# gender answers

[BEST 2AC CARD 2](#_Toc268091503)

[GENERAL 2AC 4](#_Toc268091504)

[ALT FAILS 6](#_Toc268091506)

[PERMUTATION 7](#_Toc268091507)

[REALISM 8](#_Toc268091508)

[STATE KEY—FRAMEWORK/PERM 9](#_Toc268091509)

[SCIENCE TURN 10](#_Toc268091510)

[SCIENCE: UNIQUENESS 11](#_Toc268091511)

[SCIENCE: LINK EXT 12](#_Toc268091512)

[SCIENCE: IMPACT EXT 13](#_Toc268091513)

[SCIENCE: SOLVES K 14](#_Toc268091514)

[STATE/MILITARY TURN 15](#_Toc268091515)

[STATE/MILITARY: EXT 16](#_Toc268091516)

[INTERSECTIONALITY TURN 17](#_Toc268091517)

[INTERSECTIONALITY EXT 18](#_Toc268091518)

[A2: TRANSHUMANISM BAD 19](#_Toc268091519)

[A2: SOLVES MILITARISM 21](#_Toc268091521)

[A2: ROOT CAUSE OF WAR 22](#_Toc268091522)

[A2: ROOT OF OPPRESSION 23](#_Toc268091523)

[A2: EPISTEMOLOGY/IMPACT 24](#_Toc268091524)

# BEST 2AC CARD

**The structure of their argument undermines feminism—the claim that a single link results in a big “root cause” impact marginalizes struggles against other forms of violence and discrimination**  
**Crenshaw 2** [Carrie Crenshaw PhD, Former President of CEDA, “Perspectives In Controversy: Selected Articles from Contemporary Argumentation and Debate” 2002 p. 119-126]

Feminism is not dead. It is alive and well in intercollegiate debate. Increasingly, students rely on feminist authors to inform their analysis of resolutions. While I applaud these initial efforts to explore feminist thought, I am concerned that such arguments only exemplify the general absence of sound causal reasoning in debate rounds. Poor causal reasoning results from a debate practice that privileges empirical proof over rhetorical proof, fostering ignorance of the subject matter being debated. To illustrate my point, I claim that debate arguments about feminists suffer from a reductionism that tends to marginalize the voices of significant feminist authors. David Zarefsky made a persuasive case for the value of causal reasoning in intercollegiate debate as far back as 1979. He argued that causal arguments are desirable for four reasons. First, causal analysis increases the control of the arguer over events by promoting understanding of them. Second, the use of causal reasoning increases rigor of analysis and fairness in the decision-making process. Third, causal arguments promote understanding of the philosophical paradox that presumably good people tolerate the existence of evil. Finally, causal reasoning supplies good reasons for “commitments to policy choices or to systems of belief which transcend whim, caprice, or the non-reflexive “claims of immediacy” (117-9). Rhetorical proof plays an important role in the analysis of causal relationships. This is true despite the common assumption that the identification of cause and effect relies solely upon empirical investigation. For Zarefsky, there are three types of causal reasoning. The first type of causal reasoning describes the application of a covering law to account for physical or material conditions that cause a resulting event This type of causal reasoning requires empirical proof prominent in scientific investigation. A second type of causal reasoning requires the assignment of responsibility. Responsible human beings as agents cause certain events to happen; that is, causation resides in human beings (107-08). A third type of causal claim explains the existence of a causal relationship. It functions “to provide reasons to justify a belief that a causal connection exists” (108). The second and third types of causal arguments rely on rhetorical proof, the provision of “good reasons” to substantiate arguments about human responsibility or explanations for the existence of a causal relationship (108). I contend that the practice of intercollegiate debate privileges the first type of causal analysis. It reduces questions of human motivation and explanation to a level of empiricism appropriate only for causal questions concerning physical or material conditions. Arguments about feminism clearly illustrate this phenomenon. Substantive debates about feminism usually take one of two forms. First, on the affirmative, debaters argue that some aspect of the resolution is a manifestation of patriarchy. For example, given the spring 1992 resolution, “[rjesolved: That advertising degrades the quality of life," many affirmatives argued that the portrayal of women as beautiful objects for men's consumption is a manifestation of patriarchy that results in tangible harms to women such as rising rates of eating disorders. The fall 1992 topic, "(resolved: That the welfare system exacerbates the problems of the urban poor in the United States," also had its share of patri- archy cases. Affirmatives typically argued that women's dependence upon a patriarchal welfare system results in increasing rates of women's poverty. In addition to these concrete harms to individual women, most affirmatives on both topics, desiring "big impacts," argued that the effects of patriarchy include nightmarish totalitarianism and/or nuclear annihilation. On the negative, many debaters countered with arguments that the some aspect of the resolution in some way sustains or energizes the feminist movement in resistance to patriarchal harms. For example, some negatives argued that sexist advertising provides an impetus for the reinvigoration of the feminist movement and/or feminist consciousness, ultimately solving the threat of patriarchal nuclear annihilation. likewise, debaters negating the welfare topic argued that the state of the welfare system is the key issue around which the feminist movement is mobilizing or that the consequence of the welfare system - breakup of the patriarchal nuclear family -undermines patriarchy as a whole. Such arguments seem to have two assumptions in common. First, there is a single feminism. As a result, feminists are transformed into feminism. Debaters speak of feminism as a single, monolithic, theoretical and pragmatic entity and feminists as women with identical motivations, methods, and goals. Second, these arguments assume that patriarchy is the single or root cause of all forms of oppression. Patriarchy not only is responsible for sexism and the consequent oppression of women, it also is the cause of totalitarianism, environmental degradation, nuclear war, racism, and capitalist exploitation. These reductionist arguments reflect an unwillingness to debate about the complexities of human motivation and explanation. They betray a reliance upon a framework of proof that can explain only material conditions and physical realities through empirical quantification. The transformation of feminists 'Mo feminism and the identification of patriarchy as the sole cause of all oppression is related in part to the current form of intercollegiate debate practice. By "form," I refer to Kenneth Burke's notion of form, defined as the "creation of appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite" (Counter-Statement 31). Though the framework for this understanding of form is found in literary and artistic criticism, it is appropriate in this context; as Burke notes, literature can be "equipment for living" (Biilosophy 293). He also suggests that form "is an arousing and fulfillment of desires. A work has form in so far as one part of it leads a reader to anticipate another part, to be gratified by the sequence" (Counter-Statement 124). Burke observes that there are several aspects to the concept of form. One of these aspects, conventional form, involves to some degree the appeal of form as form. Progressive, repetitive, and minor forms, may be effective even though the reader has no awareness of their formality. But when a form appeals as form, we designate it as conventional form. Any form can become conventional, and be sought for itself - whether it be as complex as the Greek tragedy or as compact as the sonnet (Counter-Statement 126). These concepts help to explain debaters' continuing reluctance to employ rhetorical proof in arguments about causality. Debaters practice the convention of poor causal reasoning as a result of judges' unexamined reliance upon conventional form. Convention is the practice of arguing single-cause links to monolithic impacts that arises out of custom or usage. Conventional form is the expectation of judges that an argument will take this form. Common practice or convention dictates that a case or disadvantage with nefarious impacts causally related to a single link will "outweigh" opposing claims in the mind of the judge. In this sense, debate arguments themselves are conventional. Debaters practice the convention of establishing single-cause relationships to large monolithic impacts in order to conform to audience expectation. Debaters practice poor causal reasoning because they are rewarded for it by judges. The convention of arguing single-cause links leads the judge to anticipate the certainty of the impact and to be gratified by the sequence. I suspect that the sequence is gratifying for judges because it relieves us from the responsibility and difficulties of evaluating rhetorical proofs. We are caught between our responsibility to evaluate rhetorical proofs and our reluctance to succumb to complete relativism and subjectivity. To take responsibility for evaluating rhetorical proof is to admit that not every question has an empirical answer. However, when we abandon our responsibility to rhetorical proofs, we sacrifice our students' understanding of causal reasoning. The sacrifice has consequences for our students' knowledge of the subject matter they are debating. For example, when feminism is defined as a single entity, not as a pluralized movement or theory, that single entity results in the identification of patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression. The result is ignorance of the subject position of the particular feminist author, for highlighting his or her subject position might draw attention to the incompleteness of the causal relationship between link and impact Consequently, debaters do not challenge the basic assumptions of such argumentation and ignorance of feminists is perpetuated. Feminists are not feminism. The topics of feminist inquiry are many and varied, as are the philosophical approaches to the study of these topics. Different authors have attempted categorization of various feminists in distinctive ways. For example, Alison Jaggar argues that feminists can be divided into four categories: liberal feminism, marxist feminism, radical feminism, and socialist feminism. While each of these feminists may share a common commitment to the improvement of women's situations, they differ from each other in very important ways and reflect divergent philosophical assumptions that make them each unique. Linda Alcoff presents an entirely different categorization of feminist theory based upon distinct understandings of the concept "woman," including cultural feminism and post-structural feminism. Karen Offen utilizes a comparative historical approach to examine two distinct modes of historical argumentation or discourse that have been used by women and their male allies on behalf of women's emancipation from male control in Western societies. These include relational feminism and individualist feminism. Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron describe a whole category of French feminists that contain many distinct versions of the feminist project by French authors. Women of color and third-world feminists have argued that even these broad categorizations of the various feminism have neglected the contributions of non-white, non-Western feminists (see, for example, hooks; Hull; Joseph and Lewis; Lorde; Moraga; Omolade; and Smith). In this literature, the very definition of feminism is contested. Some feminists argue that "all feminists are united by a commitment to improving the situation of women" (Jaggar and Rothenberg xii), while others have resisted the notion of a single definition of feminism, bell hooks observes, "a central problem within feminist discourse has been our inability to either arrive at a consensus of opinion about what feminism is (or accept definitions) that could serve as points of unification" (Feminist Theory 17). The controversy over the very definition of feminism has political implications. The power to define is the power both to include and exclude people and ideas in and from that feminism. As a result, [bjourgeois white women interested in women's rights issues have been satisfied with simple definitions for obvious reasons. Rhetorically placing themselves in the same social category as oppressed women, they were not anxious to call attention to race and class privilege (hooks. Feminist Wieory 18). Debate arguments that assume a singular conception of feminism include and empower the voices of race- and class-privileged women while excluding and silencing the voices of feminists marginalized by race and class status. This position becomes clearer when we examine the second assumption of arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate - patriarchy is the sole cause of oppression. Important feminist thought has resisted this assumption for good reason. Designating patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression allows the subjugation of resistance to other forms of oppression like racism and classism to the struggle against sexism. Such subjugation has the effect of denigrating the legitimacy of resistance to racism and classism as struggles of equal importance. "Within feminist movement in the West, this led to the assumption that resisting patriarchal domination is a more legitimate feminist action than resisting racism and other forms of domination" (hooks. Talking Back 19). The relegation of struggles against racism and class exploitation to offspring status is not the only implication of the "sole cause" argument In addition, identifying patriarchy as the single source of oppression obscures women's perpetration of other forms of subjugation and domination, bell hooks argues that we should not obscure the reality that women can and do partici- pate in politics of domination, as perpetrators as well as victims - that we dominate, that we are dominated. If focus on patriarchal domination masks this reality or becomes the means by which women deflect attention from the real conditions and circumstances of our lives, then women cooperate in suppressing and promoting false consciousness, inhibiting our capacity to assume responsibility for transforming ourselves and society (hooks. Talking Back 20). Characterizing patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression allows mainstream feminists to abdicate responsibility for the exercise of class and race privilege. It casts the struggle against class exploitation and racism as secondary concerns. Current debate practice promotes ignorance of these issues because debaters appeal to conventional form, the expectation of judges that they will isolate a single link to a large impact Feminists become feminism and patriarchy becomes the sole cause of all evil. Poor causal arguments arouse and fulfill the expectation of judges by allowing us to surrender our responsibility to evaluate rhetorical proof for complex causal relationships. The result is either the mar-ginalization or colonization of certain feminist voices. Arguing feminism in debate rounds risks trivializing feminists. Privileging the act of speaking about feminism over the content of speech "often turns the voices and beings of non-white women into commodity, spectacle" (hooks, Talking Back 14). Teaching sophisticated causal reasoning enables our students to learn more concerning the subject matter about which they argue. In this case, students would learn more about the multiplicity of feminists instead of reproducing the marginalization of many feminist voices in the debate itself. The content of the speech of feminists must be investigated to subvert the colonization of exploited women. To do so, we must explore alternatives to the formal expectation of single-cause links to enormous impacts for appropriation of the marginal voice threatens the very core of self-determination and free self-expression for exploited and oppressed peoples. If the identified audience, those spoken to, is determined solely by ruling groups who control production and distribution, then it is easy for the marginal voice striving for a hearing to allow what is said to be overdetermined by the needs of that majority group who appears to be listening, to be tuned in (hooks, Talking Back 14). At this point, arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate seem to be overdetermined by the expectation of common practice, the "game" that we play in assuming there is such a thing as a direct and sole causal link to a monolithic impact To play that game, we have gone along with the idea that there is a single feminism and the idea that patriarchal impacts can account for all oppression. In making this critique, I am by no means discounting the importance of arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate. In fact, feminists contain the possibility of a transformational politic for two reasons. First, feminist concerns affect each individual intimately. We are most likely to encounter patriarchal domination "in an ongoing way in everyday life. Unlike other forms of domination, sexism directly shapes and determines relations of power in our private lives, in familiar social spaces..." (hooks. Talking Back 21). Second, the methodology of feminism, consciousness-raising, contains within it the possibility of real societal transformation. "lE]ducation for critical consciousness can be extended to include politicization of the self that focuses on creating understanding the ways sex, race, and class together determine our individual lot and our collective experience” (hooks, Talking Back 24). Observing the incongruity between advocacy of single-cause relationships and feminism does not discount the importance of feminists to individual or societal consciousness raising.

# GENERAL 2AC

**Their critique has no explanatory power, their epistemology arguments are wrong, we don’t exclude anyone, and their alt fails**

**Jarvis 2000** (Darryl, government and international relations, U. of Sydney, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism, “Feminist revisions of international relations,” p. 162-3)

Critical research agendas of this type, however, are not found easily in International Relations. Critics of feminist perspectives run the risk of denouncement as either a misogynist malcontent or an androcentric keeper of the gate. At work in much of this discourse is an unstated political correctness, where the historical marginalization of women bestows intellectual autonomy, excluding those outside the identity group from legitimate participation in its discourse. Only feminist women can do real, legitimate, feminist theory since, in the mantra of identity politics, discourse must emanate from a positional (personal) ontology. Those sensitive or sympathetic to the identity politics of particular groups are, of course, welcome to lend support and encouragement, but only on terms delineated by the groups themselves. In this way, they enjoy an uncontested sovereign hegemony oyer their own self-identification, insuring the group discourse is self constituted and that its parameters, operative methodology, ,uu\ standards of argument, appraisal, and evidentiary provisions are self defined. Thus, for example, when Sylvester calls for a "home steading" does so "by [a] repetitive feminist insistence that we be included on our terms" (my emphasis). Rather than an invitation to engage in dialogue, this is an ultimatum that a sovereign intellectual space be provided and insulated from critics who question the merits of identity-based political discourse. Instead, Sylvester calls upon International Relations to "share space, respect, and trust in a re-formed endeavor," but one otherwise proscribed as committed to demonstrating not only "that the secure homes constructed by IR's many debaters are chimerical," but, as a consequence, to ending International Relations and remaking it along lines grounded in feminist postmodernism.93 Such stipulative provisions might be likened to a form of negotiated sovereign territoriality where, as part of the settlement for the historically aggrieved, border incursions are to be allowed but may not be met with resistance or reciprocity. Demands for entry to the discipline are thus predicated on conditions that insure two sets of rules, cocooning postmodern feminist spaces from systematic analyses while "respecting" this discourse as it hastens about the project of deconstructing International Relations as a "male space." Sylvester's impassioned plea for tolerance and "emphatic cooperation" is thus confined to like-minded individuals, those who do not challenge feminist epistemologies but accept them as a necessary means of reinventing the discipline as a discourse between postmodern identities—the most important of which is gender.94 **Intolerance or misogyny thus become the ironic epithets attached to those who question the wisdom of this reinvention or the merits of the return of identity in international theory**.'"' Most strategic of all, however, demands for entry to the discipline and calls for intellectual spaces betray a self-imposed, politically motivated marginality. After all, where are such calls issued from other than the discipline and the intellectual—and well established—spaces of feminist International Relations? Much like the strategies employed by male dissidents, then, feminist postmodernists too deflect as illegitimate any criticism that derives from skeptics whose vantage points are labeled privileged. And privilege is variously interpreted historically, especially along lines of race, color, and sex where the denotations white and male, to name but two, serve as generational mediums to assess the injustices of past histories. White males, for example, become generic signifiers for historical oppression, indicating an ontologicallv privileged group by which the historical experiences of the "other" can then be reclaimed in the context of their related oppression, exploitation, AND exclusion. Legitimacy, in this context, can then be claimed in terms of one's group identity and the extent to which the history of that particular group has been “silenced.” In this same way, self-identification or “self-situation” establishes one’s credentials, allowing admittance to the group and legitimating the “authoritative” vantage point from which one speaks and writes. Thus, for example, Jan Jindy Pettman includes among the introductory pages to her most recent book, Worlding Women, a section titled “A (personal) politics of location,” in which her identity as a woman, a feminist, and an academic, makes apparent her particular (marginal) identities and group loyalties.96 Similarly, Christine Sylvester, in the introduction to her book, insists, “It is important to provide a context for one’s work in the often-denied politics of the personal.” Accordingly, self-declaration revelas to the reader that she is a feminist, went to a Catholic girls school where she was schooled to “develop your brains and confess something called “sins” to always male forever priests,” and that these provide some pieces to her dynamic objectivity.97 **Like territorial markers, self-identification permits entry to intellectual spaces whose sovereign authority is “policed” as much by marginal subjectivies as they allege of the oppressors who “police” the discourse of realism**, or who are said to walk the corridors of the discipline insuring the replication of patriarchy, hierarchical agendas, and “malestream” theory. If Sylvester’s version of feminist postmodernism is projected as tolerant, perspectivist, and encompassing of a multiplicity of approaches**, in reality it is as selective, exclusionary, and dismissive of alternative perspectives as mainstream approaches are accused of being.** Skillful theoretical moves of this nature underscore the adroitness of postmodern feminist theory at emasculating many of its logical inconsistencies. In arguing for a feminist postmodernism, for example, Sylvester employs a double theoretical move that, on the one hand, invokes a kind of epistemological deconstructive anarchy cum relativism in an attempt to decenter or make insecure fixed research gazes, identities, and concepts (men, women, security, and nation-state), while on the other hand turning to the lived experiences of women as if ontologically given and assuming their experiences to be authentic, real,

[CONTINUED]

# GENERAL 2AC

[CONTINUED]

substantive, and authoritative interpretations of the realities of international relations. Women at the peace camps of Greenham Common or in the cooperatives of Harare, represent, for Sylvester, the real coal face of international politics, their experiences and strategies the real politics of “relations international.” But why should we take the experiences of these women to be ontologically superior or more insightful than the experiences of other women or other men? As Sylvester admits elsewhere, “Experience … is at once always already an interpretation and in need of interpretation.” Why, then are experience-based modes of knowledge more insightful than knowledges derived through other modes of inquiry?98 Such espistemologies are surely crudely positivistic in their singular reliance on osmotic perception of the facts as they impact upon the personal. If, as Sylvester writes, “sceptical inlining draws on substantive everydayness as a time and site of knowledge, much as does everyday feminist theorizing,” and if, as she further notes, “it understands experience…as mobile, indeterminate, hyphenated, [and] homeless,” why should this knowledge be valued as anything other than fleeting subjective perceptions of multiple environmental stimuli whose meaning is beyond explanation other than as a personal narrative?99 Is this what Sylvester means when she calls for a re-visioning and a repainting of the “canvases of IR,” that we dissipate knowledge into an infinitesimal number of disparate sites, all equally valid, and let loose with a mélange of visceral perceptions; stories of how each of us perceive we experience international politics? If this is the case, then Sylvester’s version of feminist postmodernity does not advance our understanding of international politics, leaving untheorized and unexplained the causes of international relations. Personal narratives do not constitute theoretical discourse, nor indeed an explanation of the systemic factors that procure international events, process, or the actions of certain actors. We might also extend a contextualist lens to analyze Sylvester’s formulations, much as she insists her epistemogical approach does. Sylvester, for example, is adamant that we can not really know who “women” are, since to do so would be to invoke an essentialist concept, concealing the diversity inherent in this category. “Women” don’t really exist in Sylvester’s estimation since there are black women, white women, Hispanic, disabled, lesbin, poor, rich, middle class, and illiterate women, to name but a few. The point, for Sylvester, is that to speak of “women” is to do violence to the diversity encapsulated in this category and, in its own way, to silence those women who remain unnamed. Well and good. Yet this same analytical respect for diversity seems lost with men. Politics and international relations become the “places of men.” But which men? All men? Or just white men, or rich, educated, elite, upper class, hetero-sexual men? To speak of political places as the places of men ignores the fact that most men, in fact the overwhelming majority of men, are not in these political places at all, are not decision makers, elite, affluent, or powerful. Much as with Sylvester’s categories, there are poor, lower class, illiterate, gay, black, and white men, many of whom suffer the vestiges of hunger, poverty, despair, and disenfranchisement just as much as women. So why invoke the category “men” in such essentialist and ubiquitous ways while cognizant only of the diversity of in the category “women.” These are double standards, not erudite theoretical formulations, betraying, dare one say, sexism toward men by invoking male gender generalizations and crude caricatures. Problems of this nature, however, are really manifestations of a deeper, underlying ailment endemic to discourses derived from identity politics. At base, the most elemental question for identity discourse, as Zalewski and Enloe note, is “Who am I?”100 The personal becomes the political, evolving a discourse where self-identification, but also one’s identification by others, presupposes multiple identities that are fleeting, overlapping, and changing at any particular moment in time or place. “We have multiple identities,” argues V. Spike Peterson, “e.g., Canadian, homemaker, Jewish, Hispanic, socialist.”101 And these identities are variously depicted as transient, polymorphic, interactive, discursive, and never fixed. As Richard Brown notes, “Identity is given neither institutionally nor biologically. It evolves as one orders continuities on one’s conception of oneself.”102 Yet, if we accept this, the analytical utility of identity politics seems problematic at best. Which identity, for example, do we choose from the many that any one subject might display affinity for? Are we to assume that all identities are of equal importance or that some are more important than others? How do we know which of these identities might be transient and less consequential to one’s sense of self and, in turn, politically significant to understanding international politics? **Why, for example, should we place gender identity ontologically prior to class, sexual orientation, ethnic origin, ideological perspective, or national identity**?103 As Zalewski and Enloe ask, “Why do we consider states to be a major referent? Why not men? Or women?”104 But by the same token, why not dogs, shipping magnates, movie stars, or trade regimes? Why is gender more constitutive of global politics than, say, class, or an identity as a cancer survivor, laborer, or social worker? Most of all, why is gender essentialized in feminist discourse, reified into the most preeminent of all identities as the primary lens through which international relations must be viewed? Perhaps, for example, **people understand difference in the context of identities outside of gender**. As Jane Martin notes, “How do we know that difference…does not turn on being fat or religious or in an abusive relationship?”105 The point, perhaps flippantly made, is that **identity is such a nebulous concept, its meaning so obtuse and so inherently subjective, that it is near meaningless as a conduit for understanding global politics if only because it can mean anything to anybody.**

# ALT FAILS

**Can’t solve patriarchy—attacking any single cause fails to uproot it and biology is the best theory**

**GOLDBERG 99** (Steven, Chairman of the Department of Sociology, City College, City University of New York, “The Logic of Patriarchy,” Gender Issues, Summer 1999)

“Patriarchy is a result of the requirement of a hunting culture, or Christianity, or capitalism, etc.” If it is to be at all persuasive, an explanation of universality must be parsimonious; the explanation must invoke a causal factor common to the varying societies that exhibit the universal institution. Just as the explanation in terms of capitalism fails to explain patriarchy in the many non-capitalist societies, so do explanations in terms of any single factor other than the physiological fail to explain the host of societies for which that factor does not apply. Non-hunting, non-Christian, non-capitalist, etc. societies are all patriarchal. A single-cause theory of the limits constraining every society need not, of course, be the neuroendocrinological one I suggest. But the few alternative parsimonious explanations fail on empirical grounds.

# PERMUTATION

**Permutation solves – working within the existing framework is key**

**Saloom** **2k6** (Rachel, JD Univ of Georgia School of Law and M.A. in Middle Eastern Studies from U of Chicago, *A Feminist Inquiry into International Law and International Relations*, 12 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 159, Fall 2006)

Tickner's last point that deserves further reflection is the notion that international law and international relations will not become free from gender bias as long as we live in a gendered world. This is not to say that small steps are ineffective, but rather that international law and international relations are merely a small part of the larger systemic problem of unequal gender relations. While it is desirable that more women occupy foreign and military policy making positions, this "desire" does not necessarily transform the way international law and international relations work. To allege that this is the case assumes that women have an essential character that can transform the system. This of course is contrary to the very arguments that most gender theorists forward, because it would mean that women have some unique "feminine" perspective. What is needed then is a release from the sole preoccupation on women and men. The state's masculinist nature that gender theorists critique affects everyone in society. Moving beyond the "add and stir" approach is quite difficult, but there must be a starting point from which gender theorists can work. [105](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/scholastic/document?_m=a2ac53a45e1fe17371cdbaa2cf370390&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkVk&_md5=2c8e9aab339ea5ca4d4f4fae4578bb53" \l "n105#n105" \t "_self) If everything is problematized, paralysis will inevitably occur. **Working within the current framework is truly the only option to bring about change.** Lofty abstract criticisms will do nothing to change the practices of international law and international relations. Pragmatic feminist criticisms of international law and international relations, however, should be further developed. Even advocates of realist thought will admit that realism is neither the most accurate nor the only way to view the world. [106](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/scholastic/document?_m=a2ac53a45e1fe17371cdbaa2cf370390&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkVk&_md5=2c8e9aab339ea5ca4d4f4fae4578bb53" \l "n106#n106" \t "_self) The changing dynamics of world politics make formulating new ways of understanding international relations quite pertinent. Keeping some semblance of realism in tact, while at the same time opening up space for theorizing about other possibilities, is necessary. Critics are quick to note that realism cannot be easily abandoned without some sort of alternative framework. Casting aside realism now, even given the concerns of gender scholars, is not the most promising option. Wayman and Diehl note that  [\*180]  "the abandonment of realism leaves a void, which in the short to medium term is at least as much of a dead end as would be the result of following realism." [107](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/scholastic/document?_m=a2ac53a45e1fe17371cdbaa2cf370390&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkVk&_md5=2c8e9aab339ea5ca4d4f4fae4578bb53" \l "n107#n107" \t "_self) **New possibilities can be envisioned while still adhering to some of the realist ideologies.** Wayman and Diehl describe realism as a detour and not a definitive road map. [108](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/scholastic/document?_m=a2ac53a45e1fe17371cdbaa2cf370390&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkVk&_md5=2c8e9aab339ea5ca4d4f4fae4578bb53" \l "n108#n108" \t "_self) Thus, theorists must admit that realism is not the only way or the correct way to view international law and international relations, but it cannot be totally abandoned. Even given all of the criticisms of feminist theories, there must be space, however, for feminist theorization. A pragmatic approach should not dismiss the benefits of theorizing. Discussions and debates on feminism and international law and relations are extremely important. Yet even where feminist discourses lack the social power to realize their versions of knowledge in institutional practices, they can offer the discursive space from which the individual can resist dominant subject positions... Resistance to the dominant at the level of the individual subject is the first stage in the production of alternative forms of knowledge, or, where such alternatives already exist, of winning individuals over to these discourses and gradually increasing their social power. [109](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/scholastic/document?_m=a2ac53a45e1fe17371cdbaa2cf370390&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkVk&_md5=2c8e9aab339ea5ca4d4f4fae4578bb53" \l "n109#n109" \t "_self) Therefore, feminist theorizing is a meaningful first step in the right direction to bring about change and sites of resistance. A pragmatic feminist approach would then take this theorizing to the next level to bring about real change.

# REALISM

**Feminist explanations of international violence are too broad to be theoretically useful–realism is the only alternative**

**LIND 2005** (Michael, Executive Editor of the National Interest, “Of Arms and the Woman,” Jan 20, http://feminism.eserver.org/of-arms-and-the-woman.txt)

Though realist theory can survive, and perhaps even accommodate, many of the arguments of feminism with respect to collective conflict and state sovereignty, realism must reject the third aspect of the feminist criticism: the redefinition of security to mean social justice. From the Marxist left, feminists have picked up the argument that interstate violence is just one genre of "structural violence," which includes the economic oppression of lower classes by upper classes (Marxism) and the subordination of women to men by custom and by violence (feminism). But this notion merely disguises a change of subject as a change of approach. To say that mass rape by soldiers in wartime and wife-beating in societies at peace (excuse me, at "peace") are parts of the same phenomenon is to abandon any pretense of engaging in serious thinking about international relations. The result may be feminist theory, but it is not a theory of world politics. It is a theory of human society in general. When, as in "ecofeminism," the mistreatment of women by men in all societies, in peace and at war, is fused, as a subject of analysis, with the mistreatment of the ecosystem by humanity, one has a theory of everything, and a theory of everything is usually not very much.

# STATE KEY—FRAMEWORK/PERM

**State key to deconstruct patriarchy**

**Harrington 92** (Mona, lawyer, political scientist, and writer in Cambridge, MA, “The Liberal State as an Agent of Feminist Change,” in *Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory*, ed. V. Spike Peterson, pg. 66)

In the face of such pressures, I believe that feminist critics of the present state system should beware. The very fact that the state creates, condenses, and focuses political power may make it the best friend, not the enemy, of feminists--because the availability of real political power is essential to real democratic control. Not sufficient, I know, but essential. My basic premise is that political power can significantly disrupt patriarchal and class (which is to say, economic) power. It holds the potential, at least, for disrupting the patriarchal/economic oppression of those in the lower reaches of class, sex, and race hierarchies. It is indisputable that, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it has been the political power of states that has confronted the massive economic power privately constructed out of industrial processes and has imposed obligations on employers for the welfare of workers as well as providing additional social supports for the population at large. And the political tempering of economic power has been the most responsive to broad public needs in liberal democracies, where governments must respond roughly to the interests of voters.

# SCIENCE TURN

**They say that epistemology precedes other issues—their epistemology undermines science**

**WALBY 2001** Sociology Department, University of Leeds (Sylvia, “Against Epistemological Chasms: The Science Question in Feminism Revisited,” Signs, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Winter, 2001), pp. 485-509, JSTOR)

Feminist standpoint epistemology and postmodern epistemology often rest on a rejection of “science” and “modernist” modes of reasoning as adequate or sufficient for feminist analysis (Harding 1986, 1991; Nicholson 1990). This rejection is not justified. The account of science in such writings is oversimplified. First, science is equated with empiricism, which is then falsely conflated with positivism (Harding 1991), the neglect of the sophisticated and diverse rold and nature of reflexive theorization. Second, science is described as monolithic (Haraway 1988), when it is actually internally divided, full of contestation, and subject to change as a result of challenges. Third, science is caricatured as absolutist, as claiming to have discovered the truth about nature and society, despite its internal debates and its continual replacement of old theories with new. Contemporary sociology and philosophy of science undermine these accounts of science as monolithic and absolutist (Quine 1960; Latour 1987, 1993). Fourth, modernist modes of reasoning are often smuggled in unrecognized through the back door (McLennan 1995), since they are actually indispensable for argumentation and in order to avoid the problem of relativism.

**Critiquing technology based on the social forces that surround it still amounts to total rejection**

**HUGHES 2006** (James, Ph.D., Public Policy Studies at Trinity College, “Democratic Transhumanism 2.0,” Last Mod Jan 26, http://www.changesurfer.com/Acad/DemocraticTranshumanism.htm)

First, left Luddism inappropriately equates technologies with the power relations around those technologies. Technologies do not determine power relations, they merely create new terrains for organizing and struggle. Most new technologies open up new possibilities for both expanded liberty and equality, just as they open new opportunities for oppression and exploitation. Since the technologies will most likely not be stopped, democrats need to engage with them, articulate policies that maximize social benefits from the technologies, and find liberatory uses for the technologies. If biotechnology is to be rejected simply because it is a product of capitalism, adopted in class society, then every technology must be rejected. The mission of the Left is to assert democratic control and priorities over the development and implementation of technology. But establishing democratic control over technological innovation is not the same as Luddism. In fact, to the extent that advocates for the democratic control of technology do not guarantee benefits from technology, and attempt to suppress technology altogether, they will lose public support.

**Nature sucks and it’s constantly trying to kill us—we should forget harmony with the earth and use technology to transcend humanity to a better future**

**DE MAGALHÃES 2008** (João Pedro, Lecturer in the School of Biological Sciences at the University of Liverpool in England [equivalent to an assistant professor in the US system], “>H: The Sky Is the Limit,” http://jp.senescence.info/thoughts/transhumanism.html)

Humans are not a finished product; we are evolving organisms, waiting for the right conditions to blossom. We can and we must evolve beyond natural and biological limits. It is our destiny. Contra naturam, the defiance of Nature, has lead us to increase our quality of life and longevity. In fact, Nature has committed countless crimes against humanity: plagues and diseases, earthquakes and floods, pests, poisonous plants, and aging; Nature created us to suffer and die. In fact, if it wasn't for Dr. Fleming's penicillin, I would be naturally dead because I had pneumonia when I was a child. It went against Nature and I'm happy for it. We have been and will continue to fight and adapt Nature using our technology and intelligence. (By "fighting Nature," I don't mean destroying the rainforest. I actually support conservation efforts and I think we can learn much from other species. What I mean is that the human condition should supplant, like it does to some degree, what Nature intended for us humans.) When we win the battle against Nature we will not be humans anymore, we will be better than humans. At present, our top priority must be to fight aging, but if we can achieve such lofty goal, we will have a world of opportunities to upgrade ourselves using genetics, cybernetics, and nanotechnology.

**Solves their K—and everything else**

**BOSTROM 2009** (Nick, Oxford University, Faculty of Philosophy, The Global Spiral, Feb 5, http://www.metanexus.net/magazine/tabid/68/id/10687/Default.aspx)

The prospect of posthumanity is feared for at least two reasons. One is that the state of being posthuman might in itself be degrading, so that by becoming posthuman we might be harming ourselves. Another is that posthumans might pose a threat to “ordinary” humans. (I shall set aside a third possible reason, that the development of posthumans might offend some supernatural being.) The most prominent bioethicist to focus on the first fear is Leon Kass: Most of the given bestowals of nature have their given species-specified natures: they are each and all of a given sort. Cockroaches and humans are equally bestowed but differently natured. To turn a man into a cockroach—as we don’t need Kafka to show us—would be dehumanizing. To try to turn a man into more than a man might be so as well. We need more than generalized appreciation for nature’s gifts. We need a particular regard and respect for the special gift that is our own given nature.5 Transhumanists counter that nature’s gifts are sometimes poisoned and should not always be accepted. Cancer, malaria, dementia, aging, starvation, unnecessary suffering, cognitive shortcomings are all among the presents that we wisely refuse. Our own species-specified natures are a rich source of much of the thoroughly unrespectable and unacceptable—susceptibility for disease, murder, rape, genocide, cheating, torture, racism. The horrors of nature in general and of our own nature in particular are so well documented6 that it is astonishing that somebody as distinguished as Leon Kass should still in this day and age be tempted to rely on the natural as a guide to what is desirable or normatively right. We should be grateful that our ancestors were not swept away by the Kassian sentiment, or we would still be picking lice off each other’s backs. Rather than deferring to the natural order, transhumanists maintain that we can legitimately reform ourselves and our natures in accordance with humane values and personal aspirations.

# SCIENCE: UNIQUENESS

**The Transhumanist movement is rapidly growing—now is the key time to shape the debate over a Posthuman future**

**BOSTROM 2003** (Nick, Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford University, “Transhumanism FAQ,” October,

http://www.transhumanism.org/index.php/WTA/faq21/80/)

In the past couple of years, the transhumanist movement has been growing fast and furiously. Local groups are mushrooming in all parts of the world. Awareness of transhumanist ideas is spreading. Transhumanism is undergoing the transition from being the preoccupation of a fringe group of intellectual pioneers to becoming a mainstream approach to understanding the prospects for technological transformation of the human condition. That technological advances will help us overcome many of our current human limitations is no longer an insight confined to a few handfuls of techno-savvy visionaries. Yet understanding the consequences of these anticipated possibilities and the ethical choices we will face is a momentous challenge that humanity will be grappling with over the coming decades. The transhumanist tradition has produced a (still evolving) body of thinking to illuminate these complex issues that is unparalleled in its scope and depth of foresight.

# SCIENCE: LINK EXT

**Their epistemology undermines public acceptance of science and technology**

**RAMAN 2009** (Varadaraja, Bachelor's and Master's degrees in Physics and Mathematics from the University of Calcutta before doing his doctoral work on the foundations of quantum mechanics at the University of Paris Global Spiral, Jan 23, http://www.metanexus.net/Magazine/ArticleDetail/tabid/68/id/10678/Default.aspx)

Next there are philosophical reasons for the anti-science movements, formulated by thinkers who bring their full logical prowess to show that a framework based on logic alone is untenable. They explore the flaws in the foundations of scientific thinking, and question science's claim to hold monopoly for a correct interpretation of the natural world. These are interesting perspectives in the academic arena, but when they spill over to the general public and uproot the public's respect for science, they can cause serious damage to the framework of reason and rationality in which science operates in its interpretation of the world. When reason and rationality are devalued or are equated with unreason in our pursuit to explain the world, superstition and mindless magic can take over with serious adverse impacts on society. Societies which are persuaded that rationality can be dispensed with can do immense harm to their peoples. In this sense philosophical anti-science is perhaps the most dangerous of all.

**Our link is more than just “tech good”—we should intervene massively in nature and view it only as a means to human ends**

**TIROSH-SAMUELSON 2008** (Hava, Prof of History at Arizona State, “Engaging Transhumanism: The Meaning of Being Human,” A paper prepared for the “Transhumanism and the Meanings of Progress” workshop, ASU, Tempe, AZ, April 24-25, 2008, Published 2008.06.05, http://www.metanexus.net/magazine/tabid/68/id/10547/Default.aspx)

Placing the unlimited human potential (rather than the human as a currently lived experience) at the center of its outlook, transhumanism is also critical of contemporary environmentalism and its concern for respect toward other species and its resistance to massive human intervention in nature, through bioengineering of plants, heavy logging, industrial pollution, unrestricted consumerism, and many other undesirable activities. Dismissing any attempt to draw ethical conclusions from natural facts, as “the Naturalistic Fallacy,” transhumanism does not take anything in nature to be sacred or especially worthy of preservation or conservation. To the extent that biology places restrictions on human freedom and the human built-in will to evolve, these obstacles should and must be removed. Only humans could transcend their biology because of the complexity of the human brain which has reached a level of complexity to a degree unknown in other animals. From a transhumanist perspective, radical environmentalism is misguided because it erases the moral differences between humans and other animals and because it invests nature with inherent moral values. The evolutionary process is not directionless but purposeful, life is not an accident but an evolutionary inevitability, and humanity is “not a twig on the bush of life, but the peak of evolutionary complexification on earth due to the incredible power of the human brain.”8 Actualizing this remarkable potential through science and technology will enhance human freedom and release humanity from the bondage of biology.

**Standpoint epistemology links**

**RAMAN 2008** (Varadaraja, Bachelor's and Master's degrees in Physics and Mathematics from the University of Calcutta before doing his doctoral work on the foundations of quantum mechanics at the University of Paris Global Spiral, Nov 22, http://www.metanexus.net/Magazine/ArticleDetail/tabid/68/id/10661/Default.aspx)

In this context, some scholarly spokeswomen have put forward theories that not many in the scientific establishment (which includes many women) accept. Sandra Harding, a formidable pioneer among them, wrote an influential book (Whose Science, Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women’s Lives, 1991)in which she developed the notion of what she calls feminist standpoint epistemology. In essence, it says that because women have had gender-specific experiences such as suffering and being oppressed, they are privy to truths which are beyond the grasp of men. Therefore their perspectives will enrich science, and make it achieve an objectivity that is beyond its scope without women's participation in the scientific enterprise. She presents the thesis that there are two kinds of objectivity, weak and strong. Weak objectivity has as its goal an amoral, uninvolved, cold and unconnected knowledge. In weak objectivity, all kinds of social interests and values are eliminated in scientific activity. But, she goes on to argue, "not all social values and interests have the same bad effects upon the results of research. Some have systematically generated less partial and distorted beliefs than others." Strong objectivity, on the other hand, involves "anti-authoritarianism, anti-elitism, and anti-domination tendencies," and has "increased the objectivity of science and will continue to do so." Two things may be said about this thesis which many scientists would regard as unacceptable, if not preposterous. However, it is more fair to say that Harding's thesis, which, in her terminology, is a strong objective analysis, becomes relevant in some fields like psychology, cultural anthropology, history, and the like, where factors affecting the human condition come into play. But it is irrelevant, and has the potential for much confusion, in the physical sciences. Harding also feels that the marginalized of the world, by which she means all of humanity save white males, should join hands and enter the white male dominated citadel of science in order to make it better. For her, "The paradigm models of objective science are those studies explicitly directed by morality and politically emancipatory interests - that is, by interests in eliminating sexist, racist, classicist (sic), and culturally coercive understandings of nature and social life." From the enlightenment point of view, the first part of the call is sound: One and all, irrespective of race and gender, must join the enterprise of science which is admittedly dominated by white males today. This can only make science even more fruitful than what it has been thus far. But the claim that the marginalized status of people would somehow reveal to them deeper insights or enable them to make greater discoveries, though it sounds like the Blessed are the meek line in the Sermon of the Mount, carries little weight in actuality. Arrogant white males could argue that without the participation of women and the marginalized, they have done quite well, thank you, and that while everyone is heartily welcome, no one group is particularly more essential for the progress of science than any other. Whether or not one makes contributions to science depends on factors like one's commitment to the field, one's hard work, one's intelligence, and in some cases even one's luck, and the like, and these are fairly independent of whether or not one has been oppressed or marginalized in society or history. The fact of the matter is, notwithstanding such interesting theorizing, it is workers in the lab and in research centers - male and female, white and otherwise - who make real contributions to science. The scientific discoveries and contributions of prolific philosophers who write and lecture about what science is or ought to be, have generally been minimal, if not non-existent.

# SCIENCE: IMPACT EXT

**Critiquing science kills billions—the solution to environmental collapse is more technology, not less**

**BOSTROM 2003** (Nick, Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford University, “Transhumanism FAQ,” October,

http://www.transhumanism.org/index.php/WTA/faq21/70/)

Population increase is an issue we would ultimately have to come to grips with even if healthy life-extension were not to happen. Leaving people to die is an unacceptable solution. A large population should not be viewed simply as a problem. Another way of looking at the same fact is that it means that many persons now enjoy lives that would not have been lived if the population had been smaller. One could ask those who complain about overpopulation exactly which people’s lives they would have preferred should not have been led. Would it really have been better if billions of the world’s people had never existed and if there had been no other people in their place? Of course, this is not to deny that too-rapid population growth can cause crowding, poverty, and the depletion of natural resources. In this sense there can be real problems that need to be tackled. How many people the Earth can sustain at a comfortable standard of living is a function of technological development (as well as of how resources are distributed). New technologies, from simple improvements in irrigation and management, to better mining techniques and more efficient power generation machinery, to genetically engineered crops, can continue to improve world resource and food output, while at the same time reducing environmental impact and animal suffering. Environmentalists are right to insist that the status quo is unsustainable. As a matter of physical necessity, things cannot stay as they are today indefinitely, or even for very long. If we continue to use up resources at the current pace, without finding more resources or learning how to use novel kinds of resources, then we will run into serious shortages sometime around the middle of this century. The deep greens have an answer to this: they suggest we turn back the clock and return to an idyllic pre-industrial age to live in sustainable harmony with nature. The problem with this view is that the pre-industrial age was anything but idyllic. It was a life of poverty, misery, disease, heavy manual toil from dawn to dusk, superstitious fears, and cultural parochialism. Nor was it environmentally sound – as witness the deforestation of England and the Mediterranean region, desertification of large parts of the middle east, soil depletion by the Anasazi in the Glen Canyon area, destruction of farm land in ancient Mesopotamia through the accumulation of mineral salts from irrigation, deforestation and consequent soil erosion by the ancient Mexican Mayas, overhunting of big game almost everywhere, and the extinction of the dodo and other big featherless birds in the South Pacific. Furthermore, it is hard to see how more than a few hundred million people could be maintained at a reasonable standard of living with pre-industrial production methods, so some ninety percent of the world population would somehow have to vanish in order to facilitate this nostalgic return. Transhumanists propose a much more realistic alternative: not to retreat to an imagined past, but to press ahead as intelligently as we can. The environmental problems that technology creates are problems of intermediary, inefficient technology, of placing insufficient political priority on environmental protection as well as of a lack of ecological knowledge. Technologically less advanced industries in the former Soviet-bloc pollute much more than do their advanced Western counterparts. High-tech industry is typically relatively benign. Once we develop molecular nanotechnology, we will not only have clean and efficient manufacturing of almost any commodity, but we will also be able to clean up much of the mess created by today’s crude fabrication methods. This would set a standard for a clean environment that today’s traditional environmentalists could scarcely dream of.

# SCIENCE: SOLVES K

**Transhumanism solves their K**

**WORLD TRANSHUMANIST ASSOCIATION 2008** (“Women’s & Reproductive Rights Advocates,” http://www.transhumanism.org/index.php/WTA/communities/reprorights/)

Women have struggled for a century to secure their right to use medical technology to control their own bodies, from contraception and abortion to birthing contracts and home pregnancy diagnosis kits. Feminists have had good reasons to be suspicious of the patriarchal practices of obstetrics, and the assumptions behind reproductive medicine. The feminist critique has helped women to take more control over their reproductive decisions and be more assertive with the health care system. Today technologies also allow women to ensure the health and characteristics of her future children. But some feminists are balking at these new technologies of self-determination, and are fighting the inclusion of genetic and reproductive technology as a part of “reproductive rights.” As Marcy Darnovsky of the Center for Genetics and Society says “It will take focused effort to make it clear that altering the genes of one’s children is not among the reproductive rights for which so many women and women’s organizations have struggled.” Some feminists, such as women’s health activist Judy Norsigian, have joined forces with religious anti-abortion groups to oppose reproductive technology and germinal choice. These bioconservative feminists refuse to acknowledge any connection between a reproductive right to abortion, which they defend, and a right to use reproductive technologies such as germinal choice, which they want to deny. In their fear of technology these bioconservative feminists have forgotten the danger of allowing the state to dictate to parents which children they are and aren’t allowed to have, the danger of coercive eugenics and anti-choice forces. According to Luisa Cabal, deputy director of the international legal program of the New York-based Center for Reproductive Rights and an expert on reproductive rights in Latin America, “What we’re seeing is conservative groups using the law in any way they can to place obstacles to women’s choices. This is not an isolated case. It is part of an articulated legal strategy, attacking the same legal foundation that upholds other women’s rights and trying to mislead the courts into saying that the international law protects the right to life of the fetus.” According to Cabal, an international effort needs to be launched to defend access to assisted reproductive technologies on the grounds of the right to form a family, the right to privacy, the right to reproductive self-determination and the right to benefit from scientific progress. Transhumanists stand shoulder to shoulder with those who want to ensure the full protection of women’s and reproductive rights, including the right of women to use conceptive, contraceptive, reproductive and germinal choice technologies.

# STATE/MILITARY TURN

**Feminism leads to the elimination of society and the state – results in extinction**

**Nyquist 2k5** (J.R., Feminism and the Defense of the West, Geopolitical Weekly Column, 6/10/05, <http://www.financialsensearchive.com/stormwatch/geo/pastanalysis/2005/0610.html>)

As traditionalist stereotyping breaks down in the face of newly empowered feminist ideas, conservative thinkers (like Patrick J. Buchanan) decry the disintegration of the family and the West’s falling birth rate. In his book, [The Death of the West](http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0312302592/qid=1118387537/sr=8-1/ref=pd_csp_1/104-0354924-5168706?v=glance&s=books&n=507846), Buchanan blames feminism as a creed that opposes traditional marriage, large families and motherhood. If the preservation of Western civilization were up to the feminists, Western Man would have no future, wrote Buchanan. In short, the rise of feminism spells the death of the nation and the end of the West. According to Buchanan, feminism has a destructive potential akin to nuclear and biological weapons. Buchanan quotes Katerina Runske’s statement that feminism is a Darwinian blind alley. Some conservatives blame feminism for triggering an irreversible decline in the Western birth rate. If present trends continue, societies that oppose feminism will supplant societies that adopt feminism. Consequently, feminism is a doomed ideology because feminism leads to the elimination of the society that emancipates women from motherhood and childrearing. A feminist might answer in two ways: (1) most women will choose a traditional role. Let those who wish to follow a different path have their freedom; (2) make feminism triumphant in all societies. Lead it to victory in Mexico, India and the Arab world. Make the birth rate fall in every country, so that the anti-feminist nations won’t overtake the West. With the obvious and rapid decline of motherhood in the West, the first point evades the issue of falling birth rates. As for the second, there are two problems with feminist imperialism: (1) How many armies, and how many battles, and how much blood would flow to impose feminist values on Arab, Hindu and Latin patriarchies; (2) at the end of the day, with the global imposition of feminism, the birth rate of every tribe would fall and the human race itself would dwindle. The freedom of the woman from motherhood is the freedom to deny procreation. How can society, let alone civilization, survive this type of freedom when the birth rate falls below that of replacement (as it already has in some Western countries). Even if we admit that woman would be happier without children, the biological circumstances of the species as well as national competition demand motherhood (just as it demands mass military conscription at times of grave national danger). Therefore, the humanistic correctness of feminism has a self-negating aspect. What significance would feminism have if the feminist creed leads to national or ethnic extinction? If this is hyperbole, then look to the more obvious multiplication of one nation while another remains numerically stagnant. The facts are these: wherever feminism takes hold the birth rate falls. Ergo, the future belongs to those nations that oppose feminist innovations.

# STATE/MILITARY: EXT

**Patriarchy key to heg and the economy**

**Longman 6** (Phillip Longman is a Senior Research Fellow @ the New America Foundation, “The Return of Patriarchy,” March 1)

"If we could survive without a wife, citizens of Rome, all of us would do without that nuisance." So proclaimed the Roman general, statesman, and censor Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, in 131 B.C. Still, he went on to plead, falling birthrates required that Roman men fulfill their duty to reproduce, no matter how irritating Roman women might have become. "Since nature has so decreed that we cannot manage comfortably with them, nor live in any way without them, we must plan for our lasting preservation rather than for our temporary pleasure." With the number of human beings having increased more than six-fold in the past 200 years, the modern mind simply assumes that men and women, no matter how estranged, will always breed enough children to grow the population -- at least until plague or starvation sets in. It is an assumption that not only conforms to our long experience of a world growing ever more crowded, but which also enjoys the endorsement of such influential thinkers as Thomas Malthus and his many modern acolytes. Yet, for more than a generation now, well-fed, healthy, peaceful populations around the world have been producing too few children to avoid population decline. That is true even though dramatic improvements in infant and child mortality mean that far fewer children are needed today (only about 2.1 per woman in modern societies) to avoid population loss. Birthrates are falling far below replacement levels in one country after the next -- from China, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea, to Canada, the Caribbean, all of Europe, Russia, and even parts of the Middle East. Fearful of a future in which the elderly outnumber the young, many governments are doing whatever they can to encourage people to have children. Singapore has sponsored "speed dating" events, in hopes of bringing busy professionals together to marry and procreate. France offers generous tax incentives for those willing to start a family. In Sweden, the state finances day care to ease the tension between work and family life. Yet, though such explicitly pronatal policies may encourage people to have children at a younger age, there is little evidence they cause people to have more children than they otherwise would. As governments going as far back as imperial Rome have discovered, when cultural and economic conditions discourage parenthood, not even a dictator can force people to go forth and multiply. Throughout the broad sweep of human history, there are many examples of people, or classes of people, who chose to avoid the costs of parenthood. Indeed, falling fertility is a recurring tendency of human civilization. Why then did humans not become extinct long ago? The short answer is patriarchy. Patriarchy does not simply mean that men rule. Indeed, it is a particular value system that not only requires men to marry but to marry a woman of proper station. It competes with many other male visions of the good life, and for that reason alone is prone to come in cycles. Yet before it degenerates, it is a cultural regime that serves to keep birthrates high among the affluent, while also maximizing parents' investments in their children. No advanced civilization has yet learned how to endure without it. Through a process of cultural evolution, societies that adopted this particular social system -- which involves far more than simple male domination -- maximized their population and therefore their power, whereas those that didn't were either overrun or absorbed. This cycle in human history may be obnoxious to the enlightened, but it is set to make a comeback. The Conservative Baby Boom **The historical relation between patriarchy, population, and power has deep implications** for our own time. As the United States is discovering today in Iraq, population is still power. Smart bombs, laser-guided missiles, and unmanned drones may vastly extend the violent reach of a hegemonic power. But ultimately, it is often the number of boots on the ground that changes history. Even with a fertility rate near replacement level, the United States lacks the amount of people necessary to sustain an imperial role in the world, just as Britain lost its ability to do so after its birthrates collapsed in the early 20th century. For countries such as China, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain, in which one-child families are now the norm, the quality of human capital may be high, but it has literally become too rare to put at risk. Falling fertility is also responsible for many financial and economic problems that dominate today's headlines. The long-term financing of social security schemes, private pension plans, and healthcare systems has little to do with people living longer. Gains in life expectancy at older ages have actually been quite modest, and the rate of improvement in the United States has diminished for each of the last three decades. Instead, the falling ratio of workers to retirees is overwhelmingly caused by workers who were never born. As governments raise taxes on a dwindling working-age population to cover the growing burdens of supporting the elderly, young couples may conclude they are even less able to afford children than their parents were, thereby setting off a new cycle of population aging and decline. Declining birthrates also change national temperament. In the United States, for example, the percentage of women born in the late 1930s who remained childless was near 10 percent. By comparison, nearly 20 percent of women born in the late 1950s are reaching the end of their reproductive lives without having had children. The greatly expanded childless segment of contemporary society, whose members are drawn disproportionately from the feminist and countercultural movements of the 1960s and 70s, will leave no genetic legacy. Nor will their emotional or psychological influence on the next generation compare with that of their parents. Meanwhile, single-child families are prone to extinction. A single child replaces one of his or her parents, but not both. Nor do single-child families contribute much to future population. The 17.4 percent of baby boomer women who had only one child account for a mere 7.8 percent of children born in the next generation. By contrast, nearly a quarter of the children of baby boomers descend from the mere 11 percent of baby boomer women who had four or more children. These circumstances are leading to the emergence of a new society whose members will disproportionately be descended from parents who rejected the social tendencies that once made childlessness and small families the norm. These values include an adherence to traditional, patriarchal religion, and a strong identification with one's own folk or nation.

# INTERSECTIONALITY TURN

**A. The alternative’s universalizing nature is exclusionary**

**Crenshaw 89**- Prof. of Law at Ucal Los Angeles (Kimberle Crenshaw, Acting professor of law at University of California. Los Angeles Law School Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics

The value of feminist theory to Black women is diminished because it evolves from a white racial context that is seldom acknowledged. Not only are women of color in fact overlooked, but **their exclusion is reinforced when white women speak for and as women. The authoritative universal voice**—usually white male subjectivity masquerading as non-racial, non-gendered objectivity—is merely transferred to those who, but for gender, share many of the same cultural, economic and social characteristics. When feminist theory attempts to describe women's experiences through analyzing patriarchy, sexuality, or separate spheres ideol- ogy, it often overlooks the role of race. Feminists thus ignore how their own race functions to mitigate some aspects of sexism and, moreover, how it often privileges them over and contributes to the domination of other women.35 Consequently, feminist theory re- mains white, and its potential to broaden and deepen its analysis by addressing non-privileged women remains unrealized

**B. This dooms the K—only differentiating the ways in which patriarchal violence is located can create true solidarity**

**Noh 2k3** (Eliza, assistant professor of Asian American studies at California State University, Fullerton, *Problematics of Transnational Feminism for Asian American Women*, The New Centennial Review 3.3, Project Muse)

I would like to investigate briefly the desire fueling transnational feminism's attempt to create alliances across boundaries, by looking at the ramifications of travel as elaborated in transnational feminist theories. In an era of cyberspace and jet travel, defining one's location [18](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/new_centennial_review/v003/3.3noh.html" \l "FOOT18#FOOT18) can demystify notions of difference and similarity associated with postmodernist accounts of border-crossing (Kaplan 1994, 138). But when I think of what a feminist colleague said to me about the apparent academic anachronism of "1980s women-of-color feminist identity politics," after the arrival of postmodern feminist "identity deconstructionism," I glimpse the backlash against Third-World women's organizing, [19](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/new_centennial_review/v003/3.3noh.html" \l "FOOT19#FOOT19) and the limits of simply questioning one's location as one travels without addressing the continuing material and subjective barriers that differentiate at least a vast half of the world's population. If identity politics represent "essentialist," and therefore politically "unsophisticated" tools for making interpersonal connections, compared to the mechanisms of self-critique implicit in fluid, postmodern identities, what happens after deconstruction? Does historicizing location make travel [End Page 142] easier while subjective and material barriers remain? I was reminded of this distance, if not rupture, in subjectivity and experience [20](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/new_centennial_review/v003/3.3noh.html" \l "FOOT20#FOOT20) by the reactions of white feminists at an international women's studies conference where I first presented this paper. I watched their facial expressions change from amusement to disdain as they realized I was propounding the importance of Asian feminist nationalism as a critique of "transnational" feminist erasures. While the few Asian women in the room expressed agreement with my ideas, I was not surprised that in this instance, like many others, some white women "just didn't get it." We must deconstruct and historicize the reasons for our divergences, but it seems that crossing lines would necessitate overcoming, in actuality, those histories of subjective and material barriers. This remains an incredibly difficult task, since people are so entrenched in their material and subjective (conscious and unconscious) investments in relations of power. In my opinion, oppositional identity politics continue to be necessary insofar as intersubjectivity operates purely as an intellectual exercise, and not as an active commitment to destroying the hegemony of certain cultural egos. As Moraga (1983) states, we must decide to "make faith a reality and to bring all of our selves to bear down hard on that reality" (xix). Making international connections and mobilizations is important to Asian American women concerned with progressive theory and practice because our lives are already linked with other national contexts through imperialism, migration, labor, race, and culture. Therefore, feminist nationalist consciousness cannot afford to take a myopic approach to issues that seem to affect us only within the national, domestic sphere. Neither can Asian American cultural struggle take a transcendental view of internationalism, for often official state nationalisms collude, serving state interests in the name of internationalism or transnationalism. A similar warning can be made about transnational feminist projects, which must be grounded through tracking histories of cultural difference and rupture. Without a critical eye honed from collective cultural experiences of material conditions, the commitment to a different practice of feminism cannot seem to move beyond a superficial level of emotional investment.

# INTERSECTIONALITY EXT

**The alt essentializes**

**Mueller 01**- BA and MA IR at UNT (Eric Muelller, December 2001, “The Terministic Filter of Security: Realism, Feminism, and International Relations Theory” <http://www.library.unt.edu/theses/open/20013/mueller_eric/thesis.pdf>)

Others (Jones 410) have accused feminist authors of their own version of essentialism, arguing the “is-ness” of alternative vocabularies at the exclusion of realist interpretations of politics. Many feminists do contend that cooperation is human nature while competition is not necessarily critical to the human endeavor. Consider this: a baby entering the world cannot survive without cooperation, but will perish if there is too much competition for resources. Indeed, in nature the lack of competition causes species 98 to thrive. Thus some feminists make the essentialist claim that the feminine standpoint is superior and logically prior to the competitive vision of human nature.

**View their K with skepticism—distorted views of sex and race**

**Crenshaw 89**- Prof. of Law at Ucal Los Angeles (Kimberle Crenshaw, Acting professor of law at University of California. Los Angeles Law School Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics

This focus on the most privileged group members marginalizes those who are multiply-burdened and obscures claims that cannot be understood as resulting from discrete sources of discrimination. I suggest further that this focus on otherwise-privileged group members creates a distorted analysis of racism and sexism because the operative conceptions of race and sex become grounded in experiences that actually represent only a subset of a much more complex phenomenon.

**Alternative ignores racism**

**Crenshaw 89**- Prof. of Law at Ucal Los Angeles (Kimberle Crenshaw, Acting professor of law at University of California. Los Angeles Law School Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics

Because ideological and descriptive definitions of patriarchy are usually premised upon white female experiences, feminists and others informed by feminist literature may make the mistake of assuming that since the role of Black women in the family and in other Black institutions does not always resemble the familiar manifestations of patriarchy in the white community, Black women are somehow exempt from patriarchal norms. For example, Black women have traditionally worked outside the home in num- bers far exceeding the labor participation rate of white women.42 An analysis of patriarchy that highlights the history of white women's exclusion from the workplace might permit the inference that Black women have not been burdened by this particular gen- der-based expectation. Yet the very fact that Black women must work conflicts with norms that women should not, often creating personal, emotional and relationship problems in Black women's lives. Thus, Black women are burdened not only because they often have to take on responsibilities that are not traditionally feminine but, moreover, their assumption of these roles is some- times interpreted within the Black community as either Black women's failure to live up to such norms or as another manifestation of racism's scourge upon the Black community.43 This is one of the many aspects of intersectionality that cannot be understood through an analysis of patriarchy rooted in white experience.

**Ignoring intersectionality takes out alternative solvency**

**Crenshaw 89**- Prof. of Law at Ucal Los Angeles (Kimberle Crenshaw, Acting professor of law at University of California. Los Angeles Law School Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics

To bring this back to a non-metaphorical level, I am suggesting that Black women can experience discrimination in ways that are both similar to and different from those experienced by white women and Black men. Black women sometimes experience discrimination in ways similar to white women's experiences; some- times they share very similar experiences with Black men. Yet often they experience double-discrimination—the combined effects of practices which discriminate on the basis of race, and on the basis of sex. And sometimes, they experience discrimination as Black women—not the sum of race and sex discrimination, but as Black women. Black women's experiences are much broader than the general categories that discrimination discourse provides. Yet the continued insistence that Black women's demands and needs be filtered through categorical analyses that completely obscure their experiences guarantees that their needs will seldom be addressed.

# A2: TRANSHUMANISM BAD

**We embrace democratic Transhumanism—every individual who endorses our project makes human survival more likely—Transhumanism is the best way to solve all problems and violence present and future**

**BOSTROM 2003** (Nick, Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford University, “Transhumanism FAQ,” October, http://www.transhumanism.org/index.php/WTA/faq21/69/)

3.5 Shouldn’t we concentrate on current problems … such as improving the situation of the poor, rather than putting our efforts into planning for the “far” future? We should do both. Focusing solely on current problems would leave us unprepared for the new challenges that we will encounter. Many of the technologies and trends that transhumanists discuss are already reality. Biotechnology and information technology have transformed large sectors of our economies. The relevance of transhumanist ethics is manifest in such contemporary issues as stem cell research, genetically modified crops, human genetic therapy, embryo screening, end of life decisions, enhancement medicine, information markets, and research funding priorities. The importance of transhumanist ideas is likely to increase as the opportunities for human enhancement proliferate. Transhuman technologies will tend to work well together and create synergies with other parts of human society. For example, one important factor in healthy life expectancy is access to good medical care. Improvements in medical care will extend healthy, active lifespan – “healthspan” – and research into healthspan extension is likely to benefit ordinary care. Work on amplifying intelligence has obvious applications in education, decision-making, and communication. Better communications would facilitate trade and understanding between people. As more and more people get access to the Internet and are able to receive satellite radio and television broadcasts, dictators and totalitarian regimes may find it harder to silence voices of dissent and to control the information flow in their populations. And with the Internet and email, people discover they can easily form friendships and business partnerships in foreign countries. A world order characterized by peace, international cooperation, and respect for human rights would much improve the odds that the potentially dangerous applications of some future technologies can be controlled and would also free up resources currently spent on military armaments, some of which could then hopefully be diverted to improving the condition of the poor. Nanotechnological manufacturing promises to be both economically profitable and environmentally sound. Transhumanists do not have a patent solution to achieve these outcomes, any more than anybody else has, but technology has a huge role to play. An argument can be made that the most efficient way of contributing to making the world better is by participating in the transhumanist project. This is so because the stakes are enormous – humanity’s entire future may depend on how we manage the coming technological transitions – and because relatively few resources are at the present time being devoted to transhumanist efforts. Even one extra person can still make a significant difference here.

**Even if Transhumanism is dangerous, it’s the best alternative—it improves human intelligence and morality—the impact is extinction**

**WALKER 2009** (Mark, assistant professor at New Mexico State University and holds the Richard L. Hedden Chair of Advanced Philosophical Studies, “Ship of Fools: Why Transhumanism is the Best Bet to Prevent the Extinction of Civilization ,” The Global Spiral, Feb 5, http://www.metanexus.net/magazine/tabid/68/id/10682/Default.aspx)

Option: transhumanism future. The transhumanist future is one where both world-engineering and person-engineering are permitted. Specifically, as noted, the transhumanist view is that we should create persons who are smarter and more virtuous than we are. The application to our problem is obvious: our fears about the misuse of 21st century technology reduce down to fears about stupidity or viciousness. Like the Australian research scientists, the worry is that we may be the authors of an accident, but this time one of apocalyptic proportions: the end of civilization. Likewise, our moral natures may also cause our demise. Or, to put a more positive spin on it, the best candidates amongst us to lead civilization through such perilous times are the brightest and most virtuous: posthumans.17 It is worth pointing out that there is no need to deny what Fukuyama claims: there are real dangers in creating posthumans. The problem with the transhumanist project, says Fukuyama, comes when we think seriously about what characteristics to change: Our good characteristics are intimately connected to our bad ones: If we weren’t violent and aggressive, we wouldn’t be able to defend ourselves; if we didn’t have feelings of exclusivity, we wouldn’t be loyal to those close to us; if we never felt jealousy, we would never feel love. Even morality plays a critical function in allowing our species as a whole to survive and adapt…. Modifying any one of our key characteristics inevitably entails modifying a complex, interlinked package of traits, and we will never be able to anticipate the ultimate outcome.18 So, although Fukuyama sees the pull of transhumanism, how it might look “downright reasonable”, the fact that traits we might hope to modify are interconnected means that “we will never be able to anticipate the ultimate outcome.” What Fukuyama fails to address in any systematic way is the fact that there are even greater dangers associated with not creating posthumans. So, a prudential and moral reason for creating posthumans is not that this is without risk, rather, it is less risky than the alternative here: steady-as-she-goes. If forced to put some hard numbers to these scenarios, I would venture to suggest there is a 90% chance of civilization surviving the next two centuries if we follow the transhumanist path, while I would put the chances of civilization surviving a steady-as-she-goes policy at less than 20%. But then, I am an optimist.

# A2: TRANSHUMANISM BAD

**Transhumanism does not result in eugenics—our philosophy is opposed to reproductive coercion and enhancements are morally desirable**

**BOSTROM 2003** (Nick, Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford University, “Transhumanism FAQ,” October,

http://www.transhumanism.org/index.php/WTA/faq21/66/)

Eugenics in the narrow sense refers to the pre-WWII movement in Europe and the United States to involuntarily sterilize the “genetically unfit” and encourage breeding of the genetically advantaged. These ideas are entirely contrary to the tolerant humanistic and scientific tenets of transhumanism. In addition to condemning the coercion involved in such policies, transhumanists strongly reject the racialist and classist assumptions on which they were based, along with the notion that eugenic improvements could be accomplished in a practically meaningful timeframe through selective human breeding. Transhumanists uphold the principles of bodily autonomy and procreative liberty. Parents must be allowed to choose for themselves whether to reproduce, how to reproduce, and what technological methods they use in their reproduction. The use of genetic medicine or embryonic screening to increase the probability of a healthy, happy, and multiply talented child is a responsible and justifiable application of parental reproductive freedom. Beyond this, one can argue that parents have a moral responsibility to make use of these methods, assuming they are safe and effective. Just as it would be wrong for parents to fail in their duty to procure the best available medical care for their sick child, it would be wrong not to take reasonable precautions to ensure that a child-to-be will be as healthy as possible. This, however, is a moral judgment that is best left to individual conscience rather than imposed by law. Only in extreme and unusual cases might state infringement of procreative liberty be justified. If, for example, a would-be parent wished to undertake a genetic modification that would be clearly harmful to the child or would drastically curtail its options in life, then this prospective parent should be prevented by law from doing so. This case is analogous to the state taking custody of a child in situations of gross parental neglect or child abuse.

# A2: SOLVES MILITARISM

**They can’t solve militarism**

**Cock 92** (Jacklyn, Professor in Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand, “Feminism and militarism, some questions raised by the Gulf War,” 1992, http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/asr/SADR6/Cock.html)

Military training is a crucial agency of this socialisation. Men are socialised into a conception of masculinity that is violent. *'Military training is socialisation into masculinity carried to extremes.'* (Roberts, 1984: 197). The notion of 'combat' is the fulcrum of this process. 'Combat' is the key dimension in the development of the masculinity\militarism nexus. Combat is presented as fundamental to the development of manhood and male superiority. (Enloe, 1983) Only in combat lies the ultimate test of a man's masculinity. The image of manhood inculcated through combat training hinges on aggression and dominance; it involves an emotional disconnection and an impacted sexuality. (Eisenhart, 1983) Through combat the man affirms his role as protector, and defender. In this sense the exclusion of women from combat roles is essential for maintaining the ideological structure of patriarchy. It has been documented how military combat training may use woman-hating as part of its method of tuning men into soldiers, a process in which the individual must learn to dehumanize other people and make them into targets. (Eisenhart, 1983; Cock, 1989(b)) According to this view there is a necessary connection between feminism and anti-militarism. The experience of Nazi Germany is relevant to this debate about feminism and militarism. Recent scholarship suggests that women were not a major force against the militarisation of German society. Koonz (1987) argues that there were elements of Nazi ideology that were attractive to some aspects of feminist sensibility. She demonstrates that in reality women contributed to the horrors of the Third Reich. Nazi women *'resolutely turned their heads away from assaults against socialists, Jews, religious dissenters, the handicapped, and "degenerates". They gazed instead at their own cradles, children and "Aryan" families.' Mothers and wives made a vital contribution to Nazi power by preserving the illusion of love in an environment of hatred, just as men sustained the image of order in the utter disarray of conflicting bureaucratic and military priorities and commands.'* (Koonz, 1987:17) This is a crucial insight. Koonz's study means the loss of *'the idea that there is something about femaleness that can insulate us from Nazism and its like. For 200 years, one strain of feminism has emphasized the moral superiority of women. This is not necessarily a biologistic view; many modern feminists believe that women have been made different from men, but that these differences are nevertheless deep and thorough. Women have been acculturated, they argue, to be more nurturing, less violent, less aggressive, more co-operative than men. The history of Nazi women belies or at least limits such views: there were many women responsible for substantial brutality, and many more enthusiastically supported men's brutality.'* (Gordon, 1987:100).

# A2: ROOT CAUSE OF WAR

**Gender is not the root cause of war—war causes gender oppression**

**Goldstein 2k2** (Joshua S., Professor Emeritus of International Relations, American University (Washington, DC) Research Scholar, University of Massachusetts and Nonresident Sadat Senior Fellow, CIDCM, University of Maryland, War and Gender , P. 412 2k2)

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice”. Then if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influences wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices. So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gener and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes toward war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression/” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

**Gender is not the root cause of war**

**HILLMAN 2004** (James, psychologist, A Terrible Love of War, pp. 86-87)

To imagine war to be a “man’s thing,” one more example of the abusive, self-inflating activity of “the patriarchy,” traps one in the genderist division of the cosmos: all things are either male or female, *tertium non datur*. The genderist division takes on the absolutism of a logical opposition, an either/or which allows no space for the “both” of compromise and ambivalence, and androgyny. This division then influences our fantasies of primordial societies, reducing war to an activity of violent hunter-gatherers versus gentle cultivator-weavers.  If, however, we think about war as an emanation of a god, war as an archetypal impulse, then patriarchy does not originate war but serves war to give it form and bring it to order by means of hierarchical control, ritual ceremony, art, and law.  Remember Foucault’s idea that law is a continuation of war in another form.  Patriarchy makes the forms.  Rather than the origin of war, patriarchy is its necessary result, preventing Ares from blowing up the world and leaving a few poor remnants a life that is “nasty, brutish, and short.” That this hierarchy, these forms can become tyrannical is evident enough, since cruelties of discipline are often secondary consequences of form. Nonetheless, patriarchal tyranny is not the primary cause of war; that cause is the god.

**There’s no single root cause of war and this argument proves the alt fails**

**Martin 90** (Brian Martin, Professor of Science, Technology and Society at the University of Wollongong, <http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/90uw/uw13.html>)

In this chapter and in the six preceding chapters I have examined a number of structures and factors which have some connection with the war system. There is much more that could be said about any one of these structures, and other factors which could be examined. Here I wish to note one important point: attention should not be focussed on one single factor to the exclusion of others. This is often done for example by some Marxists who look only at capitalism as a root of war and other social problems, and by some feminists who attribute most problems to patriarchy. The danger of monocausal explanations is that they may lead to an inadequate political practice. The 'revolution' may be followed by the persistence or even expansion of many problems which were not addressed by the single-factor perspective. The one connecting feature which I perceive in the structures underlying war is an unequal distribution of power. This unequal distribution is socially organised in many different ways, such as in the large-scale structures for state administration, in capitalist ownership, in male domination within families and elsewhere, in control over knowledge by experts, and in the use of force by the military. Furthermore, these different systems of power are interconnected. They often support each other, and sometimes conflict. This means that the struggle against war can and must be undertaken at many different levels. It ranges from struggles to undermine state power to struggles to undermine racism, sexism and other forms of domination at the level of the individual and the local community. Furthermore, the different struggles need to be linked together. That is the motivation for analysing the roots of war and developing strategies for grassroots movements to uproot them.

# A2: ROOT OF OPPRESSION

**The claim that gender is the root cause of oppression reproduces the same colonizing move they critique**

**Butler 90** (Maxine Elliot Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature @ Berkeley, Judith, Gender Trouble, p. 13)

Feminist critique ought to explore the totalizing claims of a masculinist signifying economy, but also remain self-critical with respect to the totalizing gestures of feminism. The effort to identify the enemy as singular in form is a reverse-discourse that uncritically mimics the strategy of the oppressor instead of offering a different set of terms. That the tactic can operate in feminist and antifeminist contexts alike suggests that the colonizing gesture is not primarily or irreducibly masculinist. It can operate to effect other relations of racial, class, and heterosexist subordination, to name but a few. And clearly, listing the varieties of oppression, as I began to do, assumes their discrete, sequential coexistance along a horizontal axis that does not describe their convergences within the social field. A vertical model is similarly insufficient; oppressions cannot be summarily ranked, causally related, distributed among planes of “originality” and “derivitaevness”.

# A2: EPISTEMOLOGY/IMPACT

**Their epistemology and impact claims are wrong—their alternative does nothing to solve war but our epistemology is sufficient to solve their impact**

**LIND 2005** (Michael, Executive Editor of the National Interest, “Of Arms and the Woman,” Jan 20, http://feminism.eserver.org/of-arms-and-the-woman.txt)

This recurrent focus on little sisterhoods, mobilizing against "gendered" nation-states, multinational capitalism and racial and religious prejudice, owes a lot to the Marxist dream of a transnational fraternity of workers (in a new form, as a transnational sorority of feminists) and even more to the hope of early twentieth-century peace crusaders such as Jane Addams that the women of the world can unite and put an end to war and exploitation. Enloe tries to justify the attention paid to quite different groups of women in various countries with the claim that "no national movement can be militarized"--or demilitarized?--"without changing the ways in which femininity and masculinity infuse daily life." Even if "militarization," however defined, does result in certain kinds of gender relations, it does not follow that altering masculine and feminine roles will, in itself, do much to reverse the process. Something may, after all, be an effect without being a cause. Rejecting the feminist approach to international relations does not mean rejecting the subjects or the political values of feminist scholars. Differing notions of masculinity and femininity in different societies, the treatment of women and homosexuals of both sexes in the armed forces, the exploitation of prostitutes by American soldiers deployed abroad, the sexual division of labor both in advanced and developing countries: all of these are important topics that deserve the attention that Enloe awards them. She shows journalistic flair as well as scholarly insight in detailing what abstractions like the Caribbean Basin Initiative mean in the lives of women in particular Third World countries. Still, such case studies, however interesting, do not support the claim of feminist international relations theorists that theirs is a new and superior approach. One thing should be clear: commitment to a feminist political agenda need not entail commitment to a radical epistemological agenda. Ideas do not have genders, just as they do not have races or classes. In a century in which physics has been denounced as "Jewish" and biology denounced as "bourgeois," it should be embarrassing to denounce the study of international relations as "masculinist." Such a denunciation, of course, will not have serious consequences in politics, but it does violence to the life of the mind. The feminist enemies of empiricism would be well-advised to heed their own counsel and study war no more.