# 7-week seniors korea neg

[US Troops Solve Asia Peace 3](#_Toc265743580)

[Ground Forces Key 4](#_Toc265743581)

[Troops Key to Multilat/ROK 5](#_Toc265743582)

[US Forces Key 6](#_Toc265743583)

[Nuclear Umbrella Good 7](#_Toc265743584)

[War/Allied Prolif 8](#_Toc265743585)

[prolif links 9](#_Toc265743586)

[allied prolif links 10](#_Toc265743587)

[Presence Good – War 11](#_Toc265743588)

[Presence Good – Asia 12](#_Toc265743589)

[Presence Good – Japan 13](#_Toc265743590)

[Unification Turn 15](#_Toc265743591)

[A2: Unification = Withdrawal Inevitable 17](#_Toc265743593)

[Unification Bad – Arms Race 18](#_Toc265743594)

[North Korea Threat/ A2: South Can Defend 19](#_Toc265743595)

[US-ROK Relations Turn 20](#_Toc265743596)

[A2: Korean Anti-Americanism 21](#_Toc265743597)

[A2: ROK Will Side With China 23](#_Toc265743599)

[ROK Alliance Key to Unification 24](#_Toc265743600)

[War Solves ROK Relations 25](#_Toc265743601)

[A2: ROK / US Relations 26](#_Toc265743602)

[A2: Conflict Adv 27](#_Toc265743603)

[A2: Conflict Adv—China/South Korea Cooperation 29](#_Toc265743604)

[A2: Conflict Adv—Econ Internal 30](#_Toc265743605)

[A2: Conflict Adv—Dependence Internal (Belligerence) 31](#_Toc265743606)

[A2: Conflict Adv—China/South Korea Cooperation 32](#_Toc265743607)

[A2: Conflict Adv—Succession Internal 33](#_Toc265743608)

[A2 Regionalism Adv—Asian Cooperation Now 34](#_Toc265743609)

[\*\*\*North Korea Deterrence 35](#_Toc265743611)

[1NC North Korea DA 36](#_Toc265743612)

[North Korea—Uniqueness 37](#_Toc265743613)

[North Korea—Link 38](#_Toc265743614)

[North Korea—Yes Threat 42](#_Toc265743616)

[North Korea—Military Strong 43](#_Toc265743617)

[Deterrence—Troops Key 44](#_Toc265743618)

[Deterrence—A2 Non Unique—OPCON 45](#_Toc265743619)

[Deterrence—A2 Short Tours 46](#_Toc265743620)

[Deterrence—A2 South Korea Defends Itself 47](#_Toc265743621)

[a2: china pressure 49](#_Toc265743622)

[\*\*\*ROK ECON 49](#_Toc265743623)

[south korean economy 1nc 50](#_Toc265743624)

[Defense spending uniq 52](#_Toc265743625)

[Links 53](#_Toc265743626)

[links—defense spending 55](#_Toc265743628)

[Immediate Withdrawal Link 56](#_Toc265743629)

[us key 57](#_Toc265743630)

[spending internal link 58](#_Toc265743631)

[deterrence/spending link doublebind 59](#_Toc265743632)

[A2: Link Turns 60](#_Toc265743633)

[a2: spending good—econ 61](#_Toc265743634)

[a2: spending good—influence 62](#_Toc265743635)

[a2: won’t take the risk 63](#_Toc265743636)

[Impact – Free Trade and Environment 64](#_Toc265743637)

[china influence impact 67](#_Toc265743638)

[\*\*\*BIODIVERSITY DISAD 67](#_Toc265743639)

[biodiversity 1nc 68](#_Toc265743640)

[Reunification Uniquness 71](#_Toc265743643)

[Withdrawal Links 72](#_Toc265743644)

[Peace Bad: Roads 74](#_Toc265743646)

[Peace Bad: Empirical Examples 75](#_Toc265743647)

[Peace Bad/DMZ Key 78](#_Toc265743650)

[DMZ Key Ecosystem 80](#_Toc265743652)

[A2: Preservation Measures 83](#_Toc265743655)

[A2: Reunification Inevitable 84](#_Toc265743656)

[DMZ Key Ecosystem 85](#_Toc265743657)

[\*\*\*COUNTERPLANS 85](#_Toc265743658)

[Consult ROK 86](#_Toc265743659)

[Consult Japan 87](#_Toc265743660)

[Condition on Iraq C/P 88](#_Toc265743661)

[Propaganda C/P 89](#_Toc265743662)

[Restructuring C/P 90](#_Toc265743663)

[Restructuring Solves China Fear 92](#_Toc265743664)

[Restructuring Avoids Deterrence 93](#_Toc265743665)

[Military Intelligence Brigade PIC 94](#_Toc265743666)

[CFC CP – 1NC 95](#_Toc265743667)

[CFC CP—Solves North Korea 96](#_Toc265743668)

[CFC CP—Maintains Deterrence / North Korea DA Link 97](#_Toc265743669)

[CFC CP—A2 UN Controls 98](#_Toc265743670)

[CFC CP—Unpopular 99](#_Toc265743671)

[Condition C/P and Politics Link 100](#_Toc265743672)

# US Troops Solve Asia Peace

American military presence in Korea maintains peace and strong US-ROK relations

SHARP 2010 (Gen. Walter Sharp, Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea, Congressional Documents and Publications, March 26) Calum

The Korean Peninsula sits at the center of Northeast Asia - a dynamic region that has significant national interests for the U.S. n1 Northeast Asia is home to four of the world's six largest militaries in terms of personnel and two nuclear powers (China and Russia). n2 The region contains 25% of the world's population and is an economic powerhouse. n3 In 2009, Northeast Asia housed five of the world's 19 largest economies that collectively accounted for 24.8% of global gross domestic product during that year. n4 Countries in the region also accounted for 25.8% of U.S. trade in goods during 2009. n5 At the end of 2008, the U.S. direct investment position in Northeast Asia was valued at $220.7 billion. n6

While Northeast Asia has grown into a major economic region, it is also characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and rapid change. Historical animosities, territorial disputes, competition over access to resources, and struggles for regional hegemony have combined to pose difficult and long-term security challenges not only for regional states but also for the international community. U.S. force presence in the ROK is a long-term investment in regional peace and stability and both maintains security commitments to the ROK established under the Mutual Defense Treaty and reinforces American engagement with actors throughout Northeast Asia. U.S. force presence in the ROK also helps set the conditions for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and eventual reunification of the two Koreas in a peaceful manner. A strong ROK-U.S. Alliance, with a meaningful U.S. force presence on the Korean Peninsula, is essential to meet the security challenges posed in the dynamic and economically growing region of Northeast Asia. As observed in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, achieving core missions of American armed forces requires strong security relationships with allies and partners that are best enabled and maintained through long-term presence and sustained interaction.

**Withdrawal from Korea permanently decreases American security influence**

**Richardson, 06 –** Washington-based analyst who covered East Asian security issues as a presidential management fellow with the US Department of Defense, co-founder of The Korea Liberator – weblog focused on North Korea (Coreyu, "South Korea Must Choose Sides", Asia Times, September 9th 2006, June 27th 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/HI09Dg02.html, KONTOPOULOS)

Vastly reducing or withdrawing USFK can only harm US security, it cannot help it. USFK has helped maintain peace and allowed the US to project influence in the region for the past six decades; removing that presence would be foolish and difficult to replicate once done. It is also important to keep in mind that the next presidential election will likely result in a less anti-American administration.

# Ground Forces Key

Ground troops are critical—US Air Force assets in Korea are inadequately trained for rapid response

SHARP 2010 (Gen. Walter Sharp, Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea, Congressional Documents and Publications, March 26) Calum

My first priority as Commander of UNC, CFC, and USFK is to maintain trained, ready, and disciplined combined and joint commands that are prepared to fight and win. This has been the focus of U.S. forces stationed in Korea for more than 50 years and for the CFC since it was established in 1978. Maintaining "fight tonight" readiness is the primary reason U.S. forces are stationed in the ROK, supporting the alliance between the American and Korean people in defense of the ROK. The Alliance stands ready to address the full spectrum of conflict that could emerge with little warning on the Korean Peninsula. This spectrum of conflict ranges from major combat operations under conditions of general war or provocation, to multiple possibilities of destabilizing conditions on the Peninsula, to humanitarian assistance operations, and even the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Given these varied potential security challenges, it is imperative that our forces maintain the highest possible level of training and readiness.

In order to address the full spectrum of conflict that could emerge on the Korean Peninsula, the Command has developed and constantly refines plans to deter aggression against the ROK, defeat aggression should deterrence fail, and respond to other destabilizing conditions that could affect the ROK. U.S. and ROK military personnel develop and maintain their warfighting skills through tough, realistic training to include theater-level exercises that leverage a variety of facilities and ranges located in the ROK.

The Command conducts two annual exercises: Key Resolve/Foal Eagle and Ulchi Freedom Guardian. Key Resolve, a Command Post Exercise focused on crisis management, trains and sharpens skills on how we will fight today using existing organizational structures where CFC executes command and control over the combined force. Foal Eagle is a large-scale combined field training exercise that includes the strategic deployment of American forces from bases in the U.S. as well as the participation of thousands of ROK troops. Key Resolve and Foal Eagle ensure that CFC remains ready today to decisively defeat any aggression that is directed against the ROK. The second annual exercise - Ulchi Freedom Guardian - is a computer-simulated warfighting exercise that focuses on the development of Alliance command and control structures that will exist after the transition of wartime OPCON of ROK forces in April 2012.

Maintaining "fight tonight" readiness can only occur when training is conducted that prepares forces to address the full spectrum of operations that characterizes today's complex operational environment. It is vital that Command training facilities and events support the full transformation of U.S. military forces stationed in the ROK. The U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps possess adequate training resources in the ROK to maintain unit combat readiness to include the rehearsal of robust amphibious operations. But USFK still faces challenges with respect to the training of air forces located in the ROK. We have made progress with our ROK hosts in scheduling and maximizing use of limited ranges. However, there is still insufficient training range capability and capacity. A continued shortfall in electronic warfare training capability and restrictions placed on precision guided munitions training pose deficiencies that must be addressed. Deployments of U.S. air forces to training events outside the Korean Peninsula mitigate current training shortfalls and ensure the same standard of training and readiness as American combat air forces not located in the ROK. This is not a long-term solution, however, and I continue to work with the ROK government to find a solution to this key training and readiness issue.

# Troops Key to Multilat/ROK

US troop presence is critical to multilateralism and relations with the ROK—they give Korea a stronger voice in US policy decisions

CHA 2003 (Victor, associate professor of government and D. S. Song-Korea Foundation Endowed Chair at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Focus on the Future, Not the North,” Washington Quarterly 26:1) Calum

Second, the core countries have strong reasons themselves to accept bases rather than merely access arrangements with the United States. Alliances offer allies ways to dampen U.S. tendencies toward unilateralism.26 In the Korean case, an alliance with two independent militaries would enable Seoul to say "no" to the United States in ways that they could not before. In military terms, this situation might not be ideal, particularly given the history of this alliance, but politically this potential could be the ultimate symbol of a new, more equal, and long-term alliance relationship. Some European allies did not allow the United States to fly over their air space during attacks on Libya in 1986. U.S. allies also did not allow U.S. planes to refuel on their territories while carrying supplies to Israel during the 1973 Mideast war.27 Under certain circumstances, the ROK might refuse to allow the United States liberties with the bases. Bases, rather than places, actually give Korea more leverage. With a relationship based merely on access arrangements, saying "no" could mean the end of that relationship, as happened with New Zealand. A relationship undergirded by a basing and forward presence, however, is much more difficult to abrogate.

# US Forces Key

US forces are key to defend South Korea—despite some weaknesses, North Korea would overwhelm the ROK

STEVENS 2006 (Colonel Wayne Stevens, US Army War College, “Is US Forces Korea Still Needed on the Korean Peninsula?” March 15, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA448328&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>) Calum

Strategically, the U.S. focus has been to preserve peace on the peninsula and stability within the region. In order to maintain that focus the U.S. has relied on a large U.S. military force deployed alongside ROK forces to respond to the North Korean threat. U.S. and ROK forces on the peninsula do not appear large enough to defeat a robust North Korean military without suffering a significant number of casualties and destruction from DPRK’s Taepo-Dong, Scuds, and other missiles according to Pennsylvania Congressman Curt Weldon, House Committee Member on Armed Services.77 Some may argue that the ROK has the capability to defeat the North, however, one should not assume an ROK victory with certainty because of the military power of North Korea. The DPRK has a very dangerous army with the world’s largest Special Operations Force (about 120,000) and has the ability to launch an estimated 500,000 missiles on South Korea within hours.78 The ROK currently does not have the missile defense or air power capability to counter North Korea’s artillery capability. 79 The DPRK, with a military force of about 1.1 million, significantly outnumbers the ROK and U.S. forces on the peninsula of 680,000 and about 34,000 respectively. 80 The number advantage alone will not guarantee victory, but it does tend to improve the chance for success by wearing down the enemy with larger and more frequent attacks. U.S. Joint Forces Command and supporting combatant commands can provide remarkably more combat power such as U.S. Air Force Fighter Wings, U.S. Army Divisions, U.S. Marines Expeditionary Forces, among others by employing the following capabilities: the F-15 Eagle for air superiority; the F-15E Strike Eagle for enemy suppression; B-1 Lancer bomber; MQ-1 Predator for both reconnaissance and strike capability; 81 and additional brigade combat teams (BCT) are more self-sustaining and, therefore, can undertake longer durations of conflict.82 Finally, stability in Northeast Asia not only includes the North Korean threat, but also the ongoing tensions between China and Taiwan.

Rapid US reaction is critical to defend South Korea

STEVENS 2006 (Colonel Wayne Stevens, US Army War College, “Is US Forces Korea Still Needed on the Korean Peninsula?” March 15, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA448328&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>) Calum

If war breaks out on the peninsula, the ROK will most likely require considerably more than 34,000 U.S. troops to assist.87 The need for U.S. forces within Northeast Asia capable of rapidly deploying from within the region instead of from the U.S. will enhance the ROK’s ability to stop DPRK’s aggression quickly. The joint and flexible capabilities of the U.S. forces such as air superiority, precision guided missiles, and BCTs that are more capable of independent action and more responsive to regional combatant commanders can give the ROK forces a distinctive edge during combat operations and ensure the U.S. strategic focus of maintaining stability within the region.88 Some have argued for removing or reducing the U.S. forces on the peninsula because DPRK’s nuclear capability negates the need for U.S. conventional forces in the South.89 Despite the lack of conclusive proof that North Korea actually has nuclear weapons; the DPRK may find it harder to prove that they do not have nuclear weapons. North Korea already admitted that they are conducting a nuclear weapons program and the North has extracted spent fuel and reprocessed the fuel into weapons-grade plutonium.90 Although the nuclear argument may have some validity, a major U.S. concern is the need to have forward deployed basing to allow U.S. forces to project its military power. The forces in the ROK provide the U.S. with the capability to continue its deterrence mission and also to fight the Global War on Terror (GWOT) on foreign soil before it reaches the U.S.91

# Nuclear Umbrella Good

Preserving the US nuclear umbrella for South Korea is critical to peace in Asia

MITCHELL 2003 (Derek J. Mitchell is a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS, “A Blueprint for U.S. Policy toward a Unified Korea,” Washington Quarterly, 26:1) Calum

The U.S. nuclear umbrella over South Korea and Japan during the past 50 years has been an essential element of the bilateral security alliance and has been effective in maintaining ROK security. The U.S. commitment has enabled the ROK to renounce the development, stockpiling, or deployment of nuclear weapons and has prevented emergence of a regional arms race. Encouraging a unified Korea to renounce WMD because of the U.S. retention of its nuclear umbrella will serve this end and further solidify the basis of a postunification security alliance.

# War/Allied Prolif

Troop withdrawal causes North Korean attack and allied proliferation

DAVINO 2004 (Colonel Michael Davino, US Army War College, “Should The U.S. Continue to Maintain Forces in Korea?” May 3, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423338&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>) Calum

Although the region’s economy and the support we receive from our allies are important, the major reason for maintaining the U.S. presence in the region, particularly in South Korea, is as a deterrent to the DPRK. “North Korea poses many problems, of which its two nuclear programmes – the main worry of the moment – are just the start. Also alarming are its missile development and proliferation [and] its chemical and biological warfare capacity….” 21 Northeast Asia therefore, is a critical region in the struggle against proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology. Our national security strategy requires that “we must be able to stop rogue states before they are able to …use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends.”22 Both the PRC and Russia are nuclear powers, it is likely that the DPRK has several nuclear weapons, and the ROK and Japan are clearly capable of developing them. However, the presence of U.S. forces in the region and the implied willingness of the U.S. to provide a nuclear umbrella for the ROK and Japan, has been enough to keep them from pursuing their own nuclear weapons programs. A total withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula, or elsewhere in the Northeast Asia region, at a time when tensions over the North Korean nuclear program are increasing, would risk sending the wrong message to both our allies and the North Koreans.

# prolif links

**US military presence deters North Korean aggression and proliferation**

**Stevens 2006** (Colonel Wayne Stevens, US Army War College, “Is US Forces Korea Still Needed on the Korean Peninsula?” March 15, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA448328&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

The events of September 11, 2001 brought about changes in the structuring of U.S. military security within the ROK but not in the overall strategic defense objectives of the U.S. For example, the U.S. continues to serve as a deterrent against DPRK aggression and a stabilizing factor not only for the Korean peninsula but for the region of Northeast Asia as well.22 Understandably the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan along with the Global War on Terrorism and other U.S. security commitments in Korea and Europe required the repositioning of military forces to help reduce the operational tempo placed on other units. The Second Infantry Division deployed a brigade combat team to Iraq that had been helping to deter North Korean aggression. However, other instruments of power were in place to demonstrate America’s commitment to the ROK. The U.S. has employed diplomatic and economic instruments of power in addition to military power to deter DPRK aggression. Hopefully, the combined efforts of the instruments of power will create a lasting peace that will eventually lead to unification of the two Koreas. Some may argue that since 9/11 the ROK is less important to the U.S.23 A more accurate assessment however would be that despite the global attention being focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. still views its commitment to the ROK as essential. The U.S. is particularly concerned about DPRK’s nuclear weapons program and the possibility of DPRK proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). North Korea will continue to draw a watchful eye from the U.S. for several reasons: (1) DPRK is viewed as a security threat due to their large military forces and WMD capabilities; (2) if DPRK collapsed it would create a humanitarian disaster rife with hunger and huge number of refugees; and (3) DPRK poses a proliferation threat with regard to WMD to both state and non-state actors.24

# allied prolif links

**Withdrawal causes South Korea prolif**

**Eberstadt, et. al, 07** -- \*Ph.D. in Political Economy and Government from Harvard, Political economist, Senior Adviser to the National Board of Asian Research, \*\*Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, \*\*\*Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (\*Nicholas, \*\*Aaron L., \*\*\*Christopher, "Toward an America-Free Korea", American enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, October 6th 2007, June 24th 2010, http://www.aei.org/article/26924, KONTOPOULOS)

A Nuclear Crisis--in South Korea. If forced to pursue a wholly independent self-defense in a hostile security environment, Seoul would face overwhelming pressures to develop its own nuclear arsenal. Indeed, the rapidity with which participants at the conference, American and Korean, progressive and conservative, arrived at this conclusion was chilling--especially given the likely implications for regional stability, further nuclear proliferation and South Korea's international standing.

**Pullout causes allied prolif**

**Davino 4** (Colonel Michael Davino, US Army War College, “Should The U.S. Continue to Maintain Forces in Korea?” May 3, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423338&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

Although the region’s economy and the support we receive from our allies are important, the major reason for maintaining the U.S. presence in the region, particularly in South Korea, is as a deterrent to the DPRK. “North Korea poses many problems, of which its two nuclear programmes – the main worry of the moment – are just the start. Also alarming are its missile development and proliferation [and] its chemical and biological warfare capacity….” 21 Northeast Asia therefore, is a critical region in the struggle against proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology. Our national security strategy requires that “we must be able to stop rogue states before they are able to …use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends.”22 Both the PRC and Russia are nuclear powers, it is likely that the DPRK has several nuclear weapons, and the ROK and Japan are clearly capable of developing them. However, the presence of U.S. forces in the region and the implied willingness of the U.S. to provide a nuclear umbrella for the ROK and Japan, has been enough to keep them from pursuing their own nuclear weapons programs. A total withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula, or elsewhere in the Northeast Asia region, at a time when tensions over the North Korean nuclear program are increasing, would risk sending the wrong message to both our allies and the North Koreans.

**Pull out causes Asian tensions and proliferation**

**Swanström 5**—Exec dir., Silk Road Studies, Uppsala U. PhD, Peace and Conflict Studies (Niklas, The Korean Peninsula in the U.S.’s Post-9/11 Military-Security Paradigm, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/docs/conference\_papers/2004/The%20Korean%20Peninsula.pdf, AMiles)

For China and Japan, security has decreased somewhat in Northeast Asia and specifically in the Korean peninsula as the US has directed its attention towards other regions. The general structure of the conflicts are however the same, i.e. the Korean peninsula, nuclear proliferation and the Taiwan straits.57 A perceived withdrawal of American troops is neither in Chinas nor Japans interest. China fears that South Korea and especially Japan will strengthen their own forces and even possibly acquire nuclear weapons if the North Korean nuclear development can not be staled.58 Japan feels far more comfortable under American military protection than under an unclear military arrangement where the Chinese would be the far strongest actor in the short and long term. All the Northeast Asian states will be forced to deal with increased financial commitments to the military if the US withdraws and the tension continues. American presence in the region has provided for security, but maybe more importantly it has kept down the military expenditure for Japan and South Korea. Filling a power vacuum in the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia at large will be costly for economic development in the region. Whether or not it is admitted, the US has been a guarantor of stability since the 1950’s and in practice kept down military spending. If the US withdrawal takes up phase there will be an increased military expenditure in Northeast Asia to meet new challenges in an uncertain region that risk destabilizing the Korean peninsula.

# Presence Good – War

**US presence in Korea key to stop global nuclear war**

**Swanström 5**—Exec dir., Silk Road Studies, Uppsala U. PhD, Peace and Conflict Studies (Niklas, The Korean Peninsula in the U.S.’s Post-9/11 Military-Security Paradigm, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/docs/conference\_papers/2004/The%20Korean%20Peninsula.pdf, AMiles)

Looking closer at one of the more threatening sub-regions, the Korean peninsula, we can see some worrisome changes after 9/11 but also possibilities for tension reduction, this especially in relation to changes in US policy. For half a decade America has been a stabilizing factor in the Northeast Asia. This through the active support for democratic and economic development among their allies and in the region at large, and in the defense of the South Korean border against a possible invasion by North Korea. The American presence in the Korean peninsula has been one of the US main operations in the region and changes in the US military-security paradigm will directly affect the security not only in the Korean peninsula but in Northeast Asia in general. The changes in US policy in Korean peninsula is of particular interest since one of two remaining “axis of evil”, and arguable the worst according to US perceptions, North Korea, with a possible nuclear capability and prior links to terrorism is situated here. Moreover, Northeast Asia could be argued to be the last remnants of the Cold War, with the largest concentration of troops against one border in the Korean peninsula (close to two million), which occasionally erupts in skirmishes.2 Moreover, the military expenditure in Northeast Asia is rapidly increasing as a result of the high level of tension and low level of trust between the actors in the region.3 A war in the region would threaten both the worlds' security as at lest two, potentially three, nuclear powers would be involved in the conflict, and the economic development globally would be reversed as a large part of the economic growth is in Northeast Asia. This makes a destabilization of the region one of the most threatening not only to regional stability, but also to international stability. Therefore it is crucial to understanding the new security environment and the US role in it.

# Presence Good – Asia

**American military presence in Korea maintains peace and strong US-ROK relations**

**Sharp 2010** (Gen. Walter Sharp, Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea, Congressional Documents and Publications, March 26)

The Korean Peninsula sits at the center of Northeast Asia - a dynamic region that has significant national interests for the U.S. n1 Northeast Asia is home to four of the world's six largest militaries in terms of personnel and two nuclear powers (China and Russia). n2 The region contains 25% of the world's population and is an economic powerhouse. n3 In 2009, Northeast Asia housed five of the world's 19 largest economies that collectively accounted for 24.8% of global gross domestic product during that year. n4 Countries in the region also accounted for 25.8% of U.S. trade in goods during 2009. n5 At the end of 2008, the U.S. direct investment position in Northeast Asia was valued at $220.7 billion. n6 While Northeast Asia has grown into a major economic region, it is also characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and rapid change. Historical animosities, territorial disputes, competition over access to resources, and struggles for regional hegemony have combined to pose difficult and long-term security challenges not only for regional states but also for the international community. U.S. force presence in the ROK is a **long-term investment in regional peace** and stability and both maintains security commitments to the ROK established under the Mutual Defense Treaty and reinforces American engagement with actors throughout Northeast Asia. U.S. force presence in the ROK also helps set the conditions for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and eventual reunification of the two Koreas in a peaceful manner. A strong ROK-U.S. Alliance, with a meaningful U.S. force presence on the Korean Peninsula, is essential to meet the security challenges posed in the dynamic and economically growing region of Northeast Asia. As observed in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, achieving core missions of American armed forces requires strong security relationships with allies and partners that are best enabled and maintained through long-term presence and sustained interaction.

# Presence Good – Japan

**Withdrawal rcauses Japanese militarization**

**Kim 6**—IR, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (Sung-han, Realigning Expectations for the ROK-U.S. Relationship: are We Ignoring a Glass More Than Half Full?, http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/programs/program\_pdfs/rok\_us\_kim.pdf, AMiles)

In addition, the withdrawal of U.S. forces in Korea would gradually strengthen feeling in Japan that it should cease to serve as a host country for the U.S. military presence because Japan, which will have probably become a “normal state” with military capability at that point, needs to prepare for a happy divorce with the United States. Opposing voices in Japan toward the U.S. military presence will be stronger, thereby endangering the U.S. presence even in Japan. This is not the scenario that China wants to see, since Japan without a U.S. security umbrella means that Japan will embark on rapid military build-up. **USFK and USFJ should thus be treated as a single basket**. For now, however, it seems that the U.S. believes Japan will continue to host the U.S. military presence even after the U.S. has left Korea since Japan is in need of U.S. assistance to become a normal state in the international security arena. In this vein, mutual expectations between Seoul and Washington toward ROK-U.S. and Japan-U.S. alliances appear to be unbalanced.

Presence Good—US/ROK Alliance Module

**US forces are the lynchpin of US-ROK relations—these solve terrorism, peacekeeping, economic growth, and peace in Korea**

**Sharp 2010** (Gen. Walter Sharp, Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea, Congressional Documents and Publications, March 26)

A key part of U.S. security policy in Asia is the construction of a comprehensive strategic alliance with the ROK as specified in the June 2009 Joint Vision statement. This comprehensive strategic alliance will be bilateral, regional, and global in scope and will be based on common values and mutual trust. We will maintain a robust defense posture backed by allied capabilities which support both nations' security interests. Just as today, in the future the ROK-U.S. Alliance will remain vital to securing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia as a whole. The U.S. will maintain its commitment to the defense of the ROK through the employment of capabilities postured both on and off the Korean Peninsula. Similarly, the U.S. welcomes recent moves by the ROK to expand its role in the international community at a level that is commensurate with its growing international stature. The U.S. will continue to provide extended deterrence for the ROK using the full range of military capabilities to include the nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities. As the ROK-U.S. Alliance evolves in the future, we will cooperate on a wide-ranging set of global security challenges that are of mutual interest to include peacekeeping activities, stabilization and reconstruction efforts, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. Over the next decade or so the security component of the Alliance will experience some of the most profound changes since the Mutual Defense Treaty was signed in 1953. Three of these key changes are the transition of wartime OPCON, relocation of U.S. forces stationed in the ROK onto two enduring hubs, and tour normalization. These transformational changes will strengthen the Alliance and enhance its stabilizing role on the Korean Peninsula and in the wider area of Northeast Asia. The process of change will also be supported by implementation of the ROK Defense Reform 2020 initiative. As the Alliance transforms, United Nations Command will continue to provide a coalition of 15 nations ready to provide support for defense of the ROK as well as conduct its armistice maintenance functions through the Military Armistice Commission. Through Alliance transformation we seek to build a better future for Koreans and Americans by establishing a durable peace on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia and setting the conditions for peaceful reunification of the two Koreas. As Alliance partners, the ROK and U.S. will work together toward achieving complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In the Asia-Pacific region the Alliance will work jointly with regional institutions and partners to foster prosperity, maintain peace, and improve the daily lives of people. To enhance security in the Asia-Pacific area the ROK and U.S. governments will advocate for - and take part in - effective cooperative regional efforts to promote mutual understanding, confidence, and transparency regarding security issues among nations of this region. The two governments will also work closely to address the global challenges of the North Korean threat, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, and piracy. The ROK and U.S. will also enhance coordination on peacekeeping operations and post-conflict stabilization and development assistance. In the end, the two countries will work toward achieving Alliance goals through strategic cooperation at every level. V. SUMMARY This year marks the 60th anniversary of the start of the Korean War. Thanks to the sacrifice and selfless service of a countless number of Koreans, Americans, and people of other nationalities, North Korea's aggression was repelled. This year also marks the 57th anniversary of signing the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. Thanks to the peace and stability created by the Alliance structures that emanated from this mutual defense pact, the ROK has been able to develop into a democratic industrialized state with a high standard of living and a growing role in the international community. By promoting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, the ROK-U.S. Alliance has not only set the conditions for successful development of the ROK over the last six decades, but also promoted peace and stability in the broader region of Northeast Asia - a region of key national interest to the U.S.

# Unification Turn

Strong US military presence is critical to managing Korean unification and preventing war—the impact is free trade and economy collapse

MITCHELL 2003 (Derek J. Mitchell is a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS, “A Blueprint for U.S. Policy toward a Unified Korea,” Washington Quarterly, 26:1) Calum

This article assumes that the outcome of unification will be primarily on South Korean terms and defines unification as the creation of a unified polity rather than unified societies or economic structures. The circumstances under which unification may occur—peaceful integration, the gradual or sudden collapse of the DPRK, or war—is an important if unpredictable variable in any policy-planning assessment of Korea's future. Nonetheless, however unification occurs, a number of fundamental U.S. strategic interests in postunification Korea, and postunification East Asia more broadly, will remain substantially similar to what they are today. [End Page 123]

Regional stability may become even more critical in the tenuous period of uncertainty and turmoil likely to characterize Korea's transition. Having fought three major wars in East Asia during the twentieth century, including one on the Korean peninsula that resulted in a substantial loss of American lives and resources, the United States understands well the importance of helping to maintain stability, prevent the emergence of regional rivalries, and promote the peaceful resolution of differences within and among regional nations. Nearly a half-million U.S. citizens live, work, and study in the Asia-Pacific region. More than one-third of total U.S. trade is conducted with the region, with millions of U.S. jobs depending on its continued growth and development. Sustained regional economic growth through the promotion of market economies and open sea-lanes—essential to the free flow of resources and trade into and within the region—will remain just as much a core U.S. national security interest following unification as it is now.

Long-term U.S. active engagement in East Asia—whether political, diplomatic, economic, or military—has traditionally managed to promote a peaceful security environment by providing a buffer against tensions. To continue to safeguard its regional interests, even after change on the Korean peninsula, U.S. security strategy should preserve U.S. treaty alliances as the cornerstone of peace and stability in East Asia. It is unlikely that a multilateral institution akin to NATO will be possible in Asia for the foreseeable future. The U.S. alliance structure and regional military presence will remain the most viable guarantor of regional security in its absence. At the same time, Korean unification will not minimize the profound U.S. interest in strengthening U.S. engagement with other nonallied nations in the region, particularly China, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Multilateral dialogues to promote a common approach to regional affairs and to sustain broad regional support for the alliance structure will also be increasingly necessary and appropriate.

To give form to this ongoing commitment to regional security and to mitigate potential military rivalries, the United States will have to maintain a robust and credible military presence in the region. This presence will have to be altered to address the new domestic environment in Korea as well as the changed security environment in the region. The maintenance of a ready, balanced, and forward-deployed U.S. force would fulfill important U.S. interests in regional deterrence and burden sharing and would demonstrate political commitment that a fully remote posture off the peninsula [End Page 124] would preclude. Ideally, a unified Korea would maintain a capable, conventional, national military, prepared and trained to work with the United States not only to defend the Korean homeland but also to promote regional stability.

# Unification Turn

US presence is critical to smooth reunification

MITCHELL 2003 (Derek J. Mitchell is a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS, “A Blueprint for U.S. Policy toward a Unified Korea,” Washington Quarterly, 26:1) Calum

The United States should be flexible about the structure of its presence on the peninsula but firm about maintaining some form of presence after unification. During a difficult transition, a continued U.S. presence on the peninsula will allow a unified Korea to focus on the challenges of domestic development, including the long process of reconciliation, rather than on its external security. The United States should consult closely with Korean authorities concerning an appropriate structure according to regional security needs and domestic Korean sensitivities.

# A2: Unification = Withdrawal Inevitable

Unified Korea would still seek to retain US troops

MITCHELL 2003 (Derek J. Mitchell is a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS, “A Blueprint for U.S. Policy toward a Unified Korea,” Washington Quarterly, 26:1) Calum

A unified Korea also will arguably have a substantial interest in accepting a U.S. military presence on the peninsula following unification. This presence would serve as a key component of continued alliance relations and the overall U.S. regional military presence to preserve stability throughout East Asia. Korea's continued hosting of U.S. forces would sustain the special relationship between the governments and armed forces of both sides, facilitate their coordination of regional strategy, and continue to serve as a deterrent to others seeking advantage on the peninsula.

The US will continue to support troops in Korea after unification

MITCHELL 2003 (Derek J. Mitchell is a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS, “A Blueprint for U.S. Policy toward a Unified Korea,” Washington Quarterly, 26:1) Calum

A final wildcard is the continued commitment of the U.S. populace, including Congress, to sustaining its role as security guarantor in East Asia and to expending the economic, political, and military resources necessary to maintain its presence. Currently, no evidence exists that the United States will attenuate its commitments to East Asia in the future, following Korean unification or otherwise. Given the nature of democracy, however, U.S. domestic politics or public opinion could complicate U.S. international policy. The state of the region, the world, and the U.S. domestic environment at the time of unification is impossible to predict. Variables include developments in the war on terrorism; the U.S. fiscal situation; U.S. relations with other regional states; and the political, military, and financial support of regional allies and friends to help meet U.S. interests. Nonetheless, given the tremendous interest the United States will retain in the peace and stability of East Asia following unification, as indicated above, the U.S. regional security strategy of alliances, military presence, and sustained diplomatic engagement will likely endure regardless of such potential complications.

# Unification Bad – Arms Race

**Unification causes an arms race and extinction**

**Richardson, 06 –** Washington-based analyst who covered East Asian security issues as a presidential management fellow with the US Department of Defense, co-founder of The Korea Liberator – weblog focused on North Korea (Coreyu, "South Korea Must Choose Sides", Asia Times, September 9th 2006, June 27th 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/HI09Dg02.html, KONTOPOULOS)

North Korea is the wildcard. If in the next few years reunification were to occur - through a North Korean collapse, the death of Kim Jong-il, or a possible but unlikely mutual agreement - South Korea would suddenly find itself straddled with the enormous cost of integrating North Korea. These costs would dwarf the already massive increase South Korea would have been undertaking in defense spending, something it would clearly be unprepared and unable to accomplish while maintaining its defense investment. A Korea faced with an economic dilemma of such magnitude would find maintaining its conventional military forces at current levels impossible. At the same time, it would feel more vulnerable than ever, even with US security assurances. For a nation paranoid about the possibility of outside influence or military intervention, strapped for cash, and obsessed about its position in the international hierarchy, **the obvious route might be to either incorporate North Korean nuclear devices** (if they actually exist), **or build their own, something South Korean technicians could easily accomplish.** North Korea, after all, has set the example for economically challenged nations looking for the ultimate in deterrence. One might argue that clear and firm US security guarantees for a reunified Korea would be able to dissuade any government from choosing the nuclear option. If making decisions based purely on logic the answer would be probably yes. Unfortunately, the recent Korean leadership has established a record of being motivated more by emotional and nationalistic factors than logical or realistic ones. Antics over Dokdo and the Yasukuni Shrine and alienating the US serve as examples. But the continuation of the "Sunshine Policy" tops those. Japan must then consider its options in countering an openly nuclear, reunified Korea without USFK. Already building momentum to change its constitution to clarify its military, it's not inconceivable that Japan would ultimately consider going nuclear to deter Korea. As in South Korea, there is no technological barrier preventing Japan from building nuclear weapons. While the details of the race and escalation of tensions can vary in any number of ways and are not inevitable, that **an arms race would occur is probable. Only the perception of threat and vulnerability need be present for this to occur.** **East Asia could become a nuclear powder keg ready to explode over something** as **childish** as the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute between Korea and Japan, a Diaoyu/Senkakus dispute between China and Japan, or the Koguryo dispute between Korea and China.

# North Korea Threat/ A2: South Can Defend

North Korea is a military threat to the South

SHARP 2010 (Gen. Walter Sharp, Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea, Congressional Documents and Publications, March 26) Calum

Though aging and technologically inferior, North Korea's massive army and vast artillery forces continue to represent a substantial threat capable of initiating limited offensives against the ROK that could potentially cost thousands of lives and billions of dollars in damage. North Korea also continued to develop its missile forces by attempting a multi-stage space launch vehicle, as well as multiple theater ballistic missile launches. Pyongyang continued to focus resources on its conventional and asymmetric military forces despite food shortages and a faltering economy. North Korea's missile capabilities remain a significant regional and global threat.

North Korea Threat Outlook

My number one concern will remain Pyongyang's continuing attempts to develop its nuclear and missile capabilities. The full potential of these capabilities would threaten the U.S., our regional allies, and the international community. We must also be mindful of the potential for instability in North Korea. Combined with the country's disastrous centralized economy, dilapidated industrial sector, insufficient agricultural base, malnourished military and populace, and developing nuclear programs, the possibility of a sudden leadership change in the North could be destabilizing and unpredictable.

In the future, Pyongyang may continue its strategy of periodically heightening tensions. We must never be complacent about the possibility that North Korea might take additional provocative steps or even launch an attack on the ROK. To address this threat, UNC/CFC/USFK must maintain the highest level of readiness.

# US-ROK Relations Turn

US forces are the lynchpin of US-ROK relations—these solve terrorism, peacekeeping, economic growth, and peace in Korea

SHARP 2010 (Gen. Walter Sharp, Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea, Congressional Documents and Publications, March 26) Calum

A key part of U.S. security policy in Asia is the construction of a comprehensive strategic alliance with the ROK as specified in the June 2009 Joint Vision statement. This comprehensive strategic alliance will be bilateral, regional, and global in scope and will be based on common values and mutual trust. We will maintain a robust defense posture backed by allied capabilities which support both nations' security interests. Just as today, in the future the ROK-U.S. Alliance will remain vital to securing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia as a whole. The U.S. will maintain its commitment to the defense of the ROK through the employment of capabilities postured both on and off the Korean Peninsula. Similarly, the U.S. welcomes recent moves by the ROK to expand its role in the international community at a level that is commensurate with its growing international stature. The U.S. will continue to provide extended deterrence for the ROK using the full range of military capabilities to include the nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities. As the ROK-U.S. Alliance evolves in the future, we will cooperate on a wide-ranging set of global security challenges that are of mutual interest to include peacekeeping activities, stabilization and reconstruction efforts, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.

Over the next decade or so the security component of the Alliance will experience some of the most profound changes since the Mutual Defense Treaty was signed in 1953. Three of these key changes are the transition of wartime OPCON, relocation of U.S. forces stationed in the ROK onto two enduring hubs, and tour normalization. These transformational changes will strengthen the Alliance and enhance its stabilizing role on the Korean Peninsula and in the wider area of Northeast Asia. The process of change will also be supported by implementation of the ROK Defense Reform 2020 initiative. As the Alliance transforms, United Nations Command will continue to provide a coalition of 15 nations ready to provide support for defense of the ROK as well as conduct its armistice maintenance functions through the Military Armistice Commission.

Through Alliance transformation we seek to build a better future for Koreans and Americans by establishing a durable peace on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia and setting the conditions for peaceful reunification of the two Koreas. As Alliance partners, the ROK and U.S. will work together toward achieving complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In the Asia-Pacific region the Alliance will work jointly with regional institutions and partners to foster prosperity, maintain peace, and improve the daily lives of people. To enhance security in the Asia-Pacific area the ROK and U.S. governments will advocate for - and take part in - effective cooperative regional efforts to promote mutual understanding, confidence, and transparency regarding security issues among nations of this region. The two governments will also work closely to address the global challenges of the North Korean threat, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, and piracy. The ROK and U.S. will also enhance coordination on peacekeeping operations and post-conflict stabilization and development assistance. In the end, the two countries will work toward achieving Alliance goals through strategic cooperation at every level.

V. SUMMARY

This year marks the 60th anniversary of the start of the Korean War. Thanks to the sacrifice and selfless service of a countless number of Koreans, Americans, and people of other nationalities, North Korea's aggression was repelled. This year also marks the 57th anniversary of signing the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. Thanks to the peace and stability created by the Alliance structures that emanated from this mutual defense pact, the ROK has been able to develop into a democratic industrialized state with a high standard of living and a growing role in the international community. By promoting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, the ROK-U.S. Alliance has not only set the conditions for successful development of the ROK over the last six decades, but also promoted peace and stability in the broader region of Northeast Asia - a region of key national interest to the U.S.

# A2: Korean Anti-Americanism

Statistical research shows that Korean conservatives and progressives both support US troop presence

CHAE AND KIM 2008 (Haesook Chae is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Baldwin-Wallace College in Berea, Ohio; Steven Kim is an assistant professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu. “Conservatives and Progressives in South Korea,” Washington Quarterly, 31:4) Calum

First, the characterization that conservatives are uniformly pro-American needs some minor but significant revision. As figure 3 shows, conservatives are reliable supporters of the United States. When it comes to the specific issue of South Korean armed forces, however, conservatives adopt the position more closely associated with the progressives that the military should move toward greater independence from the United States (SKMILTARY). Sup-port for the alliance with the United States and support for a stronger, more self-reliant Korean military thus are not mutually exclusive. An interesting corollary is that conservatives, much like progressives, are also opposed to the deployment of U.S. troops outside of the Korean peninsula (USSTRTGC). It appears that the argument made by the United States that flexibility in troop strength would not diminish South Korea's security and would promote vital U.S. interests has not persuaded pro-American conservatives. Conservatives, although pro-American, are nationalists first.

Second, the survey data reveal that progressive attitudes are also more complex than previously thought. Figure 3 confirms that progressives are anti-American, holding that South Korea and the United States have divergent interests in dealing with North Korea (SKUSINTR) and that the United States does not take South Korean interests into consideration significantly [End Page 85] when dealing with North Korea (USCARE). They also hold that the United States was responsible for the partition of the two Koreas (USPARTTN), was a hindrance to democratic development in South Korea (USDEMOCY), and presently is an obstacle to reunification hopes (USREUNFY). Obviously, this assessment of the United States is fairly negative, consistent with the prevailing model on what progressives believe.

On questions related to the South Korean–U.S. alliance, however, pro gressives depart from their perceived role. Progressives believe that the U.S. troop presence in South Korea has led to economic prosperity for their nation (USPROMOTE). They believe in strengthening the alliance and oppose a precipitous withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea (SKUSALNC, SKALLYUS, USFKRMVL). In general and in a hypothetical situation in which conflict breaks out between the United States and China over the Taiwan Strait, progressives hold that South Korea should not waver in its alliance with the United States in exchange for closer ties with China (TAIWANand SKALLYCH). The paradoxical conclusion is that progressives, while censuring U.S. activity in the Korean peninsula, still value the alliance with the United States. Although progressives value the alliance, they have mixed feelings toward it. Progressives view North Korea with ambivalence, both as a kin nation with which to be reconciled and as a mortal threat to be constrained. The South Korean–U.S. alliance is critical to both of these impulses. From one perspective, progressives believe that U.S. forces in Korea (USFK) are an obstacle to peacefully engaging with North Korea. At the same time, however, progressives are mindful that the alliance has staved off North Korea aggression. Alliance with the United States, then, occupies the rather complex position of being simultaneously the chief obstacle to inter-Korean reconciliation and the chief guardian of South Korea's security. Although progressives and conservatives embrace the South Korean–U.S. alliance, they disagree on how it should be structured. In February 2007, Seoul and Washington signed a bilateral agreement that will transfer operational control of the South Korean military to the South Korean government in 2012. (The United States has maintained command authority over U.S. and South Korean forces since the Korean War.) Progressives endorse this change in leadership as an enhancement of national autonomy, believing it will be done without diminishing the deterrent value or adversely affecting U.S. commitments [End Page 86] to South Korea (TWCINDPN, TWCALNC, and TWCPROVK). Progressives want the alliance but on their own terms. Conservatives, on the other hand, oppose any change to the command structure, believing it would weaken the alliance and encourage North Korean aggression. For conservatives, the alliance and U.S. leadership in it go hand in hand, and one cannot be rejected without the other. What emerges from the survey data is a complex picture. There exists a clear-cut ideological split on views of the United States, but the political camps converge on the South Korean–U.S. alliance, agreeing that the alliance is of critical importance because of a still-dangerous North. Yet, the two camps see the alliance in different ways. For progressives, the alliance should accommodate movement toward inter-Korean reconciliation; for conservatives, security is preeminent, and thus no one should tamper with the alliance. Nevertheless, both sides essentially agree that the alliance is valuable to South Korea's national interests. This pragmatic approach from the progressive camp is a major finding because many analysts in South Korea and the United States have expressed the concern that the alliance may become increasingly tenuous due to widespread and growing anti-American sentiment. This study shows that anti-American sentiments do not contradict but rather coexist with a general support for the alliance.

# A2: Korean Anti-Americanism

Anti-Americanism won’t hurt relations—even Koreans who dislike the US view the alliance as a necessary evil

CHAE AND KIM 2008 (Haesook Chae is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Baldwin-Wallace College in Berea, Ohio; Steven Kim is an assistant professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu. “Conservatives and Progressives in South Korea,” Washington Quarterly, 31:4) Calum

Third, South Korea should cultivate its alliance with the United States. Regardless of political orientation, the public supports maintaining the alliance. Counterintuitive though it may seem, strong anti-American sentiments should not be interpreted as a demand to terminate or weaken the alliance. Progressives are able to sustain both a negative view of the United States and a positive view of the alliance. For many progressives, the U.S. military presence is a necessary evil.

# A2: ROK Will Side With China

Even with anti-American feelings Koreans oppose China more

CHAE AND KIM 2008 (Haesook Chae is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Baldwin-Wallace College in Berea, Ohio; Steven Kim is an assistant professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu. “Conservatives and Progressives in South Korea,” Washington Quarterly, 31:4) Calum

There is no essential difference between progressives and conservatives on relations with China and Japan, as figure 4 vividly demonstrates. When asked to rate their feelings toward China, progressives and conservatives answered in the negative with nearly the same intensity (FEELCHNA). The same result was seen with Japan, the responses being much more negative (FEELJAPN). This concord is all the more remarkable when juxtaposed with how the United States elicited opposite responses from the two camps.

Consider in particular how China compared with the United States. When asked to what extent respondents thought China took South Korea's interests into account when acting on North Korea, both clusters registered nearly the same unfavorable value (CHCARE). Yet, the same question about the United States elicited opposite opinions from the two clusters. Even among progressives, who generally held that both China and the United States neglect the welfare of South Korea, China was thought to be more remiss. On the issue of whether China is an asset or an obstacle to the reunification of the two Koreas, both groups again gave very similar ratings perceiving China as an obstacle (CHREUNFY). On the other hand, the same question about the United States elicited opposite responses (USREUNFY). The conclusion is that China [End Page 87] is negatively viewed across the South Korean political spectrum, whereas the United States is a dividing factor between the two clusters.

South Koreans won’t support China—even with anti-American sentiment they still prefer the US

CHAE AND KIM 2008 (Haesook Chae is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Baldwin-Wallace College in Berea, Ohio; Steven Kim is an assistant professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu. “Conservatives and Progressives in South Korea,” Washington Quarterly, 31:4) Calum

Figure 5 is based on a survey question that asked respondents whether South Korea should maintain closer ties with the United States or China for the sake of national interest. An overwhelming majority, 90 percent of conservatives and 74 percent of progressives, chose the United States. This finding suggests that, for South Koreans, China is not a competitive alternative to the United States at the moment. This result may be explained by the wariness of China displayed in figure 4. The expressed preference for the United States contradicts the pervasive belief of an increasing public tilt toward China either as a result of or in tandem with growing anti-Americanism.

Figure 6 further confirms the relative insignificance of China to South Korea's national interests. Respondents were asked with whom South Korea should most cooperate if faced with the crisis of the sudden collapse of the [End Page 89] North Korean regime. Only a tiny minority, 4 percent of conservatives and 5 percent of progressives, chose China over other countries and international bodies. Consistent with their pro-American image, a plurality of conservatives (44 percent) chose the United States, while a plurality of progressives (46 percent) chose the United Nations. A large majority of progressives (69 percent) chose an international entity, whether the UN or the six-party talks group (23 percent), over any single nation.

# ROK Alliance Key to Unification

Strong alliance with the US is key to stability during Korean unification

MITCHELL 2003 (Derek J. Mitchell is a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS, “A Blueprint for U.S. Policy toward a Unified Korea,” Washington Quarterly, 26:1) Calum

Arguably, Korea's interest will continue to lie in the retention of its alliance with the United States following unification. Despite some frictions, the alliance has served to help preserve Korea's essential freedom of action and to facilitate its historic political and economic development over many decades. Maintaining an alliance with the United States will also help preserve the U.S.-led, alliance-based security structure in East Asia that has served as a stabilizing force in the region, hedged against the rise of an aggressive regional power, and protected Korea from becoming the political if not military battleground upon which the major Asian powers have historically sought regional advantage. Indeed, a unified Korea will need the stability and reassurance engendered by its alliance with the United States more than ever during the many years of transition following unification, particularly under collapse or war scenarios.

# War Solves ROK Relations

Mutual war against North Korea would preserve the US-ROK alliance

MITCHELL 2003 (Derek J. Mitchell is a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS, “A Blueprint for U.S. Policy toward a Unified Korea,” Washington Quarterly, 26:1) Calum

Finally, how unification is achieved, including the nature and degree of international involvement in the unification process, will shape the outlook of Korea toward its external environment and the context in which Korea ultimately will make its strategic choices. For instance, should North Korea collapse, the need for U.S. engagement and external security guarantees is likely to be greater than if unification comes through peaceful integration over time. Should the United States fight alongside the South in a war against the North, the fresh strategic and personal bonds created would likely tie the two sides closely together for many years thereafter. Alternatively, should unification occur under conditions in which Koreans view the United States as hindering rather than helping the process, resentment could build between the United States and the Korean people, poisoning postunification relations regardless of objective calculations of mutual national interests.

# A2: ROK / US Relations

**Relations resilient—economic ties**

**Lim 7**—Fellow at the Korea Development Institute (Wonhyuk, Economic Consequences of ROK-U.S. Separation, 27 November 2007, <http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/07086Lim.html>, AMiles)

It may be argued that this reference case is of limited use for this scenario because cooler heads ultimately prevailed on both sides, especially with regard to the phased reduction of the USFK. However, in the present context of assessing the economic impact of ROK-U.S. separation under various scenarios, it is important to note that even the most acrimonious exchange of words between the allies in recent memory **did not have a large spillover effect** on bilateral economic relations. In fact, investment and trade ties between the U.S. and ROK have been the saving grace of the bilateral relationship over the past five years.

# A2: Conflict Adv

**Tensions lowering**

**Sang-Hun 10** (Choe, Koreas Ease Tensions With Small Gestures, 31 May 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/01/world/asia/01korea.html, AMiles)

North Korea expressed a desire to keep a joint industrial complex in operation, South Korean officials said Monday, while the South indicated that it might reconsider its decision to revive psychological warfare against the North. The developments showed that the two Koreas were carefully weighing the option of easing their confrontation, analysts said. Tensions on the divided Korean Peninsula have deteriorated to their worst point in years after a South Korean warship sank on March 26. South Korea blamed a North Korean torpedo attack for the blast. “Neither side can afford to keep building up tensions,” said Kim Yong-hyun, a North Korea specialist at Dongguk University in Seoul. “Both sides have been raising tensions the way you blow into your balloon, and now they need an excuse for each other to stop blowing so that the balloon won’t burst.” After it formally accused the North on May 20 of having responsibility for the sinking, South Korea cut off nearly all trade with the North and began a diplomatic campaign to bring it before the United Nations Security Council for punishment. The South also vowed to resume psychological warfare against the North, after a six-year hiatus, by rebuilding loudspeakers along the border for propaganda broadcasts and by dropping leaflets over the North using balloons. If the psychological war resumes, the North has warned that it would shut down a joint industrial complex at the North Korean border town of Kaesong — the last remaining symbol of inter-Korean ties. The North also warned that it would shoot artillery shells across the border to blast the loudspeakers. The South would certainly have to respond in kind, officials said, raising the possibility of a major skirmish along a border guarded by nearly two million troops on both sides. “We want to continue to develop the Kaesong project,” the North Korean authorities said in a message delivered through South Korean businessmen at Kaesong on Sunday, according to a senior South Korean government official who briefed reporters Monday on the condition of anonymity. Meanwhile, Jang Gwang-il, a senior policy maker at the Defense Ministry in Seoul, said that the South Korean military was still reviewing when to send leaflet balloons over the North. His remark was seen as a step back from the military’s earlier vow to send the balloons as soon as the weather permitted. Mr. Jang said that the South would “make a comprehensive review of the situation” before deciding whether and when to start launching leaflet balloons or broadcasting propaganda across the border. The apparent pause in inter-Korean tensions came a day after Prime Minister Wen Jiabao of China declined to join South Korea and Japan in publicly condemning North Korea at a three-way weekend summit meeting, instead urging both Koreas to defuse tensions. On Monday, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama of Japan told Mr. Wen that he supported Seoul’s plans to bring North Korea before the Security Council for sanctions or condemnation, The Associated Press reported. The two countries also agreed to start negotiations over a treaty to develop natural gas resources under the East China Sea, said Osamu Sakashita, a spokesman for the prime minister’s office. South Korea remains determined to force North Korea to apologize and punish those responsible for the sinking, which killed 46 South Korean sailors. The North denies any involvement and warns of war if new sanctions are imposed. But analysts say that neither Korea can benefit from sustained tensions. Public denouncements of the North may help candidates of President Lee Myung-bak’s governing party in local elections in South Korea on Wednesday, but prolonged tensions will hurt its economy, they said.

**No more North Korean attacks**

**Hosenball 10**—Newsweek investigative correspondent (Mark, U.S. Intel Official: North Korea Is Bluffing, 26 May 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/blogs/declassified/2010/05/26/u-s-intelligence-sees-scant-evidence-that-north-korea-is-preparing-for-war.html, AMiles)

Despite all the recent huffing and puffing from Pyongyang, U.S. officials say they’ve seen little physical evidence that North Korea might actually be preparing to go to war. Just hours after Seoul blamed the North for the March 26 sinking of the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il publicly ordered his armed forces to get ready for military action, according to sources quoted in The Guardian. But two U.S. national security officials, asking for anonymity when discussing sensitive information, tell Declassified they’re not aware of any intelligence reporting on significant military mobilization or redeployments inside North Korea. The North Korean military is always on the move somewhere, one of the officials said, but at the moment whatever movements are being noted by Western intelligence agencies are regarded as not particularly threatening. A third U.S. foreign policy official, who also asked for anonymity, told Declassified that U.S. agencies are picking up “nothing of extreme concern” in what North Korean forces are currently up to. Pyongyang could still launch some form of surprise military action if it really wanted to. For one thing, South Korea’s capital and largest city, Seoul, is only 30 miles south of the Demilitarized Zone, within easy artillery range. The North Koreans keep their forward artillery batteries stocked with enough ammunition to do serious damage, one of the officials points out. But there are no indications that the North is preparing to embark on any such adventure, which would almost certainly risk a wider conflict. There’s also the possibility that Pyongyang might try to intimidate its neighbors by setting off another missile or nuclear test. And although the North might be able for the most part to conceal preparations for an underground nuclear explosion, the West’s detection equipment would probably pick up signs that the North was planning a major new missile test, and according to one of the officials, no such preparations appear to be under way.

**No war—South Korea is responding diplomatically**

**GSN 10** (Global Security Newswire, South Korea Seeks Support for U.N. Action Against North, 1 June 2010, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw\_20100601\_4041.php, AMiles)

Based on the findings, Seoul cut off trade with its northern neighbor as part of a set of planned penalties. Pyongyang has vehemently denied any involvement with the Cheonan sinking and today alleged that the United States and the South had fabricated evidence as "a golden opportunity to ignite the second Korean War." South Korea is expected to request that the Security Council punish or at the minimum censure the North over the incident. Seoul has already lined up backing from Japan and Washington but would need the support of Russia and China, two veto-holding permanent members of the council, for any resolution against North Korea to pass. The Russian Foreign Ministry has declared that it requires "100 percent proof" of North Korean complicity. Its experts planned to talk with the international investigators, check the halved ship and go to the location where the sinking occurred, AFP reported. "Russia's direct trust in our investigation results will make this case clear, and it's part of our stepped-up effort to muster international support," said one official. South Korea has invited Beijing to have its own specialists review the probe's findings, local news organizations reported, with some stating that the request had been turned down. **Seoul has already ruled out launching a punitive military strike** on the aspiring nuclear power to the north. South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan said further reducing North Korea's revenue stream would be a strong response to the situation. "If the cash inflow into North Korea is restricted, I think it will lower the possibility of nuclear weapons development and deter belligerent behavior," Yu told the BBC. During a trilateral summit this past weekend with the leaders of South Korea and Japan, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao rebuffed prodding to punish the North through the United Nations (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, June 1). Wen's refusal to condemn North Korea could indicate that China is seeking to privately prod its ally to own up to its role in the sinking, the Associated Press reported Sunday. "The urgent task for the moment is to properly handle the serious impact caused by the Cheonan incident, gradually defuse tensions over it and avoid possible conflicts," Wen said. Should the issue come before the United Nations, there is the chance that Beijing would back sanctions as it did last summer following the North's detonation of a second nuclear test device. High-level U.S. officials conjectured that Beijing would move incrementally to support the contention that Pyongyang ought to be penalized for the ship sinking. Wen informed the South Koreans that his government would "defend no one" once it had reached a conclusion on the situation, Seoul said (Young-Joon Ahn, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, May 30). The three-way summit Sunday did produce an agreement that Seoul, Tokyo and Beijing would work together on lowering tensions over the ship sinking, Kyodo News reported. "We have reached a common understanding that the sinking is a very serious issue for stability in Northeast Asia," Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama told journalists at a joint news briefing following the talks (Kyodo News/Breitbart.com, May 30). Meanwhile, alarmed by the apparent ease with which the South Korean warship was attacked, high-ranking U.S. officials said they were looking into ways to improve South Korean naval security, the New York Times reported yesterday. While multiple rounds of U.N. sanctions have left the North financially bereft and unable to maintain military parity with the South, officials said Pyongyang has responded by focusing its limited resources on developing covert, clandestine technological capabilities that can cause notable destruction. The United States has drawn down its military footprint in South Korea as the result of Seoul's heightened armed forces spending. High-level U.S. defense officials said new heavy weaponry such as warships and fighter jets ought to be more than enough to make up for a reduced U.S. deployment levels (Shanker/Sanger, New York Times I, May 30). Elsewhere, the two Koreas each took steps to lower tensions on the Korean Peninsula yesterday, with Seoul suggesting that it could decide to halt once again a border propaganda campaign against the North and Pyongyang voicing a wish to maintain a joint industrial site with the South, the Times reported. "Neither side can afford to keep building up tensions," Seoul-based North Korea expert Kim Yong-hyun said. "Both sides have been raising tensions the way you blow into your balloon, and now they need an excuse for each other to stop blowing so that the balloon won’t burst" (Choe Sang-hun, New York Times II, May 31). Despite North Korean leader Kim Jong Il's reported public command that his military make preparations for armed conflict, intelligence efforts have brought back no reports of notable troop movements within the country, U.S. security officials told Newsweek.

# A2: Conflict Adv—China/South Korea Cooperation

**No internal link—China won’t cooperate with the South**

**GSN 10** (Global Security Newswire, South Korea Seeks Support for U.N. Action Against North, 1 June 2010, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw\_20100601\_4041.php, AMiles)

South Korea has invited Beijing to have its own specialists review the probe's findings, local news organizations reported, with some stating that the request had been turned down. Seoul has already ruled out launching a punitive military strike on the aspiring nuclear power to the north. South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan said further reducing North Korea's revenue stream would be a strong response to the situation. "If the cash inflow into North Korea is restricted, I think it will lower the possibility of nuclear weapons development and deter belligerent behavior," Yu told the BBC. During a trilateral summit this past weekend with the leaders of South Korea and Japan, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao rebuffed prodding to punish the North through the United Nations (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, June 1). Wen's refusal to condemn North Korea could indicate that China is seeking to privately prod its ally to own up to its role in the sinking, the Associated Press reported Sunday. "The urgent task for the moment is to properly handle the serious impact caused by the Cheonan incident, gradually defuse tensions over it and avoid possible conflicts," Wen said. Should the issue come before the United Nations, there is the chance that Beijing would back sanctions as it did last summer following the North's detonation of a second nuclear test device. High-level U.S. officials conjectured that Beijing would move incrementally to support the contention that Pyongyang ought to be penalized for the ship sinking. Wen informed the South Koreans that his government would "defend no one" once it had reached a conclusion on the situation, Seoul said (Young-Joon Ahn, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, May 30).

# A2: Conflict Adv—Econ Internal

**Economy stable now**

**Mansourov 10**—Nautilus Institute Senior Associate. PhD, pol sci, Columbia (12 May 2010, Alexandre, North Korea: Changing but Stable, [http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10027Mansourov.html, AMiles](http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10027Mansourov.html,%20AMiles))

In spite of recent speculation in the New York Times and other Western media about North Korea's growing economic desperation and political instability, Pyongyang is, in fact, on a path of economic stabilization. Last year's harvest was relatively good-the second in a row-thanks to a raft of developments including favorable weather conditions, no pest infestations, increased fertilizer imports from China, double-cropping, and the refurbishment of the obsolete irrigation system. Thanks to the commissioning of several large-scale hydro-power plants which supply electricity to major urban residential areas and industrial zones, North Korea generated more electricity in 2009 than the year before, although losses in the transmission system remain significant. According to China's Xinhua news agency, industrial production in North Korea grew by almost 11 percent last year and 16 percent in the first quarter of 2010, compared to the first quarter of 2009. That positive development was facilitated by two nationwide labor mobilization campaigns-the "150-day campaign" and "100-day campaign" as well as growth in extractive industries, construction, a revival of heavy industries, modernization of the consumer-oriented industries and the expansion of the high-tech sector, especially, information and biotechnology. Despite a decline in inter-Korean commerce and international sanctions imposed after the North's missile and nuclear tests in early 2009, foreign trade did not contract in any meaningful way thanks to burgeoning ties with China. Moreover, Beijing seems to be committed to dramatically expanding its direct investments in the development of the North's infrastructure, manufacturing, and service sectors.

**Reforms causing economic stabilization—Western media distorts facts**

**Mansourov 10**—Nautilus Institute Senior Associate. PhD, pol sci, Columbia (12 May 2010, Alexandre, North Korea: Changing but Stable, [http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10027Mansourov.html, AMiles](http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10027Mansourov.html,%20AMiles))

The purpose of these initial steps appears to have been two-fold. First, the North wanted to reinvigorate domestic production of consumer goods. That would be done through import substitution as well as rebuilding the purchasing power and stabilizing the living standards of the mass of budgetary employees. The livelihood of these people-who constitute the overwhelming majority of the workforce, are employed at institutions such as state-owned industries, hospitals and schools and are paid out of the state budget-had been gradually eroded by marketization and high inflation. Second, the reform was designed to encourage savings as well as induce cash flow from proliferating black markets to the state banking system, which had been rapidly losing its handle on money in circulation. While this move has been portrayed in much of the Western media as a "failure" that has caused significant tensions inside the North, in fact, it is too early to declare these measures either a failure or success. Such redenominations are almost always a source of tension when they are carried out in any country and often need to be adjusted or implemented again before achieving the intended results. North Korean economist Ri Ki Song admitted that "Price adjustments and other related measures were not implemented quickly enough, and there was a situation where [North Korea] could not open the market for several days." But he took issue with "some Western reports that did not reflect what actually happened." Ri noted that "In the early days immediately after the currency change, market prices were not fixed, so markets were closed for some days, but now all markets are open, and people are buying daily necessities in the markets."[1] If inflation is eventually tamed and the currency exchange rate stabilized in the long run-the verdict is still out on both accounts-then these measures may eventually be viewed as a partial success. As always, there were winners and losers but, once again, the reality appears to be somewhat less clear-cut than has been assumed by the Western media, economists and other analysts. In view of the ongoing preparations for the leadership succession, the redenomination could be viewed as a populist measure aimed at inflicting pain on less than 10 percent of the population through wealth redistribution in order to win support from more than 90 percent of the population who still live on state salaries and have not seen any improvement in their life despite burgeoning market activities. North Korea is still fundamentally a socialist society, and Kim Jong Il's regime probably won some measure of support from the vast majority of North Koreans for its crackdown on corruption and abuses by rich traders and corrupt government officials who benefitted the most from bustling activity in black markets. Private merchants may have felt some pain (although likely had stored their wealth in goods, commodities or foreign exchange rather than the old North Korean currency). But the heaviest losses appear to have been suffered by corrupt low and mid-ranking officials from the "power organs" (People's Security and State Security officers as well as officials from courts and prosecutors' offices) and government bureaucrats who wielded licensing, auditing, or controlling authority at the county and provincial levels. They had allegedly accumulated substantial savings through bribes and abuse of power and kept their ill-gotten gains in kimchi jars and under the mattresses at home. As a result, these officials could not find a way to get these stacks of old banknotes exchanged for new ones. According to a knowledgeable South Korean source, it is their money that was reported floating in sacks down the Yalu River after redenomination, not the traders' capital. In short, the currency move may have ended up as more of a strike against corrupt officials and local elites rather than private traders. With markets re-opening and private trade resuming in late January, the latter rebounded fairly quickly, whereas it is likely to take a long time for the corrupt mid-level bureaucrats to recoup their losses through a new round of bribes and extortion. In Ri Ki Song's judgment, "an unstable situation occurred temporarily and partially after the currency redenomination," but, "it did not lead to social chaos at all, and the unstable situation was quickly brought under control."[2]

# A2: Conflict Adv—Dependence Internal (Belligerence)

**This advantage is a joke – South Korea will still be dependent on the US military after the plan**

**Shanker 10**—AND—David Sanger (Thom U.S. to Aid South Korea With Naval Defense Plan, 30 May 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/31/world/asia/31koreanavy.html, AMiles)

Surprised by how easily a South Korean warship was sunk by what an international investigation concluded was a North Korean torpedo fired from a midget submarine, senior American officials say they are planning a long-term program to plug major gaps in the South’s naval defenses. They said the sinking revealed that years of spending and training had still left the country vulnerable to surprise attacks. The discovery of the weaknesses in South Korea caught officials in both countries off guard. As South Korea has rocketed into the ranks of the world’s top economies, it has invested billions of dollars to bolster its defenses and to help refine one of the oldest war plans in the Pentagon’s library: a joint strategy with the United States to repel and defeat a North Korean invasion. But the shallow waters where the attack occurred are patrolled only by South Korea’s navy, and South Korean officials confirmed in interviews that the sinking of the warship, the Cheonan, which killed 46 sailors, revealed a gap that the American military must help address. The United States — pledged to defend its ally but stretched thin by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq — would be drawn into any conflict. But it has been able to reduce its forces on the Korean Peninsula by relying on South Korea’s increased military spending. Senior Pentagon officials stress that firepower sent to the region by warplanes and warships would more than compensate for the drop in American troop levels there in the event of war. But the attack was evidence, the officials say, of how North Korea has compensated for the fact that it is so bankrupt that it can no longer train its troops or buy the technology needed to fight a conventional war. So it has instead invested heavily in stealthy, hard-to-detect technologies that can inflict significant damage, even if it could not win a sustained conflict. Building a small arsenal of nuclear weapons is another big element of the Northern strategy — a double-faceted deterrent allowing it to threaten a nuclear attack or to sell the technology or weapons in order to head off retaliation even for an act of war like sinking South Korean ships. In an interview last week, Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that the joint training exercise with South Korea planned just off the country’s coast in the next few weeks represented only the “near-term piece” of a larger strategy to prevent a recurrence of the kind of shock the South experienced as it watched one of its ships sunk without warning. But the longer-range effort will be finding ways to detect, track and counter the miniature submarines, which he called “a very difficult technical, tactical problem.” “Longer term, it is a skill set that we are going to continue to press on,” Admiral Mullen said. “Clearly, we don’t want that to happen again. We don’t want to give that option to North Korea in the future. Period. We want to take it away.”

# A2: Conflict Adv—China/South Korea Cooperation

**China won’t cooperate**

**Forsythe 10** (Michael, China Backing Kim Jong Il Means Old Party Links Still Driving Korea Policy, 8 June 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-08/china-backing-kim-jong-il-means-old-party-links-still-driving-korea-policy.html, AMiles)

One reason why Chinese leaders wouldn’t join Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in denouncing North Korea for sinking a South Korean warship when they met in Beijing last month may be found in an obscure agency housed a 10-minute walk from their meeting place. The ruling Communist Party’s International Department oversees ties with Leader Kim Jong Il’s Korean Worker’s Party and shares with the Foreign Ministry responsibility for relations with Kim’s regime in the north. The party-to-party comradeship predates the founding of both states and was cemented on the battlefield in the Korean War. Chinese leaders have resisted condemning North Korea over the sinking for several reasons: They don’t want to undermine Kim’s regime and risk a collapse that might spark a flood of refugees, or to bolster U.S. power on the Korean peninsula. At the same time, party ties shouldn’t be underestimated as a driver of Chinese policy, said analyst Bonnie Glaser. The International Department “has always controlled implementation of policy regarding” North Korea-China ties, said Glaser, who studies the two countries at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, in an e-mail. “I fully expect that it is arguing that there is insufficient evidence to pin blame and warning of the dangers of doing so.” For most nations, China’s Foreign Ministry is the public face of diplomacy. Its officials conduct talks with counterparts from countries such as the U.S., Russia and Japan. With North Korea, the ministry shares the stage with the International Department, which reports to the party’s Central Committee, according to an organization chart on the party’s website. Kim’s Visit The department’s news office said it couldn’t respond to a faxed request for information about its role until late June. The International Department’s influence was on show during Kim’s three-day trip to China in May. The Foreign Ministry, which publicizes most visits by world leaders, deferred questions to the department. The ministry declined to confirm Kim’s presence in China, even after he was photographed on May 3 in the northeastern city of Dalian and was shadowed to Beijing by Japanese and South Korean reporters. Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Jiang Yu said May 6 she had “no information” and that the ministry wasn’t “the competent authority on the issue.” Only after Kim had left were his meetings with leaders made public by state media in both countries. ‘Communist Solidarity’ The department’s “objectives are to maintain communist solidarity with the North Korean party,” said Susan Shirk, a professor specializing in Chinese international relations at the University of California, San Diego, and a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia. It “definitely has a different perspective than the Foreign Ministry.”

# A2: Conflict Adv—Succession Internal

**Succession won’t cause instability—prefer our ev**

**Mansourov 10**—Nautilus Institute Senior Associate. PhD, pol sci, Columbia (12 May 2010, Alexandre, North Korea: Changing but Stable, [http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10027Mansourov.html, AMiles](http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10027Mansourov.html,%20AMiles))

North Korea is not static and inflexible. Indeed, there tends to be a very dynamic picture once you look below the surface. Change is a constant but, as in almost any state or society, it brings about tension. However, there is little or no sign that current tensions, caused by changes in the distribution of power within the leaderships' core cadre, positioning for succession, or economic reforms are eroding the overall strength of the regime. While such tensions may spill over into society, there have been no signs that they have risen to a level that significantly weakens the regime or have made it feel that drastic action is needed. Contrary to the popular view, North Korea is not being torn apart by an epic battle between the state and markets. The two have over time established an uneasy but symbiotic relationship. The state still considers the markets as parasites and vice versa, but each has learned to exist with the other. The popular argument that the reopening of markets in the North after their alleged (but unverified) closure is a sign of government capitulation before their power is not persuasive. Much of the "evidence" we have for the latest uptick in internal tensions following the currency redenomination consists of recycled stories from unproven or unreliable sources relating anecdotes from small slices of the country. These publicly available sources for North Korea are very subjective and come through the lens of defector groups and humanitarian non-governmental organizations that, quite frankly, have their own agendas. Corroborating these reports is often impossible. Separating speculation from rumor and fact is difficult. The best we can do is to strip back some of the speculative veneer and establish hypotheses we can test over time.

**Succession will be stable**

**Yoon 10** (Sangwon, Signs of Nearing Succession in North Korea Reshuffle, 7 June 2010, http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/signs-of-nearing-succession-in-north-korea-reshuffle/379315, AMiles)

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s brother-in-law was promoted and a premier who apologized for a currency debacle was replaced on Monday in a rare parliamentary session with strong signs that the secretive nation was preparing a hereditary succession of power. Kim was shown on state-run television presiding over the session, sitting behind a desk in the middle of a long line of parliamentarians. The scene was shot from a distance, so it was difficult to assess the health of Kim, 68, believed to have suffered a stroke two years ago. The rubber-stamp Supreme People’s Assembly usually meets once each year to approve bills vetted by the ruling Workers’ Party. The body met in April, and no reason was given for Monday’s unusual second session. But the session came amid worsening economic woes, pressing succession issues and a South Korean campaign to get the United Nations to punish Pyongyang for a ship attack in March that killed 46 sailors. The North denies sinking the ship, and state-run media did not say whether parliament discussed the issue. Pyongyang’s official Korean Central News Agency said the lawmakers approved a major leadership reshuffle. The most notable change was the promotion of Kim’s brother-in-law, Jang Song-thaek. He was named vice chairman of the all-powerful National Defense Commission, which makes security policy. Jang is widely believed to be a key backer of the North Korean leader’s third son, Jong-un, who several analysts think will be his father’s successor. Jang is married to Kim’s younger sister and is said to be poised to play a kingmaker role. Many think he will lead a collective leadership after Kim’s death until the new leader takes over. Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the Seoul-based University of North Korean Studies, said: “Electing Jang Song-thaek to the post of vice chairman officially appoints him as No. 2 **in facilitating a stable succession of power**. The new premier was identified as Choe Yong-rim, a parliament member who replaces Kim Yong-il, the KCNA reported. Kim Yong-il offered a rare public apology in February after a failed currency revamp triggered social unrest and starvation. Last November, citizens were ordered to turn in a limited number of old banknotes in exchange for new, redenominated currency in an apparent bid to reassert control over a growing market economy. But the measure left people with worthless banknotes while inflation surged because state-run shops couldn’t keep up with demand. Koh Yu-hwan, a North Korea expert at Seoul’s Dongguk University, said the premier job usually goes to someone with more economic expertise. “It’s notable that Choe, who is more of a political figure, has taken the seat,” Koh said. “Appointing a more politically inclined figure to the position can be seen as a move tied to the succession issue.”

# A2 Regionalism Adv—Asian Cooperation Now

**Asian cooperation high now—solves every internal link**

**Xinhua 10** (Wen pushes for bilateral, regional cooperation in South Korea tour, 30 May 2010, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7004712.html, AMiles)

Visiting Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao focused his efforts on promoting cooperation with South Korea and in East Asia on Saturday, the second day of his three-day tour in South Korea. BLUEPRINT FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION At an annual trilateral summit held in South Korea's southern resort of Jeju, Premier Wen, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama unveiled a blueprint for trilateral cooperation in economy, security, environmental protection, cultural exchange and other areas in the next decade. The leaders agreed that after making clear the detailed objectives and long-term goals within the next decade, all sides need to concentrate efforts on boosting trilateral cooperation to a new height, so as to further consolidate partnership, achieve more in mutually beneficial cooperation in all aspects and enhance friendship between the peoples of the three countries. They also agreed to set up a more cooperative mechanism to increase strategic mutual trust, which involves setting up a trilateral cooperation secretariat in South Korea in 2011 to jointly tackle natural disasters, discuss the possibility of a mechanism of trilateral defense dialogue to enhance security contacts, strengthen political dialogue and cooperation in police affairs, and boost government exchanges at local levels among the three nations. On developing sustainable economic cooperation and common prosperity, the leaders pledged efforts to finish by 2012 a joint feasibility study of trilateral free trade agreement, which was launched in May 2010, and to expand trade volume ahead of 2020 for the benefit of regional economic growth and integration. The leaders said the three countries will complete negotiations on investment agreement and provide a favorable investment environment to facilitate the operation of enterprises in the region. They also reiterated the importance of customs cooperation, and vowed to further cooperation in finance, science and technology, innovation, as well as policy cooperation and negotiations in such areas as energy efficiency and resources. "An open, fair and liberalized multilateral trade system is not only conducive to China, Japan and South Korea, but also important for the world. We must oppose protectionism of any form to safeguard and consolidate the system," said the document. On cooperation in environmental protection, the leaders said the three countries should jointly push for achievements at the climate change summit to be held in Mexico this year, including an effective international cooperation framework in this regard after 2012, under the principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, especially the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. On regional peace and stability, the three leaders said the denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula is very much conducive to lasting peace, security and economic prosperity in Northeast Asia. "Therefore, we will make efforts to achieve the goals set in the Sept. 19 joint statement in 2005 through the Six-Party talks," the document said.

**Any evidence from before 2009 doesn’t apply—regional cooperation has significantly deepened**

**Rathus 10**—Monbusho Scholar, Meiji U and researches East Asian regional integration (Joel, China-Japan-Korea trilateral cooperation and the East Asian Community, 15 June 2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/06/15/china-japan-korea-trilateral-cooperation-and-the-east-asian-community/, AMiles)

Since its inception on the sidelines of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) summit over a decade ago, China-Japan-Korea trilateral cooperation **has deepened significantly**. The trilateral cooperation is an important development in regional politics and economics. But the way in which it will affect an East Asian economic community remains uncertain. Cooperation between China, Japan and Korea has historically been stunted. In 1999, an agreement was reached for heads of state from each of the three countries to meet on the sidelines of the APT summit. This agreement initially constituted little more than an annual informal breakfast, and was established more to right perceived imbalances between the ‘plus three’ countries and ASEAN within the APT than because of any desire to improve problematic relations. In any case, Japan’s worsening relations with its neighbours under the Koizumi administration precluded any deepening of the process. In December 2008, the trilateral cooperation finally formally separated itself from the ASEAN Plus Three process and acquired its own identity. But the scope of the trilateral cooperation remained relatively limited, focusing upon annual meetings at Head of State and Foreign Minister level, discussions in the areas of environment, energy and education, and continued informal study of a trilateral free trade area. Even as a separate forum, it seemed unlikely that the trilateral cooperation would prove to be able to lead the creation of an East Asian community and therefore be of any great significance. **This all changed in 2009,** when Japan, China and Korea were forced to coordinate and cooperate more closely to manage the regional effects of the global financial crisis. In their joint statement on the crisis, the trio identified the need to cooperate on global issues (such as financial risk) and in global institutions, including at the G20. While a reaction to global events, this cooperation began to significantly affect the management of East Asia. Over the course of 2009, the three nations resolved their long running dispute over contributions (and thus voting weight) in the Chiang Mai Initiatives, the first major ‘success’ of the ASEAN Plus Three process. The three nations also worked together to push through a general capital increase at the Asian Development Bank to help it fight the effects of the global financial crisis, a decision mandated by the G20 but about which the US appeared ambivalent. The fact that 2009 was the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the trilateral cooperation also provided an opportunity to make the trilateral cooperation more meaningful. Japan’s then newly installed PM Yukio Hatoyama provided impetus by proposing that the long-delayed China-Japan-Korea FTA be subject to an official international study. Hatoyama’s offer represented a major break from Japan’s previous policy to avoid negotiations over an FTA without actually having to say no. Between 2002 and 2009 Japan requested that further domestic and unofficial study be undertaken as an excuse not to start the negotiations. Indeed, some the economists involved in informal FTA studies declined to participate after becoming aware of this delaying strategy.

# A2 Regionalism Adv—Asian Cooperation Now

**Consensus is towards cooperation now**

**Ran 9** (Chen, Rosy Prospects for Northeast Asian Cooperation, 16 June 2009, http://www.bjreview.com.cn/quotes/txt/2009-06/16/content\_203847.htm, AMiles)

Amid the global financial crisis, Northeast Asian states must take advantage of each other's strengths, seek development, and cope with regional issues through negotiation and consultation, a top scholar said on Sunday. Gao Quanli, Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, made the remarks at the opening ceremony of the Second International Forum on Northeast Asia Regional Cooperation and Development in Harbin, capital of northeast China's Heilongjiang Province. Gao said the idea of "cooperation brings common development" is widely appreciated in the international community. Northeast Asian states enjoy good conditions and cultural environment, which could produce huge potential for cooperation. "The current global financial crisis may provide a historic opportunity for Northeast Asian states to raise the level of economic cooperation, because developing complementary resources, technologies and products among concerned states is crucial for regional development," Gao said, adding that new forms of cooperation will help strengthen the region's economic power. Morio Matsumoto, Japanese Consulate General in Shenyang, said Japan and China have constructed friendly relations with the goal of "common interests" in the economy, environmental protection and energy that are based on the awareness that "**the two sides have become indispensable partners."** He suggested more detailed Japanese-Sino cooperation in logistics, environmental protection and agriculture. Bing Zheng, head of the Jilin Province Academy of Social Sciences, told Beijing Review that he is confident about the prospects f0r economic cooperation among Northeast Asian states. According to Bing, current regional cooperation has four features: There is consensus on joint development; bilateral economic cooperation is developing rapidly; multilateral economic cooperation lags behind and is developing slowly; and the governments of China, Russia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Japan and Mongolia are seeking international cooperation in various ways. "Northeast Asian states are relatively close geographically, and thus the mobility of economic factors is relatively convenient. The infrastructure is basically good. Convenient traffic reduces the costs of trade and transportation," Bing said. "These features are rarely seen in other parts of the world, and help form a good basis for the development of regional economic cooperation. But there are some challenges. For example, the situation on the Korean Peninsula complicates regional economic cooperation. Differences among Northeast Asian states in terms of social system, history and culture, economic level and state-to-state relations need time to be understood and adjusted." The opening ceremony of the forum coincided with Chinese President Hu Jintao's attendance at the annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the first meeting of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) leaders in Russia's Ural city of Yekaterinburg. Hu will also pay a state visit to Russia at the invitation of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. Bing said Hu's visit to Russia would push forward Sino-Russian business cooperation. "Construction on the China section of the 1,030-kilometer-long China-Russia oil pipeline began in May at Xing'an Township in the border county of Mohe, Heilongjiang Province. It is a good start for further cooperation," Bing said. "On China's side, it should increase export products to Russia, pay more attention to establishing and maintaining business credibility, and improve product quality and marketing, which will pave the way for a better marketing environment." Bing said the forum could be seen as a platform for Northeast Asian states to communicate with each other, understand each other and forge friendships, which will play a positive role in pushing forward further regional cooperation. It is important for governments, corporations, academics and non-governmental organizations in the region to do more for better cooperation.

\*\*\*North Korea Deterrence

# 1NC North Korea DA

**North Korea threat high now—US presence is key to deter conflict**

**Bechtol 6—**IR,Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Former Intelligence Officer at the Defense Intelligence Agency. Former Senior Analyst for Northeast Asia in the Intelligence Directorate, Pentagon. PhD (Bruce, Force Restructuring in the ROK-US Military Alliance: Challenges and Implications, International Journal of Korean Studies, Fall/Winter 2006, Vol. X, No. 2, CIAO, AMiles)

An examination of the evidence shows that the South Korean military is a well-trained force that has focused on working in a complementary arrangement within the umbrella of a combined fighting command with the United States since 1953. It is precisely because of the way that the South Korean military has been built, organized, and equipped for more than 50 years that significant gaps in self-reliance as a military force exist. The evidence shows that these gaps are unlikely to be filled by 2009 – or even 2012. A nation-state – any nation-state – simply cannot change the entire scope and focus of a large military force numbering more than 650,000 personnel overnight. Until a complete transition occurs, it will thus hurt the readiness of South Korea to defend itself in a large-scale conventional military conflict with the North – **unless the US military continues to provide “bridging capabilities” on-Peninsula for many years.** As discussed above, these “bridging capabilities” will be more difficult to provide once the transparent, seamless infrastructure of CFC is dissolved.48 It would not be necessary to be concerned with South Korea’s readiness to defend itself against an attack by North Korea, if Pyongyang did not continue to pose a significant and deadly military threat. But this is not the case. North Korea’s military has evolved to the point where, despite significant resource constraints, it can still threaten the very stability and security of South Korean with little or no warning. To downplay this threat is both a poor conduct of military analysis and dangerous to the national security of the Republic of Korea. Continuing C4I concerns would be dangerous in any attack by North Korean artillery and special-forces. A lack of missile defense (except for a complete reliance on US forces) makes South Korea extremely vulnerable to an attack by the North’s SRBM’s. And the confusion that these forces would cause in the initial days of combat would make it necessary to have a seamless, integrated, effective command and control arrangement for ROK and US forces that CFC currently provides. While the flexibility and professionalism of both ROK and US military forces is beyond question, evolving from a combined fighting force as they are now in wartime under CFC, to two separate military commands, will create problems and challenges that must be addressed in coming years as the command relationship evolves. This is not to say it cannot be done. **The US needs to maintain a strong commitment** to the security of South Korea and provide support whenever and wherever needed. As noted earlier, “threat” is defined as capability + intent. Clearly, North Korea has shown that it is highly motivated to maintain a capability to mount a large-scale attack on the South, and, because of this, military planners and policy makers at the highest levels have no choice but to assume that the intent to attack if there were a weakness in the South remains. In fact, the North Korean nuclear test conducted during October of 2006 further illustrates that Pyongyang presents asymmetric challenges that must be planned for.49 Thus, as this alliance, called by many the most successful military alliance since World War II evolves, care must be taken to ensure forces are refined and upgraded to meet the threat, support systems and infrastructures remain, and that the United States continues its resolve to maintain the security of one of its most important allies and deter the aggression of North Korea.

**Escalates to nuclear war**

**Carroll** **10**—Lt. Col, Airforce (Jay, North Korea, South Korea: The Military Balance on the Peninsula, 26 May 2010, STRATFOR, AMiles)

So the real issue is the potential for escalation — or an accident that could precipitate escalation — that would be beyond the control of Pyongyang or Seoul. With both sides on high alert, both adhering to their own national (and contradictory) definitions of where disputed boundaries lie and with rules of engagement loosened, **the potential for sudden and rapid escalation is quite real.** Indeed, North Korea’s navy, though sizable on paper, is largely a hollow shell of old, laid-up vessels. What remains are small fast attack craft and submarines — mostly Sang-O “Shark” class boats and midget submersibles. These vessels are best employed in the cluttered littoral environment to bring asymmetric tactics to bear — not unlike those Iran has prepared for use in the Strait of Hormuz. These kinds of vessels and tactics — including, especially, the deployment of naval mines — are poorly controlled when dispersed in a crisis and are often impossible to recall. For nearly 40 years, tensions on the Korean Peninsula were managed within the context of the wider Cold War. During that time it was feared that a second Korean War **could all too easily escalate into and a thermonuclear World War III**, so both Pyongyang and Seoul were being heavily managed from their respective corners. In fact, USFK was long designed to ensure that South Korea could not independently provoke that war and drag the Americans into it, which for much of the Cold War period was of far greater concern to Washington than North Korea attacking southward. Today, those constraints no longer exist. There are certainly still constraints — neither the United States nor China wants war on the peninsula. But current tensions are quickly escalating to a level unprecedented in the post-Cold War period, and the constraints that do exist have never been tested in the way they might be if the situation escalates much further.

# North Korea—Uniqueness

**US commitment to South Korea high now—deterrence is strong**

**Garamone 10** (Jim, U.S., South Korea to Delay Transfer of Wartime Control, 28 June 2010, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=59809, AMiles)

The United States and South Korea have agreed to delay until December 2015 the transfer of wartime operational control of troops on the Korean peninsula to South Korea, the two nations’ presidents announced following a June 26 meeting in Toronto. Specific details of how the wartime operational control will shift will be formulated next month during meetings in the South Korean capital of Seoul, Pentagon officials said. Transfer of control had been scheduled for April 2012. The change **reaffirms the importance of the U.S. military alliance with South Korea,** President Barack Obama said. South Korean officials discussed extending the transfer date with U.S. officials even before North Korea torpedoed and sank the South Korean ship Cheonan on March 26, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak said. Extending the deadline will allow the ultimate transfer to proceed more smoothly and allow the U.S. and South Korean militaries to be more in sync, Pentagon officials said. “We have arrived at an agreement that the transition of operational control for alliance activities in the Korean peninsula will take place in 2015,” Obama said. “This gives us appropriate time … within the existing security context, to do this right, because this alliance is the lynchpin of not only security for the Republic of Korea and the United States, but also for the Pacific as a whole.” Obama and Lee discussed the Cheonan incident, and what will happen in the months ahead. “We agreed that Korea and the United States, that we will do all that we can to deter any acts of North Korean aggression leveled against us, and that we will react swiftly and strongly so that this will not happen again,” Lee said through a translator.

**Hardline stance now**

**Chan** **10**—AND—Jackie Calmes (Sewell, U.S. Keeps Command of Military in Seoul, 26 June 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/27/world/asia/27prexy.html?src=mv, AMiles)

In its strongest move since the sinking of a South Korean warship, the Obama administration said Saturday that the United States would retain control of all military forces in the South during any conflict with North Korea, which has been widely blamed for the attack on the ship in March that killed 46 sailors. The announcement was an apparent attempt **to signal to the North**, which has long wanted American forces off the peninsula, that the United States would remain firmly in control of military operations if war were to break out. **The decision is** somewhat **symbolic**; the United States was not slated to give up wartime control of South Korean troops until 2012, and the new agreement extends the deadline to 2015. But the agreement allowed Washington and Seoul to take some action after months of struggling for ways to punish the North — and attempt to deter it from further violence — without provoking the country’s erratic leader, Kim Jong-il, to launch new attacks.

# North Korea—Link

**US presence key to deter North Korea**

**Brooks 8**—Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs and the Chung-Ju Yung Fellow for Policy Studies, Heritage. Adjunct prof, NDU (Peter, Why the World Still Needs America's Military Might, 24 November 2008, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/Why-the-World-Still-Needs-Americas-Military-Might>, AMiles)

Ever since the cease-fire agreement between North Korean and Chinese forces and the United Nations was concluded in 1953, the United States military has been the predominant force reducing the risk of another conflict on the divided Korean Peninsula. Indeed, even today--55 years hence--an American four-star general leads the Combined Forces Com mand of U.S. and Republic of Korea forces that keep the peace against a North Korean regime that still harbors dreams of uniting--militarily if neces sary--the North and South under its despotic rule. Nearly 30,000 U.S. soldiers stand shoulder to shoulder with 650,000 South Korean forces across a surely misnamed demilitarized zone (DMZ)-- arguably the last vestige of the Cold War--deterring over one million, ideologically driven North Korean troops. Even though peace has not been officially declared between the two nations, the odds of a conflict breaking out across the DMZ remain slim due to America's commitment to stability on the peninsula.

**US key to deter North Korea**

**Bechtol 9—**IR,Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Former Intelligence Officer at the Defense Intelligence Agency. Former Senior Analyst for Northeast Asia in the Intelligence Directorate, Pentagon. PhD—AND—Richard C. Bush, Director, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies (Bruce, The U.S. and South Korea: Prospects for Transformation, Combined Forces Operations, and Wartime Operational Control: Problems and Remedies, http://www.reportshop.co.kr/search/?qt=%22ROK-U.S.+Military+Cooperation+in+the+Post-9/11+Era:+Challenges+and+Paradigms+in+the+Age+of+Terrorism%22&old\_qt=U.S.-ROK+Military&category=T&x=0&y=0, AMiles)

As the South Korean military continues its transformation process and pushes on with the challenges it faces in the changing ROK-US military alliance, policy makers in Seoul cannot forget that **the North Korean threat remains ominous and very real**. North Korea continues to maintain the world’s fifth largest military – a military that is equipped with a nuclear capability, ballistic missiles, and an asymmetric capability that has evolved since the mid-1990s. Pyongyang has yet to even discuss terms for eliminating its estimated six to 12 nuclear weapons, and continues to deploy 70 percent of its ground forces within 90 miles of the DMZ. These forces include two deployed mechanized corps, an armor corps (now reorganized into a division), and an artillery corps (also reorganized into a division) – plus a missile corps that has more than 600 Scud’s and 200 No Dong missiles capable of striking anywhere in South Korea or Japan. In order for the Lee administration to make up for the mistakes made by the Roh administration’s “transformation” program, it will need to focus on two key areas: 1) The North Korean threat, based on the simple intelligence doctrine that a threat is defined as capability + intent = threat, and 2) A renewed focus on interoperability with U.S. forces as ROK independent capability comes to fruition. The second key area was ignored for most of the Roh administration and will be very important as the ROK and U.S. militaries make an effort to continue deterring the North Korean threat during the transitions occurring in the ROK-U.S. military alliance.

**We can’t leave now—would leave South Korea open to attack**

**Bechtol 6—**IR,Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Former Intelligence Officer at the Defense Intelligence Agency. Former Senior Analyst for Northeast Asia in the Intelligence Directorate, Pentagon. PhD—AND—Richard C. Bush, Director, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies (Bruce, Change of U.S.-ROK Wartime Operational Command, 14 September 2006, http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2006/0914southkorea\_richard-c--bush-iii.aspx, AMiles)

President Roh's proposal has a certain rationale. It reflects a desire to restore full sovereignty to the ROK and to bolster national pride. The problem with the idea is very practical, that changing "wartime OPCON" may unintentionally reduce the security of South Korea. It would inevitably mean the dissolving the CFC and perhaps lead to the end of the U.S.-ROK alliance itself, both of which have successfully deterred North Korea since 1953. The reason is that wartime control of both the US and South Korean forces under a combined structure commanded by an American general – who answers to the Presidents of both nations - is like the keystone of an arch. OPCON is tied to a host of other institutions – war plans, specific command arrangements, allotment of roles and missions – that have been developed over decades. For example, South Korea has not had to perform certain missions because the U.S military has been responsible for them and has the capabilities to do so (and the ROK military does not). Capabilities and institutions fit together to **create a formidable deterrent** against a North Korean attack and an impressive array of war-fighting capabilities should deterrence fail. But try to change the keystone and the arch will crumble. Most or all the elements of deterrence and war-fighting structure will have to be adjusted, some perhaps in fundamental ways. This is a process that will take several years to implement effectively. The urge to transfer wartime OPCON, however well-meaning, has gotten ahead of a review of all its implications. The keystone is being replaced before we and the South Koreans understand fully what is going to happen to the arch. Ironically, President Roh's desire to restore this element of perceived sovereignty has played into the hands of some Americans who reportedly wish to radically reduce the American military presence on the Korean peninsula. Indeed, the US Department of Defense has reportedly proposed that the transfer occur in 2009, three years ahead of what the South Korean government originally proposed. Most military expert analysts would agree that 2009 is far too soon for the ROK military to make needed upgrades to weapons systems, planning, and re-organization of forces that would provide the same capabilities that the CFC structure currently provides. Such a move would also make South Korea more vulnerable to both limited and large-scale acts of aggression by North Korea.

US military presence deters North Korean aggression and proliferation

STEVENS 2006 (Colonel Wayne Stevens, US Army War College, “Is US Forces Korea Still Needed on the Korean Peninsula?” March 15, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA448328&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>) Calum

The events of September 11, 2001 brought about changes in the structuring of U.S. military security within the ROK but not in the overall strategic defense objectives of the U.S. For example, the U.S. continues to serve as a deterrent against DPRK aggression and a stabilizing factor not only for the Korean peninsula but for the region of Northeast Asia as well.22

Understandably the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan along with the Global War on Terrorism and other U.S. security commitments in Korea and Europe required the repositioning of military forces to help reduce the operational tempo placed on other units. The Second Infantry Division deployed a brigade combat team to Iraq that had been helping to deter North Korean aggression. However, other instruments of power were in place to demonstrate America’s commitment to the ROK. The U.S. has employed diplomatic and economic instruments of power in addition to military power to deter DPRK aggression. Hopefully, the combined efforts of the instruments of power will create a lasting peace that will eventually lead to unification of the two Koreas. Some may argue that since 9/11 the ROK is less important to the U.S.23 A more accurate assessment however would be that despite the global attention being focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. still views its commitment to the ROK as essential. The U.S. is particularly concerned about DPRK’s nuclear weapons program and the possibility of DPRK proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). North Korea will continue to draw a watchful eye from the U.S. for several reasons: (1) DPRK is viewed as a security threat due to their large military forces and WMD capabilities; (2) if DPRK collapsed it would create a humanitarian disaster rife with hunger and huge number of refugees; and (3) DPRK poses a proliferation threat with regard to WMD to both state and non-state actors.24

US presence prevents Korean war

STEVENS 2006 (Colonel Wayne Stevens, US Army War College, “Is US Forces Korea Still Needed on the Korean Peninsula?” March 15, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA448328&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>) Calum

Each year a growing number of Americans and South Koreans debate the need for U.S. military presence in South Korea. Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute contends that the ROK is no longer the strategic asset that it use to be, particularly not if the ROK will not allow the U.S. to project forces from Korea on contingency operations against nations in Northeast Asia.5 The strategic defense objectives of both the ROK6 and U.S.7 are to maintain a stable region, prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and combat terrorism. The capabilities of United States Forces Korea (USFK) and ROK military forces help to deter North Korean aggression and provide stability. 8 The technological advances of the U.S. Armed Forces, the desire of the ROK to assume a self-reliant defense posture, the possibility for unification of the two Koreas, and the ROK’s desire to play the role of a power balancer in the region do not negate the need for U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula. U.S. State Department officials in the ROK can also assist in maintaining regional security through diplomatic means if deemed necessary by the President of the U.S. Diplomatic instruments of power provide an alternative to military force.

# North Korea—Link

**US presence prevents Korean war**

**Stevens 2006** (Colonel Wayne Stevens, US Army War College, “Is US Forces Korea Still Needed on the Korean Peninsula?” March 15, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA448328&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

Each year a growing number of Americans and South Koreans debate the need for U.S. military presence in South Korea. Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute contends that the ROK is no longer the strategic asset that it use to be, particularly not if the ROK will not allow the U.S. to project forces from Korea on contingency operations against nations in Northeast Asia.5 The strategic defense objectives of both the ROK6 and U.S.7 are to maintain a stable region, prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and combat terrorism. The capabilities of United States Forces Korea (USFK) and ROK military forces **help to deter** **North Korean aggression** and provide stability. 8 The technological advances of the U.S. Armed Forces, the desire of the ROK to assume a self-reliant defense posture, the possibility for unification of the two Koreas, and the ROK’s desire to play the role of a power balancer in the region do not negate the need for U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula. U.S. State Department officials in the ROK can also assist in maintaining regional security through diplomatic means if deemed necessary by the President of the U.S. Diplomatic instruments of power provide an alternative to military force.

**South can’t defend itself – US key to deter threats throughout the region**

**Bechtol 9—**IR,Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Former Intelligence Officer at the Defense Intelligence Agency. Former Senior Analyst for Northeast Asia in the Intelligence Directorate, Pentagon. PhD—AND—Richard C. Bush, Director, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies (Bruce, The U.S. and South Korea: Prospects for Transformation, Combined Forces Operations, and Wartime Operational Control: Problems and Remedies, http://www.reportshop.co.kr/search/?qt=%22ROK-U.S.+Military+Cooperation+in+the+Post-9/11+Era:+Challenges+and+Paradigms+in+the+Age+of+Terrorism%22&old\_qt=U.S.-ROK+Military&category=T&x=0&y=0, AMiles)

And then of course when one is considering wartime OPCON the most important reason for a ROK-US military alliance and a strong U.S. troop presence on the Korean Peninsula also comes to mind – the ongoing and menacing presence of a belligerent North Korean military with asymmetric capabilities. As Lee Jong-gu, the head of the Korea Retired Generals and Admirals Association said in an interview with the South Korean press, “We must consider when, not under what conditions, when dealing with the transfer of wartime operational command. North Korea is highly unlikely to abandon its nuclear weapons and South Korea is not expected to equip itself with a military strong enough to deter North Korea’s provocations by 2012. It is unreasonable to set a deadline for the transfer of wartime operational command, which is directly related to South Korea’s security, when North Korea is heightening its nuclear threat.” Following the nuclear test that North Korea conducted in May of 2009, many retired Generals and conservative members of the National Assembly echoed the assessments of General Lee Jong-gu – calling for a review of the date of 2012 as a reasonable time frame for disestablishment of CFC. Conclusions There are important things that both the United States and South Korea can do to improve the ROK-U.S. military alliance. I will boil this down to four basic pillars of cooperation that in my view will enhance the current status quo and then offer some suggestions that are likely to be force enhancing initiatives as the alliance looks to the future challenges it will be facing in coming years. In previous papers I have addressed the four basic pillars of cooperation both domestically and with the U.S. that the South Korean government can look to as they confront the threat of a rogue state to the North and the tough fiscal realities they will continue to face because of challenging economic times. The first pillar is Closer Technological Cooperation. This should involve bigger, more robust, longer range combat, communications and intelligence systems. Government and business joint ventures must be initiated that will enable quality focused programs that will upgrade defense capabilities and surpass threat systems while at the same time downplaying vulnerabilities that are likely to occur as CFC is dissolved. The second pillar is Closer Intellectual Cooperation that focuses on a renewed and continuing commitment to combined doctrine, training, and education. The third pillar is Closer Ideological Cooperation and a newfound commitment to democracy, human rights and free market economies as South Korea and the United States re-affirm an alliance that faced tough times under the previous administration in the Blue House. The final and perhaps most important pillar is a Fiscal Commitment to Support the Pillars Listed Above. This can be accomplished through defense appropriations that enable realistic, threat-based acquisition of important systems that will be needed for truly independent national defense capabilities. As South Korea looks to improve its national defense the United States can also play a major role – that of a strong supporting ally. By allowing the ROK government time to build up its capabilities and improve its forces – perhaps by delaying the implementation of a change to wartime OPCON – Washington will prove that it supports its loyal military ally and seventh largest trading partner. To any analyst who has done a thorough analysis of current correlation of forces, opposing firepower ratios, or terrain-dominated strategy, it is obvious that South Korea’s military will continue to need the help of the U.S. in meeting the North Korean threat. The tyranny of proximity dictates that one can hardly draw any other conclusion. As Lt. General Edward Rice of USFJ remarked in 2008, “North Korea continues to be a regime that is not very transparent in terms of their capabilities and their intentions.” Thus, these two great nations must reinforce an alliance that will continue to contribute to the security of the Korean Peninsula and the stability of Northeast Asia as a whole.

**US presence deters North Korean attack**

**Mosler 2k** (David, Professor of IR at U of Adelaide, Global America, 2000, Pg 143)

Second, a strong U.S. military presence is similarly the best means of dealing with a relatively new element in the peninsular

military equation – the threat posed by possible North Korean WMD and particularly nuclear weapons. Although the nuclear dimension

of this threat appears to be under control after the agreement reached in 1994 involving an effective U.S. financial bribe, the North may retain some chemical and biological weapons

capabilities. The U.S. military presence needs to include facilities for dealing with this potential threat. Finally, deterrence

through presence is an effective means of supporting and encouraging new political and diplomatic developments of the

inter-Korean situation. The United States needs to demonstrate that it is engaged for the long haul and is an enduring, consistent presence that remains relatively well

insulated from political currents in either the United States or South Korea.

# North Korea—Yes Threat

**North Korea is a threat**

**Bechtol 10—**IR,Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Former Intelligence Officer at the Defense Intelligence Agency. Former Senior Analyst for Northeast Asia in the Intelligence Directorate, Pentagon. PhD (Bruce, The North Korean Military Threat to the Security of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia: Paper Tiger or Ongoing Menace?, February 2010, http://www.icasinc.org/2010/2010w/2010wbeb.pdf, AMiles)

North Korea has gone through a series of enormous economic challenges and crises during the time period since Kim Chong-il assumed power in 1994.127 But the big question here is has this severely degraded the readiness and capabilities of the North Korean military and its ability to offensively threaten the South and the region? In my view, and based on the evidence presented here, the answer is that North Korea has cleverly adjusted to overwhelming economic challenges by reorganizing its military and refocusing its forces around units that can replace what was a very threatening first punch by armor and mechanized forces (a threat posed during the 1980s) with an asymmetric capability built around SOF, long-range artillery, and ballistic missiles. In fact the Kim regime continues to focus on supporting its military as its highest priority. A report based on defectors testimonies in 2008 stated that the DPRK may be diverting as much as 90% of its international food aid to the military.128 According to Kwon Young-se, a member of the South Korean National Assembly, who was quoting documents submitted by intelligence officials, North Korea has spent $65 million purchasing foreign weapons systems since 2003. During the same period, North Korea also added SCUD and No Dong missiles, artillery, and submarines to its inventory (to name a few) – which were indigenously produced and likely did not contribute to the figure quoted above.129 Of course, at the same time, the army continues to use brutal tactics to maintain control over the North Korean populace and to prevent individuals from fleeing the country.130 An analysis of North Korea‟s military capability reveals a careful, well-planned policy of revamping the military in order to continue a policy of eventual reunification through violent or threatening means despite facing challenges that would cripple such a policy for most nation-states. This has been done at the expense of providing for even the basic needs of much of the populace. There are two very important things to keep in mind here. The first is the sheer mass of North Korea‟s forces and their close proximity to the DMZ (which limits warning time). The second is the capability North Korea has built up in its asymmetric forces since the early 1990s allows them to open up vulnerabilities in ROK-US defenses that could turn the tide in the all important early days of any war – but would no doubt inflict hundreds of thousand of casualties (many of them civilians). As a press piece from 2003 reflects, “An invasion of South Korea would probably involve the use of commando forces, chemical weapons and massed, mobile artillery fire. Preventing such an attack could involve a decision by the United States and South Korea to launch a 46 pre-emptive assault.”131 Former South Korean Minister of National Defense Kim Jang-soo supported the assumption that the North Korean asymmetric threat is a serious challenge to the security of the Korean Peninsula in November of 2007 when he assessed that there was no clear intelligence that the North Korea had halted its pursuit of “asymmetrical weapons.”132 In the fall of 2008, General Walter Sharp (Commander of USFK) when referring to the North Korean military threat said it “is still a very huge capability.” He also stated that the main threat is Pyongyang‟s 13,000 artillery systems and 800 short and medium range ballistic missiles.133

**North Korea is a military threat to the South**

**Sharp 2010** (Gen. Walter Sharp, Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea, Congressional Documents and Publications, March 26)

Though aging and technologically inferior, North Korea's massive army and vast artillery forces continue to represent a substantial threat capable of initiating limited offensives against the ROK that could potentially cost thousands of lives and billions of dollars in damage. North Korea also continued to develop its missile forces by attempting a multi-stage space launch vehicle, as well as multiple theater ballistic missile launches. Pyongyang continued to focus resources on its conventional and asymmetric military forces despite food shortages and a faltering economy. North Korea's missile capabilities remain a significant regional and global threat. North Korea Threat Outlook **My number one concern** will remain Pyongyang's continuing attempts to develop its nuclear and missile capabilities. The full potential of these capabilities would threaten the U.S., our regional allies, and the international community. We must also be mindful of the potential for instability in North Korea. Combined with the country's disastrous centralized economy, dilapidated industrial sector, insufficient agricultural base, malnourished military and populace, and developing nuclear programs, the possibility of a sudden leadership change in the North could be destabilizing and unpredictable. In the future, Pyongyang may continue its strategy of periodically heightening tensions. We must never be complacent about the possibility that North Korea might take additional provocative steps or even launch an attack on the ROK. To address this threat, UNC/CFC/USFK must maintain the highest level of readiness.

# North Korea—Military Strong

Even if the country is weak in other ways, North Korean military forces are powerful

DAVINO 2004 (Colonel Michael Davino, US Army War College, “Should The U.S. Continue to Maintain Forces in Korea?” May 3, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423338&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>) Calum

Although North Korea does not come close to matching South Korea in other elements of power, its armed forces, known collectively as the Korean People’s Army (KPA), “is an imposing and formidable force of 1.17 million active personnel with a reserve force of over 5 million, making it the fifth largest military force in the world.”49 These forces far exceed those necessary for defensive purposes and “the offensive character of Pyongyang’s military strategy is demonstrated by the organization and deployment of its forces.”50 In addition to its massive conventional forces, “the KPA maintains the largest special operations force (SOF) in the world, consisting of approximately 100,000 highly trained, totally dedicated soldiers.”51 Finally, as discussed earlier, the North has extensive programs to produce weapons of mass destruction: Key elements of Pyongyang’s military strategy include the employment of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear (as recently revealed by Pyongyang) and missile systems including short and medium-range and probably intercontinental missiles. The commander of US forces in Korea assesses that North Korea has large chemical weapon stockpiles, is self-sufficient in the production of chemical agents, and may have produced enough plutonium for at least two nuclear weapons.52

# Deterrence—Troops Key

**Withdrawing ground troops makes our commitment useless and hurts Chinese relations**

**Kim 99**—Associate Professor, Institute of Foreign Affairs (Sung, U.S. Military Presence in a Unified Korea, www.cap.lmu.de/transatlantic/download/kim.doc, AMiles)

Nevertheless, a drawback of this scenario is that in light of its lack of ground forces, the U.S. commitment to "automatic involvement" in any development on the Korean peninsula **would be seen as considerably weakened.** The presence of ground troops constitutes the clearest evidence of the political determination of the United States. Therefore, if Washington's political commitment appears diminished due to the withdrawal of all but its naval and air forces, the effectiveness of U.S. forces in Japan would also decline markedly. Moreover, if the United States were to maintain naval forces along Korea's west coast across from the Chinese coastal territory, Beijing would likely react sensitively, a factor which could harm U.S.-China relations.

**Ground troops are critical—US Air Force assets in Korea are inadequately trained for rapid response**

**Sharp 2010** (Gen. Walter Sharp, Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea, Congressional Documents and Publications, March 26)

My first priority as Commander of UNC, CFC, and USFK is to maintain trained, ready, and disciplined combined and joint commands that are prepared to fight and win. This has been the focus of U.S. forces stationed in Korea for more than 50 years and for the CFC since it was established in 1978. Maintaining "fight tonight" readiness is the primary reason U.S. forces are stationed in the ROK, supporting the alliance between the American and Korean people in defense of the ROK. The Alliance stands ready to address the full spectrum of conflict that could emerge with little warning on the Korean Peninsula. This spectrum of conflict ranges from major combat operations under conditions of general war or provocation, to multiple possibilities of destabilizing conditions on the Peninsula, to humanitarian assistance operations, and even the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Given these varied potential security challenges, it is imperative that our forces maintain the highest possible level of training and readiness. In order to address the full spectrum of conflict that could emerge on the Korean Peninsula, the Command has developed and constantly refines plans to deter aggression against the ROK, defeat aggression should deterrence fail, and respond to other destabilizing conditions that could affect the ROK. U.S. and ROK military personnel develop and maintain their warfighting skills through tough, realistic training to include theater-level exercises that leverage a variety of facilities and ranges located in the ROK. The Command conducts two annual exercises: Key Resolve/Foal Eagle and Ulchi Freedom Guardian. Key Resolve, a Command Post Exercise focused on crisis management, trains and sharpens skills on how we will fight today using existing organizational structures where CFC executes command and control over the combined force. Foal Eagle is a large-scale combined field training exercise that includes the strategic deployment of American forces from bases in the U.S. as well as the participation of thousands of ROK troops. Key Resolve and Foal Eagle ensure that CFC remains ready today to decisively defeat any aggression that is directed against the ROK. The second annual exercise - Ulchi Freedom Guardian - is a computer-simulated warfighting exercise that focuses on the development of Alliance command and control structures that will exist after the transition of wartime OPCON of ROK forces in April 2012. Maintaining "fight tonight" readiness can only occur when training is conducted that prepares forces to address the full spectrum of operations that characterizes today's complex operational environment. It is vital that Command training facilities and events support the full transformation of U.S. military forces stationed in the ROK. The U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps possess adequate training resources in the ROK to maintain unit combat readiness to include the rehearsal of robust amphibious operations. But USFK still faces challenges with respect to the training of air forces located in the ROK. We have made progress with our ROK hosts in scheduling and maximizing use of limited ranges. However, there is still insufficient training range capability and capacity. A continued shortfall in electronic warfare training capability and restrictions placed on precision guided munitions training pose deficiencies that must be addressed. Deployments of U.S. air forces to training events outside the Korean Peninsula mitigate current training shortfalls and ensure the same standard of training and readiness as American combat air forces not located in the ROK. This is not a long-term solution, however, and I continue to work with the ROK government to find a solution to this key training and readiness issue.

# Deterrence—A2 Non Unique—OPCON

\*note – also in uq wall

**OPCON transfer delayed**

**Garamone 10** (Jim, U.S., South Korea to Delay Transfer of Wartime Control, 28 June 2010, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=59809, AMiles)

The United States and South Korea have agreed to delay until December 2015 the transfer of wartime operational control of troops on the Korean peninsula to South Korea, the two nations’ presidents announced following a June 26 meeting in Toronto. Specific details of how the wartime operational control will shift will be formulated next month during meetings in the South Korean capital of Seoul, Pentagon officials said. Transfer of control had been scheduled for April 2012. The change **reaffirms the importance of the U.S. military alliance with South Korea,** President Barack Obama said. South Korean officials discussed extending the transfer date with U.S. officials even before North Korea torpedoed and sank the South Korean ship Cheonan on March 26, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak said. Extending the deadline will allow the ultimate transfer to proceed more smoothly and allow the U.S. and South Korean militaries to be more in sync, Pentagon officials said. “We have arrived at an agreement that the transition of operational control for alliance activities in the Korean peninsula will take place in 2015,” Obama said. “This gives us appropriate time … within the existing security context, to do this right, because this alliance is the lynchpin of not only security for the Republic of Korea and the United States, but also for the Pacific as a whole.” Obama and Lee discussed the Cheonan incident, and what will happen in the months ahead. “We agreed that Korea and the United States, that we will do all that we can to deter any acts of North Korean aggression leveled against us, and that we will react swiftly and strongly so that this will not happen again,” Lee said through a translator.

**Transfer doesn’t hurt deterrence**

**Kim 10**—IR, Korea U. Adjunct prof, Johns Hopkins (Tong, Timing of OPCON Transfer, 31 March 2010 http://www.korea.ac.kr/do/MessageBoard/ArticleRead.do?id=4b978d, AMiles)

A part of the transition plan is that the United States will continue to provide ``bridging capabilities" that the ROK forces will not have ready by the time of transition. The U.S. will continue to provide an ``extended deterrent" to deal with the threat of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction. The United Sates will keep a four-star general's position in Korea, perhaps partly to ease the concerns of the South Koreans and probably to have an effective coordination with the ROKs and the other U.S. military commands that would be involved in the event of a contingency. There is no plan for reducing American troops in Korea below the current level of 28,500. As base relocation plans proceed, mainly the relocation of the Yongsan post and eventually the 2nd Infantry Division to Pyongtaek, the U.S. forces will evolve from ``deployed" to ``stationed," meaning U.S. soldiers serving in Korea will have three-year tours accompanied by their families. The relocation plan is being delayed by at least three to four years now.

**OPCON strengthens deterrence**

**DuBois 10**—senior adviser, CSIS. Former undersecretary of the army. (Raymond, Transferring Operational Control of South Korean Forces, 4 May 2010, http://csis.org/publication/transferring-operational-control-south-korean-forces, AMiles)

Among the arguments against OPCON transfer is that there are strategic and geopolitical reasons for a delay and that a transfer would stoke fears of a U.S. withdrawal or lack of commitment. In fact, a reversal of policy with regard to the planned OPCON transfer in 2012 might be interpreted as an indictment of the ROK military—that they are not ready for this responsibility—which in itself could be provocative. To transfer OPCON **is absolutely the right signal to send** to the North Koreans, to the Chinese, and most of all to the South Korean people. The reduced U.S. military presence makes OPCON appear even more anachronistic, particularly given the relocation of the headquarters out of Seoul. If the South Koreans truly valued our continued OPCON, they would insist that the CFC headquarters be located adjacent to the Ministry of National Defense in Seoul. The U.S. commitment to the territorial integrity of the Republic of Korea does not depend upon OPCON. In 2010, it depends first and foremost upon the unequivocal expressions of support from our president and our Congress and secondly on the forward deployment of our military forces (strategic and tactical) in the Western Pacific and not just on the peninsula.

# Deterrence—A2 Short Tours

**Tour times are being extended—overall force readiness will improve**

**Sharp 2010** (Gen. Walter Sharp, Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea, Congressional Documents and Publications, March 26)

DoD approved plans to normalize the tours of all service members in the ROK on December 1, 2008. n12 As noted in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, DoD's long-term goal is to phase out all unaccompanied tours in Korea. This goal will mean all service members stationed in the ROK will be on 36-month accompanied or 24-month unaccompanied tours. Single troops will serve 24-months. Prior to this policy change, the majority of U.S. military personnel serving in the ROK were on one-year unaccompanied assignments. For military personnel with dependents, tour normalization means that they can be accompanied by their family members while serving our nation in the ROK, something that has been done in Europe for decades. Once complete, there will be approximately 14,500 families in Korea. Phase I is currently under way and will run through Fiscal Year (FY) 2011. During this phase, the number of command sponsored families in the ROK will almost triple from the start of this phase, to 4,932. The length of accompanied tours offered in five locations - Seoul, Osan, Pyeongtaek, Daegu, and Chinhae - are now 36 months and for areas north of Seoul (Dongducheon and Uijeongbu, referred to as Area I) are 24 months. Single soldiers serve a 12month tour. The tour normalization process will synchronize increases in the number of command sponsored (accompanied tour) service members and their families with the expansion of necessary infrastructure such as housing, schools, medical facilities, and other infrastructure needed to accommodate this growth. Throughout the phased tour normalization process, the funding for needed infrastructure could come from three key sources: public and private ventures, appropriated military construction funds, and ROK cost sharing contributions where appropriate. The tour normalization initiative benefits the Command, DoD personnel serving in the ROK, military families, the ROK-U.S. Alliance, and U.S. national interests. Full implementation of this initiative improves force readiness and combat capability by keeping trained military personnel in place for longer periods of time, thus enhancing continuity, stability, and the retention of institutional, regional, and cultural knowledge. It will also reduce the stress placed on troops and units by frequent rotations and supports the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review's "preserve and enhance" objective by establishing a sustainable rotation rate that helps protect the force's long-term health. Quality of life for our service members will be greatly improved through the elimination of needless separation from their families and the use of modern DoD standard design facilities. The ROK-U.S. Alliance will be enhanced by the more meaningful and deeper interaction between Americans and Koreans that can occur during a tour of longer duration. Finally, U.S. national interests are supported through the signal tour normalization sends on U.S. commitment to the long-term security and stability of the ROK as well as Northeast Asia as a whole.

# Deterrence—A2 South Korea Defends Itself

**US forces are key to defend South Korea—despite some weaknesses, North Korea would overwhelm the ROK**

**Stevens 2006** (Colonel Wayne Stevens, US Army War College, “Is US Forces Korea Still Needed on the Korean Peninsula?” March 15, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA448328&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

Strategically, the U.S. focus has been to preserve peace on the peninsula and stability within the region. In order to maintain that focus the U.S. has relied on a large U.S. military force deployed along side ROK forces to respond to the North Korean threat. U.S. and ROK forces on the peninsula do not appear large enough to defeat a robust North Korean military without suffering a significant number of casualties and destruction from DPRK’s Taepo-Dong, Scuds, and other missiles according to Pennsylvania Congressman Curt Weldon, House Committee Member on Armed Services.77 Some may argue that the ROK has the capability to defeat the North, however, one should not assume an ROK victory with certainty because of the military power of North Korea. The DPRK has a very dangerous army with the world’s largest Special Operations Force (about 120,000) and has the ability to launch an estimated 500,000 missiles on South Korea within hours.78 The ROK currently does not have the missile defense or air power capability to counter North Korea’s artillery capability. 79 The DPRK, with a military force of about 1.1 million, significantly outnumbers the ROK and U.S. forces on the peninsula of 680,000 and about 34,000 respectively. 80 The number advantage alone will not guarantee victory, but it does tend to improve the chance for success by wearing down the enemy with larger and more frequent attacks. U.S. Joint Forces Command and supporting combatant commands can provide remarkably more combat power such as U.S. Air Force Fighter Wings, U.S. Army Divisions, U.S. Marines Expeditionary Forces, among others by employing the following capabilities: the F-15 Eagle for air superiority; the F-15E Strike Eagle for enemy suppression; B-1 Lancer bomber; MQ-1 Predator for both reconnaissance and strike capability; 81 and additional brigade combat teams (BCT) are more self-sustaining and, therefore, can undertake longer durations of conflict.82 Finally, stability in Northeast Asia not only includes the North Korean threat, but also the ongoing tensions between China and Taiwan.

**Rapid US reaction is critical to defend South Korea**

**Stevens 2006** (Colonel Wayne Stevens, US Army War College, “Is US Forces Korea Still Needed on the Korean Peninsula?” March 15, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA448328&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

If war breaks out on the peninsula, the ROK will most likely require considerably more than 34,000 U.S. troops to assist.87 The need for U.S. forces within Northeast Asia capable of rapidly deploying from within the region instead of from the U.S. will enhance the ROK’s ability to stop DPRK’s aggression quickly. The joint and flexible capabilities of the U.S. forces such as air superiority, precision guided missiles, and BCTs that are more capable of independent action and more responsive to regional combatant commanders can give the ROK forces a distinctive edge during combat operations and ensure the U.S. strategic focus of maintaining stability within the region.88 Some have argued for removing or reducing the U.S. forces on the peninsula because DPRK’s nuclear capability negates the need for U.S. conventional forces in the South.89 Despite the lack of conclusive proof that North Korea actually has nuclear weapons; the DPRK may find it harder to prove that they do not have nuclear weapons. North Korea already admitted that they are conducting a nuclear weapons program and the North has extracted spent fuel and reprocessed the fuel into weapons-grade plutonium.90 Although the nuclear argument may have some validity, a major U.S. concern is the need to have forward deployed basing to allow U.S. forces to project its military power. The forces in the ROK provide the U.S. with the capability to continue its deterrence mission and also to fight the Global War on Terror (GWOT) on foreign soil before it reaches the U.S.91

**Withdrawal kills South Korean readiness**

**Roehrig, 08** – Associate Professor in the National Security Decision Making Department at the U.S. Naval War College (Terence, "On Korea", Academic Paper Series, 2008, June 27th 2010, p. 139-140, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Teddy

One of the criticisms of the proposal to turn over OPCON to South Korea has been that South Korea is unable to perform all the necessary missions to defeat a North Korean invasion. An important requirement here, according to General Bell, is the continued U.S. provision of bridging capabilities. These are capabilities that the ROK military does not yet possess but are necessary for its defense, for example, missile defense systems such as the Patriot system, intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance capabilities, and certain battle command systems that allow theater commanders to manage these capabilities in combat.35 General Bell noted that the two countries will “put the systems in place to make sure there is no risk . . . to the Republic of Korea that some capability will not be present that is needed when operational command is transferred.”36 In the end, the United States will continue to provide important air and naval assets in a supporting role while ROK troops assume the lead on the ground.37

**South Korea’s defense doesn’t work vs. the North**

**Eberstadt et. al, 07** – \*Ph.D. in Political Economy and Government from Harvard, Political economist, Senior Adviser to the National Board of Asian Research, \*\*President of The National Bureau of Asian Research -- Policy Think Tank, \*\*\*Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, \*\*\*\*Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, \*\*\*\*\*Senior Vice President for Political and Security Affairs at The National Bureau of Asian Research -- Policy Think Tank, \*\*\*\*\*\*Senior Project Director and Director of the Pyle Center for Northeast Asian Studies at the National Bureau of Asian Research -- Policy Think Tank (\*Nicholas, \*\*Richard J., \*\*\*Aaron L., \*\*\*\*Christopher, \*\*\*\*\*Roy D., \*\*\*\*\*\*Travis, "A World without the U.S.‑ROK Alliance: Thinking about 'Alternative Futures'", National Bureau of Asian Research, September 11th 2007, June 24th 2010, p. 17, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Teddy

Nonetheless, the ROK military is not well matched to North Korea’s current “asymmetric” strategy, which employs such methods as special operations forces raids, terrorist sleeper cells, and weapons of mass destruction to disrupt South Korean rear areas before launching a conventional military invasion as a follow-on force. One example of how ill-prepared post–Cold War South Korea was to meet such threats was an incident in 1996 in which a pair of ROK army divisions took approximately three months to kill and capture 26 North Korean agents who had infiltrated via submarine. Even over a decade later, it is far from obvious that ROK forces would fare better against such a challenge were it posed today. The regional context places South Korea’s post-alliance defense requirements in even starker contrast. Many of South Korea’s defense purchases in recent years appear directed at other regional powers, rather than at the North Korean military. For example, the AEGIS-equipped Sejong the Great-class destroyers are much more useful for matching Tokyo’s and Beijing’s growing naval power than Pyongyang’s fleet of patrol boats.

# a2: china pressure

**China pressure fails**

**Feffer 2009** – PanTech fellow in Korean Studies at Stanford University, co-director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, taught graduate international conflict at Sungkonghoe University in Seoul (7/11, John, Foreign Policy in Focus, “Outsourcing North Korea Policy”, http://www.fpif.org/articles/outsourcing\_north\_korea\_policy, WEA)

There is no greater indication of frustration than the revival of the perennial U.S. calls for China to take the lead in resolving the problem. Such are the strange reversals of history. In 1950, China intervened in the Korean War to beat back American soldiers and preserve the North Korean state. Sixty years later, America is desperate for China to intervene once again but this time to restrain its neighbor.

"To have any chance of success, our focus must first and foremost be on Beijing, as China is the lifeline of the North Korean regime," writes Robert Joseph, one of the hardliners on North Korea in the Bush State Department. "To succeed, we must get China to use its leverage for reasons of its own interest." Other writers, including Henry Kissinger, urge the United States to provide reassurances to China — that the Pentagon, for instance, would not take advantage of instability in North Korea to press a military advantage in Northeast Asia — in exchange for increased pressure from Beijing on Pyongyang.

Perhaps the most bizarre analysis to appear recently has come from Washington Post columnist Anne Applebaum. China has influence over North Korea, she asserts. It wants to gain influence over the United States. So it is deliberately encouraging North Korea in its provocative actions: in order to test the mettle of the Obama administration. "North Korea is a puppet state, and the Chinese are the puppeteers," she writes. "They could end this farce tomorrow."

**But China is no puppeteer, and North Korea is no puppet**. The notion that China has so much influence that it could stoke the conflict or bring it to a close is either wishful thinking (Joseph) or Cold War paranoia (Applebaum).

China is certainly furious over North Korea's recent actions, particularly the May nuclear test. At the UN, China has backed both increased sanctions against North Korea and interdiction at sea. "Kim Jong-il's folly has deprived the North of its last important friend in the international arena and has dramatically brought new unity to Asia," writes Zhu Feng, the deputy director of the Center for International & Strategic Studies in Beijing.

Yes, China was North Korea's most important friend in the international arena. That friendship was forged in war, sustained in overlapping ideology, and, more recently, kept on life support through Beijing's large deliveries of food and fuel.

But that friendship was always conflicted. If you go to Pyongyang, for instance, you will find virtually no acknowledgment of China's contributions to the Korean War. North Korea has always been prickly about its "big brother" to the West. North Korean ideologists have counterposed the philosophy of juche — self-reliance — against sadaejuii, or flunkeyism. Sadaejuii refers to the tributary system that China presided over in East Asia for hundreds of years and that treated Korea as a satellite territory. North Korea's self-reliance is not simply directed against the international system or the United States but against China and its efforts to secure a sphere of influence.

This resentment of neighborly paternalism translated into North Korea's rejection of Chinese advice on agricultural reforms and economic modernization. Tensions have emerged around trade and aid. More importantly, China has had precious little influence over North Korea's military decisions.

Sovereignty is the essential focus of the regime in Pyongyang. The government asserts its right to control what goes on within its borders — nuclear tests, rocket launches, detentions of journalists, economic reform. It is the nature of sovereignty that no one can tell you what to do. In this sense, North Korea is probably the last truly sovereign country in the world. It rejects the interfering influences of the United States, the UN, human rights organizations, and journalists. And, **despite lingering ideological and historical bonds, North Korea keeps China at arm's length as well.**

China is not eager to undermine North Korea's sovereignty. It doesn't want to push the regime to collapse. Beijing doesn't want the refugee flows. It doesn't want the economic turmoil. And it certainly doesn't want South Korea and the United States to take over the North and push U.S. troops up toward the Chinese border.

\*\*\*ROK ECON

# south korean economy 1nc

**Uniqueness—South Korean economy is strong now but downturn is possible**

**Interactive Investor July 1 2010** (“South Korea June exports top forecasts; inflation eases,” <http://www.iii.co.uk/news/?type=afxnews&articleid=7970684&action=article>) Calum

South Korean exports rose more than expected in June to a record, easing some investor doubts about the strength of global demand and reinforcing the market's view that interest rates could go up as early as next week.

Annual consumer price inflation unexpectedly slowed in June from May on softer raw materials prices. But inflation is widely expected to accelerate later this year on rising services prices in line with a recovery in the private-sector demand.

"The monetary policy board looks optimistic about the economy and is highly likely to raise interest rates by 25 basis points next week," said Jun Min-kyoo, economist, Korea Investment & Securities. But he said economic prospects remained uncertain. A central bank inflation researcher said on Thursday the Bank of Korea may lift its consumer price inflation forecast for the second half of the year when it releases economic forecasts this month.

A slew of economic indicators showed Asia's fourth-largest economy was faring better than expected despite widespread concerns that Europe's debt crisis could hit the global economy.

**Links—The plan collapses the South Korean economy**

**First, investor confidence**

**Eberstadt et. al, 07** -- \*Ph.D. in Political Economy and Government from Harvard, Political economist, Senior Adviser to the National Board of Asian Research, \*\*President of The National Bureau of Asian Research -- Policy Think Tank, \*\*\*Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, \*\*\*\*Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, \*\*\*\*\*Senior Vice President for Political and Security Affairs at The National Bureau of Asian Research -- Policy Think Tank, \*\*\*\*\*\*Senior Project Director and Director of the Pyle Center for Northeast Asian Studies at the National Bureau of Asian Research -- Policy Think Tank (\*Nicholas, \*\*Richard J., \*\*\*Aaron L., \*\*\*\*Christopher, \*\*\*\*\*Roy D., \*\*\*\*\*\*Travis, "A World without the U.S.‑ROK Alliance: Thinking about 'Alternative Futures'", National Bureau of Asian Research, September 11th 2007, June 24th 2010, p. 22, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Teddy

A less pleasant scenario for the economy in a post-alliance ROK would be an increase in tensions in the region without an alliance to serve as a deterrent force and crisis control mechanism. The threat posed by a recalcitrant, unreformed North Korea or by a regional territorial dispute among the great powers could quickly raise concerns that Seoul is a likely victim with little control over its own future. In the final analysis, the alliance bolsters investor confidence against possible geopolitical shocks; without the alliance, South Korea’s domestic and international markets would be significantly more vulnerable. Even without disruptive flashpoint crises, the perception that the ROK had become a more risky place to do business could become self-fulfilling: if the risk premium rose, South Korea would perforce be a less competitive platform in the world economy.

**Second, defense spending**

**Jeon, 06** – Colonel of the Republic of Korea Army (Sang Jo, "Transforming the ROK-US Alliance", U.S. Army War College, March 15th 2006, June 25th 2010, p. 2-3, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Teddy

USFK’s primary mission is, along with the ROK Armed Forces, to deter aggression against the Republic of Korea and, if necessary, fight and win decisively. 11 Other responsibilities include: to support the UNC and CFC; to coordinate planning among US component commands in Korea; to exercise operational control (OPCON) of assigned US forces as directed by Combatant Commander, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM); to coordinate US military assistance to the ROK; to function as US Defense Representative in Korea; and to oversee US governmental administrative coordination as provided for in USPACOM Instruction 5400.20E.12 The US, with the world’s most powerful military, plays a major role in multiple current operations and contingency situations. Practically, USFK complements the ROK military by providing intelligence collection and early warning means.13 In addition, the US provides augmented forces and a nuclear umbrella to deter any North Korean intent to invade South Korea. USFK contributes to the ROK economy by reducing Korea’s national security budget and helping to foster stability. US Korean-related military expenditures are significant, when one considers equipment, personnel, material, operational costs, and programs such as the ammunition and other material included US War Reserve Stocks for Allies-Korea (WRSA-K). For Korea the resources required to offset the US contribution would be enormous—in the billions of dollars.

**South Korean economy is key to Asian democracy**

**NEWSWEEK 1-29**-2010 (“Selling South Korea,” <http://www.newsweek.com/2010/01/28/selling-south-korea.html>) Calum

In short, the South Korean model is a more mature cousin of China's—a hybrid economy, part free market, part state-controlled—but with more freedom for the market and for political dissent. Now Lee is positioning South Korea within Asia as a dynamic alternative to both China's mighty command economy and Japan's no-growth economy. In Southeast Asia, South Korea has long been admired for completing an economic miracle in just one generation, moving its 48 million people out of poverty and entering the ranks of fully industrialized nations, with average per capita income that surpassed $20,000 in 2007. And, unlike China, South Korea has achieved economic and political growth at the same time, with an increasingly well-established multiparty democracy that respects free speech and election results. South Korea, says U.S. Ambassador Kathleen Stephens, is "the best example in the post–World War II era of a country that has overcome enormous obstacles to achieve this kind of success." Many Southeast Asian nations, alarmed by the harsh sides of the China model, look to South Korea as an alternative. Vietnam is sending civil servants there, studying how in the 1970s and '80s Seoul used massive government support, such as cheap loans, to develop strategic industries such as steel and petrochemicals as the backbone of its export economy. As part of Vietnam's effort to develop capital markets, it also now runs a stock exchange in Hanoi, built with the help of the Korea Stock Exchange. Officials from Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Uzbekistan regularly visit South Korea to join training programs that teach economic and business management. "Developing countries are eager to learn South Korea's economic model because of its relevance to them," says Euh Yoon-dae, a Korea University economist currently heading a presidential committee to promote the national brand. "Our open economic system is more appealing to them than, say, that of China."

## Extinction

**Diamond, 95** – Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy, Professor of Political Science and Sociology and Coordinator of the Democracy Program at the the Center on Democracy at Stanford University (Larry, "Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and instruments, issues and imperatives : a report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict", December 1995, June 26th 2010, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/di.htm, KONTOPOULOS)

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness.

# Defense spending uniq

**Lee will control defense spending now**

**LEE AND MOON 2010** (Chung In Moon, professor of political science at Yonsei University; Sangkeun Lee, Ph. D. candidate specializing in North Korean politics at Department of Political Science, Yonsei University, Asia-Pacific Journal, Feb 13, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Chung\_in-Moon/3333)

Ironically, the pattern of defense spending under the Lee Myung-bak government, which won the presidential election on a conservative platform emphasizing a strong national defense, has been quite different. Although the actual amount of defense spending rose slightly as part of a fiscal stimulus package to cope with the global financial crisis, the relative share of total government spending was radically reduced to 10.8 percent in 2009. The Lee government has also announced plans to cut the estimated budget for the Defense Reform 2020 from the original budget of 621.3 trillion won to 599.3 trillion won.9

**Current increases are small—some programs are being cut while others increase**

**KOREA TIMES 5-17-2010** (“Lee Directs 3 Trillion Won Rise in Arms Buying,” http://pacificfreeze.ips-dc.org/2010/05/lee-directs-3-trillion-won-rise-in-arms-buying/)

“Upon the President’s direction, defense authorities are expected to review current arms acquisition plans and readjust their priorities,” the source told The Korea Times. “The focus will be on how to thwart the North’s asymmetrical and irregular operations.” Irregular and asymmetric warfare uses more special forces to conduct operations than regular forces, as well as the unconventional use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons systems. A Cheong Wa Dae spokesman said President Lee hadn’t directed detailed plans on the arms programs, adding the military will decide upon these. “For example, buying helicopters for maritime and air-to-ground operations will gain speed in order to help prevent the infiltration of North Korean special forces into the South, or to drop our commandos into enemy areas,” the source noted. Other weapons to be affected by a potential increase in defense expenditure would include upgrades of warships’ sonar, deployment of a sound surveillance systems (SOSUS) for islands near the sea border, development of three-dimensional anti-air radar and an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) bomb, and the acquisition of bunker-busting bombs, he said. “On the other hand, arms programs aimed at deterring North Korea’s conventional threats could be put on the back burner for the time being,” he added, apparently referring to the production of the K2 Black Panther main battle tank and K21 infantry fighting vehicle.

# Links

**US presence fosters stability that causes growth**

**Crichton et. al, 09** – \*Col of the U.S. Army, \*\*Col of the U.S. Army and Commander's Initiative Group, \*\*\*Major of U.S. Army, Creative Director/Layout and Design/Writer/Editor of USFK Strategic Digest (\*Jane Crichton, \*\*Lee Torres, \*\*\*Jerome L. Pionk, "The Region Today: Korea’s Strategic Environment", USFK Strategic Digest, 2009, June 25th 2010, p. 5, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Teddy

When measured in terms of Gross Domestic Product, Northeast Asia now possesses five of the world’s 20 largest economies. China maintains the world’s 2nd largest economy, Japan the 3rd, Russia 9th, and the Republic of Korea the 13th. As an indicator of how much the region has grown, Northeast Asia now accounts for 24 percent of all global trade, up from less than three percent fifty years ago. To facilitate this economic growth, **regional stability is imperative** for the interests of the U.S. and its allies in the region. It is an enabler of continued economic prosperity, increased democracy, observance of human rights, and supports socio-political values that complement the societies of the United States and its allies. The USFK mission and priorities support the achievement of national security principles by focusing on strengthening the Alliance and ensuring regional peace and stability. The USFK mission is to support the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command in defending the Republic of Korea against external aggression and to maintain peace and stability in East Asia. The command’s three priorities are to be prepared to fight and win; to strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance; and improve the quality of life for Servicemembers, Department of Defense civilians, and families. The priorities are interdependent and support one another. For example, strengthening the alliance through joint exercises and cultural events ensures the Alliance is more prepared to fight and win in defense of the ROK. The United States military strategy for Northeast Asia is based on the maintenance of mutual defense and security treaties with the Republic of Korea and Japan, as well as its forward military presence in the region to serve American commitments to those allies. Within that framework, **the ROK-U.S. Alliance is a critical component to regional stability that enables regional prosperity.** Northeast Asia will remain one of the world’s most important regions for the foreseeable future and the ROK-U.S. Alliance will remain a lynchpin in ensuring it remains peaceful and prosperous.

**US presence key to economic growth**

**Crichton et. al, 09** – \*Col of the U.S. Army, \*\*Col of the U.S. Army and Commander's Initiative Group, \*\*\*Major of U.S. Army, Creative Director/Layout and Design/Writer/Editor of USFK Strategic Digest (\*Jane Crichton, \*\*Lee Torres, \*\*\*Jerome L. Pionk, "The Region Today: Korea’s Strategic Environment", USFK Strategic Digest, 2009, June 25th 2010, p. 4-5, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Teddy

However, Northeast Asia also stands today as one of the world’s most prosperous regions. It has transformed from a war-ravaged corner of the world to being home to some of the world’s largest economies, while enjoying dramatic economic growth during a half century of unparalleled stability. Other than the failed economic policies of North Korea, each Northeast Asian country has prospered under a stable environment to which the United States has contributed in no small way with its commitment to security and free market economies. This prosperity has dramatically changed each regional country’s formula for determining national interests, thus creating a unique and dynamic strategic environment.

**Security alliance key to economic growth**

**Crichton et. al, 09** – \*Col of the U.S. Army, \*\*Col of the U.S. Army and Commander's Initiative Group, \*\*\*Major of U.S. Army, Creative Director/Layout and Design/Writer/Editor of USFK Strategic Digest (\*Jane Crichton, \*\*Lee Torres, \*\*\*Jerome L. Pionk, "Future of the Alliance", USFK Strategic Digest, 2009, June 25th 2010, p. 21, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Teddy

The ROK-U.S. Alliance remains the key stabilizing force in the region, helping to facilitate economic growth while providing the secure and peaceful environment conducive to steady economic expansion across the region. The U.S. partnership with the Republic of Korea will continue to evolve to ensure the Alliance is poised to remain the vanguard for peace and stability well into the future.

# Links

**Our links are empirically true – lack of security hurts the South Korean economy**

**Eberstadt et. al, 07** – \*Ph.D. in Political Economy and Government from Harvard, Political economist, Senior Adviser to the National Board of Asian Research, \*\*President of The National Bureau of Asian Research -- Policy Think Tank, \*\*\*Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, \*\*\*\*Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, \*\*\*\*\*Senior Vice President for Political and Security Affairs at The National Bureau of Asian Research -- Policy Think Tank, \*\*\*\*\*\*Senior Project Director and Director of the Pyle Center for Northeast Asian Studies at the National Bureau of Asian Research -- Policy Think Tank (\*Nicholas, \*\*Richard J., \*\*\*Aaron L., \*\*\*\*Christopher, \*\*\*\*\*Roy D., \*\*\*\*\*\*Travis, "A World without the U.S.‑ROK Alliance: Thinking about 'Alternative Futures'", National Bureau of Asian Research, September 11th 2007, June 24th 2010, p. 21, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Teddy

The contours of any discussion regarding the impact of post-alliance defense expenditures on South Korea’s economy naturally follow the assumptions that participants hold about post-alliance security requirements. The conclusions described in the preceding section informed this debate, and indicate that meeting the need to respond to North Korea’s military capabilities in the absence of an alliance **would likely be a significant burden on the South Korean economy.** Possible regional competition could also significantly impact South Korea’s future defense spending in the absence of an alliance with the United States, as the weapons systems required for competition with such powers as China, Russia, or Japan are even more expensive than many of those required by the North Korean threat. Historical experience from the 1970s provides an example of how a rupture in U.S.-ROK relations might affect Seoul’s defense spending in a post-alliance environment. In that decade, the GDP share of South Korea’s defense expenditures rose from 4% to 6% over the course of the decade and President Park Chung-hee imposed a “national defense tax.” In addition, the Park government’s push for defense self-sufficiency ushered in a “heavy and chemical industry” drive that proved immensely costly for the ROK in terms of economic distortions and lingering dirigiste policy inclinations. To be sure, circumstances are different today: the ROK is far more productive than it was in the early 1970s, and some of the economic policy mistakes of the past have been thoroughly aired in both policy circles and popular discussion. But other differences with the past do not necessarily increase freedom of maneuver by comparison with the earlier ROK political economy. Would the South Korean public today accept the potentially huge financial burden of a self-reliant defense establishment in the face of rising social expenditures and a less favorable demographic structure? That question once again raises the prospect that a post-alliance South Korea might look to nuclear weaponry as a cost-effective means of bolstering the country’s defensive capabilities.

**Withdrawal from Korea hurts investor confidence**

**Eberstadt, et. al, 07** -- \*Ph.D. in Political Economy and Government from Harvard, Political economist, Senior Adviser to the National Board of Asian Research, \*\*Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, \*\*\*Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (\*Nicholas, \*\*Aaron L., \*\*\*Christopher, "Toward an America-Free Korea", American enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, October 6th 2007, June 24th 2010, http://www.aei.org/article/26924, KONTOPOULOS) Teddy

Dramatically higher defense expenditures would in the first place put a substantial additional burden on Seoul's national budget. More generally, South Korea's economic prospects would also likely suffer in a post alliance world. In the longer run, international (and domestic) investors would almost surely lose confidence in the country without the assurance the alliance provides against a recurrence of hostilities on the peninsula.

# links—defense spending

**The plan causes increased South Korean defense spending**

**LEE AND MOON 2010** (Chung In Moon, professor of political science at Yonsei University; Sangkeun Lee, Ph. D. candidate specializing in North Korean politics at Department of Political Science, Yonsei University, Asia-Pacific Journal, Feb 13, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Chung\_in-Moon/3333)

Alliance effects also appear to have profound impacts on defense spending.38 When there was a strong U.S. security commitment, South Korea’s defense spending was minimal. But when the United States showed signs of disengagement or waning security commitment, South Korea proceeded to increase its defense spending. For example, the reduction of American forces in South Korea through the withdrawal of its 7th infantry division in 1971 prompted the Park government to increase rapidly its defense budget in the early 1970s. The phenomenal rise in defense spending from 1976 to 1979 can also be explained by alliance effects, as South Korea allocated six percent of its GNP in compliance with American demands of defense burden-sharing. The unexpected rise in defense spending during the progressive Roh Moo-hyun government was also closely related to alliance effects. Roh’s efforts to seek greater military independence from the U.S. led to an increase in military spending. Conversely, the conservative Lee government’s decision to reduce the defense budget is known to have been predicated on the restoration of strong alliance ties with the United States. Thus, the alliance factor has proven central to the patterns of defense spending in South Korea.

**Only the plan will cause significantly increased ROK defense spending**

**BANDOW 2004**

Doug, senior fellow at Cato, The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea, p. 4)

The ROK’s military lags in quantity of soldiers and materiel, but only because Seoul has chosen to rely on the U.S. military tripwire (the troop presence that guarantees U.S. involvement in any war on the peninsula) rather than build up its own forces. South Korean military deficiencies could be made up virtually at will, should Seoul decide to invest the necessary resources. But it will do so only if it must do so. And that will be the case only if Washington drops its unnecessary and unnatural defense subsidy of the South.

**South Korea will prioritize economic development over defense spending as long as US troops remain**

**BANDOW 2003**

(Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author of Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World and co-author of The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea, “Cutting the Tripwire: It's time to get out of Korea,” Reason Magazine, July 2003, http://reason.com/archives/2003/07/01/cutting-the-tripwire/1)

To the extent that the South's military lags behind its antagonist's, that is a matter of choice, not necessity. Nothing prevents Seoul from building a larger force. Rather, the American tripwire discourages it from doing so. As the South acknowledges in its own defense reports, it chose to focus on economic development at the expense of military strength -- a plan it can follow securely as long as America protects it.

# Immediate Withdrawal Link

**Immediate withdrawal crushes investor confidence**

**Eberstadt et. al, 07** -- \*Ph.D. in Political Economy and Government from Harvard, Political economist, Senior Adviser to the National Board of Asian Research, \*\*President of The National Bureau of Asian Research -- Policy Think Tank, \*\*\*Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, \*\*\*\*Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, \*\*\*\*\*Senior Vice President for Political and Security Affairs at The National Bureau of Asian Research -- Policy Think Tank, \*\*\*\*\*\*Senior Project Director and Director of the Pyle Center for Northeast Asian Studies at the National Bureau of Asian Research -- Policy Think Tank (\*Nicholas, \*\*Richard J., \*\*\*Aaron L., \*\*\*\*Christopher, \*\*\*\*\*Roy D., \*\*\*\*\*\*Travis, "A World without the U.S.‑ROK Alliance: Thinking about 'Alternative Futures'", National Bureau of Asian Research, September 11th 2007, June 24th 2010, p. 22, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Teddy

The specific nature of any U.S.-ROK breakup would naturally have a significant impact on investor confidence in a post-alliance South Korea. An acrimonious, relatively quick breakup would force investors to respond quickly to unpredictable developments, raising the possibility that they would not have sufficient time to anticipate changes. International panics, domestic capital flight, or other “contagion” effects would be possible consequences. If the alliance split over a relatively prolonged, predictable period that minimized uncertainty, however, some participants felt that investor confidence might not elicit major macro-economic responses for the ROK or the Northeast Asian region.

# us key

**US strategic decisions are the key factor in South Korean military spending—it’s not tied to North Korean threats**

**FEFFER 2009** (John, Co-Director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, “Ploughshares into Swords: Economic Implications of South Korean Military Spending,” February, http://www.keia.org/Publications/AcademicPaperSeries/2009/APS-Feffer.pdf)

But neither North Korea’s declining capabilities under the two Kims, nor rapprochement under Roh, nor more aggressive rhetoric under Lee appear to have had the direct effect on the levels of South Korean military spending that one might expect from the Cold War dynamic on the Korean peninsula. South Korean spending went up in the fi rst two cases—and most dramatically at precisely the time of greatest rapprochement—and moderated in the last case. To understand the dynamics of South Korean military spending, we must look to other external factors. Chief among these has been the United States. Signifi cant spikes in South Korean military spending have occurred three times in South Korean history, each one corresponding with perceived or actual changes in U.S. defense posture in the region. The fi rst, Park Chung-hee’s emphasis on a self-reliant defense, came in the wake of U.S. troop reductions pushed through by President Richard M. Nixon in the early 1970s.28 The second came at the end of the 1980s when Roh Tae-woo used similar language—the “Koreanization of Korean defense”—in response to U.S. military transformation at the end of the Cold War.29 Finally, the efforts by Kim Dae-jung and particularly Roh Moo-hyun have represented a third wave in Korean military spending, again a modernization effort in response to U.S. global force transformation.

# spending internal link

**South Korea will practice fiscal discipline now—increased spending will wreck the economy**

**KOREA TIMES 5-24-2010**

(“Fiscal Deficit Snowballing,” http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2010/05/123\_66428.html)

The country's fiscal deficit is snowballing at an alarming pace and economists warn that it is time for the country to strengthen control on budgetary spending. According to the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, the country's fiscal balance excluding the social security fund marked a 19.5 trillion won deficit as of March, up 7 trillion won compared to the previous month. In January, the balance marked a 460 billion won surplus. The ministry explained that the deficit was due to a delay in the budget approval by the National Assembly. It added that it would have no problem lowering this year's deficit to its target of 30.1 trillion won. However, economists are raising concern that the country should heed its fiscal health and learn a lesson from southern European countries currently going through a fiscal crisis. According to the Hyundai Economic Research Institute, the country's fiscal deficit marked 43.2 trillion won last year, and government debt reached 359.6 trillion won, or 34 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). It is even more serious when including the debt of state run enterprises which amounts to 211.7 trillion won. The government has used state run enterprises to engage in various economic stimulus programs such as infrastructure construction, but has neglected their ballooning debt as it isn't included in the fiscal balance. The deficit was bound to increase, with President Lee Myung-bak administration's tax cut policy coupled with huge spending to stimulate the economy amid the global financial crisis. Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI) said the government should learn a lesson from Greece, and overhaul fiscal policies, including cutting spending. "The crisis in southern Europe is stressing the importance of fiscal soundness," the institute said in a report. "The government is targeting a balance in 2014, and it should make sure that the aim is achieved," the report added. It advised the government to expand tax sources, and strengthen management of budget spending. Hyundai Economic Research Institute advised the government to consider various measures to increase tax sources, which include introducing a green tax or raising taxes on cigarettes. It also advised the government to consider privatizing state run businesses. "When considering the deficit that grew while overcoming the economic crisis and the possible risks following the general aging of society, it is crucial to restore fiscal soundness as soon as possible," said Won Yun-hi, president of the Korea Institute of Public Finance.

# deterrence/spending link doublebind

**The plan either causes massive defense spending or makes South Korea defenseless against North Korean attack or collapse**

**FORGACH 2009**

(Leslie Forgach is a research assistant at the American Enterprise Institute, “Let’s not get ahead of ourselves in South Korea,” Oct 23, http://www.defensestudies.org/?p=897)

A premature transition could have severe consequences for the Korean Peninsula, however. Dismantling the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command and transferring operational control to South Korea, means that during wartime, South Korean and U.S. forces will fight under separate, independent commands. Bruce Bechtol from the U.S. Marines Corps Command & Staff College argues that in order for the South Koreans to be prepared for force-on-force combat with the North, or a North Korean collapse, South Korea “must be able to actually either pay for the additional capabilities needed or ensure that a strong alliance exists with the United States, which can supplement the gaps until fiscal or military readiness challenges, or both, are met.” But South Korea lacks adequate missile defenses, command and control systems, and major logistic support such as airlift capabilities — all of which would be essential to countering the variety of threats emanating from North Korea, including the country’s elite special operations forces. And with the possibility of a North Korean collapse becoming more real every day, contingency operations would be far more difficult if conducted under separate commands. It is certainly unlikely that South Korea can supplement the gaps left by the U.S. in just under three years without dramatically increasing its defense spending.

# A2: Link Turns

**No link turns – best case scenarios don't benefit the economy**

**Eberstadt et. al, 07** – \*Ph.D. in Political Economy and Government from Harvard, Political economist, Senior Adviser to the National Board of Asian Research, \*\*President of The National Bureau of Asian Research -- Policy Think Tank, \*\*\*Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, \*\*\*\*Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, \*\*\*\*\*Senior Vice President for Political and Security Affairs at The National Bureau of Asian Research -- Policy Think Tank, \*\*\*\*\*\*Senior Project Director and Director of the Pyle Center for Northeast Asian Studies at the National Bureau of Asian Research -- Policy Think Tank (\*Nicholas, \*\*Richard J., \*\*\*Aaron L., \*\*\*\*Christopher, \*\*\*\*\*Roy D., \*\*\*\*\*\*Travis, "A World without the U.S.‑ROK Alliance: Thinking about 'Alternative Futures'", National Bureau of Asian Research, September 11th 2007, June 24th 2010, p. 20, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Teddy

Although some participants strenuously maintained that South Korea could surely “cope” with the economic consequences of an end to the alliance with Washington, such protestations rather missed the point of the exercise. All governments cope by definition. For an alternative futures analysis focused upon strategy and international security, the more pertinent issues were whether a termination of the U.S.-ROK alliance would speed or slow growth in South Korea (and by how much) and whether the end of the alliance with the United States would affect South Korea’s relative pace of economic growth as compared to other actors in the region. This introductory and exploratory session did not offer any quantitative estimates, but it is noteworthy that **none of the participants suggested that terminating the alliance would either benefit the South Korean economy or aid the ROK in growth** relative to the rest of the Northeast Asian region. Conferees did, however, identify a number of possible costs and obstacles.

**No risk of a link turn—South Korea won’t decrease military spending**

**FEFFER 2009** (John, Co-Director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, “Ploughshares into Swords: Economic Implications of South Korean Military Spending,” February, http://www.keia.org/Publications/AcademicPaperSeries/2009/APS-Feffer.pdf)

As a result of the global economic crisis, government budgets around the world are shrinking. In Northeast Asia, however, the military portions of the governments seem to be shrink-proof. “Japan, Taiwan and South Korea could resist major cuts in defense spending in the short term due to commitments to ‘recapitalizing their militaries,’” according to Richard Bitzinger.77 China, too, is better positioned to maintain the pace of its military spending because it, alone among industrial powers, is still anticipating signifi cant, though reduced, growth next year.78

# a2: spending good—econ

**Even if military spending can stimulate the economy, it has a net negative effect due to opportunity costs and trade complications**

**FEFFER 2009** (John, Co-Director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, “Ploughshares into Swords: Economic Implications of South Korean Military Spending,” February, http://www.keia.org/Publications/AcademicPaperSeries/2009/APS-Feffer.pdf)

The evidence, however, that government investments in the military—at a time of plenty or paucity—are the best growth stimulus is quite weak. Military investments produce jobs, generate some spin-off technologies, and take advantage of some spin-on developments. But other government investments contribute more to economic growth. Localization, meanwhile, does not make strict economic sense, given the opportunity costs, although establishing indigenous production for certain capacities, particularly in the software fi eld, is reasonable.82 Arms exports, although they reduce the costs of localization through economies of scale and boosting the operating capacity of defense sector manufacturing, put South Korea in a diffi cult position of muscling into a highly competitive fi eld. Arms exports often come with strings – such as reciprocal purchases. Moreover given the arms race dynamic in the region—and spending has taken place at a faster clip now than 15 years ago (Table 3)—government investments even into potentially lucrative arms export sectors can be counterproductive. And armaments, as the United States discovered with al Qaeda, have a tricky habit of ending up in the hands of those against whom increased military budgets are intended to protect.

# a2: spending good—influence

**Soft power is net more effective for South Korea—military buildups will only cause arms races**

**FEFFER 2009**

(John, Co-Director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, “Ploughshares into Swords: Economic Implications of South Korean Military Spending,” February, http://www.keia.org/Publications/AcademicPaperSeries/2009/APS-Feffer.pdf)

If the economic arguments for increasing military spending are either weak, counterproductive, or irrelevant, why should South Korea continue with Defense Reform 2020, particularly at a time of global economic crisis? Countering North Korea doesn’t require such an upgrade. Replacing U.S. capabilities is sensible—if indeed the United States plans to pull out—but only defers the question: what are all the new weapons for? South Korea cannot compete with Japan, China, or Russia militarily—certain aspirations to superpower status notwithstanding—and its own modernization plans may only encourage greater spending among its neighbors. From the perspective of comparative advantage, then, South Korea should focus on its “soft power,” which has garnered accolades from both within and outside the country.85 And it should focus government investments not on the military but on the “green” stimulus that Lee Myung-bak has launched. South Korean diplomacy and green technology: such smart power makes more economic— and geopolitical—sense than preparing to fi ght last century’s wars or helping to create the future insecurity that Defense Reform 2020 was meant to address.

# a2: won’t take the risk

**South Korea will ignore the cost of defense increases even if they hurt the economy**

**FEFFER 2009**

(John, Co-Director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, “Ploughshares into Swords: Economic Implications of South Korean Military Spending,” February, http://www.keia.org/Publications/AcademicPaperSeries/2009/APS-Feffer.pdf)

Ultimately, however, these arguments based on economic rationales are irrelevant. The Korean government has ignored economic feasibility in the past when allocating money to the military. The push for localization has more to do with nationalism than economic necessity (and echoes North Korea’s vain efforts to achieve food self-suffi ciency). Many of the specifi cally economic arguments—such as the necessity of devoting a certain percentage of the GDP to the military—are arbitrary.83 Government subsidies of the military, as evidenced by the “national security exception” in free trade agreements, lie outside the realm of so-called economic laws.84

# Impact – Free Trade and Environment

South Korean economic recovery is key to its soft power—that’s key to global free trade and environmental protection

NEWSWEEK 1-29-2010

(“Selling South Korea,” http://www.newsweek.com/2010/01/28/selling-south-korea.html)

For the first time in modern history, South Korea is laying claim to lead the club of rich nations. South Korea became the first member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development—the group of 30 wealthy nations—to emerge from the global recession when it recorded 0.4 percent growth in the third quarter of last year. This year the OECD expects South Korea's GDP to expand by 4.4 percent, the highest growth rate of any of its members. Teddy

Now President Lee Myung-bak wants to turn the end of the economic crisis into an opportunity. He knows the crash has accelerated the decline of American might, as well as the rise of China and other emerging powers, and he aims to exploit the gap between them. His goal is to transform South Korea from a successful but self-involved economic power into a respected global soft power with the clout to mediate between rich and poor nations on global issues such as climate change and financial regulation. In particular, Lee is pushing to revive momentum on a global free-trade deal—stalled in large part due to hostility from poor nations—while defending the poor by pushing for more international supervision of the global financial system. At the same time, he is trying to establish South Korea as a leader in the fight against global warming by agreeing that the country will cut emissions by 30 percent by 2020—one of the most aggressive targets in the world—even though it is not obligated to do so because it is still considered a developing nation under the Kyoto Protocol. To many in South Korea, the selection of Seoul as the site of the November 2010 summit of the G20—the group of 20 leading economic powers—is an acknowledgment of how well it has managed the current economic and environmental crises. "The old order is being dismantled and replaced by the new order," Lee said from the Blue House in a televised New Year's speech. "We have to make our vision the world's vision."

Lee is one of only two former CEOs to lead a major trading power—Italy's Silvio Berlusconi is the other—and he runs South Korea like the just-do-it boss he was at Hyundai, where staff called him "the Bulldozer." At Hyundai he led a company known for fearless forays into foreign markets, whether it was building huge bridges in Malaysia or selling cars with stunning success in the crowded U.S. market. Now he is trying to make South Korean culture—still on the defensive after a long history of colonial occupations—as cosmopolitan as Hyundai's culture. He's pushing for greater use of English and generally trying to open up South Korea to the world. In his first big political job, as mayor of Seoul, he created a huge ruckus when he ripped up the downtown to expose a boarded-up stream—but it is now a major draw for commerce and tourism. Lee's grand domestic ambition as president is a multibillion-dollar plan to refurbish South Korea's four major rivers despite protests from environmentalists and opposition members. Lee believes the project will boost local economies by creating jobs and promoting tourism and commerce. Lee's popularity ratings, after an early plummet driven by a decision to allow U.S. imports of beef, are now at more than 50 percent as voters warm to his vision of newly developed South Korea as a model nation to be emulated by many developing countries.

South Korea's successful management of the economic crisis surely helps. Early on, the country was battered like the rest of the world. The South Korean won dropped 30 percent in the first three months of the crisis, the stock market dropped by half, and foreign investors left in droves. But unlike most other rich nations, South Korea had recent experience with a major financial meltdown. Many of its current leaders are veterans of the Asian crisis that crippled the country's economy in 1998, and they knew how to manage a free fall. Lee's team immediately moved to save threatened banks and companies by setting up $200 billion in various funds to guarantee payment of their debts and for other forms of emergency aid. They struck currency-swap deals with major economies such as the U.S. to secure dwindling reserves of foreign currency and front-loaded public spending so that 65 percent of the country's $250 billion budget was spent during the first half of 2009, ensuring that the money got into the economy rapidly—but without adding new debts. A government focus on protecting jobs kept consumer sentiment relatively high, and the Bank of Korea cut interest rates by 3.25 percentage points to 2 percent, a historic low.

All the while, Lee worked relentlessly to quiet calls for protectionism at home and abroad, at a time when many other leaders, including Barack Obama and Hu Jintao, were beginning to succumb. Lee's administration is pushing for a slew of free-trade agreements with the U.S., the European Union, Peru, Colombia, Canada, Australia, and even China and Japan, if possible, says Abraham Kim, a Korea analyst at the political-risk consultancy Eurasia Group. Lee also lobbied hard at the Pittsburgh meeting of the G20 last year to have Seoul selected as the site of the next summit this autumn, an event he hopes to organize as a coming-out party. "He is trying to use the crisis to enhance the reputation of South Korea and help it to be widely recognized as a developed-world state," says Kim. "This is partly a nationalism thing, but more importantly, they are trying to get out from under Japan's and China's shadow. South Korea needs to find its niche for its long-term competitive survival."

## Free trade solves nuclear war

## Copley News Service, 99 (December 1) Teddy

For decades, many children in America and other countries went to bed fearing annihilation by nuclear war. The specter of nuclear winter freezing the life out of planet Earth seemed very real. Activists protesting the World Trade Organization's meeting in Seattle apparently have forgotten that threat. The truth is that nations join together in groups like the WTO not just to further their own prosperity, but also to forestall conflict with other nations. In a way, our planet has traded in the threat of a worldwide nuclear war for the benefit of cooperative global economics. Some Seattle protesters clearly fancy themselves to be in the mold of nuclear disarmament or anti-Vietnam War protesters of decades past. But they're not. They're special-interest activists, whether the cause is environmental, labor or paranoia about global government. Actually, most of the demonstrators in Seattle are very much unlike yesterday's peace activists, such as Beatle John Lennon or philosopher Bertrand Russell, the father of the nuclear disarmament movement, both of whom urged people and nations to work together rather than strive against each other. These and other war protesters would probably approve of 135 WTO nations sitting down peacefully to discuss economic issues that in the past might have been settled by bullets and bombs. As long as nations are trading peacefully, and their economies are built on exports to other countries, they have a major disincentive to wage war. That's why bringing China, a budding superpower, into the WTO is so important. As exports to the United States and the rest of the world feed Chinese prosperity, and that prosperity increases demand for the goods we produce, the threat of hostility diminishes. Many anti-trade protesters in Seattle claim that only multinational corporations benefit from global trade, and that it's the everyday wage earners who get hurt. That's just plain wrong. First of all, it's not the military-industrial complex benefiting. It's U.S. companies that make high-tech goods. And those companies provide a growing number of jobs for Americans. In San Diego, many people have good jobs at Qualcomm, Solar Turbines and other companies for whom overseas markets are essential. In Seattle, many of the 100,000 people who work at Boeing would lose their livelihoods without world trade. Foreign trade today accounts for 30 percent of our gross domestic product. That's a lot of jobs for everyday workers. Growing global prosperity has helped counter the specter of nuclear winter. Nations of the world are learning to live and work together, like the singers of anti-war songs once imagined. Those who care about world peace shouldn't be protesting world trade. They should be celebrating it.

## Environmental destruction causes extinction

## Coyne and Hoekstra, 07 – \*Professor in the Department of Ecology and Evolution at the University of Chicago AND \*\* Associate Professor in the Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology at Harvard University (\*Jerry and \*Hopi, “The Greatest Dying”, The New Republic, September 24th 2007, June 26th 2010, <http://www.truthout.org/article/jerry-coyne-and-hopi-e-hoekstra-the-greatestdying>, KONTOPOULOS)

Every year, up to 30,000 species disappear due to human activity alone. At this rate, we could lose half of Earth's species in this century. And, unlike with previous extinctions, there's no hope that biodiversity will ever recover, since the cause of the decimation - us - is here to stay. To scientists, this is an unparalleled calamity, far more severe than global warming, which is, after all, only one of many threats to biodiversity. Yet global warming gets far more press. Why? One reason is that, while the increase in temperature is easy to document, the decrease of species is not. Biologists don't know, for example, exactly how many species exist on Earth. Estimates range widely, from three million to more than 50 million, and that doesn't count microbes, critical (albeit invisible) components of ecosystems. We're not certain about the rate of extinction, either; how could we be, since the vast majority of species have yet to be described? We're even less sure how the loss of some species will affect the ecosystems in which they're embedded, since the intricate connection between organisms means that the loss of a single species can ramify unpredictably. But we do know some things. Tropical rainforests are disappearing at a rate of 2 percent per year. Populations of most large fish are down to only 10 percent of what they were in 1950. Many primates and all the great apes - our closest relatives - are nearly gone from the wild. And we know that extinction and global warming act synergistically. Extinction exacerbates global warming: By burning rainforests, we're not only polluting the atmosphere with carbon dioxide (a major greenhouse gas) but destroying the very plants that can remove this gas from the air. Conversely, global warming increases extinction, both directly (killing corals) and indirectly (destroying the habitats of Arctic and Antarctic animals). As extinction increases, then, so does global warming, which in turn causes more extinction - and so on, into a downward spiral of destruction. Why, exactly, should we care? Let's start with the most celebrated case: the rainforests. Their loss will worsen global warming - raising temperatures, melting icecaps, and flooding coastal cities. And, as the forest habitat shrinks, so begins the inevitable contact between organisms that have not evolved together, a scenario played out many times, and one that is never good. Dreadful diseases have successfully jumped species boundaries, with humans as prime recipients. We have gotten aids from apes, sars from civets, and Ebola from fruit bats. Additional worldwide plagues from unknown microbes are a very real possibility. But it isn't just the destruction of the rainforests that should trouble us. Healthy ecosystems the world over provide hidden services like waste disposal, nutrient cycling, soil formation, water purification, and oxygen production. Such services are best rendered by ecosystems that are diverse. Yet, through both intention and accident, humans have introduced exotic species that turn biodiversity into monoculture. Fast-growing zebra mussels, for example, have outcompeted more than 15 species of native mussels in North America's Great Lakes and have damaged harbors and water-treatment plants. Native prairies are becoming dominated by single species (often genetically homogenous) of corn or wheat. Thanks to these developments, soils will erode and become unproductive - which, along with temperature change, will diminish agricultural yields. Meanwhile, with increased pollution and runoff, as well as reduced forest cover, ecosystems will no longer be able to purify water; and a shortage of clean water spells disaster. In many ways, oceans are the most vulnerable areas of all. As overfishing eliminates major predators, while polluted and warming waters kill off phytoplankton, the intricate aquatic food web could collapse from both sides. Fish, on which so many humans depend, will be a fond memory. As phytoplankton vanish, so does the ability of the oceans to absorb carbon dioxide and produce oxygen. (Half of the oxygen we breathe is made by phytoplankton, with the rest coming from land plants.) Species extinction is also imperiling coral reefs - a major problem since these reefs have far more than recreational value: They provide tremendous amounts of food for human populations and buffer coastlines against erosion. In fact, the global value of "hidden" services provided by ecosystems - those services, like waste disposal, that aren't bought and sold in the marketplace - has been estimated to be as much as $50 trillion per year, roughly equal to the gross domestic product of all countries combined. And that doesn't include tangible goods like fish and timber. Life as we know it would be impossible if ecosystems collapsed. Yet that is where we're heading if species extinction continues at its current pace. Extinction also has a huge impact on medicine. Who really cares if, say, a worm in the remote swamps of French Guiana goes extinct? Well, those who suffer from cardiovascular disease. The recent discovery of a rare South American leech has led to the isolation of a powerful enzyme that, unlike other anticoagulants, not only prevents blood from clotting but also dissolves existing clots. And it's not just this one species of worm: Its wriggly relatives have evolved other biomedically valuable proteins, including antistatin (a potential anticancer agent), decorsin and ornatin (platelet aggregation inhibitors), and hirudin (another anticoagulant). Plants, too, are pharmaceutical gold mines. The bark of trees, for example, has given us quinine (the first cure for malaria), taxol (a drug highly effective against ovarian and breast cancer), and aspirin. More than a quarter of the medicines on our pharmacy shelves were originally derived from plants. The sap of the Madagascar periwinkle contains more than 70 useful alkaloids, including vincristine, a powerful anticancer drug that saved the life of one of our friends. Of the roughly 250,000 plant species on Earth, fewer than 5 percent have been screened for pharmaceutical properties. Who knows what life-saving drugs remain to be discovered? Given current extinction rates, it's estimated that we're losing one valuable drug every two years. Our arguments so far have tacitly assumed that species are worth saving only in proportion to their economic value and their effects on our quality of life, an attitude that is strongly ingrained, especially in Americans. That is why conservationists always base their case on an economic calculus. But we biologists know in our hearts that there are deeper and equally compelling reasons to worry about the loss of biodiversity: namely, simple morality and intellectual values that transcend pecuniary interests. What, for example, gives us the right to destroy other creatures? And what could be more thrilling than looking around us, seeing that we are surrounded by our evolutionary cousins, and realizing that we all got here by the same simple process of natural selection? To biologists, and potentially everyone else, apprehending the genetic kinship and common origin of all species is a spiritual experience - not necessarily religious, but spiritual nonetheless, for it stirs the soul. But, whether or not one is moved by such concerns, it is certain that our future is bleak if we do nothing to stem this sixth extinction. We are creating a world in which exotic diseases flourish but natural medicinal cures are lost; a world in which carbon waste accumulates while food sources dwindle; a world of sweltering heat, failing crops, and impure water. In the end, we must accept the possibility that we ourselves are not immune to extinction. Or, if we survive, perhaps only a few of us will remain, scratching out a grubby existence on a devastated planet. Global warming will seem like a secondary problem when humanity finally faces the consequences of what we have done to nature: not just another Great Dying, but perhaps the greatest dying of them all.

# china influence impact

**Chinese influence causes US-China war**

## Layne and Thayer, 07 – \*Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and \*\*Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (\*Christopher and \*\*Bradley A., "American Empire: A Debate", Google Books, p. 75, 2007, June 25th 2010, KONTOPOULOS)

## So what should the United States do about China? If the United States per­sists with its strategy of primacy, the odds of a Sino-American conflict are high. Current American strategy commits the United States to maintaining the geopolitical status quo in East Asia, a status quo that reflects American primacy. The United States' desire to preserve the status quo, however, clashes with the ambitions of a rising China. As a rising great power, China has its own ideas about how East Asia's political and security order should be orga­nized. Unless U.S. and Chinese interests can be accommodated, the potential for future tension—or worse—exists. Moreover, as I already have demon­strated, the very fact of American primacy is bound to produce a geopolitical backlash—with China in the vanguard—in the form of counter-hegemonic balancing. Nevertheless, the United States cannot be completely indifferent to China's rise.

## Extinction

## Straits Times, 00 (Ching Cheong, Straits times, July 25 2000, l/n)

The high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation.

\*\*\*BIODIVERSITY DISAD

# biodiversity 1nc

**US troop withdrawal would build Chinese support for Korean unification—this is the only possible scenario**

**VAN NGUYEN 2009** (Peter Van Nguyen is a freelance writer based in Sydney, Australia. His articles have been published in OpEdnews, Asia Times Online and Foreign Policy JournalUPI Asia 2009 “U.S. bases are obstacle to Korean reunification,” Oct 13, http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2009/10/13/us\_bases\_are\_obstacle\_to\_korean\_reunification/1193/)

The United States and South Korea recently agreed on a contingency plan in case the North Korean government collapses. The plan includes joint military operations to control the influx of refugees and to secure the North’s nuclear weapons. It also outlines the reunification of the two Koreas under a liberal and democratic leadership, with the cooperation of China. The United States believes that if the North collapsed, China would have to back reunification to demonstrate that it is a responsible player in regional cooperation. But in order to get the Chinese to endorse the plan, the United States would have to give up its strategic military bases in South Korea and order a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region. Both Koreas have been constantly eyed by foreigners due to their geostrategic value in Northeast Asia. For China, Japan and the United States, the Koreas have provided a buffer zone for more than half a century since the end of the Korean War. The Korean peninsula is also seen as a predetermined battlefield if war breaks out between China, the United States and Japan. This would leave the warring states relatively untouched, as the three nations could avoid hitting each other’s territories, which would escalate the conflict and make it difficult for all parties to disengage for fear of losing face. But both Koreas would have to face the brunt of a full-scale war. For China, protecting North Korea means keeping the United States and its allies from encroaching on its border. China would rather maintain the status quo than accept a reunified Korea under South Korean administration. Therefore, China will do its best to stabilize North Korea and rebuild its political structure in line with Chinese interests. China might be forced to accept a reunified Korea if it wants to maintain an international image as a peace-promoting country. However, unless it gets some kind of security guarantee without losing the strategic balance in the region, there is little incentive for it to allow reunification to take place unchallenged. Since the end of the Korean War the United States has maintained a large military contingent in South Korea to deter an invasion attempt by the North. The U.S. military presence keeps China’s ambitions in check and in the bargain offers Japan some security, as the Japanese fear reprisals from the Chinese for atrocities committed during World War II. Besides, China’s growing economic and military clout has increased the necessity for a military presence in South Korea. However, U.S. military bases in South Korea could pose the greatest obstacle to a peaceful reunification of the Koreas. Even a unified Korea might not want the U.S. military, as reunification would make the objective of providing deterrence against the North redundant. A U.S. military base in a united Korea would only strain ties with China, as it would be difficult to explain why it was required if the North Korean threat no longer exists. Also, millions of North Koreans have a deeply embedded resentment against the United States and are highly suspicious of its geopolitical moves in the region. Many believe that the South Korean government is a puppet of the United States. Stationing troops in Korea after reunification would only reinforce this belief. This would create a deep rift within the Koreas and threaten to derail the reunification process. The complete withdrawal of all U.S. military bases and personnel from the Korean peninsula should follow after a timetable has been set, allowing the new Korea to handle its own security. The question is, will the United States pull out all its troops in order to allow the peaceful reunification of the Koreas? The United States has been dreading a scenario in which its military bases in South Korea could come under threat. The United States may not withdraw its troops, as that would leave a strategic vacuum. It would risk losing influence over Korea to China, whose economy is touted to race ahead of that of the United States. Although complete U.S. withdrawal would be ideal, an alternative would be to allow China to set up bases in the northern part of Korea, similar to Kyrgyzstan allowing Russia and China to set up bases to ease their concerns over the U.S. military presence. This would have its challenges, however, and might increase the chances of military confrontation. But regardless of the implications and consequences, the United States will hesitate to remove its bases. China would probably ask for a U.S. troop withdrawal as a precondition to the reunification of the two Korea’s under a liberal and democratic government.

# biodiversity 1nc

**That destroys biodiversity in the DMZ—it’s a key ecosystem**

**CNN 2003** (“Korea's DMZ: The thin green line,” August 25, http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/08/22/korea.bio.dmz/)

(CNN) -- From the fields of Normandy to the forests of Ardennes, battlefields around the globe have healed their wounds and nature has fought back. Nowhere is this more evident than in the heavily-fortified border zone between North and South Korea. The Demilitarized Zone, or DMZ as it is more popularly known is now one of the few untouched havens for Northeast Asia's wildlife. Some say the only threat to its survival is peace. "Scientists have done a pretty good job of studying biodiversity in South Korea since the 1950's and I am confident that there is no place like the DMZ on the peninsula," Ke Chung Kim of the DMZ Forum told CNN. The zone was established at the end of the three-year Korean War in 1953 and while intensive agriculture and industrialization has ravaged both the North and South since, tight security measures have left the environment in the DMZ largely undisturbed for the last 50 years. As a result, the ribbon of untouched land along the 38th parallel has now become an important refuge for two of the world's most endangered birds: the white-naped and the red-crowned crane. Other rare species include Asiatic black bears, Chinese gorhals and egrets. According to some accounts there may even be Korean tigers in the DMZ -- a sub-species of the Siberian tiger, one of the rarest tigers on the planet. In total more than 20,000 migratory fowl utilize the border area. They manage to avoid setting off land mines -- although nowadays some may be too old to be active. The 4-kilometer-wide by 250-kilometer long (2.5 miles by 155 miles) DMZ stretches across the entire width of the Korean Peninsula, encompassing a cross section of ecosystems and landscapes. The corridor follows the Military Demarcation Line established by the 1953 Armistice Agreement between the two Koreas -- which are still technically at war. After the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 the DMZ is the last remaining Cold War-style frontier on the planet, bristling with sensors, tank traps and automatic artillery. Up to two million soldiers guard the world's most heavily fortified border, whilst listening to the sound of crested shell ducks and swan geese. "The DMZ and its adjacent Civilian Control Zone are unique containing wetlands, forests, estuaries, mountains, coastal islands, riparian valleys and agricultural fields," says Hall Healy of Facilitated Solutions International, an organization that aids conservation groups working in the border area. Biodiversity and barbed wire In the event of a formalized peace breaking out between the two Koreas any biological reserve would compete with other proposals for the land, even though the South Korean government has said the DMZ is a priority ecosystem. While poverty alleviation would likely prevent North Korea from putting much weight on nature conservation in the DMZ, for its southern neighbor it would be the prospect of further economic development and integration with the North that would be a driving force for development. Yet pressure from the DMZ Forum, DMZ Vets and the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM) to declare the area a "biodiversity zone," has been growing. Since much of the natural Korean natural habitat has been degraded by industrialization, urbanization and agriculture, conservationists hope that the DMZ will be preserved for its beauty and significance. "South Korea's habitats have been exploited many times over and North Korea's environmental conditions are dismal at best," says Kim. "North Korean environmental demise is the result of persistent mismanagement of forests, military destruction, and poverty," he says. In the South, the picture is not much better. A 1994 biodiversity study revealed that almost 30 percent of the country's mammals, 48 percent of reptiles and 60 percent of amphibians are either extinct or endangered. The peninsula, which covers a combined area the size of Pennsylvania and New York State, already has a combined population of about 70 million, which could rise to 100 million by 2025. This is putting more pressure on the area to the north of Seoul and to the south of Pyongyang, the North Korean capital. The distance between the two cities is only 194 kilometers and every month, development creeps nearer to the demilitarized zone. "Similar flora and fauna may have existed in other locations before, but due to development, these locations are now highly fragmented and do not possess the diversity of species they once did," says Healy. Many conservationists see the DMZ as a ready-made nature reserve. It is already well defined and controlled by a body separate to both countries -- the Military Armistice Commission. Only the future will tell. At present the conservationists best bet is for the barbed wire to stay in place to keep the developers out and the wildlife intact.

# biodiversity 1nc

**Extinction**

**WATSON 2006** (Captain Paul, Founder and President of Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, dude on Whale Wars, Last Mod 9-17, http://www.eco-action.org/dt/beerswil.html)

The facts are clear. More plant and animal species will go through extinction within our generation than have been lost thorough natural causes over the past two hundred million years. Our single human generation, that is, all people born between 1930 and 2010 will witness the complete obliteration of one third to one half of all the Earth's life forms, each and every one of them the product of more than two billion years of evolution. This is biological meltdown, and what this really means is the end to vertebrate evolution on planet Earth. Nature is under siege on a global scale. Biotopes, i.e., environmentally distinct regions, from tropical and temperate rainforests to coral reefs and coastal estuaries, are disintegrating in the wake of human onslaught. The destruction of forests and the proliferation of human activity will remove more than 20 percent of all terrestrial plant species over the next fifty years. Because plants form the foundation for entire biotic communities, their demise will carry with it the extinction of an exponentially greater number of animal species -- perhaps ten times as many faunal species for each type of plant eliminated. Sixty-five million years ago, a natural cataclysmic event resulted in extinction of the dinosaurs. Even with a plant foundation intact, it took more than 100,000 years for faunal biological diversity to re-establish itself. More importantly, the resurrection of biological diversity assumes an intact zone of tropical forests to provide for new speciation after extinction. Today, the tropical rain forests are disappearing more rapidly than any other bio-region, ensuring that after the age of humans, the Earth will remain a biological, if not a literal desert for eons to come. The present course of civilization points to ecocide -- the death of nature. Like a run-a-way train, civilization is speeding along tracks of our own manufacture towards the stone wall of extinction. The human passengers sitting comfortably in their seats, laughing, partying, and choosing to not look out the window. Environmentalists are those perceptive few who have their faces pressed against the glass, watching the hurling bodies of plants and animals go screaming by. Environmental activists are those even fewer people who are trying desperately to break into the fortified engine of greed that propels this destructive specicidal juggernaut. Others are desperately throwing out anchors in an attempt to slow the monster down while all the while, the authorities, blind to their own impending destruction, are clubbing, shooting and jailing those who would save us all. SHORT MEMORIES Civilized humans have for ten thousand years been marching across the face of the Earth leaving deserts in their footprints. Because we have such short memories, we forgot the wonder and splendor of a virgin nature. We revise history and make it fit into our present perceptions. For instance, are you aware that only two thousand years ago, the coast of North Africa was a mighty forest? The Phoenicians and the Carthaginians built powerful ships from the strong timbers of the region. Rome was a major exporter of timber to Europe. The temple of Jerusalem was built with titanic cedar logs, one image of which adorns the flag of Lebanon today. Jesus Christ did not live in a desert, he was a man of the forest. The Sumerians were renowned for clearing the forests of Mesopotamia for agriculture. But the destruction of the coastal swath of the North African forest stopped the rain from advancing into the interior. Without the rain, the trees died and thus was born the mighty Sahara, sired by man and continued to grow southward at a rate of ten miles per year, advancing down the length of the continent of Africa. And so will go Brazil. The precipitation off the Atlantic strikes the coastal rain forest and is absorbed and sent skyward again by the trees, falling further into the interior. Twelve times the moisture falls and twelve times it is returned to the sky -- all the way to the Andes mountains. Destroy the coastal swath and desertify Amazonia -- it is as simple as that. Create a swath anywhere between the coast and the mountains and the rains will be stopped. We did it before while relatively primitive. We learned nothing. We forgot. So too, have we forgotten that walrus once mated and bred along the coast of Nova Scotia, that sixty million bison once roamed the North American plains. One hundred years ago, the white bear once roamed the forests of New England and the Canadian Maritime provinces. Now it is called the polar bear because that is where it now makes its last stand. EXTINCTION IS DIFFICULT TO APPRECIATE Gone forever are the European elephant, lion and tiger. The Labrador duck, gint auk, Carolina parakeet will never again grace this planet of ours. Lost for all time are the Atlantic grey whales, the Biscayan right whales and the Stellar sea cow. Our children will never look upon the California condor in the wild or watch the Palos Verde blue butterfly dart from flower to flower. Extinction is a difficult concept to fully appreciate. What has been is no more and never shall be again. It would take another creation and billions of years to recreate the passenger pigeon. It is the loss of billions of years of evolutionary programming. It is the destruction of beauty, the obliteration of truth, the removal of uniqueness, the scarring of the sacred web of life To be responsible for an extinction is to commit blasphemy against the divine. It is the greatest of all possible crimes, more evil than murder, more appalling than genocide, more monstrous than even the apparent unlimited perversities of the human mind. To be responsible for the complete and utter destruction of a unique and sacred life form is arrogance that seethes with evil, for the very opposite of evil is live. It is no accident that these two words spell out each other in reverse. And yet, a reporter in California recently told me that "all the redwoods in California are not worth the life on one human being." What incredible arrogance. The rights a species, any species, must take precedence over the life of an individual or another species. This is a basic ecological law. It is not to be tampered with by primates who have molded themselves into divine legends in their own mind. For each and every one of the thirty million plus species that grace this beautiful planet are essential for the continued well-being of which we are all a part, the planet Earth -- the divine entity which brought us forth from the fertility of her sacred womb. As a sea-captain I like to compare the structural integrity of the biosphere to that of a ship's hull. Each species is a rivet that keeps the hull intact. If I were to go into my engine room and find my engineers busily popping rivets from the hull, I would be upset and naturally I would ask them what they were doing. If they told me that they discovered that they could make a dollar each from the rivets, I could do one of three things. I could ignore them. I could ask them to cut me in for a share of the profits, or I could kick their asses out of the engine room and off my ship. If I was a responsible captain, I would do the latter. If I did not, I would soon find the ocean pouring through the holes left by the stolen rivets and very shortly after, my ship, my crew and myself would disappear beneath the waves. And that is the state of the world today. The political leaders, i.e., the captains at the helms of their nation states, are ignoring the rivet poppers or they are cutting themselves in for the profits. There are very few asses being kicked out of the engine room of spaceship Earth. With the rivet poppers in command, it will not be long until the biospheric integrity of the Earth collapses under the weight of ecological strain and tides of death come pouring in. And that will be the price of progress -- ecological collapse, the death of nature, and with it the horrendous and mind numbing specter of massive human destruction.

# Reunification Uniquness

**Reunification won’t happen anytime soon**

**LIM 2010** (John, writer for the Georgetown Federalist, “Breaking Open the Berlin Wall of the Korean Peninsula,” Feb 25, <http://www.thegeorgetownfederalist.com/content/breaking-open-berlin-wall-korean-peninsula>)

The political stability of the Korean Peninsula is of particular importance to me. As my family is from Korea, the last thing I would want is for the North Korean communists to run over my grandparents’ orchard in South Korea. Since President Harry Truman forbade General Douglas McArthur from reunifying the Korean people, the conflict has been locked in a stalemate, with no end in sight. Now that North Korea presents itself as a viable threat through its acquisition of nuclear weapons, a resolution to this problem does seem closer than ever before. The prospect of a continuation of the Korean War has never been as real as it is now, and it appears that a new war on the peninsula would be far deadlier than the first. Additionally, the possibility of a peaceful reunification of the two Koreas, a long time vision of the Korean people and the official stance of every South Korean government since the 1990s, seems further and further away.

**US-North Korean hostility means no reunification now**

**PBS 2003** (PBS Frontline, “Face-Off: A Short History of the United States-North Korea Conflict,” January, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/northkorea/history.html)

The barbed wire that was rolled out on the 38th parallel became the demarcation point for two Koreas. Korea's division between the capitalist South and communist North, a line drawn by the world's superpowers, cut right across the middle of the country and separated countless families. On both sides of the line, there has been an almost palpable longing for reunification ever since. Over the last 10 years, dialogue between the two Koreas offered hope for a reunified country. Relations between the United States and North Korea also warmed. But then the latest crisis broke out, revealing a residue of profound mistrust.

# Withdrawal Links

**Withdrawal of US troops is key to unification—American military presence pulls the ROK into US strategy**

**LEE 2006** (Lee Chul-kee, a professor in international relations at the Dongguk University, "Strategic Flexibility of U.S. Forces in Korea,” March 9, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0619Lee.html)

What the U.S. really fears is the emergence of a situation where growing anti-American sentiment and public opinion for the withdrawal of USFK necessitate American troops to leave Korea, because this will seriously jeopardize the global strategies of Washington.

The greatest danger of "the strategic flexibility of the USFK is that Korea will be firmly incorporated into the global hegemonic strategy of the U.S. The global strategy and Northeast Asian policy of the United States are to check and blockade China through the US-Japan alliance as the main axis and Korea-US alliance as the subsidiary axis.

But they will force a confrontation and a division in Northeast Asia, creating a new cold war order in the region. If confrontation and enmity persist in Northeast Asia, peace and reunification of Korean peninsula will become remote and national division will be perpetuated.

Korea cannot have a future-oriented security policy without a critical self-reflection on its security policy which is subordinate to Washington. Korea must make efforts to extricate itself from America's military strategy and policy framework. Korea must change its perception and idea. Self-reliant national defense and amelioration of security environment for Korea depend on how much room Korea will have for independent security strategies and policies free from the U.S. military strategies and policies.

If the existing Korea-US alliance system rather endangers our national security and aggravates our security environment, we cannot but raise a basic question whether such an alliance system is really necessary. Therefore, it is necessary to fundamentally reexamine the Korea's current security paradigm that entirely depends on the Korea-US alliance system. We must build a cooperative multilateral security system for Northeast Asia, instead of a bilateral alliance system. Peace and reunification of Korean peninsula will be possible only when Northeast Asian order becomes multilateral, balanced and cooperative. This depends on how much Korea can effectively play the role of a balancer in the Northeast Asia.

**Only US withdrawal would permit Korean unification**

**KLUG 2004** (Korean Liberation and Unification Group, “Remove U.S. Troops from South Korea,” Oct 14, http://www.gopetition.com/petitions/remove-u-s-troops-from-south-korea.html)

North Korea continues to live in isolation from the rest of the world, depending wholly on China, now shying away from Communism, to survive. Recently, North Korea has been aggravated by U.S. attempts to disarm its nuclear weapons. Anti-North Korean feelings in the South have now been replaced with anti-American ones. Several riots by college universities have resulted in mass violence. America continues to OCCUPY South Korea.

It's been globally proven that the only way that unification will be successful if U.S. troops leave South Korea. If, heaven forbid, there is a rekindled conflict between the divided nation, only then would the U.S. have any jurisdiction of sending military troops to a land not even part of its own country.

# withdrawal links

**U.S. military withdrawal leads to Korean unification**

**MEYER 2009** (Carlton Meyer is a former U.S. Marine Corps officer who participated in military exercises in Korea, “The Pentagon’s Favorite Demon,” June 18, http://www.fff.org/comment/com0906h.asp)

North Korea is still touted as a major threat to the United States, yet that conflict persists because of a refusal of the United States to agree to North Korea’s demand that all foreign troops leave the Korean peninsula once an armistice is signed. As some U.S. troops are withdrawn from Iraq and Congress looks to cut budgets, generals are busy exaggerating threats. North Korea’s million man army is mostly a collection of conscripts with old weaponry who spend most of their time harvesting crops. Its millions of “reservists” are nothing more than men who once served in the military. Most of its tanks and aircraft are not operable and the remainder lack fuel supplies to operate more than a few hours. On the other hand, the 700,000 man South Korean army is well trained, equipped with modern equipment, and backed by over 5,000,000 well-trained reservists who can be called to duty within hours. South Korea has twice the population of the North, 40 times its economic power, and spends four times more on its military each year. South Korea has a massive industrial capacity and billions in foreign currency reserves to sustain a war, while North Korea has no industry and no money. If North Korea attacked South Korea, the South Koreans would fight from mountainous and urban terrain which heavily favors defense, and complete air superiority would shoot up anything the North Koreans put on the road. Their old tanks would not be able to advance through the mountainous border since the South Koreans have fortified, mined, and physically blocked all avenues. North Korean infantry and engineers could not clear road paths while under heavy artillery fire. The North Korean military could gain a few thousand meters with human wave assaults into minefields and concrete fortifications. These attacks would bog down from heavy casualties and a lack of supply. Thousands of South Koreans would suffer casualties from North Korean artillery and commando attacks. Nevertheless, the North Korean army would not break through and its soldiers would soon starve. A major North Korean objective would be to kill Americans. This is not difficult as American troops and their families are located at easily targeted bases that would be pummeled by North Korean SCUD missiles. If millions of Koreans start fighting, the 28,000 American troops in Korea would make no difference – only 4,000 are combat troops. Therefore, Americans who truly “support the troops” should demand that they be removed from Korea where they are just pawns who face death should a conflict erupt. It is important to remember that the last Korean War involved Chinese forces with the latest Soviet equipment and supplies. China and Russia no longer aid North Korea, while South Korea has become a major trading partner. If North Korea employed a crude nuclear weapon, that would invite instant nuclear retaliation from the United States. North Korea lacks the technical know-how to build an intercontinental ballistic missile, despite the suggestions to the contrary from the National Missile Defense proponents in the United States. If South Korea is truly concerned about the North Korean threat, it has the resources to expand its military and buy the latest military equipment from the United States, yet it spends a smaller portion of GDP on its military than the United States. Its government supports a large U.S. military presence since that provides thousands of jobs and billions of dollars in economic activity courtesy of the American taxpayer. North Korea’s government is unpredictable, but that is a problem for South Korea and its neighbors to address. Should fighting erupt, North Korea would quickly lose while an irritated China may seize its capital to remove its hermit leaders. If South Koreans do not want to defend their nation, why should Americans? The United States should not play a major role in Korea, lest America becomes involved in a military conflict. The American people have as much at stake in Korea as the people of Brazil. The best way to defend America from potential North Korean terror attacks is to stop provoking their leaders with demands and threats. If Asian nations can’t resolve their differences and armed conflict erupts, the United States can buy manufactured goods elsewhere. Promptly withdrawing American troops from Korea is the best option for peace, and may lead to Korean unification. This would save the United States billions of dollars a year and remove American troops and their families from a potential war zone. Americans should recall the logic of President Lyndon Johnson who said in 1964: “We are not about to send American boys nine or ten thousand miles from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing themselves.”

# Peace Bad: Roads

**Reunification will lead to transportation links across the DMZ—this will fragment the area and destroy biodiversity**

**CHOE 2004** (Prof. Jae Chun Choe teaches at Seoul National University where he is a professor at the School of Biological Sciences. He received his PhD from Harvard University and had taught at Tufts University and the University of Michigan before returning to Korea . He is also a research associate at the Harvard Museum of Natural History. He is an author of numerous articles and books on the ecology and evolution of social behavior and mating systems. He has received the Asian Environmental Award in 2002 for his effort in promoting public awareness of environmental issues through his newspaper columns and public lectures. “Consequences of Severing the DMZ: An Interview with Jae Chun Choe,” Harvard Asia Quarterly, Spring, http://www.asiaquarterly.com/content/view/146/40/)

CHOE: As we speak, both the Gyeongui and Donghae Railways are being connected. It seems too late to stop them. What worries me is that many more railways and roads are waiting to be re-connected as the unification process goes on. Two more disconnected railways, and six national roads and as many as 6-8 provincial roads are the candidates. Roads through nature always lead to death. The DMZ in fact is not that large an area. It is a narrow strip of land 248 kilometers in length and only 4 kilometers in width. Ecologists have learned that much biodiversity is lost if you cut up a natural habitat into smaller fragments. The effects of such habitat fragmentation have been documented widely and thoroughly. If we have any intention or dream of preserving a reasonable level of biodiversity and utilize it for purpose of eco-tourism, we’d better think about this seriously. In addition, I want to add my sincere hope that someday we can re-build the Gyeongui and Donghae Railways as overpasses so that the animals trapped in the DMZ can freely move to the coastal areas once again.

# Peace Bad: Empirical Examples

**Peace hurts biodiversity more than war—Borneo proves**

**McNEELY 2002** (Jeffrey, Chief Scientist at IUCN, Conserving the Peace, www.iisd.org/pdf/2002/envsec\_conserving\_overview.pdf)

So while war is bad for biodiversity, peace can be even worse: in the 1960s, when Indonesia and Malaysia were fighting over border claims on the island of Borneo, they did relatively little damage to its vast wilderness, but in the 1990s they peacefully competed to cut down and sell its forests; in Indonesia, the 1997–1998 forest fires that caused US$4.4 billion in damage were set primarily by businesses and military to clear forests in order to plant various cash crops. Ironically, the prices of these commodities that were to be grown have fallen considerably in recent years, making them even less profitable. Vietnam’s forests are under greater pressure now that peace has arrived than they ever were during the country’s wars; Nicaragua’s forests are now under renewed development pressures; and Laos is paying at least part of its war debts to China and Vietnam with timber concessions; I was told in Laos that the Chinese and Vietnamese timber merchants and logging companies are able to operate with impunity in Laos, irrespective of logging regulations, protected area boundaries, or any other considerations. This is perhaps not surprising given the dependence of the Pathet Lao on the support of Vietnam and China during the Indo- China wars. The motivations may be more noble in times of peace, but the impacts of inappropriate development on biodiversity following the end of hostilities often are even worse than the impacts of war. Market forces may be more destructive than military forces

**Peace is bad for the environment—Nicaragua proves**

**McNEELY 2002** (Jeffrey, Chief Scientist at IUCN, Conserving the Peace, www.iisd.org/pdf/2002/envsec\_conserving\_overview.pdf)

The impact of war on biodiversity is often decidedly mixed, with a complex combination of damages and benefits. Nicaragua provides an outstanding example. Engaged in civil war for over 20 years, nearly half of the country’s population was relocated in one way or another, and nearly 100,000 casualties resulted. The human tragedy was immense, but biodiversity was able to recover from a long history of exploitation, as trade in timber, fish, minerals, and wildlife was sharply reduced. The domestic cattle population, which was roughly equivalent to the human population when the war started, was reduced by two-thirds, freeing pastures for recolonization by forests, enabling the recovery of animal populations such as white-tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus), peccaries (Tayassu angulatus), four species of monkeys (Cebidae), crocodiles (Caiman Crocodilus), iguanas (Iguana iguana), large birds and various mammalian predators. Fishing boats were destroyed and fishermen fled, leading to drastic declines in the catches of fish, shrimp and lobsters, which in turn revitalized these fisheries. On the other hand, some hunting by soldiers had at least local negative impacts on wildlife, and new military bases and roads were established in formerly-remote areas, opening them up to exploitation. Further, the country’s once outstanding system of protected areas fell into neglect, and new areas planned were not established; the collapsing economy forced villagers into environmentally destructive activities, including clearing forest for firewood and harvesting wildlife for food. Nietschmann (1990b) concludes that a significant portion of this conflict was over resources and territory, not ideology. Biodiversity rejuvenated by the war came under renewed threat by people whom the war had impoverished; the post-war period saw a great acceleration of such impacts and now that peace has broken out, biodiversity is under renewed pressure.

# Peace Bad: Empirical Examples

**Peace is bad for biodiversity—hostility prevents development and allows predators to recover by eating wounded soldiers**

**McNEELY 2002** (Jeffrey, Chief Scientist at IUCN, Conserving the Peace, www.iisd.org/pdf/2002/envsec\_conserving\_overview.pdf)

But war, or the threat of war, can also be good for biodiversity, at least under certain conditions. As Myers (1979: 24) put it, “In some respects, indeed, wildlife benefits from warfare: combatant armies effectively designate war zones as ‘off limits’ to casual wanderers, thus quarantining large areas of Africa from hunters and poachers.” Of course, any benefits of war to biodiversity are incidental, inadvertent and accidental rather than a planned side-effect of conflict. But even so, it is useful to review some cases where war, or preparations for war, has benefited biodiversity, perhaps supporting the views of some anthropologists that war helps societies adapt to their environmental constraints. For example, the border between Thailand and Peninsular Malaysia was a hotbed of insurgency during the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. On the Malaysian side of the border, the military closed off all public access and potential logging activity in the Belum Forest Reserve. As a result, this extensive area of some 160,000 ha has remained untouched by modern logging pressures and therefore is rich in wildlife resources. Malaysia is now converting this into a national park that will form a transboundaryprotected area with matching protected areas in southern Thailand. While the second Vietnam War was an ecological disaster, it also led to some important biological research, such as the extensive, long-term review of migratory birds in eastern Asia carried out by the Migratory Animals Pathological Survey (McClure, 1974). The excuse for this research was its relevance to the war effort, but it has yielded data that are useful for numerous civilian conservation applications. And the watersheds through which ran the Ho Chi Minh trail, some of the most heavilybombed parts of Indo-China during the second Vietnam War, have more recently been remarkably productive in discoveries of previously unknown species. The discoveries of new large mammals include two species of muntjak or barking deer (Megamuntiacus vuquangensis and Muntiacus truongsonensis), a unique variety of forest antelope (Pseudoryx nghetinhensis), and a bovid ultimately related to wild cattle (Pseudonovibos spiralis) (Dillon and Wikramanyake, 1997) as well as the rediscovery of a species of pig that formerly was known only by a few fragmentary specimens. That such species could survive in such a heavily-bombed area is testimony to the recuperative power of nature and the ability of wildlife to withstand even the most extreme kinds of human pressure during warfare. Interestingly, these species now are even more severely threatened by the peacetime activities of development than they were by the Indochina wars. Some other species are likely to have benefited from the war in Vietnam. Orians and Pfeiffer (1970: 553) say that tigers “have learned to associate the sounds of gunfire with the presence of dead and wounded humanbeings in the vicinity. As a result, tigers rapidly move toward gunfire and apparently consume large numbers of battle casualties. Although there are no accurate statistics on the tiger populations past or present, it is likely that the tiger population has increased much as the wolf population in Poland increased during World War II.” Fairhead and Leach (1995) report that parts of the Ziama region of Guinea, which includes an extensive biosphere reserve, became forested following a series of wars that affected the area from 1870 to 1910. The resident Toma people first fought with Mandinka groups from the north and subsequently with the French colonial armies, causing major depopulation and economic devastation that in turn allowed the forest to reclaim agricultural land. The human disaster of war enabled nature to recover.

# Peace Bad: Empirical Examples

**Militarized borders are good for biodiversity—many examples prove they preserve key ecosystems**

**McNEELY 2002** (Jeffrey, Chief Scientist at IUCN, Conserving the Peace, www.iisd.org/pdf/2002/envsec\_conserving\_overview.pdf)

As one of the world’s last remaining strongholds of unexploited resources, tropical forests often serve as a point of contention as they become the focus of social, ecological, political and economic changes. Poor management of forest resources and the absence of an established set of equitable sharing principles among contending parties lead to shifts in resource access and control. Resulting tensions and grievances can lead to armed conflict and even war. Many governments have contributed to conflict by nationalizing their forests, so that traditional forest inhabitants have been disenfranchised while national governments sell trees to concessionaires to earn foreign exchange. Biodiversity-rich tropical forests in Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, Indochina, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Central Africa, the Amazon, Colombia, Central America and New Caledonia have all been the sites of armed conflict, sometimes involving international forces. While these conflicts have frequently, even invariably, caused negative impacts on biodiversity, peace is often even worse, as it enables forest exploitation to operate with impunity. Because many of the remaining tropical forests are along international borders, international cooperation is required for their conservation; as a response, the concept of international “peace parks” is being promoted in many parts of the world as a way of linking biodiversity conservation with national security. The Convention on Biological Diversity, which entered into force at the end of 1993 and now has nearly 180 State Parties, offers a useful framework for such cooperation.

# Peace Bad/DMZ Key

**DMZ is key to all Korean biodiversity—peace will destroy it**

**NEUFELD 1997** (Ann Nichole, American University Inventory of Conflict and Environment Program, “Korean Demilitarized Zone as a Bioreserve,” November, http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/dmz.htm)

The DMZ extends roughly 150 miles in length along the 38th parallel and is two and a half miles wide, or six miles wide, if one includes each country's "buffer zones." Buffer zones are the two to three mile strips on either side of the DMZ, which are used to facilitate border protection. The terrain is varied and spans Korea's multiple ecosystems, which range everywhere from mountains to jungles to water land habitats. This strip of land has been untouched by human hands since the signing of the armistice in 1953. Since that time, the DMZ has become home to many species of plants and animals. Many plants and animals thought to be extinct on the Korean peninsula, have been found in the DMZ. This factor is significant because already more than 18 percent of Korea's vertebrate species are endangered or extinct, including 60 percent of amphibians, 45 percent of reptiles, 13 percent of birds, and 25 percent of mammals, due to Korea's continuing urbanization. Squeezing 1,230 people per square mile, South Korea is one of the most densely populated countries in the world.

Because the DMZ has been left alone for almost half a century, it has become an important stop for birds on "the East Asia Migratory Flyway"(Jordan, 1997, 1). Rare Manchurian Cranes and Siberian herons are two of the many birds that use the DMZ as a resting place along their migration route. However, this strip of land has drawn more than just birds. In 1987, a group of South Korean scientists discovered "41 native and 40 rare species of plants, along with 16 native and 8 rare species of fish in the three-mile wide South Korean buffer zone adjacent to the DMZ." They also found 14 species of animals not previously know to live in the area and 8 species that are known to be threatened or endangered (Drohan, 1996,1).

Recent reports show that the U.S. has voiced its willingness to take part in negotiations to ban land mines. The one exception to this has been the roughly one million land mines used to protect South Korea from an invasion by North Korea. Pentagon strategists assert that the land mines are vital to thwarting any invasion by the 900,000+ troops posted along the DMZ (Myers, 1997, 2). The affect that land mines have had on the environment is not discussed in the available sources although they do report that after almost 50 years of land mines, any animal heavy enough to set off a land mine no longer lives in the DMZ.

The DMZ in its role as wildlife sanctuary is protected as long as the conflict between North and South Korea is continues. Ironically, peace is the one thing that threatens the DMZ's longevity. Environmentalists fear that if a peace treaty be signed between North and South Korean, ambitious developers and lax environmental laws will conspire to ruin the DMZ. The land's incredible natural beauty and its nearness to South Korea's capitol (Seoul is 20 miles south), development will be in the exclusive price rage of the very rich, which means big profits for the developers involved.

# Peace Bad/DMZ Key

**The DMZ is a key ecosystem for all of Asia—only North-South hostility keeps it intact**

**ALBION MONITOR 1997** (“Nature Preserve Ideal For Korean DMZ,” October 13, http://www.albionmonitor.com/9710a/naturedmz.html)

Uninhabited by humans for the past 45 years, the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separates North and South Korea has become an unlikely sanctuary for the region's endangered animals and plant species.

But environmentalists and scientists are fearful for the future of the DMZ nature preserve, an area 250 kilometers long and four kilometers wide, should there be a reunification of the Korean peninsula.

In the latest issue of the U.S. Journal of Science, researcher Ke Chung Kim of the Center for Biodiversity Research at Pennsylvania State University, calls for industry to be kept away from the DMZ in a proposed "Korean Peace Bioreserves System."

"The DMZ is a ready-made nature reserve containing the last vestiges of Korean natural heritage," says Kim. "The Bioreserves System provides a strategy to preserve the rich biodiversity of the DMZ while fostering trust, understanding, and respect between North and South Korea."

Kim envisions it as a natural opportunity to protect the many endangered species while fostering trust between the two Koreas

Regarded as one of the most pristine green spaces left in Asia, the DMZ, with its land mines and barbed wire, is also considered the world's most dangerous border. While rival armies snarl at each other across the divide between the two countries, cranes, swans and geese -- too light to trigger the mines -- dive for food in pristine rivers.

Environmentalists and scientists are concerned that if the two Koreas are ever joined, the DMZ will be developed and become polluted like much of the rest of the Korean peninsula.

Korea, once known as the "hermit kingdom" and a "land of embroidered rivers and mountains" has seen much of its natural ecosystems, including coastline and salt marshes, converted into industrial and urban centers.

Development in South Korea has caused severe pollution of waterways and farmlands by pesticides, chemical fertilizers, and industrial and municipal waste, says Kim. In North Korea, rampant deforestation has caused severe soil erosion and flooding; military operations have also contributed to environmental degradation.

This has resulted in a tremendous loss of biodiversity, says Kim. Almost 30 percent of the mammals and 60 percent of amphibians have disappeared. Furthermore, there is only meager knowledge of Korean biodiversity; for example there has been research into less than one-third of the insect species.

"We may not know even what is endangered or what has become extinct," Kim told IPS.

Every month, development creeps nearer to the demilitarized zone. The metropolitan area of Seoul keeps reaching closer to the demarcation line drawn up by armistice negotiators in 1953 with the end of the Korean War. An area near the DMZ called Kimpo Peninsula, which had about 6,000 residents five years ago, today has 250,000.

Because the ecosystems and landscape in the DMZ represent a cross section of the Korean peninsula, Kim envisions it as a natural opportunity to protect the many endangered species while fostering trust between the two Koreas.

Wildlife surveys have revealed the zone harbors many plants and animals that are considered endangered or threatened in the rest of the peninsula, says Kim. The DMZ ecosystems provide wintering grounds for two of the world's most endangered birds, the white-naped crane and the red-crowned crane.

# DMZ Key Ecosystem

**The DMZ is a unique hotspot for global biodiversity**

**DMZ FORUM 2010**

(DMZ Forum for Peace and Nature Conservation, “The DMZ: Description and History,” http://www.dmzforum.org/aboutus/background.php)

The DMZ is 2.4 by 155 miles. It and the contiguous Civilian Control Zone (CCZ) in the Republic of Korea--3-12 miles across the peninsula--contain five rivers and many ecosystem types, including forests, mountains, wetlands, prairies, bogs and estuaries. There are over 1,100 plant species; 50 mammal species, including Asiatic Black Bear, leopard, lynx, sheep and possibly tiger; hundreds of bird species, many of which, according to IUCN, are endangered, including Black-faced Spoonbill, Red-crowned and White-napped Cranes and Black Vulture; and over 80 fish species, 18 being endemic. These species represent 67% of Korea’s fauna. Hundreds of bird species migrate through the DMZ going to and from Mongolia, China, Russia, Vietnam, Japan, the Philippines and Australia

The future of sustainable Korea depends on a clean environment and ecologically sustainable use of the land, which provides environmental security and sustainable development for a projected future population of over one hundred million people. The demilitarized zone (DMZ) is the linchpin of pan-Korean nature conservation. The DMZ, a 4- km wide strip of beautiful land running 250 km across the entire Korean peninsula, has separated the two Koreas and controlled military hostilities between them since 1953. The DMZ became a unique natural sanctuary for biodiversity and wildlife and a showcase of natural heritage and is an important resource for Korea's nature conservation. This land must be preserved for future generations. It will provide the foundation for sustainable development, cultural and spiritual advancement and environmental security.

After a formal ceasefire with the Korean War armistice, the DMZ corridor was naturally revived from devastation, its forests recovered and wild habitats rebuilt, resulting in a renewal of life without human interference. Fallow land has returned to thick prairie and shrubby land in the western section. Rich green forests adorn the magnificent landscape of the eastern mountain ranges. With them, endangered and rare plants and animal species, including Asiatic black bear, leopard, Eurasian lynx, Goral sheep, and perhaps Amur tiger, have rebuilt their populations. A great number of migratory birds, including endangered species such as the White-naped and Red-crowned cranes and the Black-faced spoonbill have made their home in these habitats. The land devastated by war has become a rare sanctuary for endangered native species and been transformed into the most important in-situ reserve for Korea's natural heritage, biodiversity and landscapes, including many species that no longer exist anywhere else on the peninsula.

Symbolizing the tragedy of War, Korea's DMZ is a sacred resting place for millions of innocent compatriots, foreign friends, and soldiers of both sides who died for freedom and peace. Having two distinct socio-economic systems for the last half of the 20th Century, the two independent Koreas, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK), have created two different people with separate ideologies and cultures. They now have diverse perspectives on life in a rapidly changing world and yet desire to be united and mutually benefited by building a prosperous and peaceful future. Korean people in the south have worked hard for the last forty years and now enjoy a democratic society with a free consumer economy, attaining a position as the 12th largest economic power in the world. South Korea has already embarked on helping to improve the lives of their northern compatriots. The DMZ has been transformed into a place of juxtaposition for people of the two Koreas for reconciliation and concordance and as a gateway to unification and peace. The DMZ corridor with rich biodiversity and landscapes opens a unique opportunity to recreate "Keum-Su-Gang-San", meaning "land of embroidered mountains and river", for Korea's sustainable development and peace.

The DMZ that contains a complete array of native biodiversity on the peninsula already has become a unique nature reserve. This historic estate must remain a landmark nature reserve in perpetuity, as it is an important national heritage site for Koreans everywhere. The DMZ is the center of what can become pan-Korean nature conservation and a tribute to the Korean's patriotic pride, the "Keum-Su-Gang-San". The DMZ also can serve as an ecological laboratory to study nature's resilience and revival, human ecology and ecosystem sustainability. Simply put, there is no place comparable to the DMZ on the Korean peninsula and in the world - this land must remain intact and protected for the future of Korea.

# DMZ Key Ecosystem

**The DMZ is a key ecosystem**

**CHOE 2004** (Prof. Jae Chun Choe teaches at Seoul National University where he is a professor at the School of Biological Sciences. He received his PhD from Harvard University and had taught at Tufts University and the University of Michigan before returning to Korea . He is also a research associate at the Harvard Museum of Natural History. He is an author of numerous articles and books on the ecology and evolution of social behavior and mating systems. He has received the Asian Environmental Award in 2002 for his effort in promoting public awareness of environmental issues through his newspaper columns and public lectures. “Consequences of Severing the DMZ: An Interview with Jae Chun Choe,” Harvard Asia Quarterly, Spring, http://www.asiaquarterly.com/content/view/146/40/)

CHOE: At the present time we do not have the exact measure of biodiversity in the DMZ, because all nature surveys thus far have been conducted not in the interior but in the vicinities. Nonetheless, it is generally believed that the DMZ harbors approximately 1/3 (nearly 1,000 species) of the total plant biodiversity, 1/5 (more than 60 species) of birds, and 1/2 (30~40 species) of mammals on the Korean peninsula. The DMZ and its border areas also provide a critically important stopover for a number of migratory birds. Among them are three of the world’s most endangered birds: the red-crowned crane, the white-naped crane, and the black-billed spoonbill. Its ecological importance is immeasurable.

**The DMZ is a biological paradise—it’s key to biodiversity on the entire peninsula**

**CNN 2009** (“Beyond the barbed wire: the accidental paradise of the DMZ,” October 25, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/10/25/eco.dmz.korea/index.html)

While the world remembers the fall of the Berlin Wall 20 years ago, one frontier of the Cold War remains intact; the demilitarized zone that separates North and South Korea.

Formed after the Armistice Agreement in 1953, the thin ribbon of land between the two countries that are still technically at war is one of the most heavily armed areas in the world, but it has also become an accidental paradise for wildlife.

A South Korean MBC TV crew recently returned from an 18-month shoot that took them beyond the barbed wire and gun-turrets to record a documentary on the rare species that have made it an oasis from human interference.

"One of the things that makes it so special is that it has nearly all the eco-systems you'll find in Korea," Mark Strickson, a zoologist and producer of the documentary for NHNZ told CNN.

The 4-kilometer-wide by 250-kilometer long (2.5 miles by 155 miles) DMZ includes wetlands, forests, mountains, rivers and coastlines. Temperatures can range from 20 degrees Celsius (68 degrees Fahrenheit) to a debilitating minus 20 degrees Celsius (minus 4 degrees Fahrenheit) in winter.

While relations between the two sides are still waiting to thaw, the area has become a winter migrating post for rare white-naped cranes, a haven for one-third of only 2,500 red-crowned cranes left in the world and home to almost 200 other species of birds and 52 species of mammals, including Korean water deer and Amur goral.

# DMZ Key Ecosystem

**The DMZ supports wide biodiversity including tigers—soldiers even feed the animals during winter**

**CNN 2009** (“Beyond the barbed wire: the accidental paradise of the DMZ,” October 25, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/10/25/eco.dmz.korea/index.html)

As well as some stunning shots of the wildlife they also gleaned a small insight into the life of the billeted soldiers; giving wild boar scraps of food near their mess, and lobbing potatoes over the barbed wire fence, to feed the goral during the harsh winter months.

Unconfirmed sightings of big cats, including Siberian tigers and leopards, have also been reported in the DMZ by soldiers, but were not seen by the camera crew.

"If there were some tigers, they'd be struggling because of the area that tigers need to support themselves. But certainly leopards, it's the perfect place for them to be. There's no reason why they shouldn't be there," Strickson said.

A tiger sighting would complete the picture of the DMZ as an oasis of natural wonder, a reason why the non-governmental organization, The DMZ Forum, is supporting a joint research trip by both sides to find evidence of the rare big cat next year, the Chinese year of the Tiger.

**The DMZ sustains endangered wildlife**

**NEUFELD 1997** (Ann Nichole, American University Inventory of Conflict and Environment Program, “Korean Demilitarized Zone as a Bioreserve,” November, http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/dmz.htm)

The Korean War never ended, due to the two sides, North and South, never coming to any sort of peaceable agreement. The armistice, signed in July of 1953, is thought by many to be a sort of peace agreement, but it was signed as a cease-fire, only. The only signatories to it were North Korea, China and the United States. The fact that South Korea has never been party to any agreement has assured that both sides may keep the war going. But the armistice has brought an interesting and positive result. The armistice established a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that was created with the intent of providing a buffer zone between the North and the South that would help to preserve the armistice treaty. What Korean leaders did not foresee was that this area would accomplish great good outside its original purpose. For 44 years, this 248 kilometer (151 mile) stretch of land separating North and South Korea. It has come to provide an environment in which hundreds of species of plants and animals (some endangered) have flourished as an result of the war-like conditions surrounding the DMZ.

**The DMZ is key to Korean biodiversity overall**

**CARD 2006** (James Card is a freelance writer and fly-fishing guide living in South Korea. His writing about Korea has appeared in Foreign Policy, Salon, National Geographic News, the Christian Science Monitor, Wired News, ESPN Outdoors, and other publications and media. He is currently at work on a book about his explorations of the Korean backcountry. “Cold War Trout: Fly Fishing the Korean DMZ Borderlands,” http://www.midcurrent.com/articles/trips/card\_korea.aspx)

The DMZ is the Korean peninsula’s last great hope of biodiversity, untouched by the South’s nature-hating industrialization and untouched from the North’s starving, militarized masses. In the center of the DMZ are the Cheolwon Plains, a migratory stop for red-crowned cranes, white-naped cranes, and hooded cranes. Peter Matthiessen described the DMZ as an “accidental paradise” for wildlife in his book Birds of Heaven: Travels with Cranes. The Siberian tiger and Amur leopard, written off to be extinct in South Korea, are given the vague possibility of existence in the DMZ. And they would prey on the trapped populations of wild boar, roe deer, musk deer, water deer and goral, a species of Asian mountain goat.

# A2: Preservation Measures

**Support for preservation measures will be overwhelmed by developers and policy makers**

**CHOE 2004** (Prof. Jae Chun Choe teaches at Seoul National University where he is a professor at the School of Biological Sciences. He received his PhD from Harvard University and had taught at Tufts University and the University of Michigan before returning to Korea . He is also a research associate at the Harvard Museum of Natural History. He is an author of numerous articles and books on the ecology and evolution of social behavior and mating systems. He has received the Asian Environmental Award in 2002 for his effort in promoting public awareness of environmental issues through his newspaper columns and public lectures. “Consequences of Severing the DMZ: An Interview with Jae Chun Choe,” Harvard Asia Quarterly, Spring, http://www.asiaquarterly.com/content/view/146/40/)

CHOE: Ecological awareness of the general South Korean public has increased tremendously in recent years. I can say with confidence that it certainly surpasses the level of awareness policy-makers and government officials seem to have at this moment. Most people in Korea would support the idea of preserving the DMZ as a nature reserve. When it mingles with issues of unification, however, it is very difficult for anyone to voice environmental concerns that might be construed as an obstacle to the unification process. Patriotism suddenly overthrows environmentalism. It is not an easy task.

# A2: Reunification Inevitable

**Even if reunification is inevitable, time is key—accelerating the process will destroy the DMZ**

**CHOE 2004** (Prof. Jae Chun Choe teaches at Seoul National University where he is a professor at the School of Biological Sciences. He received his PhD from Harvard University and had taught at Tufts University and the University of Michigan before returning to Korea . He is also a research associate at the Harvard Museum of Natural History. He is an author of numerous articles and books on the ecology and evolution of social behavior and mating systems. He has received the Asian Environmental Award in 2002 for his effort in promoting public awareness of environmental issues through his newspaper columns and public lectures. “Consequences of Severing the DMZ: An Interview with Jae Chun Choe,” Harvard Asia Quarterly, Spring, http://www.asiaquarterly.com/content/view/146/40/)

CHOE: Preservation of the DMZ became the talk of the town more or less out of desperation. We know that we do not have much time. If we don’t mobilize soon, the biodiversity of the DMZ will be lost forever. Many think that the Sunshine policy of the Kim Daejung administration has laid out the groundwork for the implementation of the DMZ policy as we now know. But I personally think that the policy has hurt rather than helped the preservation of the DMZ biodiversity by hurrying the negotiation process for dubious political purposes and with emphasis on economic development. It may have provided a stage for future talks but in reality it is killing the diversity. However ironic it may sound, peace brings death to the DMZ. Quickened peace-building will surely turn out to be deadly.

**The DMZ will be preservation area but this takes time—delaying reunification is critical**

**GILBERT 2005** (Ruth, “K.C. Kim's efforts to preserve Korea's DMZ,” May, http://www.psiee.psu.edu/research/spotlight\_archives/spotlight\_kim.asp)

Work on the DMZ has consumed much of Kim’s time, but has progressed more than he expected. He estimates that it may take as long as 20 years before the DMZ system of permanent nature reserves becomes a reality. Although hopeful that it will reach that point, Kim is still very satisfied with the progress of the project so far. “I am delighted that not only news media but a lot of other people, and many countries, are really delighted by the whole idea. I’m proud to have made it that far. I didn’t know where I was going when I started this.”

# DMZ Key Ecosystem

**The DMZ is vital to biodiversity throughout East Asia**

**CHOE 2004** (Prof. Jae Chun Choe teaches at Seoul National University where he is a professor at the School of Biological Sciences. He received his PhD from Harvard University and had taught at Tufts University and the University of Michigan before returning to Korea . He is also a research associate at the Harvard Museum of Natural History. He is an author of numerous articles and books on the ecology and evolution of social behavior and mating systems. He has received the Asian Environmental Award in 2002 for his effort in promoting public awareness of environmental issues through his newspaper columns and public lectures. “Consequences of Severing the DMZ: An Interview with Jae Chun Choe,” Harvard Asia Quarterly, Spring, http://www.asiaquarterly.com/content/view/146/40/)

HAQ: You argue that the DMZ has important environmental implications outside of Korea as well. What exactly are these and what stake do neighboring countries ( China , Russia , etc.) have in supporting the preservation of this area?

CHOE: The DMZ provides home for as much as 20% of the world’s red-crowned cranes, 50% of the world’s white-naped cranes, and perhaps 90% of the world’s black-faced spoonbills. These are among the most critically endangered species of birds. People have drawn lines between nations but nature does not know of such borders. The three nations, China , Japan , and South Korea , have recently formed a joint ecological society called the East Asian Federation of Ecological Societies (EAFES) to promote cooperation among three nations in ecological research and environmental protection. Eventually we would like to include ecological societies of other neighboring countries, most notably Russia . The DMZ is not only a Korean issue. It concerns the entire Far East .

\*\*\*COUNTERPLANS

# Consult ROK

**CP Text: The United States Federal Government should enter into non-binding consultation with the Republic of Korea over <insert plan text>.**

**South Korea should be consulted**

**Jeon, 06** – Colonel of the Republic of Korea Army (Sang Jo, "Transforming the ROK-US Alliance", U.S. Army War College, March 15th 2006, June 25th 2010, p. 11, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Teddy

Some South Koreans worry that USFK troop reductions may cause a “security vacuum” and that the USFK may be losing its focus on deterring North Korea. As the FOTA talks transitioned to the Security Policy Initiative (SPI) talks in February 2005, South Koreans appeared to be developing a more cautious approach to the talks. Their initial priority appeared to be gaining US assurances that the primary mission of USFK remains focused on deterring aggression of North Korea.52 Many Korean officials seemed to avoid detailed discussions about possible regional roles for USFK and suggested that an ambiguous regional role was necessary to de-politicize the issue. During the 1st ROK-US Ministerial Strategic Talks held on January 19, 2006, the ROK and US agreed to the principle of “strategic flexibility” of the USFK53 which implies that USFK forces could be deployed to trouble spots elsewhere. However, the US recognized the ROK’s position on strategic flexibility, which is that “The ROK will not be involved in any North East Asian disputes against its public ’s will….” South Koreans still worry about USFK’s involvement in a regional conflict, with a USFK involvement in the Taiwan Strait as the most problematic. Moreover, if any USFK forces deploy to fulfill regional roles, additional US forces should flow into the region to maintain credible deterrence against North Korea. **The US also should closely consult with the ROK prior to deployment of USFK assets from the Peninsula, because this may have serious implications for Korea.54**

**Genuine consultation key**

**Bandow and Carpenter 2004** – \*JD from Stanford, senior fellow at Cato, former special assistant to Reagan, writes for Fortune, National Interest, WSJ, Washington Times, \*\*PhD in diplomatic history from Texas, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, contributing editor to the National Interest, editorial board of the Journal of Strategic Studies (Ted Galen and Doug, “The Korean conundrum”, Google Books, page 37, WEA)

At stake is much more than the right to try American personnel for crimes committed in Korea or the location of U.S. forces. It is the future of the Korean peninsula. It should come as no surprise, then, **that South Korea increasingly is insisting that not only should it be consulted, but it also should be involved in shaping policy** toward the North. And as the approaches of the two nations diverge, tensions between them will grow. “Absent a compelling new rationale for its continuation, this alliance will come under mounting pressure for revision,” admits Nicholas Eberstadt.240 As well it should. Even if the countries avoid a crisis today, they will only delay the inevitable. Washington’s security guarantee has lost its raison d’être, leaving no reason for the United States and the ROK not to seek an amicable divorce.

# Consult Japan

**CP Text: The United States Federal Government should enter into non-binding consultation with the government of Japan over <insert plan text>.**

Consulting Japan over Korean troop levels is critical to prevent backlash against US presence in Japan

MITCHELL 2003 (Derek J. Mitchell is a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS, “A Blueprint for U.S. Policy toward a Unified Korea,” Washington Quarterly, 26:1) Calum

The United States should be prepared to consider a combination of basing and access arrangements to sustain its presence and enable U.S. and Korean forces to continue close personal contact and joint/combined training. The United States should seek to maintain pre-positioned equipment to facilitate regional operations and training. Such training should be oriented toward both fighting and peacetime regional operations such as search and rescue, antipiracy patrols, counterterrorism, sea-lane security, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and peacekeeping/peace enforcement. The two sides should enact any reductions in numbers or changes in arrangements for U.S. military personnel on Korean soil (e.g., Status of Forces Agreement and host-nation support) in close cooperation with Japan. This consultation would ensure an appropriate balance and mix of U.S. capabilities in the region and help to alleviate potential domestic pressures on U.S. forces in Japan induced by changes on the peninsula.

# Condition on Iraq C/P

CP Text: The United States Federal Government should condition <plan text> on the Republic of Korea providing an infantry division to aid the United States in achieving American objectives in Iraq.

The counterplan would result in greater South Korean military presence in Iraq

DAVINO 2004 (Colonel Michael Davino, US Army War College, “Should The U.S. Continue to Maintain Forces in Korea?” May 3, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423338&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>) Calum

Although it clearly makes sense to re-deploy the 2 nd Infantry Division, the U.S. may want to consider maintaining its presence in the near-term for leverage in an effort to convince the ROK to contribute a division to the coalition in Iraq. The Korean press has reported that “the United States has asked South Korea for a light infantry division … to help keep the peace in Iraq….”75

The deployment of a South Korean division would enable the U.S. to establish a more sustainable rotation plan for U.S. divisions in Iraq and enhance ROK - U.S. cooperation under

the ROK - U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. The ROK government subsequently declined to provide a division and has limited the additional deployment of troops to a force of about 3,000.76

However, perhaps future changes in the Iraq security situation may enable the U.S. to reengage on this issue for future Iraq troop rotations. Withdrawal of the 2 nd Infantry Division could be deferred until the requirements for coalition ground forces in Iraq have been significantly reduced.

# Propaganda C/P

**CP Text: The President of the United States should issue an order to fund a 24 hour radio broadcast into the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to build the legitimacy of the Government of the Republic of Korea among the citizens of North Korea. The President of the United States should issue an order to cultivate, organize, and fund the necessary dissident organizations and media that have already begun operating in North Korea to achieve this objective.**

**The counterplan is critical to increase American influence in North Korea and manage its inevitable collapse**

**STAFFORD 2008** (Captain Jonathan Stafford, US Army, “Finding America's Role in a Collapsed North Korean State,” Military Review, 88:1, Questia) Calum

American military and political thinkers today are focused on creating policies to govern stability operations, but this invariably presumes the deployment of American Soldiers to advance U.S. interests. Direct stability operations are needed in Iraq and Afghanistan, but are they always necessary?

I propose the United States should adopt a new stability operations strategy, one based not on the deployment of American Soldiers but, rather, on setting conditions and providing logistical support for a third country to conduct stability operations that advance U.S. interests. For several reasons, the Korean peninsula is an excellent candidate for such a strategy.

The United States should begin creating the diplomatic conditions now to justify and support a South Korean-led occupation of North Korea. The best way to begin is by winning the information war inside North Korea. A widespread and persistent, although increasingly discredited, view holds that North Korea is belligerent because it really wants normalization and engagement with the rest of the world. A more believable theory, strategic disengagement, suggests that Kim Jong-il really wants to isolate his people from the rest of the world because allowing them to engage with it would expose the fraudulence of his propaganda and destabilize his regime.29 The U.S. must therefore challenge the Kim regime's control of information by increasing radio broadcasts into the country and helping move more radios across North Korea's borders.30 Until recently, radios available inside North Korea were fixed to receive a single, government-controlled frequency. Today, more radios that people can tune to stations outside North Korea are being smuggled into the country.

By creating a radio audience now, the U.S. can begin building the legitimacy of the South Korean Government in the minds of North Koreans. Radio broadcasts could also combat the official North Korean media's ferocious anti-American propaganda. When the inevitable regime collapse happens, the North Korean people will use their radios to seek information. Through their already established radio audience, the U.S. and South Korea would be able to pass information about humanitarian relief operations to the citizens of North Korea.

We know that radio broadcasts from the outside world already influence the North Koreans. The best single example of this is prominent author and former North Korean labor camp survivor Kang Chol-hwan, who decided to defect after listening to South Korean and Japanese broadcasts on an illegal radio.31 If radio broadcasts are influential enough to encourage North Korean citizens to defect, they can be equally effective in setting conditions for an occupation of North Korea.

Congress has already authorized key parts of this strategy with unanimous passage of the North Korean Human Rights Act, which authorizes the president to fund private and nonprofit groups to "promote human rights, democracy, rule of law, and the development of a market economy in North Korea."32 The act also states that "the President is authorized to take such actions as may be necessary to increase the availability of information inside North Korea by increasing the availability of sources of information not controlled by the Government of North Korea, including such sources as radios capable of receiving broadcasts from outside of North Korea."33 Thus authorized, the U.S. recently provided funding to increase radio broadcasts in North Korea to up to 10 hours per day.34

We can and should do more than this. For starters, Congress should fund 24-hour radio broadcasting to build the widest possible audience in North Korea.35 We should also consider cultivating, organizing, and funding some of the dissident organizations and media that have already begun operating inside North Korea. Such groups publish anti-regime flyers and posters, interview residents and file news reports, smuggle religious literature, and even take clandestine video.36 With more resources, they might be able to provide U.S. military planners with essential intelligence that could help them anticipate the population's post-collapse needs for food, drinking water, medical care, and other essential services.

# Restructuring C/P

CP Text: The United States Commander of the United States Forces Korea should restructure existing ground presence as a mobile, medium sized force of 5,000 troops, with the objective of achieving an easily deployable, but lethal, infantry. The United States Commander of the United States Forces Korea should develop a peace-keeping strategy for the Korean peninsula that relies primarily on the United States naval and air force.

The counterplan solves the case but deters arms races, prolif, terrorism, and the rise of hostile great powers in Asia

CHA 2003 (Victor, associate professor of government and D. S. Song-Korea Foundation Endowed Chair at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Focus on the Future, Not the North,” Washington Quarterly 26:1) Calum

More useful than using regional stability as a code word for contingencies that imply a quasi-containment of China, Susan Bryant and Gen. (Ret.) John Tilelli, former commander in chief of the UN Command in Korea, define regional missions for the U.S.-ROK alliance more broadly to [End Page 95] include nontraditional security activities such as humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping and peacemaking, and counterterrorism operations. 14 In one of the more useful characterizations of the term, some define regional missions in military terms as antipower projection. In other words, the primary operational concept for U.S. forward deployment is to prevent power projection by others beyond the East Asian littoral. The rationale behind this thought is that the projection of power by any others incites indigenous security dilemmas, historical animosities, and arms competitions destabilizing to the region. 15

Though the latter two definitions of regional stability offer useful guidelines, they lack a specific vision about what strategic landscape best suits the interests of the United States and its Asian allies in the future. What is the goal of the U.S.-ROK alliance beyond peninsular security? If regional stability includes peacekeeping and antipower projection, then how would the U.S.-Korean alliance contribute to these larger missions? Contrary to twentieth-century U.S. attitudes toward Korea, does a rationale for the alliance exist that can be more than ad hoc, reactive, and derivative of larger balance-of-power concerns in Asia?

Answering such questions must begin with a frank assessment of the geostrategic landscape in Northeast Asia after Korean unification—the likely, if not inevitable, fate of the peninsula. This landscape is unfavorable to U.S. interests. For reasons of geography, history, culture, power, economics, and demography, trends in Asia may emerge such that the domestic politics of Korean unification push the U.S. military off the peninsula. The new Korean entity could seek a continental accommodation with China against Japan as resurgent Korean nationalism and new military capabilities combine to incite security dilemmas with its historical enemy. At the same time, a demographically aged Japan could become isolated from the rest of Asia and be perceived as the last remaining U.S. outpost in the region.

Korean unification certainly might generate a range of alternate scenarios, but given current and past geostrategic trends, this estimate of how events might transpire is most probable. What is striking about this scenario is how heavily it weighs against U.S. interests. If the United States has the will to remain an Asia-Pacific power after Korean unification, then it has no interest in being pushed out. Moreover, this situation is not in the region's interests. An older, weaker, and isolated Japan that does not want to be considered the last U.S. military colony in Asia might finally choose greater self-reliance [End Page 96] for its security. This decision would provoke balancing reactions in China and Korea that would degrade the region's security as tensions, armaments, and the almost-certain prospect of nuclear proliferation rose.

The Way Forward:

Preventive Defense

U.S. strategic planners should not only seek to avoid future war in Northeast Asia but also should contemplate avoiding this sort of future peace. 16 Geostrategic currents in Asia following unification therefore create a preventive-defense rationale for the alliances in Asia. In other words, the United States and its allies should take prudent and premeditated actions to prevent the emergence of potentially dangerous situations, not simply deal with a threat once it has become imminent. 17 The imperative for the United States is to forestall these unfavorable geostrategic currents in Asia that would follow unification. At its core, this long-term necessity compels Washington to promote stronger relations between its two main Asian allies and to consolidate the trilateral U.S.-Japanese-Korean relationship. Such a U.S. strategy has three elements.

First, in the most immediate and pragmatic terms, the DPRK contingency continues to provide a vehicle for building Japanese-Korean security cooperation. Throughout the 1990s, the threat of North Korean implosion or aggression drove the unprecedented security cooperation involving defense minister-level bilateral meetings, search-and-rescue exercises, port calls, noncombatant evacuation operations, and academic military exchanges despite the deep historical mistrust between Seoul and Tokyo. Although previous South Korean presidents vowed during the Cold War never to engage in these security cooperation activities with past colonizer Japan despite the imminent North Korean threat, more recently they have built bilateral confidence and created an entirely new dimension to Seoul-Tokyo relations beyond the political and economic relationship.

A second critical ingredient in the medium-term strategy for consolidation is to infuse the U.S.-Japanese and U.S.-Korean alliances with meaning and identity beyond the Cold War. History shows that the most resilient alliances share common ideals, a basis that runs deeper than the adversarial threats that might have initially brought the alliance into existence. Currently, this process has elevated maintaining regional stability to become the alliance's future purpose, but there is room to go further. Beyond regional stability, a host of extraregional issues, such as liberal democracy, open economic markets, nonproliferation, universal human rights, anti-terrorism, and peacekeeping, among others, define the relationship. Ideally, the U.S.-ROK and U.S.-Japanese alliances will stand for something rather than simply against a threat. This common ideational grounding makes the relationships [End Page 97] more sustainable, becoming the glue that prevents these alignments from being washed away by regional geostrategic currents.

Third, this U.S. strategy for Korea should hedge, or have a straddle component. Theoretically speaking, the United States should commit to deterring a Korean adversary but should not grant the kind of unconditional commitment that might allow the ROK to feel comfortable free-riding its way through the alliance and doing little on its own to ensure Korean national security. In practical terms, the United States should seek to consolidate the trilateral U.S.-Japanese-ROK axis to reaffirm U.S. continued alliance relationships in the region but should do so without the type of unconditional and asymmetric security guarantee it provided to its allies during the years of Cold War patronage.

This is a lesson of history. The United States has always been the strongest advocate of better Japanese-Korean relations, but ironically, Seoul and Tokyo have responded more favorably to burden-sharing entreaties when Washington has been perceived to be somewhat less interested in underwriting the region's security.18 The U.S. position in Asia should therefore be recessed enough in this new arrangement to impart responsibilities on the allies to consolidate their own bilateral relationship, but not so recessed that Japan and South Korea choose self-help solutions outside the alliance framework. Specifically, two elements of this strategy would be to reduce the U.S. ground presence greatly but still maintain a minimal forward presence as a tangible symbol of commitment and to reinforce the U.S. political commitment by maintaining the nuclear umbrella.

Any discussion about the USFK's future should begin with antipower projection and counterterrorism as two rationales for regionalizing the U.S.-ROK alliance. To supplement them, the U.S.-ROK (and U.S.-Japanese) alliance(s) should serve a nonproliferation function, dampen security dilemmas, and prevent the rise of regional hegemons, currently and postunification, particularly but not exclusively to mitigate against the contingency where Japan is isolated, the United States is expelled, and tensions are heightened between a unified Korea and her neighbors.

The Next USFK

To perform these new missions and address its traditional role, the United States should restructure its forces on the peninsula to be:

\* Credible. In spite of any transformations in the USFK, the resulting force must still represent and preserve the traditional role as a reliable manifestation of the U.S. commitment to the defense and security of Korea. [End Page 98]

\* Flexible. While being large enough to be militarily significant, the U.S. presence should be flexible enough to handle a broad range of tasks ranging from antiterrorism operations to peacekeeping to force-projection dominance in the region.

\* Deployable. Combined with other U.S. capabilities in the region (especially in Japan), the presence in Korea must be capable of reacting swiftly to regional developments and offer an integrated joint force with the full range of mobility, strike, maneuverability, and sustainability.

\* Unobtrusive. While being politically equivalent to the old force structure as a symbol of the alliance, the new presence should possess a footprint that the Korean people do not perceive as an obstacle to peace.

With these objectives in mind, the United States should transform USFK ground, air, and naval assets from a heavy, ground-based force to a more mobile, rapid-reaction force. The types of changes needed in Korea will certainly be contingent on the status of other U.S. forces and bases as well as on access arrangements elsewhere in the region, but such a restructured USFK could resemble the force described below..

The United States should restructure the existing ground presence along the lines of Gen. Eric Shinseki's objective force concept, as a mobile, medium-sized force, easily deployable but more lethal and sustainable than existing light infantry.19 This army force of about one medium-sized deployable brigade (5,000) could react quickly to regional developments, including but not limited to unification of the peninsula, and maintain a strong U.S. presence in the region. These forces might be stationed in the southern portion of the peninsula around the demilitarized zone and outside of Seoul.

Although air assets on the peninsula would vary somewhat, they would likely remain relatively constant compared to the other services. For domestic political reasons in Korea, retaining two main operating air bases at Osan and further south at Kunsan will be difficult. The presence at Osan could be reduced and redeployed in Kunsan or even further south, placing aerial assets as much as 500 miles closer to southern contingencies. Although reductions are likely, the reconfigured force in Korea must be capable of assisting Guam in supporting some assets that might be transferred from U.S. air bases in Japan to aid the reduction of the U.S. footprint there.

Ultimately, between reconfigured U.S. air bases in Korea and the Kadena air base in Japan, the United States would ideally retain air-to-air, air-to-ground, [End Page 99] surveillance, refueling, and airlift capabilities for a truly regional role. The current force structure in Korea will support contingencies extending only about as far as the Senkakus, but the addition of longer-range craft, heavy bombers, refueling, and hardened fuel assets might enable range rings to be extended as far as the Taiwan Strait, which conceivably might be problematic for Koreans as previously mentioned. The United States could base most assets in Guam and move them if China misbehaves in the strait. Reconfigured aerial assets on the peninsula, however, would probably not be able to assist with contingencies in the South China Sea, even with aerial refueling.

Of all the services, the navy could host the largest augmentation in the USFK presence on the peninsula, depending upon how widely the force presence would be oriented and how the U.S. presence in Japan and Australia might be concurrently changed. For example, some have advocated reducing the U.S. Marine presence in Okinawa by moving them to Australia, while augmenting the presence in Northeast Asia by homeporting a second aircraft carrier in the region, possibly in Korea, with the crew based in the United States to reduce the infrastructure and base footprint. Unlike restructuring aerial assets, this plan would effectively mean a USFK presence able to assist in contingencies as far south as the South China Sea. Such missions might not be necessary if U.S. forces were positioned in, or gained access to, bases in Southeast Asia. Under any circumstances, a revised force presence in Northeast Asia should include a carrier homeport, U.S. Army and Marine training capability, and an operational air force hub, which would constitute the foundation for any anticipated subregional buildup.20

# Restructuring Solves China Fear

Restructuring solves Chinese fear of US military presence

CHA 2003 (Victor, associate professor of government and D. S. Song-Korea Foundation Endowed Chair at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Focus on the Future, Not the North,” Washington Quarterly 26:1) Calum

Beyond the broader alliance missions, the ground troop presence on the peninsula, which the Chinese have always found disconcerting, would appear less provocative to Beijing after restructuring. China will undoubtedly still oppose any configuration that maintains a U.S. presence in Korea, but a USFK that relies less on pre-positioned heavy equipment and two-division-sized ground force deployments and more on air and naval presence (excluding long-range bombers) to improve regional stability would generate less opposition in Beijing than the alternative.

# Restructuring Avoids Deterrence

The counterplan preserves US credibility and deters North Korea—the plan is appeasement

CHA 2003 (Victor, associate professor of government and D. S. Song-Korea Foundation Endowed Chair at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Focus on the Future, Not the North,” Washington Quarterly 26:1) Calum

The debate over USFK changes is often cast in terms of the progress of tension reduction on the peninsula. Some doves argue that the main rationale to restructure or withdraw the USFK should be to achieve peace on the peninsula. 6 Although there is an intuitive appeal to this view on the South Korean side, especially if one posits that the ROK military is capable of standing on its own, it is less appealing from the U.S. perspective. At a minimum, such a view assumes that North Korea has implicit veto power over the disposition of U.S. forces in Korea. [End Page 92]

At the same time, though, the hawkish argument that contemplating any USFK change must await a stable peace on the peninsula, defined as the elimination of the northern threat, is too inflexible. The more interesting and challenging question is whether one can contemplate incremental change in the USFK presence given continued conventional and nuclear threats from the North. Such a plan of action would maintain traditional deterrence against the North and sustain the U.S. allied defense commitment to Seoul, but it would also allow a new vision for the alliance to be introduced that looks beyond the DPRK. USFK changes should be neither the sacrificial lamb nor the bargaining chip for peace on the peninsula but should be driven by a larger U.S.-ROK joint vision.

Regardless of how one perceives the DPRK threat, it is not difficult to argue that certain aspects of the USFK, as currently constituted, are obsolete. Established in 1957, the USFK was built to deter and if necessary defend against a second North Korean ground invasion. Although U.S. force structure is prepared for this one contingency, ROK forces continue to improve their capability of defending against a replay of June 1950, particularly as DPRK forces simultaneously continue to deteriorate. Given the ROK's increased confidence in its own capabilities, policymakers reportedly made a conscious decision in the 1990s to build national military capabilities beyond the peninsula into a regional force. 7

Nevertheless, the competency of the ROK military to win an actual war does not reduce the important deterrent role played by the USFK. The U.S. pledge to defend South Korea is of far greater significance than any actual military capability. Given ROK capabilities and the favorable trends regarding the balance of forces on the peninsula, the United States can at any time begin thinking about ways to provide such a credible security commitment with a different force structure.

**Restructuring solves North Korean aggression**

**Sheen, 09** – Assistant Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies and Director of the International Cooperation Office at Seoul National University, Visiting Fellow at Brookings (Seongho, "A Smart Alliance in the Age of Complexity; ROK-U.S. Alliance in the 21st Century", Issue Briefing, June 1st 2009, June 25th 2010, p. 11, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Teddy

The U.S. military restructuring and troop withdrawal elevate South Korea’s responsibility for keeping up the military deterrence against the North Korean threat. It means that South Korea needs to continue with its military reforms and modernization, which will require considerable investment. Upon receiving the U.S. request for USFK force restructuring, the Roh administration went one step further and suggested the transfer of WOC to South Korea. This significant change was not in the original U.S. plan to revise the existing command structure, in which WOC belonged to the Combined Forces Command (CFC) headed by a U.S. general. There have been other continued efforts by South Korea to build up a more self-reliant defense capability. Over the past decades, South Korea has vigorously pursued the goal of building a military strong enough to deter or fend off military aggression by North Korea. Yet the South Korean military has remained very much dependent upon the U.S. war plan and military protection for a decade since the end of the Cold War. In the case of a war on the Korean Peninsula, the South Korean military would be under the command of the Commander of the USFK, who exercises the WOC authority as the Commander of the Combined Forces Command as well as the United Nations Command. In the early 1990s, the Kim Youngsam government had also sought to regain WOC. Peacetime Operational Control was returned to South Korea in 1994. Because of the developing nuclear crisis with North Korea, however, discussion of WOC transfer was postponed indefinitely.

# Military Intelligence Brigade PIC

The US should keep the Military Intelligence Brigade in Korea—this is critical to South Korean missions

CUMMINGS 2004 (Colonel John Cummings, US Army War College, “Should the U.S. Continue to Maintain Forces in South Korea?” May 3, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423298&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>) Calum

PROVIDE NECESSARY MILITARY TRAINING AND ASSETS FOR SOUTH KOREA ASSUME ALL GROUND FORCE RESPONSIBILITY USFK should share with the ROK military training and assets required to execute counterbattery and JSA missions. The Military Intelligence Brigade stationed in South Korea should remain in place to enable ROK military access to U.S. national reconnaissance assets. The U.S. should accommodate all reasonable ROK training requests and equipment transfers.

Even if the South Korean military is otherwise powerful, these capabilities are key

CUMMINGS 2004 (Colonel John Cummings, US Army War College, “Should the U.S. Continue to Maintain Forces in South Korea?” May 3, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423298&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>) Calum

The strength of the ROK defense structure lies in the combat power of their ground forces. If there is a weakness, it may be in the ROK military’s inability to assume missions currently carried out by United States Forces, Korea (USFK). Although the ROK military has kept pace with improvements to weapons platforms, they have made less progress in making improvements to their command and control structure. This appears to be an obstacle to ROK assuming USFK missions. In a recent joint news conference with both United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and South Korea Minister of Defense Cho Yung Kil, plans were announced to transfer 10 military missions from USFK to the ROK military5. Cho reported that the ROK military will have no problem assuming 8 of the 10 missions. He went on to state that ROK will need more time to take over the remaining two missions. The two missions in question are counter-battery fire against North Korean artillery units along the DMZ and security of the Joint Security Area (JSA) in Panmunjon. In their execution of both missions, U.S. forces rely on command and control systems to integrate intelligence sensors such as weapons locating radars, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and direct observation, to name a few. These command and control systems are crucial in developing and establishing an operating picture for the combatant commander. In order for the ROK military to successfully assume the remaining two missions without degradation in readiness, improvements in the area of command and control systems must be made. An investment in technology to improve ROK military command and control systems is essential to speed transition of missions from USFK to ROK responsibility.

Military Intelligence Brigade is key to accurate intelligence

CUMMINGS 2004 (Colonel John Cummings, US Army War College, “Should the U.S. Continue to Maintain Forces in South Korea?” May 3, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423298&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>) Calum

Despite the recent criticism concerning the United States intelligence community’s weakness in developing and establishing reliable human intelligence sources, the deficiencies in our technical collection capabilities are of even greater importance. When considering the threat that North Korea poses the United States needs to improve its technical collection capability. Finding out weeks after the launch that North Korea fired the No Dong missile at a range beyond 3400 miles is unacceptable. The United States must increase its research and development of technical intelligence collection to prevent future similar events from going unobserved. Recent events on the peninsula warrant the continued focus of substantial numbers of our national intelligence assets on North Korea. Intelligence on the peninsula should be a shared ROK /U.S. responsibility. South Korea should take the lead in developing and sustaining human intelligence on the peninsula. The large number of North Korean defectors residing in South Korea should continue to be a valuable source of intelligence. The U.S. military intelligence brigade, with access to U.S. national intelligence assets, can integrate its collection efforts with the South Koreans to determine North Korean intentions.

# CFC CP – 1NC

**Text—The United States federal government should offer to the Republic of Korea to establish a Joint Study Group to review the dissolving of the Combined Force Command and transfer of wartime control of troops and should abide by the Group’s recommendations.**

**South Korea wants to delay the OPCON**

**Doo-hyong 10** (Hwang ,Lawmaker urges U.S., S. Korea to begin talks on OPCON transfer delay, 25 March 2010, http://www.cnas.org/node/4276, AMiles)

A senior South Korean lawmaker Thursday called on South Korea and the United States to start talks on delaying Seoul's retaking of wartime command control of its troops amid growing nuclear and missile threats from North Korea. "I recommend that at the earliest possible time the ROK and the United States should establish a Joint Study Group to review the OPCON transfer issue," Rep. Hwang Jin-ha of the ruling Grand National Party (GNP) told a forum here sponsored by the Asia Foundation's Center for U.S.-Korea Policy. A two-term lawmaker, Hwang called for a halt in the process for the OPCON transfer, scheduled to take place in April 2012, unless conditions are met, such as a "complete resolution of North Korea's nuclear problem, removing uncertainty about potential for a sudden change in North Korea and the establishment of a peace treaty based on confidence-building between the two Koreas." Hwang's remarks echo GNP Chairman Chung Mong-joon, who recently called for a delay in the operational control (OPCON) transition, which he described as "an irresponsible decision made by the Roh (Moo-hyun) government without an objective assessment of security conditions." South Korean Defense Minister Kim Tae-young last month decried the OPCON transition in 2012 as "bad timing" and the "worst scenario," with presidential elections in South Korea and the U.S., and North Korea's campaign to establish itself as a "prosperous, great nation," all in that year. The wartime OPCON transition agreement was made in 2007 under former liberal President Roh, who sought a greater role for South Korea in maintaining its own defense. Peacetime control of South Korean forces was returned in 1994. The U.S. currently maintains 28,500 troops in South Korea, a legacy of the Korean War in which the U.S. fought alongside South Korea against invading North Korean troops aided by China. Conservatives from both Seoul and Washington, however, have called for a delay in the wartime OPCON transfer, fearing a possible gap in the joint defense of South Korea after North Korea detonated its second nuclear device and continued testing medium- and long-range missiles last year. "The ROK military is capable of countering a conventional invasion by North Korea, but it is still questionable how well it can respond to North Korea's diverse and unconventional military capabilities, including weapons of mass destruction," said Rep. Hwang, a former three-star general. John Tilelli, former commander of U.S. Forces Korea, agreed. "If North Korea weaponizes deliverable nuclear weapons ... That will change the strategic atmosphere in all of northeast Asia," he said. Park Sun-won, visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution, however, countered that North Korea's nuclear capability is not an issue that should be linked with the OPCON transfer, adding that conservative forces in South Korea have raised the issue for purely political reasons. Park, who served as Roh's presidential secretary for national security, said dealing with the North's nuclear weapons has to do with military options that both Seoul and Washington are capable of exercising, not OPCON. Other participants voiced their support for the delay, including Bruce Bechtol of the U.S. Marine Command and Staff College, Patrick Cronin of the Center for New American Security, and Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution. Bechtol and Cronin expected the Lee Myung-bak government to raise the issue with Washington sometime this year, perhaps during the strategic security dialogue with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates scheduled for June. Kim Sung-han of Korea University proposed that the transition be delayed until 2014 or 2015 when U.S. troops in Korea complete relocation out of Seoul and from near the Demilitarized Zone facing North Korean soldiers. Hwang said that the Roh government approached the issue from the perspective of "restoring national sovereignty and national pride," and Washington agreed to the transition out of fear of anti-Americanism in South Korea, where massive rallies were held for months after two schoolgirls were killed by a U.S. military vehicle in 2002. Bechtol dismissed the sovereignty issue, noting no European government raised it with U.S. commanders when they took control of NATO forces, just as they did with the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC). "The sovereignty issue is being pushed by the so-called progressives," Bechtol said, who are unwilling to support any of President Lee's policies. He explained that the CFC's one mission is using troops only in wartime against North Korean operations. "And this is really no sovereignty issue." Earlier in the day, Walter Sharp, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, reiterated that the OPCON transfer will take place in April 2012 as scheduled. "Militarily, we will be prepared to transition wartime operational control to the ROK Joint Chiefs Staff on 17 April, 2012," he said. ROK stands for South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, however, said recently that the U.S. will seriously consider South Korea's concerns over the timing of the OPCON transfer and is ready to discuss the issue. A senior Pentagon official, requesting anonymity, also said late last year, "Within the agreement, there are very clear directions for continued evaluation of political conditions and an explicit decision before the OPCON transfer decision is made. So we will continue to make progress on the things we need to do to transfer the operational control. But the decision will be made based on how things look in 2012."

# CFC CP—Solves North Korea

**CFC deters North Korea**

**Bechtol 6—**IR,Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Former Intelligence Officer at the Defense Intelligence Agency. Former Senior Analyst for Northeast Asia in the Intelligence Directorate, Pentagon. PhD (Bruce, Force Restructuring in the ROK-US Military Alliance: Challenges and Implications, International Journal of Korean Studies, Fall/Winter 2006, Vol. X, No. 2, CIAO, AMiles)

Another issue that is important to examine is the list of capabilities that will disappear as CFC is dissolved. There can be no doubt that the likelihood is high that flowing forces under Operational War plans (commonly referred to as OPLANs) will become an exceptionally more difficult undertaking. Current war plans will quite literally need to be torn up and a whole new structure and plan written to involve separate warfighting commands and an entirely different flow and integration of forces from the United States to the Korean Peninsula. This will cause difficulties that will probably come to light more clearly over the next three to five years. As it stands right now, CFC guarantees victory. There is no doubt of this – **including in the minds of those who wield power in North Korea**. A future, separate command arrangement is likely to have many more problems with flexibility, transparency, planning, integration of war fighting capabilities, and fratricide issues. Brookings Institution scholar Michael O’Hanlon recently addressed some of the problems faced in having two separate chains of command for the unique geography of the Korean Peninsula when he wrote, “When all is said and done, the new proposed policy strikes me as a mistake. I would argue against dividing commands sharing a common, constrained, small battlespace.31

# CFC CP—Maintains Deterrence / North Korea DA Link

**Hwang 10**—Korean National Assemblyman (Jin Ha, Symposium on OpCon Transfer and its Implications for the U.S.-ROK Alliance, 25 March 2010, http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/OpconTranscript.pdf, AMiles)

Let me think – first, why are we going against the way in which the security condition on the Korean Peninsula evolves? It is required to take into consideration all dimensions of North Korea such as politics, military, economy and society in assessing its current threats which have direct impact on the security conditions on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea has endlessly escalated its military threats now including unconventional threats beyond its traditional conventional threats. Despite continued sanctions and frustration by the international community, North Korea does not seem to be willing to stop its nuclear and missile development programs. These menacing behaviors pose a grave threat to north-east Asia and beyond. North Korea is no longer a regional threat only but now an international one. Recently, North Korea continues artillery firing into the west sea after unilateral of firing adjourn. According to the 2010 quadrennial defense review and the ballistic missile review registered by the United States Department of Defense in early February, if there are no major changes in North Korea’s national security strategy in the next decade, it will be able to make a nuclear war-head to a proven delivery system. In addition to this escalation of military threats, domestic political instability in the North increases potential for a new kind of crises such as a sudden collapse of the North Korean regime which might be triggered by unexpected domestic changes. Ever since the rumor of Kim Jong Il’s poor health condition began to spread in late 2008, North Korea has made enormous efforts to promote its military force policy, which particularly aims to strengthen international political cohesiveness and mobilize the people for building a great and strong nation. By the centennial anniversary of the birth Kim Il Sung in 2012, A U.S. intelligence agency predicted that the chairman Kim Jong Il would not be able to survive more than 5 years. While assistant Secretary of State Kent Kimble said recently, he revealed on off the record based on the collecting of various medical diagnosis, Kim Jong Il has a life expectancy of about 3 years. These two predictions imply that Kim’s life expectancy is at least 3 years at most 5 years. Needless to say, his death will bring about a messy particular disorder in the power system and also a power struggle among political factions. This political chaos would be likely to a dismal, particularly when the process of fire and the power cessation does not go well. In other words, the occurrence of a sudden change in North Korea would bring an overall crisis to North Korea and its neighboring States as well. In North Korea an entire political system would face unprecedented disorder and challenges. And, in the region, neighboring States would have strategic difficulties with managing their vulnerability to North Korea’s sudden change and thus, they are stimulated to take attention deficit actions. These phenomena would be likely to endanger peace and security in Northeast Asia. It is almost impossible that North Korea would be able to overcome its ailing economy. Although, North Korea implemented currency devaluation in an attempt to cure staggering inflation rates and root out the black market on November 30th 2009 for the first time in seventeen years, the result turned out to be an absolute failure. In North Korea a number of populations have died by starvation a reprint across the nation over more than ten years and the daily necessities including food could not be provided without outside assistance. Under these serious economy conditions international sanctions imposed to by UN resolution 1718 and 1874 adopted by the stopping, adopted for stopping North Korea’s Nuclear Development Program for the deteriorated economy situation. Despite this present and massive Korea’s threats, the ROK and the United States moving towards dispending combined forces command, which places people’s role in case of crisis on the Korean peninsula and transferring OpCon, which is a core of commanding structure, practicing combined defense capabilities. Secondly, there is a strong concern that the planned OpCon transfer would be likely to weaken ROK-U.S. combined transfer capability and signing a wrong, signaling a wrong message to North Korea. The top strategy priority of the ROK-U.S. alliance is to prevent a crisis and so maintaining peace and prosperity and increase the mutual initial interest. But it is widely understood that OpCon transfer significantly weakens the ROK-U.S. combined deterrence capability. Needless to say, repelling an invasion North Korea has a critical mission, but deterrence should be a more important strategy core. The ROK military is capable of countering North Korea’s conventional invasion. But it is still questionable how well it could respond to North Korea’s diverse and unconventional military capability including weapons of mass destruction. I’d like to stress that it is imperative to unify ROK and U.S. command structure for maintaining the strategy’s effectiveness of combined deterrence and war fighting capability under the condition that the ROK military alone is not able to secure deterrence capability against North Korea. It’s a common understanding that this solving military combined commanded structure would be likely to weaken the readiness portion of the U.S. forces in Korea. One signal there is the planned OpCon transfer delivery in North Korea. North Korea continues to impose to its stationing of the U.S. forces in Korea to descend North Korea has taken a wretched strategy between ROK and the United States for instigating anti-Americanism in Korea by claiming that the ROK government’s military sovereignty is lowest to the United States. You know that to sovereigns tensing disposition, North Korea has a stating expedition that is not willing to have military talks with Iraq which doesn’t have military sovereignty. For these reasons North Korea greatly welcomed the decision of dispending of CFC and OpCon tradition and advertising this trend with Eastern North Korean people as a success of efforts for restoring ROK’s military sovereignty. At the same time, it is such in depth that North Korea perceives that ROK and U.S. alliance become weak as the result of OpCon transfer. And North Korea would be likely to rushly push its demand on, demand of changing ambitious conditions into peace trade. These conditions provided federal ground for North Korea to reach the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea, beyond the dismantlement of combined forces command and OpCon transfer. Now, why do we push the planned OpCon transfer while sending a wrong signal to North Korea and regional States? Should we disband these combined forces command when responding to the escalation of the North Korean’s threats? Are we now closing our fire station despite increasing possibility that North Korea may put fire?

# CFC CP—A2 UN Controls

**US controls the CFC**

**Cha 9**—Dir., Asian Studies, Georgetown. Former dir., Asian Affairs, National Security Council (Victor, Outperforming Expectations : The U.S.-ROK Alliance, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel\_Going%20Global\_February09\_0.pdf, AMiles)

Another watershed agreement was reached on the return of wartime OPCON to the ROK by 2012. U.S. control over ROK military forces through the United States’ role as head of the United Nations Command (UNC) before 1978 and thereafter as head of the CFC was originally provided by President Syngman Rhee during the Korean War. The original OPCON agreement was a bilateral arrangement which enabled Korean leaders to allow ROK forces to participate in wartime under U.S. command. 6 To this day, it remains in the minds of many Koreans as one of the most extraordinary concessions of sovereignty in modern international relations, and has been a source of anti-Americanism among younger Koreans who feel offended by this quasi-colonial arrangement.

# CFC CP—Unpopular

**Links to politics**

**Kim 10**—IR, Korea U. Adjunct prof, Johns Hopkins (Tong, Timing of OPCON Transfer, 31 March 2010 http://www.korea.ac.kr/do/MessageBoard/ArticleRead.do?id=4b978d, AMiles)

Obama could face some opposition in Washington if he wants to delay the transition, as it would look like turning back the clock. To many in Washington, the transition was the right direction. They have confidence in their South Korean allies' capability to be more responsible for their own defense.

# Condition C/P and Politics Link

Troops are the key bargaining chip with North Korea—and the plan destroys political capital

FEFFER 2004 (John, contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus and author of a book on Korea, “Bring Our Troops Home (from Korea),” June 23, <http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig5/feffer1.html>) Calum

Although they have only a minor military function and declining symbolic value, the remaining U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula can play a vital new role: bargaining chip.

North Korea has argued that it is under threat of U.S. attack and considers U.S. troops in South Korea a longstanding provocation. So let's try something new by putting U.S. troop presence on the negotiating table. With the advice and consent of our South Korean allies, the Bush administration should offer a timetable for the removal of all U.S. troops from the peninsula. A Democrat would be hard pressed to offer such a deal. When Jimmy Carter tried to withdraw U.S. troops from the peninsula, he hit major resistance from Washington insiders. Only the hawks in Washington have the political capital to push through a complete withdrawal.