Presence is not weapons systems

1. Definition - Presence consists of infrastructure, troops and agreements and exercises conducted with the host country but excludes weapons systems

J.E. Peterson, Ph.D. Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Middle East Institute, an Adjunct Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and more. 2008. “Foreign Military Presence and its Role in Reinforcing Regional Security: A Double-Edged Sword.” *Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research*. pp. 183-205. <http://www.jepeterson.net/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/Foreign\_Military\_Presence\_in\_the\_Gulf.pdf>

Table 7.2 Levels of Foreign Military Presence

o : present in the Gulf

x : not present in the Gulf

? : uncertain if present in the Gulf

1. intervention and occupation"

2. proximate expeditionary force in region - power projection

3. bases and other permanent installations (ranging from full bases, with the FMP enjoying internal sovereignty, to small support functions, such as naval replenishment or technical facilities)

4. non-permanent deployed units

5. joint or multilateral exercises

6. pre-positioning and access agreements

7. offshore naval presence

8. "offshore" ready deployment capability (e.g. from neighboring countries or regions)

9. mutual or multilateral security treaties or agreements (CENTO, NATO, SEATO)

10. arms and equipment transfers

11. "technical" facilities (intelligence, space, communications)

12. aircraft over-flights (generally unseen and uncontroversial but reverses on occasion of aircraft trouble or in time of conflict or crisis)

13. surrogate forces (support for revolutionary or irredentist movements; Cuba in Africa

2. Violation- The aff only removes a weapon system

3. Standards

a. The aff justifies squirrely weapon of the week affs which are unpredictable and unlimiting because the United States uses thousands of different guns, tanks, planes, and other weapons systems that could possibly be removed

b. We allow for the most educational and predictable aff ground,

c. They destroy key neg ground, like the redeployment and deterrence disad

d. The aff can claim the weapons they remove are replaced by some different type, functionally makes the topic bidirectional

e. And even if they remove troops, they are extra-T which is uniquely bad in this instance because their internals are all based off of the explicit removal of these

f. They justify removing weapon systems that aren’t explicitly within the topic countries but could be utilized within these countries like the drones in Pakistan or tomahawk missiles positioned on carriers

g. They are stealing neg ground, changing the troop’s tactics and weapons are key cps to test the desirability of actually removing presence Condition CP

The United States federal government should remove all of its B61 bombs from the Republic of Turkey if and only if the Republic of Turkey ratifies the Armenian-Turkish protocol.

1. Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is at the breaking point – cease-fire violations created a deadlock

RF/ERL, 7-15-10, [“Is Karabakh Peace Process Dead, Or Just Deadlocked”, <http://www.armeniadiaspora.com/news/article-hits/1576-is-karabakh-peace-process-dead-or-just-deadlocked.html> ]

The prospects for the signing of a provisional peace agreement ending the two-decade-old Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have deteriorated dramatically over the past month. Following the most serious cease-fire violation of the past two years, in which one Azerbaijani and four Armenian servicemen were killed in a nighttime raid on June 18, the peace talks are apparently deadlocked. But despite the rise in tensions, the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan failed to avail themselves of the opportunity to meet and talk on the sidelines of the recent informal CIS summit in Ukraine. Between January 2009 and January 2010, Presidents Serzh Sarkisian and Ilham Aliyev met eight times to discuss the so-called Basic (or Madrid) Principles for resolving the conflict, reportedly reaching verbal agreement on the preamble to that document, which affirms their commitment to resolving the conflict peacefully. Since then, however, further progress has apparently been blocked by disagreement over the timetable for implementation of the various components of the peace plan, including whether the decision on the future status of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh republic should be taken before or after the withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijani territory. Armenia favors the former sequence, Azerbaijani insists on the latter. President Aliyev's early departure from St. Petersburg last month following his most recent meeting with Sarkisian reinforced the perception that the talks had reached deadlock.

2. US pressure on Turkey is key to ratification – they should use any leverage possible.

RF/ERL, 2-5-10, [Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, “U.S. Pressure ‘Essential’ For Turkish-Armenian Normalization”, <http://www.armeniadiaspora.com/news/article-hits/1098-us-pressure-essential-for-turkish-armenian-normalization.html> ]

Stronger U.S. pressure on Turkey is essential for salvaging its fence-mending agreements with Armenia and the administration of President Barack Obama understands that, according to a renowned U.S. scholar who was actively involved in Turkish-Armenian reconciliation initiatives. In an interview with RFE/RL on Thursday, David Phillips also criticized Ankara’s linkage between the implementation of those agreements and a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement. He dismissed Turkish claims that a recent ruling by the Armenian Constitutional Court ran counter to key provisions of the Turkish-Armenian “protocols” signed in October. Phillips, who coordinated the work of the U.S.-sponsored Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC) in 2001-2004, further said that Armenia should not rush to walk away from the deal. But he stressed that its ratification by the Turkish parliament can not be “an open-ended process.” “If these protocols fall apart and there is a diplomatic train wreck, it will have a serious adverse effect on U.S.-Turkish relations,” he said. “And this comes at a time when the U.S. is seeking Turkey’s cooperation on Iran, when Turkey is playing an increasingly important role in Afghanistan and during the wrap-up to redeployment from Iraq. “The Obama administration knows full well that these protocols should go forward because it is in the interests of Turkey and Armenia. It is also in America’s interests to keep the process moving forward so that U.S.-Turkish cooperation is in effect.” Analysts believe Washington will step up pressure on Ankara ahead of the April 24 annual commemoration of more than one million Armenians massacred in the Ottoman Empire in 1915-1918. Obama avoided describing the massacres as genocide in an April 2009 statement, implicitly citing the need not to undermine the ongoing Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg discussed the issue with President Serzh Sarkisian and Foreign Minisiter Edward Nalbandian during a one-day visit to Yerevan on Thursday. Phillips, who currently runs a conflict resolution program at the American University in Washington, declined to speculate on just how strong that pressure will be. “But I do believe that unless the Obama administration presses the Turks at the highest level, the likelihood of the protocols being ratified in Ankara will decrease,” he said. Phillips described Steinberg’s visit as a “a clear indication that the Obama administration understands the importance of this matter and the need to raise the profile of its involvement.” “And its efforts to use its leverage should intensify in the near future,” he said. “The U.S. needs to be actively engaged in this process if it is going to work.” U.S. officials have already made clear that they disagree with Ankara’s highly negative reaction to the Armenian court ruling. While upholding the legality of the protocols, the Constitutional Court ruled last month that they can not stop Yerevan seeking a broader international recognition of the Armenian genocide.

3. Removal of TNWs is a key bargaining chip because TNWs are widely unpopular in Turkey

Richard Weitz, PhD & Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute, 4-12-2010. (*The Turkey Analyst*, vol. 3, Number 7, page 5)

Today, Turkey remains one of five European members of NATO that hosts U.S. nuclear weapons within the framework of the alliance’s nuclear-sharing arrangement. The NATO nuclear arsenal in Turkey is unique in several respects. First, thanks to major reductions in other countries, Turkey has more U.S. nuclear weapons than any other alliance member outside the United States. Of the 200 or so B-61 nuclear bombs stationed in Europe, Turkey hosts approximately 90 at İncirlik Air Base. Second, according to public opinion polls, a majority of those surveyed in the five countries hosting U.S. TNWs would like to have the weapons removed, **but in Turkey, public opposition to the continued deployment of nuclear weapons is the highest of all** the host countries. In addition, Turkish legislators have complained that having U.S. TNWs on their soil weakens Turkish diplomatic efforts to oppose nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. At the same time, these high- level security decisions are often made by Turkish leaders even **in the face of substantial popular opposition**. The national security establishment of Turkey is traditionally granted considerable discretion in deciding such important policies.

4. Turkey-Armenian Protocol solves the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Sabine Freizer, Europe program director of the International Crisis Group, 4-21-10 [“Turkey and Armenia must move ahead”, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/worldview/100420/turkey-armenia-diplomacy]

ISTANBUL, Turkey — As April 24 approaches, Armenians and Turks will once again be watching U.S. President Barack Obama to see how he describes this day of remembrance for the 1915 mass killings and deportations of Ottoman Armenians. Last year, he chose to call the events by their Armenian term, Meds Yegherns or “great catastrophe.” For many Armenians, who insist that the only appropriate term is genocide, this was not enough. But, for many Turks it was too much. Unfortunately, this annual focus on what the U.S. president will say is misplaced. It is not a question for the U.S. president. It’s the Turks and Armenians who need to agree. There was hope in 2009 that the two sides could do just that, especially after Turkey and Armenia unveiled bilateral protocols, signed on Oct. 10, to establish diplomatic relations, and recognize and open their mutual border. But the normalization process stalled after October, and there is little chance the texts will be ratified in the two countries’ parliaments soon. Based on the protocols, Turkey and Armenia would have established a committee on the historical dimension “including an impartial scientific examination of the historical records and archives.” For Turks this would have been a way to stave off the international recognition of genocide, as few countries would move to label it as such, knowing the inter-state commission was looking into it. For Armenians such a commission is generally perceived as a fundamental violation of their national identity. They don’t accept that “the genocide fact” is up for discussion. Still, for Armenia the protocols offered something tangible: the opening of its border with Turkey which had been closed since 1993 when Armenian forces occupied districts of Azerbaijan surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh. Yet this is precisely where the deal is stuck now: in Nagorno-Karabakh. The hope was that **an open border could gradually help encourage a solution to the conflict,** buttressing the ongoing talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan brokered by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Growing contacts could lead to economic development and greater regional stability and a more balanced Turkish engagement in the South Caucasus.

**5. Conflict over Nagorno-Karbakh causes World War Three.**

Markedonov and Cornell, Chief of the Department of Interethnic problems at the Moscow Institute of Political and Military Analysis and Research Director for the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at Johns Hopkins, 2/21/08 (http://www.today.az/news/politics/43294.html)

By its consequences the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has become not only the largest regional conflict in the post-Soviet area. The due announcement was made by Sergey Makedonov, chief of department of interethnic problems of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis and candidate of historical sciences. He considers that Nagorno Karabakh has become an example for Georgia, Ossetia, Abhazia, Moldova and Transdniestria residents. "Second, there was a "karabakhization" of political life of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Karabakh problem became a key time for both South Caucasus states. Any inner political event there undergoes checking by the Karabakh factor. According to Swedish expert Svante Kornella, "by its geopolitical importance and the risk to transform into a **war covering the whole region**, it obviously occupies the first place among all conflicts in the post-Soviet Europe. This is **the only conflict**, which was discussed with a certain ground as a conflict, bearing the threat of "the **third world war**", the Russian political scientist said. He also noted that Nagorno Karabakh conflict is the only conflict in the Caucasus, which involves two independent countries as main participants. "Russia can be considered as a participant of the Abkhazian conflict, though not the major one, while Armenia is one of the two main participants in the Karabakh issue. But the most important is that the conflict is close to three countries, each of which claims for a regional center of powers-Russia, Turkey and Iran. Turkey and Iran considered their possible direct involvement into the conflict at different periods, which was resisted by Russia", Markedonov said.

6. This conflict is the most probable scenario for nuclear escalation.

Blank, professor of research at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, 2k (Stephen, “US Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia”, June, http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/docs/Blank2000.pdf)

Washington’s burgeoning military-political-economic involvement seeks, inter alia, to demonstrate the U.S. ability to project military power even into this region or for that matter, into Ukraine where NATO recently held exercises that clearly originated as an anti-Russian scenario. Secretary of Defense William Cohen has discussed strengthening U.S.-Azerbaijani military cooperation and even training the Azerbaijani army, certainly alarming Armenia and Russia.69 And Washington is also training Georgia’s new Coast Guard. 70 However, Washington’s well-known ambivalence about committing force to Third World ethnopolitical conflicts suggests that U.S. military power will not be easily committed to saving its economic investment. But this ambivalence about committing forces and the dangerous situation, where Turkey is allied to Azerbaijan and Armenia is bound to Russia, create the potential for **wider and** more **protracted regional conflicts** among local forces. In that connection, Azerbaijan and Georgia’s growing efforts to secure NATO’s lasting involvement in the region, coupled with Russia’s determination to exclude other rivals, foster a polarization along very traditional lines.71 In 1993 Moscow even threatened World War III to deter Turkish intervention on behalf of Azerbaijan. Yet the new Russo-Armenian Treaty and Azeri-Turkish treaty suggest that Russia and Turkey could be dragged into a confrontation to rescue their allies from defeat. Thus many of the conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict in which third parties intervene are present in the Transcaucasus. For example, many Third World conflicts generated by local structural factors have a great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often feel obliged to rescue their lesser proteges and proxies. One or another big power may fail to grasp the other side’s stakes since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons to prevent a client’s defeat are not as well established or apparent. Clarity about the nature of the threat could prevent the kind of rapid and almost uncontrolled escalation we saw in 1993 when Turkish noises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan led Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in that case. 73 Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally, Russian nuclear threats could trigger a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia’s declared nuclear strategies). The real threat of a Russian nuclear strike against Turkey to defend Moscow’s interests and forces in the Transcaucasus makes the danger of major war there **higher than almost everywhere else**. As Richard Betts has observed, The greatest danger lies in areas where (1) the potential for serious instability is high; (2) both superpowers perceive vital interests; (3) neither recognizes that the other’s perceived interest or commitment is as great as its own; (4) both have the capability to inject conventional forces; and, (5) neither has willing proxies capable of settling the situation.

Turkey Prolif (1/2)

Turkey’s committed to nonproliferation now—strong NATO nuclear commitment is key.

Tarik Oguzlu, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of International Relations, Bilkent University, July 2009. [SETA Foundation for Political Economic and Social Research Policy Brief No. 33, Turkey and the Transformation of NATO, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-182507-159-turkey-and-the-transformation-of-nato.html]

Today, there is an intra-alliance consensus that contemporary threats concern transnational terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, organized crime, cyber-terrorism, the spreading of epidemics, piracy, environmental pollution, and the lack of good governance in failed or weak states. From the contemporary perspective, the maintenance of standing mass armies in anticipation of conventional territorial attacks no longer serves to address today’s global and soft security challenges. The old strategies of deterrence and containment do not suffice in dealing with the asymmetrical threats posed by non-state actors. This consensus, however, does not relieve Turkey of anxiety regarding the question of whether NATO’s transformation will erode its traditional territorial/nuclear security commitments. Two occasions in the recent past appear to have led Turkish decision-makers to doubt whether the European members of the alliance continue to view Turkey’s territorial defense as part of their responsibilities. Both took place in the context of Turkey’s proximity to Iraq. First, although in 1991 and 2003 Turkey asked NATO to deploy early warning systems and Patriot missiles to Turkish territory against the possibility of an Iraqi attack, some European members of the alliance initially hesitated to respond to Turkey’s demands positively. Second, the reluctance of some western European members of the alliance to recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization or to commit to ending the PKK’s activities in their territories has worried Turkey. As long as Turkish public opinion remains convinced that the PKK owes its existence, at least in part, to support coming from European countries, Turkey’s commitment to NATO will be bound to decrease in the years to come.4

Turkey has signed on to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has thus far adopted a position of non-nuclearization in its foreign policy. However, the changing nature of regional politics in the Middle East in the wake of the latest war in Iraq might pose challenges in this regard. For example, Iran’s nuclear ambitions raise strong concerns that it may acquire the technology to produce nuclear weapons. It is no secret that other countries in the region might then follow suit. Turkish decision-makers will find it hard to resist domestic calls for nuclearization if NATO prevaricates in offering a full nuclear commitment to Turkey.

2. Removing TNWs causes Turkey to develop nuclear weapons.

Bruno Tertrais, Senior Research Fellow, Foundation for Strategic Research, 9-26-2008. [Real Instituto Elcano, The Coming NATO Nuclear Debate, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano\_eng/Content?WCM\_GLOBAL\_CONTEXT

=/Elcano\_in/Zonas\_in/ARI117-2008]

Ankara deserves particular attention. The presence of US nuclear weapons on Turkish soil is fairly unpopular within the country, but the military elite view it as a **significant component** of their relationship with the US. The US nuclear presence reassures allies that might otherwise be tempted to go nuclear. A withdrawal could affect Ankara’s perception of its security if faced with a nuclear-capable Iran. Should this be the case, many observers agree that Turkey could consider a nuclear programme for itself. Turkey currently has a significant civilian nuclear research programme, but does not have the installations required for making fissile material. It would need to either construct a uranium enrichment plant or build a dedicated plutonium production reactor. This would require a break in its current nuclear policy. Furthermore, producing fissile material with such installations would imply a withdrawal from the NPT. To be fair, such an option would appear credible only if three conditions were met: a severe crisis of confidence between Ankara and Washington, a crumbling of the NPT regime and expectations that the EU will refuse to admit Turkey (for it is difficult to imagine the EU admitting in its ranks a new nuclear nation).

Turkey Prolif (2/2)

Turkish proliferation would snowball in the middle east leading to Nuclear War and Terror

Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 6-14-07, “The EU Facing Nuclear Weapons Challenges” http://www.npolicy.org/files/20070616-Sokolski-Talk-AixEnProvence-Conference.pdf

One country that might disagree with this view, though, is Turkey. It is trying to figure out how to live with a nuclear weapons armed neighbor, Iran; is disappointed by its inability to be fully integrated into the EU; and is toying with getting its own nuclear capabilities. Whether or not Turkey does choose to go its own way and acquire a nuclear weapons-option of its own will depend on several factors, including Ankara’s relations with Washington, Brussels, and Tehran. To a very significant degree, though, it also will depend on whether or not the EU Members States are serious about letting Turkey join the EU. The dimmer these prospects look, the greater is the likelihood of that Turkey will chose to hedge its political, economic, and security bets by seeking a nuclear weapons-option of its own. This poses a difficult choice for the EU. Many key members are opposed to letting Turkey join the EU. There are arguments to favor this position. Yet, if Turkey should conclude that its interests are best served by pursuing such a nuclear weapons-option, it is almost certain to fortify the conviction of Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia to do the same. This will result in the building up a nuclear powder keg on Europe’s doorstep and significantly increase the prospect for nuclear terrorism and war.

START (1/2)

START will pass, but Obama’s capital is key

The Hill, 7-23-10, http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/110549-kerry-confident-senate-will-ratify-start-this-year

The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee expressed confidence Friday that the upper chamber will ratify a key nuclear arms treaty with Russia before the year is up. Sen. John Kerry (D-Mass.) acknowledged Republicans concerns over the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) that the Obama administration hoped would pass quickly after it was signed three months ago. But Kerry assured that it would pass before the new year. In an interview with Bloomberg News to air this weekend, the Massachusetts senator was asked if the Senate could ratify the treaty before the November midterm elections. "I don’t want to get into the odds-making on it," he replied. "What is important is the Senate will pass it." Pressed on whether the Senate would vote this year, Kerry replied, "I believe we will pass it this year." START has been put on the backburner in the midst of a hectic Senate schedule as the August recess approaches and with election-year politics at play. But President Obama has **made it clear that passing the treaty is a priority**, especially in light of his effort to "reset" the U.S.'s diplomatic relationship with Russia. The vote, however, appears to be a **heavy lift**. It takes 67 senators to ratify a treaty, meaning that all Democrats plus eight Republicans would need to support it. But aside from Foreign Relations Committee ranking member Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), no other GOP senators back the treaty.

Bipartisan Congressional opposition to TNW withdrawal – they’re committed to extended deterrence

Sokov 2009 [Nikolai, PhD, senior research assoc. @ James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, German Leadership 6, Issue 4 http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/090717\_german\_leadership/german\_leadership\_6\_issue\_4.pdf]

If some in the Obama administration support withdrawal of the weapons once the arms control agenda allows the issue to come forward, some politically powerful figures outside the administration are taking the opposite point of view. The bipartisan congressional commission on the U.S. strategic posture in its report referenced above stressed the value of “extended deterrence” and said that this mission could force the United States to retain weapons it does not need for its own security. The report gave considerable weight to the opinion of those allies in Europe who consider these weapons essential to prevent coercion by Russia and Iran. It should be noted that recent studies and interviews with representatives of these countries challenge the accuracy of this representation of their countries’ views by the commission. 35 The strong emphasis on the argument that some European countries are staunchly opposed to the withdrawal of TNW is widely attributed to commission co-chairman James Schlesinger, who has been championing this theme of late.36 Still, the political salience of this message, particularly among congressional Republicans is undeniable.

Pushing controversial issues drains Obama’s capital

Mark **Seidenfeld**, Associate Professor, Florida State University College of Law, Iowa Law Review, October 19**94**

In addition, the propensity of congressional committees to engage in special-interest-oriented oversight might seriously undercut presidential efforts to implement regulatory reform through legislation. n198 On any proposed regulatory measure, the President could face opposition from powerful committee members whose ability to modify and kill legislation is well-documented. n199 This is not meant to deny that the President has significant power that he can use to bring aspects of his legislative agenda to fruition. The President's ability to focus media attention on an issue, his power to bestow benefits on the constituents of members of Congress who support his agenda, and his potential to deliver votes in congressional elections increase the likelihood of legislative success for particular programs. n200 Repeated use of such tactics, however, will impose economic costs on society and concomitantly consume the President's political capital. n201 At some point the price to the President for pushing legislation through Congress exceeds the benefit he derives from doing so. Thus, a President would be unwise to rely too heavily on legislative changes to implement his policy vision.

START (2/2)

START key to prevent nuclear war

Blanchfield 9

Mike Blanchfield, staff writer, 7-4-2009. [Montreal Gazette, “Duck and cover or a world without nukes?” http://www.montrealgazette.com/story\_print.html?id=1759991&sponsor=]

Still, Blair and many others say the need for the U.S. and Russia to show leadership is even more pressing, to remove not only the **ever-present** Cold War possibility of a world-ending nuclear accident, but the 21st-century threat of nukes falling into terrorist hands. Much has been made of the need to press the "reset" button on the strained relations of late between the White House and the Kremlin. Medvedev struck a conciliatory note this week when he called for a new era in relations with Washington, based on a "purely pragmatic" agenda. Thomas Graham, a retired U.S. diplomat and Clinton-era arms-control ambassador, said Russian and U.S. co-operation on arms control, including a new START treaty, would pay dividends in a much broader sense. "For too long in this post-Cold War world, the two former Cold War adversaries have remained in a semi-hostile relationship," Graham said. "There could be a serious threat of broader nuclear-weapon proliferation. Many people are concerned about the Iranian nuclear program. ... This administration, I believe, correctly understands that we cannot effectively deal with either of those issues, and many others as well, without close co-operation with the Russian Federation." Officials from both countries are already hammering out the details of an agreement that would replace the START 1 treaty, which expires Dec. 5. Though the Moscow-Washington relationship is tangled in a web of tension over the U.S. missile-defence-shield plans for Europe, and NATO's eastward expansion, positive signals emerged from the Kremlin yesterday on one front: Medvedev's spokesman said he and Obama would sign a side deal that would allow the U.S. military transit of goods through Russian territory to Afghanistan. The main goal would be a new START framework that would essentially see both sides slashing their nuclear-warhead stockpiles by one-quarter, down to about 1,500 warheads each. Despite the spread of nuclear-weapons arsenals to such countries as China, Pakistan, India and elsewhere, nine out of every 10 nuclear bombs on the planet are under the control of the White House and the Kremlin. Lilia Shevtsova, of the Moscow office of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, suggests that a renewed version of START will not necessarily make the world a safer place. "When you start counting nukes, you start talking disarmament and verification procedure. It's a sign not of mutual trust - it's rather a sign of lack, an absence of mutual trust," Shevtsova said. Charles Ferguson, a senior fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations, says if Russia and the U.S. were to go so far as to cut their arsenals down to 1,000 each, other nuclear countries could begin to compete with them. For Blair, it's well past the time to abandon long-held suspicions and animosities. After walking his Ottawa luncheon crowd through his Paris doomsday vision, Blair piles on more scenarios. If there were an accidental launch of weapons that triggered all-out nuclear war between Russia and the U.S., 119 million people in each country would die in the initial exchange. That would include 15 million around the Kremlin in Moscow. A city like Chicago or Ottawa would be gone within the hour. "We've pushed our luck as far as we can; now we need a policy. So to put it bluntly, there are two paths that stretch before us: We either bury our weapons or we're buried by them," Blair said.

Security (1/6)

A. The 1ac is grounded in an orientalist discourse representing the “Middle East” as a problem region of security defined according to U.S. imperial interests.

Pinar Bilgin, Associate Professor of International Relations, March 04, International Relations 18 (1), “Whose ‘Middle East’? Geopolitical Interventions and Practices of Security,” http://ire.sagepub.com/content/18/1/25.full.pdf+html

The ‘Middle East’1 has long been viewed as a region that ‘best fits the realist view of international politics’.2 Although there has begun to emerge, in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks against New York and Washington, DC, some awareness of the need to adopt a fresh approach to security in the Middle East,3 it remains a commonplace to argue that, whereas critical approaches to security4 may have some relevance within the Western European context, in other parts of the world – such as the ‘Middle East’ – traditional approaches retain their validity.5 The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the stalling in the Arab–Israeli peacemaking amid escalating violence between Israelis and Palestinians, the US-led war on Iraq and the seeming lack of enthusiasm for addressing the problem of regional insecurity, especially when viewed against the backdrop of increasing regionalization of security relations in other parts of the world,6 do indeed suggest that the ‘Middle East’ is a place where traditional conceptions and practices of security are still having a field day. Contesting such approaches that present the ‘Middle East’ as an exception, this article will submit that critical approaches are indeed relevant in the ‘Middle East’, while accepting that some of the items of the old security agenda also retain their pertinence (as in Western Europe). Instead of taking the seemingly little evidence of enthusiasm for addressing the problem of regional insecurity in the ‘Middle East’ for granted, a critical place for such approaches to begin is a recognition of the presence of a multitude of contending perspectives on regional security each one of which derives from different conceptions of security that have their roots in alternative worldviews.7 When rethinking regional security from a Critical Security Studies perspective, both the concepts ‘region’ and ‘security’ need to be opened up to reveal the mutually constitutive relationship between (inventing) regions and (conceptions and practices of) security. Regions as geopolitical inventions The burgeoning literature on regions and regionalism has emphasized the ‘invented’ character of regions as opposed to some earlier conceptions that viewed regions as ‘eternal’,8 the point being that there is nothing ‘natural’ or ‘neutral’ about geographical assumptions and language. Throughout history, the driving purpose behind the identification and naming of geographic sites has almost always been military strategic interests. Indeed as Kären Wigen and Martin Lewis note, ‘some of the most basic and taken-for-granted “regions” of the world [such as Southeast Asia and Latin America] were first framed by military thinkers’.9 In other words, the origins of regions have had their roots in the security conceptions and practices of their inventors. In the case of the ‘Middle East’ the invention of the region is usually ascribed to Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, US naval officer and author of key works on naval strategy.10 In an article published in The National Review in 1902 Mahan suggested that Britain should take up the responsibility of maintaining security in the (Persian) Gulf and its coasts – the ‘Middle East’ – so that the route to India would be secured and Russia kept in check.11 The term ‘Middle East’ took-off from then onwards but as time progressed, the area so designated shifted westwards. In the interwar period the discovery of considerable quantities of oil in the Arabian peninsula and the increasing pace of Jewish migration into Palestine linked these chunks of territory to Mahan’s ‘Middle East’. During the Second World War British policy-makers began to use the term with reference to all Asian and North African lands to the west of India. No definite boundaries were set to the region during this period. In line with changes in British wartime policies, ‘Iran was added in 1942; Eritrea was dropped in September 1941 and welcomed back again five months later’.12 Towards the end of the Second World War the United States got involved in the ‘Middle East’, adopting the British wartime definition. These switches from one definition to another took place so swiftly that it prompted a well-known historian of the region, Roderic Davison, to ask in the pages of the Foreign Affairs: ‘Where is the Middle East?’.13 The argument so far should not be taken to mean that it was solely the military strategic interests of western powers that have been the driving force behind the invention and reproduction of such representations. Throughout history all societies have produced their own representations of the world. The term ‘Maghreb’ (‘the West’ in Arabic) has its origins in the geopolitics of an earlier epoch, that of the first waves of Arab invaders who came to North Africa in the 7th and 8th centuries. However, not all societies have been able to impose their maps on to others. This is where relative endowment of material resources comes into play in deciding whose discourse emerges as the dominant one. To put it another way, the reason why the lands to the southwest of Asia and north of Africa have been lumped together in the mind’s eye and labelled as the ‘Middle East’ has its roots not merely in the military strategic interests of Great Britain of the late 19th century, but also in Britain’s material and representational prowess. It is not only the relative endowment of the material resources of rival powers but also the changes in communications and transportation technologies that have an impact on the way geographical categories are invented and adjusted. As the military strategic interests and capabilities of the major geopolitical actors of the time changed, the ‘Middle East’ shifted in

[CONTINUES NO TEXT REMOVED]

Security (2/6)

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tandem with these changes. The point here is that technological and economic, as well as political changes, alter the way one ‘sees’ the world, thereby helping shape one’s practices. For example, after the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, some proposed a new region, that of the ‘Greater Middle East’.14 This new region includes the former Soviet republics of Central Asia which is in itself indicative of the security conceptions and practices of its inventors that include securing the route to Central Asian oil resources (in which there is now much interest) while holding Islamism in check (which has become a persistent anxiety in the United States and Western Europe in the aftermath of 11 September 2001).

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B. Orientalist forms of security guarantee genocidal conflicts -- their perspective consolidates the racist hierarchies responsible for global exploitation.

Pinar **Batur**, PhD @ UT-Austin – Prof. of Scociology @ Vassar, **‘7** [“The Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide,” in *Handbook of the The Soiology of Racial and Ethnic Relations*, eds. Vera and Feagin, p. 446-7]

At the turn of the 20th century, the “Terrible Turk” was the image that summarized the enemy of Europe and the antagonism toward the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire, stretching from Europe to the Middle East, and across North Africa. Perpetuation of this imagery in American foreign policy exhibited how capitalism met with orientalist constructs in the white racial frame of the western mind (VanderLippe 1999). Orientalism is based on the conceptualization of the “Oriental” other—Eastern, Islamic societies as static, irrational, savage, fanatical, and inferior to the peaceful, rational, scientific “Occidental” Europe and the West (Said 1978). This is as an **elastic construct**, proving useful to describe whatever is considered as the latest threat to Western economic expansion, political and cultural **hegemony, and** global **domination** for **exploitation and absorption**.

Post-Enlightenment Europe and later America used this iconography to define basic racist assumptions regarding their uncontestable right to impose political and economic dominance globally. When the Soviet Union existed as an opposing power, the orientalist vision of the 20th century shifted from the image of the “Terrible Turk” to that of the “Barbaric Russian Bear.” In this context, orientalist thought then, as now, set the terms of exclusion. It racialized exclusion to define the terms of racial privilege and superiority. By focusing on ideology, orientalism recreated the superior race, even though there was no “race.” It equated the hegemony of Western civilization with the “right ideological and cultural framework.” It segued into **war and annihilation and genocide** and continued to foster and aid the recreation of racial hatred of others with the collapse of the Soviet “other.” Orientalism’s global racist ideology reformed in the 1990s with Muslims and Islamic culture as to the “inferior other.” Seeing Muslims as opponents of Christian civilization is not new, going back to the Crusades, but the elasticity and reframing of this exclusion is evident in **recent debates** regarding Islam in the West, one raised by the Pope and the other by the President of the United States.

Against the background of the latest Iraq war, attacks in the name of Islam, racist attacks on Muslims in Europe and in the United States, and detention of Muslims without trial in secret prisons, Pope Benedict XVI gave a speech in September 2006 at Regensburg University in Germany. He quoted a 14th-century Byzantine emperor who said, “show me just what Muhammad brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.” In addition, the Pope discussed the concept of Jihad, which he defined as Islamic “holy war,” and said, “violence in the name of religion was contrary to God’s nature and to reason.” He also called for dialogue between cultures and religions (Fisher 2006b). While some Muslims found the Pope’s speech “regrettable,” it also caused a spark of angry protests against the Pope’s “ill informed and bigoted” comments, and voices raised to demand an apology (Fisher 2006a). Some argue that the Pope was ordering a new crusade, for Christian civilization to conquer terrible and savage Islam. When Benedict apologized, organizations and parliaments demanded a retraction and apology from the Pope and the Vatican (Lee 2006). Yet, when the Pope apologized, it came as a second insult, because in his apology he said, “I’m deeply sorry for the reaction in some countries to a few passages of my address at the University of Regensburg, which were considered offensive to the sensibilities of Muslims” (Reuters 2006). In other words, he is sorry that Muslims are intolerant to the point of fanaticism. In the racialized world, the Pope’s apology came as an effort to show justification for his speech—he was not apologizing for being insulting, but rather saying that he was sorry that “Muslim” violence had proved his point.

Through orientalist and the white racial frame, those who are subject to racial hatred and exclusion themselves become agents of racist legitimization. Like Huntington, Bernard Lewis was looking for Armageddon in his Wall Street Journal article warning that August 22, 2006, was the 27th day of the month of Rajab in the Islamic calendar and is considered a holy day, when Muhammad was taken to heaven and returned. For Muslims this day is a day of rejoicing and celebration. But for Lewis, Professor Emeritus at Princeton, “this might well be deemed an appropriate date for the apocalyptic ending of Israel and, if necessary, of the world” (Lewis 2006). He cautions that “it is far from certain that [the President of Iran] Mr. Ahmadinejad plans any such cataclysmic events for August 22, but it would be **wise to bear the possibility** in mind.” Lewis argues that Muslims, unlike others, seek self-destruction in order to reach heaven faster. For Lewis, Muslims in this mindset **don’t see the idea of Mutually Assured Destruction as a constraint** but rather as “an inducement” (Lewis 2006). In 1993, Huntington pleaded that “in a world of different civilizations, each . . .will have to learn to coexist with the others” (Huntington 1993:49). Lewis, like Pope Benedict, views Islam as the apocalyptic destroyer of civilization and claims that reactions against orientalist, racist visions such as his actually prove the validity of his position.

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Lewis’s assertions run parallel with George Bush’s claims. In response to the alleged plot to blow up British airliners, Bush claimed, “This nation is at war with Islamic fascists who will use any means to destroy those of us who love freedom, to hurt our nation” (TurkishPress.com. 2006; Beck 2006). Bush argued that “the fight against terrorism is the ideological struggle of the 21st century” and he compared it to the 20th century’s fight against fascism, Nazism, and communism. Even though “Islamo-fascist” has for some time

been a buzzword for Bill O’Reilly, Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity on the talk-show circuit, for the president of the United States it drew reactions worldwide. Muslim Americans found this phrase “contributing to the rising level of hostility to Islam and the American Muslim community” (Raum 2006). Considering that since 2001, Bush has had a tendency to equate “war on terrorism” with “crusade,” this new rhetoric equates ideology with religion and reinforces the worldview of a war of civilizations. As Bush said, “ . .

.we still aren’t completely safe, because there are people that still plot and people who want to harm us for what we believe in” (CNN 2006).

Exclusion in physical space is only matched by exclusion in the imagination, and racialized exclusion has an internal logic leading to the **annihilation of the excluded**. Annihilation, in this sense, is not only designed to maintain the terms of racial inequality, both ideologically and physically, but **is institutionalized with the vocabulary of self-protection**. Even though the terms of exclusion are never complete, **genocide is the definitive** point in the exclusionary racial ideology, and such is the **logic of the outcome** of the exclusionary process, that **it can conclude only in ultimate domination**. **War** **and genocide take place with** compliant efficiency to serve the **global racist ideology with dizzying** **frequency**. The 21st century opened up with genocide, in Darfur.

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C. Rejecting their demand for immediate yes/no policy response is the only way to raise critical ethical questions about the discourse and practice of ir in the middle east.

Shampa **BISWAS** Politics @ Whitman **‘7** “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist” *Millennium* 36 (1) p. 117-125

 The recent resuscitation of the project of Empire should give International Relations scholars particular pause.1 For a discipline long premised on a triumphant Westphalian sovereignty, there should be something remarkable about the ease with which the case for brute force, regime change and empire-building is being formulated in widespread commentary spanning the political spectrum. Writing after the 1991 Gulf War, Edward Said notes the US hesitance to use the word ‘empire’ despite its long imperial history.2 This hesitance too is increasingly under attack as even self-designated liberal commentators such as Michael Ignatieff urge the US to overcome its unease with the ‘e-word’ and selfconsciously don the mantle of imperial power, contravening the limits of sovereign authority and remaking the world in its universalist image of ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’.3 Rashid Khalidi has argued that the US invasion and occupation of Iraq does indeed mark a new stage in American world hegemony, replacing the indirect and proxy forms of Cold War domination with a regime much more reminiscent of European colonial empires in the Middle East.4 The ease with which a defence of empire has been mounted and a colonial project so unabashedly resurrected makes this a particularly opportune, if not necessary, moment, as scholars of ‘the global’, to take stock of our disciplinary complicities with power, to account for colonialist imaginaries that are lodged at the heart of a discipline ostensibly interested in power but perhaps far too deluded by the formal equality of state sovereignty and overly concerned with security and order. Perhaps more than any other scholar, Edward Said’s groundbreaking work in *Orientalism* has argued and demonstrated the long and deep complicity of academic scholarship with colonial domination.5 In addition to spawning whole new areas of scholarship such as postcolonial studies, Said’s writings have had considerable influence in his own discipline of comparative literature but also in such varied disciplines as anthropology, geography and history, all of which have taken serious and sustained stock of their own participation in imperial projects and in fact regrouped around that consciousness in a way that has simply not happened with International Relations.6 It has been 30 years since Stanley Hoffman accused IR of being an ‘American social science’ and noted its too close connections to US foreign policy elites and US preoccupations of the Cold War to be able to make any universal claims,7 yet there seems to be a curious amnesia and lack of curiosity about the political history of the discipline, and in particular its own complicities in the production of empire.8 Through what discourses the imperial gets reproduced, resurrected and re-energised is a question that should be very much at the heart of a discipline whose task it is to examine the contours of global power. Thinking this failure of IR through some of Edward Said’s critical scholarly work from his long distinguished career as an intellectual and activist, this article is an attempt to politicise and hence **render questionable** the **disciplinary traps** that have, ironically, circumscribed the ability of scholars whose very business it is to think about global politics to actually think *globally* and *politically*. What Edward Said has to offer IR scholars, I believe, is a certain kind of global sensibility, a critical but sympathetic and felt awareness of an inhabited and cohabited world. Furthermore, it is a profoundly political sensibility whose globalism is predicated on a cognisance of the imperial and a firm non-imperial ethic in its formulation. I make this argument by travelling through a couple of Said’s thematic foci in his enormous corpus of writing. Using a lot of Said’s reflections on the role of public intellectuals, I argue in this article that IR scholars need to develop what I call a ‘global intellectual posture’. In the 1993 Reith Lectures delivered on BBC channels, Said outlines three positions for public intellectuals to assume – as an outsider/exile/marginal, as an ‘amateur’, and as a disturber of the status quo speaking ‘truth to power’ and self-consciously siding with those who are underrepresented and disadvantaged.9 Beginning with a discussion of Said’s critique of ‘professionalism’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ as it applies to International Relations, I first argue the importance, for scholars of global politics, of taking *politics* seriously. Second, I turn to Said’s comments on the posture of exile and his critique of identity politics, particularly in its nationalist formulations, to ask what it means for students of global politics to take the *global* seriously. Finally, I attend to some of Said’s comments on humanism and contrapuntality to examine what IR scholars can learn from Said about *feeling and thinking globally* concretely, thoroughly and carefully. IR Professionals in an Age of Empire: From ‘International Experts’ to ‘Global Public Intellectuals’ One of the profound effects of the war on terror initiated by the Bush administration has been a significant constriction of a democratic public sphere, which has included the active and aggressive curtailment of intellectual and political dissent and a sharp delineation of national boundaries along with concentration of state power. The academy in this context has become a particularly embattled site with some highly disturbing onslaughts on academic freedom. At the most obvious level, this has involved fairly well-calibrated neoconservative attacks on US higher education that have invoked the mantra of ‘liberal bias’ and demanded legislative regulation and

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reform10, an onslaught supported by a well-funded network of conservative think tanks, centres, institutes and ‘concerned citizen groups’ within and outside the higher education establishment11 and with considerable reach among sitting legislators, jurists and policy-makers as well as the media. But what has in part made possible the encroachment of such nationalist and statist agendas has been a larger history of the corporatisation of the university and the accompanying ‘professionalisation’ that goes with it. Expressing concern with ‘academic acquiescence in the decline of public discourse in the United States’, Herbert Reid has examined the ways in which the university is beginning to operate as another transnational corporation12, and critiqued the consolidation of a ‘culture of professionalism’ where **academic bureaucrats** **engage in bureaucratic role-playing,** minor academic **turf battles mask the larger managerial power play** on campuses and the increasing influence of a relatively autonomous administrative elite and the rise of insular ‘expert cultures’ have led to academics relinquishing their claims to public space and authority.13

While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, there is much reason for concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic process. This is especially true for scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward Said has written extensively on the place of the academy as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals immured from the seductions of power.14 Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces, ‘the one public space available to real alternative intellectual practices: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world today’15, and lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said also complains that ‘the American University, with its munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged (intellectuals)’16. The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’, he argues, is ‘professionalism’ and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, and most worrisome of all, their ability and willingness to be **seduced by power**.17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger question of **intellectual orientation**. It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain kinds **of ethical questions irreducible to formulaic ‘for or against’ and ‘costs and benefits’ analysis** can simply **not be raised**. In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is an understanding of ‘intellectual relevance’ that is larger and more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical and perhaps unanswerable questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions, that is about *politics* (rather than techno-expertise) in the most fundamental and important senses of the vocation.21

Heg

U.S. military primacy is high – an aggressive force posture makes it sustainable, and there are no challengers

Brooks and Wohlforth 2008 [Stephen G. and William C., Profs. Gov’t @ Dartmouth, World out of Balance, p. 28-9]

The United States spends more on defense than all the other major military powers combined, and most of those powers are its allies. Its massive investments in the human, institutional, and technological requisites of military power, cumulated over many decades, make an effort to match U.S. capabilities even more daunting than the grit spending numbers imply. Military research and development (R&D) may best capture the scale of the long-term investments that give United States a dramatic qualitative edge in military capabilities. table 2.1 shows, in 2004 U.S. military R&D expenditures were me than six times greater than those of Germany, Japan, France, and Britain combined. By some estimates over half the military R&D expenditures in the world are American.' And this disparity has been sustained for decades: over the past 30 years, for example, the United States has harvested over three times more than the entire European Union on military R&D.'5

These vast commitments have created a preeminence in military capabilities vis-à-vis all the other major powers that is unique after the seventeenth century. While other powers could contest US forces near their homelands, especially over issues on which nuclear deterrence is credible, the United States is and will long remain the only state capable of projecting major military power globally. This capacity arises from “command of the commons” –that is, unassailable military dominance over the sea, air, and space. As Barry Posen puts it,

“Command of the commons is the key military enabler of the US global power position. It allows the United States to exploit more fully other sources of power including its own economic and military might as well as the economic and military might of its allies. Command of the commons also helps the United States to weaken its adversaries, by restricting their access to economic, military and political assistance….Command of the commons provides the United States with more useful military potential for a hegemonic foreign policy than any other offshore power has ever had.

Heg

Keeping nuclear weapons in Turkey would bolster Turkey’s support of US interests in Middle East.

Alex Bell, Alexandrap roject manager at the Ploughshares Fund and a Truman National Security Fellow **and** Benjamin **Loehrke**, research assistant at the Ploughshares Fund and a graduate student at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy.The status of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey. 23 November **2009**. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. “The Status of US Nuclear Weapons in Turkey”

A prescription for withdrawal. Preventing Turkey (and any other country in the region) from acquiring nuclear weapons is critical to international security. Doing so requires a key factor that also is essential to paving the way toward withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons: improved alliance relations. The political and strategic compasses are pointing to the eventual withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe--it's a strategy that certainly fits the disarmament agenda President Barack Obama has outlined. But to get there, careful diplomacy will be required to improve U.S.-Turkish ties and to assuage Turkish security concerns. The U.S.-Turkish relationship cooled when Turkey refused to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom, after which Turkish support for U.S. policy declined through the end of the George W. Bush administration. Obama's election has helped to mend fences, and his visit to Turkey in April was warmly received. In fact, all of the administration's positive interactions with Turkey have been beneficial: Washington has supported Turkey's role as a regional energy supplier and encouraged Ankara as it undertakes difficult political reforms and works to resolve regional diplomatic conflicts. For its part, Turkey recently doubled its troop contribution to NATO's Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan--a **boon to U.S. efforts there.** By incorporating Ankara into its new European missile defense plans--intended to protect Turkey and other countries vulnerable to Iran's short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles--Washington could further shore up its military relationship with Turkey. Ship-based Aegis missile systems will be the backbone of the strategy, with considerations left open for later deployments of mobile ground-based interceptors in Eastern Europe or Turkey. This cooperation could provide the bond with Washington and perception of security that Turkey seeks in the face of a potential Iranian bomb. Because Russia weighs significantly in Turkish security calculations, reductions to Russian strategic and nonstrategic nuclear arsenals also would help improve Ankara's peace of mind. The United States and Russia soon will seek ratification of a follow-on agreement to START. And treaty negotiations in pursuit of further reductions to the U.S. and Russian arsenals should involve forward-deployed nuclear weapons, including the U.S. weapons in Turkey. During any such negotiations, Turkey must be fully confident in NATO and U.S. security guarantees. Critically, any removal of the weapons in Turkey would need to happen in concert with efforts to prevent Iran from turning its civil nuclear energy program into a military one. Otherwise, Washington would risk compromising Turkey as a NATO ally and key regional partner. If used properly, Turkey actually can play an important role in this complex process, and the United States and its allies should seriously consider Turkish offers to serve as an **interlocutor between Iran and the West**. First, Ankara's potential influence with Tehran should not be underestimated. As Princeton scholar Joshua Walker has noted, given its long-established pragmatic relations and growing economic ties with Iran, Ankara is in a position to positively influence Tehran's behavior. More largely, if the United States and European Union task Turkey with a bigger role in the diplomatic back-and-forth with Iran, it would help convince Ankara (and others) of Turkey's value to NATO and have the additional benefit of pulling Ankara into a closer relationship with Washington and Brussels. As a result, Turkey would obtain a stronger footing in alliance politics, contain its chief security concerns, and foster the necessary conditions for the removal of tactical U.S. nuclear weapons from Turkish soil.

Heg

Sustained unipolar hegemony prevents multiple scenarios for nuclear conflict.

Kagan 2007 [Robert, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, “End of Dreams, Return of History”, Hoover Institution - Stanford U, in Policy Review, No 144, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10>]

Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as “No. 1” and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe.

The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying —  its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic.

It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible.

Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war.

People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that ’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War II, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe.

The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world ’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States.

Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan.

In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore  to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances.

It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, “offshore” role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more “even-handed” policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel ’s aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground.

The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn ’t change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the

region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn ’t changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to “normal” or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again.

The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.

Turkey Politics (1/2)

If the elections happened today, Erdogan would lose.

Gil Ronen, IsraelNationalNews staff writer, Last Updated, 6/6/2010, “Erdogan Poised to Lose Next Election, Expert Says,” http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/news.aspx/137906 // vkoneru

Turkey's foreign policy shift away from friendship with Israel and the West may be a ploy by the country's prime minister to gain popularity for his party, which stands to lose the next election in July 2011, says a top expert on the region. The hostile stance taken by Turkey towards Israel is part of a major transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy, according to Begin-Sadat Center Director Prof. Efraim Inbar. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is turning away from the West, he explained, and moving closer to countries such as Sudan, Syria and Iran. However, “it is not a foregone conclusion that Turkey will persist in this direction,” Inbar said in a position paper: “Among Turkish society many still support the secular parties, which are far from pleased with the rush towards the Muslim world. Even among moderate Muslim quarters there is a sense of unease regarding the government’s policy pushing Turkey to join radical Islamic elements such as Hamas and Iran. One should also recall that Shiite Iran was an historic rival of the Sunni Turks.” (For an article on Turkey under Erdogan written by an Iranian freedom activist, click here.) **Public support for the ruling Islamic party is in decline**, the expert added, mostly due to corruption and abuse of civil rights. “Were elections held last week, the Islamist party would lose many seats, and two secular parties would possibly have made up the coalition. **If current public opinion is held till the next elections**, scheduled for July 2011, **it is likely that Turkey will emerge with a new prime minister**. It is possible that precisely due to his domestic situation as reflected in the polls, Erdogan has decided to exacerbate his relations with Israel in order to gain public support.” Prof. Inbar concludes that Israel “should stand its ground on Israeli vital interests” vis-a-vis Turkey. “Moreover, Israel should not tolerate insults. This will only be perceived as a weakness. Israel should distinguish between the Turkish state and society, and the current government that deserves a strong riposte. Firm, level-headed responses will be of assistance to pro-Western Turks in their domestic debate.”

TNWs and staging posts unpopular with the public – 72% against US presence

Claudine Lamond and Paul Ingram, British American Security Information Council, January 23, 2009, “Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states,” BASIC Getting to Zero Paper, www.atlanticcommunity.org/app/webroot/files/articlepdf/CLamondTNWinNATO.pdf // vkoneru

There is a rising sentiment amongst the population for the removal of US nuclear weapons from Turkish territory. In a recent survey,[20] more than half the respondents stated that they are against nuclear weapons being stationed in Turkey. Almost 60% of the Turkish population would support a government request to remove the nuclear weapons from their country, and 72% said they would support an initiative to make Turkey a nuclear-free zone.[21] There may be several causes behind this sentiment, including the Iraq War, Turkish relations with neighboring states, budget expenditure and the moral concern over nuclear weapons. The historic precedence of Greece, a NATO member and Turkey's historic rival, ending its commitment to nuclear sharing in NATO may have further strengthened this tendency. There have been **public expressions of resentment towards the US military presence** in Turkey ever since the lead up to the US war with Iraq. The United States insisted on the government allowing American troops to use Turkey as a staging post, **despite overwhelmingly antiwar Turkish public and political opinion**. Limited permission was granted after heavy debates and delay in the Turkish parliament.

Erdogan will get credit for the plan

Lale Kemal, staff writer and columnist for today’s zaman, 6/20/2010, “What will Erdoğan do over nukes at the İncirlik base?,” http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/columnists-207467-what-will-erdogan-do-over-nukes-at-the-incirlik-base.html // vkoneru

Erdoğan urged, once again, during a speech in Washington on Monday that a nuclear-free zone be established in Turkey's region, i.e., the Middle East, which in particular will include Israel. Erdoğan also said that Turkey does not want Iran or any other nation to have nuclear weapons.

Turkey Politics (2/2)

CHP win key to EU accession

The Jerusalem Post, May 31, 2010, “Turkey’s game changer?,” lexis

The CHP has failed to come up with its version of moving Turkey forward, instead merely opposing the AKP. Subsequently, and ironically for a leftist party, the CHP has become the party opposing change - the party of "no." The implications of the dirty tactics against Baykal aside, the shake-up in the CHP's leadership presents the party with an unprecedented opportunity - Turkish leaders do not quit politics until they die - to introduce New Kemalism, a forward vision for a European Turkey. Kilicdaroglu has already voiced support for EU accession, and the talk in Ankara is that he is wooing prominent liberal, pro-EU Turkish diplomats who feel disgruntled with the AKP's foreign policy to join the CHP. If the CHP becomes the party of change, it can even mold Turkey in the image of leftist parties that took Portugal and Spain into the European Union while transforming and liberalizing their societies. New Kemalism's aim would be to boost traditional Kemalism's commitment to Turkey's European vocation while reguiding it toward more liberal values. In the early 20th century, Kemal Ataturk wanted Turkey to go West, and that remains Kemalism's goal. Europe, however, has moved even further West since then. Joining this new Europe, the EU of liberal values, has to be New Kemalism's driving mantra.

Turkey’s accession into the EU is key to peace and stability in Cyprus

Stefan Nicola, Staff writer for United Press International, June 13, 2005, United Press International, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “Cyprus backs Turkey’s EU bid,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic\_id=109941&fuseaction=topics.item&news\_id=132754 // vkoneru

The accession of Turkey into the European Union is essential to solve the Cyprus problem, a senior Cypriot diplomat in Washington said Monday. "We are in favor of Turkey joining the EU," said Euripides Evriviades, ambassador of the Republic of Cyprus, at a luncheon hosted by the Nixon Center, a Washington-based think tank. "The EU solves problems by embracing them," he said, "it has managed to reunify the French and the Germans, and it will do it for Cyprus...Turkey joining the Union is fundamental for peace and stability and long-term prosperity in the region."A former British colony, Cyprus has been divided into the Republic of Cyprus -- the Greek Cypriot south -- and a Turkish-occupied north since Turkey invaded the Mediterranean island in 1974. Although only the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus joined the EU on May 1, 2004, every Cypriot carrying a passport has the status of a European citizen. EU laws, however, do not apply to the north, which has so far been recognized by Turkey alone. Evriviades said he hopes the rejection of the EU constitution in France and the Netherlands does not influence the timetable of the EU-accession talks with Ankara, which are scheduled to start Oct. 3. EU foreign ministers also approved an agreement on Monday adapting its customs union with Turkey to the 10 new EU member states, including Cyprus, bringing accession talks with Ankara a big step closer. Once Turkey signs the document, it will have met all the conditions to start the talks. In those talks, Cyprus hopes it will not get overlooked, as the issue is one that EU leaders have repeatedly stated they would like to be solved if Turkey wants to join the Brussels-based club. But the strategic interest of the United States in Turkey, a country that borders Iran and Iraq, might be disadvantageous to such a small country as Cyprus, the ambassador said. Evriviades criticized U.S.-lawmakers for what he felt would be an unjust foreign policy towards Nicosia: The ambassador said that in a Congress hearing earlier this year, it was said that "one politically risk-free option...for the United States to improve its relations with Turkey, is for the U.S. basically to deliver Cyprus." "How do you think I feel as a Cypriot," Evriviades asked, "if my own country is being used as an extension and a trump card for somebody else's foreign policy?" The Cypriot issue, which has seen repeated sparks of violent outbreaks over the last four decades, is also on the to-solve list of the United Nations. A U.N.-endorsed reunification plan facilitated direct talks between the leaders of both parties that culminated in a referendum last April. But while the Turkish north backed the plan, Greek Cypriotes overwhelmingly rejected the proposal.

Cyprus instability escalates to nuclear war

Tony Barber, Independent Staff Writer, 1/23/1997 “Europe's coming war over Cyprus: After 22 years of diplomatic stalemate, the world's most densely militarised confrontation zone may be about to explode, writes Tony Barber,” http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/europes-coming-war-over-cyprus-1284661.html // vkoneru

Just as EU foreign ministers sit down over lunch in Brussels to thrash out what to do, word arrives that four Greek Cypriots have been killed along the Green Line dividing government-held southern Cyprus from the Turkish-occupied north. The government, backed by Greece, retaliates by vowing to take delivery within a week of a batch of Russian S-300 anti- aircraft missiles ordered in January 1997. As a Russian-Greek naval convoy carrying the warheads and launchers edges towards the eastern Mediterranean, the Turkish armed forces swing into action. Troop reinforcements pour into northern Cyprus. Planes raid the Greek-built missile base near Paphos in south-western Cyprus. The Turkish navy prepares to blockade the island. Greece declares Turkey's actions a cause for war and, angry at lukewarm EU support, invokes the secret defence clause of a recently signed treaty with Russia. Fighting on Cyprus spreads to disputed Aegean islands on Turkey's coastline. The United States warns Russia not to get involved. President Alexander Lebed, with Chinese support, tells the US to mind its own business. All three powers go on nuclear alert. Like Cuba, another island involved in a missile dispute 36 years before, Cyprus has brought the world to nuclear confrontation.

Israel-Syria relations

1. War already broke out between Israel and Syria and it has not spread to the entire region. Israel has also recently fought Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza strip yet there was still no regional war

2. The next Middle East war will probably be about oil

Dr. Gal Luft executive director of the Washington, DC based Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS). He specializes in strategy, geopolitics, terrorism, Middle East and energy security 7/14/10 ("Hezbollah finds new anti-Israeli cause; Natural gas discovery could spur more regional violence", lexis)

The discovery of a gigantic natural-gas reservoir less than 100 miles off Israel's coast seems like great news for the diplomatically and militarily embattled country. The gas finding will strengthen Israel's energy security, enable it to become an important gas exporter and contribute wealth to its economy. It also could be the pretext for the next Middle East war. Ten years after Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon, Hezbollah is struggling to find a cause that would enable it to continue its "liberation war" against Israel. Yes, there are those Shebaa Farms on Israel's northern border that, according to international law, belong to Syria, not Lebanon. But neither the Lebanese population nor Syria seems to be eager to inflame the region over a territory one-fifth the size of Disney World. Something of greater strategic importance must be found in order to revive the "resistance." This is why only days after Israel announced its gas discovery, Hezbollah claimed that the deposit extends into Lebanese waters and that it would not allow Israel to "loot" Lebanese gas resources. The discovery blows fresh wind into Hezbollah's sails, giving it a new cause to fight for and a new opportunity to hurt the Israeli economy. Furthermore, by opening a new front in the Mediterranean, Hezbollah is gaining legitimacy for holding onto its arms. Even non-Shiite sects in Lebanon accept Hezbollah's role in protecting Lebanon's waters. Druze leader Walid Jumblatt recently said that Hezbollah's "weapons are important to defend the oil in the Sea of Lebanon and national resources in the country."

3. Escalation to nuclear war is unlikely. There have been 3 major Middle East conflicts involving Israel in addition to the United States’ conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan since the Steinbeck card was written and yet no nuclear weapons have been fired in that region

4. Their Kibaroglu 10 evidence does not actually say that Turkey can bridge the Israel-Syria dispute, it merely says that Turkey is involved in the Israel-Syria talks and that that Turkey having US nuclear weapons has drawn criticism from other middle east countries

5. Their Hen-Toy and Haykel evidence never mentions anything about stability of preventing wars. This card is just a power tag

There is no coherency in the advantage. They are first wrong in assuming that the next middle east war will be about water when we better qualified author with evidence that post dates by 7 years who says oil is the likely source of the next middle east war. They have no solvency either. Their Kibaroglu evidence does not say that Turkey can resolve the Israel-Syria dispute if the TNWs are taken out. Even if you give their Kibaroglu credence, they still cannot access their impacts because the Hen-Toy and Haykel card do not show Turkey as a country that can resolve disputes in the Middle East. They also said that Israel-Syria war would escalate into a full regional war even though they fought in a war very recently and it did not escalate into regional war. Even if it escalates into regional war the chance it will go nuclear are very slim as evidenced by the many major military conflicts that have taken place in the Middle East after their nuclear war card.

Iran Relations

1. Turkey is on the brink of breaking off its ties with the West and becoming a regional Islamist Power of the Middle East; dooming US foreign policy objectives and cooperation in the Middle East

Mike Brownfield, lawyer and writer for Heritage Foundation, 6/2010 (“Turkey’s Dangerous Turn Against the West”, The Heritage Foundation, June, 2010, http://blog.heritage.org/2010/06/08/turkeys-dangerous-turn-against-the-west/)

This is not a new concern. In April 2009, President Barack Obama traveled to Turkey and highlighted the country as a Muslim nation that respects democracy and the rule of law, but as The Heritage Foundation’s Ariel Cohen wrote at the time, the president’s remarks may have been an overstatement. Cohen noted that the ruling Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) had a [stranglehold on power](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2009/04/Turkeys-dangerous-shift) and “appears to be moving Turkey away from its pro-Western and pro-American orientation to a more Middle Eastern and Islamist one.” Cohen wrote that Turkey in 2006 became the first NATO member to host the leader of Hamas (a terrorist organization, according to the United States and the EU) and [“enthusiastically” hosted Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2009/04/Turkeys-dangerous-shift) and Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. Turkey also temporarily blocked U.S. warships from delivering humanitarian aid to Georgia, was cool to the U.S. withdrawing forced from Iraq through Turkey, and made moves to strengthen its relationship with Russia. Then there’s Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has developed close ties with Ahmadinejad and openly attacked Israeli President Shimon Peres, while AKP and other Islamists “sponsored a flood of anti-Israel demonstrations, billboards and anti-Semetic rhetoric.” Erdogan also questioned calls for Iran not to produce nuclear weapons and, together with Brazil, Turkey [attempted to derail](http://blog.heritage.org/2010/05/20/iran%E2%80%99s-nuclear-diplomacy-helps-to-pull-teeth-from-u-n-sanctions/) U.S.-led UN sanctions against Iran. Most recently, it has been reported that Erdogan is “a hero to Palestinians for his vociferous verbal attacks on Israel” and has criticized western nations for not dealing with Hamas. Turkey’s involvement in the flotilla incident jives with the country’s alarming turn away from the West. The Heritage Found ation’s James Carafano writes: Turkey not only knowing allowed the confrontation to be organized from Turkish soil, it did everything possible to exploit the incident. The Turkish Foreign Minister declared, “this attack is like 9/11 for Turkey.” This is the same government that has turned a blind eye to the crushing of independent voices in Iran and has moved to block sanctions intended to deter Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. And as Carafano notes, that provokes the questions “Why are we are losing Turkey?” and “What will happen if Turkey is lost?”: The consequences of that are pretty not pretty. Phased and adaptive missile defense will be less of both without Turkish cooperation. Iran will be more unbound. Israel will feel more isolated. NATO will be further weakened. The Washington Post explains Turkey’s turn in foreign policy as [rooted in a desire to expand business ties and become a regional player](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/06/AR2010060604052.html). It underemphasizes, though, the geopolitical and extremist religious roots of Turkey’s massive shift in foreign policy — the neo-Ottoman attempts to recreate a Turkish sphere of influence in the Middle East, and the AKP Muslim Brotherhood’s strategy to build an Islamic state. Whatever the cause of Turkey’s turn away from the West, it comes at the expense of U.S. interests and reveals weaknesses – if not a failure – in Washington’s Middle East policy.

Iran Relations

2. Removal of TNWs moves Turkey closer to its new Middle East allies while alienating the West

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A key question for NATO’s new Strategic Concept is whether burden sharing will continue to be construed as it has had for many decades, as suggested by Turkey, or whether it will be altered in response to the combined negative stance of some western European allies regarding the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons. This situation could lead to a divisive and unnecessary controversy between Turkey and its long-standing allies in the West. By insisting that the weapons remain on European territory, Turkey would not only alienate some of its Western allies that truly want to move the weapons out of their territories, but also create tension in its relations with its neighbors and newly emerging partners in the Middle East. On May 17, Turkey signed a joint declaration with Brazil and Iran, providing for the safe storage of Iran’s 1,200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium fuel in Turkey in return for the delivery by France, Russia, the United States, and the International Atomic Energy Agency of 120 kilograms of fuel needed for the Tehran Research Reactor.[[26](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_06/Kibaroglu#26)] This “nuclear fuel swap” is potentially a breakthrough in the long-standing deadlock in Iran’s relations with the West over Tehran’s nuclear program. There is no question that the degree of trust that Turkey has built with Iran, especially over the last several years with the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, had a significant impact on getting this result. Iran has so far adamantly refused all other offers. Hence, the Iranian political and security elites who have been closely interacting with their Turkish counterparts at every level over the past several months and years prior to the fuel swap announcement may raise their expectations in turn. They may press for withdrawal from Turkey of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, which they fear may be used against them, as a way for Turkey to prove its sincerity regarding its stance toward Iran and, more broadly, its commitment to creating a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East. Turkey clearly has to tread carefully, but the risks should not be overstated. One concern might be the contingencies in which the security situation in Turkey’s neighborhood deteriorates, thereby necessitating the active presence of an effective deterrent against the aggressor(s). Yet, given the elaborate capabilities that exist within the alliance and the solidarity principle so far effectively upheld by the allies, extending deterrence against Turkey’s rivals should not be a problem. Turkey would continue to be protected against potential aggressors by the nuclear guarantees of its allies France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the three NATO nuclear-weapon states. Turkey’s reliance on such a “credible” deterrent, which will not be permanently stationed on Turkish territory, is less likely to be criticized by its Middle Eastern neighbors[[27](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_06/Kibaroglu#27)] and should not engender a burden-sharing controversy with its European allies.

Iran Relations

4. US-Turkish relations key to leadership—necessary to prevent Russia/China counterbalancing.

Mustafa Malik, 5/15/1997, Senior associate at The Strategy Group, an international foreign policy research entity in Washington. “TURKEY REMAINS STRONG U.S. ALLY, WHY NOT FOR EU?” Chicago Tribune, NewsBank, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1997-05-15/news/9705150295\_1\_muslim-turkey-us-turkish-relations-islamist-refah // vkoneru

That trepidation has eased now. Erbakan has agreed, though grudgingly, to retain Turkey's ties to Europe, the United States and Israel, and committed himself to working within the secular Turkish constitution. But American interest in Turkey has actually been heightened by a string of other events affecting U.S. strategic interests. China's economic and military resurgence is causing unease in Washington. Beijing appears to aspire for the status of a second superpower. And the Russian announcement of a new military doctrine stipulating the first use of nuclear weapons in a desperate conflict was a reminder that the honeymoon with the Russians is over. Even though President Boris Yelstin has swallowed the NATO expansion plans, the Russian parliament could hold off on ratifying the second strategic arms reduction treaty requiring Moscow to dismantle thousands of nuclear warheads. And Yeltsin recently joined Chinese President Jiang Zemin in a statement criticizing the U.S. domination of world affairs and calling for a "multipolar world." A multipolar, bi-polar world may not be around the corner, but the United States needs allies in the periphery of the world's second- and third-largest military powers that are resentful of its superpower status. Turkey is its only ally in the periphery of both. Turkish politics, however, remain extremely fluid and Islamic revivalism is far from over. The best way to promote stability and secularism in Turkey, its secular politicians and diplomats have been telling the West, is to integrate it with Western Europe politically and economically. Talbott's impassioned plea to the EU indicates that Washington is listening. Recently, a Turkish diplomat in Washington acknowledged that "the United States, happily, is showing a greater appreciation" of his country "during the last two, three months." He was quick to point out, though, that "the helicopters and frigates issue" remained unresolved. U.S.-Turkish relations have never been smooth. Under pressures from the Greek lobby, Congress has held up the delivery of 10 Super Cobra helicopters and three guided-missile frigates to Turkey. Besides, Yet (Turkish government., ) influential groups are sounding the alarm bell about the Islamists in the Turkey is likely to remain strategically important to Americans as long as they have stakes in its neighborhood.

5. Nuclear war

Zalmay Khalizhad, RAND Analyst, 1995, "Losing the Moment?”, Washington Quarterly, spring, ln.

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system

Random cards for now

The US should leave its nuclear weapons in Turkey

Sally McNamara Senior Policy Analyst in European Affairs at The Heritage Foundation’s Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom 7/26/10 “Turkey Going Nuclear – A Game Changer” http://blog.heritage.org/2010/07/26/turkey-going-nuclear-a-game-changer/#more-39695

Much of this is entirely predictable. President Obama’s policies—namely, his commitment to eradicating nuclear weapons per se, the uncertainty surrounding the future of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, and his water-treading missile defense program—have raised significant doubt in Turkey’s mind about the reliability of the half-century-old U.S./NATO nuclear and defense umbrella. President Obama and NATO should not stand idly by and watch this happen. The destabilization brought to the European continent from a premature removal of American nuclear weapons, or an unacceptable degradation of its force, would be a major setback for global security and stability. America should stand behind its nuclear guarantee to Europe and adopt a protect-and-defend strategy that includes robust missile defenses. Washington should also make clear to Turkey that Ankara’s acquirement of nuclear weapons will not be tolerated and would cost it both its strategic relationship with the U.S. and potentially its membership of NATO. In 2006, now-Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Philip Gordon said the U.S. would soon have to ask itself, “Who lost Turkey?” Unless he wants the answer to be “President Obama,” the Administration should address this issue as a matter of urgency.