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1NC

U.S. military primacy is high – an aggressive force posture makes it sustainable, and there are no challengers

Brooks and Wohlforth 2008 [Stephen G. and William C., Profs. Gov’t @ Dartmouth, World out of Balance, p. 28-9]

The United States spends more on defense than all the other major military powers combined, and most of those powers are its allies. Its massive investments in the human, institutional, and technological requisites of military power, cumulated over many decades, make an effort to match U.S. capabilities even more daunting than the grit spending numbers imply. Military research and development (R&D) may best capture the scale of the long-term investments that give United States a dramatic qualitative edge in military capabilities. table 2.1 shows, in 2004 U.S. military R&D expenditures were me than six times greater than those of Germany, Japan, France, and Britain combined. By some estimates over half the military R&D expenditures in the world are American.' And this disparity has been sustained for decades: over the past 30 years, for example, the United States has harvested over three times more than the entire European Union on military R&D.'5

These vast commitments have created a preeminence in military capabilities vis-à-vis all the other major powers that is unique after the seventeenth century. While other powers could contest US forces near their homelands, especially over issues on which nuclear deterrence is credible, the United States is and will long remain the only state capable of projecting major military power globally. This capacity arises from “command of the commons” –that is, unassailable military dominance over the sea, air, and space. As Barry Posen puts it,

“Command of the commons is the key military enabler of the US global power position. It allows the United States to exploit more fully other sources of power including its own economic and military might as well as the economic and military might of its allies. Command of the commons also helps the United States to weaken its adversaries, by restricting their access to economic, military and political assistance….Command of the commons provides the United States with more useful military potential for a hegemonic foreign policy than any other offshore power has ever had.

1NC

Withdrawal creates immediate regional power vacuums that embolden challengers.

Poffenbarger and Schaefer 2009 [John G., Dept Social Sciences @ Wheeling Jesuit U, and Mark E., Dept History, Philosophy, Poli. Sci. and Religion @ Marietta College, "Searching for Acceptance: The United States and South America," for presentation at the 2009 International Studies Assoc. Annual Conference, February 17, AllAcademic | VP]

It is our contention that a strategy of hegemony is preferable to one of offshore balancing for several reasons. First, we believe that the depth and breadth of United States’ interests may not be best served by the use of regional proxies. The utilization of regional partners is certainly a possibility for an actor such as the United States, however off-shore balancing seems to call for an over reliance on such partners that could weaken United States power and interests. Second, the realities of the recent Bush administration’s policies may not allow for such a strategic adjustment to offshore balancing. That is not to say that the United States might not seek to reduce its exposure abroad in some areas, but a move to an off-shore balancing strategy at this time may send the wrong message to allies and potential rivals. Next, a move away from a strategy of hegemony would likely trigger a power vacuum in some areas. The European Union faces problems of unity, cohesion, willingness, and a lack of structure to deal with most of the situations currently faced by the United States. Russia, while seeing a resurgence of power in recent years, does not appear to currently have global ambitions, but more likely wishes to focus on its “near-abroad”. (This “near abroad” also seems to lie within United States’ security and economic purview.) China also appears to currently have limited global interests, as it seeks to finalize its development and gain global energy access, but it also may be searching for ways to alter its relative power in relation to the United States. Finally, it is our belief that such a dramatic change in strategy may actually trigger more balancing; as such a withdrawal may send a signal of vulnerability and a lack of willingness to latent balancers. We contend that the United States would be best served by maintaining its current position in the international system, and by simply taking steps to mitigate the motivations for balancing while seeking to attract bandwagoners.

1NC

Sustained unipolar hegemony prevents multiple scenarios for nuclear conflict.

Kagan 2007 [Robert, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, “End of Dreams, Return of History”, Hoover Institution - Stanford U, in Policy Review, No 144, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10>]

Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as “No. 1” and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe.

The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying —  its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic.

It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible.

Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war.

People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that ’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War II, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe.

The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world ’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States.

Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan.

In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore  to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances.

It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, “offshore” role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more “even-handed” policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel ’s aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground.

The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn ’t change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the

region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn ’t changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to “normal” or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again.

The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.

Primacy Now – Comprehensive Dominance

The US has comprehensive dominance in all material measurements.

G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno and William C. Wohlforth, professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, professor of government and associate dean for social sciences at Dartmouth College, and professor of government at Dartmouth College, 2009, *World Politics*, “Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences,” accessed via Project MUSE cp

American primacy in the global distribution of capabilities is one of the most salient features of the contemporary international system. The end of the cold war did not return the world to multipolarity. Instead the United States—already materially preeminent—became more so. We currently live in a one superpower world, a circumstance unprecedented in the modern era. No other great power has enjoyed such advantages in material capabilities—military, economic, technological, and geographical. Other states rival the United States in one area or another, but the multifaceted character of American power places it in a category of its own. The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire, slower economic growth in Japan and Western Europe during the 1990s, and America’s outsized military spending have all enhanced these disparities. While in most historical eras the distribution of capabilities among major states has tended to be multipolar or bipolar—with several major states of roughly equal size and capability—the United States emerged from the 1990s as an unrivaled global power. It became a “unipolar” state.

Primacy Now – Comprehensive Dominance

Statistics prove—the US is way ahead of the rest of the world.

G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno and William C. Wohlforth, professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, professor of government and associate dean for social sciences at Dartmouth College, and professor of government at Dartmouth College, 2009, *World Politics*, “Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences,” accessed via Project MUSE cp

There will doubtless be times in which polarity cannot be determined, but now does not appear to be one of them. Scholars largely agree that there were four or more states that qualified as poles before 1945; that by 1950 or so only two measured up; and that by the 1990s one of these two poles was gone. They largely agree, further, that no other power—not Japan, China, India, or Russia, not any European country and not the EU—has increased its overall portfolio of capabilities sufficiently to transform its standing.11 This leaves a single pole.

There is widespread agreement, moreover, that any plausible index aggregating the relevant dimensions of state capabilities would place the United States in a separate class by a large margin.12 The most widely used measures of capability are gdp and military spending. As of 2006 the United States accounted for roughly one-quarter of global gdp and nearly 50 percent of gdp among the conventionally defined great powers (see Table 1). This surpasses the relative economic size of any leading state in modern history, with the sole exception of the United States itself in the early cold war years, when World War II had temporarily depressed every other major economy. By virtue of the size and wealth of the United States economy, its massive military capabilities represented only about 4 percent of its gdp in 2006 (Table 2), compared with the nearly 10 percent it averaged over the peak years of the cold war—1950–70—as well as with the burdens borne by most of the major powers of the past.13

The United States now likely spends more on defense than the rest of the world combined (Table 2). Military research and development (R&D) may best capture the scale of the long-term investments that now give the United States its dramatic qualitative edge over other states. As Table 2 shows, in 2004 U.S. military expenditures on R&D were more than six times greater than those of Germany, Japan, France, and Britain combined. By some estimates over half of the military R&D expenditures in the world are American, a disparity that has been sustained for decades: over the past thirty years, for example, the United States invested more than three times what the EU countries combined invested in military R&D. Hence, on any composite index featuring these two indicators the United States obviously looks like a unipole. That perception is reinforced by a snapshot of science and technology indicators for the major powers (see Table 3).

These vast commitments do not make the United States omnipotent, but they do facilitate a preeminence in military capabilities vis-à-vis all other major powers that is unique in the post-seventeenth-century experience. While other powers can contest U.S. forces operating in or very near their homelands, especially over issues that involve credible nuclear deterrence, the United States is and will long remain the only state capable of projecting major military power globally.14 This dominant position is enabled by what Barry Posen calls “command of the commons”—that is, unassailable military dominance over the sea, air, and space. The result is an international system that contains only one state with the capability to organize major politico-military action anywhere in the system.15 No other state or even combination of states is capable of mounting and deploying a major expeditionary force outside its own region, except with the assistance of the United States.

Conventional measures thus suggest that the concentration of military and overall economic potential in the United States distinguishes the current international system from its predecessors over the past four centuries (see Figure 1). As historian Paul Kennedy observed: “Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing, . . . I have returned to all of the comparative defense spending and military personnel statistics over the past 500 years that I compiled in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and no other nation comes close.”16

The bottom line is that if we adopt conventional definitions of polarity and standard measures of capabilities, then the current international system is as unambiguously unipolar as past systems were multipolar and bipolar.

Hegemony Sustainable

US has massive demographic advantages—other countries have aging populations.

Fareed Zakaria, Ph.D. from Harvard University, honorary degrees from Brown, the University of Miami, and Oberlin College, Trustee of Yale University, 2008, *Foreign Affairs*, “The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63394/fareed-zakaria/the-future-of-american-power?page=show cp

But Europe has one crucial disadvantage. Or, to put it more accurately, the United States has one crucial advantage over Europe and most of the developed world. The United States is demographically vibrant. Nicholas Eberstadt, a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, estimates that the U.S. population will increase by 65 million by 2030, whereas Europe's population will remain "virtually stagnant." Europe, Eberstadt notes, "will by that time have more than twice as many seniors older than 65 than children under 15, with drastic implications for future aging. (Fewer children now means fewer workers later.) In the United States, by contrast, children will continue to outnumber the elderly. The United Nations Population Division estimates that the ratio of working-age people to senior citizens in western Europe will drop from 3.8:1 today to just 2.4:1 in 2030. In the U.S., the figure will fall from 5.4:1 to 3.1:1."

The only real way to avert this demographic decline is for Europe to take in more immigrants. Native Europeans actually stopped replacing themselves as early as 2007, and so even maintaining the current population will require modest immigration. Growth will require much more. But European societies do not seem able to take in and assimilate people from strange and unfamiliar cultures, especially from rural and backward regions in the world of Islam. The question of who is at fault here -- the immigrant or the society -- is irrelevant. The reality is that Europe is moving toward taking in fewer immigrants at a time when its economic future rides on its ability to take in many more. The United States, on the other hand, is creating the first universal nation, made up of all colors, races, and creeds, living and working together in considerable harmony. Consider the current presidential election, in which the contestants have included a black man, a woman, a Mormon, a Hispanic, and an Italian American.

Surprisingly, many Asian countries (with India an exception) are in demographic situations similar to or even worse than Europe's. The fertility rates in China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are well below the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman, and estimates indicate that the major East Asian nations will face a sizable reduction in their working-age populations over the next half century. The working-age population in Japan has already peaked; by 2010, Japan will have three million fewer workers than it did in 2005. The worker populations in China and South Korea are also likely to peak within the next decade. Goldman Sachs predicts that China's median age will rise from 33 in 2005 to 45 in 2050, a remarkable graying of the population. And Asian countries have as much trouble with immigrants as European countries do. Japan faces a large prospective worker shortage because it can neither take in enough immigrants nor allow its women to fully participate in the labor force.

The effects of an aging population are considerable. First, there is the pension burden -- fewer workers supporting more gray-haired elders. Second, as the economist Benjamin Jones has shown, most innovative inventors -- and the overwhelming majority of Nobel laureates -- do their most important work between the ages of 30 and 44. A smaller working-age population, in other words, means fewer technological, scientific, and managerial advances. Third, as workers age, they go from being net savers to being net spenders, with dire ramifications for national savings and investment rates. For advanced industrialized countries, bad demographics are a killer disease.

Hegemony Sustainable

Hegemony sustainable

Robert **Kagan** (senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund) 1/15/**06** “ Still the Colossus” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/13/AR2006011301696.html>

The much-anticipated global effort to balance against American hegemony -- which the realists have been anticipating for more than 15 years now -- **has simply not occurred**. On the contrary, in Europe the idea has all but vanished. European Union defense budgets continue their steady decline, and even the project of creating a common foreign and defense policy has slowed if not stalled. Both trends are primarily the result of internal European politics. But if they really feared American power, Europeans would be taking more urgent steps to strengthen the European Union's hand to check it. Nor are Europeans refusing to cooperate, even with an administration they allegedly despise. Western Europe will not be a strategic partner as it was during the Cold War, because Western Europeans no longer feel threatened and therefore do not seek American protection. Nevertheless, the current trend is toward closer cooperation. Germany's new government, while still dissenting from U.S. policy in Iraq, is working hard and ostentatiously to improve relations. It is bending over backward to show support for the mission in Afghanistan, most notably by continuing to supply a small but, in German terms, meaningful number of troops. It even trumpets its willingness to train Iraqi soldiers. Chancellor Angela Merkel promises to work closely with Washington on the question of the China arms embargo, indicating agreement with the American view that China is a potential strategic concern. For Eastern and Central Europe, the growing threat is Russia, not America, and the big question remains what it was in the 1990s: Who will be invited to join NATO? In East Asia, meanwhile, U.S. relations with Japan grow ever closer as the Japanese become increasingly concerned about China and a nuclear-armed North Korea. China's (and Malaysia's) attempt to exclude Australia from a prominent regional role at the recent East Asian summit has reinforced Sydney's desire for closer ties. Only in South Korea does hostility to the United States remain high. This is mostly the product of the new democracy's understandable historical resentments and desire for greater independence. But even so, when I attended a conference in Seoul recently, the question posed to my panel by the South Korean organizers was: "How will the United States solve the problem of North Korea's nuclear weapons?" The truth is, America retains enormous advantages in the international arena. Its liberal, democratic ideology remains appealing in a world that is more democratic than ever. Its potent economy remains the driving wheel of the international economy. Compared with these powerful forces, the unpopularity of recent actions will prove ephemeral, just as it did after the nadir of American Cold War popularity in the late 1960s and early 1970s. There are also structural reasons why American indispensability can survive even the unpopularity of recent years. The political scientist William Wohlforth argued a decade ago that the American unipolar era is durable not because of any love for the United States but because of the basic structure of the international system. The problem for any nation attempting to balance American power, even in that power's own region, is that long before it becomes strong enough to balance the United States, it may frighten its neighbors into balancing against it. Europe would be the exception to this rule were it increasing its power, but it is not. Both Russia and China face this problem as they attempt to exert greater influence even in their traditional spheres of influence. It remains the case, too, that in many crises and potential crises around the world, local actors and traditional allies still look primarily to Washington for solutions, not to Beijing, Moscow or even Brussels. The United States is the key player in the Taiwan Strait. It would be the chief intermediary between India and Pakistan in any crisis. As for Iran, everyone on both sides of the Atlantic knows that, for all the efforts of British, French and German negotiators, any diplomatic or military resolution will ultimately depend on Washington. Even in the Middle East, where hostility to the United States is highest, American influence remains remarkably high. Most still regard the United States as the indispensable player in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Bush administration's push for democracy, though erratic and inconsistent, has unmistakably affected the course of events in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon -- never mind Iraq. Contrary to predictions at the time of the Iraq war, Arab hostility has not made it impossible for both leaders and their political opponents to cooperate with the United States.

Hegemony Sustainable – Economics

The US is conclusively ahead economically.

Fareed Zakaria, Ph.D. from Harvard University, honorary degrees from Brown, the University of Miami, and Oberlin College, Trustee of Yale University, 2008, *Foreign Affairs*, “The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63394/fareed-zakaria/the-future-of-american-power?page=show cp

In trying to understand how the United States will fare in the new world, the first thing to do is simply look around: the future is already here. Over the last 20 years, globalization has been gaining breadth and depth. More countries are making goods, communications technology has been leveling the playing field, capital has been free to move across the world -- and the United States has benefited massively from these trends. Its economy has received hundreds of billions of dollars in investment, and its companies have entered new countries and industries with great success. Despite two decades of a very expensive dollar, U.S. exports have held ground, and the World Economic Forum currently ranks the United States as the world's most competitive economy. GDP growth, the bottom line, has averaged just over three percent in the United States for 25 years, significantly higher than in Europe or Japan. Productivity growth, the elixir of modern economics, has been over 2.5 percent for a decade now, a full percentage point higher than the European average. This superior growth trajectory might be petering out, and perhaps U.S. growth will be more typical for an advanced industrialized country for the next few years. But the general point -- that the United States is a highly dynamic economy at the cutting edge, despite its enormous size -- holds.

Specifically, the US dominates in emerging technologies.

Fareed Zakaria, Ph.D. from Harvard University, honorary degrees from Brown, the University of Miami, and Oberlin College, Trustee of Yale University, 2008, *Foreign Affairs*, “The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63394/fareed-zakaria/the-future-of-american-power?page=show cp

Consider the industries of the future. Nanotechnology (applied science dealing with the control of matter at the atomic or molecular scale) is likely to lead to fundamental breakthroughs over the next 50 years, and the United States dominates the field. It has more dedicated "nanocenters" than the next three nations (Germany, Britain, and China) combined and has issued more patents for nanotechnology than the rest of the world combined, highlighting its unusual strength in turning abstract theory into practical products. Biotechnology (a broad category that describes the use of biological systems to create medical, agricultural, and industrial products) is also dominated by the United States. Biotech revenues in the United States approached $50 billion in 2005, five times as large as the amount in Europe and representing 76 percent of global biotech revenues.

Heg Sustainable (Economic dominance)

No one will surpass the U.S.

Carla **Norrlof** ( Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto) 20**10** “ America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” Cambridge University Press http://magbooks.org/post-9334/americas-global-advantage-us-hegemony-and-international-cooperation

One notices three things. First, the United States has consistently had the highest share of GDP. Second, its share of GDP has been declining, although not steadily, since shares actually increased between 1977 and 1983 and then again between 1995 and 2001. Third, while countries like Japan and China have improved their relative position, in terms of GDP shares, vis-à-vis the United States, they only command a third of the United States’ share. **Consequently, there is no single competitor around to oust the United States from its number one position.** The only existing challenger in this domain is the euro area, and a whole chapter is dedicated to analyzing the prospects for euro-zone countries to replace American hegemony. The next size measure, world trade shares, is on display in tables 2.3 and 2.4. As can be seen in table 2.3, the United States was clearly the largest exporter in 1965 but was only the third largest exporter in 2008 behind Germany and China. From table 2.4, we see, however, that the United States has maintained its lead as the world’s largest importer. These statistics get to the heart of the argument in this book, which is that commanding large import shares is more relevant for hegemonic status than commanding large export shares. As I will also argue in chapters 4 and 5, importing more than one exports, i.e., sustaining trade deficits, is desirable as long as negative consequences in the form of an unmanageable buildup in external liabilities can be avoided. In gauging the relative size of the United States’ capital market, I use the selected indicators from which the IMF derives capital market size. Table 2.5 takes into account a country’s stock-market capitalization, its bond market, and its bank assets, which are all added up to arrive at a single measure for capital market size. As can be gleaned from the table, the United States has a stronger lead in equities and bonds than in bank assets. I will return to this observation in chapter 7, in talking about the financial crisis and in thinking about how it will affect the pattern of financial power. From table 2.5 it is also clear that, in 2008, the size of America’s closest rival, Japan’s, capital market, was significantly lower than what it was in 1995 (see columns 10 and 12). **These figures suggest that no single country can challenge the United States’ dominance in the financial field,** although, as with world trade shares, we need to consider to what extent the group of countries that now constitutes the euro area is a threat to American hegemony (see chapter 7).

Hegemony Sustainable – A2: Dollar Heg

The dollar will remain the global currency-multiple reasons

Carla **Norrlof** ( Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto) 20**10** “ America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” Cambridge University Press http://magbooks.org/post-9334/americas-global-advantage-us-hegemony-and-international-cooperation

Acquiring key currency status is often seen as harder than holding on to it, however, because factors like inertia, scale economies, and network externalities contribute to the incumbent’s resilience. 3 The incumbency advantage is particularly strong in areas where gains can be made from reducing information costs as in foreign exchange trading where the dollar is predominantly used, whereas it is less strong in areas where gains can be made from spreading risk as in portfolio optimization. 4 The dollar persists because investors are risk averse (inertia), because transaction costs are lower for the dollar (scale economies), and because the more the dollar is used the more it makes sense for additional investors to use it (network externalities). The liquidity of the dollar – the ease with which it can be exchanged for goods, services, and assets in any part of the world – creates a bias to continue using it for commercial and financial transactions. Barriers to switching from one key currency to another exist because, for the most part, investors prefer to use whatever they have used in the past. These self-reinforcing advantages will tend to favour the international currency in use, in this case the dollar. Despite these incumbency advantages, there is clearly some point at which the euro could start to seem more attractive than the dollar.

AT: Growing International Markets

The US is still comparatively ahead of emerging markets—they copy the US and play catch up.

Fareed Zakaria, Ph.D. from Harvard University, honorary degrees from Brown, the University of Miami, and Oberlin College, Trustee of Yale University, 2008, *Foreign Affairs*, “The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63394/fareed-zakaria/the-future-of-american-power?page=show cp

In 2005, New York City got a wake-up call. Twenty-four of the world's 25 largest initial public offerings that year were held in countries other than the United States. This was stunning. The United States' capital markets have long been the biggest in the world. They financed the turnaround in manufacturing in the 1980s and the technology revolution of the 1990s, and they are today financing the ongoing advances in bioscience. It is the fluidity of these markets that has kept American business nimble. If the United States is losing this distinctive advantage, it is very bad news.

Much of the discussion around the problem has focused on the United States' regulation, particularly post-Enron laws such as Sarbanes-Oxley, and the constant threat of litigation that hovers over businesses in the United States. These obstacles are there, but they do not really get at what has shifted business abroad. The United States is conducting business as usual. But others are joining in the game. What is really happening here, as in other areas, is simple: the rise of the rest. The United States' sum total of stocks, bonds, deposits, loans, and other financial instruments -- its financial stock, in other words -- still exceeds that of any other region, but other regions are seeing their financial stock grow much more quickly. This is especially true of the rising countries of Asia, but even the eurozone is outpacing the United States. Europe's total banking and trading revenues, $98 billion in 2005, have nearly pulled equal to the United States' revenues. And when it comes to new derivatives based on underlying financial instruments such as stocks or interest-rate payments, which are increasingly important for hedge funds, banks, and insurers, London is the dominant player already. This is all part of a broader trend. Countries and companies now have options that they never had before.

In this and other regards, the United States is not doing worse than usual. It functions as it always has -- perhaps subconsciously assuming that it is still leagues ahead of the pack. U.S. legislators rarely think about the rest of the world when writing laws, regulations, and policies. U.S. officials rarely refer to global standards. After all, for so long the United States was the global standard, and when it chose to do something different, it was important enough that the rest of the world would cater to its exceptionality. The United States is the only country in the world other than Liberia and Myanmar that is not on the metric system. Other than Somalia, it is alone in not ratifying the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In business, the United States did not need to benchmark. It was the one teaching the world how to be capitalist. But now everyone is playing the United States' game, and playing to win.

AT: Outsourcing

Outsourcing doesn’t hurt the US.

Fareed Zakaria, Ph.D. from Harvard University, honorary degrees from Brown, the University of Miami, and Oberlin College, Trustee of Yale University, 2008, *Foreign Affairs*, “The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63394/fareed-zakaria/the-future-of-american-power?page=show cp

Manufacturing has, of course, been leaving the country, shifting to the developing world and turning the United States into a service economy. This scares many Americans, who wonder what their country will make if everything is "made in China." But Asian manufacturing must be viewed in the context of a global economy. The Atlantic Monthly's James Fallows spent a year in China watching its manufacturing juggernaut up close, and he provides a persuasive explanation of how outsourcing has strengthened U.S. competitiveness. What it comes down to is that the real money is in designing and distributing products -- which the United States dominates -- rather than manufacturing them. A vivid example of this is the iPod: it is manufactured mostly outside the United States, but most of the added value is captured by Apple, in California.

AT: Savings/Deficit

Savings and deficit analysis are outdated.

Fareed Zakaria, Ph.D. from Harvard University, honorary degrees from Brown, the University of Miami, and Oberlin College, Trustee of Yale University, 2008, *Foreign Affairs*, “The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63394/fareed-zakaria/the-future-of-american-power?page=show cp

Many experts and scholars, and even a few politicians, worry about certain statistics that bode ill for the United States. The U.S. savings rate is zero; the current account deficit, the trade deficit, and the budget deficit are high; the median income is flat; and commitments for entitlements are unsustainable. These are all valid concerns that will have to be addressed. But it is important to keep in mind that many frequently cited statistics offer only an approximate or an antiquated measure of an economy. Many of them were developed in the late nineteenth century to describe industrial economies with limited cross-border activity, not modern economies in today's interconnected global market.

For the last two decades, for example, the United States has had unemployment rates well below levels economists thought possible without driving up inflation. Or consider that the United States' current account deficit -- which in 2007 reached $800 billion, or seven percent of GDP -- was supposed to be unsustainable at four percent of GDP. The current account deficit is at a dangerous level, but its magnitude can be explained in part by the fact that there is a worldwide surplus of savings and that the United States remains an unusually stable and attractive place to invest. The decrease in personal savings, as the Harvard economist Richard Cooper has noted, has been largely offset by an increase in corporate savings. The U.S. investment picture also looks much rosier if education and research-and-development spending are considered along with spending on physical capital and housing.

AT: Technical Education/Higher Education

Your authors misrepresent data—the US trains more engineers per capita than China and India.

Fareed Zakaria, Ph.D. from Harvard University, honorary degrees from Brown, the University of Miami, and Oberlin College, Trustee of Yale University, 2008, *Foreign Affairs*, “The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63394/fareed-zakaria/the-future-of-american-power?page=show cp

No statistic seems to capture this anxiety better than those showing the decline of engineering in the United States. In 2005, the National Academy of Sciences released a report warning that the United States could soon lose its privileged position as the world's science leader. The report said that in 2004 China graduated 600,000 engineers, India 350,000, and the United States 70,000 -- numbers that were repeated in countless articles, books, and speeches. And indeed, these figures do seem to be cause for despair. What hope does the United States have if for every one qualified American engineer there are more than a dozen Chinese and Indian ones? For the cost of one chemist or engineer in the United States, the report pointed out, a company could hire five Chinese chemists or 11 Indian engineers.

The numbers, however, are wrong. Several academics and journalists investigated the matter and quickly realized that the Asian totals included graduates of two- or three-year programs training students in simple technical tasks. The National Science Foundation, which tracks these statistics in the United States and other nations, puts the Chinese number at about 200,000 engineering degrees per year, and the Rochester Institute of Technology's Ron Hira puts the number of Indian engineering graduates at about 125,000 a year. This means that the United States actually trains more engineers per capita than either China or India does.

Most engineers trained in India and China suck—the US has the best higher education in the world.

Fareed Zakaria, Ph.D. from Harvard University, honorary degrees from Brown, the University of Miami, and Oberlin College, Trustee of Yale University, 2008, *Foreign Affairs*, “The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63394/fareed-zakaria/the-future-of-american-power?page=show cp

And the numbers do not address the issue of quality. The best and brightest in China and India -- those who, for example, excel at India's famous engineering academies, the Indian Institutes of Technology (5,000 out of 300,000 applicants make it past the entrance exams) -- would do well in any educational system. But once you get beyond such elite institutions -- which graduate under 10,000 students a year -- the quality of higher education in China and India remains extremely poor, which is why so many students leave those countries to get trained abroad. In 2005, the McKinsey Global Institute did a study of "the emerging global labor market" and found that 28 low-wage countries had approximately 33 million young professionals at their disposal. But, the study noted, "only a fraction of potential job candidates could successfully work at a foreign company," largely because of inadequate education.

Indeed, higher education is the United States' best industry. In no other field is the United States' advantage so overwhelming. A 2006 report from the London-based Center for European Reform points out that the United States invests 2.6 percent of its GDP in higher education, compared with 1.2 percent in Europe and 1.1 percent in Japan. Depending on which study you look at, the United States, with five percent of the world's population, has either seven or eight of the world's top ten universities and either 48 percent or 68 percent of the top 50. The situation in the sciences is particularly striking. In India, universities graduate between 35 and 50 Ph.D.'s in computer science each year; in the United States, the figure is 1,000. A list of where the world's 1,000 best computer scientists were educated shows that the top ten schools are all American. The United States also remains by far the most attractive destination for students, taking in 30 percent of the total number of foreign students globally, and its collaborations between business and educational institutions are unmatched anywhere in the world. All these advantages will not be erased easily, because the structure of European and Japanese universities -- mostly state-run bureaucracies -- is unlikely to change. And although China and India are opening new institutions, it is not that easy to create a world-class university out of whole cloth in a few decades.

AT: Primacy/Secondary Schools

US schools are strong—education just has to be more accessible for the disadvantaged.

Fareed Zakaria, Ph.D. from Harvard University, honorary degrees from Brown, the University of Miami, and Oberlin College, Trustee of Yale University, 2008, *Foreign Affairs*, “The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63394/fareed-zakaria/the-future-of-american-power?page=show cp

Few people believe that U.S. primary and secondary schools deserve similar praise. The school system, the line goes, is in crisis, with its students performing particularly badly in science and math, year after year, in international rankings. But the statistics here, although not wrong, reveal something slightly different. The real problem is one not of excellence but of access. The Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), the standard for comparing educational programs across nations, puts the United States squarely in the middle of the pack. The media reported the news with a predictable penchant for direness: "Economic Time Bomb: U.S. Teens Are Among Worst at Math," declared The Wall Street Journal.

But the aggregate scores hide deep regional, racial, and socioeconomic variation. Poor and minority students score well below the U.S. average, while, as one study noted, "students in affluent suburban U.S. school districts score nearly as well as students in Singapore, the runaway leader on TIMSS math scores." The difference between the average science scores in poor and wealthy school districts within the United States, for instance, is four to five times as high as the difference between the U.S. and the Singaporean national average. In other words, the problem with U.S. education is a problem of inequality. This will, over time, translate into a competitiveness problem, because if the United States cannot educate and train a third of the working population to compete in a knowledge economy, this will drag down the country. But it does know what works.

The U.S. system may be too lax when it comes to rigor and memorization, but it is very good at developing the critical faculties of the mind. It is surely this quality that goes some way in explaining why the United States produces so many entrepreneurs, inventors, and risk takers. Tharman Shanmugaratnam, until recently Singapore's minister of education, explains the difference between his country's system and that of the United States: "We both have meritocracies," Shanmugaratnam says. "Yours is a talent meritocracy, ours is an exam meritocracy. We know how to train people to take exams. You know how to use people's talents to the fullest. Both are important, but there are some parts of the intellect that we are not able to test well -- like creativity, curiosity, a sense of adventure, ambition. Most of all, America has a culture of learning that challenges conventional wisdom, even if it means challenging authority." This is one reason that Singaporean officials recently visited U.S. schools to learn how to create a system that nurtures and rewards ingenuity, quick thinking, and problem solving. "Just by watching, you can see students are more engaged, instead of being spoon-fed all day," one Singaporean visitor told The Washington Post. While the United States marvels at Asia's test-taking skills, Asian governments come to the United States to figure out how to get their children to think.

AT: Britain Proves Unsustainability

British example doesn’t apply.

1. Britain’s economy sucked.

Fareed Zakaria, Ph.D. from Harvard University, honorary degrees from Brown, the University of Miami, and Oberlin College, Trustee of Yale University, 2008, *Foreign Affairs*, “The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63394/fareed-zakaria/the-future-of-american-power?page=show cp

But whatever the apparent similarities, the circumstances are not really the same. Britain was a strange superpower. Historians have written hundreds of books explaining how London could have adopted certain foreign policies to change its fortunes. If only it had avoided the Boer War, say some. If only it had stayed out of Africa, say others. The historian Niall Ferguson provocatively suggests that had Britain stayed out of World War I (and there might not have been a world war without British participation), it might have managed to preserve its great-power position. There is some truth to this line of reasoning (World War I did bankrupt Britain), but to put things properly in historical context, it is worth looking at this history from another angle. Britain's immense empire was the product of unique circumstances. The wonder is not that it declined but that its dominance lasted as long as it did. Understanding how Britain played its hand -- one that got weaker over time -- can help illuminate the United States' path forward.

Britain has been a rich country for centuries (and was a great power for most of that time), but it was an economic superpower for little more than a generation. Observers often make the mistake of dating its apogee by great imperial events such as the Diamond Jubilee. In fact, by 1897, Britain's best years were already behind it. Its true apogee was a generation earlier, from 1845 to 1870. At the time, it was producing more than 30 percent of global GDP. Its energy consumption was five times that of the United States and 155 times that of Russia. It accounted for one-fifth of the world's trade and two-fifths of its manufacturing trade. And all this was accomplished with just two percent of the world's population.

By the late 1870s, the United States had equaled Britain on most industrial measures, and by the early 1880s it had actually surpassed it, as Germany would about 15 years later. By World War I, the United States' economy was twice the size of Britain's, and together France's and Russia's were larger as well. In 1860, Britain had produced 53 percent of the world's iron (then a sign of supreme industrial strength); by 1914, it was making less than 10 percent.

That doesn’t apply to the US.

Fareed Zakaria, Ph.D. from Harvard University, honorary degrees from Brown, the University of Miami, and Oberlin College, Trustee of Yale University, 2008, *Foreign Affairs*, “The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63394/fareed-zakaria/the-future-of-american-power?page=show cp

Britain was undone as a global power not because of bad politics but because of bad economics. Indeed, the impressive skill with which London played its weakening hand despite a 70-year economic decline offers important lessons for the United States. First, however, it is essential to note that the central feature of Britain's decline -- irreversible economic deterioration -- does not really apply to the United States today. Britain's unrivaled economic status lasted for a few decades; the United States' has lasted more than 120 years. The U.S. economy has been the world's largest since the middle of the 1880s, and it remains so today. In fact, the United States has held a surprisingly constant share of global GDP ever since. With the brief exception of the late 1940s and 1950s, when the rest of the industrialized world had been destroyed and its share rose to 50 percent, the United States has accounted for roughly a quarter of world output for over a century (32 percent in 1913, 26 percent in 1960, 22 percent in 1980, 27 percent in 2000, and 26 percent in 2007). It is likely to slip, but not significantly, in the next two decades. Most estimates suggest that in 2025 the United States' economy will still be twice the size of China's in terms of nominal GDP.

AT: Britain Proves Unsustainability

2. The US military is stronger.

Fareed Zakaria, Ph.D. from Harvard University, honorary degrees from Brown, the University of Miami, and Oberlin College, Trustee of Yale University, 2008, *Foreign Affairs*, “The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63394/fareed-zakaria/the-future-of-american-power?page=show cp

This difference between the United States and Britain is reflected in the burden of their military budgets. Britannia ruled the seas but never the land. The British army was sufficiently small that Otto von Bismarck once quipped that were the British ever to invade Germany, he would simply have the local police force arrest them. Meanwhile, London's advantage over the seas -- it had more tonnage than the next two navies put together -- came at ruinous cost. The U.S. military, in contrast, dominates at every level -- land, sea, air, space -- and spends more than the next 14 countries combined, accounting for almost 50 percent of global defense spending. The United States also spends more on defense research and development than the rest of the world put together. And crucially, it does all this without breaking the bank. U.S. defense expenditure as a percent of GDP is now 4.1 percent, lower than it was for most of the Cold War (under Dwight Eisenhower, it rose to ten percent). As U.S. GDP has grown larger and larger, expenditures that would have been backbreaking have become affordable. The Iraq war may be a tragedy or a noble endeavor, but either way, it will not bankrupt the United States. The price tag for Iraq and Afghanistan together -- $125 billion a year -- represents less than one percent of GDP. The war in Vietnam, by comparison, cost the equivalent of 1.6 percent of U.S. GDP in 1970, a large difference. (Neither of these percentages includes second- or third-order costs of war, which allows for a fair comparison even if one disputes the exact figures.)

A2: Britain Proves Unsustainability

Britain’s economy was declining—other factors just masked the decline.

Fareed Zakaria, Ph.D. from Harvard University, honorary degrees from Brown, the University of Miami, and Oberlin College, Trustee of Yale University, 2008, *Foreign Affairs*, “The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63394/fareed-zakaria/the-future-of-american-power?page=show cp

Of course, politically, London was still the capital of the world at the time of World War I, and its writ was unequaled and largely unchallenged across much of the globe. Britain had acquired an empire in a period before the onset of nationalism, and so there were few obstacles to creating and maintaining control in far-flung places. Its sea power was unrivaled, and it remained dominant in banking, shipping, insurance, and investment. London was still the center of global finance, and the pound still the reserve currency of the world. Even in 1914, Britain invested twice as much capital abroad as its closest competitor, France, and five times as much as the United States. The economic returns of these investments and other "invisible trades" in some ways masked Britain's decline.

In fact, the British economy was sliding. British growth rates had dropped below two percent in the decades leading up to World War I. The United States and Germany, meanwhile, were growing at around five percent. Having spearheaded the first Industrial Revolution, Britain was less adept at moving into the second. The goods it was producing represented the past rather than the future. In 1907, for example, it manufactured four times as many bicycles as the United States did, but the United States manufactured 12 times as many cars.

AT: McDougall

McDougall’s not qualified to talk about hegemony—he agrees.

Walter A. McDougall**,** Alloy**-**Ansin Professor of International Relations at the University of Pennsylvania and Senior Fellow at FPRI, 10**,** *Orbis*, “Can the United States Do Grand Strategy?” accessed via ScienceDirect cp

That bears on the subject at hand: can the United States do grand strategy? I assume that this does not mean, can the American people do grand strategy, because an easy answer would be, sure they can and usually very poorly. Rather I assume the title means, can the relevant agencies of the U.S. federal government plan, coordinate, and execute grand strategy with sufficient competence to secure the nation and defend its vital interests. That is a complex question that has inspired a recent spate of diagnoses of what ails U.S. strategic planning and what prescriptions are indicated.3 I do not intend to choose among those expert assessments, much less add to them since I claim no authority on the subject of grand strategy apart from whatever U.S. diplomatic history can teach. In short, I plead non possumus and absolve myself of the obligation to take any controversial position. Instead, I imagine my task merely as that of a rapporteur and provocateur raising issues on which we may need to reach some consensus before we can agree on whether the United States can do grand strategy and, if so, what that strategy ought to be at the present time.

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A2: Collapse Now

US Hegemony will not collapse in the short term—there’s no major rival

Arno J Mayer is emeritus professor of history at Princeton University, "The US Empire will Survive Bush", 10/29/08, http://www.counterpunch.org/mayer10292008.html

The United States may emerge from the Iraq fiasco almost unscathed. Though momentarily disconcerted, the American empire will continue on its way, under bipartisan direction and mega-corporate pressure, and with evangelical blessings.It is a defining characteristic of mature imperial states that they can afford costly blunders, paid for not by the elites but the lower orders. **Predictions of the American empire's imminent decline are exaggerated: without a real military rival, it will continue for some time as the world's sole hyperpower.** But though they endure, overextended empires suffer injuries to their power and prestige. In such moments they tend to lash out, to avoid being taken for paper tigers. Given Washington's predicament in Iraq, will the US escalate its intervention in Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, Somalia or Venezuela? The US has the strongest army the world has ever known. Preponderant on sea, in the air and in space (including cyberspace), the US has an awesome capacity to project its power over enormous distances with speed, a self-appointed sheriff rushing to master or exploit real and putative crises anywhere on earth. In the words of the former secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld: "No corner of the world is remote enough, no mountain high enough, no cave or bunker deep enough, no SUV fast enough to protect our enemies from our reach." The US spends more than 20% of its annual budget on defense, nearly half of the spending of the rest of the world put together. It's good for the big US corporate arms manufacturers and their export sales. The Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, purchase billions of dollars of state-of-the-art ordnance.

China Challenges

China’s military buildup puts US hegemony on the brink of collapse

Peter A. Buxbaum, freelance journalist, "Chinese Plans to End US Hegemony in the Pacific", 5/31/10, OilPrice, http://oilprice.com/Geo-Politics/International/Chinese-Plans-to-End-US-Hegemony-in-the-Pacific.html)

China's People's Liberation Army is building up anti-access and area-denial capabilities with the apparent goal of extending their power to the western half of the Pacific Ocean. Chinese military and political doctrine holds that China should rule the waves out to the second island chain of the western Pacific, which extends as far as Guam and New Guinea, essentially dividing the Pacific between the US and China and ending US hegemony on that ocean. Among the anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) capabilities being fielded by China include anti-satellite weapons; spaced-based reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition; electromagnetic weapons; advanced fighter aircraft; unmanned aerial vehicles; advanced radar systems; and ballistic and cruise missiles. The Chinese also have an emerging and muscular deep-water navy. "The PLA navy is increasing its numbers of submarines and other ships," said Admiral Gary Roughead, chief of US naval operations, [at a recent speech](http://www.heritage.org/Events/2010/05/Maritime-Challenges-and-the-Future-of-the-US-Navy) hosted by the Heritage Foundation, a conservative Washington think tank. "Navies tend to grow with economies and as trade becomes more important." All of this has US military planners and thinkers worried. The A2AD buildup threatens the US forward presence and power projection in the region. "Unless Beijing diverts from its current course of action, or Washington undertakes actions to offset or counterbalance the effects of the PLA’s military buildup," said a report recently released by the Washington-based Center for Budgetary and Strategic Assessments, "the cost incurred by the US military to operate in the [w]estern Pacific will likely rise sharply, perhaps to prohibitive levels, and much sooner than many expect[...].This situation creates a strategic choice for the United States, its allies and partners: acquiesce in a dramatic shift in the military balance or take steps to preserve it." In response to the Chinese challenge, US strategic planners and thinkers are exploring a concept known as 'AirSea Battle,' the subject of the new CSBA report. "Admiral Roughead is conducting an AirSea Battle study inside the Pentagon," noted Senator Joseph Lieberman, an independent from Connecticut, and a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, at a recent Washington gathering. Spurring the need for AirSea Battle, CSBA president and report co-author Andrew Krepinevich told ISN Security Watch, is that "China will attempt to achieve a quick victory by inflicting such damage that the US would choose to discontinue the fight or driving a major US ally out of the war." A key objective

China is challenging U.S. hegemony in the pacific

Peter, **Buxbaum** “Chinese Plans to End US Hegemony in the Pacific” 5/21/**10** Online @ http://oilprice.com/Geo-Politics/International/Chinese-Plans-to-End-US-Hegemony-in-the-Pacific.html ghs ls

China's People's Liberation Army is building up anti-access and area-denial capabilities with the apparent goal of extending their power to the western half of the Pacific Ocean. Chinese military and political doctrine holds that China should rule the waves out to the second island chain of the western Pacific, which extends as far as Guam and New Guinea, **essentially dividing the Pacific between the US and China and ending US hegemony on that ocean**. Among the anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) capabilities being fielded by China include anti-satellite weapons; spaced-based reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition; electromagnetic weapons; advanced fighter aircraft; unmanned aerial vehicles; advanced radar systems; and ballistic and cruise missiles. The Chinese also have an emerging and muscular deep-water navy. "The PLA navy is increasing its numbers of submarines and other ships," said Admiral Gary Roughead, chief of US naval operations, at a recent speech hosted by the Heritage Foundation, a conservative Washington think tank. "Navies tend to grow with economies and as trade becomes more important." **All of this has US military planners and thinkers worried. The A2AD buildup threatens the US forward presence and power projection in the region.** "Unless Beijing diverts from its current course of action, or Washington undertakes actions to offset or counterbalance the effects of the PLA’s military buildup," said a report recently released by the Washington-based Center for Budgetary and Strategic Assessments, "the cost incurred by the US military to operate in the [w]estern Pacific will likely rise sharply, perhaps to prohibitive levels, and much sooner than many expect[...].This situation creates a strategic choice for the United States, its allies and partners: acquiesce in a dramatic shift in the military balance or take steps to preserve it."

China’s been modernizing for years- U.S. deterrence is clearly necessary.

Hans M. **Kristensen**, Robert S. **Norris**, Matthew G. **McKinzie**, members of The Federation of American Scientists & The Natural Resources Defense Council. Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning. November 20**06**.

That modernization, the 2006 QDR explained, “has accelerated since the mid-to-late 1990s in response to central leadership demands to develop military options against Taiwan scenarios.” The “pace and scope of China’s military build-up already puts regional military balances at risk.” China’s large-scale investments in offensive capabilities such as ballistic and cruise missiles, more advanced submarines, and “strategic nuclear strike from modern, sophisticated land and sea-based systems” directly affect U.S. military force requirements and “place a premium on forces capable of sustained operations at great distances into denied areas.”2

China War Impact

U.S.-China nuclear slapfights result in millions of casualties- two scenarios.

Hans M. **Kristensen**, Robert S. **Norris**, Matthew G. **McKinzie**, members of The Federation of American Scientists & The Natural Resources Defense Council. Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning. November 20**06**.

We conclude the report with a section that describes two nuclear strike scenarios (and several potential Chinese options) and calculates the casualties that both sides would suffer as a result. The simulations show with chilling clarity that while the nuclear capabilities of the two countries are quite different, the civilian casualties resulting from the use of just a small part of either country’s nuclear arsenal would be overwhelming. Whether the strategy is one of “countervalue” or “counterforce,” and whether the missiles are inaccurate or accurate, tens of millions of innocent people would die and more would suffer in a nuclear attack against either country. Our first scenario concludes that 1.5 million to 26 million causalities would result from a U.S. attack on Chinese ICBMs, depending upon the type and number of warheads used. Strike plans maintained by the Pentagon probably include options for significantly larger attacks. The declassified documents we examined reveal that nuclear war planning against China traditionally has involved much larger strikes against a broad range of facilities. Even so, the Pentagon has advocated – and the White House has authorized – additional nuclear planning against China. It is hard to see where deterrence ends and nuclear warfighting begins, but with U.S. planners pursuing “more discriminate capabilities for selected target types through lower yields, improved accuracy, and enhanced penetration,” the quest of the never sufficiently “credible deterrent” seems to be entering its next phase.26 Our second scenario concludes that 15 million to 40 million causalities would result from a Chinese attack on 20 populous U.S. cities. As if that is not enough, China is in the final phase of a nuclear facelift that the U.S. intelligence community has predicted will result in 75 to 100 warheads “primarily targeted” against the United States by 2015. Whether this projection will come true is not certain, but Chinese leaders apparently have decided that its antiquated long-range ballistic missile force is becoming vulnerable and a new generation of ICBMs is needed to ensure the credibility of China’s minimum deterrent. Our calculations show that the increase in warheads anticipated by the U.S. intelligence community could potentially hold as many as 75 major U.S. cities at risk and inflict more than 50 million casualties.

A2: China

Social Turmoil, Unemployment and impending leadership change prevent China from challenging U.S. hegemony

Friedberg, 2010(Aaron, July 21st, professor of politics at Princeton University, *Implications of a Financial Crisis for U.S. – China Rivalry*, Survival, 52: 4,

34-5)

Despite its magnitude, Beijing’s stimulus programme was insufficient to forestall a sizeable spike in unemployment. The regime acknowledges that upwards of 20 million migrant workers lost their jobs in the first year of the crisis, with many returning to their villages, and 7m recent college graduates are reportedly on the streets in search of work.9 Not surprisingly, tough times have been accompanied by increased social turmoil. Even before the crisis hit, the number of so-called ‘mass incidents’ (such as riots or strikes) reported each year in China had been rising. Perhaps because it feared that the steep upward trend might be unnerving to foreign investors, Beijing stopped publishing aggregate, national statistics in 2005.10 Nevertheless, there is ample, if fragmentary, evidence that things got worse as the economy slowed. In Beijing, for example, salary cuts, layoffs, factory closures and the failure of business owners to pay back wages resulted in an almost 100% increase in the number of labour disputes brought before the courts.11 Since the early days of the current crisis, the regime has clearly been bracing itself for trouble. Thus, at the start of 2009, an official news-agency story candidly warned Chinese readers that the country was, ‘without a doubt … entering a peak period of mass incidents’.12 In anticipation of an expected increase in unrest, the regime for the first time summoned all 3,080 county-level police chiefs to the capital to learn the latest riot-control tactics, and over 200 intermediate and lower-level judges were also called in for special training.13 At least for the moment, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) appears to be weathering the storm. But if in the next several years the economy slumps again or simply fails to return to its previous pace, Beijing’s troubles will mount. The regime probably has enough repressive capacity to cope with a good deal more turbulence than it has thus far encountered, but a protracted crisis could eventually pose a challenge to the solidarity of the party’s leadership and thus to its continued grip on political power. Sinologist Minxin Pei points out that the greatest danger to CCP rule comes not from below but from above. Rising societal discontent ‘might be sufficient to tempt some members of the elite to exploit the situation to their own political advantage’ using ‘populist appeals to weaken their rivals and, in the process, open[ing] up divisions within the party’s seemingly unified upper ranks’.14 If this happens, all bets will be off and a very wide range of outcomes, from a democratic transition to a bloody civil war, will suddenly become plausible. Precisely because it is aware of this danger, the regime has been very careful to keep whatever differences exist over how to deal with the current crisis within bounds and out of view. If there are significant rifts they could become apparent in the run-up to the pending change in leadership scheduled for 2012.

China is peaceful and doesn’t seek to disrupt the international system

**Hachigian**, Nina and **Peng,** Yuan ( a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, Director of the Institute for American Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations in Beijing, ) 20**10** “The US-China Expectations Gap: An Exchange”, Survival, 52: 4, 67-86

The international system is currently undergoing a fundamental change. The new international order requires that all the big powers cooperate with each other. The United States, as the only superpower, must assume an especially important role, and China as a rising power should also take its place. But peaceful coexistence is a precondition for peaceful cooperation. **China does not intend to challenge US hegemony, nor to change the current international system. On the contrary, it aims to build a good relationship with America through gradual and constructive cooperation, as it achieves its peaceful rise**.

A2: China – Economics

Beijing’s response to financial crisis destroys economic capability

Friedberg, 2010(Aaron, July 21st, professor of politics at Princeton University, *Implications of a Financial Crisis for U.S. – China Rivalry*, Survival, 52: 4,

33-4)

Whether or not China can sustain its initial recovery remains to be seen. At least in the near term, Beijing responded to the crisis by doubling down on a development model that was already approaching the limits of its utility. Rather than taking aggressive steps to boost consumer spending as a share of GDP, a course that both outside experts and many Chinese officials have identified as essential to sustaining long-term growth, the regime chose initially to pump even more money into infrastructure projects and to provide both direct and indirect support for a variety of export industries.6 While this approach may have been effective in preventing an even steeper shortterm drop in output, it threatens to create massive excess capacity, fuelling asset bubbles, weighing down banks with more non-performing loans and setting the stage for another slowdown that will be even deeper and more difficult to manage. As economist Stephen Roach points out, Beijing appears to have acted on the assumption that, as in previous recessions, foreign (and especially US) demand would soon recover, leading to a rise in exports and a resumption of rapid growth. If this turns out not to be the case, however, Roach concludes that China ‘runs the real risk of facing a more pronounced shortfall in economic growth’.7 In sum, short-term expedients may end up hastening the day of reckoning for China’s investment-heavy, export-led development strategy. While the regime has recently taken steps to encourage domestic demand, permitting workers wages to rise and the renminbi to appreciate, the changes to date have been small and tentative.8

Forward Deployment Link

Maintaining foreign deployments is key to US hegemony

Michael A. Allen, Department of Political Science Binghamton University (SUNY), "Deploying Military Bases Overseas: An Emprical Assessment", 6/6/10, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/3/1/3/6/9/p313697\_index.html

The analysis within the Harkavy books suggest one initial hypothesis that would normally act as a control variable in other studies: distance. Given that the rival for the United States during the Cold War was on the other side of a globe encourages the United States to deploy bases that are far from its own territory and closer to the Soviet Union. This impetus is also bolstered by the traditional borders of the United States containing two oceans and having its two neighbors be strong and stable allies during the Cold War. As such, we would expect the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 1: The further away a country is from the United States, the higher the likelihood the United States will deploy a base in its territory. The proximity of a state to the United States is an attractive variable for defensive and offensive reasons. Defensively, it allows for the interception of forces prior to reaching the United States and force potential conflicts to remain distant. **Offensively, it allows the United States to adequately project its military power into areas where conventional armies would normally require months to arrive**. Having some semblance of a force already deployed within a distant region makes coercion in bargaining with other states more credible.

Maintaining deployments is key to US hegemony

Washington Times, 2/1/10 ("Koreas talk after exchanging gunfire", http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/feb/01/koreas-talk-after-exchanging-gunfire/?page=1

In fact, preserving today's Pax Americana calls for extending at least these military institutional ties outside Europe in ways beyond the bilateral relationships of the past. In addition to conducting combined exercises with Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and others in a one-on-one fashion, the United States needs to build a larger security architecture--something like NATO--in other regions and with other partners. This need not be so formal a structure as the Atlantic alliance, and especially not so sclerotic a system as NATO has proven itself to be in recent years, but it could provide the practical and training basis for the wide range of coalition operations that might be necessary in the coming decades. And there could be other ways to increase cooperation among the democratic stakeholders in the post-Iraq international order: defense industrial cooperation, intelligence sharing-indeed, all the traditional tools of past alliances, but applied to new circumstances. Make no mistake, whatever the advantages of power and principle that inhere in being the sole superpower and the "last, best hope of mankind," preserving the unipolar moment is a tall order. John Ikenberry is correct when he observed that "the secret of the United States' long brilliant run as the world's leading state was its ability and willingness to exercise power within alliance and multinational frameworks."[4] But the challenge now is to weave a new fabric of international order, one that emphasizes the political rights of individuals, not merely the rights of states.

Perception of reduced U.S. forward deployment endangers U.S. security and encourages prolif

**The New Deterrent Working Group** (an informal team of defense and arms control experts with a combined total of decades of experience in the U.S. government, military service and nuclear weapons policy and programs. ) July 20**09** “ U.S. Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century” <http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/upload/wysiwyg/center%20publication%20pdfs/NDWG%20Getting%20It%20Right.pdf>

The alternative – an accord that either appears to, or in fact does, leave the United States without an offensive and defensive strategic force posture sufficiently robust to deter attacks on us, our interests and those of our allies, and to discourage proliferation – will contribute to an international environment characterized by: more nuclear weapons in more hands (many of them unfriendly); greater instability; and a far less secure America.

Forward Deployment Link

Forward deployed troop presence is necessary for effective power projection and balance-of-power maintenance.

Calder 2007 [Kent E., Prof. East Asian Studies @ Johns Hopkins U, Embattled Garrisons: comparative base politics and American globalism, p. 217]

Contrasting sharply to the Fortress America option is the traditional pattern of American basing policy since the Korean War—what might be best called “Classic Pax Americana.” The basic elements of this strategy include: (1) creation and maintenance of a U.S.-led world order based on preeminent American political, military, and economic power, and on American values; (2) maximization of U.S. control over the international system by preventing the emergence of rival powers in Europe and Asia; and (3) maintenance of economic interdependence as an American security interest. Forward deployment in Western Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Middle East has been fundamental to this strategy, in order to check potential hegemonic rivals and to assure adequate energy supplies.

The logic of Classic Pax Americana was relatively simple. Interdependence among allies of the industrialized world was crucial to global prosperity and well being, including that of the United States; instability caused by Soviet threats and communist domestic inroads was the central threat to that interdependence; and extended deterrence was the means through which U.S. strategy should counter that threat. America’s post-World War II strategy, as Wolfram Hanrieder points out, thus involved dual containment—both of the Soviet Union and Germany/Japan. U.S. forward deployment in Germany, Japan, and their environs was central to this broad neutralization of both potential challenges to American power and of regional balance-of-power rivalries.

Concentrated forward deployment is necessary for troop flexibility and deterrence.

Calder 2007 [Kent E., Prof. East Asian Studies @ Johns Hopkins U, Embattled Garrisons: comparative base politics and American globalism, p. 218-219]

The incrementalist school presents four main strategic reasons for a continued offshore basing presence, beyond the controversies of the American Iraq presence. First, the need to maintain air superiority requires offshore bases. Even in a world where long-range U.S. bombers such as the B-2 can strike targets far distant from America’s homeland, as they did in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, aircraft with shorter ranges are needed to patrol the skies around them, as well as to refuel them. Those aircraft need foreign bases.

A second reason for foreign bases relates to the need for ground forces abroad. These forces would be crucial in the event that friendly countries might be attacked and defeated before U.S. forces could respond, making it necessary to evict an aggressor. They could also be necessary for various kinds of reconnaissance and/or counterterrorist activities. Ground units may well get lighter and more mobile over time, but they will inevitably continue to be large, heavy, and quite unwieldy to deploy. This reality will necessitate an offshore supply presence – either bases or prepositioned equipment—to allow such forces to respond to contingencies in a timely manner.

A third reason for at least some offshore bases—even if scaled down and isolated to minimize expense and conflict with local societies—is the need for safe ports and friendly harbors, it is argued. These could, for example, be important to assuring secure passage in the energy sea-lanes from the Persian Gulf to consumers in the United States, Europe, and East Asia. The only way to move heavy ground forces and their equipment is, and prospectively will remain, by sea. If ports are required, it is much better to control them in advance. Thus the need is crucial for naval bases, or at least access agreements in potentially strategic areas.

A final rationale for a foreign base presence is strategic: the value of a “**tripwire**” that links a nation’s formal security commitments tangibly to its intercontinental geostrategic capabilities, and thus enhances deterrence. In the case of the United States, this logic can be formidable: with by far the most substantial, diverse, and accurate military arsenal on earth, including nuclear weapons and state-of-the-art delivery systems, the United States is in a position to retaliate at any conceivable level to attacks where its forces are engaged. Deterrence is strongest when a potential aggressor realizes that U.S. forces would suffer casualties in any attack that it might attempt, so could credibly be expected to retaliate.

Forward Deployment Link

Forward deployment key to US hegemony – deterrence and cooperation.

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**The most critical military aspect of the engagement strategy is forward deployment**. Post-Cold War reductions are nearly complete, and we now have about 285,000 personnel (or 17 percent of the active force) stationed overseas. That’s down from 510,000 (23 percent) just five years ago. But we are reminded by two articles in this issue that the debate over forward deployment continues. David Yost (in “The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence”) cites an opinion survey that shows about half of America’s elite favors maintaining current troop levels in Europe while the general public is far more isolationist. He points out that the Frank amendment of last year would have cut our force levels drastically if Europe declined to greatly increase host nation support payments. In commentary by James Lasswell (“Presence— Do We Stay or Do We Go?”)—a response to the new Air Force white paper, Global Presence, which appeared in JFQ, no. 7 (Spring 1995)—there is a strong case made for a continued naval presence overseas. This is a debate that, given the history of this century, cannot be allowed to drift. We need a national consensus in favor of continued overseas deployment. But to achieve that consensus we need a clearer understanding of the role of forward deployed forces in the post-Cold War era. **During the Cold War the Armed Forces were deployed overseas as part of containment to deter attack by a known enemy. We relied heavily on rapid reinforcement to defend. Today we still maintain a presence in South Korea and the Persian Gulf for the same purpose**. It is better to deter two major regional conflicts than to fight them. Such deployments are easy to justify. The complex strategic environment for this era, however, requires a better explanation of the overseas deployment of 285,000 Americans in uniform. It is this more complex case that must be made to the public. It rests on the concepts of reassurance, cooperation, and crisis response. Often even a token presence can serve like a cooling rod in a nuclear power plant. This is particularly true in Asia where a power balance among China, Japan, and the members of ASEAN has yet to be struck. Our roughly 100,000 military personnel stationed in East Asia stabilize the balance, reassure our friends, and prevent unnecessary regional military buildups. Most Asians recognize this more readily than Americans, which is why they wish us to stay and why Japan is willing to contribute a high level of host nation support. Reassurance also remains important in Europe where most want Germany to retain its non-nuclear status and defensive posture. In a world of multilateral diplomacy and combined military operations, close cooperation with foreign forces is indispensable. Habits learned in NATO facilitated the establishment of the coalition for Desert Shield/Desert Storm around which the Arab states gathered. This cooperation is not only critical for the success of combined forces on the battlefield, but it also yields diplomatic capital. Bosnia has illustrated the correlation between force presence and influence in the contact group. Cooperation can benefit civil-military relations in transitional societies as the Partnership for Peace has demonstrated. And cooperation yields intelligence assets, such as early warning of terrorist threats against the Panama Canal. **Forward deployment is crucial to forging patterns of cooperation without which American influence would rapidly decline**. Forward deployed forces are fundamental to America’s ability to react to crises around the world which affect vital interests or humanitarian concerns. In Desert Storm about 95 percent of the airlift came via Europe. A review of 27 operations mounted between March 1991 and October 1994 reveals that more than half were staged from Europe. Some, like Able Sentry, contribute to preventive diplomacy. **Without forward staging areas, America would be severely constrained. Each service struggles with a portion of forward deployment**. Many in the Army would prefer to bring home the two heavy divisions in Europe while only retaining a “reception center” infrastructure. There may be a case for replacing armor with more mobile light units. The Navy finds it increasingly difficult to retain a significant presence in the Caribbean, Mediterranean, Atlantic, Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf with a fleet two-thirds the size of a decade ago. As Marine Amphibious Units increasingly provide a mobile presence for crisis management, there do not seem to be enough to go around. Some within the Air Force advocate virtual as opposed to physical presence as a major contribution to our military capabilities. As we assess the significance of deterring regional conflicts, reassuring allies, cooperating in multilateral actions, and responding to crises, the case for forward deployment becomes clear. We are deployed overseas to **promote U.S. national interests** first and those of our allies second. This should not be a difficult notion to get across to the American people.

Forward Deployment Link

U.S. reneging on its commitments and withdrawing troops makes power projection difficult. Economic security, military capability and commitments to allies are impossible in a world of isolationism or off shore balancing.

Thayer 06(Bradley, Associate Professor in Missouri State University, *In Defense of Primacy*, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m2751/is\_86/ai\_n27065796/pg\_2/)

A grand strategy based on American primacy means ensuring the United States stays the world's number one power--the diplomatic, economic and military leader. Those arguing against primacy claim that the United States should retrench, either because the United States lacks the power to maintain its primacy and should withdraw from its global commitments, or because the maintenance of primacy will lead the United States into the trap of "imperial overstretch." In the previous issue of The National Interest, Christopher Layne warned of these dangers of primacy and called for retrenchment. (1)

Those arguing for a grand strategy of retrenchment are a diverse lot. They include isolationists, who want no foreign military commitments; selective engagers, who want U.S. military commitments to centers of economic might; and offshore balancers, who want a modified form of selective engagement that would have the United States abandon its landpower presence abroad in favor of relying on airpower and seapower to defend its interests.

**But retrenchment, in any of its guises, must be avoided. If the United States adopted such a strategy, it would be a profound strategic mistake that would lead to far greater instability and war in the world, imperil American security and deny the United States and its allies the benefits of primacy**.

There are two critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state? Should it strive to do this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft power capabilities. The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue. The United States has overwhelming military capabilities and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous folly, that will remain the case for the foreseeable future, With few exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment acknowledge this.

So the debate revolves around the desirability of maintaining American primacy. Proponents of retrenchment focus a great deal on the costs of U.S. action--but they fail to realize what is good about American primacy. The price and risks of primacy are reported in newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it are not.

A GRAND strategy of ensuring American primacy takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor.

In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then **the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats.**

And when enemies must be confronted, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. **This requires a physical, on-the-ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing.**

Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S. primacy is secured because America, at present, commands the "global commons"--the oceans, the world's airspace and outer space--allowing the United States to project its power far from its borders, while denying those common avenues to its enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies are reduced, and the robustness of the United States' conventional and strategic deterrent capabilities is increased. (2) This is not an advantage that should be relinquished lightly.

Link Booster

Every instance matters—any case of withdrawal causes rivals to challenge US hegemony

DR. JACQUELYN K. DAVIS et al, executive VP of IFPA, DR. ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR., Professor of International Security Studies at Tufts University, DR. CHARLES M. PERRY, VP and director of studies of IFPA, JAMES L. SCHOFF, associate director of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, ”UPDATING U.S. DETERRENCE CONCEPTS AND OPERATIONAL PLANNING REASSURING ALLIES, DETERRING LEGACY THREATS, AND DISSUADING NUCLEAR "WANNABES"”, February 2009, Institute for Foreign Policy Analyses, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating\_US\_Deterrence\_Concepts.pdf

If the notion of tailored deterrence is key to 21st century deterrence planning, so, too, is the recognition that while deterrence must be regionally focused, it must still have global relevance. In other words, how we deal with North Korea **will have implications and "lessons-learned" for how we deal with** **an Iranian leadership** on the brink of crossing the nuclear threshold. This is evident from IFPA's recent assessments of nuclear trends in both countries, as is the fact that U.S. partners and potential adversaries are **watching us very closely,** and are deriving lessons for themselves from innovations in U.S. defense and deterrence planning. Indeed, there is some evidence that Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons follows to some extent from North Korea's defi­ance in the Six-Party Talks, and that the Iranian leadership perceives nuclear weapons as one way to deter U.S. attempts to bring down the regime in Tehran. Likewise, as Japan and the United States engage in operational planning discussions about North Korea and Taiwan, Japanese policy elites are striving to assess the degree to which NATO's extended deterrence experiences and formats—particularly, the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on European soil and NATO's nuclear consultations on an Alliance-wide level—may apply to future U.S.-Japanese security co­operation that might include a more explicit link to forward-deployed U.S. nuclear forces and shared nuclear decision-making. This is occurring, as will be discussed below, at a time when the NATO allies themselves are about to embark on their own new assessment of defense and deter­rence planning for the new era, including the ongoing utility of NATO nuclear forces.

Credibility Link

Maintaining commitment credibility is key to deter challenges to US hegemony

Max Boot is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of "War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today.", "America in decline? Not in today's world: Max Boot", 6/8/10, http://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2010/06/america\_in\_decline\_not\_in\_toda.html

Much nonsense has been written in recent years about the prospects of American decline and the inevitable rise of China. But it was not a declining power that I saw in recent weeks as I jetted from the Middle East to the Far East through two of America's pivotal geographic commands -- Central Command and Pacific Command.

The very fact that the entire world is divided into American military commands is significant. There is no French, Indian or Brazilian equivalent -- not yet even a Chinese counterpart. It is simply assumed without much comment that American soldiers will be central players in the affairs of the entire world. It is also taken for granted that a vast network of U.S. bases will stretch from Germany to Japan -- more than 700 in all, depending on how you count. They constitute a virtual American empire of Wal-Mart-style PXs, fast-food restaurants, golf courses and gyms. There is an especially large American presence in the Middle East, one of the world's most crisis-prone regions. For all the anti-Americanism in the Arab world, almost all the states bordering what they call the Arabian Gulf support substantial American bases. These governments are worried about the looming Iranian threat and know that only the United States can offer them protection. They are happy to deal with China, but it would never occur to a single sultan or sheik that the People's Liberation Army will protect them from Iranian intimidation. In the Far East, a similar dynamic prevails. All of China's neighbors happily trade with it, but all are wary of the Middle Kingdom's pretensions to regional hegemony. Even Vietnam, a country that handed America its worst military defeat ever, is eager to establish close ties with Washington as a counter to Beijing. What of America's two most important allies in Northeast Asia -- South Korea and Japan? Not long ago, relations with Seoul were frosty because it was pursuing a "sunshine policy" of outreach to North Korea that the George W. Bush administration (rightly) viewed as one of the world's most dangerous rogue states. More recently, relations with Japan became strained after the election of the Liberal Democratic Party in 2009 on a platform of cozying up to China, rethinking the 50-year-old alliance between the United States and Japan, and moving U.S. bases out of Okinawa. Now Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has had to undertake an embarrassing U-turn by agreeing to an earlier plan that would move a U.S. Marine Corps air base from one part of Okinawa to another, but keep it on the island. In justifying his reversal, Hatoyama said "we cannot afford to reduce the U.S. military deterrence" because of "political uncertainties remaining in East Asia." There is no shortage of such uncertainties with the Chinese navy becoming increasingly assertive in moving into Japanese waters and with North Korea, which has missiles that can easily hit Japan, sinking a South Korean naval ship. The latter incident naturally has focused attention in Seoul and served to accelerate the reaffirmation of close American-Korean ties that had already begun with the election of the more conservative President Lee Myung-bak in 2008. The anti-Americanism that had been prevalent in South Korea only a few years ago has all but disappeared, and it is not only (or even mainly) because of President Barack Obama's vaunted charm. It is largely because South Korea has tried detente and found that it did nothing to moderate the aggressive behavior of the North Korean regime. China is South Korea's largest trade partner by far, but Beijing shows scant interest in reining in Kim Jong Il. Chinese leaders fear that North Korea will collapse, leading to a horde of refugees moving north and, eventually, the creation an American-allied regime on the Yalu River. Rather than risk this strategic calamity, China continues to prop up the crazy North Korean communists -- to the growing consternation of South Koreans, who can never forget that Seoul, a city of 15 million people, is within range of what the top U.S. commander in South Korea describes as the world's largest concentration of artillery. South Korea knows that only the United States offers the deterrence needed to keep a nuclear-armed North Korea in check. That is why the South Koreans, who have one of the world's largest militaries (655,000 activity-duty personnel), are eager to host 28,000 U.S. troops in perpetuity and even to hand over their military forces in wartime to the command of an American four-star general. Under an agreement negotiated during the Bush administration, operational control is due to revert to the South Koreans in 2012, but senior members of the government and military told us they want to push that date back by a number of years. South Korea's eagerness to continue subordinating its armed forces to American control is the ultimate vote of confidence in American leadership. What other country would the South Koreans possibly entrust with the very core of their national existence? Not China, that's for sure. And yet South Korea is not so unusual in this regard. The Persian Gulf emirates also entrust their continued existence to America's benign power. The Kurds, whom we visited in Irbil, are eager to host a U.S. base, because they know that all of the gains they have made since 1991 have been made possible by our protection. Even Arab Iraqi politicians, who traffic in nationalist slogans while running for office, are quietly talking about renegotiating the accord that would bring the U.S. troop presence in Iraq to zero by the end of 2011. They know what Kosovars, Kuwaitis and countless others have learned over many decades: American power is the world's best guarantor of freedom and prosperity. This isn't to deny the prevalence of anti-Americanism even in the Age of Obama. Nor is it to wish away the real threats to American power -- from external challenges (Iran, China, Islamist terrorists) to, more worrying, internal weaknesses (rising debt levels, decreasing military spending as a percentage of the federal budget, a shrinking Navy). But if my cross-global jaunt taught me anything, it is that those countries that dismiss the prospects for continuing American leadership do so at their peril. The U.S. still possesses unprecedented power projection capabilities, and just as important, it is armed with the goodwill of countless countries that know the U.S. offers protection from local bullies. They may resent us, but they fear their neighbors, and that's the ultimate buttress of our status as the world's superpower.

Bases Link

Bases are key to primacy

Zachary Fillingham, Geopolitical Monitor, a military research service, "U.S. military bases: a global footprint", 12/9/09, http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/us-military-bases-a-global-footprint-1/

In the words of the U.S. Overseas Basing Commission, U.S. military bases are, “the skeleton upon which the flesh and muscle of operational capability [can be] molded [1].” Global military bases have been a constant in U.S. foreign policy since World War II. Currently, there are over seven hundred of them worldwide, serving as home for over 2,500,000 military personnel [3]. On top of America’s permanent base structure, the U.S. Navy’s eleven aircraft carriers can also be taken as impromptu military bases insofar that they can be rapidly deployed to project American military power anywhere in the world [2]. Supporters maintain that U.S. military bases provide a litany of strategic benefits: they guarantee American access to markets and strategic commodities (energy in particular), afford the U.S. military a forward position with which to project military power, and serve as a potent symbol of American global power [2]. To detractors, they are merely a euphemism for empire and all too frequently their strategic value is nullified by the political, social, and environmental rot suffered in the host country.

Bases are key to US power projection—history proves

Michael A. Allen, Department of Political Science Binghamton University (SUNY), "Deploying Military Bases Overseas: An Emprical Assessment", 6/6/10, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/3/1/3/6/9/p313697\_index.html

Military basing in foreign countries is a fundamental component of military force projection for any power wishing to exercise influence outside of its immediate region. The use of foreign deployments by democracies has a historical legacy that dates back to the Delian league as the Athenian city-state expanded its influence via outposts throughout Ancient Greece and the tradition of extra-territorial basing continued through the Roman Empire (Finely, 1998; Luttwak, 1979). With each democratic power that has expanded its influence through deploying military assets abroad, accusations of imperialism were quickly established both during their time and in subsequent writings (Finely, 1998). These same accusations have been levied against the United States in popular press as the US currently holds the most extensive base deployment and coverage in world history. This manuscript attempts to find the determinants of base deployment to discern the primary driving forces behind the decision to establish a new base in a foreign country by the United States. While there has been a rise of claims arguing pax Americana is being or has been achiesved via a network of military bases through an intentional, imperialist agenda (Bacevich, 2002; Chomsky, 2004; Johnson, 2004), there have been very few large-scale quantitative work verifying the claim in international relations. This paper presents a new dataset detailing the name and location of major military installation deployments by the United States since the end of the 19th century. The paper uses multiple regression techniques to ascertain primary influences on base deployment and finds that strategic security concerns have a primary effect in determining what countries the United States is likely to use as a basing site while alternative explanations are less satisfactory. This paper proceeds in five sections. The next section discusses the current literature on military bases and the relevant hypotheses to be derived from it while the third section details the collection of the foreign deployed military assets data. Section four presents the research design and section five conducts and interprets the regression results. The final section concludes the paper with further thoughts and a proposed agenda for further investigation.

Afghanistan Link

Withdrawal from Afghanistan would be in the end of US hegemony, inviting Iran and Pakistan to fill the vacuum

John Byrnes, Fmr. Advisor to the Afghan National Police on counter-insurgency, 9/7/09, American Thinker (Afghanistan Matters, <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/2334403/posts>)

Afghanistan continues to be a failed state, Pakistan is failing. We have the opportunity to continue to influence events in the region due to our presence in Afghanistan. Should the US withdraw entirely from Afghanistan certain events are highly likely to unfold. The first would be a Taliban victory in Afghanistan. The Taliban might not see the complete victory they achieved in 1996. They would at least end up seizing and dominating several provinces. These provinces would certainly include several, North and East, which dominate the landlocked nation’s rudimentary road net. The Taliban would gain a stranglehold on the Afghan economy. They would also rule the Pashtun speaking border region. The resulting consequences of this outcome are impossible to predict. However a larger autonomous Taliban dominated zone would surely threaten the weak Pakistani government. The unspoken, nightmare outcome, we all seek to avoid, is the takeover of Pakistan by the Taliban. Pakistan is a nuclear power. Yet in spite of this modern achievement, it is a failing nation. Assassination and civil violence have dominated recent politics. The populace is fragmented ethnically and politically. The urban elites live western lives with modern hopes. Most others live poor desperate lives. Islam is the single greatest unifying factor. Pakistanis of various ethnicities have shown a consistent predilection for anti-American, anti-western, pro-Taliban politics. Two or even three Talibanized nations in place of today’s Afghanistan and Pakistan are in no one’s interest, especially if one of them is nuclear armed. Remember, Afghanistan’s western neighbor is the WMD seeking state of Iran. That nation has infiltrated arms and personnel into the western Farsi speaking provinces of Afghanistan to pressure the US and Afghan governments, and to create its own sphere of influence. George Will’s imagined scenario of special-forces and airpower serving in place of boots on the ground in Afghanistan surely sounds good to deskbound policy wonks. But they would do well to remember that policy failed us through the Clinton era. At that time Pakistan was under the more stable hand of Musharraf. If we abandon our foothold in Afghanistan, we abandon our contacts on the ground. In order for predators, cruise missiles, and SF operators to succeed repeatedly against al-Qaeda, or any other enemies, our forces need human intelligence. This is why al-Qaeda and the Taliban high command retreated to and continue to hide in the inaccessible reaches of Pakistan. It’s why al-Qaeda chose the then closed state of Afghanistan as a base in the first place. A premature withdrawal from Afghanistan will also present a tremendous propaganda victory to the Taliban. This would be a truly strategic weapon for all of our Islamist enemies in the current struggle. George Will has stepped up his campaign, and now wants to quit Iraq early as well. He cites the ties that Shiite Iran has established with Shiite Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki as a reason to end our commitment there. If we were to follow Mr. Will’s prescription, by 2011 we could be facing a hostile band of powers stretching from the India-Pakistan border through Syria, to the Mediterranean. This would be the worst middle-eastern scenario the US ever faced, as bad as the Soviet dominated region envisioned by Carter and Reagan circa 1980. We could face two Islamic, hostile, nuclear powers. Such an outcome would represent the beginning of the end for Israel. It would signify the end of American hegemony, and the start of a truly new world order; one that would be highly unfavorable to our interests. These are just the consequences for us. Mr. Will would also abandon the Afghans, the Iraqis and others to the Taliban to the likeminded Shia of Iran, and to al-Qaeda. He and his applause section remind us that Islam is incompatible with democracy, that extremism pervades the region, and that generally we have no business there anymore.While I do not subscribe to the left’s drivel that poverty and frustration are the root of terrorism, I think that a poorer more Islamic mid-east will be more miserable for the Afghans and Iraqis, and the Pakistanis and Iranians. Having spent time in both Iraq and Afghanistan, I have seen that most people there want peace and prosperity. They want to end the violence and raise their children more comfortably than poverty and war has thus far allowed. While Islam may indeed lend itself to oppressive rule, so did Christianity, for nearly two millennia of Romans, feudalism, and absolutism. Today, millions of Iraqis and Afghans have shown an appreciation for democracy, and the idea of peaceful, lawful change of governments. Come to think of it, so have the much abused Lebanese. In Iran, millions voted, and when the mullahs executed a massive electoral fraud millions protested. In India millions of Muslims regularly live peaceful lives in a democracy. It is true that democratizing the Islamic world is not, and should not be the primary prescriptive mission of the US military. However to cede the entire middle-east to the forces of extremism, to abandon our allies, to surrender our security, and make the world a much more dangerous place seems folly. And to do it so that we can say we are not nation building, so that our military is doing what a few purists claim is “its job” is beyond foolishness. My job as a soldier is to preserve the security of my nation by whatever means necessary. Right now I can’t think of a better way we can do that than holding the line against the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan Link

Afghan Withdrawal would end US global influence and spark backlash against hegemony worldwide

J ALEXANDER **THEIR**, director for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the U.S. Institute of Peace, 11/30/09, Foreign Policy (Afghanistan is Still Worth the Fight, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/30/afghanistan_is_still_worth_the_fight>)

The final argument that compels continued U.S. engagement in Afghanistan is perhaps the most difficult for Obama to make: failure in Afghanistan will have broad and unpredictable implications for the U.S. role in the world.

The United States and NATO would suffer a credibility crisis if the Taliban and al Qaeda can claim a full military victory in Afghanistan. On the heels of the disastrous U.S. experience in Iraq, the United States risks appearing feckless, unable to accomplish its highest priority national security objectives and perhaps unable to even define them. Where will its allies be willing to follow the United States next? If NATO is similarly unable to sustain commitment to its first-ever declaration of collective action in defense of a member, how will it respond to other challenges in the future?

This is not a question of "saving face"-- the lifespan of al Qaeda and Talibanism will be determined by the perceptions of the region's populations about the strength and righteousness of the militants. In 2001, the Taliban were not just weakened, but discredited. In 2009, will the Taliban be seen as Afghanistan's (and Pakistan's) future?

This malaise is likely to hit the United States at home, as well. Americans will grow increasingly skeptical of their ability to act effectively in the world, to deliver aid, to keep a difficult peace. Whatever happens in Afghanistan,

U.S. engagement in the unstable corners of our world will remain an essential element of our security and prosperity in the next century. In that context, Afghanistan, beset by extremism, conflict, and poverty remains not only important in its own right, but a critical exemplar of the challenges we must meet in the decades to come.

Afghanistan Link

US giving up in Afghanistan would allow Iran, Pakistan, India and Russia to fill the void

The Economist, 6/24/10 (After McCrystal, http://www.economist.com/node/16432784)

This infighting and hesitancy signal a lack of commitment that has drowned out Mr Obama’s warlike rhetoric. That has blighted the war’s chances of success. Too few Afghans and Pakistanis have thrown in their lot with the West, because too many think America has no stomach for the fight. Were so much not at stake, it would be tempting to give up and call the troops home. Yet, although Western leaders have done a poor job at explaining the war in Afghanistan to their voters, a defeat there would be a disaster. The narrow aim of denying al-Qaeda a haven, already frustrated by the terrorists’ scope to lodge in unruly parts of northern Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, would become impossible to achieve. A Western withdrawal would leave Afghanistan vulnerable to a civil war that might suck in the local powers, including Iran, Pakistan, India and Russia. Sooner or later, the poison would end up harming America too: it always does. Defeat in Afghanistan would mark a humiliation for the West, and for NATO, that would give succour to its foes in the world. And do not forget the Afghan people. Having invaded their country, the West has a duty to return it to them in a half-decent state.

It would be idle to harbour such dreams if they were unattainable. Yet, grim as it is, the violence in Afghanistan even now pales beside Iraq at its worst. In the pit of that conflict tens of thousands of people were dying each year, at least ten times more than in Afghanistan today. The ranks of the Afghan army and police force are slowly filling with recruits. There are reasons to think that many Afghans would like to be rid of the Taliban, if only they could believe in an alternative.

Afghanistan Link

US withdrawal leaves power in the Middle East to terrorist organizations and global power retreat

Robert Kagan, member of Council on Foreign Relations, 9/3/09, Post Partisan (Washington Post, Will’s Double Surrender Policy, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/postpartisan/2009/09/wills\_double\_surrender\_policy.html)

It’s hard to imagine a more disastrous blow to vital American security interests than the double surrender George Will is now proposing. To withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously would be to abandon American interests and allies in the Persian Gulf and greater Middle East. The consequences of such a retreat would be to shift the balance of influence in the region decidedly away from pro-U.S. forces in the direction of the most radical forces in Tehran, as well as toward al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Taliban, to name just the most prominent beneficiaries. Long-time allies of the United States would either have to accommodate to these radical forces and fall under their sway, or take matters into their own hands. What Will is proposing would constitute the largest strategic setback in American history. At a broader level, these withdrawals would signal to the world a new era of American isolationism. If we are willing to hand over Afghanistan and Iraq to radical terrorist forces, where would we not retreat? Yes, the situations in both Iraq and Afghanistan are difficult. But they are far from unmanageable. Iraq has benefited immensely from the American surge and the political processes it has made possible. Afghanistan is in bad shape, but a concerted effort by our military and civilian forces, as well as by our allies, can produce stability and the possibility of progress with time, as top military leaders, including Gen. Stanley McChrystal, have attested. Will wants us to commit preemptive suicide for fear of being killed. But we need to show some of the patience and fortitude previous generations of Americans have shown, and in far more dire circumstances. We are not in Iraq and Afghanistan today on a lark. The price of our failure would be enormous, both in the region, and, potentially, at home

Afghanistan Link

Withdrawal would be the death-knell to global power and would give emerging powers the chance to take hold

Shahid R. Siddiqi, Pakistani journalist and Fmr. Member of Pakistan’s air force, 4/26/09, Foreign Policy Journal (Obama’s Options in Afghanistan, http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2009/04/26/obamas-options-in-afghanistan/all/1)

Much as President Obama would like to quickly disengage from the ruinous Afghan war, which has come to be characterised as a battle between David and the Goliath, he finds hasty retreat difficult to make. His real dilemma is the spectre of Jihadist threat to American security. He “will not allow terrorists to plot against the American people from safe havens halfway around the world,” he said. Jihadis, Al Qaeda followers or movement of the Islamic right, whatever you may call them, remain deeply entrenched in Afghanistan’s south and east and in collaboration with Taliban are increasingly gaining ground. Despite universal opposition to continued military involvement, President Obama risks paying dearly if he chooses to fold his tent and return home, no matter how misconceived it was to begin with. The sight of the American military giant limping back home, abandoning the much trumpeted war on terror, could signal American withdrawal from the world stage at a time when its monopoly on power is being challenged by other emerging power centres. This would badly compromise Obama’s ability to wield political and military influence in Europe and elsewhere and give Jihadi movements a shot in the arm.

Afghanistan Link

Withdrawing allows a Taliban takeover that eliminates US power in central Asia

Kuldip Nayar, fmr. Indian delegate to the UN, 7/10/2010, Gulfnews (US withdrawal will suit Taliban, http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/us-withdrawal-will-suit-taliban-1.652230)

For obvious reasons, America plays a crucial role in the region — not only because of the troops it has deployed but also because of the coalition, including the UK and the European Union, that it has put together. Yet President Barack Obama's declaration that the US forces will soon begin withdrawing undermines the fight against the Taliban. How can you fight when you declare beforehand that you will soon quit? The last time America did this, it gave birth to the Taliban government. This time the scenario could be worse because the Taliban have already tasted power. At present, they are lying low and awaiting the departure of the American forces. The Afghanistan government is not viable, nor has its military developed the teeth to thwart the Taliban. The basic question remains unanswered: How to eliminate the Taliban, who have made Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan their playground? They have killed hundreds of Pakistanis. There is no alternative but to eliminate them. India and Pakistan have to develop a joint strategy to fight the Taliban, who are threatening the whole of South Asia. If nothing else, the two countries have to think of ways to fill the vacuum that the withdrawal of American troops will create.

The presence in Afghanistan is the linchpin of current geopolitics

M K Bhadrakumar, was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. 10/15/08, The Asia-Pacific Journal (US, Russia, NATO and the Future of Afghanistan: Taliban Resurgence and the Geopolitics of Oil, http://www.japanfocus.org/-M\_K-Bhadrakumar/2924)

But what clouds judgment is the geopolitics of the war. The war provided a context for the establishment of a US military presence in Central Asia; NATO's first-ever "out of area" operation; a turf which overlooks the two South Asian nuclear weapon states of India and Pakistan, Iran and China's restive Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; a useful toehold on a potential transportation route for Caspian energy bypassing Russia and Iran, etc. The situation around Iran; the US's "Great Central Asia" policy and containment strategy towards Russia; NATO's expansion - these have become added factors. Surely, geopolitical considerations lie embedded even within the current attempt to revive the Saudi mediatory role.

Afghanistan Link

Announcing a premature withdrawal date emboldens Pakistan, Russia, Iran, and China to fill the vacuum

Michael Rubin, lecturere at Naval Postgraduate School and John Hopkins, 3/8/2010, Articles and Commentary (American Enterprise Institute, The Afghanistan Withdrawal, http://www.aei.org/article/101753)

The problem with the logic that a firm deadline pressures positively Karzai's government is that it assumes that Washington and Kabul are alone in the sandbox. The fact remains, however, that Karzai has no shortage of potential foreign partners whose outlook may sharply diverge from U.S. interests. Indeed, the reason why Karzai was such an attractive figure at the December 2001 Bonn Conference was he was the one Afghan leader who could talk to all sides. For a short period of time, in the mid-1990s, he had even allied himself with the Taliban. While I certainly agree with Schlesinger that it is important to lever all aspects of U.S. power to nudge Karzai in the right direction, Washington must recognize that Karzai has other options. Obama and Karzai have had a tense relationship dating back to Obama's days as a senator. During a July 2008 trip to Afghanistan, Obama chided Karzai for failure to promote good governance. "I told President Karzai that I thought that he needs to really focus on issues of corruption and counternarcotics and to counter the narcotics trade much more aggressively than has been done so far," Obama said. After winning the Democratic Party's nomination, Obama blasted Karzai in the second presidential debate, declaring, "We have to have a government that is responsive to the Afghan people, and frankly it's just not responsive right now." Shortly before Joe Biden became vice president, a meeting with Karzai grew so tense that Biden stormed out of the meeting. It was in this context that, even before Obama launched his policy review, Karzai began considering other options. Shortly after Obama's victory, Karzai suggested that if the White House did not like his policy--in this case outreach to Mullah Omar--they could simply leave Afghanistan. Likewise, speaking to a visiting United Nations Security Council team, Karzai himself called for a timeline for U.S. withdrawal. When Karzai makes such statements to increase pressure on Washington, it holds that U.S. threats along the same vein backfire. The Pakistan Problem Pakistan, Russia, Iran, and even China are willing to move in at Karzai's invitation and fill any vacuum the U.S. leaves behind. I'm not as sanguine as Schlesinger that any of Afghanistan's neighbors would ever involve themselves positively from a standpoint of U.S. national interests. Pakistani behavior has already changed for the worse as a result of Obama's deadline. Some analysts on Pakistani television pointed out how Obama's deadline would embolden the Taliban, while others said, at the very least, the July 2011 benchmark would lead policymakers to base decisions on an artificial deadline rather than on-the-ground reality. While Pakistani authorities had previously been reluctant to approach the Taliban, after Obama announced the finite U.S. commitment, Pakistan's Army Chief of Staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, offered to mediate directly with the Taliban. According to The New York Times, "Pakistani officials familiar with General Kayani's thinking said that even as the United States adds troops to Afghanistan, he has determined that the Americans are looking for a fast exit." A Hasty Exit Obama's deadline for withdrawal snatches defeat from the jaws of victory. He emboldened Afghanistan's adversaries and undermined the chance for U.S. success. His advisers engaged in projection--assuming that adversaries' calculations and thought processes would mirror their own. Rather than pressure Karzai to embrace better governance, with one throw-away line, Obama did the opposite. It is not too late for the President to recognize the psychological aspect of the surge and state clearly that he will settle for nothing less than victory. Unfortunately, until he does, U.S. servicemen on the frontlines will pay the price.

Withdrawal creates a power vacuum emboldening the Taliban Al quidea, and Iran and would allow Russia to regain primacy in the Middle East

Dr. Miklos Radvanyi, Vice President, International Policy at Frontier of Freedom, 11/12/09, Frontiers of Freedom (The Afghanistan Crucible, http://ff.org/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=478&Itemid=1)

Under these unfavorable circumstances President Obama will definitely opt for a fairly quick exit strategy that he and Congress will disguise as gradual “Afghanization.” In this sense, the focus of his administration will become resolutely parochial and his foreign policy chaotic. For any premature withdrawal from Afghanistan will be interpreted as defeat and will create a power vacuum that necessarily will be filled by even more radical elements than the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The failure in Afghanistan will also definitely embolden the same radical forces in Pakistan that, in turn, will enhance the likelihood of greater conflicts with India. In view of the Obama Administration’s abandonment of Afghanistan, Iran will conclude that the United States will not challenge Tehran’s regional ambitions. The ensuing power vacuum in the Middle East will force the Arab governments either to adjust themselves to the new geopolitical realities, or seek again Russian protection. At the end, the United States will have no other choice but to reenter Afghanistan and reclaim its positions in South-East Asia and the greater Middle East.

Afghanistan Link

Current strategy makes the US look strong in the region, adhering to a deadline emboldens enemies to fill the vacuum

Max Boot, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 12/7/2009, Opinion (Atlanta Journal Constitution, Pro & Con: Is Obama’s troop surge the right policy in Afghanistan?, http://www.ajc.com/opinion/pro-s-troop-surge-230980.html)

Obama’s decision to send 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan changes the equation. The first reinforcements will be Marines headed for Helmand — and a likely showdown in Marjah. There will be hard fighting ahead, just as there was last summer when Marines entered Nawa and other Taliban strongholds. But with enough resources and enough patience, there is little doubt that American troops and their Afghan allies will be able to secure key areas of southern Afghanistan that have slipped out of the government’s grasp.

The questions that remain unanswered after the president’s West Point address: Will the troops have the time and resources needed to win? “Win” is a word that Obama avoided. He cited his long-standing goal of “disrupting, dismantling and defeating al-Qaida and its extremist allies,” but he spoke merely of his desire to “break the Taliban’s momentum” rather than defeat it altogether.

Nor did he endorse nation-building, even though the only way that Afghanistan will ever be secure is if we build a state capable of policing its own territory.

The most problematic part of Obama’s policy is his pledge to begin a withdrawal in July 2011. Getting 30,000 troops into Afghanistan is a difficult logistical challenge. It will be a major achievement if all of them are in place by July 2010. That will give them only a year to reverse many years of Taliban gains before their own numbers start to dwindle. That may or may not be sufficient. The “surge” in Iraq had a big impact within a year, but the United States had made a much bigger commitment to Iraq pre-surge than it has in Afghanistan.

The good part of the deadline is that it presumably means we will be spared another agonizing White House review for at least another year. That’s no small thing, given that Obama first unveiled an Afghan strategy on March 27, and less than six months later launched another drawn-out reappraisal.

The worrisome part of the deadline is that it may signal a lack of resolve that emboldens our enemies.

But for all the problems of the West Point address, the policy he announced is sound. It is essentially the strategy that Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal and his team of advisers developed this summer for a comprehensive counterinsurgency — yet another word Obama avoided, oddly enough. The president isn’t providing quite as many troops as McChrystal would like, but, counting allies’ contributions, there probably will be enough to secure key population centers.

Afghanistan Link

US withdrawal diverts India’s attentions, allowing China to be emboldened

Robert Kaplan, senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, 10/ 6/ 2009, NYT (Beijing’s Afghan Gamble, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/07/opinion/07kaplan.html?\_r=2&hp=&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1254922024-DtWtE47N281yEQSnYLmKyQ)

But what if America decides to leave, or to drastically reduce its footprint to a counterterrorism strategy focused mainly on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border? Then another scenario might play out. Kandahar and other areas will most likely fall to the Taliban, creating a truly lawless realm that wrecks China’s plans for an energy and commodities passageway through South Asia. It would also, of course, be a momentous moral victory achieved by radical Muslims who, having first defeated the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, will then have triumphed over another superpower. And the calculations get more complicated still: a withdrawal of any kind from Afghanistan before a stable government is in place would also hurt India, a critical if undeclared American ally, and increasingly a rival of China. Were the Taliban to retake Afghanistan, India would face a radical Islamistan stretching from its border with Pakistan deep into Central Asia. With the Taliban triumphant on Pakistan’s western border, jihadists there could direct their energies to the eastern border with India. India would defeat Pakistan in a war, conventional or nuclear. But having to do so, or simply needing to face down a significantly greater jihadist threat next door, would divert India’s national energies away from further developing its economy and its navy, a development China would quietly welcome.

Afghanistan Link

US Power in Afghanistan is key to preventing and Iranian rise

Mehmood-Ul-Hassan Khan, contributor to Dawn, the News, International, Nation, Business Recorder, Pakistan Times, Asia Times, 7/3/2010, Overseas Pakistan Friends (Afghanistan: A Hub of Regional Geo-Politics Compulsions and International Geo-Strategic Apparatus, http://www.opfblog.com/10963/afghanistan-a-hub-of-regional-geo-politics-compulsions-and-international-geo-strategic-apparatus/)

In recent times, Afghanistan has become the hub of regional and international power game. Hot pursuits of socio-economic dominance, geo-political superiority and above all geo-strategic presence have already made Afghanistan a flash-point of regional and international power politics. New chess-board has been staged in and around Afghanistan. New guidelines, reformation of foreign policies and the last not the least, strategic rethinking has been reshaped and remerged among the power brokers and main stakeholders. Hectic efforts show that time is short and interests are too big to handle with ease. To secure their short and long terms geo-political and geo-strategic interests composed main key players in the region have already paid personal visits to Kabul for new geo-political and geo-strategic alignments. The surprise visit of US and Iran’s presidents and others high officials indicates that rethinking and regrouping are taking place. An intensive US and NATO military offensive against the Taliban is underway in southern Afghanistan, neighbouring countries are thinking the Americans as good as gone. The old rivalries are renewed and hidden diplomacy is at its peak.

Iran is postioning itself for Afghan control-US withdrawal would only help them

Paul Vallely, Fmr. Deputy Commanding General, Pacific, 7/12/2010, Stand up America (The Iran – Afghanistan Connection, <http://standupamericaus.com/the-iran-afghanistan-connection:35158>)

America’s longest war is a disaster to date for the US-led NATO forces or at best in a draw, or at worst, in a win for the Taliban, al Qaeda’s extremist partner. Iran sees its hegemony in the region further developing and increasing at the expense of the United States and ISAF Forces. The repercussions of the US exit in these circumstances will impinge on American influence worldwide including the Middle East. The longer the Obama administration clings to the assumption that cooperation with Pakistan and its intelligence agency is the only course for beating the Taliban and al Qaeda, the more elusive an Afghanistan triumph will be for the US and its allies. Iran is winning either way. In the political and security vacuum that is today’s Afghanistan, Karzai’s effort to engage the Taliban is generating deep unease among Iran’s allies in Afghanistan’s Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara communities. Already, the leadership of these non-Pashtun communities – who also dominate the upper echelons of the Afghan military – are organizing to resist, by force, any serious attempt at power-sharing between Karzai’s government and the Taliban. If the Taliban’s political influence across Afghanistan continues to grow – particularly in an environment conditioned by what Tehran sees as America’s strategic and tactical incompetence – Iran will support its Afghan allies as they push back against a resurgent Taliban.” As Tehran pursues this strategy within Afghanistan, it must also assess the evolving role of the United States there and the implications of the U.S. posture toward Iran for Iran’s Afghanistan policy. Tehran perceives Washington as hostile to its interest which is the case and is driven by Obama administration’s pursuit of tightened sanctions. Iranian policymakers will regard the United States, along with America’s Pakistani and Saudi allies, as part of the complex of anti-Iranian external players that Iran needs to balance against in Afghanistan. In this context, Iran has a strong interest in preventing U.S. troops in Afghanistan from influencing any situation along the borders and use of covert operatives to undermine the Iranian government, or used to strengthen Iran There is no question that Afghanistan as a whole is one major SNAFU. Yes, the United States still lacks a comprehensive interagency strategic plan which will outline an end state. Yes, some Non-Government Organizations are working closely with Anti-Afghan Forces providing them with training as well as aiding and abetting their needs. And yes, the country is swiftly falling into the hands of the opposition. In contrast to the United States, which seems at least to be looking for a viable exit strategy from Afghanistan, there is no exit strategy for Iran. Iran publicly calls for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, partly because U.S. forces there could be used against Iran and US influence in the region. But Tehran also calls for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan because Iranian policymakers believe that the extended U.S. presence there is seen by much of the population as an occupation and that it is this occupation which is fueling an increasingly fierce cycle of violence and instability. From Tehran’s perspective, this cycle of violence and instability empowers Iran’s Afghan adversaries, principally the Taliban, and their external backers, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, both of which are regional rivals to the Islamic Republic.

Afghanistan Link

Withdrawal signal Jihadist victory over America and give power to extremists

J ALEXANDER **THEIR**, director for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the U.S. Institute of Peace, 11/30/09, Foreign Policy (Afghanistan is Still Worth the Fight, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/30/afghanistan_is_still_worth_the_fight>)

We continue to face a determined and resourceful enemy that sees this conflict in cosmic terms. Eight years after the September 11 attacks, top al Qaeda leaders have evaded capture and have managed to plan or at least inspire significant terrorist attacks and numerous other plots in major Western cities. Although the planning, funding, training, and recruiting for future attacks may not necessarily happen only in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, increased operating space for militants in that region will make it easier and more likely.

This base remains practically and psychologically important to al Qaeda. Al Qaeda was born in the Pashtun belt, and intermarriage and familiarity make this the "home field" -- far more than Somalia or Yemen. The jihads that drove out the "infidel" British and Soviet empires were launched here, and success in driving out the Americans would immeasurably bolster the reputation and fortunes of the militants.

We need to see the context, as they do, in both local and global terms. At the local level, al Qaeda, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and other affiliated groups have very specific, concrete aims: to drive out the "occupiers" and overthrow the governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, etc., replacing them with an Islamist caliphate. Such victories would yield territory and potentially other assets such as weapons and natural resources. On the global level, al Qaeda wants to be the standard- bearer for Islamic unity and triumph over Western hegemony. The re-Talibanization of Afghanistan would stand as a beacon for jihadist struggle against established powers from Egypt to Indonesia.

Afghanistan Links

Withdrawal undermine credibility in the region and allows Jihadist groups to become power brokers

Wall Street Journal, 10/1/09, Opinion section (U.S. Credibility and Pakistan, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704471504574443352072071822.html)

In an interview at the Journal's offices this week in New York, Pakistan Foreign Minister Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi minced no words about the impact of a U.S. withdrawal before the Taliban is defeated. "This will be disastrous," he said. "You will lose credibility. . . . Who is going to trust you again?" As for Washington's latest public bout of ambivalence about the war, he added that "the fact that this is being debated—whether to stay or not stay—what sort of signal is that sending?" Mr. Qureshi also sounded incredulous that the U.S. might walk away from a struggle in which it has already invested so much: "If you go in, why are you going out without getting the job done? Why did you send so many billion of dollars and lose so many lives? And why did we ally with you?" All fair questions, and all so far unanswered by the Obama Administration. As for the consequences to Pakistan of an American withdrawal, the foreign minister noted that "we will be the immediate effectees of your policy." Among the effects he predicts are "more misery," "more suicide bombings," and a dramatic loss of confidence in the economy, presumably as investors fear that an emboldened Taliban, no longer pressed by coalition forces in Afghanistan, would soon turn its sights again on Islamabad. Mr. Qureshi's arguments carry all the more weight now that Pakistan's army is waging an often bloody struggle to clear areas previously held by the Taliban and their allies. Pakistan has also furnished much of the crucial intelligence needed to kill top Taliban and al Qaeda leaders in U.S. drone strikes. But that kind of cooperation will be harder to come by if the U.S. withdraws from Afghanistan and Islamabad feels obliged to protect itself in the near term by striking deals with various jihadist groups, as it has in the past. Pakistanis have long viewed the U.S. through the lens of a relationship that has oscillated between periods of close cooperation—as during the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s—and periods of tension and even sanctions—as after Pakistan's test of a nuclear device in 1998. Pakistan's democratic government has taken major risks to increase its assistance to the U.S. against al Qaeda and the Taliban. Mr. Qureshi is warning, in so many words, that a U.S. retreat from Afghanistan would make it far more difficult for Pakistan to help against al Qaeda.

Afghanistan Link

Withdrawal would make the US look weak and inspire global terrorism

[Mashaal Javed](http://www.pakspectator.com/author/mashaal/), Staff writer-Pakistani Spectator, 5/9/10, Pakistani Spectator (US Withdrawal and Its Implications, http://www.pakspectator.com/us-withdrawal-and-its-implications/)

The exasperated American surge-and-exit strategy reflects the increased frustration of the western alliance resulting out of its failure in bringing stability to Afghanistan. The exit part of any military strategy surly materializes successfully however, the stability part post withdrawal or exit of the affected country always remained dicey and similarly in case of Afghanistan, the case would not be any different as the exit would not yield any long term stability. To add to the frustration, the Dutch government’s debacle over the issue of withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan, indicate the mood of the western public over the issue. Also, the fact that no other country has come forward to-date to replace the Dutch forces in Afghanistan makes it evident that the withdrawal will be there soon. The withdrawal though, may portray America as weak but it has no choice since prolonging the stay any more would still tantamount to weakness any way. The withdrawal of the foreign forces may not be wholesome but in parts over five to six years. Still, one might see presence of a few thousands of them at the end, typically on the lines of Iraqi, withdrawal.

However, in the time leading up to the phased withdrawal, there are more fervent public voices calling for immediate withdrawal of their respective forces from Afghanistan. Amongst the rising tide of like minded people in favour of withdrawal, there are some lonely voices too that are heard on and off calling for continuation of deployment of Western forces in Afghanistan. This segment of the society is skeptical of post withdrawal scenario in Afghanistan.

The apprehensions on the withdrawal are many. The most important geopolitical repercussion of the withdrawal being cited would be the perception that America stands defeated in the long drawn Afghan war. The others include the perception that the withdrawal will lead to the Taliban returning to power in Afghanistan, the Taliban allowing al-Qaeda renewed access to the country, and al-Qaeda making use of Afghanistan to successfully attack the West again.

The withdrawal will have its implications on Pakistan too and as such, it must prepare itself to confront all challenges emerging out of the event and exert its weight in stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. This will be all the more difficult as other countries like India and Iran will ,also be vying to get some stakes in Afghanistan upon withdrawal of foreign forces from there. Some of the scenarios that might develop out of the situation then would be discussed hereafter in this article.

The Northern Alliance would continue to be supported by Russia, India and Iran in the post withdrawal Afghanistan. The Pashtuns who ruled Afghanistan for over 200 years, having been denied their due right in the Afghan polity under US occupation, would resist the dominance of the Northern Alliance with the tacit support of its war time friends for Kabul that may result in further blood shed. Pakistan may again face the burden of the refugees and a destabilized Afghanistan yet again which would be detrimental to its overall security.

Since there exists a lot of disparity within the Afghan society, the afghan strife will continue that may lead to formation of fresh alliances between the various Afghan factions to develop some equilibrium which resultantly prolong instability in Afghanistan. The interim period would be exploited by India to cement its foot hold in Afghan affairs much to the detriment of Pakistan’s interests.

The withdrawal may also encourage fundamentalists and extremists world over who may be inspired by the resilience of Afghans and their success in forcing foreign military powers out of their lands and as such adopt as means of achieving victories.

Afghanistan Link

U.S. presence is needed to maintain stability in Afghanistan and prevent proliferation.

**Kagan**, Robert. Senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Obama’s Year One. World Affairs, January-February 20**10**. http://www.metapress.com/content/2241p3l6j2264600/

President Obama’s policies toward Afghanistan and Iran—or lack thereof—have received more attention than any other issues during his first year in office. And with good reason. **An American defeat in Afghanistan would throw an already dangerous region further into turmoil and severely damage America’s reputation for reliability around the world. Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would** bring about a substantial shift in the regional power balance against the United States and its allies, **spark a new round of global proliferation, provide a significant boost to the forces of Islamic radicalism, and bring the United States that much further under the shadow of nuclear terrorism.** If Obama’s policies were to produce a geopolitical doubleheader—defeat in Afghanistan and a nuclear-armed Iran—his historical legacy could wind up being a good deal worse than that of his predecessor.

Middle East Link

U.S. omnipresence in the Middle East is the only factor keeping Iran in check-withdrawal could risk Iranian assertion of dominance around neighboring countries.

**Perthes**, Volker (Director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs and Excecutive Chairman of the Board of SWP) 'Ambition and Fear: Iran’s Foreign Policy and Nuclear Programme', Survival, 52:3, 95 – 114 June 20**10**.

**Iran** clearly **sees itself as a regional great power, and** Iranian officials have indicated more than once that Iran expects the world to recognise it as such.4 Tehran therefore **does not see any reason why it should not have the same right as the U**nited **S**tates, the European Union (EU), Saudi Arabia or Egypt **to make its influence felt in such places as** Lebanon, Palestine, **Iraq and Afghanistan**. Iran's regional position has certainly been strengthened since the overthrow of the Taliban and the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2001 and 2003 respectively, and its geopolitical reach into the Levant was clearly demonstrated, though not for the first time, during the summer 2006 war between Israel and Lebanon's Hizbullah. Iranian influence in the Gaza Strip has become much stronger since other international and regional actors have refused to engage with the de facto Hamas government there, and Iran's political influence in Lebanon is accepted, though not welcomed, by the Arab states. Moreover, Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was admitted, if more or less at his own invitation, as a guest at the 2007 summit meeting in Qatar of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the regional grouping of the monarchies on the Arabian Peninsula. **The United States itself recognises the importance of Iran**, not least **for its potential influence over developments in Iraq and Afghanistan**.5 **At the same time, Iran has** had plenty of reasons to feel more strategically uncomfortable in recent years, given that since 2003 it **has been virtually surrounded by the United States**. An Iranian policymaker studying a map of the region could not help but notice that **US combat troops are stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan; the US fleet is ploughing the waters of the Gulf**; **Turkey is a NATO member; the US military is supporting non-NATO ally Pakistan; and even Azerbaijan is engaged in military cooperation with the United States**, as well as with Israel. In addition, Iran finds itself between two nuclear-armed states, Pakistan and Israel (India's nuclear arms do not raise concern in Iran), of which the former is a direct neighbour and fragile state with strong Sunni fundamentalist currents that sometimes give rise to anti-Shi'ite violence, and the latter an enemy. **Iran has no regional allies except for Syria**, which is a long-standing partner, but **which could easily change allegiances as other options emerged.**

U.S. deterrence plays a key role in preventing Iran from going nuclear.

**Perthes**, Volker (Director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs and Excecutive Chairman of the Board of SWP) 'Ambition and Fear: Iran’s Foreign Policy and Nuclear Programme', Survival, 52:3, 95 – 114 June 20**10**.

Finally, **the U**nited **S**tates and Europe **need to answer the main question** posed by those who are sceptical of the entire diplomatic process: **what if Iran crosses the line and gains a military nuclear capability**? **Even though Iran has not yet reached this point** and may not intend to eventually cross the line, **the** **answer**, in principle, **lies in the concept of extended deterrence - in credible US security guarantees for its friends in the Middle East**. **The deployment of missile-defence systems on US vessels in the Persian Gulf sends an important message**: it enhances the security of Israel and of the smaller Gulf states while clearly **signalling to Iran that Washington will stand by its friends, but does not withdraw the possibility of future engagement.**

Iraq Link

Iran fills in Iraq power vaccuum

Reuteurs, Dec 18 2009 ( World’s largest international multimedia news agency, *Iraq demands Iran withdraw troops from oilfield*, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5BH1Y920091218>)

A senior engineer from Maysan Oil Company, which operates the field, said [Iran](http://www.reuters.com/places/iran)ian troops had taken temporary control of one of the field's seven wells, an inoperative well in a disputed border area, four or five times this year.

"[Iran](http://www.reuters.com/places/iran)ian forces come to this well periodically, and then at daybreak they withdraw. They are provoking us ... I don't know why this is a big deal this time," he said, on condition of anonymity.

OIL PRICE RISES

The benchmark U.S. light crude oil future moved to a high of $74.69 per barrel at 9:14 a.m. EST (1414 GMT), up from $73.31 at 6:08 a.m. EST (1108 GMT) before the first reports.

The incident came a few days after the Iraqi Oil Ministry awarded leading global energy firms contracts to operate seven oil fields in its second tender since the 2003 U.S. invasion.

Iraq, whose oil sector is scarred by years of sanctions and war, says such deals may eventually lift capacity to 12 million barrels per day, putting it nearly on par with Saudi Arabia and far above [Iran](http://www.reuters.com/places/iran)'s output of around 4 million barrels per day.

But as U.S. troops prepare to withdraw by 2012, foreign firms must grapple with persistent violence, political feuds and legal uncertainties dogging large-scale investments.

The government has been struggling to respond to a spate of attacks, the last of which killed up to 112 last week in Baghdad, aimed at destabilizing Iraq ahead of March 7 elections.

Ties between Iraq and neighboring [Iran](http://www.reuters.com/places/iran), which fought an eight-year war in the 1980s, have improved since a Shi'ite-led government took over in Baghdad following the ousting of Sunni Arab leader Saddam Hussein in 2003.

Yet relations are tested in areas like eastern Maysan, just one of many flashpoints of continuing disagreement over shared borders between the majority Shi'ite Muslim neighbors.

The bilateral relationship is all the more delicate given Washington and Tehran's standoff over [Iran](http://www.reuters.com/places/iran)'s nuclear program and the presence of 115,000 U.S. soldiers on Iraqi soil.

U.S. officials said they were aware of the border incident but there were no U.S. forces in the area.

Iraqi Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani told al-Arabiya TV: "Iraq will not give up its oil wealth, no matter the reason."

The U.S.-based Eurasia group said in its analysis the conflict was unlikely to escalate or interrupt Iraqi oil output.

"It is likely indicative of longer term [Iran](http://www.reuters.com/places/iran)ian worries about the effect on oil prices of increased Iraqi oil production and it is perhaps a demonstration by Tehran that -- amid rising international pressure over Iran's nuclear program -- it retains the ability to meddle in Iraq."

Iraq Link

Withdrawal of U.S. troops causes regional power vacuum and aids Iran in its nuclear and regional interests causing long term instability.

Continetti 2008 (Matthew, May 18th , associate editor of The Weekly Standard, *The Iran challenge*, http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/015/199woivn.asp?page=2)

Thus Obama would make an offer that the Iranians have repeatedly rejected, except he would do it in person--at a historic summit, a propaganda coup for the mullahs. Only after they refused the offer--again--would Obama "ratchet up the pressure." We would be back where we started, except the Iranian regime would have denied the leader of the Great Satan's demands in person. This would not only be embarrassing. It would mean more leverage for Tehran.

Obama's "responsible, phased redeployment of our troops from Iraq" would also redound to Iran's strategic benefit. The policy would erase the security and political gains the United States and its Iraqi allies have made in the last year and a half. It would lead to more violence, not less, and to a weaker Iraqi government, not a stronger one. It would breathe new life into the radicals--many sponsored by the Iranian regime--who seek a failed state in Iraq. And Tehran would quickly move to fill any power vacuum that the Americans left behind in Iraq.

Why on earth, then, would the supreme leader of Iran, seeing the U.S. president knocking on his door--a supplicant--and U.S. troops retreating from Iraq, be moved to negotiate with the United States? By what strategic calculus would he determine that that would be the time to give up his chips?

Ah, but we have entered the Obama zone, where conditions are not conditions, where Ahmadinejad is and is not really the leader of Iran, where the Iranian Revolutionary Guards isn't a terrorist group one year but is the next, where Iran is simultaneously a "tiny" and a "grave" threat, and where the absence of American combat troops in Iraq actually increases U.S. influence in the Middle East.

Here, doves are reborn as hawks, and liberals are turned into "pragmatists." And somehow the security of America and her allies will be enhanced by inadvertently promoting the interests of her enemies.

Iraq Link

Iran has already set up strong ties with Middle Eastern governments from Iraq to Afghanistan; it is simply waiting for the U.S. to move its military from these areas so it can fill in as regional hegemon.

Taheri,2009(Amir, May 5th, Iranian-born journalist based in Europe, and author of The Persian Night: Iran Under the Khomeinist Revolution, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124139838660282045.html)

Convinced that the Obama administration is preparing to retreat from the Middle East, Iran's Khomeinist regime is intensifying its goal of regional domination. It has targeted six close allies of the U.S.: Egypt, Lebanon, Bahrain, Morocco, Kuwait and Jordan, all of which are experiencing economic and/or political crises.

Iranian strategists believe that Egypt is heading for a major crisis once President Hosni Mubarak, 81, departs from the political scene. He has failed to impose his eldest son Gamal as successor, while the military-security establishment, which traditionally chooses the president, is divided. Iran's official Islamic News Agency has been conducting a campaign on that theme for months. This has triggered a counter-campaign against Iran by the Egyptian media.

Last month, Egypt announced it had crushed a major Iranian plot and arrested 68 people. According to Egyptian media, four are members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Tehran's principal vehicle for exporting its revolution.

Seven were Palestinians linked to the radical Islamist movement Hamas; one was a Lebanese identified as "a political agent from Hezbollah" by the Egyptian Interior Ministry. Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of the Lebanese Hezbollah, claimed these men were shipping arms to Hamas in Gaza.

The arrests reportedly took place last December, during a crackdown against groups trying to convert Egyptians to Shiism. The Egyptian Interior Ministry claims this proselytizing has been going on for years. Thirty years ago, Egyptian Shiites numbered a few hundred. Various estimates put the number now at close to a million, but they are said to practice taqiyah (dissimulation), to hide their new faith.

But in its campaign for regional hegemony, Tehran expects Lebanon as its first prize. Iran is spending massive amounts of cash on June's general election. It supports a coalition led by Hezbollah, and including the Christian ex-general Michel Aoun. Lebanon, now in the column of pro-U.S. countries, would shift to the pro-Iran column.

In Bahrain, Tehran hopes to see its allies sweep to power through mass demonstrations and terrorist operations. Bahrain's ruling clan has arrested scores of pro-Iran militants but appears more vulnerable than ever. King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa has contacted Arab heads of states to appeal for "urgent support in the face of naked threats," according to the Bahraini media.

The threats became sensationally public in March. In a speech at Masshad, Iran's principal "holy city," Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri, a senior aide to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, described Bahrain as "part of Iran." Morocco used the ensuing uproar as an excuse to severe diplomatic relations with Tehran. The rupture came after months of tension during which Moroccan security dismantled a network of pro-Iran militants allegedly plotting violent operations.

Iran-controlled groups have also been uncovered in Kuwait and Jordan. According to Kuwaiti media, more than 1,000 alleged Iranian agents were arrested and shipped back home last winter. According to the Tehran media, Kuwait is believed vulnerable because of chronic parliamentary disputes that have led to governmental paralysis.

As for Jordan, Iranian strategists believe the kingdom, where Palestinians are two-thirds of the population, is a colonial creation and should disappear from the map -- opening the way for a single state covering the whole of Palestine. Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have both described the division of Palestine as "a crime and a tragedy."

Arab states are especially concerned because Tehran has succeeded in transcending sectarian and ideological divides to create a coalition that includes Sunni movements such as Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, sections of the Muslim Brotherhood, and even Marxist-Leninist and other leftist outfits that share Iran's anti-Americanism.

Information published by Egyptian and other Arab intelligence services, and reported in the Egyptian and other Arab media, reveal a sophisticated Iranian strategy operating at various levels. The outer circle consists of a number of commercial companies, banks and businesses active in various fields and employing thousands of locals in each targeted country. In Egypt, for example, police have uncovered more than 30 such Iranian "front" companies, according to the pan-Arab daily newspaper Asharq Alawsat. In Syria and Lebanon, the numbers reportedly run into hundreds.

In the next circle, Iranian-financed charities offer a range of social and medical services and scholarships that governments often fail to provide. Another circle consists of "cultural" centers often called Ahl e Beit (People of the House) supervised by the offices of the supreme leader. These centers offer language classes in Persian, English and Arabic, Islamic theology, Koranic commentaries, and traditional philosophy -- alongside courses in information technology, media studies, photography and filmmaking.

Wherever possible, the fourth circle is represented by branches of Hezbollah operating openly. Where that's not possible, clandestine organizations do the job, either alone or in conjunction with Sunni radical groups.

The Khomeinist public diplomacy network includes a half-dozen satellite television and radio networks in several languages, more than 100 newspapers and magazines, a dozen publishing houses, and thousands of Web sites and blogs controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The network controls thousands of mosques throughout the region where preachers from Iran, or trained by Iranians, disseminate the Khomeinist revolutionary message.

Tehran has also created a vast network of non-Shiite fellow travelers within the region's political and cultural elites. These politicians and intellectuals may be hostile to Khomeinism on ideological grounds -- but they regard it as a powerful ally in a common struggle against the American "Great Satan."

Khomeinist propaganda is trying to portray Iran as a rising "superpower" in the making while the United States is presented as the "sunset" power. The message is simple: The Americans are going, and we are coming.

Tehran plays a patient game. Wherever possible, it is determined to pursue its goals through open political means, including elections. With pro-American and other democratic groups disheartened by the perceived weakness of the Obama administration, Tehran hopes its allies will win all the elections planned for this year in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.

"There is this perception that the new U.S. administration is not interested in the democratization strategy," a senior Lebanese political leader told me. That perception only grows as President Obama calls for an "exit strategy" from Afghanistan and Iraq. Power abhors a vacuum, which the Islamic Republic of Iran is only too happy to fill.

Iraq Link

Iraq is at a precipice, continued troop presence is necessary to prevent Iranian takeover.

Dreyfus 2010( Robert, July 6th, independent journalist in the Washington, D.C, *Biden in Iraq, U.S. influence Shrinks, Iran Gains,*

The good news from Vice President Joe Biden's visit to Iraq for the Fourth of July is that the United States has reaffirmed its commitment to reducing US forces to 50,000 by next month, ending the US combat role, and pulling all of its remaining forces out of Iraq by the end of next year.

That's despite pressure from hawks and neoconservatives to slow the drawdown. Of course, there is still talk about renegotiating the terms of the US withdrawal in 2011 by establishing some kind of long-term US-Iraq military agreement. Such an agreement, however, is not up to the US alone. It will also depend on what the Iraqis think, and if Iranian influence in Iraq continues to gain strength as the US departs -- as seems likely -- and if the US and Iran continue to engage in a confrontation over Tehran's nuclear program and Iran's regional role, then the likelihood of a lasting US-Iraq aliance vanishes.

In fact, Iraq has become a battleground for competing US and Iranian influence, and Iran has the upper hand.

In his visit to Iraq -- his 17th -- Biden seemed not to care who forms a government in Iraq. "He made it very clear that we have no candidates, we have no preferred outcomes, we have no plan," said an aide to Biden, on background, briefing reporters in Baghdad. Pressed repeatedly by reporters, the administration officials conducting the briefing refused to say anything about the kind of government they'd like to see take shape. All things being equal, however, it's clear that the United States would prefer that Iyad Allawi's secular, nationalist, and anti-Iran bloc, Iraqiya, have a major role, either leading the next government or in some sort of grand coalition with Prime Minister Maliki's State of Law/Dawa Party bloc. But the United States has few cards to play, and as the level of US troops declines, it will have fewer still.

Iraq Link

Withdrawal from Iraq will create a failed state power vacuum to be filled by regional powers diminishing U.S. primacy and influence in the region.

Gygriel 09 (Jacob, July, George H.W. Bush associate professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, *Vacuum Wars the coming competition over failed states,* http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=622)

Another example could arise in Iraq. If the United States fails to stabilize the situation and withdraws, or even merely scales down its military presence too quickly, one outcome could be the collapse of the central government in Baghdad. The resulting vacuum would be filled by militias and other groups, who would engage in violent conflict for oil, political control and sectarian revenge. This tragic situation would be compounded if Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two regional powers with the most direct interests in the outcome, entered the fray more directly than they have so far.

In sum, there are many more plausible scenarios in which a failed state could become a playground of both regional and great power rivalry, which is why we urgently need to dust off the traditional view of failed states and consider its main features as well as its array of consequences.

The traditional view starts from a widely shared assumption that, as nature abhors vacuums, so does the international system. As Richard Nixon once said to Mao Zedong, “In international relations there are no good choices. One thing is sure—we can leave no vacuums, because they can be filled.”6 The power vacuums created by failed states attract the interests of great powers because they are an easy way to expand their spheres of influence **while weakening their opponents or forestalling their intervention**. **A state that decides not to fill a power vacuum is effectively inviting other states to do so, thereby potentially decreasing its own relative power**.

This simple, inescapable logic is based on the view that international relations are essentially a zero-sum game: My gain is your loss. A failed state creates a dramatic opportunity to gain something, whether natural resources, territory or a strategically pivotal location. The power that controls it first necessarily increases its own standing relative to other states. As Walter Lippmann wrote in 1915,the anarchy of the world is due to the backwardness of weak states; . . . the modern nations have lived in armed peace and collapsed into hideous warfare because in Asia, Africa, the Balkans, Central and South America there are rich territories in which weakness invites exploitation, in which inefficiency and corruption invite imperial expansion, in which the prizes are so great that the competition for them is to the knife.7

The threat posed by failed states, therefore, need not emanate mainly from within. After all, by definition a failed state is no longer an actor capable of conducting a foreign policy. It is a politically inert geographic area whose fate is dependent on the actions of others. The main menace to international security stems from competition between these “others.” As Arnold Wolfers put it in 1951, because of the competitive nature of international relations, “expansion would be sure to take place wherever a power vacuum existed.”8 The challenge is that the incentive to extend control over a vacuum or a failed state is similar for many states. In fact, even if one state has a stronger desire to control a power vacuum because of its geographic proximity, natural resources or strategic location, this very interest spurs other states to seek command over the same territory simply because doing so weakens that state. The ability to deprive a state of something that will give it a substantial advantage is itself a source of power. Hence a failed state suddenly becomes a strategic prize, because it either adds to one’s own power or subtracts from another’s.

Iraq Link

Post American Withdrawal a massive power vacuum and power struggle will engulf Iraq and destroy American primacy and hegemony in the region.

Hemeid, 2010(Salah, July 28th ,Writer for Al-Ahram Weekly,  *No government but withdrawal*, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2010/1008/re6.htm)

The lingering stand-off over forming a new government in Iraq has raised questions about neighbouring countries' strategies as Iraq itself slips into deeper crisis.

Tehran's interventions in Iraq are a way of confronting Washington in a foreign context, while Sunni Arab nations and Turkey are alarmed by the prospect of Iranian and Shia domination of Iraq, and are exploiting ties with Iraqi Sunnis to justify interventions in the country.

It is no secret that the regional players are now planning for the endgame and are ready to use all possible means to fill the power vacuum that will result from the US withdrawal.

Meanwhile, the US itself has been sending conflicting signals. While American officials have repeated that they intend to stick to the withdrawal schedule, they also say that withdrawal in no way reflects a decrease in American engagement with Iraq or US commitment to the Iraqis.

It is against this background that rival Iraqi groups are continuing their political brinkmanship, showing that they are prepared to hold out for as long as necessary to secure victory.

One risk that they are all ignoring is that such brinkmanship could expose Iraq to a dangerous political vacuum as it tries to emerge from civil strife and contain its sectarian divide.

Iraq Link

Loss of U.S. troops will lead to multiple sectarian conflicts as well as an effort by many middle eastern countries, namely Iran and Syria, to shape Iraq as a territorial pawn shattering U.S. legitimacy.

Citing Assistant Proffessor Veysel Ayhan, June 11 2010 (*Expert Warns U.S. withdrawal*, http://www.theiraqidinar.com/expert-warns-us-withdrawal-may-have-dire-consequences-for-war-torn-iraq/)

**Ayhan draws a pretty pessimistic sketch of the impact in 2012 of a probable withdrawal of the US from Iraq; he holds that such a withdrawal would lead to a bloody internal war and even regional warfare that will affect the entire region. “The SOFA [Status of Forces Agreement] signed on Nov. 17, 2008 envisages a gradual withdrawal of American forces from Iraq by Dec. 31, 2011.**

**Therefore, if no unexpected developments take place, the American military presence in Iraq will be over by January 2012. It is obvious that the US failed to maintain security in this country; it is also obvious that the US failed to have a political, economic or military influence in Iraq. The state of instability and chaos in Iraq may result in the emergence of the need for further American protectionism. At this point, the increase of the American military presence in Gulf countries may be taken into consideration.”**

**Noting that the country is becoming more instable as the time for the withdrawal approaches, Ayhan asserts that the violent groups are preparing for warfare in the aftermath of the withdrawal. “The year 2012 points to serious uncertainties and dangers; the most visible threat and danger is that the country may be dragged into a state of internal warfare in a post-US period. The primary factor that will prevent the eruption of a bloody internal war is the American military presence in the country. … Therefore, 2012 may be the start of a bloody civil war that will lead to the partition of Iraq.”**

**Arguing that a wholesale withdrawal would not be proper, Ayhan asserts that Iraq would not be the same after such a withdrawal and adds that a UN intervention may be considered in such a case. Asked how Iraq would look if this scenario was realized , Ayhan speaks of two options: “Iraq may be divided into three, four or more parts. Or, other countries in the region may expand to conquer Iraqi territory. Obviously, this would not happen peacefully.”**

**Noting that both scenarios will closely affect a number of countries including Turkey, Ayhan stresses that the greatest danger will be witnessed when other countries in the region seek to influence Iraq in the fulfillment of their own interests and goals. “The fact that Iraq accused Syria after a deadly wave of attacks carried out in the Green Zone in Baghdad, Iran’s influence over the Shiite groups in the country and Turkey’s attempt to open a consulate in the Kurdish region should be viewed as attempts by regional countries to maintain control and expand their sphere of influence in the country.”**

**Noting that the countries in the region do not have a common policy on Iraq, Ayhan stresses that the decisions taken at meetings of countries neighboring Iraq did not reflect the presence of a common resolution. Arguing that the countries in the region have conflicting interests with respect to Iraq, Ayhan further says: “For regional countries, it is hard to find a any common ground with respect to the future of Iraq. These countries have differing views and ambitions over the territorial integrity of Iraq, its constitutional, administrative and political order as well as the representation of religious sects in the political power.”**

**Noting that Turkey has stated its position most visibly with respect to Iraq’s future, Ayhan argues that some countries, including Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Oman, favor the territorial integrity of the country. Asked about the stance of other actors regarding this issue, Ayhan says: “The views of Kuwait, Iran and Syria on the territorial integrity of the country are ambiguous for different reasons. The Kuwaiti regime is skeptical that a strong Iraqi government may have the intention to again take control over part of its land. Iran and Syria have some doubts on the repercussions of the creation of a separate Kurdish state, whereas they are also considering the security risks involved in the foundation of a separate Shia or Sunni state. Yemen may prefer a partitioned Iraq instead of an Iraq under Shia control. Saudi Arabia may oppose the emergence of a Shiite state in Iraq because of its Shiite minority. Iran wants a controllable and manageable Iraq. It may seek to create a weak and federal Iraq to make sure that Baghdad does not become a strong player. Saddam Hussein not only declared war against Iran and Kuwait but also threatened Syria and Turkey. Therefore, the countries in the region would not like to see Iraq as a threat again.”**

**Speaking on the role that Turkey would assume in this process considering that it will be affected most by the developments taking place, Ayhan says the cooperation agreement signed with the Iraqi government on July 10, 2008 and the 48 additional protocols adopted are significant for the preservation of Turkish interests. “Iran sees Turkey’s eagerness to maintain dialogue with Syria and Iraq as its ambition to expand its sphere of influence. This causes tension. Iran has viewed Iraq as a rival and a threat throughout history. Therefore, it will seek to use the opportunity it got in the aftermath of the invasion in 2003.”**

**Noting that a number of countries including Turkey would strongly oppose the emergence of another Shiite state in the region, Ayhan argues: “It is certain that Iraq will become a venue of sectarian clashes and ethnic conflicts in the aftermath of 2012. Despite that the American administration won the war against the Saddam regime, it failed to prevent Iraq from turning into a chaotic state. US interests in this country are not over. But obviously, it will not be able to achieve its goals by relying on coercion and military power. The stabilization of Iraq will be a duty that falls to the states in the region. However, a clash of interests of those states may lead to further tension in the region.”**

**The opening of a consulate in the Kurdish region by Turkey should be viewed as the start of a new policy, according to Ayhan, who argues that Turkey is seeking to develop measures against developments after 2012: “Turkey is now seeking to develop ties with Sunnis, Kurds and Shiites. This means that Turkey is eager to fill the vacuum that will be left after the US withdrawal from Iraq. Turkey wants to deliver a message that it will not remain silent vis-à-vis developments turning Iraq into a satellite state by maintaining ties with the three groups in Iraq; it is also seeking to have power to influence the probable developments in this country as well.”**

**Ayhan continues: “The decision of the Turkish authorities to open a consulate in Arbil may lead to the elimination of the psychological barrier between the two parties and the emergence of a greater role and sphere of influence for Turkey. In such a case, Turkey will be able to have a greater influence in the country. It is also obvious that the US has made its decision on withdrawal without achieving its goals in the country. It is impossible to foresee the consequences of a probable withdrawal; however, we do not hold the expectation that such a withdrawal will lead to a more stable era and situation in Iraq.”**

Iraq Link

****Iraq withdrawal spells trouble for United States hegemony and influence in the middle east and beyond****

Wilson 10, (Fred, May 12th, Writer for Stratfor news, *The Iraq Question*, http://iraqidinarnews.net/blog/2010/05/17/stratfor-news-the-iraq-question-%E2%80%93-troop-withdrawl-51210/)

Judging from the results of the March 7 parliamentary elections in Iraq, the United States may have a harder time than it had previously hoped in seeing this goal through. It is now clear that the Shia will hold the upper hand over the Sunnis when it comes to dictating the terms of who gets what in the new Iraqi government, which is good news indeed in Tehran. It is not good news in Washington, which now faces the prospect of a Shia-run Baghdad – albeit with a significant Sunni population acting as a natural check – being heavily influenced by its eastern Shiite neighbor. **As American foreign policy in the region is heavily centered upon maintaining balances of power** (one of which, the Iran-Iraq balance, was shattered as a result of the 2003 U.S. invasion), **an emboldened Iran flanking its Iraqi satellite state would represent a setback for the United States.**

There are options for what the Obama administration may decide to do about the Iraq question, but none of them are very appealing from the United States’ point of view. Washington could attempt to renegotiate its Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the Iraqi government and prolong its military occupation of the country past 2011. In this case, it could opt for either a prolonged presence involving a large number of troops (the least preferable option in the United States’ eyes), or an extended presence with a smaller number of troops. Both scenarios would generate fierce opposition from Iran and many sectors of Iraqi society, not to mention Obama’s constituents at home. Choosing an extended occupation – assuming it got the go ahead for the renegotiation of the SOFA with Baghdad – would see the United States keeping its forces in Iraq and re-evaluating its options as time progresses.

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If Washington eschews both options, it could, of course, simply accept Iran as the dominant regional power. The United States’ geopolitical interests make all of these unattractive choices, however, meaning the United States could seek to alter the equation, in this case through negotiations with Iran. To do this, Washington must be prepared to give Iran credible security guarantees in exchange for a promise from Tehran to allow an independent Iraq at least a modicum of political independence.

Iran may hold the better hand at the moment, but the United States is still the global hegemon, meaning that despite being in a pretty good situation these days, the Iranian regime is anything but overly confident. The threat of war or sanctions may have subsided, but Tehran knows that its fortunes could change rapidly.

The Iranians know the United States wants to leave Iraq – sooner rather than later – and despite their bellicose rhetoric, are willing to work to accommodate the American aspiration to leave behind a relatively stable country. What Tehran desires more than anything is to guarantee its national security. It hopes it can take advantage of America’s momentary weakness to extract concessions, using its potential leverage over Iraq as its prized bargaining chip. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s routine reminders that the only way for Obama to solve his country’s problems in the Middle East is to enlist Iranian support serves to highlight this point.

Iraq Link

Withdrawal of U.S. troops causes regional power vacuum and aids Iran in its nuclear and regional interests causing long term instability.

Continetti 2008 (Matthew, May 18th , associate editor of The Weekly Standard, *The Iran challenge*, http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/015/199woivn.asp?page=2)

Thus Obama would make an offer that the Iranians have repeatedly rejected, except he would do it in person--at a historic summit, a propaganda coup for the mullahs. Only after they refused the offer--again--would Obama "ratchet up the pressure." We would be back where we started, except the Iranian regime would have denied the leader of the Great Satan's demands in person. This would not only be embarrassing. It would mean more leverage for Tehran.

Obama's "responsible, phased redeployment of our troops from Iraq" would also redound to Iran's strategic benefit. The policy would erase the security and political gains the United States and its Iraqi allies have made in the last year and a half. It would lead to more violence, not less, and to a weaker Iraqi government, not a stronger one. It would breathe new life into the radicals--many sponsored by the Iranian regime--who seek a failed state in Iraq. And Tehran would quickly move to fill any power vacuum that the Americans left behind in Iraq.

Why on earth, then, would the supreme leader of Iran, seeing the U.S. president knocking on his door--a supplicant--and U.S. troops retreating from Iraq, be moved to negotiate with the United States? By what strategic calculus would he determine that that would be the time to give up his chips?

Ah, but we have entered the Obama zone, where conditions are not conditions, where Ahmadinejad is and is not really the leader of Iran, where the Iranian Revolutionary Guards isn't a terrorist group one year but is the next, where Iran is simultaneously a "tiny" and a "grave" threat, and where the absence of American combat troops in Iraq actually increases U.S. influence in the Middle East.

Here, doves are reborn as hawks, and liberals are turned into "pragmatists." And somehow the security of America and her allies will be enhanced by inadvertently promoting the interests of her enemies.

Iraq Link

Iran has already set up strong ties with Middle Eastern governments from Iraq to Afghanistan; it is simply waiting for the U.S. to move its military from these areas so it can fill in as regional hegemon.

Taheri,2009(Amir, May 5th, Iranian-born journalist based in Europe, and author of The Persian Night: Iran Under the Khomeinist Revolution, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124139838660282045.html)

Convinced that the Obama administration is preparing to retreat from the Middle East, Iran's Khomeinist regime is intensifying its goal of regional domination. It has targeted six close allies of the U.S.: Egypt, Lebanon, Bahrain, Morocco, Kuwait and Jordan, all of which are experiencing economic and/or political crises.

Iranian strategists believe that Egypt is heading for a major crisis once President Hosni Mubarak, 81, departs from the political scene. He has failed to impose his eldest son Gamal as successor, while the military-security establishment, which traditionally chooses the president, is divided. Iran's official Islamic News Agency has been conducting a campaign on that theme for months. This has triggered a counter-campaign against Iran by the Egyptian media.

Last month, Egypt announced it had crushed a major Iranian plot and arrested 68 people. According to Egyptian media, four are members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Tehran's principal vehicle for exporting its revolution.

Seven were Palestinians linked to the radical Islamist movement Hamas; one was a Lebanese identified as "a political agent from Hezbollah" by the Egyptian Interior Ministry. Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of the Lebanese Hezbollah, claimed these men were shipping arms to Hamas in Gaza.

The arrests reportedly took place last December, during a crackdown against groups trying to convert Egyptians to Shiism. The Egyptian Interior Ministry claims this proselytizing has been going on for years. Thirty years ago, Egyptian Shiites numbered a few hundred. Various estimates put the number now at close to a million, but they are said to practice taqiyah (dissimulation), to hide their new faith.

But in its campaign for regional hegemony, Tehran expects Lebanon as its first prize. Iran is spending massive amounts of cash on June's general election. It supports a coalition led by Hezbollah, and including the Christian ex-general Michel Aoun. Lebanon, now in the column of pro-U.S. countries, would shift to the pro-Iran column.

In Bahrain, Tehran hopes to see its allies sweep to power through mass demonstrations and terrorist operations. Bahrain's ruling clan has arrested scores of pro-Iran militants but appears more vulnerable than ever. King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa has contacted Arab heads of states to appeal for "urgent support in the face of naked threats," according to the Bahraini media.

The threats became sensationally public in March. In a speech at Masshad, Iran's principal "holy city," Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri, a senior aide to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, described Bahrain as "part of Iran." Morocco used the ensuing uproar as an excuse to severe diplomatic relations with Tehran. The rupture came after months of tension during which Moroccan security dismantled a network of pro-Iran militants allegedly plotting violent operations.

Iran-controlled groups have also been uncovered in Kuwait and Jordan. According to Kuwaiti media, more than 1,000 alleged Iranian agents were arrested and shipped back home last winter. According to the Tehran media, Kuwait is believed vulnerable because of chronic parliamentary disputes that have led to governmental paralysis.

As for Jordan, Iranian strategists believe the kingdom, where Palestinians are two-thirds of the population, is a colonial creation and should disappear from the map -- opening the way for a single state covering the whole of Palestine. Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have both described the division of Palestine as "a crime and a tragedy."

Arab states are especially concerned because Tehran has succeeded in transcending sectarian and ideological divides to create a coalition that includes Sunni movements such as Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, sections of the Muslim Brotherhood, and even Marxist-Leninist and other leftist outfits that share Iran's anti-Americanism.

Information published by Egyptian and other Arab intelligence services, and reported in the Egyptian and other Arab media, reveal a sophisticated Iranian strategy operating at various levels. The outer circle consists of a number of commercial companies, banks and businesses active in various fields and employing thousands of locals in each targeted country. In Egypt, for example, police have uncovered more than 30 such Iranian "front" companies, according to the pan-Arab daily newspaper Asharq Alawsat. In Syria and Lebanon, the numbers reportedly run into hundreds.

In the next circle, Iranian-financed charities offer a range of social and medical services and scholarships that governments often fail to provide. Another circle consists of "cultural" centers often called Ahl e Beit (People of the House) supervised by the offices of the supreme leader. These centers offer language classes in Persian, English and Arabic, Islamic theology, Koranic commentaries, and traditional philosophy -- alongside courses in information technology, media studies, photography and filmmaking.

Wherever possible, the fourth circle is represented by branches of Hezbollah operating openly. Where that's not possible, clandestine organizations do the job, either alone or in conjunction with Sunni radical groups.

The Khomeinist public diplomacy network includes a half-dozen satellite television and radio networks in several languages, more than 100 newspapers and magazines, a dozen publishing houses, and thousands of Web sites and blogs controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The network controls thousands of mosques throughout the region where preachers from Iran, or trained by Iranians, disseminate the Khomeinist revolutionary message.

Tehran has also created a vast network of non-Shiite fellow travelers within the region's political and cultural elites. These politicians and intellectuals may be hostile to Khomeinism on ideological grounds -- but they regard it as a powerful ally in a common struggle against the American "Great Satan."

Khomeinist propaganda is trying to portray Iran as a rising "superpower" in the making while the United States is presented as the "sunset" power. The message is simple: The Americans are going, and we are coming.

Tehran plays a patient game. Wherever possible, it is determined to pursue its goals through open political means, including elections. With pro-American and other democratic groups disheartened by the perceived weakness of the Obama administration, Tehran hopes its allies will win all the elections planned for this year in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.

"There is this perception that the new U.S. administration is not interested in the democratization strategy," a senior Lebanese political leader told me. That perception only grows as President Obama calls for an "exit strategy" from Afghanistan and Iraq. Power abhors a vacuum, which the Islamic Republic of Iran is only too happy to fill.

Iraq Link

Iraq is at a precipice, continued troop presence is necessary to prevent Iranian takeover.

Dreyfus 2010( Robert, July 6th, independent journalist in the Washington, D.C, *Biden in Iraq, U.S. influence Shrinks, Iran Gains,*

The good news from Vice President Joe Biden's visit to Iraq for the Fourth of July is that the United States has reaffirmed its commitment to reducing US forces to 50,000 by next month, ending the US combat role, and pulling all of its remaining forces out of Iraq by the end of next year.

That's despite pressure from hawks and neoconservatives to slow the drawdown. Of course, there is still talk about renegotiating the terms of the US withdrawal in 2011 by establishing some kind of long-term US-Iraq military agreement. Such an agreement, however, is not up to the US alone. It will also depend on what the Iraqis think, and if Iranian influence in Iraq continues to gain strength as the US departs -- as seems likely -- and if the US and Iran continue to engage in a confrontation over Tehran's nuclear program and Iran's regional role, then the likelihood of a lasting US-Iraq aliance vanishes.

In fact, Iraq has become a battleground for competing US and Iranian influence, and Iran has the upper hand.

In his visit to Iraq -- his 17th -- Biden seemed not to care who forms a government in Iraq. "He made it very clear that we have no candidates, we have no preferred outcomes, we have no plan," said an aide to Biden, on background, briefing reporters in Baghdad. Pressed repeatedly by reporters, the administration officials conducting the briefing refused to say anything about the kind of government they'd like to see take shape. All things being equal, however, it's clear that the United States would prefer that Iyad Allawi's secular, nationalist, and anti-Iran bloc, Iraqiya, have a major role, either leading the next government or in some sort of grand coalition with Prime Minister Maliki's State of Law/Dawa Party bloc. But the United States has few cards to play, and as the level of US troops declines, it will have fewer still.

Iraq Link

Withdrawal from Iraq will create a failed state power vacuum to be filled by regional powers diminishing U.S. primacy and influence in the region.

Gygriel 09 (Jacob, July, George H.W. Bush associate professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, *Vacuum Wars the coming competition over failed states,* http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=622)

Another example could arise in Iraq. If the United States fails to stabilize the situation and withdraws, or even merely scales down its military presence too quickly, one outcome could be the collapse of the central government in Baghdad. The resulting vacuum would be filled by militias and other groups, who would engage in violent conflict for oil, political control and sectarian revenge. This tragic situation would be compounded if Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two regional powers with the most direct interests in the outcome, entered the fray more directly than they have so far.

In sum, there are many more plausible scenarios in which a failed state could become a playground of both regional and great power rivalry, which is why we urgently need to dust off the traditional view of failed states and consider its main features as well as its array of consequences.

The traditional view starts from a widely shared assumption that, as nature abhors vacuums, so does the international system. As Richard Nixon once said to Mao Zedong, “In international relations there are no good choices. One thing is sure—we can leave no vacuums, because they can be filled.”6 The power vacuums created by failed states attract the interests of great powers because they are an easy way to expand their spheres of influence **while weakening their opponents or forestalling their intervention**. **A state that decides not to fill a power vacuum is effectively inviting other states to do so, thereby potentially decreasing its own relative power**.

This simple, inescapable logic is based on the view that international relations are essentially a zero-sum game: My gain is your loss. A failed state creates a dramatic opportunity to gain something, whether natural resources, territory or a strategically pivotal location. The power that controls it first necessarily increases its own standing relative to other states. As Walter Lippmann wrote in 1915, the anarchy of the world is due to the backwardness of weak states; . . . the modern nations have lived in armed peace and collapsed into hideous warfare because in Asia, Africa, the Balkans, Central and South America there are rich territories in which weakness invites exploitation, in which inefficiency and corruption invite imperial expansion, in which the prizes are so great that the competition for them is to the knife.7

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Iraq Link

**U.S. military presence prevents Iraq from caving in on itself.**

**Carpenter**, Ted. (vice president for defense and policy studies at the Cato Institute) Middle East Vortex: An Unstable Iraq and Its Implications for the Region. 20**09**.

**The United States seems committed to** drawing down its forces in Iraq, with the goal of **having all combat forces out of the country by the end of 2011**. That is also the wish of Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s government and a majority of the Iraqi people. **The ﬁrst step in that process was the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq’s cities** (with the exception of Mosul, where the anti- government insurgency remains potent) by 30 June 2009. It was a disturbing development, though, that **a noticeable spike in violence occurred as the US forces redeployed and turned security responsibilities over to Iraqi military** and police units. **Experts** both in the United States and in Iraq **worry that the relative calm** that Iraq has enjoyed since mid-2007 **might not last once US troops depart.** Indeed, **there are serious questions about whether Iraq can be a viable state over the long run. If Iraq becomes a cockpit of instability again**, as it was during the ﬁrst four years following the US invasion, **the implications for the region are ominous**.

**U.S. presence is key to preventing Kurdish-Arab tensions from blowing up- past incidents prove.**

**Carpenter**, Ted. (vice president for defense and policy studies at the Cato Institute) Middle East Vortex: An Unstable Iraq and Its Implications for the Region. 20**09**

**Kurdish-Arab tensions have** already **grown so severe that Secretary of Defense** Robert Gates made an unexpected trip to Iraq to urge both sides to back away from a dangerous confrontation. General Ray Odierno, **the top US commander in Iraq, admitted that the Arab-Kurdish feud** — especially over the status of Kirkuk — **is the “number one driver of instabilities” in the country**.15 **Tensions** in both the area around Kirkuk and in Nineveh province **became so pronounced in August 2009 that Odierno suggested that US troops be deployed to create a buffer between Kurds and Arabs to prevent an explosion.**

Iraq extremely instable- laundry list

**Carpenter**, Ted. (vice president for defense and policy studies at the Cato Institute) Middle East Vortex: An Unstable Iraq and Its Implications for the Region. 20**09**

In addition to the fracture of Iraq caused by the existence of a de facto independent Kurdish state with ambitious territorial claims, **there are serious questions about the degree of stability in the rest of Iraq**. True, the carnage that afﬂicted the country following the US invasion, and which reached especially severe levels from early 2006 to mid-2007, has declined. Nevertheless, **the casualty rates are still disturbingly high**. **Al Qaeda** in Iraq, while weakened, **remains a factor**, and nervous Iraqi **and US ofﬁcials see indications that ﬁghters are returning to some of their old haunts**.22 **The** indigenous Sunni insurgency against the Shiite-dominated government also remains a worry. And **general Shiite-Sunni** sectarian **tensions simmer just beneath the surface** — a situation that continues to worry Obama administration ofﬁcials, in addition to their concerns about the growing Kurdish-Arab animosity.23 Even the improvement in the casualty numbers should not be overstated. According to Iraq’s Ministry of the Interior, **there were 437 deaths in July, and another 1,103** Iraqis **were wounded**.24 Both totals were a decline from the upward trend in casualties that occurred during the ﬁrst half of 2009 (including 543 deaths in June).25 The killings are dramatically lower (by about 75 percent) than they were during the horrid period in 2006 and 2007, but **Iraq is still far from being a safe and peaceful country**. Given that Iraq’s population is only 25 million, even the July toll would translate into an equivalent of more than ﬁve thousand deaths from political violence in the United States — an annual rate of more than sixty thousand. **Iraq is still in the throes of a civil war, albeit a relatively low-intensity one. That does not bode well for unity or even stability going forward**.

Iraq Link

Iran periodically tests its bounds in Iraq, aside from resentment and pure evil, iran needs oil to continue its growth. The only check is U.S. military presence. Without us our oil resources will be interrupted and iran will fill the power vacuum.

Reuteurs, Dec 18 2009 ( World’s largest international multimedia news agency, *Iraq demands Iran withdraw troops from oilfield*, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5BH1Y920091218>)

A senior engineer from Maysan Oil Company, which operates the field, said [Iran](http://www.reuters.com/places/iran)ian troops had taken temporary control of one of the field's seven wells, an inoperative well in a disputed border area, four or five times this year.

"[Iran](http://www.reuters.com/places/iran)ian forces come to this well periodically, and then at daybreak they withdraw. They are provoking us ... I don't know why this is a big deal this time," he said, on condition of anonymity.

OIL PRICE RISES

The benchmark U.S. light crude oil future moved to a high of $74.69 per barrel at 9:14 a.m. EST (1414 GMT), up from $73.31 at 6:08 a.m. EST (1108 GMT) before the first reports.

The incident came a few days after the Iraqi Oil Ministry awarded leading global energy firms contracts to operate seven oil fields in its second tender since the 2003 U.S. invasion.

Iraq, whose oil sector is scarred by years of sanctions and war, says such deals may eventually lift capacity to 12 million barrels per day, putting it nearly on par with Saudi Arabia and far above [Iran](http://www.reuters.com/places/iran)'s output of around 4 million barrels per day.

But as U.S. troops prepare to withdraw by 2012, foreign firms must grapple with persistent violence, political feuds and legal uncertainties dogging large-scale investments.

The government has been struggling to respond to a spate of attacks, the last of which killed up to 112 last week in Baghdad, aimed at destabilizing Iraq ahead of March 7 elections.

Ties between Iraq and neighboring [Iran](http://www.reuters.com/places/iran), which fought an eight-year war in the 1980s, have improved since a Shi'ite-led government took over in Baghdad following the ousting of Sunni Arab leader Saddam Hussein in 2003.

Yet relations are tested in areas like eastern Maysan, just one of many flashpoints of continuing disagreement over shared borders between the majority Shi'ite Muslim neighbors.

The bilateral relationship is all the more delicate given Washington and Tehran's standoff over [Iran](http://www.reuters.com/places/iran)'s nuclear program and the presence of 115,000 U.S. soldiers on Iraqi soil.

U.S. officials said they were aware of the border incident but there were no U.S. forces in the area.

Iraqi Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani told al-Arabiya TV: "Iraq will not give up its oil wealth, no matter the reason."

The U.S.-based Eurasia group said in its analysis the conflict was unlikely to escalate or interrupt Iraqi oil output.

"It is likely indicative of longer term [Iran](http://www.reuters.com/places/iran)ian worries about the effect on oil prices of increased Iraqi oil production and it is perhaps a demonstration by Tehran that -- amid rising international pressure over Iran's nuclear program -- it retains the ability to meddle in Iraq."

Kuwait Links

Troops in Kuwait key to deter invasion of Iraq

**Dobbins et al 9** (James, E Laipson, H Cobban, L Korb, Dobbins is Head of international and security policy for the RAND corporation, “U.S Withdrawal From Iraq: What are the Regional Implications?”, Middle East Policy Council, marshallarmyrotc.org )

Jim Dobbins said we're not going to have 150,000 ground troops in Iraq, but we are still going to have forces and bases in Kuwait. In the Cold War, we were sensitive about putting American forces in the Middle East, so the Saudis built bases to conform to our specifications. In the First Gulf War, when we went in, it was just like going to an American base. We had forces in Kuwait; we will also remain in the Persian Gulf with the carrier battle group and the Marine Corps expeditionary force there. Whatever happens in Iraq, if they should be invaded by a foreign country, we would be able to apply power. If conflict were to spill over into the region, we will be there to play a role.

Naval Forces positioned outside of Kuwait key to deterrence and US security

**Kostic 10** (Andrew J., MD in Strategic Studies from U.S Army War College, Commanding Officer of 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit’s Battalion Landing Team, oai.dtic.mil)

The United States can’t make every state, group, or organization agree with its policies or conform to its way of thinking, but in the contemporary strategic environment the United States can effectively shape the choices of others. The lethality, versatility, and rapid response of forward deployed Naval expeditionary forces enforce the strategic concept of deterring a wide range of potential adversaries from taking action against the United States and its vital national interests**. Deterrence is the key to enhancing security and preventing conflict and is based on credibility**.84

History has shown the enormous impact amphibious forces have in conflicts. During the Second World War, when the Germans began their offensive against the Russians on their eastern front, they left 35 full divisions to guard the coastal areas of Western, Northwestern, and Southwestern Europe; despite having recently destroyed nearly all of Britain’s combat capabilities during fighting in France, where only personnel were able to be hastily extracted from Dunkirk without their implements of war. The United States’ ability to project and sustain power ashore is its combat credibility. It is impossible to tell how many United States adversaries were deterred from taking action against the United States because Naval expeditionary forces were sitting off the coast of their country, but history clearly shows the strategic importance of amphibious forces and their ability to significantly influence land combat operations. 85 More than 27 percent of the German combat forces were withheld from the German army’s most ambitious endeavor to date because of the potential of amphibious forces striking somewhere along the vast stretch of European coastline.86 Similarly, in 1944 the Germans had only positioned 10 percent of their combat divisions in Northern France to fend off the allied invasion on 6 June.87 The other 25 percent of the German divisions that were not committed to the Russian front were drawn westward and southward to guard against possible invasions along those coastlines.88

In 1991 during the Gulf War, an amphibious demonstration off the coast of Kuwait by the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade effectively tied down six Iraqi Divisions—41,000 troops—to the Kuwaiti coastline and prevented their repositioning to the main battle area.89In order for the United States to deter future conflicts and adversaries, it must maintain a credible ability to project combat power ashore, which is best accomplished with a formidable amphibious forcible entry capability.

Kuwait Links

Withdrawal from Iraq depends on the ability to exit via Kuwait

(Thomas Kelly, Masters in Strategic Studies from US Army War College, 2008, “Crossroads in Iraq”, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA479077, page 17)

The primary objective of the Korb, Bergman, Duggan and Juul plan is to move all required equipment and personnel out of Iraq and into Kuwait within a year. After the phased withdrawal the only troops remaining in Iraq will be two brigades, (10,000 troops, including support and command elements) temporarily deployed to the Kurdish

region, for up to an additional 12 months, to prevent any Turkish – Kurd violence, as well as a plus up of Marine personnel to secure the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.

Bases in Kuwait key to any US withdrawal from Iraq and for operations in the entire region

(Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs for Congressional Reseach Service, 12-6-08, “Kuwait: Security, Reform, and U.S. Policy”, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA493167)

Kuwait hosts more than 50,000 U.S. military personnel rotating in or out of Iraq. The key U.S. staging facility in Kuwait is Camp Arifjan and a desert firing range facility, Camp Buehring (Udairi Range). U.S. forces vacated Camp Doha, the headquarters for U.S. forces in Kuwait during the 1990s, in December 2005. Kuwait’s facilities would be pivotal in any U.S. withdrawal, and might also host a post-withdrawal U.S. force that could assist the Iraqi government on short

notice. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) officials said in February 2008 they are establishing in Kuwait a permanent platform for “full spectrum operations” in 27 countries in the region. Among the objectives is to help Kuwait establish a navy. In appreciation of Kuwait’s support to OIF, on April 1, 2004, the Bush Administration designated Kuwait as a “major non-NATO ally (MNNA),” a designation held by only one other Gulf state (Bahrain).

Asia Link

U.S. Military presence key to overall Asian instability

Peter Brookes, Senior Fellow, National Security Affairs and Chung Ju-Yung Fellow for Policy Studies November 24, 2008, “Why the World Still Needs America's Military Might,” <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/Why-the-World-Still-Needs-Americas-Military-Might>, accessed on 7-19-10) SM

And what about Japan?

**American military might has been primarily responsible for Japanese security since the end of World War II**. This has not only allowed Japan to prosper economically and politically--like South Korea and Germany, I might add--but has also kept Japan at peace with its neighbors.The presence of U.S. forces and the American nuclear deterrent has also kept Japan from exercis­ing a nuclear option that many believe it might take, considering the rise of China, North Korea's nuclear breakout, its advanced scientific and technical capa­bilities, and indigenous nuclear power industry--a producer of a significant amount of fissile material from its reactors .Political and historical considerations aside, many believe that Japan could quickly join the once-exclu­sive nuclear weapons club if it chose to do so, result­ing in unforetold challenges to regional security.China and TaiwanFurther to the south, what about stability across the Taiwan Strait?

We know that China is undergoing a major mil­itary buildup, especially involving its power projec­tion forces--i.e., air force, navy, and ballistic missile forces, all aimed at Taiwan. Indeed, today Beijing has the world's third largest defense budget and the world's fastest growing *peacetime* defense budget, growing at over 10 percent per year for over a decade. It increased its defense budget nearly 18 percent annually over the past two years.

**I would daresay that military tensions across the 100-mile-wide Taiwan Strait between Taiwan and China would be much greater today if not for an implied commitment on the part of the United States to prevent a change in the political status quo via military means**. China hasn't renounced the use of force against its neighbor and rival, Taiwan, a vibrant, free-market democracy. It is believed by many analysts that absent American military might, China would quickly unite Taiwan with the main­land under force of arms.In general, the system of military alliances in Asia that the United States maintains provides the basis for stability in the Pacific, since the region has failed to develop an overarching security architecture such as that found in Europe in NATO.

Maintaining withdrawal trends undermines US hegemony

Michael Auslin is a resident scholar at American enterprise Institute, "Three Strikes against U.S. Global Presence", 4/2/10, http://www.aei.org/article/101869

Decisions by the governments of Japan and Great Britain and the passage of the bankrupting health care bill in the US spell the coming end of America's overseas basing and ability to project power. Should these trends continue, the US military will lose its European and Asian strategic anchors, hastening America's eventual withdrawal from its global commitments and leaving the world a far more uncertain and unstable place. The first strike comes from Asia. For the past six months, the new government of Japan has sought to revise a 2006 agreement to relocate a Marine Corps Air Station from one part of Okinawa to a less populated area. The upshot of these three trends will likely be a series of decisions to slowly, but irrevocably reduce America's overseas global military presence and limit our capacity to uphold peace and intervene around the globe.

****U.S. military presence in Asia key to U.S. primacy and Asian security****

**Jing-Dong Yuan**, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Evan S*.* **Medeiros**, is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation in the Washington, DC office, June 6, 20**01**, “A US military presence in Asia: Offshore balancer or local sheriff?”

The rationale for a continued US military presence in the region also derives much of its impetus from material and normative as well as security related considerations. Asia has become an increasingly important region for the USA in terms of: trade (US$500 billion annually affecting three million US jobs); the region’s budding yet fragile process of democratisation; US interest in maintain- ing SLOCs through which vital supplies of energytransit; and the many

unresolved ter- ritorial issues. US disengagement would threaten US access to Asian markets, limit the USA’s ability to influence economic and political trends in the region, and engender heated competition for influence among regional powers. For these reasons, US policymakers and defence planners see US national security interests as intimately tied to the security and stability of Asia. US defence officials often remind the public that in the last 50 years the USA has fought two ‘hot wars’ in Asia (Korea and Vietnam) and that five of the USA’s seven security treaties are with Asian nations.

Asia Link

U.S. withdrawal from Asia enables asia to counterbalance the U.S.

Walt 2009 [Stephen M., Prof. Int'l Relations @ Harvard U, "Five Big Questions," <http://lalqila.wordpress.com/2010/07/13/five-big-questions-by-stephen-walt-and-my-responses/>]

Balance of power (or if you prefer, [balance of threat) theory](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balance_of_threat) predicts that weaker states will try to limit the influence of rising powers by forming defensive alliances against them. China’s rise is already provoking alarm in many of its neighbors, who look first to the United States and possibly to each other for assistance. But how strong will this tendency to balance be? If China gets really powerful, and the United States disengages entirely, some of China’s neighbors might be tempted to bandwagon with Beijing, thereby facilitating the emergence of a Chinese “sphere of influence” in Asia. But if China’s neighbors get support from each other and from the United States, then they’ll probably prefer to balance.

But here’s the question: Just how much support does the United States have to provide, given that this issue ought to matter more to the Asian states than it does to us? If you think balancing is the dominant tendency (as I do), then the United States can pass a lot of the burden to Japan, India, Vietnam, etc. It can “free-ride” to some degree on them, instead of the other way around. But if you think these states will be reluctant to balance, then the United States might have to do a lot of the heavy lifting itself.

To make matters more complicated still, both the United States and its Asian allies may be tempted to do some bluffing with each other, to try to get their allies to pay a larger share of the burden. Asian states will quietly threaten to realign or go neutral if they don’t get more backing from the United States, and U.S. leaders may drop hints about disengagement if they don’t get what they want from the allies they are helping protect. And this means figuring out just how large and iron-clad the U.S. commitment needs to be in order to sustain a future balancing coalition is a tricky business, and there will be lots of room for disagreement.

Asia Link

Even Perception of a reduced U.S. commitment to Asia destroys deterrence and sinks the region into chaos

Ashley J. **Tellis** (senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues.) 5/**2k** “ Smoke, Fire, and What to Do in Asia” Policy Review No. 100 The Hoover Institute http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6433

The first critical interest consists of preventing, deterring, and reducing the threat of attack on the continental United States and its extended territorial possessions. In the simplest sense, this interest has two components. The first and most important involves preserving the continental United States (conus) and its possessions from threats posed by weapons of mass destruction in Asia. These weapons are important because of the extensive damage they can inflict in relatively compressed time frames. Equally important, as Bracken points out, are the challenges posed by sophisticated delivery systems, like ballistic and cruise missiles and advanced attack aircraft, currently deployed by the wmd-capable states as well as prospective delivery systems that may be acquired by other Asian states over time. This includes both spin-off technologies emerging from space and commercial aviation programs as well as other kinds of non-traditional, covert delivery systems. The other component of this national objective involves protecting the conus and its possessions from conventional attack. Because of the vast distances involved in the Asia-Pacific region, the critical variables here are battlespace denial and power-projection capabilities — both sea- and air-based — that may be acquired by one or more Asian states. Given the changes in technology, these capabilities must be expanded to include other, newer, approaches to conventional war-fighting like strategic information warfare and the technologies and operational practices associated with the "revolution in military affairs." In all instances, U.S. interests suggest the following preference ordering: preventing potential adversaries from acquiring such capabilities; if prevention is impossible, deterring their use becomes the next logical objective; and, if even deterrence is unsuccessful, attenuating their worst effects through either extended counterforce options or effective defensive measures finally becomes necessary. **It is immediately obvious that disengaging from Asia in any significant way does little to minimize the threats posed by the spread of both wmd and other strategic technologies**. Only if highly robust forms of strategic defense become available in the future does the disengagement option become viable, and even then it may not necessarily be preferable, if it implies the inability to influence the wmd procurement and deployment decisions of the Asian states. Disengagement, moreover, has other corrosive effects: It would certainly compel many current American allies to acquire disruptive technologies in order to compensate for American absence, and these responses would only generate a regional arms race that would lead to the further diffusion of such capabilities. **It is highly doubtful that encouraging a multipolar balance of power, requiring the controlled diffusion of wmd and strategic capabilities, is the solution either**. There is simply no assurance that the "grooming" of multipolarity can be successfully calibrated (either by the United States or others). Moreover, once solutions such as these are pursued, there is no guarantee that other countries in other parts of the world will want to maintain any of their current restraints. A multipolarity based on the gradual emergence of new wmd powers may become a reality over time, but **it cannot represent a future that the U.S. ought to desire or encourage, at least as a general principle**. There may be areas where exceptions to this rule are tolerated, but such exceptionalism requires additional tests before it is enshrined as a matter of policy. In any event, when U.S. extended deterrence is available to a state, it ought to be offered in the form of security guarantees as a strategy of diminishing the attractiveness of disruptive technologies. In the matter of defending its first critical interest **in Asia, therefore, a hegemonic strategy, whereby the U.S. continues to provide local security, remains the best strategy** — not because it is by any means risk-free but **because it is better than all the alternatives.** The second critical interest consists of preventing the rise of a hegemonic state in Asia. **Any hegemonic state capable of dominating the Asian land mass** and the line of communications, both internal and external, **represents an unacceptable challenge to** **the** safety, prosperity, and relative **power position of the U**nited **S**tates. For reasons well understood by geopoliticians since Sir Halford Mackinder, Asia’s great wealth and resources would privilege its possessors considerably in the struggles endemic to international politics. If the region’s wealth and resources were to be secured by any single state (or some combination of states acting in unison), it would enable this entity to threaten American assets not only in Asia but in other areas as well — Europe and Africa, for example — and finally perhaps to challenge the United States itself at a global level. This entity, using the continent’s vast resources and economic capabilities, could then effectively interdict the links that currently connect the United States with Asia and the rest of the world and, in the limiting case, **menace the U.S. territory itself through a combination of both wmd and conventional instruments**. Besides being a threat to American safety, a hegemonic domination of Asia by one of the region’s powers would threaten American prosperity as well, if the consequence of such domination included denying the United States access to the continent’s markets, goods, capital, and technology. In combination, this threat to American safety and prosperity would have the inevitable effect of threatening the relative power position of the United States in international politics. This interest in preventing the rise of a hegemonic state inevitably involves paying close attention to the possible power transitions currently occurring in the region, especially those relating to China in the near to medium term and to Japan, Russia, and possibly India over the long run. It requires developing an appropriate set of policy responses — which may range from prevention at one end through containment in the middle to appeasement at the other — designed to prevent the rise of any hegemony that breaks American connections with Asia. Plainly, **a strategy of disengagement would be unable to assure this objective, and may actually entice the larger Asian states to contemplate mounting just such a challenge**. Even if such efforts were to arouse local balancing, there is no assurance that they could be checkmated without the assistance of the United States. And, if such balancing ultimately requires U.S. military presence and assistance for its success, it is still not clear what the benefits of a multipolar solution would be since the current division of labor already accepts not only American presence but also American preeminence. This is not to say that further adjustments in the U.S. regional posture ought to be ruled out, but that any adjustments that presage a true devolution towards multipolarity — the spread of wmd capabilities to American allies and acquiescing to their acquisition of power projection capabilities — have not yet been shown to be in the U.S. interest. **The third critical interest consists of ensuring the survival of American allies**. The first and most obvious reason for this objective is that the United States has treaty obligations to three important Asian states — Japan, South Korea, and Australia — and political commitments to another, namely Taiwan. While meeting these obligations is certainly important to maintain the credibility of the United States in the international arena, it is also consequential for directly substantive reasons that go right to the heart of Bracken’s book: controlling the leakage of disruptive technologies in Asia. In at least two of these three instances, the assurance of U.S. protection has resulted in important implicit bargains that are indispensable to the American conception of stable international order. Thanks to American security guarantees, South Korea and Japan have both enjoyed the luxury of eschewing nuclear weapons as guarantors of security. **Should American protective pledges be seen as weakening, the temptation to resurrect the nuclear option on the part of both states will increase — to the consequent detriment of America’s global antiproliferation policy**. Equally significant, however, is that Japan, and possibly South Korea as well, would of necessity have to embark on a significant conventional buildup, especially of missile, maritime and air forces. The resulting force posture would in practice be indistinguishable from a long-range power projection capability possessing an offensive orientation. **Even if such forces are developed primarily for defensive purposes, they will certainly give rise to new security dilemmas region-wide — which, in turn, would lead to an intense arms race, growing suspicions, and** possibly **war. Finally, even the least troublesome of these possibilities would result in the destruction of the East Asian zone of prosperity.** While such an outcome would certainly affect the strategic prospects of the East Asian region, the United States would not by any means be immune to its extended consequences. Since a considerable portion of American growth is directly tied to the vitality of the international trading system in general and this region in particular, the enervation of the East Asian economic regime would eventually lead to a diminution of American growth rates and, by implication, the quality of life enjoyed by its citizenry. **For all these reasons, ensuring the survival of American allies in Asia through a continuation of the current guarantees represents a vital interest to the U**nited States grounded not in altruistic considerations but in the hard realities of self-interest.

Asia Link

**Forward deployment key to prevent Japanese rearmament and Chinese aggression**

James, **Thompson et al,** Senior Research Staff Member, **2002**

**,**Robert J. Atwell, Robert Bovey, William E. Cralley, James Delaney, Michael P. Fischerkeller,

Kongdan Oh Hassig, Charles Hawkins, and Gene Porter, Institute for Defense Analysis, Paper P-3707, “Transforming US Overseas

Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD”, July, <http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0207thomason.pdf>)

“Support for a visible, forward-deployed US force presence will remain strong, both to reassure and to deter.” [p. 53] “there will probably be pressure to reduce those aspects of the US presence especially provocative in a Japanese and South Korean domestic context.” “There will probably be greater overall acceptance of a considerably smaller forward deployed presence, as long as the security alliance with Japan remains intact and some significant US air and naval presence remains based on the Japanese islands.” “Extreme changes would be viewed as highly destabilizing; less drastic reductions will likely produce a more mixed response.” “All changes will require the United States to take a sophisticated approach that employs appropriate compensating policy and program initiatives.” [p. 51]…“The most destabilizing US force posture for Northeast Asia would be …the elimination of virtually all bases in the western Pacific. [p. 53] “…this change would likely produce a range of negative military and political responses—such as pressures in Japan for full-scale rearmament, greater Chinese emphasis on military development, closer RoK political and military association with the former USSR.” “A gradual withdrawal, over a longer period, might produce a less destabilizing set of reactions, but significant tensions would remain—most notably intense rivalry between Japan and Korea and the overall issue of Japanese remilitarization.” [p. 57] In the mid-1990s, Zakheim et al. [1996] conducted an extensive assessment. Based upon a variety of interviews with foreign representatives, they concluded that US presence, especially naval presence, provides strong assurance value to friends and allies in many parts of the world. The study team found that interviewees shared the view that US military presence is crucial to preserving stability, which in turn is crucial to regional economic growth, itself a US economic and national security interest. Many respondents were even more explicit about the linkage between military presence and the preservation, indeed enhancement, of their own and US economic interests. This feeling was said to be widespread throughout each of the regions. In 1995, Thomason et al. found two principal things: first, US allies and friends indicated very clearly that they were more assured by greater, rather than less, US military presence. Second, in some parts of the world (Western Europe and Korea) land-based presence was considered much more helpful, all things considered, than sea-based presence in providing assurance, whereas in other parts of the world (e.g., much of the Persian Gulf), just the opposite appeared to be true. Overall, friends and allies want help, presence, but on their own terms, which means, increasingly, as unobtrusively as possible in most instances; and they want to be recognized as political equals. [p. 8] As a part of the same study, Thomason et al. also conducted off-the-record interviews with approximately three dozen US security experts in the mid-1990s to assess the “assurance” and other values these experts assigned to various levels and types of US presence, power projection capability, and other factors (for a synopsis, see Thomason, 2001). Current and former Service chiefs, commanders in chief of Unified Commands, and other senior policy makers and diplomats were interviewed as to the effectiveness of various kinds of presence and other instruments of national power in promoting the principal objectives of presence. Overall, these US decision-makers saw reassurance of friends and allies as a vital part of our foreign policy and national security strategy. They viewed reassurance as a complex, ongoing process, calling for high-quality and, frequently, high-level attention. They cited continuous, face-to-face involvement and relationships—both military and civilian—as necessary in establishing the trust and understanding that underpins strong friendships, partnerships, and coalitions. Many of the interviewees noted that the establishment of an ongoing dialogue helps both parties to avoid misinterpreting one another’s intentions and contributes to an understanding of the way in which both parties think. Strong personal relationships, while necessary, were by no means viewed as sufficient for reassurance. Most respondents said that an essential part of effective reassurance is a demonstrable, credible US ability to “be there” for friends and allies when they need specific help, and the ability to provide assistance of the right kind at the right time. In short, there was virtual unanimity that some combat-credible presence forces were important to reassurance. A number of respondents mentioned various forms and levels of ground forces as most helpful for reassurance purposes. Others mentioned maritime assets as most helpful. Still others cited the importance of land-based air forces. Among these senior US decision-makers, a firm, widely shared belief was evident: strong, continuous, high-quality personal level interactions and relationships are necessary to promote the reassurance objective. But they are not sufficient. They need to be combined with some regular, credible evidence of US will and ability to be there to help when needed. On this latter point, however, no real consensus was evident regarding the essentiality of any one particular level (or type) of presence forces for effective reassurance. This finding may be explained in part by the possibility that what respondents viewed as “credible” may have been—at least broadly—a function of what they viewed as either the current or latent threat level in a particular region at the time. It may also have been due to genuine uncertainty as to what “works” to offset various perceived threat levels.

Asia Link

U.S. Forward deployment in Asia is critical to sustaining China relations and preventing a war with China

Ashton B. **Carter, and** William James **Perry** ( Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) for President Barack Obama, the United States Secretary of Defense from February 3, 1994, to January 23, 1997) 19**99** “ Preventive defense: a new security strategy for America” pp102-103

**The stability of the Asia-Pacific region depends on a strong forward deployment of U.S. military forces** in the absence of a regional collective security institution that would parallel NATO's role in Europe. The U.S. forward deployment would not be possible without the U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan. Their friendship with the United States is the cornerstone of U.S. policy in the region. This combination has maintained the peace and reduced the perceived necessity for regional arms races. The principles of Preventive Defense remind us not to be complacent about this generally favorable state of affairs, but instead to look ahead and ask what the challenges to this stability might be. **There are several areas of risk, including a decline in U.S. willingness to support the forward deployment and the alliances that underlie the stability**, growing out of pressure to lower the U.S. defense budget. A second area of danger is the possibility that our allies might become unwilling to carry their share of the costs of sustaining the forward deployment of American forces. That issue has already arisen: in 1995, the U.S.-Japan alliance and basing came under serious criticism in Japan. The differences at that time were resolved by the security affirmation that President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto signed in April 1996. The issue could arise again, however, if the economic problems that Japan and South Korea are now facing were to reduce their ability or willingness to share the expenses of basing U.S. troops on their territory. Third, a destructive regional war would destabilize the region. Although the United States has major forces deployed in and around Korea to help the Republic of Korea deter such a war, this uneasy balance could be upset if North Korea acquired nuclear weapons, or if its regime "imploded" due to the collapse of the North Korean economy. A fourth potential source of regional instability would result if a major military power were to emerge in the region and begin to threaten its neighbors. Some in the West believe that China is headed inevitably in this direction and point to the March 1996 crisis as evidence. The more general fear is that China could go the way of Japan in the 1930s: as Japan increased its economic, political, and military power in the Pacific, this created inevitable conflicts of interest with other Pacific powers, especially the United States. This conflict was not managed well, and the result was a bloody Pacific war. Indeed, China is today increasing its economic, political, and military power in the Pacific, and this has led and will continue to lead to conflicts of interest with other powers in that region, especially the United States and Japan. We believe that this path poses special dangers for American security but that it also provides rich opportunities. **A U.S. policy of Preventive Defense is needed to help manage the U.S.-China relationship so that it does not lead to military conflict, but instead serves to strengthen the present stability in the Asia-Pacific region.**

Asian Deterrence High

Asian Deterrence strong now

Kathleen J. **Mclnnis** ( coordinator of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a research associate at CSIS) **2005** “ Extended Deterrence:The U.S. Credibility Gap in the Middle East” http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington\_quarterly/v028/28.3mcinnis.html

A recent UN report recently warned that "[w]e are approaching a point at which the erosion of the nonproliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation."1 One major challenge to the nonproliferation regime appearing on the strategic horizon is the likely development of an Iranian nuclear capability, which could spark a wave of proliferation throughout the Middle Eastern region. With this in mind, can U.S. nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities help bolster the security of U.S. allies against the threats posed by Iranian nuclear proliferation? In addition to deterring its own adversaries, the U.S. nuclear arsenal has in the past played a vital but often overlooked role of reassuring U.S. allies against their adversaries. This assurance was a key tool in preventing nuclear proliferation among allies in the European and Asian theaters during the Cold War, despite the threat posed by the nuclear capabilities of their enemies. In today's security environment, assurance remains an important policy objective for the U.S. arsenal. The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review states that "U.S. nuclear forces will continue to provide assurance to security partners.... This assurance can serve to reduce the incentives for friendly countries to acquire nuclear weapons of their own to deter such threats and circumstances."2 Will this strategy work in practice? In the Asian theater, extended deterrence has been effective, and the United States possesses some decent options for ensuring its effectiveness in the future. The long-standing commitment of the United States to the survival of democratic states in the region, reinforced by security treaties with Japan and South Korea, has created a great deal of U.S. political credibility in the region. This political credibility, combined with U.S. military capabilities, [End Page 169] could be employed to deter the North Korean threat and assure U.S. allies in the region, thereby reducing the chance that they will respond to Pyongyang by building their own nuclear weapons program. The U.S. political commitment to its allies in Asia has been and remains robust, bolstered by the U.S. troop presence in Japan and South Korea for the past 50 years. This remains true despite the drawdown of U.S. forces in the Asian theater. Furthermore, should allies begin to doubt U.S. nuclear assurances, steps can be taken to reinforce the policy's credibility. As such, despite the major challenges presented by Pyongyang's nuclear declaration in February 2005, it is reasonably likely that East Asian allies will continue to choose to rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella well into the future rather than set off a regional nuclear domino effect.

Japan Link

US forward deployment key to maintain US primacy and deter China.

Emma Chanlett-Avery- Specialist in Asian Affairs and Weston S. Konishi – Analyst in Asian Affairs. July 23, 2009. Congressional Research Service. <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA504451>

Although the U.S.-Japan security partnership grew out of a need to contain the Soviet Union and has endured in large part because of North Korea’s threat, many analysts see countering China as the primary driver of the campaign to enhance cooperation today. The U.S. approach to rising China is often characterized by observers as having two prongs that roughly correspond to the “engagement” and “containment” camps. The “engagement” approach includes the “responsible stakeholder” concept outlined most prominently by former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, which aims to convince Beijing to contribute peacefully to the international system that has allowed its economic and political rise. The “containment” aspect of U.S. policy seeks to counter a China that could develop in ways inimical to U.S. interests. The U.S.-Japan alliance **plays a role** in both approaches. In the former, Japan could serve as a model of responsible multilateral engagement as well as a key economic partner for China in the region. In the latter, enhanced joint defense capabilities from neighboring Japan could deter any aggressive behavior by China’s military**. U.S. forward deployment in Japan plays a particularly important role** in contingency strategies for a conflict with China over Taiwan.

Japan Link

US forward deployment key to US Heg, Eas Asian Security, and to deter China.

Takashi Inoguchi **-** Japanese academic researcher of foreign affairs and international and global relationships of states. and Paul Bacon- Associate Professor of International Politics, School of International Liberal Studies, Waseda University, Japan. September 2005. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific. http://irap.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/5/2/117?rss=1&ssource=mfc

After the cold war, the United States clearly sought to reinforce its hegemonic strategy in East Asia, seeking a special role for itself as the principal guarantor of regional order. The United States could have withdrawn in order to let a local balance of power emerge and undertaken the role of offshore balancer. It could also have promoted multilateral regional security organizations, or sought to construct a regional balance of power that contained China. However, it did none of these things. Mastanduno argues that the United States will retain its preponderant power status in the coming years but that the task of maintaining and completing US regional hegemony will become more difficult. The two biggest challenges that the United States faces are the global war on terror and the management of the rise of China, as a result of which the longer-term prospects for East Asian order are uncertain and problematic. There are two key features of US hegemonic strategy in the region. First, the United States has cultivated a set of bilateral relationships with other key states in the region, the most important and enduring of which have been the ties with Japan and South Korea. Furthermore, the United States has reaffirmed its close partnership with Australia and sought to engage rather than contain China. This preference for a primary set of bilateral relationships is referred to as the ‘hub and spokes’ approach. The second institutional feature of US hegemony has been **the US forward presence in the region,** and the US intention to maintain a substantial political and military commitment to the region for an ‘indefinite duration’. US hegemonic strategy in the region has contributed to order in several ways. For China, the US presence effectively ‘contains’ Japan, and, similarly, for Japan, the US presence deters China from a bid for regional dominance. The US presence has helped to deter major powers from intensifying dangerous rivalries, and it has, in so doing, reassured smaller states whose security and autonomy would otherwise be threatened by these large states. East Asia is a dangerous neighborhood, in which smaller states must coexist with larger states that have geopolitical ambitions, territorial claims, and a history of enmity. The United States has also worked hard to manage and stabilize regional conflicts that have the potential to develop into local and possibly even systemic wars. In the 1990s, for example, the United States took initiatives in security crises between China and Taiwan, in North Korea, and in the Kashmir conflict. Finally, the United States has striven to discourage nationalist economic competition. It has pushed Japan over domestic economic reform, sought to integrate China into a globalizing world economy, and maintained access to sources of global liquidity and US markets in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. US hegemonic strategy has, therefore, made a substantial contribution to regional order in East Asia, but it also has its limitations. The United States has not sought to definitively resolve the numerous long-standing conflicts in the region, such as those between China and Taiwan, North and South Korea, Japan and China, or Japan and Korea. Rather, the United States has sought to manage relationships and crises and avoid systemic conflict. US hegemony is also incomplete, in the sense that by no means all states accept or approve of US hegemony in the region. Japan does regard the dominant regional role of the United States as constructive and legitimate, but it is also the case that Japan gains more by cooperating with rather than challenging US hegemony. The most important issue, of course, is China's long-term reaction to the US attempt to dominate the region. At present, China is grateful for the benefits of integration, but in the long run it is likely to develop its own aspirations towards and strategies for the construction of regional order.

Japan Link

**U.S presence and forward deployment prevents destabilizing conflicts and promotes under-balancing which leads to peace**

**Dan Twining,** staff writer for Foreign Policy**,** November 10, 20**09** “A crib sheet for President Obama's upcoming Asian summitry,”http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/11/10/a\_crib\_sheet\_for\_president\_obamas\_upcoming\_asian\_summitry) SM

The American alliance system, and the security guarantees and forward deployment of military forces that underpin it, remain an important stabilizing force in a region experiencing the kind of dynamic shifts in relative power that so often lead to arms racing, regional polarization, and conflict.  In this context, U.S. leadership provides a stabilizing reassurance to Asian states that might otherwise need to pursue destabilizing "self-help" policies in the face of security dilemmas American security guarantees help mitigate. American alliance commitments to Japan, South Korea, and other nations promote what political scientists call "underbalancing" -- regional states enjoying U.S. protection are able to invest more of their national resources in the pursuits of peace rather than preparations for war, which in turn helps reassure their neighbors. Asians are particularly watching to see how President Obama handles conflict with Japan, Washington's most important regional ally, over troop basing rights and other issues. Many Asian states fear that a Japan unshackled from its close alliance with the U.S. would be a destabilizing force in the region -- which is why so many Asian countries applauded the deft alliance management shown by Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush. The inexperience of the new Japanese government makes this a real challenge for President Obama, who may have to speak past Japan's uncertain leadership and directly to the Japanese public, which overwhelmingly supports a strong U.S. alliance, to rally public support for a stronger and more capable U.S.-Japan security partnership for the 21st century.

Japan Link

US forward delployment in Japan key to maintain its military primacy over China.

Dr. Elena Atanassova-Cornelis-PhD researcher at the Japanology Section of K.U.Leuven. 05-06/2010. <http://www.fusl.ac.be/fr/pdf/IEE/Brochures/atanassova_paper.pdf>

Strategic mistrust also underpins US-China relations, with the two powers wary of one another’s strategic intentions in East Asia and divided by conflicting regional visions. As in Japan, the “China threat” view in the US has gradually gained ground since the 1990s. Uncertainties concerning Beijing’s both short-term and long-term goals have led to worries in Washington that China, as it becomes stronger, might seek to alter the structure of the regional order, and hence **challenge US leadership position**, as well as interests, in East Asia.21 In particular, US official documents have stressed that the PRC has the “greatest potential to compete militarily with the US”, expressed concerns (in a similar way as Japan) that China’s military modernisation has implications going beyond Beijing’s “immediate territorial interests” (i.e., the Taiwan issue) and repeatedly pointed out at the limited transparency in Beijing’s defence policy, which is viewed as increasing “the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation”.22 America’s post-Cold War security strategy in East Asia, especially seen in George W. Bush’s reinforcement of the “hub and spoke” system of US bilateral alliances (notably with Japan), clearly shows that Washington has remained **committed to sustaining its military primacy**. To be sure, the US has increasingly come to recognise China’s growing regional influence and the need for Beijing’s cooperation in tackling regional challenges (e.g., North Korea’s nuclear ambitions). Nevertheless, America has not shown willingness to share its leadership in East Asia with China, i.e. establish a kind of condominium of power, but has rather expected Beijing to be “fully cognizant”23 of US intention to preserve its regional primacy and hence a Pax Americana.

Japan Link

US-Japan Alliance keeps China in check.

Dr. Elena Atanassova-Cornelis-PhD researcher at the Japanology Section of K.U.Leuven. 05-06/2010. <http://www.fusl.ac.be/fr/pdf/IEE/Brochures/atanassova_paper.pdf>

For the US and Japan, as discussed earlier in this paper, the need to deter North Korea has been a major factor driving their security cooperation since the late 1990s. It is also clear that the rise of China has acted as an additional stimulus for the two allies to deepen their defence ties, as well as for Japan to seek an expansion of its military capabilities. By reinforcing the alliance in order to tackle the threat from the DRPK, Tokyo and Washington have faced a security dilemma with Beijing with regard to the Taiwan issue.33 For China, its primary focus has been to **attain military superiority** with regard to Taiwan, as well as to deter the US (and Japan) from helping Taipei achieve independence. While pursuing economic interdependence with the island and emphasising the benefits of economic integration, Beijing has sought a more coercive approach to the reunification issue by means of reinforcing Chinese military capabilities and becoming more serious about the use of force. In this context, PRC’s modernisation of its nuclear and missile arsenal has been particularly important. The deterioration in Sino-Japanese ties and Japan’s security normalisation, especially under Koizumi, have arguably contributed to exacerbation of Beijing’s suspicions of the alliance’s strategic intentions, as well as to the security dilemma in East Asia. Furthermore, Japan’s willingness to assume a larger security role may have added to the complexity of America’s policy towards Taiwan and hence Sino-US relations. Indeed, some Chinese analysts have argued that, for Japan, an enhanced alliance was “an excuse” for its security activism, while for the US (namely, the Bush administration), its open support for Tokyo’s more assertive foreign policy became a means to balance Beijing and hence “consolidate US preponderance” in the region.34 With the expansion of the scope of security cooperation between Tokyo and Washington, and Japan’s acquisition of new military capabilities, Beijing has come to perceive the alliance enhancement as interference in what it regards as a domestic matter. In this context, the PRC has worried that the “situational” (rather than a “geographical”) definition of the region in the Revised US-Japan Defence Guidelines could include a future Taiwan contingency within the remit of bilateral security cooperation. **China has also been concerned about US-Japanese development** and deployment of a BMD system in East Asia, especially a mobile and sea-based one, as it could be extended for the defence of Taiwan and hence prevent re-unification with the mainland. The 2005 Joint Statement of Tokyo and Washington, which indicated the “peaceful resolution” of the Taiwan Strait issue as one of their “common strategic objectives” in the region, was strongly criticised by Beijing.35 Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing stressed that the issue was China’s domestic affair and “should by no means be deliberated in the framework of the security alliance”.36 The Joint Statement was also interpreted by some Chinese analysts as explicitly indicating Japan’s willingness to “actively intervene in the Taiwan issue to contain China”; an involvement perceived as being accelerated by the US.37 Beijing’s response was the enactment of the Anti-Secession Law soonthereafter, which underscored PRC’s intention to employ “non-peaceful means” in order to “protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”.38 The security dilemma dynamics between the US-Japan alliance and the PRC defines the mutual hedging between these powers. Washington, while emphasising common interests and bilateral cooperation with Beijing (since the Bush administration), has reinforced in the 2000s its security alliances and partnerships in Asia, with its alliance with Japan playing a central role in this hedging strategy.39 For Tokyo, its close security relationship with America has been a major component of its own external balancing behaviour vis-a-vis Beijing.40 Finally, China has adopted a strategy of “hedged acquiescence” towards the US, motivated in part by the unprecedented expansion of US-Japan security ties under the Koizumi-Bush partnership, as well as by its recognition of the strategic advantage enjoyed by the US as a balancer (notably with Japan) in Asia’s geopolitics.41 In addition to its military modernisation efforts and active regional diplomacy, Chinese hedging has included the development of new strategic partnerships beyond East Asia (including with the EU).

Japan Link

US-Japan alliance key to US power projections and East Asian Security.

[Yukio Okamoto](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v025/25.2okamoto.html" \l "top) president of Okamoto Associates, Inc and special adviser to the cabinet and chairman of the Japanese prime minister's Task Force on Foreign Relations. 2002. The Washington Quarterly. <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v025/25.2okamoto.html>).

Fifty years have passed since Japan and the United States signed the original security treaty and more than 40 years have passed since the current 1960 treaty came into force. Neither Japan nor the United States has a desire to alter the treaty obligations, much less abrogate the alliance. Nevertheless, exploring potential alternatives to the alliance is worthwhile, if only to illuminate [End Page 71] why it is likely to survive. For Japan, treaty abrogation would result in a security vacuum that could be filled in only one of three ways. The first is armed neutrality, which would mean the development of a Japan ready to repel any threat, including the region's existing and incipient nuclear forces. The second is to establish a regional collective security arrangement. This option would require that the major powers in Asia accept a reduction of their troop strengths down to Japanese levels and accept a common political culture--democracy. Neither of these conditions is likely to be met for decades. The third option, the one outlined in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, is for Japan's security to be the responsibility of a permanent UN military force, ready to deploy at a moment's notice to preserve peace and stability in the region. Such a force, of course, does not yet exist. None of the three possible replacements for the Japan-U.S. alliance is realistic. The alternatives also seem certain to **increase the likelihood of war** in the region, not decrease it--the only reason that Japan would want to leave the U.S.-Japan alliance. An overview of aftereffects on the United States of an abrogation of the alliance runs along similar lines. In the absence of a robust, UN-based security system, relations between the giant countries of Asia would become uncertain and competitive--too precarious a situation for the United States and the world. The United States would lose access to the facilities on which it **relies for power projection in the region.** Much more importantly, it would also lose a friend--a wealthy, mature, and loyal friend. Given the magnitude of the danger that an end of the alliance would pose to both Japan and the United States, both sides will likely want to maintain their security relationship for many years to come. A completely new world would have to emerge for Japan and the United States to no longer need each other. Despite frictions over trade, supposed Japanese passivity, purported U.S. arrogance, and the myriad overwrought "threats to the alliance," the truth is that this military alliance between two democratic states is well-nigh unbreakable--because **there are no acceptable alternatives.**

Japan Link – China

US – Japan Alliance key to avoid Chinese aggression over Taiwan

[Yukio Okamoto](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v025/25.2okamoto.html#top) president of Okamoto Associates, Inc and special adviser to the cabinet and chairman of the Japanese prime minister's Task Force on Foreign Relations. 2002. The Washington Quarterly. <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v025/25.2okamoto.html>).

Regardless of whether China's development takes the bright path or the fearful one, however, reason for concern exists on one issue: the resolution of the status of Taiwan. Chinese citizens from all walks of life have an attachment to the reunification of Taiwan and the mainland that transcends reason. **The U.S.-Japan alliance represents a significant hope for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem.** Both Japan and the United States have clearly stated that they oppose reunification by force. When China conducted provocative missile tests in the waters around Taiwan in 1996, the United States sent two aircraft carrier groups into nearby waters as a sign of its disapproval of China's belligerent act. Japan seconded the U.S. action, raising in Chinese minds the possibility that Japan might offer logistical and other support to its ally in the event of hostilities. Even though intervention is only a possibility, a strong and close tie between Japanese and U.S. security interests guarantees that the **Chinese leadership cannot afford to miscalculate the consequences of an unprovoked attack on Taiwan.** The alliance backs up Japan's basic stance that the two sides need to come to a negotiated solution.

Japan Booster

US-Japan Alliance key to long term hegemony

WILLIAM E. RAPP, a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army. Council on Foreign Relations- Hitachi International Affairs Fellow at the Institute for International Policy Studies in Tokyo. Ph.D. in Political Science (International Relations) from Stanford University. January 2004. Strategic Studies Institute for the Military. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub367.pdf>.

Currently in Northeast Asia there is considerable uncertainty about the future for all countries involved in the region. The nuclear ambitions of an increasingly desperate North Korea have led to serious ruptures in the U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance and greatly enhanced security fears in Japan. The global war on terrorism and widely perceived unilateralism on the part of the United States has, ironically, enhanced the confidence of China to portray itself as a multidimensional leader in Asia. The growing strength of the Kuomintang in Taiwanese politics and its agenda to build a closer relationship or even confederation with mainland China after the presidential elections of March 2004 may upend the security assumptions of the region.1 Operation IRAQI FREEDOM has reinforced the concepts of transformation and power projection from a more limited number of forward bases advocated so strongly by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, while at the same time highlighting America’s need for allies in the war on terrorism. It is a region awash in uncertainly, but one in which the United States must remain firmly engaged to protect its vital interests. In the breadth of its reach and influence, the United States is often described by others as hegemonic and the world’s sole superpower. This is a very clumsy caricature, however. Colin Powell recently quipped, “We are so multilateral it keeps me up 24 hours a day checking on everybody.”2 The extent of that reach and the means necessary for achieving American interests around the world depend greatly on cooperative efforts with other like-minded nations, if only in “coalitions of the willing” built by the United States for ad hoc purposes. In Northeast Asia, the United States has two vital alliances―with Japan and South Korea―already in place. Although the American relationship with the Republic of Korea (ROK) is undeniably critical to security on this strategically important peninsula, the relationship is very narrow in its scope and its future in some doubt.3 The relationship with Japan, however, offers greater potential to **achieve American interests** in the long run in Asia, beyond simply the defense of Japan. Being off the shores of mainland Asia and combining the two biggest economies in the world,4 this alliance offers significant long-term opportunities to more actively promote peace, prosperity, and liberal values in the region.

Okinawa Link

Advanced technology at Okinawa key to fight China and North Korea.

David Axe - independent military correspondent, staff writer for The Diplomat. 06/28/2010. The Diplomat. <http://the-diplomat.com/2010/06/28/why-allies-need-okinawa-base/>.

Without its 2 Okinawan air bases and their 3 roughly 10,000-foot runways, the US military—and by extension, US allies—would depend almost entirely on a handful of US aircraft carriers for bringing to bear aerial firepower in East Asia. That might be a realistic option, except that China has lately deployed several new classes of anti-ship weaponry specifically meant for sinking US carriers, including the widely-feared DF-21 ballistic missile and a flotilla of stealthy fast-attack vessels. In recognition of Okinawa’s growing importance, the Pentagon has spent billions of dollars in the past decade modernizing forces and facilities on the island. The US Army deployed Patriot air-defence missiles capable of shooting down enemy aircraft as well as ballistic missiles, a favourite weapon of both China and North Korea. Kadena got extensive new storage bunkers for bombs, missiles and spare parts, allowing the base to support potentially hundreds of aircraft flown in from the United States during an emergency. In 2007, the US Air Force began stationing Global Hawk long-range spy drones and F-22 Raptor stealth fighters at Kadena. The Raptors represent perhaps the greatest improvement. Indeed, in the minds of US planners, in many ways Okinawa’s most important function is to support the F-22s. In a 2009 study examining a simulated air war pitting the United States and Taiwan against China, the California-based think-tank RAND concluded that a wing of F-22s could shoot down 27 Chinese fighters for every Raptor lost in the air. F-22s flying from Okinawa could also clear the way for air strikes on ground targets in China or North Korea, according to Lieutenant Colonel Wade Tolliver, commander of the 27th Fighter Squadron, an F-22 unit based in Virginia that routinely sends Raptors to Kadena. ‘There are a lot of countries out there that have developed highly integrated air-defence systems,’ Tolliver says. ‘What we need to do is take some of our assets that have special capabilities…and we need to roll back those integrated air defence systems so we can bring in our joint forces.’ The base’s ability to host F-22s and follow-on aircraft is ‘probably the most important thing about Kadena,’ Monroe says. ‘Because of our capability to stage forces out of here—this is a huge runway—we do believe we have unmatched air power.’

Okinawa Link

Forward deployment in Okinawa key to deter Chinese and North Korean aggression, only U.S. marine presence can ensure Asian stability

Richard C. **Bush**, director at the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, March 10, 2**010**, Brookings Institute, “Okinawa and Security in East Asia,” <http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2010/0310_japan_politics_bush.aspx>, ) SM

The threat environment in Northeast Asia is not benign. North Korea’s WMD capabilities are a matter of concern but will hopefully be a medium-term problem. More attention, however, is focused on China which has gradually developed a full spectrum of capabilities, including nuclear weapons. Their current emphasis is on power projection and their immediate goal is to create a strategic buffer in at least the first island chain. Although Taiwan is the driver for these efforts, they affect Japan. Of course, capabilities are not intentions. However, how will Japan feel as the conventional U.S.-China balance deteriorates and a new equilibrium is reached, especially knowing that China has nuclear weapons? There are also specific points of friction within Northeast Asia such as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the East China Sea, North Korea, and Taiwan, some of which involve and concern more than one government. Although we can hope that China will not seek to dominate East Asia at the U.S. and Japan’s expense, we can’t be sure of their intentions either. Hope is not a policy.

The most sensible strategy—for both the U.S. and Japan—is to try to shape China’s intentions over time so that they move in a benign direction; so that it has more to gain from cooperation than a challenge. This has been the U.S. and Japan’s strategy since the early 1970s. The strategy has a good foundation in economic interdependence. However, it is easier said than done and is one of the biggest challenges of this century. The strategy requires at least two elements: engaging and incorporating China as much as possible, and maintaining the strength and willingness to define limits. This combination of elements is important because engagement without strength would lead China to exploit our good will while strength without engagement would lead China to suspect that our intentions are not benign. If engagement-plus-strength is the proper strategy for the U.S. and Japan each to cope with a rising China, it only makes sense that Japan and the United States will be more effective if they work together, complementing each other’s respective abilities. The strength side of this equation almost requires Japan to rely on the alliance since history suggests that it will not build up sufficiently on its own. An important part of strength is positioning your power in the right places. That is why forward deployment of U.S. forces in Japan has always been important. That is why our presence on Okinawa is important. Lieutenant General Keith Stalder, commanding general of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, recently spoke in Japan about the importance of Okinawa for the mission of the Marines. Among other things, he said that the U.S. Marine Corps is the emergency response force in East Asia. He explained that “The fundamental Marine Corps organizational structure is the Marine Air Ground Task Force, in which war fighting elements of aviation forces, ground combat forces, and logistics forces all operate under a single commander.” The Marine ground forces must train consistently with the helicopters that support them. Lieutenant General Stalder illustrated his point by saying that the “Marine Air Ground Task Force is a lot like a baseball team. It does not do you any good to have the outfielders practicing in one town, the catcher in another, and the third baseman somewhere else. They need to practice together, as a unit.” He went on to say that Okinawa is very important because it is relatively close to mainland Japan, to Korea, to the South China Sea, and to the Strait of Malacca. This geographic location is why, he said, “There is probably nowhere better in the world from which to dispatch Marines to natural disasters” than Okinawa. This importance of Okinawa is another reason why finding a solution to the realignment issue is essential. Any solution to the Okinawa problem should meet four conditions: efficiency of operations, safety, local interests, and permanence. Resolving the situation is also important because, as Lieutenant General Stalder pointed out, other nations are “watching to see whether the United States-Japan Alliance is strong enough to find a solution to the current issues.”[[1]](http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2010/0310_japan_politics_bush.aspx#_ftn1) Of course, our two countries and China are not the only ones concerned with the alliance. South Korea has important stakes involved in the presence of U.S. forces in the Western Pacific. In the event of a conventional attack by North Korea, South Korea has a very strong military, but it also depends on the ability of the United States to move forces quickly to the Korean peninsula. It depends on those U.S. forces, including Marines, to dissuade and deter North Korea from even considering an attack. South Korea is comfortable with the relocation of 8,000 marines to Guam, in part because there are already other U.S. troops on the peninsula and in Japan, and also because moving Marines from Guam by air doesn’t take long. However, South Korea would likely be concerned by signs that the U.S.-Japan alliance was slowly dissolving. If U.S. troops were to be removed from, first, Okinawa and, then, the home islands, it would likely weaken deterrence. Taiwan also has concerns. The Marines on Okinawa, plus the U.S. air force, serve to strengthen deterrence in the event of aggression by China against Taiwan. China will be less likely to mount an attack because the U.S. has both ground troops and an air base on Okinawa. If China attacked U.S. installations on Okinawa, that almost ensures a serious conflict. The bases act as a tripwire. demands. As previously mentioned, the public supports the alliance, but it has increasing doubts about DPJ leadership, in part because of Futenma. So, where the political logic of 2009 led the DPJ coalition to demand a lot on Okinawa, the political logic of 2010 appears to encourage Mr. Ozawa and Mr. Hatoyama to settle for what they can get.

Okinawa Link

U.S. military presence in Okinawa prevents Japanese rearmament and arms races

Eric, Vogel, Prof. @ Harvard U, 2003 Asian Studies Newsletter <http://www.aasianst.org/Viewpoints/Vogel.htm>) SM

Why is the Tokyo government ready to pay the support for the housing of U.S. troops in Okinawa and elsewhere in Japan? **Because** Japan’s alternatives to a security pact with the United States, developing an independent military capacity to defend themselves or engaging in unarmed neutrality, are less attractive. An independent Japanese military capacity is likely to unnerve the Chinese and Koreans, and the prospects of an arms race between Japan on the one hand and China or Korea on the other, would be high; most Japanese would prefer to have better relations with China and Korea. Unarmed neutrality would leave Japan open to the intimidation of neighbors, including North Korea, something the Japanese public is not likely to tolerate in the long run. Given the alternatives, thoughtful people in the Diet and elsewhere in Japanese policy circles prefer an alliance with the United States. Japanese political leaders who need cooperation from other parties in Japan take a low posture and tone down their proclamations on controversial issues, but when the crunch comes they vote to keep the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. And that is why so many Japanese politicians support the Guidelines worked out between defense specialists in Japan and the United States to specify what Japan could do to respond in case of emergencies. What is the new role of the U.S.-Japan Security alliance after the end of the cold War? It is to be ready to respond in case of emergencies and to help keep a stable environment so that Japan, China, and Korea do not feel the need to start an arms race in order for each to achieve security. Regional stability is sufficiently important that the United States, having learned the cost of isolationism in 1914 and 1941, is willing to play a considerable role in guaranteeing regional security. Chalmers Johnson wants U.S. troops to pull out of Okinawa but he wants Japan and the United States to keep their treaty alliance. Unfortunately it is not possible to do both. If the United States is to respond quickly to emergencies in places like the Korean peninsula it needs to have troops and supplies readily on hand. The North and South Koreans both know that U.S. troops would defend South Korea if the North attacks because U.S. troops are in Korea and would be affected. Most Japanese believe that U.S. troops would fight to defend Japan. But if U.S. troops were not in Japan, many more Japanese would doubt the U.S. willingness to defend them, and the temptations to develop their own military capacity would be very real; Korea and China would be unlikely to stand idly by. The United States does not negotiate with Okinawa; it negotiates with the government of Japan, in Tokyo, and the Japanese government has chosen to keep bases in Okinawa. U.S. military officials in Okinawa have worked hard and continue to work hard to keep good relations with civilians in Okinawa and to keep incidents to a minimum. We do not live in an ideal dream world where everyone would be perfectly happy. But preserving security in Asia and avoiding a new arms race and regional conflict is too important to the lives of all Asians to be cavalier about advocating U.S. troop withdrawal from Japan without carefully considering the consequences.

Marine presence in Okinawa acts as a key deterrent against enemy attacks and maintains Japan security

Bruce, **Klingner,** a Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.

May 28, 20**10**, The Heritage Foundation, “With Re-Acceptance of Marines on Okinawa, Time to Look Ahead,”http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/05/With-Re-Acceptance-of-Marines-on-Okinawa-Time-to-Look-Ahead) SM

The DPJ policy reversal is the result of senior Japanese officials having a belated epiphany on geostrategic realities. They now realize that the Marines on Okinawa are an indispensable and irreplaceable element of any U.S. response to an Asian crisis. Foreign Minister Okada affirmed that “the presence of U.S. Marines on Okinawa is necessary for Japan’s national security [since they] are a powerful deterrent against possible enemy attacks and should be stationed in Japan.”

Prime Minister Hatoyama now admits that after coming to power he came to better understand the importance of the U.S.–Japan alliance in light of the northeast Asian security environment. He commented, “As I learned more about the situation, I’ve come to realize that [the Marines] are all linked up as a package to maintain deterrence.” Japanese officials also remarked that rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula—triggered by North Korea’s sinking of a South Korean naval ship[[1]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/05/With-Re-Acceptance-of-Marines-on-Okinawa-Time-to-Look-Ahead" \l "_ftn1)—made clear to Japan that it lives in a dangerous neighborhood and should not undermine U.S. deterrence and defense capabilities.

Okinawa Link

Withdrawal from Okinawa undermines US hegemony and supports China’s rise

Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, "The Issue of the Futenma Base on Okinawa in the Japan–US Relations", 4/28/10, Google Docs)

The US treats its bases on Okinawa and elsewhere in Japan as strategic points in the Pacific. With China, North Korea, South Korea and Taiwan within their range, the presence of US forces is meant to ensure security in Asia. The reduction of US forces on Okinawa or their withdrawal from the island would amount―even if chiefly on the symbolic level―to the weakening of the US’s position as the guarantor of security in Asia, a scenario that would benefit China the most.

South Korea Link

Troops in South Korea are the linchpin of US power projection—withdrawal causes a destabilizing power vacuum

Lee Byong-Chul is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Cooperation in Seoul, "Reshaping the South Korea-US alliance", 3/4/10, AsiaSentinel, http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=2328&Itemid=182

With the Americans having now agreed to hand back control at Roh's insistence, South Korea under Lee has started having second thoughts. Conservatives are concerned that the command changes could presage a US move to reduce the American security commitment on the peninsula, an eventuality that could give North Korean adventurism new opportunities and tip the security balance at a time of growing Chinese power. Some people point out that a series of diplomatic conflicts between the US and Japan over military bases and between the US and China over arms sales to Taiwan, not to mention the Google cyber security issue in China, underlines South Korea as Washington's solid and reliable friend in the region. Far beyond the troublesome North Korean nuclear issues, and beyond the question of the alliance, however, lies a still more fundamental issue: what exactly is the nature of the military alliance facing North Korea as a nuclear state and how would American power be projected if necessary? As soon as Lee took office in 2008, he started seeking to convince his US counterparts-- George W Bush included prior to Obama's ascendancy-- how crucial the ROK-U.S. alliance should be to regional stability in Northeast Asia, not only because of North Korea's adventurism but because the rise of China is becoming an unavoidable challenge to American hegemony in the region. In short, the conservative president at least acknowledges that America's role should be bigger than that of China in the course of making an eventual Korean unification happen. It is thus no wonder that from an alliance perspective of the conservatives, Obama's easy-to-remember comments about South Korea's economic and educational achievements can be regarded as perhaps more promising than they actually are to bolster conservatives' concerns in favor of delaying the transfer of wartime operational control. On cue, South Korean Defense Minister Kim Tae-young reportedly said on Feb. 24 that "the US-led defense scheme will remain further, given the North Korean nuclear and missile threat." The four-star general-turned-minister also insinuated that the government might renegotiate with the US over the transition of operational control that Seoul and Washington agreed in 2007. Roh must be turning in his grave. In terms of substance, yet some of what Kim had to say was unsurprising. It is correct that the Lee government's possible volte-face must give away many things, as the minister remarked. The overarching question is whether operational control of South Korean troops during wartime should indeed pass from the US to Korean commanders. Today, many military experts embrace a different view of South Korea's self-defense capability against the communist North, but the reality is that the transition of wartime operational control is entirely based on US military strategy that South Korea-based US troops could be temporarily pulled out of the peninsula at any time in consideration of US national interests. Washington may feel it has a winning hand in the bargaining as operational control is considered more important to South Korea than to the US. As the US has already confirmed publicly several times that the controversial authority would not be altered, it may be quietly scoffing at Seoul's goal. It is clear that America cannot forever bankroll the security of South Korea. South Korean military policy-makers should examine the American military strategies as they are, not as they want them to be. That will be a reality of the 21st century between the two countries. In the broadest sense, most government leaders, regardless of whether they want to obtain wartime operational control as scheduled, share the same goals in South Korea. At the same time, each wants South Korea's defense capabilities to remain independent and is watching cautiously as North Korea, a de facto nuclear state, seeks direct negotiations with the US over the denuclearization of the communist regime that would fundamentally reshape the political geography of the peninsula. Each is also worried about insecurity, as the US and Japan are much concerned about the whereabouts of the nuclear weapons in North Korea, as well as the possibility that China could be the fastest to cross into its neighbor state in case a serious confrontation takes place. China says that the sanctions the US is seeking in themselves are not an end as the US and other member states of the six-party talks try to harness support for them. As the US's ultimate likely successor for dominion in Asia, China is getting tougher and tougher on the world stage. Inevitably, South Korea is paying close attention to what many China analysts consider to be newfound Chinese activism across the globe. Expanding Chinese influence in North Korea would be especially alarming to policy decision-makers in Washington, given that Beijing and Pyongyang share a long and robust blood bondage. US estimates are that China lost 400,000 dead defending North Korea. That said, China has always considered North Korea to be its backyard, albeit not being a kind of Taiwan, the self-governing island that China views as a 'renegade province.' Beijing regards Pyongyang, no matter how weak, as an essential buffer against the west on its eastern flank. From America's perspective, the Korean peninsula's geopolitical significance can be in no way ignored, because North Korea has already gone nuclear. Likewise, the peninsula has emerged as a crucial site where **America's global strategies could potentially be embarrassed** on North Korea's foolhardy nuclear weapons program.

South Korea Link

US Troops in South korea are key to US hegemony and deterring North Korea

Donald Macintyre et al, Pantech Fellow at Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford, Daniel Sneider is the associate director for research at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Gi-Wook Shin is the director of Shorenstein APARC, August 2009, "First Drafts of Korea: The U.S. Media and Perceptions of the Last Cold War Frontier", http://aparc.stanford.edu/publications/first\_drafts\_of\_korea\_the\_us\_media\_and\_perceptions\_of\_the\_last\_cold\_war\_frontier/)

Few regions rival the Korean Peninsula in strategic importance to U.S. foreign policy. For half a century, America has stationed tens of thousands of troops in South Korea to defend its ally from the threat of North Korean aggression. South Korea, in turn, is critical to the defense of Japan, another ally and the linchpin of American interests in East Asia. The rise of a nuclear-armed North has upped the ante. Yet despite the stakes, the two Koreas have registered only episodically on the radar of the United States. The troubling gap between American perceptions of the peninsula and its strategic importance remained an unexplored phenomenon until now. First Drafts of Korea breaks new ground in examining how the American mass media shape U.S. perceptions of both Koreas and, as a result, influence U.S. foreign policy.

South Korea Link

U.S. withdrawal from South Korea would undermine the credibility of U.S. leadership and make North Korean/South Korean conflict inevitable

**Center Movement**, by Patrick Flood ( 7/12/**10** “ Korea, China and the US — An Alternative View” <http://www.centermovement.org/topics-issues/foreign-policy/korea-china-and-the-us-an-alternative-view/>

The Broad Context: “Cold War anachronism” is probably not the most accurate way to describe the US presence in the Republic of Korea (hereinafter South Korea). While the main front of the Cold War ended in August 1991 with the defeat of the hard-line Communist coup in the Soviet Union, Communist totalitarianism continues to rule in China, North Korea, Laos, and to a considerable extent in Vietnam. Human rights and political and religious freedoms are as repressed in these countries as they were twenty years ago (though Vietnam has significantly relaxed its anti-religious policies). The Chinese Party-military-police regime welcomes foreign capital and the opportunity to increase its cash reserves by selling massive quantities of low-cost products abroad, but this greater economic openness has had minimal impact on how it treats its people or on its determination to maintain a system as repressive as the one in North Korea. Even apart from the nuclear issue, much is at stake in the ongoing Korean crisis: for South Korea, its independence and the rights and freedoms of its people; for the other countries of East Asia, a climate of peace with sufficient regional stability to permit normal economic, social and political development; and **for the US, all of the foregoing plus continued confidence in the reliability of US commitments to our allies and friends in the Pacific Basin, and the contribution this in turn makes to US and global security.** The Role of US Troops: **Our military presence in South Korea is the main reason war has not broken out during the fifty-seven years since the armistice**, in very much the way that our long presence, together with the UK and France, protected West Berlin. In both cases the vastly outnumbered defenders successfully deterred an attack, despite severe pressures and periodic threats of annihilation. Does anyone really think that the two million West Berliners would have remained free for a week if the Allies had removed their few brigades to West Germany? If North Korea has long had in place sufficient forces to seize Seoul and send the South Korean government fleeing, a la 1950, **the physical presence of the US “tripwire” is the only credible explanation for why it has refrained from doing so.** **Withdrawing our forces offshore and offering instead assurances of future help would be a clear statement that our security commitment to South Korea is no longer what it was, despite our alliance. One cannot effectively defend an ally against a massive land invasion solely with ships and remote airbases**. And we tried partial withdrawal a few years ago: in an effort to defuse tensions and after consultation with South Korea, we reduced troop strength by 25% and repositioned our forces within the country. This move has obviously not helped to moderate the North’s policies. And, as noted above, by staying in Korea we reassure not only South Korea but also our other allies in Asia that we will keep our commitments. Nuclear Matters: North Korea’s nuclear-weapons programs further impede the process of working toward a stable modus vivendi between the two Koreas. They add a new tension-heightening factor, lending support to those in the US who advocate air and ground military strikes to destroy the North Korean facilities. This is not the optimal solution for South Korea or for us, and it increases the incentive to explore as wide a range as possible of other pathways to the goal of a non-nuclear North Korea. In the off-and-on Six-Party Talks, we have on occasion persuaded the North Korean regime to slow down or temporarily suspend parts of its nuclear program. But it has not sustained these positive steps, ditched the program, or restored IAEA controls.

South Korea Link

U.S. Air power in South Korea is the vital internal link to deterring North Korea

Dr. Bruce E. **Bechtol** Jr. (BS, Excelsior College; MA, Catholic University; MMS, Marine Corps Command and Staff College; PhD, Union Institute) 9/1/**05** “The Future of US Airpower on the Korean Peninsula” http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/fal05/bechtol.html#bechtol

Clearly, US and South Korean airpower serves as a strong deterrent against the traditional aggression that North Korea wanted to initiate prior to the economic collapse that put its formidable armored and mechanized forces into a state of decline. But airpower also would play a major role (perhaps an even more important one) in stopping aggression from North Korea’s asymmetric capability that built up during the 1990s. As discussed previously, North Korea has now moved a large number of long-range artillery systems close enough to the DMZ to threaten virtually all of Seoul and many areas of Kyongi Province (the northernmost province in South Korea; it contains the largest concentration of that country’s ground forces) with little warning time to US and ROK forces. Currently, the ground-based mission of providing counterfire to this long-range artillery falls to the 2d US Infantry Division, which operates 30 multiple-rocket-launcher systems and 30 M109A6 Paladin self-propelled howitzers. During April 2005, as part of the ongoing shift of defense responsibilities on the Korean Peninsula between South Korean and US forces, leadership announced that the South Korean army would assume responsibility for this mission. Integration of South Korean units into the combined ROK-US command, control, communication, computers, and intelligence (C4I) system on the peninsula will be key to the success of this new mission.17 Regarding the current state of readiness of South Korean forces on the peninsula, however, the United States has concerns about the unwillingness of Seoul to spend money to upgrade its own C4I infrastructure—or to help with the costs of the current structure.18 Integrating these newly assigned units into a modern C4I system is vital because of the importance of quick reaction time in pinpointing North Korean artillery units with radar and destroying them before they fire or shortly thereafter.19 **Even if all of these systems could operate at peak efficiency and immediately integrate effectively into current or future C4I infrastructures, they would still need heavy augmentation by effective airpower in both their offensive and defensive postures. North Korea simply has more long-range artillery systems deployed along the DMZ than ground-based systems could destroy all at once**—particularly in a first-strike scenario. Of course, this is exacerbated by the concerns about C4I, which will probably remain an issue in ROK-US alliance talks for the foreseeable future. Thus, in terms of the first element of North Korea’s asymmetric triad (long-range artillery), airpower will continue to play an essential role in deterring and destroying that threat. **Because of the unique and unmatched capability of US fighter and attack aircraft to suppress this type of target, American airpower has become extremely important to countering this growing threat—and will likely remain so for many years as Seoul continues to upgrade its C4I and airborne-strike capabilities**. Regarding the second element of the triad (missiles), **US airpower is an absolutely vital deterrent, now and in the future, against a first strike by the North Koreans**, who have a large number of dispersed missile facilities (as well as mobile launchers, which they have not only deployed but also proliferated to other nations, such as Syria).20 In case of war, ROK-US forces would need to take out Scud missile sites and launchers as well as longer-range missiles because North Korea might use the latter to launch a retaliatory strike at Japan (perhaps at US bases located at Okinawa or elsewhere) (fig. 4). To do so, the US Air Force would use its assets on the Korean Peninsula (Seventh Air Force), in Japan (Fifth Air Force), on Guam (bombers), and elsewhere in Pacific Air Forces, where **US airpower possesses unique and vital capabilities for the defense of the Korean Peninsula**.21

South Korea Link – China

Withdrawal from South Korea strengthens China’s rise

Emile Hokayem, Political Editor of the National, a newspaper, "The Gulf and South Korea face threats of a similar kind", 6/7/10, The National http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100608/OPINION/706079914/1080/commentary?template=opinion

Besides prolonging the crisis on the Korean peninsula, the episode has implications for global security. The perception that North Korea can get away with bad behaviour at such small cost erodes the very deterrence that is key to stability. The US extends its defence umbrella over its Asian allies, and by doing so, prevents a conventional and nuclear arms race. If the US umbrella is seen as not credible or sustainable, countries like Japan or South Korea may decide either to take their fate into their own hands, creating more tensions with China and North Korea, or bow to Chinese hegemony. Many fantasise of a world without the US, but none of that emerged from talks with Asian interlocutors, all of whom considered a strong America critical to Asian stability and a counterweight to China.

North Korea deterred now

North Korean Deterrence is working now

**Business Week** By Patrick Harrington 5/28/**10** “ U.S., South Korea Ready to Repel North as Raptors, Ships Deploy” http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-05-28/u-s-south-korea-ready-to-repel-north-as-raptors-ships-deploy.html

May 28 (Bloomberg) -- U.S. and South Korean forces said they are ready to repel any threat posed by North Korea as 24 stealth fighter jets deploy to the region and a report said the military alert level has been raised. Naval vessels plan anti-submarine exercises close to the disputed maritime border between North and South Korea where one of the South’s warships sank on March 26, killing 46 sailors. An international team of experts last week concluded that a North Korean torpedo blew apart the Cheonan, prompting Kim Jong Il’s regime to cut all ties with the South and threaten “all-out war” over any punitive action. “U.S. and ROK forces are well prepared to deter aggression against the Republic of Korea and meet any threat posed by North Korean Forces,” said Lieutenant Colonel Angela Billings, a spokeswoman for U.S. forces in Korea, in a written response to questions. She declined to give any details on operational strategy, ship movements or contingency plans should the North make good on a threat to open fire on vessels invading disputed waters, citing security policy.

The US is successfully deterring North Korean aggression now—troops deployments in South Korea are key

Associated Press, 5/24/10, MSNBC, "U.S. backs South Korea in punishing North", http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37309788/

The Obama administration endorsed Lee's demand that "North Korea immediately apologize and punish those responsible for the attack, and, most importantly, stop its belligerent and threatening behavior." Seoul can continue to count on the full backing of the United States, it said. "U.S. support for South Korea's defense is unequivocal, and the president has directed his military commanders to coordinate closely with their Republic of Korea counterparts to ensure readiness and to deter future aggression," the White House said. Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman did not give a date for the exercises but said they will be in the "near future." The U.S. has 28,500 troops in South Korea — a major sore point for the North — as well as 47,000 troops in Japan. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton was in Beijing conferring with China on a coordinated response. She would not say whether that might include new international sanctions against the North. "We are working hard to avoid an escalation of belligerence and provocation," Clinton said. "This is a highly precarious situation that the North Koreans have caused in the region."

South Korean and US efforts are deterring North Korea now

Jeff Mason, writer for Reuters, 5/24/10, Reuters, ("Obama tells military: prepare for North Korea aggression", http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64N0ZT20100524)

The United States gave strong backing to plans by South Korean President Lee Myung-bak to punish North Korea for sinking one of its naval ships, White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said in a statement. The White House urged North Korea to apologize and change its behavior, he said. "We endorse President Lee's demand that North Korea immediately apologize and punish those responsible for the attack, and, most importantly, stop its belligerent and threatening behavior," Gibbs said. "U.S. support for South Korea's defense is unequivocal, and the president has directed his military commanders to coordinate closely with their Republic of Korea counterparts to ensure readiness and to deter future aggression," he said. Obama and Lee have agreed to meet at the G20 summit in Canada next month, he said. Late last week, a team of international investigators accused North Korea of torpedoing the Cheonan corvette in March, killing 46 sailors in one of the deadliest clashes between the two since the 1950-53 Korean War. Lee said on Monday South Korea would bring the issue before the U.N., whose past sanctions have damaged the already ruined North Korean economy. The United States still has about 28,000 troops in South Korea to provide military support. The two Koreas, still technically at war, have more than 1 million troops near their border. "We will build on an already strong foundation of excellent cooperation between our militaries and explore further enhancements to our joint posture on the Peninsula as part of our ongoing dialogue," Gibbs said. Gibbs said the United States supported Lee's plans to bring the issue to the United Nations Security Council and would work with allies to "reduce the threat that North Korea poses to regional stability."

North Korea deterred now

US troops and joint exercises will deter North Korea now

Dan De Luce, Writer for Agence France Presse, an international newspaper, 7/21/10, "US-S.Korea war games to send 'clear message' to N.Korea", http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jey5cJhsUwZDXyXwdQ7E70ICE08g

SEOUL — The United States and South Korea will launch a major military exercise on Sunday in the Sea of Japan as a warning to North Korea over the sinking of a South Korean ship, the two countries' defence chiefs said. The drill is the first in a series designed "to send a clear message to North Korea that its aggressive behaviour must stop", US Defense Secretary Robert Gates and the South's Defence Minister Kim Tae-Young said in a joint statement on Tuesday after talks. South Korea, the United States and other nations, citing findings of a multinational investigation, accuse the North of sending a submarine to torpedo the Cheonan warship near the tense Yellow Sea border in March. The North denies involvement in the sinking, which claimed 46 lives, and says any retaliation could spark war. The US-led United Nations Command said the drill from July 25-28 would involve about 20 ships including the 97,000-ton aircraft carrier USS George Washington and some 200 fixed-wing aircraft. Although the two countries had staged large-scale military exercises in the past, this was the first in "many years" to be carried out in the aftermath of a "provocation" by North Korea, said Admiral Robert Willard, head of US Pacific Command. Four F-22 Raptor fighter jets will also take part in this month's drill, flying training missions around Korea for the first time, Willard told a news conference. "Our goal is to deter North Korea from future provocations," Willard said, adding it remained unclear if the drills would have the desired effect. About 8,000 army, air force, navy and marine personnel from the two allies will take part, with drills covering anti-submarine warfare, mid-air refueling and cyber defence, officers said. "We stand fully prepared to respond militarily to any further North Korean provocation," said General Han Min-Koo, chairman of South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the UN Command statement. Seoul's defence ministry said earlier the drill had been relocated from the sensitive Yellow Sea (West Sea) to the Sea of Japan (East Sea) in deference to Chinese protests. But Gates and Kim said future drills would be held in both seas. North Korea denounced the drill as "very dangerous sabre-rattling". It is "aimed at further straining the already deadlocked inter-Korean relations and igniting a nuclear war against the DPRK (North), while watching for a chance," cabinet newspaper Minju Joson said in a commentary. US officials see China, the North's sole major ally and its economic lifeline, as playing a crucial role in reducing tensions on the peninsula but have been frustrated with Beijing's cautious stance. Willard said the US administration wanted to see China use its leverage with North Korea. "They clearly have a very strong relationship with North Korea, and we would very much like to see them exert the influence to see that a Cheonan never happens again," he said. The United States stations 28,500 troops in the South. Gates and Kim said they reaffirmed a commitment to an enduring US military presence and the current US troop level. Earlier Tuesday, Gates visited US forces at Camp Casey, 20 km (12 miles) from the North Korean border. He said the naval exercises would send "a strong signal" of deterrence to North Korea but he said the communist state would pose a continuing challenge in coming years. Gates also announced that he and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would Wednesday visit the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas. He described the North's missile and nuclear proliferation as a serious problem that would require persistent international pressure. "This is an ongoing challenge that has to be managed over a period of years," he said.

Turkey Link - TNWs

The effectiveness of the deterrent isn’t relevant – other nations still perceive Turkish TNWs as a symbol of leadership.

Sariibrahimoglu 2009 [Lale, head Eurasian analyst for the Jamestown foundation, “Turkey to face pressure over US nukes on its soil”, <http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=174286>]

Neither NATO nor the US will publicly admit to the existence of nuclear weapons deployed during the Cold War years in five NATO countries, including Turkey. NATO and the US Department of Defense do not publicly release information on the deployment of those weapons, either. Belgium and Germany, which also hosts US nuclear weapons on its soil, debated in their parliaments almost two weeks ago the withdrawal of those weapons from their territory. Those debates have now raised questions over what Turkey's policy will be on the fate of those weapons believed to be deployed at the İncirlik base in southern Turkey. According to the US-based Arms Control Association, under NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements, an estimated 480 tactical nuclear weapons remain deployed in five NATO non-nuclear-weapon states (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey) and in the United Kingdom, which also possesses an independent nuclear arsenal. Canada and Greece ended their participation in nuclear sharing. At this stage Turkish diplomatic sources decline to comment on what Ankara's policy will be if NATO presses and finally agrees on a unanimous decision to withdraw the weapons from Turkish soil, too. But Mustafa Kibaroğlu, an associate professor at Ankara's Bilkent University and an expert on arms control issues, told Today's Zaman that Turkish decision makers, i.e., both the political and the military leadership, are for maintaining those weapons on Turkish soil to continue their deterrence capabilities in the region, which includes the Balkans, the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Second, Turkey sees the US as the backbone of deterrence in the region and does not favor the idea of scrapping the nukes from its soil. Kibaroğlu, in an article he had published by the Routledge publishing house in December 2005 under the headline "Isn't it Time to Say Farewell to Nukes in Turkey?," gives an in-depth analysis of the rationale behind the Turkish reluctance over the idea to scrap US nukes on its territory. Kibaroğlu states in his article that the attitude of Turkish officials toward US nuclear weapons deployed in Turkey for over four decades has been static. Officials have understandable arguments, based on their threat analysis, as to why these weapons should be retained in Turkey. "However, since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, the international security environment has undergone radical changes. The classical deterrent value of nuclear weapons no longer applies with these emerging threats. At the same time, there is an increased probability of unauthorized use of crude radiological devices or nuclear weapons by terrorist organizations. In addition to increased security at storage sites, bolder steps must be taken by concerned countries to get rid of nuclear weapons. Such steps should begin with reducing the number of US nuclear weapons deployed in allied countries, including Turkey," he asserts. Turkey's possible reluctance to agree on the withdrawal of nukes from its soil sets another example of the Turkish state's inability to adjust itself to the new realities of the world following the demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, recalled a Turkish security analyst. Neighboring Iran's possible attempts to acquire nuclear weapons may also harden the Turkish policy of agreeing to the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from its soil, asserted the same analyst. In a major speech delivered in Prague on April 5, US President Barack Obama outlined his vision for strengthening the global effort to curb the spread of nuclear weapons, moving forward on long-overdue disarmament measures and preventing nuclear terrorism. He stated "clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons." Obama's major call on curbing nuclear weapons in the world also hints at a divergence of opinion emerging between the two close NATO allies -- Turkey and the US -- since the latter has reportedly not opposed the withdrawal of its nuclear weapons from five NATO states, including Turkey. Despite speculated Turkish opposition to withdrawing the nukes on its soil, fresh debates in the parliaments of NATO countries, such as Germany, signal that Ankara is to face increased pressure from the alliance over their removal. According to the Arms Control Association, the US has withdrawn more than 90 percent of the 4,000 tactical nuclear weapons it had deployed in Europe at the end of the Cold War. It mainly did so to implement the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) announced in 1991 by then-presidents George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev. The nuclear weapons remain in US custody during peacetime, but an estimated 180 such weapons can be released to US allies for delivery in times of war, it added. Experts estimate that Russia still holds at least 3,000 tactical nuclear weapons, although many of these may not be in usable condition, said the Arms Control Association. The United States says that Russia has been implementing its obligations under the PNIs "for the most part" but still has questions, particularly with regard to Moscow's land-based tactical nuclear arsenal, the Arms Control Association said.

Turkey Link – TNWs

Keeping nuclear weapons in Turkey would bolster Turkey’s support of US interests in Middle East.

Alex Bell, Alexandrap roject manager at the Ploughshares Fund and a Truman National Security Fellow **and** Benjamin **Loehrke**, research assistant at the Ploughshares Fund and a graduate student at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy.The status of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey. 23 November **2009**. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. “The Status of US Nuclear Weapons in Turkey”

A prescription for withdrawal. Preventing Turkey (and any other country in the region) from acquiring nuclear weapons is critical to international security. Doing so requires a key factor that also is essential to paving the way toward withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons: improved alliance relations. The political and strategic compasses are pointing to the eventual withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe--it's a strategy that certainly fits the disarmament agenda President Barack Obama has outlined. But to get there, careful diplomacy will be required to improve U.S.-Turkish ties and to assuage Turkish security concerns. The U.S.-Turkish relationship cooled when Turkey refused to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom, after which Turkish support for U.S. policy declined through the end of the George W. Bush administration. Obama's election has helped to mend fences, and his visit to Turkey in April was warmly received. In fact, all of the administration's positive interactions with Turkey have been beneficial: Washington has supported Turkey's role as a regional energy supplier and encouraged Ankara as it undertakes difficult political reforms and works to resolve regional diplomatic conflicts. For its part, Turkey recently doubled its troop contribution to NATO's Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan--a **boon to U.S. efforts there.** By incorporating Ankara into its new European missile defense plans--intended to protect Turkey and other countries vulnerable to Iran's short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles--Washington could further shore up its military relationship with Turkey. Ship-based Aegis missile systems will be the backbone of the strategy, with considerations left open for later deployments of mobile ground-based interceptors in Eastern Europe or Turkey. This cooperation could provide the bond with Washington and perception of security that Turkey seeks in the face of a potential Iranian bomb. Because Russia weighs significantly in Turkish security calculations, reductions to Russian strategic and nonstrategic nuclear arsenals also would help improve Ankara's peace of mind. The United States and Russia soon will seek ratification of a follow-on agreement to START. And treaty negotiations in pursuit of further reductions to the U.S. and Russian arsenals should involve forward-deployed nuclear weapons, including the U.S. weapons in Turkey. During any such negotiations, Turkey must be fully confident in NATO and U.S. security guarantees. Critically, any removal of the weapons in Turkey would need to happen in concert with efforts to prevent Iran from turning its civil nuclear energy program into a military one. Otherwise, Washington would risk compromising Turkey as a NATO ally and key regional partner. If used properly, Turkey actually can play an important role in this complex process, and the United States and its allies should seriously consider Turkish offers to serve as an **interlocutor between Iran and the West**. First, Ankara's potential influence with Tehran should not be underestimated. As Princeton scholar Joshua Walker has noted, given its long-established pragmatic relations and growing economic ties with Iran, Ankara is in a position to positively influence Tehran's behavior. More largely, if the United States and European Union task Turkey with a bigger role in the diplomatic back-and-forth with Iran, it would help convince Ankara (and others) of Turkey's value to NATO and have the additional benefit of pulling Ankara into a closer relationship with Washington and Brussels. As a result, Turkey would obtain a stronger footing in alliance politics, contain its chief security concerns, and foster the necessary conditions for the removal of tactical U.S. nuclear weapons from Turkish soil.

Turkey Link – TNWs

**Withdrawal of TNWs key to U.S.-Turko-NATO relations**

Alexandra **Bell** et. Al, PhD in Atomic Physics, Bulletin for Atomic Science, “The Status of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey, November 23, 20**09**, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey

Preventing Turkey (and any other country in the region) from acquiring nuclear weapons is critical to international security. Doing so requires a key factor that also is essential to paving the way toward withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons: improved alliance relations. The political and strategic compasses are pointing to the eventual withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe--it's a strategy that certainly fits the disarmament agenda President Barack Obama has outlined. But to get there, careful diplomacy will be required to improve U.S.-Turkish ties and to assuage Turkish security concerns. The U.S.-Turkish relationship cooled when Turkey refused to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom, after which Turkish support for U.S. policy declined through the end of the George W. Bush administration. Obama's election has helped to mend fences, and his visit to Turkey in April was warmly received. In fact, all of the administration's positive interactions with Turkey have been beneficial: Washington has supported Turkey's role as a regional energy supplier and encouraged Ankara as it undertakes difficult political reforms and works to resolve regional diplomatic conflicts. For its part, Turkey recently doubled its troop contribution to NATO's Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan--a boon to U.S. efforts there. By incorporating Ankara into its new European missile defense plans--intended to protect Turkey and other countries vulnerable to Iran's short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles--Washington could further shore up its military relationship with Turkey. Ship-based Aegis missile systems will be the backbone of the strategy, with considerations left open for later deployments of mobile ground-based interceptors in Eastern Europe or Turkey. This cooperation could provide the bond with Washington and perception of security that Turkey seeks in the face of a potential Iranian bomb. Because Russia weighs significantly in Turkish security calculations, reductions to Russian strategic and nonstrategic nuclear arsenals also would help improve Ankara's peace of mind. The United States and Russia soon will seek ratification of a follow-on agreement to START. And treaty negotiations in pursuit of further reductions to the U.S. and Russian arsenals should involve forward-deployed nuclear weapons, including the U.S. weapons in Turkey. During any such negotiations, Turkey must be fully confident in NATO and U.S. security guarantees. Critically, any removal of the weapons in Turkey would need to happen in concert with efforts to prevent Iran from turning its civil nuclear energy program into a military one. Otherwise, Washington would risk compromising Turkey as a NATO ally and key regional partner. If used properly, Turkey actually can play an important role in this complex process, and the United States and its allies should seriously consider Turkish offers to serve as an interlocutor between Iran and the West. First, Ankara's potential influence with Tehran should not be underestimated. As Princeton scholar Joshua Walker has noted, given its long-established pragmatic relations and growing economic ties with Iran, Ankara is in a position to positively influence Tehran's behavior. More largely, if the United States and European Union task Turkey with a bigger role in the diplomatic back-and-forth with Iran, it would help convince Ankara (and others) of Turkey's value to NATO and have the additional benefit of pulling Ankara into a closer relationship with Washington and Brussels. As a result, Turkey would obtain a stronger footing in alliance politics, contain its chief security concerns, and foster the necessary conditions for the removal of tactical U.S. nuclear weapons from Turkish soil.

Turkey Link

U.S. military dominance and power projection in the middle East and beyond centers around Turkey.

Barkey 2003(Henri J, Bernard L. and Bertha F. Cohen Professor at Lehigh University, European Security Forum, Brussels, 12 May, *Turkey’s Strategic Future: US Perspective*, <http://www.eusec.org/barkey.htm>)

U.S. interests and objectives in Turkey have steadily expanded since the end of the Cold War. The Cold War's straightjacket has given way to many new considerations. The primary U.S. foreign policy vision after the Cold War was one based on preventing regional disputes from threatening its own and its allies' interests and on expanding market reforms and democratic principles and practices. With no serious Russian threat to European security, U.S. attention shifted to mid-level powers with ambitions to acquire non-conventional weaponry and the means to deliver them, such as Iran and Iraq. This policy vision lacked the simplicity of containment, but it would impact Turkey significantly. Turkey's proximity to many regions in flux or conflict together with Ankara's long standing adherence to NATO alliance helped Washington reinterpret this country's geo-strategic importance. The Iraq War, however, is likely to alter these calculations further.

Simply put, on the eve of the Iraq War Turkey's importance for the United States could be summarized along four dimensions.

First, it served as a potential platform for the projection of U.S. power. Saddam Hussein's resilience in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War had made Ankara essential to sustain the UN sanctions regime and more importantly Washington's containment policy. From the Incirlik base in Turkey, U.S. and British airplanes as part of Operation Northern Watch, routinely patrolled the no-fly zone over northern Iraq in an effort to keep Saddam Hussein's forces away from Kurdish controlled parts of Iraq. It is difficult to see how the United States could have sustained its policy of sanctions, regime isolation, and the protection of the Kurdish population without Turkey's cooperation.

Second, Turkey was a bulwark standing in the way of revisionist regimes such as Iran's, intent on changing the regional landscape. Turkey's strong links to the United States, NATO and the West were in direct opposition to some of the Iranian regime's regional preferences if not designs. Hence even in the event of cordial relations with Ankara, no Iranian government can ignore Turkey's reaction in its regional calculations. The improving relations between Turkey and Israel throughout the 1990s has changed the strategic setting in the Middle East-although much exaggerated by Arab countries-which served to change the perception of Ankara in Washington as a more balanced regional player.

Third, what also made Turkey different and valuable is that it is a NATO ally that takes security seriously; its need for military modernization notwithstanding, Ankara has large numbers of troops under arms which are deployable and is committed to maintaining its spending on defense. Even if the economic crisis has put a dent on its modernization plans, Ankara intends to continue along this path as the April 2003 decision on purchasing AWACS aircraft demonstrates.

Finally, in Washington's perception Turkey represented an alternative and successful path for many countries in the Middle East and Central Asia. It is a model to be emulated as NATO's only Muslim member and candidate EU member. In addition to its historical ties to the West, Turkey had a vibrant albeit flawed democratic political system and in the 1980s embraced economic liberalization-well ahead of Latin America and save for Israel, the only one in the Middle East.

Ankara's actual contribution to Washington's challenges went well beyond the Middle East. Turks collaborated with the allies in both Bosnia and Kosovo. It steadfastly improved relations with Bulgaria and Romania, took the lead in organizing Black Sea region institutions, and thus proved to be a source of stability in the Balkans. Successive US administrations in the early 1990s encouraged Turkey's efforts to reach out to the Turkic Central Asian countries and the Caucasus to provide them with technical and economic know how not to mention political leadership, all designed to counter growing Iranian and Russian influence in the region. Turkish forces at Washington's request also took part in the ill-fated Somalia operation. Similarly, in April 2002, Washington prevailed upon Ankara to take over the leadership of the Afghan peacekeeping force in Kabul, ISAF.

Turkey Link

**Incirlik Air Force Base is pivotal for U.S. power projection.**

Johnson, 2009**(Chalmers, May 15th,** [**professor emeritus**](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Professor_emeritus) **of the** [**University of California, San Diego**](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_California,_San_Diego)**, Chalmers Johnson on the Cost of Empire,** http://www.truthdig.com/arts\_culture/page4/20090514\_chalmers\_johnson\_on\_the\_cost\_of\_empire/**)**

The essay by Ayse Gul Altinay and Amy Holmes, “Opposition to the U.S. Military Presence in Turkey in the Context of the Iraq War,” is important for three reasons. First, there is very little published on the bases in Turkey; second, Incirlik Air Base on the outskirts of Adana, Turkey, is the largest U.S. military facility in a strategically vital NATO ally; and third, the decision on March 1, 2003, of the Turkish National Assembly not to deploy Turkish forces in Iraq nor to allow the United States to use Turkey as an invasion route into Iraq was one of the Bush administration’s greatest setbacks. Public opinion polls in January 2003 revealed that 90 percent of Turks opposed U.S. imperialism against Iraq and 83 percent opposed Turkey’s cooperating with the United States. Nonetheless, major U.S. newspapers either ignored or trivialized Turkey’s opposition to U.S. war plans.

Altinay is a professor of anthropology at Sabanci University, Turkey, and the author of “The Myth of the Military Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey” (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). Holmes is a doctoral candidate in sociology at the Johns Hopkins University and has written extensively on American bases in Germany and Turkey.

Turkey is not an easy place to do research on American bases. Some 41 percent of bilateral agreements between the U.S. and Turkey between 1947 and 1965 were secret. It was not known that the U.S. had stationed missiles on Turkish territory until the U.S. promised to remove them in return for the USSR’s withdrawing its missiles from Cuba. Incirlik became even more central to U.S. strategy after 1974. In that year, Turkey invaded Cyprus and the United States imposed an arms embargo on its ally. As a result, Turkey closed all 27 U.S. bases in the country except for one, Incirlik. As Altinay and Holmes write, “It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of the Incirlik Air Base for U.S. power projection in the Middle East, particularly since the early 1990s; for more than a decade, the entire Iraq policy of the United States hinged on Incirlik.”

Turkey Link

Turkey-US alliance – specifically US presence in Turkey critical to US interests in the Middle East.

Rajan Menon - Professor of International Relations, Lehigh University Fellow, New America Foundation. And S. Enders Wimbush -Director, Center for Future Security Strategies, Hudson Institute. 3/25/2007. Hudson Institute. <http://www.hudson.org/files/pdf_upload/Turkey%20PDF.pdf>.

If Turkey, a key friend and ally, turns away from the United States, the damage to American interests will be **severe and long lasting**. Turkey remains exceptionally important to the United States, arguably even more so than during the Cold War. Here are some of the most important reasons why this is true: • Turkey is the top of an arc that starts in Israel and wends its way through Lebanon, Syria, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Iran. It abuts, or is proximate to, countries pivotal to American foreign policy and national security, whether because they are allies and friends, adversaries, or loci of instability. • Turkey’s critical location means that instability within it could spill beyond its borders, with the unpredictable ripple effects traveling across its neighborhood, particularly the Middle East. Turkey sits astride critical waterways and narrows (the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Bosporus and Dardanelles) that are channels for trade and the flow of energy to global markets. • Turkey is a passageway for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, and its Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, is the terminus. Turkey is therefore essential to American efforts to reduce the dependence of Azerbaijan, and potentially Kazakstan and Turkmenistan, on Russia’s energy pipelines. • Turkey’s substantial economic and political ties with Georgia and Azerbaijan contribute to the stability of these countries, whose strategic significance far exceeds their standing in commonplace measures of power. Georgia is not only a corridor for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, its stability is under threat because of its testy relationship with Russia and its conflicts with the Russian-supported secessionist statelets, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Azerbaijan is not only a major energy producer, but also a fellow Turkic country, whose territorial dispute with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh could boil over into war, just as it did in the 1990s, possibly igniting a wider conflagration that draws in Turkey (Azerbaijan’s ally) and Russia (Armenia’s patron) and putting the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline at risk. • Turkey is a democratic and secular Muslim, and its alliance with the United States helps demonstrate that the United States can maintain friendly and productive ties with an array of Muslim countries—that America’s does not oppose Islam per se, but rather the violent extremists who invoke it to justify their violence against innocents and their retrograde, intolerant agenda. This is crucial if the American campaign against terrorism is not to be seen by the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims, as Islamic terrorist groups would like it to be, as a war against Islam itself. • Turkey’s cooperation is essential to any durable political settlement in Iraq, particularly because it borders Iraq’s Kurdish north and fears that the emergence there of a Kurdish state would increase the already-considerable violence and resilient separatist sentiment in its own Kurdish-populated southeast. The fragmentation of Iraq could therefore very likely prompt Turkish military intervention, which in turn could deal a death blow to the US-Turkish alliance, perhaps even culminating in Turkey’s exit from NATO. (Turkish forces intervened in northern Iraq to attack the camps of the Kurdish separatist guerillas in the aftermath of the 1991Gulf War; in March 2003 roughly 1,500 Turkish troops entered this region, and Turkish Special Forces have reportedly carried out covert operations in post-Saddam Iraq.) • Turkey’s disillusionment with the West could prompt a reorientation of its foreign policy—away from the United States, the European Union (EU), and NATO, and toward a new multi-azimuth Gaullist strategy that looks to China, India, Iran, Russia, and Syria. Such a shift is already being discussed in Turkey, and the assumption that it amounts to bluff and bluster may prove short-sighted. The new strategic landscape created by the end of the Cold War may pose new threats to Turkey, but it also provides it a choice of new partners as well. While a rethinking of Turkish grand need not in itself undermine the alliance between Turkey and the United States, it could certainly do so if the force driving it is an anti-Western nationalism. • Turkey and the United States both face the threat of terrorism, and Turkey’s cooperation is essential to any truly effective American policy against global terrorist networks. More specifically, Turkey could also serve as a corridor that militant Islamists use to infiltrate Iraq and Turkey’s other neighbors. Turkey’s participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, a military coalition that for a time was commanded by a Turkish general, demonstrates that Ankara and Washington can cooperate in promoting stability and enabling economic development in war-torn countries. This is true even though Turkey’s military forces in Afghanistan are small and are not deployed in the south, the central theater for the anti-Taliban war. (Turkey is no different in this respect than the vast majority of ISAF’s other members.) **• Turkey is a member of NATO, and the air bases in its southeast, primarily Incirlik, but also others at Batman, Diyarbakir, Malatya, and Mus remain important to the United States**. The value of Turkish airfields was revealed after the 1991 Gulf War, when a no-flight zone was established over northern Iraq to protect the Kurds there from Saddam Hussein’s military machine. Moreover despite Washington’s inability to open a second front from Turkish territory against Iraqi forces in March 2003, American aircraft were permitted to use Turkish airspace for operations in Iraq, and Turkish installations are important for providing logistical support to US forces in Iraq.

Current Commitments Key

Current military commitments key to hegemony

**Gates**, Robert M. Secretary of Defense. Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age. Foreign Affairs, January 20**09**. http://www.jmhinternational.com/news/news/selectednews/files/2009/01/20090201\_20090101\_ForeignAffairs\_ABalancedStrategy.pdf

**The United States' ability to deal with future threats will depend on its performance in current conflicts**. To be blunt, to fail -- or **to be seen to fail** -- **in either Iraq or Afghanistan would be a disastrous blow to U.S. credibility**, both **among** friends and **allies and** among **potential adversaries**. In Iraq, the number of U.S. combat units there will decline over time -- as it was going to do no matter who was elected president in November. Still, there will continue to be some kind of U.S. advisory and counterterrorism effort in Iraq for years to come. In Afghanistan, as President George W. Bush announced last September, U.S. troop levels are rising, with the likelihood of more increases in the year ahead. Given its terrain, poverty, neighborhood, and tragic history, Afghanistan in many ways poses an even more complex and difficult long-term challenge than Iraq -- one that, despite a large international effort, will require a significant U.S. military and economic commitment for some time. It would be irresponsible not to think about and prepare for the future, and the overwhelming majority of people in the Pentagon, the services, and the defense industry do just that. But we must not be so preoccupied with preparing for future conventional and strategic conflicts that we neglect to provide all the capabilities necessary to fight and win conflicts such as those the United States is in today.

Perception Key

Perception is key—without it enemies will attack the US and allies and destroy hegemony

Paul Craig Roberts. a former Assistant Secretary of the US Treasury and former associate editor of the Wall Street Journal, "American Hegemony Is Not Guaranteed", 4/14/08, http://www.lewrockwell.com/roberts/roberts244.html)

With Iran, Russia, China, and North Korea threatened by American hegemonic belligerence, it is not difficult to imagine a scenario that would terminate all pretense of American power: For example, instead of waiting to be attacked, Iran uses its Chinese and Russian anti-ship missiles, against which the US reportedly has poor means of defense, and sinks every ship in the American carrier strike forces that have been foolishly massed in the Persian Gulf, simultaneously taking out the Saudi oil fields and the Green Zone in Baghdad, the headquarters of the US occupation. Shi’ite militias break the US supply lines from Kuwait, and Iranian troops destroy the dispersed US forces in Iraq before they can be concentrated to battle strength. Simultaneously, North Korea crosses the demilitarized zone and takes South Korea, China seizes Taiwan and dumps a trillion dollars of US Treasury bonds on the market. Russia goes on full nuclear alert and cuts off all natural gas to Europe. What would the Bush regime do? Wet its pants? Push the button and end the world? If America really had dangerous enemies, surely the enemies would collude to take advantage of a dramatically over-extended delusional regime that, blinded by its own arrogance and hubris, issues gratuitous threats and lives by Mao’s doctrine that power comes out of the barrel of a gun.

Hegemony Good – War

Heg collapse causes global nuclear conflict – ensures the US is drawn back in

Lieber 2005 – PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, “The American Era”, pages 53-54, WEA)

Withdrawal from foreign commitments might seem to be a means of evading hostility toward the United States, but the consequences would almost certainly be harmful both to regional stability and to U.S. national interests. Although Europe would almost certainly not see the return to competitive balancing among regional powers (i.e., competition and even military rivalry between France and Germany) of the kind that some realist scholars of international relations have predicted,21 elsewhere the dangers could increase. In Asia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan would have strong motivation to acquire nuclear weapons – which they have the technological capacity to do quite quickly. Instability and regional competition could also escalate, not only between India and Pakistan, but also in Southeast Asia involving Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and possibly the Philippines. Risks in the Middle East would be likely to increase, with regional competition among the major countries of the Gulf region (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq) as well as Egypt, Syria, and Israel. Major regional wars, eventually involving the use of **weapons of mass destruction** plus human suffering on a vast scale, floods of refugees, economic disruption, and risks to oil supplies are all readily conceivable. Based on past experience, the United States would almost certainly be drawn back into these areas, whether to defend friendly states, to cope with a humanitarian catastrophe, or to prevent a hostile power from dominating an entire region. Steven Peter Rosen has thus fittingly observed, “If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive.”22 Similarly, Niall Ferguson has added that those who dislike American predominance ought to bear in mind that **the alternative may not be a world of competing great powers, but one with no hegemon at all**. Ferguson’s warning may be hyperbolic, but it hints at the perils that the absence of a dominant power, “apolarity,” could bring “an anarchic new Dark Age of waning empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic plunder and pillage in the world’s forgotten regions; of economic stagnation and civilization’s retreat into a few fortified enclaves.”23

Hegemony Good – War

U.S. withdrawal would leave behind a power vacuum, spurring terrorism, economic turmoil and multiple nuclear wars.

Niall Ferguson, July/August 2004 “A World Without Power,” FOREIGN POLICY Issue 143

So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous-roughly 20 times more--so friction between the world's disparate "tribes" is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too, so it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization--the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital--has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization--which a new Dark Age would produce--would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy--from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai--would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of aids and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global hegemony--its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier--its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity--a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder.

Hegemony Good – War

Hegemony Solves multiple scenarios for conflict

**Thayer**, B.A. (Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University) [Bradley, In Defense of Primacy, The National Interest, December (lexis)] December 20**06**

THROUGHOUT HISTORY, **peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power**--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. **Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power**. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: **Appalling things happen when international orders collapse**. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American **primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for** Washington and **the world**. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy **helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia**. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, **American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy** and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. **Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because**, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, **liberal democracies are more likely to align with the U**nited **S**tates and be sympathetic to the American worldview.3 So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, **once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced**. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third, **along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy**. With its allies, **the U**nited **S**tates has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. **The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World**. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. **This** economic order **forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable.**

Hegemony Good – War

Hegemony is sustainable and solves global war – there is no alternative

Robert Knowles (Assistant Professor – New York University School of Law) 2009 “american hegemony and the foreign affairs constitution” Arizona State Law Journal, Vol. 41 Lexis

First, the "hybrid" hegemonic model assumes that the goal of U.S. foreign affairs should be the preservation of American hegemony, which is more stable, more peaceful, and better for America's security and prosperity, than the alternatives. If the United States were to withdraw from its global leadership role, no other nation would be capable of taking its place. 378 The result would be radical instability and a greater risk of major war. 379 In addition, the United States would no longer benefit from the public goods it had formerly produced; as the largest consumer, it would suffer the most. Second, the hegemonic model assumes that American hegemony is unusually stable and durable. 380 As noted above, other nations have many incentives to continue to tolerate the current order. 381 And although other nations or groups of nations - China, the European Union, and India are often mentioned - may eventually overtake the United States in certain areas, such as manufacturing, the U.S. will remain dominant in most measures of capability for decades. According to 2007 estimates, the U.S. economy was projected to be twice the size of China's in 2025. 382 The U.S. accounted for half of the world's military spending in 2007 and holds enormous advantages in defense technology that far outstrip would-be competitors. 383 Predictions of American decline are not new, and they have thus far proved premature. 384

U.S. Hegemony prevents war.

**Thayer**, Bradley A., Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, “American Empire: A Debate,” Routledge publishing 20**07**, pg. 105

In contrast to Layne's argument, **maximizing the power of the United States aids its ability to defend itself from attacks and to advance its interests**. This argument is based on its prodigious economic, ideological, and military power. Due to this power, the United States is able to defeat its enemies the world over, to reassure its allies, and to dissuade states from challenging it. From this power also comes respect and admiration, no matter how grudging it may be at times. **These advantages keep the U**nited **S**tates, its interests, and its allies **secure,** and it must strive to maintain its advantages in international politics as long as possible. **Knowing that American hegemony will end someday does not mean that we should welcome or facilitate its demise; rather the reverse. The United States should labor to maintain hegemony as long as possible-**just as knowing that you will die someday does not keep you from planning your future and living today. You strive to live as long as possible although you realize that it is inevitable that you will die. Like good health, Americans and most of **the world should welcome American primacy and work to preserve it as long as possible**.

Hegemony is key to international stability

Brzezinski 2004, former national security adviser, professor of American foreign policy at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, ( Zbigniew, THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, , p. 17)

In reflecting on the security implications of this new reality, it is important to bear in mind the points made earlier. America is the world-transforming society, even revolutionary in its subversive impact on sovereignty based international politics. At the same time, America is a traditional power, unilaterally protective of its own security while sustaining international stability not only for its own benefit, but for that of the international community as a whole The latter task compels U.S. policymakers to concentrate on the more traditional role as the linchpin of global stability. Despite the new realities of global interdependence and the mounting preoccupation of the international community with such new global issues as ecology, global warming, AIDS, and poverty, the argument that American power is uniquely central to world peace is supported by a simple hypothetical test: What would happen if the U.S. Congress were to mandate prompt retraction of U.S. military power from its three crucial foreign deployments- Europe, the Far East, and the Persian Gulf? Any such U.S. withdrawal would without doubt plunge the world almost immediately into a policitally chaotic crisis. In Europe, there would be a pell-mell rush by some to rearm but also to reach a special arrangement with Russia. In the Far East, war would probably break out on the Korean Peninsula while Japan would undertake a crash program of rearmament, including nuclear weapons. In the Persian Gulf area, Iran would become dominant and would intimidate the adjoining Arab states.

Hegemony Good – Power Vacuum

U.S. unipolar hegemony failure leads to geopolitical instability and power competitions.

**Layne**, Christopher. Professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security, at Texas A&M University. The Waning of U.S. Hegemony-Myth or Reality? A Review Essay. MIT Press, 20**09**

As Yogi Berra said, “Making predictions is hard—especially about the future.” Whether unipolarity and U.S. hegemony will end during the next two decades is a topic of contention. If they do, however, international politics could look very different—especially if the end of U.S. hegemony triggers deglobalization. In that case, liberal constraints against great power war could diminish, and the coming decades could be an era of rising nationalism and mercantilism, geopolitical instability, and great power competition.

U.S. hegemony is key to checking al-Queda, China, and Russia.

**Thayer**, B.A. (Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University). The Strategic Advantages of American Power. International Studies Review, Jun 2 20**09**.

Bruce Berkowitz addresses these questions in this impressive study. He makes a significant contribution to the growing foreign and defense policy literatures that address the causes of American hegemony and the myriad of topics associated with its continuation or demise (Kupchan 2003; Bacevich 2005; Layne and Thayer 2007; Murphy 2007). Berkowitz may be categorized as a thoughtful and cautious proponent of American preponderance and as an insightful student of the mechanics of its propagation. Berkowitz's central arguments are that **the United States must labor hard to maintain its dominant position in a dynamic** and protean **international environment where there are considerable risks of losing its strategic advantage—the ability to control or influence events** (p. 3). He argues **it can overcome the significant challenges** it faces: **the growth of Chinese power**, an often recalcitrant **Russia**, and the deadly threat of **al Qaeda inspired terrorism**. But Berkowitz also crafts his argument skillfully, moving beyond the sizeable problems posed by Beijing, Moscow, and terrorism, to identify what is too often neglected in the literature—the qualities necessary for such a position to continue. He suggests that the United States needs, first, to be flexible in its policy responses. This is necessary to confront the diverse array of security problems Washington faces. Second, **the United States must work to ensure its position** is maintained by remaining agile in its reactions to the threats it confronts and able to endure by adopting the proper policies **to promote growth**. In the course of his study, Berkowitz emphasizes that all the arrows in Washington's quiver, including diplomatic and cultural forces, are necessary to maintain its position.

Hegemony Good – Global Crises

**Decline of confidence in the U.S. causes global crisis.**

Erik **Jones,** Staff Writer for Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, PhD of IR and Professor of European Studies at Johns Hopkins University, **7-21**, 2010, “A Great Fall”, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy Vol 52. Issue 4

The Cohen and DeLong argument is declinism for a new century, grounded in now-popular notions of soft power. Although they emphasise money, their concern is norms and values, not guns and butter. When countries have money they have earned in a sustainable manner over a long period of time – not by pulling resources out of the ground, but through innovation and industry – they can influence others to adopt their own preferred way of organising things without making a conscious effort. The United States did not just export democracy, it also exported social mobility, efficiency and a host of other social norms that now seem self-evident, but were not always so. Now, however, what used to be distinctly American culture has gone global and the United States is no longer in control. Because they are the principal creditors of US profligacy, the Chinese and others are able to assert a countervailing influence; they can bind American power and perhaps also project values of their own. The problem with this arrangement is not that the United States is poorer and less attractive as a result. The loss of US money and its implications for global influence has already happened. Rather, the problem is that the transition from one position to another is making the world economy as a whole unstable. The United States cannot live beyond its means forever and so must inevitably lose the confidence of its creditors. As we have just experienced, bad things happen when that confidence breaks down. Even though the crisis appears to be over, there is no guarantee it will not flare up again. Cohen and DeLong end on a low note. The Humpty Dumpty of American global dominance cannot be put back together again. Even if it could, it would not last: ‘After all, Humpty was an egg’ (p. !+%). It is tempting to dismiss this as an exercise in exaggerated pessimism. As Joseph Nye wrote in response to Paul Kennedy, the United States is *Bound to Lead* once we understand the nature of American power.4 Nevertheless, Cohen and DeLong’s argument makes for a compelling narrative, not least because it draws on the same notion of power that Nye uses and because it contains, like *Scarfarce*, so many memorable lines. The power of belief Cohen and DeLong’s compelling version of the declinist argument has potentially important implications for the stability of the global economic system. When they talk about America’s creditors having confidence in the US government’s ability to live up to its financial commitments, they touch on an aspect of global hegemony that has gained increasing currency in modern economics. The elements of the story can be read off the contents page of George Akerlof and Robert Shiller’s recent *Animal Spirits* (reviewed in the June–July &$$" issue of *Survival*5). When we try to assess the stability of the global economic system, we need to think in terms of psychological variables like confidence, fairness, bad faith and the money illusion. Other countries will only buy into an American-centred global order if they believe the US government is willing and able to underwrite the system, if they can Downloaded By: [Dartmouth College] At: 17:26 25 July 2010 !%$ | Erik Jones have an equitable chance to pursue their own self-interest, if they believe that other powerful actors will not violate the rules of the game and so take advantage of them, and if there is some currency that can be used to connect trade and capital flows. This is not a new argument in the field of international political economy. Charles Kindleberger sketched the requirements for hegemonic stability in his !"#, study of the Great Depression.6 The difference is that Kindleberger focused on the structural characteristics of the hegemon – meaning the ability to underwrite the system by acting as an open market for distressed goods, to enforce the rules impartially, to provide moral leadership, and to act as a lender of last resort. By contrast, Akerlof and Shiller underscore the importance of perceptions held by other actors. Whatever the objective merits of the United States, if other major actors lack confidence in America’s ability to maintain open markets, if they believe that the global economic system is rigged against them, if they perceive other actors like China or Germany to be taking advantage of the system, or if they lose confidence in the dollar as the ultimate vehicle for international payments, they may begin to behave irrationally, with sudden and systemic implications. They may panic and trigger a global crisis.

Heg Good – Laundry List

Heg is key to solving free trade, global warming, terrorism, environmental degradation and disease

Greenberg 2006, Director Emeritus and Honorary Vice Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations and a member of the Trilateral Commission.(Maurice, “On Leadership”, The National Interest, Winter 05/06)

I am concerned that these are not the issues being discussed by our political leadership and that the United States is abdicating its role as a global leader. There are a number of problems that require the United States to step forward and exercise leadership. In matters of world trade, the Doha Round has not been a booming success. Promises of aid for Africa have turned out to be little more than promises. We have transnational threats such as terrorism, environmental degradation and the spread of disease. We have an issue of global warming. I'm not a scientist, but I am concerned that the intensity and strength of natural disasters has grown. Ocean warming has occurred by several degrees of temperature, ice flows are melting in the poles--what is going to be the impact of that on the world's climate? There are a whole host of issues that are not simply matters of American national interest, but are global, planetary interests. And make no mistake, if the United States does not lead, who will? The future of the European Union is a question mark. The proposed constitution was not enthusiastically embraced by Europe's population. More and more Europeans are dissatisfied with the euro, which, I might add, seems less and less likely to replace the dollar as the leading currency for global trade and finance. American leadership is essential to put together the broad-based coalitions necessary to tackle these problems. Our national interest is served by continuing to build up our relations with other states, creating a network of mutual interdependence, rather than ignoring problems or isolating ourselves from the rest of the world.

Heg Good – Economy

A global military presence boosts the economy

Carla **Norrlof** ( Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto) 20**10** “ America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” Cambridge University Press http://magbooks.org/post-9334/americas-global-advantage-us-hegemony-and-international-cooperation

As can be seen from table 6.1, there is a strong correlation between military successes and increased financial flows into the United States, providing support for the hypothesis that the United States has collected a security premium. A positive relationship is said to exist if financial flows increase/decrease the year following military success/ defeat. Military success (defeat) is indicated with a + (–) sign next to the year the operation was undertaken. Specifically, we see that in 77 percent of the COW cases, military successes are positively correlated with increased financial flows, and military defeats positively correlated with reduced financial flows. This figure is conservative and does not include the terrorist attacks on the United States, as explained above. Taking the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon into account increases the correspondence between military interventions and financial flows to 85 percent. If we expand the set of cases to include those assessed against reporting in The Economist on the war on Iraq, 82 percent of the cases either depict a positive relationship between military victory and the ability to attract capital or between military loss and the retreat of foreign capital. Again, if this figure takes the 9/11 attacks into account, the correspondence is 88 percent.

Hegemony Good – Prolif

Credibility decline of U.S. hegemony leads to international arms races and general instability.

**Layne**, Christopher. Professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security, at Texas A&M University. The Waning of U.S. Hegemony-Myth or Reality? A Review Essay. MIT Press, 20**09**.

Still, there are factors that could lead to a more fraught international environment, including: the declining credibility of U.S. extended deterrence security guarantees, which could fuel new regional arms races (p. 97); competition for control of natural resources—especially energy—which could drive great power competitions (pp. 63–66)21; and fallout from the financial and economic crisis, which could cause the international economic system to become more mercantilist (pp. 93–94). Finally, in a multipolar world, established international institutions may not be able to deal with the challenges posed by economic and financial turmoil, energy scarcity, and global climate change. In such a world, a nonhegemonic United States will lack the capability to revitalize them.

Hegemony Good – Trade

Heg is sustainable and key to free trade

David **Brooks** 1/14/**10** “ Realism and the US Hegemony” http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-news/5037238-realism-and-the-us-hegemony

**The world system will suffer without a hegemon because international laws cannot be enforced, trade slows down and financial centers collapse.** The United States has assumed the role of hegemon since the collapse of the Soviet Union, since then there has been unprecedented economic cooperation, growth and security. With rational policy makers and sound economic policy the United States will remain the hegemon for many more years. The U.S. has displayed the will and ability to be the world’s hegemon. China or the European Union are underdeveloped and lack national will to ascend to the role of hegemon. With a GDP of $13.62 trillion, the E.U. is ready to challenge the United States economically. Similarly, China has a GDP of $10 trillion, but most importantly maintains an annual growth rate around 9% (www.cia.gov). But, the U.S., with a GDP of $13.22 trillion and a growth rate around 3.4%, still is in the best position to lead the world for the next century. The international system has always been and will remain anarchic, violent and a place with few winners. If the United States is to maintain its position as world superpower it must maintain its economic power and independence. Opening foreign markets to U.S. companies and investors is the most efficient and expedient method for maintaining economic power. Companies that are well established and operate on a large scale will have a considerable advantage against smaller and lesser known companies. When Coca-Cola moves into a new market and is able to sell its new and well known product for cheaper or the same price as local competitors; Coca-Cola will assume control of that market.

Hegemony Good – Japan Rearm

U.S. military presence is key to preventing Japan from going nuclear.

Brookes, Peter. Senior Fellow, National Security Affairs and Chung Ju-Yung Fellow for Policy Studies. Why the World Still Needs America's Military Might. November 24, 2008.

**The presence of U.S. forces** and the American nuclear deterrent **has** also **kept Japan from exercising a nuclear option that many believe it might take**, **considering the rise of China, North Korea's nuclear breakout, its advanced scientific and technical capabilities, and indigenous nuclear power industry--a producer of a significant amount of fissile material from its reactors**. Political and historical considerations aside, **many believe that Japan could quickly join the once-exclusive nuclear weapons club if it chose to do so**, result­ing in unforetold challenges to regional security.

Hegemony Good – Taiwan Invasion

U.S. military presence is crucial to preventing Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Brookes, Peter. Senior Fellow, National Security Affairs and Chung Ju-Yung Fellow for Policy Studies. Why the World Still Needs America's Military Might. November 24, 2008.

We know that **China is undergoing a major military buildup**, especially involving its power projection forces--i.e., air force, navy, and ballistic missile forces, all aimed at Taiwan. Indeed, today **Beijing has the world's third largest defense budget and the world's fastest growing peacetime defense budget**, growing at over 10 percent per year for over a decade. It increased its defense budget nearly 18 percent annually over the past two years. I would daresay that **military tensions across the 100-mile-wide Taiwan Strait between Taiwan and China would be much greater today if not for an implied commitment on the part of the United States to prevent a change in the political status quo via military means**. **China hasn't renounced the use of force against its neighbor** and rival, Taiwan, a vibrant, free-market democracy. It is believed by many analysts that **absent American military might, China would quickly unite Taiwan with the mainland under force of arms**. In general, the system of military alliances in Asia that **the United States maintains provides the basis for stability in the Pacific**, since the region has failed to develop an overarching security architecture such as that found in Europe in NATO.

A2: Offshore Balancing – Perception

Your turns are inevitable and balancing is impossible – other nations will always perceive the US as the hegemon.

Drezner 2009 [Daniel W., Professor of International Politics at Tufts and a senior editor at The National Interest, 7/15, “The False Hegemon,” http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=21858]

The rest of the world certainly seems to treat America as the hegemonic power, for good or ill. According to the New York Times, Latin America is waiting for the United States to break the deadlock in Honduras. Vladimir Putin is incapable of giving a foreign-policy speech in which he does not blast American hegemony as the root of all of Russia’s ills. While Chinese officials talk tough about ending the dollar’s reign as the world’s reserve currency, its leaders also want America to solve the current economic crisis and to take the lead on global warming in the process. It’s not just foreign leaders who are obsessed with American hegemony. Last week, in an example of true hardship duty, I taught a short course in American foreign policy at the Barcelona Institute for International Studies. The students in my class represented a true cross section of nationalities: Spaniards, Germans, Brits, Estonian, Chinese, Vietnamese, Indian, Thai, Ghanaian, Kenyan, Turkish, Belgian, Mexican, Nicaraguan and, yes, even Americans. I cannot claim that my students represent a scientific cross section of non-Americans (one of them complained that I did not rely on Marxism as a structural explanation for American foreign policy). Still, by and large the students were bright, well informed about world affairs and cautiously optimistic about President Obama. That said, a persistent trend among my students was their conviction that the U.S. government was the world’s puppeteer, consciously manipulating every single event in world politics. For example, many of them were convinced that George W. Bush ordered Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili to precipitate last year’s war with Russia. The Ghanaian students wanted to know why Obama visited their country last week. The standard “promotion of good democratic governance” answer did not satisfy them. They were convinced that there had to be some deeper, potentially sinister motive to the whole enterprise. Don’t even ask what they thought about the reasons behind the war in Iraq. To be sure, the United States is a powerful actor; the government is trying to influence global events (and Americans are not immune to their own misperceptions). And good social scientists should always search for underlying causes and not take rhetoric at face value. Nevertheless, the belief in an all-powerful America hatching conspiracies left and right frequently did not jibe with the facts. For many of these students, even apparent policy mistakes were merely examples of American subterfuge. Ironically, at the moment when many Americans are questioning the future of U.S. hegemony, many non-Americans continue to believe that the U.S. government is diabolically manipulating events behind the scenes. Going forward, the persistence of anti-Americanism in the age of Obama might have nothing to do with the president, or his rhetoric or even U.S. government actions. It might, instead, have to do with the congealed habits of thought that place the United States at the epicenter of all global movings and shakings. The tragedy is that such an exaggerated perception of American power and purpose is occurring at precisely the moment when the United States will need to scale back its global ambitions. Indeed, the external perception of U.S. omnipresence will make the pursuit of a more modest U.S. foreign policy all the more difficult. The Obama administration has consciously adopted a more modest posture in the hopes of improving America’s standing abroad. If the rest of the world genuinely believes that the United States causes everything, however, then the attempt at modesty will inevitably fail.

A2: Offshore Balancing – Weakness

Balancing dynamics don’t manifest unless the US becomes overtly threatening – standard balance-of-power explanations are structurally invalid.

Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth 2009 [G. John, Prof. Politics and Int'l Affairs @ Princeton U, Michael, Prof. Gov't and Assoc. Dean Social Sciences @ Dartmouth College, and William C., Prof. Gov't @ Dartmouth College, "Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences," in World Politics, Vol 61, No 1, January, MUSE | VP]

The proposition that great concentrations of capabilities generate countervailing tendencies toward balance is among the oldest and best known in international relations.33 Applying this balancing proposition to a unipolar system is complex, however, for even as unipolarity increases the incentives for counterbalancing it also raises the costs. Walt [End Page 18] and Finnemore each analyze the interplay between these incentives. They agree on the basic proposition that the current unipolar order pushes secondary states away from traditional hard counterbalancing—formal military alliances and/or military buildups meant to create a global counterweight to the unipole—and toward other, often subtler strategies, such as soft balancing, hiding, binding, delegitimation, or norm entrapment. These analyses lead to the general expectation that a shift from a multipolar or bipolar to a unipolar structure would increase the relative salience of such subtler balancing/resistance strategies.

Walt argues that standard neorealist balance of power theory predicts the absence of counterbalancing under unipolarity. Yet he contends that the core causal mechanisms of balance-of-threat theory remain operative in a unipolar setting. Walt develops a modification of the theory that highlights the role of soft balancing and other subtler strategies of resistance as vehicles to overcome the particular challenges unipolarity presents to counterbalancing. He contends that balancing dynamics remain latent within a unipolar structure and can be brought forth if the unipole acts in a particularly threatening manner.

Finnemore develops a contrasting theoretical architecture for explaining secondary state behavior. For her, both the absence of balancing and the presence of other patterns of resistance can be explained only by reference to the social, as opposed to the material, structure of international politics. In particular, secondary state strategies that have the effect of reining in the unipole cannot be understood as the result of standard security-maximizing incentives. Rather, they are partially the outgrowth of the secondary states’ internalization of the norms and rules of the institutional order. If the unipole acts in accordance with those rules, the tendency of other states to resist or withhold cooperation will be muted. Finnemore establishes three social mechanisms that constrain the unipole: legitimation, institutionalization, and incentives for hypocrisy. Each of these entails a logic of resistance to actions by the unipole that violate certain socially defined boundaries.

A2: Offshore Balancing

Offshore balancing fails

Colin S. **Gray** ( Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England) January 20**09** “ After Iraq: The Search for a Sustainable National Security Strategy” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=902

The United States could try to effect a transition from its current on-shore Eurasian strategy of forward deployment, to an off-shore posture keyed to a policy role as "spoiler" of potential grand continental coalitions. As maritime-air-space balancer of large Eurasian menaces, the United States would both retain its political discretion over belligerency and favor its national strength in the higher technology features of its armed forces. The problem is that this off-shore role would not suffice to defend the national interest. The country would not be trusted, since it would eschew the firm commitments that require local presence. As much to the point, U.S. influence would be certain to diminish as a consequence of a process of withdrawal, no matter how impressive the reach of America's weapons through the several geographies of the great "commons." Almost by default, the United States should choose, perhaps simply accept, the role of hegemon-leader for a world order that serves both its own most vital interests as well as those of a clear majority of members of the world community, such as it is. Contrary to the sense of much of the contemporary debate, Americans have no prudent alternative other than to play the hegemonic role. But for the role to be sustainable, it has to rest upon the formal or tacit consent of other societies. Only with such consent will America be able to exercise a national security strategy geared successfully to the ordering duty.

A2: Offshore Balancing

**Balancing fail – US strength and alliance difficulties prevent**

Brooks & Wohlforth 2008 Stephen G. & William C. Associate Professors in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. World Out of Balance. International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy. <http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fMWRJy1MznUC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&dq=World+Out+of+Balance&ots=OoUSGjywNP&sig=rjiok0BKhyTk1Mh_1fqIMP4E09g#v=onepage&q&f=false>

The main systemic obstacles to external balancing are coordination – a ubiquitous difficulty in international relations – and the collective action problem, which is even more formidable. Collective goods theory predicts that counterbalancing alliances will be hard to form and make effective. A balancing constraint against a prospective hegemon can be enjoyed by states that do not contribute to it; one state’s security benefit does not prevent others from benefiting as well. The result is a powerful incentive to free ride. States are tempted to stand aside and pass the balancing buck to others. Hence it is little wonder that John Mearsheimer’s review of two centuries’ experience leads him to conclude that “great powers seem clearly to prefer buck-passing to balancing.” The collective action problem feeds into the coordination challenges that beset any cooperative endeavor among states. Each prospective balancer is a self-interested actor seeking to minimize costs and risks and maximize the degree to which the alliance’s strategy complements the actor’s other preferences. Even when they agree on the need to balance, states tend to disagree on how burdens should be shared and what strategy should be followed. Allies tend to splinter over who gets to lead and set strategy. Except for those few alliances lucky enough to be able to balance a hegemon without a great deal of strategic coordination, effective alliances demand that members’ decisions on national security be shaped by their collective purpose. Leadership in an alliance of sovereign states with roughly equal capabilities is usually so contentious an issue that it is never really settled, which leads to strategic incoherence. The sheer size and comprehensiveness of the power gap favoring the United States, moreover, raises still higher the coordination and collective action barriers to external balancing. The greater and more comprehensive the hegemon’s lead, the larger and more strategically coherent the coalition needed to check it. As figure 2.1 illustrates, the power gaps that balancing efforts had to overcome in the past were much narrower, and yet the barriers loomed large. They are far more formidable now given the long road prospective balancers would have to travel to produce a credible check on American power. A comparison to history’s most successful power-aggregating alliance, NATO, is instructive. NATO’s ability to overcome the perennial obstacles to balancing in the Cold War hinged on two conditions: it confronted a one-dimensional superpower that was competitive mainly in conventional land power; and U.S. leadership within the coalition allowed Washington to overcome coordination problems and absorb the costs and risks of free riding by others. Those advantages do not apply to the would-be members of a counter-coalition against U.S. power today. There is no obvious leader of a hypothetical coalition, nor would that coalition posses the latent power advantage NATO enjoyed. Today’s unipolar system, in short, multiplies the problems that complicated the balancing efforts of the past. Organizing collective action to check a rising power is hard enough; fashioning a durable, coherent coalition against a well-established hegemon is a tougher order of business. All of the difficulties of overthrowing a ramified status quo now work for, rather than against, the hegemon. Several of the major powers are longtime allies of United States and derive substantial benefits from their position. Attempting to balance would put those benefits at risk, and Washington has ample opportunities to exploit the free-rider problem by playing divide and rule.

A2: Offshore Balancing

**States won’t balance – geography and neighboring powers restrict them**

Brooks & Wohlforth 2008 Stephen G. & William C. Associate Professors in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. World Out of Balance. International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy. <http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fMWRJy1MznUC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&dq=World+Out+of+Balance&ots=OoUSGjywNP&sig=rjiok0BKhyTk1Mh_1fqIMP4E09g#v=onepage&q&f=false>

A final impediment to balancing is the opportunity cost of using resources and bending strategy toward countering the system’s strongest state. Some fortunate balancers may find that their efforts to counter the hegemon complement their other foreign policy objectives. But most are not so lucky; the resources they use for balancing often cannot be used for other purposes. Many are less fortunate still, and find that balancing undermines other core interests. Here, we will discuss only opportunity costs for pursuing security interests, but this analysis can easily be extended to other core interests as well. A state’s willingness to pay for balancing is conditioned by the proportion of its security problems that would be addressed by checking systemic hegemony. The smaller this proportion is, the higher the opportunity cost – and thus the lower the probability – of balancing. More specifically, the more important are local securities issues compared to the benefit of checking the systemic hegemon. First is geography. The costs and challenges of moving military forces over long distances mean that countries generally pose greater threats to their neighbors than to states farther away. Neighbors are also more likely to have more potential clashes of interest with each other than with distant states. The Atlantic and Pacific oceans separate the United States from the Eurasian landmass, where all the prospective balancers reside. When the putative hegemon and most of the potential balancers are close neighbors – as they were in the classic balancing episodes in modern European history – systemic and local imperatives more readily reinforce each other, meaning that balancing the hegemon is less likely to come at the expense of addressing local security challenges. In contrast, when the hegemon lies far offshore and the prospective balancers are close neighbors, as in the current system, local imperatives loom larger, and the counterbalancing strategy loses appeal. Second is the number of lesser states relative to great powers. The previous section showed that the current international system is characterized by an unprecedented hegemony with the great-power subsystem. Also important is the extraordinary proliferation of medium and minor powers. The dramatic increase in the number of states over the last half-century means that there are many more with at least some offensive military capability and occasionally significant defensive capability. Each great power has to think about more (and, in some cases, more capable) states than did their predecessors in most previous international systems. The result is again to increase the significance of local security issues and decrease the salience of systemic balance. A high relative salience of local security issues in today’s unipolar system raises the opportunity costs of systemic balancing. In many cases, the capabilities needed to check U.S. power are ill suited for local security challenges. As we shall discuss in more detail in chapter 3, when states face trade-offs between purchasing capabilities that might constrain the United States as opposed to those more useful for dealing with more immediate local problems, most opt for the latter most of the time. Even more important are the direct local security costs of systemic balancing. With great powers other than the United States clustered in and around Eurasia, efforts to produce systemic balance are likely to stoke local security dilemmas and generate compensating efforts by neighbors long before they materially reduce U.S preponderance. Moreover, such efforts may have the perverse effect of pushing neighboring powers closer to the United States.

A2: Offshore Balancing

**Balancing won’t happen – international structure proves**

Brooks & Wohlforth 2008 Stephen G. & William C. Associate Professors in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. World Out of Balance. International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy. <http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fMWRJy1MznUC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&dq=World+Out+of+Balance&ots=OoUSGjywNP&sig=rjiok0BKhyTk1Mh_1fqIMP4E09g#v=onepage&q&f=false>

The importance of the balancing proposition cannot be overstated, for it also figures crucially in the arguments of nonrealist scholars. When institutionalists and constructivists assess the costs of unilateralism, expected counterbalancing by other states often figures prominently. 16 Moreover, the balance-of-power metaphor is a staple of punditry, both in the United States and abroad, in which each new effort at coordination among major powers that excludes Washington is routinely hailed as an epoch-making “axis.” Indeed, the leaders of other major powers—notably the presidents of France, Russia, and China—periodically seem to invoke the balancing proposition themselves, arguing that their policies are intended to foster a multipolar world. This confluence of theoretical expectations, journalistic commentary, and political rhetoric lends initial plausibility to the balancing proposition and partly explains its popularity as an argument against unilateralism. The argument hinges on the proposition that the more the United States backs away from multilateralism, the greater the probability of counterbalancing. The problem is that there is no counterbalancing against the United States, nor is there likely to be any time soon. Indeed, the remarkable thing about the current international system is that three key causal factors highlighted by realist balance-of-power theory itself are configured so as to make the reemergence of traditional balancing dynamics among the major powers highly improbable.17 First is geography. The counterbalancing coalitions of the past all emerged against centrally located land powers that constituted existential threats to nearby major states. The United States, by contrast, lies far from the shores of Eurasia, where the other major powers are all clustered. Distance mutes the potential security threat U.S. power poses to others, while proximity magnifies the potential threat their power poses to one another and thus increases the salience of local as opposed to global counterbalancing. The geographical uniqueness of the current international system and its implications for balancing are now widely appreciated.18 This is partly true of the second key factor: the distribution of material capabilities. It is now commonplace to observe that the gap in overall power between the United States and all other states is larger now than any analogous gap in the history of the modern states system.19 Analysts are also sensitive to decisive U.S. advantages in the individual components of national power: military, technological, economic, and even demographic.20 Historically minded observers are aware that all preceding leading states were dominant militarily or economically, but never both simultaneously. Less widely appreciated is the gap in latent power.21 States make choices about balancing depending on their expectations of the capabilities prospective balancers could produce in extremis. The United States is in a better position than past leading states to enhance its capabilities vis-à-vis putative rivals for two reasons: it obtains its currently dominant military capabilities by devoting a historically small proportion of its economy to national defense (less than 4 percent of GDP in 2004 as compared to 5–14 percent during the cold war); and its historically large technological lead is a potential resource that could be further exploited. And these underlying advantages interact with the perennial problem would-be balancers face: they must coordinate policies in complex ways to increase capabilities against a hegemon whose response is coordinated by a single government. The third key factor is that American primacy is an accomplished fact rather than a revisionist aspiration. Many observers now recognize that other key powers derive benefits from the status quo and so may be reluctant to pay costs to overthrow it.22 Less recognized is that for three centuries no balance-of-power theorist ever developed propositions about a system in which hegemony is the status quo. All the historical experience of balancing from the seventeenth century until 1991 concerns efforts to check a rising power from attaining hegemony. While both history and balance-of-power theory clearly suggest that a rising potential hegemon needs to be concerned about the counterbalancing constraint, neither yields this implication for a hegemon that is already firmly established. On the contrary, both theory and historical experience suggest that when hegemony is the status quo, all the familiar obstacles to balancing will be dramatically magnified. Chief among these are the much higher coordination challenges putative counterbalancers would face today, in comparison with their predecessors. Classical balancing coalitions were always vulnerable to the collective action problem, as members would seek to ride free on the efforts of others. Those challenges would be multiplied in any attempt to counterbalance the United States today. These factors characterize an international system that is already primed against traditional power balancing due to nuclear weapons and the declining economic and military value of territory. All the major powers have or can quickly produce nuclear weapons. With a secure secondstrike capability, their territorial integrity is better secured than that of any past great power, and the security threat inherent in concentrated power is diminished.23 Moreover, the economic and military benefits of owning specific bits of land have declined dramatically, reducing the incentives for conquest and diminishing the core security threat posed by concentrated power.24 Taken individually, each of these factors militates against counterbalancing. Together they make it exceedingly unlikely, for there is considerable positive interaction among them. American preponderance in the material scales of world power feeds the collective action and coordination problems, as do geography and the status quo barrier. Other schools of IR research yield additional reasons to doubt the salience of counterbalancing today.25 But the key is that all of the factors highlighted here lie within the realist system of explanation that highlights anarchy and its attendant security problems. Even discounting the importance of factors such as shared democratic norms and institutions, there is no reason to expect the reemergence of traditional balancing dynamics in the current international system. It follows that whatever the costs of unilateralism are, counterbalancing is not among them.

A2: Offshore Balancing

Offshore balancing is impossible-cultural pressures make heg or withdrawal the only options

Gray, 2009 Colin S. Gray, professor of International Relations at Reading, 1/2009, “After Iraq: The Search for a Sustainable National Security Strategy,” <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=902>

When considered over the longer term, as in this monograph, U.S. foreign policy, national security policy, and strategy must reconcile the demands of a domestic culture that can have dysfunctional consequences abroad, with the objective circumstances of the outside world. It is almost entirely useless for American or other scholars to write books and articles urging a U.S. policy that affronts American culture. The beginning of wisdom has to be with Sun-tzu’s dictum on the necessity for knowledge of the enemy and of oneself. To be sustainable, American policy and strategy must be broadly compatible with American values. Perhaps not all American values, and not all of the time. But any policy vision that is plainly un- Page 24 10 American is certain to fail at home eventually. Foreign policy is born at home and has to succeed there if it is to succeed abroad. The current debate to which this monograph relates is replete with arguments about anticipated features of the 21st century that will prove desperately challenging to American national culture. It may well be that this century will see a return of multipolar balance-of- power politics on a global scale. But when one consid- ers this possibility, even probability, one needs to re- member that American culture wants to reject what it regards as the cynical balance-of-power politics of expe- diency. Americans believe it is a mission of their unique country to improve the world. If thwarted in this noble, even (in the opinion of many) divine, mission, they are likely to insist that the country withdraw, adopting a minimalist foreign policy. Controversialist Christopher Layne speaks for many Americans when he writes: “Precisely because of its power and geography, there is very little the United States needs to do in the world in order to be secure.”

A2: Offshore Balancing

Solf Balancing is a non-issue- not driven by hegemony.

Brooks and Wohlforth 2005 – professors of government at Dartmouth (Stephen and William, International Security, 30:1, “Hard times for soft balancing”, EBSCO, WEA)

How does one identify soft balancing? The answer matters greatly for both policy and theory, yet it remains elusive because soft-balancing proponents have not supplied the conceptual tools to distinguish behavior that is an outgrowth of the systemic balancing imperative from what we might call “unipolar politics as usual.” Crucially missing from the literature is sufficient recognition that other explanations besides soft balancing exist for state actions that constrain the United States. As a result, analysts tend to treat nearly any behavior that complicates U.S. foreign policy as soft balancing. We remove this bias by setting out four alternative explanations. economic interest States may undertake actions that hamper the conduct of U.S. foreign policy not principally because they wish to do so, but rather to advance economic gains, either for the state as a whole or for powerful interest groups or business lobbies. A government’s interest in fostering economic growth or obtaining revenue for itself or its constituents may be unrelated to the presence of a hegemon on the horizon or the potential security threat it poses. regional security concerns States routinely pursue policies to enhance local security that are unrelated to constraining U.S. hegemony. For a variety of reasons, there is a greater demand for regional policy coordination than existed in the past: a vast increase in the number of states; a consequent increase in the overall number of weak or failed states; and the rise of transnational security challenges such as organized crime, terrorism, drug trafficking, and refugee flows. Major powers frequently face incentives to enhance their capabilities—often through collaboration with other regional states—in response to these local or regional concerns. These efforts may result in shifts in relative power—and perhaps in reduced U.S. freedom of action—even if constraining U.S. hegemony is not an important driver of them. policy disputes and bargaining Other states may undertake actions that constrain the United States not in response to the security threat presented by U.S. hegemony, but rather because they sincerely disagree with specific U.S. policies. Governments may resist a given U.S. policy because they are convinced that it is ill suited to the problem at hand or otherwise inappropriate, and not because they think it directly threatens their security or that opposition to it will reduce U.S. power over the long term. If so, then soft balancing is a misnomer, for the behavior concerned is unrelated to maximizing security under anarchy by checking a dangerous systemic concentration of power. In short, other states may push back against specific U.S. policies (pushing back because they disagree) and not against U.S. power in general (pushing back because they fear or wish to challenge U.S. hegemony). Given the reasonable expectation of future policy differences on various issues, and therefore the expectation of future policy bargaining, it follows that states may take actions intended to increase, or at least maintain, bargaining leverage over the long term. This is where policy bargaining takes forms that most closely resemble what analysts mean by soft balancing. As we show below, there are crucial analytical differences between long-term bargaining enhancement strategies and real soft balancing.

A2: Offshore Balancing

No soft balancing will happen.

Brooks and Wohlforth 2005 – professors of government at Dartmouth (Stephen and William, International Security, 30:1, “Hard times for soft balancing”, EBSCO, WEA)

To the degree that these other four explanations account for actions that constrain U.S. foreign policy, the soft-balancing argument is weakened. It would be surprising to find no evidence consistent with the soft-balancing explanation. Just as unlikely would be evidence that soft balancing is the only explanation in play—even though the concept’s proponents essentially imply just such an expectation by failing to consider alternatives. The real issue is relative salience. Determining the strength of the various explanations, however, is no easy task. The key cases of soft balancing are quite recent, so reliable inside information can be scarce. The chief putative soft-balancing powers—France, Russia, and China—are also not known for the transparency of their executive decisionmaking. And public rhetoric presents difficult analytical challenges. A government with a sincere interest in soft balancing may not want to advertise it. At the same time, all four other dynamics may generate balancing rhetoric from policymakers, creating prima facie evidence for a soft-balancing explanation. Leaders motivated chiefly by domestic political considerations are hardly likely to say so; they may detect domestic political advantage in touting the balancing element even if countering the threat from U.S. power is not the real issue. In turn, leaders who have sincere policy differences with the United States may talk up balancing to help build a coalition to increase their bargaining leverage. Being seen by Washington as a potential soft-balancer has risks, to be sure, but it also holds out the promise of magnifying one’s bargaining influence and the significance of any concessions one might make. Governments that pursue relative economic advantages for themselves or their constituents may find it convenient to cloak the policy in high-minded talk about checking U.S. power. And the United States is so prominent on the global stage that it can potentially serve as a convenient focal point for other states that seek to cooperate on regional security issues. States will likely have strong disagreements on the specifics of how to cooperate at the regional level; a public stance against U.S. policies may be one issue they can agree on. Balancing rhetoric can thus be a useful rallying point for stimulating regional cooperation. Balancing talk, moreover, is often as cheap as it is useful. A state can rationally be expected to address an issue only to the degree that it has the capability to do so. Actors and observers expect France to play a far more substantial role in resolving an issue in the Balkans than in North Korea, and vice versa for China. Yet because of the United States’ globe-girdling capabilities, critical U.S. involvement is likely to be expected in both cases. This illustrates the immense gap between the set of issues the United States might rationally be expected to address seriously and the corresponding issue sets of the other great powers. As a result, there is a range of issues over which they can take positions without expecting to be compelled to bear the costs of their resolution. Ultimately, **rhetoric is a poor indicator of the salience of soft balancing**. Perhaps recognizing these challenges, proponents of the soft-balancing concept frequently place more emphasis on its portents for the future than on its contemporary significance. For the argument to be taken seriously, however, there must be evidence for its current explanatory value.17 Otherwise, soft balancing is not an explanation but an expectation: a mere reassertion of the well-known, neorealist prediction of the return of multipolarity that has been advanced since 1990, which is also typically formulated in an unfalsifiable manner.18

A2: Offshore Balancing

**Balancing theory’s wrong – assumes a rising hegemon**

Brooks & Wohlforth 2008 Stephen G. & William C. Associate Professors in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. World Out of Balance. International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy. <http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fMWRJy1MznUC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&dq=World+Out+of+Balance&ots=OoUSGjywNP&sig=rjiok0BKhyTk1Mh_1fqIMP4E09g#v=onepage&q&f=false>

Attempts to check the leading state’s power, in sum, are theoretically possible in any international system. But behavior that is possible may be patiently self-defeating and hence highly improbable. Even if we examine only causal factors that are featured in balance-of-power theory itself, it is clear that counterbalancing is highly improbable today. The plain fact is that balance-of-power theorists never contemplated a unipolar system. Applying the theory to such a system essentially reverses its implications for constraints on the leading state. The balancing constraint may well work on the leading state up to a threshold of hegemony or unipolarity. Once a state passes this threshold however, the causal arrows reverse: the stronger a leading state is and the more entrenched its dominance, the more improbable and thus less constraining counterbalancing dynamics are.

A2: Middle East balancing

Middle East Balancing Fails - U.S. Presence is key

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author of eight books on international affairs) “ The Iraq War and Iranian Power” Survival vol. 49 no. 4 winter 20**08** Online @ http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/carpenter\_innocent\_the\_iraq\_war\_and\_iranian\_power.pdf ghs ls

A marginally better option would be to exploit the sectarian divide in the region by using Sunni Arab states to balance Iran. By shifting the burden of containment to these nations, many of which already abhor Tehran’s clerical regime, America could protect its interests without putting itself into direct confrontation with Iran. Such a coalition would involve increased intelligence sharing, expanded arms sales, joint military operations and heightened maritime security. Saudi Arabia’s location, advanced weaponry and status as the world’s largest producer of crude oil give it important strategic advantages in the Persian Gulf. Egypt is the only nation with manpower resources to match Iran, with 15.5m men fit for military service compared to 15.6 in Iran. The Egyptian armed forces number 468,500. 41 Jordan and the remaining Gulf Cooperation Council states could augment the larger Sunni powers in a containment strategy, but are too small in population and territory to balance Iran militarily. One benefit of such a coalition is that the United States could sustain or even draw down its forward-deployed forces in the Gulf. This is outweighed by some disadvantages. Internal weaknesses in the two biggest potential balancers, Saudi Arabia and Egypt – the decadence of the Saudi royal family and the lack of accountability under Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak – feed resentment among volatile jihadist forces, and may constrict these countries’ abilities to promote regional stability and counter the Iranian threat. 42 Moreover, Saudi Arabia, the potential leader of the alliance, presents the United States with a double-edged sword: like Iran, it has flirted with terrorism, a fact Washington has grudgingly tolerated. 43 Moreover, Egypt may be geographically too far from the Gulf to balance effectively against Iran, while Saudi Arabia’s forces are too small to take full advantage of their advanced weaponry. Finally, the balance of power in the Gulf would be wholly sectarian. US complicity in a division within Islam would inevitably incite more terrorism against America. Moreover, such a coalition would increase the likelihood of a regional war, with the United States again in the middle of the fray.

A2: Asia Balancing

Multilateralism in East Asia Fails – Current US-Japanese Alliance should be preferred

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There are four primary reasons why the United States should not be enthusiastic about multilateral, collective security as the primary policy option in Northeast Asia. First, the region has no history of such practices. On the contrary, its history, for most of the past two millennia, has been one of subordination to cultural, economic, and political (though rarely military) influence of the Middle Kingdom in China.157 In more modern times, Amitav Acharya notes that the extreme diversity of the region, combined with the geopolitical situation following World War II, has prevented the establishment of effective multilateral regimes in Asia as compared to Europe.158 Second, a collective security arrangement requires a baseline of consensus and the shelving of standing disputes among its members as entry into the forum. Michael Armacost notes that “the prerequisites for collective security―a common perception of threats, general agreement about the territorial status quo, and a sense of community underpinned by widely accepted political and philosophical principles―have not taken root in Asia.”159 For both domestic and future energy policy reasons, it is not likely for territorial disputes such as those in the Senkakus, Northern Islands (Southern Kuriles), Takeshima, the Paracels, and the Spratlys to be put aside so readily.160 Third, a cooperative security regime requires a sanction capability that is widely perceived as legitimate to punish transgressions. Since a multilateral regime that did not include China would likely create a security dilemma for Beijing and thus lead to an arms spiral that would be highly counterproductive, the inclusion of China would exacerbate the problems of sanctioning behavior seen by the United States and Japan as illegal. This same tendency is seen on a lesser scale in the current security forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF). The ARF is hamstrung by the “ASEAN way,” which involves pervasive norms of nonconfrontation, consensus, and respect for each other’s sovereignty.161 Finally, the United States, especially under the George W. Bush administration, is wary of multilateral security arrangements that could become institutionalized in coming years and reduce American policy options in Asia.162 In summary, **reducing the salience of the U.S.-Japan alliance in favor of a multilateral cooperative security arrangement is not a viable nearterm option for the United States**.

A2: China Balancing

**Chinese balancing fails – military and economic reform won’t affect the power gap**

Brooks & Wohlforth 2008 Stephen G. & William C. Associate Professors in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. World Out of Balance. International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy. <http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fMWRJy1MznUC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&dq=World+Out+of+Balance&ots=OoUSGjywNP&sig=rjiok0BKhyTk1Mh_1fqIMP4E09g#v=onepage&q&f=false>

In sum, while rapid economic growth makes China an increasingly important actor in world politics, it still has a long way to go before it can contest American dominance in all key measures of power. This conclusion is confirmed by China’s behavior and the assessments of its leadership. None of China’s external alignments can be considered counterbalancing. The only other major power with which China has concluded formal partnerships is Russia. As we discuss in detail in chapter 3, the Sino-Russian strategic partnership is propelled primarily by economics and regional security interests and is not well explained as a counterbalancing alignment. Neither Chinese nor Russian officials, nor experts on the two countries’ foreign policies, describe the partnership in such terms. Some scholars do describe China’s growing military expenditures as counterbalancing. But it is only possible to reach this conclusion if balancing is defined so expansively as to include any effort by any state to enhance its military capacity. There is no doubt that China is improving its military, and little doubt that it will continue to do so, at least until competing demands on the state budget determine otherwise. After all, the People’s Liberation Army starts from a primitive technological and organizational base. Any military leadership would want to upgrade that force. China’s military expenditures are a small fraction of the American commitment, and this ratio is not sensitive to the means of estimating it (see fig. 2.2). With a rapidly growing economy, China can afford to spend more on defense. The result of such expenditures over time may be new challenges for U.S. military operations in what Barry Posen calls the “contested zones” in or near China. The extent of these challenges depends on what the United States, Japan, Taiwan, and others do in response to China’s efforts. But the main point is that China’s current level of effort is nowhere near adequate to constitute counterbalancing – that is, to affect the United States’ overall military primacy and its command of the commons. With a smaller and much less advanced economy and a comparatively antiquated and inefficient military force, China cannot affect the overall military gap vis-à-vis the United States unless it is able to devote a substantially greater proportion of its comparatively smaller vote a substantially greater proportion of its comparatively smaller economic resources to defense than does the United States. Compared to China, the United States has and will long have a dramatic relative advantage in its ability to convert wealth to military power because of its massive investment over decades in the accumulation of the skills and infrastructure necessary to produce and use advanced weaponry. Yet China consistently devotes a smaller proportion of its GDP to defense than the United States does. Again, this conclusion is not sensitive to the measure used (see table 2.1). Given that China is not even working as hard as the United States at generating military power, we cannot describe its behavior as counterbalancing.

A2: China Balancing

China can’t balance – economic growth hampered by globalization

Brooks & Wohlforth 2008 Stephen G. & William C. Associate Professors in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. World Out of Balance. International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy. <http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fMWRJy1MznUC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&dq=World+Out+of+Balance&ots=OoUSGjywNP&sig=rjiok0BKhyTk1Mh_1fqIMP4E09g#v=onepage&q&f=false>

While China's economic growth is indeed assisted by its access to the global economy, the situation radically departs from the one Gilpin described. For one thing, the specific FDI mechanism he highlighted does not apply today. When Gilpin's book was written in 1975, U.S. “outward investment was four-and-a-half times greater than its inward investment." In recent years, in comparison, the U.S. FDI ratio has hovered right around "a perfect balance in terms of outward and inward" Of course, China is also aided by inward FDI, likely to a much greater extent than the United States. Yet, the same is true in reverse when we look at other aspects of economic globalization: the United States greatly benefits from globalization in a number of important ways that China either does not or only to a very limited extent. Significantly, many of these specific advantages the United States draws from economic globalization are to a large degree a function of its position in the system, both in terms of the size of its economy and also its status as the "incumbent" leader of the financial system. In particular, the United States profits to a great extent from having the dollar as the world's reserve currency and from its preferred status as a destination for international portfolio investment. With such a wide scope of available opportunities, the U.S. economy has also long attracted far more scientifically trained workers than any other state. By contrast, the renminbi is in no position to become a global reserve currency; just making it convertible will be a major challenge and is unlikely anytime soon." China is also not soon going to rival the United States in any way as a preferred destination for international portfolio investment or for newly mobile scientific and technological talent. Finally, it is also significant that U.S. MNCs have been at the forefront of establishing cooperative partnerships with foreign firms to enhance innovation and they also lead in the geographic dispersal of their production throughout the globe to reap various locational advantages. In contrast, in the years ahead China can at best benefit only slightly from home-based MNCs adopting novel globalization strategies given its current dearth of firms that are large and experienced enough to pursue this course." Globalization's contribution to China's rise in recent decades should also not be overstated. In contrast to the industrialized great-power challengers Gilpin discussed, China is a developing country whose extremely rapid growth in recent years owes much to factors having nothing to do with economic globalization. In particular, the speed of China's economic ascent since the late 1970s can also be traced to the fact that Chinese leaders put in place the key institutions-land reform, basic property rights-that most economists see as central to economic growth and that it started from an extremely low initial position thanks to decades of Mao-inspired policies that had long blocked the country's economic potential. In sum, China has been able to exploit "the advantages of backwardness" both through basic domestic reforms and through globalization. Finally, even if China benefits more from enhanced global economic interdependence than the United States, a power transition is simply not in the cards for many decades precisely because the United States now occupies such a dominant power position in the system. The challengers that Gilpin discussed were great powers with advanced economies at a comparable level of development to the hegemon. In those circumstances, aggregate GDP is a far better index of power than in a case where the rising state has a very large but comparatively poor population. As chapter 2 established, the power gap between the United States and China is currently immense, especially in military capabilities: no single factor, including globalization, can wipe it away anytime soon.

A2: EU Balancing

**EU won’t balance – no military or unity**

Brooks & Wohlforth 2008 Stephen G. & William C. Associate Professors in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. World Out of Balance. International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy. <http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fMWRJy1MznUC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&dq=World+Out+of+Balance&ots=OoUSGjywNP&sig=rjiok0BKhyTk1Mh_1fqIMP4E09g#v=onepage&q&f=false>

The only other economy big and rich enough to generate military capabilities on the American scale is that of the European Union, whose 27 member states have a combined GDP larger than that of the United States. To realize that potential, however, Brussels would have to wield Europe’s aggregate economic output with the same strategic purpose as the United States, a unitary state. A superpower’s military force could be purchased only at the price of a frontal assault on European nations’ core sovereignty. Balance-of-power theory assumes that states seek to preserve their security and autonomy, and, as Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon point out, “Fundamental to an understanding of the EU is an appreciation of the fact that such considerations are as present within it as they are in its dealings with the outside world.” Neither the authority nor the ability to act decisively in Europe’s name exists even in monetary matters, to say nothing of foreign and defense policy. Ultimate authority rests with the member states, all 27 of which must agree to any decision on defense and security policy. This requirement of unanimity “place profound limits on the potential for decisive EU security policies.”

**EU can’t balance – lacks military bite and unity**

Brooks & Wohlforth 2008 Stephen G. & William C. Associate Professors in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. World Out of Balance. International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy. <http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fMWRJy1MznUC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&dq=World+Out+of+Balance&ots=OoUSGjywNP&sig=rjiok0BKhyTk1Mh_1fqIMP4E09g#v=onepage&q&f=false>

Some might argue that the European Union is an exception to the big-or-rich rule. It is true that if Brussels were to develop impressive military capabilities and wield its latent collective power like a state, the EU would clearly constitute another pole. But the creation of an autonomous and unified defense and defense-industrial capacity that could compete with that of the United States would be a gargantuan task. The EU is struggling to put together a 60,000-strong rapid reaction force that is de- signed for smaller operations such as humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, and crisis management, but it still lacks military essentials such as capabilities in intelligence gathering, airlift, air-defense suppression, air-to-air refueling, sea transport, medical care, and combat search and rescue—and even when it has those capacities, perhaps by the end of this decade, it will still rely on NATO command and control and other assets. Whatever capability the EU eventually assembles, moreover, will matter only to the extent that it is under the control of a state-like decision-making body with the authority to act quickly and decisively in Europe’s name. Such authority, which does not yet exist even for international financial matters, could be purchased only at the price of a direct frontal assault on European nations’ core sovereignty. And all of this would have to occur as the EU expands to add ten or more new member states, a process that will complicate further deepening. Given these obstacles, Europe is unlikely to emerge as a dominant actor in the military realm for a very long time, if ever.

A2: Russia Balancing

**Russia can’t balance – military and weapons are incompetent**

Brooks & Wohlforth 2008 Stephen G. & William C. Associate Professors in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. World Out of Balance. International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy. <http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fMWRJy1MznUC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&dq=World+Out+of+Balance&ots=OoUSGjywNP&sig=rjiok0BKhyTk1Mh_1fqIMP4E09g#v=onepage&q&f=false>

The real core of Russia’s relationship with China, however, is no the diplomatic partnerships but extensive military coproduction arrangements and major arms sales. Yet Russia’s fundamental interest in these exports is not checking U.S. power but rather a desperate need to slow the decline of its military industrial complex. Between 1992 and 1998, Russia experienced what was probably the steepest peacetime decline in military power by any major state in history. Weapons procurement and spending declined dramatically after 1991, and by 2000 only 20 percent of Russia’s operational weapons stocks were modern, compared with 60-80 percent in NATO countries. Given the collapse of domestic orders (in 2001, only 10 percent of Russian defense firms received state orders), Russia’s defense sector possesses massive excess capacity. Against a backdrop of massive competing demands for new resources (dismal maintenance and training, dire personnel problems and overall inefficiency), increased defense outlays after 2001 did little to alter the fact that even a downsized Soviet-scale defense sector are too big for Russia. Arms sales are a lifeline for a military industry producing less than one-third of its 1992 output, and rapidly losing technological competitiveness. Even more immediately, exports aid a defense sector that supplies income and welfare services to hundreds to thousands of workers and their families, provides the economic lifeblood of dozens of cities, and enriches numerous managers and public officials. Military industry represents one of the few high-technology sectors in which Russians remain competitive, and they perceive strong overall commercial interest in promoting exports. The evidence concerning Russia’s major arms relationships overwhelmingly indicates that Moscow’s eagerness to sell weaponry to Beijing is only indirectly and marginally connected to the issue of U.S. hegemony.

Hegemony 2AC

**Heg decline inevitable but there’s no impact.**

Erik **Jones,** Staff Writer for Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, PhD of IR and Professor of European Studies at Johns Hopkins University, **7-21**, 2010, “A Great Fall”, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy Vol 52. Issue 4

Arguments, like films, tend to be repeated in regular cycles. The argument about the decline of American power is no exception. By my count we are in at least the third iteration. The first came in the 1970s with writers like David Calleo and Robert Gilpin.1 The second came in the 1980s when Mancur Olson and Paul Kennedy reignited the debate.2 We got to skip the 1990s and much of the 2000s. Now, however, American decline is back with a vengeance. In its current iteration, the declinist argument runs along the lines of the 1980s movie *Scarface*. In that movie, protagonist Tony Montana was a(racted to the United States because of its seductive culture: ‘I watch the guys like Humphrey Bogart, James Cagney. They, they teach me to talk. I like those guys. I always know one day I’m comin’ here, United States.’ Once inside the borders, it did not take Montana long to figure out the rules of the game. ‘In this country, you go(a make the money first. Then when you get the money, you get the power.’3 Unfortunately, Montana failed to appreciate the true well-springs of American prosperity. Instead, his image of the country was an exaggerated no-holds-barred sort of capitalism. Suffice it to say that the world of *Scarface* was unsustainable and so inevitably came crashing down around him. The film is a cautionary tale about what happens in a market without rules. It also suggests a question that most viewers in the early !"%$s would not have considered: what happens when other countries have the money? This is the question Stephen S. Cohen and J. Bradford DeLong pose in *The End of Influence*. Their answer begins by reiterating the lessons of *Scarface*. American power at the end of the Second World War was rooted to a large extent in the attractiveness of its culture and the wealth of its society. Other countries were willing to follow the United States because they wanted to be like the United States. Unfortunately, however, Americans themselves began to drift towards ever more extreme forms of free-market competition. This extreme neo-liberal view was at odds with the planning and industry that made America wealthy in the first place. As they embraced an increasingly unregulated market, the neo-liberals in America put their country on an unsustainable trajectory and became increasingly addicted to the combination of cheap manufactured goods and easy credit that other countries were willing to offer. The other countries got the money, and with it, the power. But this does not mean that the United States will go down in a hail of gunfire: ‘The United States will continue to be a world leader – perhaps even *the* leader. But it will no longer be the boss’

Decline Inevitable

U.S. Hegemony is over**.**

**Karaganov**, Sergei, (head of Council of Foreign and Defense Policy) 'Russia's Choice', Survival, 52:1, 5 – 10 February 20**10**

Today, the Euro-Atlantic world seems far less victorious than it did in the 1990s. **China and other Asian countries look like the true winners of the Cold War.** It seems that **China and Southeast Asia are destined to enjoy economic and political success for at least one more decade** - much to the displeasure of their competitors and the ideological advocates of political liberalism. China's rise is based on the country's readiness to undertake economic and social experiments and the ability of its efficient authoritarian government to harness the benefitsof these experiments**.** Meanwhile, **revolutionary changes in the international political and military spheres**, coupled with the unprecedented openness of the information age, **have denied the 'Old West' the ability to impose its political and economic rules on others by force**, as it used to do in the past. Today, **neither nuclear superiority nor even conventional superiority is as important as it once was**. Against this backdrop, **America's geopolitical position and claims to sole world leadership have sharply deteriorated**, particularly in light of conflicts in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the economic crisis. **It is clear that the United States will never completely regain its former status.**

Decline Inevitable

US hegemony is near dead-continuing to pursue it only puts the nail in the coffin

David P. Calleo, professor at Johns Hopkins University, 7/21/2010, Survival (American Decline revisited, http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a924622589~db=all~jumptype=rss)

America’s less developed rivals-countries such as China, India, or Brazil-may have better prospects. They may continue to enjoy their substantial real growth vis-à-vis the United States and Europe indefinitely. China, in particular, may be able to continue channeling its once-frozen savings into its own domestic development. If so, China may emerge as one of the great winners of the new era. After two centuries of humiliation, China may regain some of its historical prosperity. Of course, no one can really say where the new century will take us. The trends of recent decades do, nevertheless, suggest a more plural world, with no single global hegemon. The future may well see a variety of great powers, probably with strong regional systems built around them. If so, the vision of a closely integrated world, led by the United States as a unipolar hegemon, seems a dangerously dysfunctional guide for American national policy. Indeed, the persistence of this uniopolar fantasy in a plural world system is probably the most reliable guarantee of morbid American decline. Since the Obama administration took office, it has grown increasingly fashionable to say this-not surprising, given a budget deficit approaching a trillion and a half dollars. But whether the president’s heightened concerns end up merely as adroit adjustments of rhetoric rather than resolute changes in the nation’s foreign and economic policy remains to be seen.

US overreach is already crushng the US both in the military and economy

David P. Calleo, professor at Johns Hopkins University, 7/21/2010, Survival (American Decline revisited, http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a924622589~db=all~jumptype=rss)

The history of the past two decases suggests that adjusting to a plural world is not easy for the United States. As its economic strength is increasingly challenged by relative decline, it clings all the more to its peerless military prowess. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, that overwhelming military power, evolved over the Cold War, is less and less effective. In many respects, America’s geopolitical imagination seems frozen in the posture of the Cold War. The lingering pretention to be the dominant power everywhere has encouraged the United States to hazard two unpromising land wars, plus a diffuse and interminable struggle against ‘terrorism’. Praying for these wars and the pretensions behind them confirms the United States in a new version of Cold War finance. Once more, unmanageable fiscal problems poison the currency, an old pathology that firmly reinstates the nation on its path to decline. It was the hegemonic Cold War role, after all, that put the United States so out of balance with the rest of the world economy. In its hegemonic Cold War position, the United Sates found it necessary to run very large deficits and was able to finance them simply by creating and exporting more and more dollars. The consequence is today’s restless mass of accumulated global money. Hence, whereas the value of all global financial assets in 1980 was just over 100% of global output, by 2008, even after the worst of the financial implosion, that figure had exploded to just under 300%. Much of this is no doubt tied up in the massive but relatively inert holding of the Chinese and Japanese. But thanks to today’s instantaneous electronic transfers, huge sums can be marshaled and deployed on very short notice. It is this excess of volatile money that arguably fuels the world’s great recurring bubbles. It can create the semblance of vast real wealth for a time, but can also (with little notice) sow chaos in markets, wipe out savings and dry up credit for real investment. What constitutes a morbid overstretch in the American political economy thus end up as a threat to the world economy in general.

Decline Inevitable

The current addiction to hegemony assures that America will never regain its world power status

David P. Calleo, professor at Johns Hopkins University, 7/21/2010, Survival (American Decline revisited, http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a924622589~db=all~jumptype=rss)

Thus, while the financial crisis has certainly made Americans fear for their economic future, it does not yet seem to have resulted in a more modest view of the country’s place in the world or a more prudent approach to military spending. Instead, an addiction to hegemonic status continues to blight the prospects for sound fiscal policy. Financing the inevitable deficits inexorably turns the dollar into an imperial instrument that threatens the world with inflation. It might perhaps be expected that Obama’s own unusual life experience would make him both willing and able to lead the country to embrace a more plural world. His eloquent speeches often suggest that he is ready to pronounce a more genuinely pluralist vision, one that permits the United State to follow a less economically extravagant foreign and security policy. The Pentagon’s recent National Security Strategy, for example, finds the president himself trying to lay out a more balanced view. But despite rhetorical bursts of presidential wisdom, the president has substantially increased America’s commitments in Afghanistan and a relentless worldwide expansion of American military engagement continues apace. Seen from the Pentagon, the globe is six military districts, each with its American commander and a massive pool of resources. In short, the unipolar vision is poisoned legacy passed on all too firmly to new generation of American leaders. Not only does it repeatedly entrap the nation in unworthy adventures, but it makes America’s morbid decline much more probable than it ought to be.

Decline Inevitable

U.S. Hegemony is unsustainable 4 reasons-

1. Debt and increased money supply will collapse dollar heg and defense spending

2. the debt to GDP ratio is unsustainable crippling the U.S. budget

3. Our allies will abandon us

4. There will be increased political pressure for cutting defense spending to boost entitlements

Christopher **Layne** (Professor in Intelligence and National Security, at Texas A&M) Summer 20**09** “ The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay” International security Volume 34 No 1 Muse

The warning signs with respect to U.S. decline are a looming fiscal crisis and doubts about the future of the dollar as the reserve currency, both of which are linked to the fear that after recovery, the United States will face a serious inflationary threat.77 Optimists contend that once the United States recovers, [End Page 167] fears of a fiscal crisis will fade: the country faced a larger debt to GDP ratio after World War II, and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. The postwar era, however, was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and sustained high growth rates. The United States of 2009 is far different from the United States of 1945, however, which is why many economists believe that even in the best case, it will emerge from the current crisis with serious macroeconomic handicaps.78 Chief among these handicaps are the increase in the money supply (caused by the massive amount of dollars the Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped into circulation to rescue the economy), and the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the Brookings Institution and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) project the United States will incur for at least a decade.79 When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U.S. current account deficit, the entitlements overhang, and the cost of two ongoing wars, there is reason to worry about the United States’ long-term fiscal stability.80 The CBO states, “Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly urgent and unsustainable fiscal problem.”81 If the Congressional Budget Office is right**, it spells trouble ahead for the dollar.** As Jonathan Kirshner noted on the eve of the meltdown, the dollar’s vulnerability “presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance.”82 The dollar’s loss of reserve currency status would undermine U.S. dominance, and recent events have magnified concerns that predated the financial and economic crisis.83 First, the other big players in the international economy now are either [End Page 168] military rivals (China) or ambiguous “allies” (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U.S. protection from the Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Because of these two factors, as Eric Helleiner notes, if the dollar experiences dramatic depreciation in the future, there is a “risk of defections generating a herd-like momentum” away from it.84 To defend the dollar, in coming years the United States will be under increasing pressure to prevent runaway inflation through some combination of budget cuts, tax increases, and interest-rate hikes.85 Given that the last two options could choke off renewed growth, there is likely to be strong pressure to slash the federal budget. For several reasons, it will be almost impossible to make meaningful cuts in federal spending without deep reductions in defense expenditures. First, discretionary nondefense spending accounts for only about 20 percent of annual federal outlays.86 Second, there are obvious “guns or butter” choices. As Kirshner points out, with U.S. defense spending at such high absolute levels, domestic political pressure to make steep cuts in defense spending is likely to increase greatly.87 If this analysis is correct, the United States may be compelled to retract its overseas military commitments.88

Decline Inevitable

Econ Crisis causes U.S. to forgo military dominance.

Friedberg, 2010(Aaron, July 21st, professor of politics at Princeton University, *Implications of a Financial Crisis for U.S. – China Rivalry*, Survival, 52: 4,

36)

This transition is symbolic; higher debt payments do not necessarily have to mean downward pressure on defence spending. For a variety of reasons, however, this is likely to be the case. The combination of rising interest costs, slower growth and the long-awaited explosion in entitlement programmes due to population aging will tend to squeeze all forms of ‘discretionary spending’.21 Of these, the defence budget is the biggest and, in political terms, it may turn out to be the most vulnerable. As the United States disentangles itself from Iraq and Afghanistan, there will be calls to pocket the resulting ‘peace dividend’ and to direct more resources to urgent domestic needs. Instead of being freed to spend more on systems relevant to a possible long-term competition with China, the Defense Department is likely over the coming decade to face the necessity of making cuts in R&D and procurement.22

U.S. more interested in domestic politics than world hegemony.

Friedberg, 2010(Aaron, July 21st, professor of politics at Princeton University, *Implications of a Financial Crisis for U.S. – China Rivalry*, Survival, 52: 4,

37)

These sentiments no doubt reflect the nation’s unhappy experiences over the last eight years with terrorism and insurgency, but they are also clearly a product of the recent economic downturn. Since the start of the crisis the number of Americans who see their country as the world’s leading economic power has fallen sharply (from 41% in February 2008 to 27% in November 2009), even as those who see China in this role have grown more numerous (from 30% to 44%). While ordinary citizens remain wary of China, they show little sign of wanting to compete with it for influence. To the contrary, the American people at present seem far more inclined to want to tend to their own problems than to go out into the world looking for trouble.23 What remains to be seen is whether and if so how China will try to exploit an interval of American introspection.

Decline inevitable

Domestic and international pressures make US decline inevitable

Alan Cafruny is Henry Bristol Professor of International Affairs at Hamilton College, ""The 'Imperial Turn' and the Future of US Hegemony: 'Terminal Decline" or Retrenchment?"", 3/26/08, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/2/5/2/1/0/p252105\_index.html

The first decade of the 21st century has not been kind to the American superpower. The meltdown in U.S. credit markets resulting from the bursting of the housing bubble has laid the global financial system “wide open to catastrophic failure” (*Financial* Times, 2008: p. 10). A disastrous military campaign in Iraq, a bloody and inconclusive holding action in Afghanistan, and growing threats to the super-currency status of the dollar have raised the specter of U.S. “terminal decline” (Arrighi, 2005), a European counterhegemonic project in defense of the European social model (Judt, 2005; Haseler, 2004; Leonard, 2005; Kupchan, 2003; Derrida and Habermas, 2003; Reid, 2004; McCormick, 2007), and rapid Chinese ascent. The “project for a new American century” seems to have ended almost before it was supposed to have begun.

Decline inevitable: Deficits

Budget deficit collapses US primacy

Paul Kennedy, professor of history and director of International Security Studies at Yale University and is the author/editor of 19 books, including "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers", "American Power Is on the Wane", Wall Street Journal, 1/14/09, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123189377673479433.html

As the world stumbles from the truly horrible year of 2008 into the very scary year of 2009, there seems, on the face of it, many reasons for the foes of America to think that the world's number one power will take heavier hits than most other big nations. Those reasons will be outlined below. But let's start by noting that curious trait of human beings who, in pain themselves, seem to enjoy the fact that others are hurting even more badly. (One can almost hear some mournful Chekhovian aristocrat declare: "My estates may be damaged, Vasily, but yours are close to ruin!") So while today's Russia, China, Latin America, Japan and the Middle East may be suffering setbacks, the biggest loser is understood to be Uncle Sam. For the rest of the world, that is the grand consolation! By what logic, though, should America lose more ground in the years to come than other nations, except on the vague proposition that the taller you stand, the further you fall? The first reason, surely, is the U.S.'s truly exceptional budgetary and trade deficits. There is nothing else in the world like them in absolute measures and, even when calculated in proportion to national income, the percentages look closer to those you might expect from Iceland or some poorly run Third World economy. To my mind, the projected U.S. fiscal deficits for 2009 and beyond are scary, and I am amazed that so few congressmen recognize the fact as they collectively stampede towards the door entitled "fiscal stimulus." The planned imbalances are worrying for three reasons. The first is because the total projections have been changing so fast, always in a gloomier direction. I have never, in 40 years of reading into the economics of the Great Powers, seen the figures moved so often, and in such vast proportions. Clearly, some people do believe that Washington is simply a printing machine. The second reason all this is scary is because no one seems to be certain how usefully (or fecklessly) this money will be applied. I wish Barack Obama's administration all the best, but I am frightened by the prospect that he and his team will feel under such time pressures as to shovel out the money without adequate precautions, and that lots of it will slip into the wrong hands. The news in the press last week that lobbyists were pouring into Washington to make the case for whatever industry, interest group, or service sector they have been hired to represent made my heart sink. Printing lots of unsecured money is bad enough. Frittering it away on courtiers is worse. The third thing I'm really scared about is that we'll likely have very little money ourselves to pay for the Treasury bonds that are going to be issued, in tens of billions each month, in the years ahead. Sure, some investment firms, bruised by their irrational exuberance for equities and commodities, will take up a certain amount of Treasury issues even at a ridiculously low (or no) rate of return. But that will not cover an estimated budget deficit of $1.2 trillion in 2009. Never mind, I am told, the foreigners will pay gladly for that paper. This notion makes me queasy. In the first place, it is (without its advocates ever acknowledging it) a dreadful sign of America's relative decline. If you have seen Clint Eastwood's poignant war movie "Flags of Our Fathers," you also will have been stirred by the scenes where the three bewildered Iwo Jima veterans are dragged all over the country to beg the cheering audiences: "Buy American Bonds!" It's uncomfortable all right, but there was one massive consolation. The U.S. government, fully converted to Keynesianism, was asking its citizens to dig into their own hoarded savings to help sustain the war effort. Who else, after all, could buy? A near-bankrupt British Empire? A war-torn China? The Axis? The Soviet Union? How fortunate it was that World War II doubled U.S. GDP, and the savings were there. Today, however, our dependency upon foreign investors will approximate more and more the state of international indebtedness we historians associate with the reigns of Philip II of Spain and Louis XIV of France -- attractive propositions at first, then steadily losing glamour. It is possible that the early sales of Treasurys this year could go well, since panicked investors may prefer to buy bonds that pay nothing to shares of companies that may go bust. But certain sharp-eyed analysts of the Treasurys market already hint that the appetite for Obama-bonds is limited. Do people really think that China can buy and buy when its investments here have already been hurt, and its government can see the enormous need to invest in its own economy? If a miracle happened, and China bought most of the $1.2 trillion from us, what would our state of dependency be then? We could be looking at as large a shift in the world's financial balances as that which occurred between the British Empire and the United States between 1941 and 1945. Is everybody happy at that? Yet if foreigners show little appetite for U.S. bonds, we will soon have to push interest rates up. If I have spent so much space on America's fiscal woes, it is because I guess that its sheer depth and severity will demand most of our political attention over the next two years, and thus drive other important problems to the edges of our radar screen. It is true that the economies of Britain, Greece, Italy and a dozen other developed nations are hurting almost as badly, and that much of Africa and parts of Latin America are falling off the cliff. It is also true that the steep drop in energy prices has dealt a heavy blow to such charmless governments as Vladimir Putin's Russia, Hugo Chávez's Venezuela, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's Iran, with the hoped effect of curbing their mischief-making capacities. On the other hand, the data so far suggest the economies of China and India are growing (not as fast as in the past but still growing), while America's economy shrinks in absolute terms. When the dust settles on this alarming and perhaps protracted global economic crisis, we should not expect national shares of world production to be the same as in, say, 2005. Uncle Sam may have to come down a peg or two. Moreover, no three or four of those countries -- and perhaps not a dozen of them combined -- have anywhere like the staggering array of overseas military commitments and deployments that weigh upon Uncle Sam's shoulders. That brings us back, I'm sorry to say, to the "imperial overstretch" remarks I made some 20 years ago. As I suggested at that time, a strong person, balanced and muscular, can carry an impressively heavy backpack uphill for a long while. But if that person is losing strength (economic problems), and the weight of the burden remains heavy or even increases (the Bush doctrine), and the terrain becomes more difficult (rise of new Great Powers, international terrorism, failed states), then the once-strong hiker begins to slow and stumble. That is precisely when nimbler, less heavily burdened walkers get closer, draw abreast, and perhaps move ahead.

Decline Inevitable: Dollar Heg

Dollar hegemony is key to US primacy

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If the Bush administration has decided to attack Iran militarily, is there any power on earth that can stop it if the people of the US are unable or unwilling to do so? The argument below is that if the USA’s ability to undertake imperial conquests depends on its obvious military supremacy, this in turn is ultimately based on the use of the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency. It is the dominance of the dollar that underpins US financial dominance as a whole as well as the apparently limitless spending power that allows it to keep hundreds of thousands of troops stationed all over the world. Destroy US dollar hegemony, and the “Empire” will collapse. David Ludden’s article ‘America’s Invisible Empire’(4) sums up the problem of the world’s most recent empire with remarkable clarity. Constituting itself at a time when decolonisation was well under way and other empires were disintegrating, US imperialism could never openly speak its name. Initially, it disguised itself as the defender of democracy against communism; when the Soviet Union ceased to exist, the pretext became the “war against terror”. National security and national interest were invoked as the rationale for global dominance. Ludden’s description evokes the image of US citizens (and a few others) living in a Truman Show world, a bubble of illusion created by state deception and media complicity that prevents them from being aware of the reality of empire, although everyone outside can see it only too clearly. It sounds quite credible that ‘the empire will not be undone until its reality and costs become visible to Americans’ (p.4777). However, Ludden’s claim that ‘US taxpayers and voters pay the entire cost of the US empire’ (p.4776) is less credible. If that were true, many more Americans would see their empire and oppose it; the Democrats would have put up a principled opposition to the occupation of Iraq and threatened war against Iran, and the overwhelming majority of the US electorate would have supported them. But it is the rest of the world that has been paying for the US empire: that is why it is almost invisible within the US. The history of dollar hegemony The core advantage of the US economy, the source of its financial dominance, is the peculiar role of the US currency. It is because the dollar has been for decades the world’s reserve currency that the US is able to maintain its twin deficits (fiscal and trade) and depend on the world’s generosity. It needs capital inflows of almost $4 billion from the rest of the world every working day to keep up its level of spending.(5) Its military superiority is one reason why it is unlikely ever to face an embargo, but more importantly, it has been able to live beyond its means because of US dollar hegemony. The dollar mechanism has been described extensively elsewhere,(6) this is merely a summary. The strength of the US economy after World War II enabled the US dollar, backed by gold, to become the world’s reserve currency. When the US abandoned the gold standard in 1971, the dollar remained supreme, and its position was further boosted in 1974 when the US came to an agreement with Saudi Arabia that the oil trade would be denominated in dollars.(7) Most countries in the world import oil, and it made sense for them to accumulate dollars in order to guard against oil shocks. Third World countries had even more reason to hoard dollars so as to protect their fragile economies and currencies from sudden collapse. With everyone clamouring for dollars, all the US had to do was print fiat dollars and other countries would accept them in payment for their exports. These dollars then flowed back into the US to be invested in Treasury Bonds and similar instruments, offsetting the outflow. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, headquartered in Washington, reinforced dollar hegemony. As a reserve currency fulfills world needs in addition to the functions of a domestic currency, the favoured country can build up debt for a protracted period on a scale that would wreck any other country’s currency. But this advantage is a double-edged sword.(8) It allowed the US economy to decline unnoticed, its fiscal and trade deficits to climb steeply: by 2006 the US trade deficit had reached $763.6 billion, the current account deficit $850 billion, the gross national debt around $9 trillion. Globalization destroyed the US as a manufacturing nation; the outsourcing of services means that even this sector is gradually being shifted out of the US.8 Only its pre-eminence in the global financial services industry remains intact.(9) And this is underpinned by US dollar hegemony.

Decline Inevitable – Dollar Heg

Dollar hegemony declining now

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Habit and inertia might have prevailed against these political initiatives to undermine the dollar as the world’s reserve currency, if continuing US belligerence and mismanagement of its economy had not helped to push the value of the dollar lower. As the dollar steadily lost value due to the massive US debt, George Soros pulled his money out of dollar assets, and other US investors followed suit.(19) An article in China Daily on 28 September 2004 by Jiang Ruiping, the director of International Economics at the China Foreign Affairs University, pointed out that China was already losing due to the dollar slide and would lose even more if it crashed; he recommended moving out of dollars into euros and possibly also yen, as well as using its dollar reserves to stock up on oil.(20) In fact, only about 15 per cent of China’s additional foreign exchange reserves acquired in the first three quarters of 2004 were in US Treasury holdings, and OPEC countries reduced the dollar assets in their reserves from 75 to 60 per cent.(21) In July 2005, the fixed exchange rate of the yuan to the dollar was abandoned, followed closely by the Malaysian ringgit, with both currencies being allowed to float in a tight band against a basket of foreign currencies.(22) The Japanese government indicated it might diversify its reserves portfolio, and the Reserve Bank of India started buying euro-denominated securities.(23) In March 2005, the Bank for International Settlements in Basle announced that Asian central and commercial banks held only 67 per cent of their deposits in dollars in September 2004, compared with 81 per cent three years earlier; Indian banks were down from 68 to 43 per cent, while Chinese dollar holdings were down from 83 to 68 per cent, with the euro and yen being the most popular alternatives.(24) Holdings in more exotic currencies also grew rapidly, albeit from much lower levels: Chinese renminbi (yuan) by 530 per cent, Indonesian rupaiah by 283 per cent, Taiwanese dollars, Korean won and Indian rupees by 129,117 and 114 per cent respectively, presumably on the expectation that they would grow in importance.(25) **By the end of 2005, euro-denominated securities had overtaken dollar-denominated ones as a medium for international investors.(**26) In 2006, the Swedish central bank cut its dollar holdings from 37 per cent to 20 percent, the Russian central bank from around two-thirds to 40 per cent, while Italy switched a quarter of its foreign currency reserves from dollars to sterling; Russian President Vladimir Putin also called for a ruble-denominated oil and natural gas exchange in Russia.(27) The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), planning to launch a common currency in 2010, was thrown off-course when Kuwait abandoned the dollar peg in May 2007 in order not to continue importing inflation via a devaluing dollar; later, as the subprime mortgage crisis struck in the US, and the Federal Reserve cut interest rates by 0.5 per cent, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain did not cut their rates in unison, amidst reports that there was an ongoing debate on a more flexible alternative to the dollar peg in all six GCC countries.(28) Data released by the US Federal Reserve showed that between late July and early September 2007, foreign central banks reduced their holdings of US Treasury Bonds by $48 billion.(29) Meanwhile, plans to establish the Banco del Sur by seven Latin American countries (with others likely to join), in order to provide an alternative to US-dominated funds like the IMF, World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank,(30) would be an even greater threat to the dollar if they included the use of a regional currency. An interesting result of the dollar’s declining value is that while the rich turn to euro, the less wealthy, from Russia to the Maldives and Mexico to Vietnam, prefer their local currency to the dollar.(31)

Decline Inevitable: Navy

Decline of the US Navy makes collapse of primacy inevitable

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A great navy is like oxygen: You notice it only when it is gone. **But the strength of a nation’s sea presence, more than any other indicator, has throughout history often been the best barometer of that nation’s power and prospects**. “Those far-distant storm-beaten ships upon which [Napoleon’s] Grand Army never looked, stood between it and the dominion of the world,” Mahan wrote, describing how the British Royal Navy had checked Napoleon’s ambitions. In our day, carrier strike groups, floating in international waters only a few miles off enemy territory, require no visas or exit strategies. Despite the quagmire of Iraq, we remain the greatest outside power in the Middle East because of our ability to pro­ject destructive fire from warships in the Indian Ocean and its tributary waters such as the Persian Gulf. Our sea power allows us to lose a limited war on land without catastrophic consequences. The Navy, together with the Air Force, constitutes our insurance policy. The Navy also plays a crucial role as the bus driver for most of the Army’s equipment, whenever the Army deploys overseas. Click here to find out more! Army units can’t forward-deploy anywhere in significant numbers without a national debate. Not so the Navy. Forget the cliché about the essence of the Navy being tradition; I’ve spent enough time with junior officers and enlisted sailors on Pacific deployments to know that the essence of our Navy is operations: disaster relief, tracking Chinese subs, guarding sea-lanes, and so forth. American sailors don’t care what the mission is, as long as there is one, and the farther forward the better. The seminal event for the U.S. Navy was John Paul Jones’s interdiction of the British during the Revolutionary War—which occurred off Yorkshire, on the other side of the Atlantic. During the quasi-war that President John Adams waged against France from 1798 to 1800, U.S. warships protected American merchant vessels off what is today Indonesia. American warships operated off North Africa in the First Barbary War of 1801 to 1805. The War of 1812 found the Navy as far down the globe as the coast of Brazil and as far up as the North Cape of Scandinavia. Peter Swartz, an expert at the Center for Naval Analyses, observes that because operating thousands of miles from home ports is so ingrained in U.S. naval tradition, no one thinks it odd that even the Coast Guard has ships in service from Greenland to South America. Great navies help preserve international stability. When the British navy began to decline, the vacuum it left behind helped engender the competition among major powers that led to World War I. After the U.S. Navy was forced to depart Subic Bay in the Philippines in 1992, piracy quintupled in the Southeast Asian archipelago—which includes one of the world’s busiest waterways, the Strait of Malacca. In an age when 90 percent of global commerce travels by sea, and 95 percent of our imports and exports from outside North America do the same (even as that trade volume is set to double by 2020), and when 75 percent of the world’s population is clustered within 200 miles of the sea, the relative decline of our Navy is a big, dangerous fact to which our elites appear blind. The End of the Mahanian Century? The best way to understand the tenuousness of our grip on “hard,” military power (to say nothing of “soft,” diplomatic power) is to understand our situation at sea. This requires an acquaintance with two books published a century ago: Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783, which was written in 1890, and Julian S. Corbett’s Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, which came out in 1911. Few books have had more influence on military policy than Mahan’s. It affected the thinking of Presidents William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt—as well as that of Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm II—and it helped prompt the naval buildup before World War I. Mahan showed that because the sea is the great “commons” of civilization, naval power—to protect merchant fleets—had always been the determining factor in European political struggles. The strength of his argument lay less in its originality than in its comprehensiveness, achieved by numerous examples. He pointed out that there were no great sea battles in the Second Punic War, because Rome’s mastery of the Mediterranean was a deciding factor in Carthage’s defeat. He noted that George Washington partly attributed America’s victory in its war for independence to France’s control of the seas—even as several decades earlier France had lost the Seven Years’ War partly because of its neglect of sea power. Mahan believed in concentrating national naval forces in search of the decisive battle: For him, success was about sinking the other fleet. Mahan’s aggressive sensibility perfectly matched the temperament of Theodore Roosevelt. As a result, it was in the quiet years before World War I that America became a great sea power—and consequently a Great Power. Julian Corbett, a British historian, did not so much disagree with Mahan as offer a subtler approach, placing greater emphasis on doing more with less. Corbett asserted that just because one nation has lost control of the sea, another nation has not necessarily gained it. A naval coalition that may appear weak and dispersed can, if properly constituted, have “a reality of strength.” He called this a “fleet in being”—a collection of ships that can quickly coalesce into a unified fleet when necessary. This fleet-in-being wouldn’t need to dominate or sink other fleets; it could be effective by seizing bases and policing choke points. Such a deceptively able fleet, Corbett argued, should pursue an “active and vigorous life” in the conduct of limited defense, by, for example, carrying out harassing operations. As it happened, Corbett’s book came out after the British Royal Navy had reduced its worldwide presence by leveraging the growing sea power of its allies Japan and the United States. A hundred years later, the Mahanian Century has ended. The period of 1890 to 1989 was about dominance: controlling vast oceanic spaces by making sure your national navy had more ships than those of your competitors. This era reached its zenith in 1945, when the U.S. Navy and its vast fleet of supply ships numbered 6,700. With no peer competitor in sight, the president and Congress moved quickly to cut that Navy, along with the standing Army, considerably. By 1950, the United States had only 634 ships. The drawdown helped set the stage for the “Revolt of the Admirals,” when a group of officers warned the nation of calamities ahead. (Indeed, two decades later the Soviet navy would be a near-peer competitor.) But in a 1954 article in Proceedings, the journal of the U.S. Naval Institute in Annapolis, a young Harvard academic named Samuel P. Huntington told the Navy not to feel sorry for itself: The resources which a service is able to obtain in a democratic society are a function of the public support of that service. The service has the responsibility to develop this necessary support, and it can only do this if it possesses a strategic concept which clearly formulates its relationship to the national security. Huntington recommended that the Navy emphasize its ability to support ground troops from the sea: Any battles with the Soviet Union were likely to be on land, so the Navy needed to play up the job it could do in a war with a great land power. The Navy took Huntington’s advice, and it worked: For the remainder of the Cold War, the Navy was able to hold the line at roughly 600 ships, in part by arguing for its importance in supporting a ground war against the Soviet Union and its allies—it would be the Navy’s job to get soldiers to the fight, and to soften up the battlefield with offshore firepower. Still, the fewer vessels you have, the riskier each deployment, because a ship can’t be in two places at once. Due to the rapid increase in ship-borne trade, globalization favors large navies that protect trade and tanker routes. Additionally, while the United States remains a great naval power, it is no longer a maritime power; that is, we don’t have much of a merchant fleet left to support our warships in an emergency. We’ve been priced out of the shipbuilding market by cheap-labor countries in Asia. All of this puts us in a precarious position. History shows that powerful competitor navies can easily emerge out of nowhere in just a few decades. The vast majority of American ships that saw combat in World War II had not even been planned before the spring of 1941. The Indian navy, which may soon be the third-largest in the world, was not on many people’s radar screens at the close of the Cold War. Nor, for that matter, was the now- expanding Chinese submarine fleet. Robert Work told me that he believes the eventual incorporation of Taiwan into China will have the effect that the Battle of Wounded Knee had on the United States: It will psychologically close an era of national consolidation for the Chinese, thereby dramatically redirecting their military energies outward, beyond their coastal waters. Tellingly, whereas the U.S. Navy pays homage to Mahan by naming buildings after him, the Chinese avidly read him; the Chinese are the Mahanians now. Then there is the Japanese navy, which now operates 117 warships, including 16 submarines. In a sense, we’re back to 1890, when a spark of naval competition among rising powers like Japan, Germany, and the United States left Britain unable to maintain its relative advantage.

Decline Inevitable: Europe

European growth causes US hegemonic collapse

Parag Khanna is a senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program of the New America Foundation, "Waving Goodbye to Hegemony", New York Times, 1/27/08, www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t.html?pagewanted=all

And Europe’s influence grows at America’s expense. While America fumbles at nation-building, Europe spends its money and political capital on locking peripheral countries into its orbit. Many poor regions of the world have realized that they want the European dream, not the American dream. Africa wants a real African Union like the E.U.; we offer no equivalent. Activists in the Middle East want parliamentary democracy like Europe’s, not American-style presidential strongman rule. Many of the foreign students we shunned after 9/11 are now in London and Berlin: twice as many Chinese study in Europe as in the U.S. We didn’t educate them, so we have no claims on their brains or loyalties as we have in decades past. More broadly, America controls legacy institutions few seem to want — like the International Monetary Fund — while Europe excels at building new and sophisticated ones modeled on itself. The U.S. has a hard time getting its way even when it dominates summit meetings — consider the ill-fated Free Trade Area of the Americas — let alone when it’s not even invited, as with the new East Asian Community, the region’s answer to America’s Apec.

No Primacy

Multipolarity Now

Robert D. **Kaplan** ( a national correspondent for the Atlantic and a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security) 12/17/**08** “ A Gentler Hegemony” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/16/AR2008121602480.html

Of course **we are entering a more multipolar world**. The only economic growth over the next year or two will come from developing nations, notably India and China. But there are other realities, too. We should not underestimate the diplomatic and moral leverage created by the combination of the world's most expeditionary military and a new president who will boast high approval ratings at home and around the world. No power but the United States has the wherewithal to orchestrate an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal, and our intervention in Iraq has not changed that fact. Everyone hates the word, but the United States is still a hegemon of sorts, able to pivotally influence the world from a position of moral strength. Yet American hegemony post-Iraq will be as changed as Britain's was after the Indian Mutiny. It will be a more benign and temperate version of what transpired in recent years. Henceforth, we will shape coalitions rather than act on our own. For that, after all, is the essence of a long and elegant decline: to pass responsibility on to like-minded others as their own capacities rise.

No Primacy

Dysfunctional political system.

Fareed Zakaria, Ph.D. from Harvard University, honorary degrees from Brown, the University of Miami, and Oberlin College, Trustee of Yale University, 2008, *Foreign Affairs*, “The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63394/fareed-zakaria/the-future-of-american-power?page=show cp

The United States has been and can continue to be the world's most important source of new ideas, big and small, technical and creative, economic and political. (If it were truly innovative, it could generate new ideas to produce new kinds of energy.) But to do that, it has to make some significant changes. The United States has a history of worrying that it is losing its edge. Today's is at least the fourth wave of such concern since World War II. The first was in the late 1950s, a result of the Soviet Union's launching of the Sputnik satellite. The second was in the early 1970s, when high oil prices and slow growth convinced Americans that Western Europe and Saudi Arabia were the powers of the future. The third one arrived in the mid-1980s, when most experts believed that Japan would be the technologically and economically dominant superpower of the future. The concern in each of these cases was well founded, the projections intelligent. But none of the feared scenarios came to pass. The reason is that the U.S. system proved to be flexible, resourceful, and resilient, able to correct its mistakes and shift its attention. A focus on U.S. economic decline ended up preventing it.

The problem today is that the U.S. political system seems to have lost its ability to fix its ailments. The economic problems in the United States today are real, but by and large they are not the product of deep inefficiencies within the U.S. economy, nor are they reflections of cultural decay. They are the consequences of specific government policies. Different policies could quickly and relatively easily move the United States onto a far more stable footing. A set of sensible reforms could be enacted tomorrow to trim wasteful spending and subsidies, increase savings, expand training in science and technology, secure pensions, create a workable immigration process, and achieve significant efficiencies in the use of energy. Policy experts do not have wide disagreements on most of these issues, and none of the proposed measures would require sacrifices reminiscent of wartime hardship, only modest adjustments of existing arrangements. And yet, because of politics, they appear impossible. The U.S. political system has lost the ability to accept some pain now for great gain later on.

As it enters the twenty-first century, the United States is not fundamentally a weak economy or a decadent society. But it has developed a highly dysfunctional politics. What was an antiquated and overly rigid political system to begin with (now about 225 years old) has been captured by money, special interests, a sensationalist media, and ideological attack groups. The result is ceaseless, virulent debate about trivia -- politics as theater -- and very little substance, compromise, or action. A can-do country is now saddled with a do-nothing political process, designed for partisan battle rather than problem solving.

It is clever contrarianism to be in favor of sharp party politics and against worthy calls for bipartisanship. Some political scientists have long wished that U.S. political parties were more like European ones -- ideologically pure and tightly disciplined. But Europe's parliamentary systems work well with partisan parties. In them, the executive branch always controls the legislative branch, and so the party in power can implement its agenda easily. The U.S. system, by contrast, is one of shared power, overlapping functions, and checks and balances. Progress requires broad coalitions between the two major parties and politicians who will cross the aisle. That is why James Madison distrusted political parties, lumping them together with all kinds of "factions" and considering them a grave danger to the young American republic.

Progress on any major problem -- health care, Social Security, tax reform -- will require compromise from both sides. It requires a longer-term perspective. And that has become politically deadly. Those who advocate sensible solutions and compromise legislation find themselves being marginalized by their party's leadership, losing funds from special-interest groups, and being constantly attacked by their "side" on television and radio. The system provides greater incentives to stand firm and go back and tell your team that you refused to bow to the enemy. It is great for fundraising, but it is terrible for governing.

No Primacy

US primacy is over.

1. History proves.

Samuel A.Adamson**,** second-year MAIA candidate at the Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center and undergraduate degree in Oriental Studies from the University of Oxford,10, *Bolgona Journal of International Affairs*, “Supreme Effort: A Lesson in British Decline” cp

When, in 1988, Jeffrey E. Garten asked the question “Is American Decline Inevitable?” one cannot help but draw the immediate conclusion, “Yes.” If ever history has presented one notably convincing and consistent model, it is that of the rise and fall of empires. Take, for example, A Study in History — the twelve volume magnum opus of historian Arnold J. Toynbee, detailing the growth, flowering and decline of over 20 major civilizations, ranging from the Egyptian, Andean and Sinic to the Mexican, Yucatec and Babylonic. It is of interest (in the context of Garten’s argument) to note that Toynbee himself remarks that, “Of the twenty-two civilizations that have appeared in history, nineteen of them collapsed when they reached the moral state the United States is in now.”2 His assertion may include a certain degree of hyperbole, but the general sentiment is one that deserves recognition and, indeed, has been the subject of growing attention in recent years.

2. Overstretch.

Samuel A.Adamson**,** second-year MAIA candidate at the Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center and undergraduate degree in Oriental Studies from the University of Oxford,10, *Bolgona Journal of International Affairs*, “Supreme Effort: A Lesson in British Decline” cp

Even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Paul Kennedy was drawing attention to the relative decline of the United States. In his seminal work The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Kennedy presents the thesis that due to the incessant fluctuations in relative strength between nations (resulting from technological, political, economic innovations, etc.), the power and influence of “leading nations” never remain constant. Consequently, such nations find themselves in a position where they are no longer able to fulfill the commitments they made at times of relatively greater prosperity, and the resulting misallocation of national resources leads to the beginning of decline. Kennedy labels this syndrome, “imperial overstretch” and, making reference to its extensive international obligations (“whose mere listing leaves one breathless”), identifies the United States as a possible sufferer, concluding that “the fundamental grand-strategical dilemma remains: the United States today has roughly the same massive array of military obligations across the globe as it had a quarter of a century ago, when its shares of world GNP, manufacturing production, military spending, and armed forced personnel were so much larger than they are now.”3

Even in a post-Soviet world, there is a continued use of the word “overstretch” with reference to the United States and its relative decline. Today, the contrastive subject is a rising China rather than a crumbling USSR, financial crises and trillion dollar wars are cited as evidence for American “overstretch.” Notably, Robert A. Pape of the University of Chicago makes extensive use of statistical data to paint a compelling portrait of a global power experiencing a significant loss in international influence and in particular identifies the beginning of a new and precipitous decline post-2000.

No Primacy

No grand strategy – expert consensus.

Walter A. McDougall**,** Alloy**-**Ansin Professor of International Relations at the University of Pennsylvania and Senior Fellow at FPRI, 10**,** *Orbis*, “Can the United States Do Grand Strategy?” accessed via ScienceDirect cp

If it was crazy, perhaps the second quotation suggests a good reason why.Strategic planning for American foreign policy is dead, dying, or moribund. This, at least, has been the assessment of several commentators and policy-makers in recent years. Michèle Flournoy and Shawn Brimley observed in 2006, “For a country that continues to enjoy an unrivaled global position, it is both remarkable and disturbing that the United States has no truly effective strategy planning process for national security.” At an academic conference in 2007, a former director of the State Department's policy planning staff complained that “six years after 9/11, we still don’t have a grand strategy”. . . . [And] Council on Foreign Relations president Richard Haass argues that the United States has “squandered” its post-cold war opportunity, concluding, “Historians will not judge the United States well for how it has used these twenty years.”

That lament introduces a new Brookings Institution volume, edited by Daniel Drexner, on the forgotten art of grand strategy.5

AT: Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth

They conclude collapse of hegemony is inevitable.

G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno and William C. Wohlforth, professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, professor of government and associate dean for social sciences at Dartmouth College, and professor of government at Dartmouth College, 2009, *World Politics*, “Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences,” accessed via Project MUSE cp

In the remainder of this introduction, we develop a framework for analyzing unipolarity and highlight the arguments of the articles that follow. The individual contributions develop hypotheses and explore the impact of unipolarity on the behavior of the dominant state, on the reactions of other states, and on the properties of the international system. Collectively, we find that unipolarity does have a profound impact on international politics. International relations under conditions of unipolarity force us to rethink conventional and received understandings about the operation of the balance of power, the meaning of alliance partnerships, the logic of international economic cooperation, the relationship between power and legitimacy, and the behavior of satisfied and revisionist states. A unipolar distribution of capabilities will eventually give way to other distributions. The argument advanced here is not that unipolarity will last indefinitely but rather that as long as it does last, it will constitute a critical factor in understanding patterns of foreign policy and world politics.

AT: Economic Primacy

Economic primacy is over.

1. The US overregulates markets.

Fareed Zakaria, Ph.D. from Harvard University, honorary degrees from Brown, the University of Miami, and Oberlin College, Trustee of Yale University, 2008, *Foreign Affairs*, “The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63394/fareed-zakaria/the-future-of-american-power?page=show cp

For most of the last 30 years, the United States had the lowest corporate tax rates of the major industrialized countries. Today, it has the second highest. U.S. rates have not gone up; others have come down. Germany, for example, long a staunch believer in its high-taxation system, has cut its rates in response to moves by countries to its east, such as Austria and Slovakia. This kind of competition among industrialized countries is now widespread. It is not a race to the bottom -- Scandinavian countries have high taxes, good services, and strong growth -- but a quest for growth. U.S. regulations used to be more flexible and market-friendly than all others. That is no longer true. London's financial system was overhauled in 2001, with a single entity replacing a confusing mishmash of regulators, which is one reason that London's financial sector now beats out New York's on some measures. The entire British government works aggressively to make London a global hub. Regulators from Warsaw to Shanghai to Mumbai are moving every day to make their systems more attractive to investors and manufacturers. Washington, by contrast, spends its time and energy thinking of ways to tax New York, so that it can send its revenues to the rest of the country.

AT: Economic Primacy

2. Globalization.

Fareed Zakaria, Ph.D. from Harvard University, honorary degrees from Brown, the University of Miami, and Oberlin College, Trustee of Yale University, 2008, *Foreign Affairs*, “The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63394/fareed-zakaria/the-future-of-american-power?page=show cp

Being on top for so long has its downsides. The U.S. market has been so large that Americans have assumed that the rest of the world would take the trouble to understand it and them. They have not had to reciprocate by learning foreign languages, cultures, or markets. Now, that could leave the United States at a competitive disadvantage. Take the spread of English worldwide as a metaphor. Americans have delighted in this process because it makes it so much easier for them to travel and do business abroad. But it also gives the locals an understanding of and access to two markets and cultures. They can speak English but also Mandarin or Hindi or Portuguese. They can penetrate the U.S. market but also the internal Chinese, Indian, or Brazilian one. Americans, by contrast, have never developed the ability to move into other people's worlds.

The United States is used to being the leading economy and society. It has not noticed that most of the rest of the industrialized world -- and a good part of the nonindustrialized world as well -- has better cell-phone service than the United States. Computer connectivity is faster and cheaper across the rest of the industrialized world, from Canada to France to Japan, and the United States now stands 16th in the world in broadband penetration per capita. Americans are constantly told by their politicians that the only thing they have to learn from other countries' health-care systems is to be thankful for their own. Americans rarely look around and notice other options and alternatives, let alone adopt them.

Learning from the rest is no longer a matter of morality or politics. Increasingly, it is about competitiveness. Consider the automobile industry. For more than a century after 1894, most of the cars manufactured in North America were made in Michigan. Since 2004, Michigan has been replaced by Ontario, Canada. The reason is simple: health care. In the United States, car manufacturers have to pay $6,500 in medical and insurance costs for every worker. If they move a plant to Canada, which has a government-run health-care system, the cost to them is around $800 per worker. This is not necessarily an advertisement for the Canadian health-care system, but it does make clear that the costs of the U.S. health-care system have risen to a point where there is a significant competitive disadvantage to hiring American workers. Jobs are going not to low-wage countries but to places where well-trained and educated workers can be found: it is smart benefits, not low wages, that employers are looking for.

For decades, American workers, whether in car companies, steel plants, or banks, had one enormous advantage over all other workers: privileged access to American capital. They could use that access to buy technology and training that no one else had -- and thus produce products that no one else could, and at competitive prices. That special access is also gone. The world is swimming in capital, and suddenly American workers have to ask themselves, What can we do better than others? It is a dilemma not just for workers but for companies as well. When American companies went abroad, they used to bring with them capital and know-how. But when they go abroad now, they discover that the natives already have money and already know how.

Middle East Heg Unsustainable

U.S. Hegemony in the middle east is unsustainable

Chris **Phillips**, 6/1/**10** “ US hegemony in Middle East is ending” http://www.america-russia.net/eng/geopolitics/245873652?user\_session=9785d91c1f36347ca38f8415c1730cee

Yet Russia’s return to Syria, whether it be the sale of MiG-29s or building a naval dock on the Syrian coast, is not the action of a superpower challenging US hegemony as it was in 1945-89 but rather an assertive regional power taking advantage of the emerging power vacuum in the region. Instead of a new bi-polar cold war, regional powers such as Russia and Turkey are increasing their influence at the United States’ expense. The idea of a new cold war has gained currency in some quarters for the wrong reasons. Syrian president Bashar al-Assad himself told La Repubblica last week that «Russia is reasserting itself. And the cold war is just a natural reaction to the attempt by America to dominate the world». In the same interview he asserted that there was a new triple alliance between Syria, Turkey and Iran — part of a «northern alliance» that Damascus has been trying to construct against Israel and the US — with Russia now cast in the role as superpower benefactor.

China Challenges

**China's growing military poses a threat to U.S. hegemonic control in East Asia, as well as the effectiveness of U.S. nuclear deterrence.**

**Bandow**, Doug.(senior fellow at the Cato Institute) China’s Military rise means the end of U.S. Hegemony? May 5, 20**09**.

**U.S. military spending continues to increase** even though conventional threats against the United States are de minimis. **China is the leading contender for Enemy Number 1**. But if **Beijing poses a threat**, it is **to U.S. domination of East Asia,** not the country itself. Only the latter is worth fighting for. **Commonly expressed is fear of growing Chinese military outlays. The Pentagon highlighted its concern with the latest annual report on the Chinese defense budget**. Yet Beijing's armed forces remain dwarfed by America's military, which starts at a vastly higher base and spends several times as much. **The Pentagon report states that the United States "encourages China to participate responsibly in the international system."** True enough, but how does Washington define "responsibly"? One suspects it means accepting American military hegemony in East Asia — something with which Beijing isn't likely to agree. **The Chinese** military buildup so far has been significant but measured. "The People's Liberation **Army** (PLA) **is pursuing comprehensive transformation from a mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its periphery against high-tech adversaries**," explains the Pentagon. Moreover, **China's "armed forces continue to develop** and field disruptive **military technologies**, including those for anti-access/area-denial, as well as **for nuclear**, space, and cyber **warfare, that are changing regional military balances and that have implications beyond the Asia-Pacific region**." Yet this concerted expansion little threatens U.S. security. Only **the Chinese nuclear force is theoretically able to strike America today**. Beijing possesses about 60 missiles, some of limited range.

China has the military capability to challenge US power

Dan Blumenthal is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, "Losing Asia?", 6/7/10, http://www.aei.org/article/102121

And then there is China, which has the greatest potential to undermine the Asia-Pacific peace. China has translated its economic resources into an impressive and growing military arsenal. Its Second Artillery ballistic and cruise missile forces pose a particular threat to U.S. and allied air supremacy in the "first island chain" (Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines). China's missiles could seriously damage and ground most U.S. air assets at our most important Pacific base--Kadena in Japan. The Second Artillery is refining a land-based anti-ship ballistic missile. China could soon have the capability both to establish local air supremacy and to hit any surface ship coming its way from the Western Pacific. China has a growing fleet of diesel and nuclear submarines. The diesel boats, which can stay longer undersea, carry arsenals sufficient to enforce a blockade of Taiwan and threaten surface ships in and around China's littorals. With a new base in Hainan Island, China's nuclear submarine force has easy access to the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait. Given historic Sino-Indian mistrust and America's reliance on the Indian Ocean for its own energy trade, China's ability to cause mischief at critical Pacific and Indian Ocean chokepoints is a serious strategic development.

China Challenges

China to overtake U.S. economically.

Friedberg, 2010(Aaron, July 21st, professor of politics at Princeton University, *Implications of a Financial Crisis for U.S. – China Rivalry*, Survival, 52: 4,

31 — 54)

From a geopolitical perspective what matters most are relative rather than absolute gains; not how fast each economy is growing (or contracting), but how wide the differential is between their respective growth rates. Since the end of the Cold War the US economy has been expanding at an average of about 3% per year while China has enjoyed annual growth rates closer to 10%. It is this persistent seven-point gap that has caused many economists to predict that, by the middle of this century, at the latest, China will have overtaken the United States in terms of total output. If both countries return quickly to their pre-crisis growth trajectories the date of expected conver-gence will not change. If, on the other hand, one recovers more rapidly or more completely than the other, that moment could either be moved up, or pushed even further into the future. While there are some optimistic outliers, the emerging consensus among forecasters is that the United States will not bounce back immediately to its pre-crisis performance. Instead of averaging 3–3.5% per year (to say nothing of the 4% some had predicted at the turn of the century, before the dot.com bubble burst) growth is expected to remain at about 2–2.5% for much of this decade and perhaps beyond.3 As for China, after rising to a peak of 13% in 2007, its annual growth was cut almost in half (to around 7% on a year-onyear basis), during the initial stages of the global crisis.4 Thanks to a very aggressive response by the central authorities, growth climbed back to just under 9% in 2009. Some estimates show it hovering between 9 and 10% for at least the next few years, while others are even more bullish, at least in the near term.5 If China can return to something near its pre-crisis, double-digit growth rates while the United States continues to limp along at roughly 0.5–1% less than its earlier performance, the gap between the two countries will obviously close even more rapidly than it was before.

AT: Brooks and Wohlforth

Brooks and Wohlforth misinterpret data—trends show US economic and military dominance are ending.

Samuel A.Adamson**,** second-year MAIA candidate at the Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center and undergraduate degree in Oriental Studies from the University of Oxford,10, *Bolgona Journal of International Affairs*, “Supreme Effort: A Lesson in British Decline” cp

Pape argues that economic strength is at the heart of the United States’ global influence, noting that “[p]roductive capacity — defined by indicators such as wealth, technology and population size — is a prerequisite for building and modernizing military forces.”4 Therefore, in support of his declinist thesis, Pape presents a cogent set of data detailing the fall in the U.S. share of world product using three distinct measurements, reproduced below as table 1 and table 2.

His first choice of measurement (a comparison of each country’s output in current-year U.S. dollars, table 1) is that which is most frequently used by Pape’s opponents. Indeed, he makes explicit reference to its employment by Brooks and Wohlforth in their 2008 argument for America’s exploitation of its hegemonic position.5 However, whereas Brooks, Wohlforth and others tend to employ single year “snapshots” to paint an overly rosy view of U.S. unipolar dominance, Pape examines the trend over time and, deftly turning their own figures against them, confronts his critics head-on, concluding that the U.S. will see a 32 percent drop in its percentage of world product between 2000–2013. His justification for taking a long-term trend perspective is clear:

Single-year ‘snapshots’ of America’s relative power are of limited value for assessing the sustainability of its grand strategy over many years. For grand-strategic concerns —especially how well the United States can balance its resources and foreign-policy commitments— the trajectory of American power compared to other states is of seminal importance.6

As further evidence for the declinist trend identified in table 1, Pape also employs two further methods of calculating the U.S.’s percentage of world product: constant-dollar calculations and purchasing power parity, both of which are commonly used to determine GDP (table 2). Although the percentage drop predicted using these alternative methods is less than that of table 1, Pape remains resolute, remarking that “regardless of the metric, the trend is the same.”7 Indeed, both predict a significant decline of around 20 percent which Pape states “form[s] the lower bound of America’s decline.”8 His conclusion is unambiguous and frank: “Simply put, the United States is now a declining power.”9 He continues,

The United States has always prided itself on exceptionalism, and the U.S. downfall is indeed extraordinary. Something fundamental has changed. America’s relative decline since 2000 of some 30 percent represents a far greater loss of relative power in a shorter time than any power shift among European great powers from roughly the end of the Napoleonic Wars to World War II. It is one of the largest relative declines in modern history.10

Afghanistan Aff – Expensive

The US spends billions to maintain presence in Afghanistan

Roxana Tiron, writer at The Hill, a congressional newspaper, "U.S. spending $3.6 billion a month in Afghanistan according to CRS report", 10/14/09, http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/63121-crs-calculates-cost-of-us-troop-presence-in-afghanistan?page=2#comments//avi

The U.S. spends about $3.6 billion a month in Afghanistan, according to data provided by the Congressional Research Service recently. The average cost per month is calculated at an average 51,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, but that number likely will go higher with the 68,000 troops the Obama administration already is planning on having in that country, and could double if President Barack Obama backs a reported request from Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the commander in Afghanistan, to send as many as 40,000 more troops to the country. The cost of sending one U.S. soldier in Afghanistan for one year is $1 million versus an estimated $12,000 for an Afghani soldier, according to Steve Daggett, a specialist with the Congressional Research Service. Those numbers fall within the calculations that the Obama administration has been using. The Obama administration is calculating $1 billion per 1,000 troops deployed to Afghanistan.

Withdrawal from Afghanistan saves billions

Anita Dancs is an assistant professor of economics at Western New England College and a Foreign Policy In Focus analyst, "The Cost of the Global U.S. Military Presence", 7/3/09, www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0907dancs.pdf//avi

This report summarizes changes in the global presence of the military, then estimates the current cost of maintaining troops, bases, and operations abroad. If the U.S. government scaled back these operations, billions of dollars could be saved each year. More than $100 billion could be saved immediately by ending the wars and occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan. More could be saved by closing bases and reducing military personnel. Current economic priorities coupled with a new landscape of security challenges, including nonconventional threats and international crime such as piracy, strengthen the case for decreasing the U.S. military’s global presence and increasing its emphasis on building mechanisms for international security cooperation.

Afghanistan Aff

Excessive US presence in the region undermines power projection

Carl Robichaud is a program officer at The Century Foundation, "Overstaying Our Welcome in Afghanistan?", 5/26/05, http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=NC&pubid=1013

A little over a year ago, attitudes towards American and the U.S. military were generally favorable. The most comprehensive survey, conducted by the Asia Foundation from February to March 2004, found that roughly two-thirds of Afghans were positive toward both the U.S. and U.S. military forces operating in Afghanistan. However, the survey gave rise to concerns: a plurality of Afghans were unfavorable to the U.S. in both the Northwest (58 percent unfavorable vs. 30 percent favorable) and the South (46 percent unfavorable vs. 37 percent favorable). Attitudes toward the U.S. military were similar (59 percent unfavorable vs. 26 percent favorable in the Northwest, 42 percent unfavorable vs 39 percent favorable in the South.) (see pp. 9-10) Moreover, there is evidence that Afghans are chafing at the thought of a long-term American 'occupation.' As General Richard Meyers and President Karzai both argued last week, the violent protests on May 11 were less the result of a single incident (the Koran desecration) than of broader frustrations about America's role. Numerous complaints broadcast in the Afghan media—ranging from imperious behavior by U.S. security contractors, to abuses during raids, to claims that former U.S Ambassador to Afghanistan Khalilzad was the real head of state—suggest that the Afghan public is growing weary of Washington's hand. The presence of American troops, which were ramped up to ensure the success of the coming parliamentary elections, could have the opposite effect, spurring a political backlash that strengthens the position of unsavory factions. In addition, this troop presence may be fueling anti-Americanism in the region. Operation Enduring Freedom, originally viewed positively by much of the world, has been re-cast in the wake of America's invasion and occupation of Iraq, and is seen by much of the world as part of a U.S. grand strategy of hegemony. A March 2004 Pew poll found that by a wide margin people in the Muslim countries surveyed (Turkey, Jordan, Pakistan, and Morocco) oppose America's war on terrorism. The 2005 Pew polling data indicate that respondents question the sincerity of America's motives in the war on terror—especially in Pakistan where only 6 percent felt U.S. efforts were sincere (vs. 58 percent insincere.) A majority of respondents in many nations worried that the U.S. military posed a threat to their country. The net result is suspicion of U.S. intentions and an erosion of America's position in the region. The U.S. can assuage some of these fears by working to internationalize the security presence in Afghanistan. The Pentagon long opposed the expansion of U.N.-authorized International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces, resulting in a small force of 5,000 limited to Kabul. The mandate of this force, which consists of NATO troops, was recently expanded to the provinces, and has played a role in securing elections and reconstruction. These international forces should be bolstered to guarantee stability until the Afghan army reaches sufficiency (and until its loyalty to the state, rather than to individual factions, is confirmed.) The international force should be increasingly constituted by Muslims, such as the Turkish troops that serve there with distinction today (to bring in more troops from mostly-Muslim states, ISAF will eventually need to involve non-NATO partners.) An expanded ISAF, authorized by the U.N., could eventually supplant the American forces. This force would have the benefit of being multi-national, multi-religious, and internationally accountable. It will be interesting to see how such a proposal is greeted by Washington, which has not pressed for increases in international troops in Afghanistan as energetically as it has in Iraq. A sizeable and indefinite base presence in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan allows the U.S. to project power toward China and Russia. Moreover, in the President's transformative vision for the greater Middle East, American troops help ensure a loyal, democratic, and thriving Afghanistan that can induce reform within Iran and Pakistan. Of course the question remains: does this presence serve as a stimulant for democratic and societal reform or as an irritant that can incite hostility and help recruit radicals? Another troubling implication of the over-militarized approach to America's regional goals is that military expenses have crowded out critical state-building investments. America efforts in Afghanistan follow the meringue model of nation-building, with a substantial military crust concealing a broad but airy layer of societal engagement. America sponsors numerous reconstruction initiatives, but many of them lack substance and funding. If budgets reveal priorities, the administration's 2005 supplemental request is illuminating: in a vast request for $82 billion, only $2 billion was set aside for non-military aid to Afghanistan. Military operations in Afghanistan, on the other hand, are estimated at $13 billion per year. It's sad to say that America's anemic levels of assistance are not unique among donors, which pledged last year to provide $8.2 billion in aid over three years, a far cry from the World Bank and Afghan government's estimate that Afghanistan needs $27.5 billion over seven years. What is unique is the military presence that accompanies these aid gestures. The U.S. should work to share the military burden, and then re-invest the savings into measures critical to long-term success: confronting the drug problem, cracking down on smuggling, and expanding government capacity. Afghanistan remains abjectly poor and ranks among the worst-off in nearly every development indicator, including education, women's health, life expectancy, infant mortality, and infectious disease. Even with recent economic and educational progress Afghanistan could still fail.

Afghanistan Aff

Withdrawal reduces opposition towards American power

Brian M. Downing is the author of several works of political and military history, including The Military Revolution and Political Change and The Paths of Glory: War and Social Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam, “Leaving Afghanistan

“,11/3/09, http://agonist.org/brian\_downing/20091102/leaving\_afghanistan//avi)

Warnings of dire consequences following a US/NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan are not convincing.  Indeed, the US will benefit from leaving. An Afghan pullout, along with the already mandated one from Iraq, would ease anti-western sentiment in the Islamic world and greatly weaken support for al Qaeda and kindred Islamist terrorist groups that thrive on the presence of foreign troops in the region. As paradoxical as it might appear to political leaders and to believers in the universal utility of might, a lower profile in the Islamic world would serve American interests and improve their national security. And of course Americans would benefit from suffering far fewer casualties in a distant and probably un-winnable war.

Afghanistan Aff

The US has too many different forces in Afghanistan—none of them are necessary

Carl Robichaud is a program officer at The Century Foundation, "Overstaying Our Welcome in Afghanistan?", 5/26/05, http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=NC&pubid=1013

Afghan President Hamid Karzai's request to President Bush this week for greater control over American troops in his country cuts to several central questions: what foreign presence is appropriate in Afghanistan? Who should run these foreign troops, and to whom should they remain accountable? Are they there to preserve Afghan security and fight terrorism, or for other purposes as well? Karzai is not the first to voice skepticism about the U.S. military's long-term role in the region. To many allies and competitors, the U.S. force posture seems incongruent with the threat. In Afghanistan alone, the Pentagon leads a coalition of 18,000 troops (16,700 of them American), ostensibly to combat a dwindling Taliban insurgency of perhaps a thousand militants. **The mandate of these troops is to combat al Qaeda and the Taliban; they do not play a role in counternarcotics operations, and are only peripherally involved in providing security for Afghan citizens**. Rather than decreasing in size in the four years since the defeat of the Taliban, coalition forces almost doubled in the past year from a low of 10,000.

Iraq Aff

FIRST STEP TO REPAIR AMERICAN IMAGE AND HEGEMONY IS IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ

Odom, 7(William E, Lieutenant General (Retired), United States Army Adjunct Professor of Political Science Yale University, American Hegemony, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY VOL. 151, NO. 4, DECEMBER 2007, http://www.amphilsoc.org/sites/default/files/1510403.pdf)

As a spectacular example of how to squander American hegemony— fiscally, militarily, politically, and morally—the war in Iraq will probably turn out to be the greatest strategic mistake in American history. Can we still save the American empire? Or is it too late? We can, but we must act soon. The first step must be withdrawal from Iraq. That invasion was never in American interests. Rather, it advanced the interests of Iran by avenging Saddam’s invasion of that country. And it advanced al Qaeda’s interests by making Iraq open for its cadres. They are killing both Americans and Iraqis there in growing numbers, and taking their newly gained skills to other countries. Many reports suggest that al Qaeda was in desperate condition by spring 2002 and that only after the U.S. invasion of Iraq did its recruiting powers recover and its funding sources replenish its coffers. Apparently, President Bush came to Osama bin Laden’s rescue in his nadir. The irony would be comical if it were not so tragic. **All the debate today over the tactical mistakes we have made in Iraq is beside the point. All of the unhappy consequences were destined to occur once the invasion started. Most worrisome, the war has paralyzed the United States strategically. The precondition for regaining diplomatic and military mobility is withdrawal, no matter what kind of mess is left behind.** The United States bears the blame for it, but it cannot avoid the consequences by “staying the course.” Every day we remain on that course increases the costs and makes the eventual defeat larger. Only after the United States withdraws can it possibly rally sufficient international support to prevent the spread of the damage beyond the region, and it might bring some order to the region as well. It cannot do that, however, unless it alters or abandons at least five of its present policies, policies that have become so perverse that they are generating the very things they were meant to prevent. The first is our nuclear nonproliferation policy. It was meant to maintain regional stability. Our pursuit of it has accelerated proliferation and created instability. The lesson that Iran and others must draw is that if they acquire nuclear weapons, Washington will embrace them, as it has India and Pakistan. Earlier, the United States let Israel proliferate, and that adds to the incentives for all Arab states to proliferate as well. Our nonproliferation policy in Northeast Asia has worsened our relations with South Korea to the point of pushing Seoul toward the Chinese security orbit. At the same time, it has allowed North Korea to diminish U.S. influence in the region while China has increased its own. That opens the path to a unified Korea without U.S. troops and with nuclear weapons, a sure formula for prompting Japanese acquisition of nuclear weapons. The second perverse policy is the so-called “global war on terrorism.” As many critics have pointed out, terrorism is not an enemy. It is a tactic. The United States has a long record of supporting terrorists and using terrorist tactics. The slogans of the war on terrorism today merely make the United States look hypocritical to the rest of the world. A prudent American president would end the present policy of “sustained hysteria,” order the removal of most of the new safety barriers in Washington and elsewhere, treat terrorism as a serious but not a strategic problem, encourage Americans to regain their confidence, and refuse to let al Qaeda keep us in a state of fright. The third perverse policy, spreading democracy, is a very bad practice. By now, it should be clear why I say so. We should try to spread constitutional order, not democracy, which, if it is implemented before a constitution is truly accepted, is almost certain to be illiberal, allowing varying degrees of tyranny over minorities. It makes sense to support individual rights and liberties everywhere, but it is wrong-headed to assume that democratic voting procedures—easy to implement— will assure such liberties. The fourth misguided policy is the Defense Department’s military redeployment plans. They are hollowing out NATO long before new members in Eastern Europe have achieved constitutional breakthroughs and transformed their militaries. Europe may create its own unified military over time, but the European Union is nowhere near that goal today. NATO, therefore, remains critical for Europe’s internal and external security. Its influence and political capacity are directly proportional to the size of U.S. forces deployed in Europe. Finally, the energy policy of “no energy policy” ensures more shocks ahead while funneling trillions of dollars into the hands of those in the Middle East and Southwest Asia who may not wish us well. And it emboldens Russian leaders smarting with feelings of acute imperial nostalgia. A serious energy policy would include putting several dollars’ tax on every gallon of motor fuel. The resulting revenue could be put into american hegemony a Manhattan Project–like crash program to find other kinds of energy for motor transport and to invigorate the nuclear power industry with safer technology and increased efficiency. It could also be used to modernize the railways, letting high-speed trains drain off air passenger traffic from air travel, especially on the East and West Coasts and between several large midwestern and southwestern cities. As these issues reveal, the accumulating undesirable consequences of America’s unilateralist diplomacy, its war policies, and its neglect of the more important foreign and domestic challenges may have already reached a point where American hegemony is irreversibly waning. Yet I believe it is still worth trying to save it. American power has been used to achieve a remarkable amount of good in the world since World War II. We are now seeing that it can also be used to cause a lot of evil. I do not subscribe to the oft-voiced view that the only way to prevent its use for the latter end is to weaken it dramatically and thereby remove the temptation. Were that to happen, not only Americans but many others in the world would be the poorer for it.

Iraq Aff

Iraq withdrawal doesn’t decrease US legitimacy

Press 2008( Daryl G., Associate Professor of Government, Department of Government, Dartmouth College, SSP interview, <http://web.mit.edu/ssp/people/alumni/Daryl_Press_spotlight.html>)

A military withdrawal from Iraq would not be particularly damaging to U.S. credibility. When leaders face a key decision, they evaluate their adversaries' and allies' credibility by weighing the interests at stake for each party, and the capabilities each side brings to the table. Leaders usually make a simple and wise calculation: they assume that countries will defend their interests if they have the power to do so.

What this means is that if we withdraw from Iraq, we must explain very clearly what our key interests are in the region, and that we have more than enough military capability to defend those interests. America's two key interests in the Gulf are ensuring the free flow of oil and preventing the conquest of any of the region's major producers. Our naval and air forces are more than sufficient for those objectives. It would be foolhardy for any enemy to conclude that because we are bad at counter-insurgency and nation building, we are unable to protect important energy interests in the Gulf. I am confident that the United States can articulate this message in a very persuasive fashion, even if we leave Iraq .

Iraq Aff

Maintaining forces in Iraq undermines US hegemony

Paul G. Frost is a Program Officer at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, "Unintended Consequences of an Expanded U.S. Military Presence in the Muslim World", Spring 2003, http://www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/isd/military.pdf//avi

A number of participants argued that expanded military presence in the Muslim world has a number of downsides for the U.S. First, several members argued that by occupying Iraq, we have taken a step down a “slippery slope” of empire, while lacking the human and political capital to sustain or even complete what we have begun in Iraq and Afghanistan. One member commented that the U.S. is acting like an “angry giant” and predicted that at some point global sentiment toward the U.S. will turn from fear and respect to resentment, dissipating our ability to influence and inspire throughout the globe. Another member countered that while the U.S. does not seek empire, it does seek the ability to confront and deal with threats wherever they appear, which is a reason for devising ways to send troops to faraway places without necessarily being stationed there permanently. Second, some members argued that the current approach is too heavily geared toward an unending, worldwide war against terror in which we will never be completely successful. Yet threats and problems other than terrorism remain. Prior to September , the administration was focused on China as an emerging threat. Worrisome trends of failing states in Africa and Latin America continue to multiply. However, we seem fixated on preparing for possible smaller wars in the “arc of instability” that runs from the Andean region in the Southern Hemisphere through North Africa to the Middle East and into Southeast Asia. As a result, our course could be in a state of continuous flux, driven by events as viewed through the single lens of countering terrorism. U.S. military deployment in Muslim nations relates to the larger debate about U.S. hegemony and a possible realignment of power. Several participants voiced concern that the reality of U.S. hegemony, when combined with a certain arrogance of tone and style, led to the trans-Atlantic dispute over Iraq, and could spawn the forming of alignments of different states opposing U.S. hegemony. One member suggested that the administration should more readily acknowledge allied cooperation — particularly from “old” Europe — in law enforcement and intelligence sharing against terrorist groups. Several members argued that NATO could play a strong role in the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq, in addition to being a force for stability throughout the region, if the U.S. can win over the most influential members in the Organization. Another participant argued that, despite the trans-Atlantic crisis over Iraq, the Bush team has been able to maintain fairly good relations with all of the world’s major powers. This has enabled the administration to press forward on many major issues such as North Korea and the Middle East peace process. In sum, as another participant noted, it is still possible for the U.S. to pursue both liberal internationalism and realism at the same time.

Iraq Aff

Withdrawal key to US legitimacy

Odom, 7(William E, Lieutenant General (Retired), United States Army Adjunct Professor of Political Science Yale University, American Hegemony, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY VOL. 151, NO. 4, DECEMBER 2007, http://www.amphilsoc.org/sites/default/files/1510403.pdf)

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Iraq aff

IRAQ WITHDRAWAL DOESN’T AFFECT U.S. LEGITIMACY

Press 2008( Daryl G., Associate Professor of Government, Department of Government, Dartmouth College, SSP interview, <http://web.mit.edu/ssp/people/alumni/Daryl_Press_spotlight.html>)

A military withdrawal from Iraq would not be particularly damaging to U.S. credibility. When leaders face a key decision, they evaluate their adversaries' and allies' credibility by weighing the interests at stake for each party, and the capabilities each side brings to the table. Leaders usually make a simple and wise calculation: they assume that countries will defend their interests if they have the power to do so.

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Iraq Aff – Readiness

Repeated Iraq Tours decrease Morale and Destroy Equipment

Saunders 07( Phillip C., Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense University, The United States and East Asia after Iraq, https://secure.www.cfr.org/content/meetings/Iraq-Impact/49-1\_09\_Saunders.pdf)

Washington’s commitments in Iraq may have a longer-term impact on US global military capabilities, which would indirectly affect the US ability to fulfill its security commitments in Asia. Iraq deployments have placed the greatest strains on the army and the marines. Many ground units have completed mul- tiple tours of duty in Iraq or Afghanistan. The resulting stress on troops and families is having some negative effects on recruitment and retention, although the services have continued to hit their recruitment quotas. Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker has called for an expansion of the size of the army, warning that the Iraq War will break the army unless the active duty force is expanded or the National Guard and reserves are remobilised.15 Over the long run, increased losses of experienced mid-level officers and non-commissioned officers could have a negative impact on US military capabilities. However, repeated tours in Iraq and Afghanistan are also providing extensive combat experience throughout the force, which may help offset the loss of some experi- enced personnel.16 The extended Iraq deployment is taking a toll on equipment as well as troops. Equipment used in Iraq faces intensified maintenance require- ments due to prolonged use in desert conditions; a higher-than-expected operational tempo also means that equipment will need to be replaced sooner than expected. The cost of equipment replacement and a potential expansion in the size of the army will place additional demands on future US military budgets and may limit the

Readiness key to Peace

Jack, Spencer, Defense and National Security Analyst at the Heritage Foundation, 9-15- **2000**“THE FACTS ABOUT MILITARY READINESS,” Heritage Foundation Reports, N. 1394, P. 1

Such a standard is necessary because America may confront threats from many different nations at once. America's national security requirements dictate that the armed forces must be prepared to defeat groups of adversaries in a given war. America, as the sole remaining superpower, has many enemies. Because attacking America or its interests alone would surely end in defeat for a single nation, these enemies are likely to form alliances. Therefore, basing readiness on American military superiority over any single nation has little saliency. The evidence indicates that the U.S. armed forces are not ready to support America's national security requirements. Moreover, regarding the broader capability to defeat groups of enemies, military readiness has been declining. The National Security Strategy, the U.S. official statement of national security objectives, n3 concludes that the United States "must have the capability to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames." n4 According to some of the military's highest-ranking officials, however, the United States cannot achieve this goal. Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Jones, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan have all expressed serious concerns about their respective services' ability to carry out a two major theater war strategy. n5 Recently retired Generals Anthony Zinni of the U.S. Marine Corps and George Joulwan of the U.S. Army have even questioned America's ability to conduct one major theater war the size of the 1991 Gulf War. n6 Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace.

Iraq Aff

Perception of aggressive US military intent has killed leadership legitimacy and hegemony

Raymond Hinnebusch, Professor of International Relations and Middle East Politics, Vol. 16, No. 3, 209–228, Fall **2007**, Middle East Critique, The US Invasion of Iraq: Explanations and Implications, <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a782790793&fulltext=713240928>)

But hegemony also depends on legitimacy—many states accept it as long as the hegemon defends a world order that benefits more actors than itself. For John Ikenberry,16 the hegemon’s overwhelming power is actually unthreatening since the US is content to be an ‘off-shore balancer’ and eschews territorial aggrandizement; because, being democratic, its policy is predictable and self-restraining, not arbitrary; and because its power is exercised through multinational institutions where it is constrained by mutually agreed rules. The Iraq war, however, suggests that the US role in the world has taken a turn away from benign hegemony as predictability, self-restraint, and multilateralism no longer hold and, in the Middle East at least, the US has become a partisan player, not a balancer. Iraq may mark a watershed, as the squandering of soft power and substitution of force for consent undermines the legitimacy of US leadership.

Iraq Aff - Overstretch

Iraq has overstretched the military—destroying recruitment, retention, and quality

General Robert G. Gard, Jr., former President of the National Defense University, and Brigadier General John Johns, former assistant secretary for defense, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Nov ‘5, “There are risks if the U.S. withdraws its troops from Iraq. Are there greater risks in keeping them there?” http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2005/11/00\_gard-johns\_there-are-risks-if-the-us-withdraws.htm

The U.S. military will be stretched to the breaking point: In January 2004, Lieutenant General John Riggs said: "I have been in the Army 39 years, and I’ve never seen it as stretched in that 39 years as I have today;" and it is more stretched now. Despite increased incentives and lowered standards, the Army is unable to meet its recruitment goals. If the U.S. maintains troops in Iraq indefinitely at or near current levels, the ability of our armed forces to protect our national security interests in the rest of the world, including in Afghanistan where the Taliban has mounted a reinvigorated insurgency, will continue to decline. It is evident that many junior and mid-grade officers, discouraged by the prospect of repeated tours in Iraq, are resigning their commissions after fulfilling their mandatory service obligations, rather than opting for careers in the military. The difficulties faced by the armed forces today will lead to a deterioration of the quality of the Army from which it will take many years to recover.

Iraq Aff – Soft Power

**Withdrawal key to improving US diplomatic effort**

William E. **Odom** , Professor of Political Science @ Yale University and Research Fellow @ Hudson Institute , Retired Army Lieutenant General,Former head of Army intelligence (Reagan), former director of the National Security Agency (Reagan), and served on the National Security Council (Carter), William E. Odom, "Victory Is Not an Option", The Washington Post, 2/11/**07**, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/09/AR2007020901917.html

Realigning our diplomacy and military capabilities to achieve order will hugely reduce the numbers of our enemies and gain us new and important allies. This cannot happen, however, until our forces are moving out of Iraq. Why should Iran negotiate to relieve our pain as long as we are increasing its influence in Iraq and beyond? Withdrawal will awaken most leaders in the region to their own need for U.S.-led diplomacy to stabilize their neighborhood.

**Withdrawal key to European Alliance and Middle East Stability**

William E. **Odom** , Professor of Political Science @ Yale University and Research Fellow @ Hudson Institute , Retired Army Lieutenant General,Former head of Army intelligence (Reagan), former director of the National Security Agency (Reagan), and served on the National Security Council (Carter), William E. Odom, "Victory Is Not an Option", The Washington Post, 2/11/**07**,http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/04/25/cut\_and\_run\_you\_bet?page=0,1

Two facts, however painful, must be recognized, or we will remain perilously confused in Iraq. First, invading Iraq was not in the interests of the United States. It was in the interests of Iran and al Qaeda. For Iran, it avenged a grudge against Saddam for his invasion of the country in 1980. For al Qaeda, it made it easier to kill Americans. Second, the war has paralyzed the United States in the world diplomatically and strategically. Although relations with Europe show signs of marginal improvement, the trans-Atlantic alliance still may not survive the war. Only with a rapid withdrawal from Iraq will Washington regain diplomatic and military mobility. Tied down like Gulliver in the sands of Mesopotamia, we simply cannot attract the diplomatic and military cooperation necessary to win the real battle against terror. Getting out of Iraq is the precondition for any improvement.

In fact, getting out now may be our only chance to set things right in Iraq. For starters, if we withdraw, European politicians would be more likely to cooperate with us in a strategy for stabilizing the greater Middle East. Following a withdrawal, all the countries bordering Iraq would likely respond favorably to an offer to help stabilize the situation. The most important of these would be Iran. It dislikes al Qaeda as much as we do. It wants regional stability as much as we do. It wants to produce more oil and gas and sell it. If its leaders really want nuclear weapons, we cannot stop them. But we can engage them.

None of these prospects is possible unless we stop moving deeper into the "big sandy" of Iraq. America must withdraw now.

Turkey Aff

U.S. troop presence in Turkey strains relationships, causes rupture in Middle East dominance.

Sherwood-Randall 07(Elizabeth, Fall, Former Founding Senior Advisor, Preventive Defense Project, *Tend to Turkey,* [Democracy: A Journal of Ideas](http://www.democracyjournal.org) ,Belfer Center Programs or Projects, )

How could such a dramatic rupture with Turkey have occurred? In short, American policymakers ignored or misread Turkish politics, disregarded legitimate Turkish concerns, and launched an invasion of nearby Iraq with substantial negative consequences for Turkish interests. In preparing to go to war, the United States aggressively sought Turkish permission for the Fourth Infantry Division to cross Turkey in order to enter Iraq from the north. The pressure Washington put on Ankara–and the perception in some Turkish circles that the United States sought to bribe the country to secure its agreement–redounded negatively in the domestic debate, resulting in the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s failure on March 1, 2003 to approve a resolution permitting U.S. troop transit into Iraq. In reaction, the Pentagon severely curtailed contacts with the Turkish military, essentially freezing it out of the action precisely at the moment that its leaders felt Turkey’s vital interests were being imperiled. On the policy side, high-level visits were postponed or canceled, and regular consultations between the Department of Defense and the Turkish military’s General Staff were suspended. Further, Turkish offers to send troops to Iraq were repeatedly rebuffed, reinforcing the impression that Turkey was being excluded from shaping events that would have serious implications for its security. At the time of the invasion of Iraq and overthrow of SaddamHussein, the Americans rejected a proposed Turkish deployment of 20,000 troops in the north on the grounds that it could lead to conflict between Turks and Kurds; later in 2003, when the U.S. sought support for peacekeeping and reconstruction, Turkey’s proposal to send 10,000 soldiers was rejected by Iraq’s Governing Council.

In Turkish eyes, the American war effort has substantially destabilized their neighborhood and severely exacerbated their most important security challenge: the continuing terrorist violence perpetrated by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). An unintended consequence of U.S. policy since the first Gulf War has been the emergence of a safe haven for the PKK in northern Iraq. This territory, largely controlled by Iraqi Kurds, has been the only relatively stable region of the country. As a result, American policymakers have resisted appeals to expand the U.S. presence there, concentrating forces on more volatile areas. Concomitantly, the Kurdish leadership of northern Iraq has failed to use its influence to effectively rein in PKK violence.

Turkey Aff

Economic and Political ties are key to Turkey-U.S. relations, not U.S. troops.

Daloglu, 2009(Tulin, Chief Washington Correspondent of Habertürk, “Turkey and the United States” **Turkey Analyst, Vol. 2 no. 115 June,** **http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2009/090605B.html)**

The point is that a broader effort exists to try to end the violence. Moreover, Obama’s reach out to the Muslim world and his desire to withdraw troops from Iraq has shifted the focus of the U.S-Turkey relationship into new areas, such as strengthening commercial and trade ties. “Turkish exports to the U.S. are around $4 billion a year,” James Jeffrey, the U.S. Ambassador to Ankara, said recently in Washington. “American exports to Turkey are a bit stronger, a little more than $10 billion a year. The state of the Turkish economy – almost $800 billion, [with] roughly $15 to $16 billion of two-way trade – is not impressive. We can do better.”  But, the ambassador cautioned, **businesses do not recognize friends or enemies – only profits. Only an environment conducive to making profits can guarantee a stronger future business ties between the two nations.**

**CONCLUSIONS:** There is no doubt that a new, positive attitude is coloring the relationship between the United States and Turkey. Whether that continues, however, is more dependent on political developments than on economic cooperation, even if the latter can make a difference as well. The future of the region is however unpredictable. Turkey’s Muslim identity has forced it to take sides in the past, and its new foreign policy, which makes it a more active player in the neighborhood, could eventually push it to do so again. The sympathies of the ruling Justice and Development Party, AKP, for Hamas and Hezbollah, as representatives of political Islam, may eventually push Turkey in their direction. President Barack Obama’s call for such organizations to lay down their arms may be put to the test soon. But the rhetoric of the relationship does nevertheless hold the promise of a positive future – one that ideally will include not only a strong political and military friendship, but an increased commercial and trade component as well.

Turkey Aff

Incirlik Not Necessary for U.S. power projection

Turkish Daily News 2007 (Feb 23rd, *Incirlik not vital for U.S. operation*, http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-159735222/incirlik-not-vital-iraq.html)

The United States' use of Turkey's Incirlik airbase in the south greatly facilitates Iraq-related military activities, but the base's role is not indispensable for American forces' operations in Iraq, a top U.S. commander said

"I wouldn't say that we have to [use] Incirlik to conduct operations in Iraq," U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Michael Moseley told a briefing at the Foreign Press Center on Wednesday.

Japan Aff

U.S. troop presence is irrelevant and dangerously unstable, Japan can defend itself and U.S. offshore balancing still solves any risk of Chinese/Korean aggression

Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant to President Reagan Transforming Japan-US Alliance, October, 29, 2009, “Transforming Japan-U.S. Alliance,”**http://www.cato.org/people/doug-bandow**

accessed on 7-19-10) SM

American influence is facing another challenge in East Asia. The latest loss of U.S. power may occur in Japan. Last month, the Democratic Party of Japan ousted the Liberal Democratic Party, which had held power for most of the last 54 years. Exactly how policy will change is uncertain: The DPJ is a diverse and fractious coalition. But Washington is nervous. U.S. policymakers have grown used to Tokyo playing the role of pliant ally, backing American priorities and hosting American bases.That era may be over. Although Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama insists that he wants to strengthen the alliance, before taking office he wrote in the New York Times: "As a result of the failure of the Iraq war and the financial crisis, the era of U.S.-led globalism is coming to an end."America's alliance with Japan — like most U.S. defense relationships — is outdated.Of course, there are significant barriers to any dramatic transformation of Japanese policy. Indeed, during the campaign the DPJ platform dropped its earlier pledge to "do away with the dependent relationship in which Japan ultimately has no alternative but to act in accordance with U.S. wishes, replacing it with a mature alliance based on independence and equality."Nevertheless, the DPJ possesses a strong left wing and vigorously opposed the ousted government's logistical support for U.S. naval operations in the Indian Ocean.Other potentially contentious issues include reducing the military presence on Okinawa, renegotiating the relocation of the Marines' Futenma Airfield to Guam at the Japanese expense, cutting so-called host nation support, and amending the Status of Forces Agreement.Some Obama administration officials privately acknowledge that adjustments will be necessary. However, the day after the election State Department spokesman Ian Kelly said that there would be no renegotiation of the Okinawa accord. This might seem like a good negotiating tactic, but it didn't go over well in Tokyo. Washington's dismissive response gives the Japanese one more reason to want to escape dependence on the U.S. Actually, Americans should support a transformation of the alliance. The current relationship remains trapped in a world that no longer exists.Japan has the world's second (or third, based on purchasing power parity) largest economy, yet Tokyo remains dependent on America for its security, a minor military player despite having global economic and political interests.There are historical reasons for Tokyo's stunted international role, but it is time for East Asian countries to work together to dispel the remaining ghosts of Japan's imperialist past rather than to expect America to continue acting as the defender of the last resort.Since Japan and Asia have changed, so should America's defense strategy. There should be no more troops based on Japanese soil. No more military units tasked for Japan's defense. No more security guarantee for Japan.The U.S. should adopt a strategy of offshore balancer, expecting friendly states to defend themselves, while being ready to act if an overwhelming, hegemonic threat eventually arises. China is the most, but still unlikely, plausible candidate for such a role — and even then not for many years.Washington's job is not to tell Japan — which devotes about one-fourth the U.S level to the military — to do more. Washington's job is to do less. Tokyo should spend whatever it believes to be necessary on its so-called "Self-Defense Force." Better relations with China and reform in North Korea would lower that number. Japan should assess the risks and act accordingly.

In any case, the U.S. should indicate its willingness to accommodate Tokyo's changing priorities.

It's the same strategy that Washington should adopt elsewhere around the globe. The Marine Expeditionary Force stationed on Okinawa is primarily intended to back up America's commitment to South Korea. Yet, the South has some 40 times the GDP of North Korea. Seoul should take over responsibility for its own defense.

Even more so the Europeans, who possess more than 10 times Russia's GDP. If they don't feel at risk, there's no reason for an American defense guarantee. If they do feel at risk, there's no reason for them not to do more — a lot more.

Defending populous and prosperous allies made little sense in good economic times. But with Uncle Sam's 2009 deficit at $1.6 trillion and another $10 trillion in red ink likely over the next decade — without counting the impact of any additional financial disasters — current policy is unsustainable. The U.S. essentially is borrowing money from China for use to defend Japan from China.In Washington, officials are rounding the wagons to protect the status quo. But America's alliance with Japan — like most U.S. defense relationships — is outdated. Both America and Japan would benefit from ending Tokyo's unnatural defense dependence on the U.S.

Japan Aff

**Troop presence in Japan is useless and forward deployment in Japan risks bankrupting the U.S.**

Doug **Bandow,** Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. “Get Out of Japan,” June 28, **2010**

*This article appeared on* [The National Interest (Online)](http://www.nationalinterest.org) *on June 18, 2010.* [*http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11928*](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11928)*) SM*

Yet what is most curious about the issue is the dogged insistence of American officials in maintaining the Japanese protectorate. The world in which the security treaty was signed has disappeared. Admits Kent E. Calder of SAIS, "the international political-economic context of the alliance and the domestic context in both nations have changed profoundly." There is no reason to assume that a relationship created for one purpose in one context makes sense for another purpose in another context.The one-sided alliance — the United States agrees to defend Japan, Japan agrees to be defended — made sense in the aftermath of World War II. But sixty-five years later Japan possesses the second-largest economy on earth and has the potential to defend itself and help safeguard its region."All of my Marines on Okinawa are willing to die if it is necessary for the security of Japan," Lieutenant General Keith Stalder, the Pacific commander of the Marine Corps, observed in February. Yet "Japan does not have a reciprocal obligation to defend the United States." How does that make sense for America today?Washington officials naturally want to believe that their role is essential. Countries which prefer to rely on America are happy to maintain the pretense. However, keeping the United States as guarantor of the security of Japan — and virtually every other populous, prosperous industrial state in the world — is not in the interest of the American people.The days when Uncle Sam could afford to maintain a quasi-empire are over. The national debt already exceeds $13 trillion. America is running a $1.6 trillion deficit this year. Red ink is likely to run another $10 trillion over the next decade — assuming Washington doesn't have to bail out more failed banks, pension funds and whatever else. Social Security and Medicare have a total unfunded liability in excess of $100 trillion. In short, the U.S. government is piling debt on top of debt in order to defend a country well able to protect itself.Some Japanese see little danger and correspondingly little need for much defense. Others are not so certain. It's a decision for the Japanese people.North Korea's military abilities remain uncertain and its aggressive intentions remain unpredictable. Prime Minister Hatoyama cited "the current situation in the Korean peninsula" as a reason to maintain the base on Okinawa.Moreover, China's power is growing. So far Beijing has been assertive rather than aggressive, but increasingly seems willing to contest islands claimed by both nations. The best way to keep the competition peaceful is for Tokyo to be able to protect itself.Of course, several of Japan's neighbors, along with some Americans, remain nervous about any Japanese military activity given the Tokyo's wartime depredations. However, the Japanese people do not have a double dose of original sin. Everyone who planned and most everyone who carried out those aggressions are dead. A country which goes through political convulsions before it will send unarmed peacekeepers abroad is not likely to engage in a new round of conquest. Anyway, the best way to assuage regional concerns is to construct cooperative agreements and structures between Japan and its neighbors. Democratic countries from South Korea to Australia to India have an interest in working with Tokyo to ensure that the Asia-Pacific remains peaceful and prosperous. Japan has much at stake and could contribute much. Tokyo could still choose to do little. **But it shouldn't expect America to fill any defense gap.The claim is oft-made that the presence of American forces also help promote regional stability beyond Japan. How never seems to be explained.** Bruce Klingner of the Heritage Foundation contends: "the Marines on Okinawa are an indispensable and irreplaceable element of any U.S. response to an Asian crisis**." But the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), while packing a potent military punch, actually has little to do.The MEF isn't necessary to support manpower-rich South Korea, which is capable of deterring a North Korean attack. The Marines wouldn't be useful in a war against China, unless the Pentagon is planning a surprise landing in Tiananmen Square to seize Mao Zedong's mausoleum. If conflict breaks out over Taiwan or various contested islands, America would rely on air and naval units**. Where real instability might arise on the ground, **only a fool would introduce U.S. troops — insurgency in Indonesia, civil strife in the Solomon Islands or Fiji, border skirmishes between Thailand and Burma or Cambodia.General Ronald Fogleman, a former Air Force Chief of Staff, argued that the Marines "serve no military function**. They don't need to be in Okinawa to meet any time line in any war plan. I'd bring them back to California. The reason they don't want to bring them back to California is that everyone would look at them and say, â€˜Why do you need these twenty thousand?'"Do U.S. bases in Okinawa help dampen regional arms spending? That's another point more often asserted than proven. Even if so, however, that isn't necessarily to Washington's benefit. The best way to ensure a responsible Chinese foreign and military policy is for Beijing's neighbors to be well-armed and willing to cooperate among themselves. Then local or regional conflicts would be much less likely to end up in Washington. None of this means that the Japanese and American peoples should not be linked economically and culturally, or that the two governments should not cooperate on security issues. **But there no longer is any reason for America to guarantee Japan's security or permanently station forces on Japanese soil**.The Obama administration's foreign policy looks an awful lot like the Bush administration's foreign policy. The U.S. insists on dominating the globe and imposing its will on its allies. This approach is likely to prove self-defeating in the long-term. U.S. arrogance will only advance the point when increasingly wealthy and influential friends insist on taking policy into their own hands. Before that, however, Washington's insistence on defending prosperous and populous allies risks bankrupting America.Washington must begin scaling back foreign commitments and deployments. Japan would be a good place to start.

Japan Aff

Japan doesn’t need the U.S. anymore- the Democratic Party of Japan is taking the charge.

**Funabashi**, Toichi, (Editor in Chief of the Japanese newspaper The Asahi Shimbun.) Tokyo's Trials- Can the DPJ Change Japan. December 20**09**.

**A more vibrant democracy at home would allow Japan to become a more active ally** to the democracies that have constituted the liberal international order since the end of World War II. **The DPJ'S main vision for Japan's foreign policy**, nyua nyuou (enter Asia, enter the West), **which calls for closer ties with both the United States and Asia, could help stabilize the Asia-Pacific region**. **The DPJ seems more willing than the LDP to confront Japan's legacy of pre-World War II imperialism, which reassures Asian nations about the country's potential as a future partner. It is in the interest of the United States that Japan**, its longtime ally**, play a larger role in the Asia-Pacific region,** as states in the area become less dependent on trade with the United States and increasingly uneasy about China's growing influence. This will require something of a balancing act: the **DPJ wants to reinforce Japan's economic and cultural identity as an Asian nation** and follow a European style of governance while maintaining strong political and military ties with the United States.

Japan Aff

Japan no longer needs sole U.S. support- multiple examples show Japanese growth.

**Chanlett-Avery**,Emma, (Specialist in Asian Affairs) Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress. November 25, 20**09**.

**In early 2007, Japan signed a bilateral agreement with Australia that pledges cooperation on counterterrorism, maritime security, peace-keeping operations, and disaster relief**. In **October 2008, a similar pact was signed with India.** **The agreements**, though short of a formal military alliance, may help to establish a framework of security cooperation among Japan, Australia, India, and the United States. Such partnerships **give Japan opportunities to strengthen strategic ties with other democracies** with similar political and economic freedoms. Continuing this trend, **in September 2007 Japan joined a multinational naval exercise with the United States, Australia, Singapore, and India** in the area west of the Malacca Straits. The exercise reinforced two interrelated trends in Asia-Pacific defense dynamics: the U.S.-led campaign of strengthening security ties among democratic allies and the strategic countering of Chinese military power. On the sidelines of **the 2007 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, Japan, Australia, and the United States held their first trilateral meeting**. Ongoing provocations by North Korea have spurred closer coordination between Japan, South Korea, and the United States. In May, defense ministers from all three nations met on the sidelines of the Shangri La conference in Singapore to discuss measures to enhance trilateral defense cooperation.

The DPJ doesn’t want U.S. overbearing policies, they have their own agenda.

**Chanlett-Avery**,Emma, (Specialist in Asian Affairs) Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress. November 25, 20**09**.

Whichever scenario proves correct, there seems little doubt that much will depend on how U.S. policy toward Japan proceeds in the months ahead. Policymakers in Washington will be working with a new and largely unfamiliar set of counterparts in Tokyo, who are themselves unused to governing. **The initial challenge for U.S. officials will likely be to gain the trust of a new ruling party** that has long expressed skepticism toward aspects of the U.S.-Japan relationship. **Although mainstream members of the DPJ support the alliance, they tend to be wary of overbearing U.S. influence and seek a less deferential bilateral dynamic** than is perceived to have existed under previous LDP rule. As coordination between the two governments proceeds on sensitive alliance management issues, such as the base realignment process, some **experts warn that overt U.S. pressure on Tokyo may be counterproductive in the early phase of the new government**.35 Patience, these experts argue, should be the operational principle guiding U.S. alliance managers over the coming months.

Japan doesn’t need us- the DPJ agenda proves.

**Chanlett-Avery**,Emma, (Specialist in Asian Affairs) Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress. November 25, 20**09**.

**As the DPJ settles into its new role as the main ruling party, it may over time show greater confidence in following through on its long-promised vision of a more assertive foreign policy for Japan**. Among some of the measures called for by the DPJ are **expanding Japan’s role in U.N.- sanctioned peacekeeping operations, deepening ties with Asia, taking greater responsibility for defending the Japanese homeland,** expanding regional and bilateral free trade agreements (FTA), and promoting an ambitious new set of global climate change standards.

South Korea Aff

A partial withdrawal solves—it improves the force structure in South Korea

Peter Brookes, a veteran of the CIA and naval intelligence, is a senior fellow at The Heritage Foundation, "Defending South Korea", 6/24/04, Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2004/06/Defending-South-Korea

First, the number of troops does not completely determine military capability. In fact, despite the decrease in American soldiers in Korea, U.S. firepower will actually increase due to expected changes in force structure over the next several years. Although technology cannot replace soldiers in some missions, today's hi-tech equipment can provide significant firepower advantages over the common foot soldier. Therefore, the U.S. can withdraw some of its Korean-based troops for other soldier-intensive missions, such as Iraq, Afghanistan and the war on terrorism, while actually improving the lethality and deterrence of its forces in Korea. Improving the defence capability of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) can be accomplished by bringing to bear such systems as Patriot PAC-3 surface-to-air missiles for air defence, the army's new Stryker brigade, the navy's High-Speed Vessel, and the forward-deployment of additional air and naval assets to Hawaii and Guam. Washington is also planning an $11 billion investment in some additional 150 military capabilities over the next four years that will enhance defence against any North Korean attack. Secondly, it is useful for Seoul and Washington to reduce the visibility and "footprint" (that is, the size and number of bases) of U.S. forces because of trends in Korean public opinion, which has been mixed about USFK's presence. Moving the U.S. Army out of Seoul, drawing down troop levels and consolidating bases will reduce pressures from some sectors of Korean society for all U.S. troops to leave.

South Korea Aff

North Korean response to increased US sanctions is to move the date of their dance festival – US presence in South Korea is not necessary

(Associated Press, 7-21-10, “North Korea to stage massive dance spectacle”,http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5j1gyMv3ZqwA60L1wrZNPaQHLynqwD9H3SV280)

North Korea will stage its massive dance-and-tumbling extravaganza known as the Arirang Festival next month, apparently cranking up its domestic propaganda efforts as tensions linger over the deadly sinking of a South Korean warship blamed on Pyongyang. The show typically feature thousands of gymnasts in synchronized maneuvers and giant mosaics formed by children turning pieces of colored paper. But it has been criticized as a propaganda tool achieved through the rigid and disciplined training of its young performers. The mass games will start in early August at Pyongyang's May Day Stadium, the North's main Rodong Sinmun newspaper said Thursday, according to the country's Uriminzokkiri website. Koryo Tours, a Beijing-based travel agency that organizes trips to North Korea, said they will run from Aug. 2 through Oct. 10. Named after a traditional Korean love song, the festival made its debut in 2002 to commemorate the birth of the North's late founding leader Kim Il Sung, father of the North's current leader Kim Jong Il. News on the latest festival came a day after the United States announced expanded and strengthened sanctions against the North and its nuclear weapons program. The move came in response to the North's suspected involvement in the sinking of the South Korean warship that killed 46 sailors. North Korea denies any involvement and has threatened war if punished.

South Korea Aff – China

Joint Military Exercises with US and South Korea endanger US-China relations

(CNS News, 7-12-10, “China Bristles at Prospect of U.S. Aircraft Carrier in the Yellow Sea” http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/69237)

In its own editorial, Global Times said China would likely send ships and aircraft to monitor the drill, and warned of the implications for bilateral relations of any misunderstanding or unintended incident involving U.S. and Chinese forces. “The entire West Pacific is not the backyard of the U.S.” it said. “The U.S. must consider the impact its military presence would have on public perception and the delicate strategic balance in the area. It must give up the idea of constantly aggravating another important cornerstone of security in the region.” Li Hongmei, a People’s Daily columnist, described a surge of nationalist sentiment reflected by posts on the Internet by ordinary Chinese calling on China to attack U.S. warships deployed close to its territorial waters. ‘Undermining China’s security interests’ The Chinese government itself has by comparison been restrained in its response, but critical nonetheless. “We firmly oppose foreign military vessels and planes conducting activities in the Yellow Sea and China’s coastal waters that undermine China’s security interests,” said foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang. “Our stance is consistent and clear. We have already expressed our resolute interest and concerns to related parties,” Qin told reporters. “We hope relevant parties exercise calmness and restraint and refrain from actions that might escalate tension in the region.”

Joint Exercises with South Korea alarming China as well as intended North Korea – China condemning the actions

(Eurasia Review, 7-16-10, “U.S. Risks Military Clash With China in Yellow Sea”, http://www.eurasiareview.com/201007165124/us-risks-military-clash-with-china-in-yellow-sea.html)

The joint exercises with South Korea, as news sources from the latter nation have recently disclosed, will be conducted on both sides of the Korean Peninsula, not only in the Yellow Sea as previously planned but also in the Sea of Japan. (Referred to in the Korean press as the West and East Seas, respectively.) Confirmation that the U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington will participate has further exacerbated concerns in Northeast Asia and raised alarms over American intentions not only vis-a-vis North Korea but China as well. An exact date for the war games has not yet been announced, but is expected to be formalized no later than when U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates arrive in the South Korean capital of Seoul on July 21. For weeks now leading Chinese foreign ministry and military officials have condemned the U.S.-led naval exercises, branding them a threat to Chinese national sovereignty and to peace and stability in the region. China's influential Global Times wrote on July 12 that "The eventuality that Beijing has to prepare for is close at hand. The delayed US-South Korean naval exercise in the Yellow Sea is now slated for mid-July. According to media reports, a nuclear-powered US aircraft carrier has left its Japanese base and is headed for the drill area." [1] Permanently based in Yokosuka, Japan, the USS George Washington is an almost 100,000-ton supercarrier: "The nuclear carrier, commissioned in 1992, is the sixth Nimitz-class vessel, carrying some 6,250 crew and about 80 aircraft, including FA-18 fighter jets and E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft." [2] The F/A-18 Hornet is a supersonic, multirole jet fighter (F/A is for Fighter/Attack) and one of its primary roles is destroying an adversary's air defenses. The E-2C Hawkeye has been described as the "eyes and ears" of American carrier strike groups, being equipped with long-range surveillance radar. In addition to the nuclear aircraft carrier, "an Aegis-equipped destroyer, an amphibious assault ship, about four 4,500-ton KDX-II-class destroyers, the 1,800-ton Son Won-il-class submarine and F-15K fighter jets are expected to join the exercise." [3] U.S. Aegis class warships (destroyers and cruisers) are equipped for Standard Missile-3 anti-ballistic interceptor missiles, part of a U.S.-led Asia-Pacific (to date, along with the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Australia) and ultimately international interceptor missile system. The F-15K ("Slam Eagle") is a state-of-the-art multirole (used for both aerial combat and ground attack) jet fighter supplied to South Korea by the U.S. The presence of a U.S. nuclear aircraft carrier and scores of advanced American and South Korean warplanes off the coast of China in the Yellow Sea - and near Russia's shore in the Sea of Japan if the Washington is deployed there - qualitatively and precariously raises the level of brinkmanship in Northeast Asia.

South Korea Aff – North Korea

Increased provocation of North Korea through military posturing in South Korea could escalate to nuclear war

(The Guardian, 7-24-10, “North Korea threatens ‘nuclear war’ over troop exercises”, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/24/north-korea-nuclear-war-threat)

North Korea has threatened to use its "nuclear deterrent" in response to planned military exercises by the US and South Korea this weekend. The regime promised a "retaliatory sacred war" amid increased tensions on the Korean peninsula over the March sinking of a South Korean navy vessel, which Seoul and Washington blame on Pyongyang. North Korea's National Defence Commission (NDC), headed by leader Kim Jong-il, issued the threat today for what it called a second "unpardonable" provocation for again being blamed for the incident in which 46 sailors died. "The army and people of the [North] will legitimately counter with their powerful nuclear deterrence the largest-ever nuclear war exercises," the commission said in a statement run on the state-run Korean Central News Agency. Pyongyang routinely threatens war when its southern neighbour and the US hold joint military exercises. South Korea's defence ministry said no unusual North Korean military movements were detected. Operation Invincible Spirit, which begins tomorrow, will involve 8,000 US and South Korean troops, 200 aircraft and 20 ships, including the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier the USS George Washington. "The more desperately the US imperialists brandish their nukes and the more zealously their lackeys follow them, the more rapidly the [North's] nuclear deterrence will be bolstered up along the orbit of self-defence and the more remote the prospect for the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula will be become," the NDC statement said. Yesterday, a North Korea spokesman, Ri Tong-il, told reporters at the Asean regional security forum in Hanoi, Vietnam, there would be a "physical response" to the drills in the Sea of Japan, which he branded another sign of US "hostility". "It is a threat to the Korean peninsula and the region of Asia as a whole," he said, adding that the exercises harked back to 19th-century gunboat diplomacy and violated North Korea's sovereignty.

Soft Power/Legitimacy Key

Legitimacy is key to hegemony—realism proves hard power alone isn’t stabilizing.

Ian Clark, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales Aberystwyth, 2009, *International Relations*, “How Heirarchical Can International Society Be?” accessed via Sage Journals Online cp

One answer for many is that hegemony is ab initio incompatible with international society.24 This seemingly rests upon the syllogism that hierarchy is a different ordering principle from anarchy; hegemony is an expression of hierarchy, and therefore hegemony cannot be a form of anarchy. Waltz famously associated hierarchy with domestic politics, and anarchy with the international. ‘The ordering principles of the two structures are distinctly different’, he maintained, ‘indeed, contrary to each other.’25 It followed then that to ‘move from an anarchic to a hierarchic realm is to move from one system to another’.26

These categorical assertions have subsequently been regularly challenged, and often presented as a continuum rather than a dichotomy.27 Some have recently challenged the validity of anarchy as a general representation of all international politics, pointing out that it has not been empirically tested, simply assumed.28 Waltz, of course, had clearly stressed that these ordering principles are ideal-types, and that in practice all ‘societies are mixed. Elements in them represent both of the ordering principles’.29 There are very few ‘pure’ cases.30 Part of the problem, it has been suggested, is IR’s enduring fi xation with formal-legal conceptions of authority, and the rigid defi nitions of anarchy that result from them.31 It is now accepted that the two principles can indeed be so ‘mixed’, and that many political systems are effectively hybrids. Accordingly, we have been encouraged to think instead of ‘hierarchy under anarchy’32 or ‘hierarchy in anarchy’,33 while others urge us to explore the ‘social logics of hierarchy that exist alongside, but cannot be explained by, the logic of anarchy’.34 It is precisely such a social logic of hierarchy that is potentially illuminating with respect to hegemony. This requires us to think of hierarchy in its consensual form, and as issuing from ‘relational authority’ that ‘rests on a bargain between the ruler and the ruled premised on the former’s provision of a social order of value sufficient to offset the latter’s loss of freedom’.35 If this is once accepted, it gets us over any absolutist rejection of hierarchy as inconsistent with international society. A focus upon legitimacy opens up the possibility of ‘genuine hierarchy’, and not simply ‘inequality under anarchy’.36

Soft Power/Legitimacy Key

Legitimacy is key to hegemony—lack of legitimacy leads to backlash and instability.

Ian Clark, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales Aberystwyth, 2009, *International Relations*, “How Heirarchical Can International Society Be?” accessed via Sage Journals Online cp

Fundamental to any such view of hegemony is that it is understood as an institution of international society. This, of course, is the central insight of the English School perspective. In its classic statement, Hedley Bull identified five such institutions (balance of power, the role of the great powers, international law, diplomacy, and war).68 The point here is to suggest that hegemony is best understood, in a cognate way, as one potential institution of international society, applicable to material conditions of primacy. It is this institutional dimension that marks the clear separation between hegemony and primacy. It is this dimension that also establishes the compatibility of hegemony with the anarchical society.

Within the English School version, the institution of the great powers generally serves to simplify the processes of international politics. It does so because of the inherent power differentials that characterise it.69 Specifi cally, the great powers can contribute to the promotion of international order by exercising various ‘managerial’ functions.70 Two principal and interconnected theoretical points emerge. The fi rst is that any such notion of the role of the great powers is meaningful only within a conception of international society where certain values are shared. This is not the universe normally depicted in neorealist accounts, and within which the concept of primacy is typically deployed. Second, such a conception places a particular emphasis upon the kind of power by which great powers are constituted: it results from a status recognised and bestowed by others, not a set of attributes and capabilities possessed by the claimant. To be a great power is to be located in a social relationship, not to have a certain portfolio of material assets. Both considerations apply with equal force to the concept of hegemony.

Anarchic and hegemonic behaviour

Primacy poses a challenge to international society, whereas hegemony need not. The task, therefore, is to ensure that the state enjoying primacy behaves in a hegemonic way, in conformity with expectations created by the institution of hegemony. This is quite contrary to the prescriptions of most neorealists. For them, concentration of power is the problem, and can be addressed only by its reduction. Surprisingly, even those who hold wholly opposing views on the likely durability of US primacy nonetheless agree on this conclusion. Those who see primacy as unstable, and likely to be short-lived, insist that the problem is not a behavioural one. ‘The United States has a hegemony problem because it wields hegemonic power. To reduce the fear of US power, the United States must accept some reduction in its relative hard power’.71 Those, on the other hand, most optimistic about the durability of US primacy tend nonetheless to concur, suggesting that there will be unease ‘no matter what Washington does’: ‘Nothing the United States could do short of abdicating its power would solve the problem completely.’72 Primacy, as well as its resulting discontents, is evidently a function of capabilities, not of diplomatic behaviour. ‘Prophylactic multilateralism’, we are therefore warned, ‘cannot inoculate the United States from counter-hegemonic balancing’.73 This again, however, brings out the confl ation between primacy and the quite different social relationship of hegemony. In Walt’s terms, the hegemon’s problem is not simply what it ‘has’, but what others think it will ‘do’.74 Hegemony offers a distinctive strategy for addressing the problems engendered by primacy, going beyond any solution that relies simply upon the US divesting itself of some of its material capabilities, or in which other states manage to balance successfully against it.

Soft Power/Legitimacy Key

Legitimacy is key to effective exercise of hegemony—even Hegemonic Stability Theorists agree.

Ian Clark, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales Aberystwyth, 2009, *International Relations*, “How Heirarchical Can International Society Be?” accessed via Sage Journals Online cp

How do legitimacy and hegemony relate to hierarchy, and how should we think about concentrations of power? To date, those arguments that focus upon legitimacy have tended largely to assume that stability arises where power is dispersed in a roughly equal manner. They understand legitimacy to pertain to agreement and consensus, at the very least amongst the major powers, and thus to require some acknowledgement of the equal status of those powers. Those arguments that dwell on hegemony, by contrast, consider stability as derivative of the concentration of power. ‘Fragmentation of power … leads to fragmentation of the international economic regime’, insisted Keohane, whereas ‘concentration of power contributes to stability’.49 Stability, so it would appear, is most likely when there is available a hegemon both able and willing to play this role. How is it that two theories, both concerned with distributions of power, have reached such diametrically opposed conclusions?

One answer is that, while interested in distributions of power, neither theory sees these as the sole determinants of international stability. The former introduces one intervening variable – legitimacy – between material power and stability. The latter injects an alternative variable – hegemony – that is again distinct from purely distributional concepts. Despite the sharp disagreement between them as to their respective preferences for dispersal or concentration of power, they in fact share a highly signifi cant common belief that stability is a function not simply of material distributions, but also of the degree of shared values. It is this shared feature that offers the prospect of a theory of international society – applicable to conditions of primacy – combining the virtues of both legitimacy and hegemony.

The fi rst cluster includes those political theorists who have long claimed a direct correlation between legitimacy and stability. This is because legitimacy denotes an acceptable, or authoritative, set of political conditions, and is less likely to meet resistance, or to require maintenance by coercive or other means of inducement. Such a view has been prevalent since Max Weber’s seminal discussion.50

This relationship was imported into IR most famously via the work of Henry Kissinger. ‘Stability’, he concluded, ‘has commonly resulted not from a quest for peace but from a generally accepted legitimacy.’51 Historically, that relationship was demonstrated in the post-1815 period: ‘the period of stability which ensued was the best proof that a “legitimate” order had been constructed’.52 Kissinger’s ‘legitimacy’ was, of course, defi ned minimally as ‘an international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy’, and as ‘the acceptance of the framework of the international order by all major powers’.53 This connection between legitimacy and stability has since been further explored by various international historians and theorists.54 On these views, international stability derives from more than the material distribution of power alone: the critical intervening variable is the attainment, or otherwise, of a shared conception of international legitimacy.

The second cluster dwells instead upon hegemony as the most likely condition for international stability, and HST is the best known of its sub-theories.55 Most famously, this has concentrated on stability in the international economic order, and grew directly from Charles Kindleberger’s analysis of the causes of the Great Depression.56 However, by extension, it has been applied also to the wider political and security order, particularly through the notion of hegemonic wars in the work of Robert Gilpin.57

HST’s core proposition is that ‘hegemonic structures of power, dominated by a single country, are most conducive to the development of strong international regimes whose rules are relatively precise and well obeyed’.58 HST undoubtedly starts from the concentration of power. This was most readily discernible in the interest shown in any putative American decline as likely to impact adversely on future stability, because ‘as the distribution of tangible resources … becomes more equal, international regimes should weaken’.59 However, although HST starts from material distributions of power, it does not end exclusively there. The concentration of power is necessary, but not suffi cient. Intrinsic to it is that the hegemon ‘is recognized by others as having special rights and duties’.60 Gilpin himself had insisted that ‘hegemony … is based on a general belief in its legitimacy’.61 What this suggests is that legitimacy-based and hegemony-based theories of stability are not as radically opposed as their initial assumptions about preferable distributions of power. Indeed, if both were valid, we might conclude that legitimacy has the potential to trump any specifi c balance of power.

This then confronts directly the relationship between legitimacy and hegemony. For much social science, the idea of hegemony already embraces that of legitimacy. ‘The concept of hegemony’, it is typically observed, ‘is normally understood as emphasising consent in contrast to reliance on the use of force’.62 For example, while acknowledging that HST ‘defi nes hegemony as preponderance of material resources’, Keohane had been mindful also that theories of hegemony needed to ‘explore why secondary states defer to the leadership of the hegemon. That is, they need to account for the legitimacy of hegemonic regimes.’63 Others too restrict the term hegemony only to a situation where a substantial element of legitimacy is present.64 Does hegemony then hold any possible attraction for the anarchical society?

Soft Power/Legitimacy Key

Soft balancing deprives states of their legitimacy—outweighs hard power.

Ian Clark, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales Aberystwyth, 2009, *International Relations*, “How Heirarchical Can International Society Be?” accessed via Sage Journals Online cp

The critics of soft balancing insist that such activities amount to no more than standard diplomatic bargaining, and object that this should not be confused with balancing.89 If there is no intention to balance the capabilities of the hegemon, then the language of balance should be eschewed. We can agree, and yet reach this same conclusion by a different route. The imagery in the depictions of soft balancing is, to be sure, misleading. What it refers to is not any attempt physically to reduce the power capabilities of the hegemon, but rather to constrain it by other means. Soft balancing can ‘increase the costs’ of the hegemon’s exercise of its power.90 This latter is a symptom not of diminished material assets, but of legitimacy deficits.91 At this point, soft balancing needs to be viewed not as a proactive policy to reduce the material power of the hegemon, but as evidence of the friction that its loss of legitimacy entails. This emerges even more clearly in those other analyses of soft balancing, where the theme of ‘legitimacy denial’ is very much apparent.92 In Nye’s words, ‘even when a military balance of power is impossible, other countries can still band together to deprive the US policy of legitimacy and thus weaken American soft power’.93 Soft balancing is tantamount to a strategy of legitimacy denial. Brooks and Wohlforth are certainly correct to insist that this represents something other than balancing, but they miss an equally important point when they then wish to reduce it to mere bargaining. Hegemonic delegitimation may well be an outcome of bargaining strategies, but the two are not the same thing. Second-tier states can choose to balance the hegemon, or to bargain with it: neither is tantamount to a challenge to its legitimacy.

Offshore Balancing Good – Laundry List

**Offshore balancing prevents unnecessary wars, blowback, and instability**

John J. **Mearsheimer**, December 31, 200**8** “Pull Those Boots Off The Ground,” <http://www.newsweek.com/2008/12/30/pull-those-boots-off-the-ground.html>,” http://cdn.eyewonder.com/100125/764302/1316426/ewtrack.gif?ewadid=112642) SM

So what would it look like? As an offshore balancer, the United States would keep its military forces—especially its ground and air forces—outside the Middle East, not smack in the center of it. Hence the term "offshore." As for "balancing," that would mean relying on regional powers like Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia to check each other. Washington would remain diplomatically engaged, and when necessary would assist the weaker side in a conflict. It would also use its air and naval power to signal a continued U.S. commitment to the region and would retain the capacity to respond quickly to unexpected threats, like Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. But—and this is the key point—the United States would put boots on the ground in the Middle East only if the local balance of power seriously broke down and one country threatened to dominate the others. Short of that, America would keep its soldiers and pilots "over the horizon"—namely at sea, in bases outside the region or back home in the United States.This approach might strike some as cynical after Bush's lofty rhetoric. It would do little to foster democracy or promote human rights. But Bush couldn't deliver on those promises anyway, and it is ultimately up to individual countries, not Washington, to determine their political systems. It is hardly cynical to base U.S. strategy on a realistic appraisal of American interests and a clear-eyed sense of what U.S. power cannot accomplish. Offshore balancing, moreover, is nothing new: the United States pursued such a strategy in the Middle East very successfully during much of the cold war. It never tried to garrison the region or transform it along democratic lines. Instead, Washington sought to maintain a regional balance of power by backing various local allies and by developing the capacity—in the form of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), which brought together five Army and Marine divisions, seven tactical fighter wings and three aircraft-carrier battle groups—to deter or intervene directly if the Soviet Union, Iraq or Iran threatened to upend the balance. The United States helped Iraq contain revolutionary Iran in the 1980s, but when Iraq's conquest of Kuwait in 1990 threatened to tilt things in Baghdad's favor, the United States assembled a multinational coalition centered on the RDF and smashed Saddam Hussein's military machine. Offshore balancing has three particular virtues that would be especially appealing today. First, it would significantly reduce (though not eliminate) the chances that the United States would get involved in another bloody and costly war like Iraq. America doesn't need to control the Middle East with its own forces; it merely needs to ensure that no other country does. Toward that end, offshore balancing would reject the use of military force to reshape the politics of the region and would rely instead on local allies to contain their dangerous neighbors. As an offshore balancer, the United States would husband its own resources and intervene only as a last resort. And when it did, it would finish quickly and then move back offshore.The relative inexpensiveness of this approach is particularly attractive in the current climate. The U.S. financial bailout has been hugely expensive, and it's not clear when the economy will recover. In this environment, America simply cannot afford to be fighting endless wars across the Middle East, or anywhere else. Remember that Washington has already spent $600 billion on the Iraq War, and the tally is likely to hit more than $1 trillion before that conflict is over. Imagine the added economic consequences of a war with Iran. Offshore balancing would not be free—the United States would still have to maintain a sizable expeditionary force and the capacity to move it quickly—but would be a lot cheaper than the alternative.Second, offshore balancing would ameliorate America's terrorism problem. One of the key lessons of the past century is that nationalism and other forms of local identity remain intensely powerful, and foreign occupiers generate fierce local resentment. That resentment often manifests itself in terrorism or even large-scale insurgencies directed at the United States. When the Reagan administration put U.S. troops in Beirut following Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, local terrorists responded by suicide-bombing the U.S. Embassy in April 1983 and the U.S. Marine barracks in October, killing more than 300. Keeping U.S. military forces out of sight until they are needed would minimize the anger created by having them permanently stationed on Arab soil.

Third, offshore balancing would reduce fears in Iran and Syria that the United States aims to attack them and remove their regimes—a key reason these states are currently seeking weapons of mass destruction. Persuading Tehran to abandon its nuclear program will require Washington to address Iran's legitimate security concerns and to refrain from issuing overt threats. Removing U.S. troops from the neighborhood would be a good start. The United States can't afford to completely disengage from the Middle East, but offshore balancing would make U.S. involvement there less threatening. Instead of lumping potential foes together and encouraging them to join forces against America, this strategy would encourage contending regional powers to compete for the United States' favor, thereby facilitating a strategy of divide-and-conquer. A final, compelling reason to adopt this approach to the Middle East is that nothing else has worked. In the early 1990s, the Clinton administration pursued a "dual containment" strategy: instead of using Iraq and Iran to check each other, the United States began trying to contain both. This policy guaranteed only that each country came to view the United States as a bitter enemy. It also required the United States to deploy large numbers of troops in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The policy fueled local resentment, helped persuade Osama bin Laden to declare war on America and led to the bombing of the Khobar Towers in 1996, the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 and, eventually, 9/11.

Shortly after 9/11, the Bush administration jettisoned dual containment in favor of regional transformation. When Baghdad fell, it briefly seemed that Bush just might succeed. But the occupation soon faltered, and America's position in the region went from bad to worse.The new president's only hope for extricating America from the resultant mess is to return to the one Middle East strategy that's worked well in the past. In practical terms, an offshore-balancing strategy would mean ending the Iraq War as quickly as possible while working to minimize the bloodshed there and throughout the region. Instead of threatening Iran with preventive war—an approach that's only fueled Tehran's desire for nuclear weapons and increased the popularity of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad—the new administration should try to cut a deal by offering Iran security guarantees in return for significant and veri-fiable limits on its nuclear-enrichment program. The United States should also take its sights off the Assad regime in Syria and push both it and Israel to reach a peace agreement.This strategy wouldn't eliminate all the problems the United States faces in the Middle East. But it would reduce the likelihood of future disasters like Iraq, significantly reduce America's terrorism problem and maximize Washington's prospects of thwarting nuclear proliferation. It would also be considerably less expensive in both human and financial terms. There are no foolproof strategies in international politics, but offshore balancing is probably as close as we can get.

Offshore Balancing Good – Maintains Hegemony

### Offshore balancing avoids blowback but still maintains U.S. primacy

### Stephen M. Walt, academic dean and the Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2005, “ In the National Interest <http://www.bostonreview.net/BR30.1/walt.phpthe>) SM

The final option is offshore balancing, which has been America’s traditional grand strategy. In this strategy, the United States deploys its power abroad only when there are direct threats to vital American interests. Offshore balancing assumes that only a few areas of the globe are of strategic importance to the United States (that is, worth fighting and dying for). Specifically, the vital areas are the regions where there are substantial concentrations of power and wealth or critical natural resources: Europe, industrialized Asia, and the Persian Gulf. Offshore balancing further recognizes that the United States does not need to control these areas directly; it merely needs to ensure that they do not fall under the control of a hostile great power and especially not under the control of a so-called peer competitor. To prevent rival great powers from doing this, offshore balancing prefers to rely primarily on local actors to uphold the regional balance of power. Under this strategy, the United States would intervene with its own forces only when regional powers are unable to uphold the balance of power on their own. Most importantly, offshore balancing is not isolationist. The United States would still be actively engaged around the world, through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and the WTO and through close ties with specific regional allies. But it would no longer keep large numbers of troops overseas solely for the purpose of “maintaining stability,” and it would not try to use American military power to impose democracy on other countries or disarm potential proliferators. Offshore balancing does not preclude using power for humanitarian ends—to halt or prevent genocide or mass murder—but the United States would do so only when it was confident it could prevent these horrors at an acceptable cost. (By limiting military commitments overseas, however, an offshore-balancing strategy would make it easier for the United States to intervene in cases of mass murder or genocide.) The United States would still be prepared to use force when it was directly threatened—as it was when the Taliban allowed al Qaeda a safe haven in Afghanistan—and would be prepared to help other governments deal with terrorists that also threaten the United States. Over time, a strategy of offshore balancing would make it less likely that the United States would face the hatred of radicals like bin Laden, and would thus make it less likely that the United States would have to intervene in far-flung places where it is not welcome. Offshore balancing is the ideal grand strategy for an era of American primacy. It husbands the power upon which this primacy rests and minimizes the fear that this power provokes. By setting clear priorities and emphasizing reliance on regional allies, it reduces the danger of being drawn into unnecessary conflicts and encourages other states to do more for us. Equally important, it takes advantage of America’s favorable geopolitical position and exploits the tendency for regional powers to worry more about each other than about the United States. But it is not a passive strategy and does not preclude using the full range of America’s power to advance its core interests.

Offshore Balancing Good – Challengers

Challengers threaten US global security interests – offshore balancing is the only way to sustainably check regional powers.

Layne 2009 [Christopher, Assoc. Prof. George HW Bush School of Gov't and Public Service @ Texas A&M U, research fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty @ the Independent Institute, “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived,” in *Review of International Studies* (2009), 35, 5–25 | VP]

Some will ask, why is there a need to rethink America’s strategy of primacy? After all, that strategy resulted directly in the creation of a post-World War II international economic system – described variously as one based on interdependence or globalisation – that has brought unprecedented prosperity to the US, Europe, and East Asia. During the Cold War, America’s strategy allowed the US to prevail decisively against the Soviet Union, thereby ushering in an era of unchallenged American dominance – an era in which it has become commonplace to compare the US to the Roman Empire at its zenith. For sure, power counts in international politics, and what possibly could be wrong with a strategy that aims to maintain American primacy? Over the past decade or so, leading neorealist scholars of US security policy have answered this question succinctly: primacy has a boomerang effect that makes the US less – not more – secure.2

Primacy’s neorealist critics have outlined an alternative grand strategy that increasingly resonates with the American public: offshore balancing.3 Its proponents believe that offshore balancing can do a better job than primacy of enhancing American security and matching US foreign policy objectives with the resources available to support them. The driving factor behind offshore balancing is its proponents’ recognition that the US has a ‘hegemony’ problem. America’s strategy of primacy increases US vulnerability to a geopolitical backlash – whether in the guise of countervailing great power coalitions, or terrorist attacks – and alienates public opinion in large swaths of the globe, including Europe and the Middle East.

Offshore balancing is based on the assumption that the most vital US interests are preventing the emergence of a dominant power in Europe and East Asia – a ‘Eurasian hegemon’ – and forestalling the emergence of a regional (‘oil’) hegemon in the Middle East. Only a Eurasian hegemon could pose an existential threat to the US. A regional hegemon in the Middle East could imperil the flow of oil upon which the US economy, and the economies of the advanced industrial states depend. As an offshore balancer, the US would rely on the tried and true dynamics of the balance of power to thwart any states with hegemonic ambitions. An offshore balancing strategy would permit the US to withdraw its ground forces from Eurasia (including the Middle East) and assume an over-the-horizon military posture. If – and only if – regional power balances look to be failing would the US re-insert its troops into Eurasia. Offshore balancing contrasts sharply with primacy because primacists fear a world with independent, multiple poles of power. Primacy is based on the belief that it is better for the US to defend its allies and clients than to have them defend themselves. Offshore balancers, on the other hand, believe for an insular great power like the US, the best strategy is to rely on a balance of power approach that devolves to other states the costs and risks of their defense.

Offshore balancing is a realist strategy because it eschews the ideological crusading on behalf of democracy that is endemic to Wilsonianism, defines US interests in terms of what is vital rather than simply desirable, balances ends and means, and is based on prudence and self-restraint in the conduct of US strategy. Most of all it is a strategy that fits within the broad realist tradition because it recognises the difference between, on one hand, what the sociologist Max Weber called the ethic of conviction and, on the other hand, the ethic of responsibility. In foreign policymaking the road to hell is paved with good intentions, and policies must be judged on their consequences, not on the intentions that underlie them. The Bush administration’s disastrous policies in Iraq and the Middle East are a much needed reminder that this is a test Wilsonianism too often fails.

Offshore Balancing Good – Counterbalancing

Offshore balancing neutralizes potential balancing coalitions – they’ll fight each other before they consider balancing against a detached power.

Layne 2009 [Christopher, Assoc. Prof. George HW Bush School of Gov't and Public Service @ Texas A&M U, research fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty @ the Independent Institute, “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived,” in *Review of International Studies* (2009), 35, 5–25 | VP]

Heretofore, proponents of offshore balancing have seen the strategy primarily as a means of shifting the costs and risks of opposing rising Eurasian, or regional, hegemons from the US to other states. Offshore balancing seeks to capitalise on the inherent strategic advantages that insular great powers possess. First, they can rely on regional power balances to contain rising powers.8 Second, if it should become necessary for them to become involved, because they are protected by geography and their own military capabilities they can stand on the sidelines and wait for the most opportune moment to decide when, and on which side, to intervene. Moreover, by taking advantage of the freedom of action that allows them to enter conflicts later rather than sooner, they can extract the maximum concessions from their alliance partners as their price for entering a conflict. However, beyond these traditional advantages of insularity, offshore balancing does – or can – have a wedge strategy dimension.

Wedge strategies are the grand strategic equivalent of what the great baseball executive Branch Rickey called ‘addition by subtraction’. A Timothy W. Crawford has pointed out, when discussing power relations among great powers, most security studies scholars focus on ‘addition’. Hence, they pay great attention to balancing behaviour – both internal and external – as a means by which great powers seek to increase their relative power. However, although often neglected, wedge strategies are way of accomplishing the same objective – increasing the state’s relative power – by a very different means: by subtracting potential opponents from the ranks of its adversaries.9 That is, wedge strategies are ‘a policy to increase a state’s relative power over external threats, by preventing the grouping or causing the dispersal of threatening alliances’.10 Great powers can improve their relative power position not only by forming coalitions and/or building up their own military capabilities, but also by preventing other states that might be inclined to align against them from doing so, or by persuading an actual or potential ally of an adversary to drop out of the alliance and assume a posture of neutrality.11 Another aspect of wedge strategies is that they can, if used successfully, prevent others from taking balancing actions directed at the state.

While not generally conceived of as a wedge strategy, offshore balancing is a way that an insular great power can neutralise threats to its security. By acting as an offshore balancer, an insular great power can accomplish two vital grand strategic tasks. First, because its would-be adversaries invariably live in dangerous neighbourhoods, by truly being ‘offshore’ and non-threatening, an insular great power can deflect the focus of other states’ security policies away from itself. Simply put, if an offshore power stands on the sidelines, other great powers will compete against each other, not against it. It can thus enhance its security simply because the dynamics of balance-of-power politics invariably will draw would-be competitors in other regions into rivalries with each other. The fact that non-insular states must worry constantly about possible threats from nearby neighbours is a factor that historically has worked to increase the relative power position of insular states. Thus, as Paul Kennedy notes, after 1815 a major reason that Britain’s interests were not challenged by an overwhelming coalition was due to ‘the preoccupation of virtually all European statesman with continental power politics’ because it ‘was the moves of their neighbors, not the usually discreet workings of British sea power, which interested them’.12

Of course, to capitalise on this dynamic, an insular great power must adopt a non-threatening posture toward other regions, and not pursue hegemonic (or imperial) ambitions in those regions. It was, after all, not simply geography and naval power that enabled Britain to be a successful offshore balancer until World War I. A critical factor underpinning the success of its offshore balancing strategy was that Britain had no positive geopolitical, territorial, or ideological aspirations on the continent that would have provoked a countervailing coalition against it. Rather, England had only a negative interest in Europe: ensuring that no great power gained continental hegemony.

England’s historic policy toward Europe also suggests another way that offshore balancing can function as a wedge strategy. One of the best ways a great power can avoid provoking the hostility – and counter-balancing efforts – of others is not to give them any reason to feel threatened.13 Insularity allows offshore great powers to choose policies of detachment. And policies of detachment, in turn, reduce the risk that others will view it as a dangerous rival. In other words, if one of the objects of wedge strategies is to prevent threatening alliances from forming, one of the best ways to accomplish this goal is for a state to mind its own business and not give others reason to feel menaced by it. Insular great powers have the luxury of reducing threats to themselves by not intruding into the affairs of great powers in other regions.

The US, of course, has not acted as an offshore balancer. Rather, for more than sixty years it consciously has sought extra-regional hegemony in Europe, East Asia and the Middle East.14 Rather than acting as a ‘wedge’ strategy, American primacy – especially now that the Cold War has ended – now threatens to act more like a kind of glue that unifies other states, and, increasingly, non-state actors like Al- Qaeda, in resistance to America’s expansive geopolitical and ideological ambitions. The operational differences between the strategies of primacy and offshore balancing can be illustrated by examining how each would deal with the most pressing foreign policy issue facing the US today: the Middle East.

Offshore Balancing Good – Iran

Offshore balancing allows diplomatic relations with Iran – even if negotiations break down, there’s no propensity for violence.

Layne 2009 [Christopher, Assoc. Prof. George HW Bush School of Gov't and Public Service @ Texas A&M U, research fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty @ the Independent Institute, “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived,” in *Review of International Studies* (2009), 35, 5–25 | VP]

Iran

As an offshore balancer, rather than confronting Iran militarily over its nuclear programme and its regional ambitions, the US would follow a two-tracked strategy of deterrence and diplomacy. Diplomatically, the US should try to negotiate an arrangement with Iran that exchanges meaningful security guarantees, diplomatic recognition, and normal economic relations for a verifiable cessation of Tehran’s nuclear weapons programme. Given the deep mutual distrust between Washington and Tehran, and domestic political constraints in both the US and Iran, it is an open question whether such a deal can be struck. If it cannot, however, rather than attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities – or tacitly facilitating an Israeli attack on them – the US should be prepared to live with a nuclear armed Iran just as it did with China in the 1960s, when China was seen as far more dangerous a rogue state than Iran is today.23

Of course, hard-line US neoconservatives reject this approach and argue that a nuclear-armed Iran would have three bad consequences: there could be a nuclear arms race in the Middle East; Iran might supply nuclear weapons to terrorists; and Tehran could use its nuclear weapons to blackmail other states in the region, or to engage in aggression. Each of these scenarios, however, is improbable.24 A nuclear Iran will not touch off a proliferation snowball in the Middle East. Israel, of course, already is a nuclear power. The other three states that might be tempted to go for a nuclear weapons capability are Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. However, each of these states would be under strong pressure not to do so, and Saudi Arabia lacks the industrial and engineering capabilities to develop nuclear weapons indigenously. Notwithstanding the Bush administration’s hyperbolic rhetoric, Iran is not going to give nuclear weapons to terrorists. This is not to deny Tehran’s close links to groups like Hezbollah and Hamas. However, there are good reasons that states – even those that have ties to terrorists – draw the line at giving them nuclear weapons (or other WMD): if the terrorists were to use these weapons against the US or its allies, the weapons could be traced back to the donor state, which would be at risk of annihilation by an American retaliatory strike.25 Iran’s leaders have too much at stake to run this risk. Even if one believes the administration’s claims that rogue state leaders are indifferent to the fate of their populations, they do care very much about the survival of their regimes, which means that they can be deterred.

For the same reason, Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons will not invest Tehran with options to attack, or intimidate its neighbours. Israel’s security with respect to Iran is guaranteed by its own formidable nuclear deterrent capabilities. By the same token, just as it did in Europe during the Cold War, the US can extend its own deterrence umbrella to protect its clients in the region – Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and Turkey. American security guarantees not only will dissuade Iran from acting recklessly, but also restrain proliferation by negating the incentives for states like Saudi Arabia and Turkey to acquire their own nuclear weapons. Given the overwhelming US advantage in both nuclear and conventional military capabilities, Iran is not going to risk national suicide by challenging America’s security commitments in the region. In short, while a nuclear-armed Iran hardly is desirable, neither is it ‘intolerable’, because it could be contained and deterred successfully by the US.

Offshore Balancing Good – Iraq

Entanglement in Iraq makes war more probable – offshore balancing ensures durable stability.

Layne 2009 [Christopher, Assoc. Prof. George HW Bush School of Gov't and Public Service @ Texas A&M U, research fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty @ the Independent Institute, “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived,” in *Review of International Studies* (2009), 35, 5–25 | VP]

The Bush administration has advanced three major reasons why the US cannot afford to leave Iraq without first attaining ‘victory’. First, withdrawing from Iraq will increase the terrorist threat to the American homeland. Second, a US defeat in Iraq will be a victory for Iran. Third, if the US fails to stabilise Iraq, the chaos there could ‘spill-over’ and trigger a wider conflict in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. These arguments do withstand close examination, however.

President George W. Bush repeatedly characterised Iraq as the ‘central front’ in the so-called war on terrorism, and argued that ‘if we fail there [Iraq], the enemy will follow us here’.26 In his view, the conflict in Iraq ‘is not civil war; it is pure evil’. Claiming that ‘we have an obligation to protect ourselves from that evil’, Bush said US policy in Iraq boiled down to one thing: ‘We’re after Al-Qaeda’.27 The administration’s claims, however, were disingenuous: American withdrawal from Iraq would not increase the terrorist threat to the American homeland. First, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has only tenuous links to Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda organisation. Second, AQI has an extremely ambivalent relationship with the indigenous Sunni insurgents. The Sunni insurgents resent AQI because it uses foreign jihadists to conduct suicide bombings, and because it indiscriminately attacks civilian targets. To the extent AQI and the other Sunni insurgents groups collaborate, it is their common hostility to the American occupation that binds them. If US troops were to withdraw, it is likely that the other Sunni insurgents would try to drive AQI out of Iraq (while also contesting the Shiites for political supremacy). Indeed, the major reason violence in Iraq has subsided since late 2006 is not because of the ‘surge’ of US combat forces, but rather because large segments of the Sunni population (including former insurgents) turned against AQI.

For these reasons, most US intelligence officials and outside experts have rejected the argument that an American withdrawal would result in Iraq becoming a base for operations against the US.28 Moreover, bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda does not need bases in Iraq in order to launch operations against the US because it already has a sanctuary in the region along the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier that it is using to reconstitute its capabilities.29 Indeed, in July 2007 in a National Intelligence Estimate on the terrorist threat to the US, and in Congressional testimony, senior US intelligence officials warned that Al-Qaeda has taken advantage of this safe haven to train its operatives and plan new attacks.30 If the US really is worried about Al-Qaeda striking the US, instead of focusing on Iraq its strategic efforts should be concentrated on defeating the resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan and – even more – getting Pakistan to crack-down on the Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces operating in Waziristan and the Northwest Frontier province – not on Iraq.31

The contention that American withdrawal from Iraq would enhance Iranian power in the Persian Gulf is simultaneously both true and misleading. Foreign policy experts widely agree that Iran has been the biggest winner in the Iraq War.32 By invading Iraq and pursuing regime change there, the Bush administration set the table for the expansion of Iran’s power and regional influence. The US invasion of Iraq upset the prevailing geopolitical equilibrium in the region. Until March 2003, the balance of power in the Persian Gulf between Iraq and Iran prevented either from establishing regional dominance, but by toppling Saddam Hussein the US rendered Iraq incapable of acting as a viable counterpoise to Iranian power. The administration’s policy also upset the domestic balance of power within Iraq, which redounded to Tehran’s benefit. The democratisation policy adopted by the administration empowered Iraq’s long-suppressed Shiite majority. Predictably, the political ascendancy of Iraq’s Shiites worked to Iran’s advantage because of these close personal relations between leading Shiite leaders and Iranian clerics, and the religious bonds between the Shiite populations in both countries. Deepening economic ties between the two countries have enabled Tehran to consolidate its influence in Iraq.33 During the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, most American foreign policy analysts foresaw that Iran would be the main beneficiary of the administration’s Iraq policy. Only the Bush administration and its neoconservative cheerleaders were oblivious to the probable consequences of their policies. Now – short of war, of course – it is too late to arrest Iranian’s growing power in the region. The damage already has been done.

The argument that US withdrawal from Iraq would result in wider regional instability cannot be dismissed out of hand. If US troops leave Iraq, bad things indeed could happen: violence in Iraq could worsen and, in addition to the bloodshed, Iraq refugees could flee to neighbouring countries with de-stabilising consequences. Other nations in the region could be tempted to intervene in a re-intensified Iraqi civil war that causes Iraq to fracture along ethnic and sectarian fault lines. Indeed, Saudi Arabia already has indicated that in this case it would come to the aid of the Iraqi Sunnis, and Turkey has conducted attacks on PPK insurgents who are using bases in the Kurdish area of Iran to conduct attacks inside Turkey. In short, the Middle East could become even bloodier and more unstable. It is by no means certain that this will be the outcome, however. Iraq’s major neighbours – Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia – have competing interests to be sure, but they also share one common interest: none of them wants to see the Iraqi state disintegrate. Moreover, the US also has leverage – military, economic, and political – that it can use to dissuade Iraq’s neighbours from involving themselves openly in Iraq’s civil war following an American pull-out.

Offshore Balancing Good – Afghanistan

Offshore balancing key to Afghanistan instability.

Pape 2009 (Robert A., Prof. Poli. Sci. @ UChicago, former Prof. Int'l Relations @ Dartmouth, “To Beat the Taliban, Fight From Afar,” October 14, New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/15/opinion/15pape.html?_r=1>)

AS President Obama and his national security team confer this week to consider strategies for Afghanistan, one point seems clear: our current military forces cannot win the war. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top American commander there, has asked for 40,000 or more additional United States troops, which many are calling an ambitious new course. In truth, it is not new and it is not bold enough.

America will best serve its interests in Afghanistan and the region by shifting to a new strategy of off-shore balancing, which relies on air and naval power from a distance, while also working with local security forces on the ground. The reason for this becomes clear when one examines the rise of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan in recent years.

General McChrystal’s own report explains that American and NATO military forces themselves are a major cause of the deteriorating situation, for two reasons. First, Western forces have become increasingly viewed as foreign occupiers; as the report puts it, “over-reliance on firepower and force protection have severely damaged the International Security Assistance Force’s legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people.”

Second, the central government led by America’s chosen leader, Hamid Karzai, is thoroughly corrupt and viewed as illegitimate: “Local Afghan communities are unable to hold local officials accountable through either direct elections or judicial processes, especially when those individuals are protected by senior government officials.”

Unfortunately, these political facts dovetail strongly with developments on the battlefield in the last few years. In 2001, the United States toppled the Taliban and kicked Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan with just a few thousand of its own troops, primarily through the combination of American air power and local ground forces from the Northern Alliance. Then, for the next several years, the United States and NATO modestly increased their footprint to about 20,000 troops, mainly limiting the mission to guarding Kabul, the capital. Up until 2004, there was little terrorism in Afghanistan and little sense that things were deteriorating.

Then, in 2005, the United States and NATO began to systematically extend their military presence across Afghanistan. The goals were to defeat the tiny insurgency that did exist at the time, eradicate poppy crops and encourage local support for the central government. Western forces were deployed in all major regions, including the Pashtun areas in the south and east, and today have ballooned to more than 100,000 troops.

As Western occupation grew, the use of the two most worrisome forms of terrorism in Afghanistan — suicide attacks and homemade bombs — escalated in parallel. There were no recorded suicide attacks in Afghanistan before 2001. According to data I have collected, in the immediate aftermath of America’s conquest, the nation experienced only a small number: none in 2002, two in 2003, five in 2004 and nine in 2005.

But in 2006, suicide attacks began to increase by an order of magnitude — with 97 in 2006, 142 in 2007, 148 in 2008 and more than 60 in the first half of 2009. Moreover, the overwhelming percentage of the suicide attacks (80 percent) has been against United States and allied troops or their bases rather than Afghan civilians, and nearly all (95 percent) carried out by Afghans.

The pattern for other terrorist attacks is almost the same. The most deadly involve roadside bombs that detonate on contact or are set off by remote control. Although these weapons were a relatively minor nuisance in the early years of the occupation, with 782 attacks in 2005, their use has shot up since — to 1,739 in 2006, nearly 2,000 in 2007 and more than 3,200 last year. Again, these attacks have for the most part been carried out against Western combat forces, not Afghan targets.

The picture is clear: the more Western troops we have sent to Afghanistan, the more the local residents have viewed themselves as under foreign occupation, leading to a rise in suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks. (We see this pattern pretty much any time an “outside” armed force has tried to pacify a region, from the West Bank to Kashmir to Sri Lanka.)

So as General McChrystal looks to change course in Afghanistan, the priority should be not to send more soldiers but to end the sense of the United States and its allies as foreign occupiers. Our purpose in Afghanistan is to prevent future attacks like 9/11, which requires stopping the rise of a new generation of anti-American terrorists, particularly suicide terrorists, who are super-predators able to kill large numbers of innocent people.

What motivates suicide attackers, however, is not the existence of a terrorist sanctuary, but the presence of foreign forces on territory they prize. So it’s little surprise that Western forces in Afghanistan have provided a key rallying point for the insurgency, playing a central role in the Taliban’s recruitment campaign and propaganda, which threaten not only our troops there but also our homeland.

The presence of our troops also works against the stability of the central government, as it can rely on Western protection rather than work harder for popular support.

Fortunately, the United States does not need to station large ground forces in Afghanistan to keep it from being a significant safe haven for Al Qaeda or any other anti-American terrorists. This can be achieved by a strategy that relies on over-the-horizon air, naval and rapidly deployable ground forces, combined with training and equipping local groups to oppose the Taliban. No matter what happens in Afghanistan, the United States is going to maintain a strong air and naval presence in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean for many years, and these forces are well suited to attacking terrorist leaders and camps in conjunction with local militias — just as they did against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in 2001.

The United States has a strong history of working with local groups, particularly the Tajiks and Uzbeks of the old Northern Alliance, who would ensure that the Taliban does not recapture Kabul and the northern and western regions of Afghanistan. And should more substantial threats arise, our offshore forces and allies would buy time and protect space for Western ground forces to return.

Further, the United States and its allies have made some efforts to lead Pashtun tribal militias in the southern and eastern areas to abandon their support for the Taliban and, if not switch to America’s side, to at least stay neutral. For instance, the largest British gains in the southwest came from winning the support of Mullah Salam, a former Taliban commander who is the district governor of Musa Qala.

Early this year the United States started what it calls the Afghanistan Social Outreach Program, offering monthly stipends to tribal and local leaders in exchange for their cooperation against the Taliban insurgency. The program is financed at too low a level — approximately $20 million a year — to compete with alternatives that the Taliban can offer like protection for poppy cultivation that is worth some $3 billion a year.

One reason we can expect a strategy of local empowerment to work is that this is precisely how the Taliban is gaining support. As General McChrystal’s report explains, there is little ideological loyalty between the local Pashtuns and the Taliban, so the terrorists gain local support by capitalizing on “vast unemployment by empowering the young and disenfranchised through cash payments, weapons, and prestige.” We’ll have to be more creative and rely on larger economic and political carrots to win over the hearts and minds of the Pashtuns.

Changing strategy does not mean that the United States can withdraw all its military power from Afghanistan immediately. As we are now seeing in Iraq, changing to an approach that relies less on ground power and more on working with local actors takes time. But it is the best strategy for Afghanistan. Otherwise we will continue to be seen and mistrusted as an occupying power, and the war will be lost.

Offshore Balancing Good – Middle East

Primacy catalyzes counterbalancing and makes terrorism and Middle East war inevitable – only an offshore balancing strategy solves.

Layne 2009 [Christopher, Assoc. Prof. George HW Bush School of Gov't and Public Service @ Texas A&M U, research fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty @ the Independent Institute, “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived,” in *Review of International Studies* (2009), 35, 5–25 | VP]

Offshore balancing and the Middle East

The US has reached a watershed in Iraq and the Middle East. Washington needs to revamp its overall regional grand strategy because the current strategy is in shambles. Although the security situation in Iraq has improved since late 2006, the nation remains extremely fragile politically and its future is problematic. On the other hand, things are unravelling in Afghanistan, where the insurgency led by the revitalised Taliban is spreading. The US and Iran remain on a collision course over Tehran’s nuclear weapons programme – and its larger regional ambitions. Moreover, the summer 2006 fighting in Lebanon weakened US Middle Eastern policy in four ways. First, it enhanced Iran’s regional clout. Second, it intensified anti-American public opinion in the Middle East. Third, it fuelled a populist Islamic groundswell in the region that threatens to undermine America’s key Middle East allies: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. Fourth, American policy in the Middle East has increased the terrorist threat to the US.

The Bush administration’s Middle East policy was a classic example of an anti-wedge ‘strategy’. Rather than preventing the coalescence of forces hostile to the US, or deflecting their attention from the US, the Bush strategy has had the effect of unifying diverse groups against American interests. Instead of viewing them as discrete conflicts, the Bush administration regarded the conflict in Iraq, the ‘war on terror’, unrest in Gaza and the West Bank, turmoil in Lebanon, and the confrontation with Iran as part of a single enterprise. This tendency to aggregate opponents rather than to peel them off was first evidenced in January 2002 when President Bush linked Iran and Iraq – and North Korea – as part of an ‘axis of evil’.

Similarly, although Syria and Iran long have had an ambivalent relationship, the administration grouped them together rather than trying to split them apart. Bush also lumped together Sunni Islamic radical groups like Al-Qaeda and Hamas and Shiite fundamentalists like Muqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi Army in Iraq, the Iranian regime, and Hezbollah – and regarded them as a single, unitary menace. As Bush put it, ‘The Shia and Sunni extremists are different faces of the same totalitarian threat. Whatever slogans they chant, when they slaughter the innocent they have the same wicked purposes. They want to kill Americans, kill democracy in the Middle East, and gain the weapons to kill on an even more horrific scale.’15 Bush’s comments manifested a vast ignorance of the cleavages in the Islamic world. Even worse, his policy of treating Sunni and Shiite radicals as a single threat may have acted as a self-fulfilling prophecy – a ‘glue strategy’ – that instead of dividing or neutralising opponents of the US, unified them and created threats that either would not otherwise exist, or would be much less potent.

In the Middle East, an offshore balancing strategy would break sharply with the Bush administration’s approach to the Middle East. As an offshore balancer, the US would redefine its regional interests, reduce its military role, and adopt a new regional diplomatic posture. It would seek to dampen the terrorist threat by removing the on-the ground US military presence in the region, and to quell rampant anti- Americanism in the Islamic world by pushing hard for a resolution of the Israeli/ Palestinian conflict. The strategy would also avoid further destabilisation of the Middle East by abandoning the project of regional democratic transformation. Finally, as an offshore balancer, Washington would seek a diplomatic accommodation of its differences with Iran.

Offshore Balancing Good – East Asia

Offshore balancing necessary to stabilize East Asia.

Gholz, Press, and Sapolsky 1997 [Eugene and Darryl G., PhD candidates – Dept. Poli. Sci. @ MIT, Harvey M., Prof. Public Policy and Organization @ MIT, “Come Home, America, The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring, 1997), pp. 5-48 | VP]

American foreign policy in Asia, too, has been captured by Cold War alliances, although in this region the formal institutions are less developed than the European NATO structure. The United States has already pulled out of its largest overseas bases, the facilities at Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines, but has reinvigorated the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and reaffirmed the “tripwire” deployment in Korea. Indeed, one of the principal architects of the Clinton administration’s Asia strategy, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., has suggested that the United States remain engaged in the Pacific Rim with the specific intent of slowly developing formal institutions of regional integration. We argue, however, that this forward presence in Asia has lost its Cold War security rationale, exposes American soldiers to risk, costs Americans money, and artificially reduces the defense burden on America’s leading economic competitors, helping them compete against U.S. companies.

As in Europe, the United States currently has about 100,000 military personnel stationed in Asia, all of whom should be brought home and demobilized. The United States should end its commitments to Japan and South Korea, cease military cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), withdraw from the Australia, New Zealand, United States Pact (ANZUS), and terminate the implicit guarantee to Taiwan, giving those nations new incentives to take care of themselves.

No Asian ally of the United States faces an overwhelming conventional threat. It requires astounding assumptions about the relative fighting strength of North and South Korean soldiers to develop a military balance requirement for U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula. South Korea may want to improve its defenses further to replace capabilities that the United States is expected to supply – e.g., build a larger air force – but it is difficult to understand how a country with twice the population and twenty times the economic power of its primary competitor, not to mention a substantial technological lead, cannot find the resources to defend itself.

Current U.S. strategy implicitly assumes that America must remain engaged because of the Asian countries’ failure to balance against Chinese strength. But Japan and Taiwan, the two plausible targets for Chinese aggression, are more than capable of defending themselves from conventional attack. Both enjoy the geographic advantage of being islands. The surrounding oceans ensure a defense dominance that could only be overcome with enormous material or technological advantages.

Offshore Balancing Good – China

Offshore balancing key to maintain influence in Asia as China rises.

Nexon 2009 [Daniel H., Asst. Prof. Dept. Gov't. and the School of Foreign Service @ Georgetown U, "The Balance of Power in the Balance," Vol 61, No 2, April, MUSE | VP]

Even more than the states of South Asia, Evelyn Goh’s survey of the Southeast Asian world suggests a strong and unwavering demand for the right kind of U.S. presence and engagement with the region. Given the area’s proximity to a rising China—which attracts even as it unsettles—Southeast Asian dependence on the United States for deterrence and reassurance is likely to remain high, irrespective of what Washington’s other failings might be. Goh emphasizes, however, that although the region would welcome renewed, but not overbearing, U.S. attention, key regional states are nonetheless focused on diversifying their “strategic dependencies” to include increased engagement with China. Their aim is to enmesh China while reaching out to other major regional actors, such as Japan and India, in an effort to balance the growth of Chinese influence. Mindful of the recent successes of Chinese diplomacy, this Southeast Asian interest in diversification is likely to increase further and though the regional states benefit from a strong offshore U.S. military presence, their ability to transparently support U.S. policies, especially when controversial, is nonetheless limited by the large Muslim populations that reside in many of these states. The best recipe for continuing U.S. success in Southeast Asia, Goh concludes, consists of maintaining a strong offshore military presence capable of maintaining hegemonic order should this be threatened, without either pursuing the “outright containment of China” or leveling burdensome demands in the individual bilateral relationships with key states, while continuing to participate in regional institutions.

Offshore Balancing Good – Avoids anti- American resentment

**Offshore balancing avoids anti-American backlash and reassures allies of U.S. commitment**

### Stephen M. Walt, academic dean and the Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2005, “ In the National Interest <http://www.bostonreview.net/BR30.1/walt.phpthe>) SM

Second, instead of emphasizing “preemption,” the United States should strive to reassure its allies that it will use force with wisdom and restraint. In particular, the United States can reduce the fear created by its overawing power by giving other states a voice in the circumstances in which it will use force. Although exceptions may arise from time to time, the United States should be willing to use a de facto “buddy system” to regulate the large-scale use of its military power, whether by NATO, the UN Security Council, or other international institutions. The point is not to cede control over American foreign policy to foreign powers or to an international institution like the United Nations; the point is to use other states or existing institutions to reassure others about the ways the United States will use its power. Conservative critics of the UN and other multilateral institutions have mistakenly focused on the rather modest restrictions that these organizations might impose on the United States, and they have ignored the role these institutions could play in legitimizing American policy and reducing the risk of an anti-American backlash. For the foreseeable future, the United States must think of this sort of “reassurance” as a continuous policy problem. During the Cold War, the United States took many steps—including military exercises, visits by important officials, and public declarations—to remind allies (and adversaries) that its commitments were credible. And it didn’t just do these things once and consider the job over; rather, it reaffirmed these signals of commitment more or less constantly. Now that the Cold War is over and the United States is largely unchecked, American leaders have to make a similar effort to convince other states of their good will, good judgment, and sense of restraint. American leaders cannot simply assert these values once or twice and then act as they please—which is what the Bush administration has done. Rather, reassuring gestures have to be repeated, and reassuring statements have to be reiterated. And the more consistent the words and deeds are, the more effective such pledges will be. The benefits of self-restraint can be demonstrated by considering how much the United States would have gained had it followed this approach toward Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Had the Bush administration rejected preventive war in Iraq in March 2003 and chosen instead to continue the UN-mandated inspections process that was then underway, it would have scored a resounding diplomatic victory. The Bush team could have claimed—correctly—that the threat of U.S. military action had forced Saddam Hussein to resume inspections under new and more intrusive procedures. The UN inspectors would have determined that Iraq didn’t have WMDs after all. There was no reason for the Bush team to rush to war because Iraq’s decaying military capabilities were already contained and Saddam was incapable of aggressive action so long as the inspectors were on Iraqi soil. If Saddam had balked after a few months, international support for his ouster would have been much easier to obtain, and in the meantime the United States would have shown the world that it preferred to use force only as a last resort. This course would have kept Iraq isolated, kept the rest of the world on America’s side, undermined Osama bin Laden’s claims that the United States sought to dominate the Islamic world, and incidentally allowed the United States to focus its energies and attention on defeating al Qaeda. Even more important, this policy of self-restraint would have made the war avoidable, thereby saving thousands of lives and billions of dollars and keeping the United States out of the quagmire in which it is now engulfed. The Bush team had all these benefits in their hands, and it squandered them by rushing headlong into war. Instead of demonstrating that America’s primacy would be guided by wisdom and restraint, the Bush team gave the rest of the world ample reason to worry about the preponderance of power in Washington’s hands. Repairing the damage is likely to take years.

A2: Israeli Strikes

US presence in the Middle East gives Israel an incentive to attack Iran

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and a Contributing Editor to Survival, “All Shook Up?”, Survival Magazine, 7/21/10)

Is this tragedy of errors not in danger of being replicated in the case of America, Israel and Iran? The United States seems to have repeatedly warned Israel not to launch an attack against Iranian nuclear installations. But at the same time, by repeating that a nuclear-armed Iran is intolerable, by escalating the sanctions (which are most likely to be ineffective), and reaffirming (rightly) its commitment to Israel’s security, does America not increase the temptation for Israel to take the initiative, in the belief (probably justified in this case) that it would not be left alone by Washington in the face of Iranian retaliation? That would be a ‘little’ war to really shake the world.

Forward Deployment Bad – Laundry List

Forward deployment fails at deterrence, strains relations with allies, and increases blow-back

Kent E. **Calder**, director of the Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Relations, a faculty member at the university’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in Washington D.C., and served as special adviser to the U.S. ambassador to Japan from 1997 to 2001, 20**07, “**Embattled Garrisons,” pg. 215,) SM

Apart from the exposure to increased danger that it presents to American troops, forward deployment also has other important negatives in human terms, it is argued. Troops in Korea and Bosnia, most marines in Okinawa, air force pilots in the Middle East, and navy sailors and marines at sea face months at a time away from their families. Large deployments abroad often complicate relations between the United Stats and its allies, as frictions on Okinawa, for example, clearly demonstrate. Perhaps the most telling argument against forward deployment, in the view of critics, is that in the final analysis it does not serve America’s most fundamental interests in a post-Cold War world – or indeed, in important respects, even those of the key allies that American troops are protecting, In contrast to Cold War days, when the U.S. forward deployed presence was larger and the Soviet threat was clear, overseas, bases today do not provide substantial extended deterrent to American allies, especially when those bases are threatened militarily by the increasingly accurate precision weapons of adversaries. To the contrary, American bases may subject the host country to unwelcome “blow-back” it is alleged. Such bases are generally costly, despite substantial burden sharing support from some allies. And those bases are potentially difficult to use operationally to show resolve in some strategically important cases. In contingencies ranging from the Ukraine and the Baltic to the Taiwan Straits, implicit host-nation restrictions on sensitive third-country deployment reduce the strategic value of many overseas bases to the U.S. military. Given America’s formidable long-range technological capabilities, coupled with the costs, dangers, and constrained utility of deploying American forces abroad, the prudent course of action – even in a realist strategic calculus – is to base U.S. forces at home until they are really needed in conflict, Fortress America proponents content. Then, when necessary, those forces could lash out rapidly, across oceans and continents, with space-power, long-range air power, and other elements of what be called a “reconnaissance-strike complex.” In this way, it is argued; they could both defend U.S. interests from America’s homeland, and also avoid the distinct negatives of forward deployment.

Forward Deployment Bad – Hegemony

Alliances hurt U.S. hegemony

David **Brooks** 1/14/**10** “ Realism and the US Hegemony” <http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-news/5037238-realism-and-the-us-hegemony>

The U.S. is tied down by to many foreign interests. In order to maintain U.S. power, it should be policy to remove the umbrella protection for Japan and military assistance to Israel. For a hegemon to remain in power it is necessary to avoid large scale wars, because they are draining on the state’s economy. The umbrella protection the U.S. military provides for Japan could lead to a large scale conflict with China. A war with a state as powerful as China would cost the U.S. a lot of money and resources. The drain from this potential war could lead to economic hardship and the eventual downfall of U.S. hegemony. Alliances, such as the ones the U.S. has with Israel and Japan could end up costing the U.S. more in the future. Israel exists in a region that is oil-rich, unstable and predominantly anti-Semitic. The U.S. provides Israel with more military aid than any other state. The pro-Israel lobby provides U.S. candidates and parties with more than $56 million in donations. The pressure for the U.S. to provide aid and assistance to Israel is growing. The U.S. should decrease support for Israel and their interests. It is important to maintain good relations with Israel, but not at the expense of U.S. superiority. (Economist 3-17-07).

Regardless of our military might forward deployment makes conflict response impossible

Quddus **Snyder** Fall 20**09** “ Systemic Theory in an Era of Declining US Hegemony” pp25-26

The problem does not only stem from fact that the US is bogged down in two wars, it is also in the throes of a serious economic downturn. Of course, everyone is getting hit. Because all are suffering, the US is still a giant in terms of relative power differentials. 42 **Relative power is important, but so is the hegemon’s ability to actually do things. It is unlikely that the US will have either the political will or capability to take on major international undertakings**. It is unclear when the US will fully withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan; however, these projects will gobble up massive amounts of resources and treasure at a time when America’s own recovery is being partly bankrolled by foreign powers like China. 43 The point is simply that America’s unilateral assertiveness on the international scene is changing. 44 US security guarantees may prove less credible than they once were, leading allies to enhance their own military capabilities. The US may still be a giant, but one that, for now at least, seems more bound.

Forward Deployment Bad: Prolif

The U.S. military presence around china incentivizes prolif

Ivan **Eland** ( director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute) 1/23/**03** “ Is Chinese Military Modernization a Threat to the United States?” http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa465.pdf

Of course, the U.S. government does not admit to a policy of containing China, as it did with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. But in Asia the ring of U.S.-led alliances (formal and informal), a forward U.S. military presence, and closer American relationships with great powers capable of acting to balance against a rising China constitute a de facto containment policy. Such a policy is unwarranted by the current low threat posed by China and may actually increase the threat that it is designed to contain. Even the DoD admits that the Chinese are recognizing and reacting to U.S. policy: China’s leaders have asserted that the United States seeks to maintain a dominant geostrategic position by containing the growth of Chinese power, ultimately “dividing” and “Westernizing” China. . . . Beijing has interpreted the strengthening U.S.Japan security alliance, increased U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific region, and efforts to expand NATO as manifestations of Washington’s strategy. 4 The DoD report continues: Chinese analyses indicate a concern that Beijing would have difficulty managing potential U.S. military intervention in crises in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. There are even indications of a concern that the United States might intervene in China’s internal disputes with ethnic Tibetan or Muslim minorities. Chinese concerns about U.S. intervention likely have been reinforced by their perceptions of U.S. response to the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crises, Operation ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo, and more recent U.S.-led military operations to combat international terrorism. . . . Following Operation ALLIED FORCE in 1999, Beijing seriously considered upgrading the priority attached to military modernization. While the senior leadership has since reaffirmed its stress on economic growth and development, it nevertheless agreed to provide significant additional resources and funding to support accelerated military modernization. 5

Forward Deployment Bad – Russia

Reducing US military presence is key to open the doors for peaceful US-Russia cooperation

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and a Contributing Editor to Survival, “All Shook Up?”, Survival Magazine, 7/21/10)

One could call such an agreement a softer Yalta. It would be contrary not just to Western security interests (particularly in the area of energy) and to the stability of the continent (as shown by the continuing bloody disorder in Russian-dominated regions such as the Caucasus), but also to the very principles which have defined Western objectives ever since the Cold War, summed up in George H.W. Bush’s phrase ‘a Europe whole and free’.6 Asmus is right to point out that it would be contrary to the post-Cold War settlement as well, which implied the right for every country to freely choose its regime. But he is wrong not to remember that any international order is based on a combination of (or a compromise between) legitimacy and power; that Western countries, particularly the United States, are not strangers to interventions aimed at regime change, or to blockades and embargoes even against freely elected governments; that the Cold War settlement and, even more, the eastward expansion of NATO were seen by most Russians as contrary to their expectations based on informal Western promises; and that their acceptance of it was reluctant and provisional. The world of 2010 is not the same as that of the 1990’s. It would be unrealistic and dangerous to attempt, as Asmus would apparently recommend, to try to turn back the clock. On the other hand, it would be foolish and immoral to reward Moscow for its aggression against Georgia by cancelling the promise of April 2008 concerning NATO membership or denying the long-term European vocation of countries such as Georgia and Ukraine. It would be even more absurd to envisage offering NATO membership to today’s Russia, with its undefined borders, its unilateral use of force against sovereign states and its permanent violation of the rule of law at home. The only way out of this dilemma is to put the discussion of the rules of competition and cooperation between states and societies at the heart of the emerging negotiations on international order and European security. **Cooperation between the West and Russia on questions of mutual interest is vital and should be developed**. Competition for influence and resources is legitimate and important, including in countries which are part of both Western Europe’s and Russia’s ‘near abroad’**. But such competition should exclude the unilateral threat and use of force**, the unilateral redrawing of borders, the totally illegitimate claim to a right to protect ethnic groups on the basis of a common language, and any attempt to punish or force out legitimately elected governments through economic blackmail, boycott or other means**. This should apply to the relations of the United States with its own Latin American neighbours** as much as to those of Russia with its East European ones. **It should also apply to the relations of great powers with so-called ‘rogue states’ in the global South**. Unilateral sanctions through which powerful states behave as accusers, judges and enforcers all at once are counterproductive and contrary both to emerging power relations and to the spirit of the times. Concerning NATO and its new and potential members, greater attention should be paid to nurturing better relations with Moscow that neither trigger Russia’s suspicions of military encirclement nor expose Russia’s neighbours to various forms of political pressure or threats. Likewise, the neighbours of great powers should avoid basing their political posture on resentment toward the latter. **Their military and diplomatic posture should aim instead at restraint and cooperation**. But the essential point is that their voluntary acceptance of limitations on their external behaviour should never impinge upon their political and economic freedom. In this respect, Finland, which all through the Cold War remained a free constitutional democracy while being careful not to appear hostile to its larger neighbour, is a positive example rather than a negative one. For East Europeans, including former members of the Soviet Union, this should not exclude, in the long run, membership in NATO and even less in the European Union, particularly if the two organisations are increasingly involved in cooperation with Russia. An overarching security structure encompassing NATO as well as its Eastern neighbours including Russia, as apparently suggested by Medvedev, could have a positive confidence-building effect, under the express condition that it contributes to overcoming the division of the continent rather than sealing it. In the even longer run, NATO could be transformed into a collective security structure including a reformed Russia. In his book, Asmus describes the multiple American warnings to Saakashvili not to initiate a war in which he would be left alone. But at the same time Georgia was being built up as a model and symbol of freedom and friendship with the United States, and Saakashvili, along with most Georgians, assumed that the United States would not leave him alone once faced with an ongoing confrontation, or at least that the Russians could not exclude an American response and would be restrained by this possibility.

Russia Cooperation Solves Economy

US-Russia cooperation solves global stability and the Russian economy

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Kennan’s formulation, according to which Russia sees its neighbours as either enemies or vassals, remains true.5 Even the reformist Russians of the 1990’s, whom Asmus appears to regard with nostalgia, thought that by abandoning communism they would play a leading role in the West, in association with the United States and the European Union, while always keeping a special authority over their neighbours. The basic thrust of Moscow’s project is to repair the ‘geopolitical catastrophe’ of the fall of the Soviet Union by keeping or recreating a virtual empire coinciding more or less with the boundaries of the USSR. When this project seemed threatened by Western policies and by ‘colour revolutions’, Russia’s policy became one of ‘offensive defence’, of creating a besieged fortress mentality against encirclement by enemy forces. Today, the Russian leadership feels it has succeeded in eliminating the danger of colour revolutions, or at least of their support by the West. It also believes the United States has too many troubles and other priorities to be dangerous, and that Europe is in a permanent crisis. But its resistance toward former Soviet republics moving to the West or threatening the Russian regime by adopting an alternative model remains unchanged. On the other hand, although Russia feels stronger politically, it is, particularly since the economic crisis, more aware of its economic weakness, and of its need for Western cooperation if it wants to modernise. It also sees merit in having a Western counterweight to a growing and potentially hegemonic Chinese power. Hence the current overtures to the West, which evoke the latter’s interests in terms of the economy or non-proliferation, but which go hand in hand with Moscow’s attempts to obtain de facto and perhaps de jure domination over its own sphere.

Russian Engagement Key

Only US engagement towards Russia solves Russian aggression

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But the most surprising and damning information revealed by the book concerns another combination of agreement and divergence between the United States and France. According to Asmus, President George W. Bush’s passivity upon learning of the Russian invasion while at the Beijing Olympics and his subsequent, very subdued protest were rooted in his fear of starting a diplomatic conflict with Russia that might escalate into a return to the Cold War. He hence chose to encourage Sarkozy, at that time in charge of the presidency of the European Union, to take the initiative and to manage the negotiations with Russia. Yet he was ultimately ‘appalled’ by the result. Sarkozy was much less favourable to Georgia than was Bush. The French president’s goal – besides assuming an active role for the European Union and for himself – was limited to avoiding an occupation of Tbilisi by Russian troops and an overthrow of the Georgian government. His dazzling solo performance did yield results, while leaving out certain important points, such as Georgia’s territorial integrity, thus forcing Saakashvili’s hand. He did communicate with Bush during the negotiations, but the two presidents’ accounts of these communications do not coincide. At any rate, Asmus rightly concludes that no matter how justified American criticisms of Sarkozy’s achievements may have been, Bush had surrendered his powers of negotiation and deterrence to his French counterpart; the only visible US action was to send a ship with humanitarian help. This defection by the man who was seen as the greatest friend and protector of new and aspiring NATO members must have come as a great shock to them. The fact that today the American, French and German governments seem unanimous in proclaiming their satisfaction with the state of their relations with Russia (Sarkozy described France’s relationship with Russia during his June 2010 visit to Moscow as ‘ambitious, cloudless and full of trust’2) must appear as adding insult to injury, given that Russia continues to violate the agreement which ended the war on some essential points, has subsequently proclaimed the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (recognised by only three countries) and effectively annexed both, and is building a military base in Abkhazia.

A2: Russia Won’t Cooperate

Russia is open to cooperation with the US now

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The trouble with this excellent, eloquent and informative book, very adequately subtitled ‘Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West’, is that its title is misleading. The little war in Georgia did not shake the world. Maybe it should have: this is certainly the opinion of the author, and to some extent of this reviewer. But the fact is, the war shook only Russia’s neighbours, particularly the former Soviet republics, but not the West, let alone the world. It did not interrupt the process of détente, rapprochement or ‘reset’ between the United States, Western Europe and Russia. On the contrary, it may have given relations an important boost by encouraging Russia, once it no longer feared the colour revolutions or the enlargement of NATO and the European Union to Georgia and Ukraine, **to shift from a strident anti-Western stance to a conciliatory and cooperative one,** based on a new partition of Europe into spheres of influence. Is this outcome acceptable for the West? If not, should it be replaced, as Asmus argues, with a return to the policies and agreements of the 1990’s? Or should ‘spheres of special interest’ and the conciliation between them, the sovereignty of states and the respect of human rights become essential themes of East–West negotiations for a new European order?

Forward Deployment Bad – ME – AT: Oil

Risks of oil shocks are overstated – multiple structural factors check drops in capacity and forward deployed troops aren’t necessary to secure resources anyway.

Layne 2009 [Christopher, Assoc. Prof. George HW Bush School of Gov't and Public Service @ Texas A&M U, research fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty @ the Independent Institute, “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived,” in *Review of International Studies* (2009), 35, 5–25 | VP]

Preventing an oil hegemon

Advocates of both primacy, and of offshore balancing, agree that – under present conditions – the US has important interests in the Gulf that must be supported by American military power. However, they disagree on two key questions. First, how deeply does the US need be involved militarily and politically in the Gulf? Second, what is the likelihood of an oil stoppage severe enough to damage the US, and global, economies seriously?

There are two main threats to US oil interests. First, there is the danger of a single power in the Gulf region consolidating its control over the majority of the world’s oil reserves. The fear that Iraq would control both Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian oil reserves, as well as its own, was the nightmare scenario invoked by US policymakers as one of the rationales for the 1991 Persian Gulf War. An ‘oil hegemon’ in the Gulf would be in a position to raise oil prices, and use oil as an instrument of political coercion. Yet, while the US does have an interest in preventing the emergence of a Persian Gulf oil hegemon, the risk of such a development is low, because the three largest states in the Gulf – Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran – lack the military capabilities to conquer each other. This was true even before the 1990–91 Gulf War, or the March 2003 Iraq War. Thus, when Iraq went to war with Iran in September 1980, the conflict ended in a prolonged, bloody stalemate. Similarly, from the end of the Gulf War in 1991 until the US invasion in March 2003, Iraq posed no military threat to Saudi Arabia (or Iran).

On the other side of the coin, because of its overwhelming military capabilities compared to the big three Gulf powers, the US easily could deter any of them from launching a war of conquest. In 1990, for example, the US was able to dissuade Saddam Hussein from using Kuwait as a platform for conquering Saudi Arabia by inserting airpower, and a limited number of ground forces (as a tripwire) into Saudi Arabia, and by imposing an economic embargo on Iraq.16 This policy of containment, and deterrence worked in 1990 – and still was working in March 2003.17 To make sure no Gulf oil hegemon emerges in the future, Washington should make it clear that it would respond militarily to prevent a single power from gaining control over a majority of the region’s oil capacity. However, a deterrence strategy does not require an on-the-ground American military presence in the region, because the US today (in contrast to 1990), can back-up its deterrent threat with long-range airpower, and sea-based cruise missiles.18

Domestic instability in a major oil producing state is another threat to US interests in the Gulf. In the form of civil unrest, instability could temporarily reduce the flow of oil from an affected country, and drive up prices. However, because the oil industry is globally integrated, other oil producers would increase their own production to make-up for the lost capacity. Thus, any spike in oil prices would be temporary, and lost supplies would be replenished by other producers. In fact, past experience shows that this is precisely what happens when internal instability in an oil producing state causes a temporary disruption in oil supplies.19 Instability in any of the Gulf oil producers, of course, could bring a hostile regime to power. Here, there are two things to keep in mind. First, it is unlikely that US military intervention could forestall such an event. Indeed, it could make things even worse. Second, the economic consequences of such an event are exaggerated.

In an integrated, global oil market it is immaterial whether a hostile regime would sell oil directly to the US. Because oil is fungible, all that matters is that such a regime makes its oil available to the market. The chances of an hostile regime selfembargoing its oil are very low. The reason is simple: all the major oil producers in the Gulf are economically dependent on their oil revenues. Even if a hostile regime in the Gulf wanted to embargo oil shipments to the US or the West, it could not long do so without shooting itself in the foot economically. Moreover, if a hostile regime chose to behave in an economically irrational fashion by sacrificing income to achieve political or economic objectives, markets would adjust. Higher oil prices caused by an embargo would lead oil consuming states like the US both to switch to alternative energy sources, use energy more efficiently, and also provide an incentive for other oil producing states to increase the supply of oil in the market. Simply put, in relatively short order the supply/demand equilibrium would return to the marketplace, and oil prices would return to their natural marketplace level.

There is a wild card, however: Saudi Arabia, which is the world’s largest oil producer, and also has the largest proven oil reserves. If, in the future, a hostile Saudi regime imposed an embargo, or cut back drastically on production, it would be difficult for the market to adjust because other oil producers do not have the capacity to replace lost Saudi Arabian oil. A major long-term interruption of oil exports from Saudi Arabia would cause real economic damage to the US and the other industrialised nations (although, over time, it would cause the US and the other industrialised nations to develop alternate energy sources that now are untapped because they cost more than oil). Given the political unrest percolating just below the surface in Saudi Arabia, it is a good bet that in coming years, the Saud Monarchy will lose its grip on power. However, America’s forward military presence in the Gulf does not offer a real solution to the possibility of a hostile regime coming to power in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the US military presence in the region serves to make things worse rather than better in this regard, because it is a lightening-rod for Islamic fundamentalists like Osama bin-Laden and Al-Qaeda. The American invasion of Iraq, and subsequent occupation, have exacerbated the problem.

Access to oil is an important US interest, and in some respects American military power plays an important role in keeping the oil flowing from the Gulf. But there is no need for an on-the-ground American military presence in the Gulf and Middle East. Over-the-horizon deterrence can prevent the emergence of Gulf oil hegemon without triggering the kind of anti-American backlash that can occur when US forces visibly are present in the region.20 Similarly, although its closure is a low-probability event, the US has an important interest in making sure the Strait of Hormuz remains open. But this is a task that can be accomplished by American naval power. Finally, domestic instability in the Gulf oil producing states is a risk – especially in Saudi Arabia. However, as Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice recently acknowledged, the Gulf – and Middle East – are going to be unstable regardless of what the US does.21 Certainly, US military power, and America’s heavy-handed political influence, are not an antidote to domestic instability in the region. On the contrary, they contribute to it. This suggests that the wisest policies for the US are to reduce its footprint in the Gulf and Middle East, and formulate a viable long-term energy strategy that minimises its vulnerability to the vicissitudes of that endemically turbulent region.22

Hegemony Bad – Economy

Trying to maintain hegemony destroys the economy—controlled descent from primacy is a preferable strategy.

Samuel A.Adamson**,** second-year MAIA candidate at the Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center and undergraduate degree in Oriental Studies from the University of Oxford,10, *Bolgona Journal of International Affairs*, “Supreme Effort: A Lesson in British Decline” cp

\The aim of this essay is to demonstrate the extent to which the initial failure by British governments to recognize, accept and adapt to the country’s new position in the post-war world had deep, painful and long-lasting effects on the domestic British political economy. Rather than being a time of reflection and re-evaluation of the world order, the post-war consensus amongst successive governments was that Britain’s victory was a validation of the old, rather than a trigger for its removal. As such, sterling was expected to continue as the world’s reserve currency and the preferred unit of exchange. From 1945 until the major devaluation of 1968, one after the other, British governments oriented economic policy towards the maintenance of sterling’s international prestige, through the manipulation of the domestic economy. Using deflationary packages to curb demand and defend the pound against external pressure, the government indirectly (but repeatedly) inflicted punishing restrictions on British industry through a chronic underinvestment in capital. As Samuel Brittan has it, “The position of sterling as an international currency, with all the risks to which it exposed Britain, was regarded as desirable in itself, like a prisoner kissing the rod with which he is being beaten.”39 In a desperate attempt to improve British competitiveness, British governments then began to intervene in industrial relations, to the detriment of the Welfare Compromise that had presided over a relatively stable period from 1945 –1960. Government-union cooperation worsened throughout the 1960s under a Labour government and reached exploding point following the election of Heath’s conservative government. The British economy plumbed new depths in the 1970s, with factories being reduced to a three- day working week and with the entire population having to endure the infamous “Winter of Discontent.” Such harsh times brought about harsh measures, to be administered by Margaret Thatcher. Her reshaping of the British political economy marks the beginning of the current era for Britain, for better or worse. With increased focus, she drew onto the City’s financial services; however, at the moment it is difficult to see past the latter. Britain, still today, feels the pain of bone-breaking readjustment to the post-war world.

It should also be emphasized that the thesis put forward here is only one example of the way in which the British government failed to adapt properly to the nation’s declining position in the post-war world. This paper could easily have taken as its topic of investigation the exuberant defense spending exhibited by an unbroken succession of British governments, characterized by the costly maintenance of an independent nuclear deterrent in obeisance to the “Top Table” argument or, as Churchill had it, “our badge to the Royal Enclosure.”40

The wider lessons to be drawn from the British experience are complex and difficult to identify clearly, as each declining hegemon (of which there have been —and will be— many) faces a potentially different set of international and domestic conditions. However, there is a clear and universal warning to be taken from the illustration presented here — a world power that may be in decline needs, more than ever, to maintain a high level of vigilance and flexibility in its attitudes to its international position. Being prepossessed of pretensions of past glories serves for nothing; rather it inhibits a nation in its readjustment. Therefore, the attitudes put forward by E. Garten in his essay regarding American decline (as outlined at the beginning of this paper) should be regarded as, at best, unhelpful, and at worst severely damaging to the future of the United States. For reasons that will not be argued here, however, I find myself in complete agreement with Garten regarding the undesirable nature of American decline, particularly in light of the candidates currently waiting in the wings to take the crown. Indeed, it is for that reason that this paper argues that it is wrong to assess the methods of “how to remedy signs of decline” (as Garten does), but rather suggests that it is instead critical to accept the inevitability of its occurrence, allowing for a more controlled descent, thereby minimizing domestic damage and allowing declining powers to still exert a good deal of influence on the international stage — at least due in part to their masterfully orchestrated readjustment to their dethronement.

Hegemony Bad – Economy

History proves it devastates domestic economies.

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Garten himself does not fundamentally disagree with Pape’s conclusion that the U.S. is in decline. Indeed, he expresses his own concern at the “speed at which Washington’s power and influence are tumbling down.”11 But the purpose of the review and thesis Garten presents is to find solutions to this decline, rather than to encourage an analysis of its nature in order to better prepare the nation for the coming realignment in international station. This is where this paper finds issue with Garten’s discourse. The argument presented here aims to warn of the dangers of remaining stubborn and inflexible in the face of decline and, by contrast, extols the virtues of maintaining a sense of self-perspective regarding international position. Rather than “breaking the fall” of decline as Garten would have it, this paper encourages an awareness of the inevitability of decline and the importance of a self-aware dynamic reaction to it, thereby allowing a more controlled and gradual decline, rather than a crashing to earth as is exemplified by the British case.12 This argument will be illustrated using the example of the post-war British governments’ failure to properly identify and accept Britain’s changing place and status on the world stage. Taking the preservation of sterling’s prestige as its primary illustration, this paper argues that by focusing excessively on Britain’s international role, domestic industry was time and again subject to punishing economic policy for the sake of maintaining sterling’s prestige. In response to the effects of this internationally focused policy set, growing domestic unrest eventually led to a breakdown of the post-war consensus, precipitating a painful decline for the British economy. As such, it will also be seen that although the short term effects were particularly painful, the heavy burden of mismanagement of the economy —particularly throughout the 1950s and 1960s— is still being felt in Britain today, thus adding weight to the central argument of the paper.

Hegemony Bad – War

## Hegemony causes war – imperial aspirations produce geopolitical backlash

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(The American Conservative "The Cost of Empire" October 3rd, http://www.amconmag.com/article/2003/oct/06/00007/)

Perhaps the proponents of America’s imperial ambitions are right and the U.S. will not suffer the same fate as previous hegemonic powers. Don’t bet on it. The very fact of America’s overwhelming power is bound to produce a geopolitical backlash—which is why it’s only a short step from the celebration of imperial glory to the recessional of imperial power. Indeed, on its present course, the United States seems fated to succumb to the “hegemon’s temptation.” Hegemons have lots of power and because there is no countervailing force to stop them, they are tempted to use it repeatedly, and thereby overreach themselves. Over time, this hegemonic muscle-flexing has a price. The cumulative costs of fighting —or preparing to fight—guerilla wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, asymmetric conflicts against terrorists (in the Philippines, possibly in a failed Pakistan, and elsewhere), regional powers (Iran, North Korea), and rising great powers like China could erode America’s relative power—especially if the U.S. suffers setbacks in future conflicts, for example in a war with China over Taiwan.

## The pursuit of primacy causes global savage wars for peace – it makes conflict inevitable.

Christopher Layne, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, 07,"The Case Against the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 54-55)

In this chapter, I argue that primacy and empire is a strategy that will lead to bad consequences for the United States. Rather than bringing the United States peace and security, the pursuit of primacy and empire will result in a geopolitical backlash against the United States. It already has. The 9/11 attacks were a violent reaction against America’s primacy—and specifically against its imperial ambitions in the Middle East. Similarly, the quagmire in Iraq also is a direct consequence of U.S. imperial aspirations. And it will not end there. Because it is premised on the belief that the United States must embark on assertive policies to bring about regime change by imposing democracy abroad, the pursuit of primacy and empire will drag the United States into otherwise avoidable wars—what one proponent of the strategy has termed "savage wars for peace." Looking ahead, if the United States continues to follow its current strategy of primacy and empire, it almost certainly will find [end page 54] itself on a collision course with Iran (and possibly North Korea and Syria) and—more importantly—China.

Hegemony Bad – Terrorism

## Hegemony sparks terrorist backlash

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(“The Peace of Illusions” (p. 190-191)

The events of 9/11 are another example of how hegemony makes the United States less secure than it would be if it followed an offshore balancing strategy. Terrorism, the RAND Corporation terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman says, is "about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and use of power to achieve political change."86 If we step back for a moment from our horror and revulsion at the events of September 11, we can see that the attack was in keeping with the Clausewitzian paradigm of war: force was used against the United States by its adversaries to advance their political objectives. As Clausewitz observed, "War is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object."88 September 11 represented a violent counterreaction to America's geopolitical-and cultural-hegemony. As the strategy expert Richard K. Betts presciently observed in a 1998 Foreign Affairs article: It is 'hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the United States had not been identified so long as the mainstay of Israel, the shah of Iran, and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault on Islam.89 U.S. hegemony fuels terrorist groups like al Qaeda and fans Islamic fundamentalism, which is a form of "blowback" against America's preponderance and its world role.90 As long as the United States maintains its global hegemony-and its concomitant preeminence in regions like the Persian Gulf-it will be the target of politically motivated terrorist groups like al Qaeda. After 9/11, many foreign policy analysts and pundits asked the question, "Why do they hate us?" This question missed the key point. No doubt, there are Islamic fundamentalists who do "hate" the United States for cultural, religious, and ideological reasons. And even leaving aside American neoconservatives' obvious relish for making it so, to some extent the war on terror inescapably has overtones of a "clash of civilizations:' Still, this isn't-and should not be allowed to become-a replay of the Crusades. Fundamentally 9/11 was about geopolitics, specifically about U.S. hegemony. The United States may be greatly reviled in some quarters of the Islamic world, but were the United States not so intimately involved in the affairs of the Middle East, it's hardly likely that this detestation would have manifested itself in something like 9/11. As Michael Scheurer, who headed the CIA analytical team monitoring Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, puts it, "One of the greatest dangers for Americans in deciding how to confront the Islamist threat lies in continuing to believe-at the urging of senior U.S. leaders-that Muslims hate and attack us for what we are and think, rather than for what we do."91 It is American policies-to be precise, American hegemony-that make the United States a lightning rod for Muslim anger

## Nuclear War

Mohamd, **Sid Ahmed,** Political Analyst, **04** [Mohamed, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm>]  
  
A nuclear attack by terrorists will be much more critical than Hiroshima and Nagazaki, even if -- and this is far from certain – the weapons used are less harmful than those used then*,* Japan, at the time, with no knowledge of nuclear technology, had no choice but to capitulate. Today, the technology is a secret for nobody. *So far,* except for *the two bombs dropped on* Japan, nuclear weapons have been used only to threaten.Now we are at a stage where they can be detonated. This completely changes the rules of the game. We have reached a point where anticipatory measures can determine the course of events. Allegations of a terrorist connection can be used to justify anticipatory measures, including the invasion of a sovereign state like Iraq. As it turned out, these allegations, as well as the allegation that Saddam was harbouring WMD, proved to be unfounde*d.* What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now livin*g.* Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

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Hegemony Bad – Economy

**Hegemony causes economic collapse – current economic crisis proves**

**Eland,** Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on peace and Liberty at the Independent Institute, Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, B.A. Iowa State University, M.B.A. in Economics and Ph.D. in Public Policy from George Washington University, Ivan, The Independent Institute, **2009**, “How the U.S. Empire Contributed to the Economic Crisis”, May 11th, http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=2498)

A few—and only a few—prescient commentators have questioned whether the U.S. can sustain its informal global empire in the wake of the most severe economic crisis since World War II. And the simultaneous quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan are leading more and more opinion leaders and taxpayers to this question. But the U.S. Empire helped cause the meltdown in the first place. War has a history of causing financial and economic calamities. It does so directly by almost always causing inflation—that is, too much money chasing too few goods. During wartime, governments usually commandeer resources from the private sector into the government realm to fund the fighting. This action leaves shortages of resources to make consumer goods and their components, therefore pushing prices up. Making things worse, governments often times print money to fund the war, thus adding to the amount of money chasing the smaller number of consumer goods. Such “make-believe” wealth has funded many U.S. wars. For example, the War of 1812 had two negative effects on the U.S. financial system. First, in 1814, the federal government allowed state-chartered banks to suspend payment in gold and silver to their depositors. In other words, according Tom J. DiLorenzo in Hamilton’s Curse, the banks did not have to hold sufficient gold and silver reserves to cover their loans. This policy allowed the banks to loan the federal government more money to fight the war. The result was an annual inflation rate of 55 percent in some U.S. cities. The government took this route of expanding credit during wartime because no U.S. central bank existed at the time. Congress, correctly questioning The Bank of the United States’ constitutionality, had not renewed its charter upon expiration in 1811. But the financial turmoil caused by the war led to a second pernicious effect on the financial system—the resurrection of the bank in 1817 in the form of the Second Bank of the United States. Like the first bank and all other government central banks in the future, the second bank flooded the market with new credit. In 1818, this led to excessive real estate speculation and a consequent bubble. The bubble burst during the Panic of 1819, which was the first recession in the nation’s history. Sound familiar? Although President Andrew Jackson got rid of the second bank in the 1830s and the U.S. economy generally flourished with a freer banking system until 1913, at that time yet another central bank—this time the Federal Reserve System—rose from the ashes. We have seen that war ultimately causes the creation of both economic problems and nefarious government financial institutions that cause those difficulties. And of course, the modern day U.S. Empire also creates such economic maladies and wars that allow those institutions to wreak havoc on the economy. The Fed caused the current collapse in the real estate credit market, which has led to a more general global financial and economic meltdown, by earlier flooding the market with excess credit. That money went into real estate, thus creating an artificial bubble that eventually came crashing down in 2008. But what caused the Fed to vastly expand credit? To prevent a potential economic calamity after 9/11 and soothe jitters surrounding the risky and unneeded U.S. invasion of Iraq, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan began a series of interest rate cuts that vastly increased the money supply. According to Thomas E. Woods, Jr. in Meltdown, the interest rate cuts culminated in the extraordinary policy of lowering the federal funds rate (the rate at which banks lend to one another overnight, which usually determines other interest rates) to only one percent for an entire year (from June 2003 to June 2004). Woods notes that more money was created between 2000 and 2007 than in the rest of U.S. history. Much of this excess money ended up creating the real estate bubble that eventually caused the meltdown. Ben Bernanke, then a Fed governor, was an ardent advocate of this easy money policy, which as Fed Chairman he has continued as his solution to an economic crisis he helped create using the same measures. Of course, according to Osama bin Laden, the primary reasons for the 9/11 attacks were U.S. occupation of Muslim lands and U.S. propping up of corrupt dictators there. And the invasion of Iraq was totally unnecessary because there was never any connection between al Qaeda or the 9/11 attacks and Saddam Hussein, and even if Saddam had had biological, chemical, or even nuclear weapons, the massive U.S. nuclear arsenal would have likely deterred him from using them on the United States. So the causal arrow goes from these imperial behaviors—and blowback there from—to increases in the money supply to prevent related economic slowdown, which in turn caused even worse eventual financial and economic calamities. These may be indirect effects of empire, but they cannot be ignored. Get rid of the overseas empire because we can no longer afford it, especially when it is partly responsible for the economic distress that is making us poorer.

Hegemony Bad – Economy

Economic decline is inevitable if America pursues primacy, making power, itself, unsustainable.

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2007 American Empire: A Debate, “Reply to Bradley Thayer” p 124-6

In fact, if anything, the costs of the American Empire are likely to increase in coming years. There are two reasons for this. First, there is the spiraling cost of the Iraq quagmire. As some readers may recall, the Bush II admin-istration's economic advisor, Lawrence Lindsey, was fired because he daredto predict that the cost of the Iraq war, and its aftermath, might reach $200billion. The administration predicted that the war itself would cost no morethan $50-$60 billion and that Iraq would pay for its own postwar recoveryfrom oil sales. Of course, the United States to date has borne most of the costof Iraq's postwar recovery. As far as the ultimate economic costs of the war areconcerned, it is apparent that the administration's $50-$60 billion estimate was a projection right out of Fantasyland. Recently, Joesph Sitglitz (a Nobellaureate in economics) and Linda Bilmes have indicated that, at the end of theday, the budgetary cost of the war will be somewhere between $750 billionand $1,184 billion (which includes, among other things, the costs of militaryoperations, Veterans Administration costs attributable to the war, increaseddefense spending, and additional interest on the national debt). Moreover, they estimate that the direct and indirect costs of the war to the U.S. economywill be between $1,026 billion and $1,854 billion." 'The second reason that defense spending is likely to increase is the simple fact that the U.S. military is not large enough to meet all of America's imperial commitments. Since the Cold War's end, the United States has shown everysign of succumbing to the"hegemon' temptation"—the temptation to use itsmilitary power promiscuously—and Iraq, along with the simultaneous criseswith Iran and North Korea, have highlighted the mismatch between America'shegemonic ambitions and the military resources available to support them. To maintain its dominance, the American military will have to be expanded in size, because it is too small to meet present—and likely future—commit-ments.'sNo one can say for certain how long significant U.S. forces will needto remain in Iraq (and Afghanistan), but it's safe to say that substantial num-bers of troops will be there for a long time. At the same time, in addition to theongoing War on Terrorism (and the concomitant requirements of homeland defense), the United States faces possible future conflicts with North Korea,Iran, and China. During the past fifteen years or so since the Soviet Union's collapse, theUnited States was able to postpone the need to grapple with the painful issuesKennedy raised in 1987. However, the chickens are coming home to roost,and those questions soon will have to be faced. Gilpin's 1987 description ofAmerica's grand strategic and economic dilemmas is, if anything, even moretimely today: With a decreased rate of economic growth and. a low rate of nationalsavings, the United States was living and defending commitments farbeyond its means. In order to bring its commitments and power backinto balance once again, the United. States would one day have to cutback further on its overseas commitments, reduce the American stan-dard of living, or decrease domestic productive investment even morethan it already had. In the meantime, American hegemony was threat-ened. by a potentially devastating fiscal crisis." At some point, the relative decline of U.S. economic power that is in the offing will bring American primacy to an end. In the shorter term, however, theUnited States can prolong its primacy if Americans are willing to pay the pricein terms of higher taxes, reduced consumption, and curtailment of domesticprograms. But, of course, there is a treadmill-like aspect to preserving the American Empire, because perpetuating it will hasten the weakening of the economic base upon which it rests.

Hegemony Bad – Proliferation – (1/2)

## Heg cause prolif – multipolarity will solve it

**Weber et al** Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute for International Studies at the University of California-Berkeley, **07** (Steven with Naazneen Barma, Matthew Kroenig, and Ely Ratner, Ph.D. Candidates at the University of California-Berkeley and Research Fellows at its New Era Foreign Policy Center, [“How Globalization Went Bad,” Foreign Policy, Issue 158, January/February,)

Axiom 3 is a story about the preferred strategies of the weak. It's a basic insight of international relations that states try to balance power. They protect themselves by joining groups that can hold a hegemonic threat at bay. But what if there is no viable group to join? In today's unipolar world, every nation from Venezuela to North Korea is looking for a way to constrain American power. But in the unipolar world, it's harder for states to join together to do that. So they turn to other means. They play a different game. Hamas, Iran, Somalia, North Korea, and Venezuela are not going to become allies anytime soon. Each is better off finding other ways to make life more difficult for Washington. Going nuclear is one way. Counterfeiting U.S. currency is another. Raising uncertainty about oil supplies is perhaps the most obvious method of all. Here's the important downside of unipolar globalization. In a world with multiple great powers, many of these threats would be less troublesome. The relatively weak states would have a choice among potential partners with which to ally, enhancing their influence. Without that more attractive choice, facilitating the dark side of globalization becomes the most effective means of constraining American power. SHARING GLOBALIZATION'S BURDEN The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity, and the United States is bearing most of the burden. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. There's effectively a market out there for proliferation, with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand, to the detriment of U.S. national security. It has become fashionable, in the wake of the Iraq war, to comment on the limits of conventional military force. But much of this analysis is overblown. The United States may not be able to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. But that doesn't matter much from the perspective of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. In Tehran, Pyongyang, and many other capitals, including Beijing, the bottom line is simple: The U.S. military could, with conventional force, end those regimes tomorrow if it chose to do so. No country in the world can dream of challenging U.S. conventional military power. But they can certainly hope to deter America from using it. And the best deterrent yet invented is the threat of nuclear retaliation. Before 1989, states that felt threatened by the United States could turn to the Soviet Union's nuclear umbrella for protection. Now, they turn to people like A.Q. Khan. Having your own nuclear weapon used to be a luxury. Today, it is fast becoming a necessity. North Korea is the clearest example. Few countries had it worse during the Cold War. North Korea was surrounded by feuding, nuclear armed communist neighbors, it was officially at war with its southern neighbor, and it stared continuously at tens of thousands of U.S. troops on its border. But, for 40 years, North Korea didn't seek nuclear weapons. It didn't need to, because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella. Within five years of the Soviet collapse, however, Pyongyang was pushing ahead full steam on plutonium reprocessing facilities. North Korea's founder, Kim II Sung, barely flinched when former U.S. President Bill Clinton's administration readied war plans to strike his nuclear installations preemptively. That brinkmanship paid off. Today North Korea is likely a nuclear power, and Kim's son rules the country with an iron fist. America's conventional military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea. Saddam Hussein's great strategic blunder was that he took too long to get to the same place. How would things be different in a multipolar world? For starters, great powers could split the job of policing proliferation, and even collaborate on some particularly hard cases. It's often forgotten now that, during the Cold War, the only state 'with a tougher nonproliferation policy than the United States was the Soviet Union. Not a single country that had a formal alliance with Moscow ever became a nuclear power. The Eastern bloc was full of countries with advanced technological capabilities in every area except one— nuclear weapons. Moscow simply wouldn't permit it. But today we see the uneven and inadequate level of effort that non-superpowers devote to stopping proliferation. The Europeans dangle carrots at Iran, but they are unwilling to consider serious sticks. The Chinese refuse to admit that there is a problem. And the Russians are aiding Iran's nuclear ambitions. When push comes to shove, nonproliferation today is almost entirely America's burden.

Hegemony Bad – Proliferation – (2/2)

## B. Proliferation leads to nuclear war

**Utgoff,** Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the

Institute for Defense Analyses. **02**, Survival, vol. 44, no. 2, Summer 2002, pp. 85–102 “Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions”

In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear ‘six-shooters’ on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

Ext. Heg Causes Prolif

## Rogue states are a self-fulfilling prophecy – states proliferate because they are afraid of the US.

Christopher Layne, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institut, 20**0**7 –e, "The Case Against the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 133)

Long before Saddam Hussein came down the pike, “regime change” has been a favored tool of American foreign policy. Here, however, U.S. grand strategy tends to become a self-fulfilling prophecy, because it causes states that might not otherwise have done so to become threats. That is, Wilsonianism causes the United States to be more, not less, insecure than it would be if its external ambitions were modest. When, by asserting the universal applicability of its own ideology, the United States challenges the legitimacy of other regimes – by labeling them as outposts of tyranny or members of an axis of evil – the effect is to increase those states’ sense of isolation and vulnerability. With good reason, such states fear that their survival could be at risk. Iran is a good example. Given that states – and regimes – are highly motivated to survive, it’s no surprise that others respond to American policy by adopting strategies that give them a chance to do so – like acquiring WMD capabilities and supporting terrorism. One thing is for sure: because of its Wilsonian foundations, the American Empire is a recipe for confrontation and antagonism with “others.”

Hegemony Bad – China War

## US primacy ensures conflict with China

Christopher Layne, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institut, 20**0**7 –e, "The Case Against the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 75)

So what should the United States do about China? If the United States per­sists with its strategy of primacy, the odds of a Sino-American conflict are high. Current American strategy commits the United States to maintaining the geopolitical status quo in East Asia, a status quo that reflects American primacy. The United States' desire to preserve the status quo, however, clashes with the ambitions of a rising China. As a rising great power, China has its own ideas about how East Asia's political and security order should be orga­nized. Unless U.S. and Chinese interests can be accommodated, the potential for future tension—or worse—exists. Moreover, as I already have demon­strated, the very fact of American primacy is bound to produce a geopolitical backlash—with China in the vanguard—in the form of counter-hegemonic balancing. Nevertheless, the United States cannot be completely indifferent to China's rise.

## Nuclear War

**Straits Times, 2000** [“Regional Fallout: No one gains in war over Taiwan,” Jun 25, LN]

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else. Gen Ridgeway recalled that the biggest mistake the US made during the Korean War was to assess Chinese actions according to the American way of thinking. "Just when everyone believed that no sensible commander would march south of the Yalu, the Chinese troops suddenly appeared," he recalled. (The Yalu is the river which borders China and North Korea, and the crossing of the river marked China's entry into the war against the Americans). "I feel uneasy if now somebody were to tell me that they bet China would not do this or that," he said in a recent interview given to the Chinese press.

Ext. – China War

Security guarantees ensure war with China

Ted, Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute

08 (Smart Power: Toward a Prudent Foreign Policy for America, Introduction Aug 15, CATO)

Such dubious security obligations are not confined to Eastern Europe. Indeed, the commitment that is potentially the most dangerous is Washington’s willingness to protect Taiwan’s de facto independence. That policy could easily lead to armed conflict with China. Under President Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan has repeatedly engaged in actions to emphasize a national identity separate from China and to seek greater international recognition for its existence as an independent state—initiatives that Beijing considers extremely provocative. Yet even if the new government in Taipei proves to be more cautious than Chen’s administration, China is unlikely to tolerate indefinitely an upstart secessionist island barely 100 miles off its coast, especially when the overwhelming majority of mainlanders consider Taiwan to be Chinese territory. As China’s economic and military strength grows, Beijing’s leaders are almost certain to become more insistent about reunification. An armed clash between the mainland and Taiwan is all too likely at some point, and those analysts who assume that economic ties between those two entities—and between China and the United States—will be sufficient to prevent a crisis are being too optimistic. Washington’s willingness to defend Taiwan is a high-stakes gamble with a decidedly unfavorable risk-reward calculation.

## Hegemony puts us on a collision course with China – absent a shift in grand strategy, conflict is certain.

Christopher Layne, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institut, 20**0**7 –e, "The Case Against the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 73-74)

To be sure, the United States should not ignore the potential strategic ramifications of China’s arrival on the world stage as a great power. After all, the lesson of history is that the emergence of new great powers in the international system leads to conflict, not peace. On this score, the notion—propagated by Beijing—that China’s will be a “peaceful rise” is just as fanciful as claims by American policy-makers that China has no need to build up its military capabilities because it is unthreatened by any other state. Still, this does not mean that the United States and China inevitably are on a collision course that will culminate in the next decade or two in a war. Whether Washington and Beijing actually come to blows, however, depends largely on what strategy the United States chooses to adopt toward China, because the United States has the “last clear chance” to adopt a grand strategy that will serve its interests in balancing Chinese power without running the risk of an armed clash with [end page 73] Beijing. If the United States continues to aim at upholding its current primacy, however, Sino-American conflict is virtually certain.

Ext. – China War

## US isn’t key to contain china – regional powers can do it

Ivan **Eland,** Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University **2006**, Is Future Conflict with China Unavoidable, Independent Institute Working Paper Number 63, Jan18)

Yet every adverse development in the world—particularly in East Asia—does not pose a threat to U.S. security. China may continue to enjoy rapid economic growth and become more assertive. Unlike in the 1930s, however, when Imperial Japan was expanding throughout East Asia, other counterweights to a rising great power exist in the region today. Prior to World War II, European empires—French, British, and Dutch—with colonial possessions in East Asia were overstretched and in decline. Although the vast distances of the Pacifi c Ocean separated the United States and Japan, the United States was the only power that could counter the potential Japanese hegemon. Now, however, if containing China becomes necessary (and it may not), India, Russia, and Japan might cooperate or form an alliance to do so. India and Russia have capable nuclear arsenals, and Japan has the wealth and technological capability to become a capable counterweight to China. Those three larger powers might be assisted by smaller, wealthy nations such as Australia, Taiwan, and South Korea. Those Asian countries might form the first line of defense against a rising China, thus allowing the United States to take advantage of the large Pacifi c moat separating China from the American homeland. Such vast separation over water should make China and the United States less threatening to each other because traversing a large body of water to invade another country is diffi - cult. Th e large physical separation over water between Japan and the United States did not prevent World War II because of the aforementioned power vacuum in East Asia, but that power vacuum no longer exists with all the powerful and wealthy counterweights to a rising China.

Hegemony Bad – Middle East and Iran War (1/2)

A. American leadership in the Middle East makes war with Iran inevitable.

Christopher Layne, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M (University) 2007 “American Empire: A Debate” p 76-7

Iran Because of the strategy of primacy and empire, the United States and Iran are on course for a showdown. The main source of conflict—or at leastthe one that has grabbed thelion'sshare of the headlines—is Tehran's evidentdetermination to develop a nuclear weapons program. Washington's policy, as President George W. Bush has stated on several occasions—in language that recalls his prewar stance on Iraq—is that a nuclear-armed Iran is"intolerable."Beyond nuclear weapons, however, there are other important issues that are driving the United States and Iran toward an armed confrontation.Chief among these is Iraq. Recently, Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. ambassadorto Iraq, has accused Tehran of meddling in Iraqi affairs by providing arms and training to Shiite militias and by currying favor with the Shiite politicians who dominate Iraq's recently elected government. With Iraq teetering on thebrink of a sectarian civil war between Shiites and Sunnis, concerns about Ira-nian interference have been magnified. In a real sense, however, Iran's nuclear program and its role in Iraq are merely the tip of the iceberg. The fundamental cause of tensions between the United States and Iran is the nature of America's ambitions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. These are reflected in currentU.S. grand strategy—which has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine. TheBush Doctrine's three key components are rejection of deterrence in favor ofpreventive/preemptive military action; determination to effectuate a radicalshake-up in the politics of the Persian Gulf and Middle East; and gaining U.S.dominance over that region. In this respect, it is hardly coincidental that theadministration's policy toward Tehran bears a striking similarity to its policy during the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, not only on the nuclearweapons issue but—ominously—with respect to regime change and democ-ratization. This is because the same strategic assumptions that underlay theadministration's pre-invasion Iraq policy now are driving its Iran policy. Thekey question today is whether these assumptions are correct.

B. China and Russia will intervene; escalates to nuclear world war.

Abid Ullah Jan 2006 “Why American will Reap in Iran What It Doesn’t Expect”, Posted February 20, http://mathaba.net/0\_index.shtml?x=528456>

Many analysts believe that an attack on Iran will turn into a World War because the Iranian government has a long-range strategy for "asymmetrical" warfare that will disrupt the flow of oil and challenge American interests around the world. Certainly, if one is facing an implacable enemy that is committed to "regime change" there is no reason to hold back on doing what is necessary to defeat that adversary. However, the main reason for escalation of the conflict will be exactly the assumption on the part of the United States, Israel and Britain that Iran cannot respond with nuclear weapons. At a time when nuclear material—including red mercury and different forms of Uranium—were flowing in the streets of Pakistan, a high ranking Pakistani official, working in the Iranian consulate, told this writer that Iran is obtaining smuggled nuclear material from its field commanders in Afghanistan. It was well before the nuclear testing by India and Pakistan took place. Keeping this fact in mind, it is simply naïve to assume that the United States or Israel will launch an un-provoked war of aggression on Iran, and Iran will remain a sitting duck and not retaliate with what it must have refined and retooled since mid-nineties.[3] Even if we assume that the Iranian government purchased nuclear material without any intention of putting it to use, it is highly unlikely that it will still let this material gather dust while it is being openly and seriously threatened by the United States and Israel. If scientists in Germany and the United States could work to develop nuclear weapons from scratch during the World War II, how long will it take a nation pushed against the wall and with all the ingredients available to put something workable together and retaliate with a bang? So, the practical chances of Iran’s retaliation with a nuclear weapon in the face of a war of aggression imposed on it are far more than the theoretical assumptions that Iranian Intelligence will plan covert operations which will be carried out in the event of an unprovoked attack on their facilities. It is true that a nuclear response from Iran would mean a definite suicide when looked in perspective of the nuclear power of the United States and Iran. But it also doesn’t make any sense that the United States would keep bombing Iran, the way it has planned, into the Stone Age, yet despite being able to respond, Iran will simply

Hegemony Bad – Middle East and Iran War (2/2)

**Continued..**

turn the other cheek. This chain of inevitable reactions will in fact lead a wider conflagration that the warlords in Washington and Tel Aviv have not even imagined. Emboldened by their adventures in Afghanistan and Iraq, and deluded by the IAEA conclusion that Iraq has no nuclear weapons, the warlords are set to go into a war that will definitely lead to massive bloodshed in the Middle East and the downfall of the United States as we see it. Despite Bush and company’s claims that the world is not the same after 9/11, the world remained more or less the same after 9/11. However, their world will surely turn upside down with their miscalculation of going into a third war of aggression in five years. The Russian and Chinese stakes in this issue cannot be ignored altogether. Attacking Iran would prove too much for Russia and China. Russia has snubbed Washington by announcing it would go ahead and honor a $700 million contract to arm Iran with surface-to-air missiles, slated to guard Iran's nuclear facilities. And after being burned when the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority invalidated Hussein-era oil deals, China has snapped up strategic energy contracts across the world, including in Latin America, Canada and Iran. It can be assumed that both China and Russia will not sit idly by and watch Iran being annihilated by the United States. If Iran is attacked with lethal force, it will retaliate with the utmost force available at its disposal; that much is certain. Remembering my discussion 9 year ago with a well informed source who was working for the Iranian government, I am pretty sure that the utmost force in the hands of Iran definitely includes nuclear weapons. One of the signs for that is the confidence with which the Iranian government responds to US threats. Iranian leaders have acted responsibly and reasonably so far. It is always the mistake of extremists to misjudge the behavior of reasonable men. The Iranians tried to avoid purchasing nuclear material from the Pakistani black market to avoid arousing unnecessary suspicion. They kept their nuclear program limited to energy production. It is the United States and its allies which are provoking it into reaction. As a result, it has been a mistake of reasonable men in Iran to mistake the behavior of extremists in Washington and not getting out of NPT or testing a few nuclear devices to balance its power against its enemies. Many analysts are predicting that attack on Iran will be provoked because a majority of Americans are not in favor of a new war. Although setting up a pre-text for domestic support cannot be ruled out, one can say with certainty from the track record of Bush and company that they will hardly bother to engineer another terrorist attack.[4] In the fits of madness, they have already made themselves believe that they have enough justification to wage a war or aggression on Iran. The Washington Times has already started beating war drums and promoting "policy experts" who believe the US must go alone if needed (Feb 6, 2006).[5] Irrespective of any pretext and going alone or in a coalition of barbarians, the signs tell us that the warlords are not going to relinquish their totalitarian dreams. It is very unfortunate on their part that they are putting their hands in hornet nest where they may get stung with nuclear weapons. Their retaliation, for sure, will lead to total disaster. A disaster, far worse than what the title "World War 3" can convey.

Hegemony Bad – Interventionism (1/2)

## Hegemony causes continuous interventions and overextension

Christopher, **Layne 06** Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University [“The Peace of Illusions” (p. 152-153)]

There is another road to U.S. overextension: the United States could succumb-and, arguably, has-to the "hegemon's temptation." The hegemon's temptation is caused by the imbalance of power in its favor. Conscious both of its overwhelming military superiority and of the fact that no other great powers are capable of restraining its ambitions, a hegemon easily is lured into overexpansion. When it comes to hard power, hegemons have it, and seldom can resist flaunting it-especially when the costs and risks of doing so appear to be low.72 Thus, we should expect a unipolar hegemon to initiate many wars and to use its military power promiscuously. From this perspective, it is not surprising that since the cold war the United States has-in addition to Afghanistan and Iraq-intervened in such peripheral places as Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo while simultaneously extending its military reach into Central Asia, the Caucasus region, and East Central Europe (all areas never previously viewed as ones where the United States had important interests). The very nature of hegemonic power predisposes dominant powers to overexpand in order to maintain their leading position in the international system. As Gilpin observes, a hegemon earns its prestige-others' perceptions of the efficacy of its hard power capabilities-by using military power successfully to impose its will on others. When a hegemon wields its military power conspicuously, others are put on notice that the prudent course of action is to accommodate its dominance rather than challenging it. In effect, hegemons believe that the frequent use of force has a potent deterrent, or dissuasive, effect on other states. Clearly, U.S. policymakers believe this to be the case. Thus, after extolling the displays of America's military virtuosity in Afghanistan and Iraq, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared that those wars should be a warning to other states: "If you put yourself in the shoes of a country that might decide they'd like to make mischief, they have a very recent, vivid example of the fact that the United States has the ability to deal withthis."74 There is, of course, a paradox to the hegemon's temptation: overexpansion leads to "imperial overstretch" and counterhegemonic balancing-the combined effect of which is hegemonic decline. Strategically, hegemons usually end up biting off more than they can chew.

## Continuous interventions cause extinction

Manuel**, Valenzeula, 2003**, “Perpetual War, Perpetual Terror” November 27th (http://www.dissidentvoice.org/Articles9/Valenzuela\_Perpetual-War-Terror.htm)]

The Pentagon is the Department of War, not Defense. It is in business to kill, kill, and kill some more. Without war, violence and weapons there is no Pentagon. And so to survive, to remain a player, wars must be created, weapons must be allocated, profits must be made and the Military Industrial Complex must continue exporting and manufacturing violence and conflict throughout the globe. And, as always, in the great tradition of the United States, enemies must exist. Indians, English, Mexicans, Spanish, Nazis, Koreans, Communists and now the ever-ambiguous Terrorists. The Cold War came to an end and so too the great profits of the MIC. Reductions in the Pentagon budget threatened the lifeblood of the industry; a new enemy had to be unearthed. There is no war – hence no profit – without evildoers, without terrorists lurching at every corner, waiting patiently for the moment to strike, instilling fear into our lives, absorbing our attention. We are told our nation is in imminent danger, that we are a mushroom cloud waiting to happen. And so we fear, transforming our mass uneasiness into nationalistic and patriotic fervor, wrapping ourselves up in the flag and the Military Industrial Complex. We have fallen into the mouse trap, becoming the subservient slaves of an engine run by greed, interested not in peace but constant war, constant killing and constant sacrifice to the almighty dollar. Brainwashed to believe that War is Peace we sound the drums of war, marching our sons and daughters to a battle that cannot be won either by sword or gun. We are programmed to see the world as a conflict between "Us" versus "Them", "Good" versus "Evil," that we must inflict death on those who are not with us and on those against us. The MIC prays on our human emotions and psychology, exploiting human nature and our still fragile memories of the horrors of 9/11, manipulating us to believe that what they say and do is right for us all. We unite behind one common enemy, fearing for our lives, complacent and obedient, blindly descending like a plague of locusts onto foreign land, devastating, usurping, conquering and devouring those who have been deemed enemies of the state, those who harbor and live among them, "evil ones," "evildoers" and "haters of freedom," all for the sake of profit and pillage, ideology and empire. Power unfettered and unleashed, our freedoms die and are released The so-called "War on Terror" is but a charade, a fear-engendering escapade, designed to last into perpetuity, helping guarantee

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that the Military Industrial Complex will grow exponentially in power. It is a replacement for a Cold War long ago since retired and unable to deliver a massive increase in defense spending. Terrorists and the countries that harbor them have replaced the Soviet Union and Communists as enemy number one. With a war that may go on indefinitely, pursuing an enemy that lives in shadows and in the haze of ambiguity, the MIC will grow ever more powerful, conscripting hundreds of thousands of our youth, sending them to guide, operate and unleash their products of death. Rumblings of bringing back the draft are growing louder, and if you think your children and grandchildren will escape it, think again. In a war without end, in battles that do not cease, the MIC will need human flesh from which to recycle those who perish and fall wounded. Empire building needs bodies and drones to go with military might, instruments of death need trigger fingers and human brains, and, with so many expendable young men and women being conditioned in this so-called "war on terror," MIC will continue its reprogramming of citizen soldiers from peaceful civilians to warmongering killing machines. After

all, "War is Peace." Yet the Department of War, ever steadfast to use its weaponry, fails to realize that no amount of money will win this war if the root causes of terrorism are not confronted as priority number one. If you get to the roots, you pull out the weed. If not, it grows back again and again. But perhaps a perpetual war is what MIC has sought all along. A lifetime of combat, a lifetime of profit, a lifetime of power. Assembly lines of missiles, bombs, tanks and aircraft operate without pause, helping expand a sluggish economy and the interests of the Pax Americana. Profit over people, violence before peace, the American killing machine continues on its path to human extinction, and it is the hands and minds of our best and brightest building and creating these products of decimation. While we look over our shoulders for terrorists and evildoers, the world ominously looks directly at us with both eyes intently focused on the armies of the "Great Satan" and the "Evil Empire," not knowing which nation will be attacked or on whom the storm of satellite-guided-missiles will rain down on next. Every action has an equal and opposite reaction. In becoming pre-emptive warmongers, we are also becoming victims of our own making, helping assure a swelling wrath of revenge, resentment and retaliation against us. If we kill we will be killed, if we destroy we will be destroyed. The MIC is leading us down a steep canyon of fury, making us a pariah, a rogue country in the eyes of the world. We are becoming that which we fear most, a terrorist state. As political scientist and ex-marine C. Douglas Lummis has said, "Air bombardment is state terrorism, the terrorism of the rich. It has burned up and blasted apart more innocents in the past six decades than have all the anti-state terrorists who have ever lived. Something has benumbed our consciousness against this reality." Today we are seen, along with Israel, as the greatest threats to world peace. When hundreds of thousands throughout the planet call Bush "the world’s number one terrorist," that less than admirable distinction is automatically imputed onto the nation as a whole and the citizens in particular. This can be seen in the world’s perception and treatment of us today.

Ext. - Heg Causes Interventionism

## Heg causes interventionism – empirically proven

Ted Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute

08 Smart Power: Toward a Prudent Foreign Policy for America, Introduction Aug 15, CATO)

The third major defect in the current U.S. security strategy is the increased willingness to intervene militarily in murky, often internecine, conflicts. That is not entirely a new phenomenon. One of the worst strategic blunders in American history, the Vietnam war, was such an intervention. During the early 1980s, U.S. leaders committed a similar blunder (albeit, thankfully, on a much smaller scale) by sending troops into Lebanon when that country was in the midst of civil war. A decade later, American military personnel died in Somalia in pursuit of an amorphous mission with little or no strategic value. The United States intervened in two civil wars in the Balkans, which may ultimately lead to greater, rather than diminished, instability in that region. And, of course, Washington invaded both Afghanistan and Iraq and continues to militarily occupy both countries. The initial operation in Afghanistan at least made sense from a security standpoint. Not only were the perpetrators of the horrific 9-11 terrorist attacks holed up in that country, but Afghanistan’s Taliban government had given al Qaeda safe haven, despite the organization’s repeated attacks on American interests. Ousting that regime was entirely justified, but instead of simply turning over control of Afghanistan to a post-Taliban government with a firm warning not to tolerate the operations of anti-American terrorists, Washington stayed on in that country and has pursued an increasingly illdefined, open-ended nation-building mission. The intervention in Iraq is an even worse case of sloppy strategic thinking. In marked contrast to the rather strong case for invading Afghanistan, Iraq posed no credible military threat to the United States. The Bush administration decided to remove Saddam Hussein from power with the naive expectation that the transition to a friendly, democratic government would be quick and easy and that Iraq would become a secular democratic model that would transform politics throughout the Middle East, thereby ‘‘draining the swamp’’ of popular support for radical Islamic terrorism. It would be difficult to conceive of a more misguided venture. Instead of a rapid and inexpensive U.S. success, the occupation of Iraq is now in its sixth year with no end in sight. It has already consumed more than $500 billion in direct costs (and perhaps another $1 trillion in indirect costs) and taken the lives of more than 4,000 American soldiers—plus thousands more who have been physically maimed. That enormous price has been paid for the dubious achievement of enabling a sectarian Shiite government, heavily influenced by Iran, to gain a tenuous hold on power. The crazy-quilt pattern of U.S. security pledges and military interventions is strong evidence of a foreign policy elite that is intellectually unable to establish priorities or even to develop an analytical framework for assessing strategic choices. Yet it is imperative to have such a framework within which to examine calls to make security commitments or embark on military ventures. Without it, the United States will persist in a promiscuous security policy, putting the lives and fortunes of the American people at risk even when there is no compelling reason to do so.

A2 Hegemony K to Deomcracy

## Heg fails to promote democracy – empirically proven

The Palestinian Chronicle, 2008 (IStockAnalyst, Al Bawaba 8, “Robert Kagan’s Mythology of U.S. Exceptionalism,” December 8th, http://www.istockanalyst.com/article/viewiStockNews/articleid/2865093)

Kagan starts his arguments with a recognition that the world is "normal again", that history did not end as postulated by Fukuyama an idea that fully supported the jargon and rhetoric of U.S. exceptionalism, the "perfection of its institutions" and its indispensability. He is quite confident, and expresses it frequently through the work, that the U.S. remains the sole superpower, an argument based on.well, it's not defined, again it is presumed to be understood. Does it matter that U.S. military technology is the most sophisticated (arguably what do we really know about Chinese advances in technology?) when rag tag bands of militias can pin down the majority of active fighting forces in two desolate regions of the world (made desolate by ongoing imperial ambitions and occupation)? Does it matter that regardless of U.S. dominance in military and nuclear technology that other nations can just as readily inflict massive and catastrophic damage to the U.S. with their military and nuclear power (there will be no winners in another world war that is without limits)? Does it matter that the U.S. economy is built on a debt structure that is at the moment imploding on itself, while those of the elite who brought us to this position are the ones trying futilely to get us out of the mess? Does it matter that demographically the U.S. has one of the worst records of the developed nations in what are normally considered indicators of national well-being such as infant mortality rate, life span, poverty rates, income gaps.? Does it matter that the rest of the world has to continue to live with an arrogant egocentric nation whose rhetoric is far outweighed by its brutal tactics to remain in control? If that defines a superpower, then yes, the U.S. is the sole superpower.The underlying theme is stated quite clearly near the beginning,"Since democratic capitalism was the most successful model for developing societies, all societies would eventually choose that path."Problems immediately arise, as noted above, with "democratic capitalism", with its assumption as being a "successful model", and eventually for it being a "chosen" path. How much choice is there when democratic governments around the world have been overthrown with great regularity: the Cuban freedom fighters and the Philippino freedom fighters were sidelined by the U.S. military after the Spanish-American war[2]; the democratic government of Mossadegh was overthrown by joint manipulations of the CIA and British intelligence; the Italian and Greek popular movements towards social democracy were subverted; the Vietnam war would never have happened if the U.S. had allowed for a democratic vote sponsored by the UN on the joining of North and South Vietnam; most of the democratic governments of Central America faced subversion and interference from CIA and other U.S. sponsored operatives, from Nicaragua and Guatemala through to Allende's overthrow and Pinochet's reign of disappearances in Chile. While democracy withers on the vine in most areas of U.S. intervention (or survives in spite of it after millions of people in opposition to the elites are murdered by death squads, government operatives, or direct U.S. military action), the U.S. pours massive amounts of manure into areas that it sees as "strategic interests".