, however, that could grow exponentially more dangerous with a nuclear arms race. Although Israeli leadership sticks to the ambiguous refrain that it will “not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East,” it is widely understood that Israel has 100 to 200 nuclear weapons.

In1981, an unfinished Iraqi nuclear research reactor, Osirak, was destroyed by Israel, and in 2007, Israel destroyed a Syrian nuclear reactor, both on the grounds that these facilities would contribute to nuclear weapons development. Iraq was attacked and its regime toppled by the US in 2003 on the false grounds that it had a nuclear weapons program.

Iran is currently enriching uranium that could be used for a nuclear weapons program. Other countries in the region, including Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia, have the potential to become nuclear weapons states.

Neither the initiation of a war nor military attacks against nuclear facilities is a sustainable way of maintaining the nuclear dominance of one state in the Middle East. The current imbalance can only be resolved by nuclear proliferation with the potential for nuclear conflagration or by the achievement of a Middle East Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.

When President Obama spoke recently in Cairo, he said, “It is clear to all concerned that when it comes to nuclear weapons, we have reached a decisive point. This is…about preventing a nuclear arms race in the Middle East that could lead this region and the world down a hugely dangerous path.”

The good news is that every country in the Middle East, with the sole exception of Israel, is a party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the parties to this treaty agreed in 1995 to exert their utmost efforts to establish a “Middle East zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.” The bad news is that this commitment was made 14 years ago, and to date there has been no progress.

It does not bode well for the region or the world that Israel remains outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Israel’s status as a non-party to the treaty and its possession of nuclear weapons is provocative to the other countries in the region. It is also clear that the United States is employing double standards in continuing its silence about Israel’s nuclear weapons, while at the same time seeking sanctions against Iran, a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, for its uranium enrichment program.

Applying double standards is a dangerous game that is likely to end in a breakdown of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, regional nuclear proliferation and possible nuclear war. It is a path, as President Obama emphasized, that we do not want to travel. This path will only become more probable and dangerous if action is not taken now to prevent it. There are many more countries in the Middle East that are now seeking to develop nuclear energy programs, which could provide a backdoor entrance to becoming nuclear weapons states.

\*\*\*Contingency Plans\*\*\*

Forward Deployment Bad (Careful—Double-Turn with Prolif Bad)

Forward deployment draws the US into war—that escalates and draws in great powers—causes nuclear war.

Christopher Layne, fellow of the Center For Science and International Affairs at Harvard, 1996, "Minimal Realism in East Asia," The National Interest, Spring

Extended nuclear deterrence has always been a difficult strategy to implement successfully because deterring an attack on one's allies is harder than deterring an attack on oneself. This is doubly true when the potential aggressor is a nuclear power because, as Charles de Gaulle reasoned well, rational states will not risk suicide to save their allies. For both protector and protected, extended nuclear deterrence raises constant and ultimately insoluble dilemmas of credibility and reassurance.

The conditions that contributed to successful extended nuclear deterrence in Cold War Europe do not exist in post-Cold War East Asia. Unlike the situation that prevailed in Europe between 1948 and 1990 -- which was fundamentally stable and static -- East Asia is a volatile region in which all the major players -- Japan, China, Korea, Russia, Vietnam -- are candidates to become involved in large-scale war. There is no clear and inviolable status quo. The lines of demarcation between spheres of influence are already blurred and may well become more so as Chinese and Japanese influence expand simultaneously, increasing the number and unpredictability of regional rivalries. The status of Taiwan, tension along the 38th Parallel in Korea, conflicting claims to ownership of the Spratly Islands, and the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands are only a few of the flash-points that could ignite a great power war in East Asia. Washington will clearly exercise far less control over the policies of East Asian powers than it exercised over America's European allies during the Cold War. Hence, the risk of being chain-ganged into a nuclear conflict are much higher for the United States in post-Cold War East Asia if it maintains or extends nuclear guarantees to any of the region's major states.

Even more important, post-Cold War East Asia simply does not have the same degree of strategic importance to the United States as did Europe during the Cold War. Would the United States risk a nuclear confrontation to defend Taiwan, the Spratlys, or Senkaku? Knowing that they would not constitute the same kind of threat to U.S. interests that the Soviet Union did, future revisionist East Asian powers would probably be more willing to discount America's credibility and test its resolve. The presence of American forces in the region may indeed have the perverse effect of failing to preserve peace while simultaneously ensuring the United States would be drawn automatically into a future East Asian war. They could constitute the wrong sort of tripwire, tripping us rather than deterring them. Notwithstanding current conventional wisdom, the United States should encourage East Asian states -- including Japan -- to resolve their own security dilemmas, even if it means acquiring great power, including nuclear, military capabilities.

Reconfiguring American security policies anywhere in the world in ways that, in effect, encourage nuclear proliferation is widely seen as irresponsible and risky. This is not necessarily the case. Nuclear proliferation and extended deterrence are generally believed to be flip sides of the same coin, in the sense that providing the latter is seen to discourage the former. Nearly all maximalists are simultaneously proliferation pessimists (believing that any proliferation will have negative security implications) and extended nuclear deterrence optimists (believing that extended nuclear deterrence "works"). But this formulation comes apart from both ends in East Asia: Potential nuclear powers in the region are unlikely to act irresponsibly and, as suggested above, the U.S. nuclear umbrella is of uncertain credibility in post-Cold War circumstances in which the Soviet Union no longer exists and strains in the U.S.-Japanese relationship are manifest.

North Korean Collapse Inevitable

North Korean collapse is inevitable in the status quo.

Glaser, Bonnie, Staff Writer for Oil Price, 5/26/10 (Is North Korea on the Verge of Collapse?, http://oilprice.com/Geo-Politics/Asia/Is-North-Korea-on-the-Verge-of-Collapse.html)ZDM

Despite the posturing of his regime, there are signs that Kim Jong-Il's hold on North Korea may be slipping and international community must be ready. North Korean leader Kim Jong-il is considered an international pariah in most nations, but he was welcomed with open arms in China May 3-7.  The visit underscored North Korea’s isolation: Kim’s last foreign visit in 2006 was also to China. Despite approving tough United Nations sanctions after Pyongyang’s second nuclear test, Beijing continues to provide energy and food assistance to the North that remains indispensible for the regime’s survival. Yet, even with China’s help, there are growing signs of economic and political volatility in the DPRK and the risks of instability—including regime collapse — cannot be ruled out. In late 2009, the North’s leadership revalued the nation’s currency, causing severe inflation and popular unrest.  The regime then barred foreign currency and closed markets, eliminating vital sources of food and other necessities.  Kim suffered a stroke in 2008, but it remains to be seen whether plans to transfer power to his youngest and least experienced son can be carried out smoothly.  It cannot be excluded that the sinking of the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan is an outcome of internal succession politics — a move by a faction seeking to gain power, or even by the leadership itself, seeking to maintain a grip on the military during the transition.   It is premature to predict near-term regime collapse in North Korea, but it is not too early for major regional parties to plan for the effects of instability, potentially including massive refugee flows and unsecure nuclear weapons, materials, facilities, and knowhow that could be smuggled out of the North and into the hands of the highest bidder.  Responses to instability could include decisions by China, South Korea and the US to dispatch troops into North Korea to restore order and to locate and secure weapons of mass destruction facilities.  Absent advance coordination, these forces could come into conflict with each other.

China Relations Good –DPRK Collapse

Positive US Chinese relations are key to preparing a contingency plan for a DPRK collapse.

Lee, Ji-Young, Visiting assistant proff @ Oberlin, 5/28/10 (The U.S.-ROK Alliance and China: Beyond the Sinking of the Cheonan, The East West Center, Asia Pacific Bulletin, #62, p 1-2, http://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/search-for-publications/browse-alphabetic-list-of-titles/?class\_call=view&pub\_ID=3469&mode=view)ZDM

The sinking of the South Korean navy vessel Cheonanon March 26 is rapidly changing the security landscape on the Korean peninsula. While Pyongyang continues to deny its involvement, an official announcement of the investigation's results on May 20 clearly points the finger at North Korea. One of the most important security implications from this incident is that it has forced South Koreans to think hard about how China is likely to react to a North Korea contingency, such as a succession crisis in North Korea. From a U.S.-ROK alliance perspective, this is a time to address the lack of shared vision on how to cooperat with China. South Korean media reporting on the Cheonan incident has devoted an unprecedented level of attention to the Chinese response to the sinking. Throughout the investigation, South Korean worries appeared to be twofold. One is that Beijing's reserved response to the Cheonanincident went against Seoul's hope of getting Chinese support to put pressure on Pyongyang. In particular, Beijing permitting Kim Jong-il to travel to China only days after President Lee Myung-bak's Shanghai visit, without informing Lee of Kim's impending trip, stirred deep dissatisfaction and heated debates within South post-Cheonan Korea about China's policy regarding the two Koreas. strategic relationship lies in The second concern centers on growing Chinese influence over North Korea against the backdrop of increasing uncertaint yabout the future of the Kim Jong-il regime. China has been North Korea's largest trading partner since the collapse of the Soviet Union, is the primary provider of energy and food to the North. In 2008, China supplied approximately half of all North Korea's imports amounting to $2 billion, up 46% from 2007, while receiving a quarter of the North's exports valued at $754 million. Compared to 2004 when ROK-China relations went downhill over the historical ownership dispute concerning Goguryeo, an ancient kingdom spanning northern Korea and northeastern China, Seoul realizes that it now faces a stronger and more confident Beijing and an even frailer Pyongyang whose economy largely depends on China for survival. What exactly does the *Cheonan* incident mean for the U.S.-ROK alliance? In addition, what steps should South Korea and the United States take to ensure that their diplomatic efforts can be pooled together to prepare for a possible North Korea contingency? Seoul and Washington have sent a strong political message to Pyongyang and the international community by standing united, but a real test of their post- Cheonanstrategic relationship lies in how they, as allies, can cooperate with China concerning North Korea. It is important to understand that the Six-Party Talks are not just about the issue of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons development program. It is very likely that the dynamics and politics today at the Six-Party Talks are going to spill over into future strategic configurations among the six countries in the event of a North Korea contingency. Alliance handlers in Washington and Seoul should approach the interactions and coordination at the Six-Party Talks as creating long-term conditions for a peaceful security environment surrounding the Korean peninsula. Washington and Seoul should take into account the possibility of reunification of the two Koreas when cooperating with China at the Six-Party Talks, and China's interests if indeed there is reunification. Due to the fact that China shares a border with North Korea, the conventional wisdom that multilateralism tends to produce an equalizing effect on participants' influence over outcomes may not necessarily be the case in this situation. Therefore, ironic as it sounds, good Seoul-Beijing relations come from *superb* Seoul- Washington relations within a big-picture, long-term perspective. Seoul's and Washington's engagement efforts at the Six-Party Talks can be more effective when U.S.-ROK policy is based on tight bilateral coordination regarding their joint position towards China. In order for South Korea and the United States to better coordinate with China regarding North Korea, they must enhance the quality of the U.S.-ROK alliance by working on a joint strategy towards China. If security threats from North Korea have been driving Washington's and Seoul's bilateral security cooperation with Beijing respectively, alliance handlers in Seoul and Washington should now think ahead and come up with a shared vision on China's future role on the Korean peninsula. One possible positive outcome of the *Cheonan* tragedy could be the fact that South Korea will begin to take China more seriously in thinking about the future of the Korean peninsula, and not just in terms of trade and investment. There have to be more measured discussions between Seoul and Washington with regard to how to jointly engage with Beijing strategically over the future of the Korean peninsula, by first recognizing that China also has its own concerns about North Korea's irresponsible behavior pertaining to Chinese national security.

**<continued>**

China Relations Good –DPRK Collapse

In Northeast Asia, North Korea's strategic value to China is to provide a safe buffer zone to block access of hostile maritime powers to Beijing. In that regard, China has good reason not to want North Korean contingency situations that can result in a massive influx of North Korean refugees into northeastern China, or the presence of the U.S.-ROK alliance forces on North Korean territory. For Seoul's part, it should exercise great care to avoid letting negative speculations about future Chinese action flame anti-Chinese sentiments within South Korea. In pursuing a clear strategy to deal with China in the context of the U.S.-ROK alliance, it is critical that Seoul, Washington, and Beijing all understand and effectively communicate that the strengthening of the U.S.-ROK alliance is not aimed at confronting or containing China. A fine balancing act of the U.S.-ROK security relationship towards China should strive to avoid polar opposites of "pushing too hard" and "not doing anything" about China. The key here is to understand the complexities of the security relationships between China and the Korean peninsula. As demonstrated in the case of the Korean War, if there is future Chinese military intervention during a North Korea contingency, it may not occur because China seeks an offensive expansionist policy on the Korean peninsula, but because it feels threatened by potential hostile forces in areas close to Beijing. With this in mind, the goal of the U.S.-ROK alliance should be directed toward a viable pattern of security cooperation in which the national interests of Washington, Seoul, and Beijing are all respected and implemented accordingly.

Global Warming Addon

Strong US Chinese relations are key to stop global warming.

Kucera, Joshua, Staff writer for US News and World Report, 5/4/10 (China and U.S. Try Cooperation on Climate, Energy Policy, US News and World Report, http://politics.usnews.com/news/energy/articles/2010/05/04/china-and-us-try-cooperation-on-climate-energy-policy.html)ZDM

When President Obama took office last year, two of his top priorities were stronger action to stem global warming and a more collaborative, cooperative approach to solving international problems. By making climate change a primary focus in America's relationship with China—the two countries are the world's top two polluters—the president sought to accomplish two goals in a single stroke. "The Obama administration is the first U.S. administration to make climate change a 'top three' issue with China," says Joanna Lewis, a professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service who studies U.S.-­Chinese energy relations. The logic of U.S.-Chinese cooperation on climate change is manifold. The two countries are the world's largest energy producers, energy consumers, and carbon emitters, combining to account for 40 percent of the greenhouse gases emitted globally each year. By working together, the United States and China could accomplish more than if they proceeded independently. For example, the costs of developing and implementing alternative energy and emissions-reduction technologies are high. But if the two nations pursue them jointly, the collaboration could create economies of scale that would drive prices down. In addition, business and political interests in both countries are reluctant to assume the costs of reducing emissions while their competitors across the Pacific continue unimpeded. Cooperation could help both sides take politically difficult steps. [Read America's New Energy Dependency: China's Metals.]

**Global Warming Addon**

**Warming destroys all life on earth—runaway greenhouse followed by Martian deep freeze.**

Brandenburg & Paxsom (PhDs) ’99 [John & Monica, Dead Mars, Dying Earth, p. 232 //]

One can imagine a scenario for global catastrophe that runs similarly. If the human race adopted a mentality like the crew aboard the ship *Californian-* as some urge, saying that both ozone hole and global warming will disappear if statistics are properly examined, and we need do nothing about either- the following scenario could occur.

The ozone hole expands, driven by a monstrous synergy with global warming that puts more catalytic ice crystals into the stratosphere, but this affects the far north and south and not the major nations’ heartlands. The sea rise, the tropic roast but the media networks no longer cover it. The Amazon rainforest becomes the Amazon desert. Oxygen levels fall, but profits rise for those who can provide it in bottles. An equatorial high pressure zone forms, forcing drought in central Africa and Brazil, the Nile dries up and the monsoons fail, Then inevitably, at some unlucky point in time, a major unexpected event occurs—a major volcanic eruption, a sudden and dramatic shift in ocean circulation or a large asteroid impact ( those who think freakish accidents do not occur have paid little attention to life or mars), or a nuclear war that starts between Pakistan and India and escalates to involve China and Russia…Suddenly the gradual climb in global temperatures goes on a mad excursion as the oceans warm and release large amounts of dissolved carbon dioxide from their lower depths into the atmosphere. Oxygen levels go down precipitously as oxygen replaces lost oceanic carbon dioxide. Asthma cases double and then double again. Now a third of the world fears breathing.. As the oceans dump carbon dioxide, the greenhouse effect increases, which further warms, the oceans, causing them to dump even more carbon. Because of the heat, plants die and burn in enormous fires which release more carbon dioxide, and the oceans evaporate, adding more water vapor to the greenhouse. Soon, we are in what is termed a runaway greenhouse effect, as happened to Venus eons ago. The last two surviving scientist inevitably argue, one telling the other, “See! I told you the missing sink was in the ocean!” Earth, as we know it dies. After this Venusian excursion in temperatures, the oxygen disappears into the soil, the oceans evaporate and are lost and the dead earth loses it ozone layer completely. Earth is too far from the sun for it to be the second Venus for long. Its atmosphere is slowly lost- as is its water- because of ultraviolet bombardment breaking up all the molecules apart from carbon dioxide. As the atmosphere becomes thin, the earth becomes colder. For a short while temperatures are nearly normal, but the ultraviolet sears and life that tries to make a comeback. The carbon dioxide thins out to form a think veneer with a few wispy clouds and dust devils. Earth becomes the second Mars- red, desolate, with perhaps a few hardy microbes surviving.

\*\*\*AT: CPs\*\*\*

South Korea Opposes Hard Line

Multiple examples prove.

Sunhyuk Kim and Wonhyuk Lim, associate professor in the Department of Public Administration at Korea University and fellow at the Korea Development Institute, 2007, *The Washington Quarterly*, “How to Deal with South Korea” cp

From 1998 to 2000, the United States and South Korea developed an effective division of labor in dealing with North Korea, by which the United States would contain North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs through direct negotiations while South Korea would promote internal changes in North Korea through economic engagement. The United States also reached an understanding with North Korea to secure better access in North Korea as U.S.–North Korean relations improved, as encapsulated in the U.S.–North Korean joint communiqué of October 2000. Through this more-for-more approach, the United States sought to resolve suspicions about North Korea’s “hole in the ground” at Kumchangri, the underground site at which it was suspected North Korea might be building nuclear facilities, and its incipient uranium-enrichment program. The Bush administration abandoned this approach in 2001 and called North Korea part of the “axis of evil” in January 2002. South Korean political leaders have subsequently become much more outspoken about their disagreements and displeasure with U.S. policies in general, but particularly on how to resolve the North Korean crisis.

In an address to the World Affairs Council of Los Angeles in November 2004, President Roh unequivocally stated that South Korea would be opposed to policies of military attack, containment, or regime change toward North Korea, even though Washington had made it clear that these options remained on the table.13 To encourage North Korea to return to the six-party talks in June 2005, South Korean foreign minister Ban Ki-moon asked U.S. officials to refrain from making provocative remarks about North Korea, such as calling it an “outpost of tyranny,” as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice did during her 2005 confirmation hearings.14

Even North Korea’s nuclear test on October 9, 2006, did not change South Korea’s stance. South Koreans initially expressed anger at the Kim Jong-il regime for escalating tensions, but many soon redirected their frustration toward the Bush administration for refusing to engage in serious negotiations with North Korea. In fact, when asked by polling companies a few days after North Korea’s nuclear test who bears the greatest responsibility for the nuclear crisis, South Koreans blamed the United States as much as they did North Korea. Their changed perceptions of their relationship with the North, because of North Korea’s economic decline and inter-Korean rapprochement, make it increasingly difficult for South Koreans to understand Washington’s use of hard-line rhetoric and policy on this issue. Moreover, in a poll conducted one week

South Korea harbors strategic anxiety about China’s growing influence on North Korea. after the 2006 nuclear test, 62 percent of respondents were in favor of continuing inter-Korean economic cooperation projects.15 They believe that these projects offer the best hope for promoting internal change in North Korea.

South Korea Opposes Hard Line

South Koreans oppose hard line towards North Korea.

Rajan Menon, Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, 2007, *The End of Alliances*, pg. 170-171 cp

Oddly enough, another source of disagreement is North Korea, long the enemy and unifier. While North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has created anxiety in South Korea, the differences between Seoul and Washington on how best to deal with the threat have become downright divisive. Within American foreign policy circles, skepticism about using economic and political incentives to moderate North Korean behavior has always been plentiful. It reached new heights under the administration of George W. Bush, which abandoned the Clinton administration’s approach—embodied in the 1994 “Agreed Framework”—of providing political and economic incentives to induce North Korea to renounce nuclear weapons and to accept stringent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. But the South Koreans were not enthusiastic about Bush’s get-tough policy. They made it clear that conciliation and cooperation were better means, both to keep the peace on the peninsula and to gains concessions from Pyongyang. In essence, this approach reaffirmed the “Sunshine Policy” initiated by former president Kim Dae jung, himself a prominent leader of the movement for democracy during the decades of dictatorship. Kim’s approach, which was marked by a June 2000 meeting with North Korea leader Kim Jong Il-sung—the “Kim-Kim summit” as it came to be known—stirred excitement and hope in South Korea about reconciliation and even reunification; but it was considered naive, even dangerous in much of Washington, certainly by the Bush foreign policy team. The premise of the “Sunshine Policy” was isolating Pyongyang would only make it even more intransient and accelerate its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and that trade, cultural exchanges, and political dialogue between the two Korean states would reduce the danger of war on the peninsula and peep it free of nuclear weapons. This view is shared by Kim Dae jung’s successor, Roh Moo-hyun—and, as opinion polls show, by much of the South Korean public.

During the 2002 presidential campaign, which ended with his victory over a conservative candidate and advocate of a hard line toward Pyongyang, Roh Moo-hyun stressed his opposition to policies designed to pressure Pyongyang and his determination to deal independently with North Korea despite American reservations. 55 The differences on how to handle Pyongyang became public in early 2006 when reports that North Korea was engaged in an extensive campaign of counterfeiting American currency and U.S. intelligence assessments that North Korea's nuclear program remained active created a hubbub. South Korean officials distanced themselves from American efforts to bring Pyongyang to account, with President Roh going so far as to assert on television that squeezing North Korea would produce "friction and disagreement between the United States and South Korea:'56 This statement in itself reflects the consequences of generational change and the emergence of viewpoints quite different from those that have prevailed within the traditional foreign policy and national security elite: Roh, a human rights lawyer and democratic activist, was fiftysix when he assumed the presidency, and was a child during the Korean War. He represents a wider change in attitude within South Korean society on issues of security, in particular the preference for engagement in dealing with North Korea. This is why South Koreans saw the Clinton administration's consideration, prior to the 1994 accord, of preemptive attacks on North Korea's nuclear installations as reckless and dangerous. It explains, as well, their view of George W. Bush as a gunslinger, whose allusions to using force to forestall the North Korean nuclear weapons program and labeling of North Korea as part of the "axis of evil" presented greater hazards to their lives than the dictatorial North Korean regime itself. (Even the 2003 decision by the Bush administration to relocate American units stationed near the DMZ to the south is seen in an unfavorable light; the fear among South Koreans is that the United States was removing its forces to safer areas so that it could launch long-range strikes against North Korea if need be.)

South Korea Opposes Hard Line

South Koreans like North Korea and disagree with the US over policy.

Rajan Menon, Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, 2007, *The End of Alliances*, pg. 166-167 cp

Also striking is the difference in perspective between Americans and South Koreans on how best to deal with Pyongyang, the common threat that is supposed to keep the alliance in business. An overwhelming majority of South Koreans oppose a hard line toward North Korea, particularly if it involves the use of force. This is true even when it comes to preventing a nuclear-armed North Korea: most South Koreans are convinced that the threat or use of force will only provoke North Korea and increase the risk of war-an outcome that they desperately want to avoid, but fear may occur because of events beyond their contro1.42 Quite apart from a divergence on tactics, South Koreans have a decidedly more positive image of North Korea-precisely when their attitude toward the United States seems to be changing for the worse.43 A poll that has tracked South Korean perceptions of Pyongyang since 2003 shows that the percentage who believed that it was possible to cooperate with North Korea rose steadily from 36 in 2003; to 39 in 2004; to 43 in 2005. Suspicion toward North Korea also declined over this period, with only 36 percent expressing wariness or hostility in 2005. Astonishingly, when asked to identify countries that they viewed positively, North Korea placed second behind the United States in each of the three years.44 This is not an aberration; other opinion surveys confirm that North Korea is now seen by South Koreans through kinder, more hopeful eyes.45

More evidence.

Rajan Menon, Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, 2007, *The End of Alliances*, pg. 172-173 cp

Better mutual understanding and greater efforts to minimize differences on "the facts" may help bridge the divide, but only up to a point. It may well be, for example, that South Koreans are wrong to fear that American toughness toward Pyongyang, particularly if its involves economic pressure, will bring about North Korea's collapse and saddle them with burdens that threaten their economic prospects, strain their social fabric, and promote political upheaval as a result. The fear bred by this possibility will not, however, be allayed by the calculations of American scholars who, sitting thousands of miles away, offer confident assurances that South Korea has the wherewithal to pick up the tab that would be left if North Korea unravels.57 The contest between facts and fears is never won so easily by the former. While American policymakers are unconvinced by the idea that North Korea no longer represents a serious military threat, this assessment has far greater purchase among South Koreans, or so some of their important decisions would indicate, a case in point being the brisk home building occurring right near the DMZ, long viewed as a prime venue for war. 58 While American officials tend to be skeptical that steps promoting interdependence and various forms of contacts will increase goodwill between Seoul and Pyongyang and allow disputes to be settled through negotiation and compromise, South Koreans increasingly take a different view. They are enthusiastic about family reunification programs and cultural exchanges, investments by South Korea in the special economic zone created by North Korea at Kaesong, and the reconnection of discontinued rail and road links and the building of new ones. They believe that these steps will not only reduce the risk of war but also create a climate conducive to pursuing peaceful reunification. By contrast, American officials regard the upbeat assumptions underlying these actions and ideas as naive at best. For example, in his 2001 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the commander of u.S. forces in South Korea expressed his concern about the "reconciliation euphoria" that had gripped South Korea, and underscored the continuing North Korean threat by pointing to Pyongyang's massive military, its development of the Nodong missile and its longerrange successors the Taepodong 1 and 2, its ongoing nuclear weapons program, and its failure to implement agreements aimed at reducing the risk of war. That South Korea nevertheless pursues policies of engagement while also reducing the proportion of GDP allocated to defense was an evident source of frustration to him.59 The general's testimony brings to light a larger problem: the divergence of view between Washington and Seoul on North Korea, which, with the Soviet Union gone and China and South Korea on good terms, remains the principal reason for the American military presence in Korea.

South Korea Opposes Hard Line

South Koreans oppose aggressive policy towards North Korea.

Rajan Menon, Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, 2007, *The End of Alliances*, pg. 167-168 cp

It should come as no surprise that with the consolidation of democracy in South Korea, the government's policies reflect these changes in public perceptions, and its policies toward North Korea exemplify this. Seoul has continued providing food and other forms of economic assistance to North Korea even when the West and the World Food Program have held back, thus effectively reducing the pressure Pyongyang faces on this particular front. South Korea has also vigorously promoted cultural contacts and trade and investment with North Korea on the premise that carrots will prove more effective than sticks in dissuading Pyongyang from developing nuclear weapons, and thus evoking its cooperation on other issues-a position in decided contrast to the Bush administration's. An American expert summed up the variance in attitudes toward handling North Korea as follows: «Whatever the public relations facades that both South Korea and the U.S. governments may wish to set up about the convergence of views . . . the differences are apparent and troubling, and obviously important to a large segment of the Korean public." As one Korean academic said, «If Americans are considered friends North Koreans are considered brothers. The U.S. should remember this."46 The differences on how to deal with North Korea have become more pronounced with the end of the cold war, and they have not turned on which party controls the White House. This is apparent from Seoul's frustration at being left out of the loop as the Clinton administration tried to persuade Pyongyang to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for light water nuclear reactors (to address North Korea's claim that it needed nuclear power to supply energy for the economy) and political normalization. At bottom, what is at work is South Koreans' belief that they have come into their own and must now manage their own fate and refuse to be a means to serve the larger ends of great powers, no matter if they are longtime allies. Opinion surveys show that South Koreans are eager for a policy toward North Korea that is independent from and not contingent on American preferences, or the constraints created by the alliance.47

Hard Line Bad

Hard line kills the alliance and causes China rise.

Sunhyuk Kim and Wonhyuk Lim, associate professor in the Department of Public Administration at Korea University and fellow at the Korea Development Institute, 2007, *The Washington Quarterly*, “How to Deal with South Korea” cp

Given its economic development, political transition, and bilateral relations with North Korea, a confident and self-assertive South Korea is neither a “rebel without a cause” nor a fleeting phenomenon. Rather, South Korea’s attitudinal shift has multiple causes and will endure through several future administrations. Faced with this newly assertive South Korea and the larger challenges of dealing with China and crafting a new regional order, Washington has two options.19

One is to ignore South Korea’s transformation and try to maintain the traditional patron-client relationship within the hub-and-spoke alliance against China, using the North Korean nuclear crisis as a catalyst. This policy, however, is likely to find little support in South Korea and may incite a nationalist backlash if the United States is increasingly viewed as an impediment to Korean reunification and regional security. It would also increase the possibility of a “Korea shift,” i.e., South Korea moving closer to China and further away from the United States, and exacerbate a continental-maritime division in Northeast Asia.

Even if the U.S. objective were to contain China, its hard-line policy toward North Korea would likely be counterproductive, only helping China to expand its influence on the Korean peninsula. The United States would find itself increasingly tied to Japan, whose reluctance to come to terms with its past has limited the effectiveness of its diplomacy. Under this strategic approach, Washington essentially risks sacrificing the Korean peninsula to cement its relationship with Japan and contain China.

\*\*\*AT: Disads\*\*\*

Alliance Collapse Inevitable

A collapse of the alliance is inevitable—the only question is whether it’s before war breaks out.

Rajan Menon, Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, 2007, *The End of Alliances*, pg. 162-165 cp

Yet the reality is different. Contrary to the first supposition, anti-American sentiment has gained ground in South Korea in the aftermath of the cold war, and is now embedded in the body politic. As a summary report of a conference on the Korean peninsula put it, even though dissatisfaction with the United States is greater in other parts of the world, South Korean anti-American sentiment is “intense” and “real” and “evident from public opinion polling by organizations ranging from left to right indicate the growth of [such feelings]…which several decades ago had been confined to the fringe element of the youth, is now far more widespread and permeates society.”

This does not mean that the alliance teeters on collapse, and some caveats are in order to place these attitudes in perspective. There have always been highs and lows in the history of the pact, and it would be incorrect to speak of a steady, steep, and irretrievable descent; nothing in life is inevitable, and this certainly applies to the Seoul-Washington alliance. Moreover, the very term *anti-Americanism* is too capacious: it can become a big pot into which too many different things are thrown. It’s important, therefore, to differentiate among beliefs that originate in an ideological position and that have an across-the-board quality and transcend particular issues; ones produced by specific features of the relationship (such as the effect of American bases on the quality of life in nearby communities); and others that are sparked by discrete events, such as incendiary incidents involving encounters between American soldiers and South Korean citizens. Then there’s the problem with television as a medium. Footage of anti-American demonstrations featuring angry slogans, flag burnings, and clashes with police make for “sit up and take notice” headlines, but they can convey the impression that such protests are routine, or that they reflect spiraling hostility toward the United States on the part of South Koreans generally. In news coverage, a picture, which necessarily omits complexities and nuances, is not worth a thousand words.

Ill will toward the United States among South Koreans has certainly increased since the end of the cold war, as has the belief that the American military presence in South Korea actually reduces their safety, but these sentiments have their deepest roots among those born after the Korean War; their understanding of that conflict and the part played by the United States (and many other states) in defending South Korea has been shaped by stories, texts, and photographs, not visceral experience. South Koreans also still remain apprehensive about North Korea, in general, and a nuclear North Korea, in particular. When the Pentagon, faced with a shortage of troops in Iraq, redeployed some forces from the Korean peninsula, South Korean commentators warning against an American disengagement and hailing the continued value of the alliance, especially when faced this American voices advocating disengagement, Koreans are not marching in lockstep when it comes to their views on the alliance.

This having been said, the end of the cold war and the transformation that has occurred in South Korea’s relationships with Russia and China have enabled antagonism toward the United States among South Koreans to emerge more easily and to gain greater depth: the cost of criticism is simply less prohibitive now that the neighborhood is less dangerous. As a result, support for the alliance is weakening and antipathy toward the United States is becoming stronger, and a more prominent part of South Korean politics. The ranks of anti-American demonstrators are no longer populated mainly by student radicals and others from the far left; they include a larger and more representative slice of the population. Furthermore, the fear that the presence of American troops actually increases the likelihood of war appears to be on the rise. (If this seems irrational, it is well to keep in mind that Seoul, which home to almost a quarter of all South Koreans, is less than fifty miles from the DMZ and would be hard hit were war to break out.)

**<continued>**

Alliance Collapse Inevitable

Public opinion polls taken in South Korea between 2000 and 2005 show that unfriendly attitudes toward America are strong and exist for several reasons, and that some are quite surprising. Furthermore, now that South Korea is a democracy, citizens’ attitudes matter: the alliance’s future ultimately depends on whether support for the continued presence of American troops remains solid and persistent. Polls that plumb this topic need to be treated with care, of course: as with polls generally, much depends on how the questions are formulated, and the political context in which they are posed. Attitudes do not remain frozen over time; they reflect the state of the bilateral relationship; and polls permitting a range of responses—as opposed to a “stay” or “withdraw” dichotomy—show that only a small minority of South Koreans favors immediate, unconditional withdrawal. Even allowing for these nuances and caveats, one would be hard put to make the case based on data from opinion surveys that the America military presence enjoys their solid support among South Koreans and that there has been no change in their attitude.

Five surveys conducted by South Korea’s JoongAng newspaper between the fall of 1990 and the summer of 2003 showed that a majority supported keeping U.S. troops in place only in two years, 1997 and 2003, when 60 percent were in favor, and that the percentage ranged between 35 and 45 in the remaining three years. Other polls reveal a different and no less important side of the same issue: the percentage who favored the withdrawal of American forces was 67.3 percent in 2000, 68.4 in 2003, and 54 percent in 2005. Even allowing for the background conditions that create variation in the strength of sentiments and for polls showing continued backing for the alliance, the picture that emerges is clear. Support for the presence of America troops is far less solid than is generally assumed, while outright opposition is remarkably high—and these attitudes are not ephemeral.

South Koreans aren’t afraid of the North—they don’t think they need the US for protection.

Sunhyuk Kim and Wonhyuk Lim, associate professor in the Department of Public Administration at Korea University and fellow at the Korea Development Institute, 2007, *The Washington Quarterly*, “How to Deal with South Korea” cp

The last cause for South Korea’s increased self-assertiveness vis-à-vis the United States is the substantially changed relationship between North and South Korea. The competition between the systems of the capitalist South and Communist North during the 1960s and 1970s fell apart as North Korea slowly degenerated into an economic disaster in the 1980s.12 The virtual end of the competition with North Korea has had significant psychological effects on South Koreans.

Most importantly, the anti-Communist, that is, anti–North Korean, propaganda that maintained a sense of emergency and repressed pro-democracy movements during the Park and Chun authoritarian regimes no longer proves persuasive. Meanwhile, the withering of the North weakens the argument that South Korea needs to maintain positive relations with a strong patron such as the United States to deter an aggressive North. Finally, the horrific images of undernourished children during the North Korean famine of the late 1990s have had a significant impact on the South Korean psyche, undermining the traditional image of North Korea as a belligerent neighbor ready to attack South Korea at any moment.

Alliance Collapse Inevitable

Suspicions damage the alliance.

Rajan Menon, Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, 2007, *The End of Alliances*, pg. 169-170 cp

One consequence of generational change is that long-standing irritants, controversies, and suspicions have a newfound capacity for creating discord within the alliance. 51 Among them are the following: whether the United States traded recognition of Japan's colonization of Korea in 1905 for Japanese acceptance of American control of the Philippines; the precise role (through prior knowledge, complicity, or negligence) that American civilian officials and military commanders played in the massacres perpetrated by U.S.-backed authoritarian South Korean governments in Cheju and Yosu (1948) and Kwangju (1980); the repression that marked the rule of the civilian and military dictatorships supported by the United States; intermittent altercations between South Korean civilians and American soldiers; the opposition to the Yongsan military base in central Seoul (which eventually led to a 2004 U.S.-South Korea accord to relocate the garrison); the perceived inequities in the "Status of Forces" (SOFA) agreements governing the U.S. military presence; extraterritorial agreements that place American soldiers beyond the reach of South Korean laws; and whether the United States used the 1997-1998 East Asian financial crisis and its support for the $55 billion bailout provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and other international financial institutions as a lever to pry open South Korea's markets and to loosen official restrictions covering foreign equity in its companies. 52

Ext – Alliance Collapse Inevitable

Prefer our evidence—even if US popularity rises and falls, our evidence cites strong trends which demographic shifts will only accelerate.

Rajan Menon, Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, 2007, *The End of Alliances*, pg. 168-169 cp

True, dislike of the United States rises and falls and is found disproportionately in younger, well-educated Koreans, but this does not mean that anti-Americanism does not matter to the alliance's future viability. While there certainly have been peaks and valleys in South Korean public attitudes, unfavorable attitudes in areas central to the alliance have remained remarkably persistent in recent years. Oddly enough, familiarity could be the foible for an alliance that has lasted for decades but has been slow to adapt to the increasing power and influence of South Korea. South Koreans want greater autonomy, but Washington is loath to alter what it sees as an arrangement that, from its standpoint, has worked well and that it does not consider hierarchical in the way that South Koreans increasingly do. Nor should Washington seek solace from the fact that it is young, educated South Koreans who are most likely to harbor ill will toward the United States, for they are precisely the ones who will soon occupy positions pivotal to the alliance and whose views will matter most in shaping South Korea's political climate and policy toward the United States. If their current attitudes are any guide, they will be far more apt than their elders to hold the view that South Korea no longer needs American tutelage and protection and should therefore not act as a subordinate.48 The passage of time guarantees that older Koreans who experienced the Korean War and who most value the American connection will play a diminishing role in South Korean politics. Senior military, diplomatic, and national security officials, and academic experts, who polls show strongly support the alliance, not least because their careers have been shaped by it, will move into retirement, passing the torch to a younger generation with markedly different attitudes.49 To the generation approaching retirement, the Korean War demonstrated the danger presented by North Korea and the importance of American protection. By contrast, the younger generation grew up in a country that is economically prosperous and politically self-confident and less fearful of North Korea as a result. A large proportion of these young men and women were born after the Korean War-half of all South Koreans are under age thirty-five-and reached political consciousness in a democratic South Korea.50 They share a deep distaste for the authoritarian governments, civilian and military, that ruled South Korea from its foundation until 1987 (when South Korea held its first democratic election) and that disregarded democracy and human rights. And many tend to blame the United States for the survival and conduct of these regimes precisely because they are persuaded that the United States dominates the alliance. And who can blame them for holding this view?

Trends make pressure to end the alliance inevitable.

Rajan Menon, Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, 2007, *The End of Alliances*, pg. 173-174 cp

True, Americans are not as divided over the alliance as South Koreans, but in time they too will start questioning its relevance.6o There is no getting around the reality that the practice of underwriting South Korea's defense has become increasingly odd now that it is a rn.odern, prosperous, highly educated society, whose products are ubiquitous in the American marketplace, while North Korea remains a stagnant backwater. The refrain that South Korea cannot defend itself against such an adversary will wear thin, particularly if anti-Americanism becomes a fixture in South Korean politics. Americans' patience will be taxed even further if disharmony within the alliance rises as the U.S. economy's competitiveness in an increasingly crowded global marketplace declines, and politicians play to the galleries by resurrecting stereotypes of "unfair" competition from "ungrateful" alliances. Such demagoguery will be particularly persuasive if spending on social programs needed to support an aging population places increasing pressure on the federal budget and jobs become harder to find or keep as allies prove to be increasingly strong economic competitors. Public pressure will then mount to cut expenditures abroad so that problems at home can be addressed, and statistics on South Korea's contribution to the costs of stationing American troops on its soil will have little effect. In any event, Seoul's payments to reduce the burden that the United States has assumed for the defense of South Korea began only in 1991, some four decades after the alliance was formalized, and amounted to $150 million. By 2002 it had almost doubled-albeit in nominal terms-but still amounted to only $350 million, or one-sixth of the overall costs incurred by the United States. Three years later, it stood at $623 million, a significant increase, even taking account of inflation, but still well below the increased sum spent by the United States for its troops in South Korea. American efforts to secure larger payments from Seoul-which Washington would like to increase so that it covers 75 percent of the costs, as Japan's contribution is said to do-were resisted by South Korean negotiators on the grounds that the United States was demanding more while cutting back its presence.61

AT: South Korea Hates the US/Shifts towards China

They just hate our North Korea policy, not the US as a whole.

Sunhyuk Kim and Wonhyuk Lim, associate professor in the Department of Public Administration at Korea University and fellow at the Korea Development Institute, 2007, *The Washington Quarterly*, “How to Deal with South Korea” cp

Given the appeal of American popular culture and general respect for the ideals of the U.S. political and economic system in South Korea, however, rising South Korean anti-Americanism certainly does not mean rejecting everything associated with the United States. It can be more accurately described as frustration and anger at Washington for general disrespect and certain specific U.S. policies, particularly toward North Korea.4 Conspicuous in the current upsurge of anti-U.S. sentiment in South Korea, however, is that it is not limited to a radical fringe of the dissident movement. It appears to be becoming ubiquitous, in civil society, academia, and even in the government.

The presidential campaign of Roh Moo-hyun, a relatively young human rights lawyer who had never visited the United States prior to his election in December 2002, benefited substantially from the high tide of anti-U.S. sentiment in South Korea. His election is both a significant result and an example of a more self-confident, occasionally anti-U.S. South Korea. This transition is the result of several important changes in South Korea’s economy, politics, and external relations during the past few decades. Some, particularly in the United States, may fear that South Korea has become anti-U.S. and is strategically shifting toward China. Such a conclusion confuses the symptoms of changes in South Korea for their causes. Instead, a combination of South Korean economic development over time, the rise of a new generation in South Korean politics, and changing inter-Korean relations help explain a Seoul that has become more fundamentally independent than anti-U.S. or pro-Chinese.

AT: South Korean Econ and US Popularity Linked

History proves it’s not true.

Sunhyuk Kim and Wonhyuk Lim, associate professor in the Department of Public Administration at Korea University and fellow at the Korea Development Institute, 2007, *The Washington Quarterly*, “How to Deal with South Korea” cp

As a result of the above strategy, South Korea averaged an annual growth rate of eight percent over the subsequent decades and joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in 1994. South Korea is now the world’s twelfth-largest economy and holds the fourth-largest foreign reserves. It is one of the top five producers in the world of ships, automobiles, electronics, and steel. Seoul’s new status as an economic middle-power has enabled it to take an active role in regional cooperation in East Asia as well as in multilateral trade negotiations. It is the seventh-largest U.S. trading partner, ahead of such European countries as France and Italy, enabling it to deal with the United States on more equal terms.

Although South Korea has rather consistently grown economically since the 1960s, South Korea’s perception of the United States has not suffered a continuous decline over the same period. Anti-U.S. sentiment in South Korea seems to have reached a peak in the mid-1980s, after which it began to decline, before recording another peak in recent years. There is thus no direct causal relationship between South Korea’s economic position and its attitude toward the United States. The fluctuations are based more on specific incidents resulting from changes in political leadership and policy preferences.

No North Korea Threat

North Korea isn’t a threat.

1. It would lose a war of attrition.

Rajan Menon, Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, 2007, *The End of Alliances*, pg. 150-151 cp

But for all of Pyongyang's bombast and vitriol, the reality is that things are not going its way, and the regime can hardly be unaware of this and the reasons why this is so. South Korea now disposes of economic resources far larger than North Korea possesses and can outspend its adversary with minimal additional economic strain; this cannot be said of North Korea. Pundits and policymakers in Washington may debate the outcome of a war between North Korea and South Korea, but the imbalance between the two countries in the capacity to mobilize war-related resources is incontrovertible. For conflicts that end relatively quickly (within several months, say), what matters is the ability to inflict in short order losses so severe that the adversary sues for peace to avoid catastrophic defeat. The ability to present an opponent with this stark choice is a function of payoffs from long-term investments in research and development (R&D) that harness advanced technology to transform the speed and lethality of weaponry. Spin-offs from a vibrant civilian economy featuring state-of-the-art technology are also of cardinal importance here, quite apart from the efforts of a government. South Korea is in a different league altogether than North Korea in both respects, and one indicator of this is its investments in R&D. In 2003, its governmental appropriations for R&D amounted to 0.78 percent of its GDP, of which 14.2 percent was allocated to defense. Only five other members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the club of the leading economic powers, surpassed the former figure and only four OECD members the latter.5 North Korea cannot hope to match this level of investment; nor can its shopworn economy produce investment capital or technological innovations remotely comparable to South Korea's. Quite apart from governmental initiatives to boost military power, South Korea's economy boasts an array of world-class industries that generate all manner of technologies pertinent to military modernization. In a war of attrition, the capacity to marshal the financial resources needed to fight on at a bearable economic cost while also managing the maladies of inflation and indebtedness that often accompany protracted campaigns is the sine qua non for victory. While wealth alone may not always determine who wins wars, it remains the single best predictor despite aberrant cases.6 Here again the news for Pyongyang is bad. Every indictor relevant to assaying the comparative economic prospects for sustaining a lengthy war shows that it is in a vastly inferior position. Worse, its relative position is deteriorating as the South Korean economy races ahead.

2. Its military tech sucks.

Rajan Menon, Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, 2007, *The End of Alliances*, pg. 151-152 cp

The second sobering reality-and one related to the first-for Pyongyang is the widening technological chasm between North Korea and South Korea. Although the two Koreas started off on a roughly equal footing in the early 1950S, North Korea has long since proven incapable of advancing beyond what might be called nineteenth-century industries. South Korea, by contrast, has mastered the domain of cuttingedge, knowledge-intensive twenty-fIrst-century technologies, while also harnessing them to revolutionize traditional industries, whether steel making, shipbuilding, or automotive production. Both categories of production matter for military might, especially now that the muchvaunted "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) has redefined the terms of war by introducing precision-guided munitions, advanced surveillance and battle-management systems, weapons that strike from beyond the horizon, pilotless drones that gather information and destroy targets, and advances in electronic warfare that have transformed targeting and jamming techniques. North Korea has failed to enter this arena, much less master it: its arsenal is stocked largely by outmoded aircraft and tanks of Soviet and Chinese vintage. This inferiority may be among the reasons why it has apparently chosen to build nuclear weapons on the theory that they constitute the great equalizer.

No North Korea Threat

3. South Korea outspends the north.

Rajan Menon, Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, 2007, *The End of Alliances*, pg. 158-159 cp

Even if one concedes straightaway that a substantial American military presence under the extraordinary terms just described was necessary during the cold war, the mainstream view that South Korea cannot protect itself even today strains credulity. Despite the ever-widening gap in power between North Korea and South Korea, however, this perspective prevails in our corridors of power.l9 But a comparison of the two states using standard measures of military capability casts grave doubt on the commonplace assertion that North Korea's stark numerical lead in military manpower and weaponry makes it impossible for South Korea to defend itself alone, let alone defeat North Korea, in the event of war. Lefs begin by examining the gap in the economic foundations of military power, using some basic measures. South Korea's GNP in 2004 was $673 billion; by comparison, North Korea's was $22 billion, a ratio of 30:1 in favor of South Korea. On a per capita basis, the disparity is not as large, but is still stark: South Korea's, in 2004, was almost $14,000; North Korea's, $969, a ratio in excess of 14:1. The gulf reappears in defense spending, despite the North Korean regime's (well-deserved) reputation for an «all guns and no butter" mentality when it comes to resource allocation. Pyongyang's military budget approached $6 billion in 2004; Seoul spent $ 16.3 billion, giving it a 2.7:1 edge.20 Because North Korea's polity is opaque, one must consider the possibility that its true expenditure is larger, but a major miscalculation seems implausible, especially given the considerably smaller size of its overall economy. A vastly larger defense budget would be unsustainable for a country that already devotes one-fifth of its GDP to military spending, giving it the dubious distinction of holding first place in a ranking of 169 countries in this category. South Korea, by contrast, devotes 2.9 percent of its GDP (which is, incidentally, a significantly smaller proportion when compared with the United States) to military spending. Not only can South Korea bear this burden easily, given the size of its economy, even a small increase will easily yield substantially larger sums for military spending, and with minimal sacrifice. Neither of these conclusions applies to North Korea.21

No North Korea Threat

4. There’s risk of conflict escalation—major powers won’t want to hurt relations with South Korea.

Rajan Menon, Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, 2007, *The End of Alliances*, pg. 152-154 cp

North Korea's third problem is that its strategic environment has been changed irrevocably, and to its detriment, with the most important development being the new relationship between China and Russia, North Korea's principal patrons, and between them and South Korea. The triumph of practicality over ideology in Beijing and Moscow accounts for this change. While China's leaders continue to pay ritual homage to Marxist precepts and to condemn capitalism's evils, they have in effect abandoned Marxist-Leninist -Maoist ideology as a guide to quotidian public policy. Unlike in the era of Mao, Beijing's preoccupation now is not the export of revolution, but the export of goods. It sees foreign investment, once shunned as exploitative and corrosive, as a key ingredient for economic success, and cultural and educational exchanges with the capitalist world, which were spurned for three decades after the revolution, as sources of economic advancement. Whatever Beijing may say about ideological solidarity with Pyongyang, its policies are driven by an entirely different calculus than they were when the Mao suits, the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution defined Chinese reality. For the future that the Chinese leadership hopes to create, wealthy, scientifically advanced South Korea is an asset while North Korea, which depends on Chinese largesse for the most basic of needs, has little to offer and is in fact a drain on resources. But Pyongyang has been dealt a double whammy, for if China has changed its priorities, its other patron, the Soviet Union, simply vanished, and its successor state, the Russian Federation, has jettisoned communism in favor of consumerism. As with Beijing, it is trade, investment, and technology transfer that matter now for Moscow, and it's apparent to the Kremlin which Korea counts for more when it comes to these necessities. While China and Russia have not abandoned North Korea outright, they have stopped shunning South Korea out of ideological fealty to Pyongyang. Given their priorities, South Korea is too consequential a state to ignore, let alone alienate; there are numerous reasons to build substantial ties with it, and that cannot happen if the old political atmosphere persists. So it is not surprising that Russia and China decided on a volte-face and changed their long-established course to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea, in September 1990 and August 1992, respectively. They also ceased backing Pyongyang's position that two Korean states could not be allowed to enter into the United Nations simultaneously-on the theory that that would have conferred legitimacy on the division of Korea-and welcomed Seoul's admission to the world body. Russia delivered an even blunter message to Pyongyang in 1996 when it unilaterally scrapped the military assistance clause in the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and pressed for negotiations to replace the treaty itself with an anodyne alternative, which was signed in February 2000.7 No less significant was Russia's decision to cease the Soviet practice of serving as North Korea's reliable supplier of weapons and its decision to sell arms to South Korea-in part to liquidate Soviet-era debt; in part for profit.8 Russian arms sales are now determined by the cash nexus, and that's bad for cash-strapped North Korea. But recalibration must not be confused with rejection, for China and Russia are not about to sever economic and political ties with North Korea. Each wants to use its influence with Pyongyang-especially now that it is playing a nuclear cat-and-mouse game-as leverage against the United States and South Korea; to ensure that any settlement on major political issues on the peninsula involves their full participation; and to avoid giving Washington the impression that it could attack a friendless North Korea preemptively, so as to demolish its nuclear weapons program, with few risks.9 Still, it is clear that Beijing and Moscow will no longer bear major economic burdens or take military risks in behalf of North Korea and that Pyongyang's strategy of manipulating the competition between them to extract benefits from both won't work as it did when they were at loggerheads. That game is over. Russia and China are no longer at daggers drawn as they were from the late 1950S to the late 1980s. The volume of their bilateral trade is up (albeit from the very low baseline of 1991). The once hotly contested border, along which their military forces clashed in 1969, has been delimited. Russia is now China's largest arms supplier by far, while China is becoming a big market for Russian energy. Indeed, both countries' interests intersect to the point that they have proclaimed a "strategic partnership."10

Ext – No North Korean Threat

Weapon quantity doesn’t matter—South Korea has massively superior technology.

Rajan Menon, Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, 2007, *The End of Alliances*, pg. 159-161 cp

The picture is somewhat different and less straightforward when one moves from money to manpower and materiel. North Korea's soldiers, tanks, and submarines heavily outnumber South Korea's, often by a sizeable margin. The only exceptions are combat aircraft, where the balance is about even, with a slight edge favoring North Korea, and frigates and destroyers, where South Korea leads almost 5:1.22 Yet the raw figures mask important qualitative contrasts that overwhelmingly favor South Korea. First, South Korea is in an altogether different technologicalleague given the moth-eaten North Korean economy; second, its greater wealth puts it in an incomparably better position to purchase advanced weaponry from abroad and to modernize its forces through efforts at home. The qualitative contrast becomes clearer if, for illustrative purposes, we consider three pillars of military prowess: tanks, combat aircraft, and naval vessels. On the face of it, North Korea, with 3,500 main battle tanks as opposed to 2,330 for South Korea, seems to have a clear advantage. But the overwhelming majority of North Korea's inven tory consists of outmoded Soviet models: the T-34 was built in 1936-37 and served as the mainstay of the Soviet tank force during World War II; the T-54 and T-55, replacements for the T-34, appeared in 1949, and were phased out in the mid-1970S to make way for the incomparably more advanced T-72 and T-80, neither of which is present in the North Korean tank force, even though Russia has sold South Korea the latter model. South Korea's tanks are far superior in decisive battlefield properties: fire control and target acquisition, mobility, laser-based range finding, quality of armor, night vision capabilities, and thermal imaging technologies. They are also newer-none was in production before 1980-and far more technologically advanced. There is little doubt where the qualitative advantage lies if one examines the technical traits of the indigenously designed and built Type 88 Kl, the American MIAI Abrams, and the Soviet T-80.23 The story is similar when it comes to combat aircraft. The bulk of North Korean fighter and ground attack aircraft are Chinese knockoffs of old Soviet models made under license: the Jian-5, based on the Soviet MiG-15, which emerged shortly after the Korean War; the Jian-6, a copy of the MiG-19, which was first tested in 1958; and the Jian-7, for which China received a license in 1961. Compared to these old models, South Korea's fighters (the American-built F-16C and F-16D Fighting Falcons) and ground attack aircraft (Phantom F-4DS and F-4Es and the Tiger F-5Es, F-5Fs, and F-5Ks) are far more advanced in speed, agility, avionics, and targeting capabilities-and are newer, especially the F-16s and the F-5Ks. North Korea does not even have the quantitative lead in the realm of airpower that it does in armored warfare. Its fleet of 590 combat aircraft exceeds South Korea's by only fifty; on top of that, because of North Korea's severe economic constraints and chronic fuel shortages, its pilots fly far fewer training missions than their counterparts in South Korea. 24 The naval balance favors South Korea even more.25 Although North Korea has a 4:1 numerical advantage in patrol submarines, they consist of Chinese-built boats of the Soviet Romeo class, dating back to the 1950S. By contrast, South Korea's Chang Bogo-class, home-built with assistance from Germany, was commissioned in 1993, and nine had been delivered to the fleet by the end of 2005. Likewise, South Korea's inshore submarine force, consisting of the German Type 214, is much more advanced than its North Korea's counterparts. The most glaring contrast appears in large surface vessels, frigates, and destroyers. North Korea's fleet is essentially an aging coastal defense force. By comparison, in 2001, South Korea committed itself to building a modern oceangoing fleet. The King Kwanggaeto-class destroyers and Ulsan-class frigates, which incorporate various advanced Western technologies-in particular the American-built AEGIS defense system that can locate and track numerous threats simultaneously, whether submarines, ships, or aircraft-but are built in South Korea, continue to join the fleet, reflecting both South Korea's commitment to construct a "blue water" navy as well as the technological prowess of its economy.26 Apart from the qualitative gap separating South Korea's warships from North Korea's aging and outmoded Najin- and Soho-class frigates, Seoul has almost five times as many major warships, and the numerical balance will only tilt further in its favor in the years ahead given the disparity in economic power between the two countries.

Ext – No North Korean Threat

South Korea can buy better arms—they have connections with the rest of the world and much more money.

Rajan Menon, Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, 2007, *The End of Alliances*, pg. 161-162 cp

There are other realities that work to South Korea's advantage. With much greater wealth and a far more sophisticated technological base, it can develop, or acquire from the West, military technologies in ways that are simply not open to North Korea. In particular, the United States will continue to be a major supplier of arms and defense technology to South Korea whether or not there is a formal alliance-and for two basic reasons: one economic; the other, strategic. First, South Korea has the cash on hand to pay for what it needs: its foreign exchange reserves at the end of 2005 amounted to $207 billion, or nearly ten times the value of North Korea's entire GDP. Of the "emerging" economies, only China ($769 billion) and Taiwan ($251.8 billion) had larger sums, and South Korea has considerably more per capita than China does.27 The United States is the world's largest exporter of weapons by far, and its defense contractors are keenly aware that South Korea offers a lucrative market for their wares. Second, America's stake in ensuring that South Korea is militarily strong will continue even without an alliance: sheer balance of power considerations ensure that the United States will assist South Korea in the unlikely event that it proves unable to defend itself. The same cannot be said about Pyongyang's traditional allies, China and Russia. Why, given the change in the relative strategic significance of North Korea and South Korea, would they jump into a war initiated by Pyongyang and jeopardize their flowering relationship with Seoul? Perhaps more important, why would they encourage such a war to begin with, or imply that they would assist North Korea once its guns start firing? Given their current priorities, China and Russia have little to gain and much to lose from a war on the Korean peninsula. Quite apart from the chaos it would wreak in their neighborhood, both countries have borders with North Korea and would almost certainly face massive inflows of refugees. A clash between the two Korean states would also rattle investors, disrupt trade, and harm the Chinese and Russian economies. The upshot is that North Korea not only faces a military balance that favors South Korea, it also cannot count on its traditional allies to help offset the disadvantage.

Troops Not Key to Protect South Korea

This makes US presence unnecessary—America isn’t needed to protect the South.

Rajan Menon, Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, 2007, *The End of Alliances*, pg. 154-155 cp

Together, these disparate developments have recast what Soviet strategists used to call the «correlation of forces" between North Korea and South Korea. II Seoul, incomparably wealthier, technologically more advanced, and strategically more consequential, is in a different position than it was in the 1950S and 1960s, when the American alliance was indispensable to its defense because it faced three hostile, wellarmed states. This means that the justification for continuing the U.S.South Korean alliance is grounded less in fact than in inertia, and the comfort South Korean and American foreign policy and national security officials and mavens derive from reenacting received routines. The assumption underpinning the alliance was that South Korea could not survive without an American commitment to defend it against the North Korean juggernaut. While that may once have been true, the new strategic landscape places in relief the contrast between a static alliance and new realities. This outmoded status quo must and will change. The proposition that the forward basing of thousands of American soldiers and a multitude of materiel in Korea remain essential is particularly flawed now that the threats facing the United States are so different from what they once were and now that Seoul is fully capable of mobilizing the resources needed and devising strategies appropriate for its defense. Quite apart from the costs related to continuing the deployment of thousands of U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula, the logic for spending $11 billion to bolster American capabilities to defend South Korea in the wake of President George W. Bush's plan to downsize U.S. forces there is shaky given the country's emergence as an economic heavyweight. 12

AT: Forward Deployment Good

Forward deployment overstretches us financially and hurts soft power.

Emilson M. Espiritu, Commander, United States Navy, 3/15/2006, “THE EAGLE HEADS HOME: RETHINKING NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION,” submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree cp

If the policy remains the same (keeping troops in South Korea) there are associated economical and financial risks. The rising cost in support of the Global War on Terror is placing a burden on the U.S. economy. According to the CRS Report for Congress, the estimated cost of U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan (assuming gradual withdrawal) between FY2006 and FY2010 could total approximately $570 billion by the end of 2010.22 There are two options to help ease the financial cost. One option would be to “do nothing” and continue to support the GWOT without any fiscal worries. Another option would be to rethink other strategies that would help ease the current burden. Simply put, it is not feasible to sustain a permanent U.S. force in South Korea while supporting the current war on terror. Additionally, keeping troops in the region could result in personnel backlash. There are a number of Asians which view the presence of troops as “foreigners with weapons on home turf”. In fact, there is evidence that there is already a growing dissention of American presence in South Korea. According to Moon, “It is the growth of civil society that has opened the floodgates of dissatisfaction with the American presence in Korea”23 Simply put, the longer the U.S. remains in South Korea, could lead to dissention among the Koreans that would eventually lead to future backlash towards current National Security Policy.

AT: South Korean Militarization

Cheonan incident causes militarization now.

Peter Lee, writer for *Asia Times*, 6/2/2010, *The Global Realm*, “The Cheonan sinking … and Korea rising,” http://theglobalrealm.com/2010/06/02/the-cheonan-sinking-and-korea-rising/ cp

The Cheonan incident remains rather murky. The investigative team claims evidence of North Korean responsibility is indisputable. However, the bizarre circumstances of the attack, even when viewed in the context of North Korea’s opaque security doctrine and chaotic command and control structure, provide ample grist for skeptics.

What is indisputable is the determination of the Lee Myung-bak administration to exploit the geopolitical opportunity presented by the sinking.

Beyond using the incident as a 9/11-type opportunity for galvanizing public opinion in favor of his administration and policies in the run-up to local elections – and unleashing a full-court media and legal effort to rebut, sideline, intimidate, and even sue critics of the Cheonan investigation – Lee is using the security crisis to build a consensus favoring its longstanding desire to confront North Korea and strengthen his nation’s strategic alliance with the US as a counterweight to China’s growing economic influence.

One of the first orders of business is, not surprisingly, an arms buildup that will give South Korea the enhanced ability to retaliate against the North without reference to US geopolitical qualms.

A major increase in defense spending – a long-held ambition of the current government – is being justified by, in the words of the Wall Street Journal, “the lethal effectiveness displayed by North Korea’s mini-submarine fleet” in a brazen exercise of asymmetric warfare that undercut the credibility of the US deterrent.

The Journal tells us:

“We need to have our own ways to threaten North Korea,” said Kim Tae-woo, a South Korean defense expert who sits on one of two committees Lee has established to assess Seoul’s military preparedness. [1]

AT: Reunification is Expensive

No economic impact—North Korea’s mineral wealth pays the bill.

Peter Lee, writer for *Asia Times*, 6/2/2010, *The Global Realm*, “The Cheonan sinking … and Korea rising,” http://theglobalrealm.com/2010/06/02/the-cheonan-sinking-and-korea-rising/ cp

More arithmetic for you: The Rand Corporation estimates the cost of Korean reunification at $50 billion, Credit Suisse insists $1.5 trillion is the expense, and Stanford fellow Peter M. Beck posits an alarmist $2-$5 trillion. Question: Who’s got that kind of cash? Answer: North Korean mines. 360 minerals are sequestered in the Hermit Kingdom’s caves, many trapped by flooding and NK’s [North Korea's] appalling infrastructure. Billions of tons of coal, iron, zinc, magnesite, nickel, uranium, tungsten, phosphate, graphite, gold, silver, mercury, sulfur, limestone, copper, manganese, molybdenum… worth an estimated $2-$6 trillion (Goldman Sach’s figure is $2.5 trillion). Reunification could be entirely paid for by these mines, perhaps with change left over.[6]

AT: South Korea Turns to China

Not true—they’re just as worried about China as we are.

Sunhyuk Kim and Wonhyuk Lim, associate professor in the Department of Public Administration at Korea University and fellow at the Korea Development Institute, 2007, *The Washington Quarterly*, “How to Deal with South Korea” cp

Beijing and Seoul do cooperate closely in dealing with Pyongyang and Washington through the six-party talks. At the same time, however, South Korea has a strong incentive to hedge against a nonpeaceful rise of China and harbors strategic anxiety regarding China’s growing influence on North Korea. There is a growing concern in South Korea that North Korea could become a de facto Chinese province if Beijing’s economic and geopolitical influence on Pyongyang continues to increase.16

Because of the trends in South Korean–Chinese relations in recent years, some U.S. policymakers and scholars have overlooked these South Korean concerns, instead concluding that Seoul has become “a runaway ally full of appeasers” increasingly aligned with China.17 According to these scholars, South Korea’s anti-Americanism is indicative of a more fundamental shift in its allegiance from the United States to China. These concerns are overblown. The emergence of a confident and self-assertive South Korea implies more independent thinking in South Korea’s foreign policy, not a shift to China at the United States’ expense.

The controversy over the true ownership of the ancient kingdom of Koguryo in 2004 provides a clear example of how South Korea reacts when China is perceived to be overreaching on historical and geopolitical matters. In April 2004, the Chinese Foreign Ministry deleted references to Koguryo from the Korea country profile on its Web site. The Chinese government–sponsored Northeast Project of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences claimed that Koguryo was a Chinese vassal state, or regional province. When South Korea protested, China responded by deleting the entire pre–World War II history of Korea. With North Korea becoming increasingly dependent on China, some South Koreans interpreted the Chinese action as laying the historical foundation to expand its influence into the Korean peninsula. Given China’s efforts to present itself as a benign and nonhegemonic power under the “peaceful rise” slogan, its handling of the delicate Koguryo issue came as a surprise to many Koreans.

AT: Deterrence

Troops aren’t a deterrent—airpower based in Japan is.

John Feffer, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies and former PanTech fellow in Korean Studies at Stanford University, 6/23/2004, *LewRockwell.com*, “Bring Our Troops Home (from Korea),” http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig5/feffer1.html cp

U.S. deterrent capacity, meanwhile, now resides in firepower based largely outside the peninsula, such as the Fifth Air Force and the Seventh Fleet, both based in Japan. As it did fifty years ago, U.S. airpower can reduce North Korea to rubble. North Korean leaders recognize that any attack they might launch across the DMZ would thus be suicidal. The presence of the remaining 25,000 U.S. troops does not alter this calculus.

More ev.

Emilson M. Espiritu, Commander, United States Navy, 3/15/2006, “THE EAGLE HEADS HOME: RETHINKING NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION,” submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree cp

The current administration has suggested a troop reduction as well as a troop reassignment in the region. In this day and age of new technology, why subject U.S. troops in the Demilitarization Zone (DMZ) when there are U.S. troops present in Japan as well as Okinawa that can respond to any Korean crisis? The military strategy whether to reduce the number of troops or re-assign their location (in Korea) has been an issue amongst the strategists and theorists. In fact, there is only a marginal difference if troops were present in South Korea or in other areas such as Japan (if North Korea attacked)…the U.S. would still prevail.17 To date, the National Security Strategy still calls for troop presence overseas to promote, deter, and defend allies

\*\*\*Politics\*\*\*

Plan Unpopular – GOP

History proves troop withdrawal destroys political capital.

John Feffer, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies and former PanTech fellow in Korean Studies at Stanford University, 6/23/2004, *LewRockwell.com*, “Bring Our Troops Home (from Korea),” http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig5/feffer1.html cp

North Korea has argued that it is under threat of U.S. attack and considers U.S. troops in South Korea a longstanding provocation. So let's try something new by putting U.S. troop presence on the negotiating table. With the advice and consent of our South Korean allies, the Bush administration should offer a timetable for the removal of all U.S. troops from the peninsula. A Democrat would be hard pressed to offer such a deal. When Jimmy Carter tried to withdraw U.S. troops from the peninsula, he hit major resistance from Washington insiders. Only the hawks in Washington have the political capital to push through a complete withdrawal.

Plan Unpopular – Congress

US troops in South Korea are untouchable—the necessity of them has become dogma.

Rajan Menon, Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, 2007, *The End of Alliances*, pg. 155-156 cp

Even though South Korea's economic achievements made its ability to defend itself apparent even before the cold war formally ended, efforts by American presidents at various points to reduce, let alone relinquish, Washington's responsibility for guaranteeing South Korea's security largely came to naught. The arguments made in support of the alliance by officials and national security experts in both countries prevailed, no matter their predictable refrain and list of particulars. The foes of exit averred that disengagement would damage American credibility-an old standby trotted out whenever proposals are made to reassess foreign commitments that have long been in place but are no longer meaningful or necessary. The departure of U.S. forces would, they added, leave South Korea exposed to attack by North Korea and allow Pyongyang to unify the peninsula on its terms, strangle the freedoms of millions of South Koreans, and transform the balance of power. These outcomes would, the critics continued, have incalculable adverse consequences for the United States and its allies in East Asia; in particular, the Korean peninsula would become a dagger aimed at Japan's heart, causing it to lose faith in the efficacy of American power and pushing it toward fullscale rearmament and setting off alarm bells and provoking arms races that would unsettle regional equilibrium. In short, very many bad things would happen. These assertions, made with force and persistence by senior policymakers and experts, have become axiomatic truths, so much so that criticisms of the status quo by definition appears unrealistic, naive, even irresponsible. The similarity between the case for maintaining the alliance with South Korea and for the continuing relevance of NATO and of the U.S.-Japan alliance is striking, as is the American foreign policy establishment's abiding attachment to existing concepts and structures. The indispensability of the alliance is so rarely disputed within the American foreign policy community that contrarians have been relegated to a "voice in the wilderness" status.l3 Is it surprising then that the United States has invested so much in the defense of Korea for so long despite the changes in Seoul's strategic environment and capabilities? True, in 2005, the Pentagon did cut troop levels in South Korea to reduce the stress that the war in Iraq had placed on the U.S. military. Moreover, further reallocations are scheduled. This is a welcome and much overdue change, but it will still leave many Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps units in place, including the Eighth Army, the Second Infantry Division, and the Seventh Air Force (plus additional forces based nearby in Japan)-in all, still a substantial commitment.l4

\*\*\*Neg\*\*\*

AT: South Korea=Lilly Pad

Not true—they don’t have the training or capabilities to fight anyone except North Korea.

Rajan Menon, Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, 2007, *The End of Alliances*, pg. 174-175 cp

As with our alliances with Europe and Japan, our existing military commitments in Korea will in time come to be seen as relics ill-suited to the post- 9/11 world. The argument that thousands of soldiers must still remain in South Korea will then gradually begin to lose its persuasiveness, while the views of those who challenge it will fallon more receptive ears. Already, the strategic logic for maintaining U.S. forces on the peninsula is shaky. Consider, for example, that these troops are trained and equipped only to fight North Korea and cannot usefully or easily be transported and utilized elsewhere;63 that even potential Pacific trouble spots such as Taiwan or Southeast Asia are too distant; and that South Koreans do not want, and will not allow, their military installations to be used for defending Japan or fighting China. Moreover, our policymakers will find it hard to rationalize a policy that ties up many thousands of troops in South Korea (and in Europe and Japan) when the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that the loci of threats and the theaters of war have changed, and that the U.S. military cannot be ordered to undertake new missions while being required simultaneously to continue carrying out old ones.

AT: Nuclear Umbrella Bad

Roehrig concludes the nuclear umbrella is still good enough to deter North Korea and it’s key to solve prolif.

Terence Roehrig, Associate Professor in National Security Studies at the U.S. Naval War College, 2/17/2010, “Nuclear Weapons and Extended Deterrence: The U.S. Nuclear Umbrella over South Korea," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Theory vs. Policy? Connecting Scholars and Practitioners, New Orleans Hilton Riverside Hotel, The Loews New Orleans Hotel, New Orleans, LA Online, accessed via *allacademic research* cp

These issues raise several important questions that will be the focus of this paper. What role does the U.S. nuclear umbrella play in South Korean security calculations? What are the threats and challenges the umbrella is directed at? How credible is the U.S. nuclear umbrella and what exactly does it deter? What insights does this case study provide for understanding extended deterrence and the nuclear umbrella in a Post-Cold War security environment? This paper will argue that the nuclear umbrella is likely to remain in place for some time since it has become an important part of the security architecture in the region. However, the credibility of the United States to use nuclear weapons in defense of South Korea is shaky at best but given the level of mistrust between the United States and North Korea, it may be credible enough to influence North Korea’s security calculations. Also, while it has important security considerations, for the United States, the nuclear umbrella is also an important non-proliferation tool to prevent more states from acquiring nuclear weapons.

North Korea won’t attack and the US won’t use nukes even if they do.

Terence Roehrig, Associate Professor in National Security Studies at the U.S. Naval War College, 2/17/2010, “Nuclear Weapons and Extended Deterrence: The U.S. Nuclear Umbrella over South Korea," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Theory vs. Policy? Connecting Scholars and Practitioners, New Orleans Hilton Riverside Hotel, The Loews New Orleans Hotel, New Orleans, LA Online, accessed via *allacademic research* cp

Third, despite the impact the nuclear umbrella has on U.S. non-proliferation goals and in reassuring South Korea, significant credibility problems remain. Under what circumstances would the United States be willing to use nuclear weapons in the defense of South Korea? Why would it need to do so given its significant conventional capabilities that could be used to deter and defend against an invasion from the North? Even in a crisis and without a “no first use” policy in place, a U.S. president would be under tremendous pressure to refrain from using nuclear weapons and crossing a fire break that has been in place for over 60 years. Washington would likely to go to great lengths to respond only with conventional weapons, even in the face of North Korean use of chemical or biological weapons, and possibly even nuclear weapons. With these uncertainties, the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella is in great doubt. However, with the high levels of mistrust between Washington and Pyongyang, the nuclear umbrella may have some impact on North Korean leaders because they may not be convinced that the United States would not use nuclear weapons. Thus, while the credibility of the nuclear umbrella may be questionable from some vantage points, it may not be so from that of the adversary. The adversary may view these situations from a worst-case assessment that the defender may indeed respond so that credibility may be stronger in its eyes than what others might believe. Yet, despite all of these uncertainties, South Korean leaders continue to place a high value on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Indeed, perhaps the political and symbolic value of the nuclear umbrella along with a belief that the credibility of the U.S. commitment is “good enough” motivates ROK leaders to continue vigorous calls to continue the nuclear commitment. motivates ROK leaders to continue vigorous calls to continue the nuclear commitment.

Inherency – North Korea Has Nukes

North Korea has already developed nuclear weapons.

Yonhap News, 4/10/10 (N. Korea has up to 6 nuclear weapons: Clinton, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2010/04/11/26/0301000000AEN20100411000200315F.HTML)ZDM

WASHINGTON, April 10 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has up to six nuclear weapons, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has said. In a Friday speech at the University of Louisville in Kentucky, Clinton said "we know" that North Korea "has somewhere between one and six nuclear weapons," the second time in as many weeks that she has recognized that North Korea has nuclear weapons. While explaining the Obama administration's nuclear policy late last month, the top U.S. diplomat depicted North Korea as a country "that already has nuclear weapons," and Iran as one that is "clearly seeking nuclear weapons," although the U.S. government's official position is not to recognize the North as a nuclear weapons state. North Korea, which conducted its second nuclear test in May last year, is widely believed to possess several nuclear warheads, with some analysts saying it has already developed the technology to mount the warheads on long-range missiles. The North's second nuclear test is widely seen as having demonstrated its nuclear capability, unlike the previous one, considered a partial failure. North Korea said late last year that it has "entered the final stage" of enriching uranium as an alternative way to produce nuclear weapons. It had been producing weapons-grade plutonium at its sole operating reactor in Yongbyon, north of its capital, Pyongyang. North Korea is also suspected of having secured enough plutonium for many more nuclear weapons from former Soviet republics after the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. A Nov. 25 report of the Federation of American Scientists listed North Korea among nine nuclear weapons states, along with the U.S., Russia, China, Britain, France, Israel, Pakistan and India.

China Cooperative Now

China helping now.

Yonhap News, 4/10/10 (N. Korea has up to 6 nuclear weapons: Clinton, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2010/04/11/26/0301000000AEN20100411000200315F.HTML)ZDM

 Clinton, meanwhile, told students at the University of Louisville that she hopes the Obama administration's new nuclear policy will help quell the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran. "I'm not suggesting that a move by the United States and Russia to reduce our nuclear stockpiles will convince Iran or North Korea to change their behavior," she said. However, she added that China, which wields veto power in the U.N. Security Council and has a great leverage on North Korea and Iran, will "become more willing to engage with us" on North Korea and Iran.

China is siding with the US and South Korea in negotiations.

Cheng, Dean, China expert at the Heritage Foundation, 5/28/10 (China Must Choose on North Korea, http://www.dodbuzz.com/2010/05/28/china-must-choose-on-north-korea/)ZDM

This is a defining moment for Beijing. After North Korea’s blatantly unambiguous, and indefensible act of sinking the South Korean Navy’s ship, the Cheonan, Beijing is either going to side with the angels or the demons. South Korea, the US, and even Japan should mobilize global pressure on China to join in the international response to North Korean aggression. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea are both Communist countries, and North Korea depends on China for access to oil and other sundry resources. The implication has often been that North Korea dances to Beijing’s tune; if only Beijing were to press, then North Korea would come to terms on issues ranging from nuclear proliferation to reducing terrorist actions. But this presumes that North Korea-PRC relations really are as close “as lips and teeth,” as was often claimed in the 1960s. In reality, however, there is real reason to question whether North Korea is especially close to China. North Korean founder Kim Il-Sung was nobody’s puppet; instead, he was very good at playing the USSR and the PRC off against each other, while remaining outside the firm orbit of either. Indeed, North Korea has gone to great lengths to rewrite history, minimizing China’s substantial contributions to the Korean War, despite Chinese casualties that number in the hundreds of thousands. Moreover, both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il have rejected following the Chinese path of “Reform and Opening,” in which China has pursued a more capitalist approach to its economy while maintaining political control in the hands of the Communist Party. This has only further increased the gap between Beijing and Pyongyang, since the dependence of the moribund North Korean economy on Chinese largesse has not resulted in North Korean compliance with Chinese interests. It is also useful to recall that North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in 2006 after China had reassured the world that North Korea would not do so. This was sufficiently embarrassing to Beijing to merit a straight-forward rebuke that the test was a “flagrant and brazen” violation. It also resulted in the Chinese joining in the passage of a UN Resolution (1718) condemning the North Korean action.

China Cooperative Now

China is turning on North Korea now – border shootings.

VOA 6/10/10 (China, North Korea Probe Fatal Border Shootings, http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/asia/China-North-Korea-Probe-Fatal-Boarder-Shootings-96047074.html)ZDM

China says its neighbor and close ally North Korea has expressed its grief following the fatal shooting of three  Chinese nationals on the countries' border last week.  A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said Thursday both countries were investigating the case. The shootings have put further strain on the relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang following the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel by a North Korean submarine. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin Gang says relevant authorities from both countries have launched an investigation into the case. China earlier made a rare formal public complaint about its neighbor and the killings of three Chinese nationals and the wounding of another. State media said Thursday Pyongyang vowed to prevent any repeat of shootings, which it said were "accidents." It also said Pyongyang had expressed grief over the deaths. North Korea wants to smooth over the incident as China is its sole major economic and political ally.  China says North Korea has promised to severely punish the guards responsible for the shooting deaths. Relations are already under strain as Beijing struggles to remain neutral over the torpedoing a South Korean naval ship in late March, killing 46 sailors. Seoul and the international community blames North Korea for the sinking. The three killed and one wounded in the border incident were apparently mistaken for smugglers according to the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

Solvency – China

Approaching China for help with North Korea is useless – they see it as against their own self-interest.

Lewis, Nicole E, Nicole E. Lewis, National Intelligence Fellow 6/22/10 (Reassessing China's Role in North Korea,

Council on foreign relations Expert Brief, http://www.cfr.org/publication/22482/reassessing\_chinas\_role\_in\_north\_korea.html#)ZDM

During her trip to China in late May, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged the Chinese to work with the United States, South Korea, and Japan "to address the serious challenge provoked by the sinking of the South Korean ship [Cheonan]." Predictably, the Chinese leadership has been reluctant to directly condemn North Korea for its actions. Premier Wen Jiabao during a visit to Seoul on May 28 opposed any acts detrimental to peace and stability on the peninsula but said China will make a judgment in an "objective and fair manner" based on the facts surrounding the Cheonan incident. He included the familiar Chinese call for all parties to keep calm and show restraint (Xinhua*)*. Now that the Cheonan incident has been referred to the UN Security Council, Washington is again faced with the likelihood that China will, at the very least, try to water down any UN statement holding North Korea accountable for its actions. So why can't Washington persuade China to take a tougher position on North Korea? A major deterrent for Beijing is its concern about stability, both on and inside its borders. Beijing may assess that North Korea is closer to collapse than at any time in its history, given its succession crisis, an unhealthy Kim Jong-Il, possible fractures between the military and Kim, a dire economic situation, and international isolation. Thus, pushing too hard might drive Kim to raise the stakes by provoking armed conflict with South Korea, almost certainly the United States, and possibly Japan, a worst-case scenario for China. It could also alienate and isolate the new leadership-in-waiting in Pyongyang, something Beijing wants to avoid. In addition, pushing too hard might hasten a collapse, which could result in a flood of North Koreans streaming into China. Chinese leaders are likely to worry that these refugees would overstress the economic and social welfare systems of the areas where they settle. Beijing may also be concerned about being exposed as having very little sway over Kim. Certainly, China is a major supplier of food and fuel to the North, but the "lips and teeth" relationship that the two countries historically enjoyed effectively died with Kim Il-Sung (Kim Jong-Il's father), and the ties between the two militaries are not nearly what they were in the 1950s when China came to North Korea's aid during the Korean War. As China emerges as a major--and possibly the major--regional power in East Asia, it does not want to risk being publicly flouted by Pyongyang and therefore looking like a paper tiger. The Chinese leadership almost certainly is thinking about how its actions could set uncomfortable precedents that China might be held to in the future. Beijing probably assesses that its approach to North Korea has a bearing on what the international community will demand from China with respect to sanctions or even military action against Iran. Moreover, Chinese leaders do not want to be seen as interfering in the internal affairs of another sovereign country, a long-standing tenet of Chinese foreign policy that reflects its concern about other states meddling in its affairs on issues like Taiwan and Tibet. Beijing likely relishes playing good cop to Washington's bad cop. Making the United States look like the enforcer or the bullying hegemon only benefits China and enables it to continue to nurture its own status in the region as an alternative to the U.S. power structure. It is possible that China believes it knows North Korea so well that it can judge Kim's true intentions and that there is no way Pyongyang will cross the line. Thus, Beijing assesses that there is no need for a tougher stance because Pyongyang will stop short of completely upsetting the delicate balance on the peninsula and in the region. We can expect China to quietly urge North Korea to make overtures to the South to try to calm tensions, but overt toughness will be more difficult to coax out of China. It is time to recognize that China's reluctance to back U.S. strategy toward North Korea is unlikely to change and that China may be more of a stumbling block than a help in resolving the impasse. Indeed, China has lived with the current status on the peninsula--with North Korea as a de facto nuclear power and occasional incidents with South Korea--for years and does not see North Korea as a threat to its own territorial integrity.

Solvency – No First Use

North Korea won’t believe no first use commitment.

Terence Roehrig, Associate Professor in National Security Studies at the U.S. Naval War College, 2/17/2010, “Nuclear Weapons and Extended Deterrence: The U.S. Nuclear Umbrella over South Korea," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Theory vs. Policy? Connecting Scholars and Practitioners, New Orleans Hilton Riverside Hotel, The Loews New Orleans Hotel, New Orleans, LA Online, accessed via *allacademic research* cp

While there is great merit in the United States providing a “no first use” guarantee, given the level of mistrust between Pyongyang and Washington, it is likely North Korean leaders would not believe it anyway. Even if the United States withdrew its nuclear umbrella in a formal declaration, North Korea would never be certain that U.S. leaders would not use nuclear weapons to defend South Korea. So long as the United States retains a sizeable nuclear weapons arsenal, North Korea will likely have little confidence in a U.S. statement not to use nuclear weapons first or a pronouncement that removes South Korea from the nuclear umbrella.

Can’t Solve Nuclear Program

North Korea has no incentive to give up nukes.

Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, special assistant to President Reagan and editor of Inquiry, 8/4/2009, *The National Interest Online*, “Grumpy Old Men” cp

Even so, a negotiated settlement remained out of reach. Despite the common assumption that the North was willing to deal, Pyongyang had reason to reject even a seemingly generous offer. Observes analyst Balbina Hwang: “For the regime itself, isolation of course serves to preserve its own power and legitimacy which would immediately be undermined by openness.” Lankov points out that the Kim regime is particularly vulnerable given the proximity of South Korea, with a prosperous and free people who share the same culture and speak the same language. Still, hope of a solution rose in the aftermath the October 2007 denuclearization agreement. Alas, the accord crashed and burned last year. North Korea has subsequently denounced the arrangement, expelled international inspectors, announced that it will not return to the six-party talks, begun to rebuild its nuclear program and restarted reprocessing activities, renounced the 1953 Armistice, nullified boundary-demarcation accords, terminated bilateral political cooperation and reconciliation agreements, and voided economic arrangements with the South. Earlier this year, Pyongyang conducted a nuclear test and several missile tests. As international criticism increased, the DPRK ratcheted up its rhetoric, threatening military retaliation in response to varied South Korean, U.S. and UN actions. None of this means that North Korea could not come back to the table. However, today there is far less expectation that the DPRK will ever be willing to abandon its nuclear program, let alone yield up its existing nuclear materials. Nuclear weapons offer the North security assurance, international status and extortion opportunities. If Pyongyang can still be bought off, the price has likely risen sharply. North Korea’s current internal instability will make reaching a deal even more difficult. Despite common claims that Kim is “crazy,” the evidence indicates that he is evil, not insane. His strategy is consistent with regime preservation.

The military is central to Kim’s rule. He long has pushed a “military first” policy. Even as the regime lost authority, it continued to funnel resources to the armed forces. Nevertheless, in their prime both Kims may have had sufficient authority to sacrifice the military’s most powerful weapon as part of a political deal. A seriously ill and perhaps dying Kim Jong Il may not. A transitional collective leadership likely would not.

Can’t Solve Nuclear Program

North Korea has no leadership—it can’t negotiate.

Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, special assistant to President Reagan and editor of Inquiry, 8/4/2009, *The National Interest Online*, “Grumpy Old Men” cp

Equally significant is the rising influence of the military. Cheong Seong-chang, director of the Inter- Korean Relations Studies Program at the Sejong Institute, argues that “Since the appearance of health issues with Kim Jong-il last year, the North Korean military became more influential.” Kim may have decided he must placate an institution capable of ratifying or blocking any leadership transition; the military may have become more demanding in the wake of his incapacity; both phenomena may be occurring simultaneously. This would explain the rapid multiple international provocations, punctuated by the nuclear and missile tests. Moreover, the National Defense Commission (NDC), one of Pyongyang’s most powerful military bodies, is gaining internal authority. Responsibility for foreign intelligence apparently was recently moved to Commission. Open Radio for North Korea reports that strategic weapons development also was shifted to the NDC (from the Korean Workers’ Party). The group concluded: “The move is an indication that the National Defense Commission is expanding its role beyond being a policy council for the senior insiders, transforming into a real power with enforcement agencies under its wings.” Indeed, Rodger Baker of Stratfor Global Intelligence goes further, telling Fox News: the NDC has really solidified as the central leadership body of North Korea, so it sits over top of the Workers Party, over top of the military, over top of the parliament, in general terms of power. It becomes the place were Kim Jong-il is able to shape his policies, where he’s able to make sure that he has all the strongmen of North Korea in one location. Even more problematic is the leadership transition. Although it is hard to know how actively involved and in control Kim remains—there is evidence of organizational changes designed to limit his workload—the ruling elite almost certainly is thinking about future contingencies. This can only complicate Pyongyang’s dealings with the rest of the world. The uncertainty created by Kim’s condition is compounded by the age of many other top officials. Indeed, Kim is relatively young compared to some of those around him. For instance, eightyone- year-old Kim Yong-nam is chairman of the National People’s Assembly and nominal head of state.

The Koreas will unify under North Korean leadership.

Emilson M. Espiritu, Commander, United States Navy, 3/15/2006, “THE EAGLE HEADS HOME: RETHINKING NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION,” submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree cp

China will most likely pursue stronger strategic relationships with Russia as well as Japan in the event the U.S. completely withdraws from South Korea. Since there is no clear hegemon in the Asia-Pacific region, a multi-polar balance of power would probably be beneficial for the region. Due to their sheer size and presence in the region, each nation could work together to help maintain stability not only to the Korean Peninsula, but to the overall Asia-Pacific region.

In order to maintain balance of power in the region, China will most likely pressure North Korea to unify the Koreas. However, if the Koreas unite under South Korea’s influence, they (the Chinese) would view this as a strategic advantage of the U.S. due to the close proximity to Korea and China; therefore the most favorable condition would be to have North Korea unify the Koreas under North Korean conditions.

AT: Nuclear Umbrella Leads to Conflict Escalation

Nuclear umbrella isn’t credible—US won’t use nukes.

Terence Roehrig, Associate Professor in National Security Studies at the U.S. Naval War College, 2/17/2010, “Nuclear Weapons and Extended Deterrence: The U.S. Nuclear Umbrella over South Korea," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Theory vs. Policy? Connecting Scholars and Practitioners, New Orleans Hilton Riverside Hotel, The Loews New Orleans Hotel, New Orleans, LA Online, accessed via *allacademic research* cp

Despite the certainty of the verbiage and annual reiteration, a number of serious questions remain about the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Successful deterrence is premised on the defender’s resolve; the defender must demonstrate that it is willing to carry out the threat should deterrence fail. Maintaining South Korea under the U.S. nuclear umbrella indicates the United States would be willing to use nuclear weapons to defend the South. Yet, what scenario would prompt a U.S. president to use nuclear weapons for the first time since 1945? Even in a crisis, there would be enormous pressure on the president to refrain from escalating to nuclear weapons. Moreover, given U.S. conventional strength, the United States could have a devastating “strategic” response on North Korea without resorting to nuclear weapons. If a crisis came to the point where nuclear weapons were being considered, it is likely ROK and U.S. troops might be deeply engaged and preparing for a move into North Korea. The use of nuclear weapons would contaminate the region and make operations exceedingly more difficult. The nuclear blast and resulting effects would kill ROK and DPRK civilians and fallout could drift over China, Japan, Russia, and others in the region. U.S. leaders are unlikely to go nuclear in response to a North Korean conventional action or even a chemical or biological attack. Some argue nuclear weapons are useful only for deterring the use of nuclear weapons. Yet, it is not at all clear the United States would use nuclear weapons in response to a North Korean decision to go nuclear. The circumstances that would prompt Pyongyang to use nuclear weapons are uncertain, but given U.S. conventional superiority, it is not at all sure that Washington would respond in kind. In fact, a DPRK use of nuclear weapons might trigger a ROK-U.S. invasion to end this security problem once and for all. Though some of these scenarios are difficult to predict, it is fairly likely that the United States would be very reluctant, if ever, to use nuclear weapons. Thus, U.S. credibility remains a question mark, yet South Korea continues to place great value on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. An important dimension of the U.S. nuclear umbrella is that Washington has not given a “no first use” guarantee. Refraining from giving a “no first use” guarantee is rooted in the Cold War when nuclear weapons gave the United States and its allies a capability that offset advantages in numbers, either from a Soviet invasion of Europe or aggression in Asia from a combination of Soviet, Chinese and North Korean forces. It was also believed that deterrence would be more robust with the fear that the United States would escalate to nuclear weapons, even if the attack were conventional. Many critics have argued that the United States should provide a “no first guarantee” to help promote greater stability. Moreover, nuclear weapons are and should only be used to deter the use of nuclear weapons.

Link – Deterrence (Naval Exercises)

Joint naval exercises are key deterring the north and reassuring the south.

AP 7/19/10 (US carrier to visit S.Korea ahead of joint exercise <http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20100719/pl_afp/skoreankoreausmilitary)ZDM>

A US aircraft carrier and three destroyers will visit [South Korea](http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20100719/pl_afp/skoreankoreausmilitary) this week ahead of a naval exercise to deter North Korea following the sinking of one of Seoul's warships, officials said Monday. The 97,000-ton USS George Washington, based in [Yokosuka](http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20100719/pl_afp/skoreankoreausmilitary), Japan, will arrive Wednesday at the southern port city of Busan for a five-day port call, the US military said in a statement. Three destroyers from the US carrier's strike group, including the USS McCampbell, will also visit South Korean ports on the same day, it said. "Our presence here is a testament to the strength of our alliance and our constant readiness to defend (South Korea)," the US carrier's commanding officer, Captain David Lausman, said in the statement. Seoul and Washington are going ahead with war games this month to deter Pyongyang. US Defense Secretary Robert Gates arrived in Seoul on Monday for talks, and Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said the port call was timed to coincide with the visit. "This is an additional manifestation of our steadfast commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea (South Korea). It will stay there for a few days and leave for a series of exercises we will begin conducting with RoK forces," he said.

Conditions Counterplan

Only the counterplan solves North Korea—talks fail and only China has leverage over Kim Jong Il.

Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the *CATO Institute*, 9/4/2006, *CATO Institute*, “Bringing Down Kim,” http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=6652 cp

That's yet more proof, if any were needed, of the increasingly pressing need to look for new ways to deal with North Korea's nuclear weapons programs before the first bomb goes off. Negotiations have failed. It's been almost a year since the last round of six-party talks, with Pyongyang refusing to return to the negotiating table until the United States abandons its successful financial sanctions against North Korea. So it's time to test the radical alternative of encouraging China to overthrow Kim's regime, in return for America agreeing to end its military presence on the peninsula.

China is concerned enough about the behavior of its long-time ally that such incentives might just be enough to tempt Beijing to act. Chinese leaders were reportedly furious that Pyongyang ignored their repeated requests not to conduct the July 5 missile tests. These included a high-level plea by Chinese premier Wen Jiabao for North Korea to "refrain from taking measures" to increase tensions on the peninsula, delivered barely a week before Pyongyang test-fired at least seven missiles. If Kim's regime now snubs Beijing again with a second round of missile launches or, even more seriously, a nuclear test, China's patience might reach breaking point. All the more so because a North Korean nuclear test would create further pressure on Japan to reconsider its non-nuclear status, and a nuclear Japan is the last thing that Beijing wants to see.

China is also the one country with the ability to bring down Kim's regime, since it provides much of the energy and food that keeps the impoverished regime afloat. According to Korea experts Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, approximately 30% of North Korea's total outside assistance and an estimated 38% of its imports come from China. The Beijing leadership is wary of using that leverage for fear that too much pressure would cause the North Korean state to implode. That could produce two consequences which Beijing fears, a massive influx of refugees and a reunified Korea that would continue Seoul's security alliance with the U.S., so bringing American forces to China's border.

While there is relatively little the U.S. can do to ease Beijing's fears of being swamped with refugees, beyond offering to help with financial assistance, the second fear is easily addressed. Washington can pledge that, if China helps bring down Kim's regime and end North Korea's nuclear-weapons programs, the U.S. would end that security alliance and withdraw all its forces from the peninsula. This would, of course, be conditional on China also agreeing not to deploy any military forces on the peninsula.

Such a concession would do no more reflect the reality that Seoul is already drifting into Beijing's orbit. Trade between South Korea and China is expanding rapidly, and Seoul increasingly sides with Beijing rather than Washington on issues ranging from relations with Japan to the status of Taiwan. That foreign-policy posture is causing complications for Washington, as demonstrated by President Roh Moo Hyun's attempts to downplay the significance of the July 5 missile tests. And the U.S. military presence in South Korea is already in the process of being cut by a third, to 25,000 troops in 2008. Completing the process in the event of a reunified peninsula would help give Washington more room for maneuver, especially as a united Korea could be expected to forge even closer diplomatic and economic ties with China.

That's unlikely to be the only concession Beijing would demand, in return for agreeing to bring down Kim's regime. Chinese leaders have hinted in the past that they would expect U.S. concessions on Taiwan, especially pressure on Taipei to end pro-independence activities and commence talks on reunification, before agreeing to put any significant pressure on Pyongyang. That's a concession Washington can never make, since it's not America's place to dictate to a fellow democracy what policies to adopt.

But a full troop withdrawal and an end to the security alliance with Seoul fall into a very different category. This simply involves relinquishing a waning strategic asset in return for something important. Nor is there any downside to making the offer. The worst that Beijing can do is say no. If, on the other hand, Chinese leaders respond positively then America will have found a cost-free way to prevent the emergence of a volatile nuclear power.

\*\*\*Misc\*\*\*

T – Ships are in South Korea

The troops are currently stationed in ports in South Korea.

AFPS 7/19/10 (American Forces Press Service, USS George Washington to Visit Republic of Korea, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=60057)ZDM

BUSAN, South Korea, July 19, 2010 – USS George Washington, the U.S. Navy's only permanently forward-deployed aircraft carrier will visit the South Korean port of Busan July 21 to 25, U.S. Forces Korea officials announced today. In addition to USS George Washington, three destroyers from its strike group will also visit Korean ports. The USS McCampbell and the USS John S. McCain will visit Busan, and the USS Lassen will visit Chinhae.

Talks With North Korea Good

Talks are key to halt international prolif and prevent violent regime collapse.

Paul B. Stares, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 10-16-2009. [Los Angeles Times, Pyongyang duck, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-stares16-2009oct16,0,2100772.story ]

So why bother talking to Pyongyang if it's going to be fruitless? Three reasons still make it worthwhile:

First, for as long as there are six-party talks focused on denuclearization, North Korea will be denied what it craves most: formal recognition as a nuclear power. And the other players -- the U.S., China, Japan, South Korea and Russia, and by extension the larger international community -- can claim they have not capitulated to the North Korean fait accompli. Otherwise, Iran and other nuclear aspirants would likely be emboldened.

Second, if carefully negotiated, the talks could also put a cap on further nuclear weapons development by North Korea, whether it be the conversion of remaining plutonium stocks into bombs or a whole new assembly line that relies on highly enriched uranium. A moratorium on further testing would be a good start. The other five parties could also collectively make clear to North Korea the prohibitive consequences should it ever transfer nuclear materials to non-state actors.

Third, the talks and the potential inspections of nuclear sites that could conceivably follow could provide a window on what is happening inside North Korea. Moreover, they provide a useful and ready diplomatic mechanism to manage the consequences of severe instability in North Korea should the situation suddenly deteriorate.

The process of continual negotiations is key to prevent North Korean aggression.

Virginie Grzelczyk, Ph.D. (Political Science @ Maryland), specialist in Northeast Asia and Korean peninsula affairs, 2009. [International Negotiation 14, Six-Party Talks and Negotiation Strategy: When Do We Get There?, p. 95-119]

The Six-Party Talks process has therefore moved to a second phase: long gone are the uncertainties about getting on the road. Now is the time to discuss the directions that the trip will take, and this has materialized itself through agreement-drafting since September 2005. Tangible results have been achieved in the sense that parties have been able to codify some of their demands into a written text clearly exposed to every Six-Party Talks participant. Even through we are still very far from ratification, implementation and enforcement, the fact that parties have moved from mere discussions to actual drafting and signing onto agreement is in itself a victory. Does this help us understand why agreements appear to keep on repeating themselves rounds after rounds? Yes. Just as it takes time for someone to learn how to drive, it takes time for parties to understand the inner mechanics of the negotiation instrument they have created. The fact that North Korea is considering the process as something important enough that it wants to be a part of it is in itself a victory. Likely, the fact that the United States has been maintaining bilateral relationships with North Korea, though always shy of entering into official diplomatic relation with Pyongyang is also a step forward. However, one must remember that North Korea has been at odd with the international community for the past fifty years and as such, has had to learn how to interact with other actors. The main question that remains is whether or not actors will be able to steer the vehicle properly and to reach a destination that nobody will want to depart from for a while. Common sense tells us that if North Korea has been pledging to get rid of its nuclear weapons and has accepted various agreements to do so but has reneged on them, then perhaps the content of the agreement (compensations, provision of a light-water reactor in due time and such) might not be beneficial enough to change North Korea’s seemingly belligerent behavior. Perhaps the Six-Party vehicle keeps on stopping at the same motel round after round because some have overlooked the fact that there are a few new motels on unexplored roads. Perhaps driver’s seat has been occupied by one driver who really wants to stay within the comfort of a motel that he has previously visited. Or perhaps parties do not think that they can afford to stay in a better motel. Either way, being on the road and having North Korea on board is a luxury that should not be taken lightly. The fact that it is sometimes not possible to look at what North Korea is doing on the back seat is however nothing compared to what would happen if Pyongyang was left alone at home, a thousand miles away, with a box-full of matches in its hands. 20

Regime Change Bad – North Korea

North Korea regime change leads to non-state proliferation, collapses South Korea’s economy, and results Korean civil war—that goes nuclear.

Bruce Bennett and Nina Hachigian, senior analyst and director at the Center for Asian Pacific Studies at RAND, 2007 *North and South Korea*, “Regime Change in North Korea Will Not Make the World Safer” pg 67-68 cp

Ideally, regime change in North Korea would mean a neat handover of power from Kim Jong II to cooperative, benign leader that the United States and its allies can work with. Or, it could lead to a quick and peaceful unification with South Korea, as happened in Germany. But realistically, these scenarios are extremely unlikely. Here are more likely scenarios following an attempt at regime change in North Korea: War. North Korea takes military action to avert regime collapse or to coerce an end to the international pressure. South Koreans fear this outcome the most, because their country could be ravaged in the process. If North Korea indeed has nuclear weapons, it might use them, perhaps killing millions of people in South Korea. Japan and possibly the United States would also be at risk. While South Korea and the United States would almost certainly win the resulting conflict, victory would require conquest and occupation of North Korea. In the process, South Korea could suffer such horrific casualties and economic damage that it would become incapable of functioning, let alone absorbing the North. The North Korean military, with a guerrilla culture and massive special forces, and a total military many times the size of Iraq’s, could well become an insurgent force that would make the Iraqi insurgency look mild. Civil War. Kim Jong Il’s government collapses into factions and civil war breaks out. The loss of central control would leave North Korean weapons of mass destruction in the hands of unscrupulous domestic factions, which could use them in the civil war and try to sell them to third parties. The resulting flows of refugees and the spillover of conflict into China and South Korea could eventually force South Korea, the United States and even China to enter North Korea militarily to restore order. Worse Regime. A new regime takes over in North Korea that is weaker than Kim Jong Il’s and even more nationalistic and thus more likely to take a hard line in negotiations to appear in control. North Korean desperation and dysfunctionality would probably increase, and incentives for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction would be greater. North Korea could experience a series of such governments before probably falling into one of the first two outcomes.

Nuclear Umbrella Key to Alliance

The nuclear umbrella is integral to the alliance—it reassures South Koreans of a security commitment during troop drawdowns.

Terence Roehrig, Associate Professor in National Security Studies at the U.S. Naval War College, 2/17/2010, “Nuclear Weapons and Extended Deterrence: The U.S. Nuclear Umbrella over South Korea," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Theory vs. Policy? Connecting Scholars and Practitioners, New Orleans Hilton Riverside Hotel, The Loews New Orleans Hotel, New Orleans, LA Online, accessed via *allacademic research* cp

In addition to its deterrence value, the U.S. nuclear umbrella also has important symbolic value to South Korea in providing reassurance of the U.S. defense commitment. For some, the nuclear umbrella is an important signal of the strength of the relationship. The alliance is in the midst of a major reorganization that included an already completed reduction of U.S. troops in South Korea to 28,500, repositioning these forces to two hub locations at Osan Air Base and Camp Humphreys near Pyeongtaek, and the return of wartime operational control (OPCON) to the South Korean military. 33 Conservatives in South Korea have been particularly concerned with the transfer of wartime OPCON believing it will hurt ROK security and might be an indication of a deteriorating alliance. A strong reaffirmation of the nuclear umbrella provided an important dose of reassurance during a time of significant change in the alliance.

Nuclear Umbrella Contains China

The nuclear umbrella contains China.

Terence Roehrig, Associate Professor in National Security Studies at the U.S. Naval War College, 2/17/2010, “Nuclear Weapons and Extended Deterrence: The U.S. Nuclear Umbrella over South Korea," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Theory vs. Policy? Connecting Scholars and Practitioners, New Orleans Hilton Riverside Hotel, The Loews New Orleans Hotel, New Orleans, LA Online, accessed via *allacademic research* cp

Despite these economic ties, there remains potential for friction. As the Chinese economy grows, it will increasingly become a competitor with South Korea for markets and resources, particularly oil and natural gas. There is also concern for China’s future intentions in the region and the degree it may seek to dominate politics and economics in East Asia. A specific source of potential tension is the dispute over the history of the ancient kingdom of Koguryo. 25 Koreans were very upset with China’s apparent efforts to claim that Koguryo was actually a Chinese kingdom, a claim that cuts to the core of Korean history and identity. The issue is quiet for the moment but Korean’s keep a wary eye on the issue. Thus, the nuclear umbrella may also be part of a long-term hedging strategy over a rising China and the uncertain future of the region.

Nuclear Umbrella Prevents Prolif

The plan causes Japan and South Korea to go nuclear.

Terence Roehrig, Associate Professor in National Security Studies at the U.S. Naval War College, 2/17/2010, “Nuclear Weapons and Extended Deterrence: The U.S. Nuclear Umbrella over South Korea," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Theory vs. Policy? Connecting Scholars and Practitioners, New Orleans Hilton Riverside Hotel, The Loews New Orleans Hotel, New Orleans, LA Online, accessed via *allacademic research* cp

Three important implications emerge from this study. First, for the United States, the nuclear umbrella is partly about guaranteeing the security of South Korea but it is also an important tool for U.S. non-proliferation goals. After the first North Korean nuclear test, U.S. leaders feared Seoul and Tokyo might be tempted to pursue a nuclear capability; U.S. assurances of the nuclear umbrella were important efforts to convince South Korea and Japan to continue forgoing nuclear weapons and keeping the NPT regime from deteriorating further. It is important to note here that similar to the days of the Cold War, South Korean and Japanese security are linked. By providing reassurances of the nuclear umbrella to South Korea, Washington also helps to reassure Japan and keep Tokyo from considering nuclear weapons. 37 Moreover, if Japan were to go nuclear, pressure would mount on South Korea to follow suit. In the wake of the 2006 nuclear test, an anonymous South Korean official noted “we are studying our options very seriously in case Japan is armed with nuclear weapons.” The official also noted that “we believe the Japanese government has been discussing options for a long time on the assumption that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons.” However, the official declined to indicate how South Korea might respond noting it was a hypothetical question.

More evidence.

Terence Roehrig, Associate Professor in National Security Studies at the U.S. Naval War College, 2/17/2010, “Nuclear Weapons and Extended Deterrence: The U.S. Nuclear Umbrella over South Korea," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Theory vs. Policy? Connecting Scholars and Practitioners, New Orleans Hilton Riverside Hotel, The Loews New Orleans Hotel, New Orleans, LA Online, accessed via *allacademic research* cp

For South Korea and other U.S. allies, the goal of the nuclear umbrella is security and deterrence. The nuclear umbrella demonstrates a commitment to provide the ultimate capability to deter aggression and reassure the ally of its importance to Washington. Yet, for the United States, the reassurance of the nuclear umbrella has another important goal: nonproliferation. After the first North Korean nuclear weapons test, Secretary Rice travelled to South Korea and Japan to reassure them of their inclusion under the nuclear umbrella for fear both countries might decide to develop their own nuclear capability. It is important to note that South Korea and Japan are linked to some degree concerning this issue. If either one decided to develop nuclear weapons, there is good chance the other might follow. Moreover, assurances to South Korea of the nuclear umbrella likely help to reassure Japan though it is not clear that the reverse is true.

Nuclear Umbrella Termination Key to Denuclearization

Talks will fail without the US rescinding the nuclear umbrella.

Cheong Wook Sik, Representative of Civil Network for a Peaceful Korea, 8-1-5, “U.S. Nukes Another Obstacle at Six-Party Talks,” http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article\_print.asp?menu=A11100&no=240634&rel\_no=1&isPrint=print

Every nation at the six-party talks that began July 26 is calling for a "nuclear free Korean peninsula." The Bush Administration says that the goal is not having talks but making substantial progress towards a nuclear free peninsula. Chairman Kim Jong IL says a peninsula without nuclear arms was one of the final wishes of President Kim IL Sung and that it is North Korea's goal. It is clearly noteworthy when North Korea and the United States speak with one voice about nukes and the Korean peninsula.

They differ significantly, however, when it comes to what that should really mean. The US defines denuclearization as the "complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement" (CVID) of the North's nuclear program, and claims that would require the North abandoning its plutonium-based program as well as a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program the North denies even exists. In addition, the US does not want to permit the North to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes such as the light water reactor.

The North, on the other hand, claims that a nuclear free peninsula can be achieved only after the US nuclear threat is removed. Since the North declared that it is a nuclear state in a foreign ministry statement March 31, the six-party talks, according to Pyongyang, should be about arms reductions instead of a process where the North gives up its program and the US takes corresponding action. It wants to talk not only about its own program but an American nuclear threat "on and around the Korean peninsula."

The North also wants nuclear transparency regarding South Korea and it wants that verified and the US nuclear umbrella removed. It says that since it and the US are technically still at war, having nuclear arms is a deterrent that guarantees peace and stability at a time when the South is under the US's nuclear umbrella.

Of great interest is whether the North will maintain that position and make it an issue at the six-party talks. If it attempts to make nuclear arms reductions a key part of what is discussed at the talks as it said it would do in its statements of March 31, then the fourth round of six-party talks could end having just been a long argument and without any serious negotiations. The US and other participating nations would then express strong doubts about the North’s intentions and commence on a program of pressure and measures against Pyongyang.

What that means is that it is highly likely the North will not insist on having talks on mutual nuclear arms reductions, there is no possibility the Us will accept having its own nuclear arms brought to the table, and because the very concept of “nuclear arms reduction” does not even fit with the project of denuclearization.

Nuclear Umbrella Bad – China Relations

**US nuclear guarantee over South Korea removes the Chinese incentive to stop North Korean nuclearization.**

Carpenter, Ted Galen, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, 10/23/09 (Stoke China’s Fears, The National Interest, <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22376G)ZDM>

During a visit to South Korea, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates inadvertently underscored a major flaw in Washington’s policy regarding North Korea. Speaking in Seoul, Gates stated that North Korea posed a serious threat to America’s allies in northeast Asia (Japan and South Korea) and pledged that the United States would “continue to provide extended deterrence, using the full range of military capabilities, including the nuclear umbrella” to protect those countries. Making a public pledge to shield Japan and South Korea with America’s nuclear umbrella was unwise on two counts. First, it eliminates the principal incentive for Beijing to regard North Korea’s nuclear weapons program as a serious problem for China, not just the United States and its allies. As columnist Charles Krauthammer aptly put it when the current crisis began in late 2002, America’s nightmare is a nuclear-armed North Korea, but China’s nightmare is a nuclear-armed Japan. By reiterating Washington’s commitment to extended deterrence—especially the nuclear component—U.S. officials send a message to Chinese leaders that they don’t need to worry about Japan (or South Korea) developing an independent deterrent. In fairness to Gates, he was not the first U.S. official to make that blunder. After North Korea’s first nuclear test, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice issued a similar, highly public pledge. Apparently U.S. leaders don’t know even the basics about playing international diplomatic chess. Obligingly eliminating the specter of a nuclear-arms race in northeast Asia is akin to casually surrendering one’s queen in a chess match with Chinese officials. Granted, the United States might want to discourage Tokyo and Seoul from building their own nuclear arsenals, thereby exacerbating the global proliferation problem, but it is unwise to make high-profile *public* statements to that effect. Any continuing commitment to extended deterrence should be confined to quiet, private assurances to Japanese and South Korean leaders. Washington’s public statements, as well as private discussions with the Chinese, need to adopt a totally different tone: that a nuclear-armed North Korea changes the entire strategic equation in northeast Asia, and that the United States cannot possibly guarantee that Japan and South Korea will not decide at some point that their own security needs dictate building independent deterrents. That is the one development that might prod Beijing into getting far tougher with North Korea on the nuclear issue.

Ships Bad – Chinese Nationalism

The presence of the USS George Washington spurs Chinese nationalism.

AP 6/25/10 (Chinese nationalists increasingly strident, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100625/ap\_on\_re\_as/as\_china\_nationalism)ZDM

Upcoming joint U.S.-South Korean naval drills have sparked an unexpected outcry from Chinese nationalists, whose fiery rhetoric has been stoked by their country's rising economic strength and global clout. While North Korea often issues diatribes condemning the routine war games off South Korea, this time, it was Chinese blogs and websites that exploded in anger at word that an [American aircraft carrier](http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100625/ap_on_re_as/as_china_nationalism) might join the drills, bringing it close to Chinese waters. Some hawks even urged their country's military to make its own show of force. "China should cover the Yellow Sea with ships and missiles and open fire and drive them back should the American military dare invade our territorial waters," a commentary on the popular ccvic.com news website demanded, though Beijing has given no sign it will make any military response. Such nationalist rhetoric jibes with a growing outspokenness among ranking members of the [People's Liberation Army](http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100625/ap_on_re_as/as_china_nationalism) that is stirring concern abroad and could hamper China's quest to be regarded as a rising — and responsible — member of international society. While Chinese nationalism has been growing for the better part of two decades, the unusually vociferous response this time reflected a sense among Chinese that their soaring economy and rising profile on the international scene deserve greater respect. The challenge for the country's leadership: Find a way to assuage nationalistic sentiments and assert newfound global influence while maintaining stable ties with Washington and a placid regional environment. The anti-submarine exercises in the Yellow Sea near China's eastern province of Shandong are expected to begin late this month, although no official date has been given. U.S. defense officials say the Navy is considering dispatching the massive nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington to the waters where North Korea allegedly sank a [South Korean warship](http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100625/ap_on_re_as/as_china_nationalism) in a major show of force by the U.S., which has vowed to protect South Korea and is seeking to blunt aggression from North Korea. China's Foreign Ministry this week registered its concerns that the drills could prompt further rash behavior from North Korea's isolated and erratic communist regime. Many here, however, see more nefarious intentions behind the war games. "The U.S. is directly threatening China by sailing an aircraft carrier into the Yellow Sea," wrote defense blogger Brother Guangdong on the Western Military Affairs site. "China must respond firmly and show the American imperialists we won't be pushed around." Even the mainstream [Global Times](http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100625/ap_on_re_as/as_china_nationalism) newspaper said a carrier deployment would "certainly be a provocative action toward China

Chinese Nationalism Bad – Taiwan Strikes

A resurgence of Chinese nationalism will result in an attack on Taiwan.

Yu, Au Loong, editor of the globalist review, sept/Oct 08 (The New Chinese Nationalism, solidarity, no 136, http://www.solidarity-us.org/current/node/1886)ZDM

This program is not new. It is the same old story of state-led growth. Han and Yang embrace Great Han nationalism so completely that they have been urging the government to attack Taiwan and incorporate it as soon as possible. “If we win this war,” Han wrote, “the years of insult inflicted upon us by the US will be left behind, the Chinese people will once more unite around the CCP, and the development of the Chinese economy and society in the 21st Century will then be guaranteed.”[(25)](http://www.solidarity-us.org/node/1886" \l "N25) Han and Yang, and many of the New Left as well as the CCP, have been so immersed in Great Han nationalism that they can never conceive of the democratic right of the Taiwan people to decide for themselves if they want unification with Mainland China and on what terms. They are also blind to the fact that ethnic minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang have been denied basic democratic rights.[(26)](http://www.solidarity-us.org/node/1886" \l "N26)

Unified Korea Can Be Regional Balancer

They’ve got the wealth and will support South Korean policies.

Emilson M. Espiritu, Commander, United States Navy, 3/15/2006, “THE EAGLE HEADS HOME: RETHINKING NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION,” submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree cp

Lastly, the third objective is to unify the Koreas. Although this maybe difficult, it is still an attainable objective. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, many believe that marked the end of the cold war, however, as Haselden has stated that “the Korean Peninsula remains one of the last bastions of the Cold War.”18 Additionally, when the Koreas unite, many believe this will signify the true end of the Cold War. There are advantages to a unified Korea. A unified Korea will make Korea a major Asian and world economic power.19 South Korea has one of the largest GDP’s in the world coupled with the resources from North Korea (iron ore, lead, zinc, and tungsten) will certainly make a unified Korea a regional power.20 Given our strong influence, a unified Korea would resemble South Korea. This will make a unified Korea will give a shared responsibility of power in the region along with Japan and China. Both Koreas have adopted a Sunshine Policy which paves the way for South Korea to negotiate with North Korea to maintain peace, security, and stability between the two countries.

ASEAN Supports Six Party Talks

ASEAN supports Six Party Talks.

Xinhua 7/20 (Xiong Tong, 7/20/10, " ASEAN foreign ministers called for early restart of six-party talks ", http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-07/20/c\_13406702.htm) cp

HANOI, July 20 (Xinhua) -- Foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Tuesday expressed their concern about increased tension in the Korean Peninsula following a South Korean warship sinking and called for early resumption of six-party talks.

Ministers attending the 43rd ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting expressed the support for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and encouraged the parties concerned to resume the six-party talks as soon as possible, said the meeting's spokesman Tran Ngoc An at a news briefing here. "The six-party talks will be a main solution for long-term peace in peninsula," said An.

China Supports Six Party Talks

China supports talks.

CRIENGLISH.com 7/13 (7/13/10, " China Calls for Early Resumption of Six-party Talks ", http://english.cri.cn/6909/2010/07/13/189s582727.htm) cp

China said on Tuesday it would work with other parties involved to resume the six-party talks at an early date and move the process forward.

"China has always regarded six-party talks as a realistic and effective tool to realize denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and peace and stability in Northeast Asia," Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang told a regular news briefing.

The Six-Party Talks, which were launched in 2003 and involve China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Russia and Japan, have been stalled since December 2008.

After the UN Security Council on Friday adopted a presidential statement on the Cheonan warship sinking incident that killed 46 sailors, China urged the involved parties to "flip over the page" and restart the six-party talks on the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue as soon as possible.

South Korean Anti-Americanism Now

Growing anti-Americanism now.

Sunhyuk Kim and Wonhyuk Lim, associate professor in the Department of Public Administration at Korea University and fellow at the Korea Development Institute, 2007, *The Washington Quarterly*, “How to Deal with South Korea” cp

The United States has been coping with a new phenomenon since 2002: a South Korea that can say “no” to America. Along with Japan and the Philippines, South Korea used to be one of the staunchest U.S. allies in Asia. From 1950 to 1953, 54,000 Americans lost their lives to defend South Korea from North Korean and Chinese Communist forces. The United States has since poured more than $13 billion in economic aid and military assistance into the country, and it still maintains approximately 29,500 troops there. Yet, despite these past and present contributions to its security and modernization, more and more Americans feel that South Korea no longer appreciates their efforts and is growing ungrateful, uncooperative, and in some cases downright hostile. Troubled by the spread of anti-U.S. sentiment in South Korea, Senator Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.) lamented that South Korea is suffering from “historical amnesia.”1

Americans experienced a full dose of this new reality in 2002. In June of that year, a U.S. armored vehicle accidentally killed two South Korean middle-school girls. When the driver and navigator of the vehicle were acquitted despite their conflicting statements in a U.S. court-marshal, hundreds of thousands of South Koreans took to the streets. Ordinary citizens joined candlelight vigils to protest the injustice of the verdict, and some students even burned U.S. flags to express their outrage. In a break with the past, South Koreans were no longer willing to give U.S. military personnel a free pass for the sake of national security.

Anti-Americanism is not a new phenomenon in South Korea. In fact, it constituted one of the strongest undercurrents of the intense and protracted pro-democracy movement of the 1980s. When President Chun Doo-hwan’s military regime brutally suppressed a pro-democracy movement in Kwangju in May 1980, many South Koreans suspected that Washington was behind Chun’s actions.2 The decade was marked by intermittent eruptions of high-profile demonstrations and protests against U.S. support of Chun’s dictatorship, such as the arson at the U.S. Cultural Center in Pusan in 1982 and the occupation of the U.S. Cultural Center in Seoul in 1985.3

South Korean Anti-Americanism Now

It’s caused by demographic changes.

Sunhyuk Kim and Wonhyuk Lim, associate professor in the Department of Public Administration at Korea University and fellow at the Korea Development Institute, 2007, *The Washington Quarterly*, “How to Deal with South Korea” cp

South Korea’s growing self-assertiveness is also a product of its self-induced democratization. Along with some formerly Communist countries in eastern Europe, South Korea democratized from the bottom up via social movements.7 Students who led the movement against the Rhee regime in April 1960 were later joined by industrial workers, intellectuals, and religious leaders in the 1970s in their campaign against Park’s dictatorship. Later, the triple solidarity of students, workers, and religious leaders expanded even further to include middle-class citizens in the democracy uprising of June 1987.8 South Korea’s democratic transition in 1987 was in large part the fruit of these persistent pro-democracy struggles by social movement activists and opposition politicians throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

The “386 Generation”—South Koreas who were in their 30s, who went to universities in the 1980s, and who were born in the 1960s—emerged as a driving force in South Korean politics during the 1990s, being well equipped with excellent organizational and leadership skills acquired during the intense pro-democracy struggles of the 1980s. Many former movement organizers have also successfully entered the political arena as legislators, party leaders, lawyers, judges, policymakers, and government officials. The proportion of 386 Generation politicians among the members elected to the National Assembly sharply increased from 24.3 percent in 1996 to 32.9 percent in 2000 to 45.9 percent in 2004.9 Their movement into the political establishment helps to explain why anti-U.S. sentiment in South Korea today is more extensive and powerful.

These new South Korean politicians and policymakers do not agree with their parents’ and grandparents’ views of the United States. To older generations, the United States was a savior, rescuing South Korea from a possible Communist takeover during the Korean War and from abject poverty in the 1950s. Their general attitude was one of profound gratitude and unwavering loyalty. In contrast, the 386 Generation and their younger cohorts feel far more ambivalent toward the United States. Younger South Koreans never experienced the devastation of war and abject poverty of the 1950s, and they do not see the United States as a savior. Many of them risked their lives fighting authoritarian regimes and are understandably proud of their country’s economic development and democratization.

South Korean Anti-Americanism Now

And historical US hypocrisy.

Sunhyuk Kim and Wonhyuk Lim, associate professor in the Department of Public Administration at Korea University and fellow at the Korea Development Institute, 2007, *The Washington Quarterly*, “How to Deal with South Korea” cp

Young South Koreans can also point, however, to several examples of U.S. duplicity. Park’s military coup in 1961, which toppled the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Chang Myon, was rewarded and legitimized by President John F. Kennedy’s warm welcome of Park during his official trip to the United States in November 1961. Throughout the early 1980s, when many 386 Generation youths risked their lives to fight for democracy, Washington largely remained silent. Most critically, because the commander in chief of the Republic of Korea–U.S. Combined Forces Command held operational control of the South Korean Army, many South Koreans argue that Chun’s brutal suppression of the pro-democracy movement in Kwangju in May 1980 would not have been possible without the United States’ implicit endorsement or active support. In February 1981, after Chun’s suppression of the democracy movement and subsequent takeover of power, President Ronald Reagan welcomed Chun to the White House as his second foreign guest since being inaugurated. Looking back, this condoning of a violent dictatorship stands in stark contrast to the harsh U.S. condemnation of the Chinese government after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre.

The current anti-U.S. sentiment in South Korea is thus a function of young South Koreans’ perception of the ambiguous U.S. role in the checkered history of South Korean democratization. Whenever young South Koreans see the United States, particularly the current Bush administration, carrying the torch of democracy promotion around the globe, they cannot help but recall the contradictory U.S. role in South Korea and be suspicious of Washington’s motives. They question the traditional patron-client relationship that has been the status quo since the 1950s.

North and South Korea are integrating economically.

Sunhyuk Kim and Wonhyuk Lim, associate professor in the Department of Public Administration at Korea University and fellow at the Korea Development Institute, 2007, *The Washington Quarterly*, “How to Deal with South Korea” cp

At the same time, economic and social ties between the North and South are growing stronger. Since the historic summit between then-President Kim Dae-jung and Chairman Kim Jong-il in June 2000, there have been a series of successful collaborative projects between the South and the North. Railroads are being connected, and an increasing number of South Koreans are visiting North Korean tourist attractions. In 2005 alone, nearly 300,000 South Korean tourists visited Mt. Kumgang, which that year turned a profit for the first time. At the Kaesong Industrial Complex, just north of the demilitarized zone, South Korean companies employ more than 10,000 North Korean workers to make clothes, shoes, and many other products for the countries’ mutual benefit. It would be an exaggeration, however, to claim that South Korea no longer regards North Korea as a threat. Although they see North Korea as a needy neighbor, South Koreans do not dispute that it is also a potential troublemaker that can wreak havoc on the Korean peninsula and around the globe.

Ext – South Korean Anti-Americanism Now

Our evidence assumes trends in the next few decades.

Sunhyuk Kim and Wonhyuk Lim, associate professor in the Department of Public Administration at Korea University and fellow at the Korea Development Institute, 2007, *The Washington Quarterly*, “How to Deal with South Korea” cp

For the next several decades, this new breed of progressive-minded South Koreans will constitute a sizable portion of the adult population. South Koreans born after 1960 accounted for 64.3 percent of the South Korean population in 2000. According to a Korea Society Opinion Institute public survey conducted in November 2006, 68.9 percent of those in their 20s defined themselves as “progressive,” greatly exceeding the national average of progressives of 44.6 percent in all age groups.11

NPT Good 1/4

NPT is the bulwark against international militarization.

William Walker, professor University of St. Andrews, 2007, “Nuclear enlightenment and counter-enlightenment”, International Affairs; May2007, Vol. 83 Issue 3, p431-453, 23p, ebsco

In conclusion, nuclear history has been shaped from the outset by awareness of the dangers of conceding normality. The nuclear weapon was acknowledged to be capable of doing exceptional harm, requiring an exceptional restraint of possession and usage and thus an exceptional kind of politics and statecraft. Bound up with this politics and statecraft was an exceptional problem of reconciliation—how to reconcile the possession of nuclear weapons by the few with the renunciation yet perceived safety of the many, and how to reconcile the diff usion of nuclear materials and technologies for peaceful purposes with the avoidance of weapon proliferation.

For survival and for the legitimacy of the non-proliferation norm, nuclear weapons therefore had to be lifted out of the usual run of politics despite their inescapably being creatures of the competitive international system. This was the essential purpose of the enlightenment project discussed in these pages. Nuclear weapons existed and might serve a common good by preventing catastrophic wars among great powers. However, their use would be strictly limited to deterrence, and the problems of control and reconciliation would be addressed through a politics that emphasized the possibility of achieving security, justice and progress for all and that sought common solutions through the exercise of public reason, informed by a powerful sense of reciprocal obligation and commitment to mutual restraint.50 Central to this politics was the NPT, the grand political and normative settlement of the nuclear age.

As became clear in the 1990s, what the NPT lacked was agreement on how states should respond to non-compliance. This was a serious failing that the United States was correct to highlight, especially after 9/11 had exposed the threats emanating from an increasingly virulent terrorism and the anti-secular movements feeding it. However, the US government’s fundamental mistake was to bring punishment, regime change and counter-proliferation into the foreground of nuclear politics without simultaneously deepening its own and everyone else’s commitment to the norms and rules that underpinned the whole international nuclear order, of which the non-proliferation regime was only part. Instead of pressing at the height of American power for the further marginalization of nuclear weapons through cooperative measures, it sought greater freedom for itself while expecting others to accept and display greater restraint. It thereby wasted the opportunity to use its hegemonic power and authority to build a stronger political and constitutional platform from which to respond eff ectively to the new challenges.

In the coming period, Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear programmes seem likely to remain thorns in everyone’s side, probably beyond early remedy and leaving little palatable alternative to containment. However, the problem of nuclear order extends far beyond the challenges posed by these states or other ‘rogue actors’. It is multifaceted, reaches across the state system, and requires attention by various means at global, regional and local levels. This complexity reinforces my contention that there can be no international nuclear order worthy of the title without the NPT or an NPT-like vessel of central principles, norms and rules. Without it, there can be little trust among states or predictability of behaviour, no reliable coordination of problem-solving, prospects for institutional innovation will be limited, and policy will be prone to militarization.

**<continued>**

NPT Good 2/4

Henry Kissinger observed in A world restored that a robust international order ‘achieves its transformations through acceptance, and this presupposes a consensus on the nature of a just arrangement. But a revolutionary order having destroyed the existing structure of obligations, must impose its measures by force … The health of a social structure is its ability to translate transformation into acceptance, to relate the forces of change to those of conservation.’ 51 The strategies associated in these pages with counter-enlightenment have shown themselves to be incapable of delivering acceptance, let alone achieving their ends. Rather than give way to anomie, governments need now to return to the question of how to institutionalize restraint, addressing the whole presence of nuclear weapons in the international arena, in a manner that upholds ‘the existing structure of obligations’ and can ‘translate transformation into acceptance’. The NPT’s demise can be overplayed: its prospects would look very diff erent if leading states parties, now with India’s tacit support, pledged to re-honour its bargains and if the various proposals for strengthening the Treaty and its associated instruments were given a chance of realization.52

Whatever the Treaty’s prospects, the key to revival rests above all else on recovering the cooperative sensibility and capacity for good judgement that gave life and shape to the international nuclear order. Some will say that little of this kind is now achievable given the facts of proliferation and the increasingly febrile condition of international politics. They need to tell us where else there is to go, and how to go there, together. If they believe that trust can be placed in muddling through, or in further exercises of military might, they are surely deluding themselves.

NPT Good 3/4

Militarism causes unending war and extinction.

Edward Demenchonok, senior researcher at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2009

“Philosophy after Hiroshima from power politics to the ethics of nonviolence and co-responsibility.”, The American Journal of Economics and Sociology 68.1 (Jan 2009): p9(41), OneFile

The idea of a hegemonic-centered world order is a recent version of what Kant two centuries ago called a "world republic," warning that it would become an amalgamation of the nations under a hegemonic state like a despotic "universal monarchy." Kant noticed that, since this is not the will of the nations, this idea cannot be realized, and thus as an alternative he proposed a league of nations or a pacific federation of free states as a basis for peace in the world. (39) Although world hegemony is an unrealistic and failed project, attempts of its implementation are undermining the collective efforts in establishing a peaceful and just world order since World War II.

The project of a hegemonic-centered world order means abandoning the international system based on the rule of law and collective actions (including collective security), and replacing it by unilateral actions of individual states (or coalitions of states). Removing the existing legal-procedural constraints on the use of force will result in the stronger states becoming unchecked, while the weaker ones remain unprotected. This would also mean falling back toward the violent, unlawful "state of nature."

The prospects of a unipolar hegemonic world look grim: a world of "social Darwinism," where the divided nations would be dominated by a hegemonic power, bur each nation would be left on its own in striving for survival in a hostile environment. Facing the economic challenges and the negative consequences of climate change and other environmental problems, the poor nations would be the most vulnerable. The major powers would more aggressively compete for the dominant position and control over the economy and the limited natural resources of the planet. Since the decisive factor in this competition is military force, this would boost militarization and the arms race, thus increasing the possibility of wars and the escalation of global violence.

A traditional reaction to social and global problems is governmental reliance on force and power politics, accompanied by "emergency" measures and a myth of protection. This simplistic approach obfuscates the root causes of the problems and thus is unable to solve them. Instead, the resulting arms race, the infringement of civil liberties, and the tendency toward neototalitarian control have become problems in themselves, keeping society hostage to a spiral of violence. (40)

For those politicians who rely mainly on military "hard power" rather than on the "soft power" of diplomacy, the reasoning seems to be that the use of force is a quick and efficient means for the solution to the problems of security, stability, human rights, and so on. However, many human and social problems by their very nature can not be resolved by force, and an unrestricted use of force can make things even worse, creating new problems. Even well-intentioned leaders or "benevolent hegemons," being limited by their political cultures and interests, cannot know whether the consequences of their policies and actions are equally good for all. Therefore, policies and decisions that potentially could affect society and the international community must be based on collective wisdom in a broad context, through deliberative democracy, international multilateral will-formation, and inclusive legal procedures, thus equally considering the cognitive points of view and interests of all those potentially affected. The complex, diverse, and interdependent high-tech world of the twenty-first century requires genuinely robust democratic relations within society and among nations as equals, an adequate political culture, and an enlightened "reasoning public." Otherwise, a society that has powerful techno-economic means bur is ethically blind and short-sighted could ultimately suffer the same fate as the dinosaurs, with their huge bodies bur disproportionately small brains.

NPT Good 4/4

The NPT is the only institution that can facilitate cooperative engagement over nuclear weapons and restrain violence – calls to abandon it are co-opted by states to justify nuclear acquisition.

William Walker, professor University of St. Andrews, 2007, “Nuclear enlightenment and counter-enlightenment”, International Affairs; May2007, Vol. 83 Issue 3, p431-453, 23p, ebsco

Supporters of the counter-enlightenment of which I shall speak eschewed the use of public reason and unilaterally sought to impose their own versions of what is right. However, they could off er only a unifying conception of encroaching disorder, or of an order reached through the revising power of religion, ideology or economic and military might. As we shall see, they also inadvertently tampered with the basic principle that nuclear weapons are intrinsically illegitimate. They drew the United States into placing trust in its enormous hegemonic capacities, using the constitutionalism of the NPT and other multilateral treaties as disciplinary instruments but abandoning them as vehicles for cooperative engagement and innovation, and ignoring the cautionary advice of realists. It has taken only a few years for the perils of this approach to be revealed—the violence intrinsic to it, the damage to international laws and norms, the loss of US authority and prestige, and the space that it has opened for others to justify aberrant behaviour.

My main point is that the exceptional nature of nuclear weapons calls for an exceptional kind of cooperative politics, and that we are in grave danger of losing the ability to conjure—even to imagine—that kind of politics. An ordering strategy founded on the enlightenment values discussed herein is full of pitfalls and has become increasingly hard to sustain as weaponry has diff used within and beyond the NPT’s confi nes. Yet it has an inherent superiority. The alternative is a degraded international politics, a more frequent recourse to violence and a perpetual vulnerability to catastrophe.

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Terence Roehrig, Associate Professor in National Security Studies at the U.S. Naval War College, 2/17/2010, “Nuclear Weapons and Extended Deterrence: The U.S. Nuclear Umbrella over South Korea," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Theory vs. Policy? Connecting Scholars and Practitioners, New Orleans Hilton Riverside Hotel, The Loews New Orleans Hotel, New Orleans, LA Online, accessed via *allacademic research* cp

The final dimension of the U.S nuclear umbrella is possible changes looming in the U.S. nuclear force posture. Earlier in his administration, President Obama declared that “we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same.” Though President Obama has recognized that this will be a difficult and long-term effort, many are awaiting the release of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review to see if any changes are forthcoming. For U.S. allies, potential cuts to the U.S. arsenal have raised questions about the future of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Would drastic reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons alter Washington’s willingness to extend the umbrella? If the United States sought to deemphasize the importance of nuclear weapons, would it also be less likely to extend the nuclear umbrella? Under the Moscow Treaty, the United States and Russia are required to cut their deployed arsenal to 1,700 to 2,200 warheads by December 31, 2012. Unfortunately, this is also the expiration date of the treaty and the agreement requires no limits on the number of warheads kept in strategic reserve. Thus, the treaty has dubious merit as an arms control agreement. However, what if the United States actually cut its total nuclear arsenal to Moscow Treaty numbers? Would it have a serious negative effect on the nuclear umbrella? Though uncertain to predict, it is likely that there may be some short-term angst in Seoul but dropping to a minimum deterrent of approximately 2,000 nuclear weapons would still provide more than enough capability to extend a nuclear umbrella while also succeeding in bringing a drastic drop to the world’s nuclear weapons stockpiles.