Politics links – DDI

Politics links – DDI	1

***GENERIC LINKS	2

Foreign policy unpopular – 1NC Quality	3

Weak foreign policy unpopular – Dems	4

Withdrawal unpopular – Dems	5

Withdrawal unpopular – public	6

Withdrawal unpopular – defense industry	7

Center/left foreign policy unpopular – START proves	8

Cutting defense spending unpopular	9

Defense Industry forces horsetrading	10

Defense lobby is powerful	11

Anti-spending doesn’t apply to security	12

Spending costs capital	13

Spending costs capital	14

Spending costs capital – Blue Dogs	15

Agencies link – general	16

Agencies link – president = lightning rod	17

Agencies link – Congress must approve budgets	18

***AFGHANISTAN LINKS	19

Afghan withdrawal Unpopular – 1NC Quality	20

Afghan withdrawal Unpopular – GOP	21

Afghan withdrawal unpopular – public	22

Afghan withdrawal unpopular – hawks	23

Afghan withdrawal unpopular – partisanship	24

Afghanistan policies derail agenda	25

Afghan Flip-Flop Link	26

Fast Afghan withdrawal unpopular – GOP	27

Afghan withdrawal deadlines unpopular – GOP	28

COIN unpopular	29

Afghan withdrawal popular – Congress	30

Afghan withdrawal popular – Congress	31

Afghan withdrawal popular – Dems	32

Afghan withdrawal popular – public	33

***IRAQ LINKS	34

Iraq withdrawal Unpopular – Public	35

Iraq withdrawal unpopular – GOP	36

Iraq withdrawal popular – GOP	37

Iraq withdrawal popular – Dems	38

Fast Iraq withdrawal popular – Dems	39

2011 withdrawal popular – GOP	40

PMC withdrawal Unpopular – Casualties	41

PMC withdrawal Unpopular – Political Cover**	42

PMC withdrawal Unpopular – Political Costs	43

***JAPAN LINKS	44

Japan withdrawal unpopular – Public	45

Japan withdrawal unpopular – Congress	46

Japan Flip-Flop Link	47

Okinawa withdrawal unpopular – bipartisan	48

Okinawa withdrawal link NU – Obama already supported it	49

***SOUTH KOREA LINKS	50

SK withdrawal unpopular – 1NC Quality	51

SK withdrawal Unpopular – Korea Lobby	52

SK withdrawal Unpopular – Blue Dogs	53

SK Flip-Flop Link	54

SK withdrawal popular	55

***TURKEY LINKS	56

Turkey withdrawal unpopular	57

Turkey withdrawal unpopular – Congress	58

Turkey withdrawal unpopular – Link Magnifier	59

Turkey withdrawal popular	60

Turkey TNWS withdrawal popular	61

***INTERNAL LINKS – POLICIES HURT OBAMA	62

Controversial policies drain capital	63

Legislation costs capital	64

Capital finite	65

Capital finite	66

Capital finite	67

Capital determines agenda	68

Obama = anti-Teflon – link only goes one way	69

A2: Winners Win	70

A2: Winners Win	71

Winners win NU	72

PC Key to Dem Unity	73

A2: Olive Branch	74

A2: Concessions	75

Flip Flops Kill Agenda	76

***INTERNAL LINKS – POLICIES HELP OBAMA	77

Winners Win	78

Winners Win	79

Winners Win – progressive issues	80

Teflon	81

Olive Branch	82

Concessions Key to Agenda	83

Momentum Key	84

*OTHER	85

Yes Spillover	86

No Spillover	87

No Spillover	88

No Spillover – Foreign policy/ Domestic Policy	89

Base Key	90

Progressive Base Key	91

Blue Dogs key to agenda	92

A2: Base Key	93

A2: Dems Key	94

Popularity Key to Agenda	95

Popularity Key to Agenda	96

A2: Popularity Key to Agenda	97

A2: Popularity Key to Agenda	98

A2: Popularity Key to Agenda	99

Partisanship Kills Agenda	100

A2: Intrinsicness	101

***GENERIC LINKS

Foreign policy unpopular – 1NC Quality

Obama must avoid heavy lifting – Congress will fight overambitious foreign policy goals.

Kupchan 2010 [Charles A., Prof. Int’l Affairs @ Georgetown U, Senior Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, “Enemies into Friends,” in Foreign Affairs, Mar/Apr, Vol. 89, Iss 2, Proquest]

DELIVERING THE GOODS

IF THE Obama administration's tentative engagement with the United States' rivals is to be more than a passing flirtation, Washington will have to conduct not only deft statecraft abroad but also particularly savvy politics at home. Progress will be slow and incremental; it takes years, if not decades, to turn enmity into amity. The problem for Obama is that patience is in extraordinarily short supply in Washington. With midterm elections looming in November, critics will surely intensify their claims that Obama's outreach has yet to pay off. In preparation, Obama should push particularly hard on a single front, aiming to have at least one clear example that his strategy is working. Rapprochement with Russia arguably offers the best prospects for near-term success. Washington and Moscow are well on their way toward closing a deal on arms control, and their interests intersect on a number of other important issues, including the need for stability in Central and South Asia. Moreover, the United States can piggyback on the progress that the European Union has already made in reaching out to Russia on issues of trade, energy, and security.

Obama also needs to start laying the groundwork for congressional support. To help clear the legislative hurdles ahead, Obama should consider including in his stable of special envoys a prominent Republican--such as former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, former Senator Chuck Hagel, or former Secretary of State James Baker--to lend a bipartisan imprimatur to any proposed deals that might come before Congress. He must also be careful not to overreach. For example, his call to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether, however laudable in theory, may scare off centrist senators who might otherwise be prepared to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Obama should also be mindful of the order in which he picks his fights. If advancing rapprochement with Russia is a priority for 2010, it makes sense to put off heavy lifting with Cuba until the following year. It is better to shepherd a few key items through Congress than to ask for too much--and risk coming back empty-handed.

Weak foreign policy unpopular – Dems

Dems are afraid of being soft on defense – they’ll push military expenditures.

Scheer 2008 [Robert, contributing editor – the Nation, “The Pornography of Power: How Defense Hawks Hijacked 9/11 and Weakened America,” p. 123]

The delusion of the Democrats is twofold: Military expenditures can be used for meaningful social programs such as job training through the military, and even if the money is totally wasted there will be enough left over to fund more needed domestic programs. Democrats, certainly since the failed presidential campaign of George McGovern, have been wary of being "soft on defense" and have come to regard the reform of military expenditures as a politically life-threatening third rail.

Withdrawal unpopular – Dems

Democrats will fight for aggressive foreign policy under political pressure.

Gelb 2009 [Leslie, President – Council on Foreign Relations, "Necessity, Choice, and Common Sense: A Policy for a Bewildering World," , in Foreign Affairs, May/June, p. 69]

The liberal internationalists still exist today as an important element within the Democratic Party. Their most impressive contribution has been to keep reminding Washington of the need to cooperate with allies and negotiate with adversaries in almost all instances. But since the Vietnam War, they have been calling for new international institutions without being specific or practical about them, and they have been drifting toward softer and more unrealistic definitions of power. Formulating a strategy is difficult for them because it is mainly a call for more negotiations and more multilateral diplomacy and less reliance on military power and force. To complicate matters further, when they come under great political pressure, many of them appear to abandon these principles and become war hawks themselves, as happened when the decision to invade Iraq was being debated.

Withdrawal unpopular – public

Polls demonstrate public opposition to aggressive forward deployment.

Preble 2009 [Christopher, Director Foreign Policy Studies – Cato Institute, “The Power Problem: How American Military Dominance Makes Us Less Safe, Less Prosperous, And Less Free,” p. 133-134]

If the American people were given the choice, they would almost surely choose a different course. Tufts University Professor Daniel Drezner observes, "Most Americans, on most issues, articulate what George W. Bush characterized as a 'humble' foreign policy during the 2000 campaign. They want a prudent foreign policy based on security against attacks and threats to domestic well-being. In polls, Americans consistently reject hegemony in favor of burden sharing. In a survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in July 2006, 75 percent of respondents believed that the United States "should do its share to solve world problems together with other countries" and only 10 percent wanted the United States to "remain the preeminent world leader in solving international problems." By a similar margin, respondents agreed with the proposition that "The U.S. is playing the role of world policeman more than it should be." Bruce Stokes and Andrew Kohut of the Pew Research Center point out in their book America against the World that since the end of the Cold War, "no more than 13 percent of Americans have said the United States should be the single most important leader in the world."

Withdrawal unpopular – defense industry

Defense contractor lobbies influence congress – they’ll force a compromise.

Benson 2009 [Krisila, Project Director Business Leaders for Sensible Priorities @ Center for American Progress, "Message from Krisila Benson, BLSP Project Director," February, http://www.americanprogress.org/projects/blsp/newsletters/nwl_blsp_0209.html]

President Obama has committed to both rationalizing defense spending and funding a bold domestic agenda. The new administration has a broad-based mandate for change and a clear idea for a new direction in public policy. But this is not enough to ensure that there will be a change in our budget priorities. President Obama cannot make spending decisions without the concurrence of Congress, which continues to be a tough sell. BLSP’s agenda competes for Congress’s attention with wealthy, well-organized, and politically entrenched defense contractors. In the first three quarters of 2008 alone the three biggest defense contractors spent a combined total of $41 million on lobbying. Weapons contractors are also taking advantage of today’s economic situation to sound the alarm that defense spending is being cut and with it jobs. Members of Congress who may personally believe in the BLSP agenda are hesitant to take a public stand either out of concern over job losses in the home district or concern about appearing soft on defense. Under President Bush, Secretary Robert Gates developed a fiscal year 2010 DOD budget of $584 billion, a 13 percent increase over the FY09 budget. This excludes wartime supplemental spending, which is likely to bring FY09 defense spending closer to $700 billion. According to press leaks, the Obama administration will ask for $527 billion for defense spending in FY10, a 2.3 percent increase over 2009 levels. But because Gates’ $584 billion figure was already made public Obama is being accused of decreasing defense spending by 11 percent and not supporting national security—making it harder to defend what is in fact an increase in defense spending. The actual budget the administration proposes for FY10 will be submitted to Congress in March or April.

No political will to resist defense industry – fear of backlash

Ackerman 2010 [Bruce, Washington Independent, “Just in Time for the Discretionary Freeze, New Report Says Defense Spending Is Unsustainable,” January 26, http://washingtonindependent.com/74818/just-in-time-for-the-discretionary-freeze-new-report-says-defense-spending-is-unsustainable]

Now, if you read through Harrison’s paper, you’ll see it contains a key assumption. Because defense spending is so bloated, and the deficit so big and the economy so bad, then obviously defense spending has to drop, so it makes sense to reprioritize what’s actually in the national interest. But that assumes political will — both from Congress and from the Obama administration — that is absolutely not in evidence. And it also assumes countervailing political pressures — i.e., the desire not to be demagogued as weak on defense — that are in abundance will suddenly abate. So we’re left with … an unsustainable defense budget and spending freezes/cuts in for more politically vulnerable clients, like the poor and middle class.

Center/left foreign policy unpopular – START proves

The centrist foreign policy lobby has no clout – GOP dismissal of START proves that nothing but the hardline position is acceptable

Daniel Drezner, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, 7-8-10, http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/07/08/death_of_the_foreign_policy_mandarins

Putting the substantive objections aside, there are some interesting implications to draw from this kerfuffle. First, START will be an easy test of the remaining power of the foreign policy mandarins. As Time's Michael Crowley points out, START has the support of former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and James Baker, former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, former National Security Advisers Brent Scowcroft and Stephen Hadley, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, and Senator Richard Lugar. If the Obama administration can't get Senate ratification of START despite the bipartisan support of the foreign policy community, well, it suggests that the foreign policy community doesn't have the political capital it once did. I posited earlier this year that START would pass because it was pretty unobtrusive and wouldn't play a big role in political campaigns. If GOP senators think differently, however, then you can kiss any foreign policy initiative that requires congressional approval bye-bye.

Zero chance for cooperation on a centrist foreign policy – the GOP has doubled down on the far right

Barron Young Smith, assistant editor of The New Republic, 7-8-10, http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/76111/non-starter

It means, first and foremost, that the responsible Republican foreign policy establishment is not coming back. Mandarins like George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, and James Baker, who have all testified or written on behalf of the START treaty—calling it an integral, uncontroversial way of repairing the bipartisan arms-control legacy that sustained American foreign policy all the way up until the George W. Bush administration—are going to be dead soon (or they've drifted into the service of Democrats). The people who will take their place will be from a generation of superhawks, like John Bolton, Liz Cheney, and Robert Joseph, who are virulently opposed to the practice of negotiated arms control. Mitt Romney, though a moderate from Michigan, is not going to be the second coming of Gerald Ford. Indeed, Romney has positioned himself far to the right of John McCain, who in the 2008 campaign implied that he would rely on advice from this older cohort and promised he would negotiate a START treaty, alongside efforts to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. And, given that Romney's primary opponents will likely be folks like Sarah Palin, Mike Huckabee, and Tim Pawlenty (who is unlikely to place himself left of Romney on such an issue), we're looking at a world where every 2012 GOP candidate, and thus the whole party, will soon be committed to overturning the New START treaty.

Cutting defense spending unpopular

Cutting defense spending is political suicide.

Politics Daily 2010 [“Congress on Military Spending Cuts: Not Now, Maybe Never”, 5/13, http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/05/13/congress-on-military-spending-cuts-not-now-maybe-never/]

Last week Defense Secretary Robert Gates asked that Congress help pare down Pentagon costs. This week he got the answer: a loud raspberry.

One key problem is the military's skyrocketing personnel costs -- for pay, health care and generous benefits. The cost of the military's health insurance, whose premiums haven't been raised since 1995, is "eating us alive,'' Gates has said. Pay is another driver of rising costs. Both the Pentagon and Congress have lavished generous annual raises on military personnel well above increases for comparable civilian pay and wages.

This year, an Army private first class, unmarried and in the first year of his or her service, will draw $35,948 in pay with $3,355.43 of that tax-free. That's not counting a slew of other benefits, ranging from reduced-cost health care to free college courses. In contrast, the average male wage earner, 16-24 years old, earns $24,596, according to the U.S Bureau of Labor Standards.

No one, of course, would argue that young Americans who put their lives on the line should be underpaid. But that's the problem, as Gates discovered this week: It is politically popular to say yes to defense spending -- and political suicide to say no.

Congress will fight defense cuts.

Dayen 2010 [David, News Desk - FDL, "Defense Spending Cuts Face Likely Congressional Override," May 17, http://news.firedoglake.com/2010/05/17/defense-spending-cuts-face-likely-congressional-override/]

The lesson of Congress in the modern age is that it’s much harder to eliminate a program than it is to enact one. Every program has a champion somewhere on Capitol Hill, and it probably only needs one to be saved – but 218 and 60 to be put into motion.

A case in point: our bloated military budget. The Obama Administration has generally tried to cancel out unnecessary defense programs, with meager success in the last budget year. Congress will probably assert themselves in an election year, however.

Last year, after a similarly protracted struggle, Gates succeeded in getting Congress to end funding for the F-22, a plane which tended to malfunction in the rain. Seriously. But Congress did not move on the F-35 engine or the C-17, and they seem similarly positioned this year. Ike Skelton and Carl Levin support the F-35 engine, for example, and included it in their appropriation requests out of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, which they separately chair.

I fully recognize that the off-limits discussion about military spending concerns the bases in over 100 countries and continued adventures abroad in places where “victory” means almost nothing. But it’s a symptom of the same problem – the persistent inertia that aids the military-industrial complex to keep the war machine moving. And so we get new engines to planes that don’t need new engines.

Defense Industry forces horsetrading

Obama will horsetrade.

Project for Defense Alternatives 2008 [member of the Security Policy Working Group and the Unified Security Budget Task Force, affiliated with the International Study Group on Alternative Security Policy (Berlin) and the International Security Network (Geneva), “Reenvisioning Defense,” December, http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/081201ReenvisioningDef.pdf]

The temptation to see and use military spending as a form of welfare for congressional districts requires constant vigilance by independent observers and actors. Congressional add-ons or “earmarks” to presidential budget requests now often exceed $10 billion. But this is only the visible tip of the problem. Ongoing support for troubled or excessive programs within the yearly presidential budget request also may reflect parochial interest. This tendency was most evident when Congresspersons from both parties worked hard to preserve redundant military bases in their states and districts, often against the Pentagon’s assessment of requirements. Pork-barreling and horse-trading within Congress tends not only to boost the overall size of the budget (to the detriment of other priorities) but also to impede adaptation of our military to new circumstances.

Defense lobby is powerful

Defense lobbying is strong

Julian Hattem B.A in Anthropology, Huffington Post, 1-21-10, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/21/top-defense-contractors-s_n_431542.html

The ten largest defense contractors in the nation spent more than $27 million lobbying the federal government in the last quarter of 2009, according to a review of recently-filed lobbying records. The massive amount of money used to influence the legislative process came as the White House announced it would ramp up military activity in Afghanistan and Congress considered appropriations bills to pay for that buildup. All told, these ten companies, the largest revenue earners in the industry, spent roughly $7.2 million more lobbying in the fourth quarter of 2009 (October through December) than in the three months prior. Such an increase in lobbying expenditures is partly a reflection of just how profitable the business of waging war can be. Each of these companies earned billions of dollars in defense contracts this past year. As the U.S. ramps up its military activities overseas, and the army is stretched thin by other ventures, it stands to reason that the contracts won't dry up any time soon. In mid-December, Congress passed a defense appropriations bill that totaled more than $635 billion. Shortly thereafter, the firm Northrop Grumman moved its corporate office to the Washington D.C. region to be closer to the heart of legislative action. Among the issues on which these ten firms lobbied, "appropriations" was the most frequently cited in lobbying forms. "We've built Rome," one longtime good-government official said of the symbiosis between contractors and the government. On a related note, the Congressional Research Service released a report on Thursday, which showed that the number of private security contractors has bulged in the wake of Obama's Afghanistan-surge announcement. Currently, contractors in Afghanistan make up between 22 percent and 30 percent of armed U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

Anti-spending doesn’t apply to security

Anti-spending attitudes don’t apply to security matters

Washington Post, 7-21-10

The series is a powerful reminder that it's not only bleeding-heart liberals who fall into the trap of trying to solve seemingly urgent problems by throwing too much money at them. It turns out that supposedly tough-minded conservatives are no less prone to runaway spending when their top priorities are involved. Sometime in the next week I expect some Republican who has railed against the scope and complexity of the Democrats' domestic initiatives to stand up in the Senate and, with Goldwater-like conviction, declare that profligacy in defense of security is no vice. One of my favorite features of the series so far has been the organizational chart of the 66 different counterterrorism command centers in the Washington area, not counting the White House Situation Room, each with its secure bunkerlike facility, its 24/7 staff, its high-tech control room, secure database, command staff and cadre of outside contractors. Looking at that chart, you don't have to be a McKinsey consultant to understand that the 9/11 Commission's dream of streamlined coordination has lost to the imperative of bureaucratic survival. Perhaps all this was inevitable given the urgency of ramping up the counterterrorism effort after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. For years, the message from the public and political leaders was to get it done fast and don't worry about the cost -- the bureaucracy and the contracting community were only too happy to oblige. An optimist might argue that now that we know what works and what doesn't, we can move on to Phase II, the rationalization and consolidation. But the realist would point out that that rarely happens. For those setting out to fix health care or the financial regulatory system, the takeaway should be that it is a lot easier to do it right the first time.

Spending costs capital

Spending is unpopular with Republicans now

McKinnon, staff writer, 7-24 (John, Wall Street Journal, 7-24-09, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124839458922777659.html)

To emphasize Republicans' interest in an overhaul, Senate GOP Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky has given 26 floor speeches since June, calling for health overhaul in each one. On Thursday, Mr. McConnell said Republicans agree with Mr. Obama on the problems -- but not the solutions. "All of us want health-care reform, but we want reform that brings down costs and long-term spending, not a so-called reform that makes things even worse," he said. According to a June 30 internal strategy memo issued by the RNC, potential targets for criticism in the Democratic health plan include its price tag, estimated at more than $1 trillion over 10 years; its perceived lack of checks on spending; and the potential risks of greater government involvement in the market, such as deterioration of health-care quality and patient choice. Republicans want to slow down what they view as Democrats' efforts to rush passage of their plan before public concerns over its costs and potential impact on the federal deficit mount. The RNC "will engage in every activity we can to slow down this mad rush," said the memo from party Chairman Michael Steele.

Spending is unpopular with Blue Dogs

Blue Dog Coalition, 09 (4-1-09, http://www.house.gov/melancon/BlueDogs/Budget%20Reform.html)

Today, leaders of the fiscally conservative Democratic Blue Dog Coalition pointed to the inclusion of several long-standing Blue Dog priorities in announcing their support of the fiscal year 2010 House Democratic budget resolution. While acknowledging the tough road that lies ahead, Blue Dog leaders applauded both Budget Committee Chairman John Spratt and OMB Director Peter Orszag for their efforts to restore fiscal discipline to the federal government and bring honesty and accountability to the budget process. “The House Budget Resolution will put our country on a path to fiscal responsibility by including key budget enforcement tools advocated by the Blue Dogs, most important of which is a clear and definite pathway to statutory PAYGO in the House this year,” said Rep. Allen Boyd (D-FL), Blue Dog Budget Task Force Chairman. “For the first time in eight years we are working with an honest document that takes the necessary steps to reverse the reckless fiscal policies that have led us into this unprecedented financial crisis. We have much more work ahead of us, and the Blue Dogs are eager to continue working with the President and our colleagues in Congress to put a framework in place that includes statutory PAYGO and allows for long-term fiscal sustainability and economic growth.” In order to address the issue of long-term fiscal sustainability, the Blue Dogs demanded that the FY ’10 House budget resolution include an iron-clad commitment to statutory pay-as-you-go rules, a deficit neutral reserve fund for health care reform, and funding for program integrity to identify waste and abuse in government spending. Members of the Coalition also played a critical role in bringing down discretionary spending levels and ensuring that cap and trade legislation is not subject to the budget reconciliation process.

Spending costs capital

Spending is a major drain to Obama political capital

Scott Wilson 6/14, 2009

Scott Wilson (Washington Post Staff Writer) 6/14, 2009: “Obama’s Spending Plans May Pose Political Risks” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/13/AR2009061302035.html?hpid=topnews

After enjoying months of towering poll numbers, legislative victories and well-received foreign policy initiatives, the White House has become increasingly concerned that President Obama's spending plans, which would require $9 trillion in government borrowing over the next decade, could become a political liability that defines the 2010 midterm elections. The concern was reflected in the aggressive response from administration officials to criticism that money from Obama's stimulus plan is arriving too slowly to help the languishing economy, as well as in the president's public endorsement of "pay as you go" legislation, which would require Congress to make room for new non-discretionary spending with equivalent cuts to other parts of the budget. Yesterday, Obama also outlined billions of dollars in savings that would be used to pay for his health-care reform proposal. But there is evidence of growing public concern over his fiscal policies. As he traveled Thursday in Green Bay, Wis., Obama was greeted by demonstrators holding signs that said, "No socialism" and "Taxed Enough Yet?" Republican leaders, who have been searching for a way to dent the president's popularity, are training their attacks on his economic policies as they look ahead to the 2010 midterm congressional elections. Their argument that Obama is spending recklessly, however, is complicated by the fact that the previous GOP administration's tax cuts, borrowing to finance wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and expansion of entitlement benefits remain the chief drivers behind the rising debt. "The reckless fiscal policies of the past have left us in a very deep hole," Obama said last week. "And digging our way out of it will take time, patience and some tough choices." But even some leaders in his own party are calling on the president to soon begin making those difficult choices, despite a fragile economy that remains in recession. After inheriting a $1.3 trillion annual budget deficit upon taking office, Obama pushed through $787 billion in short-term spending and tax cuts designed to make up for retreating private-sector demand and to spark the economy. He also won approval for a 10-year budget that aspires to sharply reduce the deficit in its first years and takes on the rising cost of health care, which his advisers say is the single biggest cause of increasing public expenditures. But Sen. Kent Conrad (D-N.D.), chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, said, "The second five years is where we're on a completely unsustainable course." "People know we have an overall situation here that doesn't add up," he said. Results from a Gallup survey released last week show that although more than six in 10 Americans approve of Obama's overall job performance, fewer than half say they approve of how he is handling the deficit and controlling federal spending. The poll also shows a decline from the previous month in the percentage of Americans who approve of Obama's handling of the economy, although a majority still does.

Spending costs capital – Blue Dogs

Blue dogs are key to Obama's agenda and they dislike spending

Kellman, staff writer, 7-23 (Laura, Associated Press, 7-23-09, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gjUfxTBnNrhPSJrTHM1K3Qj4_PvgD99KD50O0)

Conservative-leaning Blue Dog Democrats are enjoying a power surge like no other in their 15 years, forcing President Barack Obama and their own party leaders to deal with their demands for cost cuts and tax restraints in overhauling health care. The evidence is everywhere these days: Polls show the public shares their concerns about the cost of Obama's plan to insure all Americans who seek health coverage. Obama himself has spent valuable presidential time in private talks with these Democrats and in near-daily appeals for the public to prod Congress into action. And the group's political fund raising is peaking. All the while, Obama and Democratic leaders have issued shout-outs to the faction of 52 House members, a sign of the clout Blue Dogs wield over some of the president's top priorities — none more than his plan to provide health care to virtually all Americans. "I think, rightly, a number of these so-called Blue Dog Democrats — more conservative Democrats — were concerned that not enough had been done on reducing costs," Obama said Tuesday in an interview with CBS News. That's a measure of validation for a group that spent its first decade being ignored by Republicans and tolerated by more left-leaning Democrats. There was more. On Wednesday, the Blue Dogs saw their organizing principle, a pay-as-you-go fiscal spending policy, pass the House by a 99-vote margin. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi called a news conference to praise the group. Her second-in-command, Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, thanked them from the well of the House chamber and called the group "real Democrats" at a time when they are less popular with the party's liberal flank. "How sweet it is," said Budget Committee Chairman John Spratt, D-S.C. The Blue Dogs' political action committee raised $1.1 million in the first six months of this year, more than it raised for the entire 2003-04 fundraising cycle, according to the nonpartisan Center for Public Integrity.

Agencies link – general

The President is held accountable for all agency decisions, even those they have no control over.

Shane 95 (Peter M., Dean and prof. Law @ Univ. Pittsburgh, 1995 Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, Arkansas Law Review)

The reason for the insignificance of the transparency argument is that, even without plenary power to second-guess all bureaucratic policy makers, the President may well be held generally and properly accountable for overall bureaucratic performance in any event. That is because voters know the President has appointed all key policy makers and the most important managers of executive affairs. The President's value structure is likely to dominate the bureaucracy even if he is not formally able to command all important policy decisions. Professor Abner Greene has recently catalogued a series of reasons why this is so: OMB reviews virtually all agency budgets; the Attorney General controls most agency litigation; the President's support may be critical to an agency in its negotiations with Congress. For these reasons, Presidents do not inevitably have less influence over "independent" agencies than they do over "purely executive" establishments

Executive agency decisions are always connected to the President.

Cohen and Collier 99 (Jeffrey E. and Ken, professors of political science at Fordham and Kansas, 1999 Presidential Policymaking: An End of Century Assessment, p. 42)

In his study of the agenda-setting process, Kingdon finds that respondents cite the president and his administration as perhaps the most important actor with agenda influence. As Kingdon states, "there is little doubt that the president remains a powerful force in agenda setting, particularly compared to other actors." Moreover, the views of department heads and others associated with the administration are usually thought of as the president's or as having the president's stamp of approval. When they speak, it is for the administration and the president. Thus, the president has many "voices".

Agency decisions do not provide political cover for the President

Lewis 03(David E., prof. politics and public affairs @ Princeton, 2003 Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design, p. 4)

Agency design determines bureaucratic responsiveness to democratic impulses and pressure, particularly those channeled through elected officials like the president. It can determine the success or failure of modern presidents in meeting constitutional and electoral mandates. One of the central concerns of presidency scholars beginning with Richard Neustadt (1960) has been increasing public expectations of presidents (Lowi 1985; Skowronek 1993). The president is held accountable for the success or failure of the entire government. When the economy is in recession, when an agency blunders, or when some social problem goes unaddressed, it is the president whose reelection and historical legacy are on the line.

Empirically proven- agencies have caused political backlash

Kosar, government analyst, 05 (Kevin, CRS Congressional Report, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32750.pdf)

Controversies recently have arisen over certain executive branch agencies’ expenditures of appropriated funds on public relations activities, some of which have been characterized as propagandistic. Generally speaking, there are two legal restrictions on agency public relations activities and propaganda. 5 U.S.C. 3107 prohibits the use of appropriated funds to hire publicity experts. Appropriations law “publicity and propaganda” clauses restrict the use of funds for puffery of an agency, purely partisan communications, and covert propaganda. No federal agency monitors federal public relations activities, but a Member or Committee of Congress may ask the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to examine an agency’s expenditures on public relations activities with a view to their legality. Any effort to reform current statutory restrictions on agency public relations activities will face three challenges: tracking public relations activities by agencies, defining “propaganda,” and enforcing laws against agency use of funds for publicity experts and propaganda.

Agencies link – president = lightning rod

Political visibility virtually guarantees that the president will be associated with plan

Fitts, 96 (Michael, prof. of law UPenn, 19 Univ. Penn L. Rev, 1996, p.827)

To the extent that the modern president is subject to heightened visibility about what he says and does and is led to make increasingly specific statements about who should win and who should lose on an issue, his ability to mediate conflict and control the agenda can be undermined. The modern president is supposed to have a position on such matters as affirmative action, the war in Bosnia, the baseball strike, and the newest EPA regulations, the list is infinite. Perhaps in response to these pressures, each modern president has made more speeches and taken more positions than his predecessors, with Bill Clinton giving three times as many speeches as Reagan during the same period. In such circumstances, the president is far less able to exercise agenda control, refuse to take symbolic stands, or take inconsistent positions. The well-documented tendency of the press to emphasize the strategic implications of politics exacerbates this process by turning issues into zero-sum games.

Presidents are the focal point of governmental policies

CNN 02 (Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer transcripts, 4-28-02, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0204/28/le.00.html)

Bruce Morton, Cnn Correspondent: Networks will often air whatever the president says, even if he's praising the Easter Bunny. Blitzer: Competing for face time on the cable news networks. Stay with us. Blitzer: Welcome back. Time now for Bruce Morton's essay on the struggle for balanced coverage on the cable networks. Morton: The Democrats have written the three cable news networks -- CNN, Fox and MSNBC -- complaining that the Bush administration gets much more coverage than elected Democrats. They cite CNN, which they say, from January 1 through March 21, aired 157 live events involving the Bush administration, and 7 involving elected Democrats. Fox and MS, they say, did much the same thing. The coverage gap is certainly real, for several reasons. First, since September 11, the U.S. has been at war in Afghanistan, so the president has been an active commander in chief. And covering the war, networks will often air whatever the president says, even if he's praising the Easter Bunny. Plus, the White House press secretary's briefing, the Pentagon's, maybe the State Department's. Why not? It's easy, it's cheap, the cameras are pooled, and in war time, the briefings may make major news. You never know. But there's a reason for the coverage gap that's older than Mr. Bush's administration. In war or peace, the president is a commanding figure -- one man to whose politics and character and, nowadays, sex life, endless attention is paid. Congress is 535 people. What it does is complicated, compromises on budget items done in private, and lacks the drama of the White House. There's a primetime TV show about a president. None about the Congress. If a small newspaper has one reporter in Washington, he'll cover two things, the local congressional delegation and, on big occasions, the White House. So the complaining Democrats have a point, but it's worth remembering that coverage of a president, while always intense, isn't always positive. You could ask the Clintons. 9 Presidents will always get more coverage than Congresses. They're sexier. But it won't always be coverage they like.

The president gets the public blame for legislative action

Calabresi and Lindgren, Yale Law Journal, 2006

What is driving the backlash we are documenting here? First, and most obviously, presidents become lightning rods for everything that goes wrong.18 Most presidents leave office less popular than when they entered, with Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton being the only exceptions since at least Dwight Eisenhower.19 Even the exceptions (Reagan and Clinton) suffered major Congressional losses in their first midterm elections, at times when their job approval ratings were down substantially.20 Thus, the response of voters is to blame the president for whatever goes wrong, and probably as a result, to punish that president’s party in midterm elections.

Agencies link – Congress must approve budgets

Budget approvals means plan is politically perceived

About.com, 07 (online encyclopedia, 2-14-07, http://uspolitics.about.com/od/thefederalbudget/a/budget_process.htm)

The budget process begins the first month in February, when the President submits his proposal to Congress. This step in the process is governed by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. The Act also established the Bureau of the Budget which, since 1970 (Nixon Administration), is known as the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). OMB is the largest and arguably the most powerful group in the Executive Office of the President. OMB is also responsible for overseeing management and budgets of executive branch agencies as well as advising the President on a variety of issues. The President's proposed budget includes extensive supporting documentation to make the case for White House spending - and saving - priorities.

Agencies link- budget approvals have to go through Congress

US Code, No Date (TITLE 31 > SUBTITLE III > CHAPTER 35 > SUBCHAPTER II > § 3512, http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/31/3512.html)

(a) (1) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall prepare and submit to the appropriate committees of the Congress a financial management status report and a governmentwide 5-year financial management plan. (2) A financial management status report under this subsection shall include— (A) a description and analysis of the status of financial management in the executive branch; (B) a summary of the most recently completed financial statements— (i) of Federal agencies under section 3515 of this title; and (ii) of Government corporations; (C) a summary of the most recently completed financial statement audits and reports— (i) of Federal agencies under section 3521 (e) and (f) of this title; and (ii) of Government corporations; (D) a summary of reports on internal accounting and administrative control systems submitted to the President and the Congress under the amendments made by the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of 1982 (Public Law 97–255); (E) a listing of agencies whose financial management systems do not comply substantially with the requirements of Section [1] 3(a) [2] the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996, and a summary statement of the efforts underway to remedy the noncompliance; and (F) any other information the Director considers appropriate to fully inform the Congress regarding the financial management of the Federal Government.

***AFGHANISTAN LINKS

Afghan withdrawal Unpopular – 1NC Quality

Withdrawal’s massively unpopular – Republicans will take advantage of the flip-flop.

Biddle 2009 [Stephen, Roger Hertog Senior Fellow for Defense Policy, “Is It Worth It? The Difficult Case for War in Afghanistan” July-August, http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=617]

However, reversing policy and disengaging would be no easier for Obama. It would be the wrong course on the merits. Politically, it would commit the Administration to a policy now supported by only 17 percent of the electorate. It would play into the traditional Republican narrative of Democratic weakness on defense, facilitate widespread if ill-founded Republican accusations of the Administration’s leftist radicalism, and risk alienating moderate Democrats in battleground districts whose support the President will need on other issues. However bad the news may look if the United States fights on, withdrawal would probably mean a Karzai collapse and a Taliban victory, an outcome that would flood American TV screens with nightmarish imagery.

Afghan withdrawal Unpopular – GOP

Withdrawal from Afghanistan will make the GOP angry- it makes the U.S look weak.

CQ Politics, Congressional, Presidential and Political News, June 16th 2010, GOP Criticizes Withdrawal Plan in Afghanistan Efforts http://news.yahoo.com/s/cq/20100616/pl_cq_politics/politics3684343_1

Senate Republicans on Wednesday attacked President Obama's plan to begin withdrawing U.S. forces from Afghanistan in July of next year, saying that the United States was sending a self-defeating message to its allies in the region.

Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, the commander of all U.S. forces in the Middle East and Afghanistan, assured lawmakers that Obama's July 2011 date signaled the beginning of a process of troop withdrawals whose pace would be determined by conditions on the ground."That is not the day when we look for the door and turn out the lights, but when a process begins," said Petraeus, who resumed his testimony Wednesday. He fainted from dehydration during testimony June 15. "It would be helpful if your sentiments were shared by the president, the vice president and the national security adviser," said Republican John McCain of Arizona, who cited Obama, Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr., and national security adviser James L. Jones as saying that the July 2011 start of the troop withdrawal was "etched in stone." "Right now, we're sounding an uncertain trumpet," McCain said. "Our allies in the region are convinced that we're leaving." Obama laid down the July 2011 date for the beginning of a U.S. pullback in a speech at West Point last December, where he outlined his strategy to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. At the time, Obama stressed that the pace of the withdrawal would be dictated by conditions on the ground. Republican James M. Inhofe of Oklahoma suggested that Obama repeat that message. "Having only said it once, there's a problem there," he said.

GOP hates removing troops

Xinhua News, 6/27/10, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-06/28/c_13372358.htm )

U.S. ranking Senate Republicans on Sunday blasted President Barack Obama's Afghanistan strategy, dismissing the July 2011 deadline as a "political decision" not based on military strategy. "It was purely a political decision, not one based on facts on the ground, not one based on military strategy," Republican Senator John McCain said on NBC's "Meet the Press," referring to a strategy unveiled by President Obama in December, which called for a buildup of 30,000 troops in Afghanistan and beginning pulling out in July 2011. "You tell the enemy you're leaving, they will wait," he said. " In wars you declare when you're leaving after you've succeeded." Republican Senator Lindsey Graham joined McCain in criticizing Obama's Afghan timetable. "If everybody in Afghanistan believes that we're going to begin to leave in July 2011 no matter what, it's going to be hard to win over people on the fence and that's gotta change, or we're gonna lose," he said on "Fox News Sunday". Republican Senator Saxby Chambliss said on CNN's "State of the Union" that "it's a huge mistake to even put that deadline out there."

Afghan withdrawal unpopular – public

Withdrawing Troops From Afghan Unpopular with public

Michael Barone, New York Post Staff Writer, 7/19/10, New York Post, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/dems_dovishness_bedeviling_bam_7eua2rh7BDr4vEc8EeU5FK

Has the war in Afghanistan contributed to America's long-term security? Some 53 percent say it has, while 44 percent say it hasn't. Has the Iraq war contributed to America's long-term security? Some 50 percent say it has, while 48 percent say it hasn't. Those are virtually identical numbers. It seems that about half of Americans think both were Good Wars and about half consider them both Bad Wars. Substantial majorities of Republican voters consider both to be wars worth fighting, while majorities of Democratic voters disagree. What's most interesting is the switch among Democratic voters. A year ago, 41 percent of them thought Afghanistan was worth fighting for, while only 12 percent felt that way about Iraq. In this month's polls, the corresponding numbers were 36 percent and 29 percent. The Good War-Bad War distinction is disappearing. One reason is that things have been going pretty well in Iraq while things in Afghanistan look dicey. The ABC/Post poll reported that 71 percent of Americans oppose immediate withdrawal from Iraq and 60 percent favor keeping 50,000 noncombat troops in Iraq in a supporting role. Keeping US troops there seems hardly more controversial than keeping them in Germany.

Afghan withdrawal unpopular – hawks

Hawks Skeptical of withdrawing forces

Nicholas Watt, Chief Political Correspondent, 7/1/2010, Guardian Politics, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/jul/01/afghanistan-withdrawal-date-william-hague

Some ministers believe the defence secretary, who is close to rightwing Republicans, was aligning himself with hawks in Washington who are sceptical of President Barack Obama's plan to start drawing down troops next year. General David Petraeus, the commander of Nato forces in Afghanistan, told his Senate confirmation hearings on Tuesday that the 2011 withdrawal date had not been recommended by the military. Bob Ainsworth, the shadow defence secretary, said the British government was confused. "It is vitally important that the government speaks with one voice when it comes to Afghanistan but this week all we have seen is confusion," he said. The contrasting signals from ministers overshadowed Hague's speech in which he outlined the government's "agile and energetic" foreign policy.

Afghan withdrawal unpopular – partisanship

Afghan withdrawal provokes partisan conflict

BBC News 2009 ["Obama 'rules out' Afghan cutbacks," October 7, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8293558.stm]

Divisions are emerging between some Democrats concerned by the prospect of deploying more US forces to Afghanistan and some Republicans urging the Obama administration to follow the advice of top generals and increase troop levels. President Obama told the group that his assessment would be "rigorous and deliberate" and that he would continue to work with Congress in the best interests of US and international security. According to one White House source, he told the meeting that he would not shrink the number of troops in Afghanistan or opt for a strategy of merely targeting al-Qaeda leaders. But he would not be drawn on sending additional troops - which his top commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, requested last week. Democratic Speaker Nancy Pelosi said that there had been some agreement but also some "diversity of opinion" during the talks. Former Republican presidential candidate Senator John McCain urged Mr Obama to take heed of the advice given by generals on the ground. A US official, quoted by Reuters news agency, said of the meeting: "He... made it clear that his decision won't make everybody in the room or the nation happy, but underscored his commitment to work on a collaborative basis." Afghan strategy The BBC's Mark Mardell, in Washington, says there appears to be a frustration that the review of strategy has some times been portrayed in black and white terms of a massive increase or reduction of troop numbers.

Afghanistan policies derail agenda

Tension over Afghanistan disrupts other legislation – the McChrystal dust-up proves

New York Times, 6-23-10

A White House decision to punt a pivotal energy and climate meeting slated for this morning has supporters of a global warming bill concerned that it could be even tougher to clear legislation this year. "As if we had a week to burn," said David Hamilton, director of the Sierra Club's global warming program. President Obama was scheduled to meet with a bipartisan group of senators this morning to hash out a summer floor strategy on energy and climate, but his schedule was changed after the White House summoned Gen. Stanley McChrystal -- the top military commander in Afghanistan -- to Washington over a Rolling Stone magazine interview in which he and his staff criticized the administration. The White House is trying to get the meeting rescheduled for early next week, spokesman Ben LaBolt said today, but he did not confirm a specific date. Environmentalists say the delay does not reflect a lack of commitment by the president, but it could harm prospects for finishing a climate bill this year. "It is a big job, and we're already very much behind schedule," Hamilton said. "The longer it takes to get into the guts of this, the harder it's going to be to get it done."

Afghan Flip-Flop Link

Obama’s committed to sustained near-term deployment.

BBC News 6/24 [6/24/10, " Barack Obama on Afghanistan withdrawal timetable ", http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/us_and_canada/10409698.stm]

President Barack Obama has said he does not foresee an immediate withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in July 2011, the date he has set for the start of the drawdown of US forces.

"We didn't say we'd be switching off the lights and closing the door behind us," he said at the White House, a day after naming Gen David Petraeus as his new Afghan commander.

"We said we'd begin a transition phase that would allow the Afghan government to take more and more responsibility."

He also said he did not foresee any other high-level departures from his Afghanistan policy team.

Fast Afghan withdrawal unpopular – GOP

Speeding up withdrawal in Afghanistan will spark a fight with the GOP – McCain proves

CNN.com, 6/29/10, CNN, http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2010/06/29/bickering-over-afghan-troop-withdrawal-date-marks-petraeus-hearing/ )

A Senate committee hearing on Gen. David Petraeus, picked by President Barack Obama to be the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, was marked Tuesday by bickering over Obama's plan to begin withdrawing troops in July 2011. Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin, D-Michigan, stressed the date's importance, saying it "imparts a sense of urgency to Afghan leaders" and is an important method of "spurring action." When the date was announced, Levin said, there was a surge in recruits for the Afghan army. But Arizona Sen. John McCain, the ranking Republican on the committee, said Obama should make clear that any U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan will be determined "solely by conditions on the ground." Potential allies are less willing to back the U.S. mission in Afghanistan because they believe American troops will leave in July 2011, he said, and announcing a date to begin troop withdrawals is making the war "harder" and "longer." The "facts on the ground" suggest more time is needed, McCain said. The "same people" who were "defeatist" about the war in Iraq now have a similar attitude toward the Afghan war, McCain said. The deadline has been a source of contention between Obama and Republican critics. Petraeus, however, told lawmakers he supports and agrees with it.

Fast withdrawal is unpopular with the public- it risks an even bigger mess.

Robert Haddick, Foreign Policy, Obama’s Nixonian Withdrawal Strategy, May 14th 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/14/this_week_at_war_obamas_nixonian_withdrawal_strategy_0?page=0,0

During his news conference with Karzai, Obama reaffirmed his intention to begin withdrawing U.S. forces in July 2011. Obama undoubtedly wants to run for re-election in 2012 with the message that he wound down the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. He may be using Richard Nixon's first term as a model. Nixon reduced the U.S. head count in Vietnam from more than 500,000 to just a few thousand by election day in 1972. That wind down of the war, combined with an economic rebound and a weak opponent, resulted in a landslide re-election.The dangers of Obama's July 2011 withdrawal declaration are well known. The Taliban, with ample sanctuaries, can easily conserve their resources and adjust the tempo of their operations to extract maximum political effect. Once a U.S. withdrawal begins, it will become irreversible. Political events might even lead to its acceleration. The United States' remaining coalition partners surely won't dither on the tarmac. Another risk is that Afghanistan's security forces will not be ready to accept heavy responsibility in 14 months. Obama undoubtedly understands this. Doesn't his policy of a quick U.S. withdrawal risk creating an even bigger mess, a debacle of his making that he would have to fix in his second term? We have to assume that Obama and his advisors have thought this through. Obama's statements indicate an intention to gradually transition from the current large-scale manpower-intensive counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign to a small-scale advisor-based security assistance program. In addition, they have likely concluded that the 2010 troop surge and its suppression of the Taliban in Afghanistan's south further reduces the risk of transitioning from COIN to purely security assistance. The best military strategy isn't very good if it can't maintain political support. A small security assistance program might be riskier than a well-staffed counterinsurgency campaign, but that comparison is irrelevant if the COIN campaign is no longer politically realistic. Seeing what happened to the political support for the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq on election day in 2006 and 2008, Obama apparently doesn't want to take any political chances with his campaign in Afghanistan. Better to end it on his terms than risk having the electorate end it for him.

Afghan withdrawal deadlines unpopular – GOP

The GOP opposes set deadlines for Afghan withdrawal

NewsCore, News Corporation, July 4th 2010, GOP Senators Slam Afghan Withdrawal Date, http://www.myfoxla.com/dpps/news/gop-senators-slam-afghan-withdrawal-date-dpgonc-km-20100704_8478633

(NewsCore) - U.S. Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) on Sunday slammed the July 2011 target for beginning to pull U.S. troops out of Afghanistan, saying setting a firm date for withdrawal would raise questions about U.S. commitment there.

"I'm concerned about the perception of our friends and our enemies as well as the people in Afghanistan, as to the depth of our commitment," McCain told ABC News in an interview from Kabul. The Republican lawmaker and former prisoner of war said the policy of announcing a planned draw down date was a "bad idea," and that the United States should only leave Afghanistan when the country is stable enough to maintain a strong government. "I'm all for dates of withdrawal, but that's after the strategy succeeds, not before. That's a dramatic difference," he said. Sen. Lindsay Graham (R-S.C.) on Sunday said a deadline for troop withdrawal would create "confusion and uncertainty." Speaking on CBS' "Face the Nation," Graham said, "If people think we're going to leave, we have no chance of winning. It has hurt. It needs to be clarified. This confusion has hurt, hurt our friends, and emboldened our enemies." Afghanistan's ambassador to the United States, Said Jawad, agreed on CNN. He said any deadline must be "based on the reality on the ground," to send a clear message that "NATO and Afghans are there to finish the job." "If we had a fully functioning system in Afghanistan, there would be no need for the rest of the world to be there. It will take some time," he said. "The threat of terrorism is still imminent." McCain warned that the Taliban would fill any vacuum left by departing U.S. troops. "I know enough about warfare," he said. "I know enough about what strategy and tactics are about." "If you tell the enemy that you're leaving on a date certain, unequivocally, then that enemy will wait until you leave," he said.

COIN unpopular

*Generic links don’t apply – current political climate means COIN drawdown isn’t controversial.

IISS 10 [International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Obama's presidency bolstered by political success,” April, http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-16-2010/april/obamas-presidency-bolstered-by-political-success/]

As a consequence, the US has adopted a policy of qualified escalation, seeking to pacify Afghanistan through coercive and expansive counter-insurgency (‘clear, hold, build’) operations and a concerted state-building effort to bring order to its politics, contain regional militancy and ensure stability in Pakistan. The US plans to bring the American troop presence in Afghanistan to a peak of 100,000 by late summer 2010, which would represent an increase of nearly a third over the mid-2009 number. Obama’s intention is to begin drawing down the American presence in Afghanistan in July 2011.

Yet the coalition effort in Afghanistan appears increasingly problematic. Despite effective US-led offensives in early 2010 – notably in Marja, in Helmand Province – the Taliban is proving to be resilient. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has resisted US pressure to root out corruption, and is growing more distant from Washington, but his authority remains hard to sidestep. US-led training programmes for the Afghan army and especially the national police have been revealed as flawed, wasteful and ineffectual. At the same time, the ‘drone war’ against al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders in the tribal areas of Pakistan has continued to be highly effective, and a stepped-up effort over the past three months appears to have discouraged them from building up operational bases.

Accordingly, it may transpire that the full-blooded counter-insurgency and state-building effort embodied by Obama’s current Afghanistan policy is not, in fact, necessary to protect vital American interests in establishing sufficient regional stability and denying al-Qaeda a safe haven in Central and South Asia. In that case, after the health-care success, the Obama administration might judge that readjusting Afghanistan policy to set less ambitious goals might prove less vulnerable to conservative retaliation – particularly if the US public becomes uneasy with sustained American casualties and little progress to show for them. Given the central importance of an acceptable result in Afghanistan to Obama’s foreign policy, it is conceivable that he could again change course there. However, since he has already hedged the existing policy by building in the date of July 2011 for de-escalation to commence, he may wait until then to take stock.

Afghan withdrawal popular – Congress

Congress supports withdrawing from Afghanistan

Tampa Bay News, 7/22/10, Tampa Bay Online, http://www.tampabay.com/news/military/war/support-wanes-for-president-obamas-afghan-war-strategy/1110365

WASHINGTON — With military progress scarce and doubts remaining about the reliability of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, confidence in the Obama administration's Afghanistan strategy is deteriorating on Capitol Hill, including among prominent lawmakers who had been firm backers of President Barack Obama's plan. Concerns are rising as lawmakers consider a $37 billion emergency war funding bill. While Congress overall still supports the U.S. mission and is unlikely to cut off funding, members may seek to attach conditions to the bill, such as requiring the administration to outline goals and fixed timetables to reduce the U.S. commitment in Afghanistan. Leaders in both parties have said the lack of specific goals in Obama's plan makes it impossible to define success. Sen. Richard Lugar of Indiana, the top Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee and a respected voice on foreign policy, welcomed Obama's plan last November. But last week, he complained about a "lack of clarity" and warned the United States could continue to spend billions in Afghanistan without ensuring a secure, sustainable democracy. "Arguably, we could make progress for decades — on security, on employment, good governance, women's rights, other goals — expending billions of dollars each year without ever reaching a satisfying conclusion," Lugar said.

Afghanistan withdrawal is unpopular with both conservative and liberal lawmakers

Deirdre Walsh et. al, Alan Silverleib, Atia Abawi, Ted Barrett, Tom Cohen, Ed Henry, Adam Levine, Suzanne Malveaux, Matt Smith and Barbara Starr contributed to this report, CNN news editors, December 2nd 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/12/02/obama.afghanistan/, CNN Politics

Washington (CNN) -- Conservative and liberal lawmakers Wednesday sharply criticized President Obama's plan to start a U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in July 2011. Most Republicans backed the president's decision to send more troops. They claimed, however, he was playing politics by setting an "arbitrary" withdrawal deadline while insisting that any transfer of responsibility to the Afghan government ultimately will be based on conditions in that country. They also argued he inadvertently strengthened the hand of Taliban and al Qaeda extremists by allowing them to know when a U.S. departure from the war-torn country would begin. Several members of the Democratic caucus, on the other hand, expressed unease with the president's decision to send thousands of additional troops over the next several months. They questioned whether the war is winnable. Obama's blueprint faced questions Wednesday as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appeared before two key committees. "I disagree with the president's decision to personally relay to our enemies when they can regroup and when they can retake Afghan territory," said Rep. Connie Mack, R-Florida and a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. "I simply cannot understand and cannot agree with this approach," Mack said, adding that Obama's decision "emboldens our enemies [and] allows them to prepare and plan."Announcing a firm date for starting an American withdrawal while also saying such a withdrawal depends on conditions in Afghanistan "are two incompatible statements," said Sen. John McCain of Arizona, the Senate Armed Services Committee's ranking Republican."You either have a winning strategy ... and then once it's succeeded, then we withdraw or, as the president said, we will have a date [for] beginning withdrawal in July 2011. Which is it? It's got to be one or the other. It's got to be the appropriate conditions, or it's got to be an arbitrary date. You can't have both."

Afghan Troop pullout lacks votes in congress – previous bill proves

Epoch Times, 3/11/10,“Congress Rejects Early Troop Withdrawal from Afghanistan”, http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/content/view/31208/ )

A resolution to withdraw U.S. Armed Forces in Afghanistan within 30 days failed Wednesday in Congress. Congressman Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio) sparked a debate on the issue when he introduced the resolution, which was cosponsored by 21 others. The nonbinding resolution failed with 356 voting against and 65 voting for. The debate was an opportunity to explore members’ views on the issue separately from discussion about spending or appropriations legislation. Speaking about the resolution, Kucinich said the executive branch had gone too far and it is time for Congress to “weigh in on the war.” He said it was a constitutional issue because the power to authorize war lies with Congress. "We can't afford this war," said Kucinich in a video statement released on his Web site. He said that with 15 million Americans out of work, 47 million without health insurance, and 10 million who could lose their homes, “you would think it would be time for us to focus on things here at home." "America is ready to meet the challenges of global security," he said, acknowledging the need to protect against terrorism, and also “to start taking care of things at home.”

Afghan withdrawal popular – Congress

Congress against immediate withdrawal

Jim Abrams, Associated Press Writer, 3/10/10 “House rejects quick troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, but anti-war lawmakers get to vent”, http://blog.taragana.com/politics/2010/03/10/house-rejects-quick-troop-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-but-anti-war-lawmakers-get-to-vent-22742/

House rejects call for withdrawal from Afghanistan WASHINGTON — The House on Wednesday soundly rejected an effort by anti-war lawmakers to force a withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Afghanistan by the end of the year. The outcome of the vote, 356-65 against the resolution, was never in doubt. But the 3 1/2 hours of debate did give those who oppose President Barack Obama’s war policies a platform to vent their frustrations. Opposing the resolution was easy for almost all Republicans, who have been solidly behind Obama’s decision to increase U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan from 70,000 to 100,000. Only five Republicans supported the measure. It was a harder vote for some Democrats, particularly in an election year where opposing the war can be equated with opposing the troops. Several expressed discomfort with a war that has lasted 8 1/2 years and cost the nation more than 930 American lives and the treasury more than $200 billion, but said they were voting against the resolution because it was ill-timed and unrealistic. Among the ‘no’ voters was Rep. Patrick Kennedy, D-R.I., who gave an impassioned speech. The U.S. policy of needlessly sending troops into harm’s way was “shameful,” Kennedy said. He also lambasted the national media, calling their lack of attention to the loss of life in Afghanistan “despicable.”

Congress wants troops in Afghanistan

PBS Newshour, 12/8/09, debate between top leaders and generals about Afghanistan (“Afghan Timetable, Troop Levels Spark Skepticism,”, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/july-dec09/afghanistan_12-08.html)

REP. MIKE PENCE: Well, I think it would be a very good thing. And I -- and I think, at the end of the day, you would see Congress -- maybe not Jim and a few of his colleagues, but I think you would see a majority in Congress support this effort to respond to General McChrystal's request for reinforcements. And I do think, as we were able to do in the last Congress, I think you would see a majority vote to oppose the imposition of any artificial timelines. You know, Jim McGovern knows, and, Jim, you should know I'm somebody that really believes in deliberation in the people's house. And we would certainly welcome that. But there can be no mistaking here that an American success in Afghanistan is the imperative. That must be the objective of this nation. And in my judgment, the president has made the right decision in deciding to deploy reinforcements. And we ought to support that without the artificial timelines for withdrawal. But we ought to support it as strongly as we can.

Afghan withdrawal popular – Dems

Withdrawal from Afghanistan is popular. Democrats are growing weary of it

Michael Barone, Senior political analyst for the Washington Examiner, 7/20/10, Boston Herald, http://www.bostonherald.com/news/opinion/op_ed/view.bg?articleid=1269033&srvc=rss

A year ago, 41 percent of them thought Afghanistan was worth fighting for, while only 12 percent felt that way about Iraq. This month, the corresponding numbers were 36 percent and 29 percent. The Good War-Bad War distinction is disappearing. One reason for this is that things have been going pretty well in Iraq, while things in Afghanistan look dicey. The ABC/Post poll reported that 71 percent of Americans oppose immediate withdrawal from Iraq, and 60 percent favor keeping 50,000 non-combat troops in Iraq in a supporting role. But there is something more fundamental here. The Good War-Bad War distinction was based in large part on the argument that George W. Bush lied about Saddam Hussein’s possession of weapons of mass destruction. Of course, Bush didn’t lie. He relied on the same intelligence that many Democrats and leaders of foreign nations did. But, as Karl Rove wrote in his recent Wall Street Journal column, the Bush White House never pushed back against the “Bush Lied” claim. This was, as Rove now admits, “a dagger aimed at (the) administration’s heart.” It tended to delegitimize the Iraq war and encouraged many Democrats to wish for their country’s defeat. Now that Barack Obama has been commander in chief for 18 months, Democrats no longer have a psychological stake in believing that Bush’s surge strategy failed. They are coming to grips with the reality that our mission in Iraq is succeeding, that a reasonably functional democracy is emerging and that there is no great peril in maintaining a military presence there. At the same time, Democratic dovish instincts are apparent in their assessment of Afghanistan. Some Republicans are tempted to exploit this. Thus Republican National Chairman Michael Steele has told Republican candidates they should call Afghanistan “Obama’s war.” Turnabout can be fair play. But not in war. Democrats may have been happy to delegitimize the Iraq war, but that’s not reason for Republicans to do the same on Afghanistan. Rooting for your country’s defeat is ignoble. And when it comes your turn to take responsibility, it can be self-defeating.

Democrats Support Withdrawing From Afghanistan

Chad Pergram, Fox News Reporter On Congress, 7/2/10, Fox News, http://congress.blogs.foxnews.com/2010/07/02/funding-the-war-in-afghanistan-voting-without-voting%5D/

Congress has done spending bills for years. But in recent years, they're more focused on funding wars. Supplementals were easier in the days shortly after 9-11 with Republicans running the White House and both houses of Congress. Democrats control all three institutions today. And Congress has grown war-weary. A troop drawdown is underway in Iraq. Still, as a candidate, President Obama promised to focus more attention on Afghanistan. The U.S. and NATO added 40,000 troops there just last year. Many liberal Democrats want out. They instead want the U.S. to devote its resources to education, jobs and other pressing social programs. “Every dollar we spend, every life we waste is a waste. It does not enhance the security of the United States,” said Rep. Jerry Nadler (D-NY). So House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) faced rough sledding as the Pentagon demanded the money and liberals prepared to jump ship. “There is unease in our caucus about Afghanistan,” Pelosi conceded last week. A great example of that is one of the speaker’s top lieutenants, House Rules Committee Chairwoman Louise Slaughter (D-NY). “A lot of us very much want to vote no on spending the money and staying there,” said Slaughter. “If we were to win, how can you tell?” So Democratic leaders had to craft a way to pass the bill, yet not vote directly on the legislation. Pelosi was elliptical in her answer when reporters pressed her early on Thursday about what this package could look like. “When the Rules Committee completes its work, we will see what form it will be in,” said Pelosi. “But suffice to say, whatever form it is in, whatever actions we take, our men and women in uniform on the ground will not be lacking in what they need.”

Afghan withdrawal popular – public

Withdrawal in Afghanistan popular with Americans

Christ Sstirewalt, Political Editor, 7/19/10, San Francisco Examiner, http://www.sfexaminer.com/politics/Afghan-war-may-be-key-to-2012-Clinton-candidacy-1001466-98710284.html

The percent of Americans who think the Afghan war is going badly jumped from 49 percent in May to 62 percent in July. Obama won plaudits for quickly sacking his Afghan commander after Gen. Stanley McChrystal's indiscreet comments to Rolling Stone. But the article that deep-sixed McChrystal pointed to all of the president's problem points on Afghanistan: that he is seen as an uncertain leader, that troops are weary of the restrictive rules of engagement, that the Afghans are not up to the task of Western-style self-governance in anything like the 10 months remaining in the Obama surge. Busting McChrystal also meant elevating Gen. David Petraeus. Obama has some obvious misgivings about George W. Bush's favorite general. But the author of the Iraq surge was the only man for the job. Now, Obama will be under pressure to do the bidding of America's most respected military man. Most voters support the president's timetable for withdrawal. Some actually favor the idea of a hamstrung surge and others favor getting out of Afghanistan whenever we can. Without the timetable, liberals would be obliged to denounce "endless war."The timetable is the last politically useful fiction in Obama's long list of undeliverable promises.

Withdrawal is popular – the public is skeptical of nation building

Eugene Robinson, 25 yr career at Washington Post, city hall reporter, city editor, foreign correspondent, foreign editor, numerous journalism awards, 6/18/2010, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/17/AR2010061704568.html

It's not that Afghanistan is some sort of hopeless case. It's just that thinking that a U.S.-led experiment in nation-building -- and that's what we're attempting, even if we call it counterinsurgency -- can impose a whole new organizational template on the place in a year or two, or even 10, is pure fantasy. Whether or not Obama adheres to his announced deadline matters less to the Afghans than it does to us. U.S. casualties are increasing, as was anticipated; Obama has tripled U.S. troop levels since he took office; and the battle for Kandahar will be bloody. Our European allies are squirming, balking, complaining and looking for the exit. As time goes on, this will become even more of a primarily American war. The question is how much more the war will cost in precious young lives and scarce resources. Obama won the nation's forbearance by making a promise that the inevitable withdrawal of U.S. troops would begin next year. Americans should expect him to keep his word -- and insist that he does.

Withdrawal Popular-Public Opinion

CTV, 7/5/10, CTV.ca News Staff, http://edmonton.ctv.ca/servlet/an/local/CTVNews/20100705/petraeus-takes-command-100705/20100705/?hub=EdmontonHome

CTV's South Asia Bureau Chief Janis Mackey Frayer said Obama needs to have something he can point to as a measure of success, or at least progress, as he heads into mid-term elections later this year. "Public opinion polls in the United States are showing that people are turning against the war and certainly the Obama administration wants to be able to see something decisive in this campaign by the end of the year," she told CTV's Canada AM by telephone from Kabul on Monday morning. Support for the Afghan war has also dropped in Canada and the United Kingdom, as the conflict drags into its ninth year and casualties continue to mount. "There are some 130,000 troops who are going to be on the ground here by the end of the summer and the insurgency seems to be getting stronger," said Mackey Frayer. MacKenzie said Petraeus will likely follow the counterinsurgency strategy employed by McChrystal, which the incoming general helped to shape when he helmed the U.S. war in Iraq. "I don't think anybody down the chain of command will notice a change in strategy," said MacKenzie, noting that some small changes in tactics could be possible.

***IRAQ LINKS

Iraq withdrawal Unpopular – Public

CNN 2010 [Instability in Iraq could hurt support for U.S. withdrawal,” May 29, http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/05/29/poll.iraq.troop.withdrawal/index.html]

Support for President Obama's planned removal of U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of the August could drop significantly if Iraq cannot solve its current problems in time, according to a new national poll. A CNN/Opinion Research Corp. survey released Saturday indicates that 64 percent of Americans favor the president's plan to keep just 50,000 U.S. troops in Iraq by the end of the summer, with 35 percent opposed. But public approval of the plan falls to 51 percent if Iraq does not have a stable government by August and there is widespread violence at that time, with opposition rising to 48 percent. "Support drops more than 20 points among Americans with a college education and among suburbanites," said CNN Polling Director Keating Holland. "But among people who never attended college, opinion barely changes. The same is true for people who live in rural areas."

Iraq withdrawal is extremely unpopular with the public-only 15% believe the war is over.

Scott Rasmussen, Rasmussen Reports, May 11th 2010, http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/the_war_in_iraq/only_15_think_war_in_iraq_is_over

Obama administration and U.S. military officials insist that Iraq’s recent elections were a success and that the plan for removing all troops from the country by the end of next year is on schedule. But most U.S. voters remain skeptical about the situation in Iraq. A new Rasmussen Reports national telephone survey shows that just 15% of voters believe the war in Iraq is now over. Sixty-two percent (62%) say the seven-year-old war is not over, and 23% are not sure.

These findings are virtually unchanged from last July just after American combat troops were pulled out of all cities in Iraq.

Only 40% of voters are even somewhat confident that all U.S. troops will be withdrawn from Iraq by the end of 2011 as planned. Fifty-six percent (56%) don’t share that confidence. Those figures include just 10% who are very confident that the troops will be withdrawn and 19% who are not at all confident. In July 2009, voters were almost evenly divided over whether the troop withdrawal would take place by the end of 2011.

Iraq withdrawal unpopular – GOP

GOP only support conditional withdrawal – they’re deeply afraid of instability.

NYT 2009 [Peter Baker, "Iraq Withdrawal Plan Gains G.O.P. Support," February 26, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/27/washington/w27troopsweb.html]

WASHINGTON – President Obama won crucial backing Thursday for his Iraq military drawdown plan from leading Congressional Republicans, including Senator John McCain, the party’s presidential nominee who spent much of last year debating the war with Mr. Obama. As the president prepared to fly to Camp Lejenue, N.C., on Friday to announce his decision to pull combat forces out by August 2010 but leave behind a residual force of 35,000 to 50,000 troops, he reassured Congressional leaders from both parties that his plan would not jeopardize hard-won stability in Iraq. But Republicans emerged from a White House meeting more supportive than several key Democrats, who complained earlier in the day that the president was still leaving behind too many American forces. Mr. McCain said during the private meeting that he thought the withdrawal plan was thoughtful and well prepared, according to several people in the room. His spokeswoman, Brooke Buchanan, confirmed by e-mail Thursday night that Mr. McCain is “supportive of the plan.” Another key Republican, Representative John M. McHugh of New York, the ranking minority member of the House Armed Services Committee, said he was reassured by Mr. Obama that he would revisit his plan if circumstances on the ground change. “The president’s objective to withdraw U.S. combat forces from Iraq is one that we should pray for, plan for and work toward,” Mr. McHugh said. “However, I remain concerned that the security situation in Iraq is fragile and we should work to mitigate any risks to our troops and their mission.”

Republicans oppose Iraqi Withdrawal Bill

MSNBC, 7/18/07, Politics on MSNCB.com, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19797695/

WASHINGTON — Senate Republicans scuttled a Democratic proposal ordering troop withdrawals from Iraq in a showdown Wednesday that capped an all-night debate on the war. The 52-47 vote fell short of the 60 votes needed to cut off debate under Senate rules. It was a sound defeat for Democrats who say the U.S. military campaign, in its fifth year and requiring 158,000 troops, cannot tame the sectarian violence in Iraq. "We have to get us out of a middle of a civil war" said Sen. Joseph Biden, D-Del., who chairs the Foreign Relations Committee. A political solution must be found "so when we leave Iraq, we don't just send our children home, we don't have to send our grandchildren back." As members cast their votes, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice hurried between private meetings with lawmakers in their Capitol Hill offices to make the administration's case for the war.

Iraq withdrawal popular – GOP

Withdrawal from Iraq is popular with the GOP.

Peter Baker, news editor at New York Times, February 26th 2009, Iraq Withdrawal Plan Gains GOP support, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/27/washington/27troops.html?_r=1

WASHINGTON — President Obama won crucial backing on Thursday for his Iraq military withdrawal plan from leading Congressional Republicans, including Senator John McCain, the party’s presidential nominee, who spent much of last year debating the war with Mr. Obama. As the president prepared to fly to Camp Lejeune, N.C., on Friday to announce that he would pull combat forces out by August 2010 while leaving behind a residual force of 35,000 to 50,000 troops, he reassured Congressional leaders from both parties that his plan would not jeopardize hard-won stability in Iraq. But Republicans emerged from a meeting Thursday evening more supportive than several leading Democrats, who complained earlier in the day that the president was still leaving behind too many American forces.Mr. McCain said during the private White House meeting that he thought the withdrawal plan was thoughtful and well prepared, according to several people who were in the room. His spokeswoman, Brooke Buchanan, confirmed by e-mail on Thursday night that Mr. McCain is “supportive of the plan.”

Iraq withdrawal popular – Dems

Dems hate transitional withdrawal – they want a full drawdown.

NYT 2009 [Peter Baker, "Iraq Withdrawal Plan Gains G.O.P. Support," February 26, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/27/washington/w27troopsweb.html]

Mr. Obama consistently said during the presidential campaign that he would leave behind forces even after he withdrew all combat brigades. Sensitive to criticism, the administration plans to call the remaining troops a “transition force,” rather than a “residual” one. But Democrats did not like the size of it. “I have been one for a long time who has called for significant cutbacks in Iraq,” Senator Harry Reid, a Nevada Democrat and the Senate majority leader, told reporters before heading to the White House briefing. “I’m happy to listen to the secretary of defense and the president, but when they talk about 50,000, that’s a little higher number than I anticipated.” Mr. Reid’s spokesman, Jim Manley, said after the meeting that Mr. Reid still held those concerns. Another person briefed on the session said Representative Nancy Pelosi, a California Democrat and the House speaker, was particularly upset at the residual force. She had kicked off the public criticism Wednesday by saying did not understand “the justification” for 50,000 troops. Others echoed her language on Thursday. “I want to hear what the president has to say about justifying whatever number it is that he has,” Senator Patty Murray of Washington State told reporters. “I do think we have to look carefully at the numbers that are there and do it as quickly as we can.” Senator Charles E. Schumer, a New York Democrat, agreed. “Fifty thousand is more than I would have thought,” he said. “We await the justification for why that would be.” The White House declined to respond directly to Democratic criticisms before Mr. Obama’s speech. “The president asked his — the national security team — to put together a plan that they and he believed would accomplish the goal of removing our combat forces from Iraq in the most responsible way,” said Robert Gibbs, the White House press secretary.

Dems support Iraq withdrawal because of the economy

Alex Leary, St. Petersburg Times Staff Writer, 7/5/10, http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/national/midterm-elections-economy-pushes-war-into-background/1106951

The Tampa Democrat won a seat in Congress in part by pledging to push for a rapid withdrawal of troops from Iraq. She called for the firing of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and investigations into wartime spending. "A change in course is needed in Washington," Castor said on election night. "It's time." The war continues today, and about 5,500 Americans have died in Iraq and Afghanistan. But Castor, like other candidates across the United States, is focused on something else: jobs. With the 2010 midterm elections becoming a referendum on the economy, politicians are reacting to voters consumed with troubles at home. After nine years, America has become war weary. There is no greater domestic priority now than the economy. Despite mild economic improvement, millions remain out of work. Florida's 11.7 percent unemployment rate remains one of the highest in the country. "It dwarfs everything," said Republican pollster David Winston. "It's sort of like looking at a house and there's all these things that need repair, but if the roof's on fire, all these things are secondary. Jobs and the economy are the equivalent of the fire on the roof." War has slid enough out of view that some polls have stopped asking about it. A review of campaign websites in Florida shows it gets passing mention.

Fast Iraq withdrawal popular – Dems

Democrats want an even faster withdrawal from Iraq

Chris Weigant, Author and Political Commentator, 6/30/10, The Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chris-weigant/good-news-from-iraq_b_631510.html

This is, obviously, good news. And perhaps, with the holiday weekend in front of us, the news media will begin to cover the story of our brave men and women returning from overseas in large numbers. But so far, they've been missing this story. The American troop withdrawal from Iraq was one of the most hotly debated subjects on the campaign trail in 2008. Republicans, led by their presidential nominee John McCain, were outraged that any timetable for withdrawal was even being discussed. They used some pretty scary language to describe what would happen if Obama won and instituted a "precipitous withdrawal." Obama was, at the time, saying we could likely withdraw a "brigade a month" starting when he took office, and other Democrats wanted an even faster withdrawal. None of this came to pass, but the astonishing thing is that now -- when the withdrawal has actually gotten under way and is about to accelerate -- so little attention is being paid by the media and the public. Who would have thought, watching the candidates spar back then that the Iraq withdrawal would happen and America's response would be "ho, hum..."?

2011 withdrawal popular – GOP

Obama has backing of important GOP members-McCain and McHugh

Peter Baker, staff writer for the New York Times, 2/26/09, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/27/washington/w27troopsweb.html

WASHINGTON – President Obama won crucial backing Thursday for his Iraq military drawdown plan from leading Congressional Republicans, including Senator John McCain, the party’s presidential nominee who spent much of last year debating the war with Mr. Obama. Skip to next paragraph Related Names of the Dead (February 27, 2009) As the president prepared to fly to Camp Lejenue, N.C., on Friday to announce his decision to pull combat forces out by August 2010 but leave behind a residual force of 35,000 to 50,000 troops, he reassured Congressional leaders from both parties that his plan would not jeopardize hard-won stability in Iraq. But Republicans emerged from a White House meeting more supportive than several key Democrats, who complained earlier in the day that the president was still leaving behind too many American forces. Mr. McCain said during the private meeting that he thought the withdrawal plan was thoughtful and well prepared, according to several people in the room. His spokeswoman, Brooke Buchanan, confirmed by e-mail Thursday night that Mr. McCain is “supportive of the plan.” Another key Republican, Representative John M. McHugh of New York, the ranking minority member of the House Armed Services Committee, said he was reassured by Mr. Obama that he would revisit his plan if circumstances on the ground change. “The president’s objective to withdraw U.S. combat forces from Iraq is one that we should pray for, plan for and work toward,” Mr. McHugh said. “However, I remain concerned that the security situation in Iraq is fragile and we should work to mitigate any risks to our troops and their mission.”

PMC withdrawal Unpopular – Casualties

PMCs preserve capital – politicians aren’t held responsible for war costs.

Singer 2004 [Peter W., former Prof. @ JFK School of Gov’t, formerly employed by the DoD, PhD – Harvard U, National Security Fellow and Director of the Project on U.S. Policy towards the Islamic World at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at The Brookings Institution, THE PRIVATE MILITARY INDUSTRY AND IRAQ: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED AND WHERE TO NEXT?, November, for GENEVA CENTRE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES (DCAF)]

The private military industry provides the new possibility of seeking public policy ends through private military means. This allows governments to carry out actions that generally would not gain legislative or public approval. This can be an advantage in meeting unrecognized or unsupported strategic needs, but can disconnect the public from its own foreign policies. The increased use of contractors in Colombia is an illustration of this trend in the covert operations side.

As the stark public division over the Iraq war illustrates, this can be worrisome even for overt, discretionary operations. The use of PMFs in Iraq appears to be driven less by any supposed financial cost savings and more by political cost savings. Indeed, in many situations the government not only didn’t make an attempt to see if contracting would save it money, but instead set up structures that almost ensured it would not. However, the mass use of contractors meant that many tough decisions, which would have caused political costs, particularly in a presidential campaign season, could effectively be outsourced. In lieu of the 20,000 private military contractors sent to Iraq, the U.S. would have had to either expand the regular force deployed, call up even more national guard and reserve troops, or have made tough political compromises with allies or the UN. Instead, it avoided these decisions by using contractors. Such a choice importantly also came with the positive externality of contractor casualties largely staying out of the news. Indeed, the American media made a major news story in the late summer of 2004 that casualties had passed the 1000 killed in action mark, thus putting a great deal of pressure on the Bush Administration. However, they missed the fact that such a figure had long been passed, when one counted the contractor deaths.

PMC withdrawal Unpopular – Political Cover**

Singer 2007 [Peter W., former Prof. @ JFK School of Gov’t, formerly employed by the DoD, PhD – Harvard U, National Security Fellow and Director of the Project on U.S. Policy towards the Islamic World at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at The Brookings Institution, “Can't Win with 'Em, Can't Go to War Without 'Em: Six Questions for P.W. Singer,” September 30, http://www.brookings.edu/interviews/2007/0930iraq.aspx]

1. One of your first conclusions is that by using military contractors, policymakers “dodge key decisions that carry political costs, thus leading to operational choices that might not reflect the public interest.” Moving away from the operations in Iraq which are more immediately topical, security contractors have been advocated as surrogates for uniformed military as peacekeepers in Darfur, Liberia, Sierra Leone and a variety of other circumstances. A Marine general recently told me that he was concerned that the heavy reliance on contractors might allow policymakers to ease into a foreign conflict in a way that avoided Congressional scrutiny and oversight. Do you agree that this is a realistic concern?

Yes, and I wouldn’t use the word “might,” as if it were a future scenario. Contractors have already been used in all sorts of operations, in both an overt (Iraq, Balkans) and covert (Colombia, Sudan), manner to get around certain political consequences or congressional restrictions.

When the U.S. military shifted to an all-volunteer, professional force in the wake of the Vietnam War, military leaders set up a series of organization “tripwires” to preserve the tie between the nation’s foreign policy decisions and local communities. Led by then Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams (1972-74), they wanted to ensure that the military would not go to war without the sufficient backing and involvement of the nation. Much like a call-center moved to India, this “Abrams Doctrine” has been outsourced.

Instead, contractors offer the means for the choices to be dodged at the onset, as well as the scrutiny and public concern to be lessened after deployment. Your homefront (and their representatives) does not get as involved when its contractors being called up and deployed, nor ask key questions when contractors are lost (over 1000 have been killed in Iraq and 13000 wounded, but they are not counted on official DoD reports. In turn, if you want to go to a non-Iraq example, where is the concern over the 3 American contractors still held captive by the FARC in Colombia today? Imagine if we had 3 soldiers as POWs instead.). In addition, your media also becomes less likely to cover the story with contractors (one quarter of one percent of all news stories out of Iraq mention contractors). This new option is obviously greatly appealing to executive branch policymakers, but the underlying premise of the Abrams Doctrine was that, if a military operation could not garner public support of the level needed to involve the full nation, then maybe it shouldn’t happen in the first place.

PMC withdrawal Unpopular – Political Costs

Singer 2007 [Peter W., former Prof. @ JFK School of Gov’t, formerly employed by the DoD, PhD – Harvard U, National Security Fellow and Director of the Project on U.S. Policy towards the Islamic World at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at The Brookings Institution, “Blackwater Hearings Ain't No Superbad Private Military Contractors, Iraq, Afghanistan, Middle East, Defense Strategy,” October 3, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/1003militarycontractors.aspx]

Time and again, there were exchanges over whether contracting our military services to firms like Blackwater was saving money. Prince forcefully argued it was cost efficient; many representatives cited payment and profit figures that cast doubt on such a claim. That Prince could not (or would not) give even a ballpark figure for the overall profits his firm was making didn't exactly help his cause.

Those exchanges had a bigger problem. The comparisons were often of the apples-and-oranges type, so they were never fully resolvable. One side would discuss overall pay versus contracted pay -- ignoring the differences between sunk costs of training, who ends up paying benefits, etc., etc. Second, the use of private military contractors has never really been about financial cost savings. Rather, it's been about political cost savings. No one was able to point to a single decision to outsource some function to Blackwater that happened because of a cost differential analysis. Instead, each of these choices was made because a policymaker wanted to try to avoid spending political capital on an otherwise difficult decision, and a contractor was now there to enable this political cost avoidance.

Finally, the hearings did not deal with the crucial question, which is not one of oversight, of money savings, or even of legal accountability. It is becoming clear that many roles now outsourced, including the armed escort of government officials, assets, and convoys in a warzone, not only are inherently government functions, but that the outsourcing of them has created both short and long-term negative consequences. I found several statements of Prince intriguing in this light. For example, he assiduously claimed, "We are part of the 'total force' in trying to get the mission done." But then he went on to discuss how his contracted mission was often at odds with the military's counterinsurgency mission, for example, discussing how his employees explicitly avoid stopping for Iraqis who may have been mistakenly shot. "Our job is to get them off the X," referring to getting client away from a potential danger site. Again, even if the firm was performing its roles properly and there was perfect oversight and accountability, that different sense of "our job" and "the mission" is the fundamental disconnect between a private vs. public mission, which everyone seems to be avoiding.

***JAPAN LINKS

Japan withdrawal unpopular – Public

Polls prove the public opposes the plan.

Rassmussen 2009 [pollster, Rassmussen Reports, November 15, http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_politics/november_2009/26_favor_pulling_all_u_s_troops_out_of_japan]

Twenty-six percent (26%) of Americans say the United States should remove all its military troops from Japan, a central issue in President Obama’s trip to that country Friday and Saturday. A new Rasmussen Reports national telephone survey finds that 49% disagree and oppose the removal of all U.S. troops from Japan. Twenty-five percent (25%) are not sure.

Japan withdrawal unpopular – Congress

Congress doesn’t trust Japan – empirically fights base reductions.

Daily Yomiuri 2009 [“U.S. Senate move threat to realignment;
Attempt to slash budget seen by some as warning to Hatoyama over Futenma,” November 8, http://archive.wn.com/2009/11/08/1400/japanpolitical/]

A U.S. Senate move concerning the fiscal 2010 budget could jeopardize the realignment of U.S. forces stationed in Okinawa Prefecture. A Senate committee has voted for a budget bill that slashes 211 million dollars, or about 70 percent, from the 300 million dollars (27.2 billion yen) sought by the U.S. administration for the planned relocation of 8,000 marines from Okinawa Prefecture to Guam. Senators are now discussing the bill in a plenary session. The move apparently reflects the Senate's mistrust of the Japanese government concerning its reluctance to make a final decision on the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in Ginowan. Such a huge budget cut for the plan to realign U.S. forces stationed in Okinawa Prefecture could threaten the entire proposal. The White House has submitted to the U.S. Congress a document in which it objects to the proposed budget reduction, saying such a move would hurt the Japan-U.S. agreement reached in February on the relocation of U.S. marines to Guam. It was from this document that the intended budget reduction came to light.

Congress loves bases – they want deterrence and power projection.

Japan Today 2010 [Japan News and Discussion, "U.S. House offers thanks to Okinawa for hosting U.S. forces," June 25, http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/us-house-offers-thanks-to-okinawa-for-hosting-us-forces]

The U.S. House of Representatives on Thursday offered thanks to the people of Japan, especially in Okinawa, for continuing to host U.S. forces, which it says provide the deterrence and capabilities necessary for the defense of Japan and the maintenance of peace, prosperity and stability in Asia-Pacific region. The House passed the resolution in the day’s plenary session by an overwhelming majority of 412 to 2 on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the revised Japan-U.S. security treaty, which went into force on June 23, 1960. It apparently passed the bipartisan resolution with the intention to help restore bilateral ties between Japan and the United States, which deteriorated over plans to relocate a key U.S. Marine Corps air station in Okinawa, political sources said. Okinawa, an island prefecture in southwestern Japan, hosts much of U.S. military presence in Japan and is hoping to reduce its burden. Congress also hopes to enhance ties with the Japanese government of new Prime Minister Naoto Kan, who succeeded Yukio Hatoyama earlier this month. The House ‘‘recognizes Japan as an indispensable security partner of the United States in providing peace, prosperity, and stability to the Asia-Pacific region,’’ the resolution says. It also ‘‘recognizes that the broad support and understanding of the Japanese people are indispensable for the stationing of the United States Armed Forces in Japan, the core element of the United States-Japan security arrangements that protect both Japan and the Asia-Pacific region from external threats and instability.

Troops in Japan Popular-House Agrees

Japan Today, Japan News and Discussion, 6/25/10, Japan Today, http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/us-house-offers-thanks-to-okinawa-for-hosting-us-forces

WASHINGTON — The U.S. House of Representatives on Thursday offered thanks to the people of Japan, especially in Okinawa, for continuing to host U.S. forces, which it says provide the deterrence and capabilities necessary for the defense of Japan and the maintenance of peace, prosperity and stability in Asia-Pacific region. The House passed the resolution in the day’s plenary session by an overwhelming majority of 412 to 2 on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the revised Japan-U.S. security treaty, which went into force on June 23, 1960. It apparently passed the bipartisan resolution with the intention to help restore bilateral ties between Japan and the United States, which deteriorated over plans to relocate a key U.S. Marine Corps air station in Okinawa, political sources said. Okinawa, an island prefecture in southwestern Japan, hosts much of U.S. military presence in Japan and is hoping to reduce its burden. Congress also hopes to enhance ties with the Japanese government of new Prime Minister Naoto Kan, who succeeded Yukio Hatoyama earlier this month. The House ‘‘recognizes Japan as an indispensable security partner of the United States in providing peace, prosperity, and stability to the Asia-Pacific region,’’ the resolution says. It also ‘‘recognizes that the broad support and understanding of the Japanese people are indispensable for the stationing of the United States Armed Forces in Japan, the core element of the United States-Japan security arrangements that protect both Japan and the Asia-Pacific region from external threats and instability.’‘ The House ‘‘encourages Japan to continue its international engagement in humanitarian, development, and environmental issues; and anticipates another 50 years of unshakable friendship and deepening cooperation under the auspices of the United States-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.’‘The resolution notes that the United States and Japan ‘‘reconfirmed’’ a commitment to relocate the Marines Futenma base in the densely populated area in Ginowan, Okinawa Prefecture, to a less populated coastal area in Nago, also in the prefecture.

Japan Flip-Flop Link

Obama has committed to Japan

Benjamin Friedman, research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at the Cato Institute, “Defense Cuts: Start Overseas,” 6-14-10, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11896

Even if the commission calls for cutting defense commitments, the Obama administration has shown little interest in following such recommendations. When the Japanese government recently asked us to remove our Marines from Okinawa after 65 years, for example, the administration hectored Tokyo into letting us keep our base rather than wishing the Japanese well and bringing the troops home. Instead of looking to shed missions, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates recently advocated maintaining current funding levels while cutting overhead costs by a few billion to fund frontline forces. Good idea, except that it won't offset the rapidly rising cost of the military's personnel, healthcare and operational spending. The likely result will be that these accounts will continue to take funds needed for manpower and force structure, leaving a shrinking force overburdened even in peacetime. Our deficit problem is an opportunity to surrender the pretension that we are the world's indispensable nation, preventing instability, shaping the international system and guiding history. We should be content to settle for being the big kid on the block that looks out for itself and occasionally helps friends in a bad spot. That approach would take advantage of the security we have, and save money we don't.

Okinawa withdrawal unpopular – bipartisan

Staying in Okinawa is Bipartisan

The Mainichi Daily News, Japanese News Source, 6/23/10, The Mainichi Daily, http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20100623p2g00m0in032000c.html

WASHINGTON (Kyodo) -- A group of bipartisan lawmakers submitted a resolution Tuesday to the U.S. House of Representatives to express gratitude to the Japanese people, especially to the people of Okinawa, for hosting the U.S. military. The House could take a vote on the resolution on Wednesday, the 50th anniversary of the bilateral security treaty entering into force, parliamentary sources said. The draft resolution says the "robust forward presence" of the U.S. military in Japan "provides the deterrence and capabilities necessary for the defense of Japan and for the maintenance of Asia-Pacific peace, prosperity and regional stability." The resolution "recognizes that the broad support and understanding of the Japanese people are indispensable for the stationing" of the U.S. military in Japan and "expresses its appreciation to the people of Japan, and especially on Okinawa, for their continued hosting" of the U.S. armed forces, it says. The text also touched on a joint statement released by the Japanese and U.S. governments in May that reconfirmed their commitment to a 2006 bilateral accord on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, which includes a plan to relocate the U.S. Marines Corps' Futenma base within Okinawa.

Okinawa withdrawal link NU – Obama already supported it

Obama has already stated a commitment to withdrawing from Okinawa

The Mainichi Daily News, Japanese news source, 6/28/10, The Mainichi News, http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20100628p2a00m0na018000c.html

TORONTO -- Prime Minister Naoto Kan and U.S. President Barack Obama agreed on June 27 (June 28 Japanese time) to make efforts to lighten Okinawa's burden in hosting U.S. military bases and to deepen the Japan-U.S. alliance. The leaders reached the agreement in their first meeting since Kan became prime minister, on the sidelines of the Group of Twenty Summit in Toronto. During the meeting, which lasted about 35 minutes, Kan told Obama that he wanted to make serious efforts to materialize a joint Japan-U.S. statement in which it was agreed that U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma would be relocated to the Henoko region of Okinawa. He also told Obama, "I want to ask for your cooperation in reducing the burden on Okinawa." Obama reportedly agreed, saying he understood that the issue was not one that was easy for the Japanese government to solve, and that he wanted to make efforts to make sure that the U.S. military would be accepted in the region.

***SOUTH KOREA LINKS

SK withdrawal unpopular – 1NC Quality

Plan’s massively unpopular – Congress, Pentagon, and South Korea lobbies oppose

Harrison 2002 [Selig S., Senior Scholar – Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Director of the Asia Program – Center for International Policy, “Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement,” p. 180-182]

Why has the presence of U.S. ground forces in South Korea remained politically inviolate in Washington for nearly five decades? Part of the answer lies in the searing psychological legacy of the Korean War and the resulting imagery of North Korea as irrational and threatening, a new "Yellow Peril," an imagery inflated by fears that it will develop long-range missiles. This imagery has persisted despite the North-South summit meeting of June 2000 and the subsequent visits of North Korea's second-ranking leader, Vice-Marshal Jo Myong Rok, to Washington, and of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to Pyongyang. Indeed, Albright was widely criticized for legitimizing a brutal dictatorship. Some of the answer lies in the superficial appeal of the strategic arguments examined in part 5: that the U.S. presence helps stabilize a volatile part of the world and that any change in the U.S. posture would be seen as a "retreat" from Asia. But the key reason why the United States is stuck to South Korea "like Brer Rabbit was to the Tar Baby" is that Seoul has shown remarkable skill and determination in resisting any change. The impact of the negative images and the positive strategic arguments has been maximized over the years by sustained and effective South Korean lobbying efforts, aided by sympathizers in the Pentagon and in defense industries with a stake in Korea. The payoffs to members of Congress exposed in the 1976 "Koreagate" scandal were not isolated cases. A former Washington station chief of the South Korean CIA, Gen. Kim Yoon Ho, has told of how he arranged support for legislation relating to U.S. military aid and the U.S. force presence by channeling big export contracts to states with cooperative representatives in Congress, especially exports subsidized under a variety of U.S. economic and military aid programs. The manipulation of pricing in such contracts offered easy opportunities for rake-offs to middlemen. In South Korean eyes, anything that will keep the United States in South Korea is morally justified because Washington was largely to blame for the division of the peninsula and remains obligated to stay until reunification is achieved. "The South Korean Embassy swings a lot of weight in Washington," observed David E. Brown, former director of Korean affairs in the State Department, in 1997. "Long-tended friendships between conservatives in both capitals give extra potency to the political clout they wield."' South Korean influence in Washington has been reinforced by the support of legions of U.S. military officers with fond memories of their years in Korea. The semi-imperial trappings of U.S. military life there are epitomized by three eighteen-hole golf courses, one of which occupied some of the most valuable real estate in Seoul until former Ambassador James Lilley persuaded the U.S. Army to relocate it. "The pain it took to do this," Lilley recalled, "is symptomatic of the military's resistance to giving up its perks. They told me about how they have to keep up morale to retain personnel, but you can't do this at the expense of your relations with the host country."" For officers with their families, the nine U.S. military installations in the South are self-sufficient enclaves equipped with most of the comforts of home and largely insulated from the local society. For the footloose, there are kiesang hostesses, the Korean equivalent of Japanese geisha. Most important, for the top brass of the U.S. Army, Korea is the last and only place left in the world where a four-star general can be a "commander in chief" presiding over an operational command in a foreign country. All of the nine other "CinCs" with regional and functional commands have their headquarters in the United States.

SK withdrawal Unpopular – Korea Lobby

The Korean lobby will fight the plan – saps capital.

Chaulia 2003 [Sreeram, Researcher on International Affairs – Syracuse University's Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, “A Korean Exit Strategy for the US”, February 1, Asia Times, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/45/264.html]

Obstacles to US disengagement

Harrison points with acuity to a number of hurdles blocking a transformation of the US role from a combatant to a neutral honest broker between North and South. The psychological legacy of the Korean War has resulted in an exaggerated imagery of North Korea as a demonic new yellow peril in American eyes. South Korea has also lobbied intensely against the North by roping in sympathizers in the Pentagon, Congress and US defense industries that have a stake in continued militarization of Korea. Another irritant is the semi-imperial trappings of US military life in Korea, where four-star generals command a country’s army and enjoy unparalleled personal privileges. For Korea to have peace, war-economy interests will have to be smashed by a bold and visionary US president.

SK withdrawal Unpopular – Blue Dogs

Blue Dogs hate the plan.

Forrester 7 [Jason W., Visiting Fellow – CSIS International Security Program and M.A.L.D. – Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, “Congressional Attitudes on the Future of the U.S.–South Korea Relationship”, CSIS Report, May, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070504_congressionalattitudes_final.pdf]

A number of younger members of Congress have different perspectives. In the words of one Democratic Hill interlocutor: “the group of younger, ‘blue-dog’ [conservative], trade-oriented Democrats, see the relationship as more a way to confront the DPRK nuclear threat than anything else and also see the ROK as an economic engine that they don’t want to see damaged.”

SK Flip-Flop Link

Obama recently committed to South Korea – regardless of outcome, the plan is perceived as weakness

Gene Healy, vice president at the Cato Institute and author of The Cult of the Presidency, “US Out of South Korea” 6-29-10 http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11938

When America signed a mutual defense treaty with the South after the 1953 armistice, the war-weakened Republic of Korea faced a communist enemy backed by China and the Soviet Union. Today, the "hermit kingdom" to the North remains belligerent — as shown by its recent torpedo attack on the ROK vessel Cheonan — but it's a desperately poor, internationally isolated basket case. A look at the famous nighttime satellite photo hints at the two countries' relative strengths. In the North darkness reigns; but to the South, the brightly lit ROK is the world's "most-wired nation" and its 13th-largest economy. It has twice the population and more than 20 times the GDP of the North. Yet today some 28,000 U.S. troops remain in South Korea, ready to defend an ally that's more than capable of defending itself. After 60 years of guarding the ROK, haven't we done our part? Apparently not. In a Saturday press briefing, President Obama marked the war's anniversary by making clear that the U.S. isn't going anywhere. He announced that the U.S. would retain wartime command of ROK troops in any future peninsular conflict, scrapping a plan to turn over control of South Korean forces in 2012. The U.S. has an interest in denuclearizing the Korean peninsula, of course — but that doesn't require American troops stationed along the DMZ, bearing a disproportionate amount of the risk in an allegedly "mutual" defense pact.

SK withdrawal popular

Withdrawing from South Korea Popular-Public dislike troops there

Doug Bandow, staff writer, 7/6/10, National Interest, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23656

Whether or not the ROK is willing to change, Washington should take the lead. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently declared in Seoul: “We will stand with you in this difficult hour and we will stand with you always.” If that means be a friend, then fine. If that means defend the South, it makes no sense. The American government is broke. The national debt exceeds $13 trillion. The administration predicts at least $10 trillion in new debt over the next decade. The deficit this year alone is $1.6 trillion. A host of U.S. government agencies are running up more debts that Washington will have to cover: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and more. Then there are Social Security and Medicare, which currently have a combined unfunded liability of $107 trillion. Transferring OPCON was an important start, but only a start. For good reason Americans don’t like to leave their soldiers under foreign command. In this case, the 28,500 personnel on station should come home as the ROK takes over responsibility for its own defense. And there’s no need for American troops to go back to manpower-rich South Korea in any conflict. Alliances shouldn’t be forever. Instead, they should respond to particular threats in particular geopolitical environments. The era that spawned the U.S.-ROK alliance is long past. South Koreans should take over responsibility for their own defense.

***TURKEY LINKS

Turkey withdrawal unpopular

Presence in Turkey Popular-Need good relations

Paul Salem, Director of the Carnegie Middle East Center, 2010, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=41113

Once tensions cool, it will be clear that Turkey needs good and deep relations with the United States and that they and everyone else knows it. And the United States needs strong and strategic relations with Turkey. It’s incumbent on both sides to take steps to mend the relationship. There’s a lot of debate now in Turkey that perhaps Prime Minister Erdogan may have perhaps gone a bit too far and that maybe he should rebuild relations. Indeed, he has sent many envoys to Washington in the past days and weeks to that end. On the United States side, there are three things that Washington can do. First, the U.S. administration can help the Turks and Israelis find a satisfactory and face-saving way out of the flotilla crisis with some kind of apology. It will be good for the United States to show that it is concerned and trying to help Turkey and Israel.

Presence in Turkey necessary and popular

Lamis Andoni, Staff writer for aljazeera.net, 7/6/10, Aljazeera.net, http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2010/07/201075124551502442.html

In conclusion, when Obama visited Turkey in 2009 he declared: "We are not solely strategic partners, we are also model partners." No similar statement followed the Toronto meeting, but little has changed in terms of the two countries' mutual needs. The US needs Turkish support troops in Afghanistan and to benefit from Turkey's influence the Black Sea region, the Caucuses and the Middle East. It also needs secure transport from Turkish ports during the eventual withdrawal of US troops from Iraq. Likewise, Turkey needs sustained US support in its battle against the PKK and its apparent splinter groups, which Ankara suspects are backed by Israel. But the US needs to patch up the Turkish-Israeli rapture - partly to placate right wing pressures at home, but also because it is vital to US interests in the Middle East. It is likely that Ankara will collaborate with Washington to stop any further deterioration in its relations with Israel, but may wait until a new government takes over to mend the rift. And while the US cannot afford to bow to right wing pressure to drop its support for Turkey, it may still choose to support the AKP's rivals in the next elections - something US ambassador James Jeffrey's recent visit to Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the leader of Turkey's opposition Republican People's Party, may hint at.

Turkey withdrawal unpopular – Congress

Bipartisan Congressional opposition to TNW withdrawal – they’re committed to extended deterrence

Sokov 2009 [Nikolai, PhD, senior research assoc. @ James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, German Leadership 6, Issue 4 http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/090717_german_leadership/german_leadership_6_issue_4.pdf]

If some in the Obama administration support withdrawal of the weapons once the arms control agenda allows the issue to come forward, some politically powerful figures outside the administration are taking the opposite point of view. The bipartisan congressional commission on the U.S. strategic posture in its report referenced above stressed the value of “extended deterrence” and said that this mission could force the United States to retain weapons it does not need for its own security. The report gave considerable weight to the opinion of those allies in Europe who consider these weapons essential to prevent coercion by Russia and Iran. It should be noted that recent studies and interviews with representatives of these countries challenge the accuracy of this representation of their countries’ views by the commission. 35 The strong emphasis on the argument that some European countries are staunchly opposed to the withdrawal of TNW is widely attributed to commission co-chairman James Schlesinger, who has been championing this theme of late.36 Still, the political salience of this message, particularly among congressional Republicans is undeniable.

Turkey withdrawal unpopular – Link Magnifier

Public skepticism and unilateral reduction mean the plan will force debate.

Sokov 2009 [Nikolai, PhD, senior research assoc. @ James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, German Leadership 6, Issue 4 http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/090717_german_leadership/german_leadership_6_issue_4.pdf]

The U.S. public is also likely to be divided on the issue. Indeed, a recent public opinion poll indicates that Obama’s call for eliminating nuclear weapons has been greeted skeptically by the American public; on the other hand, keeping nuclear weapons away from terrorists registers as a top security concern.37 Thus, when the issue becomes ripe for decision, it is likely to provoke considerable controversy in Washington. Given such political constraints, it is likely that the Obama administration will not want to act unilaterally, but rather will seek to take action in the context of the upcoming decisions on a new NATO Strategic Concept—the first such document in a decade. Indeed, NATO has been preparing for this task for some time having authorized in 2007 an internal review of nuclear deterrence requirements for the twenty-first century.38 Working through this process would allow the United States and selected other allies (most likely the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent France) to find means for reassuring the most concerned states that their Article V protections will remain intact without the forward deployment of TNW. Some European sources indicate that the United Kingdom in fact has been pushing for such discussions to take place, but has been held back by Germany, which wants to postpone any discussion until after its September 2009 national elections.

Turkey withdrawal popular

Turkey Presence Unpopular – the US is growing weary

Desmond Butler, Associated Press Staff Writer, 6/26/10, Associated Press, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5infX83Qg20idVFtW3FcluMFJNncgD9GIR8780

WASHINGTON — The United States is warning Turkey that it is alienating U.S. supporters and needs to demonstrate its commitment to partnership with the West. The remarks by Philip Gordon, the Obama administration's top diplomat on European affairs, were a rare admonishment of a crucial NATO ally. "We think Turkey remains committed to NATO, Europe and the United States, but that needs to be demonstrated," Gordon told The Associated Press in an interview this week. "There are people asking questions about it in a way that is new, and that in itself is a bad thing that makes it harder for the United States to support some of the things that Turkey would like to see us support." "There is a lot of questioning going on about Turkey's orientation and its ongoing commitment to strategic partnership with the United States," he said. "Turkey, as a NATO ally and a strong partner of the United States not only didn't abstain but voted no, and I think that Americans haven't understood why."

Turkey TNWS withdrawal popular

Obama committed to getting rid of nuclear weapons-Removing TNWs is popular

MSNBC, 4/5/09, MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30053670

PRAGUE — President Barack Obama on Sunday launched an effort to rid the world of nuclear weapons, calling them "the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War" and saying the U.S. has a moral responsibility to lead as the only nation ever to have used one. In a speech driven with new urgency by North Korea's rocket launch just hours earlier, Obama said the U.S. would "immediately and aggressively" seek ratification of a comprehensive ban on testing nuclear weapons. He said the U.S. would host a summit within the next year on reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons, and he called for a global effort to secure nuclear material. "Some argue that the spread of these weapons cannot be checked — that we are destined to live in a world where more nations and more people possess the ultimate tools of destruction," Obama said to a bustling crowd of more than 20,000 in an old square outside the Prague Castle gates. "This fatalism is a deadly adversary," he said. "For if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable."

***INTERNAL LINKS – POLICIES HURT OBAMA

Controversial policies drain capital

Pushing through controversial legislation burns political capital

Mark Seidenfeld, Associate Professor, Florida State University College of Law, Iowa Law Review, October 1994

In addition, the propensity of congressional committees to engage in special-interest-oriented oversight might seriously undercut presidential efforts to implement regulatory reform through legislation. n198 On any proposed regulatory measure, the President could face opposition from powerful committee members whose ability to modify and kill legislation is well-documented. n199 This is not meant to deny that the President has significant power that he can use to bring aspects of his legislative agenda to fruition. The President's ability to focus media attention on an issue, his power to bestow benefits on the constituents of members of Congress who support his agenda, and his potential to deliver votes in congressional elections increase the likelihood of legislative success for particular programs. n200 Repeated use of such tactics, however, will impose economic costs on society and concomitantly consume the President's political capital. n201 At some point the price to the President for pushing legislation through Congress exceeds the benefit he derives from doing so. Thus, a President would be unwise to rely too heavily on legislative changes to implement his policy vision.

Pushing controversial issues kills Obama’s political capital

Joe Weisenthal, 7-21-2009 http://www.businessinsider.com/another-bad-poll-for-obama-2009-7

The last 10 days have seen a spate of fresh polls all showing the same thing -- that the President's honeymoon period is coming to an end, and that he doesn't have unlimited political capital. He is, after all, human, and despite the mindblowing ineptitude of the Republican opposition, political warfare hurts. The bad polls are coming just as (or maybe because) the President is really digging into the politically charged healthcare debate. Politico: Trust in President Barack Obama and his Democratic allies to identify the right solutions to problems facing the country has dropped off significantly since March, according to a new Public Strategies Inc./POLITICO poll. Just as Obama intensifies his efforts to fulfill a campaign promise and reach an agreement with Congress on health care reform, the number of Americans who say they trust the president has fallen from 66 percent to 54 percent. At the same time, the percentage of those who say they do not trust the president has jumped from 31 to 42. But the news is also bad for the GOP. A series of high-profile affairs, the political suicide of Sarah Palin, and a broad display of sheer buffoonery at the Sotomayor hearings ("Wait, just to clarify, have you now or have you ever used the term 'wise Latina'?") hasn't helped their brand. So the President takes a hit, but they gain nothing.

Legislation costs capital

Any and all legislation costs political capital

Ryan 09

January 18 2009 "Obama and political capital," Trinidad Express, http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article_opinion?id=161426968

One of the "realities" that Obama has to face is that American politics is not a winner-take-all system. It is pluralistic vertically and horizontally, and getting anything done politically, even when the President and the Congress are controlled by the same party, requires groups to negotiate, bargain and engage in serious horse trading. No one takes orders from the President who can only use moral or political suasion and promises of future support for policies or projects. The system was in fact deliberately engineered to prevent overbearing majorities from conspiring to tyrannise minorities. The system is not only institutionally diverse and plural, but socially and geographically so. As James Madison put it in Federalist No 10, one of the foundation documents of republicanism in America, basic institutions check other basic institutions, classes and interests check other classes and interests, and regions do the same. All are grounded in their own power bases which they use to fend off challengers. The coalitions change from issue to issue, and there is no such thing as party discipline which translated, means you do what I the leader say you do.

Capital finite

Obama must focus on only key issues, anything else distracts him from his agenda

Huffington Post 9 (10/27/09, " What Do We Want? Change! When Do We Want It? Ten Minutes Ago! ",

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dan-vickrey/what-do-we-want-emchangee_b_335932.html)

Since the election, Obama has set in motion many policies that have changed the trajectory of US foreign and domestic policy. He passed a plan to stave off an economic landslide, put additional troops into Afghanistan, put health care reform in motion, announced that he would close Gitmo and stopped torture as a policy. None of these should come as a surprise to anyone as Obama had promised to address these issues in the campaign and has worked to make good on them, yet it still is not enough for those who seem to forget the magnitude of the economic crisis we were in when he was elected and are thereby unable to grasp the scope of each and every one of these decisions. For the millions of Americans with television ADHD, it makes sense that we as a nation would expect these issues to be resolved if not in an hour then at least 6 months! But therein lies the heart of the issue: most people in their personal lives don't make huge decisions overnight and have them finished in a day! Quitting smoking, vowing to get in shape, sticking to a budget are things that take time to adjust to and see results. The President and the Nation are no different. The economic stimulus, health care, and the war in Afghanistan are all issues of such massive scope that previous presidents would have needed to focus on just one or two of them in a full term in office. These days that option is a luxury. This week gay rights activists are up in arms about Obama's silence on the policy of "don't ask, don't tell." Really? While I think this policy is absurd, and that in an all volunteer army we should be thankful for each and every person who pursues the armed services as a career regardless of gender, race, sexuality or anything else for that matter, I think most of us would agree that this is not an issue that is quite as urgent as the ones he has tackled. I think we can all rest assured that it is still on the to do list. George Bush educated the nation to a real truth in U.S. politics when he announced he was going to spend some of his "political capital" he felt he earned after the 2004 re-election. Presidents have only so much political capital and they had best use it wisely. This is a plain fact in politics. Obama has made an investment in these issues, any one of which could define his presidency. He must now follow them through to the end if for no other reason than to claim MORE of that coveted capital. Sure, I can see issues such as Business Regulations and Climate Change cropping up in the near future (and rightfully so), but first things first. These fights are already on the table and they must be resolved to move further ahead. Nothing breeds success like success. Those who question the President now on issues of the Economy-War-Health Care and Gay Rights should look closely at his intent. To my eye it seems clear that this president is someone who has a to do list (like many of us do) and has prioritized everything on it and is checking away. Obama also strikes me as someone who understands that these issues are tough fights that will take time. It takes hard work and patience to find success. The Health care debate is in its 3rd quarter, Afghanistan in the 2nd Stimulus in the 2nd and gays in the military on deck. For those on the left who are now critical of his Afghan policy, what did you expect? He campaigned on making this war his priority, and for better or for worst he has followed through by initially sending extra troops and now reevaluating U.S. interests there after a questionable Afghan election. For all others, relax, and let's remember where we started -- with eight years of George Bush -- and take it one step at a time. We as a nation need to acknowledge the seriousness of the problems that confront us. We as a people need to get serious about solving them with a real debate of ideas (not name calling) or we will never really progress. The Obama administration cannot do it alone, it is after all still a Nation "of the people and for the people." Even Mother Teresa didn't cure the world's ills in four years.

Political capital is finite

LIGHT 99 Senior Fellow at the Center for Public Service [Paul C., the President’s Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton, 3rd Edition p. 157]//ZE

Resources and the Need for Priorities. Priorities are central to the conservation of both internal and external resources. For the liaison staffs, the critical resource was presidential capital. “The President cannot expect Congress to act on every proposal,” one Nixon assistant argued. “He must give them a lead on the top items. Otherwise, he will spread his momentum over too many issues.” A second Nixon assistant agreed: “When you look at the situation we faced, the need for priority-setting was even more important. We had a very slim electoral margin; we faced a hostile Democratic Congress; the executive branch was not particularly interested in our ideas. Without a firm statement of priorities, we could not focus our energy. That was the primary reason for the repeated reference to the Six Great Goals in 1971. It was an attempt to concentrate our political strength.” It is to the President’s advantage to provide some statement of priorities. With increased competition for agenda space, the President must focus his scarce political support on the most valuable proposals – at least that is what the liaison staffs believe. As on Carter assistant apologized, “I don’t mean to simplify a very complex process, but Congress no longer offers that many opportunities for the President to set the agenda. Unless the President gives Congress a firm list of priorities, the Congress will drift to other business. That was a lesson we learned quite early.”

Capital finite

Political capital is finite

LIGHT 99 Senior Fellow at the Center for Public Service [Paul C., the President’s Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton, 3rd Edition p. 36-37]

The impact of resources on opportunities can be best described as a problem of policy cycles. Certain resources decline over the term, while others grow. “The more we seemed to learn about the domestic system,” one Nixon aide complained, “the less we could do. We had out best shot at the start oaf the term but didn’t have the organization to cash in. By the time we had the organization, the opportunity was closed.” This ebb and flow of presidential resources creates two basic cycles within the domestic policy process. The first pattern might be called the cycle of decreasing influence. It is based on declines in presidential capital time, and energy. Presidents can usually anticipate a midterm loss of party seats in Congress and a streaky erosion of public approval. At least for the past fifty years, all Presidents, whether Democratic or Republican, have faced a drop in House party seats at the midterm election. Johnson lost forty-seven Democrats in the House in 1966; Nizon lost twelve Republicans in 1970. And at least since George Gallup first began measuring public approval, all President have experienced some decline in their public support over the term. In the last twenty years, however the declines have been more severe. Today the President can expect a near-linear drop in his approval rating in the first three years of office, with a slight rebound at the end of the term As one Ford aide remarked, “Each decision is bound to hurt somebody; each appointment is going to cut into support. There’s really now way that the President can win. If he doesn’t make choices, he will be attacked for being indecisive. If he does, he will satisfy one group but anger three others. Declines in capital eventually bring the domestic process to a halt. Toward the end of each term, the President must spend increasing capital just trying to unclog the legislative calendar. Unless the President is highly successful with early requests, the agenda becomes dominated by the “old” business. Of the five most recent Presidents, excluding Reagan, only Lyndon Johnson was able to sustain a consistently high level of agenda activity into the second an third year’s. The other four President were force to begin repeating their domestic requests by the end of the first year in office. Even Johnson recognized the problem. As one aide remarked, “You have to start backtracking almost from the first day. Unless the programs move off the agenda, you have to start investing your time trying to bump them off. You have to devote your energies to the old items before replacing them with your new ideas.

Must use political capital before it dissipates

Wall Street Journal, 7/6/2009 (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124682940240297211.html#printMode //ZE)

WASHINGTON -- Lawmakers return to the Capitol on Monday for a five-week blitz that will help determine the fate of President Barack Obama's agenda. The Senate will be occupied for much of the summer with confirmation hearings on Supreme Court nominee Sonia Sotomayor, beginning July 13, followed by a floor debate on her nomination. Democratic leaders also hope to push health plans through the House and Senate before their summer break begins Aug. 8. It is a daunting schedule, and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D., Nev.) and House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer (D., Md.) are keeping lawmakers in Washington for five-day workweeks in July, rather than their usual Tuesday-through-Thursday routine. This will be one of the most challenging periods in the legislative session," Reid spokesman Jim Manley said. "But with a little bit of cooperation from the Republicans -- cooperation that has been mostly absent -- we can get all of our work done." Republicans say they have objected to the Democrats' initiatives because they involve massive spending with little benefit. Several factors put pressure on Democrats to accomplish their major goals this year. Mr. Obama outlined an ambitious agenda upon taking office, in addition to programs to tackle the financial crisis and the ailing economy. A president's political capital often dissipates over his tenure, and legislative compromise is harder in election years. In addition, the Democrats may lose seats in Congress in 2010, as a president's party often does in midterm elections. That means Democrats need to make big progress this month. Congress is pressing forward on the dozen must-pass spending bills for the fiscal year beginning Oct. 1, and Senate committees will tackle the climate-change bill recently passed by the House.

Capital finite

Political capital is finite- Obama will run out

Fortier, principal contributor to the AEI-Brookings Election Reform Project and executive director of the Continuity of Government Commission, 9 (John Fortier, “Spend Your Political Capital Before Its Gone,” Politico, 1/14/09, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0109/17395_Page2.html)

President-elect Barack Obama won election more convincingly than Bush, and he will have larger congressional majorities than Republicans had. No doubt he will begin with some political capital of his own. But as the Bush presidency has taught us, that capital will run out someday, and a real test of leadership will be how Obama adjusts.

Obama’s political capital is finite- he’s running out

Weisenthal, Editor of Clusterstock, a politics magazine 7-21 (Joe Weisenthal, “Another Bad Poll For Obama,” Clusterstock, 7/21/09, http://www.businessinsider.com/another-bad-poll-for-obama-2009-7)

The last 10 days have seen a spate of fresh polls all showing the same thing -- that the President's honeymoon period is coming to an end, and that he doesn't have unlimited political capital. He is, after all, human, and despite the mindblowing ineptitude of the Republican opposition, political warfare hurts. The bad polls are coming just as (or maybe because) the President is really digging into the politically charged healthcare debate.

Political capital diminishes with time - Only investing political capital the agenda through

Tod Lindberg Editor of Policy Review Magazine, Research Fellow at the Hoover Institute -2004

[ “Spending political capital,” The Washington Times, December 7. Pg. A21]

Now, in the usual metaphor of political capital, presidents who have it often make the mistake of trying to "hoard" it. They put their political capital in a safe place in order to bolster their personal popularity. They do not "risk it" in pursuit of political victories, whether on their policy agenda or for controversial judicial appointments, etc. And therein, in the conventional application of the metaphor, lies peril. For political capital, when hoarded, does not remain intact but rather diminishes over time through disuse. It "wastes away" - and with it, a president's popularity and reputation. Therefore, again in the conventional use of the metaphor, it is mere prudence for a president to "invest" his political capital. Only by seeking political victories and winning them by such judicious investment can a president maintain and even increase his political capital. Who dares wins. This is, of course, a most mellifluous metaphor for the activists in the president's camp. It promises reward for ambitious action and warns against the high price of a lack of ambition. In fact, it almost sounds like a sure thing: The president takes his political capital, invests it and reaps a mighty return.

Spending political capital key to agenda- Bush proves

John Fortier political scientist who has taught at the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Delaware, Boston College, and Harvard University. American Enterprise Institute, 1/14/09, Politico, Spend your political capital before it's gone, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0109/17395.html

Bush never regained political capital after 2005. Ronald Reagan had early heady days when he controlled the agenda; his popularity waned, but he was able to regain his footing. Bill Clinton famously bounced from highs to lows and back again. But for Bush, there was no second act. Reagan and Clinton could counterpunch and thrive as president without control of Congress. The Bush presidency had only two settings: on and off. In his first term, Bush controlled the legislative agenda like a prime minister; in the second, others set the agenda.

President-elect Barack Obama won election more convincingly than Bush, and he will have larger congressional majorities than Republicans had. No doubt he will begin with some political capital of his own. But as the Bush presidency has taught us, that capital will run out someday, and a real test of leadership will be how Obama adjusts

Capital determines agenda

Political Capital determines the agenda – above anything else

LIGHT, Senior Fellow at the Center for Public Service, 99

[Paul C., the President’s Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton, 3rd Edition] p. 34

In chapter 2, I will consider just how capital affects the basic parameters of the domestic agenda. Though the internal resources are important contributors to timing and size, capital remains the cirtical factor. That conclusion will become essential in understanding the domestic agenda. Whatever the President’s personal expertise, character, or skills, capital is the most important resource. In the past, presidential scholars have focused on individual factors in discussing White House decisions, personality being the dominant factor. Yet, given low levels in presidential capital, even the most positive and most active executive could make little impact. A president can be skilled, charming, charismatic, a veritable legislative wizard, but if he does not have the basic congressional strength, his domestic agenda will be severely restricted – capital affects both the number and the content of the President’s priorities. Thus, it is capital that determines whether the President will have the opportunity to offer a detailed domestic program, whether he will be restricted to a series of limited initiatives and vetoes. Capital sets the basic parameters of the agenda, determining the size of the agenda and guiding the criteria for choice. Regardless of the President’s personality, capital is the central force behind the domestic agenda.

Capital is key – it outweigh ideology, party support, or concessions

LIGHT, Senior Fellow at the Center for Public Service, 99

[Paul C., the President’s Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton, 3rd Edition] p. 24-25)

Call it push, pull, punch, juice, power, or clout – they all mean the same thing. The most basic and most important of all presidential resources is capital. Though the internal resources time, information, expertise, and energy all have an impact on the domestic agenda, the President is severely limited without capital. And capital is directly linked to the congressional parties. While there is little question that bargaining skills can affect both the composition and the success of the domestic agenda, without the necessary party support, no amount of expertise or charm can make a difference. Though bargaining is an important tool of presidential power, it does not take place in a neutral environment. Presidents bring certain advantages and disadvantages to the table.

Political Capital trumps everything else – concessions, wins, and bipart are useless if a president has no skill

Bond& Fleisher, Professor in Political Science - Texas A&M & Professor in Political Science - Fordham 1996 (Jon R. and Richard The President in Legislation)

Finally, the president's professional reputation affects the leeway he has to pursue his policy goals. Presidents who are viewed as unskilled as continually on the defensive. Their explanations of the problems tend to become excuses: compromises become “waffling.” Skilled presidents have more room to maneuver. When they suffer loss, as every president does, they still have leeway to pursue other items on their agenda or to try again to turn the defeat into a victory. Reagan’s efforts to secure aid for the Contras in Nicaragua during the 9th congress -6) illustrate the point. After losing several important votes by close margins n the House flood., the president eventually got a bill through the House giving him most of what he wanted, again by a thin margin.

Obama = anti-Teflon – link only goes one way

New legislation makes Obama look bad regardless of the popularity

John F. Harris and Jim VandeHei, staff writers for Politico, 7/15/10, Why Obama loses by winning, http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=D58D428A-18FE-70B2-A80D4E80D221BD8A, AL

Thursday’s passage of financial reform, just a couple months after the passage of a comprehensive health care overhaul, should decisively end the narrative that President Barack Obama represents a Jimmy Carter-style case of naive hope crushed by the inability to master Washington. Yet the mystery remains: Having moved swiftly toward achieving the very policy objectives he promised voters as a candidate, Obama is still widely perceived as flirting with a failed presidency. Eric Alterman, in a column that drew wide notice, wrote in The Nation that most liberals think the president is a “big disappointment.” House Democrats are in near-insurrection after White House press secretary Robert Gibbs stated the obvious — that the party has a chance of losing the House under Obama’s watch. And independent voters have turned decisively against the man they helped elect 21 months ago — a trend unlikely to be reversed before November. This is an odd reversal of expectations. When Obama came into office, the assumption even among some Democrats was that he was a dazzling politician and communicator who might prove too unseasoned at governance to win substantive achievements. The reality is the opposite. You can argue over whether Obama’s achievements are good or bad on the merits. But, especially after Thursday’s vote, you can’t argue that Obama is not getting things done. To the contrary, he has, as promised, covered the uninsured, tightened regulations, started to wind down the war in Iraq and shifted focus and resources to Afghanistan, injected more competition into the education system and edged closer to a big energy bill. The problem is that he and his West Wing turn out to be not especially good at politics or communications — in other words, largely ineffective at the very things on which their campaign reputation was built. And the promises he made in two years of campaigning turn out to be much less appealing as actual policies. “I tell you, it’s very frustrating that it’s not breaking through, when you look at these things and their scale,” said a top Obama adviser, who spoke on background to offer a candid take on the state of play. “Can you imagine if Bill Clinton had achieved even one of these? Part of it is because we are divided, even on the left. ... And part of it is the culture of immediate gratification.”

A2: Winners Win

Winners win only on non-partisan issues

Steven Pearlstein- Washington Post Columnist, Pulitzer Prize Winner– 1/17/2010

(Washington Post Online, Pearlstein: The current political disarray is a golden opportunity for Obama http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2010/02/16/DI2010021602915.html)

Annapolis, Md.: The funny thing is that if Obama started to show strong leadership instead of compromising, he would also get more respect from the Republicans. The one thing my conservative friends respond the best to is someone who has strong principles and sticks to them. Obama comes across as a push over (I am starting to think he just is) and that's something most people don't want to see in a president. Steven Pearlstein: I agree with that, with one caveat: The firm ground that he needs to stake out and hold is not the left-liberal ground, but more of a radical centrist ground. And the reason for that is political: it is what the American public at this moment in time can accept. That's the president's role -- to speak for the whole country. Not one party. Not one region. Not one ideology. And he can do so with some legitimacy.

Political capital will drop - every legislation decreases influence.

Light 99 Senior Fellow at the Center for Public Service [Paul C., the President’s Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton, 3rd Edition p. 36-37]

The impact of resources on opportunities can be best described as a problem of policy cycles. Certain resources decline over the term, while others grow. “The more we seemed to learn about the domestic system,” one Nixon aide complained, “the less we could do. We had out best shot at the start oaf the term but didn’t have the organization to cash in. By the time we had the organization, the opportunity was closed.” This ebb and flow of presidential resources creates two basic cycles within the domestic policy process. The first pattern might be called the cycle of decreasing influence. It is based on declines in presidential capital time, and energy. Presidents can usually anticipate a midterm loss of party seats in Congress and a streaky erosion of public approval. At least for the past fifty years, all Presidents, whether Democratic or Republican, have faced a drop in House party seats at the midterm election. Johnson lost forty-seven Democrats in the House in 1966; Nizon lost twelve Republicans in 1970. And at least since George Gallup first began measuring public approval, all President have experienced some decline in their public support over the term. In the last twenty years, however the declines have been more severe. Today the President can expect a near-linear drop in his approval rating in the first three years of office, with a slight rebound at the end of the term As one Ford aide remarked, “Each decision is bound to hurt somebody; each appointment is going to cut into support. There’s really now way that the President can win. If he doesn’t make choices, he will be attacked for being indecisive. If he does, he will satisfy one group but anger three others. Declines in capital eventually bring the domestic process to a halt. Toward the end of each term, the President must spend increasing capital just trying to unclog the legislative calendar. Unless the President is highly successful with early requests, the agenda becomes dominated by the “old” business. Of the five most recent Presidents, excluding Reagan, only Lyndon Johnson was able to sustain a consistently high level of agenda activity into the second an third year’s. The other four President were force to begin repeating their domestic requests by the end of the first year in office. Even Johnson recognized the problem. As one aide remarked, “You have to start backtracking almost from the first day. Unless the programs move off the agenda, you have to start investing your time trying to bump them off. You have to devote your energies to the old items before replacing them with your new ideas.

Winners lose

Mark Seidenfeld, Associate Professor, Florida State University College of Law, Iowa Law Review, October 1994

The cumbersome process of enacting legislation interferes with the President's ability to get his legislative agenda through Congress much as it hinders direct congressional control of agency policy-setting. A President has a limited amount of political capital he can use to press for a legislative agenda, and precious little time to get his agenda enacted. These constraints prevent the President from marshalling through Congress all but a handful of statutory provisions reflecting his policy vision. Although such provisions, if carefully crafted, can significantly alter the perspectives with which agencies and courts view regulation, such judicial and administrative reaction is not likely to occur quickly. Even after such reaction occurs, a substantial legacy of existing regulatory policy will still be intact.

A2: Winners Win

Winners don’t win - statistics

Bond & Fleisher, professor in Political Science - Texas A&M and Professor in Political Science. Fordham - 1996 (Jon R. and Richard. "The President in Legislation" p.223)//ZE

Presidency-centered variables, however, provide an even weaker explanation of presidential success. We found little support for the thesis that the weakness of legislative parties increases the importance of presidential skill or popularity for determining presidential success on roll call votes. Our analysis reveals that presidents reputed to be highly skilled do not win consistently more often than should be expected given the conditions they faced. Similarly, presidents reputed to be unskilled do not win significantly less often than expected. The analysis of presidential popularity reveals that the president's standing in the polls has only a marginal impact on the probability of success or failure.

Winners don’t win for long

Mark Seidenfeld, Associate Professor, Florida State University College of Law, Iowa University Law Review, October, 1994

In addition, the propensity of congressional committees to engage in special-interest-oriented oversight might seriously undercut presidential efforts to implement regulatory reform through legislation. On any proposed regulatory measure, the President could face opposition from powerful committee members whose ability to modify and kill legislation is well-documented. This is not meant to deny that the President has significant power that he can use to bring aspects of his legislative agenda to fruition. The President's ability to focus media attention on an issue, his power to bestow benefits on the constituents of members of Congress who support his agenda, and his potential to deliver votes in congressional elections increase the likelihood of legislative success for particular programs. Repeated use of such tactics, however, will impose economic costs on society and concomitantly consume the President's political capital. At some point the price to the President for pushing legislation through Congress exceeds the benefit he derives from doing so. Thus, a President would be unwise to rely too heavily on legislative changes to implement his policy vision.

Winners win NU

Obama just got a win on financial reform

MSNBC, 7-21-10, http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2010/07/19/4706061-obama-agenda-battling-over-unemployment-benefits

“President Barack Obama can finally chalk up a win when he signs financial reform legislation into law this week. The trick now is to spin that victory into electoral gains this November, and both the White House and Democratic leaders are coordinating on a strategy they hope will make that happen,” Roll Call writes.

PC Key to Dem Unity

Political capital key to Dem unity- must threaten retaliation

Lincoln Mitchell - Assistant Professor in the Practice of International Politics, Columbia University - 6/18/ 2009

(Time for Obama to Start Spending Political Capital, The Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lincoln-mitchell/time-for-obama-to-start-s_b_217235.html ty)

This strategy, however, will not be fruitful for much longer. There are now some very clear issues where Obama should be spending political capital. The most obvious of these is health care. The battle for health care reform will be a major defining issue, not just for the Obama presidency, but for American society over the next decades. It is imperative that Obama push for the best and most comprehensive health care reform possible. This will likely mean not just a bruising legislative battle, but one that will pit powerful interests, not just angry Republican ideologues, against the President.The legislative struggle will also pull many Democrats between the President and powerful interest groups. Obama must make it clear that there will be an enormous political cost which Democrats who vote against the bill will have to pay. Before any bill is voted upon, however, is perhaps an even more critical time as pressure from insurance groups, business groups and doctors organizations will be brought to bear both on congress, but also on the administration as it works with congress to craft the legislation. This is not the time when the administration must focus on making friends and being liked, but on standing their ground and getting a strong and inclusive health care reform bill.

A2: Olive Branch

Concessions result in voters’ unfavorably viewing failed results of compromises – kills agenda

Lincoln Mitchell - Assistant Professor in the Practice of International Politics, Columbia University – 12/15/ 2009

(“Keeping the Wheels on the Obama Presidency”, The Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lincoln-mitchell/keeping-the-wheels-on-the_b_392416.html ty)

Obama has also failed to pass a single major piece of truly progressive legislation. This is most clear in the area of health care. The willingness of the White House to swap the expansion of Medicare in exchange for Joe Lieberman's vote on cloture reveals how far the administration has come from what many progressives hoped health care reform would look like. The White House has compromised away a compromise, expanding Medicare, which was itself a compromise from the public option idea, which was an early compromise away from a single payer approach. There is, of course, nothing axiomatically wrong with compromise and pragmatism, but a presidency driven by compromise and pragmatism must be judged by the results it produces. So far, in both foreign and domestic policy, Obama cannot really point to any concrete and positive results, only trends. Politically, pragmatism without tangible results puts Obama in danger of backing himself into a corner. Swing voters will increasingly, fairly or not, judge Obama on outcomes. If jobs do not come back and if success in Afghanistan continues to be elusive, they will not evaluate him kindly. A president can survive this if he still has a strong political base, but for Obama this base is in danger of eroding. Reports that African American members of Congress are increasingly dissatisfied with President Obama suggest that this has already begun to happen.

Concessions don’t garner bipartisanship – better to fight for legislation

David Roberts - Writer for Grist – 3/31/2010

(“Democrats should stop trying to change politics with policy concessions” http://www.grist.org/article/2010-03-30-post-truth-politics/)

Republicans have quite cannily figured out how to manipulate voters' heuristics. No matter what Democrats do or propose, Republicans meet it with maximal, united opposition, criticizing it as socialism, tyranny, or appeasement. They've accurately realized that all they have to do to render Democratic proposals controversial is refuse to support them. As a consequence, no matter what Democrats do or propose, they'll have to deal with the optics of their proposals appearing partisan. We live in post-truth politics: a political culture in which politics (public opinion and media narratives) have become almost entirely disconnected from policy (the substance of legislation). This obviously dims any hope of reasoned legislative compromise. But in another way, it can be seen as liberating. If the political damage of maximal Republican opposition is a fixed quantity -- if policy is orthogonal to politics -- then there is little point to policy compromises. They do not appreciably change the politics. For Democrats shaping policy, this suggests a two-fold strategy. First, they should pull attention to issues and proposals where the political ground is already favorable, from broad stuff like financial reform to narrow bills on jobs and energy. Second, on those issues that are inevitably going to be controversial, aim for maximally effective policy and deal with the politics separately. In post-truth politics, attempting to change perceptions by weakening policy is a category mistake. Remember, no matter what shape a Democratic proposal takes -- a centrist health-care bill full of ideas Republicans supported just a year ago or a cap-and-trade system like the one first implemented under George H.W. Bush -- Republican opposition will be maximal. So: fight the opposition on political grounds and concurrently craft the best, most effective policy possible. The political controversy around a bill, whether it's over partisanship, back-room deals, or procedural maneuvers, is ephemeral. It will pass quickly. In the end, the policy will be judged by its effects on voters' lives -- whether it solved the problem it was designed to solve.

A2: Concessions

Prior political affiliation is most important: concessions have no effect.

Steven S. Smith - Director of the Weidenbaum Center on the Economy - 2007, Government, and Public Policy- 7, (Steven S., “Party Influence in Congress,” Pg 56)

Before turning to tangible incentives that party leaders can offer as incentives for cooperation, it pays to note a feature of party life in Congress that scholars have recognized as important: Supporting the party appears to be a default voting strategy for most legislators. Scholars Charles O. Jones (Jones 1961) and David Truman (Truman 1959), studying the mid-twentieth century Congress, observed a widespread proclivity to support the party line when other significant pressures were not present, creating a baseline of support for the party. Studies offer at least three distinct stories about the origin of this minimum level of partisanship. First, many arrive in Congress with a strong psychological identification with their parties. Many of them have long experience working for and with their parties in their home states, state legislatures, and elsewhere. This is reinforced in everyday life with their party collegues on Capitol Hill. A disposition to “go along” with the party position, in the absence of other influences, is the product. Identification with party collegues created the opportunity for “peer pressure,” which political scientists may overlook but legislators do not. Barber Conable (R-NY), once the senior Republican on the Committee on Ways and Means, observes that “peer group pressure is of considerably greater significance that presidential blandishments.” Leaders exploit legislators’ predispositions by frequently appealing to party loyalty when soliciting votes (Kingdon 1973; Ripley 1967)

Flip Flops Kill Agenda

The aff forces Obama to switch positions, flip-flop kills agenda.

Fitts 96 (Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Michael A., “THE PARADOX OF POWER IN THE MODERN STATE,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, January, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 827)

But as the president becomes increasingly able to perform these functions, that is, as he becomes more modern, unitary, and formally and informally powerful, he can become less able, as a structural matter, to perform many of the mediation and agenda control functions described above. The reasons for this development are related to his visibility and singularity, which can undermine the president's ability to avoid issues, control the agenda, and mediate conflict. Unitary, visible presidents have greater difficulty claiming that it is the "administration" or some neutral precommitment process of decisionmaking that led the executive branch to a particular position. n126 Under the theory of the unitary presidency, he alone must bear responsibility. For the same reason, the president may be less able to take inconsistent or vague positions on different issues or to refuse to take positions on the ground that inconsistencies should be left to stand. n127 While the president's singularity may give him the formal ability to exercise agenda control, which public choice scholars see as an advantage of presidential power, his visibility and the influence of the media may also make it more difficult for him to exercise it. When public scrutiny is brought to bear on the White House, surrounding such issues as gays in the military or affirmative action, the president must often take a position and act. This can deprive him of the ability to choose when or whether to address issues. Finally, the unitary president may be less able to rely on preexisting congressional or agency processes to resolve disputes. At least in theory, true unitariness means that he has the authority to reverse the decisions or non-decisions of others - the buck stops [*866] with the president. n129 In this environment, "no politician can endure opposition from a wide range of opponents in numerous contests without alienating a significant proportion of voters." Two types of tactics illustrate this phenomenon. First, presidents in recent years have often sought to deemphasize - at least politically - their unitariness by allocating responsibility for different agencies to different political constituencies. President Clinton, for example, reportedly "gave" the Department of Justice to the liberal wing of the Democratic party and the Department of the Treasury and the OMB to the conservatives. n131 Presidents Bush and Reagan tried a similar technique of giving control over different agencies to different political constituencies. n132 Second, by invoking vague abstract principles or "talking out of both sides of their mouth," presidents have attempted to create the division within their person. Eisenhower is widely reported to be the best exemplar of this "bumbling" technique. n133 Reagan's widely publicized verbal "incoherence" and detachment from government affairs probably served a similar function. n1Unfortunately, the visibility and singularity of the modern presidency can undermine both informal techniques. To the extent that the modern president is subject to heightened visibility about what he says and does and is led to make increasingly specific statements about who should win and who should lose on an issue, his ability to mediate conflict and control the agenda can be undermined. The modern president is supposed to have a position [*867] on such matters as affirmative action, the war in Bosnia, the baseballstrike, and the newest EPA regulations - the list is infinite. Perhapsin response to these pressures, each modern president has made more speeches and taken more positions than his predecessors, with Bill Clinton giving three times as many speeches as Reagan during the same period. n135 In such circumstances, the president is far less able to exercise agenda control, refuse to take symbolic stands, or take inconsistent positions. The well-documented tendency of the press to emphasize the strategic implications of politics exacerbates this process by turning issues into zero-sum games. n136 Thus, in contrast to Congress, the modern president's attempt to avoid or mediate issues can often undermine him personally and politically.

***INTERNAL LINKS – POLICIES HELP OBAMA

Winners Win

Winners win – political leadership in tough fights builds capital

Singer 9

(Jonathan, My Direct Democracy, “By Expending Capital, Obama Grows His Capital”, 3-3-9, http://www.mydd.com/story/2009/3/3/191825/0428)

From the latest NBC News-Wall Street Journal survey: Despite the country's struggling economy and vocal opposition to some of his policies, President Obama's favorability rating is at an all-time high. Two-thirds feel hopeful about his leadership and six in 10 approve of the job he's doing in the White House. "What is amazing here is how much political capital Obama has spent in the first six weeks," said Democratic pollster Peter D. Hart, who conducted this survey with Republican pollster Bill McInturff. "And against that, he stands at the end of this six weeks with as much or more capital in the bank." Peter Hart gets at a key point. Some believe that political capital is finite, that it can be used up. To an extent that's true. But it's important to note, too, that political capital can be regenerated -- and, specifically, that when a President expends a great deal of capital on a measure that was difficult to enact and then succeeds, he can build up more capital. Indeed, that appears to be what is happening with Barack Obama, who went to the mat to pass the stimulus package out of the gate, got it passed despite near-unanimous opposition of the Republicans on Capitol Hill, and is being rewarded by the American public as a result. Take a look at the numbers. President Obama now has a 68 percent favorable rating in the NBC-WSJ poll, his highest ever showing in the survey. Nearly half of those surveyed (47 percent) view him very positively. Obama's Democratic Party earns a respectable 49 percent favorable rating. The Republican Party, however, is in the toilet, with its worst ever showing in the history of the NBC-WSJ poll, 26 percent favorable. On the question of blame for the partisanship in Washington, 56 percent place the onus on the Bush administration and another 41 percent place it on Congressional Republicans. Yet just 24 percent blame Congressional Democrats, and a mere 11 percent blame the Obama administration. So at this point, with President Obama seemingly benefiting from his ambitious actions and the Republicans sinking further and further as a result of their knee-jerked opposition to that agenda, there appears to be no reason not to push forward on anything from universal healthcare to energy reform to ending the war in Iraq.

Winners Win – political victories multiply – insiders prove

Ornstein, American Enterprise Institute 9/10/01

(Norman, Roll Call “Congress Inside Out”)

The compromise accomplished two ends. First, it changed the agenda base of the issue. Patients' rights went from an issue where the only viable proposal was from Democrats (with GOP co-sponsors), which the President vowed to veto - to one where both Democrats and Bush are for patients' rights and merely differ on the details. Two, it gave the President a victory on the House floor when all the pundits predicted defeat a major momentum builder. In a system where a President has limited formal power, perception matters. The reputation for success - the belief by other political actors that even when he looks down, a president will find a way to pull out a victory - is the most valuable resource a chief executive can have. Conversely, the widespread belief that the Oval Office occupant is on the defensive, on the wane or without the ability to win under adversity can lead to disaster, as individual lawmakers calculate who will be on the winning side and negotiate accordingly. In simple terms, winners win and losers lose more often than not. The set of presidential victories on energy was significant in other ways. The energy bill that emerged on the House floor was put together hurriedly by House Republican leaders who wanted to get one Bush priority on the agenda and give him at least a partial victory. But up until the day before the debate and votes, nearly everyone, including GOP leaders, expected the President to be rebuffed on drilling in ANWR; most thought he would lose on CAFE standards for SUVs.

Winners win – one victory builds the habit for future wins

Norman Ornstein, Roll Call, May 27, 1993

2. Winning comes to those who look like winners. This only sounds redundant or cliche-ish. If power is the ability to make people do something they otherwise would not do, real power is having people do things they otherwise wouldn't do without anybody making them - when they act in anticipation of what they think somebody would want them to do. If a president develops a reputation as a winner, somebody who will pull out victories in Congress even when he is behind, somebody who can say, "Do this!" and have it done, then Members of Congress will behave accordingly. They will want to cut their deals with the president early, getting on the winning team when it looks the best and means the most. They will avoid cutting deals with the opposition. Stories that show weakness, indecisiveness, or incompetence in the White House - and there are always lots of them - will go unreported or will be played down because they will be seen as the exception that proves the rule of strength and competence. But the converse is also, painfully, true. If a president develops a reputation for being weak or for being a loser - somebody who says, "Do this!" and nothing happens, who is ignored or spurned by other interests in the political process - he will suffer death by a thousand cuts. Lawmakers will delay jumping on his bandwagon, holding off as long as possible until they see which side will win. Stories about incompetence, arrogance, or failure will be reported always, and given prominence, because they prove the point.

Winners Win

Aggressive legislation despite GOP generates momentum for the agenda

Lincoln Mitchell - Assistant Professor in the Practice of International Politics, Columbia University - 6/18/ 2009

(“Health Care, Financial Reform and Democratic Momentum” , The Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lincoln-mitchell/health-care-financial-ref_b_556239.html ty)

The Democratic Party's fortunes have taken a turn for the better in the last few months because, for what seems like the first time since Obama took office, the party has been aggressive, refused to back down in the face of Republican attacks and abandoned efforts to pass legislation with bipartisan support. However, the Republicans can regain the momentum back from the Democrats if the Obama administration is not vigilant about setting the agenda, pushing hard for more legislation and not being intimidated by the Republicans.

Controversial legislation reinvigorates presidency – healthcare proves

International Institute for Strategic Studies April 2010

“Obama's presidency bolstered by political success” http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-16-2010/april/obamas-presidency-bolstered-by-political-success/

The health-care bill passed without a single Republican vote, underscoring the fiercely partisan nature of contemporary American politics and increasing scepticism about Obama's ability to usher in the epoch of 'post-partisan' government about which he had spoken hopefully during his campaign and early days in office. To be sure, 'Tea Party' Republicans have continued to attack the new law as 'socialist' and vowed its repeal after anticipated Republican victories in midterm elections in November 2010, while 14 state attorneys-general have filed lawsuits challenging its constitutionality. But such threats and challenges are probably overblown. Obama's display of political muscle in pushing through the most significant and controversial piece of domestic US legislation since the 1960s has reinvigorated his presidency. It has ended a stream of media articles suggesting that in spite of his rhetoric he was proving politically ineffectual, and overly intellectual in his approach to office.

Bush proves winners will win.

Fortier and Ornstein study politics, the presidency, continuity of government, elections, the electoral college, election reform, and presidential succession disability & American Enterprise Institute Fortier - Ornstein - American Enterprise Institute. 2003 (John C. & Norman J.) <http://www3.brookings.edu/press/books/chapter_1/secondtermblues.pdf>

George W. Bush has followed the motto that “winners win.” When he was given accolades for his initial policy successes as governor, when he finally was elected to his first term as president (even in a controversial election), in the aftermath of 9/11, after his victory in the 2002 midterm elections, and after the initial successes of the Iraq War, Bush used these victories to press for more of his agenda. Whether it was a new school financing plan in Texas, tax cuts, or a Department of Homeland Security, Bush did not sit on his laurels. It was this theory of political capital that informed his plans for a second term. Two days after his reelection, Bush said: Let me put it to you this way: I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it. It is my introduction style. That’s what happened in the—after the 2000 election, I earned some capital. I’ve earned capital in this election—and I’m going to spend it for what I told the people I’d spend it on, which is—you’ve heard the agenda: Social Security and tax reform, moving this economy forward, education, fighting and winning the war on terror. Bush’s understanding of his own political capital was astute. But it also relied on his always having been a somewhat popular governor or president. Before his 2004 reelection, Bush did not suffer the wild ups and downs that Clinton did throughout his governorship and presidency. When Bush’s popularity began to drop significantly in 2005, the theory of political capital, his grip on narrow Republican majorities, and the public’s perception of his strong leadership began to suffer.

Winners Win – progressive issues

Passing progressive legislation reinvigorates his base and garners political capital

Lincoln Mitchell - Assistant Professor in the Practice of International Politics, Columbia University – 12/15/ 2009

(“Keeping the Wheels on the Obama Presidency”, The Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lincoln-mitchell/keeping-the-wheels-on-the_b_392416.html ty)

The wheels have not yet come off the Obama presidency, but they could next year. The best way to prevent this from happening would be for Obama to reenergize his political base so that they can be help put pressure on uncooperative members of Congress and help work to minimize Democratic losses in November of 2010. This will require Obama to define a progressive position on almost any issue, be it marriage equality, Wall Street bonuses, health care or anything else, and aggressively pursue it. The primary political failure of the Obama administration so far is that the president has not delivered one meaningful, major policy change for his progressive base, or more accurately, progressive bases. This not only infuriates many progressives, but ultimately it weakens Obama's presidency. Obama has not taken a strong stand on any of the issues, such as marriage equality, which are important to his base; nor has he responded to the economic problems facing the country by an explicit and substantial jobs program or a genuinely aggressive effort to regulate the economy. Instead, he has charted a course of offering some bailout money to financial institutions while seeking to cajole them into lending more money to small businesses in the hopes that this will generate jobs. On foreign policy, Obama has sought to wind down the war in Iraq while expanding the war in Afghanistan. He has pursued less confrontational policies regarding China and Russia while seeking to reinvigorate traditional alliances in western Europe. Obama's foreign policy is an improvement over Bush's because it is grounded in pragmatism and realism rather than ideology and fantasy, but it would be very premature to call Obama's foreign policy successful. Obama has also failed to pass a single major piece of truly progressive legislation. This is most clear in the area of health care. The willingness of the White House to swap the expansion of Medicare in exchange for Joe Lieberman's vote on cloture reveals how far the administration has come from what many progressives hoped health care reform would look like. The White House has compromised away a compromise, expanding Medicare, which was itself a compromise from the public option idea, which was an early compromise away from a single payer approach. There is, of course, nothing axiomatically wrong with compromise and pragmatism, but a presidency driven by compromise and pragmatism must be judged by the results it produces. So far, in both foreign and domestic policy, Obama cannot really point to any concrete and positive results, only trends. Politically, pragmatism without tangible results puts Obama in danger of backing himself into a corner. Swing voters will increasingly, fairly or not, judge Obama on outcomes. If jobs do not come back and if success in Afghanistan continues to be elusive, they will not evaluate him kindly. A president can survive this if he still has a strong political base, but for Obama this base is in danger of eroding. Reports that African American members of Congress are increasingly dissatisfied with President Obama suggest that this has already begun to happen. If Obama is losing support among African American members of Congress, anti-war activists and advocates for marriage equality, he risks becoming a much weaker political figure. This alone will not be enough to cost him re-election, but combined with a continued inability to deliver results from his compromise-driven policies it could. In the short term, this loss of support will make it harder for Obama to drive legislation and policy in Washington. Nowhere is this clearer than regarding health care, the defining domestic policy initiative of this administration. The White House has seemingly decided that getting a bill, no matter how weak, should be the goal. This is a Clintonian approach which, not surprisingly, was strongly supported by former Clinton aide Rahm Emanuel. It worked for Bill Clinton. However, it worked for Clinton because he presided during a time of relative peace and prosperity. In that context passing reform legislation was not so important to the president's future. It is different today. Because he cannot provide peace and prosperity, Obama needs to pass some meaningful legislation to demonstrate that he is doing something positive as president. Just getting a bill passed will mean nothing to many Americans who are too focused on the economy and, to a lesser extent the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, to notice some minor changes in how health care is covered. It will, however, not be lost on progressives who will view the whole episode as another disappointment by Obama. On balance, Obama is better off energizing his political base by sticking to some principles on health care, even if he fails, than by passing a sufficiently weakened bill that nobody even notices, but this is not the path he seems to be pursuing.

Teflon

Obama’s political capital is resilient

Melber, staff writer and political science bachelor, 08

(Ari Melber, staff writer and political science bachelor, 11/08, http://www.thenation.com/blogs/notion/382337)

Because now, Obama's team wants everyone to know. The massive list of energized activists is the biggest stick Obama will carry in Washington. It enables direct communication at a remarkable scale. The next President can instantly address 16 percent of his national supporters, based on the popular vote. To put it another way, the list dwarfs the audience of all the nightly cable news shows combined. So even after the gauzy honeymoon talk fades, when people start second-guessing how much "political capital" Obama really has, there will be this resilient network of people committed to enacting the Obama agenda. In a policy fight with Congress -- or a message battle with the press -- these are the people that will take action to get Obama's back. They will call their neighbors, or their members of Congress. They'll knock on doors, or storm local meetings. They'll write letters to the editor or, naturally, email and prod their networks. They can also hold Obama accountable, of course, by using the same networked technology to pressure the new administration. Peter Daou, a web strategist and former adviser to Hillary Clinton's campaign, raised that prospect in the article

Olive Branch

Brokering deals and concessions makes it easier to deal with ideologically opposed parties

Dylan Matthews – student at Harvard and a researcher at the Washington Post – 4/1/2010

(Washington Post “Are policy concessions worth it?” http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/04/are_policy_concessions_worth_i.html)

This is true so far as it goes. I doubt there would be any more breathless cries of tyranny or socialism had Obama just signed a single-payer bill into law. But the problem isn't with voters; it's with Congress. Concessions like Obama's offshore oil drilling announcement, or any number of components of health-care reform, may not sway voters, but they give individual senators and representatives cover. It's easy to see this as members holding bills hostage to parochial concerns, and to some degree that's true. But offering a minor concession to a vulnerable senator, who can then go home and say they only voted for the bill after having fought to make it better, doesn't make for a bad trade. Whipping members from ideologically diverse constituencies is tough enough with a leadership willing to broker deals; removing that tool would only make the process more difficult.

Concessions Key to Agenda

Compromises are the only way to overcome filibusters and pass agenda

Craig Volden - assistant professor of political science at the Ohio State University and David W. Brady - professor of political science and business, and Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the Hoover Institute at Stanford University, 2006 (“Revolving Gridlock : Politics and Policy from Jimmy Carter to George W. Bush,” Pg 35, Westview Press, 2006)

More often, however, gridlock is maintained through members from divorce districts who are very responsive to the electorate and thus at odds with their fellow legislators. In these cases, gridlock can be overcome only through legislative compromise, and only when status quo policies are outside the gridlock region. When a policy advocate suggests a change so major that supermajorities are difficult to achieve, the change will be stopped by a filibuster or veto. To build the needed coalition for cloture or a vet override, compromises will need to be struck, often taking one of two forms. First, the policy itself could be watered down. This was the main way that President Clinton overcame Republican filibusters in 1993 on issues like the job stimulus package, voter registration, and family and medical leave. A smaller change was more acceptable to moderate Senators.

A second possible compromise with these pivotal members needed to build a supermajority involves concessions not on the ideological position of the bill at hand, but on other issues. Often these include distributive budgetary items, like roads, bridges, research labs, and targeted tax cuts. Riders attached to budget bills add these benefits needed to smooth out compromises on earlier bills. Quite clearly, to the extent that budget concessions are needed to build coalitions on all sorts of issues, gridlock is more likely when congress is confronting deficits than when it is ignoring them or facing surpluses.

Concessions best – arm twisting results in backlash

Joseph A. Pika – Professor of Political Science & International Relations at U of Delaware AND John Anthony Maltese - Prof of Political Science at University of Georgia - 2004

(The Politics of the Presidency pp199-200)

On their relations with Congress, presidents follow certain modes or patterns of behavior: bargaining, arm-twisting, and confrontation. Bargaining is the pre¬dominant mode, and occasionally the president bargains directly with members whose support is deemed essential to a bill's passage. In May 1981, for example, the Reagan administration agreed to revive a costly program to support the price of sugar in exchange for the votes of four Democratic representatives from Louisiana (where sugar is a key crop) on a comprehensive budget reduction bill. 78 Presidents usually try to avoid such explicit bargains because they have limited resources for trading, and the desire among members for these resources is keen. Moreover, Congress is so large and its Power so decentralized that presid¬ents cannot bargain extensively over most bills. In some instances, the presi¬dent may be unable or unwilling to bargain. Fortunately, rather than a quid pro quo exchange of favors for votes, much presidential-congressional bargaining is implicit, generalized trading in which tacit exchanges of support and favors occur. If bargaining does not result in the approval of their proposals, presidents may resort to stronger methods, such as arm-twisting, which involves intense, even extraordinary, pressure and threats. In one sense, it is an intensified extension of bargaining, but it entails something more - a direct threat of punishment if the member's opposition continues. Among modern presidents, Johnson was perhaps the most frequent practitioner of arm-twisting. When gentler effort failed, or when a once-supportive member opposed him on an important issue, Johnson resorted to tactics such as deliberate embarrassment, threats, and reprisals. In contrast, Eisenhower was most reluctant to pressure Congress. Arm twisting is understandably an unpopular tactic and, if used often, creates resent¬ment and hostility. Still, judicious demonstration that sustained opposition or desertion by normal supporters will exact costs strengthens a president's bargaining position

Momentum Key

Loss of momentum derails agenda

New York Times 2/142009

(John Harwood, “Obama, With a Pile of Chips” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/15/weekinreview/15harwood.html)

Presidential mojo is an elusive and ephemeral force that flows from many sources. It derives largely from numbers: the size of the election victory, the poll ratings, the breadth of partisan support in Congress. By those measures, Mr. Obama’s 53 percent popular vote majority, mid-60 percent job approval ratings, and solid House and Senate majorities compare favorably at this stage with the profile of any new president post-World War II. But the sustainability of those power gauges can be inversely related to the scale of the political challenges a president faces — sometimes exhausting his capital in the first year of a White House term. The recession and two wars facing Mr. Obama easily match the stagflation and cold war challenges that confronted Ronald Reagan in 1981, and may exceed those of any predecessor since F.D.R. Moreover, presidential momentum can drain rapidly — or replenish — depending on unplanned events, often partly or entirely outside the president’s control. The belatedly disclosed tax problems that felled Mr. Daschle, and the about-face by Senator Gregg that ended his nomination for commerce secretary, only hint at the potential for off-script disruptions, which often come in the realm of foreign policy. The alchemy that translates those ingredients into presidential success defies consistent prediction. After John F. Kennedy narrowly defeated Richard Nixon in 1960, Americans rallied behind him; his initial 72 percent job approval rating was the highest Gallup has recorded for a new president, before or since. Mr. Kennedy retained that high standing through his first 100 days, despite the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in April 1961. Yet the victories he achieved from a Democratic Congress remained modest. The rap on Kennedy was “too much profile, not enough courage,” recalled the presidential scholar Fred Greenstein. Only after he was martyred in Dallas two years later did his proposals on civil rights sweep through Congress under his less-charismatic successor, Lyndon B. Johnson.

*OTHER

Yes Spillover

Yes vote switching – no impact to ideology

Bond & Fleisher, Professor in Political Science - Texas A&M & Professor in Political Science - Fordham - 1996

(Jon R. and Richard “The President in Legislation” pg 54)

In a previous study of presidential-congressional relations from Eisenhower to Ford, we found that ideological conflict between the president and members of Congress was associated with lower support. In general, as ideological differences increase, the president tends to lose support from members of both parties at about the same rate, although support from the opposition is lower at all levels of ideological conflict (Bond and Fleisher 1980,75). Thus ideological forces in Congress often cause the formation of bipartisan coalitions to support or oppose the president’s policy preferences. These ideological forces help explain why majority presidents have only a limited advantage over minority presidents in building majority support for their positions in Congress. Majority presidents inevitably experience defections of partisans who have ideologies in conflict with theirs. Minority presidents, on the other hand, can frequently build working majorities composed of their partisan base and like-minded members of the opposition.

Political capital spills over – 107th congress proves

LEE 05 The Rose Institute of State & Local Government – Claremont McKenna College – Presented at the Georgia Political Science Association 2005 Conference

[Andrew, “Invest or Spend?:Political capital and Statements of Administration Policy in the First Term of the George W. Bush Presidency,” http://a-s.clayton.edu/trachtenberg/2005%20Proceedings%20Lee.pdf]

The idea of investing political capital also supports the notion that the chief executive specializes in foreign and defense policy. The president may increase his domestic capital by cooperating on domestic legislation and then spend it implementing foreign policies. In executing foreign policy, the president will not issue SAPs on his own foreign policy. For example, if the president signs a treaty, Congress may or may not ratify it, but there is no opportunity for veto. Therefore, the president’s use of foreign policy is a spend maneuver, whereas his domestic policy is an invest maneuver. The 107th Congress, during which the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq began, supports this theory. President Bush may have spent his political capital towards executing those wars and attempted to invest his capital by cooperating on domestic legislation.

No Spillover

No Spillover – Congress considers policies individually

George C. Edwards III – Distinguished Professor of Political Science and the director of the Center for Presidential Studies at Texas A&M University – March 2000

(Presidential Studies Quarterly. Volume 30. Issue 1. “Building Coalitions” ty)

Besides not considering the full range of available views, members of Congress are not generally in a position to make trade-offs between policies. Because of its decentralization, Congress usually considers policies serially, that is, without reference to other policies. Without an integrating mechanism, members have few means by which to set and enforce priorities and to emphasize the policies with which the president is most concerned. This latter point is especially true when the opposition party controls Congress.

Senators don’t vote based on capital – it’s all about ideology and representing their local interests

Matt Yglesias, Fellow at the Center for American Progress Action Fund, 6-15-09, http://yglesias.thinkprogress.org/archives/2009/06/the-limits-of-political-capital.php

I think the answer to the puzzle is simply that “political capital” is a pretty misleading metaphor. The fact of the matter is that the Senate is what it is—to wit, an institution with an enormous status quo bias, that’s also biased in favor of conservative areas. On top of that, the entire structure of the US Congress with its bicameralism and multiple overlapping committees is biased toward making it easy for concentrated interests to block reform. Between them, Dianne Feinstein, Barbara Boxer, Chuck Schumer, Kristen Gillibrand, Bill Nelson, Dick Durbin, Roland Burriss, Arlen Specter, Bob Casey, Sherrod Brown, Carl Levin, Amy Klobuchar, Kay Hagan, Bob Menendez, Frank Lautenberg, Mark Warner, Jim Webb, Patty Murray, Maria Cantwell, Ted Kennedy, John Kerry, and Evan Bayh represent 50 percent of the country’s population. But that only adds up to 22 Senators—you need thirty-eight more to pass a bill. Meanwhile, the fact of the matter is that in recent years plenty of incumbent Republicans have been brought down by primary challenges from the right and as best I know zero Democrats have been brought down by primary challenges from the left. This has been a huge advantage for the Democrats in terms of winning elections—it’s an important part of the reason Democrats have these majorities. But it also means that when it comes to policymaking, Republicans have a lot of solidarity but Democratic leaders have little leverage over individual members. In other words, nobody thinks that Collin Peterson (D-MN) is going to lose his seat over badly watering down Waxman-Markey and that matters a lot more than airy considerations of capital.

No horsetrading – policies are examined individually

George C. Edwards III – Distinguished Professor of Political Science and the director of the Center for Presidential Studies at Texas A&M University – March 2000

(Presidential Studies Quarterly. Volume 30. Issue 1. “Building Coalitions” ty)

In addition, Congress has little capability to examine two policies, such as education and health care, in relation to each other. Not knowing that giving up something on one policy will result in a greater return on another policy, members have little incentive to engage in trade-offs. The budget committees have a broader scope than other committees and are involved in making some trade-offs between policies and setting some priorities. But they deal only with direct expenditures (and then usually only with increases over past expenditures), not taxes (except for general revenue estimates), tax expenditures, treaties, regulation, or other important areas. Moreover, they only recommend general limits on spending, leaving it up to the more parochial subject-area committees to go into specifics. The House committee is also composed of temporary members whose permanent committee assignments undoubtedly limit their scope.

No Spillover

Political Capital is irrelevant – case studies prove

Bond & Fleisher, Professor in Political Science - Texas A&M & Professor in Political Science - Fordham 1996 (Jon R. and Richard The President in Legislation)

In sum, the evidence presented in this chapter provides little support for the theory that the president's perceived leadership, skills are associated with success on roll call votes in Congress. Presidents reputed as highly skilled do not win consistently more often than should be expected. Even the effects of the partisan balanced Congress, the president's popularity, and, the cycle of decreasing influence over the course of his term. Presidents reputed as unskilled do not win consistently less often relative to. Moreover, skilled presidents do not win significantly more often than unskilled presidents on either important votes or close votes, in which skills have the greatest potential to affect the outcome. Because of the difficulty of establishing a definitive test of the skills theory, some may argue that it is premature to reject this explanation of presidential success based on the tests reported in this chapter. It might be argued that these findings by themselves do not deny that leadership skill is an important component of presidential-congressional relations. Failure to find systematic effects in general does not necessarily refute the anecdotes and case studies demonstrating the importance of skills.

No Spillover – Foreign policy/ Domestic Policy

No spillover between domestic and foreign policy

Andrew Lee – The Rose Institute of State & Local Government – Claremont McKenna College - 2005

(“Invest or Spend?:Political capital and Statements of Administration Policy in the First Term of the George W. Bush

Presidency,” http://a-s.clayton.edu/trachtenberg/2005%20Proceedings%20Lee.pdf)

The idea of investing political capital also supports the notion that the chief executive specializes in foreign and defense policy. The president may increase his domestic capital by cooperating on domestic legislation and then spend it implementing foreign policies. In executing foreign policy, the president will not issue SAPs on his own foreign policy. For example, if the president signs a treaty, Congress may or may not ratify it, but there is no opportunity for veto. Therefore, the president’s use of foreign policy is a spend maneuver, whereas his domestic policy is an invest maneuver. The 107th Congress, during which the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq began, supports this theory. President Bush may have spent his political capital towards executing those wars and attempted to invest his capital by cooperating on domestic legislation.

Base Key

Dems control Congress but worry about midterms- unity key to Obama’s agenda

Sam Youngman, The Hill, 07/27/09, Analysis: July has been disaster for Obama, Hill Dems, http://thehill.com/leading-the-news/analysis-july-has-been-disaster-for-obama-hill-dems-2009-07-27.html

The Obama administration, which was flying high a month ago after pushing through a climate change bill in the House, has since been dealt a series of setbacks and is struggling to regain its footing. After the climate bill passed 219-212 on the afternoon of June 26, there was a feeling that the White House could get much of its agenda through Congress in 2009. A month later, there are doubts that President Obama will even achieve his No. 1 priority of healthcare reform, much less cap-and-trade, immigration reform and a regulatory revamp of the financial sector. Since late June — when Democrats defied conventional wisdom and passed the climate bill by their self-imposed deadline — the stubborn realities of Washington have blunted and possibly even derailed the president's signature domestic efforts. The White House is frantically working to get healthcare reform back on track after missed deadlines in August. Obama had initially said he wanted both chambers to pass legislation by the August recess and sign a bill by Oct. 15. He now says he wants to enact healthcare reform by the end of the year. And while the president continues to put his critics "on notice," targeting GOP lawmakers, the Republicans are quick to note the obvious — Obama has comfortable majorities in both the House and Senate. Obama enjoyed immediate successes in office, signing into law his $787 billion stimulus package in just 28 days. He also helped shepherd a pay equity measure and a children’s healthcare bill through Congress. But in the past few months, as unemployment rates have spiked, Republicans have increasingly found traction in lambasting Obama’s agenda and fanning the flames of division within the Democratic Party. Obama did score a significant victory last week on eliminating Senate funding for F-22 fighter jets, but the triumph was overshadowed by Democratic infighting on healthcare. Despite a number of former Democratic members and aides working in the Obama administration, Democrats on Capitol Hill have grown bolder in defying their party leader. Many centrist Democrats are worried that Republicans will have the upper hand in the 2010 elections.

Base unity ensures 90 percent passage chance

Bond & Fleisher, professor in Political Science - Texas A&M and Professor in Political Science. Fordham - 1996 (Jon R. and Richard. "The President in Legislation" p.113)

Unified support countered by unified opposition is a more interesting condition. If a majority president takes a position that generates a party split, then the probability of winning increases to above .90. And the probabilities are about the same regardless of whether the party split involves only the party bases unifying against each other, or the president's party coalition (base plus the cross-pressured faction) unifying against the opposing party coalition. Opposing ideological coalitions are not as effective for majority presidents. When this condition occurs, the president wins about three out of four times, only slightly better odds than under the condition of no unity. Thus majority presidents can increase their chances of success if they take positions that unify their partisans, especially members of their political base, who have the greatest predisposition to agree with the president. And even if unified support from one or both factions of the president’s party is countered with unified opposition from the opposition party factions, the probability of success is still better than .90. The situation for minority presidents is different.

Progressive Base Key

Progressive base key to Obama’s agenda – platform commitments. More important than GOP opposition

Lincoln Mitchell - Assistant Professor in the Practice of International Politics, Columbia University – 12/15/ 2009

(“The Obama Disappointment and Its Cost”, The Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lincoln-mitchell/the-obama-disappointment_b_655340.html ty)

Barack Obama's presidency, while far from being a failure, has been something of a disappointment to many of his initial supporters. The noise from people on the far right who question the president's place of birth or believe him to be a socialist because he passed a stimulus package that many economists believe to be too small and a health care bill that will lead to millions of new customers and new revenue for the insurance companies, has overshadowed some of this. However, Obama's disappointed supporters are far more important to his political future than angry opponents who never have and never will support him. Disappointment from progressive circles seems to be based on three things, Obama's support for the war in Afghanistan, his failure to take any strong positions on important issues to progressives such as marriage equality and the relatively modest nature of the legislation the administration has passed on key issues such as health care and the economy. These decisions can all be explained-some might say rationalized. Obama, after all, campaigned on expanding the war in Afghanistan. While the health care and economic stimulus bills are not perfect, they took a great deal of work and are better than nothing. Obama has to be careful about doing too much for his base because he risks alienating moderates. These explanations are either irrelevant; nobody cares how much work or legislative pyrotechnics it took to pass the bills, or wrong; supporting marriage equality comes at far less political cost than many think. The immediate cost of this disappointment to Obama's political future will be obvious, but also debatable. Progressive supporters who came to the polls out of excitement and hope surrounding Obama in 2008 will be less likely to vote in 2010 after being disappointed by the president. There is some truth to this, but it should not be overstated. Turnout is always lower in midterm elections, so it would be wrong and ahistorical to expect turnout among progressives in 2010 to be comparable to what it was in 2008. Moreover, the possibility that the base of one or both parties will be angry and stay home is raised during virtually every election, but both parties make strong efforts, often with some success, to bring these voters out in the weeks leading up to the election. During the campaign in 2008, Obama mobilized his base substantially around the notion that he was a transformative political figure. The change which was the central theme of his campaign was not just the change that Obama was going to represent following eight years of the Bush administration, but also the change Obama was going to bring to Washington and to politics more generally. It is now, and was probably even then, obvious that the latter type of change was not likely to happen, but this was at the heart of Obama's campaign. When opponents pointed out that this somewhat amorphous but broad vision of changing politics in America was not quite realistic, Obama regularly appealed to his base to support him and refute these cynical views. Given the role that the belief in change and Obama's perceived ability to deliver that change played in his election, it would seem that the President owes his these supporters more than essentially arguing that it is tough getting things done, that he is doing his best, and having supporters recite talking points describing the real, but far from transformative accomplishments of the president. The disappointment Obama supporters feel is not simply due to their naïve expectations and hope being hijacked by reality. Many of those who are now disappointed were not naïve neophytes unfamiliar with American politics. They were progressives, angry about eight years of the Bush administration who were persuaded by Obama himself to allow themselves to have hope one more time. Critics of Obama always argued that Obama was manipulating these people. The president's ongoing failure to do anything for this important part of his base may ultimately prove these critics right, leading these people to feel not only to feel manipulated by Obama but angry at themselves for allowing this to happen. The cost of this will not be limited to dampened enthusiasm from the progressive base in the 2010 and 2012 elections, but may also lead a large group of people stop participating in the political process. Even if they continue to vote, they will probably not continue to offer their energy, time and money, at least at the national level. People who feel disappointed, or even manipulated, by Obama will be very unlikely to be excited by any future candidates as this experience will leave a mark on their political consciousness. As these people remove themselves from politics it will not only cause short, and long, term harm to the democratic party but will increase the level of anger and instability in our already precarious polity.

Blue Dogs key to agenda

They’re key to the agenda—they form key swing votes on every policy.

Chaote 2009 [staff writer, “Stenholm's 'Blue Dogs' show muscle in health plan debate”, August 9, reporter news, http://www.reporternews.com/news/2009/aug/08/no-headline---stenholm_web]

WASHINGTON — Former Big Country Congressman Charlie Stenholm predicted more than two years ago that the Democrats he fondly calls “my Blue Dogs” would vault into prominence. Stenholm, a lobbyist who still considers himself a Blue Dog, told the Reporter-News in January 2007 that no legislation would pass the House without the blessing of the caucus of conservative and moderate Democrats. The fiscally frugal group is coming into its own as shown by its members forcing negotiations on health-care reform recently in the House. The approximately 50 Blue Dogs form a powerful and unified block of swing votes on any issue they see fit to influence from climate change to pay-as-you-go budgeting. They’re bringing to heel their more liberal House leaders and bending President Obama’s ear at the White House. Former Blue Dog standout and 26-year Big Country Congressman Stenholm spoke with the Reporter-News last week on everything from what the Blue Dogs stand for to the state of health care today to tomorrow’s energy needs. Stenholm, a Blue Dog founder, long represented the 17th Congressional District with Abilene as a centerpiece. After district boundaries were redrawn to favor Republicans, he was paired with U.S. Rep. Randy Neugebauer in the 19th Congressional District and lost to the Republican from Lubbock. Q. Blue Dogs seems to have suddenly jumped to the forefront on the national scene in the last few weeks. Could you summarize who they are and what they stand for? A. They are 52 Democrats that hold very competitive congressional seats. Most of these seats have been occupied by a Republican in the last two, four, six or eight years. But even those that have been occupied by long-serving Democrats as Blue Dogs, they’re usually one of the few Democrats that get elected in their area because their districts are basically conservative but not far right conservative and certainly not far left liberal. Q. While 52 or 51 — depending who you ask — Blue Dogs is a significant number, they haven’t been terribly prominent in the past even after Democrats gained power. Why do you think they are now? A. Because there’s no question that the leadership of the House is considerably more liberal than certainly the people of Texas, the 19th (Congressional) District now — the old 17th (Congressional) District and the other districts that we’re talking about. The leadership of the House has wanted to move further to the left than Blue Dogs can vote for and still keep a majority of their people with them. So when you have a Democratic administration, a Democratic-controlled House, a Democratic-controlled Senate, then it gets down to the responsibility of being a legislator. And that is realizing that what you vote for or vote against is probably going to become law or not become law. You don’t have the luxury of voting no or voting yes and expecting it to be vetoed by George Bush. It’s now the kind of legislative agenda that a few years in my career I enjoyed when what you and your district stood for actually became the law or at least moved it in the direction you wanted to. That’s what Blue Dogs are doing now and will do for the next year and a half. Q. What would you like to see them do to maintain that influence and shape the direction things are going on Capitol Hill? A. What they are doing. Blue Dogs mainly are concerned about the fiscal concerns of our country. Some of the things that we talked about five years ago, 10 years ago, are now happening. I mean, when I was first elected, our national debt was $771 billion. Today, it is $11.6 trillion. The Reagan years, $3.8 trillion was added to our debt. (George H.W.) Bush 41, $1.6 trillion was added to our debt. Clinton’s eight years, $1.4 trillion was added to our debt. (George W.) Bush 43, $5.8 trillion was added to our debt. And there’s a big question mark with the spending that is now going on and being proposed. We can’t sustain it. It just cannot be sustained. And the Blue Dogs are going to be trying to change the fiscal direction, holding the line on spending. And that’s so important. Q. Do you think they’re walking a fine line politically? They’re conservative Democrats who might be bucking, like you said, the more liberal leadership of their party. But at the same time, what about when they need to get something done in the future? Will they have the political capital? A. Well, sure. If they’ve got something to get done in the future, it has to stand on the merits of what it is you want done. And, you know, at some point in time, Republicans are going to have to do something other than just vote no. Because if you vote no and something goes down that the people of your district wanted, which is the nature of the question you asked: What if Blue Dogs come out for something and liberal Democrats vote against it? Are conservative Republicans going to vote against it, too, just to teach those Blue Dogs a lesson? That’s a question for the people to answer. Q. Blue Dogs have come under criticism for accepting contributions from that industry and then working to alter health care legislation, some think, by weakening the public health care option pushed by the administration. Do you think that criticism is deserved? A: Let’s take political contributions out of our political system. If you can find a constitutional way to do that, I think it would be very, very positive. But right now, there is no constitutional way to remove contributions. What I was quoted in many stories on is that it should not be a shock to anyone political contributions go to people who vote like the individual entity. Business, labor union or any other organization that has a political action committee, they tend to support those who do vote their way most of the time. People do not contribute to people that vote against them. Blue Dogs, as we started out talking about, they are the swing vote now on whether or not we’re going to pass center, right-of-center or left-of-center but close-to-the-center legislation on health care, on climate change, on energy policy, on agricultural policy, on health care policy, every policy. So people and political action committees are contributing to Blue Dogs in the expectation that they will vote for something that is center, right of center and not too far left of center.

A2: Base Key

Standing up to the base would solidify Obama’s power

Politico 9 (Kasey Pipes, Politico staff writer, 3/23/2009, "Why Obama should confront his base," http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0309/20341.html)

Two months into Barack Obama’s presidency, the country has seen a man with immense political talent. Calm and calculating, the new president possesses a natural ability to lead and a remarkable degree of emotional intelligence. He’s in control of himself; but is he in control of his party? Like a swan on water, Obama glides gracefully along the surface while below his kicking never stops. So far, the kicking has hit only Republicans. Not long after assuming office, the president waved and smiled as he entered a Capitol Hill meeting with congressional Republicans. Once the doors were closed, he taunted them that “I won” and then mocked them for listening to Rush Limbaugh. This was power politics; but it was also easy posturing. Who isn’t beating up on congressional Republicans these days? More impressive would be a show of force against his own base. History teaches that leaders have to fight battles with their own people. In 1981, President Ronald Reagan ignited a conservative explosion when he nominated Sandra Day O’Connor to the Supreme Court. Yet his unwavering support for her helped convince many Americans who hadn’t voted for him that Reagan was his own man. In the 1990s, President Bill Clinton elevated this craft to an art form. Faced with a Democratic Party in Congress that leaned left, Clinton regularly looked for ways to show his independence. His work with Republicans produced welfare reform, NAFTA, a balanced budget and even a capital gains tax cut. Obama could learn from these two presidents. But the learning curve appears steep. Little in his background suggests a willingness to confront his own party. His voting record in the Senate consisted of mainly party line votes. And his presidential campaign mostly hid fairly stale Democratic ideas behind fresh new packaging. Since taking office, scant evidence has emerged that Obama wants to defy congressional Democrats. This strategy has hurt him. Take the stimulus, for example. When Speaker Nancy Pelosi inserted pet projects like funding for condoms (and then embarrassed herself trying to defend the idea), Obama’s brand suffered. This episode should have warned the president: Congressional Democrats possess their own agenda. At some point, he needs to acknowledge that and confront them.

A2: Dems Key

Alienating democrats irrelevant to agenda – Reagan proves

Charles Krauthammer - National Magazine Award for essays and criticism in 1984, the Pulitzer Prize for distinguished commentary in 1987. Weekly Washington Post columnist. 7/16/2010

(Washington Post, “Obama’s Next Act”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/opinions/biographies/charles-krauthammer.html ty)

The net effect of 18 months of Obamaism will be to undo much of Reaganism. Both presidencies were highly ideological, grandly ambitious and often underappreciated by their own side. In his early years, Reagan was bitterly attacked from his right. (Typical Washington Post headline: "For Reagan and the New Right, the Honeymoon Is Over" -- and that was six months into his presidency!) Obama is attacked from his left for insufficient zeal on gay rights, immigration reform, closing Guantanamo -- the list is long. The critics don't understand the big picture. Obama's transformational agenda is a play in two acts. Act One is over. The stimulus, Obamacare, financial reform have exhausted his first-term mandate. It will bear no more heavy lifting. And the Democrats will pay the price for ideological overreaching by losing one or both houses, whether de facto or de jure. The rest of the first term will be spent consolidating these gains (writing the regulations, for example) and preparing for Act Two. The next burst of ideological energy -- massive regulation of the energy economy, federalizing higher education and "comprehensive" immigration reform (i.e., amnesty) -- will require a second mandate, meaning reelection in 2012. That's why there's so much tension between Obama and congressional Democrats. For Obama, 2010 matters little. If Democrats lose control of one or both houses, Obama will probably have an easier time in 2012, just as Bill Clinton used Newt Gingrich and the Republicans as the foil for his 1996 reelection campaign. Obama is down, but it's very early in the play. Like Reagan, he came here to do things. And he's done much in his first 500 days. What he has left to do he knows must await his next 500 days -- those that come after reelection. The real prize is 2012. Obama sees far, farther than even his own partisans. Republicans underestimate him at their peril.

Popularity Key to Agenda

Public key to agenda – frustrations affect Congress

Bill George - professor of management practice at Harvard Business School – 1/26/2010

(Business Week “An Agenda Disrupted: Obama After Year One”

http://www.businessweek.com/managing/content/jan2010/ca20100126_350258.htm ty)

Most pressing of all for Obama's second-year agenda is the deepening jobs crisis. Twenty-five million Americans—17.3% of the workforce—lack full-time jobs. While the massive stimulus bill saved some jobs, it did virtually nothing to create new ones. This November, absent a major jobs revival, voters' frustrations are likely to be directed at the party in power, further weakening the President's ability to lead an increasingly dysfunctional Congress. At the outset of his second year, Obama faces a choice. Obama the Politician would fan the flames of populist anger to solidify his base. Obama the Leader would follow in the footsteps of President Clinton—who also faced failed health-care reform—and pivot to the political center to address the nation's most pressing problems, starting with job creation. For the sake of our nation's health, let's hope that Obama the Leader will prevail in the year ahead.

Popularity pulpit is key – outweighs all else

George C. Edwards III – Distinguished Professor of Political Science and the director of the Center for Presidential Studies at Texas A&M University – March 2000

(Presidential Studies Quarterly. Volume 30. Issue 1. “Building Coalitions” ty)

Leading the public is at the center of the modern presidency. As parties weaken and bargaining resources diminish, presidents see themselves increasingly dependent on public support to accomplish their goals; and they devote substantial time, energy, and resources to obtaining this support. Presidents “go public” more than ever, depending on a steadily expanding White House public relations infrastructure to take their messages to the American people. In 1995, for example, the White House spent $18 million advertising on behalf of the president-a year before the presidential election (Woodward 1996, 344). Thus, presidents are involved in a permanent campaign to build supportive coalitions. As Bill Clinton reflected on the results of the 1994 elections, he concluded that the principal cause of the Democrats’ stunning defeat was his failure to communicate his achievements. “I got caught up in the parliamentary aspect of the presidency and missed the leadership, bully pulpit function which is so critical” (Woodward 1996, 22). The president’s remark reflects four fundamental and widely shared premises about presidential leadership: 1. Members of Congress are responsive to public opinion. 2. Public support is crucial to the president’s success. 3. The president must not only earn public support with his performance in office but also must actively take his case to the people. Moreover, he must not only do it at reelection time but all the time. 4. Through the permanent campaign, the White House can persuade or even mobilize the public. Leading the public-changing opinions and mobilizing citizens into action-is perhaps the ultimate resource of the democratic political leader. It is difficult for others who hold power to deny the legitimate demands of a president with popular support. Commentators on the presidency often assume that the White House can persuade or even mobilize the public if the president is a skilled enough communicator.

Popularity Key to Agenda

Popularity key to political capital

Bond & Fleisher, professor in Political Science - Texas A&M and Professor in Political Science. Fordham - 1996 (Jon R. and Richard. "The President in Legislation" p.23-24)//ZE

The belief that presidential popularity affects support in Congress is widely accepted among Washington insiders. President Johnson, for example, recognized the importance of popular support. Shortly after his landslide victory in the 1964 election, he told one of his aides, "I keep hitting hard because I know that this honeymoon won't last. Every day I lose a little more political capital" (quoted in Valenti 1975, 144). More recently, a Carter aide echoed the sentiment: "No president whose popularity is as low as this president's has much clout on the Hill" (quoted in Edwards 1980, 87). The president's popularity may influence congressional decisions to support his preferences for two reasons. First, the desire for reelection might lead members to adjust their support for the president in response to his popularity -- i.e. members of Congress support the president when it is in their self-interest to do so. Neustadt (1960,46) argues that "the essence of a President’s persuasive task with congressmen ... is to induce them to believe that what he wants of them is what their own appraisal of their own responsibilities requires them to do in their interest, not his” (emphasis in original). The president's "public prestige" affects those subjective calculations of self-interest because “most members of the Washington community depend upon outsiders to support them .... Dependent men must take account of popular reactions to their actions. What their publics may think of them becomes a factor, therefore, in deciding how to deal with the desires of a President. His prestige enters into that decision; their publics are part of his” (Neustadt 1960, 86, emphasis in original). Similarly, Edwards (1980,88) makes the point as follows: "Members of Congress may choose to be close to or independent from the president. depending on his popularity, to increase their chances of reelection." Second, role theory provides a plausible explanation of why a president's popularity might influence support for his preferences in Congress (Edw ards , 1980, 88). Many members of Congress believe that their role as a representative is to reflect constituency opinion. For example, Roger Davidson I 1969. 1 18- 19) found that about one-third of the House members in his study agreed that "a representative ought to work for what his constituents want even though this may not always agree with his personal views." Representatives who hold this role orientation should increase or decrease their support for the president in response to changes in his standing with the public. Thus electoral self-interest and role perception provide a theoretical basis for expecting that a president’s popularity will affect support for his policy preferences in Congress.

A2: Popularity Key to Agenda

Popularity irrelevant – president’s can’t garner it into legislative success

Jon R. Bond et.al – Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University – February 2003

(Jon R. Bond – Texas A&M, Richard Fleisher – Fordham University, B. Dan Wood – Texas A&M University. The Journal of Politics. Volume 65. No. 1. “The Marginal and Time- Varying Effect of Public Approval on Presidential Success in Congress”. Jstor ty)

Yet there are empirical and theoretical reasons to question whether there is a systematic and fixed relationship between the president's public standing and con- gressional support. At various times, the president has been unable to translate high popularity into legislative success. President George H. W. Bush's job approval, for example, surged to historic highs during and after the Gulf War, but this popularity did not lead to more victories in Congress. The Monica Lewin- sky scandal leading to the impeachment trial of President Bill Clinton rendered the hypothesized connection between presidential popularity and how members of Congress vote even more dubious. After evidence of presidential sex, lies, and videotapes documenting them were made public, Clinton's opponents in Con- gress pressed to remove him from office, even though his job approval rating soared. The relationship between public opinion and congressional decision making over the 13 months from January 1998 to February 1999 seems opposite from what the presidential popularity hypothesis predicts. These examples raise the possibility that the connection between public approval of the president and success in Congress is more complex than suggested by pundits and tested in prior empirical work. Indeed, a substantial body of research suggests that the influence of presiden- tial popularity on roll-call support is marginal at best (Bond and Fleisher 1984, 1990; Bond, Fleisher, and Northrup 1988; Cohen et al. 2000; Collier and Sullivan 1995; Edwards 1989; Fleisher and Bond 2000b; Mouw and MacKuen 1992). These studies find little or no statistical evidence of a relationship between public approval and presidential success. Even studies that report a statistical relation- ship often find that the substantive effects are weak. There are, of course, cases and anecdotes suggesting that presidential popularity may at times translate into leverage with Congress. The critical question, however, is whether such cases can be generalized to all times and circumstances. Is the relationship between public approval of the president and congressional behavior fixed and invariant over time? If the relationship varies through time, under what conditions does public approval have a stronger or weaker effect on presidential success in Congress?

No popularity effect – Voters don’t know enough

Bond & Fleisher, Professor in Political Science - Texas A&M & Professor in Political Science - Fordham - 1996

(Jon R. and Richard “The President in Legislation” pg 54)

The proposition that the president's popularity systematically alters congressional support is based on a rather naive theory of democracy and representation that assumes levels of citizen knowledge and interest that rarely exist. Most members of Congress know that very few voters are likely to have information about their votes on specific roll calls or about their support for the president.

A2: Popularity Key to Agenda

Public popularity doesn’t create Congressional success

Mark Peterson, professor of policy studies and political science at the UCLA School of Public Policy and Social Research, 2000, The Presidency and the Political System, Ed. Michael Nelson, p. 493-494.

Media accounts often note the importance of another unstable feature of the political environment, one that can vary dramatically during a single president’s term: presidential popularity, or, more precisely, the proportion of the public that approves of the president’s job performance. Presidents are believed to do better with Congress when the people like them. Thus a certain amount of surprise underlay the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report headline in September 19 that reported, “Clinton Prevails on Capitol Hill Despite Poor Showing in the Polls?’ Consistent with this conventional wisdom, some studies have identified a significant relationship between a president’s public approval public and effectiveness in Congress. Competing studies, however, conclude that popular support has an extremely limited or inconsistent effect. The apparent confusion has many possible explanations. First, although one would anticipate that a president who is way down in the polls, as Nixon was following the Watergate scandal, will encounter a less accommodating Congress, more typical fluctuations in popular support are insufficient to alter legislative politics already shaped by party orientation, ideology, policy preferences, and constituency interests. Second, levels of presidential job approval must be substantively relevant to members of Congress for them to affect their decision making. After the victory against Iraq in the Persian Gulf War, President Bush’s public approval rating soared to an unprecedented height—89 percent in one Gallup poll. The popular accolades, however, had little effect on how Congress reacted to Bush’s domestic initiatives. Legislators could distinguish between public acclaim for the president’s actions as commander in chief and the electorate’s considerable reticence about his performance on the domestic (largely economic) front. Third, a popular president may be emboldened to challenge opponents in Congress, leading to intensified legislative conflict rather than enhanced success. Although public support probably strengthens the influence of presidents with their partisan allies, members of the opposition party may react quite differently. Finally, uncertainty exists about the direction of causality. Does public support breed legislative success, or does legislative success stimulate favorable ratings? Probably some of each. All that we can safely conclude, then, is that truly unpopular presidents are likely to encounter stiff congressional resistance. Harry S. Truman, Nixon, and Carter faced this test more severely than other recent presidents.

Popularity not key- only the president’s ability to control the agenda

Galen 07 (Rich, columnist and Republican strategist, “What Democrats need to learn about power”, Salon.com, 6-1-07, Lexis)

Also, the Clinton White House was fighting to maintain the growth in a popular domestic program. The Bush White House is fighting to maintain funding for an unpopular foreign war. Nevertheless, the Democrats in the House have surrendered on Iraq. They were permitted to save face by tacking a minimum-wage increase onto the funding bill, and about half of the tens of billions of dollars of domestic add-ons they originally wanted, but there will be no timeline for withdrawal. Despite the bluster and bother of Pelosi and her allies on the left, they could not defeat Bush on Iraq funding. The issue is not the president's poll numbers, but his ability to control the national agenda. What disappointed Democrats should understand is that even a weakened White House, one that is no longer aggressively on message, is still a more powerful political force in the United States than the majority in the House, in the Senate, or both.

A2: Popularity Key to Agenda

The effect of popularity on agenda success has been found to be less than .5%

Bond & Fleisher, professor in Political Science - Texas A&M and Professor in Political Science. Fordham - 1996 (Jon R. and Richard. "The President in Legislation" p.25-27)

The empirical evidence presented by researchers seeking to demonstrate a strong relationship between public approval of the president and support in Congress is mixed. Even those studies that purport to find a strong relationship have problems that raise doubts about the evidence. Although Edwards (1980) reports some high correlations, as Rivers and Rose (1985. 184) observe, his results are "decidedly mixed." Edwards found some negative partial correlations, yet he tends to ignore the inconsistent findings and to emphasize the strong positive relationships for his conclusion about the importance of presidential popularity. Rivers and Rose (1985), however, also fail to provide convincing evidence that public approval is a more important source of presidential success than indicated by Edwards (1980). They use highly sophisticated methods in 3D attempt to show that simpler methods fail to reveal the true (strong) relationship. A reexamination of Rivers and Rose's results (1985, 192), however, reveals that they clearly overstate the importance of public opinion. They note that Edwards did not report significance tests or standard errors. As result, we cannot judge the reliability of Edwards's parameter estimates. They correct this deficiency and use the lack of statistical significance to conclude that some variables in their model are not important. Yet they argue that the president's Gallup approval rating has a "substantial effect" on success in Congress (193), even though the coefficient for popularity is not statistically significant. A significance level of .05, of course, is an arbitrary line. But Rivers and Rose argue that significance tests are appropriate criteria to determine the reliability of parameter estimates, then fail to apply consistently the criteria they establish to interpret their results.

The evidence from the Ostrom and Simon (1985) analysis is also ambiguous. Their study also seeks to analyze the simultaneous relationships between public approval and presidential legislative success. They use Gallup polls to estimate public approval each month from January 1953 to December 1980. The measure of presidential legislative success, however, is the “cumulative proportion of of domestic policy votes…in which the position advocated by the president was victorious" (340). The summation of presidential success is restarted at the beginning of each new Congress (341 ). In the model of public approval, including the president's cumulative legislative success as an explanatory variable makes theoretical sense: It seems reasonable to suppose that public approval of the president in a given month might be influenced by his legislative successes in previous months. But analyzing the cumulative legislative success rate as a function of the current month’s public approval makes little theoretical sense. It is hard to imagine how the level of public approval in December could affect the cumulative rate of successes over the previous eleven months, because most of the victories occurred before the observation of popularity. Consequently, it is unclear what Ostrom and Simon's analysis tells us about the effects of public approval on presidential success. We see therefore that there are problems with the evidence from these studies purporting to show that public approval has a strong effect on presidential success in Congress. Furthermore, other studies present evidence that the effect of presidential popularity is marginal at best. Paul Light's analysis of congressional action on presidential proposals from Kennedy to Carter finds that popularity has a significant effect on congressional action. But the strength of the relationship is much weaker than that reported by Edwards (1980). The correlations between presidential popularity and congressional action on presidential programs are .28 for spending programs .27 for large programs, and .19 for new programs (Light 1981 -82. 731). Similarly, our study of presidential support from members of the House between 1959 and 1974 (Eisenhower to Ford) reveals limited and indirect effects for public opinion. We found that, controlling for ideological conflict between the president and a member of Congress, overall presidential popularity is related to support, but partisan forces condition the relationship. Presidential popularity is directly related to support from members of the president's party and inversely related to support from members of the opposition--that is, popular presidents tend to receive more support from members of their party but less support from members of the opposition (Bond and Fleisher 1980, 75).

Partisanship Kills Agenda

Partisan ship derails Obama’s agenda

Wall Street Journal 7/21/2009

(Fred Barns, executive editor of the Weekly Standard

“The Obama Agenda Bogs Down” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124804492049963557.html ty)

It usually doesn't happen this quickly in Washington. But President Barack Obama and congressional Democrats are finding that the old maxim that what goes around, comes around applies to them, too. Less than six months into his term, Mr. Obama's top initiatives -- health-care reform and "cap and trade" energy legislation -- are in serious jeopardy and he has himself and his congressional allies to blame. Their high-pressure tactics in promoting and passing legislation, most notably the economic "stimulus" enacted in February, have backfired. Those tactics include unbridled partisanship, procedural short cuts, demands for swift passage of bills, and promises of quick results. With large majorities in Congress and an obsequious press corps, Mr. Obama was smitten with the idea of emulating President Franklin Roosevelt's First 100 Days of legislative success in 1933. Like FDR, Mr. Obama tried to push as many liberal bills through Congress in as brief a time as possible. He made a rookie mistake early on. He let congressional Democrats draft the bills. They're as partisan as any group that has ever controlled Congress, and as impatient. They have little interest in the compromises needed to attract Republican support. As a consequence, what they passed -- especially the $787 billion stimulus -- belongs to Democrats alone. They own the stimulus outright. That makes them accountable for the hopes of a prompt economic recovery now being dashed. With the economy still faltering and jobs still being lost, Mr. Obama's credibility is sinking and his job approval rating is declining along with the popularity of his initiatives. Republicans, who had insisted the stimulus was wasteful and wouldn't work, are being vindicated.

Partisan derails his agenda – campaign promises

New York Times 7/21/2009

(Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “A Defining Moment Nears for President” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/22/us/politics/22obama.html)

Mr. Obama came into office promising a more bipartisan Washington tone, which he has so far been unable to achieve. His actions in the coming weeks on health care may determine his long-term relationship not only with Republicans but also with his fellow Democrats. “I think this will be a major factor in defining his presidency,” said Tom Daschle, the former Senate Democratic leader, who remains a close adviser to the White House on health issues. “Because he’s made it such an issue, and because he has invested so much personal time and effort, this will, more than stimulus and more than anything he has done so far, be a measure of his clout and of his success early on. And because it is early on, it will define his subsequent years.” On the Republican side, one question is whether Mr. Obama will succumb to the temptation to turn health care into a partisan fight, even as he tries to court the opposing party. He is, after all, still a popular new president confronting an unpopular Republican Party, and so it would be easy for him to demonize Republicans as obstructionists who want to stand in the way of progress.

A2: Intrinsicness

1. Intrinsicness is a voting issue. Amounts to re-planning in the 2AC, creates a moving target and makes it impossible to be neg. Aff conditionality is a VI even if they kick the argument because it makes negative strategy impossible.

If this argument justifies doing anything the USFG can do to solve a problem it gives them leeway to fiat out of all neg args.

2. The DA is intrinsic. We read links and internal links which prove that an inevitable result of passing the plan will be to [ explain DA ]. If they can’t prove otherwise, this is just a bad ‘no link’ argument without any evidence.

3. Arbitrary standard. Their argument amounts to a reasonability claim, that it has to be intrinsic enough. Creates moving goalposts. They can always demand more specificity.

4. The politics DA is good for debate. Turns their ‘logical policy maker argument’

- there is no single ‘USFG’ – there are only actors within it. And those real policy-makers have to factor in politics every day. Political calculations explain why we got the health care bill we did, why we have sanctions on Cuba, and ag subsidies. Their model of debate trains us to ignore crucial issues.

- it forces up-to-date research on current issues, which is important education, and trains us to account for broader context

- politics is key to being neg. We need generic DAs to counter big topics and tremendous aff flex.

>>>

5. Bad model of decision-making. The judge shouldn’t pretend to be the USFG. The judge should be an academic assessing the status quo. It’s their job to prove that we ought to affirm the plan – not that we should imagine ourselves as the government.

6. Their advantage isn’t intrinsic. They say that the plan will inspire a shift in overall doctrine – but that relies on assessing political conditions precisely as much as the DA.

ddi10 - politics generic - links.doc	DDI 2010

1

Last printed 9/4/09 7:00 PM

Control + 1 – Block Headings

Trevor Chenoweth

2010-07-28

Coppell ISD

Hewlett-Packard