\*\*\*Terrorism Adv\*\*\*

1NC Frontline

Economic collapse doesn’t cause war

Ferguson 6

(Niall Ferguson is the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University, September/October 2006, “ The Next War of the World”,http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61916/niall-ferguson/the-next-war-of-the-world)

 Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

Empirically denied - The japan meltdown should have triggered the warming impact because their evidence is written in context of any nuclear meltdown

No solvency - their Weart evidence says when there are less nuclear reactors IN THE WORLD, the world consumption if fossil fuels go up. The aff can’t solve energy use outside of the US

Hazmat carriers have the best safety record of any transportation method. The vulnerabilities have already been patched.

Kaplan 07

(Eben Kaplan, Council on Foreign relations, 3/12/07, “Rail Security and the Terrorist Threat,” <http://www.cfr.org/united-states/rail-security-terrorist-threat/p12800#p3>, KB )

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Transportation (DOT) offer a list of voluntary security practices for hazmat carriers, including criminal background checks for employees, regular training drills, and designating a liaison to government emergency response agencies. Many believe these measures should be mandatory; Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) described the federal government’s approach to the issue as merely “window dressing” (WashPost). The rail industry says it implemented most of these measures before the government issued its recommendations. “We have the best safety record of any transportation method in the United States,” Wilson says. “[After 9/11,] we identified our vulnerabilities and made significant changes to our operations.”

**Climate change does not lead to extinction- empirically proven**

Sherwood, Keith, and Craig Idso et al 2012 (Craig, PhD in geography @Arizona State, M.S. in Agronomy from U Nebraska) Plant Responses to Significant and Rapid Global Warming http://co2science.org/articles/V15/N24/EDIT.php

In an impressive and enlightening review of the subject, Willis and MacDonald (2011) begin by noting that key research efforts have focused on extinction scenarios derived from "a suite of predictive species distribution models (e.g., Guisan and Thuiller, 2005)" - which are most often referred to as bioclimatic envelope models - that "predict current and future range shifts and estimate the distances and rates of movement required for species to track the changes in climate and move into suitable new climate space." And they write that one of the most-cited studies of this type - that of Thomas et al. (2004) - "predicts that, on the basis of mid-range climatic warming scenarios for 2050, up to 37% of plant species globally will be committed to extinction owing to lack of suitable climate space." In contrast, the two researchers say that "biotic adaptation to climate change has been considered much less frequently." This phenomenon - which is sometimes referred to as evolutionary resilience - they describe as "the ability of populations to persist in their current location and to undergo evolutionary adaptation in response to changing environmental conditions (Sgro et al., 2010)." And they note that this approach to the subject "recognizes that ongoing change is the norm in nature and one of the dynamic processes that generates and maintains biodiversity patterns and processes," citing MacDonald et al. (2008) and Willis et al. (2009). The aim of Willis and MacDonald's review, therefore, was to examine the effects of significant and rapid warming on earth's plants during several previous intervals of the planet's climatic history that were as warm as, or even warmer than, what climate alarmists typically predict for the next century. These intervals included the Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, the Eocene climatic optimum, the mid-Pliocene warm interval, the Eemian interglacial, and the Holocene. And it is important to note that this approach, in contrast to the approach typically used by climate alarmists, relies on empirical (as opposed to theoretical) data-based (as opposed to model-based), reconstructions (as opposed to projections) of the past (as opposed to the future). And what were the primary findings of the two researchers? As they describe them, in their own words, "persistence and range shifts (migrations) seem to have been the predominant terrestrial biotic response (mainly of plants) to warmer intervals in Earth's history," while "the same responses also appear to have occurred during intervals of rapid climate change." In addition, they make a strong point of noting that "evidence for global extinctions or extinctions resulting from reduction of population sizes on the scale predicted for the next century owing to loss of suitable climate space (Thomas et al., 2004) is not apparent." In fact, they state that sometimes an actual increase in local biodiversity is observed, the case for which we lay out in Section II (Physiological Reasons for Rejecting the CO2-Induced Global Warming Extinction Hypothesis) of our Major Report The Specter of Species Extinction: Will Global Warming Decimate Earth's Biosphere? Read it and rejoice!

**Climate change is completely natural and the world is cooling – historical cycle, satellite data, ocean oscillation, and sunspots prove**

Ferrara 12 (Peter Ferrara, Director of Entitlement and Budget Policy for the Heartland Institute, General Counsel for the American Civil Rights Union, and Senior Fellow at the National Center for Policy Analysis, he served in the White House Office of Policy Development under President Reagan, and as Associate Deputy Attorney General of the United States under President George H.W. Bush, he is a graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Law School, 5/31/12, “Sorry Global Warming Alarmists, The Earth Is Cooling” www.forbes.com/sites/peterferrara/2012/05/31/sorry-global-warming-alarmists-the-earth-is-cooling/2/)

Check out the 20th century temperature record, and you will find that its up and down pattern does not follow the industrial revolution’s upward march of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2), which is the supposed central culprit for man caused global warming (and has been much, much higher in the past). It follows instead the up and down pattern of naturally caused climate cycles. For example, temperatures dropped steadily from the late 1940s to the late 1970s. The popular press was even talking about a coming ice age. Ice ages have cyclically occurred roughly every 10,000 years, with a new one actually due around now. In the late 1970s, the natural cycles turned warm and temperatures rose until the late 1990s, a trend that political and economic interests have tried to milk mercilessly to their advantage. The incorruptible satellite measured global atmospheric temperatures show less warming during this period than the heavily manipulated land surface temperatures. Central to these natural cycles is the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO). Every 25 to 30 years the oceans undergo a natural cycle where the colder water below churns to replace the warmer water at the surface, and that affects global temperatures by the fractions of a degree we have seen. The PDO was cold from the late 1940s to the late 1970s, and it was warm from the late 1970s to the late 1990s, similar to the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO). In 2000, the UN’s IPCC predicted that global temperatures would rise by 1 degree Celsius by 2010. Was that based on climate science, or political science to scare the public into accepting costly anti-industrial regulations and taxes? Don Easterbrook, Professor Emeritus of Geology at Western Washington University, knew the answer. He publicly predicted in 2000 that global temperatures would decline by 2010. He made that prediction because he knew the PDO had turned cold in 1999, something the political scientists at the UN’s IPCC did not know or did not think significant. Well, the results are in, and the winner is….Don Easterbrook. Easterbrook also spoke at the Heartland conference, with a presentation entitled “Are Forecasts of a 20-Year Cooling Trend Credible?” Watch that online and you will see how scientists are supposed to talk: cool, rational, logical analysis of the data, and full explanation of it. All I ever see from the global warming alarmists, by contrast, is political public relations, personal attacks, ad hominem arguments, and name calling, combined with admissions that they can’t defend their views in public debate. Easterbrook shows that by 2010 the 2000 prediction of the IPCC was wrong by well over a degree, and the gap was widening. That’s a big miss for a forecast just 10 years away, when the same folks expect us to take seriously their predictions for 100 years in the future. Howard Hayden, Professor of Physics Emeritus at the University of Connecticut showed in his presentation at the conference that based on the historical record a doubling of CO2 could be expected to produce a 2 degree C temperature increase. Such a doubling would take most of this century, and the temperature impact of increased concentrations of CO2 declines logarithmically. You can see Hayden’s presentation online as well. Because PDO cycles last 25 to 30 years, Easterbrook expects the cooling trend to continue for another 2 decades or so. Easterbrook, in fact, documents 40 such alternating periods of warming and cooling over the past 500 years, with similar data going back 15,000 years. He further expects the flipping of the ADO to add to the current downward trend. But that is not all. We are also currently experiencing a surprisingly long period with very low sunspot activity. That is associated in the earth’s history with even lower, colder temperatures. The pattern was seen during a period known as the Dalton Minimum from 1790 to 1830, which saw temperature readings decline by 2 degrees in a 20 year period, and the noted Year Without A Summer in 1816 (which may have had other contributing short term causes). Even worse was the period known as the Maunder Minimum from 1645 to 1715, which saw only about 50 sunspots during one 30 year period within the cycle, compared to a typical 40,000 to 50,000 sunspots during such periods in modern times. The Maunder Minimum coincided with the coldest part of the Little Ice Age, which the earth suffered from about 1350 to 1850. The Maunder Minimum saw sharply reduced agricultural output, and widespread human suffering, disease and premature death. Such impacts of the sun on the earth’s climate were discussed at the conference by astrophysicist and geoscientist Willie Soon, Nir J. Shaviv, of the Racah Institute of Physics in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Sebastian Luning, co-author with leading German environmentalist Fritz Vahrenholt of The Cold Sun. Easterbrook suggests that the outstanding question is only how cold this present cold cycle will get. Will it be modest like the cooling from the late 1940s to late 1970s? Or will the paucity of sunspots drive us all the way down to the Dalton Minimum, or even the Maunder Minimum? He says it is impossible to know now. But based on experience, he will probably know before the UN and its politicized IPCC.

Terrorist attack doesn’t escalate

An attack on railroad infrastructure has very little impact – empirically proven

RAND 08

RAND, a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world, 2008, “Improving the Safety and Security of Freight and Passenger Rail in Pennsylvania,” <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2008/RAND_TR615.sum.pdf>, KB

The consequences of certain prior accidents provide insights into the potential consequences of terrorist attacks. Average casualty rates from accidents indicate that a successful attack on rail freight would not necessarily be catastrophic. However, the derailment and rupture of 20 tank cars of fuel ethanol in New Brighton, Pennsylvania, in 2006 caused a ﬁre that burned for several days, and a 2002 derailment in Minot, North Dakota, resulted in the release of anhydrous ammonia gas, killing one person and injuring more than 300 people, 11 of them seriously. Direct damages to equipment were reported to be greater than $3.0 million, and environmental remediation costs for that incident were reported to be more than $10 million. A successful attack on a freight train carrying TIH materials through a densely populated area could easily result in consequences an order of magnitude greater: tens of deaths, hundreds of injuries, and tens of thousands of persons displaced.

Terrorism on RR Impossible

Terrorism on a railroad is impossible to execute

Moore 11 (Michael, Writer at the Pacific Standard, " Terrorist Attacks on Railroads Would Be Difficult," May 11, <http://www.psmag.com/politics/terrorist-threat-of-wrecking-the-railroad-really-hard-31033/>) KB

Since the raid on Osama bin Laden’s house in Pakistan uncovered some notes about a future vision of derailed American trains, it’s worth remembering that the idea isn’t terribly new. America’s huge rail network — never mind the ambitious high-speed lines yet to be built — would be vulnerable for obvious reasons, and some critics have complained for months that Obama’s expensive high-speed rail dreams would be wide-open targets for al-Qaeda. But news outlets and politicians have overreacted, and a report from last year by the Mineta Transportation Institute gives a number of good reasons why derailment disasters are so rare. The main reason is that blowing up a track is tougher than it sounds. “Getting a bomb to go off at the right time is difficult,” write the Mineta study authors. “Timers are unreliable if the trains do not run precisely on time, and pressure triggers do not always work.”Sabotaging the switching points — the Polish kid’s method — would be more reliable, but it takes more cleverness. Mechanical sabotage of all kinds (high- and low-tech) derailed trains with 76 percent success rate in the Mineta report’s samples — but it was much more rare than setting bombs. Only 25 out of the sample of 181 derailment attempts were acts of mechanical sabotage.

\*\*\*Solvency\*\*\*

1NC Frontline

No solvency – the aff cant solve outside of the rail industry. There are multiple other transport methods and multiple players involved

ICF 2K

(ICF Consulting, submitted to the DOT on November 1st, 2000, “Risk Management Framework for Hazardous Materials Transportation, ” <http://phmsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/PHMSA/DownloadableFiles/Files/risk_framework.pdf>, KB)

Several basic truths about hazardous materials transportation provide useful context for the risk management framework. In a number of ways, the hazardous materials transport system is highly heterogeneous and complex. Hazardous materials transport is a chain of events involving multiple players (e.g., shippers, carriers, packaging manufacturers, container reconditioners, distributors, freight forwarders, consignees (receivers of shipment), emergency responders, government regulators, enforcement personnel) having different roles in the process of safely moving hazardous materials from their origin to their destination. There often are multiple handoffs of a material from one party to another during transport. The various parties, who range from individuals to small firms to the largest of multinational organizations, may have overlapping and unclear responsibilities for managing the risks. In addition, there are many different hazardous materials (thousands are listed in DOT regulations) that pose a variety of hazards, such as flammability, corrosiveness, reactivity, and toxicity. Further adding to the system complexity is the fact that hazardous materials transportation encompasses several different modes of transport, principally highway, rail, waterway, and air. Moreover, some shipments are intermodal (i.e., switch from one mode to another during transit). In many hazardous materials transport situations, there are numerous choices regarding the mode to be used and the specific route to be followed in transporting the material.

**Air, pipeline, marine and road all solve the aff. Rail alone won’t kill the industry**

**Katz 2/1**

**Eyal Katz, 2/1/12, “Transportation in the Chemical industry,”** [**http://scn.sap.com/docs/DOC-8943**](http://scn.sap.com/docs/DOC-8943)**, KB**

The chemical industry uses every possible mode of transport to ship its goods: air, pipeline, marine, rail, and road. In addition to this already complex landscape, the chemical supply chain has been transformed by a collision of forces. Globalization, macro-economic issues, and heightened security and regulations have pushed the frontier of information technology as a key enabler to this business process transformation. Global companies are now merging their business processes (such as logistics) with information technology to better manage their operations and to create a sustainable competitive advantage.

\*\*\*DA Links\*\*\*

Plan Unpopular

Railroad security is impossible to pass, empirically proven

Friedman 5

(Lisa Friedman, Long Beach Press, 7/8/05 " Railroad security sidelined," <http://www.ble-t.org/pr/news/headline.asp?id=13953>, accessed 7/23/12, KB)

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- More than a year since declaring the deadly Madrid train bombings a "wake-up call' about the need for tighter rail security in the U.S., Congress has failed to pass far-reaching legislation safeguarding the nation's bus, train and subway systems. Among the stymied measures was a $1.1 billion plan sponsored by Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., to protect the railroads running through Los Angeles and other urban centers. His bill, which passed the Senate but stalled in the House, also would have required the Department of Homeland Security to develop a plan to improve rail security nationally. A separate bill would have authorized $3.5 billion over three years for rail and bus security. That one fell victim to a turf battle between the Transportation and Homeland Security departments over who had the authority to dole out grants. California Sen. Barbara Boxer, who co-sponsored McCain's legislation, blasted Congress' failure to act on rail security. "This administration, and I have to say, this Congress, just doesn't take it seriously enough," Boxer told National Public Radio. The attack in London, she said, "should be another horrific reminder that we have not done enough to protect our transit systems, our ports, our landmarks, nuclear power plants, chemical plants, water systems." William Millar, president of the American Public Transportation Association, said federal funding for rail security has been "woefully inadequate." Millar noted that Congress has given public transportation $250 million in security funding since the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, compared with $18.1 billion for airline security. Regional lawmakers disputed his assessment. "We're doing everything humanly possible," said Rep. Gary Miller, R-Diamond Bar, who sits on the House Transportation Committee. He called rail and airline security "apples and oranges," and said the terrifying ability to use an airplane as a missile is just one reason why that industry needs more help from Congress. Still, Miller noted that the public transportation systems have spent $2 billion to improve security since Sept. 11, 2001. In addition to federal grants the Transportation Security Administration also has issued a host of new rail security rules. Rep. Adam Schiff, D-Pasadena, agreed that rail systems have already seen improvement. Jim Berard, Democratic spokeswoman for the House Transportation Committee, said the logistical difficulties in protecting subways and train stations is a top reason for congressional inaction. "Can you imagine having to have a magnetometer at every bus stop?" he said. "To that extent, it's one reason why we haven't tackled it. It's just so daunting."

Funding is focused on highways, which makes Rail Road infrastructure unpopular

Longman, 2009 – Senior research fellow with New America Foundation, Schwartz senior fellow at Washington Monthly, senior writer and deputy assistant managing editor at U.S. News & World Report, graduate of Oberlin College, fellow at Columbia University (Phillip, “Back on Tracks”, The Washington Monthly, January/February 2009, <http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2009/back_tracks_9914>), KB

Yet despite this astounding potential, virtually no one in Washington is talking about investing any of that $1 trillion in freight rail capacity. Instead, almost all the talk out of the Obama camp and Congress has been about spending for roads and highway bridges, projects made necessary in large measure by America's over reliance on pavement-smashing, traffic-snarling, fossil-fuel-guzzling trucks for the bulk of its domestic freight transport. This could be an epic mistake. Just as the Interstate Highway System changed, for better and for worse, the economy and the landscape of America, so too will the investment decisions Washington is about to make. The choice of infrastructure projects is de facto industrial policy; it's also de facto energy, land use, housing, and environmental policy, with implications for nearly every aspect of American life going far into the future. On the door step of an era of infrastructure spending unparalleled in the past half century, we need to conceive of a transportation future in which each mode of transport is put to its most sensible use, deployed collaboratively instead of competitively. To see what that future could look like, however, we need to look first at the past.

Tradeoff Link

Funding for rail security trades off with other priorities, and security doesn’t solve

Peterman 06

David Randall Peterman, Analyst in transportation resources, science, and industry division, January 20, 2006, “Passenger Rail Security: Overview of Issues, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32625.pdf>, KB”

Security efforts involve tradeoffs in money and time. One key policy issue is where to strike the balance between the desire for security and the efficient operation of the rail systems; another is striking the balance between the cost of security efforts in passenger rail and other federal priorities, including security efforts in other areas. Some observers, noting that the number of potential terrorist targets in the United States — such as passenger rail trains — is virtually limitless, question the value of efforts to make these targets more secure. They argue that many such efforts are not cost-effective, given that if one set of targets — for example, trains — is made more secure, terrorists might simply shift to softer targets such as buses or shopping malls. Moreover, these security efforts impose a variety of costs on the public, in money, time, inconvenience, and limitations on personal freedoms. These observers argue that a more effective strategy is to increase funding for efforts to disrupt the terrorist groups that are the source of these threats (e.g., funding for intelligence and law enforcement agencies) and for efforts to respond to any attacks (e.g., funding for first responders). Others argue — though rarely in print — that the government and other entities should take visible actions intended to increase the security of people’s daily activities even if the value of those actions is uncertain, because it is important for Americans’ sense of security that the federal government and other organizations be perceived as doing something to make them safer. But such actions involve tradeoffs too, and one of the trade-offs is that resources may be applied to activities with limited security value that might otherwise be applied to activities with greater security value.

\*\*\*CP Solvency\*\*\*

Privatization CP Solvency

Railroads are privately owned now – means private corporations solve best

Association of American Railroads 08

(Association of American Railroads, May 2008, “Overview of America’s Freight Railroads,” <http://www.aar.org/PubCommon/Documents/AboutTheIndustry/Overview.pdf>, KB )

The overwhelming majority of U.S. freight railroads, including Class I railroad and all but one regional railroad, are privately owned and operated. Major U.S. freight railroads receive relatively little government funding. Contrast, U.S. passenger railroads, and both passenger and freight, heavily subsidize railroads in nearly every other country.

States CP Solvency

States should fund rail security – federal government already considers it a responsibility of the state

Peterman 06

David Randall Peterman, Analyst in transportation resources, science, and industry division, January 20, 2006, “Passenger Rail Security: Overview of Issues, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32625.pdf>, KB”

The ability of the passenger rail community to fund desired security improvements out of its own resources is limited: both the transit industry and Amtrak operate at a deficit and require government assistance to cover their costs. However transit agencies also receive a significant amount of funding from local and state governments. One issue is whether the federal government should have the primary responsibility for funding security improvements for transit agencies, or whether that responsibility should be shared with local and state governments. The federal government has generally considered security a responsibility of the transit agency and the local community. Advocates of federal responsibility for security funding argue that, since the greatest current concern is chiefly about attacks from foreign terrorists, the federal government should bear responsibility for providing security funding in its role of providing national defense. Also, they argue that the economic difficulties faced by state and local governments limit their ability to assist transit agencies with additional security funding. Advocates of a local responsibility for funding security improvements argue that the federal government is exercising its national defense responsibility through funding national defense efforts, that taxpayers all over the country should not be required to pay for security improvements to a relatively small number of transit agencies located in large metropolitan areas, and that since local and state governments are concerned with the security of the metropolitan areas in which these transit agencies operate, it makes sense for these governments to be involved in securing the transit agencies as well. Moreover, many of the security measures that passenger rail organizations may employ have other benefits to the systems, often in reducing other types of threat to passengers (for example, from ordinary criminal activity and accidents) that are considered to be chiefly local responsibilities. Finally, having the local community take responsibility for funding the security improvements can help in evaluating the cost-effectiveness of proposed security improvements, as the local community would have the opportunity to decide what security improvements seem worth paying for.

Miscellaneous CP solvency

Funding for efforts to target terrorists at the source solve better

Peterman 06

David Randall Peterman, Analyst in transportation resources, science, and industry division, January 20, 2006, “Passenger Rail Security: Overview of Issues, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32625.pdf>, KB”

Security efforts involve tradeoffs in money and time. One key policy issue is where to strike the balance between the desire for security and the efficient operation of the rail systems; another is striking the balance between the cost of security efforts in passenger rail and other federal priorities, including security efforts in other areas. Some observers, noting that the number of potential terrorist targets in the United States — such as passenger rail trains — is virtually limitless, question the value of efforts to make these targets more secure. They argue that many such efforts are not cost-effective, given that if one set of targets — for example, trains — is made more secure, terrorists might simply shift to softer targets such as buses or shopping malls. Moreover, these security efforts impose a variety of costs on the public, in money, time, inconvenience, and limitations on personal freedoms. These observers argue that a more effective strategy is to increase funding for efforts to disrupt the terrorist groups that are the source of these threats (e.g., funding for intelligence and law enforcement agencies) and for efforts to respond to any attacks (e.g., funding for first responders). Others argue — though rarely in print — that the government and other entities should take visible actions intended to increase the security of people’s daily activities even if the value of those actions is uncertain, because it is important for Americans’ sense of security that the federal government and other organizations be perceived as doing something to make them safer. But such actions involve tradeoffs too, and one of the trade-offs is that resources may be applied to activities with limited security value that might otherwise be applied to activities with greater security value.